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Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser, and the Methodology of the Social Sciences Author(s): Susan Hekman Reviewed work(s): Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 98-115 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447847 . Accessed: 21/12/2012 11:09
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This factis mostcommonlyexplained bypointingout thatalthoughsocial and political theorists social scienceis untenable. HUMANISM HAS the social ITare BECOME a somethingof a cliche'inmostsocialsciencesthatwe in stateofcrisis.and symbolic positions. They argue.is highly inapprothat the reason priate for the social sciences. Furthermore.ordinarylanguage phenomenology. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . scientists would of University Texas at Arlington In the process of discrediting positivist the methodologyin the social have not been remissin proposing sciences. The list includes criticaltheory. Its roots go back at least to the nineteenthcentury'sheated debates over the proper methodology of the social sciences.On the mostfundamental levelthehumanists model ofscientific argue thatthe positivist knowledge. furthermore. There are distinct parallels. between Weber's critique of Mill which figured prominently in the Methodenstreit Peter Winch's recent critique of positivistsocial sciand This content downloaded on Fri. The social sciences study"meaningful human action." have been suggested in recent decades."a subjectmatterthatcannot be apprehended by employing the techniques of the natural sciences. the Methodenstreit.theyhave mayagree thatpositivist not been able to agree on itsreplacement. social and politicaltheorists particularwould mostlikely in contemporary share a commonassessmentof thispositivist methodology:thatithas been seriouslydiscreditedin contemporary methodologicaland philosophical discussions in the social sciences. however. and thereason forthecharacterization the social sciencesas in a stateof of is a without theoretical anchor. ALTHUSSER. The humanist attack on positivistsocial sciences that characterizes contemporary discussions in the social sciences.theyshare a numberof common themes.ethnomethodology.BEYOND HUMANISM: THE METHODOLOGY AND GADAMER. crisis.A plethora of anti-positivist methodologies. interactionism well as various offshoots these as of analysis. most would also agree that thisconsensus is a relic of the past.The net resultof thissituation. thatthesocialsciencesare castadrift POSITIVISM VS. which. is hardly new.social and politicaltheorists alternativesto positivism. for instance. OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SUSAN HEKMAN currently Although agree that the positivist(or behaviorist-empiricist) methodology provided a common basis for the social sciences in recentdecades. although perhaps appropriate forthe naturalsciences. forthisis thatthe subjectmatter thesocial sciencesis radicallydifferent of fromthatof the natural sciences.Although there are importantdifferences among these positions.forwant of a betterterm. Yet despite this general agreement continue to among theoriststhe majorityof practicingsocial scientists conduct research on the basis of the positivist methodology.can be placed under the broad label of "humanism.
ethnomethodologists. Both humanists and positivists. Schutzian phenomenologists. have emphasized the subjectivity. This content downloaded on Fri. in this sense.instead of moving toward a satisfactory resolution.In the parlance of contemporaryphilosophy. vinced the social scientific of communityof the futility looking for the "brute facts" defined by the early positivists. Because theyhave failed to question the opposition of subject and the humanists object thatlies at the heart of the positivist epistemology. camp have presented eloquent and convincingarguments against the of These argumentshave.Michel Foucault.That is. are more disturbingthan reassuring.on the faceof it. share a it fundamentalepistemologicalassumption: the opposition of subject and object. of Shapiro makes a similarargumentin Language and PoliticalUnderstanding.however.1 That the opposition between the objectivismof positivismand the subjectivismof humanism has created serious problems for the social sciencesshould be evidentfromrecenttheoretical discussionsin the social sciences. "subjective"because it deals withmeaningful This epistemological perspective suggests both why the humanist and humanism critiquehas failedand whythe debate betweenpositivism has persisted:Positivism and humanismare. what the humanists have effectedis the "deconstruction"of the objectof knowledgein the social sciences. thisnotto be the case.have been farless successful.One of the pioneers in this line of thought. The reason for the persistenceof the debate between positivism and humanismis notreadilyapparent. theyhave attemptedto showthatthebrute.They argue. Wittgensteinianordinary lanand others in the humanist guage philosophers. instead. particularlyfor the social sciences. subject side of the dichotomy. in essence. in effect."objective"factsthatprovidethe raw materialforthe positivist's production of knowledge simply do not exist in the social sciences.conobjectivism positivism. the obverse of the objectivismof positivism.thatthe subjectmatter the social sciences of is inherently action.chosen one side of this opposition as their exclusive domain.Humanism 99 Beyond ence. The subjectivismfostered by humanism is. They suggest that the debate between humanism and positivism. however.is instead provingto be unresolvable.They claim thatthe goal of scientific investiobject gationis theaccumulationof "objectiveknowledge"freefromany taintof The humanists.Their principaltactichas See Dallmayr'sexcellentanalysisof thisthemein his recentTwilight Subjectivity. to a large extent. two sides of the same coin.on the other hand. The essence of the positivist approach has been to emphasize the side of thisopposition.thatthe humanistsare offering clear alternativeto the positivist a approach that restson an entirely different But closer examinationshows epistemology. turnsout. have. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . It would seem. These parallels. This complementaryrelationship between positivismand humanism is increasingly coming to the attentionof social and political theorists. The arguments the humanistshave advanced for an alternativemethodologyfor the social sciences. argues that instead of challenging the epistemological foundations of the on positivism humanistshave succeeded onlyin standingpositivism its head.
