January 2013


This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global economic growth, population growth, energy consumption, policy support for renewable energies and sources of energy supply. Forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may occur in the future. Actual outcomes may differ depending on a variety of factors, including product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; legal and regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and other factors discussed elsewhere in this presentation.
Energy Outlook 2030 2 © BP 2013

Page Introduction Global energy trends Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel Implications Appendix 4 7 27 69 81

Energy Outlook 2030


© BP 2013

Welcome to the 2013 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030. BP’s annual Energy Outlook contains our projections of future energy trends and factors that could affect them, based on our views of likely economic and population growth and developments in policy and technology. Together with the annual Statistical Review of World Energy, it has become a respected contribution to the global discussion on energy and I am pleased with the feedback we are receiving. Last year’s edition led the way in showing how North America is likely to become selfsufficient in energy. This year’s edition follows up by examining more closely the phenomenon which is driving America’s energy revival, the revolution in shale gas and tight oil, including its global prospects. The Outlook describes a future that is different in several respects from what many expected just a short while ago. We still expect global energy demand to grow – by 36% between 2011 and 2030 - driven by the emerging economies. Without continuous improvements in energy efficiency, demand would have to grow much more rapidly simply to sustain economic growth. Supply patterns are shifting. The Outlook demonstrates how unconventional oil and gas are playing a major role in meeting global demand. Over the period to 2030, the US becomes nearly self-sufficient in energy, while China and India become increasingly import-dependent. This report illuminates some of the consequences. The implications are far-reaching. Indeed, I believe they will stretch far beyond the boundaries of our industry.
Energy Outlook 2030 4 © BP 2013

Highlighting the “above ground” factors that have made the US and Canada engines for energy innovation can be instructive for other nations seeking to develop their domestic energy resources. in short. We hope you find the 2013 edition of the BP Energy Outlook 2030 a useful addition to the global energy discussion.As always. unlock resources and encourage efficiency. which underpin the key trends that are highlighted in the Outlook. the numbers that make up this Outlook reveal long-term trends and highlight potential “fault lines” in the system. The energy industry is highly competitive and investment will flow to the places that possess the right resources below ground and the right conditions above it. Bob Dudley Group Chief Executive Energy Outlook 2030 5 © BP 2013 . Third. A second message is the importance of technology and innovation. What messages do we draw from this Outlook? It underlines the power of competition and market forces in driving efficiency and innovation – importantly not only in unlocking new supplies such as unconventional oil and gas but also in improving energy efficiency and consequently limiting the growth of carbon emissions. from the development of shale resources to the efficiency of power generation and improved vehicle fuel economy. their job is to convey the underlying challenges and opportunities we all face in producing and consuming energy. The overall conclusion is that increased demand can be met as long as competition is present to drive innovation. the Outlook highlights the way energy resources are opening up. This is why we remain optimistic the world will produce the energy it needs to fuel continued economic growth.

taking account of developments over the past year. We focus on the “most likely” base case numbers.Note on method and assumptions This edition updates our view of the likely path of global energy markets to 2030. All data sources are listed on page 86. to provide a basis for discussion. and use a range of analytical tools to build a “to the best of our knowledge” view. Of course the future is uncertain. The underlying methodology remains unchanged – we make assumptions on changes in policy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expressed in real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. data definitions are based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. based on extensive internal and external consultations. and in the process of building the Outlook we explore the impact of alternative assumptions. and historical energy data through 2011 is consistent with the 2012 edition of the Review. Energy Outlook 2030 6 © BP 2013 . Unless noted otherwise. technology and the economy. While we do touch on some of the key uncertainties. the treatment of energy market risks here is by no means exhaustive.

Page Introduction Global energy trends Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel Implications Appendix 4 7 27 69 81 Energy Outlook 2030 7 © BP 2013 .

Population and income growth… Population Billion 8 OECD Non-OECD GDP Trillion $2011 100 OECD Non-OECD Primary energy Billion toe 12 OECD non-OECD 6 75 9 4 50 6 2 25 3 0 1990 2010 2030 0 1990 2010 8 0 2030 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

and world income in 2030 is expected to be roughly double the 2011 level in real terms.a. The growth rate declines.1% p. from 2020 to 2030.3 billion.a.3 billion people will need energy. World primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 1.…underpin growing energy consumption Population and income growth are the key drivers behind growing demand for energy. Energy Outlook 2030 9 © BP 2013 .6% p. for 2000-10. and 1.3% p. from 2011 to 2030. adding 36% to global consumption by 2030. from 2. Low and medium income economies outside the OECD account for over 90% of population growth to 2030. urbanisation and motorisation. Due to their rapid industrialisation. they also contribute 70% of the global GDP growth and over 90% of the global energy demand growth. for 2010-20.a.5% p. By 2030 world population is projected to reach 8.a. which means an additional 1. to 2.

* Hydro Nuclear 12 9 6 3 Coal Coal Gas Gas Oil Oil 2010 2030 © BP 2013 2010 0 2030 1990 *Includes biofuels Energy Outlook 2030 .Industrialisation and growing power demand… By region Billion toe 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 1990 OECD OECD Non-OECD Non-OECD By primary use Billion toe 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 2030 1990 Billion toe 18 15 Power generation Industry Other Transport 2010 10 By fuel Renew.

a.6% p.2% p. Non-OECD energy consumption in 2030 is 61% above the 2011 level. accounting for 25% of the growth of primary energy consumption. Energy Outlook 2030 11 © BP 2013 .a.) and hydro (2. Energy used for power generation grows by 49% (2.3% p. gas grows the fastest (2. and will decline in per capita terms (-0.0% p.). followed by coal (1.5% p.) both grow faster than total energy. Primary energy used directly in industry grows by 31% (1. The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) with growth averaging 7.a.a.).1% p.0% p.6% p. with growth averaging 2.2% p. (or 1.8% p. 2011-30.…increase the world’s appetite for primary energy Almost all (93%) of the energy consumption growth is in non-OECD countries. per capita).5% p.a. accounting for 65% of world consumption (compared to 53% in 2011).a.a. OECD energy consumption in 2030 is just 6% higher than in 2011 (0. Among fossil fuels.).a.a. and oil (0.).) 2011-30. 2011-30). and accounts for 57% of global primary energy growth.a.). Nuclear (2.a.4% p.a.

