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1 DANDY V. QUIJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (LABOR ARBITER, NLRC-NCR SOUTH), AND ALBERTO R. QUIMPO (COMMISSIONER, NLRC-FIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: On 19 March 2002, complainant Dandy Quijano filed before this Court a verified complaint written in Pilipino against herein respondents Atty. Geobel A. Bartolabac (Bartolabac), Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo (Quimpo) of the same Commission for violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to complainant, respondents violated his constitutional right to due process in failing to execute the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561 entitled Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corporation. The antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug Corporation (corporation). He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Eventually, the case was elevated to this Court. On 8 July 1998, the Court promulgated its Decision in favor of herein complainant ordering, among others, his reinstatement. The corporation’s motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court in its Resolution dated 5 July 1999. Complainant relates that he filed with respondent Labor Arbiter Bartolabac a motion for execution on 9 December 1998 but despite the final resolution of his case, Bartolabac issued an order that in effect changed the tenor of the final judgment. While the decision of this Court had mandated complainant’s reinstatement, Bartolabac instead awarded back wages and separation pay. Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, Bartolabac issued an alias writ of execution on 18 February 2000. However, respondent Bartolabac allegedly again unilaterally issued another order dated 5 April 2000, amending his previous order and assigning the complainant to the position of self-service attendant of the corporation instead of his original position of warehouseman. Subsequently, respondent Commissioner Quimpo
overturned the above order of Bartolabac and directed the payment of separation pay rather than reinstatement to a substantially similar position as ordered by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in deviating from the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561. HELD: The Court is unyielding in its adjudication that complainant must be reinstated to his former position as warehouseman or to a substantially equivalent position. Clearly, the Court is unwilling to accept the corporation and respondent labor arbiter’s reason that reinstatement is no longer feasible because the position of warehouseman had already been abolished and there is no substantially equivalent position in the corporation. Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the Court’s ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended. It is incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the judgment and implement the same to the letter. Respondents have no discretion on this matter, much less any authority to change the order of the Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of their functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and executory decision is mandatory. As held in Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Embang: Once the case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Salicdan v. Court of Appeals: Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Again, we are unceasing in emphasizing that the decision in the labor case has become final and executory since 1999. There can be no justification for the overturning of the
Court’s reinstatement order by the NLRC First Division and full satisfaction of the monetary award of only three (3) years after the finality of the judgment. The Court is not wont to compel the corporation to instantly restore the position of warehouseman if it has been already abolished. Indeed, the Court granted that complainant could be reinstated to a substantially equivalent or similar position as a viable alternative for the corporation to carry out. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondents liable for violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) months.
2. REYNALDO CANO CHUA, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME & STYLE PRIME MOVER CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT, VS COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, ANDRES PAGUIO, PABLO CANALE, RUEL PANGAN, AURELIO PAGUIO, ROLANDO TRINIDAD, ROMEO TAPANG AND CARLOS MALIWAT This is a petition for Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the CA affirming the order of the SSC which held that the private respondents were regular employees of the petitioner ad ordered petitioner to pay SSS for its unpaid contributions, as well as penalty for the delayed remittance. Facts: On August 20, 1985 private respondents Paguio, Canale, Pangan, Trinidad, Tapang and Maliwat filed a petition with the SSC for SSS coverage and contributions against Chua, owner of Prime Mover Construction Development, claiming that they were all regular employees of the petitioner in his construction business. They also alleged that they were dismissed without justifiable grounds and without notice to them with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. They further alleged that petitioner did not report them to the SSS for compulsory coverage in flagrant violation of the Social Security Act. Chua in his answer claimed that private respondents had no cause of action against him and assuming that there was any, they were barred by prescription and laches. He also claimed that private respondents were not regular employees but were project employees whose work had been fixed for a specific project or undertaking which completion is determined at the time of their engagement. He also concluded that the said employees were not entitled to coverage under the SSA. The SSS filed a petition in intervention and on February 1, 1995, the SSC issued its Order which ruled in favor of private respondents, stating that the petitioner should pay
Petitioner then filed with the SC a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner also questioned the failure to apply the rules on prescription of actions and of laches for filing six to eight later after they were taken in by the petitioner. Whether or not the private respondents claim to be covered by the SSS already prescribed. The private respondents are subject are subject of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law. carpenters and fine graders in the petioles various projects for at least one year. Their claim for the SSS coverage has not prescribed and not guilty of laches. Thus. The CA. the private respondents are not entitled to coverage under the SSA and that their length of service did not change their status from project employees to regular employees. Page 4 . The petitioner then filed a Motion for Review to the CA. Held: The SC affirmed the CA's decision and held that there is no dispute that private respondents were employees of petitioner who became regular employees by their being repeated re-hiring. The CA rejected the claim of prescription stating that the filing of private respondents claim was well within the twenty year period provided by the SSA. their right to claim would only prescribe after the period of 20 years. there no being employer-employee relationship. claiming the same that the private respondents are project employees whose period of employment are terminated upon completion of the project and that no employer-employee relationship existed between them. There is an employer-employee relationship existing between the parties having control over the results of the work done by the private respondents as well as the means and methods by which the same were accomplished.the SSS and the unpaid SS/EC and contributions plus penalty for the delayed remittance. The SSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner for lack of merit. and that their work was necessary desirable to petitioner's business which involved the construction or roads and bridges. Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are regular employees and thus entitled to claim for SSS. citing Article 280 of the Labor Code declared that the private respondents were all regular employees in relation to certain activities since they all worked either as masons.
Flavier informed Dr. 1999. RAUL C. The auditor maintained its position. This is a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the COA which affirmed the disallowance of hazard pay benefits of the SIG personnel of GSIS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. VS. subsistence and laundry allowance of five departments of the GSIS: the Medical Service Group. AND THE RESIDENT AUDITOR OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM. subsistence and laundry allowance. IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER. Jr. Thereafter. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (KMG). 1999 the resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance for the payment of hazard pay from January 1999 to present.3. GSIS Chief Legal Counsel requested reconsideration of the latter notice of disallowance. on October 29. the then Secretary of Health Juan M. Misa. The GSIS BOT issued Resolution No. the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied. Facts: On January 25. 1999. Consequently. On June 9. GSIS resident auditor issued a disallowance notice regarding payment of hazard pay for the SIG personnel on the ground that they are not "healthrelated workers". 52 granting them hazard pay. the Sec. the Medical Units of the branch offices. GUILLERMO N. FLORES . CARAGUE. On September 9. the Employees Compensation Department and the Office of the Vice-PresidentSocial Insurance III. the then Secretary of Health Hilarion Ramiro. Orlando C. RESPONDENTS . IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN. Page 5 . 1996. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. granted the remaining units of the Social Insurance Group (SIG) for the entitlement to hazard pay. On January 5. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. granted the request for payment of hazard pay. Petitioner KMG appealed the disallowance to the COA which affirmed the disallowance. 1993. Vice-President and Medical Director of the GSIS--that the Medical Services Group personnel were public health workers under RA 7305 (Magna Carta for Public Health Workers). PETITIONER .
Under RA 7305 the term health workers mean--all persons who are engaged in health and health-related work. Held: The SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit and upheld the COA's decision and resolution. the SIG personnel cannot be considered public health workers under RA 7305. health centers. health infirmaries. strife-torn or isolated areas and the risks brought about their work environment to their work are not so grave as to warrant their entitlement to such benefit. Page 6 . The company declared in its letter to the union president a deadlock in negotiations. Undoubtedly. The company gave its counter-proposal but the parties failed to reach a mutual settlement. sanitaria. medical corps and hospitals of the AFP. These functions are not similar to those persons working in health-related establishments such as clinics or medical departments of government corporations. and other specific health service units of government agencies. clinics and other health-related establishments owned and operated by the Government or its political subdivisions with original charters and shall include medical and. The record reveals that the functions of the SIG personnel are not principally related to health. and all persons employed in all hospitals. rural health units. The SIG personnel perform tasks for the processing of GSIS members' claims for life insurance. administrative and support personnel employed regardless of their employment status. disability and survivorship benefits. they would still not be qualified to receive hazard pay benefits because the requirements for the grant of hazard pay under RA 7305 are duly circumscribed which include contaminated. Sime Darby Employees Association submitted its proposal to Sime Darby Pilipinas. for the remaining two years of their existing CBA. ET AL VS. Even assuming that the SIG personnel may be considered public health workers. barangay health stations. allied health professionals.Issue: Whether or not the SIG are entitled for hazard pay benefits. The company sought intervention from the DOLE by filing a notice of CBA deadlock and request for preventive mediation. 4. retirement. NLRC Facts: On October 1995. The Union did not agreed on that thus objecting the deadlock and filed its opposition to the Assumption of Jurisdiction/Certification to Arbitration. Inc. SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION.
pending the resolution of the case. including the individual petitioners. mass absences and consistent low production output. On September 1995. illegal dismissal and ULP. 1998 rendered its decision in the consolidated cases. 1995. The mass termination of all employees was declared valid and authorized termination of employment due to closure of establishment. they also signed and executed individual quitclaims and releases. During that time the employees were to receive their separation pay equivalent to 150% of the base rate for every year of credited service. high rate of waste and scrap tires and machine breakdown. The company declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the ground of sabotage and work slowdown.The company filed a Notice of Lockout on June 21. the union filed a complaint for illegal lockout before the DOLE-NLRC. The claim of ULP. The stockholders of the company approved the sale of the company's tire manufacturing assets and business operation. 1996. the company having complied with the requirements in Article 283 of the Labor Code. The company filed with the DOLE a Closure and Sale of tire manufacturing operation. the union conducted its Strike Vote Referendum and filed its Strike Vote Result Report to NCMB also on July 24. The union. 1995 on the ground of deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiations and sent a Notice of Lockout Vote to the NCMB. 1995. dismissing the same for lack of merit on the petitioner’s complaints against the company for illegal lockout. They issued a Memorandum informing all its employees of the plan to sell the tire manufacturing assets and operations. On the other hand. The company individually served notices of termination to all the employees. The company then filed a motion for the return of the separation pay received by the complainants. The company sold its tire manufacturing plant and facilities to Goodyear on April 24. The Labor Arbiter on October 29. filed an Appeal Memorandum with a Petition for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before the NLRC. The motion was opposed by the union. The Labor Arbiter found the lockout valid and legal and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown. The company filed with the DOLE a Notice of Termination of Employees covering all its employees in the tire manufacturing and support operations effective December 15. the employees were barred from entering the company premises and were only allowed to enter to get their personal belongings and their earned benefits. The Labor Arbiter on August 25. Under a Memorandum of Agreement. the Labor Arbiter found no evidence to substantiate the same. and that the record merely showed that the closure of and eventual cessation from business Page 7 . On account of the lockout. They filed a Motion to Conduct Ocular Inspection of the tire factory premises to establish that it was sold to Goodyear. 1998 issued an Order directing the parties to file their respective memorandum. without filing the memorandum ordered by the Labor Arbiter.
The court declared that the Labor Arbiter was not divested of its jurisdiction over the consolidated cases when petitioners filed their appeal Memorandum Order which they sought to appeal is interlocutory in nature. but their motion was denied for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the holding of formal hearing is discretionary with the Labor Arbiter. Thus the Labor Arbiter's decision has the force and effect of a valid judgment. but was dismissed for lack of merit. in their instant petition reiterate that they were dismissed right on the day they were handed down their termination letters that as required by law they should have been given a 30-day notice. The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. This being the case the Labor Arbiter still had jurisdiction when it rendered its decision. 5. Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision to the NLRC. The petitioners. An interlocutory order is not appealable until the rendition of the judgment on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration of justice and duly burden the courts. They also contended that the Labor Arbiter lost jurisdictional competence to issue its October 29. Held: The SC denied their petition.was justified by the circumstances in order to protect the company's investments and assets. It did not put an end to the issues of illegal lockout. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the quitclaims and receipts signed by the petitioners were voluntarily signed and that settlement was reached by the petitioners and the company just and reasonable. said Order could not have been validly appealed such that it would divest the Labor Arbiter of his jurisdiction over the consolidated cases. They also alleged that the decisions of the CA and the NLRC lack evidentiary report. The CA denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the NLRC. COMPUTER INNOVATIONS CENTER VS. The finding of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only with great weight respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on the court as long as they are supported with substantial evidence. ULP and illegal dismissal. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FACTS: Page 8 . The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA's decision. making said decision void. 1998. Being interlocutory in nature. prompting them to file a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming grave abuse of the discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Cagayan de Oro City. Aggrieved. On 26 March 1998. On 15 November 1999. while acknowledging the filing of the reduced bond. Cariño announced during the said meeting that he would resign from CIC. The cited ground for the reduction of the appeal bond was the purportedly great possibility of the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision in light of the serious errors in the findings of fact and application of law as well as the harshness and unfounded nature of the award. Cariño received a call from petitioner Nelson Yu Quilos (Quilos) of CIC. in their Memorandum of Appeal.000.000. noting that the appeal could only be perfected once petitioners had posted the appeal bond equivalent Page 9 . citing among others. Davao City. and thirteenth (13th) month pay.66) representing back wages. He was promoted to Head of the Education Department of CIC in May of 1997." The NLRC ruled that "the mere perception [that] the appealed decision would be reversed on appeal [did] not justify the reduction of the required appeal bond. Quilos met Cariño at the company’s technician’s laboratory and informed the latter that his services with the company should cease by 31 March 1998. The Memorandum on Appeal was also filed before the NLRC Fifth Division. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.000. it received reports from its employees regarding Cariño’s purported unprofessional conduct. a sum that is evidently nowhere near the sum of the award made by the Labor Arbiter.666." The NLRC mistakenly noted that petitioners had not even posted the desired reduced bond. They also posted a bond of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10.00). still denied the motion for reconsideration.00). In a Resolution dated 29 June 2000. According to CIC. on 28 March 1998. and ordering petitioners to pay the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P220. However. adverting to a general lack of interpersonal skills and moonlighting activities which conflicted with the interest of CIC. It was alleged that Cariño had admitted to his moonlighting activities during the meeting of 28 March 1998. Cariño lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against CIC and Quilos with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch in Davao City. they filed a Notice of Appeal dated 12 November 1999 before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch. as claimed by CIC. The NLRC. Sancho rendered a Decision concluding that Cariño had been illegally dismissed. the NLRC Fifth Division denied the motion for reduction of appeal bond and dismissed the appeal on the ground of "non-perfection. petitioners had requested a reduction of the cash or surety bond to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. On 29 August 1999. Labor Arbiter Newton R. separation pay. and had refused a promotion offered by CIC conditioned on his termination of involvement with other computer schools. attaching thereto a Memorandum on Appeal. reporting for work only until 31 March 1998.Private respondent Reynaldo Cariño (Cariño) was hired in September of 1995 by petitioner Computer Innovations Center (CIC) as Instructor of Computer Technical Course. Two days later. that they had posted the reduced bond of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10. who advised Cariño to resign from his position. Instead.00). A copy of the Decision was received by petitioners on 5 November 1999.
