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9-2 003 Amir - Philosophy Benefit

9-2 003 Amir - Philosophy Benefit

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How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice?

Lydia B. Amir

Ordinary experience has long been the object of derision and suspicion in philosophy. ‘But isn’t that an empirical question?’ This is often followed by (or at least implies) ‘That’s not philosophy!’ And so the subject [philosophy] gets thinner and thinner until it loses so much mass that it has virtually no weight at all. (Robert C. Solomon, 1999, note 5, p. 225). A theory is exactly like a box of tools... It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself … then the theory is useless or the moment inappropriate. (Gilles Deleuze, in Foucault, 1977, p. 208)

When discussing the relationship between philosophy and Philosophical Practice in publications and conferences, we tend to emphasise one direction.2 We often ask: how can philosophy contribute to Philosophical Practice? Or, how can we use philosophy in consultation? I suggest probing the other aspect of the relationship by asking: how can Philosophy benefit from Philosophical Practice and Counselling? By ‘Philosophy’ I refer both to the activity carried out under this name in the academic world and to the body of philosophical thought which constitutes the history of philosophy. By ‘Philosophical Practice and Counselling’ I refer to an encounter with non-philosophers in which the practitioner participates as a professional philosopher. Various activities are subsumed under this label, notably: teaching philosophy to students who are not registered in departments of philosophy, teaching adults of various professions, and practising philosophy with groups, families, couples and individuals. Two assumptions underlie the question, how can philosophy benefit from philosophical practice and counselling? First, philosophy should be improved, and second, philosophical practice may prove useful in that process. The first assumption implies that philosophy should be improved in order to survive its
1 I read an earlier version of this paper at the APA meeting, Eastern Division, Atlanta, December 2002. I have profited from the comments of two Philosophical Practitioners who attended the lecture, of two anonymous referees who read an underdeveloped version of the paper, and of the current editor, to whom I am especially grateful for encouraging me to revise and submit the paper. See, for example, Gerd B. Achenbach (1984,1987), Elliot Cohen (1990,1994), Ran Lahav (1992,1993), Ran Lahav and Maria da Venza Tillmanns (1995), Marc Sautet (1995), Schlomit C. Schuster (1995a,1995b), most of the papers in W. van derVlist, (1996), various papers in International Journal of Philosophical Practice and in Practical Philosophy, some books on philosophical counselling, such as Louis Marinoff (1999), Alex Howard (2000), Tim LeBon, 2001, etc.


http://www.practical-philosophy.org.uk Practical Philosophy, Vol. 9.2. July 2008


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since I wonder whether philosophers. design. second. Although philosophers and non-philosophers alike may criticise Philosophy. partly to the divide between Analytical Philosophy and Continental Philosophy. Having clarified both assumptions. may supplement these experiences with reflection on her systematic attempts to acquaint non-philosophers with Philosophy. 1991. and advertising are the rivals philosophy has recently encountered. To assess its place. who are usually not trained in data gathering. The crisis is partly due to the postmodern criticism of reason and its subsequent relativism. second. develop and utilise aspects of its theories adapted to contemporary problems. psychoanalysis and logical analysis. A Criterion of Practicability I propose that practitioners gather information and share their experience of nonphilosophers’ capacity of implementing philosophical ideals and theories. first. p. past philosophy may be re-evaluated according to a criterion of practicability or relevance to everyday life. The second assumption states that philosophical practice may be useful in improving Philosophy. but also to the powerful rivals who want to replace philosophy. we may address the question. The investigation cannot be strictly empirical. linguistics. she accumulates information on non-philosophers’ reactions to philosophy’s main tenets. or which are often or even invariably rejected. The Philosophical Practitioner. the Philosophical Practitioner occupies a privileged place in assessing its relevance to non-philosophers. ideals and values: which are more easily embraced and implemented in their lives. in data analysis. epistemology. the philosophy-to-come will better fulfil its task by answering the needs of its epoch. presuppositions. I foresee two outcomes: first. 4 http://www. be practical and applicable to everyday life. how can philosophy benefit from Philosophical Practice? I propose that. I clarify these proposals in the remainder of the paper. Through these attempts.org. 10). however. limitations. Moreover. more recently computer science. I believe it should emphasise.uk PP9. practitioners confront academic philosophy with their findings in order to assess the usefulness of past philosophy and provide the creative philosopher (who may be the same practitioner) with up-to-date information about non-philosophers’ presuppositions. Other philosophers may generalise from their personal experience as human beings and accidental encounters with nonphilosophers.practical-philosophy. practitioners gather information on non-philosophers’ capacity of implementing philosophical ideals and theories. This point is made by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in What is Philosophy?(Deleuze and Guattari.How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice? contemporary crisis. Academic philosophers usually reserve philosophical discussions for their peers and for graduate students of philosophy. and specifically 3 The human sciences and especially sociology. marketing.2 Proof1. needs and expectations.indd 4 20/6/08 5:20:53 pm .3 Remaining solely theoretical endangers its very being. new philosophical theories hopefully devised in this century should correspond to non-philosophers’ capacities and needs in order to be accepted and implemented by them.

