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Mozambique-Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975 CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA History Author: Westfall, William C., Jr., Major, United States Marine Corps Title: Mozambique - Insurgency Against Portugal, 1963-1975 Publisher: Marine Corps Command and Staff College Date: 1 April 1984 The object of this study is to review the insurgent movement in Mozambique from the perspective of why it occured, how it was conducted, and what caused the results. The study is divided into areas of historical background, colonial issues relevant to the insurgency, organization of the insurgent movement, conduct of the insurgency, and Portuguese counterinsurgent efforts. Mozambique is a strategically located, resource rich, African nation which remains embroiled in turmoil despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence from Portugal. The global importance of the Horn of Africa and the continuing struggle between East and West to establish influence in that critical area necessitates a sound understanding of regional issues and their international ramifications. The entire situation is an open invitation for involvement of United States forces and is almost as predictable, in that regard, as was the Pacific prior to World War II. Mozambique is of particular significance to the Marine officer because it offers over twelve hundred miles of coastline to an amphibious force and retains several of the finest port facilities and natural harbors on the East African littoral. The conclusions drawn in the final section of this study attempt to define the reasons for the success of the insurgency and the failure of the counterinsurgency. If United States forces are committed to action in Mozambique sometime in the future, then the lessons learned from this conflict will be very applicable. The enemy will probably be the same that defeated the Portuguese; and it would serve us well to understand their thought process and mode of operation. WAR SINCE 1945 SEMINAR Mozambique - Insurgency Against Portugal
1963-1975 Major William C. Westfall, Jr., USMC 2 April 1984 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 22134 Table of Contents Explanation 1 Mozambique - A Background 4 Mozambique - The Colonial Era 13 Development of the Insurgency 26 Frelimo - Purpose, Strategy, External Support and Unity 38 Frelimo - Conduct of the Insurgency 67 Portugal - Conduct of the Counterinsurgency 77 Conclusions 87 Bibliography 92 Explanation On June 25, 1975, Mozambique became an independent African nation under the rule of the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Frelimo). This marked an end to over five centuries of Portuguese colonialization and, simultaneously, the end of an insurgency which had endured for greater than ten years. Strategically located and resource rich, Mozambique remains embroiled in turmoil despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence from Portugal. That golden coast just west of Madagascar, so inviting to the Portuguese, so luring to sea traders of ages past, now beckons to the military strategist and geopolitician. A painful abscess in the foreign policy of the United States, Mozambique has become a creaking door for penetration by Soviet pawns prying into the treasures of Southern Africa. The entire situation is an open invitation for the involvement of United States forces. In that regard, a sound understanding of the insurgency which culminated in Mozambican independence is imperative. The intent of this study is not to recount the chronological chain of events which transpired, but to analyze the insurgency in a broad framework suitable for comparison with other insurgencies which have taken place since the end of World War II. The tool which provides this framework is Insurgency in the Modern World (1), a publication utilized at the National War College in a subcourse analyzing insurgencies. The 1-Bard E. Oneil, William R. Heaton, Donald J. Alberts, Insurgency in the Modern World, (A Westview Special Study:
Westview Press, 1980), p. 1-42. questions which were pursued in researching the insurgency in Mozambique are provided at this juncture to orient the reader to the sections that follow (2) 1. What type of insurgency occurred? Was it revolutionary, reformist, secessionist, reactionary, conservative, restorationist or a combination of several? 2. What strategy did the insurgents follow - Leninist, Maoist, Cuban, or Urban Terrorist? 3. How much popular support did the insurgents have? What was the role of the educated classes in the population? Which techniques did the insurgents rely on to gain support? Was popular support at tected by societal divisions or geography? 4. What was the nature of the insurgent organization? 5. Were the insurgents united? What were the effects of unity or disunity? 6. Was the physical environment conducive to terrorism and/or guerrilla warfare? How did the human environment affect the insurgency? 7. What kind of external support did the insurgents receive and from whom? How important was it? 8. How effective was the government response? Did the government have a coherent program for countering the 2- See Unit V, U. S. Defense Policy, Military Strategy and Force Planning, Part 4, Insurgency, Syllabus and Readings, The National War College, Academic Year 1982-83, p. 1-7. insurgency? Was the government administrative apparatus competent and did it control affairs in all sectors of the country? Was the government military response carefully tailored to different kinds of threats or was it indiscriminate and what were the consequences? These are the questions which formed the common threads in this analysis of the insurgency in Mozambique. The answers to these questions form a foundation for a comparison with any other insurgency that has taken place in modern times or any that may take place in the future. The prospect is to learn lessons from events that have transpired and apply them to events of the future to prevent repeating mistakes of the past. To that extent, this study has illuminated broad themes of insurgency in an area where vital interests of the United States are increasingly accumulating - that part of Africa called by Brezhnev "the West's Treasure Box."
Mozambique - A Background Portuguese involvement in Mozambique began in the late fifteenth century as a result of the search for a sea route to India avoiding the dangerous overland route through what is today's Middle East. In 1498, Vasco de Gama's small fleet, en route to India, touched at Inhambane, just north of Delagoa Bay (See figure 1.), and stopped at Quelimana, Mocambique Island, Click here to view image Kilwa Island, Mombasa and Malindi before proceeding east across the ocean. De Gama encountered a sophisticated trading society. Ports were filled with ships, often as large as his own, navigational charts and instruments were more refined than those he possessed, and the settlements were impressive with stone, multi-storied structures commonplace. From as early as the ninth century Mozambique had been a center of economic exploitation for Arab and Arab-influenced African traders. Mozambican ivory and gold were highly sought trade items throughout the Arabic and Oriental world; and the Arabs had developed a sophisticated trading network which extended as far south along the African coast as the Limpopo River by the time of de Gama's arrival. Though Arab development was limited to the coastal regions almost exclusively, they had penetrated the interior along the Zambezi River and inland from Sofala to regions of present day Zimbabwe establishing trade fairs where great quantities of gold and ivory were brought to single locations for purchase by the Arab traders. The result of de Gama's visit was a determination by the Portuguese to win control of the Indian Ocean by establishing coastal strongpoints along the African littoral, the entrances to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, and the coast of India. Control of the Indian Ocean in the Portuguese scheme included complete seizure of seaborne trade from the Arabs; and they accomplished this endeavor with astounding swiftness. Motivated by religious ardor as well as commercial profit, the Portguese expanded their influence in the Indian Ocean to the point of becoming virtual masters of commerce by 1509 and remained unthreatened throughout the region until the arrival of the Dutch in the East Indies nearly a century later. Before narrowing to the specifics of the Portuguese involvement in Mozambique it is important to consider a global perspective at this point in history. It relates directly to the methods of Portuguese colonialization, the rationale for Portuguese treatment of Muslim peoples and natives who had been converted to the Islamic faith, and resurfaces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as justification for Portuguese claims to Mozambique and other African territories.
The period from the early fifteenth century to the early sixteenth century is venerated in Portuguese literature and history as "The Marvelous Century."( 3) Portugal had secured independence from Spain in 1139 through the efforts and permission of Pope Alexander III ( 4 )as a reward to Afronso Henrique, the first King of Portugal, for driving the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula. The expansionist policies of Spain and Portugal received papal encouragement throughout the period of time thus far discussed as a method of extending the crusades, 3- Thomas H. Henriksen, Mozambique: A History, (The Camelot Press, Southampton, England, 1978), p. 23. 4- Edgar Prestage, Portugal: A Pioneer of Christianity, (Watford: Voss and Michael, Ltd., 1945), p. 5-6. freeing the world for Christianity, and destroying the Islamic faith. Indeed, the Papal Line of Demarkation, drawn in 1494, divided the earth in half for subsequent conquest and subjugation by Spain and Portugal. The theory evolving in this discussion is that Portuguese expansion was driven as much by religious principle as it was by the search for increased prosperity, and more so than any of the other European colonial powers that followed. This question has long been debated by historians with no satisfactory advantage to either argument in the judgement of this author.( 5 ) Suffice it to say, that by the end of "The Marvelous Century" Portugal had linked the continents of the world by sea, monopolized the Asian trade routes, introduced Western civilization into Africa and the East, and conquered a global seaborne empire. If religious fervor had provided the motivation for Portugal's bold strategy, then certainly commercial profit was a beneficial offshoot. The problem that began arising in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Portugal's African colonies was that commercial profit had quickly evolved into commercial exploitation and the benefits of spreading Christianity to the indigenous populations were hardly sufficient to overcome five centuries of grievances. The exasperation of this feeling is summed up in an African saying which was popular throughout the Portuguese colonies in Africa in the mid-twentieth century. It is quoted from a book 5- For an excellent summary see Luis B. Serapiao and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1979), p. 1-32. written by Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo (6) "When the whites came to our country we had the land, and they had the bible; now we have
massacres. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. as mentioned earlier. who seized the opportunity to establish vast estates and surround themselves with natives in search of security and sustenance. Though they exploited the situation to gain tremendous commercial profit.9 The fate of these Africans was worse 9For extensive readings on the prazos see Thomas H. although they were not able to achieve true control of the interior of the country until the late nineteenth century.Ltd. Portugal. "Prazeiros" were Portuguese settlers. nor can they harm us. Ltd. 1962). They enslaved or killed the Muslim merchants under orders of King Manuel in the early sixteenth century. seiges and isolated murders produced no clear victor and changed the political control picture very little. however. ambushes. 7--James Duffy. and took advantage of the native princes.the bible and they have the land. quoted in a letter from Duarte de Lemos to the crown. and succeeded in monopolizing the rich trade in ivory. Malindi. In all essence this was the extent of Portuguese control for overthree hundred years. Mozambique and Sofala. Portugal in Africa. 8--Ibid. gold and precious stones. and satisfied with gaining a handful of maize... . 1969). 23. p. Muslim merchants. the Changamire Kingdom. Zanzibar. ex-soldiers and destitute officials. Middlesex:Penguin Books. It emerged from the chaotic environment surrounding the breakup of the Mwene Mutapa empire. they were never able to gain lasting political control.the Mwene Mutapa Kingdom. two issues which surface during this period that are key elements to understanding the background to rising African nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They fought their way into a position of control along the coastal region. taking advantage of rivalries which existed among the sheiks of the city states of Pate." since they are like animals. There are. p. 6--Eduardo Mondlane. Kilwa. It is sufficient to note that the time period encompassed a complex struggle in which five main contenders took part at various times . For the purpose of this study. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the "prazo" system was introduced in Mozambique. and the Malawi Kingdom." Portuguese claims to the territory of Mozambique date from de Gama's voyage in the late fifteenth century. 75. and can be used for any kind of work and treated like slaves (8). it is not necessary to recount the events of the ensuing three centuries. except on a very thin coastal strip from Cabo Delgado to Sofala. revolts. The Struggle for Mozambique. often felons. "because they are enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith and we have a continual war with them ( 7). Three hundred years of warfare.
trade. (The Camelot Press. Mozambique: A History. (The Camelot Press. only occasionally paying vassalage to the King of Portugal. Jesuit and Dominican missionaries of the time also came to own vast tracts of land. Portugal had prohibited slave commerce north of the equator in 1815. a Brazilian sociologist. In any case. at times. and in 1839. 59. than that of slaves. England. 55-74. corruption in the prazo system was so rampant that by the mid-nineteenth century the Portuguese government felt compelled to outlaw it. Slavery is the second issue which deserves discussion as background information during this time period. Southampton. a term developed by Gilberto Freyre. p. Southampton. The background provided to this point begins to establish a clear history of commercial exploitation.10 This does not appear to be the case in Mozambique since the prazeiros were small in number and if anything assimilated intp the native culture. For nearly four . The prazo system has been used as an example of Lusotropicalism". By then. using their Portuguese affiliation when it was convenient and their African background if advantageous to the situation.11 Portuguese officials in Mozambique were bought off by the slave traders. The prazeiros often controlled entire districts as personal properties and recognized no law but their own. 1978).000 Africans per year being carried away from Mozambique during the 1820's and 1830's.Henriksen. They relied on the natives for defense. Under pressure from the British and French to cease the flow of slaves to the New World at the turn of the nineteenth century. England. administering them like any prazeiro and dealing in slaves when slavery became more profitable. to describe a new civilization created in the Portuguese colonies through miscegenation and Christian conversion.12 Portugal took no effective measures to cease the slave trade until it appeared imminent that it would lead to territorial losses in Mozambique to other European powers. for the slave 10Thomas H. women. Mozambique: A History. to include. 1978). even the Governor-General. however. labor and ultimately as a commodity for the slave market. p. food. Henriksen. Mozambican slave interests plotted an unsuccessful independence from Portugal to get out from under their crimping rule. trade reached its peak during the mid-nineteenth century. Its disregard for persons and property was notorious and the slaving manor lords drove an excessive number of Africans away from the area altogether. the slave market provided such tremendous profits and Portugal exercised so little control over activites in the interior of Mozambique that their attempts to control the slave trade were virtually ineffective. Quelimane and Ibo Island ranked among leading African slave ports with an estimated 15. and banned it entirely in 1836.
