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The paper addresses the various problems/failures experienced in the CO2 removal system of an Ammonia Plant in a short span operation of less than one year. Probable causes of failures and the corrective steps taken to avoid such failures in future, have also been discussed. V.K. BALI and A.K. MAHESHWARI IFFCO Aonla Unit, Bareilly Uttar Pradesh, India
Located at Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in India, Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd, operates two Ammonia plants, each with a name plate capacity of 1350 MTPD of ammonia. Both of these plants have been designed based on Haldor Topsoe technology with steam reforming of natural gas and/or naphtha. Ammonia-1 is designed for natural gas feed stock and was commissioned in 1988. Ammonia-2 was commissioned in December,1996 and is designed for both Natural Gas & Naphtha feed stocks. The Benfield process was selected for the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 which has been converted into Giammarco- Vetrocoke (GV) dual activator system in April,1997 for achieving lower CO2 slip and energy savings. For Ammonia-2 plant, the GV dual activator low energy process has been selected for CO2 removal system from the design stage. The paper describes the problems/failures experienced in the CO2 removal system of Ammonia-2 plant during very first year of its operation.
PROCESS TECHNOLOGY ADOPTED FOR CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM
CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has a conventional design based on the GV dual activator process. The process comprises of single stage absorption and two stage regeneration. Figure-1 shows the CO2 removal system flow sheet. Carbon dioxide is removed by absorption in hot aqueous potassium carbonate solution containing approximately 30 wt% potash (K2CO3) partly converted into bicarbonate (KHCO3). The solution further contains dual activators to effectively improve the overall performance of the system . Vanadium oxide is used as corrosion inhibitor. The process gas from the shift reactors is passed to the Vetrocoke Absorber which contains stainless steel packing material distributed in 5 beds. The absorption is carried out in one stage. The major part of the circulating solution is fed without cooling to the middle of absorber at about 241° F (116 °C). The remaining solution is fed to the top of absorber after cooling to about 140° F ( 60 °C). In the lower zone of absorber, the bulk of the CO2 is
absorbed. In the upper zone,the reduced stream of cold solution is used to get low CO2 slippages due to the low CO2 vapour pressure of the dual activated solution. The solution leaving the absorber bottom, loaded with CO2 is called the rich solution. The rich solution is transferred to a two stage regeneration system operating at low pressures. The rich solution is depressurised through the hydraulic turbine and is sent to the top of the 1st Regenerator operating at 14.2 psig (1.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. A stream of rich solution extracted from the top of 1st Regenerator is depressurised through a control valve and enters the top of the 2nd Regenerator,working at low pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g).
CORROSION CONTROL IN CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM
GV solution along with CO2 at boiling temperature is very corrosive and would normally require stainless steel equipment. However, carbon steel equipment with passivation layers (oxidation layers) are being used successfully. The desired passivation layer is formed by controlled passivation in two phases called static passivation & dynamic passivation. The layer formed is tight, magnetic & tenacious and protects the carbon steel surfaces from corrosion. However, rubbing with hard sharp edges can scratch the layer. The GV system uses vanadium as corrosion inhibitor. The recommended concentration of total vanadium is around 0.5% by weight as V2O5. The hot potassium carbonate inhibited with vanadium can be safely operated, but is very sensitive for corrosion. In order to maintain the electro-chemical potential required for protection of passivation layer of metallic surfaces, it is necessary to keep 30 to 40% of the total vanadium in the pentavalent form and never be allowed lower than 20% . This ratio is kept by means of the oxidation unit which treats a side stream solution with air. Hence, formation of proper passivation layer and its protection is very essential to avoid corrosion in the GV system equipment. Any damage to the passivation layer can cause very fast corrosion & subsequent leakages.
The various problems faced in the CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant have been presented. Each problem/failure has been dealt with separately specifying the problem/failure faced, cause of the problem and various corrective steps undertaken to avoid such occurance in future.
The 2nd Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and operating at a pressure of 1.42 psig (0.1 Kg/cm2g). It is a packed tower having 129 inches (3230 mm) diameter, 1643 inches (41075 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in two beds. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drawing of 2nd regenerator are shown at figure-2.
