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MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION, Spouses JONG-WON HONG and SOO-OK KIM HONG,* TERESITA CU, and RICARDO P. GUEVARA and Spouse,** respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: To justify an award for moral and exemplary damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code (on human relations), the claimants must establish the other party’s malice or bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 21, 2001 Decision and the May 15, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 67482. The CA disposed as follows: “IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.” The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The CA narrated the antecedents as follows: “The Maria Cristina Chemical Industries (MCCI) and three (3) Korean corporations, namely, the Ssangyong Corporation, the Pohang Iron and Steel Company and the Dongil Industries Company, Ltd., decided to forge a joint venture and establish a corporation, under the name of the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation (Corporation for brevity) with principal offices in Iligan City. Ricardo P. Guevara was the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. Jong-Won Hong, the General Manager of Ssangyong Corporation, was the Vice-President of the Corporation for Finance, Marketing and Administration. So was Teresita R. Cu. On November 26, 1990, the Board of Directors of the Corporation approved a ‘Resolution’ authorizing its President and Chairman of the Board of Directors or Teresita R. Cu, acting together with Jong-Won Hong, to secure an omnibus line in the aggregate amount of P30,000,000.00 from the Solidbank x x x. xxx xxx xxx
in the amount of P1.00. THE MITSUBISHI BANK LTD.00’ “The Corporation likewise executed a ‘Quedan’..000. by way of additional security for said loan. Tokyo L/C No.283. 1991.679. for the Bank.33. 1991. Teresita Cu and Jong-Won Hong affixed their signatures on the note. . Shimbashi.000. also.00 or in the total amount of P5.00’. the Corporation. due on July 15 and 26. To secure the payment of the said loan. Japan up to the extent of US$197. 22-10.476. Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu affixed their signatures thereon for the Corporation. through Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu. Tokyo. 1991. restructure the two (2) loan availments. at the same time. title and interest to the following: ‘The entire proceeds of drafts drawn under Irrevocable Letter of Credit No. 1991 covering the following: Ferrosilicon for US$197.000.000. had amounted to P7. ‘2. On February 11.453.913. 1992. 96-91-00865-6’ in favor of the Bank evidencing its loan in the amount of P5.679. in trust for the Bank or its Order.679. The Corporation again failed to comply with the demand of the Bank.00’ “However. by November 23. the Corporation started its operations sometime in April. by way of additional security.686. through Jong-Won Hong and Teresita Cu.160. The Corporation failed to pay its loan availments from the Bank inclusive of accrued interest.000.00. the Bank sent another letter to the [Corporation] demanding payment of its account which. Matsuoka-Tamura-Cho Bldg. 1992. Tokyo. the following: ‘1. under which the Corporation bound and obliged to keep and hold. The Corporation failed to comply with the demand of the Bank. The Corporation executed ‘Promissory Note No. On May 21. On November 23. Minato-Ku. executed a ‘Deed of Assignment’ in favor of the Bank covering its rights.00. Japan for US$197.. 1991 for the account of Ssangyong Japan Corporation. 91-476 dated June 26. 7F. the Bank sent a letter to the Corporation demanding payment of its loan availments inclusive of interests due. executed a ‘Trust Receipt Agreement’. The Corporation. as its property. payable on September 20. SEC QUEDAN NO. 1992. the Corporation secured an ordinary time loan from the Solidbank in the amount of P3. Its indebtedness ballooned to P200. M-S-041-2002080 for account of Ssangyong Japan Corporation. ‘Ferrosilicon for US$197. – Tokyo dated June 13. the Corporation and the Bank agreed to consolidate and. 1991.00 Ferrosilicon to expire September 20. the Corporation stopped its operations. shortly after the execution of the said deeds. Another ordinary time loan was granted by the Bank to the Corporation on May 28. the same payable on September 20. 1991.000. “However.200. respectively.69 compared to its assets of only P65. M-S-0412002080 opened with The Mitsubishi Bank Ltd.800. the Corporation undertaking to hold in trust.“In the meantime. 5Chome. 1991.00.679. 1991.