The power sector leads primary energy growth… Growth by sector and region.5 -0.0 0.0 RoW Middle East China & India OECD Industry Other Power 2.5 2.0 -0.5 1. 2011-2030 Growth by sector and fuel.5 2.5 0.0 1.0 1. Electricity Gas Biofuels Oil Coal Transport Industry Other Power Inputs to power © BP 2013 Billion toe 3.5 1.5 0. 2011-2030 Hydro Nuclear Renew.0 0.0 2.5 Final energy use Energy Outlook 2030 Inputs to power 12 Final energy use .0 Transport Billion toe 3.

and 2% from electricity. Renewables contribute 27% of the growth. with another 13% coming from biofuels. with more than half the growth coming from non-fossil fuels. with gas making up virtually all the non-electricity energy use. Energy Outlook 2030 13 © BP 2013 . with OECD transport demand projected to decline. The sector starts to show some diversification away from oil. Industry leads the growth of final energy consumption.…while industry leads the growth of final energy demand The power sector diversifies its fuel mix. The growth of “other” sector energy consumption (primarily residential and commercial) is heavily weighted towards electricity. The industrial sector accounts for 57% of the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030. just ahead of coal (26%) and gas (21%). particularly in rapidly developing economies. The transport sector shows the weakest growth. gas accounts for 16% of transport energy demand growth.

America Middle East Europe Asia Pacific Africa 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .. Primary energy production Billion toe 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 1990 Non-OECD Non-OECD OECD OECD 2000 2010 2020 Billion toe 18 FSU 15 12 9 6 3 0 2030 1990 14 Primary energy production S&C America N..Emerging economies dominate energy production growth.

. shows the most rapid growth rate (2.6% p. and North America remains the second largest regional energy producer. the largest regional energy producer..a. due to large indigenous coal production. which will account for 78% of the world’s increase. and accounts for 48% of global energy production growth. growth in production will be dominated by the non-OECD countries. The Middle East and North America contribute the next largest increments for supply growth.with Asia Pacific accounting for nearly half of global growth World primary energy production growth matches consumption. Energy Outlook 2030 15 © BP 2013 . from 2011 to 2030. up from 69% in 2011 and 58% in 1990. The region provides 35% of global energy production by 2030. Energy production will grow in all regions but Europe. growing by 1. The Asia Pacific region.2% p.a. As is the case for energy consumption.).. These countries will supply 71% of global energy production in 2030.

Energy prices play a key role… Shares of world primary energy $2011/boe 50% 40% 30% 20% Gas 10% 0% 1965 Hydro Nuclear 1980 1995 2010 Renewables* 2025 16 Energy prices Oil 120 100 Oil .Brent Gas .basket Coal 80 60 40 20 0 1965 1980 1995 2010 © BP 2013 *Includes biofuels Energy Outlook 2030 .basket Coal .

Gas remains on a trend of modest but steady gains in share. Oil follows a long run trend of decline in its market share. technology and policy drive changes in the fuel mix. These long run price movements inevitably lead to demand and supply responses. Fossil fuels are converging on a market share of 26-28% each and non-fossil fuels groups on a market share of 6-7% each. Average annual real oil prices over the five years 2007-11 were 220% above the average for 1997-2001. with a trend decline evident by 2020. Energy Outlook 2030 17 © BP 2013 .…in shaping the response of the global energy system Prices. Fossil fuel prices have risen to record levels in real terms over the past decade. Gas and non-fossil fuels gain share at the expense of coal and oil. with oil increasingly concentrated in the sectors where it commands the highest value. for coal the increase was 141% and for gas 95%. Coal’s recent rapid gain in share will start to reverse soon. The rate at which renewables are projected to gain market share resembles the experience of nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s.

Germany.2 0.1 World US China Energy and GDP Billion toe 50 40 30 100 20 10 Energy 0 0 1970 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Trillion $2011 200 150 GDP (RHS) 50 EU* 0.0 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030 *Euro4 (France.3 0.5 0.Energy efficiency improvements are critical… Energy intensity by region Toe per thousand $2011 GDP 0.4 0. UK) pre-1970 Energy Outlook 2030 18 . Italy.

Global energy intensity in 2030 is 31% lower than in 2011. Energy Outlook 2030 19 © BP 2013 .2% p. declining at 1. Energy intensity declines in all regions. Current high prices for energy and global integration reinforce this trend. Without the projected intensity decline.0% p.9% p. The impact of declining energy intensity can be seen clearly in the gap between GDP and energy consumption. for 2020-30.a. rather than the 36% increase required in our Outlook. the world would need to almost double energy supply by 2030 to sustain economic growth. The rate of decline accelerates post 2020. in large part the result of China moving onto a less energy-intensive development path. for 2000-10.…to meeting the energy challenge We have previously noted the long run trend of declining and converging energy intensity (the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP).a.a. compared to a decline rate of 1. averaging 2.

Energy demand growth is matched by supply… Demand Billion toe 17 16 15 14 13 12 2011 *Includes biofuels Energy Outlook 2030 20 © BP 2013 Supply 2030 level Renew.* Hydro Nuclear Other Shale Tight Other OECD NonOECD 2011 Oil Natural gas Coal Nonfossil .

accounting for 17% of the increase in global energy supply. renewables and other sources. Despite all the growth from shale. conventional fossil fuel supplies are still required to expand. providing almost half the growth in energy supply. Energy Outlook 2030 21 © BP 2013 .…from all sources. Hydro and nuclear together account for another 17% of the growth. From 2011 to 2030 shale gas more than trebles and tight oil grows more than six-fold. High prices for fossil fuels also support the expansion of non-fossil energy. first for gas and then for oil. conventional and unconventional High prices are also supporting the expansion of supply. Renewable energy supply more than trebles from 2011 to 2030. Together they will account for almost a fifth of the increase in global energy supply to 2030. The “shale revolution” . is an example of this. and not just from conventional sources – the development and deployment of new technologies across a range of energy sources is opening up new supply opportunities at scale.

& C.0 0. America Africa Europe & Eurasia S..6 0. & C.0 N. America Europe & Eurasia Middle East S.4 0. America Middle East © BP 2013 Production in 2030 Resources data © OECD/IEA 2012 Energy Outlook 2030 22 Asia Pacific . America Asia Pacific Gas Oil Billion toe 1. Current resources Billion toe 60 40 20 0 Africa N.2 0.8 0.Shale gas and tight oil resources and production..