In addition to the leakage in the shell. it was decided to carry out thickness measurements around the effected area of the shell on a regular basis. Initially. This resulted in the shroud supports cracking and allowing the cleats of the shroud to hit the wall which broke the protective vanadium layer on the carbon steel shell. No thinning was found even around the hole. leading to the conclusion that the failure was localized as shown in figure 4. Thickness measurements were carried out around the leaking hole to ascertain the extent of thining in shell. a hole of approximately 0. .9.97. A hole of approximately 12 inches (300 mm) diameter was observed from inside. Stainless steel pads were welded around the 8" stainless steel pipe to strengthen the shell. a leak was observed on the other side of the shell on 11. This allowed rapid corrosion of the shell and subsequent failure of pressure vessel (Figure 6). • Cause of the problem The mechanical design of the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator was found to be inadequate. The whole exercise was carried out while the plant was in operation and the equipment was in line.1 liquid re-distributor (Norten type) at elevation of 26750 mm was found lifted from its support ring by about 50 mm on one side as shown in Figure-5. The bed no. The area of leakage was covered and welded with SS-304. The 2nd Regenerator was opened for inspection in October. Photograph (PH-2) shows the disturbed internals of the steam distributor. While the thickness measurement was in progress between A-2 and A-7 nozzles. The support design of the stainless steel protective shroud was inadequate for the dynamic loads. it was decided to measure the thickness of 2nd Regenerator shell in the failure prone zones after about 9 months of operation.8 inches (20 mm) diameter was observed which enlarged to a bigger size "Eye shaped" hole within 2 hrs of start of leakage as shown in figure-3.Photograph (PH-1) shows the damaged 2nd Regenerator shell. which had been welded to contain the leak.56 inches (14 mm) around the 8" stainless steel pipe. • Three segments of the steam distributor above the chimney at elevation of 644 inches (16100 mm) were found lifted from their support beam by about 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm ) as shown in Figure-5. As a preventive measure. 8" sch 10 pipe with blind and a vent to arrest the leakage. Welding of the cleat between SS 304 shroud and the vessel was also found broken. It was observed that the thickness had been reduced to as little as 0.the following upset conditions of a minor nature were also observed in the 2nd Regenerator.Problem/failure description Based on the failure history of this equipment in other plants.1997. This leak was located approximately 6 inches (150 mm) above the A-2 nozzle and 88 inches (2200 mm) circumferentially towards M3 manhole.
resulted in equipment failure. to improve level measurement. was identified to present such a possibility. Another operating problem experienced in this equipment. it ensures that the GV solution is uniformly distributed throughout the circumference of 2nd Regenerator and does not hit the chimney and the surface of the tower. However. Yet another design option has been considered which has now been adopted and is described separately in the paper. Photograph (PH-3) shows the original inlet distribution arrangement.Upon investigation. The above arrangement is shown in Figure-7. Also the number of cleats provided were at variance with the approved drawings. was removed. Repairs/modifications • The area of 24 inches x 24 inches (600 mm x 600 mm) which was patched up from outside to arrest leakage while the plant was in operation. was the difficulty in maintaining the proper solution level. it was also discovered that the material of the cleats was carbon steel rather than the stainless steel material specified on the approved drawings. An annular passage was provided with an annular ring at the lower end to limit the disturbance of the surface i. At the same time. Various design options Design problems in the fluid entry zone of 2nd Regenerator were reported in 1993 in a 900 MTPD ammonia plant operating in southern part of India. During the engineering and procurement phase of IFFCO-Aonla Unit. ammonia plant of Aonla Unit and other similar plants based on above design have reported failures in this equipment in the fluid entry zone. The welding of cleats to the shell to support the annular passage which is likely to have some degree of vibration due to the process conditions. The flow was directly hitting the chimney which broke off and rubbed against the tower wall. The inlet arrangement was designed to divert the flow in two directions horizontally to avoid direct impingement on the chimney. A new arrangement of the distributor and supporting arrangement as shown in Figure-8 was provided. A new matching plate of the same size was welded into the shell. in a short period of time. It was further concluded that an internal annular passage should be avoided if possible to safe guard the installation against even the slightest possibility of any means of damaging the passivation layer. A stainless steel annular passage was provided to prevent liquid impingement on the shell and possible disturbance of the passivation layer which could cause excessive corrosion .e. The existing nozzle entry configuration and stainless steel shroud was dismantled and removed. This resulted in damage to the passivation layer and caused corrosion which.it was decided to reengineer the inlet arrangement using a Norton type inlet arrangement and providing an annular passage . This arrangement removes the possibility of damaging the passivation layer. • • .
