APPENDIX A HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID

)
TO THE INDEPENDENT RISK ANALYSIS (APPENDIX C1)

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Assessment

Risknology, Inc. January 2006

Cabrillo Port LNG Project Hazard Identification Study (HAZID) Final Report January 2006

Prepared for: Ecology and Environment, Inc. San Francisco, California

Prepared by: Risknology, Inc. previously A.J.Wolford & Associates Houston, Texas Project No.: 304

This work is dependent on the accuracy of information provided by BHP Billiton and its contractors. January 2006 . previously AJ Wolford & Associates (AJW+) has made every reasonable effort to perform the work contained herein in a manner consistent with high professional standards. Inc.DISCLAIMER RELATING TO THIS REPORT Risknology.

...............0 3............................... 5 Conclusion ............xls) Security Vulnerability Assessment Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port SVA Logsheet................................................................... 3 Release Scenarios............................... 2 Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) ........................................................................................xls) Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A i Risknology...............................................................................0 Introduction....................xls) ANNEX 4: Hazard Identification Workshop Logsheets (304 Cabrillo Port Logsheet................................... 2 Design Basis used in Workshops .......... 3 Hazard Identification (HAZID) Study .......................................xls) Guidewords (Hazid Guidewords.....................................0 2................................0 6............... January 2006 ..... Inc...TABLE OF CONTENTS 1..............0 4.......0 5........ 8 ANNEX 1: ANNEX 2: ANNEX 3: List of Drawings (Hazid Binder Index.............................

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Offloading time for the LNG carriers to the FSRU will take about twenty hours. Inc. • To develop release scenarios. Inc. for which physical effects (consequence) modeling is to be conducted. The purpose of this report is to outline the methodology that was used to conduct the Security Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) workshops. 2.000 m3. store the gas onboard the FSRU. • To document the identified threats and hazards associated with the security. and regasify the LNG to send to shore via pipeline. Inc. The regasification unit Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology.CABRILLO PORT LNG PROJECT HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID) REPORT SUMMARY 1. The facility will consist of a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) that will receive incoming gas from LNG carriers. (E & E) has been contracted by the United States Coast Guard and California State Lands Commission to write the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). California in the California State Lands Commission offices on April 5. • To incorporate (identify and analyze) the public concerns that were recorded during the public scoping meetings. California in a water depth of approximately 2. Ecology and Environment.900 feet. • To identify and determine adequacy of critical safeguards (hardware systems and/or procedures) associated with the identified risks and propose recommendations to improve the vulnerability and safety systems of the project. The FSRU will be permanently moored approximately 12. and the HAZID workshop was conducted April 6-8. 2004.0 DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE WORKSHOPS BHPB’s Cabrillo Port project is a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. 2004. Study Dates The SVA was conducted in Long Beach. The FSRU will have a storage capacity of 273. (BHPB) is in the process of applying for a deepwater port license for the Cabrillo Port project. and operational activities that have the potential to impact the public and/or environment. January 2006 1 . and it is expected that there will be two to three carriers per week. Results of the workshops are discussed are including recommendations for release / consequence modeling to be conducted within the Independent Risk Analysis. Objectives The objectives of the SVA and HAZID workshops were: • To identify possible security threats and accidental hazards that have the potential to impact the public and/or environment. installation.2 nautical miles (NM) offshore of Oxnard County.0 INTRODUCTION BHP Billiton.

