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FM 3-20.

96
March 2010

Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on 13 March 2009. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Building 1002, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5123. After February 2011, this address will change to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZB-TDT, Building 4, 6751 Constitution Loop, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905-5593. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library at (www.train.army.mil).

* FM 3-20.96
Field Manual No. 3-20.96 Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, D.C., 12 March 2010

Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron


Contents
Page

PREFACE............................................................................................................viii INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................ix Chapter 1 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ 1-1 Section I Joint and Army Operations .......................................................... 1-2 Combat Power .................................................................................................... 1-2 Combined Arms .................................................................................................. 1-2 Operations in Complex Terrain .......................................................................... 1-3 Section II Role of the Squadron ................................................................... 1-3 Section III Squadron Organizations............................................................. 1-6 General Capabilities ........................................................................................... 1-6 HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ..................................................................... 1-6 IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ....................................................................... 1-8 SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron...................................................................... 1-9 ACR Cavalry Squadron .................................................................................... 1-11 BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron .................................................................... 1-12 Chapter 2 COMMAND AND CONTROL ............................................................................. 2-1 Section I Exercise of Command and Control ............................................. 2-1 Section II Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization and Integration ................................................................. 2-4 ISR Synchronization ........................................................................................... 2-4 ISR Integration .................................................................................................... 2-5

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to US government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information that is for official government use. This determination was made on 13 March 2009. Other requests for this document will be referred to Commandant, U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Building 1002, 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5123. After February 2011, this address will change to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZB-TDT, Building 4, 6751 Constitution Loop, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905-5593. DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

* This publication supersedes FM 3-20.96, 20 September 2006. 12 March 2010 FM 3-20.96 i

Contents

Section III - Planning Considerations ............................................................. 2-5 Reconnaissance Operations ............................................................................... 2-5 Security Operations............................................................................................. 2-9 Offensive Operations ........................................................................................ 2-11 Defensive Operations ....................................................................................... 2-14 Stability Operations ........................................................................................... 2-17 Civil Support Operations ................................................................................... 2-19 Chapter 3 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ................................................................. 3-1 Section I Basics of Reconnaissance ........................................................... 3-2 Fundamentals of Reconnaissance...................................................................... 3-2 Reconnaissance Techniques .............................................................................. 3-2 Reconnaissance Methods ................................................................................... 3-3 Reconnaissance Management ........................................................................... 3-5 Reconnaissance Assets and Systems ................................................................ 3-5 Site Exploitation .................................................................................................. 3-8 Movement During Dismounted Operations ......................................................... 3-8 BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron Considerations ............................................. 3-9 Section II - Actions on Contact ...................................................................... 3-11 Forms of Contact............................................................................................... 3-11 Procedures of Actions on Contact .................................................................... 3-11 Planning Considerations ................................................................................... 3-14 Section III Forms of Reconnaissance ........................................................ 3-15 Zone Reconnaissance ...................................................................................... 3-15 Area Reconnaissance ....................................................................................... 3-16 Route Reconnaissance ..................................................................................... 3-16 Reconnaissance in Force ................................................................................. 3-17 Section IV Infiltration and Exfiltration ........................................................ 3-18 Infiltration........................................................................................................... 3-18 Exfiltration ......................................................................................................... 3-21 Section V Reconnaissance Handover ....................................................... 3-22 Planning ............................................................................................................ 3-23 Preparation........................................................................................................ 3-23 Execution .......................................................................................................... 3-23 Example of Reconnaissance Handover ............................................................ 3-24 Chapter 4 SECURITY OPERATIONS ................................................................................. 4-1 Section I Basics of Security .......................................................................... 4-1 Squadrons Role in Security Operations ............................................................. 4-1 Fundamentals of Security ................................................................................... 4-2 Section II Forms of Security ......................................................................... 4-2 Screen (Stationary/Moving) ................................................................................ 4-3 Guard .................................................................................................................. 4-9 Cover ................................................................................................................... 4-9 Area Security....................................................................................................... 4-9 Chapter 5 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ............................................................................... 5-1 Section I Purpose of Offensive Operations................................................. 5-1

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Contents

Section II - Movement to Contact .................................................................... 5-3 Organization ....................................................................................................... 5-3 Execution Considerations ................................................................................... 5-4 Section III Attack............................................................................................ 5-7 Operational Considerations ................................................................................ 5-7 Sequence of Attack ............................................................................................ 5-8 Special-Purpose Attacks .................................................................................. 5-11 Section IV Transitions ................................................................................. 5-11 Consolidation .................................................................................................... 5-11 Reorganization ................................................................................................. 5-12 Chapter 6 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 6-1 Section I Purpose of Defensive Operations ............................................... 6-1 Defense Continuum ............................................................................................ 6-2 Defensive Tasks ................................................................................................. 6-2 Engagement Area Development ........................................................................ 6-3 Section II - Area Defense ................................................................................. 6-4 Organization of Forces ....................................................................................... 6-4 Types of Area Defense ....................................................................................... 6-5 Critical Tasks ...................................................................................................... 6-6 Execution of an Area Defense ............................................................................ 6-6 Defensive Area of Operations ............................................................................ 6-6 Section III - Mobile Defense ............................................................................. 6-7 Section IV - Retrograde Operations................................................................ 6-7 Section V Transitions .................................................................................... 6-7 Chapter 7 STABILITY OPERATIONS ................................................................................ 7-1 Section I Primary Stability Tasks ................................................................. 7-1 Section II Designing Stability Operations ................................................... 7-1 Stability and Defeat Mechanisms ....................................................................... 7-2 Lines of Effort ..................................................................................................... 7-3 Sequence of Actions and Phasing ..................................................................... 7-4 Section III Tactical Tasks in Support of Stability Operations ................... 7-5 Reconnaissance Support ................................................................................... 7-6 Patrols................................................................................................................. 7-6 Observation Posts .............................................................................................. 7-7 Security of Officials ............................................................................................. 7-7 Combat Outposts................................................................................................ 7-8 Searches............................................................................................................. 7-9 Roadblocks and Other Checkpoints ................................................................. 7-15 Chapter 8 CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS ....................................................................... 8-1 Section I Purpose and Types of Civil Support Operations ....................... 8-1 Army Role in Civil Support.................................................................................. 8-1 Civil Authority ...................................................................................................... 8-2 Section II Squadron Operations in Civil Support ....................................... 8-2 Multiple and Overlapping Activities .................................................................... 8-3 Mission Training ................................................................................................. 8-3

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Contents

Operational Environment .................................................................................... 8-3 Section III Key Considerations for Civil Support Operations .................... 8-3 Response ............................................................................................................ 8-3 Recovery ............................................................................................................. 8-4 Restoration .......................................................................................................... 8-4 Chapter 9 AUGMENTING COMBAT POWER .................................................................... 9-1 Section I Army and Joint Augmentation...................................................... 9-1 Brigade and Regimental Assets.......................................................................... 9-1 Support Brigades ................................................................................................ 9-2 Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Considerations ....... 9-3 Section II Engineer Support .......................................................................... 9-3 Squadron Support Assets ................................................................................... 9-3 Support Capabilities ............................................................................................ 9-4 Section III Fires............................................................................................... 9-5 Lethal Fires ......................................................................................................... 9-5 Nonlethal Fires .................................................................................................. 9-10 Targeting Process ............................................................................................. 9-10 Section IV Army Aviation Support ............................................................. 9-14 Section V CBRN Support Operations ........................................................ 9-15 CBRN Defense.................................................................................................. 9-15 CBRN Support Assets and Capabilities ............................................................ 9-16 Section VI Air and Missile Defense Support ............................................. 9-17 Section VII Civil Affairs Support ................................................................. 9-18 Squadron Role .................................................................................................. 9-18 Civil Affairs Units ............................................................................................... 9-19 Section VIII Military Police Support............................................................ 9-19 Section IX Other Support or Functions ..................................................... 9-19 Military Intelligence............................................................................................ 9-19 Explosive Ordnance Disposal ........................................................................... 9-20 Military Working Dogs ....................................................................................... 9-20 Tactical PSYOP Team ...................................................................................... 9-20 Interpreters ........................................................................................................ 9-20 Information Protection ....................................................................................... 9-21 Personnel Recovery .......................................................................................... 9-21 Army Health System Support............................................................................ 9-21 Composite Risk Management ........................................................................... 9-23 Chapter 10 SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS ....................................................................... 10-1 Section I Sustainment Staff and Units ....................................................... 10-1 Sustainment Staff .............................................................................................. 10-2 Sustainment Units ............................................................................................. 10-3 Section II Sustainment Planning ................................................................ 10-8 Planning Fundamentals and Procedures .......................................................... 10-8 Support for Reconnaissance Operations .......................................................... 10-9 Support for Security Operations...................................................................... 10-10 Support for Dismounted Operations ............................................................... 10-11

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Communications ............................................................................................. 10-12 Sustainment for Attachments and Detachments ............................................ 10-13 Contracting ..................................................................................................... 10-13 Section III Support Areas .......................................................................... 10-14 Types of Support Areas .................................................................................. 10-14 Locations for Support Areas ........................................................................... 10-18 Security of Support Areas............................................................................... 10-19 Supply Routes ................................................................................................ 10-19 Section IV Logistics Packages ................................................................. 10-20 LOGPAC Planning.......................................................................................... 10-20 LOGPAC Resupply......................................................................................... 10-21 LOGPAC Survivability .................................................................................... 10-22 Section V Evacuation of Sick and Wounded Personnel........................ 10-23 Medical Evacuation ........................................................................................ 10-23 Casualty Evacuation ....................................................................................... 10-24 Section VI - Field Maintenance .................................................................... 10-25 Organizations and Capabilities ....................................................................... 10-25 Battle Damage Assessment and Repair ........................................................ 10-26 Recovery and Evacuation............................................................................... 10-26 Controlled Exchange ...................................................................................... 10-26 Communications Security Maintenance ......................................................... 10-26 Medical Equipment Maintenance ................................................................... 10-26 Retrograde of Unserviceable Components .................................................... 10-27 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1 INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

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Figures
Figure 1-1. HBCT reconnaissance squadron organization .................................................... 1-7 Figure 1-2. IBCT reconnaissance squadron organization ..................................................... 1-8 Figure 1-3. SBCT reconnaissance squadron organization .................................................. 1-10 Figure 1-4. ACR cavalry squadron organization .................................................................. 1-12 Figure 1-5. BFSB reconnaissance squadron organization .................................................. 1-13 Figure 2-1. Development of guidance for reconnaissance operations .................................. 2-6 Figure 3-1. Single-lane infiltration ........................................................................................ 3-21 Figure 3-2. Multiple-lane infiltration ...................................................................................... 3-21 Figure 3-3. Reconnaissance handover (part one) ............................................................... 3-24 Figure 3-4. Reconnaissance handover (part two) ................................................................ 3-25 Figure 3-5. Reconnaissance handover (part three) ............................................................. 3-25 Figure 4-1. Alternate bounds by individual OPs and by subordinate units ............................ 4-7 Figure 4-2. Successive bounds and continuous marching .................................................... 4-8 Figure 4-3. SBCT reconnaissance squadron conducting area security .............................. 4-11 Figure 4-4. Convoy security organization ............................................................................ 4-14 Figure 5-1. Organization for movement to contact ................................................................ 5-4 Figure 7-1. Example of combining stability and defeat mechanisms ..................................... 7-3 Figure 7-2. Example lines of effort ......................................................................................... 7-4 Figure 7-3. Example phasing of a COA to support stability operations ................................. 7-5 Figure 7-4. Combat outpost ................................................................................................... 7-8 Figure 7-5. Typical organization for search operations........................................................ 7-11 Figure 7-6. Establishing the cordon ..................................................................................... 7-12 Figure 7-7. Example physical layout of a deliberate checkpoint .......................................... 7-16 Figure 9-1. Example augmentation of an HBCT .................................................................... 9-2 Figure 9-2. Fires battalion HBCT ........................................................................................ 9-6 Figure 9-3. Fires battalion SBCT ........................................................................................ 9-6 Figure 9-4. Fires battalion IBCT .......................................................................................... 9-7 Figure 9-5. Artillery battery armored cavalry regiment........................................................ 9-7 Figure 9-6. Targeting process .............................................................................................. 9-11 Figure 10-1. Forward support company organization .......................................................... 10-4 Figure 10-2. Example of squadron trains ........................................................................... 10-15 Figure 10-3. Example of sustainment graphics ................................................................. 10-21 Figure 10-4. Casualty reporting and evacuation procedures ............................................. 10-23 Figure 10-5. Maintenance flow ........................................................................................... 10-26

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Tables
Table 1-1. Squadron mission profiles ..................................................................................... 1-4 Table 2-1. Components of battle command ........................................................................... 2-2 Table 2-2. Operations process activities ................................................................................ 2-3 Table 2-3. Focus of reconnaissance ...................................................................................... 2-7 Table 2-4. Tempo of reconnaissance ..................................................................................... 2-8 Table 2-5. Engagement criteria of reconnaissance ................................................................ 2-8 Table 2-6. Focus of security operations ................................................................................. 2-9 Table 2-7. Tempo of security operations .............................................................................. 2-10 Table 2-8. Engagement criteria and displacement criteria of security operations ............... 2-11 Table 3-1. Organic unmanned aircraft systems ..................................................................... 3-6 Table 4-1. Methods of screen movement ............................................................................... 4-8 Table 6-1. Positioning considerations .................................................................................... 6-5 Table 7-1. Phases of intervention ........................................................................................... 7-4 Table 8-1. Impact of military duty status on squadron tasks in civil support operations ........ 8-2 Table 9-1. Close air support nine-line request format .......................................................... 9-10 Table 9-2. Targeting meeting responsibilities ....................................................................... 9-12 Table 9-2. Targeting meeting responsibilities (continued) ................................................... 9-13 Table 9-3. Army aviation missions........................................................................................ 9-15 Table 10-1. Sustainment unit counterparts .......................................................................... 10-3 Table 10-2. Contract types ................................................................................................. 10-14 Table 10-3. Typical composition of squadron combat trains .............................................. 10-16 Table 10-4. Typical composition of squadron field trains ................................................... 10-17 Table 10-5. Squadron sustainment personnel ................................................................... 10-20 Table 10-6. Organic field maintenance assets ................................................................... 10-25

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Preface
This field manual, FM 3-20.96, provides the commander and staff of the squadron and its subordinate units with doctrine relevant to the conduct of full-spectrum operations in a joint operational environment (OE). The doctrine described in this manual is applicable across the elements of full-spectrum military operations offense, defense, stability, and civil support. It is applicable to the following units: Heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) reconnaissance squadron. Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron. Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) reconnaissance squadron. Armored cavalry regiment (ACR) cavalry squadron. Battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) reconnaissance squadron. A framework for squadrons operating as part of these units: Brigade combat team (BCT). ACR. BFSB. Doctrine for squadron commanders, staffs, and their subordinate commanders and leaders responsible for conducting major command and control (C2) activities during operations. An authoritative reference for personnel who develop the following: Doctrine (fundamental principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures [TTP]), materiel, and force structure. Institutional and unit training. Unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) for squadron operations.

This publication provides the following:

This publication supports the Army operations doctrine found in FM 3-0, Operations (2008); FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production (2005); and FM 6-0, Mission Command (2003). It applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. The proponent for this publication is the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing agency is the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE), Fort Benning, GA. You may send comments and recommendations by any mean, U.S. mail, e-mail, fax, or telephone, as long as you use or follow the format of DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms). You may also phone for more information. Point of contact information is as follows: U.S. mail: Commander, US Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Building 1002 (Suite 207) 204 1st Cavalry Regiment Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5123 Email: TDCD.DoctrineBranch@conus.army.mil Phone: COM (502) 624-1188/2319 or DSN 464-1188/2319. FAX: COM (502) 624-1151/5571 or DSN 464-1151/5571. After February 2011, this address will change to Commander, Maneuver Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZBTDT, Building 4, 6751 Constitution Loop, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5593. Unless otherwise stated in this publication, the masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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Introduction
PURPOSE
FM 3-20.96 provides the commander and staff of the squadron and its subordinate units with doctrine relevant to Army and joint operations. The doctrine described in this manual is applicable across the full spectrum of military operationsoffense, defense, stability, and civil support.

EXPANDED SCOPE
The previous edition of FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, published in September 2006, was limited to doctrinal and operational considerations for the reconnaissance squadrons in the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT. This edition, now titled Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, expands the discussion of doctrine, organization, and operations to include not only the BCT squadrons but also the cavalry squadron in the ACR and the reconnaissance squadron in the BFSB.

FM 3-0, OPERATIONS
In February 2008, the Army published the 15th edition of its capstone operations manual, FM 3-0. This edition of Operations reflects Army thinking in a complex period of persistent conflicts and opportunities. The resulting doctrine established in the updated edition of FM 3-0 describes an operational concept in which commanders employ offensive, defensive, stability, or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3-20.96 has been revised to reflect the doctrine and terminology changes in this current edition of FM 3-0.

DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION
Information that is covered in other doctrinal publications is not repeated in this manual; rather, appropriate references are provided to direct readers to important information and publications. Consequently, readers should be familiar with the key field manuals that establish the foundation for the Armys doctrine. In addition to FM 3-0, these manuals are the following: FM 3-90, Tactics. FM 5-0, The Operations Process. FM 6-0, Command and Control. FM 6-22, Leadership. FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics. FM 3-07, Stability Operations. FM 3-28, Civil Support Operations. FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations. FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List.

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Introduction

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
As noted, this revision of FM 3-20.96 draws heavily on doctrine and terminology changes in FM 3-0. The following is a summary of each chapter in the manual, including areas in which significant additions and revisions have been made: Chapter 1, Overview, begins with a brief discussion of joint and Army operations based on the current version of FM 3-0. The chapter addresses the role of the squadron and the organization of the five types of squadrons the manual covers, including their capabilities and limitations. Chapter 2, Command and Control, highlights the updated concepts of battle command and the operations process based on the current version of FM 3-0. It addresses planning considerations for the four elements of full-spectrum operations (offense, defense, stability, and civil support); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) synchronization and integration; and command post (CP) distribution and functions. Chapter 3, Reconnaissance Operations, clarifies the concept of the commanders reconnaissance planning guidance and includes unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) technology and considerations for the reconnaissance squadron in the BFSB. Chapter 4, Security Operations, adds mission capabilities for the ACR cavalry squadron and the BFSB reconnaissance squadron and includes a minor reorganization of the section on area security. Chapter 5, Offensive Operations, addresses the full-spectrum capability of the squadron to conduct offensive operations based on mission variables and the higher commanders guidance. In current operations, reconnaissance units have been employed as maneuver units with an assigned area of operations (AO) and the requirement to perform the same mission set as armor or infantry battalions. Chapter 6, Defensive Operations, highlights the full-spectrum capability of the squadron to conduct defensive operations. It addresses the primary defensive tasks executed or supported by the squadron based on mission variables and the higher commanders guidance. Chapter 7, Stability Operations, establishes stability operations as a function equal in importance for the squadron to offensive and defensive operations. It addresses the primary stability tasks, design of stability operations, and tactical tasks executed in support of stability operations. Chapter 8, Civil Support Operations, introduces civil support as an element of full-spectrum operations and addresses the purpose, primary tasks, and planning and execution considerations of these operations. Chapter 9, Augmenting Combat Power, highlights augmentation the squadron can receive from higher headquarters, support brigade, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational assets. Chapter 10, Sustainment Operations, describes the sustainment staff and units relevant to the squadron. It also addresses sustainment planning and activities conducted by the squadron.

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Chapter 1

Overview
Reconnaissance units are an integraland vitalpart of the Armys modular force. This chapter provides an overview of the five key ground reconnaissance units in the Army: the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) reconnaissance squadron, the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) reconnaissance squadron, the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) reconnaissance squadron, the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) cavalry squadron, and the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) reconnaissance squadron. Each squadron is organized, manned, and equipped to provide accurate, timely, and relevant combat information in complex, dynamic operational environments (OE). This information, in turn, enables the higher commander to make rapid, well-informed decisions. Within the complex, dynamic conditions and threat profiles of future OEs, the squadron is essential to successful Army and joint operations in several ways: It provides a significant dismounted or mounted reconnaissance force. It enables the higher commander to decisively employ his maneuver battalions and joint fires and to choose times and places for engagement to his advantage. It maximizes security of the higher headquarters by providing timely, accurate, and relevant combat information. It helps the higher commander achieve advantages over an enemy or adversary in terms of the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information. Along with its reconnaissance capabilities, the ACR cavalry squadron has a combined-arms capability that enables it to fight for information against all types of enemy elements and to conduct offensive and defensive operations and more demanding security operations. The reconnaissance squadrons of the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT can conduct security operations and can fight for information against specific threats, but lack the combined-arms capabilities required in offense and defense. The BFSB reconnaissance squadrons unique reconnaissance capabilities include employing its reconnaissance troops and long-range surveillance (LRS) company in conjunction with assets of the BFSB military intelligence (MI) battalion; however, the reconnaissance squadrons ability to fight for information and to conduct security operations is significantly limited.

Contents
Section I Joint and Army Operations ... 1-2 Combat Power .................................... 1-2 Combined Arms .................................. 1-2 Operations in Complex Terrain ........... 1-3 Section II Role of the Squadron ............ 1-3 Section III Squadron Organizations ...... 1-6 General Capabilities ............................ 1-6 HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ...... 1-6 IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ........ 1-8 SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ...... 1-9 ACR Cavalry Squadron ..................... 1-11 BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron ..... 1-12

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Chapter 1

SECTION I JOINT AND ARMY OPERATIONS


1-1. Joint and Army operations occur in OEs that comprise a complex framework of factors. These environmental factors include All enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral elements across the spectrum of conflict. The state of governance. The state of technology and local resources. The culture of the local population. Aspects of the physical environmentthe air, land, maritime, and space domains. Relevant information that shapes the OE. 1-2. Joint and Army forces apply military force against decisive points to influence threat centers of gravity occurring across a continuum of operations ranging from stable peace to general war. The application of military force is described by the operational theme, which reflects the character of the dominant major operation being conducted. As an example, major combat operations served as the operational theme during Operation Desert Storm, the dominant operation involved in the liberation of Kuwait. The REFORGER training exercises (dominant operation) of the Cold War era were examples of peacetime military operations (theme) at the other end of the operational spectrum. 1-3. The foundations for Army operations are contained in its operational concept of full-spectrum operations. FM 3-0, Operations, describes full-spectrum operations in which commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

COMBAT POWER
1-4. Full-spectrum operations require the squadron to continuously generate and apply combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. (See FM 3-0 for additional information.)

COMBINED ARMS
1-5. The squadron depends on combined arms to effectively accomplish its mission. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power to achieve an effect greater than if each element of combat power were to be used separately or sequentially. Combined arms integrates leadership, information, and all of the warfighting functions and their supporting systems. Squadron commanders are free to task organize within the limits of the higher commanders intent. Note. The considerations of task organization are particularly important to the IBCT reconnaissance squadron because of its mix of mounted and dismounted elements as well as its firepower, protection, and mobility capabilities relative to the other battalions of the IBCT. 1-6. Combined arms uses the capabilities of each warfighting function and information in complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different warfighting function. For example, commanders use intelligence developed by reconnaissance elements to identify and acquire high-payoff targets (HPT) for engagement by artillery (fires). Once an HPT is acquired, artillery fires are used to engage the target to achieve the desired effect against it, such as destruction or suppression. In this example, the intelligence warfighting function enables the fires warfighting function. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting function to increase the functions overall capabilities. In reconnaissance operations, for example, higher headquarters surveillance and reconnaissance assets may cue the squadron to reposition scouts, sensors, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to make contact with threat forces early. Cueing helps to focus limited reconnaissance assets. The integration of one or more types of intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance systems reinforces the capabilities of each.

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Overview

OPERATIONS IN COMPLEX TERRAIN


1-7. Understanding the effects of terrain and weather on the squadrons operation/mission is key to its ability to execute full-spectrum operations. Terrain and weather favor the side that is more familiar with or better prepared to operate inthe physical environment. For discussion on complex terrain, refer to FM 3-06, Urban Operations. FM 3-97.6, Mountain Operations. FM 90-3, Desert Operations. FM 90-5, Jungle Operations.

SECTION II ROLE OF THE SQUADRON


1-8. The fundamental role of the squadron is conducting reconnaissance or security missions in support of its higher headquarters. The squadron progressively builds situational awareness (SA) of the OE for the higher commander. The combat information provided by the squadron enables the higher commander to develop situational understanding (SU), make better and quicker plans and decisions, and visualize and direct operations. The squadron employs unique combinations of reconnaissance and security capabilities to successfully meet the information challenges intrinsic to the spectrum of conflict. The squadrons reconnaissance operations yield an extraordinarily high payoff in the areas of threat location, disposition, and composition, early warning, protection, and battle damage assessment (BDA). This preserves its parent units freedom of maneuver and initiative over the enemy. Skillful reconnaissance operations allow the commander to shape the battlefield, ideally accepting or initiating combat at times and places of his choosing and applying combat power in a manner most likely to achieve his desired effects. 1-9. All five types of ground squadrons are designed and equipped to be highly mobile and flexible units optimized for reconnaissance missions. Depending on the mission variables of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) and the higher commanders guidance, the brigade combat team (BCT) reconnaissance squadrons and the ACR cavalry squadron can perform offensive or defensive operations in an economy of force role. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron is not designed, equipped, or intended to be employed as a close combat force. 1-10. The placement of dedicated reconnaissance units in the modular force takes into account their inherent direct combat vulnerabilities or capabilities and demands employment in accordance with those defined capabilities. This understanding also requires abstaining from employing them in missions and roles for which they were not created or resourced. When reconnaissance units are assigned close combat missions or become decisively engaged, reconnaissance ceases. When reconnaissance ceases, the potential for achieving and capitalizing upon information dominance is lost. 1-11. The squadron conducts reconnaissance and security operations to support the development of SU; this aids the parent units development of the common operational picture (COP). The COP is tailored to the higher commanders information requirements (IR), such as friendly forces, threat forces, terrain, and other factors. It is based on common data and information shared with subordinate or adjacent commands to an unprecedented degree. Analysis of the COPcombined with the commanders application of his experience, judgment, and martial instinctleads to SU by establishing the relationships among the factors of METT-TC as they apply to the immediate tactical problem. In turn, SU facilitates decision-making by helping the higher commander to identify fleeting or subtle opportunities for mission accomplishment, threats to the force, and important gaps in information that must be clarified. 1-12. Regardless of organization, the squadrons primary missions (see Table 1-1) in support of its higher headquarters are Reconnaissance (see Chapter 3, which covers reconnaissance operations): Zone reconnaissance. Area reconnaissance. Route reconnaissance. Security (see Chapter 4, which covers security operations): Guard.

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Chapter 1

Note. Squadrons of the BCTs and ACR can conduct guard operations within METT-TC factors. Screen. Area security. Local security. Table 1-1. Squadron mission profiles
TYPE OF SQUADRON ACR CAVALRY SQDN HBCT RECON SQDN SBCT RECON SQDN IBCT RECON SQDN BFSB RECON SQDN

Reconnaissance Tasks Zone Reconnaissance Area Reconnaissance Route Reconnaissance Reconnaissance in Force Security Tasks Screen Guard Cover * Area Security Local Security Offensive Tasks Attack Movement to Contact Defensive Tasks Area Defense Mobile Defense Retrograde Stability Tasks Civil Security Civil Control Restore Essential Services Support to Governance Support to Economic/ Infrastructure Development Civil Support Tasks Support to Disaster/ Terrorist Attack Support to Civil Law Enforcement Other Support F Fully Capable R Capable when reinforced P Capable when enemy capabilities do not jeopardize mission accomplishment (permissive METT-TC) X Not Capable * Note. Cover is listed as one of the security missions even though the squadron is not doctrinally capable of performing this mission independently. The squadron can perform tactical tasks in support of its higher headquarters executing a cover mission (such as screening for a BCT assigned a cover mission). F F R R R F F R R R F F R R R F F R R R R R R R R F F F P P P P P P P P P X X X F F P P P P P P X X F F X F F F P X F F F P X F F F P X F F P X X R F F F F F F F F P F F F P F F F P P F P X

Capability depends on the specific missions assigned. Depending on the mission, the squadron may require augmentation.

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1-13. When the squadrons higher headquarters is conducting offensive operations, the squadron is focused on enabling the higher headquarters to develop the situation out of direct fire contact. Combat information developed and reported by the squadron allows the higher headquarters to direct maneuver, on its own terms, against the enemy. In some situations, such as a movement to contact, the squadron may be the lead element for its higher headquarters. 1-14. During defensive operations, the higher headquarters typically tasks the squadron to conduct security operations to provide early warning and reaction time, deny enemy reconnaissance efforts, and protect the main battle area. The squadron can be tasked to execute a screen or guard based on the degree of protection required by its higher headquarters. Based on the mission variables, elements from maneuver units can be attached to or under the operational control (OPCON) of the squadron to provide it with additional combat power. 1-15. If the higher headquarters is conducting security operations, it assigns appropriate security missions to the squadron. The higher headquarters ensures the squadron is task organized and augmented for success. Augmentation could include tank and mechanized infantry units, reconnaissance units, engineer elements, attack helicopter units, close air support (CAS) priority, and intelligence acquisition systems. The nature of the security mission, the organic composition of the securing force, and the enemy situation determine what augmentation is needed by the squadron. 1-16. In the case of stability or civil support operations, the squadron focuses on reconnaissance and security operations that enable its higher headquarters to develop a better understanding of the situation. Particular emphasis may be on area security tasks. Note. During all types of operations, the squadron can be assigned appropriate tactical tasks (such as attack, raid, or defend) in an economy of force role. 1-17. The reconnaissance squadrons of the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCT are organized to conduct reconnaissance missions throughout the BCTs area of operations (AO). By leveraging information technology and air/ground reconnaissance capabilities in complex terrain, the reconnaissance squadron can develop the situation by focusing on all categories of threats in a designated AO. This allows the BCT commander to maintain battlefield mobility and agility while choosing the time and place to confront the enemy and the preferred method of engagement. He can task organize his surveillance and reconnaissance assets to optimize their complementary effects while maximizing support throughout the BCTs AO. The squadron uses the tools at its disposal to assist in conducting reconnaissance missions within all spectrums of conflict. 1-18. At times during operations such as Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the BCT reconnaissance squadrons have been employed as maneuver elements. They are assigned their own AOs and tasked to execute all elements of full-spectrum operations. During major combat operations, this will be especially true of the IBCT reconnaissance squadron, which possesses the greatest amount of combat power within the IBCT (such as up-armored wheeled vehicles, TOW missile systems, caliber .50 machine guns, and MK19 grenade launchers). 1-19. The cavalry squadron of the ACR is a highly mobile, armor-protected force. The ACR is a selfcontained combined arms organization that typically supports a corps or a joint task force (JTF). The cavalry squadron usually functions as part of the ACR, but may operate separately for a short period of time or as part of a JTF or another unit. It is often reinforced by elements of all warfighting functions organic to or reinforcing the ACR. Since the ACR has an organic air cavalry squadron, the cavalry squadron is especially adept at air-ground teaming when conducting reconnaissance and security missions in its AO. 1-20. The reconnaissance squadron of the BFSB is a multifunctional unit. Its primary mission is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to answer higher headquarters priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and other IR using manned ground assets and organic small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS). It also can execute target acquisition, limited target interdiction, and BDA in support of combat assessment. The reconnaissance squadron can also integrate additional tactical unmanned aircraft systems (TUAS), sensors,

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and counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams from the BFSBs organic military intelligence (MI) battalion to augment its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities.

SECTION III SQUADRON ORGANIZATIONS


1-21. As the commanders primary eyes and ears, the squadron serves as the first line for military assessment of information gathered through reconnaissance. As such, it is designed to efficiently direct and execute reconnaissance and security operations.

GENERAL CAPABILITIES
1-22. All five ground reconnaissance squadrons possess the following general capabilities: Fight for information within unit capabilities. Gather information about all categories of threats. Support lethal and nonlethal targeting and target acquisition for higher headquarters. Provide all-weather, continuous, accurate, and timely reconnaissance in complex terrain. Rapidly develop the situation in depth. Reduce risk and enhance survivability by providing information that allows the higher headquarters to avoid contact or to achieve overwhelming combat power if contact is necessary. Assist in shaping the OE by providing information or directing precision joint fires to disrupt the enemy commanders decision cycle and deny him planned or future options. Conduct collaborative and parallel planning that is fully integrated with higher and adjacent units and that results in employment of reconnaissance and surveillance assets to support higher headquarters operations.

HBCT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON


1-23. This squadron is composed of four troops: a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) and three ground reconnaissance troops equipped with M3 cavalry fighting vehicles (CFV) and wheeled scout vehicles. The squadron also receives a forward support company (FSC) for sustainment; the FSC is normally under OPCON of the squadron. See Figure 1-1.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP


1-24. The HHT consists of the command and control (C2) nodes and logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain operations. The headquarters troop organization includes a command group, the troop headquarters section, S-1/S-4 section, S-2 section, S-3 section, S-6 section, medical platoon, and fire support platoon.

RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS
1-25. Each of the three reconnaissance troops includes a troop headquarters, two reconnaissance platoons, and a mortar section. The two reconnaissance platoons are organized with three M3 CFVs and five wheeled scout vehicles equipped with the long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3). The mortar section consists of two 120-mm self-propelled mortars.

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Figure 1-1. HBCT reconnaissance squadron organization

CAPABILITIES
1-26. The HBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following significant capabilities: It is equipped with 120-mm self-propelled mortars. It is capable of fighting for information against heavier threats (such as mechanized or armor units).

LIMITATIONS
1-27. The HBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following limitations, which can be mitigated based on employment and/or augmentation: It requires augmentation (such as artillery and/or engineers) to effectively perform offensive and defensive operations as a combined arms element. The heavier, armored CFVs in the reconnaissance troops can limit movement or maneuver in complex terrain such as urban areas. The CFVs create significant sustainment requirements in terms of fuel and maintenance. The mix of CFVs and lighter wheeled scout vehicles in the reconnaissance troops creates a mismatch in survivability. The squadron has limited capability to conduct extensive dismounted operations.

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IBCT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON


1-28. This squadron is composed of four troops: an HHT, two mounted reconnaissance troops equipped with wheeled scout vehicles and one dismounted reconnaissance troop. The squadron also receives an FSC for sustainment purposes, normally in an OPCON relationship. See Figure 1-2.

Figure 1-2. IBCT reconnaissance squadron organization

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP


1-29. The HHT consists of the C2 nodes and logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain operations. The headquarters troop organization includes a command group, the troop headquarters section, S-1/S-4 section, S-2 section, S-3 section, S-6 section, medical platoon, and fire support platoon.

MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS


1-30. Each of the two mounted reconnaissance troops includes a troop headquarters, three reconnaissance platoons, and a mortar section. The reconnaissance platoons are organized with six wheeled scout vehicles. The mortar section consists of two towed 120-mm mortars and a fire direction center (FDC).

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DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE TROOP


1-31. The dismounted reconnaissance troop includes a troop headquarters, a sniper section, a mortar section, and two dismounted reconnaissance platoons. The reconnaissance platoons are organized into three sections with one Javelin in each platoon.

CAPABILITIES
1-32. The IBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following significant capabilities: It is equipped with 120-mm towed mortars. It can fight for information against light/motorized forces. It provides the IBCT with enhanced firepower and mobility for offensive or defensive operations through the weapon systems available in its two mounted troops (such as the caliber .50 machine gun, MK19 grenade launcher, and TOW missile).

LIMITATIONS
1-33. The IBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following limitations, which can be mitigated based on employment and/or augmentation: It lacks direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and needs augmentation when an armor threat is anticipated. It requires augmentation (such as artillery and/or engineers) to effectively perform offensive and defensive operations as a combined arms element. Its mix of mounted and dismounted reconnaissance troops creates a mismatch in terms of movement and maneuver capability. It has limited sustainment assets that must frequently operate over extended distances. It has limited mounted operations capability after airborne or air assault movement; mounted scouts usually must operate dismounted.

SBCT RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON


1-34. This squadron is composed of five troops: an HHT, three reconnaissance troops equipped with Stryker reconnaissance vehicles, and a surveillance troop. See Figure 1-3.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP


1-35. The HHT consists of the C2 nodes and logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain operations. HHT organization includes a command group, the troop headquarters section, S-1/S-4 section, S-2 section, S-3 section, S-6 section, medical platoon, fire support platoon, and a combat repair team (CRT) from the brigade support battalion (BSB) for maintenance purposes.

RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS
1-36. Each of the three reconnaissance troops includes a troop headquarters, three reconnaissance platoons, and a mortar section. The three reconnaissance platoons are organized with four reconnaissance vehicles. The mortar section consists of two 120-mm self-propelled mortars and an FDC.

SURVEILLANCE TROOP
1-37. The surveillance troop provides the squadron commander with a mix of specialized capabilities built around aerial and ground sensors. The UAS platoon launches, flies, recovers, and maintains the squadrons unmanned aerial reconnaissance aircraft. The multisensor platoon consists of ground-based radio signals intercept and direction-finding teams, such as Prophet teams. It also has a dedicated communications terminal that transmits, reports, and receives voice, data, digital, and imagery feeds from sources through national level. The ground sensor platoon provides remotely emplaced unmanned monitoring capabilities. The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance platoon has three M1135

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Stryker CBRN reconnaissance vehicles and conducts route, zone, and area CBRN reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of CBRN contamination.

Figure 1-3. SBCT reconnaissance squadron organization

CAPABILITIES
1-38. The SBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following significant capabilities: It can conduct close reconnaissance of enemy forces by maximizing the teaming of ground scouts, CI Soldiers, UASs, CBRN reconnaissance, ground-based sensors, and Prophet assets. It is equipped with 120-mm self-propelled mortars. It can fight for information against light/motorized forces or heavier threats when augmented.

LIMITATIONS
1-39. The SBCT reconnaissance squadron has the following limitations, which can be mitigated based on employment and/or augmentation: It lacks direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and needs augmentation when an armor threat is anticipated. It requires augmentation to effectively perform offensive and defensive operations as an economy of force role.

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It has limited sustainment assets that must frequently operate over extended distances. It has limited capability to conduct extensive dismounted operations.

ACR CAVALRY SQUADRON


1-40. This squadron is composed of an HHT, three cavalry troops, one tank company, and an artillery battery. See Figure 1-4.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP


1-41. The HHT consists of the C2 nodes and logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain operations. HHT organization includes a command group, the troop headquarters section, S-1 section, S-2 section, S-3 section, S-4 section, S-6 section, fires cell, support platoon, medical platoon, maintenance platoon, and armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) section.

CAVALRY TROOPS
1-42. Each of the three armored cavalry troops includes troop headquarters, two scout platoons, two tank platoons, a mortar section, and a maintenance section. Each scout platoon is equipped with six M3A3 CFVs. Each tank platoon is equipped with four M1A2 main battle tanks. The mortar section has two M1064 mortar carriers equipped with 120-mm mortars.

TANK COMPANY
1-43. The tank company consists of a company headquarters, three tank platoons, and a maintenance section. Each tank platoon is equipped with four M1A2 main battle tanks.

ARTILLERY BATTERY
1-44. The artillery battery consists of a battery headquarters, two artillery platoons, a support platoon, four fire support teams (FIST), and two combat observation lasing teams (COLT). Each artillery platoon is equipped with three self-propelled M109A6 Paladin howitzers. The FISTs are equipped with the M7 or M3A3 Bradley fire support team (BFIST) vehicle. The COLTs are equipped with the M707 or M1200 (Armored Knight) fire support vehicle.

CAPABILITIES
1-45. The ACR cavalry squadron has the following significant capabilities: It can conduct close reconnaissance of enemy forces by maximizing the teaming of mounted, dismounted, and aerial scouts. It can fight for information against all types of threats. It is equipped with 120-mm self-propelled mortars. It has an organic 155-mm self-propelled artillery battery. It can deploy in a combined arms organization down to the troop level. It can conduct offensive or defensive operations in an economy of force role.

LIMITATIONS
1-46. The ACR cavalry squadron has the following limitations, which can be mitigated based on employment and/or augmentation: Heavier armored vehicles may limit movement or maneuver in complex terrain such as urban areas. Heavier armored vehicles create significant sustainment requirements in terms of fuel and maintenance. The squadron has limited capability to conduct extensive dismounted operations.

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Figure 1-4. ACR cavalry squadron organization

BFSB RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON


1-47. This squadron comprises three troops and one company: an HHT, two mounted reconnaissance troops equipped with wheeled scout vehicles, and a long-range surveillance (LRS) company. See Figure 1-5.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP


1-48. The HHT consists of the C2 nodes and logistical assets needed for the squadron to conduct and sustain operations. HHT organization includes a command group, the troop headquarters section, S-1 section, S-2 section, S-3 section, S-4 section, S-6 section, insertion and extraction section, fires cell, fire support platoon, and medical platoon.

RECONNAISSANCE TROOPS
1-49. Each of the two reconnaissance troops includes a troop headquarters and two reconnaissance platoons. Each reconnaissance platoon is organized with six wheeled scout vehicles.

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE COMPANY


1-50. The LRS company includes a company headquarters, communications platoon, two target interdiction teams, a transportation section, and three LRS detachments. Each detachment is organized with five surveillance teams.

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Figure 1-5. BFSB reconnaissance squadron organization

CAPABILITIES
1-51. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron has the following significant capabilities: It can conduct close reconnaissance of enemy forces by maximizing the capabilities of mounted and LRS elements working in conjunction with assets from the BFSBs MI battalion. These assets include TUAS, HUMINT collection teams, Prophet signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection teams, and CI teams. It can provide technical expertise to higher headquarters for coordinating insertion and extraction of LRS teams. It can provide extended-duration surveillance of named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of interest (TAI) for periods of up to five days. It can observe unassigned areas between noncontiguous subordinate AOs within the higher headquarters AO.

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LIMITATIONS
1-52. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron has the following limitations, which can be mitigated based on employment and/or augmentation: It lacks direct fire standoff, lethality, and survivability in open and rolling terrain and needs augmentation when an armor threat is anticipated. Its ability to perform LRS operations requires extensive coordination, liaison, and support (such as movement, fires, and sustainment) from higher and adjacent units within the AO. It has limited capability to conduct extensive dismounted operations. It has limited capability to perform security missions, other than screening, unless augmented. It lacks any organic indirect fire capability and must rely on Army or joint fires for indirect fire support. It does not have the capability to perform offensive and defensive operations as an economy of force role unless it receives significant augmentation. It has no organic sustainment assets, with the exception of its medical platoon, and must rely on its higher headquarters or other sustainment assets for all sustainment. It must frequently operate over extended distances, complicating C2, fires, and sustainment.

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Command and Control


This chapter presents the tenets of C2 and provides illustrations of how the squadron commander, his staff, and subordinate leadership exercise battle command. It outlines how commanders and leaders at all levels understand the situational context, visualize an operation in terms of the factors of METT-TC, employ the elements of operational design (as outlined in FM 3-0; examples include risk, tempo, decisive points, and end state), and apply their own experience and judgment to describe their visualization using the commanders intent and planning guidance. The discussion also covers how the squadron commander communicates his vision and how he directs the operation by developing a concept of operations and by synchronizing the warfighting functions to employ forces and fires to achieve specific effects. CONTENTS
Section I Exercise of Command and Control .................................................... 2-1 Section II Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization and Integration........... 2-4 ISR Synchronization ........................... 2-4 ISR Integration .................................... 2-5 Section III - Planning Considerations ...... 2-5 Reconnaissance Operations ............... 2-5 Security Operations ............................ 2-9 Offensive Operations ........................ 2-11 Defensive Operations ....................... 2-14 Stability Operations ........................... 2-17 Civil Support Operations ................... 2-19

SECTION I EXERCISE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-1. To make sound and timely decisions, squadron and troop commanders and platoon leaders must be forward-lookingseeing themselves (and other friendly forces), the terrain, the threat, and the populace. Effective squadron commanders use integrated, information-age technologies such as attached sensors and UASsalong with the associated TTPto confirm and share a COP. This shared COP, in turn, enhances SA concerning the terrain, the threat, and friendly forces. The high-speed sharing of a COP and other relevant information (RI) enables reconnaissance commanders to make better decisions faster than their opponents can. 2-2. Key concepts that support decision making by the squadron commander are battle command and the operations process. See Tables 2-1 and 2-2.

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Table 2-1. Components of battle command


Component Description

Understand

The squadron commander uses understanding to frame the problem within the context of the situation through analysis of the operational variables. Understanding becomes the basis of the squadron commanders visualization. The squadron commanders visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding (SU), determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state. Squadron commanders describe their visualization in doctrinal terms, refining and clarifying it as circumstances require. Squadron commanders express their initial visualization in terms of the following: Initial commanders intent. Planning guidance, including an initial concept of operations. Information required for further planning (such as commanders critical information requirements [CCIR]). Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) that must be protected. Squadron commanders direct operations by Preparing and approving plans and orders. Assigning and adjusting missions, tasks, task organization, and control measures based on changing conditions. Positioning units to maximize combat power, anticipate actions, or create or preserve maneuver options. Positioning key leaders to ensure observation and supervision at critical times and places. Adjusting support priorities and allocating resources based on opportunities and threats. Accepting risk to create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Committing reserves. Changing support arrangements. Squadron commanders must possess strength of character, moral courage, and the ability to follow through with their decisions. They must be present to observe the decisive point and/or operation. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment entails three tasks: Continuously assessing the enemys reactions and vulnerabilities. Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation toward the commanders desired end state. Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Visualize

Describe

Direct

Lead

Assess

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Table 2-2. Operations process activities


Activity Description

Plan

Planning is the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commanders visualization into a specific course of action (COA) for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. At the squadron level, planning is conducted using the military decision-making process (MDMP). Preparation consists of activities performed by units to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. Execution entails putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding (SU) to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation. Assessment entails three tasks: Continuously assessing enemy reactions and vulnerabilities. Continuously monitoring the situation and progress of the operation toward the commanders desired end state. Evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Note. The most critical concept associated with the exercise of C2 is the commanders intent. Commanders express their vision as the commanders intent. This is a clear, concise statement of the purpose for the operation, the key tasks the unit must accomplish, and the desired end state. Based on his intent, the commander develops and issues planning guidance to the staff and subordinate commanders.

Prepare

Execute

Assess

2-3. The staff supports the commanders decision-making throughout the operations process, which includes intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). 2-4. The squadron staff collaborates with the higher headquarters staff in developing the overall reconnaissance and security plan. The higher commander provides guidance as to what degree the squadron is involved in the higher headquarters reconnaissance planning. There are three options in this collaboration: If the squadron and higher headquarters command posts (CP) are collocated or close to each other, squadron personnel can easily execute collaborative planning with the higher headquarters. If the squadron is executing an operation and its CP is located at an extended distance from the higher headquarters main CP, members of the squadron staff could move to the main CP to assist in planning and to serve as liaison officers (LNO). The squadron staff can collaborate with higher headquarters via FM radio or through a variety of Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS). 2-5. See the following publications for detailed information on C2 topics: FM 2-0, Intelligence. FM 3-0, Operations. FM 5-0, The Operations Process. FM 6-0, Mission Command.

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2-6. A CP is a units headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities during operations. It is often divided into echelons. The CP is the principal facility employed by the commander to control combat operations. It provides the physical facilities, personnel, and systems that allow the commander to see the battle, control and synchronize forces, maintain the COP, communicate orders, plan operations, and position sustainment assets. The commander exercises C2 over the force through and with the CP regardless of his location. He may personally control operations from other locations in the AO and is normally only present at the CP to receive information or briefings. 2-7. For a detailed discussion of CP organization and functions, see the following: FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. FM 6-0, Mission Command.