1993. the Plaintiff alleged that it impleaded Ricardo Guevara and his wife as Defendants because.D. both Vice Presidents then of MINFACO. entitled and docketed as ‘Solidbank Corporation vs. for and in behalf of the Defendant Corporation and. the Bank filed a complaint against the Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. are the Vice-Presidents of defendant corporation.D. (b) Teresita Cu signed the ‘Promissory Note’. and also members of the company’s Board of Directors. respondents] Teresita Cu and Ricardo Guevara alleged that [petitioner] had no cause of action against them because: (a) Ricardo Guevara did not sign any of the documents in favor of [petitioner]. for ‘Voluntary Insolvency’ x x x. 93-038’ for ‘Sum of Money’ with a plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Jong-Won Hong and the Sps. 115 against the Respondents as the goods covered by the quedan ‘were nonexistent’: xxx xxx xxx “In their Answer to the complaint [in the civil case]. the Spouses Jong-Won Hong and Soo-ok Kim Hong alleged. Quedan. On April 14. the Corporation filed.“On January 6. Teresita R. a ‘Petition’. x x x xxx xxx xxx “Under its ‘Amended Complaint’. hence. inter alia. Jong-Won Hong. Ricardo Guevara. was not personally liable to [petitioner]. in this case. Cu and Jong Won Hong x x x for ‘Violation of P. Teresita R. . on June 20. Civil Case No. 1994. the investigating Prosecutor issued a ‘Resolution’ finding no probable cause for violation of P. xxx xxx x x x’ “[Petitioner] likewise filed a criminal complaint x x x entitled and docketed as ‘Solidbank Corporation vs.’ xxx xxx xxx “[On their part. ‘Deed of Assignment’. ‘Trust Receipt’ and ‘Quedan’ in blank and merely as representative and. Ms. with the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. hence. Cu. Cu and Mr. x x x.1 M obtained was a corporate undertaking of defendant MINFACO executed through its duly authorized representatives. that [petitioner] had no cause of action against them as: ‘x x x the clean loan of P5. Sps. and Trust Receipt agreements with [petitioner]. Teresita R. 115’. They are impleaded as joint and solidary debtors of [petitioner] bank having signed the Promissory Note. 1993. “In the interim. [among others]: ‘Defendants JONG-WON HONG and TERESITA CU. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation.
Lastly. Consequently.916.144. finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance x x x. On February 28. xxx xxx xxx “In dismissing the complaint against the individual [respondents]. xxx xxx xxx “In view of said development.686.05. [Petitioner] filed a ‘Motion for Summary Judgment’ against the [respondent] Corporation. 93-038. the Court a quo found and declared that [petitioner] failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove the personal liability of the said [respondents] for the claims of [petitioner] and that the latter impleaded the [respondents]. from the Decision of the Court a quo and posed. ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of P7.xxx xxx xxx “Appended to the Petition was a list of its creditors. the Court rendered a ‘Summary Judgment’ against the [respondent] Corporation. . for the amount of P8. Teresita Cu and the Spouses Ricardo Guevara. the Court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action of [petitioner] against the Spouses Jong-Won Hong. in Civil Case No. 1995. solely to put more pressure on the Defendant Corporation to pay its obligations to [petitioner]. this Court hereby resolves to give due course to the motion for summary judgment filed by herein [petitioner]. the Court set aside its Order. The Court issued an Order. for x x x resolution. inclusive of accrued interests and penalties. suspending the proceedings as against the Defendant Corporation but ordering the proceedings to proceed as against the individual defendants x x x. 2000.70.086. x x x. xxx xxx xxx “On December 10. plus stipulated interest at the rate of 16% per annum to be computed from the aforesaid date until fully paid together with an amount equivalent to 12% of the total amount due each year from 24 September 1994 until fully paid. in its complaint and amended complaint. on July 12. the decretal portion of which reads as follows: ‘WHEREFORE. “[Petitioner] x x x interposed an appeal. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Petitioner] SOLIDBANK CORPORATION and against [Respondent] MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATION. 1994. 1999. on motion of [petitioner]. representing the outstanding balance of the subject loan as of 24 September 1994. “In the meantime. suspending the proceedings as against the [respondent] Corporation. dated February 2. including [petitioner]. the Court issued an Order. premises considered. the issue of whether or not the individual [respondents]. are jointly and severally liable to [petitioner] for the loan availments of the [respondent] Corporation.
