P. 1
LAWLOR, Leonard, Challenge of Bergsonism. Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics

LAWLOR, Leonard, Challenge of Bergsonism. Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics

|Views: 14|Likes:
Published by nouser00

More info:

Published by: nouser00 on Apr 07, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less






  • Chapter One: The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 1
  • Chapter Two: The Concept of Memory: Ontology 27
  • Chapter Three: The Concept of Sense: Ethics 60
  • Conclusion: Think in Terms of Duration 80
  • III. The Trumpery of Nature 97
  • IV. Mystical Experience: Emotion and Image 99
  • i
  • II
  • IV

The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics

Leonard Lawlor


The Challenge of Bergsonism

For my parents

ELthics LEONARD LAWLOR ontinuum LONDON • NEW YORK .The Challenge of Bergsonism Phenomenology. Ontology.

Guildford and King's Lynn . 11 York Road. recording. 0-8264-6803-9 (paperback) Typeset by YHT Ltd. London SE1 7NX 15 East 26th Street. New York. NY 10010 © Leonard Lawlor 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means. ISBN: 0-8264-6802-0 (hardback). or any information storage or retrieval system. including photocopying. London Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddies Ltd. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.Continuum The Tower Building. prior permission in writing from the publishers. electronic or mechanical.

Contents Acknowledgements Abbreviations Preface: Memory and Life Chapter One: The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology The Artifice The Threefold Differentiation in Order to Determine the Concept of the Image The Role of the Body The Theory of Pure Perception Chapter Two: The Concept of Memory: Ontology The Primacy of Memory The Two Differences in Nature that Define Memory The Central Metaphysical Problem of Existence The Image of the Cone Chapter Three: The Concept of Sense: Ethics The Bergsonian Concept of Intuition Bergson's Philosophy of Language Conclusion: Think in Terms of Duration Appendix I: The Point where Memory Turns Back into Life: An Investigation of Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion vii viii ix 1 1 4 11 18 27 29 31 39 43 60 63 70 80 85 I. The Theoretical and Practical Objectives of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 86 .



II. Asceticism and Sexuality III. The Trumpery of Nature IV. Mystical Experience: Emotion and Image Conclusion: The Star Appendix II: English Translation of Jean Hyppolite's 1949 'Aspects divers de la memoire chez Bergson' ('Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson'), translated by Athena V. Colman Notes Bibliography Index

91 97 99 110

112 128 136 143


I would like to thank Miguel de Beistegui who invited me to deliver three lectures on Bergson at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum in Citta di Costello, Italy, during July of 1999. I would also like to thank John Mullarkey, Frederic Worms, Renaud Barbaras, Keith Ansell Pearson and Marie Cariou for helping me understand Bergson's philosophy. Finally, I would like to thank the students who participated in two graduate seminars on Bergson that I taught at the University of Memphis (spring 1999 and spring 2002). In particular, I would like to thank Heath Massey, who proofread and indexed the manuscript. The writing of this book was made possible by a Faculty Research Grant from the University of Memphis (summer 2001). Note: Appendix II is an English translation by Athena V. Colman of Jean Hyppolite's 'Aspects divers de la memoire chez Bergsons', in Jean Hyppolite, Figures de la pensee philosophique, tome /, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971: 468-88. Michel Meyer of Revue International de Philosphie has granted permission for this translation. I would like to thank Athena Colman for translating this text.


The following abbreviations have been used throughout. At times the English translations have been modified. Reference is always made first to Henri Bergson, CEuvres, Edition du Centenaire, textes annotes par Andre Robinet, Introduction par Henri Gouhier, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959, then to the corresponding English translation. EC Creative Evolution, translated by Arthur Mitchell, New York: Dover, 1998 [1911].

PM The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Mabelle L. Andison, New York: The Citadel Press, 1992 [1946]; translation of La Pensee et le mouvant. R Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, translated by Cloudsley Brereton and Fred Rothwell, Los Angeles: Green Integer, 1999 [1911].

MM Matter and Memory, translated by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, New York: Zone Books, 1994 [1910]. ES Mind-Energy, translated by H. Wildon Carr, London: Macmillan, 1920. DI Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, translated by F. L. Pogson, Mineola: Dover Publishing Company, 2001 [1913]. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, translated by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudsley Brereton, with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977 [1935].


'to imagine is not to remember' (MM 278/135). perception does not make sense without memory. for him there is no call from the present to memory without the 'immanent sense' that perception makes available. 'To perceive is not to remember'. Bergson's relentless denunciations of analyses that divide things according to numbers or according to quantitative differences looks to be a reversal in favour of quality. Heidegger criticizes Bergson's conception of time as duration for having merely 'reversed' Aristotle's numerical definition of time. the challenge of Bergsonism is a challenge to ontology. this formula implies that Bergsonism is a 'primacy of memory'. to their distinction and to their union. To put questions relating to subject and object in terms of time means that we must think in terms of duration. Bergson.1 Through this distinction between perception and remembering. In fact. the priority of memory is so extreme that we must say that being is memory. Bergson says.2 Indeed. for Bergson. a challenge to phenomenology. in the most famous footnote in Being and Time. Merleau-Ponty intends to prioritize perception over memory. including perception. In the Phenomenology of Perception. 'twists free' of Platonism. While Bergson defines duration in many ways . while perception calls for memory.PREFACE Memory and Life Bergson himself states the challenge that his philosophy represents when he says. In contrast. this book concerns itself with the concept of duration . Yet. He twists free because memory in Bergson is onto- . and not a 'primacy of perception'. in Matter and Memory. should be put in terms of time rather than space' (MM 218/71. to use Heidegger's phrase. 'Questions relating to subject and object. Through this distinction Bergson intends to prioritize memory over any form of imaging. Of course. second. This identification of being and memory is why. first. presence becomes in Bergson derivative from memory. Merleau-Ponty says. Even though the concept of the image in Matter and Memory looks to be a new non-phenomenological concept of presence. It is possible to see in Bergson's concept of memory a reversal of Platonism. Giving the primary role to memory. for him. also MM 354/220). and this is why Bergsonism is.it can be summarized in the following formula: duration equals memory plus the absolutely new.most basically.

life. ethics in the sense of a discourse of alterity.came about on the basis of a reading of Bergson's Matter and Memory (1896). Chapter Three. But this 'failure' in Bergsonism. other than Heidegger. I also started . This means that what memory recalls are multiplicities and singularities. Because Bergson compares his image of the memory cone to a telescope.to phenomenology. I started to wonder about the resources available in contemporary philosophy for ethical thinking. but. to ethics .what Bergson calls intuition . he does not subscribe to the Eleatic philosophy of the same. But there is more. other than Sartre and deBeauvoir. he in effect criticizes the entire logic of the same and other. Appendix I expands the investigations of The Two Sources by attempting to think about Bergson's ethics as such (and not in relation to his so-called philosophy of language). variation.x Preface: Memory and Life logical. Bergson furnishes us with a new concept of sense (a new concept of the concept) in which there is no alterity. immaculate and untouchable as alterity or absolute newness. He does this in what we could call a 'philosophy of language'. The three chapters in the present volume correspond to those three challenges. This is why I have included an English translation of it as Appendix II. Through the concept of the dynamic schema.really lets the 'alterity of the new . Levinas also wonders whether the Bergsonian experience of duration .. there is alteration. Levinas acknowledges the importance of Bergson's philosophy for ethics. however. resources other than Scheler. to ontology. not identities and universals. explode. in fact. we can see that he has replaced the Platonic sun (the good) with the Milky Way.) This new sense of being means that Bergson is not merely replacing objectivism with a kind of subjectivism. movement and. with stars and planets. being as the unconscious instead of consciousness. Between the completion of the third chapter and the writing of the first appendix. It is clear that Bergson at least reverses Platonism since he constantly criticizes Zeno's alleged paradoxes. These three challenges .5 Levinas can say this because he believes that Bergsonian intuition is a form of representation. it gives us a new sense of being: being in terms of the past not in terms of the present. (In order to understand the connection between memory and being in Bergson. ends by taking up the idea of creative emotion from Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). I relied heavily on Jean Hyppolite's 'Aspects divers de la memoire chez Bergson'. Bergson's emphasis of the absolutely new means that his thought is not totalizing. therefore. the absolute itself in the etymological sense of the term'..4 But. other than Levinas. may be what is most important about it: it leads us away from the discourse of intersubjectivity and the logic of alterity. When Bergson criticizes the Eleatic tradition. for Levinas.3 In his later writings of course. the slogan for this book could be that 'the whole is not given'. instead of representation. Moreover.

that Bergson himself did not directly link. since he says that this experience is more metaphysical than moral. In this book I am trying to follow my own line. as I said above. But it is clear that. into. On the Genealogy of Morals pri- . the most striking similarity between Bergson and Nietzsche is the concern with memory. looking heavenward. by the way. with some now apparently interesting 'ethical' ideas. I had fallen into the line called forth by the very noisy drumbeat of philosophy today: 'ethics and politics. Bergson is engaged in an archaeology of originary experience.the memory cone is a kind of telescope .we must say that Bergson ethics is really an astronomy. The Two Sources privileges a religious experience . But besides an archaeology. it is the experience of the reciprocal implication of images and emotion. indicates a fundamental difference between Bergson and Nietzsche. This experience is what Bergson calls mystical experience. Mystical experience in Bergson is an experience of memory. like absolute justice. he intended The Two Sources as a continuation of Creative Evolution (MR 1193/256) . in contrast to analytic philosophy's moral theory.6 Deleuze. 'Memory and Life'. When I started then to investigate The Two Sources. Consequently. He thinks that mystical experience (and its asceticism) will transform the genus humanity into a 'divine humanity'. of course. This 'astronomy'.two books. one might say. as Bergson would say. like reversing Platonism. I have tried to show here that Bergson's 'ethics'. The Two Sources is the only published book of Bergson's in which Bergson mentions Nietzsche by name (MR 1212/278).and Bergson explicitly mentions the ascetic ideal . Instead. it is hard to be genuinely untimely. The Two Sources presents an 'originary ethics'.over philosophy. of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals. Bergson is engaged in a genealogy. there is always aspiration along with pressure. I was looking for similarities with Nietzsche. defined Bergson's philosophy with this phrase. following the image he gives us in Matter and Memory .Preface: Memory and Life xi to wonder about the possibility of an ethical thinking that is distinctly 'continental'. a super-humanity. it turned out that The Two Sources is engaged in a project that cannot be characterized as moral theory. In contemporary philosophy it is hard not to be swept up into trends. So. Memoire et vie. If it presents anything. one should note that the title of this preface is an allusion to a small book by Gilles Deleuze. it is not even clear that we can call what he is doing in The Two Sources an ethics in the standard sense. by linking Matter and Memory with The Two Sources . Again. In fact. a difference that perhaps overturns the results of Chapter Three. But I hope the reader can recognize that.I am trying to link some now apparently uninteresting 'metaphysical' ideas. thanks again to Deleuze. when I started to wonder about ethics.7 With Nietszche in mind. But it also makes one think. After all. maintains a deep connection with the concept of memory developed in Matter and Memory. ethics and polities'. his originary ethics. Nevertheless. As archaeology and genealogy suggest.

both the infinite movement of a matter that continually propogates itself. we must rethink precisely the relation between immanence and transcendence. that is. This association to the Essay is supposed to indicate the progress made over the seven years (1889 to 1896) between the two publications. because Deleuze focused primarily on Matter and Memory . the purpose of Matter and Memory lies in showing that both consciousness (conscience. like the Essay. Perhaps in the final analysis we have to characterize Bergson as a philosopher of transcendence rather than as a philosopher of immanence. Thus Matter and Memory is supposed to bring us to a new . matter is real. So. 'clearly dualist' (MM 161/9).9 Because Matter and Memory lays out a strict plane of immanence. that 'science and conscience fundamentally agree provided that we regard consciousness in its immediate data and science in its remotest aspiration' (MM 333/197). con-science) and science are right (MM 191/ 41). Deleuze (and Guattari) in What is Philosophy? say: Will we ever be mature enough for a Spinozist inspiration [of immanence]? It happened once with Bergson: the beginning of Matter and Memory marks out a plane that slices through the chaos . 318/181). the title of Bergson's first book (Time and Free Will is the title of the English translation). In any case.Deleuze says that Matter and Memory contains the 'secret' of Bergsonism8 . Matter and Memory 'asserts the reality of spirit and the reality of matter' (MM 161/9). of course) and immediately makes one think of An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.xii Preface: Memory and Life vileges 'we knowers'. if not suppress. and the image of a thought that everywhere spreads an in principle pure consciousness (immanence is not immanent 'to' consciousness but the other way around). between spirit and matter. the theoretical difficulties' which the dualism suggested by immediate consciousness and adopted by common sense has always raised (MM 161/9. On the basis of this investigation. as Bergson says explicitly in the preface of 1910. The Essay constructed a dualism between time and space. Indeed. according to Bergson. rather. I am more certain than ever that. Therefore. the philosophers who question even the value of truth. Bergson always denounces thinking in terms of differences of degree. Matter and Memory is. today. But. The subtitle of the original French edition of Matter and Memory (there is no subtitle to the English edition) translates as 'An essay on the relation of the body to the mind or spirit' (I'esprit. it confronts the problem of metaphysical dualism. in French. unlike the Essay. the conclusion of the Essay is that the difference between spirit and matter is a difference in nature. to 'attenuate. It is not the case that matter is some sort of illusion. As I have already stated. The dualism of reality allows us then. over the ascetic ideal.he classified Bergson as an immanentist.

is nothing less than a 'springboard' into ontology.12 it is an introduction to metaphysics. therefore. Bergson himself says that his philosophical method of intuition. duration. He says. empty and indefinite. In Matter and Memory's fourth chapter. This metaphysics begins with the concept of the image. The question is whether . PM 1420 n. understood as a sort of monistic substance (cf. the confused mass which tends towards extension could be seized by us on the nearer side of the homogeneous space to which it is applied and through which we subdivide it . I 11 ) where substance itself is not understood as something stable but rather as unstable differentiations of spirit into matter. . 'the plane of immanence'. is now being applied to matter. or more precisely. . to the metaphysics that Matter and Memory presents.Preface: Memory and Life xiii monism. Bergson's psychology of the immediate data of consciousness.10 The real conclusion is memory. (MM 323/186-7) Commenting on this discussion. and brought back to pure duration.just as that part which goes to make up our inner life can be detached from time. . Victor Delbos noted in his 1897 review that Matter and Memory allows us 'to surmount the dualism with which the Essay had been content and which here [in Matter and Memory] is conceived only as a critical procedure resulting in a provisional conclusion'. which had been used in relation to the problem of consciousness in the Essay.

This page intentionally left blank .

Finally. What we are going to see is that Bergsonism differs from phenomenology by means of its concept of presence. each is the reverse of the other.2 Spiritualism and materialism are reductionistic metaphysical positions. Bergson in Matter and Memory's first chapter is not making a 'phenomenology of perception'. The first step will concern the Bergsonian method. external perception is defined by the brain having the role of generating representations which are then projected out but which do not meet up with external things . we shall turn to what Bergson calls 'pure perception'. the Bergsonian concept of image amounts to a new concept of presence. While Bergson himself. in realism. external perception is defined by the spiritual projection of representations that are taken to be reality. and the third 'the role of the body'. either reducing the reality of matter to spirit or the reality of spirit to matter. divides the chapter into thirteen sections1. and to do this we must consider the Bergsonian concept of perception. unlike phenomenology. its subtitle is 'The Role of the Body'. Both positions are based in views of external perception. This chapter is entitled 'Concerning the Selection of Images for Representation'. In idealism.CHAPTER I The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology In this opening chapter we are going to consider Bergsonism's relation to phenomenology. But this reference of consciousness to matter does not mean that Bergsonism is a kind of 'fleshism'. the second the concept of image that is introduced on the first page of Matter and Memory. Most importantly. chapter one of Matter and Memory announces that the traditional metaphysical positions of materialism or realism and idealism or spiritualism are dead. as we find in Merleau-Ponty. We shall also see that. THE ARTIFICE Overall. we are going to approach the concept of perception with three preliminary steps. in his Table of Contents. Bergsonism refers consciousness to matter. Nor does it mean that Bergsonism is a kind of materialism. which is found in chapter one of Matter and Memory.

in which Bergson himself is inventing the terms of the problem. We can call it an artifice. So. metaphysics must begin by dissipating this artificial obscurity' (MM 168/16). as Bergson says. he intends to call us back from the habitual ways we think about the problem of perception. he defines an artifice as something that leads some of us to a place where others find themselves naturally. For Bergson. it becomes properly human experience' (MM 321/184. 'enlarged' (MM 176/25: 's'elargit'y. for Bergson. the year before the publication of Matter and Memory. 'the habits formed in action find their way up to the sphere of speculation. like feign in English. in . the opening of Matter and Memory therefore is an 'artifice'. cf. In a lecture Bergson delivered in 1895. So. it will open itself to solutions. an act of freedom. Bergson starts with what seems to be a fiction. The wordfeindre. but which is supposed to return us to experience 'above' utility. literally means to fashion or to shape. where they create fake [factice] problems.Descartes too uses the word 'feindre'4 . taking a bias in the direction [sens] of our utility. Reductionistic positions such as spiritualism (or idealism) and materialism (or realism) move around in a circle and are enclosed in irresolvable or badly stated problems. when the problem of perception (like all metaphysical problems) is stated well. To state the problem of perception well. for Bergson. but it is not a return to perceptual faith. which is 'below'. it is a 'hypothesis' in the literal sense of the word. The first sentence of Matter and Memory says: 'We are going to feign for an instant that we know nothing of the theories of matter and of the theories of spirit. nothing of the discussions concerning the reality or ideality of the external world' (MM 169/17. One can say that the turn of experience does not return us to perceptual faith because. consists in 'seeking experience at its source.Bergson's artifice is needed to restrain our habits and to restrain the metaphysical theories that develop on the basis of them. return us to what he calls 'immediate experience' or 'immediate consciousness'. MM 317-18/181). immediate experience is not common sense. Bergson's emphasis). The last sentence of the 1910 preface says. or rather above that decisive turn where. This return to immediate consciousness is Bergson's famous 'turn of experience': the philosophical enterprise. the problem of perception needs to be restated. Bergson's artifice is supposed to 'dissipate' the obscurity.3 With this artifice. this artifice is based in an act of liberation. it is a thesis. or. therefore.2 The Challenge of Bergsonism (cf. although. but for now let us note that the turn of experience is really the Bergsonian equivalent to the phenomenological reduction. the artifice consists in distinguishing the viewpoint of customary or useful knowledge from that of true knowledge (MM 322/186). We shall return to the turn of experience in Chapter Three. Bergson speaks of the artifice of his philosophical method. in Matter and Memory's fourth chapter. Like Descartes's fiction of the evil genius . also MM 162/10). because.

that he presupposes 'the objective world' for the sense given to the word 'being'. an Urdoxa. what Bergson. in Matter and Memory. The most important comment Bergson makes in Matter and Memory concerning common sense is found in chapter four when he says.the title of the English translation). with the . But for now. 329/193. In other words. sens means not only meaning and sense. in Chapter Three. consequently. Common sense in Bergson is the common (or even natural) direction. like the German 'Sinn'. after having exacerbated the conflicts raised by ordinary dualism. we have closed all the avenues of escape which metaphysics might set open to us. With Bergson. cf. the immediate experience that Bergson is hypothesizing here is not a 'naive conviction' (MM 192/43). rather it is intuition. Bergson is concerned. Thus. of common sense. we must always speak of this conjunction: 'consciousness in its immediate data' and 'science in its remotest aspiration' (MM 333/197). the direction towards utility. but not of creating or of constructing. which shows us our body as one image among others and our understanding as a certain faculty of dissociating. in the second introduction to his 1934 collection of essays called La pensee et le mouvant (The Creative Mind . it is difficult to maintain. also MM 327/191. of opposing logically.5 Again. So. calls 'the socialization of the truth' (PM 1327/87). willing captives of psychological analysis and. as Merleau-Ponty does in Phenomenology of Perception. But. our analysis has perhaps dissociated its contradictory elements. since Bergson speaks of science in its remotest aspiration. he suggests as much. It is our common theories about how to make things useful. Against [materialism and idealism] we invoke the same testimony. The tendency of common sense to decompose is why Bergson throughout Matter and Memory finds himself 'correcting' common sense (MM 219/73. of distinguishing. this knowledge is not equivalent to science. But.6 This theoretical outlook based in social needs is why common sense is primarily concerned with decomposing. we shall return to the question of common sense in Bergson and distinguish it from what he calls 'good sense' and especially from what he calls 'superior good sense'. but also direction. (MM 318/181) This comment implies that Matter and Memory's opening hypothesis is really supposed to 'push' common sense up above to an extreme which in turn will open common sense up and allow us to escape from it.7 As we shall see in a moment. we must recognize the importance for Bergson of the word 'sens '. knowledge. 332/196). just because we have pushed dualism to an extreme. that of consciousness. it would seem that. at least not science in the normal sense.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 3 the 1910 preface as well as in the original 1896 preface.

the image is matter and not spirit (MM 355/221). from a thing and from a representation. The threefold differentiation consists in this: the Bergsonian image differs from an affection. we shall also see how important the word 'image' is for Bergson and with it the word 'vibration' (ebranlement or vibration). Bergson tells us that matter is images (MM 161/9). The problem of perception must be restated 'in terms of images. Again. it differs in nature from what Bergson calls affection: affection is internal. then extension must apply to images. We are going to make a threefold differentiation in order to try to understand it. This independence is why Bergson can say that 'an image may be without being perceived1 (MM 185/35).8 With the concept of the image. in the vaguest sense of the word. 364/234). The second differentiation we can make is between the image and the thing. Thus the opening hypothesis defines all of reality with one term. since the title of each chapter concerns images ('The Selection of Images'. the image is defined by extension and objectivity. Since matter is always denned in terms of extension. in fact. the 'pure image' has no affection mixed in with it (MM 206/58). We are going to start with the first difference. unperceived when I close them' (MM 169/17). the opening hypothesis is leading us above the 'turn' in experience. and of images alone'. it reads: 'Here I am therefore in the presence of images. Thus. 'The Survival of Images' and 'The Delimitation and Fixation of Images'). the concept of the image is the central concept of Matter and Memory. So. So.4 The Challenge of Bergsonism refutation of materialism. it is also one of the most difficult concepts. we must return to the 1910 preface. the first characteristic of the Bergsonian image is extension and this means objectivity. that of image from affection. images are the 'common terrain' on which realism and idealism do battle (MM 177/26). Bergson is dispelling the false belief that matter is a thing that possesses a . THE THREEFOLD DIFFERENTIATION IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE In the 1910 preface. the order of our perceptions depends on extension. images perceived when I open my senses. Bergson tells us that realism has been excessive in its conception of matter insofar as realism attempts to make matter 'a thing that produces representations in us but that would be of a nature different from these representations' (MM 161/9). 'The Recognition of Images'. Here. His criticism of realism is directed at this 'thing'. Simply. Because extension and objectivity define the Bergsonian image. 'images'. the first differentiation we can make is that the Bergsonian image is not affection. it is the lowest degree of subjectivity (MM 206/57. Things that are external have an order that does not depend on our perceptions. Undoubtedly.

though denuded of physical qualities. dissolve them into vortices revolving in a continuous fluid. method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely what it appears to be. We shall return to the priority of vision in Bergson when we discuss pure perception below. then we must wonder: Why does Bergson use the word 'image'? This question is crucial. an ineffectual impulsion. a colourless light. Especially after the developments of twentieth-century phenomenology. means only that the image is what it appears to be. we always tend to turn the word 'presence' into the phrase 'presence to consciousness'. Bergson is privileging vision because vision is dependent on light. Presence. The Bergsonian image emits light. So far therefore. This 'concession to idealism'. Reduce matter to atoms in motion: these atoms. in other words. Condense atoms into centers of force. is why he then defines the image as 'presence' (MM 185/35). Bergson always praises Berkeley for having proved that the secondary qualities of matter have at least as much reality as the primary qualities (MM 162/10). these centers. one must still define these denuded things negatively in relation to perceivable qualities: a lightless vision. a colorless light. if one insists on conceiving matter not in terms of the image. presence. the one without light and the other without materiality. But. after Derrida. immediately in the lexicon of idealism. So.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 5 hidden power able to produce representations in us (cf. we must note that. as Bergson himself says (MM 186/36). from matter . ES 961-6/191-8). Thereby we eliminate all virtuality. we have two characteristics of the Bergsonian image: extension (and objective) . not lines. But if the image is what it appears to be. are determined only in relation to an eventual vision and an eventual contact..it is not affection (and subjective) . can themselves be determined only in relation to an impotent touch. What the illuminated picture gives vision to see primarily is colour. they are still images. with Bergson. we place this word. the Bergsonian image is composed of what modern philosophy called 'secondary . with the image. in particular. presence. an impotent touch. As Bergson says: 'The truth is that there is one. this fluid. Bergson insists on the word image because it suggests vision (cf. as Bergson calls it (MM 360/229). ' (MM 219/72). it is a 'picture'. understood as an image. (MM 185/35) This comment means that if one denudes matter of physical qualities.and presence . is not immediately or not yet idealistic. Bergson's refutation of materialism is contained in this rather obscure comment from Matter and Memory's first chapter: No theory of matter can escape [the necessity of thinking in terms of the image]. for Bergson. but for now. and only one. all hidden power. these movements. an ineffectual impulsion.it is not the thing. an immaterial touch. These 'things' are still images.. PM 1355/ 118).

6 The Challenge of Bergsonism qualities' and it is not therefore defined by what modern philosophy called 'primary qualities'. cf. I taste something. for example. fourth chapter: Indeed we have no choice: if our belief in a more or less homogeneous substratum of sensible qualities has any ground. as soon as I open my eyes . the colours flow continuously one into another. Its objectivity . smell and taste. as soon as I open my mouth. which implies that we are still not referring the image to a hidden thing.. as if this sensation itself were pregnant with details suspected yet unperceived. Bergson says: 'Between light and darkness. when I see a picture. in its very depth it lives and vibrates. Despite this plurality of articulations. which are spatial relations defined by geometry. The recognition that the Bergsonian image consists in secondary qualities. Bergson's emphasis. even if I maintain my mouth open. it is still not necessary that I am going to taste something.. we have just seen that the Bergsonian image is not a copy of a hidden thing. These absolute differences between qualities like colours are what Bergson calls 'natural articulations' (MM 333/197) or 'the articulations of the real' (PM 1292-4/50-2). But. of course. in chapter one of Matter and Memory he says that 'I call matter the whole of images' (MM 170/22). When I see a picture. That there are natural articulations of the real is why Bergson constantly speaks of 'images' in the plural. like colour in particular. for example. between colors. even if there is virtually no light. precisely in the immense multiplicity of movements which it executes.9 If we think about taste. it is never necessary that. the word. vision does not contain intervals during which or between which it is not functioning (MM 332/197). The impression that the image copies a thing comes from the fact that it is a surface and a surface has depth. Bergson also insists on the word image because it is always a picture of something. this can only be found in an act that would make us seize or guess. what it contains over and above what it yields up . and continuous or successive. even if it is night-time. I see a unity composed of a multiplicity of colours all different from one another. because light immediately flows into this opening. in quality itself.must then consist . But. within its chrysalis. Bergson says in Matter and Memory'?. the difference is absolute' (MM 332/196). provides us with other characteristics of the image: the image in Bergson is at once simple or one. (MM 339/ 204. Unlike the senses of hearing. We can guess .that is. also MM 376/247) In this comment Bergson emphasizes the phrase 'in quality itself. something that goes beyond our sensation. somehow. I see pictures.as the opening hypothesis of Matter and Memory says -1 see and continue to see. Motionless on the surface. literally means 'copy'. between shades. complex or different.

The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 7 about something that goes beyond quality but which 'is not essentially different or distinct from' (MM 343/208) quality. attach yourself to these movements.. means that consciously seen colours are neither the mere translation of a hidden original text (cf. there are vibrations of the larva that make the chrysalis gleam.instantaneous views are going to be taken. 338-9/ 203). but pure and stripped of what the requirements of life make you add to it in external perception. MM 358-9/226-7.11 Because the chrysalis is not a relation of translation or of duplication. just as when we strike a key of the piano at the low end of the scale. in its remotest aspiration aims at a metaphysics of plural rhythms. Science. views this . which are moving in place. In Matter and Memory. it is important to note the direction of the transition that this act involves: here. in this comment. and with it. So. try first to connect together the discontinuous objects of daily experience.is the genuine experience of matter. Reestablish now my consciousness. Pure perception. You will obtain a vision of matter that is perhaps fatiguing for your imagination. the requirements of life: farther and farther. and by crossing over each time enormous periods of the internal history of things. goes in the opposite direction. Deep within the light of qualitatively different colours. MM 171/22) nor the 'duplicata' of a non-present object. matter resolves itself into numberless vibrations. we hear the note and can see the vibrations of the string (cf. which are given to con-science. Bergson in fact describes this act by which we experience matter (MM 343/208). all linked together in uninterrupted continuity. there are the quantitatively continuous vibrations of science. we go from part to whole. pure perception is diminution instead of an 'enlargement'. In short. as we shall see. we go from what is for us to what is in itself. To use the language that Bergson develops in the later 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. and we shall have reason to return to it in Chapter Three: If you abolish my consciousness .10 The vibrations are there in the qualities. Deep within the chrysalis. there must be an act which would make us guess what goes beyond perception. resolve the motionless continuity of these qualities into vibrations. finally. also emphasizes the word 'act'. quasi.this undivided act that your consciousness grasps in the movement that you yourself execute. Bergson. We shall come back to this act later in this chapter when we discuss pure perception. towards the unperceived. which the chrysalis suggests. the colour is not even the duplicata of a diminutive object like an atom or a corpuscle (cf.. and traveling in every direction like shivers. MM 338/203). This act . by freeing yourself from the divisible space that underlies them in order to consider only their mobility . all bound up with each other.which we can indeed call intuition . The concept of vibration. This is a remarkable description. for Bergson. then.

Bergson insists on image because it suggests art. cf. To be. ultimately. of which the most vivid colors condense an infinity of repetitions and elementary changes. 'the intimate nature of movement' (MM 327/191).'contracted into one sole symbolic attitude' . or rather that all of us would be artists. and which becomes for everyone the image of a man who runs. The image. that things move. It is not like the 'snapshot'. for our soul would vibrate then continually in unison with nature.thanks to production techniques. in other words. helped by memory. (MM 343/208-9) This is the only time Bergson mentions art in all of Matter and Memory. which art reproduces.8 The Challenge of Bergsonism time pictorial. as Bergson himself says. movement is real.'the successive positions of a runner'. is 'the interior organization of movement'. is one or simple . Insofar as it is nature.12 But. would carve out [decouperaient] in space and fix in time inimitable pictures. while the imagistic picture is nature. is illusory (MM 337/202). the intimate nature of movement. 'runs in place'. In his 1899 essay on laughter. Bergson defines art as the picture of the vibrations of nature: What is the object of art? If it were the case that reality strikes our senses and our consciousness directly. that movement depends on things. In just the same way the thousands of successive positions of a runner are contracted into one sole symbolic attitude. virtually identical in Bergson. The moving image. therefore. as Deleuze does. While we must maintain the distinction between the artistic picture created by . however. so to speak. if we could enter into immediate communication with things and with ourselves. it cannot be a thing that moves. is why Bergson in chapter four of Matter and Memory speaks of 'moving images' (MM 325/189). the mobile camera and the liberation of the viewpoint . we must keep them distinguished: the artistic picture is art. For Bergson. it is.and yet multiple and continuous . therefore. I really believe that art would be useless. This priority of movement over things.is art. cinema . the image is material life. a priority that defines the Bergsonian image. (R 135-51 458-9. but like the motion picture: 'cinema'. Our eyes. Nevertheless. we must see that. The image. While it is the case that Bergson insists on denning matter in terms of the image because image suggests vision and because it suggests surface with depth. which our eye perceives. the image must itself be movement. not nature. PM 1370/135) Art and image are. a 'living unity which was born from internal continuity' (MM 320/183). We can call the moving image cinema and ignore Bergson's famous criticisms of cinema in chapter four of Creative Evolution by noting only. that cinema has changed since Bergson's day.

But.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 9 spiritual energy and the natural picture created by material energy. And again. definition of presence. unlike materialism. the crucial word of idealism is not 'art'. we see that he criticizes not only materialism. it does not make movement a function of the thing. His solution to this problem lies in the following comment: 'by "image" we mean a certain existence that is more than what the idealist calls a representation. secondly. and thirdly. but it cannot differ in nature from representation since his criticism of materialism consists in showing that matter does not differ in nature from representation. it suggests art. Bergson's so-called 'concession to idealism' then allowed us to raise the question of why he insists on the word image.13 Before turning to the third and last differentiation of the Bergsonian image. nor even 'presence'. we have seen that the image differs not only from affection since the image is extension and objective. but less than what the realist calls a thing . for Bergson. and especially not language. Overall. which is excessive in its conception of matter as being different in nature from representation. The artistic picture is virtually identical with the natural image because it carves up the universe according to its natural articulations. and new. there is continuity.an existence placed halfway between the "thing" and the "representation" ' (MM 161/9). the artistic picture remains virtually natural. of course. More specifically. the artistic picture remains virtually natural. This equation of the image with presence seemed to be leading us in the direction of idealism. idealism is excessive in its conception of matter as being identical to representation. This gives us the third differentiation of the Bergsonian image: the image differs from representation. we have seen that for Bergson the image defines matter. But. the 'symbolization' of the artistic picture 'corresponds' to the differences in nature between colours. the word image suggests the visual unity of a picture composed of continuous and complex colour. does not reverse the relation of movement to thing. but also idealism insofar as it attempts to reduce matter to the representation we have of it. While the realistic excess is one of extreme differentiation. it seems that the Bergsonian image is leading us in the direction of idealism since artistic creation is spiritual. We then saw that Bergson has three reasons for doing this that actually provide us with a very specific. The artistic picture. we must also see why the two are virtually identical. it suggests a surface which itself implies depth: the chrysalis. in the artistic picture there are no intervals. there is a second reason for the virtual identity. let us summarize this section so far. the painting is not a drawing. In this way. the idealistic excess is one of extreme non-differentiation. The 'more' and the 'less' in this comment . Bergson's criticism of idealism of course implies that the image differs from representation. but also from the thing since the image is presence. First. but 'representation'. With this last suggestion again. If we return again to Bergson's 1910 preface.

We shall return to this grey zone of artifice. Artifice is the 'zone'. Nature is denatured. As Bergson says again in the essay on laughter. which is connected continuously to other images in the whole. language and sense. So. it is the zone of lines and drawings. in Chapter Three and in Appendix I. These ideas have turned their back on true knowledge. we have the first interval that breaks up the natural continuity of images (MM 185/35).15 . in which imagination constructs only relations and figurations.like the grey light between night and day . then we end up with ideal schema which we take for the real. on experience. everything becomes 'inert' (MM 320/ 183). Thus it is not a zone of colours. representation gives us only a part of the whole. 'Below art. as Bergson calls it in Laughter. we no longer have artifice. we must note that artifice remains natural insofar as it does not reverse the priority of movement and things and insofar as it does not carve up the images according to utility. with representation. it remains turned towards the moving images. it carves up the moving images artificially. can be recomposed. But. we have lost the pictures and only the 'empty frames' remain (MM 320/183). towards experience. although partial. towards 'true knowledge' (MM 334/199). in a word. between matter and spirit. a word he uses frequently in Matter and Memory. No matter what. there is artifice' (R 418/63). and also between life and death and between the natural and the unnatural. but factice. which literally means artless.between colours and forms. representation is a decomposition of the whole. representations. This recomposition is artifice (MM 325/189). As long as artifice does not reverse the priority of movement and things out of needs of utility. rather it is the grey zone . on the real. but it is not. These abstract symbols and inert schema homogenize so well that it even looks as though the whole is given. But this first interval is not necessarily a 'denaturation' of nature. If the understanding then works on these 'perverse' ideas (MM 351-2/217-18). schemas and symbols. it remains 'open'. We have only mathematical or abstract symbols by means of which we designate different things indifferently (MM 297/156). if imagination .14 A representation is a part cut out (decouper) of the whole. the representation is less than the image. which is the grey zone of 'the turn of experience'.10 The Challenge of Bergsonism indicate that representation differs from the image by degrees. fakery (MM 320/183).our 'spirit of invention'.'reverses the natural order of the terms' out of 'inferior needs' (MM 351/217). here. Then. But for now. towards the real. then it ends up enclosing movement in things. as Bergson calls it in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (MR 1234/304) .

the body is known from the inside by affections. we have a difference in nature between matter and spirit. on the other. What is natural is the continuity of my body with the rest of matter. but also from the inside by affections: it is my body' (MM 169/17). Again. So. is due to the way I can know my body. he will claim that 'all division of matter into independent bodies with absolutely determinate contours is an artificial division' (MM 332/196). as soon as he speaks of affection.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology II THE ROLE OF THE BODY In fact. this sentence forms an important transition. as Bergson says: 'Yet there is one image that contrasts with all the others in that I know it not only from the outside by perceptions. let us return to the opening hypothesis (MM 169-73/17-22). in the sentence. As soon as we talk about the body being known from the inside by affections. we have an image like all of the others. we cannot underestimate the logic of parts and whole or the logic of container and contained that Bergson sets up in Matter and Memory's first chapter. 'but also'. the 'yet'. insofar as the spatial relation of whole-parts determines the theory of perception. we must note immediately that. Bergson defines 'my body' by the fact that it introduces something new into the universe. which allows for a perfect deducibility of the future from the present. Bergsonism cannot be defined as a 'primacy of perception'. cf. when we know the body by perceptions from the outside. on the one hand. Before Bergson speaks of affection. For Bergson. the body known from the inside by affection is already a body conditioned by memory. later in chapter four of Matter and Memory. we are on the verge of leaving matter behind for memory. this newness comes about because in my body I do not discover 'the constraint that precludes choice' (MM 169-70/18). The 'must' in this sentence of course implies necessity. to repeat the most basic principle of Bergsonism: all questions of subject and object must be posed in terms of time. But the transition does not occur at the 'pourtant'. MM 174/23). Moreover. the 'but also'. To hold onto the appearance of matter means we realize that matter hides nothing within itself: 'the future of the images must be contained in their present and will add nothing new' (MM 169/17. And. The body known from the outside by perceptions is continuous with the images of matter. The starting point for Bergson is a 'holding onto the appearances of [matter and my body]' (MM 170/18). It entirely determines his theory of perception. which differentiates my body from the rest of the material world. In the opening hypothesis of images. The difference between freedom and necessity. what I know of matter I know by perceiving it from the outside. This continuity of images is crucial for Bergson since. it occurs at the 'mats aussf. my body known from the outside is not radically distinct from the rest of matter. not space. . My body therefore acts freely. there is a difference in degree between the images. In contrast.

between the brain and the rest of matter.'Every image is inside certain images and outside others. we think that it is selfsufficient and that it could be conceived as attached to the soul and detached from the rest of matter. to interrogate the physiologist and the psychologist concerning the system of afferent and efferent nerves that I can detect in these other bodies. say. one would have to maintain that since the representation of the whole material world is infinitely greater than that of cerebral vibrations. MM 174/23). we stay on the outside in Matter and Memory's first chapter. an attitude that is perhaps still prevalent today.16 In other words. 175/24). the centripetal movements or at least some of them can give birth to create or engender representations of the external world. For Bergson. it says that a part is the whole. but we can see that with them he is pointing at a general scientific attitude of his own time. In any case. according to Bergson. as Bergson says. these molecular movements are not images like others. Since my body is separated from other bodies that I perceive. as Bergson says.12 The Challenge of Bergsonism So.consciously or unconsciously . this general scientific attitude says that if the centrifugal movements of the nervous system can provoke the movement of the body or parts of the body. until we come to the discussion of affections. That we remain on the outside is why Bergson says in the opening hypothesis that 'On the basis of bodies similar to mine. Bergson himself in Matter and Memory does not specify who these physiologists and psychologists are. from the outside. one has to say that cerebral vibrations are something that differs in nature from an image. I am now studying the configuration of this particular image that I call my body' (MM 170/18). This study of bodies similar to mine. leads us. as he says . or. here not in its remotest aspiration. Bergson says.from this radical distinction between our body and the rest of matter.and this is a crucial comment . but concerning the whole of . however. the material world is not part of the brain' (MM 171/ 19. is the only way one could explain how it could create the representation of the whole material world (MM 174/23. 'The brain is part of the material world. cf. I believe that if we study all the realist and idealist doctrines from Descartes on. Here. this difference in nature. this scientific hypothesis is self-contradictory. to hold this scientific position (which all realist and idealist doctrines since Descartes have held). science. In a letter from 1897. to hold this belief consistently. if they were of the same nature. we will see them always start . how could they engender something greater than themselves? So. has reversed the true container-contained relation. What this general scientific attitude is saying implies that the image called the brain contains the representation of the whole material universe.

the hypothesis of an isolated material object . that the conclusion that Bergson draws from it is exactly opposite to that of Husserl. we must go to the other interpretation of the similarity concerning the thought experiment of the destruction of the world.the brain for instance . if you eliminate the image called the brain. To test this claim. it does not affect the immanence of consciousness. that is. if this is the case. spirit is primarily unconscious. differs in nature from matter. representations are created without external objects influencing the afferent nerves: 'the object has disappeared while the brain persists' (MM 192/43). we cannot say that it is inside us or that it is outside us. 369/239). one could say that both Husserl and Bergson draw the same conclusion from this thought experiment. For Bergson. since interiority and exteriority are only relations between images' (MM 176/225). In other words. Here.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 13 images. For Husserl. the brain and the cerebral vibrations which are part of it would be annihilated. there is one important difference here between Husserl and Bergson. spirit. Bergson does not demonstrate the existence of God to provide the veracity of our representations. for Husserl. which. para. And it seems we can interpret the similarity in two ways. those of the modern tradition. which differs essentially from transcendent being. subsists completely' (MM 171/19). is consciousness. So. since this object borrows its physical properties and consequently its very existence from the relations which it maintains with all others in the universe as a whole (MM 175-6/24). Since the destruction of the world. is that the brain is an isolated material object capable of creating representations because of the phenomena of hallucinations and dreams. affects only matter. 'The picture as a whole. The general scientific attitude. One could say. as we shall see in Chapter Two.implies a kind of absurdity. affects only transcendent being. 215/68. 49. Since the destruction of the world. But. you erase only an insignificant detail from the immense picture. for Bergson. if we can use that word. then we might believe that perception is nothing more than what Bergson calls a 'veridical hallucination' (MM 192-3/43. Bergson engages in another sort of hypothesis: if the image that bears the name of the material world were suppressed. On the one hand. In hallucinations and dreams. for Bergson. Hallucinations seem to suggest that there is some hidden source of representations within us. he merely points to a very simple observation: . and that of some philosophers. in contrast. there is no residuum of consciousness. and it seems one must. after the annihilation of the world. consciousness is referred to the image of the universe. it does not affect spirit. since consciousness corresponds to cerebral vibrations and is defined by the present awareness I have of my body (MM 281/138). We cannot overlook the fact that this Bergsonian fiction of the destruction of the world resembles Husserl's famous fiction of the destruction of the world in Ideas /. In contrast to phenomenology. the universe.

perhaps. at least in the first time. Such an image. to strip perception clean of memory. our brains in other words. To demonstrate that the body is a centre of action. to severing the part from the whole. my body is a 'privileged centre' insofar as it regulates the other images. Sectioning of the centripetal nerves can . that my body appears to choose. and. there is another reason philosophers and scientists believe that perception is a veridical hallucination.14 The Challenge of Bergsonism in many people blind from birth. consequently. amounts. its role is 'to exercise on other images a real influence. MM 356/225 and ES 965/196). cf. The usual role of the centripetal nerves is to transmit movements to the brain and to the spinal cord. to reversing the relation of container and contained. as aiming at some sort of disinterested knowledge. yet they live and die without having formed a single visual image. Farther away from my body they are removed from my possible action. In fact. to cutting off its attachment to the real. this role of memory will motivate him. (MM 193/43) In hallucinations and dreams. plays the chief part. therefore. he takes up another hypothesis: 'in thought'. Therefore. create representations. What happens is that while the rest of the universe. as Bergson says.. memory. as my body moves closer to or farther from other images. and. for Bergson. the quantity and . within certain limits. Since the body is one image in the whole of the material world. 'The objects that surround my body reflect its possible action upon them' (MM 172/21). it must have consequently actually entered into the representation. the manner in which it shall restore what it receives' (MM 171/19). 'my perception' has entirely vanished. remains the same.. Bergson therefore is reattaching perception to the real. the visual centers are intact. this sole difference. to make it impossible for my body to extract. They presuppose that perception has a wholly speculative interest. to interrupt the current that goes from the periphery to periphery by way of the center. As Bergson says. that we. from among all the things that surround it. closer they can be touched. In the opening hypothesis of images. as we shall see in a moment. The body therefore is a centre of action. produce only one intelligible effect: that is. even the rest of my body. they change. the centrifugal nerves send back the movement to the periphery. But besides the phenomena of dreams and hallucinations. cannot appear unless the external object has played its part at least once. it acts like other images. sever all the afferent nerves of the cerebro-spinal system (MM 173/21). that it is pure knowledge (MM 179/28). to decide which step to take among several which are all materially possible' (MM 172/20. that it is a kind of contemplation (MM 215-16/68). consequently. To conceive perception as having a purely speculative end. according to Bergson. receiving and giving back movement 'with.

as soon as we compare the structure of the spinal cord with that of the brain. . when a vibration is received from the periphery. a reflex. but he could have started with inanimate matter such as hydrochloric acid (MM 299/159) because. MR 997/27). But. Here is something that concerns action. like protoplasm. MM 175/23-4) For Bergson. As in hydrochloric acid. which allows the animal to react to external stimuli with more varied movements. . and so to choose its effect' (MM 180/30. (MM 180/29. and this comment reiterates what we have already noted about the true whole-part relation. Here in chapter one of Matter and Memory. But as soon as we leave single-celled creatures. cf. my body (MM 173/22). This is an evolutionary argument that follows 'step by step the progress of external perception from the monera up to the superior vertebrates' (MM 179/28). the brain is an instrument in a very complex reflex. and not a difference in nature. and therefore Bergson describes the brain as 'a kind of main telephonic desk' (MM 180/30). and action alone.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 15 quality of movement necessary in order to act upon them. it goes through the centripetal fibres to the brain. without delay. This spiritualization of the vibration. When nerve cells appear. These divisions of cells into systems allow delays in reaction or in the reflex. he starts with 'living matter'. So. the reaction in protoplasm is immediate. however. 'a simple mass of protoplasm'. the brain adds nothing to what it receives. automatic. Besides this 'thought' experiment of sectioning the nerves. and answers to it with . . As Bergson says. chemical reactions' (MM 179/28). Bergson's emphasis). between the functions of the brain and the reflex activity of the medullary system. which then allows 'the received vibration to reach at will this or that motor mechanism of the spinal cord. (MM 173/21-2) Perception for Bergson occurs when the whole of images called matter is related to the possible action of one image. it appears merely to await its occasion' (MM 179/29). Bergson says. even when the brain intervenes. cf. 'even when the vibration received is not immediately prolonged into movement. Bergson provides a second argument to show that perception concerns action and not contemplation. we are bound to infer that there is merely a difference of complication. they tend to group themselves into systems. This comment is important because the prolongation of the vibration through the complexity of cellular systems might lead one to think that 'the received impression is being spiritualized into knowledge' (MM 180/29). hydrochloric acid 'is open to the influence of external stimulation. does not take place. we have what Bergson calls 'a division of physiological labor' (MM 179/28-9.