SECTION II INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE SYNCHRONIZATION AND INTEGRATION


2-8. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are activities that synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of sensors, assets, processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-0). Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are an integrated intelligence and operations function. They focus on the PIR needed to answer the squadron and higher commanders critical information requirements (CCIR). Through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the squadron commander and staff continuously plan, task, and employ their subordinate units and collection assets. In turn, this function supports the conduct of full-spectrum operations through four tasks: Intelligence, surveillance. and reconnaissance (ISR) synchronization. ISR integration. Surveillance (see Chapters 3 and 4). Reconnaissance (see Chapter 3).

ISR SYNCHRONIZATION
2-9. Commanders use ISR synchronization to accomplish the following: Analyze IR and intelligence gaps. Evaluate available assets internal and external to the organization. Determine gaps in the use of those assets. Recommend reconnaissance and surveillance assets controlled by the organization to collect information that answers the CCIR. Submit requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support. 2-10. The squadron S-2in coordination with the squadron S-3 and other staff elements as required synchronizes the entire collection effort based on priorities established by the commanders intent. This effort includes recommending tasks for assets the squadron commander controls and submitting requests for information to adjacent and higher headquarters units and organizations (FM 5-0). Note. Even though the squadron S-2 and S-3 are the principal staff officers focused on ISR synchronization and integration, the squadron XO manages, coordinates, and supervises the entire process. 2-11. The many reconnaissance and surveillance assets available to the squadron must be synchronized to collect combat information that ultimately results in the intelligence required by the squadron and its higher headquarters. The result is a continuous feed of relevant information that enables the squadron commander to gain SU and make timely decisions. The squadron S-3, along with the squadron S-2, integrates the sensors and other capabilities of the squadron to accomplish this. The squadrons subordinate units obtain

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information for the commander to use in answering his CCIR. The squadron S-2 takes this information, analyzes it, and gives the squadron commander refined intelligence with which to make decisions.

ISR INTEGRATION
2-12. Integration is the task of assigning and controlling a units intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (in terms of space, time, and purpose) to collect and report information as a concerted and integrated portion of operation plans and orders (FM 3-0). This task ensures assignment of the best intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets through a deliberate and coordinated effort of the entire staff across all warfighting functions by integrating surveillance and reconnaissance into the operation. In addition, ISR integration supports the targeting process by focusing the appropriate assets on the detection of targets. 2-13. The squadron S-3, with input from the squadron S-2, develops tasks based on specific information requirements (SIR) developed during ISR synchronization. SIR facilitate tasking by matching requirements to assets. They describe the information required and may include both the location and the time at which the information can be collected. Generally, each intelligence requirement generates a set of SIR. 2-14. ISR synchronization and integration result in an effort focused on answering the squadron commanders PIR and the supported commanders CCIR through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance tasks translated into orders. For a detailed discussion of ISR synchronization and integration, see FM 2-0.

SECTION III - PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS


2-15. The squadron plans operations following procedures outlined in FM 5-0 and FM 6-0. However, each type of mission brings with it specific considerations that must be accounted for. This section provides specific planning considerations addressing the following: Reconnaissance operations. Security operations. Offensive operations. Defensive operations. Stability operations. Civil support operations. Comparison of mounted and dismounted operations.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
2-16. The squadron often conducts planning in an abbreviated manner to support its higher headquarters IR under extreme time constraints. For a directed course of action (COA), the squadrons higher headquarters may direct how to abbreviate planning. Often it initiates reconnaissance, based on the initial warning order received from its higher headquarters, prior to movement of the higher headquarters main body. The squadron commander, through the exercise of battle command, provides guidance that enables the squadron to successfully perform assigned reconnaissance missions (see Chapter 3 for additional information on reconnaissance operations). FM 5-0 addresses planning in a time-constrained environment. 2-17. The squadron commanders visualization defines the end state to be achieved by the reconnaissance effort. His visualization of the impact of the mission variables of METT-TC allows him to develop guidance for planning and execution of reconnaissance (see Figure 2-1). Through his planning guidance, the commander addresses three basic considerations unique to reconnaissance operations: Focus of reconnaissance. Tempo of reconnaissance. Engagement criteria (both lethal and nonlethal) and bypass criteria. 2-18. The squadron commander continually assesses his original reconnaissance planning guidance. As the situation changes, the commander revises his guidance for reconnaissance when necessary to meet his

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higher commanders intent. The focus of reconnaissance could change based on an adjustment decision made by the higher commander. The squadron commander may direct a change to the overall tempo of reconnaissance to create opportunities for his higher headquarters or to limit risk to his subordinate units. He could also adjust engagement criteria based on information developed about enemy forces.

Figure 2-1. Development of guidance for reconnaissance operations

FOCUS
2-19. The squadron commanders intent is a clear, concise statement of the purpose for the operation, the key tasks to be accomplished, and the desired end state. For a reconnaissance mission, his intent serves as the basis for establishing the focus for reconnaissance. The most critical portion is the end state, which defines the conditions (or information) the squadron must meet to accomplish the mission. 2-20. The squadron commander further focuses the reconnaissance effort by assigning a specific reconnaissance objective. FM 3-90 defines a reconnaissance objective as a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. Additionally, a reconnaissance objective can include infrastructurethe components of which are summarized as sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations, known by the acronym SWEAT-MSOor the people in the area of the objective. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by stating the most important result of the reconnaissance effort. It should support the end state defined in the commanders intent. 2-21. The commanders intent and the reconnaissance objective allow the squadron staff and subordinate commanders to prioritize the critical tasks that must be accomplished and the assets used to accomplish them. The squadrons reconnaissance operations should focus on one or more of the mission variables (METT-TC) of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations (see Table 2-3).

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Table 2-3. Focus of reconnaissance


Guidance Focus Mission Variables Enemy. Terrain and weather. Civil considerations. Execution Information Commanders intent. Reconnaissance objective. Coordinating instructions and control measures.

Enemy/Threat
2-22. It is extremely important to quickly identify and define the threats presented by an enemy or adversary in any operational area. Reconnaissance units must be able to conduct operations facing a range of threats consisting of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive threats or any combination of these threats. For example, during offensive operations, the squadron may conduct reconnaissance to locate an enemys security force area; in stability operations, it may focus on locating improvised explosive device (IED) manufacturing sites. The information developed by enemy-focused reconnaissance helps to update possible enemy COAs as part of the continuous IPB conducted by the squadron and its higher headquarters.

Terrain
2-23. Terrain analysis at brigade and higher levels is often based on a focused ground reconnaissance of the AO. Terrain-focused reconnaissance answers IR developed during IPB that a map or digital analysis simply cannot satisfy to an acceptable degree. The information developed by terrain-focused reconnaissance helps to update the continuous IPB conducted by the squadron and its higher headquarters. The squadron must see and then understand the terrain as it affects friendly forces, enemy forces, and the areas civilian population. Reconnaissance of terrain also includes the effect of weather on the military aspects of the terrain.

Civil Considerations
2-24. Gaining an awareness of how the local society affects military operations, as well as the impact of military operations on the society, may be critical to the commander as he and his staff make decisions. Understanding how operations affect the society (and vice versa) normally begins with gaining information on the size, location, composition, and temperament of the society. The process also entails developing an understanding of the cultural and human factors that will affect friendly and threat perceptions and operations, such as religion, ethnicity, language, and political/tribal organization. It also covers infrastructure the systems that support the inhabitants, economy, and government of a specific area. The six factors of ASCOPE (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events) summarize the aspects of civil considerations.

TEMPO
2-25. Tempo is defined in FM 3-0 as the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. The tempo of reconnaissance allows the squadron commander to determine time requirements for reconnaissance in relation to the higher headquarters mission and IR. The squadron commander visualizes the tempo of reconnaissance through analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC) of mission, enemy, and time available (see Table 2-4).

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Table 2-4. Tempo of reconnaissance


Guidance Tempo Mission Variables Mission. Enemy. Time available. Execution Information Planning timelines. Critical tasks. CCIR. LTIOV. Tactical risk. Movement techniques. Reconnaissance methods. Formations.

2-26. Through his intent, the squadron commander defines when key reconnaissance tasks must be accomplished in relation to end state for the reconnaissance operation. This allows subordinate commanders to exercise individual initiative in determining how to meet the commanders intent. 2-27. The tempo for reconnaissance may be defined using terms such as stealthy, forceful, deliberate, or rapid. However, the squadron commander must ensure that he clearly defines for his subordinate how he interprets those terms. 2-28. Based on the tempo described by the commander, the staff and subordinate commanders link the tempo described by the commander to specific execution information. Examples of this information include the following: Planning timelines. Tasks to subordinate units. SIR. Latest time information is of value (LTIOV). Movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, bounding overwatch). Reconnaissance methods (mounted, dismounted, aerial, sensor). Tactical risk.

ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA
2-29. Engagement criteria are defined in FM 3-90 as protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. They can be either restrictive or permissive. The squadron commander visualizes engagement criteria through analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC) of mission, enemy, troops and support available, and civil considerations (see Table 2-5). Table 2-5. Engagement criteria of reconnaissance
Guidance Engagement Criteria Mission Variables Mission. Enemy. Troops and support available. Civil considerations. Execution Information Bypass criteria. Priority of fires. Actions on contact. Reconnaissance handover criteria. Fire support coordination measures (FSCM). ROE. Weapons control status. Information engagement.

2-30. The squadron commander must define the size or type of enemy force he expects his subordinate units to engage or avoid. This drives planning for direct and indirect fires, as well as establishment of

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bypass criteria. The squadron commander must also consider information engagement and how the squadron interacts and influences the local populace. 2-31. Merely defining engagement criteria using terms such as aggressive or discreet is not sufficient. Engagement criteria should be defined using precise doctrinal terms. Again, the squadron commander issues specific planning guidance to clearly define the engagement criteria. The staff and subordinate commanders refine that guidance into specific execution information. Examples include the following: Engagement criteria. Guidance for actions on contact. Bypass criteria. Reconnaissance handover criteria. Priority of fires. Rules of engagement (ROE) or rules for use of force. Fire support coordination measures (FSCM). Weapons control status. Information engagement guidance.

SECURITY OPERATIONS
2-32. Guidance for security operations covers three basic considerations that the squadron commander must understand to plan and execute the security mission: Focus/depth. Tempo. Engagement/displacement criteria.

FOCUS
2-33. The focus of the security operation defines what the squadron is to protect and why, or what the expected results of the security operation are. Security operations are threat-, terrain-, or friendly unitoriented (see Chapter 4 for additional information on security operations). Examples of focus in security operations include the following mission variables (METT-TC) as outlined in Table 2-6: Enemy/threat. Terrain (bridges, routes, defensible terrain). Troops/friendly forces (the protected force). Civil considerations, including the local society/population and infrastructure (political situation, facilities, food distribution). Table 2-6. Focus of security operations
Guidance Focus Mission Variables Enemy. Terrain and weather. Troops and support available (protected force). Civil considerations. Execution Information Commanders intent. Protected force. Coordinating instructions and control measures.

2-34. The focus allows the commander to determine specific critical tasks, their priority, and why they need to be accomplished to attain the end state. It allows the squadron commander to narrow the troops scope of operations to get the information that is most important. 2-35. NAIs provide a method of focusing the squadron effort. NAIs link most likely and most dangerous threat activities to terrain where those activities may occur. Given the NAIs, the troop commanders can prioritize asset emplacement to provide the most effective observation. For example, they can emplace

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observation posts (OP) and employ ground-based sensors to observe primary mounted and dismounted threat avenues of approach.

TEMPO
2-36. The tempo of the security operation allows the commander to establish associated time requirements that drive certain aspects of the security plan, including dismounted or mounted OPs, UAS rotation, and other support assets necessary to execute the mission. Tempo can relate to depth, especially in screening missions, as time is needed to properly deploy assets into position to achieve the required depth. Tempo also dictates whether units use mounted or dismounted OPs or a combination. In addition, tempo can relate to the duration of the mission. The squadron commander visualizes the tempo of security operations through analysis of the mission variables of mission, enemy, and time available (see Table 2-7). Table 2-7. Tempo of security operations
Guidance Tempo Mission Variables Mission. Enemy. Time available. Execution Information Critical tasks. CCIR. LTIOV. Tactical risk. Movement techniques. Reconnaissance methods. Formations.

2-37. Tempo affects whether short-, long-, or extended-duration OPs are used. Considerations include the following: Short duration. These are established quickly at the designated time and maintained for less than 12 hours. They allow the squadron commander to mass his reconnaissance assets by maximizing the number of observers both on the ground and in the air for a short period of time. Long duration. These are established and maintained for more than 12 hours but less than 24 hours. The number of OPs decreases because platoons and troops must manage a deliberate rotation schedule. Extended duration. These are established and maintained for longer than 24 hours. Units must coordinate for improvement of dismounted OP positions. This may include Class IV supply materials or additional engineer support, obstacles, dedicated reserve forces, wire communications, and other support that allows the OP to operate for an extended period of time.

ENGAGEMENT/DISPLACEMENT CRITERIA
2-38. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating engagement with an enemy force (FM 1-02). Engagement can be conducted using indirect fires, direct fires, and/or nonlethal fires. Squadron commanders must understand what conditions necessitate conducting battle handover to its higher headquarters maneuver elements. This is especially true in a security mission. The squadron commanders understanding of the higher commanders intent, terrain, and ROE, coupled with his knowledge of the threats most likely COA, allows him to determine the troops engagement criteria. For example, the commander may require troops only to observe threat actions, but not engage the threat, to deceive the enemy as to the whereabouts of his screen line. He may also opt to engage all threat personnel or lightly armored vehicles on sight. In stability operations, he may stipulate the use of nonlethal fires. 2-39. Displacement criteria specify at what pointeither event- or time-driventhe force should begin its displacement (FM 3-90). The squadron commander defines the events or triggers that will cause the squadron or subordinate elements to displace to subsequent positions, such as a certain size force or specific element of the threat formation reaching a given point or graphic control measure.

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2-40. The squadron commander visualizes engagement criteria and displacement criteria through analysis of the mission variables (METT-TC) of mission, enemy, troops and support available, and civil considerations (see Table 2-8). Table 2-8. Engagement criteria and displacement criteria of security operations
Guidance Engagement Criteria and Displacement Criteria Mission Variables Mission. Enemy. Troops and support available. Civil considerations. Execution Information Bypass criteria. Priority of fires. Rules of engagement. Weapons control status. Information engagement.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
2-41. The commander assigning a security mission and the security force commander must address the considerations applicable to related types of missions. In addition, they must consider the following: Force or area to be secured. Location and orientation of the security area. Initial location and types of OPs, if applicable. Time allocated to establish the security force. Criteria for ending the security mission. Task organization and augmentation of security forces. Level of protection or minimum warning time requirements. Threat considerations, such as the smallest enemy element allowed to pass without engagement or the threat elements capability to influence main body movement/activities.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
2-42. The amount of information and intelligence the squadron receives affects the manner in which the squadron plans, prepares, and executes offensive operations. The squadron creates advantages over the enemy by presenting an overwhelming number of actions from multiple directions throughout the width and depth of the AO (see Chapter 5 of this manual or FM 3-90 for additional information on offensive operations). The squadron has the flexibility to attack through varying types of terrain; this helps to prevent the enemy from predicting the direction of attack and orienting on the avenue of approach. By massing the effects of long- and short-range area and precision fires with rapid combined arms movement, the squadron can decisively defeat the enemy.

INTELLIGENCE
2-43. The results of the continuous IPB process enable the squadron staff to develop an integrated ISR plan that provides relevant information to meet the commanders IR; this is an important element in successful planning and execution of offensive operations. The squadron commanders IR, which are shaped by the mission variables (METT-TC), commonly include the following: Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the defending enemy force, including HPTs and enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. Locations of possible enemy avenues of approach. Location of enemy indirect-fire weapon systems and units. Locations of gaps and assailable flanks. Location of enemy air defense gun and missile units. Location of enemy electronic warfare (EW) units. Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations. Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.

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Withdrawal routes for enemy forces. Anticipated timetables for the enemys most likely COA and other probable COAs.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-44. The squadron commanders mission and intent determine the scheme of maneuver and how he allocates available combat power. The squadron commander and his staff translate the squadrons mission into specific objectives for each subordinate unit. Planning for offensive operations addresses the mission variables (METT-TC) within the commanders intent, including the following: Missions and objectives for each subordinate element, including special tasks required to accomplish the mission. Enemy positions, strengths and weaknesses, and capabilities. AOs for the use of each subordinate element with associated graphic control measures. This includes decisive points. Time the operation is to begin. Risk.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER


2-45. The squadron plans for movement and maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to create opportunities to increase the effects of fires. It plans to achieve surprise by making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of ongoing offensive operations, avoiding observation, and using deceptive techniques and procedures. The goal is to overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected engagements before the enemy has time to react effectively. For example, the squadron may plan to engage defending enemy forces from positions that provide an advantage, such as engaging the enemy from the rear or a flank. Additionally, the commander must identify decisive points, establish bypass criteria, and develop plans for branches and sequels to maintain tempo and to exploit expected or unexpected opportunities.

Movement Considerations
2-46. During major combat operations, the squadron mitigates risk for itself and subordinate units using a combination of appropriate formations and movement techniques (traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch). A formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground (FM 3-90). The squadron or subordinate units use five different formations depending on the mission variables: Column. Line. Echelon (left or right). Wedge. Vee. Note. The box and diamond formations are also discussed in FM 3-90. The cavalry squadron of the ACR is the only squadron that is task organized to effectively execute these formations. See FM 3-90 for detailed discussion on the box and diamond formations.

Forms of Maneuver
2-47. The squadron must consider the forms of maneuver (envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack) as it develops the scheme of maneuver for offensive operations (see FM 3-90). The squadron typically employs the forms of maneuver to support higher headquarters operations; it may operate as an advance guard or security element to provide early warning or to find and fix the enemy.

FIRES
2-48. Fire support (FS) planning is the process of integrating Army indirect fires, joint fires, and C2 warfare, including nonlethal fires, with the other warfighting functions into the commanders concept of

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operations. FS planning is performed concurrently with the MDMP. Effective FS planning places the right elements of the FS system in the right place at the right time in accordance with the commanders intent. (See Chapter 9 for additional information.) The following basic principles of FS planning apply: Plan early and continuously. Ensure the continuous flow of targeting information. Consider the use of all lethal and/or nonlethal attack means. Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support. Furnish the type of support requested. Use the most effective FS means. Avoid unnecessary duplication. Coordinate airspace. Provide adequate support. Provide for rapid coordination. Protect the force. Provide for flexibility. Consider the use of FSCMs.

PROTECTION
2-49. The focus of protection is to preserve the force so that the squadron can apply maximum combat power against the enemy force. Key protection tasks in offensive operations are air and missile defense (AMD) and CBRN operations. 2-50. Key planning considerations for AMD include the following: Prioritize air defense coverage toward the decisive operation. Integrate passive air defense measures into the execution of offensive tasks. Establish appropriate air defense weapons control status based on anticipated enemy air threats. Disseminate AMD warnings immediately throughout the squadron. 2-51. Key considerations for CBRN planning include the following: Ensure subordinate elements are prepared for CBRN reconnaissance tasks. Disseminate information on CBRN threats, once detected, immediately throughout the squadron. Develop decontamination plans based on the commanders priorities and vulnerability analysis and disseminate the location of planned and active decontamination sites.

SUSTAINMENT
2-52. The objective of sustainment in offensive operations is to allow the squadron to maintain momentum by providing support as far forward as possible without disrupting operations. Effective sustainment helps the squadron commander to take advantage of windows of opportunity and launch offensive operations with minimum advance warning time. (See Chapter 10 for additional information on sustainment operations.) The following are key considerations for sustainment planning in support of offensive operations: Continuously update the sustainment plan based on the status of units, and ensure the plan is responsive and flexible. Integrate the movement and positioning of sustainment assets with the scheme of maneuver to ensure immediate support of anticipated requirements. Plan support from initiation of the mission to the final objective or limit of advance (LOA). Consider risks that extended distances create for security of main supply routes (MSR) and sustainment assets based on the potential for encountering undetected or bypassed enemy forces. Plan for reorganization on or near the objective, and establish clear priorities of support during reorganization. Integrate security for sustainment assets into the squadron plan.

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DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
2-53. The amount of information and intelligence the squadron receives affects the manner in which it plans, prepares, and executes defensive operations. The squadron creates advantages over the enemy by presenting an overwhelming number of actions from multiple directions throughout the depth, width, and height of the AO. By massing the effects of long- and short-range area and precision fires with rapid combined arms movement, the squadron can counterattack to decisively defeat the enemy (see Chapter 6 for additional information on defensive operations). Note. In defensive operations, the culminating point is that point in time and space at which the squadron can no longer effectively locate the enemys attacking forces, provide early warning, or provide information to the higher commander regarding defense or counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense.

INTELLIGENCE
2-54. The results of the continuous IPB process enable the squadron staff to develop an integrated ISR plan to provide the relevant information the squadron needs to successfully plan and execute defensive operations. A key consideration for defensive operations is the locations of possible enemy avenues of approach and anticipated movement rates of enemy forces.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-55. The squadron commanders mission and intent determine the scheme of maneuver and how he allocates available combat power. The squadron commander and his staff translate the squadrons mission into specific objectives for each subordinate unit. Planning for defensive operations addresses the mission variables. Areas of special emphasis within METT-TC include the following: Mission: Missions for each subordinate element. Decisive points. Commanders intent. Scheme of maneuver. Essential tasks required to accomplish the mission. Risk. EnemyConditions that must be set to gain advantage over the attacking enemy. Terrain and weather: Key and decisive terrain and how the squadron uses it to gain advantage over the attacking enemy. AOs for the use of each subordinate element with associated graphic control measures.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER


2-56. The squadron has the ability to defend in restricted and severely restricted terrain when augmented with infantry; it can also cover mounted avenues of approach or open areas effectively with tanks, CFVs, or Stryker reconnaissance vehicles. During the terrain analysis, the commander and staff must look closely for key and decisive terrain, engagement areas (EA), choke points, intervisibility lines, and reverse slope opportunities to take full advantage of the squadrons capabilities to mass firepower while providing protection for the infantry. In noncontiguous AOs, the squadron usually conducts defensive operations with troops out of range and/or in mutual support of each other. This requires the squadron commander and his staff to determine the positioning and priority of support assets/capabilities.

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Assignment of Areas of Operations


2-57. Once the squadron commander has assigned AOs to his maneuver units, he must determine any potential gaps between units. The squadron should plan to cover these gaps with patrols and OPs. The squadron must plan local counterattacks to isolate and destroy any enemy elements that manage to penetrate through a gap in the AO. The commander should also plan to reposition units not in contact to mass the effects of combat power against an attacking enemys flank or rear. 2-58. With the assignment of AOs, the squadron commander also identifies EAs where he intends to fix or destroy the enemy force with the massed effect of all available weapons and supporting systems. The commander determines the size and shape of the EA taking into account the relatively unobstructed intervisibility from the weapon systems in their firing positions and the maximum range of those weapons. The commander designates EAs to cover each enemy avenue of approach into his position (FM 3-90). 2-59. The need for flexibility in taking advantage of the mobility of mechanized forces requires graphic control measures to assist in C2 during local counterattacks and repositioning of forces. Specified routes, displacement criteria, phase lines (PL), attack-by-fire (ABF) and support-by-fire (SBF) positions, subsequent and alternate battle positions (BP), EAs, target reference points (TRP), and other fire control measures are required to synchronize maneuver effectively. However, the squadron should use only the minimum essential graphic control measures, allowing subordinate units to maximize initiative and freedom of action.

Positioning of the Reserve


2-60. Positioning the reserve is critical to effective employment, requiring adequate depth to ensure a degree of protection and to prevent inadvertent commitment too early in the fight. However, the reserve must be close enough that it can rapidly enter the fight when committed. The reserve can occupy BPs or blocking or hide positions. 2-61. A reserve is normally designated at regimental and squadron level. Troops seldom have adequate combat power to do so. Troop commanders prepare contingencies for platoons that allow them to rapidly shift or assume new missions. As in offensive operations, the reserve commander is assigned missions as contingencies to provide planning guidance and to ensure timely execution on commitment. Considerations that guide organization and employment of the reserve are explained in FM 3-90.

Mobility and Countermobility


2-62. The following planning considerations apply to mobility and countermobility support: Position situational obstacles early, and link them to natural and other man-made obstacles. Plan multiple obstacle locations to support depth and flexibility in the defense. Ensure adequate security for obstacle emplacement systems. Integrate triggers for the execution of situational and reserve obstacles in the decision support template. Focus the countermobility effort to block, canalize, or turn enemy forces into positions of vulnerability where the squadron intends to isolate and defeat them. Ensure adequate mobility support for withdrawal of security forces, the reserve, and the counterattack force and for repositioning of main battle area (MBA) forces.

FIRES
2-63. Effective FS planning places the right elements of the FS system in the right place at the right time in accordance with the commanders intent. (See Chapter 9 for additional information.) In the defense, general FS considerations for supporting forces in contact include the following: Plan defensive fires in support of patrols, convoys, or reserve forces. Such fires, which may include the use of precision munitions, obscurants, and illumination, can be especially useful

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(METT-TC dependent) in response to the ambush of friendly forces during counterinsurgency or stability operations. Plan counterpreparation fire to disrupt enemy preparations for an attack. These fires strike the enemy in his assembly areas, break up attack formations, disorganize target acquisition efforts, and reduce morale. Plan for target acquisition and control of fires on all avenues of approach. Plan FSCMs close enough to open up as much of the AO as possible, yet far enough away to avoid interference with friendly operations. Use no-fire areas (NFA) to protect forward elements such as COLTs, scouts, LRS units, joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC), and special operations forces (SOF). Plan targets on avenues of approach to disrupt enemy attacks by striking the enemy during his assault. Subsequently, shift fires to continue attacking him until he is forced to break off the attack. Select planned targets on the most critical avenues of approach, and allocate firing units for final protective fires (FPF).

PROTECTION
2-64. The focus of protection is to preserve the force so that the squadron can apply maximum combat power against the enemy force. Key protection tasks in defensive operations are survivability, AMD, and CBRN operations. 2-65. Key planning considerations for survivability include Ensure the integration of survivability priorities for critical systems and units through the development and implementation of an execution matrix and timeline. Develop alternate or supplementary positions as time allows. Integrate defensive positions with natural cover and concealment when possible. 2-66. Key planning considerations for AMD include Weight air defense coverage toward the decisive operation. Integrate passive air defense measures into the execution of defensive tasks. Establish appropriate air defense weapons control status based on anticipated enemy air threats. Disseminate AMD warnings immediately throughout the squadron. 2-67. Key planning considerations for CBRN operations include Integrate the use of obscurants to support disengagement or displacement. Ensure subordinate elements are prepared for CBRN reconnaissance tasks. Disseminate warnings for CBRN threats, once detected, immediately throughout the squadron. Develop decontamination plans based on the commanders priorities and vulnerability analysis and disseminate the location of planned and active decontamination sites.

SUSTAINMENT
2-68. The objective of sustainment in defensive operations is to provide support throughout the depth of the defense without disrupting operations. Effective sustainment helps the squadron commander to take advantage of windows of opportunity and launch counterattacks without a loss of momentum. (See Chapter 10 for additional information.) The following are key considerations for sustainment planning in support of defensive operations: Continuously update the sustainment plan based on status of units, and ensure the plan is responsive and flexible. Integrate the movement and positioning of sustainment assets with the scheme of maneuver to ensure immediate support of anticipated requirements. Plan support from initiation of the defense to transitions to offensive operations.

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Consider prestocking or caching of supplies to reduce the time and distance necessary for resupply. Plan for combat-configured loads to speed resupply and eliminate the need to request supplies. Integrate security for sustainment assets into the squadron plan.

STABILITY OPERATIONS
2-69. Planning for stability operations draws on all elements of operational design (see FM 3-0). However, certain elements are more relevant than others, and some are essential to successful stability operations. (See Chapter 7 for additional information on stability operations.)

INTELLIGENCE
2-70. Effective intelligence is essential to understanding; this is especially true in stability operations, where intelligence efforts focus on the local populace, the host-nation government, and the security apparatus of the state. Maintaining understanding is a dynamic ability, and SU changes as the operation unfolds. Relevant information fuels understanding and fosters initiative. Greater understanding enables commanders and staffs to make better decisions; it allows them to focus on the current and future conditions of the environment and to describe those conditions to subordinates.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-71. Standard command and staff doctrine applies to stability operations. Orders, estimates, planning guidance, rehearsals, and backbriefs are all useful in directing stability operations. The need for mutual understanding among all members of the command group is as great in stability operations as in other operations. 2-72. Missions in the stability environment may call for dispersed operations. Digital systems organic to the squadron provide timely and accurate force tracking and facilitate reporting. Faster movement of information concerning maneuver also facilitates faster reaction to threats and allows forces in motion to be routed around new hazards.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER


2-73. In stability operationsin which area responsibilities, movements, and control of terrain or borders are sensitive and hazards are sometimes widely scatteredthe squadron needs detailed information on its AO and commonly uses detailed control measures. Squadron leaders must clearly delineate routes, installations, hazards, boundaries, and other control measures and ensure that Soldiers throughout the squadron understand them. Leaders must also clearly communicate special control measures such as curfews, restrictions on movements, and prohibition of weapons. 2-74. Mobility operations focused on restoration of essential services are also an early issue in many stability operations road and bridge repair, rubble clearing, hazardous area marking or clearing, and assessment and repair of damaged aqueducts or hydrology control facilities. Even as the level of violence decreases in stability operations, engineer elements typically remain very active. 2-75. During stability operations, squadron leaders still apply the principles of war and maneuver if it becomes necessary to engage in close combat (see FM 3-0). Depending on METT-TC conditions, examples of maneuver that may be employed in stability operations include the following: Proper formations. Movement techniques. Battle drills.

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FIRES
2-76. In stability operations, military forces combine various types of lethal and nonlethal fires to accomplish the mission, although there is generally a greater emphasis on nonlethal fires. Nonlethal fires expand the options available to commanders to achieve their objectives, while ROE may limit the use of lethal fires. Forces must be organized appropriately to reflect this change in emphasis. (See Chapter 9 for additional information.)

PROTECTION
2-77. Protection requires special consideration in stability operations. Unique threats may be present in the AO; in some cases, opposing forces may seek to kill or wound U.S. soldiers or destroy or damage property for political purposes. Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating protection considerations into all aspects of operational planning and execution. Commanders and leaders throughout the squadron deliberately analyze their missions and environments to identify threats to their units. They then make their Soldiers aware of the dangers and create safeguards to protect them. Commanders must always consider the aspects of protection and how they relate to the ROE. Protection considerations include the following: Secure the inside perimeter if the host nation secures the outside perimeter. Do not become predictable. Include protection in each plan, standing operating procedure (SOP), operation order (OPORD), and movement order. Develop specific protection programs such as threat awareness and operations security (OPSEC). Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit's location. Constantly maintain an image of professionalism and readiness. Consider protection throughout the scope of operations; base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.

SUSTAINMENT
2-78. Normally, military forces support host-nation and civilian relief agencies with these efforts. However, when the host nation cannot perform its roles, military forces may execute these tasks directly or to support other civilian agencies and organizations. It is imperative that these activities are properly scaled to local capacity for sustainment. Proper scaling also creates the best opportunity for the local populace to create small-scale enterprises to provide as many of these essential services as possible through the private economy. Large-scale projects that require complicated host-nation sustainment efforts should be avoided until the necessary infrastructure is in place to support them. 2-79. The chief sustainment challenges of stability operations are to anticipate needs and to integrate units and sources into the stability operations. IR for sustainment operations include the following: Resources and capabilities of host-nation forces. Resources available within the local area and region. Status of critical supply items and repair jobs. Nature and condition of the infrastructure. Capabilities of general support sustainment units. Mission tasks. Overall material readiness of the squadron. 2-80. In addition, the squadron must consider its own sustainment requirements during stability operations. The squadron may be operating across an extensive AO, requiring it to support multiple combat outposts, patrol bases, or fixed sites. The squadron may need to plan for the execution of combat logistics convoys to support these multiple locations. In a very austere AO, aerial resupply can also be an important consideration. (See Chapter 10 for additional information.)

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CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS


2-81. Planning for civil support operations includes understanding the types of support required, the procedures for providing support, and the time required to conduct the support (see Chapter 8 for additional information on civil support operations). The squadron develops SA and analyzes the situation throughout the MDMP to identify likely situations that may occur during an operation.

INTELLIGENCE
2-82. Intelligence support in civil support operations is conducted strictly within the guidelines of U.S. law and focuses on the specific missions directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Army National Guard (ARNG) often acts as a first military responder for civil support operations on behalf of state authorities while serving in state active-duty status or when functioning under Title 32 U.S. Code authority. State active-duty status refers to ARNG forces and state defense force personnel under state control. In state active-duty status, the state governor commands the ARNG and the state defense force (if applicable). ARNG civil support missions are planned and executed in accordance with the needs of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes. ARNG forces in state active-duty status can perform civil law enforcement missions in accordance with the laws and statutes of the state. Once placed in Title 10 status, ARNG units must adhere to the same laws governing active Army and Army Reserve operations. 2-83. Reconnaissance must be planned to adhere to the law and still answer the CCIR. Careful planning along with detailed instructions to the units and Soldiers involvedensures that reconnaissance operations do not violate U.S. laws. Reconnaissance assets can provide imagery and full motion video products of the incident location or affected areas for federal agencies, first responders, and local law enforcement to use. Reconnaissance systems that provide real time data and images can be positioned in incident CPs to provide video or imagery to the incident commander. Reconnaissance can also be a valuable tool for assessing damage to infrastructure, locating populations at risk, and determining passable routes for first responders to provide aid. For more information on civil support, see FM 3-28.1.

COMMAND AND CONTROL


2-84. Standard command and staff doctrine applies to C2 in civil support operations.

Cooperation
2-85. Cooperation with other services or agencies imposes special requirements for training, coordination, and liaison. Multiservice operations in which the squadron controls troops of other services or is controlled by another service call for special attention to command relationships and limitations on the commanders prerogatives.

Communications
2-86. The squadrons C2 systems yield significant advantages in planning and conducting civil support operations. Operation of these systems depends on communications architecture provided by the higher level of command. Use of nontactical or other nonstandard communications is likely in support of civil authorities in the United States. If this is the case, the squadron commander and staff leaders need training in operating these systems. In the early and concluding stages of an operation, the communications infrastructure may permit only limited use of C2 information systems (if available). In such situations, the squadrons plan for C2 must provide either for alternate means of communications or for full reliance on tactical systems.

Liaison Teams
2-87. Liaison teams and LNOs can be extremely useful in providing a common view of the situation for the headquarters attached to the squadron. Squadrons must staff their normal liaison teams and identify the need for more teams as early as possible. Additional teams and LNOs that may be required include Multistate support teams/LNOs. These teams/LNOs from other state agencies respond as directed through mutual support agreements.

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Relief organization teams/LNOs. These teams/LNOs represent private and charitable organizations (such as the Red Cross) typically associated with humanitarian assistance operations. Civilian agency teams/LNOs. These teams/LNOs operate out of emergency operations centers (such as police, fire, medical, private aircraft, and media facilities). 2-88. Squadrons tasked to execute civil support operations have the responsibility to ensure effective integration of their organizational capabilities. Squadrons should provide teams and/or LNOs that are fully knowledgeable on capability, employment techniques, and sustainment requirements.

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER


2-89. Movement and maneuver considerations for the squadron in conducting civil support operations are similar to those for stability operations. Refer to the discussion earlier in this section.

FIRES
2-90. Basic fire planning considerations for direct and indirect fire weapons are generally not applicable during civil support operations. The FS system and field artillery units usually contribute in nontraditional ways. The squadron can employ the equipment and organizations available in these units in OPs, convoy operations, local security, sustainment operations, and liaison operations to help provide effective C2 and to assist information engagement activities.

PROTECTION
2-91. Protection preserves the force in civil support operations, including personnel (Soldiers and civilians), physical assets, and information of the Army and civilian partners. Protection facilitates the squadron commanders ability to maintain the organizations integrity and combat power. Emphasis on protection increases during preparation and continues throughout execution.

SUSTAINMENT
2-92. Sustainment for civil support operations usually requires substantial tailoring to adapt to unique mission requirements; logistical requirements vary considerably among the types of civil support operations. Civil support operations commonly take place in areas where local resources and infrastructure are scarce, damaged, or fully devoted to the civilian population, but resourced to a low degree.

Challenges
2-93. The chief sustainment challenges in civil support operations are to anticipate needs and to integrate units and sources into the operations. IR for sustainment operations include the following: Resources available within the local area and region. Status of critical supply items and repair jobs. Nature and condition of the infrastructure. Capabilities of general support sustainment units. Mission tasks. Overall material readiness of the squadron.

Contracting Options
2-94. In some cases, contracting can augment organic sustainment in civil support operations. Squadrons may encounter or employ contractor-provided services and supply operations during civil support. The S-4 and commander must understand the terms and limitations of contractor support.

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Liaison with Civil Authorities


2-95. Nonstandard supporting relationships and close coordination with civil authorities may dictate the use of LNOs and liaison teams, including the creation of additional teams to ensure effective operations.

Medical Support
2-96. The squadron may be augmented with additional Army Health System (AHS) assets to support the squadrons mission in civil support operations such as disaster relief and displaced personnel operations. Medical treatment provided in support of these operations must comply with Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Key personnel (health care providers) should review the requirements before deployment to provide for contingencies and modifications (adding or deleting items as necessary) so that the uses, types, and quantities of medical supplies conform to the mission requirements. See FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations.

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Chapter 3

Reconnaissance Operations
Each of the five types of ground reconnaissance squadrons is organized to provide its higher headquarters with a dedicated reconnaissance capability. Reconnaissance operations enhance the higher commanders ability to operate inside the enemys decision cycle and allow him to maneuver his assets so they can take advantage of opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses. Reconnaissance is key to retaining initiative and freedom to maneuver. It helps the squadrons higher commander and staff to determine which routes are suitable for maneuver and where the enemy is strong and weak. They provide a means to answer IR and fill gaps in existing intelligence. Timely intelligence allows the squadrons higher commander to concentrate appropriate combat power against decisive points at the time and place of his choosing.

Contents
Section I Basics of Reconnaissance .... 3-2 Fundamentals of Reconnaissance...... 3-2 Reconnaissance Techniques .............. 3-2 Reconnaissance Methods .................. 3-3 Reconnaissance Management ........... 3-5 Reconnaissance Assets and Systems ........................................... 3-5 Site Exploitation .................................. 3-8 Movement During Dismounted Operations ....................................... 3-8 BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron Considerations ................................. 3-9 Section II - Actions on Contact .............. 3-11 Forms of Contact .............................. 3-11 Procedures of Actions on Contact .... 3-11 Planning Considerations ................... 3-14 Section III Forms of Reconnaissance ................................... 3-15 Zone Reconnaissance ...................... 3-15 Area Reconnaissance ....................... 3-16 Route Reconnaissance ..................... 3-16 Reconnaissance in Force ................. 3-17 Section IV Infiltration and Exfiltration ............................................. 3-18 Infiltration .......................................... 3-18 Exfiltration ......................................... 3-21 Section V Reconnaissance Handover ............................................... 3-22 Planning ............................................ 3-23 Preparation ....................................... 3-23 Execution .......................................... 3-23 Example of Reconnaissance Handover ....................................... 3-24

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SECTION I BASICS OF RECONNAISSANCE Reconnaissance Units in Close Combat Roles


Reconnaissance and close combat are two distinct tasks. When reconnaissance units are employed in a close combat role (assaulting bunkers, seizing terrain, raiding buildings) or performing an economy of force role, the higher commander loses his dedicated reconnaissance unit. Combat information will certainly result from such actions, but this is more than offset by what is lost in terms of vehicles destroyed, casualties incurred, and other reconnaissance missions neglected. Although the ACR cavalry squadron has organic tanks and artillery, none of the other types of squadrons are specifically designed to perform close combat missions, such as to defeat or destroy enemy forces or seize and retain ground. On the contrary, the other squadrons are organized to conduct reconnaissance that continually updates the COP and answers the CCIR.

FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE
3-1. Regardless of the form of reconnaissance, the squadron plans and performs successful reconnaissance operations according to the following seven fundamentals (see FM 3-90, Tactics): Ensure continuous reconnaissance. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve. Orient on the reconnaissance objective. Report all information rapidly and accurately. Retain freedom of maneuver. Gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible. Develop the situation.

RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES
3-2. There are two general reconnaissance techniques commanders employ based on relevance and ability to answer SIR: reconnaissance push and reconnaissance pull. These two techniques are not rigidly established; rather, they are descriptive generalizations explaining how and when reconnaissance elements are to be employed during the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) and how information gathered from reconnaissance is used to support decision-making by the commander. 3-3. Upon receipt of a mission, the commander and staff perform an initial assessment that includes identifying what information and products are available and assessing the amount of time available. If time is short, the commander quickly analyzes and decides which reconnaissance technique he will employ. In doing so, the commander determines where to invest the majority of his available time: on development of a detailed ISR plan to support an evolving maneuver COA (reconnaissance push) or on execution of an integrated ISR plan by reconnaissance elements focused on collecting information on enemy strengths and weaknesses that is critical to formulating the future COA (reconnaissance pull). In selecting one technique over the other, the commander considers The degree of his SA related to the enemy situation. The depth of his SU based on available information. The proficiency and training level of his staff. The proficiency and leadership ability of his subordinate commanders. 3-4. It is important to note that there are numerous variations of both reconnaissance techniques. It is neither possible nor helpful to confine each technique to a rigid definition. The following discussions, therefore, simply focus on describing the fundamental characteristics of each technique. Each has its own particular strengths and weaknesses and is appropriate to various missions, situations, and commander and

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staff personality combinations. It is advantageous for the commander and his staff to determine which technique works best for specific mission sets and situations. They can then develop detailed SOPs customized to the nuances and peculiarities of their unit.

RECONNAISSANCE PUSH
3-5. The commander uses reconnaissance push when there is a relative degree of certainty about the enemy situation. Reconnaissance push emphasizes development of a detailed ISR plan prior to deployment of reconnaissance assets to focus the reconnaissance effort on an evolving maneuver COAor on several COAs. As reconnaissance is deployed, commanders and staff begin work on one or more plans or COAs with the intent of refining these evolving plans as reconnaissance yields relevant combat information. Results of the reconnaissance effort, which tend to be broader and more extensive over a longer period of time, are reported continuously back to the higher headquarters and squadron. There, commanders and planners, as part of the MDMP, continue to update the evolving plans or COAs. They make refinements throughout the operational cycle.

RECONNAISSANCE PULL
3-6. The commander employs the reconnaissance pull technique when there is a great degree of uncertainty about the enemy situation; he deliberately refrains from committing to a specific plan or COA prior to deployment of reconnaissance elements. The commander and staff develop an integrated ISR plan designed to yield information on the most tactically advantageous way to maneuver the supported organization. Reconnaissance is focused on collecting information on enemy strengths and weaknesses that will be critical in formulating the future plan or COA. 3-7. In reconnaissance pull, the detailed plan often encompasses several viable branches or COAs that will be triggered by decision points (DP). These branches are understood by leaders at all levels and are well rehearsed. As elements of the higher headquarters deploy, the reconnaissance effort shifts to two other purposes: Answer CCIR to facilitate the commanders decisions to adopt planned branches. Identify exceptional information (such as previously undiscovered enemy strengths or weaknesses) on which the higher headquarters can capitalize with greater success outside of planned branches. 3-8. Upon discovering enemy strengths and weaknesses, reconnaissance pulls the higher headquarters maneuver units along the path of least enemy resistance into positions of marked tactical advantage. Success is predicated on all maneuver units fully understanding the commanders intentthe glue that holds the unit together in a decentralized, rapidly changing situation. Weaknesses are often discovered in the very midst of execution, necessitating an ability to rapidly shift and alter schemes of maneuver to exploit opportunities. These on-the-fly modifications, however, have to be executed in accordance with the commanders intent. Reconnaissance pull knowingly emphasizes opportunity at the expense of a detailed, well-rehearsed plan and unity of effort.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS
3-9. Reconnaissance can be conducted using four methodsdismounted, mounted, aerial, and sensor. The squadron commander considers a combination of all methods to conduct effective reconnaissance. The simultaneous employment of all four methods provides flexibility and capitalizes on the strengths of each method. This provides depth and redundancy throughout the AO and helps the squadron to accomplish the reconnaissance mission based on the factors of METT-TC and the higher commanders intent.

DISMOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-10. Dismounted reconnaissance is the most time-consuming means of reconnaissance for ground units, but it permits collection of the most detailed information about the threat, terrain, society, and infrastructure. The squadron can employ dismounted reconnaissance to collect detailed information about a fixed site or threat from close proximity, although only a limited number of dismounted scouts can be

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employed at any given time. The squadron commander considers use of dismounted reconnaissance when Stealth is required and/or security is the primary concern. Time is available. Detailed information is required. The reconnaissance objective is a stationary threat, fixed site, or terrain feature. Enemy contact is expected or has been achieved through visual/electronic means. Reconnaissance vehicles cannot move through an area because of terrain or threat. Terrain creates visual dead space, preventing the use of optics or sensors. Vehicles are not available.

MOUNTED RECONNAISSANCE
3-11. Mounted reconnaissance enables a more rapid tempo at the expense of stealth and security. It increases the probability of detection by the threat, thus compromising reconnaissance efforts. Mounted reconnaissance must take advantage of standoff provided by surveillance systems such as LRAS3 to observe from greater distances. Though a reconnaissance operation can be primarily mounted, dismounted activities will probably be required during the operation for security reasons, such as to confirm or deny threat activity in dead space. The squadron commander considers the use of mounted reconnaissance when Time is limited. Distances require mounted movement. Stealth and security are not primary concerns. Detailed information is not required, or the mounted method affords the same opportunity to collect information as the dismounted method. The nature of the reconnaissance objective allows vehicles to approach (for example, a terrain feature or road intersection in stability operations). Enemy locations are known.

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
3-12. Aerial reconnaissance, conducted by manned or unmanned Army or joint aviation assets, can serve as a link between sensors and mounted or dismounted reconnaissance and can also cue these other reconnaissance methods. Complex terrain, adverse weather, enemy air defense systems, and deception/countermeasures can degrade effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance. Army or joint aviation assets can provide a variety of reconnaissance platforms. Refer to Chapter 9 for information on Army and joint aviation support to the squadrons reconnaissance operations. The squadron commander considers the use of aerial reconnaissance when Time is extremely limited or information is required quickly. Ground reconnaissance elements are not available. The objective is at an extended range. Verification of a target is needed. Threat locations either are known and extremely dangerous (high risk) to ground assets or are vague but are identified as high risk to ground assets. Terrain is complex and weather conditions are favorable.

SENSOR RECONNAISSANCE
3-13. Sensor reconnaissance allows flexibility in economizing reconnaissance assets. Sensors can be used to observe areas where contact may not be expected but is possible or used for surveillance of areas that need to be observed over extended periods. Sensors may be employed as the cue for aerial, dismounted,

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and/or mounted reconnaissance. They provide redundancy when assets are pushed forward to facilitate ground reconnaissance. They can also extend surveillance distance between ground reconnaissance and the threat. The squadron commander considers the use of sensor reconnaissance to Expand the scope of coverage in a larger AO. Conduct missions of an extended duration. Conduct CBRN reconnaissance. Cue a more thorough ground or aerial reconnaissance of a given area.

RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT
3-14. Because no single reconnaissance method can answer every IR and there are rarely enough reconnaissance assets to cover every requirement, the squadron commander and staff use a mix of reconnaissance management methodscueing, mixing, redundancy, and task organization. These methods allow the squadron to use limited assets most effectively, collecting the most critical information with the fewest assets as quickly as possible. The following considerations apply in applying reconnaissance management (see FM 3-90 for additional information): Cueing. Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveillance systems to provide information that directs follow-on collection of more detailed information by another system. These systems may cue other ground and air reconnaissance assets to investigate specific areas to confirm and amplify information. Mixing. Mixing entails two or more different assets collecting against the same IR. Employing a mix of systems is always desirable if the situation and available resources permit. This method both increases the probability of collection and tends to provide more complete information. Mixing can also help defeat deception attempts by highlighting discrepancies in information reported by different collection assets. Redundancy. Redundancy is two or more like assets collecting against the same IR. Redundancy improves the chances that the required information will be collected. Task organization. To increase the effectiveness and survivability of a reconnaissance asset, the squadron commander can task organize it with additional assets from within or outside the squadron. For example, the squadron could task organize a reconnaissance troop with such assets as a COLT, a signal retransmission (retrans) element, and/or an engineer reconnaissance element.

RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS AND SYSTEMS


3-15. The scout directly observing the target can be the squadron commanders most valuable reconnaissance asset. However, the commander maximizes use of all assets to accurately assess the enemy and the effects of the terrain on both enemy and friendly forces. 3-16. The squadron employs numerous systems in executing reconnaissance and security operations. Commanders and staffs need to know the capabilities and limitations of these systems. They must also understand that these systems are susceptible to countermeasures and that they lack the ability to convey the human dimension of the AO in terms of assessing the threats morale, taking prisoners, or making crucial on-the-spot decisions or judgment calls. 3-17. The squadron commander integrates intelligence from external assetssuch as joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) products and satellite imagery into the squadrons reconnaissance effort. These added capabilities provide enhanced SA, which in turn enables SU and enhances lethality when integrated with joint fires. These assets also aid the squadron when it is conducting decentralized operations over extended distances in a complex environment. 3-18. During reconnaissance operations, the squadron commander and staff must leverage the available C2 systems, both internal and external to the squadron, to accomplish the following: Collaborative and/or parallel planning to speed development and distribution of plans.

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Enhanced SU for the higher commander to enable rapid development of the situation. This entails effective integration and synchronization of all combat multipliers available for the reconnaissance effort. Sharing or distribution of information obtained from reconnaissance with optimum speed, precision, and clarity.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS


3-19. UASs provide numerous capabilities to the squadron and are capable of locating and recognizing major enemy forces, moving vehicles, weapons systems, and other targets that contrast with their surroundings. In addition, UASs are capable of detecting and confirming information on the ground, such as the position of friendly forces or the presence of noncombatant civilians. (See FM 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations, for detailed information on UAS capabilities and employment.) Note. Airspace command and control (AC2) is a critical consideration for the employment of UASs. See FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, and FM 3-52.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control, for detailed information on techniques and procedures necessary to ensure safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace by UASs. 3-20. Table 3-2 lists the type and quantity of UASs available to each squadron. One Raven SUAS element consists of three unmanned aircraft, while the Shadow TUAS element consists of four unmanned aircraft. The squadron employs the Raven for close-range (up to 10 kilometers), short-duration missions (60 to 90 minutes) operating below the coordinating altitude. The Shadow is employed to ranges of 125 kilometers. Table 3-1. Organic unmanned aircraft systems
HBCT RECON SQDN Raven (RQ-11B) SUAS Shadow (RQ-7) TUAS
1 x Recon Troop (3 troops in sqdn) 2 x HHT

IBCT RECON SQDN


1 x Mounted Troop (2 troops in sqdn) 1 x Dismounted Trp

SBCT RECON SQDN


1 x Recon Troop (3 troops in sqdn)

ACR CAV SQDN


1 x Cav Troop (3 troops in sqdn) 1 x Tank Co

BFSB RECON SQDN


1 x Recon Troop (2 troops in sqdn) 2 x LRS Co

3 total systems
1 x Surveillance Trp

5 total systems

3 total systems 1 total system

4 total systems

4 total systems

3-21. In addition to its organic UASs, the squadron may plan and control employment of UASs from supporting organizations. For example, the MI battalion in the BFSB is equipped with the Shadow, as are the MI companies in the HBCT and IBCT.

Capabilities
3-22. UASs provide a variety of capabilities to the squadron. They can be employed on the forward line of own troops (FLOT) or on the flanks. Employed as a team, UAS and ground reconnaissance elements provide excellent surveillance capability. Other capabilities include the following: Support target acquisition efforts and lethal attacks on enemy reconnaissance and advance forces. Assist in route, area, and zone reconnaissance. Locate and help determine enemy force composition, disposition, and activity. Maintain contact with enemy forces from initial contact through BDA. Provide target location with enough accuracy to enable immediate target handover, as well as first-round fire-for-effect engagements. Provide or enhance multispectrum sensor coverage of the AO.

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Provide information to ground reconnaissance elements, thus increasing survivability. Reduce or eliminate exposure time of ground reconnaissance elements in high-risk environments. Support mission duration beyond those of manned systems. Provide digital connectivity that enables rapid product dissemination. 3-23. The following are capabilities unique to the RQ-11B Raven: Redundancy (multiple air vehicles per system). Day and night imagery/operations. Low noise signature. Portability. Interchangeable payloads and components. Mobile launch capability.

Limitations
3-24. While UASs are an excellent force multiplier, they have limited effectiveness in locating enemy forces that are well covered or concealed. UASs organic to the squadron, such as Shadow and Raven, are not well suited for wide-area searches. Other limitations include the following: Vulnerability to enemy fire. Weather restrictions (cloud cover, turbulence, and other factors). Line-of-sight requirements between aircraft and ground control stations (GCS). Limited frequencies for UAS control. AC2 issues. Limited sensor field of view. Limited detection capability in complex terrain. Unique Class III/V requirements. Assembly area survivability. Inability to provide first-hand knowledge of the situation. 3-25. The following are limitations unique to the RQ-11B Raven: Absence of wind, which increases difficulty of launch. Consider using mounted launch or launch from atop a building or terrain feature. Winds less than 20 knots, which decrease system endurance from increased battery use and can cause uncommanded altitude deviations. Extreme heat and cold, which reduce endurance (battery life) and degrade system performance. Overheating can cause ground control unit (GCU) failure. Only front- or side-look camera capability in night operations. Fragile components.

PROPHET
3-26. A unique capability available to the SBCT reconnaissance squadron is the Prophet SIGINT system. The surveillance troop in the SBCT reconnaissance squadron is equipped with three Prophet systems. Additionally, the BFSB reconnaissance squadron can use information developed by the six systems in the MI battalion of the BFSB. 3-27. The Prophet system is capable of monitoring or scanning for signals, stopping at detected signals, and restarting after a predetermined time or when cued manually. The system can filter selected signals. The receivers identify single-channel digital and analog signals with modulations of AM, FM, single sideband, and Morse/continuous wave. 3-28. In support of fluid mobile operations, the system has on-the-move capabilities such as direction finding and signal intercept exploitation. The Prophet crew can set up the system and be fully operational for stationary direction-finding operations within five minutes.

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SITE EXPLOITATION
3-29. Site exploitation is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations to protect the force and produce an advantage within the operational variables to support tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (see FM 3-90.15, Site Exploitation). Site exploitation remains an implied task inherent in all reconnaissance missions because the collection and analysis of information, personnel, and materiel can enable follow-on actions. Therefore, the squadron must always consider site exploitation during planning for reconnaissance operations.

MOVEMENT DURING DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS


3-30. The dismounted reconnaissance troop of the IBCT reconnaissance squadron and the LRS company of the BFSB reconnaissance squadron face movement challenges as a result of limited lift capabilities. The squadrons may require augmentation for ground movement and will require support for air movement. Depending on the mission, the units must plan accordingly. See FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, for additional information. See the detailed discussion on infiltration and exfiltration later in this chapter.

GROUND MOVEMENT
3-31. Ground operations involve movements by foot or other ground-assisted transportation means. Dismounted reconnaissance troops most often move on foot using common dismounted infantry tactical movement formations and techniques as discussed in FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and FM 321.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 3-32. Dismounted units should always consider the use of alternative means of mobility if available; they must determine whether their use would enhance or degrade the operation. Leaders must consider the nature of the operation while evaluating the use of these alternate assets and determine if the mission will support their use. Even if available, these assets can create a larger visual and sound signature that may not be acceptable for the mission. Their use may also restrict movements to certain areas, making the unit more vulnerable or susceptible to detection. On the other hand, their use may conserve Soldiers energy and move them more quickly to a desired location. Mobility assets may include, but are not limited to, the following: Tactical vehicles. All-terrain vehicles. Nonstandard tactical vehicles. Motorcycles. Horses/mules.

AIR MOVEMENT
3-33. Planning for air movements is similar to that for other missions. In addition to the normal planning process, however, air movement planning must cover specific requirements for air infiltration and exfiltration: Coordinate with the supporting aviation unit(s). Plan and rehearse with the supporting aviation unit prior to the mission if possible. If armed escort accompanies the operation, the platoon leaderas well as the assault or general support aviation unitshould ensure that aircrews are included in the planning and rehearsal. Gather as much information as possible, such as the enemy situation, in preparation for the mission. Plan and coordinate joint suppression of enemy air defense (J-SEAD). 3-34. The unit should also plan different ingress and egress routes, covering the following: Planned insertion and extraction points. Emergency extraction rally points. Lost communications extraction points.

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3-35. Planned extraction points and emergency extraction rally points require communications to verify the preplanned pickup time or coordinate an emergency pickup time window. Planning must also include details for extraction when communications between higher headquarters and the unit are lost. The lostcommunications extraction point involves infiltration teams moving to the emergency extraction point after two consecutive missed communications windows and waiting up to 24 hours for pickup (based on unit TACSOP).

WATERBORNE MOVEMENT
3-36. Dismounted units may chooseor be requiredto use waterways or to cross water obstacles during the course of their mission. Using the water to their advantage can improve the speed, stealth, and flexibility of an insertion or extraction. Waterborne operations include using surface craft, swimming on the surface, helocasting, or a combination of these methods. Whichever method is used, waterborne movement should take place during limited visibility for maximum stealth. 3-37. Dismounted units must plan waterborne operations in the same detail as other operations, with emphasis on additional water safety considerations. Common dismounted missions involving waterborne operations include the use of inflatable landing craft and helocast operations. For more detail on these waterborne operations, see FM 3-55.93. While planning waterborne operations, leaders must consider the following factors: Enemy situation. Civilian situation. Shipping. Beach landing site, which must allow the team to infiltrate and support movement to the inland objective. Environmental factors such as winds, waves, fog, thunderstorms, and lightning. Equipment. Time schedule. Leaders use reverse planning to schedule operational events. Drop site. The team debarks from a larger vessel at a planned drop site, then begins infiltration. Launch point. This is a point where swimmers enter the water and begin infiltration. Method of loading. Supervisors inspect loads and lashings, especially waterproofing, to ensure they adhere to unit SOP.

BFSB RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON CONSIDERATIONS


3-38. Because of the unique mission and organization of the BFSB, the reconnaissance squadron has its own specific considerations compared to the other types of squadrons. The reconnaissance squadron allows the BFSB to provide 24-hour manned, ground reconnaissance in support of higher headquarters. Its primary mission is to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations to answer the supported headquarters PIR and other IR. The squadron conducts reconnaissance and surveillance in the unassigned areas of the supported headquarters AO or in an AO assigned to the BFSB by the supported headquarters. The squadron is designed to simultaneously use the LRS company and reconnaissance troops dispersed within the supported headquarters.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-39. The reconnaissance squadron is capable of conducting zone, area, and route reconnaissance but is optimized for area reconnaissance. (See Chapter 1 for organizational information.) The squadron relies on stealth to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance. It is not organized to conduct a reconnaissance in force. 3-40. The squadrons two mounted reconnaissance troops can conduct various reconnaissance missions (area, zone, and route) and perform surveillance in conjunction with those missions. The mounted reconnaissance troops are capable of operating in unassigned areas of the supported headquarters AO at extended distances from the nearest source of support if required by the situation. The troops can be

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employed together or dispersed depending on mission requirements. They will typically operate mounted but can operate dismounted if required. 3-41. The squadrons LRS company provides unique capabilities to the supported headquarters. The LRS company can collect information in locations or against targets that require stealth or in situations that cannot be supported by other technical or human intelligence assets. Specific capabilities of the LRS company include the following: Provide 24-hour manned coverage of NAIs and TAIs. Establish over-the-horizon/long-range communications using high frequency (HF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite assets and short-range very high frequency (VHF) FM line of sight to ground and air assets. Employ laser designation capability for precision guided munitions, observation for pre- or postattack assessment, and positive identification missions. Use hand-held thermal and long-range infrared cameras during limited visibility operations. Emplace, monitor, and recover unattended ground sensors. Use SUASs and special camera kits to send imagery of targets in near real time.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-42. The reconnaissance squadron receives its tasks as mission orders from the BFSB. In addition to the commanders reconnaissance planning guidance, other key information for the squadron, at a minimum, includes the following: Squadron task organization, including attachments. Squadron mission and tasks. CCIR and other IR. Priorities for collection. Essential coordinating instructions. BFSB commanders and supported commanders intent, reconnaissance objective, and concept of operations. 3-43. The BFSB headquarters may direct attachment of assets from the MI battalion(s) to the squadron, such as the following: SIGINT assets such as Prophet. HUMINT collection teams. UAS assets. Multifunctional teams. 3-44. The squadron staff performs mission planning, determines what assets can best answer the IR, and tasks its subordinate units to collect the required information. The staff uses various techniquessuch as cueing, mixing, and redundancyto manage available collection and reconnaissance assets. In addition, the staff considers task organizing various assetssuch as a HUMINT collection team (HCT) attached to a reconnaissance troopto further maximize the capabilities of available assets. Attachments help to maximize collection effectiveness and provide a mix of collection assets for critical reconnaissance tasks. 3-45. Because the squadron frequently operates in unassigned areas of the supported headquarters AO, it may begin execution of reconnaissance operations from another brigades AO. This requires the squadron to conduct significant coordination with the other unit. Key areas for coordination include the following: Positioning of squadron assets in or near another brigades AO. Coordinating the use of airspace in or near another brigades AO. Planning passage through another brigades AO. Deconfliction of fires in unassigned areas of the higher headquarters AO. Coordinating sustainment support for squadron elements in or near another brigades AO.

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3-46. Another important part of the squadrons planning is the insertion/extraction of LRS teams from the LRS company. The insertion and extraction section in the squadron HHT assists the LRS company in the planning andin particularthe coordination of LRS missions. FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, provides detailed information on the planning and execution of LRS missions. Key considerations for employment of LRS teams include the following: Identify assets to support ground or air infiltration/exfiltration. Identify fires capabilities to support the team(s). Coordinate passage of lines, AC2, and security for the team(s). Plan medical treatment of team members and their extraction from the operational area. Plan communications support and reporting procedures. Plan sustainment support, including emergency resupply or use of caches.

SECTION II - ACTIONS ON CONTACT

FORMS OF CONTACT
3-47. Contact occurs when elements of the squadron encounter any situation that requires an active or passive response to the threat. These situations may entail one or more of the following eight forms of contact: Visual contact or observation. Direct fire contact with an enemy force. Indirect fire contact. Contact with enemy obstacles or those of unknown origin. Contact with enemy or unknown aircraft. Situations involving CBRN conditions. Situations involving EW tactics. Nonhostile contact. This category covers contact with personnel, including civilians, or elements that do not pose an immediate lethal threat to friendly forces. Examples include the following: Adversaries. This is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisioned (JP 3-0). Adversaries include members of the local populace who sympathize with the enemy. Supporters. This is a party that sympathizes with friendly forces and that or may not provide material assistance to them. Neutrals. This is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces.

PROCEDURES OF ACTIONS ON CONTACT


3-48. Regardless of the nature of the operation or type of mission, the squadron seeks to make contact with the smallest element possible. When contact is made, the squadrons subordinate units react using actions on contact. This series of combat actions must be thoroughly trained and rehearsed from the staff level down to platoon level so that the squadron can maintain freedom of maneuver and avoid becoming decisively engaged. Actions on contact are the following: Deploy and report. Evaluate and develop the situation. Choose a COA. Execute selected COA. Recommend a COA to the higher commander.

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Note. Actions on contact are not intended to generate a rigid, lockstep response to the threat. Rather, the goal is to help the squadron avoid blundering into the enemy. The squadron and its subordinate units can survive the initial contact by making sound decisions and executing timely actions. The squadron maintains visual contact and/or initiates direct or indirect contact. It is essential for the squadron commander to understand the higher commanders intent to enable the development of sound recommendations, COAs, and decision-making. Refer to FM 3-90 for additional information on actions on contact.

DEPLOY AND REPORT


3-49. When initial physical or visual contact is made, the element making contact immediately deploys using appropriate tactical movement or a battle drill (such as contact and action drills). The commander of the element in contact sends a contact report to the squadron as soon as possible after contact occurs. 3-50. The squadron reports the contact to its higher headquarters using the standard contact report format. The squadron updates this information as necessary based on incoming spot reports. 3-51. The squadrons higher headquarters monitors the ongoing operation to determine if it is progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan. The higher commander uses the initial information reported by the squadron to begin to develop an understanding of the current situation.

EVALUATE AND DEVELOP THE SITUATION


3-52. The commander of the element in contact makes a quick evaluation of the situation. He directs actions to protect his elements and to develop the situation (such as withdraw elements, begin to maneuver elements, or call for fire) based on specific engagement or bypass criteria from the higher commanders guidance. He quickly gathers as much relevant information as possible and sends a spot report to the squadron. Information is normally reported using the SALUTE format: Size of the enemy elements (composition). Activity of the enemy elements (disposition). Location of the enemy elements. Unit(s) of enemy forces (if this can be determined). Time enemy activity was observed. Equipment in enemy elements. The friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities). 3-53. As the squadron commander receives the initial reports from the element in contact, he also evaluates the situation and, as necessary, directs squadron-level maneuver to assist the commander in contact with further development of the situation. The squadron commander and staff compare the information from the reports to intelligence products and decision tools to identify indicators that confirm or deny the CCIR for both the squadron and higher headquarters. Examples include the following: Enemy capabilities. Probable enemy intentions. How to gain positional advantage over the enemy. The friendly situation (location, strength, and capabilities). Possible friendly COAs to achieve the specified reconnaissance objective. 3-54. As the element in contact and the squadron develop the situation, the squadron commander and staff continue to assess the situation. The squadron commander may determine that there is not enough information to answer the IR to support the higher commanders decisions or identify the enemys impact on current or future operations. To answer these IR, the squadron commander may decide to further develop the situation in accordance with the higher commanders intent using one or any combination of the following to gain additional information: Direct mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Reorient sensor assets such as UASs or other supporting aerial assets.

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Engage with supporting indirect fires. Direct reconnaissance in force if capable and permitted by the engagement criteria. 3-55. Based on information reported by the squadron, the squadrons higher headquarters evaluates the situation against the commanders intent to determine the significance of any indicators. Evaluating these indicators is a necessary step in assessing the progress of operations and determining whether a branch or sequel is required.

CHOOSE AND/OR RECOMMEND A COA


3-56. While developing the situation, the commander of the element in contact develops recommendations for the squadron commander. These recommendations include future actions for the element in contact and possible future COAs for the squadron. 3-57. At squadron level, the squadron commander and staff develop COAs that meet the higher commanders intent and are within the squadrons capabilities, including branches and/or sequels. The squadron commander may direct the squadron to continue the mission based on the original scheme of maneuver and tasks to subordinate units, or he may direct a branch or sequel and issue a fragmentary order (FRAGO). The squadron commander chooses an appropriate COA and informs the higher commander prior to execution, if possible. The squadron commander has several options in continuing the mission: Conduct reconnaissance handover or battle handover with an adjacent or supporting unit, and continue reconnaissance of the AO. Continue to develop the situation, reorganizing as necessary, and continue reconnaissance to gather additional information about the enemy contact. Establish a screen while maintaining contact with the enemy force. Bypass the enemy element, in accordance with bypass criteria, while maintaining contact and continue the mission. 3-58. Based on the higher commanders intent, the squadron commander may recommend adjustments to the higher headquarters concept of operations if the situation has a direct bearing on the higher commanders CCIR. 3-59. Based on the higher headquarters assessment of the situation, the higher commander may issue a FRAGO directing execution of a branch or sequel. This may be due to a significant, unforeseen opportunity to achieve the intent of the operation or significant threats to the operations success resulting from friendly failures or enemy successes.

EXECUTE THE SELECTED COA


3-60. If the original plan is still valid or requires only minor refinement to support the squadron commanders intent, the commander of the element in contact issues the necessary orders and continues to execute the plan. He continues to report to the squadron. Alternatively, the commander of the element in contact may be directed by the squadron commander to execute a COA. 3-61. At the squadron level, the squadron commander directs actions to apply combat power based on his decision or a COA directed by the higher commander. If the original plan is still valid and is proceeding satisfactorily, the squadron commander will not normally have to issue FRAGOs. If the evaluation of the situation indicates that a branch or sequel is required, he issues a FRAGO to his subordinates to implement it. The squadron staff completes any follow-up actions necessary to support execution, including resynchronizing the operation in terms of time, space, and purpose across all warfighting functions. The FRAGO may also call for execution of critical ongoing functions (see FM 6-0). Critical ongoing functions include the following: Focus all assets on the decisive operation. Conduct continuous intelligence, surveillance, and/or reconnaissance. Conduct security operations. Adjust CCIR based on the situation. Adjust graphic control measures.

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Employ airspace control measures. Continue liaison and coordination. Conduct targeting and target acquisition. Manage the movement and positioning of protection or sustainment assets. Perform terrain management. Reallocate resources within the organization. Change the concept of operations. Change the mission.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
3-62. During planning for reconnaissance operations, leaders evaluate a number of factors to determine their impact on the units actions on contact. For example, the squadron needs to consider how the likelihood of contact will affect its task organization, choice of movement techniques, and formations. Through this analysis, the leaders can begin preparing the unit for actions on contact. For example, they may outline procedures for the transition to more secure movement techniques or to cue surveillance assets before contact is initiated. The mission variables of METT-TC (see Chapter 1) provide a logical framework for this evaluation. The following are possible planning considerations based on METT-TC: Note. Although the planning considerations in this discussion address reconnaissance operations, they have applicability to any type of operation conducted by the squadron. Mission: What is the units mission (such as reconnaissance, security, offense, or defense)? What is the focus of reconnaissance (terrain, infrastructure, society, threat)? What reconnaissance technique (reconnaissance push or reconnaissance pull) is the higher commander directing? Enemy: What engagement criteria did the higher commander specify in his reconnaissance guidance? Based on IPB, where is the squadron or its subordinate elements most likely to make contact with enemy forces? Did the higher commander specify any bypass criteria in relation to enemy forces? What are the higher commanders PIR? Terrain and weather: Does terrain and weather favor one method (mounted, dismounted, aerial, sensor) over another? How will terrain factors such as obstacles or avenues of approach affect possible branches and/or sequels to the scheme of maneuver? Does available cover and concealment support the directed reconnaissance tempo? How will weather conditions affect surveillance systems (such as LRAS3 or Raven SUAS)? Troops and support available: How should the squadron task organize based on expected enemy contact? What additional assets are available to support the reconnaissance effort (such as Army aviation, engineers)? When and where does the squadron conduct reconnaissance handover or battle handover with follow-on units? Time available: Does the reconnaissance tempo (rapid, deliberate, stealthy, forceful) increase the likelihood of making enemy contact?

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Does the reconnaissance tempo allow for dismounted reconnaissance when required? Civil considerations: What impact do the ROE have on execution of actions on contact by subordinate units? How will the actions of the squadron and its subordinate units impact or influence the local populace? Are there any protected civilian sites such as hospitals or religious sites that potentially limit actions taken on contact with enemy or adversary elements?

SECTION III FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE


3-63. There are four forms of reconnaissancezone, area, route, and reconnaissance in force (See FM 390, Tactics). Zone, area, and route reconnaissance will normally be conducted with a multidimensional focus that includes such factors as society and infrastructure as well as the threat and terrain.

ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
DESCRIPTION
3-64. A zone reconnaissance is assigned when the enemy situation is vague or when information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. It is appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is limited or when combat operations have altered the terrain. The reconnaissance may be threat-oriented, terrain-oriented, society-oriented, infrastructure-oriented, or a combination. Additionally, the squadron commander may focus the reconnaissance effort on a specific force such as the enemys reserve. A terrainfocused zone reconnaissance must include the identification of obstacles, both existing and reinforcing, as well as areas of CBRN contamination. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.) Note. When the squadron is assigned a zone reconnaissance by its higher headquarters, it may based on its mission analysis and the subsequent specified and implied tasks identifiedperform a combination of the forms of reconnaissance to answer the higher commanders IR. Therefore, even though the squadron as a whole is performing a zone reconnaissance mission, its subordinate units could be assigned a zone, area, or route reconnaissance mission.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS


3-65. Zone reconnaissance is a deliberate, time-consuming process; therefore, it must be focused. The squadron commander issues reconnaissance planning guidance or receives it from higher. This includes the focus, which is expressed in terms of threat, society, infrastructure, and/or terrain. The reconnaissance force must accomplish certain critical tasks unless the higher commander specifically directs otherwise. These execution considerations serve as a guide to indicate the actions associated with the zone reconnaissance, although they are not a set checklist and are not necessarily arranged sequentially. Based on time constraints and the commanders intent, the squadron commander may direct his troops to reconnoiter for specific information only. A thorough IPB and clearly defined CCIR will help identify the relevant information needed by the higher commander. 3-66. Execution considerations for a zone reconnaissance, based on METT-TC, may include the following: Threat: Find and report enemy forces within the zone. Based on engagement criteria, clear enemy forces in the designated AO within the capability of the unit conducting reconnaissance. Society: Determine the size, location, and composition of the populace within the zone, as well as applicable social demographics (such as race, sex, age, religion, language, national origin, tribe, clan, class, party affiliation, education, or any other significant social grouping). Establish and maintain contact with local civilian and military leadership.

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Identify allegiances of the local populace to factions, religious groups, or other organizations. Infrastructure: Identify key municipal infrastructure that can affect military operations. Examples include transportation (such as rail, bus, or subway), communications, and the aspects of SWEATMSO. Inspect and evaluate all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts within the zone. Terrain: Locate all obstacles; create and mark lanes as specified in orders. Locate and determine the extent of contaminated areas within the zone, including CBRN. Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability of all terrain within the zone, including urban areas. Locate bypasses around urban areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas. Locate fords or crossing sites near all bridges within the zone. Reporting: Report all pertinent information to the commander directing the zone reconnaissance. Provide a sketch map or overlay. 3-67. Upon completion of the zone reconnaissance, the squadron proceeds with any assigned follow-on missions. If no mission has been assigned, the squadron will normally establish a screen along the LOA or continue to observe the specified NAIs or reconnaissance objectives. If the squadron encounters threat forces, it conducts actions on contact in accordance with ROE and previously articulated engagement criteria.

AREA RECONNAISSANCE
DESCRIPTION
3-68. The area for an area reconnaissance may be defined by a single continuous line enclosing the area to be reconnoitered, such as an objective. The area to be reconnoitered may also be defined by an NAI when focusing on a relatively small area such as a building, bridge, or key piece of terrain. Area reconnaissance enables the squadron to conduct decentralized reconnaissance in multiple areas simultaneously. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.) Note. When the squadron is assigned an area reconnaissance by its higher headquarters, it may based on its mission analysis and the subsequent specified and implied tasks identifiedperform a combination of the forms of reconnaissance to answer the higher commanders IR. Therefore, even though the squadron as a whole is performing an area reconnaissance mission, its subordinate units could be assigned a zone, area, or route reconnaissance mission.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS


3-69. Planning and execution considerations for an area reconnaissance are the same as those for a zone reconnaissance; however, the focus is on the specific reconnaissance objective or NAI that defines the area.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
DESCRIPTION
3-70. The route is a prescribed course from a start point (SP) to a specific destination (release point [RP]). It could be a road or an axis of advance. Route reconnaissance is conducted to determine whether the route is clear of obstacles and/or threat forces and how well or how poorly it will support the planned movement.

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3-71. At the squadron level, route reconnaissance is often a task performed during zone or area reconnaissance. If enemy contact is expected, a troop is normally assigned one major route. If enemy contact is unlikely, a troop is normally assigned two routes. The routes should be close enough together to enable the troop commander to maintain C2 and achieve security through some degree of mutual support. FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop, provides examples of a troop conducting a route reconnaissance. Note. A route reconnaissance may be assigned as a separate mission or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance. Reconnaissance platoons can reconnoiter only one route at a time; therefore, the number of reconnaissance platoons available directly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. The integration of ground, air, and other technical assets allows for either a faster or more detailed route reconnaissance.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS


3-72. Based on time and the higher commanders intent, the squadron commander may direct his subordinate units to reconnoiter for specific information only. IPB and CCIR often indicate information required by the higher commander that narrows the focus of the reconnaissance. Planning and execution considerations for a route reconnaissance can include the following: Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of the route. Find, report, and clear within capabilities any enemy or adversary elements that can influence movement along the route. Reconnoiter routes approaching and inside urban areas. Reconnoiter lateral routes. Inspect and classify bridges along the route. Inspect and classify overpasses, underpasses, and culverts. Reconnoiter defiles along the route. Reduce obstacles within capability, or locate a bypass. Locate mines, obstacles, and barriers along the route. Within capabilities and in accordance with the commanders intent, clear the route. Locate bypasses around built-up areas, obstacles, and contaminated areas. Update route information; this includes providing a sketch map or route overlay to the headquarters initiating the route reconnaissance.

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
DESCRIPTION
3-73. A reconnaissance in force is conducted when the enemy is known to be operating within an area and adequate intelligence cannot be obtained by other means. It is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive operation to answer clearly stated CCIR. It differs from other reconnaissance operations because it is normally conducted only to gain information about the enemy and not the terrain. The end state of a reconnaissance in force is to determine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited by the higher headquarters. 3-74. Battalion-size units or larger organizations are usually assigned a reconnaissance in force mission. The ACR cavalry squadron is fully capable of conducting a reconnaissance in force. Depending on METTTC factors, the reconnaissance squadrons in the BCTs require augmentation with maneuver or fires elements to conduct a reconnaissance in force as a stand-alone mission. During a reconnaissance in force, the subordinate elements of the squadron conduct zone, area, and route reconnaissance missions. The squadron may also conduct screening operations in support of the larger organization conducting the reconnaissance in force. Even though the higher commander directs execution of a reconnaissance in force primarily to gather information, he is alert to seize any opportunity to exploit tactical success.

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Note. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron is not organized or equipped to conduct a reconnaissance in force.

PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS


3-75. Planning and execution considerations for a reconnaissance in force can include the following: Penetrate the enemys security area and determine its size and depth. Determine the location and disposition of enemy forces. Attack enemy positionsand attempt to force the enemy to reactby using local reserves or major counterattack forces, employing fires, adjusting positions, and employing specific weapon systems. Enter AOs in complex terrain not previously occupied by friendly forces, such as urban environments. Determine weaknesses in the enemys dispositions that can be exploited. 3-76. The squadron performs the critical tasks for a reconnaissance in force within the limits of its capabilities. If it does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it informs the higher commander assigning the mission. He then issues further guidance on which tasks the squadron must complete or restates the priority of tasks, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. If the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task as it conducts the reconnaissance in force, it must report to the higher commander.

SECTION IV INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION


3-77. Squadron elements frequently employ infiltration and exfiltration to maximize stealth and maintain the element of surprise when conducting reconnaissance operations. FM 3-90, Tactics, describes infiltration and exfiltration in detail. 3-78. Successful execution of infiltration and/or exfiltration often requires these elements to conduct a passage of lines or a linkup with other friendly elements. In addition, the squadron conducts other tactical enabling operations during execution of infiltration and exfiltration as part of reconnaissance and other types of operations. See FM 3-90 for additional information on these enabling operations: Unit movement. Relief in place. Obstacle breaching.

INFILTRATION
3-79. Reconnaissance elements infiltrate through an area to orient on a reconnaissance objective without having to engage the threat or fight through prepared defenses. This form of maneuver is slow, stealthy, and often accomplished under reduced visibility conditions. Aerial reconnaissance can provide additional security by locating threat positions and identifying routes on which ground elements can move to avoid threat contact. Following an infiltration, the squadron may have to plan linkup for the multiple elements conducting decentralized execution. Scouts may infiltrate to conduct reconnaissance patrols of enemy forces in depth. The BFSB LRS company may infiltrate to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and target interdiction of enemy forces or facilities. Note. A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat, reconnaissance, or security mission. A patrols organization is temporary and specifically matched to the immediate task. See FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, for additional information on patrols and patrolling.

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PLANNING AND COORDINATION


3-80. A successful infiltration is a difficult and time-consuming mission for the reconnaissance squadron to accomplish. To maximize the success of the infiltration and enhance survivability, detailed knowledge of the terrain and up-to-date information about the threat must be available. A detailed terrain analysis can be conducted within the ACR/BCT using digital intelligence and topographic systems. The squadron uses the information from IPB, modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), and enemy situation template to aid in the planning of the infiltration. 3-81. An infiltration plan allows enough time for preparation and movement. The amount of intelligence information available during planning determines the risk involved in conducting infiltration. The squadron commander and staffand the LRS company commander in the BFSB reconnaissance squadron, if required (see FM 3-55.93)include these essential details in the plan: An overview of the enemy and friendly situation, followed by specific information for the immediate AO. Critical information includes how the situation, light conditions, and weather data will affect team operations. Clearly stated PIR and associated SIR and IR. Mission statement. Commanders intent for the mission. The area to be reconnoitered or kept under surveillance and possible locations from which surveillance can be conducted. Movement routes, formations, and actions at danger areas and halts from the infiltration site to the objective area. The FS plan, which includes plans for indirect and aerial-delivered fires. Specific plans include the following: Planned fires on movement routes and on and around the objective area. Planned fires on known, suspected, templated, and anticipated enemy positions Use of obscurants to mask movement. Use of illumination to aid observation. Fires to aid navigation. Suppressive fires as part of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Restrictive fire areas (RFA) or NFAs. Use of laser designators or beacons. The timing for execution of major events in the operation. Movement routes, formations, rally points, and actions at danger areas and halts from the objective area to the exfiltration site. Plans for evasion and escape, including planned evasion corridors, designated areas for recovery, and actions at recovery areas. Plans for the use of guides, technical specialists, or special equipment. Coordination measures with friendly forces for the passage of lines or linkup. Plans for treatment of sick or wounded team members in the operational area or evacuation from the operational area. Actions required to handle captured enemy personnel and equipment. The communication plan, which includes frequencies, logs, reporting schedule, emergency reporting procedures, and alternate communication plans. The plan also includes actions if communications cannot be established. Plans for sustainment support, including emergency resupply and use of caches. Uniform and equipment for the scouts or LRS team. Abort criteria for each phase of the mission.

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OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Size and Task Organization of Infiltration Unit
3-82. The size of the infiltrating element depends on the assigned mission, time available, the amount of available cover and concealment, and the acquisition capabilities of both friendly and threat forces.

Method of Insertion
3-83. The squadron can infiltrate as a wholealthough normally, this is not doneby individual troops/companies, or by platoons/teams. Infiltration can be executed mounted, dismounted, or as a combination of the two. Dismounted scouts and LRS teams can infiltrate to the objective by foot, vehicle, rotary-wing aircraft, or watercraft depending on the availability of equipment and type of mission. See FM 3-55.93 for more detailed discussion on infiltration of LRS elements. 3-84. Infiltration for dismounted scouts or LRS teams must be very carefully planned. Methods of insertion for the dismounted scouts or LRS teams are the following: High altitude, high opening (HAHO) (LRS teams only). High altitude, low opening (HALO) (LRS teams only). Fast-rope insertion and extraction system. Scuba (LRS teams only). Special patrol insertion and extraction system (LRS teams only). Air. Ground vehicle. Rubber boat. Stay-behind. Foot movement.

Infiltration Lane or Zone


3-85. The squadron may use single or multiple infiltration lanes or zones; it can also assign lanes or zones to subordinate units. The lanes/zones must have sufficient width to allow the infiltrating elements to change their planned routes to avoid unexpected threat contact. See Figures 3-1 and 3-2.

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Figure 3-1. Single-lane infiltration

Figure 3-2. Multiple-lane infiltration

EXFILTRATION
3-86. If the reconnaissance element infiltrates to conduct its mission, it may be required to exfiltrate once the mission is complete. In other instances, units within the squadron may be deliberately employed in a

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stay-behind mode during ACR/BCT operations. Exfiltration should be planned as carefully as infiltration, particularly if contact with the threat has occurred during the mission. The commander must plan for contingency measures should the conditions force the reconnaissance unit to conduct an unplanned exfiltration. See FM 3-55.93 for more detailed discussion on exfiltration of LRS elements.

PLANNING AND COORDINATION


3-87. The planning considerations for exfiltration are the same as those for infiltration; however, exfiltration lanes are typically different from those used for infiltration. Plans for extraction by applicable means (such as air, ground, special patrol insertion and extraction system, or water) should be made before the mission, with contingencies covering such possibilities as loss of vehicles, evacuation of wounded personnel, loss of communications, or poor weather that limits extraction by air. The OPORD must address contingencies and actions the reconnaissance element will take for both planned and unplanned exfiltration.

EXTRACTION POINTS
3-88. Extraction points for dismounted elements should be far enough away from the infiltrated observation post (OP) to ensure the threat does not hear vehicle or helicopter noises. Mountains, dense foliage, and other terrain features can mask these noises. Movement routes are planned to put ridgelines, rivers, and other restrictive terrain between the unit and threat forces. Primary and alternate linkup points should never be on a single azimuth leading away from the OP of an exfiltration route. Exfiltration operations require additional time to plan for contingencies against unforeseen circumstances, such as inadvertent contact with threat forces or unexpected restricted terrain.

METHODS OF EXTRACTION
3-89. When dismounted scouts and LRS teams are employed in stay-behind mode (withdrawal or delay), exfiltration by land is the preferred method. Exfiltration by land is used when Friendly lines are close. No other method is feasible. Areas along the route are largely uninhabited. Threat forces are widely dispersed. Threat forces are not conducting aggressive/active counterreconnaissance and security activities. Terrain degrades the threats ability to maneuver against the exfiltration unit. 3-90. Extraction by air or water is favored when the resources are available and their use will not compromise the mission. These methods are used when Long distances must be covered. A specific time of return is required. Cover and concealment are lacking. The threat does not have air or naval superiority. Heavily populated hostile areas obstruct ground exfiltration.

SECTION V RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER


3-91. Reconnaissance handover is the process of transferring information and/or responsibility for observation or surveillance of enemy contact or an assigned NAI/TAI from one element to another. It can involve visual, electronic, or digital observation and information sources in any number of combinations. Reconnaissance handover may occur between subordinate elements of the squadron or with elements from other units. The squadron exercises overall command and control of the handover.

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PLANNING
3-92. At the squadron level, planning focuses on facilitating coordination between its subordinate elements and with its higher headquarters. Planning may take place before an operation, or it may occur during operations as part of a change of mission. When planning is conducted before an operation, the squadron S3 analyzes the developing reconnaissance plan to determine which elements may be required to conduct reconnaissance handover and where or when it may take place. The squadron S-3 also considers cueing, redundancy, and mixing of available reconnaissance assets and evaluates how these reconnaissance management methods support reconnaissance handover. Once this is determined, locations and criteria for reconnaissance handover are coordinated with the squadrons subordinate elements and/or higher headquarters as applicable. Considerations addressed during planning include the following: Coordination of redundant surveillance to assist in maintaining enemy contact during reconnaissance handover. Coordination of location and criteria for reconnaissance handover. Coordination of communications plans between units. Coordination and exchange of FS information. Exchange of reconnaissance plans. Identification and coordination of requirements for target handover, as necessary. Coordination of graphic control measures to facilitate reconnaissance handover. Coordination of transfer and acceptance of C2 between units. Integration of nondigital units into the communications plan.

PREPARATION
3-93. Maneuver units and support brigade units should receive copies of the higher headquarters ISR plan and the squadron OPORD after they are developed and approved. Because all subordinate units have their own reconnaissance requirements within the higher headquarters AO, they must understand how their particular IR relate to those of the squadron. This exchange also helps leaders at all levels to understand how higher IR may fulfill the IR of lower units or passing units, therefore minimizing redundancy. 3-94. Coordination begins as reconnaissance handover requirements are identified. Based on the higher headquarters scheme of maneuver, the squadron S-3 identifies other maneuver units with which squadron elements are likely to conduct reconnaissance handover. Key areas for coordination include the following: Exchange digital and FM voice communications data. Provide updates of both friendly and enemy situations (digital, voice, and graphical). Coordinate contact or coordination points, and ensure that these points are displayed on operational overlays. Coordinate fires (direct and indirect), and ensure that the direct fire control measures and FSCMs are displayed on operational overlays. Establish and coordinate recognition signals if physical linkup is necessary.

EXECUTION
3-95. During reconnaissance handover, squadron elements transfer information and/or responsibility to other maneuver elements either by digital or voice communications or, based on the situation, through establishment of physical contact at a contact point. The squadron facilitates the exchange of information by monitoring the information exchange between elements and relaying information when necessary. 3-96. Once the required information is exchanged, squadron elements confirm that reconnaissance handover is complete, based on specified criteria, and report completion higher. When a target is being handed over, the criteria may require the accepting unit to acquire the target before handover is complete.

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EXAMPLE OF RECONNAISSANCE HANDOVER


3-97. As shown in Figure 3-3, JSTARS identifies the moving target indicators (MTI) of a battalion-size enemy force moving into the reconnaissance squadrons AO and initiates reconnaissance handover. The squadron commander issues an oral FRAGO to direct a reconnaissance troop to establish visual contact at a newly designated NAI 5. Since the movement of a battalion-size enemy force was one of the commanders PIR, the report of the MTI cues the military intelligence company (MICO) UAS platoon to launch two aircraft to establish contact with the enemy force.

Figure 3-3. Reconnaissance handover (part one) 3-98. The reconnaissance troop and the UASs establish visual contact with the advancing enemy force and populate the FBCB2 COP with enemy icons and potential ABF positions. The reconnaissance troop in contact switches to the infantry battalions command net and exchanges fires information and coordination for the forward passage of lines of the attacking battalion. This coordination and the information on the updated COP cue the infantry battalions S-3 to begin movement of the battalion scout platoon to the designated contact point to conduct reconnaissance handover with the reconnaissance troop scouts. See Figure 3-4. 3-99. Reconnaissance handover continues with the attacking infantry battalion being pulled to the enemy forces weak point (an assailable flank). As the attack occurs, the squadron continues to support through maximized information flow, continuing UAS coverage, and coordinated fires. It reports enemy retrograde operations and/or approaching reinforcements (see Figure 3-5).

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Figure 3-4. Reconnaissance handover (part two)

Figure 3-5. Reconnaissance handover (part three)

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Chapter 4

Security Operations
Security operations, as defined in FM 3-90, Tactics, are tactical enabling operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the threat, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. A review of history confirms these roles. Experience has demonstrated time and again that to preserve the striking power of an organization and preclude unnecessary attrition or premature culmination, each tactical echelon requires a specially trained organization capable of executing security missions to preserve freedom of action for the main body. Security operations cannot be divorced from reconnaissance missions. It is essential to remember that reconnaissance squadrons in the modular BCTs and BFSB are not organized, manned, or equipped for the full spectrum of security missions executed by the ACR and its squadrons. By virtue of their smaller organization, relatively lighter armament, and lack of organic armor, artillery, and manned aviation, the squadrons of the BCTs and BFSB must focus their efforts and mission sets on reconnaissance. There will be times and circumstances, however, when reconnaissance squadrons are tasked to execute security missions. In these instances, they may execute a screen or area or local security without significant augmentation. Guard and cover missions will require substantial augmentation and will, in most cases, be executed by the BCTs themselves.

Contents
Section I Basics of Security .................. 4-1 Squadrons Role in Security Operations ....................................... 4-1 Fundamentals of Security ................... 4-2 Section II Forms of Security .................. 4-2 Screen (Stationary/Moving)................. 4-3 Guard .................................................. 4-9 Cover .................................................. 4-9 Area Security ...................................... 4-9

SECTION I BASICS OF SECURITY


4-1. Security is an economy of force mission that is an essential part of all combat operations. It enables higher echelons to accomplish their missions by providing them with the time and space necessary to focus combat power on the decisive operation. The squadron often provides security for the higher commander along an exposed front, flank, or rear of the brigade or ACR. The squadron may perform security missions as part of a larger security force, or it may operate on its own with task organized attachments. Sustained security operations will normally require the entire squadron.

SQUADRONS ROLE IN SECURITY OPERATIONS


4-2. The reconnaissance squadron performs security missions to Provide the higher commander with information about the threat and terrain. Prevent the BCT/ACR (main body) from being surprised.

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Provide time and space for reaction. Preserve initiative and freedom of movement/maneuver. Protect and preserve the combat power of the BCT/ACR for decisive employment. 4-3. A key role for the squadron when performing a security mission is to provide the higher commander with relevant information that enables him to achieve SU (see FM 3-0, Operations). Examples of relevant information in a security mission include the following: Size, composition, and location of enemy reconnaissance elements. Direction and rate of movement of the enemy main body. Obstacles, avenues of approach, and key terrain and the effect on enemy and friendly maneuver. 4-4. Current trends stress the future likelihood of fighting battles in noncontiguous, extended AOs. Units will likely operate farther apart, creating significant gaps in the operational area. Despite the continual evolution of sophisticated sensors and collection assets, SU will never be perfect. This is especially true in periods of limited visibility and/or adverse weather (such as rain, sleet, or sandstorms). Uncertainty will always be a factor for commanders, their subordinate leaders, and their Soldiers. Accordingly, the squadron and its ground reconnaissance troops must always be prepared to conduct specific security missions.

FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY
4-5. The five fundamentals of security operations are the following: Provide early and accurate warning. Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Note. Alienation of the local population through ignorance of local customs, courtesies, and culture and unwillingness to interact will result in less distance and less reaction time as locals are less likely to warn U.S. forces of pending threats and threat developments. Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected. Perform continuous reconnaissance. Maintain threat contact.

SECTION II FORMS OF SECURITY


4-6. Security operations may be categorized in terms of the degree of security provided and the amount of combat power required. The five primary forms of security operations are the following (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information): Screen (stationary/moving). Guard. Cover. Area security (including convoy or route security). Local security. 4-7. All reconnaissance squadrons are organized and equipped to perform all of these missions except guard and cover. They can participate in a cover operation as part of a larger element, and they can perform guard operations only with significant combined arms augmentation. Note. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron cannot perform the same set of security missions as its counterparts in the HBCT, IBCT, SBCT, and ACR. It does, however, possess the capability to conduct screening missions for limited periods of time. Security missions (screen, guard, cover) at echelons of division and higher are normally assigned to BCTs. 4-8. A commander analyzes the degree of security required by the protected force in relation to the amount of reaction time and maneuver space his unit requires to perform the security mission. The amount

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of reaction time and maneuver space may be defined in his higher commanders intent. It can also be defined by the assigned security mission (such as screen, guard, or cover). 4-9. Commanders consider the mission variables (METT-TC) when employing their units in a security role. The ability of different reconnaissance organizations to execute security tasks is related to their organization and the capabilities of their equipment. In planning and executing a security mission, specific considerations for the commander or staff include the following: Number of OPs or patrols needed to provide the required level of security to the protected force. Time needed to occupy OPs. Time needed to establish the screen. Distance to be traveled to the positions. Impact of the range of supporting fires on positioning of OPs. Locations and times for reconnaissance handover and/or battle handover with the protected force, including how much time is needed to conduct the handover. Time and distance needed for subordinate elements to displace to subsequent positions. Note. A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat, reconnaissance, or security mission. A patrols organization is temporary and specifically matched to the immediate task. See FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, for additional information on patrols and patrolling.

