CHAPTER13

Land Use
Quant i t at i ve Ri sk Assessment
pr epar ed by
ModuSpec Aust r al i a Pt y Li mi t ed
Ap p e n d i x D
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 1 of 26
7 July 2006
CALTEX REFINERIES (NSW) PTY LTD
Kurnell Refinery
Tank 632
Quantitative Risk Assessment
6
th
Floor, 34 Queen Street, Melbourne VIC 3000,
Tel: +61 3 9614 1285 Fax: +61 3 9614 3917
Email: melbourne@moduspec.com Website: www.moduspec.com
Enquiries regarding this report please contact the author
For other ModuSpec services contact Lachlan Dreher
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Abstract
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 2 of 26
7 July 2006
Project Title Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Client Name Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd
Job No. AUS0352.8
Project Manager Lachlan Dreher
Project Analyst (s) Lachlan Dreher, Marian Magbiray, Patrick Walker
Report Author (s) Marian Magbiray, Patrick Walker
ABSTRACT
ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd was engaged to undertake a quantitative risk assessment to
analyse the risks associated with the installation of the proposed new crude oil tank
(Tank 632).
This report details the results of the individual components of the risk assessment,
including the hazard identification, frequency assessment and consequence assessment.
The individual risk was evaluated in terms of risk of fatality and risk of injury. These
results were compared with the applicable criteria to determine the acceptability of the
risks associated with the proposed installation. In determining the acceptability of the
risks, the impact on the adjacent industrial facilities to the west of the refinery boundary
was assessed, with particular emphasis on the Serenity Cove Development.
Key Words: PETROL, QRA, BUNDFIRE, STOR
Release
No.
Date of
Issue
Reviewed by Approved by Reason for Update
Draft A 19 April 2006 L. Dreher
S. Masterton
L. Dreher Client Review
Draft B 15 June 2006 L. Dreher
S. Masterton
L. Dreher Client Review
Draft C 22 June 2006 L. Dreher
S. Masterton
L. Dreher Client Review
Draft D 29 June 2006 L. Dreher
S. Masterton
L. Dreher Client Review
Release 01 7 July 2006 L. Dreher
S. Masterton
L. Dreher Release To Client
This report, prepared by ModuSpec, is confidential. It has been prepared on behalf of the client mentioned on
the cover page (“the client”) and is issued pursuant to an agreement between ModuSpec and the client. It has
been produced according to the scope of work and is only suitable for use in connection therewith.
All measures and decisions based on this analysis and these findings are the sole responsibility of the client.
ModuSpec does not accept:
ƒ any liability for the identification, indication or elimination of dangers and non-compliances (in the broadest
sense of the word), nor for any damage caused by any of these;
ƒ any obligation to report all facts or circumstances established during the visit. This obligation comes
completely under the authority and responsibility of the client
ƒ any liability for the client’s obligations resulting from (legal) rules and/or statutes;
ƒ any liability or responsibility whatsoever in respect of or reliance upon this report by any third party.
The execution of improvements recommended by ModuSpec does not indemnify the client against any legal or
contractual obligations and offers no safeguard against the elimination of dangers or damages resulting from
the client’s products, services, company assets, et cetera.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without prior permission, in writing,
of ModuSpec, except for restricted use within the client’s organisation.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Table of Contents
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 3 of 26
7 July 2006
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................. 5
1.1. Fatality Risk ........................................................................................... 5
1.2. Injury Risk ............................................................................................. 5
2. ACRONYMS & GLOSSARY ......................................................................... 8
3. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 10
3.1. Project Scope ....................................................................................... 10
3.2. Locations ............................................................................................. 10
4. STUDY METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 12
5. RISK CRITERIA...................................................................................... 14
5.1. Individual Fatality Risk Criteria................................................................ 14
5.2. Individual Injury Risk Criteria.................................................................. 14
6. FACILITY AND OPERATION DESCRIPTION............................................. 16
6.1. Facility Description ................................................................................ 16
6.2. Process Description ............................................................................... 16
6.3. Meteorological Conditions....................................................................... 16
7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION..................................................................... 17
7.1. Hazardous Materials .............................................................................. 17
7.2. Hazardous Scenarios ............................................................................. 17
8. FAILURE FREQUENCY AND EVENT TREE ANALYSIS................................. 18
8.1. Failure Frequency.................................................................................. 18
8.2. Equipment Failure Scenarios................................................................... 18
8.3. Event Tree Analysis ............................................................................... 18
8.4. Full Surface Tank Fire ............................................................................ 19
8.5. Bund Fire............................................................................................. 20
9. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING................................................................... 22
10. RISK RESULTS....................................................................................... 23
10.1. Individual Risk................................................................................... 23
10.2. Comparison with Risk Criterion ............................................................ 23
10.2.1. Fatality Risk................................................................................... 23
10.2.2. Injury Risk .................................................................................... 24
10.3. Major Risk Contributors ...................................................................... 24
10.3.1. Fatality Risk................................................................................... 25
10.3.2. Injury Risk .................................................................................... 25
10.4. Maximum Consequence Impact............................................................ 25
11. REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 26
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Table of Contents
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 4 of 26
7 July 2006
APPENDICES:
APPENDIX A – PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS...........................................................A1
APPENDIX B – HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND PROCESS CONDITIONS..............B1
APPENDIX C – FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA ...................................................... C1
APPENDIX D – HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND FAILURE CONTRIBUTORS..........D1
APPENDIX E – EVENT TREE ANALYSIS............................................................. E1
APPENDIX F – CONSEQUENCE LEVEL IMPACT CRITERIA .................................. F1
APPENDIX G – CONSEQUENCE RESULTS ..........................................................G1
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Executive Summary
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 5 of 26
7 July 2006
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd has proposed the installation of an additional crude oil
storage tank (Tank 632), for the Kurnell Refinery. The proposed location for the tank is
in the south crude storage area, immediately to the west of Tank 633. Several industrial
facilities, most notably the Serenity Cove Industrial Facility, are situated to the west of
the refinery boundary, neighbouring the southern crude tank farm and the proposed
location of Tank 632. Hence, a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) was undertaken to
assess the risk impacts associated with the new installation, and to establish whether
these risks comply with the applicable criteria.
The full range of potential hazardous scenarios and consequence events associated with
the installation and operation of the proposed tank was considered in the analysis. The
individual risk was assessed in terms of risk of fatality and risk of injury to determine the
impact the proposed installation would have on the surrounding area.
1.1. Fatality Risk
The 5 x 10
-6
per year risk criterion applied in the assessment was based on the guidelines
for risk acceptance levels to neighbouring commercial developments, as published by the
NSW Department of Urban Resources and Planning (DUAP) [1]. The 5 x 10
-6
per year
risk contour is presented in Figure 1.1.
The 5 x 10
-6
per year individual risk contour level is confined within the refinery
boundary. This risk level represents the limit of acceptability for risk impact on the
neighbouring commercial area of the Serenity Cove Development and therefore with this
risk level contained within Caltex’s site, the risk criterion is satisfied.
A review of the consequence events that contribute to the western region of the 5 x 10
-6
per year individual risk contour indicated that a bund fire associated with the new
installation constitutes a major contribution to the risk.
The risk assessment was based on whole crude oil service. The modelling of whole crude
oil represents the worst-case scenario.
1.2. Injury Risk
Continued exposure to heat flux of 4.7 kW/m
2
is considered sufficient to cause injury [1].
Hence, injury risk was assessed based on exposure to this level of heat flux or greater.
The acceptance criteria for risk of injury posed by industrial facilities onto neighbouring
residential areas is 50 chances per million per year (i.e. 50 x 10
-6
per year) [1]. The
50 x 10
-6
per year injury risk contour is depicted in Figure 1.2.
The areas bordering the Caltex site near the proposed location of Tank 632 are not
residential areas and hence application of this criterion to the neighbouring land-uses
represents a high degree of conservatism. Although no injury risk criteria has formally
been specified, it is reasonable to consider that less stringent criteria would be applied to
commercial and industrial land use, as bounds the Caltex site near the proposed location
of Tank 632.
With the 50 x 10
-6
per year individual injury risk contour lying inside the site boundary,
the risk exposure at the site boundary with the Serenity Cove Development is therefore
less than this value. This is considered acceptable.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Executive Summary
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 6 of 26
7 July 2006
632
633
622
623
100 m
N
5 × 10
-6
Figure 1.1: Individual Risk of Fatality Contour – 5 × 10
-6
per year
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Executive Summary
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 7 of 26
7 July 2006
632
633
622
623
100 m
N
50 × 10
-6
Figure 1.2: Individual Risk of Injury Contour – 50 × 10
-6
per year
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Acronyms & Glossary
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 8 of 26
7 July 2006
2. ACRONYMS & GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS
ADG Australian Dangerous Goods
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
Caltex Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd
CDU Crude Distillation Unit
DUAP Department of Urban Affairs and Planning
HUM Hold up mass
IR Individual risk
ModuSpec ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd
MV Motorised valve
NSW New South Wales
PHA Preliminary hazard analysis
P&ID Piping and instrumentation diagram
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
GLOSSARY
Acceptance Criteria Defines the level of risk to which an individual is exposed,
as either tolerable (negligible risk), intolerable or within
the ALARP region.
Bund An embankment or wall which may form part or all of the
perimeter of a compound around a storage tank, intended
to contain any release of liquid.
Consequence This is the severity associated with an event in terms of
toxic doses, fire or explosion etc., i.e. the potential effects
of a hazardous event.
Frequency This is the number of occurrences of an event expressed
per unit time. It is usually expressed as the likelihood of
an event occurring within one year.
Hazard A physical situation with the potential for human injury,
damage to property, damage to the environment or some
combination of these.
Hazardous Scenario The identified isolatable sections and/or those which have
been broken down into scenarios for specific items of
equipment.
Individual Risk The frequency at which an individual may be expected to
sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of
specified hazards.
Individual Risk of Fatality Individual risk with “harm” measured in terms of fatality.
It is calculated at a particular point for a stationary,
unprotected person for 24 hours per day, 365 days per
year. Normally measured in chances of fatality per million
years.
Individual Risk of Injury Similar to individual risk of fatality, however with “harm”
measured in terms of injury.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Acronyms & Glossary
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 9 of 26
7 July 2006
GLOSSARY
Individual Risk Contours As IR (Individual Risk) is calculated at a point, calculating
the IR at many points allows the plotting of IR contours,
these being lines that indicate constant levels of risk. Most
commonly used are the 1 chance per million-year contour
and the 10 chances per million-year contour.
Isolatable Section A system of pipes or vessels containing the hazardous
materials that are bounded by specific isolation points.
Isolation Point A point in the process, which can be used to isolate one
part of the process from the rest of the system.
Probability The expression for the likelihood of an occurrence of an
event or an event sequence or the likelihood of the
success or failure of an event on test or demand. By
definition, probability must be expressed as a number
between 0 and 1.
Quantitative Risk
Assessment
A risk assessment undertaken by combining quantitative
evaluations of event frequency and consequence.
Risk The combination of frequency and consequences, the
chance of an event happening that can cause specific
consequences.
Risk Reduction The process of risk assessment coupled to a systematic
consideration of potential control measures and a
judgement on whether they are reasonably practicable to
implement.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Introduction
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 10 of 26
7 July 2006
3. INTRODUCTION
3.1. Project Scope
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd has proposed the installation of an additional crude oil
storage tank, to be designated as Tank 632, for the Kurnell Refinery. A Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) was initially conducted to provide a semi-quantitative assessment
of the risks associated with the proposed new installation and the acceptability of these
risks [2]. The PHA was unable to conclusively demonstrate that the risk impact onto the
adjacent industrial facility complied with the adopted risk acceptance criterion.
The PHA was conducted as a semi-quantitative analysis, based on a series of simplifying
assumptions. In order to draw more definitive conclusions about the acceptability of the
offsite risk exposure, more detailed quantitative analysis was conducted, i.e. a
quantitative risk assessment (QRA). The QRA involved the assessment of the likelihood
and consequence for scenarios associated with the process in a quantitative manner,
based on data specific to the operation.
3.2. Locations
The proposed storage tank is to be located in the southern crude storage area, adjacent
to the refinery's western boundary. The location of the tank and the bunded area within
which it is located was taken from information provided by Caltex [3], which indicated
tank size, tank location and the configuration of the bunded area. These specifications
have been reproduced in Figure 3.1.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Introduction
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 11 of 26
7 July 2006
Figure 3.1: Proposed Location of Tank 632.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Methodology
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 12 of 26
7 July 2006
4. STUDY METHODOLOGY
The study methodology followed the standard risk assessment steps outlined below.
Figure 4.1 presents a flow chart of the risk assessment steps followed.
Hazard identification
Hazard identification was carried out by a review of the proposed operations and
materials handled, in order to identify the equipment and pipelines containing potentially
hazardous materials and to define representative hazardous scenarios.
Frequency assessment
The frequency assessment stage of the analysis involved defining the potential release
sources and subsequently determining the likelihood (frequency) of the various releases.
The failure frequencies were determined using failure item counts for each of the failure
items identified and publicly available historical failure rate data. Details of the failure
rate values used are provided in Appendix C. Ignition probability data was used to
estimate the probability of a release subsequently being ignited.
Consequence assessment
The potential consequences from the hazardous scenarios were determined and the
impact zones modelled using appropriate software tools. Where possible, the effects of
existing mitigation measures at the facility were also taken into account in the
consequence assessment. The primary consequence type was a pool fire following a fuel