16 The Challenge of Bergsonism We cannot underestimate the importance of this image of the main telephonic desk: Bergson conceives the living body as a machine. the calls would come in through the wires to which the pins were attached and the insertion of the pin into a socket would allow communication to take place. With this comparison.18 So just as we cannot say that Bergsonism is a fleshism. Memory. there is one rather obvious difference between these two types of machine. Bergson intends to make us see that sometimes the brain is an instrument of 'analysis'. we cannot say that Bergsonism is a philosophy of artificial intelligence. Bergson says that my body is 'the mobile sharp point' of memory. spirit has the opportunity to insert memories. no hesitation. the brain is the large. and that means duration. no waiting. a hesitation. it makes no room for spirit. perhaps indefinite number of sockets on the wall. going from matter to spirit. To repeat. The main telephonic desk includes a type of slowness. Now this is what we have to visualize with the main telephonic desk: what used to be called a 'switchboard'. on the one hand. the brain's role is to . In chapter two of Matter and Memory. an interval. which the main telephonic desk indicates. one has crossed a difference in nature. according to Bergson. For Bergson. and because it goes too fast. But. so to speak. Unlike the brain. and if we speak of the Bergsonian body known from the inside by affections. pushing incessantly into the future (MM 224/78). if we speak of the Bergsonian body known from the outside by perceptions. this conception of the living body means that we cannot make something like the lived body (Lett) or something like the flesh central to Bergsonism. if one talks about the body known from the inside. meaning that it leads the received vibration up to a plurality of systems of movements. while the image of the main telephonic desk clearly anticipates the computer. the slowness in reaction. But. On the one hand. on the other hand. The brain opens to the received vibration 'the totality of motor pathways so that it indicates to it all the possible reactions with which [the brain] is pregnant and so that [the brain] analyzes itself by dispersing itself (MM 181/30).17 In this interval in matter. 'to make a machine that should triumph over mechanism' (EC 719/264). in other words. is how the body known from the inside produces something new that escapes the deductions of science. as we shall see. A switchboard consisted in a large table with a large number of pins attached to wires that could be pulled out of the table in order to allow any pin to be inserted into any one of a large number of sockets which were located in the wall perpendicular to the table. a 'making wait'. has allowed nature. everything concerning computers and now modems and the Internet comes down to speed. we are in memory. 'fleshism'. the Bergsonian conception of the body as a machine means that Bergsonism is not a. we are in the scientific body (and ultimately the body taken up by science when it enters into its remotest aspiration). So. With analysis. artificial intelligence goes too fast.

With this conception of the role of the body. 'our body is an instrument of action. With selection. the brain is the pin being inserted into a specific socket. [the brain's] role is limited to the transmission and division of movement. and that one has to assemble support phenomena such as hallucinations and dreams.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 17 make the vibration wait. creates representations. he is really speaking of the brain. Before we turn to the next section. But. It also requires the presupposition that perception aims at disinterested knowledge. the brain's role is to allow communication. which is material. meaning that it puts the received vibration in relation with a particular chosen motor mechanism. At other times. As Bergson says in the very first sentence of the conclusion. in other words. 'in one case as in the other. what we saw was that Bergson tries to show that there is only a difference in degree between the brain and the rest of matter. we now have the context within which to consider what Bergson calls pure perception. He shows that the body is an instrument of action in two ways. He argues for this difference in degree by means of the hypothesis of the suppression of the material world which shows that the brain is part of or contained in the material world. because in these phenomena representations are created although the object has disappeared. however. . The brain 'leads the received [vibration] to an organ of reaction that has been chosen' (MM 181/30). He focuses on the brain because of a position adopted by scientists as well as philosophers since Descartes. And finally. he engages in another thought experiment. the brain. he does not accept the presupposition that perception is contemplation. the brain is an instrument of 'selection'. he places the brain in the evolutionary scale. which shows that the brain is a 'main telephone switchboard'. that something in us. the experiment of severing the nerves. He also argues against the supporting phenomena of hallucinations and dreams by pointing to an obvious fact of blindness: for someone to have a visual representation. On the one hand. On the other. When Bergson speaks of the role of the body. Its role is to allow vibrations to communicate with a chosen motor system (selection) or to make vibrations wait before the plurality of motor possibilities (analysis). let us summarize what we have seen concerning the role of the body for Bergson. the object must have been effective at least once. and of action alone' (MM 356/225). which shows that when perception has vanished the body cannot extract from external objects the quality and quantity of movement in order to act upon them. between the brain and the reflex function of the spinal cord. And no more in the higher centers of the cortex than in the spinal cord do the nervous elements work with a view to knowledge: they only sketch all at once a plurality of possible actions or organize one of them' (MM 181/30-1). To claim that the brain. creates the representation of the material world requires that the brain be conceived as different in nature from the rest of matter. So.

as Merleau-Ponty does in the La nature lectures. Bergson is not adopting a realist perspective on perception. insofar as the same membrane reacts by moving away from the object (if . this law means that there is a direct proportion between the indeterminacy of reaction and the scope of perception. He is not showing us how consciousness casts light on things in order to let them be perceived. conscious perception. and even the necessity. in a rudimentary organism.arises in the moment of hesitation before the reaction. when he speaks of spirit. In inanimate matter. he always uses the word 'progress' (cf. the vibration encounters numerous paths down which it can travel. he is showing us how consciousness. as we have discussed it here.here we have to say perception in the forms of touch and taste . But. a reaction 'can hardly be made to wait' (MM 182/32). Perception . in effect. 'Let us start. that is. if a phenomenology of perception consists in showing how conscious syntheses constitute the perception of an object. In a being with a nervous system. instead. in an organism such as a protozoa. the influence of an action or a vibration takes time. MM 354/221). Within the images of matter. Bergson states that there is a strict connection between the zones of indetermination and perception: 'Let us note first that a strict law connects the extent of the perception back to the intensity of action that the living being has at its disposal' (MM 182/31). a direct proportion between the uncertainty. of conscious perception' (MM 182/31). The starting point for this deduction is the indetermination in regard to motor reactions that the brain's complexity symbolizes: the main telephone switchboard. there is no hesitation between action and reaction. it must choose to continue on its way and only through this 'choice' does it result in a reaction. its only means of perception is touch. however. 'Deduction' is a word Bergson always uses in relation to matter.18 The Challenge of Bergsonism THE THEORY OF PURE PERCEPTION We can see already that it is very hard to maintain. For example. Therefore. the 'making wait'. Bergson says. then. touch is at once passive. by means of the concept of image. and thus the reaction is indeterminate. that Bergson in Matter and Memory wants to make a 'phenomenology of perception'. living beings are 'zones of indetermination'. and try whether we cannot deduce from it the possibility. from this indetermination as from the true principle. that is. For Bergson. is deduced from matter (MM 182/ 31). thus the reaction is always determined. zones in which the strict laws of natural necessity encounter hesitations. insofar as the organism's membrane must come into immediate contact with an object to perceive and recognize it. so. and active. the hesitation of the reaction and the distance over which the living being is sensitive to the actions of the object which interests it.19 Clearly. just as much. then this is not Bergson's project. As it travels through the system.

The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 19 the object is a menace) (MM 182/32). Pure perception is not factual perception. we have concerned ourselves only with action. consequently an effort of memory [la memoire] which prolongs. he constructs the famous hypothesis of pure perception (MM 184/33). and one that 'contracts a multiplicity of moments' (MM 184/34). there is vision and hearing and smell through which the being can be subject to more and more distant influences. in fact. the longer the wait in reaction. then we start to think that perception could be an interior. and therefore unextended vision that would be projected outward and would somehow gain objectivity and extension (MM 184/34). these memories are the source of the illusion in which we conceive perception as a veridical hallucination. In particular. on the one hand. MM 228/82) . According to Bergson. Here (MM 184/34). We see therefore that memory. a plurality of moments' (MM 184/34). on the other hand. one into another. it naturally occupies a certain duration. Anticipating the discussion of memory in the second chapter. and involves. 'swells' with memories (souvenirs} and. defines duration. in direct proportion to the quantity of hesitations. perception is 'complex and concrete' (MM 184/34). As Bergson asks. for Bergson. because it is 'mixed with' or 'impregnated by' memories (souvenirs) (MM 183/33). In a living being with a complex brain like a dog for example (cf. These two forms of memory imply that factual perception. In other words. which allowed us to see perception deduced from the action-reaction system of matter. Bergson says that memory (la memoire) has two forms: one that 'covers over [recouvre] a bedrock of immediate perception with a covering of memories'. explain why the relation of the organism to more or less distant objects takes the particular form of conscious perception. it is the 'subjective side of the knowledge of things' (MM 184/34). but duration and memory are not the focus here in the first chapter of Matter and Memory. always offers a certain 'thickness of duration' (MM 185/34). 'how is it that this perception is consciousness?' (MM 183/33). we have the first mention of duration when Bergson says: 'However brief we suppose any perception to be. subjective. memory in both these forms makes up the principal contribution of personal or individual consciousness in perception. The hypothesis of pure perception is supposed to . To answer this question.there are numerous hesitations. as we have already noted. but also. So far. these memories give birth to every kind of illusion (MM 184/33). that is. so. to perceive without effort. allows us to perceive quickly and conveniently. As Bergson says. 'perception has space at its disposal in exact proportion to the time that action has at its disposal' (MM 183/32). according to Bergson. If we do not realize that memories are the content of hallucinations. but we have not yet reached representation. the more the living being can see. however. The covering of memories especially.20 This exact law governing the relation between the indeterminacy of reaction and perception of distance does not.

Bergson provides two descriptions of pure perception. Moreover. instead. of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous. it is a vision that has eliminated memory in both forms of prolongation and conservation in memories. MM 319/182). personal and interior. since this vision has eliminated the 'multiplicity of moments'. pure perception is a theory (MM 212/65). (MM 184/33) Then. is supposed to show us that conscious perception is veridical but is not an hallucination. pure perception differs in nature from pure memory. pure perception is defined by being objective. we have to make one more point: since it has removed the covering of memories. and since pure perception differs in nature from memory. On the one hand. it is a vision. we can say first that pure perception for Bergson is defined by being 'in principle' rather than 'in fact'. to the exclusion of all other work. the perception that an adult and formed consciousness would have. but enclosed in the present and absorbed. Nothing forbids us from substituting for this perception. impersonal and external or extended. First. living as I live. pure vision is immediate (cf. but also it seems to me that we are justified in calling pure vision 'abstract'. Thus. it is 'instantaneous' (see above in the last passage cited) and 'simple' (Bergson . he says. On the other hand. And this claim . and for Bergson. in the task of molding itself upon the external object. the mediation that memory makes available to perception. which means that pure perception is a condition of factual perception: pure perception 'is at the base of our knowledge of things' (MM 184/34). instead. since it is a vision that has eliminated the mediation of the covering of memories.that conscious perception is true . (MM 185/34) On the basis of these two comments. through the elimination of memory in all of its forms. this vision is not 'concrete perception'. and which is capable. but absorbed in the present. But now we can see that. it is 'ideal' (MM 184/33). which is entirely penetrated with our past. prolongation. In relation to the elimination of memories.is no hypothesis for Bergson (MM 188/39).20 The Challenge of Bergsonism eliminate this illusion and show us that we perceive things in the things. as we shall see in Chapter Two. Now let us turn to the elimination of the other form of memory. since memory is subjective. By [pure perception] I mean a perception which exists in principle rather than in fact [en droit and en fait] and would be possessed by a being placed where I am. he says. it is not thick or complex perception. that is. since that term is really the opposite of 'concrete'.

Pure perception is division or. . We must be extremely careful in our characterization of pure vision. which is the lowest degree of spirit . better. a duration with a very fast rhythm. it unfolds a series of moments of which each is the equivalent of the preceding moment and may be deduced from it: thus its past is truly given in its present. we must say that each instant experienced by its consciousness is experienced as the same. which is determined as ideal or abstract and immediate through the elimination of memories and which is determined as instantaneous and simple through the elimination of prolongation. In chapter four of Matter and Memory. Insofar as forgetfulness defines pure vision. If matter does not remember the past. having no access to the past. pure vision must be denned as forgetfulness: pure vision forgets what it sees as soon as it sees it. So. pure perception is an experience of matter. pure perception. we have been able to assemble the following characteristics of pure perception: it is a vision.spirit without memory .is nothing but a repetition of the same. in the two descriptions just presented. we must not confuse pure perception with the act by which we pass from the chrysalis to what is inside it. an act which included duration. pure perception has no access to the past. it is divided. But. where spirit is 'grafted' onto matter (MM 356/222). Lacking both forms of memory. we must return to the . pure vision can be described as the experience of repetition. the mathematical point. as we understand matter. since in order to experience difference one must have other instants which one can compare against. We may go further: memory does not intervene as a function of which matter has no sense and which it does not imitate in its own way. When we eliminate memory from perception and achieve this pure vision. but one that is instantaneous and therefore not the genuine experience of matter. absorbed and enclosed in the present. a superficial repetition. This division is why Bergson compares the body in pure vision to 'a mathematical point' (MM 204/56). Each instant cannot be experienced as different. So. Because of being enclosed in the present. (MM 356/222-3) Pure perception . Bergson says. But. because subject to necessity. in fact. it is because it repeats the past unceasingly. we are at the exact point.spirit that is matter .. this pure vision lacks all duration. Bergson also says that pure perception is 'absorbed' or even 'enclosed' in the present. the other instants have been forgotten. To understand the mechanism of pure perception.The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 21 opens the discussion of pure perception by saying 'we will first simplify considerably the conditions under which conscious perception takes place' MM 183/33)..is really part of matter. In contrast to this act. in this pure vision.

the transition goes from the inside of the chrysalis to its outside. according to Bergson. How does the selection occur? According to Bergson. representation is always in the image virtually. to be finally only a path upon which the modifications which are propagated in the immensity of the universe pass in every direction. According to Bergson. there is 'a purely utilitarian origin of our perception of things' (MM 299/158). Again. and also what fills it. and not in nature.22 The Challenge of Bergsonism concept of the image. not in us. to transmit the totality of what it receives. or a 'selection' (MM 188/38). in other words. Living beings. to conserve from it only its external crust. (MM 186/36) The verbs by means of which Bergson always describes this transition are: isolate. therefore. I would convert it into a representation if I could isolate it. as we have seen. as we have seen. to oppose to each action an equal and contrary reaction. from a represented image is the necessity which obliges it to act through each of its points upon all the other points of other images. it is a relativity not to us. are 'centres of indetermination'. in fact. defines the transition of pure perception as 'discernment in the etymological sense of the word'. So. Bergson. its superficial skin. in pure vision. the image or presence of a material thing becomes a representation. detach. what precedes it. it is continued in those which follow it just as it is prolonged in those which preceded it. as an objective image. for Bergson. Pure perception adds nothing new to the image. In pure perception (and as well in perception mixed with memory). In perception. between being and being perceived (MM 187/37). that there is merely a difference of degree. limit and diminish. it would suffice to suppress all of a sudden what follows it. suppress. What distinguishes the image as a present image. for Bergson. it occurs because of life necessities (MM 333-4/198). things turn the side of themselves that interests our functions and . there is therefore a transition from the image being in itself to its being for me (MM 186/35). being in solidarity with the totality of other images. If there is a relativity to perception. and indetermination is based on having a variety of'functions' (MM 186/36) or 'needs' (MM 188/38). Bergson describes the transition in the following way: [The image of the material object appears to be in itself what it is for me] because. perception becomes conscious. it subtracts a part from the whole. this opposite direction of transition is why we cannot confuse pure perception with the fatiguing act by which we reached the more rapid duration of matter. we perceive things in them. especially if I could isolate its envelope. a 'slicing up'. In pure perception. In order to transform its pure and simple existence into a representation. but to the whole universe. Pure perception implies. as a part of the whole (MM 186/ 36).

static. since it gathers and transmits the influence of all the other points of the material universe'. of course. our functions' (MM 188/ 38. he tells us that 'a luxury of perception' is 'the clear distinction of individual objects'. Because pure perception is poor. I see an apple immediately because of my need for nourishment and because this need has been repeatedly satisfied with apples. In other words. But this luxurious perception is not intuition either. He goes on to say. the conscious perception of a living being exhibits a 'necessary poverty' (MM 188/38). 'Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs. Later in chapter three of Matter and Memory. . A need . the complexity and dynamism that only memory can provide. or. that is. In any case. what difference does the shade of colour make for nourishment? My need for nourishment makes me see an apple as confusedly distinct from.) Our needs therefore are like 'so many beams of light'. ideal and abstract. even the crudity of pure vision. But. Pure perception for Bergson is a . it cannot be intuition. as Bergson says in chapter four of Matter and Memory. more generally. 'What interests us in a given situation. it could be nothing more than a sketch: impoverished. only insofar as both are immediate. For Bergson. and at the same time he says that 'a clear representation of general ideas is a refinement of intelligence' (MM 298/158). in its instaritaneousness. As Bergson says. Bergson speaks of perception starting from an 'intermediate knowledge'. a clear and distinct idea must have the colours and differences. Thus. in short. cares little for the individual differences' (MM 299/158). I do not see an apple clearly and distinctly with a specific shade of the colour green. the apple tree. as we shall see in Chapter Three. In pure vision. which does not satisfy the need for nourishment. [which] is infinitely greater and more complete than ours.. that is his philosophical method. (But the apple tree could. satisfy other needs and is therefore seen as well. in contrast to this luxury and refinement. our body. which would allow me to distinguish it from another variety of apples. beams of light that sketch out confusedly 'distinct bodies' (MM 334/198).. But we can see immediately that if pure perception gives us only confusedly distinct bodies (and not clear and distinct shades of colour). a clear and distinct idea in Bergson could never be geometrical. 218/71).The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 23 needs.. conscious representation results from the suppression of what has no interest for bodily functions and the conservation of only what does interest bodily function. This intermediate knowledge is the poverty. say. one equally remote from generality fully conceived and from individuality clearly perceived (MM 298-9/158).21 We must not get confused here: what Bergson is calling 'pure perception' resembles what he calls 'intuition'. what we are likely to grasp in it first. is the side by which it can respond to a tendency or a need. compared to 'the perception of any unconscious material point whatsoever..


The Challenge of Bergsonism

simple line drawing, in fact, a drawing that could, with effort, become geometrical. That pure perception is like an abstract and simple line drawing is why he compares pure perception to a photograph (MM 188/38-9). We must remember that in 1896 we are at the beginning of photographic technology: colour photographs have not yet been invented. So, pure perception is like a black-and-white photograph. The beams of light of needs only illuminate part of the surface of things, giving us only the external crust, the envelope, the chrysalis - in other words, only the contours of the thing. As Bergson says, in order to make the transition from presence to representation, from whole to part, 'it would be necessary, not to throw more light on the object, but, on the contrary, to obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the remainder ... should detach itself from [its surroundings]' (MM 186/36). Moreover, according to Bergson, the light does not really flood out from our needs; rather, it emanates from the surfaces themselves, from presence. What happens is that the light, when it reaches living beings, can no longer pass through unopposed because it encounters them as zones of indetermination. If it could propagate itself, it would issue immediately in a reaction; in this case, it would be refracted. But when light reaches a 'spontaneity of reaction', in short, freedom, the light is no longer refracted but reflected. The reflection is a 'virtual image', an image of potential reactions (MM 187/37). When I see the apple, the representation I have is an image of the fact that I have the potential reaction of eating it. As Bergson says, 'Perception therefore resembles those phenomena of reflection that result from an impeded refraction; it is like a mirage effect' (MM 187/37). Because conscious perception is a mirage of reflected light, it 'adds nothing to what is there; [it] effects merely this: that the real action passes through, the virtual action remains' (MM 188/39). Let us summarize this discussion of pure perception before we bring this chapter to a close. All perception for Bergson is connected to action, not contemplation; in fact, perception results from the 'hesitation' between action and reaction. This 'hesitation' or 'interval' is caused by the brain making indeterminate reactions possible; the brain is the 'main switchboard' for all our bodily functions. Therefore, for Bergson, what we always perceive first is what interests our needs or functions. Because living beings like human beings have lots of bodily needs, we have vision, which is subject to the influence of lots of distant things. While factual perception involves all the senses, pure perception is only a visual representation. Insofar as it is vision (and not touch), pure perception has not yet completed itself in an action. What makes pure perception pure is that it does not involve memory at all; so, it is both immediate and instantaneous. What pure perception recognizes immediately is a confusedly distinct body. This discernment of a confusedly distinct body is due, to

The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology


say it again, to our needs. In other words, the beams of light of our needs delimit the contours, and only the contours of this body rather than that one. Pure perception therefore for Bergson is 'delimitation', as the title of the fourth chapter of Matter and Memory indicates. But delimitation, again as the title of the fourth chapter indicates, is not 'fixation'. In order to fix the vision, in other words, in order to make the virtual action become actual action, we would have to restore some of perception's thickness; we would need an affection or emotion (and that means life). An emotion always makes us leap across the interval of indetermination. If we experienced an emotion of sufficient force, we would complete the drawing we make with our eyes with a real drawing on paper. Lacking such an emotion, the drawing we make with our eyes vanishes as soon as it happens; pure perception is like, as Bergson says, 'an instantaneous flash of lightning which illuminates a stormy landscape by night' (MM 325/189). It is well known, of course, that Bergson loved all psychological and psychical research. Hence, Matter and Memory is filled with discussions of cases of psychic illnesses. But, sadly, no 'Schneider' emerges in Matter and Memory to amuse us with his sexual problems and to make us read the book as if it were a novel. This lack of a 'Schneider' means probably that Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception will always be more popular than Bergson's Matter and Memory. But in the second chapter of Matter and Memory, Bergson focuses on a peculiar fact of patients who suffer from 'psychic blindness', that is, patients who cannot recognize specific objects even though their vision is perfectly intact (MM 242-3/96-8). These patients seem unable to draw pictures or at least they cannot draw pictures very well, and this leads Bergson to discuss two ways of drawing, discussion which, I believe, is very helpful in understanding Bergson's theory of pure perception. On the one hand - and this is how Bergson's poor mental patients draw — they 'fix' on paper in an uncertain way 'a certain number of points', then they connect the points up, verifying at every moment whether the image resembles the object they are drawing. Bergson calls this first way of drawing 'drawing "by points"' (MM 243/97). Clearly, the name implies that Bergson's mental patients are rather untalented geometers. But there is a second way to draw according to Bergson, 'the habitual way', which he describes as 'drawing with "a continuous line" after having looked at or thought of the model' (MM 243/97). Bergson explains this second, nongeometrical way of drawing 'by means of our habit of discovering immediately [tout de suite} the organization of the most usual contours, that is, by means of a motor tendency to draw its schema in one whole line' (MM 243/97). This habit of drawing a schema with a continuous line is at the base of our knowledge of things, allowing us immediately to draw with our eyes the most usual contours of things; this habit is not only at the base of science in its remotest inspirations


The Challenge of Bergsonism

but also at the base of art. But to have a painting and not a drawing, to have art and not artifice, to add colour and not subtract greys, we need memory. As we shall see in Chapter Two, memory differs in nature from perception and even all forms of imaging; this difference is such a radical difference that Bergson says that 'to imagine is not to remember' (MM 278/135). Although a radical difference in nature, this difference can be experienced; to have this experience will require us to pay attention to the mental illness that Bergson calls 'division of the personality' (MM 313/175); we ourselves will have to divide our personality between matter and memory. So, in Chapter Two, we shall return to some of Bergson's mental patients. But unlike the patients suffering from 'psychic blindness', whose impoverished souls make them draw by points like bad geometers, these schizophrenics have souls that are too rich: they draw by one continuous line because they see everything double.

So. When we considered Bergson's hypothesis of pure perception. Insofar as phenomenology remains irreducibly connected to intentionality. it is hard to conceive phenomenology in any other way than as a philosophy of consciousness. phenomenological consciousness engenders or. more precisely. Consciousness is itself deduced from matter. phenomenology always remains irreducibly connected to intentionality. We must here take advantage of Derrida's remarkable clarification of the phenomenological concept of presence. let us summarize what we saw in the last chapter. as we are going to see now.1 in other words. Because of this definition. we saw that this concept amounts to a new definition of presence. material in Matter and Memory: Bergson's concept of memory.and this selection takes place on the basis of the body. As consciousness of something. In Voice and Phenomenon.CHAPTER 2 The Concept of Memory: Ontology We now enter into a discussion of extremely difficult. rather consciousness is something. maybe the most difficult. it defines consciousness as 'consciousness of something'. Derrida has established that presence in phenomenology is always defined as 'selfproximity in interiority'. Presence exceeds consciousness and this is why Bergsonism is not a phenomenology of .. we saw that consciousness does not engender representations but is the selection of images from the whole of images called matter . But no matter what. but by exteriority and therefore objectivity. constitutes representations. which is itself one of the images. as presence to consciousness. we cannot define Bergsonism as a philosophy of consciousness. Insofar as consciousness is the selection from the whole of images called matter.the image . Bergson does not define consciousness as consciousness of something. in fact. We engaged in an investigation of chapter one of Matter and Memory in order to determine Bergsonism's challenge to phenomenology. we have to say that phenomenological presence is equivalent to what Bergson calls representation. this means that Bergsonism is a philosophy of the unconscious. And if this is the case. the Bergsonian image is not defined by interiority and therefore subjectivity. then we have to recognize that Bergsonian presence .precedes presence to consciousness. Before we turn to the concept of memory. When we considered Bergson's concept of the image. Moreover.

rather. Thus. Obviously.'6 If we take this comment seriously. we must say that Bergsonism is a 'primacy of memory'. suggests that it does not. The memory-images add colour to the black-and-white photograph.that Nietzsche remains mired in the modern philosophy of subjectivity.and we can see this most clearly in his essay 'Nietzsche's Word: God is Dead'5 . It is this primacy of memory which opens the challenge to ontology. Heidegger says. Heidegger therefore raises the question. I am going to take seriously the standard Heidegger has set for ontology and try to see whether Bergson's metaphysics of memory measures up to it. Derrida is alluding to MerleauPonty who had shown in the Phenomenology of Perception that phenomenological consciousness must really be rooted in the body. then we are led to Bergson's famous image of the cone. Heidegger himself. what it finds is a corporeal or operative intentionality. 'the very expression of his efforts to grasp really the phenomenon'. as this machine becomes more complicated. On the basis of an examination of the image of .28 The Challenge of Bergsonism perception. as Derrida has also shown. in the second half of the twentieth century. we have not really escaped from the philosophy of consciousness. which in Nietzsche's case is the will to power. it is conceived as a 'central telephone switchboard'.Heidegger claims that Bergson merely 'reverses' Aristotle's views on time. in Leib. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. when phenomenology starts to take the body seriously. of course.4 Most generally. But even here. I am not really going to present a Bergsonian challenge to Heidegger's ontology. And. not as flesh. what we saw in Matter and Memory is that the Bergsonian body is a machine. this claim means for Heidegger . To reverse Platonism without twisting free of it means to reverse the objectivity of the Platonic ideas for the subjectivity of the soul. But.made famous obviously by Derrida . practically only the past' (MM 291/15). 'Bergson's "images" are the very expression of his efforts to grasp really the phenomenon within the realm he takes for his theme. in the flesh. where he claims that Nietzsche merely 'reverses' Platonism without 'twisting free' of it. Heidegger's use of the word 'reversal' here anticipates its use in para. which we are going to address to Bergson. to appropriate Merleau-Ponty's famous phrase. Bergson says. Thus. there is no primacy of perception in Bergson. 24 of his first set of Nietzsche lectures. phenomenology is always a phenomenology of perception. The slowness of the machine allows memories to be selected and to be inserted into the present. Here. 'we perceive. the word 'ontology' is synonymous with Heidegger's name. is it the case that Bergson merely reverses Platonism without twisting free of it? In his 1928 lecture course.2 Here. an image that is. of course. in fact. In the most famous footnote from Being and Time3 . we also saw that. it runs slowly. to repeat Heidegger. Memory plays such a large role in concrete and complex perception that Bergson says in the fourth chapter of Matter and Memory that 'every perception is already memory'. But.

First. but we cannot point to an experience. then. if one claims that the brain is the cause of perceptual representations. Memory. We can make a strong case for these claims being true because they explain perception better than other explanations (MM 221/74). Further. at least. The present object activates our organs and nerve centres and. we are going to have to turn to what he calls 'the central metaphysical problem of existence'. the experiential result is the same.7 and. in particular. we have to examine how Bergson defines memory by means of establishing two sets of differences in nature. To put this positively. THE PRIMACY OF MEMORY The problem of memory is primary for Bergson because of his refutation of materialism. if the brain is not sufficient to engender a memory. does not somehow have the power of engendering representations in perception. it is primary for what he calls at the end of chapter one of Matter and Memory 'the philosophy of matter' (MM 220/73). we need to see why there is a 'primacy of memory' in Matter and Memory. regardless of whether we say that the brain does or does not engender perceptions. in other words. however. suggest. that Bergson's metaphysics of memory is not a new subjectivism. the claim that matter has no hidden power means that the brain. initially. then it ought to be able to do this when the object is absent as in a memory (MM 222/75). for Bergson. But. The first point that Bergson makes is: if the brain is not sufficient to engender the representation of an absent object.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 29 the cone. then we must conclude that it is not sufficient to engender the representation of a present object. and. matter has to be understood as having no hidden or unknowable power (MM 220/73). by examining the second and third chapters of Matter and Memory. the brain is only an instrument of action (MM 221/74). but actually 'twists free' of it. Memory becomes primary for the philosophy of matter in Bergson because we cannot empirically verify these claims about matter through the analysis of perception. So. as we have already seen. or. I hope to show. With the experience called perception and even with the strange experience called pure perception. moreover. then. through a threestage process. it always looks as though our perceptions emanate from these nerve centres. in other words. For Bergson. Consequently. we are going to have to look at the image of the cone. we are always dealing with a present object. We must say that the present object is the cause of the perceptual representation. I am going to try to make a case here that Bergson does not merely 'reverse' Platonism. consequently. in short. But. from the brain (MM 221/75). finally. can provide the empirical verification of another claim . memory has to be the test case for this hypothesis.

which are representations of present objects. then we must also say that memory is a power absolutely independent from matter.is erect spirit into a reality independent of matter on the basis of 'the very example that is commonly supposed to be the most unfavorable to [spirit]' (MM 220/74). according to Bergson. but it is also provisional. First. if the survival of memories.e. despite the fact that psychologists constantly treat the brain as 'a storehouse of memories' (MM 220/74). and not a difference of degree.and this is what makes these middle chapters on memory so powerful . But. Second. then we must say that something entirely different from memory is going on in perception. before we go on. If they differ in nature from perceptions. Bergson's second point is: if it can be shown that memories differ in nature (and not by intensity) from perceptions. for Bergson. Psychologists. between the experience of matter and the experience of spirit. we are going to return specifically to this experience. Memory. then we can conclude. for Bergson. But. which are representations of absent objects. there is one rather surprising implication of it. and now we can say philosophers of artificial intelligence. we have reason to argue . the cone image explicitly symbolizes the 'connection' between matter and memory. in reference to psychology or. we can establish. But. let me repeat: overall. perception really is the experience of matter. if there is a radical difference between perceptions and memories. for Bergson. then we must say that perceptions are impersonal. let us turn now to the way in which Bergson defines memory. that we perceive matter in matter and not in us. subjective.here leaving the philosophy of matter behind for the philosophy of spirit . indeed. As we are going to see. this dualism between matter and memory for Bergson is absolutely necessary in order to dispel all thinking in terms of differences in degree. something objective rather than subjective. more precisely. psychophysiology. if there is a difference in nature between memories and perceptions. The experience is primary for him in three ways. memories are personal. So. objective. as well. Through the difference in nature between memories and perceptions. . cannot be explained by the brain. we must say that memory is a power absolutely independent of the brain. i. that the brain does not engender perceptions. At the end of this chapter. what Bergson is going to do . then we can conclude that perception is radically different from memory.30 The Challenge of Bergsonism made in the first chapter of Matter and Memory.e. But then third. constantly reduce memory to matter. that in pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves in matter (MM 222/75).that spirit is a reality independent of matter. i. If there is a 'radical difference' between memories and perceptions. As we know. there is a primacy of memory because memory is an experience. there is a third point he can make thanks to memory. As we are going to see. memory. is the most 'palpable' experience of spirit (MM 220/73).

which have been punctuated. so. I 'represent to myself the step-by-step phases. 184/34).The Concept of Memory: Ontology 3I THE TWO DIFFERENCES IN NATURE THAT DEFINE MEMORY FIRST DIFFERENCE IN NATURE THAT DEFINES MEMORY: TWO FORMS OF MEMORY' 'THE The dualism begins by establishing a difference in nature between what Bergson calls 'the two forms of memory'. one reads the lesson to be learned one time. somehow. On the one hand. Is the same thing really at issue?' (MM 225/79). making progress each time. The circumstances distinguish it from those that preceded and followed it. or. the successive readings. since he speaks of 'punctuating each verse' in this first reading.' And. that it is imprinted on my memory [la memoire]' (MM 225/79). and for him the two forms of memory distinction is the first difference in nature that defines memory. If the brain really stores memories. Bergson says. he describes a different effort by means of which I remember how the lesson was learned. it is primarily discussed in the first third of chapter two of Matter and Memory (MM 225/79. Again. The question is: do memories survive only in the brain. Bergson describes the effort to learn by heart. through which I passed. or do they survive somewhere. Here.is the same thing really at issue in the two cases even though the same words are used? . When Bergson says this . 'At this precise moment [that is. I know my lesson by heart. some say that it has become a memory [souvenir]. memory is 'the very example that is most unfavourable' to the thesis that spirit is an independent reality. when the words. each comes back to mind. The establishment of the difference in nature between the two forms of survival takes place by means of an example: learning a lesson by heart (MM 255/79). in other words. then it seems unlikely that spirit is an independent reality. it is a determinate event of my history. a difference in nature between a material memory and a spiritual memory. cf. As Bergson says. What is at issue in these two forms is a difference in nature between a memory of the body and a memory of the soul.he is referring . Let us see how this example works. 'passes again before me'. On the other hand. also MM 219/73. Then. it occupies a place in time. he continues: 'These people use the same words in the two cases. form a continuous whole]. else? Bergson is going to say that they survive somehow else. one repeats the whole poem a number of times. the reason Bergson believes this difference in nature is necessary lies in the fact that psychologists have always associated memory with the brain. and I 're-see' it with the circumstances that accompanied it and that still enframe it. 'Some will say again that these images are memories [souvenir}. that they are imprinted in my memory [ma memoire}. it seems that the lesson is a poem. First.

The efforts described here . 'is merely to utilize. or.'active' memory (MM 233/87) and active memorization . more and more. prolongation contracts a perceptual image by repeating its useful effect or action (MM 227/81.32 The Challenge of Bergsonism to the words 'souvenir1 and 'la memoire'. according to Bergson. I must press down on the brake pedal. Of course we shall return to the question of the unconscious in a moment. towards 'life'. The role of prolongation. the first form of memory. better. 'subconsciously' (cf. MM 233/87). So. Bergson himself. by setting up a mechanism. 'the example of a lesson learned by heart is artificial' (MM 229/84). in The Two Sources of Morality and . we could call this first form of memory 'the progressive memory'. is why Bergson calls prolongation 'more natural' (MM 228/83): it makes progress (MM 228/83). unconsciously. it is directed towards utility and adaptation (MM 229-30/84). Although the appearance of the amber light is random or accidental. Insofar as the operation of prolongation is directed towards future action.8 Later. automatically. towards action and towards utility adaptation. in a word. is 'seated in the present and looking at nothing but the future' (MM 227/82). eventually the reaction becomes automatic. EC 616-17/143-4). In this situation. depress the brake pedal. I must consciously think: when approaching traffic lights and I see the amber light. to which the active process of memorization refers. Prolongation.are not the operations of memory between which Bergson is distinguishing. For example. these voluntary efforts . These two 'unconscious' operations of memory divide in two different directions (cf.both the repetition of the lesson in order to memorize it and the evocation of the images of the phases of memorization . That they are not what is at stake here is why this example is so perplexing. it is directed towards future 'action'. On the basis of the example of learning a lesson by heart. in order to organize [the movements] together and. The first form of memory is this prolongation through repetition.are voluntary efforts. when I start to learn to drive a car. I repeat the same action. is the operation of 'prolongation' (MM 229/83). difference in direction always defines a difference in nature for Bergson. which will always operate into the future. I have contracted a habit. Bergson is going to distinguish between two operations that function passively. as Bergson says. In other words. but for now we must recognize that memory in Bergson is unconscious. Then I will not cause an accident. however. But. to create a bodily habit' (MM 229/83-4). he calls it instead 'habit-memory' (MM 231/86). This direction towards the future. On the one hand. It would seem that. every time I see the amber light. the movements by which the first [image] was continued. the difference in nature is going to be established between two operations of memory and two types of memory. as Bergson says. since he uses the word 'progress' in the description of memorization. as he also says. 228/82). does not use this designation.

in other words. all obligations for Bergson are habits. we might describe regressive memory as a kind of writing or as a sort of ledger (a formalization or something like the white on black of the Milky Way). In fact.refers to the operation of regressive memory. according to Bergson. and the process by which I am obliged to have obligations. for instance. as if memory were a big container. Through the recording of perceptual images. habits become perfected. The whole of obligation takes place unconsciously.the innumerable ordinary and common habits that I have are contracted by means of 'the accidental repetition of the same situations' (MM 231/85). or. more and more foreign to our past life' (MM 229/83). Bergson will call the operation of prolongation. But. let us turn to the second form of memory. something survives. Unlike habit-memory. These habits survive. 'the whole of obligation' (MR 999/29). the whole of obligation is the habit of contracting habits. as the same situations continue to repeat themselves (even when they repeat themselves accidentally).) . so perfect they look to be 'innate'. as he says later in chapter two. The distinction he is making is between particular obligations. what survives is a 'memory-image' {image-souvenir} (MM 227/81). unlike active memorization . which puts habits somewhere in the body. unlike the habit-memory. In the example of learning a lesson by heart. In other words. Now. Because he uses the obvious metaphor of imprint to speak of memory. in the plural. as we shall see in a moment. This is why Bergson calls the second form of memory 'regressive' (MM 228/83). (The hyphen in this phrase will turn out to be significant. It records each image as it occurs and maintains the images in the order of their appearance. Therefore. and this is why they can be destroyed when my body is injured. I contract thousands and thousands of habits by means of the operation of prolongation without being aware of the process. which Bergson explicitly calls 'the regressive memory' (MM 229/83). the question of where the memories are stored or recorded. 230/84. But. as Bergson says. which. We can easily see the difference in direction of the two forms of memory. what survives due to conservation are 'representations' (MM 224/78).the second description in which I reproduce the images of me memorizing the poem . they become. the process of evocation . regressive memory regresses into the past. We saw in Chapter One as well that. keeping promises. is always the wrong question for Bergson. which are 'exceptional and rare' (MM 228/83) . the repetition by means of which habits are contracted. the 'habit-memory' of Matter and Memory. the regressive memory is not a place. to use Bergson's terminology. 'more and more impersonal. conserves by 'recording' perceptual images (MM 227/81).habits learned voluntarily.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 33 Religion. as in the learning a lesson by heart example. The operation is denned by 'conservation' (MM 228/82. they are 'deposited' in the body (MM 227/81). which makes progress towards the future. 234/88).

for Bergson. We must note immediately that dreams and hallucinations are 'evocations' of the past. but also to be free of life's necessities. so. it is less natural for Bergson. and they bear the place and date of their original occurrence. Thus. they are therefore at home in our past life and not seated in the present. Insofar as memory-images are personal. even though these memory- . Let us stop for a moment here. which bring past images back to the present. are spontaneous (MM 231/86). they are not directed towards life. they do not respond to the present moment. for Bergson. We can conclude therefore that to be less natural. so they are in a sense 'detached' or 'withdrawn' from the moment (MM 228/83). they are perfect. Insofar as the regressive memory is turned back towards the past. un souvenir. But. 'thought' rather than acted (MM 228/82). a memory. they do not and cannot require the perfecting that habits require. But. The spontaneity of the memoryimage means that it is 'capricious' in its reproduction (MM 234/88) and 'fugitive' in its retention (MM 231/85). Besides being personal. they are recorded just once (MM 229/84). in a word. Bergson never explicitly calls regressive memory less natural. It comes from the Latin. We shall return to this connection later in this chapter when we turn to the cone image. But the recording operation of regressive memory is itself natural. dated and non-repeatable in the sense of not being able to be done over. which means to come to mind. But this claim. what Bergson wants us to see is that dreams and hallucinations are useless (MM 228/83) and do not contribute to adaptation. memoryimages cannot be repeated in the way that habits can. subvenire. they cannot be done over. MM 231/85). These images are. it even suggests a difference of degree. towards uselessless. just comes to mind. for Bergson. the direction of regressive memory has suddenly changed. memory-images. Insofar as regressive memory is directed to the past. which leads us to the last characteristic of the Bergsonian memory-images. as Bergson says. here. and that makes habits impersonal. is extremely complicated. what is less natural about regressive memory? What is less natural is that I do not pay attention to life when I dream or hallucinate. both of which suggest spirit. which suggests that the habit-memory and regressive memory are really not independent but connected (cf.34 The Challenge of Bergsonism Memory-images are personal. since Bergson explicitly says that the recording of perceptual images happens according to a 'natural necessity' (MM 227/81). Here the French word souvenir is essential. each is different from the next. and not to pay attention to life is in a sense not only to be dead.. spontaneously. For Bergson. So. that regressive memory is 'less natural'. In fact. they do not look to the future. is to be more spiritual. he says only that habit-memory is 'more natural' (MM 228/83). 'More' implies again a connection between the two forms of memory. it is directed not to action or movement but towards dreaming or hallucination.

by means of the operation of prolongation. Regressive memory is defined by the operation of conservation. they are used correctly for Bergson. repeatable.regressive memory towards the past. different (and not repeatable: they cannot be done over) and perfect (and not perfectible). ultimately.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 35 images are capricious and fugitive. And. Bergson concludes that habits are not memories and that 'habit-memory' is not the true memory (MM 229/84). not under the conscious control of one's will. In the case of memorization and habit-memory. SECOND DIFFERENCE IN NATURE THAT DEFINES MEMORY: 'THE DIFFERENTIATION ACCORDING TO INTEREST' For Bergson. which is a memory of our past life. utility and adaptation. because what survives is a memory. that we are not mere automatons. memory-images are spontaneous in their reproduction (they are capricious) and in their retention (they are fugitive). prolongation repeats the useful effect of a perceptual image towards the future. Despite Bergson's suggestions that there is a connection between the two forms of memory. towards dreaming (or hallucination). towards action. 2. they are not determined by necessity.image.1 we can see that what Bergson calls a 'memory-image' is an intermediate term between . Let us simplify this discussion in order to be able to see what is at stake in it. withdrawal. the words souvenir and memoire. regressive memory goes in the direction of the past. Habit-memory is denned by the operation of prolongation. the useless and thought. Because prolongation makes habits survive in the body and because habits become more and more foreign to our past life. therefore. while they are not acquired accidentally like habits. which is acquired accidentally. what survives is a habit. by means of the operation of conservation.e. to which they are never foreign. memory-images are at home in our past life. but in the case of evocation and conservation. they are foreign to our past life. Ultimately. habit-memory towards the future . what survives is a memory-image. what leads to the second difference in nature that defines memory is that the element of what we have been calling regressive memory is the memory-image (image-souvenir or souvenir-image). If we look at Fig. perfectible. Their spontaneity is the very sign of our freedom. and. are misused. habits have the characteristics of being impersonal. i. conservation records step by step the perceptual image towards the past. By means of seeing this difference in nature ..we can answer the question which Bergson asked after the two descriptions of learning by heart. habit-memory and regressive memory are differentiated in nature: habit-memory goes in the direction of the future. and life. Memory-images have the characteristics of being personal (and not impersonal).

