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Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 10 June 1985
*This publication supersedes FM 5-15, 27 June 1972 and TB 5-15-1, 16 July 1969.
P R E F A C E
he purpose of this manual is to integrate survivability into the overall AirLand battle structure. Survivability doctrine addresses when,
where, and how fighting and protective battlefield positions are prepared
for individual soldiers, troop units, vehicles, weapons, and equipment. This
manual implements survivability tactics for all branches of the combined
Battlefield survival critically depends on the quality of protection afforded
by the positions. The full spectrum of survivability encompasses planning
and locating position sites, designing adequate overhead cover, analyzing
terrain conditions and construction materials, selecting excavation
methods, and countering the effects of direct and indirect fire weapons.
This manual is intended for engineer commanders, noncommissioned
officers, and staff officers who support and advise the combined arms team,
as well as combat arms commanders and staff officers who establish
priorities, allocate resources, and integrate combat engineer support.
The proponent of this publication is the US Army Engineer School. Submit
changes for improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended
Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it directly to
Commandant, US Army Engineer School, ATTN: ATZA-TD-P, Fort
Belvoir, VA 22060-5291.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is
used, both men and women are included.
SURVIVABILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD
THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD
The purpose of military operations in the next battle is to win. To achieve success, our forces
must gain the initiative, deploy in depth, and stress agility and synchronization of activities and
functions. Such an approach will prevent the enemy from freely maneuvering forces in depth to
reinforce an attack, build up a defense, or counterattack. In the next fast-paced battle, our forces
must protect themselves as never before from a wide range of highly technical weapons systems.
Thus, in both the offense and defense, we will have to be ever-conscious of the enemy's ability to
detect, engage, and destroy us. Careful planning and diligent work will enhance our ability to
Survivability doctrine addresses five major points significant to the AirLand battlefield:
1. Maneuver units have primary responsibility to develop, position, and begin building their own
2. The engineer's ultimate role in survivability is set by the maneuver commander controlling
3. Based on those resources, engineer support will supplement units as determined by the
supported commander's priorities.
4. Engineer support will concentrate on missions requiring unique engineer skills or equipment.
5. Survivability measures begin with using all available concealment and natural cover, followed
by simple digging and constructing fighting and protective positions. As time and the tactical
situation permit, these positions are improved.
The following AirLand battle conditions will shape our protection and survivability efforts:
The need to win at the forward line of our own troops (FLOT), conduct deep battle
operations, and overcome threats in the rear area.
The use of effective firepower and decisive maneuver.
The existence of a nonlinear battlefield resulting from dissolution of battle lines and areas
due to maneuvering, and rapid dispersion from areas of nuclear and chemical weapons
Coordinated air/ground operations involving frequent movement by friendly troops.
Proliferation of nuclear and chemical tactical weaponry.
Active reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition efforts through visual, remote
sensing radar, and tactical radio direction finding procedures.
Reliance on electronic warfare as a combat multiplier.
During the next battle, US forces are likely to encounter or work with nations of widely diverse
political systems, economic capabilities, cultures, and armies. Whether the battle is with Warsaw
Pact or Third World countries, US forces will be exposed to Soviet-style weaponry and tactics.
The following outline of Threat tactics and battle priorities provides a key to understanding
survivability requirements for US forces. (See Field Manuals (FMs) 100-2-1, 100-2-2, and 1002-3 for more detailed information.)
DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS
The opposing Threat is an offensively-oriented force that uses massive amounts of firepower to
enhance the maneuverability, mobility, agility, and shock of its weaponry. It seeks to identify
and exploit weak points from the front to the rear of enemy formations. The tank is the Threat's
primary ground combat weapon, supplemented by armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other
armored fighting vehicles. Large mechanized formations are used to attack in echelons, with
large amounts of supporting suppressive direct and indirect fire. To achieve surprise, Threat
forces train to operate in all types of terrain and during inclement weather. Threat force
commanders train for three types of offensive action: the attack against a defending enemy, the
meeting engagement, and the pursuit.
The Attack Against a Defending Enemy
Threat forces concentrate their attack at a weak point in the enemy's defensive formation. Threat
doctrine emphasizes three basic forms of maneuver when attacking a defending force:
envelopment, frontal attack, and flank attack. Penetration of enemy defenses is the ultimate
objective in all three operations. The Threat force uses echeloned forces in this effort, and their
goal is to fight through to the enemy rear and pursue retreating forces.
Threat attacks of strongly-defended positions will usually have a heavy air and artillery
preparation. As this preparation is lifted and shifted to the depths of the enemy, advance guard
units conduct operations to test the strength of the remaining defenders. Critical targets are
reduced by artillery or by ground attacks conducted by advancing armor-heavy main forces.
These forces attack from the march unless they are forced to deploy into attack formations by
either the defending force or terrain conditions. The Threat seeks to overwhelm its enemy by
simultaneously attacking as many weak points as possible. If weak points cannot be found, the
Threat deploys into concentrated attack formations, usually organized into two echelons and a
small reserve. These formations are initially dispersed to limit nuclear destruction, but are
concentrated enough to meet offensive norms for attack. The Threat attacks defensive positions
in a column formation and continues the attack into depths of the defense. Threat regimental
artillery directly supports battalions, companies, and platoons for the duration of the engagement.
United States Forces
United States defending forces conduct extensive survivability operations during an enemy
attack. Preliminary activities include deliberate position construction and hardening for both
weapons and command and supply positions. Alternate and supplementary positions are also
located and prepared if time allows. Finally, covered routes between these positions are selected,
and camouflage of all structures is accomplished.
The Meeting Engagement
The meeting engagement is the type of offensive action most preferred by Threat forces. It relies
on a standard battle drill executed from the march using combined arms forces and attached
artillery support. Threat doctrine stresses rapid maneuver of forces and attacking while its enemy
is on the march--not when it is in a prepared defense. Attacking a defending enemy requires
superiority of forces--a requirement the Threat seeks to avoid.
The meeting engagement begins as the Threat advance guard of a combined arms force makes
contact with the enemy advancing force. As soon as contact is made, the Threat battle drill
begins. When possible, the main Threat force maneuvers its advance guard to a flank and attacks.
This preliminary maneuver is supported by a barrage from the Threat force organic artillery
which has deployed at the first sign of contact. The Threat force then makes a quick flank or
frontal attack on enemy forces as they advance support their engaged advancing forces.
Upon withdrawal from contact and as the enemy force reacts to the flank attack, the Threat
reconnaissance force continues its advance. This tactic then relies on the elements of surprise and
shock for success. The Threat seeks to disable the enemy force along the depth of the enemy's
United States Forces
When US forces are involved in a meeting engagement, survivability operations are needed, but
not as much as in the deliberate defense. Hastily prepared fighting and protective positions are
essential but will often be prepared without engineer assistance or equipment. Maneuver units
must also use natural terrain for fighting and protective positions.
The pursuit of retreating forces by a Threat advancing force takes place as leading echelons
bypass strongpoints and heavy engagements and allow following echelons to take up the fight.
After any penetration is achieved, Threat doctrine calls for an aggressive pursuit and drive into
the enemy rear area. This often leaves encircled and bypassed units for follow-on echelon forces
United States Forces
Survivability in retrograde operations or during pursuit by the Threat force presents a significant
challenge to the survivability planner. During retrograde operations, protective positions--both
within the delay and fallback locations--are required for the delaying force. Company-size delay
and fall back fighting and protective positions are most often prepared. Planning and preparing
the positions requires knowledge of withdrawal routes and sequence.
INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS
Threat commanders want to achieve precise levels of destruction through implementation of the
rolling barrage, concentrated fire, or a combination of the two. Combined with tactical air strikes
and fires from direct fire weapons, these destruction levels are•
Harassment with 10 percent loss of personnel and equipment; organizational structure is
Neutralization with 25 to 30 percent destruction of personnel and equipment;
effectiveness is seriously limited.
Total destruction with 50 percent or more destruction of personnel and equipment.
The Threat can plan for the total destruction of a strongpoint by delivering up to 200 rounds of
artillery, or 320 rounds from their medium rocket launcher, per 100 meter square. Thus, the
Threat force attacks with a full complement of direct and indirect fire weapons when targets of
opportunity arise or when the tactical situation permits.
United States Forces
To survive against this tremendous indirect fire threat, US forces must counter the physical
effects of indirect fire, such as fragmentation and blast. Protection from these effects creates a
large demand for engineer equipment, materials, and personnel. Careful consideration of the time
and construction materials available for the desired level of survivability is necessary. Therefore,
priorities of construction are necessary. Covered dismounted firing positions and shelters
adjacent to large weapons emplacements are constructed by maneuver units, usually without
engineer assistance. The maneuver commander must prioritize the construction of overhead
cover for command, control, and supply positions.
Threat plans and operations for their nuclear systems are ranked in the following order:
Destroy US nuclear delivery systems, nuclear weapons stocks, and the associated
command and control apparatus.
Destroy US main force groupings.
Breach US main lines of defense.
Establish attack corridors within US battlefield boundaries.
Threat nuclear targeting plans are based on the use of massive amounts of supporting
conventional direct and indirect fire. These massive artillery barrages enable the use of Threat
nuclear weapons systems against targets which conventional weapons cannot destroy or disable.
United States Forces
Due to the multiple effects of a nuclear detonation, survivability operations against nuclear
weapons are difficult. Thermal, blast, and radiation effects require separate consideration when
designing protection. However, fortifications effective against modern conventional weapons
will vary in effectiveness against nuclear weapons.
Often, Threat forces may use massive surprise chemical strikes in conjunction with nuclear and
conventional attacks. These chemical strikes are aimed at destroying opposing force offensive
capability, as well as disrupting logistics and contaminating all vulnerable rear area targets.
United States Forces
United States (US) forces must plan to fight, as well as survive, on a chemical contaminated
battlefield. Open or partially open emplacements afford no protection from chemical or
biological attack. Personnel in open emplacements or nonprotected vehicles must use proper
chemical protective clothing and masks to avoid chemical vapors and biological aerosols.
Threat doctrine dictates that the attack must advance to the enemy rear area as quickly as
possible. To supplement this main attack, the Threat may deploy its airborne, airmobile, or light
forces to fight in the enemy rear until relieved by advancing forces. In most cases, smaller
airborne/airmobile forces (battalion or regimental sizes) are deployed to strike targets in the
enemy rear which are critical to the success of Threat forces. Additionally, covert reconnaissance
missions or sabotage and harassment missions are accomplished by small Threat teams deployed
in the rear. All of the Threat forces involved in a deep attack are trained and equipped to operate
in contaminated environments.
Threat organization in the deep attack normally consists of the airborne/airmobile battalion for
missions involving a long-range strike group. Operational maneuver groups will also conduct
deep attacks using armor heavy forces. Organization for covert reconnaissance is normally a
platoon-or company-size reconnaissance element.
United States Forces
When attacks on rear areas are made by Threat force aircraft, or by covert or overt
airborne/airmobile forces, rear area activities are susceptible to many of the weapons
encountered in the forward area. Thus, survivability of these rear area activities depends on
adequate protective construction before the attack. Technical Manual (TM) 5-855-1 describes
permanent protective construction in detail.
ROLE OF US FORCES
Commanders of all units must know their requirements for protection. They must also
understand the principles of fighting positions and protective positions, as well as the level of
protection needed, given limited engineer assistance. Survivability measures are subdivided into
two main categories: fighting positions for protection of personnel and equipment
directly involved in combat; and protective positions for protection of personnel and
equipment not directly involved with fighting the enemy. In order to protect their troops in the
combat zone, commanders or leaders must fully understand the importance of fighting positions,
both in the offense and in the defense. The initial responsibility for position preparation belongs
with the maneuver commander's own troops. Even within the fluid nature of the AirLand battle,
every effort to fortify positions is made to ensure greater protection and survivability.
The engineer's contribution to battlefield success is in the five mission areas of mobility,
countermobility, survivability, general engineering, and topographic engineering. Although units
are required to develop their own covered and/or concealed positions for individual and
dismounted crew-served weapons, available engineer support will assist in performing major
survivability tasks beyond the unit's capabilities. While the engineer effort concentrates on
developing those facilities to which the equipment is best suited, the engineer also assists
supported units to develop other survivability measures within their capabilities. Before the
battle begins, training as a combined arms team allows engineers to assist other team members in
developing the survivability plan.
Survivability on the modern battlefield, then, depends on progressive development of fighting
and protective positions. That is, the field survivability planner must recognize that physical
protection begins with the judicious use of available terrain. It is then enhanced through the
continual improvement of that terrain.
In the Offense
In the offense of the AirLand battle, fighting and protective position development is minimal for
tactical vehicles and weapons systems. The emphasis is on mobility of the force. Protective
positions for artillery, air defense, and logistics positions are required in the offense and defense,
although more so in the defense. Also, command and control facilities require protection to
lessen their vulnerability. During halts in the advance, units should develop as many protective
positions as possible for antitank weapons, indirect fire weapons, and critical supplies. For
example, expedient earth excavations or parapets are located to make the best use of existing
terrain. During the early planning stages, the terrain analysis teams at division, corps, and theater
levels can provide information on soil conditions, vegetative concealment, and terrain masking
along the routes of march. Each position design should include camouflage from the start, with
deception techniques developed as the situation and time permit.
In the Defense
Defensive missions demand the greatest survivability and protective construction effort.
Activities in the defense include constructing protective positions for command and control
artillery, air defense, and critical equipment and supplies. They also include preparing individual
and crew-served weapons positions and defilade fighting positions for fighting vehicles.
Meanwhile, countermobility operations will compete with these survivability activities for
engineer assistance. Here again, maneuver commanders must instruct their crews to prepare
initial positions without engineer help. As countermobility activities are completed, engineers
will help improve those survivability positions.
Two key factors in defensive position fighting development are: proper siting in relation to the
surrounding terrain, and proper siting for the most effective employment of key weapons systems
such as antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), crew-served weapons, and tanks. Critical elements
for protective positions are command and control facilities, supply, and ammunition areas since
these will be targeted first by the Threat. The degree of protection for these facilities is
determined by the probability of acquisition,and not simply by the general threat. Facilities
emitting a strong electromagnetic signal, or substantial thermal and visual signature, require full
protection against the Threat. Electronic countermeasures and deception activities are mandatory
and an integral part of all activities in the defense.
COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE
The survivability requirements for the following units are shown collectively in the table on
Light infantry units include rifle, airborne, air assault, and ranger units. They are ideally suited
for close-in fighting against a force which has equal mobility or a mobility advantage which is
degraded or offset. Difficult terrain, obstacles, and/or weather can degrade a mobility advantage.
Surprise or stealth can offset a mobility advantage. In restricted terrain such as cities, forests, or
mountains, light infantry units are also a challenge to enemy armor forces.
Due to the lack of substantial armor protection, light infantry units may require extensive
fighting positions for individual and crew-served weapons, antitank weapons, and vehicles.
Command and control facilities require protective positions. The defense requires fortified
positions when terrain use is critical and when covered routes are required between positions.
Light forces readily use local materials to develop fighting positions and bunkers rapidly.
Priorities are quickly established for position development-first to antitank and crew-served
weapon positions, and then to command and control facilities and vital logistics positions.
Artillery positions must have hardening improvements soon after emplacement is complete. In
air assault units, aircraft protection is given high priority. Aircraft is dispersed and parapets or
walls are constructed when possible.
Mechanized infantry operations in both the offense and the defense are characterized by rapid
location changes and changes from fighting mounted to fighting dismounted. Mechanized
infantry units normally fight integrated with tanks, primarily to destroy enemy infantry and
antitank defenses. When forced to fight dismounted, such units need support by fire from
weapons on board their APCs or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). When the terrain is not
suitable for tracked vehicles or visibility is severely restricted, mechanized infantry may have to
fight dismounted without the support of APCs or IFVs. When mounted, mechanized forces rely
heavily on terrain positioning for fighting positions. Fighting positions increase survivability
when the situation and time permit construction.
The tank is the primary offensive weapon in mounted warfare. Its firepower, protection from
enemy fire, and speed create the shock effect necessary to disrupt the enemy's operations. Tanks
destroy enemy armored vehicles and suppress enemy infantry and ATGMs. Armor and infantry
form the nucleus of the combined arms team and both complement and reinforce each other.
Infantry assists the advance of tanks in difficult terrain, while armor provides protection in open
terrain, thus providing flexibility during combined arms maneuver.
Armor units rely on terrain positioning to decrease vulnerability. When possible, these terrain
fighting positions are reinforced (deepened) by excavation. Protective positions for thin-skinned
and lightly-armored support vehicles, as well as command posts and critical supplies, require
significant hardening. Armor units enhance protection by constructing alternate and
supplementary positions and defining routes between them.
Armored and Air Cavalry
Armored cavalry units need minimal fighting and protective positions. They rely almost totally
on effective use of maneuver and terrain to reduce the acquisition threat. Air cavalry units,
performing the same reconnaissance and security missions as ground armored cavalry, require
somewhat more protective construction. Protective revetments and/or parapets are required at
forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and, in some cases, at forward assembly areas.
These activities are always time consuming and supplement the basic survivability enhancement
techniques of dispersion and camouflage.
Army aviation units, in addition to air cavalry units, consist of attack helicopter and combat
support aviation forces. Attack helicopter units are aerial maneuver units which provide highly
maneuverable antiarmor firepower. They are ideally suited for employment in situations where
rapid reaction time is important, or where terrain restricts ground forces.
Combat support aviation units give dismounted infantry and ground antitank units tactical
mobility. This enables them to move rapidly to the enemy's flanks or rear, or to reposition
rapidly in the defense. Combat support aviation units can quickly move towed field artillery units
and other lighter combined arms team elements as the commander dictates. They also provide
critical supplies to forward areas in the defense and attacking formations when groundlines of
communications have been interdicted.
Protection for Army aviation units is employed with full consideration to time constraints,
logistical constraints, and the tactical situation. The primary means for aircraft protection on the
ground is a combination of terrain masking, cover and concealment, effective camouflage, and
dispersion. When possible, protective parapets and revetments are built. Aircraft logistics
facilities, including FARPs and maintenance facilities, require additional protective construction.
The FARPs require some protection of supplies and ordnance through the use of protective
parapets and bunkers. They also require fighting positions for occupants of the points.
Field artillery is the main fire support element in battlefield fire and maneuver. Field artillery is
capable of suppressing enemy direct fire forces, attacking enemy artillery and mortars,
suppressing enemy air defenses, and delivering scatterable mines to isolate and interdict enemy
forces or protect friendly operations. It integrates all means of fire support available to the
commander and is often as mobile as any maneuver force it supports. Fighting and protective
position use is one of several alternatives the field artillery leader must evaluate. This alternate
may be alone or in combination with other survivability operations, such as frequent moves and
Counterfire from enemy artillery is the most frequent threat to artillery units. Dug-in positions
and/or parapet positions, as well as existing terrain and facilities, can provide protection. Threat
acquisition and targeting activities are heavily used against artillery and are supplemented by
some covert Threat deep ground attacks. Thus, personnel and equipment need some direct fire
protection. Fire direction centers and battery operation centers should be protected with hardened
bunkers or positions to defeat counterfire designed to eliminate artillery control.
In urban areas, existing structures offer considerable protection. Preparation for these is minimal
compared to the level of protection. The use of self-propelled and towed equipment for
positioning and hardening efforts enhance survivability. Some self-propelled units have
significant inherent protection and maneuverability which allow more flexibility in protective
Combat engineers contribute to the combined arms team by performing the missions of mobility,
countermobility, survivability, topographic operations, general engineering, and fight as infantry.