yet this was not done by petitioners. Not even the filing of a motion to reduce bond is deemed to stay the period for requiring an appeal. Petitioners concede this point. as it is lesser [than] that what was required by them. The NLRC pithily noted that "the posting by the [petitioners] of the cash bond of P10. the posting of such bond is required before the NLRC can acquire jurisdiction over the employee’s appeal. as the statutory requirement pertaining to the appeal bond had not been met. Nothing in the Labor Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the monetary award in the judgment.00 means nothing. The requirement for posting the surety bond is jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. The appellate court found no fault on the part of the NLRC in denying the appeal. HELD: No. On the other hand. an appeal is perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." Invocation of this rule as a means of argument against the strict imposition of the cash bond requirement is off-base. yet in the next breath invoke the doctrine that "the dismissal of an appeal on purely technical ground is frowned upon. By explicit provision of law. in excluding damages and attorney’s fees from the computation of the appeal bond. The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement. The Court of Appeals Seventh Division promptly rendered a Decision dated 19 September 2001 affirming the NLRC. or would deem such insufficient postage as sufficient to perfect the appeal.000. The appellate court further noted that petitioners could have exhibited good faith in attempting to comply with the dictates of the law by filing a motion for leave to admit belated additional bond after the initial resolution denying their appeal. considering Article 223. Article 223 indubitably requires that the appeal be perfected only upon the posting of the cash or surety bond which is equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. and the Court should give utmost regard to this intention. ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal can be deemed perfected notwithstanding the filing of a reduced bond." The dismissal of the appeal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. As evinced by the language of Article 223.to the monetary award. There is a concession to the employer. The clear intent of both statutory and procedural law is Page 10 .
to require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the full amount of the monetary award within the ten (10)-day reglementary period.. He concluded. 7. the PETITION is DENIED. Facts: A complaint for illegal dismissal. had already been transferred to IDG pursuant to an affidavit of assumption of responsibility and quitclaims. RESPONDENTS. however. WHEREFORE. disobedience of superiors. PETITIONER. Non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. NOE LEVANTINO.00). alleging that IDG should be held liable for the claims of Levantino since Sameer's accreditation for foreign principal. Inc. INC.. He filed complaint with the POEA. that Levantino was not paid his basic salary in accordance with his POEA approved contract of employment of Two Hundred Seventy-Seven US Dollars (US$277. (FORMERLY IDG TRADING AND GENERAL SERVICES.).00) as food allowance. However. IDG HUMAN RESOURCES. INC. Levantino was terminated by the foreign employer and subsequently repatriated to the Philippines.. and low productivity.00). Arabian Fal Co. (IDG). and Page 11 . SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY.00). underpayment of wages. We have indeed held that the requirement for posting the surety bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional and cannot be trifled with. plus One Hundred Eighty Saudi Rial (SR180. VS. this time with the basic monthly salary of Six Hundred Seventy-Nine Saudi Rial (SR679. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Levantino was terminated for just or authorized cause. on 20 July 1994.. Levantino was made to sign another contract of employment. Arabian Fal Co. Sameer filed a third-party complaint against IDG Human Resources. upon his arrival at the job site on 21 July 1994. the employee having been unable to rebut the allegations raised against him of poor habits. and illegal deductions was filed by respondent Noe Levantino (Levantino) against the petitioner. INC. He was hired and deployed by Sameer for and in behalf of its foreign principal. Levantino's contract provided that his office employment was for twelve (12) months and fixed his basic monthly salary at Two Hundred Seventy-Seven US Dollars (US$277. The petitioners cannot be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal application of rules for their act of negligence.
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof. Six Hundred Thirty-Three U. probably incurred further delay in submitting the appeal bond due to the early November holidays. as plainly stated in the Labor Code. shall submit a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond posted is genuine. NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to perfect it within the ten (10)-day reglementary period.illegal deductions were made by the foreign employer from the basic monthly salary for the food allowance. There is nothing in the said period that suggests innate difficulty in obtaining the said bond. issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. The mandatory filing Page 12 . It was only on 3 November 1997 that it filed the appeal bond. along with a motion for extension of time to file a surety-appeal bond. and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision. . Section 6. an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.16). CA affirmed the dismissal by the NLRC. The filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.60). considering that the amount of the monetary judgment. In fact. The Commission may. shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule. Dollars and Sixteen Cents (US$633. Bond. his counsel. . who submitted the bond only on 3 November 1998. order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal. though such fact is of no moment considering that these holidays came only after the lapse of the reglementary period. . It is not even expected that Sameer itself expends from its own funds the entire amount of the monetary judgment for the appeal bond. as well as the bonding company.S. Nor should have there been eminent difficulty in obtaining the said bond. Thus. Sameer. is relatively miniscule. reduce the amount of the bond. the relief prayed for. hence. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite afore stated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal. The employer. the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer involves a monetary award. Had Sameer been inclined to diligently comply with the requisites of appeal. alleging that it was still arranging for the issuance of such with the bonding company. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and a memorandum of appeal on 27 October 1997. – (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule.56). in justifiable cases and upon Motion of the Appellant. the present petition. – In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter. and attorney's fees of Fifty-Seven US Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents (US$57. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. exclusive of damages and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter likewise held that Sameer and IDG were jointly and severally liable to pay Levantino. the Labor Arbiter held that Levantino was entitled to a wage differential of Five Hundred Seventy-Five US Dollars and Sixty Cents (US$575. which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected HELD: Section 3.
It is not an excuse that the over P2 million award is too much for a small business enterprise. Their claim for alleged constructive dismissal is baseless considering the absence of any documentary evidence relative thereto and their failure to present testimonial evidence to prove that respondent [JB Line] violated the essential elements for constructive dismissal. Sometime beginning the year 2000. Their failure to work regularly was due to economic crises that necessitated the reduction of trips for drivers and conductors and shortened workdays for office personnel and maintenance crew. This was done by not allowing [them] to perform their duties and function or simply by not admitting them to their work by stating that they should just return some other time.of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the afore quoted provision that the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of cash or surety bond. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium for such bond. Labor Arbiter ruled that there is constructive dismissal and petitioners should be reinstated. The law does not require its outright payment. 8. the company started constructively dismissing [petitioners]. Finding that the bond posted was not equivalent to the monetary judgment. The measures taken by respondent to prevent losses and possible closure of the business were management prerogative and were not resorted to as a ploy to constructively dismissed they can also resume duties anytime depending on the availability of buses and passengers. Cost against the petitioner. Issue Page 13 . to shoulder.000 supersedeas bond) to the NLRC. the NLRC ordered respondent JB Line to post an additional bond. Tired of being treated in the same manner and for failure on the part of [JB Line] to give them their work despite no cessation of operations and for non-payment of their salaries. the NLRC denied its appeal. this petition. The latter failed. but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. like the petitioner company. conductor and mechanics and a member of existing CBA. JOBLINE BICOL EXPRESS Facts: Petitioners are regular employees of the respondent as driver. Respondent claimed that no record will show that letter of suspension were sent to them. OSCAR G. SAPITAN ET AL VS. Respondent elevated the same to CA which reversed the decision. hence. its appeal would be dismissed for non-perfection. [petitioners were] left with no recourse except to file the instant case to force respondent [JB Line] to reinstate them in their jobs and [pay] their benefits. Hence. otherwise. particularly those who travel the Bicol-Manila-Bicol route were not given overtime and night differential pay. wage adjustments and other benefits. Respondent JB Line appealed the arbiter's decision (accompanied by a P200. They alleged that all of them were underpaid and most of them.
INC. as amended. Petitioners were no longer entitled to separation pay on the ground alone that respondent JB Line had ceased to operate due to serious losses. the reduction of petitioners' workload and/or the "floating" of their employment were still not warranted. Moreover.1. 14. NENE TIMBAL ET.. Article 283 of the Labor Code. xxx The records are devoid of proof that respondent JB Line ever furnished the DOLE or petitioners with such notice. In this case. by serving a notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. 2. however. RESPONDENTS Facts: Page 14 . provides: ARTICLE 283: Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. no similar reason existed to excuse respondent JB Line from complying with the requirement. in case of closure of business due to serious financial losses. it is imperative for the employer to send a notice of closure to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). the requirement to post a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal was relaxed but this was justified by substantial compliance.. respondent JB Line was still not off the hook. Whether or not the filing of supersedeas bond would suffice the procedural requirement in appeal. retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title. Under the law. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices. DEL MONTE PHILS. redundancy. Whether or not petitioners should be reinstated. Assuming such closure indeed took place. ART. An employee is constructively dismissed when his working days are substantially cut for more than six months due to the employer's financial losses. PETITIONERS VS MARIANO SALDIVAR. even if we were to grant that respondent JB Line was on the brink of closing down at that time. HELD: In some cases.AL. AND WARFREDO BALANDRA. Petitioners' plight had persisted for months which only meant that they were already constructively dismissed. 283 is the only instance wherein reinstatement cannot be warranted due to closure and serious financial losses of the employer. The bond posted by respondent JB Line was not even close to half of the amount required by the NLRC.
hence. particularly for encouraging defections to rival Union. Facts: Petitioner after working as a carpenter for respondent since August 1991.. Thus. On the other hand. respondent insisted that petitioner was a mere project employee who was terminated upon completion of the project for which he was hired. Issue: Whether or not Timbal was illegally dismissed? Held: In the matter at bar. 19.NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally dismissed and ordered Del Monte to reinstate them to their former position and to pay their full backwages and other allowances. Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent for illegal dismissal. On the same occasion.The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the plantation workers of petitoner. denying the allegations in the complaint and the averments in Artajo's affidavit. along with four other employees were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the Union. he was told to look for another job. The Disloyalty Board recommended the expulsion of Timbal from membership in ALU and likewise dismissal from DMPI in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the existing CBA between ALU and DMPI. Timbal filed an answer before the Disloyalty Board. Respondent Timba. Considering that the civil complaint was filed 6days prior to the execution of Artajo's affidavit. as appreciated by an impartial trier of facts. Page 15 . National Federation of Labor (NFL). ET AL. the Supreme Court adjudge the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the CA as more cogent on that points. alleging that on said date he was verbally informed that he was already terminated from employment and barred from entering the premises. it would be plainly injudicious to presume that Artajo possessed an unbiased state of mind. Such circumtance was considered by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals ruled that only Timbal was illegally dismissed and that DMPI failed to observe procedural due process. he claimed that he was unceremoniously terminated from employment without any valid or authorized cause. as they rendered favorably to Timbal. petitioner's employment was terminated on 30 October 1999. and the Court of Appeals oth appreciated that the testimony of Artajo against Timbal could not be given credence. the Labor Arbiter who is the proximate trier of facts. She noted that the allegations against her were purportedly committed nearly 2 years earlier. No credible disputation was offered by NLRC to the claim that Artajo was biased against Timbal. RBL SHIPYARD CORPORATION. HERMONIAS L. LIGANZA VS. This is due to the prior animosity between the two engendered by the pending civil complaint filed by Timbal's husband against Artajo. and that Artajo's act was motivated by hate and revenge owing to the filing of the aforementioned civil action. The dismissal for cause of employees must be justified by substantial evedence. The petition is denied and the decision the Court if Appeals is affirmed.
unlike in Sandoval where the complaining employees were hired for only one project lasting for three (3) months at most.. was tasked to "make and repair cabinet. the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. LOPEZ ET AL VS. or that he was terminated for just cause and these doubts shall be resolved in favor of petitioner. HELD: Decision in favor of the Petitioner. valid and legal cause for the termination of employment. in this case the petitioner was employed by respondent continuously from 1991 to 1999. The respondent failed to show clear. as carpenter. in line with the policy of the law to afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor.e. doors. Assuming. kitchen and other parts of the vessel that needs to be repaired. i. the repeated rehiring and continuing need for his services for over eight (8) years have undeniably made him a regular employee. Petitioner. The decision merely accomplishes a judicial recognition of the employment status of a project or work pool employee in accordance with what is fait accompli. the Court has no recourse but to grant the petition. petitioner's work was necessary or desirable to respondent's business. flooring. 21." As such. the Court reiterates that: The decision unduly burdens an employer by imposing a duty to re-hire a project employee even after completion of the project for which he was hired. without granting that petitioner was initially hired for specific projects or undertakings. There are doubts in the pieces of evidence on record that petitioner is a project employee.Issue: whether or not the petitioner is a project employee and whether his termination was illegal. windows. However. the continuous re-hiring by the employer of project or work pool employees who perform tasks necessary or desirable to the employer's usual business or trade. The import of the decision is not to impose a positive and sweeping obligation upon the employer to rehire project employees. quarters. Finally. ceiling. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. MWSS Page 16 .
Petitioners filed a complaint with the CSC. Instead. Regular employees of the MWSS were paid their retirement benefits. It added that in any event. ISSUE: Whether or not 1) the petitioner are employees of the MWSS 2) the latter has power to dismiss the latter 3) if they are entitled to the benefits provided for under the Labor Code of the Philippines HELD: Page 17 . stating that petitioners were engaged by MWSS through a contract of service. were absorbed by the concessionaires. the CSC specifically stated that “contract collectors are not MWSS employees and therefore not entitled to severance pay. petitioners were not MWSS employees. not being permanent employees of MWSS and not included in the list submitted to the concessionaire. MWSS relying on a resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that contract-collectors of the MWSS are not its employees and therefore not entitled to the benefits due regular government employees. In its Resolution dated 1 July 1999. and Benpress-Lyonnaise. Thereafter the petitioner filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was later on Denied. MWSS entered into a Concession Agreement with Manila Water Service. In addition. Moreover. Hence.FACTS: In 1997. Affirming and generally reiterating the ruling of the CSC. effectively terminating the contracts of service between petitioners and MWSS. Thereafter. which explicitly provides that a bill collector-contractor is not an MWSS employee. Regular employees of the MWSS. the Court of Appeals held that the Agreement entered into by petitioners and MWSS was clear and unambiguous. as per the terms of the agreement. as early as 26 June 1996. and should be read and interpreted according to its literal sense. Inc. except those who had retired or opted to remain with the latter. Petitioners’ claims for retirement benefits and terminal leave pay were likewise denied. are not entitled to severance pay. The Court of Appeals held that no other evidence was adduced by petitioners to substantiate their claim that their papers were forwarded to the CSC for attestation and approval. wherein the collection of bills was transferred to said private concessionaires. Petitioners filed a petition for with the Court of Appeals.the CSC denied their claims. they were refused said benefits. it found that petitioners were unable to show that they have contractual appointments duly attested by the CSC. but not petitioners. the CSC stated that petitioners. an appeal was made to the Supreme Court.