the positivists have argued they that the humanistposition restricts the social sciences to the "mere deof scription" social action. The positivist side of the debate.as a first step. and although they stem from very different intellectualtraditions.to challenge the in epistemologicalprimacyof the knowingsubjectpresupposed bythe epistemologyof both positivismand humanism.100 Western PoliticalQuarterly been to argue thatthe social scientist's first and primary taskis to describe social actionin theactor'sterms. The aim of the following theorists whose workis moving analysisis to examine twocontemporary in thesedirections.itis necessaryto completethecritiqueof positivism begun bythe humanistsby"deconstructing" otherside of the subject-object the opposition:the knowingsubject. terizesthe scientific realm.It is necessary.But the positivists unable to describe to theiropponents' satisfaction constitution the the of have been unable to offer objectivedata of thesocial sciencesand. This content downloaded on Fri. 1979: 327-40). further. to a lesser extent.at leastone theorist noted a strongsimilarity and Althusser'sposition (Scott. Ignoringthe humanists'claim that are not limitedto the descriptivelevel.Critiquesof the of objectivism the naive positivist position have resulted in increasingly sophisticated reformulationsof the positivistposition. It followsthatthe social sciences are relegated to therealm of"subjectivity" because theyare excluded fromthe realm of charac"objective knowledge" that. Both of these themes have struckrehave been sponsive chords among social scientists.thata school of thoughtfallingunder the label of "realism"has also challenged the validity the positivist of and extended epistemology theircritique to the social sciences. Benton (1977). but these arguments have not been taken very seriously theirpositivist by opponents.Hans-Georg Gadamer and. See Bhaskar (1971). an epistemologically for satisfactory justification thepurportedobjectivity of social scientific analysis. otherwords. This assessmentof the stateof the debate points to two conclusions. are to claim the status of a science. In addition.if they are. for both humanist and positivist. and Thomas has betweenthe realists (1980). thatthe social sciences must be able to move beyond the "mere description"of social action if theyare to avoid the relativism implicitin the humanistposition.2Both have succeeded in transcendingthe debate by moving to a new epistemological plane. humanist-positivist 2 It should be noted in thiscontext. first. must define their data in objective termsand.however. The strongest themesof these reformulations that the social sciences. theorists Althoughtheyare nottheonlycontemporary to move beyond the humanistcritique of positivism. Second. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . second.Louis Althusserneverthelessexemplifywhat is entailed by this movement. itsuggeststhat. however.Mostof thehumanistschools meaningful also argue thatthe social scientific can investigator and mustmove beyond this descriptivelevel.it suggeststhat in order to transcendthe sterility the on-going debate between positivismand humanism the validityof the positivist mustbe specifically definition epistemology challenged and the positivist of "scientific knowledge"called intoquestion.has also failed to presenta viable positionon the methodologyof the social sciences. of First.
Because Gadamer attackstheproblemof the futility the positivist-humanist of debate mostdirectly. Several importantconsequences followfromthis view.theyoffera way of the debate betweenpositivism and humanismthathas transcending futile created the currentcrisisin the social sciences. Althusser's position is worthyof serious attention a because. GADAMER A. he offers means of transcendand humanism. It was statedthatboth positivists and humanists accept the opposition of subject and object. is how thistranscendence is accomplishedin each's theory.in more concreteterms. The significance of the movement represented by the work of Gadamer and Althussercan best be explained by describing it in the epistemologicaltermsemployed above. First. a definitionaccepted by both positivistsand humanists. and that each focuses on an opposite side of this dichotomy. movingthe social sciencesonto a new epistemologicalplane in by whichneithersubject nor object have a prioristatus. like Gadamer. Gadamer and Althusserdeny both these postulates by arguing that both subject and object are creationsof the conceptual scheme of the interpreter. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .It followsthatbothavoid the humanists'problemofjustifying the scientific statusof the social sciences. rejectionof This content downloaded on Fri. They assert that neithercan be apa priori because neither subject nor object is a realitythat prehended exists prior to the conceptual scheme. But. the Specifically positivists argue thatthe object side of the dichotomycan be apprehended a prioriand definethisapprehension as the acquisition of "brutefacts. The purpose of the followingexamination of the work of Gadamer and Althusser to reveal. workoffers his a clearer understandingof the methodologicalimplications thismoveof ment than does that of Althusser. secondly.Humanism 101 Beyond of They have done so. theyhave rejectedwhathas come to be the hallmarkof thehumanist role of the knowing human position: an emphasis on the constituting subject. callingintoquestion the epistemology the by positivistmethodology that lays exclusive claim to the production of method. first. that both of accept thatthe object side of thisdichotomyis definitive the scientific realm.because Gadamer and Althusserreject the of oppositionof subjectand object theyalso rejectthe definition scientific method founded on it. ing the impasse created by the opposition of positivism The philosophicaldifferences betweenthe two theorists also worthy is of note.argue thatthe subjectside of thedichotomy in can be apprehended a prioriand definethisapprehension as the interpretationof meaningfulaction. The critique theEnlightenment conception knowledge of of Gadamer's hermeneutics embodies two elements that are of for the methodologicalsignificance the social sciences: first. But. althoughtheydenytheexistenceof brute facts thesocial sciences. Sec"objectiveknowledge" throughadherence to the scientific ond. despite the superiority of Gadamer's approach in this regard.and mostimportantly. The factthatGadamer and Althussershare certainepistemological assumptionsdespite theirverydifferent philosophicalroots suggeststhe of significance this movementfor the social sciences."The humanists.
rather.as theyclaimed.thatis. In summary.and. the social sciences. of however." and "objective" knowledge with the product of the scientific the method." The key both to Gadamer's allegiance to nineteenth-century hermeneuticsand to his departure fromthis traditioncan be found in his definition objective.an initialproblem mustbe considered: the fact thatGadamer statesin quite unequivocal termsthathisaim isnotto offer a methodology for the social sciences. of The error of nineteenth-century on hermeneutics. identification all deviationsfromthismodel as inexact and subjective. the developmentof a theoryof interpretation Both of thesepositionsare ence to the "subject"or "subjectiveintentions.an examinationof Gadamer's positionconsistsof an explorationof the methodological implications of his work rather than an explicit examination of "Gadamerian methodology. Given the magnitudeof the failureof nineteenth-century hermeneutics.explain whyhe employstheirthoughtas a starting pointforhis own critiqueof the Enlightenment.scientific of knowlcritique of the Enlightenment's edge. thisattemptwas a failurebecause implicit theirapproach is the accepin tance of thevalidity the Enlightenment's of definition objectiveknowlof Thus theycould not.to understand what the human sciences are and what connectsthem to the totality experience of the of world (1975:xiii). they left it unfinished.What theirthoughtamounts to. it would seem that Gadamer would do well to abandon the hermeneuticaltradition altogetherin his search fora proper understanding of the human sciences. on the contrary.the methodof thenaturalsciences. What Gadamer sees to be thevalue of This content downloaded on Fri.Gadamer's argument is that although Dilthey and Schleiermacher began this critique in the right direction. an is intothe Enlightenment explicationof how the human sciencesfit conception of knowledge.a positionwhichrestson his definition hermeneuof ticsitself:"The hermeneuticalexperience is prior to all methodological alienationbecause it is the matrixout of whicharise the questions thatit thendirectsto science" (1976A: 26).Even though Diltheyand Schleiermacherattemptedto formulatea methodology forthe human sciences in opposition to thatof the natural sciences. at a crucialjuncture.offer distinctive a method for edge. The core of the definitionof knowledge is the identification "true. and accepted by both positivists Enlightenment thatavoids refersecond. was itsfailureto offer sufficiently a radical critiqueof thisposition. either by mimickingthe objectivity the natural of sciences or by conceding the "subjectivity" the human sciences (1975: of 6-9).a significant departure fromit.PoliticalQuarterly 102 Western methoddeveloped in the the peculiar statusof theconceptionof scientific and humanists.however." of Enlightenment's "exact. and. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ." hermeneutics developed in the extensivecritiqueof nineteenth-century whichoccupies Gadamer's attentionin Truth Method. Gadamer's specificcriticisms these thinkers.Gadamer sees his workas both a continuationof theirwork and. Gadamer's account.then. and Before examining thiscritique. furthermore. In the introductionto Truthand Methodhe statesthat his goal is. Thus he is not concerned withmethodperse but what lies behind method. Strictly speaking.