the Portuguese monarchy was beseiged by a population demanding a hard line toward the British. Britain and Portugal. and mobs stoned British consulates in several Portuguese cities. Public reaction reached such a fervor that it was classified by one British observer as "driving the Portuguese national character to a level of heroic madness. "The Scramble and African Politics in Gazaland". that the true Portuguese conquest of Mozambique must be dated. 65. Compelled to capture and control the Mozambican territories assigned to her or lose them to the British. idea of spreading Christianity was a lofty goal of Portuguese expansion. Germany. initially. It is a theme for which this author can find no rebuttal and is important for the reader to understand. Though losing rights to almost all of the territory north of the Congo River due to the conference's governing principle of "effective control". Warhurst. to British territorial ultimatums due to international weakness. The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History.13" The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 partitioned Africa for development by the European powers. away from sound judgement and prudence.The Colonial Era It is from the proverbial "scramble for Africa" in the late nineteenth century.61.hundred years the Portuguese profited from Mozambican resources with little attempt at effectively occupying the territory or controlling it politically. 12P. (Manchester: Manchester University Press. Portuguese Africa. Belgium. Portugal was roused from a centuries-long slumber in Africa by what has come to be known in Portuguese history as the "generation of 1895. a wave of ultra-nationalism reflective of "The Marvelous Century" swept through Portugal forging an emotional link to African lands that had been non-existant before. p. It is also clear that although the 11Ibid. 232. specifically France. and Portugal's focus was riveted on occupation campaigns and colonial activities for . (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Portuguese claims in Mozambique were recognized by all participants with the exception of Great Britain. 1966). 1959). Faced with the rising ambitions of other European nations and the decline of its own power and influence throughout the world. Mozambique . p. p. Demonstrations throughout Portugal charged the government with cowardice and 13James Duffey. it took second place to commerce when push came to shove in the slavery issue. R. The treatment of the Africans during this period is a theme that arises strongly in later movements of Mozambican nationalism and is used by rebels and insurgents throughout the twentieth century to unite the African population. betrayal.14" A national fund was established to send a cruiser and soldiers to Mozambique. Capitulating.
claiming protection of white settlers and missionaries. .C. one faith. 27-28. Under him were various provincial governors and below these were the district administrators. which ended with the death of Maguiguana.C.the next twenty years. with a "chefo de posto" having 15Thomas H. O Mundo Portuguese (Lisbon. 16Antonio Leite de Magalhaes. the tribal emperor. Gungunyane was humiliated in front of his followers. From the end of conquest and pacification until the beginning of World War II. prisoner and "paraded through the streets in Roman fashion. Henriksen. 1937). one race. Southampton. 363. exploring the internal strengths and weaknesses of the native government. from outright military conquest where possible. the leading Gazan general and the capture of Gungunyane. The "generation of 1895" produced many heroes who were to dominate Portuguese political life for the next fifty years and determine the policies that would govern the African colonies.15" Both names resurfaced in the early 1960's in insurgent military communiques and were used to rally the population to the Mozambican nationalist cause. p. Angola in Perspective. dedication to the colonial empire and a belief in Portugal's imperial destiny to shape a colonial mentality. They worked for a new order dominated by concerns for an effective colonial administration. The occupational campaigns used any possible technique to subjugate and pacify the native population. but beneficial to colonial Mozambique whose territorial boundaries were finalized and remain as such today. transported to Lisbon as a 14F. p. Portuguese leaders enshrined their mystical nationalism. (The Camelot Press. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Egerton. 1957). to establishing diplomatic relations with important traditional rulers. the last traditional Mozambican empire. then attacking. The latter was the case in the war with the Gaza Kingdom. Each district was subdivided into numerous posts. 1978). 89. Mozambique: A History. and one civilization.16" As a conclusion to the background for the insurgency it is necessary to view the administrative. Chief among their goals was a multi-continental lusitanian community of "one state. commercial and native policies as they evolved through the twentieth century. the profitable exploitation of Mozambique's resources and the formation of a comprehensive native policy. This public focus proved determinelta to the monarchy which toppled in 1911. England. p. The keystone to the administrative structure was the Governor-General who ruled first from the capital in the city ot Mozambique and later from Lourenco Marques as the capital was moved south.
The corrupt. but once again to the detriment of the . As far as developing colonial commerce. as a result. the administrative system remained essentially unchanged. ringed with shanty towns where the African workers and servants lived. the Portuguese had little capacity to organize a profitable system and chose. the chefo de posto supervised the collection of taxes. no matter how honorable the intentions. All African chiefs were made directly responsible to the chefo de posto with the end result that the chief was no longer the leader of his community but the representative within his community of a hierarchical colonial authority. the Portuguese created Iberian townships with outdoor cafes and red-tiled roofs resulting in a city core that was strictly urban Portuguese. To assist the chefo de posto. but the administration at the African level changed very little. no amount of change could satisfy the growing nationalism. Portuguese governments came and went. Three principle companies came to dominate nearly two-third's of the colony to their own benefit and the benefit of Portugal. to be discussed later. to enter into contractual agreements with private companies which would share a portion of their revenue with the government in Lisbon. By then. Underpaid and poorly trained. "Concelhos" or townships modeled on Portuguese municipalities were authorized with limited self-government. The entire system magnified the demarkation between Portuguese and African. and normally incompetent chefo de posto was. often cruel. instead. the only direct link with the native population and served as a poor representative of Portuguese rule. most abused their power to attain as much personal wealth as possible to take with them upon return to Portugal. but made certain they could never acquire any significant power by splitting the various chiefdoms into small territories. presided over disputes. Throughout the twentieth century and until the outbreak of open warfare in the 1960's.direct control over the daily lives of thousands of indigenous natives. dispensed punishment and oversaw village agriculture. the Portuguese government re-established a limited traditional authority for some of the African chieftains. Later colonial authorities recognized the damage done by this system and tried to increase the requisite skills for the position with changes enacted in 1965. and official policies changed from time to time. the administrative apparatus worked against it. Acting as a white chief. The old political ties between the various African communities were finally severed and its place taken by Portuguese power. however. and although the social system. each with only a few thousand people. Whenever possible. encouraged the idea of one race and one nation. The local administrative apparatus was different for Europeans and "civilized" Africans in urban environments.
it is clear from research that revenues were paid to Portugal and profits were made by the companies. African taxation and communication services. Slave labor continued under the new name of "forced labor" and was actually encouraged by Lisbon. the largest and most successful of the three. but if they do not fulfill it. Southampton. p. establish schools and maintain public order. Henriksen. Their only tasks were to settle one thousand Portuguese families. 103-122. although conditions were almost as deplorable. but the intended development of Mozambican commerce and a more structured society were sacrificed17. 18Ibid. The British financed Niassa Company was given a similar charter in the regions of Cabo Delgado and Niassa (See figure 2) for a thirty-five year period. For the most part. p. reduced work exemption for farmers and made work compulsory for women. fishing.Mozambicans. public authority may force a fulfillment. Poetic license was taken with the labor code in Mozambique where various district administrators increased head taxes. 116. where. Without recounting the commercial endeavors of the three companies. the only means of paying taxes for the African was labor and their payment was not in money but quantified in "months of labor". The Mozambique Company was granted a fifty year charter to the lands within the Manica and Sofala regions (See figure 2) with extensive governing powers and a twenty-five Click here to view image year tax holiday in return for a percent of profits and shares sold. (The Camelot Press. 1978). They have full liberty to choose the method of fulfilling this obligation. of attempting to gain through work the means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition. They had exclusive control over mining.18" 17For an excellent summary of the effects of the chartered companies see Thomas H. England. This was compounded by an exodus of migrant labor to the gold mines of South Africa. . increased fines for vagrancy.00019 per year by 1960. The 1899 Labor Code embodied a new regulation which stated: "All natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are subject to the obligation. public works. was granted rights in the Tete and Zambezia districts (See figure 2). the Africans could at least earn a small wage. The continually increasing taxes and resulting "forced labor" drove a mass exodus of the native population from Mozambique. The Zambezi Company. The companies abused their privileges at the expense of the indigenous population with little interference by the Portuguese government. It has been estimated that the flood of laborers reached 250. moral and legal. Mozambique: A History.
"20. then not acknowledging the offspring. Indigena were native Africans officially defined as "individuals of the black race. Portugal was guaranteed 47. or . more often than not. the Africans were relegated to two social classes the "indigena" and the "assimilados". They also received payment for each worker recruited. and nearness to South Africa and Rhodesia had an opposite effect. The "mestico" population in Mozambique. Portuguese commercial endeavors during the colonial 19Ibid. and even that is highly questionable. there was never a widespread immigration of Portuguese settlers to Mozambique. To the African male this was another form of exploitation. 120. once back in Mozambique. 120. was paid his wages in provincial "escudos. era drew harsh lines between Africans and Portuguese. In a total population estimated between eight and ten million. As alluded to in earlier discussion. Entering into an agreement with the South Africans in 1928. The cultural and racial synthesis that has been claimed in other colonies never reached the same magnitude in Mozambique. Racial awareness was more sharply defined in Mozambique because of the small number of Portuguese immigrants. social conditions discouraged it. Portuguese authorities used this rationale to defend treatment of the Africans throughout the twentieth century. was listed as 31. in fact if anything. that is a far cry from complete mixing of the races.5 percent of all seabound rail traffic from Johannesburg. the distance from Portugal. Unlike other Portuguese colonies. Efforts to undo the damage were undertaken in the late 1950's. p. What did exist. intentions may have been good initially.the laborer. and deferred wages at the mines given to the Portuguese in gold . those of mixed Portuguese and African heritage. isolation from the Atlantic triangle of Brazil. Again. colonial authorities managed to capitalize on this aspect also. many historians have cited the spread of Christianity as one of the principle motivations for Portuguese expansion. Angola and Portugal. until 1961.465 in the 1960 census. Pretoria and Kurgersdorp in return for recruiting privileges in Mozambique. The final aspect of colonial Mozambique that is necessary to establish a background for the insurgency is the social system that developed in the colony. 20Ibid. Officially. but once again they were far too late and far too feeble. p. customs duties on goods of returning workers. White men co-habiting with African women were regarded more or less as social outcasts.however. citing the fact that all inhabitants of the colonies were brothers under Catholicism and racial disharmony was non-existant. and though policy on several occasions approached encouragement of inter-racial relationships. was Portuguese men taking advantage of African women. although.
They must read. The assimilado population of Mozambique never reached more than one percent of the total population.. The Struggle for Mozambique. Considering that in 1960. who will pass it on to the governor of the district for approval. assimilados. They must make a request to the administrative authority of the area. These organizations would come together in June of 1962 to form Frelimo and will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Portugal's rate of illiteracy was forty percent23. p. As with the commercial and administrative systems. the Africans had to make themselves notably more qualified to be considered for citizenship in their own country than the Portuguese ever had to attain.21" These were the ones that fell victim to head taxes. forced labor and vagrancy laws. who having been born and usually living in the colonies. Ltd. p. 3. 2. They must have sufficient means to support their family.1977. 48. boundaries of Mozambique and in neighboring countries which were actively campaigning for the overthrow of Portuguese rule. American University. found the administrative process to attain assimilado status almost impossible to overcome. 22Eduardo Mondlane. 21Ibid. the Portuguese government took steps in the early 1960's to correct the social injustices. They must be of good conduct. Those who became assimilados still found themselves one rung down the ladder from equality with the Portuguese citizenry. Again they were too little and too late. 5. and did. Assimilado was a status that the indigena could apply for upon meeting the conditions stated below.22 1. write and speak fluent Portuguese. Portuguese authorities made provisions for greater participation in the local government by the Africans and abolished the class distinctions between the indigena. 175. did not yet possess the education and the individual and social habits assumed for the integral application of the public and private law of Portuguese citizens. p. Organizations were already at work within the national 23Area Handbook for Portugal . 127. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. This concludes the background for the insurgency in . Compounding this situation was the lack of opportunity for any African to pursue a meaningful education. was an ingredient for the spreading Mozambican nationalist movement that grew stronger throughout the 1950's.their descendants. 4. Faced with a serious rebellion in Angola. Even those who could. 1969). and Portuguese in an attempt to halt the rising nationalism in Mozambique. This again. They must have the necessary education and individual and social habits to make it possible to apply the public and private law of Portugal to them.
their endeavors stirred African pride. it is important to set a stage for analyzing the insurgency in Mozambique where the reader enters with the appropriate background knowledge and no erroneous preconceptions. Though few in number. Too often the United States government is forced to choose sides in an insurgent movement and too often the choice is made on the basis of a poor understanding of the struggles which are taking place within an affected nation. decision-makers too distracted by competing international pressures to play a bolder part in the Mozambican crisis. and the gulfs of inequality and lack of opportunity that actually existed for black Mozambicans. In poems. While not directly involved in the insurgency in Mozambique we indirectly became a target of propaganda and may have contributed to Frelimo's hard turn to the ideological "left" in the late 1960's. We tend to forget that the foundations for our country were established by a revolutionary "insurgency" throwing off the "oppressive rule" of a colonial power. short stories and paintings these intellectuals cried out against colonialism and the suffering of their people. as well as Lebanon and the Middle East today.Mozambique. They were watched suspiciously by Portuguese authorities and as the turmoil in neighboring Angola heightened during the late 1950's. Too often. Nicaragua and Central America in this decade. In trying to preserve and defend the paramount position enjoyed by America within the present world system. and 70's. we have often found ourselves on the short end of popular support and on the receiving end of insurgent propaganda. it is done so for a purpose. such conclusions may be derived from de facto capitulation of U. After reviewing the development of the insurgency. 60's. were . Americans react to any insurgency as something contentious and in contradiction to the interests of the United States. Mozambican artists and writers living in urban areas were in the best position to observe the stark contrast between Portuguese claims for equality and assimilation of races. Examples of this occur successively throughout the twentieth century and can be typified by viewing Nicaragua in the first half of this century. Viet Nam in the 1950's. Not surprisingly. As Africans were pushed to assimilate Portuguese culture and social standards the reaction provoked a search for genuine African-ness among black Mozambicans. Development of the Insurgency Rising nationalist sentiments began to become more strident in the late 1940's and early 1950's with pressure coming from several sources. Though it is far more detailed than when originally conceived. Particularly affected were those who had achieved a higher level of education.S. While not trying to make a parallel between Mozambique and the colonial United States or Frelimo and the Continental Congress.
