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REVISED QUIZZER IN CIVIL LAW ATTY. RONEY JONE P. GANDEZA Premiere Law Review Centre & College of Law, Baguio Colleges Foundation Baguio City PRELIMINARY TITLE 1. Is there any difference in their legal effect between ignorance of the law and ignorance or mistake of fact? Yes, there is a difference. While ignorance of the law is not an excuse for not complying with it, ignorance of the fact eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence. In addition, mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. Mistake of fact may, furthermore, vitiate consent in a contract and make it voidable. 2. What are the exceptions to the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect? The following are the exceptions to the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect: 1. When the law itself expressly provides for its retroactivity. (Art. 4, NCC) 2. When the law is penal insofar as it favors the accused who is not a habitual criminal, even though at the time of the enactment of such law final sentence has already been rendered. (Art. 22, RPC) 3. When the law creates new or vested rights. (Arts. 2253, 2263, NCC) 4. When the law is procedural so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. 5. When the law is curative in character in the sense that the purpose for its enactment is to cure defects or imperfections in judicial or administrative proceedings. 6. laws. 3. Ortigas sold to Herminia in 1975 a parcel of land situated at Greenhills Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila. Their Contract of Sale provided that the property shall be used exclusively for residential purposes and that not more than one single-family building will be constructed thereon, the plans and specifications of which must be approved by Ortigas. The contract also provided that no sign or billboard shall be erected on the roof of the residential building for advertising purposes. These restrictions were annotated on Herminia’s title and shall run until December 31, 2025. In 1981, the Metro Manila Commission enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 or the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. Under such ordinance, a portion of the Greenhills Subdivision was reclassified as a commercial area. Hence, on June 8, 1984, Herminia leased to Susana the lot sold to her by Ortigas. Susana immediately constructed on the lot a When the law is interpretative of other
single-storey commercial building for her car sales company. When Ortigas learned about Susana’s construction, it immediately filed suit to stop the construction and for it to be demolished on the ground that it violated the restrictions of the sale. Ortigas contended that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on Herminia’s title, said restrictions must prevail over MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, more so because these restrictions were agreed upon before the passage of the ordinance. Ortigas contended further that the ordinance should be given prospective application only in the absence of a provision in said ordinance providing for its own retroactivity. Is Ortigas correct? Ortigas is not correct. In general, laws are to be construed as having only prospective application. Only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to a contract necessarily surpasses the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts. But the foregoing principles admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights and contracts. Police power legislation to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people is applicable not only to future contracts but equally to those already in existence. The ordinance in question is a legitimate police power measure and must therefore be read into every contract. When a portion of the Greenhills Subdivision was reclassified as a commercial area, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and Herminia limiting all constructions on the disputed lot to single family residential buildings were deemed extinguished by the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced. (Ortigas and Co. Ltd., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000) 4. Arthur and Belinda, both Filipino citizens, were married in Manila in 1937. Arthur left the Philippines in 1938 and subsequently became an American citizen in 1943. In 1952, Arthur divorced Belinda in California due to irreconcilable differences. In 1958, he married Clarita in Manila and cohabited with her until his death in 1985. Before his death, Arthur executed a last will and testament leaving all his properties to Clarita and their three children. In 1986, Belinda filed for the settlement of Arthur’s estate claiming that she, not Clarita, is Arthur’s surviving legal wife. She claims that the divorce decree obtained by Arthur in California is not valid in the Philippines and that therefore his marriage to Clarita is not valid. (a) Who between Belinda and Clarita is Arthur’s surviving legal wife?
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Clarita, not Belinda, is Arthur’s surviving legal wife. Since it was not disputed that Arthur was already an American citizen when he divorced Belinda, when he married Clarita, and when he executed his last will and testament, Philippine law does not apply to all these juridical incidents, but Arthur’s national law. The divorce, therefore, is valid as to Arthur, and Belinda was no longer Arthur’s legal wife. The divorce being valid, the marriage of Arthur and Clarita is also valid. Clarita, therefore, is Arthur’s surviving legal spouse. (Llorente vs. Llorente, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000) (b) What law governs the validity of Arthur’s will? The formal validity of Arthur’s will is governed by Philippine law, the same having been executed in the Philippines. However, the intrinsic validity of the provisions thereof is governed by Arthur’s national law pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code. 5. Juan is a Filipino citizen residing in Tokyo, Japan. State what law governs: (a) Juan’s capacity to contract marriage in Japan. Juan’s capacity to contract marriage in Japan is governed by Philippine law, that is, by the Family Code. This is pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that laws relating to the legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad. (b) Juan’s successful rights as regards his deceased Filipino father’s property in California. By way of exception to the general rule on lex rei sitae under the first paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code, a person’s successional rights are governed by the national law of the decedent. Since Juan’s deceased father was a Filipino citizen, Philippine law governs Juan’s successional rights as regards his deceased father’s property in California. (c) The extrinsic validity of the last will and testament which Juan executed while sojourning in Switzerland. The extrinsic validity of Juan’s will is governed by (a) Swiss law, the law of the place where the will was made, following the rule on lex loci celebrationis under paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Civil Code; or (b) Philippine law, by implication from the provisions of Article 816 of the Civil Code which allows even an alien who is abroad to make a will in conformity with our Civil Code. (d) The intrinsic validity of said will. The intrinsic validity of Juan’s will is governed by Philippine law, the same being his national law. (Art. 16, par.2, NCC ) 6. A Chinese donated in Germany in favor of a Filipino a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. (a) The law of which country governs the formalities of the donation?
The law of the Philippines – lex rei sitae – governs the formalities of the donation. The lex loci celebrationis doctrine enunciated under paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Civil Code does not apply because the transaction relates to land and must therefore be governed by the law of the place where the land is situated. (b) The law of which country governs the capacity of the Chinese to make the donation? The law of the Philippines – lex rei sitae – governs the capacity of the Chinese to alienate. Here, the doctrine of national law under Article 15 of the Civil Code yields precisely because the subject matter is land. (c) The law of which country governs the intrinsic validity of the donation? The law of the Philippines – lex rei sitae – governs the intrinsic validity of the donation. The general rule on lex loci voluntatis (law of the place voluntarily agreed upon) or lex loci intentionis (law of the place intended) yields to the lex rei sitae rule because the subject matter is land. 7. X, Swiss citizen and resident of Baguio City for the last forty years, died in that city leaving six children and real and personal properties located in the Philippines. In his last will and testament executed in Switzerland where the institution of forced heirs does not exist, he designated as his sole heir his eldest son. Can the other children of X question the validity of the will in the probate proceedings filed before our courts? The other children of X cannot question the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of their father’s last will and testament. Extrinsically, the will is valid on the presumption that X had executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed in Switzerland, which is all at once the place of execution, his country, and his domicile ( Arts. 17 and 816, NCC). Intrinsically, the will is also valid. The designation of the eldest son as sole heir is valid, and will not properly constitute preterition as the term is technically understood under Philippine law, because after all in Switzerland, of which the deceased was a national, there are no forced or compulsory heirs. It is clearly that the intrinsic validity of this provision shall be governed not by Philippine law but by Swiss law. (Art. 16, par.2) 8. Jeffrey, an American citizen, executed a last will and testament in the Philippines wherein he stated in paragraph 1 thereof that his estate shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine laws. Is such a testamentary provision valid? Such a testamentary provision is not valid because it is contrary to the provision of paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code which explicitly declares that it will be the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration that will govern. (Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358)
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9. What is meant by renvoi ? Renvoi literally means a referring back. The problem of renvoi arises when there is a doubt as to whether a reference to a foreign law for decision is a reference to the internal law of said foreign law or is a reference to the whole of the foreign law, including its conflicts rules. 10. X, a Californian domiciled in the Philippines, dies leaving several properties, valued at more than P50 Million, located in Makati City. In his will, he gave all of these properties to his brother Y. To his illegitimate children A and B, he left legacies of P1 Million each. Under the internal law of California, these testamentary dispositions are valid while under the internal law of the Philippines, there is an impairment of the legitime of A and B. Under the conflicts rule of California, the domiciliary principle is followed; the internal law of the Philippines (which is the decedent’s domicile) respecting legitimes shall, therefore, be applied. On the other hand, under the conflicts rule of the Philippines, the nationality principle is followed; the internal law of California (of which the decedent is a national) which does not recognize the system of legitime shall, therefore, be applied. A Philippine court is now sitting in judgment to determine the validity or invalidity of the above testamentary dispositions. Which law shall be applied? In Aznar vs. Christensen-Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, the Supreme Court accepted the renvoi. As applied to the above problem, the answer is as follows: The law of the Philippines shall be applied. Under the second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil Code, the national law of X shall govern. According to the internal law of California, the testamentary dispositions are valid, but then its conflicts rule also says that the internal law of X’s domicile shall govern and not the law of California. So, the case is referred back (renvoi) to the internal law of the Philippines. The Philippine court must, therefore, apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law rule of California, X’s national law. HUMAN RELATIONS 11. Romeo Jader was a law student at the UE College of Law from 1984 to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (school year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. His incomplete grade in Practice Court 1 notwithstanding, he was allowed to enroll for the second semester as a fourth year law student. On February 1, 1988, he filed an application for the removal of his incomplete grade in Practice Court 1 which was approved by the dean after payment of the required fee. Subsequently, he took the removal examination in Practice Court 1 but his professor belatedly gave him a failing grade. In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws as of second semester with the annotation about his failing grade in Practice Court 1. In the invitation for the graduation ceremonies scheduled on April 16, 1988, the name of Jader appeared as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared the annotation that it was a tentative list, and that degrees will be conferred upon the candidates who satisfactorily completed all the academic requirements as approved by the DECS. Jader attended the graduation ceremonies during which he went up the stage when his name was called, and he was thereafter handed by the dean a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion and then tendered a blow-out that evening. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job and enrolled at a pre-bar review class. But when he learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not allowed to take the bar examination. Aggrieved by his failure to take the 1988 bar examination, Jader filed a suit for damages against UE. Will the suit prosper? Yes, the suit will prosper. In belatedly informing Jader of the result of his removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar examinations, the school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. It is the school that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school for instance by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are useless. However, while the school is guilty of negligence and thus liable to Jader for the latter’s actual damages, it is not liable to Jader for moral damages. As a senior law student, Jader should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, it is not therefore correct to conclude that Jader has suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar examinations. If Jader was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the
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subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet. (University of the East vs. Jader, 325 SCRA 804) 12. On March 10, 1993, X purchased a Toyota Corolla from Toyota Shaw for which he made a downpayment of P164,000.00, the balance of the purchase price to be paid in 24 equal monthly installments. X thus issued 24 post-dated checks for the amount of P14,976.00 each. The first was dated April 10, 1991; subsequent checks were dated every 10th day of each succeeding month. To secure the balance of the purchase price, X executed a promissory note and a contract of chattel mortgage over the vehicle in favor of Toyota Shaw. The contract of chattel mortgage, in paragraph 11 thereof, provided for an acceleration clause stating that should the mortgagor default in the payment of any installment, the whole amount remaining shall become due. Toyota Shaw later assigned the note and mortgage contract to RCBC. All the checks dated April 10, 1991 to January 10, 1993 were thereafter encashed and debited by RCBC from X’s account, except for RCBC Check No. 279805 representing the payment for August 10, 1991, which was unsigned. Previously, the amount represented by RCBC Check No. 279805 was debited from X’s account but was later recalled and re-credited to him. Because of the recall, the last two checks, dated February 10, 1993 and March 10, 1993, were no longer presented for payment. This was purportedly in conformity with the bank’s procedure that once a client’s account was forwarded to its account representative, all remaining checks outstanding as of the date the account was forwarded were no longer presented for payment. On the theory that X defaulted in his payment, the check representing the payment for August 10, 1991 being unsigned, RCBC, in a letter dated January 21, 1993, demanded from X the payment of the balance of the debt, including liquidated damages. X refused, prompting RCBC to file an action for replevin and damages. X, in his answer, interposed a counterclaim for damages. Is X entitled to his counterclaim for damages? Yes. Article 1170 of the Civil Code states that those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of delay are liable for damages. The delay in the performance of the obligation, however, must be either malicious or negligent. Thus, assuming that X was guilty of delay in the payment of the value of the unsigned check, he cannot be held liable for damages. There is no imputation, much less evidence, that X acted with malice or negligence in failing to sign the check. Such omission was mere “inadvertence” on the part of X. The bank’s blind and mechanical invocation of paragraph 11 of the contract of chattel mortgage was unwarranted. The bank’s conduct, in the light of the circumstances of this case can only be described as mercenary. The bank had already debited the value of the unsigned check from X’s account only to re-credit it much later to him. Thereafter, the bank encashed checks subsequently dated, then abruptly refused to
encash the last two. More than a year after the date of the unsigned check, the bank, claiming delay and invoking paragraph 11 of the chattel mortgage contract, demanded from X payment of the value of said check and that of the last two checks, including liquidated damages. This whole controversy could have been avoided if only the bank bothered to call X and ask him to sign the check. Good faith not only in compliance with its contractual obligations, but also in observance of the standard of human relations, for every person “to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith,” behooved the bank. Failing thus, the bank is liable for damages caused to X. These include moral damages for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation suffered by the latter (Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 449). 13. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes in the aggregate amount of P1.7 Million. Cojuangco sent letters of demand to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) for the collection of the prizes due him. However, Fernando Carrascoso, who was then the Chairman of the PCSO, consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) who had earlier issued a sequestration order against Cojuangco’s properties. Finally, on January 30, 1991, Cojuangco commenced an action for recovery of his prize winnings and damages against Carrascoso. Is Carrascoso liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code? Yes, Carrascoso is liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under this article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one’s duties. Cojuangco’s right to the use of his property was duly impeded. While Carrascoso may have relied upon PCGG’s instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefore. A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of Cojuangco. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The withholding of the prize winnings of Cojuangco without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law (Cojuangco vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602). Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that the right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. The court may also award nominal damages in every case
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where a property right has been invaded. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts, with the relevant circumstances taken into account. 14. When the accused in a criminal action is acquitted, can a civil action for damages for the same act or omission still be instituted by the aggrieved party? It depends. If the acquittal of the accused is on the ground that he did not commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is as general rule no longer possible. There are however, two exceptions to this rule. They are: first, where the civil action is based on obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony (Arts. 31, 2177, NCC); and second, where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal. action (Arts. 32, 33, 43 NCC) 15. What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements ? A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involve in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000 limits a prejudicial question to a “ previously instituted civil action” in order to minimize possible abuses by the subsequent filing of a civil action as an afterthought for the purpose of suspending the criminal action. Under said provision, a prejudicial question has two essential elements, namely: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 16. Vicente contracted marriage twice: the first was with Thelma on April 10, 1976, and the second was with Consuelo on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, Consuelo sued Vicente for bigamy. On November 13, 1992, Vicente filed an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Thelma. On May 6, 1993, the court declared as null and void the marriage between Vicente and Thelma. In the criminal case for bigamy, however, Vicente was convicted by the court of the crime of bigamy despite his defense that since the first marriage was declared null and void, such marriage is deemed not to have taken place at all, hence, the element of a previous subsisting marriage for the crime of bigamy was absent. The lower court ruled that since Vicente contracted the second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, he was a married man when he contracted the marriage, hence, guilty of the crime of bigamy. Is Vicente guilty of bigamy?
Yes, Vicente is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code requires prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Only the courts may determine and declare the nullity of a marriage. So long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of a requisite of marriage is, the intervention of the courts must be resorted to. Since the second marriage was contracted before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, all the elements of the crime of bigamy are present. ( Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000) (NOTE: We subscribe to the dissenting opinion of Justice Vitug in the Mercado vs. Tan case. He wrote: “The Family Code has not overturned the rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is committed when a person contracted a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved. Only a valid or voidable marriage is dissolved. A marriage void ab initio is not dissolved because in the eyes of the law it never took place. Its nullity is merely declared. To commit bigamy, the first marriage must be a valid or a voidable marriage. Since the first marriage of Vicente was void initio, there was no valid prior marriage subsisting at the time of his second marriage, hence, no crime of bigamy was committed.”) CIVIL PERSONALITY 17. Distinguish juridical capacity from capacity to act.
Juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, while capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effects. The former is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death while the latter is merely acquired and may be lost even before death. (Art. 37, NCC) 18. What is the effect if there is a doubt as to which of two persons, who are called to succeed each other, died first? If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. (Art. 43, NCC) 19. What are the presumptions survivorship under the Rules of Court? on
The presumptions on survivorship under the Rules of Court are those provided for in Rule 132, Sec. 5 (jj). They are as follows: When two persons perish in the same calamity, such as a wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes according to the following rules:
as the beneficiaries. Gandeza Page 6 of 53 1. Under Article 43 of the Civil Code. 5. and his son Willy. Rules of Court. the former is presumed to have survived. The estate of P6 million will. Under this presumption. 4. but Article 43 is clear. it is clear that X and Y are presumed to have died at the same time. Willy’s surviving heirs are his mother. therefore. and the sexes be different. the name of Sarah Zita’s mother was erroneously entered in her birth record as Rosemarie Canon. the male is presumed to have survived. that during the registration of the birth of Sarah Zita. there is no proof as to which of two persons died firs. as this dispute does not involve succession. the name of Sarah Zita was erroneously entered in her birth record as Sarah Zita Erasmo instead of Sarah Zita Canon. can Wilma successfully claim that one-half of the proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate? This time Wilma can invoke the presumptions of survivorship and claim that one-half of the insurance proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate. and to correct the name of her mother as appearing in her birth certificate from Rosemarie Canon to Maria Rosario Canon. E and F cannot represent Y in the succession. and during such cohabitation. If both be over 15 and under 60. were killed in a vehicular accident. (b) Suppose Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife. Gertrude filed a petition in court for the correction of entries in the record of birth of her niece. Jaime’s only surviving heir is his wife. Consequently. the changes sought by Gertrude were undoubtedly substantial: first. While in Europe. If they are not called upon to succeed each other. there is no proof as to which of two persons died first. Julia. there shall be no transmission of successional rights from one to the other. Thus. Jaime. If one be under 15 or over 60. In her petition. they must have died during a calamity. the person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have survived the one whose age was over 60 at the time of their death. should be presumed to have survived longer? Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy had a hereditary share in his father’s estate. The above presumption is very different from the presumptions of survivorship embodied in the Rules of Court. Summary proceedings provided under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct clerical. Sarah Zita Erasmo. Wilma. Will the petition prosper? The petition will not prosper. How shall X’s estate be divided? Applying Article 43 of the Civil Code. 23. Y. An exception with respect to representation should have been made. age 58. they are called to succeed each other.” as in Sarah Zita’s case. while the other half shall pass to D. There is no proof as to which of them died first. second. spelling. so long as they died during a calamity. He is survived by: (1) his daughter D. however. (2) his grandchildren E and F. they are not called to succeed each other. the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings. X left a fortune of P6 million. children of the predeceased son Z. who is 25. the younger is presumed to have survived. The presumption on survivorship under the Rules of Court by virtue of which X is presumed to be the survivor cannot be applied because the two are called upon to succeed each other. Willy. If the two persons who died are called upon to succeed each other. the latter is presumed to have survived. and (3) his grandchildren G and H. the petition was filed to correct the entry in the record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo to Sarah Zita Canon. her sister begot Sarah Zita Erasmo. her sister told her that she was not legally married to the father of Sarah Zita. paragraph 5. Hence. When is the presumption given in Article 43 of the Civil Code applicable? How about the presumptions on survivorship? The presumption given in Article 43 of the Civil Code is applicable if the following requisites are present: first. Julia.) 22. in which all intended parties are impleaded and due process is observed. and his son Willy. typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. the presumptions of survivorship under the Rules of Court shall apply. 2. be divided as follows: one-half (1/2) thereof shall pass to G and H by right of representation. who is 65. Where the effect of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person form “legitimate” to “illegitimate. The presumptions on survivorship. and third. If both were under the age of 15 years. there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. In the present case. Consequently. There is no proof as to who died first. Substantial alterations or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings. Dura lex. If both were above the age of 60 years. she alleged that her sister Maria Rosario Canon had a common-law relationship with a certain Roberto Erasmo. and the other between these ages. can Wilma successfully claim that her late husband. and his wife. who is also Willy’s mother. and second. are applicable if the following requisites are present: first. as beneficiary. two persons “who are called upon to succeed each other” are presumed to have died at the same time. 3. the older is presumed to have survived. had a hereditary share since he was much younger than his father and. Article 43 of the Civil Code shall apply. on the other hand. Not only that. in the absence of proof as to which of them died first. X. (NOTE: The above answer is clearly unjust as far as E and F are concerned. therefore. Roney Jone P. under Section 3 (jj). children of Y.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. 20. if the sexes be the same. and his son. 21. If one be under 15 and the other above 60. The estate of Willy which is endowed with judicial personality stands in place and stead of Willy. then the older. Rule 131. which they shall divide equally. she . regardless of whether they died during a calamity or not. instead of Maria Rosario Canon. sed lex. (a) In the settlement of Jaime’s estate. died in a plane crash. Julia.
Explain the requirement of parental advice under the Family Code. .Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. the proper recourse is an adversarial contest. (Navarro vs. The duty of the local civil registrar to issue a marriage license is only ministerial. The marriage license in this case is valid because it was issued by the Civil Registrar (Arts. as well as her successional and other rights. solemnized a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction. the marriage is perfectly valid. Elias and Fely. an adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out her allegations. will she be allowed to marry here? Yes. 30. May the local civil registrar validly withhold the issuance of a marriage license if he personally knows of an impediment to the marriage of the applicants? No. 18. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature. Furthermore. together with the written advice given.” thereby transforming the filiation of the child from legitimate to illegitimate. and not to grant or deny substantial rights. 29. at his own instance or at the instance of any interested party (Art. it would affect her legitimacy. Is this requirement indispensable for the validity of the marriage? According to Article 15 of the Family Code. the marriage is valid. and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” Consequently. By its nature. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. Labrador. Is the marriage valid? The marriage is valid. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought.” But to enforce such provision. 1974. both single and 25 years of age. It is evident from the above provision that the requirement of parental advice is not indispensable for the validity of the marriage. To hold otherwise is tantamount to a denial of due process to third parties and the whole world (Republic vs. The solemnization by a judge of a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction is merely a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 of the Family Code which. or administratively liable. and the latter solemnized their marriage right there and then. any contracting party between the age of 21 and 25 shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. shall be attached to the application for marriage license. although the parties are criminally. the change may also embarrass her because of the social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. 259 SCRA 137. He then brought them to a licensed minister in a restaurant behind the city hall. which appeared as “Rosemarie” in the child birth record. In case of any impediment coming to his knowledge. 28. and not to withhold the issuance of the marriage license. Family Code). The irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license does not adversely affect the validity of the marriage. After several months of marriage. Family Code) 25. 1996. 3 and 4. a change of name would affect not only the mother but possible creditors. An American movie actress married an American star in Hollywood. X. 1. while it may not affect the validity of the marriage. which states that “illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother. except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law. If she should come to the Philippines.) 26. In fact. civilly. It must be stressed that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not contemplate an ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. The divorce will be recognized as valid here in accordance with her national law and it is valid in the place which granted the same. even if the contracting parties are able to secure a marriage license without the required parental advice and they got married even before the expiration of three months following the completion of the publication of the application for a marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice. consequences. 24. Out of their marriage were born five legitimate children. he is allowed only to note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license. On Valentine’s day. went to the city hall where they sought out a fixer to help them obtain a quickie marriage. this recourse seeks merely to correct clerical errors. Define marriage. she obtained a valid divorce decree in Hollywood. if any. Family Code). a municipal trial court judge. Second. Gertrude correctly cited Article 176 of the Family Code. 1985. 27. Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceedings. The law directs him to issue the marriage license after the completion of the 10-day publication period. Teodulfa died on April. For a fee. changed to “Maria Rosario. may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The rights of her parents over her and over each other would also be affected. unless ordered otherwise by a competent court. Consequently. Is the marriage valid? Yes. Gandeza Page 7 of 53 sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate changed from “Sarah Zita Erasmo” to “Sarah Zita Canon. The certificate must be obtained from the proper American diplomatic or consular official – under Article 21 of the Family Code. ( Art. she likewise sought to have the name of Sarah Zita’s mother. After all. If they do not obtain such advice. Pepito and Teodulfa were married on September 26. or if it be unfavorable. FAMILY CODE 24. One year and 8 months thereafter. the fixer produced an ante-dated marriage license for them issued by the Civil Registrar of a small remote municipality. provided she can get a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage here. if any. Roney Jone P. 305 SCRA 438). the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. Domagtoy.
a void marriage can be questioned even after the death of either party. of the Family Code is susceptible of two interpretations. No. Otherwise. paragraph 2. His case is not covered by Article 26. both Filipinos. In 1984. Can Betty remarry? Article 26. the fiveyear common-law cohabitation period. Andy acquired American citizenship and later divorced Betty. Roney Jone P. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. First. After their marriage. This five-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved due to the death of his wife Teodulfa up to the time of his marriage with Norma. 1997. We submit. Consequently. G. Pepito and Norma got married without a marriage license.) 32. but one of them acquires foreign citizenship. while a void marriage is deemed not to have taken at all. Second. Llorente. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other. (NOTE: The ruling of the Supreme Court in Llorente vs. it cannot be said that they had lived with each other as husband and wife for at east five years prior to their marriage on December 11. unbroken. Void and voidable marriages are not identical. no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years. The subsistence of a marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one of “husband and wife. In other words. March 14. A voidable marriage is valid until annulled. The members of the Civil Code Revision Committee subscribe to the first view. At the time of their marriage. she applied for and was granted Canadian citizenship.” (c) Do the children of Pepito have the personality to file the petition to nullify their father’s second marriage? Can they file it even after their father’s death? Although the Family Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Shortly thereafter.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. When Pepito died in a car accident on February 19. if that continuous five-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years. 1986. Badayog. it may apply to a situation where at the time of the marriage. 1986. The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible. the divorce obtained by B did not give A the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In lieu thereof. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with Norma. only about twenty months had elapsed. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it. Can A marry again in the Philippines? No. . which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage. then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common-law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse ( Ninal vs. and continuity – that is. For said provision to apply. The following year. however. B married a Canadian. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally. of the Family Code. No. 2000). Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. the Canadian court tried the case and decreed the divorced. After A was served with summons. his children immediately filed a petition in court for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Norma alleging that their marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. she sued for divorce from A in a Canadian court. The petition was filed on the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect the children’s successional rights. it may apply to a situation where both spouses were Filipinos at the time of the marriage. hence. but a voidable marriage can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. G. got married in the Philippines. (b) Were Pepito and Norma exempt from the marriage license requirement? Pepito and Norma were not exempt from the marriage license requirement when they contracted marriage on December 11. and thereafter Pepito and Norma started living with each other that has already lasted for five years. the fact remains that their five-year cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. B cannot remarry. 124371 dated November 23. 133778. he cannot. (a) What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 34 of the Family Code to warrant the counting of the five-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license? The five-year period contemplated under Article 34 of the Family Code should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. A and B were married in Baguio City in 1980. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife Teodulfa had separated in fact. 2000 has adopted the second view. Since both A and B were both Filipinos at the time of their marriage. they executed an affidavit dated December 11. while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. 31. In 1989. unlike an action to annul a voidable marriage which prescribes. 1986. should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. Andy and Betty. but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. one of the spouses is a Filipino and the other is an alien. B was offered a teaching job in Canada which she accepted. 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.R. Gandeza Page 8 of 53 or on December 11. Pepito’s children nevertheless have the personality to file the petition to nullify their father’s second marriage.R. the spouse who filed for divorce must be a foreigner at the time of the marriage. that the Llorente ruling amounts to judicial legislation.
