Hazard Identification Study

APPENDIX A HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID)
TO THE INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS (APPENDIX C1)
Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Assessment
Risknology, Inc. January 2006
Cabrillo Port LNG Project Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) Final Report January 2006
Prepared for: Ecology and Environment, Inc. San Francisco, California
Prepared by: Risknology, Inc. previously A.J.Wolford & Associates Houston, Texas Project No.: 304
DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT
Risknology, Inc. previously AJ Wolford & Associates (AJW+) has made every reasonable effort to perform the work contained herein in a manner consistent with high professional standards. This work is dependent on the accuracy of information provided by BHP Billiton and its contractors.
January 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0
Introduction..................................................................................................................... 2 Design Basis used in Workshops ................................................................................ 2 Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) ................................................................... 3 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study ............................................................................ 3 Release Scenarios.......................................................................................................... 5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 8
ANNEX 1: ANNEX 2: ANNEX 3:
List of Drawings (Hazid Binder Index.xls) Guidewords (Hazid Guidewords.xls) Security Vulnerability Assessment Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port SVA Logsheet.xls)
ANNEX 4:
Hazard Identification Workshop Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port Logsheet.xls)
Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis Appendix A
CABRILLO PORT LNG PROJECT HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID) REPORT SUMMARY
1.0
INTRODUCTION
BHP Billiton, Inc. (BHPB) is in the process of applying for a deepwater port license for the Cabrillo Port project. Ecology and Environment, Inc. (E & E) has been contracted by the United States Coast Guard and California State Lands Commission to write the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The purpose of this report is to outline the methodology that was used to conduct the Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) workshops. Results of the workshops are discussed are including recommendations for release / consequence modeling to be conducted within the Independent Risk Analysis.
Objectives The objectives of the SVA and HAZID workshops were: To identify possible security threats and accidental hazards that have the potential to impact the public and/or environment; To document the identified threats and hazards associated with the security, installation, and operational activities that have the potential to impact the public and/or environment; To incorporate (identify and analyze) the public concerns that were recorded during the public scoping meetings; To identify and determine adequacy of critical safeguards (hardware systems and/or procedures) associated with the identified risks and propose recommendations to improve the vulnerability and safety systems of the project; To develop release scenarios, for which physical effects (consequence) modeling is to be conducted.
Study Dates The SVA was conducted in Long Beach, California in the California State Lands Commission offices on April 5, 2004, and the HAZID workshop was conducted April 6-8, 2004.
2.0
DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE WORKSHOPS
BHPBs Cabrillo Port project is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. The facility will consist of a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) that will receive incoming gas from LNG carriers, store the gas onboard the FSRU, and regasify the LNG to send to shore via pipeline. The FSRU will be permanently moored approximately 12.2 nautical miles (NM) offshore of Oxnard County, California in a water depth of approximately 2,900 feet. The FSRU will have a storage capacity of 273,000 m3. Offloading time for the LNG carriers to the FSRU will take about twenty hours, and it is expected that there will be two to three carriers per week. The regasification unit
Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis Appendix A Risknology, Inc. January 2006
will be designed for a peak production of 1.5 bscfd of gas and will send the gas through the export risers to subsea pipelines. The pipelines will primarily be above the sea floor until a water depth of 45 feet, approximately 3,100 feet offshore. At a water depth of 45 feet, the pipeline will be directionally drilled, buried, and run underground to the metering station located inside Reliant Energys Complex. Once the natural gas pipeline reaches shore the pipeline will be owned, operated, and maintained by Southern California Gas. Southern California Gas will be responsible for delivering the gas to the end users.
3.0
SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SVA)
This SVA was conducted using a facilitated, team-based consensus process. Mr. William Bailey of E & E facilitated the SVA workshop. Mr. Bailey is a security professional with a comprehensive background in terrorism and intentional threat identification and assessment, qualified to design and lead security vulnerability assessments. He was the designated member of the third party EIS team that had security clearance and access to the BHPB Cabrillo Port Security Plan. Mr. Bailey was assisted by William Daughdrill, also of E & E, and Dr. Andrew J. Wolford of AJ Wolford & Associates. Sam Autry of AJ Wolford & Associates recorded the workshop. The report worksheets document the Threat and Potential Consequence defining each scenarios identified by the Workshop Team. Specific vulnerability was not evaluated during the workshop. Recommendations were generated by the SVA team for the scenario the team felt required additional safeguards. The SVA team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendations, this early in a project life, involve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precise qualitative risk ranking. Sixteen different scenarios were discussed during the workshop. One specific recommendation was made by the Workshop Team. The recommendation captured by the team addressed mitigation of the threat of a small craft being used to deliver a bomb or shape charge to the FSRU or LNG carrier alongside. Consider having onsite standby vessel at all times to enforce safety zones around the FSRU. The thought is that an onsite standby vessel could be used to deter or intercept incoming or unknowing vessels. An additional column, Continued Work was added to the SVA worksheets after the workshop was complete. The purpose for this column is to show which concerns are linked to the release scenarios described below as a result of the SVA workshop discussions.
4.0
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID)