Censorship rose to the point where only Portuguese publications or broadcasting stations were permitted within Mozambique. 25A. Those who were deported continued to write from exile and made contact with other Mozambicans who had left the country for other reasons. Henriksen.24 As with any such attempt to control the intellectual aspect of a society. (The Camelot Press. As one European power after another was forced to divest itself of African possessions. Though all of these events cannot be recounted specifically because Portuguese censorship precluded any widespread reporting or investigation. In 1956. 1952. Mozambique: A History. it was important because it awoke aspirations in certain areas of Mozambican society. Another form of protest involved labor turmoil on the docks of the capital city. Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). another riot errupted in Lourenco Marques which reportedly claimed the lives of forty-nine dock workers. they indicated a growing dissatisfaction with Portuguese rule and fed popular support to the expanding nationalist movement. T. Writers and artists were arrested or deported. England. "On the Edge of Africa's Racial Troubles". Steele. 163. p. these attempts only served to increase the cries of oppression and further stimulate nationalism. Both the agitation of intellectuals and the strikes of the urban labor force had an impact on the nationalist movement. They suffered the exploitation of the Niassa Company.actively suppressed. November 26. The Maconde were among the last ethnic group to be "pacified" in Mozambique. 1963 saw widespread rioting in the ports of Beira and Nacala as well as 24Thomas H. New York Herald Tribune. Southampton. violent disturbances were reported with several deaths and up to two hundred arrests. but both were the results of small isolated groups of individuals in an urban environment and had little effect on the vast population in the countryside. the capital city. Events in the northern provinces among the Maconde people would have a more profound impact. however. but upon its demise endured less administrative and . It influenced the young intellectuals who carried their opposition into political movements. Though the "artistic" revolution in Mozambique never reached the same level as Angola's. Portugal became increasingly determined to maintain control of her colonies. 1978). labor unrest broke out on the docks and spread to the surrounding agricultural communities just outside of the city in 1947. Portuguese censorship had increased throughout the period from World War II to the emergence of the Angolan and Mozambican insurgencies because of increased tensions in all of colonial Africa. Long known by sailors for the gruelling working conditions imposed on the black stevedores.25 Again in 1948.
1969) p. Kibiriti Diwane . Located in the northern corner of Mozambique (See figure 3) and more or less isolated due to terrain and road networks. and the police began beating them. Many wanted to speak. Ltd. They were in there for four hours. some of these men had made contact with the authorities and asked for more liberty and more pay .in the massacre at Mueda on 16 June 1960. I was close by.Tiago Muller. After a while. Then the governor invited our leaders into the administrator's office. Then without another word he ordered the police to bind the hands of those who had stood on one side. a number of local African leaders had been working for liberalization of Portuguese rule and higher pay for laborers. the administrator had asked the governor of Delgado Province to come from Porto Amelia and to bring a company of troops.. the Portuguese sent police through the villages inviting people to a meeting at Mueda. when people were giving support to these leaders. During 1959 and early 1960. The Struggle for Mozambique.social repression from the Portuguese than southern provinces and peoples because of a "remoteness" from Portuguese rule. the governor asked the crowd who wanted to speak. The Portuguese had arrested several of the spokesman and the local Portuguese administrator Click here to view image had invited nearby villagers to air their grievances at Mueda in the Cabo Delgado district. But these troops were hidden when they got to Mueda. I saw it all. When they came out on the verandah. We didn't see them at first. the Maconde had shown growing signs of restiveness under Portuguese rule.26 26Eduardo Mondlane. Several thousand people came to hear what the Portuguese would say. When the people saw what was happening. and the Portuguese simply ordered the police trucks to come and collect these arrested .. 117. "Certain leaders worked amongst us.. they began to demonstrate against the Portuguese. An account of the ensuing meeting at Mueda is provided in the following paragraphs. Some of them were taken by the Portuguese . I was waiting outside. the Maconde were able to maintain more of a degree of tribal unity than other ethnic clusters.. Faustino Vanomba. How did that happen? Well. Spanning the Mozambican-Tanzanian border. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. As it turned out. and the governor told them all to stand on one side. especially as Tanzanian independence came closer to reality.
" This account of the "Massacre of Mueda" comes from AlburtoJoaquim Chipande. but of course they have only sent him somewhere else. At that moment the troops were still hidden. Matthew Mmole (sometimes seen as Mwole). bore obvious resemblence to the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). panicked and fired into the crowd. including the President. and led by Mozambicans who had fled to Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and Kenya to escape the Portuguese. mentioned in the last paragraph. The ruthlessness of the Portuguese response to African aspirations was underlined and nationalist leaders concluded that the only resort was to form parties in neighboring countries and use armed rebellion to gain independence. but it hardened the nationalist movement to a new form of resistance. 1983). and the people went up close to the police to stop the arrested persons from being taken away. and then I ran away. Many of MANU'S leaders had been active in the independence movements of Tanzania and Kenya. So there were more demonstrations against this. 19. p. Maconde leaders went on to establish the Mozambican African National Union (MANU) at Mombasa. So the governor called the troops.27 The exact numbers will never be known 27--Thomas H. now denounced peaceful resistance as futile. and later a leader in Frelimo. (London: Greenwood Press. untrained in crowd control. Portuguese accounts hold that the troops. and it had a wide ranging impact on the burgeoning nationalist movement in Mozambique. Formed by an alliance of several smaller groups that were already in existence.persons. because there were no outside observers. who up to that point had not considered the use of violence. and the Maconde regions of Mozambique would prove to be prime havens for guerilla forces in the future conflict. in itself. and when they appeared he told them to open fire. other reports by other African sources put the death toll between four hundred and five hundred people. Kenya. The fact that the incident took place is not disputed. however. I myself escaped because I was close to a graveyard where I could take cover. killing between sixty and eighty people. Though the accuracy of it has to be questioned because of his later involvement with Frelimo. in 1961. MANU. Mueda did not. They killed about 600 people. Many. . including the Mozambique Maconde Union. cause instant rebellion. then 22. Now the Portuguese say they have punished that governor. Henriksen. Revolution and Counterrevolution. MANU was one of the three major organizations which later merged to become Frelimo.
Mondlane had no affiliation with any of the groups which merged to form Frelimo.28 It should be noted that "Gazaland" had only been pacified twenty-five years prior to Mondlane's birth and the stories of the death of Maguiguana and the humiliation of Gungunyane. The Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Territories (CONCP) held in Casablanca in 1961. UDENAMO was an organization created by mostly migrant workers and disgruntled students who had fled the central and southern regions of Mozambique and gathered together in southern Rhodesia. detailed in prior sections. Mondlane finished primary schooling and. UNAMI. when frustrated in efforts to attend . and attended by representatives of UDENAMO. as most African children. the smallest of the three groups. External conditions also favored unity. The other organizations which were to eventually come together with MANU to form Frelimo were the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Uniad Democratica Nacional de Mocambique UDENAMO) and the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (Unian Nacional Africans de Mocambique Independente . Frelimo had emerged as the single Mozambican nationalist movement. Born in the Gaza district of southern Mozambique in 1920. was formed by Mozambicans who had fled the Tete district to neighboring Malawi. he was a member of the Thonga tribe and spent his early years. the Portuguese intensified efforts to control the nationalist tendencies in Mozambique due to the outbreak of open revolution in Angola. The man chosen as president of Frelimo was Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane. herding livestock and absorbing the traditions of his tribe. Lawrence M. made a strong call for the unity of nationalist movements against Portuguese colonialism. influenced all three organizations to move their headquarters to Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and by the end of June 1962. Millinga. To make a rough analogy. and was recognized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as the sole recipient for aid to Mozambican groups. Tanzanian independence in December 1961. left bitter memories in the region. Pushed by his mother. The new exiles from Mozambique. strongly urged the formation of a single united organization. many of whom had no affiliation with any existing organization. UDENAMO. It was an alignment of MANU. one of the poets who had led the literary movement in Mozambique discussed earlier. In 1961.UNAMI). and UNAMI with former leaders of those organizations occupying key positions.and the Secretary-General. those events probably had at least the impact that is felt today in looking back on the assassination of an American president twenty-one years ago. causing an increase in the number of refugees into neighboring countries. Marcelino dos Santos. was the Secretary-General of CONCP and would soon be a key figure in the hierarchy of Frelimo.
D. Mozambique: A History. Mondlane left Lisbon to study in the United States. In September. p.30 He graduated from Oberlin College in 1953 with a B. 120.. Mondlane was highly regarded by African leaders outside of Mozambique and respected by the leaders of MANU. later assassinated while Secretary-General of the Partido Africando da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). however."31 In all probability. Ltd. he accepted an assistant professorship at Syracuse University to detach himself from the United Nations and allow more time to write articles and speak out against Portuguese policies in Mozambique. for although there existed many ideological differences within the organization. After spending a year in research at Harvard. Throughout all this time. he was sent to Lisbon to continue his studies. p. 1969). 1961. Ltd. there was never the open split that developed in other revolutionary movements. 1978). later the president of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and Amilcar Cabral. 1969). was instrumental in founding the Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mocambique (NESAM). NESAM was one of the student nationalist organizations discussed in an earlier section and Mondlane quickly ran afoul of Portuguese authorities. lies in comprehending what he was not. went to South Africa where he continued studying to the college level on scholarships. 120. he was the best qualified to lead Frelimo. The Struggle for Mozambique. he returned to Lourenco Marques where he 28Eduardo Mondlane. and later Northwestern University with a Ph. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. 172. Eduardo Mondlane was not the .. Either because NESAM was not viewed as much of a threat in the late 1940's or because Mondlane was viewed redeemable under the assimilado process. 29Thomas H.. The Struggle for Mozambique. (Southampton: Thee Camelot Press. p. he had remained in contact with the various nationalist movements in Mozambique and had toured the country on several occasions as a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 30Eduardo Mondlane. PAIGC was the movement which succeeded in gaining independence for Guinea-Bissau. Henriksen.A. While there he met Agostinho Neto. UDENAMO and UNAMI. Dismissed from Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg for being a "foreign native"29. The importance of understanding Mondlane's background. he took a position as a research officer with the United Nations where he remained until 1961. He seemed the perfect choice to head Frelimo and references have been made to his having been "hand-picked" by Tanzanian President Nyerere "for the tightrope walking job as head of a faction-formed movement. report on existing conditions. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. notably the MPLA in Angola.secondary school in Mozambique. citing constant police harassment in Portugal.
