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3 God and the Argument from Mind Arguments for Dualism Dualiam Defined Dualism Defended Problems with Physicalism 25 a General Worldview Problems with MindBody Physicalisen ‘The Distinetiveness of Mental and Physical Properties Private Access and Incorrgibilty ‘The Experience of First-Person Subjectivity Secondary Qualities Intentionality Personal Identity Morality, Responsibility, and Punishment Mind/Body Physicaliom Refated ‘What Is Self-Refutation? ‘Why Is Physicalism Self Refating? ‘The Origin of Mind The Emergent Property View Wholes and Parts Levels of Explanation and Complementarity Causation Between Levels Resultant View of the Self ‘The Origin of Mind as an Emergent Propesty A. the beginning of his Institutes of the Christian Religion, John Calvin observes: “No man can survey himself without forthwith turning his thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and moves; be- cause it is perfectly obvious, that the endowments which we possess can- not possibly be from ourselves. . . :”" A number of thinkers have made similar observations. How could consciousness have evolved from matter? Can matter think? If we are simply material beings, then determinism is 1. Joho: Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian Religion (1536; Grand Rapids: Associated Publishers and Au- thoes, n.d), 11, 7 78 Scaling the Secular City true for all human processes. But if we are determined, why should we trust our own thought processes? These questions are associated with a family of arguments which have gone by different names—the anthropo- logical argument, the argument from mind or consciousness, or the argu- ment from rationality. In one way or another, these arguments point out that man as a rational agent implies God as the Ground or Cause of his rationality. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify and defend a case for God’s exis- tence from the existence of rational minds in human beings. First, mind/ body dualism will be explained and defended by offering general arguments for dualism and by centering in on an argument which tries to show that physicalism—the view that reality in general, and humans in particular, are made up entirely of matter—is self-refuting. Second, we will explore the possibility that rational minds evolved from matter and try to show why this is not plausible. This will lend support to the view that our rational minds come from another rational Mind—God. Arguments for Dualism Dualism Defined The mind/body problem focuses on two main issues. First, is a human being composed of just one ultimate component or two? Second, if the an- swer is two, how do these two relate to one another? Physicalism is one solution to the problem. As a general worldview, physicalism holds that the only thing which exists is matter (where matter is defined by an ideal, completed form of physics). Applied to the mind/body problem, physical- ism asserts that a human being is just a physical system. There is no mind or soul, just a brain and central nervous system.’ Dualism is the opponent of physicalism and it asserts that in addition to the body, a human being, 2 See}. R, Lucas, The Fedor of te Wl (Oxford Clarendon Peso, 1970), pp. 114-23, A.C. Ewing, tur and Realy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973) pp. 26-77, 176-78; Richard Purl Reso fo Belin (Grand Raps: Eerdmans, 1979), pp. 3-49; Stephen Clark, From Athens fo fase (Oxford Clarendoa Pres, 1984), pp. 96-257; C. 5. Lewis, Maes: A Prelibary Sy (New York: Macrilan 1947), pp. 2-39. 5. Heipal introductory works onthe mind! body problem are Jerome A. Shaffer, Piso of Mind Foundations of Philosophy serie (Englewood Cliffs, N.): Prentce-Hall, 196; Paul M.Churchian, Mat- terand Cosieanese.&Contoorary irucion fhe Dp of Mina (Cambridge, Mags = MIT Press, 196}; Keith Camptell, Body aed Min, Problems in Philosophy series (Garden City, N.Y Doubleday. An- hor Books, 1970), Shafer workiea it dated and Charchland'sis heavily bssedtonard physicalism, bat both ac sil help, Carmel’ book i fay balanced. The three main varieties of modern physical are the denity thee, funcional, and eliminate tein, Thege three ae dacunted in Dovid osontha, ed Materaliss an the Mind-Boty robin, Central Isoues in Philosophy series (Englewood Clits, NJ: Prentice Hal, 1970, God and the Argument from Mind 79 also has a nonphysical component called a soul, mind, or self (words which will be used interchangeably for our purposes). There are two main varieties of dualism—property dualism and sub- stance dualism. In order