You are on page 1of 25



Int. J. Intercultural Rel. Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 753±777, 1999 # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0147-1767/99 $ - see front matter

PII: S0147-1767(99)00019-X

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this study was to examine schema theory and its application to intercultural communication, especially to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. Eight primary types of schemas for social interactions were extracted, and these schemas' functions for processing information were investigated. Furthermore, fundamental functional structures of schemas were analyzed when the theory was applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation, and eleven axioms were formulated in the following domains: the development of schemas, internal organization of schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions, and schema modi®cation and change. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Communication between people from di€erent cultures has been investigated in various research areas: for example, (a) the study of psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments such as culture shock (Adler, 1987; Bhatt & Fairchild, 1984; Bock, 1970; Bochner, 1982; Cleveland, Mangone & Adams, 1960; Furnham & Bochner, 1986; Oberg, 1960), U-curve and W-curve (Church, 1982; Gullahorn & Gullahorn, 1963; Klineberg & Hull, 1979; Lysgaard, 1955; Torbiorn, È 1982), and uncertainty reduction (Berger, 1992; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Gudykunst, 1983a,b, 1988; Sudweeks, Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey & Nishida, 1990); (b) cross-cultural adjustment or adaptation (Berry, 1975; Brislin, 1981; Furnham, 1988, 1992; Kim & Ruben, 1992; Nishida, 1992; Spiro, 1955; Taft, 1966; Ward & Kennedy, 1996), and immigrants' acculturation (Brower, 1980; Kim, 1978, 1982, 1987;
I want to thank Vernon Jensen, Dan Landis, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Hiroko Nishida, Faculty of International Relations, University of Shizuoka, 52-1 Yada, Shizuoka-shi, Shizuoka-ken, Japan 4228526.



H. Nishida

Padilla, 1980; Yum, 1982); (c) intercultural communication competence (Chen & Starosta, 1996; Dinges, 1983; Hammer, Nishida & Wiseman, 1996; Littlejohn & Jabusch, 1982; McCroskey, 1984; Nishida, 1985; Wiseman & Koester, 1993; Wiseman, Hammer & Nishida, 1989); (d) values and value orientations (Caudill & Scarr, 1962; European Value Systems Study Group, 1982; Hofstede, 1984, 1991; Kluckhohn, 1951; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Nishida, 1979; Rokeach, 1973); and (e) verbal and nonverbal interactions (Barnlund, 1975; Burgoon, 1985; Giles, 1978; Giles & Johnson, 1981; Giles, Mulac, Bradac & Johnson, 1987; Hall, 1959; Mehrabian, 1972; Morris, Collett, Marsh & Oshaughnessy, 1979; O'Keefe & Delia, 1985; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). Although we have gained considerable knowledge through these studies, there are few intercultural communication theories underlining them. Without some form of theorizing, research in intercultural communication will not take on speci®c foci or directions. As Berger (1991) notes, ``It is not enough for researchers to demonstrate that they can use certain methodological tools, even when they are used to study current, highly visible social issues. It is the capacity to sustain theoretically driven, programmatic research that produces signi®cant insights about communication phenomena in the long run'' (p. 110). In this paper, schema theory is examined in order to explicate the phenomena of intercultural communication, especially of cross-cultural adaptation. The following questions will be discussed: (a) What are schemas? and (b) what axioms can be generated when schema theory is applied to cross-cultural adaptation?

It is said that when a person enters a familiar situation, a stock of knowledge of appropriate behavior and an appropriate role he/she should play in the situation is retrieved. In other words, every interactant's social world is usually constituted within a framework of familiar and pre-acquainted knowledge about various situations. This familiar and pre-acquainted knowledge is called schemas (or schemata). The concept of schemas is not new, but existed even in the 19th century: German philosopher Immanuel Kant developed the idea that each person's experiences are gathered together in memory, forming higher order concepts (Kant, 1963). And we can ®nd the concept early in the 20th century, too: Piaget's work in the 1920s investigated schemas in infants, and Bartlett's research in the 1930s tested memory for schemas (Matlin, 1989, p. 223). Furthermore, in the last 25 years, the concept of

details from workshops 1. Matlin. Moreover. or actions'' (p. a schema is: F F F a cognitive structure that consists in part of a representation of some de®ned stimulus domain. Moreover. Hudson found that the children's memories of details were better for the workshop immediately preceding the test trial. events. Mandler. Kiss & Le Voi. The schema provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli. Rumelhart. among others): Cohen et al. some general knowledge of relationships between activities during the workshop (i. for example. clearly demonstrated how schemas are stored in long-term memory and how they are used in the real world. 1977. children tended to repair them in schematically correct order. explain schemas as ``packets of information stored in memory representing general knowledge about objects. but once the schema was formed. 28). When four workshops had been attended. 1984. that is.e. However. These studies demonstrate that even young children's knowledge is organized schematically. In short. researchers have obtained massive evidence that shows that people's behaviors are deeply related to what they store in their brain. 1989. Hudson (1990). are generalized collections of knowledge of past experiences which are organized into related knowledge groups and are used to guide our behaviors in familiar situations. (1993) for example. Contrasting preschool children's memories of a speci®c event. Hudson and Nelson (1983) found that even young children could repair not-quite-consistent stories with their schematic knowledge of their world. 2. 91) Schemas. 1975.. situations. then. the children tended to recall the entire sequence of events during the workshop better than when only one workshop had been attended. Schank & Abelson. Taylor & Crocker. Markus. The schema contains general knowledge about that domain. a not-quite-right story about a birthday party). During the period from the late 1970s to the middle of the 1990s. in Taylor and Crocker's words (1981). memory of speci®c details declined. attending one session of a creative movement workshop. a ``workshop'' schema) was built up. if only one workshop had been attended rather than four workshops. with repeated encounters of the workshop.g. and 3 were wrongly remembered as having occurred during workshop 4. (p. When misordered acts were reported (e. Thorndyke. with their memories of repeated workshop sessions. 1993.. including speci®cation of the relationships among its attributes. 1984. 1977. which include plans for interpreting and gathering schema-related information.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 755 schemas has been used and de®ned by quite a number of scholars (Cohen. 1981. 1980. children's schemas in memory are simi- . as well as speci®c examples or instances of the stimulus domain F F F .

