VICENTE S. ALMARIO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. 532 SCRA 614 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.

) Courts will not allow one party to enrich himself at the expense of another. On April 28, 1995, Almario, then about 39 years of age and a Boeing 737 (B-737) First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300 (A-300) First Officer. Since said higher position required additional training, he underwent, at PAL‘s expense, more than five months of training consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia. After completing the training course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but after eight months of service as such, he tendered his resignation, for ―personal reasons.‖ Despite a letter coming from PAL to reconsider his resignation otherwise he will bear the cost of training, Mr. Almario still proceeded with his resignation. Later on, PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), for reimbursement of P851,107 worth of training costs, attorney‘s fees equivalent to 20% of the said amount, and costs of litigation. PAL invoked the existence of an innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years. Almario having resigned before the 3year period, PAL prayed that he should be ordered to reimburse the costs for his training. In his Answer, Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have to render service to it for three years after his training failing which he would reimburse the training costs. He pointed out that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilot‘s Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), of which he was a member, carried no such agreement. Mr. Almario‘s contention was confirmed by the RTC but was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA found Almario liable under the CBA between PAL and ALPAP and, in any event, under Article 22 of the Civil Code. Thus, this action for review on Certiorari by Mr. Almario. ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Mr. Almario is in violation of the CBA HELD: Article XXIII, Section 1 of the CBA provides that pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their position and shall not be permitted to occupy any position in the company‘s turbo-jet fleet. The reason why pilots who are 57 years of age are no longer qualified to bid for a higher position is because they have only three (3) years left before the mandatory retirement age of 60 and to send them to training at that age, PAL would no longer be able to recover whatever training expenses it will have to incur.

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Simply put, the foregoing provision clearly and unequivocally recognizes the prohibitive training cost principle such that it will take a period of at least three (3) years before PAL could recover from the training expenses it incurred. Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almario‘s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almario‘s resignation after only eight months of service following the completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.

MANUEL B. ALORIA v. ESTRELLITA B. CLEMENTE 483 SCRA 634 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that status, and the onus cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith. Manuel Aloria learned that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 195684 covering his land and two-storey residential building was canceled. In lieu thereof, TCT No. C-342854 was issued in the name of Estrellita B. Clemente on the basis of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by him and Clemente. Aloria thereafter filed a Complaint against Clemente and the Register of Deeds before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for annulment of the Deed and TCT No. C-342854, reconveyance and damages alleging therein that the Deed was falsified and the signature appearing thereon was not his. In defense, Clemente claimed that she bought the property from Aloria‘s parents-in-law as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. The trial court rendered its decision holding that the Deed of Sale and cancellation of Aloria‘s title were null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that Aloria failed to overcome by clear, strong, and convincing evidence the presumption of regularity. Furthermore, the CA held that Clemente is a purchaser for value in good faith. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding Clemente as a purchaser for value and in good faith HELD: The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that status, and the onus cannot be discharged by mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith. By Clemente‘s account, she purchased the property via Deed of Sale from the Spouses Diego whom she claims showed her a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by Aloria. Given Bernardino Diego‘s denial that his signature in Deed of Sale executed by the Diegos in Clemente‘s favor is his which, as earlier observed, is starkly different from his acknowledged genuine signature, Clemente‘s claim that
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Bernardino Diego signed the Deed of Sale in her presence fails, as does her witness Ernesto Tanigue‘s testimony on the same point. A comparison between her acknowledged signature and the signature appearing above her name in the Deed of Sale reveals no marked differences. The presumption that Clemente's signature in the Deed of Sale is genuine, thus stands. Upon the other hand, as reflected above, Aloria presented clear and convincing evidence that the signature attributed to him in the same document is forged. GELLIA ALTIZO, et al. v. BRYC-V DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 203 SCRA 544 (2006), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J.) Occupation by mere tolerance by a corporation ceases upon transfer of title of the property in favor of another corporation. Sea Foods Corporation Inc. (SFC) was the registered owner of Lot 300 situated in Zamboanga City. It appears that in the early 60s, herein petitioners Gellia Altizo et al. started to occupy a portion of Lot 300. In 1989, Altizo et al., together with other occupants of a portion of of the said land, organized themselves into an association, United Muslim Christian Urban Poor Association, Inc. (UMCUPAI), for the purpose of negotiating the sale of the lands they occupy in their favor. SFC and UMCUPAI subsequently entered into an agreement where SFC signified its intent to sell to UMCUPAI Lot 300 and the latter‘s intention to buy the said lot at a stipulated price. SFC later subdivided Lot 300 into three lots: Lot 300-A, Lot 300-B and Lot 300-C. Lot 300-A was thereafter sold to UMCAPAI. It then sold to BRYC-V Development Corporation (BRYCV) Lot 300-C where Altizo et al. had constructed their houses. Over the objection of UMCUPAI, BRYC-V was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-121523. BRYC-V later asked, verbally and in writing, Altizo et al. to vacate Lot 300-C but they refused. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Altizo et al. has the right of continued possession based on the agreement they entered into with SFC HELD: Altizo et al.‘s occupation of subject lot was on the mere tolerance of the previous owner SFC. Such right to occupy ceased when the SFC sold the subject lot to BRYC-V which has been issued a title thereto, hence, entitled to its possession. Altizo et al. having withheld possession of subject lot, despite BRYCV‘s demand, they have become deforciant occupants. Altizo et al.‘s claim that they can continue to possess the subject lot, they having been granted by the previous owner preferential right to buy Lot 300 under the Letter of Intent, does not lie. No right of possession, which is the only issue in an unlawful detainer case, arises from such Letter of Intent which, as it clearly states, merely signifies intent to, not actually transfer ownership. FELIPE R. ANGELES and GREGORIA ANGELES v. FERMIN TAN, et al. G.R. No. 146678, 29 September 2004, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

At all events. Angeles proceeded with a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA). the CA ordered that the RTC decision has become final and executory. the assailed decision must remain. no reversible error on the part of the CA in dismissing the appeal is appreciated. The records indubitably show that although spouses Angeles‘ Notice of Appeal was filed on time and was given due course by the trial court. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint and the subsequent Motion to Reconsider was likewise denied which prompted a filing of a Notice of Appeal. As pointed out by respondents. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. on its own motion or on that of the appellee.Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines. denied by the CA. Section 1. are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. however. competent and convincing proof as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity and nullity of spouses Tan‘s documentary evidence consisting of public instruments and Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Spouses Felipe and Gregoria Angeles filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against Spouses Fermin and Teresita Tan. ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Angeles right to due process was violated by the outright dismissal of the case without full dress trial on the merit HELD: On procedural grounds alone. Spouses Angeles‘ petition for review was. Spouses Angeles‘ brief was filed beyond the reglementary period. due to the procedural infirmity in the filing of the Petition for Review. Absent then any clear. On the merits. for the reasons advanced by the CA. among others. Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure reads that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals. the records show there was a full dress trial on the merits before the motion to dismiss was granted. Spouses Angeles‘ contention that they were denied due process does not lie. hence. they were deemed to have abandoned the appeal. but on the ground that petitioners failed to discharge the onus of proving their allegation that respondents fraudulently caused the transfer to them of the title of the disputed property. not however. Like the CA then. However during the pendency of the Notice of Appeal. the Court found no reason to order the remand of the case. on the ground of failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules. no explanation for which was even offered. the petition fails just the same. The complaint involves the return of a parcel of land originally owned by the former which was mortgaged to a certain Prudencio Reyes who subsequently sold the same to spouses Tan after the redemption period expired without any redemption having been made by Angeles. The records show that hearings were conducted on spouses Tan‘s motion to dismiss during which both parties were given the opportunity to present evidence. they subsequently filed a Petition for Review before the CA. However.

Padigos et. Sr. lost the right of action to the property by laches . A parcel of land (the lot) located in Cebu was registered in the name of thirteen (13) co-owners to which Maximo Padigos. following Section 44. appealed. al also alleged that even if Padigos et al’s claim over the land is valid. v. Bacalso et. Sr. heirs of Alipio Bacalso Sr. recovery of possession. et al. no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. In their answer. and damages.al’s action for quieting of title. only failed to register the land to his name but subsequently occupied the land and passed it on to his heirs. While. ISSUE: Whether or not Padigos et. declaration of nullity of documents. alleged that Rosendo Bacalso et al. or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law.official entries in the Register of Deeds. Bacalso et. 552 SCRA 185 (2008).the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. al. ROSENDO BACALSO. Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides that ―entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines. et al. SECOND DIVISION. by express provision of law. al. J. the action to recover is barred by laches since Padigos et al did not claim the land at the earliest possible time. for quieting of title.’s claim is barred by laches HELD: Having failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence. Padigos et al. and damages must fail. Padigos et. (Alipio. secured a fraudulent Tax Declaration covering the disputed potions of the lot without any legal basis. al.). The Court of Appeals found the deed of sale valid Bacalso et. et al are all heirs. MAXIMO PADIGOS. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint against Bacalso et al. Sr. declaration of nullity of documents. warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. al. recover of possession. the assailed decision must remain‖. it is Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . RTC ruled in favor of Padigos et. claimed that their father Alipio.al. al ’s property and also cited laches as a means of loosing of a right over the property. al. After trial.. bought shares corresponding to some of the 13 co-owners via deed of sale decades ago. are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Alipio.) It is an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches Padigos et. Bacalso et. Rosendo Bacalso et al occupied the disputed land for a couple of decades in which they turned it into farmland. (Carpio-Morales.

(CARPIO MORALES J. Sr. renewable for 9 years at the option of Banco Filipino. Bacalso et. and that starting September 1992. The majority of the stockholders of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank agreed to form a corporation known as the Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala) to which some of Banco Filipino‘s existing branch sites could be unloaded. at a monthly rental rate.) If the parties are in pari delicto. Tala‘s director. the contract had been extended on a monthly basis under different terms and conditions including the monthly lease rental. Palma. no affirmative relief must be given to one against the other. by continuing to pay the taxes thereon. The contract required Banco Filipino to pay a certain amount as security deposit to secure its faithful compliance with its obligations. Upon the other hand. Elizabeth H. the parties executed another lease contract which modified the previous lease contract. or for any damage that may be sustained by Tala on account of any breach or default on the part of Banco Filipino. and the latter would simultaneously lease them back to it. THIRD DIVISION. had declared in his name for tax purposes as early as 1960. San Fernando. TALA REALTY SERVICES CORPORATION 503 SCRA 631 (2006). sell and/or alienate the property. Tala noted. More than 11 years after the execution of the contract of lease. it demanded that it vacate the property and pay the unpaid rentals. The second lease contract shortened the term of the lease to 11 years. and for which he had been paying taxes until his death in 1994. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v. Banco Filipino executed in favor of Tala a Deed of Absolute Sale transferring to it one of its branch sites located at Poblacion. dispose. The arrangement was that Banco Filipino would transfer some of its existing branch sites to Tala.an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of laches. ISSUE: Whether or not Banco Filipino is required to pay Tala the unpaid rental fees during the time when the Bank was declared to have been arbitrarily closed Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Tala subsequently notified Banco Filipino that the lease contract would no longer be renewed. which their predecessor-in-interest Alipio. sent Banco Filipino a letter informing it that the lease contract had expired as of August 1992. hence. On even date. to answer for any damage to the property. Tala in turn leased the property to Banco Filipino for a period of 20-years. al have been vigilant in protecting their rights over the lot. The contract further required Banco Filipino to pay Tala a certain amount as advance rentals for the 11 th to the 20th years of the lease. Tala was free to lease. renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino. however. Tala claims that on that same day. that as Banco Filipino had failed to take any definite action towards the renewal of the contract. La Union (the property) at the agreed purchase price.

with the consent of his wife Socorro. It appears that a Deed on Absolute Sale was subsequently executed involving the same property. claims that the executed Deed was actually a third amendment to the mortgage and that he had already paid in full their principal indebtedness. but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price. neither will obtain relief from the court as the one who seeks equity and justice must come to court with clean hands. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case. J. executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Jose V. Bello over their real property as security for a loan extended by Jose to Nelson. the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. The said mortgage was amended twice increasing the amount of the loan. the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. Socorro filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the sale for making it appear that she consented to the absolute sale. ISSUE: Whether or not the parties intended the deed of absolute sale to be merely an equitable mortgage HELD: Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates instances when a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage. as mortgagor. Bello contends that the sale was personally and voluntarily executed by Spouses Banga before the notary public and that the consideration of the sale is fair and reasonable because it is also based on the real estate mortgage and its amendments. The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further collect rent from the Bank. Thus. the law. SOCORRO TAOPO BANGA v. Socorro questions the unconscionably low consideration for the sale of the property. thus. The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto. the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Nelson Banga." This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. The clean hands doctrine will not allow the creation nor the use of a juridical relation such as a trust to subvert. Also.) It is the intention of the parties and not the terminology used in the contract that determines whether a deed of absolute sale in form is an equitable mortgage. SPOUSES JOSE AND EMELINE BELLO 471 SCRA 653 (2005). directly or indirectly.HELD: Clearly. Some of these cases are: (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . on the other hand. Neither the Bank nor Tala came to court with clean hands. no affirmative relief should be given to one against the other. Nelson. "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‗clean hands‘ doctrine. Thus. while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties.

ALLEGRIA BAUTISTA. and five children namely: Teofilo. J.80 square meter parcel of land (the property) in Pangasinan. Isidro and four of his five children. Teofilo. executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition of the property where Isidro waived his share in favor of his four children. In fact. Also. It has been observed by the Trial Court that the Deed of Absolute Sale was prepared in 1987. conduct. in the acknowledgement portion of the 1989 Deed of Absolute Sale whereon the phrase ―Series of 1987‖ appears. as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances. together with the circumstances mentioned above. later sold ½ of the property in favor of Cesar Tamondong. sold the ½ of the property they have acquired to Pacita and her commonlaw husband Pedro Tandoc. (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . which this Court takes as a clear design to make it appear that it was notarized in 1989. (3) In any other cases where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall ensure the payment of a debt or the performance of an obligation. such as the relative situation of the parties at that time. the attitude. represented by FRANCISCO MUÑOZ. the negotiations between them leading to the deed. Pacita. In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage. the court is not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. it confers no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. Gil. et al. Article 1604 of the Civil Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. draws the Supreme Court to affirm the trial court's ruling that the deed of absolute sale was executed to serve as additional security for the loan extended to Nelson.) Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid. Pacita. Revealing the true intention of the parties is the undisputed relationship of Nelson and the Bello spouses as debtor and creditors respectively. Alegria and Angelica (Teofilo not included). Pacita. and Gil Bautista. Alegria and Angelica. acts. and generally. She died intestate leaving the said property behind to her spouse Isidro Bautista. which. Pedro‘s nephew via Deed of Absolute Sale. the same year that the original deed of real estate mortgage was executed. Later on. Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.unusually inadequate. The decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties. Alegria. Angelica. During her lifetime. with Pedro‘s consent. Such is because the residence certificate numbers issued to the parties in 1987 appearing in the real estate mortgage of 1987 are the same as those appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed in 1989. by Deed of Absolute Sale. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. the number ―9‖ was superimposed on the number ―7‖. declarations of the parties. Attorney-in-Fact v. then filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court against his siblings claiming that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the Deed of Sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar was fictitious because she was already seriously ill that time. TEOFILO BAUTISTA. represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Francisco Muñoz. 529 SCRA 187 (2007).

000. MICC sold part of the mortgage land to Spouses Rodrigo and Sonia Paderes. As previously held by this Court in Segura v. the subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro. ―no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Consequently.‖ As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs. J. ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo Bautista‘s co-heirs is valid HELD: The Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust. On appeal by Tandoc and Tamondong. this Petition for Review on Certiorari. it transmitted no rights to Teofilo‘s co-heirs. Thus. Segura.885. conferring no rights upon the transferees under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. The same was registered in the Registry of Deeds. the action to have it annulled does not prescribe. SPOUSES ISABELO BERGADO and JUANA HERMINIA BERGARDO v. the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision and dismissed Teofilo‘s complaint on the ground of prescription. For failure of MICC to settle its obligation. CARLOTA P. by mortgaging its 21 properties including its improvements. THE COURT OF APPEALS. The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo‘s co-heirs was invalid. hence. it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years. Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid. Manila International Construction Corporation (MICC) secured a loan of 1. Banco Filipino won the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Banco Filipino filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of MICC‘s mortgage.The RTC ruled in favor of Teofilo declaring null and void and no force and effect the documents mentioned. as well as the transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid. The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid. then another part to Spouses Isabelo and Juana Bergado.) A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance constituted on the purchased thing. HON. in her capacity as the Liquidator of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank 463 SCRA 504 (2005).00 to Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). VALENZUELA. Subsequently. however. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Teofilo.

The RTC granted the petition. growing fruits. or in virtue of expropriation for public use. 1984. it does not lie. cited by Bergado et al. the approval of the corresponding bond. were ordered to vacate the premises. to the improvements. a real right or lien in favor of Banco Filipino had already been established. As such. the record clearly shows that Bergado et al purchased their respective houses from MICC. whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor. Consequently. 1983 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9. if filed before the lapse of the redemption period. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Pursuant to the Writ of Possession. Here.‘s claim that their houses should have been excluded from the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. Respecting Bergado et al. there is no question that they were also covered by MICC‘s real estate mortgage following the terms of its contract with Banco Filipino and Article 2127 of the Civil Code the mortgage extends to the natural accessions. However. The provision of Article 448 of the Civil Code.bidding. in good faith. ISSUE: Whether or not the Bergado et al. which pertain to those who. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRY DECREE). a certificate of sale was issued and the same was registered with the Registry of Deeds. and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged. and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due. Spouses Bergado et al. amplifications and limitations established by law. this petition. Being improvements on the subject properties constructed by mortgagor MICC. mistakenly build. The writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and.D. The established doctrine that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function whereby the issuing court exercises neither discretion nor judgment bears reiterating. under Articles 1312 and 2126 of the Civil Code. has no application to the case at bar. The purchases took place after MICC‘s mortgage to Banco Filipino had been registered in accordance with Article 2125 of the Civil Code and the provisions of P. CA rendered decision against the Bergado et al. Banco Filipino thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court Makati a petition for issuance of writ of possession. with the declarations.’s purchased their properties from MICC in good faith is of no moment. Hence. or it passes into the hands of a third person. subsisting over the properties until the discharge of the principal obligation. have superior rights over Banco Filipino HELD: That Bergado et al. and upheld the writ of possession. they filed an action to Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the validity of writ of possession. whoever the possessor(s) of the land might be. plant or sow on the land of another. as evidenced by the Addendum to Deed of Sale dated October 1.

remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. prompting BPI to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.) A writ of possession. BPI. hence. on the other hand. The RTC ordered the suspension of issuance of writ of possession.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Spouses Tarampi alleging therein that a writ cannot be issued on the ground that there is a pending action concerning the validity of the mortgages. BPI was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. A new TCT was issued in favor of BPI. (Carpio Morales. the Court of Appeals. HOMOBONO AND LUZDELDIA TARAMPI 574 SCRA 537 (2008). BPI executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. Spouses Tarampi filed an action for annulment of the real estate mortgages. The same was registered and annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the said parcel of land. During the auction. it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. Since the one-year redemption period expired without Spouses Tarampi redeeming the mortgage. In the meantime. ownership of the property covered thereby was consolidated in the name of BPI who had in fact been issued a new TCT. Spouses Homobono and Lusdeldia Tarampi (Spouses Tarampi) obtained loans from the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). SECOND DIVISION. unless annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. following the debtor-mortgagor‘s failure to redeem the mortgages. which were secured by real estate mortgages over a parcel of land. Spouses Tarampi failed to comply with their obligation. Spouses Tarampi failed to redeem the mortgages within the reglementary period. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . SPS. J. held that since BPI is now the registered owner of the property. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the case for annulment of mortgages HELD: In the case at bar. On appeal. filed a Petition for Writ of Possession over the property including all improvements thereon which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Issuance of a writ of possession thus became a ministerial duty of the court. and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgages or their foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title in the buyer‘s name.

The same is true with its implementation. just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself. the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. 509 SCRA 444 (2006). on the other hand. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . While Elbambuena and Olar‘s petition was pending before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). the presumption is that public officers adhered to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. Nueva Ecija a petition for cancellation of the CLOA issued to Olar. J. on the ground that they are the new farmer-beneficiaries as shown by. FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA et al. respectively. When Olar died. otherwise. the "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar. PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners Capitle. the writ will be a useless paper judgment – a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. such possession being founded on the right of ownership. A ―Pinagsamang Patunay‖ certifying that they are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot was likewise presened. he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title. wherein he acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot with petitioners Capitle. among other things. until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. SPOUSES ILUMINADA and CIRILO CAPITLE v. respondents Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda Olar. and that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered to Fortunata. the Court has disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for review. The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay. Spouses Iluminada and Cirilo Capitle. The appellate court affirmed in toto the DARAB decision. The DARAB set aside PARAD‘s decision. (Carpio Morales. Clearly then. a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name was issued. To stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession.It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. the law further provides that the debtor-mortgagor may petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled in the proceedings in which possession was requested. and the court‘s decision thereon may be appealed by either party. To underscore this mandate. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal Olar covering a parcel of agricultural land situated in Nueva Ecija.) Absent evidence to the contrary. Elbambuena and Olar appealed the decision to the DARAB. Consequently. petitioners Capitle filed before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO). claim that they have been in possession of the lot since 1960 and presented a "Waiver of Rights" executed by Olar. THIRD DIVISION. claim that Olar relinquished one-half of the lot in favour of Rosalinda. As such. spouse and daughterin-law.

the law emphatically prohibits the sale of properties between spouses. MARIA B. JR. the presumption that the public officers who issued the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties. ISSUES: Whether or not the contract of sale and TCT No. thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller. or in the absence thereof. including adhering to the provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which provides that lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay. they having merely "helped" in tilling the lot. praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of transfer certificate and the issuance of a new one. 138405. was null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . They further contend that it was after their father‘s death that they found out that a contract of sale involving the same property has been executed by their father and common-law wife Ching.) In line with the policy of the State. in favor of the Maria Ching. Goyanko et al. aver that they are the real owners of the property involved. landless residents of the same municipality in the order of priority provided. The RTC dismissed the complaint against Ching. Ching claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided its purchase price." is a virtual admission that their possession was not in the concept of owners. CHING v..ISSUES: Whether or not the presumption that the CLOA was issued to Olar in the regular course of official function was overcome by contrary evidence HELD: Petitioners Capitle‘ argument that "it would be absurd for Olar to bequeath his property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling the property and took good care of his needs. GOYANKO. declaring that there is no valid and sufficient ground to declare the sale as null and void. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed of sale and TCT No. et al. Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. fictitious and simulated. 506 SCRA 735 (2006). JOSEPH C. J. On appeal. THIRD DIVISION. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against Maria Ching. However. 138405. Absent evidence to the contrary. (Carpio-Morales.

(Carpio Morales.S. Cordero‘s refusal to execute the final contract of sale was due to the willingness of another buyer to pay a higher price. Moreover. entered into a contract to sell with respondent F. MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 506 SCRA 451 (2006). to defendant-appellant Maria Ching. F. finding in favor of Cordero et al. and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-appellant Maria Ching. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and denied their motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued its decision. and that consequently entitled to rescind the contract to sell as well as demand the payment of damages. FSMDC. DARREL CORDERO. Cordero sent FSMDC a demand letter. there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. The purported sale. having been made by Joseph Sr. It was Cordero who prevented FSMDC from complying with its obligation to pay in full by refusing to execute the final contract of sale unless additional payment of legal interest is made. while this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary. No further payments were made thereafter. the court find no evidence on record to conclude otherwise. Management and Development Corporation (FSMDC) over five (5) parcels of land located in Batangas.S. in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of her co-petitioners. FSMDC likewise demanded the payment for actual damages suffered due to loss of income. a basic social institution which public policy vigilantly protects. FSMDC paid earnest money.The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a valid marriage between Joseph Sr. have in fact been living together as common-law husband and wife. Cordero thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a complaint for rescission of contract with damages alleging FSMDC failed to comply with its obligations under the contract to sell. still the court cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph. on the other hand. in favor of his concubine. THIRD DIVISION.) effect. The record shows that while Joseph Sr. revoking the contract to sell and treating the payments already made as payment for damages suffered. The court therefore finds the contract of sale in favor of the defendant-appellant Maria Ching null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy. Moreover. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko. alleged that Cordero has no cause of action considering that they were the first to violate the contract to sell. Sr. undermines the stability of the family. et al. is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. J. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the contract. ISSUE: Whether or not contract to sell may be subject to rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and ordered FSMDC to pay damages and attorney‘s fees. v. It is therefore undeniable that the property located at Cebu City belongs to the conjugal partnership. Assuming that the subject property was not conjugal. Non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition in a contract of sale renders the latter ineffective and without force and Belen Cordero. there being overwhelming evidence on records that they have been living together as common-law husband and wife.