SCREEN (STATIONARY/MOVING)
4-10. Screen missions are defensive in nature and are largely accomplished by establishing OPs oriented on an AO augmented with patrols (mounted, dismounted, sensor, and aerial) to ensure surveillance of dead space. The screen, however, must be executed aggressively. Based on the commanders intent (engagement criteria) and unit capabilities, the screening force must disrupt enemy reconnaissance and impede, harass, or even destroy the enemy with fires. The screen is appropriate when operations have created extended flanks, when gaps exist between maneuver units that cannot be controlled, or when early warning is required in gaps that are not considered critical enough to require security in greater strength. This permits the protected force commander to maximize the security effort where contact is most expected. 4-11. Because it is defensive in nature, a screen may be performed in all directions for a stationary protected force out to supporting range of the BCTs organic artillery. A screen is performed to the flanks or rear, but not in front of a moving force. Zone reconnaissance (covered in Chapter 3) and guard (not suitable for an unaugmented reconnaissance squadron) are missions given to units in front of a moving force.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


4-12. Screens, even for a stationary protected force, are active operations of which stationary OPs and surveillance assets are only one part of the overall mission. To ensure continuous surveillance, the screen requires employment of mounted and dismounted patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and OPs that can be repositioned over extended distances. Inactivity in a stationary screen yields identifiable and exploitable gaps for the threat. 4-13. Depth is critical in a screen. It allows for reconnaissance handover of threat contact from one element to another without displacing. Depth is used to achieve the following results: Prevent the threat from easily identifying and penetrating the screen. Prevent gaps from occurring when OPs displace or are destroyed. Facilitate the destruction of enemy reconnaissance elements without compromising critical OPs. 4-14. Depth is achieved by positioning OPs, UASs, ground-based sensors, Prophet systems, and attached units between the front line trace and rear boundary of the security force. Note that when the term screen line is used, it describes only the trace along which security is provided, not the linear positioning of assets. Again, depth is critical for success of the screen.

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4-15. Displacement of the screen elements to subsequent positions is event-driven. The approach of an identified and specified threat element, detection by a threat force, relief by a friendly unit, or movement of the protected force may dictate displacement. Collapsing of the screen, executed by well-rehearsed drills performed at all levels, provides security and maintains contact for the squadron as it displaces. The protected force commander does not usually place a time requirement on the duration of the screen unless the intent is to provide a higher level of security to the protected force or to provide a tentative time frame for subordinate unit planning.

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
4-16. Screens have certain execution considerations that guide planning but are not a fixed checklist or a specific execution sequence (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information). Execution considerations for a screen include the following: Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach that affect the main bodys mission. Conduct counterreconnaissance to destroy, defeat, or repel all threat reconnaissance elements within capabilities and in accordance with engagement criteria. When facing an echeloned enemy force, locate and identify the lead elements that indicate the enemys main attack, as prescribed in the enemys order of battle based on IPB. Determine the direction of threat movement. Maintain contact and report threat activities even while displacing. Impede and harass the enemy within capabilities while displacing to provide the protected force commander with additional time and maneuver space. Detect and report all enemy ground elements attempting to pass through the screen. Note. To enhance the effectiveness and depth of the screen, the squadrons subordinate elements conduct reconnaissance handover and/or battle handover to pass contact from one element to another. In this way, the squadron uses the methods of reconnaissance managementcueing, mixing, redundancy, and task organizationto maintain threat contact and protect the main effort in accordance with the commanders intent. See Chapter 3 for discussion on reconnaissance handover and reconnaissance management.

STATIONARY SCREEN
4-17. A squadron executing a stationary screen mission requires the following minimum guidance: General trace of screen and time it must be established. Width of the screened sector. Force to be screened. Rear boundary of the screening force. Possible follow-on missions.

Squadron Planning Considerations


4-18. Given the higher commanders guidance (focus, tempo, and engagement/disengagement criteria), the squadron commander quickly considers the following in planning the screen (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information): Location of the initial screen. Movement/maneuver to occupy the screen. Assigned AOs for ground troops. Air and ground integration. Surveillance and acquisition assets. FS planning. Mobility/countermobility/survivability. Positioning of C2 nodes.

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Sustainment. Control of displacement to subsequent positions. Reconnaissance handover between screening elements.

Initial Screen
4-19. The higher headquarters establishes the general location of the initial screen. It is adjusted closer to the protected force only with approval. Because the initial screen often represents the FLOT, it is considered a restrictive control measure requiring coordination when units move beyond it to conduct aerial surveillance or ground reconnaissance. If operations forward of the screen are required, a PL is established to designate the squadron LOA. Key considerations in locating the screen are the following: Fields of observation/detection from behind the screen. Requirements to observe specific NAIs or TAIs. Range of supporting fires, if available. 4-20. With permission, the squadron can adjust the initial screen to best meet these considerations.

Movement to Occupy the Screen


4-21. Time available and the threat situation determine the method of occupation of the screen, selected from three primary methods: Zone reconnaissance. Infiltration. Tactical road march. Note. Refer to Chapter 3 for detailed information on zone reconnaissance and infiltration.

Areas of Operations for Subordinate Elements


4-22. The reconnaissance squadron commander designates AOs for subordinate elements, including responsibility for NAIs and TAIs. Reconnaissance troops are normally deployed abreast with troop elements established in depth; UASs and/or ground-based sensors and Prophet systems are positioned to provide the squadron with additional depth. Reduced depth is the trade-off when screening extended frontages. When forced to do so, the commander may have to assign specific terrain to UASs coupled with sensors. This terrain, however, should not be along critical high-speed avenues of approach. Plans must include the use of reconnaissance management (cueing, mixing, redundancy, task organization) to maximize coverage and effectiveness. As necessary, they must also compensate for the absence of visual observation by aerial assets (such as in adverse weather) by specifying how to adjust ground OPs or positions.

Air and Ground Integration


4-23. UASs or attached manned aviation assets (such as OH-58D Kiowas and/or AH-64D Apaches) may conduct surveillance forward, to the rear, or on the flanks of ground elements to add depth and extend capabilities of the ground screen. These assets may patrol along exposed flanks or in gaps between ground OPs, augment the surveillance of NAIs, or generally add redundancy and depth within the sector. Aviation assets can also provide continuous observation of threat elements to allow reconnaissance ground troops to displace to subsequent positions. Note. Aviation assets do not necessarily fly forward of the screen. They can simply fly higher (METT-TC dependent) to see over the terrain.

Surveillance and Acquisition Assets


4-24. Using its own or the higher headquarters organic surveillance and acquisition assets (such as UASs, ground sensors, and observers), the squadron develops a plan to provide early warning on the most likely

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avenues of approach. Nonorganic, higher assets (such as JSTARS or Guardrail) are then requested to provide earlier acquisition information to cue squadron assets. Note. Most likely avenues are not necessarily the high-speed avenues. The factors of METT-TC will influence the most likely avenues. 4-25. These higher-level assets can also be requested to aid the squadron when it is collapsing the screen and therefore most vulnerableor to assist in regaining contact with the threat if contact is lost. If the squadron is screening extended frontages, these assets can operate in an economy of force role, conducting periodic surveillance on areas the threat is less likely, but still has the possibility, of using.

Fire Planning
4-26. Fire planning includes the integration of indirect and direct fires, attack aviation, and CAS. It is driven by the higher commanders intent for the screenwhether its purpose is to report only, to disrupt, or to destroy/delay specific elements of the threats formations. Targets are planned at chokepoints on likely approaches, in areas where the threat must slow down, or in conjunction with emplaced obstacles. EAs are planned to help focus fires in areas along likely threat avenues of approach where the fires have the greatest likelihood of achieving desired effects. It is critical that the higher headquarters clearly identify what supporting artillery is available for the screening force, the command relationship, artillery tactical missions, the communications/digital linkages, artillery positioning plans, and FSCMs such as an NFA covering friendly OPs or positions.

Mobility, Countermobility, and Survivability


4-27. Engineers may be attached for specific tasks, such as OP survivability, improvement of roads and trails for lateral movement, and emplacement of situational obstacles. These obstacles are planned and possibly prepared, but are not executed until specific criteria are met. This means units may or may not execute situational obstacles, depending on how the battle develops. These be prepared obstacles provide the commander with tactical flexibility. FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, provides specific considerations for planning situational obstacles. Generally, mine dispensing systems are the most frequently used since they can rapidly and precisely emplace a minefield with set self-destruct times. In screen operations, situational obstacles can be used both to disrupt and delay the threat (in conjunction with fires) and to protect elements of the squadron.

C2 and Sustainment
4-28. In many instances, both the squadron tactical command post (TAC CP) and main CP must be operational to support C2 over extended distances and to maintain communications and digital linkages with higher headquarters and the squadrons subordinate elements. Initial and subsequent locations of the CPs must be integrated into the higher headquarters communications plan to ensure continuous digital connectivity. 4-29. Sustainment assets must be prepared for operations extended in both time and space. Squadron assets screening well forward or to the flanks of the BCT/ACR may require support from the closest battalion. This is determined early in the planning process to allow the supporting battalion time to conduct planning, coordinate with adjacent units, and position assets to provide sustainment to the reconnaissance units.

Control of Displacement to Subsequent Positions


4-30. PLs and checkpoints are used to control this event-driven operation. The squadron plan defines the event criteria that trigger displacement.

MOVING SCREEN
4-31. The same planning considerations discussed earlier for stationary screens apply to a moving screen as well, although emphasis may shift because the main body is moving. The squadron may be required either to conduct moving flank screens or to screen the rear of the BCT/ACR as it attacks. Screening the

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rear of a moving force is essentially the same as a stationary screen. As the protected force moves, the squadron occupies a series of successive screens. Movement is regulated by the requirement to maintain the time and distance factors desired by the main body commander. UASs or sensors may be incorporated into the screen during movement of ground troops or employed to extend the areas of coverage. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.) Four basic methods of movement may be used by both ground and aerial reconnaissance assets (see Table 4-1): Alternate bounds by individual OPs (see Figure 4-1). Alternate bounds by subordinate units (platoons or troops) (see Figure 4-1). Successive bounds (see Figure 4-2). Continuous marching (see Figure 4-2). 4-32. The moving flank screen poses additional considerations. The width of the AO is not as important as the force being protected and the threat avenues of approach that might affect the main bodys movement. The squadron screens from the front of the lead combat element of the main body to the rear of the protected elements (excluding front and rear security forces). Depending on distance from the main body and METT-TC, squadron sustainment assets may move with the BSB in the main body.

Figure 4-1. Alternate bounds by individual OPs and by subordinate units

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Figure 4-2. Successive bounds and continuous marching Table 4-1. Methods of screen movement
METHOD Alternate Bounds by OPs Alternate Bounds by Units CONSIDERATIONS
Protected force moves faster Contact possible Bound rear to front Protected force moves faster By platoon or troop Contact possible Bound rear to front Slow protected force By platoon or troop Contact possible Simultaneously or in succession Air screen during ground move Very fast protected force Perform as route reconnaissance Contact not likely Air screen on flank

ADVANTAGES
Very secure Maintain maximum surveillance Fast Good surveillance Maintain unit integrity Most secure Maintain maximum surveillance Maintain unit integrity

DISADVANTAGES
Slow Disrupt unit integrity May leave temporary gaps

Successive Bounds

Slowest method Less secure during simultaneous move May leave temporary gaps

Continuous Marching

Fast Maintain unit integrity

Least secure

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GUARD
4-33. The guard differs from a screen in that the guard force must contain sufficient combat power to defeat, cause withdrawal of, or fix threat combat forces before they can engage the protected force. A guard is appropriate when Contact is expected. There is an exposed flank or a threat force to the rear. The protected force is conducting a retrograde operation. There is a requirement for greater protection than a screen can provide. 4-34. A guard force routinely engages enemy forces with all available meansincluding direct and indirect firesto prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position where it could observe and engage the main body. The guard mission may entail decisive engagement of the enemy. The guard force is deployed in a smaller AO or narrower frontage than a screen to permit flexibility and concentration in applying combat power. The guard force may act as a fixing force to enable maneuver of the main effort. 4-35. There are three types of guard operations: advance, flank, and rear guard. A guard mission may be assigned to protect either a stationary or a moving force. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.)

COVER
4-36. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. In addition, a covering force operates apart from the main body to develop the situation early; it conducts operations to deceive, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces. Unlike screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically selfcontained and capable of operating independently of the main body. The squadron may be tasked to participate in a cover mission as part of a larger force. Normally, the covering force at division level and higher is built around an ACR or HBCT. Operating as a covering force is a high-frequency mission for an ACR. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.)

AREA SECURITY
4-37. Area security is conducted to deny the threat the ability to influence friendly actions in a specific area or to deny the threat use of an area for its own purposes (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information). It includes reconnaissance of the area specified for protection, including personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, MSRs, lines of communications (LOC), terrain features, towns, equipment, and critical points. It may entail occupying and establishing a 360-degree perimeter around the area being secured or taking actions to destroy threat forces already present. Area security operations may require the execution of a wide variety of supporting operations and tasks; augmentation may be necessary.

SQUADRON TASKS
4-38. The reconnaissance squadron may task subordinate units to conduct the following in support of squadron area security operations: Area, route, and/or zone reconnaissance. Screen. Offense and defensive tasks (within capabilities). Route and convoy security. Security for high-value assets.

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
4-39. When conducting an area security mission, the squadron prevents threat ground reconnaissance elements from directly observing friendly activities within the area being secured. It also prevents (within capabilities) threat ground maneuver forces from penetrating the defensive perimeters established by the commander. The commander can have his subordinate troops employ a variety of techniques such as OPs,

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BPs, ambushes, and combat outposts to accomplish this security mission. A reserve or quick reaction force (QRF) enables him to react to unforeseen contingencies. Using the intelligence acquisition capability available to the squadron and the BCT/ACR, the squadron can execute ambushes and preemptive strikes proactively and with greater precision. 4-40. Again, METT-TC determines required augmentation for the squadron. Of particular importance is the need for such assets as aviation, maneuver forces, engineers, HUMINT assets, and military police (MP). Early warning of threat activity is paramount in area security missions and provides the commander with time and space to react to threats. Failure to conduct continuous reconnaissance may create a vulnerable seam within which the enemy can execute an infiltration or attack. 4-41. A unit establishes a perimeter when it must secure an area where the defense is not tied into an adjacent unit. Perimeters vary in shape and distribution of assets based on the results of IPB and METTTC. A most probable direction of attack may require the massing of combat power in that portion of the perimeter to defeat an attack and/or infiltration. If the perimeter is inward-focused, as in stability operations or counterinsurgency, the massing of combat power would prevent exfiltration or a breakout from the secured area. 4-42. The unit establishing the perimeter typically divides it into troop/platoon sectors with boundaries and contact points. The unit employs integrated OPs, ground-based sensors, UASs, HUMINT assets, and mounted and dismounted patrols. Attached tanks, mobile gun systems (MGS), and other antiarmor weapon systems (attached or organic) are emplaced to orient on high-speed avenues of approach. UASs and ground-based sensors provide overlapping surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities at extended distances from the perimeter. Figure 4-3 depicts an example of an SBCT reconnaissance squadron conducting area security of a small village. 4-43. Area security is a frequent mission during stability operations, when circumstances may not permit establishment of clearly defined perimeters. When a perimeter is not feasible, the reconnaissance squadron secures the area by establishing a presence and conducting reconnaissance operations throughout the area. Subordinate units may establish perimeters around base camps, critical infrastructure, and high-value assets, while other units conduct operations to establish presence, provide security, and assist stability or relief operations. The squadron may position reaction forces or disperse its reserve among several secured perimeters. Other missions or tasks in support of area security may include the following: Route and/or convoy security of critical LOCs. Checkpoint operations to monitor or control movement. Patrols to cover gaps between secured perimeters. Maintaining an observable presence.

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Figure 4-3. SBCT reconnaiss T sance squadr conducting area security ron

ROUT SECURITY TE
4-44. Route sec curity operatio are a spec ons cialized kind o area security operations c of y conducted to p protect LOCs and frien ndly forces m moving along t them. Althoug they are de gh efensive in na ature, route se ecurity perations are conducted aggr c ressively. Unli screen mis ike ssions, they ar terrain-orien re nted. The purpose of op ro oute security is to prevent a t s threat from attacking, destroy ying, seizing, c containing, im mpeding, or har rassing traffic along the route. It also prevents the threat from in e o nterdicting traffic by emplac cing obstacles on or estroying portions of the rout te. de 4-45. Threat fo orces will try to interdict s supply routes and LOCs b a variety o methods. R by of Roads, waterways, and railways may be mined; amb w bush sites can b located adja be acent to the rou being secur or ute red; br ridges and tun nnels can be d destroyed by d demolitions. Be ecause of the nature of this mission, very long s y ro outes may be extremely diffi e icult to secure; however, measures can be enforced to m ; mitigate the risk from k th hreat forces.

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Execution Considerations
4-46. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route. The squadron may be used in an economy of force role by its higher headquarters to secure critical MSRs or other routes. To accomplish the route security mission, the force will perform the following functions: Conduct continuous mounted and dismounted reconnaissance of the route and key locations along it to ensure the route is trafficable. Conduct route clearance at irregular intervals to prevent emplacement of threat mines and explosive devices along the route. Identify sections of the route to search suspected threat locations. Establish roadblocks/checkpoints along the route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles and persons on the route and those entering the route. Occupy key locations and terrain along or near the route. If possible, establish a screen oriented to prevent threat observation and/or direct fire weapons from influencing the route. Aggressively conduct ground and aerial patrols/surveillance to maintain route security. Establish OPs (covert/overt) or ambushes at critical points to watch for threat activity.

Route Security Techniques


4-47. The following discussion highlights two techniques that the reconnaissance squadron can use in executing route security depending on the nature of the threat, purpose of the security mission, and characteristics of the route. 4-48. In the first technique, the squadron or troop conducts route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to avoid developing a pattern that the threat may exploit. Troops reconnoiter the route; they may conduct zone reconnaissance to either flank. UASs or attached manned aviation assets may reconnoiter in advance of ground troops or assist in screening the flanks. In addition to reconnaissance, troops or platoons may escort engineers as they conduct route clearance, improvement, or maintenance; clear terrain at potential ambush sites; and repair damage caused by threat actions. 4-49. The second technique entails protecting only critical lengths or locations along the route that have been identified during the IPB process. The squadron or troop establishes mutually supporting combat outposts and provides security between them. The combat outposts are established at critical choke points to prevent sabotage and to defend against or respond to attacks to interdict the route between outposts. Based on METT-TC, a troop can establish one or two combat outposts; a squadron can typically establish up to six. The route outside the reach of the combat outposts is not normally secured or patrolled. A squadron can provide route security by combining this technique at two locations or critical choke points with route reconnaissance along the rest of the route. Combat outposts should include FS assets, troop mortars, or howitzer sections capable of massing fires in support of both the outposts and the operations between them. Patrols are conducted at irregular intervals between the outposts based on threat trends and recent activities. Patrols must be organized with sufficient combat power to destroy far ambushes and to survive initial threat contact from near ambushes. Each combat outpost maintains a reaction force to respond to threat activity or reinforce patrols. 4-50. Other techniques to defeat threat attempts to interdict the route or ambush convoys include the following: Deceptive mock convoys under escort to determine threat reactions. Ambushes along known or suspected dismounted approaches to the route. Registered indirect fires triggered by sensor cues, followed by patrols. Combat patrols use fires to harass and interdict the enemy at irregular intervals during limited visibility, prior to sunrise, or before critical convoys to detect and destroy ambushes. 4-51. Although UASs cannot secure the route, they can assist in observing the route by conducting aerial surveillance, effectively covering large areas in a short time on a continuous basis. UASs can also assist in providing surveillance depth to the screen securing the route. Ground sensors can be used in surveillance of

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key avenues of approach or areas that do not require continuous surveillance by scouts. This reduces the manpower and sustainment demands on the squadrons resources.

CONVOY SECURITY
4-52. Convoy security is a subset of area security. The squadron as a whole rarely performs convoy security, typically assigning convoy security missions to its subordinate units. Convoy security missions are conducted when insufficient friendly forces are available to continuously secure LOCs in an AO. They may also be conducted in conjunction with route security operations as part of an area security mission. A convoy security force operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated route, or it may be integrated into the body of the convoy. Convoy security missions are offensive in nature and orient on the force being protected. 4-53. Commanders consider the mission variables when task organizing to support convoy security missions. The ability of different reconnaissance organizations to execute convoy security is related to their organization and the capabilities of their equipment. 4-54. A convoy security mission has certain critical tasks that guide planning and execution (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information). To protect a convoy, the security force must accomplish the following: Reconnoiter the route the convoy will travel. Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the threat could influence movement along the route. Provide early warning of enemy presence along the route. Prevent the enemy from impeding, harassing, containing, seizing, or destroying the convoy.

Organization
4-55. If possible, the convoy security force should be a combined arms organization, with integrated air and ground assets. Ideally, a convoy security force has sufficient combat power to organize into the following elements (see Figure 4-4): Advance guard. The advance guard performs tasks associated with zone and route reconnaissance forward of the convoy. It may perform duties of the security element. Security element. The security element provides early warning and security to the convoys flanks and rear. It may also perform duties of the escort element. Escort element. The escort element provides close-in protection to the convoy. It may also provide a response force to assist in repelling or destroying threat contact. Reaction force. The reaction force provides firepower and support to assist the other elements in developing the situation or conducting a hasty attack. It may also perform duties of the escort element.

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Figure 4-4. Convoy security organization

Execution Considerations
4-56. Commanders plan and execute all movements of troops and supplies as tactical operations. Because of the inherent dangers of convoy operations, emphasis is on extensive security measures, which include the following: OPSEC when planning and disseminating orders, strict noise and light discipline during movement, and varying routes and schedules (within guidance for designated routes). Coordination for FS, aerial support, and communications with units in AOs through which the convoy will move. This includes understanding how support is used to assist movement, both in enforcing preventive measures and in conducting close, continuous support of combat operations. Coordination with the supported unit moving in the formation, including C2, locations for leaders, communications, medical support, and weapon systems. Identification of possible enemy ambush sites during IPB. Contingency plans, actions on contact, battle drills, formations, and movement techniques to prepare for enemy contact, including ambushes. Use of passive and active EW systems to counter IEDs. Note. Employment of overwatch mitigates the risk of being decisively engaged during movement and is a critical factor in reacting effectively to an ambush.

Convoy Security Techniques


4-57. Convoy security missions generate unique requirements that the commander and staff must take into account when formulating a plan. The convoy security commander and his subordinates are briefed on the latest information regarding the threat situation and the area through which the convoy will pass. The

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commander formulates his plans and issues his orders, covering commanders intent, assignment of security force elements (reconnaissance, screen, escort, and reaction), the movement formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, and detailed plans for actions on contact. Immediate action drills (such as enemy ambush, obstacle, and react to indirect fire) must be identified and rehearsed prior to movement and executed in case of contact. 4-58. The squadron may maintain a reserve or QRF to support convoy movement if the squadron is assigned an AO or the convoy is moving only a short distance. If the squadron does not have an assigned AO or the convoy will move over an extended distance (beyond the range of squadron support), the reserve/QRF is provided by the unit(s) through whose AOs the convoy moves. In either case, enemy forces must be convinced that ambushes will produce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response, which can be accomplished only through coordination with the supporting units before movement begins. 4-59. Communications are vital to the success of movement. Leaders plan FM and digital communications with convoy elements and with units occupying AOs along the route of movement to ensure availability of support assets. Visual and sound signals are prearranged. These signals include colored smoke, identification panels, whistles or horn signals, and escalation of force signs. While limited, these communications means are effective when prearranged signals and responses are understood and rehearsed. 4-60. When possible, units should coordinate fire support along the entire route of movement. Coordination with FS cells that can provide fire along the route of movement ensure that FISTs can enter the FM voice or digital FDC net, send routine location reports, and request and adjust fires. Leaders must coordinate call signs, frequencies, areas of employment, schedules of movement, and target numbers prior to convoy movement. 4-61. Air defense of the convoy must be addressed if an air threat is possible. The convoy elements should review small arms air defense procedures and establish orientation sectors. Air defense reinforcements should be orchestrated into the movement and defense plan. If the route falls under an existing air defense umbrella, the squadron staff should conduct the appropriate coordination with the controlling air defense headquarters. 4-62. Convoy security operations in an urban environment or built-up area require different emphasis and techniques than those in rural areas. The population density and characteristics of the area may require the use of nonlethal weapons and the careful application of lethal weapons. To ensure they apply minimum essential force to minimize loss of life and destruction of property, leaders must conduct detailed planning, coordination, and control. Whenever possible, convoys should move through populated areas when these areas are least congested and therefore pose less danger to the security of the convoy. Convoy operations may require assistance from military or local police and other government agencies to secure the route before the convoy enters the built-up area. 4-63. The squadron S-4 and unit commanders must carefully plan for sustainment in convoy security operations. Fuel and maintenance elements should be included in the convoy itself or pre-positioned in secure areas along the route. A detailed precombat inspection (PCI) must be performed before the convoy starts movement to ensure that vehicles are full of fuel, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) have been performed, and potential maintenance problems are eliminated. Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) must be planned in detail along the entire movement route. To ensure that immediate medical support is available, coordination must be maintained among the convoy security force, the squadron aid station, the squadron CP, the combat trains CP (CTCP) when deployed, and designated units along the route. Because of the possibility of operating over extended distances from the squadron aid station, aerial medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is the preferred means of evacuation and must be planned and rehearsed in detail.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY OF HIGH-VALUE ASSETS


4-64. High-value assets are those whose capture or destruction by enemy forces could decisively change the course of the operation. Security missions to protect high-value assets are an important component of area security in both major combat operations and stability operations.

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4-65. Examples of high-value assets to be secured in major combat operations include the following: Major power-generation facilities (power plants, dams). Airports, seaports, and other centers for mass transit. Industrial complexes. Cities. Refugee camps. 4-66. Examples of high-value assets to be secured in stability operations include the following: Government officials and political and military leaders. Government facilities. High-profile detainees. Pipelines and relay stations. 4-67. Considerations the squadron must address when it tasks subordinate elements to secure high-value assets include the following: Internet protocol (IP) address, frequencies, location, and linkup point of the high-value asset. Route to be used in reaching the high-value asset and composition and disposition of enemy forces that can influence the route. Mission and movement/positioning plan of the high-value asset. How easily the high-value asset can be detected and targeted with indirect fire. The security force must consider its own survivability and maintain adequate standoff from the high-value asset. Duration of the mission and sustainment considerations. Other friendly or neutral forces in the area and their task and purpose. Triggers for change of mission from security to reconnaissance, offensive, or defensive operations. Is there an implied reserve mission? Ability of the security force to maintain communications with higher headquarters. Locations that could be used by enemy personnel serving as forward observers for enemy indirect fire systems.

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Offensive Operations
The offense is the decisive element of full-spectrum operations. Although the fundamental role of the squadron is reconnaissance, cavalry units have historically performed offensive operations. In todays modular force, offensive missions are often conducted by the squadron in an economy of force role for its higher headquarters. With the exception of the BFSB reconnaissance squadron, the reconnaissance and cavalry squadrons are capable of conducting offensive operations based on mission variables (METT-TC) and the higher commanders guidance. The higher commander must understand that assigning a mission to perform offensive operations precludes the squadron from performing its primary mission of reconnaissance, which in turn is a key component in enabling the commander to develop SU, make better and quicker plans and decisions, and visualize and direct operations. This chapter discusses the squadrons conduct of offensive operations. It begins with a discussion of the primary offensive tasks and then addresses how the squadron transitions to other operations. Reconnaissance or security operations performed by the squadron in support of offensive operations conducted by its higher headquarters are covered in Chapter 3 and 4, respectively.

Contents
Section I Purpose of Offensive Operations .............................................. 5-1 Section II - Movement to Contact ............. 5-3 Organization ....................................... 5-3 Execution Considerations ................... 5-4 Section III Attack ..................................... 5-7 Operational Considerations................. 5-7 Sequence of Attack ............................. 5-8 Special-Purpose Attacks ................... 5-11 Section IV Transitions .......................... 5-11 Consolidation .................................... 5-11 Reorganization .................................. 5-12

SECTION I PURPOSE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS


5-1. Offensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commanders will on the enemy (FM 3-0, Operations). In a dynamic, complex OE against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct way of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to achieve decisive results. Offensive operations compel the enemy to react, creating or revealing weaknesses that the attacker can exploit. Successful offensive operations place tremendousand continuouspressure on defenders, leading either to defeat of the enemy or, at a minimum, the retreat and/or disintegration of the threat. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.) 5-2. When tasked to defeat an enemy or adversary, the squadron seeks to accomplish this through the most appropriate defeat mechanism (i.e., dislocation, isolation, disruption, or destruction). Through maneuver conducted during offensive operations, the squadron seeks to place the enemy at a positional

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disadvantage. This allows the squadron to mass the effects of combat power while defeating parts of the enemy force in detail before the enemy can escape or be reinforced. When required, the squadron closes with and destroys the enemy in close combat. 5-3. There are four primary offensive tasksmovement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit (FM 3-90 and FM 3-0). Of these, the squadron is expected to perform movement to contact and attack independently with augmentation based on mission variables. Because the squadron can conduct of movement to contact and attack independently, this section provides a detailed discussion of how the squadron plans and executes these tasks. The squadron can expect to conduct movement to contact and attack missions as part of its higher headquarters conduct of exploitation and pursuit. Based on the nature of the enemy, the squadron can conduct local exploitation to take advantage of successful attacks. The squadron acts to maintain contact with enemy forces and, when directed by its higher headquarters, takes actions designed to interdict or isolate an enemy force with the aim of destroying it. 5-4. For the BCT reconnaissance squadrons, the mission variables of enemy and terrain have the most significant impact on their ability to conduct a movement to contact or attack. The nature of the threat presented by enemy forces (for example, traditional or irregular) must be considered in relation to the amount of combat power the squadron can generate. Terrain factors must also be considered. Operating over extended distances or in complex terrain such as a densely populated city may exceed the squadrons ability to generate adequate combat power for offensive operations. 5-5. The mission variable of troops available is a unique consideration for the IBCT reconnaissance squadron. The reconnaissance squadron possesses the greatest amount of firepower, mobility, and protection within the IBCT. Mounted on lightly armored wheeled vehicles, the squadrons two mounted troops can employ a total of 12 MK19 grenade launchers, 16 caliber .50 machine guns, six TOW missile systems, and four 120-mm mortars. 5-6. Regardless of type, offensive operations conducted by the squadron follow a general sequence. Each phase has a start point and end point (such as a specified time, event, or condition) with task and purpose statements for each element in the squadron. Considerations for the sequence of offensive operations include the following: Preparation/reconnaissance. During this phase, preparation time is used to conduct precombat checks (PCC) and PCIs, rehearsals at all levels, and sustainment activities. The squadron also conducts extensive reconnaissance of the objective to support the commanders decisions on how to employ the squadrons combat power against the enemy. He normally does not make final decisions until reconnaissance operations determine the enemy situation to the greatest extent possible. Movement to line of departure (LD). If attacking from positions not in contact, the squadron often stages in an assembly area, moves to attack positions behind friendly units in contact with the enemy, conducts a passage of lines, and begins the attack. In certain circumstances (such as a noncontiguous AO), there may not be an LD. Approach to the objective. The squadron plans the approach to the objective to ensure security, speed, and flexibility. Routes, movement techniques, and movement formations are selected that best support actions on the objective. All leaders must recognize this portion of the operation as a fight, not a movement. The squadron may have to fight through enemy obstacles, artillery strikes, security elements, and other combat multipliers to reach the objective. The squadron employs techniques that avoid the enemys strength when possible; it seeks to achieve surprise to strike the enemy from a flank or the rear.

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Actions on the objective. The squadrons objective may be a specific terrain feature or enemy force. If the objective is an enemy force, an objective area may be assigned for orientation, but the decisive operation is focused on the location of enemys weakest point. Actions on the objective start when the squadron begins placing fires on the objective. For a movement to contact, this begins when the squadron makes initial contact with an enemy force and begins to develop the situation. Consolidation/reorganization. Based on the mission variables, the squadron may conduct consolidation and reorganization. The squadron secures and strengthens the objective so it can be defended against counterattack. It then reorganizes to prepare for follow-on operations if required. Transition. The squadron executes follow-on missions as directed by the higher commander. The squadron develops plans for follow-on missions based on the higher headquarters plan, the higher commanders intent, and the anticipated situation.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO CONTACT


5-7. Unlike a zone reconnaissance, which is focused on reporting detailed information on the terrain and enemy within a given zone, a movement to contact is focused on finding the enemy. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.) 5-8. A movement to contact contributes to the defeat of an enemy by developing the situation and determining the enemys intent, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses. The movement to contact enables further offensive or defensive operations focused on defeating enemy forces through their dislocation, isolation, disruption, or destruction. 5-9. The squadron normally conducts a movement to contact mission as the lead element of an ACR or BCT attack or as a counterattack element of an ACR or BCT. A properly executed movement to contact develops the combat situation and maintains the commanders freedom of maneuver after making contact. This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative.

ORGANIZATION
5-10. A movement to contact is characterized by rapid, aggressive action. The critical tasks are geared for achieving fast movement and rapid location of enemy forces. The squadron normally organizes into the following elements when conducting a movement to contact (see Figure 5-1): Security force. This element allows the squadron to locate the enemy with the minimum force. Advance guard. This element protects the main body from surprise attack and develops the situation to protect the deployment of the main body. Main body. The main body contains the bulk of the squadrons maneuver elements and keys its movement on the advance guard. Flank guard and rear guard. These elements prevent the enemy from surprising the main body.

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Figure 5-1. Organization for movement to contact

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
5-11. The movement to contact usually starts from an LD at the time specified in the OPORD. The rate of movement is controlled by using PLs, contact points, and checkpoints as required. The depth of the movement to contact is controlled using an LOA or a forward boundary. (See FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, for additional information.) 5-12. One or more objectives can be designated to limit the extent of the movement to contact and orient the squadron; however, this is done only to guide movement. The movement to contact may result in taking a terrain objective, but the primary focus should be on the enemy force. An axis of advance can be used to guide movement in limited visibility; however, there is the risk of enemy forces outside the axis not being detected and thus being inadvertently bypassed.

DEVELOP THE SITUATION


5-13. A key goal during execution of a movement to contact is to prevent a meeting engagement with the enemy. Planning must allow for flexibility and promote subordinates initiative. This is accomplished by issuing a clear commanders intent, developing a simple concept of operations, and developing a series of DPs to execute likely maneuver options. In developing his concept, the squadron commander anticipates where he is likely to meet the enemy based on IPB and then determines how to develop the situation. He

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defines the conditions in terms of enemy and friendly strengths and dispositions that are likely to trigger execution of identified maneuver options. 5-14. Timely and accurate intelligence facilitates the squadron commanders selection of an appropriate COA as the situation develops. Usually, the commander makes the final decision for execution of a COA based on the progress of the initial engagement of the advance guard. The squadron movement to contact generally ends with the commitment of the main body. The following paragraphs provide a general description of the COAs that may develop as a result of a movement to contact.

Bypass
5-15. If rapid forward movement is required and the higher commander has authorized bypass of enemy forces, the squadron can bypass. If the size and mobility of the bypassed force represents a threat, the squadron must fix or contain the enemy force until released by the higher headquarters.

Attack by Fire
5-16. An ABF is effective against a moving or infiltrating force that is not aware of the presence of the squadron. Instead of immediately engaging the enemy, the advance guard (and possibly the entire squadron) moves into hasty ABF positions oriented on an EA. This option is influenced by the information available from FBCB2, by rehearsals and battle drills, and by the speed and accuracy with which FRAGOs and other instructions can be developed and passed. When most of the enemy is in the EA, the squadron uses massed direct and indirect fires and maneuver to attack the enemy.

Attack
5-17. The commander directs an attack when the squadron has the element of surprise or when the enemy is disorganized and/or in a state of disruption. The squadron commander quickly develops a scheme of maneuver and concept of fires for the attack and distributes orders to subordinate units. He employs fires, CAS, and situational obstacles. He controls movement, deployment, and possible changes to the task organization of the squadron. After a successful attack, the squadron may continue the movement to contact or execute other missions as directed by the higher commander.

Defend
5-18. The squadron commander directs a defense when the squadron has insufficient combat power to attack, when the enemys superior strength forces the squadron to halt and prepare for a more deliberate operation, or when the squadron loses the freedom to maneuver. The commander seeks to defeat an attacking enemy force and create the opportunity for offensive action. This may result in the squadron becoming a fixing force to enable the higher headquarters to execute further offensive operations against the enemy force. 5-19. The squadron maneuvers to the best available defensible terrain, either to the front or to the rear. The squadron commander may direct the advance guard or another security force to delay an enemy attack to provide time for establishment of a defense. Subordinate units quickly deploy, establish security, array forces, and develop fire and obstacle plans. Special emphasis is placed on flank protection and adjacent unit coordination. As the enemy attacks, the squadron commander repositions and maneuvers forces to defeat the enemy through massed fires, situational obstacles, and counterattacks. The commander seeks to defeat the attacking enemy force and create the opportunity for offensive action. In some cases, the squadron may need to retain its position to allow the higher commander time to commit additional forces.

SEARCH AND ATTACK


5-20. Search and attack is a technique for conducting a movement to contact. It is most often used during operations within noncontiguous AOs. The squadron conducts search and attack when the enemy is operating in small, dispersed elements or when the task is to deny the enemy movement in an area. The squadrons mission may be to destroy enemy forces, deny the enemy certain areas, protect the force, or

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collect information. The higher headquarters assists the squadron by ensuring the availability of adequate supporting fires, mobile transportation assets, timely and accurate intelligence, and reserve forces. 5-21. The squadron conducts search and attack operations by organizing into reconnaissance, fix, and finish forces. Each of these forces has a specific task and purpose. The finish force is the decisive operation. 5-22. Search and attack can be executed at any level above platoon, but typically is conducted by troopsized elements within the squadrons AO. The squadron may task its subordinate units to conduct the following missions: Locate enemy positions or heavily used routes. Destroy enemy forces within capability; fix and/or block the enemy until reinforcements arrive; or eliminate enemy/adversary influence within the AO. Maintain surveillance of a larger enemy force through stealth until reinforcements arrive. Search urban areas. Secure military or civilian property or installations. Note. Habitually used cache sites, SIGINT sites, mortar firing locations, IED locations, and infiltration routes identified during IPB are used to help focus the search and attack. 5-23. Considerations for conducting search and attack operations include IPB, organization of forces, isolation of the enemy, supporting fires, and decentralized C2. The following discussion provides more information about these considerations.

Organization of Forces
5-24. In search and attack operations, the squadron commander first task organizes the finish force and uses the anticipated size of the enemy to ensure that the force has enough combat power to accomplish its assigned task. Based on the nature of the threat (such as an infantry-based enemy force), the finish force may be able to perform the mission without augmentation. 5-25. The fixing force must have enough combat power to isolate the enemy once the reconnaissance force locates it. The fixing force may be organized around a troop. 5-26. The size of the reconnaissance force depends on the degree of certainty associated with the enemy template. The more vague the enemy situation, the larger the reconnaissance force should be. The reconnaissance force typically consists of one or more scout platoons or reconnaissance platoons. Depending on the enemy situation, a single reconnaissance platoon may require augmentation for this role. Note. The fixing force and finish force, respectively, are similar in nature to the advance guard and main body in a movement to contact. The fixing force differs from an advance guard in that it is focused on isolating the enemy rather than providing security for the finishing force. Like the main body, the finishing force focuses on defeating the enemy based on the COA directed by the squadron commander.

Isolation of the Enemy


5-27. Once the enemy is located, the fixing force isolates it, blocking escape and reinforcement routes. The fixing force incorporates indirect fires into the plan. It also blocks routes identified by the squadron. Depending on the mobility of the enemy and the likelihood of the reconnaissance force being compromised, the fixing force may have to be emplaced before the reconnaissance force enters the AO.

Supporting Fires
5-28. Available fires must provide flexible, rapid support throughout the AO. This includes the ability to clear fires rapidly, which requires units to track and report the locations of their subordinate elements. The

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capability must exist to mass fires quickly in support of the main effort. Because of the uncertainty of the enemy situation, the commander avoids command or support relationships that prevent shifting assets when necessary. Supporting fires should be flexible and destructive. They should also enhance the ability of a highly mobile attack force to destroy an enemy force located and fixed by other forces.

Decentralized C2
5-29. The squadron commander provides the necessary control, but he permits decentralized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. This includes establishing the proper graphic control measures to control movement and the synchronization of all squadron assets and attachments to enhance combat power.

SECTION III ATTACK


5-30. An attack is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Since attacks focus specifically on the defeat of enemy forces, they contribute directly to setting conditions for a stable and secure environment. This enables the transition to stability operations designed to pass authority to other U.S. government or host nation agencies. 5-31. The squadron must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against a portion (or portions) of the enemy force or terrain, with a tempo and intensity the enemy cannot match. Based on his SU, the squadron commander chooses the place where he wants to attack the enemy. This is usually a location where the enemy is weak and least prepared for an attack and where the squadron has the greatest opportunity for success.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
5-32. Attacks may require the rapid execution of battle drills by forces immediately available, or they may follow detailed plans and orders closely. At one extreme, the squadron may conduct a hasty attack resulting from a zone reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, or movement to contact to exploit an advantage in combat power or preempt enemy actions. At the other extreme, the squadron has detailed knowledge of the enemy, is augmented with additional combat power, and has a fully rehearsed plan as part of a deliberate attack conducted by its higher headquarters. (See FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional information.)

CRITICAL TASKS
5-33. Regardless of whether it is executing a hasty attack or deliberate attack, the squadron accomplishes the following critical tasks during the execution of an attack: Reconnoiter and determine the size, composition, orientation, disposition, and any weak points or flanks of the enemy force. Determine if the objective enemy force is supported by other units nearby. Find a covered and concealed approach into the enemys flanks or weak points. Designate a supporting element to conduct a shaping operation to accomplish the following before the main effort executes the decisive operation: Suppress, fix, and/or defeat all observed enemy antitank weapons with long-range direct and indirect fires. Isolate the enemy force from other mutually supporting units with direct and indirect fires, including obscuration and high explosive (HE) ammunition.

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Designate a main effort to execute the decisive operation focused on attacking the enemy forces weaknesses using all available fires. Once the attack is completed, immediately consolidate/establish hasty defensive positions and OPs on high-speed avenues of approach into the position and prepare to execute follow-on missions (sequels).

ORGANIZATION
5-34. The squadron normally organizes as follows when conducting an attack: Security force. This element allows the squadron to locate the enemy with the minimum force. Main body. The main body contains the bulk of maneuver elements, organized to conduct decisive and shaping operations. Reserve. The reserve reinforces the element executing the decisive operation and assumes its mission as necessary.

GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES


5-35. When conducting an attack, the squadron is assigned an AO, within which the squadron commander normally designates the following control measures (see FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, for additional information): The LD. This is a PL that may also be the line of contact (LC). Objective. If necessary, an axis of advance or direction of attack to further control the actions of subordinate units.

SEQUENCE OF ATTACK
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
5-36. The focus of planning at the squadron level is to develop a fully synchronized plan that masses all available combat power against enemy vulnerabilities. The squadron directs its decisive operation against an objective, ideally an enemy weakness, which will cause the collapse of the enemy defense. The squadron seeks to attack the enemys flanks, rear, or supporting formations. By doing so, the squadron retains the initiative and reduces its own vulnerabilities. 5-37. The squadron commander seeks to identify a poorly defended avenue of approach, a small unit lacking mutual support within the enemy defense, or a weak flank that he can exploit to gain a tactical advantage. When attacking a well-prepared enemy defense, the squadron commander usually tries to isolate and then destroy small, vulnerable portions of the enemy defense. The commander and staff develop the plan using a reverse planning process from actions on the objective back to the LD or assembly area. They incorporate plans for exploiting success and opportunities that develop during execution. They emphasize synchronization of maneuver, fires, and support throughout the attack. See Chapter 2 of this manual for additional planning considerations for offensive operations. 5-38. The squadron uses available time prior to the attack to conduct extensive reconnaissance, PCCs and PCIs, and rehearsals while concealing attack preparations from the enemy. The squadron commander and staff refine the plan based on continuously updated intelligence. They use digital tools to allow subordinate units maximum time to prepare. Subordinates conduct parallel planning and start their preparation for the attack immediately after the squadron issues a WARNO/FRAGO. As more intelligence becomes available, the commander revises orders and distributes them via FM or FBCB2, giving subordinates more time to prepare. Regardless of the time available, the commander must conduct detailed planning and supervision of subordinate preparations. 5-39. The squadron commander positions reconnaissance assets to maintain observation of enemy reactions to the squadrons maneuver on the objective. Reconnaissance focuses on areas the enemy likely will use to reposition forces, commit reserves, and counterattack. As the force-on-force engagement on the

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objective develops, reconnaissance elements report enemy reactions, repositioning, and BDA. Reconnaissance elements target and engage repositioning enemy forces, reserves, counterattacking forces, and other HPTs with indirect fires. Early identification of enemy reactions is essential for the squadron to maintain momentum and initiative during the attack.

MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE


5-40. During movement to the objective, the squadron is ready to Bypass, breach, or cross obstacles. React to all eight forms of contact. Transition to different formations based on the terrain and enemy situation. Employ forces to screen flanks that could become exposed or threatened during the approach. Avoid terrain features that are likely enemy artillery reference points, locations for CBRN strikes, or locations for situational obstacles. Employ indirect fires to establish conditions for assault forces. Destroy or prevent the withdrawal of enemy security forces. Minimize the effects of enemy deception. 5-41. The squadron must counter enemy security forces to ensure an unimpeded and concealed approach. Before the attack, reconnaissance forces are tasked to locate enemy security forces. Once the enemy forces are located, the squadron commander has the following options: Destroy them immediately with indirect fires and CAS. This is normally the preferred option. Destroy them with indirect fires and CAS during the approach to the objective. Attack intermediate objectives prior to execution of the decisive attack by the main effort. Employ a strong advance guard to destroy or prevent the withdrawal of enemy security forces during the approach to the objective. 5-42. The squadron must maintain a steady, controlled movement. Speed and dispersion, facilitated by close coordination and communications, are the norm when massing weapons effects to destroy the enemys defense. If the squadron is too slow or becomes too concentrated, it is vulnerable to massed enemy fires.

ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE


5-43. The squadron commander directs the maneuver of subordinate units and employs fires, situational obstacles, and obscurants to create favorable conditions for decisive maneuver against the enemy. The commander commits maneuver elements and fires to isolate a small, vulnerable portion of the enemys defense to enable an envelopment against a flank or a penetration at a weak point. The squadron achieves final destruction of the enemy force through the attack of assaulting forces.

FIRES
5-44. The squadron employs fires to weaken the enemys position and set the conditions for success prior to closure within direct-fire range of the enemy. Initially, fires focus on the destruction of key enemy forces that can most affect the concept of operations. For example, during an attack to penetrate an enemy defense, the initial focus of fires is to destroy the enemy positions at the selected point of penetration. Fires can also be used for the following purposes: Destroy enemy security forces. Neutralize enemy reserves. Emplace artillery-delivered scatterable mines to block enemy reserve routes to the objective. Deceive the enemy as to the squadrons actual intentions. Obscure friendly movements and deployment. Isolate the objective and suppress enemy positions. Neutralize the enemys indirect fires (counterbattery fires).

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5-45. The coordination between fires and maneuver is critical. As squadron elements approach the enemy defense, the squadron commander shifts fires to suppress and obscure the enemy. Proper timing and adjustment of fires enable the squadron to securely close on the enemys positions. The commander must monitor the success of fires to determine when adequate conditions exist for commitment of the force. Reconnaissance elements provide BDA to the commander to assist him in making this decision. The commander may need to adjust the speed of the squadrons approach to the objective based on reports from his reconnaissance elements.

