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Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts
Issue Five October 2012 www.foreknowledge.info ISSN 2225-5613
Walking a tight rope … ethics for intelligence analysts
Intelligencia, secreto y política
Politicisation of intelligence analysis
Ethical dilemmas for the intelligence analyst
Finding Nemo: discovering the value of open source intelligence in social media
Evaluating effectiveness of analysis in criminal investigations
From the editor Walking a tight rope: ethics for the Intelligence analyst
The ethical implications of the politicisation of intelligence analysis Intelligence & ethics: uncomfortable companions Intelligencia, secreto y politíca Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations Some advice on ethics for intelligence analysts? Categories of ethical dilemmas Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts
Editor: Dalene Duvenage 3 4 Publisher: 4Knowledge Analysis Solutions PO Box 40467 Moreleta Park Pretoria 0044 South Africa Contributions and advertising enquiries: email@example.com 13 14 14 15 16 17 18
Toolbox: Analytic rigour Upcoming events LEIU Awards 2012 Finding Nemo: discovering the value of open source intelligence in Social Media Evaluating effectiveness of analysis in criminal investigations The effective analyst: attributes The all-discipline intelligence process: wanted - a simplified construct with real explanatory power Psychology of intelligence analysis # 5
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October 2012 • Foreknowledge
from the editor
Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa
A lot has been written the last few years on the ethical aspects of intelligence, including politicization, interrogation, drones and various war and intelligence doctrines. Ethics is a fuzzy concept and dependent on individuals, organisations, ethnic groups, religious groups, cultures and countries’ interpretation and interests. These debates, mostly US-centric, usually take place on a policy-making or academic level. There is silence on how other countries and intelligence sectors deal with ethical issues while we as intelligence analysts struggle to find the relevancy to our day-to-day work. More often than not, we find ourselves walking a tight rope between what we feel is the right thing to do and what our clients or managers want from us. It’s easy to say “Talk truth to power” when work, management and political realities and pressures makes it difficult. However, if we are serious about improving intelligence analysis and professionalisation, we need to operationalise this and talk about what is best practice and acceptable and what is not. I doubt that we will ever agree on a “Hippocratic Oath” for analysts, but at least we should put our problems out there so that we can assist each other to deal with it more effectively. This issue of Foreknowledge reflects on what intelligence ethics means to our daily tasks. I hope that it will stimulate debate wherever you are. Dalene
Our contributors in this edition include intelligence professionals writing under pseudonyms as well these experts:
Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence scholar and analyst. He has written numerous books and resides in Monterey, California, USA. He gave us permission to summarise his book, Amongst others, Jan Goldman is the editor of the Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series and is a founding member of the International Intelligence Ethics Association. He teaches as NDIC and Georgetown University in Washinton, US. Mario Eybers is a mortgage fraud analyst at First National Bank, Johannesburg, South Africa Don McDowell (SCCA) received awards for his book Strategic Intelligence: a handbook for practitioners, managers and users, teaches intelligence analysis throughout the world, has a private intelligence distance learning college and is a founding member of AIPIO. He is from Pambula, NSW, Australia. Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain where he is a strategic and competitive intelligence specialist .
Janet Evans is Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
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The ethical implications of the politicisation of intelligence analysis
Jan Goldman Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence Ethics
efore we can discuss the ethical implications of the politicisation of intelligence analysis, we must first define what is meant as “politicisation of intelligence analysis.” Then, after we can agree on a definition of this term, can we better understand its impact on how it both assists and hinders intelligence analysis. So, what is the politicisation of intelligence analysis? Simply put, “politicised intelligence” is any intelligence or analysis that is developed to meet the conclusion of key judgements that have already been predetermined to support policy. Other definitions include the manipulation of intelligence to reflect policy preferences. Of course, the policymaker is not interested in objective intelligence analysis because of policy bias that may already exist by the person responsible for receiving the intelligence. Consequently, the intelligence analyst is not being asked to be objective (that is, letting the facts speak for themselves) but rather, the consumer is asking the analyst to be subjective (that is, delivering assessments that speak for themselves IN SPITE of the facts). Having your boss come over to your desk and telling you to
change your conclusions is the most blatant and obvious form of politicisation of intelligence; however, there are many other forms of politicisation of intelligence, that are more subtle and yet, just as deadly for the intelligence analyst to lose their credibility…because, if you are willing to fix your intelligence assessment to please your boss, then why should you ever be trusted to provide accurate intelligence in the future? The danger of the politicisation of intelligence community is real. Moreover, the danger can never be eliminated but the challenge is to develop reasonable safeguards. There is a need to protect intelligence from any kind of pressure. The intelligence community can defend itself by strengthening its professional ethos from political pressure, by both establishing unbiased analytical approaches and strong leadership that is not afraid to speak truth to power. Additionally, when intelligence analysts see intelligence not being handled or prepared in an objective manner, they need to speak out and make these concerns available to their chain-of-command. When intelligence is misused, everyone loses.
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Here are 7 additional and different forms of politicisation that exists. The list includes the obvious and less obvious but is important that analysts be aware of such frameworks.
Indirect manipulation of intelligence analysis This is when the boss uses subtle efforts to shape intelligence. These actions occur in how your boss “suggests” better ways to write a report leading to a different conclusion, or providing incentives to assessments that “prove a point” rather than seeking to find out what the point is.
assumptions that are agreed upon by their bosses and colleagues. Analysts are not allowed to wander off and develop their own assumptions.
carryover to how it may prove or disprove a political party’s platform.
Direct manipulation of intelligence analysis This action occurs when the policymakers points out that these are the specific findings that will be accepted and nothing else. This is probably the easiest and most obvious form of politicization of intelligence.
