You are on page 1of 1714

(v

)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Contents List List of cases Digested in VOLUME-I Comparative Table of, Income-tax Act, VII of 1918, Income-tax Act, XI of 1922 & Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 Under Section 1. Title Case No. 1-460 1 35 59 60 ..... ..... (xxxiii) (cix) Page No. 1-272 35 58 72 73

Short title, extent and commencement General Principles of Taxation / Rules of Interpretation - Legislative Powers Retrospective Legislation Remedial and curative Legislation has retrospective effect Principle of contemporary exposition Action is deemed illegal, the whole superstructure built upon it is also illegal Income cannot be taxed twice One thing implies the exclusion of another Application of rule generalibus specialia derogant Interpretation of statutes / General Principles Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities Principle of Equity Powers of courts/administrative jurisdiction Income / deeming provisions How to be construed Distinction between direct and indirect taxes Distinction between "tax" and "fee" Distinction between actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which for the time being, is only contingent

62 63 64 66 67 98 99 102 140 146 147

74 74 75 76 77 86 87 88 105 108 109

148

109

(vi)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 149 150 Page No. 110 111

Under Section

Theory of reading down as a rule of interpretation Rule of evidence Courts can strike down discriminatory and confiscatory provisions of fiscal laws Scope of various words and expressions Interpretation regarding words and expressions Past and closed provision Special law vs. income tax Machinery provisions Limitation period cannot be extended retrospectively Rules of construction - Fiscal statutes Rule of interpretation Two equal possible interpretations Exemption clauses Rule of limitation Redundancy should not be readily assigned by courts Interpretation favourable to assessee is to be adopted Rules when language is ambiguous Non obstante provision overrides conflicting provision Doctrine of binding precedent (Stare Decisis) Doctrine of merger Legal maxims Doctrine of res judicata/estoppel Natural justice/duties of court Doctrine of mutuality Non-application of federal tax laws to tribal areas Rules relating to interpretation of amending provisions explained

156 157 227 231 232 234 239 240

113 113 145 147 148 150 153 154

264 269 279 281 283 304 305 314 316 326 334 345 346 347

164 166 170 170 171 180 180 184 185 190 194 198 199 200

(vii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section

Title

Case No. 349 350 351

Page No. 201 202 204

Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities Interpretation leading to destructive ends should be avoided by courts Terms and phrases used in one statute Marginal notes to the section of an act cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the act Principle of literal interpretation Doctrine of favourable interpretation Department can go beyond a transaction Application of tax rates through a finance act explained Act is to be read as a whole Statute should be read as a whole Section vs. Rule Principle of approbate and reprobate High court is competent to entertain writ where interpretation of law is involved General rules in respect of writ petition Writ held maintainable Writ held not maintainable Miscellaneous 2(1). Definitions.-Agricultural Income. Scope of term `agriculture' Land used for agricultural purposes Agricultural process Rent / revenue, connotation of Land must be situated in Pakistan Land must be assessed to land revenue Dividends to shareholders out of `agricultural income' Sale of trees of spontaneous growth - Not agricultural income

352 353 355 356 357 358 359 360 361

205 206 206 207 207 208 208 209 210

362 363 390 408 443 461-549 461 467 472 479 480 481 483 484

211 211 227 241 263 273-324 281 284 287 290 290 291 291 293

(viii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 491 495 496 497 503 506 512 515 517 524 541 542 543 544 550-553 550 553 554 554 555-556 555 557-566 557 564 Page No. 298 302 303 303 307 308 312 314 314 316 321 322 322 322 325-328 326 328 329-330 330 331-334 332 335-345 337 342

Under Section Annuity Commission

Interest on arrears of rent

Salary / Remuneration Rent Income from mortgage Lease rent Salami (lumsump payment) Maintenance allowance `Forestry' and `agriculture' not synonymous Tea manufacturers Coffee manufacturers Sugar Manufacturers Reference to the high court 2(6). Definitions.-Assessee Scope of definition Assessee vis-a-vis Trust 2(7). Definitions.-Assessment Words "assessment" and "re-assessment" explained 2(8). 2(11). Definitions.-Assessment year Word `year' - How to be construed Definitions.-Business Adventure in the nature of trade Definition of the word "business" Purchase and sale of heavy shares with borrowed capital to sister concern at market rate 2(12). 2(14). Definitions.-Capital Asset. `Capital asset' - Scope of Definitions.-Charitable purpose. General conditions for exemption

566 567 567 568-595 568

344 346-347 347 348-363 351

(ix)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section Mixed trusts

Title

Case No. 569 575 578 583 587 589 590 596-600 596 597 598 600 601-606 601 607-618 607 615 619 619 620-632 620 623 625 626 632 633

Page No. 352 354 356 357 359 360 361 364-367 365 365 366 367 368-374 369 375-382 377 379 383-384 384 385-396 387 387 388 389 390 396 397-398 398

Charitable vs. non-charitable trust Relief of poor - Preference to relatives Residuary head - Object of general public utility - Connotation of Public- connotation of Element of private gain Illustrations 2(16). Definitions.-Company. Word "form", meaning of Expressions "by" and "under" explained Body "corporate under the law" explained Chamber of commerce 2(20). 2(24). Definitions.-Dividend. Scope of term "dividend" Definitions.-Income. General - Connotations of word "income" Criteria to determine taxable & tax free income 2(25). 2(26). Definitions.-Income Tax Officer. Definition of `income tax officer' Definitions.-Income Year. Change of year Word `year' explained Expression "such period" Expression "previous year" Miscellaneous 2(27). Definitions.-Inspecting Additional Commissioner.

Can income year be of more than 12 months? 622

Powers of inspecting additional commissioner633

(x)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 634 634 635-716 635 638 640 644 652 653 654 656 659 660 661 664 665 668 671 672 676 680 681 682 684 685 686 689 690 691 Page No. 399-400 400 401-442 409 410 410 412 416 416 416 417 418 419 419 421 421 422 423 424 427 429 429 429 430 430 430 431 432 432

Under Section 2(29). 2(32).

Definitions.-Interest. Expression "interest" - Scope of Definitions.-Person. Definition of "person" Status of "local authority" Status of "individual" Status of "AOP" Word "association" does not have technical meaning Hindus - Connotation of Hindu undivided family Connotation of Hindu undivided family vs. Hindu coparcenary Family - Connotation of Junior member Female members Partition of HUF Property of HUF Ancestral properties' Self acquired properties Property of HUF Business of HUF Throwing of self-acquired property into family hotchpot Impartible estate Remuneration to karta-partner from firm Benefits of contracts HUF & Firm Association of persons - Basic principles HUF and AOP Firm & AOP Association of companies

(xi)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section Co-heirs Co-trustees Co-executors

Title

Case No. 692 698 702 703 704 705 706 708 711 713 717 717 718-745 718 728 730 732 733 737 740 746 746 747 747 748-750 749 750 751-758 751 755 757 758

Page No. 432 434 435 436 436 436 437 438 439 440 443-444 444 445-462 448 451 454 455 456 458 459 463-465 464 466-469 467 470-474 471 474 475-486 476 480 484 485

Co-owners [Position under the 1922 Act]

Mutual concern - General tests Test as to distribution of surplus Clubs Companies Co-operative society Mutual insurance company 2(34). 2(40). Definitions.-Principal officer. Illustrations Definitions.-Resident. Significance of residential status `Year' as in `income year' Individual Test for "not-ordinarily resident" Firm - General Company Control and management - Meaning of 2(43). 2(44). 3. Definitions.-Tax. "Penalty" or "interest" on tax due Definitions.-Total income. Meaning of "total income" Income tax authorities Power of CBR Income tax officer, whether a court 4. Appointment of income tax authorities etc. Authority Comparison with Indian law Jurisdiction Removal

(xii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 758-795 759 763 Page No. 487-514 491 494

Under Section 5.

Jurisdiction of income tax authorities Jurisdiction Transfer of jurisdiction Tribunal was not legally justified in annulling the assessment on the point of jurisdiction Jurisdiction in general Jurisdiction of assessing officer Objection as to income tax officer's jurisdiction Opportunity of hearing Scope and application of provision

774 776 781 790 793 794 796-802 796 803-813 803 812 813 814-996 814

506 508 511 513 513 514 515-519 516 520-527 522 526 526 528-647 545

7. 8.

Guidance to Deputy Commissioners Guidance to assessing officers All Officers to follow the orders of the Central Board of Revenue Legality of CBR's orders, instructions & directions Powers of CBR to give direction to ITO Binding force of circulars

9, 10.

Charge of income, super tax and surcharge Charge of income tax, super tax and surcharge Scope of article 165 vis-a-vis changeability in the case of provincial Governments Liability to tax when arises Concept of income Scope of protection under the economic reforms protection act of 1992 Charge on benami transactions Tests to determine whether a receipt is a revenue or capital receipt Profit and loss appropriation account

822 829 833 846 849 850 869

548 559 561 569 572 574 584

(xiii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section

Title

Case No. 870 871 873 874 877 878 881 883 885 888 891 893 894 901 902 904 911 915 916 918 921 925 927 928 930 931 932 933 934

Page No. 585 586 588 590 591 591 592 593 593 594 595 596 596 599 599 599 607 608 609 610 611 612 614 614 615 616 617 617 618

Overriding title vs. Application of income Devaluation gain "Mercantile" and "cash system" Applicability of 1922 Act to different Provinces/States Applicability of act to rulers of erstwhile Indian states Charging section - General Charge is in respect of income of previous years Exemption from tax Double taxation Finance acts - Relevance of Tax avoidance / tax planning English cases Guiding principles Burden of proof Other factors Allocation of payment between interest and principal sum due Illustrations Commission Pension / annuity Rent Salami Illustration Subsidy / incentives Gifts / voluntary payments Share in business profits Technical know-how Patent / trade mark / copyright Mining rights Bonus shares

(xiv)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 935 936 938 940 941 946 947 949 954 955 958 960 962 963 966 971 972 973 974 975 976 Page No. 619 619 620 621 621 623 624 624 627 628 629 630 631 631 633 635 636 637 637 638 638 639 640 640

Under Section

Bonus debentures Sale proceeds of trees Sale proceeds of assets of money-lender Receipts by partners from firm Others Application of income Illustrations Maintenance allowance Royalties Payments by executor to beneficiaries under testator's will / trust Accrual of income - Connotation of Time of accrual of income - Basic principles Receipt/deemed receipt - Connotation of Time of accrual of income - Illustrations Interests Commission Underwriting commission Profits of mortgage sale Concept of real income Disputed claims Income forgone

Place of receipt / accrual of income - General 978 Accruing or arising in Pakistan - Meaning of 981 Illustrations : In case of buying and selling of goods 982 Illustrations : Relevance of place from where directions are issued for transactions/where contract is concluded Illustrations : In case of agents Illustrations : Where payment is made by posting of cheque Illustrations : Commission Illustrations : Interest

988 991 993 994 995

643 645 646 647 647

(xv)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section 11.

Title

Case No. 997-1022 997 998 1001 1012 1013

Page No. 648-675 651 651 656 666 668 670 671 671 671 672 673 676-678 677 678 679-697 682 690 696 697 698-700 699 701-702 702 703-704 704 705-715 707

Scope of total income Scope of "total income" "Accrue" and "arise", meaning of

Chargeability vis-a-vis deeming provisions Relevant date for accrual of income Receipt and accrual of income

Amount is `received' when income accruing outside is `set off' against liability in Pakistan1016 Transmission of funds is always bilateral Book entries Retrospective operation Unexplained income Liability 12(1). Salary when deemed to accrue or arise in Pakistan 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1023-1024 1023 1024 1025-1050 1025 1040 1048 1049 1051-1052 1051 1053 1053 1054 1054 1055-1066 1055

Receiving salaries from state exchequer is taxable no matter where paid Position under 1922 act 12(2). Business connection Business connection - Connotation of Illustrations of business connection Source / property Business operations 12(3). Interest when deemed to accrue or arise in Pakistan Interest 12(7). 12(9). Loan when deemed as income Scope of deemed income Dividend Paid abroad Dividend paid by a Pakistani company outside Pakistan 12(9A). Undistributed profit when taxable Additional income tax on undistributed profits - Application of provision

(xvi)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1058 1062 1063 1064 Page No. 708 712 714 714 715 716-722 717 717 718 723-725 724 726-728 727 728 729-746 731 732 732 742 744 745 745 746

Under Section

"Free reserve", meaning of Gratuity is an ascertained liability Definition "free reserve" and super tax General 12(11). Dividend Income - Basis of chargeability Word "pay", meaning of Change in law Year of taxability of dividend income 12(12). Difference between the fair market value of stocks and shares Deduction of liability towards the foreign loans 12(18). Difference between the fair market value of stocks and shares Share deposit money is not "loan" Section 12(18) vis-a-vis section 66A 13(1)(a). Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income - Cash credit Unlawful additions under section 13 are not sustainable Itat has a duty to correctly record the facts and give objective findings Cash credit Nature of receipt Firm / partners Procedures followed Illustrations 13(1)(aa). Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income - Proof of income from other source Proof of income from other source

Smallness of profits - Tests for determination1066 1067-1072 1067 1068 1069 1073 1073 1074, 1075 1074 1075 1076-1092 1076 1077 1078 1088 1089 1090 1092

"Income from undisclosed sources", meaning of1087

1093-1095 1093

747-752 748

(xvii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section 13(1)(b).

Title

Case No. 1096-1097 1096 1098-1099 1098 1100-1102 1100 1102 1103-1104 1103 1105 1105 1106-1113 1106 1108 1110 1115-1117 1118-1150 1119 1121 1123 1124 1126 1128 1139

Page No. 753-754 754 755-757 756 758-760 759 760 761-762 762 763-764 764 765-770 767 767 768 771-774 772 775-801 779 780 781 781 783 784 787 788 792

Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income Excess stock declared with banks is deemed income

13(1)(c).

Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income General Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income Valuation of land Valuation of assets - Property

13(1)(d).

13(1)(e).

Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income Explained source of expenditure Unexplained investments, etc., deemed to be income Status of law Exemptions Exempt income, meaning of "Assessable" and "taxable" contain different meanings and applications Exempt incomes vis-a-vis charge of workers welfare fund

13(2).

14.

15. 16.

Heads of income Salary Master servant relationship Salary v. professional income Salary vs. business income Contributions to pension funds Accrual of salary Illustrations of salary Perquisites - Allowances

Principles governing classification of income1114 Compensation for loss of service is capital receipt 1118 Compensation under golden handshake scheme1120

(xviii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1141 1143 1144 1146 1148 1150 1151-1157 1151 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158-1188 1158 1167 1168 1169 Page No. 794 795 796 798 799 801 802-809 803 806 807 808 808 810-835 813 819 820 820

Under Section Car perquisites

Shares allotment to employees Position under the 1979 Ordinance Position under 1922 act Managing director/director Position prior to 1979 17. Interest on securities Place of accrual of income Interest on securities Purview of chargeability Interest on securities is taxable on receipt basis Impartible estate Deductions 19. Income from house property Ownership & chargeability Applicability of explanation with retrospective effect Distinction between "property tax" and "income tax" Owner Profits and gains of business or profession vs. income from house property - Letting of properties Annual value - General Lessee Trustees Official assignee Co-operative society In case of money-lender Zamindari Property used for business 20. Deductions Wealth tax liability is an allowable expense

1175 1178 1181 1182 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189-1197 1189

828 831 832 833 833 834 834 834 835 836-840 837

(xix)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section Annual charge

Title

Case No. 1190 1191 1194 1195 1197 1198-1202 1198 1199 1201 1202 1203-1343 1203 1205 1209 1217 1218 1225

Page No. 837 838 839 840 840 841-845 842 843 844 845 846-957 860 863 865 872 873 876

Deductions - Repairs Interest on borrowed capital Taxes Certain terms defined - Impartible estate 21. Liability in the case of co-owners. Words "definite" and "ascertainable", explained Co-owners - Shares to be definite Tax as AOP Illustration 22. Income from business or profession Revenue receipts vs. capital gains Section 22 & section 27 of the ordinance Profit motive, meaning & relevance of Isolated transaction when can constitute adventure in the nature of trade Business income - General principles Profits and gains, connotation of Business when deemed to be carried on Business income vs. income from other sources - Section 22 & section 30 of the Ordinance Income determined in the case of the trust Business income on purchase of share Business income in the nature of casual or non-recurring "Abandoned" and "discarded", meaning of Loss / forfeiture of deposit Disposal or remuneration of income is not admissible in law Income or capital receipts Business income - Tests to determine nature of transaction Veil of corporation can be lifted

1226 1230 1231 1232 1234 1235 1240 1242 1243 1250

877 880 881 882 884 885 890 892 893 897

(xx)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1252 1254 1257 1258 1260 1261 1262 1264 1266 1269 1272 1278 1280 1281 1282 1284 1287 1289 1290 1292 1293 1297 1300 1302 1307 1312 1315 1316 1317 Page No. 898 900 903 903 904 905 908 909 910 911 913 916 916 917 917 919 920 921 922 923 923 926 927 928 930 932 940 941 941

Under Section

Profits derived from sale of shares and bonus shares Dealing in land when constitute business Compulsory acquisition of property In case of money-lender Other illustrations Dealers in shares Gold and silver transactions Other illustrations Concept of business - Connotation of Profession / occupation / vocation Illustrations Carrying on business / closure of business Same business - Connotation of Rental income - Hiring of business assets Rental income - Other illustrations Royalties Compensation Sale proceeds of business / business assets / stock-in-trade Exploitation of mining rights Share dealing Money-lending business Other illustrations Business loss / deduction - Allowability of loss and expenditure Conditions precedent Other concepts Distinction between `fixed capital' and `circulating capital' - Devaluation loss Payment of portion of profits Revenue or of capital loss - Test of Losses on sale of shares

(xxi)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section

Title

Case No. 1319 1320 1322 1328 1329 1333 1334 1336 1337 1339 1341 1342 1344-1369 1344

Page No. 942 943 944 946 947 951 951 952 953 954 956 956 958-978 961 967 969 970 974 974 974 975 975 976 977 977 977 979-981 980 982-1000 984 992

Loss on sale of securities / benefits Loss on sale of assets / land, etc. Loss arising to money-lenders Deductions in case of partners Others Year in which deductible - General Others Trade / professional association `Specification services' - Connotation of Speculation business - Scope of provision Valuation of land Other illustrations Mutual benefit societies 23. Deductions. General principle

Business expenditure - Scope of deductibility1353 Gratuity cannot be construed as a free reserve1355 Tests for capital or revenue expenditure Computation of profits - Basic principles Construction of documents Repairs to other premises Rent Depreciation - General Cases under 1922 act Rule 14 of schedule iv Animals - Application of provisions 23(1)(iii). 23(1)(v). Current repairs Expenditure on repairs Depreciation allowance Depreciation in general Cost how to be determined 1356 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1365 1366 1367 1370-1371 1370 1372-1388 1372 1380

Bonus or commission - Application of provision1364

(xxii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 Page No. 993 993 994 994 996

Under Section

Depreciation on buildings explained World depreciation pool Full depreciation in case of pre-dissolved and post reconstituted Depreciation is admissible on assets received as gift Depreciation on hotel building Depreciation of unregistered firm can be carried forward and set off against profits of registered firm Difference between original cost price and written down value 23(1)(vii). Interest paid on borrowed capital General Distinction between capital and revenue expenditure Capital borrowed - Connotation of Illustrations 23(1)(viii). Bonus or commission paid to employees Provision of bonus Managing director is entitled for bonus being an employee Reasonableness of bonus Expenditure held to be inadmissible 23(1)(x). Bad debts Bad debts - Meaning and scope of Bad debts - Connotation of Incidental to business - General test Embezzlement by employee Managing agent Money lender Test for determining irrecoverability of debt or when the debt has become bad - Basic concepts

1387 1388 1389-1421 1389

999 1000 1001-1025 1004 1006 1009 1014 1020 1024 1026-1033 1027 1028 1031 1033 1034-1068 1040 1042 1043 1044 1044 1044

Interest on money borrowed when deductible1392 1397 1402 1420 1422-1427 1422 1423 1425 1427 1428-1488 1428 1434 1437 1438 1439 1440

Illustrations where interest is not deductible 1408

1447

1048

(xxiii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section Onus to prove

Title

Case No. 1451 1452 1457 1463 1465 1470 1480 1489-1675 1489 1499

Page No. 1049 1049 1053 1056 1057 1059 1062 1065 1069-1209 1088 1098

Time to allow bad debts / powers of income tax authorities Effect of period of limitation Relevance of fact that debtor has become insolvent Relevance of writing off of debt Illustrations Reference to high court 23(1)(xiii). Business expenditure. Disallowability - General Wholly and exclusively - Meaning of Wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business - Illustrations of allowability / non-allowability Premium paid on annual basis Devaluation of currency

Debt should become bad in relevant account year 1476

1501 1520 1521

1098 1115 1115 1121 1125 1125 1128 1129 1131 1134 1136 1140 1143 1151 1152

"Penal interest and the penalty", meaning of 1525 Liquidated damages are allowable expenditure1529 Expenses incurred to raise capital or obtain loan or recover debts, etc. Expenditures on running school for children of employees Loss of stock-in-trade / spares, etc. Loss or embezzlement of cash / robbery or theft Rates / taxes Reasonableness of remuneration Capital or revenue expenditure Interest and dividends earned by the assessee is an allowable deduction Test of fixed or circulating capital 1531 1534 1535 1539 1543 1545 1553

Tests for determining nature of expenditure 1557 1567 1568

(xxiv)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1569 1570 1571 1574 1576 1577 1580 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1596 1597 1602 1604 1605 1607 1609 1611 1612 1614 1615 1617 Page No. 1152 1153 1154 1154 1155 1155 1156 1157 1160 1160 1162 1162 1163 1163 1164 1164 1167 1168 1172 1173 1173 1175 1177 1178 1179 1180 1180 1181

Under Section

Relevance of character of receipt in recipient's hands Travelling expenses for training abroad Expenditure must be incurred in the character as a trader Quantum of expenditure Relevance of benefit to third party Relevance of production of income from expenditure Business expenditure - Sharing of profits Land / building, acquisition of Benefit of contracts Goodwill Selling agency Copyright Electricity transmission lines / railway platforms, etc. Expenditure to save business reputation Brick manufacturers Bidi manufacturer Mining - Mining rights & mining expenses Repairs / renovation Illustrations : repairs to permises / furniture Illustrations : repairs to machinery Rent Royalty Forfeiture of security deposits Contribution to provident fund Other illustrations Compensation to managing agents / selling agents Managing agency commission

Expenditure must be for carrying of business1572

(xxv)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section Others

Title

Case No. 1618 1619 1622 1631 1633 1636 1637 1638 1642 1644

Page No. 1181 1181 1185 1187 1187 1188 1189 1189 1189 1190 1191 1192 1196 1196 1197 1195 1196 1197 1201 1201 1202 1203 1205 1206 1206 1208

Litigation expenses Expenses incurred to protect business / business assets Expenses peculiar to firms Expenses peculiar to HUFs Estate duty Excise duty / import duty Others Amount paid to ward off competition Gifts and presents

Expenditure to protect profit / source of income1629

Penalty / damages paid for breach of contract1635

Advertisement & sales promotion expenses / expenses for inaugural functions 1646 Trade mark, charges for registration of In case of profession Expenses incurred by holding company for subsidiary company Banking company Insurance companies In case of partner of a firm / firms Expenses by partner / firm Payments to retiring partner Expenditure incurred by HUF - Salary to coparcener Others `To effect or keep in force' - Connotation of Contract of insurance, meaning of Provident fund Income of co-operative Societies - Co-operative bank 1647 1648 1650 1651 1653 1659 1660 1662 1665 1670 1672 1673 1675

(xxvi)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1676 1676 Page No. 1210-1211 1210

Under Section 23(2)). 24(a). Deductions. General

Deductions not admissible.-Any cess, rate or tax levied on the profits or gains Profits or gains of business or profession - Connotation of

1677 1677 1678-1680 1678 1679

1212-1214 1212 1215-1221 1215 1216

24(b).

Deductions not admissible.Payments to non-residents General Commission paid to non-resident without deduction of tax at source

24(c).

Deductions not admissible.-Services rendered, brokerage or commission or rent of house property In cases of directors Deductions not admissible.-Interest, brokerage, commission, salary or other remuneration Interest Deductions not admissible.-Provident fund or other fund established for the benefit of employees of the assessee General Deduction of tax at source

1681 1681

1222-1223 1222

24(d).

1682 1682

1224-1225 1224

24(h).

1683-1686 1683 1684

1226-1230 1226 1227

Pension fund was maintained in foreign country for foreign employees and was payable in foreign Country after retirement 1686 24(i). Deductions not admissible.Expenditure incurred by an assessee on perquisites, allowances Excess perquisites Using the word `or' as disjunctive Reimbursement on account of medical bills is a perquisite Provident fund is not perquisite

1228

1687-1692 1687 1688 1689 1690

1231-1235 1231 1231 1232 1233

(xxvii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section 24(j).

Title

Case No.

Page No.

Deductions not admissible.Expenditure incurred on account of payment of a fine or penalty Penalty, fine and forfeiture are not admissible expense

1693-1695 1693 1696-1702 1696 1702

1236-1240 1236 1241-1247 1241 1245

25.

Amounts subsequently recovered in respect of deductions, etc. Trading liability Loss

26.

Special provisions regarding business of insurance and production of oil and natural gas and mineral deposits Assessment of insurance business Powers of assessing officers under Fourth Schedule Benefit of produced rate of tax to insurance companies Position under 1922 act

1703-1726 1703 1705 1721 1726 1727-1735 1727 1733 1734 1735 1736 1736 1737-1747 1737 1742 1733 1744 1745

1248-1272 1250 1252 1265 1268 1273-1281 1275 1276 1280 1280 1281 1282-1283 1283 1284-1291 1286 1288 1289 1290 1290

27.

Capital gains Bonus share - View's of Lahore High Court reversed

Cost of bonus shares - Method of calculation 1728 `Immovable property' is not a capital asset Face value should be cost of bonus share Immovable property vis-a-vis ownership and possession 28. Computation of capital gains Face value of bonus share constitutes its actual cost 30. Income from other sources General Gratuity - Position prior to 1.7.1979 Zamindari Income from house property vs. Income from other sources Illustration

(xxviii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1748-1757 1748 Page No. 1292-1299 1294

Under Section 31. Deductions

Scope of the section

Any other expenditure, etc., paid out or expended wholly and exclusively for purpose of earning such Income - Basic principles 1750 Interest In case of company in liquidation Others 32. Method of accounting 1751 1755 1756 1758-1845 1785 1795 1802 1822 1830 1837 1841 1845 1846-1851 1846 1850 1851 1852-1878 1852 1853 1862 1863 1864 1868 1872

1296 1297 1298 1299 1300-1375 1309 1337 1346 1350 1361 1366 1372 1374 1375 1376-1381 1377 1380 1381 1382-1404 1385 1386 1393 1395 1396 1399 1401

Rejection / acceptance of method of accounting1758 Method of accounting and chargeability System of accounting Application of sub-section (3) and proviso Power of assessing officer General Choice of method of accounting Change of method of accounting Others 34. Set-off of losses General principles Business loss could not be adjusted against free reserve Losses in case of resident and ordinary resident 35. Carry forward of business losses Words "in any other business", "such business", meaning of Same business - General tests In any other business - General tests Intra business adjustment Operation of provision When loss arises Losses of illegal business

(xxix)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section

Title

Case No. 1873 1874 1876 1879-1881 1879

Page No. 1401 1402 1403 1405-1408 1406

Income against which carried forward loss can be set off Losses of unregistered firm Illustrations 36. 38. Speculation losses Speculation losses are to kept distinct Limitation as to set-off and carry forward of losses in the case of firms, partners, etc. Unabsorbed depreciation Depreciation allowance can be carried forward without any time limit Dissolution of registered firm Share of loss 41. Allowance for investment in Defence Savings and NIT Certificates, etc. Deduction or rebate, meaning of 42. Allowance for purchase of books Exemption claimed on account of educational expenses of children of HUF 47. Allowance for donations for charitable purposes General Expression "any sum paid" 48. Exemption from tax of newly established industrial undertakings Capital employed Provisions of section for the purpose of determination of total income Deduction of tax at source Amended law and scope of Credit for tax deducted at source 50(2A). Deduction of tax at source.-Interest / profit on deposit / account Pakistani banks having branches in the tribal areas

1881-1888 1882 1883 1885 1887 1889-1892 1889 1893 1893

1409-1418 1411 1412 1414 1414 1416 1419-1422 1420 1423-1424 1424 1425-1427 1426 1427 1428-1434 1429 1432 1435-1437 1436 1436 1438-1439 1439

Unregistered firm converted into registered 1886

1894-1895 1894 1895 1896-1902 1896 1900 1903-1905 1903 1904 1906 1906

50(1).

(xxx)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1907-1908 1907 1909-1914 1909 Page No. 1440-1443 1441 1444-1449 1445

Under Section 50(2B).

Deduction of tax at source.Certain banking instruments Special deposit receipts Deduction of tax at source.-`Certain payment to non-residents' "Assessee in default" Deduction of tax at source.-Payments on supply of goods / services / contracts Banks have no right to claim or charge any commission or service charge from wapda Expression "supplies" includes sales in section 50(4)

50(3).

50(4).

1915-1918

1450-1454

1915 1916

1451 1452 1453 1454 1455-1463 1456 1458 1460 1461 1464-1466 1465

"Goods" do not include immovable property 1917 Sale of land, building and other fixed assets 1918 50(5). Deduction of tax at source.-Imports Tests for question of law Tax on imports Calculation of duties & octroi Words, "same manner" and "at the same time", meaning of 50(5A). Deduction of tax at source.-Export proceeds Export of cotton yarn 50(7A). Deduction of tax at source.-Sale of certain properties, octrio right, toll fee etc. Scope of section 50(7A) Section 50(7A) is held to be valid law Words, `sale', `property', explained Auction of the right to collect export tax is not a sale 50(7BB). Deduction of tax at source.Cost of commercial buildings General 1919-1925 1919 1922 1924 1925 1926 1926

1927-1933 1927 1930 1932 1933 1934 1934

1467-1479 1460 1470 1474 1478 1480-1481 1481

(xxxi)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

Under Section 52.

Title

Case No. 1935-1939

Page No. 1482-1486

Liability of persons failing to deduct or pay tax Assessee in default cannot be a person who was not competent to deduct tax Proceeding under section 52 held not maintainable

1935 1936 1940-1955 1940 1947 1948 1950 1951 1954 1955 1956 1956 1957-1969

1483 1484 1487-1500 1489 1494 1494 1496 1496 1498 1500 1501-1502 1502 1503-1511

53.

Advance payment of tax Advance tax - General Scope of "retained income" Constitutional and legal issues relating to advance tax Recovery notice after case has been set aside is illegal Assessee in default CBR's circular held violative of the provisions of section 53 Levy of additional tax

54. 55.

Payment of tax with return of income Full payment of tax with return Return of total income Return filed voluntarily, after service of notice, position prior to Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 Constitutional validity Person liable to furnish return Validity of return Extension of time Return under 1922 act Defective return Signing of return

1957 1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 1967 1970-1975 1970 1971

1505 1507 1507 1508 1508 1509 1510 1510 1512-1520 1513 1514

56.

Notice for furnishing return of total income Words `during the previous year' and `any' - Meaning of Notice can be given for any year

(xxxii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest. Title Case No. 1974 1976-1977 1976 1977 1978-1979 1978 1980-2006 1980 1982 1988 1989 1990 1992 1996 1997 1999 2000 Page No. 1516 1517 1521-1523 1522 1523 1524-1526 1525 1527-1552 1530 1531 1534 1534 1534 1535 1539 1540 1542 1543

Under Section

ITO can curtail the period for filing of return1973 Profit and loss account 57. Revised returns of total income Remanding of case held illegal Revised return filed before issuance of notice 58. 59. Wealth statement Statement of assets and liabilities Self-assessment Self-assessment scheme - Section 59 read with section 65 of the ordinance - General Conditions for reopening of SAS cases Registered firms not maintaining accounts - SAS was not applicable Principle of res judicata does not apply to SAS cases Scope of additions under SAS Selection for total audit Cases selected for detailed scrutiny Enhancement of income vis-a-vis Self assessment scheme Claim for immunity Comparison of income where loss assessed Assessee can file a revised return for availing the benefit of Self assessment scheme Section 59 vis-a-vis writ petition 59B. Assessment under the simplified procedure for assessment Assessee challenged the legality of notice through writ jurisdiction 59D. 60. Tax on undisclosed income Declaration of undisclosed income Provisional assessment General

2001 2002 2007 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009

1544 1546 1553-1554 1554 1555-1556 1556 1557-1558 1558

(xxxiii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I

LIST OF CASES DIGESTED IN VOLUME-I
Case No.

A
A&B Food Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 281 (S.C.Pak) A.A. Thevar Bros. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 156 (Rangoon) A.C. Macnab, Retired Financial Commissioner, Punjab, In re. [1961] 4 TAX 143 (H.C.Lah.) = 1961 PTD 713 A.G. v. Aramago [1925] 9 TC 445 (HL) A.H. Forbes v. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 208 (Pat.) A.H.Wadia v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] 17 ITR 63 (PC) A.Harvey v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 311 (Mad.) A.Hussain S. Mirza and Company, Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dacca [1966] 13 TAX 1 (H.C.Dacca) A.J. Hartshorn v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 198 (H.C.Kar.) A.Jainulabdeen Sahib v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 285 (Mad.) A.L.A.R. Bros. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 209 (Mad.) A.M. Qureshi v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1987] 56 TAX 72 (H.C.Kar.) A.R. Hattiangadi, In re [1940] 8 ITR 85 (Bom.) A.S.P.L.V.R. Ramaswami Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 389 (Mad.) A.Salam, A.Sattar, Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 179 (H.C.Dacca) Abbas S. Sharoff and another v. Income Tax Officer and Others [1998] 78 TAX 119 (H.C.Kar.) = 1998 PTD 2884 Abbot Laboratories Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone, Karachi [1989] 60 TAX 75 (H.C.Kar.) Abdul Aziz and another v. Income Tax Officer And Another [1967] 15 TAX 235 (H.C.Kar.) Abdul Hameed Awan v. Tax Recovery Officer-04 Coys Zone, Income Tax Building at Rawalpindi and 3 others [1997] 76 TAX 238 (H.C.Lah.) = 1998 PCTLR 440 = 1998 PTD 874 (H.C.Lah.) Abdul Hamid, son of Mohammad Ismail, Azad Boot House, Mirpur, and others v. Deputy Collector, Excise & Taxation / Income Tax Officer, Commissioner of Income & others [1988] 57 TAX 14 (H.C.A.J.&K.) 70, 206 684, 977 728 319 1669 1052 1066 1702 47, 177, 1125, 1141 2567 1394 1103 944, 1132 1166, 1295 1070 449 1522 771 374

373

(xxxiv)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest.
Case No.

Abdul Hussain Moosaji v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 255 (Sind) Abdul Majeed Awan v. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.C.Lah.) = 1999 PTD 2910 = 2000 PCTLR 1046 Abdul Majeed Awan v. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.C.Lah.) = 1999 PTD 2910 = 2000 PCTLR 1046 Abdul Rahman v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 302 (Lahore) Abdul Rashid (c/o Union Traders GoIe Cloth, LyalIpur) v. Special Judge (Central), Lahore and another [1976] 34 TAX 199 (H.C.Lah.) Abdul Razzak v. Collectors of Customs 1995 CLC 1435 (H.C.Kar.) Abdul Rehman & Another v. Income Tax Officer Mirpur & another [1993] 68 TAX 132 (S.C.AJ&K) Abdul Sattar Noon Muhammad and others v. The Government of Balochistan [1999] 79 TAX 93 (H.C.Quetta) = 1998 PTD 3468 = PTCL 1999 CL. 252 Abdul Sattar Noor Muhammad & Co. v. Government of Pakistan, etc. [1999] 80 TAX 49 (H.C.Qta) Abdul Sattar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi [l960] 2-TAX (Suppl.-114) (H.C.West Pakistan, Karachi Bench) = 1959 PTD 119 = 1958 PLD 220 Abdur Rehman v. Income Tax Officer [1981] 43 TAX 158 (H.C.Lah.) Abhey Ram Chunni Lal, In re [1933] 1 ITR 126 (All.) Adamjee & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1983] 47 Tax 211 (H.C.Kar.) Adamjee Insurance Co, Ltd. and Others v. Income Tax Officer and Others [1995] 71 TAX 164 (H.C.Kar.) Aftab Medical Stores Dera Ghazi Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore [1976] 34 TAX 10 (H.C.Lah.) Afzal Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chairman, Central Board of Revenue and others [1990] 62 TAX 91 (H.C.Lah.) = 1990 PTD 9/833 Agha Ice Factory, Sheikhupura v. Regional Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central Region, Lahore and 4 Others [1996] 74 TAX 215 (H.C.Lah.) Ahmad Din Alla Ditta v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 369 (Lahore) Ahmadpur Katwa Railway Co. Ltd. In re [1935] 3 ITR 277 (Cal.) Ahmed Maritime Breakers Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue etc. [1992] 65 TAX 268 (H.C.Kar.)

1325 124

117

1200 134, 168, 756, 766 309 412 1941

1922 773

1034 786 1227 409, 1714 52, 276 331 425

968 1409 333

(xxxv)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.

Ahmed Steel (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Balochistan, etc. [1998] 78 TAX 334 (H.C.Qta.) = PCTLR (Qta) 1361 Al-Ahram Builders (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal 1992 SCC 950 = [1992] 66 TAX 147 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 167 Al-Hamza Ship Breaking Co. and Others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance and Economic Affairs, Islamabad and Others [1996] 73 TAX 203 (H.C.Quetta) Al-Hilal Agencies Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Karachi and another [1980] 41 TAX 40 (H.C.Kar.) AL.VR. ST. Veerappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 56 (Mad.) AL.VR. V.P. Pethaperumal Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad.) Algemene Bank, Nederland N.V., Karachi v. Commissioner of Income, Central Zone `C', Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 306 (H.C.Kar.) Ali Davar Khan and 19 others v. Government of Pakistan and 54 others 1967 SCC 295 = [1968] 17 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak.) Ali Roberts (Bahawalpur) Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 13 TAX 188 (H.C.Lah.) All India Spinners' Association v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 482 (PC) Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Azad Kashmir Branches, Mirpur through Inam Elahi Azhar, EVP and Provincial Chief, PHQ (Punjab) v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, AJK Council, Muzaffarabad and others [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H.C.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 (H.C.AJ&K) = 2000 PTD 2872 Allied Cans v. Income Tax Officer, Circle-8, Multan and others [1995] 71 TAX 216 (H.C.Lah.) Alyani Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory, Rahimyar Khan v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and another [1974] 29 TAX 238 (H.C.Lah.) Ameer Bux Badhuddin, Sarraf, Hyderabad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi (West), Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 61 (H.C.Kar.) Amin Bricks Company. Faisalabad v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Pension) and Another [1996] 74 TAX 227 (H.C.Lah.) = 1997 PTD 76 Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others, PTCL 2000 CL. 316 (S.C.Pak) Amir Nawaz Khan, etc. v. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Finance, Islamabad, etc. [2001] 83 TAX 397 (H.C.Lah.) Amrit Waman v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 721 (Nag.) Amrita Bazar Patrika, In re [1937] 5 ITR 648 (Cal.)

1924 798 1925

1945 504, 975 491, 493 1152 751, 755 873 569, 584, 593 76

430 277, 278

1997 151, 1762 408 414, 1927 1840 1629

(xxxvi)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest.
Case No.

Amritsar Produce Exchange Ltd., In re [1937] 5 ITR 307 (Lahore) Amulyadhan Addy, In re [1936] 4 ITR 164 (Cal.) Anant Ram Khem Chand v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 511 (Lahore) Andhra Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 697 (Mad.) Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (India) Lid. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 129 (Cal.) Anisa Rehman v. PInspecting Additional Commissioner [1994 SCMR 2232] Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies Circles E1, Karachi [1986] 54 TAX 1 (H.C.Kar.) = 1986 PTD 316 Arnarchand Madhavjl & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITI1 462 (Bom.) Arshad Mahmood v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Narcotics Control, Islamabad and another 1998 PTD 370 (H.C.Lah.) Asbestos Cement Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1988] 58 TAX 80 (H.C.Kar.) Asiatic Agencies Limited, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 89 (H.C.Kar.) Asim Textile Mills Limited v. Central Board of Revenue & others [1999] 80 TAX 217 (H.C.Lah.) Aspro Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes [1936] 4 ITR 264 (PC) Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan, Dacca 1962 SCC 113 = [1962] 6 TAX 49 (S.C.Pak.) Assam Bengal Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan [19601 2-TAX (III-228) (H.C.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 379 = 1960 PLD 389 Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Range, Lahore and others 1978 SCC 453 = [1978] 38 TAX 132 (S.C.Pak.) Ata Hussain Khan Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dacca [1968] 18 TAX 2 (H.C.Dacca) Ata Hussain Khan Ltd., Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca [1965] 11 TAX 335 (H.C.Dacca) Ata Hussain Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan Dacca 1969 SCC 335 = [1970] 21 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak.) Atherton v. British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. [1925] 10 Tax Cas. 155 (HL)

860, 939, 1249 1753 932 1726 1569, 1577, 1615 316 238, 436 1468 847

1494 1114 1926 1552 1397 1554

184, 550

1781 1548 1501, 1545, 1546 1565

(xxxvii)
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.

Attock Oil Co. Ltd. Rawalpindi, v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone 1981 SCC 557 = [1982] 45 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak.) Augustine C. Paul & Co., Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, West Pakistan, Karachi [1967] 16 TAX 73 (H.C.Kar.) Augustine C. Paul And Company, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, (West Pakistan), Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 94 (H.C.Kar.) Australasia Bank Ltd., Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax, North Zone (West Pakistan), Lahore [1962] 6 TAX 7 (H.C.Lah.) = 1962 PTD 575 = 1962 PLD 779 Auto Stores, Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca [1963 7 TAX 1 (H.C.Dacca) = 1964 PTD 317 = 1964 PLD 433 Azad Friends Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1970] 21 TAX 75 (H.C.Kar.) Aziz Book Depot, Lahore v. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore and another [1995] 71 TAX 209 (H.C.Lah.) Azmat Farooq v. Regional Commissioner of Income Tax Central Region Lahore and another [1993] 68 TAX 74 (H.C.Lah.) Aasia v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal etc. 1978 SCC 446 = [1980] 41 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak)

1534 1793 1782 1535

1087 1244 1956 432 150

B
B.B. Jubb v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 210 (Rangoon) B.C.G.A. (Punjab) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 279 (Lahore) B.D.Avari v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1989] 60 TAX 79 (H.C.Kar.) B.J. Heera v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 591 (Lahore) B.K. Paul & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 20 (Cal.) B.K. Paul & Co., In re [1938] 6 ITR 395 (Cal.) B.N. Elias, In re [1935] 3 ITR 408 (Cal.) B.P. Australia Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [1946] AC 224 (PC) B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd., Karachi v. Wealth Tax Officer, II-Circle, Karachi & another [1982] 45 TAX 17 (H.C.Kar.) = 1981 PTD 217 B.R. Naik v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 124 (Bom.) Babra Srarif v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1993] 68 TAX 124 (H.C.Lah.) Babulal Kanji v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 662 (Bom.) Babulal Raj Garhia, In re [1936] 4 ITR 148 (Cal.) 1208 966, 1449, 1461, 1484, 1837, 1870 1171 1674 1664 1873 695 1562 438 741 1161 1670, 1671, 1672 1179

(xxxviii)
VOL-I

Income Tax Digest.
Case No.

Baby-own v. Income Tax Officer [1997 PTD 47] Bachu Bai F.E. Dinshaw, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 37 (H.C.Kar.) = 1967 PTD 170 = PLD 1067 Kar. 372 Badri Shah Sohan Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 303 (Lahore) Badri Shah Sohan Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 1 (Lahore) BaIaji Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 461 (Mad.) Balkishan Nathani v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1923] 1 ITC 248 (Nagpur)] Ballygunge Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 409 (Cal.) Bank Bihari LaI v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 461 (Lahore) Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1983] 47 TAX 173 (H.C.Kar.) Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 522 (PC) Bank of Punjab v. Federation of Pakistan [2000] 81 TAX 390 (H.C.Lah.) Banka Mal Niranjan Das v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab and N.W.F.P. [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.-118) (H.C.Lah.) = 1951 PLD 311 Bansidar Podd v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 20 (Pat.) Bansidhar Poddar v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 117 (Pat.) Baramula Saw Mills Ltd., Baramula v. Commissioner of Income, Punjab and N.W.F.P. [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.-104) (H.C.Lah.) = 1960 PTD 1225 = 1954 PLD 157 Barnala Commission Shop, Chak-Jhumra v. Income Tax Officer, BWard, Lyallpur [1963] 7 TAX 153 (H.C.Lah.) = 1963 PTD 534 = 1963 PLD 311 Barry Brothers v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] 83 TAX 299 (H..C.Lah.) Basant Lal Thakat Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 141 (All.) Basant Rai Takhat Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 324 (All.) Basharat Ali and another v. Deputy Superintendent, Central Excise and Sales Tax, Mananwala Circle, Sheikhupura [1995] 72 TAX 218 (H.C.Lah.) Bashir & Co., Lyallpur v. Income Tax Officer, B-Ward, Lyallpur & Another 1968 SCC 315 = [1968] 17 TAX 207 (S.C.Pak.)

451 1172 1323 1431 1128 58 1177, 1181 1127 1454 1046 362, 1903 1858, 1876 1460 1462 1039

355, 407, 556 1761 1192 1282, 1744 378

760

CBR [1993] 67 TAX 395 (H. 1591 880 1007 487 464. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 103 (Lah. Ltd.) 23 (HL) Bebari Lal Chatterji v. v.) Benarisdas Jagannath. Income Tax Officer Lahore 1973 SCC 403 = [1974] 29 TAX 190 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 377 (All. v.) Bharat Insurance Co.Lah.C.) Behari Lal Jhandu Mal. v. 214. Karachi v. 1220. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 63 (PC) Bharat Insurance Co. 546 985 1464 1129 678 948. In re [1947] 15 ITR 185 (Lahore) Bengal Coal Co. v.) Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).Pak) Bayer Pharma Ltd. In re [1944] 12 ITR 193 (Lahore) Bhajan Lal Sanwal Das v. 635 1262 319 1590. Commissioner of Income Tax [1995] 71 TAX 57 (H.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 765 = 1960 PLD 584 Benoy Ratan Banerji v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 448 (Labore) Bhagwati Shankar. 1658 1656 . v. The State [PLD 1960 Lahore 687] Bashir Sons (Pvt. 33 (HL) Beak (Inspector of Taxes) v. v.C.) Beach Luxury Hotel Ltd.. 306 856 1145 1967 1346 26. Bashir Ahmad v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 118 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 40 (Lahore)(FB) Bhagwan Das Nanak Chand v.) Ltd. Karachi 1981 SCC 546 = [1981] 44 TAX 40 (S.C.) Beak (Inspector of Taxes) v.(xxxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.Lah.) Batala Engineering Ltd. 526.Pak. 401. Commissioner of Income Tax. Ltd. v. Circle V. v.Kar.C. Commissioner of Income Tax `A' Range.) Beecham Pakistan Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 98 (All.) Bhagat Jiwan Das v. In re [1944] 12 ITR 209 (Lahore) Beli Ram & Bros.Kar. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 288 (Lahore) 312 457 446 1530 1380. Robson [1942] 25 Tax Cas. Karachi [1993] 68 TAX 184 (H.C. Dacca [1960] 2-TAX (III-451) (H. Sri Janardan Kishore Lal Singh Deo [1938] 6 ITR 632 (PC) Bengal-Burma Steam Navigation Co.C. Ltd. Income Tax Officer. Rawalpindi [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H.C. East Pakistan.) Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh v. Robson [1943] 11 ITR (Suppl. v.

) Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education v. Income Tax Officer. Mimer 51 Tax Cas. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 249 (Pat. 198 (HL) British South Africa Co. Secular Society Ltd. In re [1942] 10 ITR 103 (All.M. Case No. Lahore and others [1993] 67 TAX 398 (H. U. 384 Binjraj Hukamchand v.(xl) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1310 967 865 726. Circle-I.) British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd.) Board of Revenue v. Federation of Pakistan. 788. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 474 (Pat. Income Tax Officer. 583 (HL) v.) Booz Allen & Hamilton International (P. Karachi & others [1987] 56 TAX 24 (H.) Biafo Industries v. Inspector of Taxes) v. Karachi v.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR (Suppl. Government of The Punjab.R. v. v.Lah. Lahore v.) Bishwanath Singh Sharma v.) Bhikamchand Laxmichand v.) Brilliant Farbics & Silk Factory. PTCL 2000 CL. 735 1335 147 1451 784 787. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Bisheshar Prasad Parshotam Das v. etc. v. Atherton [1925] 10 TC 155.) Bhudarmull Chandi Prasad v. West Zone.C. 548 435 1499 1290 1134 .C. 795. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 303 (Cal. v. Bhikaji Vyankatesh Dravid & Co.C. Naik v.) = 1997 PTD 747 Bissendoyal Doyaram. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 355 (Nag.) Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. Ltd.S. Commissioner of Income Tax.A.Lah. Central Board of Revenue.C. [1997] 75 TAX 109 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom. Lahore [1966] 13 TAX 182 (H. Secretary.Lah.Kar.C.) Bhimji K.) Bismillah and Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 74 (All. v. [1999] 79 TAX 28 (H. 547. In re [1938] 6 ITR 165 (Cal. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 120 (Nag.) Inc. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 334 (Bom.) Bhikamchand Laxmichand v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 184 (Nag.) 17 (PC) Brumby (H. Lahore [1976] 33 TAX 189 (H. 989 1101 1929 1446 391 255 775 1006 571 1547 473.Lah) Bowman v. [1917] AC 406 (HL) Brentford Yousuf & Co.Lah. Zone-A.) Bisheshwar Nath & Co. Ramanathan Cheltian [1 ITC 244 (Madras)] Bombay Cloth House. Etc.

Nachiappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax.Dacca) Cbatturarn v.C. Income Tax Officer. Incomu Tax Officer and others [1985] 51 TAX 114 (H.179. In re [1935] 3 ITR 105 (Cal.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 454 (All. Central Circle II. Income Tax Officer etc. 106. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 133 (H.-121) (H.Pak. 318) Central Exchange Bank Ltd.) 75 (HL) Cannon Products Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax.. Commissioner of Income Tax. Secretary of State [1933] 1 ITR 330 (Rangoon) C. Prendergaat (Inspector of Taxes) [1940] 8 ITR (Suppl. 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S. 803..T.) C.A. v.) Cameron v.G.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 49 (Rangoon) Burma Railway Co.) = 1985 PLD 572 Car Tunes v. Southern Region.) 958 1618 1057 329 1180 1289 1558 1144 2000.C. 998 1155 1626 69.C.) Burma Corpn.) Californian Copper Syndicate v. Karachi and another [1965] 11 TAX 216 (H..Lah.Kar. Income Tax Officer.Lah.) = 1960 PTD 987 = 1954 PLD 439 Central India Spg. v. Karachi & Another 1969 SCC 322 = [1969] 20 TAX 33 (S.) Central Insurance Co.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 266 (Nag. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.J. 2001 373 1405 1960 822 1012 157.) Cement Agencies Limited v. Wah Cantt. 1704.C.Pak.Kar. Burhan Transport Service Ltd. Saunders v. East Pakistan. Islamabad etc.) = (PLD 1969 S. CBR. Wvg. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 466 (Bom. and others v.Kar. v.) Cement Agencies Ltd.) C.C.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 302 (PC) CBR & Another v. Karachi v. Abid Hussain [1999] 80 TAX 89 (H.T. Harris [1904] 5 Tax Cas.. Lahore v. & other.Macdonald & Co. v. Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 27 (H. Co. v. 1705 . Karachi v.C. v.C. [1989] 59 TAX 115 (H. Lahore [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.Kar.) = [1999 PTD 2895 Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd. 159 Caltex Oil (Pakistan) Ltd.C. & Mfg.C.C. Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Limited 1984 SCC 604 = [1986] 53 TAX 47 (S.(xli) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Ltd. Central Circle II.T. v.) = 1989 PLD 337 Carew And Company Ltd.W.C. Central. Ltd. 210 C C. Darsana v.. Rawalpindi [1980] 41 TAX 182 (H.Pak. Secretary of State [1 ITC 140 (Burma)] 1370 1613 34.

3 ITC 54 (All. Karachi and another [1992] 65 TAX 132 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 302 (PC) Chaturbhuj Vallabhdas v.Kar. Government of The Punjab Lahore v.C.C. v. Central Board of Revenue [1990] 62 TAX 67 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 350 (Mad.) Chouthmal Golapchand. Punjab NWFP [5 ITC 316] Chibbett v.) 103 1716 1157 1802. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 408 (Cal.) Charushila Dassi. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 479 (Nag. Commissioner of Income Tax [1999] 79 TAX 1 (S.) Central Insurance Company Ltd. In re. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. Central Insurance Co. 639 1467 874 480. 481 963 901 666 . 1822 363.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Charushila Dassi v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Muzaffarabad and another [2001 PTD 1174 (S.) Chatturam v.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 695 (Pat.C.) Chatturam v. [2001] 83 TAX 119 (S.) Chamber of Commerce v. Income Tax Officer and another [1990] 61 TAX 57 (H.C.Pak. v.) = PLD 1976 Lah. Case No. In re. 525 1597 1645 162 864 137. 48 Chief Secretary. Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd. 704 554 2004 1963 1959 577 513. Ltd.Kar.) = 1990 PTD 549 Chapal Builders v. [1938] 6 ITR 733 (Cal.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 397 (All.Lah.AJ&K) Chairman. Central Board of Revenue v.) Ch.) = 1992 PTD 32 Central Provinces & Berar Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd.) Chhuna Mal Salig Ram v.) Chinnaswamy Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 144 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 321 (Cal.(xlii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. v.) Chanda Motors.Karamat Hussain v.) Chengalvaroya Chettiar v. Karachi v. Lahore [1976] 33 TAX 176 (H. 1948 573.) Chockalingam Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. 258 Chimanlal Rameswarlal v. In ne [1946] 14 ITR 362 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 70 (Mad. Lahore Zone. Joseph Robinson & Sons [1924] 9 Tax Cas. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 126 (Mad.) Chhitar Mal Ram Dayal.) Chellaiah Pillai v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 122 (Mad.

Kar. Anantapur Gold Mines [1 ITC 133 (Madras) Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. Concern [1937] 5 ITR 456 (Rangoon) City Bank N.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. K.) Commissioner of Income Tax (AJ&K Council).Kar.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone). A. Commissioner Of Income Tax. Esso Eastern Standard Inc.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 23 (Cal. 1527 531 442 1737 1177 1093 560 313 158 37.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone).C. Karachi v.C.S. Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone). Diwan Ali Khan Ghughtai and another [2000] 81 TAX 371 (S.) Commissioner Income Tax v.Kar.Kar. v. Karachi v. Lahore v.) Chunnilal Nathmal v. Karachi v.Kar.Lah.) Colony Thal Textile Mills Limited v..C.) = 2000 PTD SC 892 Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone) v. Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 137 (H. v. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East). A. 1920 1497 1453 614. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 173 (Nag.Kar.) Colonel Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 52 (Lahore) Colony Textile Mills Ltd.C. Pakistan Security Printing Corporation Ltd.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 361 (Nag.Lah. Monotype Corporation Ltd. Karachi v. Central Zone-C. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Pak) & another [1972] 25 TAX 140 (H. Karachi v.) Commissioer of Income Tax (Central Zone). Commissioner of Income Tax. Zamiruddin Ahmad [1986] 53 TAX 46 (H. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Limited [1985] 52 TAX 98 (H.C.C. Karachi v. Karachi [1994] 70 TAX 159 (H. Pakistan Progressive Cement Industries Ltd.AJ&K.A.) Commissiomer of Income Tax.) Chunnilal Nathmal v.(xliii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) = 1985 PTD 389 Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone). Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 23 (H.) CIR v. Muzaffarabad and 2 others v. 1864 1399 1062 . Razak H. [1986] 54 TAX 38 (H.C.) Ciba Laboratories (Pakistan) Ltd.C. Dada [1980] 41 TAX 10 (H.) Ciba (Pakistan) Limited. [1985] 51 TAX 199 (H. Charushila Dassi..Kar. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 26 (H.C. Messrs Cade Creets Associates through Managing Partner. [1986] 53 TAX 74 (H.) = 1985 PTD 413 952 1091 913 1559 1532 1313 213. In re [1937] 5 ITR 1 (Cal.C.C.A.C. BWM Abdur Rehman [1974] 29 TAX 212 (S.) Commercial Properties Ltd. Lahore [1981] 43 TAX 9 (H.Pak.

Kar. Habib Insurance Co.) = 1982 PLD 684 Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). Forbes Campbell & Co. New Jubilee Insurance Co. Jupiter Trading Corporation.) Commissioner Of Income Tax (Investigation).Kar.(xliv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.Kar. Petroleum Institute of Pakistan Ltd.C. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone). 1232 1944 1765 1916 37.Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) v. Karachi v. Karachi [1969] 19 TAX 229 (H.Kar..C. [1982] 46 TAX 125 (H. New Jubilee Insurance Co.) 1056 1951 1060 189 1245 1977 1717 1848 802 604 1242 1231.Kar. Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 25 (H.C. Ltd.C.Kar. [1982] 46 TAX 125 (H. Pakistan Transport Co. Karachi v. Karachi v.C.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zonr). Jhang [1973] 28 TAX 66 (H. Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax (East) Karachi v. Enterprises and other [2000] 82 TAX 518 ((S. Karachi v. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 69 (H.C.C.Kar. Karachi v.C. Asian D.C. Beach Luxury Hotel Ltd.. Karachi v.C. Karachi v. [1985] 52 TAX 110 (H. Karachi [1982] 45 TAX 204 (H. Associated Products of Pakistan.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Zone. Karachi v.C.C. Ltd.Kar.Kar. Ltd [1979] 39 TAX 21 (H. Karachi v.C.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation). [1983] 48 TAX 1 (H. Ltd..C.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation). Shahsons Fisheries Limited [1985] 52 TAX 107 (H. Colony Textile Mill [1977] 35 TAX 121 (H. Volkmar Roeddes [1984] 49 TAX 110 (H. Karachi v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone). Pakistan Insurance Corporation [1980] 41 TAX 183 (H.) = 1985 PTD 498 Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). Karachi [1979] 40 TAX 32 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax AJK and another v. Karachi v.. Ltd. Karachi v.Kar. Khayam Theatre Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 109 (H. Karachi v.Kar..) Commissioner of Income Tax (West). 1316 1531 762 1000 617.C.C. Vali Bhai Kamruddin (Sind) Limited [1973] 28 TAX 143 (H. Beach Luxury Hotel Limited [1988] 57 TAX 150 (H. Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax (East). Kar.Kar. Prime Dairies Ice Cream Limited [1999] 80 TAX 282 (H. Shahnawaz Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax (East).) = 1979 PLD 207 Commissioner of Income Tax / Wealth Tax v. International Computors & Tabulators.Lah.AJ&K. Case No.) Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). 1920 .) Commissioner of Income Tax (West Zone).Kar.Kar.C.Lah.

Pfizer Laboratories Ltd..) Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. Sheikh [1992] 65 TAX 80 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax East Bengal v.C. Karachi v.Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax Companies II. Dacca v.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone Karachi v. Karachi v.C. Naseem Allawala [1991] 64 TAX 31 (H.C.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan.Kar. Razak Ltd. Krudd Sons Ltd. partner Shakil Impex Karachi 1965 SCC 228 = [1965] 12 TAX 95 (S.) Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi (West). 335 1989 315 616 111 241 46 217 .C. Kumar Narayan Roy Choudhry and others 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (111-207) (S.C.C. Khursheed Begum [1995] 71 TAX 280 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone `A'.C. Karachi v. Chief Glass House [1992] 65 TAX 205 (H.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. United Liner Agencies.Kar.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone B.Lah. Mst. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 23 (H.C. 187 1758 270 245 74.C.C. Nisar Ahmad [1984] 50 TAX 187 (H.Pak.Kar.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax Pakistan v. Aswab Ali & others 1969 SCC 350 = [1975] 31 TAX 101 (S. 1992 SCC 1000 = [1993] 68 TAX 41 (S.) 1943 1504 1683 326 221 107 186.(xlv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Naveed A.C. Habib Vali Muhammad.C. [1989] 60 TAX 24 (H.Kar.C.M.) Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone `B'. Khatija Begum.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v.Pak. S.) Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone Lahore v.Pak. Sultan Ali Jeoffery & Others 1992 SCC 974 = [1993] 67 TAX 51 (S. Karachi v.Kar.Kar. Karachi v. Wahiduzzaman 1965 SCC 212 = [1965] 11 TAX 296 (S. Karachi [1990] 62 TAX 31 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone (A). Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax Faisalabad v.) Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan & 2 others v.C.C. Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 32 (H. 161 334 316.Kar. Paracha Textile Mills Karachi [1973] 28 TAX 155 (H.C.C.Lah.Kar. Fazlur Rehman & Sayeedur Rehman 1964 SCC 176 = [1964] 10 TAX 49 (S.) Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone Lahore v.C. Gauher Ayub [1995] 71 TAX 271 (H. Karachi v. Ashfaq Ahmad Khan & 10 others [1974] 29 TAX 149 (S.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax Companies III. Farrokh Chemical Industries 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S.

Pesh.) Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone.) Commissioner of Income Tax Peshawar Zone.C. Lahore v.G.Kar. Jallo Rosin and Turpentine Factory.Lah. Miller 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1 TAX (III-1) (S. Noorani Calendaring and Finishing Mills. 181 90. Muhammad Allah Bux [1977] 35 TAX 74 (H.V.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lahore v. Govt. Malik & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore v.M. Mst. Case No. Lahore [1976] 34 TAX 71 (H. Abdul Rauf [1944] 12 ITR 76 (Pat. Achrulal [1938] 6 ITR 255 (Nag. through Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lakshmanan Chettiar [1940] 8 ITR 545 (Mad.C. 202 138 342 271 870 662 889 898.) Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone Lahore v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gatron (Industries) Ltd. Ferguson And Company [1967] 15 TAX 205 (H.C. Sukkur. Adamji Sons [1966] 14 TAX 174 (H. Lahore Central Iron and Hardware Machinery.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi Zone. [1999] 79 TAX 161 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v.Lah. A.C.Lah.Lah.Lah. 1183 1814 29 1638 .(xlvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.) 136 620 253 165 223 71 190 181 160. Waris Silk Weaving and Knitting Mills.C. NWFP & Bahawalpur v.) Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone.Pak.Qut. Peshawar v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone. Mrs.C.Pak.MR.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lyallpur 1991 SCC 801 = [1991] 64 TAX 69 (S. Siemen A. A.) Commissioner of Income Tax Sukkur Zone. Merchants [1973] 27 TAX 40 (H.C. 173.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v. New Afza Hotel Rawalpindi [1973] 27 TAX 212 (H.C. Rawalpindi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone. E.Lah. Lahore v.V.P. Gujranwala [1973] 28 TAX 181 (H.C.Kar.C. Noor Sugar Mills [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H. Wolf Gang Matzke [1975] 32 TAX 176 (H. Wazirunissa Begum [1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S. 1991 SCC 773 Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab.Lah.Kar. F.C. Lahore v. Abubakar Abdul Rahman [1936] 4 ITR 233 (Bom. Lahore [1974] 29 TAX 165 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Adamji Sons [1984] 50 TAX 196 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1933] 1 ITR 152 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anwar Textile Mills Ltd.C. Al-Karam Lamps (Pvt. Ahmedabad Millowners' Association [1939] 7 ITR 369 (Bom. American Life Insurance Company [1967] 15 TAX 268 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Asbestos Cement Industries Ltd.C.C.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax v.M. Basant Rai Takhat Singh [1933] 1 ITR 197 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Firm [1945] 13 ITR 290 (Mad.C. Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.Pak. Macdonald & Co. [1992] 65 TAX 277 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. B. Ltd. CbuniIaI B.Lah. Mehta [1938] 6 ITR 521 (PC) 575. Bhojraj Harichand [1946] 14 ITR 277 (Lahore) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Karachi [1971] 23 TAX 161 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bufco Tanneries Limited [1966] 13 TAX 185 (H.Pesh. [1941] 9 ITR 155 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bombay Burma Trading Corporation Ltd. Aga Abbas Ali Shirazi [1944] 12 ITR 179 (Mad. 1947 1147 1834 930 1740.M. C.J. Fletcher [1937] 5 ITR 428 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1935] 3 ITR 459 (Bom. AR.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Peshawar and others [2000] 82 TAX 61 (H.Kar. Sialkot [1999] 79 TAX 283 (H.Lah. & Others 1992 SCC 904 = [1993] 67 TAX 174 (S. Bombay Burma Trading Corpn. Beach Luxury Hotel Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Buckingham & Carnatic Co.Kar.. Bai Nindhi Bai [1946] 14 ITR 600 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Arif Latif [2000] 81 TAX 1 (H. [1935] 3 ITR 384 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anwar Enterprises.) Ltd.(xlvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.) = 1999 PTD 4120 Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1750 1386 1599 1581 1131 1363 1378 947 981 . Badridas Ramrai Shop [1939] 7 ITR 613 (Nag. 1795 1883 1219 1344 1940.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 580 691 1113 1719 1786.

Central India Spg.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1197 723 57 542. 1275 1865 231 1963 314 10 574 . [1947] 15 ITR 105 (Bom.L. Case No. 1174. [1945] 13 ITR 154 (Bom. Co. Chowringhee Properties Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 941. Naidu Industrial Educational Trust [1942] 10 ITR 358 (Mad. Karachi [2001] 83 TAX 376 (H. Narayanan Chettiar [1943] 11 ITR 470 (Mad. & Mfg.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mathlas [1939] 7 ITR 48 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.D..(xlviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain. [1947] 15 ITR 405 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Wvg. Dadabhoy Silk Mills Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company 1981 SCC 572 = [1982] 46 TAX 6 (S. Century Spg.Kar. 1048. Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 222 (H.C. G.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chengalvaroya Mudallar [1934] 2 ITR 395 (Mad. [1939] 7 ITR 187 (Nag.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dawood Cotton Mills Limited [1974] 29 TAX 123 (H. 1612 1647 1597 689 1194 988. Dhanomal Kewalram Aswani [1949] 17 ITR 568 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.Kar.C. ChuniIaI B. 1368.Kar. Farrokh Chemical Industries [1991 SCC 805 = 1992 SCMR 523] Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Darsanram [1945] 13 ITR 419 (Pat. Ekbal & Co. 1115 911 1035. [1935] 3 ITR 395 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Ltd.) 1367. Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Kishore [1941] 9 ITR 695 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Co. N. Mehta [1938] 6 ITR 521 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dharamchand Dalchand [1 ITC 264 (Nagpur)] Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1050 1850 682 1901 1156. Ltd. Eastern Bank Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Currimbhoy Ebrahim & Sons Ltd. & Wvg. CT.C. 1264. Diwan Bahadur S. Chhotalal Mohanlal [1940] 8 ITR 114 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Pak. RM. [1982] 46 TAX 56 (H..) Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gotnedalli Lakshmi Narayan [1935] 3 ITR 367 (Bom. Haji Gulzar & Sons.. 1637. Harveys Ltd. Hemraj Kanji [1933] 1 ITR 304 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Ltd. Hajee Abdul Gany Ayoob [1941] 9 ITR 339 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar. [1985] 51 TAX 20 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Guest Keen & Nettles Fold (Pak. [1976] 33 TAX 221 (H. [1949] 17 ITR 13 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 127 (H. [1940] 8 ITR 307 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.(xlix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Ltd.Kar. General Steel Industries [1989] 59 TAX 112 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Great Eastern Life Assprance Co.Kar.C. [1991] 65 TAX 164 (H.C. 1484 1474 1741 . [1949] 17 ITR 173 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Ltd. Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gammon (Pak) Limited. Hoosen Kasam Dada Karachi 1960 PTD 574 (H.Kar. Great Eastern Life Assurance Co. [1983] 47 TAX 222 (H. Karachi [1966] 14 TAX 304 (H. Hungerford Investrnent Trust Ltd.C. Hukum Chand Jagadhar Mal [1936] 4 ITR 380 (Lahore) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1414 1321.Kar. Ltd. [1975] 32 TAX 232 (H.C. Habib Insurance Co.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1936] 4 ITR 270 (PC) 1401 743 1099 1492 662 990 1726 1722 1894 1544.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Gurupada Dutta [1946] 14 ITR 100 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.C. Ltd. Govindrarn Seksaria [1938] 6 ITR 584 (Bom.C. Habib Bank (Overseas) Ltd. Habib Bank Executors And Trustees Co.C.. Glaxo Laboratories (Pak. 1644 359 1474. Gangabishan Mohanlal [1945] 13 ITR 20 (Mad. 1677 1253 565 837 1666 1880 895. Hukum Chand Jagadhar Mal [1936] 4 ITR 140 (Lahore) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Lah.

A.C. 2001 PTD 744 1071.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1946] 14 ITR 347 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ibrahimji Hakimji [1940] 8 ITR 501 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Ltd. Manavikraman Rajah [1945] 13 ITR 174 (Mad.C. Indian Life Assurance Co.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kesar Sugar Works Ltd. Indian Relief & Benefit Insurance Co.(l) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.C. Firm [1934] 2 ITR 183 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. K. Kathiawar CO-OP Housing Society [1985] 51 TAX 5 (H. [1941] 9 ITR 177 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1) [1939] 7 ITR 341 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jhamandas Devkishendas [1946] 14 ITR 554 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Hussaini Fund [1964] 9 TAX 278 (H. Indian Life Assurance Co.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Katrak [1937] 5 ITR 527 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Karuppaswami Mooppanar [1934] 2 ITR 284 (Mad.Pesh.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Leiah [1976] 34 TAX 85 (H. Kamruddin Fakhruddin [2001] 83 TAX 353 (H. 1072 1183 1958 1726 1725 710.C. K. 715 710.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1839 1326 514 1136 1957 1206 582 1412 1178 162 475. Charity Fund [1943] 11 ITR 603 (Bom. (No. Jug Sah Muni Lal Sah [1939] 7 ITR 522 (Pat. 2) [1939] 7 ITR 352 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ltd. Imam Bux Allah Dewaya. Karimi Industries [1983] 47 TAX 184 (H. Indian Relief & Benefit Insurance Co. 549 148 . Katragadda Madhusudhana Rao [1944] 12 ITR 1 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.K. Kathiawar Coopperative Housing Society [1985] 51 TAX 5 (H. K. (No. Karirn Bros. Jainaratn Jagannath [1945] 13 ITR 410 (Pat. Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Case No.H. Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Lah.R. 715 1663 481 1836.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.

Ltd. Madras & Southern Mahratta Railway Co. 1742 517 579 969 708. Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. [1933] 1 ITR 46 (Mad. Khan Bahadur Waliur Rahman [1946] 14 ITR 287 (Cal. [1942] 10 ITR 490 (Mad. Madras Cricket Club [1934] 2 ITR 209 (Mad. 1469 1641 1329 1150 2607 1119.) 541 750. Lady Navajbai R. Khemchand Ramdas [1940] 8 ITR 159 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1052 1165 1157.(li) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. 904. Jamal Mohamad Sahib [1941] 9 ITR 375 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kyauktaga Grant Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chettiyar Firm [1935] 3 ITR 193 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1675 1410 325 1444 896. 1608. 1583. King and Partridge 2 ITC 142 (Mad. Lal Suresh Singh [1935] 3 ITR 356 (Oudh) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. M.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.J.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. L.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1938] 6 ITR 686 (Pat.A.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Madura Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. [1937] 6 ITR 580 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharajadhiraja Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1933] 1 ITR 94 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1330. Commissioner of Income Tax v.L.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Armstrong Smith [1946] 14 ITR 606 (Bom.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Madhwa Siddhantha Onnahini Nidhi Ltd. Maharaja of Darbhanga [1944] 12 ITR 116 (Pat) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1934] 2 ITR 427 (Mad. Khemchand Ramdas [1933] 1 ITR 309 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1342 996. 1811 1461.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lachmi Narain Bhadani [1944] 12 ITR 355 (Pat. 1796 1318 . [1940] 8 ITR 280 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tata [1947] 15 ITR 8 (Bom. M. Mahaliram Ramjidas [1940] 8 ITR 442 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1128.

Kar. 1745 675 701 1611. Mehran Associates Limited [1992] 65 TAX 223 (H. 1137.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1299.) = 1956 PLD 45 = 29 ITR 296 Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 2000 PTD 280 Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mathuradas Mannalal [1942] 10 ITR 95 (Nag.Kar. Miller / Mitchell R. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd [1975] 32 TAX 239 (H. Muhammad Aqeel And Company [1967] 16 TAX 51 (H.C. Muzaffar-ud-Din and Sons [1966] 13 TAX 214 (H. E.Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mrs. Mushtaq Muhammad Ali [1987] 55 TAX 157 (H. 279. Mohanlal Hargovind [1942] 10 ITR 84 (Nag.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.C. Motiram Nandram [1940] 8 ITR 132 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. MaharaJadhlraja Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1933] 1 ITR 94 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. V.-49) (H. 1239 483 Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1939] 7 ITR 176 (Bom.Kar. Metro Goldwyn Mayer (India) Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of Darbhanga [1942] 10 ITR 214 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 902. [1941] 9 ITR 642 (Sind) 1533 1807 951 954 1354 1169 935 1990 1036. Manager of Katras Encumbered Estate [1934] 2 ITR 100 (Pat.Kar. 1045 857. Mills Store Co.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Okara) [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Messrs Sadiq Traders [1990] 80 TAX 112 (H. 858.Lah. Mutha Sarvarayudu 2 ITC 208 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 288 747 1673 887 1377 . Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Mercantile Bank of India [1936] 4 ITR 239 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.(lii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 281.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. (c/o The Colyana Estate.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Kassim [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H. H.) 1885 81. Case No. Makanji Lalji [1937] 5 ITR 539 (Bom. Mobanmal Chordia [1943] 11 ITR 352 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.

M. 458 43 1102.A.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) = 2000 PTD 254 Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. New China Glassware Company [1974] 30 TAX 158 (H. Karachi [1976] 34 TAX 158 (H.Pak.) = 1976 PTD 237 Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.Lah. Pakistan Industrial Engineering Agencies Ltd. Nasir Ali and another [1999] 79 TAX 428 (S. Concern [1938] 6 ITR 194 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = [2000] 81 TAX 249 (H. 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S. Pakistan Industrial Engineering Agencies Ltd. Pakistan Insurance Corporation & others 1989 SCC 740 = [1997] 75 TAX 113 (S.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Concern [1934] 2 ITR 417 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. New Jubilee Insurance Company [1990] 61 TAX 1 (H. Nishat Cinema.C.C.S.Kar. 1339.Kar.L.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. N.C. Olympia [1988] 57 TAX 71 (H. National Bank of Pakistan. Olympia [1988] 57 TAX 46 (H. Ltd. P.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muthu Karuppan Chettiyar [1935] 3 ITR 208 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1961 44. Mills Co.S. Ltd. 564 995 1567. P.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Narayana Gajapati Raju Bahadur Garu [1934] 2 ITR 288 (Mad. Lyallpur [1979] 39 TAX 140 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.(liii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.Pak) = 1997 PTD 49 Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1991 SCC 878 = [1992] 66 TAX 176 (S.C. Official Liquidator of the Agra Spg.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. [1988] 57 TAX 46 (H.A. National Agriculture Ltd.C.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Investment Ltd. Visalakshi Achi [1937] 5 ITR 448 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.Kar.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.R. & Wvg. New India Assurance Co.Kar.C.M.R.C.R. 1797 940 1052 327 1390 167. P. 601 1204 . [1938] 6 ITR 603 (Bom. 1340. [1934] 2 ITR 79 (All.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v..C.V.Pak. Nagina Talkies (property) Karachi [1974] 29 TAX 115 (H.Kar.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 1988 PTD 532 543 92 657 284 304 1476 165.L. 1657 145 717. Karachi [2000] 82 TAX 73 (H.