Sam Autry of AJ Wolford & Associates recorded the workshop. conclusions and recommendations resulting from the workshop are the result of consensus of the team participants and is based upon the cumulative experience and expertise of these professionals in the LNG industry. The recommendation captured by the team addressed mitigation of the threat of a small craft being used to deliver a bomb or shape charge to the FSRU or LNG carrier alongside. Mr. Southern California Gas will be responsible for delivering the gas to the end users. Dr. and Dr. qualified to design and lead security vulnerability assessments. Mr. involve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precise qualitative risk ranking. “Recommendations” were generated by the SVA team for the scenario the team felt required additional safeguards. Sixteen different scenarios were discussed during the workshop. and maintained by Southern California Gas. The pipelines will primarily be above the sea floor until a water depth of 45 feet. and has Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology. At a water depth of 45 feet. also of E & E. 4.100 feet offshore. The purpose for this column is to show which concerns are linked to the release scenarios described below as a result of the SVA workshop discussions. Bailey is a security professional with a comprehensive background in terrorism and intentional threat identification and assessment. team-based review using hazard guidewords as prompts for identification.will be designed for a peak production of 1.0 SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SVA) This SVA was conducted using a facilitated. William Bailey of E & E facilitated the SVA workshop. Wolford of AJ Wolford & Associates.. team-based consensus process. Wolford of Risknology. The report worksheets document the “Threat” and “Potential Consequence” defining each scenarios identified by the Workshop Team. The SVA team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendations.5 bscfd of gas and will send the gas through the export risers to subsea pipelines.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY (HAZID) This HAZID was conducted as a facilitated. Inc. facilitated the meetings and provided knowledge of the HAZID methodology that was used. the pipeline will be directionally drilled. He was the designated member of the third party EIS team that had security clearance and access to the BHPB Cabrillo Port Security Plan. January 2006 2 . Bailey was assisted by William Daughdrill. Andrew J. Wolford has been trained in the HAZID methodology. Andrew J. Inc. 3. An additional column. this early in a project life. • Consider having onsite standby vessel at all times to enforce safety zones around the FSRU. The work. The thought is that an onsite standby vessel could be used to deter or intercept incoming or unknowing vessels. previously AJ Wolford & Associates. Dr. and run underground to the metering station located inside Reliant Energy’s Complex. Mr. One specific recommendation was made by the Workshop Team. approximately 3. operated. a firm that specializes in process safety and risk assessment. “Continued Work” was added to the SVA worksheets after the workshop was complete. Specific vulnerability was not evaluated during the workshop. buried. Once the natural gas pipeline reaches shore the pipeline will be owned.

The workshop team utilized the “What-if…?” technique to identify potential hazards. The concern dealt with whether or not the extended amount of time the LNG carrier will Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A 3 Risknology. A representative example is “What-if … LNG is spilled overboard?” “Potential Consequences” of each scenario are documented in the report worksheets. Below is a list of concerns and recommendations from the study. “Existing Safeguards” were documented for those safeguards that already exist or are planned design / operational features that reduce the risk associated with the specific scenario. • Team expressed concerns about the durability of the turret mooring system. • Verify or confirm the safeguards associated with the flame in the SCVs. The BHP team was then excused from the meeting and did not participate in the workshop proceedings. The technique involves asking questions that require the team to analyze deviations from the anticipated normal operation of the FSRU complex. A list of guidewords can be found in the appendix along with the log sheets. Once the team had working knowledge of the individual sections. Inc. The “Whatif…?” technique is recognized as an acceptable method of identifying and evaluating hazards.conducted numerous HAZIDs for a variety of offshore platforms. January 2006 . There were 40 identified concerns that generated 8 recommendations to address them. The HAZID was broken up into nine different study sections: • Cargo System – FSRU • Cargo System – LNG Carrier • Marine System – Ballast Control • Marine System – Bilge • Utility Systems • Pipeline Systems • Turret & Subsea Pipeline including Mooring and Risers • Hull Design • Operational Modes Each morning BHP representatives provided the team with a presentation and details of each of these study sections. The concern is for an LNG release from local vents potentially causing natural gas to be released around the process equipment. • The team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. Team members were provided with an overview of the technique prior to beginning the study. • Verify whether or not a liquid spill valve will be installed on the local tank vents. floating terminals and other marine facilities. There is a concern that the flame could be considered a possible ignition source for an LNG leak or cloud. The HAZID team agreed not to use a Risk Ranking Matrix because many recommendations involve further studies and definitions necessary to perform a more precise qualitative risk ranking in terms of severity and likelihood. potential threats or concerns were identified and defined using the guideword technique. • The team expressed a concern that the potential exists for common cause failure that can cause LNG cargo tank overfilling with liquid carryover to the compressor and possible over-pressurization of the tanks.