Career interests When analysts are driven by how the intelligence will advance their careers in the organization. By becoming the intelligence expert – that provides the required answers to the intelligence questions, your status will be enhanced. Of course, you are not allowed to accept other opinions or facts that might contradict your assessments. Partisan intelligence When political motives influence the decision of the analyst and their assessment. Clearly, when two or more political parties are vying for power in a country, there is a
Bureaucratic intelligence Bureaucracies use intelligence to gain power and favour from those in political power. Good supportive intelligence for one party over another political party will result in how it will affect the organization’s budget, resources and organizational goals. Intelligence as a scapegoat Politicians will often blame intelligence for failed policies, or when government operations go wrong. Intelligence analysts can be easy prey for politicians especially when the element of secrecy is involved. Consequently, intelligence analysts can rarely speak out in their own defense. •
Subtle assumptions of fact When analysts are expected to use certain basic
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Intelligence & ethics
hough this topic keeps occasionally appearing in print and in discussions about intelligence activity in all its forms, most of the hub-bub simply tends to die away. Ethics seems not to be a topic that we in the global intelligence community want to embrace or treat seriously.1 This article, the first in a series, looks at ethics in the enforcement and corporate intelligence context, although drawing parallels with other forms and applications of the intelligence craft. A non-issue or unpopular subject Having for several years taught, lectured and given presentations on ethics a nd morality in various domestic and international settings, I still find it difficult to engage intelligence officers in any serious discussion about this topic. Clearly one could be forgiven for thinking that the “ethics and intelligence” nexus is either a non-issue, or at least an unpopular one that perhaps should neither be mentioned nor explored. It is all too easy for intelligence staff to ignore the issue of ethical and moral challenge, relying instead on our presumed knowledge of “right and wrong.” Moreover, the conviction that we do what we do for a good and proper purpose sustains belief in self. We are not alone in this either; operational agents and investigators face exactly the same choices and are driven by the same convictions. Insufficient rules and regulations Reliance on rules and regulations to guide – as well as to constrain actions and behaviour - allows intelligence officers to expect that acting according to rule will overcome any ethical or moral considerations and challenges. 6
Don McDowell Pambula, Australia
In being employed and legitimized by governments or corporations, there is a virtual umbrella of protection. Within military circles as well as enforcement paramilitary organizations, publication of ROE (rules off engagement) satisfies two requirements: firstly, that a set of rules has been developed to ensure behaviour is authorised and legitimized; and secondly, that everyone involved knows what they can do and what they cannot. However, ROE are produced for specific operational purposes governing the behaviour of all concerned (including intelligence operatives) and defining the pa-
rameters of action and contact with opposing offenders or combatants. No such procedural mechanism exists for day-to-day activities of intelligence staff. Instead, and even then not always universally applied, government departments and corporate organizations may publish a code of ethics as part of their standard operating procedural instructions (SOPs). When it comes to intelligence units (particularly in enforcement), we face the obvious dilemma of being involved in what is often typified as secretive behaviour, trying to gather information and interpret it in a sensitive environment, always to protect the safety and security of
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Thinking only operational staff and not analysts are bound by ethical considerations? This is a truly mistaken belief at the most fundamental level, unto the point of self-delusion. We share responsibility …
government and the people. The same can be said of corporate intelligence activities. Ethical challenges almost never seem to loom large in our traditional thinking as intelligence officers. Yet there are recorded cases in which scandals erupt when data collection activities – overt and covert - go “wrong,” raising questions about whether our actions were justifiable in all the circumstances. The easy solutions always seem to be to focus on those who conducted the data gathering, whether authorised or not, and rarely focus on the intelligence thinking behind the direction to collectors. If we direct collection, we share responsibility This brings us to the real challenge facing intelligence staff. We see ourselves as absolutely important to the role of guiding and directing data gathering for an intelligence case, even though we might not, ourselves, be physically involved in that activity. Hence the responsibility for improper action, were it to occur, can easily be seen to rest on the collectors. But the questions remain unanswered: if we in intelligence direct data collection, do we not also share responsibility for ensuring that the targets are properly chosen? For the hypothetical rationale? For directing the collection effort? For the specifically focused directions given by our intelligence staff? All must be rational and logical, and beyond reproach in terms of ethical and moral considerations. We can always rationalise that we carry out our functions with the best of intentions and thus perhaps “the end justifies the means.” Yet October 2012 • Foreknowledge
there are quite stringent legal requirements for enforcement and intelligence action, and merely quoting that well-known aphorism would be little useful defence against potential prosecution. Self-interested justification In the intelligence world, analysis enjoys seemingly the greatest level of protection and self-interested justification. After all, analysts merely analyse and give advice and we do not get involved in any real physical activity that needs be considered against ethical or moral issues and benchmarks. This is a truly mistaken belief at the most fundamental level, unto the point of self-delusion. In giving advice, analysts must make decisions to share their convictions with their clients and commanders. How do we decide what to tell and what to keep out of the briefing or report? It is human nature to want to satisfy ourselves that we have done something worthwhile; to admit to mistakes or errors, threatens our well-being. Yet to withhold from a client or commander information that might be essential – that we have missed out on some element of research, that some data is unreliable, or even that there are conflicting suppositions and possibilities – all these deprive the client of an ability to make a completely informed decision. Telling what we know and don’t know Are we right to focus only on the positives? Most analysts and commanders might be tempted to answer “Yes” on the basis of urgency and time and critical decisions needing to me made. But if decision-making is so critical, then surely we, the analysts, need to respond holistically, stating what we know and admitting what we don’t. Only in that way do we provide a fully disclosing, balanced intelligence report to our client. Only by acting this way are we approaching the briefing challenge with our ethical values intact. Making sure that this can happen is a matter of training and development, conditioning, monitoring and regulation. More about these issues, problems, challenges and solutions will come in planned future articles. •
Don McDowell has been an intelligence officer for nearly 50 years across a wide variety of working environments. He is a respected author, consultant, advisor and lecturer. Don was the co-founder and Charter President of AIPIO from 1990 to 1994, is co-Vice Chair of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). The exception is the focal point that the International Intelligence Ethics Association provides through its conferences and publications. The IIEA body, however, tends to focus primarily on ethical issues as they relate to national security, defense and espionage, rather than on enforcement.