225 225 466 724 1243 1691 927 742 82 222 1128 859 1752 491.) Ltd. Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh [1946] 14 ITR 738 (Pat.Lah.Kar. Raja Sri Sri Kalyanl Prasad Deo [1945] 13 ITR 17 (Pat. Ramsay Unger [1947] 15 ITR 87 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Johnstone [1934] 2 ITR 390 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ltd.(liv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 1988 PTD 66 Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.C.Kar.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Prasad Film Laboratories (P.C. Pfizer Laboratories Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar..) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. etc.C. Roneo Vicker Limited. 918 922. [1999 PTD 325] Commissioner of Income Tax v. Case No. S. Papammal [1942] 10 ITR 349 (Mad. PR.) 1356 230. Raid Prayag Krnnarl Debt [1940] 8 ITR 25 (Pat. Pakistan Progressive Cement Industries [1985] 51 TAX 199 (H.) = 1991 PTD 39 Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. [1993] 68 TAX 77 (H. [1988] 57 TAX 113 (H.Kar. [1991] 63 TAX 52 (H. Raja Bahhadur Dhakeshwar Prasad Narain Singh [1938] 6 ITR 476 (Pat. 924 1421 1754 1684 1348 1418 .) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Poana Electric Supply Co. [1946] 14 ITR 622 (Bom.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.PL. [1985] 52 TAX 18 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Palmuiappa Chettlar [1945] 13 UK 269 (Mmd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raja Bahadur Dhakeswar Prasad Narain Singh [1938] 6 ITR 476 (Pat.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. Reckitt & Colman of Pakistan Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Prime Dairies Ice Cream Limited [1999] 80 TAX 282 (H. [1988] 57 TAX 118 (H. R.C. Pandit Dhaneshwardhar Misra [1940] 8 ITR 416 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Paracha Textile Mills Ltd. Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 14 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.

Seth Rarnakrisbna Ramnath [1944] 12 ITR 21 (Nag. 464 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sarangpur Cotton Mfg. 6 ITC 178 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Pak. 2 ITC 119 (Rangoon) 1433 1483 960 688. 1278.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1223.C. [1939] 7 ITR 333 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Co.Dacca) = 1960 PLD 713 Commissioner of Income Tax v.S. S.M. and others 1992 SCC 920 = [1992] 66 TAX 125 (S. S.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1838 1443 986 .) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1835 661 633 1484 1614. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd. Chitnavls [1932] 2 Camp. Sir S. Mehta [1943] 11 ITR 142 (Bom. 861 1628 1459. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sri Talupuru Venkatasubhiah Chetty [1946] 14 ITR 227 (Mad.C. Seth Bhirdichand [1938] 6 ITR 367 (Nag. Satish Chandra Bhowmik 1960 PTD 1075 (H. 845. Singari Bai [1945] 13 ITR 224 (All. Steel Bros.S. [1938] 6 ITR 36 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ltd. 1287 443 710 1589 510.(lv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. 1991 SCC 773 = PLD 1991 SC 368 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Cas.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. S.A. 1484 962. & Co. Sarwan Kumar [1945] 13 ITR 361 (All. Sir Purshottamdas Thakurdas [1946] 14 ITR 305 (Bom.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.N. Shahnawaz Ltd. Shabir & Company [1963] 7 TAX 202 (H.A. Chitnavis 6 ITC 453 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 1963 PTD 395 = 1963 PLD 481 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co.M.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sir Horni M. Sind Central Provident Funds Society Ltd. [1940] 8 ITR 269 (Mad. Siemen A. 1861 1540 59 841.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1475. Annamalai Chettiar [1944] 12 ITR 226 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. 1860.A.G. Ramaswamy Chettiar [1946] 14 ITR 236 (Mad.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sir Kameshwar Singh [1935] 3 ITR 305 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Smt. Ltd. 712 1806.

VaIliammal Achi [1938] 6 ITR 720 (Mad. Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 141 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Subramanya Sastrigal 2 ITC 152 (Mad. Venkatachalapathi 1 ITC 185 (Madras) 508 205.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.R. [1987] 56 TAX 30 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 1991 PTD 57 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tayab Moosa And Company [1967] 15 TAX 62 (H.C.S.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Karachi [1969] 20 TAX 216 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar. Sevuga Pandia Thevar [1933] 1 ITR 78 (Mad.C. 340 144 1617 1874 882 1420 612 1594 1426 1653 851 730 968 533 979 1061 1160 888 31 .C.K.S.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. V.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar. Firm [1935] 3 ITR 158 (Rangoon) Commissioner of Income Tax v.T.Kar.Kar. Tika Ram & Sons Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tata Sons Ltd.U. [1937] 5 ITR 544 (All. of Pakistan Ltd. Valika Art Fabrics Ltd. Valliammal Achi [1938] 6 ITR 720 (Mad. Case No. V. V. [2001] 83 TAX 342 (H.E.C. Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Savurniarnurthy [1946] 14 ITR 185 (Ma&) Commissioner of Income Tax v.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surridge & Beecham [1968] 18 TAX 72 (H.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tehri-Garhwal State [1934] 2 ITR 1 (PC) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar.(lvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.R. United Commercial Bank Ltd. Vali Bhai Kamruddin (Sind) Ltd. Tejbhandas Motumal [1933] 1 ITR 202 (Sind) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Thai Airways International [1994] 69 TAX 120 (H.C. Usman Bhai [1967] 16 TAX 65 (H.Kar.C.C. [1939] 7 ITR 195 (Bom..C.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.Kar. Syed Akhtar Ali [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H.Kar. United Insurance Co.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.

Hyderabad [1984] 50 TAX 223 (H.Kar. Ebrahim D. Visweshwar Singh [1939] 7 ITR 536 (Pat.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Ahmed Food Industries Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Messrs Steel Brothers and Co.Kar.Kar. Haji Jethabhoi Gokul & Co.Kar.C.C.) Commissioner Of Income Tax. (Investigation). Adamjee Sons.Kar.Kar. Central Karachi v.) = 1967 PTD 161 = 1967 PLD 363 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Habib Insurance Co.C. (West). Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 88 (H. (Central) Karachi v. A. [1983] 47 TAX 182 (H. Hyderabad [1985] 51 TAX 71 (H. Toor [1984] 50 TAX 144 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. Wali Bhai Qamaruddin [1967] 15 TAX 145 (H.-1) (H. Ltd. Karachi v. (West Zone). (West Zone). Karachi v. (West Zone).C.C.) Commissioner Of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax.. Ahmad & others [1982] 45 TAX 232 (H.) = 1989 PTD 135 Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. M. Ltd. Karachi v.C.Kar. Mohammadi Rerolling Mills [1985] 52 TAX 161 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.C.Kar. (Central Zone). Bengal Mufassil v.Kar.) 925 1536 1886 1350 32 1139.. Bhahawalpur Textile Mills Ltd. Mercantile Fire and Central Insurance Co.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1050 = PLD 1960 Dacca 34 Commissioner of Income Tax. (East Zone). Karachi v. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 196 (H.. Zakia Siddiqui [1989] 59 TAX 79 (H. (East) Karachi v. Karachi v. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 208 (H. Burma v. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Oxford University Press.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Yousuf & Company [1967] 15 TAX 4 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Burdhan Kuti Wards' Estate [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.Kar.. [1989] 59 TAX 63 (H. Fateh Textile Mills Ltd.) = 1991 PTD 672 Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Hyderabad [1985] 51 TAX 71 (H. [2 ITC 129 (Rangoon)] Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v. Philips Electrical Co.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Central `B'. Karachi v. 1685 198 1240 1699 25 1118 1773 1788 1789 1776 1403 467 203 1355 1698 .) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C. (East). Karachi v. Karachi [1969] 19 TAX 222 (H.C.Kar. (Central). Bhahawalpur Textile Mills Ltd.C.Kar.Kar. Ltd. 1560.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax v.(lvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Karachi v..C. Karachi v. Zamindar of Singampalli 1 ITC 181 (Madras) Commissioner of Income Tax.C. of Pakistan Ltd. Karachi [1991] 64 TAX 25 (H.

Pak. Karachi v. Karachi v. Central Zone `C'.Kar. Central Zone `C'.Kar. Central Zone `A'. Hussain Ahmad [1992] 65 TAX 129 (H. [1991] 64 TAX 126 (H.C.C.Kar.) = 1992 PTD 232 Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Kar. Karachi v.Kar. Sandoz (Pak).Kar.. Pakistan Oxygen Ltd. Karachi v. Central Zone. Algemence Bank of Netherland. Ltd. Central Zone `B'. Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 130 (H. Karachi v.C. Mazhar Hussain [1988] 58 TAX 123 (H.C.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax.D. [1992] 65 TAX 138 (H.C.C. Central Zone `B'.) Ltd.. S.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Transoceanic Steamship Company Ltd.Kar.Kar. Grindlays Bank Limited. Central Zone `A'. Central Zone `B'.Kar. Karachi [1993] 67 TAX 70 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Central Zone `C' Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi [1991] 64 TAX 7 (H. Central Zone `A' Karachi v. Karachi v. Karachi v.) = 1991 PTD 839 Commissioner of Income Tax.) = 1993 PTD 46 Commissioner of Income Tax.) 1347 1422 818 1149 1690 1732 1942 1665 1457 1465 1689 1170 1452 1189 1730 1709 1505 1162 613 .C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. Karachi v. Cynamid (Pak.C. Karachi v. Central Zone `C'.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v. Karachi v. Case No.) Ltd. Ebrahim Brothers Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi Race Club Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 135 (H.C. Central Zone. Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 64 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. M. 1991 SCC 842 = [1991] 64 TAX 173 (S. Phoenix Insurance Co. Central Zone A. Karachi v. Karachi v. [1987] 56 TAX 58 (H. Ltd.C. Karachi v. Avari [1991] 64 TAX 110 (H. B.C.Kar.Kar. Chemdyes Pakistan Limited [1990] 61 TAX 149 (H. Tariq Siddiqui [1991] 63 TAX 90 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax..C. Central Zone.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 300 (H. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited [1990] 61 TAX 155 (H.Kar.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v. Central Zone `C'.Kar. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.C. Central Zone `B'.) = 1991 PTD 350 Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Central Zone `C'.Kar. [1992] 65 TAX 212 (H.) = 1991 PTD 374 Commissioner of Income Tax.C. of Pakistan (Pvt.Kar. Central Zone `C'.(lviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.C. Central Zone `A'. Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Mushtaq Ahmed [1989] 59 TAX 20 (H. [1991] 63 TAX 49 (H.

Home Insurance Co. Alpha Insurance Co.C. Central Zone-B.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax. 461. 484. Central. Tangail General Trading & Transport Corporation Ltd. Dacca v. Eastern Aluminium Agency.. Karachi and another [1999] 79 TAX 589 (S. Dacca Zone. Karachi v. Mymensingh [1961] 4 TAX 197 (H. United Liner Agencies.C. Dacca v.C. Dacca [1969] 19 TAX 103 (H.C.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 1092 = 1962 PLD 86 Commissioner of Income Tax. S. Companies-Il.. Central Zone-A. [1988] 57 TAX 46 (H. Zakia Siddiqui [1989] 59 TAX 79 (H. Karachi 1984 SCC 594 = [1986] 53 TAX 59 (S. 470.) Commissioner of Income Tax. and another 1990 SCC 744 = [1991] 63 TAX 120 (S. Jagabandhu Saha and others [1968] 18 TAX 11 (H.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Central Zone-B. East Bengal v. Dacca v. Amin Jute Bailing Company. Central. Central. Karachi [1990] 62 TAX 31 (H. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 78 (H.Pak. Mymensingh [1965] 12 TAX 136 (H.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Kar. Karachi v. General Tyre & Rubber Company of Pakistan 1993 SCC 1015 = [1993] 67 TAX 191 (S. Habib Bank Executors & Trustees Co. Ltd.Pak) = PLD 1959 SC 453 1058 1237 107 293 1695 1225 1203 1893 1521 1526.C. 1694 611 1555 485 1358 1863 1082 242. Trading Company. Premier Bank Limited. Karachi v.C. Chittagong Zone.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak. Karachi v.. Dacca v. Ltd. Pakistan Investment Ltd. Central Zone.C. Suresh Prosad Lahiri Chowdhury. Dacca Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi 1981 SCC 559 = [1981] 44 TAX 1 (S. Central.C.) = 1991 PTD 573 = 1991 PLD 280 Commissioner of Income Tax. 524 . Karachi v. Ciba Geigy (Pakistan) Ltd. Companies II.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.(lix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Karachi v.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Companies-1.C.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.Kar. Karachi v.C. Karachi v. Chittagong v.C. Fakir Cotton Ginning and Pressing Industries Ltd. Karachi v. Karachi.Kar.Pak) = 1999 PTD 3005 = 1999 SCMR 1213 Commissioner of Income Tax. Dacca v.Pak.) = 1990 PTD 829 Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & others 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (III207)(S.Kar.. Farrokh Chemical Industries 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S. B. Karachi [1994] 69 TAX 122 (H.. Dacca [1966] 14 TAX 7 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax.

Noor Hussain 1964 SCC 195 = [1964] 10 TAX 206 (S. Dacca v.Pak.C. East Pakistan.C. Tangail General Trading & Transport Corporation Limited.Kar. Khaleque (c/o Amin Agencies Ltd. Wahiduzzaman [1965 SCC 212 = [1965] 11 TAX 296 (S. Engineers Limited. Dacca v. Ahmadabad 1962 SCC 108 = [1962] 5 TAX 262 (S. Engineers Limited. East Pakistan. Companies Circle IV. Karachi v.. East Pakistan v.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 727 = 1960 PLD 535 Commissioner of Income Tax.C.C.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax. Dacca v. East Pakistan v.Pak. East Pakistan. Dacca v.C.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 900 = 1961 PLD 602 Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan. Case No..) Commissioner of Income Tax. Luxmi Narayan Cotton Mills Ltd.Pak. Dacca v. Ltd.. Wahidur Rahman.Pak. East Pakistan.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan. East Pakistan. Khan Plywood Co.Pak.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Ltd. East Zone. Dacca v. Ltd. Sind Club.C. Howrah Trading Co.(lx) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1974 630 1895 1388 1570 66. Dacca v. Mymensingh 1966 SCC 282 = [1967] 15 TAX 1 (S. East Pakistan.C. Aizuddin Gazi and others [1960] 2-TAX (III-474) (H. Income Tax Officer. Victoria Road. East Pakistan. Khulna-Bagerhat Railway Co. Dacca [1965] 11 TAX 181 (H.C. East Zone.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Dacca 1960 SCC 87 = [1960] 2-TAX (III-538) (S. Khulna Bagerhat Railway Co. East Pakistan Dacca v. 1502 1371 1680 1226 1228 817 807 1557 357 1846 1163 .Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak.. A. Radhashyam Agarwala [1960] 2-TAX (III-157) (H. East Pakistan. Dacca v. 320.) 328 358.C. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 209 (H. Ahmadabad [1961] 3 TAX 48 (H.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 253 = 1960 PLD 233 Commissioner of Income Tax. Liquidator. Dacca v. Dacca v. Chittagong) [1968] 18 TAX 8 (H. Dacca v.. A.) = PLD 1965 SC 171] Commissioner of Income Tax. Chittagong [1961] 4 TAX 135 (H.C. Karachi [1987] 56 TAX 75 (H..C.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Calcutta [1960] 2-TAX (III-492) (H.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 136 = 1961 PLD 108 Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v. Dacca v. Chittagong [1966] 13 TAX 271 (H.Dacca) Commissioner of Income Tax. Liquidator.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax.K. Dacca 1967 SCC 289 = [1967] 16 TAX 81 (S. East Pakistan. Iqbal Engineering Works and Haji Feroz-ud-Din 1986 SCC 641 = [1987] 55 TAX 1 (S.C.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 1110 = 1962 PLD 104 Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Gulistan Cinema Company.C.C.

N. Karachi [1974] 29 TAX 179 (H..) Commissioner of Income Tax. New India Assurance Co. Karachi v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. A. [1995] 71 TAX 218 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Eddie Investment Company Limited [1967] 15 TAX 254 (H. Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar.Pak. Karachi v. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 133 (H.C..C. Crescent Star Insurance Co. Karachi v.. Karachi v. Karachi v. Pak Thread Ball Manufacturers' Association. Millwala & Sons Limited. Ltd.Kar.Kar. Sadruddin [1985] 51 TAX 83 (H.C.Kar. Karachi v. Karachi. Karachi v.C.C. Karachi (West). Shabbir & Company.C. Philip's Gloelampenfabriaken. Karachi (East).) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.Kar. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 189 (H..C.Kar. Karachi 1966 SCC 260 = [1966] 13 TAX 197 (S. Karachi 1974 SCC 422 = [1975] 31 TAX 62 (S.) Commissioner of Income Tax. S.C.Kar. Karachi v. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 118 (H. Karachi [1978] 37 TAX 273 (H. Karachi (East). Karachi v. Karachi [1973] 28 TAX 155 (H. Karachi 1993 SCC 1022 = [1993] 68 TAX 35 (S.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi (West). Karachi v.C. Karachi v.Kar. Karachi v. 1458 1122 1655 1515 1517 1529 1510 1404 1514 1246 1425 1706 314 1539 1376 1250 .(lxi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.C.C.Kar.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.Kar. [1980] 41 TAX 19 (H.Kar. Ltd. Amsons Dairies Ltd.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Shahennihon Steamship Co.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Karachi v. Ltd.. Futeh Ally and Co. Karachi [1969] 20 TAX 15 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi & other v. Karachi 1991 SCC 853 = [1992] 65 TAX 229 (S. Joint Venture.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Paracha Textile Mills.C. Moosa Omar & Co. Karachi [1971] 23 TAX 121 (H. Dalmia Cement Ltd. Manzoor Hussain Abdul Karim [1984] 49 TAX 1 (H. Karachi v.) Commissioner of Income Tax. East Karachi v. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax. [1974] 30 TAX 111 (H.C.Kar.Kar.Kar.C. Cogefar Astaldi Sidmail. Queensland Insurance Co.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak. Karachi v. N. Instruments Krafts (Pvt) Ltd.C.) = 1980 PTD 314 Commissioner of Income Tax..) Commissioner of Income Tax.. Rehman [1980] 42 TAX 147 (H.) 364 1678 1676 1998 48. Arshad Javed [1989] 59 TAX 65 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak.V.Kar.Kar.

Lah.Pak. Colony Textile Mills Ltd. Lahore Zone. [1976] 35 TAX 40 (H. Lahore v.West Pakistan. Karachi 1965 SCC 220 = [1965] 12 TAX 15 (S. v.C. Sind and Baluchistan v. Lahore Zone v. Lahore v. Government of Punjab. The Netherlands Trading Society. Kohinoor Industries Ltd. Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Sh.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore [1977] 36 TAX 223 (H.Pak.Lah.C.-139) (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Muhammad Ismail and Co. Lyallpur. Umar Saigol. Government Jallo Rosin and Turpentine Factory.Lah.Lah.West Pakistan. Karachi. Lahore v. The Lyallpur Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Lahore [1976] 34 TAX 71 (H.Pak) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak..Lah. Lahore v.Lah. Pak Cinemas Ltd. Aziz Din [1976] 33 TAX 258 (H. Five Star Calico. Lahore 1980 SCC 477 = [1980] 42 TAX 179 (S. Majestic Cinema.Lah. Badar Ice Factory. Case No.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Choudhri Brothers 1980 SCC 487 = [1980] 42 TAX 119 (S.C. Lyallpur (Now Faisalabad) [1993] 67 TAX 227 (H. Lahore v. Lahore [1981] 43 TAX 100 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Abdus Salam of Sialkot [1992] 65 TAX 204 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Printing Works.(lxii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest..C. Lyallpur [1985 SCC 637 = [1986] 53 TAX 122 (S. Chief Secretary. Karachi Bench) = 1960 PTD 758 = 1957 PLD 167 Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Lah.Lah.Lah. Lahore Bench) = 1959 PTD 639 = 1959 PLD 627 Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore [1977] 35 TAX 42 (H. National Typewriter Co..C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v. Lahore (Now at Multan) v. Lahore [1973] 28 TAX 159 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v. Lahore v.C.C. 1686.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. [1959] 1-TAX (III-150) (H.C. Lahore v.C. Umar Saigal [1976] 33 TAX 245 (H. Lahore v. Lahore v.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v.C..Lah. Colony Textile Mills Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. 1914 645 1383 1105 352 638 1381 1375 826 348 1078 1681 345 107 1734 1379 107 311 1760 . Ltd. Okara [1966] 13 TAX 122 (H. Karachi.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v. Karachi [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.) Commissioner of Income Tax. [1992] 66 TAX 186 (H. Lahore Zone. Lahore. Lahore v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. West Punjab Factories Limited. Lahore 1980 SCC 471 = 1990 PTD 834 Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah.C.) 1051.

Lah. Multan [2001] 83 TAX 487 (H.Lah. West Pakistan. 1176. Shihana Perfumery Store 1980 SCC 483 = [1981] 43 TAX 14 (S. Umar Earooq C/o Sh. Muhammad Allah Bux [1977] 35 TAX 74 (H. Sheikco Ltd. 1068 1424 634 .Pesh.Lah. Fazal Rehman.) = 1962 PTD 683 = 1962 PLD 870 Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore [1972] 27 TAX 95 (H.) = 2000 PTD 2953 1701 1015 1164. Lahore [1974] 29 TAX 242 Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore Zone.Pesh. Lahore v. Multan [1972] 27 TAX 139 (H.C. Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Universal Life & General Insurance Co. Al-Makhdoom Industries. Raja of Parlakimedi [2 ITC 104 (Madras)] Commissioner of Income Tax. Peshawar v. Madras v.. Multan Zone. Lahore. Pakistan Standard Oil & Ginning Mills.Lah. Lahore v. Multan [1962] 6 TAX 75 (H. North Zone (West Pakistan). Lahore v. Ltd.) = 1962 PTD 611 = 1962 PLD 821 Commissioner of Income Tax. North Zone (West Pakistan).Pak. Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore Zone.) Commissioner of Income Tax. [1977] 35 TAX 14 (Lah. Multan v. Zone Lahore v. v.C. Crescent Textile Mills Ltd.C. North Zone. North Zone (West Pakistan).Lah. North Zone. Lahore Zone. Ghulam Siddique [2001] 83 TAX 390 (H.Lah.Lah.C.C.Lah. Lahore. Khanewal [1962] 6 TAX 66 (H. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Multan [1973] 28 TAX 9 (H. Sri Krishna Chandra Gajapathi Narayan Deo.(lxiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) = 1977 PTD 13 Commissioner of Income Tax.) = [2000] 82 TAX 426 (H. Lahore [1979] 40 TAX 55 (H. Lahore v. North Zone (West Pakistan). Mian Muhammad and Sons [1990] 62 TAX 111 (H.C.C.) = 2001 PTD 1437 Commissioner of Income Tax.. Multan Zone. Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Colony Textile Mills Limited [1970] 22 TAX 170 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Wazirunnisa Begum 1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S. Lahore Zone.Lah.C.C. Lahore v. Khanewal Oil Mills Ltd. Ismailabad. Karachi [1972] 27 TAX 145 (H. Multan v.C. 1067...Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak. Punjab Oil Expeller Co.C. Lahore v..) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore Zone.C. Lahore v. Lahore v. Lahore v. Messrs Muhammad Saleem Muhammad Arif Contractors. Multan 2001 PTD 1371 Commissioner of Income Tax. 1739 1511 622 606 1654 207 1098 1976 1898 1897 1524 1387 1884 212. Owen Roberts & Co. Mian Muhammad Allah Bux. Lahore Zone. West Pakistan. Mst.C. North Zone (West Pakistan).

Haji Maula Bux Corporation Ltd.. Rawalpindi [1996] 73 TAX 240 (H.Pak.Lah.Lah.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.C.C. Rawalpindi v. Rawalpindi v. Noor Jehan S. West Pakistan Lahore v.) Commissioner of Income Tax. K.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) Ltd. and others [2001] 83 TAX 544 (S. Sargodha 1990 SCC 753 = [1990] 62 TAX 57 (S.(lxiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. [1980] 42 TAX 81 (H. Peshawar Zone. Ltd.Kar.. Siemen A.Lah. Case No. North Zone. Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Peshawar v. Lyallpur [1977] 35 TAX 178 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax.) Commissioner of Income Tax.. Rawalpindi Zone.C. Bahar Ahmad & sons 1981 SCC 567 = [1982] 45 TAX 134 (S. Bar-at-law.C. & Co. Rawalpindi v. Mineral Industries Ltd.C.) = 2001 PTD 778 Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Peshawar v.Pak. 1991 SCC 773 = [1991] 63 TAX 130 (S. Rawalpindi v. Karachi) = 1959 PTD 707 = 1959 PLD 539 1919 602 2215 1543 211 351.C.C.) = 1990 PLD 990 (SC) Commissioner of Income Tax. now Gujranwala Zone v. Karachi v. Gujrat 1985 SCC 630 = [1986] 53 TAX 67 (S.Lah. K. Gul Cooking Oil and Vegetable Ghee (Pvt.C. South Zone. Rawalpindi v. Pak.) Commissioner of Income Tax.K.C. South Zone. Rawalpindi v. Lyallpur Cold Storage. Barrister-at-Law [1966] 13 TAX 149 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Rawalpindi Zone v. Lahore 1971 SCC 376 = [1971] 23 TAX 280 (S.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi [1959] 1-TAX (III-407) (H.Pak. Rawalpindi Zone. Rawalpindi v. Rawalpindi Zone.Lah. M.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Abdul Karim Transport Company Ltd. Rawalpindi v. Rawalpindi Zone.Pak.West Pakistan. Rawalpindi v.K. Ltd.Pak. Rawalpindi [1975] 32 TAX 57 (H. Manzur Qadir. Rawalpindi.Pak. Amanat Ali [2001] 83 TAX 268 (H.C. Karachi v. & Co. (West Pakistan). South Zone. Sales Tax. Rawalpindi Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax.G. Rawalpindi v.C. Manzur Qadir. Lyallpur 1975 SCC 426 = [1976] 34 TAX 14 (S.Lah. 1913 1345 1353 1374 1096 1427 35 769 774 1785 1831 1890 360 .C. Malik Abdul Karim Transport Co.Lah.C. Batala Cotton Ginning Pressing and General Mills. Peshawar [1980] 42 TAX 81 (H. All Bhai [1992] 66 TAX 163 (H. Noon Sugar Mills [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H. Radio Hotel.) Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah. Karachi v.Lah. Gujrat [1973] 28 TAX 13 (H. Attock Oil Company Limited.

Lahore [2000] 82 TAX 52 (H. 268. Companies Zone II.Pak. Rashid Burner.C. Food Industries Ltd.C. 1108.Lah.) = 2000 PTD 2958 Commissioner of Sales Tax (Central).Lah. Lahore [1975] 32 TAX 1 (H. West Karachi v. Multan v. A.Lah. South Zone. Vehari [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H.) Ltd. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 158 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Rawalpindi v. Companies Zone.C. Advocate. 1148 65. 597..) Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. 1988 SCC 702 = [1989] 60 TAX 55 (S. Rawalpindi v. v. 1106.Lah.(lxv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.Lah. Noor Rai Ibrahim [1992] 65 TAX 262 (S. Karachi & 26 others [1985] 51 TAX 16 (H. Pakistan Television Corporation Rawalpindi [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H.) Commissioner of Income Tax/CST (Central Karachi) v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Rawalpindi v.Kar.C. West Zone Karachi.C.) Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Mst.. Lahore v. Lahore Zone. Lawrence Road.C.) Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore v. Allah Yar Cotton Ginning & Pressing Mills (Pvt. Sialkot [1974] 29 TAX 221 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. 1110 1509 265 91 197 830 176 176 . Haji Ferozuddin [1967] 16 TAX 26 (H.Lah. Multan Zone.) Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central). 598 1100 243.) = 1989 PTD 500.Kar. Faisalabad v.C. Rawalpindi Zone.Kar.. & Others v. Karachi Ltd. and others & Pakistan Progressive Cement Industries v.C. Karachi [1983] 48 TAX 145 (H.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. Lahore v. North Zone (West Pakistan).C.B.) = 2000 PTD 497 Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax.C. Lutfi & Co. Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd.) Commissioner of Income Tax. Abdul Razaq Zia-ul-Qamar [1973] 27 TAX 99 (H. Engineering Cooperative Housing Society. Lahore [1974] 29 TAX 129 (H. Karachi v. Rana Asif Tauseef C/o Rana Hosiery & Textile Mills (Pvt. Multan Road. Lahore [1973] 28 TAX 168 (H. Oriental Dyes and Chemicals Co. Moosa Umer & Co.) Commissioner of Sales Tax Rawalpindi Zone.) Commissioner of Sales Tax.C. Qazi Abdul Hamid. Paracha Textile Mills Ltd.Kar.Lah.Pak.Lah.C. Fozia Mughis.) Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) Commissioner of Income Tax. 1989 PTD 55 Commissioner of Income Tax. v. 267.) 1887 1489 1512 1392 618 87 169 596.C. Faisalabad [2000] 81 TAX 7 (H. Lahore v. 75.) = 2000 PTD 374 Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. Karachi v.) Limited.Lah. Sarfaraz Ali Sheikh [2000] 81 TAX 341 (H.Pak) Commissioner of Wealth Tax. Ltd. Excide Batteries of Pakistan [1978] 38 TAX 126 (Kar. 1991 SCC 891 = [1992] 65 TAX 254 (S.Lah.

Hyderabad v.C. Central Board of Revenue and others [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.) Coronet Paints & Chemicals Ltd. J & G Oldfield Ltgd.C. 350.Lah. 1774 855 1351 418 216.) Curtis v. Rizki Ink Company Ltd.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 298 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax.M. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 216 (H. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another [2000] 82 TAX 156 (H.. Pakistan and others [2001] 83 TAX 305 (H.) Dalmia Cement Ltd.Pak.) = NLR 1999 TAX 170 Crescent Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. John Blott [1921] 8 T.) Cossimbazar Raj Wards Estate v.) Crown Bus Service Ltd.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah.) Crescent Textile Mills Ltd. Commissioner Sales Tax v. v.C. (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).) Crown Bus Service Ltd. [1991] 64 TAX 34 (H. 248.) Data Distribution Services v.C.) Crescent Sugar Mill v. [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H. Karachi [1986] 53 TAX 165 (H. 252. Lahore v.) Cowasjee Family Funds v. 757.(lxvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.Lah. v. Inland Revenue v.C. Wesleyan & General Assurance Society [1948] 30 TC 11 Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. 749. Lahore v. (Central).Lah.) CST/Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v. Income Tax Officer [1999] 80 TAX 273 (H.. 767 154 1434 D D.C.Kar.) Commissioner. Lahore v. Lahore [1982] 45 TAX 47 (H. Muhammad Bashir Muhammad Nazir & others [1974] 29 TAX 91 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 50 (Pat.Kar.C.Lah.C.) Controller of Estate Duty.) 1182 1970 1337 1292 412 . Case No.Lah.Lah.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 1974 SCC 407 = [1974] 30 TAX 91 (S. 9 Tax Cas. Lahore [1981] 43 TAX 1 (H.) Dada Sons. 341.C. Lahore [1979] 39 TAX 53 (H.Lah. v. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 115 (H. v. v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. 319 293 916 934 11 194 107. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 377 (Cal. Vakil v.C. Karachi v.) Dada Limited & Muhammad Ibrahim & Co. 101 (HL) Continental Chemical Co. 1955 1826 765 89.Kar.Kar.) Ltd.C.

1936 1935 1024 1818 792 1121 1790 1746 .) Director Finance. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 139 (Bom.C.) Director Finance.C. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). 1094 706 1915.) Dewan Bahadur Ballbhdas & Son v. Karachi v.Kar. v.) 1561 1994 1134 782 783.) Dhaniram Dharampal v.C. Gour v.) Dhakeshwar Prasad Narain Singh v.Lah. Col.) Dawn Sports v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 113 (Lahore) Dhanrajmal Mamnumal & Sons v. Gujranwala & another [2001] 83 TAX 8 (H.) Deniti Prasad Singh v.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax. Income Tax Officer [1993] 67 TAX 208 (H.M. Dawji Dadabhai & Co. A. West Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 77 (H.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 382 (Lahore) Dma Nath Hernraj of Cawnpore v. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 304 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 67 (Bom. v.C.) Diwan Bahadur Sir T. Commissioner of Income Tax [1990] 62 TAX 44 (H. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 24 (H.(lxvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. 794 1799 737.) Dr. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 521 (Cal.) Dr.C. 583 (HL) Dayaldas Khushiram v. Wapda.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 317 (Lahore) Diwan Chand v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2000] 82 TAX 127 (H.) Dr. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 71 (Pat.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax. Sir H. Quick 51 Tax Cas.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 165 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax (West) Karachi [l982] 45 TAX 208 (H.Kar. Wapda v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 71 (Pal. Inspector of Taxes) v. Vijayaraghavacharya v.) Dibrugarh District Club Ltd.Kar.) Day (H.) Dbakesbwar Prasad Narain Singb v. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 346 (Nag. Rawalpinidi [1977] 36 TAX 210 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 371 (Nag. Said Amman. Razzak Kazi v. v.S. v.C. Howe [1906] 5 Tax Cas.) De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.C. 198 = [1906] AC 455 (HL) Delhi Cloth And General Mills Co. Gujranwala & another v. 738 1700 1442 961 1800 1964 107.) Dayaldas Kushirarn v.

R. East Pakistan.C. Chittagong [1986] 53 TAX 80 (H.Lah. Ltd.Dacca) Ebrahim Brothers (Pvt.D.Kar.) Eastern Textile Mills Ltd. Rawalpindi [1979] 40 TAX 62 (H.) Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co. v..Kar. & others v.C.) Ltd. Case No. 250. 1728 . 1415 1173 1360 1639 754 220 272 381 353 East Khas Jharia Colliery Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 402 (Lahore)(FB) Dreamland Cinema.) Dublin Corporation v. of Pakistan & others [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H.Pak. Pro.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 351 (Pat.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi 1991 SCC 818 = [1991] 64 TAX 116 (S. Rawalpindi Zone.(lxviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1703. Commissioner of Income Tax. v.) E. 294 1222 698 E E.C. Central Zone "B". Urnar Baksh v.) East Wing Indusiries.) E.Kar.U. Adam (Survey of Taxes) [1887] 2 Tax Cas.C. 1135 179.C.Pak. Federation of Pakistan & Others 1997 SCC 1174 = [1997] 76 TAX 213 (S. Central Board of Revenue And Muhammad Fareed [1983] 47 TAX 50 (H. Dacca [1966] 13 TAX 145 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.M.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 311 (Mad. Late Eklasur Rahman Chowdhury Commissioner of Taxes. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 333 (Nag. Commissioner of Income Tax. 387 Dwarakanath Harishandra Pitale.) Eastern Poutry Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 14 TAX 211 (H. 478 E. 51. In re [1937] 5 ITR 716 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 299 (Pat.) 1667 578 50. Multan v. Govt. General Insurance Co.C. Government of Pakistan and others [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H.B. 285.) Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co.Kar. v.) 1731 1727. Merajuddin and another v. 1721 876.) Dr. Ltd. Chowdhury. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. Muthappa Chettiar v.) v.C. v.) Ltd v.V.Pak) = 1997 PTD 1693 = PTCL 1997 CL. Sir Hari Singh Gour v. Sialkot v. Dacca / and / G.C. Danby v. 980.) Eastern Poultry Services v. M. 499.) = 1992 PTD 1693 Ebrahim Brothers (Pvt. East Pakistan. Dr. Commissioner of Income Tax. Chittagong v.C.F. Karachi 1992 SCC 926 = [1992] 66 TAX 6 (S. 99.C.

Kar. Probhat Chandra Barua 1 ITC 284 (Cal.C.) Essential Industries.C. Central Board of Revenue [1995] 71 TAX 282 (H. 320.Pak. Federation of Pakistan & others 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. 607 1086 30. Karachi Bench) = 1959 PTD 119 = 1958 PLD 220 First National City Bank. Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 198 (Nag. Central Circle III. 1480.West Pakistan. Karachi v.-114) (H. 149.C. 532 403.) = 1979 PTD 461 Eruck Maneckji and others v. Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd.C.E. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.) Feroze Shah v.) = 1963 PLD 490 Emperor v.) = [1924] ILR 51 Cal. 1757 703.C.M. Dinshaw v. 140. Income Tax Officer. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 500 (Labore) F F.(lxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.C. Karachi and another [1976] 34 TAX 1 (H.Lah.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. Karachi and others [l960] 2-TAX (Suppl.C. 156. 956 Ellahi and Company v. 468.Kar. 104. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 315 (Lahore) Firdaus Trading Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 319 (PC) F. 139.) Fatehchand Cbhakodilal v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 1963 PTD 395 (H. 61.C. & others v. 56.Lah. 504 = AIR (1924) Cal. 1481. Islamabad and 2 others [2001] 83 TAX 500 (H. 198. 55. Commissioners of Inland Revenue 40 TC 698 (HL) Friends Construction Company v. 299.C. Income Tax Officer.Dacca) Evershine Paints v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Others [1989] 60 TAX 88 (H. 668 = 84 IC 31 Eruch Maneckji and others v. In re [1943] 11 ITR 478 (Lahore) Executors of the Estate of LaIa Shankar Shah v. 1946 1252 233 1019 1630.Kar.Lah.) 1. v. United (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax [1990] 62 TAX 1 (H.) = 2001 PTD 812 Faisal Plaza v.) Executors of Sardar Narain Singh.) Limited. 1486 1950 2003 1798 1801.) = PLD 1976 Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax. Dacca [1969] 19 TAX 3 (H. 146. Ministry of Finance.Kar.C. Karachi [1980] 41 TAX 25 (H. 1816 773 405 1651 2005 . Lahore v.) = 1989 PTD 843 1473. East Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax [1995] 71 TAX 48 (H. 552 Frasers Glasgow Bank Ltd.

Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) GEC Avery (Pvt.) General Corpn. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax.) General Tyre & Rubber Co. Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 146 (H.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 64 (All.) General Tyres and Rubber Co. Ltd.C.B. Peshawar & 4 Others [1997] 75 TAX 298 (H.) 119 G Ganeshi LaI Chhappan LaI v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 350 (Mad. Government of Pakistan & others 1999 PTD 4126 (H.) Ganga Ram Balmokand v. Government of Pakistan and others PTCL 1999 CL.C.Pak.) Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. and 2 Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 81 (All. 1813 655.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 141 (Sind) Ghulam Rasool v. 679 373 945 1265 394 166.Pesh.C.Kar.(lxx) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.) = 1997 PTD 849 Ghulam Hyder Bundally v.C. 668. v.) = 1986 PTD 52 Ghilaf Gul v. Zone-B.) Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 13 TAX 163 (H. In re [1935] 3 ITR 177 (All. In re [1938] 6 ITR 489 (All.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 464 (Lahore) Ganga Sagar Ananda Mohan Shaha v. v. 359 = 1999 SCMR 1072 Gaya Prasad Chhotey Lal v.Pesh. Rahimyarkhan and another [1975] 31 TAX 153 (H. Case No. v.) Gayaprasad and Chotey Lal. Pakistan v. Central.) Ganeshilal Bhattawala.. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 83 (Bom.) Girdhardas Hirivallabhdas v. 1151 1572 1523 1528 1906 1052 440 192. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).C.) General Bank of Netherlands Ltd. 1004.R. 1025. Government of Pakistan through C.Kar. Frontier Ceramics v. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 55 (Bengal) Gatron (Industries) Ltd. v.Kar.Lah. v. of Pakistan Ltd.) Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. Central Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1312 1432 314 . Islamabad and 2 Others [1995] 72 TAX 81 (H.C. 1593 1809.) = 1992 PTD 932 = PLD 1992 SC 549 1815 1369.. Income Tax Officer. Karachi [1989] 60 TAX 34 (H. 1013. Karachi 1991 SCC 784 = [1991] 63 TAX 149 (S.Lah. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & others 1992 SCC 910 = [1992] 66 TAX 74 (S.

) 868 1281 1568 658 1965 1975 1362. Islamabad and another [2000] 82 TAX 131 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 239 (Bom. (Central). Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1922] 12 TC 427 (HL) Gloucester Railway Carriage & Wagon Co. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 21 (Mad..C. v. Styles [1892] 3 Tax Cas. 412 1679 373. Commissioner of Income Tax. Central Board of Revenue. Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 102 (H. J. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary. [1929] 14 TC 364 (HL) Gresham Life Assurance Society v.) Ltd.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 243 (Lahore) Gopiram Gobindram. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 130 (All.(lxxi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. J.-174) (H. v.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1079 Gopinath Vir Bhan v.Kar. v. 280 Gomedalli Laxminarayan v. etc. Commissioner Of Income Tax (Central).) Green v.) = 1985 PTD 329 Guarantee Engineers (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 422 (Bom. v.Kar. [1965] 58 ITR 328 (PC) Grindlays Bank Ltd.) Goud Saraswat Brahmin Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.Lah. Karachi [1983] 47 TAX 39 (H.Kar. Harrison (Watford) Ltd. 1419 907 1185 1260 1338.) Gulberg Textile Mills v. Karachi [1978] 37 TAX 125 (H.C. Ltd.C. 517 (HL) Govindram Bros. 431 1812 .C. Gliksten & Sons Ltd. Ltd. IRC [1925] 12 Tax Cas. [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. 185 Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v. v. Coman [1920] 7 Tax Cas. 720 (HL) Golden Horse Shoe Ltd. In re [1936] 4 ITR 157 (Cal.C. 379.) Grindlays Bank Ltd.) Governors of the Rotunda Hospital v. 1877 1288 1218 1261 1851 1238 361. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.) Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. v.C.) Gopaldas Parsbottamdas v. v.P. Ministry of Finance. Ltd. v.) Gunda Subbayya v.) Gopinath Biswambar Roy v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 764 (Bom. Thurgood (Inspector of Taxes) [1933] 18 Tax Cas. Dacca [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.

) Hajee Cassim Tayoob Surty v.Pak.C. Commissioner of Income Tax (West).) Haider Ali Rajab All & Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 212 (H. Special Officer. 1277.C.) = 1980 PTD 1 Haideria Transport Company Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) Habib & Sons v.C.) H.Kar. 1224.C. Wealth Tax Officer & others [1992] 65 TAX 315 (S.M. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 452 (Lahore) Haji Ghulam Hussain v. Commissioner of Income Tax 1989 SCC 736 = [1990] 61 TAX 88 (S. Government of Pakistan and Income Tax Officer.) Haji Ismail Ibrahim v. Income Tax Officer Circle V. 1395 1963 852 1711 368.) Habib Insurance Co.) Haji Muhammad Shafi & others v. West Zone.Kar.) Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 113 (H.) = 1997 PTD 7 Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri v.Lah. Circle-V. Incons Tax Officer.M. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 41 (Rangoon) Hajee Mohamed Hajee Oosman v.C. & another v. Karachi and 2 others [1992] 65 TAX 153 (H. 796 801 496. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 405 (Peshawar) Haji Gula Khan v. Case No.C.Kar. Abdullah v.) Habib Bank Safe Deposit Vault v. 721 718. Commissioner of Income Tax 1963 PTD 410 = 1963 PLD 496 Haji Ali Jan v.(lxxii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 346.Pak.Pak. H H. Conville v. West Zone.Pak) 365. 412.Kar. Karachi [1982] 45 TAX 263 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1980] 41 TAX 158 (H. 1747 424 24.) = 1982 PTD 46 = 1990 PTCL 954 = 1982 PLD 266 Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri v. Ltd. 410 1804 1241 494 1047 1857 1818 699. 500.C. Income Tax Officer.Pak. 719 1987 8 . Companies Circle [1979] 39 TAX 147 (H.C. Abdullah v.Pesh.C. Circle W-II. Income Tax and Others [1997] 75 TAX 117 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 132 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 330 (Rangoon) Haji Abdul Qayum v. Commissioner of Income Tax (West) Karachi 1992 SCC 991 = [1992] 66 TAX 275 (S. 503.T. Income Tax Officer 1988 SCC 710 = [1989] 60 TAX 52 (S. Karachi & 2 others 1993 SCC 1018 = [1993] 68 TAX 29 (S.C.Kar.C.) = 1991 PTD 217 = 1991 PTD 217 H.C.

East Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax etc. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1976] 33 TAX 209 (H. Ltd.Kar. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 91 (H.Kar.Pak) Hamdard Thread House. Muhammad Zakaria & Faruqui Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1964] 8 TAX 1 (H. Lahore [1972] 27 TAX 149 (H.C. Ltd.) = 1963 PTD 867 = 1963 PLD 996 Haridas Purshottam.(lxxiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Lahore [1974] 29 TAX 248 (H. Korbaniganj. Haji Mushtaq Ahmad v.C.) = 1962 PTD 101 = 1962 PLD 136 Hakeem Muhammad Saeed v. Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone. 414 Haji Taj Mohammad Haji Abdul Rahman & Co.) Hansraj Gupta v.) Hamdard Dawakhana v. Chittagong v.) Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) v.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 290 (Pat.Kar. North Zone (West Pakistan). In re [1947] 15 ITR 124 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax [1978] 38 TAX 1 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1989] 59 TAX 102 (H.Dacca) Haji. North Zone (West Pakistan).) = PLD 1978 Kar.C.) Hari Krishna Das v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi [1980 SCC 497 = [1980] 42 TAX 1 (S..) 1881 789 1832 651 1230 1607 395 107.Lah. Dhera Dun Mussorai Electric & Tramway Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 240 (All.C.Lah.) Haji Thread Manufacturing Co.Kar.) Hamiduddin Samiuddin v.C.) Hakim Ram Prasad. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 716 (Bom. Karachi v.C. Karachi [1962] 5 TAX 147 (H.C.C.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v.C.Lah. In re [1936] 4 ITR 104 (Lahore) Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) Pakistan v. 65] Hanutram Bhuramal v..C. 384 218 1000 1891 1416 317 1477 295 1209 1211 54 683 .) Hanmantram Ramnath v. [1987] 56 TAX 78 (H. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East). Dacca [1966] 13 TAX 32 (H.) Haripur Rosin & Turpentine Factory Ltd.Kar. [AIR 1933 PC 63. `B' Karachi and another [1990] 62 TAX 98 (H. UP [5 ITC 275 (Allahabad) Haripur Rosin & Turpentine Factory Ltd. Karachi v.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Harjina & Company (Pak) Limited.Kar.

Lah.) Havell Shah Sardari Lal v. Karachi [1973] 28 TAX 96 (H.) Highway Petroleum Service (Regd.Kar.C.).Kar.) = 1989 PTD 570 Hatz Trust of Simla v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 8 (Lahore) 1471 1900 1506 297 1157 126. Commissioner of Income Tax (West) Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 66 (H. In re [1943] 11 ITR 128 (Bom. v. Limited.. Karachi v. Case No.) Hira Lal Phoolchand v. Lahore v. 349. v.) Hashmi Can Company Ltd.) Hira Mills Ltd. Justice Iqbal Ahmad. In re [1939] 7 ITR 402 (PC) Himatlal Motilal and Ramanlal Lallubhai v.Dacca) Hemraj Kanji v. 1049 1280. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 179 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). In re [1942] 10 ITR 152 (All.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 309 (Lahore) Home Insurance Company.Lah. Karachi [1989] 60 TAX 8 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 354 (Sind) Henarsidas Jagannath.) Hotz Trust of Simla v. 1861 1319 1715 812 615 821 702 .Kar.) Hon'ble Mr.C. Bell 46 Tax.Kar. In re [1947] 15 ITR 185 (Lahore) Highland Manufacturer (Pak) Ltd.C. Inspector of Taxes) v.C. 211 (HL) Helal Jute Press Limited v. 1423 98. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 Himalaya Assurance Co. Dacca and another [1970] 22 TAX 157 (H. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.M. Rahimyar Khan and 12 others PLD 1999 Lahore 417 Heaton (H. 373 1142 1855 1871 1563 293. Karachi v.C. Karachi [1992] 66 TAX 33 (H.) Hiranand Jairam Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 159 (Bom.) Hotel Methopole Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1974] 30 TAX 203 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 366 (Lahore) Hasan Ali Karabhai v. v.Kar.(lxxiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1043. Cas. Harnand Rai Harbhagat Rai v. 135. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 205 (All.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 297 (Lahore) Hazoor Bakhsh v. 1587 983. Income Tax Officer [1946] 14 ITR 417 (All.Kar. Companies-III. 387 1726 1324 1538. 459. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Hotel Metropole Ltd.C.C. Ltd. v. Punjab & NWFP [5 ITC 8 (H. Senior Superintendent of Police. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Hirala Kalyanmal. Dacca Zone. 249.

) Imperial Chemical Industries India Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax.. Islamabad [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H.) Imperial Tobacco Company of India Ltd. (Pvt. Karachi v.) Hussain Sugar Mills v. Federation of Pakistan and others [1999] 79 TAX 77 (H.(lxxv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.C. Pakistan through Secretary. 1869 1484 1095 373 400.C.Sind) = 1958 PLD 270 Ibrablmbhai Mulla Badruddin v.C. Karachi West. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 211 (Lahore) Hussain Ebrahim Agencies Ltd. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi) = 1960 PTD 747 = 1957 PLD 300 1735 1575 1766 15 1566.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 302 (Nag.Lah. Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 21 (H.) 57 (HL) Hulasilal Ramdayal.Kar.-79) (H. In re [1941] 9 ITR 635 (All. 848 1578 965.G. 1283 1450. Commissioner of Income Tax. [1940] 8 ITR (Suppl. South Zone. 1616 73 9 96 729 . East Pakistan 1963 SCC 150 = [1963] 8 TAX 59 (S.) 1028. Dinshaw 1959 PTD 176 (H. 1952 563 I I.Kar.C.West Pakistan. Ltd. Imperial Tobacco Co. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others [1981] 44 TAX 93 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. 452. [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.-308) (S.Pak.) Ltd. of India Ltd.C. Karachi [1984] 50 Tax 226 (H.Assessments of the Estate of F..C.C.C.) Ltd. Karachi 1958 SCC 37 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-284) (S. Pakistan v. of India Ltd.) Hydri Construction Co. Karachi [1979] 39 TAX 127 (H.) Imperial Tobacco Co. In re [1935] 3 ITR 21 (Cal. The Secretary of State for India in Council [1 ITC 169 (Calcutta)] Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).) Hughes (Inspector of Taxes) v.Kar. Bank of New Zealand [1938] 6 ITR 636 (HL) Hughes v.Lah.C.C.) Hukumchand Jagadharmal v. Ministry of Interior. v.C.) Ibrahim Sons v. v. Utting (B. Karachi 1958 SCC 37 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.C. 1393 175. Ltd.) ICC Textiles Limited v.T. 195.) Hussain Sugar Mills v. Karachi v..Kar. Government of Pakistan. South Zone.Pak) Imperial Tobacco Company of India v.) & Co.Pak. v.E.. Islamic Republic of Pakistan [1981] 44 TAX 59 (H.) Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt. Central. Howrah Trading Co.

. in re [1986] 53 TAX 35 (H. Suleman Bhai Jiwa & others [1970] 21 TAX 62 (Income Tax Digest Feb.C.Pak. Chitnavia [1932] LR 59 IA 290 (PC) Income Tax Officer & another v.C.) International Beverages Ltd.) Income Tax Officer (Investigation) Circle III.) Income Tax Officer. Wesleyan General Assurance Society [1948] 16 ITR Suppl. 761 1140 36. 490 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. 1026 456. 1315. Ch. 1982 53 1988 752. Karachi [1984] 51 TAX 55 (H.) Income Tax Officer. Shaikh Ghulam Shah 1991 SCC 823 = [1991] 64 TAX 91 (S.Pak.) Income Tax Officer & others v. Sheikh Nasim Anwar Dacca 1966 SCC 276 = [1966] 14 TAX 1 (S.) Industrial Management Ltd.Kar.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. 239 1014. 101 (HL) Inspecting Additional Commissioner & others v.(lxxvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Karachi v. Chotabhai Javerbhai [1941] 9 ITR 604 (Mad. Case No.Pak) = 1997 PTD 1485 Inspecting Additional Commissioner v. 1996 SCC 1093 = [1997] 76 TAX 131 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax. Mirpur & 2 others v. Muhammad Bashir [1994] 69 TAX 109 (S.) Income Tax Assessments of the Estate of F. v. 1970) Income Tax Officer & two others v. Karachi and Another v. Ltd. 1562.C.) 1771 567 1429 231..Kar. 566 879 1307 179 1968 811 .Kar.) Income Tax Officer v. Rev.Kar.C.C. Mardan v. 1582 1610 14 850 561.C.E.AJ&K) Indian Radio and Cable Communication Co. Pakistan Herald Ltd. v. v.) = PLD 1978 Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax (East). 763 1301.Pak. Karachi [1978] 38 TAX 5 (H. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 1 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 270 (PC) = AIR 1931 PC 165 Indian Turpentine & Rosin Co. J. Income Tax Assessment of Premier Tobacco Industries Ltd. Karachi and others [1999] 79 TAX 410 (H. 1 = 19 Tax Cas. Duke of Westminster [1939] A.C. 1976 SCC 430 = [1977] 35 TAX 1 (S. v. Dinshaw 1959 PTD 176 (H. v.C. 673 Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Chappal Builders 1993 SCC 1026 = [1993] 68 TAX 1 (S. Sulaiman Bhai Jiwa & Others 1969 SCC 354 = [1970] 21 TAX 62 (S.C. Ltd.) Indus Valley Construction Co. Investigation Circle & others v. Sanaullah Khan & Co.Pak.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 219 (All.C.Sind) = 1958 PLD 270 Income Tax Commissioner v.C. Manry [1942] 10 ITR 205 (All.) Indus Steel Pipes Ltd.) Income Tax Officer.C. Companies-II.Kar.C.

/Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Commissioner of Income Tax.Dacca) Jeffrey (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar.) International Traders Ltd. Casey v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.) 373 1254 1571 1213.. 283. Central Zone. 111 Jamshed Marker Brothers Ltd. In re 2 ITC 12 (Lahore) Islam Jewellers. Gardner Mountain & D'Ambrumenil Ltd.C. v.L. Karachi v. Inspector of Taxes) v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 16 TAX 46 (H. International Body Builders v. 498 (HL) IRC v.C. Anglo Brewing Co.A. Calcutta v.Kar. Ltd. Rolls-Royce Ltd.C. Secretary General v.(lxxvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Gujranwala v. 416 1627 J J.C.M. Karachi [1991] 64 TAX 14 (H.) Jamal v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 259 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 343 (Lahore) 290 144 472. Rawalpindi Zone. Chhaganmal Mangilal [1946] 14 ITR 206 (Nag. v. 1215 972 1214 178 264 1640 1430 1020 371. Rawalpindi [1978] 38 TAX 71 (H. CBR [2000] 81 TAX 88 (H. 69 (HL) IRC v. v. Lahore [1980] 41 TAX 60 (H. Fraser [1942] 24 Tax. Cas.) IRC v. Dacca [1970] 22 TAX 61 (H. The Income Tax Officer and 4 others 2000 PTD 306 ITAT v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and another [2000] 82 TAX 3 (S. Livingston [1926] 11 Tax Cas. Rolls-Royce Ltd.) Islamuddin and 3 others v.Kar.Lah.Pak) Isabella Coal Co. 476 312 67. Textile Mills Ltd.C. [1947] 29 Tax Cas. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 87 (Cal.C.C.M.) J.) Ishar Das Dharam Chand.Lah.C.Kar. Sales Tax Officer. [1925] 12 Tax Cat 803 IRC v. Wei & Co. 318 1503 1040 931 1808 .) = 1999 PTD 4138 J. 40 TC 443 (HL Jewan Shah Maya Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1989] 59 TAX 108 (H.) Jardine Henderson Ltd. Justice and Parliamentary Affairs PLD 2000 S. Law. Haji Abdul Khaliq Soomro and others 1999 PTD 1302 Irum Ghee Mills Limited v. 538 Irfan Gul Magsi v.. The State [PLD 1960 Lahore 1962] Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan.

M.S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 472 (Lahore) Kaiser Jehan Begum v. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 217 (Mad.) K.M.Pak.) = 1992 SCMR 250 Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust v. in re [1945] 13 ITR 263 (Cal. Abdul Kayum Sahib Hussain Sahib v.U.T. 656. Moore [1921] 2 AC 13 (HL) Jones v. 672. South Zone. South Zone. Swarninathan Chettiar v.B.M.N. Mohammad Abdul Kareem & Co.C.AR. v. In re [1938] 6 ITR 494 (All.C.) 674. 778 640 970 1632.G.) K. In re [1940] 8 ITR 179 (Bom. Case No. Mody.Pak. Arunachalam Chettlar v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 375 (Lahore) 938 1279 686 1256 731 1597 1247.) Kalyanji Vithaldas v. (East). Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 296 (Lahore) John Emery & Sons v.N.) K.M. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 61 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 344 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 90 (PC) Kamran Industries.T. Karachi and two others [1981] 43 TAX 92 (H. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar.A.T.) Jyotirindra Narayan Sinha Chowdhury.) K.S.K. In re [1940] 8 ITR 179 (Bom. Ltd.) = 1981 PTD 53 Jullundur Cooperative Transport Society Ltd.) Kangra Valley Slate Co. 665.Kar. 1255 1090 637.Kar. 1733 386.C.) Kahan Chand & Klshan Chand v. v. Karachi South 1991 SCC 777 = [1992] 65 TAX 102 (S. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 168 (H.) Jupudi Kesava Rao v. Lord Advocate [1936] 4 ITR 8 (HL) John Smith & Son v.C. v.G. 673 377 1624 . Income Tax Officer. Circle XVIII. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 418 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 652 (Mad.H. Income Tax Officer 1977 SCC 442 = [1977] 36 TAX 7 (S. Leeming [1930] AC 415 (HL) Jugal Kishore Mukat LaI. Collector of Customs (Exports) Karachi and Others [1995] 72 TAX 223 (H. 1659 515 K K. Jitumal Chamanlal v. Income Tax Officer Circle XVIII.) Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust & others v.M. 677 1297 1584 1216 636 806. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 412 (Mad.) K.) Jutharam Jankidas v.C.(lxxviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Mody.S.

Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar.) Khan Muhammad Yakub Khan & Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 419 (Bom..Kar.C.Kar.C.Kar. Karachi [1989] 59 TAX 104 (H.) Karachi Gymkhana. Ltd. In re [1941] 9 ITR 627 (All.Kar.) Karachi Industrial Corporation & 3 others v.Lah. 883 908 1513 509 450 693 287 . Islamabad and another [1999] 80 TAX 24 (H. 1484 696 992 1175 1490 109.Lah.Lah.(lxxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) Kedar Narain Singh v.) Kashmir Feeds (Pvt.C. Lahore [1979] 39 TAX 6 (H.C. 1767 143 399 193.C.) Kashmir Cap.) Karachi Hospital Ltd.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 675 (All.C. Club Road.) Kawther Grain (Pvt. v. 372. 1302. Central Board of Revenue through Chairman. 1917. Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] 83 TAX 383 (H. House. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 73 (H.) Karachi Steam Navigation Co.C. Karachi [1986] 53 TAX 1 (H.C. Karachi v. Karachi & Another [1983] 47 Tax 162 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & 2 others [1998] 77 TAX 1 (H.AJ&K) Kheraj Obbeya v. 843. Kaniram Ganpat Rai v. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 157 (A1l. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi Zone [1997] 75 TAX 90 (H.) Khurram Saghir Industries.) Khairpur Textile Mills Ltd.C. Government of Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax 1974 SCC 424 = [1975] 32 TAX 170 (S.. 764 1005 1021. Karachi v. v.Kar.) Ltd. 1937 839. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar.) Kantisen Mohanji Ganjawalla & Bros. v.) = 1999 PTD 1655 Kassam Haji Abbas Patel v.) Kanwalnen Hamir Singh v.) Karim Aziz Industries Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 445 (Bom.) Karachi Textile Dyeing & Printing Works.) Khairati Lal Babu Lal.. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Gujranwala [1999] 80 TAX 262 (H.Pak) Karachi Sind Development Corporation v. v.) 1478. Lahore Zone. Karachi v.) Ltd.Lah.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 332 (Pat. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 18 (H.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 18 (H. v. 1918. Lahore v. Contractors Circle. 1619 1777 337 129 1662.C.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). Income Tax Officer. West Zone. Karachi [1978] 38 TAX 120 (H. Textile Dyeing and Printing Works. Lahore [2001] 83 TAX 489 (H. v. Zone-A. Commissioner of Income Taxx. (East).C. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 308 (Lahore) Khawaja Textile Mills Ltd.) Karachi.C.

Case No.Lah.) Kumar Jagadish Chandra Sinha v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 322 (All.M.) L.R. 1682 535. 681 L L. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 35 (PC) Lahore Ice Factories Association v. In re [1942] 10 ITR 370 (All.B.) Kohinoor Raiwaind Mills Limited and others v. Income Tax. Central Board of Revenue through Member.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 416 (Rangoon) Lachhman Das Brijballabh Das. Firm v.Hira Lal.Kar. Karachi v.T. Government of Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 546 (Cal. Lahore v..M.Pak. Karachi [1933] 57 TAX 134 (H.) Lachhman Das v. 1463. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 222 (Lahore) L.) Kokine Dairy v. 1484 949 1542 1962 1417 914.C. Government of Pakistan through C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 145 (Rangoon) Kruddsons Limited. [1994] 70 TAX 11 (H.C. Lahore [1973] 27 TAX 253 (H.) Kohinoor Industries Ltd. 492 481 964.. Lahore Zone. Killing Valley Tea Company v. v. Inspector of Taxes) 1451. In re [1942] 10 ITR 186 (All.) Kohinoor Industries Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 398 (Lahore) L.C.) Kunjamal & Sons.S.C. Islamabad and 2 others [2000] 82 TAX 539 (H.Pitamber Prasad. Commissioner of Income Tax. In re [1945] 13 ITR 512 (Lahore) L. Islamabad [2001] 83 TAX 17 (H. & others [1987] 56 TAX 35 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1955] 28 ITR 732 (Cal.) Kumar Deba Prosad Garga v.C. Perry (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 569 (Lahore) 302 777 322 413 1400 809 234 544 1769 491. Secretary of State [1 ITC 54 (Calcutta)] Kishandas Sakuio v. Commissioner of Income Tax. v.C.N.) Kunwar Kartar Singh v.Lah. v.) = 2000 PTD 3351 Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 362 (Lahore) Laidler v.Bani Mal DaIal v. 877 519. In re [1941] 9 ITR 358 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax `A' Zone.R. Gadodia & Co. 1623 685 643 1133 .Lah.(lxxx) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.Lah.) Kohinoor Industries Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 1974 SCC 416 = [1974] 30 TAX 138 (S.C.) Kunwar Bishwanath Singh v. Government of Pakistan etc.

Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 647 (Bom.) Leather Connections (Pvt.) Lakshmi Narain Gadodia & Co. Central Board of Revenue.) Linga Reddi v. 412 Lakshmi Insurance Co.Kar.P.W. v.-274) (H.F. Islamabad through its Chairman [2000] 82 TAX 42 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1950] 18 ITR 984 (Lahore) Lakshmi Narain Gadodia & Co. In re [1943] 11 ITR 491 (Lahore) Lal Jagmohandas Rastogi v. 1550. 1274 893 692.) Ltd. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax. Lahore v.) 235. IRC [1943] AC 377/25 TC 107 (HL) Laxmidas Devidas & Vannji Ruttonsey v. In re [1940] 8 ITR 187 (All. Ltd.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 35 (Oudh) Lala Indra Sen.(lxxxi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 358 (Lahore) Lal Muhammad Abdul Sattar & Co.C. [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Hyderabad [1996] 71 TAX 156 (H. In re [1943] 11 ITR 491 (Lahore) Lakshmi Narayan Sen & Sons Ltd. In re [1936] 4 ITR 255 (Cal. v. v. Cas. Lakhshmi Insurance Co.C.) Lowry (Inspector of Taxes) v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1988] 58 TAX 48 (H. of Pakistan. Dacca [1969] 20 TAX 21 (H. 693 236.) Ludlow Pakistan Co. 1519.) Lokamanya Tilak Jubilee National Trust Fund. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 274 (Oudh) Lal Mohammed Sardar Mohammad v. v.) Leather Connections (Pvt) Limited v. 88 (HL) Loyal Motor Service Co. Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd.C Kar. Sylhat v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Lah.. Ltd.) 1154 680 1359. [1940] 8 ITR Suppl.Dacca) Lungla (Sylhat) Tea Co.. Punjab and N.) Latilla v. 1551.. Commissioner of Income Tax Dacca Circle Dacca 1970 SCC 366 = [1975] 31 TAX 64 (S.. The Central Board of Revenue Govt.C.C. 1574 1057. Ltd. 333 (HL) Lever Brothers Pakistan Limited v. Dacca v. 1934 1207 1495 529 592 1331 1364 1856 110 . In re. Ltd.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 414 (Bom. 1341 654 866 1966 1696 523 1269. Jones (Inspector of Taxes) [1930] 15 Tax..Pak. Islamabad [2001] 83 TAX 1 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 363 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Leeming v. [1942] 10 ITR 26 (Bom.Lah.) Lal Suresh Singh v.

Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 177 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax.Dacca) Madan Mohan Muflick & Bros. M M.C.) Ltd.C.) Mahanth Sah Thakur Dayal Sah v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 221 (PC) Macnabb v.. 836 1830 1365 881 1751.) Mabarajah of Plthapuram v.C. 1366 1027 1041 953 1621 853.) Maharaja Kumar of Vizianagaram. In re [1934] 2 ITR 186 (All. 969 1907 1772 1126 63. 669 487 530. In re [1941] 9 ITR 573 (Cal.K.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 201 (Nag. Dacca 1969 SCC 340 = [1970] 21 TAX 8 (S.Lah.Lah. 644. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 188 (Pat.A. In re [1938] 6 ITR 315 (Cal. Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 115 (H.J.T. Dacca [1961] 4 TAX 147 (H. v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Pak. Federation of Pakistan [1998] 77 TAX 79 (H. 1088.B. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 393 (All.) M.) M.Hogg v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 14 (Oudh) .M.) Mahabir Prasad Munna Lal v.) M. v.H.S. North Zone.M.) Macneill & Barry Ltd. Lahore [1975] 31 TAX 156 (H.Kar.A. and others v.) M.E. Case No.. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 505 (Mad. In re [1934] 2 ITR 186 (All. Calcutta v.T.) Maharaj Bag Club Ltd.Lah.) Sahi Bahadur v. Commissioner of Income Tax.) M.L. Somasundaram Chettiar v.M. Income Tax Officer.Pak. Lahore [1979] 39 TAX 176 (H. 1625 1634 707 664. Hameed Masood and Associates.S.) Maharaja of Kapurthala v. Hazari and Sons v.R. Narayanganj Company (Pvt. 1396 976 518 936 Maharaja Kainakhya Narain Singh v.) Magniram Bangor & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 182 (Rangoon) M.C.) Maharaj Sir Pateshwari Prasad Singh v. East Pakistan. 1970 SCC 370 = [1971] 23 TAX 223 (S.C.(lxxxii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 181 (Oudh) Maharaja Guru Mahadeo Ashram Prasad Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 281 (Pat.. Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan. Multan v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 306 (Lahore) Macneill & Barry Limited v. Chettyar Firm v.) Maharaj Kuinar of Vizianagaram.Rehman.

Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 158 (Pat.) Maulana Mohammad Ibrahim Riza Malak v.U.) Major Conville v.) Maharani of Bardwan v. Government of Pakistan 1967 SCC 295 = [1968] 17 TAX 1 (S. Karachi [1991] 64 TAX 19 (H.Pak. Karachi [1978] 37 TAX 204 (H. in re [1940] 8 ITR 378 (Cal. Rawalpindi [1980] 42 TAX 33 (H.) Maharajadhiraj Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab Bahadur of Burdwan. Krishna Kamini Dasi [14 ILR PC 365] Mahmeed (Private) Ltd.) Manufacturers' Life Insurance Co.) Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. 545 890 495.Lah.C.(lxxxiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 202 (Bom. Income Tax Officer. 1080 619. 844.) Maharajah of Pithapuram v. Inspector of Taxes) 57 TC 330 (HL) Manager.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 221 (PC) Maharajhumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh v.) Malik Muhammad Akram Khan & Co. Drummond (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. of Canda v. Radhika Mohan Roy Wards Estate. Maharaja of Kapurthala v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 486 (PC) Maulvi Brothers.) 487.C. In re [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. v.M.C. 920 255 1923 915 498. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 42 (Pat.) Mask & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 454 (Mad.) Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. v. Collector of Customs. 897 1963 60. Jhelum [1977] 36 TAX 216 (H. Karachi v.) Mandviwalla Motors Limited.C. In re [1938] 6 ITR 434 (All.C.) Mallalieu v. Quetta and Another [1990] 61 TAX 12 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 237 (PC) Maharani Janki Kuer v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 321 (Bom.Kar.C.) Maqsudal Hossain v. 917 527. Central Zone `B'. 820 1649 491.Quetta) Major A. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 74 (Oudh) Maharaja of Patiala v. 755 1635 576 849 . Commissioner of Income Tax 1 ITC 303 (Pat. 492 42 1726 751. Lyallpur v.Lah. 537 516 512. 1138 1079. Johit. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 404 (Lahore) Malik Mir Hassan Khan v.

C. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [1998] 78 TAX 299 (H.. Sheikh v.) Messrs Neelam Textile Mills Ltd.) Mian Abdul Qayyum v. Income Tax Officer Contarctors Circle-Il. In re [1942] 10 ITR 512 (Cal. 1158 1921 632. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 203 (Lahore) 1828. Lahore v. Gujranwala v. Commissioner of Income Tax Investigation Lahore 1980 SCC 474 = [1981] 43 TAX 105 (S. etc.C.) Mehran Associates Ltd. Islamabad and 3 Others [1997] 75 TAX 192 (H. Dacca [1960] 2-TAX (III-88) (H. v. Federation of Pakistan [1993] 67 TAX 195 (H.C. Contractors v. 454 1193.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1 = 1959 PLD 907 Metro Shipsreakers and another v.) Mian Anwar-ul-Haq Ramay v. v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance.Lah. Rawalpindi [1980] 41 TAX 148 (H. Lahore [1982] 45 TAX 2 (H.Pak) Mian Channu Factories Union v. 1573 1827 1738 132 444 316. Lahore Zone Lahore [1977] 36 TAX 82 (H..) Mela Mal Shiv Dayal v.C.Pak) Mian Aziz Ahmad.(lxxxiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.Lah.) Mian Aziz A.Lah.) Mian Aftab Ijaz v.C.C.) Mian Aziz S.) Mercantile Bank of India (Agency) Ltd.C. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Investigation Lahore 1989 SCC 718 = [1989] 60 TAX 106 (S. 1829 286. Lahore [1979] 39 TAX 1 (H. 433] Messrs Octavious Steel & Company Ltd. Ministry of Finance. Case No.Quetta) Meraj Sons. 1334 813 631 1971 439. Rawalpindi Zone [1981] 43 TAX 149 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 126 (Lahore) MeIa Mal Shiv Dayal v.C. 2012 581 344 1008 376. Pakistan through the Secretary. [1996] 73 TAX 85 (H.Pak) Mehran Flex International Industries (Pvt. 1991 108 690. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 329 (Lahore) Melamal Shib Dayal v. Islamabad. Sheikh v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 638 (Bom.C. v. State Bank of Pakistan and 2 others [PLD 1999 Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Ltd.Lah. Commissiiner of Income Tax.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1407 .C. Megna Industries Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi 1992 SCC 980 = [1992] 66 TAX 246 (S.Queeta) Metro Theatre Bombay Ltd.Lah. 1408. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah. v.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 206 (Lahore) Memoona Ahmad v.C. Rawalpindi Zone.

) Mian Muhammad Mansha v.Lah.) Ltd. Zone-B. Commissioner of Income Tax (East).Lah.) Muhammad Din And Sons. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. 266.(lxxxv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Company Circle 12.C. Lahore [1982] 45 TAX 21 (H. etc. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [1998] 78 TAX 173 (H. Commissioner Of Income Tax.C. 1075 1992 716 863 1586 629 1889 1648 694 978 134 2006 1089 1081 1932 1825 .Kar.Lah.) Miran Bux Karam Bux Ltd. Ross 40 TC 11 (HL) Muhammad Aslam v. etc. Lahore Zone.) 1764 356 1748 49 1349 64. Sahiwal [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 1962 PTD 603 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 65 (Mad.Lah.C.) Mobanpura Tea Co.) Millowners Mutual Insurance Association Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore [1979] 39 TAX 14 (H.Kar. Faisalabad v. Income Tax Officer Company Circle. Central Board of Revenue. v.) Mian Muhammad Bashir v.) Muhammadi Textile Mills Ltd.) = 2001 PTD 1180 Millat Bottles Store.C.) Mitchell and Edon (H.C. 1074. Lahore [1996] 73 TAX 247 (H. Mian Ghulam Murtaza v. Lahore And Another [1973] 27 TAX 229 (H.Kar.Kar. Chairman Municipal Committee. Inspectors of Taxes) v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 412 (All.) Modern Silk Mills Ltd. [1986] 53 Tax 109 (H.C. In re [1941] 9 ITR 610 (All. Lahore v.Lah.C. Ltd. v..) Mirza Book Agency v. Karachi and 2 others [1975] 31 TAX 125 (H. v. Lahore and 2 others [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H.) Muhammad Ayub Mohammad Jamil of Cawnpore. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 7 (Bom.) Muhammad Asghar. v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.M.C. In re [1937] 5 ITR 118 (Cal. Karachi [1982] 45 TAX 140 (H.Lah. Ltd.) Muhammad Younas v. Central Zone `C' Karachi [1990] 62 TAX 20 (H.C.) Minister of National Revenue v. Faisalabad and 2 others [1979] 40 TAX 113 (H. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Pakistan).) Mian Muhammad Allah Buksh v.Lah.Lah. Catherine Spooner [1933] 1 ITR 299 (PC) Minsararasam Co. Lahore v.. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1989] 59 TAX 68 (H.) Mian Muhammad Khalil v. Income Tax Officer.) = 1990 PTD 240 Micropak (Pvt.C Lah.C.Lah. Lahore v.