1 Mb/d (24%) of US oil production was from tight oil and 24 Bcf/d (37%) of natural gas from shale. Asia has an estimated 57 Tcm of shale gas and 50 Bbbls of tight oil. North America will continue to dominate production by 2030. In 2012. Energy Outlook 2030 23 © BP 2013 . versus 47 Tcm and 70 Bbbls respectively for North America. Globally there are estimated technically recoverable resources of 240 billion barrels (Bbbls) for tight oil and 200 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) for shale gas. Assessing both global resources and “above ground” factors.…highlight the importance of above-ground factors High prices and technological innovation have unlocked vast unconventional resources in the US. even as other regions gradually adapt to develop their resources. reversing the trend of falling output and altering global energy balances. 2. These resources have boosted gas output by nearly 20% and oil by 30% in the past five years.

5 1.5 0.0 1... Onshore oil & gas rigs 2011 Thousands 2.0 Oil wells drilled and output Thousands 15 12 9 6 3 0 Bakken Canada Colombia © BP 2013 *Annualised from 1Q-3Q data Mb/d 2011 Output (RHS) 5 4 3 2 1 0 2012* 2010 Energy Outlook 2030 24 .US tight oil and shale gas output is supported by.0 0.

…a competitive environment including a strong service sector
“Above ground“ factors have enabled US success: a robust service sector with the world’s largest rig fleet (over 1,800 rigs in operation, a majority of which can drill horizontally), a competitive industry that spurs continued technological innovation, land access facilitated by private ownership, deep financial markets, and favourable fiscal and regulatory terms. As an example, output in the Bakken has increased from 0.1 Mb/d just five years ago to over 1 Mb/d currently, roughly matching that of Colombia, as operators are drilling more oil wells than in all of Canada. So far, only the US and Canada have combined these variables to support rapid production growth. The pace of development elsewhere is likely to be measured, given the lengthy checklist of factors required for development of shale gas and tight oil resources.

Energy Outlook 2030


© BP 2013

Energy Outlook 2030


© BP 2013

Page Introduction Global energy trends Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel Implications Appendix 4 7 27 69 81

Energy Outlook 2030


© BP 2013

High oil prices are reducing oil’s share of primary energy…
Oil share of energy and GDP
% of energy 60% % of GDP 10% 8% 40% 6% 50% 20% 4% 2% 0% 0% 1965 1978 1991 2004 2017 2030
Energy Outlook 2030 28

Oil share in sector

Oil as % of primary energy Cost of oil as % of GDP (RHS)

100% Transport Industry Other Power



0% 1965 1978 1991 2004 2017 2030
© BP 2013

We project this to fall further to 28% by 2030. although the decline in industry has been (and will be) slower because of limits to substitution in petrochemicals and other non-energy uses.…via substitution and efficiency gains in transport After the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Oil will remain the dominant fuel in transport. Oil’s share in power generation. Oil’s share in industry and other sectors (including residential and commercial) has also declined substantially. High relative prices have led to the substitution of oil by other fuels outside the transport sector where cheaper alternatives are available. oil’s share in primary energy consumption fell from a peak of 48% in 1973 to 39% in 1985. Energy Outlook 2030 29 © BP 2013 . although its share falls from 94% in 2011 to 89% in 2030. the market response to high prices has been primarily via efficiency gains. Rising oil prices have again increased the burden of oil on the economy in recent years and oil has lost market share again – falling to 33% in 2011. fell from 22% in 1973 to 4% in 2011 and is forecast to decline to just 2% by 2030. In transport. for example.

road Oil .Global transport demand growth slows… Transport demand by fuel Billion toe 3 Electricity 2 Gas Coal Biofuels 1 Oil .non-road 0 1990 Fuel economy of new cars Litres per 100 km 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 EU US light vehicles China 2010 2030 30 1995 2005 2015 2025 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

Gas (including gas-to-liquids) is the fastest growing alternative and likely to overtake biofuels in transport by 2030. driven by consumer reaction to rising prices and tightening policy (e. Nevertheless.a. Enhancements to the internal combustion engine and gradual hybridisation of the vehicle fleet are expected to further accelerate efficiency gains. Fuel economy improvements have accelerated in recent years.…as prices and policy boost vehicle fuel economy Energy consumption growth in transport slows to 1.a. in each region over the outlook period. and non-OECD subsidy reduction. Other factors include the impact of high oil prices on driving behaviour. since alternatives are likely to remain uneconomic in most markets without policy support. (from 1. 1990-2010) primarily due to accelerating gains in fuel economy. with fuel economy in the US. Transport demand will remain dominated by oil.9% p.9% p. biofuels and natural gas both reach 5% share of transport by 2030 with electricity at 1%. CO2 emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled by technology improvements. vehicle saturation in the OECD. EU and China improving by 2.g.a.2% p. Energy Outlook 2030 31 © BP 2013 .

. Demand by region Mb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 0 1970 Other OECD Other Middle East Other nonOECD Asia China US Demand by sector Mb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 Non-OECD transport Non-OECD ind. & other Power 1990 2010 2030 32 0 1970 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 . & other OECD transport OECD ind..Liquids demand growth by region and sector.

…is dominated by non-OECD transport demand Global liquids consumption is projected to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030 but growth slows to 0.8% p. 1 Mb/d below the 1990 level. in 1990-2010 and 1. with non-OECD industry also rising (by 6. OECD demand declines across all sectors as vehicle efficiency improvements outweigh (slow) growth in the vehicle fleet. and oil is displaced by other fuels outside of transport. (from 1. Other non-OECD Asia also shows strong growth of 6 Mb/d (of which almost two-thirds are in India). The Middle East is the next largest contributor to growth over the outlook period at 3. largely for petrochemicals).5 Mb/d. OECD consumption will fall to 40. surpassing the US in 2029 (US demand falls by 2 Mb/d to 16. in 1970-90).4% p.a. liquids demand growth to 2030 comes from non-OECD transport (nearly 14 Mb/d) due to a rapid increase in vehicle ownership.a.5 Mb/d. and reach 63 Mb/d by 2030 – 2½ times the 1990 level.5 Mb/d. Energy Outlook 2030 33 © BP 2013 . Demand in China grows by 7 Mb/d to 17 Mb/d in 2030. By sector.a. Non-OECD consumption is likely to overtake the OECD by 2014.5 Mb/d over the outlook period).9% p.