And." His argumentwithregard to prejudice is radical in itssimplicity: understandAll involvesprejudice and thusneither observernor observed. it is being argued. it establishesthatin the processof interpretation.Dilthey presupposes that. conditioned. most both elementsof the dialectic.Nor is it.the analysis of which would reveal only a textureof reciprocal relationships.It is a dialectical process he compares to the dialecticof question and answer. in the process of historicalinhistorical observersoccupy an Archemedean pointvis-a-vis terpretation. The basic principleof Gadamer's hermeneutics.The essence of Gadamer's argumentis the assertionthat Diltheydid not understand his own principlethatall understandingis historical. and.then. then. These pointsformthe basis of Gadamer's theoryof the phenomenon of underof standing.Humanism 103 Beyond this traditionis most evident in his examination of Dilthey. necessarilyinvolves preconceptionsthat are a product of the historical setting.withoutexception.in otherwords. ingnecessarily textor interpreter be said to be freefromprejudice. second.the interpreter well as the as importantly. of In the processof correcting thesetwoerrorsin Dilthey'smethodology Gadamer develops the two themes that.He failed to see that all understanding. it reveals thatthe Enlightenment's definitionof truthas the eliminationof prejudice is erroneous.thatis. are of methodological significancefor the social sciences.This principleformsthecore of Gadamer's approach to as hermeneutics well. as well as text interpreter are bound by prejudice.) This content downloaded on Fri. the abstractantithesisbetween traditionand historicalresearch.His second error an and is his assumption that historicalunderstandinginvolves"gettinginside the mind" of the author of the text. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . First.somethingthat the historical observercan sidestepin the processof interpretation.(1975: 251. But Dilthey'stheoryalso containstwofundamental errors. can as theEnlightenment thinkers thatmustbe eliminated argued. Rather.are historically At the beginning of all historicalhermeneutics. apprehending the subjective intentions its author (1975: 204ff). The firsttheme is developed in the context of an examination of the nature of historical understanding. thetext. Dilthey's was contribution to advance the principlethatall understanding historiis callyconditioned. Both the Enlightenment and nineteenth-century hermeneutics failed to grasp the phenomenon of understanding because theyfailed to understand the necessityof prejudice.He assumes. The effectof a living traditionand the effectof historicalstudy must constitutea unity.he asserts.is the interplay the movementof the traditionand the movement of the interpreter.Understanding. text.is his provocativestatement thatthe attemptto remove all prejudice is itselfa prejudice (1975: 244). must be discarded.thatinterpreters overcometheir can own historicity offer "objective"analysisof a text. This correctionof Diltheyestablishestwo importantpoints: first. as Dilthey thought.it is a positivepossibility the most primordialkind of knowing (1975: of 236). between historyand knowledge. Prejudice is not. something on the way to truth.Gadamer definesthese preconceptionsas "prejudice.
Understanding. This content downloaded on Fri.it simply involvesthe fusingof the two horizons into a distinctunit: The projecting thehistorical of is a then. His point is not the negative one that we should resign ourselves to the necessityof prejudice.3 What occurs in understandingGadamer labels the and the interpre"fusingof horizons. have "horizons" of understanding that are conditioned. theprocess understanding of which means that thehistorical horizon projected.) Gadarner'sspecific to aim in thissectionis to rescue the aestheticexperience fromthe subjectivismto which Kant and subsequent Enlightenment thoughtrelinquishedit and.then. in short. he claims.is reflexive.thatGadamer phrases his to discussion of the necessityof prejudice in understanding in positive rather than negative terms. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . only phaseintheprocess horizon.the knoweris definedas aloof from ing.) This notion of what occurs in the phenomenon of understanding reveals the errorof the Enlightenment's of exclusive identification truth withthe scientific method'seliminationof prejudice. In the scientific that which is known (1975: 114-17).but equallycertainly not is inferior it?(1975: 87. does notbecomesolidified theself-alienation and into of a pastconsciousness. is overtaken our ownpresent but of horizon by In of there takesplacea real understanding. historically entailthattheinvestigator entersthe horizonof thetext.The processof interpretation does not. of understanding.is thatif the aestheticexperience is a valid experience of truthand if these elementsare valid componentsof 3 Gadamer expresses thisprinciplein the contextof his discussionof effective operative) (or historical consciousness (Wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein).to retrievethe notion of truthin art (1975: 88). What Gadamer's analysis of the aestheticexperience suggests. Rather. In theaesthetic experience the spectatoris an intimateand inseparable part of the process of knowmodel.Rather. however. as is fusing horizons."Both the textunder investigation ter of the text.his goal is to reveal the fundamentalinadequacy of the scientific model of knowledge. This problem provides the contextforhis discussionof the aestheticexperience in the first sectionof Truth he and Method.Rhetorically asks: "Is there to be no knowledgein art?Does not the experience of art containa claim to truth whichis certainly different fromthatof science.it involvesan openness to traditionthat permitsthe traditionto speak. But to demonstrate that error and to suggest a model for the kind of truthsought in the human sciences Gadamer mustproduce an "experience of truth"thatis distinct fromthescientific methodyetindisputablein itself. he insists that prejudice represents the productive possibility understanding. thus. More broadly. described conscious ofthis fusion as thetaskof theeffective-historical consciousness. (1975: 273-74. itissimultaneously We the act removed."Effective history" he defines as the demonstrationof the effectivity historywithinunderstandingitself of (1975: 267). however.104 Western PoliticalQuarterly It is important note at thispoint. Instrumental thislargergoal is his discovery an aspect of theexperito of ence of truth artthatcontradicts in thismodel. of textinvolvesbeing aware of the effect the of Understandinga historical text on the interpreter's own understanding of it.however.however.
