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564 located at Dipolog City was sold in the name of Lucia Embrado alone, who was by then already married to petitioner Oreste Torregiani since 1943. The sale was registered as TCT No. T-99. However, by virtue of a court order in Misc. Sp. Proc. No. 2330 of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, the word "single" appearing in TCT No. T-99 was canceled and replaced on 19 October 1970 by the phrase "married to Oreste Torregiani." The Torregianis then made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958 constructed a residential/commercial building thereon. As appearing from a document entitled Absolute Deed of Sale dated 1 May 1971, Lucia Embrado Torregiani sold Lot No. 564, described as her "own paraphernal property," to her adopted daughter, herein private respondent Eda Jimenez, for the sum of P1,000.00. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99 was canceled to give way to TCT No. T-17103 in the name of Eda Jimenez, married to Santiago Jimenez. On 6 March 1972, Eda Jimenez sold sixty-five (65) square meters of Lot 564 to Marcos Salimbagat for P6,500.00, and on 1 August 1972, conveyed 301 square meters of the same lot to Pacifico Cimafranca for P30,000. Both sales were duly annotated on TCT No. T-17103. On 25 September 1972, the Torregianis instituted in the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Zamboanga del Norte an action for declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez, Marcos Salimbagat and Pacifico Cimafranca alleging that the sale of Lot 564 by Lucia Embrado to Eda Jimenez was void not only for lack of consideration but also because Oreste Torregiani did not consent to the sale, which consent was necessary because Lot 564 was conjugal property. In addition, the petitioners claim that Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale marked as Exh. "D" on the belief that Lot 564 was merely intended as security for a loan that the Jimenez spouses were then negotiating with the First Insular Bank of Cebu. Since the Jimenez spouses did not acquire valid title to the land, the subsequent sales in favor of Salimbagat and Cimafranca were without legal effect. The Torregianis were sustained by the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte. The Court of Appeals reversed the CFI’s judgment. Hence, this petition.
"(w)hen the sale is made through a public instrument. and. "ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501. to wit: (a) the construction of the building at the expense of the partnership. but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. it held that it cannot adopt its conclusion that because Lucia and the original owners agreed in 1941 for its purchase and sale. petitioners nevertheless enjoy in their favor the presumption that the funds used were conjugal. 158 of the Civil Code provides that "[b]uildings constructed. Under Art. if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses. (b) the ownership of the land by one of the spouses. The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract. the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions. ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment. The second paragraph of Art.ISSUE: Whether Lot 564 was paraphernal property of Lucia Embrado or conjugal with her husband Oreste Torregiani. . 1496 of the Civil Code. since the trial court found as a fact the construction in 1958 of a residential/commercial building on said lot a part of which was leased to third persons and another part serving as the Torregianis’ conjugal dwelling. Thus." Under this article. other than the testimony of Torregiani. or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. at the expense of the partnership. also pertain to the partnership. Although no evidence was presented on the source of funds used in the construction to determine whether the same was conjugal or paraphernal. the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in 1958. 1498." However. the Court could not ultimately affirm the validity of the sale." and under Art. HELD: While the Supreme Court agreed with respondent court that Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia. even if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the "Venta Definitiva".
or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. located in Rizal Avenue Extension. On August complaint for recovery of title. Jose never put his thumbmark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. and possession C. 1981. the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Jose died intestate on February 6. ownership. recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. J. No. ever since she was a child. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No.000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which possession upon Jose’s death. The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that. FACTS: Jose T. 1984. respondents filed a against herein petitioner. 132305 December 10. On the other hand.” Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150. Santiago. 64729. Manila. 2001 Ponente: Quisumbing. Jose never acknowledged respondents’ claim over the property such that . On April 20. having been able to graduate from college. 1987. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property. sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. Labagala. because they are the only legal heirs of their brother. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C.Lagabala v. Cruz. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. Sta. 1987. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his “poor and unschooled sisters who… sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare. 64729. his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein). She pointed out that during his lifetime. before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 5. and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. Labagala. Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. Ida to recover from her the 1/3 came into petitioner’s sole Respondents alleged that Jose’s share in the property belongs to them by operation of law. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed through petitioner’s machinations and with malicious intent. Santiago G. 172334) in petitioner’s name alone.R. who died intestate and without issue. to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No.