Tight oil will drive global supply growth… Liquids supply by type Mb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 OPEC share (RHS) 45% OPEC NGLs OPEC crude Biofuels Oil sands Tight oil Other nonOPEC 6 4 2 0 2000 34 Tight oil output Mb/d 10 8 China Russia S. America % of total (RHS) 10% 8% 6% 4% NGLs 2% 0% 2030 © BP 2013 0 30% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Energy Outlook 2030 2010 2020 . America N.

Non-OPEC supplies will expand by 8.5 Mb/d by 2030 and account for nearly half of the 16.5 Mb/d versus 7.4 Mb/d and 0. tight oil should reach 9% of global supplies. North America’s tight oil growth is expected to slow post-2020 due to today’s view of the resource base and the costs and drilling activity required to sustain output. By 2030. Energy Outlook 2030 35 © BP 2013 .6 Mb/d for OPEC as the group will likely see its market share drop until 2018 due to the surge in tight oil supplies before recovering to 42% by the forecasting period.…as high prices and technology have unlocked vast resources Tight oil will likely expand by 7.1 Mb/d of global supply growth.5 Mb/d by 2030. Both Russia and China – with robust service sectors and expected additional fiscal incentives – are expected to develop their tight oil resources reaching 1. North America will continue to dominate output with limited growth elsewhere. South America will also increase output due to investment in countries like Colombia and Argentina. respectively.

With the Americas dominating global supply growth… Supply growth by decade Mb/d 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 1990-00 2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 36 Americas surpass Middle East Mb/d Americas FSU Africa Europe Middle East Asia Pacific 35 Americas Middle East 30 25 20 15 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

and Russia will supply over a third of global liquids in our outlook. Saudi Arabia regains the top oil producer slot by 2027. Saudi Arabia. The US.8 Mb/d) drive growth. Energy Outlook 2030 37 © BP 2013 .…unconventionals will constrain OPEC output The Americas will account for 65% of incremental supply growth to 2030 as tight oil (5. OPEC crude oil output will not return to the expected 2013 level of about 30 Mb/d until 2020 as non-OPEC supplies dominate global growth.7 Mb/d). From 2020-30. however. but also due to expected OPEC production cuts. Russia will likely pass Saudi Arabia for the second slot in 2013 and hold that until 2023.5 Mb/d) leads regional increases and will surpass its previous record output reached in 1970. The US will likely surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2013 as the largest liquids producer in the world (crude and biofuels) due to tight oil and biofuels growth. The US (4.1 Mb/d as non-OPEC output growth fades. and biofuels (1.7 Mb/d). oil sands (2. supplies will likely expand by 5.

Mid East India China Tight oil Biofuels Oil sands NGLs Iraq OPEC-11 NGLs 2011 NonNonOPEC OPEC declines growth OPEC growth Energy Outlook 2030 © BP 2013 .The global liquids balance reflects the shifts… Demand Mb/d 105 100 95 90 85 80 2011 OECD declines NonOECD growth 38 Supply 2030 level Other S&C Am.

from OPEC. which offset declines in mature provinces such as Mexico and the North Sea.6 Mb/d. later in the outlook. Demand growth comes exclusively from rapidly growing non-OECD economies. China. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs (2. Global liquids demand (oil. The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (4.5 Mb/d) and crude oil in Iraq (2. and Brazil (2.9 Mb/d).…in non-OECD demand and non-OPEC supply growth Oil is expected to be the slowest growing fuel over the next 20 years.7 Mb/d). India and the Middle East together account for nearly all of the net global increase.6 Mb/d. By 2030.8 Mb/d). OECD demand has peaked and consumption is expected to decline by 5. non-OPEC supply is expected to increase by 8. to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030. biofuels. Rising supply to meet expected demand growth will come primarily from non-OPEC unconventional sources and.5 Mb/d while OPEC production will expand by 7. and other liquids) nonetheless is likely to rise by 16 Mb/d. Canada (2.5 Mb/d). Energy Outlook 2030 39 © BP 2013 .

Slow demand growth and unconventional supplies… Unconventionals share of net global supply growth 100% Biofuels Oil sands 75% Tight oil 6 33 Call on OPEC & spare capacity Mb/d 9 Mb/d Spare capacity Call on OPEC (RHS) 36 50% 3 30 25% 0% 2000-10 Energy Outlook 2030 2010-20 2020-30 40 0 2000 2010 2020 27 2030 © BP 2013 .

the highest since the late 1980s. OPEC cohesion is a key oil market uncertainty. We assume that. and over 70% of the growth from 2020-30. The market requirement for OPEC crude in our outlook is not expected to reach 2011 levels for another decade. Unconventional non-OPEC supply will account for all the net growth in global production over this decade. the market would experience unsustainably large inventory increases. If OPEC were to maintain current production. OPEC members will cut production over the current decade. Thereafter. spare capacity exceeds 6 Mb/d by 2015. OPEC production rebounds – and spare capacity shrinks – as the market requirement for OPEC crude recovers. While we believe that OPEC members will be able to maintain production discipline despite high levels of spare capacity. Energy Outlook 2030 41 © BP 2013 .…create a more challenging future for OPEC In our outlook. demand growth slows and non-OPEC supplies rise – both as a result of high prices. especially in the current decade. in response.

5 75 Crude Supply OECD Crude runs: China 2 World outside China 7 2.5 4 2 9.Refinery throughputs are limited by NGL and biofuels growth… Global liquids supply and demand Mb/d 105 Global liquids demand Other NGLs 90 Biofuels Growth 2011-2030 Supply: Total liquids Other liquids 1 Non-refined NGLs Biofuels Crude + Condensates 16 Mb/d 0.5 Mb/d 60 45 2011 2015 2020 2025 42 1 includes 2030 2 if processing gains no change in net product trade Energy Outlook 2030 © BP 2013 .