rather. then the fact that theycontradictthe scientific model entails that it does not. "Whoever speaks a language thatno one else understandsdoes not speak"(1976A: Gadamer compares participationin lan65). that thatlanguage playsus: is.(1976A: 25. the linguisticality understandingidentifies locus of the "prejudice" of the so crucial to Gadamer's account.Thoughwe"use"words. quite obviously. encompass all possible valid "kinds experiencesof truth. as its proponents claim. The starting pointof thisanalysisis hisassertionthatlanguage is a universal phenomenon: The phenomenon of understanding. first. language as a formof life." For Gadamer this is entails that language is necessarilycommon.One refers that proper to to as which does "usage" something notdependon us.perfectly of truth"are possible. thatunderstanding can neverbe freefromprejudice and.Humanism 105 Beyond that experience. Both of these points are now establishedas universally applicable in the discussionof language. In his words.But forGadamer itis not the case thatwe. is impossibleto remain language.it suggeststhatother. In his discussionof historical consciousnesshe argued. The keyeleinterpretation mentin thattheory his pointthatlanguage is "I-less.itestablishesa distinctive previously theoryof thatascends to a new epistemologicalplane. (1976B: 93.subjects. it we tool speak. First. Following Wittsenstein. but.since are notallowed violate we we to it. itis nota matter our making of words of whenwe use Strictly speaking. In the discussion of aesthetics latterpointwas phrased in termsof theparticipatory of the role the spectatorin the aestheticexperience. but (in absolutelyeverything because everything the worldand out of it) is in in which included therealm "understanding" understandability of and we move. playgames withlanguage. then. second. aloof fromthe language throughwhich understandingoccurs. But Gadamer's analysis of language does more than merelyclarify establishedpoints. and.) This content downloaded on Fri. in definestheactivity of guage to participation a game. both in aestheticsand in the human sciences.) Gadamer's discussionof language solidifies numberof keypointsmade a earlier in his discussion of aestheticsand historicalconsciousness. "Subjectless" and interpretation theroleoflanguage of Gadamer's thought that has methodological The second theme for significance the social sciencesconcernshis rejectionof the claim that involves"gettinginside the author's mind. It becomes clear thatwe cannot escape this prejudice because we cannot escape our language and the preunderstandingsembodied in it. B. furthermore.Rather.Wordsthemselves the prescribe onlywaywecan put them use. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .butrather on it. isnotinthesensethat puta given to use as we please." This theme is interpretation mostcompletelydeveloped in his extensiveanalysisof language in Truth andMethod. shows the universalityof withinit . It entailsparticipation. Second. thatitinvolvesthe unity of observer and observed (the fusing of horizons).Rather.not human linguisticality a medium thatcarrieseverything as onlythe "culture"thathas been handed down to us throughlanguage.
has attackedhis positionon subjective(or whathe calls "authoHirsch'sobjectionto Gadamer's positionthatthe rial") intention.in an ongoing debate with critics. Gadamer. The methodologicalsignificance Gadamer's stance of on thisissue can be illustrated referring the controversy position to his by has aroused among literary Eric Hirsch. that means "getting insidetheauthor'smind"froma positionof interpretation historicalobjectivity. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .PoliticalQuarterly 106 Western Two importantconsequences followfromthis position. terpreterand interpreted.itis easyto identify fallingpreyto the same errorsas thatof Dilthey.. for Gadamer.Gadamer states this point veryexplicitly: in Whenwe understand textwe do notputourselves theplace of the a activities the of and it is nota matter penetrating spirtual of the other. rather.in the is the processof interpretation interpreter alwaysinside language. controversial one. Rather. From the perspectiveafforded by theforegoing Hirsch'spositionas discussion.Second.Gadamer's theoryestablishes understandingthat occurs in language does not entail recourse to the consciousnessof the individual subject. First. author'sintention does not fixthe meaningof a textis thatitobviatesthe possibilityof the objective interpretationof texts.showed this position to be fundamentally error. When a textis interpretedthe interpreter does not step outside language to an Archemedean point of objectivity.It formsa horizonof meaningconstituted the historical of by setting the text. in Hirsch's conviction that "objectivity textual interpretation in requires (1967: 237) leads him to a explicitreferenceto the speaker's subjectivity" of position that is characteristic those who unquestioninglyaccept the This content downloaded on Fri. author.fails to see thatthe determination what he calls the "meaning" of a textis a of dialectical process which must take into account the historicity the of interpreteras well as that of the text. in however. The importanceof Hirsch's criticism. The meaning hermeneutical of is the inquiry todisclose miracleofunderstanding or utterances notthemysterious and communitexts in cationof souls. rather. instead.Gadamer's analysis of historical understanding. Understanding a participation the commonaim.. What of Gadamer is asserting thatthesubjectiveintentions theauthorof a text is are not the "real" objects of the interpreter'sanalysis. the meaning of the textis independent of the author's intentions. In other words. Hirsch assumes.) This statementis the essence of what has been referredto above as Gadamer's rejectionof the subject in his theoryof interpretation.lies not in its novelty but ratherin thefactthatitrevealsthesignificance Gadamer's rejection of of subjectiveintentionality the context of contemporarydiscussions.when we understand a text what occurs is not the grasping of the author's subjective but. moves in the horizon for definedbythelanguage employed.a is.Hirsch. however.likeDilthey. is (1979: 147. and more importantly the thatthe phenomenon of presentargument.the interplayof the (linguistic)traditionsof inintentions.. Against Gadamer Hirschclaimsthatthe meaningof a textis fixedand "objective"because it is determinedbythe author'sintention.however.Gadamer's positionon subjectiveintentionality moveover.Briefly. but.