1201 663 27 923 125 . Commissioner of Income Tax.) Mothay Camp Rem v. Capital Development Authority.). Samina Ayub Khan v. Fatima Bibi C/o Crown Bus Service. Islamabad [1998] 78 TAX 168 (H.) Mohini Mills Limited v.C..C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 154 (Nag.Lah. 1596 482 1406 330 1133 1083 1191 1537 1445 1212 1845 1052 1069 833 1248. East Pakistan.Dacca) Moin Sons (Pvt. 351 (HL) Morris Jacob And Company v. Lahore [1962] 6 TAX 1 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 470 (Rangoon) Mrs.) Mrs. Rawalpindi 1980 SCC 527 = [1981] 43 TAX 18 (S.Kar.C. Govt. Qudsia Begum. Commissioner of Income Tax [1996] 74 TAX 141 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] 17 ITR 473 (PC) Mohanpura Tea Co. 392.) = 1962 PTD 625 = 1962 PLD 809 Mst. Dacca v.Lah.AJ&K) Mst. v.) Motor Union Insurance Co. North Zone (West Pakistan).) Mst. 1263 373 295 107. In re [1937] 5 ITR 118 (Cal. Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 155 (Pat.. In re [1946] 14 ITR 534 (Bom. House Building Finance Corporation [PLD 1999 Lahore 462] 1556.C. Dacca [1968] 18 TAX 13 (H.(lxxxvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.) Mothay Gangaraju v.) Moss Empires Ltd. Ltd.C.) Mrs. 1199. Commissioner of Income Tax. Hafiz Naeem-ud-Din [1997) 75 TAX 261 (H. Mohanlal Hargovind of Jubbulpore v. Dacca [1965] 12 TAX 64 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 272 (Bom.C. Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 261 (H.) Mst.) = 1997 PTD 821] Mst. Fazal Be and 6 Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 149 (Mad.) Mst. Lahore v. Saeeda & others v. Rawalpindi v. Pannabal v.) Morgan v.M. Sooniram Poddar v.Pak. Ltd.) Motichand & Devidas. Tasneem Kausar v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. of Pakistan & another [1977] 35 TAX 180 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 137 (All.Kar. Inspector of Taxes) 42 Tax Cas. IRC [1937] AC 785 Motamal Jehumal v. Tahmina Daultana v.Dacca) Mrs.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax. Perry (H. Ltd. Sarju Bai v. East Pakistan.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 58 (Mad. v.

Commissioner of Income Tax.) Muhammad Amjad v.) Muhammad Saleem Chotia. Ghazanfar Ali & Others [AIR 1920 Lahore 247] Muhammad Khan v. Mirpur and 2 others [1992] 66 TAX 226 (H. Bahawalnagar and 4 others [PLD 1999 Lahore 446] Muhammad Saleem v. Chairman Municipal Committee.C. 2007 1168 751.C.) = PLJ 1984 Lah.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 280 = 1960 PLD 298 1186 687.-146) (H. Zafar Iqbal Owasi.C.Kar.) Muhammad Naseem Ahmad and 18 others v.AJ&K) Muhammad Jameel and another v. Lahore [1984] 50 TAX 37 (H. 423 Muhammad Hayat Haji Mohammad Sardar v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1930 687 62 1104 1167 133.) = 2001 PTD 1474 Muhammad Jameel Khan v.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 184 (Mad. Lahore [1983] 47 TAX 16 (H. 2001 PTD 795 Muhammad Hanif Monnoo v. Advocate v.Pak.C. 465 Muhammad Younus v.Lah.C. 385 296 382. Commissioner of Income Tax East Zone Karachi [1991] 63 TAX 143 (H. Advocate.C. Arunachalam Chettiar v.) Muhammad Aslam v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Sahiwal [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H.S.Lah. PTCL 2000 CL. 755 324 80 224.(lxxxvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Lahore [2001] 83 TAX 158 (H. 1928. Income Tax Officer. 755 429 316 369 751.C. Government of Pakistan and 4 others.) Mufti Mohammad Aslam Khalifa Mandi v.) = 1991 PTD 658 Muhammad Bashir v. v. Punjab & NWFP [5 ITC 159 (H. AR. Zone `A' Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 176 (H. 697 163 415. Shamsuddin and others 1969 SCC 319 = [1975] 31 TAX 94 (S.) = 1992 PTD 513] Muhammad Ansar etc.Lah. Multan and another.C. MTT.C.Pak.) Muhammad Yousuff v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 26 (All. Miss Azra Feroz Bakhat and 78 others 1967 SCC 295 = [1968] 17 TAX 1 (S. Administrator Town Committee Kabirwala District Khanewal and 4 others [2000] 81 TAX 60 (H. Income Tax Officer [1995] 72 TAX 1 (H.Lah. Income Tax Officer Central Circle 1. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 412 (All.C.) Muhammad Jameel v.Lah.) Muhammad Azim v. Deputy Director FIA/CBC.Kar. East Pakistan [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah.) Muhammad Khan and Others v. Income Tax Officer. Zone-B.) Muhammad Ismail v. 247 1805 .C.) Muhammad Hanif and 21 others v. Miss Azra Feroz Bakht and 58 others 1967 SCC 295 = [1968] 17 TAX 1 (S.Pak.C.AR.

A. 623 1668 1600 . Lyallpur v.) Nagina Silk Mills.Kar.) Nagina Dal Factory through Allah Ditta. Karachi [1974] 29 TAX 125 (H. In re [1945] 13 ITR 457 (Lahore) Multiline Associates v. Karachi v..V. Kelkar & D.) N. Prop.Pak 423] Munir Ahmad & Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 13 TAX 141 Mukund Sarup v. In re [1946] 14 ITR 181 (Lahore) 1357 591 62 411 113.C.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 65 (Bom.Kar.Kar. Ltd. Muhammadi Oil Trading Co. 254.C.Kar.) = 1963 PLD 385 Mujibar Rahman. Income Tax Officer & others [1990] 61 TAX 159 (H. 555. Regional Commissioner of Income Tax. Ltd. 1896 1899 732 93 506 910 305 447 667 84.(lxxxviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 229 (Pat. Shamim & Co. Partner v. Case No.C. A-Ward. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 495 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax 1963 PTD 271 (H.) Muhammadi Steamship Company Ltd.C.C.Pak. Dacca [1966] 13 TAX 141 (H.) Nand Lal Bhoj Raj. v. Vidwans.. Income Tax Officer.) Mustafa Prestressed R. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Kar.Dacca) Mujibur Rehman v.C.) Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) through Deputy Convener. Lyallpur and Another 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 16 TAX 107 (H. v. through Partner.C. Philips Glocilin Peufabrikan v. Trustees of the Kesari & Mahratta Trust v.) Mustafa R.Lah. 828 Muhammadi Steamship Company v.S.) = 1998 PTD 3900] Musammat Radha Kuer v. 246.) Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co.) Multan Electric Supply Co. Karachi [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H. 265. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 303 (Nag. Quetta v.C.C.C.C. Ardeshir Cowasjee [PLD 1995 S.C.C. Gilani & Co. 283.C. Ltd. 318 N N. Federation of Pakistan [1998] 78 TAX 217 (H.C. Karachi v. Income Tax Officer.V. Ministry of Interior PLD 2000 S. 111 1986 72.C.C. Pipe Works.Kar. and another 1968 SCC 316 = [1968] 18 TAX 1 (S.) N. (Central) Karachi 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S. Karachi and Other [1994] 70 TAX 204 (H.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan. 226. Southern Region. Dacca v. 336 768 67. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.) = PLD 1966 S. Senator Aftab Ahmad Sheikh v.Pipe Works Ltd. 229.C. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Investigation).

) Naseer Mughis Ltd.) Nasir Industries.Lah. Sheikh v.Lah.) National Food v. Shaikh & 4 others v. Commissioner of Income Tax Gujranwala Zone [1996] 74 TAX 89 (H. v.) Navab Sons. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance.(lxxxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 121 (All. Islamabad [2000] 81 TAX 352 (H.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 628 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax. South Zone. 662 1153 164 599. v.Kar. Islam Madni.) Ltd.C. Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation) Lahore & others 1992 SCC 894 = [1992] 66 TAX 55 (S.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 486 (Bom.) = 1992 PTD 621 Naseer A. Karachi v. Karachi [1985] 51 TAX 37 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.) National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd. through Mr.) Naseer A. (Pvt.) Narain Das Bhagwan Das v.C. 250 National Cooperative Supply Corporation Ltd.C.Pak.Lah. 1229. v.Kar. The Assistant Commissioner Tax etc.) National & Grindlays Bank Ltd. v.Kar.) Ltd.C.) Native Share & Stock Brokers' Association v.) National Beverages (Pvt. v. Gujranwala v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 336 (Bom.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1991] 64 TAX 60 (H. West Pakistan.) = 1998 PCTLR 1382 Nathu Sao v. In re [1939] 7 ITR 452 (All. 1044 974 1820 557 562. Federation of Pakistan and Others [1998] 78 TAX 1 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1976] 33 TAX 121 (H.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 44 (PC) National Petroleum Co. Lahore [2001] 83 TAX 40 (H. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 135 (Lahore) Narayan Atmaram Patkar v.C.) Nasir Mahmood Dar.) National Electric Co. Nand Ram Chhotey Lal v.) Nandlal Bhandari Mills Ltd. Ltd.C.) = PTCL 2001 CL. 1120 653.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 238 (Bom. Federation of Pakistan and others [2001] 83 TAX 359 (H. 1999 PCTLR 387 1441 1037. etc. v. 711 453.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 463 (Nag. v. 1251 1055 1783 128. 810 41 713 1726 1435 1336 419 . Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 84 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).C. General Manager v.

) Nazir Ali M. Commissioner of (Investigation). Commissioner of Income Tax [1989] 60 TAX 45 (H.C. East Pakistan. Karachi v. Ltd.Dacca) = 1963 PTD 161 = PLD 1964 Dacca 373 . 487 540 1778 1938 107 758 1724 1723 323. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi v.) New Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd. 1911. Lahore v. 460 (HL) Nirala and Co.C. Ltd.Kar.Kar. 227. Commissioner of Income Tax [1973] 90 ITR 243 (Delhi) New India Assurance Co.C.(xc) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1910. Income Tax Officer.) Income Tax 501 478. 1912 354 Nizam-ud-Din Amir-ud-Din of Lahore. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 356 (Oudh) Nawabzadi Mehar Bano Khanum v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East). v. v.) New York Life Insurance Co.Kar.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax [1990] 61 TAX 71 (H.C.. Lahore [1978] 37 TAX 199 (Lah. Karachi [PLD 1999 S. Dacca 1960 PTD 1121 (H. 829. Karachi [1974] 29 TAX 143 (H.) Nazar Muhammad v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.) Nawaz Agencies. v. Dacca [1963] 7 TAX 113 (H.C.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies I. M-Circle. v.. National Bank of Pakistan.) Neelarnegham Pillai v. v. Calcutta v.C. Case No. Ganji v. Rawalpindi 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S. 343 1205. 240. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 295 (PC) Nawab Nawazish Ali Khan v. 1126] New Samanbagh Tea Co.C. 1352 1824 714 1973 310. Ltd.) New Asiatic Insurance Co.C.) Noor Hussain. 1217 1210 700. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 99 (Cal.C.H.) Nishat Talkies Karachi v. Styles (Surveyor of Taxes) [1889] 2 Tax. Karachi [1994] 69 TAX 71 (H.Kar. 1909. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 809 (Bom. Dacca v.Dacca) = 1960 PLD 823 New Snow White Dry Cleaners.Kar. Nawab Habibullah v. Karachi [1984] 51 TAX 11 (H. v. In re [1943] 11 ITR 443 (Lahore) Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. 1202 202. Secretary of State for India [1937] 5 ITR 424 (Mad. Cas. The State [1982] 45 TAX 52 (H.) = PTCL 1989 CL 660 Nishat Textile Mills Ltd.

[1951] AC 291 (HL) 1293 1320 816. In re [1940] 8 ITR 236 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 82 (Rangoon) P.M.L.Pak.(xci) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) Nrisinga Chandra Nandy. Tobacco Securities Trust Co.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 1993 SCC 1073 = [1993] 68 TAX 19 (S. Dacca 1960 SCC 93 = [1961] 4 TAX 1 (S.S.) Octavius Steel & Co. 398. In re [1937] 5 ITR 233 (Cal. Hutheesingh & Sons Ltd.M. Ministry of Finance 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S.) Pak Company.) Novitas International v.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 662 (Mad..C.C.C.RM.OM.) P. Ministry of Finance [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. 198 20.) 92 (HL) Official Assignee for Bengal (Estate of Jnanendra Nath Pramanik). v. Cook [1941] 9 ITR (Suppl.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562 Pak Industrial Development Corporation v. Varier v.O. 2401 8. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 540 (Mad. 397.P.) 955 957.Pak.Pak. Lashmanan Chettiar v. Ltd.M. 1904 1333. Ltd.C.Pak. v. v.) O. through the Secretary. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 628 (Mad.Kar. Income Tax Officer and others 1991 SCC 819 = [1991] 64 TAX 86 (S. MulIick v. Abdul Rahman & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax. 437 . 1868 1065 1420 1867 1389 2155. 1905 1980 1549 O O. Federation of Pakistan.R.S. Pakistan through Secretary. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 653 (Bom.C. Nooruddin Moosaji v.) North British & Mercantile Insurance Co.) P. Chettyar Concern v.S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 206 (PC) P. In re [1937] 5 ITR 349 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1972] 25 TAX 156 (H.) 1749 1726.M. In re [1936] 4 ITR 428 (Cal. v.Pak. Sargodha v. Rawalpindi Zone 1985 SCC 620 = [1985] 51 TAX 181 (S.C. Aich.RM. MaIlick & D.C. 1032 1650 1184 587 P P.R.) Packages Ltd.) P. v.PL.) Pak Industrial Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 200 (Mad.C.M. Muthukaruppan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Oppenheim v.) Odbams Press Ltd.

v.C.Kar. of Pakistan through Chairman & Secretary Revenue Division Islamabad [1993] 67 TAX 311 (H. 390. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).Kar. Islamabad and others [1993] 67 TAX 311 (H. Ltd. Ministry of Finance 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S. Federation of Pakistan etc. Government of Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. v.) Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v.C. Govt. v. 1235 1996 370 1063 321 1233 608. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance.) Pakistan Industrial Development Corp.C. through Chairman & Secretary. Karachi [1983] 47 TAX 155 (H.Kar.) Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v.Kar. 885. through Managing Director v.Kar.) = 2000 PTD 263 Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd.) v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East).C. Pak Packages Ltd.Kar.C. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance.Kar.C. Karachi [1987] 55 TAX 59 (H.. Karachi Commissioner of Income Tax [1980] 41 TAX 44 (H.C. etc. v. Karachi. 1949 204 17 748. Case No.) = 1999 PTD 4061 Pak. Revenue Division. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Others [2000] 81 TAX 224 (H. Islamabad. [PLD 1967 SC 1] Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. 997.Kar.(xcii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others [2000] 82 TAX 135 (H.C.Pak. through Directors v.C. Karachi v. [1980] 42 TAX 122 (H. Karachi [1978] 37 TAX 130 (H. Etc.C.C.Kar.C.) Pakistan Hardcastle Wand (Pak) v.) = [1993 PTD 804] Pakistan Electric Fittings Manufacturing Co. Commissioner of Income Tax [1975] 32 TAX 225 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax (East).) Ltd.C. 690 Pakistan Cement Pipe Construction Company v.) .) Pakistan Gum Industries Ltd.) Pakistan Educational Society. Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision) Karachi 1993 SCC 1029 = (1993) 68 TAX 49 (S. v. 1001 825 1402 838 869 Pakistan Industrial Engineering Agencies Ltd. v. Karachi [1991] 64 TAX 105 (H. 814. Educational Society Karachi v.C.Pak) Pak-Arab Fertilizers (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax [1973] 28 TAX 115 (H.) Pakistan Burma Shell Ltd. Government of Pakistan.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah. v.Kar. v.C. Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary. [1998] 78 TAX 234 (H.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562 Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation.) = PTCL 1998 CL.Lah.Lah. 1398 180 412 121. Central Central Zone-A.) Pak Services Ltd. Islamabad and 4 others [2000] 81 TAX 119 (H.

280.Kar.C. (Central). Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance & 3 others 1992 SCC 946 = [1993] 67 TAX 222 (S.C.) Pakistan Seamen Contributory Welfare Fund Karachi v.Kar.) 1073 23. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 74 (Nag. v. v. Karachi [1982] 46 TAX 31 (H.C.) = 1999 PTD 2901 Pakistan Services Ltd. Karachi v.C.Kar. Central Zone `C' (COS-1) [1999] 80 TAX 106 (H. Ltd.Pak. 568 1234 1520 209 1385 1688 112 1687 1124 1384 1493 1373 159.C. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 130 (H.Kar.C.Kar.Pak. Central Zone `C' (COS-1) [1999] 80 TAX 106 (H.) = PLD 1976 Lah..Kar. Lahore Zone. Central Provinces [2 ITC 69 (Nagpur)] Paramount Electric Company.) = 1999 PTD 2901 Pakistan through Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. Lahore v.Lah. Ltd. v.) Pakistan Petroleum Limited.C. Lahore [1976] 34 TAX 92 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone).) Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. 1147 Parashram Chintaman Joglekar v. Central Zone. Lahore Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision). Commissioner of Income Tax.) Pakistan Lyallpur-samundri Transport Co. Lahore v. Karachi v.) Pandit Pandurang v. Karachi [1984] 49 TAX 205 (H.C. Karachi v. Karachi v.Kar.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Majestic Cinema 1965 SCC 220 = [1965] 12 TAX 15 (S. Ltd.) Pakistan Services Ltd. Karachi 1993 SCC 1029 = [1993] 68 TAX 49 (S.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax. Central Zone `A'.) Pakistan Services Ltd.) Pakistan Services Ltd. Karachi v. Ministry of Finance. Karachi [1986] 54 TAX 150 (H.) Pakistan Tobacco Co. 867 1979 1257 . Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision). Karachi [1985] 52 TAX 90 (H.C.) Pakistan Services Limited v. Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 98 (H.Lah.C. Islamabad and 4 others [1991] 63 TAX 163 (H.Kar.) Pan Islamic Steamship Co. v.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. 1372 1692 170.) Pakistan Tobacco Co. v. Ltd.(xciii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Lahore [1982] 46 TAX 143 (H.. Commissioner of Income Tax. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & 2 Others [1993] 67 TAX 400 (H.C.Kar. Income Tax Officer Salary Circle and others.) = 1991 PTD 359 Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. Karachi [1990] 62 TAX 34 (H. Pakistan through The Secretary..

57 TC 219 (HL) Pfizer Laboratories Ltd.) Pokardas Dwarkadas. Karachi [1979] 40 TAX 109 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1993] 68 TAX 193 (H.Dacca) Phra Pbraison Salarak v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 38 (Mad).C.Kar. Ltd. v. 1300 1308 1447.Dacca) Pioneer Sports Ltd. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 116 (H.M. Khosla. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 363 (PC) Pondicherry Railway Co. Commissioner of Income Tax (West). Inspector of Taxes) v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Prag Naraln v.) PR. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1931 PC 165 PR. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 214 (H.) Philips Electrical Co.M.C. Dacca] v. v. Mutbukaruppan Chettiar v.-14) (H. Central Zone `C'. Karachi Bench) = 1960 PTD 786 = 1957 PLD 68 Pondicherry Railway Co. Case No.M. Dacca [Official Liquidator. Commissioner of Income Tax. v.AL. Karachi [1992] 65 TAX 323 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. Sind and Bluchistan [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.C. Muthukaruppan Chettiar v. Federation of Pakistan [1998] 77 TAX 172 (S. Stale Bank of Pakistan. Commissioner of Taxes (South) Zone.AL. 946. Commissioner of Income Tax [1995] 71 TAX 224 (H. 1810 1304 1470 . East Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 110 (Mad. Ltd.C. Ltd. 1819 1821 1491 1009 831. 991. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 305 (Lahore) Poibani Dolls v.C..Dacca) Pettison (H. Dacca [1993] 68 TAX 149 (H. ln re [1945] 13 ITR 157 (Lahore) Partington v. v.) Pioneer Bank Ltd.Kar. Mitford. (In Liquidation).) Perfume Supply Co.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 237 (Rangoon) Pimpa (Pvt) Limited v.Pak) Pheroz Ali v. Attorney-General [1896] 4 HL 100 PD.(xciv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.) 1598 878 1146 1077 1892 872 269 1853 776 959 1787 1849 1817. Dacca v. Parma Nand Haveli Ram. Karachi v. v. Marine Midland Ltd. v.C. In re [1945] 13 ITR 436 (Lahore) Peragon Silk Mills Limited v.Kar. 1784. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 76 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 216 (Lahore) Pioneer Sports Ltd.West Pakistan.C.C.

v.Kar. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [1997] 75 TAX 1 (H.C. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullick AIR 1925 PC 139 Premier Construction Co..C. v.) Probynabad Stud Farm.C. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 183 (H.. Dr. P. Mardan In re.) Prime Commercial Bank and others v. 29] Printers Combine (Mercantile) Ltd. Ltd. v.) 1314. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 380 (PC) Premier Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 355 (Lahore) Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 21 (Bom. Seth Bansilal Abirchand v. 1296 1652 18. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 338 (Nag.Kar. Commissioner Of Income Tax [1967] 16 TAX 112 (H. 1541 1327 .C.) = 2000 PTD 1288 Queensland Insurance Company Ltd. Azizul Islam [PLD 1963 S.C.B.) = 1997 PTD 605 = PTCL 1997 CL.Pak 296] Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. [1965] 12 TAX 8 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. Karachi [1995] 72 TAX 67 (H. 824 Q Qasim Ali and others v. 1908 1803 536. v.(xcv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.B. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 184 (Lahore) Punjab Small Industries Ltd.Lah. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo of Ratugarh [1941] 9 ITR 313 (Pat. Lahore [1995] 71 TAX 220 (H.Kar.) 642 463. Karachi (West). Zone VI. Karachi v.) Province of Bihar v.. 572 1268 538 491 307 912 1291. Lal Choudhury [1945] 13 ITR 309 (Pat. 553. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 318 (Nag. Bansilal Abirchand v.Lah. 497 1713 1022 318. v.) R. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 635 (PC) Punjab National Bank Ltd. Ltd.) 1198 1718 R R.. Karachi [2000] 81 TAX 458 (H.Kar.C. In re [1936] 4 ITR 114 (Lahore) Provident Investment Co.C.) Province of East Pakistan v.) Premier Sugar Mills and Distillery Co.C.) Province of Bihar v.Lah. Karachi v. Companies-Ill. Commissioner of Income Tax.

Commissioner of Income Tax.) Rafhan Maize Products Co. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1948 PC 259 = [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) Raja Pratap Bikram Shah v.) Rais Ghazi Muhammad Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 458 (All.C.) Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (Partner of Shabbir Cotton Factory Walhar. Commissioner of Income Tax. 759 465. Seth Ganga Sagar Jatia v.) Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. 1484.) R. East Pakistan 1960 SCC 80 = [1960] 2-TAX (III-211) (S.) Raj MaI-Pabar Chand v. Mirpurkhas and 3 others [1978] 38 TAX 117 (H.(xcvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax. Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 673 (Pat) Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. R. Ltd. ITAT [1947] 15 ITR 16 (All.Lah.) Raja Bahadur Major Raja Durga Narain Singh v. 900.C. 926. 532 949 412. 1646 626 1963 216 1633 2008 1852 1866 1479 937 842.C. Tehsil Sadiqabad) v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 66 (Lahore) Radhashyam Agarwala v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 683 (Pat. 919. 486. 187 Radhey Lal Balmukand.B. 1487 950.Lah. 539 488. 1284. Commissioner of Income Tax [1988 SCC 663 = 1988 PTD 571] Raghunath Das Govind Das v.) R.Pak. Lahore [1982] 45 TAX 9 (H.Kar. Lahore Zone. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 513 (PC) Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Naraln Singh v.Pak) = PLD 1960 S.C. 471.) Raja Bejoy Singh Dudhuria v. Assistant Income Tax Officer. 490. 511. In re [1942] 10 ITR 131 (All. Munshi Gulab Singh & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 135 (PC) Raja Habib Ahmad Khan v.) Rahmat Jan Muhammad Haji Dossal & Sons v. v. 1643. Income Tax Officer 1972 SCC 400 = [1974] 29 TAX 208 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 577 (Lahore) Raja Babadur Kamakshya Naraln Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 98 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All.S. Lahore [1975] 32 TAX 22 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 788 (Oudh) 1361 1455.B. 1285 889 487.C. 489 . Seth Ganga Sagar v.C.

Ltd. Punjab and NWFP..)(FB) Raja Shiva Prasad Singh v. 1305. v. Commissioner of Income Tax.-41) (Judicial Commissioner. [1945] 13 ITR 430 (Lahore) Ramkinkar Banerji v.) Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v.Lah. 1955 SCC 1 (Federal Court) = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 249 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 137 (Lahore) Ramji Das Saint & Co. In re. Calcutta v..29) (Federal Court of Pakistan) = 1960 PTD 994 = 1955 PLD 418 Ramkumar Kedarnath v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC I (PC) Raja Raghunandan Prasad Singh v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 374 (Rangoon) 942. 1841 1123 . Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 1 (All.) Ram LaI Bechairam v. Nawanshahr v. 984 891 1309 1660 671.) Ramkola Sugar Mills & Co. 1306 1845 892. 1016.. Commissioner of Income Tax (East) Karachi [1983] 47 TAX 214 (H. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 108 (Pat.. 1017. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] 17 ITR 394 (Punj. Raja Probhat Chandra Barua v. 479. 223 Raleigh Investment Co. 1800. In re [1939] 7 ITR 607 (All. Ltd. Punjab N.) Rajnagar Tea Co. 973 477.) = PTD 1976 Lah. 1609 1010 308.P. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 15 (Pat.C. East Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Ram Rakha Mal & Sons Ltd. Dacca 1960 PTD 1121 (H. 905. Ltd. 899.(xcvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.) Ram Khelawan & Sahu Thakur Das. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 292 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Rawalpindi [1976] 33 TAX 1 (H. 1116. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 113 (PC) Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. 1187. Ltd. 1018 971. v. Gujranwala v.Kar. 540 949 491 884 1205. Lahore..Dacca) = 1960 PLD 823 Rajput Metal Works Ltd. 1352 1498 1054 172 1272.) Rangoon Electric Trarnway & Supply Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 63 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 261 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 111 (Pat.F.) Ram Chandra Munna Lal v. v.) Rajah Inuganti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim Bahadur Varu v. Province [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.W. Governor-General in Council [1947] 15 ITR 332 (PC) Raleigh Investment Co. v. Peshawar) = 1952 PLD 28 Ramkola Sugar Mills Ltd.) Ram Narain Lal v. 1743 894.

Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 561 (All. Dacca v. v.C. 1588. Income Tax Officer. Income Tax Collector [1933] 1 ITR 227 / AC 368 (PC) Rijaz (Pvt. Commissioner of Wealth Tax Lahore [1992] 68 TAX 89 (H.) Rani Bhubneshwari Kuar v.Kar. v. Wealth Tax Officer Circle-III Lahore [1996] 74 TAX 9 (H.) Rayalu Ayyar & Co. v.Lah. 928. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1606 94 1794. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 727 (Mad.) Rarnratan Das and Madan Gopal. Strick (Inspector of Taxes) [1946] AC 295 Rehman Corporation v. 903.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 10 (Rangoon) Rao Saheb A. Dacca [1965] 11 TAX 176 (H. 841.) 840. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 76 (Mad. In re [1940] 8 ITR 1 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1833 1872 1631.) Rani Tara Kumari Devi v.Lah. Madras [2 ITC 107 (Madras)] Rathna Tea Estate. Proprietor.West Pakistan.) Ltd. Rani Amrit Kunwar v. Rathan Singh Motor Service.) Rashid Akhtar & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 787 (Oudh) Rao Bahadur Mothay Gangaraju v. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore [1980] 42 TAX 168 (H. 929.) = 1990 PTD 889 Reyaz-o-Khalid & Co.. Circle `A'. 293 . Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 235 (Oudh) Rani (Miss) v.C. 1661 1562 1933 421. 1117 660 153 505.C. Madura v. Ltd. v.) Regent Oil Co. Karachi Bench) = 1959 PTD 119 = 1958 PLD 220 Rhodesia Railways Ltd.Dacca) Rawji Dhanji & Co. 2002 433 773 1190. Pakistan & others [l960] 2-TAX (Suppl.Pesh) = 1997 PTD 1805 Republic Motors Ltd. Alaganan Chetty v. Ramanatha Reddlar v.C. v.) Rani Anand Kuuwar v. etc.S. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 294 (Mad. Income Tax Officer & Others [1990] 62 TAX 8 (H.C. In re [1935] 3 ITR 183 (All. Case No.(xcviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 550 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 44 (Mad. 843. 921 487 1259 1564 1642 1057 200 1602. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance.C. [1997] 76 TAX 138 (H.) Rao Bahadur S.C. v.-114) (H.Lah. 1603 83.) = 1985 PLD 787 Rehmania Hospital v. Mirpurkhas & another [1985] 52 TAX 169 (H.) Rathan Singh.) Ratan Singh v.

) 1391 1064 1413 332 1792 745 1878 1166 .) S.) 1882 1286 1328. Yousuf and Brothers v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East). Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 173 (PC) RM.AL. Commissioner of Income Tax.RM. Central Zone. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 177 (Mad. Lahore 1982 SCC 584 = [1982] 46 TAX 133 (S.) S. CBR & 2 others [1985] 52 TAX 123 (H. v. RM. Karachi v. AR. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 14 TAX 161 (H.C. The Secretary of State for India [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] Royal Exchange Assurance. 258. IRC [1924] 8 Tax Cas.) S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 97 (Mad.Kar.) S.) Rulia Mal-Ratinak Ram v..A. Arunachalam Chettiar v.C. v.A.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 186 (Mad.Pak.L. Secretary of State [1 ITC 363 (Calcutta)] Roshan Cloth House v.L. Chidarnbaram Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 464 (Mad.S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 254 (Mad. Chellappa Chettiar v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 398 (Rangoon) S. Ltd. Karachi [1983] 47 TAX 148 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 329 (Lahore) Rustam F. Commissioner of Income Tax.AR. AR. South Zone. Rivoli Theatres.Marimuthu Pillai v.M. v. Cambatta v.) Roger Pyatt Shellac & Co.Kar.Kar..) S.N. Arunachalam Chettiar & Son v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1974] 29 TAX 120 (H.C. North Zone.) RM. In re [1941] 9 ITR 589 (Cal. Cousjee & 2 others v. 1440.A.Kar.RM.) Royal Insurance Co. 671 Roberts Cotton Association Ltd. 1875 1871 1500 1428 298 1791 33.) S. 100.(xcix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.S. 1809 44 S S.S.C.N. AR. 301 1236 1726 1456.CT.A. Karachi [1989] 59 TAX 37 (H.AR. 1485.) RM. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 748 (Bom.) Rowe & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 282 (PC) Robert Addle & Sons' Colleries Ltd. Annamalai Chettiar v.C.Kar. Abdullah v.AR.M. Firm v. Arunachalam Chettiar v. Karachi and another 1971 SCC 388 = [1975] 31 TAX 55 (S.C. v.

In re [1942] 10 ITR 259 (Pat. Collector of Customs and Central Excise/Commissioner of Sales Tax. and Another v. Case No.R. CircleB. 1332 886 736 933 1755 171 1756 1847. Karachi [1979] 40 TAX 116 (H.C.) Sadiq Traders Limited v. Rabwa v. Somasundaram Chettyar v.Quetta) Sante International (Pvt.) S.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 396 (Pat. [1999] 80 TAX 9 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 451 (Rangoon) Sachindra Mohan Ghosh v.) S.Lah.) S.) Saifuddin Ghulam Ali and Sons v. [1995] 71 TAX 45 (H. Zone `A' Lahore [1996] 73 TAX 106 (H.C. Income Tax Authorities [1993] 68 TAX 173 (H.) Sanaullah Khan etc.M. Karachi v.S. 1595 . Subrahmanyam Chettiar v. Central Board of Revenue etc. Brice. v.C. v.) Ltd.) Sadar Anjuman-i-Ahmedia.C.) S. 1023 423 1592. Zone-B.S. Subrahmanyan Chettiar v.) Ltd.) Sainrapt & Et.Kar.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 504 (Oudh) 1130 1258 1294 909.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 88 (Mad. 1311. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. S. in re [1933] 1 ITR 379 (Oudh) Sameer Electronics v.) = 1997 PTD 819 Sardar Bahadur Sardar Singar Singh & Sons v.Lah. 1978 455. Mittra.) Saleem Automotive Industries (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax (West).C. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 297 (Mad. 1862 380 420 521 427. v. Chockalingam Chettiar & Sons v.) S. Peshawar and 3 Others [1995] 72 TAX 274 (H. In re [1935] 3 ITR 114 (Cal.M.(c) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.V. Commissioner of Income Tax [1987] 56 TAX 98 (H.Lah.V. Lahore and Another [1997] 75 TAX 259 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 278 (Mad.S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1990] 61 TAX 76 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1934] 2 ITR 295 (Mad.L. v.C.Moharned Jamaluddeen & Bros.S.) S. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 484 (Mad.C.C.) Saif Nadeem Electro Ltd.Warwick Smith v.Lah.C.R. v.) Sadhucharan Roy Chowdhry.Pesh. 347.) = PLD 1979 591 Saleem and Co.) Saltanat Begum. 1879 428 1999 88. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah. Province of Balochistan etc.M.K. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi [1977] 36 TAX 117 (H.R.

(ci) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. 1298 653. In re [1941] 9 ITR 25 (All.C. North Madras Mutual Befit & Co [1 ITC 172 (Madras)] Mahammad Faruq. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 441 (Oudh) Sarfraz Khan. Ramanathan Chetti. Commissioner of Income Tax [1966] 14 TAX 203 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 375 (Nag.) Seth Mathra Parshad v. Seth Khemchand Thaoomal [1 ITC 26 (Sind) Secretary to Commissioner Salt v. V. In re [1947] 15 ITR 209 (All. Sardar Saheb Sardar Singar Singh & Son v. In re [1934] 2 ITR 155 (All. Ltd.) Sarupchand Hukamchand.) 676 1084 725. v. v.M. Karachi v.) Secretary of State v.C. Karachi [1963] 7 TAX 209 (H. In re [1945] 13 ITR 245 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax.) = 1963 PTD 413 = 1963 PLD 499 Seth Kaluram Kankaria. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance & Another [1994] 69 TAX 79 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 420 (Bom.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 244 (Lahore) Seth Nathusa Pasusa Lad v.) Seth Kanhaiyalal v. Meyyappa Chettiar [1936] 4 ITR 341 (Mad.Kar.Lah. In re [1938] 6 ITR 1 (All. 734 1842.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 59 (H. v.) Sarwar & Co.) Seth Adam Haji Peer Mohammad v. minor by guardian [1 ITC 37 (Madras)] Secretary to the Board of Revenue (Income Tax) v. 790 670. George Thompson & Co.) Seth Kanhaiya Lal Goenka. 1622 779 781. Lahore [1977] 35 TAX 15 (H. & Others [1997] 76 TAX 1 (H.R. C. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 129 (Nag.Kar. 1843 188 1859 1953 292 260 727 97. 662 474 .Lah. Ramanathan Chetti.) Ltd. 101 303 257 1267 871 1273.) = 1976 PTD 361 Searle Pakistan (Pvt.B.) Seth Gurmukh Singh v.C.) Seth Ganga Sagar.) Secretary of Commissioner Salt v.) Sarupchand v.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 393 (Lahore) Seth Ismail Jamal Budhani v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 739 (All. [1927] 13 Tax Cas 83 Schazoo Laboratories Ltd. 1317 255 1888 793.) Seth Sheolal Ramlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax. minor by guardian [1 ITC 37 (Madras)] Secretary of State for India v. 733.Kar.) Scates v.

Lahore v.Lah. Circle XI. Income Tax Officer (Investigation). etc. v.C. 1993 1466 .Dacca) = 1967 PTD 774 = 1964 PLD 304 Shamim Ali and others v.) Shib Lal Ganga Ram v. 551.Lah. 1768 772 442 1488 1601 338. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 425 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax [1938] 6 ITR 485 (Pat.) Sh. Rawalpindi Zone (West Pakistan) [1974] 29 TAX 64 (H..C. Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary Finance. Lyallpur v. Lahore v. Lahore and another [1976] 34 TAX 31 (H.C.) Sh. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 240 (Nag. Karachi v.C.) Shahid Hameed.Pak. Income Tax Officer. Faisalabad v. Seths Basant Rai & Takhat Singh v. Company Circle 12. Govt. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITR 442 (All.) Sheikh Akhtar Ali v.Lah.) Sheikh Miran Bux Karam Bux Ltd.Lah.Lah. CBR & others [1969] 19 TAX 198 (H. Lyallpur v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1941] 9 ITR 224 (Lahore) 1196 441 339. Gulberg. Circle III. Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax. Islamabad and others [1992] 66 TAX 85 (H.Kar. Karachi [1976] 33 TAX 99 (H. Dacca and another [1963] 7 TAX 358 (H.Lah.Kar.C.C.C.) Sher Muhammad and 2 others v. Income Tax Officer. Abdul Hakeem v. Income Tax Officer. Centeal Board of Revenue.) Shoaib Bilal Corporation. Commissioner of Income Tax. Diwan Mohammad Mushtaq Ahmad.Pak.C. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others [1980] 42 TAX 47 (H.) Shyam Chambers Ltd.(cii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Faisalabad and anohter [1993] 67 TAX 233 (H. 627 770 1472 751.) Shaikh Naseem Anwar v. of Pakistan and another [1973] 27 TAX 51 (H. Miss Azra Feroz Bakhat and 80 others 1967 SCC 295 = [1968] 17 TAX 1 (S.) Sh. 1736 1981.C. Zone B Lahore 1989 SCC 715 = [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax 9 ITC 350 (Bom.) Sheosheyamal HiralaI v.C.) = 1974 PTD 28 = 1974 PLD 59N22 Shafqat Rasool v.Lah.) Shamsher Ali Abdul Hussein v.) Shagufta Begum v. [1975] 31 TAX 105 (H. 412 404. Income Tax Officer. 755 528 605.Lah.) Shankar Shambhaji Gangla v. Lahore [1976] 33 TAX 227 (H. Karachi v. Film Circle. Jhang and another [1968] 18 TAX 105 (H.C. 625.C.C.) Shirin Ayub Khan.C. 460 552 1995 366. 402 215.) Sheikh Mohammad Amin. Commissioner of Income Tax.Lah. Ihsan Ilahi & Co.

-90) (H.Lah. 201.) Som Chand Maluk Chand v.Pesh) Siemens Pakistan Engineering Ltd.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 11 (Mad. Karachi And Another [1983] 47 TAX 158 (H. Lahore [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. v.) Sri Hardeo Bengal Salt Co. Ltd.Kar.) = 1960 PTD 1235 = 1951 PLD 413 Siva Pratab Bhattadua v. Central Board of Revenue and 3 others [1975] 31 TAX 114 (H. Provinces. Commissioner of Income Tax and others [1964] 9 TAX 273 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax [1950] 18 ITR 998 (Punj.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 110 (Pat.) Siemens A. 196. Karachi v. & Halske v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 382 (Lahore) South Indian Industrials Ltd. Federation of Pakistan & Other [1999] 79 TAX 605 (H.) Sir Kameshwar Singh v.Kar.) Sir William Roberts Timber Co. Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 246 (Pat.) 383 906 181. v.C.) Sind Industrial Trading Estate Ltd.C. Companies Circle XIII.Kar. 1553 282. Ltd. 406. v.Kar.) = 1999 PTD 1358] Simplex Rubber Manufacturing Co. v.) Souvenir Tobacco Co. 1482 1861.) Sir Sobha Singh v.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 344 (Pat.) Sovaram Jokhiram v. 1042 155 875 1448. 389. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 13 (Pat. 1902 1322 1438 994 993 1011.) Singer Sewing Machine Co.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H. Siddique Trust v.G. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 210 (Bom. v.C.) Sir Sarupchand Hukamcband v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 15 TAX 53 (H.F. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 100 (Bom.) Sind Trading Company v.) = 1964 PTD 554 Sir Chinnubhai Madhavlal v.W. Income Tax Officer and another [1987) 56 TAX 120 (H. Punjab and N.Kar. 827 183.Kar.. Commissioner of Income Tax [1 ITC 323 (Madras) Sobhagmal Nemicband v.C. Ltd. Income Tax Officer.) Sidheshwar Prasad Narayan Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 108 (Bom. 1870 819 1092 987 . v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central Zone) [1988] 57 TAX 24 (H. 603 316 1770 174. Baramula v.(ciii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No.

) Sultan Textile Mills Limited v.C. Government of Punjab [NLR 1999 Tax 176] Syed Guulam Abbass Shah v. Sri Rajah Ravu Venkata Mahipathi Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur. Okara v. 256 520 1620 152. Ltd. Karachi [2001] 83 TAX 113 (S. Collector of Gujrat [1 ITC 189 (Lahore) Sundrabai Saheb v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1940] 8 ITR 619 (Mad. 215 (HL) Sudalaimani Nadar v.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax and another [2001] 83 TAX 132 (H.C.Lah. North Zone (West Pakistan).Kar.) Sun Newspapers Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax (Investigation).C. Commissioner of Income Tax. and the Associated Newspapers Ltd. Companies-V. Karachi [1970] 22 TAX 163 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central). Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 210 (Lucknow) Syed Mohammad Isa v.) Syed Akhtar Ali v.C. 1053 16 396 1076 1969 502 .Kar. Lahore [1973] 28 TAX 185 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. v. Mirpur and 3 others [1985] 51 Tax 157 (H. Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] ITR 445 (PC) Sriman Madhwa Siddhanta Onnahini Nidhi Ltd.) Strong and Company of Romsey Ltd.) Syed Mohainmad Mehdi v.C.(civ) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Karachi [1986] 53 TAX 169 (H.) Sutlej Cotton Mills Limited..Kar. Ltd. v.) State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt. Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax [1997] 76 TAX 110 (H.AJ&K) Syed Mahmood Shah v. Woodifield [1906] 5 Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax Hyderabad [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H.) Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. 219. Dacca 1968 SCC 313 = [1969] 19 TAX 97 (S.Lah.C.C.Kar. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 5 ITC 493 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax [1974] 30 TAX 27 (H.) Star Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Income Tax Officer.Pak.Pak. v. v.) Ltd. 559.) Steel Brothers and Company Ltd. London v.C. 1693 1780 1579 95. Cas. 1779 1763 422 412 1303 982 1525.) Syed Bhaies Pvt.Lah.) 486 1343 208. LR 337 Sundar Das v.) = 1997 PTD 1104= 1998 PCTLR 520 (H. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 61 Corn. v.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 267 (All.) Star Vaccum Bottle Manufacturing Co.. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 317 (Mad.C.

375.Lah.C.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.C.Pak. Islamabad and another [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H. [1999] 80 TAX 62 (H.) Tariq Sultan & Co. 417 1605 780 244 1518. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 319 (Cal.) Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies Ltd. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.. Foster v.C. 393 217 263 102 720 .Kar. Sales Tax Officer D-Circle Lahore [1972] 25 TAX 145 (H. 122. 258 (Ch. Punjab & NWFP [5 ITC 288 (H.Kar.Kar.B.-308) (S. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 435 (Rangoon) Tahlia Ram Amir Chand v.C. Ltd.C. Karachi [1967] 15 TAX 199 (H. v.) The Bhikanpur Sugar Concern In re: [1 ITC 29 (Patna)] The Central Board of Revenue. of India Ltd. Revenue Division and Chairman.D) Thakar Datt Sarma v. Central Zone `C'. Government of Pakistan. Karachi [1990] 61 TAX 4 (H.) T. v. 1580 1195 570 1255 130. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 345 (Lahore) Taimur Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Talchar Sabai Grass Trading Co.O. Commissioner of Income Tax.) = PLD 1959 S.Lah. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1939] 7 ITR 154 (Lahore) Tharparkar Sugar Mills Ltd.C.) Tarak Nath Bagchi v. Karachi 1958 SCC 37 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.Pak) = 1999 PTD 2174] The Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Ibrahimsa Ravuttar v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1976] 34 TAX 151 (H. Federation of Pakistan and others 1999 PTD 4037 (H.K.(cv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. C. Islamabad and others v. v.C. Lahore v.E. In re [1923] 1 Ch. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 33 (Mad. Sheikh Spinning Mills Limited.) The Bharat Insurance Company Ltd. v. South Zone.) Taj Din Maula Bux. T T. Lahore and others [1999] 80 TAX 79 (S.C.) TetIey. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 202 (PC) Tejpal Jamna Das v. 125 507 1844 1436 177.C.Kar.) Tanveer Textile Mills Ltd. v.) Tapal Energy Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax 10 ITC 234 (All. Commissioner of Income Tax.R. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 455 (Pat.Kar.Qta. 251 442 791 1697 118. etc. v.) Tar Mohammad And Company v.

) 388 1597 1972 127.C. Richard Evans & Co. 823 1939 705 373 The State v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1986] 54 TAX 155 (H. Smart (H.) Union Bank of Bijapur & Sholapur Ltd.) = PLD 1956 F.) United Bank of India Ltd.C.C. 648.) Tyrer v. In re. 590 85. v.) Trustees of the `Tribune'. Case No.C.Kar. Rekhi v.C. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others [1995) 71 TAX 139 (H.C. Commissioner of Income Tax 7 ITC 323 (Mad. Federation of Pakistan [1998] 77 TAX 127 (H. Income Tax Officer [1950] 18 ITR 618 (Punj. Inspector of Taxes) 52 Tax. Cas. [1926] 11 Tax Cas 790 Tri Star Industries (Pvt.Lah. [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.) Ujala Cotton Mills Ltd. 533 (HL) U U.. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies-I.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1036 Unique Enterprises.C.Kar.-3) (S. 586.) Union Jute Company Ltd.AJ&K) United Licence Agency v. Amir Ali [1978] 38 TAX 191 (H.C. Karachi & 5 others [1999] 79 TAX 255 (H. 1775 1507 .Dacca) = 1960 PTD 768 = 1960 PLD 621 United Builders Corporation Mirpur. The Federation of Pakistan 1955 SCC 13 (Federal Court) [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Commissioner of Income Tax [1937] 5 ITR 703 (Mad. 588.C.. 199. 649. Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan 1957 SCC 34 = [1959] TAX (III-290) (S. 1931 1143 Trustees of the Port of Karachi v.265) (H.Kar.Kar. 72 115 191 114. [1985] 51 TAX 237 (H.) Ltd.C.Lah. 1411 583. 589. The Provincial Library & Others v. Commissioner of Income Tax Muzzafarabad [1984] 49 TAX 34 (H. Income Tax Officer etc. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. 1954 943 1038 131 740 185. Lahore v.) Thomas v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax.) = 1998 PTD 3923] Trichinopoly Tennore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. & 8 others v.M. In re [1942] 10 ITR 21 (Bom.Pak) The Punjab National Bank Ltd. Punjab & NWFP [2 ITC 184 (Lahore)] The Punjab Province v. 652.Pak. Ltd. 641. v.) Union Bank Ltd. Dacca [1960] 2-TAX (III-454) (H.C. Narayanganj.(cvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.) U. 585. v. Central Board of Revenue and another [1990] 61 TAX 30 (H.Lah.C. In re [1939] 7 ITR 415 (PC) 709.C.Chengalvaroya Mudaliar v.

) Vir Bhan Bansi Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 96 (Mad. Karachi (in the matter of) v.) Usher's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 32 (Bom.) V. v.Kar.S. v.C.. Ltd. Ltd. Somasundaram Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax 8 ITC 171 (Rangoon) V. 529 Van den Berghs Ltd.) Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 4 ITC 318 (Bom. Ltd. Bruce [1914] 6 TC 399 (HL) 19. Karachi [1986] 53 TAX 137 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.) Vallambrosa Rubber Co. 469 (HL) Usher's Wiltshire Brewery. Karachi 1965 SCC 240 = [1965] 12 TAX 57 (S. Every.) = 1963 PTD 401 = 1963 PLD 487 Upper India Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 ITC 428 (Mad.C. Farmer [1910] 5 Tax Cas.Ramaswamy Ayyangar v.G.S.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax [1963] 7 TAX 184 (H. Karachi [1988] 57 TAX 155 (H. South Zone (West Pakistan).C. Clark [1935] 3 ITR 17 (HL) Vedathannl v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1933] 1 ITR 70 (Mad.. Bruce [1915] AC 433.) Vallabhdas Karsondas Natha v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1936] 4 ITR 111 (Lahore) 1024 1636 969 744 659 594. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 263 (All.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1935] 3 ITR 152 (Bom. 1382 1085 600.) Universal Engineering Co. 1188. 1270. Karachi v.(cvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Case No. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 597 (Mad.) Vellanki Lakshmi Narasayamma Rao Bahadur (Sree Raja) Zamindarini of Tiruvur v. Ltd. 1266. Karachi [1988] 57 TAX 160 (H.C.) United Netherlands Navigation Co. Commissioner of Income Tax. United Liner Agencies of Pakistan Ltd. Firm v. Central Zone. v.) V.Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax. 1496 1059 1508 808. v.A.Kar. Karachi and others v.R. In re [1937] 5 ITR 216 (Cal. 595 1451 1563 862 662 522 1963 .Kar.) Vallabhdas Murlldhar v.) United Liner Agencies. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central).S. 1276 1576 1604 V V.) United Lines Agency Pakistan Ltd.K. 1271.

(cviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax. Ltd.. In re.) Zafar Usman v. (Pak. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 272 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan. Income Tax Officer etc. v.C. Shaukat Afzal & 4 Others [1993] 68 TAX 145 (S. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 240 (PC) Wallem & Co. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 559 (Bom. 52 TC 242 (HL) 2295 722. [1989] 59 TAX 86 (H.C.C. Chittagong v. 846 426 746 .Lah.) Yasin (East Pakistan) Ltd. Inspector of Taxes) v. Lahore v. CBR through Chairman.C. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 822 (Bom.Kar. & Co. Ltd. v.) Wallace Bros.M.C.C. v..C. Government of Pakistan. [1938] 6 ITR 44 (Bom. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 470 (Mad.) Ltd. Case No.Kar.C. 881 1854 412 828 1720 854 1221 Y Yagappa Nadar v. Ltd. [1988] 58 TAX 29 (H. 159 (HL) Willingale (H.) Westminster Bank Ltd. Dacca Zone and another [1969] 20 TAX 44 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax [1974] 30 TAX 34 (H.) Wealth Tax Officer & Other v. Vissonji Sons & Co.) = 2000 PTD 303 Zam Zam Traders v. 832. Karachi [1984] 50 TAX 233 (H. Income Tax Officer.) 1437.Dacca) 1823 434 232. & Co. Lahore [1974] 29 TAX 53 (H.Kar..C. etc.) Wallace Bros. Islamabad and 2 others [2000] 82 TAX 275 (H. v. 785 739. v. Riches [1947] 28 Tax Cas. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak) West Pakistan Road Transport Board. Karachi v.Kar. (Central). 1439 1585 W Wali Traders v.Dacca) 534 1516 Z Zafar Saleem Bros. Ltd.Lah.) Zahur Textile Mills Limited v.) Western India Life Insurance Co.C. Dacca [1968] 17 TAX 126 (H.) Zeenat Textile Mills (East Pakistan) Ltd.. Income Tax Officer [1996] 74 TAX 21 (H.Lah. International Commercial Bank Ltd.) Vithaldas Thakordas & Co.

Income-tax Act. 2(68) read with 2(26) 2(7) 2(9) 2(10) read with 2(66) 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 41(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(4) I. 2001. I.T. Income Tax Ordinance. 1922.A. VII of 1918. 2001 . 1979 and Income Tax Ordinance.T. Income Tax Ordinance. 1922 1 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 2(1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 2(1) 2(3) 2(4) 2(5) 2(1)(2) 2(1)(2) 2(2) 2(3) 2(3A) 2(6) 2(2) Omitted 2(7) 2(8) 2(10) 2(4) 2(4A) 2(11) 2(12) 2(5) 2.A.T. 1918. 1979 & Income Tax Ordinance. 1979 I. 1918 1 I.T.O. Income Tax Act. 2001 Following is a comparative list of Sections and Provisions of Income Tax Act.(i) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Comparative Table of Income-tax Act.O. XI of 1922. (5A).

A. 2(19) 2(1) 2(6AA) 2(6AAA) Omitted Otiose 2(21A) 2(25) 2(26) read with 80 2(6B) 2(6BB) 2(6C) 2(22) Otiose 2(24). (29A).T.T.T. I. 2001 37(5) 2(4B) 2(13) 2(14) 2(11) 2(11A) 2(13) read with 209 2(12) read with 80 2(14) 2(65) 2(22)(a) 2(3) 2(5) 2(5A) 2(5B) 2(15) 2(16) 2(17) 2(17A) 2(18) 2(4) 2(6) 2(6A) 2(19) 2(20) 2(20) Exp.O. 1922 I.A.(ii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 2(68) & 74 2(6D) 2(6E) 2(5) 2(3) and 63(1) & 2(27) 2(28) .T. 1979 I. 12(12) 2(26) 2(29) 2.O. 1918 I.

T. 2001 2(6) 2(7) to (13) 2(4) 2(7) to (13) 2(7) 2(25) 2(29) 2(29A) 2(30) 2(9) 2(10) 2(11) 2(12) 2(13) 2(32) 2(33) 2(26) Rev.O. 9. 1922 (2) I.T. 10 . 1979 I. 2(34) 2(36) 2(37) 2(37A) 2(13A) 2(13AA) 2(38) Omitted 2(40) 2(50) to (53) read with 81. 1918 I.A.(iii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.T.T.O. 82 & 83 2(59) 2(63) 2(48) 2(48A) 2(44A) 2(46) 2(34).A. (35) 2(37) read with 81 2(42) read with 80 2(44) 2(42) 2(14) 2(14A) 2(15) 2(43) Omitted 2(44) 2(69).

I.O. Omitted Omitted 12 11(5) & (6) 11(5). 1922 2(16) 2(16A) 2(17) I. 1 9(1) Rev. 1979 2(45) 2(46) 2(8) Rev.(iv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 2 12(1) 12(4) 12(4) Exp.A.T.T. 2 4(1) Ex. 16(1) Pr. 1 4(1) Pr. (b) 3A 3B(1) 3B(2) 3 4 4(1) 4(1) Pr. 222 209 210(3) 3 3 Pr. (6).T. .O. 73(1) 2(40) 101(1) 101(8) 2(54) 4(1) Ex. 3(1A) 4A 5 5(3) I. (a) 3 Pr. 1918 I.A. 2001 207(2) 177.T. Omitted 9(2) Otiose 10(1) 10(3) 11(1) 11(2).

(v) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. I.T. 1979 12(5) 12(5) Exp.A. 4 4(1) Ex. (2) 111(1). 1922 I.T. 3 4(1) Ex. 2(40) . (2) 111(1).T. (2) 4(2A) 4(2B) 4(2C) 4(2D) 4(2E) 4(2F) 13(1)(a) 13(1)(b) 13(1)(c) 13(1)(d) 13(1)(e) 13(2) 13(2A) 13(3) 111(4) 111(5) 53(1) 4(3) 4 4(3)(viii) 4A 14(1) & II Sch. (2) 111(1).T. 8 12(10) 12(9) Otiose 12(8) 12(7) 12(13) 12(14) 12(15) 12(16) 12(18) 72 72(b) 16(1) 16(2) 16(3) 39(2) 39(3). 2001 101(12) 2(23) 101(6) 4(1) Ex. (2) 111(1).A. 1918 I. (4) 111(1). 6 4(1) Ex. 7 4(1) Ex.O.O.

O.T. I. 5(1)(b) 4(1) 4(2). (d) & 3(3). (b) 12(1) 2(55) .A.(vi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 2001 207(1) 208(1) 208(2) 210(2) 210(1) 213 206(1). 1922 4B 5(1) 5(1A) 5(2) 5(3) 5(3A) 5(4) 5(5) 5(5A) 5(6) 5(7) 5(7A) 5(7B) 5(7C) 5(7D) 5(8) 5(8) Pr.T. 133 15 I. 5(1)(c). 3(3) 5(1) 7 Omitted Omitted 8 8 Pr. (c) 3(2). 5A I. 214 130 11(1) 5 6 6 7 7(1) 16(1) 16(1)(a).A. 1979 Omitted 3(1) 4(1). 4(4) 5(1)(b) Rev. 5(2) 5(1)(c).T. 1918 I. (4) 5(1)(b). 5(1)(a) 4(1).T.O.

(f) Omitted 20(1)(c) 20(1)(e) 20(1)(g) 4(1) & 15(1). 2 8 Pr.T.T.O. 23 .(vii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. 2001 12(2) 12(2) 2(21) 2(20) 7(1) Ex. 3 7(1) Pr. 23 17(1). (2)(a) 20(1)(a) Omitted 20(1)(b) 20(1)(c). 23 17(1). 2 I. 23 17(1). 9(1)(v) 9(1)(vi) 2nd Sch 17(1) 18(1) 17(2)(a) 17(2)(b) 19(1).T. 1 7(1) Pr. 1918 I. 7 8 8 Pr.A. (d). 9(1)(iv) Ex. 1922 7(1) Pr.A. 1 7(1) Ex. 23 17(1).(2) 17(1).O. 23 17(1). 1979 40(a) Otiose 46 Omitted 16(2)(b)(i) 16(2)(c) 16(2)(e) 16(2)(e) I. 2 Pr. 1 8 Pr. 4 7(1) Ex.T. 3 8 9 9(1) 9(1)(i) 9(1)(ii) 9(1)(iii) 9(1)(iv) 9(1)(iv) Pr. 2 7(1) Pr.

(2). 9(2) Pr.T. 2001 17(1). I.A.T. 1922 9(1)(vii) 9(1)(vii) Pr.O. 23(1)(iv) 23(1)(iii) 22(1). 23 17(5) 17(6) 17(3) 15(4) 15(5) 9(2) 19(2)(b) 19(3) Exp. 1 9(2) Pr. I. 2 9(3) 9 10 10(1) Omitted Omitted 21 66 22(a) 22(1) 22 Exp. 1918 I.O.T.T. 1 10(2)(iii) Pr. 18(1) 19(1) 10(2)(i) 10(2)(ii) 10(2)(iii) 10(2)(iii) Pr.A.(viii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 10(2)(iv) 10(2)(v) 23(1)(i) 23(1)(iii) 23(1)(v) Omitted Omitted 23(1)(ix) 23(1)(vii) Pr. 2 10(2)(iiia) 10(2)(iiia) Pr. 1979 20(1)(h) 20(2) 20(3) 20(4) I. (11) .

2 10(2)(xi) Pr. (xxii) 30 . 23(1)(vi) 23(1)(ii) 23(1)(viii) Omitted Omitted 25(a) 25(b) 25(c) 25 proviso 23(1)(x) I. 1 10(2)(xi) Pr.A. (xiv) 27 10(2)(xiv) Pr. 3 I.T. 10(2)(xiva) Omitted Omitted Omitted 23(1)(xvii) 23(1)(xxi).(ix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. 1 10(2)(xiv) Pr.T.A.T.O. 2001 28 34(5A) & 70 34(5A) 34(5) 34(6) 29 26(1) 10(2)(xii) 10(2)(xiii) 10(2)(xiv) 23(1)(xii) 23(1)(xi) 23(1)(xii) 23(1)(xiii). 2 10(2)(xiv) Ex. 1979 Omitted 23(1)(v) & 3rd Sch. 1922 10(2)(va) 10(2)(vi) 10(2)(via) 10(2)(vii) 10(2)(viii) 10(2)(ix) 10(2)(x) 10(2)(xi) Pr. 1918 I.O.T. Otiose 3rd Sch.

(x) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. I. 1922 I. (i) 24(1) Ex.T. Rule 8(8)(b) 24(a) 24(c) 24(d) 24(b) 24(h) 24(i) 24(1) Ex. 10(3) 10(3A) 10(3B) 10(3BB) 10(4) 10(4)(a) 10(4)(b) 10(4)(bb) 10(4)(c) 10(4)(d) 10(4)(d) Ex. 1918 I. (ii) 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 .O. 23(2) 3rd Sch.A. (57) 2(60) 27 10(2)(xviii) 23(1)(xvi) 23 20 10(2A) 10(2A) Pr.T.T.T. 2(39). Omitted 3rd Sch. 14 10(2)(xv) 10(2)(xvi) Omitted 23(1)(xv) 23(1)(vii) 23(1)(viidd) 23(1)(viidd) Exp. 2 25 25 Pr. 2001 31 10(2)(xivb) Pr.A. 1979 23(1)(xix) I.O. 1 10(4)(d) Ex.

2001 21 10(5A) 10(6) 10(7) 10(8) 10(8) Pr. 1918 I. 40(1).T.A. (b) and 3rd Sch. 26(c) Otiose Omitted 99 & 100 99 & 100 99 & 100 99 & 100 30(1) and (2) 30(1) and (2) 31(1) 31(2) 31(3) 39(1) 39 39(5). 3rd Sch. 10(9) 10(9) Pr. 30(2)(a) 15(3) 39 12(5) 30(2)(e) . 1922 10(4)(e) 10(5) I.A.T.T.(3) 40(4) 40(5) 12(2A) 12(3) 12(4) Otiose 3rd Sch.O. 1979 24(f) 23(1) Ex.(xi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. Rule 8(7) I.T.O. 10(10) 10 11 11 12 12(1) 12(2) Omitted 22(b) 26(a) 26(b) 26(b) Pr.

2 12B(2) 12B(2) Pr.A. 40(b) 39(2)(b) 39(2)(a) . 177 32(1). 1 12B(2) Pr. 2001 89 37(1) 37(5).T. 13A 14 12 14 and 15 15(1) 15(1) Pr.O.O. 1918 I. 1979 Omitted Omitted 33 27(1) 27(2)(b) Omitted 28(1) 29(2) Omitted 29(1) 29(3) I. 15(2A) Omitted 32(1)(Rev. 174 174 32(3). 75 to 79 37(2) 37(4A) 37(4A) 68 12B(4) 13 13 Pr. Cl. 174 39(1)(a).(xii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1922 12(6) 12A 12AA 12B(1) 12B(1) Pr. 2 13 Ex. 13 Pr. (103) & (109) to (111) 174.) 32(3) 32(2) Omitted 32A 2nd Sch. 2-4 12B(3) I. 1 12B(1) Pr.T. I.T.A.T.

O.T. 1 & 2 15(5) 15A 15AA(1) 15AA(3) 15AA(3) Pr.T.A. (d) 41(2) 41(2) Rev. 2001 62 63 63 63 64 15B(1) 15B(2) 15B(3) 15B(4) 15B(5) 15B(6) 15B(7) 15BB 15C(1) 48(1) 48(2) 48(3) 48(5) 48(6) Omitted 48(7) Omitted 41(1)(f) .O.A.T. 1922 15(3) 15(3) Pr. 1979 45 Omitted 39(3) Omitted 41(1)(a). (b).T.(xiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. Omitted 41(3) 41A 44 44A 44AA 44AAA I. 2 15AA(4) I. 1 15AA(3) Pr. 1918 I.

15D(4) 15D(5) 15E 15F 15FF 15G(1) to (5) I.(xiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.A. 1979 Omitted Omitted 41(1)(f) Ex.O. 41(5) 41(1)(e) Omitted Omitted 43 47(1)(a) 47(1)(b) 47(1)(c) 47(1)(d) Omitted Omitted 47(3) 47(4) Rev.T. 2(14) 47(4) Omitted 42 106 105(1) to (5) I. 1922 15C(2) 15C(2A) 15C(3) 15C(5) 15CC(1) 15CC(2) 15CC(2) Ex. 15CCC 15D(1)(a) 15D(1)(b) 15D(1)(c) 15D(1)(d) 15D(1)(e) 15D(1) Pr.A. 1 15D(2) 15D(2) Pr.T. 2001 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 . 1918 I. I.T.O.T.

(5). 2001 172 & 173 13 16 16(1)(a) 16(1)(b) 16(1)(b) Pr.T.O.O.(6). 1 16(1)(c) Pr. Pt. 12(11) Otiose 69(3)(a) 69(3)(a) 83(4)(a) 83(4)(b) & 83(5)(c) 83(4)(c) 83(4)(a).(7) 90(8) 90(8) 2(33) 93(6) 14 3 and 17 17(1) 17(2) 1st Sch. . 2 83(5)(a) 83(5)(b) 83(5)(e) 16(2) 16(2) Pr.T. (b) 90(4) 90(4) 90(4) 90(1) & (3) 90(2) 90(4). 1918 I.A.T. Pt I.(xv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. 16(1)(c) 49 69(4) Omitted 83(1) & (3) 83(2) 83(4) 16(1)(c) Pr.A. 1 & 2 16(3)(a)(i) 16(3)(a)(ii) 16(3)(a)(iii) 16(3)(a)(iv) 16(3)(b) 16(3)(b) Pr. 1979 107 Rev. I. IV(3) 1st Sch.T. 1922 15GG I.

3) 50(3A) 152(2).T. (3) 151 152(2). 2001 17(5) 1st Sch. 1 18(3B) Pr. Para A. (3) 152(2). (3) 152(2). 2 Omitted Omitted . (4) 17(6) 14A 18 18(2) 18(2) Pr. Pt IV.O. 1922 I.2) 50(3. (d) I. 1918 I.A. 18(3B) 50(3) Pr.O. 18(3) Otiose 50(1) 50(1) Omitted 50(3) 50(3) 50(2) 50(2A) 149(1) 149(1) 152(2).1) 50(3.A.T. (3) 18(3) Pr.T. 18(2A) 18(2B) 18(2B) Pr.T. Pr. 50(3) Omitted 50(3) 50(3.(xvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. I. (3) 152(4) 152(5) 152(6) 152(1) 18(3B) Pr. 18(3A) 18(3A) Pr. 1979 Para A.

T. 2 18(6) 18(7) 18(8) 18(9) 18(9) Ex. Otiose 50(8)(a) 50(8)(b) Omitted Omitted 50(8)(c) 52. 1922 18(3BB) I. 2001 153 233 234 18(3BBB) 18(3C) 18(3CC) 50(6) Otiose 50(5) 50(5A). 86 Omitted 51 50(9) 164 155(3) 158. 1 18(5) Pr.T.A.O. (2) 236 157(1) 18(3F) 18(4) 18(5) 18(5) Pr. 1979 50(4) 50(4A) I. (2) 156 235(1). 160 161 168(1)(a) 168(1)(b) . 1918 I.A.O. (5AA) 50(6A) 148 154(1) to (3) 150 18(3D) 50(7) 50(7B) 50(7C) 50(7E) 50(7F) 50(7H) 155(1).T.(xvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.T.

T.A. 18A(8) 18A(9)(a) 18A(9)(b) 18A(9) Pr.O. (b) 87(1)(a) Omitted 53(3) 53(1) 205(1) & (2) 205(1) & (2) 205(1) & (2) 147(2). 18A(3) & (4) 18A(5) 53(1) Omitted 53(2) Omitted Omitted 53(4) 53(5) 147(5) & (6) 147(8). 1922 18(10) I. (3) & (4) 18A(1) 18A(1) Pr.T. 2001 162 147(2). 1 to 3 18A(2) 18A(2) Pr. I.T.T. (9). 1979 Omitted 52A I. 18A(10) 18A(11) 15 19 and 20 87(2) 87(1)(b) Omitted 87(2) 87(1)(a).O.A. 1918 I. (4) 205(1) & (2) 205(1) & (2) 18A(6) 18A(7) 18A(7) Pr. (10) & (11) 18A(5A) Omitted 83A 86 91 205(3). (3) & (4) .(xviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.

T. (3) 118(4) 119(1) to (4) 118 114(5) 114(6) 176 & 239(2) 176 & 239(2) 114(1). 1979 Omitted 140 Otiose 139 Omitted Omitted I.T. 21A I. 22(1A) Omitted 55(2) 55(2) Exp.(xix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.A.(2) & 118(1) 115(1) 115(3) 115(4) 116(2) 118(6) . 55 4th Pr. 1922 19 19A 20 20A 21 Pr.A. 56 57 61 61 Pr. 22(1A) Pr. 118(2).T. 1918 I. & 143B 55 2nd Pr.O. 55(1) 3rd Pr. 2001 165 165 16 22 22(1) 55(1) 55(1) 1st Pr. 55(1) 2nd Pr. 22(1) Pr.T.O. 1 & 2 55(3) 55A 22(2) 22(3) 22(4) 22(4) Pr.

O. 56 58 59A.O.A. 1918 I. 2001 116(1) 36 115(2) 22(5) 22A 17 23(1) 23(2) 23(2A) 23(3) Omitted 54 59(1). 1 24(1) Pr. 1 23(4) Pr.T.T. I. 93(2).(xx) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 2 23(5) 23(6) 23(7) 23B 63 Otiose Otiose 69(1) 69(2) 7 60 60A 123 11(4). 1979 58(1) 58(2) 58 Proviso I.T.A. 94 24(1) 24(1) Pr. I. (2) 61 67(1) 62 62A 62BB 124(3) 124A 121 137(1) 120 176 & 239(2) 18 23(4) and 24 23(4) Pr.T. 2 34 36(1) 38(4) . 1922 22(4A) 22(4A) Pr.

(xxi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. I. 93(2). 117(2) & (4) 114(3).A. 1979 35. (5) 74(2)(b) 74(2)(a) 72(2) 72(1). 2 24(2A) 24(2B) 24(2B) Pr. 93(2). 1922 24(2) I. 117(1) . 1918 I. 93(2). (d) 24(2) Pr. 36(2) 36(2) Exp. 93(2). (3).T. 114(3) 87. 94 59A.T.A. 36 Exp. (b) 24(2) Pr. 1 & 2 24(2C) 24(3) 24A(1) 24A(1) Pr. (e) 24(2) Ex. 94 58 24(2) Pr. 94 59A. (4). 114(3) 87. 1 24(2) Ex. 24A(2) 24B(1) 24B(2) 24B(3) 25(1) 25(2) 38(7) 38(2) & (5)(a) 38(3) 38(5)(b)(c) 36(2) Ex. 112 56 38. 145 87.T. 94 59A. 114(3) 114(3). 1 & 2 Otiose Omitted 81(3) Omitted 81(2) 74(1). 2001 58 2(61) 19(2) 59A. 59 59 114(3)(c) 114(3). Omitted 34 37 37 Pr. (c) 24(2) Pr.O.T.O.

28(1A) Omitted 108(a). 1918 I. 1922 25(3) to (5) 25(6) 25A(1) 25A(2) 25A(3) 26(1) Pr.A. 1&2 26(2) 26(2) Pr. I.T. (3) 68(1) 68(3) 68(4) 68(5) 68(2) 81(1). 118(5) 114(3). 111(1) 182(1). 1979 Omitted 72(3) 75(1) 75(2) Omitted 70 73(1) 73(2).(xxii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.T.O. (b) 110 Omitted Omitted 109.T.A. (2) 186 .O. 2001 114(3). 145 26A(5) Pr.T. 117(3). 118(5) 98A 98C 98C. 19 20 Omitted 28 28(1)(a) 28(1)(b) 28(1)(c) 28(1) Pr. 26A(1) 26A(2) 26A(3) 26A(4) 26A(5) I. (4) I.

1918 I. 1 Otiose 112 188 28(1A) Pr.O.T. (3) 130(1) Omitted 127(1) 127(2) 127(5). (6) 127(3).T.(xxiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.T. 2&3 30(1A) 30(2) 30(3) 30A 22 31 31(1) 116(b) 111(3) 116(a) 85 129(1) 129(2) Omitted Omitted 130(2). (2) . (4) 131(1) 128(1).O. 1922 I. (2). (2) 28(3) 28(5) 28(6) 29 21 29 and 30 30(1) 30(1) Pr. 1 30(1) Pr. 2001 185 28(1A) Pr.A.A. 111(2) 111(2A) 28(1B). 2 113 111(1) 184(1) 184(2) 184(3) 28(1A) Ex. (2A) Omitted 114 188 190(2) 184(4) 190(1).T. 1979 109 I.

O.T.T.A. (3) 132(1) 132(2) 131(1) . (3) 134(4) 134(5) 135(1) 135(2) 135(3) 135(4)(a) 132(3) 131(4) 131(2). (3) Omitted 134(1) 134(2).T.(xxiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. (6) 129(7) 130(1) 23 24 32 33 33(1)(a) 33(1)(b) & (c) 33(1) 33(2) 33(2A) 33(3) 33(3A) 33(4)(a) 33(4)(b) 33(4)(c) 134(1).T. (2) 129(3) 129(4) 129(5). I.O. (2) 132(3) 132(4) 132(5) 132(6) 132(7) I.A. 1922 31(2) 31(3) 31(4) 31(5) 31(6) 31(7) 31(8) I. 1979 131(3) 131(2) 131(4) 132(1)(a)(ii) 132(1). 1918 I. 2001 128(4) 128(3) 128(5) 129(1) 129(1).

T. 1918 I. 1 Omitted 65(1) 65(1) Pr.O.T.O.T.T. 1 122(1) 122(1) . 2 33A(2A) 33A(3) 135(9) Otiose 138(1) 138(2) 138(2) 138(5)(a) 138(3) 138(4) 138L 138N 138O 138P 122A 122A 122A 122A 122A 122A 228 229 230 231 33A(4) 25 34 34(1) 34(1) Pr.A. 1922 33(4)(d) 33(4)(e) 33(4)(f) 33(4)(g) 33(5) I.(xxv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. (9) 132(7) 132(10) 33(6) 33(7) 33A(1) 33A(2) 33A(2) Pr. 1979 135(4)(b) 135(4)(c) 135(5) 135(8) 135(7) 135(7A) 135(8) I.A. 1 33A(2) Pr. 2001 132(3) 132(3) 132(6) 132(4) 132(5) 132(8).

Omitted 66(2)(i) 66(2)(ii) 66(3) 124(1) & (2) 124(5) 124(5) 125 34(2A) & (2B) 34(2C).O.O.A. 1 34(2) Ex. 2001 122(5) 122(8) 122(2) 34(1A) 34(2) 34(2) Pr. 1918 I. 2 65(1) Pr. Otiose Omitted 66A 122(5)(a) 156(1). 65(3) Otiose 64 Pr. (iv) 34(2) Pr. (i) 34(2) Pr.T. I. 65(2) Exp.T. I. (4) 221(2) 221(3) 35(3). (2D) 34A 26 35 35(1). (4) 156(2) 156(3) 221(1). (v) 34(2) Ex. 1979 65(2) Rev.(xxvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.. (2) 35(1) Pr.T. 65(3) 64.A.T. 1922 34(1) Pr. (ii) 34(2) Pr. 66(1) Rev. 2 I. Rev. (4) 35(5) 35(6) 35(8) Otiose Omitted Otiose Omitted .

2 12(2) Omitted 78(3) 101(2). 38B(1) 38B(2) 29 30 31 32 39 Omitted.T.T. 145 146(3) Omitted 175(2) 175(1) 215 & 176(1) 176(1) & (4) 28 38 38A(1) 38A(2) 38A(2) Pr.A.A.O.T. 2001 219 27 37 37(1) 148(1) & 158 148(1) 37(1) Pr.O. 37(2) Omitted 149 144 146(2) 146(1) 144(c) Pr. (5) . Omitted 78(4) 142 33 42 42(1) 42(1) Pr. 1918 I.(xxvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. 1 42(1) Pr. 1979 152 I. 40 41 41(1) 41(1) Pr. 1922 36 I. 172 & 173 78 Rev.T. (3). 1 & 2 41(2) 78 Rev.