FIX
5-46. To reduce uncertainty during the attack, the squadron fixes the bulk of the enemy forces into defensive positions or pursues a COA that limits the options available to the enemy. The primary goal is to isolate the unit targeted for destruction by preventing the enemy from laterally repositioning or reinforcing it. 5-47. Usually, a subordinate unit fixes the enemy force by attacking an objective that isolates a portion of the enemys defense. In open terrain, the most common task for shaping operations is to fix the enemy with direct and indirect fire. In more complex terrain, shaping operations may need to seize terrain or destroy key enemy forces in limited objective attacks. The use of fires and CAS is vital when attacking enemy forces and reserves in depth; it helps to prevent the enemys commitment against the squadron. 5-48. Before commitment against the enemy, squadron elements remain dispersed outside the enemys direct fire range and avoid exposing themselves to enemy observation. Elements not yet committed use this time to conduct final preparations and make adjustments to their plans. A key action during this time is the update of intelligence on enemy locations and conditions. The S-2 should have an updated intelligence summary available just prior to the squadron crossing the LD. The squadron commander can use assault positions, PLs, and other graphic control measures to control the positioning of elements not yet committed. Subordinate commanders continuously assess the situation. They provide recommendations and anticipate decisions by the squadron commander based on tactical information they receive. The commander commits subordinate forces when the desired levels of suppression, destruction, and obscuration are achieved. Paramount to successful execution are such factors as timely reporting, crosstalk, accurate assessments, and sharing of information by subordinate commanders.

ASSAULT
5-49. The squadron must be agile enough to concentrate and mass combat power through maneuver before the enemy can reorient his defense. In some instances, the destruction of a defending enemy force dictates an assault of the objective. Shaping operations shift direct and indirect fires and reposition as required to support the decisive operation. As the assaulting force commits, the squadron commander and staff ensure that current information is available on the COP to prevent fratricide and enable exploitation of unexpected opportunities. This information should include the following: Locations and types of enemy contact on the objective. Locations of squadron reconnaissance elements. Locations of obstacles and lanes, including lane markings. Recognition signals and guides. Specific routes to use for the approach. Locations and orientations of fires from friendly forces. Additions to or modifications of graphic control measures. 5-50. The previously dispersed assaulting force quickly assembles into combat formations and rapidly maneuvers to destroy the enemy forces and clear assigned objectives. The assaulting force moves along covered and concealed routes to an exposed enemy flank, a created point of penetration, or another position of advantage. Obscuration helps to conceal the movement of assaulting forces. The assault includes destruction of defending forces and clearance of trenches and fortifications. It can involve a combination of mounted and dismounted movement. The squadron commanders main focus is maintaining momentum and security of the assaulting force. The reconnaissance effort continues to report enemy repositioning,

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BDA, and enemy counteractions to the assault. The squadron limits enemy repositioning and massing against assaulting forces through intense supporting fires, CAS, a rapid assault, and employment of obscurants.

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION


5-51. Ideally, the squadron transitions from the attack into the next mission without pausing. The squadron consolidates and reorganizes as required by the situation and mission. The consolidation and reorganization plan should be as detailed as the assault plan. 5-52. When deciding whether to consolidate and reorganize, the squadron commander must consider the balance between the opportunity to maintain tempo and initiative by quickly transitioning to the next mission against the need to maintain security against potential enemy counterattacks or to rebuild squadron combat power. Refer to the discussion of consolidation and reorganization later in this chapter.

SPECIAL-PURPOSE ATTACKS
5-53. The squadron may also be tasked to conduct special-purpose attacks (see FM 3-90, Tactics, for additional details), such as the following: Raid. This form of attack involves the swift, temporary penetration of enemy territory for a specific mission. Feint. This form of attack is intended to deceive the enemy and, with limited contact, draw attention and combat power away from the main effort. Counterattack. This is an attack launched from the defense to defeat an attacking enemy force or to regain key terrain and ultimately regain the initiative. Spoiling attack. This attack is launched from the defense to disrupt the enemys attack preparations. Exploitation. This usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Pursuit. This offensive operation is executed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.

SECTION IV TRANSITIONS
5-54. A transition occurs when the squadron commander makes the assessment that he must change focus from one form of operation to another. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and a branch or sequel. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The squadron commander directs a transition when an operation accomplishes the desired end state or reaches a culminating point or when he receives a change in mission from his higher commander. 5-55. The squadron must remain vigilant during transitions, with the squadron commander establishing clear conditions for their execution. Transitions may create unexpected opportunities for the squadron, such as enabling the higher headquarters to conduct an exploitation or pursuit. Conversely, the squadron must be vigilant against enemy threats such as counterattack by an enemy reserve element.

CONSOLIDATION
5-56. Consolidation is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured position. The squadron may need to reorganize, avoid culmination, prepare for an enemy counterattack, or allow time for movement of adjacent units. The squadron plans for consolidation before every mission, updates the plans during execution, and passes them to units as the attack is completed. Consolidation actions include the following: Establish contact (electronic, physical, or both) with adjacent friendly units. Reestablish communications (if required).

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Eliminate pockets of enemy resistance. Establish security consistent with the threat. Prepare defensive positions. Clear obstacles or improve lanes to support friendly movement and reorganization activities. Plan and prepare for future operations. Conduct site exploitation and process any detainees. Maintain contact with the enemy and conduct reconnaissance. Cross-level ammunition and other supplies and conduct emergency resupply.

REORGANIZATION
5-57. Reorganization planning begins before the operation and continues throughout execution. Subordinate units must feed reports to the squadron as losses occur to allow movement of needed resupply or replacements to begin promptly. If extensive reorganization is required, the squadron conducts it following consolidation. Reorganization tasks include the following: Reestablish the chain of command, key staff positions, and C2 facilities. Treat and evacuate casualties. Recover and repair damaged equipment as necessary. Reestablish digital connectivity, if required. Conduct resupply and refueling operations. Reposition C2, communications, and sustainment assets and facilities for future operations. Reorganize subordinate units, if required.

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Chapter 6

Defensive Operations
Defensive operations have several purposes: defeat or deter an enemy attack; gain time; achieve economy of force; retain key terrain; protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure; and develop intelligence (FM 3-0 and FM 3-90). Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Rather, the goal is to develop conditions favorable for offensive operations, such as a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Defensive actions are also combined with, or followed by, other elements of full-spectrum operations based on the specific mission variables (METT-TC) of the situation. With the exception of the BFSB reconnaissance squadron, the reconnaissance and cavalry squadrons are capable of conducting defensive operations under certain mission variables and within the higher commanders guidance. The squadrons can defend or delay, conduct retrograde operations, execute counterattacks, or perform security operations. These may be done as a shaping operation to enable offensive operations by the squadrons higher headquarters. Often during a defensive operation, the squadron may execute several of these tasks. Even when operating during the higher headquarters defense, the squadron exploits opportunities to conduct offensive operations within its AO to deprive the enemy of the initiative and create the conditions that will allow the higher headquarters to assume the offensive.

Contents
Section I Purpose of Defensive Operations .............................................. 6-1 Defense Continuum ............................ 6-2 Defensive Tasks ................................. 6-2 Engagement Area Development ......... 6-3 Section II - Area Defense .......................... 6-4 Organization of Forces ....................... 6-4 Types of Area Defense ....................... 6-5 Critical Tasks ...................................... 6-6 Execution of an Area Defense ............ 6-6 Defensive Area of Operations ............. 6-6 Section III - Mobile Defense ...................... 6-7 Section IV - Retrograde Operations ......... 6-7 Section V Transitions ............................. 6-7

SECTION I PURPOSE OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS


6-1. The primary purpose of the defense is to deter or defeat enemy offensive operations. Successful defenses disrupt enemy actions and create opportunities to seize the initiative. Defensive operations may deter potential aggressors if they believe that breaking the friendly defense would be too costly (FM 3-0). 6-2. Defense is about preventing the enemy from achieving success and then counterattacking to seize the initiative. For example, the squadron may defend to deter an enemy from breeching an international boundary or to prevent escalation of tensions between two factions or countries. Defending forces await the enemys attack and counter it; however, waiting for the attack is not a passive activity. Squadron commanders conduct aggressive security operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Such actions locate enemy forces and deny them information. Defenders engage enemy forces with fires, spoiling attacks, and security operations to weaken them before they reach the MBA.

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Chapter 6

Commanders use combined arms and joint capabilities to attack enemy vulnerabilities and seize the initiative.

DEFENSE CONTINUUM
6-3. A simple approach for the squadron in conducting a defense is to address the phases of the defense continuum: preparation/reconnaissance infiltration, counterreconnaissance, disruption, MBA defense, counterattack/exploitation, and consolidation/reorganization. Each phase has a start point and end point (usually a specified time or condition) with key tasks, reconnaissance objectives, and task and purpose statements for each element. Considerations for the phases of the defense continuum include the following: Preparation/reconnaissance infiltration. During this phase, the unit prepares by conducting a reconnaissance of the area, marking positions they are to occupy, and developing fire control measures. Rehearsal of triggers, displacement to subsequent positions, and synchronization of movement and fires are critical during preparation for the defense. The cue to initiate the next phase will be contact with enemy reconnaissance elements based on the mission and the ROE. Counterreconnaissance. During this phase, the squadron takes actionsboth active and passiveto counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. This includes combat actions to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements and to prevent enemy reconnaissance elements from observing the main body. The squadron must be organized to defeat enemy reconnaissance forces without requiring reinforcement. Disruption. As part of the higher headquarters disruption process, the squadron uses surprise to help shape the operation. The squadron commander uses existing technological advantages over the enemy, including the following: C2 warfare. Lethal firepower effects. Range of direct fire weapons. Protection. Mobility. Information management. C2 systems. MBA defense. During this phase, the squadron commander employs the bulk of his combat power using fire, maneuver, and terrain to set the conditions for the counterattack. Counterattack/exploitation. A counterattack may occur during the counterreconnaissance, disruption, or MBA defense phases. It is usually a hasty attack characterized by rapid and immediate action. This phase terminates with the destruction of the enemy force, disruption of enemy movement, or the conclusion of unsuccessful enemy operations. Upon successful execution of the counterattack, the squadron conducts exploitation. This action seeks to expand an attack to the point where enemy forces have no alternative but to surrender or flee. Consolidation/reorganization. The squadron may conduct consolidation and reorganization based on the mission variables. It strengthens its new positions so they can be defended. The squadron then reorganizes, if required, to maintain combat effectiveness or to attain a specified level of combat capability.

DEFENSIVE TASKS
6-4. The three primary tasks associated with defensive operations are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde (FM 3-0). Each of these contains elements of the others and usually entails both static and dynamic aspects. The squadron can execute an area defense or retrograde operation; it can support a higher headquarters conducting a mobile defense. 6-5. Squadrons serve as the primary maneuver elements, or terrain-controlling units, for the ACR in all types of defensive operations. The squadrons of the BCTs may perform a series of missions; the most common role for these squadrons will be executing security missions. Initially, the squadron may screen

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or guard forward of the BCT. It may also serve as part of a covering force. Alternatively, the squadron may screen or guard an exposed flank. Other tasks for the ACR/BCT squadrons may include defending AOs or positions or serving as a security force or reserve as part of the ACR/BCT coordinated defense. (FM 3-90 discusses these tasks in detail.) 6-6. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron is employed in unassigned areas of the higher headquarters AO or in its own AO to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance on tasked NAIs and TAIs. The squadron cannot perform security or defensive missions without significant augmentation. 6-7. The mission variables of enemy and terrain have the most significant impact on the squadrons ability to conduct a defense. The nature of the threat presented by enemy forces (such as traditional or irregular) must be considered in relation to the amount of combat power the squadron can generate. Terrain factors must also be considered. Operating in terrain with little or no cover or concealment, such as flat terrain with little relief or vegetation, may exceed the squadrons ability to provide adequate protection for defensive operations. 6-8. Because of its advantages in information, lethality, and mobility, the squadron can defend in both contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the higher headquarters, as well as those within the squadron structure, aid the squadron in locating and identifying the enemys decisive and shaping efforts. Preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility characterize squadron defensive operations. Refer to Chapter 2 for discussion of the synchronization of the warfighting functions during the operations process. 6-9. All three primary defensive tasks use mobile and static elements. In a mobile defense, static positions help control the depth and breadth of the enemy penetration and retain ground from which to launch counterattacks. In an area defense, commanders closely integrate mobile patrols, security forces, sensors, and reserves to cover gaps among defensive positions. In retrograde operations, some units conduct area defenses along with security operations to protect other units executing carefully controlled maneuver or movement rearward. Static elements fix, disrupt, turn, or block the attackers and gain time for other forces to pull back. Mobile elements maneuver constantly to confuse the enemy and prevent enemy exploitation. 6-10. The squadron may find itself conducting common defensive scenarios (refer to FM 3-90 for additional discussion), including the following: Defend from a BP. Note. FM 3-90 addresses the five kinds of BPsprimary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strongpointand covers the need for detailed planning and rehearsal of displacement between BPs. Defend a perimeter. Defend a reverse slope. Nodal defense (combination of scenarios).

ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT


6-11. EA development is a critical planning activity during defensive operations. The following seven steps provide a way to build an EA; although listed sequentially, some steps can and should be conducted concurrently: Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach. Determine the likely enemy concept of operations. Determine where to kill the enemy. Plan and integrate obstacles. Emplace weapon systems (including preparation of BPs). Plan and integrate indirect fires. Rehearse the execution of operations in the EA.

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6-12. Development of direct fire control measures is a critical activity for the emplacement of weapon systems during EA development. Direct fire control measures provide the manner, method, and time to initiate, shift, and mass fires and specify when to disengage. Key direct fire control measures discussed in FM 3-90 include the following: EAs. Engagement criteria. Engagement priorities. Sectors of fire. TRPs. Trigger lines.

SECTION II - AREA DEFENSE


6-13. The area defense concentrates on denying an enemy access to designated terrain for a specific time, limiting the enemys freedom of maneuver, and turning it into EAs. The focus is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting positions and on controlling the terrain between positions. The defeat mechanism is drawing the enemy force into a series of EAs where it is attacked, largely by fires from mutually supporting positions, and destroyed. The commander uses his reserve force to reinforce fires, add depth, block penetrations, restore positions, or counterattack to destroy enemy forces and seize the initiative (See FM 3-90 for detailed information). 6-14. The squadron may employ an area defense in a variety of situations, including the following: The mission requires holding certain terrain for a specific period of time. There is enough time to organize the position. The squadron has less mobility than the enemy does. The terrain limits counterattacks to a few probable employment options. The terrain affords natural lines of resistance, and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemys maneuver.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
6-15. The squadron commander organizes his force to accomplish reconnaissance, security, MBA, reserve, and sustaining operations. He has the option of two types of area defense, covered later in this discussion (see FM 3-90 for additional information): Defense in depth. Forward defense. 6-16. Positions for subordinate troops or companies may be designated by BPs or AOs. The considerations listed in Table 6-1 guide planning for positioning of squadron elements. 6-17. When the commander defends forward within an AO, he organizes his force so that he commits most of his combat power early in the defensive effort. To accomplish this, he may deploy forces forward or plan counterattacks well forward in the MBA or even beyond the MBA. If the commander has the option of conducting a defense in depth, he uses his security forces and forward MBA element to identify, define, and control the depth of the enemys main effort while fixing any secondary attacks. This allows him to conserve his combat power, strengthen his reserve, and better resource the counterattack (FM 3-90). 6-18. Additional considerations the squadron commander takes into account in planning for the area defense include the following: EA development. Displacement considerations and criteria (defense in depth). Dispersion.

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Cover and concealment. Flanking fire. Security. Ability to maneuver. Range of weapons systems. Transition to limited visibility. Dismounted infantry. Table 6-1. Positioning considerations
FACTOR Avenues of approach BATTLE POSITION Well defined; enemy can be canalized Dominates avenues of approach Narrow Achievable Good Known/clear Attached infantry AREA OF OPERATIONS Multiple avenues prohibit concentration Dominating terrain not available Wide Cannot be achieved Degraded Unknown/unclear/vague Pure or attached armor

Key Terrain Areas of operation Mutual support Observation and Fields of Fire Enemy situation Troops available

TYPES OF AREA DEFENSE


6-19. As noted, the two types of area defense are defense in depth and forward defense. While the squadron commander usually selects the type of area defense to use, the higher commander often defines the general defensive scheme for the squadron. The specific mission may impose constraints such as time, security, and retention of certain areas that are significant factors in determining how the BCT/ACR will defend.

DEFENSE IN DEPTH
6-20. A defense in depth is the preferred option when tactical conditions allow. It reduces the risk of an attacking enemy quickly penetrating the squadrons defense and affords some initial protection from enemy indirect fires. It also limits the enemys ability to exploit a penetration by employing additional defensive positions in depth. The defense in depth provides more space and time for FS assets to reduce the enemys options, attrit his forces, and set the conditions for destruction. It provides the squadron commander with more time to gain information about the enemys intentions and likely future actions before decisively committing to a plan of his own. It also allows the squadron to execute decisive maneuver by effectively repositioning subordinate elements to conduct counterattacks or to prevent penetrations. However, this repositioning increases the risk of fratricide since elements can be to the front or the rear of each other. The commander must mitigate the fratricide risk by using graphic control measures to control maneuver (e.g., boundaries), indirect fires (e.g., restrictive fire line [RFL]), and direct fire (e.g., EAs).

FORWARD DEFENSE
6-21. Due to its inherent lack of depth, the forward defense is the less preferred option. The intent of a forward defense is to limit the terrain over which the enemy can gain influence or control. The squadron deploys the majority of its combat forces near the forward edge of the battle line (FEBA) with the reconnaissance or scout platoon establishing a relatively shallow security area. The squadron fights to

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Chapter 6

retain these forward positions and can conduct counterattacks against enemy penetrations or destroy enemy penetrations in forward EAs. While the squadron may lack depth, company teams and platoons must build depth into the defense at their levels. The squadron can expect to conduct a forward defense for protection of critical assets or other forces or for political purposes such as defending an allys threatened border. 6-22. Conditions or situations in which a forward defense may be advantageous include the following: Terrain forward in the AO favors this defense. Strong existing obstacles, such as a river, are located forward in the AO. The assigned AO lacks depth due to the location of the area or facility to be protected. Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO is limited. Higher headquarters directs the squadron to retain or initially control forward terrain.

CRITICAL TASKS
6-23. Critical tasks for conducting an area defense include the following: Maintain continuous reconnaissance of high-speed routes or avenues of approach into the squadron AO (screen). Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance elements forward of the squadrons initial defensive positions (counterreconnaissance). Conduct EA development. Engage the enemy from more than one direction. Determine criteria for initiating fires, counterattack, and disengagement. Prevent the enemy from penetrating the troop rear boundary or designated no-penetration line.

EXECUTION OF AN AREA DEFENSE


6-24. Execution of an area defense typically occurs in these five steps (see FM 3-90 for detailed information): Gain and maintain enemy contact. The defending force seeks to strip enemy reconnaissance forces and hide its own dispositions, capabilities, and intent at the same time as friendly reconnaissance assets help to determine the enemys chosen COA. Disrupt the enemy. The defending force executes shaping operations to disrupt the enemys plan and his ability to control his forces. Once the process of disrupting the enemy begins, it continues throughout a defensive operation. Fix the enemy. The defending force conducts shaping operations to constrain the enemy into a specific COA, control his movements, or fix him in a given location. These actions limit the enemys options. Maneuver. This step combines the effects of shaping and sustaining operations with the decisive operations of the main body to defeat the enemy. The goal is to prevent the enemys further advance through fires from prepared positions combined with employment of obstacles and mobile reserves. Follow-through. A successful area defense allows for transition to an attack that regains the initiative. Note. See FM 3-90 and the discussion later in this chapter for additional information on transitions between forms of operations.

DEFENSIVE AREA OF OPERATIONS


6-25. Enabled by SA, air superiority, dynamic obstacles, and extensive long-range fires, the squadrons higher headquarters can defend a significantly larger AO. When it does so, the squadron may be assigned to defend over an extended AO. The squadron commander must ensure that he remains aware of the larger

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situation around him, has continuous FS, and executes continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Essentially, these operations are area defenses with exceptionally low force-to-space ratios. 6-26. Squadrons defending in extended AOs base their operations on superior intelligence, tactical agility, long-range fires, and continuous freedom of maneuver. The higher commander must clearly differentiate ACR/BCT and squadron responsibilities. The higher headquarters and squadrons employ massed long-range fires and other combat effects to suppress, neutralize, or enemy forces throughout the AO. Close combat in these operations is limited to short, violent counterattacks or direct fire ambushes against damaged, vulnerable elements of the enemys force.

SECTION III - MOBILE DEFENSE


6-27. In a mobile defense, the defender withholds a large portion of available forces for use as a striking force in a counterattack. Mobile defenses require enough depth to let enemy forces advance into a position that exposes them to counterattack. The defense separates attacking enemy forces from their support and disrupts the enemys C2. As enemy forces extend themselves in the defended area and lose momentum and organization, the defender surprises and overwhelms them with a powerful counterattack. (See FM 390.) 6-28. Units smaller than a corps do not normally conduct a mobile defense because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the AO while simultaneously supporting striking, fixing, and reserve forces. The squadron participates in a mobile defense only as part of its higher headquarters (such as the BCT or ACR). 6-29. The squadron primarily performs reconnaissance or security missions in support of a mobile defense, but may also execute offensive or defensive missions in an economy of force role for its higher headquarters. The squadron and its higher headquarters are part of either the fixing force or the striking force, but not both.

SECTION IV - RETROGRADE OPERATIONS


6-30. The three forms of retrograde operations are the following: Delay. This operation trades space for time and preserves friendly combat power while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Withdrawal. A withdrawal is a planned, voluntary disengagement from the enemy; it may be conducted with or without enemy pressure. Retirement. A retirement is an operation in which a force that is not in contact with the enemy moves to the rear in an organized manner. Note. Maintaining morale is essential among subordinate leaders and troops in a retrograde operation. Movement to the rear may seem like a defeat or a threat of isolation unless Soldiers have confidence in their leaders and know the purpose of the operation and their roles in it.

SECTION V TRANSITIONS
6-31. The squadron commander halts a defensive operation only when the operation accomplishes the desired end state or reaches a culminating point or when he receives a change in mission from his higher commander. In a defensive operation, the squadron often transitions from one phase of the operation to another without pausing. Each phase of the operation is distinguished by criteria, specified by the commander, triggering a transition to the next phase. 6-32. As noted earlier, the squadron must remain vigilant throughout transitions, and the commander must establish clear conditions for their execution. Transitions may create unexpected opportunities for the squadron such as enabling their higher headquarters to conduct an exploitation or pursuit. On the other

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hand, the squadron must be vigilant to actions the enemy may take during transitions, such as a counterattack by an enemy reserve element. During the transition, the squadron spends the minimum time necessary for consolidation and reorganization before supporting the higher headquarters exploitation or pursuit of defeated enemy forces. See Chapter 5 for information on consolidation and reorganization.

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Chapter 7

Stability Operations
Reconnaissance and cavalry squadrons are well suited to support stability operations because they are trained, equipped, and organized to command and control assets and acquire the information needed to solve complex problems. The scope of the squadrons capabilities provides the higher commander with vital options to meet stability-related operational requirements in his AO.

Contents
Section I Primary Stability Tasks .......... 7-1 Section II Designing Stability Operations .............................................. 7-1 Stability and Defeat Mechanisms........ 7-2 Lines of Effort ..................................... 7-3 Sequence of Actions and Phasing ...... 7-4 Section III Tactical Tasks in Support of Stability Operations ............................... 7-5 Reconnaissance Support.................... 7-6 Patrols ................................................ 7-6 Observation Posts .............................. 7-7 Security of Officials ............................. 7-7 Combat Outposts ................................ 7-8 Searches ............................................ 7-9 Roadblocks and Other Checkpoints ................................... 7-15

SECTION I PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS


7-1. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power (such as diplomacy and economics) to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations consist of the five primary tasks listed below (see FM 3-07, Stability Operations, FM 3-07.1; Security Force Assistance; and FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, for detailed information). The subordinate tasks performed by the squadron under the primary stability tasks directly support the broader end state of the squadrons higher headquarters, operational-level commanders, and other national agencies operating within the AO. Primary stability tasks are the following: Establish civil security. Establish civil control. Restore essential services. Support to governance. Support to economic and infrastructure development.

SECTION II DESIGNING STABILITY OPERATIONS


7-2. FM 3-07 provides in-depth information on designing and planning stability operations. The execution of stability operations often relies on gaining the cooperation and support of the populace to accomplish missions rather than simply synchronizing and integrating forces and combat power to accomplish a military objective. This section focuses on three key elements of operational design critical to the squadrons planning and execution of stability operations:

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Stability and defeat mechanisms. Lines of effort. Phasing.

STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS


7-3. Based on the higher headquarters operational approach, the squadron commander defines the stability or defeat mechanism used to meet his desired end state. In stability operations, a combination of stability and defeat mechanisms provides the most effective means to achieve the end state. Stability mechanisms allow the squadron to focus their combat power on setting conditions that enable restoration of services, governance, and economy, while defeat mechanisms focus available combat power on creating a secure environment to enable civil control. During planning, the squadron commander and his staff determine the most appropriate combination of stability and defeat mechanisms to accomplish the identified end state. Depending on the amount of violence and degree of security in the AO, the squadron commander may emphasize one over the other during a given mission.

STABILITY MECHANISMS
7-4. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians to attain conditions that support a lasting, stable peace (FM 3-0). Combinations of the stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that contribute to achieving the desired end state more effectively than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms, as defined in FM 3-07, are the following: Compel. This mechanism involves maintaining the threat of lethal forceor its actual useto establish control and dominance, effect changes in behavior, or enforce stability-related arrangements (such as cessation of hostilities or peace agreements). Control. The control mechanism involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities. It is closely related to the primary stability task, establish civil control. Influence. This mechanism involves altering opinions and attitudes of the host nation populace through information engagement, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compel and control mechanisms. Support. Support refers to establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with host nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations in humanitarian operations.

DEFEAT MECHANISMS
7-5. Defeat mechanisms primarily apply during close combat against an active threat force. They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce, both physical or psychological. The squadron commander translates these effects into specific tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat threat aims. Physical defeat deprives threat forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Again, deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are the following (refer to FM 3-07 for full discussion): Destroy. This involves identifying the most effective way to eliminate threat capabilities. Dislocate. This involves compelling the threat to expose forces by reacting to a specific action. Disintegrate. This exploits the destroy and dislocate mechanisms to shatter the threats coherence. Isolate. Isolation limits the threats ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the threats ability to influence events.

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COMBINING STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS


7-6. Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing conceptual means to solve the complex problems that commanders face in stability operations. By combining both types of mechanisms in a stability operation, the squadron can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. This is essential in stability operations where success is gauged over the long term. Figure 7-1 illustrates combinations of stability and defeat mechanisms in a notional operation.

Figure 7-1. Example of combining stability and defeat mechanisms

LINES OF EFFORT
7-7. A line of effort links multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the commanders desired end state. Lines of effort are essential in stability operations where physical, positional references to an enemy or adversary are less relevant. In stability operations, lines of effort work well to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the end state. Lines of effort are essential to helping the squadron commander visualize how his available combat power can support other military or civilian capabilities. 7-8. The squadron commander may use lines of effort to describe how he envisions the squadrons operations in creating the more intangible end state conditions inherent in stability operations. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to one other and to achieving the desired end state. In these situations, lines of effort combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks. The squadron commander may designate actions on one line of effort as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. He directs actions to synchronize and sequence related actions across multiple lines of effort, recognizing that these relationships help him to assess progress toward achieving the end state. Figure 7-2 illustrates a list of possible lines of effort. (See FM 3-07 for detailed information.)

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Figure 7-2. Example lines of effort

SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS AND PHASING


7-9. FM 3-07 identifies distinct phases of intervention during stability operations. Combined with his SU, these phases can help shape the squadron commanders visualization. Table 7-1 identifies these phases and the likely focus of stability tasks. Table 7-1. Phases of intervention
PHASE Initial Response Transformation LIKELY FOCUS Civil security Civil control Civil control Essential services Support to governance Civil control Essential services Support to governance Infrastructure/economy development

Foster Sustainability

7-10. Based on these phases of intervention, the squadron commander visualizes a broad concept of operations for how the primary stability tasks are implemented during the duration of the mission. This enables him to identify specific phases of the operation and corresponding end states that mark transitions from one phase of the operation to another. (See Figure 7-3.)

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Figure 7-3. Example phasing of a COA to support stability operations Note. Although this example of phasing provides a linear sequence for the concept of operations, phases often overlap or key tasks recur throughout the course of the overall operation.

SECTION III TACTICAL TASKS IN SUPPORT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS


7-11. The tactical tasks the squadron and its subordinate units conduct during stability operations include primarily area security (see Chapter 4), patrols, observation posts, providing security to officials, static security posts, searches, roadblocks, and checkpoints. In addition, indigenous authorities or other highranking officials may require the protection of the squadron during movement through or within the AOs. All of these tasks are enabled by reconnaissance. 7-12. A key consideration during stability operations is conducting combined operations with host nation security forces (see FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, for additional information). Tasks or activities that may occur in support of combined operations include the following: Establish combined operations and intelligence centers with host nation security forces. Conduct training management and combined training with host nation security forces.

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Share intelligence, in accordance with established regulations or procedures, with host nation security forces. Execute the targeting process in conjunction with host nation security forces.

RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT
7-13. The squadron will be tasked to conduct reconnaissance as part of stability operations, which can complement concurrent offensive and defensive operations or be conducted separately, based on the character of the dominant major operation being conducted. This reconnaissance is planned and executed to support accomplishment of the primary stability tasks related to national and multinational interests. (Refer to the discussion of primary stability tasks earlier in this chapter.) 7-14. To support achievement of national and multinational stability goals, reconnaissance operations conducted by the squadron support higher echelon lines of effort. These lines of effort may focus on specific aspects of the local situation such as the activities of host nation security forces, local development projects, and restoration of essential services. Often this involves reconnaissance to gather information on the status of infrastructure in the AO. Use of the elements of SWEAT-MSO in analyzing infrastructure helps to focus this reconnaissance effort. 7-15. An essential consideration is that reconnaissance support in stability operations is conducted using the same fundamentals as reconnaissance in other situations. Refer to Chapter 3 of this manual for a detailed discussion of reconnaissance operations.

PATROLS
7-16. The squadron may direct its subordinate units to conduct specific patrols throughout the AO. Regardless of the type of patrol, every patrol must have a specific task and purpose. Members of the patrol must understand how specific observation requirements are linked to established PIR in the squadrons ISR plan. Although patrols are usually conducted overtly, using available transportation assets (air or ground) or on foot, troops or companies take all possible precautions to protect the Soldiers on patrol. A patrol must be readily identifiable as such by all parties and must conduct movement openly while employing appropriate overwatch based on the threat situation. 7-17. During stability operations, patrols face unique challenges. Leaders must balance the need to interact with the local populace against the requirement to maintain a determined, vigilant posture to deter attacks against the patrol. (See FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, for additional information on patrols and patrolling.) 7-18. Patrols can accomplish the following: Gather information on the threat, on the terrain, or on the populace. Regain contact with the threat or with adjacent friendly forces. Engage the threat in combat to destroy him or inflict losses. Reassure or gain the trust of a local population. Prevent public disorder. Deter and disrupt insurgent or criminal activity. Provide unit security. Protect key infrastructure or bases. 7-19. A patrol must be prepared to do the following: Provide its own security. Navigate accurately. Identify and cross danger areas. Reconnoiter the patrol objective. Conduct detailed searches. Handle casualties and prisoners or detainees.

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Breach obstacles (combat patrol only). Assault an objective (combat patrol only). Support by fire (combat patrol only).

OBSERVATION POSTS
7-20. OPs are an especially important element of the squadrons effort to establish and maintain security. OPs provide protection when long-range observation from current positions is not possible. The squadron can employ any number of OPs as the situation dictates. Information gathered and reported by OPs can includebut is not limited tothe following: Movement of threat or adversary military forces, including size, activity, location, unit identification, time, equipment, direction, and other details that the OP can ascertain. Shootings, hostile acts, or threats directed against the squadron or civilians. Any improvements to defensive positions of a former belligerent. Overflights by unauthorized aircraft, either military or civilian, including the time, direction, aircraft type, and nationality. Any observed violations of an armistice agreement. 7-21. OPs are sited to provide observation of NAIs and TAIs, for clear radio communications, and for defensibility in accordance with the commanders intent. Whenever possible, OPs should be emplaced within supporting distance of each other to enhance security through mutual support and to enable reconnaissance handover between OPs. OP locations are recorded, and any relocation of the OP must be reported to the units headquarters. Access is limited to authorized personnel only. One section usually mans an OP and keeps a record of all activities. 7-22. The squadron maintains its legitimacy and acceptability to the local populace through its professional and impartial conduct. However, elements in the civilian population or among other interested parties may want to disrupt the squadrons operations and subvert ongoing stability operations. Therefore, the squadron must be prepared to defend itself. 7-23. The squadron must strictly follow the ROE and limitations on the use of force. The squadron should maintain a reaction force that can reinforce an OP or aid a patrol in distress. Field fortifications, barriers, and well-sited weapons must protect installations, and the squadron must take precautions to protect personnel and facilities from attack. The squadron fights only if it cannot avoid such engagements. The squadron commander must be prepared to withdraw an OP when a serious threat appears. Occupation and withdrawal of the OP should be thoroughly rehearsed.

SECURITY OF OFFICIALS
7-24. The squadron may be required to ensure that host nation authorities or other high-ranking officials are able to move within the AO without interference from threat or adversary elements. The strength of the security element required depends on the circumstances. The squadron security force should provide an armored vehicle as optional transportation for the official(s). The vehicle carrying the official(s) should bear no distinguishing marks and more than one vehicle of that type should travel in the escort. 7-25. Additional vehicles or personnel must provide support to the vehicle carrying the official(s) throughout the move. Each vehicle should have automatic weapons; Soldiers should be designated to perform specific security tasks for the officials. 7-26. The security element designated to accompany the official(s) must be capable of extracting the officials vehicle out of the danger area as quickly as possible in the event of an attack. The security element must develop and rehearse contingency plans, alternate routes, and actions on contact. 7-27. Before starting the move, the security element commander briefs the official(s) about what will be done in the event of an attack. Regardless of the officials seniority, the security element commander is in command of the move. (See Chapter 6 for additional information on convoy security.)

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Chapter 7

COMBAT OUTPOSTS
7-28. A combat outpost is a reinforced OP capable of conducting limited combat operations (as illustrated in Figure 7-4). See FM 2-24.2 for additional information. During close combat, combat outposts are a technique for employing security forces in restricted terrain that precludes mounted security forces from covering the area. In stability operations, combat outposts can be used to Protect critical fixed installations. This includes military installations as well as civilian facilities such as government offices, police stations, or hospitals. Protect critical points along LOCs, such as terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. Dislocate or disrupt the ability of threat elements to exert influence over the local populace.

Figure 7-4. Combat outpost 7-29. Examples of combat outpost employment range from a section guarding a bridge to a reinforced troop securing a key communications center or civilian community. The size of the outpost depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the threat or adversary, the attitude of the civilian populace, and/or the importance of the high-value asset being secured. The squadron coordinates establishment of combat outposts with the host nation. 7-30. The organization of a combat outpost varies with its size, mission, and distance from reinforcing units. For security reasons, combat outposts in remote areas are larger those located closer to supporting forces. The outpost is organized for the security of both the installation and the security force. The squadron must establish reliable communications between remote outposts and the parent unit's base. The activities involved in establishing a defensive position apply to establishment of a combat outpost (see Chapter 6).

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7-31. The squadron must control access to the combat outpost by local civilians. It screens and evacuates people living near the positions and can place informers from the local population along the routes of approach. 7-32. The commander must consider all aspects of Soldier comfort during the organization and preparation of the combat outpost. Even under the best conditions, morale suffers among Soldiers who must operate for prolonged periods in small groups away from their parent organization. 7-33. If the combat outpost is far removed from other squadron units and might be isolated by threat action, the squadron prestocks the outpost with sustaining supplies in sufficient quantities. A combat outpost should never have to depend solely on the local populace for supplies.

SEARCHES
7-34. Searches are an important aspect of civil control. The requirement to conduct search operations or to employ search procedures is continuous in stability operations. Searches can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. They usually involve both civil police and Soldiers.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
7-35. Misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations. Conversely, proper use of authority during searches gains the respect and support of the people. Soldiers must conduct and lawfully record the seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other minor items for their seizure to be of future legal value. 7-36. Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Military personnel must perform searches only in areas within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). They must conduct searches only to apprehend suspects or to secure evidence proving an offense has been committed. 7-37. Search teams have detailed instructions for handling controlled items. Lists of prohibited or controlled-distribution items should be widely disseminated and on hand during searches. The squadron contacts military or civil police who work with the populace and the resource control program before the search operations begin (or periodically if search operations are a continuing activity). Units must consider the effect of early warning on the effectiveness of their operation. 7-38. Language difficulties can interfere when U.S. forces conduct search operations involving the local populace. Units given a search mission are provided with interpreters as required. 7-39. The squadron conducts search operations slowly enough to allow for an effective search, but rapidly enough to prevent the threat from reacting to the threat of the search. Soldiers use minimum-essential force to eliminate any active resistance encountered. The squadron should develop plans for securing the search area (establishing a cordon) and for handling detained personnel.

PROCEDURES
Search of Individuals
7-40. In all search operations, leaders must emphasize that anyone in an area to be searched could be an insurgent or a sympathizer. To avoid making a threat out of a suspect who may support the host country government, searchers must be tactful. Extreme caution is required during the initial handling of a person about to be searched. One member of the search team covers the member who makes the actual search. Refer to FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations, and STP 19-31B1-SM (the skill level 1 Soldiers manual for MPs) for detailed discussion of procedures for searching individuals.

Search of Females
7-41. The threat can use females for all types of tasks when they think searches might be a threat. To counter this, use female searchers. If female searchers are not available, use doctors, aid men, or members

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of the local populace. If male Soldiers must search females, take all possible measures to prevent any inference of sexual molestation or assault. Note. A technique used by forces in Afghanistan to keep female individual searches within the cultural norms of the country entails having husbands search their wives using a magnetic wand metal detector. First, the husband is searched by the Soldiers, and then the husband uses the wand to search his wife.

Search of Vehicles
7-42. The search of vehicles may require equipment such as detection devices, mirrors, and tools. Specially trained dogs can locate drugs or explosives. Extreme care should be taken for security during the vehicle search. Before the vehicle is searched, occupants may need to be moved away from the vehicle and individually searched. One technique is to have an occupant open all doors, the trunk, and the hood. Soldiers maintain security while the occupant conducts these actions. The Soldiers then move him to the individual search area and thoroughly search the vehicle. Although a thorough vehicle search takes time, leaders must consider the effect on the population. Using a separate vehicle search area can help avoid unnecessary delays. (TC 19-210, Access Control Handbook, discusses procedures for searching vehicles.)

CORDON AND SEARCH


7-43. When intelligence identifies and locates members of the insurgent infrastructure, an operation is mounted to neutralize them. All operations must be conducted legally. This may include operations conducted by police acting on warrants of a disinterested magistrate and based on probable cause. In the more violent stages of an insurgency, emergency laws and regulations may dispense temporarily with some of these legal protections. Use the least severe method necessary to accomplish the mission adequately. This can range from a cordon and search, executed during combat operations, that creates a breach into the building to a cordon and knock during stability operations to obtain permission to enter the building prior to the search. 7-44. The commander should divide the area to be searched in a built-up area into zones and assign a search party to each zone. A search party normally consists of a security element (responsible for isolating the objective and specific areas within the objective), a search element (responsible for entering and searching specific focus areas and providing local security), and a reserve element (responsible for assisting either element, as required). (See Figure 7-5.) 7-45. In all cases, the unit conducting the search must take care to preserve evidence for future legal action. Direct fire planning, rehearsals, and maintaining the element of surprise are critical aspects in successful execution of cordon and search operations. The following discussion covers principles, procedures, and C2 for cordon and search operations.

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Figure 7-5. Typical organization for search operations

Establishing the Cordon


7-46. An effective cordon is critical to the success of the search effort. Cordons are designed to prevent the escape of individuals to be searched and to protect the forces conducting the operation. The cordon not only isolates the objective from individuals trying to escape, but also prevents reinforcements for the insurgents from entering the objective area. Based on factors of METT-TC, two cordons may be established: the outer cordon to focus on isolating the objective from outside interference, and the inner cordon to focus on keeping individuals from escaping the objective area. For security purposes, however, both cordon elements must focus both inward and outward. The security element leader may have C2 of both the inner and outer cordon elements. SUASs, scout teams, or sniper teams may be employed to observe the search area for threat forces before the main body arrives. (See Figure 7-6.) 7-47. There are two techniques for emplacement of the cordon element(s): simultaneous or sequential. Careful consideration must be given to the advantages and disadvantages of each technique. Once the squadron has determined which techniques to use, the commander should ensure that the order of march facilitates smooth, synchronized execution. Outer Cordon 7-48. The outer cordon is an integral part of the security element in any cordon and search operation. (See Figure 7-6.) Therefore, it requires detailed planning, effective coordination, and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the desired combined arms effects. Both lethal and nonlethal effects should be considered by the squadron commander. He should identify escalation of force procedures to help prevent interference from the local populace. 7-49. Each subordinate outer cordon element (traffic control point or blocking position) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Units and elements that the squadron can employ to establish the outer cordon include the following: Mounted reconnaissance platoons. Organic tank platoons. Sniper teams.

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Figure 7-6. Establishing the cordon 7-50. The outer cordon leader maintains SA in his AO, including the progress of operations for the search elements and the outer cordon. This helps him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect fires, and facilitate the outer cordon task and purpose. The security element of the outer cordon may include Mounted reconnaissance platoons or sections. Interpreter(s). Detainee security teams. Crowd control teams. OPs. Traffic control points or blocking positions. (See the discussion of roadblocks and checkpoints later in this chapter.) Host nation security forces (military or police). Aviation assets. Dismounted platoons or squads. Female search teams. Inner Cordon 7-51. The inner cordon may be under the control of the security element of the search element. (See Figure 7-6.) It is normally tasked with the following actions: Prevent exfiltration or reposition of threat forces. Serve as an overwatch element or SBF force for search teams.

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Maintain communications with the search element. Understand the marking system and control measures. Coordinate techniques for shifting or lifting fires as the search element enters target-area buildings. Seize supporting structures in built-up areas to overwatch target-area buildings. 7-52. In remote areas, the squadron may establish the cordon without being detected. The use of limited visibility aids in the establishment and security of the cordon but makes it difficult to control. 7-53. The squadron must enforce the ROE and should develop plans to handle detained personnel. Scouts accompany police and intelligence forces to identify, question, and detain suspects. Scouts may also conduct searches and assist in detaining suspects, under police supervision, but their principal roles are to reduce any resistance that may develop and to provide security. Use of force is kept to a minimum.

Conducting the Search


7-54. The search must impose tangiblebut limitedinconvenience on the populace. It must discourage insurgents and their sympathizers from remaining in the locale, but not be stringent enough to drive other inhabitants to collaborate with the threat because of the search. A large-scale search of a built-up area is a combined civil police and military operation. Such a search should be planned in detail and rehearsed while avoiding active reconnaissance of the area just before the search. Aerial photographs can provide needed information about the terrain. In larger towns or cities, the local police may have detailed maps showing relative sizes and locations of buildings. As with any operation, mission analysis is critical. For success, the search plan must be simple and the search conducted swiftly. 7-55. The search element is organized into teams. These teams can include personnel and special equipment for handling prisoners, detainees, interrogations, documentation (using a recorder with a camera), demolitions, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), mine detection, and tunnel reconnaissance. They may include such assets as military working dogs, interpreters, host nation security forces, aviation assets for observation or attack, tactical PSYOP teams, HUMINT collection teams, and female search teams. 7-56. Three basic methods are used to search a populated area: Assemble inhabitants in a central location. Restrict inhabitants to their home. Control the heads of the households. Assemble Inhabitants in a Central Location 7-57. This method is used if inhabitants appear to be hostile. It provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies insurgents an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. Depending on the objective of the search, a personnel search team may be necessary in this central location. This method has the disadvantages of taking the inhabitants away from their dwellings and encouraging looting, both of which could engender ill feelings. Another disadvantage in removing inhabitants from their dwellings is that it may generate false claims of theft and damage from the local populace. The security element is then responsible for controlling the inhabitants. The search element may escort individuals back to their dwellings to be present during the search or may leave them in the central location. Restrict Inhabitants to Their Home 7-58. This method prevents movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The security element must enforce this restriction. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their homes. Control Heads of Households 7-59. The head of each household is told to remain in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. The security element controls the group at the central location, controls the head of each household, and provides external security for the search team. When dealing with the head of

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the household, the unit leader explains the purpose of the search using an interpreter (if available). During the search, the head of the household accompanies the search team through the house. This person can be used to open doors and containers to facilitate the search. Looting is reduced, and the head of the household sees that the search team steals nothing. This is a proven method for controlling the populace during a search.

Searching a House
7-60. The objective of a house search is to look for controlled items and to screen residents to determine if any are suspected insurgents or sympathizers. A search party assigned to search an occupied building should consist of at least one local police officer, a protective escort for local security, and a female searcher. If inhabitants remain in the dwellings, the protective escort must isolate and secure the inhabitants during the search. Escort parties and transportation must be arranged before the search of a house. Forced entry may be necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. If the force searches a house containing property while its occupants are away, it should secure the house to prevent looting. Before squadron elements depart, the commander should arrange for the community to protect such houses until the occupants return. 7-61. The search party must strive to leave the house in the same (or better) condition than when the search began. In addition to information collection, the search team may use cameras or video recorders to establish the condition of the house before and after the search. All sensitive material or equipment found in the house should be documented before it is removed or collected, including date, time, location, the person from whom it was confiscated, and the reason for the confiscation. The use of a camera can also assist in this procedure.

Other Considerations
7-62. The reserve element is a mobile force positioned in a nearby area. Its mission is to help the search and security elements if they meet resistance beyond their ability to handle. The reserve element can replace or reinforce either of the other two elements if the need arises. Soldiers should treat any threat material found, including propaganda signs and leaflets, as if it is booby-trapped until inspection proves it safe. Underground and underwater areas should be searched thoroughly. Any freshly excavated ground could be a hiding place. Soldiers can use mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater.

AERIAL SEARCH OPERATIONS


7-63. Helicopter-mounted patrols escorted by armed helicopters take full advantage of the mobility and firepower of these aircraft. 7-64. The helicopter-mounted patrols may conduct reconnaissance of an assigned area or route in search of threat forces. When the element locates a threat force, it may instruct the armed helicopters to engage the threat force, or it may land and engage the threat by means of a ground assault. This technique has little value in areas of dense vegetation or when a significant man-portable air defense threat is present. 7-65. Helicopter-mounted patrols should be used only when sufficient intelligence is available to justify their use. Even then, ground operations should be used in support of these patrols. The commander must also consider the risk that aerial searches will provide advance warning to threat forces.

HANDLING INSURGENTS WHO DESERT OR SURRENDER


7-66. The following guidelines apply when insurgents desert or surrender voluntarily and indicate, at least in part, that their attitudes and beliefs have changed: Confine the insurgents only for screening and processing, and keep them separate from prisoners who exhibit no change in attitude. Supervise them after their release. The supervision need not be stringent and is best accomplished by host nation authorities, if possible. Relocate them if they are in danger of reprisal from the threat.

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Ensure that any promises made to induce their defection or surrender are met. Provide special handling to nonindigenous members of the insurgency who were captured.