This HAZID was conducted as a facilitated, team-based review using hazard guidewords as prompts for identification. The work, conclusions and recommendations resulting from the workshop are the result of consensus of the team participants and is based upon the cumulative experience and expertise of these professionals in the LNG industry. Dr. Andrew J. Wolford of Risknology, Inc., previously AJ Wolford & Associates, a firm that specializes in process safety and risk assessment, facilitated the meetings and provided knowledge of the HAZID methodology that was used. Dr. Wolford has been trained in the HAZID methodology, and has
conducted numerous HAZIDs for a variety of offshore platforms, floating terminals and other marine facilities. Team members were provided with an overview of the technique prior to beginning the study. The workshop team utilized the What-if? technique to identify potential hazards. The Whatif? technique is recognized as an acceptable method of identifying and evaluating hazards. The technique involves asking questions that require the team to analyze deviations from the anticipated normal operation of the FSRU complex. A representative example is What-if LNG is spilled overboard? Potential Consequences of each scenario are documented in the report worksheets. Existing Safeguards were documented for those safeguards that already exist or are planned design / operational features that reduce the risk associated with the specific scenario. The HAZID was broken up into nine different study sections: Cargo System FSRU Cargo System LNG Carrier Marine System Ballast Control Marine System Bilge Utility Systems Pipeline Systems Turret & Subsea Pipeline including Mooring and Risers Hull Design Operational Modes Each morning BHP representatives provided the team with a presentation and details of each of these study sections. The BHP team was then excused from the meeting and did not participate in the workshop proceedings. Once the team had working knowledge of the individual sections, potential threats or concerns were identified and defined using the guideword technique. A list of guidewords can be found in the appendix along with the log sheets. The HAZID team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendations involve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precise qualitative risk ranking in terms of severity and likelihood. There were 40 identified concerns that generated 8 recommendations to address them. Below is a list of concerns and recommendations from the study. Verify or confirm the safeguards associated with the flame in the SCVs. There is a concern that the flame could be considered a possible ignition source for an LNG leak or cloud. The team expressed a concern that the potential exists for common cause failure that can cause LNG cargo tank overfilling with liquid carryover to the compressor and possible over-pressurization of the tanks. Verify whether or not a liquid spill valve will be installed on the local tank vents. The concern is for an LNG release from local vents potentially causing natural gas to be released around the process equipment. The team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. Team expressed concerns about the durability of the turret mooring system. The concern dealt with whether or not the extended amount of time the LNG carrier will
be moored alongside the FSRU has been properly analyzed. This extended amount of time is more than most turrets operating today are exposed to. Team expressed concern about seismic activity in the area and the potential extreme loads on the PLEM. The concern dealt with whether or not these extreme loads on the PLEM have been properly analyzed. Consider including in the operations manual the philosophy to shut down loading if thrusters are lost. Clarify BHPBs intent to use tugs upon loss of thrusters. The team expressed concerns that the pump maintenance frequency will be much higher for FSRU than trading LNG carrier, thus necessitating more frequent tank entries and higher exposure to air/gas mixtures.
5.0
RELEASE SCENARIOS
During the study it was agreed that the following release scenarios would be modeled. se scenarios were developed based on the concerns that arose from the meetings, and they are meant to be used as bounding scenarios to all concerns discussed during the workshop. A brief description of the seven scenarios and the release results are given below. As discussed above, a column was added to the workshop log sheets to link the scenarios below to each corresponding concern. Scenario #1: Accidental Explosion in Void
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: LNG leak into void Ignition source Explosion over-pressure possibly ranging between 120 140 psi Potential failure of bulkheads and venting Potential structural failure to center cargo tank support Potential collapse/displacement of center cargo tank Progressive failure of center cargo tank Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following: Ignited pool fire with entire center cargo tank inventory Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking Release of adjacent cargo tank inventory subsea Partially filled buoyant cargo tank float/drift causing the cargo tanks to heat up from seawater heat transfer and failure with LNG release from cargo tanks at surface
Scenario #2: Accidental Explosion in Cargo Tank
This scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: Center cargo tank under maintenance, air environment (gas-free) LNG introduced into center cargo tank Ignition source Explosion Potential missile generation Penetration/leak from either or both adjacent cargo tanks Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following: Ignited cargo tank fire from one adjacent cargo tank Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking Release of cargo tank inventory subsea
Scenario #3: Accidental / Intentional Marine Collision
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: Collision large enough to penetrate single LNG cargo tank LNG leaks at approximate water line Ignition source Escalation for this scenario includes an ignited pool fire from inventory of center cargo tank.
Scenario #4: Accidental Explosion between Vessels
LNG Carrier
FSRU
Waterline
The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process. LNG loading arm failure LNG spill between FSRU and LNG carrier onto water Ignition source Explosion in confined space Combination of venting and excessive loading on hulls Scenario #5: Intentional Cargo Tank Breach Events
Scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: Breach of side shell, inner bulkhead and multiple Moss Tanks, with equivalent hole size appropriate to intentional event mechanism (e.g. Rocket Propelled Grenade, other tactical weapon) Release of LNG at water line Ignition source (immediate and delayed)
Scenario #6: Accidental / Intentional Cascading Multiple Tank Release (Escalating Events) It was recognized that many postulated release scenarios have the potential for cascading (escalation) of the primary release by causing subsequent failures that result in additional release of LNG. Escalation should be evaluated in such a manner that does not require construction of specific sequences of events and physical processes.
6.0
CONCLUSION
The above analysis should be considered preliminary, based upon the level of definition provided in design documents for review. The overall conclusions are: Due to the early stage in design and limited data there are 40 identified potential major risks with 8 recommendations to address them. The normal project design activities should address these risks, but project hazard management processes should verify follow-through.
ANNEX 1 LIST OF DRAWINGS
ANNEX 2 GUIDEWORDS
HAZID Categories/Guidewords Natural Disasters