Mobility missions include breaching enemy minefield and obstacles, route improvement and
construction, and water-crossing operations. Countermobility missions include the
enhancement of fire through obstacle and minefield employment. Survivability missions
enhance the total survivability of the force through fighting and protective position construction.
Topographic operations engineering missions include detailed terrain analysis, terrain
overlays, trafficability studies, evaluation of cover and concealment, soils maps, and other
information to base mobility, countermobility, and survivability decisions. General
engineering missions support theater armies with both vertical and horizontal construction
Combat engineer fighting and protective position requirements depend on the type and location
of the mission being performed in support of the combined arms team. Personnel and equipment
protective positions are used when project sites are located within an area that the Threat can
acquire. Engineers have limited inherent protection in vehicles and equipment and will require
fighting positions, protective command and control, and critical supply bunkers when under an
enemy attack. When time is available and when the mission permits, revetments and parapets can
protect construction equipment. Generally, engineers use the same methods of protection used to
protect the maneuver force they are supporting.
When engineers fight as infantry, they employ protective measures similar to those
required by light or mechanized infantry forces.
Air Defense Artillery
Air defense units provide security from enemy air attack by destroying or driving off enemy
aircraft and helicopters. Their fire degrades the effectiveness of enemy strike and reconnaissance
aircraft by forcing the enemy to evade friendly air defense. Short-range air defense systems
normally provide forward air defense protection for maneuver units whether the units are
attacking, delaying, withdrawing, or repositioning in the defense. Air defense units also provide
security for critical facilities and installations.
The main technique for air defense artillery (ADA) survivability is frequent movement. Because
their main mission is to protect divisional and corps assets, ADA units are a high-priority target
for suppression or attack by enemy artillery and tactical aircraft. Signature acquisition
equipment, smoke, dust, contrails associated with firing, and siting requirements allow them to
conduct their mission. Available terrain is generally used for cover and concealment since little
time is available for deliberate protective construction. Dummy positions are constructed
whenever possible, since they may draw significant enemy artillery fire and aircraft attack.
The ADA equipment used is usually protected by parapets, revetments, or dug-in positions
similar to infantry and armor/tracked vehicle positions as long as fields of fire for the systems are
maintained. Deliberate protective construction is always done when systems are employed to
defend fixed installations, command posts, or logistics systems.
Unit Support Systems
Several types of combat support equipment and their positions are considered unit support
systems. These systems include communications and power generation equipment, field trains,
forward supply points, decontamination sites, and water points. Protection for each of these
positions depends greatly on their battlefield location and on the mission's complexity. Protective
measures for both equipment and organic and supported personnel are normally provided. Initial
positioning of these systems takes full advantage of terrain masking, cover and concealment, and
terrain use to enhance camouflage activities.
Major Logistics Systems and Rear Areas
Major logistics systems and rear area operations include rear area supply depots; petroleum, oils,
and lubricants (POL) tank/bladder farms; rear area/depot level maintenance activities; and so on.
Survivability planners are most concerned with denial of acquisition and targeting of these
positions by the Threat. A combination of camouflage and deception activities is usually used to
conceal major logistics system activities.
Actual survivability measures used to protect large activities depend on the type of threat
anticipated and target analysis. The obvious threat to large facilities is conventional or
nuclear/chemical artillery, or missile or air attack. These facilities need physical protection and
built-in hardening. A less obvious threat is covert activities begun after a Threat insertion of
deep-strike ground forces. Measures to counter this type of threat include some fighting and
protective positions designed to defeat a ground force or direct fire threat.
THE PLANNING PROCESS
This section outlines the information needed and the decision-making process required for
executing survivability missions. Increased engineer requirements on the AirLand battlefield will
limit engineer resources supporting survivability. Mobility, countermobility, survivability (MCM-S), and general engineering requirements are in competition for the same engineer assets.
Survivability requirements are compared with the tactical need and the need for mobility and
countermobility operations. The maneuver commander sets the priorities which allow the force
to perform critical tasks. The successful force must have enough flexibility to recognize and
make immediate necessary changes on the battlefield.
Both the commander and staff are involved in the military decision-making process. It provides
courses of action for the commander and, by selecting the best course, enhances survivability.
The staff input in the decision-making process for planning survivability missions includes:
Military intelligence (enemy activity, terrain, weather, and weapon types).
Operations (tactical maneuver, fire support, and engineer support).
Administration/logistics (personnel and combat services support activities).
Civil affairs (civilians possibly affected by military operations).
The engineer prepares or assists in the preparation of survivability estimates and plans to support
the survivability efforts of the entire unit. In organizations without a staff engineer, the
operations officer performs the analysis and formulates survivability plans. The following
sequence is used to develop survivability support options and plans.
Mission and commander's guidance are received.
Time available is considered.
Threat situation and Threat direct and indirect assets are analyzed.
Friendly situation and survivability support resources are evaluated.
Survivability data, including terrain analysis results, is evaluated.
Possible courses of action are developed.
The Survivability portion of the engineer estimate is prepared.
Courses of action constraints are compared with actual engineer resources available.
Plans are prepared, orders are issued, and staff supervision is conducted.
The survivability planning process is completed when the survivability estimates and plans are
combined with those for mobility, countermobility, and general engineering. The maneuver
commander then has a basis for deciding task priorities and allocating support.
INFORMATION ON METT-T
Information on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, and troops (METT-T) is compiled.
Subordinate commanders/leaders must understand the maneuver commander's mission and
guidance. The commander/ leader must know what survivability tasks are necessary and how
they interface with mobility, countermobility, and other tasks necessary for completing the
mission. In addition, the commander/leader implementing survivability tasks must know if any
additional support is available.
The maneuver commander and engineer must fully understand the threat to the force. Weapon
types, probable number of weapons and rounds, and types of attack to expect are critical in
survivability planning. When these factors are known, appropriate fighting and protective
positions are designed and constructed.
Terrain and Weather
One of the most important sources of information the maneuver commander and supporting
engineer receive is a detailed terrain analysis of the area. This analysis is provided by the
division terrain team (DTT) or corps terrain team (CTT). It includes the types of terrain, soil, and
weather in the area of operations. A good mental picture of the area of operations enables the
commander to evaluate all M-CM-S and general engineering activities to create the best plan for
attack or defense.
Every survivability mission has a deadline for reaching a predetermined level of protection.
Hardening activities will continue past the deadline and are done as long as the force remains in
the position. Survivability time constraints are deeply intertwined with mobility and
countermobility time constraints. If the level of protection required cannot be achieved in the
time allotted, resources are then committed to mobility or countermobility operations, or as
designated by the maneuver commander.
Troops and Resources
The commander must weigh available labor, material constraints, and engineer support before
planning an operation. Labor constraints are identified through analysis of the three sources of
labor-maneuver unit troops, engineer troops, and indigenous (host nation/local area) personnel.
Supply and equipment constraints are identified through analysis of on-hand supplies, naturallyavailable materials, and supplies available through military and indigenous channels. Careful
procurement consideration is given to available civilian engineer equipment to supplement
INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE
The maneuver force commander and engineer must have access to available intelligence
information provided by staff elements. Battalion S2 sections provide the bulk of reconnaissance
and terrain information, and experts at the division level and above assist the commander. For
example, the DS terrain team, the production section of the division tactical operations center
(DTOC) support element, and the corps cartographic company can quickly provide required
terrain products. In addition, the commander uses the division intelligence system which
provides the Threat order of battle and war-damaged key facilities. When reconnaissance
requirements exceed the capability of battalion reconnaissance elements, maneuver or supporting
engineer units collect their own information.
When the engineer or maneuver units have collected all data required for protective construction,
the data is analyzed to evaluate possible courses of action. Alternatives are based on the
commander's guidance on protection needs, priorities, and planning.
Although the decision on what is to be protected depends on the tactical situation, the following
criteria are used as a guide:
Exposure to direct, indirect, and tactical air fire.
Vulnerability to discovery and location due to electronic emissions (communications and
radar), firing signature, trackable projectiles, and the need to operate in the open.
Capability to move to avoid detection, or to displace before counterfire arrives.
Armor suitable to cover direct small caliber fire, indirect artillery and mortar fire, and
direct fire antitank weapons.
Distance from the FLOT which affects the likelihood of acquisition as a target,
vulnerability to artillery and air bombardment, and chance of direct contact with the
Availability of natural cover.
Any unique equipment item, the loss of which would make other equipment worthless.
Enemy's engagement priority to include which forces the Threat most likely will engage
Ability to establish positions with organic equipment.
Using these factors in a vulnerability analysis will show the maneuver commander and the
engineer which maneuver, field artillery, and ADA units require the most survivability support.
The table Equipment to be Protected lists weapons systems in these units requiring fighting
position/protective position construction.
Based on a vulnerability analysis of systems that need protecting in the tactical situation, the
maneuver commander develops the priorities for protective activities. Setting
survivability priorities is a manuever commander's decision
based on the engineer's advice. Using the protection criteria discussed earlier,
and an up-to-date detailed terrain analysis portraying the degree of natural protection, a
commander develops and ranks a detailed tactical construction plan to support survivability
efforts. This detailed plan is usually broken down into several priority groupings or levels of
protection. Primary, supplementary, and alternate positions are developed in stages or in
increasing increments of protection.
The table below shows example standard survivability levels for maneuver units in defensive
positions. The levels and figures developed in the table are usually used by the maneuver
commander in developing priorities, and by the engineer in advising the commander on
survivability workloads. The number of vehicles or weapons systems in the table is modified
after comparing with the actual equipment on hand. The table is used as a general planning
guide. Weapon systems, such as missiles and nuclear-capable tube artillery, will require the
maximum protection the tactical situation permits, regardless of whether the force is in an
offensive or defensive posture.
In the Offense
In offensive operations, fighting and protective positions are developed whenever time is
adequate, such as during a temporary halt for regrouping and consolidation. Recommended
priorities for protection at a halt in the offense are•
Indirect fire weapons.
Critical supplies, such as ammunition and POL, as well as ground vehicles and aircraft
These positions are usually expedient positions having the thickness necessary for frontal and
side protection, making maximum use of the terrain.
In the Defense
In defensive operations, substantial effort for fighting and protective position construction is
required. General priorities for protective construction in a defensive battle position are•
Antitank weapon protection.
Tank position development.
Armored personnel carrier (APC) position development.
Command post position hardening.
Combat support position (including field artillery, ADA, mortars, and so on) hardening.
Crew-served weapons position, individual fighting position, and covered routes between
Operations Staff Officer
Priorities of work are recommended by the maneuver operations staff officer with input from the
engineer. Survivability requirements for a defensive operation might receive the commander's
first priority for engineer work. However, these tasks may require using only 10 percent of the
engineer resources, while countermobility tasks may demand 70 percent.
The maneuver commander establishes engineer work priorities and sets priorities for tasks within
the functions just mentioned. Using an analysis of what equipment requires protection, what
priorities are set for sequential protection of the equipment, and which equipment and personnel
require immediate protection, the maneuver commander can set individual priorities for
Engineer Staff Officer
Survivability data and recommendations are presented to the commander or supported unit
through an engineer staff estimate. The engineer estimate includes a recommendation for task
organization and mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering task priorities.
Instructions for developing the engineer estimate are contained in FM 5-100.
Various command and support relationships under which engineer assets are task-organized can
enhance mission accomplishment. The available assets are applied to each original course of
action in a manner best suited to the METT-T factors and the survivability analysis. The table
below lists the different command and support relationships and how they affect the engineer
unit. The recommended command relationship for engineers is operational control (OPCON) to
the supported unit.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Operations orders (OPORDs) are used by the commander or leader to carry out decisions made
following the estimating and planning process. Survivability missions are usually prescribed in
the OPORD for all units, including both engineers and nonengineers. Survivability priorities are
specifically defined in the OPORD. Field Manual 5-100 discusses engineer input to OPORDs. It
is impossible to divide responsibilities in survivability missions between the maneuver
commander and the engineer commander.
The maneuver commander is responsible for organizing, planning, coordinating, and effectively
using engineer resources to accomplish the survivability mission. The maneuver commander
must rely on the engineer staff officer or supporting engineer commander to provide analyses
and recommendations for protective construction and fighting position employment. The
commander implements decisions by setting priorities and further defining the constraints of the
mission to the engineer.
The engineer commander, in addition to fulfilling advisory responsibilities to the maneuver
commander, accomplishes tasks in support of the overall survivability mission as follows:
Insures timely reports concerning survivability tasks are made to the engineer staff officer
or the operations and plans officer (G3/S3).
Develops survivability operational plans.
Insures engineer tasks are supervised, whether or not they are performed using engineer
Inspects fighting and protective positions for structural soundness.
Provides advice and repair estimates for fighting and protective positions built or
occupied by supported units.
Recommends and identifies uses for engineer support in survivability operations through
the sequence of command and staff actions.
Evaluates terrain to determine the best areas for construction of survivability systems.
Based on knowledge of fighting and protective position effectiveness and protection ability, the
engineer continues to advise the maneuver commander on survivability matters following the
location, construction, and/or repair of these positions. The engineer provides valuable
information to aid in decision-making for deployment to alternate and supplementary positions
and retrograde operations. The engineer keeps the maneuver commander informed on the level
of fighting that the existing fighting and protective positions support, and what protection the
covered routes provide when movement between positions occurs.
STAFF OFFICERS' RESPONSIBILITIES
The engineer staff officers' (Brigade Engineer, Assistant Division Engineer) responsibilities
include Coordination of mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering tasks
on the battlefield. As a special member of the commander's staff, the engineer interacts with
other staff personnel. This is accomplished by integrating survivability considerations with plans
and actions of the other staff members. Staff responsibilities concerning survivability plans and
execution are as follows.
The G2/S2 is the primary staff officer for intelligence matters and has responsibility for
collecting information on Threat operations and types and numbers of weapons used. Using all
available intelligence sources to predict enemy choices for avenues of approach, the G2/S2
assists in survivability emplacement. It is the responsibility of the G2/S2 to receive survivability
emplacement records from the G3/S3, disseminate the information, and forward records to the
senior theater Army engineer.
The G3/S3 has primary staff responsibility for all plans and operations, and also develops the
defensive and fire support plans considering survivability and other engineering support. The
G3/S3 also receives progress/ completion reports for survivability construction and emplacement
and records this information in conjunction with mobility and countermobility records (for
example, minefield and obstacle records). The G3/S3 works closely with the staff engineer to
develop the engineer support plans for the commander.
The G4/S4 is the primary staff coordinator for the logistic support required for survivability
tasks. The G4/S4 works closely with the staff engineer to insure that types and quantities of
construction materials for survivability emplacements are available. The G4/S4 also coordinates
with the engineer to supply additional transportation and equipment in accordance with the
commander's priorities for engineer support. Engineers alone do not have the assets to haul all of
the class VI material necessary for hardened survivability positions.
A fighting position is a place on the battlefield from which
troops engage the enemy with direct and indirect fire weapons.
The positions provide necessary protection for personnel, yet
allow for fields of fire and maneuver. A protective position
protects the personnel and/or material not directly involved
with fighting the enemy from attack or environmental extremes.
In order to develop plans for fighting and protective positions,
five types of weapons, their effects, and their survivability
considerations are presented. Air-delivered weapons such as
ATGMs, laser-guided missiles, mines, and large bombs require
similar survivability considerations.
Direct fire projectiles are primarily designed to strike a
target with a velocity high enough to achieve penetration. The
chemical energy projectile uses some form of chemical heat and
blast to achieve penetration. It detonates either at impact or
when maximum penetration is achieved. Chemical energy
projectiles carrying impact-detonated or delayed detonation
high-explosive charges are used mainly for direct fire from
systems with high accuracy and consistently good target
acquisition ability. Tanks, antitank weapons, and automatic
cannons usually use these types of projectiles.
The kinetic energy projectile uses high velocity and mass
(momentum) to penetrate its target. Currently, the hypervelocity
projectile causes the most concern in survivability position
design. The materials used must dissipate the projectile's
energy and thus prevent total penetration. Shielding against
direct fire projectiles should initially stop or deform the
projectiles in order to prevent or limit penetration.
Direct fire projectiles are further divided into the categories
of ball and tracer, armor piercing and armor piercing
incendiary, and high explosive (HE) rounds.
Ball and Tracer
Ball and tracer rounds are normally of a relatively small
caliber (5.56 to 14.5 millimeters (mm)) and are fired from
pistols, rifles, and machine guns. The round's projectile
penetrates soft targets on impact at a high velocity. The
penetration depends directly on the projectile's velocity,
weight, and angle at which it hits.
Armor Piercing and Armor Piercing Incendiary
Armor piercing and armor piercing incendiary rounds are designed
to penetrate armor plate and other types of homogeneous steel.
Armor piercing projectiles have a special jacket encasing a hard
core or penetrating rod which is designed to penetrate when
fired with high accuracy at an angle very close to the
perpendicular of the target. Incendiary projectiles are used
principally to penetrate a target and ignite its contents. They
are used effectively against fuel supplies and storage areas.
High explosive rounds include high explosive antitank (HEAT)
rounds, recoilless rifle rounds, and antitank rockets. They are
designed to detonate a shaped charge on impact. At detonation,
an extremely high velocity molten jet is formed. This jet
perforates large thicknesses of high-density material, continues
along its path, and sets fuel and ammunition on fire. The HEAT
rounds generally range in size from 60 to 120 mm.
Direct fire survivability considerations include oblique impact,
or impact of projectiles at other than a perpendicular angle to
the structure, which increases the apparent thickness of the
structure and decreases the possibility of penetration. The
potential for ricochet off a structure increases as the angle of
impact from the perpendicular increases. Designers of protective
structures should select the proper material and design exposed
surfaces with the maximum angle from the perpendicular to the
direction of fire. Also, a low structure silhouette design makes
a structure harder to engage with direct fire.
Indirect fire projectiles used against fighting and protective
positions include mortar and artillery shells and rockets which
cause blast and fragmentation damage to affected structures.
Blast, caused by the detonation of the explosive charge, creates
a shock wave which knocks apart walls or roof structures.
Contact bursts cause excavation cave-in from ground shock, or
structure collapse. Overhead bursts can buckle or destroy the
Blasts from high explosive shells or rockets can occur in three
Overhead burst (fragmentation from an artillery airburst
Contact burst (blast from an artillery shell exploding on
Delay fuse burst (blast from an artillery shell designed to
detonate after penetration into a target).
The severity of the blast effects increases as the distance from
the structure to the point of impact decreases. Delay fuse
bursts are the greatest threat to covered structures. Repeated
surface or delay fuse bursts further degrade fighting and
protective positions by the cratering effect and soil discharge.
Indirect fire blast effects also cause concussions. The shock
from a high explosive round detonation causes headaches,
nosebleeds, and spinal and brain concussions.
Fragmentation occurs when the projectile disintegrates,
producing a mass of high-speed steel fragments which can
perforate and become imbedded in fighting and protective
positions. The pattern or distribution of fragments greatly
affects the design of fighting and protective positions.
Airburst of artillery shells provides the greatest unrestricted
distribution of fragments. Fragments created by surface and
delay bursts are restricted by obstructions on the ground.
Indirect fire survivability from fragmentation requires
shielding similar to that needed for direct fire penetration.
Nuclear weapons effects are classified as residual and initial.
Residual effects (such as fallout) are primarily of long-term
concern. However, they may seriously alter the operational plans
in the immediate battle area. The figure below of tactical
nuclear weapons shows how the energy released by detonation of a
tactical nuclear explosion is divided. Initial effects occur in
the immediate area shortly after detonation and are the most
tactically significant since they cause personnel casualties and
material damage within the immediate time span of any operation.