ROADBLOCKS AND OTHER CHECKPOINTS


7-67. Controlling transportation networks can be a key part of civil control during stability operations. The ability to establish roadblocks and checkpoints is an important aspect of movement control and area denial. Individuals and vehicles may be stopped during movement to assist in individual accountability or capture of threat personnel or to control the trafficking of restricted material. The fundamentals of searches, discussed previously in this chapter, also apply to roadblocks and checkpoints. (Refer to FM 3-20.971 and FM 3-20.98 for more detailed information about roadblocks and checkpoints.) 7-68. Roadblocks and checkpoints help prevent traffic in contraband and stop the movement of known or suspected insurgents. They should be manned by police or paramilitary forces, which stop vehicles and pedestrians and conduct searches as required by conditions. These elements must take care to maintain legitimacy by not targeting specific groups. Either host nation or squadron elements defend the roadblocks and checkpoints from threat attack. If police strength is insufficient for the number of positions required, the squadron can operate them. Whenever squadron elements operate roadblocks and checkpoints, host nation police or other forces should be present to conduct the actual stop and search. Squadron elements should establish communications with other elements at the site but should also remain in contact with their own chain of command. The same principles apply for waterways as for LOCs on land. 7-69. Roadblocks are established in locations where approaching traffic cannot observe them until it is too late to withdraw and escape. Narrow defiles, tunnels, bridges, sharp curves, and other locations that channel traffic, are the preferred sites. Constructed, nonexplosive obstacles slow traffic, restrict it to a single lane, and bring it to a halt. An area off the main road should be used to conduct detailed searches of suspect vehicles and people and to avoid unduly delaying innocent traffic. A small reserve using hasty field fortifications in nearby defended areas should provide immediate support to roadblock/checkpoint personnel in case of attack. A larger reserve serving a number of posts should be capable of rapid reinforcement. Refer to Figure 7-7 for a detailed illustration of a deliberate checkpoint. 7-70. Whenever possible, squadron elements should fill the reserve role when working with host nation forces. The reserve may be the target of enemy attack or ambush, especially if a threat has observed rehearsals or other preparations. Threat forces may attack multiple locations simultaneously to test responsiveness or to aid their leaders in future planning. Friendly forces should vary the locations of roadblocks and the routes used to access them. (See Figure 7-7.) 7-71. Roadblock or checkpoint operations conducted during stability operations must employ reasonable escalation of force procedures when dealing with the local populace. Effective escalation of force procedures enable Soldiers to use necessary and proportional force to confront hostile acts or intentions and to avoid alienating the local populace. Refer to the example escalation of force procedures outlined in Figure 7-7. The squadron should plan to acquire escalation of force kits to support roadblock or checkpoint operations. Typical equipment for escalation of force kits includes the following: Speaker system. Weapon-mounted lasers. Spotlights/flashlights. Chem-lites. Warning signs (vehicle and sandwich board). Traffic cones. Flares. Spike strips. Portable speed bumps. Concertina wire.

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Figure 7-7. Example physical layout of a deliberate checkpoint

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Chapter 8

Civil Support Operations


Civil support operations include tasks and missions that address the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations when the size and scope of events exceed the capabilities or capacities of domestic civilian agencies. The ARNG is usually the first military force to respond on behalf of state authorities; however, the scope and level of destruction may require states to request assistance from federal authorities, including the Active Army.
Note. FM 3-28.1, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support (CS) Operations, is the Armys current doctrinal publication addressing civil support operations.

Contents
Section I Purpose and Types of Civil Support Operations................................ 8-1 Army Role in Civil Support .................. 8-1 Civil Authority ...................................... 8-2 Section II Squadron Operations in Civil Support ........................................... 8-2 Multiple and Overlapping Activities ..... 8-3 Mission Training.................................. 8-3 Operational Environment .................... 8-3 Section III Key Considerations for Civil Support Operations ....................... 8-3 Response ............................................ 8-3 Recovery ............................................. 8-4 Restoration.......................................... 8-4

SECTION I PURPOSE AND TYPES OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

ARMY ROLE IN CIVIL SUPPORT


8-1. Army involvement in civil support operations may entail providing essential supplies, capabilities, and services to help civil authorities in the United States and its territories deal with situations beyond their control. In most cases, Army forces focus on overcoming conditions created by natural or man-made disasters. Civil support operations also include those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to foster mutual assistance and support with civil government agencies. A key part of these activities is planning or preparedness foror the application of resources for response tothe consequences of civil emergencies or attacks. Examples include national security emergencies and major disasters. The Armys roles and responsibilities for civil support operations fall under three primary tasks (see FM 3-0, Operations, and FM 3-28.1 for additional information): Provide support in response to a disaster or terrorist attack. Support civil law enforcement. Provide other support as required.

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CIVIL AUTHORITY
8-2. During civil support operations, the U.S. military always responds to and works under a civilian agency (see Table 8-1). A presidential declaration of an emergency or disaster area usually precedes a civil support operation. The U.S. military provides civil support primarily in accordance with a DOD directive for military assistance to civil authorities. This directive addresses responses to both natural and man-made disasters and includes military assistance in situations such as civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, activities in combating terrorism, and law enforcement. See FM 3-0 and FM 3-28.1. Table 8-1. Impact of military duty status on squadron tasks in civil support operations

SECTION II SQUADRON OPERATIONS IN CIVIL SUPPORT


8-3. Although the squadron is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for civil support operations, its capabilities are well suited to particular aspects of civil support. The squadron responds to or supports such events by performing common tactical missions and tasks (such as perimeter or area security), but it may also be called upon to execute unique missions and tasks (such as riot control, firefighting, or rescue support). The squadron has a functional chain of command, reliable communications, reconnaissance and surveillance equipment, and well-trained and well-equipped subordinate units. It can operate in austere environments with sustainment support. It can also provide C2 and sustainment to attached units that have more specialized equipment or capabilities (such as engineers, transportation, CA, and medical).

Special Note
Reconnaissance in civil support operations is conducted strictly within the guidelines of U.S. law and focuses on the specific missions directed by the Secretary of Defense. The ARNG often acts as a first military responder for civil support operations on behalf of state authorities while serving in state active-duty status or when functioning under Title 32 U.S. Code authority. In state active-duty status, the state governor commands the ARNG and the state defense force (if applicable). ARNG civil support missions are planned and executed in accordance with the needs of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes. ARNG forces in state active-duty status can perform civil law enforcement missions in accordance with the laws and statutes of their state. Once placed in Title 10 status, ARNG units must

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adhere to the same laws governing Active Army and Army Reserve operations. Reconnaissance must be planned so that it adheres to the law and still answers the CCIR. Careful planning of reconnaissance, with detailed instructions to the units and Soldiers involved, will ensure that collection operations do not violate U.S. laws. For more information, see FM 3-28.1.

MULTIPLE AND OVERLAPPING ACTIVITIES


8-4. In most situations, Army forces involved in civil support operations execute a combination of multiple overlapping activities. Forces must conduct civil support operations with consistency and impartiality to encourage cooperation from local agencies and the populace and to preserve the legitimacy of the overall effort. The actions of platoons, squads, or even individual Soldiers take place under the scrutiny of many interested groups and can have a disproportionate effect on mission success. Therefore, high levels of discipline and training, and a thorough understanding of the mission end state are necessary for effective civil support operations.

MISSION TRAINING
8-5. A sound foundation in combat mission training and in basic military skills and discipline underpins the squadrons ability to perform civil support missions. At the same time, many of the key individual and collective skills required in civil support differ from those the squadron normally employs and therefore require additional, deliberate training. Squadrons use most of their regularly trained movement and security tasks in civil support operations, but they modify those tasks for the special conditions of their mission. They also train leaders and Soldiers for unique tasks specific to the types of operations they are assigned.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
8-6. A variety of factors in the OE combine to make each civil support mission unique. These include the mission, the terms governing the Armys presence in the AO, the character and attitude of the populace, the civilian organizations cooperating with the squadron, and the physical and cultural environments. With the exception of specific actions undertaken in counterterrorism operations, support to counterdrug operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations, civil support missions tend to be decentralized and highly structured. The squadrons activities consist largely of directing the operations of its troops/companies and supporting units within a sector or AO in accordance with a detailed OPORD.

SECTION III KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS


8-7. Key considerations for civil support operations include the types of support required, procedures for providing support, and time required to conduct the support. While civil support operations vary greatly in every mission, the squadron can expect any COA to follow a broad pattern of response, recovery, and restoration. (See FM 3-28.1 for detailed information.) The squadron develops SA and analyzes the situation throughout the MDMP, primarily during IPB, to identify likely situations that may occur during an operation. Time permitting, reconnaissance and reports from higher headquarters help to clarify the situation. Through planning and rehearsals, the squadron commander and other leaders develop and refine COAs to deal with the situation; the COAs become the foundation of the squadron scheme of maneuver.

RESPONSE
8-8. As part of the response phase, the squadron enters the affected area, normally under higher headquarters control, and makes contact with federal and state agencies and relief organizations as early as possible. Actions during this phase of civil support include planning for the operation, staging CPs into the area, establishing security, deploying the squadron, and initiating contact with supported activities and other parts of the relief force. The squadron may make its chief contributions in this phase. Its Soldiers are usually among the first relief forces to arrive. Its C2 structure gives it the ability to communicate and coordinate. Furthermore, the squadrons ability to reconnoiter and gather information makes it useful in the initial efforts of authorities to establish understanding and control of the area and to oversee critical actions. Typical squadron requirements and takes during the response phase include the following: Search and rescue.

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High-volume emergency medical treatment. Hazard identification. Dissemination of emergency information. Food and water distribution. Collection of displaced persons in temporary shelters. Support to law enforcement agencies. Repair of power generation and distribution systems. Clearance and repair of roads, railways, and canals. Firefighting, CBRN and hazardous industrial waste decontamination, and flood control.

RECOVERY
8-9. Once the squadron operation is under way, recovery begins. With initial emergencies resolved and a working relationship between all parties in place, there should be steady progress in relieving the situation throughout this phase of operations. The squadron is fully deployed in an AO or executing an assigned task. Its work includes coordination with its higher headquarters, supported groups, and other relief forces and daily allocation of its own assets to recovery tasks. The squadron's task organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes. Security, maintenance, effective employment of resources, and Soldier support all require continuing attention. Medical officers should review and assist the commander in counteracting the psychological effects of disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering on the squadrons Soldiers throughout the operation. Typical tasks during the recovery phase include the following: Continuing and modifying information engagement activities. Resettling the populace from emergency shelters to their homes. Repairing infrastructure. Contracting to provide appropriate support (when feasible). Restoring power, water, communications, and sanitation services. Removing debris. Supporting law enforcement agencies. Transferring authority and responsibility to civil authorities. Planning for redeployment. Assisting with restoration of health care delivery system.

RESTORATION
8-10. Restoration is the return of normalcy to the area. As civil authorities assume full control of remaining emergency operations and normal services, the squadron transfers those responsibilities to replacement agencies and begins redeployment from the area. During restoration, the commander should consider issues such as the following: Transfer of authority to civil agencies (ongoing activity). Transition of C2 for agencies and units that remain in the area. Movement plans that support redeployment and continued recovery in the area. Staging of C2 out of the area. Accountability of property or transfer of property to the community, if authorized. Note. The squadron is normally relieved incrementally as civil agencies are able to assume control of certain tasks. The transfer usually does not occur at one time.

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The squadron receives augmentation based on assessment of METT-TC factors and priorities established by the higher commanders concept of operations. Section I of this chapter highlights Army assets that can augment the squadron and discusses considerations for working with joint, interagency, and multinational elements. The remainder of the chapter, Sections II through IX, addresses how the squadron employs the support provided by these assets.

Contents
Section I Army and Joint Augmentation ......................................... 9-1 Brigade and Regimental Assets ......... 9-1 Support Brigades ................................ 9-2 Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Considerations .......... 9-3 Section II Engineer Support .................. 9-3 Squadron Support Assets ................... 9-3 Support Capabilities............................ 9-4 Section III Fires ....................................... 9-5 Lethal Fires ......................................... 9-5 Nonlethal Fires ................................. 9-10 Targeting Process............................. 9-10 Section IV Army Aviation Support ...... 9-14 Section V CBRN Support Operations ............................................ 9-15 CBRN Defense ................................. 9-15 CBRN Support Assets and Capabilities .................................... 9-16 Section VI Air and Missile Defense Support .................................................. 9-17 Section VII Civil Affairs Support.......... 9-18 Squadron Role .................................. 9-18 Civil Affairs Units ............................... 9-19 Section VIII Military Police Support .... 9-19 Section IX Other Support or Functions .............................................. 9-19 Military Intelligence ........................... 9-19 Explosive Ordnance Disposal ........... 9-20 Military Working Dogs ....................... 9-20 Tactical PSYOP Team ...................... 9-20 Interpreters........................................ 9-20 Information Protection ....................... 9-21 Personnel Recovery .......................... 9-21 Army Health System Support ............ 9-21 Composite Risk Management ........... 9-23

SECTION I ARMY AND JOINT AUGMENTATION

BRIGADE AND REGIMENTAL ASSETS


9-1. The squadrons higher headquarters (BCT, ACR, or BFSB) is organized to provide or receive additional combat power for its subordinate maneuver units. The higher headquarters has organic capability in the form of a brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) or separate companies to provide additional combat power. The BFSB has very limited capability to augment its reconnaissance squadron other than with assets from the organic MI battalions (such as HUMINT assets). 9-2. If assigned its own AO, the squadron will require significant augmentation. Figure 9-1 shows an example of supporting combat power available through the squadrons higher headquarters.

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Figure 9-1. Example augmentation of an HBCT 9-3. The following references provide additional information regarding support available from the squadrons higher headquarters: FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations.

SUPPORT BRIGADES
9-4. Under the Armys modular concept, the BCT is the primary organization for the mission of fighting tactical engagements and battles. A mix of other brigade types provides support to higher-echelon commanders. These brigades are designed to support the BCT and carry out specific tasks in support of higher echelons. These support brigades include the following: BFSB. Fires brigade. Combat aviation brigade (CAB). Maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). Sustainment brigade. 9-5. The organization of the support brigades is flexible. They are designed around a base of organic elements, to which a mix of additional capabilities based on the factors of METT-TC can be added. The brigade headquarters includes the necessary expertise to control different capabilities. Each support brigades base includes organic signal and sustainment capabilities. 9-6. These references provide additional information regarding the various types of support brigades: FM 3-0, Operations. FM 3-04.11, Aviation Brigades. FM 3-09, Fire Support. FM 3-90.31, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations. FM 4-93.2, The Sustainment Brigade.

OTHER BRIGADES AND UNITS


9-7. A mix of functional brigades and units will remain in the Army force structure for the foreseeable future. These functional brigades will normally be assigned or attached to theater-level commands. Examples can include MP, engineer, AMD, signal, medical, CBRN defense, and CA assets. Functional brigades may be attached to or under operational control (OPCON) of the Army force headquarters. They may also be placed under OPCON of the joint force land component commander.

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JOINT, INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


9-8. Joint operations are the ultimate form of combined arms execution. Employing the varyingand synergisticcapabilities of the joint services enables friendly forces to preserve the initiative by forcing the enemy to react to multiple forms of contact. The squadron can expect to work with forces of other services to accomplish their assigned missions. Examples include the following: Fires from U.S. Air Force (USAF) systems can create the conditions for decisive action and multiply the effects of tactical maneuver. Army and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces are tactically interoperable. A USMC unit may replace an Army unit in an operation and vice versa. Typical USMC units that might task organize with a squadron include tank, infantry, and reconnaissance units. SOF can provide complementary capabilities for tactical operations. Commands frequently task organize tactical PSYOP teams and CA teams with the squadron. 9-9. The squadron must also be prepared to operate in OEs that require cooperation with organizations not under military command. These organizationswhich include other agencies of the U.S. government and nonmilitary agencies of host-nation governmentsare present in almost every military operation. The squadron must know how to synchronize its military action with interagency or intergovernmental humanitarian action to ensure the local population supports U.S. military efforts. Interagency and intergovernmental cooperation is not easy. It usually requires the squadron commander to dedicate liaison personnel, to share military resources, and to conduct detailed and continuous coordination to achieve overall success. 9-10. Multinational operations can be formal (such as those involving units of the Republic of Korea or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), or they can develop in a cooperative manner (such as operations with local military forces in Afghanistan and/or Iraq). Such actions as maintaining rapport, integrating military transition teams, and partnering in unit operations help to facilitate interoperability and C2 with foreign units. The squadron must articulate the commanders intent and concept of operations clearly and simply to avoid confusion that could result from differences in doctrine and terminology. The squadron commander and staff should plan to have longer planning sessions and more detailed rehearsals to develop a common understanding of the operations plan and control measures.

SECTION II ENGINEER SUPPORT


9-11. Combat engineers increase the combat power of the squadron by accomplishing mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. Engineer support relates to the warfighting functions of movement and maneuver and protection. They are integrated with the commanders maneuver and fires assets to afford or enhance opportunities for the commander to successfully accomplish combined arms missions. Additionally, they may perform reconnaissance and infantry combat missions when required. General (construction) engineers may also augment the ACR/BCT and provide support to the squadron. They are not organized, equipped, or trained to perform close combat operations.

SQUADRON SUPPORT ASSETS


9-12. Engineer assets are not organic to the squadrons. The regiment or brigade will allocate or coordinate for assets for the squadron. Engineer support for the ACR cavalry squadron is provided by the regiments engineer company. Engineer support for the reconnaissance squadron in the HBCT and IBCT is provided by the engineer company located in the BSTB. The SBCT has an organic engineer company to provide support to the reconnaissance squadron. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron receives support from engineer units assigned to the MEB. When engineer support requirements exceed the organic capabilities of the squadrons higher headquarters, augmentation from force pool assets is required.

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SUPPORT CAPABILITIES
MOBILITY
9-13. Mobility operations create and preserve freedom of movement for maneuver units and critical supplies. Engineers accomplish this by reducing the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles, by providing gap crossings, and by constructing and maintaining combat roads and trails. Engineers often support the squadron during reconnaissance by performing mobility tasks in support of the movement or maneuver of follow-on forces. Construction and maintenance of routes are accomplished to the extent necessary to support the momentum of the squadron. Improvement of existing routes is the first priority, with construction of short bypasses second. Movement of sustainment assets must also be considered when constructing combat roads and trails since these assets require the highest degree of mobility support.

COUNTERMOBILITY
9-14. Countermobility operations attack the threats ability to maneuver. This is accomplished by enhancing natural restrictions to movement with planned obstacles. Obstacles are classified as either existing or reinforcing. Existing obstacles are those natural or cultural restrictions to maneuver that are part of the terrain when the operation begins. Reinforcing obstacles are specifically constructed, emplaced, or detonated to tie together, strengthen, and extend existing obstacles. Restrictions in the AO can often be rapidly turned into effective reinforcing obstacles with minimal effort. 9-15. The two types of reinforcing obstacles are tactical and protective. Tactical obstacles are placed to achieve one of the desired effects on threat maneuver (block, fix, turn, disrupt) and are generally within or at the front of an EA. Maneuver units may assist engineers in emplacing tactical obstacles when speed is essential or engineer assets are limited. Protective obstacles are placed close to friendly positions to provide unit security. Typically, maneuver units without engineer support emplace them. Protective obstacles normally can be placed outside planned obstacle zones and belts unless otherwise specified by higher headquarters or if the obstacles are not intended to be recovered. 9-16. The squadron may receive engineer support from its higher headquarters or from engineer units assigned to an MEB. Supporting engineer units are often task organized with both mobility and countermobility equipment. In missions where facilitating movement of other forces is critical, more engineers may be assigned to initiate mobility tasks at the earliest possible time. When engineers are limited, they are best employed under squadron control to keep their efforts focused on the most critical requirements. The squadron commander specifies priority of effort for engineer tasks. In countermobility operations, priority can also be specified to designated portions of the obstacle plan. 9-17. The engineer unit may be placed in a supporting relationship with a specific subordinate ground troop for an operation in which this arrangement best accomplishes the mission. Squadron units provide security to engineers as they work on their tasks and are prepared to provide sustainment as well. These actions ensure the engineer effort is focused. The engineer company commander or platoon leader can best manage the collective effort of the entire company/platoon and supporting equipment, using them as needed to accomplish the commanders intent. Reconnaissance missions on occasion may require an engineer platoon to delegate squads to troops or scout platoons.

SURVIVABILITY
9-18. Survivability operations entail the development and construction of protective positions to reduce the effectiveness of threat weapon systems. Engineers construct survivability positions for C2 elements and for critical equipment and supplies. They may assist with the digging of individual and crew-served weapon positions, although they are often focused on creating vehicle fighting positions and performing other survivability tasks that require engineer assets. The most extensive survivability effort is expended in the defense. 9-19. There is seldom enough time or equipment for the engineers to do all the tasks desired; therefore, individual Soldiers, vehicle crews, and units must do all they can to prepare their own survivability

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positions. The squadron commander designates the priority of effort for attached engineers in survivability work. The amount of time available and the level of threat determine the amount of resources the squadron can invest in increasing survivability. Squadron priorities should list the following as top priorities: CPs, including the main CP, CTCP, and field trains command post (FTCP). High-value assets, such as Trojan elements or UAS GCSs.

SECTION III FIRES


9-20. The FS system, which relates directly to the fires warfighting function, is a collective body of target acquisition and attack systems (lethal and nonlethal), C2 systems and facilities, technical support (meteorological and survey), and the personnel required to provide and manage FS. AMD and engineer assets may also become components of the FS system. 9-21. With the emergence of numerous asymmetric threats and the possibility for multiple, simultaneous engagements in a relatively short time period, it is imperative that the squadron effectively employ FS assets. One of the squadron commanders greatest challenges is effectively synchronizing and concentrating all available assets at critical times and places. FS planning is a critical part of effective reconnaissance because the squadron will require such support as it deploys to confirm or deny the CCIR early in the higher headquarters decision-making process. 9-22. The commander must ensure that he clearly states his intent for FS and that the FS plan is developed accordingly. Each phase of the commanders plan must be supported by the FS plan. The following list covers several areas that the commander must coordinate with the fire support officer (FSO): Scheme of maneuver. This includes the AO, timing of advance, rate of movement, passage of lines, and Army aviation operating in the AO. Priority of fires. This identifies which troop has priority of artillery fires. Critical targets. These are targets that, if not fired upon, will seriously impede mission accomplishment. Priority targets. These are identified, along with how long they will be in effect. CAS. The commander and FSO, in coordination with the tactical air control party (TACP), determine what CAS assets are available, when they are available, and how they will be used (including target selection and desired effects). FSCMs. These are the existing or proposed, permissive or restrictive control measures established by higher headquarters.

CAUTION
Coordinating FS is a continuous and essential process for reconnaissance or cavalry units. The FSCMs must reduce the risk of engaging dispersed reconnaissance or security elements without unnecessarily restricting engagement opportunities of friendly forces. Examples of restrictive control measures are NFAs, RFLs, and RFAs. See FM 3-90 for additional discussion. Ammunition restrictions. These place limitations on the use of obscurants, improved conventional munitions, or other ammunition (including established controlled supply rates).

LETHAL FIRES
9-23. Offensive and defensive operations place a premium on employing the lethal effects of combat power against the enemy. In these operations, concentration (i.e., effects), audacity, tempo, and surprise are vital considerations. Historically, the side better able to combine them defeats its opponent rapidly while incurring fewer losses. Such victories create opportunities for exploitation. In some operations, the effects

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of speed, surprise, and shock are enough to collapse organized resistance. Such a collapse occurred in the offensive phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (see FM 3-0).

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES


9-24. Squadrons assigned to the BCTs receive FS from the brigades organic fires battalion. Figures 9-2 through 9-4 illustrate the typical organization of these battalions.

Figure 9-2. Fires battalion HBCT

Figure 9-3. Fires battalion SBCT

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Figure 9-4. Fires battalion IBCT 9-25. The cavalry squadrons of the ACR have an organic field artillery battery. It is organized to provide responsive and accurate fire support to the elements of the squadron, including close supporting fires and counterfire (see Figure 9-5).

Figure 9-5. Artillery battery armored cavalry regiment 9-26. The BFSB has no organic artillery units. Fire support for elements of the reconnaissance squadron is coordinated by joint or Army fires assets supporting the BFSB or other units. 9-27. Additional fire support to the squadron or its higher headquarters may come from a fires brigade. Fires brigades are normally assigned, attached, or placed in the OPCON of a division. However, they may be placed OPCON to a corps, joint force land component commander, JTF, or another Service component or functional component. Fires brigades are task organized to accomplish assigned tasks. See FM 3-09, Fire Support, for more discussion on the fires brigade. 9-28. As part of the unit basic load, cannon artillery units have several different munitions available to support the squadron. They have lethal munitions such as HE, dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), extended-range DPICM, Copperhead, and scatterable mines (SCATMINE). The 155mm cannon artillery also has a suite of special munitions such as obscurants and illumination (including infrared). Additionally, 155-mm precision munitions are available to support the squadron when the reduction of collateral damage is critical and when HPTs are encountered. 9-29. In addition to cannon artillery, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) units may provide either rocket fires (out to 70 kilometers) or missile fires (out to 300 kilometers or more). Rockets are used against

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personnel and soft and lightly armored targets at ranges of 15 to 70 kilometers. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles are designed to carry a variety of submunitions, including smart munitions, and are used at ranges of 25 to 300+ kilometers. The MLRS cannot fire special munitions such as obscurants or illumination. See FM 3-09.60, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations, for additional information.

ARMY AVIATION ATTACK OPERATIONS


9-30. The squadron may require Army attack aircraft to support combat operations. Attack operations destroy or defeat enemy forces to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Attack/reconnaissance units conduct two basic types of attackclose combat attack and interdiction attack. Both types of capabilities represent a powerful asset, capable of destroying threat elements of varying sizes, including large armor formations. See FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations, for additional information. 9-31. Close combat attack is a hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft providing air-to-ground fires for friendly units engaged in close combat. Targets may range from a few meters to several kilometers from friendly forces. Close combat attacks are generally coordinated and directed by a team, platoon, or company-level ground unit. Due to the close proximity of friendly forces, detailed coordination is required. Once the aircrews receive the mission from the ground commander, they develop a plan, then engage the enemy force while maintaining freedom to maneuver. Due to capabilities of the aircraft and the enhanced SA of the aircrews, terminal control from ground units or controllers is not necessary. Note. Close combat attack is not synonymous with CAS, covered later in this discussion. 9-32. Interdiction attack is a hasty or deliberate attack by Army aircraft to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade, or destroy enemy forces before they can affect friendly forces. The purpose of an interdiction attack is to deny the enemy freedom of action, support friendly maneuver, and destroy key enemy forces and capabilities. An interdiction attack is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration with ground forces is not required. It combines ground-based fires, attack aviation, unmanned systems, and joint assets to mass effects and isolate and destroy key enemy forces and capabilities. Deliberate interdiction attacks are focused on key objectives and fleeting high-value targets (HVT) such as enemy C2 elements, air defense systems, mobile long-range surface missiles, surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), artillery, and reinforcing ground forces. Hasty interdiction attacks are the result of sudden enemy contact or enemy attack.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT


9-33. The squadron may require support in the AO from joint aircraft against targets in close proximity to friendly ground forces. CAS can be preplanned or provided on request (immediate or emergency basis). CAS is capable of destroying threat elements of varying sizes, including large armor formations. For additional discussion on close air support, see the following: FM 3-09.32, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support. 9-34. CAS missions are broken down into two types: Preplanned. Preplanned CAS missions are generally requested 72 hours in advance and do not include detailed target information because of the lead-time for the mission. Immediate. Immediate requests are used for air support mission requirements identified too late to be included in the current air tasking order (normally less than 72 hours).

CAS Planning Considerations


9-35. CAS mission success directly relates to thorough effective mission planning. The S-3 Air is responsible for working with the squadron air liaison officer (ALO) prior to and during tactical air

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(TACAIR) operations. Since there are no digital links with supporting aircraft, the S-3 Air must consistently keep the ALO apprised of the ground tactical situation through digital and conventional means. 9-36. When operating in the squadrons AO, CAS aircraft are under the positive control of one of the squadrons TACP forward air controllers (FAC). FACs monitor the ground tactical situation; review the COP, including existing FSCMs such as NFAs around established OPs; and monitor conventional voice radio nets of the supported ground or maneuver commander to prevent fratricide in air-to-ground or ground-to-air engagements. 9-37. Other planning factors include time available for planning, C2 procedures, communications, and terrain. CAS mission success is directly related to thorough mission planning based on the following factors and considerations: Weather. Does the weather favor the use of aircraft? What is the cloud ceiling? What is the forecast for the immediate future? Weather is one of the most important considerations when visually employing weapons; poor weather conditions can hinder target identification and degrade weapon accuracy. Target acquisition. Targets that are well camouflaged, small and stationary, or masked by hills, towns, cities, or other natural and man-made terrain are difficult to identify from fast-moving aircraft. The use of marking rounds can enhance target identification and help ensure first-pass success. Target identification. This is critical if CAS aircraft are to avoid fratricide. It can be accomplished by providing a precise description of the target in relation to terrain features easily visible from the air. Smoke and laser devices can also be used for marking purposes. Identification of friendly forces. This is a key consideration in using CAS. The primary cause of fratricide is misidentification of friendly troops as threat forces. Safe means of friendly position identification include mirror flashes, thermal identification panels, infrared signals/beacons, and precise reports of direction and distance from prominent land features or target marks. General ordnance characteristics. What types of targets are to be engaged, and what are the desired weapon effects? Final attack heading. The final attack heading depends on considerations of troop safety, aircraft survivability, and optimum weapon effects. Missiles or bombs are effective from any angle. Cannons, however, are more effective against the flanks and rear end of armored vehicles. Suppression of enemy air defenses. SEAD is required based on the capabilities of the aircraft and presence of threat air defense systems in the target area. CAS/artillery integration. Army artillery and combat air power are complementary. Because artillery support is more continuous and faster to respond than CAS, CAS missions must be integrated with artillery so that limited firing restrictions are imposed. The airspace coordination area (ACA) is the airspace coordinating measure used to accomplish this integration.

Airspace Coordination Area


9-38. An ACA is a means of providing airspace for the relatively safe travel of aircraft and for facilitating the simultaneous attack of targets near each other by multiple FS assets. ACAs are classified as either formal or informal. This classification is based on the amount of time available and the level of control desired. See FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, for information on ACAs. Formal ACA 9-39. This is a three-dimensional block of airspace that provides lateral and altitude separation between aircraft and other FS assets. It is designed to be in effect for a relatively longer period of time than an informal ACA. The formal ACA is established by the ACR/BCT or higher headquarters. The extensive coordination required for a formal ACA can limit its timeliness and usefulness at the squadron level.

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Informal ACA 9-40. An informal ACA can be established at squadron or higher level by using one of four standard separation plans: lateral, altitude, timed, or lateral and altitude. It is normally in effect for very short periods of timeonly long enough to get aircraft into and out of the target area.

CAS Request
9-41. The CAS request provides the crew of CAS aircraft with the SA and information necessary to successfully engage their target(s). The terminal controller will transmit via radio (such as VHF, UHF, or FM) to the attack aircraft, providing the aircrew with enough time to write down the information and set up their navigational equipment. The controller does not transmit the line numbers. Units of measurement are standard unless otherwise specified. Table 9-1 provides the CAS request format. Lines 4 and 6 and any restrictions are mandatory read-back items (indicated by boldface type in Table 9-1). The controller may request read-back of additional items as required. Table 9-1. Close air support nine-line request format
LINE # Line 1. Line 2. Line 3. Line 4. Line 5. Line 6. Line 7. EXPLANATION IP/ BP to target: Heading: (degrees magnetic) Offset: (left/right) Distance: (in nautical miles or meters) Target elevation: (feet above/below mean sea level) Target description: (general) Target Location: (latitude/longitude, grid [including map datum, such as WGS-84], offsets, or visual) Mark: (e.g., WP, laser, infrared) Code: (actual code) Laser to Target Line: (degrees) Location of Friendly Forces: (from target, cardinal directions and distance in meters) Position marked by: Egress: (cardinal direction and/or CP) Remarks: Restrictions (FAH or altitude), threats, ACA (SEAD gun-target line) Time on Target (TOT) or Time to Target (TTT):

Line 8. Line 9.

NONLETHAL FIRES
9-42. Nonlethal fires are any fires that do not directly seek the physical destruction of the intended target and are designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities (FM 1-02). PSYOP, electronic warfare (jamming), and other C2 countermeasures are all nonlethal fire options. See FM 3-24 and FM 3-07 for additional discussion of nonlethal fires.

TARGETING PROCESS
9-43. The targeting process synchronizes the effects of fires and information engagement with the effects of other warfighting functions (see FM 3-09). The targeting process determines what targets to attack to achieve the squadron commanders desired effects, as well as how, where, and when to attack them. The targeting process is based on four functions: decide, detect, deliver, and assess (see Figure 9-6).

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Figure 9-6. Targeting process 9-44. The targeting process works as well for nonlethal systems as it does for the lethal systems discussed earlier. The staff that integrates the targeting process methodology into the MDMP will be able to provide sound guidance to its subordinate units. The targeting process Identifies resources (targets) that the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide him the greatest advantage (such as HVTs). Further identifies the subset of targets that must be acquired and attacked to achieve friendly success (HPTs). Enables the squadron commander to synchronize all warfighting functions to accomplish his mission. 9-45. The targeting life cycle is continuous. Traditionally, the squadron received an order from higher, analyzed that order, and then executed the mission specified. Once that mission was complete, the cycle began again. In the current OE, however, units constantly apply combat power and force multipliers. That is the nature of full-spectrum operations. Since there may be no clear distinctions between the end of one operation and the start of another, the squadron staff (and its CP) must be structured to conduct current operations and future planning simultaneously.

TARGETING MEETINGS
9-46. All staff members must be prepared to discuss their requirements, and the site for the targeting meeting must be set up with the appropriate products and information, such as the following: Anticipated task organizations for the time periods discussed. Assets available to the squadron for each time period (this includes analysis of combat power by day). A 1:25,000 map, maneuver control system (MCS), FBCB2, or CP of the future for developing operational graphics. A large target synchronization matrix (TSM) worksheet or chart for each time period to focus everyones attention.

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9-47. Execution and adjustment decisions encompass the following: Targeting objectives. High-payoff target list (HPTL) and desired effects. Decisive operation. Main efforts and shaping operations. PIR changes. Measure of effectiveness changes. 9-48. Adjustment guidance includes the following: Targeting objectives. Decisive operation. COA guidance. Main and supporting efforts. Reconnaissance focus (from the commanders reconnaissance planning guidance). HPTL. 9-49. As Table 9-2 indicates, the staff reviews the TSM, covering the last 24 hours, to ensure the squadron achieved the desired effects or task. If a task was not achieved, each HPT, depending on its importance, is either retargeted in the coming time periods or removed altogether because it is no longer a valid HPT. Since the HPTLs are already agreed upon (from the pretargeting meeting), this portion of the targeting meeting serves merely as a review for the staff. Table 9-2. Targeting meeting responsibilities
Staff Member XO S-2 Responsibility Review commanders guidance and commanders intent. Focus on the last time-phase line (e.g., D+3 days). Current enemy situation template and enemy COA (event template). Proposed HVT sets and link analysis. Current and proposed PIR, BDA, and AO assessments. Impact of light and weather data. Enemy COA event template (D, D+1/2/3). Collection emphasis, including higher headquarters-directed NAI coverage. Collection synchronization, including countermortar radars. Status of collection assets. Draft intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan (D, D+1/2/3). Status of current operations. Friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and commanders PIR (D-1 review; D, D+1/2/3 recommendations). Higher headquarters-directed and implied tasks. Adjacent units affecting operations (D, D+1/2/3). Task organization (assets available, including anticipated combat power. Troops-to-task ratios.

S-3

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Table 9-2. Targeting meeting responsibilities (continued)


Staff Member FSO Responsibility Recommended essential tasks for FS (and effects) and specific methodology (D, D+1/2/3). Recommended decide and detect data for TSM (D, D+1/2/3). Radar operations and counterfire predictive analysis (D, D+1/2/3). Proposed HPTs (D, D+1/2/3). Recommended changes to FSCM. Coordination and recommendations for preplanned air support requests. Submission of airspace control measures (ACM) requests. Submission of preplanned and recommended air requests for inclusion in the air tasking order (ATO) (D, D+1/2/3). Themes and messages applicable to recommended essential tasks. Updated measure of effectiveness matrix. Recommended talking points. Coordinate civil reconnaissance. Coordinate key leader engagement by constantly vetting contacts to identify elites within the AO. Plan, coordinate, and manage civil-military operations (CMO) project management. Identify and coordinate with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and host nation project management. Minimize interference between civil and military operations. Synchronize CMO to enhance mission effectiveness. Vulnerabilities and flexibility (decision points). Approved PSYOP plans and programs. Approval and availability of products. Tactical PSYOP team tasks and purposes. Products and distribution plans/synchronization. Public affairs media engagement plan. Public affairs information strategies and media facilitation. Media security plan. Enemy countermobility COA. Engineer and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assets available (D, D+1/2/3). Recommended reconstruction projects. Environmental considerations assessment. Provides final guidance and direction to the staff.

Air Liaison Officer (if available)

Unit Information Operations Officer CA Team Leader (if available)

PSYOP Team Leader (if available)

Unit Public Affairs Officer

Engineer Officer (if available)

XO

9-50. With constant analysis, the formal targeting briefing allows the squadron commander to see himself (friendly forces) and see the potential problems in relationship to time and space. In a given targeting cycle, the formal process must synchronize reconnaissance assets and enablers. It must also synchronize the combat execution of multiple tactical missions within the squadron AO through graphical concept sketches that include the following: CASEVAC. Recovery. Consequence management. Follow-up assessments and other requirements.

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9-51. The effects of failing to synchronize operations during planning means current operations only collect information. Current operations must incorporate full SU of near-term objectives, the commanders visualization of the AO, and recognition of execution friction points. Otherwise, commanders cannot make the immediate contributions required to accomplish missions and generate the synchronized effect of nested end states from squadron through the higher headquarters.

SQUADRON STAFFING
9-52. Brigade-level staffs have cells to focus both on the actual targeting meeting and on maintaining continuous targeting abilities. The squadron staff is much more austere. Some staff members must contribute to both efforts, and time is, accordingly, more valuable. Therefore, the squadron must focus on the continuous assessment of targeting to reduce the amount of time key staff members are required to be in targeting meetings. Note. Based on its table of organization and equipment (TOE), the squadron may not have authorization for certain positions (such as a CA officer) that could be involved in targeting meetings. Depending on the mission variables of METT-TC, the squadron commander can assign responsibility for a position that is not authorized or resourced to an officer or senior NCO to ensure proper oversight of the function. 9-53. Planners must be able to use current information in assessments. They require immediate access to the tools maintained by the current operations cell. They must also debrief units operating in sector and maintain SA on adjacent unit activities or even across the entire higher headquarters sector in assessing current actions and developing future plans aimed at the end state. 9-54. The squadron staff must understand that the current operations cells 24-hour time repeatedly restarts. That is, execution and tasking cycles in which the higher headquarters and squadron operate serve as an asset management cycle covering specific 24-hour periods. It is important for the squadron to understand that planners conduct planning in that cycle. The future operations cell receives assets based on the tasking cycle. The earlier planners identify any additional assets they require (such as aviation, PSYOP, HUMINT, and CA teams), the more likely they are to get the needed support.

SECTION IV ARMY AVIATION SUPPORT


9-55. Army aviation has the mission to find, fix, and destroy threat forces using fire and maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at critical times and places. Army aviation assets can provide timely reconnaissance and intelligence throughout the squadron AO and conduct air assault and air movement operations. They conduct missions either as an aviation-pure force or task organized with other elements. Army aviation relates to the warfighting functions of movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, and sustainment. 9-56. Table 9-3 lists the missions performed by Army aviation in support of the squadron or its higher headquarters.

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Table 9-3. Army aviation missions


Unit Type Attack Reconnaissance Battalion Missions Reconnaissance Security Attack Movement to contact Reconnaissance Security Air assault Air movement Attack Movement to contact C2 support Aerial CASEVAC Air assault Air movement Aerial CASEVAC Personnel recovery Air assault Air movement C2 support Aerial MEDEVAC Aerial CASEVAC Air traffic services Personnel recovery Aviation maintenance Forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations

Air Cavalry Squadron

Assault Helicopter Battalion

General Support Aviation Battalion

9-57. See the following for additional information: FM 1-100, Army Aviation Operations. FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades. FM 3-04.113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations. FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone. FM 3-52.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control.

SECTION V CBRN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

CBRN DEFENSE
9-58. CBRN defense covers the methods, plans, procedures, and training required to establish defensive measures against the effects of an attack by CBRN weapons and/or the ability to deter the use of such weapons. The main goals of CBRN defensive operations are to reduce casualties and damage to equipment and to minimize disruption of the mission. These measures are continuous in nature and integrated throughout all combat operations. CBRN support operations relate to the warfighting function of protection. Three principles guide CBRN defense: Contamination avoidance.

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Protection. Decontamination. 9-59. Units employ CBRN protection to avoid contamination by conducting vulnerability analysis, IPB, cooperative CBRN detection, and digital CBRN warning and reporting. CBRN protection measures provide several benefits. They reduce the likelihood of operational degradation and increased sustainment burden that result when a unit must be in mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP). They decrease the frequency of decontamination operations, thereby decreasing the operational tempo. CBRN protection also helps the squadron and ACR/BCT to maintain freedom of maneuver through improved SA.

CBRN SUPPORT ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES


9-60. The squadron relies on its higher headquarters for CBRN support, including reconnaissance, with the exception of the reconnaissance squadron in the SBCT. In the HBCT and IBCT, the CBRN reconnaissance platoon is in the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of the BSTB. In the SBCT, the CBRN platoon is part of the reconnaissance squadrons surveillance troop. In the ACR, the CBRN company provides CBRN support. The higher headquarters and squadron CBRN personnel use decision support tools embedded in the joint warning and reporting network to plan CBRN defense, provide battle tracking during operations, and gain and maintain CBRN SA. CBRN personnel assist the commander in the orchestration of CBRN defense through the integration of the principles of contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination.

CBRN RECONNAISSANCE
HBCT Assets
9-61. In the HBCT, the CBRN reconnaissance assets organic to the HHC of the BSTB are equipped with two M93A1 Fox vehicles manned by eight Soldiers. This CBRN reconnaissance platoon can conduct route, zone, and area CBRN reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of CBRN contamination.

IBCT Assets
9-62. In the IBCT, the CBRN reconnaissance platoon in the BSTB HHC comprises two high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) and eight Soldiers. The platoon has the primary responsibility of establishing a CRBN cell that can track all CBRN-related activities in the AO. It conducts dismounted CBRN reconnaissance, CBRN site assessment, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) mitigation, and support to CBRN consequence management.

SBCT Assets
9-63. The SBCTs CBRN reconnaissance platoon, organic to the reconnaissance squadrons surveillance troop, is equipped with three CBRN reconnaissance vehicles and is composed of 12 Soldiers. This platoon is capable of conducting route, zone, and area CBRN reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of CBRN contamination. Note. A key factor in all three types of the CBRN platoon is the limited number of vehicles (two each in the HBCT and IBCT, three in the SBCT). To operate effectively, the CBRN platoon should be used in a manner that allows mutual support between vehicles and takes full advantage of the capabilities of the vehicles CBRN systems. Generally, this requires the CBRN assets to stay together and to be employed as a platoon. CBRN assets also require a security element to provide local protection while conducting CBRN operations.

ACR Assets
9-64. The ACRs CBRN company is organized into a company headquarters, maintenance section, CBRN reconnaissance platoon, and smoke/decontamination platoon. The reconnaissance platoon has 20 Soldiers

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and fields six M93A1 Fox vehicles and one HMMWV. The smoke/decontamination platoon consists of six M58 large-area obscuration platforms, three HMMWVs, two fuel heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTT), with manning of 47 Soldiers. The CBRN reconnaissance platoon is capable of conducting route, zone, and area CBRN reconnaissance to determine the presence and extent of CBRN contamination. The smoke/decontamination platoon is capable of providing large-area obscuration or CBRN decontamination support to the regiment, although it cannot do both simultaneously.

DECONTAMINATION SUPPORT
9-65. When thorough decontamination is required, the squadron receives support from a CBRN company decontamination platoon, which is typically assigned to an MEB. The cavalry squadron of the ACR can also receive decontamination support from the smoke/decontamination platoon of the organic CBRN company. Thorough decontamination normally occurs after contamination with a persistent agent or prolonged exposure to other agents. It requires detailed planning and extensive manpower and equipment resources. Decontamination is conducted as far forward as possible to limit the spread of contamination. It is conducted in a location that affords security as well as cover and concealment from enemy forces. 9-66. The squadron may be relieved by other units to conduct thorough decontamination. Decontamination may proceed by troop, or the entire squadron may move to the decontamination site. If the decontamination proceeds by troop and the squadron remains committed in a mission, the decontamination unit may be placed under OPCON of the squadron. More often, the affected troop or the entire squadron moves to the established site and conducts thorough decontamination under higher headquarters control. This method permits the fastest, most effective use of decontamination assets. 9-67. For additional discussion on CBRN operations, refer to the following: FM 3-11, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Defense. FM 3-11.3, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Contamination Avoidance. FM 3-11.4, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NBC Protection. FM 3-11.5, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Decontamination.

SECTION VI AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SUPPORT


9-68. AMD encompasses all measures, both passive and active, employed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of a threat attack or surveillance by aircraft, theater missiles in flight, or UAS. Air defense measures reduce the possibility of attack by making the squadron a less detectable and lucrative target. In the event of attack, air defense counters the threat by destroying aircraft or disrupting the attack. AMD support relates to the protection warfighting function. For additional information, see the following: FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations. 9-69. During squadron missions, subordinate units may be too widely dispersed to rely on air defense artillery (ADA) systems. During planning, the commander and staff must consider this dispersion to identify gaps in the ADA umbrella to protect the units. Units must rely heavily on passive air defense measures, which should be covered by the units SOP. Units also use active measures, including fires from crew-served weapons and the 25-mm chain gun in Bradley-equipped units. 9-70. Other than passive or active air defense measures, the squadron must rely on higher echelons for AMD. This is usually provided on an area support basis by ADA units assigned to an MEB or an ADA brigade. The ACR cavalry squadron may receive air defense assets from the organic ADA battery regiment. 9-71. AMD employment is governed by four basic principles: mass, mix, mobility, and integration. With consideration for these principles, the normal method of employing supporting AMD is under the centralized control of the AMD leader at squadron level. Occasionally, AMD elements may be delegated to troop commanders if the mission variables dictate. The AMD leader is integrated into the FSC as a special staff officer.

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9-72. The S-2 and AMD representative determine air avenues of approach and air attack threats during IPB. The squadron commander or the S-3 provides the AMD leader with the commanders intent, scheme of maneuver, and priorities of protection. The AMD leader recommends initial allocation of AMD assets and the AMD scheme of maneuver based on this guidance. Priority is normally given to elements of the squadron at greatest risk of attack because of criticality, vulnerability, recoupment, and threat. These highrisk elements can include the following: Trains. CPs. Sustainment elements, such as logistics packages (LOGPAC). Squadron assembly areas. 9-73. Based on the commanders guidance, the AMD leader formulates the AMD plan. He coordinates the plan with the FSO and troop commanders. Weapons are positioned considering the following guidelines: Balanced fires. Weighted coverage against the most likely avenue of approach. Early engagement. Defense in depth. Mutual support. Overlapping fires. Observation and fields of fire.