High winds - typhoons Squalls, swells Hurricane Tornado Extreme wave Extreme current Tsunami Extreme heat High humidity Lightning Earthquake
Equipment/Instrumentation Malfunction
Cryogenic pump failure Pump seal failure Safety systems Communication Common cause failures
Loss of Containment/Fire/Explosion
Leak from LNG tank Leak from piping/flange Leak from process area Leak from loading line/arm Leak from turret Leak from export system Leak from vapor system Leak from fuel gas Leak into ballast tank Drains Bunker oil fire Engine room fire Generator room fire Accommodations fire Explosive hazards Energy release
Process Upsets
Pressure deviations Temperature deviations Flow deviations Level deviations Improper mixing Corrosion/erosion Startup/shutdown Simultaneous operations
External Effects
Dropped object Marine collision Helicopter impact Reduced visibility Sabotage/terrorism Mooring line failure Structural failure Loading arm failure Tank sloshing FSRU listing LNG carrier listing Loss of station keeping Loss of buoyancy Fatigue/cracking
Composition Problems
Moisture H2S Concentrations CO2
Environmental Impact
Flaring/venting during normal operations Flaring/venting during emergency LNG leak Waste water treatment Ballast water disposal Oily water treatment/disposal
Utility Failures
Blackout Cooling water Instrument air Inert gas Nitrogen Fire water HVAC system Ballast system Thruster
Crew Transportation
Crew boat accident Accident during transfer of personnel to FSRU Helicopter accident
Human Factors
Occupational accidents Improper/inadequate training Weather monitoring Shipping traffic monitoring Material handling Man overboard Dynamic situations hazards
Inspection/Maintenance Issues
Confined space Machinery/instrument accessibility Reduced visibility
Emergency Operations
Escape/egress/rescue Disconnect during loading Turning bow against intruder Release from vent
Appendix A - Annex 2.xls - HAZID Guidewords
ANNEX 3 SVA STUDY LOGSHEETS
Cabrillo Port Security Vulnerability Assessment Workshop