9 Perception in Fig. the memory-image is simply a weaker state of a present . for him a memory is not an image.he calls this whole group of theories 'associationism' (MM 277/ 134) . Having the memory-image as its element. 'Incontestable truth' is Bergson's phrase. i. Its intermediate status is why the term is hyphenated. we have a thick perception. 2. It is an 'incontestable truth' that as I make an effort to recall an old pain. Because a memory is not an image. psychological as well as philosophical theories of association . he did not purify it of perception: perception's element is always the image. 2.rely on the obvious fact that Fig. Fig. the 'regressive memory' is still partly material. So. because it includes sensation or affection or feeling. As Bergson says. since pure memory actualizes or materializes itself in a sensation. like pain. associationism argues that. we no longer have instantaneous perception. it consists in a mixture of memory and image. as Bergson says.1 (MM 276/132) the pure memory and perception.36 The Challenge of Bergsonism Figure 2. Since regressive memory has memory-images as its element. while in the first difference in nature. A 'pure and simple image'.e. An affection. that of 'the two forms of memory'.1 represents. memory purified of images. the element of perception is an image. According to Bergson. on the basis of this incontestable truth that memories actualize themselves in sensations. not a memory. in other words. between memory and perception.1 is not called pure perception. a pure memory actualizes or materializes itself in a sensation. is of the present and material (MM 278/135). even though affection makes perception thick. Yet. This brings us to our second difference in nature.e.1 shows on the left 'pure memory'. When affection is added into pure perception. But. which means that it is an incontestable truth in general and not just for associationism. i. transforms or prolongs the virtual perceptual image into actual action. 2. Bergson purified memory of habit or bodily motion. and he himself italicizes this sentence: 'To imagine is not to remember1 (MM 278/ 135). I can feel or sense the pain again (MM 279/136).

without any doubt. Bergson argues that. every memory that comes to mind in an image is really a nascent sensation. that I am feeling. But never will this weak state appear to me as the memory of a strong state. the memory actualizes itself in a strong pain. associationism treats all memories indif- . its logic depends on this: because all memories actualize themselves in sensations which are. as I make the effort to recall it. Therefore. The memory is therefore something entirely different. which I had before the painkillers? It is possible.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 37 sensation. To repeat. let us say I have a sharp. Do I get confused and think that this dull toothache is the memory of the sharp toothache. is only a weak pain. thanks to the painkillers. what Bergson realizes here is that associationism overlooks something in this incontestable truth that all memories actualize themselves in sensations. Now. Because of this isolation of the weak moment. by diminishing.the memory of an acute pain equals the weak pain I am feeling now . that I experience the weak pain as a memory-image of a weak pain. an intense pain. for example. Since there is only a difference of degree between sensation and memory we should be able to go from a sensation to a memory as well as going from a memory to a sensation: If the memory of an acute pain. since the image-memory participates already in the sensation). (MM 279/136-7) This is an obscure passage. at least at first. when I recall the sharp toothache I had before the painkillers. inversely. a moment comes when it is impossible for me to say whether what I sense is a weak sensation that I am feeling or a weak sensation that I imagine (and that is natural. given the hypothesis of weaker and stronger states. we ought to be able to go in the opposite direction.10 To contest this. through painkillers. I have only a sort of dull pain. I should experience the present weak pain as the memory of an acute pain. What it overlooks is that the memory of a sharp pain actualizes itself only at first as a weak pain. as Bergson says. Associationism isolates the moment when all memories become weak images from their beginning before becoming an image and their ending when they are just like a strong perception. end up being a remembered acute pain. But neither the memory-image of a dull pain nor the present feeling of the dull pain make me wince. The dull toothache that I feel now is just like the dull toothache that I had last year. throbbing toothache. will. I wince at the very thought of it. the throbbing diminishes. For example.then it should be the case that as an intense pain diminishes into a weak pain. If these two states are perfectly identical . but. associationism supposes an identity between the memory of an acute pain and the weak pain I am feeling now. For associationism. then. weak. Now. I never get confused and say that I experience the weak pain as the memory of a strong pain. which is the stronger state. In contrast.


The Challenge of Bergsonism

ferently; no matter what sensible intensity the memory represents, it is treated as a weak sensation. If all memories are just weak sensations, then a weak sensation that I am having right now should feel identical to a memory of a past strong sensation. Immediately we can see the contradiction: for associationism, a weak sensation is a strong sensation. Bergson specifies this difference in nature between memory and image in terms of interest. As in Chapter One, for Bergson, perception is not interested in speculative knowledge; in other words, it is not disinterested (MM 279/137); it is practical and interested. And what it is interested in is the present action (MM 361/230). This interest means that the images that perception receives have extension; they are actual. In contrast, as we have seen, memory is turned towards the past. But, since perception is interested only in the present, it finds memories uninteresting (MM 282/139). Simply, memories of the past do not contribute to useful actions. Because pure memories have no utility (until they are inserted into an actual perception), Bergson calls pure memories 'impotent' (MM 280/137) - they do not have the power to bring about action - and 'virtual' (MM 282/139) - they are not actual. Insofar as pure memories are uninteresting from the viewpoint of utility,11 insofar, in other words, as they are virtual, they involve no sensation and, therefore, they are unextended (MM 283/140-1). To summarize this difference in nature between perception and memory, perceptual images are present, actual and extended, while pure memories are past, virtual and unextended. As Bergson says, The memory actualized in an image differs, then, profoundly from [the] pure memory. The image is a present state and can participate in the past only by means of the memory from which it has emerged. The memory, in contrast, impotent as long as it remains without utility, is pure of all mixture with the sensation, without attachment with the present and consequently unextended. (MM 283/141) Before we turn to 'the central metaphysical problem of existence', we need to summarize the two differences in nature by which Bergson defines memory. Both differences in nature - 'the two forms of memory' and 'the differentiation according to interest' - focus initially on the difference between the power of memory and other powers or abilities. In the 'two forms of memory', we saw Bergson differentiate between conservation of perceptual images and prolongation of images in bodily movement. Then, in the 'differentiation according to interest', we saw him differentiate between memory and perception. Memory is always of the past and is therefore uninteresting. Bodily movements and perception are always 'seated' in the present, interested in the present, 'looking only at the future' (MM 227/82). But these differences in

The Concept of Memory: Ontology


nature are established not only to make us see these differences between the powers, bodily movement, perception and memory; they are also established to make us see the difference in nature concerning what survives by means of these powers. The prolongation of an image by means of the repetition of its useful effect deposits habits in the body. These bodily habits are purely material, purely objective, purely impersonal. In contrast to this so-called 'memory' of the body, the conservation by recording of perceptual images is the true memory, the memory of the spirit. Since we have noted the difference in nature between the so-called memory of the body and the true memory, it is hard to maintain that the true memory is recording memory-images in the body, or, more precisely, in the brain. Bergson spends pages in chapter two of Matter and Memory examining the literature on aphasics. While a patient suffering from a brain lesion cannot come up with a word when its definition, for instance, is given, the patient can use the word under other circumstances; what the brain lesion has destroyed, according to Bergson, is the mechanism that reacts to the hearing of the definition. The memory of the word is still intact. According to Bergson, since the motor mechanisms are in the body, they and only they can be destroyed. We must say that memory-images survive in a way different from bodily habits. But, Bergson takes the issue of survival further: memory-images are partly material, since they are images. A pure memory involves no image, no matter, not even any sensation. In other words, a pure memory is purely spiritual, purely subjective, purely personal. The obvious question now is whether this definition of pure memory as purely subjective traps Bergson in a subjectivism. So, let us turn to Bergson's brief examination of what he calls 'the central metaphysical problem of existence'.

Chapter three of Matter and Memory is entitled 'Of the Survival of Images'. The word 'survival' means a type of existence: memories, according to Bergson, survive the destruction of brain cells. How is this possible? To answer this question, he again reminds us that consciousness is primarily practical and not speculative (MM 284/141). Because consciousness is interested in present action, in general it remains unaware of what is ineffective or impotent in relation to action. Impotence in relation to action is precisely how Bergson characterizes pure memories; in fact, he characterizes them as 'radically impotent' (MM 283/141). Pure memories are, for Bergson, 'unconscious psychical states' (MM 283/141). In fact, throughout Matter and Memory., he defines unconsciousness as impotence (MM 315/176, 193-4/44). In order to help us conceive unconscious psychical states, the first thing Bergson does is


The Challenge of Bergsonism

break the identification of consciousness with existence since this identification is common in 'the psychological domain'; for Bergson, in the psychological domain, consciousness is not 'synonymous' with existence (MM 283/141). Thus, he limits the extension of the word 'consciousness' to the present, to the actually lived, to the active. And this limitation has the effect for Bergson of broadening the extension of the word 'existence'. Existence then can be attributed not only to consciousness, that is, to what is active, but also to unconsciousness, that is, to what is inactive both in the sense of being no longer lived and past and in the sense of being not yet lived and future. Because Bergson breaks the synonymy between consciousness and existence, which in turn allows him to broaden the meaning of the word 'existence', he can establish a comparison between 'the series of objects simultaneously arranged in space and the series of states successively developed in time' (MM 287/145). As he says in chapter three of Matter and Memory: 'In reality, the adherence of [memories] to our present state is entirely comparable to the adherence of unnoticed objects to the objects we perceive; and the unconscious plays the same kind of role in both cases' (MM 286-7/145). In everyday life, we do not recognize this comparison because we have contracted the habit of 'emphasizing' the differences between these two series and then of 'erasing' their 'resemblances' (MM 287/145). This operation of overemphasis and erasure occurs, according to Bergson, in three ways. First, because the objects arranged in space around me represent possible actions that I can execute at some moment in the future, space, like the future, remains indefinitely open, 'pregnant with menaces and promises' (MM 286/ 144). Unlike this open horizon of possible actions, memories are 'the dead weight of the past', dead because our interest in possible actions closes off the past in favour of the future. This is the difference, as we have seen, between interest in action and lack of interest in what no longer acts. But, for Bergson, we erase any resemblance between the series of objects and the series of states, because the indefinite or infinite horizon of extended space in front of us is pregnant with promises and menaces; this 'pregnancy' makes the infinite horizon of space appear to be given and present to us. Moreover, and for the same reason, in order to facilitate action, we pretend that we are free of the past of memories (MM 286/144-5). The result of this appearance is that what counts as reality in the material universe includes all that overflows our perception; the result of this pretence is that what counts as reality in 'our inner life' includes only the present moment. But this difference between the space extending infinitely and yet being present and our inner life being present but not infinite is only an appearance. The truth, for Bergson, is that what is unextended is partly present but also infinite, and the extended is infinite but also partly present.

In fact. analogous situation. for Bergson. there is not a process of one-by-one crossing. therefore lacking the appearance of a chain (MM 287/145). the whole intermediate part escapes from [my] grasp' (MM 288/146). But. which is the whole of our past states. as we have already noted. we see that. We are going to return to this leap in a moment. in fact. plays a role in any decision while only a small part of the external world plays a role. which allows me to foresee the appearance of each one on the basis of the one in front of me. Again. But. For Bergson. In other words. I have to 'cross over one by one' all obstacles that lie between me and the completed action. of which my present perception is only one link' (MM 287/145). the reproduction of memories in consciousness is capricious. when I recall. 'by looking at it closely. The capricious characteristic of memories leads us to think that the series of memories is contingent. is really the actual synthesis of all our past states' (MM 287/145-6). The role of the will indicated here in a decision brings us to the third way the operation of overemphasis and erasure occurs. again. and since [I] transport [myself] to [the prior situation] with a single bound. and the leap over states versus the one-by-one crossing of objects — do not form what Bergson calls a 'metaphysical distinction' (MM 286/144). This strict determinateness is why it is easy for me to believe that the infinity of objects is present to me. For now. When I decide to do something in a given situation. In the same decision and even in the execution of the action. For Bergson. it is of course useful to recall situations which are similar to the present one. always present in all of our decisions. As he says. there is a difference in the two orders but we emphasize it to the point of erasing the resemblance between them. The order of the series of objects arranged simultaneously in space is based in necessity: there is a type of deductivity to objects in space.the openness of the future versus the closedness of the past. by looking closely. we see that our memories form the same kind of chain and that our character. when I recall.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 41 The second way the operation of overemphasis of differences and erasure of resmblances occurs concerns the order of the series of objects arranged simultaneously in space and the series of states developed successively in time. this is really a difference but one that ends up erasing the resemblance. Unperceived . 'the strictly determinate order of these objects lends to them the appearance of a chain. I 'leap over the interval of time which separates the actual situation from a prior. unlike when I act. according to Bergson. these three overemphasized differences between objects arranged simultaneously in space and states developed successively in time . I simply leap. all of our past states exist for us more than the external world since our character. we need to recognize that this difference between a leap and a one-by-one crossing makes me think that the whole of the past does not exist intact while the whole of space does. as Bergson says. the contingency of the chain of states versus the necessity of the chain of objects.

in the external case. this is why Bergson says that a psychological state and a material object 'form a pan of a series'. In fact. the connection between the links of the series is perfect. in the psychic case. to say this again. we see that they are unequally fulfilled. the series is the whole but the whole is divided in two. Inversely. the two conditions are so closely connected that they form a whole. we have less . or fulfilled in 'diverse proportions'. 'connected back together'. and the presentation to consciousness is less than completely fullfilled (MM 288-9/147). since Bergson repeats it at the end of his discussion of the metaphysical problem of existence (MM 289/148). In short. we might say following Bergson's phrase. Bergson says: . in matter.. is important.. he really means just two cases: matter and memory. in memory. the 'inverse' of what it is in memory. 'this double fact'. Thus. When he says 'in all cases' (MM 289/147) the two conditions are 'unequally fulfilled'. leaving ample room for contingency. But these two conditions admit of degrees and. or fulfilled in 'different degrees' (MM 289/ 147). he is establishing a difference of degree between matter and memory. rather. after all the differences in nature have been established. The inverse relation between unperceived objects in space and unconscious memories in time is based in what Bergson calls the two conditions of existence. The reality for us of a psychological state or of a material object consists in this double fact that our consciousness perceives them and they form a part of a temporal or spatial series in which the terms determine one another. though both are necessary. the connections between the links of the series is less strict. In fact. Bergson is re-establishing a difference of degree. and the presentation to consciousness of a psychic state is perfect 'yielding the whole of its content in the act itself whereby we perceive it' (MM 288/147). in psychic states. existence seems to imply two conditions that are connected back together: 1) presentation to consciousness and 2) the logical or causal connection of what is so presented with what precedes and what follows.42 The Challenge of Bergsonism objects in space and unconscious memories in time are not 'two radically different forms of existence'. making something like 'a mathematical derivation' possible. we must note that. in external objects. there is an 'inverse' relation between them. these two conditions show us how the extension of the word 'consciousness' has been limited. (MM 288/147) The qualifier. What he is doing is connecting these two conditions of existence back together after the understanding had made a clear-cut distinction between them and turned them into two radically different modes of existence (MM 289/147-8). 'doubled'. Most importantly. 'reams'. we have perfect presentation of a present state and less logical or causal connection between past states. The proportion in matter is.

but. But.12 As we are going to see. Bergson broadens the sense of existence beyond this part to include both presentation to consciousness and logical or causal connections. second. difference in direction always defines a difference in nature for Bergson. we have seen Bergson eliminate three differences of degrees and then establish three differences in nature. Breaking this synonymy apart allows for these different senses of being. While Bergson is considering the problem of existence primarily within the psychological domain . synonymy that. of being. Then. this is what Bergson is doing here. then. the present itself is not the whole. by de-emphasizing differences and restoring resemblances . especially in the psychological domain. third. First. would have denned all kinds of existence by means of differences of degree of consciousness. We can simplify into four steps the rather complicated development we have seen so far in regard to the central metaphysical problem of existence. There are two sides. after all this consideration could 'lead us step by step into the heart of metaphysics' (MM 288/146-7).The Concept of Memory: Ontology 43 presentation of a present object and perfect logical or causal connection between objects that are not present. But. To put this as simply as possible. these are the true differences of degree since they are differences of degrees of the whole: matter and memory have the same ontological sense only in inverse quantities. It certainly does not suggest Platonism. first. I think we can see that this strange relation between matter and memory suggests something other than a subjectivism.he makes us see that a comparison is possible between matter and memory. Bergson is conceiving the doubling relation in terms of differences of degree. since the present consciousness is not the whole.I think we are justified in seeing them as applying more generally (cf. Already. while regressive memory goes towards the . THE IMAGE OF THE CONE So far. But this is a false difference of degree because consciousness means present awareness and the present is a part of a whole. a doubling.this is why his comments here are brief . he breaks the 'synonymy' between consciousness and existence. fourth. To say this again.in contrast to our normal habit of overemphasizing differences and erasing resemblances . So. EC 671-2/208). the cone image represents this doubling of matter and memory and this connection between matter and memory. the doubling relation between matter and memory consists in an inverse relation between presentation to consciousness and connection in the series. we have seen Bergson eliminate the difference of degrees which would make memory be defined by matter. he shows us that matter and memory go in opposite directions: habitmemory goes towards the future.

Then. therefore show us precisely how Bergson reverses Platonism and twists free of it. Platonism. But. In the modern tradition.44 The Challenge of Bergsonism past. bring the ideas down to earth. we must reconstruct. Second. If we look at Bergson's famous 1903 essay. which comes to its completion in Nietzsche. if we go from the past to the present. one would define being in terms of subjectivity. but the present turns out not to be the primary determination of time and it is this realization that is the way out of modern subjectivism and Platonistic objectivism. we must investigate time. developed under the belief that there are two different ways of knowing: one. the sense of being is time. which is represented in the cone image. this definition of being as subjectivity means that one defines being as presentation to consciousness. however. action. Platonistic philosophy believed that one passed . the ideas are removed from this world. led us to the comparison between matter and memory found in Bergson's brief discussion of the central metaphysical problem of existence. in a word. it seems that Platonism has defined being in terms of objectivity. again according to Heidegger. Because of the word 'presentation'. we see that Bergson considers what he calls 'the entire philosophy which begins with Plato and ends with Plotinus'. Bergson concludes. Heidegger's logic of the reversal of Platonism. moreover. from the perception of a weak sensation to the memory of a strong sensation. but if we go in the opposite direction. in a very general way. This last difference in nature. This reversal is what happened in modern philosophy. we saw Bergson eliminate a last difference in degree which would make all psychological existence be defined by consciousness: memory-images have stopped being interesting because they are not potentially action. Already we have to acknowledge that Bergson's 'thought of Being' is not a mere rearrangement of old philosophical ideas. the weak sensation cannot resemble the memory of a strong sensation. Before we turn to the cone image. For Heidegger. If one wanted to reverse Platonism therefore. third. this reversal remains trapped in Platonism because subjectivism is merely a reversal of Platonism's objectivism. We must recognize here that what we have seen so far tells a very complicated story concerning being. 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. the memory of a strong sensation can resemble a perception of a weak sensation. I think. So. unstable action or mutable movement. which seems to suggest that we have lost the differences in nature between matter and memory. not all psychic states are conscious. He claims that this tradition. Bergson is confronting us with a new philosophical idea of existence. According to Heidegger. with its suggestion of the present. thus we are unconscious of them but they still exist. The cone image should. This comparison has brought us back to a difference of degrees between matter and memory. the contemplation of stable immutable forms and the other. we have seen Bergson eliminate a difference in degree which would turn memory into a weak perception.

like modern science (which does this even more than modern philosophy). The two conditions of existence. For Bergson. existence (MM 289/148). he makes a simple argument. the present is one link in this larger chain. there seems to be nothing like a return to the Greeks in Bergson. if we were to say that the past is conserved in something else. If we grant this comparison. we never really doubt. it must also be conserved in a container. The veracity of this claim depends entirely on us recognizing that the chain of memories is just like the chain of material objects. it cannot therefore be a part of something else. Now.presentation to consciousness and logical or causal connection . not the part. Since it is a content. this belief. a content in the container. In chapter three of Matter and Memory Bergson develops the cone image within the question of whether memories can survive forms of material destruction like brain lesions. we will say. Bergson places the soul over the idea. So.are supposed to show us that each one of our past psychological states has a real. it is one image in the whole of images called matter. Like modern philosophy and modern science. No . which we discussed earlier . in other words. In this regard. Here. however. to go in the reverse [my emphasis] direction of ancient thought. a chain whose existence. For Bergson. of course. then we must say that the chain of past memories is greater than anything present to me right now. though unconscious. is not conserved in the brain. Bergson explicitly allies himself with modern philosophy and modern science: To borrow once more the language of the Platonists. thus it cannot be conceived as a container. mutability over immutability. it cannot therefore be conserved in something else. But does this lack of a return mean that Bergson's philosophy remains bound up with modern philosophy and thus remains only a reversal of Platonism? If we follow Heidegger's logic. (PM 1426/194.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 45 from the immutable to the mutable by diminution as if there is more in the immutable than in the mutable (PM 1424-5/192-3). then we would be saying that the whole is conserved in the part. It tends thereby. especially for Bergson. there is more in the mutable than in the immutable. The past. let us turn to the cone image. see also PM 1428-30/196-7). Since the brain is an image. movement over thing. by calling Idea a certain assurance of easy intelligibility [Bergson's emphasis] and the Soul a certain preoccupation with life [Bergson's emphasis] that an invisible current carries modern philosophy to raise the Soul above the Idea. the two conditions of existence show us that the past must exist or survive. is false. 'in itself (MM 290/149): in itself here means that the past is the whole. everything will depend on how Bergson conceives the present. it is. which defines Platonism. by stripping the words of their psychological meaning.

the oldest surviving memories. 2. not my consciousness. Figure 2. Bergson's image of the cone symbolizes this container-content relation of the past to the present. The second cone image (Fig. it is memory that is the container. since it is an image. of course. however. and the present is a content. But. which come forward spontaneously. represents these different regions with horizontal lines trisecting the . In chapter three of Matter and Memory. in dreams (MM 294/153). In other words. In any case. as Bergson calls it. The cone 'SAB'.46 The Challenge of Bergsonism matter how we look at this. specifically the true memory or regressive memory. whose summit is inserted into the plane. the brain is a part and not the whole. Therefore. The plane. the present psychic state that I am having right now is a part of the whole called memory or the past. but right now it can help us understand what is at stake in it. Bergson shows us two images of the cone. from the side of matter or from the side of memory. for example. if we can speak this way. if we must speak of a content and a container.2) is constructed with a plane and an inverted cone. we have an 'indefinite number' (MM 309/170) of different regions of the past ordered by their distance or nearness to the present. At the cone's base. it cannot therefore conserve memories (MM 290/148-9). We are going to have to revise this comment about the cone symbolizing the container-content relation in a moment. just as the brain is one part in the whole of matter. 'plane P'. 2.3). is supposed to symbolize memory. the past is the container. Bergson says we must take the two conditions of existence 'at once' (MM 289/147). in terms of containers. 'AB'. is the 'plane of my actual representation of the universe' (MM 293/152). As we descend.2 The first image of the cone (Fig. we have unconscious memories. it is one of the things being conserved by memory.

here we should also recall that the phrase 'memory-image' is constructed with a hyphen . where memories are surviving unconsciously. is inserted into the body where habit-memory is located and where actions are happening consciously. into the present. with the cone image. The two forms of memory are not really separate. we are not dealing here with pure perception. Instead. This thickness is why Bergson calls the body a 'hyphen' . we are dealing with factual perception. The cone image.3 cone. the 'hyphen' is the 'connection'. But we do not understand this connection or hyphen . as Bergson says. Bergson says that my actual representation of the universe is a . between the two forms of memory (MM 292/151). This is a surprising conclusion since we had spent so much time trying to distinguish the two forms of memory.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 47 Figure 2. Since the true memory.'between the things that act upon me and the things upon which I act' (MM 293/151). At the summit of the cone. for Bergson symbolizes this connection between the two forms of memory. The summit is inserted into the plane and thus the image of my body 'participates in the plane' of my actual representation of the universe (MM 293/152). the true memory serves 'as a base' for habit-memory (MM 293/152). 'S'. therefore. which is thick with habit-memory. This is why we cannot really say that the cone symbolizes a content-container relation: the cone is supposed to be an image of movement.more than a point .unless we visualize what is most difficult to visualize in the cone image. In his descriptions of the cone. habit-memory is repeating and prolonging a multitude of moments into action and even prolonging the useful effect of the perceptual images into repeatable actions or habits. The participation in the plane implies that my body is more than a mathematical point. The cone really symbolizes a dynamic process. we have the image of my body. which is concentrated into a point.

insofar as it is extended in space and as being denned according to us as a present that recommences constantly. in that continuity of becoming. Thus. we have the difference in nature between matter and memory. for Bergson. this second cone would have to be the inverse of the first. .13 We have already seen that. the cone's summit is itself advancing across the plane of my actual representation of the material universe. then we have to say that the cone image as Bergson presents it is incomplete. this inversion is a difference of degrees. In the extract quoted . my present consists in the consciousness I have of my body. if the memories are descending towards the summit. But that the differences are here does not mean that Bergson is prioritizing the present. as the memories are descending. a cone of matter. like a mirror image. precisely at this summit. we must see that the movement of the whole cone image is double. inversely. If matter.. our present is the very materiality of our existence. we must say that the moving plane is moving against the advancing summit. the actuality of our present consists in its actual state. cf. [My body] represents the actual state of my becoming. that part of my duration that is in the process of formation.. take place in the present. but. MM 290/141) In other words.. then. Instead. Our body occupies its center. my actual representation of the universe is moving. in this material world. If the difference between matter and memory consists in these two opposite directions. More generally. that part whose flowing we sense directly. Being a double. All the differences of matter and memory. MM 274/129). there is a second cone. it is. which is reality itself. matter and memory for Bergson come together from opposite directions at the summit (cf. since then the summit would make no progress. below the cone of memory. we also have the difference of degrees between matter and memory: . on the other hand. images are ascending up from the bottom. precisely at the summit. when Bergson introduces the idea that there is an inverse relation between matter and memory. presentation to consciousness is the very materiality of our existence. (MM 281/ 139. Before we go any further. therefore. the present moment is constituted by the quasi-instantaneous section [coupe} effected by our perception in the mass that is in the process of flowing. the summit is constantly 'advancing'. We must even say that. It would be absurd to say that the moving plane is moving with the advancing summit. On the one hand. inversely. and this section is precisely what we call the material world. and memories are 'descending' from the regions of memory (MM 293/152-3). Again. matter is a presentation to consciousness that repeats the deduction of the material world and. at the same time.48 The Challenge of Bergsonism 'moving plane'.. Bergson calls it a 'moving plane'. So.

Bergson's prioritization of time over the present is not surprising. a function of the present. is always progressive. according to Bergson. In a way. In his descriptions of the cone. since the present is nothing more than a 'quasi-instantaneous section of continuous becoming'. reinforces what we saw in Chapter One. what we have been calling 'regressive memory'. that Bergson in his early works such as Matter and Memory and 'Intellectual Effort' (which is a 1902 essay collected in . Bergson says that memories are descending to the summit. But he is not conceiving time in terms of the present. Immediately we see that if the memories are descending from the past to the present. the hyphen. but always progressive (MM 3697 239). So. we need to examine the movement of the cone itself and leave the movement of the plane behind. the present is a function of time or becoming.14 But in order to reach this new definition of being. with the cone image. for Bergson. between the 'extremes' of the base of 'pure memory'. to say that the present is a function of time also means that consciousness is a function of the unconscious. Becoming or time is not. which is immobile and which Bergson calls 'contemplation' (MM 302/163). that Bergson. since earlier we saw that he does not define existence.15 This is why Bergson says in the summary and conclusion that memory is not really regressive at all. Instead of defining being as the present or consciousness or presence to consciousness. and the plane where action takes place. as Leon Husson has shown. The realization that Bergson's philosophy is not a subjectivism also. which is reality itself.16 This movement of memory between immobile contemplation and moving action is intelligence (MM 371/242). which is reality itself. solely in terms of presentation to consciousness. conscious subjectivity is only the summit of the cone.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 49 above. This progressive movement of memory as a whole takes place. of course. according to Bergson's own usage in chapter two of Matter and Memory. earlier. he is going to define being with the past. memory as a whole. all memory. non-subjectivistic concept of presence. We must keep in mind. that Bergson does not remain trapped in a subjectivism: for Bergson the sense of being is neither the present nor consciousness. we had to avoid calling habit-memory 'the progressive memory'. memory moves between contemplation and action. It seems then. given Heidegger's logic of the reversal of Platonism. is inventing a new. Let us focus on this progressive movement. So. is also the true progressive memory. especially not psychological existence. We must conclude that 'the true memory' (MM 292/ 151). In Bergson. they are progressing towards the summit and not regressing away from the summit. we can see that Bergson is conceiving being as time: 'the continuity of becoming. It is also why. in Matter and Memory. Bergson says that the present is 'a quasi-instantaneous section' in the 'continuity of becoming. Immediately. Whether you view conscious subjectivity from the side of matter or from the side of memory. that is.

50 The Challenge of Bergsonism L'Energie Spirituelle. we are speaking of what counts in Bergson for thinking: unconscious pure memory (feeling) being explicated . let us say I have a need in the present. a unity (MM 296/ 155).we have individual or singular memories. 261/116. As we shall see in Chapter Three. so often in the central chapters on memory (cf. according to Bergson. What I am going to do here is show how this movement of intelligence. and then into actions (cf.17 Intelligence refers here to a specific mental effort. Because of this sensitivity to resemblance and not to contiguity. although intuition is based on feeling. In Chapter Three.. First. as Bergson says. I am going to lay this movement out in three distinct steps. all differentiated and contiguous according to their dates and places of occurrences. a problem that can be solved only if I impose an order on a situation. the immediacy that this leap represents is why Bergson uses the expression 'd'emblee'. invoking Heidegger.moved . 'contemplative memory . I am immediately in the past. Thus. in other words. General ideas are at once singular. from the general idea to the singular. and universal. but we must keep in mind that the three steps refer to a continuous movement of intellectual effort. MM 269/125: 'thought is a movement'). Mind-Energy in English) does not distinguish between intelligence and intuition as he will do in later works such as Creative Evolution and the 1934 collection of essays called La pensee et le mouvant (which is The Creative Mind in English). we are going to examine only one of the directions: from the singular to the general.. We have already seen this leap. which coincides with Bergson's philosophical method of intuition.into memory-images and representations (contemplation). Bergson calls the extreme at the summit. MM 278/149-50. So. we shall look at the opposite movement of thought.contemplation . 'right away'. the universal. to repetition and not to difference. apprehends only the singular in its vision' (MM 296/155). Again. also ES 944/170).action we have habits that are contracted by repetition and which react only to things that resemble one another. So. as we know. memory is never regressive in this sense. from the singular to the general. thinking. works for Bergson. is to be constantly going backwards and forwards between the sphere of action and that of pure memory' (MM 301/161). is the movement between the two extremes of contemplation and action. we . that is. At the base of the cone . in Matter and Memory Bergson says. the two extremes are also extremes of contiguity and resemblance. 'The essence of the general idea. in fact. At the summit of the cone . Concerning general ideas. So. for Bergson. I must make a 'leap' (MM 288/146). Here. having an extension over a multitude of individuals. having a comprehension or sense. the leap or 'bound' represents that I am not making a 'one-by-one' regress into the past. By means of the leap. what he calls intuition cannot be reduced to a kind of unintelligent feeling. for Bergson. we are going to examine what Bergson has to say about 'general ideas' (MM 296/155). Again.

singular. the differentiations again become obscured in order to correspond to the present per- . memoryimages. the movement of contraction 'narrows' or 'diminishes' the images. The movement of rotation expands and relates memories contiguously. I forget again about the summer of 1964. whose lens-holders I am rotating to bring a region of the sky into focus (MM 305/166. The rotation of the lens-holders continues. I have singular and personal memories. having the characteristics of being unextended. even without life. personal images. Then. The narrowing movement of contraction pulls the singular and personal images down the tube of the 'telescope' into general and impersonal images which resemble one another. in the region before my parents moved to the suburbs. and then I can see the events that took place in the rooms. But let us say that.this is Bergson's own comparison . which is going on at the same time as the rotation. I am in the bedroom I shared with my brother. and right away we are in 'the past in general and then in a region of the past' (MM 276/134). according to the size and colour. although these pure memories are not alive. cf. is like a 'cloud'. Before these 'drops' condense. all I have is the idea of my character. 310/171. as Bergson would say. the cone is like . each memory is a pure memory. my memory of my brother carefully ordering what he used to call his 'stamp-book' contracts into an image of his general orderliness. MM 310/171). Instead of 'expanding' into contiguous. Here with contraction. with the leap. no image appears at first because I have forgotten the events that formed my character. My character is like a galaxy. We shall return to this past in general in a moment. without image. a multiplicity with all the singular memory-images clustered together. Nevertheless. the stars and planets start to appear. there is a song. I can now walk through the different rooms of the house. Now I have the image of my parents' old house in the heart of the city. on the radio: I know it is the summer of 1964. without consciousness. Once the pure memories are fixed in images. according to the country of origin. Then. The pure memories in which my character consists have become fixed in living colour. cf. also MM 262/122). we come to the second step: the cone 'rotates' (MM 308/169). In other words. they are not destroyed but are surviving. I have landed in a region of my childhood. white against the black of the night sky. Even though the leap places me in this region. The idea of my character. making sure to insert the hyphen. carefully. 'Under the Boardwalk'. the cone 'contracts' (MM 308/168). he calls this state the 'nebulosity of the idea' (MM 266/122. composed of thousands of drops of water (MM 277/134).a 'telescope' pointed upward to the night sky. without sensation. the third effort. Now. he is pasting stamps into an album. without potency in the present. according to Bergson.18 Thanks to the rotation of the 'lens-holders'. he is huddled over the little desk that we also shared.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 5I make the leap. I can see the pieces of furniture and people in each of the rooms. according to the value of each.

in the vitality of the movement of the effort. which means in Chapter Three. in Matter and Memory Bergson does not extend the process this far. Through these three steps. the method can become a motor habit if the effects of the action are favourable. 'a certain assurance of easy intelligibility'. is always . And it can go still further: over time. the idea is still 'vital' and dynamic because it is based only in resemblance which means that it is still open to differences or singularities (cf. we are really repeating the process we see here in Chapter Two. for Bergson. the idea becomes an action. We have to say it becomes an individual. with this dynamism between generality. for Bergson. In Matter and Memory. the method can be put in words and become an artifice for intelligence. the contraction must go further. The idea then loses its vitality and becomes a static inert or artless symbol for classifying things. Now. in between 'the things which act upon me and the things upon which I act' (MM 293/151). In order to be inserted into the present. universality and singularity. If I am to solve the present problem of orderliness. more precisely. This is when the idea becomes. different. we have a three-step process in the construction of general ideas: the leap. in Bergson. We must not be confused here: insofar as a general idea. This symbol. as an artifice. is like a line drawing. In fact. or even new action. the true universal lies in the dynamism. which. through repetition. it is both general and singular. or. as we know from Chapter One. we are in the heart of Bergson's concept of duration. But here. when we go in the opposite direction. PM 1326/85) for solving problems of order. as Bergson says in 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. But we must note that the contraction can go further. Nevertheless in Matter and Memory. we can see that memory. the rotation and the contraction. can then become a metaphysical concept. When this happens. from the general to the singular. The image of my brother's general orderliness becomes an idea or even a general 'method' (cf. the contraction can go even further: the general idea can become 'something geometrical' where identity replaces resemblance (PM 1299/58). this is when what Bergson calls 'a refinement of intelligence' takes place.52 The Challenge of Bergsonism ceptual image. as I said. when what he also calls 'reflective analysis' 'erases the particularities of time and place from a representation' (MM 298/158). But the dynamism can be stopped. But. the movement of contraction must make the idea of orderliness as thin as possible so that it can be inserted into the hyphen of the body. But the contraction can even go further: over time. Especially we must keep in mind the distinction between dynamic and static ideas. This distinction will become particularly important in Chapter Three. PM 1299/58). of course. but we must keep this whole process in mind as we go forward. is dynamic. This is where Bergson's analysis of general ideas in the third chapter of Matter and Memory stops. so that it can fit in.

The selection of the memory-image to be inserted in the interval is how we stop ourselves from being automatons. where one can perfect actions. defines memories in this way. In other words. on the continuity of becoming. as 'perfect'. The memories at the base are in a sense eternal. that it was.'20 To say that the past is gewesen. We perceive. sends memories out from the past. In a well-known essay.) He says. select and insert a memory-image right into the interval that opens up before the virtual image actualizes itself in action.that I cannot do the summer of 1964 over again . which themselves. the brain makes indetermination possible and opens a loop in the tight mesh of material cause and effect. (MM 291/150. . in truth. every perception is already memory. remember that the virtual image of perception. which conserves by recording. '..is why Bergson says. that the base of the cone is immobile.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 53 progressive and centrifugal. of course. in conjunction with the acquired motor habits. as we saw in Chapter One. that is. Bergson. the past does not come from the present but to the present. where change occurs. in his descriptions of the cone. practically. 'The German language allows us to bring the past and essence together (gewesen and Weseri). That memories are non-perfectible . it seems.the leap into the past in general and then into a region of the past. (What Hyppolite here calls essence Bergson himself calls 'dynamic schemas' (see ES 936-7/160). since they have passed out of the present. but now we see that the present is really dependent on the past. the past cannot be repeated in the sense of being done over. we must understand pure memory in Bergson. to be actualized in present perceptions. from being at the mercy of acquired habits (and nature). Bergson's emphasis).19 Jean Hyppolite has argued that we must conceive pure memories in Bergson as essences. arises in the interval or the hesitation or the 'making wait' which the complexity of the brain's functions makes possible. We shall return to the concept of dynamic schema in Chapter Three. like another electric current (MM 274/129). and the contraction that contracts the memory-images eventually into a habit . Bergson explicitly says (and I have already quoted these passages once here). This progressive movement of memory . This is really how..returns us to Bergson's definition of the sense of being as the past. the pure present being the ungraspable progress of the past gnawing into the future'. The socalled 'regressive memory'. receive vibrations. the rotation that expands the pure memories into singular and personal memory-images. We have already noticed that the present for Bergson is dependent on time. from the other side. means not only that the actual object of perception has passed away. Memory does not come from perception but to perception. I can then evoke. like an electric 'current'. but also that nothing can change the past. When the two currents come together the virtual image that results from the confluence prolongs itself into useful action. only the past. that is. as non-perfectible through repetition.

But as soon as we say that the a priori must be experiencible. then it would no longer be a priori. the conditions of experience must be conceived as at once experiencible and yet not reducible to experience. Bergson in chapter three of Matter and Memory speaks of 'the past in general' (MM 276/134).21 This term means that memories cannot pass away. if the a priori is reducible to experience. as the early twentieth-century neo-Kantians did. a priori conditions must be experiencible. they would no longer be prior to experience. we can say that they are 'impassible'.whether it is in Derrida. so to speak. but still not themselves present. affecting present experience or conditioning it.it always refers to what we used to call an a priori condition. this construction was still speculation in the worst sense of the word. Instead. Since the memories have not and cannot pass out of time . if we want to resort to a strange word from Deleuze. The cone's contractions bring the memories together into a unity which. due to certain criticisms of Kantianism coming out of the early days of phenomenology. If the contractions bring forth something like an essence. not in the sense of doing them over again but in the sense of unifying them on the basis of resemblance. they continue to affect the present. since we normally think of essences as eternal. Deleuze. Now let us come back to Bergson. Levinas or MerleauPonty . so to speak. This detachment from the object allows memories to be repeated. then I think we are justified in introducing another strange expression. that they cannot be reducible to experience. Whenever this phrase occurs . This 'at once' means that the conditions must be in the present experience.we really cannot call them 'eternal'. they cannot be merely constructed. as well. The phrase is 'a past that was never present'. so that the present action I am considering can base itself on them.54 The Challenge of Bergsonism But although the memories have passed out of the present. that is. we realize. So. passed out of time. the memories can be evoked and. Because the memories have passed out of the present. they are 'quasi-eternal' or. forgets the differences. a priori conditions now must be conceived as temporally determined. Because we must conceive the past in Bergson not as a function of the present.they can pass only out of the present . As we have already seen. the past fits the general definition of 'a past which was never present'. one that is common in twentieth-century French thought and which probably in fact derives from Matter and Memory. they have not. But to say that the past cannot pass away leads us to conceive memories not just as gewesen but also as Wesen. if they were actually present. They are no longer tied to factual conditions. however. they are detached from the factual objects which caused them. as we have seen Bergson also claim. insofar as they constitute our character. and because we must conceive the present as a function of this past.22 We must conceive of this as always . In the twentieth century. can be generalized.

In Bergson. So. just as my character affects every present decision I make. because we must not think that an object is there in the past that is being copied. we could not explain why any present would pass or change. Bergson's idea of a pure past functions as a general condition of present experience.they are constantly present. in images of the ideas. it is a general condition which makes every perceived image pass. affecting it. But since the ideas for Plato are immobile . being past. there is always a past that is prior to it. it is not merely general or indeterminate. the present images repeat or copy past ideas. In Plato. It seems that every attempt to reverse Platonism must conserve certain elements of Platonism. according to the myths in the dialogues. that is. as the divided line indicates. since the past is a past in general. Paradoxically. and yet. for Plato. virtually invisible. Therefore. No matter what present we have. then we must conclude that there has never been a present experience that is prior to its memory.and the myths imply this immobility of the ideas . The past in general therefore makes the passing of the present possible. the current of light that the past emits is dim and distant. which means that the ideas for Plato must be denned by a past present. as Bergson says. Before . 'from obscurity or darkness into the light of day' (MM 278/135). On the other hand. but rather that perception repeats memory. we must always say that the past is the origin. So. As the telescope image suggests. The progression from the past to the present is a progression. and as singular conditions affecting the present. the coexistence of the past with the present seems to happen in two ways: on the one hand. let us assemble some of Platonism's most obvious claims. so. making it pass. that there has never been a beginning or origin of the past in the present. Now we can see exactly how Bergson's metaphysics of memory reverses Platonism and twists free of it. The past in general is concrete in all the past memories. But even this statement is misleading. memory in Bergson has no object because the factual object has disappeared. actual. become past. it is not the past that is copying the present. the ideas existed in the past and we humans had contact with this past before our souls acquired bodies. it is itself not present. Bergson's pure past implies not that memory repeats perception. be something past. This means that the memory that records perceptual images is actually developing perceptual images. material reality consists in images of the originals. insofar as this past in general is not abstracted from past experiences.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 55 coexisting with the present: all the doublings or dualisms in Bergson derive from the coexistence of the past with the present. if the past is always coexisting with the present. without the coexistence of the past with the present. it is the present that is copying the past. they exist therefore in a sort of mythological present. For Bergson. To say that the past in general coexists with the present means that it is impossible to conceive of an experience that is not conditioned by the past or that has not had the past affect it.