nonetheless supplies a theoretical support for ethics. philosophical practitioners do not need a strictly empirical investigation to uncover ideas in philosophy that rub counsellees up the wrong way. My proposal is different from the Logical Positivist criterion of verifiability and from the Pragmatist criterion of truth. 4. is that they look at results at the end or at mid-points of the treatment. Should we ask different questions regarding the relevance of philosophy to everyday life? Should we challenge the very notion of relevance? Isn’t it part of the innovation which is Philosophical Practice to challenge the intrinsic dichotomy of theory and practice? If applied to the more narrow setting of philosophical counselling. what seems workable to unconverted hearers or what seems out of the question. I do not contend that a philosophical theory which is irrelevant to everyday life has no meaning. The field of Therapy Outcome Studies in psychology deals precisely with how to evaluate various elements of counseling and therapy. the Philosophical Practitioner develops an understanding of what is ‘in’ and what is ‘out’. With experience. p. practical. Metaphysics may also be pertinent to our lives by providing an integrated worldview that answers our need for comprehension. and for most ethical theories. http://www. if we cannot supply a final answer. and metaphysical concepts and precepts to students of various disciplines. 4 If philosophers wish to be equipped for an empirical investigation. epistemological. 598).2 Proof1. Some persons’ need for holistic interpretation of the universe. Nor should it be strictly empirical. for Spinoza’s philosophy. which is particularly relevant to philosophical counselling.org. Nor do I maintain that the truth of a philosophical theory is tantamount to its practical applications. proposing a wealth of ethical. By probing philosophy’s relevance to everyday life. Amir in outcome studies. Or. One shortcoming of many earlier outcome studies. at particular moments in a session.indd 5 20/6/08 5:20:54 pm . for example. A new practice in research. which I believe cannot be proven true or false.Lydia B.practical-philosophy. promote the healing process (Hunt. what seems pertinent to life in the everyday worlds. are sufficiently equipped for an empirical investigation. does it contribute to it. I believe we can come to understand which philosophers and which aspects of a philosophical theory contribute to life as most people live it and to the activities most people undertake. 1993. would be better served through philosophical metaphysics than through New Age theories. can I use it somehow? Let me give an example. is to look more closely at what happens in therapy: how effectively different forms of intervention. Stoics’ metaphysics might be endorsed if their ethics is appealing. It is therefore highly relevant to our life. 1993. and what seems to require a philosophical monastery. I merely suggest that we add another perspective to the truth and meaning of a philosophical theory by asking: is it relevant to our life. and to adults of various professions with often varied concerns and interests.uk 5 PP9. 17). a serious discussion may be needed about what exactly ‘relevance’ consists in. as well as many shortcomings (cf. chap. is it workable. it would be good for them to acquaint themselves with the basics of this field. however. Philosophical Practitioners experiment with philosophical theories. Hunt. This is a huge field with many theoretical and practical issues. Metaphysics. since the choice of a specific metaphysics may determine the endorsement of an ethics. However. for the latter depends on the former. we may discuss the options. the same is true for Epicurean ethics and metaphysics.