the Trust Receipt Agreement. Whether or not there is ample evidence on record to support the joint and solidary liability of individual respondents with Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation. it presumed that petitioner had done its homework.” In its appeal. the CA held that the individual respondents were not liable to petitioner for damages. Before agreeing to the consolidation of Minfaco’s loans. The appellate court took judicial notice of the practice of banks and financing institutions to investigate. as well as attorney’s fees. and (2) it was not liable for their counterclaims for damages and attorney’s fees. simply because (1) they had not received the proceeds of the irrevocable Letter of Credit. Likewise. the CA upheld the trial court’s findings that it was clearly unfair on petitioner’s part to have impleaded the wives of Guevara and Hong.said [respondent] is hereby ordered to pay [petitioner] the amount of P25. which was the real party in interest. Respondent Guevara was not even a signatory to the Promissory Note. he was merely authorized to represent Minfaco to negotiate with and secure the loans from the bank. examine and assess all properties offered by borrowers as collaterals. in order to determine the feasibility and advisability of granting loans. On the other hand. . Ruling of the Court of Appeals Affirming the RTC.00 to [petitioner] as reasonable attorney’s fees as well as cost of litigation. As to the award of damages to the individual respondents. petitioner argued that (1) it had adduced the requisite evidence to prove the solidary liability of the individual respondents. the CA noted that Respondents Cu and Hong had not signed the above documents as comakers. petitioner raises the following issues: “A. 20 and 2229 of the Civil Code. Under Articles 19.000. because they had acted merely as officers of the corporation. Issues In its Memorandum. which was the subject of the Deed of Assignment. such reckless and wanton act of pressuring individual respondents to settle the corporation’s obligations is a ground to award moral and exemplary damages. and (2) the goods subject of the Trust Receipt Agreement had been found to be nonexistent. the Deed of Assignment or the Quedan. but as signatories in their representative capacities as officers of Minfaco. Hence this Petition. because the women were not privy to any of the transactions between petitioner and Minfaco. the appellate court ruled that the individual respondents were not solidarily liable with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation.
“G.” . The Court’s Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious.” not on that provided for “Co-maker. “E. Whether or not there is evidence to sustain the claim that respondents were impleaded to apply pressure upon them to pay the obligations in lieu of MINFACO that is declared insolvent. that their signatures on the loan documents other than the Deed of Assignment were not prefaced with the word “by. there are two main questions: (1) whether the individual respondents are liable. Respondent Guevara was authorized to represent Minfaco in negotiating for a P30 million loan from petitioner. In the Promissory Note. either jointly or solidarily. In the absence of joint and solidary liability[. it was determined.on the space provided for “Maker/Borrower. “F. Whether or not the inclusion of respondents spouses is proper under certain circumstances and supported by prevailing jurisprudence. May bank practices be the proper subject of judicial notice under Sec. 1 [of] Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. or because they committed fraud and deception. which justifies the piercing of the corporate veil. Whether or not respondents committed fraud and misrepresentations and acted in bad faith. and (2) whether the award of damages to the individual respondents is valid and legal. they signed above the printed name of the corporation -. First Issue: Liability of Individual Respondents Petitioner argues that the individual respondents were jointly or solidarily liable with Minfaco. with the Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation. although he had not signed any document in connection with the subject transaction. “D. the principal borrower. Whether or not there are sufficient bases for the award of various kinds of and substantial amounts in damages including payment for attorney’s fees.” and that there were no other signatures to indicate who had signed for and on behalf of Minfaco. The first contention hinges on certain factual determinations made by the trial and the appellate courts. either because their participation in the loan contract and the loan documents made them comakers. “C. As to Cu and Hong. These tribunals found that.” In sum.“B.] will the provision of Article 1208 in relation to Article 1207 of the New Civil Code providing for joint liability be applicable to the case at bar. among others.
trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach. it is beyond cavil that he was duly authorized to act on behalf of the corporation. for as long as these are for and on behalf of the corporation. as follows: . ‘3. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation. or He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation. Neither is there any specific provision of law making him personally answerable for the subject corporate acts. Equally fundamental is the general rule that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their acts. within the scope of their authority and in good faith. He consents to the issuance of watered stocks or who. does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto. ‘2. he did not hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation. Second. only when — ‘1. Court of Appeals held thus: “Personal liability of a corporate director. resulting in damages to the corporation. by a specific provision of law. or (c) for conflict of interest.Petitioner has not shown any exceptional circumstance that sanctions the disregard of these findings of fact. its stockholders or other persons. as a rule.’” Consistent with the foregoing principles. he did so in his official capacity. which are thus deemed final and conclusive upon this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal. we sustain the CA’s ruling that Respondent Guevara was not personally liable for the contracts. He is made. or (b) for bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs. whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation. ‘4. having knowledge thereof. to personally answer for his corporate action. and that in negotiating the loans with petitioner. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of corporate officers. no sufficient and specific evidence was presented to show that he had acted in bad faith or gross negligence in that negotiation. Respondents Cu and Hong signed the Promissory Note without the word “by” preceding their signatures. Tramat Mercantile v. Third. atop the designation “Maker/Borrower” and the printed name of the corporation. First. No Personal Liability for Corporate Deeds Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of each person composing or representing it. On the other hand.
3) they did not sign under the spaces provided for “Co-maker. In a joint obligation. Moreover. the Promissory Note in question is a negotiable instrument. Cu (Vice President). 2) Respondents Cu and Hong had only one set of signatures on the instrument. or Ms. Petitioner must be reminded that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. as in other cases of agency. Section 20 of the law provides that a person signing “for and on behalf of a [disclosed] principal or in a representative capacity x x x is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code.__(Sgd) Cu/Hong__ (Maker/Borrower) MINDANAO FERROALLOY While their signatures appear without qualification.” Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this case. as this matter has not been pleaded before the trial and the appellate courts. no conclusion of solidary liability can be made.” Solidary Liability Not Lightly Inferred Moreover. Their authority may be established. but seasonably in the proceedings before the trial court. and the second as themselves in their individual capacities. “there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states. the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the corporation. each of whom is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt. Under Section 19 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. it is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit. Ricardo P. acting together with Mr. petitioner anchored its claim solely on the alleged joint and several (or solidary) liability of the individual respondents. Before the lower courts. it is rather late in the day to raise the alleged joint liability. So too. Furthermore. or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. stating that “Atty. there must be at least two debtors.” and neither were their addresses reflected there. nothing supports the alleged joint liability of the individual petitioners because.the first as representatives of the corporation. if indeed they had intended to be bound solidarily -. Jong Won Hong (Vice President). when there should have been two. agents or representatives may sign for the principal. as correctly pointed out by the two lower courts. be as they are .” The authority of Respondents Cu and Hong to sign for and on behalf of the corporation has been amply established by the Resolution of Minfaco’s Board of Directors. Guevara (President and Chairman). Teresita R. and 4) at the back of the Promissory Note. they signed above the words “Authorized Representative. the inference that they signed in their individual capacities is negated by the following facts: 1) the name and the address of the corporation appeared on the space provided for “Maker/Borrower”.
courts may treat a corporation as a mere aggroupment of persons. manipulation. Negotiate with and obtain from (petitioner) the extension of an omnibus line in the aggregate of P30 million x x x. In the totality of the circumstances. and 2. only some particular or accident of the obligation is referred to by incidental fraud or dolo incidente.hereby authorized for and in behalf of the Corporation to: 1. or when it is so organized and controlled and its affairs so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality.whether through insidious machination. 3) not a single centavo was paid for the loan. when the corporate identity is used to defeat public convenience. No Reason to Pierce the Corporate Veil Under certain circumstances.” which was prepared entirely by one party and offered to the other on a “take it or leave it” basis. the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. or defend a crime. Following the general rule. inter alia. It argues that the CA failed to consider the following badges of fraud and evident bad faith: 1) the individual respondents misrepresented the corporation as solvent and financially capable of paying its loan. and 4) the corporation suspended its operations shortly after the loan was granted. agency. Fraud refers to all kinds of deception -. in order to secure the consent of the other. 2) they knew that prices of ferrosilicon were declining in the world market when they secured the loan in June 1991. In contradistinction.  or that which is not serious in character and without which the other party would have entered into the contract anyway. conduit or adjunct of another corporation. Needless to say. protect a fraud. the corporate veil may be pierced when the corporation acts as a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person. . more so because a bank is held to high standards of care in the conduct of its business. justify a wrong. In contracts. concealment or misrepresentation -. a fraud known as dolo causante or causal fraud is basically a deception used by one party prior to or simultaneous with the contract. it cannot be presumed. The distinct and separate corporate personality may be disregarded.that would lead an ordinarily prudent person into error after taking the circumstances into account. because it was the party that prepared it. the deceit employed must be serious. But to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation.” Further. the agreement involved here is a “contract of adhesion. Petitioner contends that the corporation was used to protect the fraud foisted upon it by the individual respondents. Likewise. Execute and deliver all documentation necessary to implement all of the foregoing. we hold that Respondents Cu and Hong clearly signed the Note merely as representatives of Minfaco. to whom liability will directly attach. the contract must be read against petitioner.