Bergson has identified ideas with the movement of thought and has spread thought throughout the cone. for Bergson. contemplation. If we combine the analogy of the sun with the allegory of the cave. This contemplation was disrupted. In effect. Bergsonian ideas must be defined by a past past (and not by a past present). One can enclose oneself entirely in habits and habitual ways of thinking. For Plato. Instead of an idea of the good. But superior here means that good sense is unbalanced in relation to the balance of'inferior' common sense. we know that ultimately we contemplate the idea of the good.e. 1205/270). we cannot say this because the cone really has no divisions in it. speak of a fall into matter because being is always from the beginning doubled. which is located above at the very 'summit'. goes in two directions at once. of the divided line. without exception. matter makes us forget the ideas. This disequilibrium explains why good sense. doubled between matter and memory. and Platonic reminiscence is supposed to put us back into the contemplative vision of the ideas. between singularities and universality. But unlike Platonic contemplation. so is the possibility of profound forgetfulness. we contemplated these immobile ideas. the Bergsonian contemplation is a vision of singularities or multiplicities. the uppermost part is not the summit of identity but the base of singularities. which concerns itself with identity or universality. But. Bergsonian ideas were never present. The last thing Bergson conserves from Plato is the source of forgetfulness. But because matter is always there. unlike common sense. unlike Platonic ideas. towards pure memory and pure forgetfulness. even the idea of the good (MR 1026/61. is double. Bergson says that good sense consists in a 'superior' equilibrium between the base and the summit. however. there is a fall into matter that makes us forget our original contact with the ideas.56 The Challenge of Bergsonism we acquired bodies. a contemplation which the divided line places at the top. for Plato. i. like a pendulum. we might say. however. Therefore. it is all movement. we can now say that good sense. one can stop the indefinite movement of . Bergson conserves from Plato that the original of perceptual images lies in the past. Although we shall return to good sense in Chapter Three and in Appendix I. Bergson has what he calls 'good or practical sense' (MM 294/ 153). they consist in a past that has never been present. not even in a mythological present. 1). which is unidirectional. it moves 'indefinitely' (MM 301/161) towards pure contemplation and pure action. 1/210 n. let us turn to Bergson. This is the most radical thing Bergson does through the cone image: he has mobilized every idea (EC 673 n. when our souls fell to earth and acquired bodies. while it is tempting to say that the cone image is Bergson's equivalent to the divided line. to appropriate Hyppolite's insight again). In Bergson's cone image. With Bergson we cannot. Bergson also conserves from Plato that the activity of the soul at the uppermost part of the divided line is noesis. Now. in ideas (or essences. 'matter puts forgetfulness in us' (MM 316/177). And.

we were able to conclude that Bergson's reversal does not end up in a subjectivism. Bergson places mobility over immobility. When we realize that the cone is moving. we focused on the cone image. present consciousness is conditioned either by the vibrations of matter or by the unconscious of memory. The Bergsonian reversal of Platonism consists in this: Bergsonian reminiscence is Platonic forgetfulness. In order to . After the sun has set. we came closest to showing how Bergson's philosophy represents a challenge to ontology in the Heideggerian sense. one must in short reconceive time. So. we have accepted the standard he set for thinking about our relation to being. we specified this reversal in favor of mobility in three ways. We need to remember. then we need to evoke the past. like Heidegger. that Bergson is reversing Platonism. we are able to see. one cannot simply turn the divided line upside down.23 Now I am going to summarize the discussion concerning the image of the cone. even the idea of the good. Thus Bergsonian reminiscence in Plato's eyes would be forgetfulness. Most generally. but rather one must reconceive the entire relation between the division anew. we saw that the most important but also the most difficult thing to visualize is that the entire cone image is moving. because the cone image represents the 'connection' between matter and memory. we raised the question of the sense of being in Bergson through his brief discussion of the 'central metaphysical problem of existence'. Since Bergson represents this present consciousness by the summit of the cone inserted into the plane of the material universe. because the 'connection' between matter and memory is the present consciousness I have of my body. To understand this thinking in terms of the past. he mobilizes all of the ideas. as Plato makes the slave boy remember in the Meno. in fact. Bergson's memory returns not to immobile ideas but to immobile memories. Here. But.such a philosophy would be a mere reversal of Platonism. it returns not to universals (in the strict sense) but to singularities. When this happens. immediately. First. for Heidegger. is conditioned by two sides or by two electrical currents. For Heidegger. we can say. looking for the Milky Way. This has not really been a challenge to Heidegger's philosophy as such. Here. And to do this. one must stop thinking in terms of the present. Bergsonism is not a philosophy that defines being as conscious presence . we have tried to show that Bergson's metaphysics of memory does not think in terms of the present: Bergson thinks in terms of the past.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 57 thought. present consciousness. Instead. it is moving in two directions at once. the current metaphysical sense of being that originates in Platonism conceals the true sense of being as time. We were able to see that Bergsonism is more than a mere reversal. To retrieve the true sense we must not only reverse Platonism but also twist free of it. Whether one views present consciousness from the side of matter or from the side of memory. we need to point our telescope up at the night-time sky. But.

when the jaws of the vise become so tight that memories cannot be inserted. the past always both conditions the present as what makes the passing of the present possible and affects the present as our character which supports every decision we make. Bergson proposes. we had to say. to solving problems. Attention to life is our attention to action. the original of all perceptual images lies in the past. In the 1910 preface. Unconsciously. The recognition that the cone itself represents the unconscious led us to the second specification of Bergson's reversal of Platonism. we must keep in mind that the cone itself represents the unconscious. but as defining pure memory as a vision of singularities. because the cone image implies that the past always coexists with the present. Like Plato. We were able to introduce this phrase to help us conceive the Bergsonian movement of general ideas. we noted that the reason the problem of memory is central for Bergson lies in the fact that memory is an experience. that the perversion of the . only such an experience would allow us to establish an independent reality for spirit. The most precise determination of Bergson's reversal of Platonism is that Bergsonian reminiscence is Platonic forgetfulness. The third specification came from the recognition that Bergsonism conserves elements of Platonism. he would see forgetfulness. But unlike Plato who conceives this past as a present. without going into a general theory of mental pathology. contemplation is pure memory. brought us to the realization that. that is. The cone image implies a fundamental doubling of the present with the past (and therefore of consciousness with the unconscious). If this is the case. it engages in contemplation. Bergson conserves the idea that when our soul is most removed from action. it is equivalent to the summit of the cone (MM 311-12/172-3). Because the unconscious or the past always conditions the present. Bergson. Bergson compares the attention to life to a vise whose jaws are tightening. Here we return to Bergson's sad mental patients. but pure memory is a vision of singularities. indeed here in the preface. the past does not repeat the present but rather the present repeats the past. to overcoming obstacles found in the present. We are going to conclude by thinking a little bit about this experience.58 The Challenge of Bergsonism determine Bergson's reversal of Platonism precisely. if Plato looked at Bergsonian reminiscence. Bergson tells us that 'the attention to life' is one of the 'guiding ideas' of Matter and Memory (MM 166/ 14). The experience of memory that Bergson is seeking is one that verifies that memories survive brain lesions. At the beginning of this chapter. And. Bergson's conservation of contemplation as denning pure memory. For Bergson. that mental illness results from a 'relaxation or a perversion of our attention to life'. conceives this past as a past and that means as a past that was never present. As in Plato. Such an explanation of mental illness implies that when the attention to life becomes 'perverse'. we have a pure experience of life. in the preface.

This experience is why Bergson is so fascinated with what he calls 'the panorama of the dying'. it is lifeless. can we say that this Bergsonian experience of death is an experience of the other? . la survivance. MM 311/173: 'if the idea is to live'). 'my whole life flashed before my eyes' (MM 285/155.by 'drowning' or by being 'hanged' . that Bergson's philosophy is a 'philosophy without death'. Of course.25 Perhaps here we have been speaking of nothing but death. Bergson repeatedly says that until a memory reaches the present. also MR 1199-200/263-4). this concern with death is really a concern with superlife.always says. he will even suggest. But even if his theory of memory really concerns the survival of the soul after death. Thus. after Matter and Memory. But. also PM 1387/180). Only such a pure experience of death can verify that memories survive independent of the body. it is probable that the soul survives for a time after the destruction of the body (ES 859/58. it is difficult to maintain. that since memories survive the destruction of parts of the brain. then we must say that. a person who almost died violently . in his 1912 essay 'The Soul and the Body'. when the jaws of the vise are wide open. as Levinas does in Time and the Other. even cold (for example.24 That the experience of pure memory must be an experience of death is further confirmed by the fact that throughout the second and third chapters of Matter and Memory. for Bergson.The Concept of Memory: Ontology 59 attention to life is pure life. when the attention to life becomes relaxed. we have a pure experience of death. we must conclude that Bergson's ontology of memory does not concern life but death.

We were able to see that Bergson reverses Platonism in two ways. this was not really a challenge to Heidegger's thought of being. to use Heidegger's words. we tried to see exactly how Bergsonism differs from phenomenology.we were able to say that Bergsonian memory is Platonic forgetfulness. in Chapter Two. as we saw.we must remember that the cone is inverted . which implies a monism. being is dual or doubled by the difference in nature between matter and memory. and therefore being. (We shall return to the concept of duration in the Conclusion.) Nevertheless. we attempted to understand the complicated story Bergson has to say about existence. rather. The major point. The recognition that consciousness is not fundamental led us to see that the unconscious plays a fundamental role in Bergson. On the one hand. in terms of the present. Bergson prioritizes the soul or movement over the ideas or immobility. we also tried to see whether.CHAPTER 3 The Concept of Sense: Ethics In Chapter One. consciousness is not fundamental for Bergson. of conscious perception. we cannot characterize his philosophy as a primacy of perception. this dualism is also 'connected' by a difference of degree. since the cone image is supposed to be an image of movement. Thus. but also 'twists free of it. was that Bergson does not define time. For Bergson. he defines it in terms of the past and this allows him to escape from any charge of subjectivism. On the other hand. including the idea of the good. since he specifies the base of the cone as a memory of 'impassible' or 'quasi-eternal' singularities and not as a memory of eternally present ideas . . but. Most generally. we must characterize it as a primacy of memory. however. while we came to recognize the great novelty of Bergson's thought of being. he mobilizes all of the ideas. This brought us to what I called a challenge to ontology in the Heideggerian sense. Bergson's metaphysics of memory therefore seems to be more than a reversal of Platonism. but. The major point here was that while Bergsonism deduces consciousness from matter. Bergson's philosophy not only 'reverses Platonism'. This complicated story should be enough to alert us that Bergsonism confronts us with a new philosophical idea (called 'duration') of how reality is arranged.

the trace . Clearly. the Other for Levinas is the face. any philosophy that bases itself on language is relative and mediate.1 with. as discourse.the past as a 'dead weight' (MM 286/145) and. survivance. this can be achieved only through intuition. more importantly. finally. is a tomb . But.a pyramid. we had been speaking of nothing but death.2 Of course. If it is a relaxation of the attention to life. Now. it seems to me that such a prioritization does not take place in Bergson because for him. the question that I just asked is clearly indebted to Levinas's philosophy. we will not really see a challenge to Levinas.3 Levinasian ethics therefore is bound up with a sort of linguistic immediacy. for Bergson. we had to raise the question of death eventually. it seems that we can say that the experience of memory is something like an intensification of death. also ES 886/94) . for Bergson. so to speak. For instance. in fact. There is some textual evidence to support this claim about death in Matter and Memory. what I intend to follow here is a sort of suspicion that important consequences follow from prioritizing intuition over language or language over intuition. Here. Bergson describes the inverted cone as an inverted 'pyramid' (MM 312/ 173. Levinas defines the face as immediacy and as . In contrast. In his 1961 Totality and Infinity. Instead. Now. Levinas defines ethics as 'the Same taking the irreducible Other [Autrui] into account'. but let me make my suspicion more specific. it nevertheless allowed us to raise a new question in regard to Bergson: if we can say that the experience of memory is something like an experience of death. cf. superlife.this is his phrase 'the imperative of language'. rather. It is relative because language for Bergson is social and societies are established in order to satisfy needs of adaptation. We found the experience of death in Bergson by stressing that the experience of memory.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 61 It is possible that with Bergson's metaphysics of memory. And. the sudden reappearance of a memory as a 'ghost' (MM 286/145). Levinas spent a lot of his later career trying to clarify his idea of linguistic immediacy .in light of certain criticisms levelled by Derrida in his 1964 essay 'Violence and Metaphysics'. But. philosophy must not be relative and mediate. for Bergson. only intuition can give us 'immediate consciousness' or the . in chapter three. while we had to acknowledge that the Bergsonian concern with death is really a concern with survival. of course. is a relaxation of the attention to life. if there is an affinity between Derrida and Levinas. a philosophy based in language is mediate because the repeated satisfaction of needs leads to habits and habits are expressed in static or inert general ideas through which we perceive the world. Of course. it must be absolute and immediate. this is due to the fact that both prioritize language over intuition. since we were taking Heidegger's ontology seriously. can we also say that the experience of memory is an experience of the other? This question brings us to what we could call a Bergsonian challenge to ethics in the Levinasian sense. Maybe this is obvious.

then one has a philosophy of the other as you find in Levinas and now Derrida. Levinas. pure becoming. philosophy must inhabit a 'world without others'.really lets the 'alterity of the new . But. if philosophy cannot be social. then we can reach Levinas's philosophy from Bergson only by interpreting the concept of duration on the basis of the love that Bergson describes in his only ethical text. Let me put my suspicion in another way: it seems to me that if you prioritize language over intuition.9 The challenge to ethics that we are about to enter does not concern moral prescriptions or moral theories. the 1932 The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. If intuition is representation and thus embedded in theoretism. In this direction . while. if one prioritizes intuition over language. however.. whether the Bergsonian experience of duration . So. immaculate and untouchable as alterity or absolute newness. at least not like the one we find in Derrida and Levinas.6 Levinas is able to wonder whether intuition lets alterity be absolved from the same because he thinks (and thinks this starting very early in his career with The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology7") that intuition (be it Husserlian or Bergsonian) is always a kind of representation. one very large fact weighs against it: the immense influence of Bergson on Levinas. One can interpret the love that Bergson describes in The Two Sources on the basis of the concept of duration. Foucault has shown that in the contemporary period. pure 'alteration': pure movement. this opposition is only a suspicion.. For instance.we can say that intuition is creative (and not therefore embedded in theoretism). let me specify the suspicion I am going to follow a little further: it seems to me that if one prioritizes language over intuition. more recently in the 1980s.62 The Challenge of Bergsonism 'immediate data of consciousness'. In other words. you become a philosopher of transcendence. in his 1946-7 lectures.again what Bergson calls intuition . is the great philosopher of transcendence and Deleuze is the great philosopher of immanence. you become a philosopher of immanence. also wonders.4 a phrase I take from a 1967 essay by Deleuze on Michel Tournier's rewriting of the Robinson Crusoe story. the absolute itself in the etymological sense of the term'. ethics con- . it concerns the relation of thought to unthought. indeed. of course. again. one would have to make the call that brings forth the love of God . In other words. explode. it creates a concept (sense) which is neither a constant nor a variable. Yet it is possible to go in a different direction. if you prioritize intuition over language. It seems obvious but perplexing that there is no discourse of alterity in Deleuze. a concept that is pure variation.the love of the Other .more fundamental than duration. then one ends up with a philosophy of alteration (not alterity) as I believe it is conceived by Bergson and now Deleuze.. Levinas says that Bergson's elan vital is what he calls 'fecundity'.5 Levinas. Time and the Other. but.the direction that we are following in this chapter8 .

as Bergson says in a letter to Harald Hoffding. he says that it is not instinct and it is not feeling. and his very important second introduction to the 1934 collection of essays called La pensee et le mouvant (The Creative Mind in English). but with a specific sort of feeling. So. became clear to me only a long time after the theory of duration. I am going to draw on a number of texts: Bergson's famous comments in chapter four of Matter and Memory on the 'turn of experience'. towards the end of chapter three. sentiment (PM 1328/88). this claim is hard to understand since there are at least four texts that deal with language explicitly: Matter and Memory. the experience he relies on is called intuition. Now. To orient ourselves. in the section on 'attentive recognition'. again the important second introduction to La pensee et le mouvant'. Bergson's philosophical method is an empirical one. of my own duration. So. There is a common perception that Bergson does not thematize language. To do this. we can ask: what is intuition? In the second introduction. Bergson tells us what intuition is not.10 Is the relation of thought to the unthought to be conceived on the basis of intuition or on the basis of language? So what we are concerned with here is the priority of intuition over language. it is going to turn out. upon which you insist a lot more than upon the theory of duration. in the 1932 The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. the 1902 essay 'Intellectual Effort'. as we will see. chapter two. In fact. of 'immediate consciousness' (PM 1273/32). and that means intuition is an intuition of memory. here in the second introduction what Bergson wants to steer us away from is thinking that intuition is just any sort of feeling of Anteriority or . 'The theory of intuition. I intend to extract bits and pieces from all four of these texts in order to construct something like a Bergsonian philosophy of language. Thus we are concerned with Bergson's concept of intuition and his so-called philosophy of language. like the second introduction to La pensee et le mouvant. But. and finally. It is an attempt to 'enlarge' consciousness to include the unconscious (PM 1273/32).The Concept of Sense: Ethics 63 cerns an imperative found within thought itself to think what resists thought (the unthought). then we must start from one of his later works. we must first recognize the aim of intuition: it is the attempt to experience directly or immediately the flow of my own interior life. beyond recognizing this aim of enlargement. his 1903 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. THE BERGSONIAN CONCEPT OF INTUITION As we have seen from our investigation of memory in Chapter Two. which is collected in L'Energie spirituelle (Mind-Energy in English). that Bergsonian intuition has a lot to do with feeling. 'Dynamic Religion'.'11 If we are to understand anything about intuition in Bergson. this chapter is entirely devoted to the Bergsonian concept of sense.

the only method of philosophy.it demands to be explicated into representations and actions. 'harmonize' them. We must keep in mind the etymological connection between sentir and sens as we go forward. vision will have to be harmonized or made continuous with touch and hearing. vision gives us only one part divided from the other parts that the other senses can give us. it must be an intuition that has reversed this customary direction of our senses to divide according to utility. Bergson prioritizes vision. But. alone. therefore. Although intuition may happen to us. then we must realize that it is above all else 'a simple intuition' (PM 1348/110). we value effort' (PM 1328/87). 1350/112). cf. EC 632/162). which our needs establish (MM 198/49).12 If Bergsonian intuition is an educated intuition. vision strictly concerns only images. if Bergson most frequently characterizes intuition in terms of the sense of vision or sight (PM 1364/127. If our intuition is complex or complicated. the education of our senses 'fills in the intervals or gaps'.and this passivity of intuition is why Bergson associates it with instinct in Creative Evolution . In other words. the requirement of intelligence is why Bergson can call it a method. To do this inversion of our senses. as we shall see. sentir (PM 1364/127-8). because in general our senses are coordinated to bodily needs. we repudiate facility. 'To philosophize is to invert the customary direction of thought' (PM 1422/190. But for Bergson there is no thinking that does not start in intuition. If intuition is a sensible intuition. We recommend a certain difficult manner of thinking. then we have not inverted the customary direction of thought.64 The Challenge of Bergsonism just any sort of feeling of memory. the priority of vision is why he calls intuition 'reflection' (PM 1328/88). for Bergson. And. vision alone is not enough. it has a connection to light. The problem with instinct and feelings in general for Bergson is that they come to us too easily: '. which is duration. they are directed towards dividing the world up according to possible satisfactions of needs. The simplicity of the intuition means that. At the least. Although thinking starts with intuition. like a vision . As we saw in Chapter One's discussion of the Bergsonian concept of the image. intuition in Bergson is always an intuition of the most simple idea. indeed.. 'harmony' is the word Bergson uses in Matter and Memory when he speaks about the need to educate the senses (MM 197-8/48-9). Since . As Bergson says in his 1904 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. 'intellectual effort'. intuition is a difficult way of sensing. we must. In any case. Simple here means continuity. precisely because of its continuity. once our eyes are open we see images continuously or without interruptions. it is the sense that informs us most about possible action.. it is a particularly difficult way of sensing. amounting to a filling in of all the gaps established by our different senses insofar as they are 'the beams of light of our needs'. due to this connection to light. above everything else. we must not believe that intuition is some sort of special faculty above or outside of the senses. Thus it requires intelligence. 1329/89.

then. Bergson actually says that intuition can be internal or external (MM 319/183) . one must really concentrate.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 65 intuition must invert the customary direction of thought towards actions and if you recall the cone image . but. Here. to listen to time. and through a kind of spiritual auscultation. to penetrate the life of [the self]. since intuition is an enlargement of consciousness towards unconscious memory. Pure memories. I am in immediate contact with it. must go into the depths of the 'chrysalis'. Nevertheless. I can feel the variations of levels . Bergson describes intuition in this way: intuition 'proposes . Touch is similar to vision. When one auscultates. How can I gain access to the depth of pure. to these rhythms. it is helpful to recall the true perception of matter that we discussed in Chapter One: the direction of the true perception of matter goes from the surface of the image to the vibrations deep inside. this is where we find the pure memories. So. the image of the auscultator tells us that Bergsonian intuition is like a doctor's intuition. touch is not a sense of distance but rather of proximity.. we recall. To listen to these quiet sounds. unconscious memories by means of which I can enlarge consciousness? In his 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. The problem with touch is that I can gain no tactile access to the depth unless I rip the surface open. But unlike vision. And. as I move my hand across the surface. auscultation implies that intuition is like a doctor listening through a stethoscope to a heartbeat or to the breathing of the lungs. besides vision. for complication.. I experience no interruptions. by means of the sense of touch.I can sense depth. in short. once I start to rub my hand across a surface. If this description can also characterize Bergsonian intuition . To reach this depth. requires a fatiguing effort. he calls it contact.therefore towards dreaming at the base of the cone. Once the simple intuition has vanished. as soon as I rip the surface open. vision itself will have to be enlarged. of course. to sense [sentir] its soul palpitate' (PM 1408/175. Thus. it is time for the elaboration of the intuition. Bergson's emphasis). because contact implies an uninterrupted experience. it is actually going up above the images towards pure memories. Bergson also characterizes intuition.then we must say that intuition. We shall return to the transitory nature of Bergsonian intuition. an intense intuition in which one recognizes differences and continuities (PM . differ in nature from images insofar as pure memories are virtually invisible. In this auscultation we find the effort of Bergsonian intuition. in a word. in other words. one must really listen. even vision and touch are too easy.in Matter and Memory. as I feel the surface. which implies that intuition cannot be maintained for long (PM 1275/35). for Bergson. 'Auscultation' is a technical term in medicine meaning to listen attentively to organs either by the ear directly or by means of an artifice like a stethoscope. but let us note now that it is the simplicity of the intuition that is fatiguing and thus transitory. like external perception. the image is destroyed.

strictly. 'detached' and 'discontinuous'. When a doctor auscultates. the experience that empiricism values is exactly the opposite of Bergsonian intuition. for Bergson. he or she finds the one simple source of the illness without cutting the patient up. it is perhaps needless to say that.66 The Challenge of Bergsonism 1319-20/79). the experience of classical empiricism. '[the] error [of classical empiricism] is not that it sets too high a value on experience'. we sympathize only with ourselves. Bergson says. the error lies in that it values 'an experience that is disarticulated and consequently undoubtedly denatured' (MM 320/183). self-sympathy. un regard. Bergson distinguishes his 'true empiricism'. like a doctor's intuition.. and in which it is useful that we should look at ourselves. . is a duration whose elements are dissociated and juxtaposed. Intuition. It is only from this position. In connection with this question of others. through intuition. because sympathy. for Bergson. He says. too. that we can then sympathize in the normal sense with others. in fact. for Bergson. in harmony with touch and vision. The duration wherein we look at ourselves acting [nous nous regardons agir]. The duration wherein we act is a duration wherein our states ground themselves in other states. is the basis of the true empiricism. for Bergson. that intuition is a sort of intersubjective experience. from this self-sympathy we can even sympathize with the entire universe (PM 1273/32-3). In the same chapter. suggests intersubjectivity. (PM 1396/162-3) It is hard to renounce the habitual way of conceiving sympathy as a sympathy with others. In his 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. In chapter four of Matter and Memory. however. But what is important here is to see what motivates . we have to be very careful about Bergson's frequent characterizations of intuition as sympathy. The experience classical empiricism values is one that is 'fragmented'. the true experience. In fact. we cannot characterize Bergsonian intuition as an objectifying 'look' or 'gaze'. We can sympathize intellectually or rather spiritually with nothing else. It is our own person in its flowing across time. of course. But we sympathize surely with ourselves. But. in a section entitled 'The Method We are Following' (MM319-24/183-8). does not mean that we have a relation to the other in intuition. It is our self which endures. (MM 322/ 186) In this quote Bergson uses the verb regarder. Obviously. as he calls it (PM 1408/175). from classical empiricism. Here we must be careful: intuition understood as a kind of intense listening. un regard is precisely. Bergson says: There is at least one reality that we grasp entirely from within..

Directed towards utility. these metaphysical constructs are really artificial and fake. This 'turning away' based on needs for adaptation turns towards. But. he uses the French word 'ton'. in other words. 995/25). each organ must work with all of the others. therefore. in fact. in a word. ultimately. he noted that. according to Bergson. The experience at the base of empiricism is not really a mistake. but these needs are not 'definitive' (MM 321/184). and to facilitate the satisfaction of these needs there is always 'a system of more or less deeply rooted habits' (MR 982/10). in the 'adaptation of the real to the interests of practice and to the requirements of social life' (MM 319/183). As we saw in Chapter One. nature establishes a sort of 'division of physiological labor' within the organism (MM 179/28-9). which replicate the original divisions of labour within the organism. the fragmentation of the true experience has been done 'in view of the requirements of practical life' and 'for the greater facility of action and language' (MM 320/183-4). these habits directed to societal needs and .what Bergson calls 'dogmatic metaphysics' . traditional metaphysics . as Kantianism suggests. This natural tendency to divide labour among different organs within one organism has destined certain organisms to live in societies. in order to achieve a task.including moral duties (MR 996/27. this evolutionary tendency to put organisms into societies diverges into two lines: humans and hymenoptera. towards the satisfaction of needs. which literally means 'a twist'. according to Bergson. despite this difference between humans and bees. towards adaptation. Bergson does not call the fragmented experience a false experience. In other words. as we ascend in the evolutionary scale. the need to adapt. it is a natural experience for Bergson. the motivation for the fragmentation lies.which constructs arrangements of the fragmented parts of experience. 'bodily functions' (MM 321/184). bees (MR 996-7/26-7). they manufacture artifices. these obligations to society. this 'habit of contracting habits' is at the root. each organ within one organism becomes specialized and. According to Bergson. as organisms become more and more complex. In chapter one of Matter and Memory.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 67 the fragmentation of the experience. false. Overall.13 But it is precisely these duties. is needs. i. a turning away motivated by 'the inferior needs'. What differentiates humans from bees is that humans invent their own tools. like the English word 'tort'. but a turning away from the true experience. Because the experience at the base of empiricism is not a false experience but a turning away. according to Bergson in The Two Sources. what defines social life.e. according to Bergson. what we called habit-memory consists in the contraction of habits of action and thinking by means of repeating the useful effects of perceptual images. when he speaks of 'the error of empiricism'. If there is a relativity to knowledge. this knowledge is relative to our needs. of all obligations . the fragmentation occurs on the basis of 'inferior needs' (MM 321/184).

bending itself in the direction [sens] of our utility. he says. which can become inert or artless general ideas. Bergson says that intuition is 'the attention that spirit gives to itself in surplus over [the attention it gives to life]' (PM 1320/79). is far from easy: yet this is but the negative part of the work to be done. or rather above the decisive turn where. intuition is a sort of experience of death. a phrase he uses twice in chapter four of Matter and Memory. the dawn of our human experience begins. a turning away from the . he says. The philosopher. As we have already seen. dogmatism and critical philosophy]. we must pay attention to the directions. with the infinitely small elements of the real curve which we in this way see. a turning away from social life and practicality.68 The Challenge of Bergsonism utility that require us to turn away from the true experience. knowledge . for Bergson. In the second introduction to La pensee et le mouvant. We saw in Chapter Two that action and matter are located at the summit of the inverted cone. these habits. to spirit (PM 1292/50. for Bergson. and when it is done. with all of these turns. we are approaching Bergson's famous 'turn of experience'. (MM 321/184) Then. is to turn to the true experience . Bergson in fact says in The Two Sources that Robinson Crusoe is still social (MR 987/16). must therefore inhabit a world without others more radical than that of the famous Robinson Crusoe. First.it must turn its back on social life. To renounce certain habits of thinking. and not relative. To turn away from or to invert the customary direction of thought towards utility means to turn away from action and matter. This would be to go to seek experience at its source. On the one hand. when we have taken advantage of the nascent light with which. in a word. Obviously. intuition therefore is a turning to dreaming and memory. But there is one last enterprise to attempt [after empiricism. it becomes literally human experience. hence his loneliness in Matter and Memory. If philosophy therefore. the turn of experience is a turning away from utility. Turning from action. illuminating the passage from the immediate to the useful. This turning away is the negative part of Bergson's philosophical method. and even of perceiving. 1272/32). we still have to reconstitute. the form of the curve itself which extends itself into the darkness behind them. (MM 321/ 185) Of course. society and literal human experience. when we have placed ourselves at what we were calling the turn of experience. in these passages. mediate our relation to the true experience.to turn to true.

It lies precisely in what we called earlier 'the grey zone'. which not only rotates but also contracts. then we must see that the turn of experience is bi-directional.15 The grey zone implies that Bergson could have given Matter and Memory another name. I shall never imagine how black and white interpenetrate each other if I have not seen grey. once I have seen grey.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 69 external in order to pay attention to the internal. Indeed. On the Genealogy of Morals. like The Dawn.14 Again in 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. the 'turning to' of experience therefore is like the rotating of the cone. Insofar as it rotates and turns to memory. then we cannot understand the positive part of Bergson's philosophical method. it includes unconscious memories (PM 1398/164). to spirit. In 'Introduction to Metaphysics'. as Bergson says. then we can understand the light image found in Bergson's descriptions of the turn of experience. we must keep in mind that this grey source of experience is also the source sought in Bergson's later Two Sources. the turn of experience is the place where one can see how nature and art. is still in the dark. is the passage going from the immediate to the useful. if we see that Bergson's philosophical method has two sides. what is important to see here is that the grey zone of the turn of experience does not imply that all artifice is excluded. we must take advantage of the nascent light of practical action in order to see the infinitely small elements of the real curve and reconstitute its whole form. So. Bergson says. death and life. a seeing of the infinitely small elements of the passage from the immediate to the useful and a reconstitution of the whole form on the basis of this seeing. Exactly like the cone. memory and matter interpenetrate and double themselves (cf. but I have no difficulty in understanding. But to . If we realize that the turning to of experience is like the rotation of the cone of memory.16 In any case. the turn of experience places us right in the grey light between the night of dreaming and day of practical action. it must be 'reconstituted'. PM 1430/198). The form of the curve. (PM 1430/198) Like grey. Enlarging consciousness to include unconscious memory. the turn not only turns to but also turns back or re-turns to matter. if we do not understand that Bergson is setting up a certain relation to language here in the turn of experience. Thus. In fact. We must realize that the turn of experience establishes a certain relation to language. which. Bergson tells us. or he could have called The Two Sources. how one can consider it from the double viewpoints of black and white. Bergson defines metaphysics as 'the science that claims to dispense with symbols' (PM 1396/162) and not as the science that dispenses with language. which means we might even say that the turn of experience lies between what is premoral and what is moral. Yet we know from Chapter Two that spirit is not identical to consciousness.

in which I especially listen carefully to my own interior life. from experience above to human experience below. 'world without others'. so to speak. because intuition is the continuity of duration. clearly.I must turn away from the fragmented and discontinuous experience of social life and inhabit a. then the experience is immediate.here is the effort . The wrong or the bad direction is to regress from human experience to the source above. it is an intellectual effort in which I put my senses in continuity with one another. I am in the grey zone between the day of practical action and the night of dreaming. while language is the division of words. which derive from the fragmentation of experience due to social needs. BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE The first thing we have to say here is that. Indeed. we come back down to human experience. the source will be mediated by static general ideas. In this loneliness. or language. Again. in the middle. Language is division into words because it is directed . true. there is a difference in nature between them. not from the human up to the source. Bergson's philosophical method can be characterized as an 'intuitionism' or an 'empiricism'. In this attempted reconstitution. for Bergson. is the intuition of duration: I am listening. even in this brief description. it is unmediated by the regress from social life and thus it is unmediated by the obligations. For Bergson. as we shall see. The 'good' direction determines the relation between intuition and language in Bergson. in short. If we regress. to the rhythm of my own heartbeat.70 The Challenge of Bergsonism understand this bi-directionality. so to speak. If we get the direction right. or action. I enlarge my consciousness to include unconscious memory. habits and static general ideas of social life. Intuition is not language. and. Now let us turn to Bergson's so-called philosophy of language. In other words. I am going to summarize what we have seen so far. we get up to the source only by a leap or a bound. In order to obtain this intuition . But before we turn to the relation between intuition and language. everything depends on getting the direction right: one must get up to the source above the bend where experience becomes literal human experience. we can see the good direction. by what Bergson calls 'the socialization of the truth' (PM 1327/87). like the idea of the good. I try to see the infinitely small differences in which experience consists and I try to reconstitute the whole curve of experience. this enlargement. Here. intuition is not language. if we want to be good metaphysicians. we end up in Platonism. Then. we must go from the source down to the human. although Bergson does not say this here. in which intuition or experience is not understood as a sort of easy instinct or feeling. in Bergson's intuitionism. I return to social life.

and it is as natural to speak as it is to walk. in regard to language. In the second introduction to La pensee et le mouvant. The whole of language then would be at the source of the particular languages we speak.17 but it does not mean that we have excluded every relation between intuition and language. following the terminology of The Two Sources. Bergson defines language in this way: What is the scope of words? One must not think that social life is a habit acquired and transmitted. Therefore. it would be the absolute of language. perhaps infamously. in fact. 'the whole of language'.. in contrast. Language transmits orders or warning. So. where he speaks of particular moral obligations. In contrast. 'the whole of language'. Bergson suggests such a parallel distinction when he says that '[Obligation] is a virtual instinct. In other words. the particular languages we speak are relative to the communities in . (PM 1320-1/80) What we must see here is that he is making a distinction that is parallel to one found in his Two Sources of Morality and Religion. while we bring what is necessary to reinvent them and to vary their form. all forms of verbalism.. while 'the philosophic spirit is sympathetic to the endless renovations and re-inventions which are at the bottom of things' (PM 1322/82). but with this difference. what is the primitive function of language? It is to establish a communication with a view to cooperation. which is the general habit of contracting habits. if we can coin this phrase. that the ant possesses ready-made means of attaining its end. the whole of language would be the habit of contracting the habit of speaking a particular language. which are particular acquired and transmitted habits. And finally.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 71 towards social needs (PM 1321/81). This difference in nature between intuition and language is why Bergson rejects. in The Two Sources. and he speaks of the 'whole of obligation'. and what we can call. As Bergson says. particular moral obligations are conventional. like that which lies behind speech. language gives us only rearrangements of the old. always utilizes language' (PM 1275/35). The morality of a human society may indeed be compared to its language' (MR 998/28). It would be entirely un-Bergsonian to say that things that differ in nature have no relation to one another. It prescribes or describes. intuition is continuous because it is directed towards our interior life. Now. Even though each word of our speech is conventional. Man is organized for city life as the ant is for the ant-hill. language is not therefore a convention. 'thought. while the whole of obligation is natural. we can say that Bergson is making a distinction between linguistic conventions such as the particular forms of words and particular linguistic codes or rules of syntax in which a particular language consists.

On the other hand. as we saw in Chapter Two. with the intermediate state of recognition we are again at this very connection. consequently. So. The intermediate state between the two forms of memory is recognition. to remain trapped within a particular set of conventions. requires effort.enclose us. recognition itself. We can see that with the two forms of recognition we again have the summit and the base of the cone. cannot be conversation because all conversational or dialectical philosophies merely cut reality up according to the already established divisions of a particular language (PM 1321-2/81). the memory that conserves images. so handy. Bergson is primarily interested in attentive recognition because it involves memory-images. particular linguistic conventions . he then turns to what he calls 'the intermediate states' between the two forms (MM 235/89). especially static general ideas. for Bergson. artifices . Philosophy. In other words.72 The Challenge of Bergsonism which we live and consequently they mediate our experience with the acquired. or habits is not thinking. He illustrates this with the following example: .which are. there is attentive or voluntary recognition. artifices. In fact. the two forms of memory for Bergson are not separate from one another. of course. Bergson's disdain for dialectic or dialogue or conversation explains his linguistic example found in chapter two of Matter and Memory. inattentive recognition works entirely in terms of generality and is easy. according to Bergson. So. to use the terminology of The Two Sources. comes in two forms. that we move outside them only with difficulty. in fact. like the two forms of memory. So. But. in short. it is not freedom. we are in inattentive recognition. it is a philosophy of 'the whole of language'. attentive recognition works entirely in terms of singularity. On the one hand. That Bergson is concerned with the whole of language is why he says in the second introduction that the philosophical method cannot be dialectic or dialogue or conversation (PM 1321-2/81). let us go back to this chapter. which involves memoryimages and. and in which 'our movements prolong our perception in order to draw from it useful effects and thus distances us from the object' (MM 244/98). inert or static general ideas of those communities. Insofar as it is concerned with habits and useful effects. which works entirely by habits. We recall that the one form is 'habit-memory'. Insofar as it involves memory-images and is not concerned with useful effects. To see this difference. Only the whole of language can open us up and allow us to move. if we can speak of something like a 'philosophy of language' in Bergson. Bergson is trying to differentiate between the two forms of memory. he intends the cone image to illustrate the 'connection' between them. and in which our movements ''lead us back to the object in order to emphasize its contours' (MM 244/98). Remember. When we make use of general ideas. the other. the habits of speaking are so easy. Here. there is inattentive or automatic recognition. we do not want to move outside them. And.

we could say. general ideas of their community. they speak louder. Therefore. there is only recognition based on habits. if we are to understand another person. his descriptions focus on the one who does not know the language.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 73 I listen to two people speaking in an unknown language. they probably start to think that you are a little crazy. unable to communicate . to interpret speech. in particular. Indirectly. Bergson constructs this example because he thinks aphasics are. everything that is said is analysed and synthesized. If I do not make the leap. However. We have already mentioned this leap once in this chapter. and finally distinct words. Bergson constructs this example in order to illustrate attentive recognition. for these people there is no recognition of difference or singularity and no movement outside the conventions. In this same sonorous mass. and these ideas eliminate the very possibility of experiencing difference. Because Bergson is interested in how memory functions in attentive recognition. and we shall return to it in a moment.this person. I distinguish nothing and I could repeat nothing. being a little crazy like an aphasic . we can imagine that they are talking about practical matters and therefore are utilizing conventional forms of speech and interpreting one another in general ways or according to the acquired. to recognize the difference that defines that person. but let us think a moment about the ones who do know the language and who are engaged in a conversation. I remain captive to the static general ideas or conventions of that particular language (cf. in contrast. we must be able to leap outside the particular world that we inhabit together. Bergson points to an obvious feature of this experience when he talks a little later about raising the volume of the sound (MM 254/109). Since these general ideas mediate their conversation. in relation to their own language. As I said. and they might even start to yell at you. precisely like this person in relation to an unknown language. inhabits a world without others. Of course. I perceive only a confused noise in which all of the sounds resemble one another. when you still do not respond to them. static. under these ideas. where is the difference? (MM 254/109) Clearly. in other words. subsumed. Bergson does not tell us what they are speaking about but. This is important: for Bergson. the difference lies in that they know the language and I do not. Is that sufficient for me to understand them? The vibrations that come to me are the same that strike their ears. Between them and me. the example of the person is supposed to illustrate. So. MM 261/116-17). there can be no experience of alterity or alteration here. . if it is a normal conversation. the louder voices only make you feel more outside their world and. We all know this feature: when people realize that you do not understand what they are saying.unable to recognize. In fact. the two interlocutors disentangle vowels and syllables that hardly resemble one another.

74 The Challenge of Bergsonism for Bergson. according to generalities. the aphasics lack is the ability to decompose the sounds into articulate words.. What I have is a sort of manual dexterity with the language that allows me to decompose and recompose the sentences according to the motor schemas or habits. the . certain aphasics lack the ability to recompose the words into sentences. we almost literally form the muscles of our throat and lips into the sounds we are speaking. I can then 'punctuate the sentence which is heard and . we can speak it like an automaton . emphasize its main articulations'. we have what Bergson calls 'the motor schema' (MM 255/ 110-11). But when I know a language 'imperfectly' (ES 944/170). the recognition is so easy that we do not really have to pay attention. Let us say that now I have had some training in this language. 'to sketch' these same articulations with our voice. the first side of attentive recognition does not really tell us much about the form of recognition in which I really have to pay attention. I must make an effort because the motor schemas are not entirely in place. When we speak a foreign language fluently. In fact. the language becomes easy. the second side concerns spirit.. the words all flow into one another and resemble one another. But in order to listen to what is being said and understand it exactly. the motor schema is a motor habit. What Bergson realizes here is that a part of any language training consists in a sort of 'manual education' (cf. of course. I do not hear what is different.rapidly. what I and. While the first form of attentive recognition concerns the body. Like the first form of memory. When my ear and throat have been so formed. it is not enough to know the general motor patterns of the language. So. it seems. or perhaps because I am fluent in a language. I must reflectively form my ear and throat. PM 1325/85). in which we almost literally form the inner membranes of our ears upon the shapes of the sounds that we are hearing. I and. then. so to speak. But for Bergson. I am in a different situation. the muscular ability to discern the internal articulations of the sentence as well as the muscular ability. at the moment when the habits have taken control. I am extending the example Bergson gives in Matter and Memory of a person hearing a conversation in a language I do not know. I am enclosed in this particular language with its particular set of conventions. Similarly. similarly. Therefore. Even if I am fluent in a language. singular and new in a sentence. Even with this training. But this ability to 'sketch' the motor schema with our ears and throat is only one side of attentive recognition for Bergson. it seems. So. When I hear a language I do not know. perhaps even without thought. that is. what keeps the person who does not know the language and the aphasics from recognizing or understanding what is being said. Here. that is. this first side of attentive recognition entirely concerns the body: when the repetitions have had their effect. there is also a second side. This muscular formation. takes place by repetition (MM 256/111).

as with the cone.'in the midst of the corresponding ideas' (MM 261/ 116). it is really impossible to regress from the words that I am hearing to the ideas. from the sense to the distinct words. I must leap right into the sense. What is sense in Bergson? As we have noted earlier.. to reconstruct intelligently . if I tried to regress from each distinct word to an idea. this leap into the past also means that we have escaped the particular language and now we find ourselves in the whole of language. and that means into the past in general and then into a region of the past. if I am to understand. it is going to be dependent on my own interior life. We must keep this direction in mind. I would be 'at a loss'. So. Bergson says that sense or the idea is the 'solder' of the words (MM 267/122). because it implies already that. and he discusses this concept most in his 1902 essay 'Intellectual Effort' (ES 936/160). It suggests that a sentence is a complicated but unified pattern of flows or rhythms. a word has individuality for us only from the moment we have been taught to abstract it.that is. my emphasis). we encountered the con- . In Chapter Two. In other words. like the criss-crossing of blood vessels or the channels of a river. for Bergson. on my memory. if there is alterity in this experience. my emphasis. have no 'absolute sense'. their sense is always relative to what follows them and what precedes them. But. I would never find the pattern. sense is what Bergson calls a 'dynamic schema'..the continuity of sound that the ear perceives' (MM 261/116-17. of understanding. instead.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 75 rules of syntax and the vocabulary. what is most important about the leap in Bergson is that it is not a step-by-step regress. 'To understand the speech of another is . A word is always anastomosed to the other words that accompany it and takes different aspects according to the cadence and movement of the sentences of which it makes an integral part: just as each note of a theme vaguely reflects the whole theme. (MM 262/118. A motor schema. I must not regress. Therefore. because words. from thought to action. We do not first learn how to pronouce words but sentences. starting from the ideas . with the leap we are back inside the cone. in order to find this 'soldering' sense. also MM 269/124 and ES 945/170) The word 'anastomose' is a biological term that means flowing into something else by means of an outlet.. In fact. as Bergson says. 'wandering' from word to word (ES 945/170). not thought. concerns only action. the direction of intelligence is from the ideas to the images.d'emblee .18 And. Here we return to the leap. In the second chapter of Matter and Memory Bergson says. Indeed.. where we see language connected to memory. I must place myself 'immediately' . cf. in the case of listening. Bergson goes on to make the following comparison: . As we have seen. on my sense.

the bearing. for each game. in a word. So. And. the function of each piece' (ES 938/162). in Appendix I. according to Bergson. the whole is never given. a dynamic schema is not what the images taken together 'signify'. We cannot think. is as complete as the images that develop from it. But. that this player does not have the image of each chessboard in memory 'just as it is. nor does he have 'a mental vision of each piece' (ES 938/161). Even though the dynamic schema is an 'outline' . and then the chess player would be unable to play new and different games. an example or a symbolic vision and is what we were calling in Chapter Two a dynamic general idea .it is not.. So. it is not a 'logical meaning'. it is a 'representation' of the whole that can be developed into multiple parts or elements.these are Bergson's words . Similarly. we said. it has 'reciprocal implication' and. or 'reconstitutes' the successive events that have led to the present situation. the chess player has the whole as a schema. In other words.it is also what we are going to call. the extract has too small an extension. 'internal complica- . he or she has an intuition of the whole and the differences that can be developed from it. however.76 The Challenge of Bergsonism cept of dynamic schema in our discussion of a past that was never present. Bergson gives a very good example of a dynamic schema: the memory of a skilful chess player (ES 937-8/161-2). he or she 'remakes' the history of the game from the beginning. Bergson defines a dynamic schema in this way: a dynamic schema is . an 'impoverised extract or summary' of this particular series of images (ES 937/160). He notes that a skilful player can play several games of chess at once without looking at the chessboards. which is 'developable' into 'multiple images' (ES 936/160). Therefore. What the example implies is that the chess player has something like what Bergson would call an intuition. the schema would be limited just to that series of images. the power. at every move the player makes an effort of 'reconstruction'.. because a logical meaning 'may belong to quite different series of images' and therefore would not allow us to retain and reconstruct one definite series of images to the exclusion of others (ES 937/160). in which there are unforeseeable developments. in other words. Then. in other words. while the logical meaning has too large an extension.a 'simple' 'outline of temporal relations' (ES 950/177). the player retains and represents to himself 'a composition of forces or better a relation between allied or hostile powers' (ES 938/162). is a sort of essence. A dynamic schema. In other words. if it were an extract or summary. In 'Intellectual Effort'. while an impoverished extract is too limited to be a dynamic schema. Instead. consequently. 'He thus obtains a representation of the whole that enables him at any moment to visualize the elements' (ES 938/162). a logical meaning is too unlimited to be a dynamic schema. and the value. "as if it were in a mirror"'. as Bergson says. that the chess player has the whole as such. as Bergson says. a dynamic schema. the player 'retains and represents to himself. for Bergson. Instead. this would imply that the whole is given.