THREAT 1 Small craft bomb delivery POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential loss of containment on both the LNG carrier and FSRU with possible ignition and major fire. Potential for FSRU to drift into shipping lane and possibly to shore. Release of LNG while adrift due to ship collision. No. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS / COMMENTS Consider having a standby vessel at all Correlates to Scenario #5 times to enforce safety zone around FSRU to be used to intercept incoming or unknowing vessels. The Workshop Team believed this to be Correlates to Scenario #3 non-credible. Intentional disassembly would require heavy construction / demolition support and enough time to notify or detect the attempted attack.
2 Disconnect mooring system with breech of LNG tanks
Potential for vapor cloud to drift into shipping lane and possibly towards shore. 4 Takeover of LNG carrier transit to Potential for vapor cloud to drift shore and cause intentional release of towards onshore population. LNG or natural gas. Possible use of LNG carrier to collide with impact on shore based public. 5 Takeover of LNG carrier and Potential loss of containment on both intentional collision with FSRU the LNG carrier and FSRU with possible ignition and major fire.
3 Deliberate release of un-ignited LNG offshore
Correlates to Scenario #5
The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event due to recent changes in security in the marine industry.
LNG Carriers will be in frequent Correlates to Scenario #3 communication with port during entire voyage using established, secure communication protocols, therefore early detection of an attempted takeover is very likely. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). Correlates to Scenario #6
Potential to damage structure causing escalation and further loss of containment. 7 Release of LNG directed to non cargo Potential to damage structure spaces (i.e. ballast tanks, void tanks) causing escalation and further loss of containment. 8 Takeover and malicious use of Potential to attach to FSRU and tug/supply vessel. attempt to use as propulsion to tow FSRU towards shore.
6 Intentional release of LNG onboard FSRU onto deck, structure
The Workshop Team believed this to be a non-credible event. Intentional disassembly would require heavy construction / demolition support and enough time to notify or detect the attempted attack
Appendix A - Annex 3.xls - Logsheet Cabrillo Port
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Cabrillo Port Security Vulnerability Assessment Workshop

THREAT 9 Use of commercial airliner to strike FSRU POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential for total loss of FSRU and aircraft. No. 9 RECOMMENDATIONS / COMMENTS The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event due to recent changes in security in the airline industry. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. Correlates to Scenario #6 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). Considered to be the no worse than the Correlates to Scenario #6 potential to use small fixed wing aircraft to strike FSRU. The Workshop Team questioned whether a helicopter impact could actually penetrate Moss type LNG Tank. The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event Takeover would have to be accomplished very rapidly to avoid notification or detection. The Workshop Team believed this to be a Correlates to Scenario #3 non credible event due to recent changes in security in the cruise industry. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. Correlates to Scenario #5 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event Pipeline will be directionally drilled and routed underground in a water depth of 45 feet approximately 3100 feet offshore. The Workshop Team questioned whether Correlates to Scenario #5 a shape charge on the hull could actually breech the cargo hold and release LNG from affected tank(s). Scenario not developed further. The Workshop Team believed onshore attacks would not be an attractive target due to the non-escalating events associated with the metering station. So Cal Gas will have numerous safety systems on or near the metering station. The metering station will be located inside the fence line of Reliant.
10 Use of small fixed wing aircraft to strike FSRU 11 Use of helicopter to strike FSRU
Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire.
10
11
12 Takeover of FSRU facility
Various previously defined consequences.
12
13 Takeover a large passenger vessel to Potential for total loss of FSRU and strike the FSRU cruise ship.
13
14 Use of Rocket Propelled Grenade or other tactical weapon on FSRU or LNG carrier 15 Pipeline breach in water depth less than 200ft
Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. Subsea loss of containment of gas pipeline (limited inventory).
14
15
16 Diver assault with shape charge to the Potential to breach LNG cargo tank FSRU hull on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. 17 Intentional attack on gas metering station
16
17
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Cabrillo Port Workshop General Mitigations Discussed for Security 1 Interagency response 2 Crew background checks Security force onboard cruise ships 3 Cruise ship industry security's comparable to the airline industry 4 ARPA radars (not helpful for small craft, night time or fog) 5 24 hour manned control room for vessel traffic control 6 Use of a standby vessel for monitoring (proposed) LNG carrier must give 96 hour agency notice to arrive 7 Notice must have crew list communicated to agency 8 Safety zone around FSRU will be marked on charts of appropriate scale 9 MMS rules for pipeline in water depths of less that 200 feet Pipeline will go underground at a water depth of 45 feet (approximately 3100 10 feet offshore) all the way to Reliant
Appendix A - Annex 3_Mitigations.xls
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ANNEX 4 HAZID STUDY LOGSHEETS
Cabrillo Port Hazard Identification Workshop