Team expressed concern about seismic activity in the area and the potential extreme loads on the PLEM. se scenarios were developed based on the concerns that arose from the meetings. Consider including in the operations manual the philosophy to shut down loading if thrusters are lost. and they are meant to be used as bounding scenarios to all concerns discussed during the workshop. thus necessitating more frequent tank entries and higher exposure to air/gas mixtures. A brief description of the seven scenarios and the release results are given below. Inc. As discussed above. The concern dealt with whether or not these extreme loads on the PLEM have been properly analyzed. Clarify BHPBs intent to use tugs upon loss of thrusters. The team expressed concerns that the pump maintenance frequency will be much higher for FSRU than trading LNG carrier.• • • be moored alongside the FSRU has been properly analyzed. This extended amount of time is more than most turrets operating today are exposed to. 5. a column was added to the workshop log sheets to link the scenarios below to each corresponding concern.0 RELEASE SCENARIOS During the study it was agreed that the following release scenarios would be modeled. January 2006 4 . Scenario #1: Accidental Explosion in Void The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: • LNG leak into void • Ignition source • Explosion over-pressure possibly ranging between 120 – 140 psi • Potential failure of bulkheads and venting • Potential structural failure to center cargo tank support • Potential collapse/displacement of center cargo tank • Progressive failure of center cargo tank Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following: • Ignited pool fire with entire center cargo tank inventory • Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking • Release of adjacent cargo tank inventory subsea • Partially filled buoyant cargo tank float/drift causing the cargo tanks to heat up from seawater heat transfer and failure with LNG release from cargo tanks at surface Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology.

Inc. air environment (gas-free) • LNG introduced into center cargo tank • Ignition source • Explosion • Potential missile generation • Penetration/leak from either or both adjacent cargo tanks Potential escalation for this scenario includes the following: • Ignited cargo tank fire from one adjacent cargo tank • Structural failure of hull/buckling/sinking • Release of cargo tank inventory subsea Scenario #3: Accidental / Intentional Marine Collision The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: • Collision large enough to penetrate single LNG cargo tank • LNG leaks at approximate water line • Ignition source Escalation for this scenario includes an ignited pool fire from inventory of center cargo tank. Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A 5 Risknology. January 2006 .Scenario #2: Accidental Explosion in Cargo Tank This scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: • Center cargo tank under maintenance.

January 2006 . Inc.g.Scenario #4: Accidental Explosion between Vessels LNG Carrier FSRU Waterline The scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process. • LNG loading arm failure • LNG spill between FSRU and LNG carrier onto water • Ignition source • Explosion in confined space • Combination of venting and excessive loading on hulls Scenario #5: Intentional Cargo Tank Breach Events X Scenario includes the following assumptions and/or estimates that will be proven during the detailed modeling process: • Breach of side shell. with equivalent hole size appropriate to intentional event mechanism (e. other tactical weapon) • Release of LNG at water line • Ignition source (immediate and delayed) Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A 6 Risknology. Rocket Propelled Grenade. inner bulkhead and multiple Moss Tanks.

January 2006 . The normal project design activities should address these risks. 6. The overall conclusions are: • Due to the early stage in design and limited data there are 40 identified potential major risks with 8 recommendations to address them. Escalation should be evaluated in such a manner that does not require construction of specific sequences of events and physical processes. but project hazard management processes should verify follow-through. Inc. based upon the level of definition provided in design documents for review.Scenario #6: Accidental / Intentional Cascading Multiple Tank Release (Escalating Events) It was recognized that many postulated release scenarios have the potential for cascading (escalation) of the primary release by causing subsequent failures that result in additional release of LNG. Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A 7 Risknology.0 CONCLUSION The above analysis should be considered preliminary.

