LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but

the Humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. (Calalang vs. Williams [G.R. No. L-47800, 02 December 1940]) The State is bound under the Constitution to afford full protection to labor and when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice the heavier influence of the latter should be counterbalanced with the sympathy and compassion the law accords the less privileged workingman. This is only fair if the worker is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a subordinate but as part of management with which he can negotiate on even plane. Thus labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner. (Fuente vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 110017, 02 January 1997]) The cause of social justice is not served by upholding the interest of petitioners in disregard of the right of private respondents. Social justice ceases to be an effective instrument for the "equalization of the social and economic forces" by the State when it is used to shield wrongdoing. While it is true that compassion and human consideration should guide the disposition of cases involving termination of employment since it affects one's source or means of livelihood, it should not be overlooked that the benefits accorded to labor do not include compelling an employer to retain the services of an employee who has been shown to be a gross liability to the employer. It should be made clear that when the law tilts the scale of justice in favor of labor, it is but a recognition of the inherent economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer, Justicia remini regarda est (Justice is to be denied to none). (Jamer vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 112630, 05 September 1997]) It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force." But so does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment." The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection to labor." But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the right's of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation when it is not economically in his interest to do so. (Serrano vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 117040, 27 January 2000]) EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP Importance of the existence of an employment relation A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights under the Labor Code is status of employment. The question of whether employer-employee relationship exists is a primordial consideration before extending labor benefits under the workmen's compensation, social security, medicare, termination pay and labor relations law. It is important in the determination of who shall be included in a proposed bargaining unit because it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and essential condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical relationship between the union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It means the ineligibility of the union members to present a petition for certification election as well as to vote therein. (La Suerte vs. Director [123 SCRA 679]) Tests for the existence of Employer-Employee Relationship – South West Disaster Control

In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees' conduct-although the latter is the most important element. (35 Am. Jur. 445). [T]o determine whether a person who performs work for another is the latter's employee or an independent contractor, the National Labor Relations relies on 'the right to control' test. Under this test an employer-employee relationship exist where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching the end. (LVN vs. Philippine Musicians Guild [G.R. No. 12582] citing United Insurance Company, 108, NLRB No. 115.) [T]he relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer. (Jardin vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 119268, 23 February 2000]) The case of Pajarillo vs. SSS, invoked by the public respondent as authority for the ruling that a "joint fishing venture" existed between private respondent and petitioners is not applicable in the instant case. There is neither light of control nor actual exercise of such right on the part of the boat-owners in the Pajarillo case, where the Court found that the pilots therein are not under the order of the boatowners as regards their employment; that they go out to sea not upon directions of the boat-owners, but upon their own volition as to when, how long and where to go fishing; that the boat-owners do not in any way control the crew-members with whom the former have no relationship whatsoever; that they simply join every trip for which the pilots allow them, without any reference to the owners of the vessel; and that they only share in their own catch produced by their own efforts. The aforementioned circumstances obtaining in Pajarillo do not exist in the instant case. The conduct of the fishing operations was undisputably shown by the testimony of Alipio Ruga, the patron/pilot of 7/B Sandyman II, to be under the control and supervision of private respondent's operations manager. Matters dealing on the fixing of the schedule of the fishing trip and the time to return to the fishing port were shown to be the prerogative of private respondent. While performing the fishing operations, petitioners received instructions via a single-side band radio from private respondent's operations manager who called the patron/pilot in the morning. They are told to report their activities, their position, and the number of tubes of fish-catch in one day. Clearly thus, the conduct of the fishing operations was monitored by private respondent thru the patron/pilot of 7/B Sandyman II who is responsible for disseminating the instructions to the crew members. (Ruga vs. NLRC [G.R. No. L-72654-61, 22 January 1990]) The business venture operated under Geminesse Enterprise did not result in an employeremployee relationship between petitioners and private respondent. While it is true that the receipt of a percentage of net profits constitutes only prima facie evidence that the recipient is a partner in the business, the evidence in the case at bar controverts an employer-employee relationship between the parties. In the first place, private respondent had a voice in management of the affairs of the sales force. Secondly, petitioner Tocao’s admissions militate against an employer-employee relationship. She admitted that, like her who owned Geminesse Enterprise, private respondent only received commissions and transportation and representation allowances and not a fixed salary. If indeed

petitioner Tocano was private respondent’s employer, it is difficult to believe that they shall receive the same income in the business. In a partnership, each partner must share in the profits and losses of the venture, except that the industrial partner shall not be liable for losses. As an industrial partner, private respondent had the right to demand for a formal accounting of the business and to receive her share in the profit. (Tocao vs. CA [G.R. No. 127405, 04 October 2000]) The barbershop claims it had no control over its barbers. The power to control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the employer has the right to exercise the power. As to the “control test,” the following facts indubitably reveal that the respondent company wielded control over the work performance of petitioners; in that (1) they worked in the barber shop owned and operated by the respondents; (2) that they were required to report daily and observe definite hours of work; (3) they were not free to accept other employment elsewhere but devoted their full time working at the New Looks Barber Shop for all the fifteen (15) years they have worked until April 15, 1995; (4) that some have worker with respondent’s since the early 1960’s; (5) that petitioner Patricia Nas was instructed by the respondents to watch the other six (6) petitioners in their daily task. Certainly, respondent company was clothed with the power to dismiss any or all of them for just and vald cause. Petitioners were unarguably performing work necessary and desiriable in the business of respondent company. (Corporal vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 129315, 02 October 2000]) Labor Only Contractor vis-à-vis an Independent Contractor In LEGITIMATE JOB CONTRACTING, no employer-employee relationship exists between the employees of the job contractor and the principal employer. Even then, the principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor for the payment of the employees' wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. In such case, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the job contractor's employees for a limited purpose, that is, to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. Other than the payment of wages, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. On the other hand, in LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING, an employer-employee relationship is created by law between the principal employer and the employees of the labor-only contractor. In this case, the labor-only contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer. The principal employer is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees. (PCI Automation vs. NLRC [GR No. 115920, 1996] Basis of Liability The distinction between Articles 106 and 107 was in the fact that Article 106 deals with "labor-only" contracting. Here, by operation of law, the contractor is merely considered as an agent of the employer, who is deemed "responsible to the workers to the same extent as if the latter were directly employed by him." On the other hand, Article 107 deals with "job contracting." In the latter situation, while the contractor himself is the direct employer of the employees, the employer is deemed, by operation of law, as an indirect employer. In other words, the phrase "not an employer" found in Article 107 must be read in conjunction with Article 106. A contrary interpretation would render the provisions of Article 107 meaningless considering that everytime an employer engages a contractor, the latter is always acting in the interest of the former, whether directly or indirectly, in relation to his employees. It should be recalled that a finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the owner of the project and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor (Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corp. v. Clave, G.R. No. 50915, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA 127; Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 83616, 20 January 1989, 169 SCRA 341). This is evidently because, as heretofore stated, the "labor-only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of an employer. In contrast, in "job contracting," no employer-employee relationship exists between the owner and the employees of his contractor. The owner of the project is not the direct employer but merely an indirect employer, by operation of law, of his contractor's employees.

(Baguio vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 79004, 04 October 1991]) Requisites for allowable job contracting: (I ARM Free Capital) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. INDEPENDENT business. according to his own ACCOUNT. Under his own RESPONSIBILITY. According to his own METHOD of conducting business. Free from the control of the principal except as to the result. Sufficient Capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, materials, work premises (TEM Work).

More importantly, the petitioners, individually or collectively, did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, work premises and other materials which is necessary in the conduct of the business of the respondent company. What the petitioners owned were only combs, scissors, razors, nail cutters, nail polishers, nippers – nothing else. By no standard can these be considered substantial capital necessary to operate a barbershop. (Corporal vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 129315, 02 October 2000]) Substantial Capital or Investment – The Neri and Fuji Xerox cases [I]n the case of Neri vs. NLRC, we held that in order to be considered as a job contractor it is enough that a contractor has substantial capital. In other words, once substantial capital established it is no longer necessary for the contractor to show evidence that it has investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The rational for this is that Article 106 of the Labor Code does not require that the contractor possess both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others. The decision of the Court in Neri, thus, states: Respondent BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, because it has established that it has sufficient capitalization. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both determined that BCC had a capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and paid for. BCC is therefore a highly capitalized venture and cannot be deemed engaged in "labor-only" contracting. However, in declaring that Building Care Corporation ("BCC") was an independent contractor, the Court considered not only the fact that it had substantial capitalization. The Court noted that BCC carried on an independent business and undertook the performance of its contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal in all matters except as to the results thereof. The Court likewise mentioned that the employees of BCC were engaged to perform specific special services for its principal. Thus, the Court ruled that BCC was an independent contractor. The Court further clarified the import of the Neri decision in the subsequent case of Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation vs. NLRC. In the said case, petitioner Fuji Xerox implored the Court to apply the Neri doctrine to its alleged job-contractor, Skillpower, Inc., and declare the same as an independent contractor. Fuji Xerox alleged that Skillpower, Inc. was a highly capitalized venture registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Department of Labor and Employment, and the Social Security System with assets exceeding P5,000,000.00 possessing at least 29 typewriters, office equipment and service vehicles, and its own pool of employees with 25 clerks assigned to its clients on a temporary basis. Despite the evidence presented by Fuji Xerox the Court refused to apply the Neri case and explained: Petitioners cite the case of Neri v. NLRC, in which it was held that the Building Care Corporation (BCC) was an independent contractor on the basis of finding that it had substantial capital, although there was no evidence that it had investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries and work premises. But the Court in that case considered not only the capitalization of the BCC but also the fact that BCC was providing specific special services (radio/telex operator and janitor) to the employer; that in another case, the Court had already found that BCC was an independent contractor; that BCC retained control over the employees and the employer was actually just concerned with the end-result; that BCC had the power to reassign the employees and their deployment was not subject to the approval of the employer;

No. considering that the complainants were no longer working for or assigned to it when they were illegally dismissed. 31 January 2000]) Jurisdiction of labor courts . 112139. later on. thus. is jointly and severally liable with the contractor. No. to "the performance of any work. the indirect employer. Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers. job or project". task. and the fact that they were reassigned to another principal necessarily ends such responsibility. to "the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter [on payment of wages]. and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor's employees. vs. This liability facilitates. NLRC [G. which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance. These features of that case make it distinguishable from the present one. The proposition that payment of back wages and separation pay should be covered by Article 109. the employees are eventually transferred or reassigned elsewhere. task. "to the extent of the work performed under the contract". The principal is made liable to his indirect employees. 116476-84.R. The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct employer. under Article 107. be held liable for wage differentials incurred while the complainants were assigned to other companies. (Vinoya vs.R. Under these cited provisions of the Labor Code. job or project.R. Inc. payment of the workers' compensation. 5 and 6. in any other manner. So long as the work. such that an indirect employer should not be made liable without a finding that it had committed or conspired in the illegal dismissal. it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor. (Lapanday Agricultural Development Corp. 21 May 1998]) Liability of indirect employer for unpaid backwages and separation pay Similarly. Withal. (Rosewood Processing. which holds an indirect employer solidarily responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for "any violation of any provision of this Code. but such responsibility should be understood to be limited to the extent of the work performed under the contract." would have been tenable if there were proof there was none in this case that the principal/employer had conspired with the contractor in the acts giving rise to the illegal dismissal. task. and under Article 109. under Article 106. in the same manner and extent that he is liable to the employees directly employed by him. The liability arising from an illegal dismissal is unlike an order to pay the statutory minimum wage. if not guarantees. is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. 02 February 2000]) Liability of indirect employer for unpaid salaries/wages The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Code. vs. Payment. because the workers' right to such wage is derived from law. We repeat: The indirect employer's liability to the contractor's employees extends only to the period during which they were working for the petitioner. giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. job or project has been performed for indirect employer's benefit or on its behalf." These provisions cannot apply to the indirect employer.and that BCC was paid in lump sum for the services it rendered. 116476-84. the liability accrues for such period even if. Nos. (Rosewood Processing. however. Inc. an order to pay back wages and separation pay is invested with a punitive character. because it can protect itself from irresponsible contractors by withholding such sums and paying them directly to the employees or by requiring a bond from the contractor or subcontractor for this purpose. NLRC [G. 21 May 1998]) Liability of indirect employer for statutory wage increases [T]he liability of the petitioner to reimburse the respondent only arises if and when contractor actually pays its employees the increases granted by Wage Order Nos. of the obligation. should the contractor fail to pay the wages of its employees in accordance with law. vs. principally those on statutory minimum wage. Furthermore. the solidary liability for payment of back wages and separation pay is limited. Nos. This liability of petitioner covers the payment of the workers' performance of any work.R. 126586. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. fairness likewise dictates that the indirect employer should not. NLRC [G. CA [G.

but rather in the application of the general civil law. 0165 (Illegal Dismissal and ULP) against Green Mountain Farm. No. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. on the one hand. Cabato [G. (Deltaventures Resources. The other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes. Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction. such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. Labor Code. such as payment of wages. changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. for the advancement of justice. but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution. 47739]) Petitioner filed the third-party claim before the court a quo by reason of a writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR Sheriff against a property to which it claims ownership. regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1]. No. The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. Paño [G. awards or orders. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. supra) provided the controversy concerns. The complainant was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power. Clearly. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. vs. not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment. to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. to wit: Illegal Dismissal and ULP. and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other. including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case. The writ was issued to enforce and execute the commission's decision in NLRC Case No. overtime compensation or separation pay. intrinsically a civil dispute. it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission acting through the Labor Arbiter.[W]here the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law. Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no labor jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom.R. Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation. 118216. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision.R. maintaining.R. . NLRC [G. It failed to perceive the fact that what it is really controverting is the decision of the Labor arbiter and not the act of the deputy sheriff in executing said order issued as a consequence of said decision rendered. No. including the execution of decisions. In such situations. [Article 212 (l) of the Labor Code] While it is SMC's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself. resolution of the dispute requires expertise. 09 March 2000]) Labor Dispute "Labor dispute" includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. among others. (SMC vs. (Singapore Airlines vs. Considering the factual setting. fixing. Inc. a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts. 161 SCRA 719]) [P]etitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the labor Code. Petitioner failed to realize that by filing its third-party claim with the deputy sheriff. 80774.

lay-off of workers. working regulations. No. in fact. resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. which includes hiring. 1990]) MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES An owner of a business enterprise is given considerable leeway in managing his business because it is deemed important to society as a whole that he should succeed. working methods. The company's prerogatives must be EXERCISED IN GOOD FAITH and with due regard to the rights of labor. 106107. a regular employer-employee relationship may. the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. does exist herein is evident. what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect. for the purpose of collective bargaining. therefore. place and manner of work. dismissal and recall of work. whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and. These rights are collectively called management prerogatives or acts by which one directing a business is able to control the variables thereof so as to enhance the chances of making a profit. who have signed up for Union membership. Bersamira [G. the Union also seeks to represent those workers. the ELBOW ROOM IN THE QUEST FOR PROFITS. whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit. Whether or not the Union demands are valid. an employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose lack of morals. and SanMig's cause's of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues. the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. time. respect and loyalty to his employer. they are not absolute prerogatives but are SUBJECT TO LEGAL LIMITS. In short. Further. SanMig. Put differently. transfer of employees. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS and the GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE. however. The power to dismiss an employee is a recognized prerogative that is inherent in the employer's right to freely manage and regulate his business. according to his own discretion and judgment.R. such right should not be abused and used as a tool of oppression against labor. In fact. While the law recognizes and safeguards this right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. Obvious then is that representation and association. 02 June 1994]) It is noteworthy to state that an employer is free to manage and regulate. that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig.the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). (SMC Employee Union-PTGWO vs. as defined by the law. A priori. and the discipline. the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of the law and pursuant to the basic tenets of equity. Such right. supervision of workers. be said to exist. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE. Hon. tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. for its part." (Chu vs. and as defined by law.R. justice and . "Together. The right of the company to dismiss an employee is a measure of self-protection. NLRC [G. 87700. they may be taken as the freedom to administer the affairs of a business enterprise such that the costs of running it would be below the expected earnings or receipts. basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. He may not be compelled to continue to employ such person whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his employer's interest. for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. Terms. all phases of employment. those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws. Our law. No. the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. regard for his employer's rules and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office. is subject to regulation by the State. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA. has so plainly and completely been bared. therefore. Corollarily. That a labor dispute. At bottom. Again. Thus. recognizes certain rights as inherent in the management of business enterprises. work assignments.

23 July 1991]) [T]he Court has recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer an employee from one office to another within the business establishment provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary. (PT & T vs. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or orders they regard as unjust or illegal. 95449. NLRC. the respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion. August 1997]) Reorganization The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purpose cannot be denied (Abbot Laboratories v. it is the employee's wishes that should be made to prevail.R. the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employer's decision to transfer him to another work place. the solution proposed by the employee herself. In adopting that proposition by way of resolving the controversy. rooted in considerations of personal convenience and difficulties for the family. defiance of management authority cannot be countenanced. ask to negotiate thereon. there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party. But like all other rights. To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by management. 76219. Ichong [G. The Court fails to see how the existence of objections made by the union justify the studied disregard. bring proceedings for redress against the employer before the Ministry of Labor. Even as the law is solicitous of the employees' welfare. (Philippine-Singapore Transit vs. or otherwise irregular for one reason or another. would appear to be the most equitable. illegal. conciliation. Certainly. They may object thereto. Under these circumstances. Surely. 1987. But until and Unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority. It must not be done arbitrarily and without just cause.R. 21 June 1990]) Obedience to Company Rules and Regulations This Court fails to see. on the pleaded theory that the rule or order is unreasonable. No. L-51314. The freedom of management to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied. No. 154 SCRA 713). compliance with their superiors' directives could not have foreclosed their demands for the revocation or revision of the new sales policies or rules. 76959. would be disastrous to the discipline and order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees to preserve and maintain in the working establishment and without which no meaningful operation and progress is possible. No. 76645. No. there are limits. Laplana [G. October 12. it must also protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. there was nothing to prevent them from submitting the requisite reports with the reservation to seek such revocation or revision. G. NLRC [GR No. management is not precluded from undertaking a reorganization within the company or entering into mergers with other companies to meet the demands of the enterprise. Hence. (Yap vs. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules. it cannot ignore the right of the employer to exercise what are clearly and obviously management prerogatives. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and putting to mind the basic elements of justice and fair . In such cases. of her voluntary termination of her employment and the delivery to her of corresponding separation pay. or arbitration. how these objections and accusations justify the deliberate and obdurate refusal of the sales representatives to obey the management's simple requirement for submission by all Premise Sales Representatives (PSRs) of individual reports or memoranda requiring reflecting target revenues which is all that GTE basically required and which it addressed to the employees concerned no less than six (6) times. and of the latter having what was believed to be legitimate reasons for declining that transfer. or wilful disobedience by the sales representatives of direct orders of their superior officers to submit reports. It is impermissible to reverse the process: suspend enforcement of the orders or rules until their legality or propriety shall have been subject of negotiation. benefits and other privileges. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees.R. This is a privilege inherent in the employer's right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. the company has the prerogative to abolish managerial and confidential positions or create new ones as the necessity for them requires. (GTE Directories vs.fairplay. however. the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. 27 May 1991]) Transfers The situation here presented is of an employer transferring an employee to another office in the exercise of what it took to be sound business judgment and in accordance with pre-determined and established office policy and practice.R. Sanchez [G.

v. the fabrication of aluminum handles for ice boxes does not require special dexterity. "such a penalty (of dismissal) must be commensurate with the act. and to make such changes in the duties of its employees as the COMPANY may see fit or convenient for the proper conduct of its business. to classify or reclassify employees. curtail and control factory operations and schedules of production.play. Dolores v. Article II of the CBA expressly provides that: Sec. conduct or omission imputed to the employee and imposed in connection with the employer's disciplinary authority" (at p. But the transfer can be upheld when there is no showing that it is unnecessary. Nor when the real reason is to penalize an employee for his union activities and thereby defeat his right to self-organization. to change the working hours of its employees. we have ruled in Gelmart Industries Phils. to be the sole judge in determining the capacity or fitness of an employee for the position or job to which he has been assigned. the COMPANY shall have the sole and exclusive right and power. where the employee was declared guilty of breach of trust and violation of company rules the penalty of dismissal was not meted to him considering his twenty (20) years of service without any previous derogatory record and his two (2) commendations for honesty from the company. Union Carbide [215 SCRA 554]) Imposition of Penalty.R. to introduce and install new or improved methods or facilities. 667). NLRC. Mary Johnston Hospital v. In the exercise of its functions of management. Many workers could be contracted right in Manila to perform that particular line of work. 102993. inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee . NLRC. that the same cannot preclude the State from inquiring on whether its rigid application would work too harshly on the employee. (Yuco Chemicals vs. direct. The move from Tarlac to Manila at such time would mean a disruption of their studies. the Court held that since the incident was her first offense during her seventeen (17) years of employment the penalty of termination was not commensurate with the act committed. to schedule the hours of work. supra. it was grossly inconvenient to private respondents. Manila Electric Company v. When they received the transfer memorandum directing their relocation to Manila within seven days from notice. classes had already started. to select and hire new employees.. this Court will uphold such exercise (Union Carbide Labor Union vs. NLRC. to require work to be done in excess of eight hours or Sundays or holidays as the exigencies of the service may require. shifts and work schedules. to direct the operations and the working force of its business in all respects. 1991]) Waiver of Management Prerogatives Possible. They are working students. Secondly. v. National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC [ G. among other things. management retained the prerogative. where the employee absented herself without permission from her superior. 176 SCRA 295 (1989). Even when there exist some rules agreed upon between the employer and employee on the subject of dismissal. Inc. to designate the work and the employees to perform it. first violations and length of service. 14 July 1995]) Application of. The reassignment of Halili and Magno to Manila is legally indefensible on several grounds. the Court ruled that the penalty of dismissal was too severe considering her twenty-one (21) years of service with the company and it appearing that it was her first offense. schedule. As enunciated in Radio Communications of the Philippines. we find the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him by respondent Caltex too harsh and unreasonable. As well pointed out by private respondents' counsel. No. . whenever exigencies of the service so require. A commensurate penalty for an offense [W]hile Clarete may be guilty of violation of company rules. Firstly. to plan. there appears to be no genuine business urgency that necessitated their transfer. Verily and wisely. HAVING THE RIGHT SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THAT RIGHT MUST BE EXERCISED. 2. L-75656. With minor infractions.R. And as long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. CBA provision to the contrary Section 2. Inc. Minster of Labor [G. No. National Labor Relations Commission. (Caltex Refinery vs. where the employee had a heated argument with the department head. Thus it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker. to train new employees and improve the skill and ability of employees from one job to another or form one shift to another.

