St.

Thomas Aquinas De Motu Cordis On the Motion of the Heart
Text, Translation, Supplemental Texts and Notes
§ (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

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De Motu Cordis Quia omne quod movetur, necesse est habere motorem, dubitabile videtur quid moveat cor, et qualis motus eius sit. Non enim videtur eius motus esse ab anima. Ab anima enim nutritiva non movetur, animae enim nutritivae opera sunt generare, alimento uti, et augmentum et diminutio: quorum nullum motus cordis esse videtur. Et anima quidem nutritiva etiam plantis inest; motus autem cordis animalium proprius est. Neque sensitivae animae motus esse videtur, sed nec intellectivae, intellectus enim et sensus non movent nisi mediante appetitu: motus autem cordis involuntarius est. Sed neque naturalis esse videtur. Est enim ad contrarias partes: componitur enim ex pulsu et tractu; motus autem naturalis ad unam partem est, ut ignis sursum, et terrae deorsum. Dicere autem motum cordis esse violentum, est omnino extra rationem. Manifeste enim hoc motu subtracto, moritur animal, nullum autem violentum conservat naturam. Videtur quidem igitur hic motus maxime naturalis esse, vita enim animalis et hic motus se inseparabiliter consequuntur. Dicunt autem quidam hunc motum naturalem esse non ab aliqua particulari natura intrinseca animali, sed ab aliqua natura universali, vel etiam ab intelligentia. Sed hoc ridiculum apparet. In omnibus enim rebus naturalibus propriae passiones alicuius generis vel speciei aliquod principium intrinsecum consequuntur. Naturalia enim sunt quorum principium motus in ipsis est. Nihil autem est magis proprium animalibus quam motus cordis; quo cessante, perit eorum vita. Oportet igitur inesse ipsis animalibus aliquod principium huius motus.

On the Movement of the Heart 1. Since everything that moves must have a mover, what moves the heart, and what kind of motion it has is a matter for inquiry. 2. For it does not appear to be moved by the soul. For it is not moved by the nutritive soul, for the activities of the nutritive soul are generation, the use of food, and increase and decrease, none of which appear to have anything to do with the heart. For the nutritive soul exists even in plants; but the motion of the heart is proper to animals. 3. Nor does it appear to be moved by either the sensitive or intellective souls, for the mind and sense move only by means of desire: but the motion of the heart is involuntary. 4. But neither does it appear to be natural. For it goes in different directions: for it is composed of a push and a pull; but a natural motion goes in one direction, as fire only moves upward and earth downward. 5. Now to say that the motion of the heart is violent would be completely irrational. For it is obvious that when this motion is done away with the animal dies, since nothing violent preserves a nature. It therefore seems that this motion is indeed most natural to it, since the life of the animal and this motion inseparably follow one another.1 6. Now some say that this natural motion comes not from any particular nature intrinsic to the animal, but from some “universal” nature, or even from an [angelic] intelligence. But this seems ridiculous. For in every natural thing the proper passions of any genus or species follow upon some intrinsic principle. For natural things are those of which the principle of motion is in them. Now nothing is more proper to animals than the motion of the heart, upon the ceasing of which their life ends. There must, then, be some principle of this motion in animals.

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That is to say, where there is life there is a heartbeat, and vice versa.

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Adhuc, si aliqui motus corporibus inferioribus ex natura universali causentur, non semper eis adsunt: sicut in fluxu et refluxu maris apparet quod consequitur motum lunae, et secundum ipsum variatur. Motus autem cordis semper adest animali. Non igitur est ab aliqua causa separata tantum, sed a principio intrinseco.

7. What is more, if any such motion in lower bodies were caused by a universal nature [alone], this motion would not always be in them: as, for instance, is clear in the ebb and flow of the sea, which is a consequence of the moon’s motion, and varies according to it. But the motion of an animal’s heart is always in it. Therefore it is not from any separated cause alone, but from some intrinsic principle. 8. Others therefore say that the principle of this motion in animals is heat itself, which being generated by spirit moves the heart. But this is irrational. For that which is most principal in a thing must be the cause. Now the most principal thing in an animal, and more contemporaneous with life, seems to be the motion of the heart rather than any alteration involving heat. Therefore an alteration involving heat is not the cause of the heart’s motion; rather the heart’s motion is the cause of such an alteration as involving heat. And so the Philosopher in On the Movement of Animals (ch. 10, 703a 24-25) says: “what is about to initiate movement, not by alteration, is of this kind”. 9. Again, a perfect animal, which is one that moves itself, most approaches to a likeness of the whole universe: and so man, who is the most perfect of animals, is by some called a “microcosm”.1 Now in the universe the first motion is local motion, which is the cause of alteration as well as the other motions, for which reason even in animals the principle of alteration appears to be local motion. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. 1, 250 b 14-15), pursuing this resemblance, says that motion is “like a kind of ‘life’ existing in all things”.2

Dicunt igitur alii principium huius motus in animali esse ipsum calorem, qui per spiritus generatos movet cor. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Illud enim quod est principalius in aliqua re, oportet esse causam. Principalius autem videtur esse in animali motus cordis et magis contemporaneum vitae, quam quaecumque alteratio secundum calorem. Non igitur alteratio secundum calorem est causa motus cordis, sed magis e converso motus cordis est causa alterationis secundum calorem. Unde et Aristoteles dicit in Lib. de motu Anim.: oportet quod futurum est movere, non alteratione tale esse.

Item animal perfectum, quod est movens seipsum, maxime accedit ad similitudinem totius universi: unde et homo qui est perfectissimum animalium, dicitur a quibusdam minor mundus. In universo autem primus motus est motus localis, qui est causa alterationis et aliorum motuum. Unde et in animali magis videtur motus localis esse alterationis principium, quam e converso. Unde et Aristoteles in octavo Physic., hanc similitudinem sequens, dicit quod motus est ut vita quaedam natura existentibus omnibus.
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For further remarks on this comparison, see the supplemental texts given below. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 18, art. 1. obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is, as it were, a sort of life in all things that exist by nature. But all natural things participate in motion. Therefore, all natural things participate in life. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion, viz., the movement of the celestial bodies, or to motion in general. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. Similarly, every natural motion is, as it were, a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal, so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover, then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies.

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it is indeed a motion that is natural to the entire animal and its body. What is more. quidem est motus eius naturalis et toti animali et corpori. 1 That is to say. Principium igitur huius considerationis hinc oportet accipere quod. For St.. to be sure. In other animals. but heat does not move locally except accidentally: for it belongs to heat to alter per se. the nature of which is to move down. But to act intentionally and not by nature belongs solely to man. e. [Quod enim ipsum a seipso movetur. moves itself by itself. motion according to place is caused by desire and by a sensitive or intellective apprehension. 7. Solius autem hominis est a proposito operari. the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover.” (tr. and so in [undergoing] this kind of motion the animal tires out more.” rather one must assign a per se cause which can be an intrinsic cause of motion in place. quia est a principio intrinseco ipsius quod est anima. 3. this motion is indeed natural to the animal since it comes from an intrinsic principle which is the soul. but] we say that whatever things have a principle of motion in themselves are moving by nature. but to move something in place per accidens. 11.g. 254b 16-20). Thomas. sed a natura: naturaliter enim et hirundo facit nidum et aranea telam. since in the body of an animal the heavier elements predominate [. 10. calor autem non movet localiter nisi per accidens: per se enim caloris est alterare. what is per se is prior to what is per accidens. eo quod in corpore animalis elementum grave praedominatur. 4 . 70. It is therefore ridiculous to say that “heat is the principle of the motion of the heart. Ia.Adhuc. cf. art. prius est eo quod est per accidens. 12. est quidem naturalis motus animali. as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima (433a 9-b 30). Motus autem secundum locum in animalibus causatur ex appetitu et apprehensione sensitiva vel intellectiva. N. haec natura dicimus moveri. ut Aristoteles docet in tertio de anima. quod est per se. sed oportet ei assignare causam quae per se possit esse principium motus localis. natura movetur. Whence the animal as a whole by nature. ut quodlibet animalium. nevertheless its body can be moving both by nature and beside nature. Glen Coughlin) For when an animal moves itself downward. Differt enim secundum qualem motum quod movetur eveniat. Cum enim animal movetur deorsum. per accidens autem movere secundum locum. In aliis quidem animalibus totus processus motus naturalis est: non enim agunt a proposito. each of the animals.1 But the first motion of an ani-mal is the motion of the heart. For it makes a difference what sort of motion what is moving chances [to have] and from what sort of elements it is constituted. “[a thing which is moving by itself is moving by nature. non tamen est naturale corpori gravi. the essential comes before the accidental. Movetur enim animal a seispso. et ex quali elemento constet. Ridiculum igitur est dicere. Primus autem motus animalis est motus cordis. unde et magis fatigatur animal in hoc motu. the entire process of motion is natural: for they do not act by intention but from nature: for a swallow builds its nest naturally and a spider a web. as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. but it is nevertheless not natural to a heavy body. q. quod calor sit principium motus cordis. For an animal moves itself by itself.B. Unde animal quidem totum natura ipsum seipsum movet. Now in animals.] quorumcumque principium motus in seipsis est. et non a natura. corpus tamen eius contingit et natura et extra naturam moveri. Cum autem animal movetur sursum. sicut Aristoteles dicit in octavo Physic. One must therefore accept as the principle of this inquiry that.] But when an animal moves upward.

in the same way other natural motions follow upon other forms. et fugere miseriam. from which he proceeds in order to know other things. For we observe that iron is naturally moved toward the magnet. and from volition of the end naturally desired. ut dicitur in secundo Physic. De Nat.15. Anim. sed secundum quod habet talem formam. Oportet autem considerare quod motus sursum est naturalis igni eo quod consequitur formam eius: unde et generans. is derived knowledge of the conclusions. is its per se mover in place. xxii] says that.2 Thus inasmuch as an animal has such a Sic igitur et cum motus omnium aliorum membrorum causentur ex motu cordis. as the Philosopher states (Phys. ut principium indemonstrabile in intellectualibus. Wherefore this movement is called ‘vital. ut probat Aristoteles in Lib. that which is according to nature stands first. so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. viii. Summa Theol. just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason. 13. is natural. which is happiness. and not according to the will: for like a proper accident. qui est felicitas. sed ex appetitu ultimi finis procedit in appetitum aliorum: sic enim est finis in appetibilibus. which follows from the union of soul and body. nihil prohibet et alias formas alios motus naturales sequi. Thomas’s opusculum. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator. excerpts of which are given below. is derived the choice of the means. but the first motion which is of the heart. ex quibus ad alia scienda procedit. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. est per se movens secundum locum. to desire the last end.Sed tamen cuiuslibet suae operationis principium naturale est.’ For which reason Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius. Likewise in the case of desire. as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Physics (ch. Videmus enim quod ferrum naturaliter movetur ad magnetem. Sic igitur et animal inquantum habet talem formam quae est 1 Cf. est naturalis. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature. 703a —703b 2). sed ratiocinando inveniat. St. the first indemonstrable principles are known to him naturally. De operationibus occultis naturae. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences. St. which gives the form. Sicut autem formam elementi consequitur aliquis motus naturalis. quod dat formam. 2 Cf. Hom. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. the other motions can indeed by voluntary. 5 . 10. prima tamen principia indemonstrabilia sunt ei naturaliter nota. est homini naturale. appetere ultimum finem. the principle of any of his own activities is natural. but discovers them by reasoning. q. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature.. and to flee from misery. Now we must consider that upward motion is natural to fire as a consequence of its form: and so the generator. Now just as any natural motion follows the form of the element. de Mot. 200a 1524). as the Philosopher proves in On the Movement of Animals (ch. art. 4). still. 9. Similiter ex parte appetitus. qui tamen motus non est ei naturalis secundum rationem gravis et levis. it results from life. English Dominican Fathers): Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will. which motion is nevertheless not natural to it according to its character of being heavy or light. Ia-IIae.. Nevertheless. Quamvis enim conclusiones scientiarum speculativarum et practicarum non naturaliter sciat. but to desire other things is not natural but proceeds from the desire for his last end to the desire for other things: for in this way the end in desirable things is like an indemonstrable principle in intellectual things. is natural to man. Thomas Aquinas. whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known. 17. but insofar as it has such a form.1 And so therefore since the motion of all the other members of the body is caused by the motion of the heart. motus quidem alii possunt esse voluntarii. sed primus motus qui est cordis. sed appetere alia non est naturale. ad 2 (tr.

just as upon the form of the noblest 1 element. an animal can be compared to a city governed by good laws. and principally of the heart. inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of motion. as the Philosopher says in his book On the Movement of Animals (ch. no action is performed by an individual agent that is truly separate from the monarchical rule. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo. nihil prohibet habere aliquem motum naturalem. form which is the soul. Omnis autem proprietas et motus consequitur aliquam formam secundum conditionem ipsius. Et forte secundum hunc intellectum aliqui dixerunt motum cordis esse ab intelligentia. I take the position that the natural motion of an animal is that of the heart. 4. puta ignis. Sic igitur motus cordis est naturalis quasi consequens animam. existimandum est constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. eo quod adnata sunt. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul. that which has “the highest rank”.anima. sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius ut ordinatum est. scilicet inquantum est principium motus. 256a1). et movens hunc motum est quod dat formam. et principaliter cordis. inquantum dat formam quae est principium motus. et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. inasmuch as it is the form of such a body. Hood) 15. 10. inquantum posuerunt animam ab intelligentia esse. sicut Aristoteles dicit motum gravium et levium esse a generante. follows motion to the noblest place. seeing that. namely. inquantum est forma talis corporis. Now in animals this comes about by nature: and since each one is naturally constituted to perform its proper work. which is above.” (tr. so to speak. consequitur motus ad locum nobilissimum. 6 . inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence. Sed tamen necesse est motum cordis a motu 1 “Noblest”—that is. and the mover [which gives it] its form gives it this motion. nihil opus est separato monarcho quem oporteat adesse per singula eorum quae fiunt. the other parts live indeed because they are naturally adapted to perform their proper work according to nature. 703a29-b2). And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world. ut nihil opus sit in unoquoque esse animam. John Y. which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens.. for example fire. nothing prevents it from having a natural motion. just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. sicut motus caeli in mundo. sicut formam nobilissimi elementi. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its condition. Unde et motus ipsam consequens simillimus est motui caeli: sic enim est motus cordis in animali. de motu Anim. but everything is done by custom and in accord with due order. the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them. sed in quodam principio corporis existente alia quidem vivere. quae maxime accedit ad similitudinem principii motus caeli. 16. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul. qui est sursum. Dico autem motum naturalem animalis eum qui est cordis: quia. “In a sense. insofar. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit: et quia natum est unumquodque sic constantium facere proprium opus. so that there is no need for a soul to be in each one. facere autem proprium opus propter naturam. B. but rather existing in a certain principal part of the body. But the motion of the heart necessarily falls Forma autem nobilissima in inferioribus est anima. 14. For once a stable order exists in a city. as it is a principle of motion. ut Aristoteles dicit in Lib.

the entire passage from the Commentary on the De Anima excerpted above. though distinct in thought. scilicet in corde. but similar to the circular—one. for the drawing power draws something back to itself. whence movement begins. or. if we desire to apply it to the fixed stars. habet quemdam motum non quidem circularem sed similem circulari. then. Cf. as in a ball and socket joint]. tr. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point. all movement must proceed from the motionless. are substantially and spatially inseparable. in movement. and. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point. for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. which are not always [occurring]. Omnia autem pulsu et tractu moventur. n. on account of which there must be something remaining stationary. Conway & Larcher. O. as with the pivots of the axle of a wagon wheel. unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Part. quod movens organice est ubi est principium et finis idem.” And so in order for the heart to be the principle and end of every motion that exists in the animal. “However. there must be a fixed point of immobility as its ‘center’. Now. and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. as term. follows a swelling out of the organ. 4. composed from a pull and a push. the motionless and the moved.P. while the expansive impulse. compositum scilicet ex tractu et pulsu. Thomas Aquinas. Now the motion of the heart is the principle of all the motions that are in an animal. Unde ad hoc quod cor esset principium et finis omnium motuum. 661a 13-14) says that “the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there. and from that point motion begins. Thomas Aquinas. However. then we must take the word “center” as meaning the “pole” since. to take the obvious point of comparison.M. be motionless. “for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles” (St. it has a certain motion not in fact circular. proceeding in a circle. lect. B. 835). just as the center is to a circle on a plane surface. and so the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima (433b 20-25) “what moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide” [. just as what is from a principle falls short of the principle. as starting point. so is the pole in a way to a circle on a spherical surface. it must.”1 Motus autem cordis principium quidem est omnium motuum qui sunt in animali. short of the motion of the heavens. In II De Caelo. § 834. namely. for instance. qui non sunt semper. But “all things are moved by a push and a pull. unde Aristoteles dicit in tertio de Anim. n. et sua continuitate conservat ordinem in motibus. et ad hoc terminari. at ‘Now. as it were. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. 400. quod motus delectabilium et tristium et totaliter om-nis sensus hinc incipientes videntur. propter quod oportet sicut in circulo manere aliquid et hinc incipere motum. granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement. as with a fulcrum. et hoc competit ei inquantum est principium omnium motuum mundi: accessu enim et recessu corpus caeleste imponit rebus principium et finem essendi. 17. namely. as in a wheel. Thus the first organ of local motion in animals 7 . § 833. rev. in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term. and terminate there.A. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move. these two factors in the organ. Est autem motus caeli circularis et continuus.caeli deficere sicut et principiatum deficit a principio. and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. and by its continuity preserves the order in motions. as with the poles of the axis of the celestial sphere. lectio 15... For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity. and so the Philosopher in the third book of On the Parts of Animals (ch. in the heart. Anim.” (St. nn. that for motion to take place. Book III. while the hand is moving the arm is still. 832-835: § 832. Next. 1 Sc.) It is to be understood. Now the motion of the heavens is circular and continuous.—as. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster. and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of every motion of the world: for the approach and withdrawal of a celestial body imposes upon things the beginning and end of their existence. & Sylvester Humphries.P. O. 11. and both these at once.

19. In reality it keeps to one place. Neque enim dicimus motum cordis esse naturalem cordi inquantum est grave vel leve. that the latter principle is moved neither per se nor per accidens. and the two motions that appear to be contrary are like the parts of one motion composed from both. both motionless and moving. non enim causatur ab anima sensitiva per operationem suam. anima autem sensitiva etsi non moveatur per se. eo quod deficiat a motu circulari. For we are not saying that the motion of the heart is natural to the heart inasmuch as it is heavy or light. Now the progressive motion of an animal is caused by an operation of sense and desire. but not in reality. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. Vivere enim viventibus est esse. sed inquantum est animatum tali anima. Thus it is. Et sic non est inconveniens si quodammodo sit ad diversas partes. and they say that even when animal activities cease the vital ones remain. except inasmuch it is necessary for a pause to intervene between the push and the pull. be-cause circular motion in some way is like this. 7. And they do so with good reason. And this motion continues throughout the life of the animal. sed inquantum est forma et natura talis corporis. For “in living things. et duo motus qui videntur contrarii sunt quasi partes unius motus compositi ex utroque. 415b13): but the being of each thing is from its proper form. motus autem cordis variatur secundum diversas apprehensiones et affectiones animae.Est etiam motus iste continuus durante vita animalis. but inas-much as it is animated by a soul of this sort. And so the motion of the heavens is always uniform. and on this account medical men distinguish vital activities from animal activities. quod illud principium non movetur neque per se neque per accidens. Neque etiam oportet quod causetur ex apprehensione et appetitu. 20. Based on this.” as is said in the second book of the De Anima (ch. but the motion of the heart varies according to diverse appre- Motus autem progressivus animalis causatur per operationem sensus et appetitus. 18. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. et quod animalibus cessantibus remanent vitales. 8 . and not only in thought. In thought it may move as a whole. movetur tamen per accidens: unde proveniunt in ipsa diversae apprehensiones et affectiones. et propter hoc medici distinguunt operationes vitales ab operationibus animalibus. Per hoc igitur de facili solvuntur quae in contrarium obiici possunt. even though it be caused by the sensitive soul. Et hoc rationabiliter. But its parts are changing their places really.: esse autem unicuique est a propria forma. by reason of which it falls short of circular motion. is nevertheless moved per accidens: and so there arise in it diverse apprehensions and sensations. nisi inquantum necesse est intercidere morulam mediam inter pulsum et tractum. Nor is it necessary that it be caused by apprehension and desire. Now the soul and the principle of the motion of the heavens differ in this. for it is not caused by the sensitive soul by its own activity. inasmuch as it falls short of the simplicity of circular motion. ut dicitur in secundo de Anim. we can easily dispose of the objections to the contrary. quamvis causetur ab anima sensitiva. Hoc autem differt inter animam et principium motus caeli. inquantum deficit a simplicitate motus circularis. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. vitalia appellantes quae motum cordis concomitantur. quia et motus circularis aliqualiter sic est. but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of such a body. naming ‘vital’ those which accompany the motion of the heart. in a sense. § 835. to live is to be. quem tamen imitatur inquantum est ab eodem in idem. Unde motus caeli semper est uniformis. Non enim affec- must be at once both a starting point and a term. And thus it is not inappropriate if in some way it goes in different directions. but the sensitive soul. which it nevertheless imitates inasmuch as it returns to the same point it started from. though it not be moved per se.

Next. are often timid when there is no real cause to be. 21. 10. what is formal is on the part of the sensation. but by this one is disposed toward anger. quia non fit per imperium voluntatis.e.’ he draws out what had been presupposed above. whereas ‘proceeding from’ refers to the efficient cause. Quamvis autem aliqua variatio accidat in motu cordis ex apprehensione diversa et affectione. whereas when he is already excited by violent passions arising from his bodily disposition. 1 Cf. cit. that it be a desire for revenge. if the bodily constitution has this effect on the passions. 22: § 22. so that if anger is being defined.. for instance melancholy people. utputa in ira. ut probatur in secundo Physic. and not by the intellect commanding. let it be called a movement ‘of some body’ such as the heart. but the other way around. Non igitur propter hoc aliquis appetit vindictam quia sanguis accenditur circa cor. non tamen ista variatio motus est voluntaria. Now although some variation occur in the motion of the heart from different apprehendsions and sensations. but in matter there is a disposition for the form. sed potius causant eas. for example. scilicet quod sit appetitus vindictae. but one is angered from a desire for vengeance. even when there is no danger present. And this he shows by one argument in two parts. sed involuntaria. non tamen iubente intellectu. must exist in matter. passions arising that resemble one such ‘modification’ of the soul. namely that certain modifications affect soul and body together. hence all these ‘modifications’ would seem to belong partly to the body. the heart and private parts are moved. or ‘of some part or power’ of the body. simply as a result of their physical state. lectio 2. as is clear in the second book of the Physics. the latter pertains to the body as well as the soul. but this happens in the case of all the ‘modifications’ of the soul. the definitions of these passions. irascitur autem ex appetitu vindictae. since it is necessary for the animal to be altered by a natural alteration. formale est. unde in passionibus animae. nevertheless this variation of motion is not voluntary because it does not come about through the command of the will. et huius causam assignat quoniam necesse est alterari naturali alteratione animalia. 1121). namely. and ‘existing for’ to the final cause. For the sensations of the soul are not caused by alterations of the heart. Saying this he refers to the subject or material cause of the passion. Dicit enim Aristoteles in Lib. but rather they cause them. fear. (2) At ‘This is still more evident:’ what makes this point even clearer is that we see in some people. are not to be predicated without reference to matter. such as anger. materiale autem quod pertinet ad alterationem cordis. hensions and sensations of the soul.e.1 Now in natural things the form is not for the sake of the matter. for example that there be a boiling of blood around the heart. which runs as follows. pity and so forth. Non autem in rebus naturalibus forma est propter materiam. meekness. movetur cor et pudendum. 703b 7-8. (1) We sometimes see a man beset by obvious and severe afflictions without being provoked or frightened. sed in materia est dispositio ad formam.tiones animae causantur ab alterationibus cordis. sed ex hoc aliquis est dispositus ad iram. Obviously then.. 9 . and so in passions of the soul. Anim. This is why ‘such terms. op. quod est ex parte affectionis. And to show that the physical constitution plays a part in them he uses two arguments. Whenever the physical constitution of the body contributes to a vital activity. n.” and he assigns the cause of this. For Aristotle says in the book On the Cause of the Motion of Animals (ch. he is disturbed by mere trifles and behaves as though he were really angry. de causa Mot. when he says ‘Now all the soul’s. quod multoties apparente aliquo. i. utpote quod sit accensio sanguinis circa cor.. Commentary on the De Anima.’ i. the latter must be ‘material principles’. that “oftentimes upon something appearing. sed e converso. confidence. in anger. Therefore someone desires vengeance not because blood boils around his heart. not the soul alone. but material which pertains to the alteration of the heart.

cf. 22. In consequence of the fact that the soul. and as a consequence it is the reason for the unity whereby a given thing is one. but another suffer decrease. But in consequence of the fact that it is a mover. Intellectus enim et phantasia factiva passionum afferunt. such as concupiscence. of the heart suffice for the present. (excerpt): It must be said that the truth of this question depends to some extent on the preceding one. 1949).” (emphasis added) § 10 . but upon the parts being altered. it must be said that it is united to the body immediately. alteratione incidente fiunt. Therefore. like a mover. caused by the blood. De An. irae et huiusmodi. whereby the heart is dilated and contracted. Now the causes of the motions [are] warmth and coldness. For the mind and the imagination are productive of the passions. of the heart and private parts.23. ad 7: “although the same effect is partly produced by the dissolution. and also moves the body through the spirit. Et haec de motu cordis ad praesens dicta suf. And hence every form is an act. Et praeter rationem utique facti motus dictarum partium. And motions of the aforesaid parts. For each individual thing is one on the same basis on which it is a being. whether substantial or accidental. whether in the case of actual substantial being or in the case of actual accidental being. Causae autem motuum caliditas et frigiditas. there cannot be any medium between the soul and the body. then. [of those] at any rate produced against reason. Wellmuth (Milwaukee. And let these things said about the motion ficiant. idest cordis et pudendi.alteratis autem partibus. St. ut iam moveantur et permutentur natis haberi permutationibus invicem. Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures. ut concupiscentiae.7 7 Cf. from this point of view nothing prevents our asserting many media there: for obviously the soul moves the other members of the body through the heart. by reason of which the heart is heated or cooled. Thomas Aquinas. Now. For every form.B. such that they are immediately moved and changed by the influences they are naturally apt to have upon each other. Q. ex quibus cor calescit et infrigidatur. haec quidem augeri. just as we cannot say that there is any other medium whereby matter has actual being through its own form.” Perhaps then our text ought to read: “and also moves the heart and the spirit. For an additional witness on the movement of the heart. § N. i. whether from without or occurring naturally within. is united to matter or to a subject. haec autem detrimentum pati. 2. translated by Mary C. of those humors. and more so between the soul and prime matter..e. Fitzpatrick and John J. and therefore through it as a medium the soul is united to the other parts of the body as mover”. (9 ad 13): “It must be said that the heart is the primary instrument by means of which the soul moves the other parts of the body. is the form of the body. c. as some have asserted. For if the rational soul is united to the body only through virtual contact.. ibid. so it cannot be said that there is any other medium uniting a form to matter or to a subject. come about by an incidental alteration. one part will grow larger. But if it be asserted that the soul is united to the body as a form. nothing would prevent us from saying that there are many intermediates between the soul and the body. each individual thing is actually a being through a form. art. anger and the like. quae de foris et intus existentes naturales.