and bed No. Liquid distributors and redistributors (called LRD) of stainless steel material have also been provided.10.3 containing IMTP 40 stainless steel packing. had been reduced to around 24 inches (600 mm). and by the semi-lean solution distribution pipes of nozzles A2 and A3 located at elevation of 1066 inches (26640 mm).Vetrocoke Absorber The Vetrocoke Absorber is a carbon steel tower with stainless steel internals operating at 398 psig (28 Kg/cm2g) pressure. The following failures were found as observed from various manholes. The overall performance of Vetrocoke Absorber was satisfactory as the CO2 slip at the Absorber exit was less than the design figure of 300 ppm. The LRD was raised about 6 to 8 inches (150 to 200 mm) from its support ring. Maldistribution of GV solution at top of the 2nd bed was thought to be the probable cause and it was decided to open the Absorber at the earliest opportunity.2 liquid redistributor (Norton type) called LRD located at elevation of 1030 inches (25750 mm ) was found buckled at the top and the J-bolts supporting the distributor had got sheared. It contains stainless steel packing material distributed in five beds. indicated that the second bed was not performing satisfactorily. Location : M3 manhole This manhole is located between bed No.3 at an elevation of 1056 inches The Bed no. A few loose rings were also found at the top of the LRD. Further upward movement of the LRD was restricted by the semi-lean solution distribution parting boxes placed above it. Problem/failure description The Ammonia plant was shutdown in October. The parting box was also found damaged and buckled at the ends. A few 8 inches NB nipples attached with the semilean solution distributor pipes of A2 & A3 nozzles were also found twisted. The details indicating the above failures are given in figure .1 liquid redistributor (Norten type) called LRD located at elevation of 610 inches .1997. However. a detailed analysis of the performance of each bed conducted in August.2 (26400 mm).1997 and this opportunity was utilised to open the various manholes of Absorber for inspection. Broad specifications and the general arrangement drg.1 & 2 at an elevation of 631 inches (15780 mm). The distance between the LRD and the bed no.of Vetrocoke Absorber is presented as figure-9. Location : M4 manhole This manhole is located between bed no. The Bed no.
A study of the construction of the ARC/NRV valves indicated that a large quantity of gas passing backward through the NRV portion and then through the ARC portion could be possible only if the internals of the valve were severely damaged. The support beam of bed no. The upward lifting of the steam distributor above the chimney in the semilean solution draw off tray and also the uplifting of the 1st bed LRD of the 2nd Regenerator seems to support this view. The multi-beam support plate of bed no. The discs of these valves were also getting stuck up. however could not be confirmed. Hence the cause of the failure can not be attributed only to the weak design . The above conditions were creating possibilities of back flow. was found hanging at approximately 20 inches (500 mm) above the top of the manhole. the above back flow could take place through this route only when both ARC/NRV valves & the solenoid operated valves are not holding.1 were found all around the M4 manhole.1 had lifted up by approximately 64 inches (1600 mm) from its original position. Further.2 after leaving its original position.1 LRD with its ends distorted was found loose above manhole M4 and being stuck up at ring support of Bed No. The LRD was found in distorted condition and its middle portion had taken convex shape viewed from bottom. However. The springs of these valves were found broken. Photograph (PH-4) & Photograph (PH-5) indicate the disturbed beds of Absorber. Mal-functioning of this interlock. For back flow to take place. The other possibility could be some sudden upward gas surge through the 1st & 2nd bed of Absorber which caused the upheaval of these beds and buckling of LRDs. This can take place if the discharge valve does not close during the tripping of the pumps. Loose IMTP 50 packing of Bed No. Absorbers of the same design have been reported operating satisfactorily in other plants without any problems. however suggested that forces of great magnitude acted in the upward direction in the Absorber.2. The beam had sheared from its support bracket and entered in the IMTP 40 packing of bed no. The whole bed no. • . due to failure of the interlock I-301. The process gas entering at the bottom of Absorber might have flowed backwards through the semi-lean inlet line via the ARC-NRV circulation line back to the solution draw -off tray in the 2nd Regenerator. These valves were opened to check their condition.(15250 mm) which should have been below the M4 manhole level. The plate thickness used for bed supports and clamps was only 2 mm. these discharge valves must be in open position . Each semi-lean pump had a solenoid valve at the discharge which closes when the pump trips via the interlock I-301 A/B/C. Probable causes • The possibility of construction defects and weak structure of the tower internals were considered to be probable causes of the failure.2 along with its supporting beam was not clearly visible. The extent of damage.