NLRC. 105538 [5 September 1994] The primary standard. . project employees. unless the clear legislative intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION AND/OR STATUS Regular. where the employee was adjudged guilty of tampering a receipt. No. especially after noting that it was his first offense after seven (7) long years of satisfactory service. the employment is also considered regular. but ONLY WITH RESPECT TO SUCH ACTIVITY AND WHILE SUCH ACTIVITY EXISTS. THE TEST IS WHETHER THE FORMER IS USUALLY NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE IN THE USUAL BUSINESS OR TRADE OF THE EMPLOYER. the dismissal meted out on them was too harsh a penalty. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties. dismissal from work would be too severe a penalty under the circumstances.Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. 236 SCRA 315 G.e. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year.R. (Article 280 of the Labor Code) [A]n employment shall be deemed regular if the employee performs activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business and trade of the employer OR if the employee has rendered at least one (1) year of service. the Court ruled that in view of the employee's continuous service of ten (10) years with the company the penalty of dismissal for the minor infractions would be unduly harsh and grossly disproportionate. where the employee shouted at the operations manager. Inc. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. respectively. Radio Communications of the Philippines. Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. the Court ruled that inasmuch as they had served the company without any record of violation or infraction of company rules and regulations prior to the incident for periods ranging from 16 to 26 years. the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. the Court ruled that the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal would certainly be very harsh and disproportionate to the infraction committed. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. the Court ruled that since the employee has been with the company for twenty-six (26) years and nowhere in the records did it appear that she committed any previous violation of company rules and regulations. Ferrochrome Phils.R. where the employees were found guilty of eating while at work. Bonotan v. (De Leon vs. where the employee was found guilty of misappropriating company funds and withholding messages for transmission. ALSO.. therefore. NLRC. even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent. NLRC. i. NLRC. the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. NLRC. Casual and Seasonal employees Regular and casual employment. whether the service be continuous or broken. 70705. Hence. of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. and not to other sections thereof. . 21 August 1989]) [T]he second paragraph of Article 280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition of said Article's first paragraph. whether such service is continuous or broken. The familiar grammatical rule is that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. NLRC [G. vs. v. No such intent is observable in Article 280 of the Labor Code.

as used to describe the period of employment. NLRC [G. they were free to contract services to work for other farm owners. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. BUT NOT ITS LENGTH.R. While the employer. NLRC [G. xxx xxx xxx As the law now stands. 79869. In that sense. that he has the qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for permanent employment. all other employees who do not fall under the definition of the preceding paragraph. (Article 281 of the Labor Code) [A] probationary employee. against private respondents LUTORCO and See Lin Chan considering that petitioners are regular seasonal employees entitled to the benefits of Article 283 of the Labor Code which applies to closure or cessation of an establishment or undertaking. during that period. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. the fact that petitioners do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the tobacco season does not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal employees who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period. Moreover. in said second paragraph. although respondent company therein consistently availed of the services of the petitioners therein from year to year. A probationary appointment is made to afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness of a probationer while at work. 29 November 2000]) Probationary Employees Probationary employment. unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. it was clear that petitioners therein were not in respondent company’s regular employ. seeks to prove to the employer. as understood under Article 282 of the Labor Code. the public respondent NLRC in the case at bar erred in its total affirmance of the dismissal of the consolidated complaint. Being in the nature of a "trial period" the essence of a probationary period of employment fundamentally lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by both the employer and the employee during said period. No. while it may appear that the work of the petitioner is seasonal. No. for separation pay. However. All the foregoing considered. and to ascertain whether he will become a proper and efficient employee. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees. it is within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct of the former before hiring him permanently. a number for over 20 years. inasmuch as petitioners have served the company for many years. Petitioners therein performed different phases of agricultural work in a given year. .The second paragraph of Art. NLRC is misplaced considering that since in said case of Mercado. observes the fitness. The word "PROBATIONARY". 05 September 1991]) In the case at bar. The length of time is immaterial in determining the correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during said period. but merely considered on leave until re-employed.Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the date the employee started working. is one who is on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent employment. the Court ruled in that case that their employment would naturally end upon completion of each project or phase of farm work for which they have been contracted. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment. Private respondent’s reliance on the case of Mercado vs. propriety and efficiency of a probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for permanent employment. serve as badges of regular employment. Thus. Article 281 of the Labor Code gives ample authority to the employer to . vs. (Abasolo vs. as in fact they did.R. (Mercado. on the other. 118475. the probationer. as stated earlier. The proviso. Sr. whether it be a complete or partial cessation of business operation. IMPLIES THE PURPOSE OF THE TERM OR PERIOD. performing services which are necessary and indispensable to LUTORCO’s business. deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have rendered at least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken.

from May 1980 to October 1981. (Biboso vs.R. The Court finds nothing in the law which by any fair interpretation prohibits such a waiver. The law. i. And no public policy protecting the employee and the security of his tenure is served by prescribing voluntary agreements which. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer's account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards. skills. surely. 26 January 1989]) Generally. subject to inquiry and therafter correction by the Department of Labor.R. Leodegario [G. Some people believe six (6) months is the probationary period in all cases. the period expired in accordance with contracts freely entered into. such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. as noted in the assailed order of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave. 72222. In the latter case. It states as follows: Probationary Employment has been the subject of misunderstanding in some quarter. for lack of a better measurement is deemed to be the period needed to learn the job. by reasonably extending the period of probation. actually improve and further a probationary employee's prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment. Conversely. No. By voluntarily agreeing (the extension was with Dequila's written consent) to an extension of the probationary period. their tenure was secure. The moment. the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. or when the job requires certain qualifications. Thus there was the safeguard as to the duration of their employment being respected. Article 281 does not likewise preclude the employer from terminating the probationary employment on justifiable causes as in the instant case. in accordance with the statutory statutory scheme. To that extent. . This purpose should be kept in mind in enforcing this provision of the Code. (Mariwasa vs. (International Catholic Migration vs. 30 January 1989]) This is by no means to assert that the security of tenure protection of the constitution does not apply to probationary employees. was never meant to produce such an inequitable result. that petitioners did not enjoy a permanent status. there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment. This period. they could no longer invoke the constitutional protection. experience or training.terminate a probationary employee for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise. however. L-44360. In the case at bar. Policy Instruction No. NLRC [G. On the other hand employs who have already served the probationary period are sometimes required to serve again on probation. No. such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months. Under the Labor Code. The Labor code has wisely provided for such a case thus: "The termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed with a fixed period shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employees to be secured in their employment as provided herein. if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the said period. The purpose of this policy is to protect the worker at the same time enable the employer to make a meaningful employee selection. 11 of the Minister of Labor and Employment has clarified any and all doubts on the period of probationary employment. Victorias Milling [G. six (6) months is the general probationary period but the probationary period is actually the period needed to determine fitness for the job." There is no question here. 31 March 1977]) [T]he extension of Dequila's probation was ex gratia. During such period they could remain in their positions and any circumvention of their of the rights. an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. This issuance shall take effect immediately.R. it is shown that private respondent Company needs at least eighteen (18) months to determine the character and selling capabilities of the petitioners as sales representatives.e. There is nothing under Article 281 of the Labor Code that would preclude the employer from extending a regular or a permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds that the employee is qualified for regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary period. 74246. especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling.

. which is in effect recommendatory in character. Supervisory employees are those who. if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. and selling ability of its sales representatives. Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are not managerial employees but supervisory employees. is subject to evaluation. No. inclusive. in the interest of the employer. the same. A supervisory employee is different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory employee. where such power. which is Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. suspend. par. PICOP’s contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason that any authority they my exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in character. transfer. (Ver Buiser vs. they do not supervise other managers. A managerial employee is (a) one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies. First-level managers are often called supervisors. (m). effectively recommends such managerial actions. Moreover. transfer. is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law. conduct. No.R. the very contracts of employment signed and acquiesced to by the petitioners specifically indicate that "the company hereby employs the employee as telephone sales representative on a probationary status for a period of eighteen (18) months. the evaluation being based on the published ads. discharge. we arrive at a contrary conclusion. from May 1980 to October 1981. Ranged against these definitions and after a thorough examination of the evidence submitted by both parties.e.R. .R. 101738. lay off. recall. i. an eighteen month probationary period is recognized by the Labor Union in the private respondent company. in the interest of the employer. 12 April 2000]) FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management. or (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. 1984]) Managerial employees and supervisory employees "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire. of the Labor Code is explicit. or to hire. transfer. (PICOP vs. Branch Managers.. assign or discipline employees. First-line managers direct operating employees only. although present.The Company is engaged in advertisement and publication in the Yellow Pages of the PLDT Telephone Directories. suspension and termination of employees is still subject to confirmation and approval of their respective superior. effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. Thus. This stipulation is not contrary to law. No. promotion. The finding of public respondent that bank policies are laid down and/or executed through the collective action of these employees is simply erroneous. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relating to hiring. GTE Directories [G. (NATU-RPB vs. 20 December 1994]) [A] thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. lay-off. 93468. of the Labor Code] The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once apparent. (m). morals and public policy. 212. His discussion on the division of their duties and responsibilities does not logically lead to the conclusion that they are managerial employees. Torres (G. and the clerical supervisor in a large office. the technical supervisor in a research department. Laguesma [G. Examples of first-line managers are the "foreman" or production supervisor in a manufacturing plant. assign or discipline employees.. [Article 212 (m). All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book. xxx xxx xxx And as indicated earlier. as the term is defined in Art. review and final action by the department heads and other higher executives of the company. 212. L-63316. Art. recall. suspend. Publication of solicited ads are only made a year after the sale has been made and only then win the company be able to evaluate the efficiency. discharge. par.

where power. Logically." "president. employees. From the premise that the duties of an employee entail "activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer the" conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of those activities. That distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general. Laguesma [G." The definition seems a non sequitur. What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees. suspension and termination of employees is still subject to the confirmation and approval by their respective supervisor. direction.MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer to more than one level in an organization. Laguesma [288 SCRA 15. managers. Thus. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. xxx xxx xxx Earlier in this opinion. "Managerial employees" may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories: the "managers" per se. (PICOP vs. As can be seen from this description. route managers are responsible for the success of the company's main line of business through management of their respective sales teams. Typical titles of top managers are "chief executive officer." and "senior vice-president." The concept of the employee's duties as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer" is not synonymous with or identical to employment with a fixed term. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization's interactions with its environment. 101738. although present. Whether they belong to the first or the second category. reference was made to the distinction between managers per se (top managers and middle managers) and supervisors (first-line managers). A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle manager. a distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks assigned to them. is not effective and not an exercise of independent judgment as required by law. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on matters relative to hiring. likewise. PICOP’s contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire is ambiguous and misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory in character. is subject to evaluation. which is in effect recommendatory in character." Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest management classification. implement and control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). vis-a-vis employers. promotion. Such management necessarily involves the planning. operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail. THE DECISIVE DETERMINANT IN TERM EMPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT BE THE ACTIVITIES THAT THE EMPLOYEE IS CALLED UPON TO PERFORM. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. and the "supervisors" who form the latter group. TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives. review and final action by department heads and other higher executives of the company. are. (United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. who compose the former group described above. the same. No.R. top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. 12 April 2000]) Term employment The question immediately provoked by a reading of Article 319 is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or period would be valid where the employee "has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of an employment contract and the nature of the employee's duties set down in that contract as being "usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. 1998]) [A] thorough dissection of the job description of the concerned supervisory employees and section heads indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. BUT THE DAY CERTAIN AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES FOR THE COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT . transfer.

duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent. . significantly. There is no question that the purpose behind these individual contracts was to evade the application of the labor laws by making it appear that the drivers of the trucking company were not its regular employees. where the reason for the law does not exist. the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement. to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or. it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary. curing a headache by lopping off the head. holiday pay.g. and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties. No. But the affidavit." By this clever scheme. 05 February 1990]) The private respondent's intention is obvious." Seasonal employment. The private respondent argues that there was nothing wrong with the affidavit because all the affiant acknowledged therein was full payment of the amount due him under the agreement. A DAY CERTAIN BEING UNDERSTOOD TO BE "THAT WHICH MUST NECESSARILY COME.. for all its seeming innocuousness. vacation and sick leaves. . Under these arrangements. L-48494. it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. e. (Brent School vs. to preclude absurdity in its application. morals. the private respondent did not even have to wait for the expiration of the contract as it was there provided that it could be "earlier terminated at the option of either party.RELATIONSHIP. and employment for a particular project are merely instances employment in which a period. the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers. No cause had to be established because such renewal was subject to the discretion of the parties. Zamora (G. such as a minimum wage. not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly. where it is indeed the employee himself who insists upon a period or where the nature of the engagement is such that. under a narrow and literal interpretation. they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy. necessarily implied. Unless thus limited in its purview.R. the private respondent hoped to be able to terminate the services of the drivers without the inhibitions of the Labor Code. such acknowledgment was indeed not necessary at all because this was already embodied in the vouchers signed by the payee-driver. without being seasonal or for a specific project. xxx xxx xxx There can of course be no quarrel with the proposition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee. would an agreement fixing a period be essentially evil or illicit. or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. In fact. etc. but would also appear to restrict. therefore anathema? Would such an agreement come within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of the right of the employee to be secured in . were uniformly limited to a six-month period. xxx xxx xxx Accordingly. the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences. Viewed in this light. imported . without reasonable distinctions. It is remarkable that neither the NLRC nor the Solicitor General recognized it. as already observed. costof-living allowances. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE KNOWN WHEN. But where no such intent to circumvent the law is shown. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation. All it had to do was refuse to renew the agreements. a definite date of termination is a sine qua non. the private respondent could also prevent the drivers from becoming regular employees and thus be entitled to security of tenure and other benefits. more relevantly. (his) employment?" As it is evident from even only the three examples already given that Article 280 of the Labor Code. where not expressly set down. or stated otherwise. and other statutory requirements. which. without any force.

It was a deceitful agreement cloaked in the habiliments of legality to conceal the selfish desire of the employer to reap undeserved profits at the expense of its employees. No. to a one-month period. 79869. 78693. or upon evidence aliunde of the intent to evade. No. or: 2.more than that. and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. . (PNOC vs. duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent. xxx xxx xxx The Court looks with stern disapproval at the contract entered into by the private respondent with the petitioner (and who knows with how many other drivers). the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. vs. The fact that the drivers are on the whole practically unlettered only makes the imposition more censurable and the avarice more execrable. at any time and for any cause satisfactory to itself. NLRC [G. The agreement was in reality a contract of employment into which were read the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice policy mandated by the Constitution. Ople [G. 05 September 1991]) . or even less by simply paying the employee a month's salary.R. . (1st paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code) A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. 61594. without any force.R. to be sure. The agreement was a clear attempt to exploit the unwitting employee and deprive him of the protection of the Labor Code by making it appear that the stipulations of the parties were governed by the Civil Code as in ordinary private transactions. we consider that those provisions must be read together and when so read. by which fixed contracts of employments can be said NOT to circumvent security of tenure. They were not. This indication must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the ernployment agreement. 28 September 1990]) Project employees …[W]here the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. The fixed period of employment was KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AGREED UPON by the parties. Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three (3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the employer PIA. NLRC [G. .R. are either: 1. What was insidious about the document was the waiver the affiant was unwarily making of the statutory rights due him as an employee of the trucking company. 31 March 1993]) It is apparent from Brent School that the critical consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial indication that the period specified in an employment agreement was designed to circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. the Court considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even during the limited period of three (3) years. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to shorten that term. (Cielo vs. No. 97747. the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. . No. (Mercado. Because the net effect of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA. NLRC [G. Sr. It satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee DEALT WITH EACH OTHER ON MORE OR LESS EQUAL TERMS with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former on the latter.R. 28 January 1991]) [T]he two guidelines. Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private respondents. (Pakistan Air Lines vs. the fixed period of three (3) years specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement.

AND EFFECTUATE MANAGEMENT POLICIES [specifically in the field of LABOR RELATIONS]. (Fernandez vs. if considered employees of the construction company while in the work pool. SECONDLY. Laguesma [G." necessarily the duration of the employment of its work force is not permanent but co-terminus with the projects to which they are assigned and from whose payrolls they are paid. we note that "project" could refer to one or the other of at least two (2) distinguishable types of activities. one of whom petitioner. Since its work depends on the availability of such contracts or "projects. Respondent Commission correctly observed in its decision that complainants. but which is distinct and separate. The two criteria are cumulative. there must be proof to the effect that petitioner was under an obligation to be always available on call of private respondent and that he was not free to offer his services to other employees. (Cartagenas vs. the scope and duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of employment.R.In the realm of business and industry.R. 82973. It would be extremely burdensome for their employer who. 20 which was issued by then Secretary Ople to stabilize employer-employee relations in the construction industry to support his contention that workers in the construction industry may now be considered regular employees after their long years of service with private respondent." and their services may be lawfully terminated at completion of the project. in regard (2) TO PERSONS WHO FORMULATE. The case at bar presents what appears to our mind as a typical example of this kind of "project. based on substantial evidence in the records.. that the petitioners are only project workers of the private respondent. No. from the other undertakings of the company. No.g. the private respondent depends for its business on the contracts it is able to obtain from real estate developers and builders of buildings. and identifiable as such. a twenty-five-storey hotel in Makati. (Sugbuanon Rural Bank. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business operations of the employer. 20 reads: Members of a work pool from which a construction company draws its project employees. Inc. 106090. The pertinent provision of Policy Instruction No.R. The term "project" could also refer to. NLRC [G. the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer. 02 August 1994]) As an electrical contractor. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable times. like them.R. that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion in finding. The job or undertaking also begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Employees who are hired for the carrying out of one of these separate projects. a particular job or undertaking that is NOT WITHIN THE REGULAR BUSINESS OF THE CORPORATION. Unfortunately. 109902. petitioner miserably failed to introduce any evidence of such nature during the times when there were no project. In other words. NLRC [G. 02 February 2000]) . 28 February 1994]) Confidential Employees Confidential employees are those who (1) ASSIST OR ACT IN A CONFIDENTIAL CAPACITY. DETERMINE. failed to consider the requirement in Policy Instruction No. The typical example of this first type of project is a particular construction job or project of a construction company. are non-project employees or employees for an indefinite period. 116194. No. the completion of the project or of any phase thereof will not mean severance of employer-employee relationship. and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is. vs. are properly treated as "project employees. a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is WITHIN THE REGULAR OR USUAL BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER company. We hold. 20 that to qualify as member of a work pool." (ALU-TUCP vs. FIRSTLY. No. therefore. Romago Electric [G. A construction company ordinarily carries out two or more discrete identifiable construction projects: e. 1989]) [P]etitioner relies on Policy Instruction No. If they are employed in a particular project. the worker must still be considered an employee of the construction company while in the work pool. depends on the availability of projects. and a domestic air terminal in Iloilo City. if it would have to carry them as permanent employees and pay them wages even if there are no projects for them to work on. and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. a residential condominium building in Baguio City.

or which the association represents. once acquired. as college secretary. 110399. a teacher may also be appointed as a department head or administrative officer of the school. was defined and delineated in Executive Order No. the right of self-organization does indeed pertain to all "employees of all branches. does not operate as a relinquishment or loss by him of his security of tenure as a faculty member. deans. Inc. the faculty members. an employee of a labor union. e. such information must relate to the employer's labor relations policies. or of a management association. may and should acquire tenure in accordance with the rules and regulations of the DECS and the school's own rules and standards. the agreement between him and the school may very well include a provision for him to continue teaching even on a part-time basis. CREATING A PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR. on one hand teachers. The teaching staff. or the association. If access to confidential labor relations information is to be a factor in the determination of an employee's confidential status. he retains his tenure as a teacher during all the time that he occupies the additional position of department head or administrative officer of the school. (La Salette of Santiago. associate professors. and knowledge of labor relations information pertaining to the companies with which the union deals. That tenure. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES The scope of the constitutional right to self-organization of "government employees" above mentioned. acquire a second or additional tenure. assistant instructors. 1991]) RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION As to Government Employees and Employees of GOCCs with original charters EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. and should therefore be clearly and specifically provided by law or contract. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Laguesma [G.R. will not render an employee a confidential employee. vs. subdivisions. Thus. the union. assistant deans.. (SMC vs. assistant professors. Now. On the other hand. teachers appointed to serve as administrative officials do not normally and should not expect to." "Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business standpoint. xxx xxx xxx A distinction should thus be drawn between the teaching staff of private educational institutions. as high school's principal.g. will not cause an employee to be excluded from the bargaining unit representing employees of the union or association. as member of the school's governing council. principals. must have access to confidential labor relations information with respect to his employer. NLRC [195 SCRA 80. said access does not render the employee a confidential employee. Contracts of that sort are anathema and will be struck down as null and void. No. as college dean or assistant dean. such as financial information or technical trade secrets. According to this Executive Order. directors." such employees "shall not be discriminated against in respect of their employment by reason of their membership in employees' organizations or participation in the .Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor relations information but such is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties. 180 (Effective: 01 June 1987) PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO RGANIZE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.MANAGEMENT COUNCIL. Indeed. 180. full professors and department or administrative heads or officials on the other college or department secretaries. Except in the case of a clear and explicit agreement to the contrary. The acquisition of such an additional tenure is not normal. the acceptance by a teacher of an administrative position offered to him or to which he might have aspired. 15 August 1997]) Teachers The acquisition of security of tenure by the teacher in the manner indicated signifies that he shall thenceforth have the right to remain in employment as such teacher until he reaches the compulsory retirement age in accordance with the rules of the school or the law. to be regarded a confidential employee. cannot be adversely affected or defeated by requiring the teacher to execute contracts stipulating the termination of his employment upon the expiration of a fixed period or term. instrumentalities and agencies of the Government. is the exception rather than the rule.

join or assist employees organizations of their own choosing" under Executive Order No. Section 2.. But the right of GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES to "form. employees.e. i. However. 180 concedes to government employees. Excluded from negotiation by government employees are the "terms and conditions of employment . For this purpose. dismiss. grievances and cases involving government employees" is not ordinarily left to collective bargaining or other related concerted activities. to engage in concerted activities for the attainment of their objectives. 180 declares that "high level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy making or managerial. To hire. but to "Civil Service Law and labor laws and procedures whenever applicable. 2. covered by this Executive Order shall be referred to as "government employees". boycotts. This Executive Order applies to all employees of all branches. including police officers. All government employees can form. 43633-34. To effectively recommend such managerial actions. A "high level employee" is one "whose functions are normally considered policy determining. the employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. They can also form. Section 4. or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees. of the Government. the executive order is quick to add that those activities must be exercised in accordance with law." admittedly includes the right to deal and negotiate with their respective employers in order to fix the terms and conditions of employment and also. 180 explicitly provide that since the "terms and conditions of employment in the government." In other words. the concept of the government employees' right of self-organization differs significantly from that of employees in the private sector. like their counterparts in the private sector. suspend. . (Arizala vs." What is more." that "the resolution of complaints. including the right to strike." And while EO No. that are fixed by law. assign or discipline employees. the right to engage in concerted activities. policemen. labor-management committees. A managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as: 1. instrumentalities. 14 September 1990]) I.e. 180 is not regarded as existing or available for "purposes of collective bargaining. "to form. COVERAGE Section 1. lay off. picketing." it being only those terms and conditions not otherwise fixed by law that "may be subject of negotiation between the duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities. or 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and-file government employees. i. join or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. recall. To formulate or execute management policies and decisions. The Executive Order shall not apply to the members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The latter's right of self-organization. subdivisions. works councils and other forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives.. in conjunction with appropriate government authorities.R. and agencies." and that in case "any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all available remedies under existing laws and procedures. Nos." but simply "FOR THE FURTHERANCE AND PROTECTION OF THEIR INTERESTS. managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential in nature.. the Rules and Regulations implementing Executive Order No. Section 3. are subject both to "Civil Service Law and rules" and "any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. firemen and jail guards. such as strikes. Executive Order No. join or assist employees' organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. On the matter of limitations on membership in labor unions of government employees.normal activities of their organization x x (and their) employment shall not be subject to the condition that they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees' organizations. the right of Government employees to deal and negotiate with their respective employers is not quite as extensive as that of private employees. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law. the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the (Public Sector Labor-Management) Council for appropriate action. CA [G. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. transfer.

Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof. either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations. functioning or administration of government employees' organizations through acts designed to place such organizations under the control of government authority. benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of this Code. If there be any unresolved grievances. the Bureau of Labor Relations shall. the dispute may be referred to the Public . However.The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees. Their salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as provided for in the new constitution. Government authorities shall not interfere in the establishment. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employers unit consisting of rank-and-file employees unless circumstances otherwise require. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate organizational unit. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. except those that are fixed by law. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt thereof. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment. order the conduct of a certification election and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization unit. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the Department of Labor and Employment. Their employment shall not be subject to the condition that they shall not join or shall relinquish their membership in the employees' organizations. Upon approval of the application. REGISTRATION OF EMPLOYEES' ORGANIZATION Section 7. Section 11. Government employees shall not be discriminated against in respect of their employment by reason of their membership in employees' organizations or participation in the normal activities of their organization. through their unions or associations.) Government employees may. Section 12. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE Section 5. SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATIVES Section 9. based on records of the Bureau of Labor Relations. shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. (Article 276 of the Labor Code. upon petition. and that the said organizations has the majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the organizational unit. there shall be no reduction of existing wages. as amended. V. a registration certificate be issued to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake activities to further and defend its interest. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the employees. may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government authorities. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration. . Section 8. Section 10. IV.II. III. Section 6. TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES Section 13. therefore. rules and regulations. Government employees.

do not seek to establish that they have a right to strike. which took effect after the instant dispute arose. mass leaves. No. it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.O. all government officers and employees from staging strikes. its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. As now provided under Sec. as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical. s. . by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. They claim that their gathering was not a strike. "prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees .. walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government. 69870.2(l) see also Sec. CA [G. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government. recognizing their right to do so.O. NLRC. walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages.R." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No.Management Council for appropriate action. to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. At present. 4. therefore. Strike. No.Employees to SelfOrganization. (SSSEA vs. undertaken for essentially economic reasons. G.owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. 38 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike. subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? The Court is of the considered view that they are. Nos. fixing. No. No. 85279." (SSSEA vs. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government. 180. demonstrations.A. or absence from. PEACEFUL CONCERTED ACTIVITIES AND STRIKES Section 14.Sector Labor . changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. or regulating the exercise of the right. they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of. 1 of E. [T]o implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize. they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances." should not principally resolve the present case. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter.R. Rather. 1987 which. The Civil Service laws and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees.. subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21. their participation therein did not constitute any offense. [At this juncture. 39 With these premises. CA [G. regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. In Section 14 thereof. MPSTA vs. 6 and as implied in E. 85279. No. 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. . or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. having been created under R. including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches. as defined by law. they are prohibited from striking. instrumentalities. the President issued E. we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition. like workers in the private sector. it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed. enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions. 6 is not at issue]. and agencies of the Government. work which it was the teachers' duty to perform. 37 in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike. 1161. This being the case. 28 July 1989]) We now come to the case before us. maintaining." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. Petitioners. Sec. 6.R. Laguio 36 and ACT vs. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes. Cariño.O. No. 28 July 1989]) VI. subdivisions. IX(B).