INTELIGENCIA, SECRETO Y POLÍTICA
Juan Pablo Somiedo
La obtención y el análisis de información para su posterior transformación en conocimiento al servicio de ciertos intereses particulares o generales no es una realidad nueva, sino que es casi tan vieja como el hombre mismo y nació con las primeras civilizaciones. Es una actividad que ya aparece documentada en la Biblia, como bien ha estudiado Rose Mary Sheldon. Desde sus orígenes mismos, hay una relación crucial entre información, inteligencia y poder. Uno de los riesgos de cualquier institución, en el aspecto funcional, como señala Peter Jackson, es su politización. De hecho, la historia está sembrada de casos en los que determinadas instituciones cedieron ante las presiones del poder político. Por ejemplo, la antigua inquisición fue, muchas veces, un instrumento utilizado por las monarquías de media Europa para lograr determinados fines políticos. Los servicios de inteligencia no son ajenos a este riesgo y pueden llegar a acomodar su información a los intereses políticos predominantes. Pero también se ha dado el revés de la moneda, es decir, el poder público y político es manejado por determinados servicios de inteligencia o de información para satisfacer intereses privados o individuales. Es el caso de Edgar Hoover. El que fuera director del
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) desde 1924, controló a los sucesivos presidentes y fiscales generales, a quienes, en ocasiones, amenazó con desvelar escándalos en caso de ser destituido, lo que le permitió, a pesar de las críticas, permanecer en su cargo hasta su muerte en 1972. Se le atribuye al presidente norteamericano Johnson una curiosa analogía relacionando política y servicios de inteligencia: “La política es como ordeñar una vaca. Ves la leche salir, aprietas más y la leche burbujea y sale; y justo cuando el cubo está lleno, la vaca con su rabo empuja el cubo y todo se derrama. Esto es lo que la CIA hace a la política”. Otro de los riesgos añadidos en esta relación obligada entre inteligencia y política tiene que ver con la dirección política de los servicios de inteligencia. La experiencia demuestra que cuando no existe una adecuada dirección o existen vacíos de poder y decisión, normalmente son siempre ocupados por alguien. Lo que, en algunas ocasiones, ha favorecido que, quien verdaderamente tenía la responsabilidad de haber tomado determinadas decisiones acuse a quien las tomó en su defecto cuando las cosas no salieron tal y como estaban planeadas. Por otro lado, cuando hablamos de gobiernos democráticos, la alternancia política no debiera implicar
cambios drásticos en cuanto a la planificación y las directrices, pues la continuidad implica estabilidad y esta última generalmente redunda en eficacia de los servicios de inteligencia. Pero es el secreto el que cierra esta triada circular. El secreto se halla en la médula misma del poder. Buena parte de la fuerza de las dictaduras de todo tipo y signo político reside en la capacidad de concentrar el secreto, que en las democracias se comparte y se diluye entre muchos. Pero todos los secretos guardados en una sola mano o círculo restringido, acaban siendo fatales, no solo para sus depositarios, sino para todos los afectados. El ejemplo de la Stasi en el antiguo Berlín oriental quedará siempre como un recuerdo imperecedero del lado más peligroso del secreto. • Juan Pablo Somiedo is from Madrid, Spain where he is strategic and competitive intelligence specialist. He runs a Spanish blog, Intel Times here
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations
From Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Cornell University Press (2011). Book available here
Mutual satisfaction leads to shared tunnel vision. Intelligence and policy fail to challenge each others’ assumptions and beliefs, potentially leading to disaster.
Ignore the messenger Policymakers ignore intelligence that undermines their objectives. Instead, they cherry-pick supporting information or ignore intelligence altogether. Self-isolation Intelligence self-consciously avoids contact with policymakers.
Direct manipulation Policymakers and staff pressure intelligence to produce specific findings. Alternately, they appoint malleable analysts.
Intelligence parochialism Analysts tailor findings for personal or professional gain. Depending on the analyst’s goals, this can lead to “intelligence to please” or subversion.
Indirect manipulation Policymakers send tacit signals about acceptable and unacceptable Bureaucratic parochialism conclusions. Implicit threats and promises accompany these signals. Intelligence agencies tailor findings to support their organizational interests. Embedded assumptions Partisan intelligence Widely held strategic assumptions and social norms restrict the Political parties use intelligence issues for partisan gain, often by bounds of acceptable analysis. accusing rivals of mismanaging intelligence. Intelligence subverts policy Intelligence estimates publicly undermine policy decisions. Policymakers may ignore intelligence because they fear this kind of subversion. Intelligence as scapegoat Policymakers deride intelligence when it does not support policy decisions. In addition, intelligence is blamed for failure to predict events like surprise attacks.
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Some advice on ethics to intelligence analysts?
(MA): Prof Michael Andregg: University of St Thomas, St Paul, Minnesota, US. firstname.lastname@example.org (DD): Dalene Duvenage: Trainer, consultant, scholar, Foreknowledge editor Pretoria, South Africa
Professional integrity and best practice
DD: We often forget about work ethic when we debate intelligence ethics.
As analysts, we at least have some control over our attitude towards our work, in contrast to politicisation and other ethical dilemmas. Analysts should be mindful and reflective: improve the application for methods, learn new approaches, be mindful of the biases that clouds my perspective, actively looking for counter arguments that might make my analysis better. As an analyst, I can make sure that I have done my best in terms of methods, opinions, showing what I know and what not, and be ready to answer any question or critique from my client. But if he does not want to listen to me because of his own biases and political reasons, my hands are tied. I’ll get frustrated, but being an analyst, my raison d’être is to make sense and advise, and that should be enough. If it is not, I should get another job!
(TN): Tony Nolan, Risk, Intelligence and Analytics Officer, Australian Government
Impunity and arrogance
MA: Another issue is the illusion of impunity and hubris or extreme arrogance. Hubris can destroy you in many ways. Countless analysts have distanced themselves from the consequences of their work on the theory they are tiny cogs in big machines, and that moral judgments are reserved for policy people. Bureaucracies encourage that view, but they are fundamentally amoral, having neither conscience nor soul. If you make errors in targeting and a house full of children is destroyed instead of a house full of terrorists, the soldier who pulled the trigger is no more responsible than the men or women who told him what to destroy.
MA: Cognitive biases are a problem for analysts because they affect perceptions, conclusions, and the questions one selects for research. Leaders have biases too, so a delicate balance must be struck between suppressing yours and catering to theirs without violating your commitment to objective truths. Failure can have huge consequences.
TN: The challenge facing any intelligence analyst is that not
only will they be judged by the ethics of the present, but also the ethics of the future. This makes the framework that dictates how we gather, build, complete, and pretty up our work critical. For the intelligence analyst to forget ethics altogether, rather than making an informed decision of where to apply them, could lead to a career disaster not only now, but also in the future.