'the nebulosity of the idea' (MM 266/122). and this understanding is not that of generalities. this starting point is an illusion: the articulate words I can discern act as nothing more than 'suggestions' or 'benchmarks' for me to follow (ES 943/168). Bergson compares this process to the operation of solving a mathematical problem (MM 261/116. The dynamic schema or sense in Bergson is. which are developable into singular images of action. Similarly. Similarly. but I do not see those singular events until I rotate the cone. according to Bergson. This is sense in Bergson. or verbally explained to me. which the elements or images develop. Both in Matter and Memory and in 'Intellectual Effort'. unless I do it over for myself. I then have what Bergson calls the 'directing idea' (ES 956/184). This idea directs my progression towards distinct elements or auditory images such as words. I make the leap into sense. it really is a direction. ES 943/ 168). But while this . The idea I have of my character is a simple outline of forces. I understand exactly what has been said in its singularity. that is. In fact. But only if I can repeat the sentence completely can I say I really understand it. I understand the solution to the problem when I can do it myself. I understand the other person when I reconstruct.The Concept of Sense: Ethics 77 tion'. to repeat an image from Chapter Two. Because of the starting point in sense from which I develop the singular images of words. In other words. Even if the solution to a mathematical problem is written on the blackboard. I must say the sentence over again just as rapidly as the person speaking in order to keep up. or re-say his or her sentence. A cloud is a whole composed of thousands of drops of water. I do not understand the solution to the problem unless I do it myself. Now. it is not the understanding given to me either by the motor schema or by a static general idea. When I have the sense suggested or the 'corresponding idea'. Bergsonian sense is creative. into the past in general and then into a region of the past. which seems to be determined by the teleology towards an object. but an unpredictable direction. but I do not see the different drops until the cloud condenses. in the case of hearing a language I know imperfectly. The idea anyone has of his or her character would be an example of a dynamic schema in Bergson. the idea I have of my character is composed of thousands of singular events. I repeat or double what the other person has said. on the basis of the sense. if we return to the problem of understanding another person who is speaking a language that I do know well. printed in books. It may seem that I start from the sounds I am hearing but. they are nothing but suggestions.19 Bergsonian sense is a tendency. Again the chalk marks on the blackboard or the symbols in the book or the sounds I hear do not lead me to the idea. From them. His conception of sense as an outline of temporal relations or as a relation of forces and powers distinguishes it from the phenomenological elaborations of sense. we can see that it requires an intuition of sense like that of the chess player.

is dependent on my sense. good sense is primarily defined as being 'well balanced' (bien equilibre) between the extremes of the cone. we find in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion that intuition is based in a specific sort of emotion. Yet. He also calls good sense 'an intuition of a superior order that is necessarily rare'. or. Indeed. In fact.from my intuition of my own sense. but always also active. not you. i.20 Nevertheless. it is from my character to actual actions. therefore. which means that its direction is towards action. directed towards action. Again. This direction is what Bergson throughout his writings calls 'good sense'. it develops immediately . in the 1895 speech. between the 'docility' of the dreamer and the 'energy' of the person who acts (MM 294/153). from 'an intense warmth that has become light'. but from me to the other. Indeed. So. Almost 30 years after this speech and Matter and Memory.e. it is dynamism itself. it swings back and forth like a pendulum. one year before the publication of Matter and Memory. This dynamism is why. the plurality of rhythms develops . never simply speculative. Finally. He defines creative emotions . insofar as good sense is 'well balanced'.23 Both of these comments suggest that intuition in Bergson is based in a type of feeling or emotion. its direction towards action must be understood through its primary characteristic. in their very difference. this entire speech implies that what Bergson throughout his writings calls intuition is good sense. Bergson calls good sense practical sense. the direction is not from the other to me for Bergson. in the 1895 speech Bergson says that good sense neither sleeps nor dreams. it never regresses. insofar as I leap into sense.78 The Challenge of Bergsonism understanding has had its suggestions and benchmarks in the speech I hear. the direction is from the dynamic schema or sense to the distinct words and sentences. but always makes the leap and then progresses from the sense or dynamic schema to action and language.21 It is docile enough to use memory-images to recognize the singularity of the present situation and energetic enough not to fall asleep and dream. I must make the leap to understand the sentence but. which means that for him intuition is never simply knowledge. in a speech he made in 1895. Bergson says that good sense 'loves actions'. Bergson tells us that good sense's love of action conies from being 'profoundly moved for the good'. In chapter three of Matter and Memory.22 In fact.and we must say develops without a mediating general idea. More precisely. we must even see the rhythm of the other's speech as a function of my own rhythm. and while Bergson calls it a 're-construction' or a 're-constitution'. For Bergson. this is why good sense is so fatiguing (ES 892/102). we must realize that the understanding of these specific words. Bergson calls good sense 'intellectual work itself. the understanding of the sentence develops from me. which Bergson calls creative emotions. The leap and the progress towards action and language is why we have to define good sense as doubly directed or bidirectional.

to all nature. of the very principle of life in general (MR 1187/250). So. raptures. This superiority conies from the visions. we must not take this mystical love as a metaphor to help us understand duration. Thus. arise as a consequence of a representation. defines duration. the 'disturbance is a systematic readjustment with a superior equilibrium' (MR 1170/229). MR 1156/213). 'from the darkest depths of the soul' (MR 1170/ 229). the balance of superior good sense is a disequilibrium. These emotions are rare (cf. And the action it is directed towards is love of all humanity. when I see someone I know. but rather we must redefine love on the basis of Bergsonian duration. But. according to Bergson. the mystical soul is so open that its love extends to animals. Most emotions. in other words. in The Two Sources. an example would be joy (and not pleasure). But such a rare and transitory experience upsets one's normal mental equilibrium. here the emotion is the cause and the representation is the effect. there are also emotions that precede the representations and are in fact 'pregnant' with representations. This 'disequilibrium' is why mystics are frequently classified as insane (MR 1183/245). then. as with everything in Bergson. mystical rapture is an intuition of duration. for Bergson. at the entire universe. Another example would be the religious emotion of mystical ecstasy. I feel pleasure. we are going to conclude with a discussion of duration. Therefore. of the very roots of our being. In other words. Now. the emotion that comes up from the depths. but. In fact. superior good sense is not enclosed in one society but is open to all. Bergson provides a defence of mysticism which consists in arguing that mystics have 'superior good sense'. for better or worse. As is well known. if the disequilibrium is like the leap. in relation to common sense. to the entire universe (MR 1007/ 38).The Concept of Sense: Ethics 79 as those that generate thought (MR 1011/43). or ecstasies. Here the cause of the emotion is the representation. in fact. deep-rooted mental healthiness' (MR 1169/228). he insists that mystics have 'an exceptional. But such insanity amounts to a leap outside the habits and conventions that are relative to one society. as Bergson insists.24 . we might think that this superior form of love actively directed at all humanity. what is truly important about superior good sense is its directedness towards action (MR 1169/228). to plants. Bergson interprets this emotion as a fleeting vision of the continuity of our inner life. for instance.

l we can define duration with two simple claims. as he does for instance in his 'Introduction to Metaphysics' (PM 1411/179). the survival of the past implies that the past is impassible. This explanation gives us the Bergsonian idea of the irreversibility of the past. this does not help us understand duration. But even if we can say this. continuity. this impassible character of the past means that duration is irreversible (EC 499/6). is an unrepeatable event . perhaps. change. traditional metaphysics has defined these phenomena as a synthesis of discontinuous elements.CONCLUSION Think in Terms of Duration The challenge of Bergsonism is to think in terms of duration and. As we already know. which I cannot repeat. in these investigations. creation.unlike the poem itself. we must see that duration redefines memory. or with biological or artistic creation. Bergson describes this connection between the first claim and the second. I repeat or do over the poem an indefinite number of times. We must not define duration with these terms. or that he defines it with change or movement. each recitation. The first is perhaps at the heart of Bergson's philosophy: the past survives. I improve my recitation of it. . that Bergson defines duration with memory.e. this connection confronts us with an obscure logic. if I am in the process of memorizing a poem. but now. To use the example we saw in Chapter Two. Most generally. It seems to me that. But no matter what term we decide to favour. it cannot be changed or done over. I am going to try now to throw as much light on it as possible. between the survival of the past and the novelty of the future. each time I do it over. which can be repeated. progress and passage. each time that I repeat the poem on a particular day. Each time. despite Bergson's numerous and varied descriptions of duration in his corpus. i. As we saw in Chapter Two. The second follows from the first: the moment coming from the future is absolutely new. to name the most obvious. we have done nothing but think in terms of duration. In general. in a number of ways: prolongation. For Bergson. But no matter what. in a particular place. we know already this synthesis of already analysed or juxtaposed elements cannot be duration. this particular recitation is an event of my personal history. movement. we are going to be as precise as possible about it. Bergson defines duration as memory.

then. but is at least singular. if we change direction. Imagine that the person holding the leaves is taking each leaf away immediately after he has laid it on the table. then. this rearrangement certainly would not be new. since duration or time is not reversible. like the repetition of the poem. this way of characterizing the connection between the survival of the past and the singularity of the future does not really give us newness. with each different moment. Perhaps we can visualize this connection between survival of the past and the coming moment in this way.because the leaves are so similar to one another . in other words. then I could say that the coming moment is a mere rearrangement of past moments. Yet. memory itself has changed. we would start to think . . I can see that it is different from all the others because they are still there. which are still surviving. we perceive no difference. I must conclude that each coming moment is new in relation to the past moments. the coming moment cannot be doing them over. when they are still there. Granted that the difference of each coming moment from the past gives us a new organization of the past or a new organization of duration as a whole. Nevertheless. it includes the whole of the past plus one more moment. Bergson says that 'Each [moment of our life] is a kind of creation' (EC 500/7). memory as a whole has a constantly new organization. As each leaf is presented to me. So. and since the past moments are still surviving. I can see this even though the leaves resemble each other almost to the point of being indiscernible.that this person is presenting the same leaf over and over again. We can see why Bergson insists on the novelty of the coming moment if we realize that. If this image makes sense. as each moment comes. I think we can start to see why Bergson would call this swelling of the past by different moments creation. When each leaf is taken away. in Creative Evolution. it seems to me that it only gives us difference.Conclusion: Think in Terms of Duration 81 The next step in the explanation of duration is crucial: if duration or time were reversible. with Bergson. Now. now. like an artist painting a portrait (cf. between the future and the past. If we now move from the past to the present. let us change the image. But. this person is laying each leaf down side by side on a table in front of you and he is not taking any of them away as he lays down a new one. The past is adding memory-images to the perceptual image. into the hesitation. In other words. we have been characterizing duration only from the direction of the future to the present. we perceive difference. the past moments done over. we must conclude that the survival of the past implies that the coming moment is not a repetition of the past. it is added onto the whole of the past. nevertheless I think we probably would not yet call this 'swelling' of the past creation. So far. for example. we can see that memory is constantly and spontaneously rotating and contracting past memories in order to insert them into the present. Imagine that someone is holding a bunch of leaves from the same tree behind his back.

But no matter what. the present repeats the past (even though the past is irreversible). Instead. I think we can see why Bergson constantly characterizes duration in contradictory terms: unity and multiplicity. we can say now that. the picture that results from this process is always unpredictable or unforeseeable.82 The Challenge of Bergsonism EC 499-500/6-7). inner observation is necessary intuition. the coming moment is always adding different perceptual images to the whole of memory. simplicity and indivisibility. it is only because they are the poet himself . the pain reaches a level where I sense that I have to do something. it differs by degrees from the past moments. Each different moment being added onto the ever swelling past does not necessarily bring forth a new existence or work or action. not really the right word here. I should have said here that an artist painting a portrait is like duration or that an artist painting a portrait is even in duration. since there is always potential complexity in duration. again. the past is spontaneously adding memory-images to the perceptual image. as a pain grows. of course. in a sense. Of course. like any artistic creation. But. Here is what Bergson says. Moreover.a multiplication or division of the poet the poet plumbing the depths of his own nature in so powerful an effort of inner observation that he lays hold of the virtual in the real. I can describe the pain on a numerical scale. If we keep this difference in mind between each coming moment being different in relation to the whole of the past and the spontaneous contributions of memory to the creation of the perceptual image. my decision and consequent action is a qualitative change and implies a kind of heterogeneity. The right word to characterize duration is immanence. For instance. on the other. duration is the same becoming-other. in the passage between the past and the future. what is truly important is that. at a certain moment. there are both quantitative differences and qualitative differences. simplicity and complexity. with the creation of the perceptual image by means of the addition of memory-images. with homogeneity. which implies a kind of homogeneity. and takes up what nature has left as a mere outline or sketch in his soul in order to make of it a finished work of art. I can say that it is getting worse. but a logic of alteration. the connection between the survival of the past and the absolutely new is not a contradiction because we must start with unity. in a word. indeed. we do not believe that the observation of other men is necessary for the tragic poet' (R 466/148). This starting point in immanence is why we have to say that the logic of duration is not one of same and other. on the one hand. it is unforeseeable because. and. indivisible and divisible. Thus. This is why Bergson says in his essay on laughter that 'As paradoxical as this assertion may appear. and then I decide to act. (R 467/150) . Nevertheless. Homogeneity is. I think we can see that. in his essay on laughter: If the characters created by a poet give us the impression of life.

Second. In fact. the movement from the emotion to the words will be one in which the words are forced and violence is done to them. sends us back to the essay on laughter (cf. cannot be entirely new. near the end of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. indeed. I can reduce its complexity down to three sentences. one can take ideas and words made readily available by society and rearrange them. MR 1189/252). each coming moment must therefore be new. As a result of this forcing and violence. we could call it 'superior love'. success is never certain. the past survives.esprit. 'the writer wonders at every step if it will be granted to him to go on to the end. he thanks his luck for every partial success. one works from the emotion to the words. . of course. everything depends on the direction. Madame de Sevigne's love for her daughter is famous. Yet. This is as precise a formula as we can construct for Bergson's idea of duration. of course. not being a rearrangement of the old. These words.we find what may be the most perfect linguistic expression of the intuition of duration. throughout his career but especially at the end. just as the punster might thank the words he comes across for lending themselves to his fun' (MR 1191/254). each coming moment cannot be a mere rearrangement of the old moments. to un faiseur de calembours. for Bergson.Conclusion: Think in Terms of Duration 83 Shakespeare was neither Macbeth. This reference to a punster. 'fragments of [the emotion's] own materialization'. R 444/ 111. nor Othello. Third. if we use Bergson's terminology. Some would think that it is insane. Bergson admits that. As an example of esprit. there in the discussion of wit . So. according to Bergson. because the past survives. with this way of writing. he might have been them. as Bergson says. in the construction of expressions. Bergsonian duration therefore is a simple idea. On the one hand. nor Hamlet. This is alteration from immanence. no formula ever gives us the whole of the experience of duration (PM 1288/45). Bergson gives us an expression of the love between a mother and a daughter (and not an expression of a love between a father and a son). And.2 He gives us the following excerpt from a letter from Madame de Sevigne to her ailing daughter. not the alterity from transcendence. This point in the soul is a creative emotion. But then there is the other way of writing: 'It consists in re-ascending from the intellectual and social plane to a point in the soul from which there springs an imperative demand for creation' (MR 1191/253). no formula of duration is ever adequate to the intuition of duration. but. in fact. First. of course . inexpressible (cf. what these expressions refer to remains. And. This inexpressibility of the intuition of duration is why Bergson was interested. where Bergson speaks of the calembour). he speaks of two ways of writing. in which case the words are. there is a result and one that may be 'original and vigorous' (MR 1190/253). nothing would be communicated. still. no matter how precise the expressions of the logic of duration have been here. Then. if they were. So.

. instead. according to Bergson.84 The Challenge of Bergsonism Here is the witticism: 'The cold wind of your chateau makes me hurt in your chest' (R 438/100). this witticism makes us neither cry nor laugh. it only makes us smile (R 437/97).3 I shall end by noting that.

as Bergson would say in Matter and Memory. which means that it is a work of memory. ethics is defined neither by decision procedures nor by the theoretical justification of moral judgements. We must therefore call what Bergson is doing here an archaeology. As we shall see. or better. he is attempting to determine the origin. we must call it a genealogy. The text that follows investigates Bergson's genealogy of morality and religion. first. the origins of morality and religion. civilization or acquired knowledge and habits are 'the thick layer of vegetative earth that today covers over [reconvert] the rock of original nature' (MR 1045/83).APPENDIX I The Point where Memory Turns Back into Life: An Investigation of Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion For Bergson. a memory-image. the genealogy of morality and religion. the counter- . to which we prefer to relate ourselves. Therefore. The Two Sources therefore is attempting to dig through this layer to the 'rock' below. if this memory [souvenir] was not covered over [reconvert] by others. The memory [souvenir] of forbidden fruit is what there is oldest in the memory [memoire] of each of us. a word with which he repeatedly qualifies his comments (cf. as in the memory of humanity. it is an attempt to remember the very forces of life. our 'today' is defined by being 'aphrodisical' (MR 1232/302). Bergson's genealogy aims at a transformation of our current situation. For Bergson. as for Levinas. For Bergson. The Two Sources is more than an archaeology. It seeks to find the point where memory turns back into life. we are going to. as the title itself indicates. We would notice this. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. determine what Bergson means by 'today'.2 In order to reach the point where memory turns back into life. our 'today'.1 And like Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. Instead. hidden and yet still present. (MR 981/9) But. MR 1215/282). turns back into life or emotion. Bergson is not doing moral theory. it seeks the very point where memory. The first two sentences of The Two Sources say.

just as the League of Nations was intended to prevent war. And just as there is now . THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION In the 'Final Remarks' of The Two Sources. We shall therefore begin our investigation with identifying the book's purpose. Unlike his 1896 Matter and Memory.86 The Challenge of Bergsonism weight to the aphrodisical nature of our whole civilization is asceticism.a frenzy for luxury. . second. and especially with practical matters such as the formation of the League of Nations. EC 537-8/50-1). 'can [the origins of morality and religion] help us practically"?' (MR 1206/271. I. But. for which Bergson provided a preface 15 years after its first publication. The form of the mystical experience will bring us to 'the point where memory turns back into life'. If there is something like a philosophy of history in Bergson. Thus. What we should notice here is that Bergson describes the two positions of the pendulum as 'frenzies'. and this is not as easy as one might think. The word frenzy (frenesie) derives from the Greek phrenesia. Bergson's explanation of the war-instinct depends on the idea of a 'frenzy'. The Two Sources possesses no such guide. The frenzy for luxury will eventually (but not necessarily) swing back towards asceticism. a frenzy for luxury. there was in the Middle Ages a frenzy for asceticism.'today'. Bergson was involved actively in world politics during and after the First World War. it consists in a pendulum movement between 'asceticism and sexuality'. the frenzy is double (MR 1227/296). Bergson's practical aid consists in showing how what he calls the 'war-instinct' 'will be able to be repressed or turned aside' (MR 1220/288. But before we turn to what Bergson means by 'today'. According to Bergson.in a word. which means that the frenzy is based on the artificial extension of the vital need for food (MR 1229/298). for Bergson. we must identify clearly the problem with which The Two Sources is concerned. in particular. we shall see that 'the form of the mystical experience' consists in a certain relation between emotions and images. And. Bergson states explicitly that 'The objective of the present work was to investigate the origins of morality and religion' (MR 1220/288). madness. we are going to see that there is a certain 'misdirection' (une tromperie) of nature that allows for this pendulum movement. And this misdirection of nature is at the heart of the Bergsonian mystical experience. cf. He asks. the double frenzy works like a 'pendulum' (MR 1123-4/292). we shall investigate what Bergson means by mysticism. which means 'inflammation of the brain' . Now. my emphasis). he says . in The Two Sources. mystical experience in Bergson is memorial. What is important is that Bergson does not rest with the theoretical conclusions about these origins.

On the one hand. that mystical states are 'abnormal' (TMSR 1169/228). So. So. concerns precisely Bergson's definition of mysticism. Bergson distinguishes between mystic abnormality and morbid abnormality by showing that the 'great mystics'4 themselves (such as Joan of Arc) do not define themselves by the mystical visions and emotional disturbances they undergo. his second theoretical objective consists in showing why rational beings. possess intelligence. we must understand mysticism. What Bergson is calling here 'static religion' refers not only to all the polytheisms such as the religion of ancient Greece.Appendix I 87 With this double frenzy in mind. intelligence consists in the ability to manufacture tools. in these non-mystical religions we really have madness. What a tissue of 'aberrations'. but also to all superstitions. And indeed. each one corresponding to the three chapters in which The Two Sources consists. are the only beings that believe in 'irrational things' (des choses deraisonable} (MR 1062/102). to engage in idle talk. He will explain these aberrant beliefs by means of the fact that human beings. Here. for Bergson. and 'absurdities' (MR 1061/102). states of 'disequilibrium' (desequilibres) (MR 1183/245). not only to all the forms of paganism. 'Static Religion'. to understand the frenzy of asceticism.3 The reason we associate mysticism with unbalanced states consists in the fact. In the 'Final Remarks'. Bergson says that 'mysticism calls forth asceticism' (MR 1238/308). The 'morbid states' of 'a lunatic' (un fou) resemble mystic raptures and ecstasies (TMSR 1169/228-9). In other words. For Bergson. including the belief in evil spirits and magic. unlike animals. and therefore not to act. 'Homo sapiens'. but this ability to manufacture tools requires reflection (MR 1153/210). which Bergson admits. normally what we see in mysticism is only 'pathological [mental] states' (MR 1183/245). cf. 'errors'. for Bergson. In other words. from unbalanced states. then we can distinguish the frenzy of mysticism from what he calls 'charlatanism' (charlatanisme) (MR 1184/246. If we define mysticism as action. chapter three. The word 'charlatan' literally means to prattle. this superior equilibrium results in action. Most importantly. of The Two Sources. defines mysticism. MR 1169/229). Action. Reflection then produces two kinds of danger (MR 1153-4/210). he must distinguish what he is calling mysticism from mental illness. we can now determine three interrelated theoretical objectives that Bergson is pursuing. But in order to define mysticism. 'Dynamic Religion'. This charlatanism brings us to Bergson's second theoretical objective. intelligent beings like human beings are the only creatures to believe in superstitions (MR 1067/109). Bergson begins chapter two with an obvious fact: 'The spectacle of what religions were and of what certain religions still are is humiliating for human intelligence. reflection gives humans a kind of 'foresight' . The visions and emotion are only a 'systematic rearrangement aiming at a superior equilibrium'. he must distinguish from the normal view we have of it. which is located in chapter two.

we become egoistical. Here we return to the idea of charlatanism. it occurs when an individual is afraid or feels a need (MR 1090/136).88 The Challenge of Bergsonism (prevision) that allows them to be aware of future dangers. Eventually. on the other hand. The gods. out of the feeling that there exists an invisible but efficacious presence that has 'its eyes always turned towards us' (MR 1124/176). This is not where the madness is. as soon as we begin to think of ourselves. Bergson thinks that this restoration of balance occurs naturally and that there is no madness here. Confidence is lost. This unstoppable 'proliferation' (MR 1118/169) of images is 'monstrous' (MR 1091/137). death. The magician is a charlatan. that is. But then. also EC 519/29). Nature. on the one hand. The fabulation function invents images. he is not just an imposter but also someone who merely talks. intervene in human affairs to ward off the future dangers that we cannot control. a specific form of the imagination.6 These first images of evil spirits. these images were extended in the direction of formulas. . in particular. similar ones. has generated humanity to live in societies and societal life demands disinterestedness. the gods intervene in human affairs in order to forbid egoism and thereby ensure social cohesion. the entire world ends up being 'peopled' with evil spirits. In short. But even this idle chatter is not quite madness. Because of intelligence. The magician does not engage in scientific research to cure the disease.5 they then lose 'confidence' (MR 1085/130) in their ability to act and finally detach themselves from life. we had the images of the evil spirit. 'voluntary hallucinations' (MR 1141/195). for this individual. are extended in the direction of the magical 'recipes' or 'formulas' that are used to conjure up the spirits. To do this. For example. human beings become unbalanced. he does not act. for Bergson. however. We are now in the domain of magic. Eventually. On the other hand. TSMR 1118/169. Then the fabulation function takes over and starts to produce images of evil spirits to attack the enemy or to explain the ruined crops. Bergson also calls it 'decadent' (MR 1094/140). an enemy in a distant city threatens the individual or disease has destroyed his crops. the individual can neither reach the distant enemy in order to strike back nor obliterate the disease. As if under the influence of the magic incantation 'like is equivalent to like' (cf. reflection allows humans to reflect on themselves. nature uses one of intelligence's functions. Thus in two ways things need to be set right again. according to Bergson. So. But we become unbalanced in a second way. the images continue to extend themselves. And. according to Bergson. The gods therefore restore the balance lost through intelligence. The result of this vision of death is that humans become depressed. according to Bergson. the 'tabulation function' (MR 1066-7/107-9). nor does he go to the distant city and attack his enemy. who merely utters 'incantations'. the first images attract more. At first. the images of this efficacious presence become individual gods.

Appendix I


On the basis of this consideration of the first two theoretical objectives, we can see already why Bergson called his book 'The Two Sources of Morality and Religion'. We have seen two sources or origins of religion. On the one hand, nature is the source of static religion. That is, the evolution of nature has produced intelligence, but intelligence unbalances the individual. This unbalance produces a natural need which in turn develops the fabulation function in order to restore the balance. On the other hand, a certain kind of psychological state, which is abnormal, is the source of dynamic religion. That is, a mystical rapture unbalances the normal balance of the individual resulting in a different kind of balance. Superior equilibrium results in action. Obviously, since both sources - nature and mysticism - concern different kinds of balances and equilibriums, we are again speaking of the image of the pendulum (to which we shall return below). But just as obviously, if we think only of the title Bergson gave to this book, we can see that one of its theoretical objectives is to differentiate between these two sources. But why do they need to be differentiated? This question brings us to the third theoretical objective. The third theoretical objective is located in the first chapter of The Two Sources, 'Moral Obligation'. Unlike the titles to chapters two and three - 'Static Religion' and 'Dynamic Religion' - which together indicate a difference, the title for chapter one indicates a unity, within which Bergson is going to make a difference. This difference is that of closed morality and open morality. Closed morality is the morality of a group, the morality of the city, and here we should keep in mind the old walled cities of Europe. The closed morality aims only at the self-preservation of the group and thus social cohesion. It consists in customs.7 Society therefore trains the individual in these customs to the point where the individual is habituated. The closed morality is entirely about habituation, even automatism. In contrast, the open morality is entirely about creation. For Bergson, the open morality refers to the great moral initiators, the mystics, and in particular, Jesus. Jesus gives us the image, according to Bergson, of an individual who loves all humanity, not just one's friends, not just the group. In fact, the openness of this love is such that it has no object and thus extends to infinity, to every single thing. Here, we do not have customs but an example (the image of Jesus given -in the Gospels) to follow or, more precisely, to which one aspires. Here, in the open morality, we do not have habits, but emotion and therefore, for Bergson, effort. As I said, the title of the first chapter, 'Moral Obligation', implies a kind of unity. The two kinds of morality, the open and the closed, can come to be mixed together and therefore be indistinguishable. But also, the title of the first chapter quickly makes one think of duty and thus of Kant's moral philosophy.8 According to Bergson, Kant has made a 'psychological error' that has 'vitiated many theories of ethics' (MR 991/20).


The Challenge of Bergsonism

The psychological error is this. In any given society, there are many different, particular obligations. The individual in society may at some time desire to deviate from one particular obligation. When this illicit desire arises, there will be resistance from society but also from his habits (MR 992/21). If the individual combats these resistances, a psychological state of tension or contraction occurs. The individual, in other words, experiences 'the rigidity' (la raideur) of the obligation. Now, according to Bergson, when philosophers such as Kant attribute a severe aspect to duty, they have 'externalized' this experience of obligation's inflexibility. In fact, if we ignore the multiplicity of particular obligations in any given society, and if instead we look at what Bergson calls 'the whole of obligation' (MR 995/25), then we would see that obedience to obligation is almost natural. Obligations, that is, customs, arise because of the natural need an individual has for the stability that a society can give (MR 9867/15). As a result of this natural need, society 'inculcates' habits of obedience in the individual (MR 1057/97). And, habituation means that obedience to the whole of obligation is, in fact, for the individual, effortless (MR 990/19). The psychological error then consists in externalizing an exceptional experience - which Bergson calls 'resistance to the resistances' - into a moral theory. Duty becomes severe and inflexible. But there is more to this error. Philosophers - and again Bergson has Kant in mind - 'believe that they can resolve obligation into rational elements' (MR 992/22). In the experience of resistance to the resistances, the individual has an illicit desire. And, since the individual is intelligent, the individual will use intelligence, a 'rational method', to act on itself. According to Bergson, what is happening here is that the rational method is merely restoring the force of the original tendency to obey the whole of obligation that society has inculcated into the individual. But the tendency is one thing, the rational method is another (MR 993/22). The success of the rational method, however, gives us the illusion that the force with which an individual obeys any particular obligation comes from reason, that is, from the idea or representation, or better still, from the formula of the obligation. But it is this rationalization of the force of closed morality into formulas that really leads to the need to differentiate between the closed and the open morality. The open morality, for Bergson, is identical with the dynamic religion, with mysticism. Here too we have a force. This second force is what Bergson calls 'the impetus of love' (elan d'amour) (MR 1057/96). Here too we must speak of an experience, but one that is different from the experience of resistance to the resistances. When a mystic has the experience of the impetus of love, this mystic, according to Bergson, undergoes a specific emotion and specific images (MR 1170/229).9 Both the emotions and the images can, indeed, must, be explicated into actions and representations. But this process of explication can be extended. The representations that the mystic explicates

Appendix I


can be further explicated into formulas, for example, the formula of each person being deserving of respect and dignity. These formulas, which are the expression of creation and love, are now able to be mixed with the formulas that aim solely to insure the stability of any given society. Since we are now speaking only of formulas, this mixture of creation and cohesion is found on, as Bergson says, 'the plane of intelligence'; the two forces now are mixed together, in other words, in reason. As before, where the rational method used in the experience of resistance to the resistances comes to explain force of obedience, here in the mystical experience of the impetus of love, the formulas come to explain the force of creation. A reversal has taken place. The very forces which, Bergson says, 'are not strictly and exclusively moral' (MR 1056/96) that have generated the formulas are instead now being explained by the formulas. We can see the difficulty that rational moral theories encounter. How could 'some representation of intelligence have the power to train the will'? How could 'an idea demand categorically its own realization'? As Bergson says, 'Re-establish the duality [offerees], the difficulties vanish' (MR 1057/96). Before we proceed to the next section, let me summarize what we have seen so far. In Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion., there are four objectives, each one corresponding to one of the book's four chapters. There are three theoretical objectives. Corresponding to chapter one, there is the theoretical objective of righting the relation between intelligence or reason and the forces of morality. Again, as Bergson says, 'Re-establish the original duality [offerees], the difficulties [found in intellectualist or rationalistic moral theories] vanish' (MR 1057/96). Corresponding to chapter two, there is the theoretical objective of explaining why the only beings with intelligence believe in irrational things. It is intelligence itself that brings about this belief since intelligence unbalances the individual. Corresponding to chapter three, there is the theoretical objective of differentiating between two unbalanced psychological states, between mystical states and morbid states. The difference is that mystical states result in action, while the morbid ones do not. Then, corresponding to the 'Final Remarks', we saw the practical objective, which consists in finding a method to repress the war-instinct. We shall now turn to a more thorough investigation of these 'Final Remarks' concerning the repression of the war-instinct.

We can only 'repress' or 'turn aside' the 'war-instinct', and not abolish it because, as for Nietzsche,10 for Bergson, war is natural (MR 1023/57, 1217/ 284), 'inevitable' (MR 1210/276), even normal (MR 1001/31). War is natural

humans differ from other animal species. But. two different individuals who are quarreling with one another will feel the pressure of their habits and the pressure of society . One human community must expand geographically because the tools . is the necessary condition of war. And this instinct means that we must form ourselves into small communities (tribes.to find a way to adjudicate the dispute (MR 1220/287). humanity has necessarily the 'property' of its instruments. gives us the origin of war. Therefore. like the closed society of the hymenoptera. again. As Bergson stresses. 'means discipline. then it means that each small community. insofar as they are partly willed by nature. which exists independently of any motivation (MR 1220/288). we might say that sociability and unsociability at once take place. however. cohesion. 1209/275). Thus it is impossible that humanity should renounce 'these habits of life' (MR 1221/293). under certain conditions. absolute authority of the chief. will take what it needs and protect itself from any other small community that threatens it. there is no inescapable historical law. While. In any case. pertain to biology on this particular point'. Yet.they will experience the 'resistance to the resistances' . it is 'the egoism of the tribe' (MR 1211/277). So. if human communities had remained small (MR 1023/57. war would have not necessarily broken out. aim at selfpreservation and therefore command disinterestedness imperiously. that is. Closed societies are defined by 'self-centeredness. and the human societies. and therefore isolated from one another. for instance). if communities had remained small and isolated from one another. this instinct for the conservation of the species includes an instinct for the multiplication of individuals. the instinct for the conservation of the species is a warinstinct. on war (MR 1221/293). all of which. war would have remained only 'virtual' (MR 1023/57). We 'construct' or 'invent' tools ourselves.92 The Challenge of Bergsonism because humanity is an animal species like any other. hierarchy. The virtuality of war at this moment does not mean that there are no conflicts. however. EC 613/139). because nature gave humanity a 'tool-making intelligence' (MR 1216/284. For Bergson. At the moment when two communities meet. because closed societies. contact is necessary or essential because of the nature of the tools humans invent. like every other animal species. 'there are biological laws. Yet. the war-spirit' (MR 1216/283). however. property. according to Bergson. For Bergson. conflicts between different individuals within a small closed society break out necessarily. there is a 'radical distinction' between different individuals within one community and different closed societies. Because of the egoism that comes with intelligence. however. for Bergson. for Bergson. While the war-instinct.11 The sufficient condition. is contact between human communities. As we shall see in a moment. we have an instinct for the self-preservation of the species. the war-spirit would have remained virtual.

In contrast to essential wars. Since it is easier to take the tools that are already made than to make them oneself (MR 1217/284). to feed it. we come to a second phase. Without telling us why. but becomes. the war-instinct does not hook itself onto rational motivations of self-preservation. 'the wars and conflicts of today' differ from the essential and accidental kinds of war (MR 1219/286. In accidental wars. At this first phase. for Bergson. we have to think about nations as purely agricultural populations. Thus we now have an over- . so good'. Connected with wounded pride. other lakes on which to use its tools and thereby support its population. Bergson states that an excess (un trop-pleiri) of population occurs. we must say. This contact might be due at first to essential reasons connected with the matter on which the tools work. human communities then clash over the matter on which the tools work (MR 1217/284). 1220/288). although it is originally independent of any motivation. and the sufficient condition for war is fulfilled. in short. certain wars take place out of 'wounded pride. we have the phenomenon where each group compares itself to the other.Appendix I 93 it has invented are intended to do work on specific 'matter' (MR 1217/284). of course. the sword sharp (MR 1217/285). On the other hand. A plot of land or a forest or a lake will inevitably become exhausted. so to speak. the war-instinct 'hooks itself (s'accroche) onto 'rational motivations' (MR 1220/288). accidental wars seem to arise for two reasons. war breaks out. But. Now. no war. Three times Bergson punctuates his description with a claim about there being no war or about war emerging. to keep. according to Bergson. These three terse but emphatic comments allow us to divide the description into three phases. thus one group then experiences wounded pride and vanity. is wounded vanity (MR 1230/300). in order to understand the wars of today. and the population increases parallel to the yield of the soil. Yet. As Bergson says. Two different human communities come in contact. 1217/285). Here. Bergson presents a schema of the conditions that lead to war today (MR 12201/288-9). Bergson calls this kind of war an 'essential war' (MR 1219/286). Following the egoism of the tribe. other forests. there are also what Bergson calls 'accidental wars' (MR 1219/286. On the one hand. certain wars take place in order to prepare and train for essential wars. irrational. Although Bergson does not make this distinction clearly. and the sufficient condition for war is fulfilled. Then this community will inevitably encounter another. they see each other's tools. One group recognizes the superior strength of the other group due to its tools. The wars of today are connected to the industrial character of our civilization (MR 1220/288). thereby forcing a community to seek out other lands. any given nation produces enough food to feed the population. prestige or glory' (MR 1219/286). So. in the case of accidental wars. 'So far. it is rational to support the population.

But. although the excess remain citizens of the nation in which they were born. what has happened. in short. The schema for the wars of today that Bergson has set up resembles the description of what he calls essential war insofar as the war-instinct hooks itself onto the rational motivation to take the matter on which the tools work. One nation employs. but primarily for food. Yet. Here the egoism of the tribe determines not only that the excess population does not want to emigrate but also that other nations do not want the overflow.say. as an outgrowth of modern science and 'the spirit of invention'. the excess 'is condemned to die of hunger . according to Bergson. to go and take what is refused to them. in effect. When the situation in the nation that indirectly employs changes . The contact comes because 'industry will arrange things'. the 'need' for luxuries brings forth war. the rational motivation to acquire food to stop starvation. Bergson says that 'the most serious [among the causes of the wars of today] is over-population' (MR 1221/289). people are not really threatened with dying of hunger. This brings us to the third phase. it is not the case that the matter has exhausted itself and therefore there is a shortage of food. the schema for wars of today differs in two ways from essential wars. The contact. for Bergson. From this need for luxuries. On the other hand. On the one hand. the causes of the wars of today are overpopulation and the need for luxury. does not occur because of emigration. Yet. The result is that the excess population becomes. which really defines the wars of today. . carrying the whole country with them. rather overpopulation causes the shortage and thereby provides the motivation for war. 'internal emigrants'. is that 'people consider that life is not worth living if they cannot have comforts [le confort]. the excess population of another nation. putting the excess population to work. for other nations.94 The Challenge of Bergsonism populated community.then the overpopulated nation takes from the other nation by force. there is a 'need' for luxury. and this fulfils the sufficient condition for war. In the wars of today. 'war can emerge' (MR 1221/289). the wars of today occur because of the way industry arranges things. my emphasis). pleasures [I'amusement]. and the factories produce products to be exchanged with other nations for all kinds of goods. indirectly. So. and luxury [le luxe]' (MR 1221/289). in the third phase. sexual pleasure. Industry puts the excess population to work in factories. In short. these two causes are interconnected through the question of pleasure. as an outgrowth of industry. the demand for certain products declines. Instead. if the nation that is indirectly employing the excess decides not to employ it. in particular. as Bergson says. But. which is contact with another nation.unless they decide. which then leads to unemployment in the overpopulated nation . however. instead of immediately attacking another community in order to take its food. There will be war' (MR 1221/289. Industry has therefore found a way of feeding the excess population.

(MR 1222/290) This instinct for reproduction reinforces Bergson's claim that war is natural and must be controlled in a rational way. which means that sexual pleasure is 'a psychical transposition of a physical stimulus' (MR 1011/ 43). So. Ancient mythology realized this when it coupled the goddess of love with the god of war. The demands must be satisfied and when they are. if there are only differences of degree. It is easy to understand why he calls the sensation 'strong'. This instinct demands that we preserve the species by producing as many individuals as possible. just as there is in other living beings (MR 1022-3/56-7). precisely because the sensation is strong. there is no difference in kind from one sexual act to another. in short. In no other matter [that is. since it is an intense pleasure. in procreation] is it so dangerous to rely upon instinct.Appendix I 95 In relation to overpopulation. The instinct for conserving the species by means of multiplying individuals. one other than overpopulation.12 which tells us that while overpopulation is the most serious cause of war for Bergson. There is in humans an instinct to reproduce. then sexual pleasure is based only on differences of degree. In other words. by multiplying as much as possible. If we let this instinct determine our actions. In fact. to satisfy the most basic of all needs. however. we will find ourselves in a situation of overpopulation and therefore in the threat of people dying of hunger: 'there will be war'. defines the sensation. even 'rationed' (MR 1222/290). Bergson thinks some sort of birth control must be enforced on a national or even international scale in order to attenuate this cause of war (MR 1222/290). 'the demands of the procreative sense are imperious' (MR 1232/302). He also thinks that industry should be arranged to provide enough food. For Bergson. we experience pleasure. is always essentially the same. we must conclude that for Bergson. it . As we all know. Let Venus have her way and she will bring you Mars. If intensity. has another effect. The instinct for conserving the species is demanding. Bergson calls this sensation of bodily pleasure 'forte mais pauvre'. an obvious fact about human sexuality. sexuality. sexual pleasure is a sensation and not an emotion. As Bergson says. then the pleasure. from one partner to another. it is not the most prevalent cause. Clearly. one partner is better than another insofar as that partner gives a more intense pleasure. he is confident that industry can do this. it is necessary to recall. even as it varies from one partner to another by degrees. These differences of degree can explain our preference for one sexual partner over another. feeding the world's population (MR 1236/306). that is. But. as Bergson does. it is physical and not spiritual. 'strong but impoverished' (MR 1232/ 302).

to our senses. for Bergson. The need for luxuries. the appreciation given by someone else for one's luxuries gives one pleasure. and the sound calls to us. Bergson uses the image of the pendulum to describe this movement from one frenzy back to another.. In this scale. for Bergson. These needs. 'all of our civilization is aphrodisicaF (MR 1232/302). as Bergson says. Yet for a pendulum to swing back and forth. . The sensation is always the same. But to experience pleasure. as we noted in Section I. Yet. there is more to this 'love of pleasure'. the soft bed and the cotton sheets are physically pleasurable. the war instinct has hooked itself onto irrational motivations: the need for luxuries.luxuries that we take for comforts and comforts that we take for conveniences . this need for pleasure that only luxuries can satisfy is a kind of frenzy today. the only natural need is the need to satisfy the demands of the procreative sense. it is pleasurable to love pleasure.. humanity. 'conveniences' (le simple agrement) (MR 1233/302). a shoe. an ascetic ideal had predominated. are artificial or anti-natural. In this ascending scale from conveniences to luxury.96 The Challenge of Bergsonism is 'impoverished'. needs that arise from the love of pleasure. however . If you 'strike' any object . But for Bergson. indeed. having the comfort (le bien-etre) of a soft bed is better. 'at the beginning [of this scale going from conveniences to comforts to luxuries] was vanity' (MR 1233/303). a bed is pleasurable. the frenzy for asceticism of the Middle Ages. comes down to the pleasure of being desired by someone else for one's luxuries (MR 1051/90). Pleasure itself has become the goal or end of sexuality. this frenzy was a 'reaction' to another frenzy. one must attract a partner. Despite the impoverishment of the sensation and because of its strength. As Bergson says.of course. Here already you had frenzy' (MR 1229/298). with exhaustion. Having the convenience of.leads to war. Of course. we must find ways of experiencing pleasure. an odour. has taken sexual pleasure as a fundamental 'musical note'. and we have quoted this passage before.you hear the 'sound' of sex. Pride too is at the beginning of this scale. If we love pleasure. Thus. Again. at least. the act always ends in the same way. as we have already noted. a room . say. All that we love is pleasure. one must be 'sociable'. Bergson calls this sound of sex an obsession (MR 1232/302). As he says. 'Throughout the Middle Ages. cotton sheets is even more pleasurable.13 For Bergson. in the wars of today. All the pleasure in the loving of pleasure. but having the luxury (le luxe) of. and if we must experience pleasure. according to Bergson. we see developing an ascending scale of needs. from which it has made emerge a constantly growing number of harmonics and timbres (MR 1232/302). therefore. In this case. say. it is necessary to have. it must be suspended from a point. which means that in 'our civilization' the object of love is not a person or God or all things or something created like a child. Thus Bergson claims that it is not impossible that . since it makes us imagine the sexual act.

Nature has taken the minutest precautions in order to insure the conservation of the species through the multiplication of individuals. Surely. today. if industry were organized to increase 'leisure for something other than the so-called pleasures. like our moon. This new asceticism would allow humanity to develop spiritually. the Renaissance and the industrial impetus . The planet. if we restricted ourselves to the natural function of procreation like other animal species. according to Bergson. How is any frenzy possible? We must return to the procreative sense. The Christian ideal is like a planet revolving. revolved: the frenzy for asceticism turned into the frenzy for sexual pleasure. that of asceticism.Appendix I 97 there was a 'kinship' among the three reactions . now showing one side.. nature intended that humans should procreate endlessly. Here Bergson changes his image. It has not therefore foreseen that. and that humans could abstain from reaping without renouncing the pleasure of sowing. intelligence would discover immediately the means of cutting the sexual act off from its consequences. Yet. the end being the multiplication of individuals in order to conserve the species. something has happened to this means-end relation. It might just as well turn back. everything seems to revolve around sex. Bergson describes the transition from the closed morality to the open morality: . these two faces of the ascetic ideal are indeed frenzies. But. to misdirect nature? In chapter one of The Two Sources. there are numerous cases where humanity has deceived [a trompe] nature. which is so knowing and yet so naive. The direction (sens) of sexuality has changed from its natural direction. humans would engage in the sexual act and be done with it. since. like all the other living beings. which an ill-directed industry has put within the reach of all'. Thus. Mysticism might be able to turn the war-spirit aside. If we restricted ourselves in this way. by giving us intelligence. III. in other words. (MR 1022-3/56-7. THE TRUMPERY OF NATURE Bergson thinks that 'we would finish with these demands [of the procreative sense] quickly if we held ourselves to nature' (MR 1232/302). now the other. How is it possible to go in the opposite direction from nature. the sexual act would be a means to an end. my emphasis) .against 'the form taken until then by the Christian ideal' (MR 1238/308). The frenzy for the complications of an aphrodisical civilization might turn back into a frenzy for a simpler life..the Reformation. humanity might swing back to the other frenzy.

for Bergson. but that between group and group. pleasure is not used. intelligence has found a way of'cutting off the means . Now we can understand the impoverishment of the sexual sensation. we were always to be prepared for attack or defense. (MR 1023/57. as Bergson says. Not of course that nature designed war for war's sake.the sexual act and its pleasure . since its function is to manufacture tools. It has found a way of turning Venus's love into an end in itself. And as soon as I reflect. Those great leaders of humanity drawing humans after them. Love becomes the love of pleasure in and of itself. seemed indeed thereby to have placed themselves again in the current of the vital impetus . Intelligence misdirects or trumps nature. who have broken down the gates of the city. The love that I have for one person. [and] re-open what was closed.. however. because intelligence has this function. As we have already seen. Bergson. This side of the deception is a superficial repetition of the same. pleasure has no direction. of everything. as soon as I think. We saw that its impoverishment was due to the fact that the variety of sexual pleasures amounted to nothing more than differences of degree.14 can be repeated to everything. The very same misdirection allows humanity to open and go against nature by going either in the direction (sens) of pleasure for its own sake or in the direction (sens) of the love of all beings.. and of which we can still perceive the plan in the innate and fundamental tendencies of modern humanity. But. there should be virtual hostility. not a superficial repetition but a deep repetition of difference. aphrodisia and asceticism.98 The Challenge of Bergsonism The 'misdirection' (la tromperie) that intelligence plays on nature allows us to enjoy the pleasure of sex without producing children. I think of myself. The form of love can be repeated. which we noted above. The point suspending the pendulum of the two . Those societies whose design was pre-formed in the original structure of the human soul. my emphasis) Nature aims only at the closed. since the 'trumpery' that intelligence plays on nature separates the sexual act from its natural goal. continuing the extract quoted above says: It is in a wholly other direction [sens] that humans misdirect [trompe] nature when they extend social solidarity into human fraternity. the two frenzies of history. But we can see already the point from which these two frenzies are suspended: the repeatability of the form. in another way.from its natural goal. the pleasure creates nothing. but humans mislead nature nevertheless. it must be able to reflect (MR 1158/210). required that the group be closely united. These two 'misdirecting' senses become. like Madame de Sevigne's love for her daughter. Pleasure has no goal. This would be repetition not of the same. In other words.

a 'lack' (MR 1155/211). 'we have no choice' (MR 1008/39). it is always already memorized. formalized. Although the derivation is unclear. mystical experience re-ascends to the impetus of life itself. IV. the past returns and the future is already seen. But this disequilibrium means that the returning form is freed from the present.15 Reflection (and not a reflex). We are going to reconstruct Bergsonian mystical experience in terms of two sides: emotion or image. like the two frenzies. the power of the vital impetus. Consequently. 1118/168). There is an 'interval' (MR 1005/37) between the present and the future.this defines his 'superior empiricism' . as in 'im-pli-cation'.16 The form and sense can be hooked or unhooked. it generates 'dynamic religion'. MR 1102/149. the word 'trompe' is associated with infidelity. even to unnatural or irrational objects. it goes back up above the turn in experience. calls the 'law of the twofold frenzy'). without which there would be no open morality (MR 1002/33). then the self is always already doubled. Thus the form of what returns is iterable or. perfidy.Appendix I 99 frenzies is auto-affection. It is self-imitation (cf. or 'transferable' from one object to another. The paradox is that if the self can be imitated. we must ask: what does the hooking and unhooking? In Bergson. is empirical. For Bergson. there is a loss of confidence (as we have seen) in self-reflection. the primitive force. Yet.puts an interval between the stimulus and reaction.if we are to understand what is original.the procreative sense is imperious . 'transformable'. in the 'Final Remarks'. meaning that it can be experienced (MR 1073/115).or the force of religion or intuition or emotion . There is a disjunction here between the two sides because . Thanks to the hesitation. 'transfigurable'. artifice and artificial. MR 990/19). 'corn-plication' and 'sim-pli-fication' . folded. We might even say that it is always already art. as Bergson would say. Or. One is no longer confident that what returns from the past into the present will go in the right direction (sens). There are always and only two forces: the force of nature or instinct or habit . but the sense [Sinn] is even more so'. this fold . Hence his interest in mystical experience. are reciprocally implicated in the elan vital. there is a hesitation (cf.creative emotion. But these two forces. re-folded. Unlike the abstract concept of the will to live.'pli'. depression. with Nietzsche in mind. We cannot but think of Nietzsche: 'the form is fluid. there is a kind of imbalance or disequilibrium between the past and the future (which explains what Bergson. MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE: EMOTION AND IMAGE Always for Bergson . imitated. de-folded. we must seek out 'exceptional experiences' (MR 1111/161). There is a 'deficit' (MR 1159/210). If self-imitation is fundamental. Here we have what must be called 'the paradox of the double'. 'imaged'. as Bergson stresses.

