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MICHAEL J.

SATZ {] - ' •
STATE ATTORNEY 1f1"'aU
SEVENTEENTH nJDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA (l A " J • _ I
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 SE SIXTH STREET, SUITE 660 A, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360 Q.,.
1
. _j
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST
Contact Mrs. Seltzer at (954) 831-7228 I SSeltzer@saol7.state.fl.us
Requestor: CHAZ STEVENS Request Reference #: 2120
Company: Phone:
Address: Fax:
Date: 02/13/2013
City, State, Zip
Email:: CHAZ@ZPRODUCTIONS.COM
Pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, request is made for:
Request Type: COPIES Record Type: Public Records Request
Defendant: Wilkes,Michael CtNum: 10008775CF10A
Description: REFJLED TO ll-740CF10A- Copy of case filing recommendation
YOU ARE ADVISED that the State Attorney's Office is not the custodian of the otTtcial court records. The records you have requested are only those in the custody
of the State Attorney, subject to all legal exceptions and/or redactions. For a copy of the complete and official record and/certified copies, contact the oftice of
Howard Forman, Clerk of the Court, 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida, at(954) 831 w6565
(For ::>AU use only)
Letter acknowledging request sent by Date
A. clive case discovery pulled 1J'! AS.A ..-::-.---t7<".-1-;-:-:::or-:,..,----------i'D<'a':'te:.._..,.-t,,.,.+.,.-------
by
File unable to be located by Unit Date

Request Withdrawn--Date SAO has no record as requested __
SAO record was destroyed per§ 119.021(2)( d),
Notes/Exemptions from Public Record Disclosure (For Reviewing ASA use only)
D Acttve internal affrurs investib'<ltJOn =>exempt, §112.533, FS; §655,057(1)(a), FS
D Attomey notes=> confidential and exempt, Lopez v State 696 So. 2d 725 (Fla 1997);
Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla2000)
D Confession by Defendant on active cases=> exempt, FS
D ·Bank account numbers, debit, charge and credit account numbers and social security
number.;=> exempt, §215 .322(6) I, FS; § 119 ,071(5)(a)(b ), FS; §655.057, FS; §655 .059,
FS
D Biometric ID lnfonnation=>exempt, §119.071(5)(g), FS
D infonnation revealing id of Confidenllal h1formant or confidential source> exempt,
§ll 9.071(2)(fj, FS
D Defendant not entitled to free copy of file.=> Roesch v. State, 633 So. 2d I (Fla. 1993)
D Criminal History Data=> exemp1, §943.0525, FS
D Department of Corrections Records & Investigations=> exempt, §945.10, FS
D Autopsy Photographs=> exempt, §406.135(1), FS
D E.M.S. Reports=> exempt, §395.51, FS
D Home Addresses, etc., of current or fanner prosecutors, law enforcement personnel,
firefighters, judges and code inspectors=> exempt, § 119 071(4)(d)l, FS
D Traffic Crash Report exempt for 60 days after report is filed=>exempt, §316.066(5)(a), FS
D Vtdeotaped statement of minor victtm of sexual battery=>exempt, §l 19.07l(J)2.a., FS
D DL and DMV records=>exempt, §1.19.0712(2), FS
D Other exemptions=> ________________ _
D Mental Health records=> exempt, §394.4615(1}, FS, §456.057, FS
D On active, pending cases, information not disclosed to defense in disovery=> exempt,
Satz v. Blankenship,407 So 2d 396 (Fla. 4DCA 1981); Tribune Co. v. Public Records,
493 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2nd DCA_l986)
D Personal assets of crime victim=> exempt, §119.071(2)(i), FS
D Personal victim information in cases of sexual otTense, chlid abuse, lewd &lascivious
offense'"'> exempt, §119.071(2)(h), FS; §794.024
D Medtcal Records=> exempt, §395.3025(4), FS; §395 3025(8), FS; §456.057, FS
D PSI, PTI, pre"plea, post-sentence mvestigative records=> exempt, §945.10(1)(b), FS
D Reports of abuse of vulnerable adult=> exempt, §415.107, FS
D Department of Children & Families Reports of child abuse=> exempt, §39.0132(4)(a), FS;
§39.202, FS
D School records=> exempt, § 1002.22, FS
D Photograph of victim of sexual offense=> exempt, §119 071(2)(h)
D Active criminalmtelligence and invesllgative infonnation=> exempt, §119.07Q2)(c), FS
D Identity of caller requesting or reporting "911" emergency=>exempt, §365. Y 1 (15), FS
D Juvenile Records=>exempt, §985 04, FS
D Drivers License dtgttallmagtng=> exempt, §322.142(4), FS
D Telecommunications records=>exempt, §ll9.071(5)(d)
D Phannacy Records=>exempt, §465.017(2)
Document# 3282
ORIGINAL -ADM/2 COPY- Requesting Party
Rev 05/09/1 I
COPY -Public Records File
Case Filing Recommendations
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
Notice Date: 6114/2010 Court Case No: 10008775CF10A SAO Book No: 1723580
Agency: COCONUT CREEK POLICE
Officer: HOFER, ANGELA CK17589 Offense Report No: CK1000011919 Offense Date: 5/15/2010
A.S.A.: Peter La Porte I CL
Phone: (954) 831-8089 Div: FCF Arrest No: CK10000447 Arrest Date: 5/15/2010
Subject: MICHAEL L WILKES
DOB: 5/111979 Race: B Sex:M BCCN: 0775575
Co-Defendants:
Name: TYRELL J POWELL
KERLEY JEAN
Court Case No 10008776CF10A
Victim Names:
. T-MOBILE
WILLIAM HARRISON
10009202CF10A
Action taken: DIR FILED CASE Revised, Original FILE DATE - 06/1112010
Count Action Short Description Charge
1 COC - FEL/FEL 782.04(1)A(A)- 1/CF- ATTEMPT MURDER FIRST DEGREE
Chrg Presented 782.04-3 - 1/CF- MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING SPECIFIC FELONY 1-COC
2 COC - FEL/FEL 782.051(1) -1/CF- ATT FELONY MURDER
Chrg Presented 782.04-3- 1/CF- MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING SPECIFIC FELONY 2-COC
3 COC - FELIFEL 810.02(4)(A)* A- 2/CF- ATTEMPTED BURG/STRUCT/UNOCC/MASK
Chrg Presented 810.02-4(A)- 3/CF- BURGLARY STRUCTURE UNOCCUPIED/UNARMED 3-COC
4 NO INFO 775.0845(2)B- 1/CF- ROBBERY-STRONG ARM I MASK
Chrg Presented 775.0845(2B)- 1/CF- WEAR MASK WHILE COMMITTING 2 DEG FEL 5
5 NO INFO 810.06- 3/CF- POSS BURG TOOLS
Chrg Presented 810.06- 3/CF- POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS 4
Comments:
Attempted Felony Murder is a difficult and problematic charge. Florida courts as well as courts in many other
states have struggled with the concept. In 1995, our Florida Supreme Court abolished attempted felony murder
in Florida by holding that there was no such crime (State v. Gray, 654 So2d 252). In doing so, the Court
overruled their own 1985 decision in Amlotte v. State, 456 So 2d 448 (1984) which had considered a question
certified by the Fifth District CoUrt of Appeal to be of great public importance; namely: "DOES THERE
EXIST UNDER FLORIDA LAW A CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER?". In
Gray, the Court adopted the rationale of Justice Ben Overton dissenting in Amlotte, which had, in turn, been
based upon the dissenting opinion of District Court Judge Cowart expressed in Amlotte v. State, 435 So 2d 249
(1983). Justice Overton wrote: "In my view, the crime of felony murder is based on a legal fiction which
implies malice aforethought from the actor's intent to commit the underlying felony. Thus, whenever a person
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
1723580
1723580
TmpFBI
.:::-::=.=.-=-·. -_ ---:-·::'
-· --- : = ~ = : - : - : - : - : - : - : < - : - : - : - : - : - : - : - :-:-:-;-:-;:;:_;-
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
:-·-:-:----.--- :;-:-:-=-
is killed during the commission of a felony, the felon is said to have had the intent to bring about the death
even if the killing was unintended. This doctrine has been extended to impute intent for deaths caused by the
acts of co-felons and police during the perpetration of certain felonies. Further extension of the felony murder
doctrine so as to make intent irrelevant for purposes of the attempt crime is illogical and without basis in the
law". Judge Cowart had expressed the illogic thusly: "Every crime of attempt requires a specific intent, that
is, an intent to commit some particular crime .... Felony murder is where one unintentionally or accidentally
kills another while engaged in the commission of some other felony and the law creates a fiction, from the
state of mind that consents to the commission of the underlying felony, and implies malice aforethought when
death is caused by an act resulting from such wrongful, felonious intent. A death is essential to the application
of this ancient legal fiction .... A legal fiction can be stretched only so far and this is why the fiction breaks
when an effort is made to stretch it further to include the specific intent essential to the crime of attempt. The
reasoning of transferred intent upon which the crime of felony murder is based to rationalize the absence of
specific intent as to the killing, comes full circle and is rationally inconsistent with the crime of attempt which
necessitates a specific intent to commit another crime".
The Gray court abolished the crime of Attempted Felony Murder "because the legal fictions required to
support the intent for felony murder were simply too great to extend to attempted felony murder" (see: Battle
v. State, 911 So2d 85 (SCt 2005)).
Ultimately, the Florida legislature responded by enacting F.S. 782.051 to reestablish the crime of Attempted
Felony Murder. The statute provides: "Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any felony
enumerated in F.S. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element
of the felony and that could but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first degree".
In this case, the three defendants attempted to burglarize aT-Mobile store in Coconut Creek, when they
realized that police were present, they ran back to their getaway car; when Sergeant William Harrison
attempted to stop them Michael Wilkes drove the getaway car directly at and toward Sergeant Harrison, struck
him, caused him to be thrown across the hood of the getaway car, then thrown off where he landed on the
pavement striking a curbstone in the process.