Sources of information
MA: Sources may be reliable, unreliable, or they may be spies serving other agendas. Even when sincere and well placed, sources can be simply wrong. So assessing the quality of sources is important for accuracy of your conclusions. Less discussed, but equally important in my view, is protecting your sources from bureaucracies that may abuse them without any trace of conscience. In fact, it is common for intelligence bureaucracies to squeeze as much as possible from sources, indifferent to their welfare and obsessed with short term goals. Analysts may not be directly involved in collection or handling sources, but analytic products have consequences too. So remembering the humanity of those you use, and even those you may target, is important to preserving some moral foundation for the whole endeavor.
Do not be deceived by those who say the moral way is for sissies and preachers. The prime missions of intelligence professionals are protecting your people from the dangers of our troubled world, and protecting innocence as a concept. Be professional and protect them.
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Categories of ethical dilemmas
Travels with Shiloh
Sins of Commission
An agency is in competition with another over scarce resources. In furtherance of that end a supervisor approaches a junior analyst and asks for a product with a specific conclusion. When the analyst tells her supervisor that she's not sure the data supports that conclusion, the supervisor replies: “C'mon, you can make statistics say anything.” Sins of commission, where someone in power attempts to strong arm an analyst to deliver a particular judgment, are rare among those agencies that have a strong tradition of professionalism and where analysts are able to progress beyond the lowest levels of the organization. Yet, in the United States, the past decade has seen an explosion of domestic intelligence personnel in law enforcement and 'homeland security' agencies. Most of these agencies have little or no orientation or traditions in intelligence analysis, are fragmented with few analytical personnel and rarely afford analysts the opportunity to rise within the organization to positions with decision making authority. It is under these conditions where analysts are most likely to be directed to produce politicized analysis and also where they will have the fewest opportunities for redress.
Sins of Omission
A political protest erupts in cities around the country. The protestors are dedicated to non-violence and, despite attracting large numbers of supporters, engage in little serious criminal activity. Yet, the movement attracts the attention of law enforcement and counter-terrorism officials who demand a steady stream of products linking the protest to other, violent movements despite little to no evidence of any such connection. As intelligence resources are focused on the movement, other criminal and terrorist threats are given lower priority and attention. A more common and subtle ethical issue for intelligence analysts falls into this category. Intelligence personnel may be directed to focus their energies towards a particular conclusion for any number of biases or interests. The end result, however, remains the same. Analytical judgments are influenced and manipulated based upon the parameters under which intelligence personnel directed. As in the case of the search for WMDs in Iraq, repeated requests to find evidence of a particular threat, along with increasing amounts of resources devoted to the question, inevitably leads to increased reporting. Often this reporting involves information of decreasing quality or repetitive reporting but its quantity can lead to superficial assessments that threats exist where they really don't.
Difficult ethical decisions impact on our career paths…
aising questions about practices like those discussed above, can be problematic - even for experienced intelligence personnel. While in the federal intelligence community, raising such questions may result in a transfer to a less desirable post or delayed career advancement, in the law enforcement or counter-terrorism communities the consequences can be much longer lasting. Many analysts in those communities work for small agencies and have few career opportunities other than moving to other agencies. Acquiring a reputa-
tion as not being a 'team player' can effectively destroy a career via informal channels. Expecting analysts to both be aware of ways in which their work can be manipulated (consciously or not) and expecting them to act as warning system to prevent that occurring without training or support may just be too much for them to bear. New intelligence analysts frequently come into their agency wanting to both make a good impression and a difference in their community. The important nature of the work, culture of hierarchy and presence of people of great experience, even if in a non-intelligence field, can make the pressures against raising concerns formidable at best. •
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The 3 approaches to ethics in intelligence
Renseigner, c’est aussi influencer celui ui attend une réponse. Compte tenu de l’influence potentielle des éléments fournis, il est important que l’information soit présentée de manière neutre et non à travers un prisme politique déformant. Les prismes déformants dans l’analyse et la présentation des renseignements sont de graves fautes professionnelles qui peuvent avoir des conséquences funestes, tant pour la politique qu’elle croit servir que pour la crédibilité du service.
Éric Denécé, 2011, L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in . Pdf Here
The realist approach: National security is an end which justifies all means and therefore intelligence officials may potentially pursue any course of action in the defence of national security.
The consequentialist approach: Intelligence activities
have to be judged in view of their manifest consequences. In this view, no activities (including torture or extrajudicial killings) are intrinsically wrong, the ethical evaluation depends on the consequences. The “just intelligence” theory fits here. They argue that in making judgements on selection of targets and methods of obtaining the information we must ask: is this a last resort, is there just cause, what are the prospects for success, are the means deployed proportional to the ends sought, what is the possibility of damage to innocent people and the need for oversight of the actions.
The deontological approach which contends that
some activities are intrinsically wrong and can never be justified.
From Hans Born and Aidan Wills, (2010) Beyond the oxymoron: exploring ethics through the intelligence cycle in Jan Goldman (ed) Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional vol 2 available here
Resources on ethics for intelligence analysts
Click on the book cover to access the books in our Amazon bookstore. Click on the Kindle link below to get the e-book.
