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Approved UNODA Submitter: Russia Co-Submitted: Germany, China, India Signatories: Sweden, Argentina, Kenya, Morocco, Italy, South

Korea, Switzerland Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a growing threat to international peace and security, Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote international stability, Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation and management of existing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons stockpiles, Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation, Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, Deeply concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security in the face increases in the availability of biological and chemical weaponry technology, Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security, Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and agreements to which they are party, Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; 2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them; 3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, by: (a) Developing and maintaining appropriate and effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport, and in the event that there are breaches to such established measures immediately report to the United Nations Security Council, (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law; (d)Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists; 5. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions, including but not limited to: (a). The re-adaptation of facilities, technologies and infrastructure aimed at the creation or development of biological weaponry, to purely scientific and research-orientated purposes (b). The management of pre-existing chemical and biological weapons stockpiles, including but not limited to: i. The destruction of chemical and biological weapons stockpiles ii. The transportation of chemical and biological weapons stockpiles to other sites, with the intention of destruction iii. The prolonged storage of chemical and biological weapons stockpiles, in anticipation of destruction iv. The continual inspection process of all domestic chemical and biological weapons stockpiles, in coordination with bodies such as the OPCW v. any other duties regarding pre-existing chemical and biological weapons stockpiles as mandated by either the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention (c). The prevention of the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by domestically located and operative non-state actors, with a focus on listed terrorist groups 6. Calls upon all States:

(a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; (b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties; (c) To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes; (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding

their obligations under such laws; 7. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery; 8. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials; 9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this resolution; 10. Calls for the creation of a Biological Arms Management Body headed in coordination with the International Science and Technology Center with the explicit aim to promote domestic transparency regarding biological weapons stockpiles and to readapt pre-existing facilities, funds, research and infrastructure aimed at the creation of biological weaponry to research facilities, aimed at disease orientated research. 11. Expresses the need for the creation of a watch list composed of countries that have either not signed the Biological Weapons Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention, or have signed but not ratified the conventions; this will be done with the intention to closely monitor such countries with the purposes of: (a). Ensuring that such countries do not continue to stockpile chemical and biological weapons in defiance of previous UN Resolutions and the Conditions of multilateral treaties such as the CWC. (b). To focus monitoring efforts on countries that have resisted signing such multilateral treaties or engaging in transparent dialogue regarding biological or chemical weapons stockpiles c. To give bodies such as the United Nations Security Council and the OPCW a comprehensive resource of countries to focus monitoring and inspection efforts on, (d). Pressuring countries that have resisted signing the CWC and the BCW, or have resisted engaging in transparent dialogue to either sign and or ratify the respective treaties, 12.Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

13.Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 14.Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Approved: FORUM: GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAIN-SUBMITTER: Indonesia CO-SPONSORS: South Korea, United States of America, Philippines, Georgia, Malaysia CO-SIGNATORIES: Kuwait, Argentina, Kenya, South Sudan, Nigeria, Australia, Turkey, Sweden, China, Ukraine QUESTION OF: Chemical and Biological Weapons THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Condemning the lethal nature of chemical and biological weapons; Reproving the clandestine nature of biological weaponry; Recognizing that chemical and biological weaponry is currently easily accessible to parties that desire them; Realizing that there is a lack of regulation regarding biological programs, and that this insufficiency leads to an increased risk of biological weaponry attainment by terrorists; Aware that incidents involving chemical and biological weapon attacks can cause considerable destruction, be economically and ecologically draining, and be socially detrimental; Emphasizing the need for international cooperation and communication on the question of the destruction and nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons; Acknowledging the current lack of strict supervision over all states stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons; Taking into account certain insufficiencies in the aspect coverage of the Chemical Weapons Convention; Convinced that all advances made in the field of biology and chemistry should be purposed only for the edification of mankind and not for any military advances; Commending all states that have taken steps towards the elimination of chemical and biological weapons; 1. Strongly encourages all states to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); 2. Urges for all states to sign and ratify the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); 3. Suggests amendments of the Chemical Weapons Convention to cover areas that are currently not incorporated in its treaties, including (but not limited to):

a) Establishing a grant to aid scientists in finding a solution to sea-dumped chemical weapons rather than to avoid the matter entirely; b) Allowing for pre-approved possession and research of chemical weapons rather than to push for its total destruction; 4. Calls for the establishment of the International Weapons Control Bureau (IWCB), an organization that will work on par with the UN, meeting on an annual basis, with the common goals of: a) Strictly monitoring any global stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons, through methods such as (but not limited to): i) Developing techniques to reliably detect biological and chemical weapons; ii) Collecting mandatory annual reports from all states regarding respective stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons and making these reports accessible to the public; iii) Providing grants to parties that wish to possess or study chemical and biological weapons; b) Improving defenses against biological and chemical weapons through methods such as (but not limited to): i) Sponsoring research on chemical and biological weapons by pre-approved parties through the: 1) Grant of monetary subsidies; 2) Supply of necessary resources; ii) Establishing facilities that work towards the development of defense techniques and tactics; c) Decelerating and restricting the proliferation of biological weapons materials and expertise; 5. Calls for a limitation on the possession of biological and chemical weapons in any and all locations to be set as well as the continuation of research in the field for defense purposes, with the condition that: a) Possession of these weapons by any and all parties must have been pre-approved by the IWCB; b) Research on the field of biological and chemical weapons by any and all parties must have been pre-approved by the IWCB; 6. Calls upon all states to cease activity in all biological or chemical weapons production facilities under their jurisdiction, and be compliant to matters including (but not limited to): a) IWCBs access to aforementioned facilities for: i) The verification of the permanent discontinuation of weapon production, or ii) The continual monitoring in cases pre-approved by the IWCB for the facilities to remain open; b) Provision of information about detailed plans for the destruction of such facilities, keeping in mind the safety of people and the wellbeing of the environment; 7. Proposes the formation of a subdivision in the IWCB that is solely in charge of diminishing the proliferation of the black market for chemical and biological weapons in order to restrict

terrorist access to these weapons, through methods such as (but not limited to): a) Enforcing laws to inhibit weapon trafficking through the implementation of: i) Clear-cut definitions as to what illegal trafficking of chemical and biological weapons entails; ii) Harsher consequences to discovered illegal ownership, stockpiling or usage of chemical and biological weapons and interaction between producers and sellers of these weapons, such as (but not limited to): 1) High fines; 2) Life imprisonment; iii) Resources and training for law enforcement agencies; b) Strengthening inspections of suspect persons, by methods such as (but not limited to): i) Regular inspections of persons with track records of trafficking; ii) Spontaneous inspections of suspect persons; 8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.