Sammy and Tessie were married in 1982. he indulged in drinking sprees with his friends and would return home drunk. only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Tessie filed an action to declare the marriage null and void on the ground of Sammy’s psychological incapacity. Several years and several children later. 221 and 225 of the same code in regard to parents and their children. the court rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code. (Marcos vs. October 19. Is psychological or psychiatric evaluation of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated required as a condition sine qua non for such declaration? No. He would disappear for months. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. the Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Avelino left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. 2000) 34. while not controlling or decisive. should be given respect by our courts. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job as a manicurist to support herself and her children. G. 268 SCRA 198. Is judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage necessary before a party thereto can remarry? . The psychological incapacity of a party must be established by the totality of the evidence presented. Sammy was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. (7) Interpretation given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. During the time when he was with his family. Despite the non-submission of Sammy to psychological evaluation. Gandeza Page 9 of 53 33. the lower court granted the petition finding Sammy psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Tessie and their children. On appeal. and (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. Subsequently. Avelino and Erlinda were married in 1975. 351 SCRA 425) 35. it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. (b) alleged in the complaint. On July 3. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused. he would inflict physical injuries on her. In Republic vs. the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the ground that the psychological incapacity of Sammy has not been established by the totality of the evidence submitted. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified. and that he escaped from jail on October 22. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 1985. then disappear again. In the case study conducted by the Social Worker. as her only witness.R No. The incapacity of Sammy was based solely on interviews conducted by the psychologist with Tessie. 136490. Since no psychiatrist on medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. A certification was issued to the effect that Avelino remains at-large. They begot two children. there is no way by which Avelino’s psychological incapacity can be determined. a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. the children described their father as cruel and abusive to them. summons was served by publication. Taking into consideration these guidelines. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Since Avelino could not be located. Thereafter. Evelyn. 1990. There is no requirement under the law that the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated should submit to a psychiatric or psychological evaluation. A week after their wedding. suddenly reappear for a few months. In October 1993. Tessie submitted herself to a psychologist for evaluation while Sammy did not. Finally. Dagdag. Thereafter. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law. This is because while psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. Marcos. Court of Appeals and Molina. on the date set for presentation of evidence. (Republic vs. (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Roney Jone P. and sufficiently proven by experts. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime. Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220.. this because the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino has not been proven to exist. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. Was the trial court correct in declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code? The trial court erred in declaring Erlinda’s marriage to Avelino void on the ground of psychological incapacity. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proved by experts. Avelino started leaving his wife without explanation.
the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is also a ground for legal separation unless upon returning to the Philippines. 1994.” Consequently. said subsequent marriage is void. The lower court and the Court of . Article 58 of the same Code further mandates that an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six (6) months shall have elapsed since the filling of the petition in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. (Pacete vs. Under this article. Cariaga et. Such a petition may be filed even if the intention of the petitioner-spouse is to recover his/her rightful share in the community property or conjugal partnership. Arnulfo discovered that his wife. H again moved for another extension of 30 days. the judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage. 38. May a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code be filed for a purpose other than remarriage? No. Hence. Arnulfo again caught his wife having carnal knowledge with Digno. Court of Appeals. (a) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation? Yes. 1991 when Ariel returned to the Philippines with Mystica. In an action for annulment of marriage. the subsequent marriage of Ariel could not have occurred earlier than 1990. 36. The case for legal separation was then filed.” and not the phrase “for purposes of remarriage” (Domingo vs.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Whether the second marriage is valid or not. Beatrice replied that she was in conformity with the petition for legal separation. 42. the word “ solely” is meant to qualify the words “final judgment. Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac. The reason for the law is obvious from the policy that marriage is not a mere contract. Under Article 57 of the Family Code. he again moved for another extension of 15 days from the expiration of the 30 days. is a ground for legal separation under Article 55 (7) of the Family Code. Court of Appeals 256 SCRA 158). As it is placed. Rosa filed an action for legal separation on February 5. there was no such cohabitation and therefore. It is a fundamental principle in the law on marriage that a party in an action for annulment of marriage cannot be declared in default because the granting of annulment of marriage by default is fraught with dangers of collusion. 226 SCRA 572). Beatrice. but an inviolable social institution in which the State is virtually interested because the State finds no anchor than on good. This provision reflects the call for the intervention of the state attorneys or fiscals to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties. a party thereto may contract a valid subsequent marriage upon compliance with the recording requirements under Article 52 of the Family Code. Beatrice agreed on condition that she would not be charged criminally with adultery. especially in cases of uncontested proceedings for legal separation. the aggrieved spouse must file the action within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause. Rosa agreed to cohabit with Ariel which is allowed under the Family Code. Unaware of the order. This was granted. Tarlac on January 5. Ariel married Mystica. is immaterial. (b) Has the action prescribed? The action has not yet prescribed. after being converted into Islam. and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. Article 60 of the Family Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In 1990. Moreover. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that “the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. but he was given only a period of 20 days. the year when he went to Saudi Arabia. failure to comply with the foregoing recording requirement will render the subsequent marriage void. 39. In 1991. whether in the Philippines or abroad. Roney Jone P. Unlike in an action for declaration of nullity of a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code. an action for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 is available only for the sole purpose of remarriage. There. Gandeza Page 10 of 53 Yes. Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. H and W are married. 37. 40. May a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage be filed for a purpose other than remarriage? Yes.. Under Article 53 of the Family Code. a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 40 of the Family Code may be resorted to even for a purpose other than remarriage. When the Public Prosecutor outside the court asked her why she failed to file an answer. Upon receipt of the summons. 1988. may the respondent who failed to file an answer be declared in default? No. 231 SCRA 321) 41. if a party to a void marriage enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of the previous marriage. Beatrice then left the conjugal abode. the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses. H filed a motion for extension of 20 days to file his answer. how soon may a party thereto remarry? If a marriage is annulled or declared void by a final judgment. Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1. If a marriage is annulled or declared void by a final judgment. This was again granted. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage by Ariel. was having illicit relations with Cesar. Arnulfo then told Beatrice he was filing suit for legal separation. In this case. no condonation. Crucial to the interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code is the position of the word “ solely” therein. Rosa has until 1995 to bring the action for legal separation under the Family Code. and happy families (Tuazon vs. W sued for legal separation. The same was denied and H was declared in default. Was the default order proper? The default order was not proper.al. In the instant case. Ariel having converted into Islam. In 1995. solid.
that he could no longer do anything about the matter. The latter immediately occupied said one-half portion and built his own house thereon. the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person. 43. Y’s contention that the contract was ratified by W is not well-taken. that she received the shorter end of the bargain. Is the contract of sale between H and Y void or merely voidable? The contract of sale between H and Y is void and not merely voidable. Roney Jone P.” The participation by some barangay officials in the “amicable settlement” cannot validate an invalid act.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Article 1422 of the Civil Code provides that a contract which is a result of a previous illegal contract is also void and inexistent. (a) As to unions covered: Article 147 applies to two (2) relationships. Gandeza Page 11 of 53 Appeals both denied the petition for legal separation on the ground that there was a confession of judgment under Article 60 of the Family Code. that the sale of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. properties acquired while the parties are living together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint . among others. (a) bigamous marriages. W retaliated by filing an action for the nullification of the sale of their house and lot alleging that the same is conjugal property. including their residential house thereon. (d) relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons. In 1988. the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause. and (3) consent. 291 SCRA 372) 44. purposely to prevent the giving of the decree. The barangay captain told her. So it was that when W and her children still refused to vacate their house. Will the appeal prosper? The appeal will prosper and the petition for legal separation should be granted in view of the presence of other evidence. Over the objection of W and while she was in Manila seeking employment. Article 148. Unperturbed. on the other hand. The nullity of such contract of sale is premised on the absence of W’s consent to such sale. Indeed what the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on the confession of judgment. However. Y filed with the MTC a motion for execution of the amicable settlement. Court of Appeals. however. H was then living with another woman. the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property is void. And even if the statement of Beatrice really constitutes a confession of judgment. H and W were married in 1968. and that such contract was ratified by W when she entered into an amicable settlement with him. To constitute a valid contract. and (b) the rules governing the property relations of the unions. it cannot be denied that the “amicable settlement” entered into by W and Y is a contract. (2) object. but on the strength of the evidence of sexual infidelity on the part of the wife. In the absence of proof to the contrary. and (e) multiple alliances of the same man. however. This provision does not cover void bigamous marriages which fall under Article 148. The first is when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. By express provision of law. W went to the barangay captain to question her signature on the amicable settlement. wages and salaries earned by either spouse during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and shall be divided equally between them even if only one party earned such. In 1983. (Guiang vs. Aggrieved by the news of her husband’s philandering and the sale of their house and remaining lot. The contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code which provides. even by an “amicable settlement. (b) adulterous relationships. the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar. any defendant who opposes the legal separation will immediately confess judgment. and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. an “amicable settlement” was reached whereby W promised to vacate the house. The deed of sale executed by H cannot be ratified. For refusing to accede to Y’s demand. Shortly upon her return. (c) relationships in a state of concubinage. Moreover. W was later sued by Y before the barangay lupon. namely. There. Believing. Here there was only an extra-judicial admission and not a confession of judgment (which usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading agreeing to plaintiff’s demand). The second is when a man and a woman live together under a void marriage where the parties do not have an existing marriage with another. W received notice from Y about the sale of their house lot with a demand that she and her children vacate the property. applies to five (5) kinds of relationships. W pressed and requested that the settlement be annulled but nothing was done about it. such a contract is also void. If a confession can automatically and by itself defeat the suit. It is a direct offshoot of the deed of sale. the decree of legal separation should be granted since it would be premised not on her confession. Distinguish between Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code with respect to: (a) the unions governed by each article. W returned home and stayed at their house with her three (3) children. they bought a 421-square meter lot from X whereon they built their residential house. Y contended that the deed of sale is not void ab initio but is merely voidable. still inasmuch as there is evidence of sexual infidelity on the part of the wife independently of such statement. (b) As to property relations: Under Article 147. they sold one-half of said lot to U. her husband sold to Y the remaining one-half portion of their lot. In the absence of such written consent or authority.
Under Article 148. Under Article 40 of the Family Code. property. be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. a police officer. On December 14. the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be the free from legal infirmity. Metro Manila that his office has no record of marriage license of X and Y who were married in his municipality on June 20. so long as it is essential to the determination of the case (Niñal vs. 1992. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the “death benefits” of X. who spent for his medical and burial expenses. his or her share in the co-owned properties accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership of the existing valid marriage. and a certification by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan. his or her share will be forfeited in the same manner as provided in Article 147. the same presumption of equal contribution applies in the absence of proof to the contrary. neither party can encumber nor dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during the cohabitation and owned in common without the consent of the other. 1992.000. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of X and Y void. However.00 while Z received a total of P21. If only one party is in good faith in a void marriage falling under the article. each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. for purposes other than remarriage. Another distinction is that the care by one party of the home or spiritual or moral inspiration provided to the other is not included in the article. but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons. He died on November 23. X became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. Article 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages. Z filed a case for collection of sum of money against Y praying that Y be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146.00. however. settlement of estate. Roney Jone P. She. with Y.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Meaning. to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. Badayog. adulterous relationships. with whom he had two children. is the marriage between X and Z valid? The marriage between X and Z is likewise void. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage. In the absence of descendants. In support thereof. Z admitted that her marriage to X took place during the subsistence of. In case of default or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants. 1969. and shall be owned by them in equal shares. (a) Does the court have the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the two marriages contracted by X even if the case involved only a collection of sum of money? Yes. or industry shall be owned in proportion to the respective contributions of the parties. Under the article. such share shall belong to the innocent party. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of X and Y does not validate the second marriage of X with Z. with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. relationships in a . the marriage between X and Y. (b) Assuming that the marriage between X and Y is void for lack of a marriage license. the wages or salaries of one party is his or her exclusive property. Gandeza Page 12 of 53 efforts. In 1988. and the second was on November 10. If the party in bad faith is not validly married to another. and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage.000. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio. unlike the rule in Article 147. only properties acquired through the actual joint contribution of money.00 which she (Y) received as X’s death benefits. the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership. For other purposes. with Z. is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However. If one party is validly married to another. Z presented the marriage certificate of X and Y which bears no marriage license number. 45. the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.000. testimonial or documentary. but rather. work or industry. dissolution of property regime. where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. such as but not limited to the determination of heirship.00 pertaining to X as his death benefits? One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. evidence must be adduced. and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of. For purposes of the article. 1969. the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after death of the parties thereto. Both Y and Z filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to X from various government agencies.000. 328 SCRA 122). Y was able to collect a total of P146. In such instances. Hence. like the absence of a marriage license. X. 1993. (c) Is Z entitled to at least one-half of the amount of P146. no judicial action is necessary to declare an absolute nullity. under the care of Z. claimed that the marriage of X and Y is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. a party who did not participate in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. During the trial. until after the termination of their cohabitation. or a criminal case for that matter. the court has sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in the instant case. the share of the party in bad faith shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. contracted two marriages during his lifetime: the first was on June 20.
she used two hundred thousand to buy a diamond ring. As to the property regime of X and Y. Due to a quarrel. Roney Jone P. but who nonetheless live together conjugally. if the donation propter nuptias was made independently of the marriage settlement. in relation to Articles 45 and 50 of the Family Code. Under Article 92 (2) of the Family Code. During the marriage. paragraph 3. Gandeza Page 13 of 53 state of concubinage. paragraphs 1 and 3. ( Art. By intestate succession. having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between X and Y). 48. the same being later in point of time. 86 (1). If a marriage is annulled or declared void by a final judgment. even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by X alone as a government employee. however. the property acquired by inheritance is expressly excluded from the community property. onehalf of the subject “death benefits” goes to Y as her share in the property regime. Such being the case. Guillerma alleged that the property in question was acquired by her and Mario when they were having an affair. a man and a woman who are not legally capacitated to marry each other. 1983 without any ascendant or descendant.00 are clearly remunerations. Teodora died on March 5. jewelry forms part of the community property. the marriage was called off. and multiple alliances of the same married man. it could not be said that she contributed money. Conformably. even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. and the other half pertaining to X shall pass. shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them. and niece Corazon. the donation is revocable only at the instance of the donor. his children with Y. the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. incentives. Since the diamond ring is a jewelry. The disputed P146. by intestate succession. not being the legal wife of X. Article 147 of the Family Code governs. and benefits from government agencies earned by X as a police officer.000. Article 86. what happens to donations propter nuptias made in favor of one of the prospective spouses? There are two conflicting provisions under the Family Code. From said amount. Guillerma claims that she cannot be ejected from the property because she is a co-owner thereof as evidenced by a contract to sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question together with Mario. 81. is therefore excluded. If the donation propter nuptias was incorporated in X and Y’s marriage settlement (if one had been executed). Article 148 of the Family Code will govern the property relations of the parties even though their cohabitation and acquisition of property occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Considering that the marriage of X and Z is a bigamous marriage. 50. relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons. provides that the donation propter nuptias is revoked by operation of law if the marriage is annulled or declared void and the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith. And Z. to his legal heirs. property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. It is respectfully submitted that the first view is the better view because it is more in accord with law. Is the diamond ring included in the community property? There are two views. (Carino vs. Spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez brought an action to eject Guillerma Tumlos from an apartment building which is allegedly owned by them as their conjugal property. Carino. namely. his prospective wife. the said “death benefits of X shall pass to his legal heirs. Is the donation automatically revoked? I distinguish. children of her deceased brother . is not one of them. but belong to X alone and Z has no right whatsoever to claim the same. In her defense. On the other hand. In contrast to Article 148. having been bought with the money received by W as inheritance. Hence. (Art. unless it is shown that to do so will impair vested rights. 351 SCRA 127) 46. A donation propter nuptias of a parcel of land was given by X. Family Code) 49. It is respectfully submitted that Article 86 of the Family Code prevails over Article 43. This is because there was only a substitution of values which does not change the character of the property as an inheritance. Article 147 provides that wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation. the donation is rendered void by the non-celebration of the marriage. the donation is revocable only at the instance of the donor. Family Code) On the other hand. H and W married under the absolute community of property regime. Is the apartment building co-owned by Guillerma and Mario the same having been acquired during their cohabitation? Guillerma is not a co-owner of the apartment building. Mere cohabitation without contribution will not result in co-ownership. her nephew Rene. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto. to Y. The diamond ring.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. W inherited P1 Million from her father. of the Family Code provides that the donations propter nuptias made in favor of one of the prospective spouses is revocable at the instance of the donor if the marriage is annulled or declared void and the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith. the same forms part of the community property. may be deemed co-owners of the property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. She was survived only by her husband Martin. Article 43. Under Article 148 of the Family Code. Unless Z presents proof to the contrary. entitling Y to share one-half thereof. 47. Under Article 92 (1) of the Family Code. they are not owned in common by Z and X. This being so. the prospective husband.
Court of Appeals. Since age is only determinative of capacity to marry and is not an impediment as mentioned under Articles 37 and 38. represented by her mother Vircel Andres. the manifestation of Glen’s mother in the first case. and Article 171 which provides for the instances when the heirs are allowed to impugn the legitimacy of a child. as a consequence of which a title was issued in his name. Was C legitimated by the marriage of his parents? Yes. H’s relatives contend that M is not the biological daughter of H and W. H and W. I would brush aside Marcela’s defense. Vircel Andres. Because of Manuel’s denial of paternity. 55. (Manuel de Asis vs. Article 5 of the Family Code provides that any male or female at the age of 18 years and older. this time in the name of Glen Andres de Asis. Children who may be legitimated are those whose parents at the time of their conception were not disqualified by any impediment to contract marriage. Under Article 205 of the Family Code. the fact is that Marcela is not even the proper party to impugn such legitimacy. Is M correct in citing Articles 166. in her defense. while the latter. she and Manuel agreed to move for the dismissal of the case for which reason the court issued an order dismissing Civil Case No.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis docketed as Civil Case No. eloped. may contract marriage. how would you rule on Marcela’s defense? As judge. Gregorio and Teodora alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because . Upon the death of Teodora. The articles cited by M contemplate a situation where the husband denies as his own the child of his wife. husband and wife. It does not apply to a case where it is being claimed that the child is neither the child of the husband nor of the wife. I will deny the motion to dismiss. another complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel de Asis. Manuel denied paternity of the minor child and theorized that he cannot be required to provide support for him. Hence. her husband Martin executed an affidavit of extrajudicial settlement adjudicating unto himself. If you were the judge. 170. 276 SCRA 582) 51. (Tison vs. Q-88-935 which was earlier dismissed with prejudice. Subsequently. Martin sold the property to Marcela who obtained a title in her own name. Rene and Corazon filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property by right of representation. The former is married to Maria. To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or conversion of the recipient to a public burden. support in arrears are not covered by the provision considering that the need for support was already attended to in the past. Due to a property dispute. Thereafter. (Benitez-Badua vs. provides that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. both 14 years old. is maintaining a common-law relationship with Teodora. Roney Jone P. 303 SCRA 176) 54. Teodora’s brother. Glen Andres de Asis. allegedly as sole heir. The legitimacy of Rene and Corazon cannot be properly controverted in the present action for reconveyance in view of the settled rule that the issue of legitimacy of a person cannot be attacked collaterally and that there must be an action specifically filed for that purpose. they contracted marriage with the consent of their parents. Augusto and Gregorio are brothers. the law in point. child C was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents. notwithstanding failure to receive payments of support. C-16107 before the RTC of Caloocan City. Court of Appeals. Vircel forthwith submitted to the court a manifestation withdrawing her complaint. 53. amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor child the right to claim support from his putative father. hence. When H died (the wife W died earlier). A and B. Article 170 which provides for the period within which an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child may be brought. On October 14. in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor. However. Furthermore. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the RTC of Quezon City. the right to receive support as well any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. A child C was born to them when they were already 16 years old. Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. which acknowledged that it would be futile to pursue the complaint for support in view of Manuel’s denial of paternity. In resisting the action. not under any impediment mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 1995. May the right to receive support be levied upon on attachment or execution? No. Manuel promptly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata alleging that Civil Case No. a parcel of land belonging to Teodora. In case of contractual support or that given by will. and 171 of the Family Code? No. Court of Appeals. Augusto and Maria filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio and Teodora. Marcela assailed the legitimacy of Rene and Corazon claiming that they were not legitimate children of Ramon. 1988. will you grant the motion to dismiss? If I were the judge. Q-88-935 with prejudice. a widower. When they reached the age of 19. Gandeza Page 14 of 53 Ramon. Article 301 of the Civil Code. 299 SCRA 468) 52. In their answer. Thereafter. On September 7. owned several properties. M. Upon receipt of the summons. Granting that Rene and Corazon are not the legitimate children of Ramon. not entitled to inherit from H’s estate. In his answer. invokes Article 166 of the Family Code which provides for the grounds to impugn the legitimacy of the child. This is contrary to public policy. his alleged daughter M and his collateral relatives fought over his estate. As judge.
and that the same was unsuccessful. no property of Jaime should be sold or alienated . it did not also comply with the requirement of the summary proceeding under the Family Code: the court did not serve notice on the incapacitated spouse and it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted. the special proceedings on guardianship under the Rules of Court which requires due process. When Juan learned about his mother’s desire of selling Lot 4291. the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made.R. whether of the full or half-blood. In such a case. In need of money to defray the expenses for her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization. Not only did the court fail to observe the procedure on guardianship. Jaime and Lina are husband and wife. If the spouse is comatose. applying by analogy Article 61 of the Family Code. should apply. Moreover. (Uy vs . he immediately filed a petition in court for the guardianship of his father Jaime in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of Jaime’s real and personal assets. particularly the need for a notice and hearing. (NOTE: There is something wrong with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Uy vs. In his petition he prayed that his mother Lina be appointed guardian and that in the meantime .Court of Appeals. There was no need for the Supreme Court to rule that Article 124 of the Family Code is not applicable. When Jaime suffered a stroke. and Patricia. Lina looked for ways to sell or mortgage Lot 4291 to raise funds. Is Juan correct? The Supreme Court said yes. R. the court granted Lina’s petition and declared Jaime incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of their conjugal properties. In this case. a spouse who desires to sell property as such administrator must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate which is required of judicial guardians under Rule 95. Absent an opportunity to be heard. the proper remedy is judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. 25. Lina’s petition was set for hearing in a summary proceeding pursuant to Article 124 in relation to Article 253 of the Family Co0de. 8552) . Lina also filed her own petition for declaration of incapacity of her husband Jaime and for her assumption of the sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. 8552? Republic Act No. 2000) Even assuming that the rules of summary proceedings under the Family Code may apply. Teodora and Maria are considered strangers to the family of Augusto and Gregorio. Lina also asked the court for authorization to sell Lot 4291 to defray the medical and other expenses of her husband. Said proceedings apply to situations where a spouse is absent. The inclusion of Teodora as defendant and Maria as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. According to Juan. Consequently. Under this provision. particularly Lot No. the procedural rules in summary proceedings under Article 253 in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are not applicable. the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court. (Hontiveros vs. A few days later. G. Roney Jone P. Br. he lapsed into a comatose condition without motor and mental faculties. (Sec. November 29. The situation contemplated under Article 124 of the Family Code is one where the spouse is absent. the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. parents and children. The court likewise authorized Lina to assume sole powers of administration and to sell Lot 4291. The trial court found that Jaime is incompetent due to his comatose condition. Acting thereupon. After hearing. or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. considering that Augusto and Gregorio are brothers. Court of Appeals because it is clear under Article 124 of the Family Code that in the event one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. he immediately went to court to question it.) DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT 57. No. Gregorio and Teodora cited the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code in support of their request for the dismissal of the complaint. or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.A. The rules on guardianship apply only when the spouse who assumed sole powers of administration desires to sell a real property belonging to the conjugal partnership. Is Article 151 of the Family Code applicable in the above problem? Article 151 of the Family Code does not apply in the above problem because it is not exclusively among family members. the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Consequently. The couple had several conjugal properties one of which was Lot 4291 worth more than P12 Million. brothers and sisters. He said that the proper remedy should have been the appointment of a judicial guardian of his father for which he has already filed a petition. the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife. the court failed to realize that there was no sense in complying with the requirement of notice to the spouse because the spouse whose consent is to be obtained in this case was in comatose condition. They had three children Juan. 8552 is the law known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. 309 SCRA 340) 56. 4291. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. When Juan learned of the order. Gandeza Page 15 of 53 it failed to allege that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made. Carlos. RTC of Iloilo City. ascendants and descendants. What is Republic Act No. for purposes of Article 151 of the Family Code. 1. 109557.