In order to prevent back flow. the casing vanes of hydraulic turbines were found to be eroded. Problem/failure description It was observed that the hydraulic turbine was not developing power as per design and thus the steam consumption of steam turbines was high. were found. the solenoid valves should be interlocked with low speed of turbines of the semilean solution pumps and lean solution pumps so that before all the liquid is drained off. Repairs/modifications The following corrective actions have been suggested based on all probable causes of failures as discussed above • • All damaged internals will be replaced with next higher thickness. depressurisation through this route could have resulted in the failures of 3rd and 4th bed as well. even though the internals & fittings are of the same thickness. The semi-lean flow control valve (FV-22) and the lean solution flow control valve (FV-23) should close shut on very low solution flow. No failure in these beds. the back flow through the above route may result in reverse rotation of the semilean pumps. • Another probable cause for the damage in the Absorber could be the fast depressurisation of the Absorber by sudden opening of vent valve (PV-60) located downstream of the Absorber. However. This could have occured during start up/shutdown of the plant. However. • • • Hydraulic Turbines The rich GV solution at high pressure coming from the bottom of the Absorber is let down and flashed in the upper portion of the Ist Regenerator operating at low pressure.Further. however. the absence of a reverse rotation of the semi-lean pump could be explained by the reasoning that the liquid passing in back flow through the valve was prevented by the motion of the decelerating machine. On inspection. However. Extreme care should be taken to ensure that the downstream vent valve (PV-60) is not opened suddenly under any circumstances. This could be explained because the 3rd and 4th beds are inherently stronger than the 1st & 2nd beds as the diameter there is 99 inches (2480 mm) compared to 150 inches (3750 mm) at the 1st & 2nd beds. Probable causes . An additional NRV on each of the common headers of the semilean solution line and the lean solution line should be provided. the valve would have completely closed. This let down in pressure is carried out through hydraulic turbines to supply power to turbine driven GV solution pumps and thus reduce the steam consumption of turbines. no damage to these pumps due to reverse rotation was observed.
2 psig (1. Probable causes The rich solution line is divided with two branches near the 1st Regenerator and hence enters the vessel at two points. 1796 inches (44900 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in three beds.2 psig (1 kg/cm2g). Repairs/modification The butterfly control valves have now been shifted away from the inlet nozzle of hydraulic turbine to achieve laminar flow to the turbine inlet as shown in figure-11. The above two inlet nozzles are welded to the 8 mm thick stainless steel liner provided to protect the carbon steel shell from severe inlet flow . The plant was originally built with the Benfield process and was converted to the GV dual activator process in 1997. Problem/failure description The rich solution line (20") carrying rich solution from the bottom of the Absorber to the top of 1st Regenerator through two inlet nozzles. It is a packed tower having 196 inches (4900 mm) diameter. GV Regenerator The GV Regenerator in CO2 removal system of Ammonia-1 has been in operation since 1988. 1st Regenerator The 1st Regeneator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainles steel internals with operating pressure of 14. The sudden increase in volume and the two phase flow at the turbine inlet nozzle were the probable causes of the damage to the hydraulic casing vanes. 1855 inches (46375 mm) height and contains stainless steel packing material distributed in three beds. Vibration resulted in the increased load on the welding joints and the failure of the joints. butterfly valves have been provided near the 1st Regenerator. The shaft pins of these valves have also been found to be broken probably due to flashing. These valves were causing restriction in the flow & hence the vibration in the lines. The Regenerator is a carbon steel tower provided with stainless steel internals and operating at 14.Butterfly control valves have been provided at the inlet nozzle of the hydraulic turbine.0 Kg/cm2g) pressure. In both the branches. Repairs/modifications Both the 20" butterfly valves and flanges were removed and the gaps were filled by providing 20" SS-304 spool pieces. Rich solution to the regenerator is fed through two tangential enteries (called a necklace) as shown in figure-12. Frequent leaks were observed at the welding joints at the upstream stub end of the butterfly valves provided in the inlet lines & these leakages were recurring frequently. was vibrating heavily. It is a packed tower having 147 inches (3680 mm) diameter.