ANNEX 1 LIST OF DRAWINGS Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology. January 2006 . Inc.

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Inc. January 2006 .ANNEX 2 GUIDEWORDS Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology.

HAZID Guidewords Risknology.xls .Annex 2. swells Hurricane Tornado Extreme wave Extreme current Tsunami Extreme heat High humidity Lightning Earthquake Equipment/Instrumentation Malfunction Cryogenic pump failure Pump seal failure Safety systems Communication Common cause failures Loss of Containment/Fire/Explosion Leak from LNG tank Leak from piping/flange Leak from process area Leak from loading line/arm Leak from turret Leak from export system Leak from vapor system Leak from fuel gas Leak into ballast tank Drains Bunker oil fire Engine room fire Generator room fire Accommodations fire Explosive hazards Energy release Process Upsets Pressure deviations Temperature deviations Flow deviations Level deviations Improper mixing Corrosion/erosion Startup/shutdown Simultaneous operations External Effects Dropped object Marine collision Helicopter impact Reduced visibility Sabotage/terrorism Mooring line failure Structural failure Loading arm failure Tank sloshing FSRU listing LNG carrier listing Loss of station keeping Loss of buoyancy Fatigue/cracking Composition Problems Moisture H2S Concentrations CO2 Environmental Impact Flaring/venting during normal operations Flaring/venting during emergency LNG leak Waste water treatment Ballast water disposal Oily water treatment/disposal Utility Failures Blackout Cooling water Instrument air Inert gas Nitrogen Fire water HVAC system Ballast system Thruster Crew Transportation Crew boat accident Accident during transfer of personnel to FSRU Helicopter accident Human Factors Occupational accidents Improper/inadequate training Weather monitoring Shipping traffic monitoring Material handling Man overboard Dynamic situations hazards Inspection/Maintenance Issues Confined space Machinery/instrument accessibility Reduced visibility Emergency Operations Escape/egress/rescue Disconnect during loading Turning bow against intruder Release from vent Appendix A . Inc.typhoons Squalls. January 2006 .HAZID Categories/Guidewords Natural Disasters High winds .

ANNEX 3 SVA STUDY LOGSHEETS Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology. Inc. January 2006 .

structure 6 7 Correlates to Scenario #1 8 The Workshop Team believed this to be a non-credible event. 4 Takeover of LNG carrier transit to Potential for vapor cloud to drift shore and cause intentional release of towards onshore population. The Workshop Team believed this to be Correlates to Scenario #3 non-credible.Annex 3. Release of LNG while adrift due to ship collision. void tanks) causing escalation and further loss of containment.e. January 2006 . 8 Takeover and malicious use of Potential to attach to FSRU and tug/supply vessel. 5 Takeover of LNG carrier and Potential loss of containment on both intentional collision with FSRU the LNG carrier and FSRU with possible ignition and major fire. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. No. Intentional disassembly would require heavy construction / demolition support and enough time to notify or detect the attempted attack.Logsheet Cabrillo Port 1 of 2 Risknology. Intentional disassembly would require heavy construction / demolition support and enough time to notify or detect the attempted attack Appendix A . therefore early detection of an attempted takeover is very likely. Correlates to Scenario #6 Potential to damage structure causing escalation and further loss of containment. The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). ballast tanks. 6 Intentional release of LNG onboard FSRU onto deck. Possible use of LNG carrier to collide with impact on shore based public. 5 LNG Carriers will be in frequent Correlates to Scenario #3 communication with port during entire voyage using established. attempt to use as propulsion to tow FSRU towards shore. Inc.xls . Potential for FSRU to drift into shipping lane and possibly to shore. 2 Disconnect mooring system with breech of LNG tanks 2 Potential for vapor cloud to drift into shipping lane and possibly towards shore. 7 Release of LNG directed to non cargo Potential to damage structure spaces (i. LNG or natural gas. secure communication protocols.Cabrillo Port Security Vulnerability Assessment Workshop THREAT 1 Small craft bomb delivery POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential loss of containment on both the LNG carrier and FSRU with possible ignition and major fire. 3 Deliberate release of un-ignited LNG offshore 3 Correlates to Scenario #5 4 The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event due to recent changes in security in the marine industry. 1 RECOMMENDATIONS / COMMENTS Consider having a standby vessel at all Correlates to Scenario #5 times to enforce safety zone around FSRU to be used to intercept incoming or unknowing vessels.