International Journal of Intelligence Ethics (IJIE) is the primary source for multidisciplinary information and research on the role of ethics in its application to intelligence activities. Go their website here get a free copy here
Kindle here Kindle here Kindle here Kindle here
Email the editor here
There are hundreds of articles and books on intelligence ethics in general and intelligence oversight, but only a few on the analysis function specifically:
Books: Andregg, Michael (ed) 2007. Ethics: the definitive work of 2007. PDF here Goldman, Jan (ed) 2005. Ethics of spying: a reader for the intelligence professional. Book here Goldman, Jan. (Ed) 2009. Ethics of Spying: A reader for the Intelligence Professional, 2nd edition. Book here. Rovner, Joshua. 2011. Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Book available here Articles Armstrong, Fulton. 2002. Ways to make analysis relevant but not prescriptive. Studies in Intelligence 46. Web here Bar-Joseph, Uri. 2010. The Professional Ethics of Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 24(1) $ here Davis, Jack. 2006. Intelligence analysts and policymakers: Benefits and dangers of tensions in the relationship. Intelligence and National Security, 21(6). $ here Davis, Jack. 2003. Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts, and Evidence. Kent Centre Occasional Papers, 2(2). Web here Denécé, Éric. 2011. L'éthique dans les activités de Renseignement in Revue Française D'administration Publique. Pdf here Gentry, John A. 1995. Intelligence analyst/manager relations at the CIA. Intelligence and National Security,10(4), $ here ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 203. 2007. Analytic standards. Web here Patterson, Eric & Casale, Teresa. 2005. Targeting terror: The ethical and practical implications of targeted killing. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 18(4). $ here Lunstroh, John. 2007. A proposed analysts’ code of ethics. Defence Intelligence Journal 16(1) Selim, George. 2011. Talking terrorism: can we ethically communicate the threat? International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 2(2) Shelton, Allison. 2011. Framing the oxymoron: e new paradigm for intelligence ethics. Intelligence and National Security, 26(1). $ here Westerfield, H. Bradford. 1996. Inside Ivory bunkers: CIA analysts resist managers' “pandering” — Part I. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 9(4), $ here
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The previous pages stressed how important it is that we as analysts are honest in our thinking, analysis and communicating the threat to our clients. A few scholars and practitioners are now developing methods and tools to enhance mindfulness and rigour in our quest to provide insight and foresight to clients. In this issue we look at Daniel Zelik et al’s rigour model which tries to answer the question: “How can intelligence analysts ensure that they have been rigorous in the analytical process?”
for m 2. In
How far beyond simply collecting and listing data did analyst go? Low: Compiled a unified form
cri tiq u
High: Integrated with thorough consideration of diverse interpretations
The depth and breadth of the search process used in collecting data. Low: Routine and readily available data sources High: Exhaustively explore all data
7. Information synthesis
Were the perspectives of domain experts included into the assessments? Low: No effort to seek out expertise High: Experts have been consulted
3. Information validation
n tio ra
5. Sensitivity analysis
The levels at which information sources are corroborated and cross-validated. Low: No effort to verify source accuracy High: Systematic approach to verify information and where possible use source closest to issue
iali ec Sp
oes th e under analyst co ns stand the as ider and and li mitat sump ions o t f their ions analy sis? Low: E xplan ation see High: surfa ms valid on Analy ce st ha stren s gths of ex strategy t plana o con sourc tion sider es we re to s if suppo rting prove invali d
b olla t cD
e or nd a tanc the s source r ify dent e of the broade I a tiv ng spec ng it into rstandi aci or unde ce pl sour tf unntex as in bi co d to tice roun fluence o ackg ht in yst n ce b ig Anal sour ctive m ow: L to ch in perspe ear eir ce : Res th stan High d how their n ta ders
tan ce a per-
nal ysi s
Based on Zelik, Daniel et al 2007. Understanding Rigor in Information Analysis papers here, here and here
1. Hypothesis exploration
ratorpo e inc s? wer ese th tives spec ary hypo r nt pe prim re ysts the diffe anal any amining her m of ot How d in ex use n e ittle L ew o Low: revi g pert th stron ex er & ning wi rly indi : Pe High f reaso ces clea n no chai k infere ed ea w cat and
tiple in e hypoth Low xpla e : mi inin ses co nim g da n um ta? sidere wei d ghin g of tive High s alte iden rna tify : Multip the le p ers bes pec t& exp lana most p tives to tion rob able s
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3rd International Congress of Intelligence
Australian Security and Intelligence Conference
International Crime and Intelligence Analysis Conference
14 November 2012 Barcelona, Spain
3-5 December 2012 Perth, Australia
13-14 December 2012 Manchester, UK
● April 2-6 2013: International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, US. info ● April 8-12 2013: IALEIA/LEIU Annual Training Conference, Chicago, US. info ● May 20-23 2013: International Association for Intelligence Education, El Paso, Texas, US. info ● July 24-26 2013: AIPIO annual conference, Canberra, Australia. info
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units 2012 Awards
LEIU Special Recognition Award
LEIU General Chairman’s Award
New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC)
This center has not only been a leader in the national network of Fusion Centers—it has significantly assisted all levels of law enforcement with solving and preventing criminal activity throughout the state--through the fusion of information and intelligence.
L-R: Col Rick Fuentes (Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police), Major Chris Schulz (Commander of the New Jersey State Police Regional Operations and Intelligence Center - ROIC), Assistant Director James McDermond, (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information), Lt KevinFoley (Union County Prosecutor's Office, New Jersey, Commander of the Intelligence Unit)
Gary has had a long and distinguished 40 year career with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) retiring at the rank of Captain in charge of the Major Crimes Division where he supervised several investigative units as well as the Intelligence Unit. He also served as a LEIU Board member from February 2004 until his retirement in 2007. Gary volunteered to come out of retirement to further the cause of the LEIU mission, and has taken on the role of a LEIU Foundation Board member.
The LEIU Distinguished Service Award
Rick Morton: Orange Country (CA) District Attorney’s Office
This award is presented to the person who has shown a sustained contribution to the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units and a continuous effort to enhance the professionalization of the criminal intelligence profession. Rick began his law enforcement career in 1968 with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and he retired in 1994 as a Lieutenant Commander. Rick began working as a supervising investigator with the Orange County District Attorney’s Bureau of Investigation. During (From Left to Right) Dale Ferranto, representing Lexis Nexthe past 18 years he has been assigned to the Intelligence/Organized Crime Unit, the Anti-Terrorism is, Rick Morton and Van Godsey, LEIU General Chairman Unit, and the Gang Target Unit. During his 44 year law enforcement career Rick Morton has shown a sustained contribution to the mission of LEIU and has demonstrated a sustained effort of professionalism to the criminal intelligence profession.
