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W
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WANG MIN G
MAO's
ETRAYAL
'I'ran.slal erl
by Fie Schneiereon
[EJiil
pnOC;fiESS P UBL1SUl!:l\S
MOSCOW
Ban Mila
nPE,lJ:ATEJIhCTBO 1I1AO U33-,lJ:YHA
110 aH2.1UUC"OM .4 Jw x-t
CONTENTS
A Short Fore uiord
I. FIFTY YEAHS OF TH E COMMUN IST PARTY OF
CHINA
I I. "CAI\II'AIG:\ FOH TIlE RECTIFI CATION OF STYLE"-
IJRESS REHEARSAL OF THE "ClJ LTU HA/, REVOLU-
1'101:\"
5
7
15
1. Th e Pr eparatory First Peri od of the "St yl e Hectifrca-
li on" Ca mpaign I f)
2. Th e Second Peri od of "Styl e Hectifi cati on' 54
a Th e Third Salvation" 11 8
I,. Th e Fonr th Period- "Self-Refutati on a nd Hnhahil ita -
tion " 148
fl. The Fifth Peri od- "Surnming up" 1[,2
III. THE "CULTT1HAL REVOLUTIO;\, " AXD THE MAOIST
ilW FOR COOI'ERAT IOX \\'1'1'11 164
L "Cul t ur al Revolution" in Na me :111(1 Cou ntor- Itevol u-
tionnry Coup in Substance 1131
2. Cooper at ion with Impe riali sm Is a Component of
Mao' s Cn unt cr- Hevolu t ionurv Co up 170
:l The Reg-innin g of t he Pr esent j\laoi st Line of Co-
op eration with Impe ri al ism I n
4. Th ", Basi c Reasons for Mao' s Di sgrace 195
© n OJlIITII <J ll aT 1!l75
Engli!' h t rnns la ti on © Pr ogress I'ubl ishors 1979
Pri nted in t he Uni on of So vi et S oci ali st Republ ies
IV. rue FATE OF THE " U):\,E MONK" !I ;\,D TH E
1ST 10TIl
I. Why Mao Tse-l ung Became a " Lone Monk"
2. TIll! Home and For ei gn Poli cy of the Maoist
Congre ss
a. Mao 'I'se-tnng and Chi n Shi h lI uang
A f te rw ord
MA O-
197
Hl7
10th
204
224
277
A SHORT FOREWORD
The first and second partsof this book, " Fifty Years of
the Communist Party of China" and "Campaign for th e
Re ctification of Style-Dress Reh earsal of the ' Cultur al
Revolution' " , are taken from an article I wrote in 1971
on t he 50th anniversary of th e CPC. The third par t,
"'Cultural Revolution' and the Maoist Bid for Coopera-
tion with Imperialism", was written in tho autumn of
Hl71 to explain the " sudden reversal" in Mao' s r ela tions
with th e United St ates. Due to ill health I could not
fini sh the manuscripts. Later, when health permitted, I
continued my work. The fourth part, "The Fato of th e
' Lone Monk' and th e Maoist Tenth Congress", wa s writ-
ten in the heginning of Hl74.
Joining th ese four manuscripts under on e head foll ows
the logic of th e even ts. Certainly, it wa s not acci denta l
t hat Mao ':. betrayed Communi sm and th e Revol ution. Hi s
ultimate treason cro wned a lon g suc cess ion of cr imes. A
decisive part in the chain of events leading to his ap ostasy
was played by his rea ctionary " ca mpaign for the r ectifi ca -
tion of th e style of work" in th e ea rl y half of th e
forti es and by the " cul tur al revolution" launch ed in the
latter hal f of the sixti es and cont inuing in altered form
today. Du e to hi s counte r-re volutionary turnabout, Mao
won favour with ext re me rea cti onary imperialist groups,
wh i le in th e eye s of th e true Chines e Communists, in the
eyes of l he wh nl« peopl e of China, and in th e eyes of th e
wor ld co mmuu ist a nd aut i-impet-ia l is t movem en ts he is
a despicabl e tr aitor. He knows that he is a lone , abandoned
* Mao Tse-tung died at the age of 82 in Peking on 9 Sep-
tember 1\176.
and r ej ect ed by even his once closest Foll ow ers . It wa s
this th at ma ds him say to Ed gar Sno w when seeing him
off in the spr ing o f 1971 that 'he .is " a lon e monk walking
l.he world witll -a l eak y urnbrclln ". .
The conc ludi ng part of this book deal s wi th th e l at est
events in China, I t touch es on th e follo wi ng qu esti ons :
why has Mao become a " lone monk " : the' home and
for eign poli cy decisi ons of the l Oth cpe Con-
gross: why does Mao gl orify Chin Shi h Huang, a ttack
Confuciu s' and abu se tho name of Lu Hsun: Mao' s second
"c ul tura l 'l'ovol uli on" under th e signboard of cri l.icisl ng
LiI ; Pi ao and Confu cius.
I am quit e sure that th e " lo ne monk" is doomed to
"final, d ear and compl et e" ':- def eat. prcdictiou
no prooi . It is pr edet ermi ned by hlst ory. The Chi nese
Corntnuui stsand the peopl e or China are s ure t,? throw
off Ma o' s rea cti on ary rul e t o t ake command of th eir c?u,n"
try' s dcstiuv and build their and .hap py soclahSl,
futur e. 'Iihi s condus ion foll ows fr om th e ine xora ble laws
of hi stor y.
23 Mar ch 1974
" Mao' s 0 11'11 favou rite phrase.
FIFTY YEARS
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
On 1 July L97 1 t he Communist. Part y of China wa s 50
years old.
It is a Marxi st-Leninist party, the vanguard of the
Chinese working class, Under guidance of the Commu-
nist Internation al and with the a ll-round help and sup-
port of th e Communis t Part.y of th e Sovie t Union it.
headed the l ong,arduous, heroic, a rmed and unarmed,
legal and under ground r evol utionar y struggl e of tho Chi-
nese peopl e.
Many were the sple ndid lighter s and national h er oes
who grew up in t ile hitter contest for nation al and social
liberati on in condit ions of brutal white t error and ex-
ceerli ngly difficult revoluti onary wa rs. Many have laid
down their lives for the riause of the P'arty and revolu-
tion. May their memory live for ever. ::'
Soon after th e foundi ng of the Party, du ring tllll
Peking-Hankow Railwa y st ri ke of 7 February !fl23 against
the abuse s of the Peiyaug warlords, the strikers and
th eir l ead er s di spl ayed t,he aston ishing fearlessness and
mass heroi sm typical of th e working class and it s van-
guard. After the ene my had chopped of[ hi s left hand, try-
in g to compel him t o orde r ,bhe worker s hack to work,
Lin Hsiang- ehlen, chair man of the Pcking-Hankow Rail-
wa y Workers' Union, said: " Yo u ca n chop off my head,
l will not orde r t.i1 e men ha ck to work, " Lin di ed a hero' s
death, foll owed to th e grave by lawyer Shi h Yang, who
r epresent ed th e stri king workers a nd chos e death to how-
i ng bef or e hi s tormentors.
I' The list cf comra des f.{ ivol1 here was dr awn up Irum
memor y and a vai lahlo mat erial.
7
The following met a her oic rleath in 1D25-Hl27, during
tho memorable anti-imper ial is t May Thirti eth Mov ement
( 1925) " : Ku Chen-hung, who head ed th e str ike at
Japanese-owned t extile mills in Shanghai; Ho Pen g-i, orga-
nisor of a dcmonstr ntion of Shanghai University s tuden ts ;
Li n Hua chairman of th e General Trade Uni on Connell
of Shanghai , who head ed a gene ra l str ike of half a mil -
Iiou Shanghai worker s.
And the foll owing l aid down th eir liv es ligh ting na-
ti oualnnd class ene mies: Chi Shu-fe ng, prominent eco n-
omist and author of the well -known book, China under
the Hobnail ed Baal of I mperialism, wh o orga nise d an
anti-imper iali st demunstrati on in Chen T,sall -
hsien chairman of the General Trade Union Council of
Kiangsi pr ovince; Lo l -nung and Chao l eaders
or th e th ird armed unri sing of Shang liui worker s; W an g
Shou-h ua chair man of the General Trade Uni on Council
of Shangl'lai; Li Ta-chao, one of the first th e0:ists
of Marxi sm-Leninism and its outsta nding l ead er : Chi ang
Hsicn-vun, commander of a regiment consisti ng mostly
of Communi sts, which heroically sto rme d and capture rl
tho fortr ess of Chengch ow held by a large force of Man-
churian warlords; Kuo Liang, pr omin ent pea sa nt leader
in Hunan province; .l Isieu Chin-yu, popul ar l ead er of th e
women ' s movement, secr eta ry of th o Party' s Il ankow city
committee and member of th e Central CommiLtee; Hsiao
Chu-nn, popular youth l eader ; Ma Chun, of. the
May Fo ur th Movemen t (H1Hl) , rn nmhcr of the (, 1 C from
1921, worked among th e Dungans, and lat er was secre tary
of the Party' s Peking city committee; the brothe rs Chen
Yen-nicn and Chen Chiao-nien, both me mbers of the
Party' s Politbureau, arrested
togothor; Chang Tai-lei , senior politi cal and military
load er of the Kwaugchow (Canto n) upri sing an d hea d of
tho Kwangchow Sovie t govcrnmell1.. me mber of t he
Party' s Cen tral Committee, and man y other comrades.
Many comra des fell during the agrari an r evoluti on and
th e .a n li-J a pa uesu local war uf 1928- H137, am ong- th urn
Su Chao-ch eng, leader uf the big str ike in
Kwangtung provi nce and Ho ng-kong; he was el ected chair-
.. The names are given in chronological order according to
the dale of deat h.
man of the Kwangchow Sovi et govcrnment " (during th e
Kwangchow upri sing ) , was a member of th e l' artv' s
Polithureau. di ed fr om ove rs trai n ; Chang Kun-ti
tary of the Panty' s Kwangtung provincial commit tee) and
his wife W,ang Lan-ying (chi ef of the pr ovincial commit-
tee's women ' s department), who met their death s ide
by s ide, showing gr eat courage,
Tr each er y oand betrayal re sulted in tho heroi c de ath
of Pong Pai , prominent peasant l ead er , chairman of the
Hei.lnfong Soviet gover nment and member of th e Party' s
Polithureuu ; Yang Ying, organiser of the great Kwang-
chow-Hongkong strike, member of the Kwan gchow Sovie t
govern me n t, and alternate member of th e Pulithu rcuu
in cha r ge of comba tt ing counter-r evolu tiou: Chan g Kuo-
sh u, secret ary of the Party' s Ki angsi pr ovinci al commi t-
teo and his wife Yen Pi -fang, head of th e oornrrrittcc' s
women' s department. -
At the time of the Li Li -sen line hundr eds of th e Par-
ty' s finest military and politi cal ca dres wer e se nt to vari -
ous l ar ge and medium citi es to or gan ise upri sings, and
t here met a heroi c death, Among t he m were Wu Ch en-
pen, Ma o Chua-Ian, Liu Yun, Chen Chi -ko, Ho Kun-jung,
Wang Pu-wen, Qhen Te-ch en , Hu Chin- ch ai , Tung J ih-
chang, W ang Tzu-ping, Lin Chen-lsiu , and Tang Yu-kun.
Man y othe rs fell , too: Lo 'I'cng-hsicn, a pop ular work er s'
leader and member of the Party' s Politbureau; Lin Yu-
nan and Li Chiu-shih, l eader s of t ho Chinese YCL; tho
well -known writers Il l! Ych-piug and J ou Shih, active as
pa rty cadres in literature and art; Yi ng F II , a yo ung but.
alr eady famous prol etarian poet ; Tsai He-sen, member of
th e Party's Polithnreau: Yun Tai-yin g, promin en t org a-
ni sor of the youth movement. and member of th o Pa rty' s
Central Committee; Huang Kung-lush , commander of tlH'
3rd Hed Army; Lu 1, politi cal commi ss ar of th e 2nd
Red Army; Mo Ping-Ian, chi ef of the women ' s dcpartmout
of the Party's Kwangsi pr ovinci al cornmit.t ee, and Iearl cr
of the women' s movemen t among the Chua ng et hnic'
group: Tung Chi ang-jung and Po Yang, secretaries of th e
Party' s Manchurian pr ovincial commit t ee; Ho Ss u-rnei,
Icadm of n nf.i-Jnpaneso gucrr- illn g ro ll p;: in M nnrh ur-ia :
Pu Wei-yu , commande r of \.lIe Sha ughn i workers' volu n-
':. At that ti me Su Ch no-ch ong was in Shangha i and, since tho
Kwau gchow Soviet government survived for only three days,
did not assume offi ce.
tner unit in the battl e for Shan ghai and W oosung agulnst
the J a pan ese, and his deputy , Su n .Hs ia o- pao; Tong
Chung -hsia, a pioneer l eader of the Chtnese t r ade
movement, organi se r of the F ebruary t: Strike
(1923) a nd of the Kwangtung and Hon gkon g (.192,)- 1926)
s tr ik es, member of th e Party ' s Central
Yun-tao, se cre ta ry of th e CC CPC Bureau for .North
and chairman of the Al l-China Unio n
Hu a ng Li , ser,m t. ar y of th e Part y s provi ncial
and Shanghai city commi t t ees ; Shen. Ts e-mmg,. deputy
s ec r et ar y of the IT up eh-Honan-Anhwei br anch of tho
CPC Buren u for So vie t ar ea s, s ecr et a ry of the Party s
Hupeh-Tlon an-Anhwei provincial commi ttel> member
of t he Central Committee; Ho Tsu-shu. ac ti ve III combat-
Ling th e Li Li -sen line. a gi ft ed of the masse s;
Ch llO P.o-sh en g, comma nder of t,he Herl Army' s 5th Army
Corps: Ch i Hung-ch ang. conu uander of the 2nd Army
of the Chahar-Sui yuan Anti -J apanes e Un ion Army, com-
mander of t,he Iatt er ' s northern s ec to r, a nd l ead er of th e
North China people' s anti-Japanese commit t ee for armed
se lf -de fe nce; Nie h Erh, Ch ina ' s fir st pro leta ria n compos-
er ' Hsi a Hsi , member of th e P a rty' s Ce n tra l Com mit te e
a n'd socr otarv of the CC CPC Bureau for Soviet ar eas
brunch in western di stri cts of Tl unan and Hupeh ; Tsyui
Tsyu -po, prominent Par t y functionHry. wr it er. and minis-
t er of edu cation in th e Chinese Soviet Republic; Ho Shu-
heng, delegate to the f s t Congress of crc and ?h i of
of th e cen t ra l worker-p easant i ns pe ct ion of tho Chinese
Soviet Hepu bli c: Chung Yu, l ead er of a s pecial (security)
branch un it of th e ce CP C who di splayed co ura ge beyond
com pare in fight ing t raitors und enp;my agents :. Chi en
Chuang-f ei. wh o in filtrated t he s ecr et a nd
performed many important se r vi ces for t he Party s ,
t ral Commi tt ee: Fang Chih-min. founder of th e Soviet
area in the north-ea st of Kiunzsi pr ovi nce, comma nder
of th e 10th Red Army: Hs un Hu nt-ch ou . commander of
th e 7t h Hed Army; Ho Ch ang. depu ty ch ief of th e Hed
Army's ma in pol iti ca l depar tment : Lin of
the polit ical depa rtment of th e Red Ar my' s Sth Army
Corps : Lin Chth-tan, comma nde r of the Red Army' s 2Gt h
Armv a nd fou nde r of the Sovie t area in th e north of
S h erisi pr ovi nre: Tung CIH'n-tang, acting r OIllmilTlll er of
the we ' t em sect or of t he Hed Army, comma nd er of llw
5th Arm y Corps; Ying Ch ien , head of th e CC cre No rth
China Bureau' s or gani sational department , and many
nth or comrades.
Tho foll owin g- fell in the a n t i- Ja panese war of 1937 -
Hl4 5: Tso Cliuan , deputy chi ef of the 8th Army general
headquart ers : Hsi ang Ying. pr omin en t worker s' l ead er
and CPC Iuncti onnry, deput y commander or th e [ew 11t h
Army, member of th e Party' s Politbur eau: Yuan Kuo-
pi n g'. chic] of ,t.he New !tet h Army's politicul departme nt;
Lo Ping l i ui and P eng Hsn ch -I en g. conun nnd ers uf New
4th Arm y formati ons : Chang W en - pin g, secretary of the
Party' s Kwangtu ng provinci al com mit tee. a nd Red Army
veteran: Ch en T nn-ohiu, del eg at e to t he l st Cnngross o'f
t he CPC, member of the Party' s Central Auditing Com-
mi ssi on. an d mi nister of food i n the Cl li nese ' Soviet
ll epubli c: Yang Chin-yu, couun an de r-i n-c hie l of th e North-
cas t An ti -J apanes e Un io n Army and co uuu an rl er of th e
Lst Army ; Cha o Shang-chih . dep u t y ccmmanrl or- in- chi ef
an d commander of th e 3rd Army; Tsni Shih-j ung, com-
mandcr Ill' th e f.ith Army; Chao l -rn ang, r egimental co m-
missar and h er oi n e o] ,th e a nt.i-Jn pa ncse war, nnrl man y
other cumr adcs.
Th e foll owing lli ed during th e cease- In-a an d t he libera-
ti on war of Hl4fi-H149. Prominent P art y l eader Ch i n
P a ng- hs icn ( Po Ku ), Teng Fa, ohai rman of the St a t p
Poli tical Dep artmenL of t.he Chines e Sovi et Hopnhl i a lid
me m ber of th e Pol.it.hur oau , Ccul.rul Comruit.tec member
\ Vang J o-Ioi , a nd comma nde r of tho New 4th Army Yeh
'I' i ng died on 8 April Hl46. Chu Jui , artill ery commandor
of the P eople' s Liberati on Army, a nd many other com-
rades di ed in H"11j7. Lo Sh ih-wen a nd Che Ya o-h si au ,
loa ders of the Party ' s Szech uan provinci al eommit,t ee.
nct.ive in th e united national an ti -J apa nese fron t of
Sznch uan, and man y oth ers, di ed ill uVt \) . .
This is an lucom pl et e li st of Communi s ts, YCLers,
r ev oluti onarv workers a nd peasants, i ntelle{;tuals a nd s tu-
den ts who gave their for of the ,re ,:o-
Iu l. iou urv st r uggle. Many In l fr om thl' SOylCt
Union, t oo, died h or oi call y for t he Clunese revolution.
May th eir memor y Live for ev er. .
l\'liUi on s or revoluti onar y !"I gh t ers in si de a wl
I h e Part v t,ook part ,i11 the lierni c 28-yeal' -l ong r avul uti on -
a l'Y :-t r u; rgle. Tholl s Huds of lll on a ll(1 women wer e r eare d
ill ' t he In be eon){) til e Pnl',I, y' s l Cl nding 1IIldeus and
ha ckbone, As a r esull. , t he CPC ue{; amc a Ulass party,
fu rthe,rrnor e, built a stro ng r evoluti onary army.
ena bled it to offer lead ersh i p to man y hu ndreds of mil -
l,lOlI S of peopl e and: with al l-ro und So vi et assis tance, t o
Chinese No t only did it sue-
cessf ull,Y perform the unti -impcrl uli st and anti-f eudal
hut it al so put China on the path of social is t.
r evoluti onand the buildi ng of socialism.
wer e gl ori ous chapt ers inscrib ed by the Com-
munist Party o f China and the Chin es e people in th o
coun try's 5, 000-year hi stor y, and t h eir maznificent contr i-
bution t o the world revolutionary
Under guidance of the Communist International and
wi th the hel p of th e Communi st P arty of th e Soviet
Union, with Lenini st i nternation ali sts in t.he vanguard,
armed with the th eory and tactics of Len inism , the Com-
muni st Party of Chi na won vi ct ory afte r vi ctory in dif-
I er cnt peri ods of t he Chinese r evoluti on over vari ou s anti-
Lenini st ideas and lines, It overc ame diificulti es and ob-
s tacles, and con tinuo usly gre w st ronger ,
In the sum me r of H)27 Lhe Party gr appled with the
ri ght- opportunism of Ch en Tu-hsiu; in th e spring and
summer of 1928 it squashed the "l ol t" putschi st line of
the November 1927 Central Committee Pl enum; in the
autumn of 1929 it put an end to t he activi t y of the Trots-
kyite-Ch en Tu-hsiu group of liquidator s (who aimed at
dissolving the Party) , and in 1930-1931 it defeated t h e
semi-Trotsky i te Li Li -sen line and the counter-re volution-
ary Lo Chang-lung gro up . And in all peri ods, especially
si nce the th irti es, it con ti nuo us l y ca me t o gr i ps in long,
i ntricat e and difficul t str uggles wit h th o an ti -Leninist,
anti-Gomintern, anti-Par ty, anti-Sovi et , and a nti- people
politi cal " though ts" and lines of Mao Tsc-tung. This and
on ly this enable d th e Party t o furth er th e Chinese r evo-
luti on and bring it t o vic tory, as it al so enable d the Peo-
pl e's Hepub lic of China t o mak e con sider abl e progress in
building soc ialis m with the aid of the Soviet
And yet, the vi ct ori es scored by Lenini st id eas and
Len inist political lin e over th e "tho ughts " and line
of Mao Tse-tu ng in diff(!I'pnt peri ods of th e Chinese rev-
olution are on ly one side of t he pic tu re . Th... ot her side
consists in cr imes commit t ed by Mao in the course of th e
revolution , For example. after usurpi ng milita ry
III ,th.e Par ty at the CC CPC Politbureau mee ting
III I's uu yi III J anuary 1935, Mao did unprecedented
damage to th e ere and the I'aray-l ed Chi nese Red Ar m"
In th e earl y half of 1I f t ' M' . oJ'
r " , ' ie res, ao launch ed a r eacti on -
ca mpatgn for th e r ectifica tion of the st yle of work"
11s was dir ect ed agai ns t Marxi sm-L eninisnl' the Co ' .
tern an I tl S ' U· " 1ll1I1-
" ' . 1:- oVle L, . mo n, and infli cted t erribl e i deo lov-
T! olrtJC.al and orgaulsati onal damage ;11
e " 2nd Pl enuur -oj t h e S eve nt h CPC Cen-
tral Committee In H149 Mao repla ced Leninist ' I I
t he Leninist line wi th the and t he l\ne
H
ane
democr. , "Ill " ' , , c ' 0 1!e\V
n t.I ?, Iirti es and earl y six ties hi s ad -
vc ntu r i st bi g leap poli cy and th e in stitution of peo ple' s
commm,les sot China ana cours e of political r eact ion a nd
e,cononllc The living standard and cultur al
hfe , of . the Chi nes e peopl e deteri or ated. Then, Irorn the
beginning of .t he Ma o' s home and for ei gn policy
based on and anti-communism finall y l ed
to a coup, worked by Mao under
the guise of a "cul tural r evolution". This cou nt er-r evol u-
tionary putsch was an unheard-of cal amit y for Pa rty and
people, a nd did grave h arm to th e world soci ali st system,
th e world commu nis t movem ent , th e anti-imperialist st r ug-
gle, and th e peace movem en t through out the
Following the " recti fication of \lhe ·styl e of wo rk" cam-
pai gn of t h e for ties and through out the past 30 years,
Ma o twisted , di storted ami falsifi ed the hi stor y of t he
Communist Party of China. An editoriul article published
0 11 1 Jul y 1971 i n Jenmi nj i hpao, t h o journal Hungchi a nd
bhe n ewspaper Ctuehiongchi unpao, entitled "The 50th 1\11-
nivorsary of th e Communist Party of Chi na", written on
Mao' s express orders, wa s ia new collection of li es and
slande rs , a n ow Ialsilicatlon of the h istory of the CPC,
and a furth er step al ong th e COUl'SO of anti-Sovietism and
an t i-communism, "gl or if ying" Mao Tse-tung. Only a man
compl etel y devoid of shame could i ns pire so fooli sh and
shabby all ar t ic le, Mao mad e no ment ion of th e fall en
her oes of th e revoluti on, and bhis was no t accide ntal. The
traitor to Party and revoluti on did not want -and i ndeed
had no moral right -to honour the memo ry of our dead.
The Maoi st Ialsifi cati ou of th e hi st or y of the CPC wa s
meant to portray th e vi ct or y of Len in' s ideas and the
Len ini st li ne in n hin a as a tr iumph for t he "tho ugh ts"
". To avoid repetition, I re fer the reader to Len in, Len in ism,
und t he Ch in ese Revolut ion , wher e I deal wit h these questions
i n conne ction with th e centenary of the great Lenin's birth.
13
a orl , iin l' Mao '1' so- tu ng. Th c ar duous st r ugO'les unrl
gl OI'l 2
11
:" vlr lOl' i()s of the Communi sj. Pm'l,y of and
th,o Chi nns« p() opl e und er guidRllce of the Comintorn and
WII!l ,the aid of .Ihe So vio ]. Communi st Part y and Soviet
were deplet ed by :\l ao a' his own, personal doing.
l Iis "t houg hts":, line and poli cy were passed
off as absol utely con ed ' . Mno shifted 0 11 others t,he
blame for his own mist ak es and cr imes. and to make as-
sur ance doubl y sure sys tematica lly fabri cated "c ri mes"
allegedl y committ ed by hi s politi cal opponents in the
Part y.
By th ese mebhorls he sought to win credit Ior himself
and to discr edit and defame othe rs. TI c Ial sifled the hi s-
tor y of the CPC ill every concei vable manlier to depr eciat e
Lenini sm. th e Cominl ern, and th e Soviet Un ion, and to
replace rcvoluti ouu rv Marxism-Len inism wit h count er-
r evoluti onary Maoism, l3y so doing he sought 10 deif y
his own person and .l o usurp supr emo politica l power in
Par'l y ami country. Then, at a "propiti ons moment", he
wouId usc t his power to commi t r uuk tr each ery aga i nst
HaT'ty, state 'lind peopl e, and tak e a di sgr-a ceful course
of action on t he iuterna tionul scen e ag ain st the Soviet
Union, Ihe communis t parti es of other cOII Tltrip s,and the
nati onal l ibera ti on movement. Thi s earned hi m fav our
wi eh imporiali st s and othe r reactionarie ' . In 1fl G6 and
lat er , behi nd t he scr een of a "cultural r evolut ion", Mao
per formed a counter-r evol ut ionary coup. Thereafter , he
opon],v took th e roa d 0 f nationa I betra yal , secki ng I' ll p-
pr ocli ement and coopera t ion with impcrialist forces and
rcvoali ng his tr-n o face, so carefully conceal ed for many
yours, to th e wh ole world.
To underst and tdr e r eason for the lall a nd di sgr ace of
Mao Tso-tu ug, we must ill additio n to what has already
been said exa mine mor e cl oselv the hi stori cal r oots of
hi s bet raya l, ( 0 1' they, and llIoi' e s peci fically hi s "e arn-
pai gn Ior th e r ectifi cati on of th e st yle of work" in th e
forti es, have R direct and cl ose boarin g on curre nt events.
As l at p:1' devel opments showed, thi s " re ctt fica tion of style"
cum par g u was a dress re hea rsa l of the " cul tura l reyolu -
tion". So. to und erstand the "cul tural r evoluti on" we
must have a «lea r idea of this campaign.
II "CAMPAIGN FOR THE RECTIFICATION
OF STYLE"-DRESS REHEARSAL OF
THE "CULTURAL REVOI.. UTION"
At the end of the s umme r and the beginni ng of th e au-
tuum of H141 Mao Tsc-t.un g look udvantago of the inter -
national situation foll owing OIl the Nazi attack on th e
US SR and the t omporary setbacks of t he Soviet Army,
and of the r el at i ve major ity he bad managed to build by
that time in the CC CI'C, to mount tlre " cainpa ign 1' 01'
the re ctifi cati on of the styl e of work", se cre t pr eparati on s
for whi ch he had begun in the aut umn of 19:)8, In so
doing. II I' re lied 0 11 th e CC CIJC guard which
was subordinat e to him HS chair man of t he CPC military
council.
Th e campaign last ed for foul' year s -from t he aut umn
of 19<'11 until th e slimmer of 1945, with five distinct pe-
ri ods:
1) the preparatory peri od (Sopteruber HM.1-February

th e peri od of the "ructi ficnt ion of sty l e" campaign
pr opel' (February 19/12-July Ifl43) ;
3) the period of "emergency sal vatio n" (Jul y 1943-
summe r of 1944);
II) the peri od of "seli- rci ut at ions an d re habilita t ion"
(summer of 1944-spring of 1945) ;
5) the "summing-u p per iod" (spring of 19
/1
;)-SUrnmer
of l H11 5) ,

l. TnE PREPARATORY FIRST PERIOD
OF THE "ST YLE RECTI FICATION"
CAMPAIGN
Du ri ng t hi s period l\1ao iuade th e following provi sional
moves :
1) By means of intrigues and compuls ion
he suspended all Part y periodi cal s in Yenan
These includ ed the CC CPC news pap er Hsinchunghuapuo
(New China ) , th e CC CPC j ournal s Chiehf ang (Liber a-
ti on) and Kungchuntangj en. (Communist), the journal of
the CC CPC Women' s Committee Ch ungk uojunii (Chin ese
Woman) , tile journal of th e CC crc Youth Committee
Chungkuochingni en (China Youth ) , and the li ter ary jour-
na l of t he CC CPC Chungkuourenhua (Chinese Cul tur e):
These periodi cal s wer e s us pe nde d becau se they were con-
tr olled hy Wan g Min g, 1.0 Fu (Cha ng Wen-Lien}. and
Kai Feng. Only the j ournal of t he 8th Houte Army, di -
r ect l y controlle d by Mao, con ti nue d to appear, and a new
dail y, Chiehj anr;ji hpao (Liberati on) , was Iou nrled, al so
comple te ly under his control.
2) He closed down educational establishments
Mao removed the Anti-Japanese Milt tar y-Polltl cal Schoo l
aIll) til e Nort h Shensi Inst it ut e to lh e Sha ns i-Chahar-
Hopeh Border Ar ea, whil e t he Yenan Women 's Univer-
sity and the Courses for Youth Cadres were di ssolved
because Mao fear ed tha t t he r evolutionary youth enrolled
in th cm would oppose campaign for th e " rectificat ion
of the s tyle of work" . The Central Party Sc hool and the
l ns l.i l.u Le of Marxism-Lenini sm we re nomi na lly l ef t i ntac t,
bu t cadr es wer e being concen tr at ed th ere to '(;onuuct th e
" styl e re ctificati on " campaign.
3) He eounterposed Maoism to Leninism
III tite ea rl y half of l IH1, Mao ordere d th e pub li cation of
11 collec tion en titl ed, "Marx , Engels, Lenin and Stalin on
(which included some Corni ntern documents}.
I'hi s was followed by a second collect ion, " From th e
lith CPC Cungress t o Our Day" , la ter re name d " Two
IG
Lines" ( which incl uded doc uments of the Party's l eadtnz
and the works of some Parl.y leader s · -Mao in
til' S1 Wang Ming, Po Ku and Lo Fu) . The purpose
of these col le ctions in the COurs e of the "style
ca mpaign" was to br ing home th e idea that
only Mao s are correct , while all othe r documents
and works are incorroct ".
From September Hl41 on, in private convers a li olls with
of the Politbureau, Ma o ofto n referred to his
pl an of creating Maoism. Here is the cont ent of one of
Mac 's c onvorsa tions wit h me:
"Comrade Wang Ming, I waut to crea te Maoism. What
Isyour opinion on thi s sc ore ?"
"For what purpose ?"
."If a l ead or has no 'ism' of his own, he can be over-
thrown during his lif et ime, and may even be attacked alter
rleath, ·Wit h an ' ism' the situation is diff er ent. Marx has
Marxi sm and though the Second Interna tional split int o
many groups, none dared t o go aga ins t Marx and Ma rx -
.lsan. Lenin has Leninism and t hough th er e were many
an d cur rents in th e Third Internat ional and the
.Bolshevik Part y, non e acted openly against Leni n and
Leninism. Sun Yat -sen has Sun Yat-senism and thou gh
\tJl er e is t urmoil and a gr eat number of groups in the
Kuomi ntang, none dares to go against Sun Yat-sen and
Sun Yat-seni sm. .If I do not cr eat e my own 'ism', I may
be over t hro wn even t hough the 7th CPC Congress el ect s
me chairma n of the Central Committee."
I replied: . .
li lt is not true that an ' ism' is f.I guarantee against ba in g
(Jvrn1Ju own. Indeed, if the ' ism' is wrong, one. ca,T!
very .quickl y. Trotsky and Ch en Tu-hsiu had their Isms ,
but didn't they both come a cr opper? Like the communist
parties of other countries, the Communist Party of China
is guided by Mal'Xism-Leninism. W hy ' stoke a separ at e
furnace ' and cre ate an 'i sm' ?" . " .
" By creati ng Maoism 1 shall pr eserve Marxism, sal.d
Ma o Tsc-tung. " Al l I r ej ect is L.eninism. .My approach IS
.the followi ng : Le ninism is RUSSia n Marxism, a bl end .of
the universal truth of Marxi sm with the conc rete
.of tho Russian revol ution; Maoism is Chinese or.
'Marxism, a bl end or the univer sal truth of With
.th e conc r et e practi ce of t he Chinese r evoluti on .
I t r ied to expl ain:
,.,
"What you say is untenabl e theoroti cally and also in
To .to Marxi sm, t o accept
Mar xism a nd r ej ect Lenini sm -i-this was deliber ately don e
by leader s of the Seco nd Int ern ati onal and bourgeois
scholars, who in fa ct rej ect both Leninism and Marxism.
We Communists cannot do this. For us Leninism is the
Marxism of the epo ch of imper ialism and proletar ian
r evol uti ons. In other words, Lenini sm is Ma rxism as it
con tinues to develop in th e new epoc h. To Sinif y Marx-
ism is wrong. The very appr oach is uri-Marxist, Ther e
are no nationa l Marxisms, nor ca n t here be. Marxism is
and always will be an i n ternational teachi ng. Sinc e you
have r aised thi s important top ic, l et me sincerel y say:
your approach is harmful Hot only for t he wor ld commu-
ni st movement and the Communist Party of China, hut will
al so do no good to you personally. I beg you La think long
and seri ous l y. Ther e is no need for any Maoism. "
"How can this be so'?" Mao said. " Haven't I quit e si n-
cerely told you that if a man has no 'ism' of hi s own,
he usu ally comes a cropper?"
" I n t hat case, which of yo ur writings could be used
as tha bas is for Maoism'?" I ask ed.
"W hy-s-new democr acy is Maoism. My book On New
Democracy. is the first and basic theoretical pr odu ct of
Ma oism, It was for this purpose that I wrote it in 1939.
But at that time 1 could not say so openly: now I cun."
Thereupon. I said:
"You will sure ly r ecall that when you showed your
rough copy of On Ne w Democracy to the Polithureau
comrades I spoko t o you twice and critici sed both the
title and the content. I sa id that On New Democracy is
cont rar y to Lenini sm in practically a ll the car dinal issues
of th e Chinese r evoluti on (a ssessment of the char acter of
the revolution, it s s ta ge s, motive for ces, and pe rspect ive s,
t he qu estion of hegemony, et c.) . Whatever you may wish
it to be. 'new democracy' is in effeet an anti- Len inist anrl
anti-socia list theor y and platform; it is the theory and
platform of t he Chinese na tional bourgeois ie as opposed
to the non-capitalist, i.e . socialist, perspect ive of the Chi-
nese r evolution. Apart from t alking to you, I al so wrote
you a letter saying th at your book may be used by Trots -
ky and Chen Tu-hsiu against the Sovi et Communists, the
Comin tern and the Communist P arty of China. I sug-
gested that you give some th ou ght to corre cting yo ur
book. But t hough you made a few corr ections and added
some passag es, the basi c principl es r emained th e same. SO
IIOW I s incere l y say to you : if you uppose Len ini sm with
democracy', you will be bound to fail. Thi s is why I
advise you to abandon the idea of crea ti ng Maoism a nd
to give serio us tho ug ht t o revising your book, On New
Dernucracy."
As far as I know, Ma o also s poko on this subject t o
.r en Pi -sh ih , who also cr iticised him. But Mao turned a
dea f ear to the well -meani ng advice of his comr ades. In
the course of the "styl e rectificati on ca mpaign" he open-
ly pr ocl aimed Maoi sm and began a drive again st Leninism,
4) He falsified the history of the
Tsunyi conlerence
Mao demanded that the Politburenu "corrr-ot" till' rasolu-
lio n of the Tsunyi conf ere nce (J anuary 1935) . II e wa nt ed
it to sa y that the 5th Ple num of th e Sixth Central Com-
mi ttee of the CPC had committed not mer ely a few
tactical errors (as th e r esolution said) , but that i t h ad
sot an incorrect political line. This would ena ble him to
denounce the 5th Plenum r esolution as r epr esen ting what
he termed th e "l eft" -opportunist Po Ku line an d to J'e-
doubl e his attacks OIl Po Ku and ot her comrades. Mor e,
it would ena ble him to claim that the Tsunyi conference
ha d been of cruc ia l importance . Furthermore, Mao al so
intended to say th at th e poli ti cal line of the 4th Pl enum
of t he Si xth CC CPC, whi ch nobody in Tsunyi had da red
to reject because it wa s dir ected agains t the Li Li -sen li ne
and beca use it urged impl ementati on of the r ecornmcnda-
tions of t he Comintern, repr esented " Wang Mi ngs ' left '-
oppor tu ni st line". He was al so going to say that t he TSl!-
nyi confere nce had cr iticised it. u e
up th e line of th e 4th Pl enum as fal sified by hun wil.h t he
so-call ed "left"-oppor t unist line of t he 5LIJ Pl enum, a.nd
there by establish hi s myth of " four years of t he th ir d
' left' -opportunist line in ,Party"., This would set
stage for atl.Ucki ng the Commt ern .lme Wang
as it s chief ex.ponent , and for asserting cr ucial hlst?r -
ical rol e" of the 'I' sunyi cunfer ence and his own axcluaivc
mer its during and after th at conference.
19
th e local warlords. This coul d have been eas il y avoided.
A fairly good idea of Mao' s extr eme leftist political and
military line aft er the Tsunyi confere nc e is zleaned from
tho foll owing two facts inadverten tl y p";. esentcd by
Chen Yun " in his ar t icle, "The Her oi c Western
MArch ". ,:.,:. Th e first was Ma o's already cited Kwe ichow
slogan, "sei ze Kweiyang and capt ure Wang Chia-lieh
alive" , """ and the second was th e 11 nju stifiabl e exe cu-
t ion of more than 100 pe ople ord er ed by Mao in one of
the coun ties of Yunnan pr ovince. The chief of thi s coun-
ty, Ohen Yun r ecall ed, mi stook t he Red Ar my for Chi ang
Kai-shek's tro ops, opened t he city gates, and gave it a
r ousing r eception, "' Ve decid ed t o keep up the game,"
Chen Yun writes, "and made no move t o expla in that
ours was not a Nanking army. Af t er a short re st we
as ke d: 'Have you pr epar ed food s uppl ies and money for
us ?' The r eply was : 'Every thing has been arr anged. ' Then
we aske d for te n l ocal peopl e as guides. Thereupon, chiefs
of vari ous city instit ut ions ca me to pa y th eir r espects.
Each gave his name and office : ' I am so-and-so, chief of
the guard detachment' , 'I am so-and-so, chi ef of the
seclll'it.y department'. ' chi ef of th e county' , et c. They told
us everything about the msel ves , a nd we naturall y knew
what to do with them.
" Mao Tse-tung sa id: ' If all our ene mies had been as
stu pid as t hi s Yunnan county chief, the Chinese revolu-
tion would h ave won l ong ag o' . And he was certainl y
ri goht." 'l-*l- *
-I t is pr oper t o expl ain that at this t ime Chen Yun
held that Ma o had ac ted correctly. This was why he men-
t ione d the incid ent in hi s articl e. Befor e submitting the
ar t icle t o the editors of the j ournal , Chen Yun showe d
it to me. And on reading it I suggeste d changes of two
kinds to pr ot ect the good nam e of the Party and Red
Army. He agr eed. First, instead of t he r esounding phrase,
" seize Kweiyang and ca pt ure Wang Chi a-lieh alive" , otc .,
ho put, "take W ang Ch ia-Ii eh pr isoner ". Second, three
mor e changes were made: a ) dnstead of naming the coun-
ty , he put "in a cer tain county"; b) instead of saying that
· In fact , however, the Politbureau conference in Tsunyl
III J anuary 1935 wa s part of Mao' s cons pira cy again st t he
c ( ! r r e ~ t Comintern line. The political , military an d orga-
ni sational course set a t tho Tsunyi confer ence was incor -
r ect fr om sta rt to finish. Ma o had call ed t he confer ence to
usurp military power in the Party. And the political and
military line pursue d after th e confere nce inflicted heavy
losses a nd tremendous damage on the Pa rty an d th e Chi-
ne se Red Army.
One of Mao's chi ef political and mili tary mistake s fol-
lowing th e Tsunyi confe re nce wa s that he complete ly
scrapped the Red Army' s ba sic s tra teg ic slogan - "go
north to resi st J apanese aggr essi on" . This slogan could
have won the support of th e mass of t he people and, wh at
is mor e, the sympathy of the t roops of local power-
holder s and even of Chiang Kai-shek's armies. Mao also
scrapped the tacti cal sloga n, "resi st J apan ese aggression
and light Chi ang Ka i-sh ek " , whi ch was di rect ed to form-
ing all iances with various Iocal poli tico-military groups
on tho basi s of joint r esi stance to J ap an ese imperialism
and to Chiang Kai -shek who wa s eva ding a confrontati on
with th o Jn pnnns« invnrl nr s and trying to rlestrnv th e Chi -
ne se Red Army and the armies of vari ous pr ovincial
power-holders.
Ignoring the positive experi ence of th e Chinese Rod
Army (at the end of 1933 and the beginning of Hl34 in
Fukienprovince Ohiang Kai-shek's 1Hth Army had j oin ed
th e Hed Army ito fight t ogether against Japan and Chi ang
Kai -shek; besid es, wh en in th e early part of t he Wes t-
ern March , ~ the Red Army was crossing Kwangtung and
Kwangsi provinces the local warlords refrained from a t-
ta cking it, and evon invit ed it t o r emain) , Mao issued
t he slo gan, "seize Kwoi yang 'and capt ure Wang Chia-li sh
ali ve" . , ~ , ~ As a result, the warlords of Kweichow, Yu n-
nan and Szechuan provinces had no choice but to j oin
for ces with Chiang Kai-shek's troops aga in st the Com-
munists. This du al , political and military, mi stake of Mao
Ts e-tung, who had no idea of either st rategy or tacti cs
and wh o followed an extreme "left"- opp ortuni st plan of
fighting "all comers", expo sed the Chinese Red Army t o
th e attacks of th e joint forces of Chi ang Kai -shek and
* Also kno wn as th o Long Mar ch.-Tr .
"" \Vang Chia-l ieh-warlor d, mili t ary and poli tica l chief of
Kwoicho w province.
'In
,;. At that time a member of
,;.,;. Communi st l nt ernat ional
No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.
';"'" Ibid.
**** Ibid., pp. 5q-55.
the CC CPC Politbureau .
(Chinese-l anguage editi on)
the gentry (shenshi) , repres entatives of th e merchants'
association , oth er cit izens, shenshi elders and represent a-
tives of neighbouring villages - all in all more than I00
people- had come t o pa y their res pects , Chell Yun wrote,
"several people" ; c) in place of "Comr ade Mao 'I'se-t uIIg
naturally knew what to do with them: he or der erl all of
them to be cx ecu terl", he pu t. as cited earl i or- , " we natu-
rally knew what to do with th em ,"
Chen Yun wr ot e that Mao was very pl eased with him-
soiL Th is meant th at he di d not reali se how fooli shly
he had behaved , and. that h e wa s unawar e of the prob-
able political and military consequences. The Hod Army
l eader s sho uld obviously have used the opport uni ty t o
explain to th e gentry and th e people of th e
coun ty the true aims of the Hed Arm y' s march acr oss
tho Southwestern pr oviuces t o [orth China. They sh oul d
have explained that th e Red. Army was h eading nort h t o
repulse the J apanese aggression. and th at it was corn-
polled to fight off Chiang Kai -sh cks troops hec rlllse in stead
of resisting t he Japanese invad orshe k ept at tacki ng tho
Hod Army and local armed forc es. They should also ha ve
expl ained that tho Il ed Army had no intention of fall -
ing out with th e local authorities and people. \ Ve co uld
thus have l et th e l eaders of th e pr ovinces know whore
we stoo d, i nf urrnerl the loca l popul ation of t he Red Army' :"
poli cy, r educed possible re si stance, and persuaded th e
l ocal authoriti es not to r egard Ch iang Kai -shek as a pos-
sibl e ally.
As a r esult of Mao ' s two blunder s, the l ocal authoriti es
and the population of Kwoi chow and Yunnan pr ovinces,
and al so of Szech uan and Sikang provinces, became deep-
l y s uspicious of the Chinese Red Army. This h el ped
Chia ng Kai-shek t o win over the Inr::11 authnritics and
to usc- th em against the Communists. For t he Red Army,
on the other hand, it create d unfavourable condi ti ons
and l ed t o l oss es that could have heen eas ily avoid ed.
At that time, Ch en Yun was a suppor ter of Mao Tse-
tung. The main purpose of hi s .arti cl e was t o present Ma o
in a favourable li ght. So , some of his pa ssa ges contained
in evi t abl e contr adictions and exaggerati ons. All the same,
contra r y t o the a ut hor's intenti ons, th e arti cle is a val u-
abl e hi sl.ori cnl documen t. H we compa re t he fact s per -
tain in g to th l' sit ua tio n of the npd Arm y Irnm th e be gin-
ning of the West ern March to its arrival in Tsunyi as
give n in Chen Yun's articl e with tho hi story of the Tsunyi
co nference as fabri cated by Mao du ring the "style recti-
fication ca mpaig n". we shall sec man y fundamental dis-
pa r ities. Ch en Yun ' s article. which is based on histor-
icnl fa cts, de scribes the actual sta t e of affairs, whil e
Ma o' s version is a wholesal e fabri cati on. This is why
Chen Yurr' s arti cle can be accepted as fairl y reli able evi-
de nce di sproving Mao' s version.
Another of Mao's poli tical and military mist ak es wa s
that aft er t he TS1111 yi conference h e nOl ;t ed t he correct
Comintern pl an of pr eser vi ng t he strength of the Red
Army of th e ce n tral Soviet. area durfnz its W est er n March
t o large, ri ch and den sel y popul at ed - Szechuan province.
where it wa s t o join for ces with t he 4th Front of the Red
Army (already t he re ) and crea te a ne w large base. The
·IRt . ard and 5t h ar my corp s of t he Reel 1\rmy of the
centr al Soviet ar ea , of which Mao had taken charze :'l fter-
th e Tsunvi conf erence, mad e senseless marches one day
to Kweichow, another to Yunnan, seeking r eckl ess en-
gagements with the enernv. The r ight thi n g would
have been to evade bat.tl e and preserve manpower. In
fact , preserving the nod Army's stre ngth was th e chicf
purpose of th e march fr om Ki angsi to Szechuan. Ina
telegr am t o the CC er c, the Comint ern sp ecially empha-
sised that it was most imncr tn nt to maintain the st rengt h
of th e Hed Armv. Thi s. the te legram said. was even mo re
importa nt than maintaining by preserving
t. hu Red Army it would be possible III due course to set
u r a new, l aI:ger Sovi et base on arrivin g i n Szechuan. .
Before th e Tsunyi conference. Ku , Ch ou
and other comr ades who followed HIl S correct COilluI.t er n
poli cy, nvoided linn ecessnr y .engagcmen I s wi g
Kai -shek' s troops. Th ey expl ained the slogan, resi st Jli -
pan and fight Chi ang Kat -sh ek" l ucal grot!ps and
van ced withou t com hat. Tile maxunum was rlonc to pI e-
se ",:e th e lted Army. which was exp ect ed to S:-l 11Jl a new,
la rge Soviet, area in Szechn an. .and to prime for
Sl l'lJ lY l e against Japanese aggression. n ut the Tsuny i
Maoatlacked the correct
1
ihi it as a tactic of "ricrht-o!)pol'tunlst, Ilight". I fl-
Cesc r r mg I < . < .. '- "' . " I t I
lucta nce to fight", and the like, though lw"t?ry S lOWS l Ie
olitical and mili tar y li ne set by th e ComlUte;1l .1 I e
\.v "tern 'Ma rc h to have been correct , .and s
and military line following th o Tsu n yi confer ence t o l a\ e
?q
be en incorrect. It caus..cd heavy, perfectly avoi da ble, losses
to the 31'd and :)t h army cor ps of the llcd Army.
The main Red Army for ces of the ce ntr al So vie t area
had nearly 80,000 men when it set out on the Western
March on 16 Octo ber 1934. By th e beginning of J anuary
1935 ( the time of th e Tsunyi confe re nce), th at is, two
and a half months later , th er e re mained approx ima tel y
48 ,000 men. Losses thus tot alled some 32.000. Accord ing
to Po Ku (Hankow, 19::18) . Teng Fa , \ Vang Chiu- hsiung "
(MORCOW, 1936) and other comr ades at diff er ent times,
the army had lost men not as a re sult of fighting, hut
mainl y du e to the desertion of about 30,000 men re cruited
a fow mo nths bef or e. There wore only a few engagements
befor e the Tsunyi confere nce, and none at all duri ng the
advance al ong the borders of Kwangtung and Kwangsi
provinces. Chiang Kai-sh ek did not l earn of t he wit h-
drawal of the main Red Army for ce unlil 2<'1 October .
when he quickly se nt tro ops in pursuit. But since he did
not k now tho direction of the Red Army's march, and
since he could not enter Kwangtung and Kwan gsi prov-
inces, hi s unit s caught up with the Rod Army OIl only a
few occa sions. The Red Army' s logistical units had t aken
along compar a ti vel y heavy and unwi eldy workshop equip-
ment, printing presses, pr esses for printin g money, and
the li ke. On arriving in Tsunyi , the Re d Army st opped
for a 12-day rest, because enemy activity was not es-
pecially serious.
But after' the Tsunyi confere nce, in a matte r of two
weeks foolhardy engagements an d marches orde re d by
Mao r edu ced tho army from 1t 8,000 iucn t o 22.000, losses
totallin g 26,000.
It was part of Mao' s political and militar y treach er y
that on two occa si ons-in Ab a in June 1935 and in
in September 1935 -he tried to pro voke spli ts
in the PUtty and Red Army, thus infli cting unprecedented
damage.
The events that had all but pr ecipit ated a spl it in Aha
(Szechuan province), developed as foll ows.
The 4th Front sta t ioned in th e Szechuan-Shs ns i Soviet
area and the 1st , 3rd a nd Gt.h army cor ps ma ki ng the
W estern March met i n Ab a. The 4t h Front had mor e
. ' At the Tsun yi conference Teng Fa was neutral, Wang Chia-
supported Mao, and Po Ku was attacked by Mao. Their
evidence , therefore, merits attention.
100,000 men, the 1st, 3rd and 5th cor ps only about
Tong Fa reports that Mao wanted t o "swall ow"
th e 4th Front. He persuaded Lo Fu to write an article
for t.he wall newspaper, blaming th e 4th Front command-
for mi stakes. Ther e was a very
strong r eacti on, whi ch a ll but ended in au outright split.
Leaders and cadres on both sides con Ierred over the
issue for nearly 10 days. As a result, Mao wa s compell ed
to admit the error of hi s ways and hand ove r th e dut.ies
of general commi ss ar of th e n ed Army to Chang Ku o-ta o.
Chu 'I'oh, t oo, r elinquished the post of commander-i n-c hief
to Hsu Hsiang-chien and was made his deputy, wh ile
Wang Ch ia-hs iang r elinquished the post of head of t he
Main Po litical Department to Ch en Chang-hao, and be-
came t he l atter ' s deputy. After r epeat edly confess ing and
repenting his mi stakes, Lo Fu managed to r etain the post
of general secre tar y of the Central Committee. 1\ Polit-
bureau meeling eo-opted Hsu Hsi ang- chien and Chon
Chang- hac as member s. This wa s the pri ce for aver ti ng
a split . The l eader s of t he two sides decided that the n ed
Army sho uld con ti nue t he march West i n two col umns .
The first to set out were part of the .'J:th Front and the
I st and 3rd army cor ps . They formed an advance col umn
under Hsu Hsiang-ehlen and Ch en Ch ang-h an, and wer e
foll owed by anothe r part of the 4th Fron t and by the
5th army cor ps, which formed a second col umn under
Chang Ku o-tao and Chu Tell. But ill Septembe r" on
ing Maoerhkai (Szechuan province) , and again off his
own hat , Mao suddenl y began to move the troops, and
onc e more brought matters t o the brink of a spli t.
When the first col umn ca me to Maoerhkai, Mao defied
the de ci sion of t he Politbureauand the Central Commit-
te e' s military council conc erning t he joint ad vance north
of the Lst (1st, 3rd und 5th army cor ps ) and 4th fronts,
and one nighL ordered the 1st 3rd c.orps t o
strike camp and advance al one, Without informing the
4th Front, whi ch had marched with the m up t o then.
More, through Mao 's fault the march began in adverse
conrlit ions-c- loz is ticnl arr angements had not heen com-
pl at ed of food a nd winter wer e
and requisit e i nformation had no t been
ing we atha r, and natural and ot her conditIOns III this ar ea
of mountain glaciers and swamps. As a r esult, the : st
and 3rd cor ps suffered heavier losses than ot her units,
..."
In September 1. 935, when th ey se t out, they had some
17,000 to 18,000 men, but heavy losses saw th eir st re ng th
sh r ink to 5,000. And in October , aft er fighting two minor
engagements, and after they had managed to r ecruit some
reinforcements, t hey had onl y 5,700 men.
The blame for these two sp lits falls sq uarel y on Mao
Tse-tung, th ou gh th e fa ct th aI the spli t in Mao er hkai was
used to form a second CC Political Bureau with Chang
Kil o-lao at its head . whi ch only aggravat ed th e s pl il in
tho Party and Rod Army, was the Iault of Chang Kuo-
lao. Finally, in th e aut umn of Hl3G Mao deliberately hin-
dered the western col um n of th e /ttll Front Irom geLting
modern weapon s fr om th o Soviet Uni on , 'wh ich were wait-
ing for it in Sinki ang. Th e col umn suffer ed very heavy
l osse s on this account, wiLh only 800 out of 25.000 men
final ly r eaching Sinkiang. Ma o had withheld ins tr uc t ions
for th e western column to go to Sinkia n g to get the Sovi et
equi pmen t . If the co lumn had been informed in good
time ( and th is was quite possibl e, for th e r adi o trans-
mittel' S of th e Central Committee' s military council had
r egul ar contact with it) , it wou ld cer tai nl y .ha ve col lected
the Soviet aid, and in the aut umn of 1937 th e J apanese
would have heen fa ced by a well-equipped mod ern army
with hundreds of thousands of men in North a nd Cent r al
China inst ead of just the Sth Il outo Army with 40,000
men and th e New ..Hoh with 20, 000. Tn shor t, not onl y
did Ma o ex pos e t he western column to hea vy losses, hu t
11/ ",,-, caused tremen dous harm 10 t he Part y a nd tho
Chi nese revoln ti un -c-n most se r ious cr ime.
The Tsunyi conference and Mao' s activity durinz and
aft er th e conf er ence givo no grounds whatever t o
of Ma ?'s re nder i ng any "ser vices" to t he Party and
:;(' \,O!:JlI OII. On. the :oJlt ra r y. he had commt u od ext re me
lof t -adventur is t mi stakes and a nti-Party crimes.
The fac t t ha t Mao co nti n ues to boa s t of Ihe " me rits
of .th !' TSI1.nYi con fere nce " and of hi s own "services" is
a srgn of hI S truly unash amcd immodes ty.
ye,1 th e It r ue [acts that even th e Mao-inspired
anti- I ar tJ and anll-COmllltern resoluti on of the Po lit-
coufer ence ill Tsunyi criti ci sm! the 5 th Pl enum of
the .', lXt h .Cen tr a!, Committee only for " commit ti ng some
nll stakes and di d not say t hat its zeneral l in e
'has "ll1c o.rrf'ct: Tt foll ows. t he refore . that clai m since
t e rectiflcation of st yl e campaign" t hat the 5th Plenum.'
?Ii
l in« wa s a " 'l eft' -opportunist Po Ku line" , is t otall y
g roundl oss.
As for the Comint ern line of th e 41h Plenum, h ighly
popular and accepted by the entire Party, nobody in
Tsunyi s poke agai nst it. N OI' wOIII ,l anybody have dare d
speuk agai ns t. it, In shor t, the ve rs ion advanced during the
" st yle r ectificati on cam pai gn" and propagated by Ma o
to this da y tha t th e 4th Pl enum l i ne was "Wang Ming' s
' Ieft'<opportunist linen-is entirely cont r ary t o the fact s.
Ma o' s ver sion that the Tsunyi conf er ence oppose d
" Wang Ming' s ' Iof t.-op por tuulst line wh ich had r eigned
in th e Party for four years", that it " put an end t o ' Va ng
Mi ngs 'Jeff-opportunist l eadersh i p" , th at it "establi shed
Ma o' s cor r ect l eader shi p" , t hat. " by t ho time of the Tsunyi
conlcrcnco ( i.e. by th e end of 1H:34) the Chi nese rovol u-
li on had been def eat ed due to the third ' le ft'-oppor tunis t
l ine" , t h at Mao " saved the Chinese r evol uti on" , and th o
li ke, all thi s, fr om boginning to end, is Ma o' s fabri cati on .
Its pu rpo se is 10 magnify hi s pe r son. a nd to st ri ke a l th e
CominLern l eader ship 'a nd at those crc l eader s wh o fol-
l owed t h e correct Comintern li ne during t he Chinese
revolution.
No w. l ei lIS look at t he st ate of th e Chi nese r evo lu -
l ion on th e eve of th e Tsnn vi conf er ence. This will
sh ow us how abs urd and fal se version is.
Bef or e th e begin ning of th e Wcstcru Mar ch (up to
IG October I D;)4 ) the Chinese Red Arm y had approxi -
mat ely 2RO,OOO-300. 000 men. Of thi s number about
men wer e in th e ce ntral Sovi et ar ea (mainly the [st Fro ru
under Li n Piao, the 3rd Front und er deputy commander-
in -chi ef Peng Tch -huni , and a few ot he r ar mi es under
Tung Ch en- lang, HSTln Huai-ch ou , Lo Pin g-hui, and
other s); some 150,000 men in th e Szcchuan-Shcnsi So-
vi et area (4th F ro nt under Hsu Hsi ang-ch ien and Chen
Chang-h a n}, and nearly 20 .000 men in th e Sovie t a rea in
west ern Hunan and Hu peh provinces (2nd Front under
H() Lung. in cluding Hsiao Ko' s 6th Army) . Th ere wer e
so me 10.000 men in tho Sovie t area of northeast Kiangsi
(LOth Army und er Fang Chili-min and Shao Shih- ping},
nearl y 7.000 in th e Ilupeh-Hon an -Anhwci Sovic] are a
(witl: th e 25lh Army of 5,000 under Hs u Hal -tung mov-
ing La nor th ern Sh ens i}, abou t 5,000 men (26th Army
und er Lin Chill-lan and Ka o Ka ng ) in t he Soviet area in
northe r n Shensi, and b et ween 3,000 and 5,000 (under
Pai-chu) in the Soviet ar ea on Hainan, Kwangtung
nrovmce.
In addi tio n t o the Il cd Army un its that ha d se t out on
th e West ern Mardi and lost 32,000 men by t he hegin-
ning of Janual'y193.1, th e Lime of th e Tsu nyi conference,
th e Red Army's guerrilla u nit s that had s t aye d behi nd
in the former ce n tral Soviet area under the command of
Hsiang Ying, Che n Yi, Ten g Tzu-hui , Chang Tin g-ch eng,
Tan Ch en-lin, Ts eng She ng, Yeh Fei and ot he r comrades,
number ed nearly 10,000 men. Besid es, sma ller gu errfll a
un its oper ate d i n othe r localiti es. Only two troop col -
umns were deployed on a Central Committee order fr om
other ar eas to suppor t the W estern March-the 2nd and
nth ar my cor ps under Ho Lu ng and Hsiao Ko, th e
10th Army under Fang Chih-min and t he 7th und er Hsun
Huai- chou-which t ogether formed the "advance Red
Army col umn in th e northern campa ig n of r esista nce to
Japan" . All ot h er Red Army uni ts r emained in thei r bases
in So vi et areas, and suffere d no l osses.
In the Shanghai area, North China and ot he r Kuomin-
tang r egions the Party ]IIHl Central Committ ee bureaus.
Th nro wer e provincial Party committees in Hopeh , Honan,
Shensi , Kiangsu, Szechuan an d other provin ces, and lo cal
Party committees in Shanghai , Soochow, Peking, Tientsin,
Tungsh an , Sian, Ch cn gtu, Chungking, an d ot her
cit ies, aIHI also in man y county towns. Al toget her. th ese
accounted for anothe r s ever al t en s of thousands of Party
member s (not i ncl ud in g member-s of tho YCL ) . They
pl ayed an impor t ant pa r t in t he resi s tance to Japan and for
national salvat ion, anrl wer e hi ghly ac tivo in t he work ing-
class , pea sant, st ude nt and intelJectual movements. -
An Anti-J apanese Uni on Army of bet ween 03 0,000 and
40.000 men opera ted under t he Party's leadership in ar eas
held hy J apan ese occ upa ti on forces an d the IHl j)IHJt Man-
clm kuo r egi me in Northea st China. Special committees
act ive under the guidance of the Manchuri an pro-
v i nci al ParLy comrni ttee in th e cast, north and so uth of
with Party anrl YCL organi sations operating-
III Harhju , Changclum a nd ot her large citi es.
In sh or t, t he re wer e Party a nd YCL organisat ions in
many cit ies and villagos. They fough t courageously in
extre me ly di l ficult cond it ion s. cont.i n uo usly harassed and
by dangrl', leadi ng th e Chin os« nati on in th o r n-
sis tanc e to Japan and for n a ti on al salva t ion .
28
Reports of various l ocal Par ty org anis atio ns concerni ng
the sit ua t ion in th e Commu ni st Par ty and the revolutio n-
ary movement in 1933-193<'1 are a vailable in th e an-hives
of t he CC crc. Many of t hem had be en pu blished a t
I hat ti me in Pal'ty and ouher revol utionary publications .
J Iany wer e printed in the Communist I nternati onal a
journal pu t out in Hussran , Chines e, and othe r Ianz unzes
::. publi sh ed by the Comin tern in
sheoik , organ of th e Communist Par ty of tlie Soviet
l!nion, an d China Tri bune, 1111 Engl iRh-langllage puhl ica-
LlOIl appcar lng in Shanghai. An arti cle was contr ibuted
by me, among others, in October 1934 about the Red
Army's s tr uggle agai ns t Chi ang Kai -shcks six th an ti -
communist ca mpa ig n and it s new uacti cs, It dealt with
Re d Army ope rations in th e cent r al Sovi et area in H133-
1931; the r easons for t he set backs during t he eve n ts in
Fukien province t hat ce nt re d r ound th e Ku omintang 19th
Army's comi ng out against Chiang Kai -sh ek and for r e-
sis tance to Japan; the reasons for t he Red Army' s l ea v-
ing ,the centr al Soviet are a, it s old base, after th e 19th
Army was def eated in Fukien, and set ti ng out on the
Western March in ord er t o avoid a two-pro nged att ack
by Chiang Kai -shok (in th e east fr om Fukie n and th e
nor th fr om Kiangsi) and due to ot her political, military
and econ omic r easons. My ar ti cle ap peared in Bolshevik
(No. 22) and Communist I nt ernat ional (No. 32-33 ) in
Hussianvand the article, " The Ne w Situat ion and New
Tacti cs" appeared in Inprecorr in Engli sh . Later, the two
articles we re inco rpo ruted in a pamp hl et. "The New
Situat ion and New Tacti cs" , wh ich ap peared in Chi nese.
These hi stor ical fa d s, su ppor te d by documents, are
incontesta ble.
Wh at basi s is t here then for Mao's inventions about
the st ate of the Chi nese r evolution on the eve of th e
Tsu nyi conference? According t o h is fabr icatio ns, t he
Chiuese r evolution had come to a dead end : "losses in the
Soviet are as amo un ted to 90 per cent", " losses in th e
whi te ar eas amounted to 100 per ce nt", "only 2f:i, 000 men
remaine d in t he Hed Army thr oughout the count ry". Ma o
cl aims t hat ill these cond itions ho " sa lvaged the Ch in ese
revol ut ion" -an out-and-out li e that is not and ca nno t
be suppor t ed by any facts.
* Inprecorr-«International Press Correspondence.
Chen Yun's article already cited here contains no
menti on of any " def eat of the Chiuoso r ovolu ti on " on the
eve of'the Tsunyi eon f' ar en co.
Indeed, Ch en Yun ment ions a 12-day r est aft er captur-
ing Tsunyi, hut s ays nothing oI the Pol ithureuu conlur-
ence. ':- I asked him at that time why he did not mention it.
and he replied : "It wa s neither a Party con OTOSS nor a
Central Committee pl enum-only on e of meetings
of the Politbureau, nothing more. What special need was
th ere to write about rit?"
_ Chen Yun related the following concerning the issues
discussed at that meeting:
"To begin with, there was crit icism of three past mis-
takes. First, there was no explicative work in the Party
and Red Army, and amung the population, beIore the be-
ginning of the Western March ... because we had ap-
preached the question of military secrets mechanically
and consider ed it impermissible to let Party members, sol-
diers and the population know tho objectives of the West-
ern March. This was remedied by HIe slogan, 'Capture
Wang Chia-lieh alive'. Second, we had taken along too
much ammunition and too much heavy machinery and
equipment. This matter wa s easily settled: all bulky items
were abandoned.
"The third mistake was purely military: we had
marched along a straight line mapped out beforehand. This
mi stake was remedied on reaching Liping, even before
arriving in Tsunyi.
"Besides, we changed men in two posts. This, in fa ct,
was the main purpose of the conference. Since Mao had
long wanted to replace Chou En-lai as General Political
Commi ssar, he made a bargain with La Fu that the latter
would also replace Po Ku as General Secretary. This is
now a thing of the past. So, what need is thoro to write
about it? After all, it was a very delicate thing.
"At the conference in Tsunyi Mao criticised Po Ku and
Chou En-Iai for their alleged reluctance to flght,and said
the Western March was thus more like a 'resettlement'.
On having assumed command a Iter the confer ence, Mao
kept sendi ng the troops incontinently into battle and
forc ed marches, and provoked much dissati s laction." ':- ':.
., See Communist Internati onal (Chin ese-language editi on)
No. 1-2, 1936, p. 50.
*" I bid., pp. 48-49, 50.
.A fow explanations seem to be in or der in connection
Yun',s , account. J-:I e fail ed to menti on that on
arr i vmg III Ilueili couu ty of Ynl111 al1 provi nce Lin P·.
and other army commande rs protested aU'Cl i rlst'tlle ' rao
l ess II III , . 1 f 1 OL se ns e-
. , a u. LS a nr orcer 1ll 11l'cI leS ordered by M T
After entering Szechuan province La Fu se-
sldore d M t . '1' " w 0 con-
, _, 0.0 s nn ttary tactics in correct de cided t th
witli Chen Yun and La Mai to leave the Red A age or
for work. Mao
o cou to preval] on La Fu t t .
t o Support him in the " uoliti al and conti nue
r 1 IC arena' If yo Ialto .
the politi c-al are na he said you will . t a, or In
military arena eith'er.' no s ur vive III the
They reached a compromise: La Fu and La M . ld
8, WIth th e Army, while Ch on Yun would 0'0
LUI and then t 1\ -1 1 '-"
• < .t t : : 0 uscow, to t ie Comint ern t o obi " . 1
[or tl ' l 'l . R d A , - .ai u all
, ie J o rmy. This was th o obj ec t of Chon
YUHs arrivul 111 Moscow in December But we did
leiu:H of this until 1936, from Tong Fa and Wan
Olua-hslang. g
It follows that Chen Yun, too, was as sailed by doubts
about Mao 's military tactics. Since Chen Yun left China
Red Army had met the 4th Front, the version
his arti cle ab out a larger Soviet base in Szech uan prov-
mce was contrary t o the facts. But 1'01' t hi s he cannot
be blamed: he mer el y cited the plan of t he Western
March as defined in a directive of the Comintern. None of
us coul d have foreseen then that after t he two armies
met, Mao would abandon the idea of a base in Szechuan
provoke a spli t on two successive occasions , and finally
march off separately a cr oss mountains and swamps to
the Nor thwes t, thus caus ing heavy l osses to the Party and
Hed Army.
As concerned the political aspect, Chen Yun had earlier
a ssumed that Ma o' s behaviour was correct . It did not
dawn on him t hat he was mistaken until after he had
seen the pro ceedings of the 7th Congr ess of the Comin-
tern and r ead my pamphlet, "New Conditions and New
Tactics", on the Rod Army's stand against Chiang Kai-
shek's "sixth campaign" and the tactics of the Western
March, my speech at the 7th Comintern Congress on the
united national anti-Japanose front in China, and my
article, "The Now Situation and New Policy", which
expl ai ned th e th eoretical and practical asp ects of Comin-
:-\1
t ern poli cy concerning a united front in China. This
wa s how Chen Yun came t o write in hi s ar ti cl e: " Our
J,)oliti cal COurs e in th e matter or a un it ed ant i-i mperiali s t.
fr on t. was not a corr ect one . If we had foll owed new
tacti cs and had a new course at the ti me of t he West ern
March, we would have been highl y s uccessful. But it is
not too late to make up for l ost Lime. To da y, the united
front is ab solutely ne cessary; it is the only possibl e
cor r ect cours e."
Chon Yunalso saw light in tho matter of using th e con-
tr adic ti ons between Chiang Kai-sh ek -and various local
power-holding groups. He began to see that thi s would
cr eat e more favourable conditi ons for the Red Army's
"Western March and compel Chi ang t o r esi st Japan. He
wrote: " The offens ive of th e Japanes e imperialists in
North China is exciting steadily growing anger among
the mass of the people. A bitter hidden st r uggl e is going
on between diff erent groups of warlord s, We must make
use of their contradi ctions. " ':.. *
Evidently, Ch en Yun had begun t o r eali se the error of
Mao 's political line at the Tsunyi confer enc e and in the
years t hat followed. The error of Ma o' s military line had
he en clear t o him even before. This was why he had
not mentioned the Tsunyi confer ence in his article.
But that is not all. At the end of hi s article , Chen
Yun praised, and gave a relatively true estimate of the
Party' s work after the 4th Plenum of the Sixth Central
Commil.tee. He wrote: "W hat assessment should one
give the work of the Party? Aft er t he 4th Pl enum our
Party achieved truly significant success. Its prestige is
very high in the Soviet areas, for there it defends the
interests of Lens of millions of working people. Admitted-
ly, th er e were als o some mistakes, but all of these were
remedied. No lon ger is the si tu ation anything lik e i t was
after th e betrayal of Chen Tu-hsiu or at the time of the
Li Li -s en and Tsuyi Tsyu-po mistakes, Now, in the new
sit uati on, our Party can se t new t asks. "
Anyone wishing to compar e the fact s as they are given
in Chen Yun's art icle with t he actual sta te of affa irs, and
with th e hi story of the Tsunyi confere nce as fabricated
* Communist I nt ernat ional (Chi nese-langu age editi on)
1'\0. 1-2, 1936, p, 67.
** Ih id,
"., >' Ib id.
br Ma.o during the " s tyl e rectification campa ign" C
the " resol utio n on some poi nts of hi story'
I I unum of t he Six th Contr a l Cn/llilli ll et' ) will ,
10" , and ;efl ll y
e can al so refer to EdgaJ' Snow's bonk V I ' /

t o the West, wh ich a ppeared in
III e con trary to th e author 's into Li . " .
reli abl e dis provi ng Mao' s
TS.lln
Y
I Everybody knows that
u nhui dened .h is heart 10 hi s Arn erica f ' "I h
tr ut d . II rrenu. w om he
l ed e as an old and trusted cunlida nt. From ll im he did
conce al hi s opin ion on ma tt er s perta i ning to th e
ar ty, the Conu nt ern, and th e Sovi et Union. III th e sum-
Iller and of 1936 in Paoya llg, Mao and S now had
many confida ntm] t alks. Before t he not es Sno w mad e of
the.se talks were , publish ed, h e had t hem translated into
Chinese for Mao s personal perusal S f) il t he .. ·t L'
fl . C ' ) ; , sr ua IOn
a t ie ommuuist 1- arty and th e Clunese r evolu t ion on
th e .eve of Tsunyi confe r ence had r ea lly been as
tr agic .as by Mao d.uri ng the " s tyl e rectilicat ion
campaign , and .If th e Tsu nyi conference and Ma o himself
had r eally been as " dec isive" as Mao claimed this would
cer taiJl11 have been r eported by Snow to U{e pub li c i n
the Uni t ed St a tes and th e r est of th e worl d. Snow had
gone on his jo urney on i ns tructio ns of t he US aut hori l..i es
with the int enti on of meeting Mao. He wrot e hi s " Notes';
to ma.ke Mao pop ular. So, if Mao had give n him such
he woul d have reported it with r eli sh , Besides,
Snow als o ta l ked t o Lo Fu, Chu Teh, Chou En-Iar Po Ku
Pe ng Teh-h uai , ami ot he rs WIIO had in
'I' sunyi conferenc e. And the notes he look wer e al so read
.?ach ,of t h em persona lly, and were even tual l y print ed
III Snow s Not es 0/ a Juurney to th e W est .
But read Snow's book fr om cover to cover . YOIl will
find no tr ace of th e versi on of the Tsunyi confere nce lat er
conc oct ed by Ma o.
Nei the r in th e ar chives of the cpe nor t he documen ts
of th e Comint ern, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Uni on or the Commun ist Party of Chin a,' no r in the pu h-
l ica tions of that time, nor i n Chen Yun's articl e, nor ill
the book by Edgar Snow, Mao's cl osest Amor lcan fr iend
nowh er e will you find anything fact ual to suppor t t he
his tory of the Tsunyi confer ence as fab r ica te d by Mao
du ri ng th e "style rectificat lon ca m pa ign" . On th e contr ar y,
33
the fa cts of history arc compl ete l y at va r ia nce with Mao;s
fabri cati on.
Mao' s politi cal and mi li ta ry mistakes and his in sidious
beha viour towards the 4th Front in th e course of two
y oars -fr om the Tsunyi confere nce until t he Sian
events-caused the main for ce of th e Hed Army to shrin k
to slightly mor e than 40 ,000 by the time i t was concen-
trate d in Wayopao, On coming to Wayopao, Mao was
reluctant to stay in the Nor th and wait for a favourable
opportunity to launch an ti- Japa nese operations . Motiva ted
by hi s ri ght-opportunist and pessimistic views, he united
the re mna nts of the West ern March troops of 5,700 men
with the 8 000-str ong unit of Hsu Hal -tung and Liu Chih-
tan, and on th e adventuri st marc h t o Shansi
pr ovince.
Incontr overtlble historical fa ct s sho w th at th er e had
been no rectificati on of any "four-y ears-old Ileft '- oppoJ'-
tun ist li ne by Mao Tsc-tung at the Tsunyi
an d certainl y n o "salvat ion of the Chinese revoluti on by
Mao Tse-tung". In fact, af t er it s 4t h Plenum and
until the Tsunyi confer enc e, the Sixth C0I?-mittee
had foll owed the essentially correct Commt ern line and
after the 18 SepLember events (1931) gradually developed
the pol icy of a united national anti-J front. '1',0 this,
in fa ct , the Chi nese revol u t ion owe d all its conspicuous
success in the Soviet areas, Knomintang-dominated area s,
and regions in the Nor theast under the Japanese and the ir
Ma nch urian pup pets. The- facts als o show that as a result
of Mao' s extreme " le H" -opportu nist li ne and in sidious
behaviour many of the achievements of the worker-peasant
ned Army and the Soviet movement in Chi na were
quickly squandered, in a ma tter of two years . Ther e is
nothing to support the clai m thaL thanks to Mao' s cor r ect
leadership "the further development of the Chinese revo-
lution" after th e Tsunyi conference had been successful.
On the contrary, there is ample evidence to show that
through Mao's fa ult the Party' s CenLra l Commit t ee and
the main Red Army force of more than 40,000 men were
driven into a narrow strip of land in the north of Shensi
province and found themselves in an extre mely difficult
situati on. Only thanks to the uni t ed national an ti-
Jap anese front policy t he Central Committee and the
Red Army managed to extricate themsel ves from th es e
sad straits.
::14
Thes e historical fa cts were admitted by Liu Shao-chi in
a, I.cLl er to Ma o in 1936 on beh alf of the ce ere Nor th
China Bureau. Not t he vill age ha d saved the tow n he
bu t vice versa. In other wor ds, the success of' t he
unite d national front poli cy in urba n areas
had th e ':l llage. (The complete text of Liu 's l ett er
was publi shed ill th e earli er -mention ed collection T wo
Lines; t here fore only it s main id ea is cited her e.) Before
the "style recti ficati on campaign" Mao ha d himsclf ac-
kno wledged these hi stori cal facts. lIe hal l sai d puhlicly
am?ng ot her !hings, t hat " Comrade Wang Ming's
poli cy of a u?-l ted anti-Japanese front is a groat
discovery, Wi thout It our Party and the Red Army would
ha r'dly have cope d wi th Lh e complicated si tuation of tha t
ti me ; wit hout it the Chin ese people coul d not ha ve mount-
ed Lhe anti- J apanese war on t he sca le of t he wh ole co un-
tr y." More, alr ead y after launching the "style rectifica-
tio n campaign", he said t o me " in words that come fr om
t he bottom of the he ar t" in April 194
/
l , a nd in a t alk
with me on the "styl e r ectificati on campaign" in Decem-
bel' 1948, that he still recognised thes e facts. ,:.
Mao' s unlawful -organisati onal acts a t t he Tsunyi con-
fer ence were chiefly th ese:
I. He formed a Mao-Lo bl oc and began a fa cti onal
str uggl e against the Party and its Centr al Commi tt ee, the
correct line of the Cominte rn, and t he Lop poli ti cal and
military l ead ers of the Party's Centr al Committee who
foll owed thi s line. His ai m was to usurp th o posts of
Ge neral Commissar of th e Hed Army for himself and of
Ge neral Secre ta ry of the Cen t ral Commit tee Ior La Fu.
2. The Politbureau conference i n Tsunyi was incom-
petent t o r epl ace th e General Secretary el ecterl by the
5t h Ple n um of the Si xth Cen tral Committee of the crc.
3. Tho Poli tbureau had 12 members at LhaL time. I n
Tsunyi Mao coul d count on no mor e than one-third of
th e vot es. Out of the 12 Poli tbur eau members live we re
ab s ent (Hsi ang Ying had r emained i n the former ce ntral
Soviet ar ea J en Pi- shih was wi th t he Red Army's 2nd
Front Kuo-tao was in t he S zec huan-Shcnsi Soviet
area, 'and W ang Ming and Kan g She ng we re ill t he Com-
i n te rn), Out of th e seven Politbureau memb ers present
" For th e content of these two talks see "My three tal ks with
Mao on 'Rectificati un'" in this section.
at the Tsunyi confer ence, P o Ku and Chou En-la i di d not
support Mao. Later, Tong Fa sa id if th er e had been
a vot e, he, too, would not have voted lor Mno. Mao coul d
count only on Lo Fu and Chen YUIl, for it wa s not
which way Chu Toh would have turned. nut even I f
had vot ed [or Mao this would only have made foul' for
Mao and if he h:llI voted agai nst. the majority would
have' been wi th Po Ku and Ch ou En-lai. Mao k new this
pert ectly well . So he evaded a vote. When the army
s ti ll on it s way to Tsurryi, he had r esort ed to polly m-
tri gues and demagogy to pr evail on th e army r epresenta-
tives wh o would attend th e confere nce tha t, If necessarr ,
they should back him up by shouting his ThI S
was h ow the r esolution h e wan ted was adopted" : Po Ku
was forced t o yi el d the post of Gener al to Lo.
Fu, a nd Cho u En- lai th e post of General Commissar 01
the Iled Army to Mao.
I n years to come Mao made no sec re t of th e fact that
h e had formed a grou p a ga inst the l in e. the
Commi ttee and th e Comint ern to usur p power
the P arty, On t he contrary, he r ef erred to It With undis-
guised pride.
.
,
Here . for example, is what he said to me even he tor e
the "style r ectificati on campaign" :
.'
" Du ri ng th e con fel'ence in Tsunyi I was ::t111 co.nsl rl-
ere d a rizh t' opportuni st ; I could not hope to WlII any influ-
once on own. [ was th er efore cornpell cd to use the
method of 'divid e and oppose'. At firs t, I coaxed Wan g
Ch ia -h siang and t hen La Fu i nto opposing Po Ku. At
th e sa me time, I create d the Mao-Lo bl oc and came t o
terms with La Fu th at he would Iirs! sei ze the post of
Ge ne ral Secre ta ry and th en ap poi nt me Ge neral Commis-
sar in pl ace of Ch ou En- Iai. Afte r Ple IlUI.n of th e
Six th Central Committee ( Hl3 t) the Comin te rn line rlom-
iuatod, In th e st ruggle agai nst t he Li Li-sen li nn anrl
for th e Comin ter n course you wer e in first place, Po Ku
in second and (Wang) Chia-h siang in ,thir d. Though Lo
Fu had Il U part in this st ruggl e, he was educa ted i n Mos-
and wa s also a foll ower of t he Comintern course. The
fou r of you h ad much influ en ce i n the Politbureau and
among Party cadres. You wor e at th e Cornintc rn, tlre
ot he r three were wiLh 11 5. Two out of the t hree - (Wang)
Ch ia-h sia ng and La Fu-i-upposed one, Po Ku , and sup-
por ted me. My word gai ned weight , peopl e began to li st en
36
to mo. " As a r esul t , I was abl e to ca pture militar y pow-
er - the post of General Commi ssar."
What Mao sa id to me agrees with the fact s. The sa me
was r el a ted t o me by Teng Fa, Po KI1, and others.
Certainly, if Ma o had come out against the tremendous-
l y popul ar Comintern li ne of t he 4th Pl enum. he would
have been repulsed by Po Ku , Wang Chia-h siang. La Fu,
a nd ot he r Politburoau comrades, because t h e fir st two
had been pr ominent in the s tr uggle agai nst Li Li-sen and
wer e committ ed to the Comi ntern line. As for La Fu,
th ough ho had r eturned from Moscow to Shanghai in the
summer of 1931, t hat is , six months after th o 4th Pl enum
and had taken no part in t he str ugglo against t he Li
se n line, he was committed to the Comintern lin e.
At t hat time non e of t he Polithureau member s could como
out against the line of the 4th Pl enum- tho Tsunyi con-
Iorence would not have t aken pl ace at all or , if it h ad ,
would have ende d in Mao' s t ot al def ea t.
At that time, Mao had nei th er t he power nor the cour-
age t o como out into t he oponagainst t he Comintern l i ne
a nd me, Wang Ming, the main exponent of that line.
To make hi s Ial sifi cati on of the Tsunyi confer ence
sou nd auth entic, Mao invented cou ntless l egend s and nbs
or i ns truc ted ot he rs to in ven t them. H was alleged, for
example, th at Wang Ming had take n pa rt in th e Long
March, and t hat it was n ot unt il after hi s r emoval at the
Tsunyi conference i n the begi nni ng of Hl35 that he was
sen t to the Comi nt ern to represent th e Commun ist Par ty
of Chi na. And even t his: Wang Mi ng attende d tho con-
fer en ce of cadres in Wayo pao on 27 December 1fl35,
wher e he and Po Ku opposed Mao' s repor t on the unit ed
national anti-Japane se fro nt. Mao's fal sifi cati ons were
picked up by the Chinese press, and even by bourgeois
publicati ons abroad, eithe r becau se they wer e mis in formed
or deliberatel y to make mi schief. All kinds of versions
were invented a bout my whe reabouts. It is quite n eedl ess
to re fute each of Mao ' s fab ri ca ti on s or oth er fa lse r eports.
Bu t I think it is in orde r to cl ear u p the foll owi ng point.
I hav e never been in a ny of the Chi nese Soviet areas.
In Ihe late twen ti es and ea rly t hirt lus I worked under -
ground .in Sha nghai. On 18 October 1 l eft Shanghai
for Moscow. where I arrived on 7 November . As of 10
.. At the Tsunyi conference Mao spoke only in the debate.
November I was t he CPC representat ive in th e Cominter n
and perf onn od my d u ties in its top urgans . It was not
until 14 November J93 7 that I l eft Moscow, arri ving in
Yenan on 29 November.
All ot her versions about my wh er eab outs a nd move-
ment s :1 1. that time area deliberate Iabri ca tion.
5) The pol sonlng of Wang Ming
which injured hi s health
Thi s occ urred durin g th o pr epar ations for the " recti ficat ion
of style ca mp aign". -
During the ni gh t of 3-4 October 1941 Mao brough t me
a telegram from Comrade Georgi Dimitr?v. Th.e
conta ine d 15 qu esti ons to the CC CPC, incl udi ng mq ui r-
ies about the measur es the CPC intend ed to take t o st ep
up military operations agai nst J apa n on the Sino-Ja panese
front in order to deny J apan, an ally of Germany, t he
oppo rtunity for openi ng a seco.nd .front Soviet
Uni on -in s upport of the continuing NaZI
as ke d me ,t o study th e telegra m, and added: We will
di scuss our answer tomorrow. "
On I[ and 5 October we had an un usual ly sharp argu -
ment. I said anti-Ja panese mili tar y oper at ions in Chi na
had ( 0 be s tepped up to den y J a pan any chance of h.p- Iping·
the Nazi offensive again st the Soviet Union. Mao obJect<;d,
but did not argue his case. My argume nts stumped hun
azain and acain. He glared at me and was at a loss for
,: ords. I intimated tha]. his line was anti-Soviet and
grayitated towards alliance with he began to
shout and bang th e ta ble, though unable t o say anything
coherent lo the contrary. On 6 and 7 October Mao invited
Jen Pi -sh ih an d Wang Chin-hs iang to t ake part in t he
discussion, and on 8 mid 9 October al so Kung Sheng and
Chen Yun, hopi ng that they would support him. But all
four gave to understand by their complete si lence
th ey agreed with Dimit rov's recommendations an d WIth
my view.
Thi s fright ened Ma o. To end the dis cussion, whi ch wa s
da nger ousl y going against him, he decid ed to eli minate
me, hi s chi ef political opp oncnt-c-who opposed his anti-
Soviet and pro-Japanese poli cy of nati onal bet rayal , the
* See pp. 175-81.
00
"rectification of st yl e" he wa s preparing at that time
and actions fal sifying th o Par ty' s hi st ory. On 14 Oct ober:
he Ior ced me to go to hospital. Th en (as we l earn ed
lat er) through Li Fu-chun, chie f of th e CC CPC Chan-
collc ry, he orrl crcrl a tte nding physician Ch in 1\1ao-yao to
gIve me mercnr-y drugs and cause a slow poi soning. It
wa s onl y th e and help of many Party comra desoand
doctors, Li. Ting-min, deputy chairman of
the ShensI-Kansu-Nlnghsul Bord er Ar ea governme nt wh o
wa s speci ali st in Chi nese medi cine,' and
of th o eon s(' ient ious and sol icitous Dr .
LI Yun-shi h '.' that br ough t rne ba ck nruonz th e I' .
M
'.
0 ivmg.
y constrt unn -, was badl y ,affect ed. I wa s bedridden for
years, and gra vel y ill lat er. My illn ess became chr on-
IC.and wa s accompani ed by attacks whi ch caus ed t errible
pain and s nffering.
Si?cc Ma o has for man y yea rs s prea d all kinds of in-
vcnti ons to COver up hi s cr ime , and sin ce he ha s mall ei-
?us ly accused me of " simul ating illness" to escape th e
' rectifi cation of style " campaign, I feel it is in ord er lo
to the matt er at l east bri efly.
First about th e poisoning, which injured my health.
As I have said, Ma o and I had a heaterl argument in
his house oyer Dimitrov' s t el egram. It wen t on -from 4 t o
fI Octo ber 1941 . Each day T had at l east one meal in hi s
hous e. On 8 October I had a se rious st omach di sord er with
pr ofu se bl eeding'. arcnmpa nicd by dizzy spell s and ca rdiac
weakn ess. Th e doc tor s wh o exami ned me sa id th e symp-
LOllI S wer e th ose of poi soning. On a October my con-
di ti on deteri or at ed, hu [, Mao' s per sonal aide, Yeh Tsu-
lung. practi cally dra gged me out of bed to a tte nd a meet-
in g. OnlO October 1 could no lon ger ri se fro m my bed.
Meanwhil e, pleading urgency, Mao ordere d Li Fu -chun
t o organis e th e cons truct ion of a confere nce hall and
office building for th e Cent ral Comrnilt ee. Withi n n few
dozen metres of my dwelling workmen lab oured day and
ni ght, blasting s tone bl ocks out of th e muunt ai usi do. The
deaf ening explos ions continued r ound th e clock. I wa s
deprived of peace, and Illy condition gre w worse. I asked
Li Fu -chun to st op th e blasting for a da y or two or to
get the bl ocks elsewhere. But h e r epli ed: "Those are
':. SIIr. was a mornbnr o] the CPC, had finis he d the med ical
school of Tokvo Imp erial University and headed the pediatric
department of 'the Norma n Bethune Peace Hospital in Yonan.
39
Chairman Mao's orders. Work must not stop even for a
minute."
On 14 October T was visi ted hv Li Fu-chun and Fu
Lie n-chang (deputy chief of the C·C CPC Military Coun-
cil's heal th depar tmen t and concur r ently chief of l'he Cen-
tral Committee' s heal th bureau) , wh o t ook me in a car
t o the Central Hospit al , where Chin Ma o-y a o was ap-
pointed my tr eati ng phys ician.
Chin Mao-yao prescri bed tr eatment whi ch inj urer! my
health. T could not lea ve the hospital. From Mar ch to May
1942, Chin Mao-yao administere d mercury pr epara t ions
in la rge doses, caus ing a slow poisoning . At this time
Mao launched t he "style r ectifi cati on" campaign, dir ect ed
against the Comintcrn and t he Sov iet Union. tile Com-
munist Party of China, Wang Ming, and ot hers whom
Ma o accused of belonging to a " Moscow gro up". I wa s
oft en unconsciou s a nd escaped deat h only thanks t o the
car e and vigilance of my wif e, Men g Ching-shu, wh o ('e-
mnined at my bedside in hospital. Unfortu nat el y, she as
yet knew ver y littl e about medicine and pha r macology.
but on uoti cing my negative reactions to the prescr ibed
drugs she did not l et me t ak e them and, in fact , t hrew
th en: away . Lat er , she began collecting th e doubt ful pre -
scri ptions, stowed th em away, and tu rn ed t o doctors prac-
tisi ng Chinese and European medicin e for ur gent ..