The . what precisely in the mystic is out of balance? We can answer this question only if we return to the individual in a closed society. if it be intense enough. The first side of the mystical experience therefore is the feeling or emotion that disturbs well-being.17 The other side of the mystical experience is an image. The idea is clear: one feels happy when the moral obligations are in balance with egoism. the reciprocal conditioning between individual and society (MR 1170/230) . (b) the tests. Bergson gives us three different ways to construe the reciprocal implication: (a) the voice. thereby cancelling each other out (MR 1024/58).100 The Challenge of Bergsonism Bergson himself puts one there: 'When the darkest depths of the soul are stirred. the form of an image or an emotion' (MR 1170/229. When this balance of the closed society is disturbed . what rises to the surface and attains consciousness takes on there. But. the form of the mystical experience requires this voice. There is a lack of well-being 'at the times when one's customary maxims of conduct look to be insufficient' (MR 1004/34). and (c) the detour.we stop the circular movement. there is an experience of imbalance or disequilibrium. in Section I. since Bergson stresses that the emotion that opens the mystical experience is 'inexpressible' (MR 1189/252. which one undergoes if the various resistances 'interfere' with one another. 'we run a risk in disturbing the normal relations between the conscious and the unconscious. An individual in a closed society lives in a feeling of 'well-being' (bien-etre). Bergson claims that this feeling of well-being resembles pleasure rather than joy (MR 1018/51). my emphasis).then we are about to enter the mystical experience. We must not be astonished therefore if nervous disturbances at times accompany mysticism' (MR 1170/229). These times (a des heures) of emotional disturbance are the beginning of mysticism. In both. As Bergson says. FIRST WAY OF CONSTRUING THE 'RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION' BETWEEN EMOTION AND IMAGE: THE VOICE We have already seen. There is a 'reciprocal implication' between emotion and image that defines the form of the mystical experience. that Bergson aims to distinguish mystical experience from the morbid psychological states that afflict the mentally ill. This disjunction refers to what Bergson himself calls the 'reciprocal implication of the vital impetus' (elan vital) (MR 1072/115). Nevertheless. in contrast to a lunatic. But even before the mystic undergoes an image. 1013/46). We might even say that in general the mystical experience is the mystery of the voice. she18 experiences 'a call' (un appel) (MR 1003/34) or a 'voice' (MR 1170/230). The reason we associate mystics with those who suffer from mental illness is that both undergo 'abnormal psychological states' (MR 1169/228).

'then comes a boundless joy. 'is indifferent to its verbal expression. as Bergson says. then this sensing of the presence is memory. But the sensing of the presence. that is. MR 1011/43). for Bergson. silent. of the silent voice. must be 'tacit' (MR 1004/35) or 'silent' (MR 1173/232). The result of this image is that the mystic has detached herself from life.Appendix I 101 emotion. That there are images in the experience is why Bergson (quoting the great mystics) warns that the images may be hallucinations (MR 1170/229).has transformed itself into an image. we must say that this silent voice is a non-vocalized voice. into. SECOND WAY OF CONSTRUING THE 'RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION' BETWEEN EMOTION AND IMAGE: THE TESTS The Bergsonian mystical experience therefore is an experience of the emotion joy. brings forth images.the vibration. This detachment from life means that the mystic is now in God (MR 1170-1/230).19 By means of listening to this voice (which is in the mystic). Bergson speaks of'silent conversations' (des entretiens silencieux) (MR 1173/233). we might say. the detachment from life means attachment to God. in Bergson. in the mystical experience the normal relations between consciousness (the inside) and the unconscious (the outside) are disturbed. Bergson stresses that the sensing or divination of the presence is not a direct perception (MR 1170/230). 1172/232).21 Mysticism. being an emotion. all-absorbing ecstasy or an enthralling rapture' (MR 1170/230). he says that dynamic religion supports humans not by 'imaginative representations' (MR 1127/179). To define it in the most minimal way. and not of well-being or pleasure. a 'symbolic vision' (MR 1170/230. it is an elevation of the soul that would be able to do without speech' (MR 1146/ 201). into a memory-image. that is. The mystical experience is an internal dialogue (auto-affection). also MR 1125/176) found not out in nature but in me:20 God in me. the invisible and silent presence . deep within the chrysalis that is me or the base of the memory cone with its purified memories . As Bergson says. is 'entirely interior' (MR 1127/179) and yet this presence comes from 'the outside' of consciousness (cf. By means of memory. the 'auscultation'. MR 1110/159. however. If. As we noted in the previous paragraph. he says that prayer in dynamic religion. The voice therefore. the sensing of the presence is not perception and not the fabulation function. which means that the voice is internal. Indeed. moreover. is non-linguistic. The joy comes from the pure con- . the voice. the 'apperception' of it (MR 1172/232). not by the voluntary hallucinations of static religion. in mysticism. the mystic 'senses [sent] an indefinable presence or divines [devine]' it (MR 1170/230).22 we might say. This presence is at first an 'invisible presence' (cf. In addition.

on her human will. we must keep in mind that this phrase implies that the vision is a kind of star in the night sky. If the mystic acted.102 The Challenge of Bergsonism templation of the symbolic vision. her action would be based only on herself. Mysticism. We must understand these tests as a kind of ascesis. then the mystic will move forward into complete mysticism. In any case. The vision has faded and the mystic finds herself alone. a kind of asceticism. even though there is no longer any 'distance' between thought and the object of thought. The union then is not 'total' and therefore not 'definitive' (MR 1171/230). 'mysticism calls forth asceticism' (MR 1238/308). The mystic therefore 'eliminates' . the mystic submits herself. But he tells us that. For Bergson. each part of herself'to the hardest tests' (aux plus dures epreuves). But if the mystic's joy relinquishes its space in the mystic's soul to anxiety (inquietude). any mysticism that stops here. Bergson says that we cannot analyse this final preparation since the mystics themselves have barely caught a glimpse of it (MR 1171/231). Indeed. thereby forcing the vision into the past. Now. of course. lost in the shadow (MR 1171/231). as it did in ancient Greek mysticism and in the eastern mysticisms. thereby displacing the joy that comes with the vision. Here Bergson adopts St John of the Cross's phrase: 'the darkest night'. If the mystic acted. and we have already quoted this passage earlier. What is still not absorbed in God is the mystic's will. even though there is no longer a 'radical separation' between the one who loves and the one who is beloved. and this is the final preparation for action. Thus Bergson does not provide a detailed description. He says this because the darkest night brings on the 'definitive phase' of complete mysticism. This exteriority of the will and action in relation to God brings forth anxiety and agitation. in any case most instructive. That the vision does not endure means that it fades into the past. for Bergson. Here we can see that the two reasons for anxiety are connected. in this final preparation. Why does anxiety occur? Bergson gives two reasons. in Christian mysticism' (MR 1171/231).23 The second reason consists in the fact that the mystic's life is not yet divine. desolate. according to Bergson. in this experience the pendulum is swinging back. that 'rests' (MR 1171/230) in contemplation remains 'incomplete mysticism' (MR 1166/225). it is as if the vision died (and the mystic herself is indeed detached from life). Bergson says that the idea of the darkest night is 'perhaps what there is most significant. Even though the union with God is 'close' (etroite). there is still something of the mystic that remains 'outside' the union. when this feeling of anxiety has grown to the point that it resides everywhere in the mystic. then this anxiety becomes 'the impetus' (elan) for the mystic to move forward beyond contemplation. The first reason for the mystic's anxiety is that the vision does not endure (MR 1170/230). calls for a simpler life: no luxuries. As Bergson says in the 'Final Remarks'. she would be reattaching herself to life and moving forward into the future. mysticism could stop here.

By means of the tests of herself. my emphasis). 1172/232. she is attached to life but God is in her (MR 11121 232). now. from any obstacle she confronts. the word that has no rejoinder' (MR 1172/232). The tests . The first two ways also chart a movement of inside and outside. she is the one who is sovereign. The mystic now is able to follow the example. it fades into the past and becomes a memory. 1169/228). promises such as were out of the question when the species was constituted' (MR 1023/58). even though she is elevated. 'for the soul there is a superabundance of life. As Bergson says. Before turning to the third way of construing the 'reciprocal implication' between emotion and image in the Bergsonian mystical experience.Appendix I 103 everything from her substance that 'God cannot use' (MR 1172/231-2. So far. beyond the good and evil of any closed society. But how? The image in the vision becomes an example and that is why Bergson speaks of the vision being 'symbolical'. MR 1025/59). or rather an acquired innocence. The 'definitive consequence' of the tests is that the mystic becomes a 'genius of the will' (MR 1023/58. In the first way the voice had started out as being internal to the mystic. God needs to be brought into the mystic's will. But the mystic also feels anxiety insofar as her will is external to the union with God experienced in the vision. but as it became a vision the mystic unifies herself into the vision. thereby God acts in . Even though the mystic's actions now 'flow from a spring [source] which is the very impetus of life' (MR 1172/232). the mystic does not feel the deprivation of what she has eliminated (cf. the decisive act. Instead. This fading of the vision causes the feeling of anxiety in the mystic. we saw the feeling of disturbed well-being transform itself into the joy.24 But insofar as they eliminate and simplify. I am going to summarize what we have seen in the first two. 'An innate science. Between the two emotions is the tacit voice that expresses an invisible presence calling to the mystic. This voice then transforms itself into a vision. While in contemplation. the mystic's soul was attached to God. suggests to her at the first blow the useful procedure. As Bergson says. which eventually transforms itself into humility. the tests are precisely tests of the will (MR 1172/231). through which the mystic experiences joy. She is the one who is allowed to make promises. the joy she felt in the contemplation of the symbolic vision has become 'great humility' (MR 1173/232). 'for the future of the species. she feels no pride or vanity. The mystic obtains from matter.25 The mystic has 'superior good sense' (MR 1169/228). in a word. There is a boundless impetus. she was in God. There is an irresistible impulse that hurls it into the most vast enterprises' (MR 1172/232).mystical asceticism .achieve this. What links the first two ways is the fact that the vision does not endure. The second way starts out with the recognition that the mystic's will is external to the union. In the first way. we have charted the transformation of both emotions and images. after the tests. into action.

this emotion varies only by degrees. The love that forms a side of the mystical experience is not the love of one's country. it still produces something new. The distinction is simple.2f> By the time of Creative Evolution (1907) Bergson criticizes the idea of creation ex nihilo (EC 747/298). they are acts of love. Now. although emotion is a 'feeling' (sentiment) or a 'manifestation of sensibility'. there are emotions. concerned with creative emotion. of all things in fact (MR 1006-7/38). If we ascend from our family to the nation. we are concerned with the emotion of love. This criticism means that creation is only ever for Bergson replacement (EC 732-3/2810) or. indeed. unique of its kind. (MR 1009/40-1) This comment means that the emotions created by the musical design are not . as he did throughout his career. like pleasure. Bergson compares mystical love to the emotion expressed in music. Here we have a difference in kind between patriotism and mystical love. Bergson had suggested that music is a creation ex nihilo. of the melody or symphony.104 The Challenge of Bergsonism the mystic's action. Indeed. in fact. of course. it generates representations. On the other hand. one's fellow citizens. according to Bergson. As he says in The Two Sources. Yet the mystic's love is a love of all humanity. new feelings created by that music and within that music. A supra-intellectual emotion comes temporally before representations. that come temporally after representations or sensation. This is why Bergson calls it creative. indeed. In an early text. based on nothing but itself. Although creation is repetition in Bergson. an 'affective state' (MR 1011/43). This example and this love bring us to the third way. repetition. the sensation causes the emotion. from the period of Matter and Memory. They have not therefore been extracted from life by art. new feelings that are denned and delimited by the very design. we might say. new feelings adhere [adherent} to each new musical work. We also saw in Chapter Three that Bergson in The Two Sources distinguishes between creative or supraintellectual emotions and infra-intellectual emotions. This difference in kind implies that mystical love is a genuine origin. But what are these acts? According to Bergson. That emotion is not sensation means that it is not a 'psychical transposition of a physical stimulus'. or one's family. in the mystical experience we are. THIRD WAY OF CONSTRUING THE 'RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION' BETWEEN EMOTION AND IMAGE: THE DETOUR We have already seen that Bergson separates emotion from sensation.

Yet. Being new and separated by the dative relation (the preposition 'a') from the elementary feelings. we do not have creation out of nothing. But Bergson not only speaks of the mountain. it was created in the Middle Ages (MR 101/32). from all time. This emotion sprang from the soul of Rousseau. ''qui lui etaient adherents''. contiguous with the sensation. In order to define this relation. Again. if the emotion were not some sort of repetition. At this moment. 's'accrochdt a' . soldered to it. which remained however contiguous and as it were soldered to it [y: to desire]. Rousseau would not have been able to put the emotion in circulation and allow it to become well known. neighbours [voisins] of the sensation. that is. to communicate [communiquer a] to those who were contemplating [contemplaient] it certain feelings [sentiments] comparable to sensations and which were in effect adherent to it [qui lui etaient adherents]' (MR 1009/41). which are themselves neighbours of the sensation of seeing the mountain. Bergson says. There is. we must say duplicates or repeats . This distinct yet contiguous emotion would be love and not desire. this emotion cannot be a mere copy. 'someone suddenly thought of absorbing [I'on s'avisa d'absorber] . participating simultaneously in feeling and sensation' (MR 1010/42). desire. and yet distinct from it. which stimulates the procreative sense of men. Bergson continues: 'But [Jean-Jacques] Rousseau has created. 'Rousseau's emotion'. there has been the sensation of woman. however. Bergson claims that 'romantic love' has a date. in relation to the mountain. the emotion 'hooks itself onto' (s'accrochdt a) the mountain because 'the elementary feelings. that is. We can see with this word 'contemplation' we are very close to the mystical experience. from always. he also speaks of woman: 'from all time woman must have inspired in [inspire a] man an inclination distinct from desire. Nevertheless. the relation between desire and emotion.another emotion and another representation. in other words. this is a creative emotion. Indeed. a new and original emotion' (MR 1009/41). they are not caused by nature. sensation and love reversed itself. Here we return to the question of sexuality. the emotion here is caused by the representation of the mountain. Yet. which stimulates. there is an emotion. joy and not pleasure. in relation to it [a propos d'elle. provoked directly by the mountain came to be harmonized [s'accorder] with the new emotion' (MR 1009/41).'a propos d'elle'. Bergson speaks first of all of the emotion felt in the face of a mountain: 'Thus the mountain has been able. the pendulum swung. la montagne]. Yet. participating in it. we are very close to the mystical experience since we have a new emotion. Bergson claims. it is not yet a creative emotion. Bergson is saying that. Although the emotion was there from all time (de tout temps').Appendix I 105 mere copies of emotions found already in nature. 'communiquer a'. some relation between creative emotions and the emotions that nature has already caused.

which we felt might completely pervade us later. someone got the idea that love was vaster than sex. the word. stirring into life within us. Bergson says that the object is too vast (MR 1005/36). If we desire. Because the mystic has no representation of all of humanity that could be copied.27 Bergson is speaking of the love of all humanity. this personality is outlined from the day we have adopted a model. As a matter of fact. present and future. and to which we wished to attach ourselves for the time being. It is only because the mystic cannot represent the object of her love that the love can be creative. to the depth of what we see: fidelity. since it would exclude other people (and therefore include a kind of hatred [MR 1007/39]). is: a personality brought up from the depths of the soul into the light of consciousness. indeed sexual pleasure with another individual. was no longer an end in itself but had become a means to an end. Yet the love Bergson is describing in the mystical experience is more than the love of a man for a woman (or vice versa). it can create only by means of what Bergson calls a 'detour' (MR 1002/33). It is found in chapter one of the The Two Sources. is the word whose echo we have heard within ourselves. he distinguishes between pleasure and love by means of vanity. as the disciple does to the master. we err in relation to the surface of what we see: the face of the beloved is not what it seems due to adornments. pleasure had a use in the love of all things. pleasure. If we love. which we shall make our own. This heterosexual love would still be closed. plants and all nature (MR 1006-7/38). the desire to resemble. but also animals. At this moment.106 The Challenge of Bergsonism natural love into a feeling that is somehow supernatural. At this moment (and we have already noted the importance of the Middle Ages for Bergson. her love would only copy the representation. into the religious emotion that Christianity had created and launched into the world' (MR 1010/ 42). Bergson calls this reversal or repetition or duplication of pleasure and love a 'transfiguration' (MR 1010/42). that sex was included in love as a part in relation to the whole. its ascetic ideal). The detour. the emotion would only be infra-intellectual. since it includes not just all humanity. What is this detour? We come now to the most crucial description of the 'reciprocal implication' of emotion and image. Between the two there are different kinds of illusions of love. But the object of this love cannot be represented. If she could represent the object of her love. which is ideally the generator of a form to be taken. (MR 1004/35) Thus. past. is already resemblance. the personality that we are to become or to which we aspire is outlined . Indeed. Bergson says. we err in relation to what we expect of love.

according to Bergson. something or someone singular. it duplicates that which is to be doubled. The mystic feels the need not just to act in order to save humanity this kind of action would be based on an emotion caused by the representation . in order to search in that point the acceptance or the rejection [of a musical phrase. in other words. but which was in itself something more than music and more than intelligence. a linguistic formula. 'the materials furnished by intelligence first fuse and then solidify again into ideas . where pleasure become joy. This creative repetition happens. Next. In other words. We are again speaking of the paradox of the double. . But it could just as well be something we had to memorize during childhood. It comes from the unconscious 'into' (a) consciousness. that is. It is the precise point where the past turns into the future. the musician was turning back to a point situated outside that plane. . according to Bergson. when the formulas are filled with matter and the matter is animate (MR 1005/36). informed by spirit itself (MR 1014/ 46). the image or vision could become entirely representational or symbolic. (MR 1190/252-3) This is the point where form is transformed. the direction. where one frenzy replaces another. The image .he also speaks of imitation (MR 1003/34) .could indeed be a model. Bergson says that the model might be a 'parent' or a 'friend' that we evoke in thought or that it could be a person whose life story we have heard. more reflectively elaborate than a Beethoven symphony? But through all the labor of arranging. It could even be a mediocre professor mechanically teaching a science that had earlier been created by geniuses (MR 1158/215). selecting.and here we understand again why Bergson in his description of the mystical experience speaks of a symbolic vision . which intelligence doubtless helped to unfold [s'expliciter] into music. like a poem or a prayer. it is the silent voice calling to me like an electric current passing through the telephone wire.Appendix I 107 from the day we have adopted a model. the precise point where memory turns back into life. Because Bergson speaks of resemblance and echo here . that is. Then the desire to resemble is replaced by love. at that point there lurked an indivisible emotion. it creates the form that is to be repeated. this depth is emotion. the inspiration. There is a desire to resemble a model or an example (MR 1003/34) or an image. Memory being turned back into life means that the mystic is going to create a new genus.this relation between personality and image is a duplication or repetition. Bergson again compares this creation to musical composition: What is there more systematically architectonic. But this is a strange repetition since. the depth of the soul has to rise to the surface. the repetition ideally creates the form that is to be taken. rearranging. for example]. carried out on the intellectual plane.

the imitators. in fact. of proportion. The mystic feels a need. At the beginning of Christian mysticism. he presents Joan of Arc as an example of a great Christian mystic28 who separated the form of the experience from the content of spreading Christian faith and dogma (MR 1168/228). We have so far considered only 'the form of the mystical experience'. 'He Himself can be considered as the continuator of the prophets of Israel' (MR 1179/240). the 'origin' of Christianity is 'the Christ' (MR 1178/239). to transform humanity itself. of compensation. had a passion for justice. it is not possible to understand the form without referring to Christianity. too. before 'the Christ'.30 Bergson stresses that the 'beginning' of mysticism. '[the Jewish prophets] raise their protest from the depth of the centuries'.. The image into which the mystic detours is. Much like Nietzsche. We might say that the mystic in Bergson wants to create a superhumanity. The mystic therefore wants to create beings who love to create. Indeed. Bergson himself temporarily distinguishes the form of the experience from its content. the very image of God (MR 1002/33). Here we have equality between different things established by measuring them against a definite third thing. MR 1039/76). because.32 Perhaps. Thus. The cry of injustice helps us understand better the pendulum image. Of course. not open.. it is not even possible to understand the example of Joan of Arc completely without referring to Christianity. he claims that 'the idea of justice must have already taken shape as far back as the days of exchange and barter' (MR 1033/69). Bergson makes us 'recall the tone and accent of the prophets of Israel' (MR 1038/76). and original but incomplete continuators of what the Christ of the Gospels was completely' (MR 1179/240). Justice. 'mysticism and Christianity condition one another indefinitely' (MR 1178/239). the mystic wants to create a 'divine humanity' (MR 1175/235). But he continues. by weighing them in a pendulum device.29 Nevertheless. Bergson's privileging of Joan of Arc explains why we have insisted on using the feminine pronoun when describing the form of the Bergsonian mystical experience. The prophets of Israel provided 'the impetus' (I'elari) for Christian mysticism since they 'had the passion for justice. this protest for justice was for the Jewish people alone. while he distinguishes the form of the experience from its content. demanded [redamerent] it in the name of the God of Israel' (MR 1179/240).31 Yet Joan of Arc.108 The Challenge of Bergsonism of suffering humanity. one of the voices she heard was also the cry of injustice (cf. as God Himself creates (MR 1191-2/ 254-5). has always evoked ideas of equality. in the third chapter of The Two Sources. however. in a scale or balance. As Bergson says. of course. Bergson makes a distinction within justice just as he did within moral obligation. 'the great mystics are indeed. caused by the representation of the human genus. 'Dynamic Religion'. In chapter one of The Two Sources. it was closed. When a 'great injustice has been done and condoned'. Because justice is established in .

we can say that 'ex-pensive' means 'outside of compensation'. The pendulum is always unbalanced. MR 1025/59. or the idea that foreigners. which constantly evokes equality. This sort of democratic society still seeks 'equilibrium. Not even 'the Stoic who was an emperor [that is. The other kind of justice. Now Bergson does not specify these democracies.Appendix I 109 relation to a third thing. absolute justice or charity involves a complete representation only 'at infinity' (MR 1036/74). Bergson calls this first kind of justice 'relative justice' (MR 1035/72).equality measured by a third thing but will extend it into a ratio or proportion (MR 1034/70). In fact. could not give up slavery. But Bergson's concept of absolute justice goes further than equality of rights. The ancient Greeks. arrived at mechanically and always transitory. because he immediately says that many of them allow the inequality of slavery. and the third thing is determined by the society (by the customs of a closed society). towards 'the idea that everyone. Bergson gives the example of Plato's republic but he is speaking of any kind of aristocratic or oligarchic society (MR 1035/71). absolute justice is actually charity. which Bergson calls 'absolute justice'. being barbarians. Marcus Aurelius] considered the possibility of lowering the barrier between the free human and the slave. Here justice has become 'categorical and transcendent' (MR 1039/76). 'the aristocracies tend to merge into democracies' (MR 1037/73). in the literal sense of the word: cams. But when the inequality of class comes to look suspect. Unlike relative justice in which each individual has a measurable value. also MR 1007/38. between the Roman citizen and the barbarian' (MR 1040/77-8). Even democracy. charity is always 'unjust charity'. 'outside of the balance'. does not break free of closed society. 1016/49). It is the love of all humanity. he seems to have ancient Greek democracies in mind (MR 1037/74).33 And even this gift of oneself does not balance the scales. could claim no rights (MR 1040/77). this charity is the essence of mysticism (MR 1238/309). In this sense. insofar as each individual is priceless. were of equal worth and that the community of essence conferred on them the same fundamental rights' (MR 1040/77). According to Bergson. Bergson stresses. 'outside of the weighing'. the step was taken towards universal brotherhood.34 Being essentially unjust. it is for- . This kind of proportional equality allows for orderly societies. like that of the balance held in the hands of ancient justice' (MR 1037/74). cher (cf. Playing on the etymology. insofar as being human. which makes it swing. it remains true to its 'mercantile origins' (MR 1035/71). comes only after Christianity (MR 1040/77). Christian love of the neighbour. Each person is so 'dear' or 'expensive' that justice can be rendered only by giving oneself (MR 1166-7/225). With Christianity. but. Because it cannot be completely defined. He notes that a closed society with a class structure will maintain the same definition of justice . in absolute justice each individual has an incommensurate value (MR 1037/74).

at least in intention. Just as the concept of memory in Matter and Memory was not just psychological but ontological. the only one to transcend. if we must speak of an ethics in Bergson. by negative formulas. as already mentioned. How is it possible to ask for a precise definition of freedom and of equality when the future must lie open to all sorts of progress. Bergson says.I 10 The Challenge of Bergsonism mulated precisely and categorically only by prohibitions. Bergson calls the example that one follows in open morality a 'memory that remained alive' (souvenir reste vivanf) (MR 1060/99). Indeed. It is an archaeology of the originary experience of the reciprocal implication of emotion and image. today? (MR 1215/282)35 Thus Bergson claims that the democracy of the post-medieval period 'is indeed the most distant from nature. 1238/308). while its positive formulas proceed by successive creations (MR 1037/74). CONCLUSION: THE STAR Almost 40 years later. But the connection between Matter and Memory and The Two Sources is deeper still.36 Bergson is a . If The Two Sources is genuinely a book of ethics. The latter is a book of memory. Objections occasioned by the vagueness of the democratic formulas arise from the fact that the original religious character has been misunderstood. In fact. and especially to the creation of new conditions under which it will be possible to have forms of freedom and equality which are impossible of realization. we have alluded to similarities between Nietzsche and Bergson in this investigation.the 'reciprocal implication' of emotion and image . the descriptions of mystical experience in The Two Sources . Again. This way of proceeding is also true of democracy after Christianity. It is a genealogy of forms and forces in order to transform the human genus. the conditions of the "closed society"' (MR 1214/281). we must say that ethics is fundamentally mnemonic. then we must say that this ethics is an 'originary ethics'. it consists in 'a mighty effort in the opposite direction [sens] from nature' (MR 1216/283). It is not an accident that its first line describes a memory. the love that defines the mystical experience in The Two Sources is 'essentially still more metaphysical than moral' (MR 1174/234). The Two Sources is the only published work of Bergson's which mentions Nietzsche's name (MR 1212/278). after the Middle Ages (MR 1040-1/78. Repeatedly. perhaps of conception. We find ourselves again at the trumpery of nature.complete Bergson's description of the movement of the memory cone in Matter and Memory pure memory (emotion) and memory-image (symbolic vision).

But the sinking of the sun in Bergson does not return us to the earth. a shining star (un astre).Appendix I III reverser of Platonism. Bergson's mystical ascetic. The setting of the Platonic sun in Bergson reveals. More than an archaeology. his star-gazer. Bergson's anti-Platonism is an astronomy that looks for other forms of life. His 'Zarathustra' does not descend from his mountain back down to the earth. MR 1175/235). turns his eyes to the heavens (cf. a night-time sky. that sometimes shows one side and sometimes another (cf. . with a point. more than a genealogy. using his 'telescope' of memory. across the grey light. his 'Zoro-aster'. re-ascends. MR 1238/308).

and that certain images . Ordinarily. The Bergsonian 'cogito' implies this original synthesis of the past and the present with a view to the future. it manifests the indivisibility of a change. but remains nevertheless indivisible. nor a coexistence of the past with the present.which is pure succession.is not a series of distinct terms outside of one another. But Bergson reunites the impetus towards the future with the thrust of the past in a unique intuition he calls memory. and 'all . that is. as Bergson notes in chapter four of Matter and Memory. the extension of the past into the present and therefore already memory .can attempt to communicate in order to lead us to that first experience: I endure therefore I am. This duration . If one reflects on it. there is really an original intuition of consciousness. its memory. Memory here is not a particular faculty that is concerned with repeating or reproducing the past in the present. the change is not given all at once. He speaks of 'the interior force that allows being to free itself from the rhythm of the flow of things and to retain in an ever higher degree the past in order to influence ever more deeply the future. translated by Athena V. But rather.APPENDIX II English Translation of Jean Hyppolite's 1949 'Aspects divers de la memoire chez Bergson' (Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson'). and is thereby opposed to invention and creation.in the sense in which Bergson speaks of the mediating images of philosophical intuition . undoubtedly endures. That is. Colman i Bergson repeated several times that his entire philosophy had its source in the intuition of the pure duration. a change that. memory is only conceived of as a faculty of repetition or of reproduction. which is the new sense which Bergson gives to the word 'memory'. it is consciousness itself insofar as this consciousness is creative duration. in the special meaning we give to the word' (MM 355/222). untranslatable exactly into the language of concepts. Time and Free Will. One will note already this truly new meaning of the word 'memory'. as described in his first original work.

Appendix II 113 the possible intensities of memory. In perception. all the degrees of freedom' (MM 355/222). for not having recognized the separations and the reunifications of the ecstases of the past. full duration is able itself to break itself open and give birth to this opposition of a past recognized as such and a present whose axis is titled towards the future. the conservation of our past. if not arbitrary. but of forgetting' (PM 1388/ 153). Now we believe the Bergsonian problem of memory . that is. the philosophies of becoming with those of being. therefore. however. In fact. juxtaposing itself to the present . what comes to the same thing. and the events that have preceded the lesson. or the impetus of consciousness. 'even then. This problem poses itself at the same time as that of the limits of our attention to life. these two questions are interdependent. In these conditions. present and future. as in the philosophy of the Eleatics. The distinction which we make between our present and our past is. as Bergson has often insisted. duration is as substantial as it is change. from which he concludes: 'We will no longer have to give an account of memory [du souvenir]. identical to duration. spirit is distinguished already from matter in that it is. nor is being thrown out outside of time. at least relative to the expanse of the field that our attention to life can embrace. and not solely in his 'special sense' of memory . or. Becoming is not reduced to a dust of successive fading instants. memory. Indeed. and a portion. as large as we will want. It is against the background of forgetfulness that the past can stand out as past. but we must first understand how our indivisible. Bergson tells us that memory does not need to be explained because it is duration itself. Modern philosophies of temporalization have criticized Bergson for making nothing more of the duration than 'cohesion'. allows us to understand that Bergson reconciles.is not just 'why forgetting?' but also 'why the distinction between the past and the present?' We do not make this distinction in the intuition of the indivisibility of our duration. as in Heraclitean philosophy. one can say that the second philosophical work of Bergson . The past adheres to the present without. This memory. does not constitute a particular problem: an attention which could be extended indefinitely would hold under its gaze all the prior sentences with the last sentence of the lesson.Matter and Memory .it extends itself into the present in order to create novelty and the unforeseeable. that of the determinate conditions of the effectiveness of our action in the world.is an . in his first intuition. (PM 1386/151-2) But it is precisely this distinction between the past and the present that constitutes a particularly important problem for us in Bergsonism.in the various senses which Bergson gives to the term. the synthesis of the past and the present in view of the future' (MM 354/220). of what we call our past. Through memory.

In a word.I 14 The Challenge of Bergsonism attempt to raise this problem and resolve it. the transition from Time and Free Will to Matter and Memory and the different points of view in which Bergson places himself in these two works are able to guide us already. not as a distinct representation of the present. in our current history. 'knowledge [savoir] of the past'. In relation to this question. in the special sense that Bergson gives to it. the question of what. (PM 1386-7/152) There would be much to say about this comparison which raises the question of historical duration. It is in this work that the various meanings of the word 'memory' come into view. 'image' or the concrete and actualized memory [souvenir} of an event of my former life. but rather as a representation 'of the continuously present which would also be continuously moving'. I shall efface even from my thoughts all the . in his work. 'Nature'. our present falls back into the past when we stop attributing to it a current interest. In Time and Free Will. of the past that constitutes history. just as in the present of nations: an event belongs to the past.human duration in general. but they all presuppose the first. that is. Matter and Memory is devoted to the problem of the past of the human personality. creative duration.. and has not explicitly studied historical duration . I shall stop up my ears. Bergson discovers duration through an effort of abstraction similar to that of Descartes in the first Meditations. how a certain rupture is possible at the heart of this duration. immediately what is abandoned from the present becomes 'ipso facto' a part of the past. Now. 'has invented a mechanism for canalizing our attention in the direction of the future. Bergson writes. I mean from this part of our history that does not interest our present action' (PM 1388/153). in order to turn it away from the past. incorporates the present or separates itself from that present as now being only historical. As long as its action makes itself felt. only a few indicators. and it enters into history when it no longer directly interests the politics of the day. that is. isolating the soul from the body: 'I shall now close my eyes. It is so in the present of individuals. Bergson adds this remark that allows us to consider how this separation of the present and the past presents itself to him: As soon as this particular attention releases something that it held under its view. We have to understand. But Bergson has not developed this theme. it adheres to the life of the nation and remains present to it. such as 'creative duration'. In contrast. In 'The Perception of Change'. better. memory. however.. 'knowing something [connaissance] from the past'. to the problem of the past's distinction from the present and its connection to the present. there are. after having shown how in principle a rather broad attention would hold its entire past with itself. All these meanings are tied to each other. and can be neglected without the affairs of the country being affected by it.

this dear point of the world. because we live in the world and our freedom itself is an efficacious power only insofar as we can make something of ourselves pass into the exteriority of the matter. Matter and Memory deals with this problem of the insertion of our freedom into material being. which allow us to make our deep ego [mot] explicit. The freedom of this pure interior life resembles the freedom of a beautiful soul because precisely the conditions of the realization of this freedom in the world do not seem to be considered by it. And I also understand how the notion of the interior and the exterior arises. by a rigorous effort of abstraction. After having so severely separated duration from space . The demands of action. but which succeeds in expressing itself only by renouncing a part of itself. (MM 196/47) While Time and Free Will.Appendix II 115 images of corporeal things'. Time and Free Will defined freedom by the undivided totality of our self. there is succession without 'mutual externality'. Matter and Memory raises the question of incarnation. and not from interior duration. 'In our ego [mot].it is indeed necessary to attempt to bring them together again. this centre of action and organ of my presence in the world. but the relationship of this duration to things. In contrast. I see clearly how my body ends up occupying a privileged situation in this whole. outside of the ego. Bergson attempts to isolate pure duration from space and the material things with which it is ordinarily mixed. But this dualism is as untenable as the dualism of the soul and the body. the finitude of the spiritual impetus that we are. 'mutual externality' without succession' (DI 72-3/108). lead to this body. by the complexity of its nervous system. But. is not the growing richness of this perception likely to . we are no longer considering merely pure and undivided duration. in contrast. In Matter and Memory. then the body. there is much more talk of a 'choice' than in Time and Free Will because the material conditions of our realization in the world require certain decisions and certain options. In this work. but which condemn us at the same time to maintaining always a certain gap between oneself and oneself. a growing indetermination in our reactions to the solicitations of the external world. In its widest scope.the interior life from the world . The majority of the criticisms that were made of Bergson's Time and Free Will concerned this separation between duration and the world and the difficulty of conceiving a pure interior life. Matter and Memory refers first to the body as symbolizing. Thus it is in relation to this point that our duration is considered. opens up the essence of a creative duration. This is why Matter and Memory starts from the world. Rimbaud said. this is why the role of the body is central in it. Action is. which is in the beginning nothing other than the distinction of my body from other bodies. And if this be so. In this way.

even the attention of spirit to itself. it solves too many problems. which was far away from the world in Time and Free Will. and of using the determinism of nature to pass through the meshes of the net which this very determinism had spread. which adheres to the mechanisms of the body and which is limited by them. which is necessity itself. This finitude of our spiritual impetus and the necessity of passing through the mechanisms of the body in order to give an efficacious power to our freedom express themselves by this attention to life. from this indetermination as from the true principle.. but which is not powerful enough to forgo its complication. And. an instrument of freedom. becomes here in Matter and Memory a certain indetermination connected to the complexity of an organic system. moreover. Others are possible. Bergson therefore studies spirit as oriented according to its attention to life or on the contrary (this orientation presupposing the reverse . which characterize a certain species. (EC 719/264) The human body is this set of utilized conveniences. (MM 181-2/31) One really sees how this freedom. But before bringing ourselves to this intuition which presupposes a painful effort of spirit in order to seize itself. 'the intuition that is reflection'. this set of obstacles turned aside. By first considering this function. possesses too many functions and resources for it not to be a response to some transcendent demand. and then raise the problem of the being in itself of the past and the past for us. II In Matter and Memory. when Bergson follows the progress of this complexity 'from the monera up to higher vertebrates' (MM 179/28). which is not. do we not see already the thesis of Creative Evolution sketched out: how life was able to obtain from inert material an instrument of freedom? It was a question of creating with matter. then.I 16 The Challenge of Bergsonism symbolize the wider range of indetermination left to the choice of the living being in its conduct with regard to things? Let us start. the only attention to which humans have access. Bergson studies in Matter and Memory the spontaneous functioning of our memory. for Bergson. of making a machine which should triumph over mechanism. which is powerful enough to construct it. and as Valery also says: It has too many properties. we can understand the necessary separation of the past from the present.

(This attention of spirit to itself which Bergson in The Creative Mind calls intuition must not be confused either with the attention to life in its superior forms that provides scientific intelligence. of ready-made memories [souvenirs]. will lead to a deeper reflection. we have constructed (this time voluntarily) an unlimited number of general notions. the very reflection that implies a true turning of spirit back upon itself. but which leads only to dreams or to a contemplation that is still sterile. and spirit becomes capable of doing this spontaneous process again for itself. pushes it to its extreme endpoint in order to fix its results. which intelligence alone cannot achieve. thus becomes the idea of idea. grasped in its work of adapting to the real. But already the first form of reflection appears there. spirit itself. memory plays a primordial role. The idea. one must not compare the work of memory to a mechanical combination of images. deposited somewhere in the brain or . reproducing that process in order to push it up to its extreme ending point or finally as a return of spirit to itself. in actual images which more or less overlap with the situation given in perception. It is. but sense. Sense is really what is revealed to us in Bergson's study of general ideas insofar as they are vital schemas which oscillate between a motor habit. But these images are actively created or reproduced. sense. which. and a discrimination of individual nuances. The memory [memoire] about which Bergson is speaking. by means of an effort of reflection upon this very process. But from genera so sketched out mechanically by habit we have passed. to the general ideal of genus. and when that idea has been constituted once. applied to language. or with this abandonment of spirit to the past. at a certain level corresponding to the demands of the action and of the question posed.) In this spontaneous functioning of spirit guided by its attention to life and to the world. is. the one which. which really presupposes a detachment. But it is spirit before its reflection on itself. as we said. taking up the spontaneous operation. Memory is not merely the mechanical reproduction of the past. Reflection only appears later. an identical response to different situations. as well as knowledge. Bergson will show how this effort of intelligence. as an extension of the spontaneous process.Appendix II 117 orientation) spirit as slipping away from this attention and escaping into dreams. (MM 301/ 161) In Creative Evolution. but intuition 'which is reflection' can. Memory always carries itself completely towards the present in order then to make itself explicit. It is a supple memory which spontaneously contracts itself or develops itself according to the demands of adapting to the world.in a pre-reflective stage which is first the object of his study. spontaneously formed as a vital schema. for Bergson.

which. 'It is the whole of memory'. its suppleness. Living memory is stretched out towards the situation to be interpreted. before distinguishing with Bergson between the image memory [memoire] (which gives us an original representation of the past) and habit memory [memoire] (which presents in a present corporeal mechanism the accumulated results of past efforts). and again. at each mental tone. its contraction down to the point of action. In contrast. We are thus led to interpret the past in Bergson as a set of images which are given ready-made in an unconscious . But. the validity of its hypotheses. which is spontaneous intelligence. would come to complete the given situation. memory is given in its completeness. the functioning of spirit would be comparable to that of a machine. is as outlined. and it is memory which precedes the situation. in the etymological sense of the word. or its indefinite dilation up to dreaming. writes Bergson. Perhaps it is important to describe this work of a supple memory. memory [memoire] carries sense. but it simplifies or complicates itself according to the level that it chooses in order to accomplish its evolutions' (MM 250/1045). 'in the effort of attention. projects. The famous image of the cone thus only symbolizes the possible double movement of spirit. at each level. and the double direction. this distinction of the self with itself [de soi avec soi] which the opposition between the past and the present translates and which then the memory [souvenir] that has become actual in an image and the corporeal habit express. because by starting with it we neglect too much the movement of this memory which is recognition at all stages (that is. which is the sense of the present by means of the knowledge of the past. contrasts with the rigidity of every mechanism. by starting from this memory. through the situation. Before considering this knowledge of the past as such and its sig- . which is the discovery of the sense of given situations). In this last case. since memory is always present'. do not seem to us to correspond absolutely to his conception of living memory [memoire]. This famous distinction. despite certain expressions in Bergson. we can understand the dissociation required by action between a knowledge [savoir] of the past as such and a precise adaptation to the present which results in an actual process or in a gesture of the body. as complex as is imaginable. with its own experience. which moulds itself onto the situation and informs it with its own knowledge. its ability to dilate and contract. What then needs to be explained on the basis of the attention to life is this immanent distinction by which the 'me' [moi] of the past is opposed to the 'me' of the present at the same time as it collaborates with the 'me' of the past. In the first case. 'that passes over into each of these circuits. confirming. spirit is always concerned in its entirety. with which everyone always starts. has perhaps distorted the study of Bergson a little. on the contrary. which are.I 18 The Challenge of Bergsonism in the unconscious. the direction that leads back towards the ecstasis of the past and the direction that leads to the ecstasis of gesture.