CORINTHIAN REALTY. did not arise because of the failure of FSMDC to fully pay the purchase price. Article 1191 of the Civil Code would have no application. ISSUE: 1. et al. Teofilo Guinto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.) A co-owner who sells the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners does not render the sale null and void. rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. as stipulated. HON. Delfin and the Heirs of de Leon did not affix their signature in the said instrument although their names appeared therein. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code will not apply because it presupposes an obligation already extant. A parcel of land situated in Las Pinas is co-owned by Emilio Martin and Matilde Martin (Martins) together with private respondent Delfin Guinto (Delfin). to sell and deliver the title to the property.HELD: Under a contract to sell. The Martins and Guintos entered into a Deed of Conditional Sale with Corinthian Realty Inc. Hence. There can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existing. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. The sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. However. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the payment of the purchase price is a suspensive condition to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The parties stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. which is a suspensive condition to the obligation of the Cordero et al. The non-payment of the purchase price renders the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. The non-fulfillment by the FSMDC of his obligation to pay. COURT OF APPEALS. INC. hence Petitioner Corinthian cannot file an action for specific performance Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Corinthian paid several amounts to Martins and Guintos. Since the obligation of Cordero et al. The Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) dismissed the complaint concluding that it was Corinthian who violated the deed. v. the suspensive condition not having happened. The action for specific performance was filed by Corinthian against the Martins and Guintos for not executing a Deed of Absolute Sale. 394 SCRA 260 (2002). Before the execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale. the filing of this petition. Corinthian however failed to pay the balance of the purchase price within ninety (90) days. (Corinthian). The full payment is a positive suspensive condition. Prudencio Guinto and Margarita Guinto (Guintos) and the heirs of Spouses Tomas de Leon and Francisca Medina (Heirs of de Leon). J. the seller retains title to the thing to be sold until the purchaser fully pays the agreed purchase price. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Deed of Conditional Sale was entered into with the co-owners individually 2. the non-fulfillment of which is not a breach of contract but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser.

the ownership was transferred to his wife.HELD: First Issue: Deed of Conditional Sale was entered into Individually A co-owner has the right to sell his undivided share. Petitioner de la Paz Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . MAFODECO sent a letter to de la Paz demanding him to pay Seventy Eight Thousand (P78. The transferee gets only what his transferor would have been entitled to after partition. where one of the parties to a contract does not perform the undertaking which he is bound by its terms. It was found out that the real owner was Bayani Vergara who only allowed MAFODECO to use the property as its office for free. he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party. de Guzman and Severina entered into an ―Agreement on Advance Rental‖ and agreed to split the rental payments of de la Paz between Severina and MAFODECO. Second Issue: Payment of the Purchase Price as a Suspensive Condition Corinthian‘s contention that its obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price within 90 days was not a condition precedent to the execution by private respondent Martins and Guintos of the Deed of Absolute Sale is bereft of merit. the sale is not null and void. This is because under Article 493 of the New Civil Code. Only the rights of the coowner-seller are transferred. Upun the demise of Vergara. only the proindiviso shares in the property of the co-owners – signatories Martins and Guintos to the deed were affected by the deed. DE LA PAZ v. GILBERT T. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his.) The Court cannot allow unjust enrichment on the part of one party and unjust poverty on the part of another. the obligation of private respondent Martins and Guintos to execute a deed of absolute sale had not arisen. This Court does not find any mistake on the part of the appellate court. operator of a water-refilling station for a period of one year. If he sells the entire property without obtaining the consent of the other co-owners. Furthermore. 587 SCRA 319 (2009). De la Paz. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Severina later decided to discontinue the split rental arrangement and entered into a lease contract with de la Paz. 000) Pesos for his rent and to vacate the property within five days. J. de la Paz (de la Paz). The deed could not be any clearer on the matter – Petitioner Corinthian‘s compliance with its obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price was a condition precedent to the execution by private respondent Martins and Guintos of an absolute sale. thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. Since it failed to comply with such obligation. the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. Indeed. Marikina Footwear Development Cooperative. INC. the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. MARIKINA FOOTWEAR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATIVE. leased a space to Gilbert T. Severina. That Petitioner Corinthian paid specific amounts of money to the co-ownersprivate respondents-signatories Martins and Guintos to the deed and even had said -deed notarized inspite of the absence of the signatures of private respondent Delfin and Heirs bars the claim of petitioner Corinthian that it dealt with the co-owners of the property collectively. Inc (MAFODECO) represented by its chairman Rodolfo de Guzman (de Guzman).

to two different persons. SUSAN D. Degollacion allegedly learned that a portion of TCT T-96010 was covered by TCT T-26877 issued in the name of Pilar Development Corporation (Pilar Development). absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration. 500 SCRA 108 (2006). under the circumstances. He further alleged that MAFODECO has no cause of action against him because he already have a contract of lease with Severina. Degollacion purchased from Antonio Dizon two parcels of land situated at Dasmariñas. 26796. When MAFODECO filed on February 11. this petition. the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title in dispute were derived. as the title itself says. To allow de la Paz. it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail.refused to comply with the demand prompting MAFODECO to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner before Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina City. even if both are presumed to be title holders in good faith. would constitute unjust enrichment in favor of MAFODECO and cause unjust poverty to de la Paz. et al. Hence. for the same parcel of land. On appeal. MAFODECO made such false declaration of ownership to make it appear that it had the right to lease the property to de la Paz. T-96011 and TCT No.) Where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates. the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail. as ordered by the MeTC and affirmed by both the RTC and Court of Appeals. 2002 the complaint for unlawful detainer against de la Paz. attached a document entitled ―Pahintulot Sa Paghahanap-buhay. MALFODECO alleged that it is ―the OWNER and LESSOR‖ of the property ―under a verbal lease‖ which was denied by the de la Paz. Susan D. ISSUE: Whether or not MAFODECO can demand payment of rentals from de la Paz and demand him to vacate the property HELD: MAFODECO. Bayani‘s act of tolerance in favor of MAFODECO had automatically ceased with his demise. Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAVITE. T-20726 and TCT No. DEGOLLACION v. to vacate the property and pay MAFODECO rentals until the property shall have been vacated. THIRD DIVISION (CARPIO-MORALES J. On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual issuance of subject transfer certificates of title. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 1993. de la Paz‘s existing lease contract with Severina notwithstanding. in misrepresenting in its complaint for unlawful detainer that it is ―the OWNER‖ of the property. Dizon‘s titles were accordingly cancelled and TCT No. T-96019 were issued in the name of Degollacion. Should there be only one common original certificate of title. is simply a permit or authority to engage in business. The Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of MAFODECO which was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Marikina.‖ which document. She thereafter instituted a Complaint for Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title with Damages and Prayer for a Temporary Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Apparently. it could not also have anchored its right to lease the property on the "tolerance" of its previous owner Bayani who had died more than 11 years earlier or on October 16.

3. by her claim. Degollacion claimed that the title of the corporation. was derived from spurious sources. The trial court also held that it could be possible that it was Degollacion‘s documents that were derived from spurious sources. Later on however. That Degolacion lost the Deed of Sale in her favor covering Lot 5766-B. 1967. did not preclude her from procuring a certified true copy of the deed from the Register of Deeds. Hence.Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Register of Deeds of Cavite and Pilar Development with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. from which deed material or relevant facts decisive of the case could be gathered. she merely declared that she could not produce the original of the corporation‘s title as it was. which was issued on November 8. without bad faith on the part of the offeror. no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. or Dizon failing which she then could have presented any of them to testify thereon in light of the following pertinent provisions of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: SEC. The trial court dismissed Degollacion‘s complaint on the ground that the latter failed to prove through evidence that the documents of Pilar Development were derived from spurious sources. the present petition relying heavily on the statements of the Land Registration Authority Administrator and arguing that Pilar Development‘s Transfer Certificate of Titles were spuriously produced. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Basa of the Investigation Division of the LRA for investigation. taken by a certain Atty. whether wholly or partly. ISSUE: Whether or not the Degollacion has satisfactorily proved that the Transfer Certificate of Titles of Pilar Development Corporation came from spurious sources HELD: Where two certificates of title purport to include the same land. Respecting the testimony of Degollacion‘s witness Melanie Victoria. and that the photocopy she brought along with her was handed to her by the vault-keeper. the Court of Appeals ruled on the contrary. exceptions. Original document must be produced. or the notary public. except in the following cases: (a)When the original has been lost or destroyed. Degollacion appealed to the Court of Appeals heavily relying on her witnesses and on the statement of then Land Registration Authority Administrator saying that her Transfer Certificate of Titles were regularly issued and her tax payments are up to date. the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. ─ When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. or cannot be produced in court.

and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. failed to settle the same. xxx SEC. were attached thereto as Annexes ―G‘ and ―H. ABILLA v. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. ─ When the original document has been lost or destroyed. Gerarda A. the offeror. When original document is unavailable. xxx SEC. its contents may be proved by a certified true copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. SPS. CARLOS AND THERESITA GOBONSENG 577 SCRA 401 (2009). however. or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. 7. J. (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole. xxx While Degollacion alleged in her complaint that the alleged spurious titles of the above-named Cristina Caro and Leonilo and Roberto Javier from which the Pilar Development‘s title was allegedly derived. and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. despite the order of the trial court.00). Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. 000. 5. Dizon-Abilla and the Heirs of Ronaldo P. Susan in fact failed to furnish copies the annexes to her complaint including Annexes ―G‖ and ―H‖ to the corporation.b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered. Abilla extended to Spouses Carlos and Theresita Gobonseng a loan in the amount of Five Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P550. They then executed a ―Deed of Sale‖ covering Seventeen (17) lots in favor of Dizon-Abilla and Heirs of Abilla. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .) A litigant whose rights have been adjudicated by a final judgment does not have unbridled license to litigate for another try. GERARDA A. The Deed provides an option to buy the lots within six (6) months in favor of Spouses Gobonseng which they failed to exercise.‖ respectively. or cannot be produced in court. upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part. Spouses Gobonseng. DIZON-ABILLA and the HEIRS OF RONALDO P. nowhere in the records could the same be found. or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document. As reflected earlier. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. may prove its contents by a copy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to consider the case closed and terminated HELD: The amount tendered by Spouses Domonseng. J. et al. but once a litigant‘s right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court. unscrupulous litigations would multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. Villaner later claims that the document he signed was a document captioned ―Lease Contract. The Supreme Court denied their petition. Villaner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the property for annulment of the deeds of sale. The appellate court ruled that the case has already been closed and terminated. he executed a deed conveying the same parcel of land in favor of petitioner Leonardo Acabal (Leonardo). Every litigation must necessarily come to an end. LEONARDO ACABAL.‖ wherein he leased for the property for 3 years to Leonardo. respondent Villaner Acabal (Villaner). the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision. he should not be granted an unbridled license to go back for another try. et al. When he became a widower. The case was raffled to a new judge which ordered the release of the deposited money as payment for the repurchase. the correctness of which had already been passed upon by the appellate court. However. has been determined with finality. On appeal. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Dizon-Abilla and Heirs of Abilla filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the trial court‘s decision allowing Spouses Gobonseng‘s repurchase. Nineteen (19) days after the decision of the CA became final.) Mere inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one of sale. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Gobonseng which was affirmed by the CA. Villaner was then married to Justiniana Lipajan. if endless litigations were to be encouraged. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasbas executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land in favor of their son.Dizon-Abilla and Heir of Abilla filed a case of specific performance and damages for the expenses attendant to the ―Preparation and Registration‖ of the Deed of Sale. For. 454 SCRA 555 (2005). but was denied. VILLANER ACABAL. The RTC of Dumaguete City ruled the option to buy was null and void. Dizon-Abilla and Heirs of Abilla subsequently filed another case to the trial court asserting that they are entitled to 2% monthly interest. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. v. Access to courts is guaranteed. an ―Urgent Motion to Repurchase‖ was filed to the trial court by Spouses Gobonseng alleging that they made a tender of payment to RCBC Dumaguete Branch.

Even. v. which the application he followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his possession was ―disturbed‖ by the heirs.000. On appeal. The heirs thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City a complaint for quieting of title. Inadequacy of price must be proven because mere speculation or conjecture has no place in our judicial system. that Villaner failed to present evidence on the fair market value of the property as of April 19. J.The RTC ruled in favor of Acabal and dismissed the complaint. mere inadequacy of the price per se will not rule out the transaction as one of sale. the lot ceased to be part of the public domain as it become private property. The subject lot was acquired by the heirs through a cadastral proceeding. however. ISSUE: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the date of execution of the disputed deed. ISSUE: Whether or not the deed executed by respondent Villaner in favor of petitioner Leonardo is a Deed of Absolute Sale. the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was issued in the name of Calimpong. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs. The respondent heirs of Gumelas learned that the lot was being occupied by petitioner Calimpong. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. it cannot be concluded that the price at which it was sold was inadequate. Subsequently.) The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over the lot. 1990. ANECITO CALIMPONG et al. It concluded that the free patent and the title issued to Calimpong were null and void. on the assumption that the price of P10. HEIRS OF FILOMENA GUMELA 486 SCRA 441 (2006). Absent any evidence of the fair market value of a land as of the time of its sale. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. with prayer for preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife. The heirs of Gumelas (heirs) decreed ―the owners in fee simple‖ of a lot located in Zamboanga Del Norte without certificate of title was issued and registered in their names. damages. The Court of Appeals (CA) however reversed the decision of RTC and held that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Villaner in favor of Leonardo was simulated and fictitious. It held that the title of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to the predecessors-in-interest by the government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant. HELD: It bears noting. however.00 was below the fair market value of the property in 1990. For the price must be grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience such that the mind revolts at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly be likely to consent to it.

Land held in freehold or fee title. the President of the Philippines or his alter ego. the latter not being the one who mortgaged the vehicle. Soledad refused to reimburse. Under a "car-swapping" scheme. 09721093961 issued on August 17. and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions of the text thereof. the Director of Lands. drawing Ang to file for consecutive complaints for damages against Soledad before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Ang paid BA Finance. ANG v. to pay the mortgage debt constituted thereon. despite repeated demands. 1993 by the PENRO of Zamboanga del Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued on August 19. 2874 pursuant to which the title of Heirs‘ predecessor in interest was issued. Ang conveyed to Soledad his Mitsubishi Lancer model 1988. By Resolution. the owner of the vehicle prior to Soledad. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately owned. a buyer and seller of used vehicles. however. Before the deed could be registered in Bugash‘s name. or of private ownership. constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. the vehicle was seized by virtue of a writ of replevin on account of the alleged failure of Ronaldo Panes. and a title so issued is null and void. 2874. Bruno Soledad sold his Mitsubishi GSR sedan 1982 model to Jaime Ang. The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act. COURT OF APPEALS AND BRUNO SOLEDAD 567 SCRA 53 (2008). drawing Ang to charge him for Estafa with abuse of confidence. 2874. The nullity arises not. SECOND DIVISION (Morales.Whether or not the Bureau of Lands has the authority to grant a Free Patent for a land ceased to be a public land HELD: Under the provision of Act No. a secondhand auto display center. To secure the release of the vehicle. Ang. has no authority to grant a free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership. from the fraud or deceit. 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of petitioner Calimpong are null and void. the City Prosecutor‘s Office dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot. J. The vehicle was eventually sold to Paul Bugash. Act No. was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain. For his part.) Even under the principle of solutio indebiti. JAIME D. Ang cannot recover from Soledad the amount he paid BA Finance since Ang settled the mortgage debt on his own volition and that Soledad did not benefit therein. Free Patent No. later offered the Mitsubishi GSR for sale through Far Eastern Motors. but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.

an implied warranty is that which the law derives by application or inference from the nature of the transaction or the relative situation or circumstances of the parties. and in consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another‘s expense. contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale. and in the absence of such period. which is four years (Article 1389. On the other hand. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 ." As for actions based on breach of implied warranty. and by which he promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them. the prescriptive period is. The RTC then ordered Soledad to pay Ang the amount the latter paid to BA Finance. the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Ang "for the sake of justice and equity. the general rule on rescission of contract. 1571 (warranty against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold) and Art. Soledad then appealed to the Appellate Court. irrespective of any intention of the seller to create it. A warranty is a statement or representation made by the seller of goods. Warranties by the seller may be express or implied. Hence. The Court of Appeals dismissed Ang‘s petition on the ground that the filing of said complaint seeking the awarding of damages for breach of warranty has already prescribed. Art. having reference to the character. Court of Appeals states that "the prescriptive period for instituting actions based on a breach of express warranty is that specified in the contract. and if the buyer purchases the thing relying thereon. Civil Code).City. this petition to the High Court. The ruling in Engineering & Machinery Corporation vs. 1546 of the Civil Code defines express warranty – Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the thing is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the same. 1548 (warranty against eviction). under Art. quality or title of the goods. which reverses the decision of the RTC. six months from the date of delivery of the thing sold. Subsequently. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Ang‘s cause of action had not yet prescribed when he filed the complaint 2) Whether or not Ang can recover from Soledad the amount he paid BA Finance on account of the mortgage debt HELD: First Issue The resolution of the sole issue of whether the complaint had prescribed hinges on a determination of what kind of warranty is provided in the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of the present case.

did not benefit from the proceeds thereof. et al. He was expected to have thoroughly verified the car‘s registration and related documents. as the appellate court observed. it having been filed 16 months after July 28. the date of delivery of the vehicle. and not on July 15. GREGORIO F.) The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts which are either partially or totally performed Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . But even if the date of filing of the action is reckoned from the date petitioner instituted his first complaint for damages on November 9. as seller. Since what Soledad. even if Ang invokes breach of warranty against eviction as inferred from the second part of the earlier-quoted provision of the Deed of Absolute Sale. For. he not being the one who mortgaged the vehicle. 436 SCRA 459 (2004). (2) This eviction is by a final judgment. hence. the action just the same had prescribed. v. For another. Ang cannot recover from Soledad the amount he paid BA Finance. Ang settled the mortgage debt on his own volition under the supposition that he would resell the car. have not been met. Soledad gave an implied warranty of title. DOMINGO AVERIA. Given Ang‘s business of buying and selling used vehicles. there was no suit for eviction in which Soledad as seller was impleaded as co-defendant at the instance of the vendee. the following essential requisites for such breach: (1) The purchaser has been deprived of the whole or part of the thing sold. 1996 when he filed the complaint subject of the present petition. Second Issue On the merits of his complaint for damages." Soledad gave a warranty against eviction. Finally. J. he could not have merely relied on Soledad‘s affirmation that the car was free from liens and encumbrances. there is no judgment which deprived Ang of the vehicle. even under the principle of solutio indebiti which the RTC applied. 1992. et al. 1993. the prescriptive period to file a breach thereof is six months after the delivery of the vehicle. 1571. AVERIA. gave was an implied warranty. In pledging that he "will defend the same from all claims or any claim whatsoever and will save the vendee from any suit by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. It need not be stressed that Soledad did not benefit from Ang‘s paying BA Finance. (3) The basis thereof is by virtue of a right prior to the sale made by the vendor.In declaring that he owned and had clean title to the vehicle at the time the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. It turned out that he did pay BA Finance in order to avoid returning the payment made by the ultimate buyer Bugash. and (4) The vendor has been summoned and made co-defendant in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. following Art. For one.

and of the testimony of Felimon Dagondon bearing on the receipt by Domingo of P5.000. Macaria then filed an action for annulment of title and damages alleging that fraud was employed by her co-heirs in which she was represented by Atty. borne out in the records of the case except with respect to his testimony. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Just as the testimonies of Gregorio. Felipe and Felimon. Gregorio and co-petitioner Sylvana claimed that Domingo sold to Gregorio and Agripina his 1/6 share in the remaining ½ portion of the property. Angel. Gregorio presented oral evidence to establish their claim of the sale of the property to them by Macaria and also the sale of Domingo of his share.Macaria Francisco (Macaria) was married to Marcos Averia in which they had six children namely: petitioners Gregorio and Teresa and respondents Domingo. the testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses Sylvanna Vergara Clutario and Flora Lazaro Rivera bearing on the same matter were not objected to by respondents.000. Upon the death of Marcos. In a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Summary Settlement of the Estate of Romero.000. except for the testimony of petitioner Gregorio bearing on the verbal sale to him by Macaria of the property. Domingo. The Regional Trial Court of (RTC) decided in favor of Gregorio. In their defense Gregorio contends that Macaria verbally sold ½ of her Extramadura property to him and his wife Agripina because they were the ones who spent for the litigation expenses in the former civil case and that Agripina took care of her. Her son Gregorio and his family and Teresa‘s family lived with her in the Extremadura property until her death. reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that since the sale executed by Macaria in favor of Gregorio was in violation of the statute of frauds and it cannot be proven by oral evidence.R. Angel. After six years. Gregorio contends that the same refers only to purely executory contracts and not to partially or completely executed contracts as in the instant case.00 representing partial payment of the P10. Upon the death of Roberto. Mario C. The CA however.00 valuation of his (Domingo‘s) 1/6 share in the property. respondents Domingo. 1983 from Gregorio‘s wife of P5. enforceable. Issue: Whether or not parol evidence may be admitted in proving partial performance Held: With respect to the application by the appellate court of the Statute of Frauds. a house and lot (Extremadura property) was apportioned to Macaria. he left three adjoining residential lots. The finding of the CA that the testimonies of Gregorio‘s witnesses were timely objected to by Domingo is not. Macaria contracted a second marriage with Roberto Romero in which they had no children. Felipe and Filemon filed an action for judicial partition against petitioners Gregorio and Teresa. Indeed. and Veronica Bautista bearing on the receipt by respondent Domingo on July 23. Upon hearing.00 from Gregorio were not objected to. as Gregorio insist. The case lasted for 10 years until the Court of Appeals (CA) decided in favor of Macaria entitling her to an additional 30 square meters of the estate of Romero. hence. the contracts which infringed the Statute of Frauds were ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of parol evidence. Jr. Following Article 1405 of the Civil Code.

continued to occupy the property until and after the filing on January 19. et al. and Sagana to deliver the Deed of Sale and the title covering the subject property. on account partly of Sagana‘s failure to submit certain requirements including the title to the subject property which had been burned and was pending reconstitution. Sagana Construction and Development Corporation (Sagana) and Wenonah Marquez-Azarcon (Azarcon) entered into a contract to sell a house and lot (subject property). Azarcon‘s loan application was disapproved. Consequently. 1989 of the complaint subject of the case at bar as in fact he is still occupying it. even after Macaria‘s death in 1983. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. the Board acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.Contrary then to the finding of the CA. full payment of the objects thereof having already been made and the vendee Gregorio having. petitioners claimed that there was total performance of the contracts. J. the admission of parol evidence upon which the trial court anchored its decision in favor of respondents is not irregular and is not foreclosed by Article 1405. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Hence. In any event. The Board also required Azarcon to pay rentals during the time of her occupancy which shall form part of the purchase price of the premises. a Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA) rendered a decision ordering Azarcon to pay the balance of the purchase price. But neither is such party required to establish such partial performance by documentary proof before he could have the opportunity to introduce oral testimony on the transaction. MARQUEZ AZARCON v. such partial performance must be duly proved. this petition. the Board deleted a previous order for Azarcon to pay interest. Azarcon thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging therein that the Order issued by the HLA varied the terms of the Board decision and. however. CA nevertheless dismissed the petition holding that the HLA decision is in accordance with the Board Resolution. However it is not enough for a party to allege partial performance in order to render the Statute of Frauds inapplicable. WENONAH L.) The agreement of the parties becomes the law between them and the same shall stand in the absence of evidence showing that it is contrary to public policy. 399 SCRA 365 (2003). HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER. The partial performance may be proved by either documentary or oral evidence. as such. she filed a complaint against Sagana before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (Board). Azarcon offered to pay the balance in cash but Sagana refused to accept the same unless she pays interest. the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to contracts which are either partially or totally performed. After hearing. As Azarcon refused to pay interest on the balance of the purchase price. In the case at bar. Upon reconsideration.

The dispute arises from the parties‘ conflicting understanding or interpretation of the phrase ―the said amount of rental shall form part of the purchase price as adjusted‖ found in the fallo. ―pay rentals as equitable payment for the use of the premises. however. 1517. It is clear that the payment of rentals was devised by the Board merely as an interim scheme. Rayo gave Bobadilla two months to decide whether to purchase the land.) If the land is not embraced in Areas for Priority Development/Urban Land Reform Zones. courts are without power to alter what parties have clearly. Since Azarcon fully paid the balance of the purchase price less than three months after the Board decision was promulgated on May 10. no preemptive right under Presidential Decree No. Bobadilla asserted the right of first refusal of their predecessor-in-interest under Presidential Decree No. It would also gloss over Azarcon‘s initial payment of a substantial amount when they entered into the contract to sell and her tender of payment of the balance which was. as reflected above. For over 20 years. HEIRS OF ANTONIO BOBADILLA v. rejected by Sagana. that part of the decision respecting ―payment through other means‖ devised by the Board for Azarcon to. They agreed upon the purchase price of the subject property in 1995 when they entered into the contract to sell. 1993. Danilo. In the absence of any showing that the agreement is contrary to law. Luna Street in Caloocan City on a verbal agreement from owner Virginia Rayo. voluntarily and knowingly agreed upon. J. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . As the decree is not self-executing. Of the parties‘ interpretations. Castillo required Bobadilla. JAIME CASTILLO 526 SCRA 107 (2007). in the meantime. Proclamation No. The amount agreed upon became the law between them.‖ had become functus oficio. Sagana‘s is contrary to their agreement. until a substitute method of payment of the balance of the purchase price was agreed upon by the parties. To hold otherwise would be to fault Azarcon in whom none was. have been leasing portions of a 348 square meter parcel of land located at Gen. Having heard nothing from Bobadilla after two months. which can be applied to the balance of the purchase price. 1967 was issued identifying 244 specific sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development (APD) and Urban Land Reform Zones. Azarcon contending that the payment of rentals is an alternative to the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Antonio Bobadilla. Rayo offered to sell the land to Bobadilla. Policarpio. Maria Del Mundo and Ernesto. 1517 can be invoked. and SAGANA contending that the rental payments shall be in addition to the balance of the purchase price. Del Mundo and the Serranos to vacate the land after failing to heed his previous demands to pay a monthly rental of P10 per square meter. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Rayo sold the parcel of land to Jaime Castillo. After August 1991. found by the Board. It would thus ignore the interest of justice and equity which underlies all systems of justice. otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Act. Bobadilla instituted a complaint at the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the sale between Rayo and Castillo based on fraud and bad faith.

SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Unknown to Natividad.D. ILUMINADA BAUTISTA.D. however. convinced her to take possession and cultivate some agricultural lands that will eventually be partitioned. is final.) An action for declaration of nullity of an alleged fraudulent deed of sale is imprescriptible under the Civil Code. 1967 can be applied to Bobadilla‘s claim HELD: In Caloocan City where the land is situated. only 11 such areas/zones were identified. J. have the right not to be dispossessed therefrom and the right of first refusal to purchase them under reasonable terms and conditions to be determined by the appropriate government agency. et al.ISSUE: Whether or not P. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. however. Only legitimate tenants then who have resided for ten years or more on specific parcels of land. Natividad thus filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Annulment of the Deeds of Sale and/or Partition of Properties. as affirmed by the appellate court. Such finding of fact. conclusive and binding on this Court. et al. 574 SCRA 375 (2008). The CA.. affirmed the trial court‘s decision.Borja (Natividad). ISSUES: Whether or not the Natividad‘s cause of action has already prescribed HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . a fact which she found out subsequent to her possession and cultivation of the said lands. and who have built their homes thereon. claimed that Iluminada Bautista. NATIVIDAD BAUTISTA-BORJA v. 1517 and P. through fraud and deception. Petitioner Natividad Bautista. one of the five children of deceased Spouses Pablo and Segundina Tadiaman Bautista (spouses Bautista). the titles to the lands were cancelled by virtue of Deeds of Sale executed on different dates by her parents in favor of her siblings Simplicio and Francisco. prescription and laches. Natividad thus elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). none of which was found to encompass the subject land. contending that the nature of her complaint was one for annulment of void contracts which is imprescriptible.

et al. (2006). herein respondents Victoria Caldo-Atienza and Feliciana Caldo-Sabado. become settled by the acts and proceedings of judicial or legislative officers or by Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . much less understood the significance and legal deeds ─ and/or because there was no consideration therefor. (d) succession. given that it is based on an alleged void contract. VICTORIA CALDO-ATIENZA et al. and the now deceased Alberto Caldo−father of respondent Zosimo Caldo. JESUS CALDO v. 5749-D of the Municipality of Dasmariñas. the modes of acquiring ownership are as follows: (a) occupation. 485 SCRA 504. 5749-D. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. (b) intellectual creation. Cavite. it is clear that her action is one for declaration of the nullity of the Deeds of Sale which she claims to be either falsified ─ because at the time of the execution thereof. with whom he had three children. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has. in the contemplation of law. is barred from adopting an inconsistent position. prompting Jesus Caldo to file a Complaint against Atienza et al. Pilar Sayaman later died and Francisco Caldo subsequently married Juana Manareza. petitioner‘s action is imprescriptible. Feliciana Caldo-Sabado and Zosimo Caldo‘s executed a Salaysay ng Pag-aari ng Iba’t-Ibang Lupa. Petitioner Jesus Caldo and respondents Victoria Caldo-Atienza. ISSUE Whether or not Atienza. Estoppel is not one of them x x x. Petitioner Jesus Caldo is the only child of Francisco Caldo to his first wife Pilar Sayaman. Clearly. J. and (e) prescription. The recognition by the defendants-appellants Victoria Caldo-Atienza. Francisco Caldo filed an ―Application to Purchase Friar Lands‖ covering Lot No. Feliciana Caldo-Sabado and Zosimo Caldo of the plaintiff-appellee Jesus Caldo as co-owner of the subject parcel of land in the ―Salaysay ng Pag-aari ng Iba‘t Ibang Lupa‖ was based on the mistaken belief that the said land was a conjugal property of Francisco Caldo and Juana Manaresa. In accordance with the settled rule. she registered it in her name. After Juana had fully paid for the lot. (c) donation. covering Lot No. Atienza et al. it is just the same as imprescriptible. Pablo was already gravely ill and bedridden. will not only cause injustice to the vested right of the defendants-appellants but also will run counter to the provisions of the law and applicable jurisprudence. who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner. an innocent mistake on the part of the defendants-appellants as to the legal right does not estop them to assert the same In estoppel. hence he could not have gone and appeared before the Notary Public. for Annulment of Title before the Regional Trial Court of Imus.) Estoppel is not one of the modes of acquiring ownership. thereafter executed a ―Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Waiver‖ adjudicating the lot to themselves. attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another. a person. But even if Natividad‘s complaint were to be taken as one for reconveyance. are in estoppels to deny the claim of Jesus as co-owner HELD: Under the New Civil Code.From the earlier quoted-allegations in Natividad‘s complaint. Cavite. Juana (deceased) and the Republic of the Philippines forged a private sale. The Court ruled that Jesus Caldo is entitled to inherit a share of the lot which was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. To rule otherwise. following Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

. the latter having relied upon the misrepresentation and having been influenced and misled thereby intentionally. estoppel cannot be invoked against respondents. should prevalently apply but. express or implied or in pais. Pantoja filed a motion to intervene and be substituted as applicant in the Land Registration Court. ceded and conveyed by the former in favour of the latter in consideration for a sum of money. JOSE CAOIBES. Estoppel is not understood to be a principal that. when misapplied. a mere exception from the standard legal norms of general application that can be invoked only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases. CORAZON CAOIBES-PANTOJA 496 SCRA 273 (2006). It is a principle intended to avoid a clear case of injustice. the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC. et al. Jr. The RTC ruled in favor of Caoibes. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales J. as a rule. It can only be invoked between the person making the representation and the person to whom it was addressed.. and has its origin in equity which. Since it was Juana who allegedly made the representation to petitioner to the effect that he is a co-owner of the land. either by conventional writing or by representations. The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. Caoibes. must be unequivocal and intentional for.. The Land Registration Court denied the motion. opposed on the grounds of prescription. In 1982. The term is hardly distinguishable from a waiver of right. JR. it can easily become a convenient and effective means of injustice. the following pronouncement of the Court is instructive. interests or representations Caoibes Jr. et al. like its counterpart. Estoppel. as it concededly is.the act of the party himself. of the Salaysay. (Caoibes. et al. On appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of for prescription on Pantoja started from the time of the agreement of the parties RULING: The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant. v. Jr. Fourteen years after the execution of the parties. Pantoja filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for specific performance of the agreement. et al. together with Jesus.) and Corazon Caoibes-Pantoja (Pantoja) entered to a contract of sale stating that a certain lot will be transferred. As for the invocation of estoppel against respondents in light of their execution. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . may have pending land registration proceeding. is justice according to natural law and right. holding that prescription had not yet set in. Jose Caoibes Jr.. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case.. et al. The agreement included the stipulation that Pantoja will be subrogated or substituted to whatever rights.) The law does not require that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been conveyed" for the applicant.. et al. broadly defined. Jr.

The RTC granted and appointed Paul C. Almendras and Elizabeth A. the following essential elements must concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. (SODACO). There is no showing however that those certificates of title were issued to the awardees although tax declarations were issued wherein the name ―Alejandro D.(Almendras) acquired title over the lots. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the application. Furukawa-Darong Plantation Company which has been reverted to the public domain as ―spoils of war‖ and placed under the administration of the National Abaca Fibers Corporation (NAFCO). When Almendras suffered a stroke. the lots were placed under the administration of the Board of Liquidators (Board) for sale or transfer to qualified occupants-applicants.He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. also filed a complaint for annulment of the deeds of sale. a petition for guardianship was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). injunction. DALWAMPO. et al. herein respondents Quinocol Farmers. 1529 (Property Registration Decree which became effective on June 11. the execution was equivalent to the delivery of the property to Pantoja. filed several complaints a for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Southern Davao Development Co. All Pantoja has to do is to comply with the requirements under the above-quoted Sec.. Alba as guardians over his properties. Farmworkers and Settlers Association (QFFSA) et al. Thereafter. Inc.D. EN BANC (Carpio Morales. it having transferred ownership for and in consideration of her payment of the loan. The agreement is of course in consonance with Sec. There is no showing on how Alejandro Almendras. et al. Almendras. Jr. Sr.. 488 SCRA 208 (2006).. Respondents QFFSA et al. the lots comprising the plantation to the petitioners Dalawampo et al. and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. LEONARDO M. wherein petitioner Dalawampo was the Farm Manager. the substitution by Pantoja of Caoibes. v. to honor their agreement allowing her to be substituted in their stead as applicant in the land registration proceeding.. The guardians later sold. It was unnecessary for Pantoja to file the case for specific performance subject of the present petition against Caoibes. Jr. He declared the conveyances in favor of Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. The agreement having been made through public instrument. 1978). J. as applicant in the land registration case over Lot 2 is not even necessary. enforcement of preemptive rights. The Board also executed the deeds of sale to the awardees. The Board awarded the lots to several individuals. QUINOCOL FARMERS.‖ was indicated as administrator. 22 of P. Upon the dissolution of NAFCO. In light of the law and jurisprudence. et al. 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. The lots comprising the Almendras Coconut Plantation are alleged to have been part of the prewar Y.) For a tenancy relationship to exist. 22 of the Property Registration Decree. and damages against several persons including herein petitioners before the Department of Agrarian Reform Office of the Provincial Adjudicator. Sr. with the approval of the court. et al. 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. The agreement of the parties is analogous to a deed of sale in favour of Pantoja. The Provincial Adjudicator decided in favor of QFFSA et al.

at the time of the sale.) Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and fourth elements had been proved by substantial evidence. contrary to the rule that in ejectment cases. No written tenancy contract or proof of acts implying a mutual agreement to enter into a tenancy contract between Almendras and respondents was proffered. ISSUE: Whether or not the QFFSA et al. by general industry. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. could not have transferred to them ownership of the lots in the plantation which was. 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. The intent of the parties. and their written agreements. 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. For a tenancy relationship to exist. Neither the fifth element – personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee which "includes all activities designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and husbanding the earth. are legitimate tenants of the Almendras Coconut Plantation HELD: It is settled that the existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. 412 SCRA 282 (2003). J. The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB decision and reinstated that of the Provincial Adjudicator. are even more important. There must be evidence to prove it. they are inadequate for the full ventilation of issues involving title to controverted real property. The present controversy is an agrarian dispute not any different from the case pending before the DAR because in both. the understanding when the farmer is installed. the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. inferior courts cannot adjudicate on ownership and regional trial courts cannot resolve the same on appeal because proceedings in such cases being summary in nature. the following essential elements must concur: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. claim to be the tenants thereon. Mere allegation is not evidence nor equivalent to proof. the records do not show that the first. Of the essential elements of a tenancy relationship. On appeal. and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 1995. It compounded its error when it sustained the annulment of the sale by the inferior court. It also is a legal relationship. 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law. Hence this petition. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. the property involved is an agricultural land and QFFSA et al. in the meantime died on August 3. 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. Those have no force and effect as the guardians of Almendras who. CLARA C. COURT OF APPEALS et al. v. third. still titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.petitioners Dalawampo et al. so that it may bring forth more products or fruits" – was proved. DE LA CRUZ et al. The RTC therefore erred when it treated this case as an ordinary ejectment suit and upheld the jurisdiction of the inferior court.

Rosario alleges that the two properties were hers. On that score alone. but the boundaries set forth therein do not jibe with those of the property in Mayana in the possession of and registered in the name of respondent. had. On the other hand. A tax declaration statement and a deed of absolute sale were presented to support their claim.Proof of ownership. which assumes that the parties are co-owners. Clara and Clauidia harp on Tax Declaration No. while the action had only been brought in 1992. the first having been bought by her husband even before his marriage to his first wife. On the other hand. their case fails. the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s Decision. DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES. The case involves two parcels of land.) Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Rosario Opana (Rosario) was the second wife of Tomasa‘s husband. the Supreme Court held a person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership. is the basic rule for an action to prosper. since the land had been registered in her name since 1974. Clara C. vs. it citing Rodriguez v. Clara and Claudia filed a complaint for partition of the abovementioned land. together with identity of the land. become one for recovery of property. Rosario also alleges that the complaint is already barred by laches. Clara and Claudia failed to come up with a clear description of the land sought or claimed. Proof of ownership together with identity of the land is the basic rule. 29824 covering the property in Mayana. inherited by siblings Esteban. J. In Gesmundo v. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Rosario and declared the same to be the absolute owner of the land in question. INC. and the second property inherited by him from his father. ARAGONES 461 SCRA 139 (2005). Ravilan. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Tomasa. alleging that they were the heirs of Tomasa. De la Cruz (Clara) and Claudia C. Manadong (Claudia) were the daughters of Esteban. since the Rosario alleged exclusive ownership. the action for partition. When the record does not show that the land subject matter of the action has been exactly determined. Court of Appeals. such action cannot prosper. NAPOLEON N. and therefore entitled to the land presently occupied by Rosario. Andrea and Tomasa Dela Cruz. ISSUE: Whether or not the action for recovery of property will prosper HELD: Contrary to the assertion of Clara and Claudia. On appeal. as correctly held by the trial court.

Then. but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order. there was no consideration of any special needs or requirements of DMPI taken into account in the design or manufacture of the concrete paving blocks. Thereafter. Hence. terms or conditions showing that it was one for a piece of work. In this regard. it held that DMPI and Garcia are jointly and severally liable. is a contract of sale. After the installation. DMPI appealed to Court of Appeal (CA). is a contract of sale. Aragones sent a letter to DMPI saying that instead of paying Garcia. RTC ruled in favor of Aragones. 1729 of the Civil Code which provides that those who put their labor upon or furnish materials for a piece of work undertaken by the contractor have an action against the owner up to the amount owing from the latter to the contractor at the time the claim is made. But this did not happen. the machines Aragones was obliged to fabricate were those for casting the concrete blocks specified by Garcia. It contends that the supply agreement between Garcia and Aragones is a contract of sale to which DMPI was not privy. Following Art.A contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market. whether the same is on hand at the time or not. the court affirmed RTC‘s decision. Aragones did not have those kind of machines in his usual business. materials. to supply labor. However at CA. ISSUE: Whether or not Supply Agreement between Aragones and Garcia is a contract of sale HELD: Contrary to DMPI‘s claim that ―save for the shape. hence. and not for the general market. Under Article 1467 then of the Civil Code. Aragones failed to collect the payment from Garcia. but if the goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon his special order. Hence Aragones filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against Garcia and DMPI before RTC. Del Monte Philippines Inc. a contract for the delivery at a certain price of an article which the vendor in the ordinary course of his business manufactures or procures for the general market. it is a contract for a piece of work. wherein Garcia will supply the installation of modular pavement in DMPI‘s warehouse. The deadline however was not met. Garcia as a contractor entered into a supply agreement with Dynablock Enterprises represented by respondent Aragones. it is a contract for a piece of work. whether the same is on hand at the time or not. and not for the general market. hence DMPI cannot be held liable.‖ the ―Supply Agreement‖ is replete with specifications. As reflected in the highlighted and underscored above-quoted provisions of the ―Supply Agreement. (DMPI) entered into an agreement with Mega-Engineering Services in joint venture with WAFF Construction System Corporation (MEGA-WAFF) represented by Edilberto Garcia (Garcia). the special order.‖ as well as other evidence on record. Argones started to do his obligation. DMPI filed this petition. The ―Supply Agreement‖ was decidedly a contract for a piece of work. equipment and the like. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . DMPI should directly pay him.

v. 1529.. "THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE.). maintain or improve the Kotkot and Lunsaran Watershed Forest Reserve located in Cebu and Davao. officers of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). et al. et al. Hence. J. 932 which prohibited the sale. DOLINO. however. and any person seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .. he has a cause of action upon DMPI up to the amount it owed MEGA-WAFF at the time Aragones made his claim to DMPI. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for mandamus and ordered Dolino et al. JEREMIAS L. to execute the survey or resurvey of their lots and render the necessary reports thereon.P. (Dolino.). COURT OF APPEALS. Such refusal is based on the ground that such lands were subject to the provisions of Presidential Proclamation (P. et al. Hon. et al. The presumption is that land pertains to the State. et al. including improvements and interests therein. disposition or settlement of such lands in order to protect. and over all petitions filed after original registration of title. Private respondents Viking Management and Development Corp. 17 of Presidential Decree No." a survey of a land subject of an application for registration is an essential requisite. to effect the survey or resurvey of the subject lands. et al. Dolino. automatically result in the adjudication of the land applied for in favor of the applicant. Hence.Aragones having specially fabricated three casting machines and furnished some materials for the production of the concrete blocks specially ordered and specified by MEGA-WAFF which were to be and indeed they were for the exclusive use of MEGA-WAFF. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. who is still required to prove that (a) the land is an alienable and disposable part of the public domain. (Viking. filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus to compel Dolino. with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the Writ of Mandamus HELD: Under Sec. Viking et al. herein petitioners Jeremias L. et.) The Regional Trial Courts has exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands. However. al.. requested for the survey or resurvey of their respective lots. and (b) his possession has been for the length of time and in the manner and concept required by law. Such survey does not. the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.) No. refused to accept such request. entry. 401 SCRA 695 (2003). On appeal.

continuous. Marta de Sagun and Editha G. with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and over all petitions filed after original registration of title. SEVERINO and RAYMUNDO LANDICHO. respondents would not be able to initiate and pursue. et al. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by said court. it is the Regional Trial Courts which "shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title to lands. 1529. or administrative action.) To prove that a land is alienable." If respondents fail to prove by satisfactory evidence their supposed vested or private rights over the remaining lots. that they have been the ones in open. open. the applicant must prove that: (a) the land applied for forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) he has been in open. public. SECOND DIVISION. 1529 HELD: Section 14 of P. DOMINGO v. On appeal by Landicho. 531 SCRA 606. (1) and (4) of P. par. which he supposedly purchased from one Genoveva Manlapit in 1948. No. such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. sub pars. the proper land registration proceedings and would be precluded from establishing their claimed vested rights thereon. Julian Abello. et al. (Carpio-Morales. the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingo‘s application for registration of land title. including improvements and interests therein. an application for registration of certain parcels of land (the ―lots‖).D. 2 of P. without these lots being surveyed. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12. Crisologo Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a land.Under Section 2. J. No. an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government. However. Severino and Raymundo Landicho. and has since been in continuous. adverse and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of an owner. 1945. continuous. Sarmiento subsequently filed an Answer/Opposition to Domingo‘s application. claiming. CRISOLOGO C. adverse and actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners and have even been paying real estate taxes thereon. 29 August 2007.. as the case may be.D. ISSUE: Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the lots in question pursuant to Section 14. among other things. The RTC approved Domingo‘s application for registration.D. then their applications for registration should necessarily be rejected by the cadastral court and/or land registration court. investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.

The boundaries stipulated in the contract of sale which extend the lot‘s area Both cases were consolidated and tried before the RTC which. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera (Esguerra spouses) owned several parcels of land half of which they sold to their grandchildren Feliciano. On appeal. J. subsequently filed a motion for nullification of sale between the Esguerra spouses and Trinidad on the ground that they were procured through fraud or misrepresentation. Feliciano Esguerra (Feliciano). who inhabits the lot bordering Trinidad. it is the latter which should prevail. Feliciano contended that the stipulations in the deed of sale was that Trinidad was sold a 5. Canuto. the brothers Eulalio and Julian Trinidad. after trial. Clara and Pedro. all surnamed Esguerra. mentioned in its description. but the boundaries therein laid down. the Esguerra spouses executed the necessary Deeds of Sale before a notary public. 518 SCRA 186 (2007). such as presidential proclamation or an executive order. Subsequentlly. The spouses sold half the remaining land were sold their other grandchildren. Angel. as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.268 square meters. calculated with more or less certainty. or administrative action. they remain part of the inalienable public domain. Eulalio Trinidad (Trinidad) later sold his share of the land to his daughters.) What really defines a piece of ground is not the area.All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute. v. Fidela. et al. it was discovered that the 5. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries. the appellate court also dismissed the cases. Justa. an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of government. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. all were about 5. the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. dismissed the cases.000 square meteres each. et al. During a cadastral survey conducted in the late 1960s. VIRGINIA TRINIDAD.000-square meter portion of Esguerra‘s parcel of land sold to Trinidad actually measured 6. and unless it has been shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or disposable to a private person. ISSUES: Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in holding that the description and boundaries of the lot override the stated area of the lot in the deed of sale HELD: Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared. They also executed a deed of partitioning of the lots .000 square meter lot. FELICIANO ESGUERRA.. the motion for reconsideration was also denied. and subsequently. To prove that a land is alienable.

however. more or less. In a contract of sale of land in a mass. corn and bananas and shared the produce with Rodil. and. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries.) It is a general rule in this country that compromises are to be favored. which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate. under Article 1542. et al. what is controlling is the entire land included within the boundaries. J. Later. even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the contract. Danilo Esparagera and Enrique Gonzales. it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. J. Realty Corporation (JY Realty). provided that such settlement is made free from fraud or mistake. 0-6498 was described in the deed as "humigit kumulang. Both Esparagera and Gonzales also claimed to be tenants of a portion of the same Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . This is particularly true since the area of the land in OCT No. its area or number should be designated in the contract. The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price. but the boundaries therein laid down. v. he shall suffer a reduction in the price. entered a parcel of land owned by Eugenio Rodil (Rodil) and Young by tolerance sometime 1960 and 1955. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it.What really defines a piece of ground is not the area. REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 452 SCRA 335 (2005). in proportion to what is lacking in the area or number. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. DANILO ESPARAGERA. In fine. A caveat is in order. Thus. calculated with more or less certainty. After a few years Rodil issued a notice of eviction to Esparagera and Gonzales. Esparagera and Gonzales filed two separate complaints against Toribio Rodil (Rodil) and Salud Young (Young) for Preservation of Tenancy Status which was later consolidated into one case by the Regional Trial Court." that is.. an OCT enjoys a presumption of validity. however. should he not be able to do so. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. which correlatively carries a strong presumption that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land which led to its issuance have been duly followed. the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that is included within said boundaries. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof. Esparagera and Gonzales were able to plant coconuts. brother-in-laws.Y. regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. but if. Rodil and Young sold the land to J. without regard to the nature of the controversy compromised. It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. it must be supported by clear and convincing proof. Y. mentioned in its description. Under the Torrens System. besides mentioning the boundaries. inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. SPS. Fraud being a serious charge.

Parenthetically.000. et al agreed to recognize the land as residential in exchange for JY Realty to purchase the land. Whether or not the land disputed is Residential rather than Agricultural Whether or not the action of the compromise agreement of Spouses Esparagera and JY Realty takes precedence in importance compared to the decision of DARAB Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Rodil and JY Realty filed Motion for Reconsideration to DARAB alleging that the Spouses Esparagera and JY Realty had already reached a compromise agreement. Since. If settlement be made . the Certification was voluntarily accomplished by petitioners. et al. is binding on the parties and may not. . . The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled in favor of the Robil and Young and dismissed the complaint. executed a compromise agreement between JY Realty. . Before the execution of said decision. whether it is in the nature of a compromise agreement bereft of court approval. Esparagera. Spouses Esparagera.00 each "for whatever improvements they introduced thereon. that it was not submitted before the Adjudicator and was submitted to the DARAB only after its decision had been promulgated does not violate any rules. be denied evidentiary value to affect the outcome of the case. For it is a general rule in this country that compromises are to be favored. that they received P50. The sale of the land was put on hold by JY Realty. et al. free from fraud or mistake. following Art. not agricultural. Esparagera. on account of alleged procedural or substantive legal infirmity. et al unconditionally declared that the subject land is residential. whereby there is a surrender or satisfaction. ISSUE: 1) 2) HELD: By the Certification. or of something of value. however baseless may be the claim upon either side or harsh the terms as to either of the parties. It thus has the effect of res judicata. the other cannot successfully impeach the agreement in a court of justice . Gonzales and Esparageras sought to establish that the landholding in question is an agricultural land. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that the Spouses Esparagera. .landholding. . et al. . albeit it is more in the nature of a quitclaim the voluntariness of its execution of which has not been raised. were not tenants of the farm. . and that they "have nothing whatsoever to do with the land and that they no longer are interested to pursue the DARAB case. unquestionably. On appeal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). that they would remove their houses and those of their children. it is informed by respondent in its Comment to the present petition that Esparagera. . 2037 of the Civil Code. thus reversing and setting aside the decision of DARAB and dismissing the said complaint. in whole or in part. The settlement reflected in the Certification executed by Esparagera. of a claim upon one side in exchange for or in consideration of a surrender or satisfaction of a claim in whole or in part. et al had after the execution of the Certification vacated the landholding. upon the other. without regard to the nature of the controversy compromised. et al. DARAB then denied the motion for reconsideration. which information was not denied by Esparagera. the decision of PARAD was reversed and set aside.

who conducted a spot investigation after the occurrence of the accident. Franco Transit bus collided with the rear portions of a bus and truck wrecker both owned by respondent Victory Liner. as in the instant case. On appeal. asserts an affirmative issue. As in other civil cases. In maintaining their cause of action against Franco-Cruz. Franco-Cruz alleged that she is not the real party-in-interest and. even despite her submission of the bus' Certificate of Registration in the name of Felicisima R. killing five people. The trial court denied her partial motion for reconsideration. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. they argued that Franco-Cruz failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver of the Franco Transit bus. This applies with more vigor where.) Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. relied on the January 4. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . J. she not being the registered owner of the Franco Transit bus. it was dismissed for having been filed out of time making the trial court‘s decision final. THE COURT OF APPEALS. Ilocos Norte. Liza Franco-Cruz (Franco-Cruz). the complaint stated no cause of action against her. the General Manager of Franco Transit. Before establishing a defense. It bears emphasis that the presentation by the victims of evidence ex-parte did not relieve them of the burden of proving their claims against petitioner. et al. the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. the burden of proof rests upon the party who. 565 SCRA 531 (2008). The court proceeded in hearing the case ex-parte and declared her in default. The heirs of the victims filed a civil case against Ma. to controvert Franco-Cruz‘s affirmative defense that there is no cause of action against her. Franco Transit contended that the declaration in default of a defendant who fails to attend pre-trial had been eliminated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Franco-Cruz filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that it was error to declare her in default. on the part of any of the witnesses for the heirs of the victims.. Inc. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in not allowing a new trial on the basis of failure to appear HELD: There was no attempt. 1998 Traffic Accident Report of Balajadia. wherein he stated that the Franco Transit bus was registered under the name of Marializa Franco-Cruz of Batac.MA. In her answer. therefore. Franco Transit failed to appear during pre-trial hearing. LIZA FRANCO-CRUZ v. as determined by the pleadings or nature of the case. Franco which is conclusive proof of ownership.

The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE.‖ However. it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code.URSULINA GANUELAS. Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa. CAWED. the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor. After her death. 123968. to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. Flores. except when it is Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . more than a month before Celestina died. If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death. the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio-Morales. Celestina Ganuelas Vda.. et al. thus. and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. unto the DONEE the property above. but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR. by way of DONATION. nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor. They alleged that such donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments. et al. she executed a document revoking such donation. while in the latter. If the donation is inter vivos. prompting Flores. the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey. then it is at that time that the donation takes effect. to file a complaint before the San Fernando. No.) Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former. then the donation is inter vivos. 24 April 2003. nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments. meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime. not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation. v. meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death. On the other hand. The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa. G. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. while in the latter. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa HELD: Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. niece of Celestina any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. ROBERT T. et al. But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death. Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos. described. R. challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. et al. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. J. HON. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former. La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC). Thus. and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former.

the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor. v. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition. the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with. love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio-Morales. That before his death. et al. No. 3. otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. The pertinent portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death.‖ Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . CAWED. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. More importantly. unto the DONEE the property above. As stated in a long line of cases. the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. In other words. More. by way of DONATION. failing which the donation is void and produces no effect. and of the faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former. the said DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey. the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect. In the donation subject of the present case. described. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. G. while in the latter. or.) Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former.onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. not during her lifetime. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. to become effective upon the death of the DONOR. but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. because a legacy may have an identical motivation. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. what amounts to the same thing. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. et al. R. ad nutum. the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor. 123968. HON. J. If it is mortis causa. with all the formalities for the validity of wills. 24 April 2003. the donation must be in the form of a will. there is nothing therein which indicates that any right. nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. URSULINA GANUELAS. Celestina Ganuelas Vda. ROBERT T. 2.