who should determine if an idea is relevant or pertinent to nonphilosophers’ lives? Should it be the sole decision of the non-philosopher. For the sake of amusement. that these ideas inspire counselees in their lives and cause them to realise that very abstract theories too are capable of inspiring? That they promote wisdom? That they answer counsellees’ questions about their life? It seems that these different criteria may lead to radically different evaluations. The picture that embodies the epistemological values seems to be the rational person 6 http://www. New philosophies could be tailored to problematise our times as reflected in these maps. Enriched by others’ experiences as well as by her own. while teaching a course of the history of ideas. young persons today. ‘I am losing my touch’. I would like to open the dialogue with my fellow-counsellors by presenting such a list. ideals and values. Keeping the inevitable subjectivity of what follows in mind. limitations. Philosophy as Counsellee One way of getting information on how non-philosophers respond to philosophy is to formulate an hypothesis on the presuppositions. yet not exhaustive. the Philosophical Practitioner would pay attention to the reactions to those presuppositions. I propose finding out what parts of philosophy are at odds with non-philosophers. the first step of the investigation I propose may take the form of an imaginary conversation between the counsellor and Philosophy. Then. those aspects of the history of philosophy which challenge the new generation without being rejected at the outset would be brought to the fore. and possibly acceptable by. ‘I am out of tune with the world and I do not manage to produce anything that reaches people.uk PP9. maps of new sensibilities. say. list of the tenets. or counselling. I propose to divide the list into epistemological and ethical values.practical-philosophy. Instead of being intimidated by the various questions that relevance raise. by inviting philosophical practitioners to make their own list.org. Also.2 Proof1. or lecturing on the Stoics. and indifferences would be created by joint effort. ideals and values that prevail in philosophy and that might be at odds with the views of non-philosophers. This list would undoubtedly reflect the counsellor’s personal philosophical education as well as her experience with Philosophical Practice. With time. aspirations.’ I believe that the outcome of such a discussion would be a long. Philosophy would complain. to comment on mine. beliefs and ideals which are characteristic of Philosophy and are at odd with non-philosophers. needs. or does the philosopher have a say about such relevancies even though they go unrecognised by her student or counsellee? Can you educate for relevance? Should you? I will address this question at the end of the paper. she would have a better idea of what would be helpful to. Later we may address the question whether they are or should be considered ‘irrelevant’ to their lives. Crucially. and kindly.How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice? Does the relevance of a theory mean that counsellees agree with it or like it? Or. interesting for. Later.indd 6 20/6/08 5:20:54 pm . she could report her impressions to her fellow-practitioners.

capable of undergoing a profound emotional and behavioural change through cognitive understanding. and specifically on ethics John Passmore (1970) or Robert L. He was explaining the problem of the subject. see for example. For philosophical conceptions of love. postmodernists’ conclusions are not accepted by all philosophers.nor was it meant to be.practical-philosophy.org. seek out problems people have. Bertrand Russell’s History of Philosophy (1946). while wealth. To exemplify this. Amir (2001.they can also be contested on practical ones. my (postmodernist) assistant teaches a course.using logical thought as her most natural tool.uk 7 PP9. ideals and values are in their experience most often rejected. love of virtue or Aristotelian friendship (philia). passions are denounced as the enemy within. Stoic love (philanthropy). Here the search is for happiness.will be recognised as real problems by non-philosophers. Amir . This should not undermine philosophical practitioners’ criticisms. 1999) and Martha C.all. at least at times. peace of mind. For example. of mankind. to take a famous example. he tells me of an incident he had. and turn to academic philosophy for theories that would address them? 5 For ethical ideals in philosophy. authenticity and autonomy. and which makes it hard for women and for some men to identify with these views. 2004a). It represents my analysis of philosophy’s main characteristics which are in my experience at odds with non-philosophers. to the devaluation of emotions in philosophy. My assistant is convinced that he should find another public. the Spinozistic intellectual love of God and the Nietzschean love of fate . The ethical values extol very high ideals.Lydia B. regardless of its consequences. Nussbaum (2001) testify. Love of wisdom or Plato’s philo-sophia. among others. For the prevalent attitude towards women among philosophers. entirely dedicated to knowledge. honours and lust are denigrated. Mary Briody Mahowald (1978). ‘I do not have such a problem. They are contested on theoretical grounds . searching relentlessly for truth.2 Proof1.5 This list is neither exhaustive nor evident . least of all by all people. The point is that not all philosophers’ problems . Irving Singer (1984-1987).indd 7 20/6/08 5:20:54 pm . Lydia B. when one student commented. I think he should find another theory. 2002. followed naturally by an underestimation of human love as securing happiness. Arrington (1998).’ while all the rest agreed. And last (though not least).especially those couched in philosophical jargon . a depreciation of women and therefore of the relationship with them that prevails. He complains that he can’t do much with the type of students he has. Doesn’t this problematise the ‘problem of the subject’? Can we trust postmodernists to criticise philosophy in a manner that is relevant to nonphilosophers? Shouldn’t we. First. and meaning it. Robert C. see any monograph on the history of philosophy or the history of ethics. The emphasis is on self-sufficiency. http://www. Solomon (1993. not only seemingly hard to achieve but are hardly recognised as worthy substitutes for human love by most non-philosophers. and meaningfulness. when believed to be found. Academic Criticism of Philosophy Some of the values I have listed have been denounced by postmodernist academic philosophers. It is an invitation to my fellow-counsellors to join in the debate about which philosophical presuppositions. see for example.