On 13 Au gu st 1942 I r eturned home to Yantsialin. :,'
Chi n Mao-yao contin lied to "treat" me. He was es pec ia lly
ac tive a lter a telcgrnm ar r ived in my name fro m Dimitrov
1Il Februar y '19
/
[3. sayi ng : " We' ll have you flown to Mos-
cow for tr eatmen t. "
Her e I mus t expl ain th at. my one tel egr am to Moscow
had been sent a month earlier. Two Sovi et war correspo nd-
ents had come to see me on R J anuary 1\)43. J asked
th em if J could use the ir t r a nsmitter to communica te with
Dimi tr ov, They said I could. My conrli t ion was very
serious , T th ought this wa s my la st ch ance to per form my
i nternat ionalis t: duty, and asked t he t wo Soviet comr ades
to inform the Comintern lead er sh ip t hat sinc e my r eturn
to YCIIan a t the end of November 19B7 and througho ut
the followin g five yea rs Mao had committ ed ruany gra ve
e, J had wanted to leav e the hospital before, bu t Mao disap-
proved on th e pr et ext th at th e cons tr uction of the Central Com-
mittee Chancell er y was not yet compl et ed an d workers wer e
still blast ing stone blocks neal' my house.
I.n
political mi s tak es and cr imes ; specifically, for already
t han a. year he was cond ucting a "st yl e
whi ch was in s ubst ance an ti-Leninist.
a nti-Soviet a nd ant i-Pa r ty. In concl us ion,
r i nquired If u was possibl e to send a plane [or me .a nd
me treated in Moscow, whe re r would al so give th o
ComlD tern leadership parti culars about Mao's cr imes
. Comr ade Dimitrov' s reply and especiall y my proposed
flight to badl y worri ed Mao. He immedi ately
nrdor ed Chi n to do away wi th me. On hi s order s,
On 12 February Hl43 Chi.n J\'fao-yao prescr ibed a large
dose ..of an aq ueo us solut ion of. calomel (rnerc llry sub-
ch lori de) al ong . WI t h sodi um bicarbon ate and magnesi -
11111 whi ch , as I learn ed la ter, could tUI'II th e
cal ornel Tnto co: ros ive chlor ide of mer cury. On 19 Feb-
rua ry h? pr escr ibed enemas with a 10 per cent solution
of tannin. Bot h prescriptions wer e meant to el iminate
me. But Meng Ching-shu, who had hecomo sus picious .
as ke d othe r (,locto rs to st u.dy the pr escripti ons. They sa id
the wer e hi ghly toxic and coul d not be
used. ? he lodged an official compla int ag-ains t Clii n Mao-
yao WIth th e Party' s Central Committ ee and th e medi ca l
aut horit ies . Fearin g public opi Ilion and on ou r finn in-
s istence, Mao was compelle d to ag ree for Li Fu-chun t o
invit e cons ul tants fr om the Yeri an Centr al Hospi tal , the
Norman Bethune Peace Hospital, an d th e Yenan Medi cal
Institute.
Th e cons ultants began t heir in vestiga t ion on 30 June
Ifl43 and did not end it until 30 Jul y, 'Thev s t udie d Chin
Mao-yaos pr escripti ons and the di ar y o'f th e medical
nurses, and hear d th e evidence of nu rses a nd che mis ts,
and drew up t wo documents, which th ey called " fi nding'S
concer-nin g th e dia gn osi s and trea tment of Comra de Wan g-
Mi ug", and " pr ovisional r ecommendati ons for his fur th er
tr ea tment". Her e is wh at they found:
" Afte r ta ki ng the medi cin e Comrnde \\Tang Ming vom-
itcd, had diz zy s pells and acute pains in the liv er . Hi s
spl een was en larged, the re wer e pai ns in th e r egion of th e
heart, a nd hi s body temper ature dr opp ed t o sub- norm-
al. . . . I II fa ct , t he t otal close of j list th e calome l, t ak en
int er nall y, was 10 0 large and l ed to poiso ni ng (if th e pa..
tiont had cont inue d taking it accor din g t o th e ins truc-
41
tions of head doctor Chin, ':. the dose would have probably
totalled 20. 4 grams ; so large a dose can poiso n or kill
s ever al peopl e), and t o unfavourable effects on the h eart,
liver, spleen, kidneys, intestines, stomach, oral cavity,
the t eeth, nerves, and oth er or gans."
The findings further said: " Cal omel is in soluble i n
water, and yet head doctor Chin prescribed an aqueous
soluti on of it 10 Wang Ming. . . . When cal omel is mixed
with sodium bi carbonate, magnesium sulfa te, sodi um sul-
fate, bromine preparations,and the like, it can turn into
corrosive chloride of mercury or soluble mercuric salt,
which is more readily assimilated and more toxi c. Yet
head doctor Chin pr escribed calomel with incompatible
component!'! to Wang Ming. Tn some ca ses , though pre-
scribing the incompatibl e preparations and calomel sop-
arately, he advised Wang Ming to take the merliclnes
tog ether. After taking calomel , the pati ent showed symp-
toms of mercury poisoning. but head doctor Chin told
him to conti nue taking it. .. " , and so on. *".
J think it. is not nece ssary here to go into the circum-
st.a nccs of the poisoning and th o harm to my health in the
prn-iod from Oct ob er 1!l41 to June 1D4:1. or into the vari -
ely of methods used ior Ihi s purpose. It would take up
too much space. But thoreis no harm in citing a few
documents J have kept that clinch th e matter:
1. The writt en findings and athol' papers of th e COTl-
s ul ta nts, wh o had gather ed in Yonan from 30 June to 30
Julr 191.a (their findings were in two copies, one of
\\'."I<:'h was given 10 me and th e ot her forwarded through
Ll Fu-chu n to th e Ccn t ra l Commiltee of the CPC) a t
th o. If) the findings were signed
IIlclwhng- CIlIn Mllo-vao and DI' Ma Hat t j C· ,
H' I ) . • . lY c 1- C I (George
b rg . an doct or who took Chin's Ride. Faced
f y Witness es and Illcontroverlibl e evidence tl
to affix t heir signa lures to the documen t ICy were
ne of the four wh o did t si c C .
cat od in fas ci st Germany wa s
f
hu Chen, odu-
ince. like Chiang China (Mao' a Ire 0 d prov-
Dunng th e h e an hill Ma o-yao.
nnd when th e lillI e cameo t I .h lS UIImast t? cl ear Chin,
* 0 sign t 10 findmgs he dis-
The l'efe"'H1cc is to Ch· l\f
and surgica'l Ill) ao-yao, then head doctor of U
HOSPItal. (epartmonts of the Yenan C t ,.e
j
** UF' d' e on In
III rngs...", pp. 7, 10-12.
42
.. Another wa s Hou Chien-tsun, who had s tudied
wlt.h in . t he. medical sc hool of Amer ican-oper at ed
C!lJlll Uni ver sit y In Shant ung and had al so worked with
111m at tho Ameri can-owned LIsl eh-ho Hospital in Peking.
He wa s godfather to Lina, th e dau ghter of Mao Tso-tunz
and Chiang Ching, and wa s in charge of tho child ren' s
department at tho Central Hospital, where hi s wifo wa s
se nior medi cal nurse . Chiang Ching oIlen lef t her d.nurh-
tel' in thclr care. The other two were Chu Ch ung-li and
Soviet doctor A. Orlov, who could not at t end on the day
of the signing. .
Aft er tho findings had heen drawn li p. th e s il;!" ninlr wa s
delayed for two days due to the r ecalcitra nce of Chi n
Mno-yao and the attempts of Ma Hai-t eh and Chu Chen
to ab solve him of guil t. Most of t he consu l ta nts, includ-
ing Dr. Orlov, had th e pharmacy fill Chin Mao-yao's pre-
scri pt ion of an aqueou s so lut ion of ca lo mel and th o other
incompatible ingredi ents, and had off.ere d. 1\[a
whu argued that it wa s harmless, t o drink It. Ma Hai-teh
refused. A few hours lat er , th o solution , which was in
a glass phial , turned green. Then there wa s sudden
pop and the cork flew out of th e n eck of the phial up t o
tho ceil ing. Ma Hai-teh paled, and spoke not a word more
iII Chin's defence. Fearing that he, to o, would be asked
to swall ow the sol ut ion, Chu Chen fled. Chin Mao-yao
al on e cont i nued to argue. Then, my wif e Meng' Ching-shu
passed round a prescripti on Chin had issued on 12 Feb-
ruary 1943. At thi s point Chin broke down. He ran to her.
f ell to hi s knees, and said plaintively: "Comr ade Meng
Ching-shu, thank you for not having thi s prescription
filled and not letting Comrade 'Yang Ming take it. You
have saved not onl y your husband; yo u have al so saved
me. " After thi s 11 out of the 12 doct ors present sign ed
the document (except Hall Chien-t sun).
After the findings had be en si gned, Chi n Mao-yao ra n
up to me, kneeled beside my bed and wailed with tears
running clown his cheeks :
" Comra de Wang Ming, it is tr ue. I have poi soned you.
It wa s a t orment for me to prescribe the poison. "
"W hy did yo u do it ?" 1 asked.
" Li Fu-chun t old m e to. lIe sa id you were a dogmatist.
that you wer e against Chairman Mao , and that it had
be en decid ed t o elimina te you. And I wa s to do it , b ecause
1 wa s your treating physician. I told him I was religious
43
and .lhat recently l he Central Committee had decided to
admit mc as a secre t member to the Party- so how could
I do. su ch a thing? But Li Fu-chun repli ed: 'Thi s is a
s pecial ca se a nd si nce it has been decid ed thnt you
shoul d (10 it , you have no choice. You ar e C\ member of
the Party and ar c obliged to obey Party orders, ' "
The next moment two men in army uniforms charged
into the room. One of them shouted to Chin Mao-yao: '
"\Ve have looked for you everywhere, and h ere you are.
Why arc you on your knees, wailing and weeping? W e
have como to take you to Tsaoyuan. ':. You are a criminal
and are forbidden to speak to anybody."
The two seized Chin by the collar and l ed him away.
2. The prescriptions issued hy Chi n Ma o-yao to poi son
Wang Ming, including some found at that time in the
pharmacy of the Central Hospital , and those kept by us
(other prescriptions " could not be found"). Be sid es, some
of the toxic preparations were brought by Chi n Mao-yao
directly from his house .
3. The written r osul ts of tests sho wi ng the mercury
con len t in the daily volume of urine. The te sts were made
in July 1943 in Yenan, during the period of the medical
investigation, and al so in December 1950-0ctober 1952
in a Moscow hospital , and in October 1954 in a Pe-
king hospital; in addition there are other tests and
findin gs.
The cons ult an ts in Yonan establish ed that J was being
syst emat icall y poi soned. After th eir in vesti gati on , Li Yun:"
shih , a consci en tious and consi de r ate pediatrist, was ap -
pointed my treating physician. She ba sed her treatment
on an entirely now diagnosis -mercury poisoning-s-and
did her best to help me recover. Hope appeared of deliv-
er ance from morl al danger, and th ere wer e signs of an
improvement in my health.
Besides, there were athol' Important re asons that had
helped me es cape doa th, though many times r was on its
ve r y brink:
. I. De spite til e pain. th e dang-er and th e illnesses res ult-
fr om. r ep eated poi soning, and despite predi cti on s of
a ppr oac hi ng death by Chin Ma o-yao and ot hers, my wife
* 'I'saoyuajj was the headquarters of th e Social (Secur it y)
Department of th o ec epc; l at er, Mao Tso-tun g and th e Polit-
bureau moved there from Yantsialin.
and .r heart: we turned Jar help and "(1"1',.,. t
SjJl'C J' J I " ( 'J' ( " "" 0
':, " . <1 IS S . .> llIWS(' fl nd .E I II'olwil ll meuicin s, a nd nlso
;;l udred medici ne '
" . 2'1 nll,acke d a nd s landered me du r in " t he
s l.y (' rect tfi\"'l tl(»)1 '-' . " I '" '
• '. : ' . : ( was convinc ed t hat I
politi cally a nd orga nis a tio nall y right.
1 Ill, the line of t.he 4th Plenum, and
th e policy united national anli-J apancse fr ont nev-
or .. I' In n as eve r was my se nse of prol etarian in-
towards th e Comin t ern and t he Sovi et Com-
Party. T ,,:as s uro t hat th e "style rec tificat ion Cam-
paign was a wl wron g, und ce r tai n, too, that.
Mao was Ialsf fyi ng th o h istory of tho CP C.
, :\' Despite Mao' s var ious attempts to isol at e me, 111 0St
of lh u lr ad er's and Part y cadres eit he r pu blicl y a pprove d
my s ta ndpoin t or expr essed th ei r sympa t hy and suppor ted
me cove r tly. T had many vi sitors. 'I'h e a bsol u te rnaj ori ty
of Party cadres was agains t Mao's "rect ificati on of styl e" ,
as Mao himself admitted to me in a ta l k in April In4.4.
Thi s mea nt, of course. that t hey were concerned 1'01' my
[ate, and that they beli eved in Lcniru sm and t he Coru ln-
tern line.
T hough many Party cadres feared per se cuti on or arres t
and could not vi sit me, quite a few did come regularly
to th e ho spital or vi si ted me at home, and this even dur-
ing the two mo st turbul en t peri ods -i-thut of " rect i fica t ion
of ·style" a nd that of "emergenc y sal vation". Among them
were eight member s and two al ternat e members of the
Pol itburcau (at that time it consis ted of 10 member s, in -
cluding mys elf , and [our alternate member s) .
I was also visited by some ranking comrades wh o had
returned t o Yonan Irom liberated or Kuornint ang areas.
To ke ep up appenr nu ces, Mao Tse-tung vis ite d 1111'. too. at
th e most critical period of my illness .
Comrad es from Party departments in my char ge camc
[.0 se e me many times. 1 had many fu nctions. 1 was in
c ha r ge of the United Front Depar tment of t he CC CPC
(handling matters pert aining t o the unit ed national anti -
J ap anese fr ont), was chair ma n of the Party Press Com-
mission, Politburcau in structor-representative with th e CC
CPC Northwest Bureau (including th e Shen si -Kansu-
I Tillghsia Border Area), chairman of th e CC cpe Commi s-
s ia n 1'01' So ut h China ( Huna n, Ki angsi , Fukien, Kwang-
tung and Kwan gsi ) a nd So uth we st Ch ina (Szech ua n,
Kweichow, Yunn an an d Sik ang ) , chai rma n of thp. CC CPC
Commissi on for Northeast China, a nd sec re ta r y of t he
CPC facti on i n the National-Political Council. .
I was regularly visited by Li n Po-chu, Hsieh Chueh-
tsai , Chen Cheng-jen, Shen Tse-min and othe r comr ades
of the CC cpe Bureau for Nort hwe s t China and t he
Shonsi-Kansu-Ninghs i a Border Area , who were closely
associated wi th me.
Of cour se, Ko Ching-shih, de puty chief of t he United
Front Department, visited me more often than th e others,
and we exchanged opinions on th e " styl e rectification
ca mpaign",
True, ther e were al so other kinds of visi tors . Li Fu-
chun ca me fr equently. He wa s Ma o' s trusted ag en t in
poisoning me. But as chief of the Central Committee' s
Chancellery and thus in charge of medi ca l inst ituti ons,
he could not deny me various servi ces, and came to di s-
cuss matters pertaining t o my comfort and treat me nt . It
s tands to r eason th at 1 nei th er wanted to nor could di s-
cuss with him t he "style recti ficat ion campaign" or othe r
Party or political matters.
Hy this time my du ti es as chairman of t he CC CPC
commiss ion for work among women and as r ector of
'Women' s Univers i ty, whi ch I assumed in had
dropped away by themsel ves. Th e main purpose ha d been
to buttress the P arty among women, l aun ch th e j ournal Chi -
nese Wo man, and es ta blish t he Yerian All -China Women's
Univer sity. But, as 1 h ave already menti on ed, th e
Universit y had been closed down in September 1941.
Towards the end of the forti es and in the fifti es Mao
con ti n ue d h is att empts t o eli minate me. Let me mention
j us t a fe w.
1. On 25 June 1948 a t th e Central Hospital in Chuhao ':.
my treati ng physi cian, Huang Shu-tse, ,:.,:. prescri be d lysol
. ,," a. villnga in Fupi llg . county, Hopch province,
seven an d u hall kIlometres from Hslpsipo, then the tcmpornry
headq uarters of the Central Committee. The Central Hospi tal was
then In Chuhao.
. ." * Fu Lit;n-chang appointed Huang Shu-tss my treating phy-
siciun. Po Ku an d Fu Lien-chang told me that Huang Shu-tse
was suspected of belongIng to a Trotskyite gro up. However
after .lhe "style rectification campai gn" Fu Lien-chung speciall y
transferred Huang .Shu-tse fr om the Norman Bet hune Hos ital
to the Central Hospi tal and to t he Central Committ ee's of
Hea lt h hea ded by Fu Lien-cha ng himself.
i ns t ead of medical soap for washing my i nt esti nes ' i ts
use coul d have been l eth al.
'
l owe it. to the vigil ance of my wife tha t th is ti me
a tl' a!:p c outcome was averted, This re ached t he
01 th e chlef of t he hospit al , Chou Tse-chao and ot her
doct ors .
'
H on 7 Centra l Commit tee's T3 ul'cau of
ea. a Circ ular :'*cl aiming tha t a mi s take had
.com.mltted by.a chemist whe n fill ing the prescr i pt ion.
. y issuing Iysol Inst ead of medi cal soap he caused an
acute of the di se ase; this is a serious case
of negligence, The above expla nation was, of cours e,
meant to conceal a fresh attempt on my li fe made on
orders from above.
r .
2
. On 25 Oct ober . 1!J50 at 11 o'clock in th e morni ng,
\ aug Shang-kun, c!l1 ef of th e CC CI-'C Chancellery, came
to my 'hou se and said:
" At 9. o' clock morning I was summoned by Li n
who sa id t hat l as t n igh t Chairman .\ l ao spoke
to . 111m of Wang Ming''s depar tu r e for the Soviet Union
thi s aftern oon by the train goi ng to Manchu ri a. Li u or-
dered. me t o perform all the formalities wit hout delay. It
wa s Simple : I t el ephon ed t he Ministr y of For eign Affairs
and t old th em to iss ue passports to all you!' family a t
Her e they are. You can lake along wh oever yo u
WI sh. I need is .th eir phot ogra phs. I have al r eady tol d
th o !WlIlls tr y that you must ha ve a private
car m the t rai n l eaving for Manchuri a at 6 p.m, today.
There is littl e time l eft. Will you manage t o pack ?" .
I a ske d him:
are rumours that at midnight our vol unt eer
army will .cross the Yalukiang bridge into Kor ea to r epuls e
the American aggression, and t hat MncArth or has al -
r eady issued orders for his air forc e to bomb the Shan-
haikuan-Manchuriu railway the momen t Cliineso volun-
teers ent er Kor ea in order to destroy the S\1!lply l i nos
fro m Peking and the Soviet Uni on. Is this tr ue ?'
"Yes, it is tr ue ," Yang Shang-kun r ep lied.
" So, since we wi ll be travell i ng acr oss Mane11 uria to-
morrow morni ng, we are s ure to be bombed . Am I right ?"
* The Central Commit tee's Bureau of Health then had the
code na me, Fifth Department of the Workers' School.
*,' I still have in my possession a copy of this cir cular and
Huang Shu -ts o's notes.
47
"Yes, and it is up to you to doc ldo whether you IP,IIV A
tod ay or not ," h e ans we re d. " If you decide to st ay, l et
me know: 1 must infor m th e Ministry of Rai l ways. "
It was cl e a r to !\l eng Ching-shu and me why Mao had
sudde nly decided that we s hould depart that day. Lon g
before Liu Shao-chi had given us per mi ssion to go t o
th e Soviet Union, but for more th an si x months we had
been waiting t o be told the date of our departure. W0
wondered what to do, and finall y decid ed La go despite
the ri sk, for on e could never tell if t here will be another
ch ance. I was going to Moscow not only for medical
tr satmeut, but because I wanted to sec t ho Sovi et Uni on
again after its vi ctory in tho Greal I' atrlotl c War. I had
not been th er e for 13 ye ars .
At the r eception held on our depar tur e by live l egal
and administrative institutions, some comra des advis ed us
not to risk our l ives. But a t 5.30 p.m. we boarded th e
t ra in, a nd eventually set out for our destination.
We r eached Manchuria withou t mishap, changed into
a Soviet train, and arrived in Moscow safel y. As th e train
approach ed th e Sovie t ca pital, Men g Citing-s hu, who Was
ver y fond of musi c, began humming my "Ode t u Mos-
cow" ::' :
" The ly ri cs con sist of five st anzas, which Wang Ming wrote
in late October HJ41 , when in Yenar. Central Hospital. The Nazis
wers the n close to Moscow. Meanwhile, Mao not only refused to
step up mil itary operations to pr event th e Japanese from opening
a second fro nt against th e Sovie t Union, but also launched the
an ti -communis t and anti-Sovi et "s t yle r ectifi cation campaign".
Wang Min !? dedicated this ode and ot her ant i-Mao poems (e.g.
" Yantsialin" , "Wolves Howling in the Nig ht" , and other s, which
were passed from hand to hand; Mao also rea d them) to tho
24.th au niversary of the Gr ea t Oct ober Soci alist Revolution and
to Moscow,
Wan g Min g began wri t ing poetry at th e ag e of nine. He has
wri tten more than GOO poems and songs, and when gravely ill
and sufl urin g pain and anguish, did not for ego t he slightest
cha nce to write-s-to praise labour, to propagate Marxism-Leninism
and tho Soviet Union , to pa y trib ute to fall en heroes of th o revo-
lut ion, to hon our unn l ve rsru-Ies of th e f'P,vo lutiona ry niovetn nnt,
to lig ht agains t imp eria lis m and Maot s rn, uud fo l' pea ce and th e
happiness of ma nki nd. Hi s la st lines of ver se, and fr ag me n ts of
th is bouk, wer e written three day s beforo hi s passing . TIo of ton
sa id: " To be a Communis t is to giv e all one's streng t h to the
last br eath." He had al ways followed this principl e himsslt.c-
Note by Meng Ching-sh u.
48 49
Moscow,
the Kr emlin Pal ace
live -pointed crims on s tdr.
TUlle of your chimes spreading
acro ss th e Soviet Lund
The st ar lights Up .
, , tho five cont ine n ts .
1he rlllging chimes
rea chiug all conntries
of th e world.
Moscow, triumphant
OIl of the globe.
Sy mbol 01 things to COme.
th e world of cu tu munigm
th e wur ld of
.. .. ..
Moscow,
Lenin's Mnusol eurn .
Gra ndeill' of s pir it,
llea tltloss deed.
l.cniuism has awakened
th e human race Irorn sleep.
The Sovie ts' vic torios
. in spi re an d deli ght.
Il yi ch , Iorovnr, every whe re,
. helmsman of world revolu tion.
Il yi ch, for av nr living
i n lh e hea rt s uf men .
for ever li ving
in th e hearts uf men .
.. .. ..
Moscow,
beacon of revolution.
the working people's arden t lov e,
th e fascists' hat e an d fear.
Tho man iac Hi t ler has attacke d,
and Stalin ca lmly or ders
Peopl e anJ ar my, the Party
nt th eir head:
Stand firm and win.
Peopl e and army, the Party
at th eir head ,
crush the adversary.
erush th e adversarv.
.. ,. ..
Moscow,
the Communist
Intern ational.
Ail conununists 0[,
are hrothers 0 , ,
' . . J I . Sovlel
Chinn IS ald.e1 the
C o rn. lll. \ l tl lE- S • ists
A
nChine se - -
11 1 \ the Soviet UmOD
rnust re p \. . \ .
the [ .1
ug
al
". . acroSS the \VO" u ,
ks [or victory.
I se vour I an " .1
C ?-h . to shoul
ue r
Fig t - . 1 J vi ctory.
for chens \e my friends.
. h Krcmlin palacc;
l he 1
of revolul ion;
7\lo s cO\\ , .... .
the C OllllIlt CI n.
\IoSCOW, . I
-\ ' Ol1'VC won ill 1
o f th" gloh.. .
S\' lIIbol of things to c? mc .
. worl d of
world of communism.
In t he winter of 1U52, during his visit t o Moscow,
" I ' I ' said to us " You were no l bombe d hecause TIll - ;-, iao-c 11 s I
. 1 fbI
man did not wan l a war wit h China ; he st ric t Y 0 1' ac e
10 bomb Chinese to r ritory." . '
3. I II December 1953 we returned 10 Peking. hom
April 1!'l5!1 to January! I had seven ac ute .of
cho l ecy-ti ti s and hepatitis . The fir st one was III April-
:May 1954. Huang hu-t e, Fu Li en-chang a nd
were reluctant to acknowledge that I had a ba d Iiver
and gall-bladder. because t h is could revive t alk of t he
poisoning. I stayed al horn e wi t h th e atlack five
On the six th. I was compell ed to go to Poki ng Hospital.
The doct ors diagno ed acute chol ecyst itis, but Huang
Shu-ts e stuck t o his own versi on. He said : "In addition,
t ho patient has peritonitis. "
By t his ti me Hua ng Shu-tse had been prOT1lotHrI deput y
chief of t he CC CPC Bureau of Healt h ; he nce, P oking
Hospit al was in hi s char ge. The doctor s did not da r e go
against his opinion. He in si sted on at onc e re moving th e
gall-hlarlde r . On my fourth day of ho spital an d the ni nth
after th e nuack had begun, the situati on beca me c r itical.
That mor ni ng Mcng Ching- hu summon ed bot h our sons
to my bedside for fh p leav e-taki n g. At the same ti me she
ircntcd me with repeatedl y t ested medicines. For three
days she fought de s pe rate ly for my lifr . Gradua lly, Illy
co ndition improve d, the pain s ubs ide d, the Lempera ture
dropped. a.nd I was able 1.0 take ao rrt e (n od. nut rri y d oc
to rs cont inued t o insi st on a n ope ra tion. IVe resist ed, for
I had eaLen nothing in six days and my weight was down
fr om 58-nO kil ograms t o a mere 40. 1 could not hope t o
sur vive a n opera li on. After re pea te d r equests T wa s g i ve n
t wo bl ood transfu si on s - a mer e 500 mill ilitres. .r secret,
we c ot in t ouch wit h specialistiO in Chi nese Ulcdll:.1ne, nn d
I their drugs. t,- As a result, my grad.ul\l.ly
re turned to normal. But th e t o insist
on an operation. An d when we firmly declined, t hey mad e
us sig n a pap er 10 this effect.
.
1. I n th e Slimmer of HISS, du e to an aggl'avatlOn, I wa s
again t aken Lo Peking Hosp it al. Surgeon Shao made an
infus ion of n sodi um chloride and glucose so lut ion a t th e
rate of (50 drops a mi nute. He admitted this later, but
said he had been orde re d to do so by Dr. Wang, chief of
t he s urgi ca l depart ment. A few minu te - after t he infusi on
began Dr. Shau went ou t of my ward. I began shiver i ng
S? i ntensely t hat six hot-water bottl es and three q uills
did not hel p. I was pal e, sweat i ng prof usel y, a nd Illy
h ea rt was beating furiou sl y. Thon a terrible weakness s et
in . Meng Ching-s hu asked the nurse to pull ou t the
noodl e at on ce, hut th e girl r efused : " Dr . Shao sai d the
in fusion must Dot be s lopped in hi s absence. I'll go and
l ook . for him. " Wh en t he nurse l eft, Meng Chi ng-shu irn-
s top ped t he infusion a nd mad e a ca mphor i n-
joe l ion to stimulate my heart, Gradually, I r elaxed,
t ho ugh th e ca rdiac weakness l in ger ed. Aft er a l ong t ime
t he nurse brou gh t back Dr . Shao. When he saw the in-
fu sion had been st oppe d he s ho wed his di splea sure and
we shou ld ha ve wailed for his re t urn; he wo uld have
decide d what 10 do .
Pr ofessor Y. ;\1. Vol oshin , a Soviet specialist attached
to t he surgical dep a r tment of P ek in g Hospital , said wh en
he heu rd a bout th e case: " In Comr ade Wang Min g's con-
". "L tho end of HJ4\l 1\Ino decl ar ed th at Chinese medicine wa s
" ol d medi cin e" an d Eur opean medi cin e "new medicine" ; he said
that, "the old and dyin g must be thrown out and r epl aced by the
new". Thi s cause d r.ons tor nation in th e country and among th e
SUU,UUll doctors practi sin g Chi nese medi cin e.
rlition t he ra te sho uld have hecn dr ops H 1ll.iIlH1Po,;
!l uw could anyone pre cri be a rate o! (JO '\
If th ere is another inf us ion, yon must care ful J wa t.• I
t he r a t e," , , " 1 M a Chi na-shu h ad acted COI'-
[n his 0pimou, he s aid , \V
rectly. Jf she hadn L sto: r'l d W owe Comrade V OI05111il
:'IIing' s hear t may have fal counse llor,
. 1 1 He \\, 'I S a true anr . , , SI Lt'
si ncere t HUI cS. cv, • nediat c o per a tion as '
strongl y opposed to) He said: " Chol ec
J
:s,
crested by Hu an g . al l intel'Jlal organs <d ]
l itis isn't t.he only is bar ely alive as It I S, a m
Icc ted Com rade Wan", I g t ion.'
1', .
f tl e quos I ,
,
'H I operation is out 0 , l "D lot azree to an operatIOlI 011
, He adyised us agum: 0, ICOIJ I'll ,"' li on n sllrgical int cnen-\
L 11' j)rC"PllL ..
" A H
an v <lC count.. n yo 1 - . st of <:o n;;C' quonces, J
'. I l y the var v \VOl' . 1 S . "\
li o n ran la ve all , , ' . itt cd me to go to tIC OV1\)
wh eu Liu Shao-clll aga in haste n our rl upar turo a nd
Uninn for u -cat mcnt , 'l·n e, 'ion" t hat my heart wa s
ur sru ed . in defiance of at op m ":', . ,, '
:;tr':' A
on g
u:»: the a ut umn
par
f 11)-1-' l' thor
of I !H 1 anti th e 0 , ;) 1,. mar '.
and Iact s 10 indi cat e that Mao was after my hfe.
6) Mao seizes the post of General Secretary
of the Cen tral Committee
During his pre pa r a t ion s fOI' t 110 " re ctifica tion of
, " Mao Tse t ung performed a palace revoluti on
campaig n ! c -
• f tl P tv's
and seized the post of Gener-al Secr etary 0 io arr.y s
Cent ral Commit tee. TT ere is how things devel oped :
In September 1!J41 Mao often sa id half in j est to mem-
her s of the P ol i tb ur eau :
"La Fu is the Han Emperor Hsien Ti and I am Tsao
Ts a o l.l u t 1 am not as n oLle a s T:<il O T::;ao , who was co n
to nt wilh th e title of Pr i nce \ Vei wull g (i t was his so u
who l a l er usurped t h e th rone) . 1'11 take up lhe swor d a nd
(I SIJ ('p Ill e th ro ne mys elf. "
Olle in late Septemher, at the close of a P olit-
Imr eillJ he snddenly dC'JII:llldl'd Ihat Lo Pu shollld
at once "gi\'e him" thl' post of Genp l'al Sec r'pUn y, s inn' i t
"incoJl\-e lliC'n l for hi m Lo wor"" wilho ili. it. .len
Pi -s hih instantly retortC'd :
"Thi5' will be ill-con idcr erl, It is bes t t o l eave the
maLl oI' to the 7th Congr ess , where a n of ficial d eci s ion
ca n be taksn ."
The ot. hOl's sa id not.hing, and the me eting ended.
Al t er thi s Ma o look it npun himsclj. without ;;0 mu ch
as a by your l cav o, to pre s ide at 1111' ('1 in
pIneo or Lo F Il. au d ill November inado l ho lul t or g'o "o n
a tour of inSlJI!t;L[ oJl " In the liberat ed nrcn ill no rt hwost
Sha ns i. II was i n thi s manner t hat .Ma o usurped the post
of General Se cretary of l h e CC Cf'C.
7) 1\1:\0 form s a burl y of men to conduct
the "st yle redifltatioll campaign"
Mao Tee-tun g had n o po l i ti cal cadres of hi s own, So he
employe d a variety of meth ods, Includlug threat s a n,rl
promises, t. o form a body of men to run the " s t yl e recti -
fica l ion ca mpai gn" .
First he turned his att ention to Lin Sha o-chi, then sec-
rot ary of th e CPC Cent ra l China 1:l1lJ' l:'HlI , Accord inz t o
Mao , he had often sough t clos er ti cs with Liu foll owing
the Tsun yi eOnfMe!lc:e, Duri ng the nth Plenum of th p
Sixt h Centra l COJll lllittee (Oct ober 1938) the two of th em
came to terms abou t a Mao-Lin bloc: after ' jointly :,pizillg
power in the Par ty they would ius t it utu [or t ho pos l
01' CC Ch ai rman (t he CPC h a d n ever had thi s post be-
fore), Mao would be in clJarge of military aff airs, while
t he post of Gcncrn l Se cretary woul d go to Liu. wh o would
bc i n charge of Par ty work. To amass "capi tal"
pssPll t i al 1' 0 1' th is a p po i n tme nt , Liu [oll owed Mao' s nrl\' i r:p
and wrote a book, On th e Self-F:dllcati on of a Communtst ,
in 1H:::H. '1' 11 e1'0,IIpon, Mao ofte n sl ressed at Pol ithIIrf'i1J1
meetings and in private conversa tions that Lin' s rol e in
t he Pait y s hollid be en hanced. When 1Ie open ly pl'ol'laimer!
" Maoism", he oft vn sa irl : " Liu Sl rao-rl. i is th e first
(' ()J If / lIC't ()J' anrl IH'ol11o lf' I' of
Usi ng the stick and the carrot, he WOn the hacking of
Kang Sheng, who was in r, harge of Central Commit tee
sec uri ty, Il nd Chen Yun , chie f of the Cenlrid Commillcc's
organis ational rl epCll tll1l'nt. Lilte /', he SIlIllII IOIlC' r! PI' II l.("
Chell, then Secretary of the Shilnsi-Cha har-lInpelt brand ;
of Ill n CC CPC Nort h Ch ina Fl U!'C'a ll, to Y('nall . Art er just
one falk wi th him, Mao d pd ar ed I lw( Plmg' CI1 ('J I wa:; a
" bOI'Il )\ l :J cds t " , ThC' :<aIlw or .\ l noi .;L" h('
also to Kao Kang, secr etary o r the Party cOllJmi l -
t ee of t he Shcusi- Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area and sccr c-
tary of th e CPC No r t hwes t Bureau. ::. Thereup on h e set u p
the Chancell ery of the Central Comm ittee an d, as a sign
of s pecial trust, appointed the depu ty ch ief of tho CC
organi sati unal department, Li Fu-chuu (t hen alternate
member of the CC CPC), as its ch ief.
Bes id es , h e recruited person al secretar ies- Chell Po -t u
( from t he Central Comrnittecs propagand a depart-
m ent) and Hu Chla o-mu (from t he pr opa ga nda dnpa r t-
ment of t he YCL). During t he "style rect.ifi cation cam-
paign" h e used them as a ssi stants in writing ar t icles a nd
falsif ying hi st orical Iact s.
Out of th es e eight people not more t han t h ree
s urvived, and they, too, keep di sappearing from t he pulil-
ic ul scene one day lind reappearing t he next. The res t
wer e done t o death one a fter the other or suller ed fr om
Ma o' s per s ecutions.
2. TIlE SECOND PETUOD OF
"STYLE RECTIFICATION"
During this peri od (February 1942-.ful y H143) Mao ope n-
ly "recti fied t he style of work" .
On 1 F ebruary 1942 h e spoke a t th e Ce ntral Partv
School (headquarter s for th e " r ectification of style"
among Party cadres ). Hi s s peech wa s ent itled, "Ilect ify
tho Style of tho Party " . It formall y i na ugura ted " the cam-
.. Previously. Kao Kang had been well disposed towards tho
Cornintern , the Soviet Union and me. Between the aut umn of
19:11l and th e summer of 1()41 he brought top-ranking comrades
from the Party committee of the Shcnsi -Kansu-Ninghsia Border
Area and the crc Northwest Bur eau to my lecture s on tho
of tbe. Communist Party. During the "sty le recti-
Ilcation cnrnpmgn Mao wont out of his wav to win him. For :.1
Kao Kang became Mao' , follower. After t ho Arrnv of
U!lioll entered North east China he had frequent ' contact s
With SOViet comrades becau se at that time he was in the Nort h-
and. besides. under the good influence of Kai
r eng. chie f of the Bureau s prop ngnnrln depar tment. Bcfri cndnd
by Mao. he had an opportunity to obsl'l've Mao's untr uth lulness
perfulv. hecame criti en] of Mao's line and
po.hcy. In I!b4. accused him of forming an • a n t.i-Par tv Ka o
(Ka':l: )-Jao :md had him oliminntorl. (For' mor'l)
see th e The Cult ur al Revolut ion' and the Mao ist
b
Bld for CooperatlOlI with I mpc rl uiis ur". in the third part of tlth
oak. pp. 190-96. ' .
p.aign for the rectification of the st yle of Par t v. oduca-
l. inna] ?Il d work " . hut was ill fact the prelude t o
,'ea cl.Hln al' y publi c ca mpaign against Leninism. the Com-
111t :l' n. th e Soviet Un ion. ann th e Com munist Part \' of
Chi na. On 8 February h e made a no t her s pe ec h . " Agai ns t
in t he Party". spe ll ing out additional gu ide -
l in es f or Lh e "rect i fica tio n of t.lie s l.yl e of lit erary
On 7 F ebruary. Chie hta ngji h[J{/() puhli shcd a long ar ticle .
Maoi sm". signe d by a certain Chang Ju-h sin (pre-
vio us lv known as Chang Shu-an }, n f ormer fo llower of
Wan g Clung-wei and sus pe cte d of belonging t o a Trotsky-
ite gro u p th a t. h ad infilt rated th e P a r ty. Maoism" was
t Ill' overture t o undi s guis ed cavill in g at Leninism and
laud ing of Ma oi sm . Ther eupon, in MAy. Mao h eld three:
confer ences "on liter atur e and art", where h e mane t h e
openin g and closing speeches . Known as "talks at the
Yennn forum OIl lit ornuirc and ar t", they prese nted t h e
bas ic gu ide li nes for th e " re cti ficati on of the st yl e of work
ill Iitcrutnre anrl art ", and were published in 'newspapers
Oil 23 May.
H er e, I want t o deal with the following four it em s :
1. The Commissi on and s ubdivisions f OJ' t he " rect tfica-
tion of the style of work".
2, The meth ods and objecti ves of th o " recti fica t io n of
style".
3. My thr ne lalks with Mao conce rning t he "rectification
of s tyle".
4, Ma o' s " tal ks at th e Yc nun Ioruui on literature and
art" .
1) The Commission and su bdivisions for
"the r eelifieation of the st yle of work"
To conduct the " s tyl e rect ificati on ca m pa ign" Mao for med
a " central com miss ion". the members of whi ch h e pi cked
pcrs nnall v. The ch ief member s were Liu Shan-chi. Kang
Sheng. Chen Yun, Pen g Chen. Kao Kang and Li F u-
chun-i- th c bod y of m en Mao had recruited during th e
preparatory per iod. Th ey followed h is bidding to the l et-
t or . Un ti l J anuary Hllj:3 th e commi s sion wa s chaire d b y
T\ :lllg Shen g. tlw;l Lin Shno-chi retur ned to Yeuan from
Central China and t oo k over.
In Y on an. t he "rectiflcation campai gn" wa s co uc en- :
tratcd in t hree l ar ge s ubdivis ions ,
The Iirst wa s th e Central Party School. In addition to
students of the Party School, worker s of Party COTll-
ffiItt el! s-frOffi county to terri torial CC hureaus--wer e
summoned her e fr om nil parts of til e countrv to underrro
" r ect ificat ion", So wer e ar my commanders politi (; l
officers (regimental and higher ) , cadres of atlrniuisl rati vc
or gans in areas (county and hi gh er ) held by the 8th
Houto or New 4th armies, and Communists ac tive in the
governing bodies of ma ss organi sations, The " rc cti fi ou-
li on" in th e Party School wa s headed by Pe ng Chen.
Tho second subdivision, headed hy Kao Kang, concerned
workers at all level s of Party bodies, admi nis t.rati ve
or gans and mass or gani sati ons in th e Shcnsi-Kaus u-
Ning hsia Bord er Area,
TilC third subdivision was for workers of CC CPC
bodi es, and was head ed by Li FU- CltUIl,
The "sty le rectifi cation campaign virtual lv converted
Yonan into a huze concentr ation camp, The pr emi ses of
b I \' .
schools , institutions an d ol fices became p aces 0 IH'OVI-
sionnl det ention, Nobody was allowed to couunu nicate
with any body-to write or telephone, 01' do any th ing ,
without permi ssi on of " rec tification canrpnigu' olfic lals .
2) The methods and objectives
of the "reetification of style"
Ma o Tso-tung instruct ed all thoso who wore s ubjected 10
" re cti fication" to st udy th e d ncu rn ent s he had prescribed,
to wri te "confessi ons" , and to engage in " self-cr iticism" .
Th e COlllmissio n for the Hectifica tion or Stvle announce d
t hat of all documents and writings only :\Ia(; ' s work « wer e
corr ect and should therefore he dil igently read and r er ead
as an important means of ideologi ca l re-educatiun. The
Commission specia lly emphasised Maos pamphlet On Ne w
Dem.ocracy because, it said, " Maois m equa ls New D Olll OC-
.racy' becau se, t ho was th e " prim o and cap-
il al thcoruti r-a] work, It foll owed that tho works
of Lenin, the document s of the Cominlern and the CPC,
and those of othe r Pa rty Icadors, wer e wronz and those
S'llO, read them wer e dog matists, The Marx-E; gcls-LeJl ln _
fo,rmul a .wns nccordingly clHlngpd (0 Marx-
" Some oI th e ('adres (eveIl hi gh-ran king) Wer e
_0 they publ icly burned the li st ed wOl'ks
an r llme n\:, or t hr ew them away. of Lholll
56
said, "Luckil y I have never read t hem, for T
woul d hav e become a dogmatist."
" also na med th e nll' thod,;; :l n rl ObJ·P I·J ' of
cr i ti oi s m" . ..
1) your acquaint ancas. well voursolf.
2) Sa y only dorogat or v things ahou! and
all Ill.) 31:,eouIlt an yth ing good; but abou t
Ma o Liu Shuo-chi a nd 3 f ow other listed pe r-
SOll S speak WAll only and on no ilCCou nt had lv.
3) The main objects of er itic,ism wcr e pl'p"r, ; ihed - firsl
of the " dogma l ic g[,o IIJ'" headed by 'Yang an d
1'0 1\11 for "s prea rling Rus sian unrl,
second, l.he group of " empiri eist ",' head ed h v Ch ou E n-I ni
and Peng Toh-huni for " tre adi ng i n tlw of th e
dogmatist s".
Those who had studiod in the Sovir t l l nion. the intel-
li gentsia, and those doing th coretical or polit ical wo rk
were told to confess to hring "dogmnt ists". while t hoso
of working-cl nss and peasant background and those doi ng
practi cal work wer e told to con fcss t o bein g "empiri cists".
Tho overwhelming major it y of Par t y lead(>],::'. cad )'p;: nud
rank-a nd-fi le member s wer e thus accus ed of dozm ntism
01' empiri cis m. Th e label of "captives" or "helpers " of t he
.l ogrna tis ts was attached to the " empir icists" in order to
assocint o them with th e " dogtnatists' an rl thus justify
st riki ng th e mai n bl ow at t he l att er.
In fri el. , th er e ha d never been any dogmat ic Ill' empiri r -
ist group in th e Communist Par t y of China . That i:, a
rn nk Maui s t invcnt lon, a pr etext for a n arking the maj or-
ity of tho Party membership.
/1) All were obl iged to confess to the "rn ist ukc" of pro -
metin g th e " ' Jeff -oppor tnnist line of Wnng and
Po Ku during t he civil war " and the " r ight-(,ppOl'lllu ist
lin e of Wang' Min g during t li e nnt i-Ju pau cse war" .
III Iact . th ar e had been no such l ines. They wor e lig-
mnnts of Mao ' s imagin at ion wh ich he used duri ng the
"recti hcnfi on" t o hit out at Wang' 1'0 E ll. aud the
maj orily ol th e Party 111 embel'SIii p. .
S) Ev er yone was required to COll l t' :' :' that he had nol
kn own Mnoisrn (consider ed tho gra vest of all " mis takes.")
arul had " Ii l i ndl y buli everl in I\.u s:'inn Ihat is
Lt' ni ni sm" . w aS \'p'!lIir l'd 1(1 pl 'Ol ni s(' " Il l ' "]'('1\1
:1\\' <1 .\ ' 111 0 illl'ol ogil' al \ynnpon of I1nssi an :\Inrx isill anl! 1;1]('
up Chinesi' ,\ 1an.: i;;lII , lhal i". i\!aoi ;;l1l" .
.=. 7
Mall said a t th e Ycn an Iorum on ar t and li ter atur e thnt
" ma ny member s or Ih e Par ty 'had organis ationally joined
the Party, but had n ul. en ti rely joi ned or ev en not a t all
j oined th e Par ty id eol ogically". Th is cha rge was direct ed
aga ins t Communists working in ar t a nd l it era ture, but
al so agains t th e ove r whel ming maj orit y of th e Par ty mem-
ber ship. As a result the Central Commissi on for the Rec-
tifi cati on of S t yle began demanding " con fess ions" t o th is
effect from almost the whol e l ot of Party leaders and
member s. They were required to admit that they had
joined the Party only organisationally, but not ideolog-
ically, which was meant to say that they had ideologi cal-
ly joined the part.y of " Russ ian Marxi sm" and not the
party of " Chi nese Marxi sm" . Til ey wer e re quired Lo r e-
nounce "Russian Marxi sm" a nd es pouse " Chi nese Marx-
ism", and were t old t hey would not be consider ed mem-
bers of t he crc id eol ogi cally until they d id so .
6) Everyon e wa s also required to confess t o t·he "gross
mistake" of not appr eciating "t he greatness of Mao Tse-
lung" find not knowing that " Mao 'I' ae-t un g was the l eader
of the CPC". Everyone was required to promise hence-
forth t o cons id er Mao "the sole leader " and to follow hi s
l eadership. And so OIL
In accordance with these in structions. l eaders and
cadr es conduc t i ng the " r ect i ficat ion" in th e various offices
ca lled endless bi g and small meetings a t whi ch ever yone
was made t o cr it icise himself and ot hers , People were
cont inuo us ly r equired t o write a nd r ewrite t heir "conies-
sinns", au r] no mnl ter how much one did so-or all y or in
wl'iting -il. wa s sl.i l l s ai d that he had not " fu lly apprehend-
ed his fault s ", that he had not. " cr iticised a ll there was
to cr it icise" and must continue to engage in sell-Il agella-
tion. Thi s cont i nued until people were st r ipped of their
inner commun is t and r evolutionary esse nce. eve n thei r
human essence. But even wh en they wer e r educed to thi s
s ta te th ey were s ti ll told that th ey had not cri t ic ised "d eep-
ly enough". They wer e in a state of st upor and exhaus-
ti on . and were played off one a gainst a no t he r a nd for ced to
" unmas k" and s lande r one ano ther at meet i ngs and in
writt en "con fes sions ". This was a deliberate t acti c to
create a n a t mo s phe re of mi strust, s us picion , hostili ty and
III 11111a1 sl a uder. Everyhody wa s told to hel ievo onl y Mao
Tao-tung, Liu Shao-c hi and a few others. '
58
" Any new id eol ogy a nd any new ' is m' ," Mao sa id at
th e time, " is very di fficult to ussl rni late in the period of
its co nce pt ion , for people are acc ustomed to the ol d ' is ms'
a nd ideologies. We must t.herefore follow the example of
Moh ammed , wh o converted people to t he new fa ith bv
force, with th e swor d in one hand a nd the Koran in th '! )
ot her . Wh en r ectifying bhc s tyle of work we must r esort
to f or ce, making pe opl e ad opt Maoi sm. " It became com-
mon practice ir.l all su bdivisi ons to ar rest people, hang
th em up by th eir arms. heat. th em, even kil l. Tn thi s delib-
cr ate ly cr?a te d atmosphere of stress and t error people
wer e conti nuo us ly made to ex press t heir "determ ina-
t io n" to re si s t " Huss ia n Marxism", t o war against t.hu line
of th e Comint cr n a nd agains t " do gma tic" a llil " empirici s t "
l ead ers , and h en ceforth t o bel i ev e only in " Maois m' a nd
s uppor t only th e Maoist l ead er shi p.
Mao mad e a s uccess ion of ant i-Soviet a nd pro-German
pronouncement s, suc h as. "t he Soviet Union i s s ure t o
fall, Germany is S11 re to win " , "twenty-Iour- yc ar-old so-
ci alism is no ma l ch fOT' l!ighl.-y p. ar-olrl Iasc isrn" , " S t. ali n
ca n not ov er come Hitler", and "Iluss ians ar c no match
[or Germans". AIlIl h ere is on e mor e: " Stalin' s st r at egic:
plan of def endin g Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad is a
blunder. These cities s ho uld he aba ndoned to t.ho German s .
Sovi et troops shoul d wi thdraw eas t. behind th e Ur a ls
and wa it until Amer ica, Britai n and france open the sec-
ond fro nt. t hen begi n a joinL couu ter- olleus i vc. Until th a t
t im e t he Sovie ts should depl oy on ly smul l forces and
parti san deta chmcn ts to condnet guerrilla wa rfare. U nless
this is don e df'fpat is iuevitn hl c. " I l e trin d to discred it
Leninism, invent ed fal se versions of th e hi stor y of the
So viet Communi st Pa rty a nd of Ru ssi n, expressed hi s
contempt of. and slandered the Sov iet pe ople and the
Sovi et Army. All thi s was II gui de line for the campai gn
of ficials who, wi th Mao' s "sword" in hand, made th e
s ubjects of " re cti fica t ion " re peat Maos libel agains t
Lenin ' s g reat party. t he gl'pnl Sov ie t Union, the gr eat So-
vi et peopl e a nd lh o great Sovie t Army a t meetin gs and
in th ei r "coniessious " .
Everv l ime Mao voiced hi s absu rd " t hought s" a t Pol it-
bu rnaumcet tn gs i n Aug ust a nd Septe rnher !!Vd, J en Pi-
sh ih, La FlI. and I n ever railed to r etor t th nt we must
keep OUI' fa it h i ll Leni nism, the lead er s of the So viet
Communist Party, th e pot enti al of th e So viet Uni on, the
59
Soviet peopl e, and the str ength of tlt e Soviet Army; the
set hacks of the Soviet Arm y wer e t empnra rv and in t he
long run th e soc ia list Sov iet Union was boun d to wi n IlIHI
Hi tl er' s fasc is t German y was bound to lose. Sco wli ng
ominously, Mao would r eply wi th unrepr essed angel':
" T i me will sho w. T' he n ear futu r e wi ll show who is cor-
rect. " Her e, at l east, he was ri ght - ver y soon th e Iact s
di d show.
3) My t hree ta lks wit h Mao on "reetifieatiou"
In Oclober 1\")41, April 1941 and December H)48 Mao a nd
I met to discuss th e campaign for " the ror-tification of the
s tv le of WOI'/;: " , Ma o made no hon es about I'f' plying to all
i n;pc)J' lant qu estions r el at ed to th e campaign, shedding
li ght on its t rue motives.
. ln OUI' first conversatio n ;\fao in effect repli ed Lo t he
question why he had pounced on me (Wang Min g) , Po
Ku, 1,0 Fu, \Vang Clria-hsiang, Ka i Fong. Yang Sha ng-
kun and Chu J1Ii as th e "c hief ex pone nts of dogmatism"
and a ll Chou Eu-lni and P cnz 'I'oh-hu a i as t he " eli iC' f e.\-
ponents of empir icism" . Here · is how it happened.
In our talk on l.h e ni ght 01' 4 Cktober l91 1, Mao sa id,
" tJwr e ate three peopl e popular a mong Party cadr es. The
lu-s t is you, 'Vnng Ming, th e sec ond is Chou En-Iai, a nd
t he thi rd is old muu Peng Tch -huai. You, Comra de Wan g
l\l in g'. <luHl lg;; mate theory a11(1 pr acti ce. yo u have a pol it-
ical mi nd and it se nse of reali sm, Cho u En -la i is H good
dipl omat, as well as a good orga ni ser and admi nistrator.
And old man Pcng is squally stro ng in military things
and politi cs, To him we owe most of our bi g successes
in NOJ·t h China. Th er e ar c a few othe r ver y capa ble peo-
ple among th ose who have st udied in Mosc:o \\-- ·110 Ku , Lo
PIl , Wan g Chi a-hsi ang, Kai Feng, Yang Sha ng-k uu and
Chu .lui."
Su bsequently, Mao denoun ced these peopl e as "dog- ma -
Li s ts" , " empirici sts", " subj ect ivists", " sect ari ans" . a nd the
like. They wer e th e chief target of his att acks, Through
t hem he attacked others, using thi s as <1 nll' <1 11 5 of glor-i-
fying hi s own per son.
In UI I I' secur ul cuuvcrs ution J[au exp lai ned t he purpose
of the " recti flcati on of st. vle ". and told me wl iv it cncoun-
ten-d st rung resi stau r c am ong Part y i 'h is W:l S on
1 April Hl44 a l 4 o'c lock in l he ult crnoon.
fiO
Sit ti ng at my bedside. \I ao znnd- nnt ur edl v solid:
" Comm rl« " -Hll g .\Iing, you fell ill bl.' fol'e t hc rect ifica
t ion of style hcgau of fH' ially. This is why [ had 110 op-
por tuni ty to discnss wit h you some questi ons of tho cam-
paign. Today, I ha vo Game to tllil you what is hi dden
deep in my soul.
"To begin with, why I ne eded to r ectif'y style',' The
prime purpose is 10 rewrite the history of [h p. Communist
I-' artv of China as lil y own hi story, Ilnw can th is I)( l dorw',)
It is' lIP!:(!SSal'Y to crea te Maoi sm', l low can wri to the
history of the cr e as the per sonal hist ory of Mao Ts c-
tung if th er e is no Maoism?
"The Communist Party of Chi nn was al ways gu ided by
Lenini sm, In t he earl y per iod of the Ghillese r evoluti on.
Lenin and Stali n helped us to solve many qu estions of
the ory and La work out our politi cal line. Fr om tho begi n-
ni ng, th e CPC was guided by the Coruint crn, The Sovie t
Communist Party and Soviet Government helped th n CPC
and th e Chinese r evolu tion in every possible way. All
these arc hi st ori cal fact s,
" At ori t.ioal times in the history of ti ll' cre wlieu, s nv,
Chen Tu-hsin commit ted hi s r ight-opportunist mista ke
in IH27 and th e Chinese r evoluti on was in cri tical s tra it s,
CO/llrade Tsyui 'I'syu-po took Ihe lead in cOJllba u.ing
Chen Tu-hsi uism. The Centra l Commiu.oo ca lled its Au-
gust Seve nth Con ference on the adv ice of tho Comi ntcrn
in support of Tsyui Tsyu-po against Chen ' I' u-hs iu . This
was how we overca me Chen Tu-hsiu's mi st ak e.
" In Li Li-sen committ ed hi s ' lefr -oppor tunist mis-
take and cre ate d grave diffi culties I'OJ' the Chinese revo-
lution. At that time it wa s you, Comrade \ Van g Miug,
who took th e load in combul.l .lng th e Li Li-sen liue. Th e
Executive of the Comintcrn sent a l etter t o the CC CPC
criticisinz the Li Li -sen line and advising lIS to call t he
1th to denounce the Li Li -son l in e ,w d
your struggle agains t il. Thi s wa s how we overcame Li -
Li -sen' s tni take. _ .
"Alter the '18 Sept emb er eve nts of Hl3L
led one aggression after ano ther agai nst China, \;111 10.1n
China it self ther e was a civil war hetw eeu the
tau c 'HId th e Communist Pa rty. Suppor ted hy t he Corn in-
th e Communist Part y of t he. Soviet niori, 'you
Iormul atcd anr] devel oped t he poli cy 01 th e uni ted nat IOn:
OIl unLi-Japa llcsc lr-o nt , which r-nahl ed 11S to j)1 01lUL ,
1\1
na ti onwide a nti -.Tapancse war for the sal va tion of our
coun tr y.
" This, too, is a hi stor ical fa cL.
if t his is acknowl ed ged, how wi ll it be possibl e
to l it e of tho CPC as hi st ory
of Mao I's c- tu ugi So wha t was I to do? 1 decid ed 10 con-
du et a ca mpaig n I'())' t he r ectificati on of th e s ty le 01' work
to di savow Leninism a nd to di savow th e r ol e of Lenin'
Stalin, the Comintcrn, and th e So vie t Uni on i n t he hi story
of the CPC and th e Chinese r evolution. W e say t ha t
Lenini sm is inapplicable to th e Chinese r evoluti on , that
ever yt hing Lenin a nd St ali n sa id abo ut th e Ohinese revo-
lution wa s wrong, that th e r ecommendations of the Com-
intern wer e wrong, a nd that th e Soviet Union ne ve r
helped th e CPC, a nd that if somet imes i t did h el p, its
help was usel ess a nd harmful. 'rYe do not r ecogni se Tsyui
Tsy u-pos se rvices in comba tt ing- Chen 'I' n-hsiu and say,
on th e con trary, that. he had been wron g. We do not
recogn ise your services in comba t ti ng Li Li-sen and sa y,
on the contrary, that yo ur li ne was st ill mor e l eft tha n
Li Li -sen 's. W e do not r ecogni se yo ur ser vices in devi s-
ing the poli cy of th e united n ati on al ant i-Japanes e Iront,
and say t hat yo urs was an incor r ect ri ght -oppor tunist line.
\Ve al so say th at on th e id eol ogical plane t he Comrnu-
ni st Party of China was always guide d by Maoi sm, that
th e CPC and th e Chinese revolution owe all their achi eve-
ments of the past twenty-four year s to Mao' s l eader ship,
a nd th at th e many mi s takes commit t ed by cer t ain l eaders
of tho r,PC Ill. differ en t times wor e re cti fied by Mao.
" Alas, though th e rect ificat io n has now been goi ng
on for a l ong time, my opinions are st ill encouutoriug
ve ry s tro ng r esi st ance.
" ' Vha t am ] to do ?
" 1 han given it a lot of t ho ught, hut ha ve found no
so lu ti on, To be s ure, things arc a bit simpler' with Len in -
ism , th e Cornintorn , and the Soviet Uni on because th e
Cominlern h as been di ssol ved and nobody can now
for ce us to r ecognise them. Things arc als o sim pl e with
Tsyui Tsyu-p o, for he is dead. He committed a putschist
mistake after the 7 August conf er ence, a nd the 9th
Plenum of th e Corninte rn Executive has cr i ticis ed him
for' i t. So did t h e 6th Congress of the cpe. In Inct ,
thi s was th e reason why it d id not el ect him Ge nern l Se cr e-
t ary. The 3l'd Pl enum of our Centr al Commi ttee
h im co mmi t anoth er mistake- th'l t I' ' i"
With the Li L' I' L U cu nei tat ion
' 1" 11 ( . li 'll-l
son
me, :) 0 , his in fluen ce in Lhl' Part y
'" l W neg I gl ) e. .' .
" it i s muct: har der to deal wi th yOI Y I . ,
t en a Look again st the 1i L ' ' . J. " uu lave \\"I'\t-
and th e CPC 11 . : . . ", line. lit e Comi ntor n
'" l' ) a vo pa ss ed lC,';ol utlOns agains t th L 'L'
me. I eapl e remember tl' Y , . e I 1-
art.icles, r eports and other doc
ll S
. , o,u also wrote many
tional an ti-Japanese fron t Y on th e un it ed na-
policy of th e it d '. OUI part III work ing out t he
Ulll e na ti onal anti Ja f
kn. Own not on lv 1. 0 th e C . t ( . -. .pa nese ront is
. , . ' Olllll l er n a nd tlie Iratcr , 1 "
ti es but eve n t r tl K ' . (una pa l -
Our .and parti es and
f , . ' . IUS . 0 owec this poli cy for a number
o year s, IS follo wmg It now, and wili follow it un til
of . th e anti-Ja paneso war. This is why it is vel'
Ior Party ca dre s to accept my ve rsion th at
. Ill g did not fight ag:Jinst Li Li -sen 01' th 'lt JI I' ':: ( I) .
ti on t tl L ' L ' " , ( P OSl -
il d a 10 I. i-sen .ll1l e was wrong, that Wang MiJlg-
a. no part III wo r king ou t th e poli cy of t he uni ted
natlOna! antI-Japan ese fr ont, and tha t ,,'T
ang
Min g s tood
for an in correct poli cy.
" 0 ' I 1 . . ,
11 1e1' d .1 were to recogni se tlt e line
th e l t.h Ce nLra l CommIttee Pl enum as correct , a nd
If 1 were to ack nowle dge th at it was you wh o fnrmulat-
ed th e united H1I t.i -J al,anese fr on t poli cy, yo u
would 1:J yea rs ill t he 24-ye a l' hi stor y of our
Party. Could t here be a ny Maoi sm in th at case ? How
would it. be poss i ble t hen to write th e history of our
Party as the per son al hi stor y of Mao Tse-t ung?
" Wha t am 1 to do?
" 1 have th ou ght of H sol ut ion : I am goin g to as k you
to co ucerle yn ur se r vices t o tu e. \Vill yo u agr ee ?"
I re pli ed: -
" My vie ws on t hi s SCOre diff er fro m yo urs . He wh o
reject s Leninism and tho rol e of t he Comi nter n a nd th e
Sovi et Union in the Chinese revolu tion cannot be n
Communist. No Communist, no matter how big or small
hi s con t r ibu tion is to the Par t y and revoluti on , sho ul d
r egard it as hi s own cre dit, for it is t he cr edit of th e
Party, the Comintern, a nd Marxism-Leninism. 'Wh en
Dimitrov, Thor ez and other comrades sa id to me at the
7th Congress of the Comintern: your contr ibut ion t o the
unit ed national a nt i- J a pa ne se Iront is a cre di t 10 you ,
Ior yon hav e cl one H great se r vice to th e Party, th e peopl e
0 1' Chin» , th e whole Chinese nati on," I repli ed : it is not
Illy pers onal cr edit, but a cre dit to the Party, t he Com-
in ter n, aud Ma rxi sui-I .e niui siu ,
" As you kIl UW, uIlcr t he 7t h Cougrus» Di m itrov
of' Iicially informed me tha t Comrade A. A. Zhda nov had
reported OIl the resul ts of t he 7th Comin te ru Congr ess
to th e I' oli tburcau of t he Soviet Communis t Party, and
t ha t Zlllla!lov and Lit e Politbureuu ha d comme nded my
speeche s at th e Congre ss, and in pa r tic ula r th e ne w
I'olky of a uni ted national anti-Japanes e front present-
ed on behalf of t he CPC; Zhdanov sail! that my arrow
had hi t the ta rge t. ::.::. To th ese words of pra ise, too, I
gave my previous re ply . . . , .
" Y OIl will pr obably rec all t hat bef or e sty le recti fica tio n
you yourself r ep eatedly said a t meetin gs and t o me:
>r he new policy of the unit ed national
[r ou t is a great dis covery; it woul d have been ver y di i -
hcult I' m our Party and th e Chinese Hed 1\ [, 11I y to oyer-
COIllP t heir di lhcultios wit hout th is po licy ; the Ch ines e
people would u ot have been able t o wage Lite an ti-
J apun usc W 8 1' 0 11 lh e sc ale of whol e coun try
t hi s poli cy ; it is a great cre dit, for Comrade Wang MIJlg.
And my r eply was again the same. . .
" Hu t iI' yo u thi uk thos e are lil y cre dits an d If yo u
wuu l me t o ' con cede' them to yOIl, let me as k you thi s :
10 'c oncede in what wayr '
Mao said :
"Ti l l' fact that you headed t he str uggl e agai nst th e
Li Li -sen l ine will not be mentioned. We will cons ider
Iha t 1 headed the st r uggl e agai ns t t he Li Li-sen li ne.
Let us say that the Hed Army of the b' ukie n-Kiangsi
So viet a rea, of which I wa s th en poli ti cal commissar,
did not support th e Li Li-sen li n e and that, th er efore. l
wa s the one who head ed th e st r uggl e aga ins t I he Li Li -
se n li ne. What do you sav to tha t?'
1 risked him :
':. Comra de Dirnitrov repeated those words in a conve rsati on
wi t h me ill t ho pr es en ce of Kaug She ng awl Wa ng Ch iu-hslang
heforo my retu rn to Chi na in Nove mber Hl:n.
':"f At t he ti ms of th e "style r ectifica tiun campaign" Mao
often del i bern tel y sa id: " We di schargo Marxi st -Leninist ' nrr ows'
at t he targets of the Chinese revol ution, Doguiutists di sch ar ge
urruws without any target. " Th ese wor ds were aimed agai ns t
Corurndu Zlidanov' s rerumk.
c.1.
you think this version will convince Party cadres?
o Army of t he Fukien-Ki angsi Soviet area
of you were commiss ar , attacked Ch ang I l'
the cklt
y
was almost defencele ss and mounted s ia w
attac wh en it was pack ed with a
r esulted in heavy loss es for the n troops. ThIS
J
4th
follOWing their arr-ival Aefter th e
en Pi-shih and Wang CI ' I ' nu SI ll , omrades
P
< lJa- rsi ane ca lled a ' 1
conference of the Fuki -J(' '" " . SpOC13.
which the second att ac k on CieI
n
laIngsJ So viet area, at
a
'1 It. ' I . ( . ianzs i a was describ d '
e -ac vc nt .ur is t mist ake. Til '" I ' " 1 e as
resolution on t his score. So wil o con er c.ne e ad opted a
present version ?" . , 1 th o cadr os a ccept yuur
" Quit e true, " he mumbl ed " b ut I
choico." , t icr e is no ot her
Again I asked him:
in manner am I to 'concede' t f tl
credit for creati ng th e united nation al
He replied: .
"Vi e will simply t ake no notice of th e fact that it
was who worked out the poli cy of the united nation-
al antI-Japanese Let us consider that I did it.
From on we Will say that the united fr ont policy
of tho CPC :vas launched on 27 December 1935, tho day
when 1 delivered a report on the united front at the
confere nce of Party cadres in Wayopao. "
1 repli ed:
"Do YOH t.hink you can convince t he cadres ? Con sider
the following fa cts :
Party had been working on the united
national anti-Japanese front policy for a number of
years befor e you delivered this r eport. On the day alter
the 18 September events (1931), tho Central Committee
set the sigh ts on a national-revolutionary war of the
armed people against Japanes e imperialism. It said so
clearly in it s appe a l 10 the people of Ch ina in connec-
ti on with th e Slicnyang (Mukden) even ts. Puttinz to
shame th e non -r esi stance poli cy of Chiang In
furt.herance Jor this course duri ng th e Shanghai battle
ag ains t th e . ap anese, t he Central Committee issu ed t he
slogan, ' Worke rs , peasants, soldiers, stu dents and mer-
chants, unite to r esi st Japan and save the Motherland! '
This slogan was con sonant with th e unit ed fr ont policy.
Accordingl y our P arty or ganised an an ti -Japanese vol-
65
untccr army of Shanghai worker s and called on the peo-
pi c of Sha ng hai to help th e Hlt h Army.
" In 1\):):2 when tho Japan ese occupied th e three north
easter n pr ovinces and set up the Mauchukuo puppet
s tate th e Contrnl Commi ttee sent a let te r dat ed 2;) J?e-
ceml;er to t he Man churian pr ovincial committee, ca lling
on it to create a unit ed an ti-Japanese and anti -Mancl.lUkuo
Ir out, In J93'1, the Cl' C del egation lo t he Comiutorn
se nt Comrade Yang Sung to th e northeastern prov-
in ces to supervise the activation of the anti-Japanese
Union Army of Northeast China.
" In January 1933, the central Sovie t government of
China and tho high command of t he Chinese Ited Army
anno unce d th at t hey werc r eady to concl ude an, agr eement
on thr ee s imple conditions with any ot he r Chinese army
on joint armed resistance to Japanese
Cheng, supreme commander of t he Kuomintang liqui-
dation of communists' fron t, and generals of other regu-
lar ar mies sent a tclozram to Chiang Kai -shek, asking
, t:> •
him to end hi s 'liquidation of communists' campaign
and launch joint re sistance to Japan. The command of
the 10th Route Army and the peopl e' s government . of
Fuki en province official ly concluded an agreement With
the Chinese Red Army and the Soviet government of
China on joint resi stance to J apan and st ruggl e agains t
Chiang Kai -shek, The an t i-Japa nese Union Army of
Chahar-Suiyuan, headed by Feng Chi Hung-
chang and other s, al so collaborated WIth our Party on
the basis of th ese three simple condit ions . The three
condit ions were al so accl aime d by the groups holding
power in Kwangtung, Kwangsi , Shensi, Szechuan, and
other provinces.
"]n the beginning of a six-point pro gramme of
the pr eparatory commit tee for armed self-defence was
iss ued over the signat ures of Soong Chi ng-li ng ':. and
3,000 other pr ominent personalities. W elcoming t his ap-
peal, peopl e in all our big citi es and many overseas
Chines e began organising local pr epar atory self -defence
commit tees , whi ch pr oved highly effecti ve in uniting
t he mass of the peopl e to r esi st Japan and sa ve th e
coun t ry .
" Tho widow of Dr. Sun Ya t-se n; al so known as Madame
SUIl,-Tr.
" i n August 1935, our Cent r al Commi tt ee and the
nese Soviet government issu ed a joint ap peal \0 a ll com-
patriots conce rning anti-J apanese r esi st an ce and national
salvation, setting out concr eto organisational measures
a progra mme of ten principl es for uniting the efforts
of all parties, gover nme n ts and armi es in China. This
appea l wa s received by all parties, groups
and mass or gan isations, includino a maj ority in the
Kuomintang. l:>
these political documents on the nn iLed national
anti-Japanese front adopted and issued by t he CPC, were
drawn up by me. And as you have just sa id this is
known inside but also outsid e the and
onl.y but also outside the country.
Besid es, III my speech on behalf of our Cen tra l
CommiLLee at t he 7th Congress of t he Cominter n I set
out. Lhe content of t he August First Appeal, and gave
notice of tIl.e. change that had begu n in all Our Par ty
work to facili t at e and further the united nationa l anti-
Japan ese front policy. In November of th e same year
I publish ed an ar ticl e, ' The New Si tuation a nd the New
Poli cy' , about t he theory and ta ctics of the united nation-
al anl.i-Jupuuuse Irorit, Tho idea of joining hands wit h
Chiang Kai-shek to ruaist Japan for nati ona l salva tion
was first presented in this articl e. In the beginning of
Decemb er t his pr ompted Chiang Kai -sh ek to send Tong
Wen-i, mili tar y attache of the Kuomi ntang Embass y in
th e USSH, as hi s own and t he Kuomintang Central
Executive's representative to the Government of the
USSH and to th e Comi ntorn l eader ship with a request
to facil it ate nego tiation s between him and me as rep-
rcscnta tivo of the CPC in t ho Cornirucrn on questions of
coopera tion between the Kuo min tan g an d the Communist
Par ty ill the anti-J apanes e str uggle for national salva-
t ion. Though no speci fic agr eement was readied for obj ec-
tive and subject ive reasons, a sta rt was made in Kuomin-
ta ng-Communist Party contac ts, an exchungo of opinions
had t aken place, and certain common vi ewp oints we re
establis he d.
" Second (1 continued), everybody knows that 't wo da ys
befor e your r epor t, the Politbureau had adopted a resolu-
ti on on the curr ent sit ua tion and the tasks of the Party,
in wh ich it announced it s decision to foll ow a united
Ir ont poli cy and implement a corresponding pr ogramme .
ifhough the Politbureau was not ruily informed of the
new internal and in teruational situation and it s resolu-
Lion contained several serious mistakes, it had thereby
officially adopted the united national anti-Japanese front
policy. Everybody knows that the resolution was based on
a factual report of Chang Hao ' and Liu Chang-shcn, ,:.,:.
who had been sent on my request and through the good
offices of the Soviet Communist Party's Politbureau to
Wayopao. Their report of 1) the report .and
concluding remarks I had 1ll.June 1935. at
of the CPC Comintern delegation m connection with the
drafting of the appeal to all compa tr iot s 011 anti-J
resistance and national salvation, 1.0. the August Fi rst
Appeal, and 2) that part my speech at the 7th qon-
gress of tho Comintern which the
ary movement in colonial and countr ies
tha Lactics of communist parties, specificall y the united
national anti-J apanose fruut policy in. China. .
"Third though It is now nearly nme years since your
report to' the conference of Party cadr es in Wayopao, its
text has never been published. Who knows what you
r eported at that time? ,:. ,:-,:.
.. Chang Hao (alia s Li Fu-sheng, real name Lin Chuu-tnnj e--
a worker member of the Sixth CPC Central Committee. In the
early he represented the Chinese trade unions in the
Hed I'rofiutern. IIe di ed in Yenan in 1942, soon after the official
of the "style rectilication campaign."
,'* Liu Cha ng-shea (a li as Lo Ying, real name Wang Hsiang-
pao) - former Vladivostok docker, member of th e Soviet Com-
muni st Part y since 1923, twi ce elected member of tho Chinese
Communist Party's Central Committee, After liberation, he was
deputy chairman of the All-China Council of Trade Unions. In
Hl67, during the "cultural revolution", he was mobb ed and killed
by "red guards" (hungweipings) on Mao's orders.
*** Thi s so-called repor t was included in the first volume of
Mao' s Selected Works 1G years later, in 1951, after considerable
doctoring. entitle d. "On th e Tacti cs of Fi ghting Jap an ese Im-
peri ali sm". The report was not in s uppor t, but rather against,
th e unit ed national anti-Japanese fr ont poli cy. If we are to
beli eve this repor t, tho Communis t Party of China lacked re-
source s to build a united national anti-Jap anese front with the
Kuomln t ang an d the local power-hold ing' groups. The report said:
"The big local bullies find bad gentry, the big warl ords, tho bi g
bureaucrats and the bIg comp radores have long made up their
mi nds. . : They have for med a camp of trait ors : for them such
a questi on as whether or not th ey ar e to become slaves of a
f?r eign nati ?n does not ,they have already ob-
Iit erat ad nati onal demar cations and thei r Interes ts are inseparable
"It is not.. likely, th er efor e, th at the cadres will heli evo
what you Will now say on thi s score "
Mao replied:
.
"Quite true. Howeve t h '
.
make thnm believ e it. chOIce hut t o
what is. hidden deep in my so ul. iav e come to tell
But I will gi\' e it some mor e th ought. And I be vo u
to me find a way out. Let us say no mor e t oda/ ) '
nrc Ill, too much t alk tires "On nut Jet mo t" " {IU
o
. oJ • '" cau 1011 \'o u·
. n no ac count mus t yo u tell anyone else ab oI t t h . ' '
of ou r co nve r sauo-, today."
I e co n t en t
i; one that ca n he drawn from
this: s s tyle r ectificati on campaign" was mot ivato rl
by sel fish aims; .Mao acted as a rank career-
1St and narrow nationalist.
. Mao's behavi our during- th e "styl e r ect ifica-
t ion . some cadres said: " Ma o is a poli t ical swi n-
dler. Everyth mg he s ays anrl rl OPS duri ng the ' r ecti ficat ion'
I S a sheer s Wi n nl:", or : " Mao is with out prIn-
ci pl os, WIthout scruples, WIth ou t moral s, and wi th out
shame. What reall y need s mercil ess r ect ificati on is hi s
s tyle of theso four withouts."
As I learned lat er, Mao had come to t ell me wh at wa s
" h idden docp in Ihis soul " not only becaus e Party ca dr es
were strongly oppos ed to the "style r ectificati on ca m-
paign", but al so because shor tly befor e our conversat ion
?eorgi I?i.mitrov had se nt me a lett er supporting my polit-
ICIl J positions. It had be en int erc ep led and conceal ed by
Mao. i\ nd Mao knew, of course, th at Dimitrov was then
in charge of the Sovi et Communist Party' s departmen t of
international information. Dimitrov' s l ett er worried Mao,
He was embarrassed by the " style re ctifi cati on campaign".
So, soon after this talk with me, he anno unced t he end
of "emergency salvati on " , and launch ed a peri od of "self-
relutation" and "rehabilit ation " .
In our t h ir d t.alk Mao admitted t ha t h e ha d bocn wron g
t o oppose Leninism and promo te Maoism.
Al so, he admitt ed that he had been wr ong t o fabri cat e
Wang l\fing's two " oppor t unis tic mi stakes".
from those of imp eri ali sm; th eir chief of chi efs is non e other
than Chiang Kni-shek." Referring to th e national bourgeoisie,
Mao held that only its "left wing" was likely "to take part in the
struggle" against Japanese aggression .
an
The talk was in hi s Hsipeipo on 18
1948 I t was the fifLh t ime wo t alked since October 1..1.18,
and ,t h e conte nt of our conver sati on attracted the. attent lOf
of the 2nd Plenum of th e Seve nt h CC CPC I.n Marc 1
1949. Her e are the mai n poi nts of our conversa tion.
Mao sa id: 1 f Li 1
"C d Wanz MinO' wo h av e spo {en , our imes ant
omra e ' ''' '" T d I t u to
oxchnn ed opi nions four ti mes. 0 ay, . wan yo
. I mind OIl certain impor tan t Issu es connecte d
\he styl e re ctifi cation campaign, as 1l.l C. qu cs.-
t.i on of Leninism, the political during the Civil war,
the political line during the anti- J apanese :var, and so on
i
I f on hcarinz your opinion, I find myself III th e wrong,
, 0. ."
will r ectify my mistakes.
I said: ,
"You have al re ady spoken on th ese matters dun ng our
talk in Ap ril 19H . As t he pr overb sa):s, .you have hung
a cowbell r ound the tiger' s neck and It IS. up t o you to
take it. off. 1£ you want t o r ectify y?ur mi stakes, .do
' Vh y as k the opi nio n of ,Hesld es, yo u
vious to th e opinio n of others If It does not fit OUi 0 \\ n ,
n ot onl y do you l ose yo ur temper , but you also persecute
peopl e."
Mao answered:
" Comrade W ang Ming, l et me assure yo u that I h av o
made great progress in that respect. I sho w no r ancour,
and am roady to re ctify my mi stakes."
" Fi ne." I said. " Let's di scu ss th e questio ns you have
raised . The firs t ques ti on - i- on Leni nism and 'Mao' s
t houghts' . You will r ecall th a t eve n in th e preparator y
period of the style r ectifi ca ti on campaign I advised you
against crea ti ng any Maoism, and I told you not to go
against Lenini sm. I said that this would do no good .to
th e Communist Party of China, to th e world communis t
movem ent, a nd eve n to you person all y. What is your
pre sent view on thi s score?"
" I am no w trying t o decid e wh at t o do ne xt. Mind you,
I have taken no decisi ons. I must give it a littl e more
thou ght. " Mao repli ed,
"The seco nd ques tion ," Tcontinued. " concer ns th e polit-
ical line of th e 4t h Plen um , At th e 7th Pl enum you
said the line of the Itth was more lef t than th e Li Li-sell
line, because in my bouk ab out the s tr uggle agai ns t tho
70
Li Li -scn li n e ::. I wrote that the 3rd Pl enum had failed
t o criticise some of Li Li -s el1's rizhtist theol'eti ca l views
Y,ou sai.d: says"'there wer e righti st
mont s .In . LI LI-sen s hne, he mus t be still farther l ef t
than LI LI -sen ' .
. , "Now, I ?Rk rou:, d.id not til 0 Leui nis ts criticise Trot 'ky-
lSI!1, for bein g l ef t In .form a nd right in con tent? Does
this warra nt the deductIOn that th ey wer e m or e 'l eft ' th
Trotsky? an
" Li about th e Chi nese r ovolut ion and
,re \ in China wer e of th e extr eme
Dnt, Ideas about the force and poten-
tIali tIes of the Chinass r evol uti on wer e of the -t
. I t · . ex reme
I v.anety. TIllS is wh y th e lett er of the Comint
xeCli!.I\'e descri bed I.l le Li Li -sen line as
LO,
" Vll IY one point out Li 'left' mi stakes
and not his l'l/{ht '\ ft" I' all L' Li
I . , c , • •'"'- , , 1
I?d only or der ed th e Chinese TI ed Army to at tack
had not only ill spired armed pu tsches in ma ny
IJig ci lles, and I.tad not on,l Y call ed Oil th e Soviet Unio n
and th e Mon goli an Peopl e s TIepublic to se nd troops and
!l elp th o but had al so urged the prol etariat
a: l, 'lilt? .1mper,lahs t count r ies to ri se in support of the
llpI"lRmg. Ch ina. Did not I in my book and t he .'J. th
In It S r esoluti on se verely cri ticise these extre me
l efti st, adventuri st mistakes of Li Li-sen ? Did 1 Or the
4t h Pl enum ev er suggest th at troops shoul d al so come
f roI!1' t he or Mars to hel p th e Chi ne e r evolu t ion ?
I did not. did the 4th Pl en um, So how ca n any-
say th e Iin a of t he 4th Pl enum was ' Wa ng Ming's
l ino and more 'left'than the Li Li-sen li n e?"
" The mi st akes attributed to th e 4th Pl enum are not mv
invention," Mao said. " They ar e t he in ven tinn of Lin
Shao-chi. But I accepted hi s opini on , uud 1I 0W T admit'
that I was wrong."
"The t hird question, " 1: continued, "is that of th e Par ty
li ne duri ng, the anti-Jnpanoso war. On ar r ivi ng in
fro m Moscow OIl : 29 November 19:17, T sa id a mong other
things in my r eport t o a Pol it buruan meeti ng ea rly in
December that Comrade DimiLrov r ecommended us t o
". The ref ere nce is to Wang Ming's Struggle for th e Further.
Bol sh eui sat uni of the Communist Party of China.
study th e French Communi st Party's popul ar £ront ex-
peri ence. He als o sugges ted Ihe foll owi ng slogans : 's ub-
ordinate everything t o the united nati onal anti-Japanese
front' and ' ever ything through the united national anti-
Japanese fr ont' . I said that I agr eed with th ese r ecom-
mend ati ons.
"But J never menti oned these two slogans again. Not
because I consid er ed them wrong. hut 'simpl y because
there wa g no occas ion t o mention them. I heard nothing
about th ese slogans either fr om you or fr om Lin aft er
the December 1937 meeting of th e Polithureau until the
6th Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1938.
After speak ing at th e 6th Pl enum I wa s by the
Politbureau t o dr aft the 6th Pl enum r esolution. There-
upon, I left for Chungking befor e th e Pl enum ended to
attend the second session of th e join t National Political
Council. It was a time of nati onal crisis and a cr it ical
point in the anti-Japanese war, for the city of Wuhan
had just fallen, and I wa s to explain to the peopl e our
Party's view of th e current sit uation. and it s standpoint
on closer coo per at ion between the Kuomintang and the
Communi st Party, na t ional unit y, and on fighting the anti-
Japanese war until final vi ctory, supporti ng tho se in the
Kuornintang who were for continuing th e resi stance to
Japan and hitting the group of 'Yang Ching-wei , the na-
ti onal trait or who had gone over openly to Japan's side,
Comrade Liu took advantage of my departure and said
at the Plenum: the slogan 'subordinate everything to the
unit ed national anti-J apanese fr ont' is a good sl ogan, but
the sl ogan 'everything through th e united nati onal anti-
Japan ese fr ont' is a bad slogan, becau se it signi fies, ' every-
thing thr ough Chiang Kui -shek and Yen Hsi-shan'.
"Now, let me ask you: according to Liu the slogan
'everything through the unit ed national anti-Japanese
fron t' is equival ent t o ' everything through Chiang Kai-
shok and Yen Hsi-shan', and is therefor e incorrect. Also
according to Liu, the slogan ' subordinate everything to
the united nati onal anti-Japanese front' is corr ect, though
by hi s own logic it should be equival ent t o ' subordinate
ever ything to Chi an g Kai -sh ck and Yen Hsi-shan'. What
kind of juggling is t his ?
. "'Vhnt.is the united national anti-J apanese front? It
IS the .polIcy of our . Par ty in a definite hi stori cal period
of antI-Japanese resistance and national salvation; it is
72
the Pat'ly's gen eral line during th is peri od. What was the

and purpose of our Par ty's unit ed front poli cy?
o UnIte, on definit e ter
11 I
.
.
political
. ms, a c asses, all pa rties and
th . ( groups, all armed for ces, all government s II
e rue gr oup s, and all mass or . .
. - , a
Japon eso cl ement s ill I g amsahons, excl udmg pr o-
tionary war of er twaJ
ge
a nati onal -r evolu_
I' If
" " . agilln s . apane -e ' . l'
anr In ee ence of China 's nau I ' I "; Imporla Ism
sho vereignty and :tate
t. o Party sees thi s .histor ical er iod '
o .sa!ne time,
opening the WElY to the J/ct or y pe -
ge ols-d emocra tic r evol uti on on th e sc I I mht'se our-
countr y,
- a e 0 t e wh ole
"TI"
I
t he
!Illtfl IllstoncaI period tIl e Part y s ubor di n at es it s
Jt v t thi Ii T
, .
n . ... .. " ac IV-
IlC
Y.
ti Jh e slogan 'ever ythi ng through tho
, ' . ' .na an 1- apanese fron t' mean s that in th e
given 11lstorICal peri od th e Party clischa rges it s mi .
Lh I Ihi I' Th
. . ission
r oug 1 u s po ICY. is is how I und erstood and nov
understand, t,he meaning of these two slozans . Th ey \ e v
and I agree
O
with th em. v r e
.\, IlY. (hd Lm our Poarty poli cy with Chiang
Kai -shek and Yen lIsl -shan? Lin interpret ed ' everythinjr
,through.th e united nat i.onal anti-Japa nese fr ont' to
eVCl:ythlllg through Chia ng Kai-sh ok and Yen Hsi- shan'
he ide nt ified the poli cy of the united
natIOnal. antI-J apanese fr ont with Chiang Kai -shok and
To follow Liu 's logic. the unit ed front pol -
ICy 18 cquivalcn I. to the pol icy of Chianp Kai -sh ok and
Yen Hsi-shuu, Can th er e be anything more abs ur d?
"As for Lin' s conte ntion that t here was no or zanisa-
tion in China similar to the popul ar fr ont commit tee in
France through whi ch th e pa r ties concern ed could settle
all affairs by negotiati on-this was untru e. Th ough there
was no united nati onal anti-Japanese fr ont commi ttee in
China, there wa s the bipartisan commissi on of the Kuomin-
tang and Communi st Party, whi ch wer e tho basi s of, and
the biggest forces in, the united front. Ther e was no
other politi cal party as massive and strong as either the
Kuomintang or th e Communist Party. There wer e sever al
small parties and gr oup s, out of which t he left followed
the Communist Party and the right foll owed th e Ku omin-
tang. In other words, when the Kuomintang and the
73
Communi st Party ca me to t erms on some issue, this was
t antamount to an agreeme nt among all parti es and groups
in the cou ntry. This is a r ecognised fact.
"As yLJ U know, ul t h.C\ t ti=e tho
cons is ted of the foll owmg: Wang Mlng, Chou En-lal, Po
Ku and Yeh Chien-ying for the Communist" Party and
Ch en Li-Iu, Chang Chun, Kang Tse and Liu
for th e Kuomint ang. with major issues hein g directly ne-
go ti ated wi th Chi ang Kai -shek . . ..
" I n addi ti on, the re was the Joint National
Counc il (Kuomint sanchenghuai) , on whi ch the
t ang th e Communist Party, and the oth er and
O'rou:ps were r cpr escnted. Up t o a point, in fa ct, Coun',
se rved as a n ati on al commitlne of th e
unit ed fr on t, as a place of direct contacts ne
10tIa
-
ti on s between t he Kuomi nt ang, t he Commumst 1 arty,
and ot he r par-ti es a nd organisations.
( " This is why Liu Sh ao- chi's th er e ":as
110 mech ani sm in China through which diil cr cnt patti es
coul d se ttle issu es by negotiation, was cont rar y to the
fa ct s. . 1
" After HIe anli-J ap anese war began and followmg the
emergence of the u nit ed nati oT.l al anti-Japanese fr ont on
a country wide sca le, all qu esti on s concerm ng the
muni st P arty, th e 8th Boute and the New 4th armres,
and all ot he r qu esti ons of inter es t to our Party, were ne-
gotiated by our Party with th e Kuominlang. ,1 n fa ct, none
of these issu es coul d he set tl ed without the Communist
Party. This Chia ng Kai -sh ek knew perfectly well. As for
Yen Hsi-shan and othe r local power-holdcts, they were
even mor e strong ly conscious of the fact that cer tai n
things could not he se t tled without the Communis t Party.
" This is wh y Liu's conte nti on that Chia ng Kai-shek ancl
Yen Hs i-shar; would not negotiate with the Com-
munist Party was al so co ntrar y to the fncts.
" If Liu had made these cont entions bef ore I l eft the
nth Pl enum t o go to Chu ng ki ng, I would have explained
at once th a t h is und orst andiug of th e Party' s united na-
li on al anti-Japanese fr ont poli cy is out of line with both
t he Leninist theory on the united nationa l anti- impe rialist
fron t and the present s tat e of the united national anti-
Japanese front in China.
" At the end of 1938, after I returned fro m Chu ngk ing
to Yerian, you said to me: ' 1 have pu t Li u Shao-chi right.
74
in my concl uding remarks at the Bth Central Commi ttee
.. You also said, ' Those who think that the slozan
through the united nat ional anti -Japa;ese
front 1>: t ho s am o a s "ovorything through Chi a er 1" "-
shok Yen Hsi- shan" , are in error .
thi s IS farthest from Comrade W ang Ming's th ou zhts '
. t old then that your stat ement was vague
O

First, yo u arc tryin g to te ll me now that vou
sa id thi s was .farthest from W ang Mi ngo's thoughts, but i n
yo ur r,one ludmg remarks at the 6th Plenum YOU said
n othing of so.r t. Second, you did not expla in wh o
exac tl y hel d thi s VIew. \ Vho was i t? It was Liu Shao-ch i.
I laving mi st ak enl y identified the unit ed naliunal anti -
Japanese front policy with the poli cy of Ch ia ng Kal -sh ek
and Yen Il si -shan, he said that ' ever y thi ng th r ough the
uni ted national anti-Japanese front' meant t he same as
' everyt hi ng through Chiang Kai-shsk and Yen Hsi-shan' .