. On the other hand. meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime. They alleged that such donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments. If it is mortis causa. But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor. which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the following: 1. et al. Ursulina claimed ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private respondents Leocadia G. thus. what amounts to the same thing. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former. 2. that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive. except when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. then it is at that time that the donation takes effect. she executed a document revoking such donation. That before his death. to file a complaint before the San Fernando. ad nutum. otherwise it is void and cannot transfer ownership. it must be executed and accepted with the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code. If the donation is inter vivos. then the donation is inter vivos. while in the latter. but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed. challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. or. et al. the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will. void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments.However. If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death. not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation. nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator. Thus. The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its nature. The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis causa. with all the formalities for the validity of wills. ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa HELD: Crucial in the resolution of the issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. La Union Regional Trial Court (RTC). and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament. Flores. prompting Flores. the donation must be in the form of a will. Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply with the formalities of wills and testaments because such donation was inter vivos. more than a month before Celestina died. the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the donor. niece of Celestina any share in the produce of the properties despite repeated demands. After her death.

Phil. Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST WORLD). Belle Jaialai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation (FILGAME)from enforcing: (1) the Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling executed between PAGCOR and SAGE. et al. The deed contains an attestation clause expressly confirming the donation as mortis causa: To classify the donation as inter vivos simply because it is founded on considerations of love and affection is erroneous. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. Petitioner Ramon A. As stated in a long line of cases. the provision in the deed stating that if the donee should die before the donor. That the donation was prompted by the affection of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the latter is of no particular significance in determining whether the deed constitutes a transfer inter vivos or not. Then. love and affection may also underline transfers mortis causa. In other words. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.. 429 SCRA 533 (2004). taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar. filed a Petition seeking to restrain respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from continuing its operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents Sports and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE).) While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts. which the Supreme Court denied. the donation shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donation is a postmortem disposition. filed several motions for clarification. Gonzales. the Court enjoined PAGCOR. (2) the Grant of Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games between PAGCOR and BEST WORLD. it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise. and FILGAME from managing. PAGCOR et al. title or interest in the donated properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. because a legacy may have an identical motivation. In the donation subject of the present case. PHILIPPINES AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION. et al. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the formalities of a will under Article 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with. RAMON A. and (3) the ―Agreement‖ among PAGCOR. failing which the donation is void and produces no effect. BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations. In Del Mar v. one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. More.3. there is nothing therein which indicates that any right. More importantly. GONZALES v. As the subject deed then is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition. BELLE. The phrase ―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR‖ admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death.. J. much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. Amusement and Gaming Corp. as a citizen. maintaining and operating jai-alai games and from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for that purpose. not during her lifetime.

1869 itself is inconsistent with the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .D. consequently." and that. this Court ruling that PAGCOR "has a valid franchise to. the Court is unable to accept his invitation to re-examine said cases for the simple reason that the power conferred on it by the Constitution is limited to the adjudication of actual controversies and the determination of whether a branch or instrumentality of the government has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. the respondent BEST WORLD stated that it had been unable to operate its bingo terminals and bingo games since its closure and shut down by PAGCOR and DILG.D.) 1869. That the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with BELLE and FILGAME is void The second issue has already been raised in the Del Mar cases. Since Gonzeles did not endeavor to show that P. In its comment. as amended (the PAGCOR Charter). Gonzales does not point to any inconsistency between it and the present Constitution. sports. Instead. Indeed. BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jaialai operations and the "Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gambling" between PAGCOR and SAGE had been granted. 1869 has been rendered moot and academic In assailing the constitutionality of P. maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai. is unconstitutional for having been issued pursuant to an unlawful exercise of legislative power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos 2. but only by itself (i.D.D. albeit in the separate aforementioned cases of Del Mar and Jaworski. gaming pools and the like HELD: That the P. Even with its expanded jurisdiction. 1999 among PAGCOR. The said agreement was already declared invalid by the Supreme Court. the Agreement of June 17. BELLE and FILGAME was without force and effect.Respondents BELLE and FILGAME filed a Manifestation stating that they were impleaded in the instant petition by reason of the agreement which they executed with PAGCOR. Whether or not Presidential Decree (P. while Gonzales made several poignant observations regarding the jurisprudence in the foregoing cases.. Movants may derive some satisfaction in the knowledge that Gonzales‘ prayer that respondents be enjoined from enforcing the "Agreement" among PAGCOR. it questions its issuance as an illegal exercise of legislative powers by then President Marcos. it is beyond the powers of this Court to re-write history.e. his prayer that PAGCOR be enjoined from continuing its operations and doing acts in furtherance of its existence must necessarily be denied. not in association with any other person or entity) operate. 1869. Whether or not the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with its BELLE and FILGAME are void for being undue delegations by PAGCOR of its franchise to operate and maintain gambling casinos.

BY THE BAY. Irao (Paul). to pay monthly rentals renders them with unclean hands.) A notice or demand to vacate does not have to expressly use the word “vacate”. it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. the Court clarified that "since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai. Ruby Roxas (Ruby) the representative of the Estate of Doña Trinidad de Leon Roxas and Ronald Magbitang (Ronald) representative of By the Bay. filed a case of Forcible Entry to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City (MeTC) with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages. Ruby executed another contract of lease in favor of Paul T. Inc. PAGCOR can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest. contends that the letter sent to them by Ruby Roxas was the demand to pay the rental arrears and not a notice to terminate the contract of lease. By the Bay Inc. (Carpio-Morales. Inc. as it suffices that the demand letter puts the lessee or occupant on notice that if he does not pay the rentals demanded or comply with the terms of the lease contract. By the Bay‘s restaurant was closed by the City Government and they started defaulting in the payment of the rent." By the same token. it should move out of the leased premises. By the Bay. ISSUE: Whether or not the lessor‘s demand letter to respondent sufficiently contained a notice of termination of the lease contract and a demand to vacate the leased premises to justify the taking over the possession HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Paul. inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator‘s and/or management contracts. holding that the failure of By the Bay Inc. together with the Barangay Kagawad and Security Guards. forged a contract of lease of a 3-storey building located in Pasay City for 5 years. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MeTC. In Lim v. entered and took possession of the leased premises. it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise. PAUL T. 558 SCRA 315 (2008). SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR‘s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling. herein petitioner. much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. Inc. The MeTC dismissed the complaint of By the Bay Inc. INC. Pacquing. J. IRAO v. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals holding that Paul Irao should turn over the possession to By the Bay.

The phrase ―otherwise we shall be constrained.‖ as here. v. Being the law between the parties.‖ To ―warn‖ means ―to give notice to somebody beforehand. et al. Inc. using Dominique‘s surname Aquino.‖ The letter made it clear to respondent that the therein stated adverse consequences would ensue ―without further notice.36 within five days from notice. as in the present case. Jenie dela Cruz and Dominique Aquino lived together as husband and wife.‖ ―[W]here. ―the party is aware of the danger. may be terminated and cancelled forthwith. especially of danger.517.‖ Its purpose is ―to apprise a party of the existence of danger of which he is not aware to enable him to protect himself against it.333.) The requirement that the private handwritten instrument be signed by the acknowledging parent must be strictly complied with it the same is the lone evidence to prove filiation. much to our regret‖ in the letter sends a clear warning that failure to settle the amount within the stated period would constrain the lessor to ―terminate [the] Contract of Lease‖ and ―take the necessary legal measures against [respondent] to protect [its] interest without further notice.‖ The appellate court‘s ruling that the lessor‘s letter did not demand respondent to vacate is flawed. then this lease. the warning will serve no useful purpose and is unnecessary. GARCIA. The notice of impending termination was not something strange to respondent since it merely implemented the stipulation in Section 31 of their contract that ―if default or breach be made of any of such covenants and conditions. (2009). She attached to the Affidavits Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . cannot thus feign ignorance that the repossession of the leased property by the lessor and/or its representative-herein Paul was the appropriate legal measure it (respondent) itself authorized under their contract. and there is no duty to warn against risks which are open and obvious. The lessor demanded from By the Bay Inc. A notice or demand to vacate does not have to expressly use the word ―vacate. JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ. Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth. Two months after Dominique‘s death. the full payment of its unpaid rentals of P2. By the Nay. it should move out of the leased premises. J. etc. in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City 594 SCRA 648. Jenie gave birth to a child. Contractual stipulations empowering the lessor and/or his representative to repossess the leased property extrajudicially from a deforciant lessee. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales.‖ as it suffices that the demand letter puts the lessee or occupant on notice that if he does not pay the rentals demanded or comply with the terms of the lease contract. the lease contract would be deemed terminated and that its continued possession of the leased premises would no longer be permitted. with the Office of the City Civil Registrar. employment.‖ and a ―warning‖ may be ―a notice of termination of an agreement.‖ an unmistakable warning to respondent that upon its default. RONALD PAUL S. have been held to be valid. at the discretion of the LESSOR.The language and intent x x x of the demand letter are unambiguous. they must be respected.

Rule 2 of A. can be considered as a recognition of paternity HELD: Article 176 of the Family Code. though unsigned by him. however. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. however. as amended.2. Paragraph 2. Hence. does not. be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature.a document entitled ―AUTOBIOGRAPHY‖ – a handwritten document by Dominique which states that he and Jenie ―fell in love with each other. indeed. then we became good couples.O. substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. Jenie filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court. And as of now she is pregnant and for that we live together in our house now. 1. holding that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth. explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by the putative father. ISSUES: Whether or not the Autobiography. No. which dismissed the complaint on the ground that the autobiography was unsigned and it does not contain any express recognition of paternity. special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique‘s Autobiography. a private unsigned handwritten document. In the present case. Series of 2004. This provision must. this Petition for Review on Certiorari. merely articulated such requirement. it did not ―unduly expand‖ the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .‖ The City Civil Registrar denied Jenie‘s application.

Rizal. In view of the pronouncements herein made. et al. Third. there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique‘s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the ―paramount consideration‖ in resolving questions affecting him. the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation. Dulumbayan. there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique. Dominique died about two months prior to the child‘s birth. 2005. during his lifetime. she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4. and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents‘ house in Pulang-lupa. Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic. ZENAIDA SAN AGUSTIN Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and about two months after his death. correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. Jenie gave birth to the child – they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique‘s. Second. GIL JUSTALERO.‖ In the case at bar. Jenie‘s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique‘s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. the relevant matters in the Autobiography. Teresa. unquestionably handwritten by Dominique.First. v. and 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence. These circumstances indicating Dominique‘s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that ―JENIE DELA CRUZ‖ is ―MY WIFE‖ as ―WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER‖ and ―NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.

together with their other siblings. J. Chief. Jesus Justalero (Jesus) filed a complaint against Zenaida and Noemi for quieting of title and reconveyance with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo contending that the lots subject of the petition were falsely claimed by Zenaida and Noemi. and recommended for approval by Teodoro Simpas. Surveys Division. The RTC ruled in favor of Zenaida and Noemi. the Court of First Instance of Iloilo also approved the said Subdivision Plan by Order of May 22. 30898.GONZALES and NOEMI SAN AGUSTIN 517 SCRA 341 (2007). Subsequently.) Where there is no showing that the deceased Free Patent Applicant availed himself of a legal remedy to assail an adverse decision. Gil Justalero and the heirs of his deceased brother. Pcs-06000063 which bears a note on the lower portion thereof reading ―[t]his survey is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Geodetic Engineer. 32644 and 32645 all in the name of Vicente San Agustin and Rosario Sabella.‖ The same plan was certified as correct by Bernan Certeza. For their part. Gil added that Jesus in fact filed an application for Free Patent over the subject lot. a Transfer Certificate Titles were issued to Noemi and Zenaida. The Director of Lands through Regional Director Manuel Lagunilla also approved the same. his successors-in-interest are bound by the same. Furthermore. Gil and the heirs appealed to Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision. Noemi San Agustin and Zenaida San Agustin Gonzles. After nine years. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot which is claimed by Gil and the heirs is embraced in the transfer certificate titles of Noemi and Zenaida HELD: The basis of the issuance of Noemi‘s title is the Consolidation and Subdivision Plan. entered into a Subdivision Agreement wherein they parted the estate of their deceased parents. 1979 in ―In re: Petition for Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . which were owned by their deceased parent. Zenaida and Noemi aver that the lots were covered by an Original Certificate of Title (OCT).

LWUA extended its contract with QLEAN twice which accepted the first request for extension but did not grant the second extension of contract. Qlean ranked sixth among the lowest bidders. Qlean filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City against LWUA but it dismissed the complaint. Consequently. LWUA entered into a one year janitorial service contract with Fast Manpower Services. Pending the completion of the bids. his successors-in-interest-herein . There is no showing that Gil Justaleros‘ predecessor-in-interest. Cadastral Lot No. Jesus Justalero as Free Patent applicant availed himself of any legal remedy to assail the said decision which was adverse to him. the Bureau of Lands. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION.. alleging that the bids of the first five lowest bidders should have been rejected for not being in conformity with the Minimum Wage Law and that Qlean‘s one-year contract of janitorial maintenance services was the lowest complying bid and most advantageous to the government. unless an unfairness or injustice is shown.Justalero and the heirs are bound by the decision. ISSUE: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the contract should have been awarded to it. Justalero. Hence. Iloilo City rendered a Decision in the above-stated Free Patent application filed by Jesus J. Subsequently. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. 2596. Betty S.‖ Moreover. the contract was renewed on a monthly basis. JR. Pcs-06-000063 which is now titled in the name of Noemi. declaring that the subject lot. 500 SCRA 52 (2006). URBANES. almost two years before the filing of Justalero and the heirs‘ complaint. Qlean then appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the RTC decision. PLACIDO O. is identical to Lot 8. the losing bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice.) Government as advertiser makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids.Approval of Consolidation and Subdivision Plan in accordance with Section 44 of Act 496 and Act 440. doing business under the name and style of LAGING QLEAN JANITORIAL SERVICES v. nor to compel it to accept his bid. the lowest bidder. hence. LWUA through its In-House Procurement Bidding Committee (IHPBC) conducted a public bidding for Janitorial Services for a period of one (1) year. Petitioner Laging Qlean Janitorial Services (Qlean) and respondent Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) entered into a contract wherein the former will render janitorial services for latter for one year which after the lapse of said period. Petitioner. et al. prompting Qlean to file a complaint against LWUA et al. hence he has no ground of action to compel the Government to award the contract in his favor. Villanueva. J.

David mortgaged a parcel of land registered under her name in favor of Landbank. In such cases. makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids. A Restructured Loan Agreement was subsequently executed. DAVID 563 SCRA 172 (2008). In determining what is an iniquitous and unconscionable. may not be reviewed by the courts. deliberation and decision. Demands for payment were made but David failed to settle her loan obligations. there is no binding obligation to award the contract to any bidder and in the exercise of such discretion the award may be made validly to whoever among the participating bidders has submitted the most advantageous bid. (Carpio Morales. obtained a loan from Landbank of the Philippines. nor to compel it to accept his bid. David defaulted in the payment of her monthly amortizations. Landbank moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court‘s decision. a reservation in the advertisement for bids of the right to reject any bid generally vests in the authorities a wide discretion as to who is the best and most advantageous bidder. David was not able to pay although there were initial payments made. J. On appeal. and nullifying the extra-judicial foreclosure of David‘s property and deleting the award of damages and attorney‘s fees. proprietor of David Poultry Farm. The trial court however dismissed David‘s complaint and instead granted Landbank‘s counterclaim. he has no ground of action to compel the Government to award the contract in his favor. the whole amount became due and demandable. Yolanda David. availing itself of that right. Accordingly. is enlightening: ―Government as advertiser. YOLANDA G. David filed a complaint seeking the nullification of the interest rates imposed by Landbank. which are quasi-judicial functions. Fernandez. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and when honestly performed. unless an unfairness or injustice is shown. comparison. hence. Jr. prompting Landbank to initiate foreclosure proceedings.Whether or not Qlean may compel LWUA to award the contract in its favor HELD: LWUA made a reservation to reject bids as the Invitation to Prequalify and Bid published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer shows: ―LWUA reserves the right to reject any or all the bids.‖ The exercise of such discretion involves inquiry.) Whether an interest rate or penalty charge is reasonable or iniquitous is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. the losing bidder has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice. As security for the payment of the aforesaid loan.‖ The discourse in his ―A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW‖ of former Commissioner of the Commission on Audit Bartolome C. investigation. but the same was denied. courts must consider the circumstances of each case. the Court of Appeals modified the lower court‘s decision by reducing the interest and penalty rates. The Restructured Loan Agreement provided that the interest rate shall be adjusted to 17% per annum. Due to serious business reverses. for what may be just in one case may be iniquitous and unconscionable in another. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. x x x Verily. The loan shall bear an interest ―based on the prevailing lender‘s rates/special financing rate‖ and penalty charge of 12% per annum in case of default in the settlement thereof.

obtained her signature on the SPA through fraud by representing to her that the purpose was to secure a loan with which to build a house. the public auction of the mortgaged property is nevertheless void. Lim claimed that Amay. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . About two years after the execution of the SPA. And the law empowers them to reduce penalty charges. In their Answer. according to its own terms. Tong. Whether an interest rate or penalty charge is reasonable or iniquitous is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. hence. TONG. the amount indicated as mortgage indebtedness having included excessive. J. president and treasurer. whether or not the foreclosure proceedings can be nullified HELD: Jurisprudence empowers courts to equitably reduce interest rates. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. and Propmech alleged that Lim co-signed the SPA empowering Ong and Tong to mortgage the property for the purpose of fully satisfying their outstanding obligation. iniquitous. courts must consider the circumstances of each case. Lim received a Notification of Foreclosure of the mortgage. The SPA authorized Ong and Tong to mortgage or encumber a parcel of land owned by Spouses Lim. respectively. 574 SCRA 545. Linda Uy Lim (Lim) and her husband Saturnino Lim (Amay) executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Philip Ong (Ong) and Helen Tong (Tong). In determining what is an iniquitous and unconscionable. LINDA UY LIM v.) Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of hid rights must be alleged and proved by clear and convincing evidence.000.ISSUES: Whether or not the interest rate is exorbitant and unconscionable and if such. In 1994. et al. (2008). Ong. and had not received any amount from Propmech. drawing her to file before the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City a Complaint against attorneys-in-fact Tong and Ong.000 obligation which the Lim spouses purportedly obtained from it. and exorbitant interest rate and penalty charge. HELEN O. In late 1996. for what may be just in one case may be iniquitous and unconscionable in another. While the nullity of the interest rate and penalty charge does not affect Landbank‘s right to recover the principal amount of the loan. of Propmech Corporation (Propmech) where Amay worked as sales manager. the Real Estate Mortgage was null and void. She also claimed that she had never been indebted to. from whom she had in the meantime been separated and had not heard from. the subject property was made the subject of a Real Estate Mortgage executed by Tong in favor of Propmech to secure a P1. and subsequently received a Sheriff‘s Notice of Public Auction Sale.

Malayan Realty Inc. prompting Malayan to file before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila a complaint for ejectment. INC. not due to the strict application of procedural rules. In fact. MALAYAN REALTY. Lim's subsequent position thus fails. and not intended to authorize respondents to mortgage the property.and that Lim received the amount of P400. After several years. entered into a verbal lease contract with Uy Han Yong over an apartment unit located in Manila. The RTC and the Court of Appeals both declared that the Real Estate Mortgage was legally executed and accordingly dismissed Lim‘s complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not Philip Ong and Helen Tong were within the bounds of the SPA when they executed the Real Estate Mortgage HELD: By Lim's admission. her allegation in her complaint that she agreed to sign the SPA believing that the "intention and purpose behind the same was to secure a loan with which to build the house that she had long dreamed of to be erected on the lot in question" confirms that she agreed to authorize the attorneys-in-fact to perform the acts therein enumerated including encumbering the property by way of mortgage.that she signed the SPA merely as a formality to guarantee her husband's supposed advances in the sum of P400.000. It is inconceivable that she did not understand the contents of what she was signing. he refused to vacate the property. (2006). Despite Uy‘s receipt of the notice. Malayan sent Uy a written notice informing him that the lease contract would no longer be renewed or extended. and due process.) The power of the courts to establish a grace period is potestative or discretionary. justice. as well as before the Court of Appeals and this Court. The MeTC dismissed Malayan‘s complaint. J. v. At the witness stand. She is a college graduate who had worked as a Regional Operations Clerk of Metrobank. A party to a case should decide early on what version he is going to adopt. she having believed her husband's assurance that said advances would be deducted from his salaries and commissions in the course of his employment at the corporation..000 in 1994 and 1995 from them representing a portion of the loan for the purpose of building a house. UY HAN YONG 467 SCRA 411. Malayan appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which set Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . but because it is contrary to the rules of fair play. petitioner posited a different claim . MeTC held that Uy could not be ejected on the ground of termination of the contract. A change of theory in the later stage of the proceedings is impermissible. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. she read the SPA before signing it. depending on the particular circumstances of the case.

if the rent agreed upon is monthly. given that the notice of termination of the lease was served upon him more than 30 days before its effectivity. HEIRS OF MARINA C. In the present case. Malayan thus maintains that no "equitable reason" justifies Uy‘s continued possession of the property for more than four years from the time the complaint for ejectment was filed. effectively his right to stay in the premises had come to an end on August 31. it is understood to be from month to month. a longer term may be granted where equities come into play. On the basis of Article 1687 of the New Civil Code. Malayan asserts that an extension of the period of a lease may be sought by the tenant before. the courts may fix a longer term for the lease. which time is. 2001 up to the present time. and Uy Han Yong has been occupying the premises since 1958. a written notice was served upon respondent on January 17. the extension of said term has been sought by appropriate action and judgment is eventually rendered therein granting the relief. and not after the termination of the lease. 2001. v. however. that in the event that the lessee has occupied the leased premises for over a year. Effectively. the lease period was not agreed upon by the parties. 2001. The Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision by shortening the extension of the lease contract to one year from the finality of the decision. Rental was paid monthly.et al. and may be denied where none appears. As Uy han Yong was notified of the expiration of the lease. but that Uy did not so request even after the complaint was filed in court. the RTC extended the lease contract for a period of five years. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Uy‘s lease has been extended for more than five years. and that Uy had sufficient time to request for extension. Uy has remained in possession of the property from the time the complaint for ejectment was filed on September 18. 24 The 2nd paragraph of Article 1687 provides. deemed sufficient as an extension and for him to find another place to stay. In the case at bar. As earlier stated. under the circumstances. The lease contract thus expires at the end of each month. always with due deference to the parties‘ freedom to contract. The power of the courts to establish a grace period is potestative or discretionary.aside the judgment of the MeTC. 2001 terminating the lease effective August 31. ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in granting a one year extension of the lease reckoned from the finality of the decision HELD: Under Article 1687 of the New Civil Code if the period of a lease contract has not been specified by the parties. unless prior thereto. Thus. depending on the particular circumstances of the case. REGALADO.

Thus.516 SCRA 38 (2007). and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership HELD: Whether or not Marina and her heirs have registrable rights over the subject land Here. Metro Manila. and the technical descriptions. Whether or not Marina and her heirs have rights over the subject land 2. Marina and her heirs fail to comply with the proper technical description that should be indicated in the registration. 21-A and 21-B that would actually put the interested parties on notice of the registration proceeding. and would confer authority on the land registration court to pass upon the issue of the registerability of said lots in favor of Marina and her heirs. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Whether or not Marina and her heirs had been in open. were in London. 21-A and 21-B. She withdrew the application on the grounds of discrepancies on the question of the survey and accession number corresponding to the survey plan of the property and for the inevitable absence of the applicant from the country to arrange and assist in the intestate estate of her late widowed sister whose children. Marina Regalado filed an application for registration of a parcel of land in Marikina. ISSUE: 1. Her surviving heirs pursued and litigated the land registration case in her behalf.The Court held that such is a serious defect and should be precise for purposes of identification. It was published in the Official Gazette and in Nueva Era. The CA thereafter dismissed the application for registration of the Heirs of Regalado. and notice to the public. but of certain portions thereof designated by applicant as Lots Nos. Regalado died. Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court. delineation. as published. 21). all minors. She further alleges that she acquired the land by virtue of a Deed of Assignment executed by the registered claimant Tomas Antero as assignor in her favor. boundaries and technical description of the land being registered and shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic holding that there was discrepancy in the lot size and technical description between the original. it is the publication of the specific boundaries of Lot Nos. Here.) An application for registration of land is required to indicate location. not of the big parcel of land (Lot No. and distinction. an application for registration of land is required to indicate location. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. It is the technical description of these two smaller lots that must be published in order that the persons who may be affected by their registration may be notified thereof. During the pendency of the application. the application in this case filed in the court was for registration. a newspaper of general circulation. Regalado later filed an Amended Application for Registration alleging that she had been in open and continuous possession and occupation of said land which is alienable and disposable of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. J. continuous. boundaries and technical description of the land being registered and shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times.