typical roles (customer and waiter). 1984. As we encounter more of these similar situations or as we talk more often about the information. which involves getting a menu. As the schemas become more abstract. 1982. & Nelson. 1977. 1994. When schemas become tightly organized. Thus. was named by Schank and Abelson (1977). developmental di€erences between them have been found (Crain. these schemas come to characterize the behavior of the members of the culture. Bower. They described the restaurant script which contains a theme (eating in a restaurant). Cantor. An existing literature indicates the formation of schemas for social interactions as follows (Abelson. Oates. 1979. schemas are generated and stored in our brain.756 H. Types of Schemas Schemas for social interactions are classi®ed into several types. and compact. our communication becomes much easier through such thus-re®ned schemas. Taylor & Crocker. Hudson & Nelson. Turner. 1981. and so on). Nishida lar both structurally and functionally to the schematic representations of adults. 1981. (b) self schemas which contain knowledge about themselves. for example. 1984. 1994): When we interact with the members of the same culture in certain situations for a number of times. 1994). the information the schemas contain becomes more usable. Barsalow & Sewell. They start to be accessed and used as ecient units of information among the members of the culture. Schank & Abelson.1 Schemas for Social Interactions Schemas for social interactions are cognitive structures which contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in social environment. Minsky. (d) event schemas or scripts2 which are information about the appropriate sequence of events in common 1 Although children's schemas in memory are similar to those of adults. Karmilo€Smith. reading a menu. 1988. Das Gupta. Taylor and Crocker (1981). Furthermore. Fivush. Black & Turner. Mandler. 2 ``Script''. 1981. . abstract. Mandler. 1983. Hudson & Shapiro. or talk about certain information with them for a number of times. 1992. and compact. 1991. people develop schemas by their direct experience and also by talking about schema-related information. point out the following ®ve schemas: (a) person schemas which contain knowledge about di€erent types of people. and a sequence of scenes and actions within scenes (ordering. Mischel & Schwartz. Chi. organized. entry conditions (hungry customer). 1992. (c) role schemas which represent knowledge about social roles. 1985. which includes their personality traits. the schemas become more organized. a kind of schema. Hudson. 1977.

Fact-and-concept schemas are pieces of general information about facts such as ``Tokyo is the capital of Japan''. Rosch & Mervis. a seat. and it can be acquired only after content knowledge thoroughly develops. Following Taylor and Crocker's classi®cation.'' or ``easy-going'' (i. and strategic knowledge is similar to Taylor and Crocker's content-free schemas. and concepts such as ``Bicycles are those vehicles that have two wheels. Chi's classi®cation overlaps with Taylor and Crocker's and Turner's: Chi's procedural knowledge is similar to Taylor and Crocker's event schemas or scripts and to Turner's procedural schemas. and strategic.'' ``shy.e. Chi.e. 1995. Augoustinos and Walker (1995) claim that person. Hampton. 1982.'' ``Taro is shy. and handlebars'' (Barsalow & Sewell. for example. event schemas or scripts.. it is situationally independent). their situationally-dependent functions). Cantor & . and strategic schemas are similar to their ®fth type.. (b) contextual schemas which contain information about the situation or appropriate setting of behavioral parameters. Chi further explains that the strategic knowledge is information about strategies used in various domains (i. Person schemas contain knowledge about di€erent types of people. Turner (1994) found the following three schemas play important roles when ``a schema-based reasoner'' (i. ``John is neurotic.. AI) solves problems: (a) procedural schemas which contain information about steps to take or hierarchical plans. declarative. 1975).A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 757 situations. Chi names procedural and declarative knowledge ``content knowledge'' which is characterized by domain speci®c functions (e.e. which includes their personality traits. 2. role and event schemas are primary types of social interaction schemas. and (c) strategic schemas which contain knowledge about problem-solving strategies. 1985. content-free schemas. Procedural schemas in Turner's classi®cation are similar to Taylor and Crocker's fourth type of schema. Chi (1981) classi®ed knowledge into the following three types: procedural. and declarative knowledge is our knowledge about facts and concepts. we tend to classify people in terms of their dominant personality traits (Augoustinos & Walker.'' or ``Mary is easy-going. Here again. through experiments on arti®cial intelligence (AI).. person schemas). self. and (e) content-free schemas which are information about a processing rule. Through the above examination of schemas and other related literature.g. According to Chi. procedural knowledge is about procedural information in situations. 1981.'' Since we have some representation of what it is to be ``neurotic. the following schemas can be extracted as primary types for generating human behavior for social interactions: 1. Meanwhile. Furthermore. and to Turner's strategic schemas.

especially in the areas of gender and racial stereotypes (Taylor. 1987. Taylor & Crocker.. pp.758 H. how they see themselves and how others see them). the information contained in context schemas includes predictions about appropriate actions to take in order to achieve goals in the context (i. 45). self schemas are components of the self-concept which are central to identity and self-de®nition (Markus. Research on ascribed roles have been proli®c. 1979. Mischel. 22) argues that procedure schemas are distinct systems and are derived from past planning or past action sequences that worked. Context schemas contain information about the situation and appropriate setting of behavioral parameters. 5. They include speci®c steps to take and behavioral rules for the events. (b) the intermediate level of ingroup±outgroup categorizations that de®ne one as a member of certain social groups and not others (e. that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual's social experiences'' (p.. These refer to achieved and ascribed roles (Augoustinos & Walker. for example. 1977. Thus. 1987. 1981). Lamb & Abelson. the common features shared with other members of the human species in contrast to other forms of life. Schank & Abelson. p. 1981). 1992. 64). 1977. 1977. Markus.'' and ``female''). Nishida 3. 1979. 1977. 6. Bernstein & Siladi. in terms of one's personality or other kinds of individual di€erences). Crane. Markus (1977). Turner (1994. 1978.e.. ``American. Self schemas contain people's knowledge about themselves (i. 37±39). In some instances person schemas are linked to stereotypes or prejudice (Andersen & Klatzky. Lalljee. The application of the procedure schemas causes people to take some actions (Bower et al. 1981). Taylor & Crocker. derived from past experience.e. According to Turner (1994. (c) the subordinate level of personal categorizations that de®ne one as a speci®c individual person (e. 1981).. Etco€ & Ruderman. p.e. Ruble & Stangor. and suggestions for reasonable problem-solving strategies (i.g. 1995. Markus & Wurf. Procedure schemas are knowledge about the appropriate sequence of events in common situations. According to Turner (1987. Pichert & Anderson. to activate strategy schemas).. 4. 1980. Role schemas are knowledge about social roles which denote sets of behaviors that are expected of people in particular social positions. or from ``experience'' embodied in societal or other conventions (Turner calls procedure schemas procedural sche- . 1986). 1982).g.. Shaw & Pittenger. Fiske. there are at least three levels of self-categorization (self schemas) important in the self-concept: (a) the superordinate level of the self as a human being. Taylor & Crocker. Taylor & Crocker. describes self schemas as ``cognitive generalizations about the self. to activate procedure schemas). and.

7. For example. 1991. Shaver.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 759 mas. 1991. For example.e. one factor impacting the choice of strategy is the person's expertise. However. knowing the rules and traditions of baseball is not the same as being able to play baseball. Evans. Fischer (1991) also argues that a€ect and evaluation may be accessed via their associative links to other schemas. then. or fear and anxiety in the presence of a dentist.. p. and therefore they should be included: 8. Tulving (1985) and ZolaMorgan and Squire (1990) also insist that distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge (i. 1992). There is some evidence that in humans. Schwartz. the information is instead recorded with strategies useful for coping with them (Turner. and then cluster-analyzed the obtained data. 47). asked subjects to classify 135 a€ective words and to describe typical emotional states. 1994). Kirson. is the experience level of the person with respect to the kind of problem under consideration. they found that emotions are schematically stored in long-term memory. Lazarus. 1981. doctors who are experts in a given type of problem tend to use a strategy called predictive reasoning. just as any other schemas (Manstead. Another factor that should be included is problem-solving constraints that are context-independent. Through the analysis. One factor to associate with strategy schemas. Rather than redundantly storing strategy schemas about these constraints with each context schema they a€ect. Other studies also indicate that emotion schemas are socially constructed concepts. . which is basically the same as hypothetico-deductive reasoning. a constraint on time may be seen in many di€erent contexts. for example. according to Patel. I will call it procedure schemas to emphasize the contrast with other social-interaction schemas). knowing what versus knowing how) is important since. and therefore we may experience automatic negative arousal at the sight of a prototypical politician. and O'Conor (1987). These schemas are constructed in social interactions throughout one's life. and Chawla (1987). Taylor & Crocker. Parkinson & Manstead. These studies suggest that emotion schemas play important roles in human social interactions. 1981. Turner. Strategy schemas are knowledge about problem-solving strategies (Chi. Emotion schemas contain information about a€ect and evaluation stored in long-term memory which is accessed when other schemas are activated. but less-experienced clinicians. tend to use another strategy. for example. 1994. or those solving a problem outside their area of expertise. including an emergency situation in a hospital or a situation of being late for an appointment. Recently there has been increasing interest in the a€ective dimension in schema research.