It is unfortunate that you did not point out Comrad e
Liu' s mistake a t that time. Third, you did not explain
the conte nt and purp ose of the Party's u nit ed national
anti-J apanese fron t poli cy. Nor did yo u ex pl ain what it
meant to subordi nate everything to the united nat ional
anti -J apanese Iront and do eve rything through the fro nt.
As a result, Liu' s speech and your own remarks on the
united front created ideological and poli tical confusion
and lack of clarity. Now you must decide how this ca n
be remedied.
"At that time you replied to me: ' Aft er our excha nge
of opinions today there are no longer any differences be-
tween us on thi s sc or e. At the first opport unity I will
again explain everyt hing t o our comrades in accordance
with our conversation today'. But during the 'sty le recti-
Iica tion campaign' you s udde nly declared th ese two slo-
gans to he ' W an g Min gs l'ight-opporlunist l in e of the
anti-Japanese wa r period' . I had been poi soned and was
gravely ill at that time, and had no opportunity eithe r to
expla in or to di scuss anything. \ Vh nt is your pr esent
opi nion on this score?"
" It was not Liu' s invention," said Mao. " I t was all my
invention. Liu made his speech at the 6th Pl enum on my
in stru ctions. And it was un my i nil.iative th at du ri ng the
style r ectificati on ca mpai gn th e two slogans we re
to he W anz Mtnzs l'iO'ht-opportunist line. I was wron g.
1 to him, "you h ave just, li stened
75
, " and have flxpr 8ssed sclf- cr it i-
to another man s n , 1 nrofTrpsS and 1 s incerely
ci!'U1 . YO Il 111\\' 0 cer l m ll y 111Me \' ,., ,
"welcome it.." d 1 1 hi face
H p. was sl l errt for n t ime. T'h on , S11 (en y, 11;; ,
turn ed li vid and he pounded his fist on th e t able, shout-
ing: . \ '1 1"1.4'")
" Haven't I explained my idea to you 111 .' pr i
Didn' t 1 tell you t hen what is hidden deep 111 my soul :
If Leninism is recognised. as th e gui ding ide a of th e Com-
muni st Party of China, if the line of yO':ll' 4th
is r ecogn ised as correct, and if your united nati onal an l i -
Japane se fr ont poli cy is al so as . t,holl
th ere can be no Ma oism and it WIll be ImP?SSlble to
write the history of the Communi st Party of Chma as the
per son al h ist ory of Mao 'I'ss-tung. Everything you hav,o
said t oday sho ws t hat yon still do no t recogrnso Mao s
thoughts as th e only guiding th ou?hts of th e ,crc and
that you st ill want Russian Marxi sm to dominate the
epc. Th is won ' t do! It says so clear ly in th fl General
Principl es of th e Party Rul es adopted hy th e 7th Con-
gr ess . It is impermissible for yon not to accept them, As
for the content of our conversat ion t oday, see that you
foll ow the exampl e of the gil ded ido l in the Temple of
Royal An cestors and sew up yo ur li ps. If you sa y an y-
thing to anybody about it, I want you to know that I will
st op at nothing."
J rebuffed th ese abs urdi lies. \Ve argu ed. for another two
hours, but in va in. I tri ed again and again to prevail Oll
him that it is best t o follow th e approach we had followed
in the beginning of our conversation-what is right is
right, what is wrong is wr ong. I will say you are right
wher e you had be en right , and you will admit you are
wrong wher e you had been wrong. Our principle should
be: subordinate everything to th e truth , subordina te
ever ything t o t he inter est s of the Party and the world
communi st movement. That is th e pusi tion of a COIlUll U-
ni st, es pec iall y a Part y leader . And hp. expla ine d again and
again th at he did not deny hi s errors in th e matter of
oppos ing Leni nism and of asc ri bing "opportunis t lin es " to
Wang Min g, that he was determined t o cre a te Mao-
Is.m, and t o Writ e the hi st or y of the Party as hi s personal
hi st or y.
,We were immersed in our argument wh en my
WIfe, Meng Chi ng-shu, en tered t he room an d sa id to me:
lI1 have looked for you everywhere, a nd here you are
quarrelling again. Let' s bettor go home a nd have din-
Del'."
Chiang Ching, who sat in a corner li stening to our
argument, rose hastil y and said:
"How .thaL you have come, Comrade Meng.
The ol d fighting cocks are impossible: th ey st ar t
t he moment th ey meet an d th ere is no end
argument, Take your fight ing cock Lo have dinner,
and J ll, do . th e same with mine, Then t he y will have
to stop fighting. "
was how our argument ended.
Mao had admitted t ha t his " st yle recLifica t iun
campaign" Leninism and ascribing " er-
roneous lines to others, wa s incorrect. He had
admitted that he committed thes e abomina ti ons de-
liberately.
It .follows tho con ten t of our talk that being
an . egoistic ca reeris t and narrow nationalist Mao is in-
?a1lahle pl acin g t he interests of the Party th e world
communist movement above all other interes ts. He has
given priority to the inter ests of hi s own per son.
This IS WIl Y he has never been able to re cognise an d cor-
rect hi s mi st akes. On the contrary, he has always a1717r a-
vated th em. This is wh y he committed mistake baf ter
mistake on an ever greater scale and of an ever more
ser ious character. And the more so as time went on
until his mi stakes became irreparable and he himself
degenerated into a traitor to commu nism and an acc om-
pli ce of imperialism,
4) Mao's talks at the art and literature
forum in Yenan
Mao and hi s few followers con ti nue t o extol his Talks at
the Art and Literature Forum in Yenan, thus decei ving
themselves and ot hers. They describe the Talks as a cl as-
sic exposition of " Mao's r evolutionary t ho ughts and line
in art and literature" , passing him off as t he sale author-
ity on the subj ect. Mor e, during the "style rectification"
period and until th e "cultural r evolution" Mao consider ed
it the greatest of crimes for anyone to ignore his literary
" t houghts " and "li ne". This was th e angle of his attack
on revoluti onary writer s and artis ts of th e fifties and
s ixt ies, wh om he subsequeurly subjec te d t o r epressions.
77
Let us take a closer look at the Talks-not th e original
tex t printed in th e Yenan newspaper Chiehjangj ihpao in
May 1942, whi ch was full of mist ak es, but th e repeatedl y
touched up text published in 1953 in th e third volume of
Mao's Select ed W orks. Thi s will deny him the opportu-
nity to say we are criticising something that was put out
in ha ste and had not been properly revised.
1) Mao's Insinuations
Spurning the facts of the. development of
Chinese art and literature III the preceding 20 years, Mao
levelled a whole set of accusations at China's revolution-
ary writers and artists. To begin with, he placed all of
them " under one cap" by saying they had not yet solved
or found a corr ect solution for the main question-whom
art and literature must serve. Thereupon he said they had
not yet found the right answer the qu.estion " how to
serve" - whether to raise the quality of their work (refine-
ment) or t o make their work more simple (popular).
He also accused them of not understanding " the question
of th e united front in art and literaturo" and the problem
of "li terary and art criti cism". To top thi s, he char ged
them with " ideological mistakes" and "mistakes. of s.tyl?" .
Mao al so faulted revolutionary writers and artist s .1llSI?e
and outside the epc in various other ways. He said, for
example, that many Party member s joined the Par-
ty organisationally but had not yet th.e or
had not yet entirely joined the Party' :ideologically . He
said writers and artists in side and outside th e. Party were
not able to di stinguish between the p:oletanat and the
petty bourgeoi sie, that they wer e divorced from the
ma sses and had no sympathy for wor kers, and
soldiers, and wer e ther efore producin g works
about workers, peasants and soldiers,
try to portray workers, peasants and soldiers , he said,
"all they manazo is to paint the outer shell of a work-
ing man, the essence they produce is the
essence of a petty bourgeois intell ectual , since deep in
their souls ther e is still a kingdom of the petty bour-
geois intell ectual. " 1\10. 0 ' yent on to say that. they did not
understand that art and li ter ature served politics and that
they did not kn ow whom they mu st prai se and i!WY
mu st crtticisc. Th cv did not even understand the distinc-
t!on between " the far rear , whi ch is under the domi na-
tiou of the Kuoml ntang, and the liberated ar eas, when'
tAw leading force is the Communi st Party", On all these
grounds Mao .drew the conclusion that an "effective an d
scn ous camptu.gn to I' ectify th e style of work " was needed
among revoluttonm-y writers a nd ar tists.
¥ao pretended that he was refe rri ng to just some of the
wntors and ar tists in Yenan. But the onsulng events
showed that he was a ttacking liter ar y and art workers
mSlde. and outside th e. Party ev.erywhere in the country.
He did not confine his campaign to just the liber at ed
a:eas, In he specially sent Hu Chiao-me to Chun g-
king, tho latter invited Party writers and artists to
the mISSIOn of the 8th Rout o Army and told them they
mu st conduc t an "effectiv e and serious r ectifIcati on of
campaign" in line with Mao's Talks in orde r 10
transform th emsel ves and th e content of their works".
2) The True Facts of History
Ma.o's groundless do not stand up to the his-
torical Take Ius charge that r evolu tionary writers
and art ists had not yet solved or found th e right solutiou
for the main questi on-whom art an d li t erature must
serve. This was tantamount to saying that they did not
underst and that art and li terature mu st ser ve t he wor ki nz
peopl e. Whi ch is contra ry to the facts. '"
The Chinese revolutionary literary movement, whi ch
came into being during the May Fourth Movement
(1919), resulted from the influence OIl China' s progr essi ve
intolligentsia and youth of the Great Oct ober Socialis t
Revolution, of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and Ilussiau r evo-
lutionary literature. With th e support of Lenin and th e
help of the Comintern , the Communist Party of China was
organised in th e summer of Hl2J. The pi oucers of revo lu-
tionary Chinese art :and lit eratu re, who espouse d th e
ideas of communi sm, joined the Party onc after an oth er.
This was how th e revolutionary literary movement, of
whi ch Communist s wer e the leading and working nu cleus,
became part of th e anti-imperialis t r evolution, the an ti-
feudal revolution, and the str uggle for non-cap italist,
i.e. socialist, per spe ctive. Its memb ers fought on the front
of revolutionary art and literature und er the guidance of
the Communist Party. And the revolutionary movement
'71\
in art and literature that had arisen and devel oped in thi s
manner nat?rall y could have no oth er aim but t o serve
the prolctartat and all working people.
in th e t wen ties th e for emost members of the
movement in literature unders tood th eor et -
ically and adopted in practice t he basi c princi pl e of ser v-
ing prol et ariat a nd all the working people, and of
promoting the revolution. Her e are a few examples.
1. In th e early twenti es, soon after th e Communist
Party of China was founded, promine nt Party l eaders,
among them Tang Chung-hsia, Yun Tai-ni, and Hsiao
Chui-nu wr ote in th eir articl es t-hat " li te ra ture must devel-
op as a revoluti onary weapon". They came t o gr i ps with
the " art for art' s sake " theor y, and ca lled on writers and
poets to " engage in practi cal revolutionary activity" and
"show more of the true life of society".
2. Chiang Kuang-tzu raised the same to pi c in his es -
says, Th e Pr oletariat and Culture, On Revolutionary
Lit erature. Ru ssian Lit erature, and oth er s. In On Revolu-
tionary Lit erature he wrote th at "revolutionary li t erature
is a liter a ture that r eflect s the inter ests of th e oppressed
masses", "exposes th e cri mes and evils of th e old socie ty",
and "hel ps the development of the new for ces".
Chiang Kuang-tzu not only propagated the theory of
revoluti onary art and literature, but also follo wed revolu-
tionary th eory in hi s cr eati ve writing, portraying the
revoluti onary movement of the masses in different pe-
riods.
3. In an early article, Our Ne w Literary Movement,
Kuo Mo-j o urged "resist ance to th e ferocious dragon of
capital ism". He called on the writer s t o show the " spirit
01 th e pr oletariat". In th e article, Th e Revolution and
Literature, he wrot e, "\Ve ne ed a li terature that would
express sy mpathy for the proletariat , a liter ature of soc ial-
ist re alism"; he in vit ed young writers " to go t o the peopl e,
to the fa ct ori es, t o the army barracks, to pl unge into the
whirlpool of the r evolution".
4. Mao Tun sai d in the article Naturalism and Modern
Chinese Prose that literature " mus t pay a tte n tion t o social
problems a nd show sympat hy wi t h th e oppressed and
downtrudden" .
5. Chen Fang-wu al so wrote in th e articl e, From a
Literary Revolution to a Revoluti onary Literature, that
"the worker-peasant masses shoul d be our subj ect" and
" we must use a l angu ag f "l"
masses ".
e ami WI' to th e worker -peasant
Til ese calls for a "li ter ar y r ev I . " ,
ary literature" a nd a "PI'ol' t ' 0
1
,uti on , a 'r evolut ion-
J
'
e anan Itera ture " 11 t d I
s taIlCpOlTl t not only of th b
1'0 ec e t 10
the basi c directioIl of th e authors, but al so
of that peri od.
0 u ionary art and liter ature
Th e spread of Marxi st-Leninist .d
.
of th e movement [or a new c It I euls1?nd the lllfluence
d
'IJ ur o anr rterat .
C many r evoluti on ary in tell eclt J . ' UI O, pr ompt-
gage in educa ti onal work. They' t o
working peopl e in towns and villaO'es 101'
ar t re productions, held lec tur es
ISIn g SCie nce, and organise d concer ts and othe r If'
an ies TI' , .
I per orm-
, ,L : u,s se t In m,otlOIl th e now hi storical process of
werldJllg art and lIterature with tho 1
Jllasses.
wor cer-poas an t
tit ? grea t r evoluti on o[ 1925-1927, th e drive to
p.ut aI t and htoraturo III th e se rvice of the worki ng masses
"as a cons plCu,oUS par t of th e ge ne ra l r evoluti onary
my vement. And III th e l a te twenties, followine th o def eat
0 1 th e great revolution, amid hardsh ips and a t error
t he re,voluli onary and artists worked har der th ar;
eve r for art an d lIterature t o Jacil itate tho str uggle of
t he worker s find peasants.
The Leagu e of Lef t-Wing 'Writers was organised in
March 1930 on th e initiati ve and under the directi on of
the Communist Party. Its nucleus consisted of Commu-
ni sts, whil e Lu II sun was mad e its chairman. :;. The th eoret-
ica l programme adopted at the Le ague' s inaugur a l con.
gross sa id: "We must be in th e for ofr ont of the liber ation
s tr uggle of the proletariat". It also sa id: " The con tent
of our art are th e as pira tions and fee lings of the prol etar-
iat in this di smal and medi eval class society". The League
also had an ac tion programme a nd principles, which were
a ttached t o th e th eor etical pr ogramme. The key provi-
sion in th e acti on programme said, " Tho purpose of our
literary movement is to work for the li berati on of th e
new, devel oping cl ass".
The principles of th e League wer e:
" Tsyui Tsyu-pu was closely i nvolved in di recting the League
from the latt er half of Hl31 until th e end of 1933, when he was
sen t to work ill the Soviet arcus of Chi na.
81
"f) To borrow the experience of the new, progressive
for ei gn liter ature, to expa nd our movement, a nd set up
var iou s r esearch Ladi es.
"2) To help young writers, leach thorn the art of writ-
in g, and assis t the development of worker-peasant writers.
"3) To acce pt as final the Marxi st theory of art and
Ii toraturo, and of l it erary criticism.
" 4) To pu t out journal s and various 's er ies' and ' li br a-
ri es ', and the li ke.
"5) To pr oduce works of literature for the new, devel-
oping cl ass." (See Menyah monthly, Vol. 1, No, 4.)
Faithful to its programme and principles, u. c Lea gue
publish ed a journal thr oug hout th e six i n wh ich it
existe d (March 1930-s pr ing of 1936) , pr inting works of
different genres, League members wr ot e novel s and s to-
ri es about th e life and s trug gle of worker s and pea sants,
and many easily u nd er standabl e poems and miniatures in
ve rse dedicated to th e working cl ass. So me of these wer e
put to musi c by Chi na's ru st workin g-class the
gi fte d young composer Nieh Erh, and other mUSICIanS
and became revoluti onary songs well known at horne and
abroad. Stage-plays were written, too, to be
in working-class districts, wh ere th e Leagu e organised
workers' circles and mobile th eatrical t ea ms.
In response t o th e Party' s united nati.onal
front .policy, aime d a t launching a
war agains t th e Japanese invaders, a simil ar front was
for me d in t he field of art and l it erature. .In May-August
1936 a de epl y moti vated discu ssion began among Lea,?,l;le
member s and other writers and art ists of t he slogans Iit-
er ature of national def en ce" and " mass literature of na-
t ional -r evolutionary war" . Ther e wer e divergent opinions,
but taking guidance in the Party' s corr ec t united front
policy, writers and art is ts of dWere':t vi ews ft?ally
out a common standpoint . Following tho di ssolution of
t he Leagu e of Left-vVin g Writer s, an All-China
t ion of Literary a nd Art Workers was formed, WIth the
nucleu s consisti ng of left writer s. This Fed eration visibly
cont ri but ed to the anti-Japanese resistance and national
salvation moveuicn t , awl to the cause of the working
people .
I n Ma rch 1938, during the period of KMT-CPC cooper a-
t ion in the anti- Japanese war, when fri endship flourished
between Chi na and th e Sovie t Uni on, the All-China As-
of Anl. i-Jupaneso Art and Literature W k
fou; nded in Hankow.. wh er eupon stage workers,
c.la ns , film workers, arti sts, etc. formed simil ar associa
nons. " -
,The Association Issu ed the sl ogan, " Literature for the
Village, Li t erat ur e for the Army" . It Iormod "res ' t-Ll
enemy theatrical groups" " r esis t- tho-enemy l IS I
d
e-
-' C ads " "I 1" I r opagan a
s j ua s.' runt- lIlO he lpers ' groups" " . t th
nr t I I ' e reSIS - e-enemy
at anc it er a lura working groups" and so on 1'1
wor . t t J I ,. 10 groups
, 'e se n 0 rau 0 areas and rural di stricts where tl
hel pod \'0 mobil ise the mass of th e peopl e' a zainst
Ja pan }esc, and popularised literatur e among'" workin g
peop e.
,Mea n time, tho main political department of the Kuo-
forces s et up t he 3r d Department, which
and explained t he aims and purpose
01,the antl-Japanese war t o en emy troops.
T!le l eading nucle us of tlt e All -China Association of
An tI-Japanese Art and Lit era tur e ' Yorkers and of the 3rd
Depar tment cons is ted of member s of th e crc or non-
re vulu l.iuna ry arti sts and writer's, Bef ore t he forties
dofYlllg bans barri ers rai s ed by r eact ionaries,
rna do use of t he l egal opportunities for
orgamsmg wr iters and artists who wrote and published
popular poetry, songs, plays, reports, and shor t stor ies
prod uced traditi onal Chinese drawi nzs and paint ings and
I . J ""
mac 0 an ti- apunese war films. Various youth organisa-
t ions wer e founded during th is period to conduct li t erary
and arti st ic propaganda umong workers, pea sants, soldi ers,
st uden ts and other sec ti ons of the people in the far real'
and th e baulo areas. Thi s made it gre a t impact, awakened
anti-imper ialis t national conscious ness, and raised t he na-
ti on ' s mor al e. They populari sed t he work of the CPC
and t he ope rations of the 8th Ro ut e and New 4th armi es
a nd bho Anti-Japanese Nor t heas t Union Army, ca lli ng
for unity of all patrioti c forces t o combat the Japanese
aggressi on and exposing the manoeuvres of pro-Japanese
grouJlS and Kuomint ang r eactionari es who sought to d is-
rupt th e an ti-J apanese front. All thi s hei ghtened the class
consc ious nes s of t he worker a nd peasant masses,
In th e former Soviet areas of China, where the Com-
munist Par ty wa s domi nan t, and lat er in all the li ber ated
areas, art and literature workers inside and outside the
Party, working jointly with the propaganda appa ratus of
Lhe Par ty, governmenta l educational bodies and th e army' s
politi ca l department s, conducted va der! ednentio unl activ-
iti es and organised li t er ary and ar t groups. As a result,
workers, peasants an d soldiers took an ever more active
part in th e revolut ionary art an (1 literat ure movement.
During the operations of the Sth Houte Army on the
anti-Japanese fro nt i n Nor th China, from the autumn of
1937 and unt il th e "style r octlficati on campai gn" began
in 1942, many professional theatri cal compan ies were
active in the Nort h Ch ina l iberat ed areas, incl uding t ho
Taihcngsha n th eat ri cal oornpnny, th e Theatrica l Society,
and ot he rs, The Na t ional Hcvoluti unary Arts Institute, th e
Lu Hsun AI'tS I nst itut e, and IJIC ] ns t.itute of Ar L and
Literature trained a la rge group of art worker s, who were
hi ghl y active ill r ural areas and helped the peasants 01' -
z ani so t hei r own the atrical circ le s a nd li ter ary a nd art
They also formed theatri cal circles in the battl e
areas, no ta bly the theatrical society New ElJOC!l . Jn .1940
th er e were some 100 highly active rural tlioa tr icnl circle s
in the Tai heng area, as many as 1,700 in t he een),ral
pa r t of Hopeh pr ovince by ea rly 1942, and. some 1,100
r ural thea trical and song-and-dance groups t ho
Moun tains. Anti-Japanese songs were su ng In every \' 1.1-
l age. t heatri cal groups were formed not only 1ll
libera ted areas, but al so i n guerrilla zones, where th ey
conducted anti-lmpcr ial lst and anti-war agitnt ion amo ng
enomy troops. .
The officers and politicul workers of the Anti-Japanese
Northeast Union Army used every possi ble opportu nity
in an exceedi ng ly difJi cul t si tuation to promote liter ature
and art in the army and among t he people i,n
buttress the soldiers' morale and the people s Iai th In
vict ory, and al so t o t ighten the link between army an.d
people. I n areas control le d by J,apanese th eir
puppet s, in tellectuals and st ude nts insid e and. the
Party ri sked thei r li ves to stimulate the fighting spi r i t of
the mass of the people, in flicting cons ide rnbl e moral dam-
age on t he enemy. They wrote and at.t t i-
Japanese and al1ti-;\lanch ukllo novel s and stories, sho wi ng
the bleak and bl ood-st ained backgr ound of Jnpanese-Man-
chukuo rul e, and de scribed the h er oic exploits of th e peo-
ple and the anti-Japanese armed for ces in Northeast Ch i-
na fighting the enemy under th e guidance of t he Com-
munist Parl Y.
. n
lCse
are of history. A11 this wa s don e before
191_, befor e tho Talks of Mao Tse-tunz Even LI 1.1' •
of ' tai I' . . ' 0 ' Ie au TOl' S
. eel' a m. ii stori as o! mo dern Chinese literature written
st,orders Ito .propagat e l\Iao' s l egend
o IC r evo uti onary art d li t
movement in China" I d I r 1 < . an 1 orature
" Maois t" I " ia ueve oped under Lu dlsun th e
• < • "ane expone nt of Mao 's t houghts on -art ' d
literaturo , wh ile tho "second h alf" tllat' f 11
M ' T lks I <, IS, 0 owing
ao sal>, developed under Mao himself- ove tl
aut hors could not avoid Citing these historical l es e
In li ght of th ese fa cts Mao 's claim tha t
nry. wri ters and artists di d not know "whom to "
untd he told them in Ids Talks ar e ent i I servo
1 less. . ' , < . 11'e y grounn-
mai nta ined th a t 'wr i ter s and artists i n Ku omill tanO'-
donu na te d are as wer e unabl e, even re l uctant, to
cl ose t o !'he workers, peasa n ts and soldiers, that they had
no sy.mpathy for them, and could not therefore write
anything about them. Thi s accus a tion coll aps es in fa ce
of the facts.
. The fa ct s sho w that many works wer e written about the
llf.o and stru?gle of worke r s, peasant" an d soldiers, and
th is al ready III the twenties and thirties. Let us name a
few (in the order in whi ch they appeared) .
W orks de picting the life and struggle ot the workers ,
Lu Ilsun ex tols t he higl: mor al cod e of a Pekin z
ri cksh aw i n a short story, A Small Happening (Hl20t
T'ien Han in B e/ ore Dinner (abo known as S ist ers,
1921) , a one-a ct play, portrays the Ii fe and s tru ggl e of
t he three Cha ng sisters, working in a ma tch fact or y. I n
anothe r of his well -known pl ays, The Death 0/ Kii Chen-
hung (1 925) , he dopi cts (he her oic anti-imperiali st s tr ug-
gle of the Shanghai working class a nd the death of Ku
Chon-hung, a workers' lead er in a Japanese-owned textile
Iuc tory, a t th e time of the May Thir ti eth Movement,
Yu Ta-Iu in a story, T he Euenlng of the I ntox icati ng
Spring lVind, portraying girl-worker s in a tobacco fa ctory,
and in anothe r s tory, Bodian, about ri ck shaws (c. 1fl23) ,
portrays the high-mi nded behaviour of workers and work-
ing .peopl a. .
Chiang Kuang-tz u in a short novel, Sansculottes, whi ch
appeared short l y before the April Twelfth Events ( 1927)
portrays the uprising uf Shanghai worker s in support of
lhe Northern March of the r evolutionary army.
SF;
Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, Tramcars are Back at TV orle
(1928) , prai ses th e heroic spir it and iron will of the Shang-
hai workers, arrjving at th p conc l us ion th at in t he end
the wor kin g cl ass is i)Qund to triumph.
T'ien Han in a play, The Fir e Dance (1928) , dwells on
class r elations and tho class s truggl e between workers and
capit ali sts .
Yin Fu, who wrot o the poems 1 May 1929, Dedi cated
to th e Girl of a New Ep och, and others. was a you n g pro-
l et.ari an poet who took part in the workers' youth move-
men t and portrayed th e greatness of the working class
and its bright, futur e.
Tien Han in Autumn Rain (1931 ) , a on e-act pl ay, de-
pi cted the hard life and staunch strnggle of spinni ng-mill
and other worker s and unemployed in Shanghai ' s poor
quarters. His pl ay, Moon light Sonata (19 32) , is t he
st ory of a st rike in a for ei gn -owned Sha nghai bus com-
pany.
Yeh Lin r elat es the s tory of an anti-Japanese volunteer
army for me d by Shanghai's unempl oyed i n a sho rt novel ,
Discovery.
Shu Chin-chun (Lao She ) i n a short novel , Rickshaw
B oy (i!J35) , portruys nn is-yeur-oId yo ung man who, hav-
ing' lost hi s parents, goes t o th e city to earn hi s li ving.
Ile becomes a ri ckshaw hoy and runs many mil es bathed
i n swe at bef or e he ca n buy his own rickshaw; during
an internecine war betweon local warl ords, he and hi s
ri ck shaw are se ized by soldiers.
Hsia Yen in a play, Slave-Girls (1936) , gives a lively,
uni nhibit ed and au thentic portrayal of the t ra gic fat e of
girls fr om poor peasant families tri ck ed into working in
a t extil e fa ct or y. The author exposes the wanton oppres-
sion and inhuman explo itat ion of these girls by Japanese
imperi ali st fact or y-owner s abetted by feu dal lords.
Ko Chu ng-ping wrot e a po em in prose, Demolition Team
on th e Pek ing-W uhan Rail way (1938), based on storie s
of member s of the tRam. It portrays t he her oism of team-
l eader and Communi st Li A-ken and hi s comrades.
Chang Ti en-I i n a shor t story, A fte r MOVing, expr esses
deep compassion for the children of the oppressed workers.
Jn th e twenties and thi r ti es many pop ular songs wore
written ab out. t he working class. Tsyui Tsy u- po wrot e th e
S ong of th e R ed Breakers in the twent ies, ex Lolli ng fr ee
l ab our and the f uturo worldwid e communist society.
The a utho rs of some songs, suc h as the Song of th e
Peasants and W orkers, Song of t he Young W orker, So ng
of th e Ironsmith, and many other s, are unknown. Chon
Yu' s. S ong of L?nF Road, Pu Feng' s Song of Port
and. Shih Lin s Song About the Bri ck (put to
mUSIC by Ni eh Erh), were popular in Ch ina and abroad .
in the .early t hirties, they are sun g to this day.
During the anti-Japanese war, Chinese writer s producod
many songs about the r esist ance and national salvat ion
movement, k nown i n eve ry home and liked by worke rs
and pea sants all over the count ry. Furthermore in t ho
twenti es many oxcellent Sovie t wore
transl ated m to Chinese, contri buting visibl y to the revolu -
ti on ary educat ion of the worker-peasnnt mass es and
Chi na's st udent you th .
In th e twent ies and thirt ies, more was written about
the life and struggle of peasants than about workers and
sol diers. Thi s is du e not only to tho ·peasant s' compr ising
the majority in China, but al so to tho fa ct that many
authors had t hemselves come from villages. Below, ,I li st
only some of t he works as an example.
Kuo Mo-j o in Land, Oh, Mothe r Mine (1919) , portrayed
peasants, and also coalmine rs .
Lu Hsun in a short story, My Old Home ( 1921) , r elated
t he sad story of peasant J un- tu, whom "many chil dr en,
fa mines, t axes, soldi ers, bandits, officials and landed
gentry, all had squeezed . .. as dry as a mummy". The
writ er hopes t hat the r isin g generation will have "a new
life- th e kin d of life we had never known " .
Kuo Mo-jo in a poem, Resurrect ion of the Goddesses
(1921) , por trayed an old pea sant and a shephe r d wh o
abhor war for sowing death and d est ructi on ,
The her oine of Lu JTsun' s sho rt stor y, ;1 Pray er for
ITappiness (1921t), is a pl ain-h earted, hard-workin g, kind
and poor pea sa nt woman, Il si en-l in. wh o fel l prey t o fam-
i ne and Ieud al morals ,
In the early twenties t he journal Il siaos huo uue hpao
published a uthors wh o described the situation in t he Chi -
nese coun tryside -e-Hsu Yu -n o port rayed the ca rnage
loosed by bandits and soldiers in Hon an villages i n Tom
Shoe ; Tien Yen depi ct ed the hard life on th e l a nd in
Raindrops ; Wang Jen-shu described peasant life in eas t-
ern Che k iang in Exhaust ed, a shor t s tory , a nd W ang Szc-
t ion r el ated how a destitute pea sant sold hi s chil dr en to
escape death from st arvat ion in Wiltin{{, also a shor t
story.
Kuo Mo-jo in I Remembered Chen She and Wu Kuang ,"
(1928) , expressed the beli ef that new Chen Shes and
Wu Kuangs would come to l ead the pea sants. He wrote:
"A peasant uprising' l ed by worker s-this, my friend, is
our salvation, a for ce that will transform the whole
world" .
Chiang Kuang-Izu in Fi eld Wind (1930) portrays epi-
sodes or the acute cl ass struggl e in the countr ysi de in
1927 and r elates how peasants led hy Communists organ-
is ed peasant unions and took up arms against counter-
revolutionary for ces.
Hung Sheng in hi s plays Wu Kui Bridge and Sweet -
Smelling Rice-, written in 1930 and 1\:)31, describes the
wrong-doings and perfidy of the gentry and local despots,
and the st amina and honesty of th e pea sants who r ose
to end the cruel oppr ession and exploitation, and to win
the right 10 a de cent life.
Chiu Tung-ping, who had taken part in the Heilufeng
peasant ri sing, described it vividly and portrayed the
changes wrought in the pea sant mentality by the agrarian
revolution in Messenger (1931).
Ting Ling in Wat er (1931) portrays a natural calam-
ity-a flood that spread to 16 provinces, famin e, and
countless other trials fa ced hy peasants in old China;
the peasants fight against their exploiters to gain cont r ol
over the fruits of their labour.
Sha Ting won th e r eputation of a peasant writer. Most
of his works are about the village and it s people-Pancake,
Murderer, Beastly Nature (written in the early thirties)
and Back Home, Animal Ilunt, and others (written during
the anti-Japanese war). All hi s st ories portray the con-
tradictions hetwp-en peasants and th e re acti on ary for ces
(the landed gentry and local bullies). Ho al so sho ws tho
unity of th e peasants, their in creasing s tr ength and grow-
ing soli dar ity.
Mao Tun in Spri ng Silkworms . Autumn Hnro est and
Late Wi nter (19:12-Hl33) sh ows that und er tho boot of
., Chen She (al so known as Chen Sheng) and Wu Kunng
were pea sants who headed lin upri sing against th e tyranny of
Chin Shih Huang, th e first Chine se emperor, in the 3rd century
D. C.
th e gentry and local bulli es th e peasan t s in old C,hina
go hungry whether they till the soi l or raise sil kworms,
regar dless ol t he har vest. The author al so describes how
t he young generat ion of peasa nts awa kens and sets out
t ~ end the man y cent uries of oppressio n and lack of
rights.
VV'll Ch u-hsiang writes about the greed and cynicis m of
t ho landed ge n try and l ocal d espots, and about the ruin ed
and hungry pea sants ri sing to r esist them in hi s On e
Thn.usand Ei{{ht Hu ndred Tr ibutes, A ll Qu iet in th e Ce-
lestial Empire and The Fall Fa mily Shop, written in '1933
and 1934.
Ting Ling in On . the Run (1933) t ell s the st or y of
peasants who, escaprng fr om th e ex ploit at ion of th e zen-
try, go t o Shanghai in se arch of work; they find no work
~ u t l oam to, figh t for their rights. The workers t ell them:
When you r c hungr-y yo u must dema nd food from your
masters. When we looso our jobs wo demand work from
ca pitali sts."
Yeh Tsu devot ed four of the six s tories in Ids collec-
tion A Rich Har vest ("A Rich Harvest", " Fi re ", " Behind
Charged Barbeel Wire" and " The GUide", 1933-Hl34) , t o
the people of hi s native village. He had seen hi s father
and elder sister, hath Communist s, do r evoluti onary work
among the pea sants and pa y for it with t he ir lives. and
himself took part in the peasants' st l' uggl e for a liveli-
hood. He wrot e in a comba tive spirit, givi ng the impr es-
sion that he is amo ng the charac ters of h is novel s, figh t-
ing at their side. In " Be hi nd Charged Bnrb cd Wlro" old
man Wang' s two sons join the Chi nese R ed Army, an d
tho old man, too , se ts ou t to look for it aft er he has a
few hard knocks. In " The Guid e" Moth er Lin and her
th r ee sons join the Red Army. Her sons di e in battle,
and ol d Mother Liu, too, di es for th e r evolution, but not
before she aven ges her sons and comrade s by agreeing
10 sh ow the way to ene my troops and l eadin g them into
an ambush.
Tn I935-H)3G Ye h Tsu wrot e another six stories, pub-
li sh ed in tho coll ection Night in a Mountain Village, and
a sho rt novel, The Star. All of th em wer e devot ed
to th e life anrl s truggles of the peop l e of hi s nutivc
village.
Llsiao Hung in Fi eld of Li]« and Death ( In:H) , descrihcs
tho ca rnage, arson, nn rl pl under in the village s of Nort h-
east following the 18 September events of 1931.
Japanese invader s levell ed whole villages with the ground.
The peasa nts look up arms anrl joined the r evol uti onary
people's army.
In the thirties Yang Han-sheng wrote a pl ay The
Death of Li lIsu-chen, portraying tho former field worker
wh o became t he gifted l oader and hero of t he Taiplng
Rebellion. The author himself played the part of Li Hsu-
chen in productions of hi s play during th e anti-Japanese
war. His Deepening shows the reasons for t he intensifica -
tion of t he peasant struggle in the countryside after
1928.
Tien Han in his play Th e Great Flood (1935)
de scribes the life and str uggle of peasants in floode d
areas.
On the eve of the anti-Japanese war Tien Kian wrote
a trilogy in ve rse, Stor ies of the Chinese Village (" Fam-
ine", "The Yangtse" and "There"), depi cting the hard lo t
and de sp erate struggle of the peasants.
In th e thirti es th ere were also many works devoted to
sol diers. In Th e General Retreat, for example, Kuo Ching
depi ct ed episodes from the battl e of 28 January 1932 in
Shanghai , when Kuomintang sol diers went over to t he
s ide of those who re sisted Ja pa nese aggression.
Yeh Tsu in Night Patrol (1!J33) painted a stark picture
of how Kuornintang troops terrorised the people du r ing
their " ant i-communis t campaigns", wreaking havoc, arson,
car nage and plunder. This caus ed the honest ones among
them 10 pr otest. Squad leader 'Yang Chili-ping, his dep-
uty Li Hai-s nn, private Chao Tc-sheng, ann. ot he rs r evolt-
ed, liberated imprisoned Red Army soldiers and other
pri soners and joined them in an attack on tho enemy
camp.
Hsi ao ChUD in th e novel The Village in August (1934)
sh ows how a heroic unit of the communis t-l ed Northeast
People' s Revol ut ionar y Army cons ist ing of worker s, peas-
a nts, sold iers and students, fought against the Japanese
in adver se circ umst ances. The novel sho ws the revolu-
tionary ar my fighting a people's war against the Ja panese
impe r ialist. aggression.
Chiu Tung-ping began writing in 1931. As a young
man , he had taken part in th o Heilufen g pea sant ri sing,
and l ater in the ant i-J a pan ese battl e of 28 January Hl32
i n Shanghai. He was with the New 4th Army and died
in battl e in 1941. An ex perienced soldiar h
portl b t h ' , e wrote ex-
d . a ou t e war. HIS Defence of Red Flowe P' ld
unit . of three
Flow:r Field. fores t nc ar Red
smashss two regiment s, There is a th ,'W y and
SIX men dofending a stone b .d I J mg ( escn pu on of
and a soldier, and th e a peasant,
coll ego. They f' ouzhi bravel 1' 11' 30 s o . a teach er s'
H' '" ( y, {j mg. ene mies
IS st or y. BattaliOn Commander in the U ": ' A
(December f 940) i 1 . ' man .'J rmy
t
I
· . s .11e tragic tal e of a Kuomintan o bat-
a IOn WIth ' . '"
!Ie Succeeded in ' Iundit.
mg f wo com na ni ,, ' ea -
b . , ompanles to sa fety. For this he was r eward ed
bY th e commande r of the communis t- le d New -ith Army
on the headquarters of
for not dofe n/h ng hi s positi ons to th o last
A on the Road (June 1%1) is tho s tory of
a It.h Army sta ff officer who saved a regiment of the
Union Army ( ant i-Japa nese part of the Kuomin tang
army) . It describes tho corruption rampant in lhe Ku o-
mintang forces whi ch , thou gh some times compelled t o
engage th e Japanese, were of ten hostile to th eir own
people.
Han in the shor t novel Lu kouchiao (Hl37) de-
scnbes how th e men of th e Kuomintang 29t h Army ralli ed
to resi st Japanese aggression. This marked th e beginni ng
of the f 937 July Se vent h eve n ts -Lhe beginning of the
nati onwide anti-Japanese war. He als o describes th e
help of students and working people t o an Ii-Japan ese
troops.
Chang Tien-i in Twenty-One , a shor t st ory, portrays
sol diers of a Kuominta ng unit who r efu sed to fight in the
uutl -communlst civil war. His L ast T rain ami Th e R oad
are al so about soldiers wh o, wis hi ng to fight the Japanese,
came t o gr ips wit h th eir offi cers, who wer e traitor s. In
his story, llatred, Cha ng Tien-i portrays the abominations
perpetrated hy th e ol d army, whi ch earned it the hatred
of the peasants.
Chou Wen in Season of Opium Poppies ('1936) shows
warlord s immersed in corr upt ion sc rambling for power
anrl pri vil eges, and tr eating soldiers with inhuman
cruelty.
Ai Ching's poem, IIe Died a S econd Time, is the st or y
of a wound ed sol dier' who had grown up in a village.
Hoi Yan' s T he Front describes the Northe r n March ,
and Yeh Lin' s In the Vi llage sho ws Kuomintang tro ops
bombarding villages and ex termi na ti ng peasants during
the " t hird campaign" agains t the Chi nese Red Army.
Apart Irom s tories and novels sp ecificall y devoted to
worker s, pea sants or soldiers, many of the works written
in l.he twenties and thirties si multaneously depi cted work-
ers, pea sants, sol diers, and other working people.
Many were devoted to the Oct ober Revolution and tho
civil war in Russia, portraying the building of socialism
in the Soviet land.
In A Journey Across Ne w Russi a and i n The Hi story of
the R ed Capital (end of 1920-enrl of HJ22) Tsyui Tsyu-po
t ells th e s tory of th e workers, pea sants and soldiers of
Russi a who, l ed by th e Bolsh eviks, overcome difficulties
and defeat imperiali st interventionists and local white-
guard gangs. This warm-h earted hook ac quai n ted t he
Chinese, es pecia lly th e yo ut h, with th e pa r t pl ayed by the
Communist Party n nd Sovie t power i n liber ating the
peopl e and def endin g it s gai ns.
Tsou Tao-f en g produced a four-volume travelogue
Lett ers of a Travell er (summer of 1fl33-surnmer of 19R5),
a first-cl ass .pioco of repor t age in content and form. The
first and second vol umns, which describe the condit ion
of the m as s es in the Europ ea n capitalis t co u n tr ies, and
the Iourth volume, about conditions in th e North Amer-
ican doll ar empire, are a mer ciless indictment of the
capitalist sys tem. The thir d volume , devoted to th o So-
viet Union building social ism under th e l eadership of
the Party of Lenin, is an ode t o sociali sm. These four
books ar e sti ll useful r eading for th e Chi nese of today.
Tao Hsing-chih's poetry about the life and str uggl e
of working people has earned him the r eputation of a
peopl e's poet and teache r. Unfor t unately, Mao consi znod
the liter ary Iegu cy of Tsyui Tsyu-po, 'I'sou Tao-I eng"'and
Tao Hsing-chih to th e flames, and it is unknown to th e
Chinese peopl e a m! yo ut h uf today.
Other r evol ut ion ar y Chiuoso writ er s, too, produ ced
hook s about th e great Lenin , t he Octobe r Il cvolutl on, and
Sovie t con tributi ng t o the revol utiona ry erl uc n-
of the Clunese people and th e sprea d of Sovie t ex-
pcrroncc,
92
1300ks and s tor ies ab out workers, peasants and soldiers
wero well r eceived lly rea ders at home. Some wnre tr ans-
lated, and counn cndod by for eign r ead ers. Prozr essi ve
literary cr itics and hist ori ans, bo th Chinese a nd [orei ct Il
praised them highl y. '" ,
M.ost of thes e wor ks bel ong to t he sc hool of sociali st
realism, and Some La cr it ical r eali sm 0[' re volutionary
romanti ci sm.
It stands l.o .that they diff ered ill depth and
breadth, III ideologica l and ar ti stic va lue. The same
aut hor .wntJllg. on r elated s ubjects would prorl ucr, works
of varying merit, Everything depend ed on the time place
a nd general condi ti ons. ' ",
I li sted only some of the works of t he revol utio n-
ary writer s of the twenti es and thi rti es-just a littJe over
70 ,; orks by 30 au tho rs. But thi s is enough t o show th at
Mao s cha rge is groundless. It i s not true that
the writers and ar tists of t he twen ti es and thirti es were
unable, much l ess re l uctant, to wr ite about the life and
str uggle of worker s, pe asants and sol di er s.
T? back his ehar ge, Mao decl ar ed that only works por-
t raying worker s, pea sants and soldiers cou ld serve and
be nccept abl o lo workers, peasa nts and soldiers,
This is fal se. I t only sho ws that Mao does not k now
what kind of liter ature is neede d hy th e working class as
the hegemon of r evolution, by the peasants as it s clo sest
allies, an.d by th e showing the parasitical
nature 01 th e impe r ia lists, showi ng th e enslaveme nt and
exploitati on of colonies und se mi-colonies, hooks abou t
the r ea cti on ary Manchu Ching dyn as ty, about tho war-
lords and th e Chiang Kai-shek clique, book s s tigrnatising
the landed ge n try and th e bourgeoisi e, showing the brut-
al oppression, ex ploit atio n a nd t orment in flicted on the
Chinese peo ple by J ap anese invad er s and thei r puppet s - -
are n' t th ese hook s also neede d by the worker s, pea sants
and soldier's? Don ' t they, too, serve t he in terests of the
workm-s, peasants and soldiers? It can' t be true, as Mao
would have us beli eve, that worker s, peasa nts and sol-
di ors wa nt t o read only about themsel ves and do not. want
t o r ead about t heir ene mies. Isn ' t th e pr inciple, " know
thy encuiy us th yself " , for mulated by the gifte d mili tary
l eader Sun Wu more than 2,000 years ago in h is tr eati se
On th e Art of W ar , st ill va li d for the workers, peasants
a nd soldiers of th e pr esent-day revol utionary movement?
93
And for the same valid reasons we can al so ask: aren' t
books about the life and struggl e of the re volutionary
intelligentsia and revolutionary st udents also a source of
knowl edge for workers, peasants and soldiers ?
In his novel, Before the LJawn, Mao Tun showed th e
economic impasse of the Chinese na tiona l bour geoisi e; he
tore to shreds the Tr otskyite in vention that capit alism
can thrive peacefully in China for a long time, and at
once described the st r uggle of the workers, peas ants and
soldiers. Tsao Yu demonstrated the economic bankruptcy
of th e bourgeoisi e and sho wed the decay of th e bourgeois
family in hi s plays, The Dawn and Hurri cane; he arrived
a t th e concl usio n tha t only the working class can open
new hori zons for China.
Pa Chin in his novel , The Family, depicted the degen-
era tion of the feudal-hureaucratic fami ly and its destruc-
tive effect on the youth, showing that if th o foremost
youth wants to br eak out of the vicious circl e, it mu st
fi rst break with the old family. Many other books could
be list ed. Aren' t they acceptabl e to workers, peasants and
soldiers? Can' t they, too, ser ve work ers, peasants and
soldiers'? Jt is quite clear that apart frum books about
the li fe and st ruggle of the workers, peasa nts aTHI sol-
di ers, t here ar e ma uy others that they will acce pt and
that ca n serve their intere st s.
Take thi s example, which was al so witnessed by Mao
Tse-t uu g. In 1940 comrades of the Lu Hsun Art In stitute
in Yenau produced Tsao Yu ' s plays, The Dawn Hur-
ricane, on th e stage of th e Central Party School s
ence hall. They were applauded by Party and military
cadres, many of whom were of working class or peasant
background. I rememb er their delight and enthusiasm
very clearl y, and Mao, too, must r emember it.
In short , Mao's charge is quit e groundless.
One of Mao' s gravest accusations was that tho revolu-
tionary writers of the twenties and thirties wrote too much
about th e lif e and struggle of the intelligentsia and the
st udent youth. But thi s should be considered a merit
rather than a fault. That they chose this subject is due
to specific subj ective and objecti ve hi storical circum-
st ances. Th e su bject ive factors are that most of the revolu-
t ionary wri t ers came fr om the intelli gentsia and had been
st udents themselves; when they bega n writing, th ey could
wr it e mainly of those whom they knew well. And th e
94
objective fact or was that the working people in Chi na t
lthe ext ent of per cent, were eit her compl et ely
or And so, wit hou t cul tural and
edu cational . work, WIthout promoti ng litera ture amonz
:vorln.ng pp;opl e, all the declurati olls of the
I?-telhgentsla and s tudent youth about putting art an d
Iit eraturo at the service of the workillg people would
never be more th an empty talk. For intellectuals and stu-
dents to pr opagators of r evoluti onar y cult ure it
:vas lirst to them and to help th em
revol utionary art and lit eratur e for thei ns olvos, aud then
to to unders.tand th e. interest s of the working
mas ses. I'his accords WIth Marx s pr incipl e, "The educa-
tor must himself ?e. educa ted", in the thir d of his These.':
on Feuerbach. TIllS IS why r evolutionary writers produced
works that educated young intell octual s and studen ts '
otherwisc ther might have be en generals without
army, and for combat. In due course, taking par t in
the revolutlOnar .y movement, they gra dually learned more
about the worki ug masses and Legan Lo produ ce more
books about the circums tances of th e workmuu 's Ijfe uud
stru ggle.
As a result, part of the inLelli geutsi a and students
Were drawn into the revolutionary movement, into the
Pu.rty and the YCL, joining the worker-peasant masses;
a force was thus developed that put revol utionary art and
literature in th e service of the work ing people. .
Th e fact s of history show tha t mak ing his charge Mao
was driv en by subjectivist moti ves, whereas the revol u-
tionary arti sts an d wri ters were moti vated by the concrete
obj ective and subjective circums ta nces.
For Mao the chief " argument" was tha t the revolu-
ti onary movement in art and lltoraturo had, as he saw
it, followed a petty-bour geois rat her than pr oletari an
lin e, and was th er efore at variance with Mao' s " worker-
peasant-soldier line in art and litera ture". By putting
things in this way, Mao was tryi ng to replace socialis t
realism with his own line, so called, in art and
literature.
Now, let us see wha t Mao's "worker-peasant-soldier
line in art and literature" amounts to fr om th e point of
view of its cla ss orientation:
The workers are th e prol et ariat, t he peasants are the
petty-bourgeoisi e, while Chinese soldiers, at least th e
vast majority of them, come from the peas ant class.
95
Hence, the " wor ker- pe as ant-s oldier line in art and liter-
ature" can he nothing hut a mixed prole ta r ian a nd pe tty-
bou rgcoi s Jine, and certai nly no t a prole tarian line. Ye t
from the Mar xist s tandpoiut, the class li ne in ar t ancl lit er -
ature i s determined not by the social origin of t he authors
or th eir characters , but by what worl d ou tlook, the out-
l ook of what class, t hey espouse in depi cting li fe and t he
surrounding world.
This is the cri ter ion to use in classifying art and l iter-
ature as proletarian, petty-bourgeois , bourgeois, feudal,
etc. What, then, is the class position Mao wants revol u-
t ionary writers a nd artis ts to take? I n h is he said:
" The ques tion or position, Wo st a nd on the POSl tlO11 of th e
prol etariat and th e broad mass of the people". But wha t
docs he mean by " broa d mass of th e people"? I n the firs t
part of hi s Concluding Remarks he said: " 1?u t who are
th e mass of th e peop le? T he broad mass of the people ,
constituting more than 90 per cent of our popu lation, is
made up of workers, peasants, soldiers, and the urban
petty-bourgeoisie." It follows, th erefore, th at .wants
rovol utionary wri ters and artists to take the pOSItIOn of
th e pro le ta riat and at the salli e time the position of the
pc uy-hourgeoi s ic. l n more specific t erms thi s means t ha t
in t heir cr eat ive process revoluti onary art and Iiteraturo
workers are expected to adhere simul taneousl y to the
pr ol etari an outlook and t he pe tty-bourgeois ou tlook. In
terms of theory thi s is entirely in compatible wi th th e
Marxist principle s of art and literature, and in terms of
practice it is simply impossible. Thi s is why hi s concept
was not adopted by the revolutionary writers and
a rtis ts.
In Mao's article On New Democracy which appeared
early in 1910, and in On the Democrati c Dictatorship 0/
th e Peopl e, whi ch appeared ill June 194U, he expanded the
concept " mass of t ho peopl e" to include the national bou r-
geoi sie. And after the es ta bli shment uf th e People's Re-
public of China he t ook advantage of th e supr eme ,power
he had usurped in Party, government and army to Impos e
t he vi ews contained in h is Talks at the Art and Li ter-
ature Forum in Yenan on revolutionary art and liter ature
workers. Tiley were expected to adhere simult ane ously t o
the outlook s of th e prolet ar ia t, pctty-hou rgcoisie, and bour-
geoi si e. It is easy to see , th erefor e, why a now overt now
covert st. ruggle ensued in art and lit oratura he twoen ]\[no'",
approach, on. the one hand, and t he approach of th e revo-
luti onn ry writors and ar tis ts, on t he other.
. adva nced. th e . slo*au of a " wOl' ker- pea:;an t-s oldi01'
Itn,e"JI1 a,rt. and and wanted re\'olutionary writ-
ers , to take th e of th e pro le tariat and th e broad
mass of th e peopl e bee:ause hi s views on such basi c
matter s th e qu estion of classes -not. only i n the liel ;l ' 01:
art and literature, but also in other field s - wer e confused
and His f undamental mis ta ke ca n
t raced to hi s lIIcomprehellsion of t he Marxi st crit eria
classes and social suat a, and of th e place or rol e
diff er ent classes a nd socia l str at a in t ho Iifn .I . I.
d ' I ' 0 SOCIC Y
In re: o nt i onar y movements. Striking evidence of t hi's
found In tl,l e w?rks he sp eci all y devot ed to the quos -
Lion of cl ass identity, An Analysis of the Classes Of th.
So ciety" (lH2()), How to Determine Class
tlly . i n th e Coun tryside (1933) an d the section on " tho
motive of t he Chi nese revol ution" whi ch he wro t e
fO, r th e article, Th e Chinese Re volution tuul the Commu-
nist Party of Chi na (19::l 9) .
Mao' s thoughts on class id entity, as pr esented in th e
. two of t he above articl es, coupled with the errors
III hi s Report on the Investigati on 0/ the Peasant Move-
ment in Hunan. Province (1927) and Report on the La nd
Can:paign ( Hl:3:3), ex pla i n the polit ica l
mIstakes mad e during the agrarian r evol uti on in th e So-
vie t of China and, on a still greater scale, during th e
agra rian r eform in t he wh ol e coun try la ter . In determin-
ing th e cl ass and soc ia l id en tity of th e r eal land ed gentry
a nd th e small landowners he put both unde r th e same
head, thou gh th e latter wore no t of the ge nt ry, whil e
kulaks and well-to-do middle peasant s, and even simpl y
middle peasants, we re also lumped together. As a result,
t here WaS indi scriminate confisca tion of land OWJJ(H! bv
middle pea sants along with that owne d by th e gentry
and kul aks. Th e di stributio n of land, on t he ot her hand ,
was egali tarian, and subsequentl y the land had to be
re dis tr ibuted over a nd over again wi th deplorable con-
se que nces for th e productivity of pe asant, l ab our. La st.
but not l ea st, thi s er ro neous a pproach led to in di scr im-
i nato r epressi on s, even executions .
ln th eory and practice, gui de d hy hi s ideas of " ne w
democracy", Mao gave priori ty to th e Tute rusts 01' th e
nati on al bonrgeoi si o, while the i n ter ests of the proletariat
wer e give n seconrlnry, or subor di na te , consider a ti on. He
beli eved that only a " revol u tion of new democracy" was
possible in Ch ina, while a soci ul ist r evolut ion and soci al-
ist cons tr uct ion wore impossibl e. This was a direct. result
of th e basi c mi st ak es in th e first and third of th e above-
ment ioned art icle s on th e questi on of classes, and also
in hi s other ar tic les (e.g. "T Ill! P eking COIlP a nd th e
Merch ants" in th o jou ru al Il siunglao in lm:\, etc. ) .
Mao' s no t ion of cl asses and his theor eti cal mi stakes
ccrning " ne w democracy" w:re . 1I1a lll-
s pr ings that l ed to hi s transformati on Into a traitor to
coIII Ul u nism.
,The above muy he illustrat ed with t he following
exam ples fr om Mao ' s he s ys Lemat ica lly
Ior ces Conu n unist s a nd members of th e YeL, a nd
for em ost worker s, intell ectual s and st ude nts with a
Marxi st-Leni ni st educ a tio n, Lo go to the vill age for
" re-od ucat iou b y poor peasants and lower' mldd lo
peasants",
Mao regards the soc ial ist commu nity, th e world COIll -
mu nistjnnvem en t, th e an t.i-i ru peria Ii s!. uu tiona1 libnmLion
movement, a nd the peace movement as hi s e ne mies, and
treats extrumc rea ctionary imperialist ele ments, the Ius-
c is; state s, and ruu cti on of all hu es, as fri end s. Anti -
Sovietis m a mi u ntl-co mmu nlsm have become th e pi vot of
Mao's horn e an d ' fOl' ci gupolicy.
Mao forced his elder so n, Mao An-ying, who had go ne
to a Sovie t sc hoo l a nd had fini shed th e Milluuy Politi ca!
Aca de my in th e So viet Union, "IHI who rutur uod to Yeu n»
in the winter of 1\145, to live with th e fa mil y of h is close
fr.i end a bi g Yonan kulak, \Vu Mung-yu, for " re- ed uca -
Li on" " ideologic a l renr-iental.i on ". Mao An-ying obj ect-
ed. He compl ai ne d th at the social a nd ideol ogi cal r oots
of his father' s deci si on coul d be t raced to Mao ' s or ig in
(Mao's Iathor was a hi g kulak and moneylender). UnL
Mao u se d hi s power to make hi s so n s pend several months
with t he Wn Mang-yu family. Foll owing this, Mao An-
ying to ld his [ath er and other co mra des : " I refuse to
' learn' fr om a kulak; T am deepl y r evolted hy the way
o f life of thi s hi g kulak family. I will alwa ys he 11 Marx-
is t-Lenin ist, a graduate of Soviet ed uca tional establish-
ments .' Nev er will I cons ider th isn di sgrace, Ou the con-
trnry, I am proud of it. " In thi s cl as h between fath er
and son th e truth was cer ta i nl y on tho son's side. Br cans('
of this I will always res pect Comrade Ma o An-yi ng.
Let me al so call a ttenti on to the foll owin g. III t he
" Couc ludiug l lcnuu-ks of his Talks Mao sa id : " My re-
marks o r toda y Covel' on ly SOllW of t he Iuudumental proh-
lems of our c ult ural movement. .. . I bel invo th at nil of
"p,ornradcs, arc determin?d to advance a long th os!'
lines. As wo soc, Mao admits t ha t hi s discu ss ion was
not co nfined 1. 0 "some basi c ques tions of or ientation",
that he was advanc i ng his own new line in art and
Ye t, hi s .Talks he did not touch on the ques-
of the classification of Ii teraLure by artistic or crca -
LIVl! method. Maxim Gorky, a wri ter of world renown and
a pion eer of prol et ar ian li toratnrc, sa id on this sc or e:
" The re a r c t wo ma in ' c urrents' or trends in Ii toratur e:
romanticism and r eali sm. " He pointed ou t th at , " in r om an-
we must al so d istingui sh bet ween two di s tinctl y
diflering t.rend::; - ' passive romanti cisrn' and ' acti ve romnu-
ti cisll1 ' -al1d in r eali sm between cr it ical rea lism a nd
soc ialist reali sm."
Spenking-of trends in art and literaLure (a ctuall y he
referred only to thc question of tr ends in Il ternturc) ,
Mao wholly ov erlooked the cl assifica t ion o f ar t and liter -
ature by arti sti c or crea tive method , whi ch s hows that
ho did not understa nd wha t a li ter a r y or artist ic tr end
r eall y is.
What was t he trend followed by r ovol utl on. n-y wr-iters
and arti sts in China before Mao's Tulks ]
First ado pted in t he twenties, and dorni nnn t i n t he
thi rf.ins, wa s t he t r end of socia list r eal ism. TIll"! lond i
id eas of thi s trend - a nd t hat is it s esse nce-c-wcrn th ose of
Marxi sm-Lenini s m. It wa s a new, r evo lu tionary t re nd
co nceive d by Maxi m Gorky in the begi nni ng of th'u twen-
ti eth ce nt ury. I n t he new hi stori cal setti ng Iollowing t.he
October Il evolu ti on it became the l eading trend i ll Soviet
literature, then gradnall y spread among revol utionary nnd
progressi ve writer s of other' cou n tr ie s, i ncl udi ng Ch i na,
li enee the fa il ure of Mao' s attempt at s ubs ti t u ti ng his
own trend for the tr end fo llowed by Ch ina' s rovol u tio nru -y
wr-iter s and ar t.ists, I t. is not. su r prising, t,hr. ro fOl'o, t.hnt
a long and hitter st rugg!c ensue d.
Tho limits of Ill y pr esent work pr even t me fr om g- ivi ng
a detail ed expl ication of Ma o' s ot.her accu sati on s . But
surel y ther e is no need .Ior one, because they are so
""
Ail of t he globe
are broth ers of another.
China is aided by Soviet ,
Communists agu iu sl the Japanese,
And Chineso ..
IUIISt help t he 8.0V101 l 'nlon
'l g'linst the Iascists .
across lI!C world,
dose your ranks for \,l CLOI:Y.
Fi gh t sh.oulrler ..to
for che r ished \ ICt Ol) , . • .1
my fl'1enuS.
Lhe Kremlin Palace;
the Lenin
\\osco
w
: revolutton,
i\losr.ow, th e COIllmter ll.
Moscow, . tl
You've wall ill oue ·SIX I
of the globe,
sy mbol of things to C? llle,
. "'orld of
world of communism,
. I . . , t t o Moseow Liu
. f 19<:2 dunng us VI S1 . . " ,
In wl,uter 0 .. ,, ' ) , ' I WCI' C not bomb ed beeall se Tru-
Shao-chl said to us. \0\ itl CIl'lna ' he stric tly forbadc
'. 1 t t a war WI 1 ,
man diu no wan
, it "
MacArthur t o bom.b to Peking. Fron.
3.. In Decem?eJ . .' had se ven acute ..of
April Hlfi4 to January. '. '£1 first on e was HI April-
chol ecys t it is and hee,atl
t1s:
Li en-ch ang and ot he rs
May 195/1. Huang u that I h ad a bad liver
were reluctant to acknow r eviv e talk of the
and gull-bladder, lJecausp, tIl e attack for five UllYS.
. I t yed at home Will
. 1 poi solllllg: s a., H d to go to Peking 1I0SPltli .
On the sixth, I wus compo 0 cho l cc stit.is hnl Huang
Tho doct or s diagnosed acute. ' H/ said' ' '' I n addition ,
Shu-tse stuck to o:v? ,.
t he patient has l1enlonwr tse had be en pr omoted deputy
thi s t.ime,C olf Health: hence, Peking
c.Jllef of th e I' I The doctor s did not dar e go
Hospital :vas l.n. us c on once r emovi ng the
agains t. hiS -t\ 'fl :1Y of hospital and th c ninth
gall-bl add r.r., ' k
n
lillY] 101ll I tllC sit uation be(:ame critical.
Her the attac inc ) CgUIl ,
I ' .
Monz Chiner-shu summone d bot. lour sons
I hat l\1ut!lmg . '" e 1. At the "arne time she
to my 1> efl sidp lor I lll' l eav c-ta cmg. . .
tr eated m e with r epeatedly tested rn edi cines. For three
days she fou ght desp eratel y for Ill y life. Gradua lly , my
condi tion impr oved, tho pain s ubs ide d, the temper ature
dropp ed. and J was able t o take sorn e food . But my doc-
tors conti nue d t o i nsis t on an oper a tion. \Ve r esi sted, for
I had ea ten nuthiug in six days ami my weight wa s down
fro m 58-60 kil ograms to a mere 40. T co uld not hope t o
survive an oper atio n. After r ep eated requests I wa s gi veil
t wo bl ood transfusi ons - a wer e 500 millil i tr es, 1n secre t,
we got in t ouch with speciali st s in Chin ese medi cine, and
I t ook th eir drugs. ,;. As a result, my condit ion gradually
r eturned t o normal. But th e doctor s con tinued to insi st
on an operat ion. And wh en we firmly declin ed, they made
us sign a paper to thi s effec t.
4. I n the summe r of lDS5, du e to an agg ravation, I was
aga i n taken to Poking Ho spital. Surgeon Shan mad e an
infusion of n sodi um chloride an d glucose sol uti on at the
rate of GO drops a minut e. li e admitted thi s la ter, but
said he had been orde re d to do so by Dr. Wang, ch ief of
the su rgical department, A few minutes aft er the infusion
began Dr. Shao went ou t of my ward. ] began shiveri ng
so In touscly that six hot-water bottles and three quills
did not hell). I wa s pale, s wea ting profusely, and my
hear t was beating furi ously. Then a terribl e weakness set
in. Meng Ching-shu asked the nurse to pull out the
needl e at once, hut the gi rl refused : " Dr . Shao sa id the
infusi on must not be s topped in his absence. I 'll go and
l ook for him." When the nurs e l eft, Mong Ching-shu im-
mediatel y s toppe d th e infusion and made a camphor In-
ject ion t o st imulate my heart. Gradually, I relaxed,
th ough th e ca r diac weakness linger ed. After a long timo
th e nurse brought back Dr. Shao. When he saw the in-
fu sion had been s topped he showe d hi s displeasure and
said we should h ave waited for hi s re tur n: he would have
decided what to do.
Profe ssor Y. M. Vol oshin, a Sovie t sp ecialist att ac hed
to th e surg ica l department of Peking Hospital, said when
he heard about the case : " In Comrade Wang Ming' s COJl -
':. AL the end of l U4U Mao declared that. Chinese medicine was
"old mcdi cino" and Europonn medicine "Dew medicine"; he said
that "t he old and dying mu st be thrown out and replaced by the
new". Thi s caused cons ternati on in th o count ry and among the
800,OUlI doct ors pr acti sing Chinese medi cine.
The first wa s th e Cen tra l Par t y School. Tn addit ion t o
the s tude nts of th e Pa r ty School, worker s of Part y com-
mittees- --from county to territorial CC bureaus -- woro
summoned her o lr orn all parts of t he country to undergo
" r ectificat ion". So wer e army commanders fi nd politi cal
officers (r egimental and hi gh er) , cadr es of ndmiuisuative
organs in areas (county and higher) held by the 8th
Routo 0 1' New 4th ar mies, awl Communi st s ac tive in the
gove rn ing bodi es of ma ss organblltiollS. The "rccti fica-
lion" in the Party School was- head ed by Pong Chen,
The second s ubdiv ision, head ed hy Kao Kang, conc erned
work er s at a11 levels 0 r Par ty bodi es, admini strat.i\' 0
organs and mass organisati ons in the Shcnst-Kansu-
[in gh sia Bord er Area.
The lhird s ubdivision was for worker s of CC epc
bodi es, and was headed by Li Fu-chun,
Th e "style rectificat ion campaign" virtually conver ted
Yenan into a huge conce nt ration camp . The pr emi ses of
schools, Institutions an d offices became pla ces of
siona l detenti on. Nobody was all owed to conu uunicato
with anyborly- -tu wri te or telcpho uc, or do an ythi ng,
without permi ssi on or " rec ti ficuti on ca mpa ign " ol'Iiciu. ls .
2) The methods and obj ectives
of tho "rcetifi catiuu 01' style"
Mao Tse-t uu g in struct ed all th ose who were suhjcct erl lo
" rect ification" to st udy the docu ments he had prescr ibed,
to write "confess ions", an d to engag-e in "sel l-criti cism" ,
Th e Commissi on fur the Hoctification of Stvl o annouuccd
th at of all documents and wri tings only wor ks wer e
correct arul shoul d ther efor e be dili geu tl v I'l'Fld and reread
as a n impor ta nt means of ideological r e-educati on. Th e
Commission specially emphas ise d Mao' s pa mphl et On Ne w
Democracy because, it said, " Mao ism eq ua ls Now Dsmoc-
racy" and because t he book let was th e " pr ime aTIl l cap-
ital Maoist th eor eti cal work" . It foll owed that t he works
of Lenin, the rlocuman ts of the Comi ntern a nd the cre,
and th ose of other Par ty l earlors, wer e wro ng a nd tho se
who read them wer e dogmat is ts, The Marx-Engcls-Leuin-
Stalin- Mao form lila wa s accoJ'flingly ehanged to 1\ 1arx-
Engels-Mao, Some of t ho cadr es (even hi gh -l'anking- ) wer e
so badl y eowed t ilal they pubJiely hurned t he ]islnd wor k
and documents or' simply thr'nw lh em awa y. SOllte of them
"Rid, "Luckl lv T hav e never r ead t hem, for nlh or wisc I
woul d have hocoruo a dogmati st ."
Th o Commissio n also named th e methods and Obj CI :l :; or
" cri I ic is m":
1) Crtti ci s e your acquaintances, as well as vo urself'.
2) Say only der ogator y things ahout vourscl ! and
and on no acco unt say an ything goorl: hut about
Mao [ so-tung, Liu Shao -c hi and 11 few ot her listed per-
sons speak well only aTIll on no account ha dl v.
8) The ma in objects of cr itic is m were
of all t he " dog ma t ic group" head ed hv Wa nz MillO' and
Po 1\.11 for " s pr eadi n g l\Iarxbn; ,7 a nd.
second, t.lic gro up of " cmpii-i cisl.s " headed hy Chon En-lu i
nnrl Peng Tch-huai Ior " trending in the foots teps or the
dogmati s ts'' .
Th ose who had studied in th e Sovie t Uni on, t he i ntol -
ligentsia, FI nd those doin g the oreti cal or pollt leal work
wer e t old 10 confes s 10 bein g " dog ma tists ", whi le Iho:«:
of working-cla ss and peasant backgr ound and those doing
pra cti cal work were told to conf'css to bein g "empl rh-ists".
Th e ove r whelming maj ori ty of Party l eaders, ca dres aud
rn nk-a nd- Iilo members wor e thus accused of dczmatis m
or empi ric ism, Th e label of " ca pti ves " OJ' "helpers ' of t he
rlugrnat. is ts was atta ched 10 th u "cmpir tt.ists' in orde r 10
assuci al o them wi th th e " dogmatists ' and t hus just ify
slr iking the main bl ow at the latt er .
In Iact. ther e had never' been Hny dog matic Il l' ellipirit: -
ist group in the Communis t Par ty of Chi na. That is a
ra nk Mao ist. inv enti on, a pr et ext Ior llLl al:king tho major-
ily of tIle Party muuibership.
1) All were obliged to confess 10 the " mis ta ke" of p l' O-
mol.ing' the " ' left'-o ppor t llnist lin e of Wan g Ming' and
Po Ku during the civil war " and the " right-opport uuist
li ne of Wan g 1\Iing durin g the anti- Japanese war " ,
In fact. the re had been no s uch lines, were Iig-
menl s of ;\!a o' s imagi nati on which he used dur ing tho
"rcctifi catl on" to hit out at Wan g Ming, Po Ku, a nd tho
maj or ity of t hr. Par ty memb ersh i p.
:"i) Ev er yon e was required to CfHlfes;; tha t li p ha d nul
kn own Maoi sm (r onsirlercd t ho grnvost of all " mis ta kes" )
and lind " bli ndly bel ievcrl in I111 Ssi:1n Xl arxism. t hnl is,
L p l l i ll i SIl1 " . EH' l'ylll1l' WilS I'f'i! " il'l'd 10 J! l' o ll l i :<1' "10 I iiI'll \\'
awa.\· I he idl'O!og'jcn! \YP,i1 pon or and l ;i/{('
np Clii m·.-(' l\l nl'xisIII, l liil l is, l\1:wi."lIl",
:17
anrl .so groundless. Let 11S tuko just
<l few fa cts, with a bri ef explanation for ea ch.
. Ther? me no gro unds wlwLsoe ver for Ma o's chargo that
rovoluuonary writers and artists had no idea of "how to
serve", that is, had no answer for tho question: " to en-
compr ehensibili ty or raise the quality?" To hngin
with, he should not have confus ed the qu estion of "how
to ser ve" with the qu estion of " enhancina comprehens i-
hility or raising the quality". Because here"'a part is taken
for the whole, Certainly, the problem of "enhancing com-
prehen sibility or raising tho quality" is an important part
of the qu estion of "how to servo". But the qu estion is
hronder. Mao 's vulgar and limited approach Lo th o ques-
tion of "en hanci ng compre hens ihili ty or raisin g the qual -
ity" (popularity or refinement) shows that he ha s no
idea of the subject, As everybody can see clearly, in the
mattorarul sed by Mao th e r evolutionary writers and art-
ists stood head and shoulder s above him in both thought
and deed, They were aware that from 80 to 90 per cent
of the working people could not read, For this reason
they directed their efforts to winning th e intelligentsia
and s tuden t youth to their side in order to make them
Lhe "conductors" of revolutionary art and literature ill
th e mas ses,
Mao's char ge that revolutionary writers and artists did
not appr eciate the importance of th e united front in art
is al so cont rar y to the facts. As we know, members of
the ea rly r evolutionary literary and art soc ieties of the
twenti es, suc h as th e Creative Soci ety, Society for the
Study uf Literature, and Society of th e S un had, under
Communist Party leadership, begun their activity in the
heat of theoreti cal di scu ssions, hammering ou t, a common
viewpoint. Later, in the early thirties, by a de ci sion of the
Par-l.y, ea ch of these societ ies di ssolved itself. Left writ-
ers and a rt is ts inside and outside the Party formed th e
League of Left-Wing Writers. Subsequently, in 193(j ,
suiti ng th e new situation in th e r evolutionary movement
a1\(1 th e Party' s now policy, Communist-Ied rcvulu tionary
writers and artists joined hands with other left writers
to es ta blis h the All-China F ederation of Literary and Art
Workers , and later , in 1938, the All-China Association of
Anti -J ap anese Art and Literature Workers,
l\-fao's charge that r evolutionary writers and artists
did not understand the problem of "li ter ary and art crit-
AIV\
ici sm is also en ti rel y a t variance with the facts It .
th a t .Lhey warred l ong a nd
icully agains t th e r eactIOnary curr en ts r epr es ented b
th e Cont emporary Review group the Ne M y
t,he "natiu na l
call ed third tr end, and others. This undermined th e r e-
and destroyed th eir influence. Revo -
writers and a rtis ts al so engaged extc ns i , I .
cr rt tcism and se lf -cr it icis m in their own mid t l\ e y. III
this a . I
IS, seeing
.' s ImpO!' ant means of promoting th o r evolution-
dr y m,o\ emoJ.1 t III ar t and literature as a whole and of
tho progressive devel opmen t of each member of the'.
or galllsutlOn (though, uf COurse some of th o , ,' t ' , ' . II
wa s e1'1'( II' d I ' . err I I-I S111
) eons an t ioro were faults ill cl r.. f I.
g ll' IOe) It ' I
lUICL ° an-
o ( 0' w.as preci se y to continuous cri tic is m that tI .
J'ev
l
olutlOnary movement in art and literature
its s eal y progress.
In s hort , th e thrco accu sutf ons made by Mao are
groundl ess and unjustified.
. Mao s cI,I,a rges of " ideologica l mi stakes" and " mis-
tuk es of s tyle had heel! a(ldressed to just a few indi vid-
uals, not to all the revolutionary writer s and ar tis ts in
tho country, and if he had been motivated by th o wi sh
h?lp t o not La crea te a pret ext for hi s
J octification of s tyle campai gn , there would havo boon
no t o pay any attention to all ihls. Bu t these
accu satI.ons and in sults, P?rtraying r evolutionnry writers
and artists as peopl e l acking elementary political social
and cultural knowl edge, wer e el evated by Mao' t o th e
rank of "supr emo commands" or " be hests of Ch airman
Mao ". They required every revoluti onary writer and a;·t-
ist to u.ccupy himself month after month nnd year a fter
year WIth endless self-flagellati on , wri ting "confessions "
"repentances". Certainly, this wa s bound t o, and
did, angel' r evoluti onary writer s and ar tists and all
those wh o s till r etained th eir se nse of jus ti co' and the
ca pacit y to di stinguish between truth and untruth. III
this Mao is much like t he r eaction ary judge of
olden times wh o foll owed th is simple sc he me: on de-
ciding to conde mn a guiltless cit izen, he chose th e pun-
ishment he would met e ou t, th en inven ted th e char ges,
listing the imputed "crimes", and then wres ted " confes-
s ions" fr om t he accused by cruel tort ure,
101
3) !\fao's Theoretical Mistakes, Utilitarianism
and Praglll:ltislII
In concl us ion, it is proper Lo note th at in Ids Talks
Mao di splayed his "particular" understanding and frag-
mentary knowl ed ge of th e basi c Marxi st-Leninist prin-
ciplcs concerni ng art a nd literature. In so doing, 110 hc-
traycrl hi s utilitarian and pragmatic approach to soci a l
ph enomena .
To s u ppor t my con ten tion, let me cite Mao' s
on the hi s t orical periods and th e class essence ul a r t
and liter ature. In th e Talks, and likewise in a tho l' works ,
s uc h as On New Democracu, Mao directly or indirectl y
id entifi ed til e period s in th e hi stor y or art a nd lit erature
wi th th o periods in t he his tory of social formations.
Besides , he maintained that the art literature of . an
antagoni st ic socie ty co ul d se rvo nou e but the ruling
class, and that th ere could be no art and liter-
ature th ere se r ving the interests of the oppressed
cl asses.
Thi s pr ov es th a t he did not understand t he Iull owiug
ba si c pr op osition: though, like o t her forms of soci al
conscious n ess, art and literature canno t be isola led in
th eir hi storical development Irom th e sp ecifi c develop-
mont of societ y and from the soci al or igins, th e Iacts of
hi stor y s ho w th at peri ods in the history of art and
Iiteraturn do not co incide with those of th e develop-
meut of so ciet y. lI er e is what Marx wrote all this
score:
" It is well -known in r espect o f art that dnlinite pe -
riods of it s dev el opment hy no means corres pond 10 the
ge ne ra l dev el opment of s ociety, and , consequen tl y, to
th e devel opmen t of socie ty 's material has is whi ch, in a
wa y, cons ti tutes the s ke le ton of it s organlsation. Tnko
I ho Greeks as compared with the modern n ations 01'
a lso Shakes pea re. It is eve n ac cepted in r esp ect of
forms of a rt, e.g. th e !) P OS , that in UHlir cl assical fo l'Ill ,
whi ch is a n epoch in world hist ory, th ey coul d not he
r.[·ca tr.f! tho moment. al' t is l ir. prorluofi nn as such hog-all"
f:o!'la in signlllcnnt forms in Ihe Ii elel or ar t
i ts r-l f on ly at. a low JeYeI in tho develop-
a rt. II thi s is so within a rt in th e rula t ion between
Its different typ es, it is uot surprising at all that thi s
circ umst a nce. al so prevails in the r elati on of t
I I t I I
ar as a
\V 10 e a SOCIa · ( ev eloplll ent as a wh ol e."
In s hort, Mao's vie ws on peri ods in Ii teral.ure
are contrary both to th e hi stori cal fa cts nnd t 1"'1
Ma rx.
0 \.<11
.. Mau' s s how th at he do cs nnt IInd er-
th at III cac h national c ul t ur« t.her e a rc two natiOll-
al cultures -the art and literatul'(, of th e oppressor
and t.h.o ar t a? d literature of tho op pressed classes.
'",UIIU nxplllln ed, very dearly. In hi s a r ticle, Crit ical
1\ol es lh e 1\atio nal Qu esti on, li e wr ot e: " The ro a re
nati onal cultures in every nati onnl cul turo. 'I'her e
th o c ul tu re of th o I'urishkevl ch as,
Cruch.kovs and St l'll \' eti-- b ut l.lu-r« is al so th e Gr out -
cul turo typified in th e names of Chcrn yshevsky
and Plckhanov, There are th e same two cul tu r es in t he
Ukr ain e as ther e a re in Germany, in Franco, in Engl and,
umnng th e J ews, a nd so for th. " ':.
-
Why is th er e in ea ch nati onal culture in addi tion In
th e cul t ure of t he oppressor cl ass a cul tur e r epros entiu g
lIro oppressed classes ? Lenin answered thi s qu estion ai>
well. I 10 wrot e in the sa me articl e: "The ele ments of
doruocrati c and socia lis t cul t u r e are pr es en t, if only in
rudimentary Iorm, ill every national cul t ure , since ill
every nation ther e are toiling and exploi te d masses,
whose conditions of life inevitably givo r ise to th e ide-
ology of democracy and soc ialism."
Certai nl y, Lenin' s thes is on two c ultur es applies also
10 ar t nnd Iitor ature. Mao's vi ew th at ill a socie ty of
antagoni stic classes th ere can he only an art and liter-
ature se rving capi ta lis ts and Ianrlownors and 110 art nnrl
lit erature serving workers and pe asants, is co nt rn r y hath
10 the hist ori cal fa wts and t o Lenin' s vi ews.
Mao's " concept" only s hows that he did not, under-
s ta nd th at t herc a re two diff er ent lil o/'atnl'Ps nurl two
IlifJer ent, ar ts in n sudety of nnlngonisl ic classes, awl
that apart Irom the art aud litcr aturu serv ing th e class
of landown er s or ca pita li s ts th er e is a lso an ar t and
literature serving th e expl oit ed a nd oppre ssed clas ses.
Thi s is due not only to tho fa ct th at [rom th e rnnks of th e
V. T. Lenin, Coll ected lFor/t'S, "01. 20, p. 32.
:;.:;. lhid., p. 21.
oppressed and exploited t.ll.llr e can e!I.lCcge
wh o ca n depict i n artis tic Iurm th e life, IlSIHra tIOIls and
struggles of th o cl as ses from whi ch they come, but also
to the fact that th ere may be people of the oppressor
class who br eak with th eir cl ass a nd portray l!le hard-
shi ps and as pirations of the oppresse d wor ks
of art. Thi s ca n be illus tr ated by many m t er ostmg awl
instruct ive examples fr om th e h ist or y of diff er ent cou11-
tri os, including th at of Chi na. The whole world, knOW5
the masterpi eces of Count Leo Tol st.oy, tho of
llussi an literature, who for 40 years reflected as a nurror
tlHl peculi ar featur es of an entire hi st orical ep och
the liber ation of tho se r fs in 18li1 to the first HUSSHl[)
revoluti on of 1905) . .
Lenin wr ot e in hi s ar ti cl e, L eo Tol st oy as the AIirror
of t he Russi an R evol ution: .
"Tols toy is gr eat as the s pokesman th e JdlJas .
se n timents th at emer ged amo ng the millions of BURRJ an
peasant s at th e time bourgeoi s r eyolu li Ol: was , ap -
pr oaching i n Hn ssi a. 1ol stoy I S nr ig inal , tl:c.
total of hi s views , t ak en as a to ex pt ess
th e specific features of our J'evoluliOn,
How coul d a nobl eman like Count Tol st oy become u
writ er of the Ru ssian peasant r evo l ut ion ? Lenin an -
s we re d this quest ion , t oo, in hi s ar ticle, L. N. To lsto y lind
the Modern. Labour Movement:
" By birth and ed uca tion Tol stoy bel onged to the high-
es t landed nohi l ity in Hu ssi n-he broke with all the
cus tomary vi ews uf this envirunment. " »» .
Tha t is the Mar xi st viewpoi nt on t he nature uf a rt
and literature in a society of antagoni stic class es. Hut
now back to Mao's anti -Marxist and anti-Lenin ist vi ews
on a rt a nd literature. As we know, they led up to a final
neg-ation of cult ural l eg-acy, wheth er f or ei gn or nati on al ,
c u lmi ua ti ng duri ng the "cult u ra l r evolution " in brutal
crimes that ecli pse d in sca l e a nd dep th t he barbar ous
" buI'll i Il g" of books and burying of schola rs" hy Em[J er ur
Chi ll Sh"ih Huang.
H shoul d be not ed in r elati on to th e second of th o
above-mentioned points th at Mao refer!' 10 Lenin' s works
,:.: v,. I. Lenin, Coll r.r;t ed W orks, V9l. 15, p. ..
Illld.• Vol. W , p. 3:.31.
Itl 4
sole ly to pr omot e hi s s el fish u til it arian aims, whil e in
f act open ly advoc at ing utili t ar ian islll.
III hi s Tal k s he cite d Lenin t wi ce, The firs t time
when he in th e Con cludin g lt emarks; " W hom mus t
our' Ilrt and se rve?" Her e he qu ot es an incour -
pl cte se nte nce fr om Leni n: " II. will se rve t hc u ' 11' .
I " . ' . . . llli lOll s
t en s of mi l li ons of worki ng peopl e." The second
he. appe als to Lenin i n the t hird par t of the
R emark s when t.ackling t he que st ion of " t he
l elal lon slu!) between the work of t he Par't y ill
a r t and liter atu re an d th e wor k of the Party as .
whole". u
hi s ar ticl e, Part y Organisation and Parly Literat ure
Le,I,1111 t o, the .ohject of Party Iiteratu re: '
It will be a fr ee liter ature, because it will serve,
Il O!. som? s at ia,led h er oine, not the bor ed 'upper leu
suffenng from fa t ly degen er a tion but the rnil -
1101113 and t ens of mi ll ions of worki ng people-the
fl ower of th e country, it s strength and it s future," ,;.
describes the sei vices li t er a lure r en de r s to the
pe opl e as , se r vices "the f1 owe: uf th e cou n tr- y,
Its strength and it s fu tu r e , By s o doing, he eleva tes
th e rol e of P ar ty liter a tur e, li nking it s tas ks with t he
Part y' s t asks of gui ding th e worki ng peopl e ill th e r ev-
ol uti onary transf ormation of t heir countr y. But thi s is
merel y one se nte nce ill a passage that ex plains why
Party liter ature is a free Ii teratur e. In this sc ulc nco
Lenin refers only t o the obje ct and sizniflcance of tho
services of Par ty liter ature, In the pa ssage, Leniu
als o says : .
" It will be a fr ee li t era tur e, becau se th e id ea of soci al-
ism and sympa thy wit h the worki ng peopl e, and no t
gr eed 0 1' car eerism, will bri ng ever 1I ew for ces to it s
ranks ." ,:.,:.
1L foll ows that Party literature has it s r oot s in t he
idea of soci alism and r eflects the int er est s of th e wor k-
ing peopl e. Contin uously, i t absorbs ne w, li fe-g-iving rev-
olutionary forces, a nd t hi s not only provides i t with
unlimited resourc es for devel opment, hut also helps to
expa nd the Pa r ty' s r anks.
Holerrin g to tho mer ging of scie n ti fic soc ial ism wit h
>, I bid., Vol. 10, pp. 1, 8-10,
"'" 1Mcl. , Vol. 10, p. tiS.
the mod ern working-class movement, Lenin gives a high
rating t o the r ol e of Party literature. He wri t es :
"It will he a Iree literature, e nr ich i ng the lust word
in the r evoluti onary thought of maukind with the ex plJ-
ricnce and living work of the socia list pr ol etari at, brin g-
ing about permanent inter-action h etween the ex. perience
of th e past (sci entific so ci al is m, th e compl etion of the
development of soci alism fr om its primi tive utopian
forms) and the' experience of the present (th o pr esent
s l l'uggle of the worker com r ades) ." ::'
As we see, Lenin gives an exhaus ti ve principl ed ap-
preciation of th e chnracl.er. role a nd s ign i fIca nce of Party
literature. He wants a hi gh sense of r esponsibility to
mark the work of Party writ erR, At the same ti llw, he
instils en thus iasm and Iaith in them, whi ch, of cours e,
furth ers th e development of Par t y literature. Lenin' s
ideas are o] tr elll emlous cduca tiolla l val ue a nd a s ource
uf great inspiration for tho revolulionary III nvumell t in
Chinese art and literature, [or ev er y r evoluti oll<ll'y writ-
cr and artist.
Yet, Mao, in fa ct, throw out Lnnin' i':l appreeiation of
Party literature. H e merel y cited a few in coJllpl ete
phrases from it, and, wors e st ill, Ir om t he way he llilllll\ed
th em ev en these incompl ete phrases lost their true
meaning. H e used them t o " s uus tan ti ate" the char ge
that revolutionary literary and art workers ill Chinn did
nut understand " who art and literature must s e rvo" .
Her e, ill Ia ct, is what h e sa id in hi s Talks:
"As far hack us 1\)05 Lenin s t resse d th at our litera-
Lure and our a r t mu st, se rve 'the milliolls a nd lens of
mtlllons of working people'. Amo ng 0 11 1' cOlll mdcs en -
gaged in lito field of art nud literature on lit e territory
of an ti- J a pa n es e resistance bases this question, it would
Reem, has already been sol ve d and t h ere is nO n oed t o
raise it again. In fact, however, this is n ot RO."
Mao aecllsel! rcvolutionary writ crs and arti sls of the
foll owill g: " Many comr aucR have by no moans so l ved,
01' have n ot found a correct s,ol uti oll to, this questi on ."
He al s o sa id that thi s is " a hasi c question, a questi on
III' I'rindpl e". This h e ns cd as Ih o ch ief OXCllSC for at-
tacking revolutionary writers and ar tists . Mao sw ung
th is h eavy cu dg el at th em, a cudgel h e hart hims elf
':. v, I. Lenin, C"ll cct"d W ork s, Vol. 10, p. 4\),
manufactured , hu·t whic .
atel y O' a v T ., h, to da cel ve pe I I
.?' e .er n n s name. It is II . . up C, Ie dcli har.,
hy .ci ting th e a bove -men t ion ' . lUI e lllll H oh viow; thaI
dollheralely us ed the gre t phras es, J\lao
OWlU purely enJs. emu S nmuo Lo further hi s
n th e articl e Part O· ' .
Lenin de ll ' y 1ganisaiion. and P ·t J'
on> ca with tIlfl question a/ y ;tteratlU'c
e hand, h e s uhs l an l l"l tecl II fon two pl anes: on tIll'
II P'II'l f I" , , .ue ac t II I' '
I
:J or arty work and OIL tl I ' rut Il lJl'atllJ'e was
el LIP f ··I J . , 1e 0 I l(l r I I ' ,
f , d C I tat Part y l it er I ' .. , Ie SII JSlantiat-
He wrote: a llIC had i ts own, spec i fic
Litera ture mu L b
«r IIIp , s ecumo part of l/
. 11I' ol elllr wl ' a ClIO' an d io couu uon (; ' 111" "
"I'e 'll S ' 1 ' ., lU I( a " '
'" : ., (Jew -Dem ocr a tic ' I . . ' screw of one s i llgl '
on ti ro pol ,w III S1l1 . set in Ill ati on by Ih
lllg. cl ass. Literalure must vrnguard of the entire
g nnised, pl a n ned anrl ' I JeCOlll e a cOlllpone nt or "
work" :' c m te grut ed Soc ia l- De moc r a tic )1a:'):;
110 am pli fied:
.1 h eru is no quesl ion t hat r
s uhJec t to lIIecliaui c'li adjust ( It eralu.re is l ea st of all
of II " ,( . S mont Of ' I , ' II'
. LC maj orrty ove r th e '.. ev e lng, to til!! rule
ei the r, that ill this lil "]l.' Thero is n o question
I 11 '-' l oa ur scope '
re a owed for personal initi : " ".1 list undou ht edly
thought and fa nt asy for individun] inclination
dcniahl e ; bul ali C;J.n lc nL All thi s is
of the prolet ari an Inrt ' ) S IO\\S th at th e lit erary s ide
with it s can no t he me chauicully
Lenin dealt dial ecti call y with 1 I
t el', whi ch are organi call tied JO,1 J . as pects of th e mat-
ca n he nezlectcd Nel' l l y. , th e other. Neither
eo • Ior can ne ITIvon I
you concen tr a te oxcl us i voly r I 1:0 prccer enco. If
tho ,par t icul ar , you will ine rlegeneral an.d overl ook
Parly literature ' witll ge Jlef/;I J:a))'r
y
C
t
Hlentifyin.g
you c: onc:ent l'a te excl usi ve l y 0 1 II ,onve r sel
y,
If
look the general \ ' OU \\,11 ' 1 , 10IIPartll:,ul<\!' and oveI'-
(
' . 1 ' - I llIevlta) y ' lITl ve I .
l Cta s eparat io n of P IHt y r I ' " t " [ .' - a , lin artt-
work. Neither of these a ) <l . 101Il I?ene l'a l Party
c: nUSe of the p , 'I . I' II (;a u heue!rL th e gon oml
). . '.' 'll 'y 0.1 arty lIlerature.
