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U.S. Marines in Vietnam the Landing and the Buildup 1965

U.S. Marines in Vietnam the Landing and the Buildup 1965

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Published by Bob Andrepont
United States Marine Corps History Publication
United States Marine Corps History Publication

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Published by: Bob Andrepont on Feb 10, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


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Control of Marine aviation in Vietnam was a very
sensitive issue. Many Marine aviators remembered
their experience in Korea where the 1st MAW had
been under the operational control of the Air Force.

They believed that Marine aircraft had been used

unwisely, at least from a Marine point of view, and
had not furnished the Marine infantry with the close

air support that could have been provided if the
Marine command hadretained



aviation .Marinegenerals were determined not to

allow the Korean experience to repeat itself.
In 1964, when air operations were undertaken over

Laos and North Vietnam, Admiral Sharp authorized
General Westmoreland to designate the senior U. S.
Air Force commander in Vietnam as coordinating

authority, since both Air Force and Navy air units

were participating in these operations. When the

decision was made to land Marines at Da Nang in
1965, it was natural for Admiral Sharp to direct that
a similar arrangement be devised to coordinate the
fixed-wing aviation of the 9th MEB. General Karch
reported directly to ComUSMACV and coordinating
authority was granted to the Air Force component
commander, Major General Joseph H. Moore, for

matters pertaining to tactical air support and air

traffic control.

This emphasis on coordinating authority was
reaffirmed by CinCPac in late March 1965, just

before the assignment of a Marine fighter squadron
to the MEB, General Westmoreland had wanted to
put the Marine F-4 squadron under the operational
control of General Moore, but Admiral Sharp im-

mediately objected and repeated his earlier guidance.4

One month later, Admiral Sharp published a
directive on the conduct and control of close air

support. He stated that close air support was the chief
mission of U.S. aviation in South Vietnam and that



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USMC Photo A 184307

A Douglas A-4 Skyhawk from VMA -225 makes the
first landing at the Chu Lai SA TSfield. Colonel John
D. Noble, Commanding Officer, MAG-12, piloted
the aircraft.

top priority was to go to ground troops actually

engaged with the enemy. Sharp maintained that such
support should be directly responsive to the ground
combat units. The directive also noted that "nothing

herein vitiates the prior CinCPac provision that

ComUSMACV's Air Force component command
shallactascoordinatingauthorityfor matters
pertaining to tacticalair support and airtraffic

control in South Vietnam."
After receiving CinCPac 's instruction, General
Westmoreland ordered that a revision be made to his
airsupportorder. The new MACV directive,
published on 13 July 1965, reiterated CinCPac's

appointment of General Moore as the coordinating
authority. In addition, the order charged him with
the responsibility of insuring that coordination was
established between his service and the other allied

commanders. General Walt retained operational

control of Marine aviation, but to insure maximum
use of all aircraft, the III MAF commander was to

notify the 2d Air Division daily of those aircraft

available in excess of his requirements so that ad-
ditional sorties could be allocated. *Finally,Walt, as
NavalComponent Commander, Vietnam, was

charged with preparing joint operating instructions,

in coordination with General Moore, to insure an

integrated air effort.6

Concurrently, with the revision of MACV's air
directive, General McCutcheon met with Major

General Moore to coordinate air efforts as related to

*Colonel Roy C. Gray, Jr., the 1st MAW G-3, commented,
"At the wing G-3 level it was always extremely difficult to
identify those air assets that were in excess of III MAF needs.
Generally both III MAF and the Air Force wanted far more

than the wing could muster.'' Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Com-

ments on draft MS, dtd 28Sep76 (Vietnam Comment File).

air defense operations. Moore wanted operational
control of all air defense, but McCutcheon pointed

out that the F-4B Phantom II was a dual-purpose

plane, capable of both close air support and air-to-air
defense. To relinquish these aircraft would deprive

the Marine ground commanders of an important

supporting arm.
Nevertheless, General McCutcheon recognized
the necessity of having one overallair defense
commander. After several meetings between the

generals and their staffs, it was decided to publish a

memorandum of agreement to set forth the basic

policies, procedures, and responsibilities. Under this

agreement, the Air Force had overall air defense

responsibility. McCutcheon designated those Marine

forces that would participate in air defense. He

agreed that the U. S. Air Force had the authority to
handle alert aircraft, designate targets, and control

HAWK missile readiness status, including firing

orders. Generals Moore and McCutcheon signed the

document in August 1965.7**
Therevised MACV airdirectiveandthe
memorandum of agreement provided the basic policy

for command, control, and coordination of Marine
aviation, an arrangement completely satisfactory to
General Walt. These arrangements were to remain
unchanged until 1968, when General Westmoreland

received approval from higher authority to establish a
single management system for tactical air control.

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