spill.
Details of these steps are described in the appropriate sections of the report. A number
of assumptions were made during the analysis. Details of the assumptions are presented
in Appendix A.
Risk assessment:
The frequency and consequence assessments were combined to calculate individual risk
for both fatality and injury. The risk results have been presented as contours on a site
plan. The risk results were then assessed against the selected risk criteria to determine
risk acceptability.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Methodology
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 13 of 26
7 July 2006
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT
CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT
Detailed process
information including
plans, process flow
diagrams and
emergency detection
and shutdown systems
Identification of
Hazardous Substance
Identification of
Failure Modes
Definition of Failure Case
Event Tree Analysis
End Event Identification
End Event Frequency
Determination
Failure Rate Data
Component Data
Specific System Data
Ignition Probabilities
Explosion Probabilities
Detection Strategies
Isolation Strategies
Chemical Data
- Flammability
- Specific Properties
Meteorological Data
Equipment layout and
release control and
protection systems
Emergency Response
Capabilities
Consequence Modelling
- Fire
- Flammable Vapour Dispersion
Determination of Impact Zones
Select Appropriate
Risk Criteria
Identify Major Risk
Contributors and
propose risk
reduction measures
to achieve acceptable
risk levels
Individual Risk,
calculations
Determine Acceptability
of Risk
Comparison with
Risk Criteria
Acceptable Not Acceptable
Figure 4.1: Risk Assessment Study Methodology
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Risk Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 14 of 26
7 July 2006
5. RISK CRITERIA
A comparison of the risk against an appropriate target or criterion is required in order to
assess the acceptability of that risk. The risk criterion applied for this assessment was
obtained from the criteria published by the NSW Department of Urban Affairs and
Planning (DUAP) [1].
5.1. Individual Fatality Risk Criteria
The NSW criteria are based on a principle that if the risk from a potentially hazardous
installation is less than most risks being experienced by the community (e.g. voluntary
risks, transportation risks), then that risk may be tolerated. This principle is consistent
with the basis of risk criteria adopted by most authorities internationally. The individual
risk criteria are as follows:
- Hospitals, schools, child-care facilities and old age housing development should
not be exposed to individual fatality risk levels in excess of half in one million per
year (0.5 x 10
-6
per year)
- Residential developments and places of continuous occupancy, such as hotels and
tourist resorts, should not be exposed to individual fatality risk levels in excess of
one in a million per year (1 x 10
-6
per year)
- Commercial developments, including offices, retail centres, warehouses with
showrooms, restaurants and entertainment centres, should not be exposed to
individual fatality risk levels in excess of five in a million per year (5 x 10
-6
per
year)
- Sporting complexes and active open space areas should not be exposed to
individual fatality risk levels in excess of ten in a million per year (10 x 10
-6
per
year).
These criteria apply to new industry and surrounding land use proposals. In theory, the
criteria should apply to existing facilities, however this may not be possible in practice.
For existing facilities, an overall planning approach is necessary. In terms of criteria, the
following principles should apply [1]:
- The 1 x 10
-6
per year individual fatality risk level is an appropriate criterion within
which no intensification of residential development should take place
- Safety updates/reviews and risk reduction at facilities where resultant levels are in
excess of the 10 x 10
-6
per year individual fatality risk level should be
implemented to ensure that operational and organisational safety measures are in
place to reduce the likelihood of major hazardous events to low levels. A target
level is to be established on an area basis
- Intensification of hazardous activities in an existing complex accommodating a
number of industries of a hazardous nature should only be allowed if the resultant
1 x 10
-6
per year individual fatality risk level is not exceeded by the proposed
facility and subject to cumulative risk threshold considerations
- Mitigating the impact on existing residential areas from existing hazardous
activities (in addition to safety review/updates) should include specific area-based
emergency plans. Emergency planning should be developed on the basis of
consequences for credible scenarios with emphasis on areas within the 1 x 10
-6
per year risk contour.
5.2. Individual Injury Risk Criteria
The NSW individual injury risk criterion for exposure to heat radiation is as follows [1]:
- Incident heat flux radiation at residential areas should not exceed 4.7 kW/m
2
at
frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Risk Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 15 of 26
7 July 2006
Exposure to heat flux of greater than 4.7 kW/m
2
is considered high enough to trigger the
possibility of injury for persons who are unable to be evacuated or seek shelter. This
amount of heat radiation would cause injury after an exposure period of 30 seconds.
This criterion is applicable to residential areas. Injury risk criteria for neighbouring
commercial developments or industrial facilities have now been published. The land uses
along the site boundary in the area of interest in this study are commercial and
industrial. Similar to the relationship between individual fatality risk criteria for
residential, commercial and industrial land uses, higher acceptability criteria for injury
risk would be expected for commercial and industrial land uses, as compared to that for
residential areas. On this basis, for neighbouring commercial land uses, injury risk less
than 250 chances in a million per year would be deemed acceptable.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Facility and Operation Description
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 16 of 26
7 July 2006
6. FACILITY AND OPERATION DESCRIPTION
6.1. Facility Description
The location proposed for Tank 632 is the southern crude tank area, directly to the west
of the existing Tank 633. There are several light industrial facilities neighbouring the
southern crude tank area, including the Serenity Cove Development adjacent to the
proposed location. The H.C.E Extractions Facility is located to the north of Serenity Cove.
6.2. Process Description
The product to be stored in Tank 632 would be whole crude oil. Tankers transporting
crude oil are unloaded at the Kurnell wharf and the oil is transferred via pipeline to the
storage tanks in the southern crude tank area. The crude oil in the storage tanks is
transferred to the refinery Crude Distillation Units (CDU) for further processing. The
inventory of crude oil stored in Tank 632 will cycle up and down in line with the transfer
of the cargo from the ships and subsequent transfer for processing. Tank 632 would tie-
in to the existing crude receiving and process plant suction lines.
The proposed design and operation of Tank 632 has been modelled on the existing Tank
633. Therefore, the design and operating parameters associated with Tank 633 have
been used in the QRA. Tank 633 is a floating roof tank in whole crude oil service.
6.3. Meteorological Conditions
The local meteorological data was taken from the 2001 and 2002 CALMET weather data
files, supplied by Caltex [4]. From this data, the probability of the various atmospheric
stability conditions at the site, in addition to the average temperature and wind speed at
these stability classes were determined. These values are presented in Table 6.1. The
overall average temperature was 18.1°C and the average wind speed was 3.4 m/s. The
value for the average humidity used in the analysis (57%) was obtained from the nearby
weather station at Sydney Airport [5].
Table 6.1: Meteorological Conditions Analysed
Stability B C D D E F
Wind speed
(m/s)
2.4 3.7 7.2 3.5 4.0 1.9
Temperature
(°C)
21.7 20.0 18.0 18.1 16.9 15.7
Probability 0.140 0.182 0.126 0.126 0.134 0.292
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Hazard Identification
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 17 of 26
7 July 2006
7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The hazard identification phase involved the review of relevant process information, the
site layout, and the proximity of the neighbouring industrial facilities. The following
information was used:
- The proposed location of Tank 632 and the layout of its bunded area
- The proposed piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) for the facility
- Process conditions, such as flow rates, temperatures, pressures
- Frequency and duration of storage tank filling and emptying operations
- Typical flow rates of transfer pumps
- Local meteorological data.
7.1. Hazardous Materials
The QRA was based on the storage of whole crude oil in Tank 632. Whole crude oil is a
complex mixture containing many different hydrocarbon compounds. The components of
the mixture may range from light hydrocarbons having low boiling points, such as
ethane, propane and butane, to large heavy components, having very high boiling points.
Whole crude oil is highly flammable due to the presence of the light components. It is
classified as a Class 3 dangerous good (i.e. flammable liquid) under the Australian
Dangerous Goods Code. Whole crude oil therefore presents a potential fire hazard.
7.2. Hazardous Scenarios
The hazardous scenarios identified for the operation under consideration are associated
with the release of crude oil from the tank or associated piping and equipment, or the
transfer piping and associated connections (valves, flanges etc.). Depending on the
amount of inventory released, such a scenario would result in the formation of a pool of
crude oil, with the potential to extend to the full surface area of the bund. Ignition of the
spill would subsequently result in a pool fire.
In addition to the potential for a fire as a result of a spill, there is also the potential for a
tank fire scenario. A full tank surface fire may occur as a result of:
- The sinking of the floating roof tank and subsequent product ignition
- The escalation of a rim seal fire
- Lightning strike.
The dispersion of flammable vapour from spills of crude oil to ground or from a tank (e.g.
crude oil exposed to atmosphere in the case of a sunken tank roof) was considered
during the analysis. The distance to which flammable vapours would extend was short
for all cases. Flash fires were therefore not analysed further in the QRA.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Failure Frequency and Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 18 of 26
7 July 2006
8. FAILURE FREQUENCY AND EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
8.1. Failure Frequency
The potential for the release of product is attributed to the potential for the failure of any
item of equipment within the process.
The hazard identification phase involved the identification of specific isolation points
within the process under consideration. Any items of equipment and fittings located
between these isolation points were therefore assessed as items that could potentially fail
and cause a release. The frequency assessment step involved the calculation of the
likelihood (ie. frequency) of releases from each of these sources, based on the failure
frequency of the individual items within the isolatable section. The Caltex Kurnell Crude
System P&ID, inclusive of the proposed tank, was used to identify these isolation points
and associated items of equipment and fittings.
The failure frequencies were estimated using generic failure frequency data obtained
from industry databases. The failure rate data for different types of failure items are
summarized in Appendix C. These values are dependent on the equipment/pipe sizes.
The leak frequency applied for a mixer seal is detailed in Appendix A.
8.2. Equipment Failure Scenarios
The overall failure frequency represents the rate at which an item of equipment or pipe
will fail, but provides no indication of the magnitude of the failure. Hence, a distribution
of hole sizes was assigned to represent the full range of potential failure scenarios. A
representative selection of four hole sizes was modelled for each scenario.
The guidelines for selecting the sizes were:
- Select sizes that fall into the following categories:
Small hole up to 10 mm
Medium hole 10 mm to 75 mm
Large hole 75 mm to 100 mm
Rupture Size of pipeline or 1000 mm for vessel.
- Examine the spread of hole sizes in conjunction with the failure rates of the
contributing failure items. If necessary, adjust the selected hole sizes to ensure
that the spread of hole sizes and the associated failure rate is an appropriate
representation for the particular line/vessel.
A summary of the failure frequency for each of the hazardous sections, according to the
representative hole sizes is presented in Appendix D.
8.3. Event Tree Analysis
Event trees are used to determine the potential consequence events that may result for a
given release scenario. Event tree analysis provides a systematic means of determining
which factors will influence the release, in addition to the probability associated with each
of those factors.
The possible outcomes of a release scenario are dependent on the following factors:
- Characteristics of the release (e.g. hole size, product released etc.)
- Release conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure)
- Release detection systems
- Intervention systems (i.e. to isolate or contain a release)
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Failure Frequency and Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 19 of 26
7 July 2006
- Ignition sources
- Consequence mitigation measures.
The event tree analysis includes the following factors:
- The probability of detection of a release (by personnel, the standard process
control system or via automatic release detection systems)
- Following detection of a release, the probability that the release can be
successfully isolated
- The probability of ignition – both immediate ignition and delayed ignition.
The data used in the development of the event trees is presented in Appendix E. An
event tree diagram depicting the frequency and probability values associated with the
scenario involving a loss of containment of product from Tank 632 as a result of the
rupture of the tank is presented in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Event Tree Diagram for the Rupture of Tank 632
8.4. Full Surface Tank Fire
For the scenario of a full surface tank fire, insufficient data is available on the causation
mechanisms to enable the fire frequency to be estimated directly based on the detailed
tank design. Therefore, for the purposes of the QRA, generic frequency data must be
used. In selecting an appropriate frequency to apply for a full surface tank fire in the
QRA, an extensive review of numerous published sources was undertaken [6 ,7, 8, 9,
10]. Of these, the two sources considered most applicable was the LASTFIRE Project [6]
and Technica’s “SingaporeStudy” [10].
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Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 20 of 26
7 July 2006
The Singapore Study provided data taken from three studies covering storage tank
operations in the Netherlands, USA and Scotland, as well as from oil and petrochemical
companies operating terminals in Singapore from 1945. The full surface tank fire
frequency derived from the USA/Europe and Singapore operations were 2.0 x 10
-4
per
year and 9.3 x 10
-4
per year respectively.
The LASTFIRE Project involved the largest study to date undertaken to determine the fire
frequency for large floating roof storage tanks. It involved data obtained from 16
companies, operating 2,420 tanks at 164 sites throughout 36 countries over a survey
period from 1981 to 1996. The study derived a full surface tank fire frequency of
1.2 x 10
-4
per year.
The frequency considered most applicable for the Kurnell refinery is 1.2 x 10
-4
per year,
derived from the LASTFIRE project. This value has been selected because it has been
derived from the widest sample set of events and tank locations. Statistically, this can
be expected to provide a more appropriate representation of the true event frequency.
In addition, both data sources reviewed suggested that there is a correlation between the
frequency of storage tank fires and the number of thunderstorm days experienced in the
area. When compared with Singapore, the number of thunderstorm days experienced in
the Kurnell area is relatively low. This suggests that the expected frequency for a full
surface tank fire in Singapore should be higher than at Kurnell. The selected frequency is
consistent in this respect, in that it is lower than the value determined solely for
operations in the Singapore area.
8.5. Bund Fire
A bund fire is generated by the ignition of a major release of flammable liquid from a
pipe or storage tank into a bunded area. The QRA assessed the frequency of a bund fire
based on the release of product from a failure of the tanks or associated fittings in
conjunction with the likelihood of ignition. The intervention measures implemented are
also considered in the derivation of the consequence frequency values. The likelihood of
ignition is dependent on the release rate of the product.
The failure frequencies were determined by identifying the various items associated with
the tank that may fail. The failure rate for these items, in combination with the failure
rate data for the tank itself were combined to determine the overall failure frequency.
The LASTFIRE Project estimated the frequency for a large bund fire resulting from a
major spill to be 6 x 10
-5
per tank per year [6]. The bund fire frequency used in the QRA
was determined from a specific analysis of the proposed tank and associated equipment.
Failure events that would lead to a major spill into the tank bund, would include large
and catastrophic equipment failures. A bund fire would result if such a spill was
subsequently ignited.
Of the two large bund fire events described in the LASTFIRE Project, one had a release
rate
1
of ~4.5 m
3
/min and the other had a pool fire surface area of 232 m
2
. The failure
cases analysed as part of the QRA with an equivalent hole size greater than 100 mm
would result in spills of this magnitude. The total frequency of bund fires caused by