and (e) the application of the procedure schema causes the one to take some actions such as asking questions of the other interactant. which further causes him/her to specify the current context more clearly. the procedure schema is retrieved for taking speci®c actions. strategy. For example. (c) when a goal is selected.e. on the other hand. In the above discussion. (d) the context schema. how do these schemas actually function when people interact with each other? Through experiments on AI. if one sees ¯ames coming out of a house. Anderson (1983). however. self. (b) when an appropriate context schema. According to Anderson. the context schema looks for a strategy usually useful in situations of this sort. procedural memory stores production rules and is therefore concerned with actions. Each of the production rules speci®es the exact condition in which an action should take place. suggests a procedure schema with which to achieve the goal using the selected strategy schema (i. Procedural memory. which represents similar interaction situations is found. he/she tries to recognize whether he/she knows the situation by retrieving one or more context schemas from memory that may represent the current situation. and the asterisk indicates that this version is a modi®cation of the original ACT model).760 H. Turner explained only the functions and relations among context. This is because the relations between these three and the other schemas have not been thoroughly investigated. This indicates that procedural memory in Anderson's de®nition contains the functions of context schemas which were described in our classi®cation. and procedure schemas. the schema speci®es steps to take. the context schema subsequently suggests a goal to pursue (through an attention-focusing function of the context schema). The more speci®c the current context schema. then. pp. demonstrated relationships between declarative and procedural memory using a computer model called ACT* (which stands for Adaptive Control of Thought. the schema further ®nds appropriate strategy and procedure schemas to apply to the new context. that is. the behavior of AI called MEDIC): (a) When one is in a speci®c situation. corresponds to procedure schemas. Declarative memory in Anderson's study corresponds to fact-and-concept.. Turner (1994. hierarchical plans or behavioral rules. Nishida I will call these eight schemas ``primary social interaction schemas (PSI schemas)'' hereafter. this is . the better the chance that more speci®c strategy and procedure schemas will be suggested. When the more speci®c context schema is applied. How Do Schemas Function? Then. person. in other words. to ®nd a context schema that is more speci®c for the situation. 15±22) suggests a process to generate ``behavior'' (in his study. and role schemas in our classi®cation.

g. they use a relatively small set of components (Newell. 6) Furthermore. 71±90). 1989). In other words. During the operation of the ACT* system.e.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 761 the condition for the person to take the action of shouting ``Fire. The concept of a short-term store which serves simply as a temporary repository of information has been replaced with that of an active working memory system with a functional role in a wide range of cognitive tasks (Cohen et al. Thus..g. the production rule would deposit ``a goal of buying milk'' into working memory). if activated. ``If your goal is to buy F F F'').. pp.. (p.. . (b) retrieval processes which access information in declarative memory and place it in working memory. it has fairly obvious implications for the study of mind. the situation is ®rst recognized and then appropriate action is taken. Working memory is a complex multi-component system.'' The general notion is that behavior is a response to a current situation. we come to understand how information stored in schemas is transformed into behavioral action. and (e) performance processes which transform commands temporarily stored in working memory into behavioral action (e.'' this will match one of the production rules. since these computer models aimed at the construction of comprehensive models of cognition in order to produce rather general theoretical orientations having wide applicability. 1993. matching) process which compares all the data active in working memory with the condition parts of all the production rules stored in procedural memory (e. if working memory contains ``your goal is to buy milk. (d) the action process which deposits the structures produced by the matched production rules into working memory (e. and therefore 3 One of the important features in the ACT* system is working memory. (c) a recognition (i..g. and it is foolhardy to devise theories of human cognition without considering the computational implementation of the theory. and then the context schema looks for a procedure schema to take an appropriate action. the following processes take place: (a) encoding processes which lay down information about the current state of the external world in working memory3. Sanford (1985) has described the appropriate relationship between computer programs of cognition and human cognition: Although the design of F F F programs and the study of the principles behind intelligent programs is a study in its own right. It is dicult to write programs which mimic essentially human activities without at the same time studying how humans do things. a question may be raised as to whether or not AI can simulate human cognitive functioning. ``go to the shop'' would be executed as such a behavioral action). This is similar to Turner's (1994) fundamental assumption which is that a context schema is ®rst activated when a problem is presented. through experiments on AI. However.

1988. and voluntary workers may be classi®ed as sojourners since they di€er from immigrants and refugees in two aspects: (a) Their motives are more speci®c and goal-oriented. prolonged ®rst-hand contact with a new and unfamiliar culture'' (Kim. 1982. assimilation is a uni-directional process toward the dominant host culture. cross-cultural adaptation can be viewed as transformation of one's own PSI schemas toward those of the host culture and as acquisition of new schemas in the host culture environment. therefore. WHAT AXIOMS CAN BE GENERATED WHEN SCHEMA THEORY IS APPLIED TO CROSS-CULTURAL ADAPTATION? The De®nition of Concepts The term ``adaptation'' has been used along with other similar terms such as ``acculturation'' (Kim. acculturation is a dynamic process that may involve either groups or individuals in direct contact situations between cultures. is used here to refer to the complex process through which an individual acquires an increasing level of communication skills of the host culture and of relational development with host nationals. 37±38). diplomats. however. The term cross-cultural adaptation. pp. and (b) their length of stay in a new culture is shorter than immigrants and refu- . Furthermore. refers to ``the process of change over time that takes place within individuals who have completed their primary socialization process in one culture and then come into continuous. business people. students. and voluntary workers. 1980. business people. 1974). foreign workers. 1964. internal change. however. 1965). diplomats. Among these. Spiro. acculturation is potentially a bi-directional process and does not require changes in values within the acculturating group. It is. foreign workers. Besides the de®nition of adaptation. The changes that take place can occur in one or both cultural groups and changes in values may be involved. Snyder. A number of di€erent groups of people may be subject to cross-cultural adaptation: immigrants. 1976. or acceptance by the outside group or culture. they claim that acculturation does not require a change in the reference group. According to Teske and Nelson (1974).762 H. refugees. Johnston. 1955) and ``assimilation'' (Gordon. Thus. expected that future studies on AI will provide us with comprehensive understanding of relationships among various types of schemas. On the contrary. Adaptation. Padilla. and requires value changes within the assimilating group (Teske & Nelson. In other words. Nishida relationships among various types of schemas have not been thoroughly examined yet. students. we must specify who adapt to a new (di€erent and unfamiliar) environment.