180 dated June 1.Management . The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. their "employers" to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materially. weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within bounds of the law.… (Jacinto vs. the Council shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order. "concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from. PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT COUNCIL Section 15. 87676. CA [G.R. 180). after classes. the Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the Department of Labor and Employment. 95445. No. CSC [G. But the school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits.O." The claim that the teachers involved in the 1990 mass actions were merely exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly was already rejected in Gan vs. rules and regulations [Art. constituting. Petitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities essentially. undertaken for essentially economic reasons. as they did.Member The Council shall implement and administer the provisions of this Executive Order. (Republic vs. Its employees are civil service employees (Sec. No. Department of Budget and Management . MPSTA vs. (Gan vs. the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. 06 August 1991]) [T]he claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld like any other liberty. No. the CSC or even the Supreme Court – could have held them liable for their participation in the mass action.R. 14 November 1997]) It has long been settled that the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers amounted to a strike in every sense of the term. Laguio [G. 276].Member Secretary.Vice Chairman Secretary. Civil Service Commission . 14. Since NPDC is a government agency. 14 December 1993]) VII. 110717. Had the teachers availed of their free-time recess. there is as yet no law permitting them to strike. is hereby constituted to be composed of the following: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Chairman. 124540. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor . A Public Sector Labor Management Council. work which it was the teachers" duty to perform.R. abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Article IX. No. While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join unions of their choice.It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the nonholding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. no one – not the DECS. must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. 1987 provides that the Public Sector Labor-Management Council. 2. Executive Order No. Civil Service Commission. Department of Finance . For this purpose. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the government. hence. E. On the contrary.R. 20 December 1989]) It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and. Clearly. hereinafter referred to as the Council. CA [G.Chairman Secretary. 1987 Constitution).Member Secretary. Department of Labor and Employment . Section 15 of Executive Order No. More importantly. Department of Justice . its employees are covered by civil service rules and regulations (Sec. not the Department of Labor and Employment. No. shall hear the dispute. they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protest on regular school days.

129.. the Regional Trial Court was not precluded. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others are its employees. if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union. is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either. .Managerial employees are not eligible to join. irrespective of the name of shares owned by its members they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affair of the cooperative. (Article 245 of the Labor Code) The reasons for the disqualification of a managerial employee from joining or assisting a labor organization is applied also to confidential employees thru the doctrine of necessary implication. preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from minimum wage laws. 16]. managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer. 28 July 1989]) VIII. wherein the SC took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. No. the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. Their share capital earn limited interests. negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country. IX.P. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. to act as its representatives. 77951. (SSSEA vs. In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures.Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures. This being the case. As to Members of a cooperative A cooperative. 26 September 1988] As to Managerial Employees Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization. the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. shall be followed in the resolution of complaints. Sanchez. 85279. assist or form any labor organization. right of supervisory employees. by persons. They enjoy special privileges as exemption from income tax and sales taxes. No." In the collective bargaining process.. since it is the Council. whenever applicable. Blg. therefore. and to see to it that its interests are well protected. Thus. and not the NLRC. However. in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.R. in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Section 16. collective bargaining. he corectly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the cooperative. resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. Clearly. EFFECTIVITY Section 17. partnerships or corporations. Collective bargaining in such a . grievances and cases involving government employees. thus: ". CA [G. As above stated. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. as amended. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join. from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein.R. Unlike the NLRC. for appropriate action. certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization. that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute. An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. Ferrer-Calleja [G. the Public Sector Labor Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. 1981 of the Solicitor General. (Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City vs. In the opinion of August 14. the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the Council.

in the normal course of their duties. lay-off. and the rank-and-file employees on the other. they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect. A managerial employee is defined under Art. discharge. assisting. suspend. thus. if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and-file or where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining. 116194. 212 (k) of the new Labor Code as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire. or other labor relations matters. 02 February 2000]) The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who. xxx xxx xxx The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of rank-and-file is replete with jurisprudence. 78755. Hon. Inc.R. No. It must be stressed. (Sugbuanon Rural Bank. The reason behind the Industrial Peace Act provision on the same subject matter has been adopted in the present statute. Calleja [G. or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.R. transfer. No. Unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the employers. become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee rule. vs. 93468. however. vs. assign or discipline employees. The performance of those functions may. as in the case at bar. "Management should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company's position with regard to contract negotiations. then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company. the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests or that the Union can be company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. Laguesma [G. the supervisors will be . 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities.situation can become one-sided. All employees not falling within this definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. The functions of supervisors. Augusto Sanchez (144 SCRA 628) reiterating herein the rationale for such ruling as follows: if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union. or joining a union." The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests.R. Laguesma [G. 19 July 1989]) Art. the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees.R. are separate and distinct." (Golden Farms vs. Inc. xxx xxx xxx Thus. 15 August 1997]) As to Supervisory Employees The rationale for the amendment is the government's recognition of the right of supervisors to organize with the qualification that they shall not join or assist in the organization of rank-and-file employees. The intent of the law is clear especially where. the disposition of grievances. (NATU-RPB vs. that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations information." (SMC vs. recall. No. under the doctrine of necessary implication. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming. No. are more identified with the interests of the employer. run counter to the interests of the rank-and-file. The interests of supervisors on the one hand. However. being recommendatory in nature. 29 December 1994]) As to Confidential Employees We have decreed as disqualified from bargaining with management in case of Bulletin Publishing Co. Torres [G. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. 110399.

enacted on 24 December 1986. and should he choose to join. when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". By virtue of such repeal and substitution. To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement. in the same breath. join or refrain from Joining an association. whereby an employee may. Hence. where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein. 3350. No.e. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act. he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Republic Act No. he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. properties and premises of the employer shall not be eligible for membership. however. before the enactment of RA No. NLRC [G. Security guards and other personnel employed for the protection and security of the person. 875 recognize freedom of association. before its amendment by Republic Act No. and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. reading as follows: Art. POWER. and guaranteed to the employee. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law. is the "right" to join associations of his choice. (Atlas Lithographic vs. It is clear. repealed the original provisions of Article 245 of the Labor Code. and even after he has joined. namely: first. provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Republic Act No. 245. (Philips Industrial vs. that the RIGHT TO JOIN A UNION INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO ABSTAIN FROM JOINING ANY UNION. 3350 introduced an exception. in any labor organization. therefore. by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union. therefore. Freedom of Religion Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. and substituted it with the following provision: Art. Section 3 of Republic Act No. the absence of legal restraint. Laguesma [205 SCRA]) As to Security Guards Section 6 of E. upon the employee the duty to join associations. No. i. The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is. It is. Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized. Right of employees in the public service. 3350. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935. regardless of his religious beliefs. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association. as he pleases. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects . LIBERTY OR FREEDOM. it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes. join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. wishes to be employed or to keep his employment. the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association. security guards became eligible for membership in any labor organization. if any person. therefore. however. if such labor organization is the representative of the employees". the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn. he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join. whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law. 111. 245. 25 June 1992]) Right to Unionize vs.R. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to selforganization and to form.co-mingling with those employees whom they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit. 88957. as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973.O.. a right comprehends at least two broad notions. By virtue. Ineligibility of security personnel to join any labor organization. it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to. provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right". of a closed shop agreement. and second. limited.

The qualified members of the KASAMA KO may join the NAMAWU-MIF if they want to be union members. however. (Victoriano vs. September 1974]) Under Section 4(a)." On June 18. Ferrer-Calleja [G. (2) Affinity and unit of employees' interest. they can do so. 12 September 1974]) Bargaining Unit A "bargaining unit" has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer. work. or similarity of compensation and working conditions. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith. What the exception provides. therefore. upholds and reinforces it. (University of the Philippines vs. far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association. as follows: . Elizalde [G. This case does not fall squarely within the exception. L-25246. seasonal probationary employees. such as temporary. Bureau of Labor Relations (155 SCRA 283 [1987]): . xxx xxx xxx . and to be consistent with the one-union. and the laws it enforces. 3350. If. management.which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. and (5) Other factors: the history. L-25246. The proliferation of unions in an employer unit is discouraged as a matter of policy unless there are compelling reasons which would deny a certain class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining. they can do so. Republic Act No.. or not to affiliate. of Republic Act No. the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein. comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees. indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law. extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same employer. 3350 was enacted. consistent with equity to the employer. notwithstanding their religious beliefs. 875 (IPA). that in spite of any closed shop agreement. or other employers in the same industry. is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers. and the relationship between the unit or units proposed and the employer's organization. members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". such as substantial similarity of work and duties.R. It has been the policy of the Bureau to encourage the formation of an employer unit 'unless circumstances otherwise require. It is clear... v. and working conditions of the employees. introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. if such labor organization is the representative of the employees. neither does the law prohibit them from joining. the desires of the employees. No. 875. that the assailed Act. No. with labor unions. they refuse to sign up. paragraph 4. (3) Prior collective bargaining history.. No. Republic Act No. 14 July 1992]) Factors to be considered in determining the proper bargaining unit: (1) Will of the employees (Globe Doctrine). the eligibility of the employees for membership in the union or unions involved. As held in the case of General Rubber and Footwear Corp.R. One Company – One Union Policy We see no need for the formation of another union in PHILTRANCO. which the collective interest of all the employees. prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union. 3350. (4) Employment status. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. the law does not coerce them to join. and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. therefore.R. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate. and operation. (Victoriano vs. 96189. one-company policy of the Department of Labor and Employment. Elizalde [G. wages. does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. the skill. 1961. therefore.

875 (Industrial Peace Act) requiring of labor unions registration by the Department of Labor in order to qualify as "LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION. L-50283-84. No. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations. not being a legitimate labor organization.R. much less said personality. We cannot allow one unit for typists and clerks. may not validly present representation issues. 28 June 1989]) LABOR ORGANIZATIONS Labor Organization.It is natural in almost all fairly sized companies to have groups of workers discharging different functions. the act of petitioners cannot be considered a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization. or impostors who pose as organizers. Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration): Any applicant labor organization. 20 April 1983]) Ordinarily. (Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code) Registration Requirement In PAFLU vs.' The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges. 27 SCRA 40. No. although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. in order to protect legitimate labor and at the same time maintain discipline and responsibility within its ranks. fraud. Where shall the line be drawn? The questioned decision of the public respondent can only lead to confusion. associations or unions and the possession of the 'rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations. of Labor case. 85343. associations and union or workers are engaged affect public interest. Simply put. . Hence. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. and includes any branch or local thereof. No company could possibly have all employees performing exactly the same work. which are mere statutory creations. BLR [G. discord and labor strife. Therefore. No. and so on in needless profusion.A.R. "Labor organization" means any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. which should be protected.00) registration fee. supra. Sec. We had occasion to interpret Section 23 of R. which may be exercised with or without said registration. Variety of tasks is to be expected. Sec. Inciong [G. the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) Which petitioners claim to represent. "Legitimate labor organization" means any labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment. (Article 212 (g) of the Labor Code) Legitimate Labor Organization. association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (a) Fifty-pesos (P50. a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. (Villar vs. for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses. It would not be in the interest of sound labor-management relations if each group of employees assigned to a specialized function or section would decide to break away from their fellow-workers and form their own separate bargaining unit. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 17 is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association. another unit for messengers and drivers. We affirm and reiterate the rationale explained in Phil Association of Free Labor Unions vs. of Labor. (Philtranco Service Enterprises vs. because the activities in which labor organizations. one unit for accountants. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power." and We said: The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No.

may not be supplanted by mere regulation. not only to give the grievance machinery or appeals' body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself. copies . It premises its case on the principles laid down in Progressive and Protection Technology. under the third paragraph of Article 7 of the Civil Code. the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization. 04 February 1992]) By virtue of DEPARTMENT ORDER NO. a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief. Pagpalain's only recourse now is to have said order declared null and void.R. provided that where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the same as that of the federation or national union. this fact shall be indicated accordingly. 15 July 1999]) Role of Constitution and By-Laws “[T]he Constitution and By-laws of an organization serve as a contract that binds its members. No. he overlooked or deliberately ignored the fact that .) When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute. No. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body. Since Department Order No. it was granted under the conditions laid down in the documentary requirements submitted. hence the terms and conditions set forth therein must be complied with. which provides that [j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. it will decide the same correctly. Trajano [G. Secretary [G.(b) The names of its officers. 9 is illegal. their addresses. Trajano [G. 133215. or grievance machinery. 96425. of its annual financial reports. No. Citing Article 8 of the Civil Code. Thus. (c)The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws. such as petitioner's complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions funds. First. xxx xxx xxx Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements.” (Oca vs. is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter. (d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more years. 76189.R. This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The constitution and by-laws of the organization are part and parcel of the documents submitted. and when such personality was granted. allegedly because it contravenes the above-mentioned rulings of this Court." Pagpalain declares the two cases part of the law of the land which. and the principal office of the local/chapter. the minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the members who participated in it. Petitioner's premature invocation of public respondent's intervention is fatal to his cause of action. the principal address of the labor organization. the minutes of the organizational meeting and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings. 9. All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certified under oath by the Secretary or Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested by its President. (b)The names of the local/chapter's officers. when petitioner brought before the DOLE his complaint charging private respondents with unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds. (Pagpalain Haulers. SERIES OF 1997. Inc. vs. Evidently. 9 has done away with the submission of books of account as a requisite for registration. their addresses. 08 August 1991]) (The labor organization owes its personality to the state. Pagpalain maintains that Department Order No. the documents needed to be submitted by a local or chapter have been reduced to the following: (a)A charter certificate issued by the federation or national union indicating the creation or establishment of the local/chapter. (c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty 20% percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seek to operate. (Progressive Development vs. however. and (e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union. this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body.R. as in this case. but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention.

public respondent Bienvenido E. Court of Industrial Relations. March 15. it is indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. When the THEU disaffiliated from its mother federation. Noriel. It does not mean that the said local union cannot stand on its own. Laguesma. is composed of a number of individuals. 1990]) CERTIFICATION ELECTIONS Nature of It is thus of the very essence of the regime of industrial democracy sought to be attained through the collective bargaining process that there be no obstacle to the freedom Identified with the exercise of the right to self-organization. 112 SCRA 440). No. There is this relevant excerpt: "The institution of collective bargaining is. In the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union a local may sever its relationship with its parent (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (FFW) v. and not the NATU federation. committed no grave abuse of discretion. 108951." An even later pronouncement in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment (pp. to recall Cox a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. 07 March 2000]) Right of Local to Disaffiliate from the Federation The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother federation is well-settled. xxx xxx xxx Further. No. Bureau of Labor Relations.R. xxx xxx xxx The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union THEU in the registration with the Department of Labor is merely to stress that the THEU is NATU's affiliate at the time of the registration. As labor. Thus. That is the teaching of a recent decision. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working . however. This right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Volkschel Labor Union v. under the new Labor Code. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. make their own rules by coming to terms. (Tropical Hut Employees Union vs. a certification election must be conducted. and this is usually the case. June 19. 37687. PLDT Co. United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. have made clear. that there is more than one such group fighting for that privilege. Although NATU was designated as the sole bargaining agent in the check-off authorization form attached to the CBA. 667-706. Labor is to be represented by a union that can express its collective will. Free Telephone Workers Union to the latest. 137 SCRA 42). Philippine Communications Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation (PCWF) v. When the local union withdrew from the old federation to join a new federation. there is no merit in the contention of the respondents that the act of disaffiliation violated the union security clause of the CBA and that their dismissal as a consequence thereof is valid. 1982. being a separate and voluntary association. A local union. That is to govern themselves in matters that really count. it was merely exercising its primary right to labor organization for the effective enhancement and protection of common interests. (Diamonon vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation. Neither can it be interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests independently of the federation. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a certification election. The NATU POSSESSED THE STATUS OF AN AGENT WHILE THE LOCAL UNION REMAINED THE BASIC PRINCIPAL UNION WHICH ENTERED INTO CONTRACT WITH THE RESPONDENT COMPANY.the same is clearly dismissible for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Bureau of Labor Relations speaks similarly: "Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election for the collective bargaining process. DOLE [G. 1985. labor and management. No. in dismissing petitioner's complaint. A perusal of the collective bargaining agreements shows that the THEU-NATU. L45824. Rollo). the former did not lose its legal personality as the bargaining union under the CBA. The two parties to the relationship. In the event. A local union owes its creation and continued existence to the will of its members and not to the federation to which it belongs. was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters concerning wages. Tropical Hut [181 SCRA 173. this simply means it was acting only for and in behalf of its affiliate.

Inc. the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. No. L-11029. L-41937..force. by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) and C. the employer. LVN Pictures. which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification election among its monthly-paid rank-and-file employees. No. Secretary [G. No. this Court notes that it is petitioner. and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings.R. C. Noriel [G. they should not. Bulakena Restaurant vs. 06 July 1976]) In any case. Benguet Consolidated. Trajano. it is the keystone of industrial democracy. is not such as to foreclose all further disputes as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between SSI and private respondents herein.R. in the sense in which this term is ordinarily understood. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective. (San Miguel vs. The decision in a certification election case. be considered parties thereto with the concomitant right to oppose it. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise. A certification election is not a “litigation” in the sense in which this term is understood. for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees.R. if given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice. This must not be so. for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with a purely internal affair of labor. and a certification election is not such a proceeding. (Sandoval Shipyards vs.I. Inc." (FOITAF vs. The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively. fact finding character in which the Court of Industrial Relations plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of employees as to the matter of their representation (NLU vs. is controlling..R. Its role in a certification election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. 116172. be adversarial. not jurisdictional requisite. Clearly implicit in these requirements is that the action or proceedings in which is issued the “prior judgment” that would operate in bar of a subsequent action between the same parties for the same cause. Pepito [G. 23 SCRA 436.R. 1 SCRA 132). the following requisites must concur: …. but a mere investigation of a non-adversary. as that of a mere by-stander.R. Generally. vs. 16 November 1993]) Direct Certification . however. The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are working. No.. or contentious as distinguished from an ex parte hearing or proceeding of which the party seeking relief has given legal notice to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. fact-finding character. 106446.I. An employer that involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact it wants to create a company union. but an investigation of a non-adversary. 1958. Indeed. While employers may rightfully be notified or informed of petitions of such nature. vs. which exception finds no application in the case before us. 45 SCRA 95. in which the investigating agency plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of the employees as to the matter of their representation. establishing a regime of self rule. It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections. which are non-litigious but merely investigative and non-adversarial in character (National Mines vs.. Sound policy dictates that they should maintain a strictly hands-off policy. management and labor. May 23. 10 October 1996]) This Court has always stressed that a certification proceeding is not a litigation. technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. by the very nature of such proceeding. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related thereto. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest. Go Soc and Sons. 25 June 2001]) [V]erification of a pleading is a formal. Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n. It is an established doctrine that for res adjudicata to apply. 143428. Laguesma [G.

(IBM vs. 1990 was a consent election and not a certification election. (Algire vs. the direct certification originally allowed under Article 257 of the Labor Code has apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers. was a consent election. an alternative choice of the employee voting. The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization. neither the quoted provision nor any other in the Omnibus Implementing Rules expressly bars the inclusion of the choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. 13 September 1991]) Voluntary Recognition The petition has no merit. an alternative choice of the employee voting. 84685. in an unorganized establishment like the SMC Calasiao Beer Region. Ferrer-Calleja [G. No. and. 97622. And whether the prevailing "NO" votes are inspired by considerations of religious belief or discipline or not is beside the point. one indicating the answer. if so. which became effective on March 4. No. It was an agreed one. Besides. If the results of the election should disclose that the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union. what was agreed to be held at the company's premises and which became the root of this controversy. The original Rules on Certification promulgated by the defunct CIR required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to determine which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain. (Central Negros vs. 1987. to the effect that he desires not to which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain.R. to the effect that he desires not to be represented by any union. no union can represent the employees in collective bargaining. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the import and effort of a certification election. This amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which is no longer available now under the change in said provision. De Mesa [G. join or assist any labor organization or withdraw or resign from one may be validly eliminated and he be consequently coerced to vote for one or another of the competing unions and be represented by one of them. aside from the names of each union.R. that the direct certification ordered by respondent Secretary is not proper. Ordinarily. And where only one union was involved. not a certification election. the purpose being merely to determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit." is quite clear acknowledgment of the alternative possibility that the "NO" votes may outnumber the "YES" votes indicating that the majority of the employees in the company do not wish to be represented by any union in which case. the voter shall make his cross or check in the square indicating "YES" or "NO. 23 February 1990]) Consent Election To resolve the issue of union representation at the Universal Robina Textile plant. however. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111. Indeed it is doubtful if the employee's alternative right NOT to form.R. as the petitioner did. 94045. "Yes" the other. it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. then their wishes must be respected. 19 October 1994]) Certification Election Proceedings The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by law but also in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. and may not be inquired into at all. If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees. It is unmistakable that the election held on November 15. aside from the names of each union.We rule. for it is the employees' prerogative (not the employer's) to determine whether they want a union to represent them. No. "No." xxx xxx xxx Withal. and in the affirmative case. Secretary [G. the statement in the quoted provision that "(i)f only one union is involved. the ballots were required to state the question "Do you desire to be represented by said union?" as regards which the employees voting would mark an appropriate square. by which particular labor organization. and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the . which one it should be. it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees a certification which the employer has no authority to give.

No. (Phil. Trajano. to impose their will on the majority who do not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they. if a protest can be formalized within five days after a final determination and canvass of the challenged votes have been made. vs. This principle is clearly stated in Art. join or assist labor organizations. Ferrer-Calleja [G. 77539. 92391. April 12.R. L-75321. Inc. G. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit. Thus. The law refers to "all" the employees in the bargaining unit. 29 December 1989]) At any rate. 80612-16. all rank-and-file employees. (Reyes vs. Hence." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form. converse right NOT to form. is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment. the rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period. No. and to repeat. obviously. The purpose. it is now well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present. are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining.R. Trajano. citing ATU v. 162 SCRA 318) . as in the case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practice was filed. Otherwise put. (Phil. the employees concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections. This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Fruits and Vegetables vs. 20 June 1988. The minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be different." (Airtime Specialists. but the concomitant. as in the case at bar which may take a very long period. hours and other terms and conditions of employment. (ALU-TUCP v. as it is called. G. Torres [G. Thus. it would result in an undue delay in the affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of a bargaining representative. Fruits And Vegetables vs. No. 03 July 1992]) Bars to Certification Election (1) CONTRACT BAR RULE .R. 92391. join or assist any labor union. probationary or permanent. The Code makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. if the dismissal is under question.R. No. are eligible to vote in certification elections. Trajano [G. 02 June 1992]) Who can vote in CE Proceedings In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote.workers in the bargaining unit in dealing with the employer regarding wages. 172 SCRA 49. As repeatedly stated. 1989. however. 84433. No. Torres [G. 03 July 1992]) “Close of Election Proceedings” [T]he phrase "close of election proceedings" as used in Sections 3 and 4 of the pertinent Implementing Rules refers to that period from the closing of the polls to the counting and tabulation of the votes as it could not have been the intention of the Implementing Rules to include in the term "close of the election proceedings" the period for the final determination of the challenged votes and the canvass thereof. the minority workers.R.R. They may not and should not be permitted.during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom period. No. when the said agreement is about to expire.