1
This event is described as resulting in an 8,000 m
2
bund fire, however the magnitude of
this bund fire was due to the flooding of the bund with water, which was done as part of
the efforts to control the fire. If the bund had not been flooded, the fire area would have
been limited to well below this value.
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Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 21 of 26
7 July 2006
these failures is 6.1 x 10
-5
per year. This is comparable to the bund fire value
determined by the LASTFIRE Project.
The bund fire frequency calculated as part of the QRA were considered a more
reasonable representation of the scenarios at the proposed facility, as they were derived
from a specific analysis of the proposed design. Specific design information was used in
the analysis, including equipment parts counts and the proposed failure detection and
mitigation measures. This gives an assessment that is more specific to the system under
consideration, rather than a more generic frequency value that may be based on widely
differing systems.
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Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Consequence Modelling
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7 July 2006
9. CONSEQUENCE MODELLING
The consequence scenarios associated with the installation of the proposed Tank 632
were modelled to determine their potential impact on the surrounding area. The
modelling took into account the chemical properties of the product released and the
meteorological conditions, where applicable.
The consequences modelled were based on a release of whole crude oil from the
following:
- Tank 632 or associated fittings
- Transfer piping or associated fittings.
The Bernoulli equation was used to determine the liquid release rate for the scenarios
considered. The release rate provides a measure of the magnitude of the spill. For
releases that are bunded, the size of the liquid pool would be contained, thereby limiting
the magnitude of any subsequent pool fire. The effect of bunding has been accounted for
in the consequence analysis.
The consequence types that could result from the scenarios under consideration
included:
- Pool fires
- Full surface tank fires.
Pool fires result from the ignition of a flammable liquid spill. The heat radiation emitted
by pool fires was modelled using the Mudan & Croce model [11].
The results of the analysis were used to determine the impact on personnel (fatality
rate). The probability of fatality from exposure to heat radiation from a pool fire was
determined using a probit equation. The heat flux exposure was calculated at 2 m above
ground level, to represent an upper limit of heat flux exposure to a person present near
the flame. The heat radiation levels modelled, the resulting fatality probabilities, along
with a detailed description of the criteria, are presented in Appendix F.
Full surface tank fires were also modelled using the Mudan & Croce model. The likelihood
of fatality from heat radiation was determined in a similar manner to pool fires.
Tables presenting the impact distances at the specified heat criteria for all the individual
events analysed are presented in Appendix G.
Although large storage tank fires and bund fires are very hazardous events, if managed
correctly, the likelihood of fatality is low. The most likely mechanism for fatality is when
a person is involved in the initial flash that ignites the fire. The likelihood of fatalities for
members of the public or fire fighters is extremely low and such fatalities are rare. A
notable exception to this was an incident in which a number of people were killed when
too close to a tank fire when a boilover occurred. This phenomenon is now well
understood and any such risks can be well managed by appropriate emergency response
procedures.
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Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Risk Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 23 of 26
7 July 2006
10. RISK RESULTS
10.1. Individual Risk
The overall risk was determined by combining the frequency and consequence data for
the individual scenarios examined. The results of the analysis are presented as individual
risk contours. Contours were generated for individual risk of fatality and individual risk
of injury. These are illustrated in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 respectively.
10.2. Comparison with Risk Criterion
The quantified risk results were compared with the applicable risk criteria for land use
established by DUAP. This provides the basis for determining the acceptability of the
risk.
10.2.1.Fatality Risk
Focus was placed on the risk exposure on the Serenity Cove Development located to
the west of the refinery border, adjacent to the proposed Tank 632. The Serenity
Cove Development is an office building and hence the applicable risk criterion for
individual risk of fatality level is 5 chances in a million per year (5 x 10
-6
per year).
The 5 x 10
-6
per year individual risk contour is shown in Figure 1.1. This contour is
confined within the beyond the site boundary. Therefore, the risk criterion for
individual risk of fatality is satisfied.
An overall individual risk contour for the Caltex Refinery has not been developed at
this point and hence was not available to enable a risk contour to be developed
representing the cumulative risk, including the addition of the proposed tank. In the
absence of a risk contour for the existing activities, the cumulative risk exposure on
neighbouring facilities from the addition of Tank 632 has been assessed qualitatively.
The existing refinery activities in the area where the proposed tank is to be installed
include other atmospheric storage tanks and several pipelines. The distance
between these other storage tanks and their bunds and the Serenity Cove
Development is large (i.e. shortest distance is well in excess of 100 m). Based on
this separation distance, there would be negligible contribution to risk of fatality from
events involving these tanks and their bunds because the impact distances for most
of the scenarios will not extend this far.
Several pipelines run near the site boundary. These are as follows:
- Lube oil shipping line
- Flare line.
The lube oil shipping line runs along the site boundary, whereas the flare line is
separated from the site boundary by an internal road.
The risk exposure associated with pipeline operations is typically low compared to
the risk from other items such as process vessels, storage tanks, pumps etc. High
risk exposure normally only results when large numbers of pipes run together.
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Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 24 of 26
7 July 2006
Considering the lube oil shipping line, the risk exposure may considered lower again
for the following reasons:
- The pipeline is not in continuous use for lube oil transfers
- The ignition probability is very low due to the high flash point of the oils being
transferred.
The risk exposure to adjacent areas from the flare line may be considered low for the
following reasons:
- The pressure in the flare line would normally be low
- The pipeline is separated from the boundary by a short distance.
The pressure in the flare line would normally be low as the there would be minimal
transfer through the line unless a process upset was in progress. Therefore, if there
were a failure of the line, the release rate of vapour from the leak would be low and
have a very limited impact zone. The separation distance between the flare line and
the Caltex boundary would reduce the likelihood of offsite impacts even further.
Based on the discussions above, the existing risk exposure to the Serenity Cove
Development and the HCE site from operations in the vicinity of the proposed
storage tank is expected to be well within the risk acceptance criteria applicable for
these land uses.
Given that the existing operations on the Caltex site are not expected to impose high
levels of risk to the neighbouring areas, and the risk associated with the addition of
Tank 632 does not exceed the criteria, it can reasonably be assumed that the
cumulative individual fatality risk from the existing and proposed operations does not
exceed the acceptance criteria. For the Serenity Cove Development, the individual
risk of fatality from Caltex’s operations considering the addition of the proposed
storage tank would be less than 5 x 10
-6
per year, and the cumulative individual risk
of fatality risk imposed from Caltex on HCE site would be less than 50 x 10
-6
per year
(i.e. the applicable criteria for neighbouring industrial sites).
10.2.2.Injury Risk
The 50 × 10
-6
per year individual risk of injury contour is presented in Figure 1.2.
This contour represents the criterion applicable to residential areas. The risk contour
is contained within the site boundary west of Tank 632. Its containment within the
site boundary therefore satisfies the injury risk criterion, regardless of the land use
beyond the site boundary in this region.
10.3. Major Risk Contributors
The following events contribute to the individual risk to the west of Tank 632, both in
terms of risk of fatality and injury:
- Significant release from the crude oil tank resulting in a large ignited spill
- Full surface tank fire.
The contribution to the risk associated with these events is primarily attributed to the
magnitude of the resulting fires. In the case of major spills into the bunded area, the
entire surface of the bund would be covered and resulting fires would have large impact
distances.
A full surface tank fire is essentially a large pool fire located at the top of the storage
tank. Such fires generate a large amount of heat. The proposed size and location of
Tank 632 mean that a full surface tank fire would result in significant heat radiation at
the western boundary of the refinery.
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Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 25 of 26
7 July 2006
10.3.1.Fatality Risk
The major risk contributor to the western sector of the 5 x 10
-6
per year fatality risk
contour is a major release from Tank 632, resulting in a large bund fire. As the bund
surrounding Tank 632 has a very large surface area, the heat radiation from a full
bund fire will extend well beyond the western boundary of the refinery into the
neighbouring area. The heat radiation impact from smaller fires will typically not
extend a sufficient distance to contribute to the risk at this location.
The events that contribute the most to the risk in the eastern sector of the 5 x 10
-6
per year risk contour are releases from the transfer piping. These risks impact the
adjacent Tanks 622, 623 and 633, however are limited to the bunded areas through
which they pass.
10.3.2.Injury Risk
The major risk contributor to the 50 x 10
-6
per year injury risk contour is a full
surface tank fire. The 4.7 kW/m
2
heat flux associated with this event has the
potential to extend a distance of 83.6 m downwind from the tank centre. Another
significant risk contributor is a pool fires resulting from the ignition of significant
releases (representative a range in hole sizes starting from 100 mm).
10.4. Maximum Consequence Impact
Based on the heat radiation impact distances, the installation of the proposed crude tank
at the location nominated will have the potential to generate offsite heat radiation
impacts. The major consequence event with the potential to generate offsite impact is a
full bund fire resulting from a major release of whole crude oil from Tank 632. This event