1918 I. 143(1) 7.T. 43A 43B 43C(1) 43C(2) 43C(3) 43C(4) 43C(5) 43C(6) 139(4) 139(1). 2001 108 34 43 43 Pr. (5) 80(4) I. 1 43 Pr. (a) 78(3) Pr. 2 43 Ex. I.T. . (2) 76(1) 76(2) 76(3) 76(4) Omitted 76(5) 71 80(1) 80(2) 80(3) 80(3). 78(3) Ex.(4)(a) 78(3) Pr. (5) 143(4) 7 35 44 44A 44B(1) 44B(2) 44B(3) 44C 80(6) Rev. 143(2) 7. (b) Otiose 77(3) 77(1).O. 143(3) 7.O. 1979 Omitted 79 12(2) Pr.A. 1922 42(1) Pr.A.(xxviii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 143(3).T. 3 42(2) 42(3) I.(2) & (3) 141(1) 141(2) 141(3) 141(5) 141(7) 98B 7.T.

Omitted 84 Rev.(7) 169 157(2) 154(1) to (3).A.A. 1922 I.T. 169 113(1) 44D 44E 44F 44G 44G(1) Pr. 8 & 169 153(6). 1979 80A(1) 80A(2) 80A(3) 80A(4) 80AA 80AAA 80B 80C 80C(2)(iv) 80CC 80D(1) I.(xxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.O. 2001 144(3) 144(1) 144(2) 144(4). 1918 I.T.T. 44G(2) 44G(3) 44G(4) 44G(4) Ex.O. Omitted 82(1) 82(2) 82(3) 82(3) 165 82(4) 84(1) 145 112(1) 145 145 145 145 36 45 85 . (5) 6 6 5.T.

(6) & (10) 55 & 80D 140(5) 205(1) & (2) 205(1) & (2) 205(1) & (2) 205A 183.A. (2). (3) to (5) 46(5A) Omitted 89 Rev. (2). I.(xxx) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. & Ex.T. 89 90 91(1) 91(2) 94 94 Pr. 46(2A). (5) 93A 138 146 46A(1A). 88 Rev. 1 45A Pr. 2001 137(2) 137(4) 45 Pr. (2) 46B 46C(1) Omitted Omitted 95(c) 146A . 205A 46(5A) Ex.A.T. (3). (5) 92(2A) 140(1). (3) 92(4). 2 46(1) 46(1A) 46(2) 46(2) Pr.O. 1 & 2 46(8) to (10) 46A(1) Omitted Omitted 93(1). 1979 85(1) 85(2) I. 205A 183. 1922 I. 45A(a) 45A(b) 45A Pr.T. 1918 I. Omitted 92(1).O.T.

2001 146A 37 47 48(1) 48(2) 48(3) 170(1) 12(7). 2 49D Ex.T. 163(1) 163(2) 163(3) Otiose 163(4) Otiose 164 Otiose Omitted Omitted 115(4). 1922 46C(2) 46C(3) 46D I.T.O. (8) 48(4) 38 49 101 142.(xxxi) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.A. 1 49D(1) Pr. (b) I.A. 118 & 165 181 107 107 107 107 102 & 103 .T. 1979 95(d) Omitted Omitted 85 96 100 97(1) 98(a). 143.O. 143A & 143B 143D 49AA(1) 49AA(2) 49AA(3) 49AA(4) 49AA(5) 49B & C 49D(1) 49D(1) Pr.T. 1918 I.

T. 195 199 125 124 (Rev. 1918 I.T. 1922 49E 49F 49G I.) 201 .) 121 118 120 189 197 192. (3).A.T.A.O.T. I. 1979 104 97(2) 102 102(1) 102(2) I.(xxxii) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. (4) 39 40 50 51 51(1)(a) 51(1)(aa) 51(1)(b) 51(1)(c) 51(1)(d) 99 117(a) 117(b) 117(c) Omitted 117(d) 117(e) 191(1) 191(1) 191(1) 191(1) 196 51(1A) 51(2) 51(3) 51(4) 41 52 52A 42 53 53(1) 53(1A) Omitted 119 115 (Rev.O. 2001 170(3) 171(1) 171(2) 170(2).

1918 I. IV. 1922 53(2) 53(3) 54(1) 54(2) I. 4 56 43 44 58 58 58(1) 58(2) 150(7) Rev. Pt.O. (2) 122 123 I.O. 2001 202 216(1).T. 2B Omitted 10(2) 10(3) Omitted .(xxxiii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I. 3 55(1) Pr. (2) 198 200 216(3) 216(4) 216(5) 216(6) 216(7) 216(8) 203(1) 203(2) 54(3) 54(4) 54(4A) 150(3) 150(4) 150(5) Rev.T. 150(5A) 150(6) 54(5) 54A(1) 54A(2) 54A(3) 55(1) 55(1) Pr. 1 & 2 55(1) Pr. 127(1) 127(2) Otiose 10(1) Omitted 1st Sch.A. 1979 126 Omitted 150(1).A.T.T.

T.T. (b). 2001 63 237(1) 237(2) 237(3) 53(2) 53(3) 60(2) 45 61 98 128(1) 128(2) 128(3) 61(1) 61(2) 61(3) 61(4) 157(1) 157(2) 157(3). 1922 58A-58V 58W 59(1) 59(2) 59(3) 59(4) 59(5) 60(1) I. (11) 223(2) 223(3).T.(xxxiv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.O. 1979 6th Sch. (a).O. (4).A.A. (5) 157(3)(b) 157(6) 157(7) 157(8) 157(9) 204(1) 204(2) 204(3) 223(1). I. (5) 223(3) 223(6) 223(7) 223(8) 223(9) .T. 157(4). 44 165(1) 165(2) 165(3) 165(4) Omitted 14(2) 14(2) Proviso I. 1918 I.

(2) & (3) 133(4). 2 64(3) Pr.(xxxv) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.T.A. 1979 157(10) I. 1 64(3) Pr. (5) 133(7).T. (8) .T.O. 1922 I. 3 64(4) 64(5) 48 49 50 51 65 Omitted Omitted 66 66(1) 66(2) 66(3) 66(4) 5(3)(a) 5(3)(b) 5(4) Omitted 5(5) Omitted 5(6) Omitted 161 167 210(6) 210(5) 210(4) 136(1) 136(2) Omitted 136(3) 133(1). 2001 223(10) 220 218(1) 218(2) 218(3) 218(4) 218(5) 46 62 63(1) 63(2) 153 154(1) 154(2) 154(6) 154(4) 154(6) 47 63(3) 64(1) 64(2) 64(3) 64(3) Pr.A.O.T. 1918 I.

1922 66(5) 66(6) 66(7) 66(7) Pr. 1918 I.O.O.(xxxvi) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. 1 & 2 66A(4) Otiose 136(4) 137(1) 137(2) Omitted 137(3) 137(4) 151 134(3) 134(4) 55 126(2) 50(8). (12) 133(13) 133(14) 133(15) 133(16) 66(8) 66A(1) 66A(2) 66A(3) 66A(3) Pr.A. I. 66(7A) I.T.A. 2001 133(10) 133(11).T. 224 178 227 226 225 133(9) 134(1) 134(2) 66B 155 158 66BB 52 67 67A 67AA 67B 147 162 160 159 Otiose .T.T. 1979 136(5) 136(6) 136(7) Omitted 136(8) 136(9) 136(10) I.

T.A. 238 44(1).T.O. 1918 53 I. 239(2) to (11) 240 .T. 1922 68 I.O. 2001 164A 165A 166(1) 166(2) 167 180 212 44(1).A.T. 1979 I.(xxxvii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I I.

1922 1st Sch. 3(a) Pr. rules 1 2(i) 2(i)(a) 2(i)(b) 2(i)(b) Pr. 2 3(b) 3(b) Pr. 3(c) 4 5 6(1) 6(2)-(5) 7&8 9 2nd Sch. 2 3(b) 3(b) Pr.(xxxviii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I SCHEDULES Income Tax Act. I. Pt. 3(c) 4 7 5 Omitted Omitted 6 5th Sch. 2(ii) Income Tax Ordinance.. 1 3(a) Pr.. 1979 4th Sch. rules 1 2 Omitted 3(a) Rev. rules 1 2 2A 3(a) 3(a) Pr. rules 1 2(1)(2) 2(3)(a) 2(3)(b) Omitted 2(4) .. 1 3(a) Pr.

II. Omitted Omitted 5th Sch. 4(1) & Pr. 1922 2(iii) 2(iii) Pr.(xxxix) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Income Tax Act. 2(6) 3 & Pr. rules 1 2 3 4 4 Pr. 4A(a) 4A(b) 4A(c) 4A(d) 5(a) 5(b) 5(c) 5(d) Income Tax Ordinance. Pt.. 1979 2(5) 2(5) Pr. 6(5) 4(2) 4(3) 4(3) Pr. 6A 7&8 III Sch. 1 & 2 2(iv) 3 4(1) 4(2) 5 6 6 Pr. rules 1 2(2) 2(3) 2(4) Omitted 2(1) 3(1) 3(2) 3(3) 4(1) 4(2) 4(3) Omitted .

1922 5(e) 5(f) 6 IV Sch. rules 7(1) 7(2) 7(3) 1(1) Otiose Omitted 2 Rev. 4(3) 4(4) 4(5) 5(1) 5(3) Impl..(xl) VOL-I Income Tax Digest. Income Tax Act. Otiose 5(2) 6(1) 6(2) . rules 1(1) 1(2) 1(3) 2(1) 2(2) 2(3) 3 4 5(1) 5(2) 6(1) 6(2) 6(3) 6(4) 6(5) 7 8 9(1) & (2) 10 11(1) 11(2) Income Tax Ordinance.. Otiose 3 Omitted 4(1) 4(2) & Ex. 1979 4(4) 4(5) Otiose VII Sch.

(xli) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Income Tax Act. (5) 6(6) Otiose . 1979 6(3) 6(4). 1922 11(3) 11(4) 11(5) 12 Income Tax Ordinance.

Income Tax Rules. 1962 and Income Tax Rules. 1982 1-2 204 Omitted Omitted (now S. 1962 1-2 3-5 6-7 8 9 10 11 11A 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29(1) 29(2) Income Tax Rules. 1982. 31 & 32 34 Otiose 49 & 50 52 53 & 54 55 57 59 58 50 203 62 62 63 Otiose 199 Otiose 200 56(2) 20(2) . Otiose 27. 29. 20(I)(g)) III Sch.(xlii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Following is a comparative list of rules of the Income Tax Rules.

(xliii) COMPARATIVE TABLE OF SECTIONS VOL-I Income Tax Rules. 1982 197 201 190 191 192 Otiose 194 195 196 25 Otiose 3-18 24 24 193 209-210 205(2) & 206 Otiose (Now S.3.6.1956 SRO 406 dated 22. dated 31. 1962 29(3) 29(4) 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 & 44 45 46 47 & 48 49 SRO 1041(K)/61. 59) Otiose 21 19 43 43 37 46 211-215 Income Tax Recovery Rules.3.9.8.1974 SRO 714(I)/72 dated 12. dated 22.1952 SRO 884(I)/74 dated 1.1972 SRO 57(R)/69 dated 7.1961 Notif No. No. 4 dated 14. 36.1969 99-189 Notif. 1961 Otiose .10.1959 Notif.1950 Income Tax Rules. 6 dated 10. No.7.4.

4.1975 SRO 349(I)/76 dated 12.9. 1962 SRO 353(K)/62 & SRO 354(K)/62 dated 27.1962 SRO 982(I)/75 dated 12.1976 Income Tax Rules. 1982 69-84 41 39 . Income Tax Rules.3.(xliv) VOL-I Income Tax Digest.

) _ Double Taxation is prerogative of legislature.Kar. [2001] 83 TAX 376 (H.C. Legislature enjoys wide powers in framing _ laws.) Power to levy taxes is an attribute of sovereignty of a state.Pak. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak. deductions. 5.Pak.C. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. 4.Pak. 10. 2.C. 7. [1992] 65 _ TAX 315 (S.C.C. 8.Pak.) _ Levy of minimum tax held constitutional. _ 1958 SCC 37 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.Pak. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.) The principle of “equality” applies equally to fiscal _ enactments. 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S. 6. extent and commencement PAGE NO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION / RULES OF _ INTERPRETATION LEGISLATIVE POWERS 1. 41 42 9.) Parliament is competent to levy presumptive _ taxation.C. 42 .-308) (S. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Section 1 Short title.1 SHORT TITLE. [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.) 35 36 38 40 40 41 3.Pak).Pak) Definition of word/expression “income” would mean “net income” after making all permissible allowances.Pak.) fiscal 35 Taxing rights of legislature are unlimited as long as these _ are not confiscatory. The said definition cannot be assigned to the word/expression “income” as used in section 23 of the Ordinance as the very purpose of section 23 of the Ordinance _ would be defeated.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562 The scope of powers of legislature to tax non-residents. _ [1997 SCC 1097 = (1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.Pak) _ Restrictions on power to levy tax.C.C. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.C. depreciation etc as appearing in section 2(24) of the Ordinance. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.

2 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.) Parliament can introduce a new change of tax either by incorporating that change in the Income Tax Act or by _ Finance Act. [2001] 83 TAX 305 (H. _ [1999] 79 TAX 410 (H.C.C. [1995] 71 TAX 220 (H.) Scope of Article 165 & 165A of Constitution.C.7. [2001] 83 TAX 305 (H.) 43 12.) Levy of Corporate Asset Tax is constitutionally valid.C. [2001] 83 TAX 305 (H.Kar. but also related with force in respect of advance tax. including that of Provincial _ Government.) Under the Indian Income Tax Act. 1961 presumptive tax regime has been made applicable to limited number of items but the deduction made at source has been made liable for adjustment against the tax demand created on regular _ assessment. corporations created by provincial statutes are not “governments”. 18.C. Proviso to section 50(4)(a) categorically confirmed that substantive provision of said section was also to be applied to non_ residents. assessee was under no obligation to deduct tax at source in relation to purchases on which tax at import stage had been deducted and which constituted final discharge of liability.Lah. 47 48 48 49 15. CBR circular No 19 of 1991 dated 8.Kar.Lah. [1988] 57 TAX (H. be it under section 50(4) or section 53 or any other provision of the Ordinance. _ [1999] 79 TAX 77 (H. [NLR 1999 Tax 176] _ Personal interest must yield to larger interest.) = PTCL 1998 CL.Kar.C.1991.Kar. 51 19. 17. PAGE NO 11.) The question of retrospective operation of the explanation of section 25 of the Ordinance would have arisen only if it has the effect of imposing new liability or obligation on the taxpayer or had affected any existing rights either by taking _ them away or curtailing them. 45 13.Kar. 45 14.C. 690 Powers of Federal Government to levy income tax on any property or income. [1998] 78 TAX 234 (H. 16.C.) Constitutional powers of levying taxes by Federation and _ provinces. 52 . Jurisdiction to apply provisions of Ordinance in any manner was not restricted to proceedings for assessment or recovery of final income tax liabilities.Kar.

29. 57 57 57 33.) = 1982 PTD 46 = 1990 PTCL 954 = 1982 PLD 266 Legislature has the power to enact curative legislation.) Words occurring in a constitutional provision relating to _ legislative power should be liberally construed. 30. _ [1982] 46 TAX 143 (H.) Rules can‟t be made by subordinate delegate authority _ unless expressly permitted. 56 32.C. _ [1982] 45 TAX 263 (H. 31. 34.) Authority to legislate includes authority to legislate with _ retrospective effect. 1 ITC 181 (Mad) _ Court cannot make up for any deficiency of Legislature. 26.) Charging section cannot be overlooked on hypothesis of _ history of exemption.) Charging section and subsequent provisions only enable the _ liability to be quantified.C.C. [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] Modification of exemption from taxation must be express _ and not in general terms or by implication.) Rule of interpretation of the word “income” occurring in _ Constitutional explained. 27. _ [1982] 45 TAX 232 (H.) Power to make and promulgate Ordinance includes the _ power to levy tax. [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] Fair and reasonable construction for taxing statutes.C. 53 53 54 22.C.Kar.Kar. [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H.Lah.Kar. [1966] 14 TAX 174 (H. Levy of tax on free reserves which had already suffered tax held not to be ultra-vires of the powers of Legislature under _ the Constitution.Kar. [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H.Kar. 28.Kar. [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H.C.3 SHORT TITLE. 54 55 55 55 56 56 56 25.C.Kar. [1977] 35 TAX 180 (H. 23.) “Resident” of taxable territories is liable to tax on total world income including any income accruing or arising in nontaxable territories of Pakistan. . [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. 1 ITC 185 (Mad) Subsequent general enactment does not interfere with _ special provisions unless expressed clearly.Kar.Lah.) Redundancy cannot be readily attributed to the legislature.C.C.C. 24. _ [1 ITC 140 (Burma)] 52 21. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 20. [1977] 35 TAX 180 (H.

65 65 46. 60 61 61 41. 38. 62 64 44. [1985] 52 TAX 123 (H. [1988] 57 TAX 46 _ (H.AJ&K. [2000] 82 TAX 518 ((S.C. [1991] 64 TAX 19 (H. 42.) _ Scope of Retrospective Legislation.C.) _ Scope of retrospective legislation.C. _ 1975 SCC 426 = [1976] 34 TAX 14 (S. 60 40. 65 48.AJ&K.C.) Any Act/Ordinance cannot cover any period prior to coming _ into force of the Act/ Ordinance [1984] 49 TAX 198 (H.AJ&K.Kar.Lah.) In a Taxing Act there is no room for any intendment.) = 1980 PTD 314 58 58 59 60 39. 47. 45.) Substantive law amended by Finance Act.Kar.) Omission of provision from statutes held not to operate _ retrospectively.) [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.) _ Fiscal laws and theory of retrospectivity.C.Lah. [1984] 50 TAX 187 (H.) = 2001 PTD 1180 An amendment which is explanatory or clarificatory is _ generally to operate retrospectively. 65 . 36. 37.C. 1973 held to have _ retrospective operation to cover only pending cases. [2000] 82 TAX 518 (S. [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H. _ [1991] 64 TAX 60 (H.C. [2000] 81 TAX 371 (S. PAGE NO RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION 35.Lah.) _ A penal provision cannot operate retrospectively.C.Pak.Kar.C.) If a provision is neither declaratory nor curative it cannot be _ retrospective [1980] 42 TAX 147 (H.C.AJ&K. Retrospective application of law must be by explicit words.C.C.Pak. [1996] 74 TAX 9 _ (H.) = 2000 PTD SC 892.) [1985] 52 TAX 123 (H.C.) = 2000 PTD SC 892.C.C. 43.Kar. 1969 SCC 354 = [1970] 21 TAX 62 (S.Kar.Kar.) _ Retroactivity of the law upheld.Kar.) Amendment in law which is neither clarificatory nor _ declaratory cannot be applied retrospectively.C.C.4 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C. [2000] 81 TAX 371 (S.Kar.) For the purposes of assessment of income the law applicable is that in force on the first day of the relevant assessment _ year. [1988] 57 TAX 71 (H.Kar.

C.Kar.C. if at _ all. [1979] 40 TAX 113 (H.5 SHORT TITLE. [1 ITC 248 (Nagpur)] 66 66 67 68 68 68 52.C.) _ 72 PRINCIPLE OF CONTEMPORARY EXPOSITION 60. _ 1992 SCC 920 = [1992] 66 TAX 125 (S. Remedial and curative legislation has retrospective effect. the whole superstructure built _ upon it is also illegal. 61. 68 70 56.Lah.Kar.Lah.) = 1963 PTD 867 = 1963 PLD 996 Rights conferred under statutes cannot be taken away by later legislation except by express words or by necessary _ implication. [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. [1970] 21 TAX 62 (Income Tax Digest Feb.Pak.) _ Declaratory statutes generally apply retrospectively.C. Principle of contemporary exposition.) = _ 1991 PTD 658 [1990] 61 TAX 159 (H. [1964] 8 TAX 1 (H. 71 72 58.C. [1976] 34 TAX 10 (H.C. 50. 1970) _ Right accrued cannot be taken away by implication.C.Lah. [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] _ Presumption against double taxation. cannot be taken away by repeal of _ Act. [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] Vested rights such as rights to appeal and to demand a reference already accrued. 55. [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. REMEDIAL AND CURATIVE LEGISLATION HAS RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT 59. If an action is deemed illegal. 57. _ it should not be applied retrospectively. 1 ITC 303 (Pat) 73 73 Practice of Revenue Authorities as contemporanea expositio.) Explanatory amendment is always applicable retrospectively _ to all relevant cases pending at the relevant time.Lah. THE WHOLE SUPERSTRUCTURE BUILT UPON IT IS ALSO ILLEGAL 62. [1991] 63 TAX 143 (H.) 74 .) Subordinate legislation can be applied retrospectively only if _ expressly mentioned.C. [1 ITC 264 (Nagpur)] Fiscal statutes to be strained in favour of the subject.) _ Rules to determine retrospective effect. 53.Kar. If retrospective operation of a provision results in injustice. 54. _ [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] ACTION IS DEEMED ILLEGAL. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 49. 51.

Lah.Pak) Proceedings of the Legislature can be resorted to when the _ words of a provision are ambiguous.Lah.) Claimant of an exemption has to be the same without any _ ambiguity. 828 _ Abrogation of International Law. (H. Statute must be intelligibly expressed and reasonably _ definite and certain. PLD 2000 S. 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S. 69.Pak) Person sought to be taxed must come within the letter of law. 74. _ [1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S.) 1967 76 INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES / GENERAL PRINCIPLES 67. PLD 2000 S.C.C.) _ No words to be treated as surplusage.C.Pak.Lah.Pak.Pak) _ 1970 SCC 370 = [1971] 23 74 _ ONE THING IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER 64.C.) _ A fiscal statute should be construed strictly.) = PLD 1966 S. 65.Pak. 73. 75.C. [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H. [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H. SCC 289 = [1967] 16 TAX 81 (S. PAGE NO INCOME CANNOT BE TAXED TWICE 63.C. Application of rule “generalibus specialia derogant”.C.C.) = 2000 PTD 2958 Where a provision was open to two reasonably possible interpretations.) = 2001 PTD 1180 [2001] 83 TAX 451 75 “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ” (Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) was neither _ absolute nor was of universal application. 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (111-207) (S.6 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. 111 _ True meaning of statute vis-a-vis duty of court.C.C.C. then.C. 72. 70. TAX 223 (S. the interpretation which favours the 77 77 78 78 78 79 79 79 71. [1992] 65 TAX 281 (S. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”. . 68.Pak.Pak. 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S.C. 111 _ Interpretation of statute is not CBR‟s domain.) = 2000 PTD 2958 _ 76 APPLICATION OF RULE “GENERALIBUS SPECIALIA DEROGANT” 66.C. 1958 SCC 37 = [1959] 1TAX (111-284) (S. Income cannot be taxed twice. 79 76.

7 SHORT TITLE. 83.C. [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.C. 81 81 81 82 82 82 80.) Departmental construction can be used _ interpretation.Kar.AJ&K) = 2000 PTD 2872 _ Things should be done as required by law.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 = 2000 PTD 2872 77.C.C. _ [1990] 61 TAX 30 (H. 80 79. 81.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 (H. [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO taxpayer has to be adopted. PTCL 2000 CL.) = 2000 PTD 280 Assessing officer to apply correct law even if assessee fails to _ make a claim.) Role of history of legislation in interpreting a provision of _ law/statute. _ [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H.Lah.) 84 . Caution should be used while borrowing the meaning attached to terms and phrases used in one statute. [1979] 40 TAX 116 (H. Income Tax Ordinance.C. [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.C. _ [1996] 74 TAX 9 (H.Lah.C. 90.C.Lah.C.Kar. Correct interpretation of Rule 15 vis-a-vis right of appeal.C.Kar.Kar.C.) Interpretation of machinery provisions of a fiscal statute.AJ&K) = 2000 PTD 2872 The use of word “shall” in Section 134(5). 82 82 83 83 83 86. 87. [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H. 85.C.C. [1984] 50 TAX 158 (H. 1979 does not make it mandatory in nature. while _ interpreting another statute. _ [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H.C. [1999 PTD 325] Explanation can be added to elaborate the meanings. 82. 465 _ Court must confine itself to language of law. [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H. [1990] 61 TAX 30 (H.) Speech of the Federal Minister has no legal consequences or effect.Kar.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 (H.) Proceedings of the Legislature can be resorted to when the _ words of a provision are ambiguous.AJ&K) = 2000 PTD 2872 Principles for determining mandatory or directory provision _ of law. 88. 84. [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 (H.C.) in aid of _ 80 80 78.Kar.C.) _ Harmonious construction is recommended. 89.

) Equitable construction is inadmissible in a fiscal statute.Kar.Lah.) Departmental instructions cannot be used in aid of _ interpretation. [1974] 29 TAX 221 (H.Pak) = 1999 PTD 2174] In granting leave to appeal rule of consistency is to be _ followed. [1 ITC 169 (Calcutta)] Tax must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language.8 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.Pak.Pak.C. 100. _ 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.Lah. [1977] 36 TAX 8 (Lahore) 86 PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY 99.C.Pak) Conditions under which courts can strike down a law.C. _ [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. .C.) 88 88 88 89 103. 104. Terms and phrases used in a statute prima facie should be _ construed in their popular sense. 2 ITC 107 (Mad) In dubio construction which imposes burden on taxpayer _ should be avoided.) Judicial approach on constitutional issues should be _ dynamic. [1999] 80 TAX 79 (S.) While interpreting a statute . [1999] 79 TAX 1 (S.nothing is to be read in and _ nothing is to be implied. 101. 93. 97. [1 ITC 189 (Lahore)] _ Courts are not to be influenced by doctrine of hardship. 105. 96.C. [1 ITC 26 (Sind)] 87 87 87 POWERS OF COURTS/ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION 102. PAGE NO 91. _ [1 ITC 26 (Sind) 84 84 85 85 85 85 86 92. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL LIABILITIES 98. Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities _ should be strictly construed. [1966] 13 TAX 141 Non-revenue profit/losses are not covered in Income Tax _ unless specifically provided in statute.C. _ [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] _ No equitable construction in fiscal statutes. CBR and the Federal Government have no power to resort to _ judicial interpretation of law. Equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not permitted. 95. [1974] 29 TAX 115 (H. 94.C. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.

Kar.Pak) Appeal/Reference to Supreme Court governed by Income _ Tax Law. 1974 SCC 424 = [1975] 32 TAX 170 (S.C. 1965 SCC 220 = [1965] 12 TAX 15 (S.Pak. [1984] 50 _ TAX 115 (H.) Two equally possible interpretation emerge.Kar.C.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 106.9 SHORT TITLE.C.C. 114.Pak).) In case there is anomaly in question of law framed and referred by the Tribunal to the High Court. second _ petition on the same issue is maintainable. 94 94 94 115.) 89 107.C.C.Pak.C.).Pak).C. 89 92 92 108. 116. 117.Pak) High Court has only advisory jurisdiction under section 136 _ of the Ordinance.Pak) _ In tax matters Supreme Court jurisdiction is limited. [1987) 56 TAX _ _ 78 (H. [1974] 29 TAX 149 (S. [1976] 33 TAX 245 (H. [1994] 69 TAX 71 (H. 1957 SCC 34 = [1959] TAX (III-290) (S. 1956 SCC 13 (F. CBR is not competent to issue instructions of judicial/quasi _ judicial nature. leave to appeal _ granted.Pak) Preliminary objection of jurisdiction should be decided first.AJ&K).Pak) Only question of law which has substance in it can be _ referred to the High Court.Pak. 93 111.C.). it should refer _ the case back to Tribunal for clarification. .C. [1995] 71 TAX 271 _ _ (H. 1957 SCC 34 = [1959] TAX (III-290) (S. [1985 SCC 637 = [1986] 53 TAX 122 (S.3) (S.C.C.Kar.) Only Supreme Court is competent to adjudicate between the _ governments.C. 1970 SCC 366 = [1975] 31 TAX 64 (S.C. 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S.C. 95 95 118.) = 1999 PTD 2910 = 2000 PCTLR 1046 Objection as to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. 93 93 113.Kar. [1985] 52 TAX 77 (H. 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S.).Lah.Lah.Pak) _ Transfer of jurisdiction. _ 1999 PTD 4041 (H.). _ _ [1996) 74 TAX 141 (H.C. 109. _ [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.Lah.). 1980 SCC 474 = [1981] 43 TAX 105 (S.Pak.C.C.C.) Constitutional petition dismissed as withdrawn. 93 112.C.) = [1960] 2-TAX (Supp.C. 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 _ (S. 110.Kar.) _ Effect of lack of jurisdiction.

C. 1999 PTD 4037 Objections to jurisdiction are to be decided by adjudicating _ authority before proceeding in the matter.C. 100 100 101 101 129.)] Submission to jurisdiction of a Court/Authority does not confer jurisdiction which does not vest in it/him in law. 102 . 1999 PTD 4126 (H. 423 96 96 120. Ombudsman has no power to declare any legally issued notification as perverse. [1993] 67 TAX 195 (H.C. 127. 101 133.) CBR has no authority to file presentation against the orders _ of Wafaqi Mohtasib. [1998] 77 TAX 127 (H.Lah.) = 1999 PTD 4061 [Not approved by Supreme Court in [2000] 83 TAX 119 (S.Pak. _ 1999 PTD 4037 _ Objection to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. 96 122.C.C.Pesh.C. 130.) _ CBR instructions are binding on tax authorities [1995) 71 Tax 139 (H.) Presumption of irregularity with regard to official act cannot be challenged on vague allegation of mala fide. 98 98 98 126.C. 131. _ [1984] 50 TAX 37 (H.Lah.Lah.Lah.) Every order increasing tax obligation of an assessee or reducing the refund is appealable under section 129.) CBR‟s circular holding compensation under Golden _ Handshake Scheme as taxable declared unlawful. 97 125.Kar.Lah.C.C. _ 1999 PTD 4126 (H.Kar. 128.) _ Interim stay should be given once writ is admitted. 97 97 123.) = 1999 PTD 2910 Courts/Tribunals have inherent powers to recall orders _ independent of any statutory provisions. arbitrary or discriminatory.Pesh. [1998] 78 TAX 1 (H.) Courts cannot question the wisdom of Legislature in _ enacting provision of any law.Lah.Lah. [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H. PAGE NO 119. [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.10 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. PLD 1999 Lahore 417 CBR has no authority to place judicial interpretation on any _ provision of law. _ [2000] 81 TAX 119 (H.) = PLJ 1984 Lah.C. 132.) = 1998 PCTLR 1382 _ Powers of Appellate Tribunal. 121. [1997] 75 TAX 90 (H. illegal.C.C. 124. [PLD 1999 Lahore 462] _ Doctrine of exhaustion explained.

138.Pak.C.HOW TO BE CONSTRUED 140. _ 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.Pesh.) A legal plea going to the roots of the case was allowed to be _ raised at belated stage. [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] _ 102 103 104 105 105 105 135.Kar. 141.C. [1999] 80 TAX 24 (H.) 1997 105 Widest amplitude of an entry in legislative list does not extend to tax something which is not a citizen ‟s income.C. [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H.) Courts have no concern with disputable questions of _ distributive justice. 107 LEGISLATIVE POWERS VIS-À-VIS DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION 146. _ [1989] 59 TAX 108 (H.) = 1999 PTD 1655 _ Scope of deemed income. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 134.Lah. 143.C.Lah.C. Distinction between “tax” and “fee” explained.) Only Supreme Court is competent to adjudicate between the _ governments.C. [1976] 34 TAX 71 (H. 145.Pak.Kar. 136.Pak. [1979] 39 TAX 140 (H.) Scope of definition of „tax on income‟ under the Constitution. Distinction between direct and indirect taxes hardly exists _ now.).C.) Provisions of the Income Tax Act can be challenged on _ Constitutional grounds. A question not raised before the Appellate Tribunal cannot _ be raised before the High Court.) Assessment and levy of Super tax on total income of three months at the rate applicable to twelve months‟ notional income as a condition for permitting change of previous year _ by assessee was held without legal sanction. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.Lah. [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H. [1979] 39 TAX 14 _ (H.Kar. [1976] 34 TAX 199 (H. _ 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.How to be construed. Scope of deeming provisions in respect of income.) _ Deeming provisions .11 SHORT TITLE.Pak.C.C.) Courts have inherent jurisdiction in the interest of orderly _ dispensation of justice. [1976] 33 TAX 176 (H.) _ 108 DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TAX” AND “FEE” 147. 139.C.) 106 106 107 107 142. 144.C.Lah. 137.C.C. CL.Lah.C.). INCOME / DEEMING PROVISIONS . [1975] 32 TAX 176 (H. 384 PTCL 2000 109 .Lah.

158. COURTS CAN STRIKE DOWN DISCRIMINATORY AND CONFISCATORY PROVISIONS OF FISCAL LAWS 156.Lah. SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. Theory of reading down as a rule of interpretation.12 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. [1974] 29 TAX 212 (S.Pak) Income Tax Authorities to establish by positive evidence that _ assessee‟s accounts are unreliable.C.Lah.) _ Statement in power of attorney not proof in itself.) _ Provisions of Evidence Act not applicable to proceedings _ under Income Tax Act. A Judge cannot be compelled to accept a piece of evidence. _ 1978 SCC 446 = [1980] 41 TAX 1 (S. 2001 PTD 744 _ 109 THEORY OF READING DOWN AS A RULE OF INTERPRETATION 149.Pak) _ “Accrue” and “arise”. [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H. 159.Pak) 113 SCOPE OF VARIOUS WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 157. is only contingent. [2 ITC 69 (Nagpur)] “Agricultural Income” when remains to be such in the hands _ of recipient.Pak.C. 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H. 113 114 114 114 .C.) _ “Accrue” and “arise” vis-a-vis effect of book entries.C.Pak.Pak. 151.Kar. [1996] 74 TAX 227 (H.) 1997 110 RULE OF EVIDENCE 150.) _ “Accrue” and “arise”. 154. 153. [1992] 68 TAX 89 (H. The Income Tax Law makes a distinction between actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which for the _ time being.Lah. 155.) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Ordinance is applicable to Income Tax _ Ordinance.C. Courts can strike down discriminatory and confiscatory _ provisions of fiscal laws.C.C. 1969 SCC 322 = [1969] 20 TAX 33 (S.) _ Standard of Proof.C. 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1 TAX (III-1) (S. [1 ITC 323 (Madras) 111 111 111 112 112 113 152.C. 160.C. PAGE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTUAL LIABILITY IN PRAESENTI AND A LIABILITY DE FUTURO WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING IS ONLY CONTINGENT 148. 1979.

) = 1992 PTD 513] Meaning of expression “assessment consciously completed ”.C. _ 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1 TAX (III-1) (S. 1997 SCC 1174 = [1997] 76 TAX _ 213 (S. 163.Kar. 176. “Owe” and “due” difference between. “Agriculture” and “agricultural purposes”.Pak) = 1997 PTD _ 1485.Relationship between. . [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H. [1975] 32 TAX 1 (H.) _ “Debt”.Pak) _ “Company limited by guarantee”.) _ “Complete”. [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H.C.).C. 175. [1975] 31 TAX 114 (H.Kar.C.Kar.Lah.) _ “Business connection”. 165. 164.C.Pak.C.C.Kar. 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) (S.) _ _ “Due” meaning of. 1993 SCC 1029 = (1993) 68 TAX 49 (S. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 161.C. 174.) _ “Charitable purposes”.Lah. [1984] 49 TAX 198 (H. 1989 SCC 740 = [1997] 75 TAX 113 (S.C.) _ “Charity” and “charitable purposes”. _ _ [1992] 65 TAX 262 (S.Lah.). 167.C.Pak) _ 115 115 115 116 117 117 117 118 118 118 119 120 120 121 121 122 123 123 177.C. “Loan”.C. [5 ITC 316] _ “Assessment”.C.Pak) _ “Discard”.C. [1974] 30 TAX 158 (H.C.) _ “Certified copy”. 169. [1993] 67 TAX 400 (H. [1977] 36 TAX 117 (H. 162.Kar.Lah. [1977] 35 TAX 74 _ (H. 168. 124 125 180.C.) _ “Default”.Kar. [1992] 65 TAX 176 (H.Pak) _ “Case”.) _ “Commercial” and “commerce”.).Pak) _ _ “Capital” and “dividend” distinguished.Kar.C.Pak).C.C.) = PTCL 2001 CL. 178.Lah. _ [1976] 34 TAX 151 (H. _ [2001] 83 TAX 359 (H.Pak).Kar. 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S. [1985] 51 TAX 5 (H. 171.Kar.C.Lah. 250 _ Definition of the word “Business”.C.) _ _ “Annual value”. 173. 166.C. [1976] 34 TAX 199 (H. [1997] 76 TAX 131 (S.C. [1999 PTD 1302] _ “Definite Information”. 172.13 SHORT TITLE. 170. [1983] 47 TAX 214 (H. 179.) “Company” and “shareholders” .C. 1991 SCC 784 = [1991] 63 TAX 149 (S.

C.C.C.Pesh) _ “Employee”. 183.) _ “Failure”. 195.C. [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H. [1980] 42 TAX 168 (H.C.C. _ 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S. [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H. 190.) _ “Fixed capital”.) _ “Interest”.Lah.C.C. [1973] 27 TAX 95 (H.Lah.) = 1992 PTD _ 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562. [1973] 27 TAX 99 (H. 200.C.) _ “Enduring benefit”. 192. 198. 184.Lah.-3) (S. [1997] 76 TAX 1 (H. “Dividend”.) _ “Expenditure” & “reserves”. 194. 1978 SCC 453 = [1978] 38 TAX 132 (S.Pak).Pesh) _ “Including”.C.Kar.Pak) _ “Execution of Contract”.C.) _ “Income”.Pak).) _ “Manufacture”. 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S. [2 ITC 184 (Lahore)] _ “Fixed capital” and “circulating capital”.Lah.) _ “Goodwill”. [1973] 28 TAX 181 (H. 1992 SCC 974 = [1993] 67 TAX 51 (S. “enemy territory” and “aggrieved party”.) _ “Goods” do not include immovable property. [1982] 46 TAX 125 (H.14 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. 191. [1967] 15 TAX 53 (H.Lah. 1991 SCC 773.Pak) _ “Erroneous”. [1984] 49 TAX 34 (H. 203.C. 189. 199. 201. 193.C. [1993] 67 TAX 311 (H. 1992 SCC 974 = [1993] 67 TAX 51 (S.Pak.C. 197. [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H.Pak).Lah.AJ&K) _ _ “Evasion” and “Avoidance” the difference.Lah. 187. [1974] 29 TAX 91 (H.) _ “Enemy”.C.C. 182.Pak) _ “Evasion of Tax”. [2 ITC 129 (Rangoon)] _ “Material”.Kar.Lah.C. 1955 SCC 13 (Federal Court) = [1960] 2-Tax (Suppl.C. 196.C. 186. 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1_ TAX (III-1) (S.Lah.C. 185.) _ _ 126 127 127 127 128 128 129 129 129 130 130 130 130 131 131 132 132 132 134 134 134 135 135 136 .) _ “Individual” & “association of persons”. [1966] 13 TAX 163 (H. [1969] 19 TAX 222 (H.C. 202.C.Kar.) _ “Includes”. PAGE NO 181.Kar. 1997 SCC 1097 = (1997) 76 TAX 5 (S. [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H. 188.Lah.C.C.) _ “Immunity”. [1999] 80 TAX 262 (H. 204. _ [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H.Pak) _ “Individual” and “such individual”.C.C.Pesh) _ “Liable”.

215.C.) _ _ “Processing”. [1992] 65 TAX 281 (S. 216. [1973] 27 TAX 40 (H. 211. [1999] 80 TAX 282 (H.Lah.) 145 . [1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S. [1988] 57 TAX 113 (H. 222. 224.C.Kar.) _ “Previous year”.) _ “Reserve”.) _ “Person”.) _ Word „year‟ .C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 205.C. 219.C. [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H. 220.C.”ownership” and “own”. 213.Lah. [1980] 42 TAX 81 (H. [1999] 80 TAX 106 (H.Kar.Pak) _ _ “Received” person cannot receive a thing from himself.Pak) _ “Penalty”. 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S.C.Lah.C. [1974] 30 TAX 27 (H.C. [1976] 33 TAX 99 (H.Kar.C.C. [1994] 70 TAX 159 (H. [1981] 43 TAX 1 (H.) _ “Tax”.How to be understood.C.C. 212.C.C.C.C.Kar. [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H.) _ “Pay”.Pak) _ “Occupation” [2 ITC 104 (Madras)] _ “Opinion”. 221. 208.Lah.Lah.C.Kar.) _ “Merge” & “Merger”. [1988 SCC 663 = 1988 PTD 571].) _ 136 136 137 137 137 138 138 138 138 139 139 139 140 140 141 141 141 142 142 142 142 145 226. 218.Kar.Lah. “current assets” and “current liability”.C. 209.Pak.Lah. 206. [1973] 28 TAX 155 (H. [1968] 18 TAX 72 (H.C.).).Kar. 225. _ _ [1988] 57 TAX 118 (H.) _ “Or”. 1 ITC 140 (Burma) _ “Paid”.Kar. [5 ITC 288 (H.15 SHORT TITLE.Kar.)=1999 PTD 2901 _ “Owners”. 207.) _ _ “Profit”. [1966] 14 TAX 211 (H.C. 1 ITC 189 (Lahore) _ “Repeal” & “amendment”. “May”. INTERPRETATION REGARDING WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS 227.Kar. [1990] 62 TAX 31 (H.) _ “Specify”. 210.C.) _ “Sales” and “supplies”.) “Working capital”. 217. Rule of interpretation regarding words and expressions used _ in fiscal statute. 223.) _ “Property”. [1980 SCC 497 = [1980] 42 TAX 1 (S. 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. 214.Pak.

C. Limitation period extended retrospectively by legislation _ held not valid.) = 1986 PTD 316 150 151 235. Scope of protection under the Protection of Economic _ Reforms Act of 1992.Lah.Held no. [2000] 82 TAX 275 (H. INCOME TAX LAW 232. 1974 SCC 416 = [1974] 30 TAX 138 (S.Pak.C.C. 233.) 153 .Kar. LIMITATION PERIOD CANNOT BE EXTENDED RETROSPECTIVELY 239.) Rule of liberal construction of machinery provisions. 230. _ [1988] 57 TAX 118 (H. Basic rules to construe charging and machinery provisions. 1993 SCC _ 1026 = [1993] 68 TAX 1 (S.C. 236.C. _ [1986] 54 TAX 1 (H.) Machinery provisions cannot be construed to go beyond the _ spirit of law. [2001] 83 TAX 1 (H. Amendments in machinery section being procedural are _ applicable to pending proceedings.C.) 147 SPECIAL LAW VS.C.Pak. [1969] 19 TAX 3 (H.Pak. 151 153 153 237. 1981 SCC 572 = [1982] 46 TAX 6 (S.Pak.16 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.Lah.Lah.C.C. 1969 SCC 354 = [1970] 21 TAX 62 (S.Dacca) 148 149 MACHINERY PROVISIONS 234. PAGE NO 228.) Law applicable on the first day of assessment year will apply and not the one in existence during the next year. 1963 SCC 167= [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. General and special words or terms. 238.) = 2000 PTD 303 _ General Act whether overrides the provisions of specific Act _ .C. Past and closed transactions can be reopened by giving _ retroactive effect to an amending provision.) Machinery provisions of fiscal law should be construed so as _ not to destroy recovery mechanism. 229.Pak. [2000] 82 TAX 42 (H.Pak. [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S.Kar.C.) = 1988 PTD 66 147 PAST AND CLOSED PROVISION 231.C.) _ 1990 SCC 759 = 146 147 Stable interpretation of term „assessment year‟ should be _ adopted.).

[1992] 65 TAX 80 (H.) Words in statutes cannot be treated as surplusage or _ redundant.) Words in a statutory instrument should be construed in _ their ordinary sense. [1976] 34 TAX 151 (H. 244. [1974] 29 TAX 165 (H. 248.) Meaning of doubtful words to be gathered by reference to _ words associated with them. 1959 SCC 68 = (1959) 1-TAX (III-207) (S. [1944] 12 ITR 393 (Lahore).) _ Fiscal statutes should be strictly construed. 247.) _ Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. 252. _ [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.) Inapt and inaccurate phraseology of draftsman cannot _ nullify a provision made by legislature.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 An equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not _ permissible. An equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not _ permissible. [14 ILR _ _ PC 365].Lah.C.C.Lah. [1 ITC 244 (Madras)] 154 155 155 155 156 156 156 249.) _ Strict rule of fiscal statutes emphasised. 1030 Construction of law should not lead to startling results. [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H. TAX 74 (S. 254. 246.C.C.C. [1981] 43 TAX 1 (H.C.C. 242.) _ Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. 253.Lah.C.Kar.Lah. 159 .Lah. [1999] 80 TAX 62 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO RULES OF CONSTRUCTION _ FISCAL STATUTES 240.Kar.Pak.Pak) 243.Lah.17 SHORT TITLE. [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H.C. 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S. [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.Pak. [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.C.) = 2000 PTD 497 _ Rule cannot override the statutory law. 159 255. General and specific words. 241.Qta.C. [2000] 81 TAX 7 (H.C. 828 _ Punctuation marks and construction of statutes.C.) Courts while interpreting a statute must adhere to the plain _ meaning of the words.) = PLD 1976 Kar.C.C.Lah. 156 157 157 158 159 250. 245.) = PLD 1966 S.Pak) _ 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 _ 154 1965 SCC 154 Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. 251.Lah.C. 228 = [1965] 12 TAX 95 (S.

) _ Exemption clauses are to be construed strictly. Claim for refund of money paid under mistake is not barred _ by time.Lah.) 166 167 .Pak) _ Exemption clauses vis-a-vis rules of interpretation. Tax can only be imposed by clear words of the Act.Kar. 263. [1 ITC 37 (Madras)] Long course of decisions determining construction of a repealed statute may be an aid in the construction of a new statute passed in the same terms as the former. 259. [1 ITC 37 (Madras)] _ Practice as a guide to construction.) = 2001 PTD 1180 Two equal possible interpretations of exemption clause one _ favouring the revenue to be adopted.C. 267.C. 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S.) = 2000 PTD 2958 164 164 165 165 165 RULE OF LIMITATION 269. 258. _ [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] _ Court must stick to the letter of the statute. 268.Lah. – [1 ITC 29 (Patna)] _ 160 160 160 161 162 162 163 261.C. [1973] 28 TAX 168 (H.) = PLD 1966 S. 266.Lah. 828. [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H. [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] Subject taxable if within letter of law.Pak.C. 262.) = 2000 PTD 497 Rule of benefit to subject where two interpretations are _ possible. 1 ITC 37 (Madras) Practice under repealed Act as an aid for construction of _ later Act. but a single decision not. 163 _ RULE OF INTERPRETATION TWO EQUAL POSSIBLE _ INTERPRETATIONS EXEMPTION CLAUSES 264.Lah.C.18 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. [1995] 71 TAX 280 (H. 257. 260.C. [1998] 77 TAX 172 (S.C. [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H. 265.C.C. [2000] 81 TAX 7 (H. [2000] 82 TAX 3 (S. [1 ITC 189 (Lahore)] _ Strict rule of interpretation to tax a subject. [1 ITC 172 (Madras)] Subject can only be taxed if statute expressly so provides. 270. Exemption clauses provided under industrial incentives _ should be construed liberally. PAGE NO 256.Pak) The provisions of Limitation Act are mandatory and cannot _ be waived. not taxable if not _ within letter of law through within the spirit.

Qut.19 SHORT TITLE.Lah. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 271. Redundancy should not be readily assigned by courts.C.Lah. [1964] 9 TAX 273 (H.C.) = 2000 PTD 280 Amendment in law implies necessarily an intention on the part of legislature to depart from earlier law in some respects redundancy cannot be attributed to the legislature. [1999] 79 TAX 161 (H. _ [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.) Time spent in obtaining a certified copy should be excluded _ while computing period of limitation.) _ Exemption cannot be allowed if not claimed.Pak. 284. Interpretation favourable to assessee is to be adopted.) 170 170 INTERPRETATION FAVOURABLE TO ASSESSEE IS TO BE ADOPTED 281. [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H.Lah. [1976] 34 TAX 10 (H. [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H.C.C.Kar.) Court holidays falling on the day of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation should be excluded in counting the _ period of limitation.C.C.C.) .) Application of provisions of Limitation Act to proceedings _ under Income Tax Laws. 282.C.Kar.Kar. _ [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.) _ Period of Limitation Factors to be considered while _ computing period of limitation. Time limitation for filing appeal u/s 136 vis-a-vis section 5 _ of Limitation Act.) Time required for obtaining certified copy should extend the _ period of limitation.Lah.C. [1974] 29 TAX 238 (H. _ [1982] 46 TAX 143 (H.C. [1974] 29 TAX 238 (H. REDUNDANCY SHOULD NOT BE READILY ASSIGNED BY COURTS 279. [1991) 64 Tax 31 (H. 169 169 278. 274. 275.Kar.) 167 168 168 168 273.C.) = 1964 PTD 554 _ 170 170 RULES WHEN LANGUAGE IS AMBIGUOUS 283.) _ Delay of each day must be explained.Lah.C. 277. 168 169 276. _ [1999] 79 TAX 428 (S.Kar.C. Rule of interpretation of ambiguous words 111 PLD 2000 S. [1979] 40 TAX 60 (H. 272.C. 280.) A reference application made beyond the prescribed time _ should be dismissed.Kar. 171 172 Proviso cannot extend the meaning of the enacting part.

).C. Effect of non-obstante clause.) In case of ambiguity in language.Pak) Doubt or ambiguity in language should go in favour of _ taxpayer [2001] 83 TAX 489 (H.C.Pak) 172 If a statute is capable of two interpretations then the one _ which is favourable to the subject be adopted.) A new and added obligation not formerly cast upon the taxpayer cannot be extracted uut of ambiguity of the _ provisions of the Act [1 ITC 363 (Calcutta)] _ General Language not infrequently intended sub modo.C. [1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)] 172 173 173 174 287.) _ Inconsistencies are in-built in income tax. .) = 2000 PTD 280 Statutes should be interpreted strictly in accordance with _ letter of law.) _ Court must confine itself to language of law.C.Kar.) _ = 1962 PTD 625 = 1962 PLD 809.Kar.Lah.Lah. [1991] 64 TAX 34 (H. 5 ITC 275 (All.C. [1989] _ 59 TAX 79 (H.C.Lah.).C. [1994] 69 TAX 79 (H. 174 175 292.C.Kar.C.C.Kar.Lah.) If a statute is capable of two interpretations then the one _ which is favourable to the subject be adopted.C. otherwise courts should adhere to plain words. PAGE NO 285. 176 296.) Literal rule can only be deviated in case of ambiguity in language. [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.).20 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. [2000] 81 TAX 88 (H.C.C.C. 174 291.Lah.) = 2000 PTD 280 Ambiguity in language should be resolved in the favour of _ taxpayer. 286. [5 ITC 8 (H. then the latter should be preferred. [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.) _ Benefit of ambiguity should be given to the assessee. = 1997 PTD 1693 _ [1997] 76 TAX 213 (S. 177 177 299. statement of objects _ and reason can be relied upon.C.) = 1999 PTD 4138 In case of two equally reasonable interpretations.Lah. [1962] 6 TAX 1 (H.Kar. _ 1999 PTD 4138 (H.Lah.Lah. 290.) _ Benefit of ambiguity should be given to the assessee.C. [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. 288. 289. [1996] 74 _ _ TAX 9 (H. 298. one strict and other beneficial. [1985] 51 TAX 66 (H. _ [5 ITC 159 (H. 293. 175 176 294. 1992 SCC 980 = [1992] 66 TAX 246 (S. 176 176 297.Kar. 295.

C.) Reliance on foreign cases in the presence of contrary view _ taken by Pakistani courts is strongly disapproved.Kar. 1981 SCC 546 = [1981] 44 TAX 40 (S.-29) (S. 1955 SCC 1 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Fiscal statutes should be interpreted according to their _ natural meanings.Pak. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 300.C. 303.) 178 178 178 180 NON OBSTANTE PROVISION OVERRIDES CONFLICTING PROVISION 304.Lah.) = 2000 PTD 254 180 DOCTRINE OF BINDING PRECEDENT (STARE DECISIS) 305. [PLD 1960 Lahore 687] English decisions in pari materia and their binding value. 312.) Binding judgements and conduct of different benches.C. 182 182 183 183 311. 182 182 309.Pak 296] Pre-partition judgements are binding unless overruled by _ Pakistani courts. _ [2000] 82 TAX 73 (H.C. _ [1 ITC 133 (Madras) 181 181 181 306. 302. [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] _ Practice not a guide where language of statute is clear. 308. Non obstante provision overrides conflicting provision. [1 ITC 161 (Burma)] _ Benefit of doubt is the right of taxpayer. .C. [1995 CLC 1435 (H.Kar.C.) = PTCL 1989 CL 660 _ Principles of “stare decisis”.C.Pak) Per incuriam judgement of even the highest court is not _ binding. 307.Kar. Division bench of a High Court cannot disagree with another Division Bench without reference to a larger bench or should leave the matter to be decided by Supreme Court. [1 ITC 54 (Calcutta)] _ No taxation except by express words. [1989] 60 TAX 45 (H.C.) English decisions in pari materia and their binding value.Pak 423] Cautious approach is necessary when adopting foreign case_ law. 1 ITC 37 (Mad. _ _ [PLD 1960 Lahore 1962]. _ [PLD 1995 S.21 SHORT TITLE. 313. 301.C. [1981] 43 TAX 100 (H. _ [PLD 1963 S.Kar. 310.) = [2000] 81 TAX 249 (H.

Lah.Pak.).Pak) Doctrine of res judicata . [PLD 1967 SC 1] _ Noscitur a Sociis.C.C.Kar. [1965 SCC 212 = PLD 1965 SC 171] Principles of waiver or estoppel do not apply against a _ provision of law. 327. 185 186 317.) = 1999 PTD _ _ 1358].). [1967 SCC 289 = _ [1967] 16 TAX 81 (S.C.C. _ [1997] 75 TAX 1 (H. 329. [1992 SCC 910 = PLD 1992 SC 549].C.) _ No one can be judge in his own cause.C.C. [1994] 70 TAX 11 (H.Lah. 325. [AIR 1933 PC 63.Lah. 320.) = 1997 PTD 605 = PTCL 1997 CL 29] _ Ex abundanti cautela.Lah. [1940] 8 ITR 442 (PC) _ _ Principle of res judicata not applicable. 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S. 192 . 321.Meaning of.Pak). _ [PLD 1999 Lahore 446] _ Ut res valeat quam pereat. 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S.C.) _ Mens rea. LEGAL MAXIMS 316. _ _ [1991 SCC 805 = 1992 SCMR 523].Kar. 65] _ Ejusdem generis . [1925] 9 TC 445 (HL) _ Generalia specialibus non derogant.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562 _ Income tax officer . 322.C. 1964 SCC 176 = [1964] 10 TAX 49 _ (S. 111.not applicable to income-tax _ proceedings. PLD 2000 S. 323. _ Doctrine of Merger. [1999] 79 TAX 605 (H. 324.22 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. [1999] 80 TAX 89 (H.when not bound by res judicata. PAGE NO DOCTRINE OF MERGER 314. [1935] 3 ITR 103 (Lah. [1979] 39 TAX 1 (H. [1994 SCMR 2232]. _ [AIR 1920 Lahore 247] _ Casus Omissus.Pak).Kar. 1 ITC 284 (Cal.) = [1999 PTD 2895 184 185 315.) _ Audi alteram partem. [1985] 51 TAX 83 (H. 318.) On appeal original order ceases to exists and merges itself in _ the appellate order [1992] 65 TAX 205 (H.C. [PLD 1999 SC 1126] Things should be done as per law or not be done at all.C. 190 190 191 328.C. DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA/ESTOPPEL 326. 186 187 188 188 188 189 189 189 319.

[1964 SCC 176 = [1964] 10 TAX 49 (S. [1992] 65 TAX 268 (H.Kar.Kar.C. 331. 339.C.) The court must consider the intention and not merely the _ form.) _ Judicious exercise of discretion.) Justice should not only be done but must also appear to _ have been done.C.) Principles of natural justice are part and parcel of every statute unless there is specific provision in a particular _ statute to the contrary.C. [1969] 19 TAX 198 (H. [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H. [PLD 1999 Kar. 196 196 338. 344.C. .Kar. while examining a document.Kar.) Article 4 of Constitution of Pakistan 1973 vis-a-vis “due _ process of law”. [1984] 49 TAX 18 (H. 343. 433] 194 335. Affording of an opportunity is a prerequisite for taking a _ penal action. 196 340. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 330.C.) _ Principle of res judicata and estoppel.C.Lah.C.) Principles of natural justice cannot be invoked in deciding a _ legal issue with reference to the statutory provision. [1980] 42 TAX 47 (H.) Executive actions are not excluded from the operation of _ promissory estoppel. [1990] 62 TAX 91 (H. 1969 SCC 350 = [1975] 31 TAX 101 (S.C. 195 195 336.C.C.) No adverse order should be passed against a party without _ affording an opportunity to hear the case. [PLD 1999 S. [1998] 78 TAX 168 (H. Doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked against _ the legislature and the laws framed by it.) _ Equitable doctrine of estoppel.23 SHORT TITLE.Pak) An order affecting the rights of a party cannot be passed _ without an opportunity of hearing to that party.Lah.Lah. 197 197 197 198 342.C. [1973] 27 TAX 212 (H. 332. 333. 337.Kar.C.Pak) _ Duties of courts in administration of justice.Lah. [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H. [1966) 14 TAX 161 (H. 196 341. [1968] 18 TAX 72 (H.Lah. 1126] Public power and administrative discretion ought to be _ exercised fairly.) 192 193 194 194 NATURAL JUSTICE/DUTIES OF COURT 334.Kar.C.

[1979] 40 TAX 116 (H.C. Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities.C.Lah.) 205 .Lah.C. [1977] 35 TAX 42 (H. [1976] 33 TAX 258 (H.) 202 TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN ONE STATUTE 351. Interpretation leading to destructive ends should be avoided _ by Courts.C. [1982] 45 TAX 263 (H. [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 201 INTERPRETATION LEADING TO DESTRUCTIVE ENDS SHOULD BE AVOIDED BY COURTS 350. 199 RULES RELATING TO INTERPRETATION OF AMENDING PROVISIONS EXPLAINED 347. Phrases used in one statute borrowed as aid in support of the interpretation of a different statute meant for a different purpose and dealing with a wholly different subject matter _ is not always safe.C.) 200 200 PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL LIABILITIES 349.24 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Five-point criteria for applying “doctrine of mutuality”.) = PLD 1979 591 Scope and import of incorporated provisions of law _ explained. Rules relating to interpretation of amending provisions _ explained.) = 1982 PTD 46 = 1990 PTCL 954 198 NON-APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TAX LAWS TO TRIBAL AREAS 346.Kar.Lah.) =1959 PTD 639 =1959 PLD 627 _ Non-application of Federal Tax Laws to tribal areas etc. 348. PAGE NO DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY 345. Marginal notes to the section of an Act cannot be referred to _ for the purpose of construing the Act. [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H.) 204 MARGINAL NOTES TO THE SECTION OF AN ACT CANNOT BE REFERRED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING THE ACT 352.C.C.Lah.Kar. _ [1959] 1-TAX (III-150) (H.C. _ [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.Lah.Lah.

) [2000] 82 210 . [1960] 2-TAX (III-474) (H.Kar.Dacca)=1963 PTD 161 =1963 PLD 373 206 206 DOCTRINE OF FAVOURABLE INTERPRETATION 355. TAX 131 (H.Lah.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 727 = 1960 PLD 535 _ 207 ACT IS TO BE READ AS A WHOLE 358. Provisions should be interpretated in accordance with the _ plain meaning of the language used therein.) = 1963 PTD 534 = 1963 PLD 311 _ 206 DEPARTMENT CAN GO BEYOND A TRANSACTION 356. Doctrine of favourable interpretation applies to charging _ and not to machinery provisions. _ [1961] 4 TAX 135 (H.C. (H.Lah. (H.C. Department can go beyond a transaction. Principle of approbate and reprobate explained. [1966] 13 TAX 145 (H.Dacca) 1960 PTD 574 208 SECTION VS. RULE 360. [1963] 7 TAX 153 (H.25 SHORT TITLE.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO PRINCIPLE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION 353.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 1110 = 1962 PLD 104 _ Act is to be read as a whole. In case of discrepancy in language of section and rules.) = 1959 PTD 707 =1959 PLD 539 _ 209 PRINCIPLE OF APPROBATE AND REPROBATE 361. [1959] 1-TAX (III-407) (H. [1963] 7 TAX 113 (H. Rules cannot be called in aid to interpret sections of the Act.C.Lah.C.) 1962 PTD 603 207 APPLICATION OF TAX RATES THROUGH A FINANCE ACT EXPLAINED 357. Statute should be read as a whole.C. 208 STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE 359.C.C.Dacca) _ Statute should be given its ordinary meaning. Application of tax rates through a Finance Act explained. 354. _ section is to prevail.C.

C.Pak.C. [1999] 80 TAX 262 (H. [1994] 70 TAX 272 _ _ (H. 1969 SCC 319 = [1975] 31 TAX 94 (S. 1989 SCC 715 = [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S.C. 213 369.) Writ jurisdiction can be invoked in cases of mala fide action _ by the departmental authorities.Kar. PTCL 1999 _ CL.26 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.) Remedies not availed disentitles the party from relief if _ constitutional petition also fails. [1989] 59 TAX 115 (H.Pak.C.) = 1997 PTD 821.) _ No time limitation for illegal orders. 372.C.C. 364.Pak. .) Conditions for maintainability of writ petitions explained. [2000] 81 TAX 390 (H.Pak. 368. 359 = 1999 SCMR 1072.). 2000 PTD 306 High Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction in a case where alternate remedy is only illusory in its nature and on _ the face of order it is clearly misapplication of law. Petition challenging order under section 53 held to be _ maintainable.Lah. 214 373.C.) Writs held to be maintainable vis-a-vis doctrine of _ _ exhaustion as no bar.C. 371.) Constitutional jurisdiction only in extraordinary _ circumstances.C. [1988] 57 211 211 212 366. 213 213 367.Kar.Kar. _ 1993 SCC 1022 = [1993] 68 TAX 35 (S. The assessee has other options like filing a complaint with _ Ombudsman. [1997] 75 TAX 261 _ (H.C. PAGE NO HIGH COURT IS COMPETENT TO ENTERTAIN WRIT WHERE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IS INVOLVED 362. [2000] 82 TAX 135 (H.Pak. 365.Lah.C. 1993 SCC 1018 = [1993] 68 TAX 29 (S.C. 213 214 214 370. 1988 SCC 710 = [1989] 60 TAX 52 (S.) = 1998 PTD 3923].Pak.). High Court is competent to entertain writ where _ interpretation of law is involved. PLD 1999 Lahore 417.Lah.) Extraordinary jurisdiction is not necessarily a speedy remedy.) Order passed without giving opportunity of being heard is _ not sustainable. [1999] 79 TAX 255 _ (H.) 211 GENERAL RULES IN RESPECT OF WRIT PETITION 363.Lah.C. [2001] 83 TAX 119 (S.

C.Lah. [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H.) Stay cannot be granted without notice to the Law Officer of _ State.C.Kar. 423 _ 215 219 219 375.Kar.C.C. 224 224 224 383. [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. petitioner could not be declared non-suit only on the ground _ of maintainability. 222 379.) Exemption of assessee from payment of Income Tax was refused by the Income Tax Authorities .C.Kar. 385.Lah.) Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce the rights which were not in existence at the time when the _ offending enactments were passed.) = PLJ 1984 Lah.). EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO TAX 14 (H. _ [1997] 76 TAX 238 (H. [1995] 72 TAX 223 (H. [1992] 66 TAX 226 (H.Kar.) Exercise of jurisdiction of High Court is confined only to consideration-whether authority had acted with or without _ jurisdiction. demand could be stayed. [1996] 73 TAX 85 (H.C.C. 223 223 381.C. 376.Kar.) If remedy provided under the law is not efficacious then _ speedy petition is maintainable.J&K).) _ High Court can grant stay of recovery of tax. 221 378.Kar. 225 . 382.27 SHORT TITLE.Lah. 222 380. [1981] 44 TAX 59 (H.) Writ petition admitted to regular hearing to consider the _ vires of legislation. 221 377.AJ&K) _ Stay granted could not be given beyond six months.) Extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked without first availing the remedies available under _ the relevant law. [1987) 56 TAX 120 (H.C. [1987] 56 TAX 78 (H. Writ cannot be converted into appeal under section 136.Lah.) 374. [1993] 68 TAX 173 (H.C.C.A.)= 1998 PCTLR 440 = 1998 PTD 874 Interim relief in the form of release of goods on furnishing of _ indemnity bond held. _ [1980] 41 TAX 60 (H.Queeta) Statutory period for filing revision petition long expired.High Court set aside the order of refusal of exemption and remitted the cases of assessee for decision according to law with the consent of _ parties and with a view to avoid delay. 384.C. [1995] 72 TAX 218 (H.C.Kar.C.Kar.C. [1984] 50 TAX 37 (H. [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H.

adequate and effective remedies available to the petitioner. 232 396.) = 1981 PTD 53 Provisions of the Income Tax can be challenged on constitutional grounds inspite of alternate remedies. [1950] 18 ITR 618 (Punj. .C.C.) Where a finding of fact not based on evidence or where material evidence ignored. Where alternate and equally efficacious remedy is available.) In writ. [1985] 51 TAX 157 (H.C.C. [2000] 81 TAX 119 (H.Kar. 226 226 388.AJ&K) Reference application pending disposal before the High Court held not a bar to maintainability of constitutional 231 395.) petition is 227 228 391.Kar. 389.C.) = 1964 PTD 554 225 387. 392. political victimization _ maintainable.) Writ held maintainable even during the pendency of appeals when demand of taxes was huge and ran into millions and the department was pressing hard for its recovery but orders passed were against the law as held earlier by courts.Kar. [1996] 74 TAX 141 (H. High Court can step in to prevent excess. 233 397. the petitioner is not entitled to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court by way of writ petition.C. Writ is maintainable where order is illegal notwithstanding _ the availability of alternate remedy.C. [1990] 62 TAX 98 (H.Kar. _ [1981] 43 TAX 92 (H.AJ&K) In case of writ.Lah. _ [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 Where there has been suppression of material/acts. 227 WRIT HELD MAINTAINABLE 390. 229 229 393. In cases involving fiscal rights even if alternate. [1995] 72 TAX 81 (H.C.Kar.28 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. [1999] 79 TAX 28 (H.) = 1999 PTD 4061 Writ is the appropriate remedy where order is void and _ without lawful authority. [1964] 9 TAX 273 (H. if any. 394.C.) Writ maintainable provided order is unlawful although _ alternate remedy available to the petitioner.C. PAGE NO 386.Lah. writ of _ prohibition cannot be issued. _ though for different years.Kar. reference under section 136 is _ maintainable. committed by _ public functionaries. court cannot assume jurisdiction of income _ tax department. [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H.

29 SHORT TITLE. Constitutional petition before High Court challenging vires of taxing “free reserves” to Income Tax held cannot be dismissed on ground of laches in view of nature of relief _ claimed and the circumstances of the case.) 398. etc.) Order passed without lawful authority.) Where alternate remedy available but not efficacious and statutory functionary acting mala-fide or in a partial. 239 . High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant relief to the aggrieved _ party.Kar.C. held assessee can invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court even if alternate remedy is _ available by way of appeal.C.C.C. 236 401. unjust and oppressive manner. 238 404.Kar. [1976] 34 TAX 1 (H. unjust and oppressive held High Court is empowered to grant relief to aggrived party in writ _ jurisdiction.C. held that even existence of alternate remedy would not operate to debar the assessee from invoking extraordinary jurisdiction _ of High Court. writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked even if _ alternate remedy is available. [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H. 239 405.) = 1979 PTD 461 Where fact for determination was whether receipts supported by payment certificates produced by assessee were genuine and correct and claim was rejected without application of mind to this aspect. assessment was made without taking decision on the specific objection. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO petition challenging vires of law taxing “free reserve?‟ to _ Income Tax. 552 234 235 399.) Order passed by a fiscal authority within jurisdiction but partial. unjust and mala-fide.Kar. [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. [1981] 44 TAX 93 (H. 237 402. 238 403.Lah.Kar.) Writ petition in the High Court challenging jurisdiction held _ competent even during the pending of appeal.Kar. 236 400. partial. [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H.Kar.) If impugned action is patently without jurisdiction. [1980] 41 TAX 25 (H.Lah.C. [1983] 47 TAX 162 (H.C.) In the presence of assessee‟s objection to exercise of jurisdiction on ground of bias. [1976] 34 TAX 31 (H.C.Lah.C. [1980] 42 TAX 47 (H.) = PLD 1976 Kar. held High Court competent to interfere _ in its constitutional jurisdiction.

Pak. 243 415.Lah. 1989 SCC _ 715 = [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S.C.C.C.C. [1975] 31 TAX 114 (H.) = 1990 PTD 889 240 407. PTCL 2000 CL.Lah. 1988 SCC 710 = [1989] 60 TAX 52 (S. writ jurisdiction _ cannot be invoked.Pak). [2000] 82 TAX 156 (H.C. 1999 PTD 4037 Writ is maintainable where notice is without lawful jurisdiction – [1990] 62 TAX 8 (H. 316 (S.Pak). 241 408. Writ held not maintainable where disputed question of fact _ involved.AJ&K) _ 1993 SCC 1018 = [1993] 68 TAX 29 (S.C.C.C. 1972 SCC 400 = [1974] _ 29 TAX 208 (S.Lah.C. 242 413.C.C.C. 243 248 416.Pak. without _ availing of remedies available under the law.) Where adequate alternate remedy is available writ under _ Article 199 is not maintainable. [1993] 68 TAX 132 (S. v.Lah.) If adequate remedy is not exhausted.Kar.) Writ admitted during the pendency of appeals held _ maintainable.C. .C.Pak.).C.). [1993] 68 _ _ TAX 145 (S. 241 242 410.30 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.) = 2000 PTD 263.C. PAGE NO 406.Pak).Pak.C. 1968 SCC 316 = [1968] 18 TAX 1 (S. WRIT HELD NOT MAINTAINABLE 411. Writ petition is not maintainable in the presence of adequate _ alternate remedy under the statute.C.Lah. writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked.Pak.) 242 412. If assessment is suffering from lack of jurisdiction.) _ Circumstance where writ is not maintainable.C.Pak) After availing normal remedy switching over to constitutional petition is not maintainable in the absence of _ justifiable reason. 1968 SCC 313 = [1969] 19 TAX 97 _ _ (S.) Writ is maintainable where action is malafide or without jurisdiction or vires of law is challenged Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd.) = 1963 PTD 534 = 1963 PLD 311 Writ maintainable in case where forums provided under the _ relevant statute may not be just and proper.). [2000] 82 TAX 42 (H.Lah. [2000] 82 TAX _ _ 131 (H. [2001] 83 TAX 17 (H. [2000] 81 TAX 224 (H. 241 409. 1993 SCC 1080 = [1993] 68 TAX 176 (S. 243 414.Kar.).).Kar. CBR – [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. [1963] 7 TAX 153 (H.

[1997] 75 TAX 117 (H.Pesh) = 1997 PTD 1805 In case of availing the remedy of appeal writ is not _ maintainable. 422.Lah. [1996] 74 TAX 215 (H. _ [1996] 74 TAX 21 (H. [1997] 76 TAX 138 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 417.C. writ petition _ is not maintainable.) Writ is not maintainable where parties themselves agreed _ for arbitration in bilateral contracts.remedy sought through _ constitutional jurisdiction held not maintainable. [2000] 81 TAX 60 (H.31 SHORT TITLE. 252 253 425.) In the presence of statutory remedy under the Income Tax Ordinance approach to the High Court through a writ _ petition is disapproved. [1999] 80 TAX 9 (H. 254 254 428. 426. 2000 PTD 306 Writ petition not maintainable when remedy of seeking reference under section 136 of the unamended provisions of Income Tax Ordinance is available to the assessee at the _ relevant time. 423.) = NLR 1999 TAX 170 Where the petitioner conceals material facts.) = 1997 PTD 7 Selection of return for audit . 254 .) Writ is not maintainable where facts are controversial.) Legality and correctness of a factual controvery could not be _ resolved in constitutional jurisdiction.Lah. 250 251 251 421.) Writ not maintainable in case where no right to appeal or _ reference is provided in law itself.Lah. writ is not _ maintainable. 253 427.Lah. _ [2001] 83 TAX 397 (H. [1997] 76 TAX 110 (H. Assessee cannot be allowed to bypass the _ available adequate remedy. writ petition is not maintainable. [1996] 73 TAX 106 (H.C.Lah. [1997] 75 TAX 259 (H.Lah.C.Lah. 429.) Where alternate statutory remedies available.Pesh. 1999 PCTLR 387 Writ petition is not maintainable where appeal is pending _ before any authority.C.C.Lah. 420.C.Lah. 249 250 419.Lah.) Assessing officer did not give appeal effect being challenged by the department. In presence of arbitration clause in the agreement executed between the parties.C.) 249 418.C.C. [1999] 80 TAX 273 (H. 252 424.C.C.C.) = 1997 PTD 1104= 1998 PCTLR 520 (H.

Lah.Lah.C.Kar.Lah.).Lah.) Issue being controversial involving inquiry .Pesh.C.C. held writ petition against such order was not _ competent.C.) Where appeal was dismissed by Appellate authorities on ground of limitation and this order was in accordance with law.Lah. PAGE NO 430.) Writ cannot be entertained where adequate remedy is _ available.C.32 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C.Kar.) If Income Tax Officer‟s action is jurisdictional. [1975] 31 TAX 105 (H. writ petition is not maintainable.C.) Remedies available under the law should be exhausted before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High _ Court. 259 438. writ _ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked. 260 440. [1972] 25 _ TAX 145 (H.) Factual inquiry involving controversial facts cannot be undertaken by the High Court in exercise of its _ constitutional jurisdiction. 434.Lah. [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H.) = 1986 PTD 316 High Court cannot examine the question of controversial _ facts in constitutional jurisdiction.Lah.Kar. _ [1986] 54 TAX 1 (H.C.C. [1989] 59 TAX 86 (H.Kar. [1987] 56 TAX 24 (H. 432. 431. [1973] 27 TAX 51 (H. [1972] 25 TAX 140 (H. 258 437. 262 442.) Writ petition not maintainable where adequate and _ alternate remedy available.C. [1982] 45 TAX 2 (H. 257 436. 262 MISCELLANEOUS . High Court cannot go in the domain of factual controversy.C.) = 1981 PTD 217 If question of jurisdiction of the assessing officer is not _ challenged.) 255 255 256 256 433. 260 439.C.Kar. [1993] 68 TAX 74 (H.C.) Writ is not maintainable where adequate alternate remedy _ _ is available.Lah.held not a fit case to be determined under supervisory constitutional _ jurisdiction of High Court.) Assessee cannot avail remedy of constitutional petition before High Court. 257 435.C.) Writ not maintainable in the presence of adequate and _ efficacious alternate remedy.C. being dissatisfied with the notices. [1975] 31 TAX 153 (H. [1982] 45 TAX 17 (H. 261 441. _ [1995] 72 TAX 274 (H. [1995] 72 TAX 1 (H.Lah. [1995] 71 TAX 216 (H.).