Certainly for Michael Wilkes, he has committed an intentional act that was not an essential element of the
attempted burglary; he has also attempted the premeditated murder of Sergeant Harrison although the facts
support the crime of attempted second degree murder as well.
The question regarding defendants Powell and Jean is whether their presence in Wilkes vehicle as they flee the
crime scene constitutes aiding or abetting the intentional act committed by Wilkes in striking Sergeant
Harrison or whether the law of principles encompasses all three defendants so as to render them responsible for
the act which could have but did not result in the death of Sergeant Harrison.
It is well established by case law that a charge of Premeditated Murder by Indictment encompasses felony
murder. Given the statutory scheme now in place; it is uulikely that this legal concept would be applied to
attempted murder vis a vis attempted felony murder.
Therefore, alternative charges of attempted premeditated as well as attempted felony murder will be pled in the
alternative while recognizing that double jeopardy provisions would not permit dual convictions to stand (see:
Tucker v. State, 857 So2d 978 (4th DCA 2003)). ·
And while the evidence established that the defendants Jean and Powell committed, aided or abetted in the
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
2
1723580
1723580
TmpFBI
- . :-:-:--.--
MICHAELJ. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
underlying felony of Attempted Burglary; there is no evidence to establish that they did aid or abet the
intentional act of Michael Wilkes driving at and toward Sergeant Harrison which justified attempted murder
charges against Wilkes, therefore, attempted murder charges against Powell and Jean will not be prepared for
filing.
Connt 5 merges with connt 3 to reclassify the Attempted Burglary charge from a 3rd degree felony to a second
degree felony.
Count 2 must be declined based upon applicable Florida case law which requires evidence to prove a particular
burglary tool was actually used during the burglary in question. Several "Burglary Tools" were recovered
from the defendants' getaway car and at the burglary scene; but, no one actually saw a tool as it was being
used.
Detective Hofer advised that a crow bar recovered in the getaway vehicle had white paint on it consistent with
the paint on the rear door of the T-Mobile store which had been partially pried open. Photographs show
significant pry markings on the door. This door has been preserved. Detective Hofer will inquire of the BSO
crime lab regarding the possibility of doing a paint analysis and comparison as well as a tool mark
identification analysis here. A match would enable us to charge possession of burglary tools; but, more
importantly would provide additional, compelling circumstantial evidence tending to prove the attempted
burglary charge.
Finally, having viewed the video recording of this incident made the by camera in Officer George Vassilakis'
patrol car several times with Detective Hofer, I do not believe that it can be proven that Wilkes or his co-
perpetrators committed or aided in intentional act directed toward Officer Vassilakis.
It appears from the video that as Officer V assilakis approached, Wilkes struck Sergeant Harrison and then
pulled around from behind the Sergeant's patrol car and almost immediately collided with the vehicle driven
by officer Vassilakis, neither driver being in a position to avoid the crash although Officer Vassilakis reported
having sufficient time to react and apply his brakes. Projecting this case to a courtroom, I believe that arguing
for an attempted murder conviction with Officer V assilakis being the victim would diminish the credibility of
the charges wherein Sergeant Harrison is the victim unnecessarily. Therefore, I recommend that connt 2 be
merged with the filed charges.
ASA's Brian Cavanaugh, Mark Horn and Jules Cohn were consulted regarding F.S. 782.051 and its application
in this case.
Filing Attorney
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
3
Supervising Attorney
1723580
1723580
TmpFBI
STATE ATTORNEY Lf)1::U:/
MICHAEL J. SATZ c I ·
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 SE SIXTH STREET, SUITE 660 A, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL _ j A , /)
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST IJD[/.JtAl.Lti"
Contact Mrs. Seltzer at (954) 831-7228/ SSeltzer@sao 17.state.fl.us
Requestor: CHAZ STEVENS Request Reference #: 2121
Company: Phone:
Address: Fax:
Date: 02/13/2013
City, State, Zip
Email:: CHAZ@ZPRODUCTIONS.COM
Pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, request is made for:
Request Type: COPIES Record Type: Public Records Request
Defendant: POWELL, TYRELL J CtNum: 10008775CF10B
Description: REFILED TO 11-740CF10B- Copy of case filing recommendation
YOU ARE ADVISED that the State Attorney's Office is not the custodian of the official court records. The records you have requested are only those in the custody
of the State Attorney, subject to all legal exceptions and/or redactions. For a copy of the complete and official record andlcertrfied copies, contact the office of
Howard Forman, Clerk of the Court, 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida, at(954) 831 -6565
rror VAU use onty)
Letter acknowledging request sent by Date