also represents the maximum extent of heat flux to the west of the refinery boundary.
Although this worst-case event will produce large impact zones, the frequency of the
event is low (calculated to be in the order of 1 x 10
-7
per year). The low event frequency
leads to a low contribution to the overall individual risk from this event. Consequently,
the impacts of a bund fire can be considered acceptable from a risk perspective.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment References
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page 26 of 26
7 July 2006
11. REFERENCES
1 Department of Urban Affairs and Planning – Planning NSW, “Risk Criteria for Land
Use Safety Planning”, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 4,
March 2002.
2 ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd, “Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd Preliminary Hazard
Analysis, Storage Tank 632”, Reference: AUS 0352.1, August 31 2005.
3 Email from Kevin Houlihan (Caltex RPIP Project Engineer (Kurnell) Shedden Uhde
Pty Ltd), Lachlan Dreher to (General Manager, ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd)
“Caltex Crude Tank QRA”, 4
th
May 2006.
4 Email from Ramez Aziz (Senior Risk Engineer, Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd), to
Marian Magbiray (Risk Engineer, ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd) “MET Data for
Kurnell” (AUSPLUME files for Caltex Kurnell site), 2
nd
June 2005.
5 Bureau of Meteorology, “Climate Averages for Australian Sites”;
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/tables/cw_066037.shtml,
June 14 2005.
6 LASTFIRE PROJECT, Large Atmospheric Storage Tank Fire Project – LASTFIRE
Technical Working Group, June 1997.
7 Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, Offshore Technology Report – OTO 97
950, UK Health and Safety Executive, December 1997
8 Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability Data, Center for Chemical Process
Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1989, Vessels –
Atmospheric-Metallic, page 203, Lower Value.
9 Quantitative Risk Assessment Datasheet Directory, E&P Forum Report No
11.8/250, October 1996, Chapter 10 “Storage Tank Incidents”, Table 3.1 page 6,
Atmospheric storage tank-mild steel.
10 Atmospheric Storage Tank Study for Oil and Petrochemical Industries Technical
and Safety Committee Singapore, by Technica Ltd, London, April 1990
11 Mudan, K.S. & Croce P.A., "Fire Hazard Calculations for Large Open Hydrocarbon
Fires", The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 1
st
Edition, 1988.
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Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.1 of 7
7 July 2006
APPENDIX A: PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................... 3
Assumption 1: Modelling Boundaries .................................................................... 3
Assumption 2: Scenario 1 – Crude Receiving......................................................... 3
Assumption 3: Scenario 2 – Transfer of Crude Oil from Tank 632 ............................. 3
Assumption 4: Scenario 3 – Static Tank 632 ......................................................... 4
Assumption 5: Pipelines ..................................................................................... 4
Assumption 6: Frequency Assessment – Tank and Piping Utilisation.......................... 4
Assumption 7: Frequency Assessment – Full Surface Tank Fires............................... 4
Assumption 8: Frequency Assessment – Tank Mixers............................................. 5
Assumption 9: Meteorological Data ...................................................................... 6
3. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 7
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.2 of 7
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix documents the assumptions made during the risk analysis. The
assumptions have been based on information provided by Caltex. The justification for
the assumptions has been included where applicable.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.3 of 7
7 July 2006
2. ASSUMPTIONS
Assumption 1: Modelling Boundaries
The analysis is bounded by the proposed Tank 632 and the associated crude
receiving and discharge piping to the eastern bund wall of Tank 633.
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
Assumption 2: Scenario 1 – Crude Receiving
Isolation section: Crude Receiving Line Pipe 9-P610-KA1-650 at the boundary of the
eastern bund wall of Tank 633 to the motorised valve (MV) at the inlet of Tank 632.
Product: Whole Crude Oil
Temperature: 30°C
Pressure: 88 kPa(g)
Flowrate: 4000 m
3
/hr [1].
Utilisation: See Assumption 6.
Justification
Due to the significant distance from the ship pump, the pressure in the pipeline was
assumed to be the same as the hydrostatic head in the tank.
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
Assumption 3: Scenario 2 – Transfer of Crude Oil from Tank 632
Crude Suction Line 9-P611-KA1-450
Isolation section: MV at Tank 632 outlet along the suction piping 9-P611-KA1-450 to
the eastern bund wall of Tank 633.
Product: Whole Crude Oil
Temperature: 30°C
Pressure: 88 kPa(g)
Flowrate: 400 m
3
/hr [1]
Utilisation: See Assumptions 6
Isolation section: MV at Tank 632 outlet along the suction piping 9-P962-B4-250 to
the eastern bund wall of Tank 633.
Product: Whole Crude Oil
Temperature: 30°C
Pressure: 88 kPa(g)
Flowrate: 400 m
3
/hr [1]
Utilisation: See Assumptions 6
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
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7 July 2006
Assumption 4: Scenario 3 – Static Tank 632
Tank 632 was modelled at 85% level [2]
Product: Whole Crude Oil
Temperature: 30°C
Pressure: atmospheric
Utilisation: See Assumptions 6
ModuSpec Analyst: Patrick Walker Date: 09/06/06
Assumption 5: Pipelines
- The pipe lengths were estimated from the site plan provided [3]. The largest
pipe diameter in each isolatable section was used to represent the pipe sizing
during the modelling.
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
Assumption 6: Frequency Assessment – Tank and Piping Utilisation
The tank utilisation was assumed to be 100%.
Based on the frequency and duration of the tank filling and emptying operations, the
utilisation for the crude receiving pipeline was estimated to be 10%. The transfer
piping for the delivery of crude to the CDU was assumed to be 90%.
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
Assumption 7: Frequency Assessment – Full Surface Tank Fires
Based on a review of several sources that have published the frequency values for a
full surface tank fire, the frequency considered most applicable for the Kurnell
refinery is 8.9 x 10
-5
per year, derived from the LASTFIRE project [4]. This value
has been selected because it has been derived from the widest sample set of events
and tank locations. Statistically, this can be expected to provide a more appropriate
representation of the true event frequency.
ModuSpec Analyst: Marian Magbiray Date: 21/09/05
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.5 of 7
7 July 2006
Assumption 8: Frequency Assessment – Tank Mixers
Assumption
Failure of a tank mixer was considered in terms of the failure of the mixer seal and a
leak from that seal. It was assumed that a mixer seal is comparable to a pump seal
and that external leaks are considered to be the only reasonable foreseeable failure
mode. Referring to OREDA-97 [5], the mean failure rate for pumps and the pump
seal failure percentage of the overall failure rate is as follows:
Critical Failure Mode
Failure Rate
(per 10
-6
hrs)
Seal Failure Mode
Percentage
Total Failure
Mode Percentage
External Leakage 3.64 9.02% 22.92%
Significant External
Leakage
0.63 0.26% 0.26%
Degraded Failure Mode
External Leakage 9.61 9.02% 22.92%
Significant External
Leakage
0.63 0.26% 0.26%
Applying the seal failure and total failure mode percentages presented above to the mean
failure rate gives the following failure rates that have been applied for seal failures for
each failure mode:
Failure Mode (Seal) Critical Failure Degraded Failure
External Leakage 1.19 x 10
-2
per year 3.31 x 10
-2
per year
Significant External Leakage 5.52 x 10
-3
per year 5.52 x 10
-3
per year
This corresponds to a total seal mean failure frequency of 5.61 x 10
-2
per year. It is
assumed that a mixer seal failure equates to a maximum hole size of 12 mm.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.6 of 7
7 July 2006
Assumption 9: Meteorological Data
The local meteorological data, extracted from the 2001 and 2002 CALMET files were
supplied by Caltex Kurnell. [6].
The average temperature is 18.1°C and the average humidity is 57%. Humidity data
was taken from the nearby weather station at Sydney Airport [7].
A total of 16 wind directions and 6 stability classes were used in the analysis. The
values used are listed below.
Stability
B C D D E F Average
of all
Stabilities
Wind Speed
(m/s)
2.4 3.7 7.2 3.5 4.0 1.9 3.4
Probability of
Atmospheric
Conditions
0.140 0.182 0.126 0.126 0.134 0.292 1.0
Wind
Direction
Probability of wind direction
N 0.031 0.029 0.012 0.021 0.051 0.072 0.042
NNE 0.050 0.085 0.062 0.058 0.108 0.078 0.075
NE 0.128 0.113 0.077 0.079 0.069 0.062 0.085
ENE 0.128 0.094 0.031 0.067 0.025 0.038 0.062
E 0.078 0.051 0.002 0.048 0.024 0.038 0.041
ESE 0.094 0.044 0.005 0.072 0.025 0.045 0.047
SE 0.084 0.065 0.035 0.111 0.059 0.044 0.063
SSE 0.052 0.064 0.082 0.127 0.045 0.030 0.060
S 0.071 0.116 0.221 0.135 0.090 0.046 0.102
SSW 0.025 0.056 0.101 0.064 0.059 0.049 0.057
SW 0.020 0.027 0.053 0.019 0.041 0.060 0.040
WSW 0.025 0.051 0.123 0.041 0.107 0.081 0.071
W 0.051 0.069 0.105 0.048 0.127 0.085 0.081
WNW 0.067 0.061 0.054 0.046 0.100 0.099 0.075
NW 0.069 0.049 0.027 0.036 0.038 0.106 0.063
NNW 0.029 0.026 0.010 0.029 0.031 0.066 0.037
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix A: Project Assumptions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page A.7 of 7
7 July 2006
3. REFERENCES
1 Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd, “Additional Crude Storage Project, Process Data
for Phase 2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis”.
2 Email from Tracey Hyland (Environmental Engineer, Kurnell, Caltex Refineries
(NSW) Pty Ltd), Lachlan Dreher to (General Manager, ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd)
“Fw: Tank 632 QRA Report”, 9
th
June 2006.
3 Caltex Kurnell Refinery Neighbourhood Layout for Risk Assessment, Drawing
number 127103, Revision 0.
4 LASTFIRE Technical Working Group, “LASTFIRE PROJECT, Large Atmospheric
Storage Tank Fire Project” June 1997.
5 Sintef Industrial Management, “OREDA Offshore Reliability Data Handbook”,
OREDA Participants, 3
rd
Edition, 1997.
6 Email from Ramez Aziz (Senior Risk Engineer, Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd), to
Marian Magbiray (Risk Engineer, ModuSpec Australia Pty Ltd), “MET data for
Kurnell” (AUSPLUME files for Caltex Kurnell site), 2
nd
June 2005.
7 Bureau of Meteorology, “Climate Averages for Australian Sites”;
http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/averages/tables/cw_066037.shtml, 14
th
June
2005.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix B: Hazardous Scenarios and
Process Conditions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page B.1 of 3
7 July 2006
APPENDIX B: HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND PROCESS
CONDITIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND PROCESS CONDITIONS.............................. 3
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix B: Hazardous Scenarios and