AJ&K) If notice is prima facie defective and error is incurable.) Only natural/legal persons have vested rights and not the _ government/state. _ [1998] 78 TAX 217 (H. [1995] 71 TAX 45 (H.Pak) The assessing officer cannot lay down in their judgment a _ rule which goes against Islamic Law.C.C. 271 271 456. [1991 SCC 773 = PLD 1991 SC 368 Islamic jurisprudence and rules of law are equally _ applicable to fiscal laws. 264 265 265 266 446. [1994] 69 TAX 109 (S. [1996] 73 TAX 85 (H. [1988] 57 TAX 46 (H.) _ Budget speech has no legal sanctity. [1998] 77 TAX 1 (H.AJ&K) A notification purporting to impose a new liability or _ obligation cannot operate retrospectively. [1998] 78 TAX 217 (H. 271 272 458. 452.) 263 444. 454. [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H. 449.Quetta) _ The de facto doctrine.C.Lah. 1989 SCC 718 = [1989] 60 TAX 106 (S. [1993] 67 TAX 395 (H.Lah. 455.C.) = 1998 PTD 3900] _ Discrimination in rule-making is ultra vires.Pak) _ Remedy to be sought within four corners of Act.C. [1997 PTD 47] Provisions of Protection of Economic Reforms Act. [1998] 78 TAX 119 (H.C.C. 263 445.) _ Powers of CBR Territorial & Administrative Jurisdiction. 447.Kar.C.Lah.) = 1998 PTD 3900] Civil suit does not lie against tax authorities unless order is _ malafide or illegal.Lah.Kar.Pak) Power to make rules is subject to certain limitations. [1973 SCC 403 = [1974] 29 Tax 190 (S. _ [1996] 74 TAX 89 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 PAGE NO 443. 1989 SCC 718 = [1989] 60 TAX 106 (S.33 SHORT TITLE. Islamic jurisprudence and rules of law are equally _ applicable to fiscal laws.C. 266 266 267 450.C.C. .Quetta) Government employees working in non-taxable territories _ are liable to pay income tax. 451.Lah. the _ entire proceedings are null and void. 1992 overrides Income Tax Law to the extent protections are _ provided in the former enactment. 457.) = 1998 PTD 2884 _ Basis of taxation in Islam. 448. 268 269 270 453.C.C.C.

C.34 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. .Kar.C.) 272 272 460. [1985] 51 TAX 66 (H. [1969] 19 TAX 198 (H.Kar. It is the duty of the legislature and not of a court to save _ income from escaping assessment. PAGE NO 459.) Proceedings under the Income Tax Act are judicial _ proceedings.

) 1.35 SHORT TITLE. in one of his judgments. etc. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.S. But with all this latitude certain irreducible desiderata of equality shall govern classification for differential treatment in taxation laws as well. subject matter. That the word „reasonable‟ is a relative generic term difficult of adequate definition. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Section 1 Short title. 2. Taxing rights of legislature are unlimited as long as these are not confiscatory. That the taxing power is unlimited as long as it does not amount to confiscation and that the Legislature does not have the power to tax to the point of confiscation. Legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons. Legislature enjoys wide powers in framing fiscal laws. events. That in view of wide variety of diverse economic criteria. It inter alia connotes agreeable to reason.Pak. That Courts while interpreting laws relating to economic activities view the same with greater latitude than the laws relating to civil rights such as freedom of speech. religion etc. extent and commencement GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION/RULES OF INTERPRETATION LEGISLATIVE POWERS Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. there are good reasons for judicial self restraint if not judicial deference to the legislative judgment‟. Doud (1957) U. keeping in view the complexity of economic problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait jacket formula as pointed out by Holmes J. 457 has remarked that „in the utilities.C. That Frankfurter J. . which are to be considered for the formulation of a fiscal policy. for taxation. tax and economic regulation cases. & others v. in Morey v.

v. sensible. is not germane to the above question. machinery. proper and equitable or to act within the constitutional bounds. the presumptive tax levied under Sections 80C and 80CC of the Ordinance is in consonance with the above two entries if read in conjunction.763. 3. conformable to reason. one can urge that Entry 47 does not admit the imposition of presumptive tax as the expression „taxes on income‟ employed therein should be understood as to mean the working out of the same on the basis of computation as provided in the various provisions of the Ordinance. tax on capacity in lieu of taxes mentioned in Entry 47 can be imposed.36 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Parliament is competent to levy presumptive taxation. establishment or installation in lieu of the taxes or duties specified in Entries 44. the same is in consonance with Entry 52. is to be determined with reference to the actual earning or earning capacity of an average prudent successful entrepreneur in a particular trade or business. thinking. wherein taxable income of the assessee declared was Rs. we will have to read Entry 47 in conjunction with Entry 52 which provides taxes and duties on production capacity of any plant. 48 and 49 or in lieu of any one or more of them. rational.e. Since under Sections 80C and 80CC the imposition of presumptive tax is in substitution of the normal method of levy and recovery of the income tax. or acting rationally. speaking.76. having the faculty of reason. as to whether a particular tax is confiscatory or expropriatory. If we were to read Entry 47 [of the 4th Schedule to the Constitution. capacity to earn. The fact that a particular assessee has suffered loss/losses during certain assessment years. In our view.674/07 including surcharge. We are inclined to hold that presumptive tax is in fact akin to capacity tax i. whereas the tax imposed was Rs. Third Income Tax Officer. Indian Supreme Court sustained the above levy and inter alia held that what is not income under the Income Tax Act can be made . The question. Madurai (supra). or according to the dictates of reason. undertaking. Sections 80C and 80CC of the Ordinance fall within the category of presumptive tax as under the same the persons covered by them pay a pre-determined amount of presumptive tax in full and final discharge of their liability in respect of the transactions on which the above tax is levied. In this regard reference may again be made to the case of the Madurai District Cooperative Bank Ltd. Part I] in isolation without referring to Entry 52. In this view of the matter.51. referred to hereinabove in para 28(x). just. Since under Entry 52. 47.

We may observe that once the Court finds that a fiscal statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. .e. The requirement of reasonable classification is fulfilled if in a taxing statute the Legislature has classified persons or properties into different categories which are subject to different rates of taxation with reference to income or property and such classification would not be open to attack on the ground of inequality or for the reason that the total burden resulting from such a classification is unequal. It may further be pointed out that different laws can be validly enacted for different sexes. it is not supposed to entangle itself with the technical questions as to the scope and modality of its working etc.37 SHORT TITLE. It has also rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification i. to broadening the tax base and to recover the minimum tax. may be unreasonable in the other set of circumstances. The impugned provisions of the Ordinance are based on reasonable classification as they are founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons covered thereunder with the other tax-payers. The above question pre-eminently deserve to be decided by the Government which possesses of experts‟ services and the relevant information which necessitated imposition of the tax involved unless the same suffers from any legal infirmity which may warrant interference by the Court. The question. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 income under the Finance Act or exemption granted by the Income Tax Act can be withdrawn by the Finance Act or its efficacy can be reduced. cannot be decided on the basis of advantages and disadvantages to individual assessees which are accidental and inevitable and are inherent in every taxing statute as it has to draw a line somewhere and some cases necessarily may fall on the other side of the line. It may be pointed out that reasonable classification is permissible provided it is based on an intelligible differentia which distinct persons or things that are grouped together from those who have been left out and that the differentia must have rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by such classification. as to whether a particular classification is valid or not. persons in different age groups. persons having different financial standings and that no standard of universal application to test reasonableness of a classification can be laid down as what may be reasonable classification in a particular set of circumstances. Reasonable classification does not imply that every person should be taxed equally.

(c) . Israel. This is achieved by reducing or disallowing certain itemised deductions. The object of the minimum tax is to ensure that the taxpayers who receive substantial amounts from exempt sources. Applying the above rule of interpretation. the above provision falls within the legislative competence under Entry 47 read with Entry 52. under section 56(a) a tax equal to 15% of the amount. We may again point out that the NTRC. . The levy of minimum tax has been adopted in some other countries of the world including U. in its report of December. The approach of this Court while interpreting the Constitution should be dynamic.38 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. progressive and oriented with the desire to meet the situation effectively which has arisen keeping in view the requirement of ever changing society. with the result that they do not contribute any income tax towards the public exchequer. It may again be observed that section 80D is based on the theory of minimum tax. show loss instead of any net profit. The rate of half per cent of minimum tax adopted under Section 80D seems to be on the basis of the minimum rate of tax suggested by the Exports Enhancement Committee. The imposition of minimum tax under Section 80D is designed and intended to achieve the above objectives.S. etc. We may again observe that a large number of assessees though generally earn profits but on account of various tax concessions including tax holidays. In our view. Sections 80C and 80CC cannot be equated with section 80D as the same is founded on different basis. In such a scenario. Levy of minimum tax held constitutional. which mostly comprised the representatives of business community representing various trade associations. pay at least some tax on their economic incomes of the year. we do not find any infirmity in the impugned Section 80D of the Ordinance. It envisages that every individual should pay a minimum tax towards the cost of the Government. quoted hereinabove in para 17.A. highlighted the corruption obtaining in Government and semi-Government departments and so also the dishonest tendency on the part of the tax-payers to evade the payment of lawful taxes by using unfair means.. depreciation allowance etc. 1986. is levied. France.000 (b) .. under Schedule II and deductions allowed under the various provisions of the Ordinance. In United States.. by which sum of the items of tax preference exceeds the greater of (i) $100. the Legislature is bound to adopt modern and progressive approach with the object to eliminate leakage of public revenues and to generate revenues which may be used for running of the State and welfare of its people. 4. Columbia and Thailand besides India.

The above undertaking of the Central Board of Revenue is incorporated as a part of this judgment. This will exclude any provision of the Ordinance which may be inconsistent with it. 3 of 1996 dated 18. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 It may be stated that non-obstante clause in section 80-D is for the purpose of liability to pay minimum tax of half per cent on the annual turnover. 1991. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1652). which is detrimental or prejudicial to the interest of a person. assessees who fulfil the conditions of the notifications referred to in the Schedule to Section 6 of Act XII of 1992. In this regard it will suffice to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. which was an earlier statute and which was part of a general statute. since the provisions of Act XII of 1992 are subsequent in time and as they are contained in a special statute.1996. In our view. In this view of the matter. the amounts of sales tax and excise duty charged in terms of paras 3 and 4 of the aforementioned circular would be excluded. But the same does not exclude the application of other provisions of the Ordinance which are not inconsistent with section 80-D. and others v. it has retrospective effect and will be applicable to all pending assessments. in order to eliminate . the effect of which is that while computing the annual turnover of an assessee.3.1997 filed before this Court confirmed that subject to the conditions laid down in paras 3 and 4 of Circular No.4. and hence the same remains available to assessees.39 SHORT TITLE. cannot operate retrospectively. which will have to be determined by the hierarchy provided under the Ordinance and not by this Court. which was enacted through Finance Act. However. The relevant portion of the aforesaid circular has already been quoted hereinabove. is not affected by the above levy of half per cent on the annual turnover under section 80D. To claim business loss or to carry forward the same under section 35 of the Ordinance from year to year. There seems to be no conflict between above Section 80D and section 35 of the Ordinance. is a question of fact. they shall prevail over the provisions of Section 80D of the Ordinance. We may point out that an executive order/notification. are entitled to the protection. The question. The above written undertaking of the Central Board of Revenue to make this circular applicable retrospectively is in consonance with the aforesaid judgment of this Court. as to whether a particular assessee fulfils the conditions of the above notifications. a beneficial executive order /notification issued by an executive functionary can be given retrospective effect. The Central Board of Revenue in a written undertaking dated 9. However.

1992 (Act XII of 1992). It is needless to reiterate that it is a well settled proposition of law that an entry in the legislative list must be given a very wide and liberal interpretation. Assessees who are covered by the notifications mentioned in the Schedule to Section 6 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act. That the rule of interpretation that while interpreting an entry in a legislative list it should be given widest possible meaning does not mean the Parliament can chose to tax as income an item which is no rational sense can be regarded as citizen‟s income. the legislature enjoys plenary power to impose such conditions as to liability or as to exemption as it chooses. so long as they do not exceed the mandate of the Constitution. They may approach the Income Tax Department. multiplicity of litigation and to avert element of harassment to assessees. Power to levy taxes is an attribute of sovereignty of a state.e. are entitled to the protection in terms thereof as per paras 52 to 54 hereinabove. It is also apparent that the entries in the legislative list of the Constitution are not powers of legislature but only fields of legislative needs. expenditure etc. The item taxed should rationally be capable of being considered as income of a citizen. In this view of the matter. It is also manifest that income tax is not only levied in conventional manner i. namely presumptive tax and minimum tax. but what is deemed to have arisen or accrued. Restrictions on power to levy tax.40 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. The word „income‟ is susceptible as to include not only what is in ordinary parlance it conveys or it is understood. It is a mandatory requirement of a state as it generate fiscal resources which are needed for running a state and for achieving the cherished goal. There are new species of income tax. but the same may also be levied on the basis of gross receipts. 5. we have dealt with the legal aspect of the above contention though apparently it was not urged before the High Court as we do not find any mention in any of the judgments under appeal. namely. 6. The power to levy taxes is sine qua non for a state. . by working out the net income after adjudicating admissible expenses and other items. A single tax may derive its sanction from one or more entries and many taxes may emanate from one single entry. to establish a welfare state. In fact it is an attribute of sovereignty of a state. The allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition by way of mere simple enumeration of broad catalogue.

C. the constitutional mandate that a law should not be discriminatory is fulfilled. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 7. (Willi‟s Constitutional Law). That the Legislature is competent to classify persons or properties into different categories subject to different rates of tax. It is. There should be a clear and specific provision to that effect.Pak) 8. Ministry of Finance 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S. Haji Muhammad Shafi & Others v. Unless there is a clear law imposing tax twice merely by implication tax cannot be imposed twice over. The principle of “equality” applies equally to fiscal enactments. be noted that double taxation can be imposed by clear and specific language to that effect. Pak Industrial Development Corporation v. it is liable to be struck down on account of infringement of the fundamental right relating to equality. clear that unless there is any prohibition or restriction on the power of the legislature to impose a tax twice on the same subject matter. . That the tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous. double taxation cannot be declared illegal or void though it may be oppressive and inequitable. persons. It may. methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably‟. double taxation though a heavy burden and seemingly oppressive and inequitable can not be declared to be void or beyond the powers of the legislature.Pak. If there is equality and uniformity within each group founded on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law. however. That „a State does not have to tax everything in order to tax something it is allowed to pick and choose districts. which results in inequality amongst holders of the same kind of property. Wealth Tax Officer & Others – [1992] 65 TAX 315 (S. thus. objects.41 SHORT TITLE.C. Where the language is not clear or specific by implication such levy can not be permitted. Double Taxation is prerogative of legislature. through the Secretary. Pakistan.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562  Unless there is any prohibition or restriction imposed on the power of legislature to impose a tax twice on the same subject-matter. But if the same class of property similarly situated is subjected to an incidence of taxation.

Commissioner of Income Tax.Kar. Addition in section 23(1)(v). NWFP and Delhi Provinces. Lahore v. deductions. Cases referred to: Laxmi Insurance Co.. Privy Council (AIR 1932 PC 138).) 10. (AIR 1931 Lahore 441). Karachi and others v. and 6 others appeals (PLD .-308) (S.Pak) 9. which are to be deducted from income. This construction is consistent with the words and the sense of the definition of „British India‟ as well as with the principle observed in section 4 of Income Tax Act.C. Karachi – [2001] 83 TAX 376 (H. Faysal Islamic Bank of Bahrain. Commissioner of Income Tax v. depreciation etc. depreciation etc. rentals only. section 3 of the Ordinance as the very purpose of section 23 of the Ordinance provides the various permissible allowances. The scope of powers of legislature to tax non-residents. Definition of word/expression “income” would mean “net income” after making all permissible allowances. and the rule of International Law that a legislature has a authority to tax its citizens wherever they be. v. The said definition cannot be assigned to the word/expression “income” as used in section 23 of the Ordinance as the very purpose of section 23 of the Ordinance would be defeated. United Bannk Ltd.42 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. expenditures etc. Such deduction can only be made from the “gross income” and not from the “net income” as the “net income” would be arrived at after providing/deducting all the permissible allowance. If assuming for the sake of arguments that the definition is to be taken to mean “net income”. expenditures. South Zone. and to tax the foreigners only if they earn or receive income in the country for which legislature has the authority to make the laws. Pakistan Fisheries Ltd. Imperial Tobacco Company of India Ltd.C. the said definition cannot be assigned to the word/expression “income” as used in section 23 of the Ordinance as the very purpose of section 23 of the Ordinance would be defeated. depreciations.. Karachi – 1958 SCC 37 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Muhammad Fareed that the definition as appearing in section 2(24) of the Ordinance of the word/expression “income” would mean “net income” after making all permissible allowances. Ltd. the legislature has given its clear intention that depreciation on assets given on lease shall be allowed against lease. We are not in agreement with Mr. v. deductions. Commissioner of Income Tax. Shaw Wallace & Co. depreciation etc as appearing in section 2(24) of the Ordinance. As has already been stated herein above. Punjab.

Continental Chemical Co.) Ltd.) 11. but also related with force in respect of advance tax. Applying this circular also the petitioner was under no obligation to deduct tax at source under section 50(4) in relation to the purchases on which tax at import stage had been deducted under section 50(5) and which constituted a final discharge . Jurisdiction to apply provisions of Ordinance in any manner was not restricted to proceedings for assessment or recovery of final income tax liabilities. (Pvt. CBR circular No 19 of 1991 dated 8. be it under section 50(4) or section 53 or any other provision of the Ordinance. In our view the principle of law which thus. President National Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1988 SC 53).7. since non-deduction or short-fall in relation to thereof would be of no consequence. This would surely include the further exemption prescribed by section 80C(4). any failure to deduct the tax by the petitioner would be of no consequence. Pakistan and others – [2001] 83 TAX 305 (H. In fact the deduction of tax contemplated under section 50(4)(a) also makes the following incumbent conditions: (a) (b) the credit of the tax deducted or imposed has to be passed on to the deductee. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 1993 SC 109).Kar. through the Circular under discussion the exemption in relation to deduction at source under section 50(4) has been extended to all recipients who may enjoy exemption under any the provisions of the 1979 Ordinance. v. the deductee shall be allowed to claim the benefit of this deduction in his return of total income tax and towards his final tax liability. Proviso to section 50(4)(a) categorically confirmed that substantive provision of said section was also to be applied to non-residents.C. Respondent No. Iftikhar Ahmed and others v. 3 has created a liability which cannot be ascribed as one under section 50(4)(a) of the 1979 Ordinance. This principle is squarely applicable in the present case since the sellers/importers in the present case having paid their full tax.1991. assessee was under no obligation to deduct tax at source in relation to purchases on which tax at import stage had been deducted and which constituted final discharge of liability. However. any short-fall in or failure to deduct income tax at source by the deductor/payer would not make the later an assessee in default. emerges from these Indian authorities is that where the payee/deductee pays his full tax.43 SHORT TITLE.

more particularly when the provision of section 50(4)(a) has been made subject to section 53 of the 1979 Ordinance. 1998. but only mutatis mutandis. The respondent 2 and 3 were bound to obey these orders/instructions under section 8 of the 1979 Ordinance.6. It is an admitted position that the tax to be deducted is an advance tax. In this case for the purposes of advance tax. the assessment year 1996-97. has otherwise to be imposed as per the scheme of advance tax under section 53. These proceedings and orders were thus. advance income tax) would automatically lapse since under law any payment of section 53 is a credit with the exchequer which is liable to be adjusted with the actual liability for that year. however. In the context of advance deduction of income tax at source there is no provision in the 1979 Ordinance nor any jurisdictional order issued by CBR that confers jurisdiction on the respondents Nos. it would cease to have the character of advance tax is to be paid or collected by 15th June.1998 and had completed orders in July/August.44 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Any advance tax. while these instructions were also in keeping with the provisions of the 1979 Ordinance in particular section 80C(4). beyond section 50(4)(a) incompetent and time-barred as well. . admittedly had issued his first notice on 1. In case an assessee continues default of section 53 and the time for framing the regular assessment or the end of the assessment year reaches. of necessity thus. the proviso to section 50(4)(a) categorically confirms that the substantive provision of section 50(4)(a) is apply to nonresidents as well. liabilities but also relates with the same force in respect of advance tax. while the respondent No. a petitioner can directly approach the Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. of liability under section 80C(4). But if the tax under section 50(4)(a) or under section 53 is imposed after the end of the year to which it relates.3. before the year runs out. Failure to disregard this CBR Circular is ipso facto an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction. On the contrary.1998 and then on 3.e. the substantive default of section 53 (i. The income tax to be deducted has to be a percentage of purchase and is directly linked up with the transactions. 2 and 3. respectively. The jurisdiction to apply the provisions of the 1979 Ordinance in any manner is not restricted to the proceedings for the assessment or recovery of final income tax. be it under section 50(4) or section 53 or any other provision of the 1979 Ordinance.6. It is settled law that where impugned orders are void and completely without jurisdiction (as in this case).

the legislature has not taken away any right of appeal or revision or has not in any manner curbed the rights available to a deemed assessee in default and is merely in the nature of a change of officer/authority. It is a well-established principle of law that when the legislature brings about a change in the forum then the same is always with retrospective effect unless it has the effect of curtailing the existing rights available to a party for challenging any adverse order. The question of retrospective operation of the explanation of section 52 of the Ordinance would have arisen only if it has the effect of imposing new liability or obligation on the taxpayer or had affected any existing rights either by taking them away or curtailing them. A bare perusal of the explanation is enough to hold that it only provides a change in the forum. . The question of retrospective operation of the explanation would have arisen only if it has the effect of imposing new liability or obligation on the taxpayer or had effected any existing rights either by taking them away or curtailing them.45 SHORT TITLE. whereby the powers to hold proceedings against the payer as a deemed assessee in default have been taken away from the Assessing Officer/Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax dealing with the tax proceedings of the recipients and have been conferred on the Assessing Officer/ Deputy Commissioner of Income tax having power to deal with the tax proceedings of the payer. A bare perusal of the explanation added to section 52 of the Ordinance is sufficient to conclude that it has not created any new obligation or liability on the taxpayers but has been solely designed to bring about a change in the forum where a person responsible for deducting advance tax on behalf of another assessee as per requirement of section 50 of the Ordinance is to be proceeded against on his failure to deduct or collect the advance tax and to deposit the same in Government treasury. 1961 presumptive tax regime has been made applicable to limited number of items but the deduction made at source has been made liable for adjustment against the tax demand created on regular assessment. 1961 presumptive tax regime has been made applicable to limited number of items but the deduction made at source has been made liable for adjustment against the tax demand created on regular assessment. Under the Indian Income Tax Act. 13. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 12. By the aforesaid explanation. whereby the powers to hold that it only provides a change in the forum. Under the Indian Income Tax Act.

C. respondent No. 3 against the petitioners. Consequently. Federation of Pakistan [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. to facilitate proper understanding of a provision and to serve as a guideline as pronounced by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Naveed Textile Mills Ltd. It may also be stated that the object of an „explanation‟ to a Statutory instrument is to clarify. no exception can be taken to the orders passed under section 52 read with section 86 of the Ordinance by Assessing Officer/Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax.e. respondent No. 137. In view of the addition/incorporation of the explanation to section 52 of the Ordinance.). Case referred to: Mamy Beverages v.Pak) = PLD 1997 SC 582. Federationn of Pakistan [1998] 77 TAX 125 (H. this Constitutional Petition is found to be without any substance and must fail. v. Prime Dairies Ice Cream Limited 1999 PTD 4147. Kamran Industries v.C.Lah.C. [1998] 77 TAX 127 (H. the Assessing Officer/Deputy Commissioner of the Income Tax dealing with the tax assessment proceedings of an assessee would have the right to initiate and finalize the proceedings against the said assessee in cases where he is to be treated as an assessee in default. By virtue of the explanation added/incorporated in section 52 of the Ordinance. v. 3 had the jurisdiction and authority to initiate proceedings under section 52 against the petitioners as assessee in default in the assessment proceedings relating to the petitioners and no exceptions can be taken to the order passed by him under section 52 read with section 86 of the Ordinance. Assistant Collector (Appraisement) Customs House and other reported in PLD 1984 SC 92. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. deduction and collection of tax from the amount which they had paid to the eleven importers/sellers of medicines. Julain Hoshing Dinshaw Trust v.Lah. Elahi Cotton Mills v. Income Tax Offier 1992 SCMR 250. Pakistan Textile Mills Owners Association v. As such in view of this. Administrator of Karachi PLD 1963 Kar. 68. The petitioners should have satisfied themselves by reliable and satisfactory evidence that the said importers had been subjected to tax and should not have relied on assumptions.46 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.) = 1998 PTD 2116. surmises and conjectures for non-performance of the obligations cast upon them by section 50(4) of the Ordinance i. Union Bank Ltd. Saseem 1995 PTD 91. . Collector of Customs PLD 1996 Kar.

which was confined for the . We further find that a company owned by a Government shall not. corporations created by provincial statutes are not “governments”. We further find that in the present set of circumstances. the income of the Government of Pakistan. Consequently.C.) 14. We further find that legislative intent is absent so to include corporation like the appellant company as an integral part of the Federal Government. than at least to the same extent. Having examined 1997 PTD (Tribunal) 1435. employees of the appellant company would be employees of the corporation and than whether it could be said that to the extent of 50% employees of the appellant company shall be deemed to be Government servants and all properties owned by the Corporation are owned by the Government and further all contracts made by the corporation will only be made by the President is required by Article 173 of the Constitution. Karachi and others – [1999] 79 TAX 410 (H. in fact. One further aspect could also not be ignored that 50% shares are held by the corporation in the appellant company. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Indus Steel Pipes Ltd.47 SHORT TITLE. which are so owned by them through the medium of intermediate corporations. in fact restricted this concession to companies and corporations directly owned by them and not to those. we are of the view that a company or a corporation owned by the Government shall be deemed to be a department of the Government. for all purposes. The present appellant company being an assessee cannot be taken to be an organ of the State and. the legislature has. Commissioner of Income Tax. v. It may be quite correct that 50% holding of shares by a corporation for carrying on the functions in which they are engaged may be some extent are carried out on behalf of the Government and further that the income of the corporation to the extent of 50% income of the appellant company is. it seems that the issue in hand can only be resolved by examining the status of a company and looking into the important distinctive features. be deemed to be a Government Department. Companies-II. It would be seen that the definition of the Government in the definition clause cannot be extended to an extent so as to include bodies created by Provincial or Federal Statutes or incorporated as „public companies‟ as nothing is to be employed in statutes or documents which is inconsistent with the words expressly used. therefore. Scope of Article 165 & 165A of Constitution.Kar. it appears to be a correct view that a corporation created as a result of a statute was held not to be a part of the Provincial Government.

situations may arise where two legislative fields might apparently overlap. 50 of 4th Schedule to the Constitution.) 15. the tax is being levied on the capital value of assets. purposes of its immunity to tax earlier granted and available under Article 165 of the Constitution. in order to prevent such result the two provisions must be read together. Syed Bhaies Pvt. It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that where Constitution distributes legislative powers between two different law-making bodies i. an act enacted by any such body should be examined to ascertain its „pith and substance‟ or its true nature and character for purposes of determining real field of legislation within which subject-matter of the Act lies. . . unable to agree with the learned counsel on the interpretation being placed on item No. the limits of the respective powers. and. Federation of Pakistan and others – [1999] 79 TAX 77 (H. Government of Punjab – NLR 1999 Tax 176 16. Federal and Provincial. v. the authority to deal with matters falling within these classes of subjects exists in each legislature and to define. Levy of Corporate Asset Tax is constitutionally valid. where necessary modified by that of the other. no valid exception can be taken thereto.. ICC Textiles Limited v. 1991.e. 50 of 4th Schedule [to the Constitution] and the question as to whether „gross assets‟ or „net assets‟ are to be taxed was relateable to mechanism and could be determined by the Federal Legislature while further legislating on the subject. and. however difficult it may be. Wherever legislative powers are distributed between legislative bodies through legislative lists. and language of one interpreted. It could not have been intention of Constitution that a conflict should exist. It is duty of Courts.Lah.C. to ascertain to what degree and what extent.48 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. I am.. Constitutional powers of levying taxes by Federation and provinces.there is no limitation placed on the use of word „assets‟ in item No. Ltd. No doubt tax can only be levied by the Parliament as ordained by Article 77 of the Constitution but as by promulgating section 12 of the Finance Act. in the particular case before them.. therefore.

it cannot be said in the present case that the Legislature has transgressed the limits provided by the Constitution. [Per Mamoon Kazi. Although. Under section 80C of the Ordinance. It is a recognised fiscal tool to achieve. Likewise. 690 17. under section 80-CC of the Ordinance the whole of export proceeds of a person are to be deemed to be his income. J. fiscal and social objectives”. higher than the imposition is presumed to be his income. ostensibly gross receipts of the assessee or the turnover of his business have been deemed to be his income. Unless the imposition is disproportionate to income. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance. be acting within its power while resorting to this method of legislation. Contra. v.49 SHORT TITLE. in the present case. As was again observed in Elel Hotels‟ case. Government of Pakistan. The Legislature in order to achieve certain object would therefore. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Pakistan Burma Shell Ltd. Personal interest must yield to larger interest. but even something that may be presume by the Legislature to have been received.] – The expression “tax on income” would not only include “within its ambit profits or gains actually received by an assessee. Islamabad. a tax at the rate of one-half per cent is to be imposed as minimum tax In relation to the turnover of business or trade of a person.) = PTCL 1998 CL. etc. . Under section 80C of the Ordinance the whole of the amount received by a person on account of supply of goods or on execution of a contract or the amount spent by an importer of goods (which shall also include customs duty and sales tax) is to be deemed to be the income of such person.C. it cannot be said to be confiscatory. but in reality only a certain percentage thereof. These rates neither appear to be expropriatory nor confiscatory. – [1998] 78 TAX 234 (H. Viewing the issue in the above background.. Etc. The liability for payment of Income Tax varies in case of sections 80C and 80CC from one half percent to one percent of the income in case of exports and from two percent in case of imports to two and one-half percent in case of supplies. is also the concept of profitability and any amount to be called income must have some characteristics of income as the term is ordinarily understood by its various connotations. Inherent in the concept of income no doubt.Kar. “taxation is now not a mere source of raising money to defray expenses of Government. but the Court only has to ascertain that what has been deemed to be the Income of the assessee can reasonably be deemed to be his income.

Section 80D which also by virtue of the non-obstante clause inserted therein purport to include such companies or registered firms in the tax net in whose case no tax is payable or has been paid for any reason enumerated in section 80D of the Ordinance. importers or exporters. However. Since the provisions are applicable to an assessee engaged in a trade or business it can be normally presumed that the assessee will keep a sufficient margin of profit on his total turnover or his gross receipts. no two companies or firms having similar trade or business can earn similar margin of profit. The income tax payable does not appear to be so unreasonable as to be regarded as arbitrary or confiscatory it is noteworthy that in case of sections 80-C and 80-CC of the Ordinance the assessee is not required to file returns. a return has to be filed and in case the tax payable by an assesses is more than one-half percent. The application of the provisions of section 80C or 80CC of the Ordinance to certain contractors. as a distinct class is also not difficult to comprehend because tax was already being deducted from them at source under section 50 of the Ordinance. benefit of the assessee. its constitutional validity cannot be called in question. The provisions of section 80-D on the face thereof do not appear to be discriminatory as they are applicable to the assessee as a class. the Legislature in Its own wisdom made the above provisions applicable to them. Apparently. The impugned provisions of the Ordinance are apparently based on a presumption that a certain percentage of the assessee ‟s gross receipts would be tilt minimum profit. Profitability in any trade or a business & profession is also commensurate with the relative efficiency of its management although there can be various other factors responsible for the same. merely because a fiscal statute is unreasonable or oppressive.50 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. The provisions have. However. the tax purported to be levied is neither unreasonable nor discriminatory nor it appears to be confiscatory. In case of section 80-D of the Ordinance. In our opinion. companies and registered firms have been classified by the legislation as a separate class and so have been . no taxes payable or the tax payable is less than one-half per cent. In case. The assesses has been taxed accordingly by the said provisions. therefore been designed to be simple avoiding tedious procedure of assessment for the convenience and. In the present case. the same will be assessed and paid accordingly. the mere fact that margin of profit would be different cannot render the said provisions discriminatory or arbitrary or violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. etc. such tax has to be paid. Therefore.

there is a reasonable nexus between the legislation and the object it seeks to achieve. when a larger benefit for the community is to be achieved. Powers of Federal Government to levy income tax on any property or income.Lah. However. suppliers. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 certain contractors. a few exceptions reference to which has just been made in this judgment. later on doubts arose as to whether the income of corporation owned and controlled by the Government or set up by it under Act of Legislature can be deemed to be the income of the Government within the meaning of Article 165 of the Constitution. Apparently. one of the methods that can be effectively employed to plug loss of revenue is by resort to presumptive taxation. as we also pointed out earlier.C. as has been pointed out. The petitioners have failed to discharge the burden by demonstrating that the legislation in question is not in tune with the fundamental rights. the constitution was amended by Constitution (Amendment) Ordinance (P. the turnover does not appear to be unreasonable and the legislation appears to be based on a presumption that the assessee‟s minimum profit from the trade or business would exceed the Income Tax imposed under the said provisions of the Ordinance. individual interest must yield to the larger interest. Therefore. Punjab Small Industries Ltd.O. 11) 1985 and Article 165-A was added which reads as under:Article 165-A of Constitutional: “Power of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) to impose tax on the income of certain corporations. etc. In the constitution as originally framed. In the present case. v. In order to remove these doubts.(1) For the removal . barring of course. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. the income tax levied on the gross receipts or as the case may be. Lahore – [1995] 71 TAX 220 (H. importers and exporters. The mere fact that the legislation tends to diminish the assessee‟s profile is not sufficient to-make it confiscatory either. there appears to be no ground for assuming that such a measure is discriminatory or confiscatory.51 SHORT TITLE. It can hardly be denied that in this country. As was pointed out earlier. Article 165 ordains that no tax can be levied by the Federal Government on any property or income of the Provincial Government. the Legislature has sufficient latitude to classify persons or things in different categories to achieve the object of the legislation.) 18. The object sought to be achieved has been shown to be to generate more funds for the public revenue or to prevent evasion of Income Tax. including that of Provincial Government. However.

Pakistan Secretary.Kar. of doubt. company or any other body or institution established by or under a Federal Law or a Provincial Law or an existing law or a corporation. Ministry of Finance [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. the power to make a law to provide for the levy and recovery of a tax on the income of a corporation. what is not income under the Income Tax Act can be made income by a Finance Act.C. The Finance Acts. an exemption granted by the Act can be withdrawn by the Finance Act or the efficacy of the exemption may be reduced by the imposition of a new change. The Income Tax Act or Income Tax Ordinance is a permanent Act or Ordinance while the Finance Acts are passed every year and their primary purpose is to prescribe the rate at which the income tax will be charged under the Income Tax Act or Ordinance. 1967 and 1968 by which the impugned amendments were introduced in the Income Tax Act providing for levy of Income Tax on „free reserves‟ are intra vires. Pak Industrial Development Corporation v. and shall be deemed always to have had. or by introducing it in the Finance Act or for the matter of that in any other statute. It is stated in para. Therefore.” United Liner Agencies Ltd. through Levy of tax on free reserves which had already suffered tax held not to be ultra-vires of the powers of Legislature under the Constitution. If the Parliament has the legislative competence to introduce a new change of tax. regardless of the ultimate destination of such income. This is generally determined by the consideration whether the new change is intended to be more or less of a permanent nature or whether its introduction is dictated by financial exigencies of the particular year. We are of the view that the exigencies of the financial year determine the scope and nature of its provisions. company or other body or institution owned or controlled. Karachi – [1988] 57 TAX (H.52 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax. Parliament can introduce a new change of tax either by incorporating that change in the Income Tax Act or by Finance Act. either directly or indirectly by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government. it may exercise that power either by incorporating that change in the Income Tax Act. 30 of the .) 19.Kar.) 20. But that does not mean that a new and distinct change cannot be introduced under the Finance Act.C. Karachi v. it is hereby declared that Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) has.

where courts are called upon to interpret a word occurring in a constitutional provision relating to legislative power. 138. Cases referred to: Maharajkumar Gopal Saran v. Samina Shoukat Ayub Khan v. 21. Income Tax Officer PLD 1981 S. corporation. The cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read in their ordinary. the words are to be liberally construed so as to give it widest connotation. AIR 1932 P. Eisner v. . in order to interpret the same we will refer to the dictionary meaning of the word. The word “income” has not been defined in the Constitution and. 85 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co. operations. natural and grammatical meaning. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 petition that the amount lying in „free reserves‟ of the company were in fact profits of the corporation on which Income Tax was already paid but this fact is not sufficient to render the levy of tax on such sums ultravires of the powers of Legislature under the Constitution.C. (1982) C C 84. in its natural meaning the word income will embrace any profit or gain which is actually received. The cardinal rule of interpretation is that the words should be read in their ordinary. 43(c) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of 1962. However. in the light of above dictionary meanings would include all moneys or other gains periodically received by an individual. However.C. On a fair reading of para. investments. therefore.P. for labour. service or from property. Mst. Words occurring in a constitutional provision relating to legislative power should be liberally construed. etc. Income Tax Officer K. then the words are to be deliberately construed so as to give it widest connotation. where Courts are called upon to interpret a word occurring in a Constitutional provision to power.L. natural and grammatical meaning. Macombar 64 Law End. etc. Commissioner of Income Tax (1935) 3 ITR 237. Income denotes a thing that comes in.R. 521. Therefore. Income therefore. 22. 20 of the petition we are convinced that the amounts lying in „free reserves‟ of the petitioner were nothing but unappropriated profit which could legitimately be taxed by the Legislature as „income‟ in exercise of its power under Entry No.53 SHORT TITLE. Rule of interpretation of the word “income” occurring in Constitution explained. Varghese v. K.

Commissioner of Income Tax (West). Lahore – [1982] 46 TAX 143 (H. Transport Co. the assessee had derived income from sources outside Pakistan. any income accruing to him from sources in Swat would not be taxable as the Income Tax Act at that time was not applicable to Swat. Such an assessee being a resident of an area. In such a case. One of the cardinal rules of interpretation of statutes is that where an amendment in the law takes place there must be implied necessarily an intention on the part of the Legislature to depart from the earlier law in some respects. Ltd. Dubai or U. In the instant case. income accruing from sources in. However.C. Pakistan Lyallpur Samundri. K.. v. it would not have been open to the assessee to argue that as Income Tax law is not applicable to Dubai or U. Redundancy cannot be readily attributed to the legislature. to which the Income Tax Act applied would be subject to tax under the Income Tax Act and his income from Swat would also be taxable.. would be subject to tax not only in respect of income accruing to him in Pakistan outside but Swat also income accruing to him from sources in Swat. for instance from Dubai or U. K. the assessee.) 23. Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri v. Karachi – [1982] 45 TAX 263 (H. We are not inclined to agree with this contention of learned counsel as we are of the view that an assessee.54 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. The appellant could not deny that at least the wife of the assessee maintains a dwelling house where a telephone is installed in the name .Lah.K. In this connection reference may be made to section 4(1) of the Income Tax Act where under the total income of a person ordinarily resident of a place in Pakistan to which the Income Tax Act applies includes not only income accruing to him iii Pakistan but also in respect of income accruing to him from outside Pakistan. would not be liable to tax.) = 1982 PTD 46 = 1990 PTCL 954 = 1982 PLD 266 24. if instead of the income accruing from Swat. if ordinarily resident of Pakistan.C. Redundancy cannot be readily attributed to the Legislature. “Resident” of taxable territories is liable to tax on total world income including any income accruing or arising in non-taxable territories of Pakistan. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone. and admittedly the Pakistan Income Tax law is not applicable to such countries. K. if the assessee was not ordinarily resident of any in Pakistan but which Income Tax Act applied.Kar. would have been taxed in respect of such income derived by him from sources in Dubai or U. who was ordinarily resident in a place in Pakistan but outside Swat.

Ebrahim D. Power to make and promulgate Ordinance includes the power to levy tax...Kar. of Pakistan & another – [1977] 35 TAX 180 (H. he becomes a resident of Pakistan and as his residence for the 9 years out of the 10 previous years is not denied. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. As observed hereinabove that there cannot be any cavil to the proposition that an original invalid or an order/action without jurisdiction can be validated by the Legislature while some proceeding arising therefrom remains pending and that the transaction does not become past and closed.. Govt. Rawalpindi – [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H. Saeeda & others v.. Case review : The judgement of the Sind High Court was later on approved by the Apex Court [1992 SCC 991 = [1992] 66 TAX 275 (S..Kar. We would hold that the assessee was liable to tax for all his income in and outside Pakistan. Ahmad & others – [1982] 45 TAX 232 (H. This fact by itself shows that a part of the wife ‟s residence is reserved as a dwelling place for the assessee appellant.) 27. Charging section and subsequent provisions only enable the liability to be quantified. but the liability is definitely and finally created by the charging section and all the materials for ascertaining it are available immediately.Lah. therefore.55 SHORT TITLE..) 26. must include the power to exact tax without .C. Since this definitely gives him right to live in Pakistan and. been accepted as a true principle of taxation that the liability imposed by the charging section and subsequent provisions enable the liability only to be quantified and when quantified to be enforced against the subject.Pak)].. Mst. it is evident that the Legislature has the power to enact curative legislation and to validate orders/actions which were not valid or were without jurisdiction when passed or taken in cases when some proceeding arising from such order or action remains pending. Income Tax Officer.C. within the meaning of section 4A(a)(ii) a residence is maintained for him in Pakistan for more than 120 days. therefore. Circle V. Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. From the principles deduced from the case law discussed hereinabove. It has.) 25. he automatically becomes resident and ordinarily resident of Pakistan. (Power to make and promulgate Ordinance for peace and good Government).C. Legislature has the power to enact curative legislation. (East) Karachi v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 of the appellant.

Rules cannot be made by subordinate delegate authority unless expressly permitted. The subject of tax therefore must be included within the scope of the phrase. unless the statute itself grants such power. The fundamental fact for the purposes of construction is that the hypothesis.. The only limitation that is placed on the power of the President to promulgate Ordinance is that it is subject to the like restrictions as the powers of Federal legislature to make laws and the Ordinances so promulgated may be controlled or superceded by any such act. is quite incredible. Emperor v. . Adamji Sons – [1966] 14 TAX 174 (H. In other words the President can promulgate an Ordinance on any subject in regard to which the Federal Legislature can legislate which impliedly defines the scope of the legislation by the use of the phrase „peace and good Government‟.. Venkatachalapathi – 1 ITC 185 (Madras) 31. money no good Government can function. “. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta) 30. _ Again the purport of the charging sections if the express exemptions _ be disregarded as the reasoning requires is radically altered if an exemption of all permanently settled estates is implied.Kar.) 29. It is settled principle in law that a subordinated delegate authority cannot make rules or issue notification under a statute so as to give a retrospective effect to them. In case of exemption from tax any modification made should be through express words and not in general terms or by implications.” Commissioner of Income Tax v.. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Charging section cannot be overlooked on hypothesis of history of exemption. it is a settled principle that the authority to legislate includes the authority to legislate with retrospective effect. Modification of exemption from taxation must be express and not in general terms or by implication..56 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Wide areas escape the purview of the charge. Authority to legislate includes authority to legislate with retrospective effect. that the statute may have been enacted without attention to the broadest fact in Indian revenue history.C. 28.

57
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Zamindar of Singampalli – 1 ITC 181 (Madras)
32.

Subsequent general enactment does not interfere with special provisions unless expressed clearly.

That this exemption applies to taxes which might be imposed thereafter, as well as to taxes in force at the time of sanad is clear from the judgment of the House of Lords in Associated Newspapers, Ltd. v. City of London Corporation [1916) 2 A.C. 429] and it is not less clear from the same judgment that although it is competent to the legislature to withdraw or modify such an exemption by subsequent enactment, this can only be done expressly and not in general terms or by implication. For the latter proposition we may also refer to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (6th Edition) Chapter VII, section 3. Rowe & Co. v. The Secretary of State for India – 1 ITC 161 (Burma)
33.

Court cannot make up for any deficiency of Legislature.

If the legislature, from want of foresight or for any other cause, has omitted to provide for a case, it is the province of the legislature itself, and not of the Courts, to supply the omission. Burma Railway Co. v. Secretary of State – 1 ITC 140 (Burma)
34.

Fair and reasonable construction for taxing statutes.

The rule for the interpretation of such statutes is laid down by Cotton L.J., in Gilbertson v. Fergusson [1881] 7 QBD 562 at p.572: „I quite agree we ought not to put a strained construction upon that section in order to make liable to taxation that which would not otherwise be liable, but I think it is now settled that in construing these Revenue Acts, as well as other Acts, we ought to give a fair and reasonable construction, and not to lean in favor of one side or the other, on the ground that it is a tax imposed upon the subject, and, therefore, ought not to be enforced unless it comes clearly within the words. There is another rule of interpretation, which must also be borne in mind. Where the object and intention of the legislature is clear and undoubted, that meaning should be given when possible to the words used which will best carry out the clear object and intention‟.
_______________

58
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION

Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi v. Lyallpur Cold Storage, Lyallpur – 1975 SCC 426 = [1976] 34 TAX 14 (S.C.Pak.)
35.

Retrospective application of law must be by explicit words.

Mr. M.A. Lone, learned counsel for the Department submitted in support of these petitions, that this Court‟s decision in the case of Noor Hussain still held the field. It was argued that the majority decision in that case proceeded on the interpretation of the crucial words „constituted by‟ which had replaced the earlier expression „constituted under‟ and which despite the amendment of 1965 still remained part of the statute. Learned counsel further submitted that the amendment of 1965 is merely declaratory and was inserted ex abundati cautela, and, therefore, will, in the absence of the express words in the amending statute or by necessary implication, not have retrospective effect. Income Tax Officer, Investigation Circle & others v. Sulaiman Bhai Jiwa & Others – 1969 SCC 354 = [1970] 21 TAX 62 (S.C.Pak.)
36.

Scope of retrospective legislation.

It is fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication (see Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes - 9th edition - page 221 and Treaties on Statute Law by Caries - 4th edition - page 329). It follows from this rule that retrospective effect to a statute may be given either by express words or that the same may be inferred from the language employed. It is true that the Finance Act of 1964 has not expressly stated that sub-section (2D) of section 34 shall be deemed to have taken effect from a date earlier than the date of enactment of that Act. But the language employed in that sub-section necessarily implies that the provision thereof, though prospective, has retrospective operation as well. The use by the Legislature of words, such as “shall” or “hereafter”, is taken to indicate an intent that the statute is to be construed as prospective only; on the other hand the use of words denoted past time, such as “heretobefore” constitute an explicit declaration that the Act is to be construed retrospectively. When retrospective effect to statute is not given by express words, one must, apart from the language employed, “look to the general scope and purview of the statute, and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was

59
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

that the Legislature contemplated”. (See Treatise on Statute Law by Caries - 4th edition - page 334). Commissioner of Income Tax (AJ&K Council), Muzaffarabad and another v. Asian D. Enterprises through Eijaz Qureshi, Managing Director and 5 others, Commissioner of Income Tax (AJ&K Council) -&- Muzaffarabad and 2 others v. Messrs Cade Creets Associates through Managing Partner, Diwan Ali Khan Ghughtai and another [2000] 81 TAX 371 (S.C.AJ&K.) = 2000 PTD SC 892; Commissioner of Income Tax AJK and another v. Asian D. Enterprises and other [2000] 82 TAX 518 ((S.C.AJ&K.)
37.

Fiscal laws and theory of retrospectivity.

It is evidence from the case law, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants, that there is no proposition in support of the view that a fiscal law cannot be made operative retrospectively. Obviously, when there is no such embargo imposed upon the Legislature by the Interim Constitution Act, how such a restriction can be assumed. Thus, the very basis on which the findings of the High Court rest is without any legal substance. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that demand of additional income tax is „deprivation‟ of the „property‟ of the respondents within the meanings of paragraph I, that has been done in pursuance of law, i.e., the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the Finance Act, 1995 and, thus, the tax demanded could not be held violative of the Fundamental Right No. 14 according to which a person can be deprived of his property according to law. Needless to say, as has been indicated above, the demand of additional advance income tax from the respondents was made in pursuance of the aforesaid statutes which have been validly adapted in the State. However, the fact of the matter is that by the impugned provision of law, the rate of income tax has not been retrospectively increased; only the rate of deduction of advance tax has been increased. The deduction of advance tax is only a tentative deduction which has to be adjusted when the final assessment of income tax to be paid by the respondents-Companies is made. Thus, the findings of the High Court that demand of additional advance income tax is violative of Fundamental Right No. 14 guaranteed by the Interim Constitution Act, are devoid of any force and are not sustainable. In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the above entitled appeals, set aside the impugned judgements of the High Court and hold that additional advance income tax was rightly demanded from the respondents-petitioners. Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the respondents are hereby dismissed.

60
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Retroactivity of the law upheld. It may also be pointed out that in the instant case neither it has been the case of the respondents nor there are any findings by the High Court that any of the respondents-petitioners had paid the advance Income Tax at the previous rates prior to the enforcement of the Finance Act of 1995. It is evident from the above mentioned survey of case law that the findings of the High Court that the Finance Act, 1995, which was adapted retrospectively by Ordinance No. 1 of 1998, could not operate retrospectively are not legally correct. Micropak (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others – [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H.C.Lah.) = 2001 PTD 1180 39. Amendment in law which is neither clarificatory nor declaratory cannot be applied retrospectively. The findings of this Court in re: Prime Commercial Bank and others v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax 1997 PTD 605 (H.C.Lah.) are relevant. In that case a Single Bench of this Court on the authority of an earlier view held in K.G. Old Principal Christian Technical Training Center Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer Punjab Labour Court Northern Zone and 6 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 1097) found it to be a settled proposition that generally an amendment was clarificatory or declaratory in nature. In the present case there is nothing to show that the amendment in section 12(18) by Finance Act, 1998 was brought about to clarify the earlier provision and not to bring a change in it. All the more so when the amendment was not given retrospective effect normally clarificatory or declaratory amendments are given. Rijaz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wealth Tax Officer, Circle-III, Lahore – [1996] 74 TAX 9 (H.C.Lah.) 40. An amendment which is explanatory or clarificatory is generally to operate retrospectively. As regards question of retrospectivity suffice it to say that the power of legislature to legislate retrospectively is well recognized and in the present case the retrospective operation to the explanation has been given by a specific provision in the amending law. Be that as it may, it is trite law that an amendment which is explanatory or clarificatory always operates retrospectively. Dreamland Cinema, Multan v. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.C.Lah.)  If the object of the statute is to explain the provisions or to remove a doubt, the law would apply retrospectively.
38.

61
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

National Food v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1991] 64 TAX 60 (H.C.Kar.)
41.

In a Taxing Act there is no room for any intendment.

No doubt, as has been observed by the learned Tribunal, in a taxing act there is no room for any intendment and there is no equity about a tax and there is no presumption as to a tax and nothing is to be implied but one can only look fairly at the language used. However, in case of a beneficial statute its provisions cannot be interpreted so as to bring about a result contrary to the object of the legislation. An interpretation likely to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief must be adopted in case of statutes which confer benefit on individuals or any class of persons. Mandviwalla Motors Limited, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone ‘B’, Karachi – [1991] 64 TAX 19 (H.C.Kar.)
42.

Omission of provision from statutes held not to operate retrospectively.

The Income Tax Officer, Company, Circle II, Karachi, passed an assessment order on the return filed by the applicants for assessment year 1971-72. He determined the undistributed profit of the applicants to be Rs.10,64,690 and imposed a tax of Rs.2,92,790 in terms of section 23-A of the said Act. On appeal the amount of undistributed profits was worked out to be Rs.8,58,392 and consequently tax payable was fixed at Rs.2,25,258. As the applicants failed to pay such amount additional tax under section 45-A of the Act was levied. On plain reading of the above provision of law it is abundantly clear that no provision has been made for providing any machinery for assessment but it clearly imposes a charge on undistributed income and is therefore of substantive nature. Such a conclusion is also in conformity with the principles of interpretation of statutes laid down in the case decided by the Privy Council and reported in [1940] 8 ITR 442 and followed in the case reported in 1985 PTD 465. The first contention advanced by Mr. Muhnmmad Nasim, Advocate for the applicant has no force. Mr. Muhammad Nasim, Advocate for the applicant has not been able to show that omission of section 23-A from the Act through Finance Ordinance, 1972, was done as a remedial or curative measure. We are also unable to subscribe to the view that original order of assessment by the Income Tax Officer required to be passed after issuing a show cause notice on the subject. At any rate in absence of

62
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

any provision of issuing a notice in the enactment the requirements of principles of natural justice stand satisfied as the applicants were heard on the subject by the Appellate Authorities.
Cases referred to : [1967] 15 Tax 303; (PLD 1974 SC 180); (1987 PTD 739); (1947) 8 ITR 442 and (1985 PTD 465).

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Olympia – [1988] 57 TAX 71 (H.C.Kar.)
43.

Substantive law amended by Finance Act, 1973 held to have retrospective operation to cover only pending cases.

The general rule of construction of statutes is that the enactments are not to be given retrospective operation unless the statute expressly provides so or from the language employed it appears to be the necessary intendment of the Legislature. As, however remedial statutes are designed to redress an existing grievance and do public good, and such statutes normally do not diminish, destroy or affect any vested right, these are liberally construed. Lahore High Court had also taken the view in Rippon‟s case (1973) PLD 1973 Lah. 849 that an amending law which is purely remedial and curative, must be liberally construed in favour of subject. We also subscribe to the same view. Then as stated in Crawford, if the rule of liberal construction is to be applied as it obviously should then any doubt should be resolved in favour of retrospective operation, if such operation does not destroy or disturb vested rights, impair the obligations of contracts, create new liabilities, violate due process of law or contravene some other provision of law and if such operation will carry out the intent of the Legislature as ascertained through the application of the principles of liberal construction. In our view, as the amending provision under consideration had been inserted in subsection (6) of section 18-A to remedy a wrong that was being done to the assessees, and the amending provision does not affect any vested right or create any new obligations, the amending provision is to be given retrospective operation for extending benefit to the affected parties in pending cases, to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. As observed earlier, a wrong was being done to the assessee by providing for an indefinite period during which they were made liable for payment of additional tax at the rate of 2 per cent per mensem and this wrong was sought to be remedied by the remedial and curative amendment brought about by the Finance Act, 1973. If the intention of the Legislature had been that this remedy should be available only in respect of assessments for the year 1973-74 and subsequent years, the Legislature would have used appropriate words

63
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

to express such intention. No such appropriate words are mentioned in the amending provision. There is no reason why the remedial provision of the amending law should not be applied to pending proceedings. In fact, this appears to be the intent of Legislature. Although we are of the view that the amending provision being remedial in nature and not affecting any vested right or creating any new obligation and is, therefore, retrospective in operation, which also seems to be the intent of the Legislature, retrospective operation can only cover cases which were pending at the time the amending law was enacted i.e. eases which had not been finally determined or proceedings which had not attained finality. The retrospective effect of the amending law would, therefore, apply only to those cases where assessments had not been made by the Income Tax Officer or where an appeal was pending before the Tribunal or a reference was subjudice before the High Court, at the time the amending law was enacted. The cases which had finally been determined or had attained finality i.e. which were past and closed transactions, cannot be reopened under the amending legislation as there are no express words to that effect employed in the amending law. We may observe here that when reference is made in any law, legal instrument, legal document, legal language or law book or dictionary, about vested right, the reference is to the vested right of a person natural or legal, and never to vested right of the State. Legal theories relating to vested rights never contemplate vested rights of State. We are unable to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the department that by giving retrospective operation to the amending law vested right of the State will be affected. In our opinion, this contention is not relevant for answering the question referred to us. As observed earlier, the amending law has retrospective operation to cover only pending cases and this appears to be the intention of the legislature.
Cases referred to: Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1981] 44 Tax 53 (S.C.); B.B.&D. Manufacturing Co. Private Ltd. v. E.S.L Corporation [(1976) PTD (Trib.) 21]; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rippon Printing Press (PLD 1973 Lah. 849) = [1973] 28 Tax 40; Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1926) AC 37; Chatturam v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1947) 15 ITR 302; Vidyapat Singhania v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1978] 38 Tax 95; C.S.T. v. Kruddsons Ltd. (PLD 1974 SC 180); Adam Afzal v. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187); Muzaffar Ahmad v. Anwar Ali (PLD 1965 Dacca 296); Income Tax Officer v. Vidayasagar [1970] 21 TAX 110; Taimur Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (PLD 1951 F.C. 118) and The

64
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Estman Phtographic Materials Company Ltd. v. The Comptroller Geenral of Patents, Designs & Trad Marks [1898] A.C. 571.

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Olympia – [1988] 57 TAX 71 (H.C.Kar.)
44.

Scope of retrospective legislation.

It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that any amendment in the existing law will not affect cases which has been finally determined or proceeding which have attained finality unless the amendment expressly provides for such effect. The general rule of construction of statutes is that the enactment are not to be given retrospective operation unless the statute expressly provides so or from the language employed it appears to be the necessary intendment of the legislature. ...... If the rule of liberal construction is to be applied as it obviously should then any doubt should be resolved in favour of retrospective operation, if such operation does not destroy or disturb vested rights, impair the obligation of contracts, create new liabilities, violate due process of law or contravene some other provision of law and if such operation will carry out the intent of the legislature as ascertained through the application of the principles of liberal construction. Rustam F. Cousjee & 2 others v. CBR & 2 others – [1985] 52 TAX 123 (H.C.Kar.)  Retrospective legislation is looked upon with disfavour as a general rule, and properly so because of its tendency to be unjust and oppressive. It is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation, unless such a construction appears very clear in terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact what is unjust, every statute which takes away or impair a vested right acquired under the existing law or creates a new obligations or imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already passed must be presumed to be intended not to have retrospective operation; If there are words in the enactment which either expressly state or, necessarily imply that the statute is to be given retrospective operation, then the Act should have retrospective operation even though the consequence may appear

65
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

unjust and hard; a statute is not to be construed to have greater retrospective operation that its language renders necessary.
45.

For the purposes of assessment of income the law applicable is that in force on the first day of the relevant assessment year.

It is well-settled that for the purposes of assessment to income tax the law to be applied is that law that is in force in the assessment year, in other words the income tax as stands amended on the first day of July of a financial year will apply to the assessment of that year. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. Nisar Ahmad – [1984] 50 TAX 187 (H.C.Kar.)
46.

A penal provision cannot operate retrospectively.

A penal provision can‟t operate retrospectively unless it is so provided by the statute itself. A.J. Hartshorn v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Karachi – [1984] 49 TAX 198 (H.C.Kar.)
47.

Any Act/Ordinance cannot cover any period prior to coming into force of the Act/Ordinance.

The well settled principle of law is that subject to any provision of saving clause, scope and extent of any section of any Act/Ordinance cannot cover any period prior to coming into force of the Act/Ordinance. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi (West), Karachi v. S. A. Rehman – [1980] 42 TAX 147 (H.C.Kar.) = 1980 PTD 314
48.

If a provision is neither declaratory nor curative it cannot be retrospective

The next argument of Mr. Mansoor Ahmed Khan is that Act XI of 1966 whereby section 10(2A) was amended is a declaratory, or in any case a creative enactment. He has stated that the amendment seeks to define what is a bad or doubtful debt, or in any case cures the existing provision by giving the words a purposeful and meaningful intent. Two questions arise namely whether the amendment is in the nature of declaratory enactment and if so, whether the same would be of retrospective application. A declaratory Act generally takes a form by statement “it is declared”. Patently such words have not been used in Act XI of 1966. The second characteristic of a declaratory statute is that it intends to remove doubts as to the meaning of effect of a statute and if not expressly at least by implication the legislature exhibits the reason for passing a Declaratory Act. Blackstone, J. in Nicol v. Verelete [1779] 26 ER 751, stated “declaratory statues do not prove the law was otherwise before, but rather the reverse”. Coleridge,

66
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

C. J. in Jones v. Bennet [1890] 63 LT 705, defined a Declaratory Act that “means to declare the law, or to declare that which has always been the law, and there having been doubts which have arisen, Parliament declares what the law is and enacts that it shall continue what it then is”. Such characteristics are also lacking in Act XI of 1966. Further it must be stated that our system of law abhorts retrospective legislation but if ever a necessity has arisen to give retrospective effect, the statute generally expresses such intention. Act XI of 1966 can also not be called a procedural or adjective law because it is a statutory step in determination of rights of the Income Tax Officer as well as the assessee. The right is the retention of money on behalf of others. It also makes an assessee liable to taxation in respect of moneys notionally treated as his profits while exposing him to at least a risk of demand. According to us Act XI of 1966 was intended to provide a limit of time and avoid the lying of money in a sort of suspense account for a period exceeding three years. New rights and liabilities came into existence and new concepts of law were brought into existence. This act cannot, therefore, be called a Declaratory Act. Curative statutes are by their very nature intended to operate upon and affect past transactions and are for such reason wholly retrospective. These statutes are in the nature of validating statues which operate on conditions already existing and for such reason have retrospective operation. If the enactment in question is to be in the nature of a curative law the Legislature would have stated so unambiguously. We are of the view that the amending statute is not even curative in nature.
Case referred to: Nocol v. Verelet (1779) 26 E.R. 751 and Jones v. Bennet (1890) 63 L.T. 705.

Mian Muhammad Khalil v. Income Tax Officer Company Circle, Faisalabad – [1979] 40 TAX 113 (H.C.Lah.)
49.

If retrospective operation of a provision results in injustice, it should not be applied retrospectively.

Where retrospectivety not expressly provided in amended provision of law, and retrospective operation results in inconvenience or injustice to the subject. Such a provision cannot be applied retrospectively. Dreamland Cinema, Multan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.C.Lah.)
50.

Declaratory statutes generally apply retrospectively.

All the writers are unanimous in their view that the declaratory statutes apply retrospectively. A reading of the explanation would

67
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

show that the intention of the Legislature was to remove a doubt and explain the intended import of the original provision. Undoubtedly we have to find out the intent of the Legislature and should not be swayed merely by the use of word „declaratory‟ or otherwise. If, therefore, the object of the statute is to explain the previous provisions or to remove a doubt, the law would apply retrospectively. Dreamland Cinema, Multan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.C.Lah.)
51.

Explanatory amendment is always applicable retrospectively to all relevant cases pending at the relevant time.

The amendment under review is of explanatory type stated to have been introduced “for the avoidance of doubt”. The rule about interpretation of such statute is distinct though the principles of interpretation of taxing statutes would apply if attracted to the situation. A reading of the explanation would show the intention of the Legislature was to remove a doubt and explain the intended import of the original provision‟. If the object of the statute is to explain the provisions or to remove a doubt, the law would apply retrospectively. The addition of Explanation 2 to section 24(2) was with the object of removing a doubt (probably created by the two judgments of the West Pakistan High Court) [in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Yousuf & Co. (1967) 15 TAX 4 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tayah Moosa & Co. [(1967) 15 TAX 62]. The enactment was expressly explanatory in nature. Therefore, it had to apply retrospectively to all the relevant cases pending on that date.
Cases referred to : Nicol v. Verelet [(1779) 26 E.R. 751]; Jones v. Bonnet [(1890) 63 L.T. 705]; Muhammadi Bibi v. Kashi Upadhya (AIR 1926 All. 725); Joti Ram Khan v. Janaki Nath Joshi (33 I.C. 54); Mst. Rashid Bibi v. Tufail Muhammad (AIR 1941 Lah. 291); Bappu Ayyar v. Ranganayaki (AIR 1955 Mad. 394): Abdul Hamid v. The State (PLD 1963 Kar. 373); Pennirselvem v. Veerish Vendayar (AIR 1931 Mad. 83); Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kruddsons Ltd. (PLD 1974 S.C. 180); Young v. Adams (1898 A.C. 469); Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 S.C. 119); (1961) 3 TAX 166 (S.C.); Muhammadi Steamship Co. (PLD 1966 S.C. 828); (1966) 14 Tax 281 (S.C.); Commissioner of Income Tax v. Yousuf & Co. (1967) 15 TAX 4; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Tayab Moosa & Co. (1967) 15 TAX 62; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Standard Oil & Ginning Mills (1973) 28 TAX 9.

68
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Aftab Medical Stores Dera Ghazi Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore – [1976] 34 TAX 10 (H.C.Lah.)
52.

Subordinate legislation can be applied retrospectively only if expressly mentioned.

A subordinate legislation like rules can be applied retrospectively only if the parent Act confers such a power on the rule making authority and it is so expressly mentioned in the rules as well. Income Tax Officer & others v. Suleman Bhai Jiwa & others – [1970] 21 TAX 62 (Income Tax Digest Feb. 1970)
53.

Rules to determine retrospective effect.

The use by the legislature of the words, such as „shall‟ or „hereafter‟, is taken to indicate an intent that the statute is to be construed as prospective only; on the other hand, the use of the words denoting past time, such as „has been‟ or „hereto before‟ constitute an explicit declaration that Act is to be construed retrospectively. Harjina & Company (Pak) Limited, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1964] 8 TAX 1 (H.C.Kar.) = 1963 PTD 867 = 1963 PLD 996
54.

Right accrued cannot be taken away by implication.

Rights under existing laws are not to be supposed to have been repealed by implication unless intention becomes clear from language of law. Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)
55.

Rights conferred under statutes cannot be taken away by later legislation except by express words or by necessary implication.

I am not myself prepared to go the length of holding that rights such as those conferred under the Permanent Settlement can only be abrogated if express provisions cancelling such rights are inserted in a subsequent legislative enactment. No doubt the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant may be regarded as embodying a good working rule of construction, but where the intention of the legislature to abrogate or modify existing rights is manifest as a necessary implication from the language used in the repealing statute, it matters not, in my opinion, that the existing rights are not therein expressly and specifically modified or cancelled. Lord Selborne, Lord Chancellor, refers to this canon of construction in Seward v. Vera Cruz [(1884) to App. Ca. 59], where he observes:

69
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

“If anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold the earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so.” Lord Justice Bowen restated the canon in In re Cuno, Mansfield v. Mansfield [(1889) 43 Ch. D. 12 at p. 17] in these words: “in the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away the rights which already existed before the statute was passed unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature.” See also Irrawaddy Flottila Company v. Bhagwandas [(1891) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 620; 18 I. A. 121]. Sunder Mull v. Ladhuram Koluram [1923) I.L.R. 50 Cal. 667; A.I.R. (1924) Cal. 240: 83 Ind. Cas. 757] and Duke of Argyll v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [(1913) 109 L.T. 893]. In Garnett v. Bradley [(1878) 3. App. Cas. 944 at p. 967], Lord Blackburn laid down what I conceive to be the true rule of construction applicable in the circumstances of this case. His Lordship observes: “There is an other rule if it is properly applied, namely, that where there has been a particular rule established either by custom or by statute, where there is some particular law standing and a subsequent enactment has general words which would repeal that particular law or particular custom, if they were taken in all generality, ............ yet nevertheless the first particular law is not to be repealed unless there is a sufficient indication of intention to repeal it. It is not to be repealed by mere general words: the two may stand together; the first, the particular law, standing as an exceptional proviso upon the general law.” After referring to certain cases, His Lordship continues: “In all these cases, however, the particular statute relied upon was a statute in favour of a particular class of persons or the property of a particular class of persons. I do not take upon myself to say that all cases in which that rule have been applied to which that remark would

70
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

not be applicable. But where that is the case, where the particular enactment is particular in the sense that it protects the rights, the property, the privileges of particular persons or a class of persons, the reason for the rule which has been acted upon is exceedingly plain and strong. It would be very unjust, or I would rather say unfair (I do not go further than that), to pass an enactment taking away from a particular person or class of persons his or their rights without hearing what he or they have got to say about it; and if general words were to have the effect of taking away the rights of a particular person or class which had been given to them beforehand, it would be done without their having any knowledge or opportunity of resisting it and it is not to be imputed to the legislature or to be supposed that the legislature would do what was unfair. Therefore, I think that where only general words are used, there is a strong presumption that the legislature did not intend to take away a particular privilege, right or property of a particular class, unless thy have done something to show that. If they have done something in such a way as would show that that was their intention, if they have said in negative words that those rights or privileges shall all be taken away any enactment to the contrary notwithstanding, that would prevent the presumption arising at all. But in the absence of that, I think it is an intelligible principle to say that the legislature shall not be presumed to have done anything unfair, and to have taken away this particular privilege not having stated openly that they meant to take it away, or in such open or clear language that the persons affected might come and resist and use arguments to show why it should not be taken away, but having simply used general words quite consistent with their never having thought of this privilege at all. I think, my Lords, that that principle will reconcile almost all the cases; certainly it will reconcile all I have cited, and it is a good and intelligible principle. ” Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)
56.

Presumption against double taxation.

Some reference was also made to what has been called a „presumption against double taxation.‟ In Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Secretary of

71
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

State [(1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 257 at p. 287; 5 C.L.J. 148], royalties from a coal mine were held liable both to cess under the Cess Act, 1880 and to income tax under the Act of 1886, but it was said that „it may be conceded that Courts always look with disfavour upon double taxation and statutes will be construed, if possible, to avoid double taxes. ‟ Reference was made to certain dicta of American Courts and to the English case of Carr v. Fowle [(1893) I.Q.B. 251]. But the only observation in this case was to the effect that the statute presumably did not intend that a vicar should in effect pay the same tax (land tax) twice on the same hereditament. This is plain enough. Thus the income tax is one tax, and income assessed under one Schedule cannot be assessed all over again under another. That there is any legal presumption of a general character against „double taxation‟ in any wider sense is a proposition to which I respectfully demur as a principle for the construction of a modern statute. In Maninra Chandra Nandi v. Secretary of State [(1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 257; 5 C.L.J. 148], it did not avail to cut down clear, though absolutely general language. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dharamchand Dalchand – 1 ITC 264 (Nagpur)
57.

Vested rights such as rights to appeal and to demand a reference already accrued, cannot be taken away by repeal of Act.

Under the ordinary law, vested rights including rights to appeal and to demand a reference that have already accrued are taken away by the repeal of any Act; but the procedure would be under the new Act. The rule regarding vested rights is not confined to substantive rights but extends equally to remedial rights or rights of action including rights of appeal: see Maxwell‟s Interpretation of Statutes, 6th Edition 401. In Gopeshwar Pal v. Jiban Chandra [(1914) I.L.R. 41 Cal. 1125; 18 C.W.N. 804; 19 C.L.J. 549; 24 Ind. Cas. 37], it was held that, though procedure may be regulated by an Act for the time being in force, still the intention to take away a vested right without compensation or any saving, is not to be imputed to the legislature in any case unless it be expressed in unequivocal terms. [Chief Commissioner of Public Works v. Logan (1903) A.C. 355]. This was a case of right to sue. In Ramakrishna Chetty v. Subbaraya Aiyar [(1915) ILR 38 Mad. 101; 24 M.I.J. 54; (1913) MWN 303; 18 Ind. Cas. 64] which is a case of limitation, it was held that the rule regarding vested rights is not confined to substantive rights but extends equally to the remedial rights or rights of action including rights of appeal. At

72
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

page 106 of the same ruling there is a quotation from an English case, In re Athlumney, Ex parte Wilson [(1898) 2 Q.B. 547], where wright J. observed; “Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards a matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment;” And, further, their Lordships observe: “It is unreasonable to suppose that the Act intended to destroy a man‟s rights without giving him an opportunity to comply with its provisions. The Court, if asked to give retrospective effect to a statute, will bear in mind the consequences of doing so. See Ex parte Todd, In re Ashoroft [(1887) 10 Q.B.D. 186].” Balkishan Nathani v. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1 ITC 248 (Nagpur)
58.

Fiscal statutes to be strained in favour of the subject, if at all.

Technicalities in a fiscal statute must be strained in favour of the subject, if they are to be strained at all, and not against him.
________________

REMEDIAL AND CURATIVE LEGISLATION HAS RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shahnawaz Ltd. and others – 1992 SCC 920 = [1992] 66 TAX 125 (S.C.Pak.)
59.

Remedial and curative legislation has retrospective effect.

The amendment in relevant section was a remedial and curative legislation designed to soften the harsh, unjust and unreasonable law, as was then obtaining, not restricting the maximum period for levy of additional tax. There is no reason why the remedial law should not be applied to pending proceedings. Although the amendment was made by the Finance Act, 1973 but it could not be restricted to assessment year 1973-74. The retrospective remedy would be available to all „cases which were pending at the time the amending law was enacted i.e. cases which had not been finally determined or proceedings which had not attained finality. The retrospective effect of the amending law, would, therefore, apply only to those cases where assessment had not

73
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

been made by the Income Tax Officers or where an appeal was pending before the Tribunal or a reference was sub-judice before the High Court, at the time the amending law was enacted. The cases which had finally determined or had attained finality i.e. which were past and closed, transaction, could not be reopened under amending legislation there are no express words to that effect employed in the amending law‟.
_______________

PRINCIPLE OF CONTEMPORARY EXPOSITION

Maharaja of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1 ITC 303 (Patna)
60.

Principle of contemporary exposition.

Therefore, in the absence of any clear and unambiguous declaration by the authors of the Permanent Settlement, I think it is permissible to invoke the aid of the principle of „contemporary exposition.‟ Here it is not a case of one or two stray statutes in the administration of which the strict rule of construction has been overlooked. On the contrary, a uniform course of dealing is disclosed which shows that profits from permanently settled estates have been taxed for the purposes of the State without express words revoking the exemption alleged to have been given by the Permanent Settlement Regulation; and I have been unable to discover a single statute in which any such exemption has expressly or by implication been recognized. Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)
61.

Practice of Revenue Authorities as contemporanea expositio.

Some reference was made at the bar to the practice of the Revenue Authorities since 1886 as regards fisheries in permanently _ settled estates, but there is no agreement as to what that practice if there be a practice - has been. Assuming that it would have been open to us to place some degree of reliance upon an interpretation settled by practice as contemporanea expositio, we are in fact without any such assistance.
_______________

74
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

ACTION IS DEEMED ILLEGAL, THE WHOLE SUPERSTRUCTURE BUILT UPON IT IS ALSO ILLEGAL

Muhammad Azim v. Commissioner of Income Tax East Zone Karachi – [1991] 63 TAX 143 (H.C.Kar.) = 1991 PTD 658
62.

If an action is deemed illegal, the whole superstructure built upon it is also illegal.

