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Uk Tn w1-4 Transcript 08 Wnal Nalbp

Uk Tn w1-4 Transcript 08 Wnal Nalbp

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QUESTION: Is the meaning generality of an object an other-powered phenomenon?
GEN:

No. The meaning generality is a permanent phenomenon, a generally

characterised phenomenon.

unchecked transcript

Presentation of Tenets

Page | 151

QUESTION: Does the appearance that is the object of negation for a conceptual
consciousness exist?
GEN:

The appearance exists, and therefore the appearance is not the object of
refutation. A conceptual consciousness has an appearance, and this is something that we
know from our own experience; and because this appearance is an existent, it is not an
object to refute. However, this appearance doesn‟t exist in the way that it appears. It
appears to exist as the object, but this is not in accordance with how it exists, and this is
the object of negation. The appearance to a conceptual consciousness is a completely
imputed phenomenon. We should think about completely imputed phenomena as being
that which appears to a conceptual consciousness. For example, uncompounded space
appears to a conceptual consciousness, and apart from appearing to a conceptual
consciousness, it doesn‟t exist.
There is an appearance of externally established phenomena to a sense consciousness.
This appearance exists, but it does not exist in this way. There is also an appearance of
being established as a self of phenomena to a conceptual consciousness. This appearance
exists, but it does not exist in this way. Many appearances arise when dreaming, but they
are not actually there, however the appearance is there.

QUESTION: How is a meaning generality a generally characterised phenomenon?
GEN:

A meaning generality is merely imputed by thought. It has an appearance that
is similar to what it is representing. It appears to be the object, but it is not, and this is a
sign for it being merely imputed by thought. This is important for us to understand. The
conceptual consciousness is always mistaken with regard to its appearing object. The
appearing object, the meaning generality, is a generally characterised phenomenon, but it
does not appear to be; rather it appears to be truly established.
In the common brief presentation, one would say that the appearance to a conceptual
consciousness is the same as the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness, which is

the meaning generality. The meaning generality is permanent and doesn‟t change
momentarily; it doesn‟t disintegrate. However, if you go into detail, you will see that the
appearance and the appearing object are not the same. The appearing object is always the
meaning generality, but the appearance is comprised of many things including the
meaning generality. Included would be the actual object, true establishment, external
establishment, and so forth. Therefore, when we go into detail, we cannot say that the
appearing object and the appearance are the same.

Gen Losang Jamphel lightly edited transcript

Page | 152

If you experienced something very unpleasant some years ago, you will remember it
clearly. For example, if you remember the harm that someone who has since died caused
you, you would still generate anger. Therefore, we can see that the meaning generality is
truly established because it still arises in your mind and gives rise to anger. We can also
understand whilst the actual situation changed because it is impermanent, the meaning
generality is permanent as it is still there with regard to a situation that has long changed.
You could also say that because the meaning generality appears as truly established, it
appears as externally established.
There is an appearance of true establishment with regard to the meaning generality
that appears, as well as the appearance of establishment as an external phenomenon.
However, the true establishment of the meaning generality itself is not the object of
refutation for Cittamatrins, nor is the appearance of the meaning generality as being an
externally established phenomenon. This is because it is also realised by Sautrantika that
the meaning generality is not truly established, and the meaning generality is not
established as an external phenomenon, but is a generally characterised phenomenon.
Cittamatra posit a self of phenomena as an object of refutation, which is subtler than
what Sautrantika can present. This refers to the appearance of true establishment in the
appearance, so there is a difference between a meaning generality and the appearance, as
well as the establishment as an externally existing phenomenon with regard to the
appearance. This is not accepted by Sautrantika as they accept a self of phenomena. The
object of refutation for Cittamatra is not the appearance of true establishment of the
meaning generality, but the appearance of true establishment, of self of phenomena, in
the appearance.