Existing spare capacity can accommodate some of the future growth in refinery throughputs. Energy Outlook 2030 43 © BP 2013 . Around half of global liquids demand growth is in China and that country’s refinery expansion plans will affect product balances globally. In addition. Increases in processing gains and supplies of liquids derived from gas and coal are likely to add another 0. new capacity continues to be added at a fast pace with a net 5 Mb/d due to be added globally by 2015.5 Mb/d over the next 19 years.5 Mb/d to product supplies.…with the lion’s share of crude run growth in China Growth in the call on refinery throughput will be constrained by new supplies of biofuels (2 Mb/d) and NGLs (4 Mb/d) that do not need refining. A continuation of its stated strategy to be self-sufficient in refined products would severely curtail crude run increases for refiners outside of China. limiting the increase in refinery crude runs to only 9. These supply sources will compete directly with refineries to meet total liquids demand growth of 16 Mb/d between 2011 and 2030.

Shale gas growth will gradually spread beyond the US… Gas production by type and region Bcf/d 500 400 300 40 200 100 0 1990 20 % of total (RHS) 6% Non-OECD other Non-OECD shale OECD shale OECD other Bcf/d 80 RoW China Europe & Eurasia Canada & Mexico US 18% Shale gas production 60 12% 2000 2010 2020 2030 44 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 0% 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

accounting for 73% of world gas production growth. OECD shale gas is set to account for 12. Energy Outlook 2030 45 © BP 2013 . Total natural gas production is projected to grow by 2% p. up from 64% in 2011. From a global perspective.a.2% p. Meanwhile. notably China. (or 54 Bcf/d) to reach 74 Bcf/d by 2030.5%.a. as declines in Europe are more than offset by strong growth in North America and Australia.5% p.). reaching 459 Bcf/d by 2030. Shale growth is initially concentrated in North America. The OECD also shows growth (1. accounting for 37% of the growth of natural gas supply. Most of the growth originates from non-OECD countries (2.. up from just 6% in 2011.).a.a. the momentum of shale gas growth is maintained after 2020 as developments spread to other regions. By 2030 Non-OECD will account for 67% of total supply. where growth is projected to slow after 2020.…making a significant contribution to global gas growth Shale gas is expected to grow by 7% p. based on current resource assessments.

Shale gas brings self-sufficiency to North America… Sources of gas supply. America Bcf/d 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 1990 EU Bcf/d 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 China Net pipeline imports Net LNG imports Shale gas production Other domestic production 2010 46 2030 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 . by region Bcf/d 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 1990 2010 2030 N.

leading to a 48% increase in net imports. more than offsetting the decline of conventional gas production. China is expected to be most successful in developing shale gas outside North America. For the EU. so we are unlikely to see shale growth at scale before 2030. China still requires rapid import growth (11% p.a. Energy Outlook 2030 47 © BP 2013 . Nonetheless. Shale gas is projected to grow to 6 Bcf/d by 2030. accounting for 20% of total Chinese gas production.). North America will become a net exporter in 2017. shale gas production of 2. with net exports approaching 8 Bcf/d by 2030. Supported by shale gas. which by 2030 will be larger than the current EU gas market.…while EU and China will grow imports North American shale gas production grows by 5.a. Shale gas development faces a number of challenges in Europe. reaching 54 Bcf/d by 2030. given the fast growth of Chinese consumption.3% p.4 Bcf/d in 2030 is not enough to offset the rapid decline of conventional gas production.

America 2000 2010 2020 2030 48 Demand by sector Bcf/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 Power Other Industry Transport 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .Gas demand growth is driven by non-OECD needs… Demand by region Bcf/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 China Other non-OECD Middle East Other OECD N.

and the Middle East for 23%.a. vs 1. Gas replaces coal in the OECD in power generation and industry. but from a very small base. with the industrial sector remaining.0% p. Power accounts for 39% of gas demand growth to 2030 and industry for 38%. Non-OECD markets account for 76% of global gas demand growth to 2030. Energy Outlook 2030 49 © BP 2013 . while non-OECD demand is strong enough to accommodate growth of gas and coal in both sectors.a. The bulk of growth comes from power (2.8% p. transport shows the fastest growth.) and industry (1.9% p.). the largest global destination for gas use in 2030.…for power generation and industry Non-OECD gas demand grows faster than in the OECD (2. China alone accounts for 25% of the growth. increasing the non-OECD share of global gas consumption from 52% in 2011 to 59% by 2030.a.1% p. By sector.a. just.).

Shale gas is the big growth story in the OECD… Demand Bcf/d Supply 500 450 400 350 300 250 2011 Energy Outlook 2030 Other non-OECD China Middle East Other OECD N. America 2030 level OECD Non-OECD OECD Non-OECD 50 2011 Non-shale Shale © BP 2013 .

despite all the attention surrounding the shale gas revolution.…but conventional growth in the non-OECD is even larger The expansion of shale gas supply in the OECD (37 Bcf/d) is more than enough to cover the increase in OECD gas demand (34 Bcf/d). followed by Africa (15 Bcf/d) and Russia (11 Bcf/d). this match on the aggregate level masks growing regional imbalances which will support the expansion of gas trade. in volume terms the bigger story is the expansion of mostly conventional production in the non-OECD (84 Bcf/d). However. the growth of non-OECD gas production (104 Bcf/d) almost matches the growth of non-OECD consumption (110 Bcf/d). And shale gas contributes a further 17 Bcf/d to non-OECD gas production growth. However. Energy Outlook 2030 51 © BP 2013 . The Middle East is the largest contributor with 31 Bcf/d. Overall.

Mid East Africa FSU 80 20% 60 % of total consumption (RHS) 15% 40 Europe 10% 20 China RoW LNG 5% 2020 2030 52 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 0% 2030 © BP 2013 .Gas trade continues to grow faster than consumption… Regional gas imbalances Bcf/d 80 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 2011 Energy Outlook 2030 LNG exports Bcf/d N. Am.

from 2011). and like LNG trade. accounting for 15. with a wave of large projects coming on stream from 2014. and accounts for the largest increment in net imports (18 Bcf/d).0% p.3% p.5% of global gas consumption by 2030. Energy Outlook 2030 53 © BP 2013 . Inter-regional pipeline trade grows by 3. LNG contributes an increasing share of trade. sees its share of consumption rising. Australia.. Africa is set to overtake the Middle East to become the largest net LNG exporter in 2028. to 2030. Russia remains the largest net exporter – predominantly to Europe.a.a.…with LNG playing an ever larger role Gas trade between regions continues to grow (3. Europe remains the largest net importer. expands LNG supply by 15 Bcf/d. LNG production grows by 4.7% p. overtaking Qatar as the largest LNG supplier by 2018 and accounting for 25% of global LNG production by 2030.a. On a regional level.