Paris. Parma edition. a penultimate assessment. Thomas von Aquin . vol. Paris. a P. Mandonnet. XVII. II. The Aristotelian references are to the Greek text.a The letter is addressed to a Master Philip. d For a summary of the contents of this work. M. XVII. ed.. 18. but Eschmann prefers 1270/1. I. Rome. vol. p. Mandonnet sets the date of composition at 1273. Opera Omnia. Med.St. see Walter Pagel. ed. 1927. Die Werke des hl. p. Mandonnet. 12. O. 1957.. Eschmann. New York. n. 1927. b Opuscula omnia. 1889.P. p.P. 347-348. 1949. T. Gilson. Opuscula Philosophica. Immanuel Bekker. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart VINCENT R. p. 1949. c We conclude that nothing definite is known about Master Philip. Berlin.. Ottawa. Grabmann. xxvi. Los Angeles. 1954. Des écrits authentiques de St. xxv. THE PROBLEM The Movement of the Heart 11 . 28. 141-143.. Ed. Paris. “The philosophy of circles—Cesalpino—Harvey. ed. 1899-1906. 358. 165. 419. I. It is hoped the following outline will be helpful: * Immaculate Heart College. ed. vol. this has not been established by Mandonnet. Mandonnet says he was a professor of medicine in Bologna and afterwards in Naples. Oxford. Thomas Aquinas. p. 104.” J. b but. O. Parma. 1831. as Eschmann observes. [ 22 ] PART I I. Marietti edition. c I. p. 1910. O. which is here translated. the Platonic ones to the Greek text. 508. 24. Aristotelis opera. John Burnet. “A Catalogue of St. The present translation has been made from the Marietti text edited by R. 1941 and from Summa contra gentiles in Opera Omnia. XVI. 1956. 62. ed. Rome. Hist. is regarded as an authentic work of Thomas Aquinas by Mandonnet and Grabmann. 1888-1906. e The translation of Thomas in the footnotes were made from the Summa theologiae. Piana edition. Fribourg. vol. p. Thomas’ works” in E. p. 1570-71. Turin. Perrier. Spiazzi. The opusculumd is found in the following editions of Thomas’ works: Opera Omnia. I have numbered the paragraphs. pp. vol. Munster. The Christian Philosophy of St. Platonis opera.e Because the argument of this opusculum is not easy to follow. Opera Omnia. Opuscula Omnia. M.P. Rome. 1852-73. Vives edition. pp. Thomas d’Aquin. Opuscula Omnia. I. vol. LARKIN* Introduction The letter De Motu Cordis.

. 4) SOLUTION As to origin The principle of heart movement is the soul As to nature Heart movement is natural because the soul is the form of the body (par. Also Aquinas. 10) As to nature Heart movement is not natural because it is A. I. p. I. ch. Now its movement does not seem to proceed from the soul. p. 1. V. 2 Aquinas. in opposite directions (par. 3 The heart is not moved by the nutritive soul. art. Because everything that is moved must have a mover. Bk. 8) Refutation (par. 3) B. His definition of the soul as the first act of a physically organized body having life in potency is found in De anima. Bk. 3. vol. 896 a 1-2.” 3 Plato defines the soul as the self-moving source of motion in Laws. 918b: “Man’s life consists in a certain movement which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body. I. 2. not the soul: neither 1) the nutritive soul (par. 1 we can pose the problem: what is it that moves the heart and what is the nature of its movement?2 2. 1) B. Aristotle says in De anima. 23) nor 3) the intellectual soul (par. II. 1) II. VII. ch. c. q. 27) TEXT 1. 16. vol. 4. 406 a 2 that the soul is not self-moving. vol. violent (par. art. 3) Refutation (par.A. I. Summa theologiae. 25. What is its nature? (par. X. ibid. vol. though it is the principle of living things. vol. for the functions of the nutritive Cf. 20) HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO EMOTION Emotions cause modification of cardiac rhythm (par. 4) Refutation (par. 2) nor 2) the sensitive soul (par. heat (par. Physics. HEART MOVEMENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF Cardiac cycle consists of a push and a pull with a rest period in between (par. 1 III. 19. II. 3. 22) C. 22) B. 37. 17) PART II I. II. 4) Refutation (par. ch. 1. 13 b. vol. 412 b 5. 241 b 24. I. 15. an intelligence (par. Aristotle. Bk. q.. Pars I-II. OPINIONS As to origin The principle of heart movement is A. 9. Pars I. 12 . Bk. 5) Refutation (par. 412 a 27. What is its origin? (par.

IV. 7. and the desiring part. whereas nothing that is contrary to a thing’s nature preserves it. 1110 a 1: “Those things are thought involuntary. the striving part. the nutritive. Further. Thomas says.” For Aristotle’s distinction between voluntary. as fire tends only upwards and earth downwards. vol. Thomas Aquinas. II.” 8 I. if some movements were produced in earthly bodies by a universal nature. it appears that this movement is entirely natural. art. It is. 79. I. The use of the word ‘intelligence’ is explained in Summa theologiae. Pars I. and the rational in the Nicomachean ethics. vol. for it is plain that when this movement ceases. Indeed. But nothing is more characteristic of animals than the movement of the heart. 435 c 5 and in Phaedrus. whereas natural movement extends in one direction.5 4. Bk. for when it ceases. But some say that this natural movement flows not from some determinate nature within the animal. for the life of the animal and this movement are inseparably related to one another. an immaterial substance.” The medical opinion referred to in Thomas’ De motu cordis depends perhaps on the philosophical doctrine of Avicenna. however. but the violent proceeds from an extrinsic principle. This movement does not seem to be a natural 6 one either. the separate substances. 4. 7 Summa theologiae. growth. But this is ridiculous.” 4 13 . vide: Deferarri and Barry. 439 d 8 & 439 e 3 as the rational part. Those things are natural whose principle of movement resides in them. is characteristic of animals. 1. Nicomachean ethics. perhaps because such substances are always exercising the act of understanding. however. the sensitive.. c. IV.e. 246 a 6—257 a 2. IV. II. p. Bk. art. while the movement of the heart is involuntary. involuntary and violent. 10 c. I.8 6. q. as well as to the natural. 13. 6 For the various meanings of the word “natural” in Aquinas. cit.. I. which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance. the animal ceases or dies. p. 439 d 5. II. vol. namely. The soul is found also in plants. Bk. He identifies them in Republic. vide: loc. II. Baltimore. ch. 491 b: “In some works translated from Arabic. but in the intellect only. that each proceeds from an intrinsic principle. p. 1949. vol. 5. In all natural things the attributes characteristic of any genus or species depend on some intrinsic principle. since it goes now in this direction. Pars I. completely unreasonable to say that the movement of the heart is a violent 7 one. their life perishes. now in that. Aristotle recognizes three kinds of soul. as we observe in the case of the ebb and flow of the sea which depend on the movement of the moon and vary in accord with it. nutrition. are called intelligences. None of these seems to account for the movement of the heart. 1109 b 35. A lexicon of St. 6. vol. But the movement of the heart Plato speaks of three parts or functions of the soul in Republic. Bk. and decay. The voluntary and the natural have this in common. but from some universal nature. ibid. 5. for it consists of a push and a pull. Pars I-II. ch. 3. 756 b: “Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary. q. 399 b: “Avicenna and certain others did not hold that the forms of corporeal things subsist essentially in matter. which we call angels. 65. p. III. art. 5 Aristotle. vol. they would not remain always in them. nonvoluntary. or from an intelligence. Fascicle IV. the movement of the heart. 724.[23-24] soul4 are reproduction. q. It follows then that a principle of this motion resides in animals themselves. vol. The movement does not seem to belong to either the sensitive or the intellectual soul because the intellect and the senses move only by means of desire.

I. hence in this movement the animal becomes more tired. But when an animal is moved upwards. It does not then depend on a separated cause but on an intrinsic principle. Aristotle. which is the soul. p. as it were. Therefore let us take as the principle of our contemplation what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics. It is then ridiculous to say that heat is the principle of the movement of the heart. Likewise. vol. 11. vol. as the Philosopher teaches in the third book of the De Anima. 252 b 26. Therefore alteration in heat is not the cause of the movement of the heart. VIII. that which exists essentially is prior to that which exists accidentally. Hence the Philosopher. VIII. H.” 9. Hence an animal as a whole moves itself in a natural way. vol. Hence the Philosopher says in his book. I. I. not such and such an alteration. but on the contrary the movement of the heart is rather the cause of this alteration.. Ed. That which is prior in a thing must be the cause. a perfect animal. II. 1. a kind of life that is naturally present in everything that exists. The Movement of Animals:9 “Movement must come first. art. Local movement in animals is caused by desire and by sensitive or intellectual cognizance. II. Berlin. Bk. ch. 12 Aristotle. 11 which is the cause of alteration and of the other movements. Physics. heat. 1956. 91. which by nature moves downwards. is predominant. VIII. is called by some a world in miniature. vol.. fragment 34.” 11 Cf. Bk. causes local movement only in an accidental way. The movement of animals. in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 1 c. however. Summa theologiae. but it is accidental to it that it cause local movement. 703 a 2 24-25. moves the heart. XII. which is one that moves itself.13 “We say that those things that have a principle of movement within them are moved naturally. ch. Bk. 1073 a 12. 10 9 [25-26] from its intrinsic principle. but we must assign to it a cause which can be essentially the principle of local movement. p. Cf. vol. 10. ch. It depends on the nature of the movement and the nature of the elements of which the body is composed. resembles most of all the entire universe. I. 10. 2. 7. Bk. Now the first movement of an animal is the movement of the heart. 563 a: “Man is called a little world. who is the most perfect of animals. Diehls. the movement is natural to the animal because it proceeds Aristotle. 1072 b 9. ch. for it is of the essence of heat that it alter. Metaphysics. Further.14 14 .” For when an animal is moved downwards. generated through a spirit. Now the movement of the heart seems to be prior in the animal and more closely related to life than any alteration in heat. vol. Others say that the principle of this movement in the animal is heat which. Democritus. q. because all the creatures of the world are in some way found in him. 13 Ibid.10 Now the first movement in the universe is local movement. 12. 153. 4. but it is not natural to a heavy body. Pars I. But this is unreasonable. 250 b 14-15. its movement is natural both to the whole animal and to its body by the fact that in the body of the animal the heavy element. ch.is always present in the animal. but it happens that its body can be moved both naturally or in a way that is contrary to its nature. Hence in the animal also local movement seems more the principle of alteration than the converse. Physics. 8. says in the eighth book of the Physics12 that movement is. Hence man. Also Aristotle. vol. I. pursuing this analogy. 254 b 16-20.

But the principle of bodily movement proceeds from the movement of the heart. ch. 8. 17. 19 Summa theologiae. as the Philosopher says in the book. 200 a 15-25. Therefore nothing keeps an animal. ch. and the last end. Bk. Thus the end is related to things desirable as the indemonstrable principle is to things intellectual. Likewise. which is that of the heart. II. Now let us take into consideration that upward movement is natural to fire because it results from its form. Cf. hence also the efficient cause.18 other movements can be voluntary. vol. inasmuch as it has certain kind of form which is the soul. 190 a 26. but each man does the work assigned him.16 which is happiness. 16.” 15 . for they execute naturally their own functions. The Movement of Animals. although this is not a movement natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light. vol. 703 a 14. 433 a 9-b 30. The Movement of Aristotle. it is natural for man. led by desire.16 It is characteristic of man alone to act by will. Aristotle. from which he goes on to knowledge of other things. vol. is natural. Pars I. and one task succeeds another in an accustomed order. then. 9. ad 2. ch. For although he does not naturally know the conclusions of the speculative and practical sciences. for they do not act by purpose.13.17 Since then the movement of the all the other members is caused by the movement of the heart. Physics. as the Philosopher shows in the book. but discovers them by reasoning. q. and that which is causing this movement is that which accounts for the form. ch. which produces the form. Aristotle. but inasmuch as it has such and such a form. vol. 3 c.” 17 Cf. from having a natural movement. and not by nature. III. but the first movement. In animals this same thing takes place by nature. We see that iron naturally is moved towards a magnet. as is said in the second book of the Physics. and not according to will. 9. art. I.20 “an animal must be regarded as resembling a state that is well and lawfully governed. De Anima. Nevertheless the principle of any of his acts is a natural one. Just as any natural movement results from the form of the element. which it cannot doubt. II. and to flee misery. and because each of the organs is naturally suited to execute its own function. which it cannot not will. the first indemonstrable principles. to seek the ultimate end. For when order is once established in a state.19 15. are naturally known to him. I. he goes on to desire other things. 10. there is no need for a special overseer to supervise every activity. It is not natural for him to seek other things. I.” 15 14 [26-27] Animals. 128 b: “Although our intellect moves itself to some things. p. 16 Summa theologiae. Bk. II. for the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web in a way that is natural. 809 a: “In bodily movement the principle is according to nature. 18 Cf. so also nothing keeps other natural movements from proceeding from other forms. there is no need for the soul to be in each part as the principle of movement but it is in some principal part21 such as the heart which gives life to the other parts. is essentially one that causes local movement. but by nature. I. In other animals. Pars I-II. p. Therefore the movement of the heart is according to nature. 18. yet others are supplied to it by nature. q. vol. Aristotle. as are first principles. I. Bk. 10. the entire process of movement is natural. Physics. 14. The movement of animals. but because of his desire for the last end. art. Now I say that the natural movement of the animal is that of the heart because. vol.

who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshel. I. q. II. vol.. 453 b. 23 Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart as its domicilium. Now every property and movement proceeds from some form according to its rank. Its being the form of the body precludes this. pp/ 204-205. 76. 447 b that the soul is the form of the body. Bk. 24 Aristotle. vol. 1 c. However. ad 1. I. 8 that the soul is “wholly in the whole body. which resembles most of all the principle of the movement of the heavens. Albert in De anima. I.” “Des Alfred von Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift de Motu Cordis” von Clemens Bauemker in Bëitrage zur Geschicte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. and whole in each part of it.” 16 . 1923.” Opera omnia. q. Physics. Thus the movement of the heart in the animal is like the movement of the heavens in the world. The movement of the heart is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. Band XXIII. Ed. art. Pars I. Hence the movement that results from it is most like the movement of the heavens. but it is in each part by some of its powers. t. Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul. Paris. vol. fire.17. but is whole and entire in each and every part of the body. in such a way that it would be whole in each part. Thomas departs from the teaching of his master. vol. But the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies is the soul. 22 Thomas argues in Summa theologiae. . p. Pars I. 6. 21 20 [27-28] 19. A. Summa contra Gentiles. p. and so it is not wholly in the whole body. 76. II. says: “The soul is in the heart. and this is appropriate to it inasmuch as it is the principle of all the movements of the world. 4. Cf. Pars I. As a consequence of this. ch. VIII. But the movement of the heart necessarily falls short of the movement of the heavens as the effect falls short of the cause. ch. p. art. The movement of the heavens is circular and continuous. it does not act on the body through an organ. But there were and are certain men who say that the soul is wholly in the whole body. 10. Pars I. Thomas does not oppose Aristotle on this point for he interprets him as referring here not to the essence of the soul but merely to its power of originating movement. all the emotions seem to begin here. Albert Magnus. art. W. Aristotle. St. 1841. 33. . VI. 8 c. ch. Paris. q. vol. p. 703 a 14. 76.. Bk. ibid. Munster i. ch. XIII. Augustine who says in the De trinitate. VIII. And perchance because of this notion some have said that the movement of the heart comes from an intelligence. I. as movement to the noblest place which is above results from the form of the noblest element. but this was not the opinion of a certain Philosopher. Borgnet. Alfred in his De motu cordis written about 1210 says: “The heart is the dwelling place (domicitium) of the soul. Bk. and by its continuity preserves the order in the movements that are not eternal. Cf. 1890. and. 461b. Because the soul is not united to the body as its mover. Vide: Summa theologiae. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of The Parts of Animals25 that “the movements of delight and sadness. namely. By “a certain philosopher” Albert indicates his debt to Alfred. Patrologia latina.23 18. Summa theologiae. Also Aquinas. I. and from there it pours out its powers on the whole body. p. 7. ch.” Migne. vol. Thomas’ thinking is in accord with St. inasmuch as it is the form of one particular body22 and primarily of the heart. q. XLII. tract. vol. as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics24 that the movement of heavy and light bodies comes from an efficient cause inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of movement. 5. Cf. .. 76. I. The movement of animals. 457. And this is the opinion of the Peripatetics. p. 3 c. vol. in general. as in Platonic psychology. 8. I. 462 a. 72. art. man has but one soul. 255 b 31—256a 3. for by approach and recession a heavenly body confers on things the origin and end of being. p. 929.

the word ‘systole. 674-749) in which the word ‘systole’ appears.28 for it is not caused by the sensitive soul through its own operation. they are used only with reference to the arteries. Nor must it be caused by apprehension and desire. Pars I-II. art. but inasmuch as it is the form and nature of one particular body. 850 b) uses these terms in reference to cardiac activity: “In every emotion of the soul there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart according as the heart is moved more or less intensely in systole or diastole.. 10. not circular but like circular movement.” (op. but inasmuch as it is animated by a certain kind of soul. XCIV. The parts of animals. p. as we see in the case of the wheel. John had taken over this definition from the work of Maximus the Confessor (580-662). because of this something must remain at rest. namely.” Migne. This movement is continuous throughout the life of the animal. which it imitates in so far as it goes from a point back to the same point. but within diastole. p. 1958. because circular movement also is in some respects like this. and to end here. which is itself the resting place of the ventricle. p. New York. Patrologia Graeca. 25-27 27 Modern physiologists do not speak of a rest period between systole and diastole. The living body. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of the De Anima26 “that which moves instrumentally is found wherever a beginning and an end coincide. “Radiation causes diastole. its cessation causes systole. II. III. one consisting of a push and a pull.namely. 169-173. as Aristotle. art. The locomotion of the animal is caused by the operations of the senses and the emotions. it has a certain movement. vol. 11. Bk. t. II. De anima. although it comes from the sensitive soul. 4. there are periods of inactivity such as those of isometric relaxation and diastasis. By this principle then we can easily solve the objections of an adversary. Pars I-II. ch. 24. Bk.’ which we can translated by ‘retreat’ or ‘contraction. III. 1865. 943 b. and the two movements which seem opposed are. 433b 21-22. t.. cit. He then gives the explanation of those who oppose the doctrine of the flowing spirits. ch. Therefore in order that the heart be the principle and end of all the movements in the animal. Disputatio cum Pyrrho. parts of a single movement composed of both.” Op. Thomas in Summa theologiae (vol. 11. John says in De fide orthodoxa. And so it is not contradictory if it goes somehow in different directions. in the heart. As used here. He first gives the explanation of those who speak of a spirit flowing through the arteries: “They say that diastole results when the arteries are full and stretched by spirit that flows through them. Migne. 1088: “Natural fear is a force which maintains being by means of systole. systole results when it leaves the arteries. John of Damascus (c. III. In Summa theologiae. except that a rest period is inserted midway between the push and the pull 27 because it falls short of circular motion. Vide: Best and Taylor. But in the De motu cordis of Alfred of Sareshel we find specifically medical meanings attributed to ‘systole’ and ‘diastole. ch. q.. 297 D. 47).’ lacks medical significance. 23. 21. ch. 24. 22. 44. 1. Thomas cites the definition of fear given by St. ad 2. and because of this medical men distinguish vital operations from animal 17 . 2. I.” 20. Bk. Paris. cit. pp. vol. ch. q. For we do not say that the movement of the heart is natural to it inasmuch as it is heavy or light. All things are moved by pushing and pulling. 1964. and motion must originate from this position. Patrologia Graeca. in so far as it falls short of the simplicity of circular movement.’ However. Paris. According to this group. I. Aristotle. p. vol. 23.” 26 25 [28-29] it were. XCI. 666a 11-13. sed contra. 46.

being a letter. In natural things the form does not exist for the sake of the matter. ad 1. 2. 413b 1-2. and say that when the animal ones cease. which . but no heart. Pars I-II.operations. out of desire for vengeance.” 28 [29-30] will. augmentative. cit..34 He becomes angry. this variation of rhythm is not voluntary but involuntary. for he writes of Thomas: “The author first analyses the relationship between the heart and the soul.. although not moved essentially. I. certain signs are especially evident in the exterior parts of those who are angry. He is challenging the statement of an adversary as presented in paragraph 3. or even any partial faculty of the soul. but the sensitive soul. 31 the formal element is that which comes from the Thomas here tacitly concedes that the heart is moved neither by the nutritive nor by the intellectual soul but maintains that its movement is caused by the sensitive soul. for when they cease. For “to live” is the “to be” of living things. q.33 but in matter there is disposition for form. vol. 48. especially in the heart. ch. as is made clear in the second book of the Physics. 962 b: “The movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and spirits about the heart. p. in so far as they affect the body. and generative soul. bring about a certain change in the heart. 26. ibid. 922 b: “Sorrow and pain. because of the great disturbance of the heart when one is angry. art. [see note d]) seems not to have avoided this snare. life is at an end. Hence the movement of the heavens is always uniform but the movement of the heart varies according to the diverse emotions and cognitions of the soul. Walter Pagel in his splendid article ( loc. is the first principle of movement in animals. since the heart moves involuntarily” (p.. 18 . namely. namely. And hence it is that. I. Bk. 30 Summa theologiae. the desire for vengeance. 922 b: “Every good disposition of the body reacts in some way on the heart. 141) and “The motion of the heart cannot be explained in terms of action by any force outside the organism. does not exhibit the clearly defined didactic structure of Thomas’ major works. as for example in anger. Although some variation in the rhythm of the heart occurs due to diverse apprehensions and emotions. vol. Hence diverse cognitions and emotions arise in it. is moved accidentally.30 Therefore in the passions of the soul. the vital ones remain. It is easy to take paragraph 3 for Thomas’ own position.” Also loc. cit. II. ad 3. and this is reasonable. q. however. 25. supra. excitement of blood about the heart. but conversely. p. Dr. 20. Pars I. but because of this someone is inclined to anger. They call vital those operations which accompany the movement of the heart. vol. Pars I-II. 3. vol. since this opusculum. but the material element 32 is what pertains to the movement of the heart. II. obj. art. . For the emotions of the soul are not caused by the modifications of the heart but rather cause them. 144 a: “The act of the sensitive appetite is always accompanied by some change in the body.” 31 Summa theologiae. II. 38.” 29 Aristotle. De anima. 27. . There is this difference between the principle of movement of the heavens and the soul: this principle is moved neither essentially nor accidentally. Therefore it is not because the blood about the heart is excited that someone seeks vengeance. To start with he rejects the possibility that individual faculties of the soul cause the movements of the heart: plants possess a nutritive. as is said in the second book of the De Anima:29 the “to be” belongs to each thing in virtue of its own form. 5. as on the principle and end of bodily movement. Nor are the sensitive or intellectual faculties responsible. which is the instrument of the soul’s emotions. q. 2 c. 1. art.