banks conduct exhaustive investigations of the financial standing of an applicant debtor. Trust Receipt Agreement. mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate. The latter Rule provides that a court. Quite the contrary. ordinary business prudence required it to do so before granting the multimillion loans. petitioner was unable to establish clearly and precisely how the alleged fraud was committed. not simply bad judgment or negligence. granted long before the bank required the individual respondents to execute the Promissory Note. Precisely. on the other hand. examine and assess would-be borrowers’ credit standing or real estate offered as security for the loan applied for. it has noted that it is their uniform practice.” Thus. it nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the same Rule. circumstances indicate the weakness of its submission. as well as appraisals of collaterals offered as securities for loans to ensure their prompt and satisfactory payment. Unfortunately. Second. to investigate. as a matter of practice. or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. may take judicial notice of “matters which are of public knowledge. It is of common knowledge that. Quedan or Deed of Assignment. First. before approving a loan. no words. Judicial Notice of Bank Practices This point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court in taking judicial notice of the practice of banks in conducting background checks on borrowers and sureties. or even as some accident or particular of the obligation. in its discretion. petitioner bank was in a position to verify for itself the solvency and trustworthiness of respondent corporation. Bad faith. imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong.Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. It failed to establish that it was deceived into granting the loans because of respondents’ misrepresentations and/or insidious actions. Hence. petitioner does not deny that the P5 million loan represented the consolidation of two loans. acts or machinations arising from any of those instruments could have been used by them prior to or simultaneous with the execution of the contract. the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial institutions. It is synonymous with fraud. in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another. Second Issue: Award of Damages . To uphold petitioner’s cry of fraud when it failed to verify the existence of the goods covered by the Trust Receipt Agreement and the Quedan is to condone its negligence. In fact. While a court is not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
except in any of the following circumstances: “(1) When exemplary damages are awarded. hence. The adverse result of an act per se neither makes the act wrongful nor subjects the actor to the payment of damages. because the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Article 2208 of the Civil Code states that in the absence of a stipulation. To justify an award of damages for malicious prosecution. it is necessary to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the action instituted by petitioner was clearly so unfounded and untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad faith. and observe honesty and good faith. which are grounded on malice or bad faith. three elements must concur: a) a legal right or duty. though legal by itself. as stated in their Complaint and subsequent pleadings. Upon the other hand. held liable for damages under Article 21 is one who “willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. must nonetheless be done in accordance with the proper norm. . Needless to say. an award for damages is not proper. on the basic premise that the suit was clearly malicious and intended merely to harass. act with justice. attorney’s fees cannot be recovered. Its act does not amount to evident bad faith or malice. b) its exercise in bad faith. however. and in the absence of adequate proof of malice. attorney’s fees cannot be granted. Petitioner was proven wrong in impleading Spouses Guevara and Hong. the exercise of a right.” For damages to be properly awarded under the above provisions. For the same reason. When the right is exercised arbitrarily. and c) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties. give every one his due. unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another.” Under this basic postulate. a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. To be liable under the abuse-of-rights principle. With the presumption of law on the side of good faith. contrary to law. absence of good faith must be sufficiently established. one must prove two elements: malice or sinister design to vex or humiliate and want of probable cause. we find that petitioner impleaded the spouses because it honestly believed that the conjugal partnerships had benefited from the proceeds of the loan. good customs or public policy. Article 20 makes “[e]very person who. willfully or negligently causes damage to another” liable for damages. Article 19 of the Civil Code expresses the fundamental principle of law on human conduct that a person “must. respondents have not established that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under the Civil Code’s Articles 19 to 21. Beyond that fact.The individual respondents were awarded moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code.