32" Based on this definition.France. What did exist in Eduardo Mondlane in the early 1960's. Frelimo . autonomous political community as in a secessionist insurgency. guerrilla leader that Americans are used to seeing in any insurgency that arises. employed by the United Nations in New York City. and the Portuguese Communist Party which was very active in Lisbon in the early 1950's. Nor was there any desire to . Communist trained. Committed to a NATO alliance with Portugal and requiring rights to the Azores. Though it may seem a poor comparison to once again refer to our own revolution. dedicated desire to see Mozambique released from Portuguese authority and free to pursue self-determination. The first and by far the simplest to deal with is the type of insurgency. History notes that French assistance was readily accepted. however. He had also decided that the only way this would come about was by revolution. 1969. He had strong ties to the United States. He was certainly exposed to the Communist philosophy. External Support and Unity The point has now been reached in this discussion of Mozambique's insurgency where one may begin to address the questions posed at the outset. not from Britain's allies but from her greatest rival . Though Frelimo took on more of the appearances of the "typical" front for a Soviet. 1972). circumstances might have been different. African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule. p. There was no attempt to form a separate. a professor at Syracuse University and married to a caucasion American woman. in the opinion of this author. There is nothing in his background. to indicate any preference for ties to the ideological East or West.and did. particularly after Mondlane's assassination in February. Frelimo needed support to succeed against the Portuguese and sought it wherever possible. having been educated in American universities. was a 31Richard Gibson. particularly through his associates while studying in Lisbon. (New York: Oxford University Press. Cuban or Chinese inspired insurgency through the mid and late 1960's. it might be noted that a fledgling government in the American colonies sought aid and recognition from any source in a rebellion against Great Britain and received it.typical third-world. particularly with the escalation of involvement in Southeast Asia . "Revolutionary insurgents seek to impose a new regime based on egalitarian values and centrally controlled structures designed to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community. The "other side" could offer much more .the United States offered very little. the insurgency in Mozambique was clearly revolutionary.Purpose. 277. Strategy.
student. To take the necessary measures towards supplying the needs of the organs of different levels of Frelimo. To procure all requirements for self defense and resistance of the Mozambican people.. To promote by every method the social and cultural development of the Mozambican woman. Donald J. Oneil. 2. 1969). 13. 8. Heaton. The Struggle for Mozambique. 10. To obtain funds from organizations which sympathize with the cause of the people of Mozambique. 1980). . p. William R. had ever known. p. (A Westview Special Study: Westview Press. p. To promote and accelerate training of cadres. set forth the following goals:34 1. 122-123. Mozambique: A History. youth and women's organizations. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. (Southampton: The Camelot Press. Frelimo's goals were clearly to replace Portuguese rule by whatever means were required and to restructure their society to end "the exploitation of man by 32Bard E. 15. 3. 5. To further the unity of Mozambicans. man. To organize permanent propaganda by all methods in order to mobilize world public opinion in favour of the cause of the Mozambican people. To cooperate with the nationalist organizations of the other Portuguese colonies. To encourage and support the formation and consolidation of trade union. 14. 174. 11. 33Thomas H. To cooperate with the nationalist movements of all countries. To cooperate with African nationalist organizations. 7. and differ only in the type of policies they seek to change. Conservative and reformist insurgencies both seek to alter policies within a particular political regime without necessarily replacing those in power. Portuguese colonial rule was the only government Mozambicans. Henriksen. creating schools wherever possible. 1978). collectively. making public appeals. Insurgency in the Modern World. To achieve maximum utilization of the energies and capacities of each and every member of Frelimo. 3.reconstitute a former system of government as in a reformist or reactionary insurgency. Ltd. 6. 4. To develop and consolidate the organizational structure of Frelimo."33 The first Congress of Frelimo in September 1962. To promote at once the literacy of the Mozambican people. 12. To employ directly every effort to promote the rapid access of Mozambique to independence. Alberts. 9. 34Eduardo Mondlane.
The intent of stage two. The third stage of a Maoist insurgency is an evolution into open civil war.16. The rate of increase in the guerrilla effort is dictated solely by the response of the government. is to continue to gather popular support and gain control of the countryside. isolating government forces in small areas. where the guerrilla forces take on the appearance of a regular army and conventional warfare is more predominant. Initially. The first or organizational stage is to create networks of guerrilla political/progaganda groups to win popular support and to train terrorist teams to intimidate sections of the population which may be hesitant to support the insurgency or which support the targeted government outright. and making them pay a heavy price when they venture into guerrilla controlled areas. To send delegations to all countries in order to undertake campaigns and public demonstrations of protest against the atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonial administration. As more of the population is won over to the insurgency the magnitude of the armed resistance and guerrilla warfare is increased to include greater segments of the countryside and more lucrative targets. begins with armed resistance by small bands of guerrillas operating in rural areas where terrain is rugged and government control is weak. If the government responds in a forceful. this stage is characterized by low level hit and run tactics designed to highlight the strength and organization of the insurgent movement and expose the weaknesses of the government. mainly urban. as well as to press for the immediate liberation of all nationalists who are inside the Portuguese colonialist prisons. The intent here is to openly defeat and displace the existing government authority if . The second stage. the insurgency may remain in an early stage two mode of operation for a prolonged period of time or may even revert to stage one. well-organized fashion. With no real working class or Mozambican military to isolate from the Portuguese regime and ultimately from which to gain support as in the case of a typical MarxistLeninist strategy. 17. however. To procure diplomatic. The intent is to neutralize any area of the population which will not support the insurgency at the outset and to organize the areas of the population which will provide support. They also realized the difficulties they would encounter in militarily defeating the Portuguese forces on the battlefield and for this reason Frelimo's strategy took on an aspect that was relatively unique. moral and material help for the cause of the Mozambican people from the African states and from all peace and freedom loving people. The Maoist insurgency is typically threestaged. or open guerrilla warfare. Frelimo leaders adopted a Maoist strategy with one major change.
the Namuli Highlands of the western Zambezia province. the geography of Mozambique created some natural divisions that became advantageous for the insurgents and resultingly disadvantageous to the Portuguese. Frelimo never intended to move to the third stage of the Maoist strategy. continually chipping away at the Portuguese will through ambushes and terrorist activity. until September 1964. and the Angonian Highlands of northeastern Tete province. when armed guerrilla resistance began. Climatic conditions in all of the northern areas are essentially tropical with Click here to view image characteristic monsoon seasonal conditions. As is evident in Figure 4. Frelimo set no timetable for their eventual independence and Portugal ultimately came apart from within. The Zambezi Valley divides the country into northern and southern regions with vast differences in geography. with the overthrow of the government in Lisbon in 1974. From September 1962. The morale of the guerrilla movement would be easier kept at a high level and the resolve of the Portuguese would continually deteriorate. Their strategy from the outset was attrition35 and they intended to drive the Portuguese to the conference table. Revolution and Counterrevolution. The highest and most rugged features of the country are found in the Livingstone-Nyasa Highland of Niassa province. as does all of western Mozambique. Development of road. eventually rising to the Great Rhodesian Highlands. It also meant that Frelimo would not have to rely on the massive external support characteristic of open civil war and could keep their losses at a minimum while 35Thomas H. 31. in fact. is exactly what transpired. This strategy was adopted because of the relative weakness of the Portuguese economy to support prolonged warfare in Southern Africa and the fact that they were already involved in guerrilla wars in Angola and Guinea-Bissau which were proving unpopular back home. This was the strategy Frelimo adopted from the outset with a notable exception. . p. Frelimo concentrated on establishing a network of insurgent teams in the rural sections of Mozambique which could be easily infiltrated. Henriksen. by a military regime tired of being bled year-in and year-out by a war that apparently could not be won. This. not by controlling the countryside but by embroiling it in insurgency and stretching the limited resources of the Portuguese government to the point where it would be less expensive for them to acquiesce and grant independence to Mozambique than it would be to remain engaged in a protracted guerrilla war in Southern Africa. (London: Greenwood Press. North of the Zambezi River and east of the Malawi border a very narrow coastal area gives way gradually to hills and low plateaus to the west. 1983).it has not already come apart from within.
37Eduardo Mondlane. Frelimo already had the support of most of the population. The first cadres of Frelimo insurgents were trained in Algeria. propaganda.rail. The northern provinces were the areas from which Frelimo launched the insurgent effort and the Portuguese were never to seriously challenge their control.. Having recently won independence from France. 1969). in terms of brutality. Though Frelimo tactical endeavors remained at a rather low level of intensity throughout the insurgency. 72. with the exception of operations against the Cabora Bassa Dam project which will be addressed later in the analysis. 128. 1964. and other lines of communication in the northern areas has been inhibited by all of these conditions. The border with Tanzania stretches for almost five hundred miles across the region and allowed ideal access for Frelimo insurgents whose base of power originated from Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. During 1963. Population density in the northern provinces is particularly low. The Portuguese contended from the outset that Mozambique was an integral part of Portugal much like California is an integral part of the United States and that .36 It might also be recalled that this was the area of the Maconde people and the "Mueda Massacre". especially the first one hundred to one hundred fifty miles below the Tanzanian border with a density of fewer than two people per square kilometer. Frelimo entered the second phase of their insurgency with attacks on several Portuguese outposts in northern Mozambique. On September 25. their methods. American University.1977. p. They operated freely from sanctuaries in Tanzania and could come and go at will. approximately two hundred Frelimo guerrillas were trained and returned to Mozambique to begin building a network of popular support37. and even stated objectives took on a noticeable swing to the ideological "left" during the late 1960's. Arms and ammunition were stockpiled in 36Area Handbook for Mozambique . Tanzania and distributed to small guerrilla bands in northern Mozambique. the Algerian government was already conducting guerrilla training for African nationalist movements in other Portuguese colonies. p. The Struggle for Mozambique. A reference to thin has been made in previous sections and it is felt that an explanation is pertinent at this juncture. in addition to having suitable geographical conditions for conducting insurgent operations. It became clear during the research for this analysis that what little has been written about the insurgency in Mozambique is presented from either a pro-Portuguese or pro-Frelimo perspective. and Portuguese domination was resultingly less than in other regions of Mozambique. therefore. treatment of the population.
Essentially. 2. A discussion of unity within Frelimo and the external support provided to the revolution provides the basis for the causative hypothesis. While Henriksen's publications. however. It is only during the late 1960's that pro-Frelimo publications and propaganda take on the obvious appendages of a strict Communist-backed insurgency. that the insurgency in Mozambique was strictly a liberation from colonial domination. they stop short of addressing the specifics of Frelimo's pro-left swing in the late 1960's. give an objective treatment of Mozambique and the revolution. received from either of the above. they alone were the only Western power actively engaged against the spread of world Communism. (New York: American Affairs Association. willingly or unwillingly from Africa. and other European powers in the process of removing themselves.Frelimo was just one more Communist-inspired revolution designed to undermine the western world.. X. 43. To understand this statement one must look from three separate perspectives: 1. With civil rights an issue at home. American foreign policy in regard to Portuguese Africa was non-descript. p. Maier. Unity within Frelimo and external support for the objectives of the nationalist movement appear to be inextricably related. tangible or intangible. In fact. by nature. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. other hand. brought with it a change in policy regarding the Portuguese colonies. the . The Soviet. The events which transpired within Frelimo which went hand-in-glove with the amount of support. and for the most part recount propaganda bulletins released by either side with the admission of no first hand information. Prior to 1960. Chinese. and the movement toward independence of all Portuguese African colonies. the Portuguese claimed that after the American withdrawal from Viet Nam. The position of United States foreign policy in regard to Portugual. Newspaper and magazine articles on events in Mozambique during the insurgency do not assist in clarification because of the strict censorship Portugal applied to any reports coming out of its colonies. it is only through a synthesis of all the research leading to this analysis that one is left with the "nagging feeling" that Frelimo's swing to the left in the late 1960's was not a planned evolution but was caused by external events. Those that were written are vague. 3. and Cuban involvement in Portuguese Africa. a NATO ally. In short. Inc. on the 38F. The introduction of the Kennedy administration.38 Early pro-Frelimo writers contend. specifically Mozambique. we recognized the African colonies as being an integral part of Portugal and conducted any economic or political business through Lisbon. noted on numerous occasions throughout this analysis. 1974).
.40" The United States voted for several United Nations resolutions favorable to African liberation movements in 1961. These measures worked to a degree. (Washington.new administration did not support Portugal's contention that the African colonies were part of a "greater Portugal" and would remain so.to continue present ties with Portugal. 245-252.. El-Khawas. which by most interpretations did not include Africa. p. or to strike out completely independently. to "set up a reasonable timetable for moving the territories toward self39For an excellent summary see Luis B. complying with all NATO requirements. Lisbon's contentions were that NATO arms would be used within the territorial boundaries of Portugal. Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence. formally and informally. Portugal signed the agreements. The Discipline of Power: Essential of a Modern World Structure. the Kennedy administration was forced into a softer stand on Portuguese . including a resolution condemning Portugal's repressive measures in the African territories. to the extreme of threatening a withdrawal from NATO. President Kennedy imposed an arms embargo on all weapons that could be used in Africa by parties involved in the conflict and required that Lisbon give formal assurance that American weapons would only be used in the area defined by NATO. Once again defining the African colonies as part of a "greater Portugal". but the biggest bargaining chip turned out to be an American leased naval base. Prime Minister Salazar could not understand a policy that would "inevitably wrest away its (Portugal) overseas territories and leave it economically bankrupt..C. Serapiao and Mohamed A. p.39" The new United States administration urged Portugal. determination. 245. p. 1968). 1979). but had a slightly different interpretation of the NATO area. 174. An excellent discussion of this situation is presented."41 Portugal took subsequent actions to blunt the American policy including the hiring of an American public relations firm to play up the image of a Communist invasion of southern Africa and lobbying Congressional 40George W. The Portugese were openly critical of the Kennedy administration and furious with the anti-colonial stance taken within NATO and the United Nations. which included the African territories. D. creating a split between the administration and Congress over African policy42. With the lease of naval facilities in the Azores expiring in December 1962. to join a Portuguese commonwealth. (Boston: Little Brown & Co. 41Ibid. The Kennedy administration voiced a more liberal point of view that "the people should be given the right to choose between alternatives . foreign affairs committees. Ball.: University Press of America Inc.