the bodily change.” 35 Aristotle. and the members which are connected to the chest. 240: “Every emotion comes about concomitantly with some bodily changes: for example. q. 11. I have silently corrected a few typographical errors in the text. as it is said that “anger is the excitement of blood about the heart. Pars I-II. Bk. vol. which belongs to appetite. art. Let these words on the movement of the heart suffice.” Also. q. art. Because of this.B. vol. vol. 1 (January 1960). The causes of the movements of the animal are warmth and cold. 1. The lower lip.. The movement of animals. 144 a: “Let us distinguish in the emotions of the sense appetite a certain material element. also tremble. II. art.38 29.because it does not take place at the command of the will. the heart and genitals. II. and he gives this reason: that animals necessarily are affected by physical changes. 89. . 200 a 30-34. XIII. II. ch. so that each is moved and modified by natural changes that are related to one another. because the artery of speech is near the heart.35 that often at the sight of something the heart and genitals are moved without a command of the intellect. one undergoes increase.” 32 § Source: Vincent R. 2. such as concupiscence. ibid. “St. The Cause of the Movement of Animals. doi:10. and the like on account of which the heart grows warm or becomes chilled. art. ch. I. Pars I-II. 1.” 33 Aristotle.. I.. 6. because of their connection with the heart. and another decrease. vol. vol. Thus in anger . and a certain formal element.1093/jhmas/XV. 37 A discussion of this is found in ibid. 945 b. but when the parts are affected. art. make the movements of the aforementioned parts. ibid.1. Hence the fearful tremble especially in their speech. or something like this. vol. where Thomas illustrates the chilling effects of fear: “Because in fear heat leaves the heart. Pars I-II.. p. the arms and hands tremble.22 © 1960 by Oxford University Press [N. 44. II. the material element is the excitement of blood about the heart. ad. 843 b: “In the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part some natural change of an organ is found from the standpoint of matter. and goes from the higher parts to the lower. 809 b. 703b 7-20. p. 36 which. and the entire lower jaw. 28. 3. q. 9. or something like this. ad 2. ad 3. Larkin. but the formal element is the desire for revenge. namely.37 The intellect and imagination cause emotion. ch. q. Ibid. p. For the philosopher says in the book. concomitantly with the contraction or dilation of the heart. 22-30. 34 Summa contra Gentiles. 753a. 36 This is explained in Summa theologiae. the teeth chatter. vol. p. ad 2. For the same reason. II. the heart especially trembles in those who are afraid. p. p. 20. Pars I-II. naturally present internally and externally. take place in any case independently of reason when an alteration occurs. Transcribed from: Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 1960 XV(1):2230. Pars I. xv. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart. Physics. 9.] 19 . where the heart resides. 22. I. q. also tremble.” Journal of the History of Medicine. 17. 38 Cf. Bk. . ad 3. I. vol. anger.

lat. 74) were both addressed to a certain “master Philip of Castrocaeli.” 11 The latter does occur in this Opusculum. Extant MSS: 119. No English translation: English trans. Circular Symbolism. The purpose of this letter is to show that the motion of the blood 1 and heart is produced by “nature” and not by “soul” or any outside forces. lat.6 Bibl. *16. pp. but no evidence is given. Heart and Blood Before Harvey. and Works: With Corrigenda and Addenda. I. Nat. 63-93 (basic text: Paris Bibl.. DE MOTU CORDIS: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.. v. Opuscula. 2. It is. 16297. Cf. Larkin. By James A.43 (Rome 1976). * Cf. but appertains to the motion of the heart and not of the blood. De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum de Castrocaeli (Paris 1270-71). Marietti 1954. 14546). professor first at Bologna and later at Naples.Nat. preface 95-122. Eschmann suggests Paris 1270-71. 22-30.1. This is one of the treatises preserved by Godfrey of [394-395] Fontaines (Paris MS Bibl. text 127130. ON THE DATE OF THE WORK. pp. Walter Pagel. Cf. Journal of the History of Medicine. No English translation. 1967). the next excerpt.3 395. Parma v. William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background. According to the catalogue of Bartholomew of Capua. EDITIONS: add: Leonine ed. the word “blood” nowhere appears in the letter. 485: CORRIGENDA AND ADDENDA 395. 25 (1960).. 5.: “St. Nat. Vivès v. 90-93: (b) St Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart (pl. Vincent R. 507-11. Thought. lat. 27. this letter and another on the mixture of the elements (n. Thomas Aquinas on the Movement of the Heart”. cf. 20 . p. lat. 14546) as a topic of special current interest. ibid. 14546: Bible Nat.” who is otherwise unknown. * EDITIONS” Perrier. 1983). 358-60. Friar Thomas D’Aquino. Both Mandonnet and Walz give the date as Naples 1273. Weisheipl (Washington: Catholic University of America. 394-395: A Brief Catalogue of Authentic Works 73. 165-68. Opuscula Phil. however. 1 Contrary to what is here asserted. (Basel/New York. a work that displays interesting aspects and deserves a short discussion in the present context. Mandonnet suggested that master Philip may have been a physician.1 395. 6) The Opusculum or rather Letter de motu cordis of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 10 has occasionally been looked upon as a work on the motion of the blood—an appraisal that was largely due to a misunderstanding of the term “circular. His Life.

14 St Thomas’ speculation is mainly concerned with the soul as the vital principle causing and directing the motion of the heart. 11 BAYON. d. the heart had formed the central focus of biological speculation. Differing from Alfredus who made it the dwellingplace ( domicilium) of the 10 De motu cordis ad Magistrum Phillipum . BARACH Innsbruck 1878. [90-91] soul.19 Nor finally is it caused by such external force as heat—for it is the very movement of the heart that engenders heat. With this St Thomas does not mean that the soul resides in the heart. J. p. Bayer. Kgl. Kl. opponents. William Harvey. not in the ordinary sense of motus naturalis. 17 Secondly. a letter addressed to a Master Philip (ab. 14 See below. Die Stellung des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfred Anglicus) und seiner beginnenden XIII. LI 67-72—a translation of St. the vital principle of the organism as a whole. sig. St Thomas Aquinas on the movement of the heart.S. Isis 1960. BAEUMKER. C. Jarhunderts. First ed. in 1217. – C. Thomas’ De mixtione elementorum. The latter had denied the intimate connexion of the motion of the heart with the soul: it is not a motus animalis as it is independent of appetitus and intelligentia practica. St Thomas Aquinas on the combining of the elements .20 In all these points opposition to Alfred’s stipulations is recognisable. (folio) Milan. Med. 13 Excerpta a libro Alfredi Anglici de motu cordis item Costar-ben-Lucae de differentia animas et spiritas liber translatus a Johanne Hispalensi. P. 1958. but because movement is immanent to the heart that is animated by a certain kind of soul18 and not due to external force causing the so called motus violentus. Antwerp 1612 opus XXXV. ed. Annals of Sci. Akad. with a life of St Thomas by Anton Pizamanus) published in 4o by Herman Liechenstein Coloniensis. – Edition also used by the present writer: Venetiis 1490 (ed. Des Alfred von Sareshal (Alfredus Anglicus) Schrift De motu cordis . J verso to J 2 verso = a separate edition with another opusculum – Libelli doctoris Sancti Thomae aquinatis occultorum naturae effectum Et proprii cordis motus causas declarantes studentibus phusice summe necessari appeared at Leipzig—per Jacobum Thaner of Würzburg—1499. This is seen in the role which it played in Alfred of Sareshal’s De motu cordis. and under this aspect is linked with the soul. It is so. Physician and Biologist: His precursors. 1960. the motion of the heart is natural. and whole in each of its parts. and successors Part III. 22-30. 214. In this he followed Plotinus and St Augustine who regarded the soul as “wholly in the whole body. It is regarded as a genuine work and has been translated and commented upon in recent times. Its result is that the movement of the heart is due to the soul as the form of the body and primarily of the heart. Hist. of Alexander Neckham to whom it is dedicated. Sitzber. III. written before the death.12 Ever since the reception of the philosophy of Aristotle and the acceptance of his psychophysical ideas in the early thirteenth century. 445. Beninus et Joh. like De motu cordis. 1915. 12 LARKIN. XV. H. Ant. Wiss. VINCENT R. its character as a “natural” motion and its analogy with the motion of the heavens—its “circularity”. de Honate. – Idem. C.”16 The movement of the heart that appears first in the developing organism is the principle of all the movements that exist in the animal. however. Alfredus refutes its natural 21 . predicated of a body because it is heavy or light and thus follows one direction. 1270). Philos-hist. Münster 1923.13 Some of St Thomas’ statements seem to be directed against Alfred. IX München 1913.15 St Thomas regarded the latter as the form of the body as a whole. Opusculum Omnia.if only to the show the variety of meanings attaching to “circular” and “circulatio” and for the influence it exerted in the era of the Renaissance. See also idem.

It is not the movement of the blood with which he is concerned. The basic ref. belongs to the same category as the movement of smoke that moves upwards and that of a burning torch which leads the fire in a downward direction. 103. 16 Hoti hole en pasi kai en hotooun autou hole: Plotinus. St. 18. 5. The blood sets out from the heart and returns to it after having travelled a long distance. as the heart does not follow its weight and move to the centre. De Anima lib. but that of the heart.F. really a single movement. This circularity comes about because the heart and its movement are the principle and end of all the movements that exist in the animal. in note [12]. 8 and similar passages as compiled in the index to Baeumker’s ed. arcem corporis. 10. but remains on its level. ed. Its composite structure does not therefore exclude it from being “natural” although its “naturalness” does not follow from this. Thomas knows nothing of this or at all events does not mention it. inhabitat: p. but in quite a different way. that he indeed speaks of a circular movement or at least one that comes close to the “simple” circular motion of the heavens. 70: [remainder of note omitted]. ed. quae sensus et motus et vitae principium est. Baeumker loc. The circularity with which he deals merely indicates the rhythmical repetition of a movement that is uniformly composed of two acts: that of pull and push. namely the heat which distends air and blood. I . cap. 314. it imitates its perfect and uninterrupted—“simple”—circular movement in so far as it goes from the a point back to the same point (quem tamen imitator in quantum est ab eodem in idem ). of pulsus and tractus. From this short analysis of St Thomas’ treatise it emerges. moreover it is moved by an outside force. 20. LARKIN loc. It follows that the movement of the heart must be like that of the heavens. the “form” of the body and primarily of the heart—the noblest form that exists in earthly bodies—and thus resembles the principle of the movement of the heavens. therefore. p. Alfred De motu cordis. cit. p. in note [13]. IV. Though continuous throughout the life of the animal this movement is not strictly circular because there is a rest period inserted midway between the push and the pull. It results from the soul. p. however. 21 According to St Thomas the movement of the heart is a rhythmically repeated series of pushing and pulling actions. – ARISTOTLE. then. – We return to this in the chapter on Marcus Marci later in this book. VINCENT R. l. 17 Therefore the movement of the heart is natural because it results from the soul. vol. 10. See also Barach loc. 2. 1. It necessarily falls short of the latter. l. In this “circular” means that it starts from one point and returns to it—so does the blood. in note [13]. 45. as the effect falls short of the cause. Its movement.character. see p. in as much as it is the form of one particular body and primarily of the heart. and 703 a 19. cap. p. l. H. id est cor. also as circular movement is in some respects like this. On the other hand. 6. sed similum circulari compositum ). of systole and diastole. It is a movement not circular. II. Mueller Berol. See above our footnote [25] with the passage from Baruch. p. anima igitur. 703 a 29 and 703 b 1 seq. p. Ennead. but from its animation by a certain kind of soul—the sensitive soul as the form and nature of a particular kind of body. 45. 23 Nor is its going in different directions a point against its circularity. 22 . cit. To this [see] LARKIN’S long note 23 on Thomas’ departing from the teaching of his master Albertus Magnus who adopted the opinion of Alfred of Sareshal. 412b. cor—quendam motum non circularem. Thomas Aquinas on the Heart 17 tr. Though consisting of two parts—systole and diastole 22— it is 15 Cor igitur domicilium est. cit. to Aristotle is [91-92] De motu animal. 1880. l. but “like circular movement” ( habuit— namely. 86. 35.

Oxford 1931. He stipulates that the spirit of life is not moved. For everything is moved by pushing and pulling.III. as for example in a ball and socket joint. so here there must be a point which remains at rest. See to this: Larkin loc. 2. 7-8 with ref. cap. De Anima: “that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide. since the palpitation of the artery is explained to the senses by the termination of the circuit (gemirath ha-sibbuh). 10.”25 The similar way in which this matter is treated by Maimonides and St Thomas may justify the suggestion that the latter was influenced by Maimonides therein. LARKIN 22. 24 LEIBOWITZ. ed.. St Thomas does. De anima lib. § 23 . note [115]. An additional influence on St Thomas may be found in the use of the terms systole and diastole with regard to the arteries by Alfred of Sareshel. cit. 25-27 tr. pars I-II. [remainder of note omitted] 25 ARISTOTLE.A. This is compared with the “moving of a ball. Ottawa 1941.26 26 ALFREDUS ANGLICUS. Also: GALEN. ed. 377. the flux of the spirit through the arteries causing them to be repleted and elevated has been called diastole and its cessation systole. Aphorismi. He says. vol. referring to Aristotle. 22 Tr. J. in note [13]. for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning (that is why one remains at rest while the other is moved): they are separate in definition. Tr. 10. I. De specie motus cordis. sistolen spadulatio fecit. see below note [25] and text to this note. which deals with the pulse. By contrast Thomas speaks of the rest period inserted midway between push and pull of the heart (paragr. cxii. 35-37. Bauemker. see above note [22] and below p. 20 Tr. 461L diastolen igitur irraditio. The latter speaks of the circular movement of the arteries. Alfred. med. Defin. [92-93] of the arteries—he does not mention it with reference to the heart. For the latter Larkin quotes from Summa theolog. loc. art. 433 b 21-22. 46-47. 703 a 19.O. cit. 21 ALFREDUS ANGLICUS. p. III. 20) and the increase or decrease in its natural movement in systole and diastole in every emotion. 24.276. ad 2. in note [12]. XI. and from that point the movement must originate. but used exclusively with reference to the arteries. q. cap. J. but emanates from the left ventricle of the heart by irradiation. as against: repleta et elevata arteria per fluentem spiritum diastolem fieri dicunt. LARKIN 22. XIX. LARKIN 19-22. Bauemker. 10. 23 Tr. then. Quod spiritus vitae non movetur. LARKIN 8. IX. to the IVth Particula of Maimonides. but not separate spatially. cit. in Korath 1935. in common with Maimonides speaks of the rhythmically repeated movement 18 19 Tr. 850b. II. Hence just as in the case of a wheel. De anima. By contrast. p. Kühn. SMITH. sistolen vero. p. in note [13]. 28 note 27 to passage 20 of Thomas’ De motu cordis on the medical meanings attributed by Alfred to systole and diastole. cap. cap. p. cum arterio egressus fuerit. ed. See also ARISTOTLE De motu animal. LARKIN 4. sed fit irradiatione virtutis p. loc.”24 This seems to allude to the very passage which St Thomas quotes from Aristotle.Perhaps this should be associated with a term used by the—older—Maimonides (11351204).

that scarcely can one discern obedience from command.” I answer that. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason. The members of the body are organs of the soul’s powers. is derived knowledge of the conclusions. Whether the acts of the external members are commanded? Cf. therefore all movements of members. and not according to the will: for like a proper accident. Objection 2: Further. Augustine says (De Civ. whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known. some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature. xxii) says that. St. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius. are not subject to the command of reason. On the contrary. Ia-IIae. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason.. a. Dei xiv. Objection 3: Further. and from volition of the end naturally desired. Summa Theol.” Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason. are subject to the command of reason. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason. 4). viii. Hom. the heart is the principle of animal movement. Hom. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins. 9): “The mind commands a movement of the hand. Reply to Objection 1: The members do not move themselves. Thomas Aquinas.] says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason. so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason. whereas those movements of members. of which powers. Therefore much less do the members of the body obey. Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will. Wherefore this movement is called “vital. q. the body remains cold. so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. as the Philosopher states ( Phys. and so ready is the hand to obey. De Nat. sometimes when sought it fails. art. but are moved through the powers of the soul. 24 . 16) that “the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired.3. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator. which follows from the union of soul and body. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason. it results from life. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. xxii. as stated above (A[8]). 9 (tr. that are moved by the sensitive powers. that arise from the natural powers.” For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius. viii. and whereas the heart is warm with desire. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Augustine says (Confess. whereas the natural powers are not. is derived the choice of the means. than the powers of the vegetal soul.” Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason. 17. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS. that which is according to nature stands first. De Nat.

that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God. Animal. and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses. as we shall state later on. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect. and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue. 2). These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension. Dei xiv.” and that the reason of this is as follows. 17. in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul. by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity. the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself. This is stated by Aristotle ( De Causis Mot. But because. of which passions these movements are a consequence.Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. because each is as it were a separate animal being.20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense. § 25 . because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural. which change is not subject to the command of reason. we must consider the natural cause of this particular member’s in submission to reason. in so far as it is a principle of life. This is the case with these two organs in particular.) who says that “the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary. as stated above (Reply obj. which is virtually the entire animal. through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man.

b. On the causes of animal motion: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Book III, lectio 15:
TEXT 433a9–433b27 BOOK III, CHAPTER X THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED WHAT THEY ARE It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency. §§ 818-19 Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. §§ 820-5 All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite. §§ 826-7 For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. § 828 Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent). § 829 The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors. § 830

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Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul. § 831 Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. §§ 832-5 ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY LECTIO FIFTEEN § 818. So far the Philosopher has pursued his enquiry into the principle of local movement in animals by the method of refuting unsatisfactory solutions; but now he states the positive truth on the matter: first, showing in general what that principle is; and secondly, at ‘Generally then’, how it varies in different subjects. The first point again divides into (a) a statement of the motive principle in animals; and (b), at ‘The motive-force will therefore’, an analysis of the factors at work when this principle is in action. Again (a) subdivides into three points: (1) That there are two motive-principles; which (2) he reduces to one, at ‘Now the intellectual power’, while with (3) he answers an objection (at ‘Since appetites.’) already raised. First, then, he says that the foregoing examination makes it clear that neither the vegetative nor the sensitive part is the motive-principle, since they are found in things that do not move. So it would seem that the moving principles are two: intellect and appetency. Note, however, that he includes imagination under intellect; for it resembles intellect in that it impels to action in the absence of sense-objects. § 819. For in their actions many people follow the changes in their imaginations rather than rational knowledge; for instance, those who act impulsively without reflection. Besides, other animals ate obviously only impelled to action through imagination, not through intellect or reason; but men through both intellect and imagination. Clearly, then, both these are motive-principles: intellect (including imagination) and appetition. § 820. Then at ‘Now the intellectual,’ he reduces the two to one; and this in three stages: (1) justifying the reduction; (2), at ‘All intellect, then, is right,’ using it to show the cause of a particular accidental factor in animal movements; and (3) refuting, at ‘For those who divide’ an early division of the powers of the soul. First, then, he says that the mind as a motive-principle is the mind in so far as it reasons for some purpose other than mere reasoning; in other words, it is the practical reason, which differs from the speculative by a different finality; for while the latter regards truth for its own sake and nothing else, the practical reason relates its knowledge of truth to some deed to be done. § 821. Now obviously every appetition is for some end beyond itself. It is absurd to say that desire is for the sake of desiring; desire is essentially a tendency to ‘the other’. Moreover, an object of desire is always the practical reason’s starting point; what is first desired provides

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the end whence its deliberations begin. If we wish to weigh a course of action we first lay down some end and then deliberate about the means, moving back, so to say, from what is to come later on to what is immediately to be done at the beginning. So he adds that the last thing that the practical reason considers is the first thing that has to be done—i.e. the starting point of the whole action. This is why it is reasonable to assert that both appetition and the practical reason are motive-principles; for the object desired certainly incites to action, and it is also what the practical reason first considers; so that the latter is said to impel to action because the starting point of its deliberations, the object desired, does so. § 822. And what is said of the intellect may be applied to the imagination; if it moves it does so only in virtue of an object desired: of which it contains, like the intellect, a representation. § 823. So it is clear that there is ultimately one mover, the object desired. For this both moves appetition and affords a starting point for the practical intellect—the two motiveprinciples which have been assumed. § 824. And it is reasonable that these two principles should be reduced to unity in the object of desire; for if both intellect and appetition are principles with respect to one and the same movement they must, as such, share the same specific nature; since a single effect implies always a single cause of precisely that one effect. Now it cannot be said that appetite is a moving principle through sharing the specific nature of intellect, but rather e converso; for intellect only moves anything in virtue of appetition. It moves by means of the will, which is a sort of appetition. § 825. The explanation of this (given in Book IX of the Metaphysics) is that the practical reason is essentially balanced between alternatives; nor can it initiate movement unless appetition fixes it exclusively upon one alternative. Appetition, on the other hand, can move to action independently of reason, as we see in the case of the concupiscible desire which is a sort of appetite. He mentions this desire rather than the irascible because, unlike the irascible, it has no admixture of rationality (as he shows in Book VII of the Ethics). Clearly, then, the motive-principles are reducible to the one object of appetition. § 826. Next at ‘All intellect then’ he applies what has been said to a particular accidental factor in movement or action, explaining why we go amiss in our actions. ‘All intellect’, he says, ‘is right’, by which he means that we never err about the first principles of action, about such truths as ‘it is wrong to do harm to anyone’, or ‘injustice is never right’, and so on. Those principles correspond to the equally infallible first principles of the speculative reason. But as for the consequences of these first principles, if we apprehend them aright it is because our thought is consistent with our grasp of the principles, whereas if we deviate from the truth the fault lies in our reasoning. Appetition and imagination (motive-principles likewise) may be, on the other hand, either right or wrong. Hence if we act amiss it is, in the last analysis, because we fall short of what we intellectually know; and our previous conclusion stands, that the final motive-impulse comes from the object of desire. § 827. Now this object is either a real good or a seeming good: it is a real good if the mind’s original correct judgement is maintained; it is only a seeming good if appetite or imagination cause a deflection from that judgement. Yet not every good is desirable as a cause of action, but only the good-as-term-of-action, i.e. a good that is actually related to our actions. And precisely as such no such good is always good in the same way; for it must vary in relation to ourselves. That is why the ultimate and absolute good, regarded in its universality, does not, as such, move us to act. Clearly, then, the final motive force derives from the soul itself acting through the appetitive power.

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and this in three stages. All these parts of the soul differ more than the irascible and concupiscible. and (3) the thing moved. the continent. sensitive. Then at ‘The motive-force’ he analyses the process of the movements in question. i.2 Book VI. In the case of animals. while the expansive impulse. at ‘Since there are these three’. others should have been included. and this happens ‘in beings possessing a time-sense’. in short’. Now the mover is twofold: an unmoved mover. he rejects an old division of the motive parts of the soul into the rational. For sometimes the mind forbids a man to indulge a desire in view of what will happen in the future if it is indulged: thus a man in a state of fever sees with his mind that he ought to abstain from drinking wine. the unmoved mover is some actual good influencing desire through the intellect or imagination.e. And yet. such as sensing and understanding. as it were. § 831. Next. by definition. Finally. and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. Hence that old division was incomplete. But here and now we are concerned particularly with the soul. then. § 830. from the scientific faculty which has to do with necessary objects. inasmuch as. deliberative and appetitive powers. to the object of desire or appetite. that are aware. he briefly defines each of the factors on which movement depends. it initiates movement through the mind or the imagination. First. Then at ‘For those who divide’. at ‘Now. he explains how they are interrelated. he interrelates three factors in movement: (1) the mover. intellectual. Next. though specifically one. These last two are distinguished in the same way and for the same reason as. the intention was to enumerate the potencies which are really distinct from each other. Next. But desire prompts one to take things for the sake of ‘what is now’ i. in the Ethics. he observes that if the moving principles are considered formally and specifically they are reducible to one. at ‘Now. he says. If. being itself unmoved. hence it has to be treated along with the activities common to body and soul (and is.e. First. proceeding in a circle. namely that if desire were a motive force. irascible and concupiscible potencies. therefore they all as such partake of the nature of this primary one. he meets an objection already touched upon. And because the secondary motive-principles only move in virtue of their share in the primary one. in the present moment. Aristotle distinguishes the ratiocinative faculty. in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. of which the continent follow one and reject the rest. Then at ‘Since there are these three’. namely the vegetative. § 829. Then the thing moved is the animal itself. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity. (2) the organ by which it moves. follows a swelling out of the organ. whence movement begins. not of the present moment only. 29 . at ‘Since appetites may’. for this is the absolute starting point of movement. it is the primary motororgan. Contrariety of desires springs out of an opposition between reason and the concupiscible appetite. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point. do not follow their desires. desire itself being a certain act or movement in the sense that we give to the term ‘movement’ when we apply it to activities that are consequent upon actuality. they are numerically many. But this difficulty vanishes if we consider that in man there are contrary appetites. for whatever desires is moved inasmuch as it desires. which has to do with contingent matters. And the organ by means of which desire issues into movement is a part of the body. he shows how the factors in movement are at once many and one. but of past and future as well. and a mover that moves through being moved itself. § 832. The mover moved is the desire itself. examined in the De Causa Motus Animalium). which are both included in the sensitive appetite. in fact. nobody would be continent.§ 828. For what is here and now pleasant seems absolutely pleasant and good if it is not related to the future.

namely the appetible. and both these at once. 830-835. And with respect to this he does three things.: College of St. 170-171: 830. the motionless and the moved. 15. there will be one mover. he assigns the order of motion. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move. For he treats of this in a book on the cause of motion of animals. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point. But although all things agree in the species of the first mover. Therefore in the motion of the animal. However. but not in reality. Cf. For it is clear that the second movers are not moved except in so far as they participate in the first.B. Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle . these two factors in the organ. he shows the order of motion. For purposes of comparison. when he says. and he says that there are three things which are found in motion. “To state the matter summarily…” Therefore he says first that if the moving principles are considered formally and according to species. for instance. In reality it keeps to one place. in so far as it is imagined or understood. where he says. A. 30 . nn.§ 833. and to seek itself is a kind of act or motion in the sense that motion is the act of the perfect as was said of the operation of the intellect and sense. But the organ by which the appetite moves is something corporeal. he treats in summary each one of these which are required for motion. Secondly. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. are substantially and spatially inseparable. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term. because everything which seeks in so far as it seeks is moved. 1946). both motionless and moving. for the drawing power draws something back to itself Thus the first organ of local motion in animals must be at once both a starting point and a term.—as. St. § 835. But what is moved is the animal. N. But the moved mover is the appetite itself. Now. the mover which is not moved is the actual good which moves the appetite in so far as it s understood or imagined. all movement must proceed from the motionless. and another which is a moved mover. for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. namely what is the first organ of motion. “All movement involves three…”. Thomas’s Commentary. still they are many in number. he shows how they are ordered to each other. and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. one indeed immobile. as starting point. lect. “All movement involves three…”. another is the organ by which the mover moves. § 834. be motionless. when he says. though distinct in thought. Thirdly. and therefore we must consider an organ of this sort among the operations common to soul and body. in a sense. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. as term. One which is the mover. R. And therefore all things agree in the species of the first mover. and. Then. Bk. trans. Kocourek (Minn. for this is the unmoved mover. Then. in movement. But the mover is twofold. it must. pp. But its parts are changing their places really. and not only in thought. Thus it is. granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement. For in this book he intends to treat of the soul by itself. Thomas. III. and the third is that which is moved. In thought it may move as a whole. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is clear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. “it follows that while that which originates…”. Thomas Aquinas. I give next an alternate translation of the last part of St. where he says. while the hand is moving the arm is still. 831. First he shows how the moving principles are one and how they are many. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles.