Correlates to Scenario #5 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). Correlates to Scenario #6 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s).Annex 3.Cabrillo Port Security Vulnerability Assessment Workshop THREAT 9 Use of commercial airliner to strike FSRU POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential for total loss of FSRU and aircraft. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event Takeover would have to be accomplished very rapidly to avoid notification or detection. 17 Intentional attack on gas metering station 16 17 Appendix A . Subsea loss of containment of gas pipeline (limited inventory). 13 14 Use of Rocket Propelled Grenade or other tactical weapon on FSRU or LNG carrier 15 Pipeline breach in water depth less than 200ft Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. Inc. The Workshop Team questioned whether a helicopter impact could actually penetrate Moss type LNG Tank. Considered to be the no worse than the Correlates to Scenario #6 potential to use small fixed wing aircraft to strike FSRU. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. The metering station will be located inside the fence line of Reliant. The Workshop Team believed onshore attacks would not be an attractive target due to the non-escalating events associated with the metering station. 9 RECOMMENDATIONS / COMMENTS The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event due to recent changes in security in the airline industry.xls . January 2006 . 12 13 Takeover a large passenger vessel to Potential for total loss of FSRU and strike the FSRU cruise ship. The Workshop Team questioned whether Correlates to Scenario #5 a shape charge on the hull could actually breech the cargo hold and release LNG from affected tank(s). No. 10 11 12 Takeover of FSRU facility Various previously defined consequences. The Workshop Team believed this to be a Correlates to Scenario #3 non credible event due to recent changes in security in the cruise industry. 14 15 16 Diver assault with shape charge to the Potential to breach LNG cargo tank FSRU hull on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. So Cal Gas will have numerous safety systems on or near the metering station.Logsheet Cabrillo Port 2 of 2 Risknology. Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. 10 Use of small fixed wing aircraft to strike FSRU 11 Use of helicopter to strike FSRU Potential to breach LNG cargo tank on FSRU with loss of containment and fire. The Workshop Team believed this to be a non credible event Pipeline will be directionally drilled and routed underground in a water depth of 45 feet approximately 3100 feet offshore. Scenario not developed further.

January 2006 .xls 1 of 1 Risknology. night time or fog) 5 24 hour manned control room for vessel traffic control 6 Use of a standby vessel for monitoring (proposed) LNG carrier must give 96 hour agency notice to arrive 7 Notice must have crew list communicated to agency 8 Safety zone around FSRU will be marked on charts of appropriate scale 9 MMS rules for pipeline in water depths of less that 200 feet Pipeline will go underground at a water depth of 45 feet (approximately 3100 10 feet offshore) all the way to Reliant Appendix A .Cabrillo Port Workshop General Mitigations Discussed for Security 1 Interagency response 2 Crew background checks Security force onboard cruise ships 3 Cruise ship industry security's comparable to the airline industry 4 ARPA radars (not helpful for small craft.Annex 3_Mitigations. Inc.

Inc.ANNEX 4 HAZID STUDY LOGSHEETS Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port Independent Risk Analysis – Appendix A Risknology. January 2006 .