This became even more pronounced as American involvement in Southeast Asia heightened.44 With continued pressure by Portugal and the increased strategic importance of the Azores. D. Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence. American policy in Africa had taken on a decidedly pro-Portuguese tilt. Sorenson. he was prepared to forego the base entirely rather than permit Portugual to dictate his African policy.C.American use of the Azores could be terminated at any time with only six months notice.43" It might be noted at this point that Angola was the front page issue in Portuguese Africa at the time and Mozambique was secondary. criticism of Portugal's policies in Africa subsided and a sympathy toward Portuguese problems began to develop. 43Theodore C. (Boston. Schlesinger. Robert Kennedy and His Times. continued to train 44Arthur M.. Though uncommitted to either side of the African liberation situation. Portugal attached some strings this time . after the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.S. as it would remain throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. for all Portuguese colonies were lumped into the same policy. 1965). Frelimo was decidedly more non-aligned in the early 1960's than the MPLA in Angola. Though still supporting the eventual liberation of the African colonies. the NATO alliance took on added importance. (New York: Harper & Row. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Washington. support of Robert Kennedy early in the Kennedy administration. 1978).: University Press of America Inc. the Johnson administration brought an extension of the policy which had developed during the last year of the Kennedy presidency. The Azores became an increasingly strategic location for the United States. The President finally felt that. Kennedy. El-Khawas. By the end of the Johnson administration. the administration position became more neutral. 176-177.45 Initially. The administration continued the sale of arms to Portugal.) position on Angola. particularly. Mozambique in . A new lease of the Azores was negotiated.. 45Luis B. p. p. and the plight of the African liberation movements was relegated to the back burner. using as a wedge our country's expiring lease on a key military base on the Portuguese Azores. This was unfortunate in regard to American policy toward Frelimo. p. 538. however. and Eduardo Mondlane had met and won the 42For an excellent summary see Luis B. public rhetoric was softened and the arms control restrictions became less of a focal point. even though there were differences in the liberation movements themselves. Theodore Sorenson summarized very appropriately when he stated that "Lisbon tried every form of diplomatic blackmail to alter our (U. El-Khawas. Serapiao and Mohamed A. if necessary. Serapiao and Mohamed A.colonialism. 562. 1979).
to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence.47" Thus.46 The administration settled on option two under the beliefs that the "rebels cannot oust the Portuguese and the Portuguese can contain but not eliminate the rebels.the Twentieth Century. Caetano. American foreign policy again moved to more of a pro-Portuguese position. p. Option Five: Dissociation from both black and white states in an effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area. Option Two: Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states. Portuguese military personnel and paid little attention to the claims of Portuguese use of NATO arms and material in Mozambique and other colonies. was "limited to achieving some degree of administrative autonomy in territories which are to remain a part of Portugal. Option Three: Limited association with the white states and continuing association with blacks in an effort to retain some economic. this option was adopted under the total awareness that the stated policy of Portugal's new prime minister. With the coming of the Nixon administration in 1969. the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) was prepared. and to encourage improved relations among states in the area. strategic and scientific interests." that there "is no hope for blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence. Under the guidance of Henry Kissinger. 179. though opposing violent solutions to the problems of the region. Option Four: Dissociation from the white regimes with closer relations with the black states in an effort to enhance our standing on the racial issue in Africa and internationally." and that "substantial change is only likely to come from decisions made in Portugal. scientific. (Washington: University of American Press. which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists. 1979). with United States support for Portugal becoming more evident in the United Nations. .48" This policy was pursued throughout the Nixon administration. laying out the options for American policy in Africa as follows: Option One: Closer association with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic. and strategic interest in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which the blacks will accept.
African Report. however. The changing policy was felt by the leadership of Frelimo and caused changes in the policies which they pursued. 47Ibid. 48Ibid. Though the "words" still supported self-determination. the victim of a letter bomb. 46Ibid. Nyerere's own philosophy bore the imprint of the Communist Chinese with their . If a graph of Frelimo's support from western nations would depict a downward sloping curve during the 1960's and 1970's. Frelimo's early support. 12:8. noted from NSSM 39. "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane". p. 56. the U.. and more evident as the Azores reached new heights of strategic significance in the early 1970's. and Frelimo was in the hands of a Communist supported insurgency. the policy became one of equivocation without direction. 1969. the "actions" did not. went through a period of equivocation and seemed to be moving toward support for us.49" By the end of 1967. as indicated in the previous discussion. p. noted from NSSM 39. p. reliance on the OAU and bordering countries became critical. 56. 183. U. p. p.S. p. it became apparent that more international support would be required to sustain operations.S. should be among the strongest supporters of freedom and independence in the world and that it would be tragic for the U.S. policy has become one of support for the status quo. Tanzania provided the link for that support. 1969. the policy of the United States changed from open support of African liberation movements and open pressure applied to the Portuguese government for selfdetermination in the African colonies to almost the reverse. 171. 1967. As the insurgency progressed. 184. Mondlane was dead. 51. and the construction of the Tan-Zam railway afforded a convenient cover for a heavy concentration of Chinese in Tanzania. p. As western support eroded in the face of Portuguese pressure. 49Ibid. Over the course of a decade. he commented that "when John F.more evident in arms transfers. Algeria and Egypt provided the early training bases for Mozambican nationalists and Tanzania the safe shelter from Portuguese forces. After the death of President Kennedy. 182-183.50" By the middle of 1969. Mondlane stated in May of 1963 that "the U. 50Helen Kitchen. then a similar graph depicting support from the Soviet Union and China would show the opposite. More recently. both financially and in terms of recognition came from other African nations and nationalist movements.S. Kennedy was President. to sacrifice its long range African interest by continuing to allow its short-sighted need for the Azores to form the basis of African policy. The Chinese were heavily backing President Nyerere's Tanzanian government both militarily and economically.
"Three Revolutions". With the assistance from the West drying up under Portuguese pressure. direct. These events were not lost on the leadership of Frelimo. however. Africa Report 12. generally required a strict alignment with Soviet practices. . particularly with dwindling support from the West. eventually. Chinese support was readily available and more acceptable to Frelimo than Soviet support. fascist government that still maintains the myth that Mozambique is a Portuguese Province. 8 (November 1967). 1977. the rivalry between the two Communist powers forced the Soviets into a more tolerant position toward Frelimo. The goals of the first Congress of Frelimo in September 1962. the Communist ideology. had to have an impact on the leadership of Frelimo.53 Though too numerous to recount in detail. mentor52". No. however. and consequently. "A Troubled Celebration in Zanzibar". are not the same. which came free with the weapons. p. and the rhetoric which characterized their propaganda. and bear no striking resemblance to the typical rhetoric which accompanies a Communist inspired insurgency. "The Portuguese government is a colonialist. are clear. was the moral courage provided to Frelimo by association with the world Marxist crusade. Requiring assistance in its struggle against Portugal. part and parcel of Portugal". for it came with no strings attached. an examination of a selected few should provide the general flavor: 1. Feb. The comforting feeling of being part of a world struggle which could be explained historically and of having a recipe for success provided by the Communist party. gave justification to Frelimo's struggle for freedom.emphasis on self-reliance. As important as the military assistance. Washington Post. Indeed it did. While Western powers moved closer to an alignment with the Portuguese throughout the 1960's. as can be evidenced by the turmoil within Frelimo during the late 1960's 52Roger Mann. preferring to obtain the aid and recognition of both in the struggle for independence. recounted earlier.51 This became the case with Frelimo as the "protege became more thoroughly revolutionized than the Tanzanian 51John A. 21. Marcum. The goals of the Second Congress of Frelimo in June 1968. 6. The Soviets. As ties with the Chinese became closer. though offering any support necessary. Frelimo leaders had initially maintained a policy of non-alignment with East and West. The relationship of a host country and its revolutionary guests has been described as one where the host projects its own political personality into the attitude and habits of the guest. the turn toward the East was inevitable. however. and by the end of the 1960's Soviet and Chinese military aid sustained the insurgency.
"The Mozambican people are engaged in an armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism and imperialism for their national independence and for the establishment of a social. as with nearly every organization..2. 3. p. combined with the fact that all came from different parts of Mozambique with differing intellectual and political views." 4. After Mondlane's assassination in 1969. a former leader of UDENAMO." 53Eduardo Mondlane. though it never reached such large scale splits and open warfare that were characteristic of other African nationalist movements. upon independence. Mozambique. The fragile nature of Frelimo following the first Congress created a natural tendency toward the formation of competing groups. The remainder of this section requires only a recounting of the events which took place within the leadership of Frelimo during the late 1960's and early 1970's. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. The ring of Marxist doctrine is evident in these statements. reportedly in the employment of a foreign intelligence agency54. "Our struggle is a people's struggle. 189-195. who had been introduced into the organization by Adelino Gwambe. The Struggle for Mozambique. Soviet Union. Ltd. 1969). stepped in with massive assistance once independence was achieved.. Factionalism existed within Frelimo. and was in charge of military training in 1962 and 1963. alias "Leo Milas". and at the construction of a new society free from exploitation of man by man. Weapons. Armed with the background of the United States. but it is interesting to wonder "what might have happened" had United States policy been consistent. democratic order in Mozambique.. passed himself off as a Mozambican. This struggle is part of the world's movement for the emancipation of the peoples. The lack of experience of most of the members. the significance of these events is more clearly understood. The first signs of a rift were instigated by Leo Clinton Aldridge. It requires the total participation of all the masses of the people". and Chinese policy toward the insurgency in Mozambique. money and training to back the insurgency were clearly provided by the Soviets and the Chinese. which aims at the total liquidation of colonialism and imperialism. "Many comrades are engaged in the struggle because. Cuba. Events may have turned out the same in any circumstance. though providing minimal assistance during the actual insurgency. Milas. added to a basic distrust of one another when crises arose. had graduated from the University of Southern California. became just one more Communist bloc nation. there was little doubt that Frelimo had made the full transition to a Communist inspired insurgency. While Mondlane was in the United States completing obligations to .
factions within Frelimo crystalized into three separate internal power struggles with distinct perceptions of how the revolution should be conducted and how Mozambique should be run after independence Mondlane and his followers. the first Secretary-General of Frelimo.55" It was not until 1964 when Mondlane received irrefutable information which proved Milas an imposter that he had him expelled from Frelimo. hoping to have a say in the future government. was too pro-American from rivals within Frelimo and as the years went by and American support deteriorated this accusation would resurface. due more to personal rivalries than ideological differences. an associate expelled by Milas. and many of his associates. or it will alienate potential support and fail to reconcile those real differences that somehow must be reconciled if its broad basis is to survive and develop. 55Eduardo Mondlane. As the decade of the 1960's progressed. During the mid 1960's. Africa Report 12. the political ideas of . those who felt that Mondlane's approach was becoming too radical. (Middlesex: Penguin Books. Marcum. This caused a split within Frelimo. with many members calling for the expulsion of Milas. COREMO was an amalgamation of the new UDENAMO and several of the other splinter groups which finally came together in 1965. resulted in the formation of several splinter groups. it must guard against the more dangerous type of infiltration organized by its enemies. 8 (November 1967). 133. No. 1969). Mabunda and Paulo Gumane. On the other hand. including the OAU who recognized Frelimo as the only Mozambican nationalist movement. This brought charges that Mondlane 54John A. went on to reform UDENAMO. Milas was instrumental in provoking the expulsion of David Mabunda. however few had any real impact on Frelimo other than a deterioration of the international perception of unity which Mondlane was attempting to foster. p. The Struggle for Mozambique. Other desertions and expulsions from Frelimo in the early years. COREMO initiated their own guerrilla war against the Portuguese and remained in existance until Mozambican independence. basing out of Lusaka. and those who felt he was not radical enough.Syracuse University and attempting to raise support for Frelimo.. The only group which would have any longevity was the Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO). "Three Revolutions". Zambia. and by war's end had ceased to be serious contender for power. Mondlane was reluctant to take action and permitted further widening of the rift citing that "a movement cannot afford to become too paranoiac. p. Ltd. 18-19. Discontented with Mondlane and the slowness of Frelimo's actions. They were never afforded recognition or support by any substantial external agencies. inevitably expending time and energy in the process.