14171. We find immaterial and irrelevant the allegation of hereby respondent BPI to the effect that the benefit being enjoyed by the rank and file employees covered by the existing CBA are extended/accorded to the excluded employees. The old CBA is extended until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process theremust be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. (Colegio de San Juan de Letran vs. The “Contract Bar Rule” under Section 3. even if true will not preclude them from entering into a CBA of their own. BLR and Manila Bay Spinning Mills vs. No. 06 January 1978]) The receipt by petitioner's "supervisor" employees of certain benefits under the CBA between BUKLOD and petitioner is not sufficient to deny the petition for certification election filed by the labor organization formed by the excluded employees. the Supreme Court aptly stated that: The allegation that some benefits under the existing CBA were extended to the monthly paid employees. and the direction of the election is in the interest of industrial stability as well as in the interest of the employees' right in the selection of their bargaining representatives. respondent BPI being privy to the said exclusion has to accept the inescapable consequences of its act of depriving the excluded employees of their right to selforganization for the purpose of collective bargaining. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran [G. Pura Ferrer-Calleja. such as contracts where the Identity of the representative is in doubt. The petition for certification election cannot likewise be deterred by the "contract-bar rule. The Supreme Court in the cases of General Rubber vs." which finds no application in the present case. the contract bar rule still applies. what is crucial and of paramount consideration is the fact that the excluded rank and file employees are afforded the right to bargain collectively. The petition must comply with the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. It is not equivalent to and does not compensate for the denial of the right of the excluded employees to self-organization and collective bargaining. ruled that the employees excluded from the coverage of the CBA. provides that: “ …. Rule XI. who not being excluded by law. Hon. No. Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to select representatives can be justified only where stability is deemed paramount.R. L-45513-14. in relation to Articles 253. (Mirpuri vs. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated by the law. (Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Employees Union vs. have the right to bargain collectively. Excepted from the contract bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial stability. 18 September 2000]) [A] contract does not operate as a bar to representation proceedings. Hence.R. where it is shown that because of a schism in the union the contract can no longer serve to promote industrial stability. Neither is the inconvenience that may befall petitioner for having to administer two CBAs an excuse for depriving the monthly paid employees of their constitutionally guaranteed right to collective bargaining. Indeed. thus: It is not disputed that the members of both petitioning unions NSBPI and NEMPEBPI are excluded from the coverage of the existing CBA entered into between the respondent BPI and BUKLOD. 19 November 1999]) . The petitioning union NSBPI is not questioning the majority status of Buklod as the incumbent bargaining agent of petitioner's rank and file employees.R. a petition for certification election or motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of such agreement. The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. Hence. Thus. mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the negotiation by the employer. CA [G. Estrella [G. No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. 114508. No. Book V. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during the sixty day freedom period.” The rule is based on Article 232. of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. We concur with the findings of the Undersecretary of Labor. The petition for certification election is addressed to a separate bargaining unit the excluded employees of petitioner. If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code. Further.

vs. 10 April 1992]) Prejudicial Question. BLR [G. the date of the Resolution declaring NAFLU the exclusive bargaining representative of rank-and-file workers of VIRON can have no application to the case at bar. despite noble intentions. .(2) CERTIFICATION YEAR BAR RULE . The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the management. 11 September 1992]) The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. L-67485. one of which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. however. as used in Article 252 of the Labor Code. is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest. A CBA. 09 September 1991]) (3) DEADLOCK BAR RULE . thus. While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties. 10 October 1996]) A collective bargaining agreement (CBA). A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill. from February 27. No. it must yield to the common good. does not conclude in a agreement between the parties. No. as. the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free. it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically. "presupposes reasonable efforts at good faith bargaining which. it is not.R. until decided. 22 March 1984]) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ADMINISTRATION OF AGREEMENT It is important to determine whether or not a particular labor organization is legitimate since legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by nonlegitimate unions. R. Trajano [G. the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial question that. No. and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it. No. L-51337. No.R. (NACUSIP-TUCP vs.R.within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. bars proceedings for a certification election. Inc. 116172.R. That one-year periodknown as the "certification year" during which the certified union is required to negotiate with the employer. and certification election is prohibited has long since expired. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment. When applicable to certification election proceedings Under settled jurisprudence. (San Miguel Foods. Secretary [G. or It is evident that the prohibition imposed by law on the holding of a certification election "within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result in this case. an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. As such. the deadlock of a jury or legislature. (Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang vs. 1981. 75810." There is a deadlock if there is a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces. Trajano [G. refers to a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages. as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital. 91915. Laguesma [G." The word is synonymous with the word impasse which. within the meaning of the American federal labor laws.during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement." (Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. (United CMC Textile Workers Union vs.

giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve. More importantly. hours of work. Secretary [G.The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages. It is highly impressed with public interest for it is an essential instrument to promote industrial peace. 1994]) Duty to Bargain Collectively Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. is not under any legal duty to initiate contract negotiation. G. Inc. 19 March 1993]) [T]he general rule laid out in Fernando vs. Herald Publications the rule had been laid down that "unfair labor practice is committed when it is shown that the respondent employer. hours of work and all other terms and any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party. or five (5) days before its registration. . (TUCP vs. in collusion with private respondent. Abarquez [G.. 95013. 1990. (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code. it bears the blessings not only of the employer and employees concerned but even the DOLE. the employer. 1989. namely. So much so that Article 249. No. and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251. it does contemplate that both parties will approach the negotiation with an open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. Angat Labor Union (5 SCRA 248 [1962]. designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. after having been served with a written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union. . 1989. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages. (Article 252 of the Labor Code) Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement. xxx xxx xxx The case at bar is not a case of first impression. 85867. (a) of the New Labor Code .e. Laguesma.. To set it aside on technical grounds is not conducive to the public good. had antedated the filing date of the CBA. non-compliance with the cited procedural requirement should not adversely affect the substantive validity of the CBA between ILO-PHILS and the Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division covering the company's rank and file employees. is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code. did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the said proposal. A collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract. but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. the delay in the filing of the CBA was sufficiently explained. not enforceable against the successoremployer. i. Be that as it may. there was an inter-union conflict on who would succeed to the presidency of ILO-PHILS. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation. par. the presumption on regularity in the performance of official functions hold.R. however.R. CIR wherein it was further ruled that "while the law does not compel the parties to reach an agreement. for in the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. all of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the instant case. This doctrine was reiterated anew in Bradman vs. as what petitioner did. In the absence of any substantial evidence that DOLE officials or personnel. 102132. (Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. No. No. that the said CBA was filed only on April 30. While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain. It would be injudicious for us to assume. vs. and then filed with DOLE for registration purposes on March 14. Hence. The subject CBA was executed on November 28. . par. therefore. on the unsupported surmise that it was done to suit the law that enjoins Regional Offices of Dole to act upon an application for registration of a CBA within five (5) days from its receipt thereof. (2) proof of majority representation. Razon. if requested by either party. … (E..R. and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement. The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present. that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract in personam and. 13 May 1993]) It appears that the procedural requirement of filing the CBA within 30 days from date of execution under Article 231 was not met. 1990. 1990. It was ratified on December 8. The CBA was registered by the DOLE only on May 4.

(LAKAS vs. (PAFLU vs. without the requirement that the bargaining agent be officially certified by the NLRB as such. conversely. if the informally presented evidence leaves a real doubt as to the issue. 22 January 1986]) It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the employees that it be the delegate of a majority of the employees and. 1967 were calculated . No. be for a term of five (5) years. the employer has a right to demand a certification and to refuse to negotiate until such official certification is presented. It is true that under Section 14 of Republic Act 875 whenever a party serves a written notice upon the employer making some demands the latter shall reply thereto not later than 10 days from receipt thereof. 1967 and November 7. an employer is under duty to bargain collectively only when the bargaining agent is representative of the majority of the employees. Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement.. the issue as to who is really the true bargaining representative of all the employees may be firmly settled by the simple expedient of an election. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining . that such demand be made in good faith and not merely as a pretext or device for delay or evasion. Although an employer has the undoubted right to bargain with a bargaining agent whose authority has been established. Marcelo Enterprises [G. it is not an 'unfair labor practice' for an employer to refuse to negotiate until the asserted bargaining agent has presented reasonable proof of majority representation. (National Union of Restaurant Workers vs.. No. to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro vas already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent company. And proceeding from this basis." (LAKAS vs.R. No. The fact is that respondents did not ignore the letter sent by the union so much so that they called a meeting to discuss its demands. insofar as the representation aspect is concerned. there is every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification election. 30 April 1964]) Duration of a CBA Art. designed and intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall. In this way. Having the right to demonstration of this fact. L-38258. A natural consequence of these principles is that the employer has the right to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof of its representation of its employees.R. L-20044. 253-A.. 19 November 1982] citing Rothenberg) We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said companies. Marcelo Enterprises [G. .R. L-54334. . it follows that all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of strike on June 13. These concerted activities executed and carried into effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS ire all illegal and violative of the employer's basic right to bargain collectively only with the representative supported by the majority of its employees in each of the bargaining units. NLRC [G. CIR [G. The employer's right is however to reasonable proof. illadvised and precipitate moves. The Bureau of Labor Relations [69 SCRA 132]) The inference that respondents did not refuse to bargain collectively with the complaining union because they accepted some of the demands while they refused the others even leaving open other demands for future discussion is correct.R. but this rendition is merely procedural and as such its non-compliance cannot be deemed to be an act of unfair labor practice. We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor support the finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice. as already stated elsewhere. especially so when those demands were discussed at a meeting called by respondents themselves precisely in view of the letter sent by the union on April 29. It is necessary however. or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation.. 19 November 1982]) [I]n a situation like this where the issue of legitimate representation in dispute is viewed for not only by one legitimate labor organization but two or more. This Court is not unaware of the present predicament of the employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and so lost their jobs through hasty. 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the 'two strikes of September 4.(Kiok Loy vs. 1960. No. L-38258.

However." are indeed similar. the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and stability by having both management and labor work harmoniously together without any disturbance. Confesor [G." This is similar to Art. the Union sent the Company a notice of deadlock in view of their inability to reconcile their positions on the main issues. No. 1999 Decision. on December 18. The CBA is a contract between the parties and the parties must respect the terms and conditions of the agreement. No. Likewise. (Mindanao Terminal & Brokerage vs.R. the coming together in accord of two minds on a given proposition. 253-A." The two terms. "All other provisions" simply refers to the rest of the CBA.R. This new provision states that the CBA has a term of five (5) years instead of three years. 1989. 05May 1997]) The Court in the January 27. even without any written evidence of the CBA made by the parties. This was incorporated by Section 21 of Republic Act No. particularly on wages. the terms and conditions of employment (economic and noneconomic) cannot be questioned by the employers or employees during the period of effectivity of the CBA." Parenthetically. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months. Notably. in a conference called by the NCMB. The "representation aspect" refers to the identity and majority status of the union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned. a valid agreement existed in this case from the moment the minds of the parties met on all matters they set out to discuss. the Union and the Company agreed on a number of provisions of the CBA. except representation. except representation. 6715 (the Herrera-Veloso Law) which took effect on March 21. 1999. was settled. (SMC vs. xxx xxx xxx From the aforesaid discussions. 19 September 1996]) The signing of the CBA is not determinative of the question whether "the agreement was entered into within six months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such collective bargaining agreement" within the contemplation of Art. this. The Union filed a notice of strike." It would therefore seem that at that point. leaving only the issue of retirement to be threshed out. however. the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. All other provisions of the CBA shall be negotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Thus. so that in his record of the January 14. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreement. too. including the provision on wage increase. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. 1305 of the Civil Code's definition of "contract" as "a meeting of minds between two persons. on November 12. agreements may be oral or written. shall retroact to the day immediately following such date. Art. no outside union can enter the establishment within five (5) years and challenge the status of the incumbent union as the exclusive bargaining agent. 111262. stated that the CBA shall be "effective for a period of 2 years counted from December 28. Any agreement on such other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement. which was before the February 1993 end of the six-month period provided in Art. "agreement" and "contract. 1993 conference. 1992.Agreement. this actually covers . before the amendment of the law as far as the representation aspect is concerned. 253-A refers merely to an "agreement" which. Roldan-Confessor [G. The fact that no agreement was then signed is of no moment. 111809. As in the case of contracts. according to Black's Law Dictionary is "a coming together of minds. It can be gleaned from their discussions that it was left to the parties to fix the period. 253-A. Obviously. the framers of the law did not give a fixed term as to the effectivity of the terms and conditions of employment. 1992. 1996 up to December 27. In time. the legislators were more inclined to have the period of effectivity for three (3) years insofar as the economic as well as non-economic provisions are concerned. although the former is broader than the latter because an agreement may not have all the elements of a contract. Hence. economic as well as non-economic provisions. the Med-Arbiter noted that "the issues raised by the notice of strike had been settled and said notice is thus terminated. the parties may exercise their rights under this Code. As already stated. there was already a meeting of the minds of the parties. Article 253-A is a new provision.

Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity. In general. petitioner does not dispute the allegation that in the past CBA arbitral awards. The period is herein set at two (2) years from December 1. 1995 to November 30. In addition. But there is nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary considering the absence of an applicable law. and (c) the University made no further proposal whatsoever. the Court sees no reason to retroact the subject CBA awards to a different date. However. 1995 to November 30. No. the Court considers the letter of petitioner's Chairman of the Board and its President addressed to their stockholders. the Court added in the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposal of the other. This is a clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art 250(a) of which states: xxx xxx xxx Hence. a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter. by petitioner's own actions. there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts. 22 February 2000]) Effect of Failure to Bargain Collectively A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" specially on the part of the University. petitioner's negotiating panel transmitted to the Union a copy of its proposed CBA covering the same period inclusive. may indicate bad faith and this is especially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. NLRC. In the absence of a CBA. While collective bargaining should be initiated by the union." as indicative of petitioner's recognition that the CBA award covers the said period. the law contemplates retroactivity whether the agreement be entered into before or after the said six-month period.a three-year period. [a] company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process. (MERALCO vs. Despite the silence of the law.R. Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. As we said in Kiok Loy v. 127598. the arbitral award can be considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties." . Earlier. In this connection. It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. Thus. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. there was no "'counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or their union. the effectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. the Secretary granted retroactivity commencing from the period immediately following the last day of the expired CBA. (b) it made a definite request to bargain submitted its collective bargaining proposals. Under Article 253-A: "(I)f any such agreement is entered into beyond six months. the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government." In other words. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU." Moreover. 1997 is still with the Supreme Court. The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. Quisumbing [G. NLRC. A similar argument had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. the parties shall agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof. the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. Its indifferent towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the fact therein have also been indubitably established in this case. The agreement of the parties need not be categorically stated for their acts may be considered in determining the duration of retroactivity. petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit. Kiok Loy v. On the other hand. where we upheld the order of the NLRC declaring the unions draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which should govern the relationship between the parties. the Secretary's determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining agent. which states that the CBA "for the rank-and-file employees covering the period December 1. 1997.

It is appropriate that such should be the case. No. they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement. this Court speaking through Justice Sanchez. to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes. As was held in United Restauror's Employees v. 11 September 1992]) Any provision in the CBA is deemed to be a bilateral agreement. boost their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace. reward their loyalty. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled.. but in compulsory arbitration. NLRC [G. It represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit. No. is not well-taken. GRIEVANCE AND VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION COMPULSORY ARBITRATION is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties. hence subject to negotiation The company's contention that its retirement plan is non-negotiable. preferably from those accredited by the NCMB. The NLRC correctly observed that the inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective bargaining agreement as part of the package of economic benefits extended by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of financial security after they shall have ceased to be employed in the company. Pursuant thereto. 91231. arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay. L-30241. No. to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. Inc. such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator. on the other hand. the highly salutory purpose and objective of the collective bargaining scheme to enable labor to secure better terms in employment condition as well as rates of pay would be frustrated insofar as non-members are concerned. the aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress. (Mactan Workers Union vs. (Luzon Development Bank vs. but only upon agreement of the parties. Yet that is what intervenor labor union was guilty of. they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision. Under VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION. Ideally. for it is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit. Association [G. Secretary [G.R. Torres. Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies.R. 04 February 1991] ADMINISTRATION OF THE CBA.R. including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. After all. Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on behalf of non-members of intervenor ALU. gives "A CONSENSUAL CHARACTER" to the plan so that it may not be terminated or modified at will by either party (Nestle Phil. 06 October 1995]) The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Above all. who were in the ranks of plaintiff Mactan Labor Union. parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators. It is not to be indulged in any attempt on its part to disregard the rights of non-members. or include a procedure for their selection. No. nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. Any other view would be a discrimination on which the law frowns. vs. deprived as they are of participation in whatever advantages could thereby be gained. Article 262 authorizes them. they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case." If it were otherwise. 91915. The labor union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. R. Don Ramon Aboitiz [G.(Divine Word University of Tacloban vs. referral of a dispute by the parties is made. In the Philippine context. such a third party is normally appointed by the government. 1972]) . the parties to a CBA are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. 120319. For this purpose. resulting in the complaint filed on behalf of the laborers. "the right to be the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union 'designated or selected' for such purpose 'by the majority of the employees' in the unit concerned.

R. To consider UNION contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim that res inter alios nec prodest nec nocet." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level." the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter. except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof. the only consideration involved was the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never entered the picture. Article 260 of the Labor Code on grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. thru their new bargaining agent. it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. No other body shall take cognizance of these cases. both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed. holding rights through the agency of the union representative. It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. In the instant case. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. (Benguet vs. that the majority of the employees.... No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. 30 April 1968]) The reference to a Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators for the adjustment or resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies is mandatory. therefore. to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. BCI Employees [G. only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.. It only means that the employees. Stated otherwise. And it is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be understood. xxx xxx xxx In the instant case. L-24711.. The law grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies (Article 261 of the Labor Code).In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine. on the . The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery and when not settled at this level. not of the other unions which possess distinct personalities. the "SUBSTITUTIONARY" DOCTRINE only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. Hence. Thus. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike. the justification for said doctrine was: . BBWU was the agent of the employees. The "substitutionary" doctrine. it shall automatically be referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is defeasible at the will of the principal. to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBA's does not only include grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of company personnel policies. In fact. as an entity under the statute. however. is the true party in interest to the contract. We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. No. cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings like the nostrike stipulation here in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract.

They deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include. transfer and other personnel movements which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. Canizares [G.. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. benefits. The stance of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case is totally the reverse of its posture in the case at bar. The usual source of grievances. 05 June 1998] [T]he award of a Voluntary Arbitrator is final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the award by the parties. on the one hand and a case involving termination. It is to be stressed that under Article 260 of the Labor Code." It is paragraph (c) of the same Article which respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted as giving the voluntary arbitrator jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case. violation of rights.R. 101619. however. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies. the Solicitor General was of the view that a distinction should be made between a case involving "interpretation or implementation of Collective Bargaining Agreement" or interpretation or "enforcement" of company personel policies. could be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission upon the grounds of (a) abuse of discretion. to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Where there was already actual termination. which explains the function of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator. however. Workers Union-PSSLU vs.000. 124013. 08 July 1992]) [T]ermination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. i. implementation or enforcement stage. (Sanyo Phil. We fully agree with the theory of the Solicitor General in the Sanyo case. There was a time when the award of a Voluntary Arbitrator relating to money claims amounting to more than P 100. In Sanyo.other hand. "(T)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. it shall automatically be refered to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and the company. the dismissal of petitioner does not fall within the phrase "grievance arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies. or (b) gross incompetence." In the case at bar. it may be referred to the grievance machinery set up the Collective Bargaining Agreement or by voluntary arbitration.R.00 or forty percent (40%) of the paid-up capital of the employer (whichever was lower). are the rules and regulations governing disciplinary actions.R." Article 260 further provides that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective representative to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level. which is radically apposite to its position in this case. Article 217 (c) should be read in conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor Code which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies. the termination of petitioner is not an unresolved grievance. on the other hand. However. that in the opening there appears the phrase: "Except as otherwise provided under this Code .e. the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. . The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. Note the phrase "unresolved grievances. It should be noted." the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter. No. (Maneja vs. among others. promotions. 05 June 1998] It should be explained that "company personnel policies" are guiding principles stated in broad. . Since there has already been an actual termination. 124013. the procedure in the administration of wages. This is . presumably of the arbitrator. . It argued that the dismissal of the private respondents does not involve an "interpretation or implementation" of a Collective Bargaining Agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company personel policies but involves "termination. It can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. NLRC [G. (Maneja vs. long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an organization's top authority regarding personnel matters. Moreover." The Solicitor General further said that where the dispute is just in the interpretation. it is already cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. No. NLRC [G. No.

and not to the parent association from which it has disaffiliated. pertains to the local union which continues to represent the employees under the terms of a CBA. but quasi-contractual. including collection of reasonable assessments in connection with mandatory activities of the union.no longer so today although. certiorari will lie in appropriate cases. of the individual laborers. Authorization to effect a check-off of union dues is co-terminous with the union affiliation or membership of employees. or authorized in writing by the employees concerned the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct sums equivalent to the amount of union dues from the employees' wages for direct remittance to the union. Inc. The result is that a voluntary arbitral award may be modified and set aside only upon the same grounds on which a decision of the NLRC itself may be modified or set aside. No. In this aspect. this Court has acknowledged that the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and. 15 December 1989]) The Union erred in filing a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated July 12.Check-Off A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer. Sampang [G. The legal basis of check-off is thus found in statute or in contract. Magsalin [G. a resolution approved and adopted by a majority to the union members at a general meeting will suffice when the right to check-off has been recognized by the employer. . In a special civil action of certiorari.R. only indirectly. In fact. vs. the first decision had already become so by virtue of Article 263 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards or decisions final and executory. to its very existence. the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory. deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them directly to the union. When the parties submitted their grievance to arbitration. No provision of law makes the employer directly liable for the payment to the labor organization of union dues and assessments that the former fails to deduct from its employees' salaries and wages pursuant to a check-off stipulation. is recognized by Article 248 (e) of the Labor Code. even without this stipulation. on agreement with the union recognized as the proper bargaining representative. indeed. The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. The Labor Code and its Implementing Rules thus clearly reflect the important public policy of encouraging recourse to voluntary arbitration and of shortening the arbitration process by rendering the arbitral award non. And it may be mentioned in this connection that the right to union dues deducted pursuant to a check-off.R. So did the respondent Voluntary Arbitrator in entertaining the motion and vacating his first decision. The employer's failure to make the requisite deductions may constitute a violation of a contractual commitment for which it may incur liability for unfair labor practice.appealable to the NLRC. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. (Sime Darby vs. by this Court. however. No. Statutory limitations on check-offs generally require written authorization from each employee to deduct wages. executory and inappealable. of course. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court will lie only where a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator is clearly shown. 94960. they expressly agreed that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator would be final. No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employee is imposed. deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. Its desirability to a labor organization is quite evident. Indeed. On the other hand. by it. or on prior authorization from its employees. 90426. the collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees. in order to facilitate the collection of funds vital to the role of the union as representative of employees in a bargaining unit if not. It must be borne in mind that the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and that certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. 1988. the Court will not engage in a review of the facts found nor even of the law as interpreted or applied by the Arbitrator unless the supposed errors of fact or of law are so patent and gross and prejudicial as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion or an excess de pouvoir on the part of the Arbitrator. 08 March 1993]) Levy. it is assured of continuous funding. (Imperial Textile Mills. or other special assessments and extraordinary fees. from employees who are not union members.

in order to facilitate the collection of dues necessary for the latter's life and sustenance. attorney's fees and representation expenses. Secretary [G. or agency fees for non-union employees. These are: (1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose. No attorney's fees. 18 October 1996]) Art. these being. Check-offs in truth impose an extra burden on the employer in the form of additional administrative and bookkeeping costs. 110007. attorney's fees. A check-off via individual written authorization signed by every employee. logic and prudence dictate that the union itself undertake the collection of union dues and assessments from its members (and agency fees from nonunion employees). No. without prejudice to suing the employer for unfair labor practice. the votes cast. purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. no special assessment. It is a personal obligation not demandable from the employer upon default or refusal of the employee to consent to a check-off. negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union: Provided. Requisites A levy/special assessment via a written resolution of the majority of all the members in a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose with the secretary recording the minutes of the meeting. It is a burden assumed by management at the instance of the union and for its benefit. But the obligation to pay union dues and agency fees obviously devolves not upon the employer. That attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee.But it does not by that omission. The authorization should specifically state the amount. Joaquin [G. (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the meeting. Where the employer fails or refuses to implement a check-off agreement. negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any individual union member. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members present.R. to repeat. 115949. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union's incidental expenses. Enforcement of Union Security Clause. the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment or fees. incur liability to the union for the aggregate of dues or assessments uncollected from the union members. Obligation of Employer . 16 March 2000]) Article 241 [n] Provision No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. 241 [o] 222 [b] Prohibits attorney's fees. The principle of unjust enrichment necessarily precludes recovery of union dues or agency fees from the employer. of course. No.R. The only obligation of the employer under a check-off is to effect the deductions and remit the collections to the union. however. Any contract. this. Holy Cross of Davao vs. and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned. but the individual employee. obligations pertaining to the individual worker in favor of the bargaining union. agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. The record shall be attested to by the president Other than for mandatory activities under the Code. list of members as well as the votes cast. (Gabriel vs.