and something which is moved. or not? And must this necessarily be so also in the case of the universe? Perhaps it would be thought strange were the origin of movement inside. 2 See Iliad VIII 20-22. For one part of an animal must be moved. which is the heart. Movement of Animals. Now in the animal world there must be not only an immovable without. and initiate their own movement. must there be something immovable and at rest outside of what is moved. highest of all from heaven to the plain. [700a] for that which is entirely immovable cannot possibly be moved by anything. And these two in themselves. And that it is necessary that it be the beginning and end of motion and consequently at rest and mobile is clear from the fact that every motion of the animal is composed of pushing and pulling.L. in which there is convex and concave. but the beginning of motion must be immobile in each thing moved. and against this the [10] part which is moved will support itself and be moved. 833. Aristotle. And herein lies the solution of the difficulty stated some time back. For according to concavity it is contracted in itself. because the pulling moves to itself that which is pulled. as the principle of motion and pulsation is produced by it. And because of this it is necessary that the first organ of local motion in the animal be both as the beginning of motion and the term. supports itself against another part at rest. no not even if ye toiled right hard. all ye gods and goddesses! Set hands to the chain’. come. but it is moved according to dilation and constriction.S. But in pulling that which moves is the end of the motion. in so far as motion is terminated in it. in that it depends from an original which is immovable. But in pushing. he treats in summary of local motion. when he says. just as appears in circular motion. thus also it is in every motion of the heart.832. namely the resting and the moved are diverse in definition. 835. but according to the whole it remains in the same place according to subject. for example. Cf. and not in reason only. and when the arm is moved the shoulder is at rest. 834. just as when the hand is moved the arm is at rest. and still that [is] whence the motion begins. and he says. ye would not pull Zeus. as it were the end and the other the beginning. And because in itself there is the beginning and end of motion. for one part. A. just as in a kind of ball and socket joint. Then. but also within those things which move in place. [170-171] so that it causes the motion of pushing and pulling. 31 . For the concave is as the end. according to convexity its dilation is noticed. in so far as it is the beginning of motion. in summary. And therefore it is necessary that in this there be something fixed. and thus in a way it is mobile and in a way at rest. ch. “To state the matter summarily…”. For the heart remains fixed in the same part of the body. if it move one of its parts. For the body which is moved circularly because of the immobility of the center and pole. Farquharson): To resume. there be something at rest. the possibility or [5] impossibility of dissolving the system of the heavens. 4 (799b 33-800a 11) (tr. and no part of it. one of which is. and just as every motion proceeds from something immobile. And to those who so conceive it the word of Homer2 would appear to have been well spoken: [35] ‘Nay. but the convex seems to be the principle of the motion. does not change place totally except perchance in reason. and another be at rest. as it were. that the first mover organically must be such that the beginning and end of the motion are the same thing. although they are inseparable from each other in subject and in magnitude. it is necessary that in the very organ of motion itself. that which is moving is only the beginning of motion because that which pushes removes from itself that which is pushed. but the parts vary their place in subject.

and so is able to pull and to thrust from one and the same cause. 1 Notice that St. and are visible also in aborted embryos. 8.L. and the heavy kept up by the lighter. And the animal organism must be conceived after the similitude of a well-governed commonwealth. while that which initiates movement must needs possess a kind of force and power. we further see the reason for the connatural spirit being situate where it actually is found. cf. III. and what is the reason for this. both heart and liver are visible enough when the body is only just formed. that is to say. but each creature is provided with such as are suited to its special mode of life and motion. the organ of movement must be capable of expanding [20] and contracting. the oesophagus. while no bloodless animals have any at [30] all. and the functions of movement are thrusting and pulling.S. but she resides in a kind of central governing place of the body.e. if. At all events we see that it is well disposed to excite movement and to exert power. Now since this centre is for some animals in the heart. so is it with the internal parts. others only a part. Now experience shows us that animals do both possess connatural spirit and derive power from this. ch.. Farquharson): Although from the point of view of the definition of [5] movement—a definition which gives the cause—desire is the middle term or cause. Democritus then seems to have been mistaken in the notion he formed of the viscera. and have next to treat of the viscera. Now that which is to initiate movement without [25] change of structure [i. ibid. 32 . Aristotle.) And this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved. in sanguineous animals. in the rest in a [15] part analogous with the heart. is capable of being passive to an external force. and [703b] play the parts Nature would have them play. [10] (How this connatural spirit is maintained in the body is explained in other passages of our works. The individuals each play their assigned part as it is ordered. rather than of the spirit. When [30] order is once established in it there is no more need of a separate monarch to preside over each several task. A. Thomas adduces these words as being said of the heart. without alteration (B. like the cognate question about the rest of the parts of the body. but whose nature is not to initiate movement. Cf. he fancied that the reason why none were discoverable in bloodless animals was that these animals were too small to allow them to be seen. as the external organs are not precisely alike in all animals. and while it is still extremely small. n. De Motu. and the windpipe. exhibiting gravity compared with the fiery element. Accordingly.)] must be of the kind described. For. The question whether the spirit remains always the same or constantly changes and is renewed. Now that which is moved. still in the material animated body there must be some material which itself moves being moved. and one thing follows another in its accustomed order.Cf. is better postponed. while still excessively minute. These are peculiar to sanguineous animals. being then no bigger than a point. William Ogle): We have now dealt with the neck. these also differing in different animals.A. and the remaining parts live by continuity of natural structure.1 for the elementary bodies prevail over one another in a compound body by dint of disproportion. [665b] For these parts are to be seen in the egg sometimes as early as the third day. 10 (703a 3—703b 2) (tr. We have now explained what the part is which is moved when the soul originates movement in the body. Aristotle. and this is precisely the characteristic of spirit. Moreover. some of which have all of them. and desire moves being moved. On the Parts of Animals. 4 (665a 27-666b 1) (tr. There is no need then of a soul in each part.M. the light is overcome and kept down by the heavier. So in animals there is the same orderliness—nature taking the place of custom—and each part naturally doing his own work as nature [35] has composed them. It contracts and expands naturally. and levity by comparison with the opposites of fire.

but even in other animals there is a tendency in the heart to assume a similar position. and generally of all sensation. Moreover. while it is self-evident that the addition of them to an animal is not destructive of it. and terminate there. be one. and here alone in all the viscera [5] and indeed in all the body. Again its position is that of a primary or dominating part. then. and for this it is well suited by its structure.Viscera. For the blood is conveyed into the vessels from the heart. that is to say of the part which terminates in the vent for excrement. For in such the viscera are more sanguineous. 661a 13-14) says that ‘the motion involved in pleasure and pain and all other sensations seem to begin there. For nature. and. than at any later period of life. and which holds it as it were in a receptacle. and therefore are each and all formed from sanguineous material. but rather in its upper than its lower half. and so the Philosopher in the third book of On the Parts of Animals (ch.’” (tr. but no vessel spreads through the heart. and this before any of the other parts. For no sooner is the embryo formed.) 33 . 4. St. the blood elsewhere being always contained within vessels. For the source must. whenever [15] possible. From this it is quite evident that the heart is a part of the vessels and their origin. For the centre is one. places the more honourable part in the more honourable position. the motions of pain and pleasure. [10] and the reason for this has already been given. in the centre of the necessary part of the body. and these scattered. This primary source of the vessels is the heart. 17: “Now the motion of the heart is the principle of every motion which is in an animal. namely. and it is apparently to meet this requirement that nature has devised the blood-vessels.1 This. but also evident to the senses. according to their representation. And that this part is the heart is [20] not only a rational inference. or primary receptacle. must necessarily have one primary source. there would be many sources for the vessels. Moreover. For in itself it constitutes the origin and fountain. and of greater bulk in proportion to the body. Again. and also more in front than behind. This is most evident in the case of man. there is blood without blood-vessels. must be the primary source of sensation. as is plainly to be seen in the new-born young of these animals. [15] when possible. and no sooner is it formed than it contains blood. when no other more important purpose stands in her way. Thomas Aquinas. For it is preferable that there shall be one such. There is a heart. It is however. For its central part consists of a dense and hollow [666b] substance. as already said. For that sanguineous animals must necessarily have blood is self-evident. For the heart is the first of all the parts to be formed. [5] are peculiar to sanguineous animals. and is moreover full of blood. In this they are clearly mistaken. as neither the blood itself. These. and secondly. as though the vessels took thence their origin. than its heart is seen in motion as though it were a living creature. is endowed with sensation. and [25] are not to be counted with the parts which are necessary for life. it has the character of a blood-vessel. the vessels continue their course through the other viscera. it 1 Cf. the best suited for a source is the centre. that it may serve to protect the source of heat. n. being as it is homogeneous. these sources would [30] be in a region that is manifestly cold. but none passes into the heart from without. For the vessels manifestly issue from it and do not go through it.A. nor yet any part which is bloodless. and find in it their ultimate termination. it being in the earliest stage of formation that the nature of the material and its abundance are most conspicuous. whereas the region of the heart is as manifestly hot. it is plain that that part which first has blood. in all sanguineous animals. It is hollow to serve for the reception of the blood. De Motu Cordis. For here. as the blood is fluid. There are some who say that the vessels commence in the head. while its wall is dense. Nor is this but consistent with reason. it is also a matter of necessity that there shall be a receptacle for it. in the heart. For in the first place. plainly have their source in the heart. And. then. For the limbs vary in position in different animals. B. from dissections and from observations on the process of development that the truth of these statements receives its clearest demonstration. and the [20] heart lies about the centre of the body. indeed. of [10] the blood. Again. of all places. again. and is equally or almost equally within reach of every part. as is shown by its intolerance of chill.M. rather than several. For life can be maintained even when they are removed. reason would lead us to expect.

rather. and. univocally. and which place naturally befits it. and since it is not the liver which is such. And he says that it is a principle of other bodies. and the end more honorable than the thing ended – since the contained and the terminated pertain to the notion of matter. But no one could ever deem the liver to be the primary organ either of the whole body or of the blood. It is necessary. among bodies according to the order of place. the starting-point of their nature in all animals that have blood. as in the case of an animal. being in the middle. so the outermost sphere is most formal and most noble.. which as it were counterbalances it. R Larcher (Ohio. The reason is that the middle is contained and determined by all the others.e. to the whole universe. A further evidence of the truth of what has been stated is the fact that no sanguineous animal is without a heart. A similar viewpoint must be taken with respect to the whole heaven. For the primary source of blood must of necessity be present in them all.e. it follows of necessity that it is the heart which is the source of the blood. Since then one or other of these two parts must be the central source. 20. that is to say is the heart. And therefore. The vessel. But it is not the middle place but rather the place of the outermost container that belongs to it. in the most perfectly finished animals there is another part. which is the substance of the whole consistency of things. which is the source of blood [666b] and the first of the parts to contain it. For the position in which it is placed is far from being that of a primary or dominating part. i. moreover. and the first sensory part is that which first has blood. as thus shown. containing bodies are more formal and contained bodies are more material.. is not the same as the middle of the body’s size. the spleen.e. But it is manifest that the container is more honorable than the contained. Consequently. but to be a container and that which terminates to the notion of form. the extremity. and most honorable among other bodies: and this is the sphere of the fixed stars. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens . i. moreover. For the definitive [35] characteristic of an animal is the possession of sensation. while among the elements fire is above all containing and formal. St. is the most material and ignoble among bodies.e. for that which is the magnitudinal middle among the places of the universe is more like an ultimate than like a principle. that through which the nature of a thing is preserved – as we see in animals that the middle by which the nature of an animal is preserved.” i. which is the middle of magnitude. 485: 485. trans. namely. the liver contains no spacious receptacle in its substance.. and ask what is its condition according to nature. Conway and F. n. lect.. while that which is the “end. both the middle of a magnitude. It is true that [25] sanguineous animals not only have a heart but also invariably have a liver. and no vessel whatsoever originates in it. Then at [343] he refutes the aforesaid reason [argument] and says that in the aforesaid reason [argument] the Pythagoreans used the word “middle” as though one called “middle” absolutely. On the heart of an animal as being analogous to the “middle” of the universe. 1964). in the whole universe. has the nature of a determinant and container. but its blood is in a vessel as in all the other viscera.being. P. Thomas Aquinas. as [30] does the heart. as also the primary organ in other respects. i. just as the earth which is contained by all. to seek that which is the middle of nature in the universe. extends through it. for that would be the umbilicus. the heart. and the middle of a thing according to nature. Still further. cf. Book II. 34 . He explains these two things. Hence they should not be concerned with the whole universe as though it needs a guardhouse in such a way that such a prison or guardhouse would have to be assigned to the center. for it is from the heart that all the vessels take their rise. showing first how the middle of the universe is as corresponding to the heart of an animal.

For the text of Aristotle. as if the word ‘centre’ were quite unequivocal. is more precious than earth. They further construct another earth in opposition to ours to which they give the name counterearth. creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre. § 35 . Reasoning on this basis they take the view that it is not earth that lies at the centre of the sphere. They hold that the most important part of the world. The Pythagoreans have a further reason. some have an opinion such as has been described. As to its position there is some difference of opinion. who regard the whole heaven as finite—say it lies at the centre. That centre will be something primary and precious. But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heaven as analogous to that of animals. should be most strictly guarded. and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the same with [5] that of the thing or the natural centre. Stock): [15] It remains to speak of the earth. In all this they are not seeking for theories [25] and causes to account for observed facts. At the centre. but to the mere position we should give the last place rather than the first. and the earth is one of the stars. seeing that the latter is the matter and the former the essence of [15] the system. De Caelo (On the Heavens) II. but rather forcing their observations and trying to accommodate them to certain theories and opinions of their own. but rather fire. of the question whether it is at rest or in motion. cf. Most people—all. of its position. But the Italian [20] philosophers known as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. and the limit than the intermediate. they say. he sums up [344] and concludes that in regard to the place of earth. J. in fact. L. For this reason they have no need to be so disturbed about the world. 13 (293a 15—293b 15) (tr. is fire. they say. in which the centre of the animal and that of the body are different. and what defines it is the limit.Finally. or rather the fire which occupies that place. and of its shape. Their [30] view is that the most precious place befits the most precious thing: but fire. and that which contains or limits is more precious than that which is limited. I. But there are many others who would agree that it is wrong to give the earth the central position. For the middle is what is defined. and the circumference and the centre are limits. looking for confirmation rather to theory than to the facts of observation. and name it. or to call in a guard for its centre: rather let them look for the [10] centre in the other sense and tell us what it is like and where nature has set it. [293b] which is the centre. the ‘Guardhouse of Zeus’.

while the other is inseparable from matter. Galen distinguished between three types of spirit: the spiritus vitalis or life spirit. Stefan Stenudd. Arthur Platt): Now it is true that the faculty of all kinds of soul seems to have a connexion with a matter different from and more divine than the so-called elements. cf. He also talked about a vital spirit ( pneuma zotikon. and belongs to those animals in which is included something divine (to wit. the spiritus animalis or animal spirit to be found in the brain and nerves. but it is the spiritus included in the semen and the foamlike. which traveled from the brain out to the nerves. blood and air. the case resembles that of [15] the 1 2 (www.qi-energy. formed in the liver. blood circulation and metabolism are critical elements of Galenic physiological theory. so differs also the nature of the corresponding matter. in Latin spiritus naturalis). Galen II.info/qi-synonyms-P. [10] what is called reason [nous]). His thoughts on pneuma can be described as biological applications of Aristotle’s ideas about the quintessence. in Latin spiritus vitalis). and a spirit of the psyche (pneuma psychikon. being analogous to the element of the stars. but whatever other residuum of the animal nature there may be.c. setting the body in motion. cf. I mean what is called vital heat. but as one [30] soul differs from another in honour and dishonour. which was converted into blood in the liver. Not only is this true of the heat that works through the semen. According to Galenos.htm [10/30/09]) 36 . Let us return to the material of the semen. lungs and other organs. Galen also believed that the life process was sustained by food. Pneuma as vital spirit and its relation to the fifth element called aither: On pneuma in general. this also has still a vital principle in [5] it. Therefore we ought not to expect it always to come out again from the female or to form any part of the embryo that has taken shape from it. He believed the pneuma to be a fine. the heat of the sun and that of animals does generate them. This material of the semen dissolves and evaporates because it has a liquid and watery nature. Of this principle there are two kinds. Galen came to the conclusion that the various bodily functions were induced by the Pneuma or universal spirit. Philosophy:1 On the basis of his philosophical studies. in and with which comes away from the male the spiritus conveying the principle of soul. Qi synonyms:2 But pneuma was central in the theories of the Greek physician Galen (Klaudios Galenos.geocities. which were the basics of medicine all the way to the 17 th century. and Galen was the first person to suggest a relationship between food. originating in the heart and flowing through the arteries. For Aristotle. which traveled through the heart and the blood. or natural spirit. pneuma entered through the lungs. and was in the liver transformed to natural spirit ( pneuma physikon. Blood from the liver nourished the heart. including the brain. Qi-energy Info. II. which entered the blood. whereas fire generates [737a ] no animal and we do not find any living thing forming in either solids or liquids under the influence of fire. and the natural principle in the spiritus [pneuma]. Claudius Galenus.com/IslamPencereleri/galen_2. All have in their semen that which causes it to be productive. for the senses to function.htm [10/25/09]) (http://www. 131-201 CE). spirit-like material which drifted through the universe and which controlled and organized physical bodies. 3 (736b 29—737b 6) (tr. Thus. in Latin spiritus animalis). However. Hence. This is not fire nor any such force. the one is not connected with matter. and the spiritus naturalis. Cf. From such considerations it is clear that the heat in animals neither is fire nor derives its origin from fire. Waste materials were also thought to be removed by the blood. On the Generation of Animals.

A. the liquid is separated off from it. which holds together the parts of animals. to which he imparts “movement. 1 with which Soul is “associated”. II. For the female is. so. and as the earthy parts solidify membranes form all round it. only not pure. 1963). in what sense the embryo and the semen have soul. Some of these are called membranes and others choria. for just as the young of mutilated parents are sometimes born mutilated and sometimes not. and it is this pneuma which Soul charges with a specific “movement” and uses as its “instrument” in generation just as it does in locomotion. and the relation of the semen to the catamenia is the same. rprt. the egg so forming has in it the parts of both sexes potentially.” the “element of the stars”). 4 (739b 20-32) (tr. I say. [30] whenever a wind-egg is produced by any animal. On the Generation of Animals. 32: It may be noted here that the physical substance concerned throughout the theory of generation is pneuma [= spiritus] (a substance “analogous to aither. as it were. Aristotle. Aristotle. this quality. Now semen is a secretion and is moved with the same movement as that in virtue [20] of which the body increases (this increase being due to subdivision of the nutriment in its last stage). like the solid scum which forms on boiled foods when cooling.” in order to create his works of art. for these differ in being more or less glutinous and generally in excess and deficiency. being actual sinew in some and its analogue in others. blood-vessels. the more solid part comes together. which brings into one mass and fixes the similar material. Arthur Platt): [20] When the material secreted by the female in the uterus has been fixed by the semen of the male (this acts in the same way as rennet acts upon milk. the latter because the foetus must not be in a liquid but be separated [30] from it. Generation of Animals (London. From the Introduction. the difference being one of more or less. and in what sense they have not. a mutilated [or ‘defective’] male. [35] Liquid but corporeal substances become surrounded by some kind of covering on heating. milk and the [25] catamenia being of the same nature)—when. and the like. Peck. It has been settled. but has not the principle in question. (emphasis added) Cf. is acquired by the sinewy substance. For this reason. so that it does not develop into a living creature.” the “fifth element. too. When such a principle has been imparted to the secretion of the female it becomes an embryo. they have it potentially but not actually. [5] membranes. with the heavenly bodies: there must be something like pneuma which the mover of the heavens makes use of to move other things. and as an artist uses his instruments. the principle of soul. so also the young born of a female are sometimes female and sometimes male instead. just as there is a material pneuma which the soul as form uses to produce motion in things here below. as the embryo develops and increases in size. and the catamenia are semen. For the female’s contribution also is a secretion. and has all the parts in it potentially though none of them actually. L. All bodies are held together by the [737b] glutinous. Cf. and they exist in ovipara and vivipara alike. 37 . for this is introduced by the semen of the male. 1 It being the vital heat in the pneuma which makes it to be the element analogous to that of the stars. 1942. Sec.fig-juice which curdles milk. To the same class belong also skin. this is both a necessary result and for a final cause. it has in it potentially even those parts [25] which differentiate the female from the male. for rennet is a kind of milk containing vital heat. As we shall see. the former because the surface of a mass must solidify on heating as well as on cooling. When it has entered the uterus it puts into form the corresponding secretion of the female and moves it with the same movement wherewith it is moved itself. then. for this too changes without becoming any part of the curdling masses. for there is only one thing they have not in them.

. And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body. Thomas Aquinas. by nourishment and growth. ad 9. by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (115.” Moreover. which is the soul.c. As to the active power which was in the semen. <…> Reply to Objection 3. but a certain movement towards that form. it ceases to exist. n. then it already operates in act. but as to the first act. this principle either remains after the animal is begotten. as it were. cf. which is impossible. ibid. ad 3-4 (tr. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male. 1 In contrast. the seed of the male possesses a prior grade of potency (cf. moreover. as is attested by its whiteness. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen. not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul. until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul. indeed. for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen. also de Pot. also St. then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body.. has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated. Summa Theol. This active force which is in the semen. a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul. the active force is in the semen of the male. s. for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body. 1. as also by the nutritive power. as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. In which spirit. and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this. 9. elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul’s power. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ. the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. as the Philosopher says (De Gener. it has been said that “man and the sun generate man.Cf. 3-4. Further. 89. q. thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe. Animal. this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation. but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy.. but the foetal matter is provided by the female. comm. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain. Thomas. 3. De An. as stated ( De Anima ii. q. 1. there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies. which cannot be. this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction.. 38 . because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Now it cannot remain. while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body. for thus. when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. 412b 27—413a 3).. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 3. generated by coition. 4). 118. St. Reply to Objection 4. for it has been proved above (76. and which is derived from the soul of the generator. 1 But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment. is. save virtually. ad loc. 3. and again this is impossible. not as to the second act. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal. c. the generator and generated would be identical. as the Philosopher says. by the power of the active principle in the semen. 3. if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul. And after the sensitive soul. maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom. 3). ad 2). Ia. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle. the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning. Objection 4. In perfect animals. or it does not remain. obj. ii. Further. II. because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent. SCG II. In this matter. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen. moreover. art. art.

and this power Avicenna and the Commentator in Book 7 of the Metaphysics call the formative virtue: which virtue. and food. that indistinct potency exists in it just as the form of the whole which does not exist in the part except in potency. on account of which it is said in On the Soul II. as is said in On the Generation of Animals I. Collins English Dictionary. Now the seed when it has been separated is not yet similar to the whole in act. and many in potency. it [namely. St. In II Sent. For the other powers in their operations use determinate organs: but the intellect uses none. Now to this spirit the formative virtue is conjoined in the manner of a mover rather than in the manner of a form. art. the female. at the end of the process. insofar as it undergoes change and is altered. that the seed lives in potency and not in act. whence. dist.v. “annulose: adj. c. And so since the seed is the final residue of food at its closest approximation to its final conversion. 2 Cf. And therefore after its division the soul does not remain in act but in potency. s.” Since the part possesses the same species as the whole from which it was severed. and similar animals) having a body formed of a series of rings. and in On the Soul.): …But the position of Aristotle is much more reasonable. and so the principle of such a composite cannot be a form separated from matter. but is in proximate potency. there is one soul in act. for. seeing that nothing begins either to come to be or to be generated except in accordance with the manner in which it has being: 1 and so we concede the sensible and vegetative soul to be transmitted. there is in it a potency to the whole and not any part in act.. the generator must also be such. with respect to the mode of operating is a mean between the intellect and the other powers of the soul. crustaceans. just as we also observe in annulose animals. Now the subject and organ of this power is the vital spirit enclosed in the seed. if the result of generation is a composite of matter and form. Conversely. segmented.3 1 That is to say. 3 On this comparison see our remarks below. when it is turned into a determinate part in act such as flesh and bone. even if in some way it is its form. Thomas Aquinas. they differ in this. the food that is to be turned into the substance of the body] must. and so a perfect soul remains in the part just as existed in the whole. q. Now this potency is not passive in the seed of the male in the way in which we say that wood and stones are in potency to a house (for in this way there is a power in the menstruum of the woman) but it is an active potency. 2 in which. since every univocal and proximate agent introduces into its patient its species. Whence the Commentator in Book 7 of the Metaphysics says that that virtue is included in the seed in some way just as the movers are united to the orbs. (of earthworms. albeit virtualiter. But this uses something bodily in its operation which does not yet have a determinate species. (tr. and this is the cause of its whiteness. Therefore before the final assimilation. its passive one. B.M. whence in order for a spirit of this sort to be contained in the seed it is foamy. the virtue of the species exists in it indeterminately to this or that [species] with respect to the proper virtue of a determinate part.Cf. 2. Now the manner of its transmission is like this. it must possess that form in act right from the start. seeing that by reason of the slight differentiation into organs in those animals the part is practically identical to the whole. turns into nourishment for the body (the reason being that it nourishes insofar as it is in potency to flesh.A.text 39. But before it is resolved by the act of the generative virtue in separation from the rest of its kind. receive the species and virtue of nourishment. 3. when it is divided an animate part is produced having a distinct soul. in fact. Whence the Philosopher in Book 17 of On Animals compares it to art. Still. according to the Philosopher. the seeds of both the male and the female are in proximate potency to such a form: the male containing its active principle. it is produced in act having such a potency and form. just as we say the form in the mind of the artisan is in potency to a house. text 45). 18. 39 . But when it is separated.