The Court has invariably affirmed that it will not hesitate to tilt the scales of justice to the labor class for no less than the Constitution dictates that “the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.” It is committed to this policy and has always been quick to rise to defense in the rights of labor, as in this case.
Protection to labor, it has been said, extends to all of labor¾local and overseas, organized and unorganized, in the public and private sectors. Besides, there is no reason not to apply this principle in favor of workers in the government. The government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, as employers, should set the example in upholding the rights and interests of the working class.
For purposes of determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the Court has consistently adhered to the four-fold test, namely: (1) whether the alleged employer has the power of selection and engagement of an employee; (2) whether he has control of the employee with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3) whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the employee was paid wages.Of the four, the control test is the most important element.
A review of the circumstances surrounding the case reveals that petitioners are employees of MWSS. Despite the obvious attempt of MWSS to categorize petitioners as mere service providers, not employees, by entering into contracts for services, its actuations show that they are its employees, pure and simple. MWSS wielded its power of selection when it contracted with the individual petitioners, undertaking separate contracts or agreements. The same goes true for the power to dismiss. Although termed as causes for termination of the Agreement, a review of the same shows that the grounds indicated therein can similarly be grounds for termination of employment.
On the other hand, relevant and appropriate is the definition of wages in the Labor Code, namely, that it is the remuneration, however designated, for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered. The “commissions” due petitioners were based on the bills collected as per the schedule indicated in the Agreement. Significantly, MWSS granted petitioners benefits usually given to employees, to wit: COLA, meal, emergency, and traveling allowances, hazard pay, cash gift, and other bonuses. In an unabashed bid to claim credit for itself, MWSS professes that these additional benefits were its acts of benevolence and generosity. We are not impressed.
Other manifestations of control are evident from the records. The power to transfer or reassign employees is a management prerogative exclusively enjoyed by employers. In this case, MWSS had free reign over the transfer of bill collectors from one branch to
another. MWSS also monitored the performance of the petitioners and determined their efficiency.
Even the “four-fold test” will show that petitioner is the employer of private respondents. The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. Petitioners are indeed regular employees of the MWSS. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Likewise, the repeated and continuing need for the performance of the job has been deemed sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to the business. Some of the petitioners had rendered more than two decades of service to the MWSS. The continuous and repeated rehiring of these bill collectors indicate the necessity and desirability of their services, as well as the importance of the role of bill collectors in the MWSS. MWSS committed itself to pay severance and terminal leave pay to its regular employees. The guidelines thereof states that regular employees who have rendered at least a year of service and not eligible for retirement are entitled to severance pay equivalent to one (1) month basic pay for every full year of service. In view of the Court’s finding that petitioners were employees of MWSS, the corresponding severance pay, in accordance with the guidelines, should be given to them. Terminal leave pay are likewise due petitioners, provided they meet the requirements therefore.
22. NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSN. VS. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC. Facts:
In April of 1997, NSTEA, the union filed a petition for certification election for the rank and file employees of NS Transport Services Inc., a public utility transport corporation. The petition was denied by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) prompting the union to appeal to the DOLE Secretary. The union filed for a Notice of Strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), alleging
illegal dismissal of its officers and members, as well as discrimination and coercion of employees. However, despite the mediation conducted by the MCMB, the parties failed to amicably settle their differences, thus the union pushed thru with its strike. The DOLE Secretary, upon the company’s petition, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued a Return- to- Work Order and certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Likewise, upon motion of the company, the DOLE Secretary deputized police authorities to assist in the peaceful and orderly enforcement of the DOLE’s orders. Thereafter, the company filed a complaint for declaration of illegality of strike and damages before the NLRC, alleging that while mediation was in progress, the Union staged a strike, the Union members resorted to threats, intimidation and coercion upon their co-employees. They also allegedly blocked the ingress and egress of the company and caused damage to company property. On the other hand, the Union sought to hold the company for contempt for allegedly refusing to accept its returning members. The cases were then consolidated by the NLRC.
The NLRC held that the strike staged by the union was legal and ordered the reinstatement of the individual complainants with full back wages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the company and remanded the case to the NLRC for further proceedings.
Issue: Whether the company’s right to due process was violated. Held: It is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In labor cases, it has been held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held since a formal type or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of controversy.
The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. Indeed, a formal hearing is not necessary in labor cases. However, when such formal hearing is allowed but a party is not informed thereof, as a consequence of which he is unable to attend the same; such failure to attend should not be taken against him. As the labor arbiter allowed the holding of a formal hearing, he must accord the parties the opportunity to participate therein and allow the formal hearing to proceed its natural course, if due process and the elements of fair play are to be observed. In the instant case, the labor arbiter has granted his imprimatur on the holding of a formal hearing as agreed upon by the parties. In fact, the hearing has commenced and petitioners were given the chance to exercise
The petition was denied and the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirmed. in protecting the rights of the employee. GENUINO VS. Contrary to petitioner’s claim. It is true that both parties have been provided the opportunity to prove their cases through the pleadings submitted before the NLRC. all in violation of existing company policy and Corporation Code under which carries penal sanction. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding the dismissal of Genuino to be without just cause.President. 1993. Genuino was informed she was under preventive suspension. however only the petitioners were given the chance to present its side in the formal hearing. (2) wilful breach of the trust reposed upon her by the bank. since the case was submitted for decision even before it was able to adduce its evidence during the formal hearing. Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint against Citibank for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with damages and prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. remand of the case to the NLRC is proper since the company has yet to present its evidence during the formal hearing. Equity demands that the company must be equally allowed to adduce its evidence.the same privilege. On August 23. It found that Genuino. The factual issues raised in the consolidated cases could still be affected by the additional evidence to be presented by the company. and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.” In the same letter. Citibank informed Genuino of the result of their investigation. The NLRC reversed the decision of Page 21 . if the NLRC is to come up with a rational and impartial decision. On September 27. The law. NLRC Facts: Genuino was employed by Citibank in January 1992 as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of Assistant Vice. authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. In view of the foregoing circumstances. Genuino’s employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds of (1) serious misconduct. together with Santos personally and actively participated through the use of “facilities of Genuino’s family corporation. And that Genuino and Santos realized substantial financial gains. Global Pacific” in the diversion of bank client’s funds to products of other companies that yielded higher interests than Citibank offers. Citibank sent Genuino a letter charging her with “knowledge and involvement” in transactions “which were irregular or event fraudulent. 23. 1993.
She held the position of trust and confidence. In order to constitute as just cause for dismissal. the fact remains that the charges were too general to enable Genuino to intelligently and adequately prepare her defense. Held: The dismissal was for a just cause but lacked due process. It should set out clearly what the employee is being held liable for. Assuming that Citibank did not engage in the Page 22 . The two-notice requirement of the Labor Code is an essential part of the due process. The first notice informing the employee of the charges should neither be pro-forma nor vague.the Labor Arbiter. and peso and dollar deposits for. and to sell and push for the sale of Citibank’s financial products. the act complained of should have arisen from the performance of the employee’s duties. Also. The Court of Appeals then promulgated its decision denying due course to and dismissing the petitions. While the bank gave genuine an opportunity to deny the truth of the allegations in writing and participate in the administrative investigation. loss of confidence should relate to acts inimical to interests of the employer. The requirements of twin notices must be met. While the Court held that Citibank failed to observe procedural due process. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Genuino is for a just cause and in accordance with due process. it must be substantial and not arbitrary. the dismissal could not be in accordance with due process. and keep them in Citibank. for the account and benefit of Citibank. There is no way she could deny any knowledge of the Bank’s policies nor her understanding of these policies as reflected in the survey done by the bank. and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employee’s separation from work. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in him/her employer or duly authorized representative. and of Global and Torrance. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employee’s dismissal. Since the notice of charges given to Genuino is inadequate. Genuino was tasked to solicit investments. The employee should be afforded ample opportunity to be heard and not mere opportunity. She could not likewise feign ignorance of the businesses of Citibank. such as MBS. As Assistant Vice-President of Citibank’s Treasury Department. Ample opportunity to be heard is especially accorded the employees sought to be dismissed after they are specifically informed of the charges in order to give them an opportunity to refute such accusations leveled against them. it never the less found Genuino’s dismissal justified.
and her dismissal is based on a just cause. The CA set aside the decision and declared the illness Rheumatic Heart Disease compensable and directing the payment of the claim therefore. 1994. If the decision of the Labor Arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the ground for dismissal is valid then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries received while the case was pending appeal. 1987. 8 to 10. GSIS VS. Page 23 . In March 1989. Culture and Sports in Manila on March 16. 3 of the Labor Code. respondent filed with the petitioner a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626. the corporations being controlled by her.223. he transferred to the Maritime Industry Authority as Maritime Industry Development Specialist II. 1998. then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without the need of refund. However. it is to the interests of Citibank to retain its clients and continue investing in Citibank. par. the employer is required to reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal pursuant to Art. 3 of the fallo of the September 3. which also denied the claim. Ordinarily. and company practices. 21. collective bargaining agreement provisions. 1998 due to Rheumatic Valvular Disease. 24.same securities dealt with by Global and Torrance. respondent’s claim for compensation benefits on account of his Rheumatic Heart Disease was denied on the ground that the said ailment is not work-connected. On December 1. Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement. 2007 Facts: Respondent first joined government service as Storekeeper I at the Archives Division of Records Management and Archives Office. The records of the case further reveal that respondent was confined at the Chinese General Hospital from January 8 to 10. nevertheless. he was promoted to the position of Archivist I. Finding his ailment compensable. 1994 NLRC decision. Dissatisfied with the decision. as amended. respondent requested for the elevation of his case to ECC for review. Curiously. FONTARES GR NO. Department of Education. Genuino did not just dissuade the depositors from withdrawing their money from Citibank but was even instrumental in the transfers of moneys from Citibank to a competing bank through Global and Torrance. 149571 FEB. then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no. On account of his ailment. he was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits from Jan. if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal. or it can be deducted from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his employer under existing laws. However.
the petitioner is correct in denying respondent’s application for compensation benefits under P. The petition was granted. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VERSUS CHARLIE COMILA AND AIDA COMILA Facts: Page 24 . Held: There is no dispute that Rheumatic Heart Disease is not included under the P. respondent failed to present evidence that he never contracted Rheumatic Fever which could have led to Rheumatic Heart Disease. 626 as amended. as in the instant case. Since there is no causal relation between the respondent’s ailment .Issue: Whether the respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under the existing law due to the condition of Rheumatic heart Disease. as amended. and (2) the causal relation between the ailment and working conditions. nor are there indications that the nature of his work had increased the risk of contracting the said disease. the employee must demonstrate through substantial evidence (1) that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. It is well-settled under the Employee’s Compensation Law that when the claimed contingency is not the direct result of the covered employee’s employment. 626. as an occupational disease.D. Moreover. the claim for compensations benefits cannot prosper. Valvular Heart Disease. Exposure to toxic chemicals and biological hazards does not by itself constitute the cause of respondent’s ailment. Hence. led to Rheumatic Heart Disease. The respondent failed that his work conditions has predisposing factors that caused Rheumatic Fever which in turn. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals were reversed and set aside. 626 as amended. 25. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission was affirmed.D.D. under P. and his employment and working conditions. and the claimant failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the covered employee’s employment and working conditions. the subject ailment.
and of his lack of participation therein. without being duly authorized according to law represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment. 1999. even if there is no consideration involved. In fact. the prosecution has satisfactorily established that both appellants were then engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. it is inconceivable for him to feign ignorance of the illegal recruitment activities of his wife Aida. Aida Comila and one Indira Ram Singh Lastra. As regards appellant Charlie Comila. Hence the appeal. DANIEL FANILA ET AL Facts: Page 25 . appellant will still be deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities. as amended. On the charge of illegal recruitment. was filed against Charlie Comila." With respect to co-appellant Charlie Comila. among other things. otherwise known as the New Labor Code. 26. the defense submits that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove his participation in the illegal recruitment and estafa. To be engaged in the practice and placement. TOMAS LANTING. this appellant argues that "she was merely trying to help the applicants to process their papers. we quote with approval what the trial court has said in its decision.On April 5. it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad. believing that Indira Ram Sighn Lastra and Erlinda Ramos would really send the applicants to Italy. The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when. Again. since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to private complainants. a person who. VERSUS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)." The trial and appellate courts found both appellants guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the crimes charged against them. as defined and penalized under Article 13(6) in relation to Articles 38(b). LANTING SECURITY AND WATCHMAN AGENCY. Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment was committed in large scale by a syndicate Held: The Supreme Court is fully convinced that both the trial and appellate courts committed no error in finding both appellants guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the crimes charged against them. 34 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442. in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. an Information1 for Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale by a syndicate. Through the respective testimonies of its witnesses.
the present petition. that the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the upward adjustment on a month-to-month basis. Virgilio Soriano also complained of illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not GSIS is solitarily liable to pay respondent’s salary differential Held: The petition is bereft of merit. 1991 to May 31. On March 15.00 per guard per month. During the effectivity of the contract.Tomas Lanting. rules and regulations. GSIS terminated the Security Service Contract with LSWA. which was incorporated in the Security Service Contract. On March 7.07 per guard per month effective November 1. and P4. Thus. In its Position Paper. 1991. 1993. that GSIS fully paid the services of the security guards as agreed upon in the Security Service Contract. which were issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act No. 1 and 2 by increasing the contract price from P3. 1991. 1990 to January 7. 6727. that LSWA obligated itself in the Security Service Contract to be solely liable for the enforcement of and compliance with all existing labor laws. the GSIS cannot evade liability by claiming that it had fully paid complainants' salaries by incorporating in the Security Service Contract the salary rate increases mandated by Wage Order Nos.176. complainants filed separate complaints against LSWA for underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard benefits from March 1991 to March 15. 1991. effective January 8.00 per month. 1991 to May 31. On August 9. otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.100. pursuant to Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code. 1 and Section 3 of Wage Order No. the Court does not agree with the GSIS's claim that a double burden would be Page 26 . LSWA requested the GSIS for an upward adjustment of the contract rate in view of Section 7 of Wage Order No. 1993. GSIS alleged that the Third-Party Complaint states no cause of action against it. 1991.00 effective January 8.200. 207 dated May 24. The Labor Arbiter held LSWA and GSIS jointly and severally liable for the payment of complainants' money claims. LSWA alleged that complainants were estopped from claiming that they were underpaid because they were informed that the pay and benefits given to them were based on the contract rate of P103.000.200 per guard per month.000. under Board Resolution No. 2. LSWA filed a Third-Party Complaint against GSIS for underpayment of complainants' wages. In this case. The NLRC held the GSIS solely liable for payment of complainants' money claims. doing business under the name and style of Lanting Security and Watchman Agency (LSWA) entered into a Security Service Contract to provide security guards to the properties of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) at the contract rate of P3. Hence. 1994. 1994. at P4. In its Position Paper.00 to P3.00 per eight hours of work or about P3.
they will be referred to as simply the Union and Toyota hereafter. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA). AND (2) WHETHER SEPARATION PAY SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE UNION MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ILLEGAL STRIKES. it has the right to recover from LSWA whatever amount it has paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between the LSWA and the GSIS. ISSUE: (1) WHETHER THE MASS ACTIONS COMMITTED BY THE UNION ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS ARE ILLEGAL STRIKES. which was granted. in the related cases docketed as G.imposed upon the latter because it would be paying twice for complainants' services. if the GSIS should pay the money claims of complainants. but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor Code. Joint and solidary liability is simply meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Nos. HELD: We rule that the protest actions undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23. VERSUS (NLRC-2ND DIVISION) Facts: Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (Union) and its dismissed officers and members seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). This is in line with the policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. The Union’s position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies. CORP. The joint and solidary liability of LSWA and the GSIS to pay complainants' salary differentials shall be without prejudice to the GSIS's right of reimbursement from LSWA. 158798-99. On the other hand. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation (Toyota) prays for the recall of the award of severance compensation to the 227 dismissed employees. 2001 are not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government for redress of their complaints. Under Article 1217 of the Civil Code. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS.” Shrouded as demonstrations. 27.R. they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who Page 27 . In view of the fact that the parties are petitioner/s and respondent/s and vice-versa in the four (4) interrelated cases. Such fears are unfounded. declaring illegal the strikes staged by the Union and upholding the dismissal of the 227 Union officers and members.