" ( J th o I,hm] of I.he iSRllf>S mi sl'd ill hi s Talk s
1Il . Ie lul crconnf>(:tion bct\YcC'n Part y \Yor! ' ' 11'1 ' I ' --I
, ' al , al H
:;. Ih!d., Vul. 10, p. o1 G.
"" lind" p. 46,
1117
a wholc" - Mao again referred
literature and Party work as L in ' s word s on th e pecu -
to Len i n, th ou gh ' . o 'field or' liter ature. And
Jiar features of Party WOl. \.1 Ill
t
II For Irom Mao' s pOiI.lt uf
. . , S not aCCICen a . , . I f
thi s omissi on wa ", li ted ' IS th e least suitab e or
vi ew the methods Lenin IS e « the cont rar y th o
, I' literature wer e, on ,
the Party s wor {Ill I
L
. . 1 that "zrca ter scope must
.: bl WI ere en in salc ( . '" c ,
most s ui ta e. I " f at:Livity Mao was eagOl
undoubtedl y be tOt Leni ;l:s ideas wer e all
1.0 ins t il per sonal contJ:ol
obs tacle 10 hi s ai m of es f u e " style
I
lit -at I' U by means 0 I . I ' '1.
art anr I CIa 11 v • -cvol u t i i ary wrtters a nr .II -
ca mpalgn" and making the u
c 0 . , nal In ter es s. . f
lsts ser ve Iu s own, person : I hi nd his "t'ectiflca tlOlI 0
' f 1.1 Hlrpose i c I ..., C
Mao spoke 0 ,Ie I t Kai Fen g head of th e en-
s t yle" in art a nd liter atur e I? He said: "In
LI';11 Commi ttee' s pr opugaur a hI people , and th ose
ge ne ral , in te llect uals ar e etroublesome. They have
I' ll art and literatur e are au I are th e most ill clin ed to
, . . . )(15 'l nc a . 11
th e most and chit-chat , to a
dr eams and to \loeir must be su bJecte? to
kinds of convol utIOns. T , ke them more cOlll pl wJlt ,
' . . . orde r to 111 a . .,
se ver e recufica tJOn III • darl nu t o t hink, wI'ILe 01
J
Ir III over it (Tar n, ° I t flu
to prc vcu t tn eui 1 0 ," , 1°, nd to t each t ieru a
s peak as th e mood a
onl y wha t tho? ar? IJ)l(L I ' Mao' s t rue a Lti tude
The Iollowiug 11 ustratos 0'« day durinz the I styl e
" rks nu , 0, I hl
Leu ill and Lonin s wo I' ' 1 1 1'0 Ku to Iinr urn
. . .. . . . ign" f\. ao as (ef II l :
l'cd l flCHll oll campal . , ., I II·tera tl1 r e. He ac c ec ,
. Ir L I III on at t anc ' f ' rr
quot ati on s l orn e, I 1 , intelli gen t sia when r ecti
" ll is hard to atllltess L10 I t e want is sO]lletlu ll g
I
. ., t old that w ra W I . .
sty le. If t ley ale, if we t ell th em that J.\> says
Mao Tse-tung has d such a way this Will not
1 I
n s lIch a n " , I '
they must Je.lave I , tc not beli eve in rv aois m,
have t he dosired effec t. 'II Y th e stage What we must
. . I . st COllie OIl ( . .
because It has .on y ]U ' commodi ty wit.h all old trade-
do there fore, IS pull out:1 . id this aru] this you mu st
, I I I eUIll s at c , •
mark. For eXUl np e,' , ' This they will beheve
behave in such unfl ,:1\u y.
and will Dot dare to -Leni nis m as the th eor y and
Mao did, !lor as a guide in
method oj scten I .11 ' dl'l PI'minin'T it C011l'se uf
) e ll
1
1
15
h e In scl' tod in one
l clio n. Practlca y III a e.t.. , . . f M 'x-
his works scpa l'at e phr nses from the cl aSSICS 0 ar
ism-Le nini sm (u su ally Iound for him at hi s r equest b y
o,thel's) , it merely La gi ve grea ter weigh t and attrac.
ti venuss to Ius own word s, utiing tho name or another' for
hi s uwn demagogic cuds . .
th e ra bi? , Mao had implan ted
cll u lllg the s tyle rectificatIOn campaig n, Ids call to use
the method and exper ie nce of Soviet art and liLfH' atlu'H
clearly prompted hy purel y lltililar ian cons ido -a-
t ions .
The s ame may be said of Mao's occasi on al " de nuncla-
tio ns" of Trotsky during the "recti fi ca tio n ca mpalg n' '
whe n he was op en ly subs t i tuti ng "Maoism" for
and expounding nn ant i-Le ninist and anti-soc ialist "new
democracy" . l l ere, too, his motives boiled down to
th e usu al tri ck whi ch, like th at of a thi ef s hout ing
" hold, thi ef'! ", wa s meant to divert attention fro m
himself.
The facts of histor y show t ha t Mao has always been
a utiIiLarianist . Personal gai u was the point of departuro
in everything he did. 11e used Marxism- Len ini s m exc lu-
s ively to di sgui se hi s true a ims . Tru e, be for e th e "style
re ctification" campaign, before he moun te d his ope n of-
fensive on Ma rxi sm-Leninism , he went out of hi s wa y to
conceal his aims. It was n ot until t he "rectificati on" earn-
paign, when he came ou t into the open against Marxi sm-
Leninism, t hat his ut.ilil ari an ism he carno in creas ingly
apparent.
It was no accident t hat in t he Concluding Remarks of
hi s Talk s Mao advocate d utili t ariani sm. He said, " no per-
son on earth s tands above utilitarianism" , He said, "we
are proletartan, r evolutionary utilitnri anis ts," and mad e
just on e r eser vati on, " we arc utili tari nnist s who ar e COII-
corned not with per so nal gain, but with the publi c inter-
ests ". Evidently, he thought t hat t his hon eyed phrase
would ad or n hi s views and t hat he wo uld be r eceived as
a new "r evol ut ionary" , utilitarianist. But peopl e have
long si nc e lea rned t o j udge a man not by hi s words but
by hi s de eds. More, peopl e to probe to
th e ideological and SOCIal ?ngms . of Ideas a?tl o.II S.
When Mao publicl y proclauned lumself a utlht a.nanl s.t,
many Communists wei ghi ng hi s words and actIO.ns 1I1
th e "rectification campaig n" turned for an explan a tIOn to
th o old eig ltt cflnLh-cen t ury ut ilital'iani sm of J er emy Be n-
tham, the subj ective idealist ethical doctri ne, or to tho
new llt ilit nriani sm that re Oectr,d \.he needs of t.l1l'
hourgeoisi e- th e subjecti ve ideali st. philosoph ical school
created in the eighteen-s eve nties by Cha rles Sa nders
Pi erce a!IC1 devel oped ill th e early t.wuul. ict h cent ur y b y
William James uud J ohn Dewey und er the name of
pra gmat ism. Many Communi sts compnre rl Mao' s word s
and deeds wit.h tho pr incipl r, s of th o old and th o new
utilitariani sm , arriving at. th e cOllclm;iou that Mao 's util -
i tari anism, which had nssimilated the pri uci pies of the
old utilitarianism, was a new American-type utilitarian-
ism or pragmali sm,
And the cl ear est evidence of this wa s that, cont rary t o
th e int er est s of t he Communi st Party of China , the Chi-
nese r evolutioll, and tho wOl'lll conun unis! movement, Muo
hall l alln ched a "campaig n Ior th e recti I' lcation of sLyle"
to fllrl.her hi s own, extr eme individuali st inter es ls , There
could be no clearer manifestation of tho princi ple hoi h
th e ol d and new utilitarianism (pragmatism) , accordlllg to
whi ch narrowl y egoistic and
ar e tho main motives hehind all mor al aets - th,o lIldl
Vll
,I,-
nat's truth is th at whi ch sat isfws his pel'sollal 1I1tlll'IlS!,S, '
Mao' s falsilkat.ion of th o hist or y of t.h e CPC and the Chi -
nose I'evolution, of tho histor y of th e 1ll011ern revol utio n-
ary 1ll 0\'OIllellt iu Chinese ar t an d the
IeI' and role of Lenini sm, an d of the lu stor y of the Comin-
t CI'Jl and the Soviet Union, is a s peeific man ifest.ati on of
prn grnali slll wh ich spurns t he, tr ut h and
el's as th e truth only thaI. wIuch IS In the personal Inter -
csts of t he ind ividual. In t he course of t lte " r octiflcati on
campaiern" !\lao sought t o huild a cuIt, of his pe rso
llal
iI.y,
extoll ed Lho bour geois democr acy of the Unite d States
and revilell th e di ct at orship of the pr olet ari at in the
Soviet Union, pr edi ct ed "c er ta in vict or y" for fasci st Ger-
man y and "cer tain def eat " for the soc h l is t lall ll, til e
Sovi et Union, All th is. loo, wa s a concr ete manil' cstation
of va rious pr agmat ic conce pts in sociolog y- frolll tll c Cll ! t
of " gl:eat per son ali ti es" (Ja mes ) ancl the apologia of
bour geois democracy (Dewey) to ou t right su pport of ra(:-
ist and fascist ideas. I n th e course of th e "recti flca tio ll
ealll paign", Mao seas oned his extreme individualis t. ideas
wit h an ti- Ma l'xi st, an t i-Lenini st aIII I an ti -Sov iet PI'O-
IlouncemenLs, This was a di sti nct m a ni festati o n or tll P lIeo-
pra gmatic approach , whi dl appear ed on tho in t.h e
gar b of " exper imental natul'Ulism" and whi ch blends sub-
j e:-.tivl' idonli srn with . T t-M , .'
(Sldll eyI-l ook) , nnl.i nrxism and ant.i -comml1 nism
I 'I'
, .JI co th e old vari crv I I '
LI SIII " . ' Ie nl' \\' ut Iitar ,
, . . ' ,I S II idea l ist s J I an arusru, or pragma,
Jlldl vJ(llI ali slll . Hoth Ihe old that r eposes Oil ext reme
compatihl» with M' , .' :lflr t ie new variet ins arc no'
WIt.11 wate r, It is IST)ll ll,nrJ com mu n is m than fire
lilli' Ih " " ' . y orri cal II f
l'ec:l.Jf, enl;oll .uore .(we, that dur -
" per secu ted I\Jal'X " "', ,n? r ovil or! Mill' S ism-
and • .p'ubli cly advo-
" , octl cau on campaign" was se a utdltal'ianist. The
c ul tur al r evoluti on" ,a dress r ehearsa l Io tl
', ' I pre cisely b l' ie
campalgll a nd up 10 thi s da eca uso over si nco that
!IOll lWOIlJellt. S nlld ':, all of Mao's renct.ionary pr;l-
is rn. ' , I e snl lll'nt. ml wit h 1 t' I' , .
. . I I I ,al'lall-
One ma y Iezit hna tol "1
tl'?dicted t he 11ctS 'of ' which eOI1-
rnistukos, wer e not t l Y.I ' ahoundod 111 th eor eti cal
" . , lOre anI t he b' ' ,
lllg cl'lticism at t he " nrt J t s u j ec tod to unni lu lnt-
all, tile " for um" was [l
j
I1( 1 luru m" ? Afl(:/,
' I ' . ,.. nr er 1I 0t 0 1 I b ·l '
a nr IU'!. IS!,S rosid iu
cr
ill Y ) h 1 Y Y th e wri ters
I
itt ' 1 '" ' cnan ut nls 1 t » ,.
nu lW ende rs, hy responsil 1. ' p, " , so ly Central COIl1-
rcsc nta t ives of L workers, aIHI hy 1' (1)-
. " 'L . ' " Ive mil itn ry and I '
InHLI ULJOII S, an d muss () I'g'l ' 't ' ' " aru () ( ucatlon al
, ' " , _' IIl sa lOllS,
, I' o begin wi th, at tho verv 0 ' , . "
t iflcatiou CHII IIJai
l1
11" I ' I) ut Sl:t of t ho . style rec-
)
I
' < '" n .. I lal ('sl'l blls ) I " . .
J(' IHvlollr", nnnlPly ' s(Je'l l- I " le( a pl'mclpl e of
CI
' , " '" , OilY "ood " I I I
, 11I 1J'11l Hn M'w '\Ilfl ) I I ' 0 . " H nevel' Jar! of
. ' . , ' Oil Y lal and 1 ' l '
s lIhJcete d 10 "style l'el'l iik rt L' o S goor o [ those
por! al1t., he rcl ied IIot ' :m and morc illl-
weapons as "cl'i\.i eisll1 " Du t . u ' yaupon hut 011
could affOl'r! 10 heh ave I e J?IIllS
l
ma gIC shield" Mao
wit. h facl.s, t ho
Jug comple lcly ,'edundHIII His
o
Jo;'t3 !e nSOl1l ng bl1 colll-
he as ' W ex'[ , ' Ulf Ot 10. S may, th e.!'ef(H' e,
I I
. " . Icme 0 self-glor ' fj I' JI'
ll1. lltV101I 1' I'l'sem bles t hat of 1,11 11 ':' I ea LOn. IS
gltsllJllun townl'lls Ilis Chines I "S,',ISI? s IJongk ollg" En-
W I'O _, . e s a\ e, ,l nCe I say V ( "
. ng, yo u lIlu :st be W f OJl r,. " I L" , .. , ' J lU ale
IOUI' and louic of ever d "'. I.S, USSLIILlidly, th e IJl!h av-
j ects, So is not h1n ' ?1. I. ymnt townI'ds his suh-
Jll eall S, lt Jlll r t. '[ !'O1ll sur:hgl ' Irpr.lslllg about. it. \Vh at othe r
1\1 I
' . W IIlVl our and s ue ll "1 ." I'
ao wve 10 conduc t th e '" . . , ogle , ( lei
of s tyl e"? " campaIgn for th e rccli fi ea tion
Tn any analysis of the conten t of Mao ' s Talks , as also
in th e cas e of iuany of Mao ' s other works, it might be apt
to say: "T hey seem to sound ri ght, but they aren't".
"They seem lo sound right" is the impression of people
who do not understand wh at Mao is talking abou t, and
" but they aren't" is the judgement of those who do un-
derstand. Mao belongs to th e same breed as Proudhon, of
whom Marx sa id in The Poverty of Philosophy that he
looks like a speciali st only to those who do not under-
sta nd the t opic.
Only for those who have but a faint idea of Marxi st-
Leninist policy 1'1'Iao looks like a " poli t ical expert". And
for th ose who do not unllersland art and literature from
th e Marxist-L oninis t sta ndpoint, he may look like an
"ex per t on art and literature" , . . ' .
The a bove is doubly t r ue of his philosophical VIews.
Each of Mao' s "four philosophical works" , thrown
gether with ot her peopl e's h?lp and, w.ith to
ri sm (Un Practice and On COll tradu;llOll , will e.h cd
in the early fifti es, ':. a nd On the Correct Hatuillng of Con,-
tradictions Among the People, 1957, and Where Do C?,-
rect Ideas Come From? whi ch appeared in the early S!X-
Lies), con ta in ser ious anti-male rial,ist , subjectivo
idealist and voluntarist mi st akes 1II qu estions of the?ry,
and an Li-d ia le ctical and so phis tical mi stakes in questlOn s
of method. Hi s approach and hi s cho ice of exampl es are
strongl y tainted with exLrem? .and prag-
matism , and arc con trar y to h lsl orl cal materialism;,
" philosophic al works" e na ble hi m to pa rade as a. philos-
opher" bef or e people who are not convers ant WIth ques-
ti ons of Marxist-Len in ist philosophy. Ru t for convers an t
people h e is nothi ng but a half-l earned dabbler. , Hi s
Lectures on Dialectical Materialism, whi eh wore publ.ished
in t he late thirti es conta i n so many mis ta kes and so many
puerile that anyo ne convers ant with
MaI'xi st-Lenini st philosophy may, as th e sayi ng goes, " 1050
hi s teeth from laughing" when r ead in g t his opus . In Iact.,
Mao Tse-tung bel ongs t o th o s ame breed as Diihring,
wh om Engel s descr ibed as a man who likes saying and
writing thi ngs he does not uLHl erstand.
» Man Tao-tung in cluded th ese two arti cl es in the first volume
of his Sel ect ed lI' or1.'s, cl ai ming th at th ey wer e writt en in
1937.
Mao's talks se t the st age f , tl " , ,
among revolutionary ,' t , 01 ie of st yle"
Iying the hi story of artis ts and for fal si -
(Jus part in the "st 1 ' . '. played a conspicu,
help of his Talks M:o campa ign. With the
s trong blow to revolutionar? e IV?r an .u nprecedented -
ordor to twi st their ide I .y r
t
Iiterary workers
uonal .pri nclpl ss to breal
o
tl
glCa
, politi cal and organisa-
and to provoke 'the mas <r
m
morall y nnrl physi call y,
diers into joining !)"ttl e' s o. workers, pea sants and sol-
• u , , azamst r evoluti ,
artists Fo 1\1 l b . ronnry writci-s and
, . r. ao t ie purpose of the Talk s was
leach two hi ghly important ai ms 0 tl t o tr y a nd
sought to discredit r evolution ·Cl !l . ie l?n e hand, he
art d t . . ary lIn eSe iterntura and
s uccess of th e r evoluti on ary
a IH 1 cr a t uro th at hogan in th o twont.i os
and developed so hrillianLlyin the t hir ties Tt wa s \'
to, the fa ct t ha t
? eep I'O?t, flowered, a nd was yield ing r ich
Iruit, m soil, It wa s also an attempt t o deny
that th o r eVOllll l?nary movemen t i II Chinese art unci l it er-
aturo wa s conceived under th o immedi ate ideol ogi cal in -
of tho Revolution and th e pr ogressive
Hus sian and revolutionary Soviet art and Ii teraturo and
that it was th e r esult of th e rapid s pread of
Leninism among the foremost Chinese intell ectual s follow-
ing the May Fourth Movement ( t 9J0) , and that it s success-
ful growth was due sol el y to the gui dance and all-r ound
assi stance of the Communist Party of China over a lon z
period of time. b
On the other hand, Mao wanLed to show that hi s Talks
wore nshering in a "correct line in the Chinese r ovolu-
ti onnry movement in art, and literature" . He wanted t o
parade as the "Ioundor" of Chinese r evolutionary art and
literature. All thi s was to have justified his demand that
rovolutionary wr it ers and artists shoul d tu rn their ha cks
OIL the literary and arti sti c id ea s of " Russian Marxism"
and " re-or ient" their minds on the literary a nd ar t. is l.i«
ideas of " Chinese Marxism", that is, " Mao ism" .
He thought that he would thereby s ucceed in forcing
revolutionary writers and artists to declare themselves
followers of " Mao's literary and arti sti c thoughts" and
hcncelorth to extol Mao in th eir works as tho solo cre a tor
of the correct line in th e revolutionary mo vement in Chi -
nese art and lit er ature, and al so ex tol him to th o s kies lor
cvc ryt.hiug dlllt hu ascri /)ed to irimsclf Iu ti' e falsiiied his-
lory of th e CPC and Chinese revolution he had hl msol!
produced in the course of t he " style r ectifi cation cam-
pai gn" . In ol1HW wo rds, h e tried t o convert the Chinese
revoluti on ar y wr iters i nto court scribes s ingin g t he
pr ai ses of " Maoism" and Mao' s person , into trumpete rs
a nd drummers who wo uld create a c ult of his per son al it y.
In hi s Talks, Ma o descri bed h imself as a "prof'essiuun l
revol utionary politician wh o has assimilated r ovolutiouarv
poli t ica l science or, i n other words, mastered L1H! art 1;1'
r evol utionary poli ti cs". All others he descri bed as ,;pol i-
ticin ns wit h all ar istocratic t wis t " sche mi ng ill th e sccl u-
sion of t heir st udie s, thi nki ng t he mselves vnry clover, a nd
cont inuously arlvorti siug' t he ir OWIl sel ves : "we are t he
best or t he best, so do not confuse us with an yhody olse".
"This, in fad ," he even sai d, " is t he fu ndur uentul dif-
Ier euce het ween a pr oletaria n a nd I he curr upt hourguui«
politi cian". He seems to ha ve thought in earnes t that it
was enough to praise himself and rl cf'arne others for t hl'
Chin ese revol lltionary writers and arti sts, s pell hound hy
hi s Talks, at once to hocoure his prusel ytes a ud obudieut
tools. Thi s is wh y he said ill hi s Concl utluu; R emu rks :
" I run su re t hat comra des will lind th e resolve 10 foll" w
thi s di rect.iou . .1 alii s ure that ill th e process of I'eelifyi ng
s ty le a nd ill th eir s ubse q ue n t IOlIg s t udi os a nd WOI''', cOIIl-
rades wi ll doubtl ess SUl:ceed in a l ter l ug t heir OWIl illJagr
and t hnt uf their wor ks."
(j ilt his ex pec ta tions wore dashed. Hi s Tol k s s howed
clea rly t hat he had not "ass imi la ted rovolut inua ry politi -
ca l sc ienc e", t hat he had nut "mustered thf' a rt of rcvo
l ut iuunry puliti cs" , that he was nll " prolotrui uu politi cal
leader", a wl th at, on th e cont ra ry, he was " a corru pt
politi ci an " with a u " aris toc ratic twi st" . His '1'111Irs pro-
yoke d cont.empl nnd loathing amon g th e co u nt ry' s revo-
lut ionary and a r t WOI'ke l ' s . T hey ahonIlded i ll
illcUllgruities, contrad ictiolls and t hco ,'e't ica l I11i sta kes
an d hnv e l:l'eated au unh l'idgeabl c gu lf betweell'
Mao and t he r evolutiolllll'Y wl'itel's an d ar t is ts of the
cn ti l'e toUIltl'y, jlrecipitating a IOll g nnd hard s l l'lJ gftl e
hl'twl'ell Ihpse \\'!'it el'S aIHl al ' li st s, wh om he
and Mao Tse-tuug, wh om they r es is t.
114
1) Bri efly about M IlO Tse-tung' s Poetry
:-\I' ter . tl le " styl e ruc ti licul ion ca mpaign" had oudcd dur-
".' g, his lIo.gotiations with the United Sta le s nnd c'hi anu'
III .. ill Sc pteruhur ]\lao
hi s Invuu r it e t SI '" poem, entitled
in Hsinluuii ihpuo. ll e hoped his poem would he
al:el al!!1Cd a nws\cl' pie cc . He ex pected the lnurol wrcnt II
0.1 a great He a lso hoped to hei gh ten Ids I1I'(' s-
Il ge among writers, which would "pip Ilim impose " is
control oy er th e r evolution ary movement in art, a nd li ter-
nt ur o and, convi nc e r evoluti onary writ ers a nd ar tis ts ill
t!l e need. 101' ex toll ing hi s " great ness" and his "ser vices" ,
':.ut ,aga l ll tho r es II It s coufoumled Mao ' s nxpcct nt.iou s .
Outs id« t hose organs of the pr ess whi ch were , in [tu .I. ,
hy him and co ul d ut ter 110 word of
rriticisrn , . th e poem had a cr itical r ecepti on a nd
descr ibed as s teeped in the felldal uu d mounrr .h ist
Many revolut ionary wri ters and ar t is ts insid e and
oulsi d« the Part y held th nt th e poelll wus sa t nrnt od with
folltla l unrl mounrchis t irlen ls and s hould HOt have curne
tho pen of a Communist. Thoy hold t ha t, Iar fl'Olli
bolng a wor k of socialist rea li s m, it could 1101, even he
(' ollsi dol'('(! a \\'OI'k of cr i t.icnl rcn lisru. Th e publ icntiou of
Ih e poem only widened lh l' gul f botweon l\[:lll a nd th e
r evnlu t.i o nary write rs a nd al'li st.s o r rho wh ol e ('O II/ i1J',' .
I n 1% 7 Mao publi sh ed 18 or his P OCIII S ill Ilill
[o ur na l Shih kau ( Poetry) , a nd on tI J unu rn- y
01' 10 POOIll S in l enminjihpno and t he journul ll n ugclii.
Jr \\'C' add a ll th e other of his publis he d IH.H' Ill S, \\'0 will
gil t a tota l or ::\7, out. 01' whicl: '12 worn null 25
were l si. Every limn he had his poems publi shed he «nlv
widened and deepen ed the gul f hotwccu him self nnd th'e'
ruvol utlonn rv writ ers a nd a rl isl.s. Thi s wa s nul urn l and
i uc \' ita blc, I; p. eullse IIwn y of hi s POCJJ1fi and t si \\'PI' C
pl y wre tc hl' d in eonleut. SOllie were stpcped in feudal and
nlon al' ch ist ideolo gy as " Si nyua ue hlln" (Sn ow), a l si , th e
POOI1l "' The Pnnpl l" s Li lH'l'at.ion Al'luy I l as Ca pl. nl'e d Na n-
king" , li nd " Pohtailro" (Lal/ R/II OS /III) , a Othnl'Spreaclwd
.. Tsi (lil el'lllly te,rl) - a :- peciflc form of where
th e poet pt'danlicnl ly Ih t· Ill rll SlIl' (' a nti l'ltyUlP. of one of
Ilw nn cil'lIL songs, mainly dating 10 tllP. Snng uynllsl y (960-1276) ,
the LUIllJS of nearly all of whi ch are lon g fOl'gollen,
mysti ci sm and super stiti on, as the poems " Seein g Out
th e God of Epidemi cs" , " Dedica tio n to a Phot ograph of
Comrade Li Ch in", " The Ca ve of Cele stial Bciugs in
Lu sh an g" , dep icting the a scensi on t o par adise of souls of
th e dead, "A Butterfl y Lea ves Not th e Fl ower" (A Gifl
to Li Shu-tv , and other s, And in the poem " Repl y 10 a
Fri end" , which re lates how the souls of Emper or Shun's
concubines descend t o earth, cle ments of the fe udal and
mon arch ist ideol ogy bl end with mysti ci sm and supers ti-
tion. Some tried to interpret Mao' s ver se as a work of
revoluti on ary romanti ci sm. But it is obvious th at none of
it can be r ef erred to as belonging to r evoluti onar y, wheth-
er active or " harmless", romanticism, On th e contr ar y,
l\[ao' s poetry clearly bel on gs to, pa ssive Hn.d
harmful roma nticism. Some of It IS anti-Soviet and ant i-
communist, such as Mangtsianghung, a tsi (January
the poems " Aft er Seeing th e Film 'Sun Wu-kung Thri ce
Kill s the W erewolf White Bon es' " (Novembet' . 1961)"
"Winter Clouds " (Dec ember 19(2) , and others . Some at
th e verso betra ys it s author' s ignorance of
exam ple hi s ve rsion of the le gend of l.n ,yUl-
tsno' (A gainst th e Fir st March ) , a tsi, and I!IS"
ranee of natural sc ience, as for example th e isi , NI3Jl -
nu tsn o" (Ku nlun), Some of the poe ms ar e ai me d at. but-
tr essing th e cult. of Mao' s personality and winn!n!J', th ?
yo uth for hi s nef ari ous sc hemes , s uch as th o tst , Shui-
t iaok ot ou. (Swimming) . Artisti call y Mao's poetry if'
cl umsy, a wkwar d, shall ow, s ti ff, di vor ced fr om r eality,
and la cking beauty.
Out of t ho 37 poems and ls i produced hy Ma o in 1,0
years (Hl20 to HIGO) not a singl e on e is dedica ted to
Ma rx ism-L eninism, t he Communi st Party, or th e working
class, and not a single one dep icts th e lire of workers,
pea sants and so ldie rs or th e lif e and s truggle of th e revolu -
ti onary intelligentsia and s tude nts . There is not a single
one, of cour se, in praise of th e socialis t communit y, th e
world communist movem ent, th c anti-imperiali st or nn-
tional liberation movement, or th e peace movement. Nor
is th er e a si ngle one dedi ca ted t o the memo ry of the
t housan ds upon thousands of fall en revol utio nar ies or
na tio na l heroes i nside and outside the Party. Even th e
poem "The Long March" does not hl'in g out the politi cal ,
milit ary or his torical signiflca uco of th e march , and do es
not ment.ion the ba si c fact th at the Chinese Hed Army,
fOll ght. 50 heroicall y and overcame countl ess hard-
th e march , WaS an a nuy of work ers nnrl
:\Ild .Ied . by th e Communis t Pa rty armed wit h Marx-
,Ide as . If e . t he Lung March as litt:J c
than ,til entcrt nlning lu ke acro ss mount ain s and
nVOt' S. ( ,
.:1. is t yp,C .of poet ry t hat Mao, Inki ng advan la ge of
Ill S power III 1 at t y a nd ' Ia lo, ord ers Lo he pllbli sher! in
h s of tho usands, III illions, even tuns 0 f million s of
l:°PlOS nul only in Chi nese and the languages of th e
uon-Han but abo t ranslat ed i n to Iore ign Jan -
gilages, USlllg diplom ati c, commerc ia l and cult ural chan-
Ior ,r1! ssP,Jll!n ali on . He has oven put 0 111, a photo-
0(111101 1 of th e manuscri pts of hi s poems awl
1St . No words can describe thi s ot her th an as s hameless
and mad.
In hi s Talks at the .1 rt and L it erature Forum in Yena u
he demanded of revol utionary a rtists a nrl wri ter'S thnt th o
conten t of thei r works sho uld re flect th e life of worker s
pea san ts a nd soldiers, and that th eir la nguage should
comprehens ible to the workin g masses. But hi s own poems
and l si ar e, both in cont ent and for m, th e ver y op posito
to wh at he demanded of others . In fa ct., th ey may be de -
scr i bed as abst ru se. lIe turns afton to mythulogy (111< 1 to
various lon g-si nce-f or gotten " ins tr uctive t al es or para-
hlos ". As a r esult his poems aIHI lsi arc in comprehensi ble
not only to worker s, peasants and soldiers, but even 10
in lellectuals and students . In fa ct, Ite has had t o ask
poets 10 writ e st iff, wordy, and Iar-I etch cd commen tar ies
to hi s poet ry. Yet, du e t o hi s mi suse of prover bs and old
parabl os, and also t o phraseol ogi cal incongrui ties, some
of hi s pooms and lsi arc incompre hen sible not onl y to
poets or to aut hors of literature textbooks Ior se nior
for ms, hut often also t o hi mself. At leas t, he find s it dif-
licul t t o expl ain t h em. T hi s is why in the eyes of ru vol u-
tionar y writ ers and artis ts Mao is a swindle r wh ose pro-
nouuccrnents are a t. variance wi th hi s i ntenti ons, whose
words a re in conflict wi th his deeds, who r eli sh es dofnm-
i ll " othe rs, but is in capable of being cr itical of hi msel f.
In'" shor t, th e failure of " Mao' s th ou gh t s and l ine in a r t
and Iiterntnre" is no t accide n tal . As i t says in I Ching,
th o a ncient Book of Cha nges, " fro m t hin r ime Lo t hick
ice th er e is a dist an ce of mor e th an one day, and th e
or igin of t his is in in exor abl e gradual ness" .
5) The Outcome is Total Failure
By hi s pr on ou ncom onts a nd a ctions dur ing th e no torio us
" cultu ral rovolut ion", i n suhs la ucu a counte r-revolution-
1\I'Y coup, Mao ad mitted the total fa ilur e of hi s liter ary
a lid ar tisl.i c " thoughts" and li ne, He was compelled 10 ad-
mil., on t h o one hand , t ha t h is many " i ns t r uct ions " per-
tainill g 10 a rt a nd l it erature published i n th e forties,
lifti ns alld s ix f.ies had not reall y been obeyed by uny
ruvuluti oua ry writer 01' artist ::. ( uxcluding hi s wif e, Chiang
Chi ng ) , On th o ot her hand , he consigned to th o f1 alll es all
IIIIl \\' ol' ks of [he r evoluti onar y writers of the pl'ec:mling
50 yea r s a nd brutall y pers ecuted the wr it er s t h umsolvos -»-
llIa ny of whom wer e physicall y eliminated, wh il e some,
in des perat ion, committod s u icide, T he r est. are oit hor i ll
pri snn , wh ere t hey are m orall y and physi ca lly tor tured ,
(11' in Ma y Se venth Schoo l', whi ch nrc ill rae\. forced
labuur l'a;n ps i n whi ch people ar c " re- ed uc a te d through
lab our" and cout i uuo us l y t ormented . Man y hn ve alread y
Iourul t he ir dll ath in thes e "schools". China ' s re vol ut ion-
arv arti sts aiul writ ers ,11'0 ill sor r y slrn its, nud th e r evo-
Illtionar y movem ent ill art a nd U'terature is in a s ha m-
bl es .
Dus pitu t he iguorni nious fail ll l'e of Muo' s " li tera ry anti
nrt.ist ic t hough ts and line" , Ill) s ti l l orders th e Chiu cso
UO\\ ' Sj l1lpOrS 10 r epri nt hi s Tal ks at the Jl rt and Lit erature
Forum i ll Yenu n eac h yea r Oil Ma y ami rai se a cla m-
oru us propa ganda uproar. I t is hard [ 0 luul suit able words
to desc ri be th is l olal la ck or s luun o and sc ru ple s . As I
reca ll , tho lil nrar v community in Yona n compos ed the
Inllowi ng dilly sao II a fter tho publ ica tion of Mao' s Talks.
His fal' e is thicker than 11 bri ck ill thu (j ruaL Wall ,
And his heart blacker than a chunk of coal,
S u bseq ue n t ev ent s s ho we d IhaL th ose worrls wore s ui t-
able a lid COl'J' Oc t.
a. rns THIIII) PEJUO»-
" EMERGE;\,CY SALVATION"
.l lIi n ( jlll l'iot! , of "s tyle I'ed i fica t ioll r a mpnig n",
[he penod of .eJll er geli cy s a h·a (.j o n". hegan in
J ul j 194,-) a nd la s l nd lInt Ji t he S UIll IIW I' o r
,. lI 11 fl g clt i No, !J, 11)07.

1) Fabricating the pretext for
"Emergency sa lvat ion"
MHO wns awa re tha t despi te 18 months of "style r ccl ifica -
t ion", t he curlres conti nued 10 rr-sis ]. all h is words awl nc-
tio ns whi ch Iloutod truth fi nd tho Incts. He fp, ll. l1wl
if Illi s we nt Oil he wo ulrl Il O\. bo a hlIJ 10 a l \. a i n t.ho fir st
of the desired aims or th e " s ty le rcc l.i fi cnf.iou" ca illpaign.':'"
I I) crua l o Maoi sm n nd wl'j\.e I.!IC hi st.or y or t!I O CPC a s
hi spel'sonal hi story. And if 11 0 did n u ui n the firs]
a im, (.ller p would hc no hop e at a ll of a ll a ini llg' th o sec-
oud ·- 10 "su hs t.itu t u" Maoism 1'01' Le nin is m, USUI' P su pr eru o
powe r in t he Part y, cr ea t e a c ul t of M HO' S personali ty,
and es ta bl is h his per sonal mi litary dict atorshi p ill th e
Party. Yet he held that since t he Comintern had
di ssol ved lh er« was not.hi ng to h inder h is a ctio ns: t he
ti mo was favo ura ble 1' 01' he had " Iroorlom of act ion " a nd
a cOlll plel l' Jy " f ree l uu rd " . So he decided 10 resort 10 sl.i l l
ni oru r euct.louary n nrl viol ent a nt.i- Pm-ty I CI'l'ori Sll\ - -a
ca m pa ig n of "emer gency sal va t ion" 10 fur th er hi s own
ox trcmo ego is t ic, national ist a im s .
To laun ch th e reactionary ca ui pal g u or "el llll r-
s a lva t ion", Mao I'I/'s[, Iuhri cated a (.I J' flt. ext , acco rd in g
[ 0 wh icl: Ih e uecd Ior l.ho cnmpuig u wa s impos ed by both
t he " ohj ec t ive s i l.ual inn " and the "su hj ect.ive si t ua-
ti (J 11 " .
Tu o "object.ivo sit ual. iun", he cla imed, WH S that Chia ng
Kn i-sh ok ha d decided 10 mount an offensive o n Ye na n.
Mnrf.ial law wa s enforced i n Yonan nnrl t he nut.ire Slrcusi-
Kun su-Niughsi a Border Area. An ntmosphcru of extr eme
military dan ger wa s artificially cre ated.
In Fact, however, neither th e i nl ornnt.iunal s il.unl.lou
nor the internal condit ions of that Limo pOl'lllilt.ed Chia llg
1\ai-81IOk oven La think of an a ssault Oil Y CIl 'l1l.
Th e i nterual .iunal si tu a ti on was g l' ORtt y ill nuoucurl h.\'
th e hist oric; victory of th e Soviet Ar my at Stalingmd, fol-
lowin g' wh ich IJiil cr' s tr oops su ffere d ouo del'ea [. uIt or
, II 10th CI'. Ther efor e, Ch ia ng Ka i-shek was bo und I(l ba vo
heon ap preh ensive of making any undi sguis ed Hnt. i-clllll-
IHIlBi st 1l\ ove, Besides , f oll owing t l H! o utbrea k of tl lH Jap-
a ncsl:-Alll erican war in the Pacifi c, t. he Un ite d St. a t os
hnd a st.ake in I\.J\IT-CPC cooperat ion in the a u[i -Japan ese
wal' Iheat r e in China, And t o th e opi nion of the United
Stales Ch iang al ways l ent a r espectful cal',
I ,H I
The internal condi tions of that t ime wer e mainl y
r hnract criscd by the cont i nuing Japanese occupation of
exte ns ive areas i n Nor theast , North, Cen tral and So uth
China, and, as be for e, Chiang was not able to fight a n
anti -J ap anese and an anti-communist war simult ane ous ly,
The stridently predi cted "third a n ti-c ommunis t wave"
and " Chia ng's imminent offensive on Yenan" were, i ll
fact , nothi ng but ano the r of Mao' s frauds, invented to
justify t he "emergency salvat ion" ca mpaign.
Using th e atmosphere of tension he had himself ar t i-
ficially crea te d, Mao announced that all l eader s and most
ca dres and r ank-and-file members of the Party-with the
exception of Liu Sh ao-chi and a few othe rs - were "S11S-
pectcd of count er-re vol u ti on", He speciall y declared that
l eaders, cadres and rank-and-lile member s wh o had at any
ti me in the past worked in Ku omintang-controlled ar eas
wer e pseudo-Communists smuggl ed in by th e Kuomi ntnng
to carry out the " policy of r ed banner s" , ':. This, h e said,
applied especi all y t o t he pr esent mernb ers of P arty or gan-
isati ons of all level s in T< 11 0mintan g-controll ed ar ea s.
They were all denounced as "organisations of the Kuo-
rnintang red banners policy" , In r eality thi s was mali-
cio us slander which Mao needed purel y as a pr etext. Ior
launchi ng hi s "emergency salvat ion" campaign.
2) "Emergency salvati on" in name and
repression of leaders, cadres and Party
members in fact
On Ma o' s orde rs Kang Shen g, chairman of the Central
C0r,nmissioll for the Hectifica tion of Style, publishe d an
article, " On the Em ergency Salvation of Those Who
Slipped Up" , in .th e 1 Ju-Iy1!)4;) issue of Chi ehlang it hpo» ,
This wa s tho Signal for t he campa ign to begin. Kanz
Sheng sai d that its purpose was t o " save" all those wh ;
" 1 ' I' d .. 1 '
ravi ng s ip po up , lad bocomo "national traitors"
: ',enc my " counter-revolutionari es", a nd the lil{():
I'hcreu pon, mass meetings" were called in all the sub-
di visions .conducti ng th e " styl e r ectification campa ign"
where, to l\'1a?'S ins truct ions , officials deliverell
reports III whi ch. pl eading tho exigencies of th e " obj ecti ve
.. In othe r words "to carry 11 red banner '
the rod banner ". ' In ardor to fight
120
situation" an d " s ubjective s it uat ion", t hey " subst ant iat ed
th e need" for an immediate campaign of "eme rge ncy sa l-
va tio n" . It was announced in all s ubdivis ions th at. the
second period of "style rectificat ion" wa s ove r and t ho
third period, "emergency salvation" , had begun.
In fact , th in gs wer e th e ot her way round. The pur-
poso of "emer gency sal vat ion" was not t o save th ose who
had "sli ppe d up" , but t o slandero usly accuse th e maj ority
of lead er s and cadres and many rank-and-file Party mom-
])()I ' S , and the r ovolutiouury youth, of having "slipped up",
a nd th en to use brute for ce and ma ss terror t o for ce eon-
Iessiuns of having "s lipped up" from faithf ul r evolut ion-
a ries . The so-ca lled Socia l Depar tment of t he CC CPC,
he ad ed by Kang She ng , spec ial lsed in arrests , beatings,
tOI'l.1I1' eS, and exec ut ions, Officials of subdivisio ns conduc t-
i ng " st yl e r uctifi cati on" were also authorised to arres t ,
beat, a nd k ill.
111 pr act ice, " emergency salvation" consist ed of various
me tho ds of compulsion and rleceit to for ce thousands of
cadres and members of th e Party and th e Yo uth Leagu e,
and al so emi nent per sonal it ies outside the Par ty , t o wr ite
"confess ions" admitting that they wore " counter-r evol u-
ti on ari es" , "enemy spies", " nat ional traitors", "agents of
t he Soviet Union" , and the like.
Noth ing was too l ow for t hi s end. People were arre sted
a nd cr uell y tortured or beaten up to wrest a " confession"
[rom th em. They were bl ackmail ed, bribed, and slandered
at " mass rallies" or "persuaded" at smaller meetin gs, and
reduced t o a sta te of total pr ostration by means of mor al
and physi cal t error. From some "confessions" wer e wrest-
ed in " turning wh eel " Especially brutal
tortures were reserved for cadres of pr ovincial and county
Party committees from Kuominta ng-controlled areas s pe-
cially summo ned to under go " styl e r ectifICat ion".
Those who admitted to bei ng "ele me nt s" referred
to above wer e immediatel y re leased, given th e "red flower
of glory ", and ot he rwi se re warded, Those who deni m!
commit ti nu any " cri mes". were hcateu u p aJIll t ortured.
Many (Heel as a r esu lt, Othe rs , to heal' insult,
c.oll1 l1li llcd suicide (Chou F cn g-pi ng, a guerril la lead -
With soveral interrogators alternating cl ay and night the
dotni ne c lost cOllsd ous ness, was revived, whereupon tho inter roga-
tion continued. Sometimes , reduced to semi-cons ciousness, the
detainee would "confess" the "crimes" ascribed to him.
er and secreta ry of the Szechuan provincial Par t y com-
mittea, whu had cnrl icr sur vived inhumuu tor t ure in an
ene my pr ison; ' I'scug 'I' a n-ju , head of th e wnmons de pa rt-
mont of tho Szechuan provincial Pa rty committee, who
hall al so previousl y di splayed courage a lid for ti \.11(1 c in
all ene my pri son ; Han Chuu, vete ra n Part y cadre who had
led the New Sha ns] Army Lo sa fely, eva ding wnrl ord
Yan ll si -sh an , a nd joine d up with the 8t h HOULe Ar my;
Hu, chairman or the All -Ch ina Students' Ass.u.inl iou
whose full nuruu, rogrctta bl y, 1 ca n not re call , and rua ny
others) , i\ sti ll greater number or peo ple Were red uced to
cornploto mnntal pr ostrati on or s ullored other ser-ious di s-
ord er s (Wei Kun g-chih, huar] or the organ isa tio ua l dupcllt -
ment of l.I w Honan provin ci al Part y enmmitl co, [Iu an g
Chin, who h eaded Par ty work among 1.110 yOUL! I, a utl
IIIit II Y others ) .
lu'descl'ihabl y savag e methods were uSerl someti mes.
For example the " accused" would Iw brought 10 a " mass
ra lly " and seated before it table on whi ch lay a ha yonu l.,
a via l of poison an d a l ength of rope, The audience was
then mad o to cha ut, "Eit he r imill ediat ely .ul mit that you
am a coun tcr-r c vul u t iona ry or commit su icid o her o uud
now" , " Choose a ny of the three ways".
But there wer e many stout, unbending people who
proudl y rep lied: " T' m a Conuu unist and no counter-
revu lutionary. 1 refuse to t a ke my own li f,!" . T hey would
in dignan t ly swee p the linyou et, poison uud "opP. oil u.«
tab le. Th ese sta uuch one s us ua lly became targots of
es pecially refill ed tort ur es uurl hrul a l ki lliugs.
3) Leninist lnt ernutlunall st s were
s till the main target
' Vhpn th u atmospher e or repressi on and tiliTor reached
it s apogee, t he spearhead was turned against Ll w chid
members of tho so-called Moscow group - Wang Ming
(mornbel' of th o Poli tburea u a nd secretary of Lhe
CPC), Po Ku (member of the Po!itbureau and secretary
of th e ec CPC) , Lo Fu (member of the Pol ithurcau
General Secr etary of th e ec CPC) , Waug Chia-hsiang
(alt ernat e member of the Politbureau and head of the
II Politi cal Departmen t of the 8t.h Houle Army) , Kai
Fcng member of the Po!itbureau, chief of t.h e
CC COlllIll ISSlOn for work with the yo uth and concul'!'oJl tly
122
chief of th e Propaganda Department of the CC epc fol-
lowing Lo Fu ' s depart nrc Ironi Yen an) , Yang Shang-k un
(u ltur uate member of t.hc CC CI'C an d secretary of the
CC CPC North China Burp.au ) , Ch n .lui (alternate iuem-
I.HH' or Ihe CC crc and secretary of t he Shan tung branch
ii I" the CC CPC Nort h China Burea u), and others.
As ill the "st yl e rectifi cati on " ca mpaign, t he ch ief tar -
get was ' Va ng Mi ug, whom Mao somut.i mcs tenlpm,,,t ely
"t he chief member of the Moscow gro up" a nd some -
times uhusivelv descri hed as "t he biggesl headman of the
pro-Sovi et Why rl irl Mao aiili his at lae:kiS cl ri cfl v
aga i nst Wang Min g? Thi s question is best an swered by
1\1 ao hi mselI. l lo an swered it oflic.ially i n p u hl ic o u l1l HU y
1Il',('as iol1s: " T he str uggle hot weeu mo a nd ' Vall g Ming
is 1I0\. a pers onal st ruggl e, hu t a struggle or priuciplc,
Wa ng Ming is 1ho chief r epr oscn ta tivo of Hussi nn Murx -
ism ill tho CPC, .uul I am th e chief repro sentative of
Chiueso Marx ism . Tho s t r uggle betweell us is t hcrclnro
a s l ru gg!o 01" two ideologi es, two th eories, two li nes and
t wo ways of the Ch inc se rcvolul.iun. The prctlomiruuu -o or
Hussian Mar xism i u our Part y will uot end wit h out a
s t r uggle ag ains t Wang Miug. And wi tho ut eliding th e
prudom ina uco of l1. lIssia u Mar xi sm i t is hupossihl u to
establish the produminanco or Chi nese Marxi sm."
l l ere it is necessary to give an appropriate expla uu-
t i 0 II.
To boulu with, there has Bever been nuyt hi ng l ike H
group" 01' n " pro-Soviet gro up" in th e COUl Ill U-
ni st Party of China, But in the Part y' s hi st ory, eve n lon g
hefore Mao' s "s t yle l'oe:t.iflcali on " campa ign, t hm'c wer e
two occa sions when opport unists brand ished I he slogan
or com hatt ing tho "Moscow gl'oup" ()['
a ttacking noL onl y those who opposed their opportunist
lin es, hut al so Leninism, th e Comintern, and the COJl1 Il1 I1-
uis t Party of t he .. ovi et Union,
First , th e Wuhan period in H127, wh?n r ig h t
opp or tunism was ri fe in the Part y: Chon Tu-hsiu, Pen g
Shu-ch ih an d ot her right Op portU lll stS the COI1 I-
int er n rpr,olllnwu(la tio ll Lo expand t he workers an d pea s-
an ts' movement , t o arm workers an d i\
lIeW revolutionar y al'Iny, laullch all ag,l'al'lan rcvo.
and Daht for th e lion-capit ali st of the L1llnese
revol lliion. They counler ed this . with their so-r all eel COIl -
cept of t.wo-phased revoluL.ion.
This " concept", it may be recallcrl, was sot out in an
ar ticle, "Tho Hourgeois Revoluti on a nd the Hevolutionary
Bonr gcoisio" , in the [our nal Hsiangi ao. But the dearest
and mo st th or ou gh exposition wa s given by Che n Tu-h siu
in u tal k wi th Cornrndo Miff and me lit the CC CPC
promi ses in Hankow on 1G June Hl27. WI! wore th en dis-
cuss ing why a Communist must not accept th e office of
cou nty chief. Her e is what Che n Tu -hsiu sa id abou t t he
"concept of two - pha sed revol ution":
"The Chinese r evolution has only two phases. The first
phase is a ci vil revol ut ion, that is, a bour geois r evolu-
li on , a nd the second is a soci alist r evoluti on, that is, 11
prole tarian revol ution. The Communi st Par ty ca nnot direct
th o first phase of the revol ution. Only t ho bour geoisi e ca n
direct it. Tho governmen t lind th o armed for ces must he
in t he hands of the bourgeoisi e. If a Communist were 10
head t ho army in this ph ase, h e would become a warl ord,
and if h e wer e t o head the governme nt, ,;. he would becom e
a bureaucrat. Mass movements must not be all owed to
imperil t he bourgeoisi e. The vic tory of t he revolution
must bel ong compl et el y t o the bourgeoi si e, wh ich m ust
be permitted t o devel op ca pit alism for a lon g period. The
Communi st Party must not begin the sec ond re vol utio n
un til ca pit al is m devel ops t o a degree where a prol etar-
ian re vol ution will be possibl e. Only t he n will the Com-
muni st Par ty be able to di re ct the r evoluti on, and the n
a Communis t will be able t o head th e army a nd not lw
II warlord , and t o head t he govern me nt and not be a
bureaucrat. Only in these condi tions will it be possibl e
to arm th e workers and pea sants, to carry out an
agra rian revolu tion, and t o begi n buildi ng socia lis m.
Our sys te m of t heory and method di ffers from that
ad hered to by Moscow, hut we think t hat our sys tem is
correct. "
, . Ch? n 'I' u-h siu, Pong Shu-chi h a nd th eir foll ower s call ed
l SYyl Tsyu -po , who had written a pamphl et (Third I nt er-
nati onal 0 1' Z ero Lnternul ional'[v i n s up port of th o Comin-
torn lin e, the chief rnombor of It " Moscow gro up" . All
wh o ranged wi th the Comi n tor n liuo
1.syul Tsyu- po s views, wer e call ed members
nl the TSYUl Tsyu -pn gro u p" or "Tsyui Tsyu -po' S Mos .
as is to bodi es of power in tho centre as well
124
cow grou p" . 1 s uppor ted the Comintern line and appr ove d
of Tsyui Tsyu -po's views. Among my dut ies wa s t ha t of
editor uud editorial hoard member of Hsuingt ao, of wh ich
Tsyui Tsyu-po wa s edi tor-ill-chi ef. Besid es, in No . 198 of
Hsiangtao 1 publish ed an ar ticle, " Con cerning the Out-
look of th e Ch inese Il evolu t ion and Hegemony in the Hov-
elut ion" , and wa s also immediatel y named a me mbe r of
" Tsyui Tsyu-po' s Moscow gro up".
The se cond campaign occurre d i n 1930, wh en Li Li-
sen's "l eft't -advcnt uris t li ne became dominant in the Par-
ty. At th at ti me, Li Li -sen descri bed Ch en Shao-yu, ;:.
C, hin Pang-h sicn, :;-:;- \ Vanj:{ Chia -hs iang a nd Ho
s hu ::.::-:;. (they spoke th eir mind La Li Li-sen and mem hers
of th e Politbur enu , and suppor t ed the Comi nt ern Ii/II!
ngainst the Li Li-sen line at a meeting of Centra l Commit -
t ee cadr es ) as members of a "right oppor tunist gr ou p"
or " Chen Shao-yu's Moscow group". They came und er
fire politicall y and organisa t ionally. For oppos ing Li Li -
son' s articl e, " Ques tions of the Eve of a Hevolutionary
Ups wi ng ", i n a doubl e issu e (No. 4-5) or th e CC crc
journal Bol sh evik, and al so tho Politburca u deci si on of
11 J u ne, Ch en Shao-yu was given a " la st se r ious war n-
in g" on 28 June, wh ile Ch in P ang-h sien , \ Vang Ch in-
hsiang and Ho Tsu-shu wer e given a " se rious warning" .
For opposing the Chi nese Red Arrny t acti c of atta ckin g
large cit ies and the adventurist uprisings in l ar ge cit ies
th e " last se r ious warning" given to Chen Shao-yu was
changed on 7 August t o a str ict er formula, " te mporary
s ix-mont hs' st ay in t he P arty for observation" , ::.::.::.::. whi le
the "ser ious warn ing" given to Chi n Pang-hsien, Wan g
Chl a-hsiung a nd Ho Tsu-shu wa s changed to " l ast ser ious
warning" . Not until 25 October, when thc Cominter n
Executive' s l etter t o th e CC CP C concer ni ng th e Li Li -
sen line r each ed Shanghai, the di scipli nar y acti ons taken
against the four of us wer e repeal ed i n a Polil,lmr e.au
resolution of 10 December, and the wh ole Party wa s m-
Iormed of th is.
:, Wan g Ming.
"-" Po Ku , .
,:.",:. 1-1 0 Tsu-shu was stri cl1y repri manded 0 11 7 August
Li Li-sen sent him to Poki ng for tra do union work. Ther e he
was arr ested and di ed in a Peking mil itary pr ison in 1\)32.
",,'>:, Thi s' could be followed by expuls ion fr om th e Par ty.
Besi des, in Au gust Cheu Yuan-Ino ( Li Fu}, ::. who
head ed tho Honan provincial Par ty cununitt ee mujuri l.y
whi ch opposed the deci si on of the s ec re tar y uf the pro viu -
cial committee and the CC CPC Nort h Ch inn Tluronu
concer ning armed upri sings in Chcngcho w, Kall en z.
Loyang and ot he r ci t ie s , was give n a " l a st. s er- io us wa ru -
iug" by the North Chi na Bureau ,
Aft er th e Cen tral Committee Pl enum he ask ed ror
hi s ca se to he r eviewed , hu t the Pol ithu r enu l ook sti ll
s tri cter act ion, l eaving him " i n th e Par ty t ernpor nri l y 1'0 1'
observ atlou for three months", There is a special Pol it -
bureau resolution of 29 January H1J I and a circular
conce r ning tlw ruponl of the di seiplinnry ncl.in u agnill flt
Li FII. Wh en word ul' Cheu Yuan-lao' s oppos il. iou t o the
Li Li -sen lin e reached th e Central Committeu, Li Ll-sun
new in t o 11 rage, and said: " T hose who ca me had , [rom
Moscow obstru ct my ev ery step. Chen Yua n-l ao is al so a
memho» u[ th e Cheu Shao-y u group " .
Tho th ird campaign aga in st. \Vang was 1ll 01l1l1C'r!
at tho t.i me of Mao' s nnt.i-Leni nlst, nut i-Cumi ntc ru, nul .i-
Soviet and auti-Pnrty "rect.ifiontion of s tyl e". Mao sent
hi s uieu 10 rallies and muctings, wh er e l.hny hocklod tho
" Mosco w 01' " pro-Sovie t g"Oll p" , Wa ng Mill g, tIle
"2f1, 112 Bolsh evik s of th e 1\1 OSCOW groun", th e -waug
Miug group", etc. \Vh en Mao wa s s how u th e fmrl ings of
tho gr o u p of doct ors in An gu s]. Hi lt:), he wa s l' oll l pPl Il' d to
vis it me, and I ex plained th aI Ihl'l'e had I1 OYl'l' been unv
" Mo:; l'OW gro up of vVall g Miu g" 0 1' " \ Va n g \I ing grollp".
I sa id 10 hiJII:
"The so-called Che ll Shau-yu g'I'oul l was i nvouted hy
th e Trotskyit es a nd Chon Tu-hsiuists ill tho winter 01'
H127. I had alwa ys taken parI ill Ihe s l l'lIggle a gni ns t
Trot sk yism, aud th e Trotskyites pasled all kind s of lalwl s
to Ill y lIame. On r etlll'll iu g f,'olll \ Vnhnn to Moscow i n
AlIgus tHl2i , 1 IHade a lIulllb el' or repor l.s a lld f'xpla i llcd
th e lIeed for com ha tl.i ng Ch() 11 Tn -h sin 's r ight. opp ortlln-
i SIIl. T he l'ullowol' s o f Che ll Tu-h sill alll on g th e Chinese
st udellts ill ]l,l osco\V call1' d II I() a Ts yui T SYlJ- poi sl. To ··
gelher with the Easlern Sr<:relnr'ia t of lit e COllli nlm' 1l am!
t he CPC repres enlative in lIle COJllinl cl'll 1 lo ok a u M:ti vC'
s lalld against lhe so-called l\i ali gsi -CIIPkian g So-
" Ch ell T was arresle d in Shangllai in 1!l32, tr ans-
ferred to "ankmg, an d exec uted by firin g squad.
126
ciety run by Trotsk yites and Chen Tu-hsiuists , At t h e Gl h
Congress of lhc CPC, hy decision of it s Prcs idhuu, I made
a r eport 011 th e qu est ion of th e Kiaugsi-Cheki ang Na-
t.ivcs ' Sor,iety, This was why t h e Tr- ot skyi tes and - Che n
Tu -Iisini sts began calling most of the teach ers and st u-
dent s of the Couunu nist Unive rs ity of th e Toil er s of Chi-
lin ( CUTC) t he ' Ch en S huo-yu gro up' , Their pu rpose, in
ofloct , was to sll o\V that si nce there is n Chon Shao-vu
'g roup' , t hey had a right t o have th ei r own I\i an g'si -
Chekiang Natives' Societ y.
" T ile of ' t hr. 2Hi/
2
Bols h eviks' find the 'Chr-n
Shao-yn gro up' was also luuulied a huu] by 'I' ro tsk yita s
a nd Chen Tu-hs iu is ts in t he a u t.u mn of Hl 2Q d uring th o
11at'ty purge ill ti ll! CUTC. I had loft. Moscow for 1I0011 e in
beginning of Febr uary . But. rot' sel fish purposes, the
Trots kyites nud Ch uu 'I'u -h siui sts a t tac ke d so vcrul hnn-
dred comra des, th e nhsolnt r; ma jo l'ity of t he C T C who
s u pp orl .ed t he Comiut or n a nd the Con t ral Couuni t tee of
th o Conuu uni st Pa r ty of th e Sovie t Uui on anrl oppose d
th o Trotskyit es a nd Chell Tu-hsi ui sts , 1'0 1' hning momh urs
o [ n 'Che ll Shao-YII group' , T hey pr etended t hat only a
minol'it y- 2H' /2 Bol sh eviks head ed h y Che n S hao -y n -
opposed them. Look at the nrch-rencti onnry l\uomiTllllllg'
weekl y, The Ant i-Japanese War ant! Cul ture, a ppea r ing
i n Sian. I ts chi d ed i t o r, Yuh Ching, is n t rnitor, a s py,
ami a T r ot sk yit e Cl u-u T u-hsi u is t. I':ach ixsu o cn ut u i us IIla-
l ic.ious a rti cles a1\(1 report s Yi lifyi ng t he "2'K
'
h Bolsheviks '
- Clwil Shao-yu, Po Ku , Lo Fu, \ Vau g Chia-h s ian g and
ot hers. ' I' his al on e should s how yo n how l.hi s slory ul'i gi-
na ted. "
Mao ' l' so - t.u ug l'cpl ic rl :
" I do nol. kllo w what olhel's sa y, \Vh at. I do know is
lh al yo u sLndit'd ill Mosco\\' an d t hat you \Vol'k ed th e
hi gh est COllliJlt l'l'll hod ies fO l' ns l,oug as yea l's , S l lIel'
lh e lith CPC Congress a lld the hl h Conllll lern COlIgrC' ss
in Hl28 you 1"10\\'11 l o p-!'Hlll,ing eOlllradcs o f
COll1muni'st ['al'Ly of th e Silviel Ull ioll, asso r,lflt -
ed lind hnd fri endl y rf:lati oll s with th elll 101'
wll cn yo u work ed i ll th e COll1inlel'n in tho 111,,'1 lOS. 1.11 el :e
is no ' ot h el' s \1eh person i ll our Part y exposed lo l hl' ll'
In my s peed ! Oil the recti l'l caL! on styl r I
I'ef erl' ed to peopl e who ' ne ve r ra il 10 ment IOn (, l'l' pce t.he
1ll0n1ent I.hey o p e ll th eir IllUuth '. y k1I0 WS lh at
we have u o such people in the Purl y, and t ha t ther e are
onl y people liko you, who 'novel' fail \0 mention Lenin
and St ali n the moment th ey open their mou th' , who ' ne v-
er fail to menti on th e Comi nteru th e moment th ey open
th eir mouth' , alii I who ' ne ver fail to mention th e Sovi et
Union th e momen t the y open t heir mou th'. Hence, what-
over you may say to th e contrar y, you are i n effect. the
ch i nf mernher of th e Moscow g rou p or th o pro-Soviet
grou p. Thi s is undeniabl e. As for th e Wang Ming group,
it is just another name for the Moscow group. nut it.
s ta nds /'01' more than just the Moscow group. Ever since
th e victor y over the Li Li -sen line and the 4th Pl enum
of the Sixth Central Committee you hav e been suppor t ed
and followed only by those wh o had studi ed or worked
i n Moscow. So, whether ther e is suc h a n or ganisa tio n is
one th ing, and th e fa ct t hat ma ny peopl e foll ow you,
foll ow t he Moscow li ne or the Comi ntern lin e, is another.
Now, we have begun to r ect ify s tyle pre cisel y t o end
this sort of thing."
In th e beginning of January 1943 1 hrul a talk with
Liao Lu-yen, wh o was then my poli ti cal secre ta r y, about
th e three pa st ca mpaigns against the " Moscow grou p" . He
mado notes of our conver sa tion and look th em to Mao
'I's e-tung . Learning about this, Ko Chi ng-shih warned me
that Mao Tso-tuug would pr obahl y be annoyed. But Mao
did not dare to say anything publicly about th e inform-
er ' s not es.
Thi s shows that Mao mounted hi s attack on the " Mos-
cow group" or "Wang Ming group" as a pretext for doin g
away wit h Wang Ming a nd cert a in others. From time I;)
Lime, in fa ct, he deliberatel y "spr ead the word " that. so-
t o the " W ang Min g gro up", and Saw to
It th a t t his should be r ep orted in the Iorci gn pr ess. Th er e-
he IISed th e " re port " spread by himself as th e " 1' (1 a-
SO!l for per secuting peopl e 1'01' Iwlon ging' to the " W an jr
Ming gro up " . .
.I t .IlIus L be poi nt ed out h er e that ther e ha s been a1111
st ill a s tr uggh, between two ideologi es, two th eori es,
two and two roads in 1,lw Cummu nist Party or Chi nn.
It. IS no t Mao descr ibes as a st ruggl e between
Russum Marxi sm" and " Ch in es c II i s 'I
and irrecon cil ab le betwe·cn t.ea
and . ' t ' . L " ( . "enllll sm
n arx rst, an u- enruis t I'O""tl' (')11Ilt'" M .
t l " I " U c, ' (,y IV a OI SrTl Of'
i e t i ou ghts of Mao Tsc- lung". This str uggl e I '"
two t heories . t I I. • , c' h:LWee n
s IS a s r ugg C uctwecu th o l\l al' xi sl:-Lcll il{isL
128
th eory of the Chinese revolution and tho l\Iaoist theory of
the Chinese r evol ution. '
The s ubs t auce of the Maoist theory is that " t he Chinese
r evolutio,n is H revol utio n i n a colon ial, se m i-colonial
and and that, formally, its devol-
° IH!lent consist s of t wo stages : the new-democrati c r evo-
lution a.nd t he r evolution " ( th e anti-imperialis t
a nd a nti -f eu dal r evol u t ion COIIICS under tho head of new-
democrati c. - Wang Mi ng). In fa ct, however, the Maoist
theor y of t he devel opment of China does not go beyond
st ago of the new-democral ic, r evol ution . Af ter th e
of t he r e:' ol ut ion, accomplishe d
. th o parucipaung 111 th e leadership ( t hat
I S, JOI ntl y w! th the bourgeoisie - Wan g Mil/g) or under
Icadorsh ip of the proleta riat", it will be possible to
bu dd a " new-democratic r epu bl ic" , t hat is , "a r epubli c
based on new Three People's Principle s, th ree ne w basic
poli t!cal ( i. e. a l eft-Kuomintnng type of r e-
publ ic Iol l owing three basi c politi ca l guidelines: " alliance
with Russia , alli au ce with the Communi st Party, and s u p-
port of pe asants and worker s"; i n ot her wor ds, not a
.in l ea.dership would belong [ 0 the pr ol etar-
rat and It S Communi st Party, hut a r ep ub li c l ed by t he
bourgcoisie and it s poli ti cal party- W ang Ming) . It goes
without saying that a "new-democrati c r evolution' of t his
sor t ca nnot grow over into a socialist r evolution , Ma o,
t her ef or e, se t th e soc ial ist r evolution in the distant future.
To all i ntents and purposes, Mao' s work, On New Democ-
racy , is therefore basically an ada pt ation of Che n Tu-
hsiu' s "concept o] t wo- phased revol ution" t o a new si t-
u ati on . The words give n ah ova i n inverted commas are
fro m th e sec t ion, " The Poli cy of New Democr acy", i n
On New Democracij, which ap pe ared in Mac' s on e-vol ume
Selected W orks (T ungpet shui ien, 1948 ).
The esse ntial diff er en ce between the Ma rx ist-Le n inis t
and Maoist theor y of th o Chinese r evol ut ion consis ts i n
t he foll owing: Marxism-Lenin ism stands with th e pro-
let ariat , whi le Maoism st ands with the bourgeoisie. Thi s
is expressed, first of all, in the diff er ent under standing
of the character of t he anti-i mper ialist revolution and
the struggle against the remnants of feu dalism. In the
Marxist-Len inist view the anti-imperialist revolution is
not merely a step objecti vely favouring the developme nt
of nati onal capit al ism, but al so and chiefly a par t of so-
cialism's str uggl e against world capita lism,
st ep and preliminary condit ion for socialist revolutIOn
in China. Similarly, the struggle against the remnants of
feudali sm is not merely a step cl earing way for the
development of capitalis m, but al so and chiefly prepara-
tory step and preliminary condition for socialist re v?l u-
tion in China. This is why, in th.e Marx:st-Lemmst View,
the bourgeois-democratic revolutIOn begins gr.ow over
into a socialist revolution at the moment of It.S. t
For Maoism on the other hand, the antt-impena IS
revolution and'the anti-feudal revolution. confinedbi
o
cr eating favourable conditions and 0
opportunities for the development of hlllh
This is why in his On New Demo cracy, w IC .e .
lished in early forties, Mao denied that its VIC-
tor the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolutIOn
r!w over into a socialist revolution. In l:is Chinese
and the Communist Party oj China, . Chapter 2
("The Chinese Revolution"), ,?, referrmg the
" prospects of the Chinese revolutIOn , Mao. wr?te.
"After the victory of the revolution, a capitalist .econ?-
my will have enough opportunities. for. ill
Chinese society for the r evolution WIll ehml? ate the ob-
stacles to its development. This is eas ily pIctured, and
t here is nothing sur prising about it." He at the same
time that after the victory of the revolution there can
be a "development ?f so.clalist
The difference al so consists III the following. In the
Marxist-Leninist view, t he decisive conditions for the
growth of the Chi nese bourgeois-d emocratic into a social-
is t revolution are i nside the count r y, hegemony of the
proletariat in the through Communist
ty and, on the international scene, assistance of the S?v.let
Union. At no time did Mao accept these decisive
conditions . Why? Let us briefly recapitulate Mao's perti-
nent pronouncements and actions of the past few decades.
This will help us to see why.
.. The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party of China
was pr epared in 1939 by a worker of tho Propaganda Department
of the ee epe by name of Yang Sung (Wu Shao-yi) and other
comrades. Lo Fu and then I edited it, and correct ed its mistakes.
Then, it was shown to all the Politbureau comrades for their
opinion. When it reached Mao, he did not return it. Shortly
Yang Sung "fell ill" and died in Yenan. A few years later
included it in his Se l ected W orks. '
i30
In an article, The Coup in Peking and th e Merchants
(J ul y 1923) , Mao described the bourgeoisie as th o "load-
or" of revolution.
In hi s Report on an Investigati on of the Peasant Move-
ment in Hunan Province (March 1927) , he denied th o
for an alliance between t ho peasants and the prole-
tariat and for t he hegemony of the proletariat in this
alliance , while exaggerating t he revolut ionar y r ole of t he
peasants.
In 1931 he maintained that "the Soviet movement in
China is a purely peasan t movement" an d did not ac-
knowledge th o leading role of the proletariat and its van-
guard, the Communist Party. For this r eason, he denied
t ho non -capitali st, t ha t is, socialis t perspective of the
Chinese revolution, and call ed for a "peasant capitalis m".
In hi s On New Demo cracy (Januar y 1940), he rejected
t he non-capitali st per specti ve of the Chinese r evolution.
As I have already sa id, he called for a bourgeois-democrat-
ic republic with a "new-democratic" policy, econo my and
cultur e.
In October 1940 he publicly urged an alli ance with
Germany, Italy and Japan, and, i nside t he countr y, an
alli ance wit h the Japanese Invaders, t hat is, a policy of
na tional t reason (q .v. Part III ).
From t he autumn of 1941 until the summer of 1945 ho
conducted the anti -communist and anti-Soviet "campaign
for the r ectifi cati on of style" and su bstituted Maoi sm for
Leninism.
In August Hl44, speaking to John Service, second sec-
r etary of th e US Em bassy in China, Mao sai d: "Wo do
not expect Russian hel p . . . Chinese and America n inter-
ests ar e corre la ted an d simi lar . . . We should coopera te."
To Harri son Forman, a US journ ali st, ho said: "We ar e
not stri ving for the soci al an d political Communis m of
Soviet Ru ssia. Rather , we prefer to think of wha t we are
doi ng as something that Lincoln fought for in your Civil
War: t he Iib orati on of slaves."
In April Hl45 at the 7th CPC Congress, in his report,
On Coalition Government, Mao said: "We have loo little
ca pitalis m", an d "the str uggle for new democracy will
st ill be long". lI e added: "Wit hout the deve lopment of
pri vate capitali st and other economy th o building of so-
ciali sm is impossible". He came out against the cor rect
point uf view that at th e moment of victor y the hour-
131
geoi s-demoeratic revolution grows into u soGi ai is l, r evol u-
Uon, 1 C
III March 1940, at the 2nd Pl enum, the Sevent I en-
tral Committee, Mao voiced the opiruon
victory of the bourgeoi s-d emocratic in It
would still be necessary, for a l ong tune, to f?llow tho
poli cy of four sides and eight including "equal
observance of the inter ests of cap It alI st s, as well as
ers ", and to build "the society uf ,ne,w dem?Cl :acy . He
rejected socialist revolution and Con-
cerning foreign relations, he New Ohina not
need to be recognised, at least In th e first few "
either by Britain or th e United Slates, or by the .
Mao did not want China t o ent er the soclalist
car:'the article, On the Democratic Di?tatorship of th e
People (June 1949), Mao said that no di ct atorship of t;1le
proletariat can be established ,in China, and
was a " democr at ic dictalorsillp of th e people as a joint
dictatorship of the working class, peasantry, petty bour-
geoisie, and national bourgeoi sie". . , '
In the fifties Mao set out to subver t th e socialis t gains
by the extreme "left ist " poli cy uf " three r.ed banner s" .
And followincr the failure of his adventul'lst undert.ak-
ings -the "big leap", "everybody smelts steel" , and the
people's communes - he said again: " I ll a coun-
try Iike China it will be impossibl e t o build soci alism Ior
tens, even hundreds, of years" .
. In the sixties Mao embarked on the treacherous course
of anti-communi sm and anti-Sovietism, of st ru ggl e against
th e world communis t movement, of a coun ter- rev ol ut ion-
ary coup, and of coll us ion with im periali sm and other
r eactionary for ces. Concealing hi s counter-r evol u tiona ry
deeds behind such t erms as " Mar xism-Leni nism" , " social-
ism", "dictat or ship of the pr ol et aria t" , and th e like, he
began cha nging China's political i mage, clinging, as be-
fore, to hi s r eactionary Maoist th eory of " new demo c-
racy".
The r eal st ruggle of two li nes is a st r uggle between
th e line of the Marxi sts-Lcnini sts and th e line of Mao
T's u-tung in differ ent pori ods of th e Chinese r evoluti on. I
have already wr itten ab out th e main cont ent of th ese two
Il ues in Lenin, Leninism, and th e Chin ese Revolution
publi shed in 1970 on th e ce nte nar y of Lenin' s birth:
132
Below is a comparison of the two different a pproaches to
t he qu esLi on of periods in th e Chinese revolution.
Mao Tse-tung di vi ded th e Ch inese revolution into two
stages and four per iods. Accordin g to hi m, the firs t stage
is a "new-democrati c revolution", whi ch consi s ts of four
per iods , namel y: 1) the period of th e first civil war (HI25-
Hl27); 2) th e per iod of th e second civil war (19 27-HI J7) ;
3) the peri od of the anti-J apanese war (Hl 37-1945) ;
q) the period of the third civil war (1945-Hl49). The
second stage consis ts of t he socialis t re volution, whose
advent is indeterminat e (see HIl Chiao-mu's pamphlet,
Thirty Years 01 the Commu nist Party of China, written
on Mao 's direct instructions) . It was not until after Liu
Shao-chi, wh o returned from Moscow to Peking in the
heginning of Hl53, passed on th e opinion of the Cl'SU
l eader ship th a t "the est abli shme nt of the People' s Repub-
lic of China marked th e And of the st ag e of th e bourgeoi s-
democratic r evolution and the be ginning of the soci ali st.
r evolution", a nd aft er a r esoluti on on this score wa s
adopt ed by th e 4th Ple num of the Sevent h Central Com-
mittee in February 1954, that Mao was compell ed to
r ecognise th at the sociali st stage of the Chinese r evolu-
tion had begun.
This shows that Mao knows neither the criteria for di -
viding the Chinese r evolution into s tages, nor th e criteria
for setti ng per iods. For him the form of revolutionary
st r ug gle , i. e. war , is the criterion for per iods . He doe s
not under stand t ha t the national or social cont ent of "he
revolutionary str uggl e is the real cr iter ion. I wr ote about
this in Lenin, Leninism, and the Chin ese Revolution,
showing that th e Chinese r evolution cons is ts of five pe-
riods-first, the period of the r evolution of the united
national anti-imperiali st front and preparations for tile
agr arian revoluti on (19 24-1927); second, th e period of
the agrarian re vol ut ion and pr epa rati ons for the united
national anti-Japanese front (1927-1937) ; third, the pe-
riod of the united national anti-Japanese front, the ant i-
Japanese national -r evoluti onary wa r , and pr eparations for
winning th o bourgeoi s-democratic r evolution ( Hl37-H)·'t5) ;
fourth, th e period of th e vi ctory of tho bourgeois-demo-
crat ic revolution and its gr owth into socialist revolution
(1945-1949) ; flft.h, the peri od of soci alist r evolut ion and
t he build in g of soci alis m, wh ich began with th e est abli sh-
ment of the People's Hepuhlic of China in October 1949.
133
I t needs a s pecial work t o l ook into the peri ods of
the Chinese revoluti on in greater det ail.
Due to the fundamental differen ces between Maoi sm
(or "t hought s of Mao Tse-tung") and Leninism, the
period of th e "styl e rectifica ti on" ca mpa ign main
blow being direct ed, as be for e, at the Lenini sts m the
CPC, firs t of all Wang Ming.
"Emergency salvati on r allies" wer e called in the con-
fer ence hall of th e CC CP C in Yantsi alin (at tended by
all Central Committee cadres, member s and alternate
member s of the Politbureau, including Mao, member s and
alternat e members of the Central CommltLee, del egates to
the 7th CPC Con gr ess present in Yonan, and othe rs-
all in all mor e than a th ousand peopl e). Belore a meoting
would begin , people sp ecia lly ap pointed by the "commis-
sion for th e rectification of sty le " made deprecatory re-
marks ag ains t Wang Ming, calli ng him "dogmatist", " run-
ning dog of the Russians", " tr ait or", and
tionary". This, Mao hoped, would cow the audience
submi ssion, and nobody would dare take Wang ]vIln?" s
si de. He was especially anxious that nobody shoul d raise
the subject of W ang Ming' s poi soning, a fa ct that had
been proved by th o group of cons ult ant s. There was
much talk about thi s at the time, and many peo ple
guessed that the poi soning wa s Ma o's handiwork, which
fact caused him cons ider able worry.
When Meng Ohing-shu (member of th e standing burea u
of the Central Comm it tee commi ssi on for work among
womon and a del ega te to tho 7th CPC Congress) , r ebuffed
the at one of t hese ra llies an d sa id that Wang
Minz had been poi sone d an d hi s life wa s in danger,
Mao'i' s per son al secretary Hu Chiao-mu got up and
shouted:
"W hy did you t ell people tha t Wang Ming was poi -
so ned by Chai rman Mao?"
" W ho did I t ell this to?" Meng Ching-shu asked.
Li Kuo-hua * j umped up and cr ied;
" You said it t o me."
"Wher e and wh en did I say i t to you? " Mong Ching-
shu asked.
,. Li Kuo-hun was a Red Army soldier . In the thlrtlos 11e
st udied in Moscow. At the time of "style rectification" and
"emergency salvation" he was slandered. What he said at tho
rally was obviously said under compulsion.
134
" Last March, wh en Comrade ' Yang Ming wa s in a O'rave
conditi on. I vi sited him a t th e Central Hospit al, That was
when yon said it t o me," Li Kuo-hua answered.
Meng Ching-shn said:
"At that time, * many people carne t o se e Wang Ming
ever y day. \ Vhen you came Wang Ming wa s in a cr it ical
condit ion. The guards did not let you into the ward.
Neither I nor Wang Mlng could have seen you there.
This can be confirmed by the guards. Now, I must ask
you : how could you ha ve known last March th at Wane
Ming wa s poi soned, let alone who had don e it? The fact
that Wang Ming wa s poisone d wa s establis hed this sum-
Ill?r by th e group of cons ult a nts. Who poisoned Wang
I am SUfO it wa s done by imper iali sts, national
traito r's, Ku omi rit ang spi es, Trotskyites, or simila r SCO Ull-
drels ."
Mao sat with lowered head and crimson fa ce in t he
centr e of the front row. Po Ku, who wa s in tho cent r e
of th e third r ow, s ta red at Meng Ching-shu with wide-
open eyes, dr eading that with her usu al s tr aigh tforwar d-
ness she might say every thing she kn ew.
My guards wrote a note to the chairman of the meeting,
confirming the fact t hat thoy had not allowed Li Kuo-
hua t o enter tho ward and that he had not seen either
Wa ng Ming or Meng Ching-shu.
Mao tried t o pr evail on peopl e that. W ang Ming was
si mula ting illness. This att ra cte d still more attenti on t o
my poisonin g and t o th e qu estion of wh o wag t he cul prit .
At the samo meeting, Meng Ching-shu sa id:
" I t was said at tho meeting today that th e Au gu st
First Appeal wa s written by Kang Shang. The Appeal
has l ong since become a hi storical Party document and
one would think that th ere is no need for di scussing who
wrote it. But since it is being claimed th at Kang Sheng
wrote it, I want t o ask him-has he t he ner ve t o ac-
k nowledge that he wr ote it?"
Kang Sheng l ower ed hi s head, and did not r epl y.
Menz Ching-shu cont inue d:
" T all of yon: must a Communist obey his consc i-
ence?"
Nobody dared r epl y, and she answered her own ques-
t ion :
* In 1942.
"I think he must. The August Fi" st Appf'al was written
by \Vang Ming. In the beg inn iu g of June. H135, on. t he
day h e ret ur ned to Moscow a fte r' a \,a(:a l lll ll and tr ea t-
ment in Ki sl ovodsk , h e said to th e comrades who hall
come t o see him: ' The Japa nese aggr ession in Nort h
China is ex pandi ng. The s ituation is t ense. At tho sana-
torium in Kisl ovodsk 1 ca me to the concl usion that ther,e
must be a new document in t he name of th e. CC Cl'C,
in order t o promot e the unit ed nati on al an tl -!
front poli cy.' On the foll owing he wn urur the
Appeal t o All Com pat ri ot s Resistunce to Ja pan
and Salvation of the Homel and , which lat er came to
known as t he Au gu st F ir st Ap peal. For t hr ee days. In
succession he worked OIl it unti l t hr ee in t he rnorrung,
and on the fourt h dav added fur ishing tou ches. On th e
fifth day, a meet i ng tho CPC del eg.atio,J)
was ca lled to discu ss the draft. The dISCUSSIOn cont i nued
for several da ys, wi th 'Wang Ming a report on
the draft, and th en al so th e concl uding re marks. .A:- fp;;v
comra des pr esent in thi s hall took part in th o
Now, th e " cl aq ue " l ed by Li Fu-ch un began howling.
But Kao Tzu-li ':. got up and sa id:
"I took pa r t in that meetin g, and I al so attended th e
7th Congress of th e Comintcrn. I heard Comrade Wang
Ming' s r eport a nd hi s concl udi ng r emal'k s,,, and clearly
re call the discussiun of th e dr ait, I ca n tell. ...
Ther e wer e ho wl s and s hr ieks . Kao 'I'zu-li was shout ed
down. But Mao' s attempt t o pa ss Kang Sheng off as
the i ni ti ator of tho united nati onal a nt i-J apan ese front
poli cy fell th r ough.
Thereu pon , on Mao' s in structi on s, a few speak ers
heaped in sults on me and Meng Ching-shu, Sh e
them. A few u pr ight comrades wante d t o speak 1Il our
def ence, hut none was given t h e fl oor.
Mao was worried. Tho moment Li Fu-chun cl osed tho
rally, he began upbraidin g him: " T he meeting was full
of lowl y in tere sts. There was not hing ins truc tive." In
" A l ias Chou He-sheri, head of th e building administration in
th e government of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. In
1933 he was sent to Moscow as a CPC delegate to the 7th Con-
g('ess of th e Corrun te r n. Her r. he wns elect ed momber of tho
International Contr ol Commission. Was at one time Minist er of
Agriculture of tho Chinese Soviet Republic.
130
words, he cons idered the ant i-W a ng Ming "all y a
Iailure . Ho had himself been in a deli cat e spot on some
poi nts , and was now for ced t o pl an new steps agai nst
Wa ng Mi ng,
Soon, a seco nd ant i-W ang Ming r all y wa s call ed.
This t ime. Mao in struct ed Lu Ti uO' -i ::. 10 say from tho
rostrU.lll t hat :' thc (!esorter must be S}1Ot". Lu Ting-i sa id
t ha t in war time, II] all ages, in all armies , deserter s
were shot ; now, whil e the "style r ect ification" ca mpaig- n
WaS at it s heig- ht , there were people who ha d [110 terncritv
to ask the Centr al Commltton of th e Soviet
Party and tho Comin tern t o se nd a pla ne for th em a nd
lake th em t o the Soviet Union for tr eatment; th is was
an att ornpt to esca pe "st yIe r ecti fica tion" -slwel' dese r-
lion, and deser ters mu s t be shot. Then, Lu Ti ng-i wrote
a n . whi ch on t he foll owi ng' da y in
Ch iehja ngiih.pno, Lu Ti n g- i did not mention \ Va ng- Mirr g
by name ei t. he r a t ths rall y or in t he odit or inl, hu t th o
" tal c" was qui ckl y spre ad t ha t \ Ya ng Ming was meant ;
t he atmosphe re thu s created was on e of Inar a11(1 t error.
At another rall y, Li Fu-chun suddenly go t up and
announced that Ko Cli ing-sh ih ?" was a counl.or- rn vnl u.,
t iona r y. Ko was inst antly .soi zed, ti ed lip , put under house
arrest, and order ed t o wr ite a " con fessi on". On th e fol-
lowing day, on Mao' s orders, Liu Shao-c hi surn moncd
Ko, and t old h im: " \Ye have acte d ag ainst you because
you knew \Ya ng Ming in the twenti es, look par t in th e
s tr uggl e against th e Li Li-sen line under hi s di r ection
i n 1930, and han been W an g Miug' s depu ty in the uni t-
I'd fr ont dep art.men t of t he Cen tral Committee s inc« 1D3U.
The styl e rectification Campaign has been goi ng on a
loner time but you ha ve said nothi ng yet agains t Wang
knows tha t you are an ol d YCLer and
Communis t, and W ang Ming' s dep uty. Since you have
been hranded a counter -re voluti ona ry, peo ple will be led
to concl ude that W an g Ming, t oo, is pr obabl y n ot as
reliabl e as th ey th ou ght."
* A Litt er opponent of th o Comintern , the Soviet Union and
the "Moscow group" who had been closel y connected with th e
Trotskyites in "t ho twenti es and thirties.
,',' t at er, Ko Ching-shih was member of LIte l'oli Lbur ca,u, Secre.-
tary of th e CC Cl'C Sha nghai Bureau, and mayor of Shanghal.
In 1965 he di ed "suddenl y" in Chengtu, where he had been
summoned to accompany Mao all hi s vacati on.
This is a vivid example of the cynicism of these people,
and of how far th ey departed fr om the principles and
st yle of behavi our adopted in Communist par ties in
tryin g to i ncite people against W an g Ming.
It was in this oppr essive atmospher e of fear and ter-
ror t hat Mao se nt Li Fu-chun, Peng Chen , Kao Kang
and Lin Piao " to see Po Ku in Chinliangshan, where
Chiehfangjihpao had it s editorial offices (from the autumn
of 1941 to the day of hi s death in 1946 Po Ku was
editor-in-chief of Chiehjangj ihpao). Hef erring to instruc-
t ions they had r eceived from Mao Tse-tung, t hey told
Po Ku th at he h ad to write "a confess ion revil ing throe" ,
mean ing, as Mao conceived the for mul a, "reviling himself ,
r evili nz \ VaIl O' Mi ng and r evili ng the Russians," whe re
'=' ....' C .
" reviling the - Ru ssi an s" meant reviling t he onuutern
and t he Soviet Uni on. If Po Ku had r efu sed, he would
hav e been arrested and shot, and the pr ess would report
that he had been a counter-revolutionary. Later , Mao
told me t hat Po KI1 had l ong resi sted th e order to write
a "confession". He we pt all through t he night, and did
not zi ve hi s consent until h e wa s about to be tied up
and led away. Ma o admi tted to me that he us ed the
same method with Lo Fu and Yang Shang-kun t o for ce
them t o write similar "confessions reviling three". Wang
Chia-hsiang and Kai Feng wer e gravely ill in the latter
half of the "styl e r ectification" period, which pr evented
Mao from for cing "confessions" from them.
Mao als o used strong-ar m tactics against the chief
members of the " group of empir icists"-Chou En-lai and
Pong Teh-huai , But it was only after nearl y two years of
preparing and conduc ting the "style recti fication" cam-
pai gn , which was also directed against thi s pair, that Mao
re called Chou En-lai fr om Chungking in July 1943, while
Peng Teh-huai wa s r ecalled fr om the battle zone in
Nort h China eve n l at er - November 1943. In othe r
words, the hysterical ni ghtmare of "emergency salvation"
had already begun when they r eturned to Yenan. They
were completely unpr epared, eithe r poli t ica lly or morally,
for tho abuse heap ed on t he m at va r ious rallies i n the
situat ion of " accomplis he d fact s" t hat Mao had cr eated.
As I have already said, Mao admit ted to me on 18
December 1948 that he had boon in th e wr ong at that time.
* Then commander of tho 8th Rout e Army's 115th Division.

Speaking at the 2nd Pl enum of t he Seventh Centr al
Committee i n March 1.94. rl, I compared Mao ' s
On New D.emocracy, wi th how Len ini sm and the Comin-
t ern the fundamental qu estions of t he Chinese
revolut ion. I. that Mao's con cept differed from
of and the Cominter n over its character,
mot\vo forces, and t he hegemon of th e r evol uti on,
i ts perspectives, and th e like. I demonst r at ed in fact
that "though ts" we re contr ary to Marxism-Lenini sm'
up settmg th e th at t hey wer e "the sol e gu ide';
o.f th e Communist Party of Chi na. I called speci al atton-
tJO!I to the t wo main conditi ons for 1I1 e z rowt h of t he
? hmes? bourge ois-d emocr at ic r evol ution a sociali st
}evolution of the pr oletar iat and as sista nce
rom SOVlCt Umo;r) , and showed that Ma o' s "four
r?as ons why th e C.hmese bourgeois-democratic rovo lu-
t ion coul.d notgr ow into a sociali st revolution ( the exist-
ence of irnper iall s m, th e contin uinc- azrarian revolut ion
undevelopad and of the
tional bourgeoIs.Ie III t he revol ution) were groundless.
I in my articl e, "The Soviets in
China as a .Special Far m of 'pemocr at ic Dict atorsh ip of
the Prolet arrat and Peasantry (Commnnist I nternational
1934) , I had exami ne d th e Leni ni st propositions of
Commtern t hat t he Chinese bourgeois-demo cratic rev-
olution could grow in to a socialist revoluti on. I stressed
that this would occur t he moment t he bourzcots- derno-
crat ic r evolution won a deci sivo victory in China. I told
the Pl enum that t he basic concepts presented in t his ar-
t icl o had been approved by the Comint ern .
Mao did no t dare, at that ti me and for many years
later, to publish hi s report " to the 2nd Plenum of th e
Seventh Centr al Committee. Neit her did h e cl ar e t o de-
mand that a r esolu ti on be ado pted on hi s report.
Naturally, the talk he had wit h me in December 1948
and my speech at the 2nd Pl enum had anger ed Mao. I n
hi s concludi ng remarks at the 2nd Plenum he re buked
me for continuing to oppose t he "thoughts of Mao Tse-
tung" , and sa id my speech was "full of poisons". ',':'
,. Mao's repor t, consi derably altere d, was first published in
1960, in the four th volume of hi s Selected Works.
''' ' When tIle Plenum closed, Mao stayed behind . I asked him:
"What did you mean by my speech being full of poisons?" He
said: "There were at l east eight or ten poisonous points. First,
Tlt e "theses " of hi s concl uding remarks wer e Int er ci r-
culatod among Purl y member s. One of them wa s: "How
to help Comrade ' Yang Min go re ct i fy hi s mist nkcs". This
was a sig na l for It new nnti -Wang Mi ng campaign .