QUESTION: Is it possible to not see the meaning generality as truly established, but just
the appearance?
GEN:

It is possible to realise that the mental image is not truly established, yet not
realise that the appearance is also not truly established. This is the case for Sautrantika.
The point is that there are many different appearances for a conceptual consciousness.
For example, after having seen and liked something in a shop, you will return home, think
about it repeatedly, and allow it to become an object of attachment through placing many
exaggerated qualities onto it. The object is remembered by way of a meaning generality,
but it appears in a way that it functions to generate attachment. In this moment, it
appears as being established as a self of phenomena.

unchecked transcript

Presentation of Tenets

Page | 153

QUESTION: Does the meaning generality come from the same imprint as the conceptual
consciousness?
GEN:

The conceptual consciousness arises from an imprint and thinks about an
object that arose from the same imprint. The object does not clearly appear, but the
meaning generality does. A meaning generality does not arise from an imprint, as it is
permanent, and therefore cannot arise or disintegrate.
If something has a beginning and an end, it would be an impermanent phenomenon.

Permanent phenomena don‟t have a beginning and an end, and so it is unsuitable to talk

about permanent phenomena in this way. It is also incorrect to think that the emptiness
of this table depends on there being a table. The table arises due to causes and conditions
and is therefore a dependent arising, and dependent arisings are not externally established.
That it is not externally established, this lack, is emptiness. In addition, the emptiness of
this table is not dependent on a subject realising. If you later come to know about the
emptiness of this table, it is not that the emptiness newly arrives in the table.
There is no start or end to the abiding of emptiness in an impermanent phenomenon.
The object has arisen due to causes and conditions, and what enabled it to arise is that it
is empty. Therefore, you can say that the phenomenon has arisen in emptiness.

QUESTION: Is the object of refutation for Cittamatra the appearance of establishment as
a self of phenomena, whereas the object of refutation for Sautrantika is the true
establishment of the meaning generality?
GEN:

An object of refutation for Sautrantika is that the meaning generality is truly
established. For Cittamatrins, the appearance of the self of phenomena does exist, but the
appearance being established as the self of phenomena, does not exist. Sautrantika refute
the true establishment of the meaning generality. The Cittamatrins refute the appearance
being established as a self of phenomena. The appearance exists in the mind, but what is
to be refuted is that it is not established as a self of phenomena. The appearance of being
a self of phenomena exists, but being a self of phenomena does not exist.
Similarly, when we travel in a train, there is an appearance of the trees moving, but of
course it is us rather than the trees that are moving. The appearance of the moving trees
exists, but the trees actually moving does not exist. It is the non-existent that is to be
negated.

Gen Losang Jamphel lightly edited transcript

Page | 154

In the same way, there is an appearance of a self of phenomena, but actually there is
no self of phenomena. The appearance is there, but this is not the object of refutation. It
is the establishment as a self of phenomena that does not exist, and this is to be refuted.
When sitting in the train you should recall that you have an appearance of moving
trees, but you know that they are not moving past you. You do have this appearance, but
you know that this is not the actual case. Similarly, whilst you have an appearance of an
establishment of a self of persons, this appearance does not actually exist.

QUESTION: Is a conceptual consciousness an other-powered phenomenon?
GEN:

A consciousness is necessarily an other-powered phenomenon.

QUESTION: When the true establishment of the appearance is refuted, will it go away?
GEN:

The appearance will not become non-existent, but the wrong mind will
dissolve. There is an appearance of true establishment and there is a mind that perceives
this and thinks that it is truly established. This is ignorance and is refuted and replaced by
a wisdom.

QUESTION: If the meaning generality, a completely imputed phenomena, is not
established by way of its own characteristics, but still exists, then how does it exist?
GEN:

In order to exist, it does not have to exist by way of its own defining
characteristics, as all completely imputed phenomena do not exist by way of their own
defining characterises. Only other-powered phenomenon and thoroughly established
phenomena exist in this way, because they are both truly established. Completely imputed
phenomena are not established by way of their own defining characteristics, are not truly
established, and are merely imputed by thought. Other-powered phenomena and
thoroughly established phenomena are not merely imputed by thought. A non-existent is
not merely imputed by thought, therefore because completely imputed phenomena are
merely imputed, we can say that they exist.

unchecked transcript

Presentation of Tenets

Page | 155

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