This memory responds to the present situation by occupying a certain mental level without dividing itself. We are now going to consider the double direction about which we have spoken. on the one hand.Appendix II 119 nificance. let us take note of the double process that Bergson speaks of with respect to the cone. . by which it orients itself toward the current situation in order to present to it that side of itself which is most useful. the complete memory responds to the call of a present state by two simultaneous movements. which is why Bergson says the following: In other words. In fact. it unwinds a series of moments of which each is the equivalent of the preceding moment and can be deduced from it. an unfolding of this or that past situation which serves to interpret the present. it also responds by distinguishing in itself. because. to an actual multiplicity. at every possible stage. in the totality given at this level. while matter only repeats it. the ecstasis of the past and that of the present. But a being which evolves. These are only. it is because it repeats the past constantly. subject to necessity. as he himself says. more or less freely. that of translation by which it carries itself in its entirety to the experience and thus contracts more or less without itself dividing itself in view of the action. a situation comparable to the present situation. (MM 307-8/168-9) Let us not moreover be duped by these mechanical and geometrical metaphors which Bergson makes use of here. that of the image. but one sole personal past which we can divide. But there is also. the contraction or the expansion by which consciousness narrows or widens the development of its content.. Ill Let us first start with this passage which seems to us essential and which shows us why spirit represents to itself the past. creates something new every moment. it is not the case that there are some memories [des souvenirs]. There is. that of knowledge [satwr]. This unfolding can be done at every mental level.. between which the concrete self [moi] is always situated. render explicit more or less arbitrarily according to the demands of a present situation. We thus pass from a virtual multiplicity. Thereby we will try to understand the past as such in Bergson. metaphors to make us rediscover the process of this memory which is spirit. it is therefore in vain that we would seek to read its past in its present if the past were not deposited within this being in the form of . and the other of rotation upon itself. If matter does not remember the past.

because we are our past as much as we are our bodies. or. without abandoning itself to the disinterested contemplation of the past which would completely detach it from life and from reality. still ourselves. that the past is acted by matter. The ultimate problem in Bergson's philosophy.or better yet. In the first case. In the second case. The Two Sources. But the true Self [le Soi]. living memory. must be able to oppose its past to its present as what one contemplates to what one does. at the limit. insofar as it is the creation of an unforeseeable novelty. so to speak. according to the direction of the past. as uniting in itself the two possible movements. Therefore. The finite spirit that we are is even nothing but the effort to unify itself. In this way. for the pure memory [le souvenir pur] is not an image. would not be able to define itself either by one or by the other. the movement towards the past which results in the ecstasis of a pure knowledge. Our past is. Trying hard to gather itself together despite a double solicitation. Let us content ourselves here to indicating that the attention to life is not the only . spirit is outside of itself and loses itself in an unconsciousness. despite this duality that is always present within it. In both cases. it is necessary. but a mute contemplation.120 The Challenge of Bergsonism memory [souvenir]. the creative sprit has a hold on its future only because it is capable of giving itself a certain perspective upon its past. since it is the creative impetus and since this creation in a finite being like us presupposes precisely these two extreme limits of pure contemplation. to take up a metaphor which has more than once appeared in this book. as he raises it himself in his last work.which results in. Then. the distinction must be able to be made in it between a past from which it detaches itself and a present to which it attaches itself. it is only just one movement or one series of bodily movements. Spirit. and for similar reasons. Our past is what we must leave behind us in order to be able to act. insofar as its impetus is finite. and this rupture of which we were speaking previously between the past and the present must appear within the very heart of our creative duration. re-create it. is without a doubt contained in the opposition of these two terms (to which we shall return): contemplation and action. the representation of the past is generally conditioned by our impetus towards the future. It is entirely contemplation. we must really situate the creative spirit between these two directions. (MM 356/223) Therefore insofar as spirit is invention. towards the future (for which the world of our current perception sketches out possible realizations) . it becomes an image only in the effort by which we bring it about. insofar as its attention to life is limited. and the movement towards the present . No doubt we must still consider spirit. that gesture that is in the process of being done. imagined by spirit. and pure movement. nevertheless. spirit. where we unify ourselves with our past. 'of the dreaming which is knowledge'. by which we. spirit no longer gives itself over to action.

can no longer seize spirit as a creator. Without a doubt a memory [souvenir]. Just as. and these affections refer back in turn to this knowledge.which he attributes to it. the two multiplicities that were already opposed to one another in Time and Free Will. it is true that in dreams . that pure contemplation. and the relaxation of spirit which loses itself in the knowledge of our past . is only the refuge of an intelligence. pure knowledge actualizes itself in the affections of the body. which. tends to . which always sinks us into the past and which always distances us from creative action. we would not be able to identify the created extension. if our analysis is correct. which is nothing more than a multiplicity of sensations and affections. doing violence to our nature. turning back on itself and twisting on itself. we are now in a position to understand better what Bergson calls the past. detaching itself from the present. the virtual multiplicity of all the aspects of our past life. in Bergson. But this criticism neglects the distinction between the virtual and the actual. with the distinct objects spread out in space. contains the details and events of our past life as a virtual multiplicity. for example writes Sartre in L 'Imagination. but cannot sustain more than a few moments. It is always important to turn back to this passage in Bergson which refuses to turn the pure memory of the past into an image or a multiplicity of images. 'forces him to give to unconscious objects exactly the discontinuity and the multiplicity of objects in the material world'.a correspondence is established between the two which leads to the diversity of dream images. Our past. the two demands.in itself and for us . insofar as it actualizes itself. But 'imagining is not remembering [se souvenir]' (MM 278/135). This existence of the past is considered in chapter three of Matter and Memory. In dreams.through a sort of parallelism between the relaxation of the body. Although. the faculty of seeing should be made to be one with the act of willing .Appendix II 121 attention possible. which is given in its totality undivided to consciousness. What would be needed is to unite. and the kind of existence .a painful effort which we can make suddenly. philosophical intuition is defined by Bergson as this vision of creative action: What would be needed is that. we would not be able to identify intelligible extension with the local extension of things. in Malebranche. by a painful effort. However. Indeed. Unfair criticisms are often formulated against the conception that Bergson makes of the existence of our past: 'His realistic theory of memory'. (EC 696-7/237) What would be needed is that the pure contemplation by which we define the past be not merely the result of an interruption or of a relaxation of the creative impetus.

are only virtually indicated. as we have already noted. which contains no distinction between the object contemplated and the self which contemplates. My past is only knowledge. 'is without an object'. But at its core the past is only knowledge and when I confuse myself with my past. therefore. however. the knowledge [savoir] of the object has become a knowledge [savoir] of self. We are bent on regarding perception as only an instruction addressed to a pure spirit. But the past which is at issue in Bergson is my past.knowledge that constitutes our past. Then. as having a completely speculative interest. the multiplicity of memories [souvenirs].122 The Challenge of Bergsonism live in an image. the converse is not true. and the image. in memory the object is no longer distinct from the subject. I can lose myself in nothing but a pure contemplation. he tells us. It . (MM 279/137) The German language allows us to bring the past closer to essence (gewesen et Weseri). the various aspects. thus following the continuous progress that has led it out from obscurity into the light. since it no longer has an object. (MM 278/135) How. represents the past to me only if it is indeed in the past that I went looking for it. provided that we do not confuse essence with the general and abstract. 'Pure memory'. we can find between perception and memory [souvenir] only a difference of degree. it contains the virtual multiplicity of images that I am capable of extracting from it according to the demands of action. this relationship in Bergson between this virtual multiplicity and the real multiplicity of the extended world and of the body. This is an extreme limit where consciousness tends to disappear. which. Without a doubt. as pure memory [souvenir] is itself essentially a knowledge [connaissance] of this kind. In pure memory. without losing its individuality and its originality. must we understand this past. the interiorization of all my lived experience. This pure memory [souvenir] is unextended precisely because it is knowledge and not action. or according to the whims of dreams. and what is spirit as long as it is only pure memory? Bergson clearly insists on the characteristics of this pure not imagined . The different things we know [connaissance] about the world are transposed into the dimension of knowledge [savoir] when it has become my past. pure memory in Bergson. The past presents this characteristic: in the past. it is indeed in this way it seems that we must understand the past. This is why the past is not image. has drawn itself up to essence. This is really a difficult problem. it is purely speculative and by that it cuts in upon the present which is action. It would be interesting to compare this conception of the past in Bergson with Platonic reminiscence. pure and simple.

since it is overcome [depasse] by my action insofar as it is new. but spirit insofar as it is only contemplation. is what I am in itself [en soi]. 'a thing of the past' [depasse]. another aspect of art on which Bergson has also insisted. however. ceased to act. But this correspondence on which Bergson insists in Creative Evolution with regard to the 'ideal genesis of matter' shows us that we carry within ourselves. is the life itself of spirit. insofar as it is something 'overcome'. in certain respects. renouncing action. This is the aspect of creation. The past has not ceased to be. being contemplation. and my past insofar as it is still for me [pour moi] and insofar as it is waiting for its ultimate sense from my action. however. insofar as it is only past. precisely because this relaxation is not spirit insofar as it is a creator. by means of which mute contemplation brings itself about in an image or in a present object. . my present is sensori-motor. This correspondence between spirit which reduces itself to its past and renounces action and materiality which is an interruption of the absolute creative impetus is at the centre of Bergsonian metaphysics. but which can only make this addition. this past is useless and powerless. the past. unextended. my past. on the basis of this past which then re-becomes for us [pour nous]. a priori in our own relaxation. Since it cannot completely repeat itself in my action. Finally. My past is disinterested.allow us to understand what the existence of the past means. as we have already seen. These various characteristics of the past . but not completely. which corresponds to the two possible directions of spirit. becomes nothing but knowledge [savoir] of the past. the aspect of the work.absence of an object. towards the past and towards the future. if one takes the liberty to play on these words. it has. leads us to the past. But this double relation. insofar as it is not considered in its relation to present action but insofar as it is pure past [passe] or. Bergson says. 'There is no more reason to say that the past erases itself once it has been perceived than there is to suppose that material objects stop existing when I stop perceiving them' (MM 284/142). This 'in itself is opposed to the becoming of an ego [moi] which always adds a new sense to what already was. insofar as I can change nothing in it and can only contemplate it in myself [en moi]. The difficulty really seems to lie in the necessity within which we are to consider this double relation: my past. no more stops existing when I stop realizing it than the objects of the world stop existing when they are not present to my consciousness. My past. This is why there is an aesthetic of memory. We can only contemplate it and not do it. and the relaxation of the pure creative impetus which expresses itself by means of extension and materiality. the essence of multiplicity and spatiality. and it would even perhaps be true to say that all aesthetics. powerlessness . considered from this point of view.Appendix II 123 looks as though there is a certain correspondence between the relaxation of my spirit which. There is.

If in fact one reflects on the conditions of existence that Bergson reduces to two fundamental conditions (1) the presentation to consciousness. although none of its past states manifests itself explicitly in character' (MM 289/148). but we must observe 'the solidarity of psychological facts always given together to immediate consciousness as an undivided whole which reflection alone cuts up into distinct fragments' (MM 305/166). but in a different way. of which we are parts). But this is an illusion due to the demands of the attention of life. The world sketches.124 The Challenge of Bergsonism The past in itself has not therefore stopped existing.one notices. on the fact that the thrust of the past. prompts us to close off time behind us as it flows' (MM 286/145). that is our current perception. is initially given only as an undivided totality. that these conditions are realized.. But this is precisely why in the midst of this creative impetus the . it is because it repeats the past continually. our discovery of the world goes from the part to the whole (since our perception disposes of space exactly in proportion to how our action disposes of time).. . on the other hand. And all our interest bears on the progressive discovery of this world which represents our future or is joined to our future. for the objects of the world as well as for our past. as non-existent. Finally. it is synonymous with creative duration. but repeats it tirelessly. The difference between the existence of objects of the world and the complete existence of our past is based. since there is nothing we can change about it. it is this total knowledge that always follows us. on the one hand. does not completely determine our future. The past. insofar as it is useless. It is thus considered. by denouncing the practical illusion of which we were previously speaking. But our past is also given to us in a certain way. 'If matter does not remember the past. on the fact that. our past also conditions our present 'but without determining it in a necessary manner' (MM 289/148). the horizon of our possible action in the future. and when we join back up with the total impetus (this is the first meaning of the word 'memory' [memoire]. we understand how this creative impetus differs from this repetition and from this identity towards which matter tends. And the rigorous order of the laws of nature makes it such that this world does not distinguish itself from its past. 'but the same instinct. in this way its past is truly given in its present' (MM 356/222-3). The objects of the world are partially given to our consciousness. Our future really depends in certain respects on our past. no longer interests us. in virtue of which we open out space indefinitely before ourselves. The difference between the existence of the objects of the world and the complete existence of our past is based. on the contrary. There are no memories which are 'independent and fixed beings' (MM 305/166). and (2) the logical or causal connection of what is in this way presented with what precedes and what follows . while our past. which is self-knowledge. beyond the part present to consciousness. 'Our psychological life as a whole reveals itself in our character. which constitutes our duration. therefore.

(MM 356/223) The separation of the past and the present. more or less freely. the creation of a new future. Of course. insofar as it is overcome [depasse]. IV We come back now to this opposition .contemplation and action . relative to the proper rhythm of his duration. even if. It is true that one would conceive badly. The distinction is therefore more or less arbitrary. from Time and Free Will up until The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. The effort of spirit presupposes this duality. to the memory of the . considered in its thrust and in its impetus.a completely indivisible duration of the Ego [Moi]. this opposition of its past and its present. can only be powerless and merely contemplated. creates something new every moment. which. In this way. it would no longer be correct to speak of the past. it is therefore in vain that we would seek to read its past in its present if the past were not deposited within this being in the form of memory [souvenir]. nevertheless the necessity of a retrospection and of a prospection. the distinction of the past and the present in a human individuality is relative to the tension of his memory. results at once from the demands of the attention to life and from the creative impetus which characterizes duration. at least in a finite being like us. of a relaxation towards the past and of a tension towards the future imposes itself. We now come back to the fundamental comment which has inspired our entire analysis: But a being which evolves. In this case. we understand the difficulties of the conception of the past for Bergson. even though duration and living memory are still constitutive of this Ego.which is for us fundamental in Bergson's philosophy as a whole. if one did not take into account a certain separation. but the effort makes sense only by means of the unity which envelops it. And thereby it seems that one could conceive Bergson has insisted on this many times . to the present as creator in relation to this past. considered in contrast as distinct from the present and from the future. there is some arbitrariness in the distinction of past and present. It looks as though it may be necessary to go still further by interpreting the article which Bergson has devoted to false recognition. I call past what I can only contemplate without using it or without including it in the richness of my lived present. the separation of what is contemplated and what is done.Appendix II 125 demands of action oppose the past. is not without power but which. in humans. and by means of the tension which reunites the two moments. This is why. in the richness of my actual indivisible duration.

And when one wants to realize it. We thus see ourselves in the gestures that we are making. we recognize or we are going to recognize the present as if it had already been lived 'in an indeterminate past'. without interrupting the impetus. express it in images or works.126 The Challenge of Bergsonism present. It is in this way that sometimes we recognize the present. (Likewise. The very contemplation of our personal past is imageless. beyond the attention to life. duration as creator. for Bergson. an intellectual effort is necessary which draws up more from us than there was at first.that 'contemplation is the shadow of action'. we have not been able to treat here the difficult problem of the image in Bergson which would require taking up all of his philosophy under this aspect. would in this way find its source in this other side of action. would manifest itself to consciousness only on the occasion of an interruption of the attention to life. The past. In this. would allow us to reflect creation itself as creation: this would be intuition. which expresses perhaps the essence of all contemplation. to contemplate the present as the past in this way is to stop acting. for an intelligence that would detach itself from life.) What looks to us to condense the philosophical position that Bergson wanted to take is a formula which would invert the terms of one of Plotinus' propositions cited by Bergson: 'Action is a shadow of contemplation. In this way contemplation would always be possible. is a reciprocal implication of elements of which we cannot say whether they are one or many. materiality justifies itself. would always accompany in principle the lived present. it is mute. but at that moment. and in . as this beautiful passage from Bergson shows: A thought. But this inversion of the impetus. taken by itself. selfcontemplation. from the conditions of the attention to life demanded of the human species. such that we are not able simultaneously to contemplate and to do. profiles itself always as the other side of the present oriented towards the future. suspending. as the shadow accompanies the person who moves. contemplating in it its proper past. this contemplation would appear as a summit. It looks as though the whole is given. It would be the other side of the creative impetus. It is to interrupt the very impetus of life. short of a painful and rare effort which. In this way we have seen the past which can only be contemplated. pure knowledge [savoir]. we truly stop acting. participate in the source of all creation and in turn create . Creative action would always have its shadow. but the attraction of the future would prevent us from seeing it. Thought is a continuity. which would result in contemplating the present instead of projecting it towards the future. However. perhaps. but these gestures appear to us with a character of destiny. in this reflection of the present in its past.' And. in its essence. The past. We want only to indicate these perspectives of Bergson's metaphysics. But. one must say on the contrary and this would even hold for the mystics who.

as yet cost nothing in toil. one has drawn up more from oneself than there was. which demands an effort. keeps its imprint. tendencies previously confused in the original impetus of life. because. matter provokes and makes effort possible. and calls for its intensification. it is indeed necessary that it scatter itself in words. but it is also valuable. This effort was impossible without matter.Appendix II 127 all continuity there is confusion. For a thought to become distinct. On the other hand. the poem which is no more than a dream. one has raised oneself above where one was. Our only way of taking account of what we have in mind is to set down on a sheet of paper. side by side. it is at one and the same time the obstacle. separate. of the artistic conception in statues or in paintings. It tests our strength. thanks to the effort. By the resistance that it opposes and by the docility with which we endow it. the work of art which is only conceived. and the stimulus. Just in this way does matter distinguish. resolve into individualities and finally into personalities. it is the material realization of the poem in words. (ES 831-2/22-3) . The effort is hard. Thought which is only thought. the terms which interpenetrate one another. even more valuable than the work which it produces. the instrument.

10. 298. Phenomenology of Perception. Deleuze. p. 432-3. we have in no way pushed substance to the side. The first mention on p. p. pp. 1859-1941. also. 5. Delbos. pp. in Les philosophes celebres. Cf. . Deleuze. Memoire et vie. Phenomenologie de la perception. 1859-1941. What is Philosophy?. Levinas. Etudes critiques. But the catalogue lists a 1939 French translation of The Will to Power. Bergson mentions Nietzsche twice in Melanges. 1957). pp. 22. On the contrary. he never owned a copy of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. Bergson. Deleuze and Guattari. 832 and 1180. This footnote does not appear in the Citadel Press English translation: 'Once more. Deleuze. 132. 2. p. p. 48-9. p. p. Deleuze constructs this slogan for Bergsonism on the basis ofPM 1260/19. Being and Time (SUNY). Revue de metaphysique et de morale. 378. Bergsonism. 7. p. EC 501/8. 298. 500-1. Apparently. 30. Sein und Zeit. 6. Merleau-Ponty. in Time and the Other and additional essays. p. p. 9.Notes Preface: Memory and Life 1. Levinas. Being and Time (Harper and Row). 832 is a 1910 letter that suggests that he had a rather good understanding of Nietzsche long before The Two Sources. The Old and the New. in Les philosophes celebres. in Time and the Other and additional essays.. pp. 8. 416-17. we assert the persistence of existences. BER 108/104. 11. 76. Bergson. 133. 3. The Old and the New. Qu'est-ce que la philosophic?. p. Bergson's personal library is housed at Bibliotheque Doucet in Paris. 76. pp. Henri Bergson. And we believe we have made it easier to represent that persistence. Heidegger. textes choisi par Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 4. How could one compare this doctrine to that of Heraclitus?' 12. 1897. Bergsonisme. 50.

The Relation of Representation to Action (192-7/43-8) VI. the mobile camera. Isolated from Affective Sensation (206-9/58-61) X. Passage to the Problem of Matter (215-18/68-71) XIII. 11-12. Nature of Affective Sensation (203-6/55-8) IX. p. this 'confusion' is precisely what makes the Bergsonian concept of the image interesting and important. Cinema 1: The MovementImage. Phenomenologie de la perception. Deleuze. p. pp. pp. Lechalas. For more on The Two Sources. 8. Lechalas. 6. Real Action and Possible Action (169-73/17-22) II. 83. the conquest of its own essence or novelty. Bergson extends this idea to mysticism in The Two Sources. 411. Cinema 1: L'Image-mouvement. The shot would then stop being a spatial category and become a temporal one. 12. 51). p. 1491). which concludes with a chapter on 'rhythmanalysis'. Descartes. Phenomenology of Perception. In this regard. 410-11. Image and Affective Sensation (201-3/52-5) VIII. 361. fingam. Melanges. The cinema would rediscover that very movement-image of the first chapter of Matter and Memory. 59. 9. This idea of 'the socialization of truth' refers back to the idea of a closed society and its natural instinct for self-preservation. pp. in Melanges. p.Notes 129 Chapter One: The Concept of the Image: Phenomenology 1. In this regard it is difficult to understand Sartre's criticism of the Bergsonian image in his 1936 L'Imagination. While Sartre is correct when he says that Bergson has 'constamment confondu le noeme et la noese' (p. aux conclusions du sens commun' (CEuvres. to which I have added the page numbers: I. Realism and Idealism (177-81/25-30) IV. it is hard to understand Gaston Bachelard's criticism of Bergson in his 1936 The Dialectic of Duration. par 1'analyse des fails et la comparison des doctrines. The Table of Contents lists the following titles. p. See Bergson a G. Edition du Centenaire. Natural Extension of Images (209-12/61-5) XI. Representation (173-6/22-5) III. 5. The original preface concludes by saying: '[La philosophic] doit nous ramener.' . as if this idea is an advance over Bergsonism. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. was to take place through montage. and the emancipation of the viewpoint. of course. 56. Image and Reality (197-201/48-52) VII. 57. 11. p. The Latin term is. 7. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Deleuze. Selection of Images (181-92/31-43) V. 3. Cinema 1: I'lmage-mouvement. p. which became separate from projection. 10. 4. Cf. p. 2-3: 'The evolution of the cinema. See Bergson a G. Image. Passage to the Problem of Memory (218-23/71-6) 2. p. Merleau-Ponty. in Melanges. Pure Perception (212-15/65-8) XII. 72. 23. see Appendix I. and the section would no longer be immobile but mobile.

57). 14. pp. Coming from Heidegger. Deleuze constructs this slogan for Bergsonism on the basis of PM 1260/19. 75. The Visible and the Invisible. 2000). 233. 4. See Appendix I. is a machine for the making of gods' (MR 1245/317). p. p. p. EC 501/8. 82. in Melanges. One could compare this poverty and luxury. p.Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Galilee. Sein und Zeit. Heidegger. 1. see Leonard Lawlor. 201. Deleuze. 83. p. 5. pp. Cf. pp. Bergson. Being and Time (Harper and Row). La voix et le phenomene. La voix et le phenomene. p. p. 104. Here we must think of the telescope. the idea of Wesen in the sense of a verb is at the centre of Merleau-Ponty's later thinking. 1859-1941. 228. In a working note from February 1959. Other positive uses of the word 'symbol' can be found in chapter one. 21. 20. But. the description resembles the descriptions in chapter one where he speaks of a correspondence between two systems of images (MM 191/41). in our perception. 411. 117. 17. p. Heidegger. 1. Bergsonisme. Being and Time (SUNY). translated by William Lovitt (New York. See also Derrida's more recent. Bergson describes this specific type of symbolization in chapter four. we have to say that Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible is also not doing a phenomenology of perception. also. 432-3. Harper and Row. 1977). Merleau-Ponty. Bergson a G. 15. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 416-17. Bergsonism. vol. Lechalas. Sartre in L}Imagination correctly understands what Bergson is saying about the concept of the image ('on ne saurait trouver de reele difference'. Derrida and Husserl (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. Derrida. Nietzsche. We return to it in Appendix I. Although he does not use the word 'correspond' there. 104. p. La nature. MM 355/222. 18. Le Toucher . This comment should be compared to the last sentence of The Two Sources: 'the essential function of the universe . of pure perception with the poverty and luxury of sexuality in The Two Sources. Heidegger. p. Deleuze. 19. p. perhaps. Chapter Two: The Concept of Memory: Ontology 1.. For more on Derrida's interpretation of Husserl. Speech and Phenomena. 2002). 108. vol. 2. 3. Speech and Phenomena. but it is precisely because there is only a difference in degree between the image and representation that Bergson can say that we perceive in the thing itself.130 Notes 13. . and that the thing is not in us. Nietzsche. This hesitation or interval is very important. 174). MM 187/ 37. this superficial repetition. Merleau-Ponty says that Wesen in the sense of a verb is what 'Bergson rather badly called "images"' (Le Visible et I'invisible. 298. 500-1. Again. Derrida. an image to which we shall return in Chapter Two and in Appendix I. 205/56. 16.. p. p. Deleuze.

203. the elan vital. a reciprocal implication between emotion (memory) or image (matter). for instance. Bergson (p. is like this suggestive word. When one considers these two famous chapters one is always confronted with a decision. Bergsonisme. 12. nature. Heidegger. p. appendix two. pure memories. 22. to the suggestive word of the hypnotist. the affections or feelings involved in perception are infra-intellectual emotions. p. or better still. Figures de la pensee philosophique. it designated the set of functions of intellection. in the early text. at least. 480. When a hypnotist makes someone hypnotized feel hot. therefore. 55. appendix two. p. 50. between emotion (memory) and image (matter). 10. I am obviously following Hyppolite and Deleuze. Indeed. See MM 250/105. at the time of Matter and Memory. one can focus on the metaphysics of memory. Bergsonism. 1). 21. See Vieillard-Baron in his 'Que sais-je?' volume. that is. Insofar as Bergsonian memory is Platonic forgetfulness. for example. Cf. see Appendix I. Deleuze. the hypnotist uses a word to suggest the feeling of hotness. Bergsonisme. It is very important to remember that Bergson specifies the impotence of pure memory in terms of utility.. creative emotion. 50. 482.. see Appendix II. 9. Bergson also compares memories. 11. for Bergson. For more on this distinction see Chapter Three and especially Appendix I. For more on this image of the night sky and planets. L'Intellectualisme de Bergson. tome 1. Hyppolite. suggests the possibility of a second cone.Notes 131 6. In the discussion of the difference in nature between the two forms of memory. regardless of the distinction one can make between them. Bergsonism. obviously. 7. In Bergson's 1908 essay. 23. 1 and p. 13. the word 'hot' is not itself hot. Figures de la pensee philosophique. Hyppolite. 19. 121-2 17. where he says that '. in a word. p. Bergson suggests that the two forms are not really independent (MM 231/85). Memory purified of images is life. but. tome 1. that is. 123 21. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. See. 18. Clearly. the other image Bergson provides. which is not a sensation. p. as Jankelevitch. 14. he calls this past that was never present 'an indeterminate past' or a 'past in general' (ES 899/111). p. comprehension'. One can focus on the psychology of memory. does in his book on Bergson. p. For an English translation of this essay. taken as a whole. p. 16. 15. 50 n. p. 'Memory of the Present and False Recognition'. in reference to the function of memory in recognition. 8. Deleuze. We could say that there is a 'reciprocal implication' between memory and matter. For more on 'the whole of obligation' see Appendix I. See Husson. 51 n. 20. the word "intelligence" designated the set of superior function of knowledge. as Deleuze and Hyppolite do. Bergsonian . PM 1275/35. p. Bergson had not yet made the distinction between creative or supra-intellectual emotions and infra-intellectual emotions. 55. or. in terms of needs and therefore in terms of instincts. or. A memory.

14. for example. and p. 2. Foucault. Melanges. Calling it a point allows us to connect this zone to Bergson's metaphor of a revolving star or planet (un astre). p. We will follow the other direction in Appendix I. 775. 17. See Michel Foucault. 12. English translation by Andre Orianne as The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. History. 18. a kind of 'point of diffraction'. in Time and the Other and additional essays. 4. Chapter Three: The Concept of Sense: Ethics 1. 3. See Jankelevitch. Cf. pp. in Homage a Jean Hyppolite. 83. 1973). p. 130. . Genealogy. Bits et ecrits. p. CounterMemory. on the education of the senses. 25. See Vieillard-Baron. 8. See Husserl. you are confronted by forces that are not strictly and exclusively moral. 7. 1907-1968. 9. Hyppolite. 15. 23. History. 56. See Deleuze. 48-9. pp. p. 1'histoire. Jean Hyppolite. 1954-1988. 19. 60. in Logique du sens. in Language. 1148-9. Totalite et infini. Logic and Existence. 71. p. Ideas I. 1984). 202. The Old and the New. Levinas. pp. 131. again following Foucault in The Archeology of Knowledge. Emmanual Levinas. 17-18. English translation by anonymous translator as The Order of Things (New York: Random House. p. Michel Tournier et le monde sans autrui. 328. 47. Levinas. pp. Le temps et I'autre. in Michel Foucault. 190. Nietzsche. 52. Totality and Infinity. 80. as in Appendix I. p. Le Temps et I'autre. 10. in his Nietzsche. I have appropriated this idea of a grey zone from Foucault. we could call this zone. p. p. Levinas. p. 20. 363. 13. 25. Totality and Infinity. Michel Tournier and the World without Others. Bergson. 1970). 1966). And thus connected to the elan vital. 171. la genealogie. Logique et existence. pp.132 Notes memory is really what Foucault calls a 'counter-memory'. Genealogy. 89-90. MM 197-9/48-50. Theorie de I'intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl (Paris: Vrin. p. 163. to use Bergson's later terminology. 271. We shall return to this intersection between Bergson and Nietzsche in Appendix I. MR 1056/96: 'but in the two cases [open and closed]. But. 11. Les mots et les choses (Paris: Gallimard. Time and the Other. Nietzsche. 318-19. Melanges. p. 'Pure variation' is Deleuze and Guattari's definition of a concept in Qu'estce que la philosophic?. 24. 56 n. What is Philosophy?. Cf. in The Logic of Sense. We return to The Two Sources in Appendix I. Levinas. See. Totalite et infini. paras 124. Bergson. pp. 1. Time and the Other and additional essays. 5. 6. See Foucault. pp. Levinas. Practice.' 16. p. 133. p. 20. p.

2. we have to see The Two Sources as an attempt. Bergson says. MR 1012/44 for Bergson on 'feminine' sensibility and see. Melanges. TM 1090/136). 7. 361. magic apparently worked (MR 1116/166). 17. p. also MR 984-5/13). in particular. 362. like Creative Evolution. At the beginning. individuals. calls 'the morality of mores'. 23. Appendix I: The Point where Memory Turns Back into Life: An Investigation of Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 1. for example. 2 in the English. p. Bergson takes this phrase (MR 1179/240) from Henri Delacroix's study of mystics (Etudes d'histoires et de psychologie du mysticisms). By means of the fabulation function. para. 22. 1961). before its indefinite extension. Magic becomes irrational when it extends itself in the direction of evil spirits and the mechanical repetition of incantations (MR 1117-18/168-9). Cf. pp. There are two main descriptions of duration in Bergson's corpus: chapter two of the Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Time and Free Will in English) and the first eight pages of Creative Evolution. 24. n. 2. See Henri Gouhier.Notes 133 21. Conclusion: Think in Terms of Duration 1. to trace 'the genealogical tree of life' back to its 'root' (EC 531/43). p. We return to the question of mysticism and creative emotion in Appendix I. 371. n. 94). The Two Sources 'goes beyond the conclusions of Creative Evolution' (MR 1193/256). or more precisely. magic is rational and not madness (cf. 154. Melanges. p. Bergson et le Christ des evangiles (Paris: Fayard. third treatise. static religion fills in this deficiency and reattaches us. Deleuze explicitly compares Bergson's 'the whole of . in The Genealogy of Morals. para. in beings endowed with reason. as Bergson himself says. 789. see second treatise. to life in closed societies. 'Religion is that element which. 2. Ill of Lettres. it is an appendix to Chapter Three above. 1 in the French. pp. 6. 5. Concerning Bergson's idea of ethics. The actual letter is from 29 December 1688. Melanges. and this efficacy is why magic contributed at times to the progress of science. 3. 294-6 of vol. 372. 3. Like Nietzsche who had already recognized that religion has the function of'curing' depression (On the Genealogy of Morals. See Melanges. for Bergson. Strictly. especially. 4. Since. is called upon to fill in any deficiency [deficit] of attachment to life' (MR 1154/210. p. The closed morality in Bergson is identical to what Nietzsche.

2 for Bergson's discussion of a mother's love for her child. 21. 50. While Bergson introduces this idea of efficacious presence in the discussion of static religion. para. p. at the beginning was vanity. humans have always invented machines. what Bergson says in his 1897 'Compte rendu des "Principes de Metaphysique et de psychologic" de Paul Janet'. 51. Nietzsche and Philosophy. 19. and these discoveries stimulate new inventions. See MR 1012 n. para. are. for the progress of science will never stop' (MR 1235/305). p. From ancient times onward. According to Bergson. In this comment Bergson does not limit the word 'religion' to static religion. we believe. industry has not concerned itself enough about the greater or lesser importance of the needs to be satisfied. 18. 10. in Les Etudes philosophiques. ' "semi-personal powers" or "efficacious presences" . 15. Bergson thinks that agricultural overproduction is a deception. Bergson says.134 Notes 8. Again. 133. 'If that were so. pp 78-9. see Chapter One. Delacroix. But Bergson claims that we cannot say that modern science is responsible for the startling quantity of new inventions in the last few centuries. On Inequality. 11. On the Genealogy of Morals. Here as often in his discussion of war. 20. On the Genealogy of Morals. p. For a brief discussion of the distinction between creative emotions and non-creative emotions. and industry have only given what has been asked of them.. Nietzsche. II est plus pres . 4/2001: 453-64. according to Bergson because production in general has not been organized well. 1235 n. this irrational cause of war has been exacerbated by the spirit of invention. It has willingly followed fashion [la mode] and manufactured with no other thought than selling' (MR 1236/306). There he quotes Ravaisson: 'Dieu nous est plus interieur que notre interieur. Modern science continually expands in its discoveries. artifice and artificial or fake). 365. humanity would be vowed to a growing materiality. See Frederic Worms. The question concerning technology. 9. 13. Modern science has not therefore produced artificial needs.. Bergson follows Rousseau's Second Discourse. is whether the spirit of invention necessarily creates artificial needs or whether the artificial needs have guided the spirit of invention (MR 1234/ 304). 17. at the origin of religion' (MR 1142/196). He says. modern sciences. p. 1/306 n. 12. 16. Cf. and for more on Madame de Sevigne. see the Conclusion. see Chapter Three. L'intelligence gagnee par 1'intuition? La Relation entre Bergson et Kant. We return to the nature of this experience below in Section III. second treatise. obligation' to Nietzsche's 'morality of mores'. so that there is no way to exchange all of the products (MR 1235/305-6. we must note that it functions in both static and dynamic religion. As Bergson says. 153. the spirit of invention. 'Generally speaking. For more on these three terms (art. for Bergson. 11. Nietzsche. 5). 14. Etudes de mysticisme. 12. 1/44 n. See later in this section why it is necessary to use the feminine pronoun. at times it seems as though there is overproduction. Cf. No. But. second treatise. see Nietzsche et la philosophic. p.

pp. See n. 390. however. 34. St Teresa. See Chapter Three for more on auscultation in intuition. 189. Nietzsche. Joan of Arc. pp. p. in CEuvres poetiques completes. Bergson. 31. 272). D'Une erreur fondamentale dans les 'Deux Sources' de M. 276. pp. The Genealogy of Morals. The anxiety of the mystic seems to contradict what Jankelevitch says: 'il n'aura done plus d'insomnies ni d'angoisse' (p. 49. see Edward Lucie-Smith. Here we can again refer to Joan of Arc. pp. sans cesse et a mille egards etrangers a nous-meme' (Melanges. Simons. Cf. Bergson. homosexual desire and love. Jankelevitch. Also Noe Gottlieb. p. what Jesus means in the Sermon on the Mount when he speaks of the 'poor in spirit'.. ed. 36-7. 2. Bergson mentions St Paul. deBeauvoir's distinction between mystical women of action (she mentions Joan of Arc) and narcissistic female mystics in The Second Sex resembles the distinction Bergson makes between incomplete and complete mysticism. See also Jankelevitch.Notes 135 22. which allows for the openness of love. We have suggested this connection between Bergson and Heidegger in Chapter Two. second treatise. 35. according to Bergson. Bergson himself is basing his comment about Joan of Arc on Henri Delacroix's study and the poetry of Charles Peguy. Margaret A. See deBeauvoir. 1933. 1586-7.. Indeed. 32. Jankelevitch. 58-9. pp. For a careful reconstruction of Joan of Arc's life. 29. No. in The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir. 379-87. 30. But see Jankelevitch for a different view on death in Bergson. Bergson's Influence on Beauvoir's Philosophical Methodology. pp. 24. 36. pp. p. 2003). also allows for non-heterosexual. 27. 28-9. 7 in the Preface. This not feeling the deprivation is. St Catherine of Sienna and St Francis. The Second Sex. Melanges. See MR 1239-40/310-11. p. See also. Revue des Etudes juives. 26. 33. While she does not cite Bergson. XCV. Cf. See Charles Peguy. 44-5. 25. . 28. This comment must remind us of Foucault's idea of the continuing work of freedom. that is. 275. 270-1. para. de nous que nous ne le sommes. Of course.. Bergson. As great Christian mystics. 678. See also Melanges. Again we must see Bergson's discussion of anxiety in The Two Sources as quite close to that of Heidegger in Being and Time. Bergson. Bergson is aware that static religion can adopt an image such as that of Joan of Arc and thus convert her image into 'imperialism' or fascism. the 'trumpery' that intelligence plays on nature. Claudia Card (New York: Cambridge University Press. 264-5. Le Mystere de la Charite de Jeanne d'Arc. Bergson. 23. 391).

Pogson. Mineola: Dover Publishing Company. Palmer. The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics. 1990. 1959. translated by Arthur Mitchell. 1972. 1999 [1911]. London: Continuum. Creative Evolution. IN: University of Notre Dame Press. L. 1995. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. translated by N. translation of L'energie spirituelle. 1977 [1935]. Andison. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. New York: Zone Books. . translated by F. New York: Dover. English translations Mind-Energy. translated by H. 1920. Cours III: Lecons d'histoire de la philosophic moderne. translated by Mabelle L. Melanges. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Bibliography Works by Bergson CEuvres. Matter and Memory. Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. Los Angeles: Green Integer. 2001 [1913]. Cours I: Lecons de psychologie et de metaphysique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Theorie de I'dme. New York: The Citadel Press. Horsfall Carter. 1998 [1911]. 2001. Bergson: Key Writings. Cours II: Lecons d'esthetique. translated by Cloudsley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. S. psychologie et metaphysique. 1992. 1992 [1946]. Ashley Audra and Cloudsley Brereton. M. edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. translated by R. London: Macmillan. Notre Dame. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Wildon Carr. 1994. with the assistance of W. Lecons de morale. Paul and W. translation of La pensee et le mouvant. Edition du Centenaire.

Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. New York: Vintage Books. Leibniz. 1989. Carr. Cariou. pp. Keith. M. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag. Casey. London: Routledge. C. Renaud. Renaud. La perception. Singularite et sujet: une lecture phenomenologique de Proust. Deleuze. Ansell Pearson. Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual. 2002. Parshley as The Second Sex. Couchoud. Paul-Louis. 1956. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. English translation by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam as Bergsonism. Cariou. Keith. Bergsonisme. 1950 [1936]. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Grenoble: Millon. The Oscillating Now: Heidegger on the Failure of Bergsonism. Barbaras. Paris: Aubier. Paris: Hatier. in John Mullarkey . H. Barbaras. Gilles. New York: Zone Books. The Crisis in Modernism. Victor. 1919. 1949. Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition. Revue de metaphysique et de morale. 1994. 1995. Philosophy Today. Marie. and C. Paris: Gallimard. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bergson etLucrece. April/June 2000. Stephen. No. Edward S. redacteur. Jones. 2000. Lectures Bergsoniennes. Frederick. 2001. Manchester: Clinamen Press. Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change. Bergson. Revue Philosophique de la France et L'Etranger: Rationalisme et Mystique au xvii siecle. London: Routledge. Howard. 1992. 1997. Cariou. Les Etudes Bergsoniennes. Fall 1997: 405-23. W. La Dialectic de la duree. La Conception de la difference chez Bergson. deBeauvoir. and Douglas. L'Atomisme: Gassendi. Levinas and the Political. Marie. Bergson et Bachelard. Keith. Bergson: 1859-1941. 1967. Marie. 1956: 77-112. London: Routledge. Gaston. Gilles. Simone. Delbos. English translation by Melissa Mcmahon as Bergson's Conception of Difference. La Visibilite de I'invisible.. C. 1990. Caygill. Cariou. Germinal Life. 1897: 353-89. Le Deuxieme sexe. 1902: 225-43. essai sur la relation du corps a 1'esprit. London: Routledge. Mauro. 4. Breeur.. Matiere et Memoire. English translation by Mary Mcallester Jones as The Dialectic of Duration.Bibliography 137 Texts by other authors Ansell Pearson. Paris: Aubier. 1991. Deleuze. Gilles. 292-9. Paris: Vrin. Cariou. 1976. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Vol. Paul. Burwick. Roland. Paris: Mazenod. Bachelard. 'Matiere et Memoire' de M. 1987. English translation by H. 2002. 2000. Marie. La Metaphysique nouvelle. 1999. Ansell Pearson. in Maurice Merleau-Ponty Lesphilosophes celebres. London: T. Deleuze. Marie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Revue de Metaphysique et de morale. Le tournant de I'experience. Bergson et le fait mystique. Carbone. Crocker. Remembering: A Phenomenological Study. 1978. 1997. 2.

The New Bergson. Paris: Gallimard. Foucault. Deleuze. Paris: Gallimard. English translation by James Strachey as The Unconscious. 1986. 770-85.com). Time and the Instant. 1999. 1970. Paris: Minuit.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press. in Gesammelte Werke. 42-65. Gilles. 1'histoire. Foucault. 1971. 1960: 37-62. New York: Columbia University Press. in Dits et ecrits. Paris: Minuit. L'Archeologie du savoir. 1989. 1991. originally published in Revue de Metaphysique et de morale.). 1907-1968. Sigmund. Jeanne. 1954-1988. Deleuze. English translation by anonymous translator as The Order of Things. Counter-Memory. (ed. Delhomme. pp. Ithaca. New York: Random House. Foucault. English translation by David B. 264-303. Vol. Deleuze. Jean Hyppolite. Jacques. 1949. English translation by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam as Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Allison as Speech and Phenomenon. Michel. Nietzsche et Bergson: La representation de la verite. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Les mots et les choses. in Logique du sens. Paris: Galilee. New York: Pantheon. 1954. Difference et repetition. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Deleuze. 1985. in . pp. Paris: Minuit. in Homage a Jean Hyppolite. Das Unbewusste. 'une conference' (downloaded from the Internet at www. 1978. La voix et le phenomene. Delhomme. Cinema 1: L'Image-mouvement. Zehnter Band: Werke aus denjahren 1913-1917. Practice. 1973. Meditationes de Prima Philosophia. 1966. 1968. Michel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Qu'est-ce que la philosophic?. Michel Tournier et le monde sans autrui. Paris: Vrin. Le Toucher -Jean-Luc Nancy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Theorie des multiplicites chez Bergson. Deleuze. Gilles. la genealogie. 5. 1969: 131-4. pp. Paris: Gallimard. Gilles. in The Logic of Sense. Manchester: Clinamen. Descartes. Jeanne. Jacques. English translation by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta as Cinema 2: The Time-Image. History. 139-64. Robin. 1977. 145-72. English translation by Paul Fatten as Difference and Repetition. New York: Columbia University Press. Durie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Paris: Minuit. 2000. 1990. Genealogy. Gilles. English translation by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon as Nietzsche. 1994. English translation by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell as What is Philosophy?.138 Bibliography (ed. Michel. 1967. 2. Deleuze. 1994. 1969. Rene. Freud. London: Imago Publishing Co. Derrida. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 2000. 1969. English translation by Alan Sheridan as The Archeology of Knowledge. Gilles. English translation by Constantin Boundas as Michel Tournier and the World without Others. Nietzsche. pp. Derrida. New York: Columbia University Press. Michel. in Language. 1983. pp. Cinema 2: L'Image-temps. 1972. Gilles and Guattari.webdeleuze. Les etudes bergsoniennes. No. Foucault. 1994. Vie et conscience de la vie. Meditations Philosophiques. NY: Cornell University Press.. Felix.

1979. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Gilson. Ingarden. James. Noe. 1. D'Une erreur fondamentale dans les 'Deux Sources' de M. Figures de la pensee philosophique. and Co. Mysticisme et folie: Essai sur la simplicite. James.. Bernard. Recommencement. Jean. 1904. 1996. Kersten as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Gouhier. 1977. La revision Bergsonienne de I'esprit. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer.). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 189. Gutting. Vol. New York: Harper and Row. General Psychological Theory. Fecundity. Basic Problems of Phenomenology. French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. 1. Collected Essays and Reviews. Hyppolite. Roman. Bergson. Husson. Tubingen: Niemeyer. 1962. Albany: The SUNY Press. Sein und Zeit. English translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as Being and Time. pp. 1994 [1920]. Edmund. Presses Universitaires de France. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. 1982. Goddard. New York: Touchstone. Gottlieb. Gesammelte Werke. 1976. Paris: Fayard. 177. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer. 1984. Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Husserl. 1971. Vol. London: Longman. Jean. James. Varieties of Religious Experience. Henri. 1. 45. Pfullingen: Neske. Herman. Bergson et le Christ des evangiles. English translation by Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen as Logic and Existence. New English translation by Joan Stambaugh as Being and Time. Fruhe Shriften zur Erkenntnistheorie. 1991: 122-9. 1983. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Jankelevitch. 1994. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. William.. Martin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Green. Heidegger. 1997. Nietzsche. Daniel. Vol. 2002. and Memory. in Nietzsche. English translation by David Farrell Krell as The Will to Power as Art. Martin. New York: Harper and Row. Paris: Vrin. 1967. New York: Random House. 1959. Martin. Heidegger. The Writings of William James. Martin. New York: Cambridge University Press. Martin. Logique et existence. translated by William Lovitt. Revue des Etudes juives. Hicks. 1933: 4. Vol. Leon.Bibliography 139 Philip Rieff (ed. Albany: The SUNY Press. No. Vladimir. New York: Harper and Row. 1979 [1927]. Hyppolite. Henri Bergson. The Problem of Novelty in Levinas and Bergson. Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst. William. English translation by F. Husserliana Band III. translated by Michael Heim. William. Jean-Christophe. 116-50. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. 1996. 1953. 1961. Heidegger. translated by Albert Hofstader. Heidegger. Band 6 (Intuition undlntellekt bei Henri Bergson). Gary. 1947. No. 1997. XCV. Revue Internationale de Philosophie. 1961. Buck: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phdnomenologie. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 2001. I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Scott E. Heidegger. unpublished manuscript. L'Intellectualisme de Bergson. . La phenomenologie de 1'intensite..