instead. a baptismal certificate. The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented. while the second was dismissed. On October 17. Therefore. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession. Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the property. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action. At the pre-trial conducted on August 11. The Court found the petitioner’s silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. 1990. However. it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner recognized respondents’ ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed by the RTC. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property. Although Ida denies that the said birth certificate was hers. a private document. The document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation. Hence. she could not present another birth certificate to prove otherwise. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. the Court agreed with the CA’s conclusion that said certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Petitioner’s counsel argued that petitioner .respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. petitioner’s counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago. is not conclusive proof of filiation. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty. The birth certificate contained the information that Ida was the child of spouses Leon Lagabala and Cornelia Cabrigas. this petition. Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. The first was decided in her and the other defendants’ favor. the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. asserting that she is not at all their brother’s child. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name alone. 1988. allegedly after respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty taxes thereon. More so are the entries made in an income tax return. HELD: In this case. though she had been using this name all her life. which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. respondents are not assailing petitioner’s legitimate status but are.
Not being a child of Jose. the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence. to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. as one of the respondents. 2004 Ponente: Panganiban. Esperanza. the Court noted that petitioner. use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree. The respondent Loreta P. Inc. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel. and contrary to her averment. In her petition before this Court. however. the Court agreed with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. He was born in Japan on September 17. not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother. The petitioner further alleges that on November 4.A. J. . in Caloocan City. Miguel. Thus. In the school year 2000-2001. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11. where he finished the nursery course. the mother of the minor. 2002. has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. Further. On April 25.had been using Santiago all her life. who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. Miguel 440 SCRA 455 October 18. 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. FACTS: On March 5. During her testimony before the trial court. 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon. who claims to be Ida Santiago. 2002. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. School. Miguel. petitioner Joey D. the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L. 1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. However. Briones v. 2002 ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21. petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas.
Miguel were the ones who took the child from the petitioner or the latter’s parents. Respondent Loreta P. 2711. assisted him in taking care of the child. She further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived in the Philippines. The petitioner went several times to respondent Maricel P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement. Tuguegarao City but he was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother at Batal Heights. He sought the assistance of the police and the Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to bring him back to him. Santiago City. Miguel alleges that sometime in October 2001. he has not been gainfully employed. but all his efforts were futile. respondent Francisca P. Miguel and Francisca P. according to respondent Loreta P. 2002. the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. Miguel likewise denies petitioner’s allegation that respondents Maricel P. Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM Department store. Miguel at Tanza. In their Comment. she has already . to which the petitioner agreed. Hence. The custody of the child. 2001. the petitioner was deported from Japan under the assumed name of Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. However. On May 6. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents while they were both working in Japan. She averred that she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented. he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. When he went there. Respondent Loreta P. in compliance with the May 2. the respondent Loreta P. On May 2. the said case was withdrawn ex-parte. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon. who are both retired and receiving monthly pensions. Miguel told him that Michael Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.According to the petitioner. She added that even before the custody of the child was given to the petitioner’s parents. the respondents filed their Comment. respondents Maricel P. The petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and as he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him. However. 2002 Resolution of this Court. his parents.
except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. may be denied the custody and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away. as the natural father. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Without the subsequent marriage.” Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that.” This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. She further stated that she has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she could. Obviously. Respondent Loreta P.” under the Family Code) child. The CA awarded the custody to Loreta P. parental authority over him resides in his mother. generally. Miguel as the mother of the minor. HELD: Having been born outside a valid marriage. She likewise stated in her Comment that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. . and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in the cases authorized by law. is entitled to have custody of him. being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor. Kevin pursuant to Article 213 (2) of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner. a natural child remains an illegitimate child. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. without any distinction between natural and spurious.been living separately from the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until his deportation. Michael is a natural (“illegitimate. She cannot be deprived of that right. Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta. notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him. no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother. and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The concept of “natural child” is important only for purposes of legitimation. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176. She has the right to keep him in her company. as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Under Article 176 of the Family Code. Respondent Loreta. all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category.