The principal initial casualty producing effects are blast,
thermal radiation (burning), and nuclear radiation. Other
initial effects, such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and
transient radiation effects on electronics (TREE), affect
electrical and electronic equipment.
Blast from nuclear bursts overturns and crushes equipment,
collapses lungs, ruptures eardrums, hurls debris and personnel,
and collapses positions and structures.
Thermal radiation sets fire to combustible materials, and causes
flash blindness or burns in the eyes, as well as personnel
casualties from skin burns.
Nuclear radiation damages cells throughout the body. This
radiation damage may cause the headaches, nausea, vomiting, and
diarrhea generally called "radiation sickness". The severity of
radiation sickness depends on the extent of initial exposure.
The figure below shows the relationship between dose of nuclear
radiation and distance from ground zero for a 1-kiloton weapon.
Once the dose is known, initial radiation effects on personnel
are determined from the table below. Radiation in the body is
Nuclear radiation is the dominant casualty producing effect of
low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. But other initial effects
may produce significant damage and/or casualties depending on
the weapon type, yield, burst conditions, and the degree of
personnel and equipment protection. The figure on Tactical radii
shows tactical radii of effects for nominal 1-kiloton weapons.
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) damages electrical and electronic
equipment. It occurs at distances from the burst where other
nuclear weapons effects produce little or no damage, and it
lasts for less than a second after the burst. The pulse also
damages vulnerable electrical and electronic equipment at ranges
up to 5 kilometers for a 10-kiloton surface burst, and hundreds
of kilometers for a similar high-altitude burst.
Nuclear weapons survivability includes dispersion of protective
positions within a suspected target area. Deep-covered positions
will minimize the danger from blast and thermal radiation.
Personnel should habitually wear complete uniforms with hands,
face, and neck covered. Nuclear radiation is minimized by
avoiding the radioactive fallout area or remaining in deepcovered protective positions. Examples of expedient protective
positions against initial nuclear effects are shown on the chart
below. Additionally, buttoned-up armor vehicles offer limited
protection from nuclear radiation. Removal of antennae and
placement of critical electrical equipment into protective
positions will reduce the adverse effects of EMP and TREE.
Toxic chemical agents are primarily designed for use against
personnel and to contaminate terrain and material. Agents do not
destroy material and structures, but make them unusable for
periods of time because of chemical contaminant absorption. The
duration of chemical agent effectiveness depends on•
Type used (nerve, blood, or blister).
Field Manual 21-40 provides chemical agent details and
characteristics. Since the vapor of toxic chemical agents is
heavier than air, it naturally tends to drift to the lowest
corners or sections of a structure. Thus, low, unenclosed
fighting and protective positions trap chemical vapors or
agents. Because chemical agents saturate an area, access to
positions without airlock entrance ways is limited during and
after an attack, since every entering or exiting soldier brings
Survivability of chemical effects includes overhead cover of any
design that delays penetration of chemical vapors and biological
aerosols, thereby providing additional masking time and
protection against direct liquid contamination. Packing
materials and covers are used to protect sensitive equipment.
Proper use of protective clothing and equipment, along with
simply avoiding the contaminated area, aids greatly in chemical
Fuel-air munitions and flamethrowers are considered specialpurpose weapons. Fuel-air munitions disperse fuel into the
atmosphere forming a fuel-air mixture that is detonated. The
fuel is usually contained in a metal canister and is dispersed
by detonation of a central burster charge carried within the
canister. Upon proper dispersion, the fuel-air mixture is
detonated. Peak pressures created within the detonated cloud
reach 300 pounds per square inch (psi). Fuel-air munitions
create large area loading on a structure as compared to
localized loadings caused by an equal weight high explosive
charge. High temperatures ignite flammable materials.
Flamethrowers and napalm produce intense heat and noxious gases
which can neutralize accessible positions. The intense flame may
also exhaust the oxygen content of inside air causing
respiratory injuries to occupants shielded from the flaming
fuel. Flame is effective in penetrating protective positions.
Survivability of special purpose weapons effects includes
covered positions with relatively small apertures and closable
entrance areas which provide protection from napalm and
flamethrowers. Deep-supported tunnels and positions provide
protection from other fuel-air munitions and explosives.
Before designing fighting and protective positions, it is
important to know how the previously-described weapons affect
and interact with various materials that are fired upon. The
materials used in fighting and protective position construction
act as either shielding for the protected equipment and
personnel, structural components to hold the shielding in place,
Shielding provides protection against penetration of both
projectiles and fragments, nuclear and thermal radiation, and
the effects of fire and chemical agents. Various materials and
amounts of materials provide varying degrees of shielding. Some
of the more commonly used materials and the effects of both
projectile and fragment penetration in these materials, as well
as nuclear and thermal radiation suppression, are discussed in
the following paragraphs. (Incendiary and chemical effects are
generalized from the previous discussion of weapons effects.)
The following three tables contain shielding requirements of
various materials to protect against direct hits by direct fire
projectiles, direct fire high explosive (HE) shaped charges, and
indirect fire fragmentation and blast . The table below lists
nuclear protection factors associated with earth cover and
Direct fire and indirect fire fragmentation penetration in soil
or other similar granular material is based on three
considerations: for materials of the same density, the finer the
grain the greater the penetration; penetration decreases with
increase in density; and penetration increases with increasing
water content. Nuclear and thermal radiation protection of soil
is governed by the following:
The more earth cover, the better the shielding. Each layer
of sandbags filled with sand or clay reduces transmitted
radiation by 50 percent.
Sand or compacted clay provides better radiation shielding
than other soils which are less dense.
Damp or wet earth or sand provides better protection than
Sandbags protected by a top layer of earth survive thermal
radiation better than exposed bags. Exposed bags may burn,
spill their contents, and become susceptible to the blast
Steel is the most commonly used material for protection against
direct and indirect fire fragmentation. Steel is also more
likely to deform a projectile as it penetrates, and is much less
likely to span than concrete. Steel plates, only 1/6 the thickness
of concrete, afford equal protection against nondeforming
projectiles of small and intermediate calibers. Because of its
high density, steel is five times more effective in initial
radiation suppression than an equal thickness of concrete. It is
also effective against thermal radiation, although it transmits
heat rapidly. Many field expedient types of steel are usable for
shielding. Steel landing mats, culvert sections, and steel
drums, for example, are effectively used in a structure as one
of several composite materials. Expedient steel pieces are also
used for individual protection against projectile and fragment
penetration and nuclear radiation.
When reinforcing steel is used in concrete, direct and indirect
fire fragmentation protection is excellent. The reinforcing
helps the concrete to remain intact even after excessive
cracking caused by penetration. When a near miss shell explodes,
its fragments travel faster than its blast wave. If these
fragments strike the exposed concrete surfaces of a protective
position, they can weaken the concrete to such an extent that
the blast wave destroys it. When possible, at least one layer of
sandbags, placed on their short ends, or 15 inches of soil
should cover all exposed concrete surfaces. An additional
consequence of concrete penetration is spalling. If a projectile
partially penetrates concrete shielding, particles and chunks of
concrete often break or scab off the back of the shield at the
time of impact. These particles can kill when broken loose.
Concrete provides excellent protection against nuclear and
Direct and indirect fire fragmentation penetration into rock
depends on the rock's physical properties and the number of
joints, fractures, and other irregularities contained in the
rock. These irregularities weaken rock and can increase
penetration. Several layers of irregularly-shaped rock can
change the angle of penetration. Hard rock can cause a
projectile or fragment to flatten out or break up and stop
penetration. Nuclear and thermal radiation protection is limited
because of undetectable voids and cracks in rocks. Generally,
rock is not as effective against radiation as concrete, since
the ability to provide protection depends on the rock's density.
Brick and Masonry
Direct and indirect fire fragmentation penetration into brick
and masonry have the same protection limitations as rock.
Nuclear and thermal radiation protection by brick and masonry is
1.5 times more effective than the protection afforded by soil.
This characteristic is due to the higher compressive strength
and hardness properties of brick and masonry. However, since
density determines the degree of protection against initial
radiation, unreinforced brick and masonry are not as good as
concrete for penetration protection.
Snow and Ice
Although snow and ice are sometimes the only available materials
in certain locations, they are used for shielding only. Weather
could cause structures made of snow or ice to wear away or even
collapse. Shielding composed of frozen materials provides
protection from initial radiation, but melts if thermal
radiation effects are strong enough.
Direct and indirect fire fragmentation protection using wood is
limited because of its low density and relatively low
compressive strengths. Greater thicknesses of wood than of soil
are needed for protection from penetration. Wood is generally
used as structural support for a survivability position. The low
density of wood provides poor protection from nuclear and
thermal radiation. Also, with its low ignition point, wood is
easily destroyed by fire from thermal radiation.
Expedient materials include steel pickets, landing mats, steel
culverts, steel drums, and steel shipping consolidated express
(CONEX) containers. Chapter 4 discusses fighting and protective
positions constructed with some of these materials.
The structure of a fighting and protective position depends on
the weapon or weapon effect it is designed to defeat. All
fighting and protective positions have some configuration of
floor, walls, and roof designed to protect material and/or
occupants. The floor, walls, and roof support the shielding
discussed earlier, or may in themselves make up that shielding.
These components must also resist blast and ground shock effects
from detonation of high explosive rounds which place greater
stress on the structure than the weight of the components and
the shielding. Designers must make structural components of the
positions stronger, larger, and/or more numerous in order to
defeat blast and ground shock. Following is a discussion of
materials used to build floors, walls, and roofs of positions.
Fighting and protective position floors are made from almost any
material, but require resistance to weathering, wear, and
trafficability. Soil is most often used, yet is least resistant
to water damage and rutting from foot and vehicle traffic. Wood
pallets, or other field-available materials are often cut to fit
floor areas. Drainage sumps, shown below, or drains are also
installed when possible.
Walls of fighting and protective positions are of two basic
types-below ground (earth or revetted earth) and aboveground.
Below ground walls are made of the in-place soil remaining after
excavation of the position. This soil may need revetment or
support, depending on the soil properties and depth of cut. When
used to support roof structures, earth walls must support the
roof at points no less than one fourth the depth of cutout from
the edges of excavation, as shown.
Aboveground walls are normally constructed for shielding from
direct fire and fragments. They are usually built of revetted
earth, sandbags, concrete, or other materials. When constructed
to a thickness adequate for shielding from direct fire and
fragments, they are thick and stable enough for roof support.
Additional details on wall design are given in FM 5-35.
Roofs of fighting and protective positions are easily designed
to support earth cover for shielding from fragments and small
caliber direct fire. However, contact burst protection requires
much stronger roof structures and, therefore, careful design.
Roofs for support of earth cover shielding are constructed of
almost any material that is usually used as beams or stringers
and sheathing. The first two tables present guidelines for
wooden roof structures (for fragment shielding only). A third
table is converting dimensioned to round timber. The tables on
Maximum Span are pertaining to steel pickets and landing mats
for roof supports (for fragment shielding only).
When roof structures are designed to defeat contact bursts of
high explosive projectiles, substantial additional roof
protection is required. The table on defeat contact bursts gives
basic design criteria for a roof. Appendix B of this manual
describes a procedure for overhead cover design to defeat
contact burst of high explosive projectiles.
Seven categories of fighting and protective positions or
components of positions that are used together or separately
Holes and simple excavations.
Overhead cover and roof structures.
Shelters and bunkers.
HOLES AND SIMPLE EXCAVATIONS
Excavations, when feasible, provide good protection from direct
fire and some indirect fire weapons effects. Open excavations
have the advantages of•
Providing good protection from direct fire when the
occupant would otherwise be exposed.
Permitting 360-degree observation and fire.
Providing good protection from nuclear weapons effects.
Open excavations have the disadvantages of•
Providing limited protection from direct fire while the
occupant is firing a weapon, since frontal and side
protection is negligible.
Providing relatively no protection from fragments from
overhead bursts of artillery shells. The larger the open
excavation, the less the protection from artillery.
Providing limited protection from chemical effects. In some
cases, chemicals concentrate in low holes and excavations.
Trenches provide essentially the same protection from
conventional, nuclear, and chemical effects as the other
excavations described, and are used almost exclusively in
defensive areas. They are employed as protective positions and
used to connect individual holes, weapons positions, and
shelters. They provide protection and concealment for personnel
moving between fighting positions or in and out of the area.
They are usually open excavations, but sections are sometimes
covered to provide additional protection. Trenches are difficult
to camouflage and are easily detected from the air.
Trenches, like other positions, are developed progressively. As
a general rule, they are excavated deeper than fighting
positions to allow movement without exposure to enemy fire. It
is usually necessary to provide revetment and drainage for them.
Tunnels are not frequently constructed in the defense of an area
due to the time, effort, and technicalities involved. However,
they are usually used to good advantage when the length of time
an area is defended justifies the effort, and the ground lends
itself to this purpose. The decision to build tunnels also
depends greatly on the nature of the soil, which is usually
determined by borings or similar means. Tunneling in hard rock
is slow and generally impractical. Tunnels in clay or other soft
soils are also impractical since builders must line them
throughout to prevent collapse. Therefore, construction of
tunneled defenses is usually limited to hilly terrain, steep
hillsides, and favorable soils including hard chalk, soft
sandstone, and other types of hard soil or soft rock.
In the tunnel system shown, the soil was generally very hard and
only the entrances were timbered. The speed of excavation using
hand tools varied according to the soil, and seldom exceeded 25
feet per day. In patches of hard rock, as little as 3 feet were
excavated per day. Use of power tools did not significantly
increase the speed of excavation. Engineer units, assisted by
infantry personnel, performed the work. Tunnels of the type
shown are excavated up to 30 feet below ground level. They are
usually horizontal or nearly so. Entrances are strengthened
against collapse under shell fire and ground shock from nuclear
weapons. The first 16½ feet from each entrance should have
frames using 4 by 4s or larger timber supports.
Untimbered tunnels are generally 31½ feet wide and 5 to 6 1/2
feet high. Once beyond the portal or entrance, tunnels of up to
this size are unlimbered if they are deep enough and the soil
will stand open. Larger tunnels must have shoring. Chambers
constructed in rock or extremely hard soil do not need timber
supports. If timber is not used, the chamber is not wider than
6½ feet; if timbers are used, the width can increase to 10 feet.
The chamber is generally the same height as the tunnel, and up
to 13 feet long.
Grenade traps are constructed at the bottom of straight lengths
where they slope. This is done by cutting a recess about 3½ feet
deep in the wall facing the inclining floor of the tunnel.
Much of the spoil from the excavated area requires disposal and
concealment. The volume of spoil is usually estimated as one
third greater than the volume of the tunnel. Tunnel entrances
need concealment from enemy observation. Also, it is sometimes
necessary during construction to transport spoil by hand through
a trench. In cold regions, air warmer than outside air may rise
from a tunnel entrance thus revealing the position.
The danger that tunnel entrances may become blocked and trap the
occupants always exists. Picks and shovels are placed in each
tunnel so that trapped personnel can dig their way out.
Furthermore, at least two entrances are necessary for
ventilation. Whenever possible, one or more emergency exits are
provided. These are usually small tunnels with entrances
normally closed or concealed. A tunnel is constructed from
inside the system to within a few feet of the surface so that an
easy breakthrough is possible.
Excavations and trenches are usually modified to include front,
rear, and side earth parapets. Parapets are constructed using
spoil from the excavation or other materials carried to the
site. Frontal, side, and rear parapets greatly increase the
protection of occupants firing their weapons. Thicknesses
required for parapets vary according to the material's ability
to deny round penetration.
Parapets are generally positioned as shown below to allow full
frontal protection, thus relying on mutual support of other
firing positions. Parapets are also used as a single means of
protection, even in the absence of excavations.
OVERHEAD COVER AND ROOF STRUCTURES
Fighting and protective positions are given overhead cover
primarily to defeat indirect fire projectiles landing on or
exploding above them. Defeat of an indirect fire attack on a
position, then, requires that the three types of burst
conditions are considered. (Note: Always place a waterproof
layer over any soil cover to prevent it from gaining moisture or
Overhead Burst (Fragments)
Protection against fragments from airburst artillery is provided
by a thickness of shielding required to defeat a certain size
shell fragment, supported by a roof structure adequate for the
dead load of the shielding. This type of roof structure is
designed using the thicknesses to defeat fragment penetration
given in the table on Indirect Fire Fragmentation and Blast. As
a general guide, fragment penetration protection always requires
at least 11/2 feet of soil cover. For example, to defeat
fragments from a 120-mm mortar when available cover material is
sandbags filled with soil, the cover depth required is 1½ feet.
Then, the Maximum Span table shows that support of the l½ feet
of cover (using 2 by 4 roof stringers over a 4-foot span)
requires 16-inch center-to-center spacing of the 2 by 4s. This
example is shown below.
Protection from contact burst of indirect fire HE shells
requires much more cover and roof structure support than does
protection from fragmentation. The type of roof structure
necessary is given in the following table. For example, if a
position must defeat the contact burst of an 82-mm mortar, the
table provides multiple design options. If 4 by 4 stringers are
positioned on 9-inch center-to-center spacings over a span of 8
feet, then 2 feet of soil (loose, gravelly sand) is required to
defeat the burst. Appendix B outlines a step-by-step design and
reverse design analysis procedure for cover protection of
various materials to defeat contact bursts.
Delay Fuse Burst
Delay fuse shells are designed to detonate after penetration.
Protection provided by over-head cover is dependent on the
amount of cover remaining between the structure and the shell at
the time of detonation. To defeat penetration of the shell, and
thus cause it to detonate with a sufficient cover between it and
the structure, materials are added on top of the overhead cover.
If this type of cover is used along with contact. burst
protection, the additional materials (such as rock or concrete)
are added in with the soil unit weight when designing the
contact burst cover structure.
Triggering screens are separately built or added on to existing
structures used to activate the fuse of an incoming shell at a
"standoff' distance from the structure. The screen initiates
detonation at a distance where only fragments reach the
structure. A variety of materials are usually used to detonate
both super-quick fuzed shells and delay fuse shells up to and
including 130 mm. Super-quick shell detonation requires only
enough material to activate the fuse. Delay shells require more
material to both limit penetration and activate the fuse.
Typical standoff framing is shown below.
Defeating Super-Quick Fuzes
Incoming shells with super-quick fuzes are defeated at a
standoff distance with several types of triggering screen
materials. The first table below lists thicknesses of facing
material required for detonating incoming shells when impacting
with the triggering screen. These triggering screens detonate
the incoming shell but do not defeat fragments from these
shells. Protection from fragments is still necessary for a
position. The second table below lists required thicknesses for
various materials to defeat fragments if the triggering screen
is 10 feet from the structure.
Defeating Delay Fuzes
Delay fuzes are defeated by various thicknesses of protective
material. The table below lists type and thickness of materials
required to defeat penetration of delay fuse shells and cause
their premature detonation. These materials are usually added to
positions designed for contact burst protection. One method to
defeat penetration and ensure premature shell detonation is to
use layers of large stones. The figure below shows this added
delay fuse protection on top of the contact burst protection
designed in appendix B. The rocks are placed in at least three
layers on top of the required depth of cover for the expected
shell size. The rock size is approximately twice the caliber of
the expected shell. For example, the rock size required to
defeat 82-mm mortar shell penetration is 2 x 82 mm = 164 mm (or
In some cases, chain link fences also provide some standoff
protection when visibility is necessary in front of the standoff
and when positioned as shown. However, the fuse of some incoming
shells may pass through the fence without initiating the firing
SHELTERS AND BUNKERS
Protective shelters and fighting bunkers are usually constructed
using a combination of the components of positions mentioned
thus far. Protective shelters are primarily used as•
Medical aid stations.