On Hi March t 949 a t 5 p.m. , Mao vi sited me. (We
lived then in the villa ge of l l si pei po, Pi ngsl iau county,
Hopch pr ovi nco.) II e sh owed me the " conl essi ons" of Po
Ku, Lo Fu and Yang Shang -ku n, and said I 111I1St al so
writ e a "confession r evili ng three", that is, revi ling my-
se lf , r e\'iling them (Po Ku, Lo Fu, Yang Shang-ku n and
oth er s), and r evili ng the Russians. Th er eupon, with ob-
vious pride, Mao told me h ow he had forced Po Ku and
t he oth er s t o writ e their "con fessions" . Sudd enl y, he
rai sed hi s voi ce: "If you don' t write it , I'll treat you as
I treat ed Po 1\:11. " I ca tego ri ca ll y r efll sl' d to do th o absurd
and improper thi ng he ask ed. I said it would be cr imi nal ,
and warned him: " If you dare stain your hands wit h
' Yan g Mings bl ood , you wi ll earn th e re puta tion of
cou nter-r evol u tioJlary and t r aitor to commu ni sm, whlch yon
will never be abl e t o wash off." I al so sa id: " Not only
do I refuse to writ e, ImL also to r ead anyth i ng of the
ki nd. " I asked h im to take the " confessi on s" away.
Crimson to hi s cal'S, Mao said: "Whether or not vou
write a conf ession is up to you Lo decid e. T will l eave
in my report th er e was no mention of Marxi sm-Leninism, Lenin.
Stalin and the Comintern. Your speech, on th e other hand, had
so J!iHny ql!otlltions an n refer ences to Mnrxl sm-Leninism, and to
Lenin, Sta lin and the Comintern about th e Chinese r evolution
th at th e comr ades will think you are th e only one who r ecognises
them, and . I do not recogn ise them. Aft er your spee ch, during
thc int erv al . I portraits of Marx, En gels, Lenin and
Stalin to he hung up III the hall. In my concl uding remarks, to
mak e up Ior Illy omission, I suggest ed 'thn t all comr ades should
t \\'I']:-'e books of Marx. Enge ls, Lenin and Stali n, But thi s
\ \ ' 111 not out the imp ressi on cr eated by your speec h, Is th is
not. II, poison? my repor t to the Pl enum gnvn 110 sys -
t emati c . eXP,ll1ll at lOll uf question s of th e Chi nese revolu tion.
I said. \I as t hat the Chinese revolution had urban period s and
}ural per iods. and th at the r ovolu t ionarv war would conti nu e
OT' anoth er three 10 five I about th e curren t sta p
r
f
r ev1.lutlon and th e polit lca l line. questions of home
orergn P? I Cy. and so Oil . In your speech, on the oth er ha nd
the que stions of th e Chin ese revolut ion ar a present ed ns s stord
and are out that it looked li ke '
up 0If histor tcal r esult s. I'his creat ed tho impr ession th at you
g
not . were milki ngo th » r eport to tl 1'1 ' V < • •
puisnn ?" \11 ' . II I r'· . ie cnum. \ as th is not
. . • III ,. 10 I st !! d " t 1 ' 0 ." I "
t ions for each uf . ell iorsons'. pro vlrlod expluua-
t he se three for you to r ead " I ' 1
t I
· ' . r llmamce [r ue t o I ·t t
m en nne (lJd not r ead t hem . 1\I CIl" (,1' . __ I n y :; .a ()-
tl I tl . ,'r , r:"t Ill, w h o g l n n c tHI
\ . 101;1, s,ald:. ' 1 he ha sic content of t hese 'con-
(.f I 0 Ku, 1. 0 F u and Yang Shang - ku n WII K Ull -
qu ostionahly Iabricntcd by Mao Tse-tung. "
I had so fir ml y r ef used to write a " confes sion
t hr ee", Mao devised new in t rigues against me.
On _b Oct ober Ior example , l .o lold t he I'ol ithureau
include " Poin l No. !r' (on Wang- l\ling) in it s
and OIl 9 June 1n:J0 ti ,e 3rd PJ e lll J1I1 of t he Se ven th
Commi ttee, al so. on his in si sten ce, adopted a
DeCI SIOn 011 COl I1 l'Hdo \ Vilng Miug. The two decisions
t o a demand that I sho uld acknowl edge the
' mis t akes of 'Yang Ming's political lines duri ng the civi l
war an d the anti-J apane sc war" Iabricated by Mao dur-
the "style rectiflcation" campaign. Though the dcci-
SIOn. of the 3rd Plenum said t.hat " Comrade ' Vang Mi ng-
conti nues to r efuse t o repent his pa st mistakes" I was
certain th at my position was correct: the t ruth
was on my side. The decision read: " The 3rd Pl enum of the
Central Committee has decided that Comrade Wang Ming
must at long last ful fil t ho de cision of the 2nd CC Plenum
and de eply repent the commission of fundam ental mi stakes
in his variou s articles, pamphlets and other documents
writ ten during the civil war and the war of resi stance
to Japan". Yet , th er e had been no deci si on of t he 2nd
CC Pl enum demandi ng such a s ta tement fr om me. The
first J h ear d of suc h a demand was on 23 Octo be r 1949
from Liu Shao-chi , whom Mao had sent to me,
The t al k with Liu Sh an-chi she ds light on the situat ion
i n which .Mao Iabricated tho "two li nes of Wang Ming"
an d explains why he wanted me to wr ite such a stateme nt .
"Why did you write so prolifically durinz the civil war
and the anti -Japanese war -e-several million words in
all?" Li n asked me. "You wrote arti cl es, r eports and
and even a book on th e s tr uggle against th e
Li Li-sen line. Look aro und you , has an yone else in our
Part y. writ ten as much as you have? Nobody has. And
since you wrote so much, Chairman Mao was able t o
t ake two phrases at random during th e s tyl e r ect ificat ion,
and turn th em into two oppor tuni st li nes. Is t his a l ot ?
On e could take more phrases, and easily produce 20, 200
and 2,000 lines. That Chairman Ma o asks you to wr ite
a s tatemen t is nothing but a point of organisational
procedure. He knows you will not write it. Mind. you,
even if you wrote it, it would be of no use.
Mao can then say tha t everything you wr ote IS at
variance with the thoughts of Mao Tse -tung, so your
writing the st atement will be in vain." .
Most of the comrades in the Central Committee knew
that in the civil war and the anti-Japanese war Wang
Ming represented the correct, Comintorn line, and that
it was Mao Tse-tu ng who, in bot h these periods, followe d
an incorrect political li ne and many
tal mi stakes. This is why , despite the donunciations
and threats contained in the decisio ns of th e Politbureau
an d the 3rd Central Committee Plenum, I was able
(knowing that these decisions had been taken under
Mao' s pressure and were contrary to th e facts and the
truth of history) to continue defending the truth and
denouncing the untruth, and not wr iting the statement:
Here is the t ext of the Decision on Comrade Wang Ming
of the 3rd Plenum of the Seventh CC, taken on 9 June
1950: . d b C d W
" In view of th e mistakes commI tte y e ang
Ming during the civil war and, the war of to
Japan, the 2nd Plenum of th e Central m.Feb-
ru ary 1 instructed Comrade Wan? Mmg to writ e a
statement to the Politbureau. At that time .C.omr ade Wang
Ming said that he would honour this deCISJOIl. B.ut he IS
continuously deferring his promise though the
has issued reminders. On 23 Octobe r 1949, Liu Shao-chi
was sent to talk to Comrade Wang Ming on behalf of
the Politbureau. He told Comr ade Wang Ming th at he
must respect the decision of the 2nd CC Plenum and
that it is a misdemeanour on his part to delay matters
and not write the statement. He said that Comrade Wang
Ming must promptly produce th e ?,n 26 Oc-
tober 1949, having heard Comrade Liu Shao-chi s account
of his t al k with Comrade Wang Ming, the Politbureau
informed Comrade Wang Ming of the following: 'Com-
rade Wang Ming is obliged to obey th e decision of the
2nd CC Plenum and, abi ding by the general trend of the
criticism expressed against him by comr ades at the 2nd
CC Plenum, and also by virtue of the oral consent given
by him at tho Plenum, must wr ite the statement more
promptly and submit it for study to the Politburcau.'
On 6 November 1049, in a letter to the Chair man, Com-
i 42
rade Wang Ming said that he had writt en a letter con-
cerning mistakes at the time of th e civil war to th e 7th
Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee on 20 April
1945, his rea.diness completely to accept the
Resolution on Some POInts of History adopted by the
7th CC on 20 April 1945. Though he subsequentl y
told the Chairman that he disagreed with this resolution
lie refused to make any additional statements on the
grounds t hat he had initially expressed his readiness to
accept th e Resolution. As for mistakes committed duri ng
t he of resi stance to Japan, he declared his readiness
to abide by the conclusions of the Central Committee but
to make any statement on this scor e. '
The 3rd CC Plenum has the impression that Comrade
Wang Ming is still r efusing to r epent hi s past mistakes
tha t he is insincer e towards the Central Committeo and
holds th at his fail ure to fulfil the decision of 2nd
and his reluctance to write a statement to the
Po!,tLbure au constitute un disciplined behaviour.
For this r eason, the 3rd CC Plenum has decided
that:
"Comrade Wang Ming mus t ful fil the decision of th e
2nd CC Pl enu m. He must express his deep repentance of the
fundament al mi stakes containe d in various arti cles
pamphlets and other documents which he wrote in
periods of the civil war and the war of resi stance to
Japan, provi ng thereby that he has deeply understood and
admits his mi stakes, and that he has truly corrected th em
in th eory and in practice. As soon as he writes the state-
ment, it must be immediately submitted for study to the
Poli tbureau of the CC. If necessary, the Polithureau will
forward it for discussion to the next CC Pl enum."
The foll owing explanations are in order.
1. It is not t rue that the 2nd CC Plenum, held in
Mar ch 1949, took any decisio n instructing me "to write
a statement to the Politbureau". It was in a one-page
ste ncill ed circular, "Theses of the Concluding Remarks
at t he 2nd Pl enum of the CC (13 March 1949)", that
Mao Tse-tu ug put down the following words under
Point 6: "How to help Comrade Wang MinC7 rectify his
mistakes ." t>
2. The 3r d Pl enum's Decisi on on Comrade Wang
Ming of 9 June 1950 was forwarded to me through the
CC Chancellery as late as 30 July. I had just r eturned
143
"" UIIl Ti ents in, wher e i was on a tour of insp ecti on, find
th en 1 fell ill. Furth ermore, I was inv olved. in the
pl'epal'ULions for the firs t all-China juridical
1'01' whi ch I was hurri edly wr iting a r eport and dr awln?
up (hafts conce rni ng a criminal code, .So, it was not until
17 Auuust t hat I found time t o wrr tc a l etter to Mao
in whi ch I as ke d him the foll owing:
1) IT ow much ti me am I given? I need LIme to l ook
t hru ugh all my articles, pamphl ets and other
wri tte n durinz the civil war and the war of resi stance
I> •
to Jap an and to draw conc lus ions.
. 2) I need the notes for my r eport to the
1\):-1 7 1' ulit bureau meet ing, and al so my not ebook, which
were taken from me, as they were from by Wang
Shall-tao ch ief of t he CC secretariat, on Mao s orders at
the mill th e Pol itbureau mooting, and which have not
been returned. . " (
:)) Defore the evacuation of Yenan III U1. 7, my vVu-
han files of Hsinhu.ajihpao and files of t he Yonan news-
paper Hsinchunghuapao, and much other materi al had,
on Mao' s or ders, be en sent to Wayopao. All trace of
them was l ost. In roy l ett er to Mao I demanded that
t hey be r eturned to me or a new set, be given..
Though very busy at that tune, and also III phYSI-
ca lly weak, I wanted \,0 look t hrough eve ryt hi ng I
wri t ten before produ cing for the Party an hon est
up of it s activity based on the tr;l e fac.ts hi st ory,
whi ch bore no r esemblance t o Mao s fal slfrcaLlOlls. But
Mao did not r epl y to my l ett er . And on 25 October h e
sud den ly arran ged for my immedi at e departure to the
Sov iet Union.
3. The 3rd Plenum's Deci si on on Comrade Wang
Ming says that I had wri tt en a l etter to the ?lh Pl enum
of the Sixt h Centr al Commi ttee on :W April Hl45, ex-
pressing my r eadi ness "comple tely to accept th e Ileso-
lu t ion on Some Points of History" adopte d by th e 7th
Plenum.
As I have said before, I had been r epeatedly poi soned
between th e beginning of Octo ber and tho summer
of H)4::3, This was done on Mao' s orders. At that time,
hi s "st yl e re ctifi cat ion campaign" wa s at i ts hei ght.
When I was in a cr it ical condition, Mao di d not expec t
me to survive . But thanks (0 my stu bbor n r osi stanoo, t o
t he s upport of many of my Par ty comrades and of Com-
144
f ade Geor gi Dimitrov, t hanks to th e good news from the
Sovi et Union (h aving r ecover ed fr om its ini ti al setbacks,
th e Sovi et Red Ar my was on t he countor-ollcns ivc},
and thanks to the new treatment foll owing th o doctors'
consultation in the summer of 1913, my h ealth had
begun to improve, though I was still bedridd en and had
fr equ ent pai nful a ttacks ,
Mao was pl anning Lo convene t he 7th Congress of th o
ere in April I 945 . 'f his was wh y Lhe 7th Pl enum of
the Six th Central Committee was called on 20 April ,
Rut in th e begi nnin g of t he month he had se nt me th e
draft of th e on Some Points of His tory, and
aske d me to study It. Then, twice he se ut Liu Shun-chi
Chou En-Jai, Jen Pi-shih and Chu Teh to speak t o me:
and onc e he ca me himself. I was urged to wr it e a state-
ment acknowledging th e resoluti on and " repent ing my
mi stakes". I r efu sed. '=>
Fri end s ca me to me, ann we discussed my cours e of
act ion. The day of t he Soviet Union's fina l victory over
Iascist Germany was swiftly approach in g. It was cl ear'
that eve n if I refused t o r ecognise the r esolution, Mao
would hardly dar e t o expel mo Ir om th e Party. But my
comra des argued that , Iirst, th e Comintern had been
di ssolved and th er e was no l onger an orga nisa Lion befor e
which I could plead my case. According t o the Par ty
Rul es tho minori ty was obliged to submit t o the maj or -
ity. The coming 7th Congr ess was being pre pared under
Mao 's complet e con trol. At present , I had nei ther oppor-
tuni ty nor physica l strength to put my views to the
Congress. Besi des, th e Congress would not be abl e to
alter th e re soluti on of th e 7th CC Plenum. Se cond, my
comra des said, peopl e in the country an d abroa d had
not yet fully under s tood th e r eacti onary essenc e of Mao ' s
"styl e r ectilicat ion cam pa ign".
A l ong s tr uggle agains t Mao l ay ahea d, t he y sa id, and
by preserving me th ey would pr eser ve the truth of th e
Party and th e l eader (I f th e anti-Ma o str uggle . If I
wer e' t o r efu se t o acknowledge the 7Lh Pl enum rcsolu-
Lion, the 7th Cong ress woul d pro bably " adopt " an iden-
ti cal r esoluti on, and if I wer e again to ref use, I could
be expelled fr om th e Party, making tho str uggle agains t
Mao still mor e dif ficul t.
Th ese were the r easons wh y I t old th e 7th CC Pl enum
that I submit te d to th e Con Ir a1 Committee deci sion.
11<5
On 2:1 December HJ<i5 I made a report;, "On th e
rent Situation and the Tasks of the Party , at a meeung
of cadres of the ce ere Party committee, N?rthwest
Bureau, and the Party committee of the Shensl-Kansu-
Ning haia Bord er Ar ea. It was attended by than
1,000 people. This report, which presented my, Idea the
riaht pol itical course was in content dIanwtrlCally
to r epo'rt to the 7th CPC Congress, " On
Coalition Go\,el'llment". »
AIt er I had Imished my report, a few comrades came
up to me and said: " As lon g as there are trees on
hill there will be wood for th e fire." And lat er , after
Illy 'two-hour speech at the 2nd Plenum in March
when I sho wed tha t Mao was in effect . r.onouncm
g
soci ali st revoluli on and the building of socialism, there
I
, ' I t e: "Did you notice that
were comr ades w 10 saH 0 m . .
ever ybody li st en ed to yo u in compl et e SIl ence two
hours? It is a lon g time since we heard ill
This was the Iirst and the last tunc since y
. ' tl I I t ool' part In a CC pl enum. Later,
poi soning Ill. . \ U • CC
during my st ay in Peking, I coul d n?l take part. .
pl enums or the all-China Party Conf erence for raasons
of health. , 20 A '1 1(\45 I
In vi ew of th e fad that foll oWlIl,g . pn
(lid noL write a s tatement and con unue d an ti-Mao
str uggle, Mao made th e and the drd
of the Seven th Central Committ ee adopt the aloresaid
dec isions. I • I
From Novembe r 1950 t o November 1953 I was 1I1 t re
Soviet Union.
Then , from \J December 19;;;), when I r eturned to
Peking, until 30 Janu ar y 19SG, when 1 again l eft Peking
for Moscow, th ere were many other episodes in Mao's
persecution of \Vaug Ming and \Vaug Ming's s tru ggl e
ag ai nst Mao 'I'se-tung . Le t me descr ibe some of them.
Aft nr Mao 's mist akes - his rejection of socialist rev-
olutio n and the building of social is m-we re cri ticised
at th e end of 1952, many people began to under stand
th at the line I had ba cked at the 2nd Plenum of the
Se venth Central Committee (th e bourgeois-democratic
ruvoln lion g rows into a soc ia list revoluti on the moment
it wi ns through out th e country) was correct, while th e
t t " Wang Mi ng, Lenin, Lenin ism and the Chinese Revolu-
10 11, Moscow, 1970.
14G
line imposed by Mao at the sa me Pl enum (aft er victory
t he r evolution will for a l ong Lime foll ow the road of
" ne w demo cracy", that is, th e r oad of capitalist develop-
ment) was incorrect. This was why, for a time Mao
had stopped asking me for my sta temen t. But the
all-China Party Conference in March 1955 he read out
a letter from a certain Fu Chen-shenc addressed t o Mao
and the presidium of th e conference.
o
The autho r of the
letter heaped slander on me." I was bedridden at the
llJ,ltil 30 ,J an uar y '195G, through the interven-
of Liu Shao-chi an d athol' comrades, including a few
Sov!e t . comrades, was 1 t ak en fr om Peking Hospital to
a SOViet plane, and on 1 February again arrived in
Moscow, so dear to all of us.
4) Most Party leaders were declared
"counter-revolutionary suspects"
Those leading members of the Central Committee, such
as Chou En-lai (member of th e Politbureau and Central
Committee Se cretary) , Chu Teh (member of th e Politbu-
reau and commander of th e 8th Route Army) , J en Pi -shih
(member of the Politbureau), Teng Fa (member of the
PoliLhureau), and Pong Teh-huai (alternate member of
th e Politbureau and deputy commander of the 8th Route
Army) ,':":' who had been acc used of "empir icis m" and
"dogmatism" during Mao 's "st yl e rectification " cam-
paign, were charged with " counter -revolution ary activity"
during the "emer gency salvation" peri od. At various
meetings people were prompted to cast sl ander at them.
Even a renegade like Kang Sheng (member of the
Politbureau) , who capitalised on anything he could and
for whom no misdeed was too vile, and a wily operatur
like Ch en Yun (member of th e Poli tbureau and alter nat e
member of the CC Secretar ia t) , wh o always held his
nose to th e wind, had admitted t o being " wicke d em-
piri ci sts" during the pr eparator y peri od of "style rec-
tification". It was only after they had don e so that Mao
included them among the campaign officials. Out of the
whol e Politbureau and Central Committee Secret ar iat
only two men r emained above cr iticism-Mao Tse-tung
. * The Iou or was given to me to read and I have a copy
of It. '
,'" Her e and further we give only their chief duties.
\ 0* 14'i
(member of th e Pol itbureau and ee Sncrctnry} , wh o
him self asserted hi s absol ute " purity and infall ib ility"
and t ook it up on himse l[ t o per secute and repress ot hers,
and Liu Shao-chi (alternate member of P olithureau
and Seeretary of th e CC Cf' C Ce ntral Chin a Bur eau),
whom Mao employe d exte nsivel y for his own ends, Every-
body was ordered and expected to speak of th ese two
onl y in pr ai se. . .
The unl awful acts commi tted by Mao dunng. , r ec-
tilicati on of s tyle " and the sa lva l lo.n w? re
not - and, of COU I'se, could not be-;- sub] eet c1JSCUSSlOll
0[' approval a t 01' . p leuUl.ns .
From the heginnlng of the s tyle campa ign
Mao bad ignor ed th e Party's leading .10d1Os -
the Politbureau, Se cre t ari at, and Central Committ ee !Ie
formed and personally contro lled a cen tral ISSlOn
f;)r the conduc t of the style
issued order s a nd in struction s 1ll It s name and fas c1hull-
" , f 1,1 e CC cpe Military Coun cil. Belying or irutc
man 0 1 , . 1 . J ' Ii I,
force on the guard r egiment that was direct y S,ll 111a .-
ed to him, he committed all sor ts of and evil
acts. Thi s continued i n ylC subsequont , , Upon
lnunchinz th e notoriou s cultural r evol uti on , he corn-
pl etely ignored all the l eadi ng bodi es. of P art y and
and for med a "group for the aii airs of t he
revolution", which oper at ed under his (hrect,Jon.
As before, he issued commands and Or dl11' S 1ll th e
of this group and as chairman of the CC CP.C Military
Council. Backed by a section of the which he had
misguided, an d on the " red guards , thus ac?om-
pli shed a co unter-re volutionary co.up. The styl,e
tion" campaign was, ther efor e, III everybo dy 0RI man,
Mao 's dr ess r ehea rsal of th e "cultural revolution . And
this descripti on of it is, of course, cor rect.
Ii. THE FOURTH PEnIOD-"SELF-REFUTATION
AND HEHABILITATTON"
1) The reasons for the "self-refutation
and rehabilitation" campaign
In this period (summer of 19H-spring of 1945) Ma o
Tse-tung was compelled to procl aim a ca mpa ign of
"self-refutation and rehabilita ti on ". And her e is why.
148
The cont i nuous ly advancing Soviet t roops wer e about
t o clinch the final victory ove r nazi Germany. Yet the
va st maj ority of Purty cadres and Party an d YCL mem-
bers had been branded "counter-r evol uti onaries" It was
imp ossible to distinguish between real and fal se
Out of th e th ousand CC CPC cadres mor e than 900 had
been declared. "counter -rev,olutionari es". Even pupils of
Yenan Primary School, the children of high-rank-
lllg' cadre s, wer e among their number. In Yenan and
o,the)' . liberat ed areas, ofIl cia Is in charge of "style rec-
tifi cation among t he masses" used to sum mon th e peas-
ants of a village, t o line them up and order them to
f t bei "
con ess 0 emg "ene my spi es"
or " nat ional tr aitors", Those who " conf essed" were
all owed to go home; those who refused were subjected
to proces sing-hun g up by th eir arms, beaten , and put
un der guard, So, t he vast majori ty of the loc al popula-
t ion, irresp ective of sex and age, had "owne d up" to
being "count er -r evoluti onari es" or " en emy spi es" or
"national traitors". And, naturally, most of th e leading
cadr es and rank-and-file Party and YCL members, and
al so people outs ide th e Party, were shocke d and dis-
gus ted.
The campai gn of "self -r efutati on an d r ehabilitation"
was or ganis ed 'on th e following lines.
AL a meetin g of t he Central Commi ssion for the Rec-
tificati on of Sty le. Mao said that Wang Ming and some
oth er l ead er s of th e Central Committee, and many top-
ranking cadres of the Party, government and army, had
committ ed dogmati c or empiric is t mistakes and followed
"left" or right lines. These mi stakes, he said, coul d not
be refuted, and the people who had committed them
could not be rehabilitated, Yet , he adde r! : "There arc
now n o poli ti cally uncl ear questi ons concer ning these
peo ple, that is, ther e is no suspici on of counte r-revolu-
tion, betrayal, or any other type of political unreli abil-
ity. All charges of this kind made agai ns t them may
now be self -refu t ed. "
He then said that those who had been declared "conn-
ter-re volutionaries", "enemy spies" or " nat ional tra ito rs "
were entit led to " self-ref ute" t he ir previ ous "confess ions "
and would thereupon he "rehahilitater!".
Those who wer e in ch ar ge of " style r ectifica ti on" and
"emergency salva t ion" wer e or dered to " summon" and
persu ade all those who had undergone "rectificati on"
and persecuti on to r efut e their confess ions, so that th ey
could be r eli eved of the label s of "counter-r evolutionary",
" en emy spy", "national traitor", and the like. They
would thus reg ain th eir freedom and win the opportu-
nity for being- rehabilitated. As a result, all tho se who
had confesse d " crimes" wr ote "self-refutations" , wh er e-
upon th e "styl e r ectifi cation commissi on" immediat ely
abs olved th em of "counter-revolutionary" and other
"offenses" . Mao maintained that all th e injus tices of th e
campaign stemmed from tho poli cy of "compulsion,
confession, and foll owed by Kang Sheng,
wh o had fail ed to obse rve the "nine instructions" issu ed
t o him by Mao, and, in particular, tho princi ple of
"execute no one, arres t only a few". (Kang Sheng later
complained that he had never heard of any nine inst ruc -
tions.) Thus Mao un consciousl y admitte d !ha.t very
many peopl e had been kill ed and that the majority had
been imprisoned.
It has been estimated in various quarters that a
mi nimum of 50,000-60,000 people were kill ed in the
"style rectification" campaign , whil e tho nu mber of peo-
ple arrested defies calculation. And here is another,
bitter and appalling faet . Obeying Mao' s order of "e mer-
gency salvation", Jao Shu-shi (acti ng of, tho
CC CPC Central China Bureau and political commiss ar
of th e New 4th Army) declared the several tens of thou-
sa nds of young men and women who had come fro,m
vari ous par ts of the country t o the lib er ated areas III
Centr al China to take part in the anti-Japanese war and
gai n r evoluti onar y knowl edge, to be "enemy spies",
"na tional tra itors" and "coun t er-r evoluti onari es", th ough
many of them wer e Party or yeL membe rs of lon g
standing. Ex pelled from the li ber ated areas, these youn g
peopl e fell int o th e hands of th e Japan ese occupa tion
forces or their puppets, and were executed.
In the Shensi-Kansu-Ni nghsia Bord er Area Mao in-
eiled local cadres against cadres who had come from
else where. As a r esult, ma ny of the latt er wer e killed,
ma imed or beat en. Later , when the dust had settled,
" to confess, "confession" under pressure, and
confidenco ID that the evidence obtained by compulsion was
true.
the local cadres and the comrades from other local -
ities were equa lly bitter about the whole thin g . nd
equall y sorry. ' a
2) The so-called poli cy or magnanimity
t?,e height of the "self-refutations" and "r ehabiIita-
, . Mao ordered hi s secur it y agencies to carrv out
a pnlicy of ma gnanimit y", ur gin g" t he inmates of
. pfl son:-murrler.ers, robbers, rnal counter-revol-
u ti onar ies. national traitors enemy spies and tl 1'1
t "f " , ' , < re 1 {e-
. re ute their earlier te:timony. Foll owing this, they
\\ Pr e nil r.eleased. Dr. Chill M too, who had
been nomlnallv serving hi s sentonce (for poisoning
Wang Ming) in the Social Department of the ec epc
lost no tim e to "refute" hi s pr evi ous evidence . In short '
a man wh o was supposed to " atone for hi s guilt by
labour" became a man of ."merit". He was allowe d to go
free and was at once appointerl trf'ali ng physician to Mao
Tee-tung and members of the CC CPC Polithureau,
After the lib erati on of Peking, Chin W ::IS made deputy
chief of Peking Hospital , whi ch had been set aside for
l eaders of th e Party, government and army, and for
other top- echelon cadres . Th ough in 1952 the health
department of the ec CPC Mil itary Canneil was com-
pell ed, due to numerous protests, to dismiss Chin from
his office in Peking Hospital , he was at once appoint ed
chief of the 2nd Central Hospi t al , an d according t o
Jenminjihpao reports (12, 16 and 18 February 1973) ,
is now a high-ranking official of the Heal th Mini s try.
* As menti oned earlier, Chi n MaO-F lO had confessed to me
that Li Fu -chun had on Mao' s i nstructl ons or dere d him to poison
me. Neithe r I nor he could at t hat ti me reveal th is secre t. A
speci all y organi sed "Chi n Mao-yno tribunal" . chai red by Li n
Shao-chi and including Kang Shong and Li Fn-chun. ru led: "Chin
Mao-yao has confesse d that he poisoned Wang Ming on th e
instructi ons of the cha irman of tho Kn omi n tnnz Reel - Cross. a
per son named Chu. who belongs to th e Chen- Li-fu gr oup",
Thereupon, tho tr ibunal provisionall y sentenced him to five wars
impri sonment. But t he r ul ing also said: "In pursua nce of Cha ir-
man Mao's poli cy of mngnanimitv, Chin Mao-van shall he allowed
to con tinuo his nractl co as physician duri ng the period of i m-
pr isonment i n or der to at one for hi s gui lt by labour." During th o
"self-r efu tation an d r ehabilitation" campaign Chin Mao-yao
"refut ed" hi s earli er testimony. saving that "he had not de-
Iihl!ratcly poisoned Wang Ming" and th at th is had happ ened by
an over sight.
ri. TITE FIFTH PEnIOD-"SUl\lMING UP"
During lhis peri od (spring and summer of 1945) Mao
Tse-tung summed u p the r esult s of . t he f.our-year
campai gn of "rec tif ying s tyle " i n the ide ologic al , po-
litical , and orga nisat iona l sphe res.
1) The ideologl eal and politi cal re sults
The ideol ogi cal and politi cal r esults wer e up
first. They - wer e defin ed chiefly in th e Resolution on
Some Points of Hi st or y wr itt en by Mao by
the 7th Plenum of th e Six th Con trn l Committee, and 1Il
instructions concer ning' th e " t ho ugh ts of Ma o T ao-tung
in the Gener al Pr incipl es of t h e Party Rul es ad opted
by the 7th CPC Congress. Th e no tor ious 7th PI.enum
Hesolution was the first document in which. th o
of t he Party was openly Ialsi ficd. Billow IS tho basi c
content of th is Il esolu tion:
1. Tt proclaimed the " great r ol e" Mao
tung and t h e " though ts of Mao Tao-tung " 111 th.e hi s-
tory of tho Cl'C. The CPC, it said, had al ways on
" Mao' s thoughts" and th er e had al ways been the cor-
rect line of Mao Tao-tung" in the Party.
.
2. It sa id that th e CPC owed all its a: hievement s . III
24 years t o Mao' s l eader ship and the Impl emCI:.tatmn
of hi s "thoughts", wher eas all th e faults and mistakes
were ascribed t o others.
. r.:
3. It said th a t th e pnlit.ical li nes of th e ,Hh and ,)t.h pl e-
nums of tb e Six t h Cen tr al Committ ee (Ja nu ary 1931 and
January Hl::M) wer e" ' Icf t --op portun lst " li nes. .
4. It said th at the Tsunyi coufcr ence had rectified
t he "left" -oppor tu ni st lin e of th e above t wo plenums
established "the corr ect l eadership of Mao Tso-tung III
the epe.
li . thr
5. It said that Mao r epr es ent ed Lhe cor rec t me III rc
Sovi et a reas, and Li n S hao-chi r ep resented the correct
iine in the whi t e areas, and th e l ike.
'f Durin g th e "st yl e rcct lficat lon" uS,e.ll
as a cover: ac tually. he opposed, . '.!' hl s I S why th e
original dr af t of tllll Hesol ution sa id: Maoi sm 15 a blend 0/
gener al t ru th s of Mar- xism wi t h t he concr ete pr acti ce 10 . 10
Chinese r ovolut lon" Th o second dr aft WRS produ ced at Lio LImo
tIl() ' Soviet A'rmy hall reached .Lhe
Berlin and t he word " Marxism was r epl aced by ,?I Xlsm
Lenini'sm", and "Maoi sm" by "thoughts of Mao Tso-tung .
The Resoluti on was never pu blished i n the pr es s.
And it is i n orde r to note that th e Resol uti on of tho
7t h Plenum of th e Sixth Central Committee publ ished
i n the fifti es i n l\Iao's Selected rVarks, though dat ed
20 April '1945, was i n fact an en ti re l y new t ext. It was
fa lsified for th e ben efit of Joseph Sta li n an d members of
the CC CPSU.
For example:
1. Through ou t th e "st.yl e r ectificati on " campa igon 1\L10
i ndul ged i n all ki nds of an t i-Soviet sl ander, comp l etel y
negati ng the z reat contri bu tion of Leni nism and t he Com-
intern to th e Commu ni sl Party of China and t he Chinese
r evolution. But since the Sovi et Army h ad bv then
already def ea ted Hi t.J er German y. Mao did not. dare t.o
writ e his slanders agai nst th e Corni ntern int o the Heso-
Iu ti on . He s imply did not. men t ion Leni nism and t he
Comintern i n the 1 Resolution . The Resol utio n pub-
li sll ed in t he fift ies Jllentions Lenin and th e Comin t ern,
and even gives th e Comint ern con cept pr ecedence i n
r elation t o th e basic issues of the Ch inese r evolu ti on.
adding th at. Mao's opinion coi ncided wi th it. It main tains.
quit e groun dl es sl y, t hat Mao "d evel oped the t eac hin g
of Lenin and Stalin on the questions of colonies and
s emi-colonies . and th e t eaching- of Stali n On the ques-
ti ons of the Chinese r evoluti on".
2, The or iginal Res olu t. ion of th e f orti es claimed th at.
th e " t. hough ts of Mao Tse-tung" were th e sole guide of
th e Cmn mll n ist ParIv of Chi na and of th e Ch i nese r ev-
ol ution, The Rf'so ITll.ion published in th e fift. i es does
not. even Irnve t he ter rn "thouzhts of J\lao Tse-tung", It
says: "The id eas of Marx ism-Leni nism as r epresent.ed
by Comrade Mao Ts e-tung.".
3. The so-called " tIl i rd 'l eft. '-oPDort n nist, line" and
it s compariso n with t he line of Ma'o 'I'se-tunz. an d t he
"impor tance" and " 1'011::" of the Tsunvi conference-all
il lis ,was ment ioned i n so many word s i1; t he or ig inal Res-
elution. whereas t he Resolut.ion of t he fifties cont. ai n ed
a more th oro ugh faJsi ficat icn, T here are also ot he r differ-
ences in the two t exts.
LM' t. but. not least, tlwse two resol uti ons. though dif-
fer ing fr om nne anot. her in content hava one ident ical
Ienture, namel y : not n word is saili in them abou t th e
all-round s u pport and aid render ed to the Communis t.
Part y of China and t ho Ch illcse hv l he CPS U
anrl IIIC Soviet Un ion.
" -
In sum, th e Resolution concocted by Mao in the forti es
with t he purpose of fal sifying t he hi st ory of t he CPC,
was itself subjected to fal si ficati on in t he fifti es. In
years t o come, in other times and other circumstances,
Mao will not balk at new fal sificati ons of t his Resolu-
t ion for th e sake of some personal aim. Ever since the
" styl e r ect ificati on" campa ign he has "distingui sh ed
himself" -for sel f-aggr an di zement and t o attack othflrs-
in fal sifications : he fal si fied history, fa bricated " fact s" ,
cou nterfeited documents and writings. For this he
r esorted t o " cover t intri gu es" and " overt intri gues";"
In short, Mao Tso-tung is an adroit and experienced
m anag cr of th e fi r m - Mao and Co. sp ecialising in
all sorts of fal sificati on s. But past experience shows
th at tr uth is always t r uth , and untruth always untruth.
The truth ca nnot become an uu lruth any mo ro t ha n an
untruth can become the truth . On e ca n deceive people,
but this only for a time. The truth is immutabl e. And no
matter how' much ink and energy Mao expends, he will
never succeed in changing the fact s of th e history of the
CPC. His exe r tions only emphasise his di sgrace.
Wi th a " swor d" in one hand and "Mao's t ho ughts" in
the other. Mao compell ed the 7th Pl enum of the Six th
Central Commi ttee t o adopt his wholly fal se Re solution
on Some Points of Hi st ory ; then , with a " sword" in one
hand and t his Resolution in the other , he compelled the
7th Conzrcss of t he CPC t o wri te in th e Gen eral Princi-
ples of the Partv Ru les t hat t he CPC "is guide d in all it s
work bv th e thought s of Mao Tee-tung" .
Mao ·hoped that wi th a " sword" in one hand and the
Gen er al Pri nci pl es of the Party Rul es in t ho other, he
would then substitute the " th ough ts of Mao Tee-tung"
for Marxi sm-Leninism. and that nobody would ever
al!a in da re to go against Mao's "thoughts", lin e and pol -
* At th e 2nd Pl enum of th e Ssventh Cantrnl Cornrnittea. Mao
said : "According to W ang- Ming the stvl o r ectification campaign
was an int ri gn ». T SIl Y thllt it. was not a cove r t int rlr-no. but an
OVAI'I T s ai d pub llclv t h at I want to rlismi ss W lln g Mi n g
t nk o nlace. an d t herefore WTot A th " Oil SOIl[p'
of Ri st on ' . I sha ll still writ » h :st orv. Row rn n thi s h<>
dp's(,J'I !Jp. r),,"s a ro',"er t intI'i g'Ilr.? T See it onl v I'lS nn overt inf,riiUR,"
I askl'd: What did you msn n when vou snid VOIl ", nntl' d tn tak n
pl nce? I WIlS not th e concrnl socre tarv." Ma o renl lod: "Po J<1I
Lo Fu wore sp.crr;>t nr ies only nomina ll v. Afte r t hp.
t Pl enum of the SIxth Centra l CornmItloe, Wantr Minz \VIIS
t o all Intents and purposes, th o Par ty' s commander-i n-chief." « c ,
The Iact s have up set hi s plans. Tholl lTh condit ions
cca .me {nore . in tol erabl e, th e t r ue
contJIJUC( their s tr uggle , against Ma o aft er the 7t h
P I n assessmg the politi cal sit uati on and
. n.r y s tas s after vict ory in the anti-Japanese war'
set. t lll ¥ th e course of the agrari an refor m' in estimat'
SItuation during th e war against K;i- I 1'-
dnd . in t he. que:'5tion of tho bourgeoi S-democr ati c s
Into 11. social ist r evolu ti on at th e moment
o I s vIctory-on all t l . 11 .
'. i eso pOInts nino committed
rrous mista kes, and invariahly encoun tered firm
On th e part of Mal'xi sts-Leni nist s. Than ks t tl
as slstanco of the CC CPSU and the f 0 10
I d ' COurse u even ts at
an ?n Lh e. scene, the Party fina lly
" lI n r ectIfymg Mao s erroneous poli ti cal li ne
anc prmctp es .
The 4th Pl enum of the Seventh Central Commit tee
{.Fe bnwl'y 195ti ) criti ci sed and correc te d th e poli tical
1110 th at had r en ounced the socialist way.
MilO had followed hi s in correct lin e for five '
the 2nd Plenum of t he Seventh Central
tee Il1 Hi s mistake concerning the ba sic qu estion
of t he r evoluti on wa s shown t o r epeat Trot sky' s
concept of permanent r evolution" and Chen Tu-hsiu' s
concept of "two-phased" revoluti on. The "thou ghts of
Mao Tse-t ung" suffere d a defeat.
. Furthermor e, th e fight against the per sonality cult and
Its consequences begun hy the 20th Congress of t he
CPSU had a fav ourabl e effect on th e climate in th e CPC.
Mao was compell ed to consent Lo expun ging th e princi-
pl e concer ning the "though ts of Mao Tse-tunc" from the
Gelleral Pr incipl es of th e Party Ilules. The Ilul es adopt-
ed by t he 8th epc Con gress (September 19GB) had th e
" The Communist Party of China is
guided In Its activity by Marxism-Leninism" ,
.Rut Mao , that ext reme in dividualist, careeris t and in -
trI gu er . would not abandon his desi gn s,
Hi s " cultural r evol uti on" , in substance a military
counter-revolutionary coup, completely wrecked the Par-
ty, its Rul es, and the deci sions of the 8th CPC Congress,
Th e Hul es adopted at the Mao-inspired 9th Con zress
ext ol th e "thoughts of Mao Ts c-tung" even more
ly than bef or e. He uses these Rules to combat Marxism-
Leninism.
We ure deeply convinced that this s ta te of affairs is
tornpornry. Soon, th e Communis t Party of China and the
Chinese people will throw out the Itul es of the 9th and
'1Oth congresses together wi th all the "t houghts of
Mao Tse-tu ng". AIl-conquer in g Marxi sm-Leninism will
triumph on Chinese so il for goo d.
2) The "organisational concl usions"
III th o wak« of the ide ological " summing up" came 01'-
zanisatlonal decisions. Though no members or alternate
of tho Politbu rc au , CC Secre tariat or Central
Committee were expelled from these l eading bodies rim-
ing the "style re ctification" campai gn, i t was cle ar from
the eJeclion R at th e 7th Con gress and the Lst Ple-
num of the Seventh Central Committee what " or ganisa-
tional con clusions" Mao woul d now put into effect . To
befuddle th e Congress del ega t es and P art y rank-and-f le,
Mao repeatedly declare d hefo1',e th e ,?lJenin
g
of, t he.
Con O'I'CSS that the purpose of t h e s ty le r ecti ficatlon
had "'been "to achi eve unity OIl a new hasi s flowin g from
the wi sh for unity after pa ssing throu gh struggle".
To cr ea te the impressi on t hat the whol e P arl.y was
"united" Mao resorted to all kinds of st rata gems. For
example,' about half an hour bef ore th e offi cial opening
of the Congr ess, he came to me, approached my bed, and
s aid with all marks of cou r tesy :
"Comrade Wang Ming, on behalf of all the del egates,
the Central Committee, the Poli tbureuu and me person-
ally, I be g yo u to attend t he 7th National Congr ess of
our Party,' whi ch will open p resently."
"1 am ill. As you see, I canno t gel up from my bed,"
I replied. "How can I attend the Congr ess?"
"Two of the best porters hav e come with me. Let me
ask Comrade Moug Clung-shu to h elp you dress and you
will be taken ther e in a se dan-chair ," Mao sai d with
the same polit e mien.
"I can be taken th ere, but I can't s tay a long time,"
T said.
" Can you stay for ab out 15 minutes?" Mao as k ed.
"Just for the open ing cere mo ny, and hetter s till if you
stay a bit l onger to h ear part of my r ep ort. Comrade
Wang Ming, 1 beg y ou t o come. Our 7th Con gr ess is
a co n gre s s of un ity. Y O II I' prese nce will m nkc th i s cle ar .
1 hav e also i u v it.cd Comrade \Vang Chiu- hsinng and sen t
f!it:
H, se dan-chair to his house, He will han ,,' . 1 1 1
Il me yo ueome Let ( .all l\e< JYtlfl
l' olithur ean and the of the
Wang Minz and Wane e Chis I " c e ee omrades
o . ' '" la- isiang TIll S make
congress truly a congress of unit ' I ' I ll ' s ,t:ur
Congr ess expect s hath of yo t y. sna now. I'he
until you come." . u o come. It will not open
When Wang Chi a-h sianO' and I . .
hall, Mao mount ed th e s t;' ( , 1 wer e ca rried into the
s poocl I ps o Lie st age macle " I " f
. " , 1, ant opened t. he COil r S ' A " , '. H H1e
cd , and tho azcnda a . g c'. sl' lHesldll llll was elec t-
1
_ . < '" « nnoun co. All thi s 1
:) mmut es. When Liu Sh ao cl : lIS t oo { ab out
would begin hi s politi cal e' ( -,t II that Mnn
of the hall. r p J I , as ..ed to he taken out
. in these 15 minut es I saw that th
gl oss bore no r oscmhl an-., t . C 7th Con-
, . c J 0 a congress of I ' t 1'1 '
wa s el ear fr om ho w member s of 1 . .' . . un y.
seats when the J' I f 'I Pi 110 presldtum t ook t hei r
on th e ' IS, 0 '. .nam es was r ead . .Mao was alone
.. ' sla.ge anl.l Jll S. at ins vi gor ously, invi tin ,T them
t o JOIIl 111 Ill. L I1I Sh ao-chl. Chou ] . "11- 10.1' Cll l' gl ·.1
J Pi hi] . . J , J II e I aUI
en I-S lJ 1 ascende d the stage and s tood helJinrl the
t he oth er t en of tllO
pr eaidiurn kept t hei r scats i n the llall (CI Y .I(
Sl P , ( len IJ n anc
•. 1 en g Teh-huai .and Ch ang vVen-tien, who
be I e-el ect ed t o th e PohLbureau; Kao Kung and P eng Chen
who were be electe d member s of th e Cen tr al
te e and . Pohtbureau for the first time; Lin Po ehu and
PI -WU, who wer e t o be elect ed members of the
Pol1l!.llll'eaU for t he fir s t time' and rl T .1
II H " ,( 0 .JlIIlg aIH
,su s,lang-clllen , who wer e to he el ected members
of Y1: Commi ttee . the first time). Now, gcs -
vehem ently, Mao i nvited them t o th e platform.
I hey came on e by one, seemi ngly ernbar rnssed, walking
to the cor ner on th e ri ght and seat ing themselves
beside the wall at a di stance from the presidium table.
They were thus hidden fro m view even t o del egates
s ea ted in the fr ont r ows.
Meanwhil e, at th e fro nt of t he stage, where the above-
mentioned five stood beside the presidium table, Mao
Tse-tung wandered fr om on e to the other, while the rest,
th ei r faces r ed from embarrassmen t, shu fil ed about and
prodded each other like children at a party. Th ey did not
know yet wh ere each was expecte d to sit.
Before the " sty le rectificati on" campaign, Liu Shao-
chi had occupied a more modest placo in the Party than
th e other three and he was embarr as sed to tako the sca t
next to Mao 's. ClIOIl En-lai , Chu Teh and Jen Pi-shih (es-
pecially Chou En-lai) been
persecuted during the style rectification campaign
and, of course, did not know what seats they were as-
signed. L' si
At long last Mao seated them as follows: LU la?-
chi in second 'place, Chou in third, Chu :l'eh
fourth , and Jen Pi-shih in filth. All five took their seats
si multane ously. . 1
The vast majority of the delegates showed no specia
emotions. Watching these unseemly arrange-
merits, each delegate naturally formed his own opimon,
observing the proceedings with a sense of estrange-
ment.
Suc h strange goings-on had been at any
pr evi ous congress of Party. This small episode was
a reflection of the prevailing disarray.. .
During the "election" to the leading bodies, Mao again
re sorted to doubl e-dealing. He said to . the delegates:
"Comrade Wang Ming was not only of big, mIS-
takes, but has al so performed gr eat services. It Will be
a good thing to elect him to the Seventh Central Com-
mitte e of Lhe Party."
Li Fu-chun followina Mao 's in structions, manipulat-
ed the Amo;g other things, ho said to the
delegates : "In the case of people like Wang Ming, we
mu st follow the policy of 'shaving the bamboo'. This time
let's 'shave off' his membership in the Polithuroau
and CC Secr etariat, and leave him in the CC. Otherwise
people in side and outside the Party, at home and abroad,
will be confused. "
The " or ganisati onal conclusions" flowing from the
"style r ectification" campaign mainly affected "elec-
tions" to the Party's leading bodies at the 7th CPC Con-
gress and the 1st CC Plenum, both of which were rigged
by Mao Tse-tung. Out of the seven chief members of the
" Moscow dogmatic group", as Mao called it, Wang Ming
and Po Ku were not re-elected either to the Politbureau
or the CC Secretariat; Lo Fu (Chang Wcn-uen), though
not re-elected to th e Secretariat, was re- el ected to tho
Politbureau thanks to his "services" in the "Mao-Lo
bloc' a t th o Tsunyi conference; Wang Chia-hsiang and
158
Ifai. Feng were not r e-el ect ed alt erna t e members of the
loht?ureau; th e former was elec ted alt ernate member of
the CC .and the latter not even that, Yang Shang-k un and
JUI were not alternate member s of th e CC.
only member of th e PoJitbureau of working-class
Teng Fa, was not even el ected t o th e Cen tral
Mao explained: " Tong Fa did not want t o
a bad :\'ord against Wang Ming and Chou En-
e, ,he IS a dogm ati st .and empirici st", But there
was a deeper r eason l or Mao s at ti tude towards Tenv
Fa: he was al ways disdainfu l and h ost il o t:llval'ds leat
ers and cadres of working-cl ass background F
he was by even the menti on of Jf Sia;;
Y,Jllg, also. of worklllg-das::; origin, who was a member
the and deputy commander of the New
Ith Army. He SImply could not hear Hsiang Ying In
J anuary 1941, Hsiang Yin g di ed t rag icall y during' the
even ts pr ovoked by Mao in th e sout h of Anhwei. As for
the other ex-me mbers and alternate member s of the Polit-
though re -el ected bore th e stigma
of empmcist', dogmatist", and the like.
A "exoanti I"
. . n oxcop person appeared in th e Party's lead-
mg usurping the post of Central Committee chair-
man. TIns was Mao Tao-tung th e incomp arable who
th ought himself th e r esurrect ed Yanwanz (god of
death). Wi th a "swor d" in one hand and "t houghts
?f Mao Tso-tung" in the other, he strut t ed ab out, perfect
III all r esp ects, th e "supr emo ruler of mortal s".
,!,hel'e an "especially influential" person.
TIns was Liu Shao-chi, made a member of the Politburcan
and CC Secretariat. With a trumpet in hi s left hand
ami a in his right, he assiduously sounded
tho .of Mao and Ma o's "thoughts".
By this time the absolute maj ority of cadres and Par-
ty members had been branded "dozmatist s" " empir i-
cists", and the like, Their forced " conf;ss ions " "counte r-
revolutionary activity" were filed away in the social
or organisational departments of the Central Committee
and could be dug up at a moment's notice with enough
" evidence" for seizing anyone of them "by the pi gtails".
This was how Mao undermined the Marxist-Leninist
pillars of the Communist Party of China.
t50
3) Th e results in questions of "style"
In concl usion, a "su mming up " was also marle in ques-
ti ons of "style of work". Though no r esolutions w.ere
written on this scor e, stride nt calls resounded
the " style rectification" campaig!,l for l?eopl e to
t he correct style of Mao Tse-tung and fight ol d
correct styl e", Now every10dy knows that l\la? s s tyle IS
nothing bu t a bl end of th e s tyle of
and martinet s aIHI th e style o[ a Cl11ef--:-
. sl ·t the s tyle of an extreme [ndividunlist and nar-
In s lUI, ' . ., . . I' t 1' 1 ' style
row "gre at II an Celest ial Empire nati ona IS ' . Ie.
Mao oppo sed, t he style that had a.lways III the
CPC, was the s tyle of Commu nIsts and exponents of
pr olctanan int erna ti anal ism. .
If we now l ook at th e fate of the main representatIves
f
" d ti sm" and " empiri cism", those who had been
o ogma IS . , . " 1 11 see
per secuted during the "style I'ectlhcatlOn , we rch. . 1
' I " 1 th at " s tyl e rectification" was a dress r c rearsa
L cal y . "
of th e " cult ur al revolutiOn . ., . . .
P Ku (China Pang-hsien) and Teng l'adred 11l a
fl';m Chungking to YenaJl in an Amer ican
t ransport all 8 April 1\)46 . f 1
CI J i who had been artillery commamler 0 t 10
P Army at the hcgi nnirig of t ile
revolutionary civil. war, in a
explosion during a tour. of ?f gl:ll emplace _
mcnts ncar Changchun In 'H)l17. J he mille had been de
li ber at el y planted.
I n 'HJ55, shor tly before the CPC National
Ka i Feng di ed suddenly afte r a . meal o.n. having
horne fr om the Institute of Marxism-Leninism .
known [·0 have feared th at he would speak III dcl ence of
Kao Kang at t he confer enc e.
In J uno 1966, at t he very beginning of th e s.o-called
c ult ura l r evolution, Yang Shang-kun was seize d by
"red guards" on Mao's order. A cap was pl aced .on
his head Ids fa ce was smeare d WIth soot , and an in-
scription ' was hung round hi s s aying: of the
Sovie t r evi si onists, counter -r evolution ary re visionist black
bandit, traitor" , and t he lik e. He was beaten to death
during a "re d gu ard " r ally.
I n '1958, La Fu (Chang Wen-tion ) was persec uted for
having j oined Peng Teh-huai and ot her s in cr it icis ing
160
specious of th ree red banner s". During the
l;ultur:al r evol ut ion" the " re d gu ards" t ormented and
brutally. His la t er fate is unknown. "Red
gua rds a!so t ormented Wang Chia-hsi ang. As for me
( ang l\l lll g) , ever since th e "sty]c r ectifi enti on" cam-
pa ign Mao has been sl andering me in the press and at
as t he exponent of what he call ed l eft
and ri ght ?PIHlrtUllJsm. In the early six ti es, when Mao
came out th e open against the Soviet Union an d
sought to th e world communist movement I was
accused of brlIl g' a " pro-Sovie t revi sioni st", Th o' attach
III t he and a t ralli es did not s top Ior a
When cu lt.ur al r evoluti on " er upted, huge posters
Pekmg and. olhe r , l ar ge ci ti es, saying:
Down \\ ith agent of t ho Soviet revisiontsts, t he
bl ack bandit, the big tra i tor Wang
MllI g ." . ! was often the cllief target of a tt acks in the
and the j ournal
My :vlf e, i\leng Cillng-shu, wh o had studied in
••10 SOVIet .UnlOll a nd IH\ s Ior rriany years actively com-
batted Maoism, was also a target of attack On Mao's or-
der s "red guards" dese crated the remains of my fat her
Chen Pi n-chil i, ,;. b uried ill the Papaoshan Cemetery of
r evoluti onari es in Peking, ransa cked my h ouse, and beat
my t han SO-year-old s tepmothe r, Huang Lien-
fang, ..···almost to death. " Re d guards" threw h er in lo
the st reet, and burned or otherwise destroyed dozens of
my manuscr ipts, and my library.
As for the chief " empir icists", Peng Teh-huai earned
Mao's hostility for urging t he armed forces to l earn fro m
the Sovie t Union and wanting to build the People 's Lib-
erat ion Army into a modern force of national defence
wi th Sovie t cooperation and aid. In 1958 he spoke out
a ga inst Mao's re ckl ess " thr ee red banners" policy, and
was brutally assai led. In 'l!:J59 he wa s officiall y dis-
missed from the post of Defence Ministor, and, in effect ,
put un der house arr est. In December 1967 Mao sent a
" He had lived a hard life full of privations. For his participa-
tion and the participation of hi s sons and daughter in the revolu-
tionary movement, he served live terms in Kuomintang prisons,
where' he was tortured. The last lime he had t ome out of prison
shor tly before the liberation of his native Tsin chai county in
Anhwei province.
** She was a housewife and came from a humble peasant
family,
planoful of ,"r ed guards " to Chengtu to seize Peng Teh-
huai and him to According to SOUle sources
he was kill ed by th e red guards ", and accordi nz to
others he was impri soned. In any case, his fat e is"'un-
known.
The onl y one t o sur vive was Chou En- Iai. When the
"cultur al r ovolution" broke out, "r ed guards" heaped in-
sults on him and threatene d to "burn him alive". Then,
Mao changed his mind and kept him on as premi er of
the State Council to use him as the all-enduring,
obedient and hard-working official that he was
(even in the thirties, Mao had ni cknamed Chou En-lal
"hard-working donkey").
Though the 7th Congress was sa id t o have been a
summing up of th e results of t he "style rectification
campaign", th e camp aign continued, Mao kept cadres
summoned from di ffer ent parts of the countr y in the Par-
t y School pr emises in Yenan, saying, "There is nothing
for th em t o do at home. Let's wait until next summer,
when US forces land in North China and assist the 8th
Haute Army. Then they will havo th eir hands full at
home". His t rue purpose, however, was to conti nue
their " brainwashing". Not until af ter 9 August 1945,
when the Soviet Uni on decl ar ed war on J ap an, did Mao
hastily despatch cadres to vari ous regions. At that time,
many of th em sai d: " Our Sovie t elder brothers have killed
two birds with one stone : not only havo their troops
lib erated our five provinces (t he three northe as t prov-
inces, Jehol, and Chahal' ) and tens of millions of our
compa triots , but have also saved us from concentra-
tion camp and from 'styl e r ectificat ion'. " These words,
though spoken in j est, were true.
The "styl e rectificati on " campa ign had continued for
four years and its consequences were immediately felt;
th e harm it caus ed the Communist Party of China and
th e Chi nese revolutionary movement in ideology and
politics, organisational matters, and styl e, was truly in-
calculable. It cr eat ed very gra ve difficulties for the CPC
in the succeeding r evolutionary pr ocess.
Tt is now clear t hat the "r ect ificat ion of style" cam-
paign and directed personally by Mao in the
fort ies, a reactionary, in essence anti-Leninist a nti-com-
munist, anti-Sovi et and anti-people campaign,' set a dan-
ger ous precedent, foll owed by a succession of other cam-
paigns-"str uggl e against right elem t ." " "
Idc?l?gical education", "four " s ',
reVISIOni sm" "lear Ir 1 st r uggl e agai nst
, arn l orn th e Llher ati on A . " "
cato s uccess ors ", find th e like lb' LIlly , edu-
wer e t he sa me. FUl'thermore' n SU" stance all. of them
was a dr ess rehearsal f ' th e" s tyle rectification"
launched OIl Mao's I . cultural revolution "
persona l command in the and un der his
tion " was, in effect a counter res, 1 cultural rovolu -
N
h
' -revo utIOnary c
o ook, however Iar I
oup.
.scripti on of the for a. fU!l do-
and anguish of th o vi cti plot; "and lll trr ¥, ues,
tion , and of th e fortitude a d ms 0 style rectific a-
sisted it during four years. °t thoso. who re-
are no more tha n a hare l' c s CI ted here
I hope it will give th e picture But
and cri minal nature of Mao's "style °rect ,lfie rte.actlOnar
y
P
· " d '.
1 ca IOn cam-
, aign an convince him that it was a dre
lo r th e coun ter-r evolutionary military coup ofSSt}
L t1 't' .
ie SIX lOS.
, y! 1 " IS in order t o stress that duri ng the "st Ie
I , Mao falsi fied t he hi story of the CPC.
this, m fact , .he as much impor tance as ho did
to t he Itself . It was only in th e conditions of
the that he coul d falsi fy the history of the
FPC, Just as It was .onl y by fal sif ying CPC histor y t hat
,10 could l aunch such a campaign. These two factors were
lllterdependent and mut ually conditioned' one " hel d"
the oth er, a.nd each tho cause and effect
ot her . In this way, using two "poisoned arr ows " Ma o
out on hi s career of usurper of Party
shIp; 1!lIS. pr esents only t he ma in facts concer ni ng
Mao 5 fal sification of CPC histor y. Much addit ional re -
s.earch IS needed to pinpoint th e many other Ialsifica-
hans .
m THE " CULTURAL REVOLu tION" AND
THE MAOIST mn FOR COOPERATION
WITH I MPERIALISM
1. "CULTURAL REVOLU'l'ION" I N NAME
AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY COUP
IN SUBSTANCE
In the summer of 1966, under the nag of a "cultural
re vol ut ion", Mao l aunched a counter-revol u tio n.ary co up
directed against t he CPC and the people of China, al:d
against th e Soviet Union and the world communist
movement. .
The chief objecti ve of this coup was to substi t ute th e
counter-revol uti onary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" for
revol utionary Marxism-Lenini sm and to make .the
sole basis for the country's in ternal and ext ernal pol it ical
guide lines and poli ci es. . . '
I n home policy, Mao us ed military for ce to. smash the
great and gl ori ous Communist Party of China a.nd to
su ppr ess the tale nt ed, hard-working, and r evolutlOI
cpt
paopl e of China. Most of t he member s of tho CC
Politbur cau wer e malici ousl y slande re d a nd
(Liu Shao-chi Pen g Teh-huai, Ta o Chu, Ho Lung, LI
Ch in-chuan, Peng Chen, Ta.n Chang
W en-ti en alias Lo Fu, Lu Tmg-I, Po I-pO) or
asscd (Chu Teh, Chen vr, IIsu Hs iang-ehlen, Nl ell
J ung-ch en) . Ma o Ts e-tung WIth al -
most all the members of the Cr:c
Ch la-h si ang, Tan Ch ien, II uang Ko-ch ong, Ill -clu ng,
Hsi Chung-hsun, Wang J en-ch un.g, Liu Nmg-I.' . . Yang
Shang-kun, Hu Chiao-mu, and Liu Lan-tao. Harr owi ng
t orment was the l ot of some 140, or nearly four-fi,fth s,
of the 174 member s of t he CPC Central Committee.
Par ty organisations of all levels - city, coun-
ty district, rural , P. tc: ,-wcr e smas he d. I here was whole-
sal e lIl a S Sil C1' 11 and pers ecution of cadres and rank-and-
file Party members. Army commande rs and poli t -
ica l officers. t oo, were attacked. Government bodies, t he
t rade uni on bodies of all levels and .
elations of cre at ive a nd sci enuf 'k varIOUS assn.
up. 'rhe in tell ect ual s who w k c .wor ers , were broke n
HS well a s insid o the Pa t or ed III them, t hose ou tsido
. r y, wore cr uelly tr eat" I 1\1 -
were phYSIcall y eli mi na ted. M'U' 1 allY
workers, peasants, i nt ell ect 1 I Ions of th e for emos t
Youth were ma ssacr ed ;1' s, and t he 1'0\"01uti onary
The l osses suffere d by th c' .
Mid the Chin ese people w: omrumlst ,Par ty of Chi na
grea ter . f t I " r e co ossa. r iley wore far
' , Ill act , t Ian t he l oss es in flictod 0 P
bJ: ,internati onal imperialists P ei , n -
Chiang h al-slick and Wan C1' ' . ya ng warl crds,
cOllut er- r ovol ut iona r ies c0Il1 b1ned lIn g-woI, ant! :llJ oLl lel'
May th e memor y of all t h ' . .
Ji ve fOl' ever, e victims of Mao's crimes
At th e Dth crc Congress (Apri l HJ69) M ' . '
ed a pseudo p.... l·ty if I . I' I - ao s ubs t! tu t -
- , - U ( lIS OW11 or Lie ro 1 CI ' - C
muni st P ar I. ' JI . . a , lUl eSe 0 1U-
, 0 I S 1I0W tl'YlIlg to lise it to promote Ids
antI-communi st and an ti-Sovi et ends. The
Party and tho people of China are submerged in
a vortex of unheard of ca lami ties.
, Mao's .extre me crimes h ave made him a traiLor to the
Communis t Party of China and to the Chinese r ovolu-
ttonvand an ene my of t he whol e Chinese peopl e.
_ In t ho of foreign pol icy, Mao bega n an insane
::; t ruggle against the Sovi et U nion and th e ot her so-
countries, His fr en zy is dir ect ed to suhvert ing and
split ting t ha world socialis t sys tem. He has gone to the
length of maki ng territorial cla ims on the Soviet Union,
has Ill.ounted ar me d attacks on t he Sovi et fr onti er , and
!IIl Stri ed to annex th e Mongolian Poople 's Repu bli c. He
IS a Ltaeking' th e Mar'xi st-Len i ni st communist and workers '
parties of all countries, and has publicly proelaimed
Ids inten ti on of " putti ng an end" t o them. He I' IJ -
gages in subversi ve and -divisive activity i n t h o world
communis t movement , a nd also in t he anti-imperialis t
nati onal liber ati on movement of t he Asian, African and
Latin American countries. He is doing his wor st [,0 im-
pair t he ir friends hi p and soli da rity with t he social is t s ta tes
and the world communist movement. Thi s is hel ping'
imperi alist a ttempts at r e- estahlishing control ove r these
coun t ries and at conunitt i np ag gressions against t he m
wh ere possibl e. Mao is hatching intri gues [0- provoke rm
America n-So viet arme d conflic t, which would gro w into
a world war. He hopes that flames of war will engul f
and destroy t he sucialist coun tr iee, as well as the Impe-
riali st states and their allies. He hopes t hat a
nuclear war will further his maniacal dream undi-
vided world supremacy. He has. broken
ti ons with the socialist commumty and has hItched hI S
count r y t o the capit alis t ch ar iot , s ett in g the stage for the
restorati on of ca pitalism in China. , '
Mao's extremely serious cr imes on the
scene have made him a t raitor to the commumst
movement and the anti-imperialist revolutIOnary
ment and have turned him into an ene my of progressive
and ; eace-Ioving peop le t hroughout the world. .
Mao' s crimes, committed in hi s
ary coup confirm the fact that home and foreIgn
. . di . "ble' home policy being the sour ce of foreIgn IS in IVISI .
. f 1
policy, and foreign policy being the 0
policy. Inside the country Mao uses anll-communlsm
to clear the way for the
time, he tries to consolidate nts th p. anti -
communist str u ggle by JUeans of antI-Sovl el:lsm" ,
. On the international scene, h e uses antl-S
ovlCt

anti-communist acts as a means of r approchement wi th
imperi ali sts and reactionaries abroad.
,
I have given a fairly detailed account of. Mao s. var-
ious crimes inside the country and on the mternatIOnal
scene durin g the early period of the "cultural
tion" in my article, "What Mao Tse-tung Has St ar.t ed IS
Not a 'Cultur al TI evollltion' But a Counter-TIevol utlOnary
Coup" , published in 1969. So, it is needless to r epeat
the story here.
.
In the foll owing years th e
coup cont inued. Its main cons l.st ed i n anti-
communism, anti-Sovi etism, and cr imes against t ho people.
Mao ac ted under suc h sl ogans as "for deep criticism of
r evi sionism and for r ect ificati on of styl e" , "for a fur.ther
de epening of struggle , cri ticis m, aud reform", "oontlUue
t he one ' down' and three 'againsts' and "preparo for
* The one "down" was the anti -communist and anti -Soviet
campaign inside the count ry under the "DO\;,n
handful of power-holder s and ca pita h st r oader s and DOVin With
the counter-revolutionary revisionists". Out of the three "against s"
only one slogan was in actual use-"Against modern revisioni sm,
at the heart of which are tho revisionists of the USSR". Th\5
sudde n attack fr om the North" ; h e pr omot ed h is line
suc h campaigns as the " educati on al ca mpaign
in the fleln. of ideology .and politics" and "boycott t he
fa lse Marxi sts Wang Ming and Liu Sh ao-chi".
These slogans and campaigns h elped Mao to seek out,
P?rsecute and exterminate the count ry's leading Commu-
nists, YCLer s, worke rs , peasants, in t ell ec-
and the Disse.nt er s wer e sought and found
Ill. e\ ery offi?e, military UTIlt, or ganisation, school, enter-
pr ise, pe ople s commune, and family. Mao's sl ogan "re-
{lIn, a bsor b the new", means t hat h e wiIi eon-
tmue wipmg out his ene mies-and not onl y his own hut
also those of hi s heiress, Chiang Ching, and his son-in-
law. Hi s main target are the Marxists-
and Internationalists, those in fa vour of Chinese-
SO'",Iet. fr iendship, and al so all opponents of US im-
•. In this way he expects to r each his extreme
i ndividualist ann sel fish aim: "Not to be over thrown dur-
ing my li feti me, and n ot t o be denounced after my
death".
. Theso sl ogans and campaigns helped Mao in his fren-
attempts at subverting and disrupting the world so-
cial ist sys tem, the world communist and anti-imperialist
at es tah.1 is hing cl oser ti es with impe r ial-
tst elements in th e United Sla tes and other countries .
As befor e, Mao aims his attack s agai ns t the CPSU and
the Sovi et Uni on. This is natural, because:
- The CP SU and the Soviet Union are th e livinz
embodiment of sci enti fic: communism; they ar e
Lenin ism in action.
- The CPSU is the mo st advanced, th e mo s t expe r i-
enced, the most prestigious, and the mo st powerful com-
munist party, a recognised vanguard of th e wor ld com-
muni st movement, whil e th e Sovi et Union has tho gr eat-
est experience, th e gr eatest ac:hic ve me nts, the greatest
power nnfl greatest prestige in the social ist. community.
Mno used as nn excuse for hi s nnti-Sovi et and anti-rommunist
acts on the Int nrn ati onal scene. The other two "agalnsts" were
"Fight against the imperiali st headed by th e USA" (nul-
hy the development of Chinese-American rel ations) . and
"Fight against reactionari es of all countr ies" which Mao helied
when. hand in hand with US imperiali sts he supported the
reactionary Paki st an militarist , Yahya Khan, who exterminated
three million Bengalis fighting for nation al liberation. and Iqr
democracy and freedom.
.".,
- T1H' CPSU and th o Soviet UIlion arc tho impreg-
nable s tr onghold of tlle peoples' st ruggle agai nst imperial-
ism and r eaction, and for peace, democr acy , national in-
de pendence, social progr ess, and socialis m, while th e So-
viet Communi sts and Soviet people ar e the most depen-
dabl e fri ends an d comr-ades of the Chinese Communi sts
and th e Chinese peopl e in th e re volutionar y s tr uggle
and th e buildi ng of soc ial is m.
- Under lh r. ' l eadershi p of the CP SU, fulfill ing the
hi storic decisions of th o 24th crsu Congress, t he Soviet
people nre putting into effect th e grand plans of building
communism and th e magnificent pro gramme of world
peace. . .,
It wa s for th ese reasons th at Mao mad e an tl-SOVll"l t ls m
his motto and l aunched out agai nst
the socialist count ries. the CUlll lll\llllst a1H1 workers
parti es (in cluding th e Communi st Party of China) , the
anti-imperiali st movement, and world peace. He uses
anti-Sovi eti sm t o ear n the approval and nppreciation of
the imperialist power s, tho YSimperialists, and
reactionari es in all countries. He is eager to cooperate
with th em on an anti -Sovi et and anti-communist ba sis,
Anti -Sovieti sm is a concen trate d expr es sion of anti-
communis m and pr o-imperialism. Comrade Janos Kadar,
First Secretary of tho Hungarian Soci alist Workers' Par-
ty , wa s ab solutely r igh t wh en he said that there never
was and never will be an anti-Sovi et communism; it
foll ows that th er e never wa s and never will he an anti -
Sovi et Communi st.
It i s precisely because Mao' s anti-Sovietism is na-
ti on alist in form an d an t i-communist in cont ent th at it
becam e th e foun dati on of his r ea ct ionary for eign poli cy
and th e core of hi s r ea cti on ar y horne pol icy .
From th e peopl e of China Ma o conc eal ed all word of
th e joi nt fes t ivities held by th e CC CPSU, the USSH
Supreme Soviet and th e RSFsn Supremo Soviet on the
50th a nni ve rsary of th o Uni on of Sovie t Socialist Hepub-
lies, held in December Hl72 in Moscow, in which represent-
a tives of Irutorrial Marxi st-Lenini st parties, national-
democrati c parties, and national liberati on movements par-
ti cipated. lIe al so conce aled from hi s people the historic
report of the CC CPSU General Secretary, Comrade Brczh-
nev, a t Ihos.e whi ch. h,rilliantIy summed up
the outstanding vi ctori es of Lenin s ':.a li onal policy and
168
achi evements of t he mu ltinati onal Soviet social-
1st 1Il t he 50 years of th e Un ion , and elu cidat ed the
L,emnust home and for eign poli cy of th e CPSU and So-
",lOt G:over nTnOnL in moder n conditions. Ther ef ore I con-
sidsr lt useful to qu ot e that part of Comrad e
wh er e he r e.fened .to the presen t r elations between
CIll.na. and the SOVIot Union, as well as most of the other
an d alsu exatni nad the s ubs t ame of th e
Maoi s], policy , I do so in or der t o gi ve t he Chinese
Communists and. the people of China a cl ear idea and a
dear ullder st a.ndlng of the hypocr itical a nd incendiar y
nature Mao s howls about a "Soviet th reat".
IS what Comrudn L. I. Brezhnov said :
. Now: H few words ab out our pr esent r ela-
tions With China or, r ather , ab out China's attit ude to-
wards most of th o soci al ist s ta tes.
",It. :s more l:han t. en. yea rs si nee th o l end er s of the
People s HepublIc of Chll1a .too k the Iiuo o[ opposing the
USSR III effect, th e enti re socialis t communi ty, which
they continue to r egard as the mai n obst acle to their
great-power designs.
"Speaking what is Peking' s for ei gn policy
today? l.t. consi sts of ab surd claims to Sovi et territory
and sl ander of the Sovi et social and politioal
syst ?ll1, of our peaceable foreign poli cy, It consi sts of
outright sabotage or the efforts to limit t he arms race
of the efforts to bring about disarmament a nd a relaxa-
tion of international t en si on. It consists of const ant at-
tempts t o spli t th e sociali s t camp and th e communist
t o .s Li r up di scord among th e fighters for na-
tional liberati on, t o r ange the developing coun tri es
against th e So vie t Union and th o other socialist st at es.
Lastly, it cons ists of unprincipled ali gnments on anti-
Soviet grounds wi th any, be they even th e most r eac-
tionary for ces- the most rabid hater s of t he Soviet Union
Irom among th e Briti sh Tories or th e re ve nge-seeking
clements in th e FHG, the Por tu gu ese colonialis ts or the
ra cists of South Africa.
"Tn subs lance, tho purpose of doing th e greatest pos-
sibl e harm t o the USSR, of impairing the interests of the
sociali st community, is now the sole cr ite r ion determin-
ing the Chinese load er s' approach to any maj or interna-
tional problem.
"What can one say about this policy?
169
"We hold that it is unnatural for relations between
soci ali st countries, that it runs counter to the interests
not only of th e Sovi et, but al so of tho Chinese people,
that it runs counter to th e interests of world socia lism,
tho liberation and antl-Irnporialist struggle, peace and in -
ternational secur it y.
"It i s therefore understandable why we ca tegoricall y
rej ect this policy. (Prol onged applause.)
" The Chinese leaders claim to be di sturbed about some
threat emanating from the Soviet Union. If th ese s tat e-
ments are not hypocriti cal, it is impossible to under stand
why China has not replied to our pr oposal, repeatedly
rna do since 1969 , to assume clear, firm and permanent
commit me nts ruling out an attack by one countr y or
tho othe r. If Peking is r eall y concer ned about China's
security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to con-
cl ude a special treaty renouncing th e usc. of th e
dr aft of whi ch was submit ted to the Chinese SIde on
January 15, 1971 ? The draft of this st ates un eql.liv-
ocall y that the sides- and I quote- shall not usc against
each other arme d forces employing any type of arms, In-
cluding: (a) conventional, mi ssile, or (c)
th e Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical SOViet
threat' quite obviously do not st and up to scrutiny." ::.
2. COOPERATION WITII IMPERIALISM
IS A COMPONENT OF MAO'S
COUNTEn·nEVOLUTIONAny COUP
\\1e have alr eady point ed out that Mao Tse-tung is using
h is anti-Soviet and anti-communist counter-r evolutionary
coup as a means to win t he appreciat ion of, and es ta b-
li sh cooperation wi th t he imperia lis ts . The course of
even ts has full y confirmed t his. Mao' s ca llrse, set all a
counter-revolutionary coup, wa s applauded by imper ial -
i sts and reacti onar ies , and first of all by the imperialists
or th e United States. Comrade GII S Hall , General Score-
tary of th e CP USA, spe aking at the festiviti es on the
50th anniversar y of th e USSH., said r ightl y that th e Mao
gro up foll ows a counter- revolut ionary policy, and that it
" L. 1. Brozhnov, Foll ouiin g Len in ' s Cours e Progress Puhllsh-
ers, 1!l75, pp. 84-85. '
is therefor e natural for the capitalist press t o sound the
praises of Mao' s "cultura l revolution". Diplomati c repre-
sentat ives of capitalist countries flock to Peking t o shake
Ma o's hand and express their friendly sentime nts. And,
certainly, th e gr eatest atten ti on is drawn to t he "sudden
change" in Chinese-Ameri can r el ations. After Edgar
Snow, Mao' s bosom fri end, had sp ent many months in
Peking and h ad had many secret conversati ons with
Mao , a US pi ng-pong team visited Chi na , where upon,
on 16 July 1971 , the official Chin ese and American press
simultaneo us ly publ ished a communique confirming r u-
mours that Henr y Ki ssinger , then a national secur ity ad-
viser to the US President, had secr etly vis ited Peking
and held 20 hours of confidential talks wi th Premi er Chou
En-lai. Also confirmod were rumours that US President
Richard Nixon had accepted the Chinese gov ernment' s
invitation to visit. China. Th ereupon, hoth sides reported
Kissinger' s second trip to Peking t o pr epare Ni xon's
vi sit to China, and announced Nixon' s arriva l in Peking
on 21 February 1972.
In short, Nixon's China visit was not a fortuitous thing,
but a far-reaching step by Mao and cer tain US ele-
monts.
It is common knowledge that ever since the ina ugura-
tion of the People' s Republi c of China, the Soviet Uni?n,
other socialist countr ies, and some of th e Afro-ASian
st at es have systemat ically, at all sessions of t he UN
General As sembly, demanded the ous t ing of the Chiang
Kai-shok r epresentativo and the r ecognition of tho legit-
imate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. Due to
the stubborn opposi tion of th e USA and its allies, and
due to US insistence that tho ultimate decisi on needed
t ho approval of two-thirds of the UN member ship, this
is sue was dragged ou t for many years . At the 26th UN
General Assembly, however , the United Sta te s and .its
allies "suddenl y" vot ed for l etting th e PRC r eprosent ati ve
take th e place of tho Taiwan emissary in th e UN. Ohv i-
ously, this change of heart followed a preliminary agree-
ment reach ed in confidential Ameri can-Chinese negotia-
ti ons.
News ag encies report that Peking is crowded with US
"visi tors " an d that Ameri can guests are received in Pe-
king with courtesy an d ca re. It is qu ite cer tain t hat the
cooperation of MaQ and th e US is expanding eac h day.
17i
Mao' s del egat es use the 20th UN Genoral Assembly
a nd t he UN Se curi ty Cou ncil for anti-Soviet campaigns ,
Th ey heap mali cious insinuati ons and slands rs all the
USS R, and sta nd befor e th e world as Fait.hful help er s of
the US imperiali s ts and other r eacti on ari es. They vot ed
against the Soviet proposal for a world di sarmament con-
ference . Yet, t he UN session ad opted a r esolution on thi s
score by a majorit y vote. And Mao stoo d unveiled befor e
the worl d as an enemy of peace and a hen chman of the
for ce of war . In t he Se curity Con neil , Mao' s spokesman
joi ned th e US s pok esman to back the reacti ona ry Pakis -
tani mili tarist, Yahya Khan, and opposed the liber a ti on
movement fightin g for th e na tion al self-de termina ti on,
democr acy and fre edom of th e 75 million people of Ban-
glades h. i3y s o doi ng, th ey opposed th e USSR and Jndin ,
which suppor ted t he liber ati on str uggle in Bangladesh.
The Maoist st an d on the Mid dl e East favoured Isra el a nd
US re actionaries . The Ma oist s deni ed su ppor t t o th o ju st
s truggle of th e Arab countr ies and th e Arab peopl e of
Palesti ne against th e US-backed Is raeli aggre ssion, a nel
did not back the UN Se curi ty Council r esolution r ef]ui r
ing I sr ael to withdraw h er troops fr om overrun Arnh
lands. At th e sa me time, furth eri ng their nefarious de-
s igns, th e Maoi st s t r ied t o und orrni no the fri end shi p and
cooperation between t he Arab peopl es and th e Sovie t.
Union.
In the United Nat ions Maoi st spokesmen act hand i n
ha nd with imperi al ist forces, and thi s mor e and mor e
fr equentl y. Comrade Gu s Hall , s peaking on USSR Cen-
tral Tel evision on 29 April 1973, said it is al most i m-
possible to di stingui sh Maoist poli cy fr om imperialist
poli cy. Maois ts and imperialist s tend to act in concer t.
Tiher c is practi cally no differ ence, for exampl e, between
tho .Maoist utt er ances in the UN and the UN speeches
of r eacti onary imperialis t spokesmen. Perhaps t he only
diff er ence, Hall ad ded, is th at t he Maoists are mor e given
t o the us e of coarse and abusive langu age.
All th is is nat ura l. It is th e effect of th e anti-Sovi et
and anti -communist poli cy aimed at ra ppr och ement wit h
imperi ali st. for ces in th e Un it ed States, foll owed hy Mao
since th o " s tyle r ectification ca mpa ign" for more than
3.0 year s cover tly or overtly, wi th or wi th ou t interrup-
u on s,
ll EGINNIl\'G OF THE PRESEN'r !\IAOiS't'
LI NE OF COOPERATION WITH DII'ERIALISM
To Maoist polic y aimed a t
With imper ial is t for ces, we must look h'ICI - at
I s JegllllllJlgS. ( L
1. I.n the .a ut umn of 1936 Edgar Snow had lana con-
l\-{aOWin PJaoyan
g
( nor tharn part of Sh.ellSi
. ioug I ley : lad met for th o firs t ti M
a nd Snow behaved li ke old fr iends. Thei r
:vere fI'ay k thorough, irresp ecti ve of wh etlHJl: they
concer ne publi c or personal matters, Par ty and s tat e
.0 1' matters related to the Cumint ern and th e' So-
VIet Union, etc. This is why i t did not take them very
lon g to become bosom fri ends.
to th e twenties, Mao Tao-tung sai d t o Edgar
Snow, I .was th an a s trong suppor ter of America' s Mon-
r oe Doctrine t he Open Door. " ,: . Thi s sen tenc e means
at l east two things: fir s t, Mao wanted to pa rade as a con-
follower of th e USA; second, h e wanted to exp r ess
!l1S hrm s uppo: t of th e imperialist and expansionist pol-
of the, United Sta tes in China and othe r countries .
The experi enced US bourgeois [ournal ist Edzar Sno w
' ''' ,
was sure t o dr aw th e ri ght concl usions .
It is not surpr isi ng th at the not es of Sno w's talks
with Mao, when publi shed, alerted Georgi Dimitrov. In
November '1937, shor tl y before my r et urn from Moscow
to Yonan, Dimitrov i nstr ucted me to explai n to th e CC
CPC and to Mao personall y that he had departed fr om
positions exp ected of a Communist in talks wit h a US
bourgeois j our nal is t,
Snow's impression is said t o have been that Mao was
at most an agrarian reformer, and certainly no Commu -
ni st; if Mao were to hecorue top leader of th e Communist
Party and, in addition, some da y hold power i n China, he
would not bu i Id sociali sm, would he an oppone n t of th e
Sovie t Union, and an ally of imperiali sm.
2. At the end of 1937, after my return to Yenan, I
l earned t hat Mao had negotiated with Lo Hang, a r ep-
resentative of Chon Tu-hsiu, an d had permitted t he en-
ti r o Trotskyit e-Chon Tu-hsi ui st group t o r ej oin the Par ty
(thanks t o my r et urn this wns prevented). This showed
':. Edgar Snow, Red Star oll er China, New York, 1061, PI 154.
17 ;}
even at that early date that Mao was prepared to [oln
hands with Trotskyites, those active abettors of imperial-
is t reaction.
3. In the summer of 1938 Mao published ,his article,
On a War o] Attrition, in which he divided
anc so war into three stages: Japanese offunsive-cqmhb-
ri um- Chinese counter-offensive. In the first stage Ja pan
attacked while China re treated. In the second st age ne i-
ther of th e warring sides was abl e to and th?re
was a state of equilibri um. .I n the thud stage China
would wait for Japan to attack the Soviet Uni on, and
then mount a counter-offensive .
These views, and especially the idea of waiting fo.r a
Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, at that ume
consonant with the designs of the US, and
imperialists, and also with those. of ..
They were waiting for the same thing. 1 hen, sitttng on
the mountain and watchi ng the tigers light", they hoped !
to reap the maximum advantage. In short, a yvar .oj,,-
Attrition l et the imperialists know of Mao s anti- Sovi et-
designs. ., M .'
After the article was published III Yonan, 0.0 sent it
to Wuhan and asked for it to bo in Hsin-
huaiih.pao " (which was under my direction) . Ohm Pang-
hsien (Po Ku), Hsiang Ying, Kai Feng, .other
and I were against the article, because It was oriented
on passive resi stance and on waiting for t? attack
the USSR. This would work against the national mt?rests
of the Chinese people and contradicted
ist duty of the Communist Party of China. The Party s
policy was to further the nation' s active to the
Japanese aggression in order to def end C111na's indepcnd-
ence and territorial integri ty, and to prevent the Jap-
ane se militarists from starting a war against the USSR.
So we decided not to publish On a War of Attrition in
Hsinhuajihpao. I asked a Soviet comrade who was
then in Wuhan to l et Stalin and Dimitr ov know of our
opinion. Dimitrov saw t o it th e should not
appear in the journal Communist International. (Wang
* At that time it was the daily newspaper of tho ee epe.
** Later reluctant to betray to tho onemy tho existence of
fundamentai differences in the epe leadership at so critical a
point in the war, it was decidod to publish the article as 11
pamphlet and distribute it as a supplement to the Hstnhua;ihpao.
Chia-hsiang inf ormed Mao of Dimitrov's decision and
also me about it when he r eturned from to
Yenan III the autumn of Hl38.)
4. In October 1938 Mao publish ed his r eport On the
N:w Stage, to the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Com-
rnittee. Her e he said the second of the three stages of
of begun . This was de-
SIgned to Justi fy Ius passiveness in the war of resistance
Mao's concept was i nstantly approved by th e J
invader s and br Chi ang Kai-shsk. For the Japanese Chi-
na .was a staging area for an attack southward on the
Un it ed ?tates or northward on th e Soviet Union. They
could better than a standstill in Sino-Japa-
neso hostilities, Chiang Kai-shek, too, aft er the fall of
Wuhan, was eager to avoid engagements with the Japa-
nose army and to preserve his armed forces for a future
war against th? Communist Party. He was banking on
a JapaJ.l 0se-SovlCt or Japanese-Amorican war.
In Mao al so advocated "Sinifying" Marxism
and r ej ecting overseas stereotypes". I3y this demagogic
slogan I: e was, fact, trying to fold up tho
of . and the use of Soviet experience,
:oJe.ct tho guidance of the Comintorn, and crush Lenin-
ist intcmationaltsts in the Party. The report On th e New
Stage also l et the imperialists see that Mao made free
with interests of th e Chinese peopl e and
that hIS mtentions were anti-Marxist anti-Leninist anti-
S
· d "
oviet, an anti-communist.
My speech at the 6th Plenum, "On the War Situation
after .Loss ?f was based on Lenin 's precept
that anti-imperial ist national re volutionary wars are pro-
gr essi ve wars and are always victorious. I showed that
the many millions of Chinese were bound to defeat Jap-
anese imperialism with th e aid of the socialist Sovi et
Union, provided they fought staunchl y an d strove for
victor y. This ran counter to Mao's erroneous line, as set
forth in his On the War of Attrition and On the New
Stage.
5. In the beginning of 1940 Mao published his On
New Democracy. Here he openly contradicted Lenin's
view of the non-capitalist (i.e, socialist) perspective of
the Chi nese revolution. In so doing, he defe ndod the in-
terests of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, opposed
China' s taking th e socialist road, and advocated a "new-
democruuc' wa y impl ying a l ong period of ca pit al ist de-
vel opment. On New Democracy enabled imper ialist id ool -
ogues t o see Mao's ulti mate in tentions : defe nce of th e
bourgeoisie and hostility towards the prol etariat; defence
of ca pitalism a nd hostility t owards social ism.
6. In Oct ober 1040 Mao publicly came out in fa vour
of an all ia nc e between nazi Germany, fascist Italy, mil-
itarist J apan and th e Soviet Union, and i nsid e th e coun-
try an alliance with th e J apancss ag gressors, which
amounted to national treason. Here is how it happened.
One October ni ght a comrade from the Sinchunghi oa-
pao (the Yen an newspa per of th o CC CPC, which ap-
peared eve ry three days) ca me to show me th e conten t
of th e following cl ay's issue ( I was th en chairman of th e
CC CPC press commis sion and wa s in char ge of the
Sinchungluoapaov, 1Jy att en ti on was dr awn to the title
of the l eading articl e- "On Alliance Between Germany,
Ital y, Japan, and th e Sovi et Uni on" .
"W her e did you got thi s articl e?" I aske d.
" It wa s se nt in by Comrade Mao Tao-tung," th e corn-
rade r epli ed. "This afternoon he held a confe rence with
our editors and comrades fr om th e Central Committee
pr opaganda depar tment. He said that we must se t t he
si gh ts all a n alli ance be tween Germany, Italy, J ap an and
the Sovie t Union in in t ernational r elations, and on a
united {,runt with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei in-
side th e country. He said he had .pr epar ed an editor ial
and t old us to publish it in our next issu e. The question
is a se rious one . Hasn' t he di scu ssed i t with the other
members of th e Polit bureau?"
I said h i go and t alk t o h im.
Mao ad mitted th at h e h ad held th e confere nce, and
added:
"Stalin an d Di mit.r ov suggeste d an an ti- fascis t alliance
of Bri ta in, t he Uni ted States, France and the Soviet
Union agai ns t Germany, Italy and Japan . Even ts have
proved th is t o be a mistake. What we want is no t an
alliance between Britain , t he United State s, France and
the Sovi et Union, but between Germany, Italy, Japan
and th e Soviet Uni on ."
" Why?" I asked.
" Germany, Italy a nd Japan are poor," Mao r eplied.
" W o will gain nothi ng fro m fighti ng th em. In caso we
win , we ca rl take nothing fr om them. Britain, tho United
1if)
, ta les am) France are rich es cciall R' .
COIO!l ic'" If sl ' I I' P , y , fl lal1l . Look at her
-vs , ie IS (TUS l Ot gl'C' t fit ' II
j us t L' 'L' I . . , <I pr o S \\"1 accr ue from
- eIVl Cing rer colonies. Yon Ill .
fascist line bu t 1 d ' ay , accus o me of a pro-
f. . ' 0 no t car e, In Chin a we want a u ' t )
['O!li wit h the J apanese and Wanz CI ' c . c ec
ph II{ai-hs hek" not th e
Jy J OI L n s art, you arc wronz " b
" \Vhcrc am I wron z ?" I asl'ebe)'
" \ V ° . < , •
I
ca n not o\' erpowcl' the Japan ese " 1\1'10 suid "So
\\' !y !
crl
t lh ' \\T ' ' -' . •
I" ' '" . ern : o would do better to f\C1!l t CI'
xai-shek with tho hell) of Tapa n and \\ ' °CI ' lla n?
r J. I 1 ' l lang nng-wm
. Ala , ,at ti e argo t errit ori cs Chi ang Kai -sh ok con tr ol ;
In the southwest and northwest If II " ' - I .
t . ::. . " I ::. re a te n, W e call
ge a pIe eo of the north west. Thi s would he ' . I
knr . 'II tl a gam.
, YOu. WI " say la t I am pro- Japa nese and g uil ty of
na ti ona ] tl r;a::.on, but 1 do Hot care. I nm not afraid of
be i ng a national tr aitor."