Mandler. or teleological relationships. Barsalow & Sewell. Bailey (1970). research on schema development implies: . correlational. Therefore. He maintains that axioms may describe causal. Sojourners usually spend six months to ®ve years at a new culture while intending to return to their home countries (Furnham. or teleological relationships. Hudson & Shapiro. 1982. schemas are generated and stored in their long-term memory. it should be stated that the goal of theory is to provide an explanation of the phenomenon being studied. p. Bower et al. The more they engage in similar situations or exchange similar information. they articulate the basic assumptions of the theory. the more organized. and to formulate axioms in this research domain. it is the purpose of this section to apply schema theory to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. Once axioms are formulated. In this paper. As individuals behave in ways that arm these schemas. Thus. 1981.. axioms will express causal..A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 763 gees (Furnham. 1981. 1983. The Development of Schemas When people interact with members of the same culture in certain situations or they talk about certain information for a number of times. Before going further. and schema modi®cation and change. 43). and compact the schemas become. they are also indirectly supported by theorems that are susceptible to empirical veri®cation (theorems are not presented here). 1994). Hudson & Nelson.. Schank & Abelson. Chi. argues that assuming axiomatic theories must express causal relationships will result in either distorted theories or the absence of theories about noncausal relationships. 1977. the schemas are strengthened as others respond accordingly in a cyclical fashion (Abelson. internal organization of schemas. Fivush et al. 1979. 43). Although axioms are not directly testable. abstract. 1985. axioms are propositions that involve variables that are taken to be directly linked causally. 1988. 1981. schema-driven versus data-driven functions. schema theory is applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation in the following functional domains of schemas: the development of schemas. Turner. 1977. 1991. 1984. however. Minsky. 1969). axioms are commonly associated with covering laws theory and causal relationships. Taylor & Crocker. 1988. following Bailey. p. and therefore some theoretical statements (axioms and theorems) can be generated. In this paper. Thus. While their validity is assumed. axioms should therefore be statements that imply direct causal links among variables. theorems are deduced from the axioms (Blalock. According to Blalock (1969). Cantor et al. 1984. correlational.

For example. These in turn organize more speci®c schemas that can achieve increasingly more speci®c goals. This suggests the following axioms: Axiom 2: Sojourners' failure to recognize the actions and behaviors which are relevant to meaningful interactions in the host culture are mainly due to their lack of the PSI schemas of the culture. the intermediate level that de®nes one as a member .764 H. 45) claims that self schemas have at least three levels such as superordinate level of the self as a human being. the more likely the schema will be stored in the person's memory. Cantor & Mischel. Vesonder. and they were also likely to recall the events in the correct order. the performance of people who have well-organized schemas is linked to their ability to perceive and think in terms of meaningful chunks. In other words. Nishida Axiom 1: The more often a person repeats a schema-based behavior. A baseball text was then presented to them. is to guide the encoding of information into meaningful chunks. p. One of the characteristics of schemas. human behavior in a speci®c situation can be subdivided into such schemas as context. and they wrote down as much as they could recall from the passage. strategy and procedure. Axiom 3: Internal Organization of Schemas According to schema theory. according to Chase and Ericsson (1982). 1979). those with less knowledge about baseball were more likely to recall details that were peripheral to the game. Chiesi and Voss (1979) is an excellent demonstration. role. A study by Spilich. The subjects in this study were divided into high. Near the top of the hierarchy are very general schemas. and these schemas are further subdivided into subschemas. In contrast. The highknowledge people recalled more statements about actions that were important to the outcome of the game. Turner (1987. as cited before. This study suggests that the background information (schemas) provides a meaningful context for the acquisition of new information. Acquisition of the PSI schemas of the host culture is a necessary condition for sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation to the culture.and low-knowledge groups on the basis of a 45-item test of baseball knowledge. 1981. For example. any given behavior can be subdivided into schemas forming a ``hierarchy'' (Brewer. Dull & Lui.

1984. 23).g. Acquisition of information about interrelationships among the PSI schemas of the host culture is a necessary condition for sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. when the communication-with-family schema (a context schema) is selected. if people are in¯uenced by the nature of the information itself. and emotion schemas (the PSI schemas) are interrelated each other. self. 23). Forgas. a selection of a speci®c strategy schema) causes changes in all the other parts and ®nally in the total system (i. in behavior).. forming a network of schemas. Axiom 5: Schema-Driven versus Data-Driven Functions One of the most important assumptions of schema theory is that schemas are built up through many encounters with similar events or information. These are referred to as top-down or schema-driven processes. 1988. role. a change in a particular part (e. Moreover. p. the more likely schematic processing was to be activated. when a person retrieves a schema from his/her memory. whereas . Forgas (1985) found that the more culturally salient and consensual the stimulus.. knowledge that might not otherwise have been retrieved may be retrieved as part of a chunk (Turner. in behavior). procedure. when every part of the system is related to every other part. A change in one schema causes changes in all the other schemas and ®nally in the total system (i. Once a schema is developed.e. Fiske & Neuberg.e. Through research on person prototypes (person schemas). Thus. Research on the internal organization of schemas suggests the following axioms: Axiom 4: Fact-and-concept. 1990. the most appropriate role. activation of schemas spreads from one schema to related schemas. to generate behavior. person. On the contrary. An additional bene®t is that. that is. information tends to be processed through the schema. context. strategy. Fiske & Taylor. strategy and procedure schemas are activated. 1994.. These are referred to as bottom-up or data driven processes (Brewer. it has a chunk of related knowledge about the current problem.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 765 of certain social groups. and the subordinate level that de®nes one as a speci®c individual person. Retrieving information from memory involves working through various levels of the network of schemas. 1985). eliminating the need to search for each piece of that knowledge separately (Turner. 1994. For example. their schemas are not applied. p.

Fiske and Neuberg (1990) emphasize that most person impressions are initially schema-based.. however. they insist that humans tend to use schema-driven processing more often than data-driven processing. argue that people have a tendency to reorganize what they have heard or seen to ®t with their schema-based expectations. whereas data-driven processing is used when the data are less clear and are of considerable importance to the person. Axiom 7: If one has well-organized schemas. Regarding data-driven and schema-driven processing. Bower et al. Fiske & Taylor. 1979. . whereas ambiguous information will either direct a search for the relevant data to complete the stimulus more fully. individuating piecemeal processings. then information about the person is processed in a piecemeal fashion. What is important here is that data-driven processing is individuating and piecemeal processing. Nishida information with low cultural salience was more likely to be data-driven.. ambiguous information directs a search for the relevant data to complete the stimulus more fully (i. communication moves from relatively shallow. or it can be ®lled in with ``default options'' or ``best guesses'' of the schema which is activated (i. however. This is because schema-based processing consumes less time and e€ort than data-based processing (Fiske & Neuberg.e. (1979). one is motivated to pay detailed attention to the target person. non-intimate levels to deeper. that is. and therefore requires attention and e€ort. 1990). Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) ®nding may provide us with an answer: schema-based processing is used when the data are unambiguous and relatively unimportant to the person..e. The following axioms are suggested in this domain of research: Axiom 6: People use both schema-driven and data-driven processing to perceive new information. indicate that ambiguous information can either be data-driven or schema-driven. depending on the situation and their motivations. or it will be ®lled in with default options of the schemas. If.766 H. schematically salient information is more likely to be processed through the schemas. whereas schema-based processing is e€ortless and sometimes unconscious. that is. schema-driven). This aspect is also suggested by Taylor and Altman (1987). however. 1984). data-driven). more personal ones. Other ®ndings (Bower et al. that is. They insist that as relationships develop.