L-25291.R. the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. the letters. in turn simply issued a termination letter to Cariño. any employer who engages in interrogation does so . Ltd." . should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. Notwithstanding the Unions Security Clause in the CBA. vs. No. Nonetheless. but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. We believe that the Company should have given petitioner Carino an opportunity to explain his side of the controversy with the Union. (Cariño vs. 323. it is quite clear that had the Company taken the trouble to investigate the acts and proceedings of the Union. No. We do not believe so. it could have very easily determined that the Union had not acted arbitrarily in impeaching and expelling from its ranks petitioner Cariño. (Rothenberg on Relations.R. 08 May 1990]) UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE Of Employers Indeed. 374. and cases cited therein. The Company offered the excuse that the Union had threatened to go on strike if its request had not been forthwith granted. provided the same is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists. citing NLRB v. National Labor Relations Board. The right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the Company or his own Union. 1971]) An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike. Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which. C. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own Union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and hence dismissal from his job.) (Insular Life Assurance Co. II. frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered. Ford. and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on selforganization and collective bargaining.S. We conclude that the Company had failed to accord to petitioner Cariño the latter's right to procedural due process. exhibits A and B. p. The Company also pleaded that for it to inquire into the lawfulness of the acts of the Union in this regard would constitute interference by the Company in the administration of Union affairs. the termination being made effective the very next day. the Company should have reasonably satisfied itself by its own inquiry that the Union had not been merely acting arbitrarily and capriciously in impeaching and expelling petitioner Cariño. though innocent in themselves. Assuming that such a threat had in fact been made. Insular Life [G. if a strike was in fact subsequently called because the Company had insisted on conducting its own inquiry.. whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications. 332). 170 F2d 735).. Vol.. 91086. p. The letters should be interpreted according to the "TOTALITY OF CONDUCT DOCTRINE. xxx xxx xxx The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act. 321 U. the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. Employees Assoc. it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. xxx xxx xxx 5. Labor Laws 1956. From what was already discussed above.Turning now to the involvement of the Company in the dismissal of petitioner Cariño we note that the Company upon being formally advised in writing of the expulsion of petitioner Carino from the Union. (Francisco. is not wiped away by a Union Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a CBA. NLRC [G... the Court considers that such would have been prima facie an illegal strike.A. Besides. 1948.

assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization. No.. No. (Blue Flash Express Co." (Manila Hotel Co. Officers Guild [G.R.R.. or coerce employees in their exercise of the right to self-organization" is an unfair labor practice on the part of the employer. The fact that management granted Christmas bonus to its employees. Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. dominate. Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to initiate. 28 September 1972]) Under the CBA between the parties that was in force and effect from May 1. PHILSTEAM's aforestated interrogation squarely falls under this rule. seasonal lay-off. restrain. Thus. (Phil. desire to give employment to more needy persons. 5119).with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor practice if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. L-20667/69. Inc.. This is a clear case of discrimination.1988 it was agreed that the "bargaining unit" covered by the CBA "consists of all regular or permanent employees. L19997. (Visayan Bicycle. refusal of non-union employees to work with union employees. 19 May 1965] citing Rothenberg on Labor Relations) The petitioner further claims that it could not have committed the unfair labor practice charge for dismissing some of its employees due to their alleged union activities because the alleged dismissal took place more than four (4) months before the organizational meeting of the union and more than one (1) year before actual registration of said union with the Labor Organization Division of the BLR. vs. vs. L-87672. No. libelous remarks against management. vs. the same should have been divided equally as it has been done before. is unavailing. (Judric Canning Corp.. Indeed. No. whether or not the Pines Hotel incurred losses is of no moment.G.. cessation of operations. It is to this class of employees who were excluded in the "bargaining unit" and who do not derive benefits from the CBA that the profit sharing privilege was extended by petitioner. lack of work.R. the private respondents were dismissed or their services were terminated. below the rank of assistant supervisor. In this particular case. some of them were granted year-end bonus while the employees of the Pines Hotel did not receive any year-end bonus. Aside from the Christmas bonus of 50% that was allocated to the Manila Hotel employees. constitutes unfair labor practice (Scoty's Department Store vs. corporate affairs office. Inciong [G.R. it appearing that there is no union at the Manila Hotel or the Taal Vista Lodge and considering further that lately respondents had always been beset with demands for better living conditions from the complainant union as well as strikes being staged by the union. [G. vs. Employees Union [G. Inc. the assignment by the employer or another reason. refusal to work overtime. security office. Steam Navigation Co. it has been held that the facts disclosed that the employer's acts in discharging employees were actually prompted by the employers 'improper interest in the affected employee's improper interest in the affected employee's union affiliations and activities. No.) xxx xxx xxx The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities. including the giving of financial or other support to it. 52 O.R. vs. whatever its semblance of validity. Micaller. 19 August 1982]) Respondent court thus correctly held that: "(T)o the mind of the Court. in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part. 13 October 1989]) . The contention is without merit. vice-president. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly situated. L-51494. violation of company rules. 109 NLRB 591. Mfg. 29 October 1965]) [I]t can be established that the true and basic inspiration for the employer's act is derived from the employee's union affiliations or activities. 1985 to April 30. Wise & Co. (Wise & Co. discrimination per se is not unlawful. accounting and treasurer department . There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. "to interfere with. Inc. NLU [G. because they were soliciting signatures in order to form a union within the plant. L-30139. Co. and the other offices of the company personnel office. even though the employer urged that his acts were predicated on economic necessity.. CIR. Phil. Also expressly excluded from the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are all regular rank and file employees in the office of the president.

it is of no consequence either as a matter of procedure or of substantive law. In the case at bar. CIR. CIR [G.R. Management also has rights which. it is the ALU which is the exclusive bargaining representative of BALMAR employees and as such it has the right and duty to bargain collectively with BALMAR. 1962 up to the present. the workers and employer shall be represented by their exclusive bargaining representatives. rights and benefits that are given to all the other regular employees retroactive as of the effectivity of the first agreement of March 14. NLRC [G. "(T)he question is whether the (respondent) committed the act charged in the complaint. hours of work and all other terms and conditions or employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or questions arising under such agreement if requested by either party but . No. vs. Hence. what the act is denominated whether as a restraint. 30 October 1970]) In the bargaining process. the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. If it did. It is speciously grounded on mere form rather than the realities of the case. however. as some members of the Court believe it to be. to order the cessation of an unfair labor practice and "take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act. No." Petitioner's failure to comply with its duty under the collective bargaining agreement to extend the privileges. as such. are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. or as refusal to bargain as some other members view it. petitioner "could not have been guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act. its judgment that said drivers and helpers "should be given and/or extended all the privileges. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. respondent court but discharging its function under section 5(c) of the Act. xxx xxx xxx While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class. Inc." (Alhambra Industries." Failure on petitioner's part to live up in good faith to the terms of its collective bargaining agreement by denying the privileges and benefits thereof to the fifteen drivers and helpers through its device of trying to pass them off as "employees" of its salesmen and propagandists was a serious violation of petitioner's duty to bargain collectively and constituted unfair labor practice in any language. it cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to selforganization. or even as a combination of any or all of these. constitutes unfair labor practice. tobe dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. Inc.The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule. (Sime Darby Pilipinas. rights and benefits thereof to the drivers and helpers as its actual employees clearly amounted to the commission of an unfair labor practice. or as a discriminatory discharge as other members think it is. L-25984. As succinctly stated by Mr." In ordering. is that respondent court expressly found that "in truth and in fact. 119205. And consequently respondent court properly ordered in. The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages. Justice Castro on Republic Savings Bank vs. In form.R. which management deems necessary to increase production. such favoritism has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving. As shown by the records. it should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. supra. vs. (petitioner) corporation is the "employer" of the driver or helper and not the salesman or propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such services. interference or coercion. respondent court gently treated petitioner's scheme to deprive the fifteen drivers and helpers of their rightful status as employees and did not denounce it as a betrayal of the salutary purpose and objective of the Industrial Peace Act." The reality. shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. 15 April 1998]) Petitioner's appeal must be dismissed. but instead remarked that since the grant of employees' benefits hinged on the court's decision on their status as such employees. in unfair labor practice cases. Although this Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer.

15 October 1991]) Of Employees This Court has held that a closed-shop is a valid form of union security. it became the minority union. including employees who are members of petitioner Union. was ordered by CIR pursuant to the Union's petition for direct certification docketed as Case 1455-MC and a similar petition for certification filed by SELU docketed as Case 1464-MC. considering that the latter has been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of BALMAR rank and file employees. 1965. except with a high sense of responsibility. No. all the more sustains the finding of bad faith for it is not for the petitioner BALMAR to question which group is the collective bargaining representative of its rank and file employees. or other conditions of employment. Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer. BALMAR'S pretense that majority of its rank and file employees disaffiliated simply because of a letter it received to that effect. A union member may not be expelled from her union. BALMAR refused to negotiate with ALU allegedly because` it received a copy of a letter purportedly written on November 12. and consequently from her job. Artex Development Company. Because of this. Not controverted. that said letter was favorably acted upon. hours of work. 21 SCRA 561). SELU was certified to the Sulo management as the "collective bargaining representative of the employees . NLRC [G. As matters stand. fairness. is the fact that. rates of pay and/or such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law. For. (Balmar Farms.R. 73504. 1965. 1965. the right to be the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is vested in the labor union "designated or selected" for such purpose "by the majority of the employees" in the unit concerned. There is no showing.. wages. who claimed to be the president of Balmar Farms Employees Association. 18 December 1968]) . it could. voice out and seek remedies for the grievances of all Sulo employees. (Manila Mandarin Employees Union vs.e. too. under such circumstances. it might have been true that the Union commanded a majority of Sulo's employees. much less their own members. 109 SCRA 87.R..R. for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality. The Court stresses. it should be noted. BALMAR cannot also invoke good faith in refusing to negotiate with ALU. Manalang vs. 29 September 1987]) When the Union struck and picketed on January 16. 1982 certifying ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file workerks of BALMAR. Torres [G. (Lirag Textile Mills. Inc. But it is not disputed that on October 4. ALU sent a letter to BALMAR. Inc." (United Restauror's vs. the Union can no longer demand collective bargaining. Without need of certification. Verily. vs. said right properly belongs to SELU. fair play." The consent election. and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. 76989. prudence.. 1982 by one Johnny Luces. As observed by the SolGen. which commands the majority. Labor Code. 252. regarding the "rates of pay. and legality. however. is there an order superseding the Med-Arbiter's order of October 27. hours of employment. i. that union security clauses are also governed by law and by principles of justice. Procedurally.. SELU has the right as well as the obligation to hear. SELU defeated the Union. informing the Labor Regional Director that more than a majority of them would like to negotiate directly with their employer BALMAR. vs. No. however. shortly after this case was filed on September 18. petitioner herein. Inc. attaching therewith its proposals for collective bargaining agreement. No. in that consent election.such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession (Art. In reply. as amended). much less. NLRC [G. By law. for collective bargaining purposes as regards wages. Blanco. L-24993. and judiciousness. conclude a collective bargaining agreement with Sulo. a consent election was held.

3. 95494-97. maintaining.R. vs. is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.R. It has never been shown that the act of the Company was intended to induce the complain ants to renounce their union-membership or as a deterrent for non-members to affiliate therewith. Under Republic Act 875. (Lapanday Workers Union vs. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. Nos. 103560. its refusal to all complainants to work and requirement that the latter stay out of the premises in the meantime (perhaps while the strike was still going on at the factory) was borne out of the Company's justified apprehension and fear that sabotage might be committed in the warehouse where the products machinery and spare parts were stored. strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. 07 September 1995]) Requisites for a lawful lockout [T]he requisites for a valid lockout are as follows: 1. as has been the case in Binangonan. Inc. NLRC [G. Nos. the same must have been committed to courage or discourage such membership in the union. Undeniably. regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. for the discrimination by reason of union membership to be considered an unfair labor practice. however. CIR [6 SCRA 628]) It is not herein controverted that the complainants were locked out or denied work by the respondent Company. NLRC [G. considered as the most effective weapon of labor. (Article 212 [p] of the Labor Code) A STRIKE. (San Pablo Oil Factory vs. As clearly established by the evidence.STRIKES. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest. nor as a retaliatory measure for activities in the union or in furtherance of the cause of the union. No. the lockout is not discriminatory. taking of strike vote. 06 July 1995]) A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit . fixing. a notice of intention to declare a lockout has been filed with the Department of Labor. supra.R. They provide for the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike filing of notice of strike. a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice. (Rizal Cement Workers Union vs. L-19767. an impasse has resulted in the negotiations. 30 April 1964]) Requisites for a Lawful Strike [T]he requisites for a valid strike are as follows: 1. [G. NLRC [G. This cannot be said of the act of the Company complained of. (Gold City Integrated Port Service. (Lapanday Workers Union vs. and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment." It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. and 4. 2. 07 September 1995]) Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code. Madrigal Co. at least 30 days has elapsed since the filing of notice before the lockout is declared. 2. LOCKOUTS and CONCERTED ACTIONS A LOCKOUT mans the temporary refusal of the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.R. No. 95494-97. as amended.

No. unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads. 3. (Lapanday Workers Union vs. too. free from emotionalism. with better chance to succeed. No. No. rest on a rational basis. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. Thus. MOLE intervention could have possibly induced CAC to provisionally give the 13th month pay in order to avert great business loss arising from the project strike. (NFSW vs. (NFSW vs. the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved. if the strike would coincide with the mining season. the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. it is the best hedge against haste and error. 05 May 1997]) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory. Confesor [G. the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management.R. or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. however. As pointed out by the Solicitor General: Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of minority groups within the union.R. Nos. Ovejera [G. NLRC [G. Ovejera [G. 95494-97. if the report concerning it is false." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with. So. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period. L-59743." the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. These requirements are mandatory. (First City Interlink vs. although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. 106316. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must. without prejudice to the subsequent resolution of the legal dispute by competent authorities. as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served." the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike. Similarly. 07 September 1995]) When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice. therefore. the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.concerned. In addition. still. L-59743. or mediation/conciliation could have convinced NFSW to at least postpone the intended strike so as to avoid great waste and loss to the sugar central. a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence. be antithetical to the public welfare. subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period. the sugar planters and the sugar workers themselves. obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law. and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not. 13 May 1982]) The SEVEN (7) DAY WAITING PERIOD is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike.R. the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. As applied to the CAC-NFSW dispute regarding the 13th month pay. 13 May 1982]) . In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period. our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible.R. It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.

This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.R. Given this factual and legal backdrop. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. Noriel [G.R. The Union officers and members.R. are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. No. as a result. (PTWU vs. (PSBA-Manila vs. Had it not been so. when in the exercise of such right. national interests will be affected. Confesor [G. No. (PTWU vs. Necessarily. Thus. No. Thus. 80648. this authority to assume .: When in his opinion. 12 March 1997]) The intervention of the Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had lingered and which had affected both respondent company and petitioner union.R. as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 82088. corollary to the assumption of jurisdiction. Inc. (Zamboanga Wood Products. 12 March 1997] citing International Pharmaceuticals. However. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. NLRC [G. 15 August 1988]) A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. or to act at all in contemplation of law. 12 March 1997]) The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Secretary of Labor) [T]he fact remains that under the circumstances the Secretary had the power and the duty to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and. [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. Thus. The section provides in part. it cannot be deemed that the Secretary of Labor had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a well-founded basis in issuing the assailed order. No.R. issue a return-to-work order. 13 October1989]) Incidental Issues [T]he fundamental normative rule that jurisdiction is the authority to bear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. 117169. this should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. . pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 117169. viz. and decide the same accordingly. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Inc. 117169. his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers' right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. (PTWU vs. vs. the deadlock will remain and the situation will remain uncertain. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to the national interest. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Secretary. The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers' right to strike but merely regulates it. v. Thus. CONFESOR [G. the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Confesor [G.Assumption of Jurisdiction Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers' constitutional right to strike.

the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals.Manila vs. and he nevertheless acted on it. and while as a right it may be waived. the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent Secretary's compulsive power of arbitration and. 100158. PAL) The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. to justify their actions. as was the case in PAL v. No. for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would. (St. must therefore be immediately complied with. it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will.R. 02 June 1992]) To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import.R. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. employees shall immediately return to work. (PSBA . After all. v. Inc. have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned. If it was not. Scholastica's College vs. or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor. 09 January 1992]) Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute. Torres [G. Nos. Torres [G. citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company. 02 June 1992]) Return to Work Order Once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over. once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. 100158. "all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Otherwise. Secretary or Labor and Employment. will apply. or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may. consequently. for instance. until set aside.R. The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute.R. They cannot. Returning to work in this . "be declared to have lost his employment status.. Noriel [G. including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. without jeopardizing national interests. v. No. 92981-83." This means that by its very terms. Thus.R.jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom. the law mandates that if a strike or lockout has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification." [Art. supra. Inc. the contention that error attended the issuance of such order is without any legal basis. the Acting Secretary. in the ordinary course. or the validity of their claims. supra. Secretary [G. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity. 02 June 1992]) [T]he underlying principle embodied in Art. (International Pharmaceuticals.] Far from erring. No. No. 19 December 1990]) [T]he return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty. Labor Code. . Scholastica's vs. that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Scholastica's vs. in issuing the return to work order. a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Inc. (UFE vs. the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to. as amended. 80648. Torres [G. 263 (g). to the Secretary of Labor for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters. 88710-13. Regardless therefore of their motives. therefore. or certifies for compulsory arbitration. [G. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes. No. in assumption and/or certification cases. (St. . "all striking . Secretary of Labor and Employment. merely implemented the clear mandates of the law. a labor dispute adversely affecting the national interest. (PALEA vs. 100158. the same must be involved in the labor disputed itself." (St. 264(g) on the settlement of labor disputes is that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. 15 August 1988]) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption. ignore return-to-work orders.R. Nestle Phil.

NLRC [G. Therefore.. 118223. Tuico [G. NLRC [G. the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an . Inc.. 06 July 1995]) [I]f the existence of force (acts of violence) while the strike lasts is not pervasive and widespread. although rejecting that PNOC and its subsidiaries were guilty of discrimination. 27 June 1988]) We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers. and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. No. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude.R.R. the NLRC reiterated the policy enunciated in several labor cases "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. including those with related interest. Roldan-Confesor [G. thus severing his ties with the company. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. The worker can of course give up his work. Article 264(g) is clear. we are constrained to uphold the respondent Secretary's ruling that responsibility for these illegal acts must be on an individual and not collective basis. whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. vs. Inc. we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute. only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent. No.situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. Thus.R. and like other workers. 88710-13. 103560. Once an assumption/certification order is issued. (Shell Oil Workers Union vs. nor consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. (UFE vs. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. although the strike was illegal because of the commission of illegal acts. No. No. however. the presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor practice is subsequently found to be untrue.R. 26 June 1998]) Injunction The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. [G." Indeed. No. illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status. may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. No.. strikes are enjoined. An ordinary STRIKING WORKER cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. not an absolute one. 31 March 1976]) Nevertheless. 75271-73. Inc. A union officer. it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. if he does not want to obey the order. 19 December 1990]) Liabilities for an Illegal Strike A UNION OFFICER who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. The right is. provided that the union and its members believed in good faith in the truth of such averment.R. (First City Interlink Transportation Co. or if one has already taken place. all strikers shall immediately return to work. when he commits an illegal act during a strike. the striking workers erred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. (Gold City Integrated Port Service. responsibility for serious acts of violence should be individual and not collective. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech. 05 May 1997]) Thus. Thus. Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently. Nestle Phil.R. Shell Company Of The Phil. L-30658-59. If peacefully carried out. on the other hand. (Sarmiento vs. [G. vs. but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike. (PNOC Dockyard vs. 106316.

R." as well as "testimony in opposition thereto.. 27 June 1991] Liability of Employer for backwages . No." b) reception at the hearing of "testimony of witnesses. peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat. . if sustained. and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property.R. (PAFLU vs. NLRC. with opportunity for cross-examination. expense or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction. Although sustained on a different ground. 91980. . a temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte under the following conditions: a) the complainant "shall also allege that. 91980. if offered . sufficient. Cloribel [L-25878." (IBM vs. prohibited or unlawful act. to all known persons against whom relief is sought. unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice. to wit: a) a hearing held "after due and personal notice thereof has been served. and (5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. 28 March 1969]) Among the powers expressly conferred on the Commission by Article 218 is the power to "enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which. including all reasonable costs. . [G. However. [G. It is to be noted that in the instances cited. And in one American case. NLRC. in such manner as the Commission shall direct. together with a reasonable attorney's fee. no connection was found other than their being situated in the same premises. a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable. . may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party . (IBM vs.impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission. a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were located. In one case decided by this Court. b) there is "testimony under oath." c) the "complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss. No. association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof. 27 June 1991] As a rule such restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte. to justify the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice. (2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow. except against the person or persons. c) a finding of fact by the Commission. (4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law." and d) the "temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days. but only after compliance with the following requisites. greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief. to the effect: (1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained. (3) That as to each item of relief to be granted. we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. if not restrained or performed forthwith. in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath.

an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of the new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities. (2) Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his representative. (See Dinglasan v. or identical. even if in protest against unfair labor practices. Andrada and the salesmen may be justified. 28. vs. However. they did not voluntarily strike. On this score.[T]he distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed employees and those who struck.R. No. albeit in protest against the company's unfair labor practice. pp. National Labor Union. v. Moreover. 107320. effects the transfer of the same employee to another entity whose owners are the same. 371. Accordingly. We are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award backpay are no longer controlling. and (4) Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing. as in this case. Petitioner's failure to deny that Sugarland is its sister company and that petitioner absorbed Sugarland's security contract and security personnel assumes overriding significance over the resignation theorized upon. (Article 285 of the Labor Code) Resignation The Court cannot uphold and give weight to private respondent's resignation letter which appears to have been written and submitted at the instance of petitioner. CIR [G. 1955) Hence. No. In contrast. L-7887. the award of backpay to Gaddi. L-14183. (b) An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the employer for any of the following just causes: (1) Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the employee. NLRC [G.R. Inc. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company's unfair labor practice. We hold that where. of the Phil. The Court cannot sanction the practice of some companies which. (3) Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of the employee or any of the immediate members of his family. it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike.R. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for damages." (Quoted in Teller. the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they considered unfair labor practices of the company. G. Its form is of the company's and its wordings are more of a waiver and quitclaim. The salesmen. Progressive Federation of Labor. were practically locked out when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage. "When employees voluntarily go on strike. the supposed resignation was not acknowledged before a notary public. 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining. (A' Prime Security Services. the award of backwages. May 31. in order to deprive subject employee of the benefits and protection he is entitled to under the law. shortly after a worker has become a regular employee. No. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. 997-998) (Cromwell Commercial Employees vs.. 1959) As explained by the National Labor Relations Board in the case of American Manufacturing Co. evincing petitioner's design to ignore or violate labor laws through the use of the veil of corporate personality. 19 January 2000]) . Nov.R. that is from the day of their discharge. when the strikers abandon the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practices and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitute unfair labor practices. 30 September 1964]) TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT By Employee (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee-employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least one month in advance. (See Macleod & Co. NLRB 443. Discriminatorily dismissed employees received backpay from the date of the act of discrimination. L-19778. as already stated. the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts. Sec. No. G.

R. not a valid ground. 116542. the dismissal of an employee must be for a just or authorized cause and after due process. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action. The two requirements of this legal provision are: 1. a forbidden act. NLRC [G. (Cebu Filveneer vs. Such misconduct. and 2. (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. nevertheless. it must be established that the said orders. there can be no higher penalty than dismissal from employment. except for the most serious causes. regulations or instructions are (a) reasonable and lawful. No. however serious. NLRC [G. willful in character. Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code. and mandate that every doubt must be resolved in their favor. that is. and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. [I]n order that an employer may terminate an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to the former's orders. with observance of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing. dismissal under the ground provided under Article 282 (Just Causes) or Articles 283 and 284 (Authorized Causes) of the Labor Code. and insubordination or willful disobedience of the lawful order of his superior officer. No. Just Cause An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following just causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. The legality in the manner of dismissal. NLRC [G. are just causes for the dismissal of an employee. (Cosep vs. 30 July 1996]) In labor-management relations. our Labor Code decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed.R. habitual neglect of duty. Dismissal prejudices the socio-economic well being of the employee's family and threatens the industrial peace. NLRC [G. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. [Seahorse Maritime Corporation vs. 126601. 16 June 1998]) Serious misconduct in the form of drunkenness and disorderly and violent behavior. (Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. 10 January 1994]) Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his separation. must. 107721. No. (b) sufficiently known to the employee. a dereliction of duty. 1989]) . The overly concern of our laws for the welfare of employees is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our Constitution. NLRC [173 SCRA 390. The legality of the act of dismissal. the misconduct has no relation to the work of petitioners. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. and (c) in connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. regulations or instructions.By Employer Under Section 1. hence. that is. (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. No. the cause for termination must be a serious and grave malfeasance to justify the deprivation of a means of livelihood.R. 24 February 1998] Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. This is merely in keeping with the spirit of our Constitution and laws which lean over backwards in favor of the working class. (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. In this case however.R. 124966. vs. (Article 282 of the Labor Code) To be lawful. Dismissal severs employment ties and could well be the economic death sentence of an employee. Due to its far reaching implications. (Manebo vs.