son/daughter of one A “child legally available for adoption ” refers to a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or to a duly licensed and accredited child-placing or child-caring agency. An illegitimate son/daughter of the adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy. 4. (d) has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. and 2. if any. of the adopter(s) and adoptee. ibid). Who may be adopted under the Domestic Adoption Act? 3. one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4 th) degree of consanguinity or affinity (Sec.” 1. (c) Sexual assault or violence. 3. if ten (10) years of age or over. 7(a). (i). if any. of the adopter if living with said adopter and the latter’s spouse. ibid). Any person below 18 years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption. ibid). or the legal guardian. Who may adopt under the Domestic Adoption Act? The following persons may adopt under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998: 1. on the following grounds: (a) Repeated maltreatment by the undergone counseling: physical adopter(s) and despite verbal having (b) Attempt on the life of the adoptee. 9. Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above-stated for Filipino nationals. 2. 61. 3(b). The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters. 2. 63. The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities (Sec. and (d) his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter (Sec. the requirements of residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her own country may be waived for the following adopters: 1. (c) he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her own country. (f) at least 16 years older than the adoptee. (a) his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines. What are the grounds for rescission of adoption? The adoption may be rescinded. 5. or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent (Sec. The biological parent(s) of the child. or (d) Abandonment and failure to comply with paternal obligations. (ii). a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity. What is meant by a “child legally available for adoption”? The following may be adopted under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998: 1. 8. A child whose previously rescinded. The requirement of 16-year age difference between the adopter and the adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee. (c) of good moral character. if known. 2. 7(c). Any Filipino citizen (a) of legal age. adoption? May the adopter(s) rescind the . 59. ibid). 62. ten (10) years of age or over. The spouse. (iii). 4. ibid). (b) he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered. that no proceeding shall be initiated within (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s) (Sec. 3. if prior to the adoption he has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority. and 5. Gandeza Page 16 of 53 58. 60. provided. The adoptee. A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died. and (g) who is in position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. (e) emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children. Roney Jone P. 64. ten (10) years of age or over. freed of the parental authority of his/her biological parent(s) or guardian or adopter(s) in case of rescission of adoption (Sec. if any. The illegitimate sons/daughters. The legitimate spouse by the other spouse. 7(b). of the person adopting or to be adopted (Sec. A person of legal age. ibid). ibid). or adoption has been 6.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. May an alien adopt under the Domestic Adoption Act even if he has not complied with the requirements of residency and certification of qualification to adopt in his/her own country? Yes. (b) in full possession of full civil capacity and legal rights. adoption? Whose consent is necessary to the The written consent of the following persons is necessary to the adoption of “a legally available child. at the instance of the adoptee. provided. 7(b). or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child.
under the Inter-Country Adoption Act. ibid). Convention on the Rights of the Child. 3(a). possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws (Sec.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. ibid). and 9. Where should the application for adoption be filed? is eligible to adopt under his/her national Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is filed. his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption. 9. and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of the law on inter-country adoption. 8. However. agrees to hold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws. 8043 is the law known as the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (Sec. 71. 5. Who may be adopted under the InterCountry Adoption Act? Only a “legally-free child” may be the subject of inter-country adoption (Sec. the U. R. jewelry. How will the treasure be divided if X is a usufructuary of the land? If X is a usufructuary of the land and he himself discovered the hidden treasure. 73. the supervised trial custody is undertaken. ibid). the lawful ownership of which does not appear (Art. 8043). When may a child be considered for “matching”? No child shall be considered to be matched to a foreign adoptive parent unless it is shown that the child cannot be adopted locally (Sec. Sec. 19. Roney Jone P. 75. 11. for legal purposes. adoption? What is meant by inter-country 3. 8. is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age at the time of the application and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted. 3(f). 439. is in a position to provide for the proper care and support and give the necessary moral values and example to all his children. including the child to be adopted. means a person below fifteen (15) years of age unless sooner emancipated by law (Sec. comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national law. INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT 65. 3(g). whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency.A. being in the best interest of the child. 4. he is entitled to one-half thereof. which application shall be in accordance with the requirements set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. What is Republic Act No. 1. in the country of the prospective adoptive parents. 7. 72. unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent. ibid). has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. any hidden and unknown deposit of money. the adopters may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code (2nd par. This is because with respect to the hidden treasure which is found on the land held in . What is a hidden treasure? By hidden treasure is understood. or other precious objects. Adoption. shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). or with the InterCountry Adoption Board. through an intermediate agency. 70. ibid). X found a hidden treasure on Y’s land. 3(b). if married. Who may adopt under the InterCountry Adoption Act? Any alien or Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for intercountry adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: 1. 67. 68.. Gandeza Page 17 of 53 No. The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings (Sec. 66. ibid). What is meant by a “legally-free child” for purposes of the Inter-Country Adoption Act? A “legally-free child” means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the DSWD in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Sec. NCC). has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national law and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country. ibid). An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child. 69. ibid). ibid). 10. What is meant by a “child” for purposes of the Inter-Country Adoption Act? A “child”. PROPERTY 74.N. What is meant by “matching” for purposes of the Inter-Country Adoption Act? “Matching” refers to the judicious pairing of the adoptive child and the applicant to promote a mutually satisfying parent-child relationship (Sec. and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines (Sec. 6. law. 2. 8043? Republic Act No.
par. the usufructuary is considered as a stranger (Art. Court of Appeals. Rule 75 of the Rules of Court that partition be put in a public document and registered with the Registry of Property has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the co-owners themselves against tardy claims (Vda. NCC). if the accessory thing is much more precious than the principal thing. (3) If the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith. par. Moreover. Furthermore. 466. Furthermore. 80. Court of Appeals. and gradually received as an effect of the current of the waters. 77. the owner of the accessory thing may choose between the former paying him its value or that his accessory thing be separated.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. 215 SCRA 866 ). When X acquired the property by repurchasing it. NCC). Is an existing mortgage constituted on a real property a bar to its partition? No. if another person discovers the hidden treasure. 457. 459. However. a mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed on whoever the possessor may be. 199 SCRA 646). By law. redemption not being a mode of terminating a coownership (Mariano vs. What is adjunction? Adjunction is the process by virtue of which two movable things belonging to different owners are united in such a way that they form a single object (Art. 82. to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it is constituted (Pailano vs. 470. 466. from whom the property came. What is avulsion? Avulsion is the process whereby the current of a river. 469. the owner may demand its separation. 79. indemnifying the owner of such accessory for its value (Art. and both owners had acted in good faith. Court of Appeals. NCC) 78. NCC). even though the principal thing may suffer some injury (Art. 157 SCRA 455). he merely acquired the right to be reimbursed for the amount equivalent to the shares of his co-owners Y and Z (Adille vs. NCC). Court of Appeals. The redemption of the land by X did not terminate the co-ownership nor did it give him title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership ( Paulmitan vs. (5) If both owners had acted in bad faith. Was the co-ownership terminated when X repurchased the property? No. Y. they sold said parcel of land to A with a right to repurchase. NCC). De Reyes vs. for a period not exceeding ten (10) years. 459. one-half goes to the finder and the other half goes to the naked owner. Avulsion is sometimes referred to as “delayed accession” in the sense that if the owner abandons the detached land. and (5) When the legal nature of the common property does not allow partition. 469. When is partition of a property owned in common at the instance of a co-owner not allowed? A co-owner may demand partition of the property owned in common at any time. the owner of the principal thing shall be liable for damages ( Art. (4) When physical partition would render the property unserviceable. 84. NCC). Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. their respective owners may demand their separation (Art. the owner of the principal thing acquires the accessory. The usufructuary in such a case is not entitled to anything. 83. 76. (2) If the two things cannot be separated without injury. 1. X. Only X exercised the right to repurchase and thereafter obtained a title over the property. (2) When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator. he loses the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the principal thing for the damages which the latter may have suffered (Art. NCC). 470. NCC). and Z are co-owners of a parcel of land. (4) If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing. for a period not exceeding twenty (20) years. 2. partition is prohibited. . The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share. Nevertheless. the accretion is owned by the owner of the estate fronting the river bank (Art. 470. (3) When partition is prohibited by law. The existence of a real estate mortgage on a real property is not a bar to its partition by the coowners. or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate. creek. Roney Jone P. the land to which it has been attached acquires ownership thereof (Art. Why is avulsion sometimes called “delayed accession”? 81. Gandeza Page 18 of 53 usufruct. 566. except in the following cases: (1) If by agreement among the coowners. What is alluvium? Alluvium is the soil deposited or added to the lands adjoining the banks of rivers. In 1985. the partition of said real property by the co-owners does not operate to extinguish the mortgage constituted thereon. What are the rules in adjunction? Adjunction is governed by the following rules: (1) If the two things can be separated without injury. The requirement under Section 1. (Art. As a matter of fact. 222 SCRA 736). NCC). There is no law that requires partition among the co-owners be in writing to be valid. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common. Court of Appeals. their respective rights shall be determined as though both had acted in good faith (Art. Under Article 2126 of the Civil Code. NCC). 223 SCRA 732). even though it will cause damage or injury to the principal thing. Is oral partition of a property in coownership allowed? Yes. the co-ownership is not terminated by the redemption of the land by X. insofar as his share is concerned. or fails to remove the same within two years. oral partition of a property in coownership is allowed.
with an area of 415 and 313 square meters. although found to have encroached on Lot No. 87. the latter acquired ownership of the property and he is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller X in regard to all the rights of ownership. is registered in the name of A. no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. De Espina vs. then A may sell to B that portion of Lot No. 24 on which the latter’s improvement stands. an ejectment case was filed against him by by X. Good faith is always presumed. Y contends that under Art. however. 25 and 26. Forthwith. 24. belongs to the landowner. that Lot No. and is registered in the name of C. Consequently. Upon delivery of the property to Z. Is Y correct? Y is not correct. X constructed a building on his lot. to exercise either of the two options under Article 448 of the Civil Code. he must pay rent to A. X purchased a property adjacent to that of Y. If buying the improvement is impractical as it may render B’s house useless. In a relocation survey. B constructed his house in 1984 and C in 1983. Article 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to B as owner and possessor of his lot and C as builder of the improvement that encroached on a portion of B’s land ( Ballatan vs. In short. A. Court of Appeals. X owns a parcel of registered land adjacent to that of Y. that is. X discovered that a portion of the lot he purchased was encroached upon by Y’s house. (a) Can X be considered a builder in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil Code? Yes. including its fence and pathway. 88. X can be considered a builder in good faith even if his lot is covered by a Torrens Title. and C are the registered owners of adjacent lots. In short. avail of the benefits of Article 448 of the Civil Code? Yes. he has the pre-emptive right to purchase the portion encroached upon. On Lot No. All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. 86. that his house. 196 SCRA 312). the owner of the lot encroached upon. In 1985. What are the rights and obligations of the parties? B constructed his house in 1983. the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. 448 of the Civil Code. and by the principle of accession. B constructed his house. If B is unwilling or unable to buy the lot. Adjacent to Lot No. A. This advantage in Article 448 of the Civil Code is accorded the landowner because “his right is older. are registered in the name of B. 24. During the construction. 24. There is no evidence that C was aware that when he built his house he knew that a portion thereof encroached on B’s adjoining lot. 25. hence. 26 is Lot No. not at the time of taking. Lots Nos. Their rights must therefore be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil Code. Good faith is a state of mind. (b) Can Z. a mere buyer. In the event that A elects to sell to B the subject portion of his lot. may choose to purchase the improvements made by B on his land. C. including the right to compel Y. 27) before A and B. they may go to court to fix the same. A informed B of the encroachment. did not lose nor gain any area. he discovered that the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of B encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of his property. X sold his lot to Z. were built within his lot. that Lot No. 25. After a relocation survey. 266 SCRA 242). Gandeza Page 19 of 53 85. or sell to B the subject portion. cannot compel B to buy the land if its value is considerably more than the value of the portion of his house constructed thereon. A. however. He is therefore deemed to be a builder in good faith until the time A informed him of his encroachment on the latter’s property. respectively. however. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying. 24. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreement because partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners (Vda. 25 which is adjacent to Lot No. 417 square meters in area. 304 SCRA 34). Y refused to vacate the lot despite verbal and written demands. to appropriate the improvement after payment of proper indemnity or to sell the portion encroached upon. Court of Appeals. Article 448 of the Civil Code is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on which another builds. B. he had no knowledge that he encroached on A’s land. Abaya. as owner of Lot No. plants or sows in good faith. the surveyor found that Lot No. on the other hand. If A and B do not agree on the terms of the lease. 24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary. were gained by Lot No. then B must pay reasonable rent. 25). Thereafter. (c) Can Y demand the removal of the encroaching structures? . 24. If the value of the land is much more than B’s improvement. B claimed. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment. Lot No. Is partition of real property covered by the Statute of Frauds? An oral agreement for the partition of a property in co-ownership is valid and enforceable upon the parties. Lots Nos. 27. 26 and 27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. This is a case of an owner who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. Unfortunately. and he built it in the belief that it was entirely within the boundaries of his land (Lot No. and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. A constructed his house on Lot No. then he must vacate the land and. 25 lost some three (3) square meters which. 414 square meters in area.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. a portion of the building was constructed on Y’s lot. 27 on its western boundary. Roney Jone P. 24. until he vacate. built his house on his lot (Lot No. he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing” (Benitez vs.
e. (NOTE: If Y. 93. the pawnshop cannot even insist on reimbursement of the amount for which the thing was pledged. the lot owner. a usufructuary is obliged to: (a) take care of the thing with the diligence of a good father of a family. 2085. Court of Appeals. i. however. What is meant by condominium? According to the Condominium Act ( Republic Act No. opted to appropriate the improvements. At the commencement of the usufruct . a usufructuary is obliged to: (a) make an inventory of the property. a condominium is an interest in real property consisting of a separate interest in a unit in a residential. if the possessor had acquired the property in good faith by purchase from a merchant’s store. stolen. He is not even required to pay rentals in the meantime). 592. where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. NCC and Arts. and (f) pay the expenses. 601 and 602. the transfer is deemed defective because the transferor is not the owner. the pawnshop cannot insist on reimbursement of the amount for which the thing was pledged (Dizon vs. Consequently. (c) notify the owner in case there is an urgent need for extra-ordinary repairs on the property. NCC). In the Chapter on Possession. The legitimate owner who had lost the thing or who had been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover it even from a possessor in good faith (Art. NCC). or if the possessor had obtained the goods because he was an innocent purchaser for value and a holder of a negotiable document of title to the goods (Art. However. 94. During the pendency of the usufruct. 593. 85. NCC). Gandeza Page 20 of 53 Y. because of enormous profits. NCC). although there was a mode of transferring ownership. In the second place. or a title where. 4726). or markets in accordance with the Code of Commerce and Special Laws (Art. Marivic pledged it to a pawnshop. the term “ just title” has two different meanings. 47 SCRA 160). (b) make ordinary repairs on the property. (b) proper indemnity is paid. and (b) give security (Art. As the term is used in the Civil Code. or in fairs. 90. . the owner can no longer recover possession of his movable property. 91. 559. whether or not he had lost his property or had been unlawfully deprived of it. (d) pay the annual charges and taxes on the property and those considered as lien on the fruits. a usufructuary is obliged to deliver the thing. neither has she been authorized to pledge it. Suntay. Instead of selling the ring. however. pawnshop operators must necessarily assume the corresponding risks. the builder has the right to retain the lot until he is paid of his necessary and useful expenses. “just title” means a true and valid title sufficient to transfer ownership. and (d) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and. cannot demand the removal of the encroaching structures. NCC). a separate interest in the other portions of such real property. vs. the contract of pledge is void because the pledgee (Marivic) is not the owner of the thing pledged. A condominium may include. In the Chapter on Prescription. costs. without prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to him or his heirs for taxes and extraordinary expenses which should be reimbursed (Art. NCC). in addition to the foregoing. The Civil Code is explicit. What are the usufructuary? obligations of a A usufructuary has the following obligations: 1. the acquisition being from a private person. the landowner. “ just title” means a colorable title. 596. the transferor himself is the owner of the thing sold or transferred. May the true owner of a movable property recover possession of his property from the present possessor? If so. The owner may also recover possession of his movable property but should reimburse the possessor if such possessor acquired the property in good faith at a public sale or auction (Art. and liabilities in suits with regard to the usufruct ( Arts. 589. When can the owner of an estate claim a compulsory right of way? Under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. industrial.. 612. Moreover. Teresa entrusted to Marivic a diamond ring to be sold on commission basis. Roney Jone P. is there a need to reimburse said possessor? The true owner of a movable property may recover possession of his property without reimbursement from a possessor in bad faith or even a possessor in good faith if said owner had lost the property or been unlawfully deprived of it. At the termination of the usufruct. directly or indirectly. 268 SCRA 5). 1518. 86 Code of Commerce). 559. Such right is available only if and when he chooses to compel the builder to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter fails to pay such price (Technogas Phils. the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory easement of right of way only after he or she has established the existence of the following requisites: (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without an adequate outlet to a public highway. one essential requisite for the validity of pledge is lacking ( Art. (e) notify the owner of any act of a third person that may be prejudicial to the ownership of the property. Can Teresa recover the ring from the pawnshop? Can the pawnshop insist on payment first of Marivic’s loan? Teresa can recover the ring from the pawnshop. Hence. 3. In the first place. insofar as consistent with the law. (c) the isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts. or if the owner is precluded from denying the seller’s authority. 1505. in the land on which it is located and in other common areas of the building.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. or embezzled. 583. 92. what is meant by “just title”? As used in the Civil Code. 2. or commercial building and an undivided interest in common. even if he offers to reimburse. 89. The thing pledged might have been robbed. NCC).
Quezon City. Bernad. The opening of an adequate outlet can extinguish a legal or compulsory easement but not a voluntary easement (La Vista Association vs. This is a negative easement which requires the owner of the servient estate not to impair in any manner whatsoever the use of the easement (such as a right of way). May an existing easement of right of way be extinguished by the opening of an adequate outlet to a public highway? An easement of right of way provided for in a contract of sale is a voluntary easement. . there can be an easement over another easement. When Zorro started enclosing the lots with a concrete fence.” not because there are visible signs of their existence but because of the making of a notarial prohibition. insofar as consistent with the law. negative easements cannot be acquired by prescription because they are nonapparent. necessity for it. it is not enough that the easement be where the way is shortest. 97. After the petition was granted. Yantoc. prove that in certain cases. turn right to a private road. In the present case. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other estates and has no adequate outlet to a public highway. Can there be an easement over another easement? An easement over a usufruct? A usufruct over an easement? As to the first question: Yes. that from Visayas Avenue they have to pass by a narrow alley. Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as Lot 1 and Lot 2. 98. the very existence of Article 621 of the Civil Code (insofar as it relates to negative easements). This outlet. notorious. Roney Jone P. the use of the servient estate is continued by operation of law. but there can be an easement over a property held in usufruct. the same should not be imposed (Cristobal vs. but maintained that the subject property belongs to X by virtue of acquisitive prescription. is already sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate. The burden of proving the existence of these requisites lies in the owner of the dominant estate. Yantoc sold both lots to Zorro. 5. 88). circuitous and inconvenient. on the other hand. He contends that the closure of Lots 1 and 2 will make it more burdensome for him and his family to reach the nearest public road because the alternate path is much longer. Article 631 of the Civil Code provides for the modes of extinguishing an easement. Xeres objected and immediately instituted an action for compulsory easement of right of way. (2) that proper indemnity has been paid. 100. Xeres and his family were using this road lot as their access to the nearest public road. Furthermore. it cannot be extinguished by the opening of an adequate outlet to a public highway. continuous. Aug. To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way. where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. 96. What is the effect of the sale of the dominant estate with respect to the easement constituted thereon? The sale of the dominant estate does not extinguish the easement (Tanedo vs. the proposed right of way over Zorro’s property (Lots 1 and 2) is the most convenient and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. located adjacent to the property of Xeres. and actual possession of the subject property. As such. Xeres is the owner of a house and lot located at No. there must be real. the conditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. Hence. Why is a negative easement acquirable by prescription despite its being non-apparent? Generally.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. not fictitious or artificial. However. adverse. (3) that the isolation was not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate. Sept. Mere inconvenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory easement. The court later declared void the deed of donation for failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law. Court of Appeals. Article 629 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of the servient estate must abstain from anything that will render the use of the easement more inconvenient to the owner of the dominant estate. and (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and. Gandeza Page 21 of 53 95. It is more important that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate. Lots 1 and 2 were originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides that there must be a statement in the title of conveyance of either the dominant estate or the servient estate abolishing or extinguishing a easement. 99. where he and his family have been residing from 1961 to the present. Subsequently. As to the third question: No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension. 291 SCRA 122). there cannot be an easement over a usufruct. though circuitous and longer in distance than the one being claimed. despite the sale of the dominant estate. there cannot be a usufruct over an easement. As to the second question: No. Even in the face of necessity. and turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until they reach their property. X claims ownership over a parcel of land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias from his parents and that he had been in open. the first element is clearly absent because an outlet already exists. Does Xeres have the right to demand a compulsory easement of right of way over Lots 1 and 2? No. When Visayas Avenue become operational as a national road in 1979. but a usufruct may be established in a property burdened by an easement. 30. Court of Appeals. and for purposes of prescription. Admittedly. Still. 1997). is the owner of a subdivision at Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which included Lots 1 and 2. there are negative easements that may indeed be considered “apparent. The notarial prohibition makes apparent what really is non-apparent. Yantoc filed a petition in court to convert Road Lot 2 into residential lots. then enter a vacant lot. if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement. In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way. Sale of the dominant estate is not one of them.
assuming that the sports car costs less than P5. 103. then the donation may be made orally. Can the donor impose upon the donee the condition that the property shall not be alienated within a period of one hundred years.000. nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation to Y. a provision in the deed that the “donee shall not sell or encumber the property within ten (10) years after the death of the donor. He did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof. in order to be valid. the donation is void. Pedro never received that letter because it was never mailed. does it follow that said donation is a donation mortis causa and should therefore follow the forms and solemnities of wills? No. Jose called Pedro by cellular phone to thank him for his generosity and to inform him that he was sending by mail his letter of acceptance. namely: that the possession should be in the concept of owner and that such possession be public. The death of Jose before Pedro could receive the acceptance indicates that the donation was never perfected. must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time. Indeed. Under Article 746 of the Civil Code. then the donation and the acceptance must be made in writing. otherwise the property shall revert to the donor’s estate? No.00. and since it had not. He did not get possession of the property donated. On August 14. 276 SCRA 601). the donation was never perfected. Assuming that the value of the thing donated. peaceful. Such a prohibition against alienation. On July 27. acceptance must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. Under Article 748 of the Civil Code. May the heirs of the donor sue the heirs of the donee for revocation of the donation if there is a violation of any restriction in the deed of donation? Yes. but still. (a) Is there a perfected donation? There is no perfected donation. Court of Appeals. therefore. The donation was made in a public instrument. Montanano. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos. it must comply with the formalities of a will. Is the donation inter vivos or mortis causa? The donation is mortis causa and not inter vivos. the right to revoke may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor and may be exercised against the heirs of the donee. Consequently. the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of the donor’s certificate of title and the issuance in its place of another certificate of title in the name of the donee. issued a new one in the name of the donee Y. uninterrupted. Upon the other hand.000. and the Register of Deeds canceled the donor’s title and. the ostensible donee. Pedro mailed in Manila a letter to his brother. a private document of donation may serve as a basis for a claim of ownership (Heirs of Maningding vs. the donor or his heirs have the personality to question the violation of any restriction in the deed of donation. where from the body of the instrument of donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the donor but rather the services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter. offering to donate a vintage sports car which the latter had long been wanting to buy from the former. the acceptance of Jose was not in writing. and the action prescribes after four years from the violation of the condition ( Garrido vs. (b) Will your answer be the same if Jose did mail his acceptance letter but it was received by Pedro in Manila days after Jose’s death? Yes. the simultaneous delivery of the car is needed and there being none. 194 SCRA 180). X retained the owner’s duplicate copy of the new title. The deed of donation was entitled “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. X donated to Y a parcel of land. If Jose’s mail containing his acceptance of the donation was received by Pedro days after Jose’s death. With a clear and convincing evidence of possession. then the donation should be considered as inter vivos. Jose. If a donation is to take effect after the donor’s death. The condition that the donation is to take effect only after the death of the donor should be interpreted to mean that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated should take place only after the donor’s death (Vita vs. and adverse. 1997). 1997. the donation is perfected the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. 1997. 1997. 104. 101.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty.00. a vintage sports car. Pedro received a telegram from Iloilo informing him that Jose had been killed in a road accident the day before (August 13. In the instant case. the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Under Article 764 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals.” There is. Roney Jone P. On August 5. in its place. Even if the donor says that the donation is to take effect after his death. exceeds P5. 236 SCRA 450). as well as the property itself. however. Even assuming that the donation propter nuptias is void for failure to comply with the formal requisites. That notwithstanding. In this instance. it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. while the acceptance made by Y was embodied in the same public instrument. the donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. More importantly. 105. The restriction is patently unreasonable and constitutes an undue restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property donated. Prescription in general is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership of a property and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. a resident of Iloilo City. then the donation is still void because under Article 734 of the Civil Code. As such. He was therefore simply a “paper . Gandeza Page 22 of 53 Was the court correct in declaring that X acquired ownership of the property donated by acquisitive prescription? Yes. the answer will be the same. which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership. or any other right of dominion over the property. he never even laid hands on the certificate of title to the same.” The deed of donation was presented for recording in the Registry of Property. he did not acquire the right to dispose of the property – this would accrue to him only after ten (10) years from the donor’s death. 102.