258). through the attention-focusing function of their context schemas (Turner. This self-regulation is related to ``homeostasis'' which means the self-righting adjustments of schemas in order to prevent a rapid disintegration of their parts when they are subjected to stress (Cannon. Tuning refers to slight adjustments in schemas that are made on a temporary basis to meet a transient problem. an American who is visiting Australia would tune his/her schema for the wolf or the rabbit familiar to North Americans in order to understand a Tasmanian wolf or a rabbit bandicoot. so that they may change or elaborate their internal structures (i. These aspects have been explained by Rumelhart and Norman (1978) as tuning. a self schema plays an important role. His/her perception and memory of these animals would depend on simply ®ne-tuning pre-existing schemas. One important aspect in this line of reasoning is that data-driven processing is linked to self-schemas. 53. As Fiske and Neuberg (1990) claim. For example. pre-existing schemas which are their native-culture schemas) as a condition of survival. However.. pp. 1968. This implies: Axiom 9: When information is data-driven.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 767 Axiom 8: Sojourners who lack the PSI schemas of the host culture are more likely to employ data-driven processing which requires e€ort and attention. Accretion refers to a gradual and permanent modi®cation of a . p. and when he/she is motivated to pay detailed attention to the target person.e. Schema Modi®cation and Change In schema theory. and procedure schemas. 57). When people encounter unfamiliar situations in the host culture where they lack appropriate schemas. The schemas metaphorically stretch and shape themselves for a moment to accommodate to the novel situation. but also to selfdirection to a changing environment. trying to provide integration of information using their native-culture schemas. people are subject not only to self-regulation or homeostasis. What they usually do is that they selectively direct their attention. strategy. data-driven processing is used when the data are of considerable importance to the person. In other words. accretion and restructuring. and this further changes role. they are subject to stress because of the disintegration of context and other related schemas. This is an example of homeostasis or self-regulation. 1994. schemas regulate themselves. an environmental change elicits a change in a context schema.

this paper will analyze intercultural communication studies which have been intensively studied by Gudykunst and his colleagues (Gudykunst. According to Rumelhart and Norman (1978). Nishida schema. they try to resolve ambiguities and to establish integration of information using pre-existing schemas (their native-culture schemas) by gradually modifying them. restructuring is an abrupt and massive change in existing schemas. Finally. 1984. it registers the results. sojourners' initial experiences are manifested as cognitive uncertainty and anxiety because of their lack of the PSI schemas of the culture. Yang. 1986. event. The last case includes formal education in which teachers try to impose schemas. Axiom 11: Implications Implications of this study will be drawn when other studies are examined from the perspective described here. In the stage of self-regulation. they actively try to reorganize their native-culture schemas or to generate new schemas in order to adapt to the host culture environment. As an example. or through active e€orts to reorganize what one knows. 1991. In the host culture. restructuring may come about spontaneously after enough exposure to discrepant experiences.g. In the stage of self-direction. 1988. 1993. Through these studies. Slowly. . A good example of this process is the situation in which sojourners who have stayed in the host culture for a prolonged period of time (e. through conscious re¯ection on one's experience. sojourners experience the stages of self-regulation and self-direction.. & Nishida. 1983a. more than ®ve years) cannot distinguish their native culture schemas from those acquired in the host culture because of their prolonged exposure to the host environment. 1989. 38). 1985).b. the following axioms are included: Axiom 10: In the host culture. The underlying theoretical propositions of his claim come from uncertainty reduction theory developed by Berger and his colleagues (Berger. 1979. Thus. or situation. the shape and complexity of the schema modify itself to the requirements of the environment. Gudykunst. Gudykunst & Nishida.768 H. Gudykunst (1993) claims that ``e€ective [intercultural] communication is moderated by our ability to mindfully manage our anxiety and reduce our uncertainty about ourselves and the people with whom we are communicating'' (p. on the other hand. Each time a schema accommodates to a novel object.

176) Thus. Le Voi (1993) claims: There is an intimate relation between the theory [schema theory] and the phenomena. . Their attempts to reduce uncertainty in a novel situation involve a pattern of information-seeking (uncertainty reduction) and tension (anxiety) reduction. re®ned and sometimes rejected in the light of new ®ndings about human communication which are inconsistent with them. while consistent information may be generated at later recall. (p. however. Human communication must be accurately documented and analyzed before useful theories can be developed. and (b) interactants manage to reduce their uncertainty by gaining missing data about the stranger mainly through data-driven strategies. Primarily.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 769 1992. This indicates that the theory has two major presuppositions: (a) Interactants share the PSI schemas of their culture. they may have a strong desire to reduce uncertainty about that person. 1982. reading books about the host culture. or even the best one. 1975). Inconsistent information may be forgotten. or talking with friends who have lived in the host culture for a prolonged period of time. but can be found in the situations where they try to acquire the PSI schemas of the host culture: for example. it may not be the only possible explanation. but if one theory accurately describes several disparate facts F F F we can propose it as an explanation. attending an intercultural communication training. uncertainty reduction theory deals with interpersonal communication between people of the same culture. All these various phenomena can be conveniently summarized by a schema theory. abstracts. and because schema theory captures many di€erent facts about memory. We now know that human memory selects. (b) uncertainty and anxiety may be the resultant psychological states when strangers (both sojourners and immigrants) do not have appropriate schemas of the host culture. Of course. we follow a long tradition and claim that this theory is an explanation of those characteristics. Berger & Calabrese. integrates and normalizes information. di€ers from interpersonal communication in three aspects: (a) Interactants in intercultural communication may not share the PSI schemas of each other's cultures. Intercultural communication. and (c) information-seeking behavior of strangers is not limited to gaining data about the other interactant. Berger & Bradac. These di€erences may indicate that we must be cautious of the direct application of uncertainty reduction theory to the domain of intercultural communication because the theory does not cover strangers' information-seeking behavior about the PSI schemas of the host culture. When people interact with a stranger. the application of schema theory to sojourners' cross-cultural communication may be a necessary step for us to accurately document and analyze the phenomena.