” In the instant case. 18-42.. but the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees is DELETED. laborers and skilled workers.  Rollo. “(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. 222. just and demandable claim. Guevara’s spouse is not found in the records. No costs. . “(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. pp. SO ORDERED. * Her first name is not specified in title of the Petition. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED.“(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Sandoval-Gutierrez. Carpio-Morales. Corona. p. “(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws. “(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers. WHEREFORE. “(6) In actions for legal support. Rollo. In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff. “(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded. “(3) “(4) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff. ** The name of Mr. JJ. this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. but is found on page 1 of the Spouses’ Memorandum. concur. “(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime. and Garcia. none of the enumerated grounds for recovery of attorney’s fees are present.
Firme v. CA. May 24. supra. CA. v. October 7. CA. 10-11. Inc. The Petition was deemed submitted for decision on June 28. 2003. v. Maximino Z. (cited in FCY Construction Group..    Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Petitioner’s Memorandum. Sesbreño v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation. 290. 682. September 25. CA. January 29. supra. August 14. 154. Mejia.  Being a juridical entity. 1997. Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association. 659. 407. 208. 2000). 850. April 15. Agagan and Mario R. February 1. and now a member of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Josefina Guevara-Salonga (members). upon the Court’s receipt of the Memorandum of Respondents Teresita Cu and Guevara. Banaga Jr.  . CA. v. 420. 238 SCRA 14.. May 11. 488. 1994. August 7. Original in uppercase. Larena v. The Memorandum of Respondent Spouses Jong-Won Hong and Soook Kim Hong. 698. 387 Phil. was filed on June 21. Smith. NLRC. See Francisco v. a corporation acts through its board of directors and/or officers and agents. pp. Bañas v. Mapili. 2004. was received by the Court on June 8. Bell & Co. Inc. November 7. 415 Phil. 381 Phil. 153. 25-26. Reahs Corp. 7-16. 2004. Pacis. 356 SCRA 671. id. 34. 110. Excerpted from the CA Decision. 166-167. 2000. 357 Phil. 415. p. 414 SCRA 190. (then chair. 2001. Callejo Sr. 350 SCRA 414. CA. 31-32. 203. February 10.   Petitioner’s Memorandum. 481. pp. 863. 127. v. 337 Phil. NLRC. 706. 165. J. Bordalba v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. 222 SCRA 466. People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co. July 8. February 6. Frez. 2003. 1998. Twelfth Division. Inc. Mejia. They are the stockholders or members of a corporation. 19. 1-10. Industrial Management International Development Corp. per Vitug. Antonio C. January 25. See Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corp. 382 Phil. signed by Atty. 282. 31. Constantine G. Roca v. Inc. 1997. CA Decision. signed by Atty. 1998. pp. April 19. v. 666. 2001. 434 SCRA 27. 1993. CA. rollo. pp. pp. 144. pp. 202-203. October 23.  Francisco v. 2001. 425 Phil. 357 Phil. CA. 2004. pp.. Monfort III. 2002. signed by Attys. 194. CA. v. v. 335 Phil. 408 SCRA 484. 2000.Penned by Justice Romeo J.. 2004. National Labor Relations Commission. rollo. Citations omitted.      Supra.