It is well settled principle that if the very foundation of an action is illegal or without jurisdiction the whole superstructure built upon it cannot validly and legally stand. N.V. Philips Glocilin Peufabrikan v. Income Tax Officer & others – [1990] 61 TAX 159 (H.C.Kar.)  Where any action is challenged as without jurisdiction and if it is so declared then all orders and proceedings taken on the basis of such illegal action shall also be vitiated. In 1970 Law Notes 28 (DB) Lah. it was held that if on the basis of void order subsequent orders have been passed either by the same authority or by other authorities, the whole services of such order, together with the superstructure of rights and obligations built upon them, must fall to the ground because such orders have as little legal foundation as the void order on which they are grounded.
_______________

INCOME CANNOT BE TAXED TWICE

M.Rehman, Income Tax Officer & others v. Narayanganj Company (Pvt.) Ltd. – 1970 SCC 370 = [1971] 23 TAX 223 (S.C.Pak)
63.

Income cannot be taxed twice.

The learned judges in the High Court relied on the following remarks of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Commissioners of Income Tax, U.P. v. Kanpur Coal Syndication [(1964) 10 Taxation 175]: “Section 3 imposes a tax upon a person in respect of his total income. The person on whom such tax can be imposed are particularised therein, namely, Hindu undivided family, company, local authority, firm, association of persons, partners of firm or members of association individually. The

75
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

section, therefore, does not in term confer any power on any particular officer to assess one of the person described therein, but is only a charging section imposing the levying of tax on the total income of an assessable entity described therein. The section expressly treats as association of persons and the individual members of an association as two distinct and different assessable entities. On the terms of the section the tax can be levied on either on the said two entities according to the provisions of the Act.” The rule issued in the case was in this view made absolute by the Division Bench of the High Court and the impugned notice under section 65 set aside, from which leave to appeal was generated to consider whether it was a case of double assessment or a case of rectification of assessment wrongly made upon individual partners in respect of the income of an unregistered firm.
_______________

ONE THING IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER

Micropak (Pvt.) Ltd., Lahore v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and 2 others – [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H.C.Lah.) = 2001 PTD 1180
64.

“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”.

In the present case at the relevant time the express mention of the word “loan” excluded all other similar or equivalent terms, transactions, or nature of the receipts. No maxim of law was of more general and uniform application than “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”. Whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form, it necessarily includes in itself a negative, viz. that the thing shall not be done otherwise. The purpose of introduction of the provisions of section 12(18) of the Ordinance at the relevant time was to check fictitious loans and it was after quite some time that it was realized that the scope of the provisions needed to be expanded. No addition of the kind could possibly be made nor the defence taken by the assessees rejected without recording a finding of fact that these sums were injected in the business and were used as capital, circulating or otherwise. In other words the defence of the assessees could have been demolished only by recording a finding of fact that the alleged share deposit moneis were factually used in the business and therefore, could be taken as “loan” taken for catering the capital needs of the companies.

76
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Multan Zone, Multan v. Allah Yar Cotton Ginning & Pressing Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Multan Road, Vehari – [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H.C.Lah.) = 2000 PTD 2958
65.

“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) was neither absolute nor was of universal application.

The rule that express mention of one is exclusion of the rest is neither absolute nor is of universal application.
_______________

APPLICATION OF RULE GENERALIBUS SPECIALIA DEROGANT

Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. Engineers Limited, Dacca – 1967 SCC 289 = [1967] 16 TAX 81 (S.C.Pak.)
66.

Application of rule generalibus specialia derogant.

The second contention, raised by the learned counsel for the Commissioner of Income Tax, that clause (xvi) was not applicable rested on the rule that a special provision in a statute excludes the application of a general provision of similar nature. This is a well established rule of construction of statutes, but is attracted in the interpretation of clause (xvi) the relevant clauses read as follow: (xii) any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) laid out or expended on scientific research related to the business; any expenditure of a capital nature on scientific research related to the business; any expenditure laid out or expended on the training abroad of citizens of Pakistan, in connection with a scheme approved by the Central Board of Revenue for the purposes of this clause; and any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation.

(xiv) (xv)

(xvi)

The scope of clause (xvi) which is residuary nature is thus wholly different from the sums included in clause (xii), (xiv) and (xv). There being no similarity of subject-matter between clauses (xii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) of section 10(2) the rule generalibus specialia derogant was clearly not attracted.
_______________

77
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES/ GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary General v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) through Deputy Convener, Senator Aftab Ahmad Sheikh v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior – PLD 2000 S.C. 111
67.

Statute must be intelligibly expressed and reasonably definite and certain.

Statutes must be intelligibly expressed and reasonably definite and certain. An act of the Legislature to have the force and effect of law must be intelligibly express and statutes which are too vague to be intelligible are a nullity. Certainty being one of the prime requirements of a statute, a statute in order to be valid must be definite and certain. Anticipated difficulty in application of its provisions affords no reason for declaring a statute invalid where it is not uncertain. Reasonable definiteness and certainty is required in statutes and reasonable certainty is sufficient. Reasonable precision, and not absolute precision or meticulous or mathematical exactitude, is required in the drafting of statutes, particularly as regards those dealing with social and economic problems. Penal statutes contemplate notice to ordinary person of what is prohibited and what is not. Statute creating an offence must be precise, definite and sufficiently objective so as to guard against an arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the State functionaries who are called upon to enforce the statute.
68.

True meaning of statute vis-a-vis duty of court.

It is the duty of the Court to find out the true meaning of a statute while interpreting the same. The general rule is that the Courts adopt as uniform an approach as possible to the reading of ambiguous Acts of Parliament which are some times imperfect, obscure and vague. The primary rule of interpretation of statutes is that the meaning of the Legislature is to be sought in the actual words used by him which are to be interpreted in their ordinary and natural meanings. The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the

78
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Court has no right to impose another meaning or to read into its limitations which are not there, based on a prior reasoning as to the probable intention of the Legislature. Court can resort to the proceedings of the Legislature when the language employed is ambiguous. Central Insurance Co. & other v. CBR Islamabad – 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S.C.Pak)
69.

Interpretation of statute is not CBR‟s domain.

The interpretation of any provision of the Ordinance can be rendered judicially by the hierarchy of the forums provided for under various sections of the Ordinance, namely, the Income Tax Officer, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Appellate Tribunal, High Court and this court and not by the CBR. Therefore, interpretation of statute is not CBR‟s domain. A&B Food Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Karachi – [1992] 65 TAX 281 (S.C.Pak)
70.

Proceedings of the Legislature can be resorted to when the words of a provision are ambiguous.

We are inclined to hold that reference to the proceedings of the Legislature can be restored to when the words of a provision of a statute are ambiguous with the object to discover the real intention of the law-makers but when there is no ambiguity in the language employed in the relevant provisions of the statute, recourse to the proceedings of the Legislature cannot be made in order to construe the same in violation of the language employed therein. In our view, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court is bound to construe and to give it effect without taking into consideration anything extraneous to the same. Reference may also be made to a recent decision of this court in the case of Miss Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan [PLD 1988 SC 416] wherein following observations were made on the question: whether the proceeding of the Parliament can be referred to while interpreting a provision of a statute. Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone, Lahore v. Mst. Wazirunissa Begum – 1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S.C.Pak.)
71.

Person sought to be taxed must come within the letter of law.

In determining whether or not a particular matter comes within taxing statutes, it is only the letter of law that can be looked into. There is ample authority for the proposition that in a fiscal case, form

79
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

is of primary importance, the principle being that if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great a hardship may thereby be involved but on the other hand if the crown cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law he is free, however, apparent in may be that his case comes within what might be called the spirit of the law. Muhammadi Steamship Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central) Karachi – 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S.C.Pak.) = PLD 1966 S.C. 828
72.

No words to be treated as surplusage.

It is well established rule of interpretation of statute that no words in a statute are to be treated as surplusage or redundant. The words „such capital being computed in accordance with the rules made by the Central Board of Revenue‟ could not be read as surplusage or redundant. Imperial Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, Karachi – 1958 SCC 37 = [1959] 1-TAX (111284) (S.C.Pak.)
73.

Abrogation of International Law.

Statutes are not to be construed as abrogating International Law unless their language clearly leads to that result, and that extra territorial operation of a statute over foreigners is not to be presumed as having been intended unless it is expressly so stated. Commissioner of Income Tax East Bengal v. Kumar Narayan Roy Choudhry and others – 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (111207) (S.C.Pak.)
74.

A fiscal statute should be construed strictly.

A fiscal statute should be construed strictly and no question of equitable construction arises. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax, Multan Zone, Multan v. Allah Yar Cotton Ginning & Pressing Mills (Pvt.) Limited, Multan Road, Vehari – [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H.C.Lah.) = 2000 PTD 2958
75.

Claimant of an exemption has to bring the same home without any ambiguity.

These cannot be read as exemption granting provisions. It is an established proposition of fiscal laws that the claimant of an exemption has to bring it home without any ambiguity.

80
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd., Azad Kashmir Branches, Mirpur through Inam Elahi Azhar, EVP and Provincial Chief, PHQ (Punjab) v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, AJK Council, Muzaffarabad and others – [2001] 83 TAX 404 (H.C.A&JK) = [2000] 82 TAX 417 (H.C.AJ&K) = 2000 PTD 2872
76.

Where a provision was open to two reasonably possible interpretations, then, the interpretation which favours the taxpayer has to be adopted.

Where a provision was open to two reasonably possible interpretations, then, the interpretation which favours the taxpayer has to be adopted.
77.

Correct interpretation of rule 15 vis-a-vis right of appeal.

Rule 15 further contains that where the memo. of appeal is not filed in the manner specified, then, the Registrar or the Officer authorized under rule 7, may return it to the appellant or his authorized representative, if any, to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the said Rules within such time as he may think. The aforesaid rule also lends support to the arguments that section 134(5) is directory provision of law and not mandatory because it suggests that if any memo of appeal is not accompanying the necessary document then, the Registrar shall return the same and provide further time for its completion. Thus, it clearly shows that in case, the appeal fee was not deposited within time then the Registrar should have directed the appellant to deposit the requisite appeal fee. He should have also provided time to the appellant for depositing the appeal fee, so, it could not be said that this provision is a mandatory provision of law, therefore, if, at all, the memo of the appeals were not accompanying the requisite fee, then, under rule 15, it was the responsibility of Registrar to provide further time to the appellant for depositing the appeal fee. Nothing like such was done in the instant cases. It is to be noted that if it would have been a mandatory provision of law, then, the rule 11, it should have been mentioned that the memo. of appeals should accompany the requisite court-fee and the consequences for failure of which would have also been provided in the aforesaid rules.
78.

The use of word “shall” in section 134(5), Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 does not make it mandatory in nature.

No doubt, that in section 134(5), the word „shall‟ has been used but merely and simply on the basis of the word „shall‟, it could not be construed that it is mandatory provision of law.

81
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Both the aforesaid reports clearly conveys that where the consequences of failure to comply with the provision are not stated, the provision is directory and where the consequences are specifically mentioned, the provision is mandatory. In the instant case, the consequences of failure to comply with section 134(5) has not been given, therefore, it could not be construed as a mandatory provision of law but it is a directory provision of law.
79.

Principles for determining mandatory or directory provision of law.

No universal rule or absolute test existed for determining whether a provision of law was mandatory or directory and it was to be determined according to the intention of the Legislature and the language which had been used in the provision. Ordinarily, where consequences of failure to comply with certain provisions were not stated those were to be deemed to be directory, and where the consequences were specifically mentioned, the provision was mandatory. Statute, as a general rule was understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of directions but it was construed as mandatory when those directions were followed up by an express provision that in default of following them, he had to face the consequences. Provision was mandatory if its disobedience entitled a serious legal consequence. Muhammad Saleem v. Deputy Director FIA/CBC, Multan and another – PTCL 2000 CL. 465
80.

Things should be done as required by law.

Where a thing was provided to be done in a particular manner, it had to be done in that manner and if not so done, the same would not be lawful. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Muhammad Kassim – [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.C.Kar.) = 2000 PTD 280
81.

Court must confine itself to language of law.

While interpreting a provision of statute, Court has to read the provision as it exists and to deduce or infer the meaning in accordance with the existing test or the words or particular provision. Court is not supposed to add to or subtract any word(s) from any provision of a statute while interpreting a provision so as to give same a meaning other than the one which obviously and plainly flows or can be inferred from it.

82
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Prasad Film Laboratories (P.) Ltd. – 1999 PTD 325
82.

Assessing officer to apply correct law even if assessee fails to make a claim.

It is the duty of the assessing officer to correctly apply the law notwithstanding the fact that assessee failed to make a claim. Rijaz (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wealth Tax Officer Circles III Lahore – [1996] 74 TAX 9 (H.C.Lah.)
83.

Explanation can be added to elaborate the meanings.

As a general principle it is true that an explanation does not enlarge the scope of the provision to which it is attached but it is equally wellsettled that if doubt about true interpretation of a provision have arisen, it is open to the legislation to clarify its intention by amending the law which may as well be by adding an explanation. All principles of interpretation are agreed towards finding out the true intent to the legislative which in the present case was made clear by adding an explanation which cannot be ignored. Mustafa Prestressed R.C.C.Pipe Works Ltd. Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Investigation), Karachi – [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H.C.Kar.)
84.

Harmonious construction is recommended.

It is well-settled principle of interpretation that all the provision of an enactment have to be construed harmoniously. Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. CBR & another – [1990] 61 TAX 30 (H.C.Kar.)
85.

Proceedings of the Legislature can be resorted to when the words of a provision are ambiguous.

A taxing statute usually contains charging and machinery provisions. The former fixes the liability to pay tax and has to be construed strictly and where two reasonable interpretations are possible one which favours the subject should be accepted. Once the liability to tax is fixed the machinery provision comes into play. This has to be construed liberally and in a manner that the recovery is ensured. Where more than one reasonable interpretation of such provision is possible one which favours recovery should be adopted.
86.

Interpretation of machinery provisions of a fiscal statute.

Mr. Sheikh Haider the learned counsel for the respondent has contended that as section 50(7A) is not a charging but machinery provision it should be liberally interpreted to ensure that recovery

83
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

of tax is made and no part of it escapes. It is true that the machinery provisions of a fiscal statute should be interpreted in such a manner that recovery is not frustrated or adversely affected. But it does not mean that to achieve this object one can travel beyond the realm of law and do violence to language and intention of the statute. The machinery can be extended only to the extent it is permissible under law. In this attempt one cannot override the rights of other parties only because a recovery has to be made. Such provision have their own limitations and they are to be found within the statute itself. Commissioner of Income Tax/CST (Central Karachi) v. A.B. Food Industries Ltd. Karachi – [1984] 50 TAX 158 (H.C.Kar.)
87.

Speech of the Federal Minister has no legal consequences or effect.

I have no hesitation in holding that the speech given by the Finance Minister cannot have any effect on the legal consequences flowing from the language employed in the enactment. Sainropt and ET Brice Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax West Karachi – [1979] 40 TAX 116 (H.C.Kar.)
88.

Role of history of legislation in interpreting a provision of law/statute.

It is well established that in the interpretation of statutes, the meaning of the words should be considered in the light of history of the legislation and the state of the law at the time the statute was passed, in order to consider whether the statute was intended to alter the law or to leave it exactly where it stood before. As observed by Maxwell on „Interpretation of Statutes‟, 12th edition, page 47, the court is not to be oblivious of the history of law and legislation in amending the law. Craies on „Statute Law‟, 7th edition, at page 126) observes that the cause on necessity of the Act may be discovered by considering the state of the law at the time when the Act was passed and in memorable cases the courts with a view to construing an Act have considered the existing law and reviewed the history of legislation upon the subject. Crown Bus Service Ltd. Lahore v. CBR & others – [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.C.Lah.)
89.

Departmental construction can be used in aid of interpretation.

It was laid down in Nazir Ahmad v. Pakistan and 11 others (PLD 1970 SC 453 at page 459) that a passage from Craford‟s Statutory Construction, 1940 edition, at page 399 may be usefully reproduced to

84
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

point out the effect of „departmental construction‟, that is to say, the construction which is placed in practice on the provisions of a statute or rule by the administrative authorities who are charged with the execution of the statute or the rules. The learned author observed; “Where the executive construction has been followed for a long timing an element of estoppel seems to be involved. Naturally many rights will grow up in reliance upon the interpretation placed upon a statute by those, whose duty it is to execute it. Often grove injustices would result should the courts reject the construction adopted by the executive authorities.” Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v. Noon Sugar Mills – [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H.C.Lah.)
90.

Caution should be used while borrowing the meaning attached to terms and phrases used in one statute, while interpreting another statute.

It is not always safe to borrow the meanings attached to terms and phrases used in one statute as aid in support of the interpretation of a different statute meant for a different purpose and dealing with a wholly different subject matter. It is of course permissible to have recourse to the ordinary dictionary meanings in interpreting a statute. Commissioner of Sales Tax Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi v. Rashid Burner, Sialkot – [1974] 29 TAX 221 (H.C.Lah.)
91.

Terms and phrases used in a statute prima facie should be construed in their popular sense

There are two rules as to the way in which terms and expressions are to be construed, when used in an Act of Parliament. The first rule is that general statutes will prima facie be presumed to use words in their „popular sense‟..... critical refinement and subtle distinction are to be avoided and the obvious popular meaning of the language should, as a general rule, be followed. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nagina Talkies (property) Karachi – [1974] 29 TAX 115 (H.C.Kar.)
92.

While interpreting a statute nothing is to be read in and nothing is to be implied.

In fiscal statutes the meaning has to be ascertained from the plain language of the statute and „nothing is to be implied ‟ in such statute.

85
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Mujibur Rehman v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1966] 13 TAX 141
93.

Departmental instructions interpretation.

cannot

be

used

in

aid

of

Departmental directions have nothing to do with the interpretation of the statute. Rathan Singh, Proprietor, Rathan Singh Motor Service, Madura v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras – 2 ITC 107 (Madras)
94.

Non-revenue profit/losses are not covered in Income Tax unless specifically provided in statute.

It is one of the fundamental principles of income tax legislation both in India and in England that capital losses are never allowed in income tax assessment unless specifically provided for in the words of the statute. It is equally true that profits arising from capital transactions are not liable to be taxed. I am fortified in this conclusion by the remarks of Schwabe C.J., in Board of Revenue v. Ramanathan Chettiar (244 ITC 247) where he states: “It does not seem probable that the legislature meant to provide a deduction for losses on sales of machinery by manufacturing concerns without at the same time bringing into account any profits that might be made on such sales. Sales of machinery are sales of parts of the capital of a concern of this kind and the resulting profits or losses on such sales are dealt with quite apart from this section.” Sundar Das v. Collector of Gujrat – 1 ITC 189 (Lahore)
95.

In dubio construction which imposes burden on taxpayer should be avoided.

It is a sound principle that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words to that effect and that in dubio you are always to lean against the construction which imposes a burden on the subject. Imperial Tobacco Company of India v. The Secretary of State for India in Council – 1 ITC 169 (Calcutta)
96.

Courts are not to be influenced by doctrine of hardship.

It is a well-established rule that Courts ought not to be influenced by any notion of hardship in exceptional or individual cases in interpreting a statute.

86
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Secretary of State v. Seth Khemchand Thaoomal – 1 ITC 26 (Sind)
97.

Tax must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language.

As, observed in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 4th Ed.,page 429: „Statutes, which impose pecuniary burden, are subject to the rule of strict construction. It is a well-settled rule of law that all charges upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties‟.
_______________

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL LIABILITIES

Highway Petroleum Services (Regd.), Lahore v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another – [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.C.Lah.)
98.

Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities should be strictly construed.

On well based judgments, the propositions are stated in Maxwell, Rules of Interpretation, 12th Edition at page 257 as under:“It is well settled rule of law that all charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language, because in some degree they operate as penalties (as in penal laws) the subject is not to be taxed unless the language of the statute clearly imposes the objection(s) and language must not be strained in order to tax a transaction which, had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words. „In a taxing Act‟, said Rowlett, J., „one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room or any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.‟ But this strictness of interpretation may not always ensure to the subject‟s benefit, for if the person sought to be taxed comes within the latter of the law, he must be taxed, however, great hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be.”
_______________

87
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY

Dreamland Cinema, Multan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.C.Lah.) 99. Equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not permitted. There is no dispute about the proposition that equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not permitted. A person must be taxed only if he comes with the letter of law, otherwise he is free even though his case falls within the spirit of law as held in Hira Chand v. Emperor (AIR 1931 Lah. 572). In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ectis C. Reid (AIR 1951 Bom. 333) their Lordships observed that in interpreting a Taxing Statute the language should not be strained to hold subject liable to tax. The judicial committee of the Privy Council approved the following passage in Bank of Chittinad v. Income Tax Officer, Madras (AIR 1940 PC 183): “If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of law he must be taxed, however, great hardship may appear to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however, apparently within the spirit of the law, the case might otherwise appear to be.” Where two equally reasonable constructions are possible, one strict and the other beneficial to the assessee, the latter should be preferred in a taxing statute in view of the rule laid down in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hossen Kasam Dada (PLD 1961 SC 375). Rowe & Co. v. The Secretary of State for India – 1 ITC 161 (Burma) 100. Equitable construction is inadmissible in a fiscal statute. The High Court of Calcutta relying on those and other cases, in Killing Valley Tea Company, Limited v. Secretary of State for India (1 ITC 54; 48 Cal. 161; 32 CLJ 421; 61 Ind. Cas. 107) said there is no room for controversy that the Crown seeking to recover the tax, must bring the subject within the letter of the law, otherwise the subject is free, however, much within the spirit of the law the case might appear to be. There can be no equitable construction admissible in a fiscal statute; the benefit of the doubt is the right of the subject. Secretary of State v. Seth Khemchand Thaoomal – 1 ITC 26 (Sind) 101. No equitable construction in fiscal statutes. Again, the legislature may or may not be justified on moral or political grounds in cancelling or modifying the rights and privileges which

88
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

were granted under the Permanent Settlement. Such problems are matters of policy with which the Court has not concern.
_______________

POWERS OF COURTS/ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION

The Central Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills Limited, Lahore and others – [1999] 80 TAX 79 (S.C.Pak) = 1999 PTD 2174]
102.

CBR and the Federal Government have no power to resort to judicial interpretation of law.

It seems to be well-settled proposition of law that the Central Board of Revenue, or for that matter even the Federal Government, cannot control or curtail judicial adjudication powers vested in the forums provided under the relevant law by giving a particular interpretation to a particular provision of the relevant law or by issuing notification/S.R.O. for that purpose. Central Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1999] 79 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak.)
103.

In granting leave to appeal rule of consistency is to be followed.

Mr.Sheikh Haider, learned Advocate Supreme Court, appearing for the official respondents/caveators, has submitted that the above petitions merit dismissal as the assessments pursuant to the impugned notices have already been finalised and recoveries have already been made and the parties have filed appeals etc. against the above assessments. Since earlier this Court has already granted leave against the judgment of the High Court which is also the subject-matter of the present petitions, in order to follow the rule of consistency, we are inclined to grant leave in the present cases to consider inter alia the question on which earlier leave has been granted. However, we are not inclined to grant any stay order. Leave is accordingly granted. Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak.)
104.

Judicial approach on constitutional issues should be dynamic.

That the policy of a tax, in its operation, may result in hardships or advantages or disadvantages to individual assessees which are accidental and inevitable. Simpliciter this fact will not constitute violation of any of the fundamental rights.

89
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

That while interpreting constitutional provisions Courts should keep in mind, social setting of the country, growing requirements of the society/nation, burning problems of the day and the complex issues facing the people, which the Legislature in its wisdom through legislation seeks to solve. The Judicial approach should be dynamic rather than static, pragmatic and not pedantic and elastic rather than rigid. That the law should be saved rather than be destroyed and the Court must lean in favour of upholding the constitutionality of a legislation keeping in view that the rule of constitutional interpretation is that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the legislative enactments unless ex facie it is violative of a constitutional provision.
105.

Conditions under which courts can strike down a law.

That though the Legislature has the prerogative to decide the question of quantum of tax, the conditions subject to which it is levied, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, but if a taxing statute is patently discriminatory or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of tax or that is confiscatory, the court may strike down the impugned statute as unconstitutional. Central Insurance Co. & Other v. CBR Islamabad – 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S.C.Pak)
106.

CBR is not competent to issue instructions of judicial/quasi judicial nature.

We may point out that the Central Board of Revenue cannot issue any administrative directions in the nature which may interfere with the judicial or quasi-judicial function entrusted to the various functionaries under the statute. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone-B, Karachi v. Farrokh Chemical Industries – 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 523
107.

High Court has only advisory jurisdiction under section 136 of the Ordinance.

The High Court should not have raised a question of law not forming the part of the Reference expressly or by implication. The mere fact that the High Court would have come to a different finding would not justify the conclusion that the findings of the Tribunal is based on conjectures, suspicion or irrelevant material. The High Court while deciding the Reference is not entitled to proceed on its own findings on

90
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

a question of fact but has to proceed on the facts and circumstances found by the ITAT. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone v. Sh. Muhammad Ismail and Co. Ltd. Lyallpur – 1985 SCC 637 = [1986] 53 TAX 122 (S.C.Pak)

The High Court cannot disturb or go behind any finding of fact given by the Tribunal even on the ground that there is no evidence to support it, unless it has been first expressly challenged by a question raised in the reference application under section 66 to the Tribunal. We may also add that the function of the High Court in cases referred to it under section 66 is advisory only and is confined to considering and answering the actual question referred to it. Mst. Fazal Bibi v. Commissioner of Income Tax – (1996) 74 TAX 141 (H.C.AJ&K)

A finding of fact not based on evidence or where a material evidence is ignored a reference to the High Court will be maintainable. Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone Lahore v. Gauher Ayub – [1995] 71 TAX 271 (H.C.Lah.)

This Court can only deal with the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal passed under section 34 of the Act. The question arising out of the order of Tribunal is that question which was raised before the Tribunal and which was dealt with by the Tribunal, or that question which was not raised before the Tribunal but was dealt with by it or that question which was raised and alleged before the Tribunal but was not dealt by the Tribunal. All such questions are questions of law arising from the order of Tribunal. Nazir Ali M.H. Ganji v. Commissioner of Income Companies I, Karachi – [1994] 69 TAX 71 (H.C.Kar.)

Tax

Under section 136 of the Ordinance, the provision for reference to the High Court is the same as under section 66 of the 1922 Act. The scheme of the Ordinance so far as the scheme of the reference to the High Court on question of law arises the Tribunal can and in certain circumstances must seek, at the instance of the assessee or at the instance of the Revenue, the opinion of the High Court on such

The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is purely advisory.)  In our view.C. Dhanrajmal Mamnumal & Sons v. In giving the opinion properly.Kar. jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts must be kept separate from the concept of inherent powers or incidental powers in exercising jurisdiction under section 136 of the Ordinance. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 question. such powers cannot be so construed as to confer the power of reviewing the judgment.C. It is not that of a Civil Court exercising original or any appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) v. if any question of incidental or ancillary power arises such as giving an opportunity or restoring a reference dismissed without hearing or giving some additional time to file the paper book.)  High Court can grant stay of recovery of tax.91 SHORT TITLE. The appeal is kept pending before the Appellate Tribunal. . the High Court do not exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon them by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Charters or by the Acts establishing the respective High Courts. – [1987) 56 TAX 78 (H. subject to furnishing bank guarantee of the amounts involved (outstanding tax payable). We are of the view that the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court are those which are expressed and conferred upon them and also those which inhere in the exercise of that function and jurisdiction of giving advice.Kar. Section 136 of the Ordinance is a special jurisdiction of a limited nature conferred not by the Code of Civil Procedure or by the Charters or by the Acts constituting such High Courts but by the special provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance for the limited purpose of obtaining the High Courts opinion on question of law. West Karachi – [1985] 52 TAX 77 (H. We are of the humble view that in respect of certain matters. Commissioner of Income Tax etc. this Court has always the jurisdiction to intervene if it appears that the Tribunal has arrived at a finding based on no evidence or where a finding is inconsistent with the evidence or contradictory of it or it has acted on material partly relevant and partly irrelevant or where no person judicially acting and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination reached. Commissioner of Income Tax. It is an admitted position that in answering questions or disposing of references under section 136 of the Ordinance.

Commissioner of Income Tax. Two equally possible interpretations emerge .)  An appeal from the reference under the Income Tax Law is not concerned by any of the conditions mentioned in Article 185(2).)  It has been held by the superior Courts.Pak) 109. Umar Saigal – [1976] 33 TAX 245 (H. There is no provision in the law for issuance of a notice before a case is transferred from one office to another. Commissioner of Income Tax Investigation Lahore – 1980 SCC 474 = [1981] 43 TAX 105 (S.Kar.Pak) 108. Article 185(3) limits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by providing that: „An appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment. West Karachi – [1984] 50 TAX 115 (H. It is urged that the rule of natural justice requires that before an order adverse to a party is passed he shall be heard. Lahore v. we grant special leave to appeal. The question for consideration before the High Court depended upon two equally possible interpretations of the expression „unless he is himself liable to pay any income tax and super tax thereon as an agent. order or sentence of a High Court in a case to which clause (2) does not apply shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal‟. that the Court would be entitled to intervene if it appears that the fact finding authority acted without any evidence which cannot reasonably entertained or facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination reached. Constitution of Pakistan (1973).C. Mian Aziz S. Sheikh v. There is little force in the contention the transfer of jurisdiction in this case was to facilitate assessment at one .leave to appeal granted. Karachi Industrial Corporation & 3 others v. Transfer of jurisdiction.C. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1974 SCC 424 = [1975] 32 TAX 170 (S.Lah. Karachi v.C. Coronet Paints & Chemicals Ltd. decree.C. Commissioner of Income Tax.‟ The High Court has itself noticed the fact that there has been a great difference of opinion as to the interpretation of this expression and since a legal question which is likely to affect a large number of cases has arisen.92 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

C.) 113.C. A-Ward. Constitutional petition dismissed as withdrawn second petition on the same issue is maintainable. Pakistan through Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. If the petitioners have any specific grievance against the Income Tax Officer. it was ruled by the Federal Court that a suit brought by the Punjab Province to challenge its liability to Income Tax. Majestic Cinema – 1965 SCC 220 = [1965] 12 TAX 15 (S. There must be some substance in it. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. Ashfaq Ahmad Khan & 10 others – [1974] 29 TAX 149 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax Dacca Circle Dacca – 1970 SCC 366 = [1975] 31 TAX 64 (S. on income derived from certain commercial activities of the Province. Income Tax Officer.constitutional petition was held to be maintainable. when it discovered a clear anomaly in the question referred to it.) 111. Writ petition dismissed as withdrawn . it should refer the case back to Tribunal for clarification. Effect of lack of jurisdiction. Ltd. Lyallpur v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 place.Pak.Pak. Only question of law which has substance in it be referred to the High Court. In the Punjab Province v.) 112.subsequent writ petition on the same issue . Per se such an order does not result in any prejudice to the assessee. to send the case back to the Tribunal for clarification of the question referred to it.Pak.C. under section 204 of the Government of India Act.Pak.93 SHORT TITLE. It may be pointed out that it is not every question of law that must be referred to the High Court. It was pointed out therein that where the Income Tax . 1935 was not barred by section 67 of the Income Tax Act or by section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. so that the High Court should have known whether it was asked to consider a question of law applying to the whole matter before the Income Tax authorities or only to a part. Nagina Silk Mills.) 110. they should bring it to notice of the Inspecting Additional Commissioner. Lungla (Sylhat) Tea Co. In case there is anomaly in question of law framed and referred by the Tribunal to the High Court. Sylhat v. It might have been more appropriate course for the High Court to take.C. Lyallpur and Another – 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. The Federation of Pakistan [PLD 1956 FC 72].

Pak) 115. Officer‟s order of assessment was wholly vitiated by complete lack of jurisdiction.) = [1960] 2-TAX (Supp. The Federation of Pakistan – 1956 SCC 13 (F. The principle underlying Article 184 of the Constitution of Pakistan is that all disputes whether of law or of fact are to be determined by Supreme Court of Pakistan if the parties to the dispute happens to be the Federal Government on the one side and any one or more of the provinces on the other side or if two or more provinces are arrayed against one another. The Provincial Library & Others v.C. The order in such a case cannot be said to have been passed under the Act.94 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.Pak) 114. The Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain a statutory appeal in matters arising under the Income Tax Law is limited to the case mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 137 and that such jurisdiction . It therefore follows that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court could have been invoked in challenging an Income Tax assessment on the basis that the officer in question lacked jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. would not apply.C. The Punjab Province v. Where the question is whether an appeal to the Supreme Court lies in income tax matter. Appeal/Reference to Supreme Court governed by Income Tax Law. the question has first to be decided not with reference to provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. In tax matters Supreme Court jurisdiction is limited. but solely in terms of section 137(1). Only Supreme Court is competent to adjudicate between the governments. Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan – 1957 SCC 34 = [1959] TAX (III-290) (S. Governor-General-in-Council is a representative. though once the case is held to be qualified under section 137(1) the provisions relating to appeal to the Supreme Court will apply to the appeal as if it were an appeal from decree of a High Court.-3) (S. The machinery provided for appeals/revisions in the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 is not relevant in such disputes.C. the principle laid down by the Privy Council in cases of Relight Investment Company Limited v. within the meaning of section 67 of the Act and a suit even in a Civil Court would not have been barred. the constitutional provision must prevail. 116. The writ jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court by a constitutional provision and even if there be a conflict between such a provision and another statute.

either under section 156 of Income Tax Ordinance.95 SHORT TITLE. Objection as to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 can be invoked only where the High Court has delivered judgment on a reference made to it under section 136 and also certified the case to be fit one for appeal before the Supreme Court. before the forum in the hierarchy of jurisdiction under Income Tax Ordinance.Kar. Preliminary objection of jurisdiction should be decided first. Federation of Pakistan and others – 1999 PTD 4037 (H. the petitioner can raise all the objections to the exercise of jurisdiction. If the petitioner is not satisfied with the decision.) 118. before the respondents who will decide the objections as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary step and will proceed in the matter strictly in accordance with law. It is an established principle that submission to jurisdiction of a Court or Authority does not confer jurisdiction on such court or authority and in support thereof reliance is placed on the case of Mohammad Afzal v. West Pakistan and others reported in PLD . or under section 66A of the Ordinance and the respondents will be dutybound to attend to the objections and determine the same by recording a well-reasoned order. Tapal Energy Ltd. he shall be at liberty to challenge the order in appeal. before exercising the jurisdiction or invoking authority under the relevant law. Learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the objection as to the jurisdiction would be attended to by the authority concerned as a preliminary step and will be decided in accordance with law. v. Abdul Majeed Awan v.)=1999 PTD 2910=2000 PCTLR 1046 117. Admittedly. The matter will be reopened only if the objection as to the exercise of jurisdiction is over-ruled. either on the question of jurisdiction or otherwise. In the circumstances noted supra. The respondents are expected to first satisfy that the circumstances warrant for indulgence under the relevant provisions and that they have the jurisdiction to reopen the matter. this petition is disposed of with the observations that the petitioner should raise all objections to the jurisdiction and also on the factual side. if raised in the proceedings and to decide it as a preliminary step.C. Board of Revenue. Every quasijudicial authority is under legal obligation to consider the objections as to its jurisdiction. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax – [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.Lah.

„or otherwise increasing the liability of an assessee‟ . 1967 SC 314.)] In the context of Income tax we have been able to lay our hands on Hassan Ali Khan Kara Bhai v...96 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax PLD 1974 Kar.” Frontier Ceramics v..C. arbitrary or discriminatory. writing for the Court held that notwithstanding that no specific appeal was provided under section 30 of the Income tax Act. therefore.. It may also be pointed out that the objection as to the jurisdiction can be raised at any stage and for the above reliance is placed on the case of (i) Shagufta Begum v. 1922 against an order under section 35.e. Shad Mohammad and others reported in PLD 1995 SC 66. Government of Pakistan & others – 1999 PTD 4126 (H..Kar..C. The Income Tax Officer reported in PLD 1989 SC 360.” Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd. such an order being in the nature of an order of assessment was appealable to the Appellant Assistant Commissioner under Section 30 of the Act.CBR is not a person as contemplated under section 32 of the President Order 1 of 1983 and. it is no where provided that the learned Ombuds has the authority to declare any legally issued notification as perverse. and (ii) Pir Sabir Shah v.) 119... Islamabad and 4 others – [2000] 81 TAX 119 (H. Ombudsman has no power to declare any legally issued notification as perverse. illegal. 120.. however.C.. and therefore.. Every order increasing tax obligation of an assessee or reducing _ the refund is appealable under section 129. The issuance of notification cannot be termed as maladministration because it could not be aid to have been isued for a particular person or in a particular case. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance. The above discussion would amply confirm that the omnibus clause in section 129 i. through Managing Director v... CBR has no authority to file presentation against the orders of Wafaqi Mohtasib. it was issued for and applied to all those concerned. 473 wherein Noorul Arfeen J. such appeal lay since the order under section 35 pertook the character of a fresh assessment order referable to section 23 of the 1922 Act... [Not approved by Supreme Court in [2000] 83 TAX 119 (S.Pesh.) = 1999 PTD 4061 121.Pak. illegal or arbitrary and discriminatory.. In the above provisions of law [Wafaqi Mohtasib Ordinance of 1983]. CBR has no authority to file representations before the President of Pakistan against the recommendations/decisions of the Mohtasib. “..

Objections to jurisdiction are to be decided before proceeding in the matter by adjudicating authority. v. 3 to issue the alleged notices and to initiate the said proceedings against them would not confer jurisdiction on respondent No. the petitioner could raise all the objections to the exercise of jurisdiction. Lah. before exercising the jurisdiction or invoking . Every quasijudicial authority is under legal obligation to consider the objections as to its jurisdiction.) = 1999 PTD 2910 (H.) 122.C. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H.Lah.Kar.C. Objection to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. The Income Tax Officer reported in PLD 1989 SC 360. Even.C. Abdul Majeed Awan v. otherwise failure of the petitioners to question the authority or jurisdiction of respondent No.97 SHORT TITLE. The objection raised by Mr.Lah. The matter will be reopened only if the objection as to the exercise of jurisdiction is overruled. and (ii) Pir Sabir Shah v. Inspecting Additional Commissioner of Income Tax – [1999] 80 TAX 115 (H. 123. Board of Revenue. West Pakistan and others [PLD 1967 SC 314]. It may also be pointed out that the objection as to the jurisdiction can be raised at any stage and for the above reliance is placed on the cases of: (i) Shagufta Begum v. Shad Muhammad and others reported in PLD 1995 SC 66. making such orders appealable under section 129.) = 2000 PCTLR 1046 124. Federation of Pakistan and others – 1999 PTD 4037 (H. either under section 156 of Income tax Ordinance or under section 66-A of the Ordinance and the respondents will be duty bound to attend to the objections and determine the same by recording a well reasoned order. if raised in the proceedings and to decide it as a preliminary step. Shaikh Haider is not sustainable and is overruled. 3 which did not vest in him in law. Tapal Energy Ltd.) = 1999 PTD 2910 = 2000 PCTLR 1046 Abdul Majeed Awan v. Admittedly. It is an established principle that submission to jurisdiction of a Court or Authority does not confer jurisdiction on such Court or Authority and in support thereof reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Afzal v. Submission to jurisdiction of a Court/Authority does not confer jurisdiction which does not vest in it/him in law.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 covers every possible eventuality where the tax liability or obligation to pay income tax is increased or refund reduced.

Khizar Hayat PLD 1977 Lah. Courts/Tribunals have inherent powers to recall orders independent of any statutory provisions. Tasneem Kausar v. See Qamar-uz-Zaman v. Federation of Pakistan – [1998] 77 TAX 127 (H. Hazoor Bakhsh v. Union Bank Ltd. Rahimyar Khan and 12 others – PLD 1999 Lahore 417 126. Mst. Senior Superintendent of Police. It is hardly necessary to reiterate that this doctrine does not absolutely bar the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate such petitions if other remedies are available against the impugned orders/ grievance. Tribunal or Authority has an inherent jurisdiction to recall orders obtained from it by practising fraud and misrepresentation. The respondents are expected to first satisfy that the circumstances warrant for indulgence under the relevant provisions and that they have the jurisdiction to reopen the matter.) 127.98 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the orders /proceedings/actions of functionaries of State under attack are in excess of authority or totally destitude of authority if had power to come to the relief of the effected party in exceptional circumstances. CBR has no authority to place judicial interpretation on any provision of law. authority under the relevant law. House Building Finance Corporation – [PLD 1999 Lahore 462] 125. Court. Doctrine of exhaustion explained. In highly exceptional circumstances this Court definitely will come to the rescue of the effected party as pointed out by a celebrated Judge Mr. Such power is inherently available to a Court/Tribunal of special or limited jurisdiction independent of any statutory provision. Justice Aftab Hussain in Haji Muhammad v.Lah. 1979 as mentioned in . flow from doctrine of exhaustion as embodied in Article 199 of the Constitution. 1979 the liability of the assessee to pay advance tax has to be worked out after giving due allowance for the tax already paid under section 50 of the Income Tax Ordinance. Doctrine of exhaustion is regulatory in nature.C. 424. While parting with this order we are inclined to reiterate that rules enunciated above. Suffice it to stay that according to the petitioner‟s learned counsel under section 53 of the Income Tax Ordinance. It is not necessary to state the facts in view of the limited nature of the controversy before this Court. v. Zila Council Bahawalpir 1990 MLD 1748.

According to the learned counsel the direction of Central Board of Revenue that the tax withheld under section 50 be not accounted for as payment of quarterly advance tax instalment is violative of section 53 itself and cannot be given effect to.99 SHORT TITLE.B.. 13 of 1997 dated 29. 13 of 1997 is barred as under section 8 of Income Tax Ordinance. Learned counsel has assured that the authorities concerned shall interpret section 53 of the Income Tax Ordinance. Advocate has conceded before this court that Circular No. That being so... v.. The C....R. the Central Board of Revenue would be well advised to desist from issuing any such circular which influences the decision of the adjudicating authorities. 1979. The jurisdiction of Central Board of Revenue for issuing instructions is confined only to administrative matters.. Further discussion in this behalf is unnecessary as Mr.. therefore. It is a matter of some regret that the Central Board of Revenue while issuing the circulars does not follow the law declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan which under Article 189 is binding on all authorities which are required to act in aid of Supreme Court of Pakistan.. learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that authority of the Central Board of Revenue to issue Circular No.. M.. Relying upon pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Messrs Central Insurance Co. Ilyas Khan. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 clause (b) of sub section 1 of section 53 itself but the Central Board of Revenue while interpreting the above section in the impugned circular has opined in para-2 of the circular that the tax withheld under section 50 shall neither be included in the amount of tax assessed nor shall such tax be accounted for as payment of quarterly advance tax instalments... The law on the subject was clearly enunciated in Central Insurance Co. and others (1993 SCMR 1232)... .‟s case supra relied upon by the petitioner‟s learned counsel in which it was held that Central Board of Revenue is not one of the authorities in the hierarchy of officers which has jurisdiction to interpret any provision of the Ordinance.. He further says that neither any assessing officer nor any appellate authority under the Income Tax Ordinance has. adopted the said circular. it may be stated that prima facie this contention appears to have merit inasmuch as according to the wording of Section 53 (1)(b) the liability of the assessee is to pay the advance tax minus the tax already paid under section 50. 1979 irrespective of the view taken by the Central Board of Revenue..9. ..1997 issued by the Central Board of Revenue has no binding force..

.. we find that question referred to by the Tribunal is of academic nature and need no further examination.] The Central Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction to issue any circular as to curtail the discretion vesting in the Adjudication Authorities . the circular issued holding that the amounts received under the Golden Handshake Scheme were salaries is ultra vires the powers of the Central Board of Revenue. Rule 33. CBR‟s circular holding compensation under Golden Handshake Scheme as taxable declared unlawful. it has the power to cancel or vary such orders and can pass necessary consequential directions as the situation may warrant.. v. clearly shows that if the Appellate Tribunal is not satisfied with the orders passed by the forum below... shall be refunded to the petitioners.100 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Nasir Mahmood Dar. etc.[This decision has been overturned by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court. Federation of Pakistan and Others – [1998] 78 TAX 1 (H. The Adjudication Officer shall proceed to decide independently of the circular as to whether the amounts received by the petitioners are tantamount to salaries or not and are taxable.. CPC. The amounts.Lah. rule 33.. Karim Aziz Industries Ltd. In this view of the matter.Lah. CPC.. deducible from the foregoing discretion is that the power of Appellate Income Tax Tribunal under section 135 of the Ordinance are almost analogous to the powers of Civil Court under Order XLI.. if any.C.11.C. withheld by the Banks and the amounts disbursed to the Department under the impugned Circular...These powers are of a wide sweep and arm the appellate court with the power to pass an order of remand if it comes to a finding that the orders of the courts below are illegal and there is an occasion for fresh proceeding before the first authority/court. A careful reading of sub-section (5) of the above provision... The language of this section clearly indicates that the powers of the Tribunal under this section have very wide amplitude and are almost to the power of Civil Court under Order XLI.) 129.1997 is declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect... v. The ratio. .) = 1998 PCTLR 1382 128. all these petitions are allowed and the circular issued by the Central Board of Revenue on 6. This power is expressly embodied in the language of conclusion.. Powers of Appellate Tribunal. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi Zone – [1997] 75 TAX 90 (H..

Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any provision of the Constitution by which the Legislature is required to lay down guidelines in the law to regulate the exercise of power which if confers on the executive. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others – [1995) 71 Tax 139 (H. Courts cannot question the wisdom of Legislature in enacting provision of any law.. Lahore v.) 131.. In the absence of any provision.) 130..Lah. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Tharparkar Sugar Mills Ltd. CBR instructions are binding on tax authorities The circulars issued by CBR are of binding nature on the functionaries of Income Tax Department.Lah.once a petition in tax matters is admitted that ispo facto shows that the petitioner has made a prima facie case and therefore interim stay may be granted. Mian Anwar-ul-Haq Ramay v. it is difficult to hold that this court has the jurisdiction to declare any provision of law as ultra vires of the Constitution on that score. Federation of Pakistan – [1993] 67 TAX 195 (H.. justly and .101 SHORT TITLE.” Unique Enterprises. this court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare any law or any custom or usage having the force of law as void to the extent so far it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by chapter I of Part II of the Constitution known as the fundamental rights beyond which the jurisdiction of this court to examine the vires of law in our view does not extend.C.C.. We may state here that in our considered view to which no exception can be taken the authority is required to exercise power reasonably.. v. The law is firmly settled that it is not for the courts to question the wisdom of Legislature in enacting provision of any law in any manner and their judicial function in this regard primarily is to confine to the interpretation of the law as it is.Kar. Interim stay should be given once writ is admitted. “. and deviation from the instructions contained in the circulars is nothing but misconduct.) 132.C. Before parting with the discussion on this aspect of the case we may observe that we should not be understood to have held that the absence of any guide-lines for exercise of discretionary power conferred under the statute gives to the authority concerned a free had to exercise the same arbitrarily and whimsically. Federation of Pakistan and Others – [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H. Under Article 199 of the Constitution under which this petition has been made.

C. Modern Silk Mills Ltd.102 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. a presumption of regularity with regard to all official acts and until that presumption is rebutted. The Central Board of Revenue exercises functions under various enactments e. the Central Excise & Salt Act. Before determining this question may observe that in my view the argument of Mr.g. with wisdom and maturity keeping in view above all the interest of the state. Lahore v. Lahore – [1984] 50 TAX 37 (H. fairly on the basis of relevant consideration having legal nexus with the object of law. Muhammad Hanif Monnoo v. Lahore and another – [1976] 34 TAX 199 (H. A question not raised before the Appellate Tribunal cannot be raised before the High Court. the action cannot be challenged upon mere vague allegations of mala fide. Income Tax Officer Central Circle 1.C. In our opinion these principles shall be read in the statute as guiding principles to regulate the exercise of powers conferred on the functionaries of the state and they are of so fundamental in character that they need not be expressly provided in the statute itself. Presumption of irregularity with regard to official act cannot be challenged on vague allegation of mala fide.C. It is the first authority described in section 5 of the Income Tax Act. Saeed Ahmed Khan PLD 1974 SC 151.) 134.Lah. Now it is well settled principle of law that unless a question has been raised before the Appellate Tribunal or arises out of its order the same cannot be raised for the first time before the High Court. Special Judge (Central).Lah. Case referred to: Federation of Pakistan v. The Income Tax Act. Ilyas Khan that the point about the necessity of the constitution of the Board of Revenue should have been taken and urged before the Income Tax Authorities is not without force. Sales Tax Act. It is well settled that there is to start with. Wealth Tax Act.)  The first question is whether there is substance in the argument that the Central Board of Revenue was required to be constituted again in Pakistan under section 9 of the Governor General‟s Order 20. other . Abdul Rashid (c/o Union Traders GoIe Cloth. LyalIpur) v. 423 133. Gift Tax Act. The petitioner has failed to rebut the presumption of regularity attached to the impugned proceedings.) = PLJ 1984 Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1979] 39 TAX 14 (H. Customs Act and Estate Duty Act.Lah.

Income Tax Officers etc. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1964 SC 829). that as the impugned . The learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that there is no right of appeal against the impugned orders and that a revision or reference is no right of a litigant. Ilyas Khan that his point raises a question in the nature of quo warranto even in regard to existing members who would be necessary parties to this petition. I agree with the argument of Mr. The challenge to the constitution of Board of Revenue should have been thrown at the time of assessment. cannot be allowed to be taken since this point was neither raised before the Income Tax authorities nor before the Special Judge nor in the writ petition. The dictum in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan & another – [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.103 SHORT TITLE.C. Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1964 S. It falls within sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-Article 1 of Article 199 which authorises the High Court to require a person within its territorial jurisdiction holding or purporting to hold a public office to show under what authority of law he claims to hold that office. Since the year 1962 and by virtue of the provisions of Ordinance 31 of 1962 which amended the Income Tax. otherwise it would lead to an anomalous situation in so far as the assessment is treated as legal while the approval for prosecution on the basis of that assessment is attacked as a nullity. the Central Government.) 135.Lah. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 authorities being the Commissioner of Income Tax.) Lahore v. The impleading of Central Board of Revenue through its Chairman cannot cure this defect. the Central Board of Revenue is also the appointing authority of other Income Tax authorities. Provisions of the Income Tax Act can be challenged on constitutional grounds. Highway Petroleum Service (Regd. The other point that no member of the Central Board of Revenue in Pakistan has been or can be treated to have been appointed by the competent authority i. These words clearly make the person holding office a necessary party to the writ petition and in the absence of such party the petition cannot be treated to be properly constituted.e. An attack on the existence of the Board of Revenue by the petitioner who was assessee after 1962 is an attack on the vires of the appointment of the other Income Tax authorities and ultimately on the legality of the assessment. Further. 829 (840) applies to this case and the writ ought to be refused. This objection is also belated. Act. Case relief upon: Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v.C.

Lahore – [1976] 33 TAX 176 (H. Lahore – [1976] 34 TAX 71 (H. It is common knowledge. The submission is obviously sound and is sustained.) 136. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore v. In the 1962 Constitution there was a corresponding provision in the form of Article 57.) = PLD 1976 Lah. Only Supreme Court is competent to adjudicate between the governments. that a statute normally does not provide for each and every conceivable eventuality and in respect of some unforeseen events arising in a case for which it has made no provision. lastly. 258 137.C.. Jallo Rosin and Turpentine Factory. But as it was a purely legal plea gong to the root of the case we allowed the permission to the respondent to raise the objection for whatever its worth. provisions are being challenged on constitutional grounds. This was an altogether new plea which was for the first time raised in this court belatedly after the conclusion of the arguments.. therefore. It is submitted that a court interpreting the constitution finally is an appropriate forum to raise the questions.C. Government of The Punjab Lahore v. the petitioners have a right to challenge the same by means of a petition under the constitution and that. . since the questions raised in these petitions relate to the challenge of the provisions in the Income Tax Act itself.104 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Wolf Gang Matzke – [1975] 32 TAX 176 (H.Lah. even at this late stage.. to declare the same to be invalid. have original jurisdiction in any dispute between any two or more governments. Lahore Zone. Courts have inherent jurisdiction in the interest of orderly dispensation of justice. to the exclusion of every other court...Lah.Pesh. A legal plea going to the roots of the case was allowed to be raised at belated stage. Chief Secretary. alleged in this application that under Article 184(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.C.) 138. inspite of alternate remedies. In this connection Article 185(1) of the 1973 Constitution lays down that the Supreme Court shall. 1973 only the Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this dispute between the Central Government and the Provincial Government. It was. Govt. Commissioner of Income Tax. On the merits the additional objection raised before us has considerable force. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v.

C. That any legislation whereby either the prices of marketable commodities are fixed in such a way as to bring them below the cost of production and thereby make it impossible for a citizen to carry on his business or tax is imposed in such a way so as to result in acquiring property of those on whom the incidence of taxation fell. & Others v. It is a tax imposed upon a person (natural or artificial) in relation to his income. they cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which they are created. In other words. the Act required him to be treated as he were with all inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. That the legal fictions are limited for a definite purpose. That when a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and in truth was not done. That where a person is deemed to be something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something. That generally the effect of a deeming provision in a taxing statute is that it brings within the tax net an amount which ordinarily would not have been treated as an income. Courts have no concern with disputable questions of distributive justice. then such . Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta) 139. Scope of deeming provisions in respect of income.) 140.105 SHORT TITLE.Pak.this upon the plainest ground that by very strong presumption the legislature has not intended that questions of equality or fairness in taxation should be left to any decision save its own. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S. _______________ INCOME / DEEMING PROVISIONS _ HOW TO BE CONSTRUED Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. That income tax is a tax on a person in relation to his income. In construing a fiscal statute the Court has no concern with disputable question of distributive justice . the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to. it brings within the net of chargeability income not actually accrued but which supposedly to have accrued notionally. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 the courts would be deemed to have inherent jurisdiction in the interest of orderly dispensation of justice. Emperor v.

106
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

legislation would be violative of the fundamental rights to carry on business and to hold property as guaranteed in the Constitution.
141.

Widest amplitude of an entry in legislative list does not extend to tax something which is not a citizen‟s income.

That the rule of interpretation that while interpreting an entry in a legislative list it should be given widest possible meaning does not mean that Parliament can choose to tax as income an item which in no rational sense can be regarded as a citizen‟s income. The item taxed should rationally be capable of being considered as the income of a citizen. That before charging tax, an assessee must be shown to have received income or the same has arisen and accrued or deemed to be so under the statute. Any amount which cannot be treated as above is not an income and, therefore, cannot be subject to tax. That there is a marked distinction between a tax on gross revenue and a tax on income, which for taxation purposes, means gains and profits. There may be considerable gross revenues, but no income taxable by an income tax in the accepted sense.
142.

Scope of definition of „tax on income‟ under the Constitution.

We may state that at this juncture, it will not be out of context to take up Mr. Iqbal Naim Pasha‟s submission that the definition of the term „tax on income‟ given in Article 260 of the Constitution provides guideline as to the import and scope of Entry 47 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, Part I, by providing that „tax on income‟ includes a tax in the nature of excess profits tax or a business profits tax which, according to him, have the same connotations which were understood in respect of Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, and the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947. The above contention is devoid of any force, firstly, for the reason that the definition of the term „tax on income‟ given in Article 260 of the Constitution, used the words „tax on income‟ includes a tax in the nature of an excess profits business or a business profits tax. The factum that the word „includes‟ has been employed and not the word „means‟ indicates that the definition given in Article 260 of the above term is not exhaustive. Secondly, the entries in the Legislative List, as pointed out hereinabove, are to be construed liberally and not in a pedantic manner. The word „income‟ as highlighted hereinabove in various reports and treatises is susceptible to a very wide meaning. We may point out that the question, as to whether the impugned taxes are direct or indirect taxes highlighted by Mr. Sikandar Hayat with the aid of above three Privy Council cases, is not relevant. In the

107
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

above cases the controversy in issue was, whether the Dominion concerned Legislature had the power to levy the impugned tax or the Province concerned. There is no such controversy involved in the instant case. Even otherwise, the impugned taxes are direct taxes. Kashmir Feeds (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue through Chairman, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and another – [1999] 80 TAX 24 (H.C.Kar.) = 1999 PTD 1655
143.

Deeming provisions - How to be construed.

When a statute contemplates that a state of affairs should be deemed to have existed, it clearly proceeds on the assumption that, in fact, it did not exist at the relevant time but by a legal fiction one has to assume as it did exist. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Syed Akhtar Ali – [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H.C.Kar.)
144.

Scope of deemed income.

Setion 12(7) envisages „deemed income‟ as income where an assessee makes any loan or advances to any person which is either interest free or on which interest at a nominal rate is charged. We are of the view that in such a situation, interest worked out at the rate of two percent above the bank rate as reduced by the interest, if any, charged by the assessee shall be deemed to be interest income of the lender. J.L. Wei & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1989] 59 TAX 108 (H.C.Kar.)

The law clearly provides that all the entires found in the assessee ‟s account books for the previous year unless clearly explained and the nature and source are disclosed satisfactorily, the same will be treated as income and will be charged to tax. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Nishat Cinema, Lyallpur – [1979] 39 TAX 140 (H.C.Lah.)
145.

Assessment and levy of super tax on total income of three months at the rate applicable to twelve month ‟s notional income as a condition for permitting change of previous year by assessee was held without legal sanction.

We heard the learned counsel for the Department who urged that under this proviso the Income Tax Officer had wide discretion to burden the permission for change of previous year, with such conditions as he may think fit. The assessment of notional income and imposition of super tax thereon, according to the learned counsel are

108
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

reasonable conditions, which can justifiably be imposed on the assessee by the Income Tax Officer, to accord his consent. It is thus obvious that the tax is to be levied on the profits and gains of the business carried on by an assessee. Gain is the equivalent of profit and profit accrues if the receipts from the business exceed the expenditure incurred for acquiring the receipts. Section 10 is, however, subject to the other provisions of the Act. The combined effect of sections 3, 4, 6 and 10 is that to sustain the levy there should have been income attributable to the business carried on by the assessee. The concept of notional income of a previous year, by multiplying 3 months‟ income by 4 is thus not vouched by the provisions of the Income Tax Act. It appears to us that in imposing conditions on an assessee, to allow him to change his previous year, there is an overriding limitation on the powers of the Income Tax Officer not to levy such a condition which is not warranted by the Income Tax Act itself. The learned counsel for the Revenue has placed reliance on the proviso to spell out the powers for the assessing authority to set out the impugned condition. But as observed above this power is qualified and has to be exercised within the limits fixed by the statute. The proviso has to be interpreted in harmony with the other provisions of the Income Tax Act and not to nullify those provisions.
Cases referred to: Ikram Bus Service v. Board of Revenue (PLD 1963 S.C. 564); Kohinoor Textile Mills v. The Province of Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 100) and the Guardian of the Poor of the West Derby Union v. The Metropolitan Life Assurance Society (1897) AC 647.
_______________

LEGISLATIVE POWERS VIS-À-VIS DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION

Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak.) 146. Distinction between direct and indirect taxes hardly exists now. That a direct tax is one which is demanded from the very person, who it is intended or desired should pay it, whereas indirect taxes are those, which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another, like custom duties, excise taxes and sales taxes, which are borne by the consumers. That levy of building tax on the basis of the covered area without taking into consideration, the class to which a particular building

109
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

belongs, the nature of construction, the purpose for which it is used, its situation and its capacity for profitable use and other relevant circumstances bearing on the matters of taxation is not sustainable in law for want of reasonable classification. That there is a clear distinction between the subject matter of a tax and the standard by which the amount of tax is measured keeping in view the practical difficulties, which are encountered by the Revenue to locate the persons and to collect the tax due in certain trades, if the Legislature in its wisdom thought that it would facilitate the collection of tax due from specified traders on a presumptive basis, the same is not violative of the Fundamental Right relating to equality.
_______________

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TAX” AND “FEE”

Biafo Industries v. Federation of Pakistan – PTCL 2000 CL. 384
147.

Distinction between “tax” and “fee” explained.

Therefore, the distinction between a tax and fee lies primarily in the fact that tax is levied as a part of common burden or general revenue, while a fee is a payment for special benefit or privilege. This distinction between tax and fee was adopted in the case of Abdul Majid and others PLD 1960 Dacca 502 and in the case of Mahboob Yar Khan PLD 1975 Lah. 748. However, it should not be forgotten that there is no generic difference between a tax and fee. Both are compulsory exaction of money by public authorities. A tax is imposed for public purposes and is not supported by any consideration of service rendered in return. Whereas a fee is levied in view of services rendered. Consequently, there is an element of quid pro quo between the payer of the fee and the authority which imposes it.
_______________

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTUAL LIABILITY IN PRAESENTI AND A LIABILITY DE FUTURO WHICH FOR THE TIME BEING IS ONLY CONTINGENT

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kesar Sugar Works Ltd. – 2001 PTD 744
148.

The Income Tax Law makes a distinction between actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which, for the time being, is only contingent.

The Income Tax Law makes a distinction between actual liability in praesenti and a liability de futuro which, for the time being, is only

110
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

contingent. The former is deductible but not the latter. The controversy to be decided in this case therefore is whether the present liability, accrued against the assessee in the assessment years under consideration. This has to be decided by taking into account all the facts and circumstances of the case. If the liability is an actual liability in praesenti in the year under consideration, it is deductible. If it is a contingent liability, it cannot be the subject-matter of deduction even under the mercantile system of accounting. There is no dispute in the present case that in the years under consideration the liability to pay interest was an actual liability. It was no more contingent. There is no dispute on this count. The only ground on which the claim of the assessee for deduction was denied by the Income Tax Officer was that the assessee was disputing the liability by filing an appeal to the Supreme Court. This view of the Income Tax Officer did not find favour with the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal. The law in this regard is well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1971) 82 ITR 363, that if there is actual liability in praesenti, deduction cannot be denied on the ground that the assessee is disputing the liability. As a result, in the case of an assessee maintaining the mercantile system of accounting the amount payable by the assessee would be deductible as an accrued liability even though the assessee objects to it and seeks to get the order of the concerned authority reversed, subject, however, to any statutory provision to the contrary (viz., section 43B of he Income Tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, with effect from April 1, 1984, which provides that certain liabilities can be deducted only on actual payment).
_______________

THEORY OF READING DOWN AS A RULE OF INTERPRETATION

Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak.)
149.

Theory of reading down as a rule of interpretation.

That denial of reliefs provided by sections 28 to 43C of the Indian Income Tax Act to the particular business or trades covered by section 44AC thereof without showing some basis fair and rational and without having nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the Legislature, held unfair, arbitrary, disproportionate to the prevalent evil and constitutes denial of equal treatment. Consequently, the Indian Supreme Court did not press into service non-obstante clause

111
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

of section 44AC by applying theory of reading down as a rule of interpretation. That it is an accepted canon of taxation to levy tax on the basis of ability to pay. The sections 115J and 115JA incorporated in Indian Income Tax Act, 1961, were intended and designed to bring within the tax net the companies, which though making huge profits and also declaring substantial dividends, but have been managing their affairs in such a way by availing of tax concessions etc. as to avoid payment of income tax. That the theory of reading down is a rule of interpretation which is resorted to by the Courts when they find a provision read literally seems to offend a fundamental right or falls outside the competence of the particular legislature.
_______________

RULE OF EVIDENCE

Miss Asia v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal etc. – 1978 SCC 446 = [1980] 41 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak)
150.

A Judge cannot be compelled to accept a piece of evidence.

There is no rule of law compelling a judge to accept evidence, even though it is uncontradicted, which he believes to be a pack of lies. Amin Bricks Company v. Commissioner (Revision) etc. – [1996] 74 TAX 227 (H.C.Lah.)
151.

of

Income

Tax

Income Tax Authorities to establish by positive evidence that assessee‟s accounts are unreliable.

The contention of the learned counsel for the department that no obligation is cast on Income Tax authorities to establish by positive evidence that the assessee‟s accounts are unrealisable, seems to be misconceived; the power of assessing officer under the law is not merely discretionary power but amounts to a statutory duty; it is not a purely subjective or arbitrary exercise of discretion and is required to be exercised judicially and adverse inference cannot be drawn unless the assessing officer is satisfied that the accounts have been suppressed by the assessee. Syed Akhtar Ali v. Commissioner of Income Tax Hyderabad – [1994] 69 TAX 38 (H.C.Kar.)
152.

Standard of proof.

It is always to be remembered that the standard of proof applicable to prove a positive fact and the one which is required to prove a negative

112
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

fact cannot be the same. A high standard is always applied for the proof of a positive fact while the standard of preponderance of probability is sufficient to prove a negative fact. The assessee is required to prove that the failure to return correct income did not arise from any fraud or gross or wilful neglect. The assessee merely has to place materials of the primary facts or the circumstances which in all reasonable probability would show that he was not guilty of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect. He may discharge this onus by placing the facts found in the assessment order to show that the facts found therein had not in the least given an inkling of fraud or gross or wilful neglect, on the part of the assessee and, therefore, it must be held without proof of any other fact that there was no fraud committed by the assessee in his failure to return the correct income nor was he acting grossly or wilfully negligently. Miss Rani v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax Lahore – [1992] 68 TAX 89 (H.C.Lah.)
153.

Qanoon-e-Shahadat Ordinance is applicable to Income Tax Ordinance, 1979.

The Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 has been made applicable to all judicial proceedings before any court, a Tribunal or any other Authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers or jurisdiction except an Arbitrator. The scope of applicability of Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, is thus much larger than that of Evidence Act, 1972. It cannot be doubted that the proceedings before the Income Tax Authorities are judicial in nature and further that they are exercising quasi-judicial, if not judicial powers. The applicability of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to tax proceedings is, therefore, established as the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. CST/Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. – [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H.C.Lah.) _ 154. Provisions of Evidence Act not applicable to proceedings under Income Tax Act. It is correct that the Evidence Act is not applicable to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act.

113
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Siva Pratab Bhattadua v. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1 ITC 323 (Madras)
155.

Statement in power of attorney not proof in itself.

It is argued that the power of attorney, which was filed by the agent, stated that it was a joint family, but a statement in a power of attorney would not prove itself. It will be like any other statement made by a person.
_______________

COURTS CAN STRIKE DOWN DISCRIMINATORY AND CONFISCATORY PROVISIONS OF FISCAL LAWS

Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1097 = [1997] 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak.)
156.

Courts can strike down discriminatory and confiscatory provisions of fiscal laws.

That though the Legislature has the prerogative to decide the questions of quantum of tax, the conditions subject to which it is levied, the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, but if a taxing statute is plainly discriminatory or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of the tax or that is confiscatory, the Court may strike down the impugned statute as unconstitutional.
_______________

SCOPE OF VARIOUS WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS

Cement Agencies Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Central Circle-II, Karachi – 1969 SCC 322 = [1969] 20 TAX 33 (S.C.Pak)
157.

“Accrue” and “arise”.

The policy of the Ordinance is to make the amount of income taxable when it is received either actually or constructively. So far as the words „accrue‟ and „arise‟ are concerned. We are to take ordinary dictionary meaning of these words. Since both the words have been used in the provision in question they must be taken to have distinct meanings. „Accrue‟ conveys the sense of growing up by way of additional or increase or as accession or advantage, while the word „arises‟ connotes comes into existence or notice or presents itself. It is, however, to be noticed that these two words have been used in contradistinction to the word „received‟ indicating a right to receive. The words „accrues‟ and „arises‟ represent a state anterior to the point

114
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

of time when the income becomes receivable and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate. Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. BWM Abdur Rehman – [1974] 29 TAX 212 (S.C.Pak.)
158.

“Accrue” and “arise”.

Whereas „receive‟ clearly connotes a specified sum passing into the possession of the receiver. The word „accrued‟, in the context, obviously means no more than that a right had arisen in a certain person to recovery of a certain sum. The expression „accrued‟ in the context also, carries plainly the sense of an accrual for the benefit of the person concerned, as distinguished from the sense of merely receiving money under legal obligation to pass it on to another person or authority, which is incidental to the recovery of cesses by an assessee. Pandit Pandurang v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Provinces – 2 ITC 69 (Nagpur)
159.

“Accrue” and “arise” vis-a-vis effect of book entries.

In a very recent case decided by the Privy Council, St. Lucia Usines and Estates Co. v. St. Lucia [(1924) A.C.508 at p. 512], Lord Wrenbury has observed:– “The words „income arising or accruing ‟ are not equivalent to the words „debts arising or accruing. ‟ To give them that meaning is to ignore the word „income‟. The words mean „money arising or accruing by way of income ‟ There must be a coming in to satisfy the word „income‟........ If the taxpayer be the holder of stock of a foreign Government carrying say 5 per cent interest, and the Government is that of a defaulting state which does not pay the interest, the tax-payer has neither received nor has there accrued to him any income in respect of that stock. A debt has accrued to him but income has not. It does not follow that income is confined to that which the tax-payer actually receives. Where income tax is deducted at the source the tax-payer never receives the sum deducted but it accrues to him. ” Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab, NWFP & Bahawalpur v. Mrs. E.V. Miller – 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-1) (S.C.Pak)
160.

“Agricultural Income” when remains to be such in the hands of recipient.

A servant employed on an agricultural farm under a contract of service can no more claim his salary to be agricultural income on the

115
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

ground that he is paid by his master out of his agricultural income than a shopkeeper can claim exemption from tax because the price which he has received for his wages has come out of the agricultural income of the buyer. But if income lying in reserve with a person is agricultural income which he himself cannot enjoy and is meant to be distributed among its rightful claimants, it cannot be disputed that no change of character is implied in the distribution of that income because income is earned for expanding and a person who is precluded in law from expanding it on his own enjoyment and holds it for the benefit of the others does not bring out any change in the nature of that income when he posses it on to the beneficiary. Commissioner of Income Tax East Bengal v. Kumar Narayan Roy Choudhry and others – 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) (S.C.Pak.)
161.

“Agriculture” and “agricultural purposes”.

The word „agriculture‟ is not used in the Act in its extended dictionary meaning. It has been used in a narrow sense and so interpreted, it means that an operation to be agricultural must involve or be connected with the cultivation of the soil. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kathiawar Coopperative Housing Society – [1985] 51 TAX 5 (H.C.Kar.)
162.

“Annual value”.

From plain reading of sub-section (2) of section 19, it would appear that the actual rent received by the landlord is not the basis for determining the taxable amount, but the amount which the leased property is likely to fetch by way of rent or which the property might reasonably be expected to fetch from year to year shall be the basis of calculating the taxable amount. Chhuna Mal Salig Ram v. Punjab NWFP – 5 ITC 316

The annual value of property under section 9 of the Income Tax Act does not include sums paid by the tenants to the owner on account of house tax payable by the owner...... Muhammad Amjad v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Zone ‘A’ Karachi – [1992] 65 TAX 176 (H.C.Kar.) = 1992 PTD 513]
163.

“Assessment”.

Kanga and Palkhivala‟s in the Law and Practice of Income Tax, Eighth Edition Volume I, at page 1127 have commented upon the word „assessment‟. They have observed that “the word „assessment‟ is

116
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

used in the Act as meaning sometimes the computation of income, sometimes the determination of the amount of tax payable; and sometimes the whole procedure laid down in the Act for imposing liability on the taxpayer. The word „assessment‟ must be understood in each section of this Act with reference to the context in which it is used, in some sections it has a comprehensive meaning and includes reassessment (e.g. section 265) and in some sections it has a restricted meaning and is used as distinct from re-assessment (e.g. section 147)”. They have further observed that “the method prescribed by the Act for making an assessment to tax using the word assessment in its most comprehensive sense as including the whole procedure for imposing liability upon the taxpayer consists of the following steps. In the first place, the taxable income of the assessee has to be computed. In the next place, the sum payable by him on the basis of such computation has to be determined. Finally, a notice of demand in the prescribed form specifying the sum so payable has to be served upon the assessee.” National Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others – [2001] 83 TAX 359 (H.C.Kar.) = PTCL 2001 CL. 250
164.

Meaning of expression “assessment consciously completed”.

The expression “assessment consciously completed” has been elaborately explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and 3 Others (PTCL 1992 CL. 376 = 1993 SCMR 493) as under:6. The question as to when reopening of the case under section 65 of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 is allowed and justified in spite of the fact that all material facts were already on the record when previous finding was given, came up for detailed examination before this Court in the case of Edulji Dinshaw Limited (supra) in which nearly the whole caselaw on the subject has been noticed. It is held in the reported judgement of that case once all the facts have been fully disclosed by the assessee and considered by the Income Tax Authorities and assessments have been consciously completed and no new fact has been discovered there can be no scope for interference with these concluded transactions under the provisions of section 65 on the ground that the income chargeable to tax under the Ordinance has escaped assessment or has been underassessed in the meaning of section 65(1)(a)(b) of the Ordinance. Maximum emphasis in this ruling is on use of words to the effect „assessments have been unconsciously

117
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

completed‟. Requirement spot-lighted is that Income Tax Officer has applied his mind consciously to the facts of the case and perusal of the record. If there is conscious application of mind, then rule laid down in this case will apply with full force. If there is no conscious application of mind by Income Tax Officer, then rule laid down in this case will not be attracted.” Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone, Lahore Muhammad Allah Bux – [1977] 35 TAX 74 (H.C.Lah.)
165.

v.

Definition of the word “business”.

The term „business‟ has been defined in section 2(4) of the Act. „Business‟ includes any trade, commerce or manufacture or any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. It has been repeatedly observed that „business‟ with the aid of meaning given in dictionary be deprecated. Commissioner of Income Tax v. New China Glassware Company – [1974] 30 TAX 158 (H.C.Kar.)

The definition of the word „business‟, as contained in section 2(4) of the Act, embraces only such activities as are in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture. General Bank of Netherlands Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Karachi – 1991 SCC 784 = [1991] 63 TAX 149 (S.C.Pak)
166.

“Business connection”.

After survey of case law, learned Judges in the High Court correctly took the view that in order to bring a case under the head of „business connection‟, it is necessary that there should be some activity in the taxable territory which contributes, directly or indirectly, to the earnings of those profits or gains which are to be taxed. Their Lordship also agreed with the view canvassed by the appellant that „the interest earned on the securities in questions cannot be said to be profits or gains accruing or arising from any business connections in Pakistan‟. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation & other – 1989 SCC 740 = [1997] 75 TAX 113 (S.C.Pak) _ 167. “Capital” and “dividend” distinguished. The words „capital‟ and „dividend‟ though related have entirely different considerations. In the context of the Income Tax Law, very

118
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

broadly speaking „capital‟ would signify investment whereas „dividend‟ would denote gain or return on the investment. However, in clause (d) of section 2(6A) of the Act, an extended meaning has been given to the word „dividend‟ so to bring to tax such payment also that a company may make by manipulating its share capital ..... The scope of this clause can not be extended when the company merely returns to the shareholders only their original investment. Abdul Rashid v. Special Judge (Central) Lahore & another – [1976] 34 TAX 199 (H.C.Lah.)
168.

“Case”.

The word „case‟ in section 5 of the Act has recorded statutory interpretation in the explanation to sub-section (7-A) of section 5 in the following manner:“In this section, the word „case‟ in relation to any person whose name is specified in an order or any direction issued thereunder, means all or any proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on the date of such order or direction which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after the date of such order or direction in respect of any year.” Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Rawalpindi v. Pakistan Television Corporation Rawalpindi – [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H.C.Lah.)
169.