Republic v. 1989.Only the most compelling of reasons. b) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General. such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority.1992. On January 23. the RTC rendered its decision. Thereafter the case was heard during which private respondents Zenaida Caranto. being of the opinion that the same was in the best interest of the child. Private respondents prayed that judgement be rendered: a) Declaring the child Michael C. . The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from “Midael” to “Michael. 1996 Ponente: Mendoza. Caranto since he was seven years old. who had been living with private respondent Jaime B. it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption. then fifteen years old. Florentina Mazon (natural mother of the child). 1986. There is no showing at all that she is unfit to take charge of him. Mazon stayed with them under their care and custody. No.” He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error. J. Also presented was Carlina Perez. not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B. the minor Midael C. and c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly registered as “MIDAEL” be corrected to “MICHAEL. Caranto and Zenaida P. 103695 March 15. who endorsed the adoption of the minor. social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.” The RTC set the case for hearing on September 21. When private respondents were married on January 19. On May 30. the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. 1988. shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. FACTS: The petition below was filed on September 2. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes. giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the Office of the Solicitor General. Mazon. and the minor testified.R. CA G.
Zandueta 61 Phil. Mazon and the Court of Appeals. Changing the name of the child from “Midael C. 752 August 9. tunog. correctly did so. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court. because both names “can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono. consequently. Mazon” to “Michael C Mazon” cannot possibly cause any confusion. 1935 Ponente: Goddard. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case. The present case involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. § 4. J. in affirming the decision of the trial court. 2. While there was notice given by publication in this case. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Whether on the facts stated. himig). Rosario Gomez. For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C.” so that what appears as “Midael” as given name would read “Michael.Hence. so far as the correction of entry was concered. it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance with Rule 99.” Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters “ch” for the letter “d. FACTS: The respondent.” The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. aged two years. this petition. HELD: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting private respondents’ prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry. Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco. Yes. the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents’ petition for adoption. 2. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and. of the opportunity to be heard. Francisco v. through his natural mother and guardian ad litem. ISSUES: 1. instituted an action for support against the herein .
it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. as defendant in that case. the Honorable Francisco Zandueta. Notwithstanding this denial of paternity the respondent judge issued the order of May 2. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law. The respondent judge. case No. (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter. 1935.petitioner in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila. the civil status of marriage or that of relationship. 47238. petitioner moved for the reconsideration of that order on the ground that it was issued in excess of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of the plaintiff was placed in issue by the pleadings. hence the institution of this special proceeding. while in the former there is no presumption. a fact in issue. there is nothing but a mere allegation. HELD: Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and wife. that he was not present at the baptism of the plaintiff and that he was married at the time it is alleged that the plaintiff was born. Paraphrasing the language used in the decision in the Yangco v. therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son. from which the right to support is derived. through his guardian ad litem. denied that motion. who alleges that he is the son of the petitioner. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status. it may be said that in the present case the action for support is brought by a minor. it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. being in issue. Rohde. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to support from petitioner. should it finally be decided that he is not the father of the plaintiff. His alleged civil status being in litigation. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son. (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants. The petitioner. that the plaintiff has no right to monthly support from the defendant until his status as a child of the latter is finally determined in his favor and that as the guardian ad litem of the plaintiff admits his lack of means to defray even the ordinary expenses of existence it would be impossible for the defendant to recover whatever amount he may have advanced to plaintiff as support pendente lite. It is also . and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment. In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support. answered by a general denial of each and every material allegation contained in the complaint and as a special defense alleged that he never acknowledged and could not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son. On May 11. (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In that case it is alleged that the therein plaintiff is the acknowledged son of Luis Francisco and as such is entitled to support. 1935.