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
Discovering the value of open source intelligence in Social Media
but scrutinizing the semantics of the qualitative content (the actual text of the message) is more delicate. Through tailored lexicons, sentiment tracking, keyword- and entity extraction; clusters can be generated to be explored for its influence on networks and more specifically, explicit nodes in such networks. A good example would be a recent case analysis done on Twitter to trace poachers of protected marine resources in a small fishing village. HUMINT indicated that poachers used the term “goldfish” as an euphemism for a specific protected marine resource. The keyword was inserted into a Twitter extraction script linked to its API (open programming interface to Twitter) which then trawled the network for a prescribed period. The harvested data posed a rich array of classes for evaluation which enabled the analyst to first generate a topic view to identify clusters of expression and filter residual clutter. Specific clusters identified actors within the network. Categories of users (tweeters) were created and a network was constructed by linking common users with the IDs of retweeters coupled with various keywords. The word ‘goldfish’ returned an unusual number of links in a common cluster and enabled the analyst to converge on the central nodes within the network which participated in the messaging process of the goldfish theme. Within minutes, the network, the centrality and the theme was mapped to identify the extent of the poaching network in the village. The tools at hand to assist the analyst in Social Media Intelligence are numerous but obligate the user to possess a firm understanding of what the output and expectations are to be. NodeXL, Palantir, Starlight, Analyst Notebook, and Memex are but a few which can yield strong outputs but no analytics in this environment can be effective unless viewed through the lens of big data management. Social media data is colossal and the noise is titanic—the tools necessary to illuminate intelligence from such volume are not all embracing. Given Gladwell’s 10 000-hour prescription for specialization and the “freshness” of social media, real SM analytical gurus are few and far between. To understand social media is not enough. To secure an inclusive perception of a specific theme, the analyst’s ability to fuse assorted streams of cross-platform data will be imperative. So, to trace the beloved Nemo via Twitter, one would have to extract who tweeted his disappearance, who tweeted his reappearance, how many times his sightings had been retweeted, and who finally tweeted his arrival in Australia. That would not take more than 4.3 degrees of separation and should be analytically probable in lesser time than it takes to explore the film. Now, let’s go find Lord Lucan… •
Using open source intelligence to flush out the antihero may be as old as the hills, but Social Media is a relative new kid on the block. Much hype has been created around the role of SNSs (social networking services) in various circumstances of political protests, unrests and demonstrations throughout the world. As a leading microblogging service, Twitter has been the darling of interaction and news dissemination in several prominent hotspots of unrest since 2009 (Moldova, Tunisia, Iran, Egypt). By posting user-generated content to mass audiences, the rapid organizing of protests and mobilizing of bulk participation is executed in a flash across a borderless society only bound by common interest. To the intelligence analyst, SNS platforms present a treasure trove of data to explore for patterns and clues towards understanding behavioral patterns. The unstructured content of messaging within enormous sets of records may seem daunting to some, but to an analytically trained eye with an appetite for nodal investigation, the rewards can be substantial. The examination of networks is not new, but tracking and mapping the messaging relative to its impact on network change has only recently become a possibility due to the visualization tools which can render such complexities. The structured content around the messenger is fairly simple to cognize for profiling,
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
The role of analysis in criminal investigations
Part 2: Evaluating effectiveness
No investigation or project can start without deciding up front on how the success of the investigation will be measured. Evaluating the effectiveness of the information management and analysis approach is therefore crucial and often one of those critical aspects of an investigation that is neglected. It generates focus areas for future improvement in the analytical approach and identifies those analytical models and techniques that are not effective. Note that the focus areas of evaluation, as far as information and analysis activities are concerned, will differ from investigation to investigation. Evaluation should be focused on the entire team’s performance in all activities relating to the management and analysis of information: ● Information management: Here the focus can be on the effectiveness of the analyst to manage the information, the creation and optimisation of communication channels to stimulate participation, as well as the effectiveness of the team to maximise on information available under guidance of the analyst. ● Participation and communication: Here the focus can be on the participation of team members in analytical process, the quality of input provided by the team with regard to product requirements as well as the willingness of team members to participate in information sharing activities. ● Analytical products and services: Applicability of analytical techniques to the analysis of specific information sets. Effectiveness of analytical products to meet the investigation requirements. To make the review more effective, it may be useful to use an independent evaluator to conduct the final debriefing session. All team members must be present, and participate in the activity, while feedback and recommendations must be documented. Part of the evaluation process can be to develop a scorecard that can greatly assist to measure the effectiveness of information management during an investigation. Standard debriefing reports are often qualitative in nature, whereas scorecards can assist to quantify the effectiveness based on the specific criteria chosen for evaluation. The table below depicts an example of such a scorecard. Understanding what contributes to a successful investigation is essential to ensure that analytical efforts make a positive contribution to the investigation and prosecution of criminals. •
Score Card Measuring the Effectiveness of the Information Analysis Approach during an Investigation
Low Score Project or Case Initiation ● No initial assessment of available information ● No criminal value chains ● No scenarios ● No analytical plans Analyst and investigator make contact with team members and do initial information assessment. Following documentation is available: ● Criminal value chain ● Analytical plan Investigation No planning for analysis Information pushed towards analyst with limited consultation on what is to be achieved. Analysis is seen as a support function Analyst provides feedback to client and investigation team only during investigation and project meetings. The following is presented during formal meetings: ● Link charts with no supporting analytical report. Planning for analysis Team take responsibility for entire investigation inclusive of the development of analytical products. Analysis is the driving factor that will push the investigation to a successful conclusion Investigation officer together with the analyst ensures that all clients and team members are updated on: ● What is being analysed High Score
● What techniques are utilised during the analysis ● Communication analysis containing no inferences ● What the expected end results will be or conclusions. ● How these results will influence the outcome of the investigation Clients and investigating officer cannot peruse analyti- Investigation team have full access to all analytical cal working files whilst the analysis of information is in files. progress. Prosecution No role Testifying to analytical work conducted. Case Finalisation No debriefing session Debriefing of analyst and project/ investigation team.