Process Conditions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page B.2 of 3
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides details of the hazardous scenarios identified in the analysis and
the process conditions relating to them. The definition of the data presented in the
tables is outlined below:
Scenario Name The name of the isolatable section or specific equipment
considered as the scenario
Product The product representing the material in the scenario
Utilisation (%) The percentage of time the scenario is in use
Temperature (°C) Temperature in the process
Pressure (kPa) Pressure in the process
Diameter (mm or m) Diameter of pipeline or vessel
Length (m) Approximate length of pipeline
Height (m) Height of the vessel
Liquid Level (%) Liquid level in vessel
Total HUM The hold up mass for the isolatable section
Vessel Capacity (t) The capacity of the vessel
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix B: Hazardous Scenarios and
Process Conditions
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page B.3 of 3
7 July 2006
2. HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND PROCESS CONDITIONS
Table 2.1 details the tank scenario modelled. Table 2.2 presents the process conditions for the transfer pipelines (crude receiving line and
transfer lines to CDU for further processing).
Table 2.1: Summary of Vessel Scenario
Scenario Name Product Diameter
(m)
Height
(m)
Vessel
Capacity
(t)
Utilisation
(%)
Temperature
(°C)
Pressure
(kPa)
Liquid
Level (%)
Tank 632 Whole
crude oil
77.5 20.5 5.4 x 10
4
100 30 101 85
Table 2.2: Summary of Representative Pipeline Scenarios
Scenario Name Product Diameter
(mm)
Length
(m)
Total HUM
(kg)
Utilisation
(%)
Temperature
(°C)
Pressure
(kPa)
Crude receiving
(Pipe 9-P610-KA1-650)
Whole crude
oil
650 240 55,748 10 30 189
Crude suction to CDU
(Pipe 9-P611-KA1-450)
Whole crude
oil
450 220 24,493 45 30 189
Crude suction to CDU
(Pipe 9-P962-B4-250)
Whole crude
oil
450 220 24,493 45 30 189
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.1 of 8
7 July 2006
APPENDIX C: FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA...................................................................... 3
2.1. Process Pipes........................................................................................... 3
2.2. Valves .................................................................................................... 4
2.3. Flanges................................................................................................... 6
2.4. Small Bore Fittings ................................................................................... 7
2.5. Tank Mixers............................................................................................. 7
2.6. Storage Tanks ......................................................................................... 7
2.7. Full Surface Tank Fires.............................................................................. 7
3. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 8
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.2 of 8
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
For each of the hazardous scenarios examined, items such as tanks, pipework, valves,
flanges and fittings termed “failure items” associated with the scenario were identified.
Failure modes of each failure item were represented as a range of hole size releases.
Frequencies of hole size releases of each failure item were obtained using historical
industry data.
This appendix presents the failure frequency values applied in the analysis.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.3 of 8
7 July 2006
2. FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA
2.1. Process Pipes
Table 2.1: Process Piping Failure Frequency [1]
Pipe Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year per 10 m
length)
25 5 317.26
25 25 58.74
40 5 178.88
40 25 50.81
40 40 5.31
50 5 135.40
50 25 45.39
50 50 7.21
60 5 107.58
60 25 40.44
60 60 8.65
75 5 80.98
75 25 34.23
75 50 7.74
75 75 2.39
80 5 74.56
80 25 32.48
80 50 7.81
80 80 2.66
100 5 55.95
100 25 26.70
100 50 7.75
100 100 3.60
125 5 41.91
125 25 21.54
125 50 7.27
125 125 4.47
150 5 33.06
150 25 17.87
150 50 6.68
150 150 5.06
200 5 22.70
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.4 of 8
7 July 2006
Pipe Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year per 10 m
length)
200 25 13.07
200 100 9.42
200 200 1.80
250 5 16.94
250 25 10.14
250 75 6.96
250 250 3.56
300 5 13.33
300 25 8.19
300 100 7.29
300 300 2.53
350 5 10.88
350 25 6.81
350 100 6.45
350 350 2.72
400 5 9.12
400 50 8.77
400 200 4.71
400 400 0.90
450 5 7.81
450 50 7.64
450 200 4.42
450 450 1.02
2.2. Valves
Table 2.2: Valve Failure Frequency Data [2]
Valve Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
25 5 108.16
25 25 2.84
40 5 102.70
40 25 8.29
40 40 0.01
50 5 98.88
50 25 12.06
50 50 0.05
60 5 95.26
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.5 of 8
7 July 2006
Valve Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
60 25 15.58
60 60 0.16
75 5 90.33
75 25 20.20
75 50 0.46
75 75 0.01
80 5 88.83
80 25 21.55
80 50 0.61
80 80 0.01
100 5 83.43
100 25 26.14
100 50 1.38
100 100 0.05
125 5 77.87
125 25 30.29
125 50 2.64
125 125 0.20
150 5 73.30
150 25 33.17
150 50 4.06
150 150 0.47
200 5 66.20
200 25 36.50
200 50 6.87
200 200 1.43
250 5 60.90
250 25 37.99
250 75 11.38
250 250 0.73
300 5 28.37
300 25 19.26
300 100 7.63
300 300 0.24
350 5 26.69
350 25 19.26
350 100 9.11
350 350 0.44
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.6 of 8
7 July 2006
Valve Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
400 5 25.29
400 25 19.12
400 200 11.06
400 400 0.03
450 5 24.10
450 25 18.90
450 200 12.44
450 450 0.06
500 5 23.08
500 25 18.64
500 200 13.68
500 500 0.10
2.3. Flanges
Table 2.3: Flange Failure Frequency [2]
Flange
Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
25 5 108.38
25 12 2.61
40 5 106.70
40 12 4.26
50 5 110.06
50 12 0.94
60 5 109.65
60 12 1.35
75 5 109.03
75 12 1.97
100 5 107.84
100 12 3.14
125 5 108.99
125 12 2.01
150 5 108.61
150 12 2.38
200 5 107.37
200 12 3.60
250 5 108.70
250 12 2.29
300 5 53.91
300 12 1.58
350 5 54.28
350 12 1.21
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.7 of 8
7 July 2006
Flange
Size
(mm)
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
400 5 54.00
400 12 1.49
450 5 54.36
450 12 1.13
500 5 54.00
500 12 1.49
600 5 53.49
600 12 1.99
2.4. Small Bore Fittings
The failure frequency value used for small bore fittings is 7.19 X 10
-4
[3]. This has been
applied for fittings having a diameter less than 25 mm.
2.5. Tank Mixers
Failure of a tank mixer was considered in terms of the failure of the mixer seal and a leak
from that seal. The total seal mean failure frequency used was 5.61 x 10
-2
per year.
Refer to Appendix A for further details.
2.6. Storage Tanks
Table 2.4: Storage Tank Failure Frequency Data [4].
Hole Size
(mm)
Failure Frequency
(x10
-6
/year)
10 1543.75
75 617.50
100 302.75
Rupture 6.00
2.7. Full Surface Tank Fires
The frequency of full surface tank fires used in the analysis was 8.9 x 10
-5
per year [5].
Refer to Appendix A for additional details of the derivation of this frequency.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix C: Failure Frequency Data
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page C.8 of 8
7 July 2006
3. REFERENCES
1 “Hydrocarbon Leak and Ignition Data Base”, E&P Forum, February 1992,
N658/Final Report, Section III.3, Appendix III, page 2.
2 “Classification of Hazardous Locations”, A.W. Cox, F.P. Lees and M.L. Ang,
IChemE, 1993, Table 18.1, page 68.
3 Geometric mean of data obtained from source 2 and “Hydrocarbon Leak and
Ignition Data Base”, E&P Forum, February 1992, N658/Final Report, page 25.
4 “Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics, Offshore Technology Report – OTO 97
950”, UK Health and Safety Executive, December 1997.
5 LASTFIRE PROJECT, Large Atmospheric Storage Tank Fire Project – LASTFIRE
Technical Working Group, June 1997.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and
Failure Frequency
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.1 of 6
7 July 2006
APPENDIX D: HAZARDOUS SCENARIO AND FAILURE
FREQUENCY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND FAILURE CONTRIBUTORS .......................... 3
2.1. Tank 632 ................................................................................................ 3
2.2. Crude Receiving....................................................................................... 4
2.3. Crude Suction to CDU............................................................................... 5
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and
Failure Frequency
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.2 of 6
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix contains a listing of the hazardous scenarios identified and the process
failure items and overall failure frequency relating to them. The definitions for each of
the headings presented are detailed below:
Item Failure item or specific equipment included in the isolatable
section.
Count The number of failure items associated with the isolatable section.
Diameter Diameter of failure item (mm).
Hole Size 1 Representative hole size for a small release.
FFreq. 1 Failure Frequency of pipeline release for hole size 1 (x 10
-6
per
year).
Hole Size 2 Representative hole size for a medium release.
FFreq. 2 Failure Frequency of liquid release for hole size 2 (x 10
-6
per
year).
Hole Size 3 Representative hole size for a large release.
FFreq. 3 Failure Frequency of liquid release for hole size 3 (x 10
-6
per
year).
Hole Size 4 Representative hole size for a rupture scenario. This equates to
the maximum size of the equipment, or 1000 mm for vessels.
FFreq. 4 Failure Frequency of liquid release for hole size 4 (x 10
-6
per
year).
Frequency total Sum of frequencies at individual hole sizes.
The rupture case for storage tanks was represented by a hole size of 1000 mm. The
rupture cases for the pipelines were represented by the hole size equivalent to the pipe
diameter.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and Failure Contributors
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.3 of 6
7 July 2006
2. HAZARDOUS SCENARIOS AND FAILURE CONTRIBUTORS
The following section lists the failure item parts count within each respective isolatable section.
2.1. Tank 632
Table 2.1: Failure Items for Tank 632
Item Count
Diameter
(mm)
Hole
Size 1
(mm)
FFreq 1
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole
Size 2
(mm)
FFreq 2
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole
Size 3
(mm)
FFreq 3
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole
Size 4
(mm)
FFreq 4
(x10
-6
/y)
Associated pipework 60 m 350 25 106.14 100 38.7 350 16.32 1,000 0
Associated pipework 40 m 500 25 27.16 100 27 350 16.56 1,000 4.4800
Flange 2 25 25 221.98 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Flange 1 100 25 110.98 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Flange 4 350 25 221.96 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Flange 1 500 25 55.49 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Flange 1 600 25 55.48 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Small bore fitting 6 N/A 25 4,314.18 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Tank Mixer Seal 5 N/A 25 280,500.00 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Valve 2 25 25 222.00 100 0 350 0 1,000 0
Valve 1 100 25 109.57 100 1.43 350 0 1,000 0
Valve 3 350 25 137.85 100 27.33 350 1.32 1,000 0
Valve 1 500 25 41.72 100 0 350 13.68 1,000 0.1
Process Vessel -floating roof 1 77.5 m 25 1,543.75 100 920.25 350 0 1,000 6
Frequency Total