1987. Dumingag. asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag. Belmes G. Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100. At the time.evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of a son and his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such a status. No. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City. The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife. the natural mother of the minors. the case was set for hearing after 3consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily. 47238. Finding sufficiency in form and in substance. This status not appearing by a final judgment. a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22. 2001 Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez. During his lifetime. 1988. Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.00. FACTS: Petitioner. Belmes. Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One. Thereafter. Vancil v. J. on June 27. 1618-CEB.R. Helen G. On August 13. 132223 June 19. Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No.000. Vancil. the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner. On July 15. pendente lite. is the mother of Reeder C. or any other amount as monthly support. 1987. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City. 1986. Sometime in May of 1987. Helen Belmes. as defendant in case No. to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30. that the . submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. Bonifacia Vancil. petitioner.
being a naturalized American citizen. however. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24. 1988 and dismissing Special Proceedings No. has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. Colorado.00. In case of disagreement. in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian. the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. xxx. the Court held that the petition is moot with respect to her. this petition. Canon City. HELD: Since Valerie turned 18 on September 2. 1998. On appeal. has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.S. after due proceedings. 1988. the father’s decision shall prevail. Petitioner. Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent. Hence. Vincent. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. 1618-CEB. Petitioner. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: “Art. On October 12. unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court. the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC order of October 12. The Court agreed with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent.” Indeed.petition was filed under an improper venue. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50. the Court only resolved the issue with respect to the minor child. absence or unsuitability of respondent. 1988. . respondent’s unsuitability. can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death.000. contrary to existing jurisprudence. petitioner has to prove. 211.A. as the surviving grandparent. being the natural mother of minor Vincent. Thus. U. being the natural mother of the minor.
Zenaida and Yolanda. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. On the same day. named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan. No. FACTS: Fe D. the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.S. On reconsideration. claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo. private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice.Fe Quita v. entitled to onehalf of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan. On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. with or without the documents. she married for the third time. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco. and petitioner to the other half. Private respondent was not declared an heir. which was resolved in favor of the latter. Padlan. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. CA and Dandan G. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves. California. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan). At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987. Still in the U. Padlan. a partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children. Emmanuel. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. to a certain Wernimont. with the exception of Alexis. both Filipinos. after which. He left no will. and Claro.S. U. 1998 Ponente: Bellosillo. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.A. 124862 December 22. the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. Quita and Arturo T.R. Alexis. were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. Later Ruperto T. intervened. Atty. claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan. opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. all surnamed Padlan. Ricardo. They were not however blessed with children.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. J. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Leonardo Cabasal. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.. .
Yasin v. The trial court. Consequently. 1995 Ponente: Bidin. nor as to their respective hereditary shares. No. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. Hence. petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent.R.The CA ruled in favor of Dandan. respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten days from receipt thereof. However. 94986 February 23. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U. ISSUE: Whether this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. this petition. a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. FACTS: . J. Shari’a District Court G. and in fact had twice remarried. In the present proceeding. Significantly.A. among others. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce. with or without the documents. the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution. HELD: The Court agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan. the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised. the trial court could not grant her prayer for a hearing on the matter of petitioner’s citizenship. after which.S. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate.
Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner's maiden name and surname. 1990.D. and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. 56. Saul. the respondent court on July 4.On May 5. nonetheless. No. PD 1083). the Rules of Court and . Hence. Under Article 187. In the instant petition. Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Finding her petition lacking. by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law. Proc. 1990. petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but. this petition. 57[b]. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P. Rules of Court. instead. no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 06-3). The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10. HELD: The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil register. Hatima Centi y Saul having been granted divorce from her marriage with Hadji Idris Yasin and the latter having contracted a subsequent marriage to another woman. 1990. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition for change of name. 1083). Petitioner is praying for the respondent court to allow her to resume the use of her maiden name. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. prays that she be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin. issued an order for petitioner to amend her petition pursuant to Section 2(a) and 3 of Rule 103. The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda (Art. the Civil Code of the Philippines. PD 1083. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code. on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103. No. the only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Hatima C. PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the marriage by divorce (Art.
other existing laws. Civil Code). 371. which appear to be satisfactory to the court. Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right. 370. such petition for confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law. after annulment of the marriage (Art. Civil Code) and after the death of the husband (Art. no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. Even under the Civil Code. In view of such circumstances. The Court found the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. Civil Code). the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. 372. 373. . insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws). the use of the husband's surname during the marriage (Art. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding. Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation (Art. shall be applied suppletorily. where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes. nevertheless.
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