HAZARDOUS EVENT POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No. RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
CARGO SYSTEMS - FSRU (04/06/2004)

Tank Rollover High loading of storage tanks on FSRU, Pressure relief system potential damage to tanks and venting of cold natural gas through vent stack. Gas dispersion with no significant consequences. LNG spill overboard Rapid phase transition with low temperature Spill will be limited due to ESD. thermal loading of hull, potential to introduce Continuous water curtain on LNG carrier local buoyant effects and stresses. If LNG and FSRU to reduce thermal loading. carrier is present, a potential exists for explosion Concrete hull coating beneath loading arms. between hulls if cloud forms and ignition source is present. Loss of containment into any void Fire / deflagration within void space, potential to Cargo containment system design space (due to improper, damage cargo tank(s). Leak detection system inadequate inspections) Loading arm failure Release of LNG. Rapid phase transition with Quick disconnect valves on loading thermal loading of hull, potential to introduce operations. local buoyant effects and stresses. If LNG Spill will be limited due to ESD. Continuous carrier is present a potential exists for explosion water curtain on LNG carrier and FSRU to between hulls if cloud forms and ignition source reduce thermal loading. is present. Concrete hull coating beneath loading arms. Limiting environmental conditions for loading operation. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. Unplanned disconnect during loading (any reason) Release of LNG with local freezing of water and possible structural damage to the LNG Carrier and FSRU. Potential for explosion between the hulls of the LNG carrier and FSRU if ignitions source is present. Additional rate of vaporization due to energy input. Tank and pump tower fatigue and possible loss of ship stability. Liquid carryover to the compressor. Potential over-pressurization of tank with limited loss of containment. Potential to overheat exchanger with possible flame impingement on equipment (coupled with motions) Flow control valve on pumps. Spill will be limited due to ESD. Limiting environmental conditions for loading operation. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. Pipe tower is connected to the top and bottom inside the LNG cargo tank. 1 No consequence to public
One of the major causes for an unplanned Correlates to Scenario #4 disconnect during loading would be failure of heading control in sea state.
Tank sloshing
Cargo tank overfill
Ignition source in SCVs
FSRU collision from ship
Potential breech of cargo containment with subsequent release of LNG. Potential for ignition and possible flooding and structural failure of FSRU.
There is a concern that the potential exists for common cause failure causing overfilling of cargo tanks. Verify or confirm the safeguards Bounded by Scenario #6 associated with the flame in the SCVs. There is a concern that the flame could be considered a possible ignition source for leak of LNG. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. Correlates to Scenario #3 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s).
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HAZARDOUS EVENT Release from local relief vents POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential for natural gas to encounter process equipment and/or flame sources. Potential for vapor cloud to drift towards onshore population. Possible use of LNG carrier to collide with/impact shore infrastructure. Potential for sudden listing conditions (5 degrees or greater), possibly causing fender failures and overstressing one or more mooring line. Potential for disconnection of one or more loading arms resulting in consequences detailed in #4 above. Collapse of ballast tank or void tank with possible distortion of sphere foundation. No immediate significant consequences. Automatic tension system. Weather vaning capabilities. Flow control valve on pumps. Spill will be limited due to ESD. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No. RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS 10 Will a liquid spill valve be installed on the Bounded by Scenario #6 local tank vents? 11 Addressed in Security Vulnerability Assessment
CARGO SYSTEMS - LNG CARRIER (04/06/2004)