There is a concern that the flame could be considered a possible ignition source for leak of LNG. Unplanned disconnect during loading (any reason) Release of LNG with local freezing of water and possible structural damage to the LNG Carrier and FSRU. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. Inc.Cabrillo Port Hazard Identification Workshop HAZARDOUS EVENT POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No. Tank sloshing 6 Cargo tank overfill 7 Ignition source in SCVs 8 FSRU collision from ship Potential breech of cargo containment with subsequent release of LNG.FSRU (04/06/2004) Tank Rollover High loading of storage tanks on FSRU. If LNG Spill will be limited due to ESD. Appendix A . a potential exists for explosion Concrete hull coating beneath loading arms. Potential for ignition and possible flooding and structural failure of FSRU. Rapid phase transition with Quick disconnect valves on loading thermal loading of hull. 1 No consequence to public 2 Correlates to Scenario #4 3 Correlates to Scenario #1 4 Correlates to Scenario #4 5 One of the major causes for an unplanned Correlates to Scenario #4 disconnect during loading would be failure of heading control in sea state.Annex 4.xls . Verify or confirm the safeguards Bounded by Scenario #6 associated with the flame in the SCVs. Gas dispersion with no significant consequences. Correlates to Scenario #3 The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). Additional rate of vaporization due to energy input. Spill will be limited due to ESD. Potential for explosion between the hulls of the LNG carrier and FSRU if ignitions source is present. Leak detection system inadequate inspections) Loading arm failure Release of LNG. January 2006 .Logsheet Cabrillo Port 1 of 4 Risknology. potential to introduce operations. Potential over-pressurization of tank with limited loss of containment. 9 There is a concern that the potential exists for common cause failure causing overfilling of cargo tanks. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS CARGO SYSTEMS . damage cargo tank(s). local buoyant effects and stresses. between hulls if cloud forms and ignition source is present. is present. LNG spill overboard Rapid phase transition with low temperature Spill will be limited due to ESD. Loss of containment into any void Fire / deflagration within void space. potential to introduce Continuous water curtain on LNG carrier local buoyant effects and stresses. thermal loading of hull. If LNG and FSRU to reduce thermal loading. Continuous carrier is present a potential exists for explosion water curtain on LNG carrier and FSRU to between hulls if cloud forms and ignition source reduce thermal loading. Pipe tower is connected to the top and bottom inside the LNG cargo tank. Tank and pump tower fatigue and possible loss of ship stability. carrier is present. Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. Limiting environmental conditions for loading operation. Pressure relief system potential damage to tanks and venting of cold natural gas through vent stack. Limiting environmental conditions for loading operation. Liquid carryover to the compressor. Potential to overheat exchanger with possible flame impingement on equipment (coupled with motions) Flow control valve on pumps. potential to Cargo containment system design space (due to improper. Concrete hull coating beneath loading arms.

Flow control valve on pumps. ESD system. Potential for disconnection of one or more loading arms resulting in consequences detailed in #4 above. RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS 10 Will a liquid spill valve be installed on the Bounded by Scenario #6 local tank vents? 11 Addressed in Security Vulnerability Assessment CARGO SYSTEMS .Annex 4. Fire water system from the standby tugs and FSRU. Ability to use the fire water system from the standby tugs and LNG carrier if alongside. Potential loss of thruster capability with subsequent loss of heading control.BALLAST CONTROL (04/07/2004) Ballast system malfunction 12 Correlates to Scenario #4 Vent system failure (i. flooding. Spill will be limited due to ESD. Loss of all generators will enable the thruster system with subsequent loss of heading control. Potential for sudden listing conditions (5 degrees or greater). UPS. Potential for vapor cloud to drift towards onshore population. EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master.BILGE (04/07/2004) Down-flooding of void space Potential to increase boil off gas (BOG) rate with Non return valves installed to prevent down. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary. Potential loss of all generators including the inert gas generator. Weather vaning capabilities. Auto-start emergency generator not located in the engine room. Emergency generators do not supply enough power to run the thrusters.e. undersized) 13 MARINE SYSTEMS . Automatic tension system. Fire suppression system. Stratification of stored LNG due to loss of recirculation if long term event.Logsheet Cabrillo Port 2 of 4 Risknology.LNG CARRIER (04/06/2004) Takeover of LNG Carrier MARINE SYSTEMS . January 2006 . Possible use of LNG carrier to collide with/impact shore infrastructure. Emergency procedures. 17 18 Correlates to Scenarios #1. Auto-start emergency generator. possibly causing fender failures and overstressing one or more mooring line. Emergency procedures. escalation if LNG carrier is along side. Potential for fire on FSRU and possible Fire suppression system.14 no significant consequences. significant consequences to FSRU. Fire water system from the standby tugs and LNG carrier.xls .Cabrillo Port Hazard Identification Workshop HAZARDOUS EVENT Release from local relief vents POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Potential for natural gas to encounter process equipment and/or flame sources. Fire in the engine room LNG carrier LNG leak from storage tank and failure of inert gas system Potential to suspend loading operations with no Fire suppression system. Emergency procedures. Redundant busses and power supply. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary. Inc. 15 Emergency generators do not supply enough power to run the thrusters. Collapse of ballast tank or void tank with possible distortion of sphere foundation. #6 PIPELINE SYSTEMS (04/07/2004) Appendix A . No immediate significant consequences. UTILITY SYSTEMS (04/07/2004) Complete blackout (long term) Fire in the engine room FSRU 16 All primary generators would have to be lost to lose thruster capabilities.