English translation by Alphonso Lingis as The Visible and the Invisible. Levinas. Transcendance et Intelligibility Geneve: Labor et Fides. Lawlor. Maurice. 1987. 1969. Bergson. 1986. Emmanuel. Annales de philosophic chretienne. English translation by Alphonso Lingis as Totality and Infinity. The Philosophy of Bergson. 1996. R. Merleau-Ponty. Signe. 1976. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1982. Le Temps et I'autre. Levinas. 1996. Paris: Gallimard. 1984. Paris: Gallimard. which first appeared in L'ancien et le nouveau. 1961. No. Paris: Vrin. Thinking Through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question. Peperzak. Georges. D. Edward. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. McCleary as Signs. En Decouvrant I'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Boston: Kluwer. 1911. Paris: Gallimard. Basic Philosophical Writings. 1961. Maritain. Twentieth Century French Philosophy. English translation by Andre Orianne as The Theory of Intution in Husserl's Phenomenology. Jacques. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Emmanual. English translation by Colin Smith. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. 1955. 1945. d'apres un nouveau livre de M. Totalite et infini. Gordon Andison. New York: Philosophical Library. 1979. Paris: Vrin. 1962. . Lindsay. 1964. Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. 1985. 55. Matiere et memoire. James Edie and John O'Neill. translated by Mabelle L. New York: Routledge. 1989. Lechalas. which first appeared in The University of Ottawa Quarterly. New York: Norton. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Bergson. in collaboration with J. Paris: Edition du Cerf. A. June 1897: 314-34. and The Old and the New. English translation by Simon Critchley and Tamra Wright as Transcendance and Intelligibility. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. English translation by Richhard Cohen as Time and the Other and additional essays. Lucie-Smith. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (eds). (The other essays are Diachrony and Representation. Andison. Leonard. Emmanuel. revised by Forrest Williams as Phenomenology of Perception. 2003. Paris: Fata Morgana. Leonard. Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism. Merleau-Ponty. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1964. Marion. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Joan of Arc. 4. Emmanuel. Jean-Luc. Prolegomenes a la charite. Maurice. Levinas. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Emmanuel. In Praise of Philosophy and other Essays. Merleau-Ponty. 1973. Phenomenologie de la perception.. London: Dent. 1988. Paris: La Difference. Maurice.) Levinas. 2001. Maurice. New York: Oxford University Press. Merleau-Ponty. 2002. Matthews. Levinas. in Adriaan T. Le Visible et I'invisible. A. Theorie de I'intuition dans la phenomenologie de Husserl. 1968. 1984. translated by John Wild.. May 1897: 147-64. troisieme edition corrigee. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Vol. Lawlor.140 Bibliography Lacey. English translation by Richard C. Eric.

No. 3. in Claudia Card (ed. Simons.). Bergson ou les deux sens de la vie. Le Vocabulaire de Bergson. Jean-Louis. 1940. (Euvres Poetiques Completes. Paris: Edition de I'Herne. The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir. 1991: 295-305.Bibliography 141 Merleau-Ponty. Winter 1994: 339-55. Vieillard-Baron. New York: St Martin's Press. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 15. presentation et traduction du portugais (Bresil) par Renaud Barbaras. unpublished manuscript. 1998. 2003. Nietzsche. Hildesheim: Georg Olrns Verlag. meme voix. Frederic. Frederic. Bergson entre Russell et Husserl: un troisieme terme?. No. Bergson. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. la Premiere Guerre mondiale et le moment 1900. Soulez. 2002. Worms. Bento. Worms. translated by Roger D. Etudes philosophiques. Friedrich. Mullarkey. Paris: Gallimard. Sartre. Robinet. Frederic. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Paris: Seuil. 3. L'imaginaire. 1960: 375-88. Jean-Paul. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Phillipe. 29: 79-96. 4. La nature. Sartre. Jean-Paul. No. Worms. Mullarkey. 1999. . Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Vol. Autre voie. Swenson. in Cahier de I'Herne: Emmanuel Levinas. de Sevigne. III. de 1'image et du souvenir chez Bergson. Frederic. Lettres.). On the Genealogy of Morality. (ed. Paris: Gallimard. John. Madame. Mullarkey John. Frederic. Paris: Gallimard. L'imagination. Pierre. 1995. 1989. 1964. Masters. Andre. Jean-Jacques. 2000. Margaret A. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Bergson Politique. John. Peguy. 2001: 63-81. Presence et champ transcendental: Conscience et negativite dans la philosophie de Bergson. Maurice. L'Intelligence gagnee par 1'intuition? La relation entre Bergson et Kant. Revue de Metaphysicque et de morale. edited by Roger D. Introduction a Matiere et Memoire. Worms. 1936. and Judith R. The First and Second Discourses. Worms. Rousseau. The New Bergson. Bergson's Influence on Beauvoir's Philosophical Methodology. Paris: Ellipses. 1998. Frederic. Rue Descartes. Les Etudes philosophiques. Masters. 1999. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Le Passage a la conception biologique de la perception. 1963. Prado. Charles. Au-dela de 1'histoire et du caractere: 1'idee de philosophie Francaise.. 1991. Bergson and Philosophy. No. 2001: 453-64. Worms. New York: Cambridge University Press. Philosophy Today. Trotignon. 1957. translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Duplicating the Flesh: Bergson and the Current Philosophy of the Body.

This page intentionally left blank .

22 as memory ix roots of our being 79 senses of being x. 24. 74. see the soul the brain 1. 11-17. 120. 52. 102-3. George 5 biology 92 blindness 14. 127 artistic creation 9. 62. 12-19. 32. 47-8. 82. 49. 22 in itself 7. 32. 108-9 becoming 48-9. 53. basic principle of 1. 85. 78. 111 automatic recognition 72 automaton 35. 52. 82-3 alterity x. 21. 47. 57 a doubling of being 43 for us 7. 82. 122 acquisition of bodies 55-6 bodily functions 23-4. 52. 89-91. 120-6 acts of love 104 centre of action 14-15. 62. 42-4. 87. 7. 95-8 appearance 5. 73. 61. 73-4 aphrodisia 85-6. 45. 52-4. 64 present action 38. 96-8. 23. 134 artificial obscurity 2 artificial self 99 asceticism xi-xii. 26. 24. 82 an artist painting a portrait 81-2 the artistic picture 8-9 artless general ideas 68 artless symbol 52 artifice 2. 111 associationism 36-7 astronomy xi. 100 the absolute 62 abstract 10. 27-8. 77-9. 60. 57. 79. 57. 69. 44. 86-7. 58 as storehouse of memories 30 makes indetermination possible 53 . 67 bodily injury 33 bodily movement 38-9 bodily needs 64 bodily pleasure 95 known from the inside 11. 99-100. 102 possible action 14-15. 29-30.11 Berkeley. 114-15. 35. 70. 123. 74. 17-19. 67 affection 4. 28 art 8-10. 72. 20-1. 38. 87-8. 11. 39. 75. 23. 10-11. 67-8. 89. 53. 9. 53. 40 archaeology xi. 83 analogy of the sun 56 anxiety (inquietude) 102-3 aphasia 39. 54 real and virtual 24-5 and superior equilibrium 89 to turn away from action and matter 68 adaptation 32. 104. 102. 99. 69. 64-5. 42-3. 106. 17. 122 action 2. 36 allegory of the cave 56 alteration x. 75. 73. 25. 11-12. 31. 3. 49. 89 balance 56.Index abnormality 87. 67. 113 as conscious presence 57 conceived as time 49. 59. 49-50. 115 future action 32 and mysticism 79. 40-1. 53. 45. 99 artificial extension of vital needs 86 artificial intelligence 16.16 known from the outside 11 the lived body (Leib) 16. 80. 110-11 Aristotle ix. 17 psychic blindness 25-6 the body 3. 34. 30 artificial metaphysical constructs 67 artificial needs 96. 22. 118. 36. 99. 114-17. 82. 44. 15. 53. 89-91. 26. 113 being ix-x. 23. 107-8. 58. 91. 40. 57 Bergsonism. 117 as instrument of analysis 16-17 as instrument of selection 17 damaged by a lesion 39. 28 as a machine 15-16 memory of the body 31 and the soul.

124 charity 109 charlatanism 87 choice 1. 77-8. 51-4. 101 copy 6. 52. 79 cause and effect 53. 14. 23-4. xii-xiii. 72. 60-3. 38. 71. 75—7 of vibration 7 of the will to live 99 concession to idealism 5 conditions of experience.9 11. 68. 45. 105 communities 92-4 complexity 6. 41-4. 69. 9-10. 28.115 decoupage 8. 126 confidence 88. 53. 115-16 Christianity 108-9 Christian ideal 97 chrysalis 6-7. 68 customary maxims 100 death 10. 91. 72 the summit 46-50. 75-7 of the image xiii. 64 of intuition 63 of memory xi.82.53. 18. 43 conservation 20. 60. 53 continuous line 25-6 continuous movement of intellectual effort 50 continuous whole 31 contraction 19. 23. 56-7. 49. 61 a vision of death 88 De Beauvoir Simone x. 80. 79 chain of appearances 41. 27. 98. 56. 82. 57 between memory and being x between the survival of the past and the absolutely new 82 between two forms of memory 47.48-50. 23. 53. 65. 135 deception 97-8 decision 41. 68-9. 89-90 customary direction of thought 64-5. 119-26 of beings who love to create 108 creative duration 112-15 creative emotion x. 51. 46. 18-21. 56. 104. 67. 45 of our past 113 of the species 92. 102-3. 10 deduction 18 . 49-50. 70. 51 communication 16-17. 27. 57.58. 120-6 contiguity 50-1. 75. 67. 107. 104 creative repetition 107 creativity 77 critical philosophy 68 Crusoe. 83. 33. 129 civilization 85-6. 13. 43-54. 79-80. 28-30.55. 93. 105-6 creation 80-3. 45 change 7. 102. 27. 117-19 of habits of action and thinking 67 psychological state of tension or contraction 90 conversation 72. 72 conscience xii. 122. 97 constitution of objects 18 of representations 27 contact 5. 58. 100-1. 9. 1. 110-11. 95. 61. 105. 64. 99 connection to light 64 logical connection 42-3. 100 closed morality 89-90 closed society 92. 69-70. 7 consciousness x. 65. 131 the base 46-50. 21-22. 96-7 closed 41. 49 of sense x. 135 the dead weight of the past 40.25-6. 62 of the dynamic schema 53. 89-90. 124 between matter and memory 30. 112-13 character 41. 44. 92. 14-15. 34. 68-9. 55-6. 72. 107 consciousness of the body 57 conscious perception 18-24 conscious subjectivity 49 conscious syntheses 18 enlarging consciousness 63. 126-7 of becoming 48-9. 54-5. 58. 100 closedness of the past 41 colour 5-7. 55. 34. 39. 101 cinema 8. 63. 21-2. 65. 24. 88. 124. 24. 119. 9. 27-8. 112. 59. 118-19. 19-20.144 Index causal connection 42-3. 77-8. 1. 99. 89. 5. 56-7. a priori 54-5 necessary condition of war 92 sufficient condition of war 92-3 the cone x-xi. 41-3. 45. 7. 3. 105 continuity 6-7. 35. 126 the conscious and the unconscious 100-1. 69-70 a function of the unconscious 49 immediate data of consciousness 62-3 presentation to consciousness 42-5. 108. 82 computer 16 the concept of absolute justice 109 of the concept x of duration ix. 4-5. 64. 92-4 contemplation 14-15. 79. 110 of perception 1 of presence 1. 18. 48-9 present consciousness 57 synonymy between consciousness and existence 40. Robinson 68 custom 2. 17.

131 between matter and memory 48. 48. 79. 40-3. 66. 59 of habits 33 of the image 65 of memories 51 detachment 24. 79-83. 88. 77-9. Rene 2. 30. 120. 72-4. 38 between habit-memory and regressive memory 35. 17. 16. 36. 107 of the present with the past 58 of the psychological state and the material object 42 of the self 99 of what the other person has said 77 drawing 24-5. 106 development 76 dialectic 72 difference 4. 99-100 distance 18-19. 59. Jacques 5. 123 145 directed toward action 79. 21-2. 119-20. 75. 118. 81. 61-2. 21. 11-13. 131 between infra. 121-2. 15-17. 60. 38. 27-8. 42-4. 12. 34-5. 24. 82 indivisibility 82. 48. 17. 60. 70. 80. Victor xiii Deleuze. 122 between love of family and love of nation 104 in sexuality 95. 55. 48. 105-6 destruction 33. 129 desire 90. 35-6. 42-3. 3. 91 quantitative and qualitative differences 82 between supra-intellectual and infra-intellectual emotions 104 difference of degree xii. 51. 98 difference in kind 89-90. 98 differentiation xiii. 64. 51 direction 2-3. 70. 86. 60. 65. 99. 68. 54. 36. 121 discourse 61-2 disequilibrium/imbalance 87-9. 41 of the material world 48 perception deduced from matter 18 Delbos. 58.Index deduction (continued) consciousness deduced from matter 27. 9. 118. 57. 26. 60. 48. 69 the paradox of the double 99. 19. 89. 37. 60. 30. 39. 72. 17. 124-6 formula for ix. 7. 52. 26. 62-3. 104 between open and closed morality 89-90 between patriotism and mystical love 104 difference in nature 4. 110. 38-9. 65. 26. 56. 24. 115 duplication 7. 117. 8-9. 104. 11. 88. 120 detour 100. 54. 43. 67 of words 70 dogmatism 67-8 doubling 55. 65 of the body 59 of brain cells 39. 34. 32-5. 115. 70. 62. 52. 113 of the personality 26 of physiological labour 15. 120 double viewpoints 69 double vision 26 duality of forces 91 of good sense 56 of matter and memory 43. 22. 83. 101-2. 52 dreams 13. 135 of sexuality 97 of thought 64 the turn of experience as bi-directional 69-70 of what returns from the past to the present 99 discernment 22. 60. 10-11. 22. 133 creative duration 112-15. 91. 127 dualism xi. 81 deep repetition of 98 difference in complication 15 difference in direction 32-5. xiii. 104. Gilles xi-xii. 107.and supra-intellectual emotion 104-6. 22. 106-7 Derrida. 22. 51. 43. 60 the future deduced from the present 11. 9. 89-90 between intuition and language 70-1 between memory and perception 30. 60 between spirit and matter xii diminution 7. 30. 72 the divided line 55-6 division 21. 112-15. 68-70. 83 historical duration 114 inexpressibility of the intuition of 83 the logic of duration 82-3 relationship to things 115 thinking in terms of ix duty 89-90 . 76. 105-7 duration ix-x. 87 of expression 83 of formulas 88 good sense as bi-directional 78 ill-directed industry 97 of the love of all beings 98 misdirection (tromperie) 86. 107 of consciousness with the unconscious 58 double direction of good sense 78 double frenzy 86-7 double movement of the cone 48. 52. 128-33 democracy 109-10 depth 6. 24 discontinuity 7. xiii. 29-32. 97-9. 34. 37. 78. 130 Descartes. 54. 45. 7. 4.

20. 17. 42 external perception 1. 100 elan vital 62. 62. 19-20. 68. 102-3. 99. 113 forgetfulness/forgetting 21. 103-4. 70 human experience 68. detached and discontinuous experience 66. 107. 89. 78. 131-2 element 35-6. 110 religious experience xi of repetition 21 of spirit 30 true experience 67-8 turn of 2. 78-9. 100. 66. 75 force 25. 101 extension 4. 78 process 47-8 religion 87. 69-70 equilibrium 78-9. 43-4. 38. 10. 27. 42-3 identification of consciousness with existence 40 a new philosophical idea of existence 44 of the past 121. 52 effort 31-2. 99. 60. 87 effects 32.146 dynamism dynamic dynamic dynamic 23. 106-7. 68-9 of union with God 102-3 uninterrupted experience 65 of the vital impetus 99 expression 83. 66-7. 89. 16 flow 63. 115 externalisation of the experience of inflexibility 90 external objects 14. 89-90. 101 schema x. 79.17 existence 9. 100 the force of religion or intuition or emotion 99 infra. 47. 121-3 exteriority 13. 54-8. 86. 117-21. 38-9. 104. 99-100 a new and original emotion 105 relation with image 86. 35. 60 the central metaphysical problem of existence 29. 70 of the impetus of love 90 of the instant 21 intersubjective experience 66 of matter 21 of memory 58. 65. 99-102. 9.68 the fabulation function 88-9. 70. 83. 133 factual perception 19. 64-5. 83 exceptional experiences 99 false experience 67 fragmented. 110. 131 form 10. 74. 109 essence 53-4. 105-8.and supra-intellectual 104-7 of the mystic 90.100. 50. 20. 101. 39. 113. 131 emotional disturbances 87. 76. 74. 61 mystical experience xi. 125-7 egoism 88. 75-8 Index of difference 73 of duration 62. 122-3. 29. superior 56. 98-9. 69. 12.103. 21. 50. 85. 131 empiricism 66. 13. 63-4. 91. 54. 97 the unforeseeable 76. 41 of the will and action 102-3 echo 106-7 ecstasis 118-20 ecstasy 79. 49. 10. 88. 72 of alterity or alteration 73. 110 events 51. 76-7 equality 108-9 equilibrium. 82. 7. 70 of consciousness 63. 99-101. 110 created by repetition 107 distinguished from content 108 fluidity of 99 formalized self 99 .90-1. 87 emotion 25. 26. 123-4 two conditions of existence 45-6. 82.28 fleshism 1. 92-3. 102. 74 in the present 20-1 enlargement 2. 95. 76 of a priori conditions 54 of death 61. 36. 70. 83. 126 eternal 54 quasi-eternal singularities 60 ethics x-xi. 4. 24. 62.106. 98-100. 38-40. 110 of obligation's inflexibility 90 of the other 61 of pleasure 95-6 of the reciprocal implication of emotion and image xi. 104-6 fiction 2. 70. 110 creative emotion 79. 102. 87.110 duality of forces 91 foresight 41. 63. 72. 13 of the destruction of the world 13 the flesh 16.99. 76-7 an unrepeatable event 80 evolutionary argument 15. 30. 124 experience 2. 47 feeling 36-8.83.15 external things 1 external world 1-2. 58. 40. 51. 52. 99 classic versus true 66 superior empiricism 99 enclosed in one society 79 in particular linguistic conventions 72. 53.

131 habit 2. 67 the habit of contracting habits 67. 34-5. 35. 106. 120. 112. 28. 52. 101. 60-1. 104. 101 harmony 64. 12 identification of memory with weak sensation 37-8 of consciousness with existence 40-3 identity x. 43. 19-20. 47. 66. 60 nebulosity of 51. 117-18 the force of nature or instinct or habit 99 habit-memory 33-5. 19-20. 3-14. 110. 57. 117-26. 110-11 general ideas 23. 100. 99 history 114 Hoffding. 34 frenzy 86-7. 99-100. 99. 68. 36. 64-5. 124 image xiii. 106-10 divine humanity xi. 40. 134 good sense 2. 107 . 25. 92. 87.Index form (continued) formation of the ears and throat muscles 74 forms of life 111 forms of memory 19. 38. 85. 96. 1. 25. 101-3. 72. 60. Leon 49. 45-6. 103 superior good sense 79. Jean x. 80-3. 22. 101 the future 11. 34-5. 99. 70. 89. 74. 102-3. 105 hearing 64. 56. 96-7 ascetic ideal xi-xii. 110 of the universe 13 imagination ix. 69-70. 131-2 ideas 44. 18. 104. 62. 50. 40. 71 the habit of erasing resemblances between objects and states 40 habituation 89-90 motor habit 52-3. 103. 10. 111. 8. 47. 61. 23. 123-6 already seen 99 the coming moment 81-3 dangers of 88 moving forward into 102 open to progress 110 the past turns back into the future 107 of the species 103 genealogy xi. 131 Hymenoptera 92 the hyphen 33. 18-19. 135 fragmentation of experience 66-7. 103. 56. 106. 72. 56 idle talk 87-8 illusion 8. 120-1 to imagine is not to remember ix. 44-5. 106 idealism 1-5. 78 dynamic 23. 17. 106. Michel 62. 27-8. 95. 9. 117 Bergsonian versus Platonic ideas 56 clear and distinct 23 dynamic and static see general ideas the idea of the darkest night 102 the idea of the good 56-7. 96-9 functions 22-4. 53. 88. 90. 67-8. 112-27. 106 Heidegger. 70. 52-3. 72 hooked and folded 99 of the mystical experience 100. 78. 77 ideal 20-21. 36. 49. 130. 19. 51. 75. 35. 11-13. 121 imitation 99. 76 static and inert 10. 58. 85-6. 108 human experience 2 human fraternity 98 human genus xi. 61. 72-3. 85.74. 81. 108 hunger 94-5 Husserl. 24. 76. 49. 108. 55-6. 14 Hyppolite. 62. 97-8. 129-31 the brain as one image among others 45 of the cone see the cone) of evil spirits 88 of God 108 imaging ix. 135 hesitation 16. 108. 56.60. 23-6 God 13. 29 hypothesis of pure perception 19. 88-9. 61. 47. 103. 6. 77. 11-12. 88. 6. 89 proliferation of 88 relation with emotion 86. 110. Harald 63 homogeneity 10. Edmund 13. 16. 17. 32. 52 hypothesis 2-4. 90. Martin ix-x. 109 grey zone 24. 26 imaged self 99 movement-image 8. 70 freedom 2.70 immobility of ideas 55-6. 109 need to transform humanity 108 super-humanity xi. 78-9. 132 Husson. 50-2. 23. 43. 68. 110 human intelligence 87 leaders of humanity 98 love for all humanity 89. 77. 53. 103 the Greeks 45. 51-2. 53. 108 new forms of freedom and equality 110 the point where form is transformed 107 of what returns 99 Foucault. 76-7. 47. 56. 129 of the pendulum 56. 131-2. 27 hypothesis of weaker and stronger states 36-7 opening hypothesis 2-4. 106. 76-7 genuine experience of matter 7 geometry 6. 32-38. 43. 82 147 humanity 79. 115-16 and necessity 11. 70-4. 128. 32-5. 55. 24.117 hallucinations 13-14. 110.

148 Index intensity of action 18 of sensation 38. 102-3. 17. 126. 35. 27. 19. 23^1 immediate reaction 24 immediately in the midst of ideas 75 immediately in the past 50 linguistic immediacy 61 the immutable 45 impassibility 54. 68-9 immediate communication 8 immediate consciousness xii-xiii. 62-3. 131 intellectual and social plane 83 intellectual work 78 intelligibility 45. 112-13. 69-75. 24-5. 52. 15. 30. 70. 131 tool-making intelligence 92. 63-70 of pure duration 112 of sense 77 thinking starts with intuition 64 as a turning from action to spirit 68 of the whole 76 invention 2. 117 the absolute of language 71 linguistic convention 71-4 linguistic formula 107 particular languages 71. 91-4 intelligence 49-50. 7. 124 disinterestedness 88. 122. 23. 95-6. 124 immediate contact 18 immediate data xii-xiii. 92. 126 of duration in mystical rapture 79 as good sense 78 method of xiii. 107 supra-intellectual emotion 104-5. 3 immediate development 78 immediate experience 2-3. 101. 134 inversion of the senses 64 of thought 68 Israel 108 Jesus Christ 89. 72 the whole of language 71-2. 83 madness 86-8. xii. 53. 44.92-3. 88. 100 morbid states 87.112. 98 indeterminacy 18-19. 33-5. 78. 63. 121. 107 instantaneous 7. 91 phrenesia 86 inspiration 105. 95. 98 . 131 of language 73 two ways of knowing 44 true knowledge 2. 49. 38-40. 98-100. 134 knowledge 2-3. 2. 108. 66 interval 10. 24 indetermination 18. 82 of consciousness 13 immanent sense ix the immediate 61. 99-100. 68. 100 industry 93-4. 61. 76-9. 89-90. 117. 120. 10 language 10. 103. 95 intentionality 27-8 interest 22-23. 100-2. 108. 64. 131 the war instinct 86. 25. 3. 70-1. 51 impetus 62. 53. 77-8. 85. 98-100. 120-7 boundless 103 for Christian mysticism 108 of love 90-1 to move beyond contemplation 102 vital 62. 97 inner life (see interior life) insanity 79. 135 Joan of Arc 108 joy 79. 39. 75. 113-16. 67. 106 impoverishment 76. 97-8. 16. 121. 41. 116-17. 71. 50. 106. 102-3 implication 77. 107. 61-71. 62. 75. 89. 87-8. 61-3. 115. 64. 10. 82-3. 99. 134 interior organization of movement 8 interior life 40. 75 individual action 52 individual consciousness 19 society and individuals 90. 50. 99 intuition x. 115-16 indetermination of motor actions 18 individuality 23. 73-5 philosophy of x. 92 interiority 13. 75 writing 83 immanence xi. 19-20. 107 justice 108-9 absolute justice xi. 116. 129. 103 interruption 64-5 intersubjectivity x. 53. 90-2. 70 immediate perception 19-21. 63. 90-1. 36 quasi-instantaneous section of becoming 48-9 instinct 63-4. 23. 52 plane of intelligence 91. 109-10 formula of 109-10 passion for justice 108 juxtaposition 80 Kant. 105. 92. 80 impersonal 20. 79 internal complication 77 internal continuity 8 internal voice 101. 131 humiliation of 87 infra-intellectual emotion 104. 20-21. Immanuel 54. 122. 25. 70. 118-26. 106 reciprocal implication 100. 23-5. 133 mental illness 87-9.

99. 63. 35 Levinas. 106 of all humanity 89.31-5. 47. 38. 54. 55. 49 regressive memory 33-5. 40-2. 45 material reality 55 material universe 23. 78-9. 57 material world 11-14. 109 more metaphysical than moral 110 mystical love 104 and pleasure 106 of pleasure 96. 68. 23-5. 104. 54. 120. 46. 28. 20 on which tools work 93-4 meaning 2 logical meaning 76 mechanism 16. 102. 69. 58. 104. 131 singular memories 50-1 unconscious memories 69 Merleau-Ponty. 28. 59. 85-6. 28. 39. 32. 41. 123-4. 85. Nicolas 121 materialism. 58-9. 128-30 . 39 motor mechanism 17 mediation 20.47. 60. 50-1. 1. 134 mechanical repetition see repetition magic 88. 81 memory-image (image-souvenir) 33-7. 110 metaphysics of (see metaphysics) pure memories 65. 72. 16. 19-24. 68. 132 life x. 79. 53 as subjective. 127 attention to life 34. 65. 86. 58-9. 72. 124-5 active memory and memorization 32. 51. 128. 42-4. 131 memories (souvenirs) 19—21. 78 memory ix-xi. 94. 9. 49-50. 56. 111 love 62. 64. 124-6 detachment from 88. 49 two forms of memory 19. 34 memory turns back into life 107 the point where memory turns back into life 85-6 requirements of 7 a simpler life 102 a superabundance of 103 light 5-6. 72. 63 memory turns back into life 85-6. 112-13. 107. 30. 101-2 life's necessities 22. 130. 45. 61. 48 materialism 1-5. 15-21. 101-2. 123. 104. 28. 58. 78. 25. 101. 115-16. 40. 63-4. 130 149 machine 15-16. 29 the materiality of our existence 48 the materiality of memory 36-7. 114-17. 107 actualized/materialized in sensations 36-7 connection between two forms of memory 47 constantly new organization 81 effort of memory 19 elimination of memory 20-21 habit-memory 32-5. 25. 110 of all beings 89. 43. 32. 29-30. 106-7. 22. 83-4. 61-2. 77-9 learning a lesson by heart 31-3. 80-1. 60 progressive memory 32. 46-7. 107 not just psychological but ontological 110. 130 as a power absolutely independent of matter 30 primacy of ix. 31-9. 4-5. 7-13. 8. 126-7 animate matter 107 fall into matter 56 material cause and effect 53 material destruction 45 material energy 9 material life 8 material object 22. 92 of the two fold frenzy 99 League of Nations 86 leap 25. 85-6. 39 the plane of the material universe 57 return to matter 69 the source of forgetfulness 56 to turn away from action and matter 68 a vision of matter 8. 49. 68-70. 55. 125 chain of memories 45 conservation of memories 45-6 covered over by others 85 the impassibility of memories 54 inserting memories 16. 39. 114. 49-50. 122. 72. see matter mathematics mathematical point 21 mathematical problem 77 matter xii-xiii. 82. 53. 73. 35. 116-21. 48-52. 119. 1. Emmanuel x. Maurice ix. 43. 10. 53-5. 85. 107. 50-3. 81. 68. 39. 101. 51-3. 42-3. 45-6. 96. 65. 106. 10.Index laughter 8. 75-6. 78. 17.98 romantic love 10 superior love 84 luxury 23. 118 of an invisible and silent presence 101 memorized self 99 memory as an experience 58. 11. 48. 98. personal and interior 19—20 supple memory 117-18 true memory 46-7. 89-91. 58. 88. 28. 104-6. 68-9.18. 42. 117-22. 26-9. 70. 96. 7-8. 98. 133 Malebranche. 21. 61. 69. 30—6. 10 law 18-19. 34-5. 44. 120-1.72. 85. 110.

113. 116. 91. 131 artificial needs see artifice) ascending scale of 96 basic 95 inferior needs 10 for luxuries 94. 104 archaeology of originary experience xi. 69-70. 89. 85. 96 for stability 90 the new ix-x. 78 the outside 12. 53. 99-102. 7. 97-8 mobility 8. mechanism. 89-90. 57 the Milky Way x. xiii. 38-9. 66. 12. 27-8. 67. 105-6. 19-20. 55-7. 108 moral prescriptions 62 moral theory 62. 104-5. 74. 52. 110. 119. 97-9. 101 . 60-1. 91. 110. 104. 44-5. 118-20. 126. 44. 8. 107 mysticism 79. 133 moral duties 67 moral initiators 89 moral judgements 85 moral obligation 89.150 Index habit-memory more natural than regressive memory 34 laws of 124 misdirection of nature 86. 97. 50-2 order of appearance 33 order of perceptions 4 order of the series of objects in space and states in time 41 organization 25. 123 dogmatic metaphysics 67 a metaphysical concept 52 a metaphysical distinction 41 metaphysical dualism xii metaphysics of memory 28-9. 19.21-23. 60. 108. 33. schema. 72-3. 61. 38. xiii. 134-5 charity as the essence of 109 Christian mysticism 102. 110. 50-1. 28. 110. 108 complete and incomplete 102.34. 89-90 particular obligations versus the whole 90 ontology ix-x. 51 misdirection (tromperie) 86. 132-5 metaphysics xi. 112-13 Nietzsche. Friedrich xi. 90-1 open and closed 89. 34. 39. 100. 6-9. 99 openness of the future 41 order 4. 62.58 the other 59. 80-3. 88-9. 81 origin 55. 1-3. 120 of contraction 51-2 from emotion to words 83 of intelligence 50 movement-image 8. 44 love that has no object 89 objectifying look 66 the objective world 3 objectivism x objects in space 40-2. 118. 56-7. 135 mystical experience xi. 60. 129 moving in place 7-8 of the plane 48-9 progressive movement 49 of thought 50 multiplicity x. 97 natural articulations 6. tendency movement x. 86. 47-50. 85. 110 of morality and religion 85 mysticism as a genuine origin 104 of the present 55. 57. 71. 6. 16.41 need 22-25. 99-108. 55. 86-91. 60 morality 71. 50. 129 between asceticism and sexuality 86 circular movement of conditioning 100 of the cone 48-9. 9. 42-3. 130 the central metaphysical problem of existence 29. 101 will of the mystic 102-3 nature 8-10. 110-11. 80. 33. 11. 129. 64. 97 the origins of morality and religion 85-6 motor see habit. 30. 110 mystical love 104. 86. 60. 9 natural continuity of images 10 natural function of procreation 97 natural image 9 natural love absorbed into a supernatural feeling 106 natural necessity 34 natural need 90 natural obedience to obligation 90 natural order 10 natural restoration of balance 88 source of static religion 89 trumpery of 86. 55. 121-2 music 96. 51-4. 99. 72. 85-6. 61-2. 57. 16 . 110. 76. 110 open 10. 67. 80. 131 deceived by humanity 97 denaturation 10 objectivity 4. 110 and war 91-2 necessity 11. 38. 33. 70-1. 103. 32. 129 monism xii-xiii. 82. 123-4 obligation 33. 85-6. 40. 69. 57. 100. 59-61. 14-17. 43. 28. 60. 106 mystical rapture 79. 58. 69. 101. 87. 67. 40 open morality 89-90. 105-8.

57. 44. 28-30.10 of vision 5. 62-3. 100-1. 85-6. 76. 91. 35-8. 43-50. 42-5. 72 photography 24. 72 modern philosophy 44-5 philosophical method xiii. 38^0. 77. 60 Platonic reminiscence 55-7. 73. 78. 112. 53-7. 49-51. 32-3. 51. 33-5. 99. 107 of representation 46-8 151 Plato 55-8. 78. 49. 9. 72. 75. 63-4. 19. 22. 10 plane of immanence xii of intelligence 91. 77 return of 99 thinking in terms of the past 57 vision fades into the past 102 pendulum 56. 76. 58 badly stated problems 2 procreation see sense progress 32. 53. 14. 1. 49. 78 the point where memory turns back into life 85-6 prayer 107 pregnancy 6. 116 irreversibility of the past 81-2 past as container of the present 46 past life 33-5 a past that was never present 54-6. 131 of the vital impetus 99 practicality 68. 81. 28. 108 perception ix. 2. 107. 28. 58. 61. 47. 96 priority of intuition over language 62-3 of language over intuition 61-2 of movement over things 8. 4-5. 82. 47-8. 107. 105-7 Plotinus 126 plurality 6-7. 8. 60. 28 physical qualities 5 piano 7 picture 5-6. 27. 32. 101. 82 the present situation 76. 64 problems 50. 1. 60 Plato's republic 109 Platonic ideas 55-6. 96. 116 knowledge of the past 114 mythological present of Platonic ideas 55 a past that was never present (see the past) presentation to consciousness 42-5. 24. 82. 18. 60 phenomenology of perception 18. 27—8. 110-11 pleasure 94-8. 1-2. 60 thick perception 20. 27 to perceive is not to remember ix perception repeats memory 55 perceptual images 32-3. 36.Index pain 35-7. 28. 117. 7. 13. 52-8. 75. 100-1. 102. 80 the past 20-21. 127 poverty 23. 70. 60. 103 efficacious presence 88 invisible presence 101 the present 11. 122 Platonic sun x. 111 reversing Platonism ix-xi. 25. 16-17. 38. 28-9. 82 painting 26 passage 53-5. 130 phenomenological elaborations of sense 77 phenomenological reduction 2 philosophy of language x. 40. 105. 78. 117-21. 122. 58. 68-70. 20-21. 102. 99 impotence of pure memory 39. 80. 67. 19 poetry 80. 55-8. 131 the past truly given in the present 21 the past turns back into the present 107 the present repeats the past 58. 40-2 the present repeats the past 58. 124-6 coexistence of the past with the present 55 distinction between past and present 113. 98. 88. 17-25. 65. 28-9. 55. 53. 52. 123. 68-9. 99. 125. 130 deduced from matter 18. 11. 28. 130 power 38-9. 55. 52. 60. 35-6. 34-5. 89. 113-26 being denned in terms of the past 49 coexistance of the past with the present 55 distinction between past and present 113. 54. 60 Platonism ix-x. 49. 109 anti-Platonism 111 Platonic forgetfulness 56-8. 82 regions of the past 46. 44-5. 4. 60. 11. 78 the pure present 53 pride 93. 5. 26. 47 true perception of matter 65 the unperceived 7. 55-8. 79 presence x. 44-6. 80 progression 55 . 23. 41-2 personality 106-7 perversion 58-9 phenomenology ix—x. 51. 49. 115. 112-14. 38. 48-9 the present as a function of the past 54 present consciousness 57 present experience 54 present image 22 present objects 29. 81-2 primacy ofi x.

52. 50. 58-9. 110 pure movement 62 pure past 55 pure perception 1. 133 perception repeats memory 55 the present repeats the past 58 repeatability of the form 98 of the same 21. 100 reversal ix. 14 realism 1-2. 27. 124 creative repetition 107 of difference 98 mechanical repetition 107. 17. 45. 126. 49.152 Index reflection 24. 112. 62. 51.134 prolongation 15. 65. 46. 61. 91. 108-9 psychology xiii. 112. 117 resemblance 40-1. 80-1. 76. 39. 63. 61. 40 psychological analysis 3 the psychological domain 40. 121 . 99 relativity of particular languages 71 relative justice 109 of sense 75 to the universe 22 relaxation 58-9. 28-9. 101 auto-affection 99. 72. 32-3. 9-10. 52-A. 100 psychological theories of association 36 reality of psychological states 45 punster (faiseur de calembours) 83 purity pure action 56 pure alteration 62 pure becoming 62 pure consciousness xii pure contemplation 56 pure duration xiii. 130 creative emotions precede representations 104-5 engendering representations 29 object of mystic's love cannot be represented 106 the plane of my actual representation of the universe 46-7 veracity of our representations 13 reproduction 33-4. 60. 3. 103 property 92 proportion 18-19. 47 adds nothing new to the image 22 as objective. 17. 77. 94. 114 pure experience of death 59 pure experience of life 58-9 pure forgetfulness 56 pure image 4 pure knowledge 14 pure memory 36. 77 Schneider 26 science xii. 25 scientific attitude 12 the scientific body 16 schizophrenia 26 sensation 36-8. 124. 118-19. 7. 4. 126 attentive and inattentive recognition 72-4 auscultation 65-6. 78-9. 19-20. 54. 125 religion 85-90. 104-7. 90-1. 58. 78. 82. 123. 12. 29. 110-11 reversing Platonism see Platonism rhythm 7. 1067 resistance 90-2. 22. 44. 114. 1. 101. Jean-Paul x. 118. 80 promises 33. 49-51. 3. 122 repetition 32-5. 22-24. 38-9. 126 reflex 15. 39. 21. Arthur 115 Rousseau. 19-25. 53. 101 false recognition 125 reductionism 1-2. 101. 70. 19. 9. 18 reality 1.14. 121. 91. 43 psychological error 89-90 psychological state of tension 90 psychological states of unbalance 89. 12-14. 66 of spirit xii. 7. 50. 129 Rimbaud. 112. 47. 32-3. 134 innate science of the mystic 103 metaphysics as a science 69 the remotest aspiration of xii. 75. 16. 109. 17. Max x schema 25. 98. 40. 64. 44-5. 25. 4. 133-4 reminiscence 56-8. 78. Jean-Jaques 105. 35. 95. 53. 43. 30-1. 87-8. 121. 4. 30-1. 105-6. 64. 73. 55. 16. 109. 48. 104-6. 40. 57-8. 64. 7. 129-30 Scheler. 72-4. 98 representation x. 98-9. 93-4 inert schema 10 motor schema 74-5. 25. 98 Sartre. 41. 104-5. 30 intuition irreducible to unintelligent feeling 50 conditions of experience irreducible to experience 54 the same x. 65. 36. 52. 74. 30 recognition 26. 36. impersonal and external 20 as superficial repetition 21 pure variation 62 pure vision 20-3 questions relating to subject and object ix the question of where memories are stored 33 the real 10. 56. 117. 29-30. 50.

116-25 evil spirits 88 grafted onto matter 21 independent reality of spirit 58 intuition as a turning to spirit 68 of invention 94 palpable experience of 30 sexual pleasure not spiritual 96 spirit of invention 10. 100. 69. 28 listening to time 65 questions of subject and object put in terms of ix reconceiving time 57 states in time and objects in space 40 . 78-9 immanent sense ix procreative sense 96-7. 83.106. 8. 9. 8. 94 spirit of philosophy 71 spiritual auscultation 65 spiritual energy 9 spiritualism 2 153 spiritualization of impressions 15 the war-spirit 92.58-9 of the past 80-1. 79. 81. 99 the senses 24. 113. xiii. 39. 24. 27-8. 55. 57. 28 symbol 10. 130 symbolic attitude 8 symbolic vision 76. 97-9. 59. 53 sentir 64-5 Sinn 2. 100 intellectual and social plane 83 language as social 61-2 sociability and unsociability 92 social cohesion 88-9. 67-8. 77-8. 30-1. 17 time ix. 35. 129 democratic society 109 habits and conventions of 79. 31. 28-9. 106 relationship to duration 115 thinking/thought ix. 91-2 social life 67-8. 74. 10-11. 49.101-3. 97 stars 102. 126-7 ancient thought 45 generated by creative emotions 79 the movement of thought 56 the relation of thought to the unthought 62-3 speaking without thought 74 thought of being 60 thought experiment 13-15. 51. 4. 94-7. 57. 68. 98.51. 81. 114-15. 117-18. 105 sens 2-3. 16. 20 moral theories 62. 45. 122 spirit xii-xiii. 52. xiii. 72-3. 76-7. 40-2. 106-7 elevation of 101 memory of 31 of the mystic 102-3 space ix. 28.Index sense 10. 58. 130 Shakespeare. 104. 19-20. Madame de 83-4. 92. 60. 45. 109-10. 115 survival 31-3.110 sympathy 66 telescope x-xi. 53-4. 34. 13. 49 conscious subjectivity 49 subjectivism x. 123-4 speculation 2. 11. 130 corporeal things 114 a thing that moves 8 love of all things 89. 98. 42-4. 55. 106. 100-1. 59. 25 theory of perception 11 theories of association 36 things 4. 60. 21. 52. 82-3. 112. 70-1. 75. 14. 68-9. 130 tendency 23. 129 the soul 12. 101 St John of the Cross 102 subjectivity 4. 1. 72. 55. 56 different ontological senses of matter and memory 42 fluidity of 99 good sense 2. 39. 56-7. 97-9 senses of being x. 70. 77-9. 99. 40-2. 30. 20. 123 common sense 2-3. 112-13. 56-7. William 83 singularity x. 11. 62-3. 72-4. 64. 56. 85 theoretical justification 85 theoretical objectives 87-9 theoretism 62 theory of duration 63 theory of intuition 63 theory of pure perception 20. 60 succession 6. 70. 114-15 and the body 12. 88 social needs 3. 18-19. 39. 42-3. 77 static ideas see general ideas static religion 87-8. 19. 92 and individuals 90. 98. 6. 111. 83 of representations 33 switchboard/telephonic desk 15-17. 61. 29. 107. 65. 31. 40. 47. 68. 75. 77. 58-60. 101. 114-15 depths of 79. 57. 70-1 social solidarity extended 98 socialization of the truth 3. 48. 100. 80-1 of memories 33. 49. 65-6. 24. 62-4. 110-11. 54. 64. 8. 132 staticity 23. 50. 45. 34. 121. 50-3. 70 Sevigne. 106 singular events 77 singularity of the future 81 society closed society 92. 106-7. 98 motor tendency 25 tests 100-3 theory 2-3. 78. 134 sexuality 86. 44. 79. 90. 124 Aristotle's view reversed ix. 39.

118 of obligation 33. 38.71. 110 transmission and division of movement 17 trumpery see direction unbalance see imbalance the unconscious x. 75 of memory 82. 53 virtual instinct 71 virtual invisibility 55. 85. 107. 41. 44. Michel 62 training 74. 101-3. 103. 73-5. 75. 45-6. 35. 40.154 Index 92-4 vision 5-8. 89. 103.90 of the past 41. 131 the useful 69 useful action 53 useful effect repeated 32. 47. 95. 60.45. 77. 82. 121 genius of the will 103 of the mystic 102-3 will to live 99 will to power 28 wit (espirit) 83-4 words 73-5. 24. 77-8 unity 6. 73. 46 Urdoxa 3 utility 2-3. 124 will 41. 70. 64. 54.107. 44.101-3. 17. 53. 106 the world 11-14. 102-3 vital need for food 86 vital schema 117 voice 100-1. 91-4. 64. 64-6. 39. 50. 72 uselessness 34 vanity 93. 14. 44 unconscious spirit 13 unconsciousness as impotence 39 understanding 2. 124 world politics 86 a world without others 62. 10-15. 122. 24. 69-70 unconscious operations of memory 32 unconscious psychical states 39. 120 unconscious material point 23 unconscious memories 42. 22. 117. 106. 93 transcendence xi. 7. 62 transcendent being 13 transformation xi.110 visual unity 9 vitality 52 vital impetus (elan vital) 62. 73 tools ton 67 touch 18. 27. 65 virtual multiplicity 121-2 of war 92 Zeno's paradoxes x . 64-6 Tournier. 76. 46. 106. 48. 57-8. 82 virtual identity 9 virtual image 24. 32. 9. 43. 67-9. 91-8 essential versus accidental 93-4 the war-instinct 86. 106-7 of the continuity of inner life 79 of creative action 121 of death 88 foresight 87-8 of the ideas 56 an invisible but efficacious presence 88 of matter 8. 115. 52. 101. 68. 43 of images 27 of language 71-2. 20 of the mystic 87. 22. 107 of singularities 58 symbolic vision 76. 96-7 Wesen 53-4 the whole x. 6-8. 35. 96. 126 whole-part relation 7. 98-100. 19-25. 118. 23. 109 universe 12-13. 36. 83. 107. 36. 100-1. 90. 73. 10-15. 61. 19-20 vibration 4. 106. 57. 38. 15-18. 56-7. 91.81-2 of space 41 never given x. 103. 49. 107-8 silent voice 101. 120. 107 war 86. 134 verbalism 71 veridical hallucination 13-14. 22. 99. 50. 101 virtuality 5. 102-3. 89 universality x. 91. 50. 9. 10. 63. 103.

You're Reading a Free Preview

/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->