398 SCRA 97 (2003). In her testimony. Molina filed an action for reformation of instrument and/or annulment of document and title with reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale does not express the true will of the parties. she stated that she intended to pay taxes only if and when ordered to do so by the court. 1602. As for the tax declaration. More than four years after petitioner Pedro Molina (Molina) executed the Deed of Sale conveying his share of the property to his sister Felisa. the evidence indicates that Marina possessed and occupied a small portion of the property. PEDRO MOLINA v. That the alleged loan was received by Molina in installments Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . while some 600 other parties possessed and occupied the rest. and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership fails. there is no proof that Marina religiously paid taxes on the property. and (b) that their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. and adverse possession in the concept of owner under a bona fide claim of ownership Marina and her heirs had not been in open. ISSUE: Whether the parties intended the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Flores and Herrera to be an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage HELD: For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Art. two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale. et al. J. In the case at bar. Molina executed another Deed of Absolute Sale in lieu of the first deed covering the same share in favor of Felisa‘s son respondent Margarito Flores and his wife Nerisa Herrera. the transaction indicated was one of sale on installment. a party signed receipts under which he acknowledged receiving sums of money as payment for his property. which receipts were worded in the vernacular and could not have been mistaken or misunderstood for anything else other than as evidence of the sale of his property. continuous.) If prior to the execution of the impugned Deed. At most. continuous. Margarito and Nerisa appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC‘s decision and dismissed the complaint of Molina. COURT OF APPEALS.Whether or not Marina and her heirs had been in open. the second requisite is conspicuously absent. There is no proof to sustain that Maria and her relatives have been residing in the property for more than 30 years and that she herself has been residing there for 15 years when Tomas Antero executed the deed of assignment in her favor. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. The RTC ruled in favor of Molina and ordered the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale.

of P1. predecessor of Ninoy Aquino International Airport Authority (NAIAA). J.000. Molina argues that assuming arguendo that a contract of sale was entered into. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales.000. leased to United Bus Lines (UBL) a portion of a state-owned lot. The contract remains but the payment of the price is a resolutory condition. The Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). UBL was dispossessed of certain portions of the leased premises for an approximately ten-year period from 1980 to 1990 due to the presence of squatters in certain portions thereof as well as the adverse claims of ownership from some individuals and entities This led UBL to file an action to reform the lease agreement so as to have a new term of fifteen years. and the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or. It confirms this Court‘s earlier observation that the transaction indicated was one of sale on installment. hence. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of UBL extending the lease contract for another ten years from the finality of the decision. to start running after the premises are totally cleared by the NAIAA of any form of disturbance. NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v.) Nothing appears objectionable in the lease contract between United Bus Lines and Ninoy Aquino International Airport such that the latter is no less bound by its terms and conditions like any other private person or entity that is party to a contract. by the Deed in question Molina acknowledged receipt of the P8. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court‘s finding that United Bus Lines are entitled to a ten-year extension of their lease contract with the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Authority Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . it does not by itself bar the transfer of the ownership or possession of the property. Assuming that to be so albeit. much less dissolve the contract of sale. which receipts were worded in the vernacular and could not have been mistaken or misunderstood for anything else other than as evidence of the sale of his property. seals the case against him.00 in fact indicates that the transaction was not one of a loan but of sale on installment. in case of a substantial breach. The lease contract contained a provision that the terms shall be considered as extended for a period of time equal to that during which lessee was not in possession of the leased premises.00 purchase price. COURT OF APPEALS. signed receipts under which he acknowledged receiving sums of money as payment for his property. to rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. it applied the stipulation on the contract providing for the extension of the lease for such period. it was not consummated as the entire purchase price was not paid. 398 SCRA 703 (2003).000. et al. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals finding evidence supporting UBL‘s main averment that UBL was dispossessed of certain portions of the leased premises for ten (10) years.00 per month for ten months or a total of P10. That Molina. prior to the execution of the impugned Deed.

respondent UBL would hold on to the leased premises for a period longer than it is entitled under the ten-year extension. thereby calling for the application of the contractual provision on extension of term. DR. (Carpio-Morales. v. At all events. and despite demands to vacate. The extension must thus begin on the day following the termination of the amended lease contract or on May 8. 2000. NAIAA‘s obligation to deliver to UBL the entire leased premises and maintain the latter in peaceful.HELD: Regardless of the extent of dispossession.) A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner.. have been in possession of a parcel of land in Bantay. When UBL could not occupy and use portions of the leased premises. good customs or public policy. Pilar filed a complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bantay. THIRD DIVISION. Prospero Pilar. or to allow the lessee to remove the improvements. SAMUEL PARILLA. PROSPERO PILAR 509 SCRA 420 (2006). Ilocos Sur which was leased to them by respondent Dr. they have already occupied the premises in the exercise of their adjudged right to the extension for the full period of ten years. A contract is the law between the parties and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so long as it is not contrary to law. Spouses Samuel and Chinita Parilla and their son. Since UBL and Silva have in fact been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the premises since the promulgation of the trial court‘s decision of May 31. J. as dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell). It also ordered Pilar to reimburse the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the provision on extension of term applies since the UBL‘s failure to use a portion of the leased premises is equivalent to a dispossession from the entire area in question. While the Court upholds the trial court‘s and appellate court‘s ruling that UBL is entitled to a ten-year extension of the period of lease. Hence. If that were the case. 1990. the Parillas and the other occupants remained in the property. 1990 and during the pendency of the case at bar. it was in effect deprived of possession thereof for there was incomplete performance by the petitioner of its principal prestation. Nothing appears objectionable in the lease contract between respondents and petitioner such that the latter is no less bound by its terms and conditions like any other private person or entity that is party to a contract. The MTC ordered the Parillas to vacate and to pay Pilar a reasonable compensation for the use of the property. under the Civil Code. the Parillas remained in possession of the property on which they built improvements. When the lease contract between Pilipinas Shell and Pilar expired. morals. upon termination of the lease contract. it is the lessor who is given the option. By the terms of the contract then. whether total or partial. either to appropriate the useful improvements by paying one-half of their value at that time. et al. Ilocos Sur. to last for a 10-year period or up to May 8. uninterrupted possession was indivisible. it does not uphold that which reckons the period from the date of finality of the decision of the trial court. thereby virtually rendering nugatory petitioner‘s right of ownership over the premises.

that it was only on February 22. It appears. and respondent QVEGG Marine Transport and Builders Corporation (QVEGG) as lessee. The Parillas claim for reimbursement of the alleged entire value of the improvements does not thus lie under Article 1678.Parillas the amount Two Million Pesos representing the value of the improvements introduced on the property. agent or usufructuary. the Court of Appeals set aside the lower courts decision. This option solely belongs to the lessor as the law is explicit that ―[s]hould the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount.‖ It appears that the lessor has opted not to reimburse. of the structures they originally built — the billiard hall. Pilar appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Vigan and the RTC affirmed the MTC‘s Decision. the lessee may remove the improvements. by the Parillas‘ admission. or to allow the lessee to remove the improvements.‖ PFDA would terminate the contract and file the necessary legal action. ISSUES: Whether or not the Parillas are entitled to reimbursement for the improvements being builders in good faith HELD: Jurisprudence is replete with cases which categorically declare that Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders.g. J. have a claim of title thereto. At all events. it is the lessor who is given the option. at least.‖ Should QVEGG fail to comply with the ―instructions.. 467 SCRA 449 (2005).’’ Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) as lessor. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. sari-sari store and a parking lot. A tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no pretension to be owner. et al. on Pilar‘s petition for review. receipts or other documentary evidence detailing costs of construction. The right of the lessor upon the termination of a lease contract with respect to useful improvements introduced on the leased property by a lessee is covered by Article 1678. restaurant. COURT OF APPEALS. e. only the ―bodega-like‖ sari-sari store and the parking lot now exist. it is Article 1678 of the New Civil Code which applies to the present case. QVEGG was delinquent in the performance of its contractual obligations so QVEGG requested the restructuring of its overdue account which was granted by the PFDA subject to several ―instructions. such as a mere tenant. there being no substantial evidence. but not when the interest is merely that of a holder.) The New Civil Code provides that “various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together.00. however. upon termination of the lease contract. 1993 Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . sowers or planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or.000. either to appropriate the useful improvements by paying one-half of their value at that time. even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. Not even for one-half of such alleged value. entered into a 10-year lease contract covering the Iloilo Fishing Port Complex slipways and other auxiliary facilities for a monthly rental of P85. attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. Clearly. under Article 1678. However. Besides.

Lauro Leviste. paragraph c of the ―instructions‘ cannot stand alone independently of paragraph 3 of the lease contract for paragraph c does not provide for the amount. The New Civil Code provides that ―various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together.‖ The RTC found for QVEGG and declared illegal the termination of the contract by the PFDA. within a period of three (3) years. In the meantime. Jr. period or manner of payment. Said paragraph c did not amend paragraph 3 of the lease contract. a stockholder and member of the Board wants a rescission of the sale. LAURO LEVISTE. PFDA contended that paragraph 3 of the contract was rendered ineffective by the new terms and conditions of the ―instructions. any cancellation or issuance of title over the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same would have to be subject to the outcome of the suit. as President.825 hectares in Occidental Mindoro to Fernando O. on the other hand. Both QVEGG and PFDA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed their petitions for want of merit. et al. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. Jose P.that QVEGG paid its January 1993 space rental and electric and water bills.000 hectares of the property to the latter. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . this petition. attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.‘‘ Indeed. PFDA then terminated their contract for failure of QVEGG to strictly comply with the terms and conditions imposed. ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 3 of the lease contract is rendered ineffective by the new terms and conditions set forth in the ―instructions‖ HELD: The termination by the PFDA of the contract is illegal since paragraph 3 of the contract calls for its termination only after the QVEGG fails for two successive months to comply with its obligations thereunder. Carrascoso. Thus. executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell whereby the former agreed to sell 1. This was denied. Hence. J. Carrascoso and the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). it is only the QVEGG that fails. QVEGG. hence. 477 SCRA 634 (2005). Leviste. In view of Carrascoso‘s failure to pay the balance of the purchase price. Carpio Morales. it holding that paragraph c of the ―instructions‖ did not modify paragraph 3 of the lease contract but it did not grant QVEGG‘s prayer for damages. sought reconsideration explaining that it interpreted paragraph c of the ―instructions‖ in relation to paragraph 3 of the contract which provides for that its failure to pay rentals for two successive months shall be a ground for the termination of the contract. El Dorado Plantation sold a parcel of land with an area of approximately 1. QVEGG then filed a complaint for Enforcement of Contract and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

but (3) does not create a non-existent right or lien. and (2) binds a purchaser of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that will be promulgated thereon whether such a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser or not. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the CFI granting the rescission of El Dorado. otherwise by successive alienations pending the litigation. the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and while it remains uncancelled. a purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation. which forbid a litigant to give rights to others. Carrascoso and PLDT forged a Deed of Absolute Sale over the 1. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that PLDT took the right. its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution. interest and title to the farm subject to the notice of lis pendens HELD: Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered.sent a letter to Carrascoso informing him that. The CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground of prematurity. Two years after their agreement to Buy and Sell. Carrascoso alleged that he was given an extension to pay the balance and El Dorado committed a gross misrepresentation when it warranted that the property was not being cultivated by any tenant to take it out of the coverage of the Land Reform Code. In other words. the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded. more often than not. pending the litigation.000 hectare portion of the property. to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution or decision. Hence. so as to affect the proceedings of the court then progressing to enforce those rights. any cancellation or issuance of title over the land involved as well as any subsequent transaction affecting the same would have to be subject to the outcome of the suit. PLDT alleged that it is a purchaser in good faith and for value. El Dorado was seeking the rescission with damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI). The filing of a notice of lis pendens in effect (1) keeps the subject matter of litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment so as to prevent the defeat of the latter by successive alienations. Lauro and El Dorado also caused to be annotated a Notice of Lis Pendens. the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered. The doctrine of lis pendens is based on considerations of public policy and convenience. Notice of lis pendens has been conceived and. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity. this petition for review. availed of.

or delay.) Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud. filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon. When Editha died. Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud. PLDT cannot shield itself from the notice of lis pendens because all that it had at the time of its inscription was an Agreement to Buy and Sell with Carrascoso. They alleged that the delay in the delivery of the message contributed to the early death of Editha. asking her to send money for their mother Editha Verchez (Editha) who at that time was confined in a hospital in Sorsogon. are liable for damages.rule being necessary to the administration of justice in order that decisions in pending suits may be binding and may be given full effect. 481 SCRA 384 (2006). it is not protected from an adverse judgment that may be rendered in the case subject of the notice of lis pendens. ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper despite the fact that there was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts HELD: RCPI‘s stand fails. ALFONSO VERCHEZ. respondent Alfonso Verchez (Alfonso). RCPI argues that there is no privity of contract between other respondents except with Grace. and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof. and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffs-herein-co-respondents. and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof. Respondent Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace) hired the services of Radio Communications of the Philippines. The RTC rendered judgement against RCPI. RCPI appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). Inc. also the delay in the delivery is caused by force majeure. her husband. negligence. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. or delay. that there may be an end to litigation. are liable for damages. and to preserve the property that the purpose of the pending suit may not be defeated by successive alienations and transfers of title. v. which in effect is a mere contract to sell that did not pass to it the ownership of the property. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. maintaining further that they exercised due diligence in choosing their employees. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract with regard to Grace. PLDT's possession at the time the notice of lis pendens was registered not being a legal possession based on ownership but a mere possession in fact and the Agreement to Buy and Sell under which it supposedly took possession not being registered. along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses. But it took 25 days before such message was conveyed to Zenaida. INC. et al. (RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister respondent Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida). by keeping the subject matter in controversy within the power of the court until final adjudication. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES. J. negligence. hence they must be released from any liability.

Bacalso filed a Petition for the Reconstitution of Lost Certificate of Title covering the same lot before the RTC. it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. J. Years later. RCPI failed. It took 25 days. its messenger claimed he could not locate the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt that he was able to deliver the telegram. And for quasi-delict. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. however. to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. however. There lies the fault or negligence. nonetheless. is obliged to pay for the damage done. it should have at least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the nondelivery s that she could have taken steps to remedy the situation. in the name of Pascual Ocariza. in representation of the Heirs of Pascual Ocariza. Cebu City but was dismissed by the RTC. it was found that Decree No. RCPI is liable to Grace‘s co-respondents following Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person‘s participation – whether by active intervention. RCPI invokes force majeure. But it did not. Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the telegram at the soonest possible time. situated in Inayawan. Such fault or negligence. 99211 has already been issued on the lot. alleging that pursuant to the decree. 4147 had been issued by the Register of Deed. the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message.In the case at bar. It was held that upon verification of Record Books of Cadastral Lots.) There must be sufficient evidence to prove that an Original Certificate of Title was issued to his predecessors-ininterest for an order of reconstitution to be valid. Additionally. RCPI‘s liability as an employer could of course be avoided if it could prove that it observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code. there being fault or negligence. specifically. for RCPI to deliver it. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. an original certificate of title to said Lot No. RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. Remedios Bacalso. For the defense of force majeure to prosper. but the owner's Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . HEIRS OF PASCUAL OCARIZA. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. neglect or failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. One‘s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another. REPRESENTED BY CO-HEIR BACALSO 566 SCRA 92 (2008).

Assuming arguendo that there was indeed a Decree No. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. after the LRA recommended its dismissal. was issued to Pascual Ocariza. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of reconstitution is valid HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious not on the ground advanced by the Solicitor General but on the ground that there is no evidence to show that the alleged Decree No. It was thus palpably wrong for RTC Cebu to credit heirs' attorney-in-fact Remedios Bacalso's testimony that the decree was issued in the name of Pascual Ocariza "per" LRA Report. "not among the salvaged decrees on file in the Land Registration Authority. 99211 which is.duplicate and original copy of which on file in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The Solicitor General appealed the RTC‘s decision. arguing that the heirs failed to prove their interest. the heirs‘ alleged predecessor-in-interest. which application was deemed withdrawn by Branch 17 of the RTC on their motion. to credit Remedios Bacalso's testimony that the decree was issued in the name of Pascual Ocariza "per" the LRA Report because nothing in said Report is there any statement that the decree was issued in the name of Pascual Ocariza.) Being jobless and a drug user is not a state or condition or attitude shown to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition. as reflected above. upon payment of the required fees. RTC ordered the reconstitution of the lost original certificate of title in the name of Pascual Ocariza. That even the heirs of Pascual Ocariza were not aware of any such decree is shown by the fact that. and to credit Remedios Bacalso's testimony that a title was issued covering the lot in the name of Pascual Ocariza. they had years earlier filed an application for original registration covering the lot. and an Original Certificate of Title. as shown in the Report of the LRA. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. J. 99211. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . that the decree was issued in the name of Pascual Ocariza. then left Manolito for being jobless and hooked into gambling and drugs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. before filing their Petition for Reconstitution. Repondents Manolito San Jose and Laila Tanyag-San Jose got married. were lost during the last World War. Thereafter Laila gave birth to two children. however." there is no statement. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and MANOLITO SAN JOSE 517 SCRA 123 (2007). the duplicate copy of which was lost as well as the original copy in the possession of the Cebu Registry of Deeds. Laila.

Tayag shows. the term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Manolito is psychologically incapacitated HELD: Psychological incapacity. the lack of concern to his family. it is essential that it must be shown that the other party is incapable of doing so due to psychological incapacity not physical illness. Tayag's Psychological Report does not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of Manolito was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Nedy Tayag found that Manolito was psychologically incapacitated based on the testimony of Laila. the absence of remourse. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. as a ground for nullity of marriage. It is ―unscientific and unreliable. as these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. As the earlier-quoted Report of Dr. the doctor‘s conclusion is hearsay. Neither does it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . and his self-centeredness.‖ so this Court declared in Choa v. Laila appealed to Court of Appeals (CA). Dr. her conclusion about Manolito‘s psychological incapacity was based on the information supplied by Laila which she found to be ―factual. Dr. the constant incapacity in terms of maintaining the marital relationship.Laila then filed a Petition for Declartion of Nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Brix Ferraris (Ferraris). Armida Perez-Ferraris v. The CA concluded that the deficiency of Manolito was so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Dr. The CA held that Manolito was psychologically incapacitated hence their marriage is void ab Initio. The RTC denied Laila‘s petition on the ground that it is not enough to prove that one failed to perform his marital duty. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.‖ Undoubtedly. has been succinctly expounded in the recent case of Ma. In this case. Parenthetically. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to. Dr. Consequently. his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. Choa where the assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated was based merely on the information communicated to the doctor by the therein respondent-spouse. Tayag further said that he suffers from anti-social personality disorder because of the following overt manipulations: the presence of drug.

even bringing the matter before barangay authorities but the latter were ―uncooperative. The MTC held that Martin et al. Rimasug et al. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against them with Municipal Trial Court (MTC). respondents had satisfactorily proven that they are duly recognized agricultural tenants of SMCCU on the subject lots. J. without their knowledge and consent.. were ―either employees or relatives of some employees‖ who were members of the San Miguel Cooperative Credit Union (SMCCU) organized by the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) labor force.‖ In the meantime. as well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Rimasug et al. Petitioners Norberto Rimasug et al. however.cause.’s occupation of the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . of their intention to build their houses thereon and accordingly asked them to vacate within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. could not ―come up with money to start a legal battle with respondents‖ tolerated Martin‘s et al. contrary to the findings of both the MTC and the RTC. to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition. The appellate court held that. On appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). on notice of their ownership. that respondents Melencio Martin et al. NORBERTO RIMASUG et al. entered the lots on which they planted various agricultural crops. MELENCIO MARTIN et al. And it belied Rimasug et al. however.’s claim of having tolerated Martin et al. They later came to know. failed to prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship ordering them to vacate the premises. It merely states that "such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply immersed within the system and continues to influence the individual until the later stage of life.) Concurrence of all the essential requisites must be established by substantial evidence to prove the existence of a tenancy relationship between the previous landowner and the subsequent landowner. continued occupation of their lots until they advised Martin et al. Martin et al. Due to financial constraints. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Separate titles were issued in their favor. filed an Urgent Verified Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Injunction and Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. Manolito's state or condition or attitude has not been shown. thereupon put Martin et al. were unable to construct houses on their respective lots." Manolito's alleged psychological incapacity is thus premised on his being jobless and a drug user. Rimasug et al. it affirmed the decision of MTC. The appellate court reversed RTC decision and dismissed the complaint of Rimasug et al. v. When the demand went unheeded Rimasug et al. SMCCU acquired several lots and were sold to Rimasug et al. 475 SCRA 703 (2005).

He submits that the statements. Larong of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Fernando T. – and No. LARONG 561 SCRA 493 (2008).) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production.) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. On that score alone. J. 1 – that the parties are the landowner and the tenant is agricultural lessee. HELD: For this purpose. 3 – that there is consent between the parties – not being present. ATTY. By their own admission. however false or malicious they may be. the concurrence of all the following essential requisites must be established by substantial evidence: 1. should not be stripped of their privileged nature. it charging the former ―as former employees or workers of the previous landowner company‖ with actual knowledge of the latter‘s tenancy.) Utterances. although the official receipts issued to them were under the name of SMCCU. The Investigation Commissioner found Larong guilty of grave misconduct.) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. while opening up a lawyer to possible administrative sanction for the use of intemperate language under the Canons of Professional Responsibility. requirements No. for how could respondents have contracted with a landowner whose identity they are not even certain of? Such uncertainty becomes more pronounced when note is taken that before the trial and appellate courts they maintained that the lots are owned by SMC. 4. 2. JOSE C. were ―informed‖ that the lots they are tilling are ―allegedly‖ owned by SMC because the one collecting the payments was working at SMC. only if they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry. Petitioner Jose C. Martin et al. petitions and motions are considered as absolutely privileged. and Martin et al. Saberon charged respondent Atty. Larong seeks for the Court‘s declaration that the questioned allegations were privileged communication. and 6.) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in finding that there was an implied tenancy relationship between the Rimasug et al. SABERON v. On the other hand.) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. FERNANDO T. 5.) there is consent between the parties to the relationship.lots. Saberon nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. the claim of the existence of a tenancy relationship fails. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . 3.

In light of Larong's apologies. FAUSTINO AND ILUMINADA G. the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness. the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which. The RTC dismissed the complaint. petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged. ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND. misconduct. Respecting Larong's argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged. the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the RTC decision and concluded that Faustino owned only 753 sq. ISSUE: Whether or not a description of a lot area can be used as evidence for purchase and ownership of the lot Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .) In a contract of sale of land in a mass. it suffices to stress that lawyers. a lawyer's language even in his pleadings must be dignified.381 sq. Bienvenido S. JUAN CASTILLO v. SPOUSES BIENVENIDO S. but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry. while Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language. rather than grave. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. under the circumstances. however false or malicious they may be. including Benjamin Salinas and Dolores Salinas. Thus. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. Faustino purchased from his several co-heirs. m. DOLORES SALINAS. the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. m. though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients. FAUSTINO 566 SCRA 18 (2008). their respective shares to a parcel of land consisting of 1. utterances. True. On appeal. Salinas contended that her signature on the Deed of Sale was forged and she paid the taxes due on the land she is occupying. is considered simple. such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit Larong's disbarment. should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment. Faustino and his wife filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Salinas alleging that she is occupying part of former‘s land. of the land. J.ISSUES: Whether or not Larong is guilty of grave misconduct HELD: On many occasions.

and not the area in sq. m. m. it is the boundaries indicated in a deed of absolute sale. and 2) Salinas occupied 628 sq. m. the 628 sq. Why the appellate court. hence. given that respondents base their claim of ownership of the questioned 628 sq.375 sq. Spouses Valdez opposed such act. Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject property.. This prompted Spouses Valdez to file. Spouses Fausto own the remaining 753 sq. m. lot surveyed for Benjamin P. m. reflected in Exh. lot. 1962 Deed of Sale was the 1. Bk 5-K. Psd-8268. m. Conciliation was then initiated.375 sq. 1017 in her name. parcel of land reflected in the Plan-Exh. J.. concluded that what was sold via the 1962 Deed of Sale to respondent Faustino was the remaining 753 sq. 1962 Deed of Sale covering a 300. m. the basis of the appellate court‘s conclusion is erroneous. after excluding the 628 sq.HELD: Indeed. the Court of Appeals subtracted from the total land area of 1. a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages. portion thereof. in a contract of sale of land in a mass. 1962 Deed of Sale the total land area of 753 sq. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . lot covered by a Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner from the 1. 1960. the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries.381 sq. m.. Spouses Tabisula failed to attend the conferences scheduled.381 sq. in the Deed of Sale in respondents favor that control in the determination of which portion of the land a vendee acquires. The Court of Appeals thus doubly erred in concluding that 1) what was sold to respondents via the June 27. which is Plan of Lot 3. m. Salinas in 1960. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed. m.375 sq. escapes comprehension. m. SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ and JOCELYN VALDEZ v. A. after more than six years of execution of the deed. the Plan of Lot 3. as prepared for Benjamin R. and which was prepared on February 10. As will be shown shortly. Thus. m. m. A prepared in 1960 for Benjamin Salinas. area of the lot claimed by Salinas as reflected in Tax Declaration No. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales.381 sq. m.) The requisites provided in conferment of a legal easement of right of way under the Civil Law must be complied and such existence be proven. Psd-82 was prepared for Spouses Faustino and Salinas‘ first cousin co-heir Benjamin Salinas on February 10. Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses Francisco and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San Fernando. Salinas containing an area of 1. despite the clear provision of said Deed of Sale that what was conveyed was 300. m. In concluding that Faustino acquired via the June 27. SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA and CARIDAD TABISULA 560 SCRA 332 (2008). however. The absolute sale indicated a right of way. As the immediately preceding paragraph reflects. mentioned therein 300. It defies logic. La Union.381 sq. Block 5-k. 1960 by a private land surveyor. occupied by Salinas on that June 27.

should be construed as merely permissive where. Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads. The trial court dismissed the petition. (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts. which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification. On the other hand. the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject property on the assurance of providing them a road right of way. The stipulation harped upon by Spouses Valdez that they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of real property. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. ISSUES: Whether or not Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of way as indicated in the absolute sale HELD: Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing. the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway. however. CITYTRUST FINANCE CORPORATION 474 SCRA 285 (2005). as in the case at bar. On appeal. by the trial court. SPOUSES FERDINAND AGUILAR and JOSEPHINE AGUILAR v. the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. J. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. As found. Spouses Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways. The use of the word shall. and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule. no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.) Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649. they have no right to demand the grant by spouses Tabisula of an easement on the western side of Spouses Tabisula‘s lot. which is supported by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is not included in this sale could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement for the purpose. spouses Tabisula averred that the 2-meter easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property and not theirs. (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servant estate. a common evidence of the parties. herein the spouses Valdez. (2) proper indemnity must be paid.