a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power. being that which is finally distributed to the parts of the body. Ia. Freddoso): Reply to objection 2: Even though a celestial body is. For in a certain way a rational soul takes its knowledge of truth from the sensory powers. and that they are analogous in females to the semen in males.For the basis of the foregoing doctrine in Aristotle. for that which goes to all the parts of the [15] body resembles that which is left over. 19 (726b 1—727a 3): We have previously stated that the final nutriment is the blood in the sanguinea and the analogous fluid in the other animals. and (2) that being of such a nature it should be a mass of sanguineous liquid. Bk. c. 1. a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. it follows that it will be either (1) blood or that which is analogous to blood. q. cf. for the loss of the pure and healthy blood is an exhausting thing. therefore it is plain that semen will be a secretion of the nutriment when reduced to blood. Second. But since it is necessary (1) that the weaker animal also should have a secretion greater in quantity and less concocted. nonetheless. it is impossible for any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements—and this because of the celestial body’s impassibility. So that the semen which is to form the hand or the face or the whole animal is already the hand or face or whole animal undifferentiated. then. and since it has already been stated that such is the character of the female—putting all these considerations together we see that the [727a] sanguineous matter discharged by the female is also a secretion. that each part of the body is made. 91. Arthur Platt). Since the semen is also a secretion of the nutriment. cf. Summa Theol. 67. this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. q. [30] On this subject. On the relation of the celestial element to the sublunar. for the hand also or any other bodily part is not hand or other part in a true sense if it be without soul or some other power. 40 . I. their claim that light is a body is false (cf. It is plain. art. Hence. but is only called by the same name as the living hand.. or whether it has in it some faculty and efficient cause thereof. 76. absolutely speaking. and since the semen if properly concocted is quite of a different character from the blood when it is separated from it. a. St. whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body. And such is the discharge of the so-called catamenia. ad 2 (tr. On the Generation of Animals (tr. and what each of them is actually such is the semen potentially. I mention these alternatives here because we have not yet made it clear from the distinctions drawn hitherto whether it is the [20] matter of the semen that is the cause of generation. and (3) since that which Nature endows with a smaller portion of heat is weaker. q. when concocted and somehow divided up. Alfred J. 2). more noble than an earthly body. so much may be laid down. that the catamenia are a secretion. First of all. but if not properly concocted has been known in some cases to issue in a bloody condition if one forces oneself too [10] often to coition. for this reason also it is natural that the offspring should resemble the parents. But since [5] it is from the blood. And this is the reason why it has so great power. because a celestial body cannot be acted upon (cum sit impassibile). Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence ( aliquid de quinta essentia) enters materially into the composition of the human body. 7). and that in its final stage. then. Thomas Aquinas. or (2) something formed from this. either in virtue of its own mass or because it has a certain power in itself. a.

having supposed according to the Faith that the heaven is an inanimate body. which requires a fixed point as its center. Therefore it seems that it is educed in being not by the activity of nature. and nothing acts beyond its species.): praeterea. On this matter.M. 41 . every activity of a lower nature is reduced to a heavenly virtue precisely as to the virtue of the first altering thing. In II Sent. seeing that an effect cannot be more powerful than its agent cause. would not also the heavens? That is to say. too. Summa Theol. Thomas Aquinas. omnis operatio naturae inferioris reducitur in virtutem caelestem. dist.. Ia. But inasmuch as the one bears “the principle of soul”. Aristotle and St. since the heavenly body is not alive. 2. sicut in virtutem primi alterantis. corresponding to the material principle the soul uses as an instrument must there not likewise be such a principle employed by the mover of the celestial orb? In other words. This is not fire nor any such force. et nihil agat ultra suam speciem. 3. B. cum corpus caeleste inanimatum sit. (tr. St. 737b 33-34). But if the former requires vital spirit in order to produce motion. quod supposito secundum fidem nostram quod caelum sit corpus inanimatum. according to Genesis 1:20: “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life. ergo videtur quod non per operationem naturae. <…> ad tertium dicendum. The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated. q.A. But the sensible soul cannot be educed by the virtue of the heaven. quia effectus non potest esse potior causa agente. sed per virtutem caeli anima sensibilis educi non potest. With respect to the comparison of the natural motion of the heart to that of the heavens. sed per creationem in esse educatur. would the other: cf. the expansion and contraction of the heart is due to that of the pneuma which he held to be diffused throughout the body. St. but by creation. the pneuma being its immediate subject. being analogous to the element of the stars” (GA II.” Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power. sc. (tr. <…> To the third it must be said that. nihilominus tamen ponimus quod motus ejus sit ab aliqua substantia spirituali sicut motore: Further. ad 2. so. it is now clear that the vital heat belonging to the seed stands to it just as the corresponding quality in the stars—which is their vital heat— stands to the aither. English Dominican Fathers): On the contrary. as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements—for instance by putrefaction. obj. and the natural principle in the spiritus [pneuma]. while the element aither stands to it as its ‘principle’. 18. Thomas explain the way in which the heart moves as being comparable to the motion of a wheel.But to return to our immediate object. the fifth element. the counterpart of which in the heavens lies in the two poles of the celestial sphere. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power. 2. Now as we have seen. 3. 118. as Aristotle shows. cf. 1. which moves with an everlasting circular motion and so presupposes as its instrument a vital spirit pervading the cosmos as such. Thomas Aquinas. we nevertheless hold that its motion comes from some spiritual substance as mover. q. the virtus formativa of Thomas. But “the element of the stars” whose analogue here below is the principle of pneuma is nothing other than aither. corresponding to the sublunary pneuma there must be a celestial ‘spirit’ with respect to which the former is said to be the likeness: “I mean what is called vital heat.. art. art. but it is the spiritus included in the semen and the foam-like.

. is the movement imparted to the seed by the generator whereby his form comes to exist in it virtualiter in the manner of an instrument. just as the seed of the male consists in pneuma possessing vital heat as founded on the analogue of the element of the stars. 10 (703a 12-14). are the counterparts to such a pivot-point? But. 42 . the aither. but also a certain spiritual virtue on the part of the mover. is the cause of material life. must possess a vital heat in the form of pneuma. too. Canto XXXIII. the heavenly body. itself founded on the element in which it consists. Applying these principles to the movement of the heavens. XII. as we have seen. whereas a spiritual virtue. 7 (1072a 19-1073a 12). qualis est per animam sensibilem et vegetabilem. III. “this spirit appears to stand to the soul-centre or original in a relation analogous to that between the point in a joint which moves being moved and the unmoved” (De motu. we maintain that. inasmuch as it exists in it by the intensity and power of the mover. and so must be something like the effervescence observed in an active substance (about which see the following note). as is elsewhere explained. for which reason must we not also suppose there to be a cosmic pneuma standing in the same relation to the axis of the celestial sphere the poles of which. 10. oportet quod in motu non tantum relinquatur virtus corporalis ex parte mobilis. animal. And since motion is the act of the mover as well as the mobile. Now as Aristotle explains in the case of animal motion.et cum motus sit actus motoris et mobilis. And because the mover is a thing living with the noblest life. ideo non est inconveniens. In the foregoing passage St. and therefore stands to it just as the idea in the mind of an artisan stands to the instrument he employs in producing his work. per modum quo virtus agentis principalis est in instrumento. De An.1 such a virtue would move by being moved by the love that moves the sun and the other stars. in the way in which the virtue of the principal agent exists in the instrument. Paradiso. it must be the case that there re-main in the motion not only a bodily virtue on the part of the mobile. for the correlative in animal motion. In the case of reproduction. sed etiam virtus quaedam spiritualis ex parte motoris: et quia motor est vivens nobilissima vita. Metaph. ch.2 § 1 2 Cf. so. cf. si motus caelestis. or fifth element. inquantum est in eo intensio et virtus motoris. at the end. of the sort which comes by the sensitive and vegetative souls. as he also explains. understood as “the first altering thing”. it is not unfitting if the motion of the heavenly body. Thomas distinguishes a bodily virtue from a spiritual one. a bodily virtue can only be the pneuma enclosed in the seed of the male by reason of which it is foamy and white. est causa vitae materialis.

the following definition: “Effervescence. cf.To improve our insight into Aristotle’s ideas in pneuma we should consider here not only the word. 128-129: . Ch. The bubbling of a solution due to the escape of gas. and in water pneuma is present. so that in a way all things are full of soul..The continued existence of bubbles throughout the liquid—its pneumatization—thus is a phenomenon which is characteristic of milk and indeed is due to some very specific chemical features. between sexual and ‘spontaneous’ generation in Aristotle’s physiology: from a physiological point of view.B. cf. the only difference relates to the source of the vital heat.”1 For evidence of the Philosopher’s understanding of this property. like milk. and my suggestion is that he took it as a model of how the pneuma can durably remain suffused in the blood: milk is the paradigmatic instance lurking behind the notion of a pneumatized fluid as a fluid in which an aeriform substance continuously inheres without separating off and rising to its natural place. he had in mind the singular characteristic features of the process in which fresh milk is heated and eventually boiled... These tiny bubbles do not coalesce to form large ones and they do not immediately rise to the surface. is potentially—present. Thus. as in a carbonated drink. (GA 3. it contains bubbles through and through—it remains thoroughly “pneumatized” in the precise sense of the term.) Aristotle here says in so many words that (a) in all moisture pneuma is—and this means.35 Similarly. rather. . 43 . 762a19 ff.N. but the world too.. as long as milk is maintained warm. 11. then. sec. 736a24). There is no essential difference.36 Our interpretation of Aristotle’s view of how connate pneuma is produced and maintained can be confirmed by considering the four following accounts in which pneuma is explicitly or implicitly involved: (1) The most impressive one is Aristotle’s account of ‘spontaneous’ generation: ‘Animals and plants are formed in earth and in the water because in earth water is present. generative. That this is how Aristotle pictured the pneumatization seems to be confirmed by his description of male semen. or by coming out of solution after having been under pressure.34 Now Aristotle considers milk one of the fluids produced in the body through the concoction of the blood. so that (b) upon heating by the sun’s generative37 heat (c) pneuma is formed (just as in the living body). .. Gad Freudenthal. The action of heat on milk [121-122] almost from the outset (above 30 o C) causes the formation of minute bubbles throughout the liquid. as in a fermenting liquid. which (d) carries vital. III. 11. and in all pneuma soul-heat is present.2. pp. Form and Soul (Oxford. a ‘frothy bubble’ is formed ( GA 3.In 36 [footnote omitted] 1 The American Heritage® Science Dictionary Copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Company.. which. 121-124. heat. 1995). 2. Aristotle’s Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma. when pneuma 34 35 [footnote omitted] [footnote omitted] [122-123] is produced in water by the action of the heat of the sun. where they would vanish. a procedure we may safely assume he had occasion to observe. is blood that has undergone further concoction: Aristotle says that the semen contains pneuma in the form of tiny bubbles (GA 2. they persist in the liquid and rise only very slowly. The gas may form by a chemical reaction. I suggest that when Aristotle referred to the formation of pneuma within the blood through the action of vital heat. On the aforementioned quality of the pneuma. 2)—manifestly the pneuma of the semen does not separate off the fluid.

arg. arg. 2. 3.).B. And likewise habits are difficult to change. 4. Aristotle calls ‘exhalation’. 2.. 6 743a33 f. 2. but beyond its nature. For the form and properties of generators.g. as connate pneuma results from blood within the body (except that the vapour. 4. N. unlike the connate pneuma. [123-124] ‘spontaneous’ generation that initial pneuma is produced by the action of the heat of the sun. n. wood is heated by fire. 4.g. In the present context we are interested in the first only. 346b29ff.B. but not forever. ibid. but dispositions and passions (properties).) and the earth. and that heat is not proper to the wood. then the thing in motion must in the beginning of the motion undergo the impressions of the agent imperfectly. Meteorology I. in the end. E. I. [footnote omitted] Note Freudenthal’s description of pneuma as “aeriform substance”. GA 3.A. and Meteorology.M. n.50 Physically speaking. [intervening text omitted. Aristotle says. also called ‘vapour’ ( atmis. 9. is of a fluid nature. 1. Aristotle. 380b23 on the ripening of fruit] On [128-129] what grounds. 359b34. because they are made natural to them. receiving what the agent gives it as something foreign to it [matter is reluctant. we must turn to his theory of exhalations. Meteorology I. then. And Ch.). etc. and the more so the hotter (and purer) it is. like the latter. but in the end of the motion the things given to it by the agent become proper to it. 9. the connate pneuma can indeed be held to rise by virtue of its heat. On the nature of the transformation such as is involved in concoction. can warmer (and purer) pneuma be assumed to travel higher than less warm pneuma? For Aristotle’s answer. separates off).37 GA 3. 54. but then takes on things as its own]. respectively (e. either of bodies or of animals. on the scale of the entire world. as is well known.. Summa Contra Gentiles III. 3 (tr. because they are turned into the nature. And note as well the comparison of the aither with semen suggests that the former. 341b5ff. Cf. Also 2. the connate pneuma is somewhat analogous to what. Now the idea that the exhalations produced by the sun rise is self-evident: it is part of their definition. the heat becomes proper and connatural to it.) 51 The vapour results from the action of heat on water. 346b33. 354b31. on yeast making dough rise. The ‘exhalation from water’. 755a17 ff. ff. 737a3. 762a14. 152. 4. 11. but in the end. Meteor. is ‘most naturally moist and warm’ ( Meteorology I. 51 52 . but cf. when the wood is ignited. the other according to the primary qualities (B. 2. then. because they are in them as on the way to nature. 3. 44 . remain in the things generated after the generation. 3. 340b2f f. 6: The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect if the action of the agent is ceased. raised by the sun from water (the sea. cf.)] a gap which forbade one to say that something rises because it is hot. 52 On the basis of the theory of exhalations.. remain sometime after the action of the agent. postulates the existence of a moist and a dry exhalation. cf. whose rationale was precisely to bridge the gap between the two competing construals of the elements [one being according to their proper places. unless the impression is turned into the nature of the effect. then. Michael Augros): Whenever something is moved by an agent to something which is the property of that agent.

d. Supplement: On natural definitions: How they are dialectical: Cf. Charles De Koninck, Natural Science as Philosophy (repr.; Québec: Laval University, 1959), p. 1:
We are often told of a distinction between philosophical psychology and experimental psychology. This is a distinction that I do not understand. Take the beginning of the De Anima, where Aristotle shows that even here we must provide natural definitions as distinguished from the logical or dialectical. His example is that of ‘anger’. It is true that anger is ‘a desire for vengeance’. But this definition is purely formal, somewhat like the definitions of mathematics, i.e. ‘per species’. Now, in mathematics, formal definitions are sufficient to the subject, since the subject is abstract; anger, however, is also something physical, as may be seen in the behavior of any person in a rage. If we are to form a natural definition of what anger is, we will have to add something to that ‘desire for vengeance’, such as ‘attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’. A psychology which would confine itself to formal definitions would be no more than dialectical. (Notice, however, that this natural definition of anger is itself only dialectical, but dialectical in a different sense. For propositions—and a definition is virtually a proposition—may be called dialectical for two different reasons: either because the composition or division of the known terms which it comprises is no more than probable; or because one or both of the terms themselves are insufficient, which is the case of purely formal definitions of natural things. We have to do with something less than dialectical when the terms are themselves no more than likely constructs, even though they have some basis in experience. Such was the case of Aristotle’s ‘incorruptible’ heavenly bodies, and of Dalton’s ‘atoms’.) In the definition of anger as ‘a desire for vengeance attended by an effervescence of the blood about the heart’, the former part is certain, though dialectical; the latter part, taken by itself, is natural, yet dialectical qua insufficient even as a natural definition. Natural, because it refers to something sensible; dialectical because no more than provisional.

Cf. Charles De Koninck, The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science:
We must consider still another difficulty, one which is more obvious in our time, and that seems to justify the distinction between philosophy of nature and natural science. The ancients did not respect the prodigiously fruitful role of fictions—“logical fictions”, as Bertrand Russell calls them. Nor did Galileo or Newton, for the matter of that; a fact ironically brought out by Newton’s famous hypotheses non fingo. (Newton actually contrived most fruitful fictions, though he failed to realize that they were fictions.) The contemporary mathematical physicist knows that he can probe into the world of nature only by means of mental constructions suggested in part by experience, in part by mathematics. They are fictions in the strict sense of this term, whose power we must not underrate. The atom, for instance, is largely a logical fiction. If you have any doubts, look at what has happened to atoms since Dalton’s days. (I say “largely”, for in physics the mental constructs must have some foundation in experience and experiment, else they could hardly lead to further knowledge of nature)…. Now, all this faces us no doubt with a deep enough cleavage between diverse modes of knowing the things in nature. But does this cleavage restrict natural philosophy to our initial gropings under investigation? What we are agreeing to call philosophy of nature is experimental too, though not quite after the manner of mathematical physics nor even of advanced biology. I pointed out long ago that in the study of nature we must distinguish between strictly scientific knowledge (in Aristotle’s sense) and that which is called dialectical, as providing no more than an opinion. Now, opinions are still enunciated in words, and are in fact true or false if it be speculative knowledge that we mean to express.

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Notice, however, that an opinion is not a fiction in the strict sense of this term. It is, at bottom an inquisitive proposition. The opinion that “the world is eternal” still leaves open the question whether the world really is or has to be eternal. We can unfold what we mean by “world” and by “eternal”, but can we in truth say the latter of the former? The notions of “world” and “eternal”, though vague, have a relatively stable meaning. What we are questioning is not their meaning, of course, but their connection in a proposition. Is such a proposition necessary? Is the eternity of the world a fact? But in mathematical physics, when words are used to describe, not how things are in fact, but merely how a certain symbolic construction has been laid down, e.g., that of the atom, we must be aware that, unlike the terms used in a statement about nature, the symbols, the construction, and the names we choose to employ for the purpose of communication do not have a stable meaning. The only stable meaning the word “atom” ever had was that of “indivisible”. In other words, we are now entitled to question not merely the connection of the terms, but the very terms themselves. At any rate, these are utterly provisional, whereas what “world” or “eternal” stand for are not.

§

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e. On the principle of the motion of the heavens: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II: Creation. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), cap. 70, nn. 1-7:
Chapter 70 THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE THE INTELLECT MUST BE SAID TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM [1] Now, since Averroes seeks to confirm his doctrine especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle, it remains for us to show that in the Philosopher’s judgment we must say that the intellect, as to its substance, is united to the body as its form. [2] For Aristotle proves in the Physics [VIII, 5] that in movers and things moved it is impossible to proceed to infinity. Hence, he concludes to the necessity of a first moved thing, which either is moved by an immobile mover or moves itself. And of these two he takes the second, namely, that the first movable being moves itself; for what is through itself is always prior to that which is through another. Then he shows that a self-mover necessarily is divided into two parts, part moving and part moved; whence it follows that the first selfmover must consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved. Now, every thing of this kind is animate. The first movable being, namely, the heaven, is therefore animate in Aristotle’s opinion. So it is expressly stated in De caelo [II, 2] that the heaven is animate, and on this account we must attribute to its differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself. Let us, then, ask with what kind of soul Aristotle thinks the heaven to be animated. [3] In Metaphysics XI [7], Aristotle proves that in the heaven’s movement two factors are to be considered: something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now, that which moves without being moved moves as an object of desire; nor is there any doubt that it moves as a thing desirable by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as an object of concupiscent desire, which is a sense desire, but of intellectual desire; and he therefore says that the first unmoved mover is an object of desire and understanding. Accordingly, that which is moved by this mover, namely, the heaven, desires and understands in a nobler fashion than we, as he subsequently proves. In Aristotle’s view, then, the heaven is composed of an intellectual soul and a body. He indicates this when he says in De anima II [3] that “in certain things there is intellect and the power of understanding, for example, in men, and in other things like man or superior to him,” namely, the heaven. [4] Now the heaven certainly does not possess a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle; otherwise, it would have diverse organs, and this is inconsistent with the heaven’s simplicity. By way of indicating this fact, Aristotle goes on to say that “among corruptible things, those that possess intellect have all the other powers,” thus giving us to understand that some incorruptible things, namely, the heavenly bodies, have intellect without the other powers of the soul. [5] It will therefore be impossible to say that the intellect makes contact with the heavenly bodies by the instrumentality of phantasms. On the contrary, it will have to be said that the intellect, by its substance, is united to the heavenly body as its form. [6] Now, the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies, and by, its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven, which is completely devoid of contrariety; so that in

47

For the nobler a body is. Much more. and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired ( Metaph. the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings. English Dominican Fathers): Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. although to some they appear to be luminous bodies devoid of sense or intelligence. It was the belief of Origen ( Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive.” I answer that. Now. ii). Objection 3: Further. the more nobly it should be adorned. Philosophers have differed on this question. with fish. that of the angels. text. Thomas Aquinas. as pertaining to its adornment. as being the first principle of life. 48 . and neither a god nor even a living being. 41). for they have neither life nor sense. seemingly. have the heavenly bodies a living soul. Ia. [7] As for the heaven being animate. text. moon.” 1 See the excerpt from the Prima Pars below.. 34. the nobler must be its form. and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life. whether the sun. 3 (tr. a cause is nobler than its effect. and the beasts of the field. Objection 2: Further. 36). the first of movables is the heaven. and must therefore have nobler forms. 27). and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural ( De Coel. xii. “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things.” 1 (emphasis added) Cf.” On the other hand. as is shown in the same book (text. is adorned with living beings. i. 7. surveying all places round about. but as its form. art. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. Anaxagoras. therefore. to my mind. Augustine says in the Enchiridion: “Nor is it certain. as Augustine mentions (De Civ. we have spoken of this not as though asserting its accordance with the teaching of the faith. and stars are a cause of life. because. for instance. to which the whole question is entirely irrelevant. text. Dei xviii. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. St. the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life.” The lights of heaven. namely. Hence. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul. Therefore the lights of heaven. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension. what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move themselves. Objection 4: Further. Objection 5: Further. 1:6). birds. “was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone. Therefore. therefore. viii. as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. moon. moon. But a body less noble than the heaven. are living beings. 70. Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings. of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself. “The spirit goeth forward. But the sun. On the contrary. Summa Theol. and all the stars belong to the same community. which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Damascene says (De Fide Orth.Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms. should be living beings also. q. the nobler a body is.8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. But the sun. as is proved in Phys.

viii. only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power. Yet for some of these operations. Wherefore Aristotle ( Phys. however. though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings. this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. that these bodies have life. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. There are. like bodies of specific gravity. cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. The intellect. that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving. This. 42. and that if they are called so. is not a difference of things but of words. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt. as a mover is united to that which he moves. and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements. where such diversity of opinion exists. it can only be equivocally. operations of the soul. and generation. It follows. however. in order to move the heavenly body. as a contact of a moving power with the object moved. through which the nutritive soul operates. our body is a necessary instrument. though the body ministers. to their production. on the part of one only. growth. Enchiridion lviii). text. which perceives elemental qualities. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance. but by contact of power. the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. From what has been said. it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals. he says. 18. goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. since all the senses depend on the sense of touch. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body. for the form does not exist for the matter. although capable of existing apart from it. and act as their moving power. as we have seen. iii. the operations of the sensitive soul. and is in proportion thereto. which are not exercised through the medium of the body. for example. but the matter for the form. and thus far is dependent on the body. then. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. do not need a body as their instrument. ad lit. the moving and the moved. vi in Hexaem. except to supply phantasms through the senses. 49 . It remains.43). without committing himself to either theory. for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception. as it were. it rests. can be exercised by the heavenly bodies. and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings. lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained. ii. as sensation and nutrition. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm. this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them. and those who deny. Moreover. Accordingly. In examining the truth of this question. But the operations of the intellect. if one is a body and the other not. which is to a certain extent its end. which does not act through the body. possible that the functions of nutrition. makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses. It is not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way. iii.But Basil (Hom. for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body. then. 4). after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts. then. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. need be united to the latter as its form. whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation. and not. not that the soul. their souls must be akin to the angelic nature ( Gen. by nature.

since their form perfects their matter entirely. 1964). Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens . Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved. P. First he solves the first question. not on account of their active principle. Book I. the Philosopher here starts to solve them. as the matter. But if the problem at hand is to be settled. and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment. for they are moved by a living substance. not by the union of the mover. is solved. trans. Having proposed the two doubts. He says therefore first [324] that the reason why the first question is difficult is that we investigate the heavenly bodies as though they were merely an orderly system of bodies without being animated. it is of the nature of an instrument. As to the first he does two things: First he shows what ought to be assumed in order to make the first question easier to resolve. Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind. then. but not in a particular respect. Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved. the second one (L. Secondly. but by contact with the motive power. For the diversity and number of the motions is to be taken more in terms of a relation to the final good. Conway and F. The number shown to agree with modern astronomers. and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle. then. If this is assumed. 458. As a consequence. from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power. Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely. 458: Lecture 18: The first difficulty. 19). which act for an end as being masters of their act. as we have said. he gives the solution. So far. Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural. just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. lect. whereas a soul does not do this. concerning the number of motions of the stars. 18. at 459. which is 50 . it seems to us that the order of their motions should be in accord with the order of numbers and according to the position of the bodies. viii. with the moved. which is not in potentiality to other forms. we must assume that they have not only some sort of life but also actions – this being proper to things with a rational soul. 27). R Larcher (Ohio. text. Thomas Aquinas. but on account of their passive principle. St. Cf. which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent. and do not act by the sole impulse of nature as do all irrational things. it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms. that is to say. n. nothing is seen to be occurring unreasonably if the number of their motions does not proceed according to the position of the bodies.Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement. Secondly. as the form. While. the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic.