Journal of Memory and Language. F. 58. 53. 101±113. C. Luce & E. J. 715±729. F. Sociological methodology (pp.. Cambridge. L. Toward internationalism (pp. (1985).). S. Chautauqua: why are there so few communication theories: communication theories and other curios. S. Barnlund. schema-driven versus data-driven functions. M. (1970). W. C. especially of sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. In H. (1975). San Francisco. Eight primary types of schemas. (1987). Traits and social stereotypes: levels of categorization in person perception. Contrasting the representation of scripts and categories. (1979). 235±246. P. Giles & R. When this is done. internal organization of schemas. and schema modi®cation and change. which are central to human social interactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Culture shock and the cross-cultural learning experience. Oxford: Blackwell.. I. Smith (Eds. Berger. & Walker. L. theorems must be generated and tested in the ®eld in order to verify the axioms formulated here. (1983). 122±144). the theory can be used for the design and implementation of cross-cultural studies to facilitate individuals' adaptation to the host culture environment. were investigated. M. Borgatta (Ed. Anderson. Clair (Eds. (1991). In E. Barsalow. Tokyo: Simul. Nishida CONCLUSION The purpose of this paper was to examine schema theory in order to explicate the phenomena of intercultural communication. Language and social psychology (pp. R. Beyond initial interaction: uncertainty. Social cognition: an integrated introduction.). Psychological status of the script concept. 646±665. American Psychologist. & Klatzky. 24±35). D. R. In future studies. .770 H.). Evaluating axiomatic theories. & Sewell. Augoustinos. MA: Harvard University Press. REFERENCES Abelson. when applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. R. (1987). The architecture of cognition. Berger. schema theory suggested eleven axioms in the following functional domains of schemas: the development of schemas. and these schemas' functions for processing information were examined. London: Sage. 36. 48±71). 24. K. R. St.. In L. understanding. Adler. D. D. P. (1981). R. Andersen. (1995). Public and private self in Japan and the United States. R. C. and the development of interpersonal relationships. Bailey. Cambridge. CA: Jossey-Bass. MA: Newbury (Original work published 1972). Furthermore. Communication Monographs.

Cross-cultural encounters. Brewer.). Caudill. W. T. K. (1985). (1992). & Mischel. W. (1988). N.. 55. Cognitive Psychology. (1984). pp. . A. L. Human Communication Research.). (1982). New York: Sage. J. 1. The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 1±58). Bhatt. Gudykunst & Y. Arnold. Elmsford. Cantor. B. cultural adaptation. Brislin.. (1982). 446. C. Berger. 207±228). (1962). Beverley Hills. R. New York: Academic Press. New York: Alfred A. Brower.). CA: Sage. (1968). M. J. Chicago. & Lui. B.. In T. Kim (Eds. Lonner (Eds. Self-regulation of the body. S. London: E. H. H. H. I. J. J. 5±16). Cannon. 256± 258). J. (1981). Brewer. Cultures in contact: studies in cross-cultural interaction. S. Buckley (Ed. In W. (1975). K.. Theory construction: from verbal to mathematical formulations. 45±77. Handbook of interpersonal communication. Cantor...). NY: Pergamon... Modern systems research for the behavioral scientist: a sourcebook (pp. (Eds. & Scarr. Values of convergence for Indian students in the United States. 14. In L. J. Perceptions of the elderly: stereotypes as prototypes. & Bradac.). Language and social knowledge: uncertainty in interpersonal relations. (1982). NJ: Prentice Hall. G. W.. Advances in social cognition (Vol. Black. A prototype analysis of psychological situations.E. Bochner & W. 99±112. & Schwartz.) (1970). Dull. (1969). Mischel. R. R. W. Japanese value orientations and culture change. H.. Wyer Jr. B. Oxford: Pergamon. Berger. W. 53±91. Personal Guidance Journal. Knapp & G. W. 11. J. 646±652. In S.). C. Cognitive Psychology. Readings on communicating with strangers: an approach to intercultural communication (pp. M. W. Berry. C. (1981). & Fairchild. Psychological Reports. 177±220. V. Brislin.). Berkowitz (Ed. Bower. K. In W. Chase. C. Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Bochner (Ed. R. W. 58(10). 12). B. Culture shock: a reader in modern anthropology. Scripts in memory for texts. P. J. Communicating under uncertainty. C. (1980). Y. Bower (Ed. Hillsdale. (1979).). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Nonverbal signals. 41. (1979). Ethnology. 1. L. H. A. (1982). The social psychology of cross-cultural relations. (1975). IL: Aldine. In R. Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. N. Cross-cultural perspectives on learning (pp. R. (Ed. & Ericsson. Srull & R. G. In M. & Turner.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 771 Berger. 1. & Calabrese. Ecology. In G. 656±670. H. Miller (Eds. Counseling Vietnamese. and psychological di€erentiation: traditional patterning and acculturative stress. A dual process model of impression formation.. 1±36). A. Skill and working memory. New York: Academic Press. Bochner.. H. Prototypes in person perception. NJ: Erlbaum. New York: McGraw-Hill. Blalock. Burgoon. Englewood Cli€s. Knopf. Bock. S.

P. A continuum of impression formation. 540±572. Gudykunst & Y. The overseas Americans. 19. (1993). M. Tajfel (Ed. (1986). Das Gupta. In D. (1984). R. & Taylor. Cohen. Fischer. Mangone. Fivush. Intercultural competence. In M. Images of childhood and theories of development. 1±74). 353±383). T.). T. DSWO Press. Kim (Eds. Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. (1994). Church. British Journal of Social Psychology. Handbook of intercultural training: issues in theory and design (Vol. Main European Report. 42±61). Hudson. Cross-cultural adaptation (pp. & Adams. P.). & Bochner. Reading. 3±17. & Neuberg. 199±243). London: Academic Press. 30. New York: Academic Press. M. B. 23. (1981). H. G. In W. Gudykunst (Eds. Intergroup behavior (pp.). 91. Englewood Cli€s. I. CA: Sage. (1990).. Children's long-term memory for a novel event: an exploratory study. (1988). A. S. E. G. Cleveland. The foundations of child development. H. Amsterdam. Newbury Park. A. Furnham. New York: McGraw-Hill. (1996). T. from category-based to individuating processes: In¯uences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. Memory: current issues (2nd ed. Theories of development: concepts and applications. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly... (1981). P. Furnham. B. MA: AddisonWesley. Intercultural communication competence: A synthesis. The adjustment of sojourners. Knowledge development and memory performance. G. Forgas. J. S.). In J. H. P. (1960). & Starosta. Giles (Eds. pp. European value systems study group (1982). 303±316. Oates (Ed. Kim & W. Culture shock: psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments. In Y. Y. . Giles. Landis & R. In H. Oxford: Blackwell. (1984). G. London: Routledge. (1983).). (1978). K. Linguistic di€erentiation between ethnic groups. In J. Giles. L. Di€erentiation between social groups (pp. New York: McGraw Hill. Philadelphia. 336±345). Kiss. pp. & Nelson. pp. Fiske. 361±393). A. & Le Voi..). S. (1982). Sojourner adjustment. W.. (1992). S.. New York: Pergamon Press.. Emotion scripts: a study of the social and cognitive facets of emotions. A. H.).. Fiske. NJ: Prentice-Hall. 221±229). CA: Sage. P. In M. T.772 H. O'Conner (Eds. 24. Oxford: Blackwell. Friedman. Brislin (Eds. Furnham. S. N. P. G. Chi. The role of language in ethnic group relations. Y. C. Dinges.). Intelligence and learning (pp. 176± 202). (1991). New York: Plenum Press. A.. W.. Psychological Bulletin. Social cognition. Person prototypes and cultural salience: the role of cognitive and cultural factors in impression formation. Readings on communicating with strangers (pp.. & Johnson. H. Nishida Chen. J. Communication yearbook (Vol. The adjustment of sojourners. Crain. Das & N. Turner & H. Thousand Oaks. PA: Open University Press. J.). J. (1992). Zanna (Ed. (1985). J.