Spouses Aguilar received letters from Citytrust. she verified from his supervisor and the latter confirmed Perez‘ authority to receive payment remains unrefuted by World Cars. The same were intended to take effect only if the checks issued by Spouses Aguilar would be dishonored.In conditional obligations. the latter informed her that the last payment had not been received. had no right to collect from them the amount stated in the simulated Chattel Mortgage cum Deed of Assignment. In fact. This information of Domondon does not jibe with the claim of World Cars that it received only Josephine‘s first check in the amount of P148. Inc. Perez was the agent of World Cars and was duly authorized to accept payment for the car. these present petitions of the Spouses Aguilar and World Cars. Spouses Aguilar filed a complaint for ―annulment of chattel mortgage plus damages‖ against Citytrust and World Cars before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).00 as downpayment for the said car. (World Cars) through the latter‘s agent. Further. as earlier stated. It ruled that the promissory note and its derivative instruments were not really intended to produce legal effect. Josephine‘s testimony that before issuing the checks in the name of Perez. World Cars‘ Vice President Domondon informed Spouses Aguilar that the last payment had not been received.000. World Cars admitted in its Answer with Counterclaim that ―[w]hat was actually paid [by the Spouses Aguilar] and received by [it] was [Josephine‘s] check in the amount of P148. as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired. Spouses Aguilar subsequently executed a promissory note. when Josephine spoke to World Cars‘ Vice President Domondon. the Court of Appeals modified RTC‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the promissory note and derivative instruments were null and void for the same were not really intended to produce legal effect HELD: Clearly. On appeal. RTC ordered Citytrust and World Cars jointly and severally for damages in favor of Spouses Aguilar.000. Hence. the acquisition of rights. chattel mortgage and other accessory documents the dates of which were left blank.‖ Parenthetically. The promissory notes and chattel mortgage were subsequently assigned by World Cars to Citytrust. advising them of overdue account and unpaid installments for the months of August to December 1992 plus accumulated penalty charges. The spouses issued three checks payable to Perez who was authorized by World Cars to receive payment. The RTC held that the Spouses Aguilar had paid World Cars the full purchase price of the car and Citytrust. Petitioner Spouses Josephine and Ferdinand Aguilar bought a car from World Cars. Joselito Perez. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Thus. shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. as the assignee.00 as downpayment payable to Perez.

are under obligation to settle the same. the corporation asked its other retained counsel. Since the condition for the instruments to become effective was fulfilled. enforceable and in all respects what they purport to be. 465 SCRA 29 (2005). Respondents Sison brothers negotiated for the sale of their 3 parcels of land to their co-respondent Santos Land Development Corporation (the corporation). at a reasonable amount. valid. petitioner Atty. MARTIN T. are subsisting. NELSON A. Basa. World Cars guaranteed that as further warranties. was present in order to incorporate whatever the parties agreed upon in the draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and the Deed of Absolute Sale they were going to forge. [World Cars] hereby agrees and shall be bound by the following: a.) Parties. as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. the promissory note. before having knowledge of the assignment. 1181 of the Civil Code which provides that in conditional obligations. since under the RFA. In the series of negotiations. The parties agreed to conclude and sign the MOA prepared by Atty.Since Spouses Aguilar payment to Perez is deemed payment to World Cars. the obligation on the part of the spouses Aguilar to be bound thereby did not arise and World Cars did not thus acquire rights thereunder following Art. specifically paragraph 5(a) thereof. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . ATTY. SUELTO v. it had nothing to assign to Citytrust. shall be released from the obligation. Basa whereon the Sisons had in fact affixed their signatures but since Atty. which is the law between them. that the papers contain the entire agreement between the customers and [World Cars]. chattel mortgage and other accessory documents they executed which were to take effect only in the event the checks would be dishonored were deemed nullified. shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. for an assignee cannot acquire greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. Atty. At all events. Basa was at the time out of the country. Consequently. SISON et al. the Spouses Aguilar having fully paid the car before they became aware of the assignment of the instruments to Citytrust when they received notice thereof by Citytrust. to charge notorial fees. x x x that it has absolute and good title to such contracts and the personalties covered thereby and the right to sell and transfer the same in favor of [Citytrust]. and assigns. they were released of their obligation thereunder. one of two retained counsel of the corporation. World Cars guarantees to [Citytrust] its successors. The Civil Code so provides that the debtor who. J. Martin Suelto to give the MOA a final look. Citytrust cannot enforce the instruments against the spouses Aguilar. pays his creditor. that the installment papers so discounted by virtue of this agreement. that it has full right and legal authority to make the assignment or discounting. all the checks having been cleared. As no right against the Spouses Aguilar was acquired by World Cars under the promissory note and chattel mortgage. having agreed in an agreement. Danilo A. While Citytrust cannot enforce the instruments against the Spouses Aguilar. the acquisition of rights.

but the balance thereof having been returned to them without Atty. Suelto a Statement of Account addressed to it. The MOA provision that notarial fees relative to the sale. He also made some amendments and prepared a Joint Affidavit of Clarification and Confirmation (Joint Affidavit). ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Suelto indicated the billing for the preparation and notarization of the MOA and for the final preparation of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. A pertinent provision in the MOA prepared by Atty. Agudo. As Atty. The CA‘s presumption that the notarial fees had been paid with the return by the corporation to the Sisons of the balance of the 10% retained purchase is thus incongruous with the clearly established fact that Atty. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . among other expenses. They also executed 3 Deeds of Absolute Sale which were notarized by the Sisons‘ counsel Atty. however. The Sisons. however. as finalized by Atty. having agreed in the MOA. which was retained in the final MOA. called for the retention by the corporation of 10% of the total purchase price for taxes. no agreement on the amount of notarial fees to be paid or taken from the 10% retained amount. The Sisons denied their obligation to pay Atty. which is the law between them and the corporation. at a reasonable amount of course. Suelto and ordered the Sisons to pay him his legal fees.Atty. notarial and attorney‘s fees and other fees and charges and incidental expenses. Suelto is entitled to receive payment from the Sisons for his legal services HELD: The Sisons were ―willing to pay for the notarial fees to be charged to the 10% retained amount of the purchase price. Suelto‗s notarial fees being settled. There was. however. reversed the decision of RTC. Suelto inputed in the MOA the names of the respective spouses of the Sisons. wherein Atty. Basa. he filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Collection of Sum of Money and Attorney‘s Fees against the Sisons. would be charged to the 10% retained purchase price bears no qualification whatsoever. they are under obligation to settle the same. The Court of Appeals (CA). The Sisons and the corporation affixed their signatures on the MOA. Suelto‘s notarial fees had not been paid. to charge notarial fees from the retained 10% of the purchase price. The corporation received from Atty. Suelto failed to collect his fees. Suelto his legal fees. for the account of the Sisons. noting the provision in the MOA regarding the retention of the 10% selling price by the buyer corporation to be applied to expenses including notarial and attorney‘s fees. Suelto who notarized it. on which lawyer — whether of the Sisons or of the corporation — would perform notarial services for the provision to apply. if the lawyer notarizing it is one of their choice‖. The RTC ruled in favor of Atty.

returned the check to Tamayo. under the circumstances reflected above. HLURB removed the awards of damages in favor of Huang et al. In the said agreement. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. CARLOS TAMAYO v. Josefino Huang. entered into a contract of ―Indenture‖ with EAP Development Corporation (EAP) under which the EAP shall develop their lands into a first class subdivision. acting as the Attorney-in-Fact and Manager of the Huang et al. Huang et al. for which a receipt was issued. J. before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). MILAGROS HUANG et al. Miguel Huang and Milagros Huang.) In case the developer of a subdivision or condominium fails in its obligation. to continue development thereof on May 22. Huang et al.00 as fair and reasonable notarial fees. Tamayo paid installments up to June 1982. on the ground that there has been no valid consignation. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Both the HLURB Arbiter and HLRUB Board of Commissioners dismissed Tamayo‘s complaint. it gives the buyer the option to demand reimbursement of the total amount paid.The RTC‘s determination of the amount of P100. More than 5 years after the execution of the contract to sell. 1985 and to even file a complaint to rescind its contract of ―Indenture‖ with EAP which the RTC Davao granted. Later on. he may suspend payment of installments until such time that the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligation to him. However. and when the buyer opts for the latter alternative. Tamayo agreed to pay in 60 monthly installments a total purchase price of P242. On appeal by Huang et al. 480 SCRA 156 (2006).. Such petition was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). remains valid HELD: It is not disputed that EAP. but stopped paying thereafter due to the non-development of the subdivision as agreed upon in the contract. they raised for the first time that the subject lot has been sold to certain Nene Abijar. to the Office of the President (OP). totally abandoned the development of the subdivision in 1983. under a contract to sell. Tamayo issued a check representing the full payment of the value of the lot. Tamayo thus filed an action for specific performance with damages against Huang et al. Respondents Huang Sui Sin.00. Tamayo purchased a lot from Huang et al. ISSUE: Whether or not the contract to purchase the lot between Tamayo and Huang et al. 080. inclusive of actual litigation cost. However. The OP affirmed the decision of the HLURB holding that Abijar‘s right as a purchaser of the land in good faith prevails over the right of Tamayo.000. or to wait for further development of the subdivision. Carlos R. merits the Court‘s approval. Huang et al. thus prompting Huang et al. demanded Tamayo for the payment of lot. without prejudice to Tamayo‘s right to reimburse what he has already paid. filed an action to rescind the contract of ―Indenture‖ against EAP for abandoning the development of the subdivision.

offered to reimburse Tamayo of the total amount he had already paid. however. Section 23 of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers‘ Protective Decree gives the buyer the option to demand reimbursement of the total amount paid. 1986.00 he had consigned does not lie too. 1997 the complaint before the HLURB that Huang et al.537. thus resolves to remand the case to the HLURB for a proper determination of the respective rights of the parties vis a vis the alleged sale of the lot to Abijar in accordance with the foregoing discussions. for under the law. As noted earlier. were mum about it. Huang et al. In any event. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . compel Huang et al. 1981. without interest.. the Huang et al. Tamayo is entitled to the lot he contracted to purchase after payment of the outstanding balance which he was ready and willing to do. improvements. it puts them in estoppel. Huang et al. it was only after Tamayo filed on July 24. 1986 betrays such claim. Tamayo. or to wait for further development of the subdivision. it has remained valid and subsisting. failure to carry out which is sufficient cause for the buyer to suspend payment. The decision of the OP which was deemed affirmed by the appellate court ordering a full refund of the installment payments of Tamayo in the amount of P59. that he desisted from further paying monthly installments and that he would resume payment if the development of the subdivision had been completed. sent no notarized notice or any notice of cancellation at all.‘s demand for payment of the unpaid balance sometime between the period of April 30. informed Huang et al. therefore. It was. and when the buyer opts for the latter alternative. he may suspend payment of installments until such time that the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligation to him. and any sums of money already paid shall not be forfeited.706. From Tamayo‘s earlier-mentioned letter of December 24. Yet Huang et al. to execute a deed of absolute sale. infrastructures and other forms of development. In case the developer of a subdivision or condominium fails in its obligation under Section 20. not being a trier of facts. 1986 to December 24. The Supreme Court. 1986.00 and the release to Tamayo of the amount of P270.The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers‘ Protective Decree directs every owner and developer of real property to provide the necessary facilities. The contract not having been cancelled in accordance with law. he made clear his intention not to seek reimbursement of the total amount he had already paid but to comply with his obligation to pay the balance in full upon completion of the development of the subdivision. by letter of December 24. nevertheless claim that the contract was ―deemed rescinded‖ five years after its execution on April 30. upon full payment of the purchase price. Such silence suggests an admission of the veracity and validity of Tamayo‘s claim. The claim-advice of Tamayo notwithstanding. In fact. within Tamayo‘s right to maintain his option to await the completion of the development of and introduction of improvements in the subdivision and thereafter.

700. which amounted to P14. To secure the payment of the loan.‖ the provision of the mortgage contract does not specifically mention that. Spouses Leopoldo and Mercedita Viola of Leo-Mers Commercial. As the Credit Line Agreement specifically defined ―a penalty fee of three percent (3%) per month of the outstanding amount to be computed from the day deficiency is incurred up to the date of full payment thereon.455. receipts of which were issued without PCI Bank specifying "whether the payment was for interest. PCI Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and that the mortgaged properties were sold at a public auction.) A mortgage must sufficiently describe the debt sought to be secured. for the principal obligation.024. but the mortgaged properties were sold to satisfy an inflated of P4.00. ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage contract also secured the penalty fee per month on the outstanding amount as stipulated in the Credit Line Agreement. On appeal. They alleged that they had made substantial payments of P3. on the interest. penalty or the principal obligation". EQUITABLE PCI BANK. plus 3% penalty fee per month year and 15% interest per year. VIOLA and MERCEDITA VIOLA v.22.623.SPOUSES LEOPOLDO S. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Thus.073. Inc. a ―Real Estate Mortgage‖ in favor of PCI Bank was executed. In the case at bar. 1997 – the Credit Line Agreement granting the Client a loan through a credit facility in the maximum amount of P4. which description must not be such as to mislead or deceive.69. J.210. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .67. Inc. Spouses Viola filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.224. not a single centavo of their payments was applied to the principal obligation. that the foreclosure proceedings and auction sale were null and void because the mortgage debt is only P2.137. HELD: A mortgage must sufficiently describe the debt sought to be secured. obtained a loan through a credit line facility from the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank). the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for lack of merit.783. the parties executed two separate documents on March 31. and P1. PCI Bank contends however. Spouses Viola made partial payments therein. accounting and damages before the RTC. An obligation is not secured by a mortgage unless it comes fairly within the terms of the mortgage.254. Based on PCI Bank‘s statement of account. which description must not be such as to mislead or deceive. Spouses Viola filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale. and an obligation is not secured by a mortgage unless it comes fairly within the terms of the mortgage. 572 SCRA 245 (2008).31. INC. and the Real Estate Mortgage contract securing the payment thereof. which was later merged with Equitable Bank and became known as Equitable PCI Bank. that Spouses Viola made no further payments despite demands.36. The RTC upheld the position of the PCI Bank but reduced the interest of the principal.669.000.

." In Philippine Bank of Communications v. credit and other banking facilities obtained x x x from the Mortgagee. to wit: (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . including the interest and bank charges. (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Court of Appeals which raised a similar issue. . accompanied by unidentified CAFGU members. . The heirs of Legaspi thus filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Reconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages against Oco. The RTC favored the heirs of Legaspi and ordered to return the possession of the land. as amended by Republic Act No. destroyed the planted crops and took possession of the land. Oco questions the exercise of the RTC of jurisdiction over the case. the Court held that there is also sufficient authority to declare that any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible of different interpretations must be read against the party who drafted it. namely: "loans. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of RTC. REPRESENTED BY PEDRO LEGASPI G. representing to be a peace officer connected with the PNP. (Oco). A ―penalty fee‖ is likened to a compensation for damages in case of breach of the obligation. the costs of collecting the same and of taking possession of and keeping the mortgaged properties. et al. Moreover. the ―penalty fee‖ does not belong to the species of obligation enumerated in the mortgage contract. . . ―Penalty fee‖ is entirely different from ―bank charges‖. such fee must be specific and fixed by the contracting parties. The phrase ―bank charges‖ is normally understood to refer to compensation for services. v. municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. 7691 provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts. it must be excluded from the computation of the amount secured by the mortgage.) Disputes involving title to or possession of real property falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.Since an action to foreclose ―must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage‖ and the penalty fee of 3% per month of the outstanding obligation is not mentioned in the mortgage. 174346 (2008). J. FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. ISSUE: Whether or not the court lacks jurisdiction over the case HELD: Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. Johnny Oco Jr. . No. forced his way into land owned by the heirs of Vicente Legaspi (heirs of Legaspi) and dispossessed them of the property. unlike in the present case which slaps a 3% penalty fee per month of the outstanding amount of the obligation. .R. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI. . Being penal in nature. and all other expenses to which the Mortgagee may be put in connection with or as an incident to this mortgage .

” Subsequently. As head coach. The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. damages of whatever kind. No. its validity or performance or compliance of which cannot be left to the will of only one of the parties. Under paragraph 3 of the same contract it was stipulated there that. v. or possession of. Under their contract. therefore. GF equity invoked paragraph 3 of the said contract. litigation expenses and costs: Provided. Valenzona was required to comply to his duties such as coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the team. However. the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.) Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract. 7565. With the modifications introduced by R. Accordingly.000. GF Equity hired Arturo Valenzona (Valenzona) as head basketball coach of Alaska team. a common exhibit of the parties. it does not represent the true or market value of the property. Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. the COACH.‖ The subject land has an assessed value of P11. Valenzona contends that the condition in paragraph 3 violates Article 1308 of New Civil Code (NCC).000. real property.A. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Counsel of Valenzona demands for compensation arising from arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But the RTC dismissed the complaint and affirmed the validity of paragraph 3 on the grounds that Valenzona was fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.00) or. Valenzona would receive P 35. GF EQUITY. in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION. falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.00 monthly and GF Equity will provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. Commonly. or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20. the plenary action of accion publiciana was to be brought before the regional trial court. “If at any time during the contract. the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50. INC. J. in civil actions in Metro Manila. however. That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes.160 as reflected in Tax Declaration No. the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . GF equity refused it. 7691. Valenzona was terminated.000. The bare claim of Legaspi heirs that it has a value of P50.which involve title to.00) exclusive of interest. ARTURO VALENZONA 462 SCRA 466 (2005).000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The case.000 thus fails. attorney‘s fees. fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team. 7691 in 1994. the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20.000. Assessed value is understood to be ―the worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. P50. Valenzona filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against GF Equity for breach of contract.

the former‘s wife. They filed a complaint "for judicial settlement of estate with damages and Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . however. et al.. or contrary to public policy. was said to be awarded to the heirs of Cornejo (Cornejo heirs). if it is to be declared justified. the first half was awarded to Mario Domingo. Lot 1769-A. J. claim that the Cornejos‘ share was sold to them in a transaction represented by Arturo Domingo. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. The said property was subdivided. for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor. a valid reason within the ambit of its management prerogatives. 508 SCRA 563 (2006). fairness or reasonableness. Intestate proceedings were filed before the then Court of First Instance of Davao City involving the parcel of land owned by the late spouses Emilio Domingo (Domingo) and Felicidad Cornejo (Cornejo). et al. HEIRS OF CLARITA D. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to exhibit the required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team. the Court of Appeals (CA) held that the questioned provision in the contract ―merely confers upon GF Equity the right to fire its coach upon a finding of inefficiency. although not expressly stated in the clause‖.On appeal.) A judgment is conclusive as to the facts admitted by the pleadings or assumed by the decision. the corporation may terminate the contract. DOMINGO. represented by Emilio Bernabe (Bernabe). GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness. MARTIN. subject to limitations imposed by law. and the other half. where they were essential to the judgment. in the sole opinion of the corporation. The contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate the contract — that ―if the coach. whose family were killed during World War II.‖ It concluded. however.‖ ISSUE: Whether or not paragraph 3 of the contract is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts HELD: The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties. or even lack of basis of its opinion. To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals. GF Equity was not precluded from the right to pre-terminate the contract. HEIRS OF EMILIO R. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. heirs of Domingo (Domingo heirs). The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding. and were such that the judgment could not legally have been rendered without them. and ―the right granted in the contract can neither be said to be immoral. v. In other words.‖ The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of mutuality of contracts. GF Equity ―abused its right by arbitrarily terminating Valenzona‘s employment and opened itself to a charge of bad faith. The heirs of Emilio Domingo‘s siblings. et al. unlawful. The pre-termination must have legal basis. that while ―the mutuality of the clause‖ is evident.

or any person who has an interest in the property. The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court‘s decision upon a finding that the Domingo heirs failed to establish their claim to the share of the property ivolved." before the Regional Trial Court against the heirs-children of Enrique and Clarita Martin who claimed that the same share was sold to their parents by the heirs of Felicidad Cornejo. Domingo heirs‘ evidence of receipt of payment presented to show that Arturo Domingo paid the purchase price of a "lupa sa Lapanday sapagkat iyon ay mana rin namin" could refer to any parcel of land in Lapanday." The finding in Misc.attorney‘s fees. Flores thereafter sought the issuance of another Tax Declaration in his name. 1769-A as the portion allotted to the Cornejo heirs. ISSUES: Whether or not the claim of ownership was established by preponderance of evidence HELD: Domingo heirs failed to prove their claim to Lot 1769-A by preponderance of evidence.918 square meter parcel of land in Aklan which was among the properties left by Restar. Case No. both of which identify Lot No. Flores.) Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years while extraordinary acquisitive prescription only requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. The Domingos‘ Motion for Reconsideration before the CA was denied. Martin heirs have proved their predecessors‘ title by presenting the decision in the intestate estate proceedings and the Subdivision Plan. Restar's eldest child. and were such that the judgment could not legally have been rendered without them. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . In fine. without more. it is settled that "a judgment is conclusive as to the facts admitted by the pleadings or assumed by the decision. Case No. Martin heirs have proven their claim by a preponderance of evidence. that "lupa sa Lapanday" was understood to refer to the lot covered by Lot 1769-A does not persuade. The RTC held in favor of the Domingo heirs. 4100 does not constitute res judicata to the present case. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Domingo heirs‘ claim. his assigns. CICHON 475 SCRA 73 (2005). The same covers a 5. there being no identity in causes of action. J. HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR v. caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration in Restar's name. While the decision in Misc. where they were essential to the judgment. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. Flores later on died. on the basis of a Joint Affidavit he executed with Helen Restar. 4100 was essential to the judgment since a petition for reconstitution may be filed only by the registered owner. Emilio Restar died intestate. leaving eight children-compulsory heirs.

al. 1973 (exhibit "20"). 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.Ten years later. they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it from Flores. ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan alleging that the widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children. Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code. declaration of nullity of documents. why then did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar. they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale. acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. Heirs of Chichon never possessed the lot. however. the defendants Flores‘ heirs refused. Flores‘ heirs claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since time immemorial. ISSUE: Whether or not Heirs of Flores acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary prescription HELD: Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. and enjoying the produce thereof. Dolores R. When Restar died in 1935. his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate succession. Aklan way back in 1945. Without good faith and just title. If they were able to demand the partition. the heirs of Flores' sisters. and upon their demand for partition of the lot. Cichon. In contrast. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription. much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision finding that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his co-heirs of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs' claim of ownership. (Heirs of Cichon) filed a Complaint against Flores' heirs for "partition of the lot. Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised acts of dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the land. Lezo. the children had already finished their respective courses. considering that at that time all of Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Aklan held that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership. introducing improvements. to which they agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education. Banga Aklan on September 28. et. The RTC of Kalibo. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce of the lot or that upon Flores' death in 1989. it would be divided into eight equal parts. they contending that by 1977. Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it to finance her children's education. Heirs of Cichon did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog.

m.square meter lot which forms part of Lot 19. rebutted or disputed by any of the heirs of Cichon. Thus. J. Apolinario Hermosilla (Apolinario) occupies a parcel of land in San Pedro Tunasan Homesite until his death in 1964. his daughter Angela Hermosilla (Angela) filed a protest before the LTA contending that as an heir of the deceased. payment of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein. The Republic of the Philippines acquired through purchase a 65. The lot was subdivided into two. et al. she is also entitled to Lots 12 and 19. Jaime. He filed for an application to purchase the said lot and was granted by the LTA. HEIRS OF SALVADOR HERMOSILLA v. adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner — which length of possession had never been questioned. Dura lex sed lex. The trial court held that the Angela et al. The Court of Appeals (CA) rendered the Kasunduan void because at the time of its execution. The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) later found that Lot 19 is still available for qualified applicants. Apolinario conveyed Lot 12 to his son Salvador Hermosilla (Salvador). Angela et al. Spouses JAIME REMOQUILLO and LUZ REMOQUILLO. for which he and his wife were issued a title. the lot was still owned by the state and so there was no right that was transferred to Jaime as well as to Angela.the brothers and sisters. Jaime and Salvador made a Kasunduan whereby Jaime transferred ownership of the 65 sq. Lot 12 and Lot 19 with the same area of 341 square meters. The LTA awarded Lot 19 to Jaime. were co-owners of the subject property. the eight heirs of Emilio Restar. the protest was dismissed. the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name. being its occupant filed an application in 1963. and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. After Apolinario died. in Lot 19 in favor of Salvador. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his heirs. he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary prescription.) A transfer of property arising from a void contract does not confer title over it. By Resolution of the LTA. filed for the annulment of the title on the ground of fraud. being thus duly supported by substantial evidence. Jaime Remoquillo. were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition? Indeed. the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents. The trial court's finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed the land in open. ISSUES: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Apolinario made a Deed of Assignment in 1962 transferring possession of Lot 19 in favor of his grandson. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. (2007).

Whether or not Angela et al. acquired any right over the property HELD: The transfer "became one in violation of law (the rules of the PHHC being promulgated in pursuance of law have the force of law) and therefore void ab initio." Hence, Angela et al. acquired no right over the lot from a contract void ab initio, no rights are created. Estoppel will not apply for it cannot be predicated on an illegal act. It is generally considered that as between the parties to a contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against public policy. Angela et al. go on to postulate that if the Kasunduan is void, it follows that the 1962 Deed of Assignment executed by Apolinario in favor of Jaime is likewise void to thus deprive the latter of any legal basis for his occupation and acquisition of Lot 19. Angela et al.'s position fails. They lose sight of the fact that, as reflected above, Jaime acquired Lot 19 in his own right, independently of the Deed of Assignment. In another vein, since the property was previously a public land, Angela et al. have no personality to impute fraud or misrepresentation against the State or violation of the law. If the title was in fact fraudulently obtained, it is the State which should file the suit to recover the property through the Office of the Solicitor General. The title originated from a grant by the government, hence, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

DON PEPE HENSON ENTERPRISES v. MARIANO DAVID et al. 436 SCRA 605 (2004), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholding. Petitioner Don Pepe Henson Enterprises (DPHE) impugns the coverage of its land under P.D. No. 27, otherwise know as the Tenant Emancipation Decree, and the issuance of the Emancipation Patents in favor of respondents Mariano David, et al. The Provincial Adjudicator decided in favor of DPHE and on appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the decision was reversed and the complaint was dismissed. The Court of Appeals sustained the finding that the disputed land was indeed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27. It however annulled the Certificate of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents and TCT‘s issued in favor of David without prejudice to another application. ISSUE:
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Whether or not the disputed land is covered by the P.D. No. 27 HELD: With regard to the first ground to which the present petition is anchored, the Court holds that while it is undisputed that the bulk of the 19-hectare land of DPHE is devoted to sugarcane production, the 5.5 hectare portion thereof – the farmholding of David et al.– is devoted to palay, hence, such farmholding is covered by P.D. No. 27. If the 5.5-hectare farmholding is deducted from the 19-hectare property of DPHE, it still has 13.5 hectares of farmland. The 5.5 hectare farmholding of the land was thus legally disposed to David et al. under the Operation Land Transfer Program. DPHE‘s position that the 19-hectare land is not owned by the partnership but by at least twentythree (23) partners in common each of these partners is entitled to the 7-hectare retention limit, it‘s conclusion that the aggregate area of 19 hectares is exempted likewise fails. A partnership has a juridical personality separate from the individual partners. The CA has found as a fact that DPHE is the registered owner of the land. . . . The land being then owned by a single entity, a partnership, it is among those covered by the Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to LOI 474. The Certificates of Land Transfer, Emancipation Patents and TCTs being void then as they are unchallenged by both parties, it would be incongruous to apply Section 2 of P.D. No. 816. What should apply instead is Section 3 of the same law which provides that any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholding;‖ Therefore, in so far as that the CA allowed David, et al. to apply for new patents and certificates, its decision is not in accordance with Section 3 of P.D. No. 816 which operates to deprive David et al. of their ―right to be issued Certificates of Land Transfer under P.D. No. 27 and their farmholding.‖ On this score, David‘s ejectment is proper.