“Certified copy”.

A certified copy will, therefore, be one which answers the requirements as given in section 76 of the Evidence Act, by reference, even though Evidence Act is not applicable. It may, therefore, be supplied in any form provided that it bears a certificate of an authorised officer that it is a true copy of the original in his custody. Pakistan Seamen Contributory Welfare Fund Karachi v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal & 2 Others – [1993] 67 TAX 400 (H.C.Kar.)
170.

“Charitable purposes”.

As is evident from clause 2(14), the definition of „charitable purpose‟ is not exhaustive but the same is an inclusive definition which only has the effect of enlarging the ordinary meaning of the expression „charitable purposes‟. It would, therefore, be erroneous to assume that the definition in any case restricts the meaning of the said expression to what has been referred to be in the said definition. Consequently,

119
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

the mere fact that the object, for which the petitioner institution has been constituted, is not public benefit, cannot in any manner disentitle the petitioner to claim exemption under clause (94). Sadar Anjuman-i-Ahmedia, Rabwa v. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi – [1977] 36 TAX 117 (H.C.Lah.)
171.

“Charity” and “charitable purposes”.

It is undoubtedly very difficult to define „charity‟ with precision. The literature on the point is as vast as despairing. The question strictly speaking is not whether „a charity exists, but whether the trust on which property is held as „trusts for a charitable purpose‟. In determining its legal meaning the courts have to be guided by the lists of charitable objects set out in the preamble to the statutes 43 Eliz I. C.4, 1601. The best classification of charitable purposes under the above Act has been given by Lord Macnaughtan‟s speech in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pensel ((1891) A.C.531) which is being consistently followed by the English Courts. It was stated that „charity‟ in its legal sense comprises four principle divisions: i) ii) iii) iv) trusts for relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for the purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads.

That judgment added that the trusts referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of law because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do so either directly or indirectly. The American Law Institute in the Restatement of Trusts adds two more headings. v) vi) promotion of health; and governmental and municipal purposes.

The religious and charitable objects of Muslim Waqfs cannot be of any assistance in the cases in hand. A perusal of the explanation after the second proviso in section 4(3)(i) of the Act, would show that the scope of the term „charitable purpose‟ in the Act are as extensive as adopted by the British or American Courts and guidance can be sought from them in view of the paucity of authority in this country. Further, it is well established principle of law of charities that a purpose is not charitable unless its benefit is directed either to the public-at-large or a sufficient section of public or community

120
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

sufficiently defined or identified by some quality of a public nature.......... Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (East) Karachi – [1983] 47 TAX 214 (H.C.Kar.)
172.

“Commercial” and “commerce”. (i)

_ Word „commercial‟ meaning of According to Ballentine‟s Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 222, means: “Pertaining to the purchase and sale or exchange of goods and commodities and connoting as well forms of, and occupation in business enterprises not involved in trading in merchandise; in a broad sense, embracing every phase of commercial and business activity and intercourse.”

(ii)

Word „Commerce‟ meaning of: “According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 336 the word „commerce‟ is defined as, the exchange of goods, productions or property of any kind.”

Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab, NWFP & Bahawalpur v. Mrs. E.V. Miller – 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1 TAX (III-1) (S.C.Pak)
173.

“Company” and “shareholders” - Relationship between.

The constituents of a company are its shareholders because its promoters must subscribe to its shares in order to bring it into existence. The company has a memorandum of association which controls its business activity. For the management of its affairs it has its own articles of association and a board of directors. The assets of a company are owned by it and not by its shareholders but the company is constituted for the purpose of earning profits and the shareholders are not only entitled to rateable distribution of its assets on its being wound up, but also indirectly control the management of the company by appointing the directors. Thus the shareholders have ultimate control over the management of the company, though they do not directly manage its affairs. It is true the directors derive their authority from the law, but as their own appointment rests with the shareholders, they are, in substance, the agents or delegates of the general body of the shareholders. What is of vital importance, however, is that a company is brought into existence and exists for sole purpose of earning profits and gains and it earns them not for itself but for the benefit of the shareholders. To earn profits for its shareholders being the reison d ‟entre of the company, a company would be defeating the object of its own existence if croesus-like it filled coffers with gold and did not

121
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

distribute it as dividend to its shareholders. A company cannot enjoy its own income, the ultimate beneficiaries of the income being the shareholders themselves who, on the recommendation of the directors, declare the dividends. If a company went on taking its profits to reserve every year and did not distribute it among its shareholders, it would be acting contrary to all business principles and the shareholders would be compelled either to change its management or to dissolve it because they invest their capital for the purposes of enjoying the income and not for the purpose of the company accumulating such income. True, a company is a person but it is only a juridical person, having no mouth to feed or person to shelter and sustain, and if it is taxed, it is taxed not on any general principle of law but because such is the policy of the statute that taxed it. Its own income is but notional and it is only on its distribution that it becomes the actual income of its shareholders. Sind Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue – [1975] 31 TAX 114 (H.C.Kar.)
174.

“Company limited by guarantee”.

A company limited by guarantee is generally a non-profit making association and such a company in an alternative to a company by shares. Under the scheme of Companies Act 1913, a company cannot be created in which the members are free from any liability whatsoever. Therefore, ordinarily a company created under the Companies Act is limited by shares, that is, the members of the company are made liable as contributories to the extent of the shares they have taken or they have agreed to take in the company. But such a company is not suitable for non-profit making association, and therefore, as an alternative to such a company, the companies Act permits the incorporation of a company limited by guarantee, that is, a company in which the members agree that, in the event of liquidation of the company they will subscribe an agreed amount. In effect, such members are guarantor of the company‟s debts up to the agreed amount. As regards the working capital of such a company, it generally comes from other sources, that is, endowments, grants, fees, subscriptions, etc. Hudabya Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore v. Pakistan through Secretary Minister of Interior – [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H.C.Lah.)
175.

“Complete”.

According to Black‟s Law Dictionary, 6th edition, at page 285, complete as adjective means „full‟, „entire‟, „including every item or element‟ of the thing spoken of, without omissions or deficiencies; as, a

122
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

„complete‟ copy, record, schedule or transcript, perfect, consummate; not lacking in any element or particular; as in the case of a „complete legal title‟ to land, which includes the possession, and the right of property. In Corpus Juris Secundum, volume 15-A at page 118 „complete‟ has been defined as „absolutely finished‟; completed or concluded; consummate, entire, filled up, free from deficiency, perfect, including every item or element of the thing spoken of, without omissions or deficiencies, whole; lacking nothing, with no part, item, or element lacking; having all needed or normal parts, elements or details. Similarly in Words and Phrases, permanent edition 8, at page 386, while defining „complete‟ it is stated that the word „complete‟ means filled up with no part, item or element lacking, free from deficiency, entire, perfect, consummate. Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Noor Rai Ibrahim – [1992] 65 TAX 262 (S.C.Pak) _ 176. “Debt”, “loan”, “owe” and “due” difference between. From these judgments, definitions and meanings it can safely be stated that the word „debt‟ has a wide meaning and is an obligation to pay an ascertained sum in present or in future. Any amount owed to some other person would be a debt owed by him to the creditor. The essence of the word „debt‟ is the obligation to pay and the amount which is payable. It is a liability to the person who has an obligation to pay, the amount which may be certain or calculable readily. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore v. Mst. Fozia Mughis, Lahore – [1975] 32 TAX 1 (H.C.Lah.)

It is further to be noticed that the word „debt‟ is to be kept distinct from what is known as a „loan‟, for every loan may be a „debt‟ but every „debt‟ will not necessarily be a loan. Our view is that a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in future by reason of a present obligation debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro. In some cases it may not be presently payable and it may be uncertain in amount which will become certain when accounts are finally dealt with. In other words it is a present liability to pay an amount in future, though it was not ascertained but was ascertainable. As regards the word „owed‟ in Aiyer‟s Law Lexicon (1940 Edition page 931) it is written that „owe‟ means to be under obligation to pay.

123
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

It is to be remembered that strictly speaking there is a difference between the words „owed‟ and „due‟ for that which is due is always owed by the debtor, but which is „owed‟ may not be due at a particular date .....the former refers to liability whereas the latter to payability. A.J. Hartshorn v. Commissioner of Income Tax (West) Karachi – [1984] 49 TAX 198 (H.C.Kar.) _ 177. “Due” meaning of. In Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary, IVth Edition, meaning of the word „due‟ is „immediately payable‟ (it is common signification). The word „due‟ signifies a fixed and settled obligations or liability which has to be determined in each case from its own context and usually is neither contingent nor dependent on any happening. Taimur Shah v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1976] 34 TAX 151 (H.C.Kar.)

We find ourselves unable to agree with the broad proposition of Mr. Nusrat that the word „due‟ has an implication of a liability which is continuing from the past. Irfan Gul Magsi v. Haji Abdul Khaliq Soomro and others – 1999 PTD 1302
178.

“Default”.

Expression „default‟ connotes an element of wilful and deliberate failure to fulfil an obligation and negligence in the performance of the duty. Every failure on the part of a person without any ulterior design and mala fide intention would not equate with the expression „default‟ as used in its strict legal sense. Before a person is declared to be in default, it is absolutely necessary that there should have been a demand to make payment of a determined sum which should have remained unresponded and unattended for a period beyond the period prescribed by law. Issue of „default‟ in the context of Rent Laws was set at rest in the famous case reported as Ghulam Muhammad Lundkhor v. Safder Ali (PLD 1967 SC 530). In the words of the apex Court the word „default‟ in legal terminology necessarily imports an element of negligence or fault and means something more than mere non-compliance. To establish default one must show that the noncompliance has been due to some avoidable cause, for a person who ought not to be made liable for a failure due to some cause for which he is, in no way, responsible or which was beyond his control. It is not lightly to be presumed that the law intends to cause injustice or

124
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

hardship, thus, unless the Legislature has made its intention clear that construction must be preferred which will prevent manifest injustice and obviate hardship. On this principle also the expression „default‟ should mean an act done in breach of a duty or in disregard of an order or direction. This view was followed in the subsequent cases reported as Muhammad Hassan Khan v. Mirza Abdul Hamid (1981 SCMR 799), Irshad Hussain v. Abdul Rehman Kazi (1983 SCMR 471), M. Imamuddin v. Surriya Khanum (PLD 1991 SC 317) and NDFC v. Naseemuddin (PLD 1997 SC 564). E.F.U. General Insurance Ltd. & Others v. Federation of Pakistan & Others – 1997 SCC 1174 = [1997] 76 TAX 213 (S.C.Pak)
179.

“Definite Information”.

It was observed that the words „definite information‟ are the keywords for the purpose of justifying action under sub-section (1) [Section 65] and, as the said words had not been defined in the Ordinance they will carry their literary meanings. It was observed that every information cannot be treated as the basis for re-opening of the assessment but the information should be of the nature which should qualify as „definite information‟ and that the expression „definite information‟ could not be given a universal meaning but it will have to be construed in each case. It was further observed that where an assessee discloses all the material facts without any concealment and the assessment had been consciously completed by the Income Tax Officer, in such a case, in the absence of the discovery of any few facts which can be treated as „Definite Information‟ there cannot be any scope for reopening of the assessment under section 65. It was further observed that any change of opinion on the basis of the same material by the Income Tax Officer will not meant pressing into service the said provision. It was observed that a circular from the Central Board of Revenue interpreting any provision of a law not a „definite information‟ for reopening of assessment by an Income Tax Officer. It was then observed that expression „definite information‟ will include factual information as well as information about the existence of a binding judgment of a competent court of law/forum for the purposes of section 65 of the Ordinance, but any interpretation of a provision of law by a functionary which has not been entrusted with the function to interpret such provision judicially cannot be treated as a „definite information‟.

125
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Inspecting Additional Commissioner & another v. Pakistan Herald Ltd. – [1997] 76 TAX 131 (S.C.Pak) = 1997 PTD 1485

The term „definite information‟ conveys a meaning which is not the same „as change of opinion‟. A different interpretation of any provision of law or deriving a different conclusion from a given set of facts will not amount to a definite information. It will be a change of opinion. Therefore, the basis for reopening the assessment was a change of opinion of the respondent. The respondent therefore could not have taken any action under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance as it was not based on any definite information, but on change of opinion. ” Central Insurance Co. & Others v. C.B.R. Islamabad – 1993 SCMR 1232 = 1993 SCC 1049 = [1993] 68 TAX 86 (S.C.Pak)

Mere guess, gossip or rumour cannot be treated as definite information. However, the expression „definite information‟ cannot be given a universal meaning, but it will have to be construed in the circumstances of each case. The term „definite information‟ conveys a meaning which is not same as change of opinion. A different interpretation of any provision of law or deriving a different conclusion from a given set of facts will not amount to definite information. It will be a change of opinion. Receiving or obtaining by an assessing officer certain interpretation of a particular provision of law from any department, be it a ministry of law or Central Board of Revenue or any legal adviser or from his knowledge and reading law books would not constitute „information‟ in terms of section 65. Dangerous results may follow from a liberal interpretation of the word „information‟ as sometime advocated by the Department, as it will give unrestricted discretion in the hands of the assessing officers who may on their own interpretation of law set at naught the settled and final assessment. Pak Services Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Revision) Karachi – 1993 SCC 1029 = (1993) 68 TAX 49 (S.C.Pak)
180.

“Discard”.

No doubt that extended meaning of „discard‟ given in the dictionary includes „abandonment‟. However, all abandonment of property cannot and does not amount to discarding of the property. The word „discard‟ entails a choice, a selection, a voluntary act of leaving behind, causing of leaving or abandoning. Without such a choice, selection or volition,

126
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

the word „discarded‟ would be inappropriate to use. For example, if one was made to forcibly leave his house that would not amount to discarding the house. Commissioner of Income Tax Peshawar Zone, Peshawar v. Siemen A.G. – 1991 SCC 773
181.

“Dividend”.

The word „return‟ is generally understood as profit in the nature of dividend and not in the nature of interest and/ or obligatory charge. „Return on capital‟ as guaranteed in the agreement between the parties was thus „dividend‟ within the meaning of term as defined in Income Tax law. The Income Tax authorities cannot change the nature of the contract intended by the parties „under the pretext that the rule of interpretation of a fiscal law in this behalf is different ‟. The courts are bound to apply Islamic rules of interpretation to all laws, and fiscal laws are no exception. Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab, NWFP & Bahawalpur v. Mrs. E.V. Miller – 1959 SCC 53 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-1) (S.C.Pak)

The company, though a separate legal person in the contemplation of law and liable to assessment as a subject chargeable with tax, is not, for all purposes, to be regarded as entirely separate and distinct from the shareholders. The underlying principle of the clause, as the commissioner in stating the present case has recognised is „that the dividend represents merely the shareholders‟ share in the income of the company‟. Siemens A.G. & Halske v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H.C.Pesh)

„Dividend‟ according to Black‟s Law Dictionary, may denote, a fund set apart by a corporation out of its profits, to be apportioned among the shareholders, or the proportionate amount falling to each. Prima facie a “dividend” according to Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary, means a payment to share holders when a company is a going concern. In Halsbury‟s Laws of England Volume VII, 4th Edition, the ordinary meaning of „dividend‟ is share of profits, whether at fixed rate or otherwise, allocated to the holders of shares in a company. The term is generally used with reference to trading or other companies, and to payments made to members of a company as such and not by way of remuneration for services.

127
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone, Lahore v. Owen Roberts & Co. Ltd. Lahore – [1973] 27 TAX 95 (H.C.Lah.)
182.

“Employee”.

The word „employee‟ is too well understood in the English language and usage to require any elucidation and we would restrict overselves to observe that the expression „employee‟ clearly envisages the relationship of master and servant and can hardly be applied to a person who is an alter ego of a juristic person. Sindh Trading Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1967] 15 TAX 53 (H.C.Kar.)
183.

“Enduring benefit”.

The expression „enduring benefit‟ does not imply that it necessarily lasts for ever. It only means that it should endure in the way that fixed capital endures. What degree of durability or permanence it should possess for qualifying as a capital asset depends upon the facts of each case. The main consideration in such cases always is, whether the expenditure concerned, is part of the company‟s working expenses, or in other words, expenditure laid down as part of the process of profit-earning or whether on the other hand, it is a capital outlay, viz. expenditure necessary for the acquisition of property or of rights of a more or less permanent character, the possession of which is a condition of carrying on its trade at all. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Pakistan – 1978 SCC 453 = [1978] 38 TAX 132 (S.C.Pak)
184.

“Enemy”, “enemy territory” and “aggrieved party”.

Now in the following rules namely, the Defence of Pakistan Rules, framed under section 3, „enemy‟ and „enemy territory‟ have been comprehensively defined as under:2-(2) 2-(3) (a) „enemy‟ means - any person or state at war with, or engaged in military operations against Pakistan. „enemy territory‟ means any area which is under the sovereignty of, or administered by, or for the time being in occupation of, state at war with, or engaged in military operations, against Pakistan. any area which may be notified by the Central Govt. to be enemy territory for the purposes of these rules or such of them as may be specified in the notification.

(b)

128
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Aggrieved party:- Now in order to be „aggrieved party ‟ within the meaning of sub-Article (2) of Article 98, of the Constitution of Pakistan 1962, it would be imperative for a party to show that any of his proprietary or personal right as recognized by the laws of the country, has been invaded or denied to him. „Right‟ and „remedy‟ are no doubt complementary concepts, because right without remedy would be meaningless just as it would be inconceivable to think of a remedy without a corresponding right. In other words „a right‟, be it tangible or intangible such as the right of a person to enjoy his property or to remain secure in his reputation, clearly postulates something of value to a person for the protection or the realisation of which remedy is provided in every civilised legal system. Inevitably, therefore, if a person is unable to show that any of his right as recognized by law has been invaded or denied to him then he would have no cause of action to seek any relief, for evidently he cannot claim to be „aggrieved‟. United Builders Corporation Mirpur, v. Commissioner of Income Tax Muzzafarabad – [1984] 49 TAX 34 (H.C.AJ&K)
185.

“Erroneous”.

The word „erroneous‟, as defined in Oxford Dictionary, means, mistaken, incorrect, in the legal sense, an order was considered erroneous if it deviated from the law. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies II Karachi v. Sultan Ali Jeoffery & Others – 1992 SCC 974 = [1993] 67 TAX 51 (S.C.Pak) _ 186. “Evasion” and “Avoidance” the difference. In the field of taxation, tax avoidance and tax evasion are two different terminologies conveying completely different meaning. Tax avoidance occurs when a person in a legitimate manner as provided by law adopts a course by which the mechanism within the provisions of law. In Aruna v. State of Mairas 55 ITR 642 relying on Latilla v. IR 11 ITR (Suppl.-78) (HL) and Howard v. IR 25 TC 121, it was observed that „avoidance of tax is not tax evasion and it carries no ignominy with it, for it is sound law and, certainly not bad morality for anybody to so arrange his affairs as to reduce the burnt of taxation to a minimum‟. Avoidance of tax by adopting legal methods will not amount to evasion of tax. But the moment avoidance is sought by illegal contrivance, deceitful methods and adopting a course not permissible in law it turns into evasion.

129
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Commissioner of Income Tax Companies II, Karachi v. Sultan Ali Jeoffery & Others – 1992 SCC 974 = [1993] 67 TAX 51 (S.C.Pak)
187.

“Evasion of Tax”.

Evasion with reference to taxation laws means to illegally manipulate things in such a manner that the tax payable under law cannot be assessed. By an act of evasion the assessee can reduce his tax liability or completely eliminate it. Evasion of tax or duty is always in breach of the applicable and binding law. In taxation law evasion will mean adoption of such deceitful mechanism and manipulation not permitted by law which may result in reduction or elimination of legal tax liability. Sarwar & Co. v. C.B.R. & Others – [1997] 76 TAX 1 (H.C.Lah.)
188.

“Execution of Contract”.

The meaning being placed by the learned counsel on the expression „execution of contract‟ is neither borne by the context in which it has been used nor by its dictionary meaning. In Black‟s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, at page 510, „execution of contract‟ has been defined as including performance of all acts necessary to render it complete. Similarly, according to Words and Phrases permanent edition, „execution‟ means, completion, fulfilment or perfecting of anything. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) Karachi v. New Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd. – [1982] 46 TAX 125 (H.C.Kar.)
189.

“Expenditure” & “reserves”. (i) „expenditure‟, meaning of, Expenditure‟ is thus what is „paid out or away‟ and is something which is gone irretrievably. (ii) „reserves‟, meaning of, According to Ballentine‟s Law Dictionary, third edition, page 1101, „reserves‟ means: Verb: To appropriate to a particular purpose, to exclude, to set aside, to set apart from that which has been granted, to make a reservation. Noun: In insurance, a sum of money variously computed or estimated, which, with accretions from interest, is set aside, as a fund with which to nature or liquidate, either by payment or reinsurance with other companies, future unaccrued and contingent claims, and claim accrued but contingent and indefinite as to amounts or time of payment.

130
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone, Lahore v. Waris Silk Weaving and Knitting Mills, Gujranwala – [1973] 28 TAX 181 (H.C.Lah.)
190.

“Failure”.

If a person is required by law to do something which becomes impossible for him to do, not on account of his own negligence or fault, but on account of something which was unavoidable and in any case not subject to his control, he cannot be said to have failed to perform that which the law or an order passed under the law required him to do. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab & NWFP – 2 ITC 184 (Lahore)
191.

“Fixed capital”.

Securities purchased by banks are permanent investments being part of their „fixed capital‟. They do not form part of their stock-in-trade. Gillander Arbuthnot & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1966] 13 TAX 163 (H.C.Lah.)
192.

“Fixed capital” and “circulating capital”.

„Fixed capital‟ represents the amount spent on setting up structure of the business, e.g. land and machinery, for manufacture of goods, the sum paid for acquiring a concern and the amount spent on purchase of stock and securities, etc. Appreciation of their value is not a trading receipt and their depreciation not a trading expense to be incorporated in the profit and loss account. Circulating or floating capital in the amount spent on running the concern, in „carrying on‟ and „carrying out‟ „an operation of business for making profit‟, for example purchase of raw-material, pay-roll, directors‟ fee, etc. Literally, it is that capital which keeps circulating and floating in the course of business and does not constitute its outer framework. The amount spent in this account is trading expense and an increase on it a trading receipt to be incorporated and circulating capital is, however, not inflexible, e.g., land and machinery will be circulating capital in the hands of a real estate dealer and manufacturer of machinery, respectively, but fixed capital in the hands of a manufacturer of goods. Kawther Grain (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujranwala – [1999] 80 TAX 262 (H.C.Lah.)
193.

“Goods” do not include immovable property.

The interpretation of word „Goods‟ as adopted by the Assessing Officer does not find support either from the Income Tax Ordinance or for that matter from any other law. The consistent view of the Superior

131
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Courts in Pakistan that in cases of fiscal statutes only the letter of law should be seen has sufficiently been highlighted in re: Collector of Customs v. S.M. Ahmad & Company (supra) and re: Muhammad Younis v. C.B.R. (supra). It is also an accepted proposition that the words used in a statute if not defined therein should be assigned their ordinary dictionary meaning. Reference to the aforesaid two dictionaries supports the contention of the learned counsel. The sale of immovable property including land and building alongwith machinery installed therein could by no imagination be treated as supply goods or services rendered. Controller of Estate Duty, Lahore v. Muhammad Bashir Muhammad Nazir & others – [1974] 29 TAX 91 (H.C.Lah.)
194.

“Goodwill”.

A goodwill is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define, it is the benefit and advantage of the good name and reputation and connection of a business. It is the attractive force which brings in customers. It is the one thing which distinguishes an old established business from a new business at its first start. The term „goodwill‟ is nothing more than a summary of the rights accruing to the purchaser from their purchase of the business and property employed in it. The goodwill of a partnership may be said in a general way to be the value of its business, over and above the value of its tangible assets and which grows out of the firm name, trade worked up and publicity obtained. It is as much an asset of the firm, to the amount of its actual value to the business, as is its physical property, and consequently, is the subject of sale and other contract or of a right of action for a trust concerning it, as is any other property of the firm. Like any other form of goodwill, the goodwill of partnership depends very largely upon the continuance of the business and a cessation of the business, for any extended time will generally in whole or in part, destroy the value of the goodwill..... Goodwill being an asset of the firm is subject to a partial ownership of every member thereof and is ascertained in the same manner as any other asset, by settlement of partnership. Hudabya Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. Lahore v. Pakistan through Secretary Minister of Interior [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H.C.Lah.)
195.

“Immunity”.

In Ballentine‟s Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, the following definition of „immunity‟ appears at page 584:

132
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

A personal favour granted by law, contrary to the general rule ex parte levy, 43 Ark 42. A privilege or special privilege, a favour granted, an affirmative act of selection of special subjects of favours not enjoyed in general by citizen under constitution, statute, or laws, Hammer v. State 173 Ind. 199, 89 NE 850. A right in the negative form of freedom from action or restraint which otherwise might be taken against or imposed upon a person such as the right of witness to be free from arrest while attending court. Siemens A.G. & Halske v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H.C.Pesh)
196.

“Includes”.

The word „includes‟ [in section 2(6-A) of I.T.A. 1922] is significant and it is apparent that the word „means‟ has not been used in the section. The „includes‟ denotes that the definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. The meaning of both these words has been given at page 197 of Crais on Statute Law, 1952 Edition, and it is remarked that „there are two forms of interpretation clause ‟. In one, where the word defined is declared to „mean‟ so and so, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive. In the other, where the word defined is declared to „include‟ so and so, the definition is extensive. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi v. Abdul Razaq Zia-ul-Qamar – [1973] 27 TAX 99 (H.C.Lah.)
197.

“Including”.

We have already seen that the word „including‟ is used for enlarging the scope and for bringing in species which would otherwise not be covered. Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. & others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad – 1997 SCC 1097 = (1997) 76 TAX 5 (S.C.Pak)
198.

“Income”.

The expression „income‟ entails wide spectrum. It covers actual as well as constructive receipts and benefits in cash or kind. It even includes what one saves by using it for oneself. For example, use of house by its owner. That as per dictionary, the word income means „a thing that comes in‟. Its natural meaning embraces any profit or gain which is actually received. However, while construing the above word used in any entry

133
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

in a legislative list, the above restrictive meaning cannot be applied keeping in view that the allocation of the subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but by way of mere simple enumeration of broad categories. That what is not income under the „income tax act‟ can be made „income‟ by Finance Act. An exemption granted by the Income Tax Act can be withdrawn by the Finance Act or the efficacy of that exemption may be reduced by the imposition of a new charge, of course, subject to Constitutional limitations. That the question, whether a particular kind of receipt is income or not would depend on its answer on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. If the nature of the receipt and its source are not satisfactorily explained by an assessee, facts which are generally within his peculiar knowledge the Income Tax Officer may legitimately presume that the amount in question is an income of the assessee from an undisclosed source. In Haig‟s language, income is „increase or accretion in one ‟s power to satisfy his wants in a given period in so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or (b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money‟, whereas, Simon equates personal income with algebraic sum of consumption and change in network. That the process of income determination is often expressed as one, of matching costs and revenues. It involves the process of working out costs used in connection with the earning of the revenue in a particular accounting period. Pak Industrial Development Corporation v. Federation of Pakistan – 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562

Word „Income‟ as used in section 2(24) should be read in its ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. However, when this term is to be viewed in the constitution conferring legislative powers, the most liberal construction should be put upon this word so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude. Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central) Karachi v. Habib Insurance Co. Ltd. Karachi – [1969] 19 TAX 222 (H.C.Kar.)

Having held that the word „income‟ in the Government of India Act 1935 has to be given the widest possible meaning the court observed that the gains taxed under section 12(B) were profits that were

134
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

received by the assessee. It was in this context that the court went on to say that, according to its ordinary meaning, income means „a thing that comes in. ‟....... We have to construe the word „income‟ in the widest possible manner and, in our opinion the word is wide enough to include capital gains on the appreciation of investment as provided in rules 3 and 6 even though such gains have not been realised. The Punjab Province v. Federation of Pakistan – 1955 SCC 13 (Federal Court) = [1960] 2-Tax (Suppl.-3) (S.C.Pak)
199.

“Individual” & “association of persons”.

There can be no doubt that the word „individual‟ can only mean a natural person i.e. a human being. While every individual must be a person, the converse is not true because an artificial juridical person or a legal person, whether it is a corporation aggregate or corporation sole, is not an individual. By no stretch of imagination the provincial government can be held to be an „association of persons. Rashid Akhtar & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1980] 42 TAX 168 (H.C.Lah.)
200.

“Individual” and “such individual”.

There are in fact three reasons for giving to the words „any individual‟ now a meaning different from one that is urged..... Firstly, the word „individual‟ as held in the case of Khatija Begum, in its ordinary meaning, and as it was then used in section 3 of the Income Tax Act, implied both a male and a female....... Secondly, any doubt in this respect has been further removed by the substitution of the expression „her husband‟ by the expression „he or she‟ in clause (i). The context now is such that it positively indicates that the individual could be male or a female....... Thirdly, in clause (ii) the use of the expression „such individual‟ takes us back to the individual mentioned in the opening words of sub-section (3) of section 16. The scope of expression „such individual‟ is, as wide as that of the expression „an individual‟. Siemens A.G. & Halske v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1983] 47 TAX 132 (H.C.Pesh)
201.

“Interest”.

The word „interest‟ has not been defined in the Income Tax Act. Various meaning of „interest‟ have been given in Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary and at serial no. 42 it is shown to mean compensation paid by the borrower to the lender for deprivation of the use of his money.

135
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Interest, according to Black‟s Law Dictionary, means the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance or detention of money. According to Wharton‟s Law Lexicon, „interest‟ means money paid at a fixed rate percent for the loan or use of some other sum, called the principal. Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi – 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S.C.Pak)
202.

“Liable”.

The word „liable‟ inter alia carries the meaning as subject to an obligation, that for which one is liable, a debt, bound or obliged in law or equity, responsible, chargeable, answerable, legally subject or amenable to, compellable to make satisfaction, compensation or restitution. The above quoted definitions of word „liable‟ indicate that it inter alia carried the meaning as „subject to an objection‟, „that for which one is liable‟, „a debt‟ „bound or obliged in law or equity ‟, „responsible‟ „chargeable‟ answerable legally subject or amenable to‟, „compellable to make satisfaction compensation or restitution. It is also evident that the meaning of the word „liable‟ is not restricted to denote an absolute and fixed liability but has the meaning expressed by phrase „within the range of possibility. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi v. Noon Sugar Mills – [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H.C.Lah.)

The word „liable‟ is susceptible of two interpretations. In a wider and a broader sense it means answerable or responsible in law. In narrow and stricter sense it only connotes held liable, after the liability has been fixed on him by adjudication. Commissioner of Income Tax, Burma v. Messrs Steel Brothers and Co., Ltd. – 2 ITC 129 (Rangoon)
203.

“Manufacture”.

In Murray‟s New English Dictionary, „manufacture‟ is defined as „to work up (Material) into forms suitable for use ‟. In Annandale ‟s Concise English Dictionary, „manufacture ‟ is defined as „the operation of reducing raw materials into a form suitable for use by more or less complicated processes.‟ In Chamber‟s Twentieth Century Dictionary „manufacture‟ is defined as „to make from raw materials by any means into a form suitable for use. ‟ According to these definitions it appears to me to be self-evident that Messrs. Steel‟s

136
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

operations in the milling of rice, in the extraction and conversion of timber, in the ginning of raw cotton and the pressing of oil-seeds all amount to „manufacture‟. Pak. Educational Society Karachi v. Govt. of Pakistan through Chairman & Secretary Revenue Division Islamabad – [1993] 67 TAX 311 (H.C.Kar.)
204.

“Material”.

The meaning of the word „material‟ given in Legal Thesaurus by W.C.Burton „basic, capital, cardinal, central, compelling, consequential, essential, extensive, far-reaching, fundamental, indispensible, influential, key, heading, main, major, memorable, momentous, necessary, paramount, pertinent, pivotal, prevalent, primary, principal, relevant, remarkable, salient, signal, significant, substantial, valuable, vital, weighty, worth considering ‟. (i) “Material Evidence”: The expression „material evidence‟ has been defined by Black‟s Law Dictionary as under:Material Evidence: - Such as is relevant and goes to the substantial matters in dispute, or has a legitimate and effective influence, or bearing on the decision of the case. „Materiality‟, with reference to evidence does not have the same signification as „relevancy‟. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surridge & Beecham – [1968] 18 TAX 72 (H.C.Kar.)
205.

“May”.

Ordinarily the word „may‟ is used in a permissive or an enabling sense. But this is not universally true. There are cases in which it is used in the imperative sense. When statutes authorise persons to do acts for the benefit of others or for public good or the advancement of justice, the use of expression „may‟ has a compulsory force. A&B Food Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Karachi – [1992] 65 TAX 281 (S.C.Pak)
206.

“Merge” & “Merger”.

The definitions of the words „merge‟ and „merger‟ given in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol 57, pages 1067 and 1068, read as follows:„Merge‟ The verb „to merge‟ has been defined as meaning to suck or disappear in something else; to be lost to view or absorbed into something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up; to lose identity or individuality. It has also been defined as

137
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

meaning to sink the identity or individuality of; to cause to disappear; to make to disappear in something else; to cause to be absorbed or engrossed; to swallow up. It is frequently used with the words „in‟ or „into‟. „Merger‟. In law it is the absorption or extinguishment of one estate or contract in another. It is said that merger is an operation of law not depending on the intention of the parties. However, it has also been stated that it is the law that merger is largely a question of intention to a great extent depending on the circumstances surrounding each particular case, and it is said that the courts will always presume against it whenever it will operate to the disadvantage of a party. In merger there is a carrying on of the substance of the thing, except that the substance is merged into, and becomes a part of a separate thing with a new identity......” Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Sri Krishna Chandra Gajapathi Narayan Deo, Raja of Parlakimedi – 2 ITC 104 (Madras)
207.

“Occupation”

If, however, he (that is the owner) furnishes it (that is, the vacant house) and keeps it ready for habitation whenever he pleases to go to it, he is an occupier though he may not reside in it one day in a year. Star Rolling Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1974] 30 TAX 27 (H.C.Kar.)
208.

“Opinion”.

An opinion on the basis whereof a statutory authority is entitled or empowered to take any action or initiate any legal proceeding, may by accurate or erroneous, but it must be an honest opinion or conviction, based on tangible material capable of sustaining such opinion, and not mala fide opinion or colourable exercise of statutory power. Pakistan Services Ltd., Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone ‘C’ (COS-1) – [1999] 80 TAX 106 (H.C.Kar.) = 1999 PTD 2901
209.

“Or”.

We do not see any reason for holding that word „or‟ appearing in Explanation (i) to section 24(i) of the Ordinance is not to be used in its ordinary and natural use as disjunctive and to use it as conjunctive as to relate to the word „bonus‟ with the expression „payable to an employee in accordance with the terms of his employment as remember‟.

138
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Burma Railway Co. v. Secretary of State – 1 ITC 140 (Burma)
210.

“Owners”, “ownership” and “own”.

It must be presumed that the legislature was aware that the expressions „owner‟, „ownership‟ and the verb „to own‟ in its various tenses have been frequently used in Acts of a similar nature and further that they can be and are used in various meanings in different Acts, in some of which they have been specially defined for the purposes of particular sections. Nevertheless the expression has not been defined for the purposes of this Act. It may have the narrow and technical meaning of the full ultimate and legal owner, but if this was intended, it could easily have been expressed and the failure to do so points to its not having been so intended. Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi v. K.K. & Co. Ltd. – [1980] 42 TAX 81 (H.C.Lah.)
211.

“Paid”.

The word „paid‟ used in the context of the bonus under section 10(2)(x) could not be so extended as to cover any provision of payment at the end of the year unless the obligation is discharged by actual payment of the sum involved during the accounting year. Commissioner of Income Tax, North Zone, Lahore v. Mst. Wazirunnissa Begum – 1972 SCC 395 = [1974] 29 TAX 188 (S.C.Pak.)
212.

“Pay”.

The word „pay‟ in section 16(2) means to satisfy, to set at rest, to discharge, to require with what is due or deserved etc., and it is obvious that the word as used in the aforesaid provision means when the money is actually delivered and not when a decision is made to make the payment. City Bank N.A. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Zone ‘C’ Karachi – [1994] 70 TAX 159 (H.C.Kar.)
213.

“Penalty”.

Term „penalty‟ according to the Black‟s Law Dictionary is an elastic term with many differentiations of meaning. It involves an idea of punishment corporeal or pecuniary, civil or criminal, although its meaning generally is confined to pecuniary punishment. There can not be two opinions about such meaning of the term. But in order to understand the real import of a term in a statute, it is necessary to examine the statute itself as an aid to interpretation.

139
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. Income Tax Rawalpindi – [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H.C.Lah.)
214.

Officer

Circle-V,

“Person”.

The power of authority of the present day legislature is not limited to the following of principles of jurisprudence and treat a dead man as a non-entity which in actual fact is; the Legislature can treat the dead man as alive as for certain purposes, it can treat a living human being as dead for example in cases of bankruptcy or insolvent. Sheikh Miran Bux Karam Bux Ltd. Karachi v. Income Tax Officer, Company Circle 12, Karachi – [1976] 33 TAX 99 (H.C.Kar.)
215.

“Previous year”.

Previous year‟ had only one definition in the Income Tax Act, 1918. However, by a subsequent legislation, namely, the Income Tax Act of 1922, the definition of „previous year‟ was enlarged. While retaining the old definition, paragraph (b) was added, and paragraph (c) was introduced by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act 1939. Looking at the two paragraphs, it is clear that, in case of paragraph (a), the previous year meant an accounting year comprised of a full period of twelve months and corresponding to a financial year preceding the financial year of assessment. But in paragraph (b), the use of words „such period‟ was unqualified and gave a discretion to the Central Board of Revenue or such authority, as was authorised by the Board in this behalf to lay down the length of the period which could either be less than one year or more than one year of a year. Rafhan Maize Products Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1988 SCC 663 = 1988 PTD 571
216.

“Processing”.

Admittedly the operation of freezing, preserving or canning of these items would not change their identity and, therefore, the word processing as used in the aforesaid legal provision, is also to be interpreted or understood in the same manner, i.e. the identity of the raw material is not destroyed in the operation or operations. Crescent Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone, Lahore – [1981] 43 TAX 1 (H.C.Lah.)

The term „manufacture ‟ has often been understood as transformation of one article into a commercially different commodity. The Tribunal does not appear to be wrong in confining the „processing ‟ to undergoing a treatment which does not change the identity of the

Firstly the word „profits‟ as occurring in the said proviso must be understood in its context. The Income Tax then in force was the Act of 1918.. goods.C.Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax. a similar interpretation was adopted by a Special Bench of the Madras High Court on the basis of several English decisions.140 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. for whatever purpose it was used ‟. v. and the „gains of a trade ‟ were taken to be „whatever was gained by the trading. freezing and preservation of good through various methods. that here the word processing is not amenable to extended meaning and conceivably has been used along with the associated words in the cognate sense as a phenomenon of the food processing industry which includes. 25) interpreted by the House of Lords to mean „the net proceeds of a concern after deducting the necessary outgoing without which those proceeds could not be earned or received ‟ or „income of whatever character it may be over and above the costs of receipts and collection‟. “Profit”.. There is nothing to show that the word „profit‟ is used in different sense in the Indian Income tax Act.) 217.C. The word „profits‟ has not been defined in the Income Tax Act. the connotation of the word „manufacture‟ and „processing ‟ overlap but we..R. but there seems to be no material difference in the provision of that Act and the present Act so far as the point under discussion is concerned.)  In Mersy Docks and Harbour Board v.A. and that is.RM Arunachalam Chethiar (1 ITC 75). May be. In Board of Revenue v. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi – 1980 SCC 497 = [1980] 42 TAX 1 (S. Paracha Textile Mills Karachi – [1973] 28 TAX 155 (H. as used in clause (i) is a term of the wide import and subject to any limitation . London Assurance Corporation (2 Tax Cas. commercial expediency. feel.Pak) 218. 100).. in relation to the bonus paid to the employees and the requirement of reasonableness between profits and bonus. The same view was adopted by the majority of that House in Last v. the canning.Lah. Al. Lucas (2 Tax Cas. Hamdard Dawakhana v. The Bharat Insurance Company Ltd.. that in some shades in exactly. Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v.C. Punjab & NWFP – [5 ITC 288 (H. including as aforesaid. “Property”. There is consensus of judicial opinion that the term „property‟.

It is comprehensive enough so as to cover even business. committed. Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co. any amount which has been kept apart with reference to its particular use at a future time will be called a . acquired. “Reserve”. There is no difference in principle between repeal and amendment. as a thing offered.) 221. the person who receives and the person from whom he received. therefore. the Punjab. “Received” person cannot receive a thing from himself. it signifies every possible interest. Collector of Gujrat – 1 ITC 189 (Lahore) _ 219. hold and enjoy.Kar. or forwarded it to. United Liner Agencies. to accept. either for oneself or for a third party. I am of opinion that the assessee. did not receive it again when he brought it into. who had already received the money in Baluchistan. The Act contains no definition of the word „receive‟ or „received‟ but in Murray‟s Oxford Dictionary the expression „receive‟ is defined as „To take in one‟s hand or into one‟s possession (something held out or offered by another).C. namely. securities and other such things. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1966] 14 TAX 211 (H. I would.C. “Repeal” & “amendment”.141 SHORT TITLE. Sundar Das v. accrued under any enactment so repealed. sent. deposits. A person cannot receive a thing from himself. ‟ It seems to me that the word „receive‟ implies two persons.) 220. communicated or the like.Kar. The word „reserve‟ in its ordinary sense means keeping apart something with a view to utilise it on a future date for a particular or specific purpose. v. Therefore. to take. given. which a person can acquire. privilege. hold that he is not taxable on the alleged income mentioned in the reference. cash. Under this provision of law the repeal does not affect any right. There is nothing in the language of the clause in question to restrict in any manner the normal and accepted meaning to the word „property‟ so as to exclude business from its contention.‟ In the Imperial Dictionary the same expression is defined as „to get or obtain. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 or qualification which the context might require. Section 6 of General Clauses Act is applicable to the present case. Karachi – [1990] 62 TAX 31 (H. Taking the expression „received‟ in its ordinary dictionary meaning. paid.” Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone Karachi v. to take delivery of (a thing) from another. obligation or liability.

The expression „supplies‟ as embodied in section 50(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance. Lahore v.C. This in fact is a specification „by reference and this is nothing usual.. Merchants – [1973] 27 TAX 40 (H. A tax is a compulsory extraction or a contribution imposed by a sovereign authority or required by the general body of the subjects and citizens. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. But if there is an unappropriated amount in the profit and loss account without specifically keeping it apart for utilising for any purpose in future. therefore. “Tax”.Lah.) 223. Chairman Town Committee Sahiwal – [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H. From the above quoted passages from the various books on accounting the following deductions can be deduced with reference to the terms.) 224.142 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. „working capital.C.. To sum up. Commissioner of Income Tax v.) = 1988 PTD 66 225.. ... reserve. 1979 (XXXI of 1979) does include „sales‟.Lah..) 222.. if something has been described „as far as is reasonably possible ‟ or „as far as a careful man of business could and would do without going into the unreasonable particulars ‟ and it need not „be a completely accurate and detailed description ‟ and it can be „unambiguously identified ‟ it would be said to have been „specified‟. Commissioner of Income Tax v. “Specify”. Prime Dairies Ice Cream Limited – [1999] 80 TAX 282 (H. Muhammad Younus v. “current assets” and “current liability”..‟the supply may include sale but this cannot be synonymous with the aforesaid expression‟.... Lahore Central Iron and Hardware Machinery. – [1988] 57 TAX 118 (H.C.Kar. it will not be deemed to be a reserve. The power to levy a tax has to be founded in a statute whereby authority is given to levy and collect the compulsory contribution in the good of the citizens or for running the administration. “Sales” and “supplies”.C. “Working capital”... Commissioner of Income Tax North Zone.Lah.. meaning of.. current liability and current assets‟: .

and purchase of goods. working capital is current assets less current liability other than those for taxation and proposed dividends.Kar. safe and convenient conduct of the business having regard to the owner‟s ordinary outstanding both payable and receivable. The total requirement is met partly by the credit that the suppliers of goods and services rendered to the firm and the remaining by the firm itself. That according to Machullan Dictionary of Accounting. That the difference between the current assets and current liabilities is also called working capital. It is not a permanent investment but turn over many times in a year. Current liability is a financial obligation of company falling due within one year or within an operating cycle if it is longer than one year.C. – [1988] 57 TAX 113 (H. for extending credit to customers and for maintaining a cash balance.e. the amount of cash and supplies necessary to be kept in hands to meet current expenses and contingencies as they arise for the proper. Total the working capital represents the investment of the company‟s medium and longer term funds in assets which are expected to be realised within the year of trading.. etc. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd.)  In the instant ease it is an admitted position that the dividend was not even declared by the respondent company when the above provision was included by the Income Tax Officer for the purpose of levying 10% surcharge of income tax and super tax instead of excluding the above amount. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 (i) The working capital is the amount that remains for the running or working of a business after the purchase price of the fixed assets has been paid. (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Current liabilities are debts which business must pay in near future not later than 12 months from the date of the last balance sheet which includes inter alia taxes.143 SHORT TITLE. It is required for maintenance of inventories i. stock of raw-materials. work-in-progress. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Income Tax Appellate Tribunal that the provision for the proposed . Working capital can also be defined as the money which has been put into business and which to stay there.

As a matter of fact. namely.) 347. tax and super tax payable.144 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. There cannot be any cavil to the legal proposition propounded in the above two cited cases. The law applicable to a particular assessment year will be the law which is in force in that year and not the law which was in force during the accounting year unless otherwise stated or implied. Maneklal Vallabhdas Parikh & Sons v. . Central. our answer to the question referred to hereinabove in para 1 is that the Tribunal was justified in holding that income tax liability payable for relevant assessment year could be included for purposes of working out „retained income‟ for levy of surcharge. contrary to this was not convassed by the learned counsel for the respondent assessees. that accounting year is different from assessment year. The legal position is very obvious. dividend should have been excluded for the purpose of computing the above tax and should have been included in the amount retained for meeting the working capital requirement seems to be correct. Hirjina & Co. indicate that law prior to it did include the amount of tax and super tax payable within the ambit of the definition of „retained income‟ which submission is supported by the above Supreme Court Case. Karachi (1975) 31 Tax 78 (SC). Cases referred to : [1979] 40 Tax 47 (Trib. it was not contended that the above substituted proviso pertaining to surcharge which was effective from assessment year 1981-82 was applicable to the present cases which pertain to the assessment years prior to the above year but what was Contended and referred to hereinabove is that the factum that the legislature thought it fit to provide definition of the words „retained income‟ in explanation (a) and to‟ exclude. Our answer accordingly is that the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that the provision for proposed dividend was retained income as requirement of working-capital and was not liable to surcharge. Commissioner of Income Tax (1969) 72 ITR 637.. Isthmian Steamship Lines (1951) 20 ITR 572. Any payment under section 18A of the Act is merely on account in respect of the liability which is to be determined after the coming into force of the new Finance Ordinance or Act for the relevant year and that the mere fact that certain amount of advance tax goes out of the control of an assessee does not change the legal character of the amount as it remains a provision for tax. For the aforesaid reasons.). (Pakistan) Ltd.. 1987 PTD (Trib. Commissioner of Income Tax v. CST. Karachi v.

. Income Tax Officer.) 226.C. Lyallpur & others – 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S.How to be understood. _______________ INTERPRETATION REGARDING WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. The rule of interpretation of statutes referred to in the above two cases of English jurisdiction has been consistently pressed into service by the superior Courts in Pakistan. namely. namely.) 227.Pak. Rawalpindi – 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S. in which this Court while construing the word “inquiry” used in sections 190(I)(3) and 344 (1) Cr. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Nagina Silk Mills. the proper mode of interpretation or discovering the true intention of the Legislature would be to consider as to what was the state of law before the statute . a year of twelve months. A-Ward. In such cases the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such absurdity or inconvenience Beck v. according to a fixed measure of time. P.Pak. Yaqub Khan and another (1981 SCMR 267). Word „year‟ .C. While interpreting the statutes like the one before us. The legislature never intended that the period of limitation prescribed in the Act should become variable with the changes in the “financial year” or “year” inserted by Finance Act for certain other purposes. Commissioner of Income Tax. Smith (1836) 2 MW (191). Lyallpur v. v.C. the ordinary meaning of a word need not be adhered to if a construction based on it. Definition alone cannot extend a period of (limitation) which had already commenced to run many years earlier. to accord with the new accounting years adopted by Government. Rule of interpretation regarding words and expressions used in fiscal statute. inter alia observed as follows:“No doubt the elementary rule of construction is that the words used in a Statute should be construed literally but according to what is termed as the „Golden Rule of Interpretation‟ by Maxwell. In this behalf reference to the following judgments of this Court will not be out of context:(i) Mehar Khan v. would be at variance with the intention of the Legislature as collected from the statute itself or if it leads to an absurdity.145 SHORT TITLE.

” 228. . Such a contrary intent may be found in the purpose and subject matter. or its provision was given its present form and as to what was the mischief of difficulty which was sought to be suppressed and remedy which the Legislature had intended to advance. cannot over-ride or prevail upon the provisions of the parent Statute and whenever there is an inconsistency between a Rule and Statute.C. 12th Edn. they should be given their full and natural meaning. . Ref: Abdul Majid Khan v. that is. 589). 210) and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. or context of the statute. Crawford 1940 Edition. . however. and Rabnawaz v. so that as a result the general terms may be qualified or restrained . envisages that all efforts to reconcile the inconsistency must first be made and the provisions of the parent statute prevail only if the conflict is incapable of being resolved.” . This. . Bashir Ahmad (PLD 1973 S. it should be understood to have been used in its dictionary meaning or even its ordinary or popularly understood meaning . Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner (PLD 1968 S. at p. the latter must prevail. . . Jahana (PLD 1974 S. (ii) Hirjan Salt Chemicals (Pak) Ltd. unless the statute in some manner reveals that the legislative intent was otherwise. Divisional Superintendent. 40”.-It is also a basic rule of construction that general words should be given a general construction. 154). We also do not have any cavil with the proposition that when construing any word used in a Statute which has not been defined therein. General and Special Words or Terms. . . P. Reference may also be made to para 189 from the Construction of Statutes by Earl T. in which this Court made the following observations on the question in issue:“It is now a well established principle of interpretation of Statutes that Rules which are merely subordinate legislation. . v. which reads as follows:189.C.146 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. v.W.R.C. Union Council & others (1982 SCMR 522). General and special words or terms.

The legal proposition is very obvious. even though the amending provisions in question. The law applicable to a particular assessment year will be the law which is in force in that year and not the law which was in force during the accounting year unless otherwise stated or implied. Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. Law applicable on the first day of assessment year will apply and not the one in existive during the next year.) = 1988 PTD 66 230. On the expiry of the period of four years under section 14. the business profits for the chargeable accounting period in question. namely.. Chappal Builders – 1993 SCC 1026 = [1993] 68 TAX 1 (S.C. Income Tax Officer. that but for the amendments. This right could not. Lyallpur v. The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant are without substance. A-Ward.Kar. that accounting year is different from assessment year.) 231. clearly acquired a right and the assessment for the said year became a past and closed transaction. Lyallpur & others – 1963 SCC 167 = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. – [1988] 57 TAX 118 (H.C. . were not liable to be assessed on 31. Past and closed transactions can be reopened by giving retroactive effect to an amending provision.) 229.Pak.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Nagina Silk Mills.1958.Pak. _______________ PAST AND CLOSED PROVISION Income Tax Officer & another v. in the facts of the present case. therefore.e. Stable interpretation of term „assessment year‟ should be adopted. We are of the opinion that. therefore. “assessment” and “year”.1. There is no dispute between the parties. The word “assessment year” should not be broken into two segments i. the assessee had. were a part of the procedural laws.147 SHORT TITLE. they cannot be given retrospective effect. It must be given stable interpretation and must be held to mean a period of twelve months. Commissioner of Income Tax v. The “year” here does not mean period of shorter or longer duration than a time frame of 12 months. be taken away by giving retroactive operation to the amended statutory provisions extending the period for assessment.

On the expiry of the period of four years under section 14. Government of Pakistan.) = 2000 PTD 303 232.C. This right could not.11. the business profits for the chargeable accounting period in question. And whereas a number of economic reforms have been introduced and are in the process of being introduced to achieve the aforesaid objectives. There is no dispute between the parties.Lah. therefore. in the facts of the present case. were not liable to be assessed on 31. In case of doubt about interpretation of this statutory provision preamble can validly be referred to.” . INCOME TAX Zahur Textile Mills Limited v. 1992 does not use the words “economic reforms” but it is to be seen that this word does not appear anywhere except in the preamble and the definition clause.1958. they cannot be given retrospective effect. that but for the amendments. therefore. Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company – 1981 SCC 572 = [1982] 46 TAX 6 (S. 1992 it becomes clear that it provides protection to the various economic measures taken on or after 7. _______________ SPECIAL LAW VS. It reads as under:“Whereas it is necessary to create a liberal environment for savings and investments and other matters relating thereto. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Islamabad and 2 others – [2000] 82 TAX 275 (H. From a perusal of various provisions of Act. were a part of the procedural laws. the assessee had.C. CBR through Chairman.)  We are of the opinion that. even though the amending provisions in question.148 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Although it is true that section 6 of the Act. And whereas it is necessary to provide legal protection to these reforms in order to create confidence in the establishment and continuity of the liberal economic environment created thereby. The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant are without substance.1. Scope of protection under the Protection of Economic Reforms Act of 1992.Pak. be taken away by giving retroactive operation to the amended statutory provisions extending the period for assessment. clearly acquired a right and the assessment for the said year became a past and closed transaction.1990.

The Intention of the Legislature becomes manifest from a perusal of the Schedule. East Pakistan. When the matter reached the High Court it was contended on behalf of the assessee that (i) the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of section 26A and section 18 of the Partnership Act do not provide that application for registration or renewal of registration should be signed by all the partners. and. 1992 is contained in section 2(b) which reads as under:2(b) „economic reforms‟ means economic policies and programmes. then there was no necessity of specifically mentioning two notifications in the Schedule. The Income Tax Officer refused to grant registration and renewal of registration for all these years on the ground that these applications were not signed by all the partners of the firm. laws and regulations announced. General Act . 1954. If the argument of the learned counsel is correct that section 6 applies to all the notifications issued before the promulgation of the Act. banking. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 The definition of “economic reforms” in the Protection of Economic Reforms Act. Dacca – [1969] 19 TAX 3 (H. finance.149 SHORT TITLE. Dacca v.C. (ii) Rule S of the Income Tax Rules which requires that such as application shall be signed by all the partners is ultra vires of sub-section (i) and (2) of section 26A of the Income Tax . Applications for renewal of registration for the subsequent two years were also made on the basis of the same partnership. and nationalized banks. Essential Industries. promotion of savings and investments. 1990 which was the date on which the then Government came into power. holding and transfer of currencies. For the charge year 1953-59 an application for registration under section 26A was made on behalf of the assessee-firm comprising of five partners and constituted under a partnership deed dated the 12th February. 1990.Dacca) 233. It is thus obvious that what section 6 says is the measures taken by the Government after 5th November. relating to privatization of public sector.Whether overrides the provisions of Specific Act Held no. Commissioner of Income Tax.” A cumulative reading of section 2(b) and the preamble would who that the saving clause apply only to the economic measures taken after 5th November. enterprises. deed. introduction of fiscal incentives for industrialization and deregulation of investment. promulgated or implemented by the Government on and after the seventh day of November. exchange and payment systems. 1990 pursuant to the economic policy of the Government which granted the incentives.

Pak. Therefore. Held. _______________ (ii) (iii) (iv) MACHINERY PROVISIONS Kohinoor Textile Mills Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1974 SCC 416 = [1974] 30 TAX 138 (S. the Partnership Act is a general law which will govern the business transaction of the firm but it cannot override a specific provision. therefore.150 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. At the same time it is also true that a firm should be vigilant about its rights and should be aware of the rules required to file. and (iii) if the application for registration had not been decided after a lapse of over four years the assessee could have filed the subsequent applications duly signed by all the partners well within the period of limitation. Act. In fact. Had the list application been disposed of expeditiously the assessee would have been spared some financial toss. that (i) the expression such person or persons occurring in subsection (2) of section 26A clearly shows that the power of fixing the number of persons requiring to file such application has been delegated to the Rule making authorities. this specific provision shall override the general provisions made in the Partnership Act.C. Amendments in machinery section being procedural are applicable to pending proceedings. the contention that rule 3 of the Income Tax Rules is ultra vires of section 26A is of no substance.) 234. and it is indeed deplorable that such applications are left unattended by the department for years and then are turned down for technical defects. it is clearly laid down in the Rules that the application should be signed by the partners and the Income Tax authorities have. rightly refused to entertain this application in question. v. We have carefully re-examined the provisions of the Finance Act of 1957 and have come to the conclusion that the applicability of statutory amendments could not possibly have been made to depend upon modifications to be made by the executive for then the executive could have rendered the statute nugatory by one making the .

Mere reading of aforesaid section. It operated of its own force and it becomes the duty of the executive to give effect to it as far as possible even without the modifications which could. In this attempt one cannot override of other parties only because a recovery has to be made. Such provisions have their own limitation and they are to be found within the statute itself. Islamabad – [2001] 83 TAX 1 (H. to agree with the High Court that without the modifications the amendment was not applicable. Such procedural amendments operate retroactively and apply even to pending proceedings.) Ltd. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 necessary modifications.) 235. It is settled proposition of law that principle of strict construction of fiscal statute is applicable only to taxing provisions such as charging provisions and not to those parts of statutes which contain machinery provisions as per principle laid down in (1980 Tax Law Report 185).151 SHORT TITLE. We are also unable to agree that the amendment did not apply to pending proceedings because.Lah. Central Board of Revenue.1995 reveal that the same are in accordance with law. of Pakistan.” clearly indicated that even if no modifications were made the amendment would still be operative. the provisions of section 34 of the Income Tax Act impose no charge on the subject but merely deal with the machinery of assessment as held by the Privy Council in the case of the Commissioner of Income Tax. It is true that the machinery provisions of a fiscal statute should be interpreted in such a manner that recovery is not frustrated or adversely affected. v.4. Machinery provisions cannot be construed to go beyond the spirit of law. if any. an amendment of procedure in which no assessee has a vested right.C. The use of the words “modifications. But it does not mean that to achieve this object one can travel beyond the spirit of law and do violence to language and intention of the statute. The Central Board of Revenue Govt. Islamabad through its Chairman – [2000] 82 TAX 42 (H. Section .C. therefore. This was. Messrs Mahaliram Ramjidas [(1940) 8 ITR 442]. notification and letter dated 4.) 236. Leather Connections (Pvt. We are unable. Leather Connections (Pvt) Limited v. The machinery can be extended only to the extent it is permissible under the law.Lah. Machinery provisions of fiscal law should be construed so as not to destroy recovery mechanism. at best be only of a consequential nature. The statute which had come into force by the will of legislature could not also remain “dormant” at the will of the executive. Bengal v. therefore.

Ranjidas. But it does not mean that to achieve this object one can travel beyond the spirit of law and do violence to language and intention of the statute. Similarly the contention of petitioner‟s counsel has no force that notification was not published in the official gazette. has no authority to issue notification. 614/93.R.152 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.O. issued S. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by judgment of this Court “P. It is true that the machinery provision of a fiscal statute should be interpreted in such a manner that recovery is not frustrated or adversely affected. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the following judgments: Commissioner of Income Tax‟s case AIR 1940 PC 124 Maithram v. dated 18. therefore. therefore. C. The machinery can be extended only to the extent it is permissible under the law.1993 which was published in official gazette on 18th July. C. Commissioner (1971) 23 Tax 230 (S. It is also settled proposition of law that interpreting a fiscal statute that Court must look all the words of statute and interpret the same in the light of what is clearly expressed and Court has no jurisdiction to imply anything which is not expressed.R.R.I. Such provisions have their own limitation and they are to be found within the statute itself. as per principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ellahi Cotton Mills‟s case (PLD 1997 SC 582). has given formula to determine the estimated cost of construction of a building on the basis of cost of construction as specified by Pakistan Public Works Department or Provincial Building Department does not indicate at all that the CBR has delegated its powers to the other department on the well known principle of adoption or legislation by Reference which is known principle. In this attempt one cannot over-rights of other parties only because a recovery has to be made.Pak) = (1971 SCMR 128) and Collector of Custom‟s case (1977 SCMR 371).B.B. 50(7BB) was inserted by the Competent body by Finance Act No. . No.B.B. 1993. Proviso (ii) of aforesaid section 50(7BB)(b) confer powers to C.A. contention of petitioner‟s counsel has no force that C. Corp‟s case (PLD 1979 Lah 415).7. 10 of 1993.C.R. It is settled proposition of law that principle of strict construction of fiscal statute is applicable only to taxing provisions such as charging provisions and not to those parts of statutes which contain machinery provisions as per principle laid down in (1980 Tax Law Report 185). In this behalf reliance is placed on Hirjina and Company v.R.

C. shall be deemed to have been made without lawful authority. Con.C. 3 as is held by D. Karachi – [1986] 54 TAX 1 (H. Income Tax Act/Ordinance provides structure for levying and collection of tax and purpose of scheme of Act/Ordinance relating to this object must be kept in view.C. Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. v. 1956 Federal Court 220) The same was again upheld by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Let.T.) = 1986 PTD 316 238. Basic rules to construe charging and machinery provisions. Limitation period extended retrospectively by legislation held not valid. It is also settled proposition of law that machinery provisions of fiscal statute should be liberally construed to ensure recovery as per principle laid down by this Court in W.Kar. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Escorts Limited‟s case [1975] 31 TAX 164 (H. Investigation Circle & others v. Amir-uddin (P. The orders annulling the assessments in question on ground of limitation in view of the extension of the period of limitation by ex post facto legislation.Pak.L. 119) The contention of learned counsel for respondent No.Lah. of Karachi High Court in Raman‟s case (1985 P. Sections which impose charge should be strictly construed and those which deal with machinery of assessment and collection should not be subjected to strict construction. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan‟s case (PLD 1961 SC.) = 1975 SCMR 570. Provisions of Income Tax Act/ Ordinance are to be construed in such a way as to make it workable. _______________ LIMITATION PERIOD CANNOT BE EXTENDED RETROSPECTIVELY Income Tax Officer. 787). Companies Circles E-1.D.B. 237. 1953 Lah 433).P. Income Tax Officer. _______________ .D. Sulaiman Bhai Jiwa & Others – 1969 SCC 354 = [1970] 21 TAX 62 (S. K.D. Province v.L.153 SHORT TITLE. 3 has a force that in case of non-deduction of advance tax on the basis of aforesaid section penal consequences have to be faced by respondent No. The aforesaid judgment was confirmed by Federal Court reported as (P. Rule of liberal construction of machinery provisions.B.) 239.

Reference may also be made to para 189 from the Construction of Statute by Earl T. Now it is well-settled that the words of a statute.Pak. are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the object of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. General and specific words. Such a contrary intent may be found in the purpose and subject matter. when there is doubt about their meaning. Kumar Naryan Roy Choudhry & others – 1959 SCC 68 = (1959) 1-TAX (III-207) (S.‟.C. v. Crowford 1940 edition.) 242. that is. they should be given their full and natural meaning.Pak) 240. (iii) what remedy Parliament has appointed.. and (iv) the reasons of the remedy. (ii) what was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided. so that as a result the general terms may be qualified or restrained. A fiscal statute should be construed strictly and no question of equitable construction arises.Pak) 241.. Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. which reads as follows: „General and special words or terms: It is also basic rule of construction that general words should be given a general construction..C. or context of the statute. An equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not permissible.154 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. partner Shakil Impex Karachi – 1965 SCC 228 = [1965] 12 TAX 95 (S. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION _ FISCAL STATUTES Noon Sugar Mills Ltd. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute. . The same author also says that: “To arrive at the real meaning it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim.” Commissioner of Income Tax Karachi v. scope and object of the whole Act.. unless the statute in some manner reveals that the legislative intent was otherwise. East Bengal v. Commissioner of Income Tax.. to consider according to Lord Coke (I) what was the law before the Act was passed. Khatija Begum. Rawalpindi – 1990 SCC 759 = [1990] 62 TAX 74 (S.C.” Commissioner of Income Tax.

v. (1928) A. Companies Zone. 1944] secondly it mainly deals with special procedure in respect of certain manufactured goods as provided under Chapter-XV of the Central Excise Rules.) 245. v.) = 2000 PTD 497 243. therefore. 1944] being subordinate legislation cannot supersede to the provisions of Section 3-C of the Act. clearance of goods exempted from duty etc. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone Lahore v. Sheikh – [1992] 65 TAX 80 (H. 162 in the following words:It is well-established that one is bound.) 244. etc. Betts. the argument put forth by the learned counsel has not substance.Lah. Before proceeding further. but does not deal in respect of the event when determination of tariff value and of rate of duty will be worked out. Rule cannot override the statutory law. the imposition of tax must be affected by plain words of Legislature. and that so-called equitable constructions of them are not permissible. [Central Excise Act. Rule 96ZZ [Central Excise Rules. Tariq Sultan & Co. 143. Words in a statutory instrument should be construed in their ordinary sense.C. 1944.Lah. This Chapter deals with regard to filing of the application and the revised procedure. clearance of goods on payment of duty. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. Briefly. that fiscal statutes are to be construed strictly and a citizen is to be taxed within the letter and spirit of a charging statute. Strict rule of fiscal statutes emphasised.Qta. to give a fair and reasonable construction to their language without learning to one side or the other. in construing Revenue Acts. that no tax can be imposed on a subject by an Act of Parliament without words in it clearly showing an intention to lay the burden upon him. Naveed A. – [1999] 80 TAX 62 (H. that the words of the statute must be adhered to. Faisalabad – [2000] 81 TAX 7 (H. It is well settled and needs no authority that the words used in a statutory instrument are to be construed in their ordinary and natural .C. we feel necessary to reiterate three wellknows rules of construction of fiscal statute.C. Firstly. Rana Asif Tauseef C/o Rana Hosiery & Textile Mills (Pvt. Faisalabad v. Government of Pakistan. Lord Atkinson stated this principle in case of Ormond Investment Co.C.. deposit of goods in the store room.155 SHORT TITLE. maintenance of current account.) Ltd.

Lah. but. It is one of the cordinal rules of the construction of statute that when several words have been used in an enactment.C. Crescent Sugar Mills Distillery Ltd.) 248. 11th edition. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone.Lah. the meaning of the doubtful words may be gathered by reference to words associated with it.) Lahore v. Courts while interpreting a statute must adhere to the plain meaning of the words. Mustafa Prestressed R. Lahore v.Pipe Works Ltd. based on sound judicial precedents. It is also true that the historical background of a statute serve as a useful guide in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. unless the context otherwise requires.C. The court remains under an obligation to adhere to the plain meaning of the words employed in it. I put on the phrase „additional amount of tax‟. Inapt and inaccurate phraseology of draftsman cannot nullify a provision made by legislature. Muhammad Younus v. sense and if different words are used by the legislature.) 246. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Investigation). It is well-settled principle of interpretation that all the provisions of an enactment have to be construed harmoniously.C. Rule of harmonious construction of statutes. It is to the following effect: . Lahore – [1981] 43 TAX 1 (H.C.C. that an inapt and inaccurate phraseology of the draftsman cannot and should not nullify a provision made by the legislature which is consistent with existing legal norms. may be quoted in support of this view. Meaning of doubtful words to be gathered by reference to words associated with them. the object is to convey different meaning. Karachi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan & another – [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H. renders the last two words virtually redundant but clearly I am of this view also.C. Karachi – [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H. only if the words used are capable of more than one interpretation.) 247. Chairman Sahiwal – [1986] 53 TAX 93 (H. A passage from Sweet and Maxwell.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 249.Lah. Municipal Committee. but it has never been held that courts may depart from the plain meaning of the words employed in statute because of its historical background.156 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Highway Petroleum Services (Regd.Kar. at page 221.

tax is to be determined and assessed under the provisions of section 23 of the Act. On such assessment being made. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1976] 34 TAX 151 (H. to be seen when a Tax is due from a person leaving aside the deduction of Tax at source under section 18 or the payment of advance tax under section 18-A. leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment. or by rejecting them altogether. presumably not intended. Fiscal statutes should be strictly construed. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar. The provisions of the aforesaid (section 45A) come into play only when an assessee fails to pay the tax due from him. 1030 251.Kar. except in a case of necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used. therefore. on the basis of the returns of income to be made under section 22. . mainly. Multan v. A person must be taxed only if he comes within the letter of law. a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words.) 250. neither of which provisions are applicable in the instant case. that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. or to some inconvenience or absurdity.Lah.C. It is.C.) = PLD 1976 Kar.” Dreamland Cinema. by altering their collection. Taimur Shah v. An equitable permissible. of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify. under the influence. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H. and even the structure of the sentence. it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman ‟s unskillfulness or ignorance of the law. no doubt. otherwise he is free even though his case falls within the spirit of law. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 “Where the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction. the Tax becomes due and a notice of demand is to be issued under section 29 of the Act specifying the sum due and payable. hardship or injustice.157 SHORT TITLE. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear. by giving an unusual meaning to particular words. construction of a fiscal statute is not There is no dispute about the proposition that equitable construction of a fiscal statute is not permitted.

in the absence of clear necessity.C. nothing in section 45A which implies that its application is restricted to tax due for the year following the insertion of the said section. and. CBR and others – [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H. the three notices of demand for the three charge years in question were all issued in September 1965 much after section 45A had been added to the Income Tax Act. 10th Edition : “It is but a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislator intended spine thing which it omitted to express”.Lah. we are unable to construe section 45A of the Act so as to limit its application to tax due for the years following its addition to the Act as this can only be done if we were to add these words or words of similar „import‟ in the section. however. An assessee this would be deemed to have failed to pay the tax due from him if he fails to pay the tax by the date specified in the notice of demand issued under section 29. The amount specified in the notice of demand is required to be paid with the time specified in the notice. . Crown Bus Service Ltd. in a fiscal statute. As such the assessee‟s failure to pay the tax due from him occurred after section 45A had become a part of the Income Tax Act. as already pointed out. It is well settled that courts should follow that construction of law which does not lead to startling results or destructive ends. it is a wrong thing to do”. There is. its provision have to be strictly construed and no additions to or omissions therefrom are permissible. If the intention of the Legislature had been that the application of this section should be restricted to the tax due for the_charge years following insertion of the said section then this intention would have been made manifest by the use of appropriate words. As such. Lahore v. As observed by Lord Mersey in (1910) AC 409. In the instant case.) 252. therefore.158 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. as provided in section 45. 420: “It is a strange thing to read in an Act of Parliament words which are not there. Construction of law should not lead to startling results. According to Maxwell. No question. of retrospective operation of section 45A arises in the instant case. which is not permissible to us.

Lah.C. Seth Gurmukh Singh v.C.. (Central) Karachi – 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S.) = PLD 1966 S.159 SHORT TITLE. not being a part of the statute to be construed. Provisions granting exemptions or privileges have to be construed strictly against the person claiming the exemption or the privilege. is not a determining factor and if the proviso as punctuated leads to an absurd result or conflicts with some other provision of the statute which is unambiguous and free from doubt. that the words „as obsolete‟ govern the word „discarded‟ appearing immediately before them and not the word „sold. Punctuation marks and construction of statutes. Commissioner of Income Tax. Muhammadi Steamship Company Ltd. Lahore – [1974] 29 TAX 165 (H..) 253. in other words. Rules and the section are to be read together in harmony and not in derogation of one another. Maharani of Bardwan v... 424]. It is an error to rely on punctuation in construing Acts of the Legislature..... v. If it were intended to read . all sales of machinery are included irrespective of whether they are sold by reason of their being obsolete.C. Ramanathan Cheltian – 1 ITC 244 (Madras)  It is then argued that. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore Zone Lahore v.. the punctuation must yield to an interpretation that is reasonable and makes it consistent with the other provisions of the Act .‟ The phraseology of this clause is not very happy because it is obvious that the words could bear either meaning..” [p.. Board of Revenue v. Rule of harmonious construction of statutes..Pak. in the interpretation of statute punctuation. It is a well established rule of interpretation of statutes that no words in a statute are to be treated as surplusage or redundant. 828 254. and we must take the punctuation marks as part of the statute. Words in statutes cannot be treated as surplusage or redundant.. but the statute has been punctuated. on the true construction of clause (vii). Commissioner of Income Tax – [1944] 12 ITR 393 (Lahore)  “. Krishna Kamini Dasi – 14 ILR PC 365 255. Malik & Co..

certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute.150 at page 154]. the subject is free. Strict rule of interpretation to tax a subject. It is a commonplace that in statutes of taxation the imposition of a duty must be in plain terms [Per Buckley L. the words „as obsolete‟. seeking to recover the tax. the comma being put after the word „obsolete‟. however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. North Madras Mutual Befit & Co – 1 ITC 172 (Madras) 257. any governing purpose in the Act. and what is intended to be taxed is income. what is called an equitable construction. I mean what is the intention of the Act as expressed in its provisions. Subject can only be taxed if statute expressly so provides. and the Court is not entitled to substitute for express words or an irresistible inference a process of guess-work. 1894 and Studdert [(1900) 2 Ir. R. in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. In various cases the principle of construction of . because in a taxing Act. „If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed. In other words. The Secretary of State for India –1 ITC 161 (Burma) 258. in any statute. Sundar Das v.C. it is impossible. however subtle the reasoning or ingenious the marshalling of facts by which such a process is supported. Secretary to the Board of Revenue (Income Tax) v. cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law. K. Smith [(1892) A. 212 at p.. In Tennant v. if Crown. if there be admissible. however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. to do more than take such tax as the statute imposes.J. „No tax can be imposed except by words which are clear and the benefit of the doubt is the right of the subject‟ [per Lord Justice FitzGibbon in In re Finance Act.C. And when I say what is intended to be taxed. 219]. Lord Halsbury L. 400].B. where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute‟. v. Tax can only be imposed by clear words of the Act.said: This is an Income Tax Act.160 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Gribble [(1913) 3. such a statute must be construed strictly and the onus lies upon the Crown to show that the person whom it is sought to tax falls clearly within its operation. as governing „sold‟ one would expect to find a comma after the word „sold‟ There is none. On the other hand. I believe. to assume any intention. Rowe & Co. Collector of Gujrat – 1 ITC 189 (Lahore) 256.