that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed. 113. signed in the same manner on the left margin of each sheet. entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. The only instance when the notary public is required to read the will is in the case contemplated by Article 808 of the Civil Code – regarding a blind testator. Both X and Y were aware of the pending probate proceedings at the time of the execution of the contract to sell. contemplating a transfer of ownership to the ownership to the donee after the donor’s death. If you were the judge. NCC). to read the will or to know the contents thereof. All these circumstances. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in making the will. the rule is settled that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance. Gandeza Page 23 of 53 owner” of the donated property. will you grant the motion to dismiss? If I were the judge. May the notary public himself be an instrumental witness in a last will and testament? No. Roney Jone P. Despite Y’s full payment of the purchase price. the function of the notary public is. Thus. the testator. intestate. among others. X promptly moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the property subject of the contract formed part of the estate of his father. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having witnessed and signed the will. 777. In the execution of a holographic will. as vendor. 108. There is no requirement under the law that the notary public be present at the execution of the will. and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator. NCC) thru testamentary. not even allowed. 293 SCRA 385). X refused to execute the proper deed of sale in Y’s favor for which reason Y sued for specific performance. as vendee. When is succession to the estate of a deceased person transmitted? The right to the succession is transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent ( Art. If the third witness were the notary public himself. Is it necessary that the notary public be present when the testator executes his will? . 109. the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the “Contract to Sell” because X has the substantive right to sell the whole or part of his share in the estate of his late father. The attention clause of a will reads: “x x x and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence and we at his request did the same in his presence and in that of each other as witnesses to the will. 107. This function would be defeated if the notary public is one of the instrumental witness (Cruz vs. In the instant case. X became the owner of his hereditary share the moment his father died. as long as the testator himself copies the draft in his own handwriting. I would allow the probate of the will. 114. If you were the judge. to recollect the property to be disposed of. Villasenor. the contract to sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court. would you allow the probate of the will? If I were the judge. Furthermore. or to know the contents thereof. he would have to acknowledge his having signed the will in front of himself. or mixed succession (Art. in respect of which a petition for probate was pending in court. and signs it. including the explicit provisions of the deed of donation – reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donor and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the property until ten (10 years after his death – ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa. and Y.” It SUCCESSION 106. that he needed assistance even to raise himself to a sitting position. Court of Appeals. 777. A statement in the attestation clause of a notarial will that the person delegated by the testator to sign in his behalf did so in the presence of the testator is not essential for the validity of said will. 112. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time. Is the notary public required to read the will. dates it. before he notarizes the same? The notary public is not required. subject to the pending administration. as well as we. in no wise stands in the way of such administration (Opulencia vs. The probate of a will is opposed on the ground that the testator was at the time of the execution of the will extremely ill. 110. as witness. and lastly. NCC). unless the testator permits him to do so. 778. his presence is required only for the acknowledgement. X. and that during the paroxysms of asthma he could not speak. in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma. I will deny the motion to dismiss considering that the contract to sell is valid. may the mechanical act of drafting the will be left to someone other than the testator? The mechanical act of drafting a holographic will may be left to someone other than the testator. and that consequently. to guard against illegal or immoral arrangements. 111. Is there a need to state in the attestation clause of a notarial will that the person delegated by the testator to sign in his behalf did so in the presence of the testator? No. The rule is settled that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death (Art. It is enough that it be proved in court that this was what happened. Furthermore. The physical weakness of the testator in no way establishes his mental incapacity or lack of testamentary capacity. 54 SCRA 31). Upon receipt of the summons.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty.
What is the effect if in a will. or a brother or a sister. It does not determine the rights of such relatives.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. par. The testator provides in his will that he institutes as his sole heirs his children A and B and his friend F. 122.00 by accretion (share of B divide into two). that is. 121.) 118. Upon B’s repudiation of his share.000.e. or a total of P7. 116. B repudiates his share in the inheritance. The institution of heirs affects only the free portion. joint wills executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the Philippines. 856.00 with two (2) legitimate children surviving. Testator left an estate worth P30. the right of representation covers only the legitime (Arts. i. to whom should the reservable property be adjudicated? The rules of intestate succession shall apply.500. the testator in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other (Fernandez vs. When representation is proper. 819. In the final distribution.500. How shall the estate be distributed? The legitime in this case is one-half of the estate or P15. What are some of the special rules in reserva troncal? . Vergel de Dios.000. i. In case several persons can qualify as reservatarios. NCC). A and B. 124. the testator imposed upon the heir an absolute condition not to contract a first or subsequent marriage? An absolute condition not to contract a first or subsequent marriage shall be considered as not written unless such condition has been imposed on the widow or widower by the deceased spouse. NCC). What is meant by preterition? What are its effects? Preterition or pretermission is the omission. In reserva troncal. illegitimate descendants of legitimate children cannot inherit by right of representation because of the barrier under Art. 119. (a) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property came (called the origin). Upon the testator’s death. What are joint wills? Are they valid in the Philippines? Joint wills are those which contain in one instrument the will of two or more persons jointly signed by them. 123. his share accrues to A and F. whether intentional or not. (c) the ascendant who in turn acquired the property from the descendant by operation of law (called the reservor or reservista). or by the latter’s ascendants or descendants (Art. NCC). In testate succession. therefore. what is the extent of the representative’s inheritance? It depends.e. This is so because Article 891 of the Civil Code merely determines the group to whom the reservable property should go. But in intestate succession. and (d) the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (called the reservatarios). 1.000.00 in their own right under the terms of the will. There must be a double relation of consanguinity. the nearer relative exclude the farther relative (Art.00 (Art 1021. 854. the entire legitime will go to A in his own right. Gandeza Page 24 of 53 is contended that this clause does not state that the testator and the witness signed on the left margin of each sheet in the presence of each other. 120. is given both to legitimate and illegitimate descendants of illegitimate children (Arts. when proper. NCC). 962. Only then can he be considered as belonging to the line from whence the property came. which under the will should be divided into three (3) equal parts if all succeeded.. 46 Phil. Moreover. NCC). the reservatario should be related by blood not only to the descendant but also to the other ascendant. They are void under Article 818 of the Civil Code. even though authorized by the laws of the country where they may have been executed (Art. however. it covers the entire share of the person represented. NCC). 1035. Is the attestation clause sufficient? The attestation clause is sufficient because the words “in the same manner” mean nothing but that the testator and the witnesses signed on the left margin of each sheet of the will “in the same manner” in which they signed at the bottom thereof.00. The whole descend to the representative by the rules of intestate succession. A will get a total of P22. 922).500. 117. What is meant by reserva troncal? Reserve troncal is a system of reserva by virtue of which an ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant. or P5. who will therefore each get P5. 891. NCC).00 each. (b) the descendant who acquired the property gratuitously (called the propositus). of a compulsory heir in the inheritance of a person. Who are the persons involved in reserva troncal? There are four persons involved in reserva troncal. Roney Jone P. 992 of the Civil Code.000. NCC). (NOTE: The right of representation. and P2. is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came (Art. or brother or sister from whom the property came. 902. 115. Preterition of a compulsory heir annuls the institution of heirs. In intestate succession. But upon the repudiation by B. but legacies and devises shall remain valid insofar as they are not inofficious (Art..500.00 and F will have P7. 874. will a relative by affinity of the origin of the property be entitled to reservable property? Relationship will not be sufficient to establish one’s right as a reservatario.
Under Article 875 of the Civil Code. or which is not one of those recognized by law (Art. on the ground that she is the owner of the same. provided representation is proper (Art. whether they be of the full or half-blood (Art. if it takes place. Should brothers and sisters of the fullblood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half-blood. Gandeza Page 25 of 53 The following are some of the special rules in reserva troncal: 1. 982. 125. Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserve troncal says nothing more than the ascendant must make the reservation. When is accretion proper? There can be no accretion insofar as the legitime is concerned. In the collateral line. when it is Disposicion captatoria is a disposition made in a will upon the condition that the heir shall make some provision in his will in favor of the testator or of any other person. The reservista has the power to alienate or encumber the reservable real property. What captatoria? is meant by disposicion Imperfect or ineffective disinheritance refers to a disinheritance without a specification of the cause. NCC). without prejudice to the Land Registration Act and the Mortage Law. NCC). they shall divide the inheritance per capita. but the right to reservation in favor of B must be recorded on the title. 6. Roney Jone P. NCC). Subsequently. In reserva troncal. the other co-heirs shall succeed to it in their own right. NCC). but subject to the reserva. Grandchildren always inherit by right of representation. but never in the ascending line (Art. NCC). insofar as the legitime of said heir is impaired. and other testamentary disposition shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime (Art. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to M exclusively – use. Whenever all the children repudiate. NCC). concerns only the free portion (par. NCC). 2. 972. 128. 130. for here representation is not proper (Art. Accretion. 873. and the land was inherited by his mother M who now seeks to register the property in her own name. May a married woman repudiate an inheritance even without the consent of her husband? Yes. the right of representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters. the reservatario inherits the reservable property from the propositus. 127. enjoyment. 977. according to the law. Upon the death of F. Should there be more than one ascendant of equal degree belonging to the same line. 918. However. The propositus must be a legitimate descendant (or legitimate half-brother or half-sister) of the origin of the property. What is the effect of an impossible condition in a will? Is the rule the same in civil obligations? When attached to a testamentary disposition. 2. If a compulsory heir is ineffectively disinherited. even if the testator should otherwise provide (Art. 126. What is meant by disinheritance? What are its effects? ineffective attached to a civil obligation in such manner that such obligation shall depend upon the fulfillment of such condition for its perfection. 4. whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of law. that is. NCC). 1006. the grandchildren inherit in their own right. The legacies and devises. par 2. a brother of F (uncle of S). A renouncer can represent. 969.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. 972. S died without any issue. 987. the reservatario can get the real property from the transferee as soon as ownership is transferred to such reservatario. 2. 5. (NOTE: If the free portion has not been disposed of. one-half shall go to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. that is. disposal. a. NCC). 1921. acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. B. NCC). 918. it is annulled (Art. legatee or devisee. 1047. the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter (Art. an impossible condition shall be considered as not imposed and shall in no manner prejudice the heir. and recovery. the ineffectively disinherited heir gets not only his legitime. 1. the very existence of said obligation is affected. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line. 3. he left to his son. and not by right of representation (Art. opposed the registration on the ground that the property is reservable. such kind of a disposition is void. . This is because he is an intestate heir also). NCC). In each line the division shall be made per capita (Art. is not proved. 976. a married woman may repudiate an inheritance even without the consent of her husband (Art. a parcel of land. or for a cause the truth of which. should they be of different lines but of equal degree. NCC). but only insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited. 1021. 7. Art. 131. Should the property be registered in the name of M? Yes. NCC). 3. 1183. NCC). Should the part repudiated be the legitime. the institution of heirs is annulled. but cannot be represented (Arts. but also his intestate share of the free portion. not from the reservistar. The ascendant (such as M) who inherits from a descendant (such as S). if contradicted. par. What are some of the important rules in intestate succession? The following are some of the important rules in intestate succession: 1. S. 129.
3. Santos. What are the basic principles in the institution of heirs? The following are the basic principles in the institution of heirs: 1. 846. Principle of Individuality. and (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent (Ajero vs. The probate of a will is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity. . The will in question having been probated by a competent court. heirs who are collectively instituted are deemed individually instituted. and it is provided that the whole of it should pass to them unimpaired. Will the criminal action for forgery lie against the husband? No. the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery. Principle of Simultaneity. In testate succession.” It was further provided in the will that should Y die. “I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to his surviving children in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of Y or his children in so far as it is legally possible. But if it clearly appears from the will itself that the testator’s only reason for making the disposition is the illegal cause.” The testator himself had nothing to do with the crime. whether they survive alone or with concurring compulsory heirs (Art. (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed. 135.” the estate shall be administered by the persons named in the will. and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress. NCC). It can only determine questions as to extrinsic validity of the will. the mere statement of an illegal cause should not impair the institution. heirs who are instituted without a designation of share inherit in equal parts (Art. 215). If so. What are the issues to be resolved in the probate of a will? In probate proceedings. the decedent’s last will and testament. 134. Roney Jone P. they are instituted simultaneously and not successively (Art. The testator instituted as his sole heir his nephew Y “so that upon my death and after the probate of this will x x x he will receive the properties composing my hereditary estate. and the disposition is essentially based on affection. 66 Phil. Gandeza Page 26 of 53 132. A last will and testament contains a provision that it shall not be presented before the courts. Legitimate children: 1/2 of the estate. 136. fraud. Sixteen months after the probate of the will. All the requisites of a fideicommisary substitution are present.” Further on it was provided that should “Y die after me while his children are still in their minority. with the only proviso that he should not dispose of it because its transmission is limited to his children. Under this principle. The presentation of the will before the courts is required by the law so that it may be determined whether it was validly executed. The testator provides: “I hereby institute as my heir my brother Juan who is now in prison for having killed my political enemy. Criminal action will not lie against the forger of a will that has been duly admitted to probate (Mercado vs. Is this a simple substitution fideicommissary substitution? or a The substitution is a fideicommissary substitution. 2. May a probate court rule on the intrinsic validity of a will? In general. Under this principle. The principle underlying the rule on the statement of a false cause under Article 850 of the Civil Code should also apply in the case of an illegal cause. Is the institution valid? The institution is valid. and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. menace. then the disposition should be void. The husband filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. and if it is not validly executed. The mere statement of a cause contrary to law will not invalidate an institution. that he may enjoy them with God’s blessing and my own. The parties interested in one way or another in a case are not the ones who confer or deprive the jurisdiction of the courts. which is the sole responsibility of his brother Juan. 138. Under this principle. Principle of Equality. September 15. (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 137. what are the different combinations of survival and concurrence of compulsory heirs and the amount of their legitimes? 1. in equal portions. the probate court is limited only to the resolution of the following issues: (1) whether the instrument submitted is. Court of Appeals. NCC). 133. 849. 139. so long as it does not appear in the will that such illegal cause is the only motivating factor for the institution.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. the husband was prosecuted for falsification or forgery of the will which was already probated. the same is intrinsically void. The will contemplates the enjoyment of the estate by the heir instituted during his lifetime. 888. the estate will be distributed according to its terms in so far as conformable to law. when several heirs are instituted. a probate court cannot rule on the intrinsic validity of a will because it is a court of limited jurisdiction. 847. indeed. It also contemplates the survivorship of the heir. NCC). NCC). the estate will be distributed as in intestacy. 94). Such provision cannot deprive the courts of the authority to determine whether the will is duly executed or not. The exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the parties agree to submit the issue to the probate court and no third person is prejudiced thereby: and (b) when upon the face of the will. Is the provision valid? The provision is not valid. or undue influence. If the true cause is the generosity of the testator. unless the contrary intention appears (Art.
NCC). 996. NCC). 1/2 of the estate (Art. NCC. surviving spouse: legitimate parents. par. otherwise. the surviving spouse. 3. both will get equal intestate shares. 1/2 the share of each legitimate child. NCC) to be divided equally among themselves. illegitimate children and the surviving spouse: divide the estate according to the ratio of two (2) shares for each legitimate child. illegitimate children. 1/2 of the estate. Illegitimate children alone: 1/2 of the estate (Art. the deceased and the surviving spouse have been living as husband and wife for more than five years (Art. 903. 2. the surviving spouse. in equal shares. 1/2 of the estate. Illegitimate parents and children of any class: illegitimate parents. 140. Illegitimate parents alone: 1/2 of the estate (Art. (NOTE: If there is only one legitimate child concurring with the surviving spouse. 1/2 of the estate. 901. the share of the surviving spouse having preference over those of the illegitimate children. Two or more legitimate children. NCC). illegitimate children. provided legitimes of the legitimate children should not be impaired (Arts. NCC). par. 1/2 the share of each legitimate child (Art. 888 and 892. 888. distribute the remainder according to the ratio of two (2) shares for the legitimate child. NCC). par. despite marriage in articulo mortis and death of the spouse within three months after marriage. and the surviving spouse: legitimate children. illegitimate children. in equal shares. One legitimate child. 892. par. Legitimate children and the surviving spouse: legitimate children. NCC). 6. 1/3 of the estate.) 5. last par. a share equal to that of each child (Arts. 888. illegitimate children. in equal portions. Art. 4. 1/2 of the estate. NCC). 892. Art. whose share may suffer reduction pro rata because there is no preference as among themselves. Two or more legitimate children and the surviving spouse: consider the surviving spouse as a legitimate child and divide estate by the total number (Art. Art. Roney Jone P. and 899. 1. 889 and 893. 9. 888 and 892. 5. 1/4 of the estate (Arts. 1. Illegitimate parents and surviving spouse : illegitimate parents. 1/2 of the estate. none (Art. surviving spouse. 980. (NOTE: The surviving spouse and the illegitimate children get their legitime from the free portion. 896. Family Code). Legitimate children. surviving spouse. 892. 903. 1/2 of the estate (Arts. surviving spouse. apply Nos. 8. Art. 3. Legitimate children and illegitimate children: estate to be divided in proportion of two (2) shares for each legitimate child and one (1) share for each illegitimate child. 11. One legitimate child and the surviving spouse: legitimate child. Legitimate parents and surviving spouse : legitimate parents. NCC). 1/4 of the estate. children (legitimate and/or illegitimate). 1/4 of the estate (Arts. 889 and 896. each illegitimate child. If there be any left. 176. 1/2 of the estate. in accordance with the clear intent of the law to consider the spouse as a child. 176. Legitimate children: entire estate to be divided in equal shares as there are legitimate children (Art. Legitimate children and illegitimate children: legitimate children. One legitimate child and the surviving spouse: legitimate child. surviving spouse. 14. and one (1) share for each illegitimate child (applying by analogy Arts. in equal portions. surviving spouse. and 898. in equal portions. 1/4 of the estate (Art. NCC). Gandeza Page 27 of 53 2. Legitimate parents: 1/2 of the estate. whether they survive alone or with concurring compulsory heirs (Art. 15. 1/2 the share of each legitimate child. 1/4 of the estate (Art. the illegitimate children. . and one (1) share for each illegitimate child (Art.) 6. each illegitimate child. Surviving spouse alone: 1/2 of the estate. par. 2. 889. or 1/2 if. 1/3 of the estate (Art. 1. NCC). 3). Family Code). 889. NCC). NCC). 12. Legitimate parents and illegitimate children: legitimate parents. NCC). 1/4 of the estate. NCC. 10. and the surviving spouse: legitimate child. Family Code. illegitimate children. One legitimate child. 903. share equal to that of a legitimate child (Arts. 983 and 985. 1/2 the share of the legitimate child. and 895. 7. NCC). 1/4 of the estate. par. 16. 176. 1/2 of the estate. 1/8 of the estate (Arts. 4 and 11 as the case may be. 900. the plural word “children” as used in Article 996 of the Civil Code must be deemed to include the singular word “child”). In intestate succession.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. the legitime children would be prejudiced if there were so many illegitimate children. illegitimate children. 13. 2. NCC). NCC. what are the different combinations of survival and concurrence of intestate heirs and the amount of their intestate shares? 1. or 1/3 if marriage is in articulo mortis and deceased spouse dies within three (3) months after marriage. two (2) shares for the surviving spouse. 4. and the surviving spouse: legitimate child. two (2) shares for the surviving spouse. NCC). 888 and 996. and there are no other relatives. 999. 1/4 of the estate (Arts. surviving spouse. the surviving spouse. NCC). NCC). 888. Illegitimate children and the surviving spouse: illegitimate children. in equal portions. 1/2 of the estate. (NOTE: The shares of the illegitimate children should be taken only from the free portion. the surviving spouse. 1. each illegitimate child. 894. 1/2 of the estate. After all.) (Art 895. Legitimate parents.
the surviving spouse should in such case gets one-half of the estate. 16. When two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same parcel of land in whole or in part. 14. Legitimate parents and illegitimate children: legitimate parents. 1/2 of the estate. 993. By title. This rule. Illegitimate children alone: entire estate (Art. State: entire estate (Art. to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the partition case. are conjugal properties. 6 (for both legitimate and illegitimate children). Legitimate parents. 1/2 of the estate (Art. The son argues that his sole ownership as shown in the title would be improperly assailed in a partition case and that it should be done through a separate action. Should cancelled? the notice lis pendens be No. LAND REGISTRATION 141. however. the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. and nieces : entire estate (Art. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked. 896 and 1000. 1/2 of the estate. his son was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. NCC). Legitimate parents and the surviving spouse: legitimate parents. After his mother’s death. registration is another (Lee Tek Sheng vs. Surviving spouse and brothers. 1/4 of the estate (Arts. the father alleged that four parcels of land. NCC). nephews and nieces: surviving spouse. 1/2 of the estate. Thereupon. certainly such share cannot be less when he/she concurs with illegitimate parents. Illegitimate children and the surviving spouse: illegitimate children. 1/2 of the estate (Art. 8278. In other words. and. Legitimate parents alone: entire estate (Art. 8278 to their rightful owner – the conjugal regime. the earlier in date must prevail. children (legitimate and/or illegitimate). NCC). Surviving spouse alone: entire estate (Art. and 11 (for illegitimate children) as the case may be. Collateral relatives (up to 5th degree): entire estate (Art. 19. 1003. which title must prevail? When two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part. sisters. registered solely in his son’s name under TCT No. NCC). brothers and sisters. The son apparently confuses certificate of title with title. however. Court of Appeals. and the other half should go to the illegitimate parents. in case of . Gandeza Page 28 of 53 7. 9. If that is the share of the surviving spouse concurring with legitimate parents. The annotation of a notice lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack on the certificate of title of a parcel of land. 998. NCC). 1/2 of the estate. 10. Roney Jone P. (NOTE: While Article 997 of the Civil Code provides for the share of the surviving spouse concurring with legitimate parents (see. in equal shares. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. 18. and the surviving spouse: legitimate parents. illegitimate children. No. 993.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. 11. the surviving spouse. 142. The father then prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the four lots covered by TCT No. the father caused the annotation of a notice lis pendens on TCT No. Illegitimate parents alone: entire estate (Art. in equal shares. 1010. 991. 8278. in equal shares (except when representation is proper). 1/2 of the estate. it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. 995. the notice lis pendens should not be cancelled. NCC). NCC).) 15. 9 above) of the decedent (where the former gets one-half of the intestate estate. 12. 20. the son moved for the cancellation of the notice lis pendens on the ground that it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case. 1 (for legitimate children). surviving spouse. 1/2 of the estate (Art. NCC). 997. 1011. 17. Meantime. NCC). the son filed a complaint against his father for the partition of the conjugal properties of his parents. 985. nephews. otherwise. 1/4 of the estate. illegitimate children. Ownership is one thing. surviving spouse. apply Nos. 292 SCRA 544). The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title. 1/2 of the estate. (NOTE: Illegitimate parents inherit ab intestato only in default of legitimate or illegitimate descendants of the deceased. 988. none (Art. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. the surviving spouse. In spite of this omission. 1/2 of the estate. is not material to the instant case. Illegitimate parents and the surviving spouse: illegitimate parents. Illegitimate parents and children of any class: illegitimate parents. NCC). there is no article providing for the share in intestacy of the surviving spouse when concurring with illegitimate parents of the deceased. In his answer with counterclaim. in equal portions. The father contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in his son’s name only as a trustee considering that at that time. the illegitimate parents. 8. 1001. NCC). illegitimate children. Brothers. cannot be entitled to more than one-half in the same situation). if the legitimate parents get only one-half of the estate when concurring with the surviving spouse of the decedent. who should have less rights. and the latter get the other half). 13. 1/2 of the estate (Art. sisters. NCC). nephews and nieces. NCC).