" Y I . I
" . ou rave .no 1'Jg It , to decide anything of su ch inter -
na tio nal and in ternal Imparlance on you r own " 1 . I
"Ot . . . '. I ' sa lt .
, II ,:1 gUlIle? t IS point ess . I pr opose normal procedure,
, s?lldmg a. telegr am with your opinio n to Com-
Stalin and D.nmtrov, an ti discussin g the matter at a
meet ing of th e I' ol it bur eau. "
"No suc h tel egram ca n he sen t now," -'l ao r epli ed. " The
two vencrablo old 1I1cn may fly in to a r agc. That would
be n? joking ma tter. Neith er do 1 want a Politburcau dis-
at the pr esent moment."
"\ Vhyi'"
" The is not yet ripe," he r eplied. " In six
mont hs events will show that I am r ight. Then I will se nd
a I had !ong si nce made t hcse 1'1'0-
pos als HI an art ic le 111 t he Slnchunghwapao, And Com-
r ad es Stali n and Dimitrov wi II r eply: ' Comrade Ma o Ts e-
tung, yo u wore right, and we were wrong' . You t oo Com-
rad e Wang Mi ng, will then have to admit mi sta ke
and say: ' C,oillratlc l\Iao Tsc-t uri g, you were right, and i
wa s wr ong. At th e next Poli tbureau meeting I will as k
not to send a ny tel egram t o Stali n and Dimitrov and
not to discu ss t he matter at any Pol itb uruan 'meet-
ing." ':-
* of the Pol itb uren u members in Yon an did indeed
proposal because, after the nth of
SIxth Central Commi tte e, th oy were afraid to cross him.
17i
"Out what if the next SI X months prove you wrong ?
What then?" I asked.
" How can I be wrong? I am certain to be ri ght, " Mao
replied bl andly.
"That yon ar e certain of it is one thing, ,and ho.w evonts,
develop is another. me what you will do events
pr ove you wrong? WIll you sen d a t elegram to
Stalin and Dimi tr ov admi tting your mist ak e? WIll you
ab o admit your mist ak e to me?"
Mao did not answer.
The course of events , as we know, has ,the folly
of Mao's pro-fa scist idea of an alliance '.vlth
Italy and Japan, and of hi s line of,
with Ja pan and \ Vang Chin g-weI. I-ar Ius
err or to anyone after Hitler the Umo,n, .he
1 nched the "style recti fI cati on campargn, making
L
au
. . th e Coml'ntem the Soviet Union, and the COJ11- enlllIsm,
, .
munist Party of China its chief targets.
Our conver sati on continued. .
b
d " t l e must not be pu - "In short," I said, your ar IC
he said. " I havehcld a .and
have sen t in th e manuscri pt. if we. don t publrsh I
will lose face. I want the ar ticle published, and I
here and now, and will also declar e to all a
Politbureau that I alone ,bear th e ,r esponslbllr ty for
Half and half demanding, he had the artie 0
mblished in th e Sinchunghwapao.
.
I To be sure, Mao could only pr attle about. the pollcy
of the world communist movement and SOVIet fOr eIgn.
Iicy. Alter them he could not. All the same, events
th at this unpri ncipled p.olitical,
intriguer had a defi nite pur pose III publishing an article
advocating alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan.
His aim was to cover up hi s treasonable. pro-Japaneso
outlook, and to justify the order ho. had to t.ho
tr oops to halt anti-Japanese operations
armed conflicts i nside th o country. On the internati onal
plane, he me ant to undermine Sovi et prestige among anti-
fas cist for cos ill ot her countries.
Secretly, without th e knowledg.., e of the .
usi nz the ra dio-t ransmitt er of th o CC CPC Military Coun-
cil, orde red Jao Shu-shi h, Political Commiss ar of the
New 4th Army, to send a spokesman to negotiate cooper-
178
uticn against Chiang Kai-shek with rapr eseutativos of
t.h e . Japanese army and Wang Chin g-wei. Operations
against the enemy were suspended. Gut at that ti me
neither the Japanese nor Wang Ching-wei would believe
tha t Mao was capable of trea son. They sus pected a tra p.
As a r esul t , no concr et e accords wore rea ched.
KMT propaganda, however , made the most of Mao's
dea ling wit h the enemy . Luckil y, tho CPC enjoyed tr c-
revolutionary prest ige among the people as th e
initiator of th e anti-Japanese national revoluti onary war
11,nd the unit ed national anti-Japanese front. [obody be-
lieved tha t th ere could be nati onal tra itors li ke Ch i n
Kual ':. and Wang Ching-wei among the CPC leaders.
Chiang Kai- shek's attempts to use the above-mentioned
Iac ts in his anti-communist propaganda proved fruitless.
l n 1955, on th e pr etext of combat ting a " Kao (Kan g)-
l ao (Shu-shih) bl oc", Mao arrest ed Jao Sh u-shih and had
him killed. He also took advantage of the campaign t o
arrest and execute Pan Han-ni en (former chief of the
New -ith Ar my' s r econnaissance) whom Jao Shu-shih had
sent to negoti ate with th e Japane se and Wang Ching-
wei, and Hu Ohun-ho, who ha d r epresent ed the Japanese
and \Vang Chi ng-wei at the negotiations. (In the pas t ,
Hu Chun-ho had betrayed the Communist Party, but
during th e negoti ati ons Pan Il un-ni en pers uaded hi m to
servo our Party again.) Mao wanted all witnesses of hi s
nati onal betrayal out of the way .
Si nce Hu Chun-ho was a triple agent (for Chi ang
Kai-shek, for t he Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, and
finall y, thanks to Pan Han-ni en' s efforts, al so a counter-
intelli gence agent of the New 4th Ar my in th e Japa nes e
and Wang Chi ng-wei camp, and in Chi ang Kai -sh ok's
camp) , the content of his negotiations with Pan Ran-
nicn was promptly r elayed to the US and Br itish secr et
age nts in China through Chiang Kai -shok' s spy agencies .
In shor t, th e American and British imperialists were
g- iven to underst and that even though the Japanese had
inva ded China and the nation had risen to r esist the
aggressor, Mao was prepared to deal with Ja pan and
become a national tr aitor ; thi s meant t hat in a different
situation he would seek alliance with i mperi ali sm.
" A nati ona l traitor at the time of th e Sun g dynast y.
Since many people in side and outs ide th e Pnrt.y have
11 0 kn owl edge of th o tr ue i m pli ca l.i ons of th e "anti- Pa r ty
Kao Ka ng-Ja o Shu-s lii h hloc" , i t, will he upp rn pri nt« to
give a brief account of it here.
The " anti- Par ty Kao-J 0.0 bloc" cas e (19 54) Iabricated
by intriguer Mao pursued three aims.
First, he wanted Teng Il si ao-ping and n ot Liu Shao-
chi to be el ected General Secre ta r y of t he Centr al Com-
mit tee, r en eging on hi s "sole mn promise " (tha t Lin
Shan-chi would get the post of Gen er al Secre ta ry) mad e
wh en th e " Mao-Li n bl oc" was Iormed. At the I s L Pl e-
num of th e Se ven th Central Committee he had objected
t o having a General Secre tar y in ch arge of all organisa -
tional work and sugges ted retaining thu post of chief of
th e CC SecI:etaria t, who would man age the affairs of var-
ious CC organs and ce rtain current CC bu siness. In
1953, however, Mao began ar guing in favour of havin g a
Gen eral Secre tary . He required his cl os est ellto ur age -
Lo Jung-huau, Lo Jui-ching, and othe rs -v-to ha ck Kao
Kang' s open campaign against electi ng Liu Shao-chi. Ap.
a result, Liu Shao-chi was compelled to agree that Teng
Hsi ao-ping, one of Mao' s trusted li eutenants, should be
el ected Gen eral Secr etary.
Se cond, Mao wanted all power in the P arty and gov-
ern ment agen ci es and the army i n Nor th east Chin a, U
maj or admini strative region, to pass from Kao Kang to
Lo Jung-huan, Thi s is why he s udde nl y stabbed Kao
Kung in the back, de cl aring that Kao Kang's cam-
paign ag ainst Liu Shao-ch i was directed against " the
empero r's cl osest associ ates" or , mor e pl ainly, "nominal-
l y against Liu Shao-chi but in fact aga inst Ma o 'I'se-
tung". Kao Kang was seized (after his execution h e was
r eviled as a "suic ide" and " expell ed" fr om the ParLy) ,
and hi s pos ts in Northeast China t o
huan. I3ut t he r eal r eason for s
was his poli cy of since re cou pcru t iou With th e Sovie t
Union in defiance of Ma o' s orders,
Third Mao wante d La use tho "ant i- Par ty Ka o-Jao
bl oc" t o destroy J ao Shu-shih, Pan Ilun-ni en, R.ll
Chun- ho , and a few ot he rs, th at is, all wi tn ess es of Ius
tr easonable line of "alliance with J apan and W ang
Ching-wei against Chiang Kai- sh ck" , dating t o Hl1.0.
7 From th e au Lumn of 1941 to tho summer of 1945
conduc t ed hi s " s tyle rcctl fica tlon campaign" against
MarXism-Len ini sm, the Comi nt ern th e SO " .
the . Par Ly of Ch ina 1'f ' " J.et Uni on,
perwhsLs that anti-S ovi etis . d li S. convlllced th e un-
ingrained in l\Jao's outl ook. m an anti -communism wore
In 1948 Mao said to me' "AI h
Pacific war betwoen Ja t el' t e of the
Roosevelt has repeated1 P and Amel'lca, President
son offi cer in Yenan st gr este d through the US liai-
r.1J:1l':l ct er of th e chf nge the nnmo and
will, Moscow. This was break off
and t echni cal aid t o t ho 8th n o t for US
did not agree. vVe would now b .u e we
But though formall d.ed
lll
a prctty x,' If We had."
y Iv ao I n ot a O' r ee to alt tJ
namo and character of tho CPC and d·l t b k er
ff
ie
lati ons with M. hi . ' ( . I n o r ea a r e-
"style' re cti and an ti-c ommunis t
of readin ess to ful fil '1,as, 11l, subs ta nce, 11 token
D
' , (eman( s.
nrmc th e "st ,] t i fica t :
II . ,'"' , ' ) 0 .rcc 1 c:atlOn ca mpaign" t he vVhit e
' ow'.: sen.t a of h igh-r anki ng dipl omat s and
ge"nel 'l ls (lIl clucllJ1 g P atl'I ck lIllrl e" a person 1 f
L1 l)S P . ' .," ( '. a envoy 0 '
Ie, , . restdent) I.? Yeri an. MHO spoke to th em in an
anll-SovlOt and antl -c,ommunist vein seeki ng US a' I
and US-l\fao coop eration. On 23 Au O'dst, 194,1, . '. IC
, , ti . h J } 0, 1, In a con-
\ or sa IOn Wit 0 III political advisor to th e US
commande r of the Chma-13nrma- I ndia war theatre and
se,con? of t he US Embassy in Chungking, Mao
expl ainod m r epl y to a questi on why he was so anxiou s
to aid and support and Why' he sa id nothing o'f
!;llSSHl. do n ot ex pect Hussi an help," Ma o said.
hav e suffere d gr eatl y i n th e war and
:vl11,,1lave th.en' hands full with their OWn j ob of r ebuild-
mg. . He t o convinco Service that " Chinese and
Am encan in t eres ts arc cur r el atorl and si milar . They fit
together, economica lly and politicall y... This is wlry it
is so Import ant to us Communist s to know what yo n
Am eri cans ar e thinking and pl anning. We cannot
cr ossi ng you - cannot ri sk any conflict with you,"
To get, US ai d and cooperntion Mao did not shrink
fr om sla ndering the poli cy and programme of the Corn-
muni st Par ty of China, describing th em as purel y hour -
gcois or purely anti-f eud al. lIe told Servic .-. for ('.\ 11 111 -
pll' . t.l urt " t he poll cir-s of the Comruun is t P urty
:11' (' II I I-'l' l'h' l ihorn! ". anti that " e \'l! 11 t he mo st N II I Sl' l'VH-
tivo Am o'ricHIl hu si nessm an can lind nothing· · in our
program to take exce pti on At abou t the t.ime
Mao t old Harrison Forman: Vve are not striving for
th e social and politicul Communism of Sovi et Russia.
Rather , we prefer to think of what we are as some-
thing t hat Lincoln fought for in your CIvil War :
liber ati on of sl aves. In Chi na today we h av e many mil -
lions of slaves , shackled by feudalism."
Need 1 say that th e policy and. programme the
Communist Party of China was neither bourgeois nor
liber al. and not exclusively anti-feudal. Mao spokc for
himself , r eflecting his own ideas, his own pol l?y
pr ogramme. What he wanted was that t he Im-
per ialists should k now him as a mere r ef orm er ,
not a Communist, and more hostile to socialis m than to
capitali sm. . h ' " t I
Th er e arc fact s to prove that dur ing IS s .y 0 rec-
tificat.lon campai gn" of th e forti es Mao
hegged th e USA-for and .look ed t.he sli ghtest
ch ance to establi sh MaOlst-AmerJcan cooper ation.
How obsessed h e was hy this idea may he seen fr om
the foll owi ng episode. On e sunny day in l at ter half
of Novemhe r 1944, as I l ay on a couch out side my h ouse
wrapped in a WMm quilt, 1 was suddenly approached by
a smiling Mao Tse-t ung:
" Comr ade Wang Ming," he sa id, "I have br ought good
"
news. d 11 d
I asked him to be seated. He sat down an pu e a
piece of paper out of th e pocket of his overcoat. ITe gave
it to me.
" Here, r ead thi s". .
The paper was about 1;) centimetre s. l ong and}O WIde.
with three lines in Engli sh. The first lin e read: Mr. Mao
Tse-tung," th e second. "thanks for your congr ntul a-
tlons" . and the t hi rd . "Roosevelt." . I n the corner
were four boldly pencilled Chinese ch ar act ers : Destroy
at. once after r eading".
"Now that we have this telegram," Mao said, " our re -
l at i on s with America will he much smonth er ."
". S<'e John S. Service, The Ameras ia Papers: S ome Proble ms
in t h e Hlst or u of US-China Il ela t ions, a nubll catl on of the Uni-
vcrsi tv of Cal ifornia Center for Chin ese Studies. Berkel ey, Cali-
forni a, n. 173.
** Harri son Forman , Report from Red Ch in a, N. Y., 1!l4fi,
p. 178.
"\ Vhy?"
" In the past we dealt with Roosevel t' s subor dinat es."
Mao replied. "Thi s time he answer ed personally.
w? can exc hange t elegrams and l etter s directly, main-
tam personal contact s, and negoti at e man to man. This
makes it easier to settle th ings."
by thi s t el egram," I s aid doubtfully, "it does
not l ook like Roosevelt wants any direct exchanges of
t elegrams or letter s with you. l et alon e any settlinsr of
t hings." '"
do you think so?" Mao asked pe evishly.
TIm; does not look l ike an official t el egram. If he
had wan t ed t o exchange te legrams directly, hi s reply
should at I east have been typed on officia l stationory of
t he US army observers in Yonan. if not on an of ficial
US Embassy l etterhead. What you re ceived is a scr ap
of paper wi th a few pencilled Engli sh words. Can you
prove that thi s is really a t el egram fr om President Roose-
velt? If some day th e Am eri cans sho uld s ay that Roose-
velt had never sent you any t el egram, you will no t
be abl e to prove that he did."
He stared at me. Then he said:
" How can thi s be possibl e? A member of th e US army
group of obser ver s handed it to me per sonally. "
"And what do you think of t he four Chin ese char ac ters
in the 1p, ft corner?" I asked.
" Roosevelt is probably afraid that Chiang Kai-shek
may l earn about this te legram, and wants us t o burn it
after r eadi ng," Ma o r eplied.
"If Roosevelt is afraid of Chiang Kai-sli ek learni ng
about a telegram like this, how can you expect him to
exc hange telegrams or to se tt l e things with you direct -
ly?"
Mao' s fac e darkened. The sm ile va ni sh ed fr om hi s
lips. After a moment' s sile nce, with a for ced grin, he
sa id:
"All t he same, I think that after this direct exchange
of telegrams things will go mo re smoothly."
He took back th e note and went away.
T re called that hi s first talk with me that year was
on 1 April. He had come with a defin it e purpose: to
speak hi s "words from th e hottom of th e heart.". 'VItal.
han been the purpose of his visit this time? W hy had he
como to show me the t el egram? Before this, for several
years he had s topped briefing me on hi s contacts with
the Americans. So, I assumed tha t Ma o had wanted to
demon strate his s trength : " Look , I h ave direct t el egr aph-
ic con tac t with US - Pr esi dent Roosevelt. That is no
j oking matter. "
Si nce then Iacts have come to li ght t o bear out my
assumption. I n Sep tember of tha t (1944 ) Di.mit-
rov, wh o was about lo r et urn to Bulgnrla aft er her lib er-
ation by th e Soviet Army, had wr itt en one more lat t er
to me. I .ike th e previous one, it had been inter cepted by
Ma o Tso-tuug. lI o was a fr aid t hat I mi ght l earn
it. That was wlry he had cnmc to show me Hoosevclt s
tel egram : " Look, y01l may hav e Dimitrov, but I have
Roosevelt. "
8: I n th e au t.u mn of 1\145, a fte r the Sovie t Ar-my en-
te re d Northeast Chin a and milit ari st J apan was crushed,
the situati on in Asia chang ed r ud ica Ily. Mao was com-
pelled t o demonstrat e fri endship for th o Sovie t Union so
that th e Si h Ilouto Army could enter Nor theas t Ch inn
aud cull ucl, the tremendous Sovie t military aid. At th e
same t im e, he conti nue d to nurse hopes of American
help i n uniting and building postwar Chi na. Thi s is
why, in tho autumn of 1945, on the invitation of Pat r ick
Hurley. th e US A Ambassador t o China, Mao went t o
Chungking t o negotiate with Chia ng Kai -shek, trusting
tho US Ambassador t o he the arbiter. As a r esult, the
conc ilia tory ri ghtward-leaning Oc tobe r Tenth Agreement
was con cl ud ed by th o Kuomintang and crc, whi ch looked
like a concess ion t o th e ri g-ht forces.
Und er this St h Rou te and New 1th
arm ies and all ant i-J apanese guerri ll a units under thei r
command-nearly 900 ,000 mon in all -wore to he re con-
stituted in to no t more t ha n nine di vi sio ns. And ant of
these nine, t he Communists could in depende ntly for m
only thre e. The r emaining s ix wer e to cont ai n Ku omin-
t ang units. Upsides, we were t o r oli nquish all liberated
south of. th e Yangtse. Fur thermore, acco rding t o
an und er st anding between the USA, Chia n g Kat-sli ck
and Mao. th e US Army would ope n mili tary schools in
",:onan aIHI Ch angki akow ( Kal gan) Jar 8th Hou t o and
New .'Jth Army personnel. ':.
• <. pue
J
toi he prcpara tions for Ill! anti-communist civil
\ltrJ .ly t 10 morrcans and Chiang Kai-shek nono of tho points
o t us agr eement was put into effect. '
184
I want to descri be th e ci rcum st ances in whi ch Mao
signe d this agreement. Since it s t erms wore harsh and
humili atin g Mao was afraid t hat the P arty and our r ev-
ol ut ionary armies would object to thorn. So. at. first. he
was r el uctan t to a ffix his signature. Then, Ch ia ng Kai -
shek r esor ted t o the old method of " demo nstr ating the
execu tion of a hen to the ape": t o in timidate Mao he
arrested Lung Yun, military ch ief of Yunnan provinc e.
And Hurl ey kept saying: " These ar e the fina l terms. If
you don ' t sign, th er e will be no ot he r chance." Mao ga ve
i ll , anti signed, An ex t reme ind ividuali st. he was con-
cor ned solel y wi th his selfish in t er ests, a nd was neglect ful
of th e interes ts of Party and r evolut ion. Bad ly in timi -
dated, he all hut los t hi s head. On returning to Yen an,
he complained to comrades fr om t he Central Commit-
te e: " I n Chungking- my nerves wore str a ine d to t he
limit. Now, 1 feel unwell and ofte n have heart
palpit ati ons, dizzy spells. aud insomn ia. " He sullered
a ner vous breakd own, which l asted for ma rc t han six
months.
Until the da y war hroke ou t between th e Kuomi nl ang
and CPC on a nati uual sc ale , Mao he lievcd t ha t th e
United States wou ld force Chiang Kai -shck to ag ree t o a
coalit ion government headed by the KMT and including
the CPC and othe r pa rti es and gro ups (as Mao had en-
vi sioned in hi s r eport, On Coalition Government, to the
ith CPC Congress ).
Mao expect ed t he United Sta tes t o h el p China t o unify
peaceful ly, Though after th e surrender of J apan th e
US A was r eacti vating and armi ng Ch iang Kai -sh ek' s
tr oops for an anti-communi s t civil war , and thou gh
Kl\IT tr oops had been attacking CPC troops (the 8th
Route and New 4th armies) a t diff er en t poi nts in North
and Central China since the latter half of 1946 Mao
l aboured under the illusio n that the "ccasofire t eams"
wit h US army ar biters would he lp t o en d the KMT-CPC
civ il war.
Tn the autumn of 1946, Mao i nvit ed Gene ral George
C. Truman's special envoy, t o Yo-
nan , hI S good offices in negotiatin g a peace wi th
th e l'.-MT, I n the winter of 1946, he was st ill nursing
.ill ll.sion th a t th o US would assi st Chi na' s pea cel'ni
uuili cution CVP l) though VI' I I l.Isi-shau' s urruv Il ad beuun
large-scal e m ilitary oper ations azai ust tI lU· su,
Army in Shansi and Chiang Kai-shck's troops mounted
seven successive offensives against the New 4th Army in
northern Kiangsu. The futility of Mao's hopes was ob-
vious. In tho beginning of 1947 Fu Tso-yi's cavalry cap-
tured Changkiakow (Kalgan) in a sur pr ise raid and
Chiang Kai-shek, heartened by this success, officially or-
dered an "anti-communist oxtermination campaign" on
14 March, thus precipitating a civil war on the scal o of
tho whole country. Yet, it wa s not until 1 May 1947 that
Mao finally said, "Down with Chiang Kai-shek", in one
of the Mayday slogans.
9. In 191.7-HI49, the KMT-CPC civil war.
Mao 's r elations with the USA were marked by mutual
hostility, though a search continued on. both fo.r
ways and means of cooper ation. Meanwhile, Chiang KaJ-
shek concluded a Sino-American treaty which, in effect ,
turned China into a US semi-col ony. At that time the
KMT st ill cont roll ed the larger part of China wi th an
army of mor e than two million men , which th e Truman
Adrnini sl.rntion was priming for an anti -communist civil
war, for th e US imperialists did not beli eve Mao would
succeed in putting th e Communist Party of China and th e
Communist -l ed Peopl e' s Lib er ation Army on the path of
anti -Sovi eti sm and rapprochement with th e United St ates.
They knew that a victorious Chinese r evolution und er CPC
l ead er ship and with Soviet aid would radically alter
the r el ati on of forces in the Far East and. th e re st
of As ia in favour of soc ialism and against imperial-
ism.
But this did not mean a total break with Mao. Tn the
latter half of 1948, in the final st age of the war, the
White House again st r etched a hand out to Mao. Chiang
Kai-shak had l ost the support of hi s army, the people
had turned against him, and he was facing imminent de-
feat. The White House , on the other hand, did not want
US t.r0ops to be involved against the CPC, fearing the
r eaction of th e Sovi et Uni on. Besid es, it had 10nO" sin ce
und erst ood f ao' s anti-sociali st and anti-Sovi et
was rel ucta nt to ali enate him. Its cours e of bchav-
JOnI' clea r from th e followi ng- fact s. Til North and
Eas t Chma th ere were then more than 600 000 US
troops g d ' f '
h . - roun , all' or ce, and navy-which withdrew
wherever the Peopl e' s Liberation Army hove in-
to SIgh t In or der t o avoid a direct engageme nt. US Am-
HU;
Stuart in Nanking let Mao know th r ough
different channels th at th o Unit ed Sta tes was pre pared
to l oan a new Chi nese governme nt t wo billion dollars for
five t en .years, pro,".ided it did not es ta blish diplomatic.
r el a tions WIth t he Soviet Union.
Mao was r eady to moet tho United St at es half-way.
He ordered the Peopl e' s Liberation Ar my not t o fire on
US troops. Poli ti call y, he foll owed a "wide-open door"
poli cy in anticipat ion of cooper ating with th e USA.
The ab ove is borne out by th e general poli t ical line
set hy Mao in his r eport to t he 2n d Pl enum of th e Se v-
e nt h Central Committee in March 194n. This genera l
line and the concomitant home and for eign poli cy were,
of course , above all a pr oj ection of hi s anti-Lenini s t and
anti -socialt st "new-democratic" li ne and policy.
M ilO' S line wa s at cro ss purposes wi th the Len ini st line,
according t o whi ch the Chi nese bourgeoi s-democrati c
revolution would grow into a socialist revolution at th e
moment of it s victory on the scale of the whole counlry,
leading to th e building of socialism. Mao maintained
that after the victory of the bourgeois-d emo cr ati c r evo-
lution the sights shoul d be set on a non-socialist "new-
democr ati c" society. His argume nt s against a sociali st
revoluti on an d the building of soc ialism in Chin a wer e
four: -
1) "Imperiali sm conti nues to exi st",
2) "the agrarian r evolution has not been comple ted",
3) " capitalism in China is undeveloped", and
4) "the national bourgeoisie is st ill involved in tho
revolution".
Only ono out of th ese four arguments-"the agra r ian
revolution has not be en compl ete d" - had no immediate
r elation t o imperi alism. The first argumen t meant t hat so
long as " imperiali sm existe d" Mao -was not t o se t,
the course on soci alist r evolution and. the huildinz of
socia l ism. And the th ird and Iourt h showed t hat he
itated towar ds capital ism and dirl not want t o come t o
grips with th e bourgeoisi e.
In home poli cy, he favour ed a "poli cy of four sides
and c!,ght dir ections", which included these four points:
;) "equal concern for publi c and private in terests",
... ) concern for t he inter es ts of workers and
capitalists",
3) " mutual ai d of t own and vill azo"
b ,
4) "commerce between th e int er nal a nd exte rnal mar -
kot s".
The first two point.s are cle arl y non-sociali st. The ot her
two do not look obj ectionable. nut if we r ecall one more
pa ssage from Mao' s conversation with Jo hn Service
in 1944. it. will be cl ear th at these two points wer e al so
chiefly aimed at furthering Maoi st-Ameri can economic
cooper ation. Mao said to Se rvice th at " America and
China compl ement each other economically: they will
not compete. China does not have th e requirements of a
heavy industry of major size.., China needs to build up
light industries to s upply her own market and raise the
living s tandar ds of h er own people... America is not only
th e most suit able countr y to assist LIti s economic devel -
opment of Chi na: she is also the on ly cou ntry full y abl e
t o participat e." We ma y al so re ca ll that Mao had mad e
cle ar hi s wi sh for US manufac t ured goods Lo he su p-
plied to China, whi ch would pay the USA with farm
produce, and the like, This shows th at th e l atter t wo
points apply not only to home poli cy, but als o to for ei gn
policy, Surely, White House official s and American s tu-
dents of China who foll owed Mao' s eve ry movo wer e
pleased with this trend in Ma oist poli cy .
In for eign poli cy . Mao s uggf'st ed th e foll owing course :
" At lea st ill th e first few ye ars new China docs not
11 ?l;'r! lo he recognlserl hy th e three great powcrs-c-Brit-
a Ill , th e USA and USSH-so that they sho uld not inter-
fere in our internal affairs. " Her e he deliber ately placod
th e socialist Soviet Union on one pl ane with imperiali st
Britain and t ho imperi alist USA. The purpose was the
same as t he one Mao pursues t oday with hi s dcmagogi -
cal talk of " two superpowe rs-t he USA and USSR'-': °to
mislead t he pu blic and slander t he Sovi et Uni on , and t o
di sguise hi s hostili t y t owards th e Soviet Union whil e
seek ing ra ppr och ement with the USA and Britain.
But at t hat t ime t he in te rna tional situation and th e
condi tions at home did not permit Mao to foll ow an U11-
di sguised anti-Soviet and pr o-imperialist poli cy . The CC
CPSU and t he Soviet Governme nt foll owed a Lenini st
internati onalist poli cy towards China. The Soviet
announced it s r ecognition of t he Peopl e' s Il cpubllc of
China as as i t was in augu r atod. It ga ve new Ch in a
nl l-round ll ll! ill th (· pul it icnl. diplomati c.
economic, rillauciuI, SCIon tifi c, techni cal , cul tural , and
188
educational fields, and in publi c health. Fo r a time, thi s
torpedoed Mao' s pr o-imper iali st and ant i-Soviet cons pira -
cy.
10. From the autumn of 1950 to the su mmer of 1953
China helped the peopl e of Kor ea t o repulse the US ag-
gressor. During t hi s per iod, t oo, Mao did not aba ndon
hope or fri endl y r el ati on s with th e impe rial is ts . Thi s
is supported by fa cts wh ich Liu Shao-chi r eveal ed to me
at that time.
At 8 p.m. on J0 Nove mber 19.52 Li u Shao-chi (who
had come to th e 19l h Con gr ess of tho CPSU and wa s
s till ill Moscow) in vit ed me (in l\Ioscow for medical
treatment) for a t alk. "When t he Angl o-Amer ican troops
landed in In chon," he said, " the sit uat ion in North Korea
cri tica l. But Chairman Ma o hesitated to send
Chinese volunteers to r epulse the US aggres sion and
help Kor ea. The Polithurcau was in ses sion round the
for f,ourteen days, but could not come to a de -
sa id: :T1Ie moment our army goes
acti on , t he tr adit ional Sma-American fr iends hip will
(he. 'Who ca,n tell how l ong it will take to r estore it?
supposing we act, what ar e we going to do if we
Iail halt. the Ameri cans ?' In shor t, he could not make
up. 111. 5 mind. It was not until :::; troo ps capt ured
SIUUgIShu and ther e was only the bridge across the Yalu
between them aurl China that Cha irman Mao was for ced
t o come Lo a dec ision, He said : 'Now we mus t act.
If our, troops begin now, wo ca n st ill coun t on glory
and gam-the glory of proletar ia n internati on alists nnd
the gain of flghting not on Chines e but on Korean soil.
If we wait until tho Ameri cans cross the Yalu we will
lose both glor y and gain.' When later, after our troops
had already gon e into act ion, Chairman Mao l earned
that Truman had forbi dden MncArthur to bomb th e Shun-
yang-Manchuria r ailway, he sai d ru efully: ' Have we
done right t o engage our troops?' And st ill l ater, when
MacArthur insi sted on extending the war to Manchuria
and s take d his job on this (either he docs what he
wants, or he r esi gn s ) , and Truman di smissed MncArthur,
Chairman Mao wa s deeply upset. He sa id: 'If we had
known bef or ehand that the USA docs not want to fight
against us, We should not have involved ourselves
th? Ameri cans by aiding Korea and injuring
Sino-American r elations. Now, we must see how we
18S
can put an end to the matter quickly. Until we do, it is
no use seeking a gradual r estoration of Sino-American
frie ndship.' "
This "friends hip" , as we see, was more important for
Mao th an aiding a frat ernal socialist coun try and her
people aga ins t a US imperialist aggression. Even at the
time of the Kor ean war he was st ro ngly affect ed by
America-mania, as well as America-phobia. .
H. The period fr om 1951 to Hl57 was one uf cont in-
lI OIl S nezoti ations between China and th e United States,
laying tl lC ground for Maoi st -American cooperat ion.
The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina cl eared the
way for r egula r Amor ica-Maois t contact s. The Kor ean
war and the American tr eaty with Chiang on
joint " de fence" of Taiwan had strained Maoist -Ameri can
re lations for a time. But at the Gen eva Conf er ence the
Chinese and American representatives cons igne d th ese
s trai ns t o obli vion. The two sides defined methods and
st ages for subs equent regular contacts. The
between t he Chinese and US ambassadors m Warsaw
were part of this pattern. Fearing exposure of his unsa-
voury deals, Mao tri ed to ke ep the content of the nego:
t iutions from the Chinese peopl e and th e world. The US
State Department, too, itself to . saying . that
though Washington and Peking had no r e-
l ations, t he progr ess made in the W ars aw
was fa r great er than that of Britain and other countr ies
which di d have diplomatic r elations with Chi na. 'fh.e
more than a hundr ed meeti ngs of the Chinese and Ameri-
ca n spo kesmen in Wars aw did, indeed, pave the way to
closer contacts between the Maoi sts and certain quar-
t ers in the United Sta tes.
12. In t he per iod from 1957 to 1965 Mao was busy
pr eparing t he anti-communist and anti-Soviet "cult ural
r evolution". . . , "
The 1957 "campai gn against right ist elements . was
personally stage-managed by Mao. At first he proclaimed
t he specious slogan, " may a hundr ed flower s bl oom
and may a hundr ed school s compet o" . He urged people
to "say everything that is on your mind, sa y ever ything
fr ankl y. Those wh o talk commit no cr ime and those who
listen get a va lua ble wa rning" . On his order s people were
encouraged at meetings and t hrough th e pr ess to
speak up without fear. First, Mao wanted to identify
HIO
those who were still critical of th e mi stakes he had made
On New Democracy and in hi s r eport to the 2nd
of Seve.nth CommitLee, that is, spe-
cdicall )., of his hasic pol iucal s tand agains t a socia lis t
revolution and th e building of socialism in China afte r
t lte vi ct ory of the bou rgeois-demo crati c revolution' sec-
ond, to identify t hose who approved th e
denuncrati on of th e per sonali ty cult at the 20th Conaress
the Sovi et . Party, th osn who, in one form
or another, directly of mdi r ecLl y, opposed the deification
of Tse-tu ng .and his dict atorship. To engineer a pre-
te.xt for persecuti ng peopl e cr it ical of his mi stakes, he
or der ed his agents to persuade, even forcibly compel cer-
Lam r eal counter-r evolutionaries a nd pr o-KMT
to th e Party of China and th e Chinese
revolution at meetmgs and in the press Lat. .
LI "f "I . er, us mg
resa i e .pounced on thoso wh o cr it icised him
fr om positions, br anding th em "c oun-
ter-revolutIOnary r igh tis t elements " .
. Mao admitted th at 800,000 people were nailed down
in the "campa ign against ri ghtis t eleme nts" . Bu t the
n umber of i ts vic tims wa s much gr eater. Among them
were Party cadres , writ ers and art wor ker s, and most
of tll? l eaders and members of democr atic parti es and
aSSOCIatIOns.
From HJ58 t o 1960 Mao conduct ed his rec kl ess " thr ee
red .banners" poli cy und er the of outs tr ip ping th e
Soviet economy in a few years. 1:hi s scheme failed di s-
wh er eupon, in April 1960, Mao th r ew off all
di sguises and began an ide ol ogi cal and poli t ical battle
against the CPSU and the world commun ist movement,
and char ged the Marxist-Leninist parti es wi th "revi-
sionism". At th e Int ernati onal Meeting of Communist
and Worker s' Par ti es hi s sl anders wer e condemne d by
th e vast maj ori ty of frat ernal parti es.
Tn HH:i2 Mao launch ed an officia l campaign against
" r evisionis ts" insid e the country. At first, he struck
ag ainst part of the leader ship, not ably Liu Shao-chi, and
then banish ed a number of writer s and artists known
th e . an d thirti es t o remote vil lages, de-
scnblllg thi s as going to th e masses".
I n 1963 Mao launched hi s notori ous 25-point pro-
gramme, aimed . at spli tting th e soc ia list community, th e
world commumst movement, an d th e an ti -imperiali st
191
/lati on al libenltion movemen t. J\ t th p. same time, us ing
hri bery and deceit, h e began emati ng an anti -Sovie t, anti-
Communis t and pro- Maoi st fift h col umn in ot he r coun-
t ries.
I II H161. and t(l G5 h e co nducted a " learn from the
Lib erati on Army" and an " educating successors " cam-
pai gn, pl acing th e army ab ove Party and peopl e. IIe also
launched other campaigns directed to deifying his
person, befu ddli ng the youth and drawing it " in to t he
s torm an d turmoi l together with Chairman Mao" . This
se t the s tage for depl oying th e youth and People' s
Lib eration Army units ill a counter-revolutionary military
coup.
These an ti-Soviet and anti-communi st divi sive moves
were meant to win sympathy and favour in im pe rialis t
quarters. I n 1964 and HlG5 the White House di spatched
Edgar Snow, and then Li Tsung-j cn, to contac t Mao Tse-
tung.
13. The period from i nGS toH170 saw unprecedented
developments i n Maoist-Ameri can relations. At the he-
ginni ng of 19(j5 Mao refused t? join tl.le.
Union and t he other socialis t countries in th e
people of Vi etnam in th eir just against aggres-
sion and even obs tr ucte d their ald. At the tuue when
th e 'US was esc ala ti ng its aggressi on in and
Mao was prepar-ing for his " cult ural revol ution .Snow
and Li Ts ung-jen came to Pek ing. Snow 1Il the
British Sunday Times in May t97 t that referr ing t? tho
war in Vi etnam Ma o had sa id t o him, " The Clunes.e
will not fight, unless t he Ampri cans a t tack th em. Is this
not cl ear ? The Chinese h ave their hands full at home."
In this way Mao l et th e While Hou se know Chi na
r eally stoo d in the Vi etnam war , thus comfor ting and
encoura zi nz th e aggressor . Ref erring to Si no-Soviet r ela-
ti on s, r eport ed th at Liu Shao-c hi .,had wanted to
se nd a Chi n ese del egation to the 23rd Congress of the
Cl'SU in Inus with the aim of r eviving t he Chiuese-
soviet all ia nce. But Mao h ad put hi s foot down. He was
i n fav our of a peo ple 's war against bo th t he Unit ed
Sta tes and th e Soviet Un ion.
I t is common kn owle dge th at Mao has always been
hostil e to t he So vie t Union, but onl y pr etended ho sti lity
t owards til e USA. By mentioning war aga inst. 1111>. Uni ted
St ates he was merely cre a ting a smokes creen for hi s
H12
[.r epar at ions a war against the Sovie t Union. Surely ,
th e two old Tee-t u ng and Ed(1ar S IlOW-
must hav e di scu ssed the "cul tural even
not mention it i n hi s re port.
Ll 1 sung-l.cn all old lackey of US illllJedali slJl. After
th e collapse 111 1v1.H of the anu-communm war in which
he had,pl ayed prominent part as the so-c alled \ Tice-Presi-
deut of,tlw Ch iness Repu bli c, Li Tsung-j r n emigrate d to
the United Sta tes. There he s layed for 17 years, th en
sudde nly r et ur ned to China. I n Peki ng Mao re ceived him
as an. guest. Banquets and re ceptions were held
for him. I hereupon, he toured the big cities. During hi s
travels he propaga t ed the slogan, " t o figh t agai nst im-
perial ism it is essentia l to figh t against re vis ionis m"
cont r ibuting th ereby to the prepar ati ons for th e
a l "evolution" . Hi s ca ll for lIghting agai nst impe rtalism
was a mere pl oy, whil e hi s call for fighti ng against " re-
visionis m" con formed in s ubs tance with Mao's own
plans , Oil t he int ernati onal plane, this meant str uggle
against the Soviet Union , the oth er socia l ist coun tr ies,
and the world comui unis t moveaent. Insid e t he countr y,
it meant str uggle against t he Communi st Party of
China, th e for emost workers , peasants, in tell ect ual s and
you th, and the poli ticall y conscious r evol u tion ary se ction
of th e Peopl e' s Lib eration Army.
It was an open secre t that Snow and Li Tsung- jen
represented th e White House and exp r essed th e opi nion
of officia l US quar ters. They had a common object ive:
to learn more about the preparati on s for the "cult ural
revolution' and to express th eir approval 0 11 be half of
the White House.
In the summor of 1966, while wavi ng th e nag or a
cultura l r evolut ion , Mao performed a counte r- r evo lut ion-
ary coup. Agai n, he was seeki ng t o win t he confidence
of imperialist r eaction and to begin cooper ating wit h it
on an anti-Soviet and anti-communist basi s. His de sig ns
horn Iruit, US Pr esiden t Lyndon J ohnson, State Secrn-
tary Dean Ru sk, Def en ce Secretary Rober t McNamar a,
a nd others, stated that th ey wanted to improve
cnn-Chiuese r el ati ons, to coo perate wit h China III the
Far East, and acted accor dingly. A conference of US ex-
ports declared that the White House looked with favour
upon Mao Tse-tuug i n th e bcli el th at " Mao's victor y in
tho 'c ult ural revoluti on ' is in the inter ests of the USA".
t o?
Mor e docl ar ntions followed from influential US qu art er s,
saying th at they wanted better r elations
with the Maoi sts . Commercial, diplomatic ant i political
act ions wer e t aken to "stimulate mutual und er standing".
In shor t, in the period from J to 1970 both sides -
Mao Tso-tun g anti th e US qu arters concerned- t ook the
requi sit e s te ps to arra nge 1'01' ('oop er ali on.,
'14, In th e period Irom th e sunu uc r ol U/O, In t.he
s pr ing nf J971 !'Ilao a nd Snow h eld lon g
tal ks on these issues. It will be r ecall ed th at 111
Mao and Snow h ad become bosom fri ends at first Sig h t.
Ther e is evide nce th at Snow was the Iirst middl eman
throu gh wh om Mao arranged sec ret contacts with impe-
ri al ist US q ua r te rs . This was wh y Mao ofte n rdcl'I'cd
gratefull y to S now saying: " l owe it mainl y to S now
fllilt I hav e known all over the wo rl d, es pcr,inll y
in t he USA , and t hat I am unrlcrst ood by th e Auu-r-
lea ns ." In Fcbru nry 1!)71 , as Sno w was leaving Peki ng
after many se cre t conve rs atio ns with Mao concer ning
Maoi st-Aui ericau cooper ati on, th ey parted dose frie nds
who had come to an undcrstandiug and whose I'olati oll s
cordial and fra nk. Thi s is horne out by a va rie ty
or sources mll1 by Sno w's own r ep ort in Lije ill April
"l!171. They had di scu ssed a vi si t 10 Chin a by th e US
President, Mao' s co ntinui ng str uggle agai ns t th ose of
h is count r ymen who favoured Iricndsuip with thn Sovie t
Un ion a ud o pposed a rupproch eui en t wi til US im perin 1-
ism, and ma ny other subj ccts. Th ere is th is roveaIi Ilg
passage ill . now' s re port in Lif e, ref erring to Mao: " As
he courteously escorted me to th e door, h e said 110 was
not a compl icate d man, but r ea lly very simpl e. Hn was,
he said, on ly a lone mon k wal king the world with H
leaky umbre lla."
The sense of Mao' s sad words was th at al ter th e ou t-
break of t he "cult ura l rovol u t ion " he had h eeu nbundonud
0 1' betrayed by his clo se st associates; a " purge " was
in the offing of hi s most trusted fri ends (including hi s
appointed " succ ess or' Lin Pi ao and intimate Ch en Po-
ta). He was consci ous or hi s a loneness and hi s ra il ing
str ength , a nd wa s in desperate need of h elp fr om the
United States .
Cer ta inly, the above docs not cover all th e asp ects of
Maoist poli cy, d ir ect ed to coo pera tion with imperiali st
forc es. But it is CIlOUb: h t o s h ow th at Mau' s rupproch e-
194
mont with imper ialism is neither sudden no r Iortultous.
aud th at it is a deliherately planned ai m of Mao' s coun-
ter- re vol utiona ry activity.
It. TIlE BASIC REASONS FUn MAO'S DISGllACE
IL is bey ond qu esti on th at Mao' s di s g rucclul fall, hi s
betrayal of the r evolution , has ideological, th eor etical ,
hi storical and socia l roots.
The ideologi cal root s are in his counter-revolutionary
ideas of feudal monarchism, anarchism, Trotskyism, mil-
i tnri sm, and reactiona ry pragmatism. This is why,
though Mao did j oin t he r evoluti onary movement, hi s
ideology drove him ultimately to the ranks of counte r-
r evolutionaries.
The th eoretical ro ot s : in philosophy, poli tica l ccoun-
my, and in th e question of r evolution and socialist con-
s tructi on, Mao was not simply a fa lse "Marxi st who con-
ce aled hi s true identi t y behind a " Ma rxist" mask, but an
outright oppon ent of Marxism. This is why, though he
did penetrate the ranks of th e Communis t Party by pre -
tending to be a follower of Marxism-Leninism, he ulti-
mately subs t it ute d hi s unsci entifi c and cou ut cr-ruvolution-
ary Maoi sm for th e profoundl y scie nt ific and revolut ion -
ary t ea chin g of Marxi sm-L enini sm, and be ca me a traitor
to Marxi sm-Lenini sm.
The hi storical roots: Mao' s lifesl ory is not only a long
hi story of anti -Party, an ti-Marxist and an t i- Lenin ist,
anti -Comintern and an ti -Sovi et ac tiv ity, not only a hi story
of right- and " le ft"-oppor tunist mi stakes in question s of
poli cy in all the periods of th e Chi nese revol ution, a nrl
in many cases a hi story of grave crirnus , but also a l ung
history of id eol ogi cal kowt owing to imperi ali sm. This is
why from a pseudo-Communist. car rying the Communis t
banner ho ulti mately turned into an outri ght an ti -
commu ni st using the Communist Party nag as camo uflugu .
The socia l root s : in the anti- imperialis t, an ti- feuda l
and socialist. r evolution Mao mai nl y represented th e in -
t er ests of th e n ation al bourgeoi si e (as most cl early ax-
pressed in hi s On New Democracy ). Hi s style and method
smac k of th e ways and mor al s of decl asse petty propric-
tors and lumpenprol ctari ans , and in some cases eve n of
r ank Ieudal l andl ordism. Thcso arc the compl ex social
origins of the anti-proletarian character of hi s ideas and
actions . It wns inevit able that he should ultimat el y be-
tr ay th e interes ts of th e pr olet ariat.
The limits of th is book pr event me from going into
the sources of Mao's di sgra ce in gre ater detail.
But to (Je t a better idea of th e reasons why Mao t urned
'" .
into a class traitor and nat ional renegade we mu st,
if only bri efly, exa mine one or th e important i.rl eological
sources that influenced hi s thinking and hohavl our-e-Iou-
dal monarchi sm. Th e old Chinese feudal monarchi sm
affected him chiefly in two ways: he wa s ,to
egoce ntric "son of houveu" notio n, that. is, the deifi cati on
of one's self in the man ner of the Ch inese emperors as
son of heaven (god, supreme being), a superman who
consirlers no other men his equals an d cannot treat them
as equals; all other men (f oreign ers as well as compa-
triots) are ordained from hi rth to be hi s sub ject s alll i
slaves . Th is is the ideological source of Mao' s di sgrace-
ful and ridiculous individuali sm. He dei fied himself,
called himself " the red sun", th e "magic ape Sun WlI -
Kung" , " the firs t in th e Celestial Empire", "the only
great man wi th no equals eit her among the ancients . OJ'
among contemporaries" , an d the
wa s al so dr awn to th e feudal monarchistic Sinocc nt r ic
not ion s of t he Celestial Empire - the autocrat' s rlei ficn-
li on of his dynasty as th e emhodiment of th o divin e
will and cause, rejecti ng equa l r elations with other coun-
tri es, which are ordained to bo it s tributaries and vas-
sals . This is th e ideological source of Mao' s pr esumptuous
and extreme nationalism, yuar-ulug day and night for th e
supremacy of hi s Maoi st dynasty in Asia, Afri ca and
Lati n America, and for world hegemony.
1t should be remembered, however, th at th ese noti ons
apply excl usivel y to periods of prosperity. Ther e wore
also many feudal dynasties in Chi nese hi st or y whi ch at
tim es of decline paid tribute to st ronger foreign dynas-
ti es, gave t.heir duught or s in wedlock to alie n rul ers, and
swore allegiance to them as faithf ul vassals. The king
humbl ed himself and called himself "son-emperor" to
his tenuous hold on power. At such ti mes , th e
sun ct i t y of th e son of heav en" an d th e " impregna hi lity
of the Celestial Empire" were forgo tten. And t-his
affected t hinki.ng, for did he not advocate a'
Ja panese Iine of na t ional tr eason and does he not now
follow a pr o-imperialist line of national tr eason?
IV TIlE FATE OF THE "LONE MONK"
AND TUE MAO! T 10TH CONGHESS
I. WilY MAO TSE-TUNG ll ECA1\fE A " LO ' E l\IONK"
1) The inevitable result of ideological
and political mi stakes.
Mao Ts e-t uu g became a "lone mall k" . 'I' h is was riot
s ur pr isi n g. It was, first of all, a logi cal result of th o evo-
lution and development of his ideological mi stak es a nd
l'!TOneOUS politi cal lines. Of late, Mao has been sayi ng
"ever ything depends on wh ether t he ideological an d
litical line is correct" , And t his is essentially tr ue, If a
Communist mHkes one ideo logi ca l mi stake after another,
if h? continuously foll ows an erroneous politi cal l ine,
turning a deaf ear to the criti cal remarks of l eading Par-
ty and if he continues to aggra-
v.uo .llls he IS hound to ond up a traitor to
al:xrsIll-LOIll ru sru, proletarian int er nationali sm, th e so-
revoluti on and socinlist cons tr uction, to th o COIU-
ruunist Party, the pr ol etariat, and the toilers. This was
L!le of .t raitor Trotsky. This was tho path of t r ai tor
Chon I'n-hsiu. And t his is also Mao Tso-tung's path to
treason.
In 28 years -from tho founding of the CPC in 1921
10 the victory of the Chinese revolution in 19ItH- l\l ao
made oue ideologi cal and political mis tak e alter
ta ki ng ei ther "l eft " or right opportunist li nes.
. t he victory of the Chine se revo lution, with Mao' s
rnist,akes developing i ll scale
and hi s evol ut ion C' lll mlIlllted in hetraval of com-
1ll 11l11St and coll usion with imncn a lts m. De tested
h{ an d working people, he bccamn what he
h UllseH dcsci-ibed as a "lune mou k " ,
2) The inevitahle result of persecuting
and exlel'lllinaUng all " close associales"
Th at Mao has become a " lone monk" was also t he
un avoid able resul t of hi s own intr igll
es
and plots, and of
tho brutal r epressi on of hi s cl osest and. most faitbful
associates, The inhuman br utali ty Mao l oosen ed agains t
hi s revolu tionar y comrades and Communists is commo n
kn owl edge, Her e I will cite only a few exampl es of how
perfidioUSly and savagely he treate d people whom he hall
used at differ ent ti mes and wh o wer e counted aJllong
hi s "i nt ima tes" an d "all ies ", These few examples are
onough 10 show why he became a "l one monk" deserled
by hi s dosest cou federates,
In th e autumn of 1927 , ou order s of the Centra l CUJl\ -
mitt ec, Mao ca ine to t he mountains of Cb;ngkllngsl
1an
lit,
th e head of a tr oop of armed poasants. At that time peas-
aut t roops had no comhat experienco, and Mao could
depend only on th e unils of Wan g Tso and Yuan Wen-
lsai , whi ch consisted of peasant rcbe ls who had long since
Found refuge in Chingkangs han. It was tha nks to mil -
itary coopera tio n with the se unit s th at Mao man aged to
sur vive an d build a su pport base. In t he spring of 1928
Chu Teh arrived th er e wit h r evolutionar y unit s, and in
the autumn Pong Teh-huai and Huang Kung-lueh with
th eir units. Ther eupon, resor ti ng to t he ol d warl ord
tr iek, " a plot and a banquet" , Mao execu ted Wang Tso
uud Yuau Wou- ts ai , and di sarmed their troops. At th e
end of tile thirti es, in one of hi s talks with me, Mao ad-
milled: " Aft er all th ese years I have reali sed thal Wang
Tso an d Yu an Wcn-t sai sho uld have been spared, The y
and t heir tr oops had been fairl y slIccess flllly ru-
educa ted. "
It. was not until Chu Tell , Pong Teh-huai, Huang
Kun g-Iueh, and othe l's callie to Chi-nglwngshan that (t
became a revoll1Liollal' y hase ca pahl e of i lld\qwndellt mi l-
it ary operllt ions. Mao had 11 0 knowledge of wa rcmft.
Uu[ul'llT na l. cly, Hn an g Kun g-lueh wa s I(ill ed dul'iug a
Kuolllinl nng air ra id in I!"):H, For man y yea rs, Mao re-
li ed nn Clm Teh and Pen g Teh-hnni. Th en, souto
years nIt!'r seizing mili t nr'y lr ad l>T' ship in th e Party at
th e TSlTnyi confp, renc e (J allllUl' y Hl:i :'i ) , he did not hesi -
t nl e to hlTmili at e th em, Dming t he "styl e r eeti ficati on"
call1 paign in the cllr ly forti es thcy were cllCIl'getl with
grave an d orgnu isatloun l mist ak A .
perse cul. ion (:011 t iuuod during tho « , it' nd .th el r
Pung' Teh-hua l os ieciall . cu ur n r evolution" .
rv hrutoli t y. ' , I " y, was tr eated with extraordi na-
J l was chi efly the " Mao-Lo bl oc" til
Tse -tu ng lo USUJ']I lh e I. ' I' " at enabled Mao T . op 1111 Ilar y IJ Ost in til P l
. sunvi I U J anu ar v HP5 1 I '
e ar ,y at
the hel p of Lo ('eh' n 101' .wor ds , he di d it wit h
Dut. in the 1 and Wang' Chia-
l
' " J
' '" nu rrn g t he "st I ti f
mn , Liev wer e both at t: 'I' I I . Y e roc 1 rca- " I'
< ac , ee 'y hun ' I I .
ell tural revolution" LI \ I l ' 'I ' anr e unng the
Mao launched hi s "sltoYla,IC<t'fjwas. renewed.
lI 1 1
,. , o r ccu H: at IOn (' 1 . ' " '
le. 10 p, among other thinvs < , ",ul 'l Hl lp l WIt h
which he had hezun to " gs, I.he J\ l ao-LILI bloc"
(it h Pl enum of Ih'e'" S J' XI 11
S
Cla lllD III C
I
October Hl38 at.
I "
' ' .' .en 1"1 om' tl Y
I ie cult ura l rev ol ution " I "11 . " 111 1, ee. , et duri ng
"1 ' ['1 I
10 pI OlJPd I I II SI I . ; I) , S n <e- irc aker , trait or ' ,.. ' . . ' .J , , 1<IO-C; 11 as
III g ca pila l ist -r ondeI', and \1
1
0\ chio] pow.er-twl ll-
cr uelly,
. 10 I ce, ,I1HI dealt WIth IiiIII
As rot, Lill Piao Mao I ' I I . f .
At that time Lin jJi'I( )' (1l' tll,le t)l'lI' IIP1Hl\ ll' r
d
him since 1\1:3;).
I' "
,110 'I - 0 '1' IT f
,li S successor" ser iously, li e told' P 0 or 0 , being
III II ny episode .
. 0 Ku about It as a
After t he Tsunyi contc ro M
Ids post of / fO advantage of
a l! d, lat er, Chairman of I, Hed A.I' IIlY
Will OYCI' Lin Piao T .: ,I , . 3 1 Ys 11I Iary Council In
Tho f ' \\ ICC io s poke '11)0111 L' Pir
IP. lu-st t.iuir- was i ll t he s " (J' " 'f f '( III lHO . tO ni e.
"Comrnde \ VanO' M' 0 LlB.J. Mao sai d:
Lin Pia o') HI' i s It'l ' y mg, \\ IllY are yon mak ing lip to
I
. . , mall ,lil t 1 don 't ,- t
..
durmlnud. "
'
\\ , 111 Illy wall I1 n-
"What do you me . I I .
- . " \ VI ' d' ) asked In surpr ise .
, I y H you prUl se Li n Pi ao ' L II . , ,
intern ati onal youth delegati , H
a
li e mcoting wlt h HII
"All Ts aid ' " tl I G TOn III an <ow la st summer?"
, ' \\ as la , .relleral LiIl Piao -I • '
l1I illld III th e lJaLtle at 1" . ' I " 1- ' ' \\ 10 \\ as III COIll -
nlall . fl ow call Ihis bl' wal s. also H young
0 " ' I , - '.' '. asmai: lllg llIllohin
. 1 <IS IlllC erIllJnln g' YOUl' \\"lI P " I .1' I
I, " B . . - " rep JC(
Y JH' al slllg Lin Pi ao you \\' > ' i . .
waJl," Mao saiel " N ' 1' " tI (1 lIJ1t l'r lllllll ng my
work for wpl! 0 \\ I have been doi,ng lIlilit ar y
won is L' 1" H ) Cal s, ami the only fn elld I have
. II Ill. lao, e I S my man. Hi s is t1w only arm ' r
can ca m1l1 e, tllr onl\' army I can (lel)t·· llel . 'TI Y
1 ('r .t f' I " . '
, 0 n, Je 0 t I -
. llll! s o l ie 8111 Houte and Ncw 4th " )'11·1" " 5 ' , l " .I I e 110
I
mi ne. So, be caref ul. I'll 110 1. let. anyon e und ermi ne Illy
wa ll. "
The second time we tal ked a ll t his subj ect wa s af te r
the closing of tha 2nd Pl enum of the Sev enth Central
Committee in March H149. Mao had said that my speech
at t he Plenum contained " ten poisons". Two of th em
concer ned Lin Pi ao.
Mao sa id to me:
did yo u prai se Lin Piao at. the Pl enum'? Why
did say hi s descripti on of tho military s ituati on had
been c]ear and 10 th e point? Didn't I tell you te n yea r s
ago th at to praise Lin PI ao was t o m y
Now you have pr aised him aga in. Isn' t thi s porso n-
Oil S? "
"And didn't T toll YOU t en ye ars a go, " I l'l-'plied, " t hat,
a s I 1'1 0 0 i t, all Par ty cadr es , ' includin g you and me, he-
long to t he Par ty and that it is abs urd to say that some
me mi nc UI' you rs, or nuyb od y' s . I did not mea n to mak e
up to Li n Pi ao O!' to mak e him 'my' mall. You Hay
th at yo u a nd he have boon clos e for a lo ng time. If that
is ease, ca n a few word s of pr ai se Will him away
fr om yon'?"
Th es e t wo t al ks show how much Mno depended on
Li n Pi ao, how much he need ed him and how un sure he
wa s of him . Hi s relati onshi p wit h Lin Piao was no t that
of two close associates wi th common aims an d ide als.
Thou gh by abus ing hi s post of Chairman of th e Mil itury
Council an d that of Central Committee Cha irrnnn, Mao
used press ur e Hnel promises to befri end Lin Pi ao a nd
make him his suppor ter in the army, th e l att er did not
want to be i nvolve d in Ma o's dirty tr icks. Duri ng th e
"style rec ti fica tio n", for exa mple, Mao did not t ell Lin
Pia o of hi s plan of fal sifying the hi story of tho Party or
of hi s other in trigues, for th e l atter would hav e di sap -
proved. J can also cite a few other cases in whi ch I was
pe rsonally involv ed and which show that th er e were dis-
agreemen ts between Li n Pi ao a nd MHO Tse-tung.
1. In Decembet' 'I at th e firs t Politbureau meeting
th at. I fI ltendr d a Iter my return to Yonan from tho Com-
int ern, two di fferent as sessments were made of th e'
battl e at, Pingh si nkuan and of our st ra tegy in th e anti -
J ap anes e wa r .
Mao said that th e battl e a t Pln gh sinkunn hnd brok en
th e rules of gue rri ll a warfar e, that it hu rl been n halllu
200
of manoeuvr e, and tha t no such battl es sho uld be fou ght
ill future because we were not capable of anythin g fJU t
guerrill a operations against the Jap auese. This, he said,
was our strategy.
Chu Tch, commande r- in- chief of the Sth Houte Army,
Pong Tch-huai, hi s Hsi ang Ying, formally dopu-
ty commander but TIl fact th e comma nder of the Ne w
,1t h Army, Chou En-Iai, dep uty chai rman of th e CC Cf'C
Military Council , and ot hers, maintained th at the bat tl e
a t Pi nghsi nkuan had shown that given appropria te
prcpur atious favourable conditions we wer e clearly
of t aking on tho Japanese in s imilar butl.los ;
cer tal,nly, so long as our army lacked mo dern weapons
guerri lla warfar e s hould be our main str ategic course bn l
wh en condit ions wer e fa vour abl e we should not sh un
battl es of manoeuvre.
als ? di scussed tho proposals of Stali n and Voro-
shilov which I had brought from Moscow: the 8th Houto
an(.1 4th armi es sho uld muster avail able moans to Iorm
units With modern arms. These arms could como 1'1'0111
the one-fift h or one-fourth shar e of Sovie t arms su ppl ied
to th e Chinese armed for ces under the accord r each ed
some years bef ore wi th Chiang Kai -sh ek . Stalin had also
aske d me to say to t he Politburcau of t he ec cre ·
" Art ill ery is th e god of modern warfare. T he ' Rt h
Te,y 4th armies should form artill ery uni ts.
.' he UIIT?n CUll with a workshop for repair-
IJI g mach in e-guns, rifl es, nnd ot hur wcapous , and
making s he lls and cart f'i dg cs . Equipment and tec h-
nr ct an s could al so be su pplie d. " All comrades of th e
welcomed St ali n's and Vorosh ilov 's proposa ls,
WI th th e sa le exception of Mao Tse-t ung.
. Mao sa id: "Agai ns t t he Ja pan ese we must fight a guer-
WIlJ'. \ V ne ed ,1,10 guns. w, need no worksho p. They
Will be a nur sance. Of COIlI'se, he wa s wrong-not only
mi li tar ily, but al so politicall y. -
At th a t lime, Lin P iao wa s not H member of th e
Pol ithu r ea u. He did not at te nd the meeting, where he
could have expressed hi s opinion. But as fa r as I know
Irom olh er Pol it burcan com rad es, ho opposorl Mao's yipw-
point.
2, One Novomhor day in HI4.8, ontormg Ma o's st udy,
found him in a sta te of ex tr eme ir ritation ,
" What is th e tro uble, Cha irman Mao?" 1 aske d,
:J01
" I t' s Lin Pi no," he r epli ed .
" Wha t lias 110 dOllor"
" Lin fliao is di sobeyin g order s," Mao sa id. " I ha ve
issu ed se veral orders for hi m to a ttack a nd tak e Cha ng-
chuu. l l o wo n' t do i t. Il o wants lo s tarve th e dty and
wake its ga rr is on surru nrlu r."
3. The Ioll owiug month I again Iouud Mao i ll th o same
s ta te of irritation.
r asked:
"Chairman Mao, wh at is it 1his ti uic ?'
" It 's Li n Piau again ," he said,
" \Vha L has he ({OIl C'? "
Mn« replied: ,
" He is still di sob eying or ders. I drew u p an
uun for Fu Tso-yi . Lin Pi ao was to have furwarded It to
him . I dcmnudcd inunudi ato s urre nde r . If Fu 'I's o- yi WCI'O
to r eject it, we would mou nt a gene ral ollcnsive a mi pc
him out. Lin Piao has di sobeyed my orders on the
of T on Pao-shuang a nd other middl emen . They say I'll
Tso-yi is a st uhhoru northern er aIHI is SUI'C 10 re fuse to
sur re nder: t hey claim, on the othe r hand, Lhul h e muy
be pursu adcd to joi n lI S as a 'I'ebol' . , If we yl'l' sc ul tIle
ult im atum, h e may ell gage h is :100,000 mun In a desp er-
ato assa ult. If dul cated, he would esca pe by plane to
Nanking, whil e P oki ng and it s e nvirons would be rav-
agod -something we want lo a void, So, Lin Pi ao is s ti ll
w'aiting for 1"11' Tso-y i t o ' re bel ', and is i gn orin g lily
orders. "
Yes, Li n P iao ofte n had IIis own viewpoint. Il c r efused
to he Mao' s blind tool.
Yet , i n mi litary matters Mao was compe l led to dep end
on Li n Piao. In 1959, when he di smissed Teh- huui
fr om the post of Mi ni st er of Defence, he a ppoi nt ed Lin
P iao t o replace him and l et him h an dl e all the current
affairs of t he Central Com mi t tee 's Mil itary Co un ci l. Also,
ft c or de re d Lin Pl ao to l aunch t ho " l ea rn Irorn Lei Feng "
ca mpuigu in t he a rm ed Ior cvs . To all in te nts anti pur-
poses , thi s mean t pr opaga ting ti le SJOgUll, " re ad trw hooks
of Chairman Mao, obey C, hHi l'lllan Man, fol low tho be-
hest s of Ch airman Mao" , awl i nc ulcating a s pir i t of blind
obe dienc e to Mao. Thereupon , Mao launched t he " lear n
from the Liberation Army" and "ed uc ate successors "
ca mpaigns t o fnrt her t he personali ty cu lt a nd to set the
s Lage for offlcially nami ng Lin Pi ao his s uccess or.
'When tir e "cultura l r evol ution" beg-un, Lin Pi ao ex -
I. oll l!r/ Mao's pe rson and " t houg hts ", and tho Maois t. pr op ,
ugan da machin e k ept howling' da y a JUI ni gh t : " Li n Piau
is Chu i rman Mao ' s cl os es t asso ciate", " Li n P ian is tl w
most fa ithfu l associate of Chai rman Mao a nd the most
Faithful expon ent of the t houghts of Mao Tse-uin g", and
" Lin Piao is t he finest success or of Chairman At
the li me of t he so-call ed Btl, Congr ess i t was officia ll y
wri tten into the Party Constitution that Lin Piao wa s
Mao's "su ccessor ",
I n l oss th an two and a half years, however, th ere oc-
curre d t he so-c alled Sc pt eruhor ev ents. Lin Piuo van ished
Irom t he scene t ogether wi th hi s wifc Yeh Chun,
deputy mini st er of def ence and chi ef -of-s taff Huauz
Yu ng-s he ng, co mma nde r of lh e ail' fo rc e W u
poli tical commissa r of Lhe uuvy Li Tso-p eng , anrl c: li il-d'
of army or dnance Chu Il ui -tso , At th e 9th Congress all
uf t he m had, On Ma o' s s peci al in stru cti ons, been el ected
members of t he P olitburcau.
Th e Sept embe r eve n ts occ urred during' t ho "s udden
improvem en t " in Maoi s t-American relations Iollowinz
th e t wo vi sits Lo Peking' of Hen ry Kissinzer s peci al
" '" ,
\'oy of th e US President, a nd short ly befor e Nixon' s vis-
it. The for ei gn press deduced a ca usc- und-e llect con-
nect ion between th e Muoist -Arneri can rapprochement a nd
Mao's br eak with Lin P iao.
Now, a few words abou t Chen Po -la, In Se pte mbe r
1% 1 Mao made hi m Iris persona l secr eta ry awl a ide in
th e "sty l e rect.ili cution enrJI paig n" . Mao hefri ended him
a nd Iurth cred hi s Cn rNJI'. On Mnu' s advice Che u Po-ta
wro te oonunentnri es and a r ticles OIl crucial iss ues of
home and for ei gn policy. T hi s was to gi ve him " weig ilt "
and in flueuce. Mao gra dua lly prom ot ed him fro m a lte r-
nat e member of the Central Committ oo to member of the
Sta ndi ng Committee of Lhe Politburc a u, and made him
one of hi s most tr us ted li eu tenants. He decl are d 011 every
possible occ asio n lIlat Chen Po- tu wa s t lte principal i n-
t erpreter of the " t ho ugh ts of Mao Tso-tuug" , a nd sa w t o
it t hat this sho uld be uni ver sal l y ack nowl edged. During
t he " cu l t u ra l re vol ut ion IIH put Chen Po-La a t t ho head
of the g rou p s uperv is ing the "cult u ral r evo lution ",
though Chia ng Chi ng, Mao' s wife, was its act ua l chief.
All th o same, tho appo i ntment, a lbeit on ly nomin al , was
a token of s peci al trust. Yet in August 1\:)70, SOon a ltcr
Edgm' Snow's arrival in Peki ng, Chell stopped . ap-
pearin g on t he political scene , and accof'(!l!lg to .
qua rters vanishe d comple tely. to gether wit h Lin P IUO
duri ng th e September events of 1971.
Mao had afton said that he had fo ur "old close ,a:;-
sociatcs" dati ng to th e Chingkaugshan peri od: La Jung-
hua ng, Tan Chien, 1,0 Jui-ching and .lIo Ch ang.-kung.
Followi uz the " s tyle rectificati on ca mpaign " he said t hat
he also h atl several "new close assoc iates": Liu Shao-
chi, Che n Po- ta, Uu Chiao-mu, Che n, Kao
Lu Ti ng-i and Chou Yang. Kao Kaug was physically
eli mi na ted by Mao in H154, Lo J ung-hua ng died of a ll
illness in L!lU3, and none of hi s othe r now and old "close
associates " survived th e repressions of t he " cu lt ura l r ev-
ol ution" pe riod.
Th e inevit abl e re sult of "style rcctlfi catlun"
and " cultural revolution"
Mao beca me a " lone monk" as a res ul t of th e I'CC-
tifi outi on " campaign and th e "cultural revolu t ion", "bo t h
of wh ich he had organi sed himself'. He becam e . a lone
mon k" du o t o h is undi sguised t reach ery and .1
m
;
sion with i mperi alism and reaction on the baSIS of a nti-
Sovietism a nd anti-communism.
T he " Lin Piao ca se" a nd its extreme ly grave co nscq-
uunces sig nified a major defeat for Mao's
lin o. As II. r es ul t , r ent by s t r ife an d th e
Maoi st group is in sad s t ra i ts and mus t contin uously ox-
pect "sto r ms a!ld we.athel:" . M.ao's at"
nth Congress fo r unit y t o gam s till gloatel. :l.ctolles
was in vain. Th ere followed still greater dlVI SIOTl a nd
still greater defea ts . Thi s is why . Mao admits to being.
a " lone monk" who has los t prestige and the s uppor t of
his followers. At the lOllI Congress he was no more th an
"an id ol in th e temple of royal a nces tors wi t h t hrice
seale d lips" .
2. THE HOME AND FOREIGN POLI CY
OF TIlE MAOIST 10TH CONGRESS
According to t he ClJin ese press , th e '10th Congress of t he
CPC ope ne d on 2/1 Au gu st and closed on 28 August
1973 . But ther e are rel iabl e reports th at it opened ear-
204
li or , i n mid-Augnst. Fo llowing con t f'Ovcws ies a nd disagree-
t l!e l ead ership finall y jJubli shed two reports ,' t he
COlJStltutlOlI, a e0I11111lJ lli que, and se ve r a l lists of members
of central organs.
The peopl e of ClJilJll a nd t ho worl d have not hCJOn told
how. of t he 1 de legates, all appointed by Mao,
s po l\c In th e dehate, a nd what th ey said. Noith or does
a nyhody know whet. her Mao, who "direct ed tho Congress",
any speech Ill mself. Bu t wheLller llC di d not speak
or' (and d.oes not dare puhlisll hi s speech) h e wa s
Ob,:,lOus ly lJ,1 dlffi .culli es, JUdging fr om the publi shed rna-
lOIl HI , s policy endorsar] by the Wt h Cong-l'ess Jl ll S
hecoms s til l more rea ctIOnary and iLs aims s t ill more
mapprolJl'j ale. Thi s is why t he 10th Congress line is
for st ill g re a ter set backs t ha n t ha t of th o 9t h
Con gr'ess.
1) The lll ain objective of home policy
"yeca n. from thl' , puhlished material that Llw prin-
of Mao s home policy and th e conespond-
mg orglllllsa tIOna l measures is lo maintain Mao's on e-mnn
!'el\. ction al'Y ru le nnri prepare tho ground for tJ'llnsfel'1'inl.!'
power to Chiang Ching.
F irst , t h is is confimlCd hy th e cen t ra] item dea lt with
th e 10t h so-c alJod Lin Piao case, Why
dJ(1 Mao t um agamst Lin Piao, hi s offi ci al successor'?
Wh at is beh ind t he Lin Piao case? T he Maoist po litir.a l
r eport to t ho 10th Congress delivererl by Cho u En-Ini
sa id: " Prior to t he Con gres s, Lin Piao had produced 11
? ra ft political r eport in coll abor a tion with Ch on Po -tn .
They woro opposed to contin ui ng t/IO revo lution undor
tho. di ctatorsh ip of the pl'oletarint, contenrling that the
mum task af ter th e !:It/I CongI'eSS was to develop produc -
ti on . Th is was a r efurbi shed version under new con di -
tions of th o same r evi sionis t trash th at Liu ShaD-chi and
Chen Po-ta had s mugglod into the r esol u t ion of t he 8t h
CongTOSS, which alleged t hat the major contradiction i n
0111' co unt r'y wa s not the contradiction be/ween th e PI'O-
let ar int an d t he hourgeoi s ie, hut that between th e advanced
socia list systern and th e backward prorlueti vo for ces
of socioty. "
Mao rej ected th e draft and drew up a new r epor t, which
Lin Pi ao was to have delivered to t he Dth Congress .
. , 1 i ons fr om thr puhli sh ed
\Vc ca n dr aw certa In cone l1S1 '
ex tract s of th e Maoi sl t ' uiug t he r evol ution , , , f . r r 01 con III
,
.\ Mao was 111 avau 1 t ' ri at" whi ch mean s ,
I ' £ t he pr o 0 cl w v ,
under the dict ators up 0 , " the cOlln te r - I'evolu-
. r " . or con t lll\ l1l1g
'1
that he was 111 (1\ our , " hi tting the prol etanat ur«
tlonar y "cultur al r evolutIOn , 't ll 'ar ty 0 11 the pr etext of
its van<J uard, the t h e nat ional bour-
o , \ !)OUl'rt eol sl e , - 1 t1 r sa fel y
"comhat t lHg tie n , flClel Mao gual' an t? e,( 1: : tho
g
eois
i c
, in the and trusl and pnvileges In
. ital and \HOI1 s,
.
of Its ca pl
. , ' ns l con t in mn g
political fwI,d, I Chen po-ta were alga: : " de vel opin g
') Li n Plao anc ," awl call
oe
or , ' . of
M
.... " cu}tu r al r evOl\ltlO
1
n
" 1I
cr
th e " pl,'n(\nct lVe or
,J ,'" or der t o III ;, ialisl syStEll1 ,
productIOn 'u " the ndva nced soc. ' 1 r on " and
s ociet y" i n l i ne WI I I t he "cult ura l rc vo u I
, I' , . words , to Oll( ,
I
111 ot l L-l " , f socia1
1s n
l. . Slu -ch! am
hegln the nuilding 0 \' 8t h Congr es s LlU • 1,\0 1 " fell
') At the t li1\e or tie l ' ru] Mao, on t h e ot lUI ,
, ,
tl one h ant , <l •
Chell 1' o-t a, on o ] bui\ding soci a lJs
Jll
, . ,' , of Mno-
ou t ovel' t he quesliOn hi t ile "st an dan l- bea lo l 1 1\ "'\
. 1 Li Sh ao-
e
11, . , } 1 ' f w iom " vVll
v
dll JIt!· it " t l1pol'is t, iot n 0 L' n 'ao
J CI P o-to. I S ' f ' t ' s an d In 11< , ism, and • l en " e the earl y or re , ' ',-\0 years
, d Mao' S t rust SIUC 1 for 1110r e than , - I
Cll
lO
Y1
e,
I I)cen enltival ed by 1\ 11
1
0 un e IIis 0VP01len ts :lJIe
whu \,1( ' 1 ccessor )eCOl
. l ' offl Clll SU " ,
a,Hll . 1Is } f ft ies all d Six t Ies? , , t act wi th Mao
HeS III t 1e I
'd'n ly con
\.
enen " " t il they were I II " 1 l ' I a - To b egll1 \\ 1 , • ew a ll Iu s )e nnr - . , f the
[01' t ens or years, a nd kllhad ' flI's t-hane\ l\llowl ed g
e
0 ,
f;lir s, and his home :111' \' \l en
nl an v mistakes III lIs\ " cOllsequences' l It ', -
, • 'r 1<\ of t l ell ' " , , 'S i et an' l\l
elgll POLIC)}, 'd
l1
l1is an ti-comnUIl1lst" <1
1
n t1- ,.(:v ohvioll s\y a
Mao }aUIlC1e
. .. wIlle 1 \\ ,\ "
"
1
" I\t u ral re vo l ntlOn , l ' " :;l nndar<l -hea l'lll','
IWoP c CI
on p even W i , 'l lhl 5
c ,.' ould not hut ri se a gmns .
,; , ,''' . nd " succcssor c ,
th coll
st
a , . and t l' altor,
J . Piao
t ILe same r ep ort that Jl n 1()7ll
, I ' " 'u e In ' , . A cr u st Chou En- a l -< , , bceallse In tI ,., ' ', ,'
i
, -. IOr la l oneill )
I ' "t at whle 1 N ao 1I r evoluti onary coup ( e " ,
li
e s tar te d " a connter- p\ ' Session of t he N1I1t h
tl 'Second ellar y ., - I
was ab orted , at )(J. 'M 'Cll '1\17 1 he dr( !W lip ti e
(
' ' t t ee l hen III nl'
" Central ,01)\1111,
Iltl' ()llary con I) (\ etat cn-
. \ con n l flr-I'(WO\
, \ pInn [or a n 1I1 111 el " . ancl on Scpt (! mher H w
' I l OtI' c of ProJccl ,J I , •
"
tIt ec II ll\ ' , ,·Id a tt cJl1I)t t o as sass lllate OUI
launched the cou p III a \\ I ,
n{'\. O
great l eader Cha ir ma n Mao and set lip a ri va l cent ral
couuui u eo."
A la ugh ably crud e versi on, Even hefore the IOth C OIl -
0 11 or ders, Cho n En-l ui ex pl ain cd
Lit e 1,111 P IIW case' t o S and Briti sh cor res ponrlun ts ,
th e latter co mme n te d in th eir' ro p ort.s t.hot t.he t al u did
not s ound true. Mao fabri ca ted th e circu ms tn nces o f th e
case us Il pretext for pl imina t i ng Lin Pin o. But. eve n
it' we wer e \ 0 accep t t he s t or y as t rue. it is qu ite f1 p-
pa r ent th a t Li n P iaos mot.Ivnt.Ions s te mmed lrom Maos
comple te ideol ogical. pol it icul , and urganisat ional ba n k-
ru pt cy, Th is was why Mao' s intention t o con t inue the
"cu ll.ural r evolution" e ncou ntere d ca tegorical ob ject ions
even 0 11 the pa rt o] hi s "s uccessor a nd on the part 01'
th o chief of t he "group SIIpervlsing the ClJltural revolu-
ti nn ",
Tho ma in I'l'aSOJl why Mao destroy ed Lin Pi an was
th at he had never I'l' a ll y mean t to make Lin his s ne ce s- .
Sa l' , He h ad el eva te d Lin Pi ao in word, but was r eall y
setti llg the s ta ge fo r Ch ia ng Chi ng, I men ti oned thi s
in an art icle. " Mao ' I'se -tung Perf or ms a Counter- Hevo lu-
t ion ary Coup, Not a ' Cult ural H(!Volntion ' " ( Mar c h
10G\J ) , " Mao' s nu t. l -commun ist a nd ant i-people g r'ou p,"
T wrot e, "consis ts of a ha nd ful of per son s, Out of th ese
hi s wi fe Chia ng Ching is Mao' s closes t an d most t r usted
associa te, T his is why he has con trived t o put her in
t h ir d place in his hi erarchy, afte r Lin Piuo." Accordi ng
to th e conuuuniqu c of L1 1!! l Ot h Congress, Mao brand ed
Lin Pi ao a bourgeoi s careuris t, cons pirato r, COll llte l'-revo-
luLionary douhl o-d cal er, renegad e a nd Lraitor, an d h ad
h im expe lled fr om th e Par t y "once and for all " , Che n
Po- La was descr ihed as " t he principal mr mhel' of the
Lin Pi ao clique", llra nr!e<! an "an l i-co mmunis t Kuolllin-
l.ang Trol sk yit r, r r negad e. eIWl1l Y age ut a nd
r evis ioni s t, expelled froll1 th e P a l't y and di smissed frolll
a ll pos ts illSidfl and ou ts idc t he Parly . T he Co ngress del -
lh e cOllllll l1 lli qlle also said, "su ppor te d th e
c. is ions made on all t he conespo nding mea s u res taken
hy, the Committee of tIl e Communis t Party of
Clu na, t o tlt e ot ho r principal member s of
t he Llll Plan ant l-P ar l y clique",
Who WCI'l' t lwse "othor princi pa l nH1mhm's" ? Mao l ack ed
the coul' age Lo n a nw lh em publi cl y, T he whole world
k nows tha t WIl('Il Li n Pi ao di sappeared, hi s wife, II
momher of t he Polithureau, di sappear ed as well ; so did
foul' other members of th e I' olithurc uu , three ?f .: vho m
wer e al so commanders-i n-chief of three
. d for ces th e air force, and the navy ; the om tl
grolln
l
ief of :lrmy ordnance. But what has hapPoulc,dl·ttO
was c II ( ber f tho 0 1 -
Li Hsueh-f eng, fonner alternate mern or 0 '
bureau? 11 Hl71 eve nts Mao purged th e so-
Aft er the Se pte m er. ' . 1 P, t aOVOl'l1me nt ,
called Lin P i no group WllO wer e
and rthr. commun ique of
these people ? aut
t l
Iug OIl this score. Thi s, too, I S
10th Con gr ess sal no II
part of th e Tse-t;l.n
g
. h as been con Li nuouslv
Since tho se Marxi sm, and not ruv t-
repeating the slogan. . J at\\:. h e open and abovcboard,
s tonis m; unite, and don t sp I.' " T hese three " mus ts"
a nd don't and int; the new Party
1
" lon'ts wer e w .. f ' .
a nd t.Ire? c. u " [u nda mHntal princi pl es 0 mn er-
Cons tl tuuou as ie
Party str uggle. ' 11 ' b hind honeyed words is another
To conceal evt (Olll gs e , .
. .' k f Mao Tse-tu ng s. . 1 ti
fav ounte t ric O. . I .' t anti-SovlCt anr an I -
I
his anti - -,enlIll S, < "
For examp e, . ' li e ,le;;c1' ihe d as n cam-
, campa lgll " .. '
communist reacl\<mary 1 " and his counte r-J'c)\' o-
paign for rect if yi ng and a ca,m-
lutionary .coup as t 1£ I f c'lpilal isi -l'oallees holding
paign " agal nst a iauc P' < and Chen I' o-t a he also
power ". His assault on Jao <} I' 1 I
. lib t Iy dl:-lortec 19 h.
presents 1Il a de I era e i juggle r of truths an d
Iact, Mao has always} l,a
T
\ order to decei ve the
. ' facts ant les t
untr uths, I rest of th e wor1<1 and pr oven
people of China am l :- 1" cations of the even ts.
them fr om seeing used by
All these are old tnc s onc .. f 12 April "n2 1
H
" ti ommulllst coup 0 . 1
Kai -sh ek. IS I-i of th e national l'lWOlutlOll a.lle
he described as de ene
l
e
ts " While coll udi ng With
f
ti nary e e111 en. . l' ,. he
purge 0 reac 10 . 1 ' un tr y down t \e ri ver. '
imperialism and se llIng tr aitor s". He was
kept calli ng the lu ti on ary , ye t he shoute l1
an ou t- and-out coun ter- l e Kai -shek, was and
from th e r OO [t ops he" r " If eve r cateh me d.?ln
g
a lways be en a he used to say , yoU
anytldng counter-re\ 0 U 10 t '" Kuomintang veterun Bu
may shoot me on the spo.
Ha n-min said on thi s score: " Chiang Kai -shek has pro-
noun ced all th e fine words th at exist , and ha s cornmi tte d
a ll th e ab ominati ons imaginable." Chia ng Kai-shek is
of the " three t eachers" th at Mao OHOll sai d had in -
UUUllCOU him ( th e othe r two ar c " t he impe ria lis t " and
" t he beggar") . In fa ct, Mao surpasses Chi an g at spouting
hon.eyed words t o cover up iniquiti es. As the Chinese
goes, " havi ng origina ted fr om bl ue, blue r outdoes
It ; saying runs, "came lat er -went hi gher" .
. It IS now apparent that t he Lin Piao ca se lias ha dly
fright ened Mao. Despite the violent reaction to the Se p-
t ember 1971 eve nts a t home and abroad, Mao did not clare
to uch on th e s ubject for a long time. Fin all y, he launched
se cret purges of military and political ca dres, whil e
officially he mer el y publish ed th e slogan of comba tti ng
"swindlers Liu, Shno-c hi" . Two ye ars of mass purges
and repr essi ons loll owed. Sti ll, th e communique of
th e I Oth Congress sa id: "At present we should continue
to put th e task of criticis ing Li n Piao and rectif yi ng
s tyle of work above all else." The politi cal report predict-
ed that " Lin Piaos will appe al' again" and that eve nts
like t he Lin Piao case will keep r ecurrin g.
This shows th at it wa s Mao's continuous purges and
repressions during the "cult ural revol ut ion" direct ed
against Party, gover nme nt and mi li tary ca dres th a t had
led t o th e Lin Piao case, and tha t t he Li n Pi ao case is
bound to l ead t o new purges and repressions. Mao is
ca ught in a vicious ci rcle of unsol vabl e con tr adic tions in
hi s re lation s with Party, go vernme nt and military
cadres, marked by eve r in crea sing mut ua l di strust and
hostility.
Second, at th e 10th Congress Mao publicly declared hi s
int ention t o con tinuo mali gning a nd persecuting Commu-
ni sts and th l' working people. The Maoist poli ti ca l report
deliver ed by Chou sai d: "Lin P inos wi ll ap pe ar
again and so will per sons li ke ' Vang Mi ng, Li u S hao -
chi, Peng Toh-huai and Ka o Kang. This is somet hing
in de pendent of man ' s will. " Thi s is th o reason wh y Mao
intends to r enew hi s attacks on Party, governme nt and
military load ers , and also on tens of t housands of ca dres
employed in Party, governmen t, mili ta ry , mass and ot he r
organi sati ons " ten, t we n ty, and thirty t imes", as he had
don o in th e cas e of Lin Piao, \Van g Ming, Lin Shao-c hi ,
Pen g Tch-huai and Kao K un g .
These words and deeds of Mao 's have their origm in
his " t heor y" of " re movi ng th e old and ab sorbing the
new" . What this concept means is that per secution of
revolutionary cadres and working people must be as
continuous as the blood circulat ion is in a hUllHUI body ,
His target s are cadres and Party member s of all l.hp.
periods li s led in th e communique of th e I Ot h Congr ess -
not only the "older generation, whi ch outlived th e !ound-
ing of th e Party and the tirst and secon.d r evolutiouary
civil wars" , not only "cadres who s urvived th e ordeal
of the anti-Japanese war", not only " t hose wh o took part
in aiding the Korean people to repulse American ~ g g r e s ­
sion", and not only cadres who had grown up III the,
period between China' s liberation and th e outbreak 01
the "cul t ura l revolution", but al so th ose young lead er s
and ca dres who had made th ei r CiUCCI' S duri ng th e "cu l-
tural r evoluti on " , and the youth that j oin ed th e Party
during thi s period.
In the beginning, the "cultural revo lution gl'Oup
cons ist ed of 17 members. Out of these only Ch ia.ng
Ching, Yao W en-yuan and Chang Chun-chi ao ha ve re-
ma.in ed in th e public ey e. Its most zealous members have
long si nce vanished from th e scene. In shor t , Mao' s
intention to persecute and purge leaders, cadres and
Party members is not a chali ce st rat agem.
Though, in contrast to th e earlier peri od of th e "cu l-
tural revolution", Mao docs not send " red gUill'ds " with
unfurled banners and rolling drums into th e streets to
beat up Communists and working people 0 1' make th em
march in processions with dunce caps 011 their heads and
yokes round th eir necks , expose d to insults and blows,
his spies sc our factories, mines, transport en te r pr ises, of -
fices , orgarrisations, schools and h0111 es , arrosting, purg-
ing and exterminating cadres and intellectual s. This con-
tinuous persecution and exter minat ion of whol e groups
of peopl e with revolutionary exper ie nce, polit.i cally edu-
cated anrl ab le to see through hi s counter-revolutionnry
esse nce, is for Mao th e chi ef means of buttressing hi s
reactionary rul e and preparing th e ground for hi s heirs.
The "st yle rectifi cation" and th e "cul t ural revoluti on ",
the brutal persecuti on of "old associ ates" and " tr ul y
trusted persons" such as Lin Piao and Chen Po-La, and
es peciall y the intention announced in th e documents of
the 10th Congress of continuing repressi on s, has finally
210
iet peopl e see Ma o' s perfidious and cruei nature. They
have underst ood th at Mao's tr eatment of any person de-
pended ex cl usi vely on hi s usefulness t o Mao' s extreme
egoisti c interests, So long as a person was useful to him,
Mao literall y showe re d him with bl essings, bu t th e 1110-
mont he was no longer need ed he was "kick(!d out and
treated as pr escrib ed in a memorabl e " cul tural revolu-
tion " dlrective-i- " t hrow to th e grou nd un d trample wit.h
the hoot". Ma o' s morbid su spi ciousness ("be tter>mi streat
the guilt less than be deceiv ed" ), hi s desp otism and vio-
len ce, hav e s urpassed th ose of Tsao Tsao, known and
hated by most people down the ages for hi s perfidy and
cupidi ty, hut deepl y r evered by Mao Tse-tung.
Mao no lon ger beli ev es an yone, exce pt perhaps Chiang
Ching. But neither' doe s anybody beli eve Mao, The bl ame
for th is rel ationship of mi strust and suspic ion betwe en
hirn and milli ons of Comm uni sts a nd working peopl e Ialls
en t ire ly Oil Mao. And thi s tenuous s tate of in compatibil -
ity is bound, soo ner or later , t o precipitate grea t di s-
meier, which will doubtl ess resu lt in vi ctory for th e ma ss
of the people and in def eat for the "lone monk" .
Third, take th e li st of deputy ch airmen of the Central
Committee and th e li st of member s of th e St andi ng Com-
mittee of the Politbureau handpi ck ed by Mao aIt er th e
l Oth Con gress. 1n th e past, ther e were al WHyS it few
Party ve te ra ns in th e top lead er ship. Mao was afraid to
instal " II H\\' arrival s " mud e by the " cultural r evolution" in
high posts, lest this shou ld ca use out rage in th e count ry.
This time, however , hH mad e Wang' Hung-wen and Li
Teh-shen deput y cha irmen of the Cent ra l Couunlttee, find
tho same Wan g /lung-wen and Li Teh -shen , al on g with
Chang Chun-chi ao, members of the Standing Committee
of th e CC CPC Polithurcau.
Since Mao has of late toned down th e vir ulen t cult of
hi s person, and incl ude d neither Chia ng Ch in g nor Ya o
Wen -yuan in th e list of deput y chair me n of th e Central
Committee and member s of th e I'olf tbureuu SLa ntlillg
Committee , some obser vers concl uded that he had s uf-
fered a se tback at th e 10th Congress 01' was COlli poll ed
to draw back,
This is true. Mao and hi s " cl osest trusted person s"
Chiang Ching and Yao 'Veil-yu an found th emselv es in
an atmospher e of di saffect ion crea ted by th e " cul t ura l
revolution" or, more preci sel y, by th e bl oody events of
211
the ar med co un ter-re vol ut ion , So, th ey rleemerl it wi ser
to with draw i nto t he shade, But th e ' move was purely
Iormul.