The Mozambique Liberation Front. later President of Frelimo after Mondlane's death and decidedly pro-Chinese. Though future events would prove the overall strategy was certainly the best path to eventual success. Lazaro Kavandame. His emphasis remained on mobilizing the population at the expense of military or terrorist action to win ultimate victory for the people . the Frelimo leader in Cabo Delgado. Jundanian. The radicalization of his ideas may have been assisted by the deaths of some of his more moderate supporters and the ensuing rise of younger. He began identifying the efforts of Frelimo with those of similar liberation movements around the world. using the solidarity of the revolutionary struggle to create a state free from foreign exploitation. Jaime Sigauke. urged Mondlane to concentrate all efforts to expel the Portuguese completely. Kavandame was adamant that Mondlane was not aggressive enough in pursuing the revolution and openly defied directions from Frelimo headquarters. Filipe Magaia. The split between Kavandame and Mondlane continued to widen through the Second Congress of Frelimo in 1968. This did not fit into the overall strategy of the Frelimo heirarchy. his basic premise that the struggle would be waged by the people and built on their continued support was unchanged.no matter how long the duration. His subsequent replacement was Samora Machel. eventually expanding the network southward. 62. but would not grasp their ideas in totality. Secretary of the Department of Interior Organization. head of the Department of Defense and Security was killed in action56. This carried over into his conception of society in an independent Mozambique after the revolution. While Mondlane's ideas of the revolution were undergoing a radicalization. sites an unpublished paper which charges Magaia was killed by a member of Frelimo. For this reason. Portuguese control was marginal and guerrilla successes were numerous. 1966. 1970). Communists as the war continued. Kavandame argued that too much effort and funding were being wasted on the population and that the effort should be redirected to a military victory over the Portuguese where it was possible. more aggressive members of the organization. was assassinated by a Portuguese "friend" on July 14.Mondlane had radicalized. where debate centered on the prosecution of the war as proposed by both . p. He became intent on restructuring society to insure political and economic equality. In October 1966. which was to create popular support in all the northern regions. This middle of the road position made Mondlane the target of any discontent within the organization and it emanated from both factions previously mentioned. he accepted more support from the 56Brendan F. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales. The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado district had been easily prosecuted in 1964 and 1965.
58 Kavandame refused to attend the Second Congress of Frelimo but the debate over revolutionary strategy took place with others arguing his philosophy. p.59 Kavandame was suspended from Frelimo on January 3. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales. On May 9. 88. p. The ideological split was not resolved. Frelimo headquarters in Dar es Salaam was attacked by a group of Mozambicans. 1969. 1968.factions. A splinter group formed in 1968. the Director of the Institute. He was . the area between the Rovuma and Zambezia Rivers. Mondlane continued to hold to the original long range strategy and pressed for more party unity. himself. 59Ibid. his fate was overtaken by events. led by Kavandame's son and Mateus Gwenjere. Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated on February 3. Other factions felt that Mondlane was too radical. the Uniao Nacional Africana de Rumberia (UNAR) referred to Frelimo as the "lynching" front and urged a secession of Northern Mozambique. The school had to be closed in March. and was used by Portuguese propagandists to advertise the collapse of Frelimo. however. led riots against Mrs. or of being too soft on the Portuguese. and denounced the leadership of Frelimo. a Mozambican priest who had led the riots at the Institute of Mozambique. Jundanian. Kavandame represented the faction that thought Mondlane too conservative. 58Brendan F. The Mozamblique Liberation Front. Students. was murdered. Mondlane's strategy was endorsed by the Second Congress and prosecution of the war was to continue under the plans that he had set out. COREMO leaders charged throughout the war that Frelimo killed more Africans than Portuguese and voiced specific resentment against Mondlane. Kavandame's arguments had been further magnified by events at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam earlier in the year.60 Assailed from within Frelimo as being too radical and too conservative. Mondlane. desiring to concentrate their efforts in the northern regions. 1968. Mateus Muthemba. however. disgruntled with the slow moving guerrilla efforts. surrendered to the Portuguese in April 1969. a supporter of Mondlane when he visited Cabo Delgado operations in December. due to the volatility of the situation. Maconde leaders felt that their tribe bore the brunt of Frelimo guerrilla efforts throughout Mozambique and were dissatisfied with the radical ideas of Frelimo's leadership. They had accused Mondlane and his wife at one time or another of working for the CIA and being too pro-American. 1968. 1969. pending a final decision by Frelimo leaders. with possible annexation into Malawi. Kavandame continued to be an antagonist and his supporters assassinated Paulo Kankhomba.. 1970). a member of Frelimo's Central Committee and a Mondlane supporter. Kavandame. 87.
was expelled and the former Secretary of External Relations. Uria Simango. 1970). itself. all things considered. Murupa. and there is much speculation that the Soviets and Chinese played an active role in stirring resentment against Mondlane within Frelimo because of his neutral stance on the East/West issue. The events surrounding the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane on February 3. There is little doubt that the Portuguese Secret Police (PIDE) played an important part in aggravating the internal disputes. informers. The Mozambique Liberation Front. England. was postmarked in Moscow. later claimed that Frelimo had fallen under a Communist takeover. a personal appointee of Mondlane. The former Vice-President. in terms of military and financial assistance. managing to keep Frelimo on a steady course despite the internal conflict and managing to present a relatively united front to the rest of the world. He was killed by a letter-bomb delivered to the Dar es Salaam home of an American friend where he was working. and assassins (Jaime Sigauke's death was 60Brendan F. Jundanian. 1978). Machel advocated the military approach to more of a degree than Mondlane and stepped up the guerrilla war and urban terrorism. Southampton. Miguel Murupa. Though the unity of Frelimo would no longer be in question. Mozambique: A History. attributed to PIDE). The letter-bomb. Frelimo managed unrivaled advances and growth in comparison with other movements in the Portuguese territories or Southern Africa during the period. the organization had made a definite mid-course correction. 181. 1969.61 61Thomas H. Communist support. deserted the party. The Tanzanian police investigation pointed the finger at Kavandame with the assistance of PIDE. No matter the culprit. (The Camelot Press. consolidating power and increasing ties with the Chinese and Soviets. The political mobilization of the population within guerrilla dominated zones and Frelimo's growing sympathy throughout the country and the world appears to have gone on unimpaired by discord at the top. Frelimo accused Kavandame. However. will probably never be known for sure. After numerous expulsions and defections internal dissent within Frelimo subsided for the remainder of the insurgency. .undoubtably more successful than any other potential president could have been. who later defected to the Portuguese. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales. who was subsequently executed. with paid agents. Machel moved the party to the ideological left. After a brief power struggle. the pro-Communist Samora Machel assumed the Presidency. and Silverio Nungo. increased . p. Henriksen.an excellent summary of all of these events is presented from pages 60-94. the results had an important impact on Frelimo.
and were decidedly unimpressed with the visit of "Che" Guevara in 1965. In the early years. use of the devices became much . and attacks on Portuguese forces were extended to the southern areas of Niassa and Cabo Delgado as Frelimo control of the northern regions became apparent. and down the extreme northern coastal region in Cabo Delgado. Guerrilla lines of communication from havens in Tanzania and Malawi were primarily created by the use of dugout canoes across the Rovuma River. The latter two districts were much stronger positions for the guerrillas and mobilization of the population was attained much more easily. Lake Malawi. through 1966. Utilization of land mines by the guerrilla units entered into insurgent tactics and it became commonplace to find indiscriminate planting of these devices near any Portuguese outpost. Henriksen. p. actual combat remained at a low level of intensity throughout the insurgency. Frelimo . however. attacks. Revolution and Counterrevolution. In both regards they were successful. 1964. 1983).substantially after Machel took over. The use of land mines by guerrilla forces would increase extensively through the rest of the insurgency and had tremendous impact on the morale of the Portuguese. Propaganda was decidedly that of the typical Communist supported insurgency. new recruits were expanding the size of guerrilla units. and automatic pistols. Frelimo's focus from the beginning was on mobilizing the population and demoralizing the Portuguese through protracted conflict.62 From the commencement of operations against the Portuguese on September 25. (London: Greenwood Press. As the insurgency progressed. By late 1965. This probably led to the coolness of relations with Cuba through the 1960's and very early 1970's. conducting most of their attacks at night and taking advantage of the rainy season (November through March) to conceal their movements effectively. Zambezia. particuarly in the extreme northern regions.Conduct of the Insurgency As indicated in earlier sections. Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts. the mines were used strictly to harass Portuguese forces and rarely were covered by fire. Their objectives in the early years were to disperse the Portuguese forces by conducting operations in widely separated areas and to prevent counter62Thomas H. The guerrillas were armed at this point with rifles. They had chosen not to follow the Cuban theory of emphasizing military forces and military confrontation as practiced in Angola. operations were characterized by ten to fifteen man hit and run groups operating against minor installations and administrative posts in the Tete. light machineguns. 187. There was not too much doubt that Mondlane's neutrality had fallen by the wayside.
Occupying a large portion of the northern provinces was expensive in terms of funds to establish the social programs necessary for continued popular support. Monetary support from the OAU could not cover the costs of expanded operations and support from the West had all but dried up. Agencies were established to provide support to Mozambicans who had fled to Tanzania and Malawi to avoid the conflict. Frelimo units continued to expand with occasional company size attacks (65-150 men) during the closing months of year. and as the strength of the military forces increased. and though rudimentary.63 By 1966. and social systems were created in the areas controlled by Frelimo. By 1967 Frelimo had gained control of approximately one fifth of Mozambique and one seventh of the population. freeing the men for offensive actions in other zones. It also proved extremely frustrating to the Portuguese. allowing the frequency of operations to increase substantially. The Mozambique Liberation Front. and a reorganization of the military structure was undertaken to facilitate centralized control of guerrilla operations. 1970). there existed no centralized command structure within the Frelimo military. the cost of food. medical. 1966 also saw the introduction of women detachments into Frelimo's guerrilla units.more calculated. 63Brendan F. The guerrilla force had grown to approximately eight thousand personnel. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales. who still contended that Frelimo was an unorganized group of bandits. This proved to be very advantageous for Frelimo. These detachments were concentrated in the defense of liberated areas. they were an improvement over conditions under the Portuguese and helped build faith in the nationalist organization. In late 1966. a mobile central command was created just north of the Tanzanian border to coordinate all guerrilla operations. evaporate into the jungle as Portuguese forces pursued. It might also be recalled that the years from 1966 through 1968 were full of dissent within the leadership of Frelimo. and strike again in a coordinated effort at another critical location. This was a year of decision for the leadership of Frelimo. p. Frelimo also continued to place heavy emphasis on winning the support of the population. Prior to 1966. however.64 Tactics had remained the same. clothing and equipment rose proportionately. Jundanian. regional commanders conducted operations as they saw fit. small-scale hit and run operations. 76-80. Mondlane wanted to . and to encourage them to return to Mozambique to take part in the revolution. Portuguese forces in the northern regions were confined to several small outposts and rarely ventured into the countryside. allowing them to strike the Portuguese at key locations. Education.
Thus. the project would open eight million acres of land to agriculture and provide four million kilowatts of electrical power to southern Africa. calibre heavy machine gun began appearing in guerrilla attacks. Inc.retain the same scale of guerrilla operations but urged projection of forces to other areas of Mozambique in a widening arc of insurgent actions. p. As the fifth largest hydro-electric project in the world and the largest on the African continent. Maier. it would create the largest man-made lake in the world and simultaneously isolate a large portion of the frontier from guerrilla penetration. defensive circles of over one million land mines to the defense of the Cabora Bassa project. One of the projects undertaken by the Portuguese in the late 1950's as a belated attempt to improve economic conditions in Mozambique was the building of the Cabora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi River. Inc.. 1974). X. The Portuguese committed three thousand troops and three concentric. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. its construction was beneficial to Portugal in convincing the rest of the world of Portuguese good intentions in Mozambique. (New York: American Affairs Association.66 1968 was a good year for Frelimo in terms of propaganda. Frelimo was opposed to the construction of the dam for obvious military reasons and also because of the political victory Portugal would achieve in world opinion upon its completion. 70. when it became apparent that Mozambican independence would be forthcoming and the Cabora Bassa Dam would be an economic asset for the new government. Militarily.. Maier. After the outbreak of hostilities. 12. To accomplish this he sought more external support. (New York: American Affairs Association. p. X. The Mozambique Liberation Front. Jundanian.62 64Brendan F. 1968 marked the beginning of guerrilla operations against the project which would increase in intensity until 1974. 1967 and particularly 1968. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique.65 Weapons were upgraded to a standard armament of AK-47 and AK-50 rifles. 1970). Economically. 66F. and Chinese 75mm recoiless rifles and 122mm rockets also began appearing. By late 1969 and early 1970 Soviet anti-aircraft weapons. work was stepped up in an effort to complete the project as quickly as possible for both economic and military reasons. additionally. 1974). 11. saw the beginning of big-power involvement in Frelimo policies specifically the Soviet Union and Chinese. p. mortars. Action in the Tete district which had met with early success in the beginning of the insurgency. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etupes Internacionales. but which had been dormant for several years. was reopened and the Cabora Bassa Dam project was the main target.67 Frelimo was . 65F. The Soviet RPD light machine gun as well as the Goryunov M1943 7.