1949]) The employee admits that she had asked someone to punch-in her time card because at that time she was doing an errand for one of the company’s officers. 1994. No. he had no idea that his work schedule (night shift) would be cancelled. Victory Employees [85 PHIL 166. Nothing is shown to prove he deliberately falsified his daily time record to deceive the company. 124617.R. Finally. Sleeping on the job Petitioner's reliance on the authorities it cited that sleeping on the job is always a valid ground for dismissal. NLRC [G. 124617. it was done in good faith considering that she was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing that she was anyway accommodating the request of a company executive and done for the benefit of the company with the acquiescence of her boss. No. (Permex vs. The authorities cited involved security guards whose duty necessitates that they be awake and watchful at all times inasmuch as their function. (Philippine Aeolus Automotive vs. examines her pay slip every time she receives her salary. is misplaced. the company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the offense was immediately known and corrected. was also allowed to go home that night and like private respondent logged in advance 7:00 a. it eas her first time to commit such infraction during her five (5)-year service in the company. the same should not be laid solely on the employee because the mistake is not hers alone. The NLRC found that even management's own evidence reflected that a certain Felix Pelayo. NLRC [G. The mistake resulted from the collective laxity of petitioner’s accounting personnel and inadvertence on the part of the respondent. 141900. Needless to say.m. 29 April 2000]) Such dismissal.[W]here a violation of company policy or breach of company rules and regulations was found to have been tolerated by management. The amount in controversy was only P254. 125031. But we cannot always expect the employee to go further as to determine if her overtime pay. v. 20 April 2001]) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. 29 April 2000]) An ordinary employee. (Philippine Aeolus Automotive vs. is "to protect the company from pilferage or loss. Considering the employee’s salary was not fixed as it fluctuated from time to time due to varying amounts of tips. Richard Tan. it would not have been right to assume always that the employee would examine every detail of the computation of her salary. When it was confirmed at 10:00 p. Considering the factory practice which management tolerated. the doctrine laid down in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar. was too harsh a penalty for an unintentional infraction. as his time-out. that there was no "butchering" of tuna to be done. No. 24 January 2000]) The act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card although a violation of company rules. No. not to mention that it was his first offense committed without malice. v. . NLRC [G. This supports Filoteo's claim that it was common practice among night-shift workers to log in their usual time-out in advance in the daily time record. a co-worker of private respondent. merely forgot to correct his initial time-out entry. and committed also by others who were not equally penalized. quite understandably. those who reported for work were allowed to go home. with the consent of the plant manager. and that was with the permission of William Chua. But it appears that when he timed in. CIR. Secondly. Firstly. which is for the benefit of the company. we are persuaded that Filoteo. in our view. then the same could not serve as a basis for termination (Tide Water Associated Oil Co.90. It is clear that the alleged false entry in private respondent's DTR was actually the result of having logged his scheduled time-out in advance on July 31. which is not much anyway. Filoteo even obtained permission to leave from the Assistant Production Manager.R.R. was properly computed up to the last centavo or whether the overtime pay pertained to a particular day the work was rendered. in his rush to catch the service vehicle. Besides.m. the practice was apparently tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so. Dialogo [G. including private respondent. likewise does not constitute serious misconduct. to use the words in Luzon Stevedoring Corp.R. (Shangri-La Hotel vs." Accordingly. commissions and overtime pay received. In fact.

is revealed by the following averment in his position paper before the Labor Arbiter: Before delving into the issues of the above entitled case. aside from absence of substantiation of the alleged offense. First. (Icawat vs. must always be fair and reasonable. under the attendant circumstances. must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. NLRC [G. an employee's posture will be illogical if he abandons his work and then immediately files an action for his reinstatement (Remerco Garments v.R. We have consistently ruled that a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Furthermore. Neither was it shown that private respondent's alleged negligence or neglect of duty. if any. This refusal must be clearly shown. he reported back for work 50 days after his operation.While an employer enjoys a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies. after nine (9) long years of unblemished service. in the first place. Mere absence is not sufficient. the dismissal meted out on private respondent for allegedly sleeping on the job. The authorities cited by petitioner are also irrelevant for the reason that there is no evidence on the depravity of conduct. believe that private respondent's motivation in filing the complaint for illegal dismissal despite his refusal to return to work. for an alleged offense which caused no prejudice to the employer. Inc. NLRC [G.NLRC [GR No. 113721. (Davies. considering that he was being held liable for first time. willfulness of the disobedience. where the employer proffers substantial evidence of the fact that it had not. and the corresponding penalties. those directives. We. fair play as well requires that. it must be accompanied by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 2002]) Undeniable is the over-reliance of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the notion that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the employer's defense of abandonment by the employee of his work. 135 SCRA 167 [1985]). when prescribed.R. Minister. complainant would like to request the Honorable Commissioner to take judicial notice of the fabricated and manufactured criminal case filed by the respondents in retaliation to the institution of this case and in fact the latter had confronted the former to drop this case in exchange of the dropping of the fabricated and manufactured criminal case. NLRC [G. there must be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. xxx xxx xxx The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC similarly answered the question with the alleged truism: private respondent filed the complaint for illegal dismissal because he was illegally dismissed. the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal by private respondent is inconsistent with the allegation of petitioners that he had abandoned his job. 19 January 2000]) Abandonment For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment. vs. neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC may simply ignore such evidence on the pretext that the employee would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not indeed been dismissed. terminated the employee but simply laid him off due to valid reasons. reinstatement is just and proper. While the burden of refuting a complaint for illegal dismissal is upon the employer. In fact.R. In the case at bar. No. No. 133573. the following circumstances clearly manifest private respondent's intention to sever his ties with petitioners. 07 May 1997]) In this case. (VH Manufacturing. rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees. Surely. was gross and habitual. or conclusiveness of guilt on the part of private respondent. Thus. 31 August 1993]) As found by the Labor Arbiter. This is clearly a non sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee. private respondent even bragged to his co-workers his plan to quit his job at . private respondent's physician advised him to rest for 30 days before reporting back for work in order to recuperate. Private respondent heeded this advise and even exceeded the number of days recommended by his doctor for his recuperation. however. 130957. (Arc-Men Food Industries vs. appears to be too harsh a penalty. however. No. This would clearly show that private respondent was ready to assume his responsibilities considering that he had fully recovered from the operation. Inc. vs. 106915.

Loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal does not entail proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct. It is enough that there be "some basis" for such loss of confidence or that "the employer has reasonable grounds to believe. (Leonardo vs. NLRC [G. Concomitantly. Galsim vs. he never reported back to work anymore. It goes without saying that the prayer for separation pay. Considering that private respondent was acting in good faith. 113081. he surrendered the shop's keys and took away all his things from the shop. it has no application where the complainant does not pray for reinstatement and just asks for separation pay instead as in the present case. Such rule applies where the complainant seeks reinstatement as a relief. he was not at home but was out driving a pedicab to earn extra income when the company nurse visited his residence after he filed an application for sick leave. All the above facts clearly point that the filing of the case is a mere afterthought on the part of complainant Leonardo. 23 August 1995]) The employee’s failure to detect and report to the respondent company the fraudulent activities in her division as well as her failure to give a satisfactory explanation on the irregularities constitute “fraud or willful breach of trust reposed on her by her employer or duly authorized representative” – one of the just causes in terminating employment as provided for under paragraph c. Corollarily. contradicts private respondent's stance. for what is at stake is not only the employee's position. Such conduct of respondent Edwin P. why did it take him ten (10) long months to file his case if he indeed was aggrieved by the respondents.Cesar's Palace Barbershop and Massage Clinic as borne out by the affidavit executed by his former coworkers. as amended. It must be stressed that while Leonardo alleges that he was illegally dismissed from his employment by the respondents. it is undisputed that respondent Edwin P. he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal without praying for reinstatement. Moreover. 114920. Fifth. public respondent's assertion that the institution of the complaint for illegal dismissal manifests private respondent's lack of intention to abandon his job is untenable. the employee’s actuations betrayed the utmost trust and . complainant. 125303. PNB. And.R. The rule that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complainant for illegal dismissal is not applicable in this case. 29 SCRA 293 [1969]) To be a valid ground for dismissal. Worse. dismissal will be disallowed. after being pressed by respondent to present the customer regarding his unauthorized solicitation of sideline work from the latter and whom he claims to be his aunt. As sufficiently established by respondents. he got employed with Dennis Motors Corporation as Air-Con Mechanic…. This finding is further bolstered by the fact that after he left the respondent. warned and suspended for incurring excessive unauthorized absences.R. 16 June 2000]) Excessive absences In the case at bench. Zamora. he immediately sought a regular employment in another barbershop. (PCI Bank vs. Article 283 of the Labor Code. Moreover. being the alternative remedy to reinstatement. No. but also his means of livelihood. Second. 02 February 2000]) [T]he evidence on record indubitably shows that Leonardo abandoned his work with the respondents. as realistically stressed by the Solicitor General. he did not report anymore to the shop without giving any valid and justifiable reason for his absence. surprisingly he never stated any reason why the respondents would want to ease him out from his job. No. 90 SCRA 92. No. NLRC [G. his dismissal would run counter to such established doctrinal rulings.R. 121605. No. Sabuya undoubtedly constitutes gross and habitual neglect of duties.R. despite previous assurance that he could remain in petitioners' employ. (Worldwide Papermills vs. unless based on a ground provided by law and supported by substantial evidence. NLRC [G. if not to entertain the moral conviction that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position" (Reyes vs. 111 [1979]. Fourth. Third. Sabuya had within a span of almost six (6) years been repeatedly admonished. 12 May 1995]) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust. (Jo vs. NLRC [G.

But such ground must be founded on facts established by substantial evidence. was her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company. as found a quo. are not necessarily the same as those applicable to termination of employment of ordinary employees. 18 July 2000]) We have consistently held that loss of confidence is a recognized ground for the discharge of an employee from employment. as it was verbally instructed to you. the branch supervisor of the company. Furthermore. such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct. Indeed. it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence. moreover. Medina [1989]). than in the case of ordinary rank-and-file employees (Cruz vs. he committed acts which betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him . generally. therefore.R. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. 23 May 1997]) [T]he rules on termination of employment. honesty and efficiency required of her position. But suspicion has never been a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. 13 November 1992]) That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M.00 shortage in its vault. (Nokom vs. she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. In other words. it should not be simulated. The burden of establishing such facts as reasonably cause loss of confidence in an employee such facts are reasonably generate belief by the employer that the employee was connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation therein is such as to render him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position is on the employer. penalties for infractions. illegal. Employers. He had access to the vault where the monies of the bank were kept. it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper. He should have realized that his position requires the full trust and confidence of his employer in every exercise of managerial discretion insofar as the conduct of his employer's business is concerned. the cash operations of the branch were under his control and supervision. the records are bereft of any showing that private respondent Jemina is responsible.") Parenthetically. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employer's caprices. and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic). private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. compel private respondents to retain the employment of the employee who is shown to be lacking in candor.confidence reposed upon her by the respondent company. this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. 101372.R. and resort to concerted actions. petitioner Bank has every reason to suspect Jemina for the P100. Verily. As regards a managerial employee. In the case at bar. We cannot. in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor. In this case. petitioner. be hinged upon conjectures and surmises. are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial personnel or those of similar rank performing functions which by their nature require the employer's trust and confidence. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC analyzed the employer's proofs and came to the reasoned conclusion that they did not adequately demonstrate Jemina's connection with the said loss.R. However. or unjustified. mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for dismissal. No. The employee's fate cannot. in the words of the latter.000. is tasked to perform key functions. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment. Jemina is a possible suspect. No. After all.000. (Pilipinas Bank vs. Oficial. in justice. 140043. (PT&T vs. 118978. solely or partly. over and on top of that. NLRC [G.00 in the vault of petitioner Bank's Binondo Branch. He had joint custody with the Branch Manager over all cash and properties inside the vault." Again. NLRC [G. No. he is bound by an exacting work ethic. True. for the loss of the P100. NLRC [G. private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but. insofar as managerial employees are concerned. with the reminder.

this Court speaking through Justice Arsenio Dizon held inter alia that a cursory reading of Section 1. PNR [G. Their use is covered by Item No. (Lim vs. Cash shortages in a cashier's work may happen.R. 118434. CA [G. 1787. Benguet Consolidated Inc. NLRC [G.R.by tampering with very sensitive equipment at the joint terminal facility." Petitioners knew that the commission of this offense is punishable by dismissal in view of its seriousness. which enumerates the just causes for which an employer may terminate an employment with a definite period. Nor can petitioners avoid liability by claiming that the SN Forms are not company records but SSS documents.R. No. there is also a corresponding breach of trust. [G.R. They cannot therefore complain of its harshness." the constitutes.. No. 10 February 2000]) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Their commission constitutes serious misconduct. he committed acts inimical to the interest of his employer which is mandated by law to observe extraordinary diligence in its operations to ensure the safety of the public. (Farrol vs.R. R. Petitioners cannot downgrade the seriousness of their offenses. . it cannot constitute breach of trust so as to render the dismissal from work invalid. L-17780. One is analogous to another if it is susceptible of comparison with the latter either in general or in some specific detail. NLRC [G. 133259. Benguet Consolidated. These are crimes punished by the Revised Penal Code itself. just cause to terminate an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code.A. 133259. . NLRC [G." for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business. No." (Soriano vs. Inc. In doing so. 24 August 1962]) (Hence to constitute an “analogous cause” under Article 282 of the Labor Code. On the assumption that there was indeed a breach. In the case of Nadura vs. (Deles vs. the act must be willful and voluntary on the part of the employee [and illness is not]) We cannot but agree with PEPSI that "gross inefficiency" falls within the purview of "other causes analogous to the foregoing. 10 February 2000]) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. we are constrained to conclude that petitioner's admitted infraction as well his past violation of safety regulations is more than sufficient ground for respondent company to terminate the employment of petitioner. 09 March 2000]) A perusal of RCPI's dismissal notice reveals that it merely stated a conclusion to the effect that the withholding was deliberately done to hide alleged malversation or misappropriation without. however.' (Eugenio Nadura v. No. L-43224. 23 August 1978) 'The employer cannot rightfully dismiss the employee who is sick even if he complies with the requirement of the Act as to the service of the required notice or payment of the corresponding separation pay. (Farrol vs. Indeed. stating the circumstances in support thereof. 121348. No. "Gross inefficiency" is closely related to "gross neglect. knowingly using falsified record or document. It should be facts noted that the term 'trust and managerial employees. he exposed the terminal complex and the residents in adjacent communities to the danger of a major disaster that may be caused by tank explosions and conflagration. They committed falsifications.R. 12 of the Schedule of Offenses and Penalties which provides ". 26 July 1996]) . It further mentioned that the position of cashier requires utmost trust and confidence but failed to allege the breach of trust on the part of petitioner and how the alleged breach was committed. therefore. is sufficient to convince anyone that illness cannot be included as an analogous cause "by any stretch of the imagination. and when there is no proof that the same was deliberately done for a fraudulent or wrongful purpose. or has a close relationship with the latter. because sickness is not willful or voluntary on the part of the employee. No. It may not even be presumed that when there is a shortage. there is no evidence that petitioner was a managerial employee of respondent RCPI. Verily.

it appears that petitioner falsified the truth when he made a false report about the incident to private respondent SMC to cover up for his misdeeds. 7877 15 February 1995 AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT. he failed to remit collections. agent of the employer. 108153. regardless of whether the demand. or any other person who. The State shall value the dignity of every individual. so that in 1986. . 22 March 1991]) Habituality In other words. Work Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. he was suspended for thirty days. guarantee full respect for human rights. (Mendoza vs. Title.R. terms. EDUCATION OR TRAINING ENVIRONMENT. employee. Inc. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. Declaration of Policy. students or those undergoing training. And to a shipping company engaged in the transportation of passengers and cargoes any delay of its vessels may greatly affect its business and reputation and expose the company to unmitigated lawsuits for breach of contract and damages. No. education of trainingrelated sexual harassment is committed by an employer. teacher. or in granting said individual favorable compensation. employees. sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment. NLRC [G. segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate. (Villeno vs. Unfortunately. deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. Moreover on previous occasions. Aside from the infractions he was found to have committed. v. The law. Thus." Section 2. manager. Section 3. having authority. coach. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 1. conditions. 26 December 1995]) Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. or privileges. Ople) Sexual Harassment REPUBLIC ACT NO. (ColgatePalmolive Philippines. and uphold the dignity of workers.R. demands. Towards this end. As to whether an offense is minor or serious will have to be determined according to the peculiar facts of each case. (a) In a work-related or employment environment. petitioner committed violations of company rules and regulations concerning pricing as a salesman of the company in a way that is detrimental to his employer. education or training environment are hereby declared unlawful. promotions. request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other. professor. On one occasion. authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 94294. supervisor. trainor. enhance the development of its human resources. in protecting the rights of the laborer. NLRC [G. or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting. the totality of the infractions that petitioner has committed justifies the penalty of dismissal. considerations of first offense and length of service are overshadowed by the seriousness of the offense. all forms of sexual harassment in the employment. applicants for employment. Work.Totality of Infractions Petitioner also assails the severity of the penalty imposed upon him alleging that he should have merited a suspension only considering his past performance. re-employment or continued employment of said individual. Under the law. No. instructor. instruction or education. influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment. respondent Minister is duly mandated to equally protect and respect not only the labor or workers' side but also the management and/or employers' side. petitioner does not appear to be a first offender.

apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender. The committee shall conduct meetings. as the case may be.000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos (P20. hostile or offensive environment for the student. through their duly designated representatives. Section 4. or offensive environment for the employee. instructors. education or training environment if the employer or head of office. Section 7. among others. with officers and employees. the trainors. In the case of the educational or training institution. training. Nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work. Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.000) or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. prescribing the procedure for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor. trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. and from the rank and file employees. instructors. if any. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related. custody or supervision of the offender. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related. . The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this sub-section (a) shall include. settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment . It shall also conduct the investigation of alleged cases constituting sexual harassment. Education or Training Environment. coaches. as the case may be. the employees form the supervisory rank. or the payment of a stipend. educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned. Head of Office. allowance or other benefits. (3) When the sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade. The employer or head of office. training or apprentice. Towards this end. education or training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent action for damages and other affirmative relief. the employer or head of office shall: (a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with an jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees. or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10. professors. educational or training institution is informed of such acts by the offended party and no immediate action is taken thereon. (b) In an education or training environment. educational or training environment or institution. In the case of a work-related environment. or the granting of honors and scholarships. sexual harassment is committed: (1) Against one who is under the care. Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment. Section 6. Educational or Training Institution. (2) Against one whose education. Penalties. guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions. The employer or head of office. Independent Action for Damages. the union. the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative each from the management. to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution. the committee shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the administration. Liability of the Employer.(2) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing labor laws. Any person who violates the provisions of this Act shall. Any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual harassment as herein defined. be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months. Section. teachers. or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating. or (4) When the sexual advances result in an intimidating. upon conviction. (b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. shall also be held liable under this Act. professors or coaches and students or trainees. teachers. hostile. educational or training institution shall be solidarity liable for damages arising from the acts of sexual harassment committed in the employment. or who cooperates in the commission thereof by another without which it would not have been committed. privileges or considerations.

whichever is greater. the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service. however. this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy. is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. No. In termination cases. No. and (d) closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of law. (c) retrenchment to prevent losses. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year. and superfluity of a position or positions could be the result of a number of factors. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title. by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.R. (e) disease which renders continued employment prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his fellow employees. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses. Court of Industrial Relations [83 Phil. (b) redundancy. Inc. (Chua-Qua vs. 121314. 49549. despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores. Clave [G. A position is redundant when it is superfluous. Sheet Metal Workers' Union vs. 453]) Redundancy Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what would reasonably be demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. vs. This policy. If the two eventually fell in love. (Edge Apparel. the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service.An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as the health of his co-employees: Provided. 30 August 1990]) Authorized Causes Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year.R. redundancy. Installation of labor-saving devices The installation of labor-saving devices contemplates the installation of machinery to effect economy and efficiency in its method of production. (Article 284 of the Labor Code) Authorized causes for the termination of employment: (a) installation of labor-saving devices. (Article 283 of the Labor Code) Disease as ground for termination. . definitely. That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service.With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts.The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices. It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. 12 February 1998] citing Phil. whichever is higher. whichever is higher. it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. NLRC [G. But. the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. . such as the .

All these considered. or of automation. to abolish positions which it deems no longer necessary (Great Pacific Life vs. Management is at liberty. CA [G. by respondent company. it is an act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation of a business. a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. 115394. lack of work. No. As for the FIRST REQUISITE.overhiring of workers. the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings. 114776. absent any malice on its part. (2) written notice to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. resorted to by management during periods of business recession. (Edge Apparel. such as cutting down services. no evidence that any written notice to permanently retrench them was given at least one month prior to the date of the intended retrenchment. however. No. No error nor grave abuse of discretion. therefore. The REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE to both the employees concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be written and given at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment. 27 September 1995]) [T]here are three basic requisites for a valid retrenchment: (1) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven. conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery. As a result. Here. including the reason for the retrenchment: When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably needed. We are not prepared to disregard this finding of fact. it is undisputed that the petitioners were given notice of the temporary lay-off. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures. 188 SCRA 139 [1990]). Simply put. NLRC [G. and considerable reduction on the volume of his business. is used interchangeably with the term "lay-off. NLRC [G. No. 12 February 1998]) The prerogative of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve its purposes cannot be denied. number of frequencies of flights. a right consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. industrial depression. Inc. could be attributed to respondent appellate court. 121314. …. or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders. or seasonal fluctuations. (Laureano vs. both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that the private respondent was suffering and would continue to suffer serious losses. But what the law requires is a written notice to the employees concerned and that requirement is .R. Moreover. and (3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2 month pay for every year of service. There is. An employer has no legal obligation to keep on the payroll employees more than the number needed for the operation of the business. for which he was given ample notice and opportunity to be heard. It is settled that findings of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only with respect but with finality if they are supported by Substantial Evidence. (Sebuguero vs. NLRC. vs. whichever is higher. whether or not an employer would imminently suffer serious or substantial losses for economic reasons is essentially a question of fact for the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to determine. and reduction of the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet. 02February 2000]) Retrenchment Retrenchment. The NLRC found that GTI conveyed to the petitioners the impossibility of recalling them due to the continued unavailability of work. we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause. thereby justifying the retrenchment of some of its employees. shortage of materials. defendant-appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots." It is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee's and without prejudice to the latter.R. In this case. including the petitioners. including plaintiff-appellee.R.