Mao is s till t he di ct ator , He has given up none of his
power. AJI(I Ch illng Chi ng, who had moved up into second
place- after Mao- at th e ti me of t he
ti on " and was, in effect, ge nera l secret ary 01 th e Polit-
bureau St anrli ng Committee in cha rge of the Ma oi st par-
ty , cou t.i n.ucs to 1'1111 tho party' s alini rs her
formal offi ce, The so-c al led Hingl e pa r ty l eade rs hfp so
vigorously emphasise d by Mao t hese days, is designed
t o'"subordinate everybody to hi m and to his wife.
'1. By making W ang Hung-wen and Li Teh-shen dep-
uty chair men of t he Central Committee, and the same
two plus Chang Chun-cliiao members t he
Standing Commi ttee, Mao se t t he s tage for nutting Chiang
Chine anrl Yao Won-yuan in th e game high office. What
he t o show is that since 'Yang Hung-wcn, Li ' I' eh-
s hell and Chang Chu n-c hia o can occupy t o-ech elon posts,
so can Ch ian g Ching and Yao W en -yuan . At any mo -
ment, lie is liabl e to - raise Chiang Ching and Ya u Wen-
yua n t o th e sarno summits. , "
2. The symbo l ic effect of Ma o s moves IS still more
important. He ga ve th e count ry a mi the world \0 under-
stand th a t Ch in a is ente r i ng a period when t op party
and gove n lllwllt posts will be held by peopl e wh o mad e
th eir ca reers durmz the "cu lt ural r evoluti on ". Everybody
knows th at W an g tlung-wen was pushed up hy the " cul-
tu ral revolution" ; it is -k nown OIl good aut hority, in fact ,
t.hat he played a leading part cri mes th e, is ao-
[ans. t ho t rouhl a-makers , who se i zed power III Sh_a ng-
hai and r an sn ck erl th o local or ganisation s of L1w Com -
mu II ist Pa rl.y, th e t ra de uni un s , and th e local gove r n-
men L. He [oi ned th o MHoist party a nd was ]11'0111ptly
mad e de puty chair man ol th e Sha ugha i " re voluti onar y
commit te e" . Then , Ma o transf erred h im t o Peking to
give him pol itical presti ge, for he was bei ng groomed 1'01'
a loadi ng rol e at t he 10th Congress. Mao put W an g
Tlmi g-wen in second pl ace af' te r hi mself chie fly . to bring
hom e to t he people th at 1'1'0111 now on top-ran king lead-
ers would como froUl a mong th ose marIo by the "cultur al
I'evoluti on " , Al so, this mo ve was t o pave the Wfl Y 1'01'
orrteia ll y appointing Chiang Ching hi s sllceesROI:. In
to usc the classi c phrase , Wang Huug-wen IS now a
ty pical personage in a sit uat ion" or , in t he polit-
ical the most. ty pical r PIJI'cSonl ative of those made
by th e cult ur al r evoluti on " .
, pul !t ical slrata?eIll is desi gned to ma ke peopl e
th e Idea , th at s l.nce W ang Hung-wen can take
SLc?Jld pla ce, Chia ng Ching ca n too, for s he has a g reater
cla1111.
, I.' egards. th e "cul t ur al rovolu-
Lion as til e bi ggest nclu ovemcnt" of 111' S lif ' .1 I 11
tl t Cl . ' NT '- 1 e, ant 10 ( S
u: I SllOlIld, there for e, Iorovor he hi s , Awl
;\:here i t is d ue" , who should occupy
c u. _. Lin I lao, wh o was hi s appointed heir i's
1I0 more . Chen Po-t u chief of Ihe " c 11 . I I '"
7 ' " I ' u .ui a revo uti on
I.as. al so eli mi nated. Conseq uon tly t he
l eputy chie l 01 group " , Ch ia ng Chin g, is a " nat,lIral "
Is this not clear? Mao is planuinz t t
in Chai r No. 2 a nd ho/ '
cesser. Pur , thiS he needs only to pu sh W an g lI UlW-WOll
out. But th is does not mea n th a t Mao \\' 1'1 1 11(") 1 '"
\V, II , , ' ougur lis e
v ang lin g-wen III hi s llllllel'iland dua lings . On the CO Il-
:Vang Hun g-wen was promot ed by him for thi s
ex press purpose. Wang has a lr ea dy IJC()n used to dulivo r
t.h o. Heport OIl th o Hevi si on of the Pur t y Consf.it ution
says that " re vol ut ions li ke this wi ll ha ve tu
carried out many limos in th e Iutu ra ". And t here is no
do?ht th at}Iao also i ntends to use Wang Hung-won as
chie f of a second cultu ra l revolu tion " .
ta ke th e l!st of members of t he Tenth Central
COlllllll lt ee. It conta ins s till fewer old member s and 11, 1-
I. el'll ate !lWIII]) ors da t.ing to bef ore LlIU fllll Congre ss, wh il e
!'!l e number of who . mad e th ei r earners - during ll w
cul t ura l r evoluti on has incr eased . Besid es, th ere are IrO
wOllH:n th em , This is l!npreced ented , conside ri ng'
that 111 add iti on t here we re 32 women a mong the '148
members of th e Ten th Con gress presi dium. T h is Iuet CU Il -
not hy itself evoke adverse comme n t, hut in t he case of
l.he Maoi s t cli que it has a defi ni te purpose-to gi ve
grea ler weigh t to t ile person of Ch ian g Ching aIII I i"'e-
pur e cadr es t o suppor t her ascension to t he throne.
Now about th e re habili tation of t he score or old mum-
hers and al te rn at e members of th e Cen lra l Commi ttee.
Hel' ll, la o, ]\[a o WfiS guide d hy se l fish ends , On t ho Ol le
hand, he wanted t o soothe feHl ings i ll co ndi ti ons of a
gr a ve crisi s and, 0 11 the ot her , he h ad H definite lise for
the a rme d counte r- rcwo]ut ion. So, th ey deem ed it wiser
t.o withdraw into th e sh ade. But th e ' move was purely
for mal. ,
Mao is st ill the di ct ator. He has give n up non e ol hi s
power. And Ch ia ng Ching, h al,' up
place-afler Mao- at th e tune of t he cu ltura l
ti on " a nd WH S, in effect, gelllH'a l of th p: Poht-
bureau Standing Committee in char ge 01 the Maoist par-
ty, co nti nu es to run th e party' s a ffai rs regardl ess her
formal ofIk e. The so-cal led si ng le par t y ImHler slllp so
vig orous ly emphasised by Ma o t hese is . designed
t o subordinate everybody t o him and to hi s Wife.
t. By making Wang, Hung-wen Li 'I'oh-shen dep -
uty chairmen of th e Centra l Committee, and same
two plus Chang Chun-chiao memher s th e
St a nd ing Committee, Mao se t the st age for putt ing Chiang
Ching anrl Yao Wen-y uan in tho same hi gh offl ce.. What
he wants to show is that s ince Wang Hun g-won, LI Teh-
shcn and Chang Chu n-chiao can occupy to-ech elon posts,
so can Chiang - Chi n g and Yao Wen-yuan. At an y mo-
men t , he is liable to raise Chi an g Ch ing a nd Yao W en-
yuan to the same s ummits . , .'
2, The sy mboli c effect of Mao s moves IS still mo re
importnnt. He gave th e count ry and th e wo r ld to 111Hler-
st a nd th at China is enter ing a peri od when top party
and gov ernmen t posts will be held by people wh o mad e
th eir careers during the "cultural r evolut ion ". Every body
kno ws t hat \ Van g Hung-well wa s pu sh ed up by t he " cul-
tural r evolut ion "; it is kn own on goo d authority, i n fact,
th at he pl ayed a leading pal'l in the crimes of the i sao-
fans , t he t. rou hln-makcrs, who "seized power in Sha ng-
hni nn rl r ansacked th e local orga ni sation s of the Com-
mun ist Pa rt y, t ile tr ad e unions , and th e loca l gover n-
ment. He joined the Ma oi st party and was promptly
mad e deputy ch airman of th e Shanghai " r evol ntionar y
commit tee". Then , Mao transf erred him to Poking to
give him politi cal presti ge, for he was bein g groomp,d I' m'
a leading rol e at .t he 10th Congress , Mao put Wang
Hun g-wen in se cond pla ce afte r lrlmsol] ch iefly to br ing
home to th e peopl e that I rorn now on top -rank in g lead -
er s wou ld come from among th ose made by th e "c ultural
r evolut ion " . Also, t hi s move was t o pave th e way for
officia ll y appointing Chiang Ching his successor. I n s hor t ,
t o lise t he class ic phrase, Wan g Hun g-wen is now " a
'Ji'J
typical per sonage in a ty pical s i t uat ion" or, i n t he polit-
ical j ar gon , th o must typi ca l represent ati ve of th ose made
by t.he " cul t nra l r evol ution " ,
Mao' s pol !t ical st ra tagem is designed to ma ke people
accept th e Idea that s ince Wang Hung-wen can ta ke
se cond pl ace, Chi ang Chi llg can t oo, for she has a gre at er
cla i Ill.
, Mao rega rds th e counter -r c\' ol u tionary "cul t ural revol u-
t.ion" as bigges t "achievement" of hi s li fe, an d hold s
TO: I shou ld, t herefore, for ever he his , And
If I; .)gn'.en it is d ue' '., who s hou ld Occupy
Cha n No. _: . l. i n I la o, who was h is appoi nted heir, is
uo Chou PO-L a, chief of th e "cul l II I'll I revolu tion
, h,as, a.lso Couscqu on tly, t he
dEpll ty cliiel of th e gro up , Cluang Chi ng, is a "natura l "
. . l ::l nO,t clmll'; Mao is pl annin g to put
Chia ng Clung III Cha i r No, 2 and appoi nt. her his sue -
ces ser. For , thi s he needs on ly to push Wang Hu ng-woll
Ol;,t.. 1I1l s does , not . mea n th a t Mao will lI O louger lise
\\ a ng Hung-wen III Ins underh and deali ngs , On t ho CUll -
trury, Wang l lu ng-wun was promot ed hy him for th is
ex press purpose. Wang has a lr eady been used to deli ver
t he, Ii eport ou the Hovisi on of the Par ty Consti tution,
whi ch says tha t " re vol ut ions li ke t his will have to he
ca r ried out many t imes in the futu re". And there is no
that}oIao also intends t o use \Vang Hun g-wen as
chIOf of a second cuIturaI revol ution "
, take t he li st of member s of ' th e Tenth Centra l
Commi tt ce. It COIl tains s till f ewe r old III embel'S and a l-
tornato da ti ng to befor e the Ilth Con gress, while
!}IC n umber of who . made their ca reers during the
cul tura l r evol uti on hns i ncrcnsed . Besid es, thuro are 40
WOll1 f:n t he m. Th is is IJ nprcced en ted , cons ide r! ng
that III additi on t here were 32 wom en among t ho '11 8
mombors of the Ten t h Congress presidium, Thi s Iuct can-
not hy it self evuke adverse comme n t, hut in th o elise of
t he cli que it has a defi ni t e purpose·- to give
gre a te r wei ght t o th e pe rson of Chi ang Ch i ng and pr e-
pare ca dres to suppor t her ascension to th o throne.
Now about the reha hilitatio n of th e score of old ni em-
bel'S and al te rn ate member s of t he Con1./'(\ I Couuni tt ee,
UN e, too, Mao was gl1 idnd hy s elfish ends , On t he one
hand, he wan ted t o soothe fee lings in condi t ions of a
grave cr isis and, OIl th e othe r, he had a defini te lise for
each of the rehabilitated: some were to win over cer-
tain military units , other s to win sy mpa t h.y. amollg. 11011-
Han peupl es, and st ill other s ruha bi li ta te d
for th e sake of a ppeara nces. As Ior th e bulk, o! the re -
habilitated " , we cun still right fully use t he Chi nese say-
in g: " T ho ugh we hear th e s taircase the a, nes wh o
are descendin g it are not to be seen . Al'e. these. people
st ill alive'? Are th ey still i n pris on, and being tor-
tured ? Ar e t hey doing forced l abour in May ca d res
sc hools ? Ar e th ey und er hou se and ex pos ed
to insults'? Or have th ey r eally regai ned th eir
and are really being treated as members of the Cen tral
Committee?
Let us ass ume th at th ov arc st ill ali ve, a nd th a t th ?y
have nominally been r einst at ed on th e Ce ntr al
t ee. Let us eve n assume that a st ill greate r Will
return lo the Central Committee and other institutions.
Bill, a rc th ey sa fe from being perse cuted and represscd
.
agalll . . .
-Fifth, lak e Mao' s Lrnatment of th e yo ut h and won.len S
movcmeut.s. Prior to th e l Oth Con gress, Mao huni cdly
formcd a false Komsomol. The new Maoi st Party Con-
st it nt io n ad opted by th e 10th Co ngress says that th o
hunguieipi ngs (r ed guards ) and hungsiaopings (li ttle
g ua rds) a re lcgitimatc organi sati on s of yo ut h and chi l-
dren. The fa lse Komsomol is meant to deceive th e pub-
li e and t o m a k e th e nn m e o[ tho Koms om ol nvailn blo
for Mao' s und erhand desi gn s, Tho hungwei pings and
hungsiaopi ngs have been pr eserv ed for use in th e s ucces-
s ive "cult ural revol utions" of t ho future as a blind tool
for kill ing, manhandli ng, and tormenti ng cadres and
working people,
As for women' s organisa tions, Mao had al ways tr eated
them wi t h di sd ain. In the initial peri od of t he "cul tu ral
r evolution" he is kn own to ha vo said: "There is nothin g
more usel ess than women' s organi sations". Wom en ' s 01' -
gn uisa tio ns W CI' C cr ushe d, and th eir a r res ted .
since 8 Mar ch -1 972 he has been saying : Due utt out.ton
must he devoted to work among women " and " a ll
things men ca n do, women ca n do as well ", Si nce the
LOth Congress the women's movement is being r evived,
Women ' s con fere nces are being h eld in all proviur .iul
ce nt res. New women's org unis a ti ons arc being Iormcd,
And th e aim is obvious : to have mass organis a tions that
214
would sound th e pra ises of Mao Tse-tnng and Chiang
Ch ing, a nd se rve as pill ars of su ppor t for Chiang Ching,
Tho a hovu examples show that Mao is hurrying to
buttress his reactionary rule and to se t t he stage for
r, hiang Ching's inheri ting h is "throne", But i n th e in -
tur na l and international" condit io ns of th e sevent ies,
Mao' s attempts at making th e Peopl e's Hepubli c of China
a famil y COIICCl'Il can, of course, have bil l. one outco me-
total bankru ptcy.
The Maoi st politica l re por t, t o the 10th Congress like
to t he !lth. contains no conc rete men tio n of eCI;uom-
I,C or "achievements", There is not one eonc rc te
hglll:e In I t. The Maoist clique channel s a considera ble
portion of t.he nati on al i ncome, th e contri but ions of
ov cr sc.as Chinese, and th e lion' s share of th e r evenue
from lorni gn trad e into war industri es, ()specially nuclear
and balli stic mi ssil es, Con siderable re source s
al'e, b?lllg . for subvers i ve acti vity agains t the
th e world communisj, movement, th e
a nl1-l111 pcnahst nati onal liber ati on movemen t, and tho
pea ce money is s pent on finan cing a
fifth .111 VIlI'lO US countries to promot e Mao's a bove-
menllOncd Huns. Only H small porti on of t he nat ional in-
c.orne goes to industry and agrieul ture, sus ta in i ng lh e
life of t he mass of th e peopl e at a mini ma l le ve l. So,
wh at could Mao havc said a bout economi c "ach ieve-
m en ts " .
, he had really wanted to name figures sho wing th e
li ving standard of the peopl e, he would have had to ad-
mi l Lha.t t he past 20 years th ere was a uster- ity
a nd str-ict rn ttoni ng of necessaries as in wartime. Take
fuod. All t hat a person ca n buy on a mo nth's ration
ca rds is from n ilie to 20 kil ograms of bread (01' ro ot
cro ps at. a ratio of 4: 1) and fr OID 125 to 225 grams of
vsgetubl o oi l. As for ot her' commod it ies, spec ifica l ly clot h,
fr om five t o nine are allotted pe r person annua lly.
All th e same, Mao s clique keeps nrging people " 10 di vide
th e rood of t hree alllong fi ve", " to cat a mouthful less
at every meal " and " to pr epare for Will' and natural ca-
lamiti es " - all in order " to s to re mure grai n". Speaki ng
of housing, practi call y no new constructi nn ha s been see n
s ince th e lime of the " big leap" (1958) .
Ou tsid c th e biggl!s t cities - whew a modest nu mber
of hi gh er educatio nal es tablishments is s till fu nctioning
with a shor ter training period, a curtailed curr iculum,
and a r educed number of s tude n ts -s-scc oudnry and pri-
mary education, whi ch has be en compl etel y denied sta te
subs idies Ioll owing its " tr ans fer to th e char ge of t he
people 's communes ", is in a truly wretched state.
are shortages of specialist s in various fields of science
and production. Many wer e repressed, many wer e exiled
to vi l l a gcs . So, what co ul d MHO h nvo said about " achie ve-
ments' tIn t he cult ural Held?
I t would have been soli-chas t iseme nt for the Mao
clique tu l'cf cl' t o th ese economic and cl,l1t ul',al This
is why th e matter wa s glossed over In sil ence HI t he
Maoi st repor t s to the nt h and !Oth cong resses .
The sp ending of tremendous sums for the upkeep uf
the Maoist empire and for war pr eparations, on o.ne
hand , and the policy of cons igning the vast maj ority
of the nation to wretched pover ty, suffering and prema-
t ure death on th o other, havo crea ted insoluble and in-
crcus iugly ' sharp centrad icti ons bet ween th e Mao ist cliq ue
aIHI th e people of China.
2) The central link in th e for ei gn policy
of th e 10Ul Cong ress
Tu judge fr om the documents of t he 10th Congress and
th e accompau yiug diplomatic ac tivi ty, Ma o' s aim s i ll
for ei gn affairs are focussed on intensive pr eparati ons .for
war against th e Soviet Union aI1l1 attempts a t provoking
a world war.
First, this is made evident by the communique of the
10th Congress. It say s : "Be un guard ... particularly
against sur prise attacks by soci al-imperialism and be
read y t o wipe out resolulct y, th or ou ghl y, wholl y and
completely any cnomy that dare in vad e us!" What
clearer evide nce can th er e be that Mao is in fact himself
pr eparing an anti -Sovie t war?
As far ba ck as addressing guests from Japan,
Mao laid cla im Lo large areas in th e Soviet Union an d
(,0 th e territory of t he Mon golian Peopl e' s Hcp uh lic.
Following th e outbreak of the " cultural revol ution" in
1\:)66, the hungioeipings, encour aged by Mao, screamed
to t ho accompaniment of rolling drums th at th ey want
"to go (,0 war against Moscow an d hois t the re d han ner
of t he thoughts of Mao Tse-tung Over t he Kr emli n" .

Troops wer e con cen t ra ted in areas bord ering on th e
SuvieL Union , and large number s of " r ed guar ds " wore
settl ed in areas adjoining th e Chinesa-Sovi ot and Chinese-
Mon goli an borders,
IJ.1 1969, on ord er s, Chinese tr oops twice
perfidi ousl y attacked Soviet horde!' gua rd s, ca usi ng bl ood-
she d 01.' l!order. Tn 1I1is extre me ly
grave ,tho . Sovie t Umon was co mpelled t o take
all requisite defensive measur es, on t he one hand and
in September HW9 to offer th o Chinese si de imme;liate-
ly to begin negot iati ons On border issu es on the othe r
These negot iati ons have been dragging for a ntuuhe;
of years, but hav e so far yielded nu r esults du e to th e
intransigence of th e Maoi st s.
Addressing th e jubilee meeting On the 50UI anniver-
sar y of th e Uni on of Soviet Soci al ist Il epuhli cs, Comra de
L. 1. Brczhncv noted that in!f.l71 th e Soviet Govern-
iueut had offered th e Chine se Government lo concl ude a
treaty on th e non-use of force. The Chineso s ide took no
not ice this pr oposal. Speaking in Tashkent in Septem-
ber 1\)7,'\, Dr czhll ev ruvealed that in Ju ne t h e So viet
Uuion had again offere d to concl ude a Sino-Soviet non-
aggre ssion tr eaty, and again tb e Chinese side saw Iit to
ignore the offer.
Despite th,is, in th e past few years th e Maoist propa-
ganda machine has been howling about "Soviet int en -
tio.ns" L.o Ch!?a". on. t he pre text of counteri ng
this SOViet t hr eat, Mao I S ca lling on th e peo ple of China
" to pr epare fOI' war, " " to pr epare Ior war and for hun-
ger", and th e like. This is meant t o justify th e inten -
sive growt h of war industri es, t he manufact ure of nu cl ear
arms and missiles of va ry ing rang e, t he musteri ng
of ten s of mill ions of people for digging bomb-shel ters,
and the mili tary t ra in ing of mili ti amen in town s and
villages . All extre mel y t ense atmosphe re of immine nt
war is thus being creat ed to make people submit t o mil-
ita ry co ntro ls an d to reconci le t hemselves to poverty.
Hcca ut. ly, Mao ad vanced t his sloga n: " Dig tunnel s
deep, s tore grai n everywhere , and never seek hegemony" ,
The fir st two phrases are aimed at furthering war pr oparn-
ti ous, whil e th e third ost en sibly expl ains th e aim of an
eve ntual Wil l' , Hut Mao' s douhl c-rlcnli ng is we]! known.
By saying- " neve r seek hcgernouy" , lie 1I ;"eHlIs thut hegem-
ony is to be sought.
')17
Prcpal"ing for an anti-Soviet and at tempting t o
provok e a world war -these two nuns , th e s ubs tance of
Mao' s foreign poli cy, also underl ie hi s home He
is hostil e to evcry thi ng as socia te d wi th the Leui ni st for -
eig n poli cy o[ peace o[ th e CPSU and t he Sovie t
Go vernmen t , and puts himself out to defamc the gra nd
P eace Programme of th e 24 th Congre ss of t he CPSU
wh ich has al ready helped ch ange th e world cli mate. As a
r esult, Mao' s loathsome image of warmonger is st ill bet -
t er seun by the whole world.
Second , Mao is eager to t hrow i n h is lot wi th t he
ex tre me react ionary imperi ali s t gro ups. He has gone ou t
of his way to cs t .a hlieh contacts wi th NATO, and is
sccki ug closer r el ations with th e Common Mar ket, He is
wouing tho US military-ind ustri al com pl ex, th e r even ge-
seeking for ces in W est Germany, t he anti -Soviet anti
anti-communi st British Tori es and J apanese milit ari st
grollps. He advises aga i ns t r orlu cing ar me d for ces a nd
ar mame nts in Europ e, pleads for th o US 7th Fl eet t o
drag Oil t i ts presence in Asi a, tri es \'0 tor pedo th e Con -
Ier ence on Securit y and Cooperati on in Euro pe, and is
rl aarl sr,l ngain st col lective security in Asia.
Th ird, Mao is s npporting, and showing fr iendly feel ing
luwards the fasci s t cou p in Chile. lI e expelled t he am-
bassad or' of t he Popular Uni ty gover nment and wel-
comer! an ambassador appo in tor! by t he fa sci st j unta.
Siding wi th th e Iuscist rlictatorsh ip, he tr ea ts as ene mies
the Communi st Part y of Chile an d its Gen era l Se creta r y,
Lui s Corvala n, the Socia list Par t y of Chi lo built by Pres-
iden t Sal vadore Allende, and t he working people of Chile
Iighting cou rageo usly aga inst f ascis m.
Thi s is no accident. The targets of Mao's count er- r evo-
lution ar y coup and th e couu ter- rovol u tionar y coup of the
Chilean mi li ta rist s we re t he sa me-c- Marx ism- Lcnin ism,
the wor ki ng class and it s par ties, t he working poasantry,
th e pr ogr essi ve iutclll gun tsia , uud r cvoluti ounry yout h.
On th e interna t iona l pl ane Loth co ups wer e directed
a gainst th e Soviet Union and the soci alist conuu uui ty
as a whol e, th e wo rld couun unist and workin g-class mov e-
ment, th e a nt i-imper ia lis t nati on al liber ati on move-
ment, and t he peace movement, In both cases th e meth-
ods were th o same as well -Lerror , brutality, physi cal
el imina tion, and burning of book s .
'l HI
By siding wi th t he fasci st milit ary dict ator ship in
Chi le, Mao demon strat es su ppor t of "conlcderates" and
jo int action with US imperiali st forces. T his is why th e
Chil ean militari sts noL on ly express t heir grat i tude to
Mao, hut also, as r ep orted, arc aiming to se nd a del ega-
t io n to Peking " to st udy the expe r ie nce" of Mao's co u nt-e r-
re volutionary coup. And this, too, Ma o an d his chums
prob ably co ns ide r a " gre at victory" for th e " thoughts of
Mao Tse -tung and the " gre at cultural revo lution".
Ur'ot herl y treatment of the Ch ilean junta is in tended
to will Chil e as an all y in Mao's anti -S ovie t and an t i-
communi st drive, and, other Impurinli st ageuts, to
(Teal e ba se III La ti n Ameri ca Ior disr upting
the anti -imperlalt st, democratic, progressi ve, a nd peace
JlI overnonts.
"'1' 1'
o by qu ality, and people hy s pir-
itual kin shi p - - t Ill S aphoris m ex plai ns th e Iri undship
and s ympa thy . s hown by Mao, who has performed a
COII Jl in hi s own country, for' all
a nd su ndry Iascist dictatorshi ps a broa d.
.F.() urt h, is t rying to foment confl ic ts in As ia and
;\ I r·Jr..a . He JS . a.nIl oycd t he re storation of peace
III VIet nam. He I S sabotaging a peaceful solut ion in th e
J\ Ii ddle Eas!.. lTe is doi l.l g his ut mos t lo prevent a ne go-
tiate d sol u ti on of th e di s putes betw een India and Bang-
lad osh, on th e one ha nd, and Paki stan, on the ot he r .
And he does 11 11 thi s t o further hi s criminal plans of
turni ng' local wars into a world war,
Mao is ho stil e lo the Soviet- I ndia n Treaty of Pea ce ,
Fri endsh i p and Coop eration , which is tremendously im-
portan t for peace in Asia and the r est of t he worlrl. He
has s et ou t lo di srupt th e historica l fr iendship between
th e peopl es of three great powers i n Asia -China, Indi a.
and the Soviet Union. He is cont inuously stoking up t en-
s ions i n Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-Indian rel ations,
Hull persi st s in his attempts at di srupting cuopcru t iou
bet ween I ndia a nd th e Soviet Union.
1\Iao is lr yin g to di vi de a nd weaken t ho moveme nt
for Afri can unit y di rected agai nst imper ialism and
against old anti new col oniali sm, and also eon nives with
th e r cacti nnnry r aci st r egime 01 th o Hepublic of South
AIri ca.
Everywh er o in As ia and Al rica h e is s pr eading dema-
gogic propagand a t al es abo ut th e " t wo s uper powers"-
the ussn and USA-with th e one objective of anti:
Sovi et subversion. Using appea ls for "struggl e against US
imperiali sm" as a cover, Mao is in fact doing his utm.ost
to injure the Soviet Union and. to of tho
and African countr ies for the Imperialist camp, to enli st
them as partner s to his pro-imperialist, anti- Soviet
anti-communist policy of inciting armed conflicts m ASIa
and Afri ca as a fuse for setting off a world war, .
Fifth, the essence of Maoist pol.icy is revealed In the
following pa ssage of the of the. iou.
gr ess : "We must unite with all genuine Marxi st-Leninist
parties and organisations w?rld over and
struggle against modern to end.
What Ma o call s " ge nuine Marxist-Lenlni st parties HlIl I
orlJani sations" (a s Trotsky had on ce called hi s cou nter-
or ganisations "Leninist ") are. handf.uls
renegades financed by him and serving his
appeal to "curry the struggle against
th rough to the means Mao considers h.o.stIlI ty
towards t ho sociul ist community and all communis t and
workers' parties to be his main aim. The lrailors to c.o
m
-
mu nism, hourgcoi s agon still .surviving
"left" and right opportunist s, revi sionists, a nd the h.ke,
whom he has srath erod Lo his Iold ill vari ous coun t ries,
are dolnz Ids and s trideut ly ex tolling hi s name,
and splitting their tlllgS in th e anti-So.viet. anti -
communist chur us . Today, this chor us I S SlII g 11lg the
prai ses of th e r ea ctionary "thou ghts of Ma o Tse-tuug"
and th e count er- re vol u tio nar y "c ul tural r evolution", 011
the on e hand, and of Mao's aucmpts to unrl ormine wor ld
pea ce , intensify war preparations, and provoke u world
war, on t he other .
The IOth Congress communique says : " The Congress
pointed out: th e present international situation is charac-
t eris ed by great di sorder on the ea r th." What doc s thi s
mean? From Mao' s point of view it means imminence of
n world war.
Mao' s attempts at turning local wars (su ch as t he war
ill Vietnam, t. he war on the l nd iun s ubcou tlncn t, the
Will' in th e Middl e Ea st, etc . ) inlo a world war have Iai l ed.
The armed conflic ts he had hi mself provoked on t he
Chin ese-Indian border did not devel op i nto a lull -scal e
war. Mao's armed provocations against the Soviot Union
di d )JoLgrow into a large-scal e conflict because the Soviet
220
Union. whil e' r opul sin u th e ag gre'ssor, foll owed 11 linn pol -
icy of peace.
Now Mao is r esorting t o other methods. He is trying
to brlng China int o th e imperialist camp, t o make her
an ally of imperialis t groups in orde r one day to tr y and
ignite a third world war. Ho hopes a new world war will
ti g hten hi s pr ecariou s hold on power and, at onc e, secure
hi s he gemony in th e " thir d world " and. later', th e whol e
world, But thi s mad drsam will not come true. The im-
periali sts will hardl y want to be vi ctims of a worldwide
th ermonucl ear hol ocaust in Ma o' s compa ny. But one
t hi ng compels vi gil an ce: Mao is in a desp er ate plight;
t here is nothing he ca n count on. If he 1I181l1l 1{CS to a muss
a quantity of nuclear weapons and mi ssiles and succeeds
in obtaining modern weapons in sufficien t qu antity fr om
reactionary imperiali st sources, he may decide to plunge
i nto a military adventure.
Th e peopl e of China and all other nations must be
constantly vi gilant against imperiali st attempt s at br eac h-
ing t he peace in concert with Mao Tse-tun g. They
must firmly repulse all suc h attempts.
:1) Mao i n th e grip of i ns ol uble
cuntradietlons
Mao's effort s to reach th e above-mcu tionorl a ims in
home and for ei gn poli cy ha ve submerged him i n a quag-
mire of contradicti ons . From these ther e is no esc ape.
And all the mor e de sperate arc hi s at tempts at making
the People' s Hepuhlic of China a reactionary family COIl -
cern for himself and hi s wife, and th e gre ater is the
anger and r esi st ance of th e true Chinese Communi sts
and th e peopl e of China. But the mor e dearly he feel s
th e ge ne ral indi gn ati on and th e wi sh of hundreds of
millions of working people to be rid of him, the more
active he will be in forg ing a r eacti on ary " famil y s ta te"
as hi s onl y r ecourse. And the mor o r eckless ar e his at-
tempts at pr ovoking a n anti-Soviet a nd a new world
wa r , the mor e swe eping will be the conde mnation and
r es is tance of the Communi sts of all coun tr ies and of
all peace-loving; mankind, and th e greater the l oathi ng
he will ear'lI or th e Counnun ist s and peopl e of Chi u».
And t he knowl edge that th e Chinese peopl e and th e re st
of th e world re gard him as an wil l make him seck
salvation n11 th e more dospern tel y in intensifying rene-
Li on at home and in pr ovok i ng war s between. Be-
sides for hi m coll us ion with extre me r eacti onar y nnpe-
ri ali s't groups is a sts ppi ng-s tonc hi s aims i.n . homo
and for ei gn poli cy, for th ey are hi s cl osest al.h es
in inciting wa rs on th e internati onal sce ne and 111
ing hi s gr ip in side th e country. !his adds .t
o
th e exist ing
inter na l a nd extern al contr adloti ous and the
hostili ty between Mao an d t he vas t r evolutIOnar y a nd
progressi ve forces at home and a br oad. An d the mo re
dearly he sees that he cannot ove l'come . these for ces, th e
more desper ately will he .seek cont ac t WIt h ext re me reac-
tionary imperi alist , , " 'r
The contradictions, whi ch ar c of Mao s o,: n
. . d " I' lley arc like a gIallt
are conu nuousl y groWing eepel. " c , . "
net in which Mao , thi s " magic ape Sun , has
entangl ed himself without hope of , . "
Since th e tim e of the " cultural r ev.01l.ltlOn Mao
cr eated a variety of in solubl e contr adictions . And thes e
contradi ctio'ns make th e old ones, t he ones he creat-
ed before, st ill sha rper. . .
lI e has subst i tuted COli nt er-r evolution ar y
th e r evoluti onar y teaching of Mal'xi sln-Lenill.lsm . -:r:
llls
has created an il'l'econ cil ahl e politi cal and ideologirnl
eoutra dict ion between Mao and th e Mar xi sts-Lenini sls In
China and t he r est of th e world.
He has subs tituted a pseudo-communist party for th e
r naI Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of China, wh ose
orgnnlsations wer e ransack ed whose acti.vists W?I'C
r epressed. Besides, he has been ins trumental lor ming
ant.i-commun ist, Maoist pseuc! o-commuIllst parties In
HI' lands. Thi s has create d an i rr cconoiluhlc contr adic-
ti on between Mao and th e Communi sts of China and th e
res t of th e worl d.
He foll ows a blatantly r eacti onar y home and fore ign
poli c:y tota ll y incompatibl o wi th the of the CI.li-
nose na tion . Thi s has cr ea ted an ant agonistic contr adic-
ti on between Mao and th e worki ng class, th e workin g"
peasantr y, th o intelli gentsia, and t he student yo uth of
China. He a nd th ey have diametri call y opposi te inte rests.
He foll ows a two-fa ced poli cy toward s th e Peopl e' s
Lib er ati on Army, usin g it in hi s rea ct iona ry a nt i-
conu uuni st, anti -people a nd a nt i-Soviet cr imes, on the one
hand, and subjec ting it s commanders , political officers ,
and soldiers to cont inuous purges and r epr essi ons, on tho
ot her. This has c r ea t ed a con tr udic t. iun bet ween Mao and
the PLA, ma king th eir coexis tence impossi ble.
He foll ows an ex tre me chauvinist great-Han poli cy to-
wa rds th e non- Han peoples of China. Thi s poli cy is bru t-
al to th e point of harbnri sru, marked by disori uuna uo n,
forci ble as similatio n, a nd mass r epr essions.
This has created a n insolubl e cont rarl ictin n between Mao
and th e nnn-Hnn peoples of Chi na.
Il e f?ll ows an ex treme reacti on ary for ei gn pol icy based
on alliance wit h imperialism and reacti on an d on
anti -Sovi et ism an d ant i-communism. Th is creat ed 11
contradictio n stemming fr om the opposit e
lilt cres ts of t he two sides between him and the world
socialis t community, th e worl d communis t a nd working-
class movemen t, and th e anti-i mper ial ist , democr ati c,
a nd pI'ogl'essive movements.
I1e foll ows a pol icy of divisio n an d subvers ion towards
th e. nati onal . lib er ation movement in As ia n, Afti cun and
Latin Ameri can count ries, t rying to dri ve H wedge be-
tween th em . an d tl,l ei r true fri ends an d all ies in t he .str ug-
gle for nat ional Ind ependence, and against colonia lism
and nco-coloni alis m. rucia l oppres sion uud raci al discrim-
inati on - th e Sov iet Unio n, th e socialis t cutup as a whol e
and Ll l(!. world cOlllm." l1 is l movement. lI e is tr ying
drag . th is Into th e camp of imper ialis m a nd
IS. cr eati ng II con tr adiction flowi ng Irom
th e incompnti bl n in ter est s of the Maois ts and th e " third
worl d" countries .
l Ie rej ects all proposals and measures di rected to
fur thel'ing the pea cef ul coexis teuco of st at e-s with differ -
ent socia l-ec onomic t o casi ng int ernati onal
t ension, to establ is hi ng reg iona l collec t ive securit y sys-
t ems, and t o sa fegua rdi ng world peace. He mak es no
secre t of hi s war prepara t ions an d is t r'ying to provoke a
new world war . This has cr ea ted a sharp contradicti on
between Mao an d all peopl e of peaee- a contrndict ion
s lnmming fr om th e cho ice between li fe and death , he-
t ween re gress ion and progress.
The r elati on of for ces is d ear : Mao Tse-tung and hi s
gl'llllP 011 one side, ami t he r evoluti onary, pl'og"l 'cssiv c
and ponce-l ovi ng forces of China and t he wh ole world
on the ot her. Tfle two sides are locked i n a conti nuous
and irrcconcil ahl a s tr uggle. And th er e is 11 0 doubt about
Its outcome: Mao Tse-tung a nd hi s group will nol escape
defeat. I
Th e contrndict ions within th e Maoist group are so
a siunilicant element sa pping th o streng th of the Maoist s
and""br ing ing cl oser the downfall of th e Mao
In short, the lin e of th e 10th wlll,eh I S the
line of Mao Tse-t uug, is bound to result III a grea te r
number of major set backs t han t hose whi c!l , Ill' suffered
aft er the \ll h Con gress, Thi s is t he wr lllll g on L1lC'
wall. The march of hi story is not subject to t he will of
th e "lon e monk" .
3. MAO ' I'SE-TUNG AND CIIl N SHm HUANG ..
Followi ng L1lC' 10th Cong ress, th p Chinese pr ess
a campaign in prni se of Chin Shih Huang. To land Chill
Shih 11 uang it calle d down on tho head of Con-
fuciu s and ahusod the name 01 Lu l Isun.
1) Why and how Mao Tse -tung praises
Chin Shih Huang
Mao begun his by t!lO th?t
di slinuu ish cd Chin Shih Hliang' s despoti c rul e, ."n(m n
as kengj iii (burning of books of
" 1 I s) On 28 Scptembor '1D73 Jennurutll.pao printed
51, 10 ar. . I .. ", ( In Do
an a rt icle ent it led, " Fengshu , cng,llll plCn -
Ience of Burnin g Books and Burying Its aut h-
or , who /-{aye his name as S hih Tt ng: writes I n th e 0 )l I ' II -
ina passages of th e ar ticle : ,
hooks and burying schol ars ImpOl:-
t l
li ti cal event during th e ru le of Chin Sin h Hu ang,
a n , po I " . I ' t Though
Man y comments were wr itt en about I. li S even . ,
not nll opin ions coinc ide, most peopl e regar d th e hurning
of b'ooks a nd bur ying of scholnrs Chin Shih Hu an g
as a despotic and cru el aC,t , , a measure th at
led t o th e downfall of the Chin llynasly. f
Furt her Oil he quote s Chin 1, a well-known man (! .
l etter s aTl II poli tical figure of th o , H :ll1 dynasty. ,I n
Tra vels i ll Chill, Chia I describes ' t he burning of book s
>, TI l l' fir st l' mpN OI' of L1 w Chi n rlyn as ty -> Yin g Chong (25(1-
210 B. C,) ,
burj:ing of scholars" as a " r ej er- ti on of the cours e of
tne p!'eVlOUS ru ler ", and " the cons ignme nt to fire of th e
t eac1ungs of a hundred schools" as an act " to he f tl
peopl e" "B k b og ie
• 00 s were urned, and punishmen ts became
moro Chin I wri t es, and adds: " This is wh ,Lth e
downfal ! of t he wa s only to be
,.he author ?f th e Jen m llll lhpao ar ticl e admit s tha t " the
\ of Chla I had a s trong inll uence all hi st ory" and
CItes th e full text of a poem by Chang Chic h a :r a g
dynast y poet, ent-it l ed " The Pits for Burning Il
T,hc bamboo and sil k " wero swall owod by Burnes'
1he might of th e empire va nished, t oo, '
Ip va in di d mou ntain ranges and turlml ent streams
guard over th e dr agon's lai r. .,*
'I he as h of th e pyres had not grown cold
turmoil hr ?ke out in Sh antung,
l'hough neither Li u Pang nor Hsiang 'I'll
Had read many books,
The author expla ins th at th e poet " wants us to beli eve
that as a r esult of th e burning of books aIHI burying
of scholars by Chin Shi h Huang, th e Chi n empire l ost
vigour and fell und er th e assault of Liu Pan g and
l l sinng Yu". He expr ess es empha tic di sa greement with
Chia I, Chan g Chi eh , and others. He descr ibes the burn-
ing of books and burying of scholar s as a " progressive
measure". " Books wer e burned for t he sake of ideol ogi-
ca l unity," he writes, " and th ere wa s no connection be-
tween th e collapse of th e Chin dynast y and t he bur ni ng
of books and burying of scholars" . Mi gh t we ask, then,
why the Chin dynasty coll aps ed? The auth or cannot s ide-
s tep th e conclusion accepte d by ever ybody since an-
ci ent .t imes. " The Chin dynasty fell ," he writes, " because
brutal execu ti ons and puni shments had l ed to univer sa l
disorder". Sever e laws, tortures and executions " al armed
young and old t hroughout th e Celes tial Empire". ::.:;.:;. T hen
.he goes on t o say: " The Chin dynas ty Iel l du e t o an ag-
gravation of contr adictions between the feudal rul ers
and tho br oad mass of th o peopl e, The u pri sing of Che n
She.ng and Wu Ku an g wa s a r evoluti on ary st ruggle
".; .} Bamboo an d silk- he re books. which wer e writ ten 0 11 st ri ps
of bamboo or on sil k in those remote times.
'. '. -. •,., ' Dragon' s lair-lito ca pltal of th o Chin ompcror.
" >'>'>' See ' Ssu -mn Chinn. Shih Chi (Hi st ori cal Record ) .
agf!in s t the Iuud al ex ploite rs a nd h asten ed th e eol lupse
of t ho Chin dynasty, I n shor t , the Chin empir e was ov er -
thrown by a peasant r evol ut ion,"
All art icles C.\ toll in g Chin Shili Tluuu g were dclib cr -
ately written to r el ate th e pr aise heap ed on Chin to Mao
Tse-tung, They make Chi n re se mbl e Mao a nd Mao r e-
se mbl e Chill.
Some for ei gn obser ver s note ri ghtlv that th ese arti cl es
were eit her wrt t te n by Mao himsell' or were a t lea s t pJ'O-
d ucerl on hi s or ders and with his a pproval. No body would
dare t o compare Mao with th e most notorio us despot ill
Chi nese lrist or y wit ho u t his express co ns en t,
Now, let us see why Mao prui ses Chill Hu ang a nd
Ii ken s himsel] 10 tha t a ho mi nabl o tyrnut.?
Mao pruiscs Ch in Shi h Hu au g chi efly because he is
himself sa turate d wi th feudal iuou ar chi s t idea s. Thi s is
confi rmed by th e Ioll owiug examples.
1. The poe m, "Sinyunnchuu" , which Mao wrote ill
1 is nominall y a descripti on of a snow-covered la nrl -
scape: ill it he compa res th e peopl e' s revnl ul. ion under
th e lead er ship of th e Conuuunist Part y or Ch ina with
th o power s tr uggle betw een emper or s and prl uces, and
li imscl l with th e ancient emperors Chi ll Sh ih l luaug,
Hall \VII Ti, THng Tai Tsung, S ung Tui - tsu a nd Geughis
Kh an ,
2, I n a Chi ne se -la ngua ge edit ion of no te s on hi s trav-
el s in West Chill a, whi ch a ppeared in l U::I7, US jour-
nal is t Edgar Snow quotes Mao as ha vi ng said th at si nc e
hi s yout h ho had admired Chill Sh ih Huang', Han Wll Ti,
a nd uth er a nci e ut CIll !)()l' OI'S,
:1 , Mao Tsc-tung is in th o habit of ca ll ing t he Par ty' s
top l eader emperor, a nd t he ot her l end ers -e-hi gh ol ficials
of hi s ma j esty. Be for e th o I s t Pl enum of th e Sevent h
Ce nt ral Committee, in HJ45, whe n he was cha ir ma n of
the Mil itnr v Cou nc il a nd not ye t cha ir mnn of t he P}\]'ty,
Ma o, Imi ta tin g th e feud al mon archs, dill no t allow peo-
pl e 10 call him by his name. He wi sh ed to be addr essed
as ('h a inll all,
-1. , 111 t he wi nter of Hl48 and in early 1!J4!J, when Ih e
Peopl e' s Lih er ati on Army was poiRed to ente l' Pekill g,
Mao sa id t o member s of th e Ce nt ral Conu ni ttee: " W hen
T was a young man, I often th oll ght - ·-how good to he
an empe ror , But I d id not know how to become Hll e m-
peror. Now 1 know. Soon , we shall en ter Peking: The
WE' cnt.er flokin g i will he empero r . I sn 't th is
W hen was he began cnlli ng himself
,emp.er,Ol 111, new .coIHh tlOllS" and ordere d t he puliti-
(, \1 dd,lllllll stral lUll of the Ce n tral Couuuit teo's Mil itary
Cou ncil to or ga ni se lcct , ', f" •
" el . . , " L , or serVicemen, saying
-nam u a n Ma o IS II new emperor " . -
S. In. 1D() 4 in a talk with a French Nationa l Ass ' ' I I
dul egnuon Mao decl ared himsal ] "au f ' eN,Ill ) Y
l eon". ( « d n a po-
L.
6
. He punished writers 'I' icn Han, Wu Han 'I'cnsr T
iao Mo-sha, and others for r idiculing . "' t .' " '" 0,
perors i n th eir b k H' 01 e l l i c i s ing em-
Il 00 s. e said to attacl .
Ia.ntrunoun j, t o attacking Mao ac { empe rors IS
Mao ex tolled Ch in Shih lIn b'
mu ch in common. a ng ecauso tho two have
1. Chin Shih Hu a ng v If
tri o careel'is t, and II se -conc,oi tod ,and egocon-
descr ibed hi r If I to the pel sona lt t y cult . He
, mso as t re first grea t
lcsti nl Em pire. Mao too . ' I I' ( emperor of t he Co-
cul t, ' , IS ar ( Icted to t he persona lity
or j2t y' SII 1Ii h HI y aIl g consi de re d himself th e "sole aut h-
on a t ling'S. A t iicaI . . . . (
despoti sm he "made tho J . ( exponent of one-man
I
" ( r eCI SIOns on all 'jffn" f
,1Ot. h IHg and s mall, by himself" (8 or
icai Hecord ch " P " . I NT • su-ma Chie n. Histor:
HUlin 0' '' " • . I lIlc lpaolos about Chin S hih
;-J . CI)' to o" IS an nutho r ilaria n despot.
" lI.n ._hi h was an extre me i ndividualis t of
ex t raor dlIlary cupidity. He ca lled himself S11'/ l·r T'
(
I' ' t . • I I uunc I
u s a nd wanted hi s "family dynnsty" 1('"' he
everlnst.ing throu gh t he se cond t hird etc ' ' . '
.. 'I I I " " " ge ne ra
Il g I , u p to t. IC te ll th ousandth d escendant, Mao Lon
turn into a " famil y eonce r n"
Chiang Chi ng, and l o hand it down from llOil' 10
ieir.
0' 4. .Shih was a , despot. for whom, as E n-
gels put It 1T1 A peopl e were "all equal, name -
ly, equal to ni l , h? .d id not co ns ider peopl e
ho peopl e. From prrme mllllst.er down to plain su b-
l eel; all wer e wo r th not n;rore to him th an hens, dogs,
cows or s hee p; a l l wer e IllS s hives wh om he co uld eXB-
cut e, impr iso n, 01' exi le. Mao, too , is that k ind 0 1' tyr ant..
S. Chin Shih Huang was a advo(:a le of a
" Gre a l. Ch in Ce les t ia l EIllpi re". Towards s l at es and tribes
n ei ghb ouri ng on t he Chin Empire he foll owed a pol-
icy of arme d conquest, rOl' cibl c ass imilation. forced reset -
tl cmont, and brutal r epr essi on. Mao, too, is an extreme
grea t-Ha n nationalist; hi s treatment of et hnic min orities
inhabiting differ ent parts of China is th e same as Chin
Shih Huang's.
6. In th e ninth year after the founding of the united
Chin Empire (213 B. C.), Chin Shih Huang ordered all
books to be burned. Among th ese were Shih Chi ng (The
Book of Songs ), 81m Chi ng ('fhe Book of Hi story) , th e
works of Confucius and of exponents of all other schools,
books on the hi story of th e Chou dynasty and the hi sto-
ri es of six non-Chin sta tes. Onl y a few books on medi -
cine , fortun e-t elling and agricu lture wer e spared. There
was nothing for peopl e to r ead. Then, in t he tenth year
(21 2 H. C.) , he or dered all scholars to he buri ed alive
(mor e than 460 Confucia n schola rs were buri ed ali ve
together, in cluding G2 of th e 70 "doctors" at Chin's own
cour t ) . This made him the first fero cious despot in hi sto-
r y to burn books barbarousl y and massacr e schola rs.
But in quantity and range of subjects, the books burned
by Ma o during th e "cult ur al r evolution" far sur passed
t110 S0 burned by Chin Shih Huang, and in number s the
intellectuals physically eliminated by Mao far sur pass ed
Chin Shih Huang' s burying of scholars,
Thi s is wh y Mao Tse-tung mak es no bones about prai s-
in g Chi n Shih Huang and defend s hi s despoti c " hurning
of hooks and burying of scholars" .
Worse still, Ma o extols Chill Shih Huang with a dull-
nile secret poli tical aim. Take th ese rnw examples .
1. Mao praises Chin Shih Hu an g for havin g been "a
politi ci an who stopped th e attempts at r estorin g the slave
syste m" (see th e article in l enminiih.pao of :)1 October
Hl73, signed by th e "group of authors of th e Shens l
Tench er-Trai ning I nstitute").
This betrays Mao's la ck of eleme nt ar y knowl edg e of
the hi stor y of ancient Chinese societ y. Hi storians who
s tudied China's an ci ent hi stor y have demonstrated that
uudor t he Sha ng Yin dynasty (18th-12th centur ies R. C.)
China saw the eme r genc e, bloom, and downfall of th e
slave-owning syste m. In th ose days, OIl a rul er 's or noble-
man' s death, from several dozen to 2,OOO-:-{, OOO people
were sacrificed for "co-burial with the deceased". In th e
Lime of Western Chou ('12th-8t.h centur ios R. C.) this
s ucri fice wa s prohibited ; human bein gs wer e replaced by
clay or wooden doll s. Thi s shows th \V
Ilu a slave-owni ng
lhat Wesl ern Cho u which l ast ci f rca s snow
the Shang dYIJasty b ' Cho' e the eli mination
Ilsllinent of the capit al
J
· WI '.1 \V' lIlg and tJlO cstah-
1
.
' In vaoc li n a to til) t f f
t ie capi ta l east by Cho u Pi n a \ V "'IT '); ra TIS er 0
WII S essen tially an em of FL_-n1 R. C.) ,
Chou , whi ch began wi th th e' early E.as tel'll
Loyau g hy Chou Ping Wa f er of the ca pital to
LlIO following abo ut ')00 (7
111
n o D. C.) and for
serf dom lihe-' t ' f- ,Je drs, t lore was a decli ne of
, 1a IOII 0 serf s and a 0" I 1
landl ord s, a now class of 1:1 d d ;,I UC. ua emergence of
di sp ar al u cconoll1/' c and IPIOIIJrJetors. Due to th e
. 'poI rca ecv I .
sta tes, whicl: WOre in depcndent tlli ,e oJ . lli e
. state to state ' t ' d ' s process dIffere d from
., III Imo an tempo At}
.
{l onded OIl th e size of th e Ian '. ax w. lOse size de-
th e Lu sta te befor e 594 R Illt r oduced ill
Chin, r emot e, isolated and 'ec " w III tI.l e s tato of
ward, a harvest r enL was hack-
I,OHR C Yt I as I S ellO/ ced as late as
w: s trend of dovelopment in all
Accordin a to the An I its d I .
tI >:> a ec s an Ol ler litera ry classics
io foudal system no l onger oxi sted in II li f tin . f'
Confuciu s (55 1-47!J B C )' h . . re J e 0
others. Ser fs had aOfnIe',lv
l
, 'e
Vel
,
sys t \ f f I I 1
'
conomrc
TI . om a euc a andlord s had already come in to hein g
. re now class of lunell ords controlled) . \ I . .
Contending- Sta tcs B C ) I.:OWOl . j n.c III th e
I . . -- . J . soclOty cont iuuer] to
devel op, stim ula ted hy th e introduction of imB implo-
Th er e was unprecedented prosperity. Eco nomy
ell.le .cll lturo grew, an d it variety of philosoph ica I a nd oth-
elschools emerged and engaged in fr ee di scussi ons.
Yet there. was conte n tion uud riv al r y among th e seve n
with . continuous fra tr icida l Wil l' S, becau se eac h
as pir ed to el iminating tho ot he rs and cr eating a united
elll lHr e.
Th e Ieur la l landowning' economic sys torn took
deep foot. In t he Ch.in sta te follo wing Shang Ya ng's r e-
Iorm, hegan 3,5(J . B. C., cur taili ng th e ri ghts uf
the hel'e(lIlaJ'y nobility, nn pr oving t he condition of
peasant s and warri ors, ending coroee, and el imina ti ng
hounds (b etween fields of the ge nt ry and pea sant s ) . Th e
. sys tem had cea sed to exist aoo yea rs be-
for e Chill SIn h Hu ang es tabl ishe d his united feuda l OUl -
pire (22 1 B. C.) . Mor e, in the Chin s t ate eve n se r f-owning
had gOlw out some 200 years previou sly. ::. In other
words', the question of " res toring the slave sys te m" could
not arise at th e timo of Chin Shih H ua ng' s rule. Tho dispute
between chef/ si ang ( pri me mi nis ter) Wang Kuang and
iingioei (j udge of t ho s upr eme cour t ) Li Ssu over r eta in-
ing th e sys te m of s ta te s or introducing' a syst em of pre-
Iccl.ur es and counties, a nd the di sputes on th e same s u b-
j ect be tween a group of Confucianists headed by Sh UIl
Yu-y u and anoth er headed by Chou Ching-chen con-
ce r ned th e type of administration to be introduced i ll the
Ch in empire, and h ad no relation at all to "rcs toratiou
0 1' anti-restoration of th e sl a ve system".
Ignor a n t of tho soci al system at the lime of Chou ami
Chill, Ma o mistakenly consider s Ch inese society prior
to th e Chill dynasty a "sla ve s ys te m" (an erroue ous
term' in th e Marxist teaching on th e hi story of soci ety
the r e is no r oom [or a "sl ave system", only for a slave-
ow n ing s ys te m, for "slave s ys tem" s uggests a s ocia l s ys-
t em in which sl aves are do mi nant ; t he r e was no s uc l:
soci ety in hi st ory ) . He descr ibes t ho con tr overs y over
til e " system of feudal s tates" and tho " syst em of prefec-
Lur es coun t i es" as a con tr oversy over " res tor a t ion"
and "anti -res tor ut iou" of th e "slave syste m" .
As we sec, Mao' s portrayal of Chin Sh i h Huang as
" a pofit.iciun who prevented the res tor ati on of sl a ve-
owners " lias no subs tance in hi story.
Hy defyi ng h is tory a nd ex toll ing Chin Shih Hunug,
Mau seeks Io portray himself as "a pol it.icia u who r eso-
lut el y pr ev ented t he r ostoration or cnpi tul isru". In th e
early peri od of the "c ul tural r ev olution" h e iss ued t he
s loga n of combat t i ng th e " han df ul of power-holding ca p-
ita Hst-roudcrs" in ord er t o attack Lin Shun-c hi nnrl th e
ca dres of tho Party, and in t he past two years has bran-
dis hed the s logan of comba tting "cons pir a tor s and double-
deal er s who are restori n g ca pita lism" i n order to di s-
credit awl attack Lin Pia o a nd the Party's military an d
politi cal ca dr es" Thi s exposes Mao as an intriguer who
is him elf a ca pi la lis t-r ondcr and cer tai nly no " pul i ti-
cla n r esolut el y pr eventing the ru stornl.iun of ca pi ta l is Ill".
" It is impossibl e to dnal in grealer detail with the nature
or th o social syst em at th e tim e of Chou and Chin in t hi s
hook.
Fa cts datin g t o the " cu l tu ra l r evoluti on " and la ter ,
ha ve confirme d thi s . Nut only h as Ma o destroyed
th o socia list s u pors tr uc l uro of Chinese soci e ty; h e has
a lso allcred the soc ialis t cha rncler of China' s nationa l
economy" He ha.s crushed th e s ta tu npparntus directed
th e . COflllllUnI sl of China and ha s r eplac ed it
wI,l h hi s one-man reacti onary milit ary-terrori st di ctator-
At pr esent CI' , t '
. . .'- .' una s s ate economy se rves not maxi-
m um sa t ls fadwn of th e malerial and eult urni need s of
th e . but l'e.aelional' Y dic ta tors h ip of Mao
and hi s anl.I -? ov! et a nd anti-communi st mili t arism.
LJemenl s a ca pi ta list econ omy with gua ra n te ed r.a pi-
,t al a nd for and wi th ca pi ta lis ts lWRd illg
,\. of s ta te .on th c prete x t of being
el,;OIlOIll IC t cc h nicn] s pe c1iil ls ls, co n l inu o t o nouri sh
under th e Signboar d of mixed Slate-privat e en ter pr ise,
These Iucls , too, s ho w I hc truc na turo of Ch ina ' s s la te
CCO11oIII Y.
, The 1:lIra I peopl e' s com111 un es, th ou gh s t.i/I coupera t. iVI !S
In n? me, have been s t r ipped of th e right to settle
qu esti ons of pr od uct ion and di slri bu Iion on t.h oil' own
a nd 10 th e needs of Ma o' s r ea c li onary
tl!r shl p, W It h ug ri cul turo cut off fr om industria l a nd ftnan-
cial aid on tI.1C part <.I f. the socialist s ta te, th ey a re deni ed
t he opportunity of rai sing til e materi al and cu ltu ral s ta nd-
of th eir members, who are s t ill at th e level o f
poor a nd lower middl e pea sants" . I n effec t, the COIll -
become regimented s u pplie rs of food and raw
rnat er ial s 101: Mao' s r ea cti ona ry d ictnt ors hl p, a nd have
thus l ost. thair former chnract ur.
In the two compo ne n ts of Chi na's nati onal econ-
omy, !IH)u.stry and agricu lture, r et ain only a fPW s oc i ali st
I II form of properly, but 11I\\'u los L l.huir soc ia l-
ist na t ure as regards the obj ect th ey se rve . Mao makes
. se cret of this. He l oses no oppo r t un ity lo ded ar e that
China bel ongs among the dcve lopi ng countr ies of th o
" t hird worl d" . Actually, cons ide r ingeo Mao' s ruuotionurv
rul e, Ch ina does not belon g even among them.
a re essen t ia l ly opposed to impe-
ria lism a nd i ts colonial ami neo-col oni al poli cy, with th e
leadin g on es dirceting their e ffOlts t o the lion-capita li st.
perspective, th at is, t he r oad t o s ocia l ism. Ma o, on the
other ha nd, is con nivi ng wi ll , extreme r eacti onary im-
pe l'i:J lists anrl rl i-ivi ug Chi na i nto t.hn impnri nl is t
:!31
2. Mao says that Chin Shih Huang was th e founder of
th e Iirst feudal dynasty in China' s history and " a power -
ful f eudal r ul er who unifi ed all China" (see " Struggle
between Bestor atlon and Anti -Hcstor ation During tho
Emer gence of t he Chin Dynast y" , signed Lo Ilsi-iing
in : Hungclit TO. It, t!)73) . I n fact, Mao h ea ps all t he
credit for the establishment of the singl e feudal Chi n
dynasty on Ch in Shih Huang alone. This, too, is contra -
ry t o t he fa cts of hi stor y.
. The s ubs tance of t he phrase, " Iouudor of the firs t feu-
dal dynasty in China's history" , may be re duced to two
fact s : Iirs t , conque st of the six s ta tes; se cond, introduc-
li on of th e system of pr efectures and count ies.
Let us take t he Iirst fact first. Histor y sho ws th at Chin
Shih Huang was abl e to eli minate the si x ot her st a tes
because he hal! inhe ri te d a so und " concer n" fou nd-
ed by Ch in Hsiao Kung, whi ch was consoli dated
by ge nera li on s of Chin Shih Huang' s ancest ors in
th e course of so methi ng like a hundred years . Ry ea r-
rying out Shang Yang' s r ef orm, Chin Hsi ao Kung laid
the eco no mic Ioundation s for enr ich ing hi s st ate and mak-
ing it mi li ta rily powerful ; mor e, he began ce nt ralis i ug
political power by di viding his. countrr into 31 count ies .
Fan Tsun es ta blis he d tho for ei gn poli cy of the s ta te of
Chin : "friendshi p with di stant coun t ries in order to at-
t ack nuar coun t ries" , and wooing of eve ry s ta te se pa ra te-
ly in order to pr event th e six fr om jo.in ing Ior ces
again st Chin, I n hom e poli cy he con t inue d what
Shang Yang had begun. Chin Shi.h Huang inherit:d t he
thron e at '1 3 years of age. All affairs of state wer e In
hands of chensiang Lu Pu-wei. No t until h e was 22 did
Ch in Sh ih Huang assume cont ro l. By that time th e foun-
dati on s had long been l aid for t he wealth and power
of hi s st ate . Also, there were man y capable men in civ-
ic and mi litary offices. All Chin Shi h Huang h ad to cI o
was swim wit h the cur r ent, issue orde rs, and reap t he
ha r vest,
The second of th e r eason s which enu hlc d Chin Shi h
Huang to eli mi nate t he six s ta tes was their l ack of uni-
ty, wi th devel opments in these states favouring Chi n's
pl an s of aggrandizement . For example, the st at e of Chu
wi th it s l nrge are a and populati on was more ca pa hle
t han th e others t o com pete with Chin ; but due t o th o
assass inati on of r efor mer Wu Chi by the nobles, there
') '-l.')
;vas no ,reform like that of Shang Yang in Chin,
It l,ost Sun w« a brilliant mili tar y
The st ate of Chao could abo h av e stood u to
.but th er? OCcur re d a tragedy between the
us sons III th e fa mily of Prince Chao ,V 1-1' .
g: fte d l eader . Ch.ao's tr oops l eu by
,\ ere def eated. Chin buried alive 400000 ca t d CI .
sold ' . . . I I . ' <pure lao
i lOIS, aIH t Ie s ta te of Chao never re cov er ed fro n tl .
.oss . Besides, Chin Hsi ao Kung and each of th e
mg monar ch s ca pt ure d cons ider a ble territor y from nei '1-
boul'lng states, t h us ell laJ'uing th e CII1' II sta te' I rg n
un I t ' I . '" < S i urn an
(.. ( rna erra pot ent ial. By th e t ime Chi n Sh ih H uan u
came t? power all .t he six s la tes were well on the wag
to decli ne, a nd Chin had no to defeat
OILO by ono. .
ab?ut in,tr odtH:ti oll of t ho sys te m of prefec-
1he I'cJeet ion of the syste m of s tat es
the of pr efe.dUl'es and coun ties folJow-
t he the SIX s ta tes wa s cer tainl y not
invented Chi n Shi h Huang himself. Thi s we ca n see
fr om ,fa,cts of his lory, After Shang Yang's r efor m th e
s ta te of ,Cln n wa s divided into 31 coun ties. Fo llowi ng th e
of the s ix st a tes, th e Chin c ru pi ru was di vid-
ed In to ;Jb prefecture s, each of whi ch was divided in to
eou ntios . This Was therefor e a projection of Shanz
Yang's The conver sion of st ates into
a nd tho, dynasty to se t up a s ingl e
em pire. TIll S coi nc ide d with th e political needs
of th e landlord class, whi ch need ed a ce nt ralised power
h.ead ed by .a!l emperor, with prefectural and count y ol fi-
cials exerClSlllg local go ve rnment. Thi s secu red a peace-
se ttin g for exploit in g and oppressin g th e pea sants,
ITl contrast to th e ceasel oss civil wars that had occurred
when there were many st ates and " batt les for a localit y
covered. it with cor ps es and battl es for a town filled it
with dead peopl e" .
Compared with a count r y divid ed into uiany st a les,
the si ngle feudal mona rch y was, of course, a s top for-
wa rd.
Bu t we ea n see from t he ah ove analysi s of concr ete
events tha t the cre dit for t hi s act of progressive signifi-
cunce docs not belong to Chin Shi h Hua ng a lon e. Ye t
Mao uso ri bes it a ll lo hi ui . T his on ly het. rays Mao's ex -
tremely subjective voluntar istic approach to hi stor y.
Resid es, it is not r i gh] . to judge Chin Shih Huang on
th o merit s of ju st lit o progrcssiv e s ig ni flc,n nco of the
uui hcal.iuu into a single Ieud al em pire of a cou n t ry th at
had consisted of ri val sla tes . Look at the cons equences
of thi s for the toiler s. From t ho Ma r xi st point of vie w,
and thal. of t he working people, th e l atter as pect is much
rnorc irn port.a nt. Chin Sh ih Huang united Chi na in th e
2Gt h year of his rul e (22 \ 13. C.). Bu t had he don e an y-
thi ng for t he peopl e from t he li me Ite th o
si ngle feudal monarch y t o th e da y of his dea th ? DId h e
ever g-ive an y th ou ght to th e welfare a nd need s of th o
people? The ans we r is no. All his th ou ght s a nd
were rlirect crl \ 0 his own Interests a nrl t ho lus ti t ut iou of
a n " eternal empire" for himself and hi s fa mil y. Look a t
Chi n Shi h Huang' s mai n wo rk s of th at poriod.
According to Ssu-iua Chie n' s ll istoricat Record and
ot her so urces, the following was wh a t Chin Shi h l luaug
princi pall y eng aged i n :
L Appropr iating th e crocli t and for the. deeds of
other s, he pr ocl aimed himself as ha vlll g. the
thr ee Huuugs in meri t, and ex celled the live lis 11,\ 1lI0-
ru lity" ". He look th o ti tle of Chin S hi h Hu ang-i t and
pel'f Ol' med " t ou rs of inspection" across mou n-
tain s and l arge rivers, putting up gl'aven monu ments
01' glory" to immortalise hi s "explo its" he
wcnl. He or de red that hi ghways sho uld l aid wher e
hi s route would pass - will e eno ugh for his SUlll ptuouS
six -hor se ca rriugo Ilauked by mou nt ed guards, a nd f,oot
so ld iers. Man y millions of peopl e were into bu ild-
in g th ese r oads, paved not Silllply by their labour but
a lso bv th eir s wea t, bl ood a nd bon es . The human a nd
mul.cri al was te of thi s is ea sil y imagined.
2. Thou gh internecin e wars ended, Chi n S.hi h Hu.ang
conti u uousiy l oosed wars of aggression aga ins t ueigh -
bouring s ta l es a nd t r i bes, The hope of the . I?eopl e for
deliver a nce Irom th e scourge of wa r and 1111 11ta ry con-
scr i ptio n proved in va in. Not on ly wer e more people
into uiil lturv se rv ice in vi ew of th e cease less ho sllhtllJs,
hut th er e was al so a f HI' l arger a mo u nt of for ced
l ahou r th a l th ey had to do.
':. Th e three " uangs ar e Huang Ti , Shell "ung, and Fu Xi;
the fiye Ti s are Sh Ari IIao, Chuan Ti. Kll, a nd
IIr c ah brevia ted lIame s of seml-myll llenl wise ru l er s of
rclllo tc antiquity.
.3. I n dread of the augury of a stargazer th at " Chi n
will be deslroyed by (h e HUj' eJls ( Hun s) " CI' Shi
11 . , '. " li n _:> 11 1
uang se n t a n a rmy of 300,000 under lIIell g 'T' t
eng'\ge tl H I hi , ien 0
bU'1 1 1 ie . anr ili sed million s of peopl e to
1 ( l re th ou sands of kilometres 101lg Grea t \Y'II I
and h u nger and illness, do ing
mos t of them s lllTCl' ell death before th e \,... II '" ,
1) \ l
• I I) 1\1 ., . " a W,U:i COll\-
, e. C(, lilt j no r egard s th e Gre at Wall as on .
Shih Hua ng' s grea le t hi ". e of Chiu
i " I r· . · : ievemcnts, and never fails to
ue 0 1ergu gues ts to rnspect iL Yet Ch i SJ ' J H ' .
11:.
t
nt ::in ·L10•.lI1I ?
T I ' . ' IOUS (J tOI ers .
, . 0 mild himself a mausol eum CI " 1 'J
s u uu uouc d IIlor e th an 700000 " , ,: • li n ? I! I Il unu g
cra ftsme n. Then 10 keen I ,COIl\ldllC! erlI nlllHls Hnd
bu ri ed alive i ll it s a secr et, he had all of t hem
,S . To revolt an d se cure th e t h ro ne for hi _
s"elf and his desceudauts , Chin Shill Hll "lllg mud n III
I
' t • . I " « nvor y-
JOl J urn III t iei r weapon s 'J'ho"'e \\'110 I I '
} ' I I ' I '. . . .., . r e usee we re
?ec • H I i ug o The an us were s melted down
/ flor lllous Idol s wer e made out of LIds meta l i ll
nng (Lheu lh o imperi al ca pit al) .
0, . ,1,0 I he und th ose suspected
of discon I en t, Ch111 Shi h II lia ng consigned hundreds of
.01' peopl e to deat h, tortu re, inca rc er ati on , han-
ishment, forced luhour, deportati on t o remote borde r
a reas 1'01' building for fifica ti on s, and tho like. An in ca l-
cula ble ,lIymbl'r of g ui l tless people fell pr ey to his sav-
age pol icies .
7. Seeking inuuort nli f.y a nd wan t iug 10 l iv e " le u l hou-
sand years", Chill Shi h Huang did not. hesitate 10 squun-
del' human and materi al r es ources, and 10 send monks
and sec ta ria ns to all parts of the world in search of
" methods of l ongevit y" and " el ixirs of l ifo".
8. To gratify hi s wanton lusts, Chin Shih Huang col-
Iect ed va st sums of mon ey in all parts of the couutry
and had s ever al milli on people wast e th eir labour 011
b uild i ng the palacu of EluIuug, whi ch is said to have
no equa l in hi stor y, Its edifices cove red an area of hu n-
dr ods of kilometres in l ength and breadth. Here Shih
l Iu a ug I, cpl hi s Cl lllC, Uhin es captl1l'ed in the s ix cOllqnerel!
sl a l os, allll s t or ed h is va rious t r easnres. The pal ace wa s
Illl lin is hcl! wh en he di ed . LHter, \\'lIell Hsi an r, 'tu at tIle
hoad of hi s lroops ca pt ured Hsi eH-Yang and seL lire to
Ehrfang, the flames raged unintermittently for more
than three months, This gives an idea of its size and of
tho amount of labour and material that had gone into
building it. There were hanging bridges and underground
passages between dillorent parts of the palace, for Chin
Shi h Huang did not venture to walk in the open, He
kept hi s whereabouts secre t not only because he wanted
" more eas ily to meet" th e " denize ns of heaven" , but als o
and chi p-fl y because hi s cri mes had made him an obj ect
of uni ver sal hatred, and he sa w in eve ry man a poten-
t ial threat to his life. When he was pa ssing through Po-
lansha on one of his "lours of inspection", a cer tain
Chang Liang mad e an attempt on hi s lif e despite the
heavily armed guard. Chang Liang thr ew a heavy iron
hammer, but hi s vic Li m turned out to be a " double" of
Chin Shih Huan g' s wearing the same clothes as the em-
peror and se a ted in a carriage that wa s an exac t r eplica
of th e em peror's, Though the empe ror immediately 0 1'-
dered a ton-day se arch for Chang Liang, th e man wa s
never found. This shows that he wa s protected by tho
emperor' s bodyguards and giv en conc ealment by tho
people. Chin Shih Huang was, indeed, a lone lies pot 011
wh om even his intimates am! his cl os est entourage had
t urned th eir ba cks.
Hi s poli cy of befogging the peopl e, aimed at perpc -
tuatiug Iris tyrannical rule and leading lo suc h barbar-
isms as tho " burning of books aurl bur yin g of scholars",
ha s di shonoured hi s -name for all time,
In th e 13th ye ar of the Chin dynasty, that is, a year
a lter Chin S hih Huang' s death (200 B, C.) , th ere wa s a
peasant uprising under Chen She n and Wu Ku ang. Th e
empire wa s shake n to it s foundations, and three ye ars
later (206 B, C,) it fell under the combine d onslaught
of th e armies of Hsi ang Yu and Lin Pang,
Why docs Mao extol Chin Shih Huang for having
" conque red six st ates anrl founded a s ingle feudal em-
pire" ? Mainly in order to further hi s own designs or in-
tensi l ying war preparations against the Soviet Union
and neighbouring Asian countries. Like the rul er s of th e
Man chu Ching dynasty and the reaotionary warlords, he
ha s always regard ed countri es bord ering on China -the
Mon goli an Peopl e' s Ilopubli c, Koru a, th e countries of
Ind ochina, Th ailand, Burma, Nepal and oth er s -as Chi -
nese territory. Besides, he wants 10 incorporate in China
the ent ire Soviet Far East, The milil ar isati on of the
,and, the large-scal e war pr eparati on s of r ecent
ye ars, ar e aimed not onl y at ca pt uri ng Sovi et territor
but at occ upying neighbouring Asi an countri es
cr ea ting a Pan-Asi atic lVInois t empire as a st e tow' I
I hid, for world supremacy. Mao el tols
, u I lian g lo furth er J ' If'
mad I ' I I us so -aggl'll nrl iZoIllent and his
,( uesi gn s, nne also to decei ve th e I . "
whom he wants to pander t . I' . peop e Chinn,
cha uvinis t g'I'Cat-]lOWer amb' t 'O ! IS arrogan t egrnsm and
WI I I IOn:; ,
iy noes Mao make so m 'I .
Huang' s r ej ection of the s st lie 1 over Shi h
tion of the system of y em 0 s la tes and introdu c,
to further Ilis plans and eount ies? Mainly,
People's Liberation Army It savag-e purges of th e
ing hi s pr epa rati on s for tJ I be r ecalled tha t dur-
launch ed campaiO' Il }tel cUl t ulra l prevol utio n" Mao
I
'"" Ie w 10 p, ar ty the I I
pcop e must l ear n from rho PLA " T! ' , " . W 10 e
playoff on e sec t ion of th PLA ' . lIS was don e to
and "captura power " fa Cl
e
, aMgalnst othe r secti ons
I' ianmao ao. When lIP ,
and govern ment bodi es wer e smashe d b fca U1,-
(red guar ds ) and tsaofans
of military regions 01'
I
PIS to head re\"o! ul ionaJ'y cOlTImi Ll ees " 'Inc! II
a So ' par lv COllI itt "i B , ' Iell
. IllJ ees . sut afte r t he so- ca lled T' FJ' ,
cas e he g '11 " ,In I<lO
." , r ew , mor e sus picious of commande rs or
I egtonat, provtncial and local troop" Now lIe' . "
I ' ", " IS again
'; anIlll.'g a mass purge of the Peopl e' s Liberation AI'
For thi s he will use the "mil it ia" t he "r ed g ds" m
y
l, II Iik b' . , uar S , a ru
. Ie, I co, ut cl lle flr will pl ayoff ono part of the PLA
against why he is again making threats,
again engag,l1l g 111 swi ndlos, again issuing promis es and
rcsort.ll1g t o, in cit ement in orde r to dis rupt com'rullll-
ship III var rous 1 LA unit s and se t one RP- ne ral against
He Iaun ch cd the " PLA mu st learn from th"p
people on the one hand, and is shufl1 ing com-
mandcrs of military r egi ons and provinci al units on the
oth er, This ,is b?in g done to se t th em u p for di sllli sSfl]
al.HI r ?presslOn III th e next r ound of t he " cr iti cis m of
Lin Piao and the r ectificati on of style " or wh en a second
" cultural erupts, Thus, t he pur pose Iris
a.ttacks ,?n th e syst em of s tat es" is cl ear-the denuncia-
lion of se parat e s la tes" and "disobedi ent warlords" will
be a pretext for assaulting military commanders in the
localiti es. And the purpose of hi s s u pport for th e "sys -
tem of pr ef ectures and cou nt ies" i s to s t reng then
" a bs ol ut e ce n tral power" or, mor e precisel y, t h e
ti ouary dicl at 01' ship uf Mao a nd " r ellnr o. pu L-
li e nplui ou" fur th e persecuti on 01 I' LA cadres III tho
" " '1' '1"
name of th e "centr al commi t tee", /)) 1 it nr v counet ,
and " central govel' nnw llt" ,
Certain lmpcri alis; paper s observ e th at local gene r als
in China have too mu ch power: t hey expect th at a ft er
Mao' s death, as after that of Yuan t his will
l ead to internecine s t r ife between wa rl ords. 1 hese COUI-
iueuts ar e hclpiug Mao to ou t hi s
In the hegi nning of t h e cul tur al r evol uti on people
said th at Mao was Chin Shih Hua ng No .2, th at h e
a s t ill biggel' tyrau! tha n Chin Shih Huang, and t ha t his
Hew "burning 'of books and buryi ng of scho l ars" : vas 110
l ess bnrharous than Chin Shih Huang' s,. At tha.t
would not accept thi s view and s till to just ify hi s
acti ons. No w, like an incorrigible crimina l, murder er and
fu-obrand convict ed by ampl e ev idence and co mpel le d to
ndruit hi s crimes, Mao h ns l a uncherl a pr ess (:ampa
exone r a ti ng Chin Shi h Huang and, in cile ct, adlll lUl ng
th at he is a mod ern 1 to
Maos prai se of Chill Sh ih Huang 1S me ant not. 01 1 y
forbi'd Lo denounce cr imes li ke lit he llll r n,i" g of
lind buryi ng of schol ars", but also t o t he s
image a nd use it as a mea ns for himself and .,Ill.t-
ti rur othe r s, II e h a s a lready q uali fied ntt acks ou
Shih Hua ng a nd on the burni ng of hooks and .hurYlIlg
of sc ho la rs as a "cr i me " conu ni t tc d hy ' Ya ng a nd
c(;ndc m na t ioll o[ Chin Shih H ua ng [or book s
and buryi ug sc ho la rs and r eading of s
Th e Pit s for Burnin g Books as a crune com mitted
by Lin Pi a u, No w he can l evel charges at
who m he has decid ed to pers ecute III th e camprugn 01
" cr i ticisi ng Lin I' iao awl r ectifying style" 01' i n th e S?C-
ond " cul t ur a l revoluti on" , most
the sol e oxc opti on of the Mao cl i qu e, r ecall SIIIII
Huang a nd hi s a tro citie s with hOI'1' o.1' revulsion. HI!t
we trust t hat Mao' s tr eatment of Chin SIn h Huang-thIs
despot a nd ty ra nt known as such to e,: ery Chin?se - as
hi s prototype and t eacher will not add ei ther to Ill S
l.i ge or lo hi s power, On the c, on t.rn r y, we trust t.hat d ,
will add t o th e people' s ui saffectiun a nd resis ta nce ,
2) \Vh)' and how Mao attacks Confucius
Ind eed , why hAS Mao found it necessarv to a tt ac k
C<.l1lfur i us. whiu- extolli ng Chin Sh ih Huang'!) To be gin
:: 'Itll , hcca us« Mau h illl,self, like Chin Shi h /I liang, iHIS
. burned hooks a nd buri ed scholars". The so lo dillerence
IS th at Mao has grea t ly su r passed Ch in Sh ih Hu a nc in
th e number of hook s IHII'IlCd a nd i nt ell ectn al s
s uch nets as viol a ti ng th e grave of Couf'u-
destroyi ng hi s mon uments, and burni ng his dwell-
lu g and tern plo , Mao also followed in Chin Shi h Ifuaug's
foot steps.
. Tho ot he r is. t ha t ther e a re fundamen ta l ideol og-
and pol iti cal di fleren cos between Mao a nd Chi n
SInh Hnang, a ll th o one hanri , and Conf' uoius, OIl the
other . Let us cons ider a few cxa mpl os t.h nt Suppor t. thl s
s ta t emen t.
1. Confueius held th at " when the peopl e are tr eated
as . .of s ta te , th e l att er enjo ys wel1-
. Such pol iti cal Ideas a rc I utule ra hlu for' Chin
Sh ih. Huang and Mno 'I'se- Lunp , th es l' t.wo despots who
consider th emsel ves "SOilS of hca vun" a nd are acc us-
tomed to trampl ing' a ud abusing the people.
,2. praise d r ul ers who gave up t hei r h igh
office of their own fr ee will , as Yao to Sh un, a nd Shun
10 Yu, :' as t he dismi ssal 1'0 1' incompetence of Tse b y
Tall.g, a nd likewise Wn Wang' s military ca mpa ig;1
uga ms t Chou ' Ya ng. Thi s is as incom pat ibl e as wa ter
a lid lir e with t he way of thinki ng of th e careor lsts CII iII
Shi h Huang a nd Mao Tsc-tun g, who cl ing to th ei r t. hrou es
and want to perpetuate t heir dynasty.
3. Confuciu s wan ted t he " mo na rch to t reat hi s s ub-
j ects with r esp ect, and t he su bjects to se rve the monarch
with l oyalt y" (Anal ect s, 4; " Pa I", 3) .
By s ubjects Confuei us mea n t not. only bi g and s mall
official s, bu t also (" ever ywhe re t he ear t h is inhuhit cd by
s ubject s of t ho monarc h" ) I.he ent ir e lu;opl e. S uc h polit-
ical idea s are a tel'l'if yin g' wa rni ng to all anci ent a nd
pr esent-day desp ots who do not tr ea t th eir "s ubjec ts" as
people.
,'. 1\1. th e time of Yao, Shun and Y11 th er e was no slale, Volun-
tary chango or beadm lll\ship was consislent wit h the tr adition
of elect ing t ri lJal chiefs .
4: Confucius in favour of lelling people Increase
number s, prosperously, and amass knowledge,
1he1'e IS a special re cord to th is effect in the Analects'
" On in th e W ei sta te ill th o company of Jal;
Yu, Confucius exclaimed:
" ' How many people !'
" 'Y
os, many people, What else should on e wi sh'?' Jan
Yu asked.
:: 7
0
give the.m pro sperity,' came the answer.
Ami assu nunp that prosp erity has been ac hieved,
what el se should he ad ded ?'
" 'To give them an education.' " (A nal ects 16' "TsII-
III", 13) . ' ,
Confucius advocated good treatment of toil ers. People,
he said, must not wear th emselv es out in toil. Th ere is
a fra gment on thi s SCore ill th e Analects :
"Tsu-lu asked how the people should be governed.
"< Firs t the people must be given advantages, a nd
thereafter th ey must he given work,' Confucius said.
" 'What el se is needed?'
" ' People must not be worn out,' carne th e answe r ."
(Anal ects, Hi; "Tsu-lu", 13) .
For Chin Shi h Huang and Ma o Tse-Lung, wh o ar c con-
ce rned only with their own interests and give no thought
to th e needs of the people , th ese ideas are unacceptable.
S. Confucius wa s all advocate of educa tion and opposed
th e pnli cy of befogging the peopl e. He said: Ming ke shi
tt« chii . Pu ke siu chji chit (Anl/lects , 9; "Tai Po" , 8).
Thera arc two in ter pr et at ions of this pa ssage (because
th er e were no punctuation marks in th e olden da ys).
Some put a comma after th e first cl i]i in mi ng ke sh! yll
chj i, .. . Then th e saying means "a people should he made
to work, but must not be given knowl edge" . In t his
interpretation, on e that is pre-ferred by the Maoist press,
Confuci us is made out to be in favour of befogging t he
people: T he other interpretation, ming ke shi, yu chji ;
tni ke shi , chji chit, means: "if a people wants to pe r-
Iorm services, let th is be so; if , however, th e peopl e do
not want to perform se r vices, they must be to ld what
is wh at" . This interpretation is obviou sly the correct one,
be caus e, as we know, Confucius was in favour of educ a-
tion and prosp erity in pea cetime.
Confuc ius advoca ted publi c ed uca t ion even iuwart.i me.
He said: " To pl unge people into a war and , not edu-
ca te th em is to abandon th em to the vagaries of fat e"
(An alects, 16; " Tsu-l u", 13) .
Chin Shih Huang and Mao Tse tu
hand foll owed li , f b .- ng, on tho othe r
, a po ICy 0 ofoggmg pe 1· ' fl '
they did 110t even shrink from "bum ing boor e, dorb t 11S
lllg scholars " It is , " a {S an ur y-
ideas of s not sur pr ls111 g, th er ef or e, that the
C
. , . lUS were r epugnant to them
hIll Shi h Huang and Mao '1' .
logger heads with Confucius Tl . are cl early at
1I10l'e progressi ve camp ' 'd ie I( eas of Confucius were
1:-1 are to those of CI' oJ ' J
( uang, who lived more thn 200 . 1m " 11 I
and they 1 < n years after Confucius
of Mao than the
. ,oug 1Y ao was born more tha 2 hOO
Yfi ears after Confucius. Confucius said' " 'l'l des n d'u
Ills one with awe ' who 1- . ie oscen ant
anything to Jivi n he will concede
known t l t J ' g oday . He could not have
i a tor ay It would be more right t o sa ' that " t l
doscond an t fills one with s hame ' lie I'S 'et ' . d I U
, I I " 1 rogr a 0 oven
comparee to t ioso who lived ill an ti quity"
Th e a ttack Oil Confuci . d . d '
_ . ' . I U S 15 csrg n e to pruruote Mao's
poli ti ca l auns. For example : .
L I n th e article, " On the Wor shi P of Confucianism
and t he St r uggle Against . Fn-chio"; ::. sigued S hih
[JllII , maintains that " Confuci us was a diehard
.of.. t he di ctatorship or the s lave-owni ng cl ass"
0: 25 Oct ob er i On OJ' Il ungchi No. H),
I fl73) . TIll S contention betrays Mao ' s la ck of elemen tn-
I'y knowl edge of th e epoch of Confuci us. We ha VI' a lr eady
shown tha t in Confucius' lifetime the slave-o wn i nz
ilys te m. wa s over ami that serfdom, too, had
to decl ine. It IS, th erefore, cont. rary to the facts of hi s-
tory Con fuc i us as a " diehard champion of
of the sla ve-o wning cl ass" . Thi s chnrge
I S obviousl y groundless and can not be taken ser iously.
Mao' s contempt of the hi stori cal facts h as a I'ar-
reachi ng aim: to use specio us " hist orica l para llels" to at-
tack those wh om he wants to destroy as " foll owers ' of
Confucius " ill the cam pa ign of " cri ti c.ism of Lin Pi a o
an d rectifica ti on of s tyl e" or a second " cul tura l r evolu -
tion" , that is , accu se th em of being " diehard ch ampions
of t he di ctat or ship of th e bourgeoisie" , and treat t he m
accordingl y.
::. Fa-chia-c-legnl ists, champions of legalism, a politi cal school
in unclont China.
,)Io t
2. Mao accuses Confucius or " tryi ng to restore th o
wh ol e political system and ord er that existe d under th e
rule of th e sl ave-owning nobility in West ern Chou" . To
"support" this charge he fal sifi es th e sens e of Confuci us'
saying: ke t si lu li wei jen.
The ar ti cl e, "Right Opportunism and the Ideas of
Confucius" , signe d by 8. Chin Yun-ko, said the foll ow-
ing:
"len is th e core of th e ideas of Confuciu s; it s purpose
is t o ' r evive eti que tt e' . Confucius said: self -improve-
ment for the sake of r eviving eti quette - t his is [en
(Analects , "Yan Yuan"). 'Reviving etiquette' implies
the wi sh t o rest ore the wh ol e political syste m and ord er
that had exis ted under t he rul e of th e slave-owning
nobi li ty of Western Chou" (see l cnminj ih. pao, 21 Novem-
ber Hl73 or llungchi No. 12, Hln ) .
In th e ar ticl e "On the Worship of Confucianism and
the St ruggle Against Fa-chic" th er e ar e identical pa s-
sages, though the two were signe d with different names.
This shows that both were written on the orders of Mao
Tse-tung.
For young Chinese r ead er s to obtain a cl eare r idea of
this issue, I must first of all bri efly ex plai n the ori ginal
meaning attache d t o th e te rms [en a nd eti que tt e in th o
leaching of Confucius.
In ancient times " [ en" meant simply " man". It says
in th e commentar y to th e Book of R it es: "len also
means man". Menc ius and Shuo-uren al so say: "Ien
is man". And this is the ri ght interpretation.
"Fan Chih as ked, 'what does " jeri" mea n?' Confuci us
r epli ed: ' Love of man' " (Analect s, 1;); "Yan Yuan",
12) .
In t he specific hi stori cal env ironmen t of that time
"[ en means man" and "[en means love of man " connot-
ed th at man should be treated humanel y and cou ld no
longer be r egarded a slave or ser f. Relati ons between
.. "Se l f-i mpro veme nt in accordance with etiquette- this
is [en",
*" The author wrongly interprets Confucius' saying as fol-
lows: "Self-improvement for the sake of reviving etiquette-this
is [ en ";
,"' * Sl iuo- uren is short for the title of H SlI Sheri 's great oty-
di ctionary, Sh u o-ur e n C hten- t eu , wrlttan ill the era of
Eas tern Han (2nd century).
peopl e mu st be human. tn the langu age ot our time
" j en" mea ns " humanism". Since anci ent times mos t
Confucia n scholars cuns idere d " jen" th e progr essive
uf ,t he Confucian doctrine. OUl uf t his nucl eus
IIlforJ'cd th e mot ive for noble deeds, self-
good and peace on eart h. Follow-
th e of ' an y ua n concorn ing 'jell came
th o .questlOn . of Chun/? Ku ng concerni ng ' jen' " , "the
question of Ssu-rna NIII concerning 'jen '" , I " I
qu estion of Fan Chih concerning ' [en' " 'T ' lanc
r
It t e
Confuciu diff . 0 eac i ot t i ern
. s gave a 1 ere nt r epl y. This is evidence t ha t
was a t eacher who geare d his ex
nati ons t o t he abilIty of hi s disci ul es More 't' p.
den ' f t l di . ! ' . , I IS eVI-
co o. .l e rvers tt y of meanin gs attache d to ' .
uci an teaching. Jen III
" origl na l fy meant "sum of r ites ", " coremon "
' "and In a mor e gene ra l se nse it me:nt
also
l
ha s ce , etc. In t he Conf UCIan teaching, "eti quetto"
. s a br o?d con tent and meani ng- includ in
of varIOUS act s, impr ovemen t of self
munsh ip, and the li ke. . , . , .