Supply and ammunition shelters.
Sleeping or resting shelters.
Protective shelters are usually constructed aboveground, using
cavity wall revetments and earth-covered roof structures, or
they are below ground using sections that are airtransportable.
Fighting bunkers are enlarged fighting positions designed for
squad-size units or larger. They are built either aboveground or
below ground and are usually made of concrete. However, some are
prefabricated and transported forward to the battle area by
trucks or air.
If shelters and bunkers are properly constructed with
appropriate collective protection equipment, they can serve as
protection against chemical and biological agents.
For individual and crew-served weapons fighting
and protective position construction, hand tools
are available. The individual soldier carries an
entrenching tool and has access to picks, shovels,
machetes, and hand carpentry tools for use in
individual excavation and vertical construction
Earthmoving equipment and
explosives are used for excavating
protective positions for vehicles
and supplies. Earthmoving
equipment, including backhoes,
bulldozers, and bucket loaders,
are usually used for larger or
more rapid excavation when the
situation permits. Usually, these
machines cannot dig out the exact
shape desired or dig the amount of
earth necessary. The excavation is
usually then completed by hand.
Descriptions and capabilities of
US survivability equipment are
given in appendix A.
Methods of construction include
sandbagging, explosive excavation,
and excavation revetments.
Walls of fighting and protective
positions are built of sandbags in
much the same way bricks are used.
Sandbags are also useful for
retaining wall revetments as shown
on the right.
The sandbag is made of an acrylic fabric and is rot and weather
resistant. Under all climatic conditions, the bag has a life of
at least 2 years with no visible deterioration. (Some olderstyle cotton bags deteriorate much sooner.) The useful life of
sandbags is prolonged by filling them with a mixture of dry
earth and portland cement, normally in the ratio of 1 part of
cement to 10 parts of dry earth. The cement sets as the bags
take on moisture. A 1:6 ratio is used for sand-gravel mixtures.
As an alternative, filled bags are dipped in a cement-water
slurry. Each sandbag is then pounded with a flat object, such as
a 2 by 4, to make the retaining wall more stable.
As a rule, sandbags are used for revetting walls or repairing
trenches when the soil is very loose and requires a retaining
wall. A sandbag revetment will not stand with a vertical face.
The face must have a slope of 1:4, and lean against the earth it
is to hold in place. The base for the revetment must stand on
firm ground and dug at a slope of 4:1.
The following steps are used to construct a
sandbag revetment wall such as the one shown.
The bags are filled about
three-fourths full with
earth or a dry soil-cement
mixture and the choke
cords are tied.
The bottom corners of the
bags are tucked in after
The bottom row of the
revetment is constructed
by placing all bags as
headers. The wall is built
using alternate rows of
stretchers and headers
with the joints broken
between courses. The top
row of the revetment wall
consists of headers.
Sandbags are positioned so
that the planes between
the layers have the same
pitch as the base-at right
angles to the slope of the
All bags are placed so
that side seams on
stretchers and choked ends
on headers are turned
toward the revetted face.
As the revetment is built,
it is backfilled to shape
the revetted face to this
Often, the requirement for filled sandbags far exceeds the
capabilities of soldiers using only shovels. If the bags are
filled from a stockpile, the job is performed easier and faster
by using a lumber or steel funnel as shown on the right.
Explosive excavation is done by placing charges in boreholes in
a particular pattern designed to excavate a certain dimensioned
hole. Boreholes are dug to a depth two thirds that of desired
excavation. The holes are spaced no farther apart than twice
their depth, and no closer to the desired perimeter than the
depth of the borehole.
The boreholes are dug with posthole diggers, hand augers, or
with 15-or 40-pound shaped charges. The holes are backfilled and
tamped. Borehole sizes made with shaped charges are listed in
the first table below. Boreholes made with shaped charges may
need additional digging or partial filling and tamping to
achieve a desired depth. When setting explosives, the charges
are placed in the borehole with two thirds of the charge at the
bottom and one third halfway down. The charges are then tamped.
The second table below lists the pounds of explosive needed in a
sandy clay soil per depth of borehole.
Because soil type and explosive effectiveness vary, the quantity
of explosive required may differ slightly from the amounts given
in the previous table. A test hole is detonated to check the
accuracy of the table in the specific soil condition. After
tamping and detonating the charges, the loose earth is removed
and the position is shaped as desired.
Borehole and charge location in rectangular position excavation
shown below in the diagram is as follows:
The outline of position is marked on the ground.
Holes are located a borehole's depth inward from each of
the four corners.
Additional holes are spaced along both sides at distances
not exceeding two times the depth of the boreholes.
Inner rows are spaced equal distance from the outer rows at
distances not exceeding two times the borehole depth.
Each row is staggered with respect to adjacent rows.
The calculated charge weight is doubled in all holes in
Information concerning the calculation of charge weights and the
use of prime cord or blasting caps is contained in FM 5-34 and
To create ramps for positions in relatively flat terrain using
explosives, the lower portion is excavated as a rectangular
position, as shown, and the upper end is excavated by hand.
Charges are not placed closer than the borehole depth from the
desired edge, and not farther than twice the borehole depth
apart. Portions of the position less than 2 feet deep are
usually excavated by hand.
Circular positions are prepared with a circular
arrangement of boreholes surrounding a
borehole at the center of the position. Several
concentric rings of holes are needed for large
positions, and one ring or only one charge for
small positions. The charge layout shown on the
right is as follows:
The radius of the desired
circular position is
The borehole depth is
subtracted from the radius
and a circle is inscribed
on the ground with the new
The new radius length is
divided by twice the
borehole depth to determine
the number of rings within
Each additional ring is
positioned at equal
distances between the outer
ring and the center of the
Boreholes are spaced equal
distance along each ring.
Each hole should not exceed
twice the borehole depth
from another hole on the
The charge weight is
doubled in all holes in the
When the position diameter does
not exceed twice the borehole
depth, a single charge placed at
the center of the position is
enough. When the position
diameter is between two and four
times the borehole depth, space
three holes equal distance
around the ring and omit the
Positions in Frozen Soil
In frozen soil, blasting requires about 1.5 to 2 times the
number of boreholes and larger charges than those calculated for
moderate climates. To determine the number of bore-holes needed,
testing is performed before extensive excavation is attempted.
For frozen soil, hole depth (d) should equal required depth of
excavation. The required charge weight (w) is w = 0.06 d 3
pounds, where (d) is in feet.
Positions in Rocky Soil
Boulders and rocks are removed by using blasting methods
described in FM 5-25 or FM 5-34.These manuals also described
similar activities for stump and tree root removal.
Excavations in soil may require revetment to prevent side walls
from collapsing. Several methods of excavation revetments are
usually used to prevent wall collapse.
The need for revetment is sometimes avoided or postponed by
sloping the walls of the excavation. In most soils, a slope of
1:3 or 1:4 is sufficient. This method is used temporarily if the
soil is loose and no revetting materials are available. The
ratio of 1:3, for example, will determine the slope by moving 1
foot horizontally for each 3 feet vertically. When wall sloping
is used, the walls are first dug vertically and then sloped.
Facing revetments serve mainly to protect revetted surfaces from
the effects of weather and occupation. It is used when soils are
stable enough to sustain their own weight. This revetment
consists of the revetting or facing material and the supports
which hold the revetting material in place. The facing material
is usually much thinner than that used in a retaining wall.
Facing revetments are preferable to wall sloping since less
excavation is required. The top of the facing is set below
ground level. The facing is constructed of brushwood hurdles,
continuous brush, poles, corrugated metal, plywood, or burlap
and chicken wire. The following paragraphs describe the method
of constructing each type.
Brushwood Hurdle. A brushwood hurdle is a woven revetment unit
usually 6½ feet long and as high as the revetted wall. Pieces of
brushwood about 1 inch in diameter are weaved on a framework of
sharpened pickets driven into the ground at 20-inch intervals.
When completed, the 6 ½-foot lengths are carried to the position
where the pickets are driven in place. The tops of the pickets
are tied back to stakes or holdfasts and the ends of the hurdles
are wired together.
Continuous Brush. A continuous brush revetment is constructed in
place. Sharpened pickets 3 inches in diameter are driven into
the bottom of the trench at 30-inch intervals and about 4 inches
from the revetted earth face. The space behind the pickets is
packed with small, straight brushwood laid horizontally. The
tops of the pickets are anchored to stakes or holdfasts.
Pole. A pole revetment is similar to the continuous brush
revetment except that a layer of small horizontal round poles,
cut to the length of the revetted wall, is used instead of
brushwood. If available, boards or planks are used instead of
poles because of quick installation. Pickets are held in place
by holdfasts or struts.
Corrugated Metal Sheets or Plywood. A revetment of corrugated
metal sheets or plywood is usually installed rapidly and is
strong and durable. It is well adapted to position construction
because the edges and ends of sheets or planks are lapped, as
required, to produce a revetment of a given height and length.
All metal surfaces are smeared with mud to reduce possible
reflection of thermal radiation and aid in camouflage. Burlap
and chicken wire revetments are similar to revetments made from
corrugated metal sheets or plywood. However, burlap and chicken
wire does not have the strength or durability of plywood or
sheet metal in supporting soil.
Methods to Support Facing
The revetment facing is usually supported by timber frames or
pickets. Frames of dimensioned timber are constructed to fit the
bottom and sides of the position and hold the facing material
apart over the excavated width.
Pickets are driven into the ground on the position side of the
facing material. The pickets are held tightly against the facing
by bracing them apart across the width of the position. The size
of pickets required and their spacing are determined by the soil
and type of facing material used. Wooden pickets smaller than 3
inches in diameter are not used. The maximum spacing between
pickets is about 6½ feet. The standard pickets used to support
barbed wire entanglements are excellent for use in revetting.
Pickets are driven at least 1½ feet into the floor of the
position. Where the tops of the pickets are anchored, an anchor
stake or holdfast is driveninto the top of the bank and tied to
the top of the picket. The distance between the anchor stake and
the facing is at least equal to the height of the revetted face,
with alternate anchors staggered and at least 2 feet farther
back. Several strands of wire holding the pickets against the
emplacement walls are placed straight and taut. A groove or
channel is cut in the parapet to pass the wire through.
SPECIAL CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
The easiest and most efficient method of preventing the
targeting and destruction of a position or shelter is use of
proper camouflage and concealment techniques. Major
considerations for camouflage use are discussed in appendix D.
Following are some general guidelines for position construction.
Natural concealment and good camouflage materials are used. When
construction of a positions begins, natural materials such as
vegetation, rotting leaves, scrub brush, and snow are preserved
for use as camouflage when construction is completed. If
explosive excavation is used, the large area of earth spray
created by detonation is camouflaged or removed by first placing
tarpaulins or scrap canvas on the ground prior to charge
detonation. Also, heavy equipment tracks and impressions are
disguised upon completion of construction.
Fields of fire are not overcleared. In fighting position
construction, clearing of fields of fire is an important
activity for effective engagement of the enemy. Excessive
clearing is prevented in order to reduce early enemy acquisition
of the position. Procedures for clearing allow for only as much
terrain modification as is needed for enemy acquisition and
Concealment from aircraft is provided. Consideration is usually
given to observation from the air. Action is taken to camouflage
position interiors or roofs with fresh natural materials, thus
preventing contrast with the surroundings.
During construction, the position is evaluated from the enemy
side. By far, the most effective means of evaluating concealment
and camouflage is to check it from a suspected enemy avenue of
Positions and shelters are designed to take advantage of the
natural drainage pattern of the ground. They are constructed to
Exclusion of surface runoff.
Disposal of direct rainfall or seepage.
Bypassing or rerouting natural drainage channels if they
are intersected by the position.
In addition to using materials that are durable and resistant to
weathering and rot, positions are protected from damage due to
surface runoff and direct rainfall, and are repaired quickly
when erosion begins. Proper position siting can lessen the
problem of surface water runoff. Surface water is excluded by
excavating intercepted ditches uphill from a position or
shelter. Preventing water from flowing into the excavation is
easier than removing it. Positions are located to direct the
runoff water into natural drainage lines. Water within a
position or shelter is carried to central points by constructing
longitudinal slopes in the bottom of the excavation. A very
gradual slope of 1 percent is desirable.
If water is allowed to stand in the bottom of an excavation, the
position is eventually undermined and becomes useless. Sumps and
drains are kept clean of silt and refuse. Parapets around
positions are kept clear and wide enough to prevent parapet soil
from falling into the excavation. When wire and pickets are used
to support revetment material, the pickets may become loose,
especially after rain. Improvised braces are wedged across the
excavation, at or near floor level, between two opposite
pickets. Anchor wires are tightened by further twisting. Anchor
pickets are driven in farther to hold tightened wires. Periodic
inspections of sandbags are made.
If the walls are crumbling in at the top of an excavation
(ground level), soil is cut out where it is crumbling (or until
firm soil is reached). Sandbags or sod blocks are used to build
up the damaged area. If excavation walls are wearing away at the
floor level, a plank is placed on its edge or the brushwood is
shifted down. The plank is held against the excavation wall with
short pickets driven into the floor. If planks are used on both
sides of the excavation, a wedge is placed between the planks
and earth is placed in the back of the planks. If an entire wall
appears ready to collapse, the excavation is completely
In almost all instances, fighting and protective positions are
prepared by teams of at least two personnel. During
construction, adequate frontal and perimeter protection and
observation are necessary. Additional units are sometimes
required to secure an area during position construction. Unit
personnel can also take turns with excavating and providing
BASIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
While it is desirable for a fighting position to give maximum protection to personnel and
equipment, primary consideration is always given to effective weapon use. In offensive combat
operations, weapons are sited wherever natural or existing positions are available, or where
weapon emplacement is made with minimal digging.
Positions are designed to defeat an anticipated threat. Protection against direct and indirect fire is
of primary concern for position design. However, the effects of nuclear and chemical attack are
taken into consideration if their use is suspected. Protection design for one type of enemy fire is
not necessarily effective against another. The following three types of cover-frontal, overhead,
and flank and rear-will have a direct bearing on designing and constructing positions.
Frontal cover provides protection from small caliber direct
fire. Natural frontal protection such as large trees, rocks, logs, and rubble is best because
enemy detection of fighting positions becomes difficult. However, if natural frontal protection is
not adequate for proper protection, dirt excavated from the position (hole) is used. Frontal cover
requires the position to have the correct length so that soldiers have adequate room; the correct
dirt thickness (3 feet) to stop enemy small caliber fire; the correct height for overhead protection;
and, for soldiers firing to the oblique, the correct frontal distance for elbow rests and sector
stakes. Protection from larger direct fire weapons (for example, tank guns) is achieved by
locating the position where the enemy cannot engage it, and concealing it so pinpoint location is
not possible. Almost twice as many soldiers are killed or wounded by small caliber fire when
their positions do not have frontal cover.
Overhead cover provides protection from indirect fire
fragmentation. When possible, overhead cover is always constructed to enhance
protection against airburst artillery shells. Overhead cover is necessary because soldiers are at
least ten times more protected from indirect fire if they are in a hole with overhead cover.
Flank and Rear
Flank and rear cover ensures complete protection for fighting
position. Flank and rear cover protects soldiers against the effects of indirect fire bursts to
the flanks or rear of the position, and the effects of friendly weapons located in the rear (for
example, packing from discarded sabot rounds fired from tanks). Ideally, this protection is
provided by natural cover. In its absence, a parapet is constructed as time and circumstances
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY
The position is usually uncomplicated and strong, requires as little digging as possible, and is
constructed of immediately-available materials.
A high degree of imagination is essential to assure the best use of available materials. Many
different materials existing on the battlefield and prefabricated materials found in industrial and
urban areas can be used for position construction.
Positions should allow for progressive development to insure flexibility, security, and protection
in depth. Hasty positions are continuously improved into deliberate positions to provide
maximum protection from enemy fire. Trenches or tunnels connecting fighting positions give
ultimate flexibility in fighting from a battle position or strongpoint. Grenade sumps are usually
dug at the bottom of a position's front wall where water collects. The sump is about 3 feet long,
½ foot wide, and dug at a 30-degree angle. The slant of the floor channels excess water and
grenades into the sump. In larger positions, separate drainage sumps or water drains are
constructed to reduce the amount of water collecting at the bottom of the position.
CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT
Camouflage and concealment activities are continual during position siting preparation. If the
enemy cannot locate a fighting position, then the position offers friendly forces the advantage of
firing first before being detected. Appendix D of this manual contains additional information on
INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS
The table below summarizes the hasty and deliberate individual fighting positions and provides
time estimates, equipment requirements, and protection factors.
When time and materials are limited, troops in contact with the enemy use a hasty fighting
position located behind whatever cover is available. It should provide frontal protection from
direct fire while allowing fire to the front and oblique. For protection from indirect fire, a hasty
fighting position is located in a depression or hole at least l ½ feet deep. The following positions
provide limited protection and are used when there is little or no natural cover. If the unit
remains in the area, the hasty positions are further developed into deliberate positions which
provide as much protection as possible.
Deliberate fighting positions are modified hasty positions prepared during periods of relaxed
enemy pressure. If the situation permits, the unit leader verifies the sectors of observation before
preparing each position. Continued improvements are made to strengthen the position during the
period of occupation. Small holes are dug for automatic rifle bipod legs so the rifle is as close to
ground level as possible. Improvements include adding overhead cover, digging trenches to
adjacent positions, and maintaining camouflage.
CREW-SERVED WEAPONS FIGHTING POSITIONS
The table below summarizes crew-served weapons fighting positions and provides time
estimates, equipment requirements, and protection factors.
This section contains designs for fighting and protective positions for major weapons systems
vehicles and their support equipment. Initially, vehicles use the natural cover and concealment in
hide positions to increase survivability. As time, assets, and situation permit, positions are
prepared using organic excavation equipment or engineer support. Priority is given to those
vehicles containing essential mission-oriented equipment or supplies. Drivers and crews should
use these fighting positions for individual protection also.
Parapets positioned at the front of or around major weapons systems will provide improved
protection from direct fire and from blast and fragments of indirect fire artillery, mortar, and
rocket shells. At its base, the parapet has a thickness of at least 8 feet. Further, the parapet
functions as a standoff barrier for impact-detonating direct fire HEAT and ATGM projectiles.
The parapet should cause the fuzes to activate, thereby increasing survivability for the protected
vehicles. If the expected enemy uses kinetic energy direct fire armor piercing or hypervelocity
projectiles, it is impossible to construct parapets thick enough for protection. To protect against
these projectiles, deep-cut, hull defilade, or turret defilade positions are prepared. The
dimensions for fighting and protective positions for essential vehicles are constructed no larger
than operationally necessary.
Success on the battlefield requires maneuver among fighting positions between main gun firings.
Maximum use of wadis, reversed slope hills, and natural concealment is required to conceal
fighting vehicles maneuvering among fighting positions. After a major weapon system fires its
main gun, the vehicle and gun usually must maneuver concealed to another position before firing
again. If the major weapon system immediately reappears in the old position, the enemy will
know where to fire their next round. The table summarizes dimensions of the hasty and
deliberate vehicle positions discussed in the following paragraphs. Construction planning factors
for vehicle fighting positions are shown in the table.