The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike. Sans ample evidence to the contrary. the Union was unable to justify the February 2001 mass actions. It is administered by the Carmelite Fathers at New Escalante. 282 of the Labor Code were serious or grave in nature and attended by willful or wrongful intent or they reflected adversely on the moral character of the employees. As they failed to conform to the law. and 23. 28. (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. 22. and commission of a crime against the employer or his family. the strikes on February 21. petitioner is not appealing the judgment itself but the manner of execution of the same.deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros. on February 21 to 23. and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company. The Union failed to comply with the following requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of strike. 2001 were illegal. Petitioner Mt. the award of separation pay to the Union officials and members in the instant petitions cannot be sustained. MT. Facts: In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance. ET AL. The Court declined to grant termination pay because the causes for dismissal recognized under Art. Based on existing jurisprudence. 282 like willful disobedience. The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard their rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their cause. which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. 2001 concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a valid strike under Art. or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice. The acts of the med-arbiter in the performance of his duties are presumed regular. the Union failed to advance convincing proof that the med-arbiter was biased against them. CARMEL COLLEGE VS. Manila. We therefore find that in addition to serious misconduct. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. It is obvious that the February 21 to 23. Respondents were Page 28 . 263 of the Labor Code. However. Carmel College is a private educational institution. fraud or willful breach of trust. in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. What comes to the fore is that the decision not to work for two days was designed and calculated to cripple the manufacturing arm of Toyota. separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. 2001. Negros Occidental. gross and habitual neglect of duty. JOCELYN RESUENA.
Labor Arbiter Drilon found that they were not illegally dismissed but ordered that they be awarded 13th month pay.47. Respondents were terminated by petitioner on 15 May 1998. An order for reinstatement must be specifically declared and cannot be presumed. thus. There being no specific order for reinstatement and the order being for complainant’s separation. separation pay. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It further directed the reinstatement of respondents or payment of separation pay. there can be no basis for the award of salaries/back wages during the pendency of appeal. or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable. issued a Memorandum to each of the respondents.employees of petitioner. petitioner’s Director. Fr. But this was precisely because on appeal to the NLRC. an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement. if viable. Respondents. Thereafter. Page 29 . Upon appeal to the NLRC. Modesto E. In effect. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. participated in a protest action against petitioner. together with several faculty members. Rev. nonacademic personnel. it is a separate and distinct relief given to an illegally dismissed employee. ISSUE: (1) whether reinstatement in the instant case is self-executory and does not need a writ of execution for its enforcement. like back wages. petitioner issued written notices of termination to respondents on 7 May 1998. separation pay is granted. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. the NLRC reversed the findings of the Labor Arbiter ruling that the termination of respondents was illegal and ordering the payment of backwages of respondents from 15 May 1998 up to 25 May 1999. it found that there was no illegal dismissal. The Memorandum directed respondents to explain in writing why they should not be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence for joining the protest action against the school administration. After a hearing conducted by petitioner’s Fact-Finding Committee and submission of its Report on 25 April 1998. and other students. an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: back wages and reinstatement. and (2) whether the continuing award of backwages is proper. Malandac. neither reinstatement nor back wages may be awarded. Petitioner maintained that respondents were occupying positions of highly confidential nature. and back wages. damages and attorney’s fees. Respondents charged petitioner with illegal dismissal and claimed 13th month pay. This Court had declared in the aforesaid case that reinstatement during appeal is warranted only when the Labor Arbiter himself rules that the dismissed employee should be reinstated. separation pay and attorney’s fees in the amount of P334.875. recommending dismissal or suspension of respondents. with backwages.
). the LA ruled that non-compliance with the procedural requirement will not per se make the termination illegal and held that requirement of procedural process was not totally disregarded. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option. that redundancy did not deter the employer to hire additional workers when it is deemed best for proper management. 29. 1997. He was a Senior Accounting Analyst receiving a monthly salary of P29. 1997. Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of back wages. Petitioner. and (2) whether petitioner gave a written notice to DOLE as required under Article 283 of the Labor Code. CALTEX (PHILS. are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights. there must be factual basis. 1997 due to the redundancy of his position and awarded him a separation package. then.The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal. that neither did petitioner send notice to DOLE one month prior to respondent’s dismissal.00 at the time of his termination on July 31. Issues: The issues for resolution are (1) whether private respondent’s termination on the ground of redundancy was valid. notified private respondent of his termination effective July 31. 1984. The LA found that private respondent's dismissal from the service on the ground of redundancy was done in good faith and a valid exercise of management prerogative. STO. Held: Page 30 .) VERSUS NLRC AND ROMEO T. that the records did not disclose any evidence to show basis for respondent’s termination. Sto Tomas (private respondent) was a regular employee of petitioner since February 2. Respondent filed his appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC expounded that although Article 283 of the Labor Code authorizes termination due to redundancy. (NOW CHEVRON PHILIPPINES. and payment of back wages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. While the LA found that petitioner failed to give notice to DOLE one month before the intended date of private respondent’s termination. INC. INC. TOMAS Facts: Romeo T. separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. and that there is no need for petitioner to conduct an impartial investigation or hearing since private respondent’s dismissal was not related to his blameworthy act or omission. through a letter dated June 30.860.
However. In February 1999. there being “no illegal dismissal to speak of. It is the burden of petitioner. This was confirmed by respondent KTC which admitted that petitioner was declared on sick leave with corresponding notification. he stayed home and spent time to recuperate. as employer. (KTC) of which co-respondent Filemon Lim is the President. redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirement of the enterprise. ruling that Article 284 of the Labor Code has no application to this case. and 4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. said certificate was not honored by the respondents who refused to allow petitioner to work. petitioner suffered a second heart attack and was again confined at the PHC. However. while categorically declaring that petitioner’s dismissal was illegal. As we ruled. Inc. the NLRC.” The CA upheld the NLRC Resolution. attesting to petitioner’s fitness to work. DUTERTE VERSUS KINGSWOOD TRADING CO. A month later. in its Resolution of April 24. petitioner had his first heart attack and was confined for two weeks at the Philippine Heart Center (PHC). 3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions. petitioner returned to work armed with a medical certificate signed by his attending physician at the PHC. The labor arbiter found for the petitioner. the labor arbiter. applied Article 284 on Disease as ground for termination on the rationale that since the respondents admitted that petitioner could not be allowed back to work because of the latter’s disease. Upon release. petitioner filed against his employer a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages. FILEMON LIM AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION Facts: Petitioner was hired as truck/trailer driver by respondent Kingswood Trading Company. We have held that the employer must comply with the following requisites to ensure the validity of the implementation of a redundancy program: 1) a written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. 1998. Respondents refused to declare petitioner fit to work unless physically examined by the company physician. ROQUE S.The CA correctly dismissed herein petitioner’s petition for certiorari. instead of applying Article 279  of the Labor Code on illegal dismissals. INC. On November 11. saying that the Commission committed no grave abuse of Page 31 . On respondents’ appeal. the case fell within the ambit of Article 284. 1999. 30.. 2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service. petitioner attempted to report back to work but was told to look for another job because he was unfit.. whichever is higher. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondent was illegally dismissed. to prove the factual and legal basis for the dismissal of its employees on the ground of redundancy. On November 8. set aside the labor arbiter’s decision. 2002. In June 1999.
) No. as amended. convinced that her husband’s ailment was work-related. All told. denied her claim for lack of substantial evidence to prove that the cause of his death was work-connected. And when the respondents asked the petitioner to look for another job because he was unfit to work. such unilateral declaration. 2001. Issue: Would the dismissal of an employee on the ground of disease under the said Article 284 still require the employer to present a certification from a competent public health authority that the disease is of such a nature that it could not be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment? Held: The Court disagrees with the NLRC and CA. in its Decision dated December 18. Here. his dismissal is tainted with invalidity.D. 626. Judge Vallar passed away at the age of sixty-six (66). The law is unequivocal: the employer.discretion in holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed and could not be granted any relief. did not meet the quantum requirement mandated by the law. the record does not contain the required certification. Clearly. Camiguin Province. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing that of the ECC and awarded full benefits pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. as amended.” His surviving spouse. However. there must be a certification by a competent public authority. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the diseases which caused the demise of Judge Vallar are compensable under the law. VALLAR Facts: From 1991 to 1996. The cause of death was “bronchopneumonia secondary to paraplegia: neuromyelitis. before it can legally dismiss its employee on the ground of disease. Judge Vallar suffered chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). On July 4. filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree (P. the GSIS.. GSIS VS. we rule and so hold that petitioner’s dismissal did not comply with both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process. must adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment. former Judge Teotimo Vallar presided over the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Catarman-Sagay. the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) rendered a Decision affirming the GSIS judgment. Page 32 . even if backed up by the findings of its company doctors. During his tenure. 31. Victoriousa Vallar. On appeal by Victoriousa.e. 1996. i. 626.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals (Second Division) was AFFIRMED. while PCPI and PPHI are corporations duly organized under Philippine laws. 32. PCPI. law books. 156848 October 11. It is true that “neuromyelitis optica” or “Davic’s disease. AND ANTONIO D. for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable. TEOFILO GUADIZ. the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex “A” of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied. is not listed as an occupational disease in Annex “A” of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. TODARO G. legal periodicals and other legal materials. LTD VS.” a disorder of the spinal cord. He worked long hours and burned the midnight oil reading records of cases. his health failed and eventually. PIL is engaged in the ready-mix and concrete aggregates business and has established a presence worldwide. For his part.” Under the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation.Held: Section 1 of P. However. No. His daily routine certainly subjected him to visual fatigue. JR. the full benefits she is entitled to under P.D. as amended. he died. HON. These severely strenuous working conditions contributed to the weakening of his immune system and caused him to contract neuromyelitis. defines a compensable sickness as “any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by his working conditions. PIL established PPHI as the holding company of the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines. No. Petitioner GSIS was ordered to pay respondent Victoriousa B. Judge Vallar evidently did his best to live up to these exacting standards. upon notice. McDonald is the Chief Executive Officer of PIL’s Hong Kong office while Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI. this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is exposed to. 2007 Facts: PIL is a corporation duly organized under Australian laws. transcripts of stenographic notes. Page 33 . he had to work at home and even during weekends. 626.. Often. Vallar. Inc. or (b) it must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. No. BRANCH 147. MAKATI CITY.R. Thus. stress and strain. as amended. IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Todaro further alleged that he was the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete. 626. PIONEER INTERNATIONAL.D. (Betonval) from June 1975 up to his resignation in February 1996.