to understand the difference, we must first spell ‘out the distinction between a property and a substance. A property is an entity: redness, hardness, wisdom, triangularity, or painfulness, A prop- exty has at least four characteristics which distinguish it from a substance. First, a property is a universal, not a particular. It can be in more than one thing or at more than one place at the same time. Redness can be in my coat and your flag at the same time. Second, a property is immutable and does not contain opposites (hot and cold, red and green) within it. When a leaf goes from green to red, the leaf changes. Greenness does not become red- ness. Greenness leaves the leaf and redness replaces it, Greenness and redness remain the same. Third, properties can be had by something else. They can be in another thing which has them. Redness is in the apple. The apple has the redness. Fourth, properties do not have causal powers. They do not act as efficient causes. Properties are not agents which act on other agents in the world, A substance is an entity like an apple, my dog Fido, a carbon atom, a leaf, or an angel. Substances contrast with properties in the four character istics listed. First, substances are particulars. For example, my dog Fido cannot be in more than one place at the same time. Second, a substance can change and have opposites. A leaf can go from green to red or hot to cold by gaining or losing properties. During the process of change, the substance gains and loses properties, but itis still the same substance. The same leaf which was green is now red. Third, substances are basic, funda- menial existents. They are not in other things or had by other things. Fido is, not a property of some more basic entity. Rather, Fido has properties. Fido is a unity of properties (dogness, brownness, shape), parts (paws, teeth, ears), and dispositions or capacities (law-like tendencies to realize certain properties in the process of growth if certain conditions obtain; for in- stance, the capacity to grow teeth if the fetus is nourished). They are all united into the substance Fido and possessed by him. Finally, a substance has causal powers, It can act as a causal agent in the world, A carbon atom can act on another atom. A dog can bark or pick up a bone. A leaf can hit the ground. Property dualists hold that the mind is a property of the body. As Rich- ard Taylor puts it, “A person is a living physical body having mind, the mind consisting, however, of nothing but a more or less continuous series of conscious or unconscious states and events... which are the effects but never the causes of bodily activity.”* This view is called epiphenomenalisin, 4, Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p, 28, 80 Scaling the Secular City The minds to the body as smoke isto fire. Smoke is different from fire, but smoke does not cause anything. Smoke is a byproduct of fire. Similarly, rind is a byproduct of the body which does not cause anything, It just “rides” on top of the events in the body. Body events cause mind as a by- product. The mind is a property of the body which ceases to exist when the body ceases to function. ‘Though some theists have denied it recently, the historic Christian view has been substance dualism. The mind, distinct from the body, is a real substance which can cause things to happen by acting and which can exist when the body ceases to function.” Dualism Defended Problems with Physicalism as a General Worldview Physicalism as a worldview holds that everything that exists is nothing but a single spatio-temporal system which can be completely described in terms of some ideal form of physics.* Matter/energy is all that exists. God, souls, and nonphysical abstract entities do not exist. If physicalism is true at the worldview level, then obviously, mind/body physicalism would fol- low. But is physicalism adequate as a worldview? Several factors indicate that it is not. First, if theism is true, then physicalism as a worldview is false. God is not a physical being. Second, a number of people have argued that numbers exist and that they are abstract, nonphysical entities (e.g., sets, substances, or properties).’ Several arguments can be offered for the exis tence of numbers, but two appear frequently. For one thing, mathematics claims to give us knowledge. But if this is so, there must be something that mathematics is about. Just as the biologist discovers biological truths about biological objects (organisms), so the mathematician often discovers mathe- matical truths (he does not invent them all the time) and these truths are about mathematical objects. If one denies the existence of numbers, then it is hard to rescue mathematics as a field which conveys knowledge about 5 Examples of Christian wsiters who have denied substance dualism are Richard Bubo, The Suman Quest Waco: Word, 1971), pp. 29-97, 1955, Donald M, Mackay, Human Selene and Huron Dirty (Downers Grove: Inter Varsity, 1979); David Myers, The Huan Pui: Paycholgieal Recarch an Chest ‘Sel (San rancico: Harper and Row, 1978) My own view i tht eubstance dualism isthe biblical view, ‘ut this does not mean Descartes’ version of dualism. More inline with the biblical deta isthe duaieer oF Aristolle o Aquinas, Fora good treatment ofthe relationship between substance, sou, and mind inoeth Arisotle and Aquinas, see Thomas Ragusa, The Substance Thar of Mind and ContonpoaryFunetenaton (Washington, D.C: Catollc University of America, 1937) A good treatment of biblical anthropology fe Robert Gundry, Soma in Bibi! Theoagy (Cambridge: Cambeldge University Pres, 1970) & SeeD.M. Armstrong, Nominalsm an Scientific Realism, 2 vol, (Cambridge! Cembridge University Press, 1978), 1126-32 7, ‘A bref diecussion ofthe esues involved inthe existence of mambers and modern set theory ean be found in Keith Campbell, Metaphysics: An turaducton (Encino, Cll: Dickenson, 1976), pp, 20 as, God and the Argument from Mind 81 something. Without numbers, mathematics becomes merely an internally cortsistent game which is invented, A second argument is often given for holding to the existence of num- bers. Scientific laws and theories seem to assert their existence, For exam- ple, a calcium ion has a positive charge of two which is expressed in the formula Ca‘*. The number two here seems to be more than a mere formula for calculating relative amounts of compounds in laboratory reactions. Two expresses a property of the calcium ion itself, The property of twoness is just as much areal property of the charge of the calciunras the property of positiveness. If one denies that numbers exist, it is hard to continue to maintain that science gives-us a real description of the world rather than a set of operations that work in the laboratory, In sum, without numbers, mathematical and scientific knowledge is hard to maintain. But if numbers exit, physicalism as a worldview is false because numbers are not physical entities. Some have argued that values, in addition to God and numbers, exist and are not physical. Certain objects (persons, animals) and certain events (helping a stranger, for example) have a nonphysical property of worth or goodness. Furthermore, moral laws ate often held to be absolute, objective realities (e.g., one should not torture babies). But if certain ob- jects possess goodness, and if certain moral laws are objective realities, then physicalism must be false, because the property of goodness and the nature of moral laws are not physical. For example, it makes no sense to ask how much goodness weighs, or to ask where a moral law exists. Such realities are not physical. Fourth, if physicalism is true, itis hard to see what one should make of the existence and nature of theories, meanings, concepts, propositions, the laws of logic, and truth itself. It would seem that theories themselves exist and can be discovered. The laws of logic seem to be real laws that govern the relationships between propositions. Propositions seem to exist and be the content of thoughts which become associated with the physical scratchings of a given language called sentences. Sentences may be made of black ink, be on a page, and be four inches long. But it is hard to see how the content of the sentence (i.e., the proposition or thought expressed by the sentence) could be on the page, Such entities seem to be nonphysical entities which can be in the mind.’ Truth appears to be a relation of corre- 4. Fora good treatment of how diferent ethizal ystems view the ontological stats of valve, ee ©. Broad, Five Types of Ethie! Theory (Londons Routledge and Kegan Poul, 1830) 9. Physicists tempt to do away with semantic notions like "trath,”“denotaio,” and “propos "hy racing theo o sentences (tring of physical markings) and the lke For tivo exemple ofthis tepy, see Hartry Fe, “Tarski Theory of Truth,” The journal of Pissophy 69 uly 1972}. 347-75, WW. ¥.0, Quin, Piasuphy of Logic Cnglewood Clif, N j: Prentice-Hall, 197), pp. I-A, For acre oF cawliphyshaliststatepes, see Dallas Willard, gc andthe Fj of Kreg: Suis asses Esty Phuespiy (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984), pp. 205-18, Three good detenses ofthe existence