conceptionof scientific knowledgecan only be challenged by calling into question both sides of the subject-object on dichotomy whichthatconceptionrests. although this position is distinctfromthe positivist view thatthedata of thesocial sciencesare objectivein thestrict sense. And. From thisit follows. "the but conceptof objectivity representedbythe sciencesexemplifies a special This content downloaded on Fri. There is a certain irony in this position. then the social sciences." Hirsch. second. course of his analysis of the linguisticality understandingGadamer of shows that all understanding involves. As Gadamer puts it.and.The natural sciences define knowledgein termsof the exclusion of the influenceof the observer'sperspectiveas well as any historical. the objectivity subjectivity. theirrelationshipto the natural sciences. that the natural sciences are an aberrant and highlyunique mode of knowing ratherthan the model for all true knowledge.further." This prejudice is defined as the prethatis a preconditionof all human ununderstandingor forestructure. in as that (196: 246). of Nor can it be debunked by givingup on objectivity altogetherand embracing subjectivity.however. hypothesis of and that suggests themuch-advertised in between and the cleavage thinking the sciences humanities does notexist.Humanism 107 Beyond of model of objective knowledge: searching for legitimacy the scientific the "objective facts"that will make the social sciences truly"scientific. itis in all thinking aspiresto knowledge. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .itclearly of depends on the assumptionof the validity the positivist conceptionof scientific method. Hirsch puts it this way: The identity genre.Gadamer's rejectionof subjective thatthe positivist intentionality suggests.that.on Gadamer's view.It cannot be debunked by proclaiming. the naturalsciences the goal of knowledgeis preciselyto exclude both of these fundamentalelementsof human understanding.the participationof the knowerin the act of knowing. In the and.the two themes of Gadamer's theory. What it comes to is that the subjectiveintentionsof authors become the objective data of the social sciences. can obtain objective knowledge. It can be concluded. too. first. that. Hirsch's quarrel with Gadamer points to the followingconclusion: unless the validity the positivist of methoditself is conceptionof scientific the social scienceswillinevitably into the errorof mimickfall challenged ing the methodsof the naturalsciences. It must be concluded. most particularly.The hypothetico-deductive is process fundamental bothof them. then. particularistic aspects of the experience under analysis.pre-understanding.the rejection of the Enlightenment conception of knowledge and the rejectionof subjectiveintentionality offera radicallydifferent perspectiveon the nature and taskof the human sciences. the inescapable influenceof the knower's "prejudice. taken together.as Hirsch does. in derstanding. along with many contemporarysocial scientists. argues that if social scientists can identify the "objective data" in their discipline that parallels that of the natural sciences. then.
But thereare twoimportant respectsin whichthe theoriesconverge: as both explicitly eschew subjectiveintentionality a valid basis for first.nor is thatmethod the universalmodel of certain knowledge. exof cluded fromthe realm of truth. The acceptance of this to model leaves the social scienceswithonlytwoalternatives: first. attempt to identify the "objective data" of the social sciences (either as the behavioristsdo. in Althusser's terminology.By callingintoquestion the legitimacy of method and by the Enlightenment's identification truthwithscientific Gadamer offers the human to the rejecting appeal to subjectiveintentions sciences a self-identification distinctfromeither of these conceptions. second. in the apprehension of subjectiveintentions) second. whileGadamer concernshimself solelywitha critiqueof the method. But even more significant Gadamer's conclusionas to where thisleaves the social sciences.PoliticalQuarterly 108 Western is case" (1979: 129). hence. On this point he is veryclear: then IfVerstehen basicmoment human of isthe in-der-Welt-sein. While Gadamer Althussergoes merelyproclaimshis rejectionof subjectiveintentionality." the knowing of subject. And. both offeran epistemology that repudiates the methodand objectiveknowledge.would seem to be the polar opposite of Gadamer's hermeneutics. It also has the effect removingthe "inferiority complex" that is the result of the acceptance of the Enlightenment'smodel of scientificknowledge. in a "value-free" assessment of human behavior. analysis and.The objectivitythelatter nolonger unequivocal obligatan and of is (1979: 106). oryideal of knowledge. ALTHUSSER Althusser's social theory. Diltheydoes.leads to twoconclusions: first. and.then.Despite precisely these differences and despite the factthatGadamer's approach is on the whole superior to that of Althusser because he offersa more radical critique of the Enlightenmentconception of knowledge. that the understanding which is soughtin thehuman sciencesprovidesthefoundationor preconditionfor the naturalsciences(1975: xvii. on to offer specific a deconstruction theconceptof "man. or. the provinceof scientific method. Althusser'stheorysupplies a more Enlightenment'sscientific fully developed non-positivist(or.non- This content downloaded on Fri. as or. it is worth exploring how the two theories converge on these issues. second.is all the more striking because of the differences betweenthem.thehuman are nearerto humanself-understanding the naturalscithan sciences ences. to identifythe human sciences as inherently "subjective" and. Enlightenment conceptionof scientific The convergenceof thetwoapproaches on theseissues. withitstiesto both Frenchstructuralism and Marxism. Gadamer's extensiveexamination of the relationshipbetween truth thattruthis not strictly and method.446-47).Also. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . This positionhas theeffect in of. turningthe tableson the naturalsciencesby definingthe human sciences as epistemologically of prior. can be argued that in certain respects Althusser'stheory servesas a kind of complementto Gadamer's approach.however. a sense. more it positively.