JESTRA DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. DANIEL PONCE PACIFICO 513 SCRA 403 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Cancellation of the contract, under the law, requires that the seller should extend the buyer a grace period of at least 60 days from the due date of the installment, and at the end of the grace period, the seller shall furnish the buyer with a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission. Daniel Ponce Pacifico (Pacifico) signed a Reservation Application with Fil-Estate Marketing Association for the purchase of a house and lot located at Paranaque, Metro Manila and paid the reservation fee of 20,000.00. Under the Reservation Application, upon fulfillment of the 30% down

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payment by Pacifico, he will sign a contract to sell with the owner and developer of the property which is the JESTRA Development and Management Corporation (Jestra). Pacifico run out of funds to pay for the property, and he requested to Jestra to suspend payment. Jestra denied his request. Pacifico filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against Jestra claiming that despite his full payment of the down payment, Jestra failed to deliver to him the property within 90 days as provided in the contract to sell dated March 6, 1997 and Jestra instead sold the property to another buyer in October 1998.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Jestra in canceling the contract to sell agreement with Pacifico is valid

HELD: R.A. 6552 was enacted to protect buyers of real estate on installment against onerous and oppressive conditions. In Fabrigas v. San Francisco del Monte,Inc., the court described the cancellation of the contract under Section 4 of R.A. 6552 as a two-step process. First, the seller should extend the buyer a grace period of at least 60 days from the due date of the installment. Second, at the end of the grace period, the seller shall furnish the buyer with a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission through a notarial act, effective 30 days from the buyer‘s receipt thereof. Pacifico admits that the first installment on the 70% balance of the purchase price was due on January 5, 1998. He issued checks for it but was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Pacifico was notified of the dishonor of the checks but he took no action, hence, 60 days grace period lapsed. Pacifico made no further payments thereafter. Instead, he requested for suspension of payment. Also, Pacifico admits that Jestra was justified in canceling the contract to sell via the notarial Notice of Cancellation which he received on May 13, 1998 which took effect on June 12, 1998. Thus, the cancellation of the contract to sell of Jestra is valid.

ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO, et al. v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 125329, 10 September 2003, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right. Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo (Brigitt) is an illegitemate child of common-law-spouses Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo. Wanting Brigitt to carry his surname, Eddie executed an affidavit and a letter which was submitted to the Local Civil Registrar asking for the change of her surname. The
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The CA declared that an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the surname of the father but the power to effect the change lies in the Court and not with Local and Civil Registrar. 95939 was issued in her favor. When there is a right. LEONIN and PEPITO A. The rule applies even if petitioner‘s father admits paternity. Prospero Leonin and his co-owners allowed his siblings.00). They however failed to settle the said loan. there is a remedy. Teofilo Leonin (Teofilo). Teofilo later sold the property by Deed of Absolute Sale to his daughter. redeemed the property. J. LEONIN v. there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right. LEONIN 503 SCRA 595 (2006).00). The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. herein respondent Germaine Leonin. if there is no right. The owners of the property mortgaged it with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a loan in the amount of Forty Eight Thousand Pesos (P48. Evangelime and Pepito Leonil to occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals. this appeal. for Forty Eight Thousand Pesos (P48. A new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.‖ The Court declared in Mossesgeld the Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. Conversely. As a consequence thereof. Article 176 of the Family Code provides that ―an illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother.000. and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. Brigitt then appealed to the Civil Registrar General which also denied the request on the ground the same ground. Since Brigitt was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect. COURT OF APPEALS and GERMAINE P. she has no right to use her father's surname. Leonardo filed a Petition for Review upon the Court of Appeals. EVANGELINE A.Local Civil Registrar of Manila denied said request on the ground that under the family code. illegitimate children should carry their mother‘s surname. upon which GSIS executed a Release of Mortgage and turned over to him the owner‘s duplicate title. It likewise held that it does not have the authority to effect such change. Prospero‘s brother. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales.) Occupants of a property by tolerance of the owner becomes deforciant occupants upon their failure to heed to the owner’s demand to vacate. Undaunted. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . GSIS foreclosed the mortgage and the property was sold at public auction to GSIS. Hence. ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code can use the surname of the father HELD: Ubi jus.000. ibi remedium.

SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. This demand remained unheeded..After her father Teofilo‘s death. at any rate. Spouses Montecalvo and Looc Bay subsequently forged an agreement under which latter will buy portion of the land which it presently uses as log pond. when they failed to heed Germaine's demand to vacate. v. ISSUE: Whether respondent had the right to possess the property upon the execution of a deed of absolute sale and the issuance of a transfer of certificate of title in her favor HELD: Respecting the issue of whether germane has the right to possess the property upon the execution of a deed of absolute sale and the issuance of a transfer of certificate of title in her favor. Hence.al. Germaine sent a letter to her father‘s siblingsherein petitioners asking them to vacate Apartment C as their occupation thereof was by mere tolerance and. J. they had become deforciant occupants. INC. Said lease agreement will expire in 1978 but was to be extended for another ten years as provided for in the agreement. INTESTATE ESTATES OF VICTOR MONTECALVO AND CONCORDIA L. Inc. Looc Bay claims that during the Victor‘s lifetime. It bears noting that Evangeline‘s and Pepito‘s occupation of the property was on the mere tolerance of the former owners. MONTECALVO. REPRESENTED BY DR. VICTOR L. Spouses Montecalvo died. JR. requiring them to execute a contract of lease with her.Spouses Montecalvo agreed to sell to Looc Bay‘s sister company. Later.) An essential requisite of a valid contract is the consent of the contracting parties. Looc Bay paid for the consideration the balance of which to be paid on installment. Under VFD will pay Spouses Montecalvo in consideration of which a deed of absolute sale shall be executed by the parties. Victor Montecalvo Sr. LOOC BAY TIMBER INDUSTRIES. he promised to execute the deeds of sale corresponding to the two agreements and deliver the titles of lands subject Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the couple‘s heirs notified Looc Bay that they were terminating 1978 lease agreement. and his wife Concordia purchased a parcel of land which was leased to petitioner Looc Bay Timber Industries. (Looc Bay). the same must be resolved in the affirmative. et. 556 SCRA 758 (2008). Consequently. MONTECALVO. the Visayan Forest Development (VFD) Corporation. portions of land adjoining the logging road of Looc Bay.

Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . represented by couple‘s heirs. On appeal. Looc Bay elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review. the Court finds that the trial court overlooked the fact that the November 28. the court cannot give validity to the second agreement. upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate. no documents of sale nor were copies of titles delivered to Looc Bay. CA held it as not binding since Looc Bay‘s sister company Visayan Forest‘s representative Valeriano Bueno did not affix his signature on the agreement. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. 1984 Agreement was not signed by Valeriano Bueno." The agreement was thus not perfected and therefore created or transmitted no rights. Absent such signature. In the absence of Valeriano Bueno's signature. Consent may be construed to be present if the vendee also signed this second agreement.) A month-to-month lease under the New Civil Code is a lease with a definite period and expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period. petitioner Looc Bay and/or its sister company could not have accepted the offer made by Victor to sell those "certain portions adjoining the logging road of [petitioner] or the entirety of the said land. FAJARDO 468 SCRA 664 (2005). Thus Looc Bay filed an action for specific performance with Regional Trial Court of Samar.thereof but he failed to do so and despite repeated demands from Intestate Estates of the Montecalvos. LETICIA R. the Court of Appeals held the first agreement was fully paid but with respect to the second agreement. J. In the present case. The RTC held that the agreements were valid but that there was no showing that the considerations in two agreements were fully paid. Hence. TRISTAN LOPEZ as Attorney-in-Fact of LETICIA and CECILIA LOPEZ v. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in declaring the contract void and no effect for lack of consent on part of the vendee HELD: An essential requisite of a valid contract is the consent of the contracting parties. the representative of petitioner's Looc Bay‘s sister company-prospective vendee.

Fajardo appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that a minimum of 3-month arrearages is required to justify a lessor to eject a lessee and held that Fajardo had incurred back rentals of only 2 months when Lopez. et al. et al. August 2000 and September 2000. had sufficiently established their cause of action arising from the expiration of the lease contract. Fajardo again failed and refused to pay her July and August 2000 rentals.000 representing payment of the rentals in arrears for July 2000. 2000. Having no settlement. sent her the letter of demand hence. and advance rentals for October 2000 up to July 2001 but it was not accepted by Lopez. against Fajardo on the ground of failure to pay her monthly rentals from May 1999 to February 2000. it was noted that the rentals were paid on a month-to-month basis. Cruz. et al. The Lopez sisters filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) a complaint for ejectment with damages.Leonor Sobrepena and her kins (the Sobrepenas) were the owners of a 2-door apartment at 1326 and 1328 Tomas Mapua St. There are exceptions expressly provided by law. et al. which include the expiration of a lease for a definite period. the lease could be validly terminated at the end of any given month upon prior notice to that effect Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . This was settled after Fajardo paid P35. Fajardo then remitted to Lopez. the prohibition against the ejectment of a lessee by his lessor is not absolute. Under the Rent Control Law. et al. et al. Sta. the lease being terminable at the end of any month after due notice. In the instant case. The Sobrepenas sold such property to Leticia and Cecilia Lopez (the Lopez sisters). Thus. and failure of Fajardo to pay the stipulated rental which are the grounds for ejectment under Article 1673 of the Civil Code. upon proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate. filed a new complaint for ejectment and damages against Fajardo before the MeTC wherein it held that Lopez.‖ ISSUE: Whether or not Lopez.. prompting Lopez.000. The apartment at No. Such was appealed by Fajardo to the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of MeTC. the very time their oral lease contract shall expire and they are giving her a grace period of one (1) month within which to vacate the premises. ―the filing of the ejectment case was premature.00 representing rental in arrears and current rental for June 2000. et al. has a valid ground for the ejectment of Fajardo HELD: A month-to-month lease under Article 1687 is a lease with a definite period and expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period. 1328 has for so many years been occupied under a verbal contract of lease Leticia Fajardo (Fajardo). Manila. to send her a letter informing her that they have decided to terminate their monthly lease contract effective midnight of August 31. Lopez. a check in the amount of P30.

i. the appeal was dismissed and the CA affirmed the Orders of the OP. another legal ground for judicial ejectment. Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). failed. After Rabina had fully paid the amortization payments for the lot. Sibuyan transferred the lot via ―Assignment and Transfer of Rights‖ to Celestina Rabina (Rabina). 289. the lease is deemed to be for a definite period. annulment of mortgage and incomplete development of the subdivision project Reymarville Subdivision. against MDC before the Office of Appeals. Marenir Development Corporation (MDC).on the lessee. MDC. On elevation to the Court of Appeals. it was error for the appellate court to ignore the fact that by the earlier-quoted August 18. et al. After all. it forged a real estate mortgage covering real estate properties including the lot which was subject of a Contract to Sell to Amante Sibuyan (Sibuyan). 574 SCRA 16 (2008).) The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has the power to regulate real estate trade and the same include complaints for annulment f mortgage. it expires at the end of every month. ISSUES: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . et al. then sent the August 18. with the conformity of MDC.e. it was well within his rights. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. MBC contended that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over it by virtue of Section 29 of Republic Act 265. To secure the payment of such loan. J.. When Lopez. Upon MBC‘s appeal. SPOUSES ALFREDO AND CELESTINA RABINA. The said document mentioned the Contract to Sell which MDC had executed in favor of Sibuyan. prompting Rabina to institute a complaint for nondelivery of titles. In fine. they had notified Fajardo of the expiration of the lease contract. this petition. MBC then elevated the case to the Office of the President (OP) but the same have been dismissed. however. 2000 letter of which was annexed as Annex "F" to the complaint. as amended by Executive Order No. 2000 letter to respondent informing her that the lease would be terminated effective at the end of the same month. Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar Manuel found in favor of the Rabina and ordered for the payment of moral damages. the HLURB Board of Commissioners affirmed the Arbiter‘s decision. Hence. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION v. when the rentals are paid monthly. owner/developer of a subdivision project in Quezon City obtained a loan from the Manila Banking Corporation (MBC). she asked MDC for the transfer to her of its title.

et al. without the knowledge and consent of lot Spouses Rabina and without the approval of the HLURB.D. By Decision the CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision and accordingly dismissed the appeal. TAN. Metrobank alleged that the Spouses Tan. Metrobank appealed before the Court of Appeals. as required by P. On the other hand. The real estate mortgages are null and void because Jose B. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Tan. J. Upon application of the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage.Whether or not the HLURB has jurisdiction over the case at bar under Presidential Decree 957 HELD: The act of MDC in mortgaging the lot. together with their two sons. et al. Before the scheduled public auction.) Absent any evidence that the property is conjugal. JOSE B. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage covering the title in question would render the encumbrance void Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . this petition. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but the same has been dismissed. 509 SCRA 383 (2006). the line was gradually increased. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. the Office of the Provincial Sheriff issued a "Sheriff‘s Notice of Sale" setting on the sale at public auction of four mortgaged parcels of land registered in the name of Jose B. Consequently. obtained a credit line from which they made availments from time to time. To disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency. 957. Eliza Go Tan avers that she never gave her consent or conformity to encumber the title in question. is not only an unsound real estate business practice but also highly prejudicial to them. Tan and Eliza Go Tan filed a complaint against Metrobank for removal of cloud on the title in question and injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Tan. Hence. v. Tan had already fully paid the obligations secured by the mortgages. Spouses Jose B. lack of consent by one spouse does not automatically render the mortgage void.

In other words. Catapang requested First United Travel. which informed him that his ticket was not ―rebookable or reroutable. The RTC ruled that Northwest was liable for breach of contract of carriage. DELFIN S.00.‖ and he could not rebook unless he pays US644. (Northwest) was willing to accommodate his request provided that he will pay an additional US$50 for every rebooking or rerouting of flight. Upon Catapang‘s arrival in New York. 174644 at the back of the title. upon his return.) Any discourteous conduct on the part of the carrier’s employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. TAN. ISSUES: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . CATAPANG 594 SCRA 401 (2009). For proof is wanting that the property covered by the title is conjugal — that it was acquired during respondents‘ marriage which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal property. he called up Northwest‘s office. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. lack of respondent Eliza Go Tan‘s consent to the mortgage covering the title in question would not render the encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar. filed with RTC of Makati a complaint for damages against Northwest.HELD: As for the claim that respondent Eliza Go Tan did not give her consent to the mortgage of the title in question. He was further informed that his ticket was of a ―restricted type. In any event. Delfin S. without more. FUT informed him that Northwest Airlines. it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. NORTHWEST AIRLINES v. On appeal. the Court of Appeals. Inc. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Inc. J.‖ He thus proceeded to Northwest‘s nearest ticketing office where he was treated in a rude manner by an employee who informed him that his ticket was not rebookable or reroutable. the same is belied by her signature on Real Estate Mortgage which is annotated as Entry No. (FUT) to issue in his favor a ticket that would allow rebooking or rerouting of flights within the United States. does not lie. affirmed the trial court‘s Decision. Catapang paid that amount for rebooking. of legal age. married to Eliza Go Tan" does not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal. Her bare denial that the signature was forged. The statement in the title that the property is "registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. Catapang. Catapang agreed with the condition. Before such presumption can apply.

Bernandita subsequently sold the same to Spouses Ergelia nd Leonardo Olasiman. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. respect. namely Isebero Verzano. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Bernandita and Estrella Verzano. Jr. SPOUSES ERGELIA OLASIMAN and LEONARDO OLASIMAN 485 SCRA 464 (2006). injurious language.) The issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean in such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value. Paula Verzano sold an unregistered parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. SPOUSES MARIO ONG AND MARIA CARMELITA ONG and DEMETRIO VERZANO v. indignities and abuses from such employees. Victoria Verzano. on the condition that he would pay $50 for every rebooking. Epifanio Verzano.Whether or not Northwest was right to assail the award to Catapang of moral and exemplary damages by virtue of breach of contract HELD: When Catapang inquired from Northwest‘s agent FUT if he would be allowed to rebook/reroute his flight. Passengers have the right to be treated by a carrier‘s employees with kindness. insulting Catapang by telling him that he could not understand English. Northwst‘s agent in New York exhibited rudeness in the presence of Catapang‘s brother-inlaw and other customers. 18-270-A 1 in her name to her niece Bernandita Verzano-Matugas (Bernandita). J. and the children of her deceased brother Isebero Verzano. Demetrio executed a document entitled ―Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole Heir and Sale‖ where he adjudicated to himself the subject property. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . courtesy and due consideration. Instead of civilly informing Catapang that his ticket could not be rebooked. FUT advised him that he could. Paula thereafter died without an issue and was survived by her sibling Demetrio Verzano. He likewise sold the same to Spouses Carmelita Ong and Mario Ong. He was not told by FUT and the ticket did not reflect it that the ticket being issued to him was a "restricted type" to call for its upgrading before a rebooking/rerouting Northwest‘s breach in this case was aggravated by the undenied treatment received by Catapang when he tried to rebook his ticket. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and ruled that the ―Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole Heir and Sale‖ as null and void.. Their claim of having bought the land in good faith.e. i. ISSUE: Whether or not the ownership over the parcel of land. SPOUSES WILFREDO N. therefore. ownership thereof was transferred to the latter in accordance with Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501. 1992. Since the properties in question are unregistered lands.‖ quiet of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. he could not have conveyed it to Spouses Ong. she no longer owned the questioned lot and. her brother Demetrio could not have inherited it. When Paula died on November 26. J. Consequently. Spouses Ong as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their peril. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. The ―Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole Heir and Sale‖ did not thus confer upon Demetrio ownership of the questioned lot. as it actually did in this case. The issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean in such case the purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.) Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . ONG AND EDNA SHEILA PAGUIO-ONG v. by virtue of the ―Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole Heir and Sale‖. it likewise declared that the sale in favor of Spouses Ong is null and void. 1992 the parcel of land of which the questioned lot formed part. that their seller did not own the property at the time of the sale. without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in the property. would not protect them if it turns out.Spouses Olasiman filed a Complaint against Spouses Ong and Demetrio for annulment of the ―Extrajudicial Settlement by Sole Heir and Sale. On appeal. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Bernandita contains nothing contrary to an intent to transfer ownership. hence. ROBAN LENDING CORPORATION 557 SCRA 516 (2008). is transferred to Spouses Ong HELD: When Paula sold to Bernandita by Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1. or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

an amendment to the amended Real Estate Mortgage which consolidated their loans amounting to P5. or dispose of them. These loans were secured by real estate mortgage on Spouses Ong‘s parcel of lands. and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. Spouses Ong filed a complaint before Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City to declare the mortgage contract. the failure by the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Later Spouses Ong and Roban executed several agreements . On various dates. Ong and Edna Sheila Paguio-Ong obtained several loans from respondent Roban Lending Corporation in the total amount of P4. Spouses Ong allege that the dacion in payment agreement is pactum commissorium. finding that there was no pactum commissorium. Under the Memorandum of Agreement. RTC ruled in favor of Roban. which enables the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged property without the need of any foreclosure proceedings. and therefore void.In a true dacion en pago. which is prohibited under Article 2088 of the Civil Code which provides that the creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage. dacion in payment agreement. 916. are: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation. Memorandum of Agreement and the Dacion in Payment contain no provisions for foreclosure proceedings nor redemption.000. 000. Here. dacion in payment wherein spouses Ong assigned their mortgaged properties to Roban to settle their total obligation and Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the dacion in payment agreement will be automatically enforced in case spouses Ong fail to pay within one year from the execution of the agreement. the assignment of the property extinguishes the monetary debt. The Court of Appeals upheld the RTC decision. and MOA void. ISSUE: Whether or not the dacion in payment agreement entered into by Spouses Ong and Roban constitutes pactum commissorium HELD: The Court finds that the Memorandum of Agreement and Dacion in Payment constitute pactum commissorium. In its Answer with counterclaim. Roban alleged that the dacion in payment agreement is valid because it is a special form of payment recognized under Article 1245 of the Civil Code. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void The elements of pactum commissorium. petitioner Spouses Wilfredo N.117.50.

Even after signing the Deed of Sale on the lot. 486 SCRA 599 (2006). Spouses Osea stipulated that the house would be constructed in accordance with. v. A month after occupying the house. wherein respondent Ambrosio contracted his co-respondent Rodolfo C.50 which they were to pay within one year EDMUNDO T. et al. and Approved Building Plan by the Building Official of Quezon City. Spouses Osea filed a complaint for damages against respondents Ambrosio and Perez before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Osea and Ligaya R. contending that it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The Dacion in Payment did not extinguish Spouses Ong's obligation to Roban. 916. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint damages based on the violation or deviation from the approved subdivision plan HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . 297840. On the contrary. et al. J. Perez to construct the Spouses Osea‘s house in accordance with the Specifications in the Contract to Sell. Osea and respondent Antonio Ambrosio. the assignment of the property extinguishes the monetary debt. AMBROSIO. the terms of the Contract to Sell.petitioners to pay their debt within the one-year period gives respondent the right to enforce the Dacion in Payment transferring to it ownership of the properties covered by TCT No. a lowcost housing and lot project. involves the sale and purchase of a ―house and lot unit‖ in Villa San Agustin Subdivision. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Here. the Bill of Materials. in effect. The Contract to Sell executed by spouses Edmundo T. inter alia. petitioners had to execute a promissory note for P5. automatically acquires ownership of the properties upon Spouses Ong's failure to pay their debt within the stipulated period. under the Memorandum of Agreement executed on the same day as the Dacion in Payment. Ligaya Osea executed a Certificate of Lot and House Acceptance and thereafter occupied it. Respondent.) The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction provides that courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues call for the exercise of sound administrative discretion. and not by way of satisfying the debt. OSEA. ANTONIO G. 117. the alienation of the properties was by way of security. Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for damages. In a true dacion en pago. its front and back walls cracked.

957. declared null and void the trial court‘s Decision for lack of jurisdiction as it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the complaint.The Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not one who has been identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as potential agrarian reform beneficiary may be ejected from the land where he is identified as such. appealed the decision contending that the court has no jurisdiction over the case on the ground of a pending agrarian reform dispute between them and the corporation. On appeal. Constructed on the said land are houses occupied by the corporation‘s workers. The corporation thereafter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities in Bacolod City. JESUS PASCO et al. ―Sale‖ and ―purchase‖ of subdivision lots under P. are former workers of the corporation. automatically make the ejectment case an Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . v. No. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision which affirmed the RTC‘s decision. Jesus Pasco et al. The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of P.) Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. by Decision which is being challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari. is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental. 957 explicitly include the sale and purchase of buildings and other improvements thereon which form an integral part of the approved subdivision plan.D. The appellate court did not thus err when it characterized petitioners complaint for damages as based on the violation or deviation from the ―approved subdivision plan‖. by the landowner. J.D. When their employment contracts were terminated. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. however. who has already been notified by the DAR of the coverage of his land by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government HELD: The issuance during the pendency of the case of a Notice of Coverage to Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation does not. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Pasco et al. ownership of the land is transferred only after the award of the same to the beneficiary by the Department of Agrarian Reform. PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 485 SCRA 514 (2006). they were asked to vacate the house but they refused to do so. the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision.‖ Section 3 of this statute provides the HLUB has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation. Pasco et al. ―THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE.

The RTC found that Martini‘s being ―mama‘s boy‖ manifests Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . a seaman working overseas.agrarian dispute over which the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has jurisdiction. Hence. Martini never communicated with Lynnette. She therafter realized that Martini was a ―mama‘s boy.Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation did in the present case. Because of this. drawing her to inquire from Martini's employer who told her that he had already disembarked. Lynette suggested that they lived with Martini‘s parents but the later disagreed. Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he is "single" and named his mother as principal allottee. the land‘s suitability to agriculture. Since then. Lynette had not heard from Martini and stopped receiving her share of the allotment. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO 556 SCRA 711 (2008). Nothing in the records of the case shows that the DAR has made an award in favor of Spouses Pasco et al. Martini stayed there only on weekends and during weekdays. got married in 1997. he stayed with his parents. as what respondent Pison. Lynette later on noticed that every time the two of them talk. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Hence. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. he informed her that they should part ways. The owner retains its right to eject unlawful possessors of his land. When Lynette and Martini finally met.) Psychological incapacity must be characterized by utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Respondent Lynnette Baguio (Lynnette) and Martini Baguio (Martini). The issuance of a Notice of Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the State‘s acquisition of the land for agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or transfer the ownership of the land to the government. "the land will be placed under agrarian reform. Martini would always mention his mother and his family. On investigation. The couple lived at Lynette‘s parents. no rights over the land they occupy can be considered to have vested in their favor in accordance with Section 24 of the CARL which provides that the rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him. Since during a field investigation the DAR and Land Bank of the Philippines would make a determination as to whether. In 1999. Lynette filed before Regional Trial Court of Cebu a Complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Martini‘s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital duties and obligations under Articles 68-70 of the Family Code. Since then. which award shall be completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. The last time the two of them talked was at the airport when Martini was about to depart for abroad. J." a Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render the land subject thereof a land reform area. Martini‘s money was equally divided between her and Lynette. Lynette soon found out that he was in Muntinlupa. he stayed with his parents. when Martini returned from work.‖ On Martini‘s mother insistence. among other things.

was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. and that the same incapacity existed at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows. Gerong. and the like. and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained the mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. moral corruption. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness.his psychologically incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage. 38. drug addiction. 37. nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence. as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages. at the time of the celebration. The CA held that Lynette‘s oral deposition and the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. The Solicitor General challenged the RTC‘s decision before the Court of Appeals. habitual alcoholism. or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. a clinical psychologist. declaring Martini‘s psychological incapacity was sufficient proof that indeed Martini suffers psychological incapacity. specifically Articles 35. and Article 55 on legal separation. abandonment." Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies. there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is essential that the parties to a marriage Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. "Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. civil interdiction. sexual infidelity. shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. and 41 which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio. moral pressure. ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in declaring the marriage between Lynette and Martini null and void on the ground of latter‘s psychological incapacity HELD: Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who.

they found out that the land was registered in the name of a certain Isadora Gonzales (Gonzales). not refusal or neglect or difficulty. after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition.which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. it being a portion of the public domain and that Barandiaran or her predecessors-in-interest had not been in open. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. It is downright incapacity. Dr. SECOND DIVISION. MTC declared that the land is registrable under Barandiaran‘s name. ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of the property has been sufficiently established by Barandiaran HELD: The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of state ownership of lands of the public domain lies on the person applying for registration. which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (Carpio Morales. Hence. how the doctor arrived at the conclusion. Respondent Maria Isabel Laurel Barandiaran (Barandiaran) filed an application for registration of a parcel of land (Land) before the Municipal Trial Court of Tanauan. Gerong found that Martini's "personality disorders" including his being a "mama's boy" are "serious. Only petitioner Republic of the Philippines (RP) opposed the said application on the ground that the land belongs to them. however. grave.must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence to overcome the presumption must be ―well-nigh incontrovertible. it is gathered that Martini's failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refusal. 23 November 2007. continuous. Barandiaran testified that she and her siblings became interested in the land and upon asking from the people within the vicinity of the land and from the Assessor‘s Office of Tanauan. to do so. that any such personality disorders of Martini have been existing since Martini's adolescent years has not been explained. not incapacity. Barandiaran and her siblings bought the land from the heirs of Gonzales and the land was subsequently declared under Barandiaran‘s name for taxation purposes. The Declaration of Real Property in Gonzales‘ name. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court‘s decision. this petition. exclusive and notorious possession or occupation thereof. much less ill will. MARIA ISABEL LAUREL BARANDIARAN 538 SCRA 705. Batangas (MTC). existing already during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family. In another vein. J. Here." The doctor's findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette's deposition. From Lynnette's deposition. does not prove Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .) The person applying for the registration of the land has the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of the State’s ownership over lands of public domain by incontrovertible evidence.