PIL’s co-defendants. PIL asserted that the trial court has no jurisdiction over PIL because PIL is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines. PCPI. and PIL. McDonald. and your refusal to consider my terms of offer of permanent employment. Todaro sent a letter accepting the proposal of PIONEER INT’L. and not the trial court. PIL maintained that the complaint does not state a cause of action because there was no perfected contract. PIL also questioned the service of summons on it.M. by special appearance. According to Todaro. has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. and Klepzig. then Pioneer would offer him a position to manage the premixed concrete operations. Should Pioneer proceed with an investment in the Philippines. Todaro met with several of PIL’s representatives and even gave PIL the names of three of his subordinates in Betonval whom he would like to join him in PIL. a motion to dismiss Todaro’s complaint. This. Issues: Page 34 . It claimed that assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Folwell (Folwell). PIL’s Executive General Manager of Australia and Asia.. Todaro confirmed McDonald’s package concerning the consultancy and reiterated his desire to be the manager of Pioneer’s Philippine business venture. Todaro confirmed his availability and expressed interest in joining PIL. Pioneer Concrete Group HK. filed a separate motion to dismiss. Finally. it was not Klepzig but De Leon who received the summons for PIL. PPHI. Klepzig’s message reads: It has not proven possible for this company to meet with your expectations regarding the conditions of your providing Pioneer with consultancy services. PPHI. and no personal judgment could be rendered by the trial court against PIL because PIL is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and there was improper service of summons on PIL. to Todaro dated 18 September 1997. leave me no alternative but to withdraw these offers of employment with this company. the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum non-conveniens. PIL contacted him in May 1996 and asked if he could join it in establishing a pre-mixed concrete plant and in overseeing its operations in the Philippines. as a consultant for three (3) months on the condition that after three (3) months consultancy. The letter dated 20 October 1997 of K. Assuming arguendo that Klepzig is PIL’s agent in the Philippines. under the letterhead of PPHI. PIL filed.Before Todaro filed his complaint. under the letterhead of Pioneer Concrete Group HK. there were several meetings and exchanges of letters between Todaro and the officers of Pioneer Concrete (Hong Kong) Limited. as its Managing Director or CEO in the Philippines. replied to Todaro stating his confirmation of the offer to engage Todaro as a consultant to Pioneer International Ltd. he should be employed by PIONEER INT’L. to Todaro confirmed the contents of Klepzig’s letter. Klepzig sent another letter. on a permanent basis. PIL further stated that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
[the trial court] committed grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of the case. exclusive jurisdiction is vested with the [NLRC]. Foreign Investments Act of 1991. Page 35 . are not mere acts of a passive investor in a domestic corporation. Such are managerial and operational acts in directing and establishing commercial operations in the Philippines. including annexes. motions and all evidence on record. a court can consider all the pleadings filed in the case. Pursuant to the principle of forum non-conveniens. which acts are hypothetically admitted in PIL’s motion to dismiss. B. [Todaro] does not have a cause of action and the complaint fails to state a cause of action. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground. PIL’s alleged acts in actively negotiating to employ Todaro to run its pre-mixed concrete operations in the Philippines. D. [The trial court] did not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since the allegations contained therein indubitably show that [Todaro] bases his claims on an alleged breach of an employment contract. Thus.A. Jurisprudence is settled in that in resolving a motion to dismiss. PIL was doing business in the Philippines when it negotiated Todaro’s employment with PPHI. The propriety of dismissing a case based on forum non-conveniens requires a factual determination. This is in accordance to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. [the trial court] still failed to acquire jurisdiction since summons was improperly served on [PIL]. the complaint does not contain appropriate allegations of ultimate facts showing that [PIL] is doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Held: The doctrine of forum non-conveniens requires an examination of the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint. hence. Section 1. Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not mention forum non-conveniens as a ground for filing a motion to dismiss. Moreover. 7042. the trial court should do so only after vital facts are established to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance. [The trial court] did not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of [PIL] considering that: [PIL] is a foreign corporation “not doing business” in the Philippines. C. Assuming arguendo that jurisdiction may be acquired over the person of [PIL]. it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
in addition to breach of contract. (2) service on the government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does not have a resident agent. 36. PIL’s liability for the non-implementation of the alleged employment agreement is a civil dispute properly belonging to the regular courts. Todaro’s employment in the Philippines would not be with PIL but with PPHI as stated in the letter of Folwell. Klepzig’s Executive Assistant. there are three prescribed ways: (1) service on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose. a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with offices at No. No costs.When summons is served on a foreign juridical entity. Instead. Todaro’s causes of action as stated in his complaint are. In this instance. PIL transacted business in the Philippines and Klepzig was its agent within the Philippines. However. They started working as guards with the petitioner San Miguel Corporation assigned to the Beer Division on different dates until such time that they were promoted as supervising security guards. the employer-employee relationship would be between PPHI and Todaro. Mandaluyong City. the rule on substituted service of summons on a natural person was applied and it was held that no reason was given to justify the service of PIL’s summons on De Leon. However. based on “violation of Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code” for the “clear and evident bad faith and malice” on the part of defendants. the petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED. Assuming the existence of the employment agreement. The NLRC’s jurisdiction is limited to those enumerated under Article 217 of the Labor Code. Ltd. summons was not served personally on Klepzig as agent of PIL. summons was served on De Leon. not between PIL and Todaro. For symmetry. In effect. and (3) service on any of the corporation’s officers or agents within the Philippines. SMC VS. The Decision dated 27 September 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 January 2003 of the appellate court were AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that there was improper service of summons on Pioneer International. From the Page 36 . LAYOC Facts: Respondents were among the “Supervisory Security Guards” of the Beer Division of the San Miguel Corporation. WHEREFORE. the sheriff resorted to substituted service. 40 San Miguel Avenue. there was improper service of summons on PIL since summons was not served personally on Klepzig. De Leon was not PIL’s agent but a mere employee of Klepzig. The case was remanded to the trial court for proper service of summons and trial.
or diminish such benefits. Corollary. petitioners had no written authority to stop respondents from punching their time cards because the alleged memorandum authorizing such stoppage did not include supervisory security guards. holiday. The NLRC affirmed with modification the ruling of Arbiter Canizares that respondents suffered a diminution of benefits as a result of the adoption of the “no time card policy. Moreover. without prior consultation with the private respondents. and night premium pay.00 to P2.00 a month.000. eliminate. holiday. the personnel of the Beer Division of the petitioner San Miguel Corporation affected by the “No Time Card Policy” were given a 10% across-the-board increase on their basic pay while the supervisors who were assigned in the night shift (6:00 p. the Beer Division of the San Miguel Corporation implemented a “no time card policy” whereby the Supervisory I and II composing of the supervising security guards of the Beer Division were no longer required to punch their time cards. making petitioners liable for non-payment of overtime. and overtime.m. holiday and night premium duty through time card punching. there was a company practice which allowed the enjoyment of substantial additional remuneration. there is no rule excluding managerial employees from the Page 37 .500. Furthermore. holiday. who may not unilaterally withdraw. the San Miguel Corporation embarked on a Decentralization Program aimed at enabling the separate divisions of the San Miguel Corporation to pursue a more efficient and effective management of their respective operations. the private respondents were availing the benefits for overtime. In the present case. Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice.” Moreover. to 6:00 a. The Labor Arbiter ruled that rendering services beyond the regular eight-hour work day has become company practice. the time cards were ordered confiscated and the latter were no longer allowed to render overtime work. and violation of the equal protection clause and due process of law in relation to paragraphs 6 and 8 of Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. moral damages. As a result of the Decentralization Program. in the early 1990’s.m. the private respondents were required to punch their time cards for purposes of determining the time they would come in and out of the company’s work place. However. Respondents stated that the Beer Division of SMC maliciously and fraudulently refused payment of their overtime. Thus. and night premium pay from because of the “no time card policy.commencement of their employment. exemplary damages.” The NLRC cited a well-established rule that employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer. the respondents suffered a diminution of benefits. Respondents prayed for actual damages for two years (1993-1994). petitioners failed to show good faith in the exercise of their management prerogative in altering company practice because petitioners changed the terms and conditions of employment from “hours of work rendered” to “result” only with respect to respondents and not with other supervisors in other departments. However. Consequently. violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. in lieu of the overtime pay and the premium pay.) were given night shift allowance ranging from P2. and night premium pay.
moral shock. night shift differential (Article 86). petitioners did not freely give the payment for overtime work to respondents. Page 38 . contrary to the nature of benefits. Aside from their allegations.” respondents could not demand overtime pay from petitioners if respondents did not render overtime work. generally. hours worked (Article 84). Even if petitioners did not institute a “no time card policy. The appellate court affirmed the deletion of the award of actual. and computation of additional compensation (Article 90). Petitioners paid respondents overtime pay as compensation for services rendered in addition to the regular work hours. Thus. respondents did not present proof of previous earnings from overtime work and were not awarded with actual damages. emergency overtime work (Article 89).coverage of the principle of non-diminution of benefits. meal periods (Article 85). It is thus clear that. The appellate court ruled that while the implementation of the “no time card policy” was a valid exercise of management prerogative. First. The requirement of rendering additional service differentiates overtime pay from benefits such as thirteenth month pay or yearly merit increase. Issue: Whether the circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to the rule that supervisory employees are not entitled to overtime pay. Held: Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. and exemplary damages. overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code. However. Respondents rendered overtime work only when their services were needed after their regular working hours and only upon the instructions of their superiors. These benefits do not require any additional service from their beneficiaries. social humiliation. Respondents failed to show that the circumstances of the present case constitute an exception to this general rule. and similar injury to respondents to justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. besmirched reputation. Moreover. With the exception of Layoc. managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. the rendering of overtime work by respondents was a longaccepted practice in SMC which could not be peremptorily withdrawn without running afoul with the principles of justice and equity. the appellate court did not find that the implementation of the “no time card policy” caused any physical suffering. overtime work (Article 87). undertime not offset by overtime (Article 88). The other provisions in the Title include normal hours of work (Article 83). respondents assert that Article 100 of the Labor Code prohibits the elimination or diminution of benefits. moral. respondents were not able to present anything to prove that petitioners were obliged to permit respondents to render overtime work and give them the corresponding overtime pay.
while respondent Andres C. Torres-Yap (Yap) is its owner/ manager of Bodega City. Eizmendi. So long as a company’s management prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. 41. TORRES-YAP. Andres Soriano III. Torres-Yap (respondents). and its Resolution dated October 16. 55838 ordering petitioners San Miguel Corporation. SP No. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July 18.. WHEREFORE. The “no time card policy” undoubtedly caused pecuniary loss to respondents. to cushion the impact of the loss. Francisco C. petitioners granted to respondents and other supervisory employees a 10% across-the-board increase in pay and night shift allowance. The Decision dated 29 August 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. FACTS 1 Respondent Bodega City (Bodega City) is a corporation. PETITIONER. Galang to pay Numeriano Layoc. the petition is GRANTED. 00-0301729-95. and Faustino F.2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. However. SP No. The complaint of respondents is DISMISSED.R. 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. the “no time card policy” affecting all of the supervisory employees of the Beer Division is a valid exercise of management prerogative. VS.Given the discretion granted to the various divisions of SMC in the management and operation of their respective businesses and in the formulation and implementation of policies affecting their operations and their personnel. the Court will uphold them. RESPONDENTS. The NLRC Decision set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Lolita Lopez (petitioner) was illegally dismissed by Bodega City and/or Andres C. BODEGA CITY (VIDEO-DISCO KITCHEN OF THE PHILIPPINES) AND/OR ANDRES C. Jr. 66861. in addition to their yearly merit increase in basic salary. LOLITA LOPEZ. overtime pay and the other respondents nominal damages is SET ASIDE. Jr. 2 Bodega alleged that Lopez have acted in a hostile manner against a lady customer who informed the management that she saw petitioner sleeping while on duty. Petitioner was the "lady keeper" of Bodega City tasked with manning its ladies' comfort room. 2002. Page 39 .R. dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it and affirming the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR Case No.
On March 22. premises duly considered.Petitioner contends that it was wrong for the CA to conclude that even if she did not sign the document evidencing the concessionaire agreement. Thereafter. the NLRC issued a Resolution. and in its stead.4 8 Petitioner (LOPEZ_filed an MR of the above-quoted NLRC Resolution. respondents Bodega contended that no employer-employee relationship by virtue of a concessionaire agreement she entered into with respondents. she impliedly accepted and thus bound herself to the terms and conditions contained in the said agreement when she continued to perform the task which was allegedly specified therein for a considerable length of time. a complaint for illegal dismissal contending that she was dismissed from her employment without cause and due process.3 7 Respondents(Bodega) filed an appeal with the NLRC. 2001. The the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision dismissing her special civil action for certiorari. herein petition based on the following grounds:(RULE 45) 1. but the NLRC denied the same. 11 Hence. the case was assigned to a different Labor Arbiter. a new one entered DISMISSING the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Petitioner Lopez further argues her EVIDENCES Page 40 . on appeal. 5 The complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. the NLRC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. the Decision appealed from is hereby ordered SET ASIDE and VACATED. hearings were conducted and the parties were required to submit memoranda and other supporting documents.3 Petitioner Lopez filed with NLRC. 2. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 9 Aggrieved. Prior to all these. Upon remand. 10 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied. However. 4 In their answer. petitioner asserts that her job as a "lady keeper" was a task assigned to her as an employee of respondents. Petitioner claims that the concessionaire agreement was only offered to her during her tenth year of service and after she organized a union and filed a complaint against respondents. 6 The Judgment finds that Lopez was an employee of respondents and that the latter illegally dismissed her. petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
(2) her identification card(EVIDENCE 2) clearly shows that she was not a concessionaire but an employee of respondents Moreover. Respondent Bodega’s evidence to rebut  “concessionaire contract for a period of three years is evidence of her implied acceptance of such proposal.18 The CA did not err when it held that a solitary petty cash voucher did not prove that petitioner had been receiving salary from respondents or that she had been respondents' employee for 10 years. (2) the payment of wages.from respondents is a clear evidence that she was an employee of the latter. the grounds relied upon in the instant petition are matters that have been exhaustively discussed by the NLRC and the CA.(1) receipt of a special allowance . as the amount she received was equivalent to the minimum wage at that time. To prove the element of payment of wages. 12 On the other hand. respondents Bodega contend that the present petition was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the proceedings of the case. petitioner presented a petty cash voucher showing that she received an allowance for five (5) days. namely: (1) the manner of selection and engagement. (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal. the last one is the most important. she Page 41 . Of these four. petitioner failed to present competent documentary and testimonial evidence to prove her contention that she was an employee of respondents since 1985. Indeed. petitioner submits that the fact (3) that she was required to follow rules and regulations prescribing appropriate conduct while she was in the premises of Bodega City is clear evidence of the existence of an employer-employee relationship between her and petitioners. The so-called "control test" is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employeremployee relationship. jurisprudence has invariably applied the four-fold test. and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. HELD To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship. if petitioner was really an employee of respondents for that length of time.  Lopez failed to present evidence to prove her allegation that the subject concessionaire agreement was only proposed to her in her 10th year of employment with respondent company and after she organized a union and filed a labor complaint against respondents. ISSUES : Whether or not Lopez is an employee of respondents.
To prove the element of control. Inc. The Court agrees with respondents that petitioner could have easily shown other pieces of evidence such as a contract of employment. The petitioner C. PETITIONER. JR. SSS or Medicare forms. or she could have presented witnesses to prove her contention that she was an employee of respondents. petitioner was not dismissed by respondents. C. VS. RESPONDENTS. Petitioner failed to do so. 42.R. Instead. PAPASHIP in turn appointed private respondent Rizal International Shipping Services (Rizal) as manning agency in the Philippines.. Sharp) appeals by certiorari the April 30. Thus. 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. there is nothing in the agreement which specifies the methods by which petitioner should achieve these results. entered into a Crewing Agreement3 with Papadopolous Shipping.F. HON. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT. SP No.F. INC. recruiting Filipino seamen for LCL’s vessel. as shown by the letter of Yap to her their contractual relationship was terminated by reason of respondents' termination of the subject concessionaire agreement. (C. or certificates of withholding tax on compensation income. (PAPASHIP).F. a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Cyprus.. The only evidence presented by petitioner as proof of her alleged employment are her ID card and one petty cash voucher for a five-day allowance which were disputed by respondents. ESPANOL. Sharp Crew Management.should have been able to present salary vouchers or pay slips and not just a single petty cash voucher. 53747 and the November 5. PARTIES Louis Cruise Lines (LCL). HON. QUISUMBING AND RIZAL INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING SERVICES. FACTS Page 42 . SECRETARY LEONARDO A. Ltd. 2002 Resolution2 denying its reconsideration. UNDERSECRETARY JOSE M.