Th e li mit s of this book trai f .
. . r esrmn us rom exa rni ninp
,t,'lO. meanmgs and interpretations of [ en. a nd
. eti quette given by Confuc ius in th e Armlect u, But it
IS d ear from th e af or esaid t hat j en and " etiquet te" do
not mean wh at Mao Tse-tung wants them to mean.
l et . us compare Mao's in ter pr etation of Ice ts i fu l l
ioei ten WIth th e corre ct in ter pr et ation of this phr ase
fr om t he Analects. This will show t ha t Mao's falsi fica-
tion is wholl y incompati hle with the original sense of
th ese words.
In the Anal ect s (" ¥an Yuan", l S) , we read:
" Yan Yu an ask ed for th e meaning of ' j en' . Confucius
r epli ed : " ' self-improvement in accorda nce wit h
- t his is [ en',
" ' Ple ase explain in detail ,' Yan Yuan sa id.
" And Confucius replied: 'See not wh at is not in accor d-
ance with eti que t te. Il eal' not what is not in accordance
with etique tte. Speak no t wh at is not ill accorda nce wit h
etiquette. Do not do what is not in accordance with eli-
qu eue'. Yan Yuan said: ' Though I am not cle ver, I want
to beh ave in accorda nce with wha t yo u hu vc said' ."
What connecti on can there be bet ween this dialogue
and "restoration of the whole political system and order
Hi" 243
that exis ted under th e rule of th e slave-owning nobility
i ll Western CII(H1 " ? Non e wh atever , '1'11 0 con ve rs ation be-
tween t each er and di sciple concer ns se lf -impro vement
and has no r el ati on to Mao's fal se imputation ,
Furth er , the ar ti cle signed by Ch in Yun-ko misinter -
pr ets Conlu ci us' saying, " what yo u do not like wh en
don e to yourself, do not do t o others", as an appeal " t o
treat th e enemy honestl y and magnanimousl y" ; in ot he r
words, do no t fight t he ene my, pardon th e ene my, a nd
eve n sur re nde r to t he mer cy of the ene my. Let us, how-
ever, chec k th e ri ght meaning of th os e wo rds in th o
Analects.
Confucius s poke these words on two occasions, The
first time he spoke th em directly foll owing the "ques-
l ion of ); a ll Yu an co nce rning ' je n ' " i n answeri ng the
"ques tion of Chung Kung conccrn iug ' j en' " . C?nf uci us'
an swer consi sted of live se nte nces, one of whi ch wa s,
" wha t you do not like when done to yo urself do no t do
to others" . This sent ence was meant to explain j en. The
second tim e, Confucius spoke these words in his reply to
the question of 'l' su Kung: " Is ther e a word t hat one
could follow all life long?" Confucius r epli ed: " The word
is shu ": what , you do not like wh en done t o yourself do
not do to ot he rs ," (Anal ects , 18; " Wei Lin-kung" , 15) ,
Hero Confucius s poke these words to ex plai n shu. Thero
is noth ing in these dialogues to justify the interpretation
n]' th is sen tence as being a n appeal to treat tll o enemy
hon estly and magn animousl y. Suc h a n interpretation is
ju s t, anot her of Ma o' s falsifi cations.
Ma o' s perverse under standing of Ca nIucian teach-
i ng of jell , etiquette and chungshu ...... on ly het.ra ys hi s
undi ul ccti cal sophis tr y,
Chi n Yu n-ku's article , " Right Oppor tunis m and tIll'
Ideas of Conf ucius" , is based on t hese Maoi st fal sifi ca -
ti ons , Afte r quali fying Confucius' ideas of jen, eti quette
and chungs lui as idea s of r ea ctionary slave-owners and
an appea l to s urr ende r t o th e ene my, Chill Yun -ko
l inked th em with th e so-called ri ght-opportuni st ideas,
maintaining tha t the latter fed 011 the id eas of Conf u-
cius. TIe won ; on t o say that the irleas of Confucius were
" a tool wh er eby right-opportunists tri ed to subver t.
" Sh ll- he re , pu L yourself in the place o f nn othor,
.,.•,. Cilll ngs/Ill - be faithf ul to your duty and show concern 101'
other s, honesty,
Chinese revoluti on a nd are trying to r estor e it I
Ism in CI' " TI -
. . nna'. i cr euu on, th e a uthor of IIIC nrtl cl
heaped III SU1l S and slander all th ose l eaders of t l ' CPC
who had at dilTCI' ent times 0 lOS I I Ie
tionary "tho "J t ," f AI ?,I e.( t i e counter- re vol u-
. II 1 S O li no l se-Lu!]<r TI is ' !
In three large fragments. The \V,as l on e
to sla nde ri ng Wang i\I i ng '
huai , tl w second to slandel'inO' Liu S I , ' 1' '" '
third to slanderlng Li n Piau . '=' 1<1 0 - (, II , und t1w
! YetI i t
l
is C
nol.lC
other than Mao Tse-t ung' who has he-
r'ayer t w hiues o r evolution and' I "
soc ia list sys tem in China. IS unr erlllIIJ IlIg th e
. By, at t ack i ng Con Iu cf us , Mao Int.ends uot only t
Just.dy til e " blll'Jl i ug of hooks and bu r yiug or
the other tyrannical ac ts of Chin Shi h HUHng and
IIIruself , hut also Lo create a, n ew pretext ror pers ocuti u(T
peopl e. !I,1 the next st age 01 the "cri ti cis ru o f Li n
and I' ecllhcati on of s t yle" or when ' I second " c JI '. 1 '
I ' " 1 ' , o v . u .urn rev-
o ou t , ,\te will be ab le to acc use au von e
he wi she s of bei ng a follower of Confuci us ", whi chwll l
be, tant amount. to charging him with su bver ti no th e
CllI lles,e an d tr ying to re store
, In' ed mor e than 2,500 years ago. Due to the
and peculiari ties of tho se times, his teaching
wa s dual I II character : ba ckward for it s "wors hi p of th e
monarch " and progressive for it s tea ching of jen. Feuda l
of all lat er epochs, as well as reactionary warlor ds,
expl oi ted th e backward aspect of Con lu ci anism, whil e
pro gressive thinkers promot ed it s pr ogr essive aspect.
Bogin ning wit h Ha ll W u- ti ( Li u Che ) who " d is ba nded
all other sc hools and r evered only Confuci us " , all fe u-
dal dynasti es up to and incl uding t he Pci yaug wa rlor ds
a ud Chia ng Kni-sh ck, made th e most of th o backward
as pec t of Conluci ani sm, wors hi p of th e monarch, lo but-
t ress their OWIl reactionar y r ille and to attack th ei r po-
litica l opponents. The May Fourth Movement ( Hl HJ),
which was a s tr uggle aga inst imperi alism, lit e l' ei yang
warlords and th e feudal or der, oppose d th e backward
as pect of Confuci anism and opened the doors to l he new,
revolu l.inn ar y ideas of Marxi sm-Leninism. Tn th e thi rti es,
Chi ang Kai-shok used th e te ac hi ng of Confuci us, Mon g-
Isu , Buddh ism and Taoi sm to pr omole hi s Ne w Lif'n
Movement which was, i ll cllcct, a cumoullagcd Iascist
movement .
. exposing J(a i-shp;k' s rea ctionary jugg l-
11l g' with the teucluug of Co n Iu ci ue uud Mcug-t.su, we
Communists crit icise d th e backward aspect of Confucian-
ism. Thi s was correc t and necessary because it weak-
ene d, even neutralised, th e influence 0 11 the masses of
reactionary groups that used the backward aspect of tho
teach ing of Confucius and Mcng-tsu for sel fish ends.
Tt is common knowledge that the backward asp ect of
Confu cianism, "worship of th e monarch and expuls ion
of for eigners" , is an im portant ideologi cal source lind
part of t he "though ts of Mao Tse-tung". Worship of the
monarch means worship of th e "son of heaven", and
"expulsion of for ei gners" means China' s identifi cation
with th e Cel es ti al Empire. The "son of heaven " ideol ogy
li es at th e root of Mao' s egoce ntris m and extre me indi-
viduali sr u, while th e Cel esti al Empire ideology li es a t
the root of his extreme nationalism and chauvinis m.
Jn fa ct , there was a time when he used t o describe him-
self as "a politician who is outwardly a Confucianist and
inwardly a Taoist" . This is tantamount to admitting that.
he is "a politician who never tires to s peak of vir tue
and morali ty, but thinks only of plots and intrigues".
Mno Tso-tung, as we see, was als o one of those who
used Confuciani sm to buttress their r eacti onary r ule.
In this re spect, his purpose wa s the same as t hat of all
til e pr evi ous reacti onary rulers of China.
But hi s pres ent approach has changed-he attacks
th e pr ogressive conc epts of anc ie nt Confuci anism baser!
on the teaching of j en in order to extol Chin Shih Hua ng
and re tain hi s grip on power, Having betrayed commu-
ni sm a nd having become a se r va nt of imperialism , Mao
regards a ll r eaction ary ideas and doctrinos -e-Irom th e
r ea ctionary ideol ogi cal sc hools of antiquity to modern
fascism- as " par tners" of tho " t houghts of Mao Tse-
tung", while Marxi sm-Leninism and the progres sive con-
ce pts of anci ent Confucianism are for him mortal ene mies
of hi s rea cti on ary "thoughts". In fact, ex ploiti ng the
backward as pec t of Con fucianism and attacking its pro-
gressive as pect, t ho ugh antipodal in approach, pursue
nne and th e sa me aim by di ffer ent means and are there-
fore two sides of on e and th e same r eactionary scheme.
Mao Tse-tung attack s [ en as the nucl eus of th e Con -
fucian teaching, and also attack s the tradit ional Chinese
moralit y. His attacks un humanism, which is accepte d
by all pr ogressives as the foundati on of moralit
veh ement. :rhis proves, on th e une h'anl'
the were right to de scrib M f
the st yle r ecllflcatlOn ca m ai" I " e ao 0
lio n" as a mall total! la ckfn anr c ul t ural revol u-
morali ty and sh . y I g 11l humaIllty, cons cience
" . arne, on t re ot he r hi ' ff '
se lf admitted t o being (I vnid f I' e III o oct him-
e 01 0 I UInalllty . ti I
esty, kindness, and decenc _ . ' .Jus IOn-
cynical a d h 1 y . a ma n who I S pe r fi dious
. n same ess, sc he ming to ' ,
s till more immor al a bom' t ' I commit many ot he r ,
J }
, Ina IOns t has come t
w ior o 10 cons ide rs eve r ethi i 0 a pass
prot est or ri di cu lo dir ect eYd hr '!le an accusa tion or
I . agruns t un
t IS sa fe to say On t he evi d .
far from helping Mao reach I .. °lf . past hi stor y that
ly to l ead to the vel' ( 0 ar ms, lIS conduc t is like-
used th e backward fAI! r?actionaries wh o
for pers ecllting progressive as a pretext
exponents, came to the sam u ionary Ideas and their
and for th eir r eacti onary id e for t hcmsolves
an d th eir ex on e ,1 eas,. w e r evoluti onary idea s
st ill Pints eme i ge d vic torio us a nd covered with
s ivo of C
g
O? . who a ttacks the pro gres-
L
" on ucr anr sm m order to persecute Marxl' srrl
enllll sm d 't . -
} f . ' I ' an I s ex ponents will , as the re ac ti onaries
Jle 0.1 e 11m, come to t he sa me sad end- f nal and con
c USlve def eat. -
. pers ecutes Communist s and intellec-
tuals fur IlJ shklllg Chin Shih Huang and liki C f
" . Thi • • l Ing on u-
1;1u.s. IS shows that hi s campa ign of ex tolling Chin
Huang and Confucius is in tertwined with
hi s agams t th e Communist Party and th e
of . China on th e home fr ont, an d against th e
SOVIet Uni on and th e world communist mo vemen t on th e
extern al fr ont,
Let only add that. his praise of Ch in Shih Huang
and cr iticism of Confucius have two ot he r secre t aims.
One of them is t o divert people fr om the struggle and
to obfusca t e it s cha racter; in other words. he is del iher-
ately creat i ng con fusi on in or der to portray t he struggle
between th e revolutionary idea s and poli cy of Marxism-
Leni nism and the react ionary "thoughts" and policy of
Mao Tse-tung as a st ru ggle between those for and
against Chin Shi h Huang or between those for and
against Con fucius. The ot he r aim is to confus e peopl e
by juggli ng with ancient "wisdoms". Si nc e not on ly t he
mass of workiug peopl e, but also the younger
or in tell ect uals h ave only a scant knowledge of anciout
writi ngs and the fa cts of ancient hist or y, Mao thi nks that
hi s manipulations will identify the str uggle of the pres-
ent with ancient history and t hereby obscure t he tru e
state of affairs.
It is our duty, therefore, to be vigi lant and to e.xp? se
Mao's ma chiuations , lIe is very likely to r eso rt, to simi lar
ploys in futur e as well. For example, he may instruct
cer t ain per sons to write articles extolling Shang Chou-
wang ::. and the l at t er ' s favourite saying
that Chou-wane was not a Ierocious de spot, did not in-
dulac the whims of Ta-chi and did not commi t abomina-
while Ta-chi did not enc ourage Chou-wang's ty-
ranny a nd that th e downfall of the Shang dynasty I S
not t; be blamed on the wrongdoings of Chou-wa ng and
Ta-chi. A11 this, or course , wouIII be de signed to exoner-
at e Mao Tse-tllng' and Chiang Ching. Or he may, for
ex ampie, fa lsify the teaching (if Mo-tsu, descri be. Mo-ts u
as a r enctionary thinker, and t hen use t he stIgma; of
"follower of Mo- tsu" t o persecute peopl e, and the 11 ke,
But wha tever s tr a ta gems Mao may some day use, we
shall be abl e to s ec through them, to se e hi s desi gus
and their "subt let ies", if we employ the "lie detector"
of Marxi sm-Lcnini srn.
3) Why and how Mao Tse-tung
abuses the name of Lu Hsun
In concl usion l et us se e how Mao abuses the name of
Lu Hsun in hi s pra ise of Chin Sh ih Huang and cr iti-
r.i sm of Confucius.
He has pulled out Lu Hsuu's pamphlet, The lJifferellGes
and Resemblances Bet ween the Burning of Books in
China and Germany , written in '1 933, t o
"burning of books and bu r ying of scholars by Chin
Shih Huang.
, T ho main id ea in Ln Hs u u' s pamphlet was corr -ect:
he hel d that though Hitl er and Chin Shi h Huang had
both b ur'n ed books , Hitl er was th e more abominable. By
a nalogy, had Lu Hsun been alive in t ho l a t ter half of
. . " A contcrnptiblo tyr ant, th e last ruler of the Shang dynasty
(17{j(j -1'1 22 n. C.).
th e sixt ies and had he writ t en a pamphl et on the differ-
ences and resem blances between the hurn in jr of book s
ill nntiqui ty a nd th e present time, h is main idea would
surel y have been that though Mao and Chin Shih Huang
had hot.h burned hooks. Ma o was the more abominable,
and th is, t oo. would have been COJTect. Bu t ill hi s
pamphlet Lu HSUIl did not denounce t he burnino of
by Chin Shih On the contrary, he w;ote:
It. IS true th at Chin Shi h Hu ang burn ed hook s. He
burned fOI' tile of ideologica l uni t.y" . Tll is, of
I S mcorrect, Yet , in the earlier mentioned arti-
clos, ' Tn of je ngshu kengiiu:', ::- " On th e Wor sh ip
of Confuci ani sm and th e Str uggl e Against Fa-chia" and
" Chi n Shih Huang Was a Who Combatt ed
Attempts a l HestoL"iug Slave-Owners ", t he ir authors,
doing Mao' s bidding, used this phrase of Lu Bsun' s to
j ustify 1I 0t only the burning of hooks by Chin Sh ill
Huang and not only the crimes of Mao Tse-tung who
burned books du r i ng th e " cu ltur a l r evoluti on " . but. also th e
fasci st mil it ar ist s in Chi l e, wh o ar e a lso burnin g' hook s.
By thi s phrase of Lu Ilsuu' s Muo is trying t(; justify
t lte pa st, pr esen t and any fu tu r e burning of books by
reacuonaries and, of course, abo ve all t o justify the end-
less destr ucti on of cult ure and the persecuti on of intellec-
t uals by Mao himself in his successiv e "cult ural revolu-
t ions ", But hi s eITor ts are in vain. 1£ only hecause in nn
art icle . "On Two or Three Ch inese Affairs" , written in
H1:14. Lu lI SIlIl, in eller.t.. r evi sed his Iorrn cr viewpo in t
on the burni n g of books by Chin Shih Huang. Lu Tlsun
wrote: " Ch in Shi h Huang burn ed books. This has ea rne d
him the r eputation of a not ori ous per sonality, uud hi s
ac t is eve n r ef erred to as a pr eced ent for the hurni u g of
books hv Hitl er ". Lu Hsun makes clear th ereby th at the
burninz 01' books by Chin Shih Huang. as well as by Hit-
ler, wa s a crinri ual ac t , with t he so le di fference being
tli e lapse in ti me. Mao avo ids any mention of this, for
other wise h e would no t he able to use what Lu Hsun
sai d in '1933 to ju sti fy hi s own crimes. Rut facts ar e
Incts, Th e works of LIl Hsun are intact. And hard as th o
Maoist grou p may try t o hush up th o fact s, th o hulk of
Lu Hsun's r ead er s kn ow th orn.
:, Fengs h u li <? ll b'j i u - l.Iw burning of books and burying of

Tho authors of tho above articles quot e what Lu Hsun
wrote in 1933 about the burning of books by Chin Shih
Huang to justify the "burning of hooks" and the " bur y-
of scholars" as deeds of the same order. By HO
doing they try to persuade their readers that Lu Ilsun
also approved of the burying of scholars by Chin Shih
Huang. The fa cts show, indeed, that Chin Shih Huang
of Hitler of the thirti es, Mao Tao-tung of the
sixties, the Iascist gang in Chile of the seventies, and
al! other reactionari es combined the burning of books
WIth th e ph ysical elimination of intellectuals. The only
differenco is that Chin Shih Huang buried
scholars, while the present-day reactionari es execute
Marxi st s-Lenini sts, fight ers against imperialism, and rev-
olutionary intell ectuals. It is no accid ent, th erefore, that
Mao justifi es the " bur uiug of hooks" and th e " bur ying
of as things of the same order .
Yet, in fact , Lu Ilsun protested against th e "burning
of books", and also against the "burying of scholars".
Take hi s "Short Introduction" to Sandal s (1!.l::l 4) , a col -
lection of Chinese writers in English translation. Here
he wrote: "All progressive writers became revolutionary
writers and their suppression became increasingly vi -
cious-bans on publication, burning of books, and exe -
el ution of writer s. During this dark ni ght many young
people paid for their work with their lives." This shows
that Lu Ilsun's 1933 reference to the burning of books
by Chin Shih Huang was no more than a t emporary aber-
ration. He protested furiously against such despotic acts
as the burning of books and the execution of intellec-
tual s.
In th e ahove-mentioned " Shor t Introduction", Lu Hsun
protest ed against the burning of books and the killing
of intellectuals by Chiang Kai -sh ek. 1£ he had lived to-
day, he would surely have protested still more indig-
nantly against the burning of books and killing of intel-
lectuals by Mao Tse-tung and the Chilean fascists.
The Iact s show that Chin Shih Huang did not secure
"unity of ideas" or save his dynasty by "burning hooks
and burying scholars". On the contrary, there was still
greater ide ologi cal turmoil, which hastened the downfall
of th e Chin dynasty. Mao, too, who is burning books and
slaugh tering intellectuals, will s uffer tho same fate as
Chin Shih Huang.
Few peopl e, I am sure, will be misled by th e usc of Lu
Hsun's cr iti cism of Con fuciu s t o suppor t Mao' s anti-
Confucian ca mpa ign.
be,9
in
M.ao used a sentence from Lu Hsuu's
ai ticl e, ConfucIUS ll1 Modern China" , wri tten in 'I\)35
as an argumen t against Confucius. Here it is' "Q 't'
true, Con fuc ius drew 1I1J excellen t pl an s of ho . t III e
om a sta te, hut all of th em wer e desi gned tCI w
j
o .gov
t
-
the mas ' f tl I ' ( onuna e
' . SOlO peop o and wer e drawn up for tl . .
authol'lty; th er e was nothing in them for the peopl its elf
tl lOLiillHPlicatf ons thi s phrase,
o e 0 u Sun s artICle He r ef er d itl
to .the life of Con fucius and ti j() fa te of Wl
j
I
°If Confucius in his own
'1 I "1 egan on g wfore th e twenti eth centur y" He
s lOWe( th at Confu ciu s was "a rna I I '
mu ch du ring- hi s lifetime " TI <II JW 10 lad su rfer'ed
tl I I . ' lei eupon i e not ed l. hnL a It.er
10 (eat 1 of Can Iuc ius he was "presentod by di IT " t
rul er s und er all kinds of disguises by means of
powder's, and was ra i,sed t o an awesome height". Lu
t ha t ,Ill past eras all aspira nt \'0 all
offi ci al post s tu di ed t he f our Book s and t he Fi ve Rooks
essays in t he paku style, th em
a brick for knocking on t he door ". " The moment tho
door , 01?en ed," he ad ded, "the brick was thrown away.
Confucius, t oo. was used af ter his death as a ' br ick (or
k nuckin g on th e door'. " Ending' his ar ti cle, L u l l sun
wrote: " If we t ake example s from recent times, thi s will
be still clearer." He scoffs a t General Sun Ch ua ng-fan g
who, " havi ng insta lled himself in Kiangsu an d Chekiang,
chupped off th e head s of villagers on th e r oads at will",
and ridi cules General Ch an g Tsung-ch an g, " who ha s lost
coun t of hi s t reasures, soldiers, and conc ubi nes". These
two wort.h ies had also tried to escape def eat hy pa ying
a tribute of de ference t o Con fuciu s, and had al so recited
Confucian sayings. It was in hi s sati re agai ns t th e Pei -
yang warl or ds who t rl erl in va in t o escape def ea t by kow-
towing t o Confucius that Lu Hsun mad e t he ai oru- mun-
t.ioncd cr itical refer ence to the pl an s of Confucius as being
" dr awn up for those in autho rity" . In short, th e motiva-
". "The St ruggle Bet ween Fri end s and Foes of Confuciu s in
th e Pa st One Hundred-Odd Years" in: l en.nit ru ihpao, 7 December
1973; th e art icle was signed hv "tho Peki ng and Tsi nghua uni-
versi ti es group of big cr iti cism,l. .
Lions be hind Lu Hsuu's criticism of tho backward aspect
of Confucianism wore the sa me as those of revolutioua-
rip s and Conun uui sts at th e time of the May Four th
Movement and ill the t hirties. Whi le denounci ng the USH
of Confuciani sm by warlords and Chiang Kai -shek as a
means of huttressing reactionary rule, they (:riti ci sed the
backward aspect of Coulucianis m to lessen or even elim-
inate til e influ en ce of t ile reactiona ry rul ers who ab used
t he name of Confucius.
Apart from the above article, Lu Hsun passed j udge-
mcnt 011 Con fucius and the teaching of Confucius nurl
Mong-tsu in some of his shor t pieces (sketches, r eviews,
and essays) coll ec te d under the title, Various Sent iments.
The se were not specific studies of Confucius 01' tho teac h-
ing' of Confucius and Mcug-tsu. They merely r- irlicn lcd
contemporary rcn ct ion ari es wh o soug ht salva tion in lau gh-
a ble " wors hi p of Confu cius " awl " rec i ta l of Co nfucian
writi ngs". Everybody knows tha t i n his Various Senti-
melds Lu Il sun expressed hi s own thoughts on this score.
Awl what he wrote coinci de d wit h the cr i ticis m of Con-
Iur.iu s by revol utionaries and Communists at t he time
of th e Ma y Fourth Movement and in th e thirti es.
From antiquity to th e present time all inca lculable
number of works has been written on Co nfuci u s and the
t ea chinz of Coulucius and Meug-tsu. Theil' aut hors
di sparate opinions , SOllie of th em diametrically
opposite on es, and each expo unded what was by und
lar go hi s own vi ew. Mao, however, not on ly " sanct.i-
Iiod" Lu Hsun' s pronouncements on Confucius ami the
tea chi ng of Con Iu cius unci Meng-tsu as i udi spu tahl e dog-
ma, but also made them a " r eason" for persecuting COI11-
munists and r evoluti onary int ellectual s, For this th oro
is absolutel y no j ustificat ion ,
Of lute, Mao has begun ide ntifying Lin Piao a nd Con-
fuci us . In hi s ca mpa ig n 01' " cr i ticising Lin Piao and Co n-
Iucius" he makes s pecific use of Lu Hsuri ' s pronounce-
iucnts on the t eaching' of Confu ci us and Meug-Lsu, Th is,
as we have already noted, is mea nt to purl ruy t he s t rug-
g le between i\I ao Tse-tung and Lin Piao as a s tr uggle be -
tween Mao' s nnti -Conlucianisru and Lin Pi an ' s worship of
Couluci anism in order to obf uscate the t r ue motives o]
tho s tr uggle between Mao and Lin I' iao.
It is commo n knowl edge th at Mao began abusing,
dis torting, and Ial sif yi ug' l .u I ls uu' s pronouncements, and
usin u Lu Ilsun's name 10 promote hi s own rcacti onarv
aims: , a long time ago: ago, :lIl d es pec ia lly during
th e c ult ura l revul u tio n " , Mao d istort cd and fal si fied
Lu JIsun arbitraril y to at tac k people wh oru he wanted
to put o,ut of t h? wa y. Here is a sample of one cr ude
rn h IS t es tament , Lu Hsun said among ot he r
111 . Europe, when some one di es he usually per-
forms th? rit e of bogging th e forgiven ess of other s , and
also Iorgivos others. I have ma ny enemies .. , hut T f01'.
givc of t hem.': Jn Oct ob ?r 1966, a t n meeting on the
BOt h aunrvorsary of Lu Hsun s death, Chen Po -tu quoted
these words from Lu Hs un s t est a men t in h is concl ud ing
remarks, He adde d-eVide n tly on Mao 's hehalf: " I con-
s ider thi s. it \"CI'y important t estament left us by Lu
TIs u.n, whi ch we must never forget. " By del i beratoly di s-
torl lug' what Lu Hsun wrote, Ma o tri ed to create th e
the great writ er would not forgive those
r ev oluti onar- y lit erature and art worker s in sid e a nd out-
side th e Part y who harl opposed him in the di scu ss ions
of th e twenti es a nd thirties. But the f acts fr om Lu Hsuu's
l if e contra dic t this arbitrary interpretation,
I n th e thir ti e , in the Lea gue of Lef t-Wing Writers
Lu Hs un was closely associ a te d with th e r evolutionary
wr iters and arti sts who had opposed him in t' ) discus -
sions of th e twenti es. In 1932, in a forewor d to hi s Col-
lecti on of a Triple Loafer, he referred to th em with
warmth and gratitude. " T here is one thing for which
1 am for ever gra te ful to th e Creative Art Soc ie t y . It
s purre d me t o readi ng certain works on the science of
liter a t ure," Lu Hsu n wrot e. " This help ed me to di sp el
th e doubts which Iormor hi stori ans of li terat ure had de-
bated at su ch enormous l en gth that they create d st il l
greater confusi on. In doin g so, I transl at ed Pl ekhunov ' s
book, On th e Arts, in ord er t o rectify my mi stake and
also the mistake! of th ose who had s uffered because of lll L' -
the mistake of one-sided, all-absorbing fa ith in th e th eory
of evo lution," Jointl y with th e co nn-ados of t he Leagu e of
Left- Wing Writers" (with whom he had Callie t o grips
". The League of Lef t-Wing Writers, founded un der the di rec-
tion of the Cl'C, existed from 1930 to 1930, It brought tog ether
many writer s- some were Commu nists, some were out side the
Par ty, and all of the m were rovol uuo nnri es. In 1936 th e League
di ssol ved it self in connection wit h the omcrgence of the unit ed
nntioua 1 anti-Japauese front and the need Ior uniting the coun
try' s patriotic writers.
in a di scussion in the summer of 193tJ) , Lu Hsun signer!
a decl aration in earl y Octob er 1936, en t itl ed Declaration
of br oth ers in literatu re and art on unity for the sake of
resi sting aggr essi on and sec uring fr eedom of speec h.
Jointly with th em he fought the ene my. But for Ius un -
timely death on J9 October 1936, I.le would surely have
fought on for an anti-Japanese united front ar.t and
literature jointly with those who had opposnd him Ill . th e
discussions. Lu Hsun always di stinguished between Iriond
and foe. He is the very oppo site of Mao Tao-tung, wh o
liberately di storted Lu Hsun's testament and, IS
wor se used it as a pretext for persecuting revolutionary
wriLe;s and artist s, and th e vast of CPC leaders
and rank-and-file memb er's as encnues, .
One mor e example. Th e di scussi on th at er upted 1Tl t he
League of Left -\Ving Writors over t he .two sl ogans t':on-
cerning the establishment of anti-J apanese
front in art and literature, ended III tho summe r of 1G?!J.
Already then, taking guidance in the cor rect CPC poh.cy
of a united national anti-Japanese front, the adversarl.es
ani ved at til e concl usion that th er e was no essen t lal
differ enc e hetween the slogan "literature of national de-
fence" and th e sloga n "mass literature of national revo-
lutionary war ". Thi s was why in hi s " Reply
Il su Mao-yung on th e Question of th e Anti-J apanese Unit-
ed Front", Lu Hsun acknowledged the Heed for th e "co-
existence" of th e two slogans "inas much as th e s logan
"li ter at ure of nati onal defenc e' is highl y popul ar and is
kn own to many, and can increase our political and literary
influ enc e". The fact s of history show, ind eed, that in tho
political climate of that tim e th e slogan of
tional defence" was more in keapi ng With the task 01
building an ant i-Japanese united front in ar t and literature.
Thi s was why it won public approval ami was welcomed
by writers and arti st s. Slogans such as "poetr y and songs
of nati onal defence", " plays of national defence" , " Ii Irus
of nat ional defenc e", and th e like, were quickly put
forward.
In subs ta nce both slogans were based on document s
of th e CC CPC: Chou Yang and others of the CPC gr oup
in the League of Left-Wing Writers who advanced the
slogan, "li terat ure of national defence", in the beginning
of Hl3G, had taken it from the August First Appeal Lo
All Compatriots on Resistance to Japan and for the Sal-
vation of ;he Motherl and, publi sh ed on 1 August Hl35 by
.CC CI C t he Central Government of the Chinese
ovi et Hepu 1>1Ic to promote th e un it ed na tional ant'
fr ont. This Appeal adva nced the sloga ns of 0;=
yalllslll
g
an united government of na tional de-
an all- China anti-Japanes e un ion army
ie ugust 1< 11' 5t Appeal alId 't I " .
f . < I S S ogans govcrnment
r1 efence" and "anti-JapaneRe Union Ann "
a concrete plan for resol Ving the
pr obl ems of th e all-China united national
fr ont. Pro-J apanese tr ai tor Wang Ching-
WeI held that existence in China of different govern-
mel.1
ts
and a.rmlCs precl uded resist ance to Japan, while
Chia.ng exploited t hese circum-
to s ubs t a nt ia j « hi s own s loga n, "hefore resi st-
outsid e enemy we mu st put down internal
s u-ifo . Our : arty' s prop osal of an all-China united govern-
me.ll t of nat iuna ] defence and an all-China anti-Japanese
.al'mx destroyed these "e xcuses" and "s ub-
stantliltlOns , and gave th e peopl e of Chi na and all anti -
J and groups t he happ y perspective of
ending CIVil strife and .l aunching a joint str uggle agains t
the All of th em suppor ted the
August 1< II'St Appeal of th e CPC, and acted on it. This is
why, Loo, t!le slogan of "li terature of nationa l defence"
Won ext e? SIVe suppor t among writ ers and art ists.
vVhen"lIl 1936 Lu H un and oth ers advaneNI t he
Slogan, ma ss li terature of nationa l revoluti ona r y war"
were .guided by t he CC CPC appeal of 19
hOI Hl31, Issu ed afte r the Japanese OCCII pation of She n-
yang (Mukden) on 18 Se ptember, which called for a na-
tional rov.oluti o.na:y war by th e armed peopl e against
Japanese Imperi al ism. Th e 10 Se ptember appea l was di -
rected against Chian g Kai -shek's policy of non-r esi st-
ance. It was a mil itant app eal to th e Chinese peopl e to
launch an arm ed struggle against the Japanese imperia l-
ist aggressi on. Yet , as noted ea rlier, at tha t time our
Party had not yet for mul at ed th e policy of a united na -
ti onal anti-J apanese front directed to marsh alling all
anti-Japanese forces of China. Sloga ns furthe ri ng thi s
policy wer e first issu ed a littl e over four months lat er
during th e Sha nghai battl e against th e Japanese, wh ich
began on 28 JUlluary1932.
The fact s of history show that in th e condit ions creat-
ud by th e cont inuo us armed aggr ession of Japnnose im-
periali sm and Chi ang Kai-shek's an ti-commu nis t war it
wa s impossibl e to ca rry into effect the militant slogan
of an ant i-J a pa nese national r evolution ar y war, which
impli es unity of the whol e nation , in the absence of a
united national ant i-J a panese front poli cy , Faithful to
the Ma rxi s t-Leninist doctrine 0 11 nati on al r evoluti onary
wars, th e Communis t Part y of China fir st. called for an
anti-J apanese national r evolutionary war. Subs eque ntl y,
taki ng' guidance in Lenin' s theory on th o united nation-
al anti -imperi alist front, it worked out th e poli cy of a
united national anti-Japanese front. I n th e teeth of nu-
merous diffi culties, guided by th o Comintern and helped
by the COIll rnunist Party 0 r th e So vie t Unio n, it
se cured an end to tho war between the Kuomintang and
th e Communist Party, es tabli s hed cooper a tion with the
Kuomintang, a nd further ed nationwide r esi stance :to
J a pa nese ag gl'essi on, This wa s a vivid exa mple of
the Communist Party of China appli ed t he common prm-
ci pl es of Marxism-Leninism to th e conc re te condi tio ns
of t he Chinese revoluti on, Al so, it wa s a hi stori ca l se r vice
render ed by th e CPC to th e Chin ese nat.ion.
When during the eve nts of 18 September 1931 t he
Party issued the slogan of an anti -Japauese national rev-
olutionnry war, Mao was in on e of th e So viet area s of
China and learned about it only some time later. Dur-
i ng th e def ence of Shanghai against th e J apan es e in
HI:J2, we issu ed th e sl ogan : " Wor kers , peasants, soldiers,
st ude nts, intell ectual s, mer chants ! Unite Ior joint res ist-
ance t o J apan a nd fo r th e salvat ion of the Mother -
land! " Ther eupon, the CPC offere d " three conditions"
on which the Ch inese Reel Army was pr epill'eel t o con-
elude an agr eement of joint ar med ac tion against the
Japanese in vad er s with th e Kuornintang and any other
a rmed Ior ces. It advanced a s ix- point ac t ion programme
fOI' establishing a commi ttee for th e armed sel f- dcf'ouc c
of th e Chi nese people, l t suggest ed a nati onal united
front ag ainst Japan and Man chukuo, and was instrumental
in activating the Nor t heas t An l.i-J a pa nese Un ion Army,
It wa s in these documents and th e r el ated ac ti ons
that th e poli cy or a united nati onal anti -Japanese front
wa s gl'ad ually evolve d. In it s August First Appeal and
ot hol' documents , th e Party COl lSUlllll1a tcd t. bi s ba si c pol -
icy of resi stance to .I apan and salva Lio n of tIle Mother-
250
land. News of th ese d 1
until later. He was eit h:ve,opments di d not reac h Mao
on th e \Vestern March SoUl h0
11
1of th e Sovie t areas or
ll av e tu ken part in t h o ;ad taken no purl. nor
H13;:> that Mao mude 'his t w,as on 27 December
agains t .J apanese I eport on tacti cs of
wit b a. Central Commi ttee dec: i:lt Ism. Her e, compl yi ng
tl.1e um led nati onal anti-J11 ano on, h e first llJ elltione d
d1(1 not SUppo rt th e Cent t C se But his repor t
J,fl.panese unit v: Mao <; -t s poli cy of anti-
lin I' • , , se ar t I hi <; ow 1 f
e ( lrected aga inst Ihe Par l v's - , n e t-opportunis t
lh at th e r cnor t was not In d ' l' l y ohc
y
, .Slllal1 wond cr
D
· - a e pun IC t 'l 1(" .
eS{Jlte th e" e fact - f 1 ' uu I ) vears lat er
, :; 0 IIst OI' . . ' 0 c •
neSe pres.s published Ch ' CYh' ,Ill ," lDC() th e Chi-
te rence on Lit erarr; . tny mg' s Aotes on t he Con-
Thes e notes aI·I..J' l,l a ll( .I rt TVorh' in Ar1111/ ':.
" , It 0 ier d OCl . . ,.
further th e coun ter- revol utio published lat er to
deserihed the slogan "li ter at nary r r.\'olu ti on ",
vancod by Ch oi Y ure of nati oual defence" ad-
Aug ..· ust First ' ?bt her s 0:1 the basis of t he
1 i tl
' . , ou rgeOls "l ogan" 1 1
IlH e: ie mfluence of " Wan Min ' -, ' . . ac.opt e(
a unit ed national anti- J apane;e fr defeatist polIcy of
Hsun a nd others ha <; ed thc : The sloga n of Lu
desl:l'ihed as u o,n e
l
I f) Appeal was
l]
I
' c arran s ozau in k 'e . , 1 '
IO.Ug It s of 2\1 ao Tse- tun 1"" , e ping Wit 1 t he
ti 1 g on tI e poli cv of it d
JO lla an li-Japanese front", Th e ' ' . a uru e na-
slogans r f'l atl'n cr t o ant' J dISC. U5510n of the two
c 0 ,1- apanese ' t '
turu, which wa s amicahly se tt l ! .u
m
? III art and li teI' H-
Mao Tse-tun « now r esent e( lll. t t e of 1floG,
vocates ' f o"b P : s as a (hscu sslOn between "d-
. " <; " 0 a our geois ,;loga" I "
gan", and as a str u Ie - a slo-
oppor tunis t lin e ill gargt and I.ete n t Mlll g s ri ght-
, . c , I era ure : a I " :\1 T
tung 5 r evolutionar y l ine il l art and l ' t .' lI
t
( :, ao so-
1'1 Iar , . , I era ur e
Y
ie acts, which are also known t o M 0 : . Cl
ang and Lu Hsun ea ch ba sed ht sr a , ar o: I OU
docu ments of the CC crc b I IS on one of two
by ,.\ Vang Mi n z: the 1 , ot I of which wero \\Til t en
nmlat od by also
t ate to pr esent t he "1 9 S t b A ,.e t ung clId not h esl -
('ont a ins t he "logan of a
e p
er
l
ppea l of "1931, whi ch
" < na IOna revol u tio nary wa r , as
':' Thl' se .vol es of Chiang Chin d
,t1wL th l'y were t hr ice b a let ter by Lin Piao
In t.he Journ al H lln.gchi .'\u, 9, 1967. Y Mao Tsc-t un g. appeared
?,'1 '
his own correct line, and the August of
1935 and it s slogan of a government of national defe.lIce
as the "right-opportunist" line and slogan of Wang Ming.
Could anything be more ridicul ous? . ,
It is quite clear that by means of t his
Mao intends not only to elevate himself and dellve,r a
blow at Wang Ming, but also to portray the
ary writers and artists of the thirti es insid e and
the Par ty as opponents of Lu Hsuu' s and Mao Tsc-tung s
, • • 0 . " d 0 f 11 of "\ Vang
" li Lerary-ar tIs tIc line an as o. " 0 •
Ming's ri ght-opportunist literary-artistic hne , -and thi s
in or der t o line them u p for brutal persecution . ' 0 1
The gr eat est insult t o HS.llll is l\luo ' s
, of the zr cat writer III Iu s On New Democra cij ,
pr al s.e . l:> 1, H.)!10 Here Mao r ais ed Lu HSUll to
use the latter 's words in r efe,r-
the specious' praise of by those III
1
, M osthumously pr ocl aimed Lu Hsun a
aut iority. ao P f "1\'1 T .o-tunz' s literary-
" Mao ist" and an exponent 0 i V. ao" S H <> M in
artistic thoughts", By so , Lu
fact el evated himself , But Icaring s: ,peo
p'
d
. Hsui
, " 1' Mao mudo Lu sun s WI ow,
for .hls tric the meeting on th e 30th
h .uang-pllllf; dea th that " tho all-conqueri ng of
of her hus an s 1 eady then the supreme gUldmg
and all r evolutionar y literary
pnnci p es or u T se tun was tho reddest of the
and art worker s.., Mao s - H g " d so forth. Yet, as
r ed suns in t he heart of Lu Is un 'fanM Tse tung" did
1 "th ig Its 0 ao -
ev eryb?dy. knows
iI
Ie, and i t would not have
not exis t III LIl SUIll S It 0ln'pUl'C Mao with the sun .
. d t o anyon e t len 0 c < , , 1 .
OCCUfJe J 1974 Jenmi nj i hpao carried an ac vel -
On 11 anuary . diti n of the compl ete works
ti sement of a mistakes made in com-
of Lu Hsun, w llC I sa ' . I S edl'tl'on have been cor rec t-
' I' and diting the previot ' ,
pi mg <In e I di tion." The meaning is cl ear: Mao s
ed in th e present e I ffect t hat Lu Hsun's works
mouthpiece If :alsifl'ed to suit th e present
hav e been distor ted an , zrou 1 Everybody
d
f Mao' s counter- r evolut IOnary '=' I , 0 hli
nee sa·· M' is a ast master at gar mg
knows, after all" that, 1 the Pworks of other people,
and doct oring a nn . I it L Hs un's name in
Tse-tung is trying to exp 01 u . hi
1 ao '; d L Hsun's works as tools III us
his own interests an u • 1 1 of
0' ' Ve Chinese Communists and t 10 peop e
Intrlgup,s.
n oo
China must save Lu Hsun and his works from th e diu.
bolic clutch es of Mao Tse-tung.
To save r evolutionary Lu Hsun from th e bl oodstained
hands of counte r- re vol ut ionar y Mao Tse-tung is als o the
du ty of all the true admirers of the gre at wr iter . On
the on e hand, we must expose the wil y devi ces of Mao
Tse-tung, who abuses th e name and works of Lu Hsun:
on the ot her, we must acquaint people with the true
Hsun, the revolutionary writer. \ Ve must help th e mass
of th e people t o understand th at Lu Hsun's main distinc-
t ion, earned him fame as a r evolutionary writer,
wa s that in t ho late twenties and early t hir ti es he opted
once and for all for fri endship and cooperation with the
Communist Party of China and with the Soviet Union .
He fought by their side, defended th eir interests, and
at t acked their enemios wit h his sharp pen. And inasmuch
as Mao has become an enemy of th e CPC, he is also an
enemy of Lu Hsun, and for this reason is trying t o con-
ceal the truly remarkable accomplishments of the gre at
writer.
Lu Hsun fought shoulder to sho ulder with t he Com-
munist Party of Chi na against th e anti-commu nis t abom-
inations and "extermination ca mpaigns" of t he impe-
rialists and of Chiang Kai -sh ek. He support ed th e CPC
policy of a unit ed nati onal ant i-J ap anese front th at wa s
being or ganised for an anti-Japanese na ti onal revolution-
ary war, In 1933, in a foreword t o t he Complete W orh's
of Li Ta-cha o, Lu Hsun r eferred to Li 'Fa-chao' s ci vic
funeral or ganise d by the people of Pei ping ,;- in the fol-
lowing t er ms: " I t was an entirely ju stified ceremony. "
Of Li Ta-chao's literary l egacy he said that it would
"live ete rnall y, hecause it is a brill iant monume nt t o
the histor y of the revolution". In 1936, paying tribute t o
tha memory of Tsyui Tsyu-po, Lu Hsun pu blis hed a two -
volume collection of Tsyui Tsyu-pos translations. writ-
ing a for ewor d for eac h volu me and paying homag e t o
his comr ade ,
But wh at did we see lat er ? Mao used armed force t o
crus h the Comm unist Party of China. He massacred
countless Communi st s, He cons igne d t he works of Li
Ta-chao and Tsyui Tsyu-po t o the flames. He dug up
and desecrat ed the graves of the t wo revolutionaries.
* Peking was then known as Peiplng,
?Sll
Theil' r elatives -e-Li Ta-chao' s son Li Pao-hua, and Tsyui
Ts vu -po' s widow Yang Chih-hua -have been brut all y
maltrea t ed. If Lu Hsun had heen alive today, he woul d
surely ha ve sai d t o Mao: You have commit te d more vil-
l aini es th an Chiang Kai -shek and all the known nati onal
t raitors combi ned; even they had not managed to r e-
press so many Communists ; even t hey h ad not dar ed t o
desecrat e th e graves of Li Ta-cha o and Tsyui Tsyu-po.
\Vhat you have don e is an in sult t o el ementary Ch in ese
mor alit y.
Lu Hs un joined ba ttl e again s t th e ir n per ialist warmon-
ge rs. He angrily exposed imperialist slande r against the
So vie t Union. IIl an arti cle, Never Again Shall W e Be
Deceived, which appeare d in HI:) 2, he wrote: " The i m pe-
rl al is ts want to make war on th e ussa. The more suc -
ce ss fully th ings go with the USSR, the grea ter their wi sh
t o at tuck and th e mor e S II rel y they head for a fall. " To
explai n why Imperialist s slande r t he Union
ar c poi sed to al. l nck it , Ln Hsun wrot e:. are g Ol1l g'
t o seed. They can bar el y keep on th eir fee t. Th ey are
trying t o save th emselves, and hat e th e progress . of the
Soviet Uniou. Neit he r slu uders, nor curses, nor invoca-
ti ons, nor venomous hat red can hel p th em. The only
thi ng th ey ca n do is t o prep are for an
Th ov will not r est until th ey crush t he USSR. Thi s
wOll'lel also he a tr ue descr-ipti on of Mao' s att it ude t o the
Sovi et Union if we added "and Mao Tse-t ung after the
word " imperial ist s" 0 1' s ubs ti t uted " Mao Tse-tuug" 1'01'
" imper ial is ts" . In the same ar ticle Lu Hsun explai ned
what the attitude of th e Chi nese people should he t o-
wards a war agai nst t he USSR. He wrot e: II f f t he me-
ni al s of imper ia li sm wi sh to go t o war, l et them follow
thei r masters. W et the people, h ave ent iroly di ffer ent in-
t erests than theirs. We are against attacking the USSR.
On the contrar y, we wa nt to over thro w and dest r oy t he
demon who wants t o att ack the uss n, no matter how
h oneyed hi s speech or how nobl e th e mask behind
he hid es. This and only this is our .road to. sal va tion.
Mao Tso-tung has become a men ial of Impel'l all sm.
He is itc hing to attack the USSR. Yet th e t houghts of
t.he Chinese people on thi s score are t he same as LIl
Hsu n' s : "overth row and destroy the demon who wa nts
1<.1 attack t he USSR" bccuuse " Lhis and only this is our
roiul to salvat ion".
260
The Ch in ese Communists have always treated Ln
Hsun and hi s works with loving car e aild conc ern. i n
the CC CPC trusted L u II sun with the ol fico of
of th e of Left -Wi ng Writers. From Jul y
to J a nu ary 1D.i 4. , Tsyui Tsyu- po, who had a sol-
l.d lit erury background much experience, hel ped oi-
l the League on the instr uctions of the Central Com-
mill ee: In HJ:14 he was se n t t o the Sovi et areas of Chi-
n a. with th e grou p in th e League, he helped
Hsun. III matt ers of Ideol ogy an d politics , and also i n
Iu s practical work. In the la te s pring and ea rlv summer
of HI3/j, on learning fr om Ern i Siao t hat Lu II sun wa s
gra vel y ill, I asked Georgi Dirnitrov to invite him t o
t.'w Soviet Union for treatment. \ Ve sent Pan Ha n-ni cn
fr on.1 Moscow t o Shanghai to arrange for Lu Il sun and his
famil y t o come to the Soviet Union. Pan Han-m en made
all th e arrangemen ts hu t un For tunat el y Lu II suns health
had deteri orat ed and he was unabl e t o make th e lonz
journey . When he died on 2.1 October 1931i , I
an obi t uar y in the name of th e Communist P art y of
Chi na, "Sad Loss of t he Chinese Pe op le". for th e ta«.
k uoshipuo, a weekly appearing in Pari s. ':. And at a
public meeting in Chungking on 19 Oct ober 1939, I
spoke on be!lalf of CC CPC on til e :lr d anniversary
of Lu Hsun s death.r" I referred t o Lu Hsun and his
works in gl owing terms. ca ll i ng on writ er s and artists,
a nd on youth, to learn fr om Lu Hsun and hi s wor ks the
spirit of r evoluti onary s tr uggle, and to redouble thei r
contr ibution to th e r esi st ance t o J apanes e aggression.
There is nothing in common between tile at tit udes
towards Lu Hsun of the Chi nese Communi sts and of
Ma o Tse-tung. For us Lu Hsun is a comr ade -in-an us and
hi s works not on ly a pr eci ou s literary l egacy. hut also
H wea pon furthering the r evolutionary ca us e. Ma o, (I ll
the ot her hand, us es LIl Hsun's name and works to dis-
gui se his coun ter-revolu tionary tri cks. He " idoli zes " Lu
Hsu n. making him an object of bli nd worship. l l o al so
" idoli zes" th e works of Lu JIsun, trying t o turn th em
illto dogma for se nseless exe rc ise. He does thi s in ord er
.;. A Chinese-language weekly published in Paris by the CPC
dele gati on to th e Comint ern with the help of th e Comintern
leadership. Wang was it s editor-in-chief.
. I,,,· Th e full text of this speech appeared all th e Ioll owinc day
111 th e Hs inh ua j thpao, appe aring in Chungking. .,
') ' I
to be able to use, distort, an d fal sif y Lu Hsun' s sayings
and views, and t o ' pr event anybody from eve r daring to
question anything.
This is why it is so vital for China today to under-
stand Lu Hsun, We must squash the vile intrigues of
Mao Tse-t ung, who tries to use Lu Hsun and his works;
for r eactionary ends by "idolizing" him. We must see-
to it. that every time Mao exploit s the name of L11 Hsun
to di sguise his own reactionary vi sage people should
be abl e cl early to di stinguish truth from untruth and
see where Mao ab uses, dist orts, and fal sifies the great
wri ter.
Mao ' s treatment of Lu I-Isun only shows that Mao i s
an inveterate pragmatist and an exponent of subject ive
idealism, the most reactionary of all philosophical
sch ools.
q) " Criticis m of Lin Piao and Confuciu s"
and th e fate of the " Ione desp ot"
We have already shown t hat Mao praises Chin Shih
Huang in order to praise himself, that he berates Con-
fucius in order to vindicate per secutions, and that he
abuses Lu Hsun's name for hi s own r eactionary ends.
Not onl y is this a part of th e pre sent ruthless " criticism
of Lin Piao and rectification of s tyle" campaign, but al-
so a preparatory measu re for a second "cultural r evolu-
tiou", The idea that "cul tur al r evoluti ons will have to
be carri ed out many times in the future" has been of-
ficially recorded in the " par ty constitution" adopted by
the Maoist 10th Congress. The re por t to Congress on
this "cons t it uti on" said that carrying out " cultural re vo-
lutions" every seven or eight years is "an obj ect ive l aw
as revealed by Chairman Mao". The " documents of the
IOth Congress" and the joint New Year 's edi Lorial of
the "Maoist three newspapers and one journal" sai d:
" There is great di sorder in the whole of the earth", "a
deluge is ab out to break out in the mountains" and
"gales are bl owing through th e house" . Yes, gales have
already begun to - ra ge in Peki ng, Nankin g, and ot he r
Chinese cities .
On 12 J anuary '1974 the Jenmi nj i hpao announce d on
it s Iront pa ge: "The l etter and extr ac ts fr om the di ary
of Huang Shuai, the red guard gi rl from School No. J of
th e Peking subur b of Chungkuangchun, and an aft er-

of the edito rs, which were publish ed in Jenmin-
[ihpao and Pefchingj ihpao, have aroused deep feeling
among and teachers of secondary ' and primary
schools 11l P.ekIng; and also among the public at large;
have given Impetus t o the unfolding cr it icism of
.Plao and .r ect ification of s tyl e, cri t icism of r evi -
s .ornsm, and crt t ici sm of the bOllrgeois wor ld outlook' fur
thermore, t hey have helped to pr omote the In
th e ed uca ti onal field. "
It Was cl ear t o one and all that th e so-ca lle d letter
and extracts from th e diary of Hu ang Shuai, in which
s he compla in ed of being ill -treated by her t eacher, wer e
.a. to in cite a campa ign against " re-
VlsIOl1l SIIl III education. The paper att acked s uch "ana -
chronism" as " t he incontestable authori ty of the t each-
er", m.ental edu cati on ", and "the syste m
of examinat ions . ThI S was mea nt t o lead to th e foll ow-
ing conclusi on: th e qu estions raised by Huang Shua i
are not qu estions concerning an individual a school or
the rel ati onship between t eacher and pup'il ; th ey (;on-
c er n the struggle bet ween two classes, two li nes, a nd
"the struggle against r evisionism and for Lhe preven tio n
of r evi si onism" .
The Jenminj i hpao announce me nt was r emini scent of
Mao' s manoeu vr es prior to launching t he Iirst "cul t ural
revolution" : they di ffered only in par t iculars. I t w a s
natural t o expect, therefore, that he would soon shift
hi s attack from secondary an d pr imar y schools to the
lligher schools, and then from the educa tiona l field t o
Party, gov ernment an d mili t ary organs as a pre text for
's t epping up th e "criticism of Lin Pi ao and r ect ification
-of style" and starting a second "cul tura l r evolution".
As expec ted, on 18 Januar y th e l enminjihpao published
on its front page t he "Application for Rel ease from
Study" of one Ch un g Chih-ming, a Nanking Unive rs ity
.st udcnt, son of an old military cadre , wi th editorial com-
m ents. This ser ved not ice that the "st r uggl e between
two cla sses and t wo lines" , th e " str uggl e agains t r evi-
sionism and for the prevention of revi si onism" , and the
like, would spread from higher schools to the army, Par-
ty, governmen t, and other areas. Clearly, a second "cul-
tural revolution" was imminent.
The mudslinging in Mao' s anti-Sovi et pro pa gand a has
<of lat e been accompanied by suc h infl ammaLory anti-
263
Soviet acts as the arrest and maltreatment of Soviet
lomats and me rn beT' S of their famili es hy Peking securi ty
agen ci es. Or de rs had corne fr om " high up" , and worked
as As on 2 F ebruary 197!l the
ca rried an edito rial, "Carry Out t o th e End Cri t i-
cism of Lin Piao and Confucius". Judging hy gro ss-
ness and t one of authority it must hav e been or
r evi sed by Mao hims elf. In effect, i t was ,?ffiC.IDI a n-
nouncemcnt of a second "cu lt urul r evolul1? n " with the
slogan of "c r- it icls iug Lin. Pi ao a,nd Confucius , and. one
mor e of Mao' s declara tIOns of war on the Chinese
Communi st s and t.h e peopl e of China. "
' In its passag e the edito r ial declared
th e personal init ia tive a nd under the per son al e
of Tse-tu ng "a mass pol iti cal , struggle I S
1 I
. I ' , 11 fi'el ds t o cri t ic ise Lin PIao and Confucius .
a unc leI 111 a ' . " I Il ow f
Abus e wa s hea ped on Lin for a 0 ower 0
Confucius to th e marrow of Ins . ')',
'1'0 "s ubstantiate" the conne ct ion between Lin Piao
. ', . C f' . , ring ke
and Con fu cius, the editor ial ci ted on ucm.s Sa\1ll ,
isi fu li (self-impro vement in accordunce with eti que t te }
"show" that Confucius wanted " to res tore the
. svstein" and Lin Pi ao wanted " to r est or e capi-
ownIng.. c I . ,' ,
t Iism ' j' he whol e thinz is a crude and c uuisy I11S111 Ucl -
Til e Maoist r eport. t o the 10th
clearly that it is none ot her Mao se-tull
t
g
. di ', 1' I and III fact wants 0
who opposes buil ing SOCIa isn (, k 'f hi sl '
, I t L· ck th e clock 0 11:-> ory .
r est or e ca pit al is m ant urn uc . . . t t o
Thereullon t he ar ticle enumerated sevefn C
P
· "foll ower 0 on u ,1 '. .
"1T'OVe" that Li n iao was a .' I
I I I d et out t o cr i ticis e Lin Pino am
Inasmuc 1 as 1, ao la s . P ' . . . ' I
Confucius t ogeth er and to
I I d we re based on t ie saving ' I
aile c ee s . 1 f I gic l et alone th e scientifiC meth ?l ,
elementary I U es 0 0 , , ' . f Confuc ms
r equired him t o cite the 0 , f ' . to
, 'I even points WIth a precise re erence .
Oil each of l l e
l
sl nzside give th e re levant wO I'(I s or dee ds
the source, anr a 0 '" .'I . the
fT' Piao also with corroboraLmg evir once, on .
a ..1ll c , c. ' \ S This would have enabl ed th e reade r
samle se ven and a rrive at th e du e conclu si on s.
to c raw compall . " . 1 M . ly one of
. Yct in the se ve n " pr oofs giv en )':1 I ao, on . t his
. 1 1 C Iu cius and eve n Il S
t.he .phrus es ,,:a5 spo ? h sho w 'i' he "quo-
phrase Mao mi squot ed , as S a
tations" in the other six poi nts wer e no t fro m Confuci us .
This is why Mao does not provide any pre cise da ta as
t o wher e and what Confucius said, and t ries to misl ead
peopl e with offhand " refer ences" , su ch as " Confuc ius
and Mellg-tsu maintained", "Con lucius awl l\leng-
tsu preached", and " t he followers of Confucius and Menc-
t su" said or did.; <>
One can only wonder how Mcug-t su, WIIO was bor n
107 ye ars a ft er Confuc i us ' death, could "maintain " or
" preach" t oget her with Confucius. As 1'01' I he " followers
of Confucius and Mcn g-t su" , there wer e cou ntl ess num-
bers of t he m in the past 2.500 years. and it. would be
l egi timat e to ask wh ich of them Mao had in mind.
Though. a ll th e same, whoever they may be, they cannot
speak for Confuciu s himself.
Th e el ementary demands of scie nti fi c logic-e- to be oh-
jcct ivc a nd specifll:- rcqui re th at only word s spoken by
Confuc iu s himself sho uld be r ef CITed t o Confuci us. Nei-
th er those of :\[png-t sll nor th ose of any other foll ower
of Conf uci us CHII be l egit ima tely ascribed to Con fucius.
Following the rleuth of Confuci us the 1II 0l'e than 70 of
hi s best discipl es broke IIp int o se ve ral gro u ps, eac h of
whi ch had it s own int erprel ati ons for muny of Confu-
ci us' sayings. In shor t, Confucius and Merig-t su s ho uld
not be heaped t ogether . Th e Iat l ers words should on 110
account be ascr ibed to th e former. Be si des, ou t of th e
Seven " proofs" put forward by Ma o on ly one and a ha lf
sente nces reall v belong to ;\[eng-tsu and . fu rt hcrruore,
th eir int erpret at ion is dubi ou s,
I n the first part of ea ch of t he seven poin ts Mao fab-
ricated sayings, ascr ibed th em t o Con f ucius, and inter-
preted (h em t o s uit hi s ends. In t he second pa rt of each
point he falsifi ed Lin I'i ao' s words and al so guve them
hi s own interpret ati on. It is clear at the vory first gla nce
t hat th e wh ol e th ing was an in venti on to promote
" crit icis m of Lin Piao and Confucius ". One canno t hel p
no ting. moreover. t hat i II SOllie of his references to Lin
Pial' . Mao unconsciousl y admitted that in the matt er a t
hand Lin Pia a opposed hi s opinion.
Now l et us cons ider each of Mao's se ven fabricat ed ,
poi nts. .
Point One. Mao maintains that Conf uci us an d Me ng-
tsu pr each ed " knowl edge from birth". Ther e is a varie ty
of r ecor ds on thi s scor e in the Analects, bu t in so fa r as
Confucius is concerned, he said tho very opposite. Take
the Analects, 8; "Shu Erh", 7. There it says in so many
words:
" Confucius said: ' I am not one who possesses knowl-
edge fr om hirth, but one who acquired it throu gh lily
lov e of an tiqui ty and dili gence in learning'. "
Ma o also sa ys, " Confuci us and Mcng-tsu adver tised:
'If vou want t o govern the stale with success, then who
el se' bu t me is ther e among the contempora ries capable
of doing it' ?" Confucius never said nnything of the sor t.
Besides' this se nte nce by Men g-tsu is in compl et e. Befor e
lIe uttered the above, he said: " Heaven did not wish
the st at e t o be governed with suc?,ess", and the: eupo.n
he said: " ' Vhy am I downh ear'l ed ? Mcn g-tsu
as he wa s l eaving th e slat e of Chi, where his apphcatlOn
for an official post had been turned down. A man by th e
name of Chung Yu, whom he met on the way, had asked
him why he looked so sad. Uttered in La Chung
Yu, Mong-tsu's words connoted
fidence, but not that he tntan ded going anywhere t o
ern th e state with success", let al on e seize power . Yet
Mao ju ggles words t hat he ascribes to Confucius, and
distorts th e meaning of the words spoke n by
to accuse Lin Piao of expounding a "theory of iutell ec-
tual genius" and call ing hims elf "extr.a-noblo' ''. and.
like. Mor e, he porlrays this l ine as s
" anti -par ty theoretical programme and It as
proof of a "cons pir acy to usurp the party and pow-
er, and an at te mpt at Imposlng hi s personal
ship" . This is Lruly a case of lying without a of
consci enc e. The fa cts show that the man wh o thinks
himself a " genius", " gre at", "exceptional " and. "su per-
human", who invente d an "anti-par ty th eor eti cal pro -
gramme ", who h at ch ed " a conspiracy t o usurp th e p.arty
and seize powe r" , and who imposed hi s di cta-
torship. is none other than Mao Tse-tung
Po int T wo. The se ntenc e Mao quoterl , the hi gh es t
wi sdom and th e lowest folly cannot ch ange into one anot h-
er ," was, indeed, spoke n by Confucius. But Ma o either
misunder st ood or deliberately garble d it s meaning. Ac-
cor ding to a note by Kung An-kuo to "Yang R o" in the
Analects, it means: "T he highest wi sdom cannot he made
to br eed evil any mo re than the l owest foll y can be
forced to becom e virtuous." T he sen tence was spoken by
to exp la in wh y he did not want to meet ta-
fU. 1.aug What he" is that Yang Ho ca nnot
fOI co Confucius of the highest wi sdom" to h t
tc ' I I I e a par y
rIo evi c p-ec"s any mor e .,t han Confu cius can mak e Yang
. of t he lowes t fully t o become virtuous under the
Jllj]uence of othe rs . K ung A n-k uos nol l' is unqucsf ioua hl r
correct, he as sociated the saying wi th th«
of t he words of the t al e: " Ya ng- Ho wi sh ed to
but Conf ucius did IlI)t wan t to
him." ...... . -
. Yet Mao des crtbed th e phrase as an " idealis tic view
ol} he a bout tI.l e luzhest wisdom and th e lowest fo l-
ly • claiming tha t It expre ssed contempt for toil er s. This
shows that the row of ancient books 0 11 Maos book-
no mor e than a di spl ay of spurious "scho lar-
ship designed to dec eive workers, peasants, soldiers . and
th e Eit her he has not ser ious ly r ead t he first of
th e an.cIent books, the Analects, or has fail ed t o und er-
s tand It.
Point Thr ee. mai nt ains : " Confucius and Mcng-
t su pr each ed humanity, ho nesty, loyal t y and
conc er n for others . All t hese are di stinct ethical con-
cepts, not Confucius' sayin gs . Yet Mao uses hi s conten-
tion to " prove" that Lin Piao "opposed rcvol utiouarv fo rce
and opposed dic ta tor ship of the proletariat". Hcfhere-
by. admitted that Lin Pi ao opposed t he bru-
t alit y of Mao s counter-revolutionarv " cultura I revolu-
tion" and Mao's reactionary on e-man military-te rror ist
over Communists and working people .
Point Four. Mao says that Confucius and Menz-tsu
" propagated' the chungyung principle. ,:.,:. ,:. ::. As we
T'ahsu eli (Groat Learning) and Chunginuig (Doc t rine of
the Mean) wer e pa rts of Li Chi (Record of Rit es ) . In
the Sung dynasty, Chen Hao and Chell Yi describe d
fr om th e Record of Rit es as the " l egacy of Con-
fUCIUS in order to combat Buddhism an d Lao Tse. Lat-
P.I', Chu Hs i i ncorpor at ed Chungyung fr om t he R ecord
of Rites with t he Analects, MencillS and the Doctrine of
., Tal l/- ancient titl e of a feu dal cour tie r.
., .•,. For details see A.nalects, 20; ..Yang TI o". 1T,
';""" Judgi ng fI:om rec ent photogr aphs in the Jell III tni iltpao,
Mao I'CCC1Ves for eign guests against the background of book-
and a desk piled high with ancie nt books.
-f".,., Cllllngyung-the golden mean.
the Mean to The Four Books. Thereafter peo-
pl e to t he chungyung princip le as 'h eing
Confucian. Neither Confucius nor Mcn g-t su ever pr opa-
gated any chungij ung principle .
The " . t " 1- . 1
,, '" arg.umen : icr e is la sed on Confucius' phrase:
• S ITlCC anc ie n t times, ch. un guung as the perfect vir tue
IS ver y rarel y obser ved by peopl e. " ':. This was cer t ainly
no for peopl e to observe ch ungij ung, On the con-
Lrary, t WH S H stat ement of fnet: people ver y r arel y acte d
a; l'ordmg to chu ng ij ung 0 1' had comple tely abandone d it.
)' e l Mao names c ]lll ngYll n g as Ih e re nsun wh y Lin Piao
evidently opposed hi s conduct in " t he str uggle against
r evi si oni sm" for being "excessively extre me" . Her e Mao
unwilli ngl y admits Lhat in some thi ngs Lin Pi ao dis-
a greed with his candidly pro-imperi ali st and rabidly reac-
ti onary a nti-Sovie t for ei gn poli cy .
i 'oint Fi ve. Mao maintains that " Confuc ius and Meng-
tsu pr each ed a philosophy of life that amo unte d to ' swal -
l owing ins ults Ior th e sake of success''' . Neither Con fu-
cius nor Mcng-t su ever preach ed any suc h ph ilosophical
concept. To " pro ve" that Lin Pi ao foll owed thi s " phi los-
ophy", Mao Inbri cat ed the stor y of his borr owing LWo
lines of ver se fr om the popular classic novel. The rT hree
Kingdoms: "Compelled for lile t ime being to dwell in
th e den of the tiger" and " dlsc rotion a nd a qui ck wi L-
th ose arc t he mi racl es one ca n tru st. " ' l' herebv Ma o ad-
mit ted t ha t as close a n in timat e of hi s liS Lin 'Piao, who
had constantly been by hi s side, felt th at " to be in the
compa ny of t he monarch was like being with a tiger" ,
and that. for this reason , he had had to net up to Mao,
r-olvi nz on " discr eti on and a quick wit" lest t his fl'ro-
cio'us t iger devoured him. If thi s wa s the case with Lin
Piao, then what could be sa id of t he other s'?
Point Six . Mao maintains th aL " Conf uci us and Meug-
t su pr each ed : ' The ment al worker governs people, the
manual worker is governed by peopl e' . " Thes e words
bel on g to Men g-t su, not Con Iuoiu s.
Here Mao tri es to find th e reason wh y Lin Pi ao opposed
the May Seven th Cad re Sc hoo ls for bein g "
a
vari ety of
concent ra t ion camp", " han ish me ut of cadres to t he lower
depth s for manual l nb ou r ", "a vari ety of unempl oy-
ment", "banishment or youth to mountains and vi l l ages
' f A nalects, 7; "Yun Yi", 6,
for re-educat ion by forced la bour" I .
Ma o also uIlwi ttingl v admits th a ' like, Ther eby
per seeuti on of and tl L t Lin PIaO opposed th e
yo uth-whi ch are i ;ld'eerl Ll'allSrorta tioll of educa te d
by cver vb odv ' , cr imes l rat made Mao ha te d
) . ' ..
I oint Seven. Mao mainta i ns tl " J '
Con fuci us and Men g Isu J I·L
I
ra t I ie follo wers of
' I . • -.. a io I S l ed one 1 Ir d
wOI's ill PIWd onlv Coufuoinm " U re schools
;ng to do wit h Confuci us has vo
t h-
iundrsd schools and wor ship of C· f ',')O I IOn a one
11
' . ' on Hems 0 I " I,
Ie Ii mes 01 Emper or I l un "r T ' Y n y dat e to
en Conf uci u<; ' " J' " , lJ " I. et u n dru- Poi n l :::;I.. y-
, - I , C largc( WIth th e manlier of T • •
mont passed down before hi s deat h bv Cho ,' \T gO' PI li-
to \\' u-\Van " An 0 I • U en- wan g
tation l ':. g .. 1 tragcous sample of mi srepresen-
As we see, Mao re sor t s here to till I . .
more ill it era ta '111(1 -uu ba s I c umsier. st ill
n , , I mor e razen f · lsif t.i
fabr i,ca ted by him t hr ee yea'rs
cu l led OUtJlIlP. of Project " 571 " . , lJl ic so-
Tse-tuug, a past mas ter at sla nde r ing a nd lvin
has, Ind eed, r each ed to th e bottom of tho t I y i n g'
Tl C· . lC!. l're .
,Ie on f,uc lUs . who is heing cr it icised bv Mao is
sown invention . and cer t ainly not t he C f
And the Li.n Piao who is bei ng cr it icised
I S a! so an d not the real Li n P ia o. h fol-
.thaL Mao S i nt ent ion to "CIIl'l'Y out to tl I 1
cr i tic f L ' Pl Ie one t ill
. .icism O I,n HIO and Confuc ius" is an int ent ion to
t he ,LIll Piuo and Confuciu s Mao had h i mscl f
a Could there be anything funnier a nr l 111M'"
cyulca r ' Y
Ma ? iu it i ut ivc' and is "pcrsouul-
ly .t he of "cri ticising Lin Pian and
Confucius , III :vlli ch ele mentary respect. justice and de-
an: conspicuous by their absence, and this not on ly
to di sguis e the true conte nt of the pol iti cal clash be-
tween Mao aIH' Lin Pi ao, but also to be abIe t o use the
la bels "Conf ucianist" and " followe r of Li n Piao" to per-
sec ute peopl e in t he second "cultural rev olution" . I n the
"second cultural revol ution" Mao in tends to get rid of
those wh o are obs tr ucti ng th e ex treme reacttonarv home
and for ei gn poli cy of t he LOth Congress, that is, t hose
". Chou Wen-wan died in t 135 B. C.; Confuc ius was born in
531 B. C.
who .he thinks are obstructing th e per petuation of hi s
r eacti onary rul e, his intention t o l eav e his "t hrone" to
Ching and create a " family empire", t he prepa-
r ati ons for war agains t the USSR and inc itement of a
new world war , and his coll us ion with extreme react ion-
ary imperi ali st groupings . For th e imperi ali sts and for
t raitor Mao Tse-tung, all Marxists-Leninists and expo-
nent s of pr ol et ari an inter nati on ali sm, all anti-imperial-
is Ls and fr iends of soc ialis m, all r evol ul ionari es and vet -
erans of r evolut ionary wars, all peopl e who disti nguis h
between fri end and foe and wh o possess kn owledg e and
a r evolutionary outlook, all intellectual s and pr ogressive
youth - all t hese are mortal enernies "subject t o sup pres-
sion",
Th is is why Mao' s edi t or ial portrayed his " cri t icism
of Li n Piao and Confucius" as a "ser ious cl ass st ruggle"
and a " radical r evolu ti on in the field of ideology". There-
up on, he thr eatened: "activeness or passiven ess is th e
t est of every lead er in so colossally important a mat ter
as the cr iti cism of Lin Piao and Confucius" , adding that
" only with struggle ca n we advance; withou t s truggle
th ere can be on ly retreat, without str uggle t here ca n he
onl y di sl ocati on , without struggle th er e can he only re -
vi si oni sm", Then he demanded: " Le aders at all l evel s
mus t he in t he for efront of th e s truggl e; they must re-
gard t he critici sm of Lin Piao and Confucius as a mat-
ter of paramount importance, a nrl give it t he ir para-
mou nt attention."
At th e end of t he articl e Ma o issued this stri ct in s tr uc-
ti on : revolu ti onary cadres and th e r ewlillti onary intelli-
zentsia mu st t ake an active part in th is st r uggle . and
diligently to re mould their worl d outlook. Those
in t ellectua'ls who are " re lative ly strongly contami nat ed
wit h Coulucius and Meng-ts u mu st eng age in self-
ed uca tion" .
Thi s amount s t o an ult imatum for " ever y lead er",
" leaders at all levels", "revoluti0l111r y cadres and t he rev-
olut ionarv inLelligentsia", and " those in t ell ectuals who
arc rel ativelv st rongly contaminate d with Conf uc ius and
,,' dO" " "t l d" t o "be in the
Mcnz-tsu ' t o stan t ests , 0 r cmouic' , 1
'" I " 0. " . If d
[or ehont of t he str ugg e ,an t o engage III se -e uca-
li on", Thos e who have li ved throu gh t he "style r ectifica-
ti on campaign" and t he "cultural r evolution" k now t hat ,
s poken by Mao Tse-t ung , t he wor ds " te sts", " be in the
forefront of the struggle" " re mo uld " and " .
il f 0. . ., ' ,engage III
-e ucat ion , mean that th ov are beinc declared s b
Ject to d . . • '" c , lI-
. enunciat ion, persecution. impri sonment Iloz
g mg, banishment,. and death, These words'
?1Jlhons of Communi sts, revolut ionary worker s t he
and yo uth,. must prepare th emselves' for
mora l t orment and physical suffering "bitt t ear I
11 d
" d ' er em s anr
) 00 : an . that many of t hem will die .
• s eth tor.ia l "The broad mass of workers. peas-
a.nd soldi ers IS main force in the cr iticism of
Pl ao and , adding that they "know best
of all how to crrticise Lin Piao and Con fuc ius" 1'1' ·
" . I I "1 " lIS was
s alt recause I ' ao kn ows that t he vast maj orl tv (If wor k-
ers, peasants and soldiers haw little or no knowl edze
of Confuci us and hi s teaching. So, those of them who do
Ma o' s bid ding ca n berate none but the Conf uci us Iabri-
by and the Li n Pi ao Iabrlcat cd by Mao, All
t his . 1S not hing but s leight- of-hand: wit h one hand Mao
fa.Jmcat es a fal se Lin Pi ao and a false Confuci us, and
with the other he directs people to revil e t hem,
. Judging Mao has of late been devoting
himsel f to training and arming a " mili t ia", Now. he
h as "militia" from under the charge of
gle mil it ary t o t he charge of the Maoi st
pal:ty and " revolutionary committees" . In
Shanghai. Wuhan and ot her cit ies
.1l1 11l tl amen . have already begun t o perform th e func-
ti ons of poli cemen. It is repor ted th at Mao i nt e rul s to
"Use th em as storm-troopers in tho second "cult ur al r ev-
ol,ut ion" against Party and military cad res, and cadres
1Jf government organs, mass organisat ions and educa-
tioual Ther eupon, he wi ll gr aduall y
convert them into regul a!' troops t o repl ace th ose PLA
unit s whi ch st.i II hav e s trong re volu tiona ry tradi tions .
I t has heen r eported th at in Shanghai the so- ca ll ed
mil itiamen have already begun putting up tat siipaos
newspapers) and holding s t reet-corner meet ings.
Pek ing ne wsp apers have published phot ographs of tat-
su paos stigmatising "class enemies". In Pcki nz an d many
other cit ies so-calle d rallies ar e held "to c; i ti cise
Piao an d Confucius". In ot he r words, 1\10.0 has already
s ent hi s stor m-t rooper" into t h o s tr-aats t o st a rt a second
" cul tural revolution".
2/1
Mao describes hi s counter-revolutionary acLi ons as a
di spla y of " t he revolutionary s piril, that boldl y goes
against the curr ent" and as " a march to meeL s torm
and tempest" . Documents of th e Mao ist i Oth Cong ress,
t oo, urge " going boldl y against the c urr ent " ,
\ Vhat is this " curr ent" referred to by Mao and tho
Maoist. LOth Congress? It is tho r evolutionary current
un exampled in volume which has arisen in th o hearts
of t he millions of Chinese Communists and the many
hundreds of mi lli ons of Chinese ag ui nst til e counter-
revolution ary thoughts of Mao Tao-tung, th o coun te r-
revo lutionary rule of Mao Tse-t u ng, and t he counter-revo-
lutionary "cult u ral revo lution". It is a vast cur rent,
ga the r ing momen tum with " Len Iors" and " Le n
againsts" :
for r evolu ti onary Mnrvi sm-Lcnini sm and against the
counter-revolutionary " tho ughts of Mao Tsc-tung" ;
[or a genuine CPC and Komsornol , and against Lhe
false CPC and Kornsomol of Mao Tso-tu ng ;
f or people's demo cratic power under th e leader sh ip of
the Communist Party, and against t he one-man r eaction
ary military-t crrort st di ct ator ship of Mao Tse-tuug:
[or building soc ialism, and agai nst Mao' s poli cy of
undermining the pillars of social ism;
[or improving t he material and cultural lif e of th e
peopl e, and against Mao ' s policy of perpetuating poverty
and ba ckwardness ;
/ 0 1' th e Peopl e' s Lib eration Army always to he a rHO-
lutionary army defending th e Com mun ist Party and
the peopl e, and against its convers ion by Mao Into an
an ti-communis t, ant i-Soviet, and anti-people counte r-
revolutionary for ce;
for th e equa l coex iste nce and pro speri ty of all ua tioua l-
iti es in China, and against Mao' s grea t-Ll an nationali sm
and oppression of national minorities;
for unity with the Soviet. Union an d all soci a list
countri es, and against Mao' s collus ion with impertali st
forces;
f or unity with all Asian, Afri can and Latin Amer ican
countries oppos ing imperialis m, colonialis m and nee -
coloniali sm, and against Mao's ideas of hegemony in the
" third world" together with imperiali sts ;
for world peace, and agai nst Mao' s war pr eparati ons
and in citement of a third world war.
272
Mao Tse-tu ng is fright en ed of this mi ghty revolut ion-
ary curren t. By threats and promises he is makin g pr- npl e
join him in comba tting it. He hopes t o stern it by means
of counter-revolution ary " cult ur al r evolu ti ons ".
Th e Chinese Communists and the people of Chill a know
tha t th ey must ove rcome Mao' s perni ci ous rnovemen l.,
which is raising a dovili sh ga le and di aboli c waves t ha t.
cause incal cul able ca lamities. Then and only t hen will
China be saved.
The Chi nese Communis ts, th e peop le of China . and
all men and officers of th e PLA must unit e agai nst th e
count er -r evolu t ionary " t houghts of Mao Tse-t ung" an d
th e counter-r evolutionary " cultura I r evolution" . fn [ace-
of tempes t and storm, they mu st go forward hol dlv unt il
complete vi ctory is gaine d, so th at Maoism never aga in
ca uses anyone any harm.
'I'h eu and only th en will th e splendid flower of social-
ism bu r st forth in bl oom, yieldi ng prodigious socia lis t
fru it. on the soil of 0 111' beloved mot hcrlu nd.
Th en and only th en wi ll workers, peasants, in tellec-
t uals and th e yo uth of China li ve the free and happy life
that is t heir bir thright.
Th en and on ly t he n will our Peopl e's Lib eration Army
reall y be a vali ant rc vol ut ionary army pro te ct ing our
soc ialist l and and perf orming it s int ernationali st duty.
Then and only th en will the Chinese Communi st s an d
the people of China be abl e to stand up t o imperiali sm
and reacti onaries of all countr ies, and t o work for world
peace, fr eedom and happiness shoulder t o shoulder with
t he Soviet Union and t he entire socialist communi ty. and
with th e communist part ies and peopl es of all countries,
Mao Tsc-tu ng and th e reac tionary imper iali st gro ups.
wielding th o co nducto rs baton behind his back r ega rd
successiv e count er -revoluti on ary " cult ura l revolu tio ns
as the chief instrument Ior sustaining r eactionary rul e
in China. But ti me will sure ly show that "cult ural 1'0" 0 -
luti ons" , which have roused the anger of th e ar med forces
and the mass of t he peopl e, will in the lon g I'UU br ing
about the downfall of the Mao dynasty. It is due t o his
counter-r evolution ary "cultural r evolution" t hat Mao has
become a "lone monk" abandoned by disciples and fol-
lower s and surrounded by internal and exte rnal " ene-
mi es" . No ma tt er how he manipulates, how hi ghly he
extol s Chi n Shi h Huang, and how fi er cely he attacks
273
Confucius and exploi ts the na me of Lu Hsun, no matter
he uses and how much he curries favour with
. their aid and support, nothing can
prevent Iu s nnmment downfall.
As a re sult of his "cultural revolution" Mao is im-
mersed . a tangle of in soluble internal' and external
And the re acti onary home and for ei gn pol -
of th e 10th Congress has only made th ese contradi c-
tio ns more acute. Th ere is no doubt that th e revolution-
ary teaching of Marxi sm-Leninism will overcome the
COll nt er-rcvol utionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and that
prol etarian internationalism will overcome hour-
Certainly, the revolutionary forces of
China and of th e world will over come Mao 's counte r-
revol utionary clique. TIll! Chinese Communi st s and th e
Chiu ese people will s ur ely conquer th e on e-man react ion -
ary military-t errorist dictat or ship of Mao Tse-tunz will
Tcbuild the socialist pillars undermined by t he
and will put China back on the radiant road of social ist
construction.
Reaction insid e the country and incitement of wars
o utsid e arc typical of Mao' s pre sent poli cy. Hitl er and
1\1ussolini foll owed t he same path to def eat. Collusi on
'wit h ext reme r eacti onar y imperia list gr oups, anti-corn-
muui sm in home policy, and anti-Sovietism in for ei gn pol-
icy- this is the essence of Mao' s present-day course,
Chia ng Kai -shek foll owed th e same path to his downfall.
Comparing himself to the s un is the pri III i \,i ve meth od
Mao has been usin g for year s to deceive himself
and othe rs . This, t oo, is a road to defeat already trodden
in antiquity by Tse-wang of the Usia dyn asty. Accord-
ing t o Fu Sheng' s book, S hangshii T'achuan (Han dy-
nast v}, I he la st ruler of the Hsia dynasty Tse-wang corn-
pared himself t o th e sun. "When the sun perish es," he
said, " t he n I shal l peri sh". This was desi gn ed to deceive
aIHI int imida te people, who would thus drea d hi s
death and wi sh him immor tali ty. But the peopl e hat ed
th e desp ot so implacably that they replied: "Let th e
's uu' di e, We will be gla d t o perish with you just t o see
you di e" . No, identificati on with the sun does not save
despot s Ir om defeat. And in the eye s of the PLA and
the wh ole Chinese peopl e, traitor and despot Mao Tse-
tung is a sel l- decl a red sun li ke Tse-wang of the Hsia
dynasty, and the peop le hate him just as impl acabl y.
Mao knows th at he is sitting on t op of a vol cano that
is ab out to erupt. He is lon ely and impot ent. Thi s is why
in December 1970 he said to his Ameri can trusted per -
son, Edgar Snow, that he is a "l one monk" walking the
with a leaky umbrell a. " Lone monk" is a eup he-
nusm Mao emp loys for "l one desp ot ", as th e worst two
in Chinese his tor y-Shang Chou-wang and Ch in
Shih Hua ng-wer e ca lle d by t he Chinese people . I n mor e
moder n t imes t he people " confer red" t he sa me titl e
of " lone desp ot " on two other t yrants and militarist s-
Yuan Shih- ka i and Chi ang Kai -sh ck . All th ose wh om th e
people called " lone des pot s" came to a sad end. Anrl ,
ce rt ainly, th e new t yrant and militarist, Mao Tse-tung,
whom th e peopl e have also begun t o r egard as a " lone
despot ", will not esc ape the same fate.
I n til e filial count, Mao Tse-t ung will he def eated, Ther e
is no doubt about that.
But thi s does not mean tha t Mao can no longer breed
-evil. On th e contr ary, t he closer he approaches his end,
th o mor e re ckle ssly he is st r iking ba ck and th e mor e
energy he is sp ending in home poli cy looki ng for ways
t o pr olon g hi s reactionary rul e and l eave hi s "throne"
to Chi an g Ching, and in foreign poli cy to intensify prep-
arations for an anti-Soviet wa r and to in cit e a world
war. II e s topped at nothing to achi eve hi s aims and make
Ch ina tIle most reactionary centre of s tr uggle against
cOI11I11.unism. th e Soviet Union , and peace and progress.
He will stop at not hing graduall y to r econv ert China in -
t o a semi-colony of world imperialism in ret urn for aid
suPPM! from extre me reactionary impo rial ist zrou p-
mgs, Throu gh his first "cul tural revol ution" he t o
win th e imperi ali st s and pa ve the way Ior
Maoist i rupcr-i alist coopera tion . Hi s second "cultural rev-
olution" aimed at wi dening the spheres and raising
th e " level of Maoist-imperial ist coopera t ion . -
. Under cover of "crit icising Lin Pi ao and Conf ucius ."
Mao has, iu effect. begun a second " cult ural re vol u tion"
as a step in ca rrying out th ese designs .
. It WIll he r ecall ed th at since 1966, wh en Mao launch ed
hi s count er-revolutionary coup d' pt at behind the screen
of a "cult ural : evolution", the Communist Party of Chi-
na and t he Chi nese peopl e hav e been immer sed in un-
heard-of tra gedy a nd suffer ing. The world soc ial ist sys-
tem and th e worl d communist and workin g-cl ass move-
275
ment hav e suffered serious losses , and the anti-i mperi al-
ist national lib er nuon movement and the movement l or
pea ce, democracy and social pr ogress have al so in cu rred
losses, It ha s he nn a hoon for int ern ati on al i 111 -
periali sm a nd r ea ction aries ill all countries.
A " second cult ur a l r evo lut ion " will 10 0 s p.1l fresh ca la m-
iti es a t hom e, and ca use sever e setbacks on the inter -
nati onal scene.
1t foll ows th at Man' s se cond "cult ur al revolufiou "
conc erns not only Chinese Commu ni st s a nd th e peopl e
of China, a nd no t onl y th e world commu nis t movement
autl the soci alist community , hut al so all pr ogr essi ves
and all pea ce for ces in th e world.
In Chill a, th e Communi sts and peoples of all nation-
ali ti es face a mort al , diffi cult and grave s truggle. And
as th ey char t th ei r plans and determine thei r ac t ions
against Maoism and th e " cultural re vol ution", t hey will
doubtless ta ke account of the peculiar feat ures of th e
pr es ent i nternal and int ernat ional si tua tion, Thev will
s um up th e r esults of th e str uggle aga i ns t th e fn's't " cul-
tural r evoluti on " , and draw le sson s fr om it. They will.
use all av ailable opportuni ties Ior un iting th e anti-Man-
ist for ces and opponents of th e "c ultura l r evol ut ion". Tf
th ey succeed i n unil i ng and or gan ising their ranks. t hey
will ce r ta inly be abl e t o r epuls e and def ea t Mao' s coun te r-
r evoluti on ar y " cultural ruvolution' and counter-re vo-
lutionary rul e,
Th e Chi nese Commu nists a nd th e peopl e of China
t ru st th at in all countrios Communist s , figh ters agai ns t
imperi ali sm nnd for pe ace, and all people of goodwill
will stand by them.
AFTERWORD
A Chinese prov erb SHyS th at 70 years is a rare ngl' .
Comrade Wang li ved until 70, and succee ded "in
compl at ing th e final page of t his book Tit is was not
easy. He did not live to se e his work publi shed. All the
same, it s appearance is a big and import ant even t. Here
I wanI 10 expr ess sp ecial gr ati tude t o th e So viet Com-
munist s and t he Soviet people for thei r cons ta nt fr iend-
sh ip and support.
Of course, it is impossi ble t o presen t a detai l ed acc ount
of event s from the thirt ies t o th e pr esent day much l ess
so years' hi s tor y of th e Communi s t. Part;' ;)f Chi na,
in one book. .
After finishing thi s book Comrade Mi n er had
planne d t o wri t e a critici sm of the t heoretica l
in t he " !h oughts of Mao Tso-tung", especia lly as con-
cerns phil osophy , He want ed to do th is becau se i n t he
past 3U-odd years the Ma rxi st -Leninist erlucn tiun of CPC
?udres m cmbel'S wu s seriously j mpai red by l he crirn-
i nal an ti- Marxist. ant i- Len i nist. ant i-Sovi et and ant i-
Communist. activit y of Ma» Ts e-t ung. Durin z the " cul-
t ur al r evol ut ion". which was essenlia llv coun ter-
revolut iouary coup, Mao Tse-tung am) hi s groll)l publicl y
declar ed th eir wi sh "'0 hoi st the red banner of t he
thou ght s of Ma o Tse-tung ov er th e wo rl d", th ou gh. in
fa ct , the Maoists ;H' e s till compe lle d t o disgui se th ei r
und erhand schemes with the banner' of " Marxism-
Lenini sm" both ins ide uurl outsi de th e coun trv. This is why
a th eor etical analysis and fa ctual evi dence' are required
t o s ho w how Mao distorte d. defamed and betraved Mar x-
ism-Leninism. and how, und er th e sig nboa rd ' of "Sini -
/.77
Iying Marxism" , he engaged in ideological contrnband-e-
subs ti tuting counter- revolutiona ry Maoi sm for Mar xi sm-
Leninism. In the la st years of his life Comrad e Wan g
i\1ing work ed very hard in thi s directi on. Unfortuna tely,
hi s health, badly impaired in th e forties and fifti es, failed
and he departed from us before he wa s able t o com-
pl et e th e next st age of hi s pla nne d work.
Comrade Wang Ming ' s deat h is a ver y severe loss for
th e Chinese Communist s and th e people of China. Yet ,
he was always sure that th e Chinese Commun ists and
the people of China, who have th e sympat hy of the Com-
munist s and peopl es of ot her countr ies, will overcome all
difficulti es and obstacles and bri ng Chi na back into t he
great socialist family head ed by th e Sov iet Union.
Meng Clung-slue
1979
REQUEST TO READERS
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ha ve yo ur opinion of the tr ansl ati on and
design of this book.
Pl ease send your comments to
17 Zuhovsky Boulevard. Moscow. USSR.
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