. 259. 771] Viscount Haldance L. therefore. a causus omissus which the legislature was unlikely to have contemplated.C. there is. or to show that if the section be not construed as the Crown contends it should be construed. In re [(1855) II Ex. These evils. must. It is not enough to bring the case within the spirit of it. that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words‟. all we are permitted to look at is the language used. Court must stick to the letter of the statute. on the construction which the Court of Appeal have put on the statute.C. if probabilities. if such they be.. are to be looked at. „It is a well established rule.765 at p. Judicial tribunals must in interpreting these taxing Act stick to the letter of the statute.C. but I believe they may be all reduced to this.‟ and in the same case Lord Atkinson said:“To succeed the Crown must bring the case within the letter of that enactment. 452 at p. 887].. but.said:“The duty of a court of construction in such cases is not to speculate on what was likely to have been said if those who framed the statute had thought of the point which has arisen.161 SHORT TITLE. my Lords.” Again in Lumsden v.877 at p.456]. that inasmuch as you have no right to assume that there is any governing object which a taxing Act is intended to attain other than that which it has expressed by making such and such objects the intended subject for taxation. If it has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless. Viscount Haldane L.an immunity from successive levies of estate duty. apart from the words used. you must see whether a tax is expressly imposed. Lord Wensleydale said in Micklethwaite.C. if they exist. be cured by legislation. or will enjoy. In Attorney-General v. the context directs us to do so. Milne [(1914) A. said: „It may be that. that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose. above all in a statute which imposes taxation. under the taxing Acts always resolve themselves into a question whether or not the words of the Act would have reached the alleged subject of taxation. recognising that the words leave the intention . EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 taxing Act has been referred to in various forms. reading the statute as a whole. and also. Inland Revenue Commissioners [(1914) A. Cases. property which ought to be taxed will escape taxation. Speculation as to a different construction having been contemplated by those who framed the Act is inadmissible. But.

The noble Lord said: “No tax can be imposed on the subject without words in an Act of Parliament clearly showing an intention to lay a burden on him. however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. that income accruing to a person in British India from any business wherever carried on is liable to be assessed. minor by guardian – 1 ITC 37 (Madras) 260. But when that intention is sufficiently shown it is not open to speculate on what would be the fairest and most equitable mode of levying that tax.” 261. If the legislature intended to tax these incomes and it would have been a very substantial source of public revenue they could have easily said. if there be admissible. not taxable if not within letter of law through within the spirit. Black [(1881) 6 App. seeking to recover the tax. If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed. however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. 315] Lord Blackburn stated the same rule somewhat differently. in any statute. with only such extraneous light as is reflected from within the four corners of the statute itself. Practice as a guide to construction.G.L.162 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Attorney-General [(1869) 4 E. In Partington v. read as a whole.” In Coltness Iron Company v. cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law the subject if free. On the other hand. it is this. Subject taxable if within letter of law. 100]. and if with that knowledge they repeated in the new enactment the same words on which the practice of the Government was founded.” Secretary of Commissioner Salt v. it gives rise to the presumption that they did not want to assess such incomes. Ramanathan Chetti. obscure. .App. what is called an equitable construction certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you should simply adhere to the words of the statute. In other words.I. H. to construe them as they stand. Lord Cairns stated the rule thus“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation. as in the English statute. if the Crown. Cas. We are justified in assuming that the legislature was aware of this practice.

The language employed by some of the noble Lords in that case was very strongly relied on by the learned Advocate-General. As I started by saying. D.C.D.163 SHORT TITLE. 531] and Yewens v. Limited [(1915) A. For these reasons I am of opinion that the assessee is not taxable. 455] and in Cesena Sulphur Company v. Pemsel [(1891) A. which on the face of it imposes a duty upon income of this kind. the facts in De Beers Consolidated Mines. Practice under repealed Act as an aid for construction of later Act. In my opinion the facts to which our attention has been drawn are not specific enough to enable us to say that the business was really carried on in British India. Moreover. It was elicited in the course of the argument that until the year 1914 or 1915 no income tax was levied in respect of foreign trades of principals residing in British India. Noakes [(1880) 6 Q. 1022] were different from the facts on which we have been asked to give our opinion.. Whatever may be the weight we may attach to it. However. So. Nicholson [(1876) I Fx.C. be taken to have concurred in the interpretation . 428] and in Mitchell v. I do not therefore think any good will be served by discussing these cases. I do not invoke the aid of this practice as in my opinion there is nothing in the Act. it seems to me that Courts will not acting wrongly in referring to the practice in construing the Act. Mr. The Bhikanpur Sugar Concern In re: [1 ITC 29 (Patna)] 263. but a single decision not. The old Act of 1886 was repealed in 1918. Egyptian Hotels. The observations of Lord Davey who subsequently explained the position in Commissioners of Taxation v. Kirk [(1900) A. Limited v. unless the words are clear. a fiscal enactment should not be construed as imposing a tax by implication. The provisions of the previous Acts in practically identical language and must.B. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 262. the executive Government in India did not levy income tax upon business of this kind.C. 588] do not support the view that by giving general instructions the business is carried on in the country from which these instructions issue. Krishnaswami Ayyar relied on this practice and quoted Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. therefore. 530] as enunciating that the practice under a repealed enactment can be looked into for construing the later enactment. Howe [(1906) A.C. Long course of decisions determining construction of a repealed statute may be an aid in the construction of a new statute passed in the same terms as the former. for about 30 years at least. There is only one other remark that need be made.

It appears. 1979.Pak) 264. this may be taken into consideration in construing a new enactment passed in the same terms as pre-existing statutes. Provisions granting exemptions or privileges have to be construed strictly against the person claiming the exemption or the privilege. (Central) Karachi – 1966 SCC 266 = [1966] 14 TAX 281 (S.Pak. Exemption clauses provided under industrial incentives should be construed liberally.6. but a single decision such as that referred to cannot. Since the principal objection of the clause was to encourage setting up of industrial undertakings by offering tax incentives to boost up industrial growth a benefit view was to be taken rather than to defeat its object on technical grounds. .1997.C. however.164 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. from the basis of any presumption as to the intention of the legislature in the present case. 828 265. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and another – [2000] 82 TAX 3 (S. and the appellant is declared entitled to the exemption granted by clause 118E of the Second Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance. I agree where there has been a long course of decisions determining the construction of a statute. in my opinion. the appeal is allowed. the ex-parte order dated 30. _______________ _ RULE OF INTERPRETATION TWO EQUAL POSSIBLE _ INTERPRETATIONS EXEMPTION CLAUSES Irum Ghee Mills Limited v.C. dated 26. which it has been agreed shall abide the result of the present reference. Commissioner of Income Tax. This assessment has been paid under protest and a suit is still pending in connection with it.1998 are set aside. placed upon the Act by the Commissioner of Tirhut in 1912.) = PLD 1966 S.06. v. with the result that the Bhikanpur factory was assessed on the whole of its profits for the year 1916-17.C. that in 1914 the Board of Revenue were not satisfied with this decision and placed the matter before the Local Government and finally before the Government of India. Muhammadi Steamship Company Ltd. the subsequent appellant orders and judgement of the High Court. Exemption clauses vis-a-vis rules of interpretation. For the reasons discussed above.

Rana Asif Tauseef C/o Rana Hosiery & Textile Mills (Pvt. Further that in case of doubt or two equally possible interpretations the one favour to the revenue shall be adopted. and another v. Cashew Industries v. Lahore – [1973] 28 TAX 168 (H. Damon‟s Estate (103 V..C. Lahore and 2 others – [2001] 83 TAX 451 (H.Lah. Multan v. Atl. Multan Zone. See Iram Ghee Mills Ltd. Thirdly. 166 (1986) ITR 804). Faisalabad v. Two equal possible interpretations of exemption clause one favouring the revenue to be adopted. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Commissioner of Sales Tax Lahore v. v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1652). it would be for the assessee to show that his case falls strictly within the scope of the exemption. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Micropak (Pvt. Luknow v.A. Commissioner of Income Tax. Multan Road. 176 (1989) ITR 435 and Collector of Central Excise. Likunju.)  Since the exemption creates an exception to the general rule of taxation. Where the fiscal legislation embodies exemption/deduction provisions. the same should be resolved in favour of assessee on the touch-stone of the intention of legislature. the same are construed strictly and against assessee.P.) = 2000 PTD 2958 267. Exemption clauses are to be construed strictly. Parle Export (P) Ltd.) Ltd. Lahore v. 519.C. 518) and . Reference be made also to Heartland v. If the language of that provision is doubtful.Lah. Rule of benefit to subject where two interpretations are possible. Faisalabad – [2000] 81 TAX 7 (H. Where two interpretations of a taxing statute are equally possible then the one favourable to the subject was to be adopted. Cooperative Federation Ltd. (V. 183 (1990) ITR 624). See P.C.Lah. an exemption/deduction provision should be construed by liberal approach with an eye on the underlying purpose of said provisions. Vehari – [2000] 82 TAX 433 (H. Companies Zone. For reference see the judgement in re: Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd.165 SHORT TITLE.) = 2000 PTD 497 268.) Ltd. Bombay-I. (1998 PTD 3835).) Limited. U.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax.C.) = 2001 PTD 1180 266.. Allah Yar Cotton Ginning & Pressing Mills (Pvt. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Commissioner of Income Tax (V. Lutfi & Co. 156. (V. Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax. v.

But in order to be subjected to a tax. in following terms:A law for the assessment and collection of taxes is to be construed with the utmost liberality.H. or section 33 of the Act etc. and not such as can be brought within it by a process of reasoning only or by a strained construction because the legislature must be presumed to be fairly able to describe such property as it desires to tax without resorting to a strained construction or a course of fine reasoning. Kimball v. in the description given in the statute.166 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. The Indian Supreme Court and the various High Courts referred to in the cited case-law. or section 27(1) of the Indian Customs Act. It is also apparent that such payments are held to be not covered by rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules. indicates that the latest judicial trend is to deprecate and to discourage withholding of a citizen‟s money by a public functionary on the plea of limitation or any other technical plea if it was not legally payable by him.Pak) 269. 196 Atl. It is also evident that the claims for the refund of the amount paid as a tax or other levy on account of mistake as to want of constitutional/legal backing or because of exemption are at par. the property must be such as is ordinarily included. hereinabove had ordered the refund of the amounts involved in exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Indian . Federation of Pakistan – [1998] 77 TAX 172 (S. 1944. Observation of learned Judge. The refunds of such amounts are allowed by the Superior Courts inter alia in India on the basis of section 72 off the Contract Act which provides that „a person to whom money has been paid or anything delivered by mistake or under coersion must repay or return it. 1951. v. in first case. English and Pakistani jurisdiction.‟ Such refunds can be claimed either by filling a suit for the recovery of the amount for which the period of limitation applicable would be three years under Article 96 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act (which provides period of three years from the date mistake becomes known to the plaintiff) or the same can be recovered through a constitutional petition if no disputed fact is involved. Claim for refund of money paid under mistake is not barred by time. The above resume of the case-law of Indian.C. 272). _______________ RULE OF LIMITATION Pfizer Laboratories Ltd. Potter (N.

We can ‟t approve the view that a party can claim the refund of an amount paid to a Government functionary under a mistake without any constraint of limitation as it would adversely affect the good governance in financial matters. Time limitation for filing appeal under section 136 vis-a-vis section 5 of Limitation Act. does not leave the matter of limitation to the pleadings of the parties as it imposes a duty in this regard upon the court itself. it should be within statutory period provided under the relevant Article of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. But it may not be understood that we are laying down that a party is free to claim refund of a tax or any other levy paid under a mistake of fact or law at his sweat will at any time even after the expiry of 20 years. Ministry of Finance. therefore. It is an admitted feature of the case that the order of Appellate Tribunal was received on 14.C. or if the refund of the same is to be claimed by invoking in aid the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies Zone Lahore v. through Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. The petition should not suffer from laches which may defeat the claim. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Constitution. Gatron (Industries) Ltd.7. Member (Judicial). but it was made on 21.C. it is time-barred by 7 days for which no explanation . Commissioner of Income Tax Sukkur Zone. CBR and Kohinoor Industries Ltd. subject to the provisions of section 4 to 25 of that Act. – [1999] 79 TAX 161 (H. Mst. and reference application could have been made within 60 days. Khursheed Begum – [1995] 71 TAX 280 (H. Sukkur. If a suit is to be filed for the refund. be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as defence.) 270.1997 and as such. The law.167 SHORT TITLE.1997 which is time-barred and it should have been filed on or before 14.1997.7.5. Faisalabad v.) 271. the petitioner should approach the court promptly.Qut. Sindh and Lahore High Courts have also allowed the refund of such amounts under Article 199 of the Constitution in exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction in the cases of Ghulam Abbas v.Kar. In Pakistan. The provisions of Limitation Act are mandatory and cannot be waived. The limitation being a matter of statute and the provisions being mandatory cannot be waived and even if waived can be taken up by the party waiving it and by the Courts themselves. The words of section 3 of the Limitation Act are mandatory in nature and that every suit or application instituted after period of limitation shall.

So far as the second issue is concerned. Commissioner of Income Tax/CST Rawalpindi v. An intending appellant has got the right to get excluded the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy even though an attested copy . whatsoever has been given but factum of delay has been taken very lightly and even the exact number of days were not mentioned regarding which condonation is required.168 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. of Pakistan & others – [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H. Multan – [1979] 40 TAX 60 (H.Kar. holding that if the Reference Application is made beyond the prescribed time Tribunal has no discretion but to dismiss the same unless the statutory provision to the contrary is made. The statutes of limitation should consequently be applied without regard to equitable consideration. Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. Govt.C. Period of Limitation Factors to be considered while computing period of limitation. Time spent in obtaining a certified copy should be excluded while computing period of limitation. Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone ‘A’ Karachi v. A-Circle. Delay of each day must be explained. Khalid Cotton Factory.) _ 272.) 273.C. A reference application made beyond the prescribed time should be dismissed.C. Section 160(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance provides that the period during which any assessment or other proceedings under the Ordinance are stayed by any Court shall be excluded while computing the period of limitation. Multan v.Lah. Naseem Allahwala – [1991) 64 Tax 31 (H.Kar. Insofar as section 5 of Limitation Act is concerned it is well-settled by now that once limitation starts running no subsequent event can stop or suspend it and that matters dealt with by the Limitation Act shall be determined according to the true construction of the word used by the legislature and the doctrine of equity. Income Tax Officer. S. Eastern Poultry Services v.) 274. justice and good conscience cannot be applied as to over-ride and abrogate the express provisions of the Limitation Act.C. Rawalpindi – [1978] 38 TAX 181 (H.Kar. It is settled principle of law of limitation that each day‟s delay in filing of reference application has to be explained. it has been dealt with in several cases.M.) 275.

Alyani Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory. Rahimyar Khan v. the primary period plus the periods allowed by the various provisions of the Limitation Act itself. _______________ . The principle. Only court holidays which are to be allowed in addition to the prescribed period of limitation for filing suit. Aftab Medical Stores. for obtaining the certified copy.C. Dera Ghazi Khan v. appeal or application are those which fall on the day of the expiry of that period or immediately following it. Time required for obtaining certified copy should extend the period of limitation. the right of appeal subsists.Lah. Application of provisions of Limitation Act to proceedings under Income Tax Laws. therefore.C. We are. Court holidays falling on the day of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation should be excluded in counting the period of limitation. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 had been supplied to him by the Income Tax Officer. Alyani Cotton Ginning and Pressing Factory.C. that the period of limitation comprises two elements namely. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and another – [1974] 29 TAX 238 (H. If the period of limitation is still running when the court re-opens. and as long as this period has not expired.169 SHORT TITLE. Rahimyar Khan v. the period of limitation would stand extended by the time requisite.) 278.) 276. is certainly not open to any exception. the plaintiff or the appellant cannot claim the exclusion of such holidays. Such being the case an application for obtaining a certified copy of the judgement or decree can be made within this period. with the result that the period shall stop running until such time as the copy is delivered.) 277. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax and another – [1974] 29 TAX 238 (H. To put it more simply.Lah.Lah. alongwith the notice of demand or even if he is not required to file one with an application for reference. of the considered opinion that section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings before the Income Tax Authorities. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1976] 34 TAX 10 (H.

) = 2000 PTD 280 281. Assessee was entitled to relief under section 15B of 1922 Act. The position canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner would lead us to the conclusion that such an amendment is redundant because inspite of it the position in regard to the adjustment of unabsorbed depreciation carried forward remained as it was before the amendment. There must be something in the law to irresistibly indicate.C.) = 2000 PTD 280 279. Amendment in law implies necessarily an intention on the part of legislature to depart from earlier law in some respects redundancy cannot be attributed to the legislature. Commissioner of Income Tax and others – [1964] 9 TAX 273 (H. Redundancy should not be readily assigned by courts. Muhammad Kassim – [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H. Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax. If there is any doubt or ambiguity in the language used in the statute which renders it capable of several interpretations. Exemption cannot be allowed if not claimed. Interpretation favourable to assessee is to be adopted. Ltd. It is held that .C.Lah. REDUNDANCY SHOULD NOT BE READILY ASSIGNED BY COURTS Commissioner of Income Tax v. It is a well-established principle of interpretation of statutes that no provision of an enactment is to be treated as redundant or surplus and has to be given its meaning and effect to.Kar.Kar. Lahore – [1982] 46 TAX 143 (H. v.) = 1964 PTD 554 282. that the alteration sought has not been achieved on the words or expressions used in the amending Act. _______________ INTERPRETATION FAVOURABLE TO ASSESSEE IS TO BE ADOPTED Commissioner of Income Tax v. This cannot be readily accepted. Pakistan Lyallpur-samundri Transport Co. then the interpretation favourable to the assessee or the citizen is to be adopted. but he did not claim this relief in the return of income. One of the cardinal rules of interpretation of statutes is that where an amendment in the law takes place there musts be implied necessarily an intention on the part of the Legislature to depart from the earlier law in some respects. Muhammad Kassim – [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H.) 280. Redundancy cannot be readily attributed to the Legislature.170 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C.Kar.C. Singer Sewing Machine Co. Lahore Zone.

it became the duty of the Commissioner to grant relief if the entitlement was clear. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary. . Justice and Parliamentary Affairs -&. That such a proceeding in revision would be a judicial proceeding and not merely departmental affair. owing to misapprehension of the correct position. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.C.” _______________ RULES WHEN LANGUAGE IS AMBIGUOUS Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan. but section 33. that ignorance of law was no excuse. Law. The provision of section 33A(2) of 1922 Act apparently envisages a remedy alternative to a regular appeal from assessment. We allow the appeal and quash the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax in this case. Ministry of Interior – PLD 2000 S. It must be found as a result of the above discussion that the Commissioner declined to exercise his undoubled jurisdiction in the case. Secretary General v.” “. All these factors go to establish the bona fides of the assessee-company in claiming that the assessment in question was not appealed against.” “. . Rule of interpretation of ambiguous words. . The High Court has observed.C. according to judicial principles. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 assessing officer was not bound to grant relief as ignorance of law is no excuse. Their Lordships observed: “. Judicial Review : OVERRULED by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1965 SCC 234 = [1965] 11 TAX 364 (S. In the circumstances. of which it availed itself and the relief was denied to it. That may be conceded. sub-section (20) provided on alternative judicial remedy to the assessee. It is a well-settled rule of construction of statutes that if the words used are ambiguous and admit of two constructions and one of them leads to a manifest absurdity or to a clear risk of injustice and the . .Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) through Deputy Convener. The learned Commissioner apparently misdirected himself in holding that he had no power to interfere in the matter. The power of revision has to be exercised. on an erroneous view of law by the Commissioner. This fact calls for correction of his order. Senator Aftab Ahmad Sheikh v. in this connection. .Pak).171 SHORT TITLE. . on a ground which was legally not supportable. 111 283.

Pak) 286. E.) 284. If a statute is capable of two interpretations then the one which is favourable to the subject be adopted. and Others v. we hold that the export rebate contemplated under section 3(4)(a) of the Ordinance is admissible both to the registered firm as well as its partners in respect of super-tax and income tax payable by them. The Federation of Pakistan & Others – [1997] 76 TAX 213 (S.C. There is no room for any intendment nor there is any equity or presumption as to a tax. . the same is to be resolved in favour of the citizen. Nasir Ali and another – [1999] 79 TAX 428 (S.Pak) = 1997 PTD 1693 285. respectively.U. would fall within the language and meaning of the enacting part. which is covered by the enacting part of the provisions. Effect of non-obstante clause.172 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C. therefore. has to be interpreted strictly. v. the second interpretation must be adopted. A proviso.Pak. Effect of said non-obstante clause is that the specified sections of the Act or rest of the Ordinance to the extent that these are inconsistent with Section 10(7) and First Sched. Such general provisions then apply for computation of tax on income from general insurance business. A fiscal provision of a statute is to be construed liberally in favour of the taxpayer and in case of any substantial doubt. Mehran Associates Ltd.C. The cardinal principles of interpretation of a fiscal statute seem to be that all charge upon the subject are to be imposed by clear and unambiguous words. the proviso cannot by implication exclude from its purview what clearly falls within the express terms of the main enacting part. Karachi – 1992 SCC 980 = [1992] 66 TAX 246 (S. but for the proviso. General Insurance Company Ltd. Proviso cannot extend the meaning of the enacting part. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that a proviso deals with the subject. Commissioner of Income Tax. The proviso only carves out an exception which. No inconsistency exists between the special provision relating to general insurance business in the Act or Ordinance and the applicable Schedules containing general provisions for computation of tax on business. of the Act or Section 26 and Fourth Schedule of the Ordinance shall not be given effect to. and where the language of main enacting part is clear and unambiguous. Accordingly. Commissioner of Income Tax v. other leads to no such consequence.F.

N. Lastly as remarked by the learned Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the aforesaid judgement even if there was any doubt or ambiguity in the language the interpretation favourable to the assessee had to be adopted as laid down by the apex Court in re: B. Doubt or ambiguity in language should go in favour of taxpayer. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Lahore v.V.Lah. Muhammad Kassim – [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H. Biscuit Factory Ltd. The use of word “prior” in second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13 and in sub-section (2) makes it very clear that two “prior” separate approvals of the Inspecting Additional Commissioner were required where an Assessing Officer was to make addition to the declared value of any valuable property. Zone-A. Court has to read the provision as it exists and to deduce or infer the meaning in accordance with the existing test or the words or particular provision.C. Commissioner of Income Taxx. M. Rakhani & Company v. Obviously the requirement of prior approval was meant to safeguard the interest of the assessee to avoid arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Assessing Officer.C.Kar. Cases referred to: Commissioner of Income Tax v.P. Wealth Tax Officer (1996 SCMR 1470). Court must confine itself to language of law. . A simultaneous approval normally will not serve the purpose of the provisions because more often than not a simultaneous approval would be a fait accompli.) 287. Lahore – [2001] 83 TAX 489 (H. Biscuit Factory Ltd. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Khurram Saghir Industries. Muhammad Kassim [2000] 81 TAX 229 (H. Lakotoi Express and 2 others [PLD 1994 SC 894].).Kar.) = 2000 PTD 280 288.173 SHORT TITLE. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the considered view that two separate prior approvals under section 13(2) and in proviso to section 13(1) of the Ordinance were required and a combine approval obtained under both these sub-sections or of the draft assessment order did not fulfil the requirement of law. Court is not supposed to add to or subtract any word(s) from any provision of a statute while interpreting a provision so as to give same a meaning other than the one which obviously and plainly flows or can be inferred from it. While interpreting a provision of statute. V.C. v.

Textile Mills Ltd. If there was any doubt or ambiguity in the language used in the statute which rendered same capable of several interpretations. The situation. Karachi also supports this kind of approach in fiscal matters.) = 1999 PTD 4138 290. 289.Lah. that where an article or income can equally be placed under two heads of income or tariff then the one favourable to the taxpayer should be adopted. Karachi & others and Abdul Majeed Khan and others (supra). In case of two equally reasonable interpretations.A. Also that in case of any ambiguity or doubt arising from construction.. Karachi (PLD 1961 SC 375) states that when two equally reasonable constructions are possible one strict and other beneficial then the latter should be preferred. v. For reference sees PLD 1961 SC 375 re: Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan v. calls for employing at least two general principles. 291. Statutes should be interpreted strictly in accordance with letter of law. Karachi & Others v. Hossen Kasam Dada.in case of other laws and statutes which infringe upon the rights of citizen or a party the apex court in re: Abdul Rehman v Inspector General of Police. thus. one strict and other beneficial.. The ratio settled in 1993 SCMR 274 = 1993 PTD 69 re: Mehran Associate Limited v. J. “. The rule settled in re: Commissioner of Income Tax. then the latter should be preferred.. For reference see 1977 SCMR 371 re: Collector of Customs. Hossen Kasam Dada.C. Commissioner of Income Tax. East Pakistan v. . the same should be resolved in the favour of subject.174 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.. expressly falls into one clause then its placing into another clause would be unjustified.. Abdul Majeed Khan & Others.. then the interpretation favourable to the assessee or the citizen was to be adopted. when the other clause is subject to a higher rate of tax. It is an established principle that fiscal statutes should be interpreted strictly in accordance with the letter of law used and the words employed. CBR – [2000] 81 TAX 88 (H. First. Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1995 SC 546) favoured a beneficial interpretation. All the moreso. Second when an item or income etc. Ambiguity in language should be resolved in the favour of taxpayer.

if two interpretations are possible then any interpretation which favours the assessee has to be preferred. West Karachi – [1985] 51 TAX 66 (H.C. v. Benefit of ambiguity should be given to the assessee.” Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner Sales Tax v.. if any. Commissioner of Income Tax. – [1991] 64 TAX 34 (H. Central Zone-B.Kar. There is no cavil about the settled principle of interpretation that taxing provisions should be strictly interpreted and the benefit of ambiguity. Zakia Siddiqui – [1989] 59 TAX 79 (H..) Ltd.175 SHORT TITLE. .) Ltd. Wealth Tax Officer Circle-III Lahore – [1996] 74 TAX 9 (H.. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance & Another – [1994] 69 TAX 79 (H.Kar.C.)  It is well recognised principle of interpretation that if a fiscal statute is capable of two reasonable interpretations then the one which is favourable to the subject be adopted. Rizki Ink Company Ltd. according to us.) 292. It was observed that according to the well-accepted principles of interpretation the doubt has to be resolved in favour of the citizen.. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Searle Pakistan (Pvt. Rijaz (Pvt. Highland Manufacturers (Pak) Ltd.. v. In these circumstances.)  “. If a statute is capable of two interpretations then the one which is favourable to the subject be adopted.Kar. the law-maker could clarify its intention by adding an explanation which cannot be legitimately objected to. v.Lah. must go to the subject.C.C. Karachi v.Kar.)  We would observe that the Income Tax provisions have to be strictly construed and should be interpreted in a manner which is more favourable to the subject.C.) 293.

Lahore – [1962] 6 TAX 1 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 169 (H.. Benefit of ambiguity should be given to the assessee. Inconsistencies are in-built in income tax. Lahore v.Lah. When once the meaning is plain. It is true that the interpretation of the Indian Income Tax Act is far form being an easy matter.176 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Dreamland Cinema. Where two equally reasonable constructions are possible. may influence the interpretation of a statute when its language is ambiguous and capable of more than one meaning .C.) 297. statement of objects and reason can be relied upon.C. Statement of objects and reasons be referred when there is ambiguity in fiscal statute.. Muhammad Hayat Haji Mohammad Sardar v. In such a case are to benefit should go to subjects. In case of ambiguity in language. the latter should be preferred in a taxing statute.Lah. Mst. otherwise courts should adhere to plain words..Lah. one strict and the other beneficial to the assessee.) 296.. Commissioner of Income Tax. But the argument ab inconvenient as well as that based upon the order in which the two sections stand. UP – 5 ITC 275 (Allahabad)  The Income tax Act is a fiscal enactment and in the case of an ambiguity. Fatima Bibi c/o Crown Bus Service.. according to the real sense of the words. Commissioner of Income Tax. Hari Krishna Das v. The English Acts have been added so or varied to meet certain attempts to evade them and . Its duty is not to make the law reasonable. but to expound it as it stands. Hatz Trust of Simla v.C. Literal rule can only be deviated in case of ambiguity in language. Punjab & NWFP – 5 ITC 8 (H. It is founded on the English Acts with certain differences to meet different conditions.) 294.) = 1962 PTD 625 = 1962 PLD 809 295.Lah. it is not the province of a Court to scan its wisdom or its policy.. Multan v. it is to be construed by the well-known principle in favour of the subject and not against the subject. North Zone (West Pakistan). Commissioner of Income Tax.C. Punjab & NWFP – 5 ITC 159 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax.

Roger Pyatt Shellac & Co. General Language not infrequently intended sub modo. But in the first place an Income tax Act may be taken to have been framed so as to express intentions of the legislature on a matter of cardinal importance for its purpose.g..the charging section . Fourthly. It is. the more highly assessed holders of estates temporarily settled) for some degree of uniformity in the incidence of direct taxation. . Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta) 299. Emperor v. Secondly.177 SHORT TITLE. Thirdly. v. It is difficult indeed to believe that the effect of the tax upon such important subjects as mining profits in permanently settled provinces was left to be thrashed out as against all interests upon the terms of the Regulation. General language is not infrequently intended sub modo. and even in statutes cannot be taken at the foot of the letter. The Courts cannot assent to the view that if a section in a taxing statute is of doubtful and ambiguous meaning. that is.are calculated to an end which in the absence of any saving clause they are apt and sufficient to secure. that. The result is that there may appear to be certain inconsistencies. it is essential that this intention should be stated in plain terms. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 the same is true of the Indian Acts. important to remember the rule. which the Courts ought to obey. probably of compromise. where it is desired to impose a new burden by way of taxation. Out of ambiguity of the provisions of the Act cannot be extracted a new and added obligation not formerly cast upon the taxpayer.. the words employed in section 4 . Nor can it reasonably be taken as axiomatic that it is any more fair or just to tax forthwith an estate subject to periodical revision as regards land revenue than to tax an estate permanently settled. they place on the subject claiming exemption the burden of making out his case under the strict provisions of the statute. and the legislature so far from moving in diversa materia. may very easily be supposed to regard its own provision as a precise formula. Secretary of State – 1 ITC 363 (Calcutta) 298. it is possible out of that ambiguity to extract a new and added obligation not formerly cast upon the taxpayer. adequately meeting the obligations imposed on it for modern purposes by the Permanent Settlement as well as the demands of others (e. the basis of the express modification is the payment of land revenue. the modification sought to be implied overlaps a modification made expressly and with much care to limit and define its scope. I think.

and not by an attempt to construe the statute benevolently in favour of the Crown. if there be admissible in any statute what is called an equitable construction. it is this: If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed. if the case is not-brought within the words of the statute interpreted according to their natural meaning. Benefit of doubt is the right of taxpayer. On the other hand. _ _ I am not at all sure that in a case of this kind a fiscal case form is not amply sufficient.B. said: “The benefit of the doubt is the right of the subject”.178 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. who appeared on behalf of the Company. 410] Fitzgibbon L. “Therefore. so far as the present question is concerned. great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. which have been.” Rowe & Co. Secretary of State – 1 ITC 54 (Calcutta) 302. because. 1886. for an interpretation which has long been acted on. In great stress has naturally been laid by Sir Binod Mitter. Fiscal statutes should be interpreted according to their natural meanings. if the Crown seeking to recover the tax cannot bring the subject within the letter of law the subject is free. v.” These observations were cited by Collins M. and if there is a case which is not covered by the statute so interpreted. 1894 and Studdert. 396] and the learned judge proceeded to say: 300. In Finance Act. that can only be cured by legislation. will not be disregarded by a Court of law [Lancashir and Yorkshire . This is no doubt a circumstance to be taken into consideration. certainly such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute. on the important fact that no attempt was ever made to assess the Company to income tax under the corresponding provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act. as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation. reproduced with no substantial variation in the Indian Income tax Act. In other words. where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute. In re [1900] 2 Ir. The Secretary of State for India – 1 ITC 161 (Burma) 301. the Crown fails.R. in Attorney General v. 388 at p. however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. however. 400 at p. R.J. Killing Valley Tea Company v. 1918. Practice not a guide where language of statute is clear. Selborne [(1902) 1 K.

. 12 CWN 657]. 816. it ought to put its own construction upon it. of Scotland [(1890) 15 App. v. Smith [(1892) A. 315]. if occasion arises. 23 C. in such circumstances.. Cas.C.L.. 890] and Mathura Mohan Saha v. v. 370. where the Court is called upon to construe an Act of Parliament expressed in unambiguous language.W. But as Channell J. the fact that a mistaken interpretation has been generally put upon it cannot alter the law.713. 701 at p. Cas. Inland . 596]. 15 C. by those whose duty it has been to construe. 35 Ind. Manindra Chandra v. in a clear case of error. Crawshay [(1871) L.L. 488] and has been applied in the case of Corporation of Calcutta v. Cas. 26.C. 150 at 154]. Tancred Arrol and Co.W. Secretary of State for India [(1907) I. 790 at p.L.B. at the time of its enactment and since.R. Tenant v.179 SHORT TITLE. Bhagirathi [(1908) ILR 35 Cal. “It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that Courts. 125 at p. 7 Ind. We have finally been pressed to apply the elementary rule that taxing statutes must be construed strictly. Evanturel [(1869) L.L. Wyatt [(1905) 2 K. Morgan v. L. 476. 5 C. will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it. Clearly. 20 C.” This view is supported by the dictum of Sir Robert Phillimore in Evanturel v. 747]. 7 CLJ 563. 148]. We may add that it was stated by the Advocate-General that there has been some divergence of opinion among successive legal advisers of the Crown and that the assessment has been made in this instance with a view to obtain a judicial determination of the true meaning of the legislative provisions on the subject.R. 586 at p. Lumsden v. 422]. I do not suggest for a moment that such interpretation has by any means a controlling effect upon the Courts. 400.R. allow our decision to be controlled by the conduct of the Revenue Authorities in the past. Fermoy Peerage Claim [(1856) 5 H. 257. Benony Krishna Boos [(1919) 12 C. execute and apply it. 304 at p.J. Cas. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Railway Co. 31 Mad. regardless of the construction that has been commonly put upon it.N. Corporation of Madras [(1908) I. 349].L.R.J. 417 at p. a Court would without hesitation refuse to follow such construction. 408. Ramkumar Saha [(1915) L. Goldsmith Co. 305]. 141]] and the Court should have regard to the construction put upon a statute when it first came into force. have to be disregarded for cogent and persuasive reasons and. 43 Cal. Steel Co. Mylapore Hindu Permanent Fund. 716 at p. 18 M. Sury Corporation [(1889) 14 App. we cannot. Limited v.L. L.T. observed in the case last mentioned. v. 2 P. 3 M. 5 H. To the same effect are the observations in Baleshwar v.R.L.J. 84.N.L.J.C 462 at p. in construing a statute. such interpretation may. 34 Cal..

180
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Revenue Commissioners [(1914) A.C. 877 at p. 897], Attorney-General v. Milne [(1914) A.C. 765]. Now, there is no room for controversy that the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, must bring the subject within the letter of the law, otherwise the subject is free, however much within the spirit of the law the case might appear to be. There can be no equitable construction admissible in a fiscal statute; the benefit of the doubt is the right of the subject; Partington v. Attorney-General [(1869) 4 E. & I. App. H. L. 100 at p. 122], Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal Company [(1879) L.R 4 H.L. 197 at p. 202]. Secretary to Commissioner Salt v. Ramanathan Chetti, minor by guardian – 1 ITC 37 (Madras)
303.

No taxation except by express words.

Unless the words are clear, a fiscal enactment should not be construed as imposing tax by implication.
_______________

NON OBSTANTE PROVISION OVERRIDES CONFLICTING PROVISION

Commissioner of Income Tax v. National Agriculture Ltd., Karachi – [2000] 82 TAX 73 (H.C.Kar.) = [2000] 81 TAX 249 (H.C.Kar.) = 2000 PTD 254
304.

Non obstante provision overrides conflicting provision.

....if two provisions of a Statute are not consistent or are in conflict with each other then the provision of the section starting with the expression “notwithstanding” or with “non obstante” clause would have preference and would override the provisions or the sections of the Statute dealing with the same subject-matter.
_______________

DOCTRINE OF BINDING PRECEDENT (STARE DECISIS)

The doctrine of stare decisis is one of the policies grounded on the theory that justice and certainty require that the established legal principle, under which right may accrue, be recognised and followed. In Constitution of Pakistan, this doctrine is reflected in Article 189 and 201 which read as under: 189. Any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other courts in Pakistan.

181
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

201.

Subject to Article 189, any decision of a High Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all courts subordinate to it.

Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee – PLD 1995 S.C.Pak 423
305.

Division bench of a High Court cannot disagree with another Division Bench without reference to a larger bench or should leave the matter to be decided by Supreme Court.

In such circumstances, legal position which emerges is that the Second Division Bench of the High Court should not have given finding contrary to the findings of the 1st Division Bench of the same court on the same point and should have adopted the correct method by making a request for constitution of a larger Bench, if a contrary view had to be taken. In support reference can be made to the cases of the Province of East Pakistan v. Azizul Islam PLD 1963 SC 296 and Sindheswar Ganguly v. State of West Bengal PLD 1958 SC (Ind.) 337, which is the case of Indian Jurisdiction. We, therefore, hold that the earlier judgement of equal Bench in the High Court on the same point is binding upon the Second Bench and if a contrary view had to be taken, then request for constitution of a larger Bench should have been made. Beach Luxury Hotel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income TAX (Central), Karachi – 1981 SCC 546 = [1981] 44 TAX 40 (S.C.Pak.)
306.

Cautious approach is necessary when adopting foreign case-law.

There is, however, a word of caution, a reservation to be kept in view in all such historical and comparative studies. Not much help can be directly obtained in construing a particular provision of our Income Tax Act, by reference to interpretation of similarly, or analogous provisions, in Income Tax Legislation in England or India. However, on analogous provisions, fundamental concepts and general principles, unaffected by the specialities of either, the authorities may be helpful as guides. Province of East Pakistan v. Dr. Azizul Islam – PLD 1963 S.C.Pak 296
307.

English decisions in pari materia and their binding value.

If there is decision which constitutes direct authority on a question by High Court another Bench of same strength of the High Court if inclined to take to a different view they should have referred the matter to a larger Bench. Alternately, they could have expressed their doubts regarding the view taken in the precedent case in a court of equal strength, while yet following the view and left the matter to be raised in appeal before Supreme Court.

182
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Ramkola Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax Punjab & NWFP – 1955 SCC 1 = [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl.-29) (S.C.Pak) 308. Pre-partition judgements are binding unless overruled by Pakistani courts. The judgements of Indian courts are binding, unless overruled by Pakistani Courts, having being pronounced prior to the partition of the sub-continent. Abdul Razzak v. Collectors of Customs – 1995 CLC 1435 (H.C.Kar.) 309. Per incuriam judgement of even the highest court is not binding. A per incuriam decision, even of the highest court, does not bind any other court and it matters little that such court itself be at the lowest rung of the hierarchy of courts.
[N.B. The position after adoption of 1973 Constitution is different as Article 189 and 201 specifically provide the binding nature of orders passed by the Supreme Court and High Courts. Recent decisions explain the correct position that decisions of co-equal benches cannot be ignored by subsequent benches unless the matter is referred to a larger bench or a contrary judgement of a higher court is available. For detailed discussion see Article “Tax laws and law of binding precedent” in Tax Review, May 2005.]

Nishat Talkies Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1989] 60 TAX 45 (H.C.Kar.) = PTCL 1989 CL 660 310. Reliance on foreign cases in the presence of contrary view taken by Pakistani courts is strongly disapproved. We disapprove the practice of not considering and relying upon the judgements of our Superior Courts. It is the duty of every court and Tribunal in Pakistan to follow the judgements of Supreme Court. Under Article 189 of the Constitution any judgement of the Supreme Court which decides a question of law or enunciates a principle of law is binding on all Courts in Pakistan. Likewise and in the same terms, Article 201 provides that subject to Article 189 all judgements of the High Court are binding on all the Courts subordinate to it. We hope in future learned Tribunal will be careful in this regard. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore v. Badar Ice Factory, Lahore – [1981] 43 TAX 100 (H.C.Lah.) 311. Principles of “stare decisis”. The Tribunal agreed with the departmental representative ‟s assertion that each assessment is final and conclusive and should not be allowed to operate as estoppel or resjudicata on the other assessments, but it was of the view that as a general rule it would not be permissible to abandon a consistently applied formula. it accordingly directed the

183
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Income Tax Officer to work out the assessee income on the tank capacity basis, after taking into consideration admissible allowance. The Income Tax Officer had in this particular case, rejected the prevailing 1/3rd tank capacity formula and applied his own formula, which according to him was a better one. The formula suggested by the Income Tax Officer did not find favour with the Tribunal, and we have no doubt that a more accurate formula could have found favour with the Tribunal, as it itself rejected the department‟s plea of stare decisis. Having found that the formula suggested by the Income Tax Officer was neither lucid nor certain and that it was dependent upon varied and uncertain factors, which in turn were capable of manipulation, and adoption of such a formula could result in arbitrariness, it was within the competence of the Tribunal to reject the same. Jamal v. The State – PLD 1960 Lahore 1962
312.

Binding judgements and conduct of different benches.

......a decision of a Division Bench was not binding on another Division Bench. It is unnecessary to give here elaborate reasons for that view and all that needs to be said is that it is not obligatory for a Division Bench if it does not agree with the view of another Division Bench to follow the views it does not agree with, and in case it is not prepared to do this, to refer the case to a Full Bench. Bashir Ahmad v. The State – PLD 1960 Lahore 687

(1) (2) (3)

The decision of the Full Bench of the Court cannot be dissented from by a Division Bench or a Single Bench. The decision of a Division Bench of the Court cannot be dissented from by a Single Bench. The decision of a Division Bench of the Court can be dissented from by another Division Bench or even by the same Bench and may be overruled by a Full Bench but it cannot be dissented from by a Single Bench and The decision of a Single Bench can be dissented from by another or the same Single Bench and can be overruled by a Division Bench or a Full Bench.

(4)

Commissioner Income Tax v. Anantapur Gold Mines – 1 ITC 133 (Mad)
313.

English decisions in pari materia and their binding value.

As regards this particular case, I will only say that while the Commissioner has rightly based his decision on the language of the

184
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Indian section, which differs materially from the corresponding section of the English Act, he has fallen into error in supposing that in Imambandi v. Mutsaddi [1918) I.L.R. 45 Cal. 878; 45 I.A. 73: 35 M.L.J. 422; 16 A. L.J. 800: 24 M. L.T. 330; 28 C.L.J. 409; 23 C.W. N. 50; 5 P.L.W. 276; 20 Bom. L.R. 1022; (1919) M. W.N. 91; 9 L.W. 518; 47 Ind. Cas. 513], the Privy Council deprecated the practice of referring to English decisions, which are the basis of so much of our law in India. The decisions in question were American decisions and were correctly described as foreign, an adjective which is inapplicable and would certainly not have been applied by the Privy Council to the decisions of the English Courts. As regards income tax, the Indian Act generally follows the lines of the English Act, and where the provisions are similar, English decisions are the best guide to their meaning. The revenue authority no doubt may not always find it easy to apply them, and that is one reason why the Act empowers and requires it to make a reference to the High Court in appropriate cases.
_______________

DOCTRINE OF MERGER

Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. v. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax & Others – 1992 SCC 910 = [1992] 66 TAX 74 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 932 = PLD 1992 SC 549
314.

Doctrine of Merger.

Section 66A authorises Inspecting Additional Commissioner to examine and initiate action if the decision is erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue. The Inspecting Additional Commissioner did not have the jurisdiction or power to initiate same action in respect of the orders passed by the appellant authorities or the Tribunal. However, as observed above such power has now been vested in Inspecting Additional Commissioner from the year 1991. The controversy is whether after the appellate authority has passed an order the Inspecting Additional Commissioner can still go to take action under section 66A. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 57, at page 1067 words „Merge‟ and „Merger‟ have been defined as follows:“The verb „to merge‟ has been defined as meaning to sink or disappear in something else, to be lost to view or absorbed into something else, to become absorbed or extinguished, to be combined or be swallowed up.

185
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

„Merger‟ is defined generally as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased, an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality.” Commissioner of Income Tax v. Farrokh Chemical Industries – 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 523

It was observed that „the order of the Income Tax Officer upon appeal merged in the ......... order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal‟. Here the assessment order made by Income Tax Officer was reopened under section 65 and a revised assessment was framed which has been set aside by the Tribunal. Thus, the order of the Income Tax Officer has merged in the order of the Tribunal which holds the field. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi v. Sadruddin – [1985] 51 TAX 83 (H.C.Kar.)

The view that has consistently been prevailing and has been followed is that after the Appellate Court has passed an order, the order of the Original Court is merged into it. Commissioner of Income Tax Faisalabad v. Chief Glass House – [1992] 65 TAX 205 (H.C.Lah.) 315. On appeal original order ceases to exist and merges itself in the appellate order Indeed it is well recognised general principle that on appeal the original order ceases to exist and merges itself in the appellate order of variance. As a necessary corollary, with all the proceedings taken in pursuance to the original order would be washed away and obliterated.
_______________

LEGAL MAXIMS

Commissioner of Income Tax Pakistan v. Fazlur Rehman & Sayeedur Rehman – 1964 SCC 176 = [1964] 10 TAX 49 (S.C.Pak)
316.

Audi alteram partem. but the the less

No man should be condemned unheard is not confined to courts extend to all proceeding by whomsoever held with may effect person a property or other rights of the parties concerned in dispute, and the maxim [audi alterm partem] will apply with no force to proceedings which effect liability to pay a tax.

186
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Siemens Pakistan Engineering Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan & Other – [1999] 79 TAX 605 (H.C.Kar.) = 1999 PTD 1358]

Audi alteram partem i.e. no one shall be condemned unheard is a universally established principle of law. This rule is applicable to both judicial and non-judicial proceedings (1994) SCMR 2232). Anisa Rehman v. PInspecting Additional Commissioner – 1994 SCMR 2232

No order is maintainable if affected person is denied his right of audi alteram partem. Mian Aziz Ahmad, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore – [1979] 39 TAX 1 (H.C.Lah.)

The right to be heard is not confined to proceedings which are judicial in form. The maxim „no man shall be condemned unheard‟ is not confined to courts but extends to all proceedings, by whomsoever held which may affect the person or property or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute, and the maxim will apply with no less force to proceedings which affect liability to pay a tax. Muhammad Khan and Others v. Ghazanfar Ali & Others – AIR 1920 Lahore 247

Orders violating the principles of audi alterm partem are void. Hansraj Gupta v. Dhera Dun Mussorai Electric & Tramway Co. Ltd. – AIR 1933 PC 63, 65 317. Casus Omissus. A casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reasons for it is found in the favour corners of statutes itself. Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary General v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs & Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) through Deputy Convener, Senator Aftab Ahmad Sheikh v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior – PLD 2000 S.C. 111 318. Ejusdem generis - Meaning of. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is well-settled. It means that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of

187
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

a particular and specific meaning such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. However, the doctrine will apply when there is nothing in the provision or Act to show a wider sense was not intended or the intention to give to the general term a broader meaning than the doctrine requires was not manifested. General terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature. In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. The rule of doctrine of „ejusdem generis‟ will apply unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. Where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words, under the rule or maxim of construction known as „ejusdem generis‟, will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown. The doctrine applies when the following five conditions exist: (1) (2) (3) (4) The statute contains an enumeration by specific words; the members of the enumeration constitute a class; the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; a general term follows the enumeration; and

(5) there is not clearly manifested an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. Prime Commercial Bank v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax – [1997] 75 TAX 1 (H.C.Lah.) = 1997 PTD 605 = PTCL 1997 CL 29]

The provision itself which if read as a whole leaves no room to hold that the words (special deposit receipt) must be interpreted ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding and subsequent words. Beli Ram & Bros. v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1935] 3 ITR 103 (Lah.) & AG v. Aramago [1925] 9 TC 445 (HL)
319.

Ex abundanti cautela.

An assessment which is made ex abundanti cautela by the assessing authority is called protective or precautionary assessment or

188
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

alternative assessment. When the department has any doubt as to person who is or will be deemed to be in receipt of the income, protective or alternative assessment is permitted. Thus there is no double assessment if the first assessment is void. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca Engineers Ltd. – 1967 SCC 289 = [1967] 16 TAX 81 (S.C.Pak)
320.

v.

Generalia specialibus non derogant.

The scope of clause (xvi) [parallel to section 23(i)(xviii) of Income Tax Ordinance, 1979] which is residuary in nature is thus wholly different from the sums included in clauses (xii), (xiv) and (xv). There being no similarity of subject matter between clauses (xii), (xiv) and (xvi) of section 10(2) the rule Generalia specialibus non derogant was clearly not attracted. Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Calcutta)

No doubt the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant may be regarded as embodying a good working rule of construction, but when the intention of the legislature to abrogate or modify existing rights is manifest as a necessary implication from the language used, it matters not, in my opinion, that the existing rights are not therein expressly and specifically modified or cancelled. Pakistan Hardcastle Wand (Pak) v. Federation of Pakistan etc. – PLD 1967 SC 1
321.

Mens rea.

Even in the case of statutory offence, the presumption is that mens rea is an essential in gradient. Kohinoor Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan etc. – [1994] 70 TAX 11 (H.C.Lah.)
322.

Noscitur a Sociis.

The words used in statute are to receive the meaning which the context in which they appear admits. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute 12th Edition at page 289 explains the principle of noscitur a sociis:“Where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, noscitur a sociis they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, colour from each-other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general.”

189
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

New Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd., Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi – PLD 1999 S.C. 1126
323.

No one can be judge in his own cause.

Before delisting the name of the Insurance Company from the list of approved Insurance Companies, the Bank was not obliged to obtain adjudication as to the genuineness of its claim against the Insurance Policy. The basic question was as to whether there was material available on record on the basis of which a reasonable unbiased person could have concluded that there was no basis for rejection of the claim. In the present case if the Bank would have invoked section 44-B, of the Insurance Act, and if the second Surveyor would have given report to the effect that the Insurance Company‟s rejection of the Bank‟s claim was unjustified/unwarranted by law, it would have been justified to delist the Company from the list of approved Insurance Companies. Bank did not opt to get an independent surveyor appointed by the Controller of Insurance under sub-section (1) of section 44B of the Act, nor it had recourse to the remedies provided under the Insurance Policy, namely, arbitration, nor it invoked the jurisdiction of a competent Court of law. The Bank had itself adjudicated upon the question of genuineness and correctness of its claim. In other words it had become a judge in its own cause and delisted the Company‟s name from the list of approved Insurance Companies, and in consequence thereof it carried with it a stigma to the effect that the Company was an Insurance Company which did not honour its legal obligation under the Insurance Policies. The Bank not only delisted the Company from the list of approved Insurance Companies, but circulated the copy of the same inter alia to all of their offices and branches. Muhammad Saleem Chotia, Advocate v. Zafar Iqbal Owasi, Advocate, Bahawalnagar and 4 others – PLD 1999 Lahore 446
324.

Things should be done as per law as not to be done at all.

Where law had provided a thing to be done in a particular manner then it ought to be done in that manner and all other modes of doing it would stand excluded. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mahaliram Ramjidas – [1940] 8 ITR 442 (PC)
325.

Ut res valeat quam pereat.

It is a crucial rule of interpretation of statutes that the words of the statute should be given a sensible meaning so as to make them effective....... The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery

190
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

for assessment have to be constrained according to the ordinary rules of construction, that is to say, in accordance with the clear intention of the Legislature which is to make a charge levied effectively.
_______________

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA/ESTOPPEL

Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone B, Karachi v. Farrokh Chemical Industries – 1991 SCC 805 = [1992] 65 TAX 239 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 523 _ 326. Principle of res judicata not applicable. The doctrine of res judicata does not strictly apply to Income Tax cases. The previous decisions or findings can be reopened if fresh facts come to light which on investigation would lead to a conclusion different from that of his predecessor. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pakistan Industrial Engineering Agencies Ltd. – 1991 SCC 857 = [1992] 65 TAX 84 (S.C.Pak.) = 1992 PTD 576 = PLD 1992 SC 562
327.

Doctrine of res judicata - not applicable to income tax proceedings.

It is now well-settled that principles of res-judicata cannot be applied to the cases on assessments under the Income Tax Act in the same manner as it is applied in Civil proceedings. Reference can be made to Commissioner of Income Tax v. Waheeduzzaman PLD 1965 SC 171, which was followed in a recent judgement namely Commissioner of Income Centre Zone B v. Farrokh Chemical Industries, Case Nos. 104 to 111 K of 1984. In both the cases the applicability of principles of res-judicata was restricted and in the later case following Waheeduzzaman‟s case it was observed as follows: It may be reiterated that a previous decision of an Income Tax Authority will not be a bar in the following cases: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) Where the earlier decision is clearly open to some objections; if it is a decision which is not reached after proper inquiry; if it is a decision as could not reasonably have been reached on the material before the authority; it is a decision which suffers from a defect which falls within the purview of the ground mentioned in section 100, CPC and liable to correction thereunder in second appeal, if it were a decision of a Civil Court; and

191
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

(v)

if fresh evidence having a material bearing on the point decided in the previous decision is available.

Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan Dacca v. Wahiduzzaman – 1965 SCC 212 = [1965] 11 TAX 296 (S.C.Pak.) = PLD 1965 SC 171
328.

Income tax officer - when not bound by res judicata.

Where there is no statutory provisions barring reopening of a matter the applicability of the principle of res-judicata depends on the necessity of giving finality to litigation and the injustice of vexing a person twice in respect of the same matter and these being only general considerations relating to administration of justice with no technical and defined limits the applicability of res judicata in such cases will be governed by considerations arising with respect to the particular statute under which a matter has been determined. The dominant consideration always being that the cause of the justice be advanced..... under the circumstances the ends of justice will be served by confining the bar of res judicata in relation to decision of Income Tax Authorities to cases where the decision is not clearly open to some objection. On the basis of assessments for the year 1945-46 and 1946-47, it was contended that the findings of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, so far as the amounts in question were concerned, operated as resjudicata and these questions could not be re-agitated in the subsequent assessment proceedings of the same assessee. The Bombay High Court held in Seth Ram Nath Daga v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1971] 82 ITR 287 that the question of res-judicata need not detain us long, as there is a plethora of decisions holding that the income tax authority is not a court and the decision of an income tax authority in a prior year does not operate as res-judicata in the assessment proceedings of the subsequent years. To quote a few, they are: Perianna Pillai v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1929, 4 TRC 217), Kaniram Ganpat Rai v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1929, ITR 332 (Pat.), Tejmal Bhojraj v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1941, 22 ITR 208) (Nag.) Omar Salay Mohammad Sait v. Commissioner of Income Tax, etc. v. Commissioner of Income Tax; Colombo (1961, 2 All S.R. 436 (PC) and Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai, etc. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1967, 63 ITR 416). In Kaniram Ganpat Rai v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1941, 9 ITR 332) the Patna High Court held that the Income-tax Officer is not bound by rule of res-judicata or estoppel and he can reopen the assessment if fresh facts came to light which on investigation would entitle the officer to come to a conclusion different from that of his predecessor. Similarly, in Tejmal Bhojraj v.

192
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Commissioner of Income Tax (1952, 22 ITR 108) (Nag.) it has been held that the principle of res-judicata or estoppel by record has no application and the previous finding or decision may be re-open by the department when the previous decision has not been arrived at after due enquiry, or the said decision is arbitrary or fresh facts come to light. In view of this, if the assessee in a subsequent year is able to satisfy the income tax authority that the previous finding is not correct either because it was not arrived at after due enquiry or because it is arbitrary of if the assessee has put before the income tax authority fresh facts from which a different conclusion can be arrived at, then in that case the income tax authority would be justified in arriving a different conclusion than what was arrived at in the previous proceeding. C.W.T., Southern Region, Karachi v. Abid Hussain – [1999] 80 TAX 89 (H.C.Kar.) = [1999 PTD 2895
329.

Principles of waiver or estoppel do not apply against a provision of law.

There is no waiver or estoppel against a provision of law and furthermore the question of exemption, being a question of law, it could be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If any authority is required in support of this it is to be found in the case of Shad Muhammad v. Pir Sabir Shah, reported in PLD 1995 SC 66. Moin Sons (Pvt.). Ltd., Rawalpindi v. Capital Development Authority, Islamabad – [1998] 78 TAX 168 (H.C.Lah.)
330.

Doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be invoked against the legislature and the laws framed by it.

The Capital Development Authority would be under an obligation under the law to deduct Income Tax on all the bills to be paid to the petitioner in accordance with the rate or rates specified in the First Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, pursuant to sub-section (4) of section 50 thereof. In the case, of failure to deduct tax in accordance with the rate specified in the First Schedule to the Ordinance, the Capital Development Authority will be liable to penal action specified in section 52 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, meaning thereby that irrespective of sub-clause 73.1 of the agreement between the petitioner and the Capital Development Authority the liability of payment of tax at the rate or rates specified in the First Schedule to the Ordinance will remain intact. As held by the Supreme Court in Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 2 Others v. Salahuddin and 3 others (PLD 1991 SC 546). The doctrine of

193
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Legislature or the laws framed by it. It was held by the Court that payments received by the contractors are deemed to be their income in terms of section 80C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, which does not contain any provision that the rate of tax shall relate back to the date on which agreement was entered into and not when the payments were received. It was, thus, held therein that the contractors were liable to, pay tax on the payments received by them under the contracts of the nature specified by sub-section (2) of section 80C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979, at the rate prevailing at the time of receipt of payments and not on the date the contrat under which these payments were made were entered into. In the instant case, the petitioner is not being asked to pay tax at the, enhanced rate on the payments which had been made to him prior to the first, July, 1995, but the tax at the prevailing rate of 5% is being collected on the payments to be received by him on and after the first July, 1995, when the rate of tax was enhanced under the Finance Act, 1995, from 3% to 5% on the payments to be made to the contractors. Hence, in view thereof, the deduction of tax at the enhanced rate cannot be claimed to have been given retroactive operation.
Cases referred to: Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, lsMmabad and 6 others (1997) 76 Tax 5 (S.C.Pak.) = (PLD 1997 SC 582); Al-Samrez Enterprise v. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMA 1917); Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 2 others v. Salahuddih and 3 others (PLD 1991 SC 546); Altaf Construction Co. v. Central Board of Revenue and others (1995 PTD 804) = (1996) 74 Tax 39 (H.C.Lah.) and Sarwar & Co. v. C.B.R. and others (1997) 76 Tax 1 (H.C.Lah.) = (1997 PTD 1138).

Afzal Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chairman, CBR – [1990] 62 TAX 91 (H.C.Lah.)
331.

Equitable doctrine of estoppel.

As regards technical objection to the sustenance of the writ petition, it may be observed that estoppel does not flow out of the proceedings which are violative of law. The rule that a litigant on account of his conduct may be disentitled to discretionary relief under writ jurisdiction, is an equitable doctrine by which the court regulates its jurisdiction and is not an absolute rule.

194
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

S.M. Abdullah v. CIT – [1966) 14 TAX 161 (H.C.Kar.)
332.

Principle of res judicata and estoppel.

The doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by record cannot be applied to proceedings pending before the Income Tax authorities. Admittedly the proceedings before them are not judicial proceedings in the sense that they are before the courts of law. The assessment of Income Tax authorities for a particular year is binding on the parties to the extent of that assessment. But the question is whether the Income Tax authorities are entitled to change the basis of assessment or the footing on which the previous assessment was made in subsequent years. In other words, whether they are entitled to blow hot and cold in the same breath? On principles of natural justice, finality and certainty of decision is expected and desirable even before quasi-judicial tribunals like the Income Tax authorities, and if such a tribunal arbitrarily and capriciously comes to a different conclusion from another tribunal on the same question, it will create uncertainty in the minds of the assessee. In order to avoid resulting injustice, there is an implied limitation on the power of such tribunal, namely, that it cannot reopen a question unless some fresh facts comes to its notice or the previous decision was arrived at without equity and is perverse. This implied restriction is inherent in every quasi judicial tribunal and there is no reason why it should not be applied in the case of Income-tax authority. Ahmed Maritime Breakers Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue etc. – [1992] 65 TAX 268 (H.C.Kar.)
333.

Executive actions are not excluded from the operation of promissory estoppel.

Bare perusal of the above citation would make it clear that executive actions are not excluded from the operation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
_______________

NATURAL JUSTICE/DUTIES OF COURT

Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan & 2 others v. Aswab Ali & others – 1969 SCC 350 = [1975] 31 TAX 101 (S.C.Pak)
334.

Affording of an opportunity is a prerequisite for taking penal action.

It is an elementary principle of law that no person can be subjected to an obligation without affording him an opportunity to show cause.

195
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Similarly, an order favouring a person passed by a competent authority cannot be varied to his disadvantage without hearing him. Commissioner of Income Tax East Pakistan v. Fazlur Rahman & Saeedur Rahman – 1964 SCC 176 = [1964] 10 TAX 49 (S.C.Pak)
335.

An order affecting the rights of a party cannot be passed without an opportunity of hearing to that party.

We do not think the mere absence of a provision as to notice can override the principle of natural justice that an order affecting the rights of party cannot be passed without an opportunity of hearing to that party. Yet it cannot be said that it is not necessary to hear the parties affected in a proceeding under section 115, CPC.The fact that the proceedings are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature is sufficient to entitle a party to a hearing in the absence of specific provision to the contrary. Mustafa Prestressed R.C.C.Pipe Works Ltd. Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Investigation), Karachi – [1990] 62 TAX 119 (H.C.Kar.)
336.

Duties of courts in administration of justice.

The Courts and quasi-judicial officers are required not only to do justice but to perform their duties in such a manner that justice is seen to have been done. In discharge of such duties no steps should be taken which may create apprehension in the mind of a litigant that justice may not be done. If a subordinate officer submits his proposed order to his revisional appellate or superior authority and after his approval announces it then it will furnish a strong ground for challenging it, although such authority may not have amended the order. Such reference indicates that the judicial mind of the officer passing the judgment was not free and sufficiently tainted as he had in the mind the feeling that he has to submit the proposed order to his superior officer and thus may have thought fit to make such an order which may be acceptable to him. If the documents are such which a party has to produce the same may not be looked into if not produced at the relevant time, but if reference is to be made to the notifications or gazettes then they have to be treated differently from the documents which require proof. Duly notified order can be referred by looking to the gazettes. It is the primary duty of every party to produce all the records and documents relevant to the case. But so statute, rules and notifications which are notified and gazetted are concerned they should not escape notice of the court and all efforts should be made to find them out so that a

196
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

wrong order may not be passed. Therefore, the court should not entirely rely upon the parties and their advocates for producing these documents, but should make search, to find out the state of law applicable to a case. Karachi, Textile Dyeing and Printing Works, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Karachi – [1984] 49 TAX 18 (H.C.Kar.)
337.

No adverse order should be passed against a party without affording an opportunity to meet the case.

No party can be condemned on basis of evidence or information adduced behind his back and without any notice to him. It is true that technicalities of Evidence Act cannot fetter the exercise of power of the Assessing Authority but rule of justice demands that before any adverse order, penalty or liability is passed or imposed upon a party he should be afforded full opportunity to meet the case and rebut the evidence used against him. Sheikh Akhtar Ali v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others – [1980] 42 TAX 47 (H.C.Lah.)
338.

Justice should not only be done but must also appear to have been done.

Justice should not only be done but must also appear to have been done. Sh. Diwan Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad, Karachi v. CBR – [1969] 19 TAX 198 (H.C.Kar.)
339.

Principles of natural justice are part and parcel of every statute unless there is specific provision in a particular statute to the contrary.

It has been irrevocably held by decisions of the Supreme Court that the rules of natural justice are to be read as part and parcel of every statute unless and until there is a specific provision in a particular statute to the contrary. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surridge and Beecheno – [1968] 18 TAX 72 (H.C.Kar.)
340.

Principles of natural justice cannot be invoked in deciding a legal issue with reference to the statutory provision.

We are doubtful of the application of the principles of natural justice by the learned Tribunal inasmuch as the matter has to be decided in the first instance strictly in legal plane with reference to the statutory provision whose proper application clinches the issue.

197
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Crown Bus Service Ltd. Lahore v. CBR and others – [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.C.Lah.)
341.

The court must consider the intention and not merely the form, while examining a document.

We may observe as a matter of principle, all that the courts of law are required to examine while considering a document or an instrument is the intention and not merely the form of any order or direction continued therein depending upon the facts, circumstances and the context of each case. Commissioner of Income Tax Rawalpindi Zone, Rawalpindi v. New Afza Hotel Rawalpindi – [1973] 27 TAX 212 (H.C.Lah.)
342.

Judicious exercise of discretion.

Since the discretion is objective it is to be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice and not according to the private opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be not arbitrary, vogue and fanciful but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to exercise. New Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd., Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi – PLD 1999 S.C. 1126
343.

Article 4 of Constitution of Pakistan 1973 vis-a-vis “due process of law”.

There are certain basic norms of justice. One of the cardinal principles of such basic norms is that one cannot be a judge in his own cause. The breach of the said cardinal principle of jurisprudence will in fact be violative of the right of „access to justice to all‟ which is a wellrecognised inviolable right enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitution. This right is equally founded in the doctrine of „due process of law‟. The right of access to justice includes the right to be treated according to law, the right to have a fair and proper trial and the right to have an impartial Court or Tribunal. The term „due process of law‟ can be summarised as follows:(1) A person shall have notice of proceedings which affect his rights, (2) He shall be given reasonable opportunity to defend, (3) That the Tribunal or Court before which his rights are adjudicated is so constituted as to give reasonable assurance of its honesty and impartiality, and (4) That it is a Court of competent jurisdiction. Above are the basic requirements of the doctrine „due process of law‟

198
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

which is enshrined, inter alia, in Article 4 of the Constitution. It is intrinsically linked with the right to have access to justice which is a fundamental right. This right, inter alia, includes the right to have a fair and proper trial and a right to have an impartial Court or Tribunal. A person cannot be said to have been given a fair and proper trial unless he is provided a reasonable opportunity to defend the allegation made against him. Messrs Neelam Textile Mills Ltd. v. State Bank of Pakistan and 2 others – PLD 1999 Kar. 433
344.

Public power and administrative discretion ought to be exercised fairly.

We may further observe that it is by now settled law that all public power and administrative discretion ought to be exercised fairly and reasonably and a burden imposed must bear a reasonable nexus with the harm caused. The concept of proportionality in the exercise of public power has been recognised and approved by our Courts and in the case of Independent Newspaper Corporation v. Chairman Fourth Wage Board (1993 SCMR 1533) the Honourable Supreme Court observed „the principle is well-settled that when express statutory power is conferred on a public functionary, it could not be pushed too far, for such conferment implies a restraint in operating that power, so as to exercise it justly and reasonably. In the words of Scarman, L.J ‟ excessive use of lawful powers is itself unlawful.
_______________

DOCTRINE OF MUTUALITY

Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore v. The Lyallpur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Lyallpur – [1959] 1-TAX (III-150) (H.C.West Pakistan, Lahore Bench) = 1959 PTD 639 = 1959 PLD 627
345.

Five-point criteria for applying “doctrine of mutuality”.

The assessee was registered under the Co-operative Societies Act 1912. Up to 1948, income of all co-operative societies and banks was exempt from payment of tax, but on the 20th August 1948, the exemption was withdrawn. Shortly after this, the Central Board of Revenue issued a circular that profits earned by co-operative credit societies registered under the Co-operative Societies‟ Act 1912 from dealing with their own members would continue to be exempt under the doctrine of mutuality. The Income Tax Officer while making

199
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

assessment for the charge year 1950-51 declined to exclude such profits from the income of the assessee on the ground that it was not derived on the basis of mutuality. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the Income Tax Officers ‟ order on the ground that since the assessee‟s business consisted of financing Co-operative Societies and other parties and loans were not restricted exclusively to members, the income in question had arisen not because of the relationship between the assessee and its members but because of the loans advanced to them. The Appellate Tribunal accepted the assessee‟s contention that doctrine of mutuality was applicable incase of income derived from members because one could not assess income arising to oneself. After discussing a good deal of the case law the Department ‟s reference failed and the Tribunal‟s finding was upheld. Their Lordships while examining the cases cited, observed that each of those cases was based on its own peculiar facts.
Judicial review: This is perhaps the only case in Pakistan where their Lordships have considered the doctrine of mutuality at a great length, considering a number of cases cited at bar. Their Lordships laid down five point criteria in determining the applicability of the doctrine of mutuality. After applying the said criterion, their Lordships observed that interest on loans advanced to members of the assessee should be exempt from tax. Cases referred: Last v. London Assurance Corporation (2 Tax cases 100 CH. L.); Styles (Surveyor of Taxes) v. New York Life Insurance Company (2 Tax cases 460 CH. L.); Secretary, Board of Revenue (Income Tax) Madras v. The Mylopore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd. (1) Income Tax cases 217 (Madras) Trichmopoly Tennore Hindu Permanent Fund Ltd., v. Commissioner of Income Tax Madras (1937 ITR 703); Commissioner of Income Tax Madras v. Salem District Urban Bank Ltd. (1940 ITR 269); The English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Commissioner. of Agr. Income Tax Assam (1945 ITR 295); The English and Scottish Joint Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Agr. Income Tax Assam (1948 ITR 270 (P.C.); Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd., v. Hills (16 Tax cases 430).
_______________

NON-APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TAX LAWS TO TRIBAL AREAS

Haji Ibrahim Ishaq Johri v. Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi – [1982] 45 TAX 263 (H.C.Kar.) = 1982 PTD 46 = 1990 PTCL 954 = 1982 PLD 266
346.

Non-application of Federal tax laws to tribal areas etc.

According to the above Article of the 1962 Constitution, no central law was to apply to any tribal area unless the Governor of the Province

200
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

which the tribal area was situated, with the previous approval of the President, so directed. In the circumstances we are of the view that Income Tax Act, 1922 was not applicable to Swat for the assessment years in question.
_______________

RULES RELATING TO INTERPRETATION OF AMENDING PROVISIONS EXPLAINED

Sainrapt & Et. Brice, Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax (West), Karachi [1979] 40 TAX 116 (H.C.Kar.) = PLD 1979 591
347.

Rules relating to interpretation of amending provisions explained.

It is well established that in the interpretation of statutes, the meaning of the words should be considered in the light of history of the legislation and the state of the law at the time the statute was passed, in order to consider whether the statute was intended to alter the law or to leave it exactly where it stood before. As observed by Maxwell on “Interpretation of Statutes” (12th Edition page 47), the Court is not to be, oblivious of the history of law and legislation and the Court has to say what is the object of the legislation in amending the law. Craies on “Statute Law” (7th Edition at page 126) observes that the cause and necessity of the Act may be discovered by considering the state of the law at the time when the Act was passed and in innumerable cases the Courts with a view to construing an Act have considered the existing law and reviewed the history of legislation upon the subject.
Cases referred to : Rais Pir Ahmad Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore Zone, Lahore (1975 PTD 70) = [1975] 32 TAX 22; Sitaram Motiram Jain v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1961] 43 ITR 405; Wallem & Co. (Pak) Ltd. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1974 PTD 207] = [1974] 30 TAX 34; Pherozali v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Est) Pakistan, Karachi [PLD 1978 Kar. 765] = [1979] 40 TAX 109 and Abdul Aziz and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim [PLD 1977 SC 442].

Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore v. Kohinoor Industries Ltd., Lahore – [1977] 35 TAX 42 (H.C.Lah.)
348.

Scope and import of incorporated provisions of law explained.

The learned counsel for the petitioner did not dispute the well established position of law that when some provisions of an earlier Act are incorporated in a later Act, the incorporated provisions, for all practical purposes, become part and parcel of the later Act and no subsequent change in the earlier Act even though retrospective in its

201
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

application, shall apply to the incorporated provisions of the later Act unless the same had been made applicable express or by necessary intendment.
_______________

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL LIABILITIES

Highway Petroleum Service (Regd.), Lahore v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H.C.Lah.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797
349.

Principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities.

Before adverting to the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners on merits which he canvassed very ably, if I may say so with respect, it may be said straight-away, that he is quite right when he made the submissions about the principles governing interpretation of financial liabilities. The tax can be imposed on “income ” and not on any thing else much less on expenditure or tax, which is not an “income” but a liability. But all this does not solve the problem and help the petitioners. They are not being imposed a tax. What is happening to them is that for non-compliance of the relevant provisions for paying the tax either in full or part they are being asked to pay an additional amount. In other words, for withholding the amount which they were liable to pay, they are being told that for user of that amount or depravation of the use of the same by the rightful owner i.e, the State, the person concerned must pay an additional amount. Now, it is quite common in Civil Law that a person withholding somebody else ‟s money and using the same or depriving the rightful owner of used, the former may be liable to make good the gain derived by him, or, suffer the loss which the rightful owner had undergone for not getting his money. Therefore when the petitioners are asked to pay additional amount of tax for non payment of the tax contrary to law, they are not being imposed additional amount of tax on their income but are being asked to defray the liability for non-compliance of the law. The use of the phrase “additional amount of tax ” and since that is calculable with reference to the non paid or underpaid amount of the tax, gives an impression that the demand is of “additional amount of tax ” on the non paid or unpaid “tax”, and that, no additional amount of tax can be levied on. tax, the latter being not an income but an expenditure

202
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

or liability, Though the phrase “additional amount of tax ” as a whole is loose and it would have sufficed to say that for nonpayment or under payment. The defaulting persons would be liable to pay additional amount ” without saying “of tax ”, yet, for an inaccurate or inapt phrase, the provision cannot be rendered nugatory.....an inapt and inaccurate phraseology of the draftsman cannot and should not nullify a provision made by the Legislature which is consistent with existing legal norms.
Cases referred to : Maxwell, on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, p.157; Craies, on Statute Law, 17th Edition, pp.112-115; Bank Chettinad Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1940) 1 ITR 523; D‟avigdor Goldmid v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (1953) A.C. 347; Wijesuriya v. Amit (l965) 33 All. E.R. 72 and (1944) AIR F.C. 73.
_______________

INTERPRETATION LEADING TO DESTRUCTIVE ENDS SHOULD BE AVOIDED BY COURTS

Crown Bus Service Ltd., Lahore v. Central Board of Revenue and others – [1976] 34 TAX 54 (H.C.Lah.)
350.

Interpretation leading to destructive ends should be avoided by Courts.

In Act IV of 1924 no particular mode of constituting the Central Board of Revenue has been mentioned except, perhaps, by making appointments of its members and we are doubtful as to whether any such plea in his context can be successfully advanced by the petitioner. The objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on the assumption that under section 2 of Act IV of 1924 two formalities viz. (a) constitution of Central Board of Revenue and (b) appointments of its members, had to be independently performed and if, for instance, certain person or persons are straightaway appointed as members of the Central Board of Revenue that probably is not enough. We do not agree, because, there is nothing to lead to such a corollary in the wording of section 2 of Act IV of 1924. Confining ourselves to the notification dated 29.8.1947 we may observe as a matter of principle, all that the courts of law are required to examine while considering a document or an instrument is the intention and not merely the form of any order or direction continued therein depending upon the facts, circumstances and the context of each case. Acting on that principle we hold that if the intention of making appointments of certain officer or officers as members of the Central Board of Revenue is for example with a view

203
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

to establish the Central Board of Revenue and similarly if the appointments cannot be made except when it implies a creation of the Central Board of Revenue, then on the facts and overall circumstances in such situations, it can be safely held that the aforesaid appointment inter alia implied the constitution of the Central Board of Revenue as well and a specific and independent recital regarding the creation of the Central Board of Revenue is not to be considered as a must, especially when as already pointed out, in Act IV of 1924 no particular form and procedure for constituting a Central Board of Revenue had been laid down. The view of our government has also been the same. This will bear out the deductions which we have made from Governor-General‟s Orders Nos. 2 and 12