6(b).The Inspection Report5 signed by Corazon Aquino of the POEA and countersigned by Mr. as amended in relation to Sec. It belittled the inspection report of the POEA inspection team claiming that it simply stated that interviews and recruitment were undertaken.F.F. Sharp as crewing agent in the Philippines. the respondent CF Sharp is as it is hereby ordered suspended for another period of [eighteen] (18) months or to pay the fine of P180. Sharp with the POEA 5. 3 On December 17. 7 C. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment and ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months or in lieu thereof. Espanol. and blacklisting against LCL and C. it is ordered to pay a fine of P50. 1997.F. cancellation or revocation of license.F. Rizal filed a complaint6 for illegal recruitment. Sharp elevated the Administrator’s ruling to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). 1996. but the AFFIRMED the decision. C. Jose M. Sharp was thereafter submitted to the POEA. However. Rizal reported LCL’s recruitment activities to the POEA on December 9. Rule I. two(2) principals of LCL arrived in the Philippines and conducted a series of interviews for seafarers at C. but Rizal objected on the ground that its accreditation still existed and would only expire on December 31. C.F. without reference to who were conducting the interview and for what vessels.. Sharp admitted that the two principals conducted interviews at C. It then appointed C. 1996. 29 of the Labor Code. C. POEA representatives conducted an inspection and found the two(2) principals C. Sharp interviewing and recruiting . but denied that they were for recruitment and selection purposes but for LCL’s ex-crew members who had various complaints against Rizal. Sharp’s office. Jr.F. 8. Page 43 . 1999 by the then Undersecretary. Book VI of the Rules and Regulations governing Overseas Employment. A supersedeas bond was posted by the CF Sharp for payment of the fines as imposed above should the CF Sharp opt to pay the fine instead of undergoing suspension of its license. 1996.000.000. Sharp requested for accreditation as the new manning agency of LCL with the (POEA). 9. On January 2. 2(k). Sharp’s office. Further. and requested an ocular inspection of C.F. Sharp’s premises. The POEA Administrator was not persuaded and found C. 4.F. the suspension shall remain in force until such fine is paid.00 for committing 9 counts of violation of Article 29 of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Sec. Book II of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment in accordance with the schedule of penalties. Reynaldo Banawis of C. Rule II.8 6.1 LCL terminated the Crewing Agreement with PAPASHIP to take effect on December 31.F. Sharp’s motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 5.F.00 for violation of Art. 1996.For its part. or in the event that the petitioner-appellant further appeals this Order. 2 Pending approval of the accreditation.F.F.
this Court referred the petition to the CA.18 but the CA denied it on November 25.F. Thus. Book VI of the POEA Rules when it appointed Henry Desiderio as agent. Sharp. Sharp was already estopped from assailing the Secretary of Labor’s ruling because it had manifested its option to have the cash bond posted answer for the alternative fines imposed upon it. Sharp. withholding of wages.. Page 44 . Sharp denies committing illegal recruitment activities in December 1996.F.F.F.F. By paying the adjudged fines. Rule I. 12 C. and includes referrals. contract services. thus. utilizing.F. Sharp wants to portray . Sharp filed a motion for reconsideration. concludes that it cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment.F.10. Sharp liable for illegal recruitment. It posits that the interviews undertaken by the LCL principals do not amount to illegal recruitment under Section 6 of Republic Act No. C. promising or advertising for employment. hiring or procuring workers. Sharp’s petition for certiorari. C. their complaints for non-remittance of SSS premiums. undertook recruitment activities without authority. the appellate court declared that the Secretary of Labor acted well within his discretion in holding C.19 Issue: Whether or not C.F. Sharp is liable for illegal recruitment. Finally.F.the conduct of preparatory interviews is a recruitment activity. HELD C. along with C. it affirmed both labor officials finding that C. 2002. Sharp effectively executed the judgment. specifically. it contends that the interviews conducted were not for selection and recruitment purposes. locally or abroad whether for profit or not: Provided.17 holding that C. Further. The CA denied C. Sharp violated Article 29 of the Labor Code and Section 2(k). 8042 or the Migrants Workers Act. without prior approval from the POEA. It claims that it was only upon approval of its application for accreditation that the employment contracts were entered into and actual deployment of the seamen was made.F. The CA also agreed with the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor that LCL. offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 11.F. but were in connection with the seamen’s past employment with Rizal. contracting. That any person or entity which in any manner. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as: any act of canvassing. It elevated the case to this Court on petition for certiorari. illegal exactions from medical examinations and delayed allotments. On the basis of this definition and contrary to what C. DOLE Resolution. transporting. enlisting.
Facts: Aida Aparecio worked for BMG records as one of the promo girls in its Cebu Branch. SSS. he NLRC. Aparecio filed a complaint against BMG and its Branch Manager. premium pay for rest day. Since the letter of resignation showed no signs that it was made through duress or compulsion. Issue: Whether or not respondent Aparecio was illegally dismissed by BMG. co-petitioner herein.. JR. however. Later on. Jr. Jose Yap.This Office cannot conceive of a good reason why LCL should be interested at the time in unearthing alleged violations committed by Rizal Shipping whose representative status as manning agency was to be terminated in just a few weeks thereafter. Page 45 . Held: No. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. They stood to gain nothing from such taxing exercise involving several hundreds of ex-crew members. however. The observation of the POEA Administrator that the complaints of the crewmen were filed only after Rizal Shipping filed its complaints with the POEA merely to bolster the defense of CF Sharp. Upon appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the Decision was filed by petitioners. which could be handled by government agencies like the POEA. holiday pay. BMG RECORDS (PHILS. VS. The labor arbiter dismissed Aparecio's complaint. NLRC. resolved to deny the motion. is telling and was just an afterthought. APARECIO AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.).. for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay. RESPONDENTS. On appeal. AIDA C. the NLRC found that Aparecio was illegally dismissed from service. service incentive leave. the severance of her employment was brought about by her submission of resignation letter to herein petitioner. 13 th month pay. the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the NLRC. spending valuable time and money in the process. AND JOSE YAP. and separation pay. PETITIONERS. 43. it was concluded that the severance of her employment in BMG was brought about by her resignation and not by the illegal dismissal supposedly committed by the latter. INC..
Also. the CBA is the law between the contracting parties. for reimbursement of P851. 45. should reimburse the training cost to PAL. On February 11. Issue: Whether or not Almario. After eight monts of service. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. he tendered his resignation. INC.107 worth of training costs. the Court of Appeals. 1997. PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). under Article 22 of the Civil Code. PAL Facts: Vicente Almario worked for Pal as Systems Engineer and later on as First Officer. VICENTE ALMARIO VS. the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether in fact. On appeal by both parties. proficiency. resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service. Facts: Page 46 .Also. Upon promotion. 2005. and costs of litigation. and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. Held: Yes. who resigned after only eight months of service. It found Almario liable under the CBA between PAL and ALPAP and. Hence. with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill. in any event. reversed the trial court’s decision. by Decision dated March 31. EASWAYS MARINE. or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 officer. it should be complied with both the employee and the employer. 44. Almario underwent an additional training. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. PALISOC VS. he or she intended to sever from his or her employment. attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the said amount. The RTC dismissed the complaint of PAL and ordered them to pay Almario damages.
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Thereafter. a PPA Pass and Page 47 . Respondent filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. Held: Yes.Mars Palisoc filed an action before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against respondents and Capt. Terencio. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits. Boclot was hired by PASSI to perform the functions of a stevedore. and its President to pay disability benefits. Inc. medical reimbursement to the former. moral. payment of service incentive leave and 13th month pays. Respondent alleged that he was hired by PASSI in October 1999 and was issued company ID No. 46. The CA dismissed the petition. Also. exemplary and actual damages. and attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the NLRC and it modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent Jeff B. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same for lack of merit. absorbing PASSI workers as well as their relievers. PIER AND ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES ET AL. VS. Thereafter. 304. BOCLOT Facts: Petitioner Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services. petitioner’s inability to work for more than 120 days determines his entitlement to permanent disability benefits. (PASSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing arrastre and stevedoring services at Pier 8 in the Manila North Harbor. the concept of permanent disability in the Labor Code (192 [c] ) applies also to seafarers. the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) seized the facilities and took over the operations of PASSI through its Special Takeover Unit. Inc. claiming regularization. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Palisoc and ordered Easways Marine.
Pati ruled for petitioners and dismissed respondent’s complaint contending that Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code were inapplicable. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. since it was his sixth continuous month in service in PASSI’s regular course of business. Labor Arbiter Felipe P. It was elevated before the Court of Appeals but it was affirmed. However. Article 280. That. In fact. any employee who has rendered at least one year of Page 48 . Regular and Casual Employment. respondent contended that he became a regular employee by April 2000. Petition for review under Rule 45 Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT JEFF BOCLOT IS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE OF PETITIONER PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES. is neither a probationary employee nor a casual employee. Hence. BECAUSE HE PERFORMED TASKS WHICH ARE USUALLY NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE TO THE MAIN BUSINESS OF PETITIONER CORPORATION Held: Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. the State affords full protection to labor. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force and guarantees that it shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. petitioners alleged that respondent was hired as a mere “reliever” stevedore and could thus not become a regular employee. local and overseas. The NLRC predicated its findings that respondent is a regular employee of petitioners on the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. INC.SSS documents. and the promotion of full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. . on the contention that the aforementioned articles speak of probationary employees and casual employees while respondent. organized and unorganized.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. as a reliever. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
while Andito Pael (petitioner Pael) in 1993. The primary standard. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. ET AL. regularization. the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint “for not being substantiated with clear and convincing evidence. the employment is also considered regular. even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent. Petitioners' contracts were renewed from time to time. Hence. and the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition filed before it. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE SEASONAL/PROJECT/TERM EMPLOYEES NOT REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF RESPONDENTS Page 49 .” The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the LA's dismissal. Also. therefore. the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.service. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exist. if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year. until May 1999 when they were informed that their contracts will not be renewed anymore. 13th month pay. Facts: Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (respondent) is a corporation engaged in the cane sugar milling business. 1999. damages and attorney’s fees. but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. whether such service is continuous or broken. 47. At the start of their respective employments. they were made to sign a Contract of Employment for Specific Project or Undertaking. of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. CACERES VS. UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORP. In a Decision dated August 24. incentive leave pay. Pedy Caseres (petitioner Caseres) started working for respondent in 1989.
That. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. PETITIONER. VS.Held: ART. and such successive employments were not continuous. as length of service is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee. even if petitioners were repeatedly and successively re-hired. whether such service is continuous or broken. JOHN F. necessarily the employment of respondent’s work force was not permanent but co-terminous with the projects to which they were assigned and from whose payrolls they were paid Moreover. Petitioners' repeated and successive re-employment on the basis of a contract of employment for more than one year cannot and does not make them regular employees. – The provision of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. and since their work depended on the availability of such contracts or projects. 280. still it did not qualify them as regular employees. the proviso in Article 280. stating that an employee who has rendered service for at least one (1) year shall be considered a regular employee. FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION Page 50 . the duration of his employment ranged from one day to several months at a time. pertains to casual employees and not to project employees. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. With regard to petitioner Pael. but whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking. Further. Length of service is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee The fact that petitioners were constantly re-hired does not ipso facto establish that they became regular employees. its completion has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. Regular and Casual Employees. MCLEOD. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION). 48. These support the conclusion that they were indeed project employees. his employment never lasted for more than a month at a time. while his employment lasted from August 1989 to May 1999. In petitioner Caseres's case. Their respective contracts with respondent show that there were intervals in their employment. any employee who has rendered at least one year of service.
ROSA TEXTILES. INC. Inc. Far Eastern Textile Mills. attorney’s fees plus interest against Filipinas Synthetic Corporation (Filsyn). Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the private respondents and the petitioner? Held: No. (PEGGY MILLS.. SRTI. PATRICIO L. Rosa Textiles. McLeod cannot hold Patricio solidarily liable with PMI. Patricio L.495. (FETMI).5 days for every year of service for his twelve (12) years of service from 1980 to 1992 based on a salary rate of P50. Inc. its stockholders or other persons. and Eric Hu appealed to the NLRC. vacation and sick leave benefits.. McLeod filed a complaint for retirement benefits. (SRTI). having knowledge of such issuance. Inc. Sta. do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection. McLeod. Inc. Lim (Patricio). Facts: John F. McLeod thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the decision and resolution of the NLRC. moral and exemplary damages. Personal liability of corporate directors. Far Eastern Textile Mills. McLeod failed to present evidence to support his allegation of employer-employee relationship between him and any of Filsyn. (3) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation. Page 51 . RESPONDENTS. (2) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when.. AND ERIC HU. or (4) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action. Sta. non-payment of unused airline tickets. STA.. FAR EASTERN TEXTILE MILLS.(FILSYN). The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC that respondent Patricio Lim is jointly and solidarily liable with Peggy Mills. to pay complainant his retirement pay equivalent to 22. holiday pay. LIM. INC. or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation. and FETMI. Inc.. or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs. Rosa Textiles. McLeod (McLeod) filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its Resolution of 30 June 1999. trustees or officers attaches only when (1) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation. Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation (Filsyn). underpayment of salary and 13th month pay. The NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of Labor Arbiter and ordered respondent Peggy Mills. John F. INC. Considering that McLeod failed to prove any of the foregoing exceptions in the present case.). Inc. Patricio Lim and Eric Hu. to pay the following amounts to petitioner John F.00 a month.. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of herein petitioner and held all respondents as jointly and solidarily liable for complainant’s money claims..
filed a complaint against Rubberworld for unfair labor practice (ULP). RUBBERWORLD (PHILS. or the decision/dismissal order and writ of execution issued by the NLRC. CPA’S (IN ITS CAPACITY AS LIQUIDATOR OF RUBBERWORLD (PHILS. office. as amended. pending before any court. PETITIONERS. and non-payment of salaries and separation pay. Faced with this dilemma. for brevity). Rubberworld filed with the Court an Urgent Omnibus Motion to declare null and void the execution/garnishment made pursuant to the same writ.. to have committed unfair labor practice A writ of execution was issued by the NLRC in favor of the petitioner union with a copy thereof served on the respondent corporation. As such.55. illegal shutdown. body. including the dismissal by the NLRC of Rubberworl’s appeal. With the creation of the Management Committee. tribunal. it cannot be said that the decision of the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: Whether the writ of execution issued by the NRLC will lie in this case? HELD: Given the factual milieu obtaining in this case.) INC. could not have achieved a final and executory status. Notwithstanding the SEC's aforementioned suspension order and despite Rubberworld's submission of a Motion to Suspend Proceedings. AND ANTONIO YANG. INC. Page 52 . RESPONDENTS. Commission or sheriff are hereby deemed SUSPENDED. all actions for claims against Rubberworld Philippines. the Lingkod Manggagawa Sa Rubberworld. board. Inc. LAYA MANANGHAYA SALGADO & CO. Rubberworld filed with the SEC a Petition for Declaration of a State of Suspension of Payments with Proposed Rehabilitation Plan. Labor Arbiter Dinopol went ahead with the ULP case and rendered his decision thereon declaring respondent Rubberworld Phils. While the aforementioned complaint was pending with Labor Arbiter Dinopol. the Labor Arbiter’s decision. ADIDAS-ANGLO. FACTS: Herein petitioner union. Adidas-Anglo (Lingkod. LINGKOD MANGGAGAWA SA RUBBERWORLD. the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC are all null and void for having been undertaken or issued in violation of the SEC suspension Order.. VS. Thus. The Labor Arbiter completely disregarded and violated Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree 902-A..). ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS AS REPRESENTED BY SONIA ESPERANZA. could ever attain final and executory status. which categorically mandates the suspension of all actions for claims against a corporation placed under a management committee by the SEC. Inc.