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
The effective analyst
Part 4: Attributes
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
In this last article in a series of four, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.
n this the final article in the series, I will consider the final theme that emerged from considering what makes an effective analyst Attributes of the analyst. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, I am going to reflect on the most ethical way forward for us as a community of practitioners now knowing the findings offered by this study. In the previous issues I described how 246 constructs were used by the subject matter experts to describe the theme of analytical products and 107 constructs to describe the theme relating to the analysts attitude. In contrast only 21 constructs were used to describe the attributes of the analyst by subject matter experts. The theme of attributes incorporated inherent characteristics and qualities as well as physical characteristics like age or gender. From this study it is asserted that the attributes of the analysts contribute less than other themes to indicate an analyst as more or less effective. From an ethical or equity perspective this is heartening as there is no indication that men or women, older or younger analysts make better analysts. The attribute factors that held some interest for the subject matter
experts were being confident, being calm and patient, and being likable. The results of this research serve as the first empirically-based set of characteristics required to effectively perform the role of analyst. The importance of the analytical product in understanding and determining an analysts’ effectiveness has been clearly demonstrated. For an analyst to be viewed as effective they need to have skills in developing a product as well as disseminating their results. The most critically important variable in disseminating the product was the ability to communicate with the recipient of the product both in general terms and through briefings and a written product. This requires us to reconsider our approach to recruitment and development. It is our moral responsibility to select analysts who can perform in these domains and, if we already employ analysts, ensuring they are servicing the goals of law enforcement as effectively as they can by having received the ‘right’ training. It is no longer enough to train analysts on software or to give them another tool. This study shows that effective analysts derive meaning and develop inferences that require enhanced thinking skills. Analysts need to develop themselves into advanced problem-solv-
ers. In this study computer and technical skills were barely mentioned and the importance of thinking skills and life experience were highly sought after in determining effectiveness. Although data collection and collation are described as part of the intelligence cycle they were not considered to be an indicator of analyst effectiveness It is now our ethical responsibility to decide if this is because they in fact are not part of an analyst’s role and if so why are so many of our analysts consumed with this task? Is it because this is what they have become comfortable doing? As managers can we pave a new path towards where analysts predominantly think (rather than collect), derive meaning and create and deliver products? This study has raised a number of questions that require further investigation, including how we best test for effective communication skills and how do you measure an analyst’s attitude to the position. These questions and others have at their heart an ethical responsibility to make choices not just at a point in time, for the sake of your career, to ease the pain of recruitment or to silence an analyst who just wants another mapping course, but for a profession in it’s development years and in many cases for the safety of our communities or countries. •
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
The all-discipline intelligence process: wanted a simplified construct with real explanatory power
In this 3rd instalment of a discussion on the intelligence cycle and counterintelligence functions process, the scholar and practitioner B offers a model that might assist us in understanding the complexity of our discipline.
he two preceding contributions argued that the traditional intelligence cycle as a notional construct that do not accurately convey the way in which intelligence ‘works’. This was based on the central contention that the intelligence cycle does not accommodate counterintelligence at all. In substantiation, an outline of the counterintelligence process was provided and this was compared with the traditional cycle. The latter was shown to be, at most, a positive intelligence model. It was further mentioned that an overarching intelligence process model should accommodate all main intelligence
processes in a simplified construct with real explanatory power. Business Intelligence – can we borrow? Such integrative proposals are in short supply within Intelligence Studies. Significant progress has, however, been made in Business Intelligence. A seminal model in this regard was forwarded by Nolan in 1997. This was followed by contributions by various others. While copyright restriction prevents an inclusion of Nolan graphical depiction in this magazine, the proposal by Brouard1 (2004) below is an example of the work done within in Business Intelligence.
Business Intelligence models are useful, but for various reasons cannot be summarily applied to the statutory context and thus Intelligence Studies. Intelligence Studies – no eureka-type insights as yet Within Intelligence Studies, we need to be frank that we don’t know. We don’t as yet have an eureka-type insight on an overarching intelligence process model that actually works. How then should we progress toward this goal? Progression has several requisite which are discussed in the article cited below. Suffice to state here that the forwarding of high-level theoretical constructs is but one dimension of this quest. Duvenage & Hough’s (2011)2 proposition serves as an example such a theoretical contribution on a high level of abstraction: Key contentions on which the nexus rests are: ● The overarching statutory intelligence process is the sum of processes executed in three principal disciplines3, namely, positive intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action. Each of these has a distinctive and, to a degree, a unique pattern of activities. October 2012 • Foreknowledge
● Analysis and collection are functional areas of activity performed within all three principal disciplines and as part of the collective all-discipline process. Notwithstanding obvious similarities, there are simultaneously significant differences in emphasis and methodology in the manner in which these functions are executed within the respective primary disciplines. In comparison with positive intelligence, counterintelligence analysis for one is more diverse in its scope, methodology and techniques. Cognisance is taken of the fact that some practitioners may categorise collection and analysis as ‘disciplines’ or ‘subdisciplines’. If so, then they are functional, not primary disciplines. Be that as it may, functional areas are not limited to analysis and collection. The identification of further functional areas would require dedicated research and only ‘intelligence management’ is proposed as an addition here. The intelligence process is performed by means of a multi-directional activity flow. The latter applies to the respective principal disciplines, the functions and the combination thereof in the all-discipline process.
Conceptual nexus towards an all-discipline intelligence process: Duvenage & Hough WMD), organised crime and counterterrorism serves as an example. While some scholars consider counterterrorism as part of counterintelligence, others assert counterterrorism to have “developed” into a “separate intelligence discipline.” Counterterrorism is neither a separate intelligence discipline, nor is it part of counterintelligence. It is a security concern that involves facets of positive intelligence, covert action as well as counterintelligence. The same applies to counter-proliferation and organised crime. Is this really helpful? This three part contribution demonstrated an abundance of fragmented knowledge of ‘what we know’ and ‘what we think we know’ in as far as the intelligence process is concerned. What counterintelligence practitioners and scholars ‘do not know’ is how to structure these multi-facetted processes in a manner that satisfactorily meet model construction’s demand of reflecting this reality in a simplified notional construct with real explanatory power. Similar to other contemporary models, the nexus above neither attains this evasive goal, nor does it escape several deficiencies cited in respect of other existing postulations. It should thus be viewed as part of the gradual progression towards to a viable intelligence process model. Who knows perhaps it will be found to be a circle after all? •
Nolan, J A. 1997. “Confusing Counterintelligence with Security Can Wreck Your Afternoon” Competitive Intelligence Review, 8(3) 2 Article based on Petrus Duvenage and Mike Hough, 2011, The conceptual structuring of the intelligence and the counterintelligence processes: enduring holy grails or crumbling axioms – quo vadis? Strategic Review for Southern Africa, vol. 33, no. 1, pp.29-77. Download here. (10MB pdf) 3 The axiom of intelligence consisting of the four principal disciplines is thus contested. It is unclear how the common acceptance of ‘analysis’, ‘collection’, ‘counterintelligence’ and ‘covert action’ as the principal intelligence subdisciplines originated or evolved. Future studies by Intelligence Studies’ historians and historiographers might well find that it was influenced by the organisational structuring of some post-World War II, Western statutory intelligence services. Whatever the reason, this axiom is incongruent with reality.