Philippine Air Lines. Laureta. p. 204. 593. rollo. 1996. 384. 336. March 9. February 23. 450 Phil. 39.. February 24. 423 Phil. 1994. June 25.  See Associated Bank v. CA. 230 SCRA 320. 103 SCRA 7. v. 327 Phil. Petitioner’s Memorandum. v. IV. Pacific Banking Corporation. 369 Phil. August 10. Laureta. 421 Phil. 506. supra. Cojuangco Jr.  Lim v. supra. v. v. Quiombing v. Geraldez v. 20. April 30. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. March 4. 2001. Francisco Motors Corp. Tan. 373. 18. 1991 ed. Inc. August 17. August 30. 384 Phil. 189 SCRA 325. 368 Phil. Lirag. 1997. v. 708. 446 Phil. 1976. v. 156940. 155. 165-166. supra. February 2. November 21. January 4. 690. 2003. Francisco v.. p. CA. May 28. supra. Article 1338 of the Civil Code refers to this kind of fraud. Mejia. 35. supra.      Article 1344 of the Civil Code. Civil Code of the Philippines. Del Rosario v. CA. 374. 328. 599. 2001. 24-25. Inc. 424 Phil. . 2001. CA. 355. Intermediate Appellate Court. 401. 350 SCRA 446. 2000. February 21. David. 434. 404. Caram Jr. 2004. 206 SCRA 408. 418. 472. Sulo ng Bayan. 238 SCRA 397. v. Ouano v. 371. 47. 410. 415 Phil. 72 SCRA 347. See also Geraldez v. The Imperial Insurance. supra. Samson v. GR No. CA. Vol. CA. Inc. 197. Inciong Jr. 2002. January 23. Philippine Commercial and International Bank v. June 26. p. 1990. Inciong Jr. Maestrado v. 55. CA.  Samson v. CA. p. Araneta.PH Credit Corporation v. 2003. September 29. p. Inc. 331.     Marubeni Corporation v. 832. Caram Jr. Olalia. 2004). 26. CA. 186. 108. July 2. NLRC. 1981. 10 (citing BPI v. pp. v. January 29. CA. December 14. 293. 302. See also Tolentino. 29. 1994. p. December 14. Queensland Tokyo Commodities.    CA Decision (referring to Exhibit “A” and Records. CA. p. 1992. November 22. 412-413. Tolentino. 1999. Bonga.. Lipat v. CA. pp. 364. 350 SCRA 101. rollo. 41. 218 Phil. 595). 1999. 1984. CA. Casa Montessori Internationale. 821. pp. 430 SCRA 262. v. Inc. 298. BPI Express Card Corporation v. 2001. 1999. Sanchez v. 2001. 345 Phil. CA. 216-217. November 25. 362 Phil.
Home Bankers Savings & Trust Co. Inc. . v.  Ibid. 812. November 25.. 1999. 399. 531. Jader.  Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. v. NLRC.    Ibid. 2 million. 2005. 529. 705. 800. Heirs of Manlapat v. while the second loan of P1. v. Dimatulac. v. R & B Surety & Insurance Co. 221. 449 Phil. 128354. Pellosis. 1999. CA. 2003. Inc. 2001. 361 Phil. See also Article 2220 of the Civil Code. Northwest Airlines. which was granted by the bank to the corporation on May 21. Rellosa v. January 16. supra. 697. would render the transaction un-conscientious. Manikan. 2003. Rural Bank of Sta. 443 Phil. Sea Commercial Company. 744-745. Bancom Finance Corporation. good faith was defined as “an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another. 1999.. 382 Phil. Savellano v. supra. v. 2002. BPI Family Savings Bank v. July 8. April 26.8 million was granted on May 28. 122 SCRA 576. 414 Phil. 786. CA. March 19. 1991. CA. 792. 428-429. 25-26. even though the forms and technicalities of the law. CA. Inc. 367 Phil. 620. 432 SCRA 418. 635. The first indebtedness was for P3. 468. June 17. GR No. August 9. 129 SCRA 736. Ignacia Inc. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. Inhelder Corporation v. 240. 499. 125585. 405 SCRA 416. CA. 1983. 2004. 2005. 1999. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. 1991. CA. v. Cruz v. 584. p. June 8. January 21. v. In University of the East v. 2003. GR No. February 17. March 2. 363 Phil. CA.    Inhelder Corporation v. 1984. 377 Phil. May 30. June 22.”   Audion Electric Co. 17. Act Theater. CA. 2000. 225. Cervantes v. pp. 422. April 29. 229. Intermediate Appellate Court. 407. together with the absence of all information or belief of facts. 429 Phil. 463. June 17. p.
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