A passage from Henriksen's Revolution and Counterrevoltion68 summarizes perfectly: "According to Frelimo. The mine is a weapon of the semi-skilled and as such fitted into Frelimo's reliance on village youth to conduct its campaign. Yet the highest 68Thomas H. (New York: American Affairs Association. It was an open demonstration of territorial control and Frelimo made the most of it. Frelimo forced a United Nations Resolution condemning the project in 1972. it used mines against the Forces Armadas for military. struck down by the guerrillas were mine victims. particularly after Mondlane's death and Machel's swing to the "left".. or 70 percent. conducted the next morning. however. of third world countries in the United Nations to condemn Portugal at almost every turn. 44. Maier. (London: Greenwood Press. economic and psychological goals. Portuguese forces could not locate the site of the convention until late on the last evening. Its effectiveness was great. and a marked increase in the brutality and psychological warfare directed at the Portuguese forces. Frelimo leaders were able to maneuver the consortium 67F. but was highly successful in interdicting convoys en route to the project site and intimidating workers. Understandably. Additionally. 1983). X. political. 1974). For Frelimo. The indiscriminate use of land mines by guerrilla forces probably had more impact on the Portuguese than any other single point of the conflict. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. a widening of the conflict into the Manica and Sofala districts. troops feared treading on an anti-personnel device. Propaganda was a strength of Frelimo throughout the insurgency. p. Inc. Revolution and Counterrevolution. a tremendous increase in urban terrorism. . The identification with other world liberation movements and association with the Communist powers afforded increased sympathy for the cause in every international forum. were futile. Two out of every three troops. Even with unchallenged air superiority. casualty was Portuguese morale. 41. Their propaganda victory lay in the fact that the Portuguese forces could not stop the guerrillas from interrupting work on the project which eventually led to a withdrawal of most foreign financial support. Their bombing missions. Henriksen. the years 1970 through 1974 contained no unique and signficant operations. but were characterized by an intensification of all guerrilla activities.seldom successful in direct attacks upon the dam. The other major propaganda victory in 1968 was the convention of the Second Congress of Frelimo on guerrilla held territory within Mozambique. p.
the colonial forces towed away the derelicts. by the all-too-quick getaway of the guerrillas who fired and ran. But many a convoy was spared heavy damage. The number of civilian casualties was tremendous and is one of the saddest aspects of the conflict. Transportation and other facilities were more tied up for a wounded man than a dead one. Machel reversed this policy in 1973. however brief. but it contributed to the psychological war against the Portuguese. adandonment. their leavetaking. when used for evacuation." Mining with the intention of inflicting Portuguese casualities was only one aspect of the grisly campaign. By 1973. also reduced the forces flying combat missions which could have inflicted losses on the guerrilla army. he had advocated a non-violent attitude toward Portuguese settlers and other Europeans in Mozambique and concentrated efforts against the Portuguese government and military. "Panic.This led to a mine psychosis and contributed to a static defense mentality in some colonial units. Helicopters. Mined vehicles twisted like licorice and mine craters along roadways conjured up grim reflections of previous tragedies. The anger of the civilian population was directed at the Portuguese soldiers because they could not protect the innocent. and white settlers again became targets of guerrilla attacks. Not only were the Portuguese engaged with a guerrilla force which they could not defeat. but they became the target of increasing abuse by even the friendly part of the native population as the conflict wore on. the insurgents' goal took more into account than raising the casualty list when burying the lethal canisters in the ground. Frelimo used this tactic to turn European against European as well. Thus. guerrilla forces were laying mines near civilian population centers just as indiscriminately. Riders in ambushed convoys in many instances stayed frozen in their vehicles or on the roadside to avoid stepping on anti-personnel mines which were often sown near the anti-vehicular variety of mines. diminished the size of the patrol. Generally. and a sense of futility all were reactions among whites in Mozambique". Sometimes. When Mondlane had been President of Frelimo. aside from the stricken vehicle and its crew. not for spare parts but to remove telltale reminders. demoralization. When two or three soldiers left the combat zone to carry a mined comrade.69 The settlers . Still another Frelimo objective was attained by mine wounds. Frelimo abstained from prolonged assault on well-escorted convoys.
A tense stage was well set in both Mozambique and Portugal. but since Frelimo was 70Thomas H. tired of serving repeated cycles of two years in Africa. Henriksen. The Portuguese actions in response to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1964. p. Portuguese authorities felt that if they could contain the guerrilla forces long enough without alienating the total population. making all native born Mozambicans citizens of Portugal. 1983). lives and careers. Henriksen.Conduct of the Counterinsurgency The Portuguese had taken political and social steps in the late 1950's and early 1960's to defuse the rising nationalism in Mozambique. was to contain the guerrillas in remote. 1983). then the social and political reforms would work to undercut the goals of the guerrilla movement with the insurgency dying a natural death. The morale of the army again was undermined and a sense of utter hopelessness became pervasive. Soldiers. 39. 1974. (London: Greenwood Press. p. In 1962. the Portuguese strategy actually assisted. Lisbon's counterinsurgent strategy. Portugal . (London: Greenwood Press. the labor laws were overhauled to create minimum wages. establish maximum working hours and improve working conditions. as discussed in earlier sections. Revolution and Counterrevolution. Frelimo's strategy had finally prevailed. one year at home.demonstrated against the Portuguese in Vila de Manica and Vila 69Thomas H. but at the same time keep Portuguese expenditures at a minimum until the guerrillas quit in frustration or dissolved into rival factions in the face of improved social and economic conditions. questioned their own long term prospects. in the early years. Portuguese forces could not effectively respond. underpopulated and economically expendable lands. a military coup took control of the government in Lisbon.70 If Frelimo's strategy had been to seek a quick victory this may have been effective. and stoned military installations and soldiers in Beira. In 1961 the "Indigena Laws" were repealed. On April 25. The 1963 "Overseas Organic Law" was designed to give some autonomy to the Mozambican colony. the initial Portuguese response to guerrilla attacks by Frelimo was limited and the initial strategy played into the hands of Frelimo. Though no announcement of Mozambique's liberation was immediately forthcoming. Having already been at war in Angola for nearly four years and Guinea for two years they had made some preparations in the . Frelimo's hit and run strategy continued in the early months of 1974. As a result. 37. Revolution and Counterrevolution. Pery. preparing for a protracted conflict. Although none were successful in heading off the outbreak of open conflict. kept in line with their strategy. wresting away every initiative.
Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etupes . always. This was roughly the same situation in which United States forces found themselves later in South Viet Nam. pgs.72 Though no 71Facts presented in this paragraph come from Jundanian's analysis. As guerrilla operations increased in intensity. Military forces were increased and surveillance by military intelligence units and PIDE (the Portuguese Secret Police) was stepped up.71 These policies.northern provinces to contain the insurgency. and the victory would have to come quickly. 72Brendan F. By trying to simply contain the guerrillas. not just waited out. any increased defense spending came at the expense of an already low standard of living for the Portuguese. The Portuguese found themselves falling into a situation which would haunt them for the rest of the conflict. 1968 and 1969 saw Portuguese force levels grow to sixty thousand with an additional forty thousand native soldiers active in the southern provinces away from the general conflict. one step behind the guerrillas. Communications were improved and several airfields were constructed to assist in containing the guerrillas. Far from one of the richest nations in Europe. the Portuguese were giving them time to expand. however. the guerrillas were not cooperating. everything was going as planned. It was becoming apparent that the colonial wars would have to be won. The Portuguese had purchased several B-26's from the United States and forty Fiat G-91 fighter bombers from West Germany to step up the air war against the guerrillas. The draft age had been lowered to eighteen with obligatory service extended to three or four years depending on the draft category. Basically. the Portuguese had broken the structure of the underground movement in Lourenco Marques and had arrested the leaders. collectively. and organize. it seemed. The Mozambique Liberation Front. By 1965. (Library of Congress. The Portuguese military budget for Mozambique had increased thirty percent per year and total defense spending had reached fourty-four percent of the overall Portuguese budget. The guerrilla forces had stolen the initiative and would dictate the location and tempo of operations to the Portuguese. A build-up of troops and equipment began and would continue until the last months of the conflict. the Portuguese found they no longer had enough forces to successfully cover the expanded area to successfully cover the expanded area of operations. combined with minimal good news from any of the three African colonies were beginning to have an impact in Portugal. Portuguese forces would almost always be reacting to the guerrilla strategy. 50-60. train. Jundanian. PIDE had successfully infiltrated Frelimo and would prove instrumental in causing turmoil within the insurgent organization.
accurate figures are available as to the quantity of these aircraft which arrived in Mozambique. It is interesting to note that West Germany sold the aircraft to Portugal under the stipulation that they be used only in NATO areas. many did. "Arms and Nationalists". Efforts were made to intensify old tribal enmities and to play up the Maconde dissatisfaction with Frelimo in an attempt to divide the population and reduce the potential support for Frelimo. South View Nam. One incident. will be covered in a later discussion. 15. 5. p." The Portuguese attempted to clear the entire border region. In addition to the stepped up military operations. The Portuguese forces resettled over two hundred and fifty thousand natives in the provinces along the southern border of Tanzania hoping that the larger hamlets could refuse to aid Frelimo guerrillas where isolated Africans could not. No. purchased through the CIA. The number of B-26's was between seven and twenty. Jundanian. Africa Report. Special medical and social benefits were made available to natives who would support the Portuguese administration.. 10. fell victim to a "scorched earth policy."73 Another part of the increased counterinsurgent operations was the creation of strategic hamlets in the northern provinces. unfortunately one tended to off set the other. The rest of the region south of the Tanzanian border. p. 74Brendan F.. the planes would be used only for defensive purposes within Portuguese territory.74 73Basil Davidson. because part of the increased counterinsurgent operations included napalm strikes against suspected Frelimo villages. similar to the experience at. The G-91 could operate from very short runways carrying a good ordnance load. much like the resettlement campaign. A Portuguese Foreign Ministry official clarified this: "The transaction was agreed within the spirit of the North Atlantic Pact . and Portuguese Guinea. the "unfortunate acts" became all too commonplace. May 1970. My Lai. were often carried out with a vengeance. 1970). napalming villages and using herbicides on the jungle. and did not inspire long term loyalty. These actions. 1970). which extends to Africa Angola. (Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internacionales. Vol. exclusive of the strategic hamlets. Mozambique. 66.Internacionales. however. and as a result was an excellent aircraft for counterinsurgency operations. Portuguese forces increased civil action efforts and propaganda campaigns. 73. Old animosities against the Portuguese were difficult to overcome and often one unfortunate act would negate any potential benefits from a particular program. The Mozambique Liberation Front. As the level of frustration built with the seemingly enless war. . p.
The second was the onset of the rainy season in November which proved to be longer than usual and subsequently gave the guerrillas more than enough time to recover. and initiated large scale "search-and-destroy" missions. (London: Greenwood Press. . and was almost successful. a new commander for Portuguese forces in Mozambique was appointed. These tactics were effective and Arriaga pursued the guerrillas relentlessly. Tactics consisted of lightning quick airborne assaults on small camps. 1983). motorized armies converged. the exertions of "Gordion Knot" could not be continued indefinitely. The first. He also requested a further increase of troops and material.for several reasons. noted above. had been content with the relatively low casualty figures. Arriaga launched the largest offensive campaign of the war Operation "Gordion Knot". Revolution and Counterrevolution.In March 1970. Henriksen. The brunt of the effort was in the Cabo Delgado district. He possessed definite ideas on the conduct of the war in Mozambique which were reinforced by a visit to the United States for consultations with General William Westmoreland concerning American tactics in Viet Nam.75 Arriaga insisted on the deployment of aircraft to support ground operations. 75Thomas H. ultimately thirty-five thousand men. The politicians in Lisbon. however. Though "Gordion Knot" had been the most successful campaign of the counterinsurgency it had not delivered the ultimate victory desired by Arriaga . though dissatisfied with the success of the counterinsurgency until Arriaga's assumption of command. Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga had studied the Mozambican theater from a position on the staff of the Institute of Higher Military Studies in Lisbon and had served as commander of ground forces in Mozambique for eight months prior to assignment as overall commander. particularly helicopter gunships. The third was the simple fact that Arriaga had to mass all of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique to pursue the campaign in the extreme northern provinces in hopes of a relatively quick but decisive victory. was political "queasiness" with the increased casualty rates and subsequent meddling in the operation itself. As casualty rates continued to climb during "Gordion Knot" their early pleasure with the improving tactical operations diminished. 49. Bolstered with three thousand additional Portuguese soldiers. "Gordion Knot" was a seven month campaign employing. Political meddling in the conduct of the war appeared with increasing frequency. Continual artillery and aviation bombardment rained down on larger sites while bulldozer guided. As the number of guerrilla killed and captured increased. The objectives of the campaign were to seal off the infiltration routes across the Tanzanian border and to destroy permanent guerrilla bases. so did the number of Portuguese casualties. p.