. pprov Disapprovedby
FI e unable to be located by Unit Date
See Notes/Exemptions/Redactions indicated below /<X)
Request Withdrawn--Date SAO has no record as requested
SAO record was destroyed per §119.021(2)(d),
Notes/Exemptions from Public Record Disclosure (For Reviewing ASA use only)
D Active internal affairs investigation=> exempt, §112.533, FS; §655.057(1)(a), FS
D Attorney notes-:'> confidential and exempt, Lopez v. State 696 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997);
Arbelaez v. State, 775 So_ 2d 909 (Fia2000)
D ConfessiOn by Defendant on active cases=> exempt, §119.071(2)(e), FS
D Bank account numbers, debit, charge and credit account numbers and social security
numbers=> exempt, §215.322(6)1, FS; 119.071(5)(a)(b ), FS, §655.057, FS; §655.059,
FS
D Biometric ID Information=>exempt, §J 19.071(5)(g), FS
0 information reveahng id of Confidential InfOJmant or confidential source> exempt,
FS
0 Defendant not entitled to free copy of file.=> Roesch v. State, 633 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
D Cnmmal HisloJY Data=> exempt, §943.0525, FS
CJ Deprutment of Corrections Records & Investigations=> exempt, §945.10, FS
CJ Autopsy Photographs=> exempt, §406.135(1), FS
CJ E M.S. Reports=> exempt, §395.51, FS
CJ Home Addresses, etc., of current or fanner prosecutors, law enforcement personnel,
firefighters, judges and code inspectors-=> exempt, § 119.071(4)( d)1, FS
CJ Traffic Crash Report exempt for 60 days after report is filed=>exempt, §316.066(5)(a), FS
CJ Videotaped statement of minor victim of sexual battery=>exempt, §ll9.071(j)2.a., FS
CJ DL and DMV records=>exempt, §119.0712(2), FS
CJ Other exemptions=> _____ _
D Mental Health records=> exempt, §394.4615(1), FS; §456.057, FS
D On active, pending cases, information not disclosed to defense in disovery=> exempt,
Satz v. Blankenship,407 So. 2d 396 (Fla 4DCA 1981); Tribune Co. v. Public Records,
493 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2nd DCA_l986)
D Personal assets of crime victim=> exempt, §119.071(2)(i), FS
D Personal victim information in cases of sexual offense, child abuse, lewd &iascivious
offense=> exempt, §119 071(2)(h), FS; §794.024
D Medical Records=> exempt, §395.3025(4), FS; §395.3025(8), FS; §456.057, FS
D PSI, PTI, post-sentence investigative records=> exempt, §945.10(1)(b), FS
D Reports of abuse of vulnerable adult=> exempt, §415.1 07, FS
D Department of Children & Families Reports of chtld abuse=> exempt, §39.0132(4)(a), FS;
§39.202, FS
D School records=> exempt, §1002.22, FS
D Photograph of victim of sexual offense=> exempt, § 119.071 (2)(h)
D Active criminal intelligence and investigative infonnation=> exempt, §ll9.07(12)(c), FS
D Identity of caller requesting or reporting "911" emergency=>exempt, §365.171(15), FS
D Juvenile Records=>exempt, §985.04, FS
D Drivers License digital imaging=> exempt, §322.142(4), FS
D Telecommunications records=>exempt, §119.071(5)(d)
D Phannacy Records=>exempt, §465.017(2)
Document# 3283
ORIGINAL -ADM/2 COPY- Requesting Party
Rev 05/09/11
COPY -Public Records File
Case Filing Recommendations
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCIDT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE. FL 33301-3360
Notice Date: 6/14/2010 Court Case No: 10008776CF10A SAO Book No: 1723581
Agency: COCONUT CREEK POLICE
Officer: HOFER, ANGELA CK17589 Offense Report No: CK1000011919 Offense Date: 5/15/2010
A.S.A.: Peter La Porte I CL
Phone: (954) 831-8089 Div: FCF Arrest No: CK10000448 Arrest Date: 5/15/2010
Subject: TYRELL J POWELL
DOB: 8/20/1982 Race: B Sex:M BCCN: 0775579
Co-Defendants:
Name: MICHAEL L WILKES
KERLEY JEAN
Court Case No 10008775CF10A
Victim Names:
. T-MOBILE
I 0009202CFI OA
Action taken: DIR FILED CASE Revised, Original FILE DATE- 06/14/2010
Count Action Short Description Charge
1 COC - FELIFEL 810.02( 4)(A)* A- 2/CF - ATTEMPTED BURG/STRUCT/UNOCC/MASK
Chrg Presented 810.02-4(A)- 3/CF- BURGLARY STRUCTURE UNOCCUPIED/UNARMED 3-COC
2 NO INFO 782.04(3)- 1/CF- MURDER SECOND DEG/ACCOMPLICE
Chrg Presented 782.04-3- 1/CF- MuRDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURlNG SPECIFIC FELONY 1
3 NO INFO 782.04(3)- 1/CF- MURDER SECOND DEG/ACCOMPLICE
Chrg Presented 782.04-3 - 1/CF- MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURlNG SPECIFIC FELONY 2
4 NO INFO 810.06- 3/CF- POSS BURG TOOLS
Chrg Presented 810.06- 3/CF- POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS 4
Comments:
Attempted Felony Murder is a difficult and problematic charge. Florida courts as well as courts in many other
states have struggled with the concept. In 1995, our Florida Supreme Court abolished attempted felony murder
in Florida by holding that there was no such crime (State v. Gray, 654 So2d 252). In doing so, the Court
overruled their own 1985 decision in Amlotte v. State, 456 So 2d 448 (1984) which had considered a question
certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance; namely: "DOES THERE
EXIST UNDER FLORIDA LAW A CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER?". In
Gray, the Court adopted the rationale of Justice Ben Overton dissenting in Amlotte, which had, in turn, been
based upon the dissenting opinion of District Court Judge Cowart expressed in Amlotte v. State, 435 So 2d 249
(1983). Justice Overton wrote: "In my view, the crime of felony murder is based on a legal fiction which