(NOTE: The basic rule is that after the lapse of one year. 727 was issued to them. cannot convert them into private property. Thus. however. Court of Appeals. it is basic that prescription does not run against the State. such a remedy is without prejudice to the rights of any innocent purchaser for value with a certificate of title. Court of Appeals. Since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in active possession of the property. however long. if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person. this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. On the basis of this certification. 231 SCRA 498). 1937. 267 SCRA 339). . that the aggrieved party is without a remedy in law. it was held that the use of a forged instrument constituted only intrinsic fraud for while it perhaps prevented a fair and just determination of a case. the subject land was not yet released as alienable and disposable public land (Reyes vs. 144. the Solicitor General. 238 SCRA 158). Republic. This does not mean. the right to seek reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property does not prescribe (Vda. Gandeza Page 29 of 53 successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the land. But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. 1937. In the leading case of Palanca vs. 727 and for the reversion of the land to the public domain. X sold an unregistered parcel of land to Y in 1932 and the latter immediately took possession of the same. 143. 1941. the decision may be attacked any time. 147. In 1975. the district forester issued a certification that the area covered by OCT No. The remedy of the original owner (the person prejudiced) is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or employed fraud. an action for reconveyance is still available (Javier vs. the use of such instrument or testimony did not prevent the adverse party from presenting his case fully and fairly. 1961. It is settled that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes. 24 SCRA 819 (1968 ). an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for the recovery of damages against the State Assurance Fund (Obsequio. Court of Appeals. ibid). however. Court of Appeals. and if the latter are insolvent. On January 2. the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. X filed with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application which was approved on April 23. Is the use of a false affidavit of loss in a reconstitution case constitutive of extrinsic fraud that would warrant the invalidation of a final judgment in said case? No. 145. Y filed an action against X for the reconveyance of the land on the ground that the latter committed fraud in causing the land to be registered in his name. X obtained in 1937 a certificate of title over the land pursuant to a decree of registration issued by a land registration court in a cadastral proceeding initiated by X himself. Consequently. 727 was a forest zone from 1941 to 1960 and that said land became alienable and disposable only on January 31. May an owner of a registered land seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud? Yes. on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. an owner of a registered land may seek the annulment of a transfer thereof on the ground of fraud. The right of the innocent purchaser for value must be respected even if the seller obtained his title through fraud. the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. X’s heirs contend that the reversion case had already prescribed and that their certificate of title to the land is already indefeasible. Does an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribe? An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. a decree of registration is no longer open to review or attack although its assurance is attached with actual fraud. the title issued to them is considered void ab initio. X died survived by her children. Sometime in 1980. the subject land was still part of the public domain. The subsequent release of the subject property as alienable and disposable did not cure any defect in the issuance of the homestead patent nor validated the grant. However. the persons holding a prior certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate (Margolles vs. If the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. Insofar as the timeliness of the action of the government is concerned. (Demetriou vs. Public lands fraudulently included in patents or certificates of title may be recovered by the State in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Court of Appeals. De Cabrera vs. 230 SCRA 97). Decide. Hence. It is a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves or timber lands are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof. It is clear that at the time when the homestead patent was issued to the heirs of X in 1941. X contends that the action had already prescribed and is already barred by laches. On December 28. 295 SCRA 296). However. unassailable and irrevocable. This is because every person dealing with registered land may safety rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige to him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property (Obsequio vs. 230 SCRA 550). filed on October 23. 146. The hard fact remains that at the time of the issuance of the homestead patent and the title. a homestead patent was issued in the name of X’s heirs and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. The use of a false affidavit of loss in a reconstitution case is similar to the use during trial of forged instrument or perjured testimony. Roney Jone P. Despite such sale. 1981 a complaint for cancellation of OCT No. Court of Appeals.
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. but X and Y refused to do so. 1973 and the Patent and Title issued on December 10. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12. and conveying said properties to X. FV-540. 1957. and that after discovery of the fraud. judgment was rendered in said case in favor of X and against Y ordering the latter to pay damages in the amount of P5. 1999). If he fails to do so. In 1951. 149. In 1981. X filed a complaint against Y for damages. X and Y obtained the torrens title on the land in question on February 23. Y filed an action to declare void the auction sale in 1966 and to quiet title over said land. Unknown to X. To satisfy the judgment. It bears stress that in both Manangan and Olviga. which prohibits the alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent. (NOTE: The decision in Manangan is contrary to the ruling in Heirs of Olviga vs. In Olviga. does not prescribe. They alleged that sometime in 1977. claimant Y is in actual possession of the disputed land but the Supreme Court declared nonetheless that his right to seek reconveyance of the property had already prescribed because of his failure to file the action within the (10) year prescriptive period. X was able to obtain in his name a tax declaration over the land and another over the family home. If you were the judge. the Supreme Court declared that the rule in which an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. The judgment obligation of Y against X arose on June 24. the family home. Even assuming that the title was procured by fraud. citing Article 153 of the Family Code which provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. Court of Appeals. the action for reconveyance had already prescribed because the case was filed 24 years after the discovery of the fraud. On June 24. Y slept on his right for thirty eight (38) years counted from the time the certificate of title was issued to X in 1937 until he filed his action for reconveyance in 1975. Y invoked the provisions of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 1985. 1980. The remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully and erroneously registered in another’s name is to bring an action in the ordinary courts of justice for reconveyance. 1965: one was a parcel of land and the other. The registration constitutes notice to the whole word (Veracruz vs. Ignacia Rural Bank vs. An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations. definitely selling. The . 1957 under OCT No. Y applied for a free patent on the land in question. through fraud and illegal scheme. the subject parcel of land had been titled in the name of X and Y under Original Certificate of Title No. upon Y’s failure to redeem the properties. Y’s right to bring such action was barred by laches as he took no step towards that direction reasonably after the title to the property was issued under the torrens system (Manangan vs. which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property. Such title became indefeasible one (1) year after its issuance. an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens title over the property. X and Y moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed and is already barred by laches. It is respectfully submitted that the ruling in Olviga is more in accord with the law. 1964. 115794.000. June 10. Court of Appeals. they demanded from X and Y to reconvey the land to them. (2) If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks. a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9. What are the rules on redemption of extra-judicially foreclosed properties acquired pursuant to a free patent or a homestead patent? (1) If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act 720. In the instant case. Gandeza Page 30 of 53 Is Y barred by prescription and laches in filling the action to recover ownership of the subject property? Y’s right to bring the action to recover ownership of the disputed land had already prescribed and is barred by laches. he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the 2-year redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. Court of Appeals. 230 SCRA 513). In Manangan. 307 SCRA 198). 227 SCRA 330. 1968. transferring. 141). 3135. Consequently. the mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or from the registration of the Sheriff’s certificate of sale. and that if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession. Roney Jone P. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right (redemption). the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. The law is clear on this point. Dumat-ol. he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (Sta. two (2) of Y’s properties were levied on execution on December 1. In the same action. 1964. Under the law. Will the action prosper? The action will not prosper.00. 150. 1966 to X as the highest bidder. the right to seek reconveyance.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. G. 141. such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the date of the registration of the title. which requires that the action must be commenced within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. FV-540 issued on February 23.) 148. Thereafter. will you grant the motion to dismiss? If I were the judge. This application was approved on October 13. on November 5. however.R. and in case of registered land. I will grant the motion to dismiss because the action had already prescribed and is already barred by laches. however. the parties claiming ownership of the disputed properties were in actual possession thereof. Y also contends that the house which was constituted in 1964 as a family home is exempt from execution. Spouses H and W filed a complaint against Spouses X and Y for reconveyance of a parcel of land. As a result. No.
Presiding Judge. Was the court correct in denying Y’s motion to prove his registerable title over the land? The trial court was not correct in denying Y’s motion to prove his registerable title over the subject land. 3344. This was opposed by Y who claimed to be in actual possession of the land subject-matter of the registration proceeding. Jr. (Taneo. Under Section 37 of Act No. the final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to X was issued after Y failed to redeem the properties within the reglementary period. Consequently. the provision would make no sense if the prohibition starting “from the date of the approval of the application” would have no termination date. But the prohibition of alienation commences from the date the application is approved. The trial court denied said motion on the ground that no further proceedings in the land registration case could be pursued because the conflicting interests therein involved ceased to exist with the withdrawal of X’s application. 141 does not apply since it is clear that the judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the approval of the application for free patent. as amended by Act No. asserting a claim over the land sought to be registered. registration of instruments involving unregistered lands is “without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The distinction is important because only actual or extrinsic fraud has been accepted as a ground for a judgment to be annulled (Heirs of Manuel Roxas vs. Neither does Article 162 of said Code states that the provisions of Chapter 2. as amended by Act No. 153. it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences. Extrinsic fraud is also known as actual fraud. the trial court is required to resolve the claims of the remaining parties.” As stated in Beniga vs. or where it operated upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. Roney Jone P. Is an adverse claim annotated at the back of the Torrens title automatically cancelled upon the lapse of the 30-day effectivity period? No. for all intents and purposes. 496. As of that date. It is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court. X filed an application for registration of title of a parcel of land. The opposition filed by the Director of Lands is. 1968 finally transferred the property to X. as between buyers of unregistered land. the withdrawal of the application by the applicant and/or 152. 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. which the court granted. even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Y and the Director of Lands became the only contending parties in the registration case. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. 1973 and the Free Patent was issued only on December 10. On February 9. Y’s included. Y appeared in court and moved for the reception of his evidence to prove his title over the subject land.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. whichever comes earlier. Consequently. the annotation of an adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party-in-interest. On the date set for the initial hearing. (NOTE: Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no application to lands not registered under Act. vs. X filed an ex-parte motion to withdraw his application. 304 SCRA 308) 151. Court of Appeals. the date when the prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patents commences is “the date of the approval of the application” and the prohibition embraces the entire five-year period “from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant. Title V thereof have retroactive effect.” This phrase means that a mere registration of the sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land. Bugas. 1968. 496. 1988. The sequence of events leads to the inescapable conclusion that even before the application for homestead had been approved. so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. No. 1980. 1966. or the second buyer who purchased the land in an execution sale whose transfer was registered in the register of deeds? Under Act No. 112 SCRA 327. As declared by the Supreme Court in Amper vs. As a result. 496. Y was no longer the owner of the land. 3621. Who. and by the Director of Lands who prayed that the subject land be declared as a public land. a conflicting interest as against that of the applicant X or of the oppositor Y. having previously sold the same to somebody else. are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth. The prohibition under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 35 SCRA 111. are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. the withdrawal of X’s application does not terminate the registration proceeding when there is an adverse claim. 3621. Court of Appeals. the specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a homestead is restricted starts to be computed from the date of the issuance of the patent. were or could have been litigated therein. After the lapse of said period. What is the distinction intrinsic and extrinsic fraud? between Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent act pertains to an issue involved in the original action. 270 SCRA 309). or where the acts constituting the fraud . Gandeza Page 31 of 53 properties were levied and sold at public auction with X as the highest bidder on February 12. Before the initial hearing. the withdrawal by either X or Y from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the conflicting interests in the case. is the rightful owner: the first buyer in a prior sale but was unrecorded. Y did not actually have anymore right over the land. The deed of conveyance issued on February 9. Neither is the case terminated because under Section 37 of Act No. 154. Y’s application for free patent was approved only on October 19.
(3) that upon full payment of the purchase price. the squatters would not leave. as vendor. Y countered by citing Article 1383 of the Civil Code to the effect that where specific .4 Million. hazard. (1) Y shall pay the amount of P600. September 15. or the will of a third person. or the will of a third persons. But the condition that such contract may be terminated if the electric cooperative is forced to stop or abandon its operations is a casual condition which depends on chance. Civil and natural obligations may be distinguished as follows: (1) civil obligations derive their binding force from positive law. 303 SCRA 495). In August 1986. The act giving rise to a quasi-contract must be lawful. and every quarter thereafter. Court of Appeals. X offered to return the P100. vs. while natural obligations derive their binding effect from equity and natural justice. Y took possession of the subject parcels of land together with all the improvements thereon. hazard. that is. 158. X consigned the P100. the action will not prosper.4 Million shall be paid in four (4) equal quarterly installments of P350. plus damages. Gandeza Page 32 of 53 the oppositor notwithstanding (Director of Lands vs. In December 1985. until the whole amount is paid. 1984. Distinguish it from the other sources of obligations. 1983.00 each dated June 15. Since it was X who failed to comply with his conditional obligation. the contract between the telephone company and the electric cooperative is subject to a mixed condition. and (4) that immediately upon the signing of the agreement. and (c) the contract: “shall be for as long as the telephone company has need for the electric posts and shall terminate only if the electric cooperative is forced to stop or abandon its operations as a public service and it becomes necessary to remove the electric posts. Court of Appeals. (b) the telephone company is obliged to install and allow the electric cooperative the free use of ten (10) telephone lines. a condition dependent partly on the will of a party and partly on chance. Y issued four post-dated checks payable to X in the amount of P350. On May 15. A quasi-contract is a juridical relation which arises from certain lawful. Aggrieved by Y’s failure and refusal to make good the checks.” Is the contract between the telephone company and the electric cooperative subject to a potestative condition? No.000 as down payment . executed an “Agreement of Purchase and Sale” respecting two parcels of agricultural land for the total sum of P2 Million. When presented for payment. thus differentiating it from a quasi-delict. he is not the aggrieved party who may file the action for rescission but Y. 230 SCRA 351). X contented that the failure of Y to completely pay the purchase price is a substantial breach of the obligation which entitles him to rescind under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. voluntary. 156. The condition that the contract shall be effective for as long as the telephone company has need for the electric posts is decidedly a potestative condition because it is dependent upon the sole will of the telephone company. which do not invalidate a contract (Naga Telephone Company. 159. A telephone company and an electric cooperative entered into a contract subject to the following terms and conditions: (a) the telephone company is allowed to use the electric posts of the electric cooperative for the installation of its telephone and cable wires. the first to be due and payable on June 15. (2) the balance of P1. The agreement contains the following terms and conditions. Roney Jone P. at which time it will pay the balance of the purchase price. the checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. however. Y promised to replace the checks but failed to do so. X shall execute a good and sufficient deed of sale and conveyance in Y’s favor.000 in court. Will the action prosper? No. Y refused to accept the money and demanded that X execute a deed of absolute sale of the property in his favor. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 155. Distinguish between civil and natural obligations. as vendee. Give the concept of a quasi-contract.00 as down payment.00. December 15. If the squatters are not removed within six months. and Y. X and Y executed a Deed of Conditional Sale wherein the former agreed to sell his 500-square meter lot in Baguio City to the latter for P1 Million payable P100. On May 10. and filed an action for rescission of the deed of conditional sale. however. X filed an ejectment suit against the squatters. The action for rescission may be brought only by the aggrieved party to the contract.000. Y shall take possession of the parcels of land. the value of the land had doubled by the time.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. X filed suit to rescind the agreement and to recover the properties. but in spite of the decision in his favor. 1983. and the balance 60 days after the squatters on the property have been removed. to the end that no one may be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. And to answer for his balance of P1. 1983.000 down payment to Y.000. is not opting to rescind the contract but has chosen to waive X’s compliance with the condition which he can do under Article 1545 of the Civil Code. the P100. Incidentally. on the ground that he is unable to remove the squatters on the property. which is based on fault or negligence or mere lack of foresight. and (b) civil obligations can be enforced by court action or the coercive power of public authority. X. to distinguish it from contract in which there are two parties who come to an agreement. and unilateral acts.000 down payment shall be returned by the vendor to the vendee.000. 1983 and March 15. In sum. Y. Inc. it must be voluntary. thereby distinguishing it from crime in which the act or omission is unlawful. 1983. 1983. 157. and it must be unilateral. the fulfillment of natural obligations cannot be compelled by court action but depends exclusively upon the good conscience of the debtor.
vs. X clearly elected to resolve or rescind the lease contract. while in a contract to sell. the seller is entitled to be restored to the possession of the thing sold.” the proper term really is “resolution. Obviously. his failure to do so brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of X to convey title from acquiring obligatory force (Ong vs. In a contract of sale. He also claims that the provision in the contract of sale where the seller warranted to defend his title to and peaceful possession of the property partakes of the nature of a condition. 160. and the latter took possession thereof. but he cannot have both the possession of the leased premises for the remainder of the term and the rent which the other party contracted to pay. the contract can be rescinded (Power Commercial and Industrial Corp. Roney Jone P. the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold. Said stipulation pertains merely to the usual warranty against eviction. the contract entered into by the parties in the case at bar does not fall under any of those mentioned by Article 1381. The failure of the seller to eject the lessees from the lot in question and to deliver actual and physical possession thereof to the buyer cannot be considered a substantial breach for two reasons: First. reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. by agreement. The nonfulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective without force and effect. casual or serious.” Resolution is a principal action which is based on the breach of a party of his obligation.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. they are not entirely identical. consequently. A reading of the agreement entered into by X and Y shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell. the agreement of the parties may be set aside.000. rescission may not be resorted to. Rather. but not because of a breach on the part of Y for failure to complete payment of the purchase price. . required Y to return the leased property if he cannot pay the rents. in this instance. (b) Was there a breach of warranty against eviction? There was no breach of warranty against eviction. the same should have been expressly provided for in the contract. Will the action prosper? The action will not prosper. Y vacated the property and notified X. but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Gandeza Page 33 of 53 performance is available as a remedy. This promise to sell was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition that Y will pay in the full the purchase price. But he cannot have both the thing sold and the price which was agreed to be paid. Court of Appeals. and not a condition that was not met. X leased to Y a building for a period of fifteen years. Similarly. the failure of which is no a breach. Will the action prosper? Yes. The buyer was not deprived of his title. the lessor is entitled to be restored to the possession of the leased premises. X sold a parcel of land to Y. Y. Had the parties intended to impose on the seller the obligation to eject the tenants from the lot sold. In a contract to sell. The termination of the lease has the effect of destroying the obligation to pay for the future. 310 SCRA 1). the action will prosper. for the resolution or rescission of the contract has the effect of destroying the obligation to pay the price. Hence. Pursuant to this demand. if it has already been delivered.00 payable in advance during the first ten days of each month. Buyer now wants to cancel the contract for violation of a condition. In this case. 274 SCRA 597). and second. X was permitted to elect between the two remedies of resolution or specific performance. although both presupposes and both require mutual restitution when proper. There were existing lessees in the subject property at the time of the sale. failed to complete payment of the purchase price. while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. He is not entitled to pursue both of these inconsistent remedies. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. the contract may provide that if the lessees are not ejected with a certain period. Article 1383 is inapplicable. For example. The presence of lessees does not even constitute an encumbrance on the land nor does it deprive the buyer of its control thereof. with damages in either case. such “failure” was not stipulated in the contract as a condition – whether resolutory or suspensive. Failure of Y to pay. its effects and consequences were not specified either. The buyer failed to appreciate the difference between a condition and a warranty and the consequences of such distinction. While Article 1191 uses the term “rescission. The stipulation adverted to by the buyer does not impose a condition or an obligation on the part of the seller to eject the lessees from the lot. 161. X later brought an action for the recovery of the rentals that should be paid under the lease contract for the unexpired term of twelve (12) years. ownership is. He alleges that he cannot use the lot because of the seller’s failure to eject the lessees. after which no rentals were paid. X in the case at bar bound himself to deliver a deed of absolute sale and clean title covering the two parcels of land upon full payment by Y of the purchase price of P2 Million. through his lawyer. (a) Is the buyer’s claim tenable? The buyer’s claim is not tenable. in the case of the resolution of a contract of lease. Their notarized contract of sale contains a provision that the seller warrants that he will defend the buyer’s title to and peaceful possession of the property. is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents X’s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. as distinguished from a contract of sale. Court of Appeals. at a monthly rental of P10. the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the Civil Code should be distinguished from rescission of contract under Article 1383. The lessee occupied the premises and made payments of rentals for about three (3) years. however. In the common case of the resolution or rescission of a contract of sale for failure of the purchaser to pay the stipulated price. X.
167. (d) the lessor shall have the right to sell the leased premises during the period of the lease. various things are due. D had no right to pay the loan before the lapse of two (2) years. The agreement to convey the house and lot in the event of X’s failure to pay the debt in money at its maturity does not constitute pactum commissorium. 1991. 1). 165. liability was solidary but in the judgment. only one thing is principally due. Gandeza Page 34 of 53 162. has not yet expired when the action was brought. To guarantee the loan. upon payment of the amount of the loan and interest. 1980. How should the obligation be considered. but the giving of one is already sufficient compliance with the obligation. (b) the lessee is strictly prohibited from using the leased premises for any other purpose without the written consent of the lessor. 3. 163. for this is a case of loan. Is the stipulation valid? Yes. C contends that the action to recover the jewels had already prescribed because the period of prescription must be computed from the date of the contract of loan (1980) inasmuch as from that date D could already have recovered the jewels by paying the amount of the loan with interest. jointly and severally.00. It was agreed that at the maturity of the debt. and (e) in the event that the lessor decides to sell the leased premises. the lessor informed the lessee of his desire to sell the property. with interest. wherein the term benefits D by the use of the money lent and C by the interest. And it must be so. the obligation remains. it must be presumed to be for the benefit of both. the lessee assigned his right of first option under the lease contract to his daughter. D pledged some pieces of jewelry. the 10-year period of prescription on written contract. 164. that last one must still be given. The judgment did not state that the obligation was joint and several. if it is impossible to give all except one. Distinguish between alternative and facultative obligations.000. In an alternative obligation. such as the one involved in the problem.00 with interest at the rate of 25% per annum for the term of two (2) years. Article 1311of the Civil Code is too clear to be misinterpreted. if it is impossible to give the principal. so none of the defendants may be required to pay for the whole obligation. 1982. C sued A and B for sum of money. A and B signed a promissory note binding themselves to pay C. On December 5. par. It provides that “contract take effect only between the parties. X borrowed money from Y. and it is that one which is generally given. Has the action prescribed? The action has not yet prescribed. If one of the presentations in an alternative obligation is illegal and the other prestations are valid. Consequently. 166. This being so. their assigns and heirs except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature or by stipulation or by provision of law. For non-payment of the debt. which is expressly allowed by the law. if the principal obligation is void. It is not an attempt to permit the creditor Y to declare a forfeiture of the security upon the failure of the debtor to pay the debt at maturity. 1199. Alternative obligation and facultative obligations may be distinguished as follows: 1. as lessor. In a facultative obligation.” . and if it is impossible to give the substitute. 1). There being no circumstance to show that the period in the contract of loan was for the benefit of either party. On October 25. the substitute does not have to be given. the amount of P30. The judgment did not state whether the liability of the defendants was joint or solidary. (c) the lessee shall not sublease his right of lease over the leased premises. D brought an action to recover the jewels. After trial. What is an alternative obligation? An alternative obligation is one where out of two or more prestations which are due. par. joint or solidary? The obligation should be considered as merely a joint one. In the contract. What is a facultative obligation? A facultative obligation is one where only one prestation has been agreed upon but the obligor may render another in substitution (Art. judgment was rendered in C’s favor directing A and B to pay the indebtedness. On the second year of the lease. X will give Y either the sum lent or a particular house and lot. but the substitute may be given to render payment or fulfillment easy. because such a payment in advance would have deprived the latter of the benefit of the stipulated interest. Roney Jone P. the performance of one is already sufficient compliance with the obligation (Art. the lessee has the first option to purchase the property. 1206. and Y. the stipulation is valid because it is simply an alternative obligation. Their lease agreement contains the following terms: (a) the leased premises shall be used exclusively by the lessee for a specific purpose. 2. as lessee. C then asked for execution on the properties of A for the whole obligation. hence. C can get the properties of A corresponding to his proportionate share in the judgment debt. In an alternative obligation. It is simply provided that if the debt is not paid in money it shall be paid in another specific way by the transfer of the property at a valuation. It follows that the action to recover the thing pledged accrued only from the date of maturity of the loan. Does the daughter have the right to exercise her father’s right of first option under the lease contract? The assignment has no legal basis.000. or on October 25. 168. In a facultative obligation. X. there is no longer any need of giving the substitute. entered into a contract of lease. the principal must still be given. without the consent of C. nothing was said about the nature of the obligation. C loaned to D the sum of 100.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Being then sickly. In a facultative obligation.
no novation. at two parcels each. Y interposed the defense that her agreement with X was novated when the latter agreed to be paid directly by the buyers of the jewelry items and on installment basis. When W refused to surrender the owner’s duplicate copies of the titles of the lots. and only the owner can dispose of a property (Cruz vs. When sued for estafa. or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other (implied). it retains the partition of the properties which W and her children supposedly placed in the co-ownership. the necessity of their consent. a decision was rendered against W in an action for sum of money filed by her creditors. Novation may be express or implied. at that time. 305 SCRA 708). Court of Appeals. and the Memorandum of Agreement created an obligation on the part of W to share with the other co-owners the proceeds of the sale of such lots. 278 SCRA 379). one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation. When the decision became final. The option was given to the lessee because he was the lessee of the property. Likewise. Y failed to return the jewelry items to X. he is similarly barred from assigning his first option to buy the leased property to his daughter (Bayangan vs. W and her children executed a notarized Deed of Partition by virtue of which each of them received a share in the intestate estate of H consisting of several parcels of registered lands. It is thus easy to see why X’s acceptance of the buyer’s payment on installment basis cannot be construed as a case of either expromision or delegacion sufficient to justify the attendance of extinctive novation. It cannot be denied that the lessee’s right of first option to buy the leased property in case of its sale is but part of the bigger right to lease said property from the lessor. It was a component of the consideration of the lease. and (4) there is a valid new contract. Indeed. People. 293 SCRA 239). X. it vests in the registered owner the power to dispose of the lots adjudicated to him or her under the Deed of Partition even without the consent of the other parties to the Memorandum of Agreement. requires the concurrence of the following: (1) there is a previous valid obligation. Court of Appeals. Y and Z. and Z failed to show that the Deed of Partition and the Memorandum of Agreement are materially and substantially incompatible with each other. (2) the parties concerned agree to a new contract. Granting that there was such novation. Roney Jone P.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. as their respective shares in the inheritance. In 1981. It was simply necessitated by the fact that. X delivered to Y pieces of jewelry to be sold on commission basis. The Memorandum of Agreement fell short of producing a novation because it does not express a clear intent to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration for the emergence of a new one. Despite the lapse of the period agreed upon. This is so because a solidary obligation implies mutual agency and mutual confidence. . she was forced to receive the tender of the buyers. and his three legitimate children. hence. the criminal liability for estafa committed by Y is then not affected by the subsequent novation of the contract. a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon the two (2) lots assigned to W. a solidary creditor cannot assign his right without the consent of the others. however. (a) Was there a novation of the Deed of Partition? The contention of X. it does not necessarily imply the extinguishment of the liability of the first debtor. (NOTE: Novation. W and her children were assigned individual parcels of land. it is imperative that it be so declared an unequivocal terms (express). Y and Z that the Memorandum of Agreement novated the Deed of Partition is not well-taken. absent an agreement that the first debtor shall be released from responsibility. W. there is no doubt that the right of the other creditors would be endangered. (3) the old contract is extinguished. constitute an extinctive novation. (b) Was the co-ownership revived by the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement? The very provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement belie the revival of the co-ownership. H died intestate in 1977 survived by his widow. X. Gandeza Page 35 of 53 In the case at bar. Not too uncommon is when a stranger to a contract agrees to assume an obligation. X. the creditors petitioned the court to nullify said titles. In the settlement of the intestate estate of H. and while this may have the effect of adding to the number of persons liable. There is no incompatibility between these two contracts. Should the assignee or substitute do acts which would prejudice the others. First. Y and Z opposed the petition on the ground that they are co-owners of the lots in question by virtue of their Memorandum of Agreement which they claimed novated their partition agreement. the lease contract between the lessor and the lessee clearly reveals the intent of the parties to limit their lease relationship to themselves alone. W and her children executed a Memorandum of Agreement by virtue of which they agreed to divide equally among them the proceeds of the sale of the lots that were assigned to each of them. She added that her liability is merely civil in nature. Neither would the fact alone that the creditor (such as X) receives guaranty or accepts payments from a third person who has agreed to assume the obligation. A day after the execution of the partition agreement. Jus disponendi is an attribute of ownership. Was there a novation of X and Y’s agreement? The acceptance by X of partial payments tendered by Y’s buyers does not evince the intention of X to have their agreement novated. Y had substantial accounts payable to X. to obviate the situation where X would end up with nothing. 169. 170. Thus. 171. If the lessee is barred by the contract from assigning his right to lease the property to any other party. the Deed of Partition granted title to the lots in question to W to whom they were assigned. for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State (Quinto vs. hence. Y. and second. In their partition agreement. In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same. May a solidary creditor assign his right under the obligation? Under Article 1213 of the Civil Code.