GTI's position paper. No. The notice to the DOLE is essential because the right to retrench is not an absolute prerogative of an employer but is subject to the requirement of law that retrenchment be done to prevent losses. proven. The DOLE is the agency that will determine whether the planned retrenchment is justified and adequately supported by facts. (Revidad vs. the possibility of incurring losses is constantly present. in other words. the NLRC found that GTI offered to give the petitioners their separation pay but that the latter rejected such offer which was accepted only by 22 out of the 38 original complainants in this case. NLRC [G. There is also nothing in the records to prove that a written notice was ever given to the DOLE as required by law. constitute substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. since some. indeed many. In order to be justified. it seems equally clear that not every asserted possibility of loss is sufficient legal warrant for the reduction of personnel. is an economic ground to reduce the number of employees. in contrast to redundancy. since. the phrase "TO PREVENT LOSSES" means that retrenchment or termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be undertaken by the employer sometime before the anticipated losses are actually sustained or realized. 111105. the termination of employment by reason of retrenchment must be due to business losses or reverses which are serious. and Memorandum in this case do not mention of any such written notice. 27 June 1995]) Retrenchment. or seasonal fluctuations. That they were already on temporary lay-off at the time notice should have been given to them is not an excuse to forego the one-month written notice because by this time. 111105. In the nature of things.mandatory. The purpose of this notice requirement is to enable the proper authorities to ascertain whether the closure of the business is being done in good faith and is not just a pretext for evading compliance with the just obligations of the employer to the affected employees. 115394. the possibility of incurring losses is constantly present. NLRC [G. 27 September 1995]) In its ordinary connotation. As to when this offer was made was not. in addition to the right to present their respective position papers and documentary evidence. The notice must also be given at least one month in advance of the intended date of retrenchment to enable the employees to look for other means of employment and therefore to ease the impact of the loss of their jobs and the corresponding income. we are of the considered opinion that the proceedings had before the voluntary arbitrator. the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC stated in their respective pleadings and decisions was that the offer and payment were made during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter. 27 June 1995]) Anent the mandatory written notice to be filed with the labor department one month before retrenchment. the intention of the lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his employees until after losses shall have in fact materialized. where both parties were given the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in their favor. All that the parties. industrial depression. In fact. in the nature of things. Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by the employer will justify retrenchment. NLRC [G. their lay-off is to become permanent and they were definitely losing their employment. Comment to the Petition. (Revidad vs. in greater or lesser degree. Retrenchment is normally resorted to by management during periods of business reverses and economic difficulties occasioned by such events as recession. offer of exhibits. With respect to the PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY. But with or without this offer of separation pay. (Sebuguero vs.R. actual and real. It is an act of the employer of reducing the work force because of losses in the . of the factors which impact upon the profitability or viability of such operations may be substantially outside the control of the employer. our conclusion would remain the same: that the retrenchment of the petitioners is defective in the face of our finding that the required notices to both the petitioners and the DOLE were not given.R. At the other end of the spectrum. in carrying on the business operations. No. in the carrying on of business operations. It is not. in greater or lesser degree. If such an intent were expressly written into the law. that law may well be vulnerable to constitutional attack as unduly taking property from one man to be given to another. The law requires two notices one to the employee/s concerned and another to the DOLE not just one. No. the voluntary arbitration proceedings more than satisfied the intendment of the law considering that the parties were accorded the benefit of a hearing. however.R.

because of that arrangement made by the respondents in paying their termination benefits. 1991 (date of lay-off) to July 22.operation of the enterprise. Understandably. respondent company was justified in the temporary lay-off of some of its employees. a measure oflast resort when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be inadequate. during the trial of this case and in view of the strained relations between the parties. vs. However. or general principles of fair play and justice (UST vs. respondent company chose not to recall nor send notice to the complainants after the lapse of the six (6) month period. Clearly. 286) to be recalled back to work. or of automation" is technically a ground for termination of employment by reason of installation of laborsaving devices but where the introduction of these methods is resorted to not merely to effect greater efficiency in the operations of the business but principally because of serious business reverses and to avert further losses. Respondent company should have recalled them after the end of the six month period or at the least reasonably informed them (complainants) that the Respondent company is still not in a position to recall them due to the continuous drop of demand in the export market (locally or internationally). grant greater benefits to some and less to others. Article 283 of the Labor Code. Complainants cannot be placed on temporary lay-off forever. and the 31 July 1988 and the 28 February 1989 were due to closure. 103575. No. Inc. that the lack of work and selection of personnel continued to persist and considering the antagonism and hostility displayed by both litigants. in many ways. Thereafter the employees.R. (Edge Apparel. are entitled under the law (Art. complainants herein. as observed by this Arbiter. 190 SCRA 758). the law requires the granting of the same amount of separation benefits to the affected employees in any of the cases. reinstatement of the complainants would not be prudent.R. NLRC [G. However. . 12 February 1998]) Granting that the 16 May 1988 termination was a retrenchment scheme. The respondent argued that the giving of more separation benefit to the second and third batches of employees separated was their expression of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees who have tried to save and make the company viable in the remaining days of operations. The institution of "new methods or more efficient machinery. as a general rule. There are workers in the first batch who have rendered more years of service and could even be said to be more efficient than those separated subsequently. as amended. however. . the temporary lay-off of the complainants from January 22. NLRC. such right is likewise limited to a period of six (6) months applying Art. the device could then verily be considered one of retrenchment. in view of constructive dismissal. Management prerogatives are not absolute prerogatives but are subject to legal limits. was a concession enough and may already be considered as favor granted by the respondents to the prejudice of the complainants. While there is a valid reason for the temporary lay-off. The limited period of six (6) months is based provisionally too prevent circumvention on the right to security of tenure and to prevent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the employer. as testified by the Vice-President for marketing and personnel manager. thereafter complainants are already entitled to backwages. Failing in this regard. 05 April 1993]) Although. 286 of the Labor Code on suspension of employer-employee relationship not exceeding six (6) months. As result thereof. This justification is not plausible. It may not. since during the trial it was proven. NLRC [G. 121314. yet they did not receive the same recognition. lack of work. thereby extending the temporary lay-off with a definite period of recall and if the same cannot be met. 1991 is valid. their being retained longer in their job and be not included in the batch that was first terminated. there are workers in the first batch who have rendered more years in service but received lesser separation pay. As it happened. The law requires an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. due to the fact that they were no longer recalled back to work. there was impermissible discrimination against the private respondents in the payment of their separation benefits. protects workers whose employment is terminated because of closure of the establishment or reduction of personnel ((Businessday Information vs. in the guise of exercising management prerogatives. collective bargaining agreements. In this case. Hence. . the same is also limited to a duration of six months. No. there is in this complaint a clear case of constructive dismissal. A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would severely affect the continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all and sundry if not properly addressed. Retrenchment is. Respondent company has the prerogative and right to resort to temporary lay-off. then the company should implement retrenchment and pay its employees separation pay. or considerable reduction on the volume of business.

Thus. there appears to us no need for an investigation and hearing to be conducted by the employer who does not. must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. (Sebuguero vs. amounts to cessation of petitioner's business operations in Makati. the employees should either be recalled to work or permanently retrenched following the requirements of the law. SECONDLY. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in character. the ground for dismissal or termination of services does not relate to a blameworthy act or omission on the part of the employee. 115394. Because of the far-reaching nature of the retrenchment. speaks of a permanent retrenchment as opposed to a temporary lay-off as is the case here. at which private respondent would have had the right to be present. which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwise laid-off. The temporary lay-off wherein the employees likewise cease to work should also not last longer than six months. There should. allege any malfeasance or non-feasance on the part of the employee. No.R. be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. Federation of Free Workers. No. In such case. 24 August 1992]) Article 283 of the Labor Code. 07 February 1991]) Broadly speaking. the substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. NLRC [G. Inc. to begin with. 85286.(Sebuguero vs. The case of Sugar Lopez Corporation v. and that failing to comply with this would be tantamount to dismissing the employees and the employer would thus be liable for such dismissal. 27 September 1995]) Closure Under Article 283 of the Labor Code. would be to impose upon the employer an unnecessary and inutile hearing as a condition for legality of termination. NLRC [G. but certainly not the least important. Section 5 may be seen to envisage charges against an employee constituting one or more of the just causes for dismissal listed in Article 282 of the Labor Code. (Balasbas vs. (Wiltshire File Co. the bonafide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question. as in the instant case. on the business and financial circumstances compelling retrenchment and resulting in redundancy. the alleged losses if already incurred. Article 286 may be applied but only by analogy to set a specific period that employees may remain temporarily laid-off or in floating status. Section 5 gives the employee the right to answer and to defend himself against "the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal". Six months is the period set by law that the operation of a business or undertaking may be suspended thereby suspending the employment of the employees concerned. the closure of a business establishment or reduction of personnel is a ground for the termination of the services of any employee unless the closing or retrenching is for the purpose of circumventing the provision of the law. It is such allegations by the employer and any counter-allegations that the employee may wish to make that need to be heard before dismissal is effected.R. No. a requirement which is obviously applicable where the ground for dismissal is the commission of some act or omission falling within Article 282 of the Labor Code. 27 September 1995]) We note that Section 2 of Rule XIV quoted above requires the notice to specify "the particular acts or omissions constituting the ground for his dismissal". It must be stressed that the phrase "closure or cessation of operation of . LASTLY. FIRSTLY. NLRC [G. 82249. lays down the general standards under which an employer may retrench or reduce the number of his employees. vs. Thus.R.. But while business reverses can be a just cause for terminating employees. however. There is no specific provision of law which treats of a temporary retrenchment or lay-off and provides for the requisites in effecting it or a period or duration therefor. it must. These employees cannot forever be temporarily laid-off. be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment. in other words. the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. Where.R. After six months. as such imminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. 115394. NLRC [G. THIRDLY. to require petitioner Wiltshire to hold a hearing. Again. there are no allegations which the employee should refute and defend himself from. these must be sufficiently proved by the employer. in our view. To remedy this situation or fill the hiatus. there appears no complete dissolution of petitioner's business undertaking but the relocation of petitioner's plant to Batangas. and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled. No.

Yet. 122876. however. Razon. that the situation in this case were a closure of the business establishment called Patalon Coconut Estate of private respondents. of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reading as follows: Sec. Rule I. 02 March 2000]) Broadly speaking. NLRC [G. (Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation vs. There is no doubt that petitioner has legitimate reason to relocate its plant because of the expiration of the lease contract on the premises it occupied. petitioner therein provides arrastre services in all piers in South Harbor. plain and free from ambiguity. No. (NFL vs." in a statute. Hence. the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at . the cancellation was not sought.R. the ownership of that large portion of the estate was precisely transferred to PEARA and ultimately to the petitioners as members thereof and as agrarian lot beneficiaries. Article 283 of the Labor Code does not contemplate a situation where the closure of the business establishment is forced upon the employer and ultimately for the benefit of the employees. it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. In Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. Where the words of a statute are clear. Quezon City to Candon. When the Patalon Coconut Estate was closed because a large portion of the estate was acquired by DAR pursuant to CARP. No. NLRC. 17 February 2000]) It is clear that Article 283 of the Labor Code applies in cases of closures of establishment and reduction of personnel. vs.". (Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corporation vs. Secretary. Before the expiration of the term of the contract. Thus. in our view. Article 283 of the Labor Code is not applicable to the case at bench. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable in this case.an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or reverses" under Article 283 of the Labor Code includes both the complete cessation of all business operations and the cessation of only part of a company's business. In Philippine Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees. Book VI. involves neither the closure of an establishment nor a reduction of personnel as contemplated under the aforesaid article. Inc. the PPA cancelled the said contract resulting in the termination of employment of workers engaged by petitioner. The company therein did not actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations to another place. The use of the word "may. 122876. . arguendo. NLRC. much less desired by petitioner. NLRC [G.R. still the petitioners/employees are not entitled to separation pay. in E. NLRC [G. Ilocos Sur. 17 February 2000]) Disease The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is Section 8. petitioner has to accord its employees some relief in the form of severance pay.R. Even assuming. this Court considered the transfer as closure not due to serious business losses for which the workers are entitled to separation pay. this Court required petitioner therein to pay its workers separation pay in view of the cessation of its arrastre operations. amounts to cessation of petitioner's business operations in Makati. That is its prerogative. there appears no complete dissolution of petitioner's business undertaking but the relocation of petitioner's plant to Batangas. this Court considered the transfer as closure not due to serious business losses for which the workers are entitled to separation pay. . Manila. Nevertheless. It must be stressed that the phrase "closure or cessation of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or reverses" under Article 283 of the Labor Code includes both the complete cessation of all business operations and the cessation of only part of a company's business. Ilocos Sur. The peculiar circumstances in the case at bar. vs. 8. But even though the transfer was due to a reason beyond its control. Yet. Disease as a ground for dismissal. denotes that it is directory in nature and generally permissive only. vs. The company therein did not actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations to another place. 127718. a company transferred its tobacco processing plant in Balintawak. The closure contemplated under Article 283 of the Labor Code is a unilateral and voluntary act on the part of the employer to close the business establishment as may be gleaned from the wording of the said legal provision that "The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to. Obviously. In other words. Quezon City to Candon. under a management contract with the Philippine Ports Authority. No. a company transferred its tobacco processing plant in Balintawak.

Deputy Minister Of Labor [G. an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period. dismissal was unquestionably a severe and unlawful sanction. if he so chooses.R." and merely stated the employee's disease. to be present and to be heard. the employer shall not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. L-58639. (Aberia vs. we agree with respondents that although the aforesaid investigations were not conducted in the manner of a regular trial in court. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. 12 August 1987]) Due Process The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. It is important to stress that the rights of an employee whose services are sought to be terminated to be informed beforehand of his proposed dismissal (or suspension) as well as of the reasons therefor. such consultation or consent was not a substitute for actual observance of those rights of private respondent Calangi. namely the right to be informed of the charges. petitioners freely and voluntarily answered the questions and even made further statements in their defense during the concluding stages thereof. 107721. NLRC. NLRC [G. but the union cannot waive them for him. And in Sajonas vs. We may surmise that if the required certification was not presented. No. No. neither petitioner nor the labor union actually advised Calangi of the matters at issue. this type of hearing is not even mandatory in cases of complainants lodged before the Labor Arbiter.R. Drilon. vs. NLRC [G.R. vs. 1993]) A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process. were accorded petitioners. Inc. are rights PERSONAL TO THE EMPLOYEE. (Stayfast Philippines Corp. If so. That the private respondent simply 'kept silent" all the while. 06 November 1992]) "AMPLE OPPORTUNITY" connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation.. NLRC [G. who was not a "competent public health authority. The Memorandum of petitioner's Personnel Manager certainly offered no helpful particulars. 77859. The employee can waive those rights. Notice and opportunity to be heard must be accorded by an employer even though the employee does not affirmatively demand them. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. The medical certificate offered by the petitioner came from its own physician. Petitioner Corporation's "prior consultation" with the labor union with which private respondent Calangi was affiliated. (Cebu Royal Plant vs. was legally insufficient. Those rights were not satisfied by petitioner Corporation's obtaining the consent of or consulting with the labor union. According to Llora Motors Inc. vs. the elements of due process. In said investigations. No. The record does not contain the certification required by the above rule. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing…. 102023. is not adequate to show an effective waiver of his rights. 25 May 1988]) . it was because the disease was not of such a nature or seriousness that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. So far as the record shows. (Manebo vs. or as applied to administrative proceedings. and to be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself from the charges levelled against him.R. NLRC [218 SCRA 596. 10 January 1994]) The record of this case is bereft of any indication that a hearing or other gathering was in fact held where private respondent Calangi was given a reasonable opportunity to confront his accuser(s) and to defend against the charges made by the latter. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. we observed as follows: Finally. on the matter of due process which petitioners claim was denied them by private respondents during the investigation which led to their dismissal. No.such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. (Century Textile Mills. without more.

we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. There are three reasons why. Thus. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. On the other hand. or property without due process of law. NLRC [G. which is not the case here. violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff. NLRC [G.R. Indeed. Instead. on the other hand. he must be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. where the private respondent. Thus in the present case. . He has no right to return to his former employer. This is plain from the text of Art. 283. should not be rewarded with re-employment and back wages. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1. then. No. in accordance with that article. . The rule is explicit as above discussed. III. However. . liberty. he should be reinstated. it is shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized cause. (Serrano vs. he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving. if not undesirable.000. he should not be reinstated. 117040. then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement. The measure of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.00. 27 January 2000]) Violation of procedural due process not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer. 08 February 1989]) WENPHIL Doctrine abandoned by Serrano vs. however. The FIRST is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment. or property of the individual. NLRC In sum." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life. such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. 282.: "No person shall be deprived of life. §1 of the Constitution. instead of being given separation pay. In either case. when it appears he was not afforded due process. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes mentioned in said Art.WENPHIL Doctrine The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction. 282. Under the circumstances the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be maintained. remains in the service. (WENPHIL vs. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. viz. No. 283. he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect. It does not apply to the exercise of private power. to the denial of due process by the State. who appears to be of violent temper. liberty. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. 80587. The purpose of the Due Process .… xxx xxx xxx If the employee's separation is without cause.R. caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him. should be re-examined. However. whether he is reinstated or only granted separation pay. it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment. with respect to dismissals for cause under Art.

6715 on March 2. 1052. Where the termination of employment was for a just cause. gross and habitual neglect of duties. to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor Code is an aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that Art. 1954. 1989. 282 (i. serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer.e. Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will prove that many cases have been won by employees before the grievance committees manned by impartial judges of the company. 283 had its origin in Art. an employee could be laid off by paying him a mesada equivalent to his salary for one month. the law was amended by R.P. As Art. in case an employee leaves his job without cause and without prior notice to his employer. 277(b) provides.A. 28 This provision was repealed by Art. Court of Appeals. 282. or other analogous cases). Araneta University Foundation.A. employee. the purpose of which was to give the employer the opportunity to find a replacement or substitute. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. there should now likewise be a rule that. 1950. fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer. for there is none. That is why. Accordingly in Montemayor v. And it was still much later when the notice requirement was embodied in the law with the amendment of Art. no notice was required to be given to the. "Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. although a professor was dismissed . the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. 1981 that notice was required to be given even where the dismissal or termination of an employee was for cause. This was made in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor and Employment to implement B. On June 21." But here we are dealing with dismissals and layoffs by employers alone. however. The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but a regulatory measure. It cannot be that the former regime denied due process to the employee. 30 It was only on September 4. The THIRD REASON why the notice requirement under Art. it was held that "Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a property and that the labor agreement between him and [his employer] is the law between the parties. without the intervention of any grievance machinery. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art.A. was enacted reviving the mesada.. compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal. 130 which amended the Labor Code. 1957. 1787 providing for the giving of advance notice or the payment of compensation at the rate of one-half month for every year of service. 2270 of the Civil Code. No. and the employee the equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. his act should be void instead of simply making him liable for damages. Blg. his summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property without due process of law. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 which gave either party to the employer-employee relationship the right to terminate their relationship by giving notice to the other one month in advance. which Justice Puno cites. ·v. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him. which took effect on August 30." The grievance machinery is. commission of crime against the employer or the latter's immediate family or duly authorized representatives. The SECOND REASON is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. No. in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. different because it is established by agreement of the employer and the employees and composed of representatives from both sides. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. 283. Even in cases of dismissal under Art. R." Indeed.Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods. Otherwise. Thus. But on June 12. otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law. In lieu of notice. 277(b) by R. No.

as the case may be) void. the employee was fully heard in his defense. give everyone his due.without a hearing by his university. if it is the employee who fails to give a written notice to the employer that he is leaving the service of the latter. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice. No. 1592. except by bringing an action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a notarial demand. 1191. xxx xxx xxx Thus. NLRC [G. We hold. only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. as found by the Court. a notice of rescission given in the letter of an attorney has no legal effect. which would result from the adoption of the theory of the minority cannot simply be explained by invoking resident Ramon Magsaysay's motto that "he who has less in life should have more in law. No. of the Civil Code in rescinding a contract for the sale of immovable property. in relation to Art. NLRC [G. If warranted. in cases involving the sale of immovable property. NLRC. 279 by adding another ground for considering a dismissal illegal. the vendor cannot exercise this power even though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price. under the Labor Code. not because there was a denial of due process. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept. 282283. 285. with respect to Art. therefore. it would ignore the fact that under Art. and the vendee can make payment even after the due date since no valid notice of rescission has been given. Under these provisions. and observe honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen. was not proven. illegal. Justice Panganiban cites Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. not to render his act (dismissal or resignation. his dismissal for having made homosexual advances on a student was sustained. This disparity in legal treatment. embodied in the Civil Code. that even if the termination is for a just or authorized cause the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art. therefore. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. Indeed.R. Given the nature of the violation. therefore. his failure to comply with the legal requirement does not result in making his resignation void but only in making him liable for damages. The statement that the failure of management to comply with the notice requirement "taints the dismissal with illegality" was merely a dictum thrown in as additional grounds for holding the dismissal to be illegal. The sanction is not the payment alone of nominal damages as Justice Vitug contends. the appropriate sanction for the failure to give notice is the payment of backwages for the period when the employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed or his employment terminated. that. only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided by law is it illegal and. (Serrano vs. therefore. 27 January 2000]) Effect of Lack of Notice: backwages until determination of just cause . To contend. but because the dismissal was without cause. It is similar to the failure to observe the provisions of Art. nonetheless. to act with justice. Consequently. while the power of a party to rescind a contract is implied in reciprocal obligations. The dismissal was. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be exercised. at least one month in advance. What is more. The consequence of the failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages." That would be a misapplication of this noble phrase originally from Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School. 27 January 2000]) Effect of Lack of Notice. v. nominal and moral damages may also be awarded. Termination INEFFECTUAL Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. as Justices Puno and Panganiban do. the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely INEFFECTUAL. the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. it appearing that in the NLRC. in support of his view that an illegal dismissal results not only from want of legal cause but also from the failure to observe "due process. 117040." The Pepsi-Cola case actually involved a dismissal for an alleged loss of trust and confidence which. 283 of the Labor Code. (Serrano vs.R. 117040.

The situation is that of a corporate office having been declared vacant. No. Justices Puno and Panganiban. may act only through its directors. whether as officer or agent or employee. The need is for a rule which.Validity of Petitioner's Layoff Not Affected by Lack of Notice We agree with our esteemed colleagues. for example. Rather. Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty. acting as such corporate agents. (Businessday vs. at the same time acknowledges the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. 283-284. if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Arts. NLRC [G. are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. 283 in addition to backwages. solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as. in the following cases: . We do not agree. being a juridical entity. Obligations incurred by them. (Serrano vs. and of TAN's not having been elected thereafter. his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is ineffectual. True. 103575. however. however. that disregard of this requirement by an employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment null and void. There is no evidence in this case that Locsin acted in bad faith or with malice in carrying out the retrenchment and eventual closure of the company. installation of a labor-saving device. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in Arts.R. No. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages when it is shown that he has not been given notice and hearing although his dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized cause. he may not be held personally and solidarily liable with the company for the satisfaction of the judgment in favor of the retrenched employees. We agree with petitioners. If the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement. officers and employees. 27 January 2000]) Corporate Liability A corporate officer is not personally liable for the money claims of discharged corporate employees unless he acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating their employment. is not determined by the nature of the services performed. Generally speaking. but the employer did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of termination in advance.R. but by the incidents of the relationship as they actually exist. For the same reason. 05 April 1993]) This is not a case of dismissal. the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay as provided in Art. However. hence. But. of an attempt on the life of the employer or the latter's family.e. the remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. A corporation.. That would be to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right of the employer to dismiss for cause. and involves the exercise of deliberate choice and the faculty of discriminative selection. generally. then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. while recognizing the employee's right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off. 117040. that the NLRC erred in holding Centeno jointly and severally liable with MAM. The matter of whom to elect is a prerogative that belongs to the Board. otherwise. i. NLRC [G. 283-284. or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order to prevent losses. that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employer's disregard of the notice requirement. the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for such dismissal or if the termination is for an authorized cause. the relationship of a person to a corporation.