Hasty fighting positions for combat vehicles including armored personnel carriers (APCs),
combat engineering vehicles (CEVs), and mortar carriers take advantage of natural terrain
features or are prepared with a minimum of construction effort. A frontal parapet, as high as
practical without interfering with the vehicles' weapon systems, shields from frontal attack and
provides limited concealment if properly camouflaged. Protection is improved if the position is
made deeper and the parapet extended around the vehicle's sides. Because of the false sense of
security provided by parapets against kinetic energy and hypervelocity projectiles, hasty vehicle
fighting positions with parapets are not recommended for tanks, infantry fighting vehicles
(IFVs), and improved TOW vehicles (ITVs). Hasty fighting positions do offer protection from
HEAT projectiles and provide limited concealment if properly camouflaged. As the tactical
situation permits, hasty positions are improved to deliberate positions.
Deliberate fighting positions are required to protect a vehicle from kinetic energy hypervelocity
projectiles. The position is constructed in four parts: hull defilade, concealed access ramp or
route, hide location, and turret defilade. Positions formed by natural terrain are best because of
easy modification; however, if preparation is necessary, extensive engineer support is required.
Each position is camouflaged with either natural vegetation or a camouflage net, and the spoil is
flattened out or hauled away. All fighting positions for fighting vehicles (tanks, IFVs, ITVs)
are planned as deliberate positions. Since the lack of time usually does not allow the full
construction of a deliberate position, then only some parts of the position's construction are
prepared. For example, the complete fighting position for a tank requires the construction of a
hull defilade, turret defilade, concealed access ramp or route, and hide location all within the
same fighting position. The maneuver team commander uses organic and engineer earthmoving
assets and usually constructs fighting position parts in the following order:
Concealed access ramp or route.
Vehicle protective positions are constructed for vehicles and weapons systems which do not
provide direct fire against the enemy. The positions are neither hasty nor deliberate because they
all require extensive engineer assets and construction materials to build. Unless separate
overhead cover is constructed, the positions do not provide blast protection from indirect fire
super quick, contact, or delay fuze shells. The positions do, however, provide medium artillery
shell fragmentation protection from near-miss bursts greater than 5 feet from the position, and
from direct fire HEAT projectiles 120mm or less fired at the base of the position's 8-foot thick
Trenches are excavated to connect individual fighting positions and weapons positions in the
progressive development of a defensive area. They provide protection and concealment for
personnel moving between fighting positions or in and out of the area. Trenches are usually
included in the overall layout plan for the defense of a position or strongpoint. Excavating
trenches involves considerable time, effort, and materials, and is only justified when an area is
occupied for a long time. Trenches are usually open excavations, but covered sections provide
additional protection if the overhead cover does not interfere with the fire mission of the
occupying personnel. Trenches are difficult to camouflage and are easily detected, especially for
the air. Trenches, as other fighting positions, are developed progressively. They are improved by
digging deeper, from a minimum of 2 feet to about 5 ½ feet. As a general rule, deeper excavation
is desired for other than fighting trenches to provide more protection or allow more headroom.
Some trenches may also require widening to accommodate more traffic, including stretchers. It is
usually necessary to revet trenches that are more than 5 feet deep in any type of soil. In the
deeper trenches, some engineer advice or assistance is usually necessary in providing adequate
drainage. Two basic trenches are the crawl trench and the standard fighting trench.
Each trench is constructed to the length required and follows either an octagonal or zigzag trace
pattern. Special combinations and modifications are made to meet battlefield demands.
Survivability operations are required to support the deployment of units with branch-specific
missions, or missions of extreme tactical importance. These units are required to deploy and
remain in one location for a considerable amount of time to perform their mission. Thus, they
may require substantial protective construction.
Forward logistics are subdivided into the following areas normally found in the brigade trains
area of a mechanized division:
Field trains (elements of maneuver battalions and companies).
Forward supply points.
Forward support maintenance.
Battalion aid stations.
Shelters described in the next section (Special Designs) are adequate for general supply storage.
In practice, most of the supplies remain on organic trucks and trailers in forward areas so trains
can responsively move to support combat forces. They are protected by deep-cut vehicle
positions or walls.
Forward Supply Points
Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products are a critical supply category in mechanized
operations. Tanker trucks of the supply points are protected by natural berms or deep-cut
protective positions. Overhead cover is impractical for short periods of occupancy, but maximum
use is made of camouflage nets and natural terrain concealment. Class I, II, and IV supplies not
kept in vehicles are placed in deep-cut trenches when time permits, but are of low priority for
protection since even a direct hit on unprotected items may not completely destroy stocks.
Forward Support Maintenance
In a highly fluid battle situation where frequent displacement of the forward support company is
required, the company cannot afford the effort required to construct extensive protective
positions and shelters due to conflicts with basic mission accomplishment. Further, the company
base of operations is close to the brigade trains area which is relatively secure from overt ground
attack. Also, a large portion of the company is habitually employed away from the company area
providing contact teams to supported units. Thus, the basic protection requirements are simple
positions for individuals and crew-served weapons. The specific number of positions is
determined by the size of the company position perimeter and the number of personnel and crewserved weapons available to protect the perimeter. In the principal company area, individual
positions are constructed near their billeting areas and on the periphery of their work sections.
Simple cut-and-cover or other expedient shelters are constructed next to principal shop facilities
to provide immediate protection from artillery/ air attack. These shelters are usually not larger
than 10-person shelters.
The amount of equipment emplaced at a medical clearing station varies from mission to mission.
Protection for a minimum of 40 patients is required as soon as possible. Design and construction
of shelters with adequate overhead cover is mandatory so medical care and treatment are not
interrupted by hostile action. Enemy air activity may hinder prompt evacuation of patients from
the clearing station; thus, adequate shelter for both holding and treating patients becomes
paramount. For planning purposes, shelters for protecting 20 personnel on litters or folding cots,
and smaller shelters for surgery, X-ray, laboratory, dental, and triage functions are considered.
The deliberate shelters are generally well-suited to these activities.
Protection for personnel organic to medical companies is provided by individual and crew-served
weapons positions. When the situation permits, shelters are constructed for sleeping or other
activities. Ambulances and other vehicles also need protection. Vehicle protection is usually
deep-cut type, with maximum advantage taken of protection offered by terrain and vegetation.
Battalion Aid Stations
Battalion aid stations normally operate from a tracked vehicle situated behind natural terrain
cover. As time and resources permit, this site is improved with overhead cover and parapets
allowing vehicle access and egress. Although the patient-holding capacity of the aid station is
extremely limited, some permanent shelters are provided for patients held during periods when
enemy activity interrupts evacuation.
Miscellaneous activities include forward arming and refueling points (FARPs), water,
decontamination, clothing exchange, and bath points. In fast-moving combat situations where
established supply points are too distant to provide rapid fuel and ammunition service, FARPs
are established. With the anticipated short time of intense operation of the FARP, personnel have
little time for protective activities. Prefabricated defensive walls provide the necessary protection
within the short time available.
The various activities involved in water, decontamination, clothing exchange, and bath points
require protection for both customers and operating personnel. Equipment, such as power
sources (generators), needs protection from indirect fire fragmentation and direct fire. Operating
personnel need both individual fighting positions and protective positions. Many of the shelters
described in the next section (Special Designs) are adapted for aboveground use in
decontamination operations, clothing exchange, or bath points.
Artillery firebases are of extreme tactical importance and require substantial protective
construction. The most frequently constructed firebase houses are an infantry battalion command
element, two infantry companies, a 105-mm howitzer battery, and three to six 155-mm howitzer
batteries. A firebase housing the above units consists of the following facilities: infantry TOCs,
artillery FDCs, ammunition storage positions, garbage dump, command and control helicopter
pad, logistics storage area and sling-out pad, artillery firing positions, helicopter parking area and
refuel point, and hardened sleeping protective positions. Firebases usually are surrounded by a
protective parapet with perimeter fighting positions, two or more bands of tactical wire, hasty
protective minefield, and a cleared buffer zone to provide adequate fields of fire for perimeter
defense. (Field Manual 5-102 provides detailed information on minefield.) If a local water source
is available, an airportable water supply point is setup to provide water for the firebase and the
units in the local area.
Firebase construction is divided into three phases: combat assault and initial clearing (Phase I),
immediate construction (Phase II), and final construction (Phase III). Dedicated engineer support
is a requirement for the construction of a firebase.
Combat assault and initial clearing consists of securing the firebase site and clearing an area
large enough to accommodate CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters if the site is inaccessible by ground
vehicle. The time required to complete this phase depends on the terrain at the firebase site. If the
site is free of trees and undergrowth, or if these obstacles were removed by artillery and tactical
air fire preparation, combat engineers can move immediately to phase II after the initial combat
assault on the site. If the site is covered with foliage and trees, the security force and combat
engineers are required to descend into the site from hovering helicopters. Depending on the
density of the foliage on the site, completion of the initial clearing phase by combat engineers
with demolitions and chain saws may take up to 3 hours.
Immediate construction begins as soon as the cleared area can accommodate either ground
vehicles or, if the site is inaccessible by ground vehicle, medium or heavy lift helicopters. Two
light airmobile dozers are lifted to the site and immediately clear brush and stumps to expand the
perimeter and clear and level howitzer positions. Meanwhile, the combat engineers continue to
expand the perimeter with chain saws, demolitions, and bangalore torpedoes. If enough area is
available, a heavy airmobile dozer is usually committed to clear a logistics storage area and
sling-out pad, then expand the perimeter and fields of fire. The backhoes are committed to
excavate protective positions for the infantry TOC, artillery FDC, and, as soon as the perimeter
trace is established, perimeter fighting positions.
The immediate construction phase is characterized by the coordinated effort of infantry, artillery,
and engineer forces to produce a tenable tactical position by nightfall on the first day. A
coordinated site plan and list of priorities for transportation and construction are prepared and
constantly updated. Priorities and the site plan are established by the tactical commander in
coordination with the project engineer.
As soon as a perimeter trace is set up and the site is capable of accepting the logistics and
artillery lifts, maximum effort is directed toward the defenses of the firebase. Combat engineers
and the heavy dozer continue to push back the undergrowth to permit adequate fields of fire. The
two light airmobile dozers are committed to constructing a 5 to 8 foot thick parapet around the
perimeter to protect against direct fire. Infantry troops are committed to constructing perimeter
fighting positions at sites previously excavated by the backhoes. With the assistance of combat
engineers, the infantry troops also begin placing the first band of tactical wire, usually triple
standard concertina. Artillery troops not immediately committed to fire missions prepare
ammunition storage protective positions and parapets around each howitzer.
Final construction begins when construction forces complete the immediate defensive structures.
Combat engineers placing the tactical wire or clearing fields of fire begin construction of the
infantry TOG and artillery FDC. Infantry and artillery troops are committed to placing the
second band of tactical wire to building personnel sleeping protective positions with overhead
cover. Phase III is usually a continuous process, involving constant improvement and
maintenance. However, most protective structures, including sandbag protection of the TOC and
personnel positions, usually are completed by the end of the fourth day. Time is the controlling
parameter in construction of a firebase.
Strongpoints are another example of unit positions requiring substantial protective construction.
A strongpoint is a battle position fortified as strongly as possible within the time constraints to
withstand direct assaults from armor and dismounted infantry. It is located on key terrain critical
to the defense and controls an enemy main avenue of approach. In some cases, the brigade or
division commander may direct that a strongpoint be emplaced by a battalion or company-sized
unit. The strongpoint is essentially an antitank "nest" which tanks physically cannot overrun or
bypass, and which enemy infantry reduces only with expenditure of much time and
overwhelming forces. The strongpoint is the "cork" in a bottleneck formed by terrain, obstacles,
units and preplanned fires. The strongpoint is similar to a perimeter defense in that it is
developed to defeat an attack from any direction. It is distinguished from other defensive
positions by the importance of the terrain on which it is located and also by the time, effort, and
resources spent to its development. A strong-point is not setup on a routine basis.
Survivability tasks necessary to develop a strongpoint are divided into developing positions in
open areas and in urban or built-up areas. Critical survivability tasks in open areas include
Tank hull defilade positions as a minimum for primary, alternate, and supplementary
positions. Turret defilade and hide positions are prepared as time allows.
Dug-in positions for command, aid stations, and critical storage.
Covered routes between positions.
Critical survivability tasks in built-up areas include preparation of•
Covered routes between buildings.
The table summarizes construction estimates and levels of protection for the fighting positions,
bunkers, shelters, and protective walls presented in this section.
The following two positions are designed for use by two or more individuals armed with rifles or
machine guns. Although these are beyond the construction capabilities of non-engineer troops,
certain construction phases can be accomplished with little or no engineer assistance. For
example, while engineer assistance may be necessary to build steel frames and cut timbers for
the roof of a structure, the excavation, assembly, and installation are all within the capabilities of
most units. Adequate support for overhead cover is extremely important. The support system
should be strong enough to safely support the roof and soil material and survive the effects of
Bunkers are larger fighting positions constructed for squad-size units who are required to remain
in defensive positions for a longer period of time. They are built either above-ground or below
ground and are usually made of reinforced concrete. Because of the extensive engineer effort
required to build bunkers, they are usually made during strong-point construction. If time
permits, bunkers are connected to other fighting or supply positions by tunnels. Prefabrication of
bunker assemblies affords rapid construction and placement flexibility. Bunkers offer excellent
protection against direct fire and indirect fire effects and, if properly constructed with appropriate
collective protection equipment, they provide protection against chemical and biological agents.
Shelters are primarily constructed to protect soldiers, equipment, and supplies from enemy action
and the weather. Shelters differ from fighting positions because there are usually no provisions
for firing weapons from them. However, they are usually constructed near-or to supplementfighting positions. When available, natural shelters such as caves, mines, or tunnels are used
instead of constructing shelters. Engineers are consulted to determine suitability of caves and
tunnels. The best shelter is usually one that provides the most protection but requires the least
amount of effort to construct. Shelters are frequently prepared by support troops, troops making a
temporary halt due to inclement weather, and units in bivouacs, assembly areas, and rest areas.
Shelters are constructed with as much overhead cover as possible. They are dispersed and limited
to a maximum capacity of about 25 soldiers. Supply shelters are of any size, depending on
location, time, and materials available. Large shelters require additional camouflaged entrances
All three types of shelters-below ground, aboveground, and cut-and-cover-are usually sited on
reverse slopes, in woods, or in some form of natural defilade such as ravines, valleys, wadis, and
other hollows or depressions in the terrain. They are not constructed in paths of natural drainage
lines. All shelters require camouflage or concealment. As time permits, shelters are continuously
Below ground shelters require the most construction effort but generally provide the
highest level of protection from conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons.
Cut-and-cover shelters are partially dug into the ground and backfilled on top with as
thick a layer of cover material as possible. These shelters provide excellent protection from the
weather and enemy action.
Above-ground shelters provide the best observation and are easier to enter and exit than
below ground shelters. They also require the least amount of labor to construct, but are hard to
conceal and require a large amount of cover and revetting material. They provide the least
amount of protection from nuclear and conventional weapons; however, they do provide
protection against liquid droplets of chemical agents. Aboveground shelters are seldom used for
personnel in forward combat positions unless the shelters are concealed in woods, on reverse
slopes, or among buildings. Aboveground shelters are used when water levels are close to the
ground surface or when the ground is so hard that digging a below ground shelter is impractical.
The following shelters are suitable for a variety of uses where troops and their equipment require
protection, whether performing their duties or resting.
Several basic types of walls are constructed to satisfy various weather, topographical, tactical,
and other military requirements. The walls range from simple ones, constructed with hand tools,
to more difficult walls requiring specialized engineering and equipment capabilities.
Protection provided by the walls is restricted to stopping fragment and blast effects from nearmiss explosions of mortar, rocket, or artillery shells; some direct fire protection is also provided.
Overhead cover is not practical due to the size of the position surrounded by the walls. In some
cases, modification of the designs shown will increase nuclear protection. The wall's
effectiveness substantially increases by locating it in adequately-defended areas. The walls need
close integration with other forms of protection such as dispersion, concealment, and adjacent
fighting positions. The protective walls should have the minimum inside area required to perform
operational duties. Further, the walls should have their height as near to the height of the
equipment as practical.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND SITUATIONS
SPECIAL TERRAIN ENVIRONMENTS
Jungles are humid, tropic areas with a dense growth of trees and
vegetation. Visibility is typically less than 100 feet, and
areas are sparsely populated. Because mounted infantry and armor
operations are limited in jungle areas, individual and crewserved weapons fighting position construction and use receive
additional emphasis. While jungle vegetation provides excellent
concealment from air and ground observation, fields of fire are
difficult to establish. Vegetation does not provide adequate
cover from small caliber direct fire and artillery indirect fire
fragments. Adequate cover is available, though, if positions are
located using the natural ravines and gullies produced by
erosion from the area's high annual rainfall.
The few natural or locally-procurable materials which are
available in jungle areas are usually limited to camouflage use.
Position construction materials are transported to these areas
and are required to be weather and rot resistant. When shelters
are constructed in jungles, primary consideration is given to
drainage provisions. Because of high amounts of rainfall and
poor soil drainage, positions are built to allow for good,
natural drainage routes. This technique not only prevents
flooded positions but, because of nuclear fallout washing down
from trees and vegetation, it also prevents positions from
becoming radiation hot spots.
Other considerations are high water tables, dense undergrowth,
and tree roots, often requiring above-ground level protective
construction. A structure used in areas where groundwater is
high, or where there is a low- pressure resistance soil, is the
fighting position platform, depicted below. This platform
provides a floating base or floor where wet or low pressure
resistance soil precludes standing or sitting. The platform is
constructed of small branches or timber layered over crossposts, thus distributing the floor load over a wider area. As
shown in the following illustrations, satisfactory rain shelters
are quickly constructed using easily-procurable materials such
as ponchos or natural materials. Field Manual 90-5 provides
detailed information on jungle operations.
Characteristics of mountain ranges include rugged, poorly
trafficable terrain, steep slopes, and altitudes greater than
1,600 feet. Irregular mountain terrain provides numerous places
for cover and concealment. Because of rocky ground, it is
difficult and often impossible to dig below ground positions;
therefore, boulders and loose rocks are used in aboveground
construction. Irregular fields of fire and dead spaces are
considered when designing and locating fighting positions in
Reverse slope positions are rarely used in mountainous terrain;
crest and near-crest positions on high ground are much more
common. Direct fire weapon positions in mountainous areas are
usually poorly concealed by large fields of fire. Indirect fire
weapon positions are better protected from both direct and
indirect fire when located behind steep slopes and ridges.
Another important design consideration in mountain terrain is
the requirement for substantial overhead cover. The adverse
effects of artillery bursts above a protective position are
greatly enhanced by rock and gravel displacement or avalanche.
Construction materials used for both structural and shielding
components are most often indigenous rocks, boulders, and rocky
soil. Often, rock formations are used as structural wall
components without modification. Conventional tools are
inadequate for preparing individual and crew-served weapons
fighting positions in rocky terrain. Engineers assist with light
equipment and tools (such as pneumatic jackhammers) delivered to
mountain areas by helicopter. Explosives and demolitions are
used extensively for positions requiring rock and boulder
removal. Field Manual 90-6 provides detailed information on
In areas with rocky soil or gravel, wire cages or gabions are
used as building blocks in protective walls, structural walls,
and fighting positions. Gabions are constructed of lumber,
plywood, wire fence, or any suitable material that forms a
stackable container for soil or gravel.
The two-soldier mountain shelter is basically a hole 7 feet
long, 3 ½ feet wide, and 3 ½ feet deep. The hole is covered with
6--to 8-inch diameter logs with evergreen branches, a shelter
half, or local material such as topsoil, leaves, snow, and twigs
placed on top. The floor is usually covered with evergreen
twigs, a shelter half, or other expedient material. Entrances
can be provided at both ends or a fire pit is sometimes dug at
one end for a small fire or stove. A low earth parapet is built
around the position to provide more height for the occupants.