the principle in all things able to be done [i. Therefore. But the motion of the heavens is not of this sort. But something moved by itself cannot exist. This translation is for informational purposes only. every motion [caused] by a soul is accompanied by labor and suffering. 1 * This translation is based on the Latin text contained in Scriptum super Sententiis Petri Lombardi. But every such motion is the motion of an apprehensive power. Book I. (Norvelle’s note) 51 . because they do not have a composite body. we proceed as follows. Translation by Erik Norvelle. Parma. But the heavenly bodies cannot have a sensitive or vegetative soul. published under a Creative Commons 2. Therefore it is necessary that the motion of the heaven be from some apprehensive power. Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard.. unless it is that sort of thing of which one part is a mover. and another part the moved.0 Non-Commercial Share-Alike license. Book II. 1) It appears that the motion of the heavens is not from a soul or from an intelligence. St. voluntary actions]. as is clear from the comparison of the parts of the soul with the species of figures in On the Soul. For the motion of the heavens is a natural motion. 1) it is proven in Physics. Book II. the motion of the heavens is from some kind of apprehension. because it would not be able to be continuous and uniform. But there would be no way to solve this question if they were moved by the sole impulse of nature. Book II. as the Philosopher states in On the Heavens. and not from anything which moves by understanding. Distinction 14. an intellective soul is not connected to a body except by the sensitive and vegetative soul. that [the heavenly body] is moved by itself. But the heavenly body. But on the contrary.e. 2) Every natural motion is from a body existing outside of its own location. art. Therefore it appears that it cannot be moved by a soul. 3) Further. 1856. Erik Norvelle):1 Article 3: Whether the motion of the heavens is due to an intelligence Regarding the third issue. But this is impossible to posit in the heavens. which would be required in order that it be an instrument for a vegetative and sensitive soul. as well as other differences of position. as is plain from the words of the Philosopher in Ethics VII and Physics II. every body moved by a soul has a left and a right. 3 (tr. Cf. 2) Further. Therefore it appears that [the heavens] cannot be moved by an intellective soul. being completely uniform. But a natural motion is that whose principle is a form of a natural body. as is shown in the same place. Book VII. Therefore it is not moved by a soul. or by these as separated. does not have this kind of diversity of parts. 4) Further. as is stated in On the Heavens. and should not be cited for the purposes of academic publications without prior comparison with the Latin text. Thomas Aquinas. One should note in this regard that it makes no difference whether we suppose that the heavenly bodies are moved by intellectual substances united to them after the manner of a soul. Question 1. Therefore it appears that the motion of the heavens is from its natural form. as heavy and light bodies are.

according to these thinkers. For nature is not said only in regards to the form. i. The reason for this position was that an Intelligence. they assigned to every sphere two motors: one conjoined. the motion of the heavens is said to be natural. as Dionysius states. and is therefore not appropriate for immediately directing the renewals of the diverse motions of the heavens. a natural motion is to one place only. which they called the soul of the sphere. just as the Commentator says in the first book of his commentary on On the Heavens. all of which is also foreign to the heavenly body. and from this there is produced the substance of the sphere itself. Book VIII. But this position is partly heretical. but not immediately from God Himself: for this does not correspond to the order of divine wisdom. but also in regards to matter. the Intelligences are created immediately by the First Cause. are called higher Angels. as is proven in Physics. is the generator which gives form. and partly can be held in a Catholic manner. Thus also Avicenna says that [those beings] called Intelligences by the philosophers are what. it is nevertheless not the motor. For these same [thinkers] hold that things proceed in an ordered fashion from God. But we can sustain [their position] in this respect. it should be stated that. such as Cherubim and Seraphim. because it gives itself existence. and the accidental [motor] is that which removes that which blocks motion. But this appears not to be true. so also will be the motion of the celestial body. even though the natural form is the principle of motion. which have more particular forms. 1) In response to the first argument. and this they called the soul of the sphere. just as the motion of other simple bodies is from their corporal natures. as we said. And thus others say that it must be the case that the motion of the heavenly body is from another intelligent being endowed with will. and thus they demonstrated the number of intelligent movers on the basis of the number of these [moved and mobile things]. which they called an Intelligence. are motors. whereas the Souls of the spheres are said to be lesser. And thus Gregory [the Great] states that corporeal creatures are governed by spiritual creatures. because the spheres receive only motion from them. and these are called ministering Angels. but not existence. possesses universal forms. and thus labor and suffering would 52 .e. However. For some say that. and from [the Intelligences] the soul of the sphere proceeds. and thus it is probable that some created intellect is the proximate motor of the heavens.I respond by saying that concerning this issue there are multiple opinions. but this is totally inappropriate for the celestial body. which is God. But this our faith does not suffer. are proximate motors. For every motion is from some motor. whereas the inferior Angels. not because its active principle is some natural form. The essential motor. which have more universal forms. according to the Law. however. the effect of which comes to the last things through middle things. since it posits that only God is the creator of things. and another separated. as was stated above. as was stated before. for then that motion would be caused by a soul against the nature of the moved body. And thus we can say that the Angels. which move the spheres in a proximate fashion. like a cause proportioned to itself. But in the motion of simple bodies. in that the higher Angels. Therefore it can be said that the proximate motor is its form or soul. are separated and remote motors. and is of a body which exists outside of its natural place. not having a natural repugnance to this voluntary motion. or those things which are educed by the motor of the heavens. but not forms or souls. as there is in us. And further. Nevertheless it should be known that the philosophers posited diverse motors in diverse moved and mobile things. 2) Regarding the second argument: the Philosopher is speaking against those who posited the heavens to be of the [same] nature as the inferior bodies. but because the celestial body itself is of such a nature that it naturally is susceptible to such a motion [imparted] by some intellect. Hence it is necessary that there be a motor in which there are the particular forms which direct [the lesser things] in motion. and is perfected by natural rest.

and not merely with respect to us. he excludes certain objections. he explains which dimension determines “up” and “down” in the heaven. Thirdly. Secondly. its motor does not acquire cognition from things.” i. because the part which is now in the East will later be in the West.e. muscles and nerves.. and thus it does not need any vegetative form. also. at 317. Similarly. and thus it does not need a sensitive soul.be necessary present in causing motion. 4) Regarding the fourth argument: according to the Philosopher. and ‘below’ is the Northern pole. the heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible. and thus according to the philosophers the soul of the heavens and that of man are not said univocally. later becomes left. and its ‘left’ is the West. and ‘behind’ is the lower hemisphere. Exposition of Aristotle’s Treatise On the Heavens. he shows which part of the heaven is up. but in the heavenly body that part of the sphere which is now right. the differences of position befit the parts of the heaven 313. as in the case of non-living bodies which do not possess within themselves an active principle of motion but a passive one only. and ‘ahead’ is the upper hemisphere. Conway and F. there are found “such powers. After determining the question of the positional parts of the heaven according to the opinions of others. in us these parts are diversified by figure and power. (emphasis added) Cf. as is said in Physics VIII. but has a kind of active knowledge. Book I. as the Commentator himself states. trans. according to the Philosopher’s opinion. differences of position according to the respective virtues in the parts. in two regards. but this is not the case in the heavenly body. but this is not the case in the heavenly body. these parts. About the first he does two things: First he proves his proposition. and ‘above’ is the southern pole. Thomas Aquinas. But if we posit that that motion is from an intellect according to the condition of the body moved. With respect to the first he gives the following argument [236]: It has been previously determined that in things possessing a principle of motion. in us that determinate part which is right never becomes left. As to this he does three things: First he shows that such positional differences must be in the heaven. the celestial body can be assigned differences of position. nn. 53 . 3) Regarding the third argument: as the Commentator states in his book On the Substance of the Spheres. This occurs because the power which brings out motion in us is the act of the body to whom organs are affixed. and which is down. namely. P. i. St. But the heaven is animated and possesses a principle of motion. are assigned differently to the heavenly body and to our bodies. First. 313-315: Lecture 3: How. from whence the motion originates. lect. 314. 3. the Philosopher here discusses them according to his own opinion. Nevertheless. at 320. as are our bodies.e. 323. since it is spherical everywhere. in living bodies which possess a moving principle within themselves. Secondly. and thus its ‘right’ is said to be the East. R Larcher (Ohio. there will not then be violence nor labor. Secondly. 1964).

it seems better to say that the substance moving the heaven is separated from the body than to say that the heaven is animated. And according to this. Someone could object. and principally of the heart. But that this is false is clearly shown by the words of Aristotle in Metaphysics XII to the effect that the first mover. n. as some mentioned by Simplicius would claim. But in respect to the natural existence of the soul it is better for the soul to be in the body. that although it is more noble for a body to have a spiritual substance conjoined to it. as from a secondary and passive principle. For this reason Plato was led to say that it is for the good of the rational soul to be separated from the body at some time. for this will give greater nobility to the motion of the heaven. however. 315. The motion of the heart is therefore natural as following upon the soul. as was said above. if there be a spiritual substance whose power is determined to the motion of the heaven. This last consideration led Plato and Aristotle to posit an animated heaven. or by a separated spiritual substance. the motion of heavy and light things comes from that which generates them. Thomas Aquinas explains in On the Motion of the Heart (De Motu Cordis). as such a body is apt to be moved in such a way. it makes little difference whether the heaven is moved by a conjoined spiritual substance called its soul.A. that the soul in it is nothing other than the nature of such a body. just as Aristotle says in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. And perhaps in accordance with this understanding of the matter some have said that “the motion of the heart is caused by an [angelic] intelligence.” inasmuch as they held the soul to be from an intelligence. because through it the soul attains the perfect existence of its species. B. Consequently.M. inasmuch as it is the form of such a body. then for that substance it is nobler to be in such a body than to be separated. For they say that Aristotle called the heaven animate not because it had a rational soul but inasmuch as it had a kind of life implanted in its body in such a way. moves the heaven as an object of thought and desire moves something. inasmuch as it gives the form which is the principle of motion. Otherwise it would seem. But a separated substance whose power is not determined to this effect is absolutely nobler…. (emphasis added) That the soul is the noblest form in lower things St. But an answer to this could be that in one sense it is nobler for the human soul to exist outside the body than in the body.That the heaven is animated he supposes from something proved in Physics VIII. because the action is more perfect which is performed through a conjoined instrument than with a separated instrument. For every property and motion follows on some form according to its 54 . indeed. since the mover is nobler than the moved and since motion depends more on the former. Now in regard to this way of causing motion. 15 (tr. which it moves without labor. Now according to this. according to his opinion. namely. however. following Plato’s opinion. the heaven is according to its soul something that desires and understands. except that a greater dignity accrues to the heaven if it is considered moved by a conjoined spiritual substance. namely. however. namely. to the extent that it moves the body with labor against its nature. Consequently. inasmuch. 4. the motion of the heaven proceeds from its nature and from its soul: from its nature. that the soul of the heaven would be in a worse condition than the human soul. that all mobile beings must be reduced to one first self-mover that possesses its own active principle of motion and not merely its own passive principle. 256a1). yet for the spiritual substance it is nobler to be separated from a body. it follows that. which is completely immobile.): 15. from its soul. as from a primary and active principle of motion.

its circulation would seem to follow from Harvey’s principles. but as its form. Walter Pagel. II. It is this intimate hearth—the fundament of life and author of all—that is devoted to the whole body. it is through its virtue and heat that the blood is moved. thickens and as it were becomes effete—whence it returns to its principle. Translated. spirituous and so to speak nutritious blood: that by contrast the blood in these parts is cooled down. Thus the heart is the principle of life and the sun of the microcosm (just as proportionally the sun deserves to be called the heart of the world). with an Introduction and Notes by James F. And notice how his understanding of the circulation of the blood seems to demand the circular motion of the heart: for just as the cycle of evaporation and condensation follows the circular motion of the heavens. namely the heart. heating and quickening it. but rather considers the blood’s effect on the body as resembling that of rainfall on the earth. Harvey.[82-83] ing to Aristotle. the human body is the noblest of all lower bodies. the vapours lifted up are condensed. Conversely. In the foregoing passage Harvey has in mind Post. 1967). however. 82-83: In Harvey’s own words: “I began to think by myself whether it (the blood) has a certain motion. n. as it were the treasure of life. Book II: Creation. Now the noblest form in lower things is the soul. William Harvey’s Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background. 6: [6] Now. 12 (96a 5-8). f. Thomas does not consider the relation of the heart’s movement to that of the blood..”[31] 1 2 “Noblest”. 2 In the same way in all likelihood it should happen in the body through the motion of the blood that all parts are nourished. accord. in the same way in which. For the moist earth evaporates when heated by the sun. which afterwards I found to be true. so would the blood that of the heart. which most approaches to a likeness to the principle of the motion of the heavens. and that the blood is propelled from the heart through the arteries into the body and all parts … and back again through the veins … to the right auricle…. follows motion to the noblest place. William Harvey’s Circular Symbolism. 1975). The circular movement of the heart in relation to that of the heavens: Cf. That the body is the noblest of all lower bodies he explains in Summa Contra Gentiles. so that in Aristotle’s judgment the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms. so to speak. (Basel/New York. 70. fervent heat. pp. and condensed into rain come down again. just as upon the form of the noblest1 element. whereas St. vaporous. which is completely devoid of contrariety. his approach and recession.condition. perfected. 55 . it is made fluid again and pregnant with spirits and so to speak balsam is dispersed from here again. And so the motion following upon it is most similar to the motion of the heavens: for the motion of the heart in an animal is like the motion of the heavens in the world. that is. as it were in a circle. warmed and quickened by the warmer. which I give next. here. moisten the earth and in this manner generation takes place and similarly tempests and atmospheric phenomena develop through the circular motion of the sun. and by its equable temperament most closely resembles the heaven. cap. This may be called circular motion. air and rain emulate the circular motion of the bodies above. fire. the fountain and hearth of the body in order to recuperate its perfection. does not pursue this part of the analogy. through the natural. Anderson (Notre Dame. and all this depends upon the motion and beat of the heart. quickened and protected against corruption and clotting. which is above. for example. potent. An. that which has “the highest rank”. nourishing. more perfect.

When that happens a cloud is produced. the Philosopher now shows how one should take it in the case of things that come to be in reciprocal generation. p. VIII. and as a result of the rain the earth must be moistened. ed. provided that the terms of the demonstration are taken in such a way that middle and extremes follow one upon the other: because in the case of things that are generated in that way. Now we proved at the outset [96a] ( Pr. 102 (“coepi egomet mecum cogitare. Larcher. Hence it does not follow that the same numerical thing is prior and subsequent. p.S.”). WILLIS. Bouchier): We see with regards to matters in process that production is effected in a circular manner. Roterod. Cf. Now we observe in Nature— a2. p. Bk.46. Post. and when the third is present the first recurs again. De motu cap.. in things that come to be in a direct line. 56 . ed. Aristotle. An. An. He says therefore (95b38) that since we observe a certain pattern of generation in things that are generated circularly. Secondly. and water in turn from earth. to syllogize from what is subsequent. 1648. which is the cause. O.P. II. when that is present a third follows. Cf. In actual fact— a8. A CAUSE WHICH IS NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE EFFECT IS TAKEN AS MIDDLE IN A DEMONSTRATION HOW ONE DEMONSTRATES THROUGH CAUSE DIFFERENTLY. he elucidates it with examples (96a2). Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas translated by Fabian R. II.. 12 (95b 37—96a 8) (tr. namely. and then a return is made from the last to the first. as is explained in On Generation II. he proves his proposal.[31] HARVEY. [5] When the earth has been moistened vapours must arise. and when any one of the terms is present another follows. and it is then that conversion takes place. Some occurrences are universal— a12. tr. lect. From the cloud comes rain. In the case of matters of production the method may be regarded as follows. We have already explained After showing how one must take the middle. it is stated in On Generation II that a kind of circular reciprocity is found in generation in the sense that earth is generated from water. there is a kind of circular conversion in the sense that one passes from the first thing to the last thing. Hence the process has returned to its starting point. E. IN THINGS THAT OCCUR ALWAYS AND IN THINGS THAT OCCUR AS A GENERAL RULE b38. although these things are not numerically but specifically the same. 42. and that is the meaning of the circular process. it is possible in these cases also to follow what has been established above. 1628. II. First. and we observe that this may happen when the major and minor and also the middle terms are each of them consequences of the other. 12: Lecture 12 (95b38-96a20) HOW IN THINGS THAT COME TO BE RECIPROCALLY. an motionem quandam quasi in circulo haberet. For if A is predicated— a20. or is cause and effect. 5-7) that causes and effects may be proved circularly. In regard to the first it should be noted that because the circular movement of the heavens is the cause of generation in sublunar things.

An example of this is that every human male develops a beard as a general rule. which is the minor extreme.e. then it follows of necessity that A is predicated universally of C both as to time and as to subject. it is necessary that the action of the sun release vapors from it. Then (96a12) he proves that if one is to conclude to something that occurs as a general rule it is necessary to take a middle which occurs as a general rule. it is necessary that rain water be formed. because always. He says therefore first (96a8) that there are some things which come to be universally both as to time. as in the case of heavenly movements. just as in the case of things that occur always. i. and as to subject. Yet this cycle of causes cannot be found according to the order which is found in per se causes. this is a circular demonstration. either because they maintain themselves as unchangeable things which are not subject to coming to be. because in all cases. still another comes to be. and B of C. For if one were to assume the opposite by taking a middle which occurs universally and always. whose matter is not vapor but the common matter of the elements. which is the major extreme. nevertheless if they are not entirely the same. it is necessary that in falling upon the earth it saturate it. for. First. Thus it is clear that a cycle has been achieved in the sense that with one of them existing.And this is suitable to the process of demonstrations. if A. but not vice versa. and after they are formed. and that other existing. which is not numerically the same. Concerning this he does three things. Then (96a2) he uses examples to elucidate what he has said. a return is made to the first. as has been established in the foregoing. it is necessary that clouds be formed. For we will accept as the efficient cause of the rain-soaked earth. But the fact that water is generated from fire. is predicated universally of B. whenever some of the premises can be syllogized from them. but specifically the same. Now this saturation of the earth was the very thing we took as being first. there are other things which do not occur in the sense of always. the heat of the air which is caused by the sun. there is nothing unfitting. or because they come to be as changeable things which always follow a uniform pattern. is not per se but per accidens. and when this is formed. if we proceed from cause to cause in per se causes. for example. Again. although it does not occur always. which is the middle. Therefore. however. it is necessary to take a middle which is always. Secondly. as happens in things that are circularly generated. he proves what he has proposed (96a12).. Therefore. so in the case of things which occur as a general rule. And although this is not fitting if the very same thing which was first the conclusion is later the principle of the same numerical thing (otherwise the same thing would be at once better known and less known). which is the same as being predicated always and of each thing. for in per se causes it is necessary to reach some one thing which is first in each genus of causes as is proved in Metaphysics II. For if the earth is saturated with rain. he sums up (96a20). we are now saying that for something to be predicated universally is the same as 57 . another comes to be. when these are released and borne aloft. but the material cause we take as water. he proposes what he intends. For being is generated per se not from actual being but from potential being. there will not be a cycle. Hence. it is not the same saturation as the one from which we first began. saying that a circular process is seen to occur in the works of nature. it is necessary to take a middle that occurs as a general rule. Then (96a8) he shows how one demonstrates through the cause differently in things which occur always and in things which occur as a general rule. whenever conclusions are converted. and fire in turn from water. but as a general rule. Thirdly. as it is stated in Physics I. and that one existing.

within the field of being. necessary. whereas. so far as the certitude of demonstration is concerned. If. when the being of the posterior is necessary. it is clear that the same character will attach to them no less when they are coming-to-be: in other words. it is necessary that the middle. If that be the case. must a house cometo-be? It seems that this is not so. or whether everything may fail to come-to-be. the prior [20] also must have come-to-be: and if the prior has come-to-be. in fact. unless it is necessary absolutely for the latter to come to be. II. Then (96a20) he sums up what has been said. [10] is it absolutely necessary for some of them to come-to-be? Is there.g. therefore. On Generation and Corruption. inasmuch as we have shown how the several genera of causes are middles of demonstration according to the respective diversities of things. but only conditionally. i. Hence. namely. impossible that they should fail to be able to occur? Assuming that what is prior must have come-to-be if what is posterior is to be (e. a house must come-to-be if foundations have come-to-be. Thus it is obvious that certain immediate principles of things which occur as a general rule can be taken. however. this coming-to-be after that without any interval. Hence sciences of this kind fall short of sciences which deal with things absolutely necessary. then the posterior also must come-to-be—not. Therefore. H. in any sequence. Now if the sequence of occurrences is to proceed ad infinitum downwards. 11 (336b 35-338b 19) (tr. on the contrary. (emphasis added) g. such that those principles exist or come to be as a general rule. between things that cannot possibly not-be and things that can not-be? For instance. it must at the same time be true to say of it that it is. And this is the way that the principles which are taken possess truth. For the prior was assumed to be so related to the posterior that. is it necessary that solstices shall come-to-be. as well as vice versa. Joachim): Wherever there is continuity in any process (coming-to-be or ‘alteration’ [337b] or any kind of change whatever) we observe consecutiveness. the prior also must have come-to-be before it. the nexus is reciprocal—in other words. [5] though it be true to say of something now that it is going to be. For it will always be necessary that some other member shall have come-to-be beforehand. a distinction in the field of coming-to-be corresponding to the distinction. the [25] coming to-be of any determinate later member will not be absolutely. if there are to be foundations). if the latter is to be.e. it is quite possible for it not come-tobe—thus a man might not go for a walk. though he is now going for a walk. however. But it has been assumed that A is predicated of C as a general rule. And since in general amongst the things which are some are capable also of not-being. but because the future being of the posterior was assumed as necessary. Then are all the things that come-to-be of this character? Or. For if it be true to say of something that it will be. should be taken as existing as a general rule. On cyclical processes: Cf. is the converse also true? If foundations have come-to-be. We have also shown in what sense there is or is not demonstration or definition of the quod quid.being predicated of all and always. 58 . that it is true in the majority of cases. their coming-to-be will not be necessary.e. H. because of the prior. which is B. on account of which it is necessary that this should come-to-be: consequently. Aristotle. i. that foundations must have come-to-be if there [15] is to be a house: clay. saying that we have now established how the quod quid which is practically identical with the propter quid is assigned among syllogistic terms. when the prior has come-to-be the posterior must always come-to-be too. Yet such demonstrations do not enable one to know that what is concluded is true absolutely but only in a qualified sense. Hence we must investigate whether there is anything which will necessarily exist. it is necessary that the posterior should come-to-be.

is not the same numerically. Yet coming-to-be must have a beginning [10] (if it is to be necessary and therefore eternal). when foundations have been laid. And if. necessary. given the prior. it is also necessary for the posterior to come-to-be. neither will there be in the infinite sequence any ‘primary’ member which will make it necessary for the remaining members to come-to-be. For coming-to-be must either be limited or not limited: and if not limited. its coming-to-be is eternal. was seen on other grounds to be eternal since precisely those movements which [338b] belong to.since what is infinite has no beginning. whose substance is perishable (not imperishable) must ‘return upon themselves’ in the sense that what recurs. this eternal revolution ‘come-to-be’ of necessity. on the contrary. there must be a cloud if it is to rain). on the contrary. does this coming-to-be seem to constitute a rectilinear sequence? In discussing this. the sun 31 moves in a determinate manner. Nor again (ii) will it be possible to say with truth. [15] It is in circular movement. whether the members being taken downwards (as future events) or upwards (as past events). whose substance—that which is undergoing the process—is imperishable. conversely. e. the movement of the things it moves must also be circular. while men and animals do not ‘return upon themselves’ so that the same individual comes-to-be a second time (for [10] though your coming-to-be presupposes your father’s. the revolution of the heavens. No: if its coming-to-be is to be necessary. and depend upon. That is why. though in some sequences what recurs is numerically the same. it is evident that those things. showers and air. In consequence of this distinction. return upon themselves.g. It follows that the coming-to-be of anything. By this I mean that the necessary occurrence of this involves the necessary occurrence of something prior: and conversely.e. therefore. since that which ‘must be’ cannot possibly not-be. because there could not be any beginning . that it is absolutely necessary for any one of them to come-to-be. the coming-to-be of a thing is necessary. not ‘numerically’: and if these too recur numerically the same. Those things. will be numerically. his coming-to-be does not presuppose yours)? Why. therefore. or whether. so that it must rain if there is to be a cloud and. on the other hand. And this is reasonable. the same in their recurrence: for the [15] character of the process is determined by the character of that which undergoes it. it is necessary that each of them is coming-to-be and has come-to-be: and if the coming-to-be of any things is ‘necessary’. even in regard to the members of [30] a limited sequence. For what is of necessity coincides with what is always. and if eternal. a thing. For since the revolving body is always setting something else in motion. i. the seasons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle. when Water comes-to-be from Air and Air from Water.e. and of necessity will be. must return upon itself. if the coming-to-be of any things is cyclical. Thus. We cannot truly say. if it is absolutely necessary. must [5] be cyclical—i. for circular motion. we must begin by inquiring whether all things return upon themselves in a uniform manner. it must be either rectilinear or cyclical. or by many. and since the sun moves thus. that it is absolutely necessary for a house to come-to-be when foundations have been laid: for (unless it is always necessary for a house to be coming-to-be) we should be faced with the consequence that. though specifically the same. members. And this will hold continuously throughout the sequence: for it makes no difference whether we take two. 30 Consequently it must be cyclical. nor can it be eternal if it is limited. so in their turn do the things [5] whose coming-to-be the seasons initiate. Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this cyclical fashion (as. e. which need not always be. in other sequences it is the same only in species. their coming-to-be is cyclical. must always be. i. it is of [338a] necessity.g. as well as specifically. at any rate this does not happen with things whose ‘substance’ comesto-be-whose ‘substance’ is such that it is essentially capable of not-being. In other words. and in cyclical coming-to-be that the absolutely necessary is to be found. it must be always in its coming-to-be. Hence the nexus must be reciprocal. the Air is the same ‘specifically’. Hence a thing is eternal if its being is necessary: and if it is eternal.e. But the first of these last two alternatives is impossible if coming-to-be is to be eternal. and since they come-to-be cyclically. since the upper movement is cyclical. 59 .