287,668.26 1,014.71 47.88 10.58
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and Failure Contributors
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.4 of 6
7 July 2006
2.2. Crude Receiving
Table 2.2: Failure Items for the Crude Receiving Line (Pipe 9-P610-KA1-650)
Item Count
Diameter
(mm)
Hole Size
1 (mm)
FFreq 1
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
2
(mm)
FFreq 2
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
3
(mm)
FFreq 3
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
4
(mm)
FFreq 4
(x10
-6
/y)
Flange 1 25 10 10.84 25 0.26 100 0 650 0
Flange 4 100 10 43.14 25 1.26 100 0 650 0
Flange 4 500 10 21.60 25 0.60 100 0 650 0
Flange 4 600 10 21.40 25 0.80 100 0 650 0
Process Pipe 240 m 650 10 9.53 25 0 100 9.91 650 9.50
Small bore fitting 11 N/A 10 158.19 25 632.74 100 0 650 0
Valve 1 25 10 10.82 25 0.28 100 0 650 0
Valve 4 100 10 33.37 25 10.46 100 0.57 650 0
Frequency Total

308.89 646.40 10.48 9.50
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and Failure Contributors
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.5 of 6
7 July 2006
2.3. Crude Suction to CDU
Table 2.3: Failure Items for the Crude Suction Line to CDU (Pipe 9-P611-KA1-450)
Item Count
Diameter
(mm)
Hole Size
1
(mm)
FFreq 1
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
2
(mm)
FFreq 2
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
3
(mm)
FFreq 3
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
4
(mm)
FFreq 4
(x10
-6
/y)
Flange 2 300 25 49.94 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 1 350 25 24.97 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 1 350 25 24.97 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 3 450 25 74.91 100 0 250 0 450 0
Process Pipe 220 m 450 25 77.32 100 75.64 250 43.76 450 10.1
Small bore fitting 6 N/A 25 1,941.38 100 0 250 0 450 0
Valve 2 300 25 42.87 100 6.87 250 0 450 0.22
Valve 1 350 25 20.68 100 4.10 250 0 450 0.2
Frequency Total