Deserts are extensive, arid, arid treeless, having a severe lack
of rainfall and extreme daily temperature fluctuations. The
terrain is sandy with boulder-strewn areas, mountains, dunes,
deeply-eroded valleys, areas of rock and shale, and salt
marshes. Effective natural barriers are found in steep slope
rock formations. Wadis and other dried up drainage features are
used extensively for protective position placement.
Designers of fighting and protective positions in desert areas
must consider the lack of available natural cover and
concealment. The only minimal cover available is through the use
of terrain masking; therefore, positions are often completed
above ground. Mountain and plateau deserts have rocky soil or
"surface chalk" soil which makes digging difficult. In these
areas, rocks and boulders are used for cover. Most often,
parapets used in desert fighting or protective positions are
undesirable because of probable enemy detection in the flat
desert terrain. Deep-cut positions are also difficult to
construct in soft sandy areas because of wall instability during
excavations. Revetments are almost always required, unless
excavations are very wide and have gently sloping sides of 45
degrees or less. Designing over-head cover is additionally
important because nuclear explosions have increased fallout due
to easily displaced sandy soil.
Indigenous materials are usually used in desert position
construction. However, prefabricated structures and revetments
for excavations, if available, are ideal. Metal culvert
revetments are quickly emplaced in easily excavated sand,
Sandbags and sand-filled ammunition boxes are also used for
containing backsliding soil. Therefore, camouflage and
concealment, as well as light and noise discipline, are
important considerations during position construction. Target
acquisition and observation are relatively easy in desert
terrain. Field Manual 90-3 provides detailed information on
Cold regions of the world are characterized by deep snow,
permafrost, seasonally frozen ground, frozen lakes and rivers,
glaciers, and long periods of extremely cold temperatures.
Digging in frozen or semifrozen ground is difficult with
equipment, and virtually impossible for the soldier with an
entrenching tool. When possible, positions are designed to take
advantage of below ground cover. Positions are dug as deep as
possible, then built up. Fighting and protective position
construction in snow or frozen ground takes up to twice as long
as positions in unfrozen ground. Also, positions used in cold
regions are affected by wind and the possibility of thaw during
warming periods. An unexpected thaw causes a severe drop in the
soil strength which creates mud and drainage problems. Positions
near bodies of water, such as lakes or rivers, are carefully
located to prevent flooding damage during the spring melt
season. Wind protection greatly decreases the effects of cold on
both soldiers and equipment. The following areas offer good wind
Densely wooded areas.
Groups of vegetation; small blocks of trees or shrubs.
The lee side of terrain elevations. (The protected zone
extends horizontally up to three times the height of the
The three basic construction materials available in cold region
terrain are snow, ice, and frozen soil. Positions are more
effective when constructed with these three materials in
conjunction with timber, stone, or other locally-available
Dry snow is less suitable for expedient construction than wet
snow because it does not pack as well. Snow piled at road edges
after clearing equipment has passed densifies and begins to
harden within hours after disturbance, even at very low
temperatures. Snow compacted artificially, by the wind, and
after a brief thaw is even more suitable for expedient shelters
and protective structures. A uniform snow cover with a minimum
thickness of 10 inches is sufficient for shelter from the
weather and for revetment construction. Blocks of uniform size,
typically 8 by 12 by 16 inches, depending upon degree of
hardness and density, are cut from the snow pack with shovels,
long knives (machetes), or carpenter's saws. The best practices
for constructing cold weather shelters are those adopted from
natives of polar regions.
The systematic overlapping block-over-seam method ensures stable
construction. "Caulking" seams with loose snow ensures snug,
draft-free structures. Igloo shelters in cold regions have been
known to survive a whole winter. An Eskimo-style snow shelter,
depicted below, easily withstands above-freezing inside
temperatures, thus providing comfortable protection against wind
chill and low temperatures. Snow positions are built during
either freezing or thawing if the thaw is not so long or intense
that significant snow melt conditions occur. Mild thaw of
temperatures 1 or 2 degrees above freezing are more favorable
than below-freezing temperatures because snow conglomerates
readily and assumes any shape without disintegration. Belowfreezing temperatures are also necessary for snow construction
in order to achieve solid freezing and strength. If water is
available at low temperatures, expedient protective structures
are built by wetting down and shaping snow, with shovels, into
the desired forms.
The initial projectile-stopping capability of ice is better than
snow or frozen soil; however, under sustained fire, ice rapidly
cracks and collapses. Ice structures are built in the following
Layer-by-layer freezing by water. This method produces the
strongest ice but, compared to the other two methods, is more
time consuming. Protective surfaces are formed by spraying water
in a fine mist on a structure or fabric. The most favorable
temperature for this method is--10 to --15 degrees Celsius with
a moderate wind. Approximately 2 to 3 inches of ice are formed
per day between these temperatures (1/5-inch of ice per degree
Freezing ice fragments into layers by adding water. This method
is very effective and the most frequently used for building ice
structures. The ice fragments are about 1-inch thick and
prepared on nearby plots or on the nearest river or water
reservoir. The fragments are packed as densely as possible into
a layer 8 to 12 inches thick. Water is then sprayed over the
layers of ice fragments. Crushing the ice fragments weakens the
ice construction. If the weather is favorable (-10 to -15
degrees Celsius with wind), a 16- to 24-inch thick ice layer is
usually frozen in a day.
Laying ice blocks. This method is the quickest, but requires
assests to transport the blocks from the nearest river or water
reservoir to the site. Ice blocks, laid and overlapped like
bricks, are of equal thickness and uniform size. To achieve good
layer adhesion, the preceding layer is lightly sprayed with
water before placing a new layer. Each new layer of blocks
freezes onto the preceding layer before additional layers are
Frozen soil is three to five times stronger than ice, and
increases in strength with lower temperatures. Frozen soil has
much better resistance to impact and explosion than to steadilyacting loads--an especially valuable feature for position
construction purposes. Construction using frozen soil is
performed as follows:
Preparing blocks of frozen soil from a mixture of water and
Laying prepared blocks of frozen soil.
Freezing blocks of frozen soil together in layers.
Unfrozen soil from beneath the frozen layer is sometimes used to
construct a position quickly before the soil freezes. Material
made of gravel-sand-silt aggregate wetted to saturation and
poured like portland cement concrete is also suitable for
constructing positions. After freezing, the material has the
properties of concrete. The construction methods used are
analogous to those using ice. Fighting and protective positions
in arctic areas are constructed both below ground and above
Below ground positions. When the frost layer is one foot or
less, fighting positions are usually constructed below ground,
as shown. Snow packed 8 to 9 feet provides protection from
sustained direct fire from small caliber weapons up to and
including the Soviet 14.5-mm KPV machine gun. When possible,
unfrozen excavated soil is used to form parapets about 2-foot
thick, and snow is placed on the soil for camouflage and extra
protection. For added frontal protection, the interior snow is
reinforced with a log revetment at least 3 inches in diameter.
The outer surface is reinforced with small branches to initiate
bullet tumble upon impact. Bullets slow down very rapidly in
snow after they begin to tumble. The wall of logs directly in
front of the position safely absorbs the slowed tumbling bullet.
Overhead cover is constructed with 3 feet of packed snow placed
atop a layer of 6-inch diameter logs. This protection is
adequate to stop indirect fire fragmentation. A layer of small,
2-inch diameter logs is placed atop the packed snow to detonate
quick fuzed shells before they become imbedded in the snow.
Aboveground positions. If the soil is frozen to a significant
depth, the soldier equipped with only an entrenching tool and ax
will have difficulty digging a fighting position. Under these
conditions (below the tree line), snow and wood are often the
only natural materials available to construct fighting
positions. The fighting position is dug at least 20 inches deep,
up to chest height, depending on snow conditions. Ideally,
sandbags are used to revet the interior walls for added
protection and to prevent cave-ins. If sandbags are not
available, a lattice frame-work is constructed using small
branches or if time permits, a wall of 3-inch logs is built.
Overhead cover, frontal protection, and side and rear parapets
are built employing the same techniques described in chapter 4.
It is approximately ten times faster to build above-ground snow
positions than to dig in frozen ground to obtain the same degree
of protection. Fighting and protective positions constructed in
cold regions are excavated with combined methods using hand
tools, excavation equipment, or explosives. Heavy equipment use
is limited by traction and maneuverability. Explosives are an
expedient method, but require larger quantities than used in
normal soil. Crater formation from surface bursts of explosives
is possible and creates craters of a given depth and radius
based on the information in the first table below. Crater
formation by charges placed in boreholes is a function of charge
depth and charge weight as shown in the second table. A 15- or
40-pound shaped charge creates boreholes as indicated in the
Shelters are constructed with a minimum expenditure of time and
labor using available materials. They are ordinarily built on
frozen ground or dug in deep snow. Shelters that are completely
above ground offer protection against the weather and supplement
or replace tents. Shelter sites near wooded areas are most
desirable because the wood conceals the glow of fires and
provides fuel for cooking and heating. Tree branches extending
to the ground offer some shelter for small units or individual
Constructing winter shelters begins immediately after the halt
to keep the soldiers warm. Beds of foliage, moss, straw, boards,
skis, shelter halves, and ponchos are some times used as
protection against ground materials dampness and cold. The
entrance to the shelter, located on the side least exposed to
the wind, is close to the ground and slopes up into the shelter.
Openings or cracks in the shelter walls are caulked with an
earth and snow mixture to reduce wind effects. The shelter
itself is constructed as low to the ground as possible. Any fire
built within the shelter is placed low in fire holes and cooking
pits. Although snow is windproof, a layer of insulating
material, such as a shelter half or blanket, is placed between
the occupant and the snow to prevent body heat from melting the
Survivability of combat forces operating in urban areas depends
on the leader's ability to locate adequate fighting and
protective positions from the many apparent covered and
concealed areas available. Fighting and protective positions
range from hasty positions formed from piles of rubble, to
deliberate positions located inside urban structures. Urban
structures are the most advantageous locations for individual
fighting positions. Field Manual 90-10 contains detailed
information on urban terrain operations. Urban structures are
usually divided into groups of below ground and above-ground
Below Ground Structures
A detailed knowledge of the nature and location of below ground
facilities and structures is of potential value when planning
survivability operations in urban terrain. Typical underground
street cross sections are shown in the figure below.
Sewers are separated into sanitary, storm, or combined systems.
Sanitary sewers carry wastes and are normally too small for
troop movement or protection. Storm sewers, however, provide
rainfall removal and are often large enough to permit troop and
occasional vehicle movement and protection. Except for
groundwater, these sewers are dry during periods of no
precipitation. During rain-storms, however, sewers fill rapidly
and, though normally drained by electrical pumps, may overflow.
During winter combat, snow melt may preclude daytime below
ground operations. Another hazard is poor ventilation and the
resultant toxic fume build-up that occurs in sewer tunnels and
subways. The conditions in sewers provide an excellent breeding
ground for disease, which demands proper troop hygiene and
Subways tend to run under main roadways and have the potential
hazard of having electrified rails and power leads. Passageways
often extend outward from underground malls or storage areas,
and catacombs are sometimes encountered in older sections of
Aboveground structures in urban areas are generally of two
types: frameless and framed.
Frameless structures. In frameless structures, the mass of the
exterior wall performs the principal load-bearing functions of
supporting dead weight of roofs, floors, ceilings; weight of
furnishings and occupants; and horizontal loads. Frameless
structures are shown below.
Building materials for frameless structures include mud, stone,
brick, cement building blocks, and reinforced concrete. Wall
thickness varies with material and building height. Frameless
structures have thicker walls than framed structures, and
therefore are more resistant to projectile penetration. Fighting
from frameless buildings is usually restricted to the door and
Frameless buildings vary with function, age, and cost of
building materials. Older institutional buildings, such as
churches, are frequently made of stone. Reinforced concrete is
the principal material for wall and slab structures (apartments
and hotels) and for prefabricated structures used for commercial
and industrial purposes. Brick structures, the most common type
of frameless buildings, dominate the core of urban areas (except
in the relatively few parts of the world where wood-framed
houses are common). Close-set brick structures up to five
stories high are located on relatively narrow streets and form a
hard, shock-absorbing protective zone for the inner city. The
volume of rubble produced by their full or partial demolition
provides countless fighting positions.
Framed structures. Framed structures typically have a skeletal
structure of columns and beams which supports both vertical and
horizontal loads. Exterior (curtain) walls are nonload bearing.
Without the impediment of load bearing walls, large open
interior spaces offer little protection. The only available
refuge is the central core of reinforced concrete present in
many of these buildings (for example, the elevator shaft).
Multistoried steel and concrete-framed structures occupy the
valuable core area of most modern cities. Examples of framed
structures are shown in the following figure.
Material and Structural Characteristics
Urban structures, frameless and framed, fit certain material
generalities. The first table below converts building type and
material into height/wall thicknesses. Most worldwide urban
areas have more than 60 percent of their construction formed
from bricks. The relationship between building height and
thickness of the average brick wall is shown in the second table
SPECIAL URBAN AREA POSITIONS
After urban structures are classified as either frameless or
framed, and some of their material characteristics are defined,
leaders evaluate them for protective soundness. The evaluation
is based on troop protection available and weapon position
employment requirements for cover, concealment, and routes of
escape. The table below summarizes survivability requirements
for troop protection.
Cover. The extent of building cover depends on the proportion of
walls to windows. It is necessary to know the proportion of nonwindowed wall space which might serve as protection. Frameless
buildings, with their high proportion of walls to windows,
afford more substantial cover than framed buildings having both
a lower proportion of wall to window space and thinner (nonload
Composition and thickness of both exterior and interior walls
also have a significant bearing on cover assessment. Frameless
buildings with their strong weight-bearing walls provide more
cover than the curtain wails of framed buildings. However,
interior walls of the older, heavy-clad, framed buildings are
stronger than those of the new, light-clad, framed buildings.
Cover within these light-clad framed buildings is very slight
except in and behind their stair and elevator modules which are
usually constructed of reinforced concrete. Familiarity with the
location, dimension, and form of these modules is vital when
assessing cover possibilities.
Concealment. Concealment considerations involve some of the same
elements of building construction, but knowledge of the venting
(window) pattern and floor plan is added.
These patterns vary with type of building construction and
function. Older, heavy-clad framed buildings (such as office
buildings) frequently have as full a venting pattern as
possible, while hotels have only one window per room. In the
newer, light-clad framed buildings, windows are sometimes used
as a nonload bearing curtain wall. If the windows are all
broken, no concealment possibilities exist. Another aspect of
concealment undetected movement within the building depends on a
knowledge of the floor plan and the traffic pattern within the
building on each floor and from floor to floor.
Escape. In planning for escape routes, the floor plan, traffic
patterns, and the relationships between building exits are
considered. Possibilities range from small buildings with front
street exits (posing unacceptable risks), to high-rise
structures having exits on several floors, above and below
ground level, and connecting with other buildings as well.
Survivability requirements for fighting positions for
individuals, machine guns, and antitank and antiaircraft weapons
are summarized in the table below.
Individual fighting positions. An upper floor area of a
multistoried building generally provides sufficient fields of
fire, although corner windows can usually encompass more area.
Protection from the possibility of return fire from the streets
requires that the soldier know the composition and thickness of
the building's outer wall. Load bearing walls generally offer
more protection than the curtain walls of framed buildings.
However, the relatively thin walls of a low brick building (only
two-bricks thick or 8 inches) is sometimes less effective than a
15-inch thick nonload bearing curtain wall of a high-rise framed
The individual soldier is also concerned about the amount of
overhead protection available. Therefore, the soldier needs to
know about the properties of roof, floor, and ceiling materials.
These materials vary with the type of building construction. In
brick buildings, the material for the ceiling of the top floor
is far lighter than that for the next floor down that performs
as both ceiling and floor, and thus is capable of holding up the
room's live load.
Machine gun positions. Machine guns are usually located on the
ground floor to achieve grazing fire. In brick buildings, the
lower floors have the thickest walls and thus the greatest
degree of cover. In frame buildings, walls are the same
thickness on every floor and thus the ground floor provides no
advantage. Another consideration is the nature of the local
terrain. Should a building selected for a machine gun position
lie over the crest of a hill, grazing fire is sometimes not
possible from a ground floor. In such cases, depending on the
area's slope angle, grazing fire is achieved only from a higher
Antitank weapon positions. The positioning of antitank weapons
within buildings demands consideration of the critical need for
cover. Buildings with fairly thick walls have rooms that are too
small to permit firing of heavy antitank weapons, such as the
TOW. Therefore, only the LAW, Dragon, and the 90-mm recoilless
rifle (RCLR) are usually fired from these buildings. When
antitank weapons are fired, backblast is present as illustrated
When weapons are fired in enclosed areas in structures, the
following conditions are required:
The area must have a ceiling at least 7 feet high. Minimum
floor sizes by weapon and type of construction are as shown
in the table below.
Approximately 20 square feet of ventilation is necessary to
the rear of the weapons. An open door normally provides
Small, loose objects and window/door glass are removed from
the firing area.
Combustible material is removed from behind the weapon.
Curtains and over-stuffed furniture out of the blast area
are usually left in place to help absorb sound.
For ATGMs, vertical clearances between the bottom of the
launch tube and the wall opening are 6 inches for TOW and 9
inches for Dragon.
Occupants must be forward of the rear of the weapon and
wear helmets and earplugs.
For heavy ATGMs (TOWS) designed for effectiveness up to 3,750 meters, there is an acute need
to select light-clad framed buildings that have considerable fields of fire.
Antiaircraft weapon positions. The deployment of antiaircraft
weapons can also be related to a consideration of building
characteristics. An ideal type of building for such deployment
is a modern parking garage (one with rooftop parking). It offers
sufficient cover, a circulation pattern favoring such weapons
carried on light vehicles, and frequently offers good lines of
Other Planning Considerations
Fighting and protective positions located inside urban buildings
sometimes require upgrade or reinforcement. Prior to planning
building modification, the following factors are considered:
Availability of materials such as fill for sandbags.
Transporting materials up stairwells and into attics.
Structural limitations of attics and upper level floors
(dead load limitations).
The United States maintains substantial forces in Europe for
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations and forces
in Korea as part of the combined forces command (CFC). In these
areas, established command and control arrangements permit
detailed peacetime planning, base development, and host nation
support agreements. In most potential combat theaters, however,
international agreements with United States allies on principles
and procedures do not exist or are only partially developed. In
both types of possible theaters of operations, combat activities
will involve combined operations with allied forces.
Interoperability is the capability of multinational forces to
operate together smoothly. Commanders involved in combined
survivability operations must have a knowledge of standing
operating procedures (SOPS), standardization agreements
(STANAGS), and any other procedural agreements made between
forces. In addition, a commander should maximize training and
use of equipment and supplies organic to friendly foreign
forces. Host nation support agreements may provide equipment and
indigenous labor for protective construction. These assets
require full identification and use. Interoperability is
discussed in FM 100-5.
Terrain and climate characteristics of the following three NATO
regions are critical to the survivability planner in Europe.
ALLIED FORCES, NORTHERN EUROPE (AFNORTH)
The Northern European Command, also known as Allied Forces,
Northern Europe (AFNORTH), is made up of Norway, Denmark, and
that portion of the Federal Republic of Germany north of the
Elbe river. The climate of this area includes subarctic and
arctic winters which, in some locales, 8 months out of the year.