. (Deleuze. in other words.indd 8 20/6/08 5:20:55 pm . I might still believe that genuine philosophical change will take place only when these ideal conditions obtain. always outside itself. I might describe this ideal as being at odds with most people’s views and capacities without thereby criticising it. Once the crisis is over and its lesson learned. he says (Deleuze. 8 http://www. Heavily indebted to Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s practical philosophies. 208) Deleuze’s project is ultimately concerned with the effects that philosophy is able to produce. granting postmodernists the importance of their criticism. 139-140). It must function.org. p. e. psychologists.’. searching relentlessly for truth. Students attend a lecture looking for something they can use for themselves.’ (Deleuze. Deleuze’s teaching experience seems to be a practice of philosophy. 6). the practical bent of his view of philosophy is unmistakable: ‘Philosophy must constitutes itself as a theory of what we are doing. historians. we read: ‘A theory is exactly like a box of tools ….practical-philosophy. has nothing to do with general culture. 1990. one who works in philosophy. as a postmodernist would say. 1977. p. he explains that ‘the students … expect philosophy. Commenting on ‘a very particular aspect of university teaching’ in Vincennes ‘where a professor. etc. Taking the use of logic as an example: all I might do is notice that many persons do not mind contradicting themselves.6 6 I have recently come across Gilles Deleuze’s writings as part of a monograph I am writing. ‘Philosophy has an essential and positive relation to non-philosophy: it speaks directly to non-philosophers’.. not because the law of contradiction is no longer valid. in Foucault. but construct new ones: we have no choice but to make others.How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice? Moreover. This academic philosopher exemplifies the influence of practice on theory. regardless of its consequences. 1991. he writes. even and especially if this philosophy does not discuss mathematics or music. 2006. what directly orients the teaching of philosophy is the question of how useful it is to mathematicians.’ (Deleuze. 166-7. the other subjects or materials which they already possess to whatever degrees. and meaning it. nor believing that it is outmoded.uk PP9. Recall. as he relates in ‘How Philosophy is Useful to Mathematicians or Musicians’. As most sceptical phases in the history of philosophy were followed by the creation of new ideas and bold systems. the epistemological values: the ideal of the rational person. 133) Reiterating the motto of this paper. entirely dedicated to knowledge. or to musicians. Philosophy will matter to them … in terms of their immediate concerns. And not for itself. italics added) Although Deleuze maintains that philosophy gains nothing from the non-philosopher and owes nothing to conversation (Deleuze and Guattari. We don’t revise a theory. not of what there is’. It must be useful. Furthermore. or that it necessarily is pertinent to philosophers. when believed to be found. precisely because the students are led to participate in terms of their own needs and competences. In this way. If no one uses it. p. It might have always been an ideal for some. but because they do not entertain an ideal of cognitive coherence. etc. their strength is not in providing elements for a regeneration of philosophy. capable of undergoing a profound emotional and behavioural change through cognitive understanding. beginning with the theoretician himself … then the theory is useless or the moment inappropriate. One way of viewing postmodern thought is as a sceptical crisis within modernity. for example. to intersect with their other activities. to be useful to them in some way. The practice of philosophy is a better guide to what needs reevaluation than Nietzsche’s writings.g. it is practical and experimental. for example. This kind of teaching. musicians. using logical thought as her most natural tool.. this may happen now. lectures to a public that includes to varying degrees mathematicians. 1996.2 Proof1. postmodernist academic philosophers denounce some of these values for reasons that are very different from the reasons those values on my list. philosophy would still have to correct its Enlightenment excesses and define its post-romantic and post-postmodern ideals. p. The fact that some philosophers have re-evaluated past academic philosophy does not entail that the outcome of their re-evaluation is relevant to non-philosophers. pp.