” namely.. the material—for the moving cause has been discussed in the tract on motion. he resolves it. at the end of the present book.e. at 57. we should inquire into the reason why generation always exists.. 60 .e. 7 complete: Lecture 7 The cause on the part of matter in generation never fails. he explains the question he has introduced and says that one cause that may be assigned of the eternity of generation is that which is called “whence the principle [beginning] of motion comes. it will later be assigned. both absolute generation and generation “with respect to a part. 1964). 53. namely. generation in a qualified sense. i. tr.30 31 The text is corrupt at this point. 8). pertains to another part of philosophy. by Pierre Conway & R. Secondly. which is matter. Larcher (Columbus. in Physics VIII. he introduces the question and resolves it. F.e. With respect to the first he does three things: First. in order to get a better understanding.” i. I. Regarding the first he does two things: First he introduces the question [52] and says that “these. another cause may be assigned. the answer to which resolves the previous objection. the moving or efficient cause. of the perpetuity of generation absolutely speaking and in the qualified sense. namely. the heavens. the mover which causes perpetual generation because it is itself continually being moved. at 54.e. the part which is first among all the parts. Commentary on Aristotle’s Generation and Corruption by Thomas Aquinas. Reading ku/kl% o) h(/lioj... he presents the question. he tackles the question. After presenting an objection against the aforesaid solution. Now those who posit that the world and motion are perpetual must also posit perpetual generation. and that.” i.. What the force of Aristotle’s arguments is with regard to the perpetuity of motion and the eternity of the world we have explained in Physics VIII and in On the Heavens I. Thirdly. namely. And this is the one to be assigned now.” i. he uses this solution to resolve the main question (L. 52. But regarding the other mover. hence in Metaphysics XII the Philosopher determined concerning the cause of the perpetuity of motion and of generation. Cf. how this is the cause “of each of the aforesaid. where it was said that there exists a certain immobile mover for all time.e. the previous objection should be handled to the extent that the proposition requires. lect. Secondly [53]. Bk. About this he does two things: First. the first mover. Secondly. and a mover which is always moved. namely. To determine concerning one of these.” i. the Philosopher here introduces another question. namely. the mover of the heavens.

at 55. 61 . Democritus however assumed infinite empty space. since.e. so that nothing should be left now but emptiness. such as fire or air or water or something in-between. Then [55] he excludes two answers.. And lest this seem to be foreign to the proposition. something can be taken which. there is always being subtracted some one or other of the things having natures. attributed infinity to the principles.” i. it will. For someone could say that. Then [54] he pursues the question brought up. Likewise. and if generation is ab aeterno. or “where. i. or quantity. someone could say that. But this is excluded. generation and corruption do not desert nature. as is said in Physics III. as well as an infinitude of indivisible bodies. so what is corrupted absolutely would seem to fall into non-being absolutely. in the sense that this non-being would be absolutely nothing. is finite. A second answer is now presented and refuted [56]. First. For that into which it falls cannot be a “something. Anaxagoras posited an infinitude of similar parts as principles. a substance. even though it is not infinite in act. no matter how large. yet without its ever being totally consumed. therefore. he [Aristotle] adds that perhaps it will at the same time be shown both what must be said about this question and what must be said of absolute generation and corruption. endowed that principle with infinity. Hence.. falls away to non-being. by corruption.. Consequently. and which is the cause “classed under the head of matter. if that which is corrupted absolutely falls into non-being. from natural body. The first was that of the ancient natural philosophers who. from a finite continuum. as was proved in Physics III and in On the Heavens I. For just as what is generated absolutely comes to be from non-being absolutely. what is corrupted absolutely must fall into nonsubstance. if the whole universe. just as. although there is not present in nature any infinite in act. Consequently. in order to account for the perpetuity of generation. there is nevertheless an infinite in potency.” or any of the other predicaments. For such a thing is impossible. out of which all things are generated. who says that it cannot be that the reason why generation does not cease is because that is infinite from which something is generated. so too. 54. it is plain that whatever is finite will be consumed if something is continually removed from it. since accidents cannot exist without substance. All these tenets are rejected by the Philosopher. generation and corruption go on forever.” namely.e.” i. If. eternally revolves in nature. then all being should have been exhausted long ago. he rejects some answers to this objection. even though it is not infinite. He says therefore first [54] that there seems to be sufficient reason to inquire as to the cause why generation is “folded around. For if. 56. be finally consumed—for example. Secondly. Consequently. 55. neither can the non-being at which corruption ends be quality. the void. there is in nature no infinite in act. as is evident in the division of a continuum. whether there be one principle or many principles. the material cause. For all who posited one principle. Now.But now we must assign the cause why in perpetuity. for since absolute corruption is of substance. it seems that some being will always be falling into non-being.e. the same quantity is always removed. he presents an objection that would deny perpetuity of generation. something can be taken ad infinitum by division from a continuum without its being consumed. from which each and every being is generated.

Such a division having been made. The same holds for any other ratio. But a continuum is divided ad infinitum if subtraction is always made according to the same proportion—for example. namely. in the First Provincial Synod of Westminster. Similarly. and so on infinitely. for although that which is corrupted becomes non-being. Consequently.e. there is in generation and corruption a certain cycle which gives it the aptitude to last forever. John Henry Newman.D.e. ii. in the way that a continuum is forever divided. is that the corruption of this is the generation of something else. if a continuum be divided in half. which indeed is now subject to another form. The Second Spring: A sermon delivered to the First Provincial Council of Westminster. amica mea. Then [57] having rejected the false solutions. and the half into half. Consequently. my beautiful one. For generation per se is indeed from a being in potency. That nature is cyclical: Cf. the way generation and corruption endure ad infinitum cannot be similar to the division of a magnitude ad infinitum. Oscott. 57.] Surge. That is why. Flores apparuerunt in terra nostra . Consequently it does not follow that what is corrupted departs completely from the whole nature of things. my dove..” i. but per se from a being in potency. with respect to which it is being in act. unceasing.. then whatever is generated later will always have to be smaller in quantity. as has been said elsewhere. Accordingly matter cannot remain without being subjected to some form. columba mea. Arise. according to which it is a being in act. my love. But we do not see this happen. v. it is plain that what is taken after the half will always be less than what was taken before—for the half of the half is always less than the half of the whole. the rain is over and gone. with respect to which it is non-being in act. 1852: A Sermon by John Henry Newman. c. Finally he concludes with the summary that the aforesaid cause should be considered sufficient as to why there should be absolute generation and corruption with respect to each and every thing in perpetuity.—Cant. upon the corruption of one thing. namely. et veni. Hence Aristotle concludes that. that which has been generated. i.if one should continue to remove a palm’s breadth from the diameter of the heaven. 62 . formosa mea. before Cardinal Wiseman and the Bishops of England. (emphasis added) h. the original quantity will not be totally consumed. or “unceasing. from matter. the Catholic faith does not suppose. that the reason why the transmutation of generation and corruption must be unfailing. and upon the generation of one thing another is corrupted. D. and at the same time of the privation of the form to be induced.. For the winter is now past. he concludes to the true one. and come. On this account Aristotle in Physics I says that generation is per accidens from a being in act. if this is the way that generation and corruption are to endure forever. a thing is per se corrupted into a being in potency. and vice versa.. propera. i. and to the privation of the previous form. so that. which is as the subject of natural things—it is accidental to the matter out of which something is generated that it be the subject of another form. with respect to which it is now non-being in act. what is generated being always less. yet something else remains. imber abiit et recessit. make haste. This is true on the supposition that the world and motion are eternal—which. in St. however. 1852. by virtue of what is subtracted from natural body being always less. namely. The flowers have appeared in our land. Jam enim hiems transiit. another is generated. 10-12. [Preached on July 13. Mary’s College.e.

1997. 1853). casual observation over the course of one’s life makes the cyclical nature of seasons self-explanatory. ever to be sober. or more beautiful than the world.—yet one change cries out to another. because they are to wither. It is like an image on the waters. (emphasis added) Cf. Change upon change. We mourn over the blossoms of May. is the great whole. It is bound together by a law of permanence. by its own ultimate return. never-ceasing as are its changes. Who is not compelled to admit the truth of what I assert by that agreeable. Each hour. 1995):1 With or without astronomy. Yonge. I say. at another be covered with snow? Or. they must necessarily be a part of what we all allow to be the most excellent. uniform. to be born out of it. only the more surely. withal. C. could the approach and retreat of the sun in the summer and winter solstices be so regularly known and calculated? Could the flux and reflux of the sea and the height of the tides be affected by the increase or wane of the moon? Could the differ-ent courses of the stars be preserved by the uniform movement of the whole heaven? Could these things subsist. never to despair. thought. “A Brief History of Time” (April 9. in other terms) the mind. in such a harmony of all the parts of the universe without the continued influence of a divine spirit? (emphasis added) 1 (http://old. it is ever coming to life again. and easily discernible to the naked or even blind eye. G. the perpetual renovation of the material world which surrounds us. VII. Book II. On the Nature of the Gods. On the pagan view. in praise and in glory of their Maker. though it is ever dying. Dissolution does but give birth to fresh modes of organization. as it comes. which is preceded by spring. and not only there is nothing better. if such a number of things regulated their own changes. xvi (tr. the day is swallowed up in the gloom of the night. how certain. But where did we find that which excels all these things — I mean reason. like the alternate Seraphim. or more excellent. still it abides. it is set up in unity. The Nature of the Gods and Divination . I. Chris Weinkopf. Spring passes into summer. Bohn. One need have no appreciation of the earth’s orbit around the sun to discover that fall invariably follows summer. and in our depth of deso-lation. and one death is the parent of a thousand lives. Marcus Tullius Cicero. which is the most important and valuable of all? But certainly there is nothing better.perseus. D. and continued agreement of things in the universe? Could the earth at one season be adorned with flowers. the constancy. but we cannot even conceive anything superior to it. that May is one day to have its revenge upon November. restless and migratory as are its elements. yet how secure.—which teaches us in our height of hope. which is ever the same. but we know. and from whence did we receive it? Shall the world be possessed of every other perfection. is but a testimony. by the revolution of that solemn circle which never stops. and.tufts. Amherst: Prometheus Books. This order is unfailing. the successor of winter. understanding.We have familiar experience of the order. and through summer and autumn into winter. as fresh as if it had never been quenched. prudence. Frail and transitory as is every part of it. and be destitute of this one. VII: BOOK II.html [12/21/09]) 63 . or (if you please. and if reason and wisdom are the greatest of all perfections. towards which it resolutely hastened from its first hour. cf. how fleeting. though the waters ever flow. The sun sinks to rise again. to triumph over that grave. original edition H.edu/GreekScience/Students/Chris/TIME2.

An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith by St John Damascene. For things which are opposed in the nature of their existence must also be opposed in the mode of their existence. And what could this be other than Deity? And even the very continuity of the creation. have combined with each other so as to form one complete world. The Greek is τῳ αὐτομάτῳ. and its preservation and government. Athan. and He Who hath implanted in everything the law whereby the universe is carried on and directed? Who then is the Artificer of these things? Is it not He Who created them and brought them into existence. Vol. 7. I mean angels and spirits and demons. Watson and L. will refuse to grant that all existing things. such as fire and water. Orat. For we shall not attribute such a power to the spontaneous [9]. If. then.W. Edited by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo. For. 1899). For if he had been created. whose existence originated in change. Pullan. and the maker cannot have been created. or rather to what was in existence before these. and continue to abide in indissoluble union. or. if you please. whether a struggle or a surrender. Cont. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. while the others suffer changes of generation and destruction. Things then that are mutable are also wholly created. Book I. that exist. For how [6] could opposite natures.. must also be subject to change. things are created. 10. Reading προαίρεσιν. Greg. who supports and maintains and preserves and ever provides for this universe.. but even the very angels. Various reading. and so on till we arrive at something uncreated. a variant is τροπήν. 34. were there not some omnipotent power which bound them together and always is preserving them from dissolution? What is it that gave order to things of heaven and things of earth. to chance. But things that are created must be the work of some maker. to heaven and earth and air and the elements of fire and water? What [7] was it that mingled and distributed these? What was it that set these in motion and keeps them in their unceasing and unhindered course[8]? Was it not the Artificer of these things. …All things. that is to say. whether it be that they perish or that they become other than they are by act of will[5]. and all those things that move in the air and in the water. is also wholly immutable. not only such as come within the province of the senses. 9. then. Second Series. air and earth. of quality and of movement in space. whether it is a progression or a retrogression in goodness. to the automatic. Translated by E. viz. perhaps = to the accidental. What of that which has preserved and kept them in harmony with the original laws of their existence [11]? Clearly it is something quite distinct from the spontaneous[12]. are subject to change and transformation and movement of various kinds? For the things appertaining to the rational world. cf. Who. 9. Naz. being uncreated. Whose was the disposing of them in order? 64 . what of the power that put all in order[10]? And let us grant this. he also must surely have been created by some one. The Creator. of increase and decrease. 8. And what could this be other than Deity[13]? 5. supposing their coming into existence was due to the spontaneous. For things.For the Judeo-Christian understanding of this subject. it follows that they are also wholly mutable. Or. then. 6. are subject to changes of will. teach us that there does exist a Deity. are either created or uncreated. But if things are uncreated they must in all consistency be also wholly immutable. Gent.. must have opposite properties: who. Chapter III: CHAPTER III Proof that there is a God.

or. 13. “we lift our eyes on high. appear and disappear. the orderly march of the seasons. and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” (Eccl.. and see who created these things. Essays on the Writings of Ibn Ezra. And even though we cannot look on the earth as a living thing in the sense in which a plant or animal is so called. Vol. 1 The experience of previous failures. and on the other hand. 21).” also limited the sphere of the all-investigating human mind. we know that our own existence depends. amidst all this change a certain constancy is noticed. De Incarn. i. 1-2: HE who set a boundary to the ever-flowing billows of the sea. on the one hand. The restless human mind tries to break down every fence.. 1886). Introduction pp. First Essay. 4 (London. there is evidently another sense in which we may speak of the life of the Earth. is likewise of no avail. generation to succeed generation. the ceaseless flow of rivers. “For in much wisdom is much grief. and said. M. the constant or fitful blowing of the winds. or. παρα τὸ αὐτόματον.11. and on which.” we are not satisfied with only admiring the grandeur of the Universe and the infinite wisdom of its Creator: we are anxious to know this great Architect. in short all things to flow in a perpetual tide. quite other than the spontaneous. Whose are the preserving of them. in order to pass into regions which are beyond its reach. however. Or. (emphasis added) For a witness from the Jewish tradition. change appears to be the rule of nature. and the keeping of them in accordance with the principles under which they were first placed? 12. Friedlaender. the question is naturally asked. When and how did this series of successions commence? When will it end? We are as much at a loss to form a conception of its absence as to comprehend its continuance from infinity to infinity. in compliance with the exhortation of the prophet. 2-3: 4. Naz. Consider. the unvarying succession of day and night. 18) 2 ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF IBN EZRA. Verbi. cf. the [2-3] regular circling of the ocean tides. of systems which flourished for some time and faded away. indeed. (emphasis added) Cf. and to comprehend the scheme of Providence by which all parts of the divine work are kept in marvellous harmony. § 65 . seasons to come and go. Archibald Geikie. When. neither search the things that are above thy strength” (Ben Sira iii. 1886). 34. observable “on the face of the earth”] is everywhere associated with life and movement. When. Greg. This variety [sc. to understand the mysterious art by which He became the Author of all Beauty. near the beginning. Orat. Athan. poets and prophets have warned us in vain against any attempts at realising such a desire as useless and even dangerous. the manifold growth and activity of plant and animal life! Surely it was no strange thought when men in old times pictured this world as a living being. yet in view of all that multitudinous movement which is ever in progress upon its surface. “Thus far shalt thou go and no further. than chance. for instance. clouds to 1 “Seek not out the things that are too hard for thee. The Philosophy of Ibn Ezra. pp. Elementary Lessons in Physical Geography (London. when the sun is observed to rise and set. Moralists of old.

11. Anaxagoras. Metaphysics. 1 The rest of the tradition has been added later in mythical form [ta de loipa muthikos ede prosektai ] with a view to the [5] persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency. They are handed on.” (emphasis added) (www.M. what are styled the gods are only the first principles. in fact. that these [celestial] bodies are gods. of their traditions] have been introduced in the manner of fable for the persuasion of the multitude who cannot grasp intelligible things. n. and certain things consequent to those things. 12. that they are gods. lect.] seems to mean some sort of cosmic mind.i. Thomas Aquinas. 31 (tr. But if only the first principle be called God there is only one God. and that what is divine contains [or encloses] nature as a whole. George Mason University: “Rather. XII.gmu. adding that they said the gods were similar in form to men and to certain other animals. And he says that certain things were handed on by the ancient philosophers about the separated substances and were dismissed by those coming after them as being in the manner of fables. And what was introduced in the manner of fable he explains.htm [12/18/08]) 66 . and that the divine encloses the whole of nature. Aristotle.. and certain animals. in the form of a myth [en muthou schemati]. have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure. (emphasis added) Cf. also Rose Cherubin. with others. when he says. St. But the rest [sc. New Platonism and Alchemy: The Eclectic Philosophy: Aristotle declares: “The divine essence pervades the whole world of nature. namely. and they say other things consequent on and similar to these which we have mentioned. Aristotle and St. In XII Meta. “Notes on Anaxagoras and Philolaus”. he [sc.” <…> 1 Cf. But if one were to separate the first point from these additions and take it alone—that they thought the [10] first substances to be gods. is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors clear to us. these opinions. and they said other similar things. D. as is clear from the things already said. so that from inventions of this sort the multitude would be persuaded to tend to virtuous acts and turn away from vices. who otherwise would not give them any regard or veneration. 8 (1074b 1-14) (tr. And this. Thomas on Thales’ understanding of the soul in the excerpts given below. they say these gods are in the form of men or like some of the other animals. Ross): [1074b] Our forefathers in the most remote ages have handed down to their posterity a tradition. speaking of Nous. then. and reflect that. B. 10. Only thus far. Cf. 14)…. Supplement: The comparison of the universe with a living thing: That the divine encloses (or ‘pervades’) all of nature: Cf.A. may be gathered from the things above. For they put down in the manner of fable certain men made into gods. while probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished. (emphasis added) Cf. and for their usefulness to human social life [conversationis humanae]. W. and insofar as it was the best [expedient] for delivering the laws. he compares the things that have been discovered about immaterial substances to ancient and popular beliefs. The myths and stories were devised to make the religious systems intelligible and attractive to the people.): Next. Alexander Wilder.edu/courses/phil/ancient/anph2. one must regard this as an inspired utterance. if all immaterial substances be called gods. something that pervades the cosmos (frr.

But the First Principle is neither fire. happily. Ia. all the motions and all the forms which are so much admired in it. 1. a perfect animal. q. St. O. Thomas Aquinas. Therefore. [N. St. 250 b 14-15). 9 (tr. cf. All that is concerning the human shape and attributes of these deities is mere fiction. 18. the motion of the heavens comes from a conjoined mover.” On the motion of the heavens as founding the comparison with life. And in both senses motion is said to be like the life of natural bodies according to a certain likeness and not properly speaking.P. STh. which has. for which reason even in animals the principle of alteration appears to be local motion.M. art. all beauty. q. Now in the universe the first motion is local motion. A spiritual substance is the cause of the Universe. every natural motion is. n. a certain likeness of a vital operation in natural things. says that motion is “like a kind of ‘life’ existing in all things”. as it were. if the whole corporeal universe were a single animal. from what they recollect of him. O. Similarly. Summa Theol. all natural things participate in life.. §58 TEXT 404b30–405b30 1 Cf. then it would follow that its motion is the life of all natural bodies. art.P.He [Proclus] also repeats the words of Aristotle: “There are many inferior theoi but only one Mover. is by some called a “microcosm”. B. nor anything that is the object of sense. But all natural things participate in motion. For the motion of the celestial bodies in the universe of corporeal natures is like the motion of the heart by which life is conserved in an animal. ad 1 (tr. which is one that moves itself. All must be led up to this one primitive substance.. <…> Reply to objection 1: This passage from the Philosopher can be understood to apply either to the first motion. as it were. Again. cf. 1951): TEXT 404b30–405b30 BOOK I. most approaches to a likeness of the whole universe: and so man. Thomas Aquinas. pursuing this resemblance. De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart). nor earth. which is the cause of alteration as well as the other motions. invented to instruct the common people and secure their obedience to wholesome laws. was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion.] 67 . 70.B. (New Haven.—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a ‘soul’ because it attracts iron.A. escaped the wreck of truth amid the rocks of popular errors and poetic fables. For St. which governs in subordination to the First. And so the Philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics (ch. Freddoso): Objection 1: In Physics 8 the Philosopher says that motion is. nor water. 1. 1. obj. CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS It seems that Thales.1 For related notions. or to motion in general. Alfred J. 3. Thomas. This is the general doctrine of the ancients. viz. Ia. cf. a sort of life in all things that exist by nature.): 9. and the source of all order. Hence. the movement of the celestial bodies. the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima by Thomas Aquinas translated by Kenelm Foster. so that (as some have claimed) its motion were from an intrinsic mover. and Sylvester Humphries. who is the most perfect of animals. II. CHAPTER.

would not. but rather a motive force. Now this Orpheus thought that the whole air was alive. Thales devoted himself to the world of nature and was the first natural philosopher. he too is mentioned here. and that the so-called souls of living bodies were really nothing but the air these bodies breathed. saying that it is just as inadequate as the others he has criticised. for there are many animals that do not breathe at all.BOOK I. Orpheus. for they wrote in verse on philosophy and about God. his cruder disciples (such as Hippo) asserted that it was water . at ‘It seems that Thales’. Then at ‘Some cruder thinkers’. 68 . Next. The criticism touches the inadequacy of the theory. II. but while the others studied moral questions. He identified this with water on account of its humidity. Orpheus was one of those three early thinkers who were. So far indeed they followed their master. ‘a fact’. had a soul because it moved iron. he said water was that principle. referring to those who said that water was the basic principle of things. then. CHAPTER V. For there were certain rather crude followers of Thales who tried to make the principle of one particular thing an analogy of the first principle of Nature as a whole. was indeed a sort of living soul. The other two were Museus and a certain Linus. ‘which was overlooked’ by those who held this opinion. CONTINUED EMPEDOCLES’S THEORY OF COGNITION SOUL NOT COMPOSED OF THE ELEMENTS § 190. (emphasis added) TEXT 409b18–411a7 BOOK I. though admitting water to be the first principle.’. he defined it as that which has motive force. Aristotle states an opinion of some who made water the first principle. and this being water. And a certain philosopher named Orpheus having fallen into a rather similar error in what he said about the soul. For Thales thought that the way to find the principle of all things was by searching into the principle of living things. that he identified soul with a motive force. CONTINUED PREVIOUS THEORIES SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS § 58. But the Philosopher objects to the Orphic theory. <…> § 62. and since all the principles or seeds of living things are moist. not for identifying the soul with fire. Hence he asserted that a certain stone. he states the opinion of a philosopher called Thales who had only this in common with the others mentioned above. that the latter was water. Anaxagoras and Thales. was the first man to induce his fellows to live together in society. in short. of whom Thales was one. Yet he did not follow his theory to the point of saying that soul was water. CHAPTER. For this reason it is said of him that he could make rocks dance to the sweet sounds of his harp. And after these three poet-philosophers came the seven sages. as we have seen. Thales. and this idea he expressed in verse. allow that the soul was water. Hippo tried to refute those who said the soul was blood with the argument that blood is not the generating seed (which they called ‘the inchoate soul’) of animate things. and the latter that it was at the origin of movement. he thought that the absolutely first principle must be the most moist of things. the magnet. Observing that moisture was fundamental to living things they concluded that it must be the first principle of all things. so to say. but whereas he. but because the former said that the soul was the source of knowledge and sensation. a wonderful orator whose words had power to civilise wild and brutish folk. he says. are included in the present list. poet-theologians. which really means that his eloquence could melt the hardest hearts. This Thales was one of the Seven Wise Men. Hence Aristotle remarks ‘from what they recollect etc. rather.