LNG trade is accompanied by deeper market integration… LNG diversification 10 8 6 4 2 0 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 54 LNG infrastructure 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 © BP 2013 Suppliers per importer Customers per exporter Re-gas terminals Liquefaction plants Energy Outlook 2030 .

The trend towards diversification is expected to continue as new exporters and importers join the LNG trade. Another indicator of increased diversification is the decline in the share of LNG accounted for by the largest importer and largest exporter .from 68% and 39% respectively in 1990 to 23% and 31% respectively in 2011. with an average of 20 trading partners in 2011. Increased market flexibility and integration is also supported by the expansion of the physical infrastructure. Energy Outlook 2030 55 © BP 2013 . Qatar and Trinidad & Tobago are leading export diversification. creating an ever-expanding network of trading nodes.…improving optionality for importers and exporters Alongside the growth of LNG volumes. we have seen a diversification of trading partners for both exporters and importers. Nigeria. In 1990 each exporter or importer had an average of 2 partners – by 2011 that had risen to 9 and 6 respectively.

Coal consumption and production will level off after 2020… Coal demand by region Billion toe 5 4 3 2 1 0 1990 China China China 3 India India India Other Non-OECD Other non-OECD OECD OECD OECD 2000 2010 2020 2030 56 Coal supply by region Billion toe 5 4 Oil China China Industry China India India India Other Non-OECD Power Other non-OECD OECD OECD 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 2 1 0 1990 Energy Outlook 2030 .

Production in China and India rises 0.a. Energy Outlook 2030 57 © BP 2013 . with increases in non-OECD countries offsetting declines in the OECD.a.9% p.6% p.5% p.9% p. China and India account for 63% and 29% respectively of global coal growth to 2030.a. China’s coal demand growth decelerates rapidly from 9% p. while India (12%) overtakes the US to become the second largest in 2024.a.8% p. respectively. driven by a shift to less coal-intensive economic activities and by efficiency improvements.a. in 2011-2030. this decade and 0. India’s coal demand growth slows down more gradually from 6. Growing imports drive further expansion and integration of global coal markets.5% p.a. and 3.…as the OECD and China reduce their reliance on coal Coal consumption declines in the OECD (by 0.a.a.4% p.a. in 2000-10 to 3.). but continues growing in the non-OECD (1. China remains the largest coal consumer (52% of global consumption).9% p. in 2000-10 to 3. in 2011-2030. in 2020-2030. as energy efficiency gains partially offset rising energy demand for industrial and infrastructure expansion. Global coal supply is set to grow 1.0% p. 2011-2030).a.

The share of coal declines in all sectors… Coal demand by sector Billion toe 5 4 Industry Industry 3 2 1 0 1990 Power Power 30% 20% 10% 0% 2000 2010 2020 2030 58 Coal share in sector Other 50% 40% Power Industry & other Transport 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

2000-10 to 1. in 2020-30. nuclear and renewables all gain share.0% p.7% p.a. this decline accelerates to -1.).a. from 7.6% p. the growth of coal use in power slows. In the OECD coal use in power is already in decline (-0.a.a.a. 2011-20 and 1.a.4% p. in 2011-20 and 0. its industrial consumption of coal decelerates from 9. coal’s share in fuels used for power generation declines from 44% in 2020 to 39% in 2030.9% after 2020.a. Energy Outlook 2030 59 © BP 2013 . gas. Coal consumption in the industrial sector also levels off.…driven by structural change and fuel diversification The growth of global coal consumption in power generation slows from 3. after 2020.1% p. 2000-10). While consumption continues to decline in the OECD (-1. in 2000-10 to 2. As the focus of China’s economic development shifts from rapid industrialisation and infrastructure building to growth based on services and light manufacturing.8% p.a.a. to 1.9% p.a.2% p.2% p. In the non-OECD.2% p.a. in 2020-30. As a result.a. in 2000-10 to 0. after 2020.6% p. in 2000-10. growth in the non-OECD decelerates from 7.4% p.

5 0.0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 60 0.5 Billion toe 2.0 Non-OECD Renewables in power 0.0 1.5 Biofuels Hydro Nuclear 1.0 1.0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .5 Biofuels 0.0 Renewables 1.Non-fossil fuels growth is led by renewables in the OECD… OECD Billion toe 2.

India and Russia pursue ambitious expansion programmes. but in terms of volume growth the OECD remains just ahead of the non-OECD. while nuclear output remains below pre-Fukushima levels.7% p. and hydro continues to grow slowly.…while nuclear leads in the non-OECD Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD (2. vs 6.). Energy Outlook 2030 61 © BP 2013 .). In the non-OECD.a. Renewables growth is initially led by the EU.). OECD growth is concentrated in renewable power (6.1% p.a. growth is more evenly split between renewables.) as China.a. Nuclear contributes the most to growth.9% p.9% p. nuclear and hydro.0% p.2% p. up from 2% in 2011. renewables reach a 6% share of global primary energy by 2030.a. with output increasing rapidly (7. but from 2020 the US and China are the largest sources of growth. Including biofuels.a.a.) and nonOECD (5. The non-OECD shows a higher growth rate than the OECD (10.

a. 15% 25% Growth (RHS) Nuclear 1970-2000 20% 15% 10% Non-OECD 5% OECD 0% 2000 1970 2010 1980 2020 1990 2030 2000 62 20% Share 2011 Share 2030 15% 12% 9% 6% 3% 0% 10% Renewables 2000-2030 5% 0% OECD Europe Other OECD NonOECD Energy Outlook 2030 © BP 2013 .Renewables continue to gain market share… Share of power generation Renewable power Growth 2011-30. and share of power % share % p.

Renewable power growth in the EU slows.…assuming cost declines can keep the subsidy burden in check Renewables are projected to gain market share in power. Less mature markets for renewables. because overall power growth is low (0. and continued public opposition led to a loss of policy support. can sustain higher growth rates. rising costs. the most pressing of which – and the key factor limiting growth – is the affordability of subsidies.a. Continued rapid cost reductions are required to keep the subsidy burden at an acceptable level as renewables scale up. Nevertheless renewables continue to gain market share in the EU. Energy Outlook 2030 63 © BP 2013 . Nuclear power then gained share rapidly. with lower current shares. as the share of renewables is now at a level where the subsidy burden has become an issue.8% p. Renewables face a different set of challenges. but peaked in the 1990s as safety concerns. at a slower but perhaps more sustainable rate than nuclear in the 1970/80s.).