NLRC [G.R. for reasons of public policy and social justice.R. (MAM Realty vs. (Prudential Bank vs. The bank participated in the proceedings from start to finish. 114787. NLRC [G. 141093. (Manlimos vs. Even before the CA. The bank actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the Corporation. Reyes [G. As a general rule. the Court has held corporate directors and officers solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees done with malice or in bad faith.When directors and trustees or. It was only when the CA ruled in favor of public respondent did it raise the issue of jurisdiction.R. 2. Corp. When the decision of the Labor Arbiter was adverse to it. Drilon [G. When a director. is to give preference to the qualified separated employees in the filling of vacancies in the facilities of the purchaser. When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who. the transferee is under no legal duty to absorb the transferor employees as there is no law compelling such absorption.R. trustee or officer is made. in appropriate cases. labor contracts being in personam. petitioner bank can no longer raise the issue of jurisdiction under the principle of estoppel. It filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter. No. an elective position under the corporate by-laws and her non-election is an intra-corporate controversy cognizable by the SEC and not by the NLRC. No. although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its employ the employers of the seller of such assets or enterprise. (Sundowner Dev. 4 When a director. A labor contract merely creates an action in personally and does not create any real right which should be respected by third parties. 20 February 2001 Sale/Merger or Consolidation Where such transfer of ownership is in good faith. the bank said nothing about jurisdiction. the bank appealed to the NLRC. labor contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise. 06 December 1989]) 1. having knowledge thereof. However. In labor cases. this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel never supervened. 113337. there is no law requiring a bona fide purchaser of assets of an on-going concern to absorb in its employ the employees of the latter. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings. it never questioned the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. . thus binding only between the parties. and the same can only be restricted by law through the exercise of the police power. 82341. When the NLRC decided in its favor. 02 June 1995]) The fact that complainant is a corporate officer. This conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer to select his employees and to decide when to engage them as protected under our Constitution. and other persons. by specific provision of law. personally liable for his corporate action. The most that the transferee may do. 02 March 1995]) The rule is that unless expressly assumed. (b) act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the corporate affairs. for instance. the parties are liable to the employees if the transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith. (c) are guilty of conflict of interest to the prejudice of the corporation. No. did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto. the NLRC and the CA. No. its stockholders or members. the officers of a corporation (a) vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. vs. 3.

for a security guard is paid on a monthly basis while a laborer in the sugar plantation is paid either on a daily or piece work basis.We disagree with the Labor Arbiter's reliance on the case of Mobil Employees Association vs. Mobil Oil Philippines. 171 SCRA 164 [1989]). Termination of Employment. provide: Sec. Rule XIV. National Labor Relations Commission. Section 4. In short. Inc. the corporation itself. Laborers do not work year round but only when needed and on off-season months. after the 30-day period of suspension beyond the . to dismiss the worker.R. upon being informed thereof and of their eventual termination from employment. (Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation vs. NLRC [G. Preventive suspension. an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. National Labor Relations Commission. In the case at bar. Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. unreasonable or unlikely. In such case. 110930. (Manlimos vs. NLRC. as in the case of private respondent Super Mahogany Plywood Corporation. vs. Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. In the case at bench. On the contrary. Likewise. as a distinct and separate juridical entity. they are not required to work at all. No. Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides that preventive suspension cannot be more than the maximum period of 30 days. 3. No. One does not need to stretch his imagination to distinguish the work of a security guard and that of a common agricultural laborer in a sugar plantation. there was only a change of ownership of Super Mahogany Plywood Corporation which resulted in a change of ownership. completely withdrew from business and was even dissolved. The NLRC was correct in holding that Mobil was not applicable because Mobil involved the termination of employment under Article 283 (before Article 284) of the Labor Code and not termination of employment as a result of the change of corporate ownership. 205 SCRA 492 [1992]. Sec. NLRC [G. the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides. NLRC) There is a constructive dismissal when the reassignment of an employee involves a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay (Lemery Savings and Loan Bank v. Rule XIV. after completion of the hearing. they freely and voluntarily accepted their separation pay and other benefits and individually executed the Release or Waiver which they acknowledged before no less than a hearing officer of the DOLE.. as. The issue of whether there was a closing or cessation of business operations which could have operated as a just cause for the termination of employment was not material. continues to exist. 13 July 1995]) Preventive Suspension Sections 3 and 4. (Oscar Ledesma & Co. there was a diminution of salary. The change in ownership of the management was done bona fide and the petitioners did not for any moment before the filing of their complaints raise any doubt on the motive for the change. In Mobil. 02 March 1995]) Special Circumstances Constructive Dismissal CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible.R. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially equivalent position of the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension. the demotion of private respondent is tantamount to constructive dismissal. 113337. he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. Hence. 4 Period of suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. No preventive suspension shall last longer than 30 days. the original employer.

(d) The contract is not contrary to law. Proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's misconduct is not required. and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. (b) There was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties. 26 June 1998]) The reason for this rule is that the pertinent personnel files. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person. (c) The consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. Ltd. and his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. differentials. HI-TECH failed once again to discharge the onus probandi. to which he is by law entitled. All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence. 26 June 2001]) Burden of Proof in Labor Cases Private respondent's documentary evidence showing the culpability of petitioners should prevail over petitioners' uncorroborated explanations and self-serving denials regarding their involvement in the pilferages. National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution. (Periquet v. the burden of proving payment rests on petitioner NSC. it being sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. payrolls. petitioners cannot assert that the public respondent closed its eyes to their evidence. NLRC [G. with full understanding of what he was doing. 13 December 1994]) The fact that Santos neglected to substantiate his claim for night shift differentials is not prejudicial to his cause. 143204. public policy. It must be noted that his main cause of action is his illegal dismissal. we have no choice but to award those claims to petitioners. DOLE) First. remittance and other similar documents – which will show that overtime. Thus. 123520. in choosing not to present evidence to prove that it had paid all the monetary claims of petitioners. Thus. No. (Hyatt Taxi Services vs. vs. 130935. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement. No. Catinoy [G. (Villar vs.R. it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. The latter's findings are supported by substantial evidence which goes beyond the minimum evidentiary support required by law. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily. the union has no authority to compromise the individual claims of members who did not consent to such settlement. is a negative allegation which need not be supported by evidence unless it is an essential part of his cause of action. or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face. Thus. morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Santos' allegation of non-payment of this benefit. 112203. Consequently. (Segismundo vs. No.R. public order. 11 May 2009]) Quitclaims The requisites of a valid quitclaim are: That (a) It was voluntarily entered into by the parties. It has not even been proven that the considerations for the quitclaims were unconscionably low and that the petitioners had been tricked into accepting them. service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid – are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.maximum period amounts to constructive dismissal. After all. records. NLRC [G. Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. the burden of proving that payment of such benefit has been made rests upon the party who will suffer if no evidence at all is presented by either party. and the claim for night shift differential is but an incident of the protest against such dismissal. NLRC) "Dire necessity" is not an acceptable ground for annulling the releases. Rule 138 Section 23 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court requires a special authority before . even if a clear majority of the union members agreed to a settlement with the employer.R.R. especially since it has not been shown that the employees had been forced to execute them. NLRC [G. (Veloso v. No. and.

" has no retroactive effect and does not apply to cases of illegal dismissal taking place before its effectivity on March 21.R. (Philippine Carpet Employees Association vs. We are thus constrained to conclude that private respondent should be paid by petitioner not only the sum of P26. R. But. 111342 [19 June 1995] Strained relations "Strained relations. Since petitioners were dismissed in 1987. it is the employer and not the employee who has the burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered into. Inc. 16 March 2000]) [A]n employee who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to his full backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement. the order of public respondent for the reinstatement of private respondent with award of backwages has no factual and legal basis. No. and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.A. 199 SCRA 628 [1991]. PCMC [G. petitioner should have at the very least reinstated him in its payroll right away. (Golden Donuts. there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. As private respondents did not authorize the union to represent them not bound by the terms thereof. No. Inc. NLRC [G. 113666-68. No. 08 November 1993]) A careful scrutiny of the records of the case at bench. 19 January 2000]) The mere fact that the employee was not physically coerced or intimidated does not necessarily imply that he freely or voluntarily consented to the terms of the quitclaim." In the case at bar.64 awarded by the NLRC. (Kunting vs.R. NLRC [G. 126805. NLRC G. . No." as amplified in Employee's Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. undue influence or fraud.R. If petitioner were sincere in its intention to reinstate private respondent. NLRC [G. Mere offer to reinstate a dismissed employee. 125671. consent may be vitiated not only through intimidation or violence but also by mistake. vs. where the differences between the parties are neither personal nor physical. NLRC. given the circumstances in this case.R. they cannot demand payment of full backwages until they were actually reinstated. BALLADARES vs. minority union members did not authorize the union to compromise their individual claims. Nos. nor serious. 1989.866. Moreover. must be of such a nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. but the petitioner should be held liable for the entire amount of backwages due the private respondent from the day he was illegally dismissed up to the date of his reinstatement. (Condo Suite Club Travel. inclusive of allowances. which amended Art. 28 January 2000]) We agree that no full backwages from the time their pay was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement can be ordered paid to petitioners. Absent a showing of the union's special authority to compromise the individual claims of private respondents for reinstatement and back wages. No. vs. then there is no reason why the illegally dismissed employee should not be reinstated rather than simply given separation pay and backwages. More so if the cause of the perceived 'strained relations' is the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code.140269-70. however. No. 6715. readily discloses the existence of strained relationship between the petitioner and private respondents. 101427. is not enough.R. 14 September 2000]) Reliefs under the Labor Code Reinstatement plus backwages Since private respondent's dismissal was for just and valid cause. 279 of the Labor Code by requiring that an employee who is illegally dismissed shall be paid "his full backwages.an attorney may compromise his client's litigation. (PAL vs. Only then could observance of labor laws be promoted and social justice upheld.R. NLRC [G. "The authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and should be duly established by evidence.

00 to answer for exemplary damages. 05 April 1995]) As the Court held in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already been strained. petitioner consistently refused to re-admit private respondents in his establishment. but precisely.R. NLRC [213 SCRA 528. the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service. based on the provisions of Articles 2229 and 2232 of the Civil Code. good customs or public policy. 114250. Inc. It is our view that herein private respondents had not fully acted in good faith. we are cognizant that a cooperative promotes the welfare of its own members. we deem it proper to reduce moral damages to only P10. Inc. 182 SCRA 538 [1990]:Obviously. the prayer in his supplemental motion for reconsideration should have contained not just the mere deletion of the award of separation pay. For if petitioner were to pursue further the entire logic of his argument. private respondents themselves.Firstly. As the conscience of the government. (Congson vs. In determining the amount of damages recoverable. social and financial position of the offended parties and the business and financial position of the offender are taken into account. That is human nature. NLRC [G. although petitioner ostensibly argued in his supplemental motion for reconsideration that reinstatement should have been the proper remedy in the case at bench on his premise that the existence of strained relationship was not adequately established. 116066. (Spartan Security Detective Agency. the damages awarded by the labor arbiter. Cooperatives help promote economic democracy and support community development. No. Besides. vs.000. and disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations. Sibal v. xxx xxx xxx And secondly. it is the Court's sworn duty to ensure that none trifles with labor rights. had already indicated their aversion to their continued employment in petitioner's establishment. We also deem it sufficient for private respondent NEECO I to pay each individual petitioner P5. 206 SCRA 701 [1992]. are excessive.R. we find it proper in this case to impose moral and exemplary damages on private respondent. the business. However. Petitioner even replaced private respondents with a new set of workers to perform the tasks of private respondents. NLRC [190 SCRA 147.000. 24 January 2000]) Separation Pay . No. (Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative. Under these circumstances. For this reason. citing]. Otherwise reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. However. The very filing of their second case before Labor. (Anscor Transport and Terminals v. to our mind. notwithstanding petitioner's argument for reinstatement he was only interested in the deletion of the award of separation pay to private respondents. or constituted an act oppressive to labor. or was done in a manner contrary to morals. v. are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management. 1992]) Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional rights of workers and employees to self-organization. 1990]) Moral and exemplary damages Private respondent is not entitled to the recovery of moral damages since these are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud. they are distributed among members in correlation with the resources of the association utilized. The economic benefits filter to the cooperative members. Either equally or proportionally. the reinstatement of private respondents.00 payable by private respondent NEECO I to each individual petitioner. yet petitioner never sincerely intended to effect the actual reinstatement of private respondents. from the very start. Notre Dame of Greater Manila. including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect. NLRC [G. no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right. Quite obviously then. Moreover. NLRC.

But where the cause of the separation is more serious than mere inefficiency. on the ground of social justice.R. There is no doubt it is compassionate to give separation pay to a salesman if he is dismissed for his inability to fill his quota but surely he does not deserve such generosity if his offense is misappropriation of the receipts of his sales. habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude. And we do not agree that the punishment is his dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. There is no reason why he should not also be paid three years back wages corresponding to the period when he could not return to his work or could not find employment elsewhere. No. 80609. we hold that the contention of Sweet Lines that separation pay and back wages are inconsistent with each other is not well-taken. the situation is changed completely. if an employee who has worked only one year is sustained by the labor court after three years from his unjust dismissal. 79907. particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. Thus. This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the Constitution. (PLDT vs. Of course it has. the generosity of the law must be more discerning. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is. Indeed. or financial assistance.R. the cited order of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been rendered functus officio. Thus. petitioner pointed out that the SEC's order suspending all claims against it pending before any other court. A working mother who has to be frequently absent because she has also to take care of her child may also be removed because of her poor attendance. 23 August 1988]) Thus. tribunal or body was pursuant to the rehabilitation receivership proceedings. A contrary rule would. is not depraved. No. . For example. this being another authorized ground. We have ordered the payment of both in proper case as otherwise the employee might be deprived of benefits justly due him. as the petitioner correctly argues. But if he was in fact not really sleeping but sleeping with a prostitute during his tour of duty and in the company premises. (Lim vs. if the employee who steals from the company is granted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed. has been given the imprimatur to proceed with corporate liquidation. It is not the employee's fault if he does not have the necessary aptitude for his work but on the other hand the company cannot be required to maintain him just the same at the expense of the efficiency of its operations. the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause. We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.Finally. have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. This is not only inefficiency but immorality and the grant of separation pay would be entirely unjustified. He too may be validly replaced. NLRC [G. a subordinate who has irreconcilable policy or personal differences with his employer may be validly dismissed for demonstrated loss of confidence. however. Ledesma Saludo & Associates. like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker. Back wages represent compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. 16 March 1989]) There should be no question that where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards. NLRC [G. Since receivership proceedings have ceased and petitioner's rehabilitation receiver and liquidator. which is an allowable ground. The bases for computing the two are different. for example. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Under these and similar circumstances. Such order was necessary to enable the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company. the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate. granting him separation pay only would entitle him to only one month salary. the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay. the first being usually the length of the employee's service and the second the actual period when he was unlawfully prevented from working. while inept. it is not unlikely that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment because he thinks he can expect a little leniency if he is again found out. This is no longer mere incompetence but clear dishonesty. or whatever other name it is called. A security guard found sleeping on the job is doubtless subject to dismissal but may be allowed separation pay since his conduct.

No. may not be allowed. As We held in the case of Del Monte Phils. separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character".00 as financial assistance on equitable consideration as decreed by the labor arbiter. Petitioner's willful disobedience of the orders of her employer constitutes serious misconduct. or whatever other name it is called. We find that the same is not justified.A. Considering that petitioner's monetary obligation to private respondent is long overdue and that petitioner has signified its willingness to comply with such obligation by entering into an agreement with private respondent as to the amount and manner of payment.000. which would qualify the retiree to retirement benefits equivalent to onehalf (1/2) month's salary for every year of service. 114761. (PAL vs. NLRC.R. 19 January 2000]) It must be emphasized that the right of employee to demand separation pay and backwages is always premised on the fact that the employee was terminated either legally of illegally. No. fifty-five (55) years old and Alanan fifty-eight (58) years old at the time their services with petitioner were ended by their resignation. they had not yet reached the age of sixty (60) years. 16 March 2000]) Retirement In the instant case.R. and both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC so held. Abellana [G. The Court notes that when private respondents filed their complaints more than one (1) year after they had been allegedly illegally dismissed. or financial assistance. the employer. the applicable retirement age is the optional retirement age of sixty (60) years according to Article 287. was fifty-seven (57) years old while respondent Alanan was sixty (60) years old. like theft. respondent Ausan. fraud. Unfortunately. due to events subsequent to the filing of this petition. 7641 took effect. habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude. vs. 100878. is awarded as an alternative to illegal dismissed employees where reinstatement is no longer possible. NLRC [G. No. before the statute went into effect. CLUB. Inc. subject to the rules on preference of credits. it appears that private respondents did not qualify for the benefits of R. We stress. at the time private respondents stopped working for petitioner. Jr. That would make Ausan. Hence. may not be required to give the petitioner separation pay. No. Jr. 7641 under the terms of this law itself. private respondent must present its claim with the rehabilitation receiver and liquidator of petitioner.A. however.R. vs.there is no legal impediment for the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter for the payment of separation pay. (CJC Trading. The award of backwages belongs to an illegally dismissed employee by direct provision of law and it is awarded on grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to illegal dismissal. on the other hand. if the reason for the valid dismissal is. NLRC [G. 115884. 28 June 2001]) Financial Assistance With regards to the award of financial assistance to petitioner. separation pay or financial assistance. NLRC [G.R. As we have consistently held in previous cases. falsification or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker. that private respondents had ceased to be employees of petitioner. (Jo Cinema vs. the complaints of private respondents were still being resolved on the labor arbiter level when R.R. NLRC [G. However. on the ground of social justice. that there is nothing to prevent petitioner from voluntarily giving private respondents some financial assistance on an ex gratia basis.. 126805. However. (Aguilar vs. by reason of voluntary resignation. or by whatever other name it is called. No. 132837. (Alemar's Sibal & Sons. Inc. No. Separation pay. for example. petitioner can not delay satisfaction of private respondent's claim. Thus. "henceforth. Inc. vs. it was quite clear. Moreover. Since the record does not show any retirement plan or collective bargaining agreement providing for retirement benefits to petitioner's employees. 20 July 1995]) . such monetary award is justified only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those adversely affecting his moral character. No. 02 December 1992]) Neither could we allow the award of P5.

must be viewed and read in conjunction with the provisions of the Civil Code on concurrence and preferences of credits. partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court. 19 January 1994]) PD No.” The law did not make any exception in favor of labor claims. To allow such actions to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver. No.Worker preference Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. 86227. (3) Republic Act No. 902-A is clear that “all actions for claims against corporations. (DBP vs. board or body shall be suspended accordingly. require judicial proceedings in rem in adjudication of creditors' claims against the debtor's assets to become operative. to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate.In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business. as amended. including Article 110 of the Labor Code. . (Article 110 of the Labor Code) (1) Article 110 of the Labor Code. Thus. (2) The aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the “rescue” of the debtor company.R. 6715 has the effect of expanding the "worker preference" to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims of laborers. tribunal. his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims. should only be given prospective application. which took effect on 21 March 1989. any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to numerous claims and would defeat the rescue efforts of the management committee. the labor case would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay. and (4) The amendatory provisions of Republic Act 6715. whose time. NLRC [305 SCRA 721]) JURISDICTION Regional Director . (Rubberworld vs. NLRC [G. effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed towards its restructuring and rehabilitation.

Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. — Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided, further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. Any sum thus recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article shall be held in a special deposit account by, and shall be paid, on order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Regional Director directly to the employee or househelper concerned. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper, because he cannot be located after diligent and reasonable effort to locate him within a period of three (3) years, shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers. Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may supervise the payment of unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, found owing to any employee or househelper under this Code. (Article 129 of the Labor Code) Labor Arbiter Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: (1) Unfair labor practice cases; (2) Termination disputes; (Subject to Art 261 - VA's jurisdiction over unbresolved grievance from CBA/company personel policies) (3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rate of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; (4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; (5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and (6) Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. (b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. (c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (Article 217 of the Labor Code) Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
xxx xxx xxx

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxx xxx xxx

(Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 [Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995]) Bureau of Labor Relations The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor and Employment shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration. The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties. (Article 226 of the Labor Code) Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the BLR in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction over decisions of the BLR rendered in the exercise of its appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the union's certificate of registration, said decisions being final and inappealable.
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It is clear then that the Secretary of Labor and Employment did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting an ABBOTT's appeal. The decisions of the BLR on cases brought before it on appeal from the Regional Director are final and executory. Hence, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Abbott Laboratories vs. Abbott Laboratories Employees Union [G.R. No. 131374, 26 January 2000.) Voluntary arbitrator The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding Article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this Article, gross violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration provided in the collective bargaining agreement. (Article 261 of the Labor Code) Appeal

From Labor Arbiter to NLRC Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that technical rules of evidence in courts of law shall not be controlling in any of the proceedings before the Commission or the Labor Arbiters. Further, the Commission is required to use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts without regard to technicalities or procedure. Technical rules may be relaxed to prevent miscarriage of justice. They must not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner had the opportunity to rebut the truth of these additional documents. Respondent NLRC, on appeal, correctly accorded weight to these documents considering their nature and character. These were daily time records, certifications from the postmaster, etc., whose trustworthiness can be relied upon. (Cañete vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 114161, 23 November 1995]) Grounds for Appeal (a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter; (b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption; (c) If made purely on questions of law; and (d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. Grave Abuse of Discretion The phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by the tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power as to amount to lack of power. (Arroyo vs. De Venecia [277 SCRA 268, (1997]) Private respondent, after receiving a copy of the labor arbiter's decision, wrote the labor arbiter who rendered the decision and expressed dismay over the judgment. Neither notice of appeal was filed nor cash or surety bond was posted by private respondent. Nevertheless, the labor tribunal took cognizance of the letter from private respondent and treated said letter as private respondent's appeal. In a certiorari action before this Court, we ruled that the labor tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion in treating a mere letter from private respondent as private respondent's appeal in clear violation of the rules on appeal prescribed under Section 3(a), Rule VI of the Rules of Procedure of NLRC. (Garcia vs. NLRC [264 SCRA 261, 1996]) The labor arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to resolve immediately by written order a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the supplemental motion to dismiss as mandated by Section 15 of Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Philippine Airlines Inc. vs. NLRC [263 SCRA 638, 1996]) The NLRC gravely abused its discretion by allowing and deciding an appeal without an appeal bond having been filed as required under Article 223 of the Labor Code. (Unicane Workers Union-CLUP vs. NLRC [261 SCRA 573, 1996]) The labor arbiter gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the rule governing position papers. In this case, the parties have already filed their position papers and even agreed to consider the case submitted for decision, yet the labor arbiter still admitted a supplemental position paper and memorandum, and by taking into consideration, as basis for his decision, the alleged facts adduced therein and the documents attached thereto. (Mañebo vs. NLRC [229 SCRA 240, 1994]) The NLRC gravely abused its discretion in treating the motion to set aside judgment and writ of execution as a petition for relief of judgment. In doing so, public respondent had, without sufficient basis, extended the reglementary period for filing petition for relief from judgment contrary to prevailing rule and case law. (Gesulgon vs. NLRC [219 SCRA 561, 1993])

Appeal Bond Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Artiber are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
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In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. (Article 223 of the Labor Code) The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employee's just and lawful claims. (Viron Garments Mfg., Co. vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 97357, 18 March 1992]) There is a clear distinction between the filing of an appeal within the reglementary period and its perfection. The latter may transpire after the end of the reglementary period for filing the appeal. Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal to the NLRC from the decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter must be made "within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders." Under Section 3(a) of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the appeal fees must be paid and the memorandum of appeal must be filed within the ten-day reglementary period. Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond. Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that effect may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC. (Star Angel Handicraft vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 108914, 20 September 1994]) The precipitate filing of this special civil action for certiorari without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed judgment of NLRC warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we consistently held in numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had. It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. 5 In the case at bar, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the impugned decision, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned judgment of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, original action of certiorari, as in this case will not prosper. Further, not having filed a motion for reconsideration within the ten-day reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. Thus, as regards petitioner, the decision of NLRC became final and executory on December 7, 1995. Consequently, the merits of the case can no longer be reviewed to determine if the respondent NLRC could be faulted of grave abuse of discretion. (Lagera vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 123636, 31 March 2000]) Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule: Where 1. The order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; 2. The questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

The important distinction between them. In a criminal case. 120482.A.B. 27 January 1997]) WAGE DISTORTION means a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contradiction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills. The proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process. NLRC [G. of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated. (Rules Implementing Republic Act 6727) 3.P. relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable. The proceedings was ex parte or on which the petitioner had no opportunity to object. Liner vs. No. however. 06 March 2001]) From NLRC to Court of Appeals A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R. 4. and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals. 8. an agreement between two or more persons. (Reformist Union Of R. Under the circumstances. The issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. 7.R. (St. Martin Funeral Home vs. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. No. whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve.R. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. more particularly on Senate Bill No. for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit. all references in the amended Section 9 of B." and as mode of arbitration where the parties are "compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by the a third party. No. Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court.R. In fine. and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining. adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on. the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. NLRC [G. 6. the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. length of service. No.There is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable. or other logical bases of differentiation. No. balanced by the danger of losing. but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. but would subvert. 16 September 1998]) Miscellaneous [C]OMPULSORY ARBITRATION has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties. No. Petitioner is deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency of relief. No. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress. a motion for reconsideration would be useless. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. 120482. NLRC [G. 27 January 1997]) [C]OMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Consequently. (Abraham vs. NLRC [G." (Reformist Union Of R. 1495. 1495/H. who.R. Liner vs. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.B. 130866. 10452. The Court is. 5. . therefore. 143823. Therefore. No. and 9.

NLRC [G. No. (Sebuguero vs. Inc. Court of Industrial Relations.. Secretary of Labor [G. 115394. 56 SCRA 694 [1974]) HOLD OVER PRINCIPLE states that it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing CBA during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties. vs. (Mercury Drug Co.R. 01 August 2000]) . 27 September 1995]) MERCURY DRUG RULE which limited the award of back wages of illegally dismissed workers to three (3) years "without deduction or qualification" to obviate the need for further proceedings in the course of execution. 127598. No.R.SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE means that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Meralco vs.

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