implies malice aforethought from the actor's intent to commit the underlying felony. Thus, whenever a person
06114110
Agency SAO File
1723581
1723581
TmpFBI
MICHAELJ. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH ruDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORJDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
20 I s:E. SIXtH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
is killed during the commission of a felony, the felon is said to have had the intent to bring about the death
even if the killing was unintended. This doctrine has been extended to impute intent for deaths caused by the
acts of co-felons and police during the perpetration of certain felonies. Further extension of the felony murder
doctrine so as to make intent irrelevant for purposes of the attempt crime is illogical and without basis in the
law". Judge Cowart had expressed the illogic thusly: "Every crime of attempt requires a specific intent, that
is, an intent to commit some particular crime .... Felony murder is where one unintentionally or accidentally
kills another while engaged in the commission of some other felony and the law creates a fiction, from the
state of mind that consents to the commission of the underlying felony, and implies malice aforethought when
death is caused by an act resulting from such wrongful, felonious intent. A death is essential to the application
of this ancient legal fiction .... A legal fiction can be stretched only so far and this is why the fiction breaks
when an effort is made to stretch it further to include the specific intent essential to the crime of attempt. The
reasoning of transferred intent upon which the crime of felony murder is based to rationalize the absence of
specific intent as to the killing, comes full circle and is rationally inconsistent with the crime of attempt which
necessitates a specific intent to commit another crime".
The Gray court abolished the crime of Attempted Felony Murder "because the legal fictions required to
support the intent for felony murder were simply too great to extend to attempted felony murder" (see: Battle
v. State, 911 So2d 85 (SCt 2005)).
Ultimately, the Florida legislature responded by enacting F.S. 782.051 to reestablish the crime of Attempted
Felony Murder. The statute provides: "Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any felony
enumerated in F.S. 782.04(3) and who commits, aids or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element
of the felony and that could but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first degree".
In this case, the three defendants attempted to burglarize aT-Mobile store in Coconut Creek, when they
realized that police were present, they ran back to their getaway car; when Sergeant William Harrison
attempted to stop them Michael Wilkes drove the getaway car directly at and toward Sergeant Harrison, struck
him, caused him to be thrown across the hood of the getaway car, then thrown off where he landed on the
pavement striking a curbstone in the process.
Certainly for Michael Wilkes, he has committed an intentional act that was not an essential element of the
attempted burglary; he has also attempted the premeditated murder of Sergeant Harrison although the facts
support the crime of attempted second degree murder as well.
The question regarding defendants Powell and Jean is whether their presence in Wilkes vehicle as they flee the
crime scene constitutes aiding or abetting the intentional act committed by Wilkes in striking Sergeant
Harrison or whether the law of principles encompasses all three defendants so as to render them responsible for
the act which could have but did not result in the death of Sergeant Harrison.
It is well established by case law that a charge of Premeditated Murder by Indictment encompasses felony
murder. Given the statutory scheme now in place; it is unlikely that this legal concept would be applied to
attempted murder vis a vis attempted felony murder.
Therefore, alternative charges of attempted premeditated as .well as attempted felony murder will be pled in the
alternative while recognizing that double jeopardy provisions would not permit dual convictions to stand (see:
Tucker v. State, 857 So2d 978 (4th DCA 2003)).
And while the evidence established that the defendants Jean and Powell committed, aided or abetted in the
06114/10
Agency SAO File
2
1723581
1723581
TmpFBI
MICHAELJ. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH TIJDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
underlying felony of Attempted Burglary; there is no evidence to establish that they did aid or abet the
intentional act of Michael Wilkes driving at and toward Sergeant Harrison which justified attempted murder
charges against Wilkes, therefore, attempted murder charges against Powell and Jean will not be prepared for
filing.
Count 5 merges with count 3 to reclassify the Attempted Burglary charge from a 3rd degree felony to a second
degree felony.
Count 2 must be declined based upon applicable Florida case law which requires evidence to prove a particular
burglary tool was actually used during the burglary in question. Several "Burglary Tools" were recovered
from the defendants' getaway car and at the burglary scene; but, no one actually saw a tool as it was being
used.