Roney Jone P. and the lessor may hold him liable for the rent therefore. if the price is not paid.000 was rejected. the lessor could easily defeat the lessee’s right by simply imposing unreasonable and onerous conditions to prevent the parties from reaching an agreement (Allied Banking Corp. The annotation in the third written offer amounts neither to a written nor an implied acceptance by Y of X’s offer. serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties.” X contends that this stipulation is void for being violative of the principle of mutuality of contract under Article 1308 of the Civil Code. Undaunted. 1978 and may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee. and ABC Bank. X made a written offer to Y regarding the purchase of the latter’s car. (3) In a contract of sale. and Y. after delivery has been made. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed. since the seller retains ownership. despite delivery. in a contract to sell. Inasmuch as the certificates of titles over the lots were still in the name of third persons who had already executed deeds of conveyance and disclaimer in favor of the vendor. the payment in full of the price is a positive suspensive condition. ownership is retained by the seller. X made a second offer which was likewise rejected. it was agreed that the total purchase price of P2. After all. title over the property generally passes to the buyer upon delivery.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Court of Appeals. Annotated on this third written offer was the phrase “receive original (9-4-89)” beside the signature of Y. if circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent man would have taken the necessary precaution if in the same situation (Embrado vs. i. Such refusal to believe in the strong possibility of a defect on the vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value (should such title later prove to be defective). For then. as vendee. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment.000 as earnest money. vs. and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. 233 SCRA 333). (b) How shall the clause be interpreted or applied? The clause “may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee” means that the exercise by the lessee of his option resulted in the automatic extension of the contract of the lease under the same terms and conditions prevailing in the original contract of lease. it is as if the obligation of the seller to deliver and to transfer ownership never became effective and binding. 284 SCRA 357). the contract of sale may by such occurrence put an end to a transaction that once upon a time existed. entered into a contract of “Conditional Sale of Registered Lands” over three (3) parcels of land situated in Batangas City. Court of Appeals. A contract of sale and a contract to sell are distinguished as follows: (1) In a contract of sale. free from all liens . On April 11.000 with a check for P100. for fourteen (14) years. the seller has lost ownership and cannot recover it unless the contract is resolved or rescinded. Court of Appeals. X. as vendor. that is. there was no perfected contract between X and Y. the contract if he seeks to oust the buyer for failure to pay.e. And while the lessee has a right to elect whether to continue with the lease or not. 268 SCRA 160).1 Million would be paid by the vendee to the vendor in the following manner: P300. it cannot. Was there a perfected contract of sale between X and Y? No. regardless of delivery and is not to pass until full payment of the price. Gandeza Page 36 of 53 172. as an independent source of obligation. X made a third written offer for P600.00 upon signing of the contract.. entered into a contract of lease involving a building. in a contract to sell. 176. he is enforcing.000. once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts.8 Million upon presentation by the vendor of transfer certificates of titles in his name. SALES 173. Hence. and the balance of P1. 1981. Distinguish between a contract of sale and a contract to sell. in a contract to sell. the non-payment of the purchase price is a resolutory condition. Their lease agreement specifically states that the “term of the lease shall be fourteen (14) years commencing from April 1. the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the lessee. as lessee. The requisites of a valid contract of sale are lacking in said receipt and therefore the sale is neither valid nor enforceable (Jovan Land vs. the phrase “ for a like term” referring to the period of the lease. and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the property for the duration of the new lease. Until the contract of sale is perfected. 175. 174. What is the “mirror doctrine” in the law on sales? The “mirror doctrine” in the law on sales is a principle in law which states that a purchaser of a property cannot close is eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect on the vendor’s title. both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. It is fundamental principle that before a contract of sale can be valid. X. then the option – which is an integral part of the consideration for the contract – would be rendered worthless. (a) Is the clause “may be renewed for a like term at the option of the lessee” violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts? The fact that the lessee’s option to renew the lease is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render such option void for lack of mutuality. (b) determinate subject-matter. as lessor. Such annotation is merely a memorandum of the receipt by Y of X’s offer. If the renewed contract were still subject to mutual agreement by the lessor and the lessee. the following elements must be present: (a) consent of the contracting parties. When the first offer of P500. not rescinding. (2) In a contract of sale.
the retained balance of the purchase price would earn interest at 17% interest per annum or P20. Roney Jone P. Y’s children brought an action for the cancellation and correction of Y’s title and the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names and to reflect in said title their distributive shares. Court of Appeals. 1981 without any reservation of title on the part of the vendors. X then executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Y who had died seven (7) years earlier. 177. hence. NCC). Gandeza Page 37 of 53 and encumbrances. Upon the death of Y in 1971. which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations. as vendor. In 1967. the children of Y necessarily became the owners of the subject lot in whose favor the deed of sale should have been executed by the vendor (Dawson vs. Having stepped into the shoes of their father Y upon his death in 1971 with respect to the contract to sell. 1529 (which calls for summary proceedings) does not apply. the sale is not effective. 1983. otherwise. the title over the subject property vests in the vendee only upon full payment of the consideration. Hence. ownership of the lots passed to the vendee both by constructive and actual delivery.00 monthly payable to the vendors until December 31. He also requested that the vendee continue paying the monthly interest of P20. the deceased Y had no more civil personality or juridical capacity. the vendor executed a notarial rescission of the sale to which the vendee responded by reminding the vendor that he was the one who did not comply with his contractual obligation to deliver clean titles within the stipulated 20-month period. Court of Appeals. Section 108 of P. specifically on December 31. and delivery of registerable documents of sale in favor of the vendee within twenty months from the signing of the contract . paying in full the selling price of the lot from their own funds.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. can resort to the summary proceedings under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. had no right to rescind the contract. It is undisputed that Y died in 1971 without having completed the installments on the property. the vendee sued for specific performance to compel the vendor to comply with his obligation to deliver clean titles over the properties. the vendor requested the vendee for an indefinite extension within which to deliver clean titles over the lots. Although denominated as a conditional sale. 276 SCRA 149). Where the installments agreed upon have not been completely paid upon the death of the original vendee and the certificate of title was erroneously issued in his name. His juridical capacity. 179. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the petition? The court was not correct in dismissing the petition. and completed the payment in 1978.600. Aggrieved by the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of their father. In 1978. a transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of Y instead of his children. entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land in Quezon City. Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. assumed his obligations thereunder by paying the selling price of the lot from their own funds. In the meantime. it does not matter whether the expected thing . 178. instead of his children who assumed his rights and obligations in the contract. his heirs. his children assumed his rights and obligations in the contract to sell. Because of the error. Thereupon. After trial on the merits. A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a “conditional sale” absent a stipulation reserving title in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price or a stipulation allowing the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract in case of non-payment. through a deed of absolute sale. Will the action prosper? Yes. If the expected thing in emptio rei sperati does not materialize. and Y. the action will prosper. His heirs then took over the contract to sell.D. The vendee refused the request. the contract between the vendor and the vendee is one of absolute sale. It is sufficient that he is the owner at the time the object is delivered. who assumed his obligations and completed the payment. Nool vs. Two (2) days prior to the expiration of the 20-month period. was lost through death. It was expressly stipulated that the vendee would have absolute and unconditional possession of the lots as well the right to introduce improvements thereon. 1461. he may be held liable for breach of warranty against eviction. Is it necessary that the seller be the owner of the thing sold? Yes. and being the ones who continued the installment payments of the selling price from their own funds until its full payment in 1978. Register of Deeds. 1529 to correct the manifest mistake). 290 SCRA 532). which payment was completed in 1978. while actual delivery was made when the vendee took unconditional possession of the lots and constructed valuable improvements thereon (Babasa vs. 1529 is clearly available as a remedy to correct the erroneous issuance of the certificate of title in the name of Y. the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it pertains more to the partition of the estate of Y which will in effect transfer ownership of title of the property to his children as compulsory heirs. Constructive delivery was accomplished upon the execution of the contract on April 11. With said full payment. Indeed. Accordingly. but he need not be the owner at the time of the perfection of the contract.6000. In emptio spei.00 starting January. the ownership of the lot had not been vested in Y during his lifetime. while emptio spei is the sale of the hope itself (Art. 1982. (NOTE: In a contract to sell. 1982. as vendee. X could not have transferred the title over the lot. In retaliation. 295 SCRA 733). What is emptio rei sperati? Emptio spei? What is their effect in a contract of sale? Emptio rei sperati is the sale of an expected thing. X. to Y in 1978 considering that he had died seven (7) years earlier in 1971. In the instant case. (NOTE: Sale of a parcel of land by a nonowner who cannot deliver the thing sold is null and void under Article 1409 of the Civil Code because it contemplates an impossible service.
He was the head of the company’s cash department. 184. and (5) that in the event of resignation or dismissal from the service of Rolando. NCC). 1501. to allow the forfeiture of the earnest money or advance payment in favor of the seller would amount to unjust enrichment of the seller at the expense of the buyer (Goldenrod. although there has been delivery. 181. Y sold the land to Z who.000. 182. especially in the absence of a clear and express agreement thereon. the buyer becomes the owner of the thing sold upon delivery.000.00. there can be a valid sale of a future property) 180. as of December 15. at that time. Y obtained a transfer certificate of title in her name. 281 SCRA 491). 186. 187. he became the owner thereof. may the seller of real estate keep the earnest money to answer for damages in the event that the sale fails due to the fault of the prospective buyer? In the absence of a specific stipulation. Court of Appeals. Roney Jone P. it shall be considered as part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. 751. (2) The buyer can return the thing even if he finds nothing wrong with the quality of the thing sold. Is this rule absolute? No.00. and has not yet been converted into a contract. the rule is not absolute. 299 SCRA 141). On January 9. (3) that for the duration of the lease agreement. The discretion to return is with the buyer. the parties could not have intended that the earnest money or advance payment would be forfeited when the buyer should fail to pay the balance of the price. Rolando and the company entered into an agreement with the following provisions: (a) that for and in consideration of a monthly rental of P1. Article 1523 of the Civil Code provides that delivery to the carrier is presumed to be delivery to the buyer. repair and maintenance. As a result. oil and parts replacement shall be for the account of Rolando. Inc. 272 SCRA 548). such a provision is valid. but he may revest the ownership to the seller by returning the thing within the time fixed in the contract. and (b) as proof of perfection of a contract of sale. applying Article 1490 of the Civil Code by analogy. Rolando acquired from the company a 2door Colt Lancer 1979 model pursuant to the latter’s car plan program for its top employees. 1984. Rolando may exercise the option to purchase the car from the company and all monthly rentals shall be applied to the payment of the full purchase price of the car. Under Article 1482 of the Civil Code. if the sale has not yet become absolute. an earnest money is an advance payment which must be deducted from the purchase price. Inc. The company ceased operations in 1981. . the company leases to Rolando the vehicle for his use: (2) that Rolando will pay the lease rental thru salary deduction in the amount of P1. although there has been delivery. 183. he bears the loss because upon delivery to him of the thing. What are some of the basic rules on transactions on sale or return? (1) In a transaction on sale or return. What are some of the basic rules on a sale on approval or trial or satisfaction? (1) In a sale on approval or trial or satisfaction. This produces no juridical effect. 185. such rule would have no application where the sale itself specifically called for delivery by the seller to the buyer at the latter’s place of business (Mobile Oil Phils.00 per month for a period of five (5) years. whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale. While Article 1523 of the Civil Code provides that delivery to the carrier is presumed to be delivery to the buyer. or if no time has been fixed. Nonetheless. (4) that at the end of the 5-year period or upon payment of the 60th monthly rental. X sold to his common-law wife Y a parcel of land. Thereafter. gasoline. unless the sale becomes absolute. This is a mere offer. Hence. within a reasonable time (Art. X can no longer recover the land from Z because the latter is a buyer in good faith and for value who had the right to rely on the title of Y (Cruz vs. insurance. vs. except: (a) if buyer is at fault. Will the action prosper? The action will not prosper.. Court of Appeals. (2) The risk of loss remains with the seller. (3) If it is stipulated that a third person must signify approval or satisfaction. In the absence of stipulation. NCC). Because of the sale. Gandeza Page 38 of 53 materialized or not. and (b) if buyer had expressly agreed to bear the loss. the seller is not allowed to keep the earnest money in the event that the sale fails due to the fault of the prospective buyer.00. What is an earnest money? What are its purposes? An earnest money ( arras) has a dual purpose: (a) it is considered as part of the purchase price. What is meant by “policitacion”? “Policitacion” is a unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing which is not accepted. If refusal to accept is not justified. (3) If the thing is lost in the possession of the buyer. Moreover.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. 1980. X is correct in claiming that the sale to Y was null and void because it was a sale between common-law spouses. Rolando was laid off. X is now trying to recover the lot from Z on the ground that the previous sale to Y was null and void. seller may still sue. and creates no legal bond. but the third person must be in good faith. Rolando was an employee of Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation. Court of Appeals. However. all expenses and costs of registration. (NOTE: While there can be no donation of a future property (Art. he shall return the car to the company in good working condition. By its very nature. was not aware of the relationship of X and Y. title remains with the seller. what is important is that the hope itself validly existed. Thereupon. vs. Rolando was able to make payments on the car in the total amount of P61.
and thereby “depriving” Rolando of its use (Elisco Tool Mfg. 288 SCRA 144). Will the action prosper? The action will prosper. Article 1484 and 1485 of the Civil Code will apply. even if the contract of sale stipulates that the same shall be deemed automatically cancelled in case of the non-payment of the price at the agreed time. MFC Corporation is engaged in the business of selling roofing materials to the public. This is so because of the stipulation in the agreement that all monthly rentals shall be applied to the payment of the full purchase price of the car.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty.5 Million. the company filed a complaint for replevin and damages against Rolando. provides that Article 1484 shall be applied to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy. Upon the facts given. . husband and wife. If the seller did not rescind and even accepted late payments. Remigio filed an action against Ubaldo and Santos for cancellation of the sale. there was no separate consideration. In this case. Remigio received a letter from Santos informing him that the building had been sold to him by Ubaldo for P5 Million. not lease. will your answer be the same? Yes. as of May 1986. Thereafter. Corp. H and W. 188. Gandeza Page 39 of 53 On June 6. This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by virtue of Article 1485. Under Article 1592 of the Civil Code. Will the action prosper? The action will not prosper. Through extensive advertisements in media and in its brochures. its violation is predicated on quasi-delicit. Rolando failed to settle the obligation thereby entitling the company to the possession of the car. the natural tendency of which was to induce the buyers. vs. the company made representations respecting the durability of the tiles and the sturdiness of roofing installed in accordance with its particularly described method. He certainly had the right to treat the lessee’s counter offer of a lesser amount as a rejection of his offer to sell at P5 Million.000. Article 1485. Ubaldo informed Remigio that he was willing to sell the building for P5 Million. the answer will be the same. Ubaldo has repeatedly assured Remigio that if he should decide to sell the building. 1994. Thus. It is clear that the transaction in this case is a lease in name only. MFC Corporation is liable under Article 1546 of the Civil Code (express warranty) because MFC. Suppose that Ubaldo had given Remigio an option to purchase the building instead of a right of first refusal. Moreover. The following day. not cumulative. the vendor in a sale of personal property on the installment plan has three remedies against the vendee. The exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. On June 30. which was the same price he got in selling it to Santos. The action will not prosper because an option must be supported by a consideration separate and distinct from the purchase price. Under Article 1484. 1986. relying thereon. Court of Appeals. the lessee’s right of first refusal does not go so far as to give him the power to dictate on the lessor the price at which the latter should sell his property. purchased these roofing materials from MFC Corporation. H and W sued MFC for damages caused to their residence when its roof was blown away by a typhoon. the vendee may still pay even after the expiration of the period as long as no demand for rescission has been made either judicially or by a notarial act. when the lessor has deprived the lessee of the possession of enjoyment of the thing. he will give Remigio the right of first refusal. Roney Jone P. namely: (a) to demand exact fulfillment of the obligation. should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments. The so-called monthly rentals are in truth monthly amortizations on the price of the car. and (c) foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold. therefore. the condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of the possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Article 1485 was fulfilled by the filling of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of the car. The right of first refusal is not based on a contract but is predicated on the provisions of human relations and. totaled P39. One week later. In the case at bar. By virtue of the writ of replevin issued by the court. (b) cancel the sale.00. as in fact it did induce H and W. Therefore. 190. that despite repeated demands. the seller is deemed to have waived his right to rescind (Heirs of Pedro Escaniar vs. to purchase the roofing materials. Settled is the rule that the remedies under Article 1484 are alternative. the deputy sheriff seized the vehicle on August 6. the lessor had sufficiently complied with his commitment to give the lessee a right of first refusal when he offered to sell the property to the lessee for P5 Million. Deliveries were made by MFC and the materials were installed by its employees. Court of Apeals. Ubaldo is the owner of a building which has been leased by Remigio for the past 20 years. Ubaldo did not reply. had made affirmation of fact relating to its advertised product. and to compel Ubaldo to execute a deed of absolute sale in his favor. based on his right of first refusal. on the other hand. as seller to the general public. and that he will not renew Remigio’s lease when it expires. if one has been constituted. Remigio sent a letter to Ubaldo offering to buy the building at P4. 189. 191. he was free to find another buyer upon receipt of such counter-offer. should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments. The contract being one of sale on installment. The company alleged that Rolando failed to pay the monthly rentals on the car which. should the vendee fail to pay. Was the agreement between Rolando and his former employer a contract of lease with option to buy or one of sale of personal property on installment? The agreement between Rolando and his former employer is one of sale on installment. 1986. the option may be withdrawn by Ubaldo at anytime. Does the vendee have the right to pay the balance of the purchase price (or the unpaid installments) in a sale involving realty even after the expiration of the period agreed upon? Yes. 301 SCRA 731).
Thus. As an incentive to complete the construction of Phase III. 1991. Republic Act 6552. They cannot be rewarded for their own misdeed. As of September. otherwise known as the “Maceda Law. 1990. that the provision under Article 1592 does not apply to a contract to sell where payment is a positive suspensive condition. (NOTE: The Maceda Law. Roney Jone P. although she admitted having failed to pay the installments due in October and November. or 50% of the contract price of P3. Court of Appeals.A. tried to pay the installments due in said months (October and November. XYZ Builders had already paid P1. which was half of the contract price. It is clear that H and W were not justified in refusing to accept the tender of payment made by X on December 31. In any event. H and W contend that they have complied with the requirements under Article 1592 of the Civil Code regarding the rescission of a sale of realty when they sent X the letter dated January 4. Metro Manila. When all her efforts to make payment were unsuccessful. the sum XYZ Builders had disbursed amounted to more than the total of 24 installments.6 Million. However. H and W failed to prove the conditions that would warrant the implementation of this clause. there was deliberate effort on her part to meet her responsibility to pay. the vendors through their lawyer sent a letter to X notifying him that they were enforcing the provision on automatic rescission and automatic forfeiture clause in the deed of conditional sale. The fact is. 6652. In a letter dated March 15. X. but Marina refused.6 Million. X had already paid the amount of P2 Million. however. The letter also made a formal demand on X to vacate the property. Marina replied that it was canceling the contract to purchase and sell due to XYZ Builder’s abandonment of the construction of Phase III. On January 4. 1990 (Valarao vs. Moreover. with XYZ Builders Construction Company as the principal contractor of Phase III of the project. In the present case. Was the cancellation of the contract to purchase and sell proper? The cancellation of the contract was not proper. which means that she had a total grace period of three months from December 31. the title does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agreement or the delivery of the thing sold. 1991. on October 9. 1990) including the amount due in December. she would have paid all three monthly installments due. Among the requirements of R. 1991. 1990 on December 31. On September 4.” Pursuant to Section 3 of said law.A. and not to a sale on installment or a contract to sell. the rescission of the contract and the forfeiture of the payments already made could not be affected because the case fals squarely under R. 279 SCRA 590). however.e. Unlike in a contract of sale. i. Prior to Marina’s unilateral act of rescission. which is not covered by Article 1592. The construction of the project commenced sometime in 1988. inclusive of downpayment. 1991. In a contract to sell.000. 1990.. 193. No.8 Million. is applicable even to contracts to sell and the buyer is entitled to a grace period which he earned). XYZ Builders demanded the delivery of the unit. H and W sold to X under a Deed of Conditional Sale a parcel of land payable in installments. It was further stipulated that all improvements introduced by X in the property shall belong to the vendors without any right of reimbursement. 192. Marina Properties Corporation is the owner-developer of the “Marina Bayhomes Condominium Project” to be built on a parcel of land at Asiaworld City. No. in order to effect the . Coastal Road in Parañaque. the sale shall be considered automatically rescinded without the need of judicial action and all payments made by X shall be forfeited in favor of the vendors by way of rental for the use and occupancy of the property and as liquidated damages. In the complaint for specific performance filed by XYZ Builders against Marina. : H and W refused to accept X’s payment so will have a reason to demand the enforcement of the automatic forfeiture clause. In other words. Marina allowed XYZ Builders to purchase a condominium unit in the condominium project known as Unit B121. 1987. 1988.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. After paying P1. the title over the subject property is transferred to the vendee only upon the full payment of the stipulated consideration. 304 SCRA 155). the deed of conditional sale is of the same nature as a sale on installment or a contract to sell. Court of Appeals. the parties entered into a Contract to Purchase and Sell covering Unit B-121 for P3. Gandeza Page 40 of 53 Note. 1988. 1990. It was stipulated in the deed of conditional sale that should X fail to pay three successive monthly installments within the period stipulated. X sought judicial action by filing a petition for consignation on January 4. (a) What is the applicability of the requirement of rescission by suit or notarial act referred to in Article 1592 of the Civil Code? It is well-settled that Article 1592 of the Civil Code requiring demand by suit or notarial act in case the vendor of realty wants to rescind applies only to a contract of sale. otherwise known as the “Act to Provide Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Installment Payments:. X was entitled to a one-month grace period for every year of installments paid. 1990 but was turned down by the vendors. 6552. Had they accepted it on said date. XYZ builders inquired from Marina the “turn-over status” of the condominium unit. and that XYZ Builder abandoned its work on the Phase III Project as of December. two years worth of installments computed at a monthly installment rate of P67.00. where title remains with the vendor until full payment of the price. (b) Can H and W enforce the automatic forfeiture clause in the Deed of Conditional Sale? The validity of the automatic forfeiture clause in the deed of conditional sale is conceded.8 Million. There is no need for rescission because there can be no rescission of an obligation which is non-existent (Pangilinan vs. the latter contends that its cancellation of the Contract to Purchase and Sell involving Unit B-121 is justified since XYZ Builders has failed to pay its monthly installment since October 1989 or for a period of almost two (2) years.