In a parallel fashion Althusser's critique of the classical economists'and. "man" is not." who are "real" objects of theoreticalinquiry.the economy was defined as a "real" object in the sense thatitwas seen as theresultof human relationsultimately reducible to individualhuman actions. For Althusser. the "real" object of theoretical the of inquiry. His theoryprecludes the possibility thatindividualmen can be seen as the articulationof the social structure. were attributedreality. In the case of Althusserthecore of hisapproach is a distinctive of interpretation Marx's social theory. Althusser's restson a critiqueand reinterpretatheory tionof the nineteenth-century approach to epistemologicalissues. boththe objectand the subject. Marx's maturetheory. is to "construct"the concept of the economy as a in purelytheoretical concept and to show. in identifies real protagonists history the the in as This content downloaded on Fri. as the classical economists assumed.Thus. "bearer"of thestructure capitalist In Marx's analysis.Marx's taskin Capital. Gadamer's critiqueof Dilthey'sunderstandingof subjectiveintentions formsthe basis of his epistemologicalunderstandingof the role of the subject. entirely the theoreticalrealm. both the economy and the "men" who constituteit. contrast. economy.on Althusser's to interpretthe social totality a totalityof intersubjective as relations between "men.This complementarity conceptionof scientific be explicatedby focusingon twoaspects of Althusser'sextensivecorpus: his discussionof the ideological concept of "man" and his understanding of the construction scientific of concepts.Men. derivatively.Alhusser's interpretation Marx revolvesaround of the thesis that.is "category thesubject.Althusserinsists. Central to this argument is the thesis that the objects of the real and theoretical worldsare produced in analogous ways. His principalargumentis thatMarx's epistemologicalbreak withthe classical economistswas constituted his definition the economyas a theoretiof by cal concept rather than a "real" object of theoreticalinquiry.that is. rather. The goal of Althusser'sdiscussionis the parallel one of revealingthe errorof the classicaleconomist'sassumption that "man" can be an object of theoreticalknowledge. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .enter the analysisonly insofaras theyfill certaindeterminateplaces in the social structure (1970: 252-53). It is thisidentification Marx's breakthrough theseparationof real of as and theoreticalobjects that formsthe core of Althusser'sepistemology. For the classical economists.Humanism 109 Beyond can empiricist) knowledge.He is. Marx effectedan epistemologicalbreak (or rupture)withthe humanistphilosophyof hisyouthand enteredintowhat Althussercalls a new "continentof thought"by introducinga radically new epistemology. as Althussersees it. how it is produced (1970: 182).Althusserdefines his task as that of explicatingthis epistemological perspectivewhich is implicitin Marx's later work.after 1845. forthesetheorists. The ideological of concept "man" Like Gadamer.rather. men neverappear as men. A."The humanists'error. humanistMarxists'concept of "man" the formsthe basis of his epistemologicalunderstandingof what he calls the of account.
the subjectivewill or intentionof social actorsis not the "real" object of theoretical inquiry. If Althusser of rejectsthe "bourgeois myth"of the subject as the origin.4 By arguing that both subjects and objects are products of theoreticaldiscourse he has effectively undermined the humanists'positionand thedichotomy betweensubjectand objecton whichitrests.but. in his approach Althusserdefines no differencesbetween the natural and social sciences while significant Gadamer's theoryrests on the definitionof a profound difference be4 But Althusser'sdeconstruction the subject also raises a serious problem. as the humanistsargue.Althusser's deconstruction thisconcept. rather. but. more specifically.that the "subject" and. This content downloaded on Fri." then. althoughin different ways.then the question arises as to how he deals withbiologicalhuman beings in his theory. be explained by referenceto individualwills.in other words. thus.But these positionscome to much the same thing: the rejectionof the essence of the humanistposition. "a process withouta subject" (1971: 124).somethingbecomes a historical event by insertioninto formsthat are themselveshistorical(1969: 126). Biological men are only the supports or of bearers of the guises assigned to themby the structure relationsin the social formation. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .110 Western PoliticalQuarterly social relationsof production.however. Both argue. stituting B. Althusser'sexaminationis cast in termsof a narrowconcern: the formulation of scientific concepts. however.forAlthusseras forFoucault.thatalthoughAlthusser takenan important step in revealingthe dependence of humanismon the concept of the subject. The construction theoretical of concepts The second aspect of Althusser'spositionthatconvergeswiththatof Gadamer can be found in his discussionof the construction theoretical of concepts.the conhuman subject.theconvergencebetweenAlthusser'spositionon thisissue and that of Gadamer should be clear. Historicalevents cannot.opposed to Gadamer's approach. In contrastto Gadamer's broad examination of the nature of human understanding.Their appeal to the realityof subjects and subjective wills is shown to be as of unfounded as the positivists' appeal to the reality brute facts.Furthermore. is that "subjects" have no status.he has not as yet worked out a coherent theoreticalapproach that serves as an antidote to the humanists'error in this regard. Althusser'sposition on this issue appears to be radically.not. On the face of it.Gadamer does thisbyrejecting notionthatinterpretation the involvesprobingsubjective intentions.Historyis. a keyelementin his theoretical is of approach. In other words theyare active in history ratherthan creatorsof it. What Althusseris asserting. It seemsfairto conclude.establishesthe necessityof abstractingfrom concrete individuals (1976: has 200). He declares that human beings are agents in history that work in and through historical forms(1976: 95). rather.Althusser rejects it by arguing that subjects are theoretical rather than "real" entities. Althusser insists thatMarx's theoretical anti-humanism does notentail"despising"man.as both the humanistsand classical economiststhought."real" entities.Here Althusseris less clear.They are theoretiindependentreality apart fromtheirtheoretical cal objectsconstructed the scientific in realm of thought.furthermore. epitomizes the errorsof the humanists'approach to social theory. The conceptof"man. Also.