Takeover of LNG Carrier
MARINE SYSTEMS - BALLAST CONTROL (04/07/2004)

Ballast system malfunction 12 Correlates to Scenario #4
Vent system failure (i.e. undersized)
13
MARINE SYSTEMS - BILGE (04/07/2004)

Down-flooding of void space Potential to increase boil off gas (BOG) rate with Non return valves installed to prevent down- 14 no significant consequences. flooding. Potential loss of thruster capability with subsequent loss of heading control. Stratification of stored LNG due to loss of recirculation if long term event. Potential loss of all generators including the inert gas generator. Loss of all generators will enable the thruster system with subsequent loss of heading control. Auto-start emergency generator. Redundant busses and power supply. ESD system. UPS. Auto-start emergency generator not located in the engine room. Fire suppression system. Emergency procedures. Ability to use the fire water system from the standby tugs and LNG carrier if alongside. 15 Emergency generators do not supply enough power to run the thrusters.
UTILITY SYSTEMS (04/07/2004)

Complete blackout (long term)
Fire in the engine room FSRU
16 All primary generators would have to be lost to lose thruster capabilities. Emergency generators do not supply enough power to run the thrusters.
Fire in the engine room LNG carrier
LNG leak from storage tank and failure of inert gas system
Potential to suspend loading operations with no Fire suppression system. significant consequences to FSRU. Emergency procedures. Fire water system from the standby tugs and FSRU. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary. Potential for fire on FSRU and possible Fire suppression system. escalation if LNG carrier is along side. Emergency procedures. Fire water system from the standby tugs and LNG carrier. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary.
17
18
Correlates to Scenarios #1, #6
PIPELINE SYSTEMS (04/07/2004)
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HAZARDOUS EVENT Mechanical damage from construction/digging POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Release of natural gas with possible ignition. Possible fatality to working crew and possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline damage. Structural failure of the bridge supports and the pipeline. Potential release of natural gas with possible ignition. Possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline failure. EXISTING SAFEGUARDS Shutdown systems on the pipeline. State one-call law (call before you dig law). 49 CFR 192 requirements. Shutdown systems on the pipeline. 49 CFR 192 requirements. No. 19 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS Pipeline risks addressed in EIS, not part of this IRA
Inadequate bridge design to support the new pipeline
20 New pipeline will deviate from existing path and will be routed underneath new bridge to limit construction under water.
Pipeline risks addressed in EIS, not part of this IRA
Seismic activity
Uncoupled motions between pipeline and bridge Shutdown systems on the pipeline. structure with potential failure of the pipeline. 49 CFR 192 requirements. Potential release of natural gas with possible ignition. Possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline failure. Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting FSRU. Spill will be limited due to ESD.
21
Pipeline risks addressed in EIS, not part of this IRA
TURRET/SWIVEL/MOORING/SUBSEA PIPELINE AND RISERS (04/07/2004)

Any ship collision/LNG carrier Potential parting of riser with gas release and possible loss of buoyancy. Potential for drifting FSRU towards shipping lanes. Riser connection fatigue Possible gas release inside turret (confined space). Potential for catastrophic damage to turret if ignited. Drifting object strikes riser Possible gas release inside turret (confined space). Potential for catastrophic damage to turret if ignited. Fatigue of FSRU mooring system Potential to lose one or more mooring lines possibly resulting in drifting FSRU towards shipping lanes. Correlates to Scenario #3 22 Team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. 23
Spill will be limited due to ESD.
24 Team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting 25 Team expressed concerns about the FSRU. turret mooring system and the extended Visual inspection of mooring lines will detect amount of time the LNG carrier will be failed mooring lines. moored along side the FSRU. 26 Team expressed concern as to whether seismic extreme loads on the PLEM have been consider in design. 27 28 29
Seismic activity
See Comment
Subsea current action of S-wave Large displacement and extreme loads on riser. Vortex induced vibration is not likely. flexible riser Possibility of vortex induced vibration. Subsea failure of riser Submarine activity in area Gas bubble in water with possible loss of buoyancy of the FSRU or LNG carrier Spill will be limited due to ESD.
Potential to collide with risers or moorings. Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting Potential for FSRU to become disconnected and FSRU. drift towards shipping lanes. Safety zone around FSRU will be marked on charts and communicated in federal register. High energy break of spring lines Potential to breach LNG storage tanks, with (emergency release or failure) subsequent release of LNG. Potential for ignition and possible flooding and structural failure of FSRU.
30 Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s).
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HAZARDOUS EVENT POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No. 31 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS Correlates to Scenario #1
HULL DESIGN (04/08/2004)