a void judgment is regarded as a nullity. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC ruled that the issue of whether there was overpricing is secondary only to the issue of whether Rosales breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his employer.). They contended that Rosales was given time to explain. 56. FACTS: Rosales filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against Norsk Hydro. It neither binds nor bars anyone. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all. No rights are divested by it nor obtained from it. and (2) his right to due process was violated. non-existent. They had set a hearing. petitioners Norsk Hydro and Neverdal maintained that Rosales was dismissed for a just cause.. In other words. JR. RESPONDENT. having connived with the real estate brokers to overprice the properties and profited from it to the gross disadvantage of the company. the Labor Arbiter found nothing irregular in the manner Rosales was dismissed. all proceedings upon which the judgment is founded are equally worthless. NEVERDAL. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC and declared that Rosales was illegally dismissed. NORSK HYDRO (PHILS. ROSALES. except when the law itself authorizes their validity. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.The Labor Arbiter's decision in this case is void ab initio. PETITIONERS. It held that the company was justified in terminating Rosales’ employment on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It accordingly leaves the party-litigants in the same position they were in before the trial. He also claimed that he was not given opportunity to go over the records incriminating him and that the investigation was hastily terminated. who was not a representative of any of Page 53 . INC. According to the Court of Appeals. For their part. Undaunted. which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found Abecia’s sworn statement sufficient basis for the company to lose its trust and confidence on Rosales.Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. AND HANS T. BENJAMIN S. Being worthless in itself. VS. yet Rosales failed to answer the charges against him. Moreover. Rosales filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because (1) there was no legal basis for his dismissal. He claimed that there was no evidence showing that he defrauded the company. The Court of Appeals held that Norsk Hydro failed to prove with substantial evidence that Rosales participated in the alleged overpricing nor had it shown the extent of his participation. the company should not have relied on the affidavit of Abecia. and therefore. Rosales appealed to the NLRC.
or that the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. PETITIONERS. VS. Dean N. respondent received a letter from petitioner company concluding their retainership agreement effective thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. without justifiable excuse. and purposely. INC. Respondent inquired from the management of petitioner company whether it was agreeable to recognizing him as a regular employee. It is sufficient that there be some basis for the same. It should also be stressed that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss of trust and confidence on the responsible officer. thoughtlessly. Holiday Pay. Climaco is a medical doctor who was hired by petitioner CocaCola Bottlers Phils. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states. COCA COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS. DEAN N. FACTS: Respondent Dr. on the premise that an employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. however. including 13th Month Pay. While the complaint was pending before the Labor Arbiter. Service Incentive Leave Pay. It ruled that Norsk Hydro did not observe due process because it did not furnish Rosales or his counsel with the documents for him to prepare intelligent answers to the charges against him. it must be willful.the owners and that.). Cost of Living Allowance. heedlessly or inadvertently. The management refused to do so. Respondent filed a Complaint before the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether the respondent employee was legally dismissed by the petitioner? HELD: Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence. by virtue of a Retainer Agreement. 57. without being cross-examined. seeking recognition as a regular employee of petitioner company and prayed for the payment of all benefits of a regular employee. Inc. knowingly. This prompted respondent to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner company with the NLRC. Page 54 . More specifically the loss of trust must be founded on clearly established facts. RESPONDENT. CLIMACO. Ordinary breach will not suffice. especially in cases of employees occupying positions of responsibility. DR. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally. and Christmas Bonus. as distinguished from an act done carelessly./ERIC MONTINOLA. MANAGER. that the loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer.. and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position. his affidavit was hearsay.
and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct. Thus. Complainant does not dispute the fact that outside of the two (2) hours that he is required to be at respondent company’s premises.The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner company lacked the power of control over respondent’s performance of his duties. in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. (3) the power of dismissal. coupled with the actual services rendered by the petitioner. when read together with the Comprehensive Medical Plan which was made an integral part of the retainer agreements. (2) the payment of wages. how to immunize. The NLRC dismissed the appeal in both cases for lack of merit. employees of [petitioner] company. the Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent’s complaint in the first case. would show that all the elements of the above test are present. or how to diagnose and treat his patients. which contains the respondent’s objectives. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC correctly found that petitioner company lacked the power of control over the performance by respondent of his duties. Likewise. Respondent appealed both decisions to the NLRC. does not tell respondent "how to conduct his physical examination. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties. The Court agrees with the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the circumstances of this case show that no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties. duties and obligations. or the so-called "control test. It declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner company and respondent based on the provisions of the Retainer Agreement which contract governed respondent’s employment." considered to be the most important element. (2) the payment of wages. and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. he is not at all further required to just sit around in the premises and wait for an emergency to occur so as to enable him from using such hours for his own benefit Page 55 . the allegation of complainant that since he is on call at anytime of the day and night makes him a regular employee is off-tangent. (3) the power of dismissal. The Retainer Agreement executed by and between the parties. The resolution of the main issue will determine whether the termination of respondent’s employment is illegal. HELD: The Court. The Court of Appeals ruled that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner company and respondent after applying the four-fold test: (1) the power to hire the employee. has invariably adhered to the four-fold test: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. and recognized as valid the Retainer Agreement between the parties. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that the Comprehensive Medical Plan.
as well as de Lara and Alovera. their backwages has reached the sum of P562. FABELA VS. where he services his patients. Respondents explained that SMC previously operated under the "Route System. (See attached computation). the services of petitioners. Rogelio Lasat. an employee is required to stay in the employer’s workplace or proximately close thereto that he cannot utilize his time effectively and gainfully for his own purpose 58. were hired by respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) as "Relief Salesmen" for the Greater Manila Area (GMA) under separate but almost similarly worded "Contracts of Employment With Fixed Period. The Office of the Labor Arbiter ordered that the respondents be reinstated Marcelo Dela Cruz. were terminated after SMC no longer agreed to forge another contract with them.336. In fact. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed on appeal by the NLRC. Brent instructs that a contract of employment stipulating a Page 56 .and if it is an employee of respondent company who is attended to by him for special treatment that needs hospitalization or operation. More often than not. Manuel Delos Santos and Rommel Quines to their former positions with full backwages from the time their salaries were withheld until they are actually reinstated. who was its Human Resources Manager. bills them accordingly -. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION Facts: Petitioners. Henry Maliwanag. Held: Yes. claimed that the hiring of petitioners was not intended to be permanent. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.and advantage. complainant maintains his own private clinic attending to his private practice in the city. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the NLRC.64. The complaints of Jun Alovera and Joselito De Lara must be dismissed for lack of merit. as the same was merely occasioned by the need to fill in a vacuum arising from SMC’s gradual transition to a new system of selling and delivering its products. Respondents’ contention that there are fixed periods stated in the contracts of employment does not lie. this is subject to a special billing. Respondent SMC and its co-respondent Arman Hicarte. Norlito Fabela. along with Joselito de Lara and John Alovera. As of this date." After having entered into successive contracts of the same nature with SMC." but began implementing in 1993 the "Pre-Selling System" in which the salesmen under the earlier system would be replaced by Accounts Specialists which called for upgraded qualifications.
however.000. by letter of February 10. Uy for P60.000 to John Chua who. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be effected. 1999. even if clear as regards the existence of a period. sold it to Benito Bonghanoy. On appeal. the Integrated Internal Audit Operations (IIAO) of respondent required petitioner to explain in writing why the plan had not been transferred to Josefina and was instead sold to another. however. Having gotten wind of the transactions subsequent to her purchase of the plan. As Brent pronounces. such as when the employee himself insists upon the period. damages and attorney’s fees against respondent.4 informed respondent that petitioner had "swindled" her but that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long as petitioner pay the amount involved and the interest. 59. a fixed-term employment is valid only under certain circumstances. The Labor Arbiter. NLRC.17 thus: x x x A stipulation [for a fixed-term] in an agreement can be ignored as and when it is utilized to deprive the employee of his security of tenure. where the scales generally tip against the employee. The sheer inequality that characterizes employer-employee relations. petitioner pledged it for P50. or where the nature of the engagement is such that. petitioner procured an educational plan (the plan) from respondent which she had fully paid but which she later sold to Josefina Pernes (Josefina) for P37. a definite date of termination is a sine qua non. Acting on Josefina’s letter. PANUNCILLO VS. found the same too harsh. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to Gaudioso R. while finding that the dismissal was for a valid cause. Josefina.fixed-term. and should thus be ignored. And so does Paguio v. Facts: In order to secure the education of her son. CAP PHILIPPINES. Petitioner thus filed a complaint14 for illegal dismissal. without being seasonal or for a specific project. Respondent thereupon terminated the services of petitioner by Memorandum. by Decision of October 29. The Supreme court upheld the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. often scarcely provides him real and better options. 13th month pay. INC. service incentive leave pay. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Page 57 . is invalid if it can be shown that the same was executed with the intention of circumventing security of tenure. He thus ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to a position one rank lower than her previous position.000.
she violated the trust and confidence of respondent and its customers. Petitioner had an altercation with Richard Alcantara (Alcantara) of the ASF. On even date. To allow her to continue with her employment puts respondent under the risk of being embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits from customers similarly situated as Josefina. The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter.38 caliber revolver service firearm and duty detail order had already expired.000 for every year of service. It merely ordered his reinstatement. On the same ground. (respondent) as a security guard. Page 58 . Alcantara filed a complaintfor Gross Misconduct. Pido (petitioner) was hired by Cherubim Security and General Services. claiming that when he directed petitioner to present his security license.On January 23. Inc. PIDO VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION Facts: Federito B. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner’s suspension for more than nine months had ripened into constructive termination.000. Before terminating the services of an employee. or for the total amount of P32. Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). petitioner reported for work at the Ayala Center but he was not allowed to stay in the premises. the law requires two written notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. respondent exercised its management prerogative when it dismissed petitioner. on account of which he ordered the payment of separation pay equivalent to one month salary of P8. Petitioner thus filed a case. While it found that petitioner was indeed constructively dismissed. Clearly. a Recall Order having been issued by respondent through its Operations Manager.2001. and (2) the other to inform him of his employer ’s decision to dismiss him.4 of respondent’s Code of Discipline. 60. Held: Yes. arising from a statement of Alcantara that petitioner’s security license for his . By petitioner’s repeated violation of Section 8. the NLRC denied petitioner’s claim for backwages. the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be heard. it finding that petitioner’s dismissal was illegal and accordingly ordering her reinstatement to her former position. it set aside the award of separation pay. petitioner angrily and on top of his voice questioned his authority. given respondent’s willingness to assign petitioner to another post which he declined. 2000. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed. And Alcantara recommended that petitioner be relieved from his post. reversed that of the Labor Arbiter. and that immediate disciplinary action against him be taken. and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing. et al. As to the requirement of a hearing.
00 to the petitioner. Respondent was assigned to the Alaminos. The Appellate court sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that while a security guard. Quezon City. the employer should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. in instances when contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to it even for want of cause. CHERUBIM SECURITY AND GENERAL SERVICES. PIDO. Also. destined to Cubao. respondent drove his assigned bus from Alaminos. A floating status requires the dire exigency of the employer's bona fide suspension of operation of a business or undertaking. The assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that respondent. the respondent deposited a cash bond in the amount of P10. INC VS. the replaced security guard may be placed on temporary "off-detail" if there are no available posts under respondent’s existing contracts. His confinement therein lasted a month." he does not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law. FEDERITO B. respondent failed to discharge. Tarlac. INC. In security services. Pangasinan. the bus he was driving was bumped by a Dagupan-bound bus. this happens when the security agency’s clients which do not renew their contracts are more than those that do and the new ones that the agency gets." the same should continue only for six months. and pay him back wages. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee. While traversing Moncada. As a consequence thereof. VICTORY LINER.Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was constructively dismissed? Held: Yes..Cubao. otherwise the security agency could be liable for constructive dismissal. RACE Facts: Respondent was employed by the petitioner as a bus driver. When a security guard is placed on a "floating status. Petitioner shouldered the doctor’s professional fee and the Page 59 . PABLO M. is further ordered to reinstate petitioner. One month after his release from the said hospital. As a requisite for his hiring. On the night of 24 August 1994. may be lawfully placed on a "floating status. This. respondent suffered a fractured left leg and was rushed to the Country Medical and Trauma Center in Tarlac City where he was operated on and confined from 24 August 1994 up to 10 October 1994. the respondent was confined again for further treatment of his fractured left leg at the Specialist Group Hospital in Dagupan City.000. route on the evening schedule. like petitioner. Pangasinan . 61. Quezon City.