Potential for ignition and possible flooding and structural failure of FSRU. Vortex induced vibration is not likely. Potential release of natural gas with possible ignition. not part of this IRA Seismic activity Uncoupled motions between pipeline and bridge Shutdown systems on the pipeline. with (emergency release or failure) subsequent release of LNG. The release of LNG cargo would only be from affected tank(s). Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting FSRU. Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting Potential for FSRU to become disconnected and FSRU. State one-call law (call before you dig law). drift towards shipping lanes. Potential to collide with risers or moorings. Possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline failure. Possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline failure. structure with potential failure of the pipeline. High energy break of spring lines Potential to breach LNG storage tanks. Potential for catastrophic damage to turret if ignited. Possible fatality to working crew and possible injury to public in the immediate area of pipeline damage. Appendix A . 49 CFR 192 requirements. Potential for drifting FSRU towards shipping lanes. Fatigue of FSRU mooring system Potential to lose one or more mooring lines possibly resulting in drifting FSRU towards shipping lanes. Potential release of natural gas with possible ignition. Correlates to Scenario #3 22 Team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. Structural failure of the bridge supports and the pipeline. Subsea failure of riser Submarine activity in area Gas bubble in water with possible loss of buoyancy of the FSRU or LNG carrier Spill will be limited due to ESD. 27 28 29 Seismic activity See Comment Subsea current action of S-wave Large displacement and extreme loads on riser. Potential for catastrophic damage to turret if ignited. 49 CFR 192 requirements. Inc. Pipeline risks addressed in EIS. Drifting object strikes riser Possible gas release inside turret (confined space). moored along side the FSRU. EXISTING SAFEGUARDS Shutdown systems on the pipeline. 21 Pipeline risks addressed in EIS. 30 Probably not a total loss of LNG cargo. Standby tugs can be used to rescue drifting 25 Team expressed concerns about the FSRU. Shutdown systems on the pipeline.Logsheet Cabrillo Port 3 of 4 Risknology. No. flexible riser Possibility of vortex induced vibration.Annex 4. not part of this IRA TURRET/SWIVEL/MOORING/SUBSEA PIPELINE AND RISERS (04/07/2004) Any ship collision/LNG carrier Potential parting of riser with gas release and possible loss of buoyancy.Cabrillo Port Hazard Identification Workshop HAZARDOUS EVENT Mechanical damage from construction/digging POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES Release of natural gas with possible ignition. turret mooring system and the extended Visual inspection of mooring lines will detect amount of time the LNG carrier will be failed mooring lines. Spill will be limited due to ESD. 24 Team expressed concerns about the understanding and decision as to why an internal turret was not considered. 26 Team expressed concern as to whether seismic extreme loads on the PLEM have been consider in design. 23 Spill will be limited due to ESD.xls . 49 CFR 192 requirements. Riser connection fatigue Possible gas release inside turret (confined space). not part of this IRA Inadequate bridge design to support the new pipeline 20 New pipeline will deviate from existing path and will be routed underneath new bridge to limit construction under water. January 2006 . Safety zone around FSRU will be marked on charts and communicated in federal register. 19 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS Pipeline risks addressed in EIS.