The contour provided above clearly requires considerable refinement and substantiating research. Notwithstanding its cursory nature, the nexus holds out against one of the litmus test for theories, namely conceptual clarification. The notional ‘uncluttering’ of the relationship between counterintelligence and transnational security concerns such as counter-proliferation (of Weapons of Mass Destruction – October 2012 • Foreknowledge
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Psychology of intelligence analysis
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of chapter 4 on Strategies for Analytical Judgment - applying theory. You can also download the entire book here.
In the previous Foreknowledge, we looked at situational logic as one of the means in which an analyst generate hypotheses if available data is insufficient to provide foresight. In this edition, we look at how we apply theories to understand data. Theory is an academic term not much in vogue in the Intelligence Community, but it is unavoidable in any discussion of analytical judgment. In one popular meaning of the term, "theoretical" is associated with the terms "impractical" and "unrealistic". Needless to say, it is used here in a quite different sense. A theory is a generalization based on the study of many examples of some phenomenon. It specifies that when a given set of conditions arises, certain other conditions will follow either with certainty or with some degree of probability. In oth20 er words, conclusions are judged to follow from a set of conditions and a finding that these conditions apply in the specific case being analyzed. For example, Turkey is a developing country in a precarious strategic position. This defines a set of conditions that imply conclusions concerning the role of the military and the nature of political processes in that country, because analysts have an implicit if not explicit understanding of how these factors normally relate. There are both advantages and drawbacks to applying theory in intelligence analysis. One advantage is that "theory economizes thought." By identifying the key elements of a problem, theory enables an analyst to sort through a mass of less significant detail. Theory enables the analyst to see beyond today's transient developments, to recognize which trends are superficial and which are significant, and to foresee future developments for which there is today little concrete evidence. Consider, for example, the theoretical proposition that economic development and massive infusion of foreign ideas in a feudal society lead to political instability. This proposition seems well established. When applied to Saudi Arabia, it suggests that the days of the Saudi monarchy are numbered, although analysts of the Saudi scene using situational logic find little or no current evidence of a meaningful threat to the power and position of the royal family. Thus, the application of a generally accepted theoretical proposition enables the analyst to forecast an outcome for which the "hard evidence" has not yet begun to develop. This is an important strength of theoretical analysis when applied to real-world problems. October 2012 • Foreknowledge
Yet this same example also illustrates a common weakness in applying theory to analysis of political phenomena. Theoretical propositions frequently fail to specify the time frame within which developments might be anticipated to occur. The analytical problem with respect to Saudi Arabia is not so much whether the monarchy will eventually be replaced, as when or under what conditions this might happen. Further elaboration of the theory relating economic development and foreign ideas to political instability in feudal societies would identify early warning indicators that analysts might look for. Such indicators would guide both intelligence collection and analysis of sociopolitical and socioeconomic data and lead to hypotheses concerning when or under what circumstances such an event might occur. But if theory enables the analyst to transcend the limits of available data, it may also provide the basis for
Theory enables the analyst to transcend the limits of available data, but it may also provide the basis for ignoring evidence that is truly indicative of future events
ignoring evidence that is truly indicative of future events. When evidence is lacking or ambiguous, the analyst evaluates hypotheses by applying his or her general background knowledge concerning the nature of political systems and behavior. Logic-of-the-situation analysis also draws heavily on theoretical assumptions. How does the analyst select the most significant elements to describe the current situation, or identify the causes or consequences of these elements, without some
implicit theory that relates the likelihood of certain outcomes to certain antecedent conditions? For example, if the analyst estimating the outcome of an impending election does not have current polling data, it is necessary to look back at past elections, study the campaigns, and then judge how voters are likely to react to the current campaigns and to events that influence voter attitudes. In doing so, the analyst operates from a set of assumptions about human nature and what drives people and groups. These assumptions form part of a theory of political behavior, but it is a different sort of theory than was discussed under theoretical analysis. It does not illuminate the entire situation, but only a small increment of the situation, and it may not apply beyond the specific country of concern. Further, it is much more likely to remain implicit, rather than be a focal point of the analysis. •
Former US Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, who has written a controversial book detailing the Abbotabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden, has credited a ‘feisty’ female CIA analyst for leading them to their target, after spending five years hunting him. Bissonnette said that he and the other SEALs asked the young agent, "What you do think? Think he's there? "She's like, ''One hundred percent. One hundred percent he's there,” he said. Read more here.
A part-time army of civilian spies is set to be recruited by the UK intelligence agency GCHQ to help in the war against cyber crime. Hundreds of computer experts will work one or two days a week at the agency’s Cheltenham headquarters and they have already been dubbed “iPlods”, under plans being discussed by ministers. The move is part of an ongoing drive to harness the best skills in the private sector to combat the growing threat of hackers. Read more here.
Top 5 Things Only Spies Used To Do (But Everyone Does Now) Kris Wheaton 1. Use satellites: even our cell phones have capabilities that were not even dreamed of by spies 10 years ago! 2. Have an agent network: sure, that's not what we call twitter, LinkedIn etc, but that is what they are! 3. Use passwords and encrypt data: buying/selling on the internet, 007?! 4. Shake a tail: we are all using sophisticated tools to help us navigate the internet without being followed. 5. Have a cover story: we all have multiple email accounts for various aspects of their lives or different social media platforms for different purposes.
Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab have embarked on several innovative programs that allow both intelligence analysts and tactical operators to visualize the battlefield as never seen before. The lab’s staff is comprised of an eclectic group of researchers that includes interdisciplinary faculty partnered with seasoned special operators with years of boots-on-the-ground experience. Together, they aim to illuminate the “human terrain” by utilizing advanced analytical methodologies. Read more here
October 2012 • Foreknowledge
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October 2012 • Foreknowledge