Respondent rebuffed the increased offer. however. Employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and respondent cannot be deemed to have been extinguished on 10 November 1994. Labor Arbiter Nambi concluded that respondent’s cause of action against petitioner had already prescribed. went to the petitioner’s office to report for work. Thereafter. Since the respondent stated in his complaint that he was dismissed from work on 24 August 1994 and he filed the complaint only on 1 September 1999. sent a letter to the petitioner demanding employment-related money claims. In January 1998. He stated that the prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal case is four years from the dismissal of the employee concerned. still limping heavily. informed by the petitioner that he was considered resigned from his job. the four-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employee’s dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment. (3) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal. On 30 June 1999. medication and hospital expenses of the respondent in the aforestated hospitals.operation. He also noted that respondent committed several labor-related offenses against the petitioner which may be considered as just causes for the termination of his employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Held: The petition is PARTLY GRANTED insofar as it prays for the non-reinstatement of respondent. Thus. It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases. The so-called "control test" is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee Page 60 . through his counsel. (2) the payment of wages. Montes told him that he was deemed to have resigned from his work and to accept a consideration of P50. the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated. He was.00. the respondent. Labor Arbiter Nambi rendered his Decision dismissing the complaint of respondent for lack of merit. respondent. Rationale: The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of action of the worker. he again conversed with Montes who reiterated to him that he was regarded as resigned but raised the consideration therein to P100.00. before Christmas of 1998. Issue: Whether respondent is entitled to money claims in relation to its prescriptive period and if he was dismissed legally.000.000. It should be borne in mind that there are four tests in determining the existence of employer-employee relationship: (1) the manner of selection and engagement. Respondent rejected the explanation and offer. and (4) the presence or absence of the power of control. There being no response from the petitioner. During their meeting.
petitioner’s talent contract expired. would imperil the lives of the passengers and the property of the petitioner.private respondent Associated Broadcasting Company (ABC) hired petitioner Thelma Dumpit-Murillo as a newscaster and co-anchor for Balitang-Balita. it is obliged under the law to observe extra-ordinary diligence in the conduct of its business. Petitioner’s services were engaged for the program “Live on Five. The contract was for a period of three months and was also renewed thereafter. may be a just cause for the termination of employment under paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code since it is a form of neglect of duty. or the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. The petitioner insisted that respondent had already abandoned his work on 10 November 1994 and. that to allow the respondent to drive a bus. the latter’s employment was deemed terminated as of such date. Under the requirement of substantial due process. however. The order for the reinstatement was contrary to law. 62. 1999.(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. THELMA DUMPIT-MURILLO VS. that it will violate such obligation if it will reinstate the respondent as bus driver.(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved. NT95-1805. The Labor Code mandates that before an employer may legally dismiss an employee from the service. an early evening news program. Petitioner also alleged that respondent was guilty of insubordination as well as gross and habitual neglect in the performance of his duties for reckless driving and for being involved in several vehicular accidents. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On October 2. the requirement of substantial and procedural due process must be complied with. and that the award of back wages to the respondent was unjustified. We. Two weeks after Page 61 . found that there was no abandonment of work on the part of the respondent. but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.relationship. thus. Under the control test. 1995. under Talent Contract No. despite the fact that the latter sustained a fractured left leg and was still limping. Abandonment of work. The following are just causes for the termination of employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. after four years of repeated renewals. the grounds for termination of employment must be based on just or authorized causes. that as a common carrier. and(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.” On September 30.
that the petitioner was a regular employee illegally dismissed. Javier another letter stating that upon no response from the first letter she deem it as a constructive dismissal of her services. Thereafter. that the subject talent contract was void. Jose Javier. 1999. petitioner sent a demand letter to ABC. On appeal. A month later. exemplary and actual damages. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. NLRC decision is AFFIRMED. 1996. she wrote Mr. Rationale: Petitioner avers however that an employer-employee relationship was created when the private respondents started to merely renew the contracts repeatedly fifteen times or for four consecutive years. informing the latter that she was still interested in renewing her contract subject to a salary increase. 2000. 2000. premium pay. Vice President for News and Public Affairs of ABC. but that the other claims of petitioner had no basis in fact or in law. aside from 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. The parties agreed to submit the case for resolution after settlement failed during the mandatory conference/conciliation. 1999 had been processed and prepared. the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. (c) payment of 13th month pay. (b) payment of unpaid wages for services rendered from September 1 to October 20. overtime pay. Held: The petitioner was a fixed-term employee. for illegal constructive dismissal. ABC replied that a check covering petitioner’s talent fees for September 16 to October 20. nonpayment of salaries. petitioner sent a letter to Mr. the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter in a Resolution dated August 30. She likewise demanded payment for moral. vacation/sick leaves and 13th month pay.the expiration of the last contract. On December 20. On November 5. Mr. Issue: Whether petitioner was a fixed term employee and therefore cannot be dismissed without just cause. The NLRC held that an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and ABC. The Page 62 . service incentive leave pay. separation pay. holiday pay. 1999. Edward Tan. demanding: (a) reinstatement to her former position. Javier and Mr. and that she was entitled to reinstatement and back wages or separation pay. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. vacation/sick/service incentive leaves and other monetary benefits due to a regular employee starting March 31. as well as for attorney’s fees. petitioner stopped reporting for work. On March 29. 1999 and full back wages. petitioner filed a complaint against ABC.
public order or public policy. (b) the payment of wages.The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee. Since private respondents did not observe due process in constructively dismissing the petitioner. morals. we hold that there was an illegal dismissal. The petitioner claimed that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment representing the regular rank-and-file promo employees. the petitioner Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa-Pinagbuklod ng Manggagawang Promo ng Burlingame (LIKHA-PMPB) filed a petition for certification election before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). they should be struck down for being contrary to law. As a regular employee. regular status arises from either the nature of work of the employee or the duration of his employment. It prayed that it be voluntarily recognized by the respondent to be the collective bargaining agent. (c) the power of dismissal. the law provides for two kinds of employees. While this Court has recognized the validity of fixed-term employment contracts in a number of cases. with respect to the activity in which they are employed. LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSAPINAGBUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWANG PROMO NG BURLINGAME VS. In other words. Page 63 . in the alternative. 63. whether continuous or broken. and (d) the employer’s power to control. but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it. The most important element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct. BURLINGAME CORPORATION Facts: On January 17. not only as to the result of the work to be done. that a certification/consent election be held among said regular rank-and-file promo employees. Concerning regular employment. 2000. and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service. petitioner is entitled to security of tenure and can be dismissed only for just cause and after due compliance with procedural due process. good customs. it has consistently emphasized that when the circumstances of a case show that the periods were imposed to block the acquisition of security of tenure. or. namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. LIKHA-PMPB sought to represent all rank-and-file promo employees of respondent numbering about 70 in all.
Issue: Whether F. which then reversed8 the decision of the Secretary. labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits. Garil. 2003 and the Resolution dated March 15.6 A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the respondent on January 19. and any of the following elements are [is] present: i) The contractor or sub-contractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job. 2002 of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Rationale: Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. but the same was denied in the Resolution7 of February 19. Held: WHEREFORE. For this purpose. 2000. work or service to be performed and the employees recruited. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordering the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file promo employees of Burlingame is reinstated. Respondent then filed a complaint with the Court of Appeals.The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. supplies or places workers to perform a job. a duly licensed local employment agency. On December 29. Garil). 2000. the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29. Page 64 . work or service for a principal. To prove such contention. Garil is an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor. 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. which the Court of Appeals denied. Garil Manpower Services (F. It further alleged that the petitioner’s members are actually employees of F. prompting the petitioner to file an appeal5 before the Secretary of Labor and Employment. the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. Parungo dismissed4 the petition for lack of employer-employee relationship. 2001. respondent presented a copy of its contract for manpower services with F. On June 29. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration. Med-Arbiter Renato D. It argued that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the petitioner’s members.
Muntinlupa City. Ronald Leviste last reported for work on Sept.. equipment. Petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Law (P. located at Sucat. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SOLID MILLS. The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of the Labor Code. implements. No. The SSS dismissed her claim based on the following findings: A cursory re-evaluation of the benefit claim records of your husband disclosed the following:1) Mr.supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.D. "Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations. machineries and work premises.. The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed.m. he left the company premises and immediately proceeded home to join his family at Brgy. 9. Muntinlupa City. At the time of his death. tools. actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job. Page 65 . 68.. but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. to determine not only the end to be achieved. work or service contracted out. the decedent was a Supervisor at Solid Mills.).m. Facts: Petitioner is the widow of Ronald Leviste (decedent) who suffered “Sudden Cardiac Death”[sic]. INC. 626). Poblacion. GINA LEVISTE VS. as certified by his employer SOLID MILLS INC. 1999 on a day shift and timed out at 4:00 p. as amended. 2) That after his tour of duty at 4:00 p. or ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. and a member of the Social Security System (SSS). Inc. (Solid Mills) at Sucat.
3) If the injury or death is sustained elsewhere the employee is executing an order for his employer In view therefore. 1997. From the facts aforementioned. for the statutory presumption of causal relation to arise.D. due to the nature of his work. 3) That at about 11:50 p. is not compensable under ECC. and that. The significance of the inclusion of cardio-vascular diseases in Annex “A” is that it relieved petitioner of the burden of proving a causal relation between the “sudden cardiac death” of the deceased member and the latter's work. the ECC included cardiovascular diseases in the List of Occupational and Compensable Diseases (Annex “A”) appended to the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. Batangas. SSS affirmed that the death Ronald Leviste is NOT work related and thus. Page 66 . 626) Held: Yes By Resolution No.m.Malvar. at work in the afternoon before he died. the immediate cause of which is “CARDIAC SUDDEN DEATH”. However. the decedent was constantly exposed to harmful elements like fumes and heat. Issue: Whether cardiac death is compensable under Employees' Compensation Law (P. Annex “A” requires that. not every death resulting therefrom automatically entitles a claimant to death benefits. the decedent performed an extremely strenuous activity of helping carry “a 100-kilo air-conditioning compressor from the rooftop of the three-storey administration building” down several flights of stairs and out to a workshop located 300 meters from the administration building. No. while the diseases listed in Annex “A” are presumed to be work-related. Annex “A” established a presumption that “sudden cardiac death” is work-related. it appears that the circumstances surrounding the death of Ronald Leviste does not fall within the ambit of PD 626 which requires death or injuries to be considered work related must satisfactorily comply [with] the following: 1) The employee is injured or dies at the place where his work requires him to be. it must be established beforehand that the listed disease was contracted under certain working conditions. he was rushed to a hospital nearby his residence and was pronounced dead on arrival. 432 approved on July 20. on the same date. 2) The employee is performing his official functions. Petitioner impugned the findings of the ECC pointing out that the ECC completely glossed over evidence extant in the records that. Instead.
EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents which exceed P5. There is no question that the high-grade uncontested documentary evidence presented by petitioner established with a reasonable probability . the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Private respondents instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). 626. EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY is ORDERED to pay the computed deficiencies owing to the affected employees. and 2. VS.Strict rules of evidence do not govern claims for workmen's compensation for under P. LAGUESMA Facts: Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency. His death took place under the second condition. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI. EBVSAI pointed out that the Regional Director should have endorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter. EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Director does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claim of each private respondent exceeded P5. Held: EBVSAI claims that the Regional Director did not acquire jurisdiction over EBVSAI because he failed to comply with Section 11. Thus. Bokod. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Page 67 .000..D. Inc. Benguet (Ambuklao Plant). giving rise to the presumption that it was workrelated and therefore compensable. of causal relation. (EBVSAI) is in the business of providing security services while private respondents are EBVSAI’s employees assigned to the National Power Corporation at Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant.that the decedent succumbed to “sudden cardiac death” within twenty-four (24) hours from undertaking backbreaking work and after manifesting signs of over-fatigue.000. No.even certainty . it suffices that such claims be based on mere probability. not certainty. INC. Issue: 1. 69.
Jr. if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. appeared before the Regional Director. AUSTRIA Facts: Page 68 . the Labor Arbiter. Sensing. They were.00. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE VS. They claimed that the 22 March 1996 notice of hearing was received late and manifested that the notices should be sent to the Manila office. Danilo Burgos and Edwina Manao. Sec. In Allied Investigation Bureau. we ruled that while it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code. EBVSAI points out that the notice of hearing was served at the Ambuklao Plant. on 29 March and 13 June 1996. the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5. v. said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative.. The Regional Director validly acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI. of Labor.000. v. not the Regional Director.000. asked to submit. In fact. has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case because the individual monetary claim of private respondents exceeds P5. Inc. where we sustained the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director and held that “the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even where the individual claim exceeds P5. 2. They were also informed of EBVSAI’s violations and were asked to present the employment records of the private respondents for verification. and that it was addressed to Leonardo Castro. EBVSAI maintains that under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the Labor Code.A. moreover. detachment commander and bookkeeper of EBVSAI. 7730). respectively. In this case. In this case. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5. EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. within 10 days. EBVSAI also argues that the case falls under the exception clause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. EBVSAI asserts that the Regional Director should have certified the case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for a full-blown hearing on the merits.000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the exception clause. Thereafter. said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by R. Inc. Rather.000. then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. proof of compliance or their position paper.Procedure. This was further affirmed in our ruling in Cirineo Bowling Plaza. the notices of hearing were sent to the Manila office. EBVSAI’s Vice-President. 1. 71. No. not at EBVSAI’s main office in Makati. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the Regional Director. ROLANDO A.” However.
2000.560. 2000. Illegal Suspension. Parañaque (AMA) is an educational institution duly organized under the laws of the Philippines. respondent was informed of his dismissal. 2. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since respondent can no longer be reinstated beyond September 17. 2000. the parties are free to agree on a fixed period of time for the performance of such activities. Austria gives up the Dean position or fails to meet the standards of the (sic) based on the evaluation of his immediate superior. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties. Eventually. The rest of the petitioners are principal officers of AMA. Austria (respondent) was hired by AMA on probationary employment as a college dean on April 24. Respondent substantially refuted the charges of gross inefficiency. he will be entitled to a transportation allowance of One Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Pesos (P1. Non-Payment of Salary and 13th Month Pay with prayer for Damages and Attorney's Fees against AMA and the rest of the petitioners. respondent was placed on preventive suspension from September 8. Respondent Rolando A. incompetence. respondent was charged with violating AMA’s Employees’ Conduct and Discipline provided in its Orientation Handbook. 2000. or the salary and benefits withheld prior thereto. In the event that Mr. 2000 to September 17. In view of this. and leaking of test questions filed against him. 2000 to October 10. Sometime in August 2000. The Court ruled that the nature of respondent's employment as dean is one with a fixed term. What is the nature of respondent's employment? 2. We held that Article 280 of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period. on September 29. Even if the duties of the employee consist of activities necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer.Petitioner AMA Computer College. respondent should instead be paid his compensation and transportation allowance for the period from September 8. Issue: 1. The lack of notice of termination is of no consequence because when the Page 69 . Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal. On August 22. 2000. 2000 as his designation as college dean was only until such date. It is axiomatic that a contract of employment for a definite period terminates on its own force at the end of such period. Thereafter. The resolution of the second question requires full cognizance of respondent’s fixed term of employment and all the effects thereof. Notices of Investigation were sent to respondent.00). he shall be considered for a faculty position and the appointee agrees that he shall lose the transportation allowance he enjoys as Dean and be entitled to his faculty rate. Was he unlawfully dismissed which therefore entitles him to benefit from such employment? Held: 1. respondent’s appointment as dean was confirmed by AMA’s Officer-in-Charge (OIC).
The unanimous finding of the Labor Arbiter. already ceased to exist. which is the source of the benefits. acting on the mistaken belief that respondent was liable for the charges leveled against him. by then. it comes to an end upon the expiration of such period. because the employment.contract specifies the length of its duration. Page 70 . the NLRC and the CA that respondent adequately refuted all the charges against him assumes relevance only insofar as respondent’s dismissal from the service was effected by petitioners before expiration of the fixed period of employment. had. True. But respondent also cannot claim entitlement to any benefit flowing from such employment after September 17. petitioners erred in dismissing the respondent. 2000.