2,257.04 86.61 43.76 10.52
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix D: Hazardous Scenarios and Failure Contributors
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page D.6 of 6
7 July 2006
Table 2.4: Failure Items for Crude Suction Line to CDU (Pipe 9-P962-B4-250)
Item Count
Diameter
(mm)
Hole Size
1
(mm)
FFreq 1
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
2
(mm)
FFreq 2
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
3
(mm)
FFreq 3
(x10
-6
/y)
Hole Size
4
(mm)
FFreq 4
(x10
-6
/y)
Flange 1 25 25 49.95 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 1 250 25 49.95 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 2 250 25 99.89 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 1 300 25 24.97 100 0 250 0 450 0
Flange 1 350 25 24.97 100 0 250 0 450 0
Process Pipe 220 m 450 25 77.32 100 75.64 250 43.76 450 10.10
Small bore fitting 2 N/A 25 647.13 100 0 250 0 450 0
Valve 1 25 25 49.95 100 0 250 0 450 0
Valve 2 250 25 89.00 100 10.24 250 0.66 450 0
Valve 1 300 25 21.43 100 3.43 250 0 450 0.11
Frequency Total

1,134.56 89.31 44.42 10.21
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.1 of 6
7 July 2006
APPENDIX E: EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. EVENT TREE DATA.................................................................................... 3
2.1. Operator Nearby ...................................................................................... 3
2.2. General Assumptions ................................................................................ 4
3. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 6
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.2 of 6
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
Data acquired for the event tree considered the following for both a release and fire:
- Probability of detection
- Probability of isolation
- Time to detect a release
- Isolation time.
The assumptions relating to leak detection and intervention measures for the proposed
Tank 632 were based on previous analysis for the gasoline storage tanks at the Kurnell
Refinery. The inlet and outlet lines of Tank 632 are to be fitted with motorised valves,
whereas the event tree data for the gasoline tanks was based on the absence of remote
isolation. Therefore, the isolation strategies for Tank 632 were modified accordingly to
incorporate the provision for remote isolation. This is reflected in the time allowed for
“1
st
isolation”. The event tree input data was collected by Caltex, based on discussions
with relevant Kurnell Refinery operations personnel [1].
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.3 of 6
7 July 2006
2. EVENT TREE DATA
Descriptions of the main headings on the event tree table are provided below.
% chance of seeing or % time person near unit - This is related to detection of the
release or fire. There are two options for detecting a release or fire. The first is
“Process” which is the chance that the basic process control system (e.g. an alarm or
other indication) will alert a process operator to an anomaly. The second is “Person”,
which is the chance that a person will detect the release or fire if they are in or near the
unit. The “% time” is the percentage of time that a person will be in or near the unit.
Note that for the case where the probability of detection is quoted as 100%, the value
used in the calculation was 99.5%, to allow for human error.
% chance of achieving isolation/time taken (min) – This is the probability of
achieving isolation within a specific time frame. This occurs only once the release or fire
has been detected. There are two chances for isolation (1
st
isol and 2
nd
isol) and each
has an associated time. The 1
st
isolation time is typically associated with the automated
isolation of the release or fire. The 2
nd
isolation time is related to the manual isolation, in
the absence or failure of any automatic isolation.
Worse case time to detect - This is the maximum time that the leak could proceed
undetected. Generally this is for a release occurring in the middle of the night, when the
likelihood of detection is low.
2.1. Operator Nearby
The proportion of time that an operator / personnel are within the vicinity of the relevant
unit was estimated based on weekday and weekend operations. Table 2.1 presents the
number of hours that different personnel are in the vicinity of the particular plant areas.
The average value, based on weekday and weekend operation is listed in the final row.
The data acquired for the gasoline tank farm quantitative risk assessment was applied to
the south crude tank farm, the area where Tank 632 is to be located.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.4 of 6
7 July 2006
Table 2.1: Typical Presence of Personnel in the Crude Tank Farm.
Number of Hours
WEEKDAYS Crude Tank Farm
Operator 3.6
Security 0.5
General maintenance 1
Maintenance, vessel maint. routine 0
Personnel drive pass 1.5
Public 0
Total 6.6
% time a person at or nearby unit 27.5
WEEKEND Crude Tank Farm
Operator 3.6
Security 0.5
General maintenance 0
Maintenance, vessel maint. routine 0
Personnel drive pass 1
Public 0
Total 5.1
% time a person at or nearby unit 21.25
Average % time a person at or nearby the
unit
25.71
2.2. General Assumptions
The following general assumptions associated with detection and isolation of a release
and fire in the Kurnell refinery were applied during the analysis:
- The operator has no or minimal chance of detecting a small release or fire through
indications on the basic process control system
- There are no gas detectors at the facility
- The probability of detection (process and person) increases as hole size increases
- Fire is generally more readily detected than a release for any given hole size
- For any given hole size, isolation times will be greater for fires than releases, as
access to isolation points may be more difficult
- There are no heat or fire detectors at the facility
- All releases are liquid.
Caltex has supplied data for the time to detect a release or fire for each of the individual
scenarios analysed [1]. The values used in the analysis for the “time to detect” were the
average of the time to detect a release and the time to detect a fire. The “worst case”
time for detection (i.e. longest duration for which a release may go undetected) was
assumed to be the time to detect a release.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.5 of 6
7 July 2006
Table 2.2: Event Tree Data (probability of detection and successful isolation for
a release or fire at each section)
No. 1 1 1 2 2 2
Name Tank 633Tank 633Tank 633Pipelines PipelinesPipelines
Hole Size s m r s m r
Operator
on/near
unit
% time
26 26 26 26 26 26
Detector 0 0 0 0 0 0
Process 10 15 80 0 15 80
Release
Person 20 60 90 20 60 100
Detector 0 0 0 0 0 0
Process 10 15 80 0 20 80
%

c
h
a
n
c
e

o
f

s
e
e
i
n
g


Fire
Person 80 90 100 80 100 100
Detect Time min 727.5 67.5 17.5 247.5 122.5 17.5
Time R/FNote 1440/15 120/15 30/5 480/15 240/5 30/5
1st isol. 90 90 90 90 90 90
Time min 1 1 1 2 2 2
2nd isol. 95 95 95 95 95 95
Release
Time min 15 15 15 15 15 15
1st isol. 70 60 50 90 80 80
Time min 2 2 2 2 2 2
2nd isol. 15 15 15 80 80 80
%
c
h
a
n
c
e
o
f
a
c
h
i
e
v
i
n
g

i
s
o
l
a
t
i
o
n

/


t
i
m
e

t
a
k
e
n
(
m
i
n
s
)
Fire
Time min 30 30 30 20 20 20
Worst
case
detection
Time min 1440 120 30 480 240 30
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix E: Event Tree Analysis
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page E.6 of 6
7 July 2006
3. REFERENCES
1 E-mail from Ramez Aziz (Senior Risk Engineer, Caltex Refineries NSW, Pty Ltd) to
Kate Filippin (Principal Risk Engineer, ModuSpec Australia) and Marian Magbiray
(Risk Engineer, ModuSpec Australia), “Event Tree Data (again),” 12
th
July 2005.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix F: Consequence Impact Level Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page F.1 of 4
7 July 2006
APPENDIX F: CONSEQUENCE LEVEL IMPACT CRITERIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. HEAT FLUX CRITERIA ............................................................................... 3
3. REFERENCES ............................................................................................ 4
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix F: Consequence Impact Level Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page F.2 of 4
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides details of the criteria used to evaluate the risk of fatality for pool
fires. The general effects of thermal radiation are summarised in Table 1.1 [1].
Table 1.1: Thermal Radiation Effects.
Heat Flux
(kW/m
2
)
Effect
1.2 Received from the sun at noon in summer.
2.1 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute.
4.7 Will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure (at
least second degree burns).
12.6 Significant chance of fatality for extended exposure. High chance of injury.
After extended exposure, causes the temperature of wood to rise to a point
where it can be readily ignited by a naked flame.
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a
thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure.
23 Likely fatality for extended exposure and chance of fatality for
instantaneous exposure.
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure. Unprotected steel will
reach thermal stress temperatures which can cause failure.
Pressure vessel needs to be relieved or failure will occur.
35 Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure.
Significant chance of fatality for people exposed instantaneously.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix F: Consequence Impact Level Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page F.3 of 4
7 July 2006
2. HEAT FLUX CRITERIA
The effect of human exposure to a fire is a function of both the intensity of heat radiation
and the duration of exposure. The harmful effect can be characterised by a thermal dose
that is defined by the function (tI
4/3
), where I is the heat radiation intensity and t is the
exposure duration.
A probit function has been used to evaluate the likelihood of fatality for different heat flux
exposures. The probit equation utilised is the Eisenberg equation [2]:
Equation 2.1:
Y = ÷14.9 + 2.56 ln tI
4
3
|
\