Detective Hofer advised that a crow bar recovered in the getaway vehicle had white paint on it consistent with
the paint on the rear door of the T-Mobile store which had been partially pried open. Photographs show
significant pry markings on the door. This door has been preserved. Detective Hofer will inquire of the BSO
crime lab regarding the possibility of doing a paint analysis and comparison as well as a tool mark
identification analysis here. A match would enable us to charge possession of burglary tools; but, more
importantly would provide additional, compelling circumstantial evidence tending to prove the attempted
burglary charge.
Finally, having viewed the video recording of this incident made the by camera in Officer George Vassilakis'
patrol car several times with Detective Hofer, I do not believe that it can be proven that Wilkes or his co-
perpetrators committed or aided in intentional act directed toward Officer V assilakis.
It appears from the video that as Officer V assilakis approached, Wilkes struck Sergeant Harrison and then
pulled around from behind the Sergeant's patrol car and almost immediately collided with the vehicle driven
by officer Vassilakis, neither driver being in a position to avoid the crash although Officer Vassilakis reported
having sufficient time to react and apply his brakes. Projecting this case to a courtroom, I believe that arguing
for an attempted murder conviction with Officer Vassilakis being the victim would diminish the credibility of
the charges wherein Sergeant Harrison is the victim uunecessarily. Therefore, I recommend that count 2 be
merged with the filed charges.
ASA's Brian Cavanaugh, Mark Hom and Jules Cohn were consulted regarding F.S. 782.051 and its application
in this case.
Filing Attorney
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
Supervising Attorney
3
1723581
1723581
TmpFBI
MICHAEL J. SA TZ f.' ' , _,j
STATEATTORNEY 'Cihf1_L/
SEVENTEENTH NDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA /', _ , - -J a:;;-:J.
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE V{..()jCU l) "'""-
201 SE SIXTH STREET, SUITE 660 A, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 3339!-3f60 (} _ _ J
PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST f...Or./'JeP(aCT
Contact Mrs. Seltzer at (954) 831-7228 I SSe1tzer@sao 17.state.flus
Requestor: CHAZ STEVENS Request Reference #: 2122
Company: Phone:
Address: Fax:
Date: 02/13/2013
City, State, Zip
Email:: CHAZ@ZPRODUCTIONS.COM
Pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, request is made for:
Request Type: COPIES Record Type: Public Records Request
Defendant: KERLEY,JEAN CtNum: 10008775CF10C
Description: REFILED TO 11-740CF10C- Copy of case filing recommendation
YOU ARE ADVISED that the State Attorney's Office is not the custodian of the official court records. The records you have requested are only those in the custody
of the State Attorney, subject to all legal exceptions and/or redactions. For a copy of the complete and official record ami/certified copies, contact the office of
Howard Forman, Clerk of the Court, 17th Judicial Circuit ofFionda, at(954) 831-6565
(For SA U use omy;
Letter acknow !edging request sent by Date
Active case discovery Date

to be located by Date
See Notes/Exemptions/Redactions indicated below /1J() }i.Mtli!flli}t,.O
Request Withdrawn--Date SAO has no record as H:TJ:r------ 0
SAO record was destroyed per §119.021(2)(d), /VD lJ12-'l
Notes/Exemptions from Public Record Disclosure (For Reviewing ASA use only)
D Active intemal affairs investigation=> exempt, §112.533, FS; §655.057(l)(a), FS
D Attorney notes=> confidential and exempt, Lopez v. State 696 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1997);
Arbelaez v_ State, 775 So. 2d 909 (Fla.2000)
D Confession by Defendant on active cases=> exempt, §ll9.071(2)(e), FS
D Bank account nwnbers, debit, charge and credit account numbers and social security
numbers=> exempt, §215 322(6)1, FS; §ll9.071(5)(a)(b), FS; §655,057, FS; §655.059,
FS
D Biometric ID Information=>exempt, § 119 .071(5)(g), FS
D infonnation revealing id of Confidential fuformant or confidential souroe> exempt,
§ 119.071(2)(fj, FS
Cl Defendant not entitled to free copy of file.=> Roesch v. State, 633 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993)
D Criminal Histmy Data=> exempt, §943,0525, FS
D Department of Corrections Records & Investigations=> exempt, FS
D Autopsy Photographs=> exempt, §406.135(1), FS
D E.M.S. Reports=> exempt, §395.51, FS
D Home Addresses, etc., of current or former prosecutors, Jaw enforcement personnel,
firefighters, judges and code inspector:r=> exempt, § 119.071( 4)(d)1, FS
D Traffic Crash Report exempt for 60 days after report is filed=>exempt, §3l6.066(5)(a), FS
D Videotaped statement of minor victim of sexual battery=>exempt, §119.07l(j)2,a., FS
D DL and DMV records=>exempt, §119.0712(2), FS
D Other exemptions=> ________________ _
D Mental Health records=> exempt, §394.4615(1), FS, §456.057, FS
D On active, pending cases, infonnatton not disclosed to defense m dtsovery==> exempt,