The DARAB held in favor of San Diego but the Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB decision citing Monsanto v. Zerna where the Supreme Court laid down the elements of a tenancy relationship. So Republic v. his son Eufrocinio Evangelista inherited the property which part of it was planted with rice and the remaining with bamboo. Following the guidelines set forth in Monsanto. After Andres Evangelista died. as well as contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.‖ No such proof of actual possession of the property was presented. they only become evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators. the Agricultural Leasehold Contract of San Diego with the late Andres Evangelista excluded the bamboo land area. and damages with respect to the bambooland portion of the property. Evangelista countered that San Diego is a tenant only with respect to the riceland portion of the property. the bambooland portion not being tenanted. (Carpio Morales. and a legislative act or statute. Moreover. EUFROCINIO EVANGELISTA 479 SCRA 666 (2006). an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order. It is settled that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax purposes are ―not incontrovertible evidence of ownership.ownership of the land.) The contract. for the simple reason that requisites of ―personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or lessee‖ and ―harvest sharing between the landowner and the tenant or lessee.‖ MONICO SAN DIEGO v. Monico San Diego has been an agricultural tenant in a parcel of land owned by Andres Evangelista. San Diego filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evangelista for maintenance of peaceful possession. As for the notation on the subdivision plan of the lot stating that ―the survey is inside alienable and disposable area. enjoyment. Tri-Plus Corporation instructs: ―To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable.‖ the same does not constitute proof that the lot is alienable and disposable. ISSUE: Whether or not San Diego has a right over the bamboo portion of the land for allegedly being part of the leased property Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . the annual payment of lease clearly showed that the said payments correspond only to the yield of rice over the portion of riceland and not on the disputed bamboo land. J." are wanting in the instant case. an administrative action. is used to determine the nature of the relationship of the parties.

A. the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. Acts contemporaneous and subsequent to the execution of the contract show that the parties intended to establish a tenancy relationship only as regards the rice-planted portion of the property. J. Brokerage refused to admit liability for the damaged goods which it delivered from Philippines Skylanders. (Wyeth-Suaco) as insurance payment for the goods delivered in bad condition." Art. petitioner has been paying rentals in palay. Inc. shows that the parties established a tenancy relationship only with respect to the riceland portion of the property. A. created . ISSUE: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . . . which evidence has not been controverted by petitioner.F. Thus. It provides that "an agricultural leasehold relation . discovered when the sealed containers were opened outside the PSI warehouse. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the said complaint.) A common carrier is liable to the resulting damage to the goods if the improper packaging is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation. not in bamboo. (Sanchez Brokerage) to collect the amount paid by the former to Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories Inc. but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception. v. is . In fine. SANCHEZ BROKERAGE INC. COURT OF APPEALS and FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION 447 SCRA 427 (2004).HELD: The contract relied upon by San Diego is clearly worded. thus applies. as well as the acts of both San Diego and Evangelista contemporaneous and subsequent to the execution thereof. Neither does San Diego's suggestion that there was a prevailing custom entitling landlords to a share of 10 cavans of palay per hectare lie. . Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU) brought an action for reimbursement against petitioner A. . (PSI) to Wyeth-Suaco as it maintained that the damage was due to improper and insufficient export packaging.F. however. Sanchez Brokerage Inc. on a farm lot which is a portion of a parcel of land. The evidence proffered by Evangelista on the other hand abundantly shows that the bambooland portion of the property has always been untenanted.. 1370 of the New Civil Code which provides that if the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. . . the decision was subsequently reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. according to the rules of evidence. the contract.F. finding that Sanchez Brokerage is liable for the carriage of cargo as a ―common carrier‖ by definition of the New Civil Code. THE HON. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. it not having been proven in accordance with Article 12 of the New Civil Code which provides: A custom must be proved as a fact.

Whether or not the FGU Insurance is liable for the delivery of the damaged goods HELD: As defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code. common carriers are persons. Sanchez Brokerage as a common carrier is mandated to observe. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. water or air for compensation..) A common carrier shall exercise extraordinary diligence to prevent and/or minize the loss or destruction of goods. It does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Court of Appeals. The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale. then it should naturally have received the cargo under protest or with reservation duly noted on the receipt issued by PSI but it made no such protest or reservation. While paragraph no. extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods it transports according to all the circumstances of each case. but he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition. offering their services to the public. the rule is that if the improper packaging is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation. corporations. INC. et al. carriage and delivery. In this light. It requires common carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresight and ―to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of goods tendered for shipment and to exercise due care in the handling and storage including such methods as their nature requires. If the claim of Sanchez Brokerage that some of the cartons were already damaged upon delivery to it were true. it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. J. he is not relieved of liability for the resulting damage. The contention therefore of Sanchez Brokerage that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. 456 SCRA 557 (2005).. firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both by land. It was established that Sanchez Brokerage received the cargoes from the PSI warehouse in good order and condition and that upon delivery by petitioner some of the cargoes were found to be in bad order as noted in the Delivery Receipt and as indicated in the Survey and Destruction Report. LTD. under Article 1733 of the Civil Code. In the event that the goods are lost. SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION v. 4 of Article 1734 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from liability if the loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . TRANSPORT VENTURE. It suffices that petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY. (Carpio Morales. destroyed or deteriorated. The concept of ―extra-ordinary diligence‖ was explained in Compania Maritima v.

therefore. That it was nighttime and. Schmitz and TVI HELD: TVI‘s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation. for it to be relieved of liability. The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. before. during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods. it was acting for its principal. The barge capsized. As for Schmitz. The tugboat. and litigation expenses. It asserts that in chartering the barge and tugboat of TVI. because of the strong waves. Later on. and in the open sea. the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. there was no tugboat that pulled the barge back to the pier. Rizal. it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help. engaged to secure the requisite clearances. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk. it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss.’s motion for reconsideration is denied. Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport. at such a precarious time. TVI and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of Manila. consignee Little Giant. By noon the next day. ISSUES: Whether or not the liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea. In effect. Schmitz now filed charges against TVI et al. It likewise engaged the services of respondent Transport Venture Inc. but was the proximate cause of the loss. washing the 37 coils into the sea. the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. and to deliver them to Little Giant Steelpipe Corporation‘s warehouse at Cainta.SYTCO Pte Ltd. attorney‘s fees. Petitioner Schmitz Transport. arrastre operator commenced to unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge. but it did not. The Court rendered a decision holding Schmitz and TVI liable. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. While Schmitz sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to counter-check the operations of TVI. the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. However. prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss. Industrial Insurance won and the Schmitz et al. After noting that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions. after positioning the barge alongside the vessel. Eventually. during which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm. for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees. following Article 1739 of the Civil Code. Russia on board M/V ―Alexander Saveliev‖ (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by respondent Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets. hence. the transportation contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI. left and returned to the port terminal. it should. to receive the cargoes from the shipside. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours.

it had discharged its duty. CRUZ & CO. the present petition.) That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. In fine. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio-Morales. through Schmitz. v. 2 covering the shipment provides that delivery be made ―to the port of discharge or so near thereto as she may safely get. J. Cruz however appealed to the Office of the President which overturned the decision of the DENR Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed. SIAIN contends that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore land and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it preferential rights over the Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 .F. agree upon a definition of delivery that extends the services rendered by the carrier. however. declaring that there was no basis to declare the area as ―reclaimed‖. always afloat. F. Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to certain lots registered in its name. It subsequently filed a foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from DBP. however. a portion of which is adjacent to the lot previously occupied by WESVICO. SIAIN filed a protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the property adjoining the overlapping area.F. In the case at bar. Cruz.F. Bill of Lading No. The case was. argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential right since the area in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖ and that the ownership was not by means of accretion. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands. Cruz's foreshore lease application overlapped that covered by its foreshore lease application. Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary..The Court holds then that Schmitz and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes. It eventually withdrew the application and filed a petition for registration over the same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo. 500 SCRA 406 (2006). (SIAIN) purchased the properties previously owned by WESVICO from the Development Bank of the Philippines. INC. F. As for Black Sea. Iloilo City a foreshore lease application over a foreshore land. Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land subject of F. INC.F. Hence. WESVICO has ceased operations. it should be given preference in its lease.‖ The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from ―pier to pier‖ but from the shipside of ―M/V Alexander Saveliev‖ and into barges. SIAIN was upheld. no liability may thus attach to Black Sea. F. Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant. SIAIN ENTERPRISES. its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant Parties to a contract of carriage may. Cruz & Co.F. (F. F. This argument has been sustained by the Land Management Bureau. Sian Enterprises Inc. and later on.F. On appeal. for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. archived as WESVICO‘s representative could no longer be contacted.

ISSUES: Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or ―reclaimed‖ area HELD: That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner. littoral owner WESVICO cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its preferential right to lease the disputed area when it subsequently filed an application for registration thereover. Spouses Sim argued that the insurance contract novated their obligation which should be computed on the basis of the principal amount. To secure the obligation. the mere fact that the creditor is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy does not release the debtor from his responsibility.) In the absence of an agreement. Spouses Benjamin and Agrifina Sim purchased a motor vehicle from Angus Motors Corporation (Angus) on installment basis.‖ Following Santulan. prompting them to file an insurance claim with the CIC making MBC as the beneficiary thereof. FINANCE CORPORATION 508 SCRA 556 (2006). ownership of the area could not be acquired by WESVICO. as stated earlier. Cruz undertook its reclamation. The appellate court. they executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle which is insured with the Commonwealth Insurance Company (CIC) and a promissory note in favor of Angus. M. albeit a faux pas. The latter then assigned its rights. in fact more than proves its interest to utilize it. Finance Corporation (MBC). On appeal.B. Finance then filed a complaint against Spouses Sim for sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. title and interest to M. It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought the disputed foreshore area into existence. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Such a situation does not constitute novation. The vehicle was carnapped and was not recovered. the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same. pursued but eventually denied.F. For being a part of the public domain.B. was archived by the trial court. Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President. J. M. Such foreshore area existed even before F. however. held that there was no novation. The trial court discredited Spouses Sim‘s claim that the payment of the proceeds of the insurance policy for the loss of the vehicle extinguished their obligation. Spouses Sim defaulted in paying the monthly installments. Its preferential right remained. WESVICO would not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease application. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . were WESVICO‘s petition for registration which. however. Parenthetically. SPOUSES BENJAMIN and AGRIFINA SIM v. Its move to have the contested land titled in its name. It was ―formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea. As correctly argued by SIAIN. the petition for registration of WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest but because it ceased operations due to financial reasons.B. as affirmed by the appellate court.

the insurance policy was not intended to substitute the promissory note. the other to substitute a new one in its place ─ requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation. manning agent in the Philippines of Navales Shipmanagement and Marine Consulting Pte. there is no new or old contract to speak of since all agreements were apparently executed simultaneously. (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation. Navales subsequently appointed Seagull Maritime Corporation(Seagull) as its manning agent in the Philippines and assumed full responsibility for all seaman deployed by Philimare. Furthermore. He thereafter filed a claim before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the payment of his insurance from Philimare and Seagull. respectively.B. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply (Philimare). the mere fact that M. Finance is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy issued by CIC does not release spouses Sim from their responsibility. Balatogan met an accident in Egypt and was found to be permanently disabled. Ltd of Singapore (Turtle). and COURT OF APPEALS 14 SCRA 419 (2003). J. respondent and CIC as the insured. Sim. SOUTHEAST ASIA SHIPPING CORPORATION v. Finance on the ground that the contract between the parties has not been novated HELD: In the absence of an agreement. In this case.B. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . hired Nerry Balatogan to work aboard the vessel Turtle Bay. and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. or on or about the same time. of Singapore (Navales) which was acting for and on behalf of Turtle Bay Shipping Pte. Novation may either be extinctive or modificatory. Ltd. Such a situation does not constitute novation. SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former. the literal meaning shall stand. (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract. The same decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. the insurance agreement was between Benjamin L.ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred when it failed to release Spouses Sim from liability to the M. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions. Clearly. the NLRC affirmed the decision of the POES. There was no reference to said promissory note. it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. beneficiary and the insurer. novation would have dual functions ─ one to extinguish an existing obligation. The POEA rendered judgment in favor of Balatongan.) When the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous. On appeal. Under this mode.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision. despite the circumstances under which it was accomplished. one fact is certain. Navales ―on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping Corporation Pte Ltd. Seagull filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court against Seascorp for the recovery of the amount paid by them to Balatogan. Whether Seascorp‘s employees merely copied the Affidavit from a copy of the POEA. Seagull was the manning agent of Navales which was acting for and behalf of Tutle Bay Shipping. ISSUE: Whether or not Seascorp is liable to Seagull‘s claim solely on the basis of the agreement executed by Seascorp and Navales prior to the rendition of judgment by the Supreme Court HELD: As stated earlier. Reference then to the Special Power of Attorney is likewise in order. On appeal. Of Singapore” and Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation(Seascorp) enterd into a manning agency agreement wherein Navales appointed Seascorp as recruiting agent of Filipino seamen. before the promulgation of the Supreme Court of the earlier decision. would sacrifice the substantial rights of Seascorp and thus work injustice. That is the mandate of Article 1370 of the Civil Code. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . SEASCORP could only have referred to liabilities that may arise or have arisen with respect to seamen it recruited and deployed for NAVALES ―acting for and on behalf of ARAWA BAY SHIPPING”. On the basis of the agreement.” named. thus upholding the literal interpretation of the affidavit against affiant Seascorp. There is no doubt that the general rule is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous about the intention of the contracting parties. The Special Power of Attorney just as clearly stated that Navales. appointed Seascrp as its recruitment agent for the hiring of Filipino seaman. ‖acting for and in behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping. Seascorp was mistaken either through ignorance. The Manning Agency Agreement clearly states that Navales. To disregard the Manning Agency Agreement and the Special Power of Attorney in construing the affidavit as the appellate court did. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Seagull. ―acting for and in behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping. Seascorp was the manning agent of Navales which was acting for and on behalf of Arawa Bay Shipping.However. or negligence. which circumstances throw light upon. The affidavit does not thus express the true intention of the parties. Upon the other hand. The same Manning Agency Agreement states that it shall incorporate the Special Power of Attorney executed by Navales for the purpose in favor of Seascorp. lack of skill. rather than promote justice. the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. It was stated in the affidavit and special power of attorney that Seascorp will assume all liabilities that may arise with respect to all seamen recruited and deployed by Seagull for Navales. explain and restrict the terms of the affidavit. constituted and appointed Seascorp as its attorney-in-fact.

In fine. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. That apart from the check no written proof of the grant of the loan was executed was credibly explained by Villapaz when he declared that Spouses Tan‘s son being his godson. That Antonio Tan had an outstanding balance of more than P950. as Spouses Tan‘s side of the case is incredible as it is inconsistent with the principles by which men similarly situated are governed.00 must appear in writing is only for convenience. the same is misplaced for the requirement that contracts where the amount involved exceeds P500. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that the transaction in dispute was a contract of loan and not a mere matter of check encashment HELD: At all events. By way of Compulsory Counterclaim. it should have been expressly stipulated upon in writing by the parties. Antonio Tan failed to settle the same. he. 1358 of the Civil Code. As for spouses Tan‘s reliance on Art. finally 3) that the check is inadmissible to prove the existence of the a P250. It is pure naivete to believe that if a businessman has such an outstanding balance in his bank account. whereas Villapaz‘s claim that the proceeds of the check. Respondent Carmelito Villapaz filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for sum of money against Spouses Antonio and Lolita Tan. the essential requisite for the validity and enforceability of a loan is wanting. J. could prove a loan transaction. Spouses Tan denied obtaining a loan from Villapaz. a check.SPOUSES ANTONIO and LOLITA TAN v. hence. he would have no need to borrow a lesser amount.00 in his account at PBCom Monteverde branch where he was later to deposit respondent‘s check did not rule out petitioners‘ securing a loan.) A check. out of trust and respect. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . but it was not. They also alleged that 1) the check issued by Villapaz was in exchange for equivalent cash. the entries of which are no doubt in writing. they prayed for the award of damages and litigation expenses and attorney‘s fees. Villapaz alleged that Spouses Tan obtained a loan from him where he issued a crossed check payable to the order of Antonio Tan and deposited the same to the latter‘s account at the PBCom Davao City branch. the entries of which are no doubt in writing.000 loan. 3) that since the alleged loan was one with a period. believed that the crossed check sufficed to prove their transaction. and. The RTC dismissed the Complaint and granted the Counterclaim.000. could prove a loan transaction. 2) that they never received any demand for payment be it verbal or written. Villapaz appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed the trial court‘s decision. CARMELITO VILLAPAZ 457 SCRA 720 (2005). On the maturity date of the loan.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3. it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage. subsequently. which action for annulment may be filed. the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death has been filed before the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. Diaz contracted marriage. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse. Bailon and Alice P. contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque and designated her the Social Security System (SSS) beneficiary of the former. no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. Clemente G. THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales. and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved. ISSUE Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent Teresita Jarque may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon HELD: The second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. Teresita protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Thus Article 42 thereof provides the subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse. 1988 of the Family Code. the preponderance of evidence inclines on Villapaz. Under the Civil Code. J. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. Under the Family Code.which were admittedly received by petitioners. a subsequent marriage being voidable. Bailon. represented a loan extended to petitioner Antonio Tan is credible. unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. SSS cancelled the claim of respondent Teresita Jarque of her monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice. Hence.) Where a person has entered into two successive marriages. More than 15 years later. DE BAILON 485 SCRA 376 (2006). which has been granted. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.

After the investigation. They partially paid amortization until April 2001. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT. In the case at bar. but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage. Romeo. and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure. Reynaldo a and Manuel. ROMEO UYECIO. despite the fact that the improvements and amenities reflected in the sales brochures were yet to be completed. Bailon‘s and Teresita‘s marriage prior to the former‘s death in 1998. Amaris. Lucia has not shown any ground to merit a disturbance of the findings of the HLURB which have been sustained by the OP and the appellate court. entered into a contract to sell with Sta. Lucia Realty) covering seven (7) lots. among others. The decision of HLURB was affirmed by the Office of the President and by the Court of Appeals. either by affidavit or by court action. the suspensive condition not having occurred. Lucia Realty & Development. In the present case.. all surnamed Uyecio (Uyecios). they are considered conclusive. are not to be disturbed. will not terminate such marriage. v. J. INC. STA. and by fiction of law. (Sta. Lucia Realty at the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) compelling the completion of the Sta. Inc. Lucia Realty‘s project within six (6) months or refund of their total payments. Sta. in accordance with law. such absentee‘s mere reappearance. HLURB ruled in favor of the Uyecios and ordered. The sale was premised upon the brochures of the project detailing the improvements and amenities to the unconstructed subdivision. The Uyecios agreed to pay part of down payment of the lots in installment of 10 years at 21% interest per annum. Teresita is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. such presumption continues inspite of the spouse‘s physical reappearance. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage. as no step was taken to nullify. he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. The Uyecios filed a complaint against the Sta. AMARIS UYECIO. REYNALDO UYECIO and MANUEL UYECIO 562 SCRA 226 (2008).If the absentee reappears.. SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead.) Articles 1191 of the Civil Code does not thus apply to a contract to sell since there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent. the rescission of the Contract to Sell between the parties. ISSUES: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the rescission of the Contract to Sell between the parties HELD: In the absence of substantial showing that the findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise were arrived at from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented.

unless. In 1988. Annaliza and Andrea. as a general rule. On even date. Cancellation. Santiago. died leaving behind two children. Julieta and Ireneo. executed a Deed of Sale covering the first of the aforementioned lots in favor of herein respondents Lourdes Panlasigue and Julieta P. THIRD DIVISION. inexcusable delay in asserting a right and acquiescence in existing conditions are proven.Articles 1191 of the Civil Code does not thus apply to a contract to sell since there can be no rescission of an obligation that is still non-existent. et al. the full payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition.‖ Teodoro. the wife of her eldest child-herein petitioner Teodoro Sta. donated the second lot to Ireneo Sta. In other words. 500 SCRA 476 (2006).) The doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions. LOURDES PANLASIGUE. the breach contemplated in Article 1191 is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation already extant. but simply an event which prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring any obligatory force. the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court‘s decision holding that the sale and donations were not null and void. On appeal. The CA also held that the right of Teodoro to question the title of Lourdes and Julieta has been barred by laches. Ana. Anatolia. filed a complaint alleging among others that he did not participate in the extrajudicial partition and donations relative to the conveyance of land in favor of Lourdes. who was then abroad. via a ―Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Donation. together with eight of her living children and Fe Sta Ana. together with the same eight children and Teodoro‘s wife Fe. like a contract of sale. Two parcels of land situated in Pasig City were registered in the name of Petronilo Sta. the suspensive condition not having occurred. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig held that the sale and donations were null and void. the failure of which is not considered a breach. J. Ana. Ana who died leaving behind his widow Anatolia and ten children. not rescission. upon coming home to the country in 1996. ANA v. one of the Sta. ISSUES: Whether or not Teodoro‘s right to question the title of Lourdes. one of the ten children of the Sta. After sometime. Nicolas. not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation. Ana couple. He prayed that his share be reconveyed back to him. casual or serious. Julieta and Ireneo has been barred by laches HELD: Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . In a contract to sell real property on installments. TEODORO STA. Ana children. Anatolia. of the contract to sell is thus the correct remedy in the premises. (Carpio Morales.

Jurisprudence of course dictates that the "[t]he doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions, unless, as a general rule, inexcusable delay in asserting a right and acquiescence in existing conditions are proven." From the annotation on May 6, 1988 of the challenged documents on Petronilo's title up to the filing by Teodoro on August 20, 1996 of the complaint subject of the present case, a period of more than 8 years had elapsed. Gratuitously assuming that the action for reconveyance is based on implied trust, it prescribes in 10 years. Therefore, Teodoro's complaint had not prescribed when he filed his complaint. The facts and circumstances attendant to the case indicate, however, that there was inexcusable delay on the part of Teodoro in asserting his right and acquiescence in existing conditions. Tala Realty Services Corporation, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank G. R. No. 130088, 7 April 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC) 17 complaints for reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) et al. Banco Filipino‘s complaints commonly alleged that in 1979, expansion of its operations required the purchase of real properties for the purpose of acquiring sites for more branches; that as Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a bank‘s allowable investments in real estate to 50% of its capital assets, its board of directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites. Thus, Nancy L. Ty, a major stockholder and director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco Filipino, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco Filipino; that after the transfer of Banco Filipino properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres‘ sister Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did, endorse to her his shares in Tala Realty and registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add International. Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through her nominees Pilar, Cynthia, and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add International and her nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control through his own nominees, the latest being Tala Realty‘s president, Rubencito del Mundo. In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. Tala Realty simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decided to sell them. Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and goodwill, with a threat to eject Banco Filipino.
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Thus arose Banco Filipino‘s 17 complaints for reconveyance against Tala Realty. ISSUE: Whether or not the trust agreement is void HELD: In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision dated November 22, 2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in the reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions, held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced. An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that "where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud." The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law. As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached. Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price." This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, the Court cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the ‗clean hands‘ doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala. UNIWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., v. ALEXANDER M. CRUZ 529 SCRA 664 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complain may be brought before other venues. Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a franchise agreement with Alexander M. Cruz granting the latter a five-year franchise to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family Store System‖ for the establishment and operation of a ―Uniwide Family Store‖ in Marikina City. The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three percent of gross monthly purchases, whichever is higher to UHI, payable within five days after the end of each month without need of formal billing or demand from UHI. In case of any delay in the payment of the monthly service fee, Cruz would, under Article 10.3 of the agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge
Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010

of three percent per month. Cruz thereafter purchased goods from UHI's affiliated companies First
Paragon Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).

FPC and USWCI subsequently executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning all their rights and interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC and USWCI in the amount of P1, 358, 531.89.00. UHI sent a letter demanding for the payment of such amount but it was not settled. Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque against Cruz praying for payment of service fee, accounts payable to FPC and USWCI and attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses. Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He invokes Article 27.5 of the agreement which provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the courts f Quezon City. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of improper venue where only one of the causes of action arises from a contract with exclusive venue stipulation

HELD: In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC and USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to the stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖ The Court found merit in this contention. The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that a ll other
actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not, however, exclude parties from bringing a case to other venues. Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.

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(Xavier III). however. Thus. morals. They are based on separate. 510 SCRA 619 (2006). XAVIERVILLE II HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. J.It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a breach of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. public order. To have the force of res judicata. or public policy. it filed a motion to dismiss the same. the parties' attention is invited to National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia v. Thus. filed this present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by the petitioner is within the jurisdiction or of the HLURB HELD: En passant. morals. XAVIERVILLE III HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. v. The RTC denied the motion. Inc. provided they are not contrary to law. hence. the compromise agreement must be approved by final order of the court. Faculty of Civil Law Digest Pool 2010 . Xavierville II Homeowners Association. Court of Appeals wherein the Court held that under Article 1306 of the Civil Code. clauses. INC. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. contracting parties may establish such stipulations. Now comes the parties‘ ―Joint Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss based on Compromise which prays for the dismissal of the case. THIRD DIVISION. public order. (Xavier II) contended that it is the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over Xavierville III Homeowners Association. a compromise agreement whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their differences to thereby put an end to litigation is binding on the contracting parties and is expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement between them. good customs. (Carpio Morales. any action arising from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive venue stipulation embodied in the agreement. The appellate court having denied the association‘s motion for reconsideration and thus.) Contracting parties may establish such stipulations. Inc. distinct and independent contracts-deeds of assignment in which UHI is the assignee of Cruz‘s obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. clauses. good customs. or public policy. provided they are not contrary to law. INC.

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