C acquired title to the property from XYZ Bank. C turned down the offer. It is not necessary that the vendee has an absolute title. C refused. What is the effect of partial payment of the price and the entry into the land by the buyer in a case of oral sale of land? A vendee in an oral contract of sale of land who made part payment thereof. took possession of the land. the parties executed a separate instrument. an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quite title. C sued A and D for breach of his contractual right of “first option to buy. is entitled to bring a suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. Their lease contract contains a stipulation to the effect that B has the “first option or priority” to purchase the leased property in case A decides to sell the same. Undisputedly. they obtained a loan from XYZ Bank. and not from the Spouse H and W. secured by a real estate mortgage on their lands which were still registered in the names of W’s brothers A and B. B subsequently assigned all his rights and interests in the leased property to C. His counter-offer was to buy the property for P5 Million which was the same amount paid by D in the first sale. hence. vs. X files an action for specific performance. Thereupon. X tendered payment on several occasions which Y rejected. the right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument. May Y be compelled to resell the lot to X on the basis of the instrument denominated as a Right to Repurchase? No. while the action is denominated as one for specific performance. The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument. Court of Appeals. When the couple were in need of money. vs. .” whereby Y promised to sell to X a piece of land within two years. Therefore. Court of Appeals. May C be compelled to resell the parcels of land to H and W? No. A later sold the leased property to D for P5 Million. even if unsupported by any consideration is accepted. C’s complaint sufficiently alleges an actionable contractual breach on the part of the defendants A and D. Meanwhile. there is also nothing to repurchase. denominated as Right to Repurchase. Gandeza Page 41 of 53 cancellation of the contract. Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed. Said assignment was contained in a “Deed of Assignment” with the conformity of A. An agreement was made to the effect that H and W may redeem the property from C anytime when they have the money. Is Y’s contention correct? Y’s contention is not correct. When C turned down the offer. On the same day and along with the execution of the Deed of Sale. as an independent contract.” In the present case. Marina’s cancellation of its contract with XYZ Builders was void. X and Y entered into an “Option to Purchase. and any right thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but some other right like the option to buy in the instant case (Nool vs. and made valuable improvements thereon. The sale was made after XYZ Bank consolidated its title on the subject lands. the alleged written contract of repurchase is bereft of any consideration distinct from the price. For. the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase. 196. 195. a notarial cancellation must first be had. another brother of W. it is in effect an action to quiet title (Pingol. One “repurchases” only what he had previously sold. it results in a perfected contract of sale. ( Marina Properties Corp. A owns a parcel of land leased by B.” Will the action prosper? The action will prosper. 194. X sold to Y a parcel of land under a deed of sale which was duly ratified and notarized. 226 SCRA 118). The mortgage was foreclosed and XYZ Bank’s ownership was consolidated when Spouses H and W failed to exercise their right to redeem within one year. granting X the right to repurchase the lot within ten (10) years. The assignee C wrote A so the latter had the property reconveyed to him for the same amount. et al. A contract to repurchase arising out of a contract of sale where the seller did not have any title to the property “sold” is not valid. The property was then offered to C for 15M. The transaction between the parties was not a sale with right to repurchase. Spouses H and W owned two parcels of land. Article 1324 of the Civil Code applies. 276 SCRA 149). A sold the property to D for P9 Million. the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase but some other contract right like an option to buy (Vasquez vs. 198. Court of Appeals. Y contends that the option was a unilateral promise to sell and was unsupported by consideration distinct from the price. Once the instrument of absolute sale is executed. It was stipulated in the contract of lease between A and C that the latter was granted “first option or priority” to purchase the leased properties in case A decides to sell the same. it cannot bind C. Spouses H and W sold the parcels of land to C. 294 SCRA 273). 198 SCRA 102). X offered to redeem but Y refused. C then bought the two parcels of land from XYZ Bank and the title was later transferred to him. Roney Jone P. absent this notarial cancellation. Since nothing was sold. 197. hence void.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. the right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same parties. Article 1479 of the Civil Code provides that “an accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissory if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. They bought the same from W’s brothers A and B. X cannot avail of the right of conventional redemption. When H and W asked C to deliver the property to them after paying the amount. The subsequent agreement between H and W and C is actually an accepted unilateral promise to sell. Court of Appeals. but is a right reserved by the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. In other words. but is a right reserved by the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once a unilateral promise to sell. Accordingly. Moreover.
Was the pacto de retro sale without a valuable consideration? There was a valuable consideration in the sale.000 00 from her as interest for the P4. Court of Appeals. She contended that the 30-day period for redemption period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code had not . The basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any prospective buyer. 1992. A then informed E that she was exercising her right of redemption as a co-owner of the subject property. sold the unmortgaged portion of the land to Z. In preparing and executing the deed of sale with right of repurchase and in delivering to Y the land titles. Inc. 1979. being a relative. Z agreed to execute a fictitious deed of sale in Y’s favor with right to repurchase covering his three lots subject to the following conditions: (a) that the amount to be stated in the document is P4. As a matter of fact. One check was for P4. M sold her 1/5 share in the property for P10. Title was later acquired by the bank which then sold the land to Y. (Parañaque Kings Enterprise. his properties were not for sale. (c) that although it would appear in the document that Z is the vendor. C. 1992. After a lengthy discussion. A received summons. vs. On August 5. When Z presented the two checks for payment. 199. In order to secure a loan. with a demand that the rental corresponding to her 1/5 share on the subject property be remitted to her. It is plain therefore that consideration existed at the time of the execution of the deed of sale with right of repurchase. When X was nowhere to be found. She requested Z to cede to Y his three lots in Tacloban City as settlement of the face value of the rubber checks. Said letter was sent with an attached copy of the Deed of Sale between E and M. but also his receipt of P420. X is the owner of a parcel of land. 200. Can Y claim the right of legal redemption? The exercise of the right of legal redemption presupposes the existence of co-ownership at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owners. moreover.P. On September 14. To stave off her impending prosecution. they were dishonored by the draweebank for having been drawn against a closed account. On May 30. X prepared the “Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase” and after it has been notarized. thus making the latter a co-owner of the property to the extent of the share sold. As agreed upon. To assure Z that X will redeem the properties. and (d) that titles to the properties will be delivered to Y but the sale will not be recorded in the Register of Deeds.4 Million with interest thereon at 5% per month.00 to E who is another sister of A. X. Y did not register the transaction with the Register of Deeds. 1995. they sold 1/5 of their undivided share in the subject parcel of land to their mother M. (b) that the properties will be repurchased within six (6) months.4 Million. Court of Appeals. While it is true that the checks were dishonored. Z’s cause of action was to file criminal actions against X but not a civil action against Y to annul the sale. without the knowledge of the other co-owners. Z immediately vetoed the proposal because he owed Y nothing and he was under no obligation to convey to the latter his properties. It is not only Z’s kindness to X. Z cannot seek refuge in the equitable maxim that “where one or two innocent persons must suffer. he gave occasion for the damage caused by virtue of the deed of sale with right to repurchase which he prepared and signed (Mate vs. with a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No.4 Million supposedly for the selling price of the properties and the other was for P420.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty.4 Million. Undaunted.00 corresponding to the interest for six months.000. Court of Appeals. and D were the co-owners of a parcel of land and a building. On August 6. X issued to him two post-dated checks. X explained to Z that he was in no danger of losing his properties as he will merely execute a simulated document transferring them to Y but they will be redeemed by her later with her own funds. that person who gave occasion for the damages to be caused must bear the consequences. there is absolutely no basis for Z to file a complaint against Y to annul the pacto de retro sale on the ground of lack of consideration. which impelled him to execute such contract. A instituted a civil action for redemption of the subject property. 290 SCRA 463). Immediately thereafter.000. he mortgaged a portion of it to ABC Bank which foreclosed the mortgage when X defaulted. 268 SCRA 727). 22 on account of the rubber checks that she issued to Y amounting to P4. 1986. A and three of her sisters B. 201. the sale of the properties for the amount of P9 Million (the price for which the property was finally sold to D) should have been first offered to C. the right of legal redemption cannot be exercised (Uy vs. it was given to Y together with the titles of the properties. X was on the verge of being prosecuted for violation of B. Only after the grantee fails to exercise said right could the owner validity offer to sell the property to a third person under the same terms as offered to the grantee. Moreover. on the other hand.” This is so because he was not an innocent person. Considering that Y was not a co-owner of X of the portion sold at the time of the conveyance to Z. On September 8. Roney Jone P. he immediately filed an action to annul the sale pacto de retro with damages. He contends that the sale is void for lack of consideration because no money changed hands when he signed it and the checks which were issued for the redemption of the properties have been dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. 246 SCRA 703). Z actually accommodated X so she would not be charged criminally by Y. it would be X who will provide the money for the redemption of the properties with her own funds. 15510 filed by E demanding her share in the rentals being collected by A from the tenants of the property. X solicited the help of her relative Z. Gandeza Page 42 of 53 To comply with this obligation. A received a letter from E informing her about the sale.
and there remains only in the juridical relation. 1992 sufficient compliance with the notice requirement under Article 1623 of the Civil Code? No. Under Article 1649 of the Civil Code. May the lessee assign the lease to a third person? No. unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Can the lessor ask for the cancellation of the lease contract for violation of the provision against assignment? No. The lessor prevailed. are easily discernible. and its validity. 1992. She learned about the sale only on August 5. the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor. No. therefore. but against the lessor. (b) Granting that E’s complaint in Civil Case No.8 Million. the lessee may remove the improvement. so that the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the alienation. two persons: the lessor and the assignee. Also. does A still have the right to redeem M’s 1/5 share? Assuming that the receipt by A of the summons in Civil Case No. 1986. X is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land.. a lessee may generally sub-lease the property in the absence of express prohibition. option and privilege to purchase. never informed her and the other co-owners about the sale to E. the sub-lessee may remain. he (X) leased to Y said parcels of land at a monthly rental of P10. An action for unlawful detainer was brought against the lessee and the sub-lessee. The lessee did not assign the lease. 1985. to the sublessee. Article 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly provides that the thirty (30) day period of exercising the rights of pre-emption or redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor or prospective vendor not from any other person. 203. the vendor. LEASE 202. This is so because the lessee remains a party to the lease even if he had already created a sub-lease thereon. The lessee appealed. but the sublessee did not. the rule being that in the absence of an express prohibition a lessee may sublet the thing leased. May 31. In such a case his personality disappears.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby (Art.000.00 for a period of 18 months beginning August 1. 15510 amounted to actual knowledge by A of the sale between E and M. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount. (a) Is E’s letter to A dated May 30. Gandeza Page 43 of 53 begun to run against her since the vendor. the sublease is lawful. The vendor of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. The lease contract provided that in order to . the lessor cannot have the lease cancelled for alleged violation of the provision against assignment. the notice being a reaffirmation thereof. The contract expressly prohibits the assignment of the lease contract or any portion thereof. During the pendency of his appeal. 205. X gave Y the exclusive right. 204. 137677. A still had until September 4. by substituting the person of the debtor) so the creditor-lessor must consent.e. 206. 15510. as provided for in Article 1623 of Civil Code. 208. G. without prejudice to his responsibility to the lessor for the performance of the contract. or any portion thereof.R. A has not been furnished any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by M. has not yet accrued (Francisco vs. who is converted into a lessee. What are his rights to the garage. the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale.000. Can execution issue against the sub-lessee? No. the leased premises and all the improvements thereon for the aggregate amount of P1. Lessor and lessee entered into a contract of lease involving a 4-storey commercial building. Roney Jone P. and not by the vendee. A’s right to exercise the legal right of preemption or redemption. NCC). M. 207. the lessee has a right to occupy the leased premises. given to a co-owner when any one of the other co-owners sells his share in the thing owned in common to a third person. What is the legal justification why the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor? The lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor because an assignment of the lease constitutes novation (i. together with the complaint. 1678. 15510 on August 5. and in the meantime also. in whole or in part. 1984 and expiring on January 30. 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day period of redemption commenced to run. The lessee later subleased a portion of the leased premises to a third person. On January 10. 1992 within which to exercise her right of legal redemption. As part of the consideration of their lease agreement. The lessee constructed an enclosed garage on a parcel of land leased to him. as lessor. can acquire the improvement by paying for one-half of its value. 2000). Since the problem does not state that the contract of lease contains a prohibition against sublease. Unlike in assignment. if any? The owner of the land. and has thus dissociated himself from the original contract of lease. Indeed the rights of the assignee as lessee are enforceable not against the assignor. within the lease period. An assignment exists when the lessee has by the contract made an absolute transfer of his interest as lessee. her exercise of said right was timely. its perfection. The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the vendor. 1992. and therefore the same should be given effect. after she received the summons in Civil Case No. In the case at bar.00 redemption price on August 12. he cannot. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the vendee. May the lessee sub-lease the leased premises? Yes. Since A deposited the P10. Boiser.
and had been punctual in paying his monthly rentals. Tenants of an apartment building. (NOTE: The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates the trust applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts. and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust (Tigno vs. 1986. A. In support of his request. However. B. 1985 (Carceller vs. The first sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil Code. obtains the legal right to the property which he ought not to hold.00 per month. X likewise requested Y to advise him on the option on or before January 30.000. 1986. duress. 280 SCRA 262). the former being the trustee and the latter the beneficiary. Was there an implied trust between X and Y? Yes. In 1972. As stated in his letter. Court of Appeals. Y filed an action for specific performance. tenants came to know that their President became the new owner of the apartment units. Constructive trust arise against one who by fraud. Said trust can be implied from the nature of the transaction since the president admitted that he was not only representing himself but also the other tenants. still the intent to exercise the option was made manifest by the earlier letter of January 15. 302 SCRA 718). or abuse of confidence. The president violated the trust when he kept secret the perfection of the sale for two years. Y has to send a letter to X manifesting his intent to exercise the option within the lease period ending January 30. Subsequently. which is sometimes referred to as “purchase money resulting trust. Y was requesting for an extension of the contract of lease for six months “to allow him to generate sufficient funds in order to exercise his option to buy the leased property. On January 7.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. Will the suit prosper? Yes. 1986. alleging that he needs ample time to raise sufficient funds in order to exercise the option. 1986. Aggrieved by X’s refusal to accept the downpayment.” finds application in this case. showing the confidence reposed in him. Was a constructive trust created between the president and the tenants? Was such trust violated? Yes. the purchase price was paid by Y who was the real owner of the property. to both questions. and C are co-owners in proindiviso shares of a parcel of land. A and B sold the whole property to D. Y notified X of his decision to exercise the option to purchase the property and at the same time he made arrangements for the payment of the stipulated downpayment. 210. Roney Jone P. X rejected the request. it is essential that there be (a) an actual payment of money. 211. in order to purchase the building. 227 SCRA 330. or an equivalent. Y requested for a six-month extension of the lease contract. the Supreme Court ruled that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years (point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of the title over the property) but this rule applies only when plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. In a letter dated January 15. An implied trust arises when a person purchases land with his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name of another. if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property as in the case of C. was fair notice to the latter of his intent to exercise the option notwithstanding his request therein for extension of the lease contract. since. X sold to Z the property without the knowledge or consent of Y. X notified Y of the impending termination of their lease agreement. 1986. Two years later. To give rise to a purchase money resulting trust. C sold the half portion of his 1/3 share of the land and retained for himself the other half. Although the deed of sale was in the name of X. D invoked the defense that the action is already barred by prescription. 1986. A constructive trust was created between the president and the tenants in respect to the apartment building. An implied trust was created between X and Y. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of the land claiming to be the owner may wait until his possession of the land and his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. and the short period of time left within which Y could still validly exercise the option. Court of Appeals. 269 SCRA 334). but offered to lease the same property to Y at the rate of P30. He purchased the units for himself at bargain prices so he could resell them at a profit (Policarpio vs. X refused Y’s downpayment stressing that the period within which the option should have been exercised had already lapsed. In Heirs of Olviga vs. Gandeza Page 44 of 53 exercise the option. he averred that he had already made a substantial investment on the property. On February 18. TRUSTS 209. Said 1/3 share was possessed and occupied by C himself and by his vendee E despite the sale of the whole land to D. In such case.” While the formal exercise of the option was contained only in Y’s letter dated February 18. In 1950. property. 1986. Can Y still exercise the option under the lease contract? Yes. the right to seek reconveyance which is in effect an action to quiet title does not prescribe. unless a different intention appears. the property is held by way of resulting trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer. for a period of one (1) year. the suit will prosper. designated the president of the tenant’s association to negotiate for them but no sale ripened. which was received by X on January 29. in constructive implied trusts. constituting valuable consideration. Court of Appeals. hence. Court of Appeals. prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the . or approximately three (3) weeks before the expiration of the lease contract. C later filed an action for reconveyance. 1986. X was named as a vendee in a deed of sale although it was Y who actually paid the purchase price. or services. Y’s letter to X dated January 15.
by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership. A corporation may not be a general partner in a general partnership.. (NOTE: Contracts of security are either personal or real. As the law so puts it. then the property encumbered can be alienated for the payment of the obligation. a pledge. Court of Appeals. One of the requirements of chattel mortgage is an affidavit of good faith and the law has provided that the parties to the contract must execute an oath that the mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation specified in the conditions thereof and for no other purposes. Gandeza Page 45 of 53 relationship (Buan Vda. vs. X. or any penalty is incurred. 213. however. Refusal on the part of the borrower to execute a new contract may be treated as default and the mortgagee can then foreclose the original chattel mortgage with respect to the old obligation. the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the mortgage. and Z is one such partnership. real estate mortgage. . After the lapse of the redemption period. along with each partner’s capability to give it. a husband and wife may validly form one or be a member thereof (CIR vs. if owing. 214. and Z are partners in a construction business. the faithful performance of the obligation by the principal debtor is secured by the personal commitment of another (the guarantor or surety). et. Can two corporations general partnership? organize a SECURED TRANSACTIONS 216. The partnership of X. He later filed with the SEC a petition for the dissolution of the firm. Due to the untimely death of H and W. the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. the bank consolidated its title on the property and became its registered owner. He must. The right to choose with whom a person wishes to associate himself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. or antichresis may exceptionally secure “after-incurred” obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described. The birth and life of a partnership at will is predicated on the mutual desire and consent of the partners. H and W were the owners of a parcel of land. Consequently. it would not prevent the dissolution of the partnership but that it can result in a liability for damages (Ortega. in real estate mortgage. once the obligation is complied with. and chattel mortgage secure “after-incurred” obligations? Except for a chattel mortgage . Atty. This is so because a chattel mortgage can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. This was denied by the SEC hearing officer on the ground that the withdrawal of Atty. act in good faith. A partnership which does not have a fixed term is a partnership at will.al. 217. Can a husband and wife form a limited partnership? Yes. X caused damage to the cars of his partner Y and A. A promised expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are yet to be contracted can be a binding agreement that can be compelled upon but the security itself does not come into existence until after a chattel mortgage agreement covering the newlycontracted debt is executed either by including a fresh chattel mortgage or by amending the old contract. the placing of the movable property in the possession of the creditor. the loan was not paid in full. PARTNERSHIP 212. Verily. Was the SEC hearing officer correct? No. real estate mortgage. Its continued existence is. mortgage or antichresis. anyone of the partners may. 27 SCRA 152). Is the partnership liable for the losses suffered by Y and A? The partnership is liable for the damage suffered by A but not to the damage suffered by Y. antichresis. At the public auction sale. dependent on the constancy of that mutual resolve. dictate a dissolution of the partnership at will. 253 SCRA 66). De Esconde vs. Suter. The Civil Code prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a universal partnership. and in antichresis. their client. 215. Court of Appeals. at his sole pleasure. by the execution of a public instrument encumbering the real property covered thereby. While operating a bulldozer in the ordinary course of the partnership business. X did not dissolve the firm. in turn. In contracts of real security. null and void). not an obligation that is merely contemplated. such as guaranty or suretyship. ipso facto. by the execution of the corresponding deed substantially in the form prescribed by law. the contract of security becomes. but should the obligation be duly paid. X withdrew from the XYZ law firm which does not have a fixed term. et. The heirs of H and W later filed an action for the annulment of the public No. In contracts of personal security. either with an individual or with another corporation. and thereafter to the principal of his credit upon the essential condition that if the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor defaults. then the contract is automatically extinguished from the accessory character of the agreement. or with the authority of his co-partners. the bank was the highest bidder.. not being a partner in the partnership. loss or injury is caused to any person. Since a limited partnership is not a universal partnership. The debts referred to in the law is a current obligation. such as pledge. Roney Jone P. May a contract of pledge. by a written instrument granting to the creditor the right to receive the fruits of an immovable property with the obligation to apply such fruits to the payment of interest. they executed a deed of real estate mortgage over their property in favor of the Development Planters Bank.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. If he acted in bad faith.al. they can. Y. To secure a loan. Where. 245 SCRA 529). that fulfillment is secured by an encumbrance of property – in pledge. because the principle of mutual agency in general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the corporation will violate the principle in corporation law that only the board of directors may bind the corporation. in chattel mortgage. Y.
It is prospective in operation and intended to provide security with respect to future transactions within certain limits. a guaranty. 3135). NCC). X and Y were the owners of a parcel of land. H and W.R. Act No. 220. was short of P64. without right to file a claim for deficiency. covering a series of transactions. Will the suit prosper? The suit will not prosper. the couple executed in favor of the bank a real estate mortgage over nine parcels of individually-titled lands with an aggregate area of 2. husband and wife. Development Planters Bank. on the other hand. Hence. the bank filed an action to claim the deficiency. Being such. 307 SCRA 156). Is the bank deficiency claim? entitled to recover its Yes. This is the basis for continuing guaranty or suretyship.292 square meters. after proceeding against the principal. foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred by prescription. What is a “continuing guaranty”? A “continuing guaranty” is one which is not limited to a single transaction. (Palmares vs. Obviously. A surety binds himself to perform if the principal does not. A guaranty shall be construed as continuing when by the terms thereof it is evident that the object is to give a standing credit to the principal debtor to be used from time to time either indefinitely or until a certain period . an undertaking that the debtor shall pay. These are: (1) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim. is such undertaking that of a surety as in insurer of the debt. 288 SCRA 422). 121739. the mortgaged properties were sold to the bank for P7. (b) that the deputy sheriff who conducted the sale did not submit a certificate of posting. A surety is an insurer of the debt. 3135 which governs the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages. does not contract that the principal will pay. A secured creditor holding a real estate mortgage has three options in case of death of the debtor. the amount of which may not be known at the time the guaranty is executed. 1484. may proceed against the guarantor if the principal is unable to pay. When the loan was not paid after maturity. there is but one contract. on the other hand. A suretyship is an undertaking that the debt shall be paid. a guaranty may be given to secure even future debts. To secure a loan. while silent as to the mortgagee’s right to recover. penalties. however.” it is a continuing guaranty. Thereafter. accrued interests. and contemplates a succession of liabilities for which the guarantor becomes liable as they accrue. Accordingly. while a guarantor agrees that the creditor. NCC) and in chattel mortgages of a thing sold on installment basis (Art. 2115. Gandeza Page 46 of 53 auction sale and for the reconveyance of the property. There was no irregularity in the sale at public auction First. When the spouses failed to pay. attorney’s fees. This is because in suretyship. a deficiency claim arising from the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage is allowed (Phil.00. were granted by the PNB a loan of P34. and (c) that the Post Office and Finance Building where the notice of sale was allegedly posted were not public places. they mortgaged the same to ABC Bank. To guarantee the loan.00 representing the balance on the principal obligation. While the legislature has denied the right of a creditor to sue for deficiency resulting from foreclosure of security given to guarantee an obligation as in the case of pledges (Art.00 as the highest bidder at the public auction sale. 3135.000. generally for an indefinite time or until revoked. par. 219. On December 29. 3.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. June 14. Court of Appeals. or of a guarantor who warrants the solvency of the debtor? The undertaking is one of suretyship. and expenses of litigation. 218. the bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage. A guarantor.000. without regard to his ability to do so. (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim. the bank foreclosed on the mortgage. the bank should have filed its claim against the estate of the said deceased mortgagors. They contended that upon the death of H and W.000. and the surety is bound by the same agreement which binds the principal. When the couple failed to redeem the properties within the statutory period. personal notice to X and Y is not required under Act No. and later consolidated its title on the land upon failure of X and Y to redeem the same within the period prescribed by law. but simply that he is able to do so. 1999). No. and (3) rely on the mortgage exclusively. 1975. Act No. Therefore. X and Y later filed suit to annul the foreclosure sale contending that: (a) they were not notified of the foreclosure sale. if the property is worth more than four hundred pesos (Section 3. does not. prohibit recovery of deficiency. It is a settled rule that if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. All that is required is that notice be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty (20) days in at least three public places of the city or municipality where the property is situated. Roney Jone P. Stated differently. and publication once a week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or municipality where the property is situated. any discussion into the issue of whether X and Y received a notice of . if the contract states that the same shall secure advances to be made “from time to time. The liability of a party who binds himself to be jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor is that of a surety. the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from the debtor. 221. but which contemplates a future course of dealing. a surety promises to pay the principal’s debt if the principal will not pay. This amount. G. not guaranty. Court of Appeals. Will the suit prosper? The suit will not prosper. he is bound equally and absolutely with the principal and as such is deemed an original promissor and debtor from the beginning. the bank availed itself of the third option (Maglaque vs. Under the Civil Code. National Bank vs. When a party signs a promissory note as a co-maker and binds himself to be jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor in case the latter defaults in the payment of the loan. whereas a guarantor is an insurer of the solvency of the debtor.