January 2006 . Fendering system. 36 Correlates to Scenario #2 OPERATING MODES (04/08/2004) Air ingress into LNG tank (e. Manual override from loading master and LNG carrier master. 35 The team expressed concerns that the pump maintenance frequency will be much higher for FSRU than trading LNG carrier. Clarify BHPB intent to use tugs upon loss of thrusters. 40 According to BHPB. LNG Carriers will not be allowed to do maintenance while moored at the FSRU and this restriction will be written in operating procedures. startup) Flammable mixture in LNG tank with potential explosion and major tank damage possibly escalating to hull and subsequent flooding. Drifting repair only conducted under approval of Port Captain. Operating procedures during startup and maintenance. Under design of LNG carrier for Slamming of carrier against FSRU with potential Limiting environmental conditions for mooring using fendering for stroke out of loading arms. during maintenance) Increased volume of fuel oil during installation Increased vessel traffic across shipping lanes during installation activities Drifting LNG tanker during repairs Flammable mixture in LNG tank with potential explosion and major tank damage possibly escalating to hull and subsequent flooding. collision between vessels.Cabrillo Port Hazard Identification Workshop HAZARDOUS EVENT POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES EXISTING SAFEGUARDS No.xls . during maintenance.Logsheet Cabrillo Port 4 of 4 Risknology.g.g. Increased potential for ship collision. thus necessitating more frequent tank entries and higher exposure to air/gas mixtures. land based terminals Loss of thrusters during loading Ship potentially moves beam-on with large Manual override from loading master and relative motions. loading operation. Potential for ship collision with other vessels in shipping lanes. 31 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS Correlates to Scenario #1 HULL DESIGN (04/08/2004) Leak from LNG tank to void space Flammable mixture in void space with potential Inert void space upon leak detection explosion with major hull damage and subsequent flooding. 37 38 Correlates to Scenario #3 39 Port captain currently allows ships to drift (1 to 2 hours) during approved maintenance or testing. loading operation. Ability to use tugs to separate LNG Carrier from FSRU if necessary. Standby tugs will be available at FSRU if needed to intersect LNG tanker. arrangement in exposed weather Manual override from loading master and conditions compared to in port LNG carrier master. Inc.Annex 4. Slack line with extreme motions Slamming of carrier against FSRU with potential Limiting environmental conditions for for stroke out of loading arms. Construction safety zone. Propulsion system unavailable due to major maintenance while moored at FSRU See Comment Appendix A . Correlates to Scenario #2 Potential to discharge fuel oil into the water with subsequent environmental impact. Extreme loads and possible LNG carrier master. LNG leakage into LNG storage tank with air present (e. Notice to mariners. 32 Correlates to Scenario #4 33 Correlates to Scenario #4 Correlates to Scenario #4 34 Consider including in the operations manual the philosophy to shut down loading if thrusters are lost. Operating procedures during startup and maintenance.

xls 1 of 1 Risknology. Inc.Keywords/Concerns Captured During the Workship . January 2006 .Not Discuss Further Relief Case? Tank fatigue Caustic materials Loss of LNG containment from SCV tube into the water Increased potential for human error due to increased frequency of loading Failure of inert gas generator Valve shuts at GC (offspec gas or GC malfunction) Structural failure of the yoke Commercial pressure to operate outside design envelop Increased loads from accepting larger LNG carriers than currently available Rapid reversal of currents during loading Rapid reversal of winds during loading Misjudgment or calculation of pipeline and seafloor coefficient of friction Seawater in the SCVs Dropped diesel refueling tank Extreme weather causing tug to seek shelter Appendix A_Annex 4_Summary of Concerns.

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