Electricity gains in all sectors… Electricity share of final consumption World power generation Thousand TWh 50% 40% 30% Industry 20% 10% Transport 0% 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 64 40 Renewables Other 30 Hydro Nuclear 20 Coal 10 Gas Oil 0 1970 1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

meeting 33% of non-transport energy demand in 2030. for 2000-10.1% p. Improving conversion efficiency in power generation means that the total fuel inputs to generate power grow less rapidly than electricity demand. averaging 2. decline in electricity per unit of GDP .a.5% p.…but power growth slows as China restructures The power sector is a key driver of global energy growth. and the only sector where all the primary fuels compete. Total electricity consumption will be 61% higher in 2030 than in 2011. (versus 3.a. Energy Outlook 2030 65 © BP 2013 . Global electricity demand growth accelerated as China started to industrialise at scale.a. growing by 2.4% p. The net result is a 1. Electricity continues to gain share in final energy use.1% p. Improving end-use efficiency everywhere adds to this “China effect” . and 2. compared to a 0.a.1% p. decline 1990-2010. Electricity is closely tied to economic growth and industrialisation.7% for 1990-2000). Beyond 2020 global electricity growth slows as China shifts to less energy-intensive growth. up from 28% in 2011.a.

1990 2010 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .The fuel mix for power generation diversifies… Growth of fuel inputs to power Billion toe 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.4 19902000 20002010 20102020 20202030 66 Shares of power output 100% Oil 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1970 Coal Nuclear Hydro Gas Renew.

In the 1970s and 1980s high priced oil was replaced by nuclear and to a lesser extent by coal. and coal’s share also rose. and the increased role of both renewables and nuclear. The impact on the growth of fuels for power. reflecting the growing weight of Asia’s coal-intensive power sector in global power generation. policy.…with coal’s share declining rapidly post 2020 Over time we see large shifts in the fuel mix for power generation. Energy Outlook 2030 67 © BP 2013 . and technology developments. In the 1990s and 2000s gas gained share as CCGT technology was deployed. After 2020 we see very little growth in coal used in power. driven by relative prices. in volume terms. This is the result of the slowdown in total power growth. as renewables start to penetrate the market at scale. but to a much lesser extent than coal. Gas growth is also reduced. From 2011 to 2030 coal loses share and gas gains share only marginally. is particularly striking in the final decade of the outlook. in stark contrast to the previous two decades.

Energy Outlook 2030 68 © BP 2013 .

Page Introduction Global energy trends Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel Implications Appendix 4 7 27 69 81 Energy Outlook 2030 69 © BP 2013 .

& C. America Europe FSU Middle East Asia Pacific Key: % share of global total 50% 2011 reserves 2030 output 0% Net importers 2011 Net exporters 2011 Energy Outlook 2030 S. America Africa 70 © BP 2013 .Distribution of oil and gas reserves: importing regions… N.

more likely to turn reserves into production The world has ample proved reserves of oil and natural gas to meet expected future demand growth. Indeed. yet they will account for 38% of global production in 2030. and will deliver one-third of the growth in global production. Energy Outlook 2030 71 © BP 2013 . At the end of 2011. These countries sit atop just 16% of global proved reserves of oil and natural gas. The distribution of global proved reserves of oil and natural gas – while essential for energy production – is not a good predictor of the distribution of future production growth. for natural gas that figure is 64 years. global proved reserves of oil were sufficient to meet 54 years of current (2011) production... and Europe – are expected to contribute a disproportional share of the world’s oil and natural gas production to 2030.. the world’s oil and gas importing regions – Asia Pacific. North America.

The expected slowdown in tight oil and shale gas production… Range of tight oil forecasts (excludes NGLs) Mb/d 10 8 6 4 2 0 2010 0% 2020 2030 2000-10 2010-20 2020-30 72 Share of global supply growth Shale gas Tight oil Bcf/d 120 100 80 60 Range of shale gas forecasts Range BP 75% Range BP 50% 25% 40 20 0 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .

varying assessments of above ground issues are another driver of divergent forecasts. Different views on the North American resource base – in particular. in part due to current assessments of the resource base. After 2020. North American growth is expected to moderate. growth elsewhere results in slower global production growth in the next decade. for example. by reducing the market requirement for OPEC crude and boosting spare capacity. however. The global understanding of tight oil and shale gas potential is still evolving. whether to expect further growth – are the key factor behind the range of external forecasts. Continued. but more modest.…may not materialise if more optimistic outlooks are realised We project that the current decade will experience the most rapid growth in global production of tight oil and shale gas. by 2030. and the range of external forecasts reflects the uncertain landscape. These uncertainties could result in a significantly higher path for tight oil and shale gas production – as much as 5 Mb/d and 35 Bcf/d. Energy Outlook 2030 73 © BP 2013 . Additional supplies would have follow-on implications for the broader outlook: in the case of oil. respectively. Elsewhere.

200 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 Oil Gas Coal China EU US Energy imbalances to GDP ratio Toe per $Mln GDP 60 40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 China US EU Energy Outlook 2030 74 ..000 -1..Energy imbalances: significant changes in import profiles. Energy imbalances Mtoe 200 0 -200 -400 -600 -800 -1.

Other things equal. the growth in Chinese energy imports will be taking place in a context of robust economic growth.put into perspective by economic growth Growing production and flat consumption will see the US become nearly self-sufficient in energy by 2030. With net exports of natural gas and coal.. and will replace the US as the world’s largest oil importing nation by 2017. Energy Outlook 2030 75 © BP 2013 .. US energy production will reach 99% of domestic consumption. up from a low of 70% in 2005.. Adjusting the volume of energy imports for expected economic growth will leave China relatively less dependent (per unit of GDP) than EU on imported energy. The US will remain a small net importer of oil. the development of energy imbalances point toward a reduction of global trade imbalances. However. China is on pace to match Europe as the world’s leading energy importer by 2030. although net imports will decline by about 70%.

Energy imbalances Saudi Arabia Mtoe 800 Oil Gas Coal Africa Russia Toe per $Mln GDP PPP 1200 1000 800 400 600 400 200 0 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 © BP 2013 Energy imbalances to GDP ratio 600 Saudi Arabia Russia Africa 200 Energy Outlook 2030 76 .Energy imbalances: growing energy exports...