The CO2 removal system of Ammonia Plant has been operating normally except that the CO2 slip was high at around 1400-1600 ppm. A consultants' expert in these systems . Both the necklace weld joints with liner were found cracked at two places in each joint. Lower cleats welding with liner were found cracked. Following the recommendations of this consultant . the following observations were made. The liner plate had got deformed and was touching the Regenerator main shell at several places as shown in figure-13 . On 21 October . Corrosion of the shell at several places just below the lower edge of SS liner were also found as shown in figure-15. The leaking zone was thoroughly inspected and the leak was arrested by welding. Thickness measurements showed patches of reduced thickness. However. it was observed that the iron content in the solution was increasing. KNO2 and V2O5 however.1997 to carryout thorough inspection and repair of GV Regenerator. Broad specifications and the general arrangements drawing of GV regenerator are presented in Figure-12.1997 to analzse the problem of high CO2 slip.1997 another leak was observed about 180 Degree opposite the previous leak. The gap between the liner and the shell should be 10 mm as per design ( figure-14). An attempt was made to arrest the leakage by providing a box around it. Problem/failure description The Ammonia Plant was shutdown in October . But iron level continued to increase in the solution. resulting in continuous GV solution droplets falling down.conditions. • • • Black colour deposition was found above the shroud. • • • .1997 in a very short span of two weeks time and was a clear cut indication of heavy corrosion taking place in the system. It was decided to shutdown the plant and carryout a thorough inspection and repair. On opening the Regenerator. It was observed on 18 October. V+5 to total V ratio was being maintained at the same level of around 15% as was maintained with Benfield system. Heavy corrosion on the shell near and including the tray support ring was found at three places as shown in figure-15. This was not possible as the vessel thickness had been reduced by corrosion to the extent that welding was impossible. Only marginal advantage in the reduction of CO2 slip was observed. were added to increase the ratio of V+5/V to stop further corrosion. various chemicals were added to the system to increase the concentration of chemicals in the solution.1997 that GV Regenerator had started leaking from the top. The iron content in the solution had increased from 67 PPM on 30 September. The length of crack was about 12 inches (300 mm).1997 to 127 ppm on 15 October. was called in the last week of September.
At two places. Increase in concentration of chemicals further aggravated the situation for corrosion. • • Repairs/modifications • It was decided to cut the liner by about 8 inches (200 mm) from the bottom at the places where there were no gaps between the liner and the shell to check for further damage to the shell. Also there is two phase flow at the inlet. Some of the welding of end plates of omega trays which was found to be broken. it was discovered that some of the shell areas and the circumferential seal welds behind the liner were found badly corroded. A total of about 35 stainless steel cleats were welded behind liner to maintain a uniform gap between the liner and the shell throughout the periphery . This must have resulted in vibrations in the liner and damaged the passivation layer.• Some of the weldings of end plates of Omega trays were found broken. end plates were missing. • the fast corrosion in the GV The stainless steel liner plate became deformed and was touching the shell at various places.This was done to ensure no further contact between the liner and shell in the future to avoid damage to the passivation layer and to avoid stagnation of the solution. No further corrosion was observed on the shell behind the liner. • • • • CONCLUSION . V+5/V ratio was slightly on the lower side at around 15% in comparison to the consultants recommendations of minimum value of 20% and probably was not sufficient to give the desired protection to carbon steel shell. The 18 inches (450 mm) width liner was rewelded in position. Another 18 inches wide by 80 inches long (450 mm x 2000mm) section of liner was removed to inspect the condition of the shell. was rewelded. A broken piece of 690 mm x 280 mm was also found loose. All the corroded areas of shell were repaired by filling material with welding. The places where there was no gap between shell & liner corrosion could be due to stagnated solution. After cutting. Cleats of the liner were also found cracked. Probable causes The following reasons put together can be attributed to Regenerator and its subsequent leakage. All the repair welds were ground finish and DP tested. The cracks on both necklace to liner joints were also repaired & DP tested.