Satz v. Blankenship,407 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4DCA 1981); Tribune Co. v. Pubhc Records,
493 So 2d 480 (Fla. 2nd DCA_l986)
D Personal assets of crime victim=> exempt, §119.071(2)(i), FS
D Personal Victim mfonnation in cases of sexual offense, child abuse, lewd &iascivious
offense=> exempt, §ll9.071(2)(h), FS; §794.024
D Medical Records=> exempt, §395.3025(4), FS, §395.3025(8), FS; §456.057, FS
D PSI, PTI, pre-plea, post-sentence investigative records=> exempt, §945 10(1 )(b), FS
D Reports of abuse of vulnerable adult=> exempt, §415.107, FS
D Department of Children & Families Reports of child abuse=> exempt, §39.0132(4)(a), FS;
§39 202, FS
D School records=> exempt, § 1002.22, FS
D Photograph of victim of sexual offense=> exempt, §119.071(2)(h)
D Active criminal intelligence and investigative infonnation=> exempt, §119.07Q2)(c), FS
D Identity of caller requesting or reporting "911" emergency=>exempt, §365.:V1(15), FS
D Juvenile Records=>exempt, §985.04, FS
D Drivers License dtgttal imaging=> exempt, §322.142(4), FS
D TelecommunicatiOns records=>exempt, §119.071(5)(d)
D Phrumacy Records=>exempt, §465,017(2)
Document# 3284
ORIGINAL -ADM/2 COPY- Requesting Party
Rev 05/09/11
COPY -Public Records File
Case Filing Recommendations
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301-3360
Notice Date: 6/14/2010 Court Case No: 10009202CF10A SAO Book No: 1725122
Agency: COCONUT CREEK POLICE
Officer: HOFER,ANGELA CK17589 OffenseReportNo:CKI000011919 OffenseDate: 5/15/2010
A.S.A.: Peter La Porte I CL
Phone: (954) 831-8089 Div: FCF Arrest No: CKI0000449 Arrest Date: 5115/2010
Subject: KERLEY JEAN
DOB: 10/2711981 Race: B Sex:M BCCN: 0775959
Co-Defendants:
Name: MICHAEL L WILKES
TYRELL J POWELL
Court Case No 10008775CFIOA
Victim Names:
. T-MOBILE
10008776CFIOA
Action taken: DIR FILED CASE Revised, Original FILE DATE· 06/14/2010
Count Action Short Description Charge
I COC - FEL/FEL 810.02(4)(A)* A- 2/CF- ATTEMPTED BURG/STRUCT/UNOCC/MASK
Chrg Presented 810.02(4)(A)*l · 3/CF ·BURGLARY STRUCT UNOCCUPIED 3-COC
2 NO INFO 782.04(3)- 1/CF- MURDER SECOND DEC/ACCOMPLICE
Chrg Presented 782.04-3- 1/CF- MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING SPECIFIC FELONY I
3 NO INFO 782.04(3) -1/CF- MURDER SECOND DEC/ACCOMPLICE
Chrg Presented 782.04-3 - 1/CF- MURDER NOT PREMEDITATED DURING SPECIFIC FELONY 2
4 NO INFO 810.06- 3/CF- POSS BURG TOOLS
Chrg Presented 810.06 - 3/CF - POSS BURG TOOLS 3
Comments:
Attempted Felony Murder is a difficult and problematic charge. Florida courts as well as courts in many other
states have struggled with the concept. In 1995, our Florida Supreme Court abolished attempted felony murder
in Florida by holding that there was no such crime (State v. Gray, 654 So2d 252). In doing so, the Court
overruled their own 1985 decision in Amlotte v. State, 456 So 2d 448 (1984) which had considered a question
certified by the Fifth District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance; namely: "DOES THERE
EXIST UNDER FLORIDA LAW A CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER?". In
Gray, the Court adopted the rationale of Justice Ben Overton dissenting in Arnlotte, which had, in turn, been
based upon the dissenting opinion of District Court Judge Cowart expressed in Amlotte v. State, 435 So 2d 249
(1983). Justice Overton wrote: "In my view, the crime of felony murder is based on a legal fiction which
implies malice aforethought from the actor's intent to commit the underlying felony. Thus, whenever a person
06/14110
Agency SAO File
1725122
1725122
TmpFBI
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH mDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33301·3360
is killed during the connnission of a felony, the felon is said to have had the intent to bring about the death
even if the killing was unintended. This doctrine has been extended to impute intent for deaths caused by the
acts of co-felons and police during the perpetration of certain felonies. Further extension of the felony murder
doctrine so as to make intent irrelevant for purposes ofthe attempt crime is illogical and without basis in the
law". Judge Cowart had expressed the illogic thusly: "Every crime of attempt requires a specific intent, that
is, an intent to commit some particular crime .... Felony murder is where one unintentionally or accidentally
kills another while engaged in the commission of some other felony and the law creates a fiction, from the
state of mind that consents to the connnission of the underlying felony, and implies malice aforethought when
death is caused by an act resulting from such wrongful, felonious intent. A death is essential to the application
of this ancient legal fiction.... A legal fiction can be stretched only so far and this is why the fiction breaks
when an effort is made to stretch it further to include the specific intent essential to the crime of attempt. The
reasoning of transferred intent upon which the crime of felony murder is based to rationalize the absence of
specific intent as to the killing, comes full circle and is rationally inconsistent with the crime of attempt which
necessitates a specific intent to connnit another crime".
