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, Respondent G. R. No. 189755 July 04, 2012 Sereno, J. FACTS In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space ISSUE Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open space as defined in P. D. 1216. RULING Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space. The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area falls under other similar facilities and amenities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible.

HUMAN RIGHTS STATUTE CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP and SR. SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, and SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JUDE ROMANO, in his capacity as the Director of the Governments Witness Protection Program; SPO2 EDUARDO DELOS REYES and SPO2 CORAZON DELA CRUZ, respondentsappellees G. R. No. 134855 July 2, 2002 Austria-Martinez, J. FACTS On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were killed along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City in an alleged shootout with the Anti-Bank Robbery Intelligence Task Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP). SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) of the PNP and who was one of the officers assigned to conduct an investigation of the May 18, 1995 incident, made a public disclosure of his findings that there was no shootout and the eleven (11) suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were instead summarily executed. SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, also a member of the CIC, made the same statement corroborating the claim of SPO2 delos Reyes. The Senate conducted hearings to determine the circumstances surrounding the subject incident. SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz testified before the Senate hearings. On June 2, 1995, former Senator Raul Roco, who was then the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, recommended that SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz be admitted to the government's Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program. Accordingly, SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz were admitted into the said Program. On March 12, 1996, the herein petitioners, in their capacity as taxpayers, but who are also among the PNP officers implicated in the alleged rubout, filed before the court a quo a petition for injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order questioning the legality of the admission of SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz into the Program. Petitioners contend that under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6981, law enforcement officers, like SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruz, are disqualified from being admitted into the witness protection program even though they may be testifying against other law enforcement officers. ISSUE Whether or not SPO2 delos Reyes and SPO2 dela Cruzs admission into the Witness Protection Program is wrongful and illegal. RULING No. It is true that the proviso in Section 3(d) of R. A. No. 6981 disqualifies law enforcement officers from being admitted into the Program when they "testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority." This is the general rule. However, Section 4 provides for a specific and separate situation where a witness testifies before a legislative investigation. An investigation by a legislative committee does not fall under the category of "any investigating authority" referred to in Section 3. Section 4 contains only a proviso that the witness' admission to the Program must be recommended by the legislative committee when in its judgment there is a pressing necessity therefor and said recommendation is approved by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be. Section 4 does not contain any proviso similar to Sec. 3(d), nor does Section 4 refer to the application of the proviso under Section 3. It is basic under the law on statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. The operation of a proviso is usually and properly confined to the clause or distinct portion of the enactment which immediately precedes it or to which it pertains, and does not extend to or qualify other sections or portions of the statute, unless the legislative intent that it shall so operate is clearly disclosed.

SOCIAL SECURITY AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION STATUTE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (NFA), and JUANITO M. DAVID, in his capacity as Regional Director, NFA Regional Office No. 1, San Juan, La Union, petitioners, vs. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY INC., represented by its Acting President & General Manager, COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO (RET.), respondents G. R. No. 163448 March 8, 2005 Ynares-Santiago, J. FACTS On September 17, 1996, MASADA Security Agency Inc. entered into a one-year contract to provide security services to the various offices, warehouses, and installations of NFA within its scope in Region I. Upon the expiration of the said contract, the parties extended the effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under the same terms and conditions. Meanwhile, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board issued several wage orders mandating increases in the daily wage rate. Accordingly, respondent requested NFA to increase their monthly contract rate including the daily minimum wage, overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, holiday and rest day pay. Respondent also claimed the increase in Social Security System and Pag-ibig premiums as well as in the administrative costs and margin. NFA granted the request of the respondent but only with regard to the increase in the daily minimum wage. ISSUE Whether or not the additional liability of NFA under Section 6 of RA 6727 is limited only to the increment in the statutory minimum wage rate. RULING Yes. The term wage as used in Section 6 of RA 6727 pertains to no other than the statutory minimum wage which is defined under the Rules Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increases or the additional liability to be borne by the principal under Section 6 of RA 6727 is the increment or amount added to the remuneration of an employee for an 8-hour work. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. Since the increase in wage referred to in Section 6 pertains to the statutory minimum wage as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject provision. The settled rule in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.