and upsets during plant operation etc. C) PRESSURE (KG/CM2G) CO2 REMOVAL SYSTEM FLOW SHEET .these examples must be carefully analysed to prevent their occurance in other plants.defects introduced during manufacturing or fabrication. The cases presented do not indicate that a particular system or design is more prone to failures than others. Figure-1 1ST REGENERATOR CO2 GAS 1. 0 106 4 3 2ND REGENERATOR CO2 GAS 0.7 70 PROCESS GAS OUT 3 2 2 106 70 124 1 2 1 1 HYDRAULIC TURBINE 1. helps the plant personnel to reduce the potential for failures. 2 5 112 PROCESS GAS IN 28 101 LEGEND TEMPERATURE (DEG. 1 VETROCOKE ABSORBER 27. Instead. The awareness of the conditions which produce failures.The failure presented in the paper were caused by a number of different factors including design deficiencies. This also helps in purchasing the most suitable equipment for a given operation and ensuring proper design & fabrication of the equipment. service related deterioration . 2 127 0.
9 TYPE IMTP 50 IMTP 50 LEAN SOLUTION INLET A3 SEMI. 2200 M M HOLE 1030 900 15100 14200 A-2 430 M M M-3 (Development Of Shell) .Figure-2 GAS OUTLET B1 2nd REGENERATOR RICH SOLUTION A1 INLET PACKING DETAILS BED .2 BED VOLUME (M 3) 1 2 BED .9 81.1 81.LEAN SOLUTION B2 OUTLET A2 SEMI-LEAN SOLUTION INLET B3 LEAN SOLUTION OUTLET Figure-3 2nd REGENERATOR LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION 1800 15945 1300 CIRCUM WELD SEAM APPROX.
EXCEPT FAILURE. 1 IMTP 50 PACKING M ULTI-BEAM SUPPORT PLATE STEAM DISTRIBUTOR ( 3 SEGM ENTS FOUND LIFTED FROM ITS SUPPORT BEAM BY ABOUT 150 M M ) 15100 M M A2 BED LIM ITER 16100 MM CHIMNEY .BEAM SUPPORT PLATE 26750 LIQUI D REDISTRIBUTOR FOUND LIFTED BY 50 M M ON ONE SIDE BED NO. WELD SEAM 1300 1030 900 15930 15530 15100 14850 14000 A-2 M-3 A-7 HOLE 14200 THICKNESS MEASUREMENT WAS CARRIED OUT IN THE HATCHED AREA NO REDUCTION.Figure-4 2ND REGENERATOR LEAKAGE IN SHELL DUE TO CORROSION 3000 15945 2850 1800 CIRCUM . 2 M ULTI. WAS OBSERVED Figure-5 2ND REGENERATOR FAILURE OF LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR AND STEAM DISTRIBUTOR BED NO.
20 Φ HOLES 2ND REGENERATOR (Original Arrangement) SHELL (25 M M THK ) LINER ( 8 M M THK ) IMPINGEMENT PLATE Figure-7 10 M M GAP SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE (A2) 900 φ CHIMNEY 48 NOS. 20 Φ HOLES .2ND REGENERATOR SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE CLEATS Figure-6 SHELL SHROUD IMPINGEMENT PLATE CHIMNEY 10 MM GAP 48 NOS.