London: McGraw-Hill. Gudykunst. & Nishida. 10. W. McLaughlin (Ed. B. J. W. J. New York: Oxford University Press. and dating relationships in Japan.. W. (1964). Bradac. Newbury Park. T. T. (1996). Assimilation in American life. CA: Sage. The in¯uence of situational prototypes on dimensions of intercultural communication competence. In M. Gudykunst. (1986). Newbury Park. In R. Newbury Park. Communication Monographs. (1990). Fivush & J. P. Koester (Eds.). Gullahorn. friends. CA: Sage. Gudykunst (Eds. Korea. Theories in intercultural communication. Gudykunst. G.. 9. A. (1984). A.. (1993). J. Intercultural communication competence (pp.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 773 Giles. Communication Quarterly. E. 166±196). Asante & W. W. Hofstede. A. Knowing and remembering in young children (pp. S. H. Uncertainty and anxiety. Uncertainty reduction and predictability of behavior in low. 51. 49±65. G. T. A. J. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. Garden City. J. 525±549. CA: Sage.). The silent language.. Bridging di€erences: e€ective intergroup communication. 13± 48). CA: Sage.. R. M. (1983b). M.and high-context cultures. Speech accommodation. B.. 27(3). (1991). In Y. (1989). Newbury Park. (1988). Nishida. E. (1959). XLIX. & Wiseman.). Beverly Hills. Hammer. In R.. Hall. 236±251. M. Handbook of international and intercultural communication (pp. Kim & W. The emergence of autobiographical memory in motherchild conversation. W. Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. T. B. . (1982). 149±156. & Nishida. 23±36. NY: Anchor Books. B. Theoretical perspectives for studying intercultural communication. 12. W. B. T.. Y. (1991). B. Gudykunst (Eds. R. L. Memory & Cognition. Gudykunst.. Individual and cultural in¯uences on uncertainty reduction. An investigation of the nature of abstract concepts. & Nishida. An extension of the U-curve hypothesis. 33±47. 11. W. W. Human Communication Research. Gordon. T. CA: Sage. Culture's consequences: international di€erences in work-related values. Communication yearbook (Vol. Hudson (Eds. New York: Cambridge University Press. CA: Sage. (1984). 19(3).. Wiseman & J. (1985). Gudykunst. and the United States.). 267±282.highcontext cultures. Newbury Park. (1987). 33±71). The Southern Speech Communication Journal. B. Gudykunst. Hofstede. Hampton.). Toward a theory of e€ective interpersonal and intergroup communication: an anxiety/uncertainty management (AUM) perspective. Yang. Similarities and di€erences in perceptions of initial intracultural and intercultural encounters.. A cross-cultural test of uncertainty reduction theory: comparisons of acquaintances. Human Communication Research. (1983a). B. In M. & Johnson. 17±46). & Gullahorn. Mulac. Gudykunst. J. W. Hudson. Journal of Social Issues. Attributional con®dence in low. 407±455. (1963). & Nishida. B. 31. pp. Gudykunst. Gudykunst. B. L. H.

Kim. F. Y. Western Australia: Paterson Brokensha.. D. Nishida Hudson. Hewstone (Eds. (1982). Newbury Park. Philadelphia. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. Chichester: Wiley. J.. Hillsdale. 19. Kim. Communication and cross-cultural adaptation. Communication and acculturation. Stroebe & M. I. Evanston. R. Kim. Lysgaard. (1992). Intercultural transformation. 819±834. Mandler. Y. R. (1955). Facilitating immigrant adaptation: the role of communication and interpersonal ties. I.) (N. O. Trans. 388± 433). C. American Psychologist. (1965). Communication competence: model and application. W. Johnston. (1988). S. Variations in value orientations. In W. Belmont. Journal of Applied Communication Research. B. F. Lazarus.).774 H. & Strodtbeck. M.. Kim (Eds. Le Voi. and personal narratives. PA: Open University Press. Lamb. London: Macmillan. Y. (Original work published 1787). Kiss & M. Peterson. (1991). J. (1993). Karmilo€-Smith. & Jabusch. New York: Macmillan. R. 7(1). E€ect of script structure on children's story recall. In A. 359±368). (1984). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion. Gudykunst & Y. Memory: current issues (2nd ed. 192±211). (1987). Values and value orientations in the theory of action. New York: McGraw-Hill. M. CA: Wadsworth. Kim. & Abelson. Lalljee. Intercultural communication: a reader (3rd ed.). G. scripts. In T. CA: Sage. (1982). (1978). Y. Kim. Overview. A. Developmental Psychology. pp. 625±635. Y. Littlejohn. R. From knowing to telling: the development of children's scripts. A communication approach to acculturation processes: Korean immigrants in Chicago. S. Developing narrative structure (pp. (1983). In G. & Nelson. Kant.). K.. Adjustment in a foreign society: Norwegian Fulbright grantees visiting the United States. MA: MIT Press. P. Toward a general theory of action (pp. Peterson (Eds.. (1963). L. Kluckhohn. R. Klineberg. Y. (1951). A. 197±224.). & Shapiro. Cambridge. Communicating social support: process in context (pp. W. Immigrant assimilation. Albrecht & M.). S. Readings on communicating with strangers: an approach to intercultural communication. Y. In L. (1979). Cambridge. Y. In T. A. (1991). International Journal of Intercultural Relations. 89±136). International Social Science Bulletin. Cohen. B. Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science. At a foreign university: an international study of adaptation and coping. K. 46. (1992). & Ruben. Parsons & E. Y. 3. Porter (Eds. 29±37. M. C. Le Voi (Eds.). M. NJ: Erlbaum. European review of social psychology (vol.. Smith. Critique of pure reason (2nd ed. Hillsdale. F. stories. .. Y. The role of event prototypes in categorization and explanation. 2(2). Kluckhohn. Hudson. and scenes: aspects of schema theory. Shilds (Eds. pp.. 153±182). 10(1). A.).). (1992). IL: Row. E. & Hull. A. R. J. Stories. Y. MA: Harvard University Press. Adelman (Eds.. (1961). McCabe & C. Samovar & R.). NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. L. In W. V. 45± 51. Perth.