As a region. Once again adjusting for expected economic growth. By 2030. By 2030. with increases in exports of all fossil fuels. Africa will become an increasingly important source of fossil fuel exports as well... oil exports in volume terms are likely to be 17% above the 2010 level.and their relative importance Russia will remain the world’s largest energy exporter. Energy Outlook 2030 77 © BP 2013 . Net energy exports will rise by 25% in volume terms. although the trajectory over time will be impacted by the likelihood of OPEC production cuts discussed earlier. Saudi Arabia will be the world’s largest oil exporter.. Russia – and the African countries as a group – are likely to remain significantly less dependent on energy exports than Saudi Arabia.

Energy demand growth drives carbon emissions… CO2 emissions and primary energy Billion tonnes CO2 50 40 30 20 10 0 1970 Emissions from energy use Primary energy (RHS) Billion toe 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 2030 78 Growth of CO2 emissions % p. 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1970-1990 1990-2010 2010-2030 Gas Oil 1990 2010 -2% China EU US © BP 2013 Energy Outlook 2030 .a.

renewables in power and the displacement of coal by gas. The structural transformation of China’s economy slows its energy demand growth. results in a gradual decoupling of emissions growth from primary energy growth.…but the link weakens as the energy mix decarbonises Carbon emissions from energy use continue to grow. causing a significant reduction in the growth of China’s carbon emissions. We assume continued tightening in policies to address climate change. especially after 2020 and especially for coal.2% p. Carbon emissions continue to fall in the EU – on the back of carbon abatement policies. There is some progress: the changing fuel mix.a. in particular the rising share of renewables and substitution of coal with gas. Energy Outlook 2030 79 © BP 2013 . yet emissions remain well above the required path to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases at the level recommended by scientists (450 ppm). increasing by 26% between 2011 and 2030 (1.). support for renewables and declining overall energy demand – and in the US – driven by falling oil demand (efficiency gains in the car fleet).

4% Economic growth needs energy Income per capita 3% Competition and innovation are the key to meeting this need − energy efficiency − new supplies 2% 1% Popul ation 0% Economic growth Efficiency gains New supply Energy security and climate change remain challenges Energy Outlook 2030 80 © BP 2013 .Conclusion % p.a.

Page Introduction Global energy trends Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel Implications Appendix 4 7 27 69 81 Energy Outlook 2030 81 © BP 2013 .

.. America oil & gas supply Middle East oil & gas supply Transport consumption Inputs into power generation Non-OECD Asia fossil fuel use -150 Coal -100 -50 0 Mtoe Energy Outlook 2030 82 © BP 2013 Revised up Oil Gas Biofuels Biofuels Coal 50 100 150 200 250 . Changes in 2030 levels versus the 2012 Outlook Revised down N.Key changes versus last year’s Outlook.

The North American oil and natural gas supply outlook has been revised higher (14%) due to evolving expectations for shale gas/tight oil plays.5% by 2030. Energy Outlook 2030 83 © BP 2013 .…result in little net change in total energy Our aggregate projection for world energy demand and supply is little changed since our last Outlook – up about 0. where fossil fuel useage is impacted by a reassessment of that region’s potential for economic development. with overall Middle East oil output revised lower with knock-on effects for associated natural gas production. Oil and gas useage in the transport sector has been revised up. largely reflecting the need to offset a drop in biofuel supplies resulting from more modest expectations of the penetration of next generation fuels. Demand for power generation has been revised higher due mainly to increased demand for electricity in non-OECD Asia Pacific. Higher tight oil output leaves the market requiring less OPEC production.

Comparison with other outlooks: the key difference… Growth of energy consumption. 2010-2030 Billion toe 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 IEA NPS EIA BP IEA CPS 84 Billion toe 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 IEA NPS EIA BP IEA CPS © BP 2013 non-OECD OECD Other Gas Nuclear Liquids Coal Energy Outlook 2030 .

which assesses demand prospects on the assumption that announced national policy objectives are implemented. Energy Outlook 2030 85 © BP 2013 . Yet our outcomes are closest to the IEA’s “Current Policies Scenario” and the EIA’s reference case. it also shows more growth for fossil fuels. In that respect it differs from the energy projections published by the IEA and the EIA. especially for coal. in particular on the speed with which they can move to a less energy-intensive growth path. both of which assume no change in policy settings. This probably reflects differing views on the outlook for rapidly industrialising economies. Our Outlook shows more growth in non-OECD energy demand than the IEA NPS.…lies in different views on non-OECD prospects Our Outlook is based on a “most likely” assessment of future policy trends. which are based on specific policy scenarios and which make no judgements about the likelihood of those scenarios. Our policy assumptions are closest to those in the IEA’s “New Policies Scenario” (NPS).

Fennema J. January 2012 Center for International Comparisons of Production. B. Appleby P.. Paris. Aten.. France. International Energy Outlook ... Houston. New York. United Kingdom. United States. Light-Duty Automotive Technology.l.. 2012 International Energy Agency. 109-116. France International Council for Clean Transportation.S. United Kingdom. D. London. and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2011. 2012 International Energy Agency. Global passenger vehicle standards update. March 2012 World Bank.. Carbon Dioxide Emissions. Naumov A.T.. UN Population Division. United States Rühl C. June 2012 BP p. Texas BP p.C. France.Data sources Baker Hughes. NY. Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries. France.l. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. Oxford. BP Energy Outlook 2030.A.c. pp. 2012 Oxford Economics Ltd.. Smith Bits S. 2012 International Energy Agency. Paris. 2011 US Environmental Protection Agency. UK PIRA Energy Group. Paris.. A. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion.. New York. France. Paris. vol 50. August 2012 International Energy Agency. Nov 2012. (2012). World Energy Outlook 2012. Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.1.T. Paris. London. R. World Bank Commodity Price Data (Pink Sheet). Energy Information Administration. Energy Policy. Summers. November 2012 Plus various official sources Energy Outlook 2030 86 © BP 2013 . BP Statistical Review of World Energy. 2012 GIIGNL. United States. Energy Balances of OECD Countries. Schaffer ME.c. Heston. Washington. Penn World Table Version 7. Economic development and the demand for energy: a historical perspective on the next 20 years.

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