SECTION VII CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT


9-74. CA activities performed or supported by CA personnel and organizations enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present (FM 1-02). The goal is to facilitate military operations and to consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CA support relates to the C2 warfighting function. CA core tasks include the following (see FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations): Populace and resource control. Foreign humanitarian assistance. Civil information management. Nation assistance. Support to civil administration.

SQUADRON ROLE
9-75. In supporting the execution of CA activities, the squadron is usually employed to advise and assist host-nation military forces. The squadron may enter into direct civic action programs. The squadrons higher headquarters can assign CA elements to the squadron to assist in carrying out CA plans. The squadron should establish liaison and coordination with U.S. and host-nation government agencies operating within its AO. 9-76. The squadron is not authorized an S-9 to serve as CA officer. During stability or civil support operations, the squadron commander may assign this responsibility to an officer or senior NCO to assist him with relations between the civilian populace and military units during operations. The responsibilities of the CA officer or NCO can include the following: Advise the commander on the effects of the civilian populace on operations. Assist a CA unit in the operation of a civil-military operations (CMO) center. Assist the S-3 in integrating attached CA units into the squadron. Assist in development of plans to deconflict civilian activities in relation to military operations.

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Plan community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and support of military operations. Coordinate with the FSO on culturally sensitive sites and protected targets.

CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS


9-77. CA units provide the commander with the means to shape his OE with regard to core CA tasks (listed earlier in this discussion) and to synchronize these tasks with military operations. In addition, CA units perform important liaison functions between the military force and local civil authorities, international organizations, and NGOs. CA elements can assess the needs of civil authorities, act as an interface between civil authorities and military forces, and serve as a liaison to the civil populace. They can develop populace and resource control measures, and coordinate with international support agencies. CA personnel are regionally oriented. They possess cultural and linguistic knowledge of the countries in each region, although this capability is generally limited to Active Army elements. With guidance from the commander on desired effects, CA personnel have a wide variety of resources at their disposal to influence the AO. (See FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, for more details).

SECTION VIII MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT


9-78. The squadron receives MP support from MP units assigned or attached to an MEB. MP units perform five primary operational functions: Maneuver and mobility operations. Area security (including route and convoy security). Internment and resettlement operations. Law and order operations. Police intelligence operations. 9-79. MPs, in support of the squadron, can be used in an economy of force role (such as patrols, convoy security, route security, and fixed-site security missions). See FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, for additional discussion on MP operations.

SECTION IX OTHER SUPPORT OR FUNCTIONS

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
9-80. Intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) assets produce both combat information and intelligence. Combat information is unevaluated data provided directly to the tactical commander because of its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information concerning a threat force, foreign nation, or AO. See FM 2-0, Intelligence, for additional discussion on the role of MI. IEW assets support the commander by accomplishing seven major functions (see FM 34-54, Technical Intelligence): Indications and warning. IPB. Situation development. Target development and support to targeting. Information protection. BDA. OPSEC. 9-81. The MICO in the ACR provides IEW support to squadron operations. The reconnaissance squadrons of the BCTs rely on IEW support from the MICO in the BSTB. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron receives IEW support from the MI battalion.

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9-82. MI assets conduct surveillance and collection and jamming activities in support of squadron operations. Collection and jamming assets are positioned to detect enemy activity as far forward as possible and to employ electronic countermeasures against enemy communications nets as early as possible. The commander will normally designate priorities for the collection and jamming effort. The jamming effort is usually directed against enemy reconnaissance, C2, or fire control nets. Enemy reconnaissance can be jammed early in the operation, while C2 nets may be jammed at critical points of the operation, such as during the destruction of an enemy force in an EA. 9-83. See FM 2-0 for additional information about the following intelligence disciplines: HUMINT. SIGINT. Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT). 9-84. HUMINT is especially important during civil support operations. In many cases, the squadron may receive augmentation in the form of HCTs. The HCT includes MI personnel who specialize in the acquisition of information from personnel through elicitation and debriefing as well other means. The team can use these skills to help answer the CCIR. The squadron S-2 must be knowledgeable in the employment of the HCTs.

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL


9-85. The squadron generally requires explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support for destruction of ammunition and to ensure that IEDs and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are rendered safe. EOD capabilities are not organic to the squadron; augmentation must be requested from higher headquarters. Requests for EOD support are processed through operational channels to the higher S-3 maneuver support cell, which forwards requests to the supporting EOD headquarters. Once an IED or UXO is located and reported, the EOD headquarters determines what EOD assets may respond. If there is a constant presence of IED/UXO hazards, EOD teams may be attached to the squadron.

MILITARY WORKING DOGS


9-86. Military working dogs are trained for a variety of purposes, especially locating a wide array of items (including people). Units such as engineers use working dogs for mine and explosives detection. MP units use dogs to find personnel, contraband, weapons, and ammunition. If working dogs are available, infantry units may employ them as an enabler to alert handlers to various types of objects of interest, including personnel and material.

TACTICAL PSYOP TEAM


9-87. Tactical PSYOP teams can support the squadron by coordinating public broadcasts or distribution of information to influence the populace on or near the objective. At the tactical level, PSYOP teams seek to influence targets directly through face-to-face contact, limited production of printed products, and use of loudspeakers or other delivery means. Tactical PSYOP has these purposes: Influence potential adversaries in the civil populace not to interfere with friendly force efforts. Induce cooperation or reduce active opposition. Reduce collateral damage by giving instructions to noncombatants in the combat zone.

INTERPRETERS
9-88. Interpreters, or linguists, can be a valuable asset during reconnaissance operations that require close proximity to indigenous personnel. The squadron may be operating near individuals who have had no previous contact with U.S. personnel and are unsure of how to deal with them. Early in the planning process, the commander should request the services of an interpreter who is either from the AO or familiar with the AO. Through the use of interpreters, communications between the local population and unit personnel can improve intelligence gathering and win acceptance of the unit within the AO. Interpreters are often used during the conduct of a search, including operations at roadblocks/checkpoints.

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INFORMATION PROTECTION
9-89. Information protection, one of the five Army information tasks, encompasses active or passive measures that protect and defend friendly information and information systems to ensure timely, accurate, and relevant friendly information. It denies enemies, adversaries, and others the opportunity to exploit friendly information and information systems for their own purposes. The key aspects of information protection are the following: Information assurance. Computer network defense. Electronic protection. Communication security (COMSEC). 9-90. Information protection is accomplished with a full range of security means. External and internal perimeter protection prevents unknown users or data from entering a network. External means include COMSEC procedures, router filtering, access control lists, and security guards. Physical isolation or barriers are placed between protected and unprotected networks. Internal perimeter protection consists of firewalls and router filters. See FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, for additional discussion about information protection.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY
9-91. Recovery operations are conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. See the following for additional information: FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery. 9-92. The Army uses four principal methods when planning and executing military recoveries: Immediate. Deliberate. Externally supported. Unassisted. 9-93. The ability of the Army to meet its personnel recovery responsibilities hinges on leaders at every level preparing for the recovery of isolated, missing, detained, or captured personnel. Personnel recovery responsibilities are based on public law, DOD directives and instructions, and Army policy, as well as the moral obligation to make every effort to recover missing personnel. Personnel recovery must be integrated into ongoing planning, preparation, and execution activities. Commanders must consider a broad range of possible options for successful execution. See FM 3-50.1 for detailed information on personnel recovery.

ARMY HEALTH SYSTEM SUPPORT


9-94. AHS support includes both health system support (HSS) and force health protection (FHP). The HSS mission is a part of the sustainment warfighting function. FHP falls under the protection warfighting function.

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT


9-95. HSS includes all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of personnel in the Army and, as directed, in other services, agencies, and organizations. This includes casualty care, which involves these AMEDD functions: Organic and area medical support.

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Hospitalization. Dental care (treatment aspects). Behavioral health/neuropsychiatric treatment (treatment aspects). Clinical laboratory services. Treatment of CBRN patients. MEDEVAC. Medical sustainment functions (including blood management).

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION


9-96. FHP includes all measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being and fighting fitnessof Soldiers, a vital responsibility of all leaders. The best way to do this is for commanders and leaders to emphasize preventive measures, safety standards, and access to medical care. The unit TACSOP should establish physical hygiene standards, sleep plans, safety procedures, and other measures to maintain unit health. 9-97. Small-unit leaders must be especially concerned about preventive health measures and stress control. Platoon and squad leaders ensure the health and fitness of their Soldiers through preventive medical measures. See FM 4-02, Force Health Protection in a Global Environment, for additional discussion.

Preventive Medicine
9-98. Leaders reduce the health threat by emphasizing preventive medicine (PVNTMED). Platoon and squad leaders are active participants in the areas of hygiene, sanitation, and counseling and in the treatment of stress and combat and operational stress reactions (COSR). They take a leading role by establishing and maintaining standards for the following: Proper field sanitation. Rules of hygiene and field sanitation should be established in unit SOP and observed daily to prevent the spread of debilitating disease. Wear, use, and maintenance of uniforms and protective equipment. Drinking and washing from approved water sources. Proper cleaning of eating utensils. Sleep plans. Safety measures in the field, especially around vehicles, weapons, and other equipment. 9-99. Safety is a continuous requirement to prevent accidents that could injure Soldiers. The combat environment is full of risks associated with vehicles, weapons, stress, and fatigue. Safety is inherent in following proper equipment and weapons operating procedures. Leaders continuously enforce proper equipment operating procedures and SOP items covering safety. 9-100. Supporting medical units assist unit commanders by providing these services: Sanitary inspections of food service, latrines, and shower points. Medical surveillance of field water supplies. Sample collection for potential toxic industrial material (TIM).

Combat and Operational Stress Control


9-101. Operational stress is caused by many factors, including potential and actual enemy actions, the natural environment, and operations in a combat environment. Sound leadership works to keep these operational stressors within tolerable limits and prepares troops mentally and physically to endure them. Some of the most potent stressors are interpersonal in nature and can result from conflict in the unit or at home. For behavioral health and combat and operational stress control (COSC) support, leaders should contact the supporting medical company through the medical support section. For information on control of combat stressors and for details about specific leader and individual actions to control stress, see the following:

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FM 4-02.51, Combat and Operational Stress Control. FM 6-22.5, Combat and Operational Stress Control Manual for Leaders and Soldiers. 9-102. COSC focuses on the FHP aspects of treatment and prevention, including the rapid reversal of COSR. These PVNTMED measures are essential in enhancing Soldier survivability across full-spectrum operations. Units that make continual health hazard assessments a priority can minimize disease and injury. All BCTs have a mental health section consisting of a behavioral science officer and a mental health specialist. The BCT chaplain assists with behavioral health and COSC services by helping unit commanders identify Soldiers who are stressed.

Sleep Deprivation
9-103. The effects of sleep deprivation can be catastrophic to unit missions and personnel. Leaders should be familiar with signs of sleep loss and fatigue. Leaders should remember, however, that these signs could be subtle, or even absent, in some Soldiers. Although the presence of some indicators suggests possible sleep loss and fatigue, their absence does not guarantee that a particular Soldier is well rested, alert, and capable. The use of temporary stimulants should be closely monitored by the command and balanced against the dehydrating effects caused by those stimulants.

COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT


9-104. Risk management provides leaders with a systematic process for identifying, assessing, and controlling risk arising from operational factors. It entails making informed decisions that balance risk with mission benefits. The squadron commander, through his staff, integrates risk management into all aspects of the operations process. During planning, commanders from squadron down to platoon identify, assess, and weigh risks. They convey risk considerations as guidance. At the squadron, risk guidance affects COA development and the application of some elements of operational design, such as end state, designation of objectives, and lines of operation. Risk management also influences task organization, control measures, and the concepts of operations, fires, and sustainment. During execution, assessment of risk assists squadron commanders in making informed decisions on changing task organization, shifting priorities of effort and support, and shaping future operations. Effective risk management results in mission accomplishment at least cost. See FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, for additional information. 9-105. Two main categories of risk are accident-based and tactical (enemy). During risk assessment, leaders identify ways to mitigate both types of risk. Leaders can mitigate accidents by developing controls, such training; use of barriers, guards, or warning signs; elimination of hazards; and strictly enforced standards. Tactical risks can be mitigated by implementing drills (such as actions on contact), developing overlays and graphics, conducting rehearsals, enforcing SOPs, and tailoring SOPs to meet the situation based on the risk assessment. Risk can be managed when commanders motivate subordinates to follow the guiding principles of risk management: Integrate risk management into all phases of missions and operations. Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. Accept no unnecessary risk. Apply the process continuously. Do not be risk averse. Identify and control the risk; complete the mission.

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Chapter 10

Sustainment Operations
As the Army has transformed its operational organizations, it has also transformed its sustainment structure to allow for quicker deployability and a reduction of the sustainment footprint required by Army forces. This reduction in structure is a result of advances in sustainment capabilities, C2, and SU that enable more effective support to the force. Still, in many situations, the sustainment structure will be challenged to support the squadrons wide-ranging and, in most cases, decentralized missions.

Contents
Section I Sustainment Staff and Units ...................................................... 10-1 Sustainment Staff ............................. 10-2 Sustainment Units............................. 10-3 Section II Sustainment Planning ......... 10-8 Planning Fundamentals and Procedures .................................... 10-8 Support for Reconnaissance Operations ..................................... 10-9 Support for Security Operations...... 10-10 Support for Dismounted Operations ................................... 10-11 Communications ............................. 10-12 Sustainment for Attachments and Detachments ............................... 10-13 Contracting ..................................... 10-13 Section III Support Areas ................... 10-14 Types of Support Areas .................. 10-14 Locations for Support Areas ........... 10-18 Security of Support Areas ............... 10-19 Supply Routes ................................ 10-19 Section IV Logistics Packages .......... 10-20 LOGPAC Planning .......................... 10-20 LOGPAC Resupply ......................... 10-21 LOGPAC Survivability ..................... 10-22 Section V Evacuation of Sick and Wounded Personnel ........................... 10-23 Medical Evacuation ......................... 10-23 Casualty Evacuation ....................... 10-24 Section VI - Field Maintenance ............. 10-25 Organizations and Capabilities ....... 10-25 Battle Damage Assessment and Repair .......................................... 10-26 Recovery and Evacuation ............... 10-26 Controlled Exchange ....................... 10-26 Communications Security Maintenance ................................ 10-26 Medical Equipment Maintenance .... 10-26 Retrograde of Unserviceable Components................................. 10-27

SECTION I SUSTAINMENT STAFF AND UNITS


10-1. Sustainment is the provision of the logistics, personnel services, and AHS support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. FM 4-0, Sustainment, describes the sustainment warfighting function. 10-2. The sustainment warfighting function comprises the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Generally, the squadron and its higher headquarters are organized with the self-sustainment capability for up to 72 hours of combat. Beyond 72 hours, sustainment organizations at higher echelons must replenish tactical unit combat loads.

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SUSTAINMENT STAFF
10-3. Within each type of squadron, the following staff sections or special staff officers have responsibility for the synchronization and coordination of sustainment for the squadron: S-1 section (human resources support). Unit ministry team (UMT). Surgeon. S-4 section (logistics). S-6 section (signal).

SQUADRON S-1 SECTION


10-4. The squadron S-1 section is responsible for planning, providing, and coordinating the delivery of human resources (HR) support, services, or information to squadron personnel. HR support roles and responsibilities are outlined in FM 1-0, Human Resources Support. All other HR support is coordinated with the brigade S-1 section.

SQUADRON UNIT MINISTRY TEAM


10-5. The squadron UMT consists of the chaplain and an enlisted chaplain assistant. The chaplain is responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing religious support operations within the command. As a member of the commanders personal staff, he has direct access to the commander and advises him on matters of religion, morale as affected by religion, the moral and ethical conduct of the command, and the impact of indigenous religions on operations. The chaplain assistant provides religious support and staff skills to assist the chaplain.

SQUADRON SURGEON
10-6. The surgeon is a special staff officer who is responsible for AHS support operations in the squadron. He participates in the squadron MDMP to ensure timely planning, integration, and synchronization of AHS support within the maneuver plan. The squadron surgeon keeps the commander informed on the health of the command. Note. The BFSB reconnaissance squadron does not have a squadron surgeon. The physicians assistant in the medical treatment platoon fulfills the special staff officer role of a surgeon.

SQUADRON S-4 SECTION


10-7. The squadron S-4 section is responsible for sustainment planning. The S-4 coordinates with sustainment unit counterparts to ensure that subordinate elements and attachments to the squadron receive maintenance, supply, transportation, and field services support. Table 10-1 identifies the sustainment unit counterparts for each squadron S-4 section. Because the SBCT and ACR are not organized with FSCs, the S-4 coordinates with the support operations officer and the support operations section of the respective support battalion/squadron. Note. An integral part of todays sustainment capabilities is provided through contracted support. In most cases, the squadron will be a supported unit (receiver of contracted support), but based upon METT-TC, it could be the requiring activity (requestor of contract support) for some supplies and services. The squadrons sustainment staff must be familiar with the local commands operational contract support policies and procedures.

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Table 10-1. Sustainment unit counterparts


SQUADRON S-4 SECTION HBCT Recon Squadron S-4 IBCT Recon Squadron S-4 SBCT Recon Squadron S-4 ACR Cavalry Squadron S-4 BFSB Recon Squadron S-4 SUSTAINMENT UNIT COUNTERPART Forward Support Company (FSC) Forward Support Company (FSC) Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) Support Operations Section Regimental Support Squadron Support Operations Section Brigade Support Company (BSC)

SQUADRON S-6 SECTION


10-8. The S-6 section is responsible for maintenance of selected components of the squadrons command, control, communications, and computers system. The S-4 and S-6 must coordinate to ensure there are no gaps in the maintenance system for COMSEC, computers, and other specialized command, control, communications, and computer equipment.

SUSTAINMENT UNITS
10-9. The higher headquarters of each type of squadron has an organic sustainment unit that is manned, equipped, and organized to provide dedicated sustainment support for the organization. As noted in Table 10-1, the squadron coordinates and synchronizes sustainment support beyond organic capabilities with the following units: BSB in the BCTs. Regimental support squadron in the ACR. Brigade support company (BSC) in the BFSB. 10-10. For additional information, see the following references: FM 3-90.6, Brigade Combat Team. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations.

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM BRIGADE SUPPORT BATTALION


10-11. The BSB provides organic sustainment for the BCT. It consists of functional and multifunctional companies assigned to provide support to the BCT. The BSB of the SBCT task organizes elements to provide support to the reconnaissance squadron. In contrast, the BSBs of the HBCT and IBCT have an FSC organized to provide habitual support to the squadron. FSCs are generally under OPCON of the squadron. The FSC provides each squadron commander with dedicated sustainment assets organized specifically to meet his units requirements. The FSC commander receives technical oversight from the BSB commander. Because of their criticality and proximity to combat operations, medical platoons remain organic to the squadron.

BSB Staff
10-12. The BSB commander is the BCT commanders primary advisor for sustainment. The BSB support operations officer manages sustainment operations for the BSB commander, providing the technical supervision for the BSBs external sustainment mission. He is the key interface between the BSB and its supported units. The support operations officer plans and monitors support operations and makes necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met. He also requests and coordinates augmentation with the higher echelon when requirements exceed capabilities. The BSB of the HBCT and IBCT also has a sustainment automation management officer who assists with maintenance of related Standard Army Management Information Systems throughout the BCT.

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BSB Organization
10-13. In addition to its HHC, the BSB has the following functional companies: Four FSCs (HBCT/IBCT only). Distribution company. Field maintenance company/forward maintenance company in the HBCT/IBCT or CRT in the SBCT. Brigade support medical company. Forward Support Company 10-14. The BSB has distinct FSCs to support the reconnaissance squadron, the fires battalion, and each maneuver battalion. The FSC commander is responsible for executing the sustainment plan in accordance with the supported squadron commanders guidance. The FSC has a distribution platoon and a maintenance platoon that support the following: Food and water (Class I). Fuel (Class III). Ammunition (Class V). Repair parts (Class IX). Maintenance and recovery.

Figure 10-1. Forward support company organization Distribution Company 10-15. The distribution company provides all classes of supply (excluding Class VIII) for BCT units. It has three functional platoons: Transportation platoon. Fuel and water platoon. Supply platoon (includes Class V and Class IX).

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Field Maintenance Company/Forward Maintenance Company 10-16. The field maintenance company or forward maintenance company provides common maintenance support for the BCT, excluding medical and automation support. It generally supports the BSTB and BSB; support for the squadron and maneuver battalions comes from the FSCs in the HBCT/IBCT and the CRT in the SBCT. 10-17. The field maintenance company/forward maintenance company (HBCT/IBCT) has a recovery section and the capability to repair the following systems and equipment: Automotive. Armament. Missile. Communications. Power generation. 10-18. The CRT (SBCT) has the capability to repair the following systems and equipment: Automotive. Armament. Power generation. Medical Company 10-19. The brigade support medical company provides Role I and II medical care to all units assigned to the BCT and to units operating in the BCTs AO. It is responsible for the evacuation of patients from unit (Role I) medical treatment facilities (MTF) or squadron aid stations back to the brigade support medical company (Role II) MTF. Treatment teams from the brigade support medical company provide augmentation and reinforcement support to Role I MTFs/squadron aid stations and Role I medical care to units without an organic medical section. Role II and higher (Role II+) medical care is provided predominantly from within the brigade support area (BSA). The brigade support medical company performs the following functions: Medical treatment of disease and nonbattle injuries (DNBI), COSC, and trauma injuries. MEDEVAC by ground ambulance. Class VIII resupply. PVNTMED. Operational (emergency) dental care. Medical equipment maintenance and repair. Patient holding. Radiological services. Laboratory services. Role II+ surgical resuscitative services when augmented by a forward surgical team (FST).

ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT REGIMENTAL SUPPORT SQUADRON


10-20. The regimental support squadron provides organic sustainment for the ACR. It consists of functional and multifunctional troops assigned to provide support to the ACR. The regimental support squadron task organizes elements to provide support to the cavalry squadron.

Regimental Support Squadron Staff


10-21. The regimental support squadron commander is the ACR commanders primary advisor for sustainment. The regimental support squadron support operations officer manages sustainment operations for the regimental support squadron commander, providing technical supervision for the support of the squadrons external sustainment mission. He is the key interface between the regimental support squadron and its supported units. The support operations officer plans and monitors support operations and makes

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necessary adjustments to ensure support requirements are met. He also requests and coordinates augmentation with the higher headquarters when requirements exceed capabilities.

Regimental Support Squadron Organization


10-22. In addition to its HHT, the regimental support squadron has the following functional troops: Supply and transportation troop. Maintenance troop. Medical troop. Aviation maintenance troop. Supply and Transportation Troop 10-23. The supply and transportation troop provides all classes of supply (excluding Class VIII) for ACR units. It has three functional platoons: Supply platoon (including Class V and water). Petroleum platoon. Transportation platoon. Maintenance Troop 10-24. The maintenance troop provides common maintenance support for the ACR, excluding medical and automation support. It generally supports the ACR HHT, special companies (chemical, engineer, MI, and ADA) and the regimental support squadron. The maintenance troop provides each cavalry squadron with a maintenance support team (MST). 10-25. The maintenance troop has the capability to repair the following systems and equipment: Automotive. Armament. Missile. Communications. Power generation. 10-26. The MSTs supporting the cavalry squadrons have the capability to repair the following systems and equipment: Automotive. Armament. Power generation. Medical Troop 10-27. The medical troop provides Role I and II medical care to all units assigned to the ACR and to units operating in the ACRs AO. It is responsible for the evacuation of patients from unit (Role I) MTFs/squadron aid stations back to the medical troop (Role II) MTF. Treatment teams from the medical troop provide augmentation and reinforcement support to Role I MTFs/squadron aid stations and Role I medical care to units without an organic medical section. Role II and Role II+ medical care is provided predominantly from within the regimental support area. The medical troop performs the following functions: Medical treatment of DNBI, COSC, and trauma injuries. MEDEVAC by ground ambulance. Class VIII resupply. PVNTMED. Operational (emergency) dental care. Medical equipment maintenance and repair. Patient holding.

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Radiological services. Laboratory services. Role II+ surgical resuscitative services when augmented by an FST. Aviation Maintenance Troop 10-28. The aviation maintenance troop is responsible for performing field-level maintenance, including intermediate-level maintenance. The aviation maintenance troop provides field-level maintenance support to the regimental aviation squadron maintenance troop and their assigned aircraft and equipment.

BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE BRIGADE BRIGADE SUPPORT COMPANY


10-29. The BSC is organized to sustain all organic BFSB elements. It provides support teams for maintenance, distribution, and field feeding to individual battalions (primarily the reconnaissance squadron) as necessary. It can establish a mission support site for remote or long-duration missions. 10-30. Due to its limited assets, the BFSB uses a combination of organic sustainment provided by the BSC and other brigades (for BFSB assets operating in their AOs) and area support provided through sustainment brigade elements. Attachment of battalion-size units or multiple smaller attachments to the BFSB may require it to request augmentation (such as additional sustainment support, support staff/C2, or LNOs) to support the attachments.

BSC Organization
10-31. In addition to the company headquarters, the BSC has the following elements: Field feeding section. Distribution platoon. Maintenance platoon.

BSC Capabilities
10-32. The BSC provides the following functions and capabilities: Distribution-based sustainment to the BFSB. Wheeled vehicle maintenance. Power generation equipment repair. Small arms repair. Communications equipment repair. Chemical and quartermaster equipment repair. Maintenance quality assurance and quality control. Recovery assets. Transportation for loads configured by the sustainment brigade for Class III bulk, Class V, and water. Food service support for organic and attached elements.

Unique Considerations for the BSC


10-33. When BFSB elements are task organized to another brigade, the BSC provides a support package tailored for the unit. The support package then ties in with the gaining brigades supporting sustainment unit. BFSB assets operating in another brigades AO, but still under OPCON of the BFSB, are either supported by the BSC or receive support from the other brigade. BFSB assets operating in the supported headquarters unassigned areas receive a support team from the BSC. This support team may be positioned with another brigades supporting sustainment unit to reduce distances required to support the unit, enhance protection, and provide a central location for linkup with sustainment brigade assets. Units attached or

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under OPCON to the BFSB come with a support package tailored to their needs. For a detailed discussion on BFSB sustainment, see FMI 4-93.2, The Sustainment Brigade.

SECTION II SUSTAINMENT PLANNING


10-34. The sustainment environment in which the squadron operates is very different from that of other maneuver units. It is characterized by longer distances, more dispersion, frequently decentralized execution, and fluid situations. Because of this, staff planners must be careful not to use maneuver battalion or BCT planning factors when computing sustainment requirements for the squadron. Also, the squadron must be fully supported by the area common user network and be able to send data traffic by radio. 10-35. The lead planner for sustainment in the squadron is usually the S-4 assisted by the S-1, squadron surgeon (for AHS support), and the appropriate counterparts from supporting sustainment units. Representatives from these elements form a sustainment planning cell at the CTCP to ensure sustainment plans are fully integrated into all operational planning. Although the sustainment planners at the CTCP control and coordinate sustainment for specific squadron operations, routine sustainment operations usually are planned and coordinated by the sustainment unit supporting the squadron (such as the FSC, BSC, or brigade support medical company). The S-1 may have a representative at or near the aid station to monitor casualty operations.

PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS AND PROCEDURES


10-36. Sustainment planning is fully integrated into all operational planning, with the concept of sustainment support synchronized with other areas of the concept of operations. Planning is continuous and concurrent with ongoing support execution. In addition, key sustainment planners (such as the S-4 and S-1) must actively participate in the planning process, including war-gaming. The goal is to ensure support during all phases of an operation. The SOP should be the basis for squadron sustainment operations, with planning conducted to determine specific requirements and to prepare for contingencies. Squadron orders should address only specific support matters for the operation. Any deviations from SOP sustainment planning should be covered early in the squadrons planning process. In some situations, sustainment planning begins before receipt of the mission, as part of the ongoing process of refining the squadron sustainment estimate. 10-37. To provide effective support, sustainment planners and operators must understand the mission statement, commanders intent, and concept of operations. The S-4 is responsible for producing paragraph 4 (Service Support) of the OPORD, which should include the following: Squadron commanders priorities. Priority of support, by type and unit. Sustainment overlay. Supply routes. Logistics release points (LRP). CASEVAC points. Maintenance collection points. Class III/Class V resupply during the mission, if necessary. Movement criteria/triggers. 10-38. To predict support requirements, sustainment planners must determine the following: Type of support required. Quantities of support required. Priority of support, by type and unit. 10-39. After determining these support requirements, sustainment planners assess the following information: Sustainment resources available (organic and supporting).

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Status of the sustainment resources (location, maintenance, and personnel status). Time that sustainment resources will be available to the squadron and troops. How resources will be available. 10-40. With this information, planners develop the support plans for the operation. Several planning tools are available. The sustainment estimate is the formal, detailed process of analysis that supports sustainment planning and is used when time is available. During execution, a running estimate is used to support decision-making by the squadron commander. Sustainment planning is more informal at squadron level and is normally formulated in terms of the following considerations: The current and projected unit status of maintenance, supply, and transportation. Quantities and types of sustainment assets needed to support the operation. How sustainment support assets will be transported to where they are needed. How to provide security to sustainment assets as they move to the supported units location. When assets must be on hand. External support needed. Displacement of sustainment assets, if required. How sustainment requirements can be met. Host nation support available. Shortfalls and impact on the operation. How to prioritize the supportability of each COA. Availability of AHS support, including MEDEVAC, Class VIII resupply, and treatment. CBRN decontamination capabilities and contamination considerations. How to maintain communications between maneuver and support command centers. 10-41. To facilitate rapid planning, the information needed to address many of these considerations should be readily available through FBCB2, medical communications for combat casualty care, and the battle command sustainment support system. Supplemented by their actual operational experience, sustainment planners and operators take advantage of these additional resources: Running estimates, status charts, and books. Updated status reports when a warning order is issued. Established planning factors and data tailored for their unit. Procedures and organizations specified in the SOP.

SUPPORT FOR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS


10-42. Maintaining the momentum of the operation is the overriding consideration in supporting reconnaissance. Certain general considerations guide planning and preparation for reconnaissance support; the emphasis on any particular consideration varies with the given mission variables. Emphasis, priorities, and requirements may also shift while the operation is under way. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the operation becomes more critical as the operation progresses since MSRs lengthen, communications become strained, and requirements for repair and replacement of systems increase. 10-43. Planning considerations and techniques in support of reconnaissance include the following: Echelon squadron trains. Combat trains remain mobile. Position a portion of each essential sustainment asset (such as ammunition; petroleum, oils, and lubricants [POL]; medical; and maintenance) in the combat trains, unit maintenance collection points (UMCP), or medical aid stations. Consider the use of blivets for fuel and water and caching for other classes of supply. Ensure basic loads remain replenished. Plan for increased consumption of POL. Recover damaged vehicles only to the squadron MSR for quicker identification by unit or field maintenance personnel.

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Use push packages of preplanned and preconfigured essential sustainment items. Plan for increased vehicular maintenance, especially when operating over rough terrain. Keep maintenance assets and other support teams well forward. Request unit distribution at forward locations. Request additional sustainment assets from the higher headquarters to support attachments or extended operations. Plan use of airlift and airdrop for resupply. Use captured threat supplies and equipment, particularly support vehicles and POL. POL must first be tested for contamination. Vehicles must be well marked to prevent misidentification and engagement by friendly units. Test natural water sources before using. Suspend most field service functions such as clothing exchange, bath, and laundry. Select supply routes, LRPs, and subsequent trains locations for the entire operation, and plan alternate routes and means. If a CBRN threat exists, plan for alternate routes, collection points, and aid stations for evacuation of contaminated casualties and equipment. Plan and coordinate detainee operations. Anticipate greater numbers of enemy prisoners of war (EPW). Plan for increased use of medical assets, including the following: Requirements to handle casualties and medical sustainment (Class VIII supplies and equipment). Use of patient collection points and ambulance exchange points (AXP). Augmentation of medical treatment elements. Use of nonmedical vehicles to support CASEVAC. Requirements for aerial MEDEVAC across extended distance. Impact of weather on aerial resupply or aerial MEDEVAC. Upload sustainment requirements for the operation in advance, if possible. Plan for longer transportation and turnaround times as the length of the MSR increases. Plan for trains and convoy security (including direct/indirect fire planning and escorts, if available).

SUPPORT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS


10-44. Security operations can be dynamic in nature, involving substantial maneuver. As they become more dynamic, certain planning considerations similar to those for reconnaissance apply. The most important consideration for security operations is best use of available preparation time and front-loading of the sustainment effort. As with reconnaissance, emphasis on any particular consideration varies with the mission assigned and shifts during mission execution. Planning considerations include the following: Plan for increased use of Class IV and Class V. Pre-position limited amounts of ammunition, POL, and barrier material in centrally located forward positions and on subsequent positions in depth. Request additional sustainment assets for attachments from the higher headquarters. Consider the additional transportation requirements for movement of Class IV and prepositioned stockpiles. Use push packages of critical supplies on a scheduled basis. Continue routine resupply until the using unit requests otherwise. Resupply during limited visibility to reduce the chance of enemy interference. Prepare to conduct immediate resupply on short notice well forward during lulls in the operation or as required. Use maintenance assets well forward. Echelon sustainment assets in depth. Plan displacement of these assets so uninterrupted support continues.

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As missions become more dynamic in execution, increase the mobility of forward support assets to maintain pace with the unit. Select MSRs that do not interfere with movement of units or a reserve force while also planning for alternate routes and means. Plan engineer mobility operations to maintain MSRs. Plan displacement of support assets and supplies early to keep routes open. Nonessential sustainment assets should move as early as possible. Limit forward flow of supplies except for those essential for the operation. Plan destruction of supplies and equipment (except medical) that cannot be evacuated. Plan alternate means of evacuation for casualties, including use of nonmedical vehicles to support CASEVAC. Emphasize recovery and evacuation of equipment over forward repair to preclude loss to the threat. Use available vehicles to tow disabled vehicles. Plan for trains and convoy security (including direct/indirect fire planning and escorts, if available).

SUPPORT FOR DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS


10-45. Both the IBCT reconnaissance squadron and the BFSB reconnaissance squadron can conduct extensive dismounted operations. The techniques and procedures used to sustain mounted operations can be used to support dismounted operations. At times, however, the squadron must consider unique techniques or different modes of delivery to sustain dismounted elements operating at extended distances from the squadron. This section briefly addresses the following techniques: Pre-positioned supplies. Aerial resupply. Foraging and scavenging. Note. Sustainment of the BFSB reconnaissance squadrons LRS company poses significant challenges. The squadron S-4 is the link between the LRS company and the BFSB S-4, BSC, and the theater support command for coordinating sustainment support. The squadron S-4 coordinates with the BFSB S-4 for additional outside support for parachute rigging and on aircraft for insertion and extraction operations. See FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, for additional information.

PRE-POSITIONED SUPPLIES
10-46. Pre-positioning of supplies entails the placement and concealment of supplies at predetermined locations to support operations. It is most often required when dismounted elements are conducting longduration missions. Pre-positioning enhances the survivability and security of dismounted elements since they do not have to use routine resupply measures that may disclose their positions. 10-47. Pre-positioning must be carefully planned and executed. The squadron staff coordinates the time, method of delivery, and location for pre-positioned supplies with the supported element. All leaders must know the exact locations of pre-positioned sites and verify them during reconnaissance or rehearsals. The squadron must ensure that subordinate units take steps to ensure survivability of the pre-positioned supplies. These measures include digging in pre-stock positions and selecting covered and concealed positions. The squadron also plans for the removal of supplies when they are no longer needed or provides destruction criteria to subordinate elements to prevent the enemy from capturing them.

AERIAL RESUPPLY
10-48. Air Force and Army aviation assets can be a vital lifeline for reconnaissance units, especially when they are operating forward of friendly lines for extended periods. Aerial resupply operations reduce the risks associated with conducting ground resupply under such conditions; however, they require significant

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planning and entail consideration of a different set of risks. The squadron staff, especially in the BFSB and IBCT reconnaissance squadrons, must have a working knowledge of aerial delivery planning considerations (see FM 4-20.41, Aerial Delivery Distribution in the Theater of Operations). 10-49. Aerial assets are useful in resupplying dismounted reconnaissance elements in restricted terrain. On the other hand, aerial resupply sometimes will not be feasible, such as when helicopters are not available or weather conditions do not permit it. In addition, the signature produced by aerial delivery (such as rotor wash, dust, or noise) can compromise unit positions. Careful choice of resupply routes and landing zones (LZ) based on thorough IPB will minimize this risk. 10-50. In using aerial resupply, the squadron must consider the enemy's ability to locate squadron elements by observing the aircraft. Unless conducting the resupply in an area under friendly control and away from direct enemy observation (reverse slope of a defensive position with reconnaissance well forward), locate the drop zone (DZ) or LZ away from the main unit in an area that can be defended for a short time. The delivered supplies are immediately transported away from the DZ or LZ.

FORAGING AND SCAVENGING


10-51. In emergency situations, foraging and scavenging can be used as a method of sustainment. Foraging is the gathering of supplies and equipment necessary to sustain basic needssuch as for food, water, and shelterfrom within the AO. Scavenging entails the gathering of supplies or equipment (friendly or enemy) from within the AO to help the user accomplish his military mission. The decision to forage or scavenge must be carefully weighed by the commander, and a thorough risk assessment should be made before implementing it.

COMMUNICATIONS
10-52. The CTCP is the net control station for the squadron administrative and logistics (A/L) net. The CTCP generally monitors three other FM voice radio nets: Squadron command net. Higher headquarters A/L net. Sustainment unit operations net (BSB, regimental support squadron, BSC). 10-53. Sustainment planners and operators also use digital communications and computers for the sustainment effort. FBCB2 is the battle command information system for units operating at the tactical level. It is found on all vehicles at troop and squadron level and on key platforms at the higher headquarters. FBCB2 uses the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS) and one of two communications systems: terrestrial or Blue Force tracking. For terrestrial communications, the singlechannel ground and airborne radio systemsystem improvement program (SINCGARS SIP) transmits data over a tactical internet. Blue Force tracking uses satellite communications. 10-54. The squadron A/L radio net is used for squadron sustainment operations. Troop first sergeants and XOs use the net to submit reports and requests for support. Troop first sergeants have the ability to send FBCB2 reports to the CTCP, enhancing the precision and speed with which the information can be passed. The CTCP also has the capability to pass digital information using FBCB2. The CTCP fills requests from what is available from the combat trains and then sends the request for unfilled items via FM or FBCB2 to the field trains. The CTCP coordinates with the higher headquarters sustainment unit for replenishment of combat trains supplies. 10-55. Sustainment functionality on FBCB2 gives the commander a clear picture of the current sustainment situation at his echelon of command and at subordinate levels for operational planning and execution. FBCB2 also provides sustainment planners and operators with a better view of the sustainment situation throughout the AO as well as enhanced capability to provide synchronized support to supported units. All sustainment leaders and sites operate on the A/L net to respond to requests and to coordinate sustainment execution. The FBCB2 and the A/L net are also used to control movement of support assets during LOGPAC displacement and movement until the LOGPACs are turned over to first sergeants at LRPs.

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SUSTAINMENT FOR ATTACHMENTS AND DETACHMENTS


ATTACHMENTS
10-56. When the squadron receives attachments, the necessary sustainment augmentation is also attached. This augmentation is established by SOP and should be coordinated in advance. It normally consists of medical, maintenance, and recovery support and supply support for Classes III, V, and IX. Class I support is coordinated on a case-by-case basis. Sustainment assets may be attached to the squadron; these may be used in the manner that best supports the overall mission. This is particularly true when the attached unit is task organized within the squadron. Generally, these assets form the combat trains and LOGPAC for the attached unit. When attached, they should arrive fully uploaded and ready to provide support to the unit. Small unit attachments (i.e., platoons or sections), unless unique to squadron systems, can be supported by the squadron with little to no adjustment. 10-57. When receiving attachments, sustainment planners should receive or obtain some basic information from the sending units S-4 to anticipate support requirements. Planning considerations include the following: Number and type of vehicles, personnel (by specialty), and weapon systems. Current status and/or strength. When attachment is effective and for how long. What support assets accompany the attachment. When and where linkup will occur, coordination measures for the linkup (such as near/far recognition signals), and who is responsible for linkup.

DETACHMENTS
10-58. The squadron may detach a subordinate element to other units or organizations for certain missions. The same considerations that apply to receiving attachments should be used. Troop-size detachments should deploy with the appropriate level of support including maintenance, Class III and V resupply, and medical, based on how long the troop is detached. This also applies to troops operating a considerable distance from the squadrons sustainment assets but technically still attached to the squadron. The S-4 should send the following information to the receiving units S-4: Number and type of vehicles, personnel (by specialty), and weapon systems. Current status and/or strength. When attachment is effective and for how long. What support assets accompany the attachment. When and where linkup will occur, coordination measures for the linkup (such as near/far recognition signals), and who is responsible for linkup. 10-59. Reports should reflect the addition or subtraction of units if the attachment/detachment is effective for more than 24 hours. This allows the cycle to remain relatively constant as task organizations change.

CONTRACTING
10-60. In todays era of persistent conflict, the Army is turning more frequently to contracting support to provide required goods and services. Contracting support is an integral part of the overall process of obtaining support across the entire spectrum. Contingency contracting provides operational commanders with a flexible and responsive means to support deployed forces and their mission. 10-61. Contracting support is most frequently coordinated by the squadrons higher headquarters. In most operations, an Army field support brigade, along with the Army component commands principle assistant responsible for contracting, plans and coordinates the contracted field support capabilities through the theater support command and higher headquarters G-4 office. The squadrons higher headquarters usually receives this contracted support on an area basis and does not have direct control over the contingency contracting officers or other contracting organizations responsible for managing the support.

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10-62. Contract management is accomplished in accordance with the terms of the contracts through contracting management channels. Since most contractor supervisors and systems support contracting officers are not physically located in the squadrons higher headquarters AO, the higher headquarters maintains day-to-day control of the systems support contractors via the designated contractor officers representative. The U.S. Army Materiel Commands brigade logistics support team, part of the Army field support brigade, assists the higher headquarters in managing systems support contractors in such areas as accountability and deployment preparation.

TYPES OF CONTRACTS
10-63. In general, the squadron and its higher headquarters may receive contracting support through three different types of contracts, which are described in Table 10-2. (See FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield.) Table 10-2. Contract types
LEVEL OF CONTRACT Theater Support Contracts SUPPORT PROVIDED Provide support to deployed operational forces under prearranged contracts or contracts awarded from the AO. Provide goods, services, and minor construction, usually from the local vendor base, to meet the immediate needs of operational commanders. Prearranged contracts awarded by service acquisition program management (PM) offices that provide technical and/or maintenance support of military weapon and support systems. Provide support to deployed operational forces that is separate and distinct from either theater support or support provided by system contractors. They may be prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency itself to support the mission.

System Support Contracts

External Support Contracts

Note. The Commanders Emergency Response Program is a unique form of contracting that provides a critical capability in the squadron commanders toolbox for conducting stability operations. Program funds provide the commander with a means to conduct multiple stability tasks that have traditionally been performed by other U.S., foreign, or indigenous professional civilian personnel or agencies.

SECTION III SUPPORT AREAS

TYPES OF SUPPORT AREAS


10-64. A support area is a designated area in which sustainment elements, some staff elements, and other elements locate to support a unit. The primary support areas for the squadron are the following: Squadron trains. BSA or regimental support area.

SQUADRON TRAINS
10-65. Trains are a grouping of unit personnel, vehicles, and equipment organized to provide sustainment. They are the basic tactical sustainment organization. Squadrons use the trains concept to array their subordinate sustainment elements. Squadron trains usually are under the control of the S-4, assisted by the S-1. The composition and location of squadron trains varies depending on the number of units attached to or augmenting the squadron. Squadron trains can be employed in two basic configurations: as unit trains in

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one location or as echeloned trains (see Figure 10-2, which illustrates employment of trains in the BFSB). Considerations include the following: Unit trains at the squadron level are appropriate when the squadron is consolidated, during reconstitution, and during major movements. Echeloned trains can be organized into troop/company trains, squadron combat trains, and squadron field trains.

Figure 10-2. Examples of squadron trains employment (BFSB) 10-66. Two types of squadron trains, combat trains and field trains, provide sustainment support. The squadron commander may designate either the CTCP or FTCP as an alternate squadron headquarters.

Combat Trains
Organization 10-67. The squadron combat trains typically consist of a maintenance element and the squadron aid station. Table 10-3 lists the typical combat trains composition for each type of squadron. The UMCP should be positioned where recovery vehicles have access and limited maintenance can be performed. The mission variables must be considered when locating combat trains in a squadron support area.

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Table 10-3. Typical composition of squadron combat trains


SQUADRON HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron TRAINS ELEMENTS S-1/S-4 personnel FSC maintenance platoon elements Squadron aid station S-1/S-4 personnel FSC maintenance platoon elements Squadron aid station S-1/S-4 personnel Field maintenance company/forward maintenance company CRT Squadron aid station S-1/S-4 personnel Squadron maintenance platoon elements Squadron aid station S-1/S-4 personnel Squadron aid station BSC field maintenance team

IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron

SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron

ACR Cavalry Squadron

BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron

10-68. The squadron may have no need or requirement for combat trains or a CTCP during some types of operations. Sustainment is achieved through anticipation, planning, and coordination for requirements well in advance of the need for supply. LOGPAC operations, however, remain the primary means for the delivery, but occur only when needed. Combat Trains Command Post 10-69. The CTCP plans and coordinates sustainment for tactical operations and may serve as an alternate for the main CP. When established, the CTCP usually consists of organic or attached sustainment elements (i.e., FSC, support platoon), squadron S-1, and squadron S-4. Most of the time, the S-4 is the officer in charge (OIC) of the CTCP. Situations that may dictate the need for a CTCP include the following: Fast-moving, fluid operations. Establishment of a forward logistics element (FLE) by the supporting sustainment unit. Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations. 10-70. Elements of the squadron combat trains (see Table 10-3) typically collocate with the CTCP. The S4 works closely with his supporting sustainment unit counterpart to coordinate sustainment for the squadron. The CTCP serves the following functions: Track the current battle. Control sustainment of the current operation. Provide sustainment representation to the main CP for planning and integration. Forecast and coordinate future requirements. Monitor MSRs and control sustainment traffic. Coordinate the evacuation of casualties, equipment, flatracks, and detainees.

Field Trains
Organization 10-71. Field trains include those assets not located with the combat trains. Table 10-4 lists the typical field trains composition for each type of squadron. The field trains can provide direct coordination between the squadron and its supporting sustainment unit (such as the BSB, regimental support squadron, or BSC). Field trains personnel facilitate the coordination and movement of support from the supporting sustainment unit to the squadron AO by ensuring that LOGPACs are organized and configured according to the units requests and that the LOGPACs make it forward to the LRP and back to the BSA/regimental support area.