Thinking: readings in cognitive science (pp.. Collett. B. The self in social psychology. H. (1989). N. (1982). C. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. & Delia. (1992). Bernstein. communication and social psychology (pp. H. St. D.. & Oshaughnessy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Frame-system theory. H. 35. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.. (1985). Padilla. Cambridge. Communication competence: the elusive construct. J. Chicago: Aldine. Morris. Practical Anthropology. Acculturation: theory. In P.). G.. London: Lawrence Erlbaum. (1984). J. M. Minneapolis. Johnson-Laird & P. Evans. A. L.). A. & Siladi. A. Crane. 38±50. Cultural shock: adjustment to new cultural environments. Matlin. Oberg. Wegner & R. Gestures: their origins and distribution.S.. K. 7. Bostrom (Ed.) (1994). P. Patel. P. M.. S. The foundation of child development. In H. Rinehart and Winston. Chicago: Holt. Variations in Value Orientations and Cultural Change in Japan and the USA: An Intercultural Perspective. Beverly Hills. (1987). Competence in communication (pp. Appraisal as a cause of emotion. Oxford: Blackwell. Manstead. In D. (1980). 42. D. A. How to build a baby: on the development of an accessible representational system. J. Minsky. Annual Review of Psychology. Wason (Eds. R. 63±78. (1979). B. Washington DC: Westview. Japanese intercultural communication competence and cross-cultural adjustment. McCroskey. Gokai no kouzou: America-jin to hataraku toki no chishiki to gijutu no reporto [The structure of misunderstanding: A report on knowledge and skills for working with Americans in the U. (1987). Uni®ed theories of cognition. Cognition and emotion.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 775 Mandler. Psychological and interactional dimensions of communicative development. 9. Marsh. Nishida. 353±362.). R.. 113±136. Markus. Vallacher (Eds. M. (1960). In R. Newell. Cambridge. A. (Ed. M. 299±337. models and some new ®ndings. University of Minnesota. H. Parkinson. (1979). A. 38. CA: Sage.A]. 41±85). N. Markus. (1988). Giles & R.. H. Review of Personality and Social Psychology. M.) (1980). Cognitive Development. S.. 355±376).. Markus. H. Markus. A. MA: Harvard University Press. E. J. H. R. S.). Cognition. L. The dynamic self-concept: a social psychological perspective. UK: Cambridge University Press. Recent advances in language. (1977). V. (1992). Nonverbal communication. Tokyo: Diamond-sha. (1991). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 13. Self-schemas and gender. Oates. Nishida. Mehrabian. M. New York: Oxford University Press. M. J. (Ed. Emotion in social life. Predictive versus diagnostic reasoning in the application of biomedical knowledge. 3. & Manstead.. O'Keefe. (1972). (1989). (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. 122±149. Clair (Eds. 5. Proceedings of the . W. 177±182. Nishida. & Chawla. E. (1985). London: Jonathan Cape. M. 259±268). & Wurf. 247±269. The self in thought and memory.

52. H. 7.. 275±290. Spilich..). Hillsdale. Ruble. Shaw & J. London: Tavistock. J. B. Cotton & R. H. 14. CA: Sage. B. Z. A. Rumelhart. & Crocker. (1986). In M. & Altman. Brewer (Eds. 33±58). Bruce & W.). & Voss. (1975). Taking di€erent perspectives on a story.). Spiro. Vesonder.. In D. Chiesi. J. P.776 H. F. E. The acculturation of American ethnic groups. (1981). Text processing of domain-related information for individuals with high and low domain knowledge. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (1976). R. W. M. A. Developmental themes in Japanese-North American relationships. Shaw. Rosch. Family resemblances: studies in the internal structure of categories. Communication in interpersonal relationships: social penetration theory. goals and understanding: an inquiry to human knowledge structures. (1977). S. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. G. C. R. Shaver. Schematic bases of social information processing. & Pittenger. T. 1061±1086. 221±233. Rolo€ & G. Emotion knowledge: further exploration of a prototype approach. Neighborhood gatekeepers in the process of urban adaptation: cross-ethnic commonalities. Cognitive Psychology. D. (1978). 573±605. E. (1987). 4. C. New York: Free Press. tuning. Sanford. (1973). C. G. and restructuring: three models of learning. (1985). 69. (1977). 1240±1252. D. Hillsdale. & Abelson. 103±132). NJ: Erlbaum. Hillsdale. J. Bransford (Eds. Taylor. Taft. Nishida Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Miller (Eds. Representation and understanding: studies in cognitive science (pp. W. 207±233. Pichert. Ting-Toomey. Rumelhart. (1975). Cognition and cognitive psychology. P. 37±53). Perceiving. (1990). & Norman. P. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Interpersonal processes: new directions in communication research (pp. Schwartz. Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. Kirson. 309±315. plans. C. 35±52. Notes on a schema for stories. Stalking the elusive schema: insights from developmental and social-psychological analyses of gender schemas. The nature of human values. In J. (1980). J. (1966). C. 227±261. Gudykunst.. G.. & Anderson.. Perceiving the face of change in changing faces: implications for a theory of object perception. From stranger to citizen. R.. (1987). E. J.. Urban Anthropology. 57. J. R.. Hillsdale. & Mervis.. In E. & Stangor. Washington. Rumelhart. E. Collins (Eds. F. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. R. American Anthropologist. Spiro. M. Newbury Park. Zanna (Eds. C.. Snyder. A. Taylor. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior. J. P.. (1955). S. S. Klatzky (Eds.). Script. Accretion. E.. In R. Journal of Educational Psychology. P. 257± 277). Sudweeks. J. Rokeach. & O'Conor. acting and knowing: toward an ecological psychology (pp. R. N. Bobrow & A. T. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. L. Social Cognition. Herman & M. (1979). D. D. D. In R. W. 5(1). E.. D. Schank.. Social cogni- . T.). D. (1977). Seattle. Theoretical issues in reading comprehension (pp. B. New York: Academic Press. E.. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. & Nishida. 18. 211±236).. C. I.). Semantic factors in cognition (pp. Higgins.

13. Freeman. 351±367. R. I. Pragmatics of human communication. Tulving. (1994). O. Intercultural communication competence. Wiseman. 154± 169. Teske. Anderson & S. 8(2). & Nelson. & Jackson. Rediscovering the social group. M. L. L. Newbury Park. Beavin. Bhawuk (Eds.. W. & Nishida. (1989). & Squire.. E. (1990). P. & Koester. Diamond (Ed. R. & Kennedy. S. New Delhi. (1974). pp. & Ruderman.. R. R.. 349±370. H. Applications of schema theory in cognitive research. Acculturation and assimilation: a clari®cation. Crossing cultures: the relationship between psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of cross-cultural adjustment. Ward. R. (1982).. (1996). L. Zola-Morgan. Turner. Sinha & D. In A. Taylor.. D. J. Neurophysiological investigations of memory and amnesia: ®ndings from humans and nonhuman primates. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. S.. India: Sage. H. Hammer. Torbiorn. (1993). R. 778±793. (1984). 167±192). Yum. E. O. H. Fiske. A.). 1. .. (1985). R. Pandey.). Oxford. Predictors of intercultural communication competence. Hillsdale. Asian contributions to crosscultural psychology. Thorndyke. J. D. H. R. C.). L. Hillsdale. J. In J. Human Communication Research. In J. J. (1982). (1967). NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Categorical and contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. American Anthropologist. 385±398.. San Francisco: W. N. C. S. C. Watzlawick.A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 777 tion: the Ontario symposium (Vol. (1987). New York: Norton. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.. Turner. 434±456). UK: Basil Blackwell. Wiseman. P. Kosslyn (Eds. Living abroad: personal adjustment and personnel policy in È the overseas setting. 89±134). 1. International Journal of Intercultural Relations. (1978). CA: Sage. J. Etco€. S. Tutorials in learning and memory (pp. 40. H. How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist. B. A. M. The development and neural bases of higher cognitive functions (pp. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 36. A. Communication patterns and information acquisition among Korean immigrants in Hawaii. Adaptive reasoning for real-world problems: a schemabased approach.