First. blessed by He. CONTINUED THE ELEMENTS HAVE NO SOUL And some say that the soul is intermingled generally with the Universe. so also the soul dwells in the inmost part of the body’ (Ber. however. The Doctrine of God. involves several difficulties. Chapter I. Having stated and rejected the theories and arguments of those who maintained that the soul was composed of elements. that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements. whereas it does so in composite beings?—and that. be homogeneous. divided off thus. but the soul be composed of heterogeneous parts. It is necessary then. 6: To assist the comprehension of the place of the incorporeal God in the Universe. Omnipresence. fills the whole world. dwells in the inmost part of the Universe. and then. to discuss the notion. an analogy is drawn from the incorporeal part of the human being—the soul.) On either count the theory is absurd and unreasonable. blessed be He. so also the soul sees but cannot be seen. he says. For why does the soul in fire and air not result in an animated being. blessed be He. That is perhaps why Thales thought that the whole world was full of divinities. either that it be of homogeneous parts. § 198 I That the distinction here referred to between parts of ‘soul’ refers to mortal and immortal existence is St. LECTIO THIRTEEN § 192. and if there is a soul in them. This perhaps is what Thales meant when he said that everything was full of gods. sees but cannot be seen. so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element. that just as soul exists everywhere in each living thing so a god was everywhere in the Universe 1 and everything therefore was ‘full of divinities’. 10a). and that it is neither true nor apposite to say that it is in motion. ‘As the Holy One. blessed be He. the argument used to support it. §§ 193-5 They seem to have held that there was a soul in these on the ground that the Universe is made up of homogeneous parts. so also the soul nourishes the whole body. however. § 196 If then the air. is pure. § 197 It is evident then. so also the soul is pure. As the Holy One. at ‘They seemed to have held’. they must say that the soul [of the Whole] is homogeneous with its parts. 69 . the Philosopher is now led. whether simple elements or things composed of these. § 192 This. some who see a soul intermingled with everything. Thomas’s interpretation of this passage (§ 197). from what has been said. it is inconsistent not to call them animals. he states this opinion. As the Holy One. then. even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former. 1 For an analogue in the Judaic understanding of God. upheld by some. There are. so also the soul fills the whole body. CHAPTER V. at ‘This. Abraham Cohen. or that it be not in any and every part of the whole. p. something of it [the soul] will exist and something not. And the opinion itself is first stated and then. 1949). cf. by the same train of thought. (And one might well query why the soul in the air should be nobler and more enduring than that in animals. As the Holy One. nourishes the whole world. perhaps he thought that the entire Universe was alive and its life was divine. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the most wanton of absurdities. As the Holy One. Everyman’s Talmud: The Major Teachings of the Rabbinic Sages (New York. And perhaps this was the notion that underlay idolatry.TEXT 41a 8–411a25 BOOK I.’ attacked. blessed be He. according to which a soul is intermingled with the elements.

At ‘If then’ he refutes this argument. one may therefore speak of a ‘soul’ of the world and the like without being committed to the view that the world as such is an animal. For the latter constitute knowing. it is contradicted by experience. for. as it were. according to them. i..e. So much should be clear to anyone who has followed the discussion up to the present. the soul of the animal itself is. i. At ‘This. however the objections are put. was that they thought that the whole and the parts in elements were of the same nature. at ‘It is. was the cause and principle of animal life. he says. those outside and those breathed in. which came into contact with the bodies of animals through their breathing. For instance. Things composed of several elements are animals precisely because they contain a soul. a portion of the soul of the whole air. § 196. Observing that that part of ‘the containing element’. he says.e. sentient animals. is immortal.e. which is against those who said that all the air had a soul. he says. and (3) the place of air in the phenomena of ‘life’.e. Neither of these two predications made’ by the ancients was. then the same is true of the soul. in all the elements. then the soul is not in every part ‘of the whole’.’ he points out. of the whole air.e. § 195. (2) the inference that a ‘motive force’ even in inanimate things like a magnet suggests that all things are full of soul.§ 193. he states the reason used in support of this theory and refutes it. § 197. because the portion of the air removed and inhaled by an animal is of a like nature to the air as a whole. that all the containing air was alive. The reason. But. why some philosophers seem to have thought that a soul existed in ‘these’. why air and fire are not animals. i. as that which has never ceased from vivifying animate beings. To say that fire or air is a living body is most improbable in itself. the soul of air ‘exists’. and one would expect the soul to be all the more powerful where the element is pure and simple. either true or well-expressed. § 194. namely that knowledge in the soul is a consequence of its being composed of elements. Then at ‘It is evident’ Aristotle concludes this part of the discussion of earlier opinions. i. since the elements are simple . however. 70 . and that movement is in it for the same reason. If all the parts of air. the result is damaging to this theory. whereas the soul of this or that particular animal ‘does not exist’. that is to say. after which. evident’ he draws a general conclusion from all the foregoing discussions. for it would follow that there was no difference between souls that exist in bodies and those that do not. But in accordance with the first explanation. the foregoing reasons furnishing the foundation for the comparison of the cosmos to a living thing. the air. not so the former. at ‘They seem to have held’. But if the soul’s parts are heterogeneous while the air’s are homogeneous. Then.e. but this has been disproved. if a soul exists in air and in fire (and of these two especially this was asserted) it is hard to see why it does not make ‘animated beings’ of them. i. Again . The assumption is that. (emphasis added) One may therefore liken the world to an animal and its motive principle to the soul on the basis of three things: (1) the ubiquity of motion in the universe. are homogeneous. is not immortal. And to deny that things which have souls need be living bodies is most unreasonable. one might ask. that it presents certain difficulties. they thought it necessary to conclude that the soul of the whole was ‘of the same specific nature as the parts’. i. and is unsupported by any good reason. But on their own principle this is clearly false.. why the soul which they place in the elements should be considered higher and more immortal than the soul of things composed of elements. § 198. Therefore either of two awkward consequences flow from this theory. against this opinion.

130: CHAPTER 130 GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD BY GOD Second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause. From this proceeds that union of affection by which the soul adheres most closely to God. The action of any of them is caused by God. IV. which is properly called “indwelling. do you wish to bring the civil powers. Tatian. Consequently all the agents through which God carries out the order of His government. and this. can I adore my own servants? How can I speak of stocks and stones as gods? For the Spirit that pervades matter is inferior to the more divine spirit. Our God did not begin to be in time: He alone is without beginning. then. not pervading matter.3). c. But I will set forth our views more distinctly. Divinum illud munus (May 9. J. also St. Louis. 71 . Ryland): CHAP. Leo XIII. nor comes within the compass of human art. Man is to be honoured as a fellow-man. can act only through the power of God Himself. being Himself the Father of both sensible and invisible things. Now this wonderful union. if I am not disposed to comply with the usages of some of them. For what reason. I am ready to render it. Thomas. The Compendium of Theology.. S. God alone is to be feared. just as the movement of a mobile object is caused by the motion of the mover. I acknowledge the serfdom.8. God is a Spirit. for He who is in want of nothing is not to be misrepresented by us as though He were indigent. Nor even ought the ineffable God to be presented with gifts. Address to the Greeks. cf. translated by Cyril Vollert. cf. E.J. Moreover. will I not obey. They say that God is present and exists in all things “by His power in so far as all things are subject to His power. iv (tr. and apprehend His invisible power by His works. and enjoys God in all fullness and sweetness. impalpable. as in a pugilistic encounter. (St.—He who is not visible to human eyes. is not to be honoured equally with the perfect God . but the Maker of material spirits. desire. in a most intimate and peculiar manner. and He Himself is the beginning of all things. why am I to be abhorred as a vile miscreant? Does the sovereign order the payment of tribute. God by grace resides in the just soul as in a temple. ch. but because He is more fully known and loved by him. into collision with us? And.--THE CHRISTIANS WORSHIP GOD ALONE. The sun and moon were made for us: how.For the Christian alternative to the pagan point of view. Him we know from His creation. not only as in inanimate things. He is invisible. Cf.” differ[s] only in degree or state from that with which God beatifies the saints in heaven. men of Greece. Only when I am commanded to deny Him. by His presence. and of the forms that are in matter. 1897). and seek after the good.. I refuse to adore that workmanship which He has made for our sakes. n. inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being” (St. 1947). inasmuch as all things are naked and open to His eyes. since even by nature we spontaneously love.. Thomas Aquinas. even when assimilated to the soul. thus instruments operate under the direction of art. ST I. by His essence. But God is in man. 9: It is well to recall the explanation given by the Doctors of the Church of the words of Holy Scripture. Does my master command me to act as a bondsman and to serve. but will rather die than show myself false and ungrateful. In such event the mover and the movement must be simultaneous. (emphasis added) On the right way of understanding the presence of God to the world. more so than the friend is united to his most loving and beloved friend.

just as its “becoming” depends on the action of the builder.” but he is not the direct cause of its “being. so that not for a moment could it subsist. art. When the builder departs.” This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its “becoming. For the being of every creature depends on God. Another point: not only the action of secondary agents but their very existence is caused by God. so far as it is its cause. thus a builder constructs a house. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such. 1. Such activity is. English Dominican Fathers): I answer that. indirectly. For the builder causes the existence of the house only in the sense that he works for the existence of the house as a house. 104. a process that ceases when he desists from his labors. which is essentially the same as the form of the other. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker.Hence God must be inwardly present to any agent as acting therein whenever He moves the agent to act. and thus the builder is directly the cause of the becoming of the house. as a man may be said to preserve a child. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect. whom he guards from falling into the fire. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air. Ia. by making use of cement. Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. namely. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. indeed. when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. Thus whenever a 72 . Therefore the “being” of a house depends on the nature of these materials. we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous. the house still remains standing. xvi). (emphasis added) Cf.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is a result of its form. since it would then be the cause of its own form. for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them. This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause. but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power.. as Gregory says (Moral. but not directly of its “being. but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—In other words. but so far as they continue to exist. the constructing of the house. To make this clear. c.” as when man begets man.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming. and accidentally. q. and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this form. First. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. Thomas Aquinas. and results from the natural qualities of certain things. and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun. by Himself. so that it is not necessary to keep them from corrupttion. the cause of every existence. Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such. similarly God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. as was shown above. neither will it be directly the cause of “being” which results from that form. Secondly. St. Therefore God must be in all things…. which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials. just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. But God is directly. The same principle applies to natural things. in its “becoming” only. thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption. stones. a thing is said to preserve another ‘per se’ and directly. and fire causes fire. but it will be the cause of the effect. In this way God preserves some things. Summa Theol. However. but not all. (tr. and this not only so far as they begin to exist.

Therefore. then the “becoming” of the effect. For as the sun possesses light by its nature. consequently it is not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of “being. Therefore. Water is vital both as a solvent in which many of the body’s solutes dissolve and as an essential part of many metabolic processes within the body. ad lit.” In the same work ( Gen. ad lit. Sometimes. because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately. while. such as gas absorption. “Water”. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such.” depends on the agent. glucose. 12): “If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures. Photosynthetic cells use the sun’s energy to split off water’s hydrogen from oxygen. Hydrogen is combined with CO 2 (ab1 (http://en. their nature would at once cease. since it has no root in the air. dust collection. which is the principle of light. without water. Therefore. air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun. Supplement: The importance of water for life: Cf. when the sun ceases to act upon it. Effects on Life:1 From a biological standpoint. so that its essence is not its existence. these metabolic processes would cease to exist. Wikipedia. even for a moment. however. leaving us to muse about what processes would be in its place. and not merely as existing in this matter.” Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “becoming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased. In catabolism. and in His absence returns at once to darkness. water is used to break bonds in order to generate smaller molecules (e. and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature. so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence.” (emphasis added) j. fatty acids and amino acids to be used for fuels for energy use or other purposes). Now every creature may be compared to God. It carries out this role by allowing organic compounds to react in ways that ultimately allow replication. which is the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in “being. the air does not continue to be lit up. the light ceases with the action of the sun. triglycerides and proteins for storage of fuels and information).g.natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause.” This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action.org/wiki/Water [02/01/10]) 73 . in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. the heat will remain for a time only.g. since His Essence is His existence. it would retain that form always. the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause. In anabolism. so is man enlightened by the presence of God. on the contrary. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire. starches. Metabolism is the sum total of anabolism and catabolism. water has many distinct properties that are critical for the proliferation of life that set it apart from other substances. the free encyclopedia. Water is thus essential and central to these metabolic processes. All known forms of life depend on water. and all nature would collapse. viii.wikipedia. Water is also central to photosynthesis and respiration. 12) he says: “As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun. as Augustine says (Gen. etc. as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. water is removed from molecules (through energy requiring enzymatic chemical reactions) in order to grow larger molecules (e. whereas every creature has being by participation. On the other hand. iv. but not its “being.

and in its parts. which man has not. whose continuous parts extended through all the Universe. 1871: God. a God. Therefore Pythagoras called man a microcosm. does not know who he is. Aristotle’s obersvations that the divine encloses nature. like Moses. life. II. without separation. for whom “there is one universe made up of all things. as having in itself perpetuity of movement and life. Adler. had placed the Supreme Cause in the Universe itself. Thus he made the Universe a great intelligent Being. like the soul in the human body. so that. Albert Pike. the immortal bodies that form the harmonious system of the heavens. which thus became no more than a material work. in saying that but a small number of wise men. 1952). real authors of all the old Cosmogonies. therefore the Supreme Cause of all. partaking of elementary Nature. who had severed the Divinity from the Universe. and intelligence. and there was the guiding power of the rest of the world. had sought for God or the Cause of all. was ONE. as possessing in miniature all the qualities found on a great scale in the Universe. the Universal Soul that moves. having in itself. like man—an immense Deity. in their view. on which acted the Abstract Cause. by a constant and regular progression. Everywhere extended. k. in the view of Pythagoras. or inequality. being as it were its head. or little world. Chapter 51. seemed to him its principal seat. The highest portion of the Universe. the Soul of the World to that of man.” In the belief that it is through and through an orderly world 1 Cf. He does not hesitate long before the dilemma that “it is either a well-arranged universe or a chaos huddled together.” man has only to exercise the divine spark of reason in himself in order to be at home in a world which reason rules. “does not know where he is. This Eusebius attests.” writes Marcus Aurelius. In the seven concentric spheres is resident an eternal order. and that the soul of the world is homogeneous with its elements. All living cells use such fuels and oxidize the hydrogen and carbon to capture the sun’s energy and reform water and CO 2 in the process (cellular respiration). The World or Universe was thus compared to man: the Principle of Life that moves it. a perpetuity of existence. isolated from it. and reproducing himself.” According to the Stoic emperor. On man as a microcosm: Pagan and Christian views on the divine which pervades all things: Cf. movement. difference. Vol. the world and all its parts are in God. and. to that which moves man. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists. Mortimer J. and besides. a single substance. while the Philosophers of Egypt and Phoenicia. nor what the world is. outside of that ALL. “World” (Introduction): HE who does not know what the world is. by his reason and intelligence partaking of the Divine Nature: and by his faculty of changing aliments into other substances. in the view of Pythagoras. Morals and Dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry. and one God who pervades all things . act everywhere equally nor in the same manner. making Him exist apart from the Universe. what man has in himself. The Ancient Theology did not so separate God from the Universe. of growing. The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World (Chicago. prepared for the Supreme Council of the Thirty Third Degree for the Southern Jurisdiction of the United States: Charleston. 74 .sorbed from air or water) to form glucose and release oxygen. fruit of the intelligence. this Universal Soul does not.1 He denied the doctrine of the spiritualists. (emphasis added) Cf.

O Universe. or the Absolute Spirit which manifests itself historically in both physical and psychical nature-on any of these views cosmology merges with theology. armed solely with his own weapons. the conception of the world or universe is inseparable from the ideas of God and man. the least part of which it is not in his power to know. and Freud. on the lowest story of the house and the farthest from the vault of heaven. that we consider “man alone. man “feels and sees himself lodged here.– a cosmos rather than a chaos. The cosmology that “is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus” displaces man and shrinks him. Plotinus.” Except “by the vanity of this same imagination” by which “he equals himself to God. in the freedom of His act of creation. if he pictures the world thus. Spinoza. the whole world is less than God. without outside assistance. Sometimes “world” means the all-embracing universe. “which is harmonious to thee. the world is not part of God. but only a tiny speck in a world-system of a magnitude hardly conceivable. These three ideas always interpenetrate each other. but throughout the tradition of the great books. the eternal light of those torches rolling so proudly above his head. as for the Stoics.” how absurd for him to imagine himself “above the circle of the moon. much less to command?” If. though the resulting pattern of thought varies according to the direction in which thought moves from any one of the three to the other two. the deadest. Montaigne. Sometimes the whole universe lies on one side of the infinite distance between the Creator and His creation. . “Everything harmonizes with me.” How then does the world appear? Is it. and the most stagnant part of the universe. should call himself master and emperor of the universe. in all its vastness. But suppose.” With a Christian’s faith in God’s plan and providence. On this view. Humanity cannot hold on to “its naive self-love. is unaffected by the world’s coming to be or passing away. according to Freud. What could lead him to believe.” NOT ONLY IN THE reflections of Marcus Aurelius. uncreated and coeternal with the divinity which dwells in it. he asks. the human habitat—the home of man. and Hegel. only presumption or conceit can save man from being dwarfed by the world. the transcendent One from which emanates in all degrees of being the multiplicity of intelligible and sensible things. who is not even master of himself . and bringing the sky down beneath his feet. its lord and master? Man deceives himself. taken by Christian theologians. and the foundation of his being. Whether God is the prime mover of the universe. the fearful movements of that infinite sea. Montaigne thinks. as Montaigne thinks he should. a thing of soul as well as body. But science robs man of such conceit. then man belongs both to this world and to another—the realm of spiritual creatures which is also part of the created universe. and if “world” means the physical totality. nailed and riveted to the worst. God is not part of the world. amid the mire and dung of the world. Montaigne is also willing to conceive the universe as the stage on which man acts his destined part.” how can he regard himself as occupying an exalted position in the universe? Deprived of the religious faith that he is made in God’s image and that all the rest of the visible universe is made for him. the infinite substance which exceeds the sum of all the finite things that exist only as its modifications. which is his whole honor. that the “admirable motion of the celestial vault.” Freud writes. his strength. in terms of his own reason and knowledge. governed by providence rather than by chance – Aurelius is willing to assume whatever place destiny allots him in the universal scheme. to know 75 . Though man is greater than the earth he treads or the skies he watches. and deprived of divine grace and knowledge. nor is there any whole which embraces both. Montaigne adds. as in the theories of Aristotle. Who has made it out of nothing and Who.” he says. . For Spinoza and Hegel. were established and have lasted so many centuries for his convenience and his service? Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and puny creature. including mind as well as matter. and man has a special place of honor in the hierarchy of beings which constitutes the order of the created world. when it realizes that the earth is “not the center of the universe.

she has / No part of any godhead whatsoever. Some theological principles 16. “But always acts of her own will. Since he is one of nature’s progeny. 5. Sometimes. man is burdened with heavy cares. each and every man in turn but mirrors back his own mysterious self. Its order or structure is more than divinely instituted. p. and all there is of it can be reduced to atoms and the void. 30 Creed of Nicaea.” writes Lucretius. (emphasis added) For the Judeo-Christian perspective. he must be entirely self-reliant.31 The beginning of each human being is therefore a reflection of the coming to be of the world as a whole. Catholic.net/writers/mis/mis_02christiantradition1. in an analogous way to the creation of the entire cosmos. “A Theologian’s Brief On the Place of the Human Embryo Within the Christian Tradition. I. Yet from time to time defeat reminds him that the world remains unruly. the doctrine of a world soul animating the body of the universe is repeatedly proposed in the dialogues of Plato as a way of understanding man. he may not be wholly alien in this world of material forces. For a Christian.” Nevertheless. 1990. The dominant note here is that of man against the world. its matter and mind. The world’s body and soul. The universe obeys no laws except the laws of its own matter in motion. Such views of the world tend. 2 (http://www. the question of the status of the human embryo is directly related to the mystery of creation.” For their own happiness.lifeissues. Lucretius exiles his papier-mâché gods to the interspaces where they “lead lives supremely free of care. It is the indwelling divinity itself. gazing on the gold doubloon he has nailed to the mast as a reward for sighting Moby Dick. 1 Of course the viewpoint of Isaac Newton finds a way to reconcile a world of matter in motion obeying fixed laws and a belief in a provident cause setting all things on their course. In the context of the creation of things ‘seen and unseen’ 30 the human being appears as the microcosm.”2 The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Reproduced with Permission (Submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research by an ad hoc group of Christian theologians from the Anglican. he holds no checkrein to prevent his being overthrown. Considering the philosophers who assert that “mind is the king of heaven and earth. the world is all there is.html [11/18/08]) 76 . It reveals the creative act of God bringing about the reality of this person (of me). 1 “Nature has no tyrants over her. for the most part. are there to be seen in miniature.the world is to know God. Captain Ahab. cf. godless. which. but neither is he. and in which. Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils London: Sheed & Ward.” Socrates suggests in the Philebus that “in reality they are magnifying themselves. and in this unequal struggle science alone gives him the sense-or perhaps the illusion-that at least in his little corner of the world his mind may dominate. as with Lucretius and later philosophers of a materialist cast. assured of nature’s hospitality. and that mad or at least cryptic Platonist. reflecting in the unity of a single creature both spiritual and corporeal realities. The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics. Orthodox and Reformed traditions) Prepared by Rev David Jones MA MSt. Bridle its matter and harness its energies as he will.” But man is not so fortunate. In a world that is not made for him. It is thrown together by blind chance rather than designed by a presiding intelligence. to look upon the individual man as a microcosm mirroring the macrocosm. There is a mystery involved in the existence of each person. London.” A third alternative remains. like a magician’s glass. like a beloved son. N. observes in soliloquy that “this round gold is but the image of the rounder globe.

pp. that is.”[19] It is necessary. et M..I. St. has its origin. On the ‘vital source’ of man’s soul. ch. He breathed into it a soul from the vital source of His own Spirit. S. and Thou shalt renew the face of the earth. The Divine Institutes. that it might bear the similitude of the world itself. and who shows how from this it does not follow that it is of the divine substance: for it is a figurative way of speaking. by loving His goodness. Chapter 27: CHAPTER 27 How the assertion that the breath of life which God breathed into the face of man is not the rational soul. (emphasis added) Cf. Rudolph G.P. Vol.T.P. xi. that is the soul. Contra Errores Graecorum by St. rather Moses said the outpouring of the Holy Spirit was superimposed on the human soul. the body out of the earth.D. that the hearts of men. And what is more. Cf. translated by Peter Damian Fehlner. we do not call this breath of life the soul. Thomas Aquinas.B. Re-edited and missing chapters supplied by Joseph Kenny. cf. D. Collins.12. 13.” Many benefits come to us from the Holy Ghost. Wis. and they shall be created. out of nothing. the soul is created by the Holy Spirit. F.”[18] Thus. Dionysius says: “Divine love did not permit Him to be without offspring. In The Ante-Nicene Fathers: translations of the writings of the Fathers down to A. the soul would be uncangeable and would not sin because it would be of the divine essence. 48. O.D. 325.”[20] <…> [49-50] 18. 50: The Catechism of St.. 30.. In The Catechetical Instructions of St. destroyed by sin. Ph. O. 19. 110 This is contrary to the explanation of Augustine 111 who claims that by that breath is meant the human soul. of the dust of which we have said that it was formed. 7: For having made the body. 25. because God has made all things through Him.D. Joseph B.31 Gregory of Nyssa On the Making of Man. Book II.. but the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is to be understood. of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live. IV. 230. Thomas Aquinas THE EIGHTH ARTICLE: “I Believe in the Holy Ghost. Translated with a Commentary by Rev. For he consists of soul and body. Tanner p. Another doubt arises from Cyril’s statement that “when in Genesis 1 109 God is said to have breathed the breath of life into the face of man in order that man might become a living being. as it were. Thomas Aquinas. Now.S. Nom. Lactantius. and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made. Thomas Aquinas. created everything: “Thou lovest all things that are. Ph. Introduction by Rev. out of heaven from God. Thomas Aquinas. Creed of Lateran IV. but only that he made the spirit. ciii.D.. The Catechism of St. therefore. (Baltimore. Div. The Apostle’s Creed. for God. it appears to 77 . (1) He cleanses us from our sins. as it were. 112 meaning not that the Holy Spirit breathed as a body. The Eighth Article. 1939). For were it the soul. which is everlasting.. S. N. be made anew by the Holy Ghost: “Thou shalt send forth Thy Spirit.D. Ps. Bandas. The reason is that one must repair that which one has made. 20. John Damascene Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II. which is composed of opposing elements.

ad litt.131 131 Cf. “O heavenly King. of matter and spirit. § (c) 2013 Bart A. c 1. 5-12. Nicene Creed: DS 150. Creator Spiritus). 109 110 Rather Gen. from the Thesaurus ass. 34 (PG 75. As a composite of body and soul. Cyril’s explanation cannot be described as literal. “the Creator Spirit” (Veni.contradict statements of the Apostle who says in 1 Cor. Byzantine Troparion of Pentecost Vespers. 15 (45): The first Adam became a living being. All rights reserved. Hymn “Veni. 36. Mazzetti. Hence that inbreathing by which man became a living being cannot be understood as the grace of the Holy Spirit. c 2 (PL 34. 291: 291. Lib. the “source of every good”. (emphasis added) Cf. St. then.. Mazzetti 78 . VII. the “giver of life”. also The Catechism of the Catholic Church. 584 D). man is the image of the world. …The Church’s faith likewise confesses the creative action of the Holy Spirit. See also: De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Philippum de Castro Caeli (On the Combination of the Elements to Master Philip of Castrocaeli). and then the spiritual”. Consoler”. Trans. Thomas Aquinas. the last Adam became a life-giving spirit. c. But it is not the spiritual which is first but the physical. Here the life of the soul is expressly declared to be different from the life which is through the Holy Spirit. 1. Hence. whereas the heart stands to the body as the heaven to the world. n. 112 Figurative way of speaking: thus Peter Lombard. but only allegorical. d 17. Bart A. 2:7. abbreviated by Peter Lombard II Sent. 356). 111 De Gen. the principles of which are earth and heaven. Creator Spiritus”.