The Gray court abolished the crime of Attempted Felony Murder "because the legal fictions required to
support the intent for felony murder were simply too great to extend to attempted felony murder" (see: Battle
v. State, 911 So2d 85 (SCt 2005)).
Ultimately, the Florida legislature responded by enacting F .S. 782.051 to reestablish the crime of Attempted
Felony Murder. The statute provides: "Any person who perpetrates or attempts to perpetrate any felony
enumerated in F.S. 782.04(3) and who connnits, aids or abets an intentional act that is not an essential element
of the felony and that could but does not, cause the death of another commits a felony of the first degree".
In this case, the three defendants attempted to burglarize aT-Mobile store in Coconut Creek, when they
realized that police were present, they ran back to their getaway car; when Sergeant William Harrison
attempted to stop them Michael Wilkes drove the getaway car directly at and toward Sergeant Harrison, struck
him, caused him to be thrown across the hood ofthe getaway car, then thrown off where he landed on the
pavement striking a curbstone in the process.
Certainly for Michael Wilkes, he has connnitted an intentional act that was not an essential element of the
attempted burglary; he has also attempted the premeditated murder of Sergeant Harrison although the facts
support the crime of attempted second degree murder as well.
The question regarding defendants Powell and Jean is whether their presence in Wilkes vehicle as they flee the
crime scene constitutes aiding or abetting the intentional act committed by Wilkes in striking Sergeant
Harrison or whether the law of principles encompasses all three defendants so as to render them responsible for
the act which could have but did not result in the death of Sergeant Harrison.
It is well established by case law that a charge of Premeditated Murder by Indictment encompasses felony
murder. Given the statutory scheme now in place; it is unlikely that this legal concept would be applied to
attempted murder vis a vis attempted felony murder.
Therefore, alternative charges of attempted premeditated as well as attempted felony murder will be pled in the
alternative while recognizing that double jeopardy provisions would not permit dual convictions to stand (see:
Tucker v. State, 857 So2d 978 (4th DCA 2003)).
And while the evidence established that the defendants Jean and Powell connnitted, aided or abetted in the
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
2
1725122
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TmpFBI
MICHAEL J. SATZ
STATE ATTORNEY
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCillT OF FLORIDA
BROWARD COUNTY COURTHOUSE
201 S.E. SIXTH STREET
FORT LAUDERDALE. FL 33301-3360
underlying felony of Attempted Burglary; there is no evidence to establish that they did aid or abet the
intentional act of Michael Wilkes driving at and toward Sergeant Harrison which justified attempted murder
charges against Wilkes, therefore, attempted murder charges against Powell and Jean will not be prepared for
filing.
Count 5 merges with count 3 to reclassify the Attempted Burglary charge from a 3rd degree felony to a second
degree felony.
Count 2 must be declined based upon applicable Florida case law which requires evidence to prove a particular
burglary tool was actually used during the burglary in question. Several "Burglary Tools" were recovered
from the defendants' getaway car and at the burglary scene; but, no one actually saw a tool as it was being
used.
Detective Hofer advised that a crow bar recovered in the getaway vehicle had white paint on it consistent with
the paint on the rear door of the T-Mobile store which had been partially pried open. Photographs show
significant pry markings on the door. This door has been preserved. Detective Hofer will inquire of the BSO
crime lab regarding the possibility of doing a paint analysis and comparison as well as a tool mark
identification analysis here. A match would enable us to charge possession of burglary tools; but, more
importantly would provide additional, compelling circumstantial evidence tending to prove the attempted
burglary charge.
Finally, having viewed the video recording of this incident made the by camera in Officer George Vassilakis'
patrol car several times with Detective Hofer, I do not believe that it can be proven that Wilkes or his co-
perpetrators committed or aided in intentional act directed toward Officer V assilakis.
It appears from the video that as Officer V assilakis approached, Wilkes struck Sergeant Harrison and then
pulled around from behind the Sergeant's patrol car and almost immediately collided with the vehicle driven
by officer V assilakis, neither driver being in a position to avoid the crash although Officer V assilakis reported
having sufficient time to react and apply his brakes. Projecting this case to a courtroom, I believe that arguing
for an attempted murder conviction with Officer V assilakis being the victim would diminish the credibility of
the charges wherein Sergeant Harrison is the victim urmecessarily. Therefore, I recommend that count 2 be
merged with the filed charges.
ASA's Brian Cavanaugh, Mark Hom and Jules Cohn were consulted regarding F.S. 782.051 and its application
in this case.
Filing Attorney
06/14/10
Agency SAO File
3
Supervising Attorney
1725122
1725122
TmpFBI

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