Leak from LNG tank to void space Flammable mixture in void space with potential Inert void space upon leak detection explosion with major hull damage and subsequent flooding. Slack line with extreme motions Slamming of carrier against FSRU with potential Limiting environmental conditions for for stroke out of loading arms. loading operation. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. Under design of LNG carrier for Slamming of carrier against FSRU with potential Limiting environmental conditions for mooring using fendering for stroke out of loading arms. loading operation. arrangement in exposed weather Manual override from loading master and conditions compared to in port LNG carrier master. land based terminals Loss of thrusters during loading Ship potentially moves beam-on with large Manual override from loading master and relative motions. Extreme loads and possible LNG carrier master. collision between vessels. Fendering system. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary.
32
33
Correlates to Scenario #4 34 Consider including in the operations manual the philosophy to shut down loading if thrusters are lost. Clarify BHPB intent to use tugs upon loss of thrusters. 35 The team expressed concerns that the pump maintenance frequency will be much higher for FSRU than trading LNG carrier, thus necessitating more frequent tank entries and higher exposure to air/gas mixtures. 36 Correlates to Scenario #2
OPERATING MODES (04/08/2004)

Air ingress into LNG tank (e.g. during maintenance, startup) Flammable mixture in LNG tank with potential explosion and major tank damage possibly escalating to hull and subsequent flooding. Operating procedures during startup and maintenance.
LNG leakage into LNG storage tank with air present (e.g. during maintenance) Increased volume of fuel oil during installation Increased vessel traffic across shipping lanes during installation activities Drifting LNG tanker during repairs
Flammable mixture in LNG tank with potential explosion and major tank damage possibly escalating to hull and subsequent flooding.
Operating procedures during startup and maintenance.
Potential to discharge fuel oil into the water with subsequent environmental impact. Increased potential for ship collision. Notice to mariners. Construction safety zone. Potential for ship collision with other vessels in shipping lanes. Standby tugs will be available at FSRU if needed to intersect LNG tanker. Drifting repair only conducted under approval of Port Captain.
37 38 Correlates to Scenario #3
39 Port captain currently allows ships to drift (1 to 2 hours) during approved maintenance or testing. 40 According to BHPB, LNG Carriers will not be allowed to do maintenance while moored at the FSRU and this restriction will be written in operating procedures.
Propulsion system unavailable due to major maintenance while moored at FSRU
See Comment
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Keywords/Concerns Captured During the Workship - Not Discuss Further

Relief Case? Tank fatigue Caustic materials Loss of LNG containment from SCV tube into the water Increased potential for human error due to increased frequency of loading Failure of inert gas generator Valve shuts at GC (offspec gas or GC malfunction) Structural failure of the yoke Commercial pressure to operate outside design envelop Increased loads from accepting larger LNG carriers than currently available Rapid reversal of currents during loading Rapid reversal of winds during loading Misjudgment or calculation of pipeline and seafloor coefficient of friction Seawater in the SCVs Dropped diesel refueling tank Extreme weather causing tug to seek shelter
Appendix A_Annex 4_Summary of Concerns.xls
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APPENDIX A HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID)

TO THE INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS (APPENDIX C1)

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Assessment

Risknology, Inc. January 2006

Prepared for: Ecology and Environment, Inc. San Francisco, California

DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT

1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0

ANNEX 1: ANNEX 2: ANNEX 3:

Hazard Identification Workshop Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port Logsheet.xls)

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis Appendix A

Risknology, Inc. January 2006

DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE WORKSHOPS

SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SVA)