is informedby thisposition. See Scott(1974). His theorycan be reduced to two theses whichhe derivesfromMarx's analysisin Capital: first.This is the case because "the sphere of thereal is separate in all itsaspectsfromthesphere of thought" (1970: 87). second. both Gadamer and Althussermove the debate over the social sciencesbeyond the narrow confinesof the positivist-humanist dichotomyby rejecting As both alternatives.For Marx the production process of real.in both accounts. Althusser's of the productionof scientific concepts. but. The goal of Marx's analysis. In addition to arguing thatAlthusser'sseparation of these two realms is illegitimate.itcan be argued that. a position roughlyequivalent to what was referredto above under the heading of On definition empiricist the sees knowledgeas the positivism. while the in productionof thoughtobjectstakesplace entirely therealmof thought (1970: 41). the twoapproaches dictatea similarapproach to the definiand mostimportantly.then. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .like thatof theory his deconstruction theconceptof "man" is rooted in his understanding of of Marx's theoreticalapproach. concreteobject. however.whatis accomplishedin the acquisition of scientificknowledge is not.Humanism 111 Beyond in tweenthetwo. a broad sense. a resultof thispositionboth claim.rather. is to 5Althusser's has separationbetweenthoughtand reality been the subjectof much criticism. thatthe goal of thesocial sciencescannotbe definedas theacquisitionof "objective as Asking knowledge"of socialreality ithas been definedbythe positivists. to an analysisof the internaldynamicof the productionof knowledge.Despite thesecontrasts. But neitherGadamer nor Althusserturn. is not to understand the betweenthe real and the thought. of whichretainsthereality theobject sought. Althusser's extraction the essence fromthe real. This extraction. of is askingthewrongquestion.as do the humanists. second. In the case of Gadamer thismeant examining the relationshipbetween truthand method. Marx's analysisin Capital.then.The first thesisstemsfromthe positionthatscience has no object outside itsown activity but. the appropriationof the real world by the worldof thought.5 The goal of Althusser'stheory. Althusseropposes this theoryto what he labels the "empiricist"conception of knowledge.rather. the analogy betweenthe productionof scientific conceptsand the productionof objects in the materialworld. In opposition to thisconception of knowledge Althusserproposes a radical separation of the realms of thoughtand realitythat entails a rejectionof the empiricistnotion that knowledgeis a partof thereal world. As Althusserunderstandsit. radical separathe tion of the realms of thoughtand reality.instead.rather.and. these authors This content downloaded on Fri.to the subjectivity the social sciences to rectify of this error. Benton (1977) and Glucksmann(1974). Both turn.produces itsown norms and the criterionof its own existence. In the case of Althusserit means examining the construction scientific of concepts.to analyze the relationship process of productionof thoughtobjects (1970: 54).Althusser claims. material objects takes place entirelyin the real world. as in the empiricistaccount.First. tionof knowledgein the social sciences.is accomplishedthroughthe of use of the scientist's "abstract" concepts. Callinicos (1976). forthe "objectivity" knowledgein the social sciences.
The second resultis equally significant. "objective" or "given" facts about the real world.thewhole question of the"objectivity" scientific of factsis dissolved. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . hence. They are.on Althusser's world. in his words. They are operated on and.This body of concepts will differfrom one historicalperiod to another and with the necessarily developmentallevelof a particularscience. criteria sciences(1970: 62-7). the productionof scientific conceptsbegins withraw materials.thatGeneralitiesIII do not reveal the essence of Generalities I. as the empiricistsclaim."are transformations the abstractconcepts of GeneralitiesI (1969: 184-85). Since the normsof the scientific community are historically of but produced."transformed" Generalities by II: the axiomatic methods of the science. of 7 This has that aspectof Althusser's theory been attackedon twocontradictory grounds: first. analogous formof production occurs. Since Althusserclaims that the criterionof scientificity given by the norms of scientific is discourse and thatthese normschange withthe developmentof the particular science.But theyare at anygivenpoint a productof the normsand values of scientific discourse and the particular problematicmotivating that discourse. Althusser is carefulto insist. Rather. 1976: 102. thusser's answer to this is very straightforward: guarantee of scithe is entificity given by the operating norms and rules whollyinternal to scientific discourse (1970: 67). Althusser clearly rejects the empiricistnotion that the of scientificity resultsis guaranteed throughreferenceto the"facts. therecan be no "checking"of the factsto guarantee the accuracyof the results. Generalities III. of and of and.1974).In short.6 This understanding of the process of the production of scientific concepts provides Althusserwithanswers to a numberof questions central to the definitionof knowledge in the social sciences.have no connectionwiththe real concepts.They are formulatedwithonlyone end in view: the productionof knowledge. which he also refersto as the "concrete in thought.the body of conceptsoperativein the scientific at community a particulartime. thereis no general criterion scientificity.in the separate worldsof the real and the theoretical. Despite arguing forthe radical separationof the real and the thought. Scientific account. Two importantresults follow from this position. One of these questions is the definitionof what constitutesa scientific concept. 1972: 80).His pointof departure is the assertion an that. thathe overemphasizestheabsolutenessof thecriterion scientificity and. Another question concerns the means of guaranteeing the of Alscientificity the knowledge produced by the scientific community. Like production in the material world. he needs a univesalcriterion scientificity failsto supplyone (Glucksmann.But theseraw materialsare not. The result of this transformation is Generalities III: the "knowledge" that is the goal of scientific analysis. First.7 onlytheparticular developed byparticular also point out thathe is confused on thispoint. fails to give proper emphasis to the historicalconditions under which it is produced (Callinicos. 6The "abstract"concepts that provide scientists with their raw materialsAlthusserlabels GeneralitiesI. Geras.itfollows thatthosethings thatare recognizedas "knowledges" are historically conditioned. This content downloaded on Fri.he also wantsto maintainthe primacyof the real over the thought(1970: 87).PoliticalQuarterly 112 Western presentan analysisof how the scientist produces and manipulates conthe cepts within realm of thought. however. second."Since there are no "facts"in the sense of real world data in Althusser'stheory. rather.
then. on the one hand. it is neverthelessthe case that simplyby positing the existence of the two worlds he perpetuates the positivistillusion that.He also establishesthe unavoidable historicity knowledge by definingthe production of scientific of discourse in historicalterms.first. He rejects the possibility even desirability "objective knowledge" provided by this model not by claiming that the social sciences are inherently subjectivebut by denying any connection betweenthe real and theoretical worlds. The advantage of Althusser's approach is that.like Gadamer.in a broad sense. encourages us to thinkof not interpretation as the appropriationof the "real" subjectiveintentions of authors.The resultof thismovementin bothcases is to place the social sciences on a new epistemological plane.as the humanistsdo. workof Gadamer and Althusserpointsto an approach to the social sciencesthatdefinesanalysisin termsof modes of discourse rather than in termsof specifying relationshipbetween the real world and the theworldof theory. the First. his analysisis cast in termsof and fact.by attackingits central or of epistemologicaltenets.however. theirapproaches move the social sciencesin similar methodologicaldirections.Although in two of these cases Gadamer's apdistinctly it proach is clearlysuperiorto thatof Althusser.Althusser. also raisesa serious problem.But it should guaranteeingthe correspondencebetween theory also be noted that Althusser'sposition. In conclusion the methodologicalimplicationsof this movementcan be specifiedby identhree aspects of theirapproaches thatpoint the social sciences in tifying new directions. byrejectingthe lightenment conceptionof scientific constitutive of theindividualsubjectthathas been the hallmarkof the role humanistcritique.Gadamer. Gadamer and Althusser approach thisissue in different ways. CONCLUSION In the foregoingI have attemptedto establishthatboth Gadamer and discussionsof the Althusser make valuable contributions contemporary to of the social sciencesbecause both theoriesmove beyond the philosophy debate. he grounds his conception of knowlwithinthe confinesof scientific discourse and grounds that edge entirely in discourse firmly history.Even thoughhe uses thethesisof theradical attack separation of the two worldsof thoughtand realityto specifically the empiricist(positivist)relationship between these two realms. conception of scientific methodologynot by claiming.but. of Althusser's on theotherhand.thatdespite thedifferences like Gadamer. second. challenging the fundamental premises of the Enby methodand. thatit is inapplicable to the social sciences. but. radical separationof the worldsof thoughtand reality. rather. somehow.as his many criticshave argued. Both accomplishthis steriledogmatismof the positivist/humanist movement.Humanism 113 Beyond betweenthe two It can be concluded. rejectsthe Enlightenment theories.In sum.in termsof the dialecticalinterplay traditions. By focusingon the problem of the nature of human understanding. rather. is castin terms histhesisof the of approach. there is a This content downloaded on Fri. is nevertheless significant that. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .
the workof Gadamer and Althusserpoints to the definitive rejectionof the inferiorstatusdictated to the social sciences by both the and humanistapproaches. furthermore.it can nevertheless argued thatwhat is common to be both is the positionthatthe productionof knowledgeis to be understood in termsof an interplay meaningsand concepts internalto discourse. Again. far fromidentical. then.114 Western PoliticalQuarterly "real" world out there that is distinct from the world of thought. Althusseraccomplishesthisbyvirtupositivist betweenthe naturaland social sciences. both Gadamer and Althusser point the social sciencesin directions thatwould move thembeyondboth positivism and humanism. The terminologicaldifferences concepts between the two approaches make it difficult express this point in to terms. allyignoringany distinction at the same time. of In these three areas.Althusser'spositionis cast in termsof the prodgeneral use theirconceptual apparatus to operate uction of discourse: scientists in on theobjectof investigation order to produce theobjectof knowledge. thus placing the branches of science on an equal footing. Gadamer castshis argumentin termsof the processof interpretation: the horizon of the interpreter fused with the horizon of the text into a is distinct entity. Gadamer's perspective.Gadamer's position. His analysis of the production of scientificknowledge holds for all scientificanalysis. Although both theorists the social scienceson a new footing the vis-ai-vis natural put sciences.rejectingthe epistemologicalpositionthatrelegatesthe social sciences to second-class status.offersa more complete analysis of the relationship between the sciences. Second. By encouraging social scientists be suspicious of the to as well as the "objects"presupposed in positivist social science.definesthe social sciences as epistemologically prior to the natural sciences because theydeal withthe universalphenomenon of understandingwhichis the precondition for all human knowledge. it can be argued that Gadamer's approach to thisparticularissue is superior to thatof Althusser. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .By to encouraging us.By analyzing the universal phenomenon of human understanding. Althoughthe twoapproaches are. Gadamer's approach definitely rejectsthe notionof a real worldopposed to the world of discourse. Althusserfailsto account forwhatis the mostsignificant of discovery Gadamer's hermeneutics:his identification the "prejudice" that unof dergirds knowledge in both the natural and human sciences. think in terms of the production of discourse ratherthan in termsof "objective" knowledge theyoffernew directionsfor inquiryin the social sciences.bydelvingmore deeply intothe problemof human understanding. Third. however. in contrast.however. as was indicated above. avoids this problem entirely.Although the specificsof the This content downloaded on Fri.but. It is in this sense that their of approaches are worthy close attention. "subjects" both Gadamer and Althusserhave made a significant contribution.Gadamer. the work of Gadamer and Althusserdictatesa position that in of of definestheactivity analysisor interpretation termsof theinterplay withina mode of discourse.
" 57-86. Grahame Lock.London: Pluto Press. Gadamer. (1979). 5: Analysis Michael (1981). and Method. pp. Haven: Yale University P. University Thomas. Press.Ben Brewster. of sachusettsPress. of of Routledge and Kegan Paul.New York: The Seabury Press.Beyond Humanism 115 methodology dictated by both theorists have yet to be worked out.Miriam(1974). Social (1979). Ted (1977).trans. Philosophical of Routledge and Kegan Paul. in New Press.trans. LeftReview71 (January-February): in A Social Glucksmann. "The Problem of HistoricalConsciousness. (1974). trans. Structuralist Analysis Contemporary Thought: and London: Comparison theTheories Claude Levi-Strauss Louis Althusser. ed. David (1980). Louis.Louis (1976). (1975). Hans-Georg (1976a).trans.Eric D. Berkeley: Universityof California Press. Amherst:The University Masof Dallmayr. London: Allen Lane. University This content downloaded on Fri. 103-60. Truth New Geras. it seems clear that the social sciences would profit by moving onto the epistemological plane suggested by their analyses. (1967). Philosophical Hermeneutics. Naturalism and Social Science. Alex (1976). Christopher (1976b). and E.and ed." In Interpretive Science. Studies. (1969). Languageand PoliticalUnderstanding. John phyofSocial Science9 (September): 327-40. Althusser's Fred (1981). Berkeley: University California Press. Atlantic Althusser. of Linge.For Marx. Callinicos." Sociological and Theory 89-113. "RealistSociologyand the Critiqueof Empiricism. Validity Interpretation. REFERENCES trans. "Sociological Theorizing and the AlthusserianIdeal. Marxism. Norman (1972). P. Ray (1979) ThePossibility Naturalism. David E.New York: Pantheon Books.Ben Brewster. Althusser." PhilosoScott. 21 Dec 2012 11:09:35 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . New York: Cambridge Press. Paul Rabinow and William Sullivan. Twilight Subjectivity. Balibar (1970). AtlanticHighlands: Humanities Bhaskar. Essaysin Self-Criticism. Highlands: Humanities Press. Foundations the ThreeSociologies. Hirsch. Hegel'sDialectic:Five Hermeneutic Smith. ReadingCapital. New Haven: Yale University Press. Penguin Press. of Press. New Haven: Yale Shapiro.Boston: Benton. "Althusser'sMarxism:An Accountand Assessment.
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