|
.
|
where: Y= probit value
t = exposure time (seconds)
I = radiation intensity from fire (kW/m
2
)
In terms of human exposure, it is generally accepted that an exposure of 12.6 kW/m
2
will
result in a 50% chance of fatality. Based on Equation 2.1, the required exposure time
would be 81 seconds.
To account for all the possible means that adverse outcomes can occur, a range of heat
flux levels need to be assessed. The values used in the analysis were based on an
exposure time of 81 seconds and are presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Heat Flux Levels and Corresponding Fatality Probability
Heat Flux (kW/m
2
) 8.7 9.7 11.7 13.6 16.1
% Fatality 10 20 40 60 80
The actual heat flux received at a point located between two contours will be a value
between the heat flux values corresponding to each contour. Similarly, the probability of
fatality at this location will be between the fatality probabilities for two contours. In
determining the risk at such a location, the higher fatality probability is applied in the
calculation process. For example, all points lying between the 13.6 kW/m
2
and 16.1
kW/m
2
heat flux contours for a given scenario are treated as resulting in fatality to 80%
of the exposed population. For the case of heat flux exceeding 16.1 kW/m
2
, the a
probability of fatality of 100% is assumed.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix F: Consequence Impact Level Criteria
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page F.4 of 4
7 July 2006
3. REFERENCES
1 NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning; “Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety
Planning”, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 4”, Sydney, 1990.
2 Lees, F.P., "Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Hazard Identification
Assessment and Control", Butterworth & Heinemann, 1996, 2
nd
Edition,
Volume 1, p9/64.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.1 of 9
7 July 2006
APPENDIX G: CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 2
2. CONSEQUENCES ....................................................................................... 3
2.1. Pool Fires................................................................................................ 3
2.2. Full Surface Tank Fires.............................................................................. 9
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.2 of 9
7 July 2006
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix contains the consequence results. The results are presented in table
format. The following list provides a definition for each of the headings presented.
Scenario Name The name of the isolatable section or specific equipment
considered as the scenario.
Hole Size (mm) The specific hole size considered for the consequence
scenario.
Release Rate (kg/s) The rate at which the product is expected to be released.
Duration (s) The time taken for the product to be released.
Frequency (x10
-6
/y) Failure frequency for the scenario.
Distance (m) to Heat
Criteria (kW/m
2
)
The maximum distance at which the consequence is
experienced for the given heat flux level from the centre
of the pool.
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.3 of 9
7 July 2006
2. CONSEQUENCES
2.1. Pool Fires
Table 2.1: Consequence Modelling Results for Pool Fires.
Distance (m) to Heat Criteria (kW/m
2
)
Scenario
Hole
size
(mm)
Release
Rate Used
(kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/y)
8.70 9.70 11.70 13.60 16.10
Crude Receiving 10 0.57 113352
0.3
14 13 13 12 12
Crude Receiving 10 0.57 114402 0.03 14 13 13 12 12
Crude Receiving 10 0.57 128352 2.25 14 13 13 12 12
Crude Receiving 25 3.5 30711 1.28 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Receiving 25 3.5 31761 0.12 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Receiving 25 3.5 45711 0.02 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Receiving 25 3.5 45711 9.67 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Receiving 100 57 8454 0.16 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Receiving 100 57 9504 0.02 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Receiving 100 57 16554 0.35 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Receiving 650 778 1193 0.55 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Receiving 650 778 2243 0.08 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Receiving 650 778 2993 0.01 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Receiving 650 778 2993 0.11 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 25 3.5 21886 2.25 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 25 3.5 22936 0.22 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 25 3.5 36886 0.03 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 25 3.5 36886 16.96 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 100 57 7902 1.33 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 100 57 8952 0.21 65 62 57 52 46
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.4 of 9
7 July 2006
Distance (m) to Heat Criteria (kW/m
2
)
Scenario
Hole
size
(mm)
Release
Rate Used
(kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/y)
8.70 9.70 11.70 13.60 16.10
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 100 57 16002 0.03 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 100 57 16002 2.98 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 250 78 7539 1.04 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 250 78 8589 0.16 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 250 78 15639 0.02 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 250 78 15639 2.33 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 450 78 1191 0.59 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 450 78 2241 0.09 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 450 78 2991 0.01 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P962-B4-250) 450 78 2991 0.12 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 25 3.54 21886 4.48 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 25 3.54 22936 0.44 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 25 3.54 36886 0.06 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 25 3.54 36886 33.75 28 27 26 25 24
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 100 57 7902 1.29 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 100 57 8952 0.2 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 100 57 16002 0.03 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 100 57 16002 2.89 65 62 57 52 46
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 250 78 7539 1.02 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 250 78 8589 0.16 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 250 78 15639 0.02 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 250 78 15639 2.3 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 450 78 1191 0.61 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 450 78 2241 0.09 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 450 78 2991 0.01 128 121 110 103 100
Crude Suction (Line 9-P611-KA1-450) 450 78 2991 0.13 128 121 110 103 100
Tank 632 25 4.4 12442307 926.11 30 29 28 27 26
Tank 632 25 4.4
12443657 127.34 30 29 28 27 26
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.5 of 9
7 July 2006
Distance (m) to Heat Criteria (kW/m
2
)
Scenario
Hole
size
(mm)
Release
Rate Used
(kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/y)
8.70 9.70 11.70 13.60 16.10
Tank 632 25 4.4
12486407 104.19 30 29 28 27 26
Tank 632 25 4.4
12486407 4208.88 30 29 28 27 26
Tank 632 100 70.1 779050 13.23 70 67 61 55 48
Tank 632 100 70.1 780400 2.43 70 67 61 55 48
Tank 632 100 70.1 783550 1.98 70 67 61 55 48
Tank 632 100 70.1 783550 38.56 70 67 61 55 48
Tank 632 350 64,041 953 0.14 177 168 155 150 149
Tank 632 350 64,041 954 2.63 177 168 155 150 149
Tank 632 350 60,891 963 0.17 177 168 155 150 149
Tank 632 350 59,541 967 0.90 177 168 155 150 149
Tank 632 Rupture N/A Instantaneous 0.10 209 198 176 176 176
Tank 632 Rupture N/A
Instantaneous 0.12 209 198 176 176 176
Tank 632 Rupture N/A
Instantaneous 0.13 209 198 176 176 176
Tank 632 Rupture N/A
Instantaneous 0.50
209 198 176 176 176
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.6 of 9
7 July 2006
Table 2.2: Consequence Modelling Results for the 4.7 kW/m
2
Heat Criteria for Pool Fires
Scenario
Hole size
(mm)
Release Rate
Used (kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/ y)
Distance (m) to 4.7kW/m
2
Heat
Criteria
Crude Receiving 10 0.6 113352 0.30 16
10 0.6 114402 0.03 16
10 0.6 114402 0.00 16
10 0.6 128352 2.25 16
25 3.5 30711 1.28 32
25 3.5 31761 0.12 32
25 3.6 45711 0.02 32
25 3.6 45711 9.67 32
100 56.7 8453 0.16 78
100 56.7 9503 0.02 78
100 56.7 16553 0.00 78
100 56.7 16553 0.35 78
650 778 1193 0.55 159
650 778 2243 0.08 159
650 778 2993 0.01 159
650 778 2993 0.11 159
PLT 2 Suction 25 3.5 21885 2.25 32
25 3.5 22935 0.22 32
25 3.6 36885 0.03 32
25 3.6 36885 16.96 32
100 56.7 7902 1.33 78
100 56.7 8952 0.21 78
100 56.7 16002 0.03 78
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.7 of 9
7 July 2006
Scenario
Hole size
(mm)
Release Rate
Used (kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/ y)
Distance (m) to 4.7kW/m
2
Heat
Criteria
100 56.7 16002 2.98 78
250 78 7539 1.04 159
250 78 8589 0.16 159
250 78 15639 0.02 159
250 78 15639 2.33 159
450 78 1191 0.59 159
450 78 2241 0.09 159
450 78 2991 0.01 159
450 78 2991 0.12 159
PLT 45 Suction 25 3.5 21885 4.48 32
25 3.5 22935 0.44 32
25 3.6 36885 0.06 32
25 3.6 36885 33.75 32
100 56.7 7902 1.29 78
100 56.7 8952 0.20 78
100 56.7 16002 0.03 78
100 56.7 16002 2.89 78
250 78 7539 1.02 159
250 78 8589 0.16 159
250 78 15639 0.02 159
250 78 15639 2.30 159
450 78 1191 0.61 159
450 78 2241 0.09 159
450 78 2991 0.01 159
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.8 of 9
7 July 2006
Scenario
Hole size
(mm)
Release Rate
Used (kg/s)
Duration (s)
Frequency
(x10
-6
/ y)
Distance (m) to 4.7kW/m
2
Heat
Criteria
450 78 2991 0.13 159
Tank 632 25 4.4 12442307 926.11 34
25 4.4 12443657 127.34 34
25 4.4 12486407 104.19 34
25 4.4 12486407 4,208.88 34
100 70.1 779050 13.23 85
100 70.1 780400 2.43 85
100 70.1 783550 1.98 85
100 70.1 783550 38.56 85
350 64,042 953 0.14 224
350 64,042 953 2.63 224
350 60,892 963 0.17 224
350 59,542 967 0.90 224
Rupture N/A Instantaneous 0.10 258
Rupture N/A Instantaneous 0.12 258
Rupture N/A Instantaneous 0.13 258
Rupture N/A
Instantaneous 0.50 258
Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd ModuSpec
Tank 632 Quantitative Risk Assessment Appendix G: Consequence Results
Ref: AUS0352.8, Release 01 Page G.9 of 9
7 July 2006
2.2. Full Surface Tank Fires
Table 2.3: Consequence Modelling Results for Full Surface Tank Fires
Downwind Distance (m) to Heat Criteria (kW/m
2
) Scenario Frequency (x10
-6
/y)
4.7 8.7 9.7 11.7 13.6 16.1
Tank 632 Full Surface Tank Fire 120 81 81 81 81 81 81

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