Terrain is generally very lightly wooded and susceptible to
flooding in many areas.
ALLIED FORCES, CENTRAL EUROPE (AFCENT)
Allied Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT) includes most of Western
Europe-specifically West Germany. The climate of this area is
usually cold and wet. The terrain is generally rolling and open,
with many urban and built-up areas of 50,000 population and
ALLIED FORCES, SOUTHERN EUROPE (AFSOUTH)
Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) includes Italy, Greece,
Turkey, and countries in the Mediterranean area. Generally, this
area has a warm and comfortable climate, but it also includes
some bitterly cold regions. The terrain of northern Italy,
Greece, Turkish Thrace, and eastern Turkey is mountainous and
affords excellent natural protection. The plains of the Po River
Valley, however, provide unrestricted mobility and direct fire,
and require substantial protection activities.
PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM)
United States forces stationed from the west coast of the
Americas to the east coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean
come under the umbrella of the Pacific Command (PACOM). Two
important areas of the command are Japan and Korea. As in NATO,
important differences in capabilities, doctrine, and equipment
exist among various national forces in PACOM. Unlike NATO, few
STANAGS exist to negotiate the differences.
The powerful North Korean army is a threat to the Republic of
Korea (ROK). It is continually poised for attack along the 151mile demilitarized zone (DMZ). The area in which protection
activities would take place includes mountainous, rugged terrain
with a temperate, monsoonal climate. Most of the terrain favors
light infantry operations, yet two major avenues of approach
from the north allow mechanized activity. Because of the
segregation of US and ROK units, existing survivability
/interoperability problems are considered when protection
activities are planned.
The five major islands of Japan have a climate similar to that
of the east coast of the United States. The islands are mostly
mountainous, with the urban areas and huge population centers
situated in and around the remaining habitable areas. Operations
in Japan are governed by the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan.
Significant efforts are required to ensure interoperability of
forces. Survivability tasks will most likely center around
protection of built-up areas.
Contingency operations, generally initiated under circumstances
of great urgency, are geared to protect vital natural resource
supplies or assist a threatened ally. The US contingency force
must have the capability to defeat a threat which varies from
terrorist activity to well-organized regional forces armed with
modern weapons. Contingency forces must prepare for chemical and
nuclear warfare, and also for air attack by modern, wellequipped air forces. Fighting and protective positions are
initially prepared for antitank weapons, ADA forces, and field
artillery weapons in order to deny the enemy both air
superiority and free ground maneuver. Most potential locations
for contingency operations are relatively undeveloped. Logistics
and base support requirements will dictate operational
capabilities to a much greater extent than in a mature theater.
Planners must provide ample logistic basic loads for initial
construction and use locally available materials for expedient
General contingency plans must allow for rapid changes in the
tasks, organization, and support to adapt to widely-varied
potential threats and environments. The composition of the
contingency force must permit rapid strategic deployment by air.
At the same time, it must possess sufficient combat power and
equipment to provide necessary engineer support. The lack of
logistic support for the deployed task force requires a
capability to fully exploit whatever host nation support is
Deployed engineer forces are responsible for all engineer
functions. Initially, there is little back-up support for
engineers organic to combat forces; however, engineer support in
the survivability effort is essential. Survivability missions in
contingency operations are of primary importance after
deployment. The force requires protection at all levels since
the enemy often expects the force's arrival, and since assembly
areas are limited until specific missions are developed. Due to
the light force structure and limited logistical support,
priorities are established to determine where the engineers
should dedicate their resources. Conditions such as delayed
supply and resupply operations, and scarcity of engineer
equipment, demand force maneuver units or light forces to
prepare their own fighting and protective positions. The
situation will determine whether shifts from those priorities
This appendix contains powered survivability equipment used in
engineer operations. The operational concepts and capabilities
for each system are presented. The following table contains
general excavation capabilities for survivability equipment.
Outputs depend on operational efficiency, soil conditions,
weather, and cycle time. Production estimates determine
equipment required, completion time, and best performance
methods for the project. Technical Manuals 5-331A and 5-331B
provide detailed information on estimates for production,
loading, and hauling.
M9 Armored Combat Earthmover (ACE)
The M9 is a highly-mobile, armored, amphibious combat
earthmover, capable of performing mobility, countermobility, and
survivability tasks in support of light or heavy forces on the
integrated battlefield. The vehicle hull is a welded and bolted
aluminum structure with four basic compartments: engine
compartment, operator's compartment, bowl, and rear platform.
The bowl occupying the front half of the hull is the earth and
cargo compartment. Directly behind the bowl are the operator's
and engine/transmission compartments. Below the platform, in the
rear quarter of the hull, is a two-speed winch with 25,000-pound
capacity for recovery operations. A towing pintle and airbrake
connections are provided for towing loads.
With track pads removed, the M9 has bulldozing and earthmoving
characteristics comparable to the D7 dozer. The M9 is equipped
with a unique hydropneumatic suspension system which allows the
front of the vehicle to be raised, lowered, or tilted to permit
dozing, excavating, rough grading, and ditching operations. A
self-ballasting capability of the M9 gives it earthmoving
characteristics equal to an item of equipment twice its empty
weight. The M9 provides light armor and chemical agent
protection for the operator, and armor protection for the
operator, engine, power train, and other key components. It is
capable of 30 miles per hour (mph) road speeds on level terrain,
when unballasted, and can swim at 3 mph in calm water. The M9 is
airtransportable by C130, C141, and C5A aircraft.
M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV)
The combat engineer vehicle (CEV) is a full-tracked armored
vehicle which consists of a basic M60Al tank with a frontmounted, hydraulically-operated dozer blade, surmounted by a
turret bearing a 165-mm demolition gun, a retractable boom of
welded tubular construction, and a winch. The demolition gun is
operated from within the vehicle. The winch is housed on the
rear of the turret and is used in conjunction with the boom to
lift, or without the boom to provide direct pull. The vehicle
and dozer blade are operated from the driver's compartment, The
demolition gun may be elevated or depressed for use at various
ranges of up to 950 meters. A .50-caliber machine gun is cupolamounted, and a 7.62-mm machine gun is coaxially-mounted with the
The CEV provides engineer troops in the forward combat area with
a versatile, armor-protected means of performing engineering
tasks under fire. Some of the tasks which are accomplished under
fire by the CEV are: reducing roadblocks and obstacles; filling
craters, tank ditches, and short, dry gaps; constructing combat
trails; preparing fighting or protective positions; assisting in
hasty minefield breaching; destroying fortifications; clearing
rubble and debris, reducing banks for river crossing operations;
and constructing obstacles.
The scoop loader, sometimes referred to as a front loader or
bucket loader, is a diesel engine-driven unit mounted on large
rubber tires. The hydraulically-operated scoop bucket is
attached to the front of the loader by a push frame and lift
arms. The loader is used as a one-piece general purpose bucket,
a rock bucket, or a multisegment (hinged jaw) bucket. The
multisegment bucket is used as a clamshell, dozer, scraper, or
scoop shovel. Other available attachments for the loader are the
forklift, crank hook, and snowplow. The current military
engineer scoop loaders range from 21 ½ - to 5-cubic yard rated
capacity, and are employed in the majority of engineer
organizations including airborne/air assault units and the
combat heavy battalion.
D7/D8 Crawler Tractors
The crawler tractor, commonly referred to as the bulldozer, is
used for dozing, excavating, grading, land clearing, and various
construction and survivability operations. The military models
D7 and D8 tractors are equipped with a power shift transmission,
hydraulically-operated dozer blade, and a rear-mounted winch or
ripper. The D7 tractor with an operating weight of 50,000
pounds, 200 horsepower diesel engine, and drawbar pull of 39,000
pounds, is classified as a medium tractor. The D8 tractor with
an operating weight of 83,000 pounds with ripper, 300 horsepower
diesel engine, and drawbar pull of 56,000 pounds, is classified
as a heavy tractor.
JD410 Utility Tractor
The John Deere (JD) 410 is a commercial piece of construction
equipment used to excavate 2-foot wide ditches up to 15 feet
deep. It also has a front loader bucket of 1 ¼-cubic yard
capacity for backfilling ditches or loading material into dump
trucks. The tractor has front wheel steer and rear wheel drive.
The machine is also equipped with hydraulically-driven concrete
breaker, tamper, and auger attachments. The tractor has a road
speed of approximately 20 mph. For longer distances, the tractor
Small Emplacement Excavator (SEE)
The SEE is a highly mobile, all wheel drive, diesel enginedriven tractor equipped with a rear-mounted backhoe, a frontmounted dozer or loader, and portable hand-held auxiliary
hydraulic tools such as pavement breakers, rock drills, and
chain saws. The front-mounted attachments are interchangeable
through a quick hitch mount, and the rear mounted backhoe is
easily removed for rapid conversion to other configurations. The
tractor is used to rapidly excavate small combat positions such
as TOW weapon positions, individual fighting positions, mortar
positions, and command posts in the main battle area. The weight
of the tractor is limited to 16,000 pounds. The SEE tractor has
improved road speeds up to 40 mph and cross-country speeds
comparable to supported tracked or wheeled units. The tractor is
equipped with a backhoe capable of excavating 14-foot depths at
a rate of approximately 30 cubic yards per hour. The dozer and
loader buckets provide defilade excavation capabilities in
addition to other tasks such as loading or dozing.
BUNKER AND SHELTER ROOF DESIGN
This appendix is used to design a standard stringer roof that will defeat a contact burst projectile
when the materials used are not listed in the table, Center-to-Center Spacing for Wood
Supporting Soil Cover to Defeat Contact Bursts. For example, if a protective position uses steel
and not wood stringers, then the procedure in this appendix is used for the roof design. The table,
Center-to-Center Spacing for Wood Supporting Soil Cover to Defeat Contact Bursts, was made
using the design steps in this procedure. The calculations are lengthy but basically simple. The
two example problems in this appendix were worked with a hand-held calculator and the
complete digital display is listed. This listing enables a complete step-by-step following without
the slight numerical variation caused by rounding. In reality, rounding each result to three
significant digits will not significantly alter the outcome. The roof is designed as follows.
STANDARD STRINGER ROOF
First, hand compute the largest half-buried trinitrotoluene (TNT) charge that the earth-covered
roof can safely withstand. Then, use the charge equivalency table to find the approximate size of
the super-quick or contact burst round that this half-buried TNT charge equals. The roof design
discussed here is for a simple stringer roof of single-ply or laminated sheathing covered with
earth (figure B-1). After determining the need for a bunker or shelter roof, the following
questions are addressed:
What type of soil will be used for cover (soil parameters)?
How deep will the soil cover be?
What will the size and orientation of the stringers be and what kind of stringers will be
used (stringer characteristics)?
What will the stringer span and spacing be?
DESIGN PROCEDURE DATA
Two soil parameters are needed in the design procedure-unit weight and transmission coefficient.
Soil unit weight must be determined at the time and place of design. Both the soil (sand, silt, for
example) and its water content affect unit weight. Soil unit weight is usually 80 to 140 pounds
per cubic foot. The transmission coefficient can be taken from table B-1
For wood stringers, the data needed in the design procedure are given in table B-2 and B-3. For
steel stringers, the moment of inertia (I) and section modulus (S) values needed in the procedure
are given in table B-4. For the modulus of elasticity (E) and maximum dynamic flexural stress
(FS) values, use E = 29 and FS = 50,000. (Additional structural design data is in FM 5-35.)
STANDARD STRINGER ROOF PROCEDURE
(Contact Burst Rounds)
Enter the unit weight of the soil (lb/cf) as determined on site
Enter the proposed depth of soil cover (ft)
Enter the S value (in 3 ):
if wood, from Table B-2
if steel, from Table B-4
Enter the stringer spacing (in)
Enter the FS value (psi):
if wood, from Table B-3
if steel, enter 50,000
Enter the stringer span length (ft)
Multiply line 1 by line 4, enter result
Multiply line 7 by line 2, enter result
Multiply line 8 by line 6, enter result
Multiply line 9A by line 6, enter result
Divide line 9B by 8, enter result
Divide line 9C by line 3, enter result
Divide line 9D by line 5, enter result
If the line 9E result is greater than O but less than 1.0 go to line
If line 9E is greater than 1.0, the roof system is overloaded. Then
do at least one of the following and recompute from line 1:
a. Decrease stringer spacing.
b. Decrease span length.
c. Use a material with a higher "S" or "FS" value.
d. Decrease soil cover.
Enter side A of Figure B-2 with the line 9E value, find the side
value, and enter result:
if wood, use µ = 1 curve
if steel, use µ = 10 curve
Enter the E value (106 psi):
if wood, from Table B-3
if steel, enter 29
Enter the I value (in4 ):
if wood, from Table B-2
if steel, from Table B-4
Multiply line 9A by 0.08333, enter result
Multiply line 12B by 0.64, enter result 1
Divide line 12C by line 9E, enter result
Multiply line 9A by 0.0001078, enter result
Multiply line 12A by line 11, enter result
Multiply line 6 by line 6, enter result
Multiply line 14B by line 6, enter result
Divide line 14A by line 14C, enter result
Multiply line 14D by 28,472.22, enter result
Divide line 14E by line 13, enter result
Take the square root of line 15, enter result
Divide line 12D by line 16, enter result
Multiply line 10 by line 17, enter result
Divide line 2 by line 6, enter result
Multiply line 19 by line 19, enter result
Take the square root of line 19, enter result
Multiply line 21A by line 20, enter result
Divide 0.6666667 by line 21B, enter result
Multiply line 20 by 4, enter result
Add 1 to line 23A, enter result
Divide 4 by line 23B, enter result
Take the square root of line 24, enter result
Take the square root of line 25A, enter result
Multiply line 25B by line 24, enter result
Add line 25C to line 22, enter result
Choose a C value from Table B-1, enter result
Multiply 61.32 by line 18, enter result
Take the square root of line 14C, enter result
Multiply line 28A by line 28B, enter result
Multiply line 27 by line 4, enter result
Multiply line 28D by line 26, enter result
Divide line 28C by line 28E, enter result
Raise line 28F to the 0.8571 power (or use the graph in Figure
B-3), enter result
The value on line 29 is the largest half-buried TNT Charge (lb) that the roof can withstand. Enter
Table B-5 with this value to find the round having an equivalent charge weight equal to or less
than the value on line 26.
EXAMPLES USING THE DESIGN PROCEDURE
WOOD STRINGER ROOF
The 2-76th Infantry is about to relieve another battalion from defensive positions as shown in
figure B-4. The 1st Platoon of the A/52d Engineers is supporting the 2-76th. As its platoon
leader, you have been asked to find how much protection such positions give against the contact
burst of an HE round.
You first estimate that the 16-inch-deep soil cover (sand) weighs 100 lb/cf. You then note that
the roof is made of 4 by 4 stringers, laid side-by-side over a span of 88.75 inches.
B - 10
B - 11
B - 12
Thus, the largest TNT charge that the roof can withstand is 1.56 pounds. Entering Table B-5 with
this value, you find that the roof will withstand a contact burst explosion of up to an 82-mm frag
round (only 1.0-pound charge size) excluding the 76-mm HE round (1.8-pound charge site).
STEEL STRINGER ROOF
The 2-76th Infantry will occupy the positions described in the first example for an extended
period of time. Thus, the battalion commander has ordered the 1st Platoon of the A/52d
Engineers to construct a tactical operations center. This structure must have at least 10 by 12 feet
of floor space and be capable of defeating a contact burst of a Soviet 152-mm round. The S2 of
the A/52d Engineers reports that 13 undamaged 8-inch by 6 ½-inch wide flange beams have been
found. They are long enough to span 10 feet and can be salvaged from the remains of a nearby
demolished railroad bridge.
B - 13
As platoon leader, you are to design a roof for the tactical operations center using these beams as
stringers. You plan to place five of the stringers on 36-inch centers and cover them with a 4 by 4
wood deck. You use the same bagged sand as described in the first example. You begin your
design by assuming that the soil cover will be 3 feet deep.
B - 14
B - 15
Thus, the largest TNT charge that the stringers can withstand is 29.6 lb. You next use the
procedure again in a manner similar to that in example 1 to evaluate the 4x4 wood deck. You
find a line 29 value of 29.64. Enter Table B-5 with the largest of these values (29.6), you find
that the roof will withstand a contact burst explosion of up to a 160-mm HE round (only 16.3pound charge size). Thus, the roof you have designed will be capable of defeating a contact burst
of a Soviet 152-mm round.
B - 16
POSITION DESIGN DETAILS
C - 10
C - 11
C - 12
C - 13
C - 14
C - 15
C - 16
C - 17
C - 18
C - 19
C - 20
C - 21
C - 22
C - 23
C - 24
C - 25
C - 26
C - 27
C - 28
C - 29
C - 30
C - 31
C - 32
C - 33
C - 34
C - 35
C - 36
C - 37
C - 38
C - 39
C - 40
C - 41
C - 42
C - 43
C - 44
C - 45
C - 46
C - 47
C - 48
C - 49
C - 50
C - 51
C - 52
C - 53
C - 54
C - 55
C - 56
C - 57
C - 58
C - 59
C - 60
C - 61
C - 62
C - 63
Modern sensing devices detect objects or terrain disturbances
even though they are well camouflaged. These devices detect
reflected short-wave and radiated long-wave infrared (ir)
energy. Special video devices "read" ir energy and detect dead
or dying vegetation as well as objects painted similar to their
surroundings. As a counter, special camouflage paint having a
short-wave infrared response much like natural vegetation is
available. The long-wave or thermal infrared energy radiated by
a surface depends on the surface temperature. Hot surfaces
radiate much more energy than cool surfaces; thus, hot surfaces
are normally easier to detect with thermal infrared or heatsensitive devices. Certain precautions are taken against
detection by these devices.
Hot objects such as generators, stoves, or other heatgenerating items are not openly exposed.
Artificial surfaces are shaded or insulated to reduce solar
Distinctive shapes or patterns which readily identify the
type of feature or facility are obscured.
If natural material is used for camouflage, there are two major
considerations. First, gathering natural material nearby creates
voids, changes the appearance of the natural surroundings, and
reduces the effectiveness of the camouflage. Therefore, limbs
are cut from several trees, not just one. Also, limbs are cut as
close to the trunk or main branch as possible. A tree should
still appear "natural" after branches are cut. Secondly, while
natural material aids both visual and infrared camouflage
initially, it loses effectiveness as it dries out. Thus, when
vegetation is cut for camouflage use, it is watered and/or
replaced as it withers. The replaced camouflage is disposed of
so that it does not draw attention to the concealed area. Excess
soil from constructed positions, waste materials, and any worn
or damaged camouflage are moved to another area and made to look
like natural terrain. These materials are also used for
constructing a poorly camouflaged dummy position.
Regardless of the materials used to camouflage a bivouac site,
both visual and infrared capabilities are considered. For
example, a field fortification constructed of galvanized steel
is set in a grassy area. During midday, the steel appears
unnaturally bright to both visible and thermal infrared sensing
devices. In the visible range, it reflects more light than the
grass and differs in color. In the short-wave infrared range, it
appears darker than the surrounding vegetation. In the thermal
infrared range, it is much hotter than sod or vegetation.
Sodding the roof camouflages the position for all three types of
always possible, artificial materials are used. Paint or nets,
such as those used on vehicles, may help. Paint protects against
detection by visible and short-wave infrared devices, but
shading by nets reduces the thermal infrared signature and thus
the detectability of the site to heat-sensitive devices.
Natural materials are used for the three methods of concealmenthiding, blending, and disguising. Indigenous materials provide
the best concealment, are economical, and reduce logistic
requirements. For camouflaging, natural materials are divided
into four groups: growing vegetation (cut and planted), cut and
dead vegetation, inert substances of the earth, and debris.
Cut vegetation is used for temporary concealment, completing or
supplementing natural cover, and augmenting artificial cover. It
is also excellent for overhead screening if cuttings are
carefully placed to appear as in the natural state. Cut foliage
wilts and is therefore replaced frequently (every 3 to 5 hours).
In addition, cutting large amounts reveals the site. Inert
substances such as cut grass, hay, straw, or dead branches
require very little maintenance. However, because of their dry
nature, these items are a potential fire hazard and lose their
ability to provide infrared detection protection. Inert
materials are ideal when vegetation is dormant.
Other substances such as soil, sand, and gravel are used to
change or add color, provide coarse texture, simulate cleared
areas, or create shapes. Debris such as boxes, tin cans, old
bottles and junkyard items are also used for camouflage in some
cases. In winter, snow is used, but some differences are
expected between undisturbed and reworked snow, especially with
infrared detection devices.
Man-made materials fall into three categories: hiding and
screening, garnishing and texturing, and coloring.
Hiding and screening materials include prefabricated nets, net
sets, wire netting, snow fencing, truck tarpaulins, smoke, and
so forth. Generally, these materials are most effective when
used to blend with natural overhead or lateral cover.
Garnishing and texturing materials are used to add the desired
texture to such items as nets and screens. Examples of such
materials are gravel, cinders, sawdust, fabric strips, feathers,
wood shoring, and Spanish moss.
Coloring with standard camouflage paint, available in ten colors
in addition to black and white, allows selecting a color scheme
which blends with any natural surrounding. Normally, standard
camouflage paint has a dull finish, is nonfading, possesses a
certain degree of infrared reflectivity, covers in one coat, and
lasts approximately 9 months. If this paint is not available,
other materials such as crankcase oil, grease, or fieldexpedient paint can be used as a stopgap measure.
FIELD SITE DEVELOPMENT
The four stages in the development of a field site are planning,
occupation, maintenance, and evacuation. Since units often move
without an opportunity to plan, the first stage is sometimes
eliminated. In that case, the five points listed in the
following paragraph are satisfied after arrival to the area.
Because of the frequent halts characteristic of modern mobile
warfare, planning is difficult. Since there is seldom time or
facilities available for elaborate construction, sites are
quickly entered and evacuated. However, no matter how swift the
operation or how limited the time and facilities, the unit
commander plans for concealment. The general area of the halt is
determined by the tactical plan. Prior to entering the area, the
quartering party becomes familiar with the terrain pattern
through a careful study of maps and aerial photographs. The
party is also fully acquainted with the tactical plan and the
camouflage requirements. The five critical points for the party
Concealment of all-around position defense.
Camouflage begins before the unit moves in to occupy the site.
Vehicles are carefully controlled in their movements so telltale
tracks do not lead directly to a camouflaged position. All
traffic moves on existing roads or trails or follows tree lines.
Occupation is achieved with a carefully controlled traffic plan
which is strictly followed. Guides posted at route junctions,
fully aware of the camouflage plan, enforce camouflage
discipline. Turn-ins are marked to prevent widening of corners
by vehicles. Foot troops follow marked paths as closely as
possible. The position is sited so that it is not silhouetted
against the sky when viewed from an attacker's ground position.
It also blends--not contrasts--into the background.
Maximum use of trees, bushes, and dark areas of the terrain
reduces the amount of camouflage required and the likelihood of
air observation. It is equally important that the concealing
cover not be isolated, since a lone clump of vegetation or a
solitary structure is a conspicuous hiding place and will draw
enemy fire whether the enemy "sees" anything or not. The terrain
should look natural and not be disturbed any more than
absolutely necessary. This objective is best accomplished by
removing or camouflaging the spoil.
Natural terrain lines, such as edges of fields, fences,
hedgerows, and rural cultivation patterns, are excellent sites
for positions since they reduce the possibility of aerial
observation. Regular geometric layouts are avoided. The
lightweight camouflage screening system (LWCSS) is especially
important in preventing identification of recognizable military
Before any excavation is started, all natural materials, such as
turf, leaves, forest humus, or snow, are removed, placed aside,
and later used for restoring the natural appearance of the
terrain. When a position cannot be sited under natural cover,
camouflaged covers are valuable aids in preventing detection.
Materials native to the area are preferred; however, when
natural materials are used over a position, they must be
replaced before they wilt, change color, and lead to detection.
Next to occupation, maintenance is the most critical stage. If
the occupation was successful from a camouflage standpoint,
maintenance is relatively simple. Successful maintenance
involves frequent inspection of camouflage; active patrol
measures for discipline; and, where possible, aerial observation
and photos. When critical unit activities require congestion of
troops, such as for dining, the traffic plan must be rigidly
enforced. It is often necessary to use artificial overhead
cover, such as LWCSS. Garbage disposal pits are concealed, with
special care given to the spoil. During hours of reduced
visibility, it is human nature to relax and assume that the
enemy cannot see during darkness or in fog; however, the
maintenance of noise and light discipline, as well as
camouflage, is important at all times. Failure to maintain light
and noise discipline may make all other methods of camouflage
ineffective. Even during periods of reduced visibility, an
exposed light can be seen for several miles. Any unusual noise
or noise common to military activity may draw attention to its
New thermal imagery technology is capable of detecting equipment
not covered by thermal camouflage nets, regardless of light or
weather conditions. Generators, heaters, or any other running
engines create additional thermal signatures which must be
limited as much as possible. As a result, stricter camouflage
discipline is required during the hours of reduced visibility,
since a camouflage-undisciplined unit will become even more
recognizable. Wire and taped paths will aid personnel in finding
their way with minimum use of flashlights.
Although evacuation is the last operation at the halt site,
camouflage does not end when the unit prepares to move out. An
evacuated area can be left in such a state that aerial photos
reveal the strength and type of unit, its equipment, and even
its destination. It is an important part of camouflage to leave
the area looking undisturbed. Trash is carefully disposed of or
taken with the unit. Spoil is returned to its original location
to assume a unit is not engaged when it departs. If engaged, it
may not be possible to return the site to its original
CAMOUFLAGE OF UNIT POSITIONS
Since the command post is the nerve center of a military unit,
it is a highly-sought enemy target. Command posts have
functional requirements which result in creating easilyidentifiable signatures such as--
Converging communication lines, both wire and road.
Concentration of vehicles.
Heavy traffic which causes widened turn-ins.
New access routes to a position which could house a command
Protective wire and other barriers surrounding the site.
Defensive weapon positions around the site.
Primary camouflage solutions include intelligent use of the
terrain and backgrounds, and strict enforcement of camouflage
The site requirements of a large command post are primarily
reconnaissance and layout, quartering parties, rapid concealment
of elements, camouflage discipline, and a well-policed track
plan to prevent visitors from violating it. Since a large
headquarters is likely to remain in an area for a greater length
of time than a halted maneuver unit, the site must be capable of
being disclosed by changes in the terrain pattern. It is unwise
to locate a headquarters in the only large building within an
extensive area of operations. If the command post is located in
a building, there must be other buildings in the area to prevent
the target from being pin pointed.
Communications are the lifeblood of a command post. Command
posts sited to take advantage of existing roads and telephone
arid telegraph wires are easiest to conceal. When new
communication means must be created, natural cover and terrain
lines are used. The use of remote communications should be
concealed wherever possible.
After the site has been selected and camouflaged to supplement
whatever natural concealment is present, continued concealment
depends on discipline. Tracks are controlled; vehicles are
parked several hundred meters from the command post; security
weapons and positions are concealed and tracks to them made
inconspicuous; all spoil is concealed, and protective and
communication wires follow terrain lines and are concealed as
much as possible. Night blackout discipline is rigidly enforced.
Routes to visitor parking areas are maintained in accordance
with the track plan. Power generation equipment is also
concealed to protect against noise and infrared signature
In open terrain where natural concealment is afforded only by
small scrub growth and rocks, overhead camouflage is obtained by
using the LWCSS. Even in desert terrain, broken ground and scrub
vegetation form irregular patterns and are blended with
artificial materials. Digging-in reduces shadow and silhouettes,
and simplifies draping positions or tents. In open terrain,
dispersion is particularly important. Routes between elements
are concealed or made by indirect in straight lines.
CAMOUFLAGE OF CIVILIAN STRUCTURES
A headquarters within an existing civilian structure presents
the problem of hiding day movement and concealing the evidence
of night activity when blackout conditions prevail. Military
movement in a village or a group of farm buildings is less
discoverable if kept to a minimum. Attempts to alter the
appearance of buildings by disruptive painting is evidence of
occupation and simply reveals a military presence. Erection of a
small structure simulating a new garage or other auxiliary
civilian building is unlikely to arouse suspicion. Any major
changes, however, especially if the enemy is familiar with the
area, will be closely scanned by enemy air observers. When
buildings are partially destroyed and left debris-littered,
installations are camouflaged with debris to blend with the
rough and jagged lines of the surroundings. A few broken
timbers, pieces of broken plaster, and a few scattered rags
accomplish quick and effective concealment. Other debris usually
available includes rubble, scrap metal, wrecked vehicles, and
CAMOUFLAGE OF SUPPLY POINTS
Camouflage of a supply point includes all the difficulties of
both maneuver unit and command post concealment, plus a number
of particularly troublesome factors peculiar to supply points
alone. Supply points vary in size from large concentrations of
materials in rear areas, to small piles of supplies in the
forward areas. Large amounts of equipment are quickly brought
up, unloaded, and concealed, yet are easily accessible for
redistribution. Flattops are used effectively providing the
supply points are not too large, time and materials are
available, and they blend with the terrain. For supply points
which cannot be concealed, decoy points will often disperse the
force of an enemy attack.
Natural concealment and cover are used whenever possible. Stacks
of supplies are dispersed to minimize damage from a single
attack. New access roads are planned using existing overhead
cover. In more permanent installations, tracks running through
short open areas are concealed by overhead nets slung between
trees. Traffic control includes measures to conceal activity and
movement at, to, and from the installation. Even when natural
cover is sparse or nonexistent, natural terrain features are
In cultivated fields, supplies are laid out along cultivation
lines and textured with strip-garnished twine nets to resemble
standing stubble. In plowed fields, supplies are stacked
parallel to the furrows and covered with earth-colored burlap
for effective concealment. Access routes are made along the
furrow, and no unnatural lines appear on the pattern.
Camouflage discipline measures at supply points include track
plans that result in minimal changes to terrain appearance,
debris control to prevent accumulation and enemy detection,
concealment and control of trucks waiting to draw supplies, and
CAMOUFLAGE OF WATER POINTS
Effective concealment of water points and other support
An adequately concealed road net.
Sufficient concealment to hide waiting vehicles.
Adequate concealment-artificial or natural for operating
personnel, storage tanks, and pumping and purification
Strict enforcement of camouflage discipline.
Control of spilled water and adequate drainage to prevent
standing pools of water which reflect light.
Foliage not sufficiently thick for perfect concealment is
supplemented by natural materials or LWCSS. Concealment is
required for water point equipment, the shine of water in the
tanks, and any small open areas that are crossed by vehicles or
personnel. Shine on water is concealed by a canvas cover or
foliage. The characteristic shape of tanks is distorted by
foliage or artificial materials. Camouflage discipline at a
water point requires a water supply schedule for using units.
Lack of a schedule, or violation of it, usually causes a jam of
waiting vehicles which cannot be concealed.
CAMOUFLAGE OF CREW-SERVED
AND INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONS
If positions are expertly camouflaged and maintained, the enemy
will have great difficulty in locating them until stumbling into
a kill zone. Natural materials used to camouflage fighting
positions should be indigenous to the area. As an example,
willow branches from the edge of a stream will not appear
natural in a grove of oaks. Since spoil may differ in color from
the ground surface, it may be necessary to camouflage the soil
or remove it from the unit area.
Routes taken by troops to fighting positions are obscured so
footprints or telephone lines do not reveal the positions. All
camouflage procedures used for any field location, both visual
and thermal, are successfully applied and maintained.
CAMOUFLAGE OF OTHER DEFENSIVE POSITIONS
Other positions are camouflaged the same way as positions
located in the defensive area. Positions include those for major
weapons, special design shelters, protective walls (in some
cases, obstacles), and trenches.
CAMOUFLAGE IN SPECIAL TERRAIN
Special terrain conditions, such as deserts, snow regions, and
urban areas require special camouflage measures.
Areas where there is no large convenient overhead cover are
unplowed fields, rocky areas, grasslands, and other wide-open
spaces. In certain types of flat terrain, shadow patterns and
judicious use of drape nets render objects inconspicuous. Units
in deserts or other featureless terrains are highly vulnerable
to breaches of light or sound discipline during day or night.
The eye's capability to reasonably discern stationary objects is
greatly reduced by this type of terrain. Dust trails from moving
vehicles identify a military position faster than open,
stationary, noncamouflaged vehicles. Luminosity at night in open
plain areas significantly degrades depth perception and,
dependent upon surface texture, makes visual observation useless
at long ranges and significantly enhances sound detection
A desert version of the LWCSS provides concealment against
visual, near infrared, and radar target acquisition/surveillance
sensor devices. A radar transparent version of the LWCSS allows
US units to camouflage radar without degrading operations. The
desert camouflage net is a complete cover since it depends on
ground surface imitation, both in color and texture, for effect.
A blanket of snow often eliminates much of the ground pattern
and makes blending difficult. Differences in texture and color
disappear or become less marked. Snow-covered terrain, however,
is rarely completely white. By taking advantage of dark features
in the lines, stream-beds, evergreen trees, bushes, shadows of
snowdrifts, folds in the ground, and the black shadows of
hillsides a unit on the move or halted successfully blends
itself into the terrain. However, exhaust, ice fog, and infrared
signatures are difficult to overcome regardless of how well the
unit is hidden.
Good route selection in snow-covered terrain is usually more
important than any other camouflage measure. Because of the
exposed tracks, skis and snowshoes are not used near the area
since their marks are more sharply defined than foot tracks, and
may be discovered with infrared imagery.
D - 10
To avoid tracking up the area, personnel, vehicles,
and material are restricted from open areas. Well
concealed positions in snow terrain are easily
identified when the snow melts, unless precautions
are taken. Light discipline is enforced to prevent
disclosure of the position. Compacted snow on
well-traveled paths melts slower than the
uncompacted snow, and leaves visible white lines
on a dark background. The snow is then broken up
and spread out to hasten melting.
By following communication lines
or other lines which are a natural
part of the terrain, tracks are
minimized. Tracks coinciding with
such lines are harder to identify.
A turn-in is concealed and the
tracks themselves continued beyond
the point. Windswept drift lines
cast shadows and are followed as
much as possible. Straight tracks
to an important installation are
avoided. Snow region camouflage
nets and paints assist in
Because vegetation is scarce in
urban areas, maximum use is made
of the shadows available. Outside
buildings, vehicles and defensive
positions use the shadows to
obscure their presence. Troops
inside buildings observe from the
shadow side of a window in order
to be inconspicuous. Combat in the
urban environment usually produces
considerable rubble from damaged
buildings and roads. This material
is used for obstacles as well as
camouflage for defensive
positions. These positions are
blended into the terrain and
placed behind rubble as it would
naturally fall from a building.
D - 11
In urban areas, the prime concerns for individual
fighting positions are exposure and muzzle flash.
When firing from behind a wall, the soldier fires
around cover (when possible), not over it. When
firing from a window, the soldier avoids standing
in the opening and being exposed to return fire.
Also, the soldier avoids firing
with the gun muzzle protruding,
especially at night when muzzle
flash is so obvious. When firing
from a loophole, the soldier gains
cover and concealment. The soldier
is positioned well back from the
loophole to keep the weapon from
protruding and to conceal muzzle
flash. When firing from the peak
of a roof, soldiers use available
The principles for individual
fighting positions also apply for
crew-served weapons positions, but
with the following added
requirements. When employing
recoilless weapons (90-mm RCLR and
LAW), the soldiers select
positions which allow for
backblast. Shown is a building
corner improved with sandbags to
make an excellent firing position.
Similarly, another means of
allowing for backblast while
taking advantage of cover in an
elevated position is also shown.
When structures are elevated,
positions are prepared to take
advantage of overhead cover.
However, care is taken to ensure
that backblast is not contained
under the building, causing damage
or collapse of the structure, or
possible injury to the crew. When
machine gun positions are fixed,
the same consideration as
individual positions is given to
exposure and muzzle location. For
D - 12
further information on camouflage
operations, refer to FM 5-20.
D - 13
forward area alerting radar
armored combat earthmover
forward arming and
air defense artillery
fire direction center
Allied Forces, Northern
forward line of own troops
Allied Forces, Central
Allied Forces, Southern
armored personnel carrier
high explosive antitank
antitank guided missile
infantry fighting vehicle
battalion operations center
combat engineer vehicle
combined forces command
(NATO term for “rad”)
improved TOW vehicle
light antitank weapon
corps terrain team
mobilit y-countermobility survivability
continuous wave acquisition
mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, time, and troops
division tactical operations
division terrain team
miles per hour
North Atlantic Treaty
pulse acquisition radar
petroleum, oils, and
tactical operations center
pounds per square inch
tracked, wire guided missile
radiation absorbed dose;
transient radiation effects on
Republic of Korea
range only radar
nuclear, biological, chemical
Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or to comply with FM 5-103.
Field Manual (FM)
Explosives and Demolitions
Engineer Field Data
Engineer’s Reference and Logistical Data
Tactical Deception (How to Fight)
Soviet Army Operations and Tactics
Soviet Army Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support
The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment
Operations (How to Fight)
Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not
required in order to understand FM 5-103.
Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam)
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Field Manual (FM)
Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
Engineer Combat Operations
Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations
(How to Fight)
The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad
(How to Fight)
The Infantry Platoon and Squad (Infantry, Airborne, Air
Assault, Ranger) (How to Fight)
7-10 (HTF) The Infantry Rifle Company (Infantry, Airborne, Air
Assault, Ranger) (How to Fight)
The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, and
NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Defense
71-1 (HTF) Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team
(How to Fight)
71-2 (HTF) The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force
(How to Fight)
90-3 (HTF) Desert Operations (How to Fight)
90-5 (HTF) Jungle Operations (How to Fight)
90-6 (HTF) Mountain Operations (How to Fight)
90-10 (HTF) Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How
Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Organizational, Technical,
and Logistic Data (Unclassified Data)
Standardization Agreement (STANAG)
Marking of Contaminated or Dangerous Land Areas
Training in Combat Survival
Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage Control
Technical Manual (TM)
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
Army Facilities Components System (Temperate)
Army Facilities Components System (Tropical)
Army Facilities Components System (Frigid)
Army Facilities Components System (Desert)
Army Facilities Components System: Designs: Vol 1
Army Facilities Components System: Designs: Vol 2
Army Facilities Components System: Designs: Vol 3
Army Facilities Components System: Designs: Vol 4
Army Facilities Components System: Designs: Vol 5
Army Facilities Components System - Logistic Data and
Bills of Materiel
Utilization of Engineer Construction Equipment:
Volume A; Earthmoving, Compaction, Grading and
Utilization of Engineer Construction Equipment:
Volume B; Lifting, Loading, and Handling Equipment
Protective Design: Fundamentals of Protective Design
Projected publications are sources of additional information that are
scheduled for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be
distributed automatically via pinpoint distribution. They may not be
obtained from the USA AG Publications Center until indexed in DA
Field Manual (FM)
The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force
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