rejected by students and counselees. which. used to being on their own most of the day. were challenged more by the counsellees’ behaviour than by philosophical discussion.indd 9 20/6/08 5:20:55 pm .org. compatible with and interesting for. an important decision awaits the philosopher: should this ideal be rejected. He conceptualised it as an identity problem and now develops this theme in an academic setting by writing a master’s thesis on the subject. most Philosophical Counsellors attempt to implement. To take another example. we include in the practice of philosophy teaching philosophy to non-philosophers. aspirations. the Catalonian Philosophical Practitioner Xavier Carbonell recognised in counselling a recurrent problem for aging ladies. Amir Future Philosophies One promising way of creating new ideals is by studying the relationship of non-philosophers with philosophy. I have found the consultation room to be sometimes more like a battlefield than a laboratory. Especially the Enlightenment ideals of rationality and autonomy. the Philosophical Practitioner is particularly well-situated to evaluate the needs and interests of nonphilosophers. Kierkegaard might claim that God is the most relevant concept to our lives whether we recognise this or not. I believe. http://www. ideals and values. which would be tailored to problematise our times. Some philosophical ideas might be considered important even if at odds with many people. however. and for autonomy in Amir (2004b). they are now alarmed at the thought of spending the rest with their lives at home with their retired husbands. A regular professor of philosophy does not engage in philosophical discussions with non-philosophers in a systematic way and on a professional basis. softened Stoic ethics to accommodate Roman taste. But even if almost everybody rejects a certain ideal. Posedonius and Panaetius.the philosophical and the non-philosophical. a suspicion. and indifferences could trigger the creation of new philosophical theories. mitigated or held without change? The Stoics of the middle period. needs. The reception of the ideal by other students or counsellees should be followed up. Maps of new sensibilities. and consequently she might nurture an idea of what would be helpful to.2 Proof1. She can also be painfully aware of the gap between those needs and what philosophy has to offer. It seems that even then the debate on Philosophy’s relevance to non-philosophers is not value-free. Philosophical tenets. It is my opinion that Philosophical Practice’s most important role is to combat the dangers of a populist nihilism related to postmodernism. young persons today. limitations.uk 9 PP9. Philosophical Practitioners take part in two worlds . If. It combats these dangers 7 See my account of some counsellees’ capacity for rationality in Amir (2003).Lydia B. For example.7 Is it enough that ideals are challenged in order to reject them? Should future philosophical theories reject autonomy and rationality because they are hard to implement? Reticence from a philosophical ideal triggers a question mark.practical-philosophy. should not be considered necessarily irrelevant to their lives. Philosophers may insist that relevance to one’s life is not always to be perceived in the moment nor determined by popularity.

Philosophical practitioners can play an important part in this contemporary endeavour. in H. and future philosophy could better fulfil its task by answering the needs of our times. 10-22. I invite fellow-counsellors. Philosophical Practice thus helps Philosophy in its most important contemporary task: defining its postromantic and post-postmodern ideals. 0 http://www.org. References Achenbach.). I propose we use practitioners’ experience on non-philosophers’ capacity for implementing philosophical ideals and theories. Henning. in problematising how philosophy is thought in the academic world. in order to assess the usefulness of past philosophy and provide the creative philosopher with up-to-date information about non-philosophers’ presuppositions. I invite fellow-practitioners to join in the debate on the role the practice of philosophy can have in redefining philosophy’s task. Our epoch needs such a revaluation. Svare (eds. how can we use philosophy in consultation? I suggest probing the other aspect of the relationship by asking: how can philosophy benefit from Philosophical Practice and Counselling? The significance of this paper lies in putting this question on the agenda. Philosophy had to redefine the problems it addresses. needs and expectations. Philosophy in Society (Oslo.indd 10 20/6/08 5:20:56 pm .uk PP9. L. whilst revising and refining them using the experience gathered through practice. Throughout its history. rather than how it is written or taught.How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice? by implementing the ideals of the Enlightenment in practice. .practical-philosophy. beliefs and ideals which characterise Philosophy whilst being at odds with many non-philosophers.B. A. (1984 & 1987) Philosophische Praxis (Koln. rather than how it is written or taught. Amir. and kindly. 4. (2001) Plato’s theory of love: rationality as passion. and to question its role within society.B. I invite fellow-practitioners to join in the debate on the role the practice of philosophy can have in redefining philosophy’s task. to comment on mine. G. in problematising how philosophy is thought of in the academic world. Unipub).(2002) The role of impersonal love in everyday life. Practical Philosophy. limitations. therefore. 3. to revise its objectives. Juergen Dinter). to make their lists of tenets. Past philosophy could then be re-evaluated according to a criterion of practicability or relevance to our life. that we confront philosophy with our findings. to amend its relationship with other disciplines.2 Proof1. Conclusion When discussing the relationship between Philosophy and Philosophical Practice we usually ask: how can Philosophy contribute to Philosophical Practice and Counselling? Or. Holts and H.