223. 12 of the deed of assignment provides for the appointment of the assignee D as attorney-in-fact with authority. Gandeza Page 47 of 53 foreclosure sale would be an exercise in futility since it would not have any bearing at all on the alleged validity or invalidity of the foreclosure sale in question.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. it is significant only in the matter of proving compliance with the required posting notice. When Y refused to vacate. for the validity of the foreclosure sale under Act No. Executed a promissory note for the said amount. Is X entitled to the possession of the mortgaged property? X is not entitled to the possession of the mortgaged property. Rather. a pactum commisorium. By virtue of this loan. 1980. an assignment to guarantee an obligation. the registration of the deed of sale. in case of default of P in paying his loan. This is sanctioned under Section 7 of Act 3135. the corporation. X filed an action for possession before the RTC. (Bohanan vs. Second. Court of Appeals. Under the law. Court of Appeals. As security for the said loan. Court of Appeals. (b) a deed of mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan. D then demanded that P vacate the fishpond. vs. among other things. TCT No. a chattel mortgage was executed by the corporation over its properties . 3135. (Zaballero vs. Thereafter. D cannot take refuge in the condition that he can sell or dispose of the leasehold rights in case P defaults in the payments of his loan. T-58748. Said condition in the deed of assignment did not provide that P’s default would operate to vest in D ownership of said leasehold rights. the mortgagee. Simultaneous with the execution of the promissory note was the execution of “Assignment of Leasehold Rights” where P assigned to D his leasehold where P assigned to D his leasehold rights and interests over a 44-hectare fishpond. D instituted an action to eject him therefrom. T-58748 was delivered to X. a certificate of posting of the notice of sale is not required. X registered the undated deed of sale of the mortgaged land in his favor. 284 SCRA 14). to sell or otherwise dispose of the assigned property. ownership of the property would be automatically transferred to X and the stipulation that the deed of sale in his favor would be registered are. has the right to acquire possession of said foreclosed property during the 12month redemption period. When P refused. The subject transaction being void. Condition No. Roney Jone P. When P defaulted in the payment of his loan. to wit: (a) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein a property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of loan. and (c) an undated deed of sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the mortgagee X. 222. The stipulation in the promissory note providing that. which authorizes the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage and alienate the mortgaged property for the payment of the principal obligations ( Development Bank of the Phils. upon failure of Y to pay interest. a purchaser can demand for a writ of possession after the expiration of the redemption period. 12 in the subject deed of assignment a pactum commissorium? Condition No. is a standard condition in mortgage contracts and is in conformity with Article 2087 of the Civil Code. together with all the improvements thereon. T-58748 was cancelled and in lieu thereof. If the sheriff testifies and declares under oath that he posted notices of the questioned sale. When Y failed to pay interest. 256 SCRA 335). such testimony suffices in lieu of the customary certificate of posting and can properly be accorded the presumption of regularity of performance having come from a public officer to whom no improper motive to testify has been attributed. X demanded possession of the mortgaged realty. It is settled that a condition in a deed of assignment providing for the appointment of the assignee as attorney-in-fact with authority. among other things. full possession of the property will be transferred and the deed of sale will be registered. is virtually a mortgage and not an absolute conveyance of title which confers ownership on the assignee. Court of Appeals. in case of default by the assignor.5 Million to Y. P obtained from D a loan of P336. TCT No. X granted a loan of P7. the owner’s copy of TCT No. Francisco Realty and Development Corp. as amended by Act 4118. They embody the two elements of pactum commisorium under Article 2088 of the Civil Code. On April 17. 12 in the subject Deed of Assignment is not a pactum commissorium. 298 SCRA 349). For this purpose. (NOTE: The purchaser of a foreclosed property. 000. by virtue of which X was able to obtain TCT No. (a) What was the nature of the deed of assignment made by P to D? The deed of assignment executed by P merely served as security for his loan and was never intended to convey ownership of the leasehold rights to D. The promissory note expressly provided that upon failure of the mortgagor to pay the stipulated interest without prior arrangement with the mortgagee. in consideration of which the latter executed the following documents: (a) a promissory note stating an interest charge of 4% interest per month for six months. (b) Is Condition No.00 covered by a promissory note. D immediately appropriated P’s leasehold rights over the fishpond and claimed ownership over the same on the basis of the deed of assignment executed by P. 224. ABC Corporation obtained a loan of P2 Million from DBP. With more reason. PT-85569 covering the subject lot. 229 SCRA 810). As a result. to sell of otherwise dispose of the leasehold rights. much less considered indispensable. must also be declared void (A. through its President. Vs. upon ex-parte application therefore and the posting of the requisite bond. promising to pay the loan by installment. and (2) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. in substance. as in the instant case. PT-85569 was issued in the name of X.
in a judgment for non-payment of purchase price or actions for damages for injury to person or property.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum. 1174. and.00. (b) from judgment up to the time of finality. Crismina was obliged to pay Norma. (b) forbearance for the use of money. the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the chattel mortgage. for her services. 4. 304 SCRA 356) 227. NCC). penalties and surcharges.000 pieces of assorted girls’ denims. 1937. Section 14 of Act No. vs. purchased the foreclosed properties for a sum of P300. In all other monetary judgments not involving loans or forbearance for the use of money. the trial court rendered judgment ordering Crismina to pay Norma the sum of P76. NCC). ownership of the thing loaned is retained by the lender ( Art. while mutuum refers only to personal property. the ownership is transferred to the borrower. while in mutuum. After trial. As agreed upon.000. since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the complaint was filed. This applies. . the sale of the thing pledged extinguishes the entire principal obligation. is essentially gratuitous. the borrower must return the identical thing loaned. Under Article 2115 of the Civil Code. Court of Appeals. for example. Crismina failed to pay Norma the stipulated amount of P76. expressly entitles the debtor-mortgagor to the balance of the proceeds of the sale at public auction. and (8) In commodatum.3 Million which includes the unpaid outstanding obligation. the total amount of P76. and (c) judgment involving a loan or forbearance of money. 226. NCC). 12% per annum because it partakes of the nature of forbearance for the use of money.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty.00. 310 SCRA 281). the loss of the thing loaned is suffered by the bailor since he is the owner (Art. Since the Chattel Mortgage Law bars the creditor-mortgagee from retaining the excess of the sale proceeds. (Crismina Garments. (2) In commodatum. The interim period is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Court of Appeals. the lender may not demand its return before the lapse of the term agreed upon. (4) In commodatum. vs. 1935. the interest should be reckoned at 12% per year annum. No interest rate shall be paid unless it is expressly stipulated in writing. 6% per annum. 1933. Gandeza Page 48 of 53 consisting of inventories. (7) In commodatum. Furthermore. Art. Crismina interposed an appeal contending that the trial court erred in imposing interest at the rate of 12% per annum for an obligation that does not involved a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties. the borrower need only pay the same amount of the same kind and quality. Despite demands. interest rate of 12% applies to: (a) loans (Central Bank Circular No. goods or credit. NCC). 1946. Will the appeal prosper? Yes. 1936. the legal interest of 6% per annum should be applied. 6% per annum. the appeal will prosper. (NOTE: The rule is different in pledge because the creditor-pledgee is not entitled to a recovery of his deficiency claim. however. as amended. while in mutuum. the bailor may demand the return of the thing loaned before the expiration of the term in case of urgent need ( Art. Distinguish between and mutuum: commodatum (1) Commodatum ordinarily involves something not consummable (Art. furnitures and equipments. Roney Jone P. 1942. NCC). Consequently.00. 1508. the borrower suffers the loss even if caused exclusively by a fortuitous event. there is a corollary obligation on the part of the debtormortgagor to pay the deficiency in case of a reduction in the price at public auction (PAMECA Wood Treatment Plan. Crismina contracted the services of Norma for the sewing of 20. while in mutuum. to cover the whole value of the loan. upon satisfaction of the principal obligation and costs. What are the rules on interest rates under the Civil Code? 1. the subject matter is money or other consummable thing. the mortgagor-debtor is allowed. Thereafter. 2. the bank filed a complaint against the corporation for the collection of the balance of P4.000. (3) Commodatum.000. Upon failure of the corporation to pay. NCC).) 225. Inc. such that the pledgor-debtor may no longer recover proceeds of the sale in excess of the amount of the principal obligation. as sole bidder in the public auction. But after judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied. interests. while in mutuum. In the absence of stipulation as to the amount. while in mutuum. hence. (6) Commodatum is a loan for use (Art. while mutuum maybe be gratuitous or onerous. 416). to be counted from the filing of the complaint until fully paid. and (c) from finality up to actual payment. 3. Article 2209 of the Civil Code provides that the legal interest of 6% per annum shall be applied in the absence of stipulation. while mutuum is a loan for consumption. goods or credit. (5) Commodatum may involve real or personal property (Art. not from a loan or forbearance of money. goods or credit. Norma sewed the materials and delivered them to Crismina which acknowledged the same. or the Chattel Mortgage Law. Inc. that is.000. with stipulation to pay interest. May the bank recover the deficiency? Yes. Interest rate for actions for damages under Article 2209 is imposable (a) from filing before judgment. in a chattel mortgage. Norma sued Crismina for the collection of the principal amount of P76.00.000. The amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work. the 6% should be computed from the filing of said complaint.
Filcar Transport did not have any participation . he chose to save the latter. in view of its insurance contract with Lydia. ownership does not pass to the borrower. and 1754. the car collided with and severely damaged the car owned and driven by Lydia. par. Though not possessed with a Philippine driver’s license. May the depositary use the thing deposited? Generally. Was the dismissal proper? Yes. This is so because the depositary is in estoppel. (3) if the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value. the contract loses the character of a deposit and acquires that of a c ommodatum despite the fact that the parties may have denominated it is a deposit. What are the different kinds of deposit? A deposit may be voluntary or necessary. NCC). 3). NCC) . (3) when made by travelers in hotels and inns. it is called an irregular deposit. being able to save either the thing borrowed or his own thing. unless safekeeping is still the principal purpose of the contract. A deposit is necessary (1) when it is made in compliance with a legal obligation. FGU Insurance Corporation failed to prove the existence of the second requisite. By way of subrogation. par. Gandeza Page 49 of 53 (NOTE: The bailor in commodatum need not be the owner of the thing loaned (Art. (5) if. par. In a necessary deposit. 231. a Danish tourist. commodatum. 1984. Because Peter had already left the country earlier. such as fire. 1938. DEPOSIT 229. (2) when it takes place on the occasion of any calamity. (2) he keeps it longer than the period stipulated or after the accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum has been constituted. flood. FGU Insurance Corporation. unless there is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event. 1997. because only the fault or negligence of Peter was sufficiently established. pillage. (Art. 230. it sued Peter and Filcar Transport for quasi-delict. 1977.. the court dismissed the complaint for failure of FGU Insurance Corporation to substantiate its claim. the depositary cannot make use of the thing deposited without the express permission of the depositor (Art. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant. While cruising along EDSA. hence. But if safekeeping is still the principal purpose of the contract. leased from Filcar transport. he was dropped from the complaint. this freedom of choice is absent. paid the latter her insurance claim. NCC) since by the loan. 1. What are the instances when the bailee is liable for the loss of the thing loaned even if it should be due to a fortuitous event? As a general rule.e. and (4) when made by passengers in common carries (Arts. As a matter of fact. Roney Jone P. It is plain that the cause of the accident was Peter’s negligent driving thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle as his personal liability. Is it necessary that the depositor be the owner of the thing deposited? The depositor need not be the owner of the thing deposited considering that the contract does not involve a transfer of ownership. the dismissal was proper. NCC). TORTS AND DAMAGES 234. deposit is not constituted but some other contract like lease. NCC).) 228. fault or negligence of Filcar Transport. the depositary cannot even dispute the title of the depositor to the thing deposited (Art. 232. It is sufficient if the bailor has such possessory interest in the subject-matter or right to its use which he may assert against the bailee and third persons although not against the rightful owner. What are the rules when the depositary is expressly given permission to use the thing deposited? (1) If the thing deposited is nonconsummable and the depositary has permission to use the thing. i. However. or agency. the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff. 1998. a Mitsubishi Colt Lancer. (2) If the thing deposited is money or other consummable thing. Trial proceeded only against Filcar Transport. In the present case. shipwreck. 1977. After trial. What is the principal purpose of a contract of deposit? The principal purpose of a contract of deposit is the safekeeping of the thing delivered so that if it is only an accessory or secondary obligation of the recipient. the depositary may make use of the thing deposited even without the express permission of the depositor when such use is necessary for its preservation but in such case the use is limited for that purpose only (Art. To sustain a claim for quasi-delict based under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. except in the following cases: (1) he devotes the thing to any purpose different from that which it has been loaned. storm. and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Peter drove the rented car. 233. As a consequence. 1942. the permission to use it will result in its consumption and converts the contract into a simple loan or mutuum.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. or other similar events. Peter. A voluntary deposit is made by the free will of the depositor. 1996. 1. (4) if he lends or leases the thing to a third person who is not a member of his household. the bailee is not liable for loss or damage of the thing loaned even if it should be through a fortuitous event. it is still a deposit but an irregular one.
1984. some negligence must have occurred. Purportedly because of this letter. 1994. it commenced judicial action against X for breach of contract and damages. 1991. Under the circumstances of the case. as binding as an ordinary contract. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road. Assuming arguendo that Z’s refusal to leave the leased premises was the proximate cause of X’s failure to comply with its obligation to Y. 1984. X disclaimed any actionable fault or negligence for the non-delivery of the leased space to Y and. has no cause of action against the first lessee Z because there was no privity of contract between them (Valgosons Realty. and (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence. Article 1654 of the Civil Code provides that a lessor. Z wrote to X informing the latter of the termination of their contract of lease by October. that Z shall have the right to terminate the lease contract at anytime before the end of the 5year period by giving notice in writing to X at least six months in advance. For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor to apply to a given situation. the fire that occurred and consumed M/V Manila City would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised. Roney Jone P. instead. The lease was to take effect on December 1. But came October 1984. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies. Y paid X a sum equivalent to six months rentals. 1986. Thus. as deposit and advance rentals. 1984 and expire at midnight on November 30. Inc. It appears that before leasing the premises to Y. First. 1985 and asked for reimbursement and payment of damages.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. William Lines was the owner of M/V Manila City. In a letter dated May 3. For failure of X to place Y in possession of the leased premises. the following conditions must concur: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. the officers and crew of M/V Manila City stayed in the vessel. including being held liable for damages. Thereafter. vs. 1984. like X. On February 21. 287 SCRA 718). Second. 237. it would not be difficult for Cebu Shipyard to escape liability by the simple expedient of paying an amount for much lower than the actual damage or loss suffered by William Lines (Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works vs. X and Y entered into a contract of lease whereby the former leased to the latter the ground floor of its building. 1984 or two months after the announced termination of X’s contract with Z in October 1984. 236. X entered into a contract of lease with Y for the lease to it of the premises occupied by Z beginning December 1. 1991. there are instances when reliance on such contracts cannot be favored especially when the facts and circumstances warrant that subject stipulation be disregarded. The fact that Z did not vacate the premises at the time Y was supposed to enter therein cannot exculpate X from its liability for the nonperformance of its obligation towards Y. (a) Is Cebu Shipyard liable for the loss of the vessel? Yes. On October 2. On February 16. Z refused to vacate the leased premises contending that it still has a subsisting lease up to September 30. using their cabins as living quarters. Court of Appeals. Z failed to vacate. alleging that the fire which broke out in M/V Manila City was caused by Cebu Shipyard’s negligence and lack of care. While the vessel was undergoing dry-docking and repairs within the premises of Cebu Shipyard. William Lines brought said vessel to the Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works for annual dry-docking and repair. it would indeed be unfair and inequitable to limit the liability of Cebu Shipyard to One Million Pesos only. contracts of adhesion have been consistently upheld as binding per se. it must answer to Y for damages. Reynaldo was on his way home. 235. it took the risk that if it could not deliver the premises for whatever reason. as second lessee. then. As stipulated. (b) Is Z liable to Y for damages? Z is not to Y for damages. 295 SCRA 449). the agency charged with negligence is Cebu Shipyard which had control over the subject vessel when it was docked for annual repairs. Despite X’s repeated demands. Y rescinded their contract of lease on March 19. the addendum to their contract provided. Court of Appeals. Failure to do so constitutes a wrong to which X exposes itself to legal action. among others. is obliged to deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for the use intended. To allow Cebu Shipyard to limit its liability to One Million Pesos only notwithstanding the fact that the total loss suffered by William Lines amounted to Forty Five Million Pesos would sanction the exercise of a degree of diligence short of what is ordinarily required because. it caught fire and sank. William Lines. (a) Is X liable to Y for damages? X is liable to Y for damages. William Lines field a complaint for damages against Cebu Shipyard. In other words. When X entered into the second lease contract at the time of the subsistence of the first lease contract. vs. heaped the blame on Z against whom it filed a third-party complaint with prior leave of court. it knew that Z is still occupying the premises. . 1991. 1986. Gandeza Page 50 of 53 therein (FGU Insurance Corp. X had already leased the same to Z for a term of five (5) years beginning October 1. 1981 up to midnight of September 30. 306 SCRA 762). On February 5. resulting to its eventual loss. is such stipulation valid? The stipulation is not valid. a luxury passenger-cargo vessel. However. Although in this jurisdiction. Considering that negligence on the part of Cebu Shipyard has been sufficiently proven. The facts in the instant case reveal the concurrence of said conditions. after the vessel was transferred to the docking quay. still the latter. Cupang. (b) Suppose there was a stipulation limiting the liability of Cebu Shipyard to One Million Pesos only in case of loss or damage to the vessel.
not its passengers. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. Reynaldo sustained head injuries which caused his death. three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers. including two Maranaos. Caorong contending that it was not negligent in the performance of its obligation under its contract of carriage. The intended target of the violence was the bus company and its employees. The absence of any of the foregoing requisites would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability. In the present case. Sued for damages. Due to the collision. the bus company is liable for the death of Atty. He then heard shots from inside the bus. Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. In the present case. before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger’s constitutional rights. (c) Was Atty. The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides. However. One of the passengers saw Atty. (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner. they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Was what Reynaldo’s death? the proximate cause of were able to pull Atty. two (2) pairs of red lights. It has been said that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident. Caorong out of the burning bus and rushed him to the hospital where he died while undergoing operation. the bus company denied any liability for the death of Atty. On November 22. Caorong is guilty of contributory negligence. on both sides of the metal plates. At that time. Under the circumstances. All the passengers were then ordered to get off the bus. if the employees of the common carrier could gave prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. the seizure of the bus by armed men was made possible. Investigators revealed this plan to the bus company. Caorong was hit. The driver. Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen. Caorong. Consequently. 238. Fortune Express is a bus company operating in Mindanao. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident (Reynara vs. Despite the report that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of Fortune’s buses. Accordingly. it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will. Gandeza Page 51 of 53 Muntinlupa. no other person was to blame but Reynaldo himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck.” The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Then the bus was set on fire. this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered as force majeure) is lacking. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. Atty. contributory negligence? Caorong guilty of Reynaldo’s bumping into the left rear portion of the truck-trailer was the proximate cause of his death. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. 306 SCRA 102). . 1989. Some passengers Atty. (a) Is the bus company liable for the death of Atty. Talib Caorong. He was in control of the situation. Traveling behind the truck. The owner of the trucktrailer was later sued for damages. including Atty. At some point on the road. preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors. the injury to the creditor. On November 18. is inevitable. Hiceta. he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.Caorong was not guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. seized a Fortune Express bus at Linamon. Had the bus company and its employees been vigilant. a Fortune Express bus figured in an accident with a jeepney resulting in the death of several persons. climbed out of the left window and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway. (b) Was the seizure of the bus by armed men a force majeure? The seizure of the bus does not constitute force majeure. Caorong? Yes. a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages. To be considered as force majeure. An Isuzu truck-trailer driven by Freddie was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 Kilometers per hour. one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Atty. and that Atty. or aggravation of. such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. He was playing the role of a Good Samaritan. and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in. Police investigators revealed that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the bus company by burning some of its buses. and then shot the driver on the arm which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. The leader of the hijack group ordered the driver to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Article 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of the other passengers. The passengers. that the seizure of the bus by armed men constitutes force majeure. stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway. simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers. nothing was really done by the bus company to protect the safety of the passengers. Roney Jone P. who had in the meantime regained consciousness. The asphalt road was not well lighted. about 35 watts each. (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. What angered them was his attempt to help the bus driver by pleading for his life. it is clear that because of the negligence of the bus company’s employees. Caorong pleaded with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrongdoing and was only trying to make a living. unless contradicted by other evidence. which was without tail lights. 1989. Reynaldo crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck-trailer. The armed men actually allowed Atty. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway.
illegal search or defamation. 1. in culpa contractual or breach of contract. 240. PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS 40 days Redhibitory action based on defects of animals (Art. D was able to prove that the action against him was clearly unfounded. 1147. the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant. illegal or arbitrary detention. moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries. NCC) Action for reduction of price against hidden defects of thing sold (Art. to wit: (a) first. The term “analogous cases. NCC) Action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer (Art. NCC) 1 year Action to impugn child’s legitimacy if husband residing in the same place (Art. vs.C. par. Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to the offended party? An award of moral damages requires certain conditions to be met. 170. If the rule were otherwise. 1389. 1577. is not a ground for an award of moral damages. NCC) Action for rescission of rescissible contracts (Art. NCC) Action for revocation of donation based on non-fulfillment of condition (Art. 1146. 170. Court of Appeals. In culpa criminal. 764. exceptionally. or psychological.C. 305 SCRA 14). par.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. F. following the “ ejusdem generis” rule must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law. 1560. lascivious acts. NCC) Action upon a quasi-delict (Art. In his answer. 1391. whether physical. then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant (Expertravel & Tours vs. (c) third. 2. 309 SCRA 141). Roney Jone P. NCC) 6 months Action for reduction of price or breach of sale of real estate (Arts. a situation that cannot be by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. however. par.” referred to in Article 2219. 769. After trial on the merits. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. and (d) fourth. NCC) Action for defamation (Art. this act cannot be considered an act of negligence. let alone recklessness (Fortune Express. D interposed a counterclaim for damages because of what he claimed was the institution of a clearly unfounded suit against him. In culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict. 1146. Court of Appeals. when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Thereupon. moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and. Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit? Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney’s fees. Court of Appeals. moral damages may also be recovered. (b) second. Inc. F.C. 309 SCRA 141). 763. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court. P sued D for recovery of a sum of money and damages. 1147. clearly sustained by the claimant. 1543/1539. there must be a culpable act or omission factually established.) 4 years Action for revocation or reduction of donation based on supervening birth or adoption (Art. 1571. 2. NCC) Action upon an injury to rights of plaintiff (Art. the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.) Action for revocation of donation for acts of ingratitude (Art. NCC) . F. NCC) Action to annul voidable contracts-vitiated consent (Art. (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries. NCC) Action for recovery of movable (replevin) if possessor in good faith (Art. 1132. or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort.) 3 years Action to impugn child’s legitimacy if husband is abroad or outside the Philippines (Art. 1629. such filing. there must be an injury. illegal arrest. adultery or concubinage. the trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered P to pay D moral damages for instituting a clearly unfounded suit. NCC) Action for warranty of solvency in assignment of credits (Art. NCC) Action for loss or damage to goods under COGSA 2 years Action to impugn child’s legitimacy if husband is in the Philippines but not residing in the same place (Art. (Expertravel & Tours vs. Gandeza Page 52 of 53 Certainly. NCC) Action for rescission or for damages if immovable sold is encumbered with non-apparent burden (Art. 239. mental. 170. Under the provisions of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
C.Revised Quizzer in Civil Law by Atty. NCC) 30 years Action for recovery of ownership of immovables (accion reivindicatoria) if in bad faith (Art. 47. NCC) Action upon a judgment (Art.C. 1094. NCC) Action for recovery of ownership of immovables (accion reivindicacatoria) if in good faith (Art. NCC) All other actions whose periods are not fixed by law (Art. 182. 57. NCC) Action upon an obligation created by law (Art. If by other means. 1132. only during lifetime of parents) (Arts.C. 1144. NCC) 8 years Action for recovery of movable (replevin) if possessor is in bad faith Art. 2. Action to probate a will Action to enforce a moral right (PD 49) Action to recover possession of registered land under Land Registration Act by registered owner or hereditary successors .) Action to claim legitimacy (lifetime of child) (Art. and Art. 173. NCC) 6 years Action upon an oral contract (Art. NCC) Action upon a quasi-contract (Art. 1146.C.C. par. 649. 1142. 2. NCC) Action upon a written contract (Art. 1100. NCC) Action for warranty of solvency of debtor if credit is assigned to a co-heir during partition (Art. F. 47. NCC) Action among co-heirs to enforce warranty against eviction in partition (Art.) Action to impugn legitimacy (Art.) Action for declaration of incapacity of heir (Art.C.C. F. 750. 175. F. Gandeza Page 53 of 53 Action for rescission of partition of decedent’s estate on account of lesion (Art. 173. 1140. F. NCC) 5 years Action for legal separation (Art. 1134. 555 and 1134. 1145.) Action for annulment of marriage except on the ground of insanity (Art. Roney Jone P. 1149.) Action to claim illegitimacy (lifetime of child. 39. NCC) 10 years Action for recovery of possession of immovables (accion publiciana) if real right is lost (Arts. 1141. 1144. 1144. F. par. F. F. NCC Action to demand partition in co-ownership or to enforce an express trust. NCC) Action upon a mortgage contract (Art. F. 2.) Action for declaration of nullity of marriage (Art. 1040.C. NCC) No Prescription Action to declare a contract as inexistent or void Action to recover movable possessed thru a crime (no prescription in favor of offender) Action to demand right of way under Art. NCC) Lifetime Action for annulment based on insanity (Art. 1095. par.) Action to claim legitimacy or illegitimacy if child dies during minority or in state of insanity (Art.) Action for legal support Action for reduction of donation due to failure of donor to reserve property for his support and support of others (during lifetime of donor or relatives (Art.
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