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Table 10-4. Typical composition of squadron field trains


SQUADRON HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron TRAINS ELEMENTS HHT headquarters S-1/S-4 personnel FSC headquarters and other FSC elements. Supply sergeants from subordinate units HHT headquarters S-1/S-4 personnel FSC headquarters and other FSC elements Supply sergeants from subordinate units HHT headquarters S-1/S-4 personnel Field maintenance company/forward maintenance company CRT elements Supply sergeants from subordinate units HHT headquarters S-1/S-4 personnel Support platoon elements Elements from the maintenance platoon Supply sergeants from subordinate units HHT headquarters S-1/S-4 personnel Supply sergeants from subordinate elements

IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron

SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron

ACR Cavalry Squadron

BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron

10-72. Field trains may collocate with the BSA/regimental support area, operate independently between the BSA/regimental support area and the combat trains, or collocate with the combat trains or with the nearest trains of other battalions. The location is determined by the level and capabilities of the enemy and the distances between the forward elements of the squadron and the BSA/regimental support area. 10-73. If the squadron is operating within supporting distance, the squadron field trains may collocate with the supporting sustainment unit in the BSA/regimental support area. This facilitates support, eases communications requirements, simplifies security requirements, and reduces the need for additional coordination with the higher headquarters for terrain. When collocating with the supporting sustainment unit, the field trains fall under the OPCON of the supporting sustainment unit commander for movement, security, terrain management, and synchronization of sustainment activities. The positioning needs of the squadron must be clearly communicated to and coordinated with the supporting sustainment unit. The squadron field trains must be positioned near the exit points of the BSA/regimental support area in case it needs to move forward quickly to better support the squadron. If the squadron is operating at extended ranges from the BSA/regimental support area, the squadron field trains are positioned between the supporting sustainment unit and the squadron to better facilitate support. Field Trains Command Post 10-74. The squadron FTCP, when established, is the primary direct coordination element between the squadron and the BSA/regimental support area. The FTCP usually consists of the squadron S-1 and S-4 and HHT personnel, including the HHT commander, XO, first sergeant, CBRN NCO, supply sergeant, subordinate unit supply sergeants, and organic or supporting sustainment elements. Generally, the HHT commander is the OIC of the FTCP. Situations that may dictate the need for a FTCP include the following: Periods of supply or resupply of major end items. Periods when sustainment elements of the squadron are no longer 100 percent mobile.

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10-75. FTCP personnel facilitate the movement of support from the supporting sustainment unit to the squadron AO by ensuring that LOGPACs are organized and configured according to the units requests and that the LOGPACs make it forward to the LRP and back to the BSA/regimental support area. The FTCP works closely with the supporting sustainment unit staff to coordinate sustainment for the squadron. The FTCP serves the following functions: Track the current battle. Plan for sustainment of future operations. Provide sustainment representation to the main CP for planning and integration. Forecast and coordinate future requirements. Coordinate the return to duty of Soldiers and repaired equipment.

BRIGADE/REGIMENTAL SUPPORT AREA


10-76. The BSA/regimental support area is the sustainment hub of the squadrons higher headquarters. It typically consists of the following: BSB (less FSCs or CRTs, as applicable), regimental support squadron, or BSC. Alternate CP for the higher headquarters (if formed). Squadron and/or battalion field trains. Elements from BSTB units or separate companies. Other sustainment units from higher headquarters.

Organization
10-77. Typically the commander of the supporting sustainment unit (such as BSB, regimental support squadron, or BSC) organizes his CP for C2 of three primary functions in support of the BSA/regimental support area: Sustainment operations, controlled by the support operations officer. Intelligence, under the control of the S-2. Protection (BSA defense), under the control of the S-3.

Forward Logistics Element


10-78. Based on the tactical situation and sustainment requirements, a FLE may be organized to push critical supplies and services to a designated unit or location such as the squadron combat trains or field trains (if forward of the BSA/regimental support area).

LOCATIONS FOR SUPPORT AREAS


10-79. Usually the BSA/regimental support area is located near an MSR and, ideally, is out of the range of the enemys medium artillery. All support areas have many similarities, including the following: Cover and concealment (natural terrain or man-made structures). Room for dispersion. Level, firm ground to support vehicle traffic and sustainment operations. Suitable helicopter landing site (with the landing site clearly marked). Good road or trail networks. Good routes in and out of the area (preferably separate routes for entry and exit). Access to lateral routes. Position along or good access to the MSR. Position away from likely enemy avenues of approach. 10-80. The trains should not be considered a permanent or stationary support area. The trains must be mobile to support the squadron when it is moving and should change locations frequently depending on available time and terrain. The trains changes locations for the following reasons:

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To avoid detection because of heavy use or traffic in the area. When an area becomes unusable through heavy use, such as in wet and muddy conditions. To prevent security from becoming lax or complacent due to familiarity or inactivity.

SECURITY OF SUPPORT AREAS


10-81. All sustainment elements must organize and prepare to defend themselves against ground or air attacks. They approach this requirement from the perspective of executing a security mission with the protected force being their own element or unit. They normally occupy areas that have been secured by maneuver elements. Chapter 4 of this manual provides additional information and guidance on the execution of security missions. 10-82. The security of the trains at each echelon is the responsibility of the individual in charge of the trains. The best defense is to avoid detection. The following activities help to ensure trains security: Select sites that use available cover, concealment, and camouflage. Enforce strict movement and positioning discipline as well as noise and light discipline to prevent detection. Establish a perimeter defense as in an assembly area, using these procedures: Establish OPs and conduct patrols. Position weapons (small arms, machine guns, and antitank weapons) for self-defense. Plan mutually supporting positions to dominate likely avenues of approach. Prepare a fire plan and make sector sketches. Identify sectors of fires. Emplace TRPs to control fires, including indirect fires. Integrate available combat vehicles within the trains (such as vehicles awaiting maintenance or personnel) into the plan and adjust the plan when vehicles depart. Conduct rehearsals. Establish rest plans. Identify an alarm or warning system that would enable rapid execution of the defense plan without further guidance; the alarm, warning system, and defense plan are usually included in the SOP. Designate a reaction force.

SUPPLY ROUTES
10-83. MSRs are routes designated within an AO along which the bulk of sustainment traffic flows in support of operations. An MSR is selected based on the mission variables, with terrain and enemy being key considerations. Alternate supply routes are planned in the event that an MSR is interdicted by the enemy or becomes too congested. In the event of CBRN contamination, either the primary or alternate MSR may be designated as the dirty MSR to handle contaminated traffic. Alternate supply routes should meet the same criteria as the MSR. MPs may assist with regulating traffic, and engineer units, if available, can maintain the routes. Security of supply routes in a noncontiguous environment may require the squadron to provide security for sustainment elements. Chapter 4 of this manual addresses route and convoy security. 10-84. Route considerations include the following: Location and planned scheme of maneuver for subordinate units. Location and planned movements of other units moving through the squadrons AO. Route characteristics, such as route classification, width, obstructions, steep slopes, sharp curves, and type of roadway surface. Two-way, all-weather trafficability. Classification of bridges and culverts.

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Requirements for traffic control, such as at choke points, congested areas, confusing intersections, or built-up areas. Number and locations of crossover routes from the MSR to alternate supply routes. Requirements for repair, upgrade, or maintenance of the route, fording sites, and bridges. Vulnerabilities that must be protected, including bridges, fords, built-up areas, and choke points. Enemy threats, such as air attack, conventional and unconventional tactics, mines, ambushes, and CBRN strikes. Known or likely locations of enemy penetrations, attacks, CBRN strikes, or obstacles. Known or potential civilian/refugee movements that must be controlled or monitored.

SECTION IV LOGISTICS PACKAGES


10-85. A LOGPAC is a grouping of multiple classes of supplies and supply vehicles under the control of a single convoy commander. This tactical grouping of sustainment elements is tailored based on the mission variables but adheres to some fundamental tenets that are suitable for inclusion in SOPs.

LOGPAC PLANNING
10-86. The S-4 leads the squadrons sustainment planning. Table 10-5 identifies the leaders responsible for execution of the sustainment plan. These leaders are responsible for ensuring that the LOGPAC reaches, at a minimum, the LRP, which is the point along the supply route where the troop first sergeant or unit guide takes control of a troop LOGPAC. Table 10-5. Squadron sustainment personnel
SQUADRON HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ACR Cavalry Squadron BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron SUSTAINMENT PERSONNEL FSC commander/first sergeant FSC commander/first sergeant HHT commander/first sergeant Support platoon leader/PSG BSC commander/first sergeant

10-87. A useful method for sustainment planners is to identify where sustainment assets should best be used throughout the squadron AO and to place LRPs depicting those points on the overlay. Likely areas for the LRP are near MSRs, at crossroads, or in close proximity to water (such as a lake, pond, or reservoir). In some situations, however, mission variables and security factors may require placement of the LRP in a less conspicuous location. In all cases, LRP sites must be defended. Movement of sustainment assets and sustainment functions is primarily based on three methods: On order. Triggered by events. Triggered by distance between sustainment assets and the supported elements. 10-88. The use of checkpoints or LRPs controls the movement of assets. Functions that will occur at the checkpoint or LRP are activated or turned off based on the three movement methods and are incorporated into the OPORD or SOP. Figure 10-3 illustrates sustainment graphics used in LOGPAC operations.

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Figure 10-3. Example of sustainment graphics

LOGPAC RESUPPLY
10-89. The S-4 coordinates to ensure that LOGPACs contain requested or required supplies necessary to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the S-4 determines which LRP best supports the mission and notifies all units. LOGPACs are normally organized every 24 to 72 hours for routine resupply depending on the organization. Subordinate unit supply sergeants control the LOGPAC for their units. A habitual LOGPAC organization facilitates operations and allows direct coordination by the supply sergeant as necessary.

ORGANIZATION
10-90. LOGPACs are normally organized for the following units or elements: Each subordinate unit and attachments as necessary. Main CP (this includes the command group and TAC CP). Combat trains, including immediate resupply vehicles. 10-91. Attached units may have a separate LOGPAC if the parent unit provides sustainment assets. If not, they resupply from squadron LOGPACs. Prior coordination by the S-4 is necessary to ensure the designated LOGPAC is augmented with additional assets to handle the increased requirements. The S-4 ensures no organic or attached unit is left unsupported. The S-4 monitors the service support provided by parent units to attached or OPCON units. Sustainment operators remain prepared to organize unscheduled

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LOGPACs to provide immediate or supplementary resupply. This LOGPAC may be for a specific unit or for replenishing the stocks held in the combat trains. 10-92. LOGPACs normally consist of the following: The subordinate units supply truck controlled by the supply sergeant. This vehicle brings replacement Soldiers, incoming mail, and the unit water trailer. Class I rations and the unit water trailer. POL trucks. Bulk fuel and packaged POL products (Class III) are on these vehicles. Ammunition trucks. These vehicles contain a mix of Class V for the units weapons. Demolitions and mines are also included. The squadron SOP normally establishes a standard LOGPAC load of munitions. The S-4 uses reports by unit first sergeants or other users to adjust the standard loads. Additional trucks as necessary to carry other supplies (such as Class II) requested by the troop. Class IX parts or other maintenance items requested by supporting field maintenance elements (such as an MST or CRT).

RESUPPLY TECHNIQUES
Tailgate Resupply/Unit Distribution
10-93. The tailgate method is usually used in static positions such as assembly areas. The main CPs and the combat trains are normally resupplied by this method. Combat vehicles remain in their positions or back out a short distance to allow trucks carrying Class III and Class V supplies to reach them. Individuals rotate through a feeding area, pick up mail and sundries, and fill or exchange water cans. Any EPWs are centralized and guarded. Soldiers killed in action (KIA) are brought, with their personal effects, to the holding area, where the first sergeant takes charge of them.

Service Station Resupply/Supply Point Distribution


10-94. Service station resupply is used during most tactical operations when units are moving or temporarily halted. Unit elements move to the designated site for resupply. The subordinate unit XO selects general LOGPAC sites based on the overall situation, but the first sergeant makes the final positioning determination. A good site should provide the following features: Cover and concealment. Proximity to platoons or elements being resupplied. A road or trail network that supports the LOGPAC vehicles and tactical vehicles. Room for dispersion. Reduction of thermal signatures.

LOGPAC SURVIVABILITY
10-95. Decentralized execution and the requirement of support elements to operate over extended distances require LOGPACs to organize and defend themselves against ground or air attack. LOGPACs are executed as if they were a combat operation. Key areas to address during planning and preparation include actions on contact in reaction to the following: Indirect fire. Snipers. Ambush. IEDs.

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SECTION V EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED PERSONNEL


10-96. Evacuation of sick and wounded Soldiers is conducted by MEDEVAC or CASEVAC. Refer to FM 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, for a detailed description of these evacuation methods. Figure 10-4 shows procedures for reporting and evacuating wounded Soldiers.

Figure 10-4. Casualty reporting and evacuation procedures

MEDICAL EVACUATION
10-97. Medical evacuation is the use of medical personnel on medical transportation to move individuals and provide them with medical care during movement from the point of injury to an MTF. The medical evacuation plan is a crucial part of the medical operation plan (OPLAN) or OPORD. The brigade surgeon section is responsible for developing the BCT MEDEVAC plan. The squadron medical platoon and the brigade support medical company are responsible for execution of the brigade MEDEVAC plan (including the use of both ground and air assets). The medical planning process should include (at a minimum) the medical company commander and XO, brigade S-1, brigade XO, brigade S-3, forward support medical evacuation team leader, the BSB support operations section medical plans and operations officer, the brigade aviation element (if available), squadron S-3, squadron surgeon, squadron S-1, and medical platoon leaders. The MEDEVAC plan identifies AXPs and casualty collection points (CCP), which are posted on

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support graphics in FBCB2. Additional ambulance support is also coordinated with the supporting sustainment unit support operations section and the supporting medical company. 10-98. The squadron medical platoon is responsible for MEDEVAC of casualties from the point of injury to the squadron aid station. Ambulance teams from the supporting medical company evacuate patients from the squadron aid station back to the Role II MTF located in the BSA. Pre-positioning of ambulance teams with the aid station reduces ambulance turnaround times. Recovery responsibility does not end until casualties are transferred at the AXP or are transported to the area medical support unit in the BSA/regimental support area. Patients are evacuated no further to the rear than their condition requires and returned to duty as soon as possible. 10-99. The preferred method of MEDEVAC is by air ambulance, but use of this method depends on mission variables. Usually, the brigade aviation element positions a forward support MEDEVAC team in support of a brigade-size element. This team provides area support to all units in the supported area. The brigade aviation element and surgeon coordinate the use and positioning of the forward support MEDEVAC team. 10-100. In developing the MEDEVAC plan, medical planners must anticipate the potential for high casualty rates, long evacuation distances, and adverse weather. They must also identify and coordinate AXPs for all squadron operations. This includes the locations of AXPs for all phases of each operation and triggers for displacement to their next locations. Planners must retain the flexibility to shift nonstandard evacuation assets to support mass casualties or CASEVAC, as required. Plans and exercises should also include the use of air evacuation (when available) to transport litter-urgent patients.

CASUALTY EVACUATION
10-101. CASEVAC is the movement of casualties aboard nonmedical vehicles or aircraft. Since CASEVAC operations can reduce combat power and degrade the efficiency of the AHS, units should use CASEVAC only in extreme emergencies to move Soldiers with less severe injuries when MEDEVAC assets are overwhelmed. When possible, nonmedical vehicles and aircraft transporting casualties should be augmented with a combat medic or combat lifesaver. (Nonmedical aircraft, however, may lack sufficient space to permit a caregiver to accompany the casualty.)

WARNING
Casualties transported aboard nonmedical vehicles may not receive proper en-route medical care or may not be transported to an MTF that can properly address the patients medical condition. If the casualtys medical condition deteriorates during transport or the casualty is not transported to the appropriate MTF, longterm disability or death may result.

Note. The BFSB has limited medical capabilityfour evacuation squads and two treatment teams. During planning, the reconnaissance squadron must consider designating vehicles to support CASEVAC. The BFSB coordinates area medical support from brigades to which BFSB assets are attached or for squadron units operating in other brigade AOs. The BFSB also relies heavily on aerial MEDEVAC support from aviation medical units because of the locations where BFSB units operate and the extended distances involved. 10-102. Medical planners should ensure that CASEVAC is addressed as a separate operation in the OPLAN/OPORD because of the required prior planning, coordination, synchronization, and rehearsals. Nonmedical vehicles are identified and positioned forward for mass CASEVAC. As casualties occur, the

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S-4 directs assets to assist with CASEVAC. Casualties should be evacuated to the nearest aid stationnot necessarily the squadron aid stationfor treatment.

SECTION VI - FIELD MAINTENANCE


10-103. The Army has transitioned to two levels of maintenance: field and sustainment. Field maintenance consists mainly of on-system preventive maintenance and replacement of defective parts. Field maintenance returns repaired equipment to the Soldier. It covers tasks previously assigned to operator/crew, organization/unit, and direct support maintenance levels. It includes some off-system maintenance critical to mission readiness. Table 10-6 identifies the field maintenance assets organic to or supporting the various types of squadrons. Table 10-6. Organic field maintenance assets
SQUADRON HBCT Reconnaissance Squadron IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron SBCT Reconnaissance Squadron ACR Cavalry Squadron ORGANIC ASSETS BSB FSC maintenance platoon BSB field maintenance company BSB FSC maintenance platoon BSB field maintenance company BSB field maintenance company/forward maintenance company CRT BSB forward maintenance company Troop maintenance section Squadron maintenance platoon Regimental support squadron maintenance troop BSC maintenance platoon

BFSB Reconnaissance Squadron

ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES


10-104. The squadron XO manages maintenance with the assistance of personnel from supporting maintenance elements. The UMCP must not become a mass collection point of vehicles. If a vehicle cannot be rendered mission capable within a reasonable amount of time (determined by unit SOP and METT-TC factors), controlled exchange should occur. Coordination should begin for evacuation of vehicles that are not mission capable (NMC) to the BSA or regimental support area. This allows the UMCP to maintain mobility so it can support the squadron at extended ranges or during missions such as reconnaissance. (See Figure 10-5.) 10-105. Supporting sustainment units have maintenance platoons that repair automotive, armament, ground support, electronic, and missile equipment. These maintenance platoons focus on line-replaceable unit replacement using combat spares from the prescribed load list and shop stock. They also have a service and recovery section that can perform battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR). The Standard Army maintenance system-enhanced is used to order repair parts and to manage combat spares. The supporting sustainment unit commander establishes UMCPs in coordination with the squadron S-4. 10-106. Maintenance of low-density, specialized MI or signal equipment usually requires maintenance by Department of the Army civilians or contractors. The squadron S-4 must develop specific management procedures for this maintenance.

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Figure 10-5. Maintenance flow

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND REPAIR


10-107. BDAR is the first step in returning disabled equipment to the battle. BDAR is the act of inspecting battle damage to determine its extent, classifying the type of repairs required, and determining the maintenance activity best suited to accomplish the repair.

RECOVERY AND EVACUATION


10-108. Supporting maintenance elements are responsible for recovering their own and their supported units damaged equipment. The use of FBCB2 enables recovery vehicles to identify the exact location of the inoperable piece of equipment. When the decision is made to repair the equipment at the BSA/regimental support area, either recovery or evacuation is used. If recovery assets are overextended, recovery support can be coordinated with the BSA/regimental support area to prevent excessive repair delays. Equipment that cannot be repaired at the BSA/regimental support area usually is evacuated to a sustainment brigade.

CONTROLLED EXCHANGE
10-109. Controlled exchange is the removal of serviceable parts from an item of NMC equipment to install on another piece of equipment that can be rendered mission capable more quickly or easily. The higher headquarters SOP may give the squadron commander the authority to direct controlled exchanges.

COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MAINTENANCE


10-110. COMSEC equipment is evacuated through normal maintenance channels to the higher headquarters sustainment unit or a network support company, if appropriate.

MEDICAL EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE


10-111. Maintenance of medical equipment is very specialized and requires special skills and test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment. Medical equipment is maintained within equipment specifications at all times. Maintenance that cannot be accomplished at this level is referred to the closest medical

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sustainment company or combat support hospital element for sustainment support. See FM 4-02.1, Combat Health Logistics, for more information regarding medical equipment maintenance and other medical sustainment support.

RETROGRADE OF UNSERVICEABLE COMPONENTS


10-112. A reparable is an item that can be cost-effectively repaired. When a reparable such as a diesel engine or turbine fuel control malfunctions, it can be replaced by a repaired or rebuilt component; it usually does not need to be replaced by a new item. Although mechanics at the squadron level cannot repair these unserviceable items, the component repair companies in the sustainment brigade need them to create serviceable repair parts. 10-113. Each time mechanics at the squadron level order recoverable parts, they must return the unserviceable parts to the Class IX section of the distribution company. The unserviceable parts are then retrograded to the sustainment brigade for repair by a component repair company. Once repaired, the serviceable parts are placed back into the supply system.

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Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-20.96 is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


1SG A/L A/N A/O AA ABCS ABF AC2 ACA ACM ACR ADA AHS ALO AM amb AMD AMEDD AO APOD ARNG ASCOPE ASLT PSN ATACMS ATK PSN AVLB AXP BCT BDA BDAR bde first sergeant administrative and logistics net as needed as occurs avenue of approach (graphics only) Army Battle Command System attack by fire airspace command and control airspace coordination area airspace control measure armored cavalry regiment air defense artillery Army Health System air liaison officer amplitude modulation (radio communications) ambulance air and missile defense Army Medical Department area of operations aerial port of debarkation Army National Guard areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (factors in analysis of infrastructure) assault position Army Tactical Missile System attack position armored vehicle launched bridge ambulance exchange point brigade combat team battle damage assessment battle damage assessment and repair brigade

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Glossary

BFIST BFSB bn BP BSA BSB BSC BSTB C2 CA CAB CAS CASEVAC cav CBRN cbt CCIR CCP cdr CFV CI cl CLS CMO co COA COIN COLT COMSEC COP COSC COSR CP CRT CS CTCP DA div DNBI DOD DP

Bradley fire support team (vehicle) battlefield surveillance brigade battalion battle position brigade support area brigade support battalion brigade support company brigade special troops battalion command and control civil affairs combat aviation brigade close air support casualty evacuation. cavalry chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear combat commanders critical information requirements casualty collection point commander cavalry fighting vehicle counterintelligence class (supply) combat lifesaver civil-military operations company course of action counterinsurgency combat observation and lasing team communications security common operational picture combat and operational stress control combat and operational stress reactions command post combat repair team combat support combat trains command post Department of the Army division disease and nonbattle injury Department of Defense decision point

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DPICM dsmtd DZ EA EEFI EOD EOF EPLRS EPW evac EW FAC FAH FARP FBCB2 FDC FEBA FFIR FHP FIST FLE FLOT FM FPF FRAGO FS FSC FSCM FSO FST FTCP GCS GCU Gen GEOINT HAHO HALO HAZMAT HBCT HCT HE

dual purpose improved conventional munitions dismounted drop zone engagement area essential elements of friendly information explosive ordnance disposal escalation of force enhanced position location and reporting system enemy prisoner of war evacuation electronic warfare forward air controller final attack heading forward arming and refueling point Force XXI battle commandbrigade and below fire direction center forward edge of the battle area friendly forces information requirements force health protection fire support team forward logistics element forward line of own troops field manual; frequency modulation (radio communications) final protective fire fragmentary order fire support forward support company fire support coordination measure fire support officer forward surgical team field trains command post ground control station ground control unit general geospatial intelligence high altitude, high opening high altitude, low opening hazardous materials heavy brigade combat team HUMINT collection team high explosive

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Glossary

HEMTT HESCO HF HHC HHT HMMWV HPT HPTL HQ HR HSS HUMINT HVT IBCT IED IEW INTSUM IP IPB IR ISR JP J-SEAD JSTARS JTAC JTF KIA kph LC LCMR LD LNO LOA LOC LOGPAC LOGSTAT LRAS3 LRP LRS LTIOV LZ

heavy expanded mobile tactical truck Hercules Engineering Solutions Consortium (barriers) high frequency headquarters and headquarters company headquarters and headquarters troop high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle high-payoff target high-payoff target list headquarters human resources health service support human intelligence high-value target infantry brigade combat team improvised explosive device intelligence and electronic warfare intelligence summary internet protocol intelligence preparation of the battlefield information requirement intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Joint Publication joint suppression of enemy air defenses Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System joint terminal attack controller joint task force killed in action kilometers per hour line of contact lightweight countermortar radar line of departure liaison officer limit of advance line of communications logistics package logistics status (report) long-range advanced scout surveillance system logistics release point long-range surveillance latest time information is of value landing zone

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m maint MASINT MBA MCOO MCS MDMP MEB MEDEVAC METT-TC

meters maintenance measurement and signatures intelligence main battle area modified combined obstacle overlay maneuver control system military decision-making process maneuver enhancement brigade medical evacuation mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (factors in mission analysis; also called mission variables) military intelligence military intelligence company multiple launch rocket system millimeters military police miles per hour main supply route maintenance support team medical treatment facility moving target indicator named area of interest North Atlantic Treaty Organization nuclear, biological, and chemical (publication titles only) noncommissioned officer noncommissioned officer in charge no-fire area nongovernmental organization not mission capable operational environment officer in charge observation post operational control operation plan operation order operations security precombat check precombat inspection priority intelligence requirement phase line

MI MICO MLRS mm MP mph MSR MST MTF MTI NAI NATO NBC NCO NCOIC NFA NGO NMC OE OIC OP OPCON OPLAN OPORD OPSEC PCC PCI PIR PL

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Glossary

PM PMCS POL PSYOP PVNTMED PZ QRF recon retrains RFA RFL RI RIP rly ROE RP RSOI rte S-1 S-2 S-3 S-3 Air S-4 S-6 S-9 SA SBCT SBF SCATMINE SEAD sec SIGINT SINCGARS SIP SIR SOF SOP SP spt sqdn SSM

program management preventive maintenance checks and services petroleum, oils, and lubricants psychological operations preventive medicine pickup zone quick reaction force reconnaissance retransmission restrictive fire area restrictive fire line relevant information relief in place rally (graphics only) rules of engagement release point reception, staging, onward movement, and integration route personnel staff officer intelligence staff officer operations staff officer air operations staff officer logistics staff officer signal staff officer civil affairs staff officer situational awareness Stryker brigade combat team support by fire scatterable mine suppression of enemy air defenses section; seconds signals intelligence single-channel ground and airborne radio systemsystem improvement program specific information requirement special operations forces standing operating procedure start point support squadron surface-to-surface missile

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SU SUAS surv SWEAT-MSO TAC CP TACAIR TACP TACSOP TAI TIM TOE TOT TOW TRP trp TSM TTP TTT TUAS UAS UHF UMCP UMT USAF USMC UXO VHF WARNO WIA WP XO

situational understanding small unmanned aircraft system surveillance sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other operations tactical command post tactical air tactical air control party tactical standard operating procedures target(ed) area of interest toxic industrial material table of organization and equipment time on target tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (missile) target reference point troop target synchronization matrix tactics, techniques, and procedures time to target tactical unmanned aircraft system unmanned aircraft system ultra high frequency unit maintenance collection point unit ministry team United States Air Force United States Marine Corps unexploded ordnance very high frequency warning order wounded in action white phosphorous executive officer

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Glossary

TERMS
area defense A type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. (FM 3-90) area reconnaissance A form of reconnaissance operation that is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. (FM 1-02) area security A form of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specified area. (FM 3-90) attack An offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (FM 3-0) civil support (joint) The term used to describe Department of Defense (DOD) support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02) cover A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (FM 3-90) exfiltration A tactical mission task where a commander removes soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (FM 3-90) exploitation A type of offensive operation that rapidly follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. (FM 3-90) guard A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely on fires and enabler assets of the main body. (FM 3-90) infiltration A form of maneuver in which contact with the threat is avoided. It entails movement through or into an area occupied by a threat or a friendly force by small groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals. (FM 3-90) local security Low-level security operations conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (FM 3-90) mobile defense A type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. (FM 3-90) movement to contact An offensive operation conducted to develops the situation and establish or regain contact. It also creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. (FM 3-0) pursuit An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (JP 1-02)

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Glossary

reconnaissance A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. (FM 1-02) reconnaissance in force A deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test enemy strengths, disposition, and reaction capability or to obtain other information. (FM 3-90) reconnaissance pull * Technique in which reconnaissance forces are typically deployed prior to development of a detailed plan or course of action (COA) to determine which routes are suitable for maneuver, where the enemy is strong and weak, and where gaps exist. This technique thus facilitates the commanders initiative and agility in development of the plan/COA and pulls the main body toward and along the path of least enemy resistance. reconnaissance push * Technique in which reconnaissance forces are typically deployedor pushedafter development of a detailed plan. This technique focuses the reconnaissance effort on gaining information that assists the commander in refining the common operational picture (COP), finalizing the plan or course of action (COA), and supporting shaping and decisive operations. It is normally used once the commander is committed to a scheme of maneuver or COA. retrograde A type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. (FM 3-90) route reconnaissance A form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communications (LOC), such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. (FM 3-90) search and attack A technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission. (FM 3-90) screen A form of security operation that provides early warning to the protected force. (FM 3-90) site exploitation A series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of operations, with the purpose of protecting the force and producing an advantage within the operational variables to support tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (FM 3-90.15) surveillance The systematic observation of airspace, surface, or subsurface areas by visual, auditory, electronic, photographic, or other means. (FM 1-02) zone reconnaissance A form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. (FM 3-90)

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Glossary-9

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References
SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 13 November 2006. JP 3-09.03, Close Air Support, 8 July 2009. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 1 August 2006. JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, 25 January 2007. JP 3-28, Civil Support, 14 September 2007. JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 January 2007. JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 30 August 2004.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
FM 1, The Army, 14 June 2005. FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, 21 February 2007. FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004. FM 1-05, Religious Support, 18 April 2003. FM 1-100, Army Aviation Operations, 21 February 1997. FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004. FM 2-91.4, Intelligence Support to Urban Operations, 20 March 2008. FM 3-0, Operations, 27 February 2008. FM 3-01, US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations, 25 November 2009. FM 3-04.111, Aviation Brigades, 7 December 2007. FM 3-04.113, Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations, 7 December 2007. FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations, 16 February 2007. FM 3-04.155, Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations, 29 July 2009. FM 3-04.203, Fundamentals of Flight, 7 May 2007. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 29 September 2006. FM 3-05.60, Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations, 30 October 2007. FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 5 July 2007. FM 3-06, Urban Operations, 26 October 2006. FM 3-06.11 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, 28 February 2002. FM 3-06.20, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations, 25 April 2006. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008. FM 3-07.1, Security Force Operations, 1 May 2009. FM 3-09.31, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, 1 October 2002.

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FM 3-20.96

References-1

References

FM 3-09.32, (JFIRE) Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, 20 December 2007. FM 3-09.60, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Operations, 12 August 2008. FM 3-11, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations, 10 March 2003. FM 3-11.3, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Contamination Avoidance, 2 February 2006. FM 3-11.4, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, 2 June 2003. FM 3-11.5, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination, 4 April 2006. FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001. FM 3-19.15, Civil Disturbance Operations, 18 April 2005. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001. FM 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations, 4 September 2007. FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop, 4 August 2009. FM 3-21.8, The Infantry Platoon and Squad, 28 March 2007. FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Company, 27 July 2006. FM 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion, 8 April 2003. FM 3-21.71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), 20 August 2002. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006. FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 21 April 2009. FM 3-28.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Civil Support Operations, 3 December 2007. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 2 April 2009. FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, 31 August 2000. FM 3-34.22, Engineer OperationsBrigade Combat Team and Below, 11 February 2009. FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery, 10 August 2005. FM 3-52, Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone, 1 August 2002. FM 3-52.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airspace Control, 22 May 2009. FM 3-52.2, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air Ground System, 10 April 2007. FM 3-55.93, Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations, 23 June 2009. FM 3-90, Tactics, 4 July 2001. FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, 7 April 2008. FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, 4 August 2006. FM 3-90.15, Sensitive Site Operations, 25 April 2007. FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations, 21 September 2007. FM 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, 28 November 2000. FM 4-0, Sustainment, 30 April 2009. FM 4-02, Force Health Protection in a Global Environment, 13 February 2003. FM 4-02.1, Combat Health Logistics, 28 September 2001. FM 4-02.2, Medical Evacuation, 8 May 2007. FM 4-02.51, Combat and Operational Stress Control, 6 July 2006.

References-2

FM 3-20.96

12 March 2010

References

FM 4-20.41, Aerial Delivery Distribution in the Theater of Operations, 29 August 2003. FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003. FM 6-22.5, Combat and Operational Stress Control Manual for Leaders and Soldiers, 18 March 2009. FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations, 27 October 1997. FM 9-207, Operation and Maintenance of Ordnance Materiel in Cold Weather, 20 March 1998. FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, 24 December 1996. FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 18 July 1956. FM 90-3, Desert Operations, 24 August 1993. FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations, 16 March 1987. FM 90-5, Jungle Operations, 16 August 1982. FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994. FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, 4 August 1999. FMI 4-93.2, The Sustainment Brigade, 4 February 2009. STP 19-31B1-SM, Soldiers Manual, MOS 31B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, 5 December 2007. TC 2-22.4, Technical Intelligence, 19 November 2009. TC 19-210, Access Control Handbook, 4 October 2004.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication. DA forms are available on the APD website (www.apd.army.mil). DA Form 2028, Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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References-3

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Index
A
actions on contact, 2-9, 3-11, 3-12, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 7-7, 10-22 forms of contact, 3-11 planning, 3-14 procedures, 3-11 air and missile defense (AMD), 9-3, 9-5, 9-17 air-ground integration, 4-5 area of operations (AO), 1-5, 27, 3-3, 4-2, 4-13, 6-1, 8-3, 95, 9-14, 9-18, 10-5 area reconnaissance, 3-10, 316, 3-17 critical tasks, 3-17 definition, 3-16 in area security, 4-9 area security. see also security operations, 4-1, 4-2, 4-9 procedures, 4-9 tasks, 4-9 armored cavalry regiment (ACR) cavalry squadron, 1-11 cavalry squadron capabilities, 1-11 cavalry squadron limitations, 1-11 assembly area, 3-16, 5-2, 9-18, 10-19, 10-22 aviation support, 3-4, 4-5 reconnaissance squadron limitations, 1-14 branches, 3-3 brigade combat team (BCT), ix, 1-3, 1-5, 2-3, 3-3, 3-8, 3-22, 4-2, 9-2 engineer support, 9-3 squadron organizations, 1-6 brigade special troops battalion (BSTB), 9-1, 10-5 brigade support battalion (BSB) see also sustainment, 1-9, 114 brigade support medical company. see also force health protection (FHP) and sustainment, 9-22 combat repair team (CRT). see also maintenance and sustainment, 1-9, 1-14 combat trains command post (CP), 4-15 combat trains command post (CTCP), 10-8 command and control (C2), 21, 2-4, 3-5, 3-23, 4-5, 4-6, 414, 8-2, 9-4, 9-5, 10-1 C2 systems, 3-5 components of battle command, 2-2 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) synchonrization and integration, 2-4 command post (CP), 4-6, 4-15, 9-18 collaboration with higher headquarters, 2-3 combat trains command post (CTCP), 4-15, 10-16 field trains command post (FTCP), 10-18 commander, 2-3 commanders critical information requirements (CCIR), 3-2, 3-16, 9-5 commanders intent, 3-3 common operational picture (COP), 2-1, 2-4, 3-2, 3-24, 99 communications security (COMSEC), 10-3 complex terrain, 1-3, 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-11, 3-7, 3-18, 5-2, 510 concept of operations, 2-1, 2-2, 3-13, 3-14, 5-4, 5-9, 9-1, 9-3, 10-8 contact. see actions on contact, 3-11 contractors, i, 10-25 control measures, 2-2, 2-12, 214, 2-15, 2-17, 3-14, 3-23, 57, 5-8, 5-10, 6-2, 6-5, 7-13, 9-3, 9-5, 9-9, 9-19 convoy security. see also security operations, 4-13 critical tasks, 4-13 in area security, 4-9, 4-10

C
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), 4-15, 10-10 cavalry squadron (armored cavalry squadron [ACR]), 111 cavalry troop, 1-11 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), 3-11, 3-15 assets in heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), 916 assets in infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), 916 assets in Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), 916 contaminated areas, 3-15, 3-16 defense, 9-15 mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), 9-16 reconnaissance, 1-10, 1-11 civil support operations, ix, 1-2, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21, 8-1, 8-2, 83, 9-18 close air support (CAS), 1-5, 46, 9-5, 9-8 airspace coordination area (ACA), 9-9 integration with artillery, 9-9 planning, 9-8

B
battle command. see also command and control (C2), 2-1 battle damage assessment (BDA), 1-3, 3-6 battle drills, 5-7 battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB), ix, 1-1, 3-8, 5-1, 9-1, 10-2 reconnaissance squadron, ix, x, 1-1, 1-3, 1-5, 1-12, 1-13, 1-14, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-18, 5-1, 6-1, 6-3, 9-1, 9-3, 9-7, 9-20, 10-2, 10-7, 10-11, 10-12, 10-24 reconnaissance squadron capabilities, 1-13

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FM 3-20.96

Index-1

Index organization, 4-13 procedures, 4-14 cover. see also security operations, 4-1, 4-2, 4-9 5-9, 5-11, 6-4, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-6, 7-10, 7-11, 8-1, 10-25 food, water, subsistence items (Class I supply). see also supply/resupply operations, 9-22 force, 1-5 force health protection (FHP). see also sustainment, 1-8, 19, 1-14 combat and operational stress control (COSC), 923 preventive medicine, 9-22 fragmentary order (FRAGO), 313, 3-24 fratricide, 6-5, 9-9 full-spectrum operations, viii, x, 1-3, 2-4, 5-1, 6-1 intelligence, 1-5 intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), 9-20 intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 2-7, 3-12, 316, 3-19, 4-10, 8-3 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 1-3, 1-5, 2-3, 3-23, 4-10, 9-5

D
defensive operations, x, 1-7, 19, 1-10, 1-11, 1-14, 2-14, 215, 2-16, 5-3, 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-8, 7-6, 9-6, 9-15 displacement criteria, 2-9

J
joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD), 3-8

E
electronic warfare (EW), 3-11 enabling operations, 3-18 enemy, 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6, 1-10, 1-11, 1-13, 2-2, 23, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 211, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 216, 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 37, 3-8, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, 314, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 3-18, 319, 3-20, 3-22, 3-23, 3-24, 51, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7, 5-8, 5-9, 5-10, 5-11, 5-12, 61, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8, 7-2, 7-3, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-9, 7-10, 7-11, 7-12, 7-13, 7-14, 7-15, 9-4, 9-6, 9-9, 917, 9-20, 10-10, 10-11, 1012, 10-17, 10-18, 10-19, 1020 engagement criteria, 2-6, 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-11, 3-13, 3-14, 3-16 engineer, 1-5 engineer support/operations, 95 exfiltration, 3-8, 3-11, 3-18, 320, 3-22, 7-12 air or water extraction, 3-22 land extraction, 3-22 methods, 3-22

L
liaison officer, 2-3 local security. see also security operations, 4-1, 4-2 logistics package (LOGPAC) operations. see also supply/resupply operations, 9-18 long-range surveillance (LRS) company, 1-12

G
guard. see also security operations, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-9

H
heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), ix, 1-1, 9-3, 10-3 reconnaissance squadron, 1-6 reconnaissance squadron capabilities, 1-7 reconnaissance squadron limitations, 1-7 human intelligence (HUMINT), 1-6, 1-10, 1-11, 4-10, 7-13

M
main battle area, 1-5 main command post (CP), 4-6 maintenance. see also sustainment, 1-9, 1-14, 4-12, 4-15 medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), 4-15 medical support. see force health protection (FHP) and sustainment, 1-8, 1-9, 1-14, 4-14, 4-15 military decision-making process (MDMP), 2-13, 3-3, 8-3 military intelligence company (MICO), 3-24 mission(s), 1-5 mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METTTC), 1-3, 2-1, 4-3, 4-7, 4-10, 4-12 mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), 9-16 mobility, countermobility, survivability, 4-5, 4-6

I
improvised explosive device (IED), 4-14, 9-20 infantry, 1-5 infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), ix, 1-1, 3-8, 9-3, 10-3 reconnaissance squadron, 1-8 reconnaissance squadron capabilities, 1-9 reconnaissance squadron limitations, 1-9 infiltration, 3-8, 3-9, 3-11, 3-18, 3-19, 3-20, 3-21, 3-22, 4-5, 6-2 methods, 3-20 operational considerations, 3-20 task organization, 3-20 infrastructure, 2-7, 2-9, 2-18, 220, 3-4, 3-14, 3-15, 3-16, 71, 7-6, 7-10, 8-4

F
fire planning, 2-20, 4-6, 7-10, 10-10, 10-11 fire support, 1-6, 1-8, 1-9, 1-12, 1-14, 3-19, 3-23, 6-5, 9-5, 96, 9-7, 9-9 air and missile defense (AMD), 9-5 engineer support, 9-5 fires brigade, 9-7 focus, 1-2, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-9, 213, 2-16, 2-17, 3-2, 3-3, 314, 3-15, 3-17, 5-4, 5-7, 5-8,

O
observation post (OP), 2-10, 211, 3-22, 4-3, 4-10, 4-12

Index-2

FM 3-20.96

12 March 2010

Index dismounted, 2-10 duration (short, long, extended), 2-10 mounted, 2-10 obstacles, 2-10, 2-15, 3-9, 311, 3-15, 3-16, 3-17, 4-6, 411, 4-15, 5-2, 5-5, 5-9, 5-10, 5-12, 6-6, 6-7, 7-15, 9-4, 1020 engineer support, 9-4 existing and reinforcing, 9-4 offensive operations, x, 2-7, 211, 2-12, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 217, 5-1, 5-2, 5-5, 5-8, 6-1 operation order (OPORD), 218, 3-2, 3-22, 3-23, 5-4, 10-8 operational environment (OE), 1-1, 1-6 operations security (OPSEC), 2-18 orders, 1-6, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 3-10, 3-13, 3-16, 5-5, 5-7, 5-8, 108 reconnaissance focus, 2-5, 2-6 reconnaissance guidance, 2-5 reconnaissance handover, 3-22 reconnaissance pull, 3-2, 33 reconnaissance push, 3-2, 3-3 route reconnaissance, 1-3, 3-17 techniques, 3-2 tempo, 2-5, 2-8 zone reconnaissance, 1-3, 3-15, 4-3, 4-5 reconnaissance pull, 3-2, 3-14, 3-24 reconnaissance push, 3-2, 3-3, 3-14 reconnaissance squadron, viii, ix, 1-1, 1-3, 1-5, 1-7, 1-8, 19, 1-10, 2-3, 3-7, 3-8, 3-18, 3-19, 3-24, 4-1, 5-1, 5-2, 6-1, 9-3, 9-16, 9-20, 10-3, 10-4, 10-11, 10-12 battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) reconnaissance squadron, 1-12 capabilities and limitations, 1-5 engineer support, 9-3 heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), 1-6 in combat roles, 3-2 infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), 1-8 missions, 1-3 role, 1-3 role in security operations, 4-1, 4-2 squadron commander, 2-1 squadron staff, 2-1 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), 1-9 reconnaissance troop, 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 1-9, 1-12, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10, 3-24, 4-2 cavalry troop (ACR), 1-11 dismounted troop (IBCT), 19 relevant information (RI), 2-1 reports and reporting, 3-16, 415 route reconnaissance, 3-10, 315, 3-17, 3-18 critical tasks, 3-17 definition, 3-17 in area security, 4-9 in convoy security, 4-13 in route security, 4-12 organization, 3-17 route security. see also security operations, 4-11 in area security, 4-10 methods, 4-12 security force tasks, 4-12 rules of engagement (ROE), 316, 6-2, 6-4, 7-7

S
S-1/S-1 section (personnel officer/section), 1-8, 1-9, 114 S-2/S-2 section (intelligence officer/section), 1-8, 1-9, 114, 9-18 S-3/S-3 section (operations officer/section), 1-8, 1-9, 114, 3-24, 9-18 S-4/S-4 section (logistics officer/section), 1-8, 1-9, 114, 4-15 S-6/S-6 section (signal officer/section), 1-8, 1-9, 114 screen. see also security operations, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3 air-ground integration, 4-5 command and control (C2), 4-6 critical tasks, 4-4 depth, 4-3 displacement, 4-4, 4-7 fire planning, 4-6 in area security, 4-9 in convoy security, 4-13 initial screen, 4-5 mobility, countermobility, survivability, 4-6 movement, 4-5, 4-8 moving screen, 4-7 planning, 4-3, 4-4, 4-7 sectors, 4-5 stationary screen, 4-4 surveillance and acquisition assets, 4-6 sustainment, 4-6 security force, 2-7, 2-11, 2-15, 5-3, 5-5, 5-8, 5-9, 6-3, 6-4, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-12, 7-13 security operations, 1-3, 1-5, 16, 2-5, 2-9, 3-14, 4-1, 5-1, 61, 6-3, 10-10 area security, 1-4, 4-1, 4-2, 4-9 convoy security, 4-10, 4-13

P
passage of lines, 3-11, 3-20, 52, 9-5 personnel, 2-3 planning, 2-3 preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), 4-15 priority intelligence requirements (PIR), 1-5, 314, 3-19 psychological operations (PSYOP), 9-3

Q
quick reaction force (QRF), 210, 4-10, 4-15

R
reconnaissance handover, 313, 3-22 example, 3-24 execution, 3-23 planning, 3-23 reconnaissance operations, 12, 1-3, 2-5, 2-6, 3-1, 3-2, 3-4, 3-5, 3-8, 3-11, 3-14, 3-18, 41, 4-9, 7-6 area reconnaissance, 1-3, 3-16 aviation support, 9-14 fundamentals, 3-2 in route security, 4-12

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FM 3-20.96

Index-3

Index cover, 4-1, 4-9 engagement criteria, 2-10 forms of security, 4-2 fundamentals, 4-2 guard, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-9 local security, 1-4, 4-1, 4-2 planning, 4-3 route security, 4-10, 4-11 screen, 1-4, 4-1, 4-2, 4-3 situational awareness (SA), 13, 2-1, 3-5, 9-10 situational understanding (SU), 3-2, 3-5, 5-1, 10-1 society, 2-7, 2-9, 3-3, 3-14, 315, 3-16 stability operations, x, 1-3, 2-7, 2-10, 2-17, 2-18, 3-4, 5-7, 71, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8, 7-15 staff, 2-3 standing operating procedure (SOP), 10-8 force health protection (FHP), 9-22 reconnaissance operations, 3-3 Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), ix, 1-1, 3-7, 9-3, 102 reconnaissance squadron, 1-9 reconnaissance squadron capabilities, 1-10 reconnaissance squadron limitations, 1-10 suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), 3-8, 9-9 surveillance troop, 1-9, 1-11, 37, 9-16 surveillance. see also reconnaissance operations, 4-1, 4-5, 4-12 sustainment, x, 1-7, 1-9, 1-11, 1-14, 2-4, 2-13, 2-14, 2-16, 2-17, 2-18, 2-20, 2-21, 3-11, 3-14, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 5-2, 8-2, 9-2, 9-4, 9-14, 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10, 10-11, 10-12, 10-13, 10-15, 10-16, 10-17, 10-18, 10-19, 10-20, 10-21, 10-25, 10-26, 10-27 terrain. see also mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), 2-9, 3-16 time, 1-5 toxic industrial materiel (TIM). see also chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN), 9-22 trains. see also supply/resupply operations, 9-18

U
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), x, 1-5, 1-10, 1-11, 21, 3-24, 4-4, 4-5, 4-7, 4-10, 4-12, 9-17

T
tactical command post (TAC CP), 3-23, 4-6 tactical road march, 4-5 targeting, 1-6, 3-14, 3-24, 7-15, 9-10, 9-11, 9-19 close air support (CAS), 9-9 targeting meetings, 9-11 targeting process, 9-10 targeting squadron staff, 914 task, 1-5 tempo, 2-5, 2-6, 2-7, 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 3-4, 3-15, 5-7, 5-11, 96, 9-16 in offensive operations, 5-7, 5-11 in reconnaissance operations, 2-5, 2-7, 3-4, 3-15 in security operations, 2-10, 4-4 security planning, 2-9

W
warfighting functions, 2-1 water (Class I supply). see also supply/resupply operations, 9-22 weather. see also mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), 4-5, 9-9

Z
zone reconnaissance, 3-6, 315, 3-16, 3-17, 4-3, 4-5, 5-3, 5-6, 5-7 critical tasks, 3-15 definition, 3-15 in area security, 4-9

Index-4

FM 3-20.96

12 March 2010

FM 3-20.96
12 March 2010

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.


General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

1005005

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115891 requirements for FM 3-20.96.

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PIN: 080700-000