. Journal of Applied Philosophy. Bouchard (ed.(1991) Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay of Hume’s Theory of Human Nature.. 9-18. Howard. . Columbia University Press). Hodges and trans. psychology. Practice. trans. Blackwell). 36-41. Anchor Books Doubleday). 7. 1. . Lahav. G.Y. . (New York. Practical Philosophy. 2. . by M. Lapoujade (ed. 7. 1. 2. Foucault.A. in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. D. 43-57. Deleuze. 5.). Essays on Philosophical Counseling. (1990) Negotiations. Boundas. Practical Philosophy. R. Counter-Memory. (New York. University Press of America). Lahav. Cornell University Press). Macmillan).). N.uk  PP9. 1. by M. (New York. (1992) Applied phenomenology in Philosophical Counseling. Burchell. Tomlinson and G. D. Joughin.org.(2006) ‘How Philosophy is useful to mathematicians or musicians’. Tillmanns (1995) (eds. 0. by H.(1994) Caution: Faulty Thinking can be Harmful to your Happiness (Fort Pierce. M. trans. (Ithaca. M. E. Philosophical Practice. Trace-Wilco). N. International Journal of Applied Philosophy. Columbia University Press). and M. (1993) The Story of Psychology (New York.2 Proof1. Arrington. Amir . Semiotext(e)). philosophy. R. by C. Deleuze. Hunt. 45-52.Lydia B. 243-251. 1.(2004b) Three questionable assumptions of philosophical counseling. http://www. . Taormina. A. A. in Language. G. (1998) Western Ethics: A Historical Introduction (Malden. .(1993) Using Analytic Philosophy in Philosophical Counseling. L. Guattari (1996) What is Philosophy?. Cohen. (New York.(2003) Philosophical Practice: a method and some cases. (2000) Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy: Pythagoras to Postmodernism (London. 14-25. .(2004a) The affective aspect of wisdom: some conceptions of love of humanity and their use in Philosophical Practice. 43-49. (New York.). (1990) Logic. & F.(2005) Morality. trans.practical-philosophy. Columbia University Press). International Journal of Applied Philosophy.indd 11 20/6/08 5:20:56 pm . (1977) ‘Intellectuals and power’. 6. rationality and counseling.F. . International Journal of Applied Philosophy. International Journal of Philosophical Practice. R. 1.

George Allen & Unwin). Schuster. Passmore. (2001) Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge & New York.ac. 2 http://www. lydamir@colman. (1984-1987) The Nature of Love. Vlist. 99-114. Continuum). Lydia B.org. C. . (1995a) The practice of Sartre’s philosophy in Philosophical Counseling and in existential psychotherapy.(1995b) Report on applying philosophy in Philosophical Counseling. R. The University of Chicago Press). 44.2 Proof1.indd 12 20/6/08 5:20:57 pm . Cambridge University Press). Harper Collins). Tel-Aviv. . (1999) Plato not Prozac: Applying Philosophy to Everyday Problems (New York. She is also an experienced philosophical practitioner working with organisations.il. (Doorwerth. J. (1978) (ed. 1. Practical Philosophy: the Journal of Consultant Philosophers. (Indianapolis/ Cambridge. (1993) The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life. The Netherlands: The Dutch Society for Philosophical Practice). couples and individuals. C. Sautet. Russell. Academic Studies. Israel. The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly.) Philosophy of Woman: An Anthology of Classic to Current Concepts (Indianapolis/ Cambridge. T. W. Oxford University Press). Hackett). (1970) The Perfectibility of Man (London: Duckworth). has written a book on Spinoza and Nietzsche and is finishing a manuscript on philosophy and humour to be published with SUNY Press.How can Philosophy Benefit from Philosophical Practice? LeBon. (1995) Un cafe pour Socrate (Paris. (1946) A History of Western Philosophy (London. M. Nussbaum. L. Amir is senior lecturer in Philosophy at the School of Media Studies. The International Journal of Applied Philosophy.uk PP9. groups. (Chicago. 3 vols. S. B. 9. van der (1996) (ed. She has published extensively on Philosophical Practice.practical-philosophy. College of Management. Solomon.) Perspectives in Philosophical Practice: The Proceedings of the Second International Congress on Philosophical Practice. Laffont). 51-55. Mahowald. Singer. (2001) Wise Therapy (London.(1999) The Joy of Philosophy: Thinking Thin versus the Passionate Life (New York & Oxford. C. 2. I. M. M. Marinoff. B. Hackett).

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