4 M1 BED 1 2 3 4 Figure-9 PACKING DETAILS VOLUME (M3) 104.R. 3 48. 5 (B2) RICH SOLUTION OUTLET M4 MULTI BEAM SUPPORT GOT DISPLACED FROM T.D. 2 3750 MM.R. L. 0 2480 MM.2ND REGENERATOR (Modified Arrangement) Figure-8 SHELL (25 M M THK ) 496 Φ X 10 THK SOLUTION INLET NOZZLE (A2) 900 φ CHIMNEY VETROCOKE ABSORBER LEAN SOLUTION INLET (A1) MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT M2 SEMI -LEAN SOLUTION (A 2 & A 3) INLET BED NO. 1 PROCESS GAS (A 4) INLET M5 BED NO. WAS DAMAGED & LIFTED ABOVE M . 3 TYPE IMTP 50 IMTP 40 IMTP 40 MELLAPACK 250 Y IMTP 70 LIQUID REDISTRIBUTOR PLATES BENT UPWARDS BED NO.4 . 9 48. BED NO. BED NO. 3 M3 5 11. 9 104.S.
1 T.BEAM LYING LOOSE PACKING MATERIAL OF BED NO.VETROCOKE ABSORBER Figure-10 PACKING BED NO. 2 MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT OF BED NO. OF LRD PACKING BED NO.R. 2 LYING LOOSE IN THE BED. 1 HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET PIPING USV 126 ORIGINAL 2 76 MODIFIED RICH GV SOLUTION USV 126 2 76 RICH GV SOLUTION 18 26 18 26 00 11 ER 14” x 8” ER 14 8 ”x ” HIC 18 HIC 18 107 0 1070 70 8” HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET NOZZLE 8” HYDRAULIC TURBINE INLET NOZZLE Figure-11 .R. 1 DOUBLE C . DISTORTED / DISPLACED LRD OF BED NO.S. OF MULTI-BEAM SUPPORT MANHOLE ( M 4 ) T.S.
5 TYPE SLOTTED RINGS SLOTTED RINGS SLOTTED RINGS BED .3 44900 M M RICH SOLUTION INLET PACKING DETAILS BED .GAS OUTLET B1 Figure-12 GV REGENERATOR (Old Plant) A1-2 4900 M M LEAKAGE FROM C .SEAM WELD SHROUD LOWER EDGE AREAS OF CORROSION ON SHELL TRAY SUPPORT RING .SEAM WELD JOINT BED .1 B 2-3 SOLUTION OUTLET B4 SOLUTION OUTLET Figure-15 GV REGENERATOR DEVELOPMENT OF SHELL AND SHROUD SHOWING AREAS OF CORROSION 0 DEG NECKLACE NOZZLE M2 NECKLACE NOZZLE SHROUD SOUTH SHELL NORTH 180 DEG CIR.5 2 3 172.2 BED VOLUME (M 3) 1 172.5 172.
SEAM OF SHELL 8 NOS. SUPPORT CLEATS 10 MM GAP SHELL (16 MM THK) 8 MM. SUPPORT CLEATS LIQUID DISTRIBUTOR TRAY SUPPORT RING BED LIMITER GRID PACKING BED NO 3 BED SUPPORT Figure-14 Figure-13 GV REGENERATOR DEVELOPMENT OF LINER 0 DEG NORTH NECKLAC E NOZZLE 180 DEG M2 NECKLACE NOZZLE SOUTH LINER GAP EXISTS NO LINER GAP LINER GAP EXISTS NO LINER GAP LINER GAP EXISTS .GV REGENERATOR SHROUD 2 NOS. THICK SHROUD SUPPORTING STRIPS CIR. INLET NOZZLES 180 DEG APART SECTIONAL VIEW 10 NOS.
PH-1:2ND REGENERATOR Damaged Shell Near Solution Inlet PH-2:2ND REGENERATOR Disturbed Steam Distributor .
PH-3:2ND REGENERATOR SOLUTION INLET (Original Arrangement) PH-4:VETROCOKE ABSORBER Disturbed Bed .
PH-5:VETROCOKE ABSORBER Disturbed 1st Bed Liquid Redistributor .
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