During 1973 and early 1974. By 1972. A veteran . then contested. Frustration and suspicion mounted. whether disillusioned by "Gordion Knot" or restrained by Lisbon. Arriaga. Recounts the incident at Wiriyamu as described by the Dominican priest. 1971.76 The exposure of Wiriyamu brought with it the exposure of numerous other incidents on a smaller scale and increased world-wide (particularly third-world) condemnation of Portugal. had lost a great amount of confidence in military solutions and were encouraging the expansion of 76Adrian Hastings. The civilian authorities in Lisbon. The incident. they increased operations in other provinces. A Portuguese communique issued in late January. and in this atmosphere elements of the Portuguese army massacred the inhabitants of the village of Wiriyamu. Frelimo forces began advancing southward. not all military objectives had been realized. black and white. in a spontaneous outburst of frustration during a small scale search and destroy mission. sparsely guarded by Portuguese troops. in July 1973. best estimates are that four hundred to five hundred natives were slaughtered by Portuguese soldiers. 1972 could probably be described as "the beginning of the end" of the insurgency. Though details of the entire episode will never be known. operations by PIDE. Portuguese forces were apparently unable to halt them. Wiriyamu. (London: Search Press. the situation continued to worsen for the Portuguese. The Portuguese stepped up violent tactics. and disagreement on the proper role of the secret police in combating the insurgency widened the rift between the central government and the military leadership. Simultaneously. by a Dominican priest. 1973. 1974). prolonging the campaign and consuming Portuguese resources. for the frustrations of the Portuguese soldiers were becoming evident. acknowledged that in spite of the massive operation. Forced resettlements and reprisals became more frequent and on a larger scale after mid-1972. itself. shifted from extended conventional sweeps to small unit actions deploying black and white shock troops. was not brought to the attention of the rest of the world until nearly a year later. It was at first denied. trying to make the natives afraid to support Frelimo. then rationalized as a response in-kind by Portuguese authorities. continually dispersed into the jungle.Frelimo realized this and as any good guerrilla force. embarrassed by the atrocities exposed in July. The violence and brutality of campaign actions against the population were increasing on both sides. the situation had deteriorated again with Portuguese forces operating out of traditional secluded strongholds in guerrilla dominated territory. PIDE's paramilitary endeavors were viewed as excessively brutal and counterproductive by the leaders of the military.
Revolution and Counterrevolution. but Frelimo. Instead of engaging the guerrillas. an increase in bombing attacks on guerrilla controlled territories. (New York: American Affairs Association Inc. and the war between the army and the secret police. Conclusions As noted at the beginning of this study. would not comply. the war between the army and the secret police. Despite tremendous assistance from Cuba. 1974. The troops fighting in Mozambique realized that the coup in Lisbon and the opening of negotiations with Frelimo were a prelude to withdrawal. 24. 1975 . and the central government. Mozambique remains a tinderbox in Southern Africa despite almost a decade of self-rule since achieving independence. and on September 8. and by ordering 77F. The situation has been further aggravated . 78Thomas H. by handing out arms to rural settlers. many refused to continue risking their lives in a war that could not be won. 1974.78 The Spinola government countered by ordering northern outposts abandoned and the concentration of troops in the southern regions.Portuguese journalist described the deteriorating situation quite accurately: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against Frelimo. Machel's goal of achieving greater prosperity in Mozambique and raising the general standard of living by using the Communist system has been largely a failure. 1974). The war had ended. p. but proved futile. Mozambique remains steeped in poverty and ripe for internal conflict. p. as described by one Portuguese officer.the thirteenth anniversary of Frelimo. These measures were intended to support the Portuguese position at the negotiating table. the Portuguese position in Mozambique all but collapsed. which came to power after the final withdrawal of Portuguese forces in 1975. 1983). The agreement called for a transitional government with full independence for Mozambique to be granted on June 25. sensing victory. Henriksen. Maier. aligned solidly with the Communist world and severed most relations with the West. head of the new government and former commander of counterrevolutionary forces in Guinea-Bissau. X. General Antonio de Spinola. By mid-summer an undeclared truce prevailed since the bulk of the Portuguese army would not leave their barracks. and China. The government of Samora Machel. (London: Greenwood Press."77 When the Movimento de Forcas Armadas (MFA) seized control of the government in Lisbon on April 25. the Soviet Union. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. an accord was signed formalizing the cease-fire. maneuvered to maintain some control over the destiny of Mozambique by calling for a cease-fire and Portuguese sponsored elections. 57.. Frelimo announced the opening of a new front in Zambezia and poured guerrillas into the middle regions of the country "like fleas through a rug".
Fearful of the Communist penetration into Southern Africa through Angola and Mozambique and very aware of the tenuous position their own government would occupy if Western support became critical. Frelimo's knockout punch came in the form of terrorism. particularly economically. This strength fed on the mirrored acts of European powers hastily divesting themselves of costly African colonies. they rarely engaged Portuguese forces head-on and then. the lessons learned from analyzing the insurgency against Portugal are critical. Mozambique has been hard hit. colonial domination. specifically the indiscriminate use of landmines in the final years of the insurgency. who finds punches raining down from every direction and is too busy ducking to land a well-aimed blow of his own. Conducting classic guerrilla hit and run operations. Once again. in accepting a protracted conflict with all of the inherent pitfalls of a long term insurgency. Portuguese morale was devastated beyond their capacity to recover. At the same time. the Machel government has made overtures to the South Africans indicating a desire to normalize relations and enter into reciprocal agreements aimed at easing the fears of South Africans and gaining a respite for the Mozambican economy. The basic failure of the Portuguese was an underestimation of their enemy. Mozambique. Mozambique appears to be moving toward center ground in a potential East-West confrontation. The basic strength of Frelimo. forcing the Portuguese to react and never allowing them the initiative. only with clearly superior strength. so too. almost guaranteed eventual success particularly against Portugal. in all probability. Because of their initial . This characteristic is inherent to almost every unsuccessful counterinsurgency. has not seen the last of guerrilla warfare. Much like the weary fighter. if no other. the guerrillas dictated the tempo and location of operations. For this reason. The strategy of Frelimo. do the Portuguese eventually succumb. Portugal's stubborn reluctance to follow suit created the amalgam for insurgency. was the fact that it came into existence following five hundred years of inflexible. Machel has indicated "somewhat" of a desire for better relations with the United States. the South Africans have actively promoted guerrilla activity in both of the aforementioned countries. undoubtedly the poorest of European colonial powers and the only one to see long term profit in maintaining African colonies. From the outset. particularly in the early stages of the insurgency. The Communist powers have invested considerable time and money in gaining a toehold in Southern Africa and cannot be expected to remain idle as Machel warms up to the West. Recently.by actions of the government of South Africa. Frelimo's tactics were supurb throughout the insurgency.
Inability to agree on any particular strategy and follow through to success or failure highlighted the disunity of policy-makers and underlined the lack of a plan to eventually end the conflict. the Portuguese never settled on a strategy which would eventually end the conflict. was containment and was designed around the idea of employing minimum forces and minimum assets to hold Frelimo in check. Mozambique offers extreme variations in terrain. Their strategy. and should not be expected to arise in support of an external power intervening to free them from Communism. The most unfortunate aspect of this point is that Portuguese forces had sufficient strength to easily overpower the guerrillas in the early years of the insurgency had they employed a better strategy. entering virtually all regions of the country. it was hoped. if extended over a few more years. The result was a generation of Portuguese soldiers who felt they were being sacrificed aimlessly in the African colonies with no hope for extrication. Frelimo would cease to exist as an organization due to internal conflict. If Mozambique should become the scene of confrontation in the future. Tribal loyalties and animosities are extremely significant. therefore. Civil affairs programs. This is probably the greatest single problem confronting any force introduced into the area. The people have lived.estimation of Frelimo's capabilities. avenues of approach or lines of communication depending upon the structure of the force. unhappily for the most part. Infiltration routes from the north and west are almost unlimited with nearly two thousand miles of contiguity to nations which would provide haven for guerrilla units in all probability. should be well planned and genuine or their impact will be negligible. and can be formidable obstacles. Politically. This is a critical point. The . with areas that are ideal for the conduct of guerrilla operations. Even as late as 1970. particularly in rural areas. and can prove advantageous if properly understood. this allowed Frelimo the time to gather strength and committed Portugal to a spiraling force buildup which they could not afford. At some time in the near future. The situation in which we found ourselves during the recent Lebanon crisis. under the rule of white men for nearly five hundred years. Tremendous rivers cross Mozambique. General Arriaga's "Gordion Knot" came within easy distance of complete victory but was cut short by vacillating policy within the Portuguese government. could very easily have caused similar misgivings. As was discussed in previous sections. guerrillas in Mozambique have already displayed a propensity for terrorism. from the beginning. but one that should be easily understood by any United States Marine. there are critical elements in the make-up of the country which bear understanding before committment of forces.
Santos. 1969. Excellent background information on Portuguese . it provides insight into Machel's reasoning and priorities. Any force being committed to action or presence in Mozambique should have a well defined answer to this problem in advance. 1975. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Excellent volume for insight into Mondlane. Manuel Pimentel Pereira dos. 1959. The lessons learned in Mozambique apply across the board. An interview with the Portuguese governor of Mozambique. Our confrontations will be in the "third world" for at least the remainder of the twentieth century.S. indiscriminate use of landmines was relatively unique to the insurgency in Mozambique. and had frightful impact on both the opposing force and the native population. New York: A. 1974. Middlesex: Penguin Books.I. The best source for an understanding of Frelimo's goals in the early years.. Adrian. 1973. The Struggle for Mozambique. A NATO ally was "bled" in a collapsing colonial situation which we could not shepherd.widespread. The insurgency in Mozambique is extremely important for one final reason. Samora. not just a colony. Provides excellent insight into the leader of Frelimo. Again. Machel. It reflects Portuguese views of Mozambique prior to the military takeover in 1974. the first President of Frelimo. The Tasks Ahead. Mondlane. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Hastings. The author presents his views on the condition of Mozambique following the conclusion of the insurgency and the tasks that lie ahead in developing the nation. Portuguese Africa. Lisbon. 1975. London: Committee for Freedom in Mozambique. Wiriyamu. Machel. London: Search Press. the United States stands as a strong reservoir of optimism in the face of a powerful challenge pledged to our destruction. James. and his views of the revolution and conduct of the insurgency. Ltd.. Samora. Written by the Dominican priest who first exposed the massacre. Provides transcripts of important speeches made by Machel since becoming President of Frelimo. Eduardo. this volume accurately establishes the atmosphere of frustration which led to the events at Wiriyamu and portrays his struggle to convince the world of the atrocities taking place in Mozambique. Mozambique is Not Only Cabora Bassa. Secondary Sources Duffy. Sowing the Seeds of Revolution. Like it or not. Gives Portuguese justification to the idea that Mozambique is an actual "part" of Portugal. Mozambique. Part of that pledge was paid by Portugal in Mozambique.
Serapiao. Luis B. Inc. 15:5. 1983. 12:8. 12:8. February 6." Marcum. Thomas H. John A. Helen. 1970. The Mozambique Liberation Front. African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule. Describes the organization as it grows through four distinct phases of the conflict and the perceived reason for the changes. An excellent reference. Provides good information on areas of the insurgency not covered in detail in other publications. Written by the foremost expert on the area. 1967. Mozambique: A History. Though obviously pro-Frelimo. The author attempts to provide an impartial view of the events which transpired during the insurgency. Maier. Gibson. 1972. Roger. Africa Report. Washington: University Press of America. Brendan F. Basil. Also provides additional information on utilization of landmines during the insurgency. Southampton: The Camelot Press. Jundanian. Library of Congress: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etupes Internacionales. this publication is an absolute necessity for a sound understanding of the situation in Mozambique. 1967. Henriksen. Inc. New York: Oxford Univesity Press. 1970. 1979. The most thorough volume found covering the history of Mozambique.involvement in Africa prior to the outbreak of insurgency in the colonies. Thomas H. Washington Post Magazine. An excellent summary of Frelimo as it changed throughout the insurgency. F. it balances other publications and provides the reader with many thoughts to ponder. Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence. particularly the Cabora Bassa Dam project. Presents another view of the events which led to the insurgency and the direction in which Mozambique is moving. Mohamed A. Periodicals Kitchen. 1977. and El-Khawas. Revolution and Terrorism in Mozambique. Good account of all the liberation movements in Africa." Davidson. Revolution and Counterrevolution. "Arms and Nationalists." Mann. Continues the excellent analysis of the Mozambican struggle started in his first volume." . "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane. Africa Report. X. Africa Report. The only publication found that appears to present the facts without a biased opinion. Henriksen. New York: American African Affairs Association.. 1974. London: Greenwood Press. Richard.. 1978. "A Troubled Celebration in Zanzibar. "Three Revolutions. Gives an excellent summary of the Portuguese dilemma in all of her colonies. but somewhat pro-Portuguese.
P. C2. "Mozambique Gains Independence After 470 Years" Post (Washington). A-13. "New Charges of Mass Executions in Mozambique" Post (Washington). C3. 4 September 1973. P. C2. "Guerrilla Upsurge Shakes Mozambique" Post (Washington). C3. A-11. "Lisbon General Reports Gains in Mozambique War" The Christian Science Monitor. P. P. 14 July 1973. 2. P. "Priests Comments on Slaying Report" Times (New York). 12 September 1974. "Guerrillas Step Up Raids in Mozambique" The Christian Science Monitor. 12 July 1973. P. 15 March 1971. 3C. Cautious" . "Independent Mozambique seen as Marxist.Newspapers Times (New York). P. "Guerrillas Winning Control of Mozambique" Post (Washington). P. 26 June 1975. C4. 18 August 1974. 30 May 1974. A-17. P. 5 July 1973. P. A-30. 25 June 1975. "Rioting Kills at least 47 in Mozambique" Times (New York). "Mozambique Rebel Says Forces Aim to Block Dam" Times (New York). "Showdown Nears in Mozambique" Times (New York). "Mozambique: A Study in Terror" Post (Washington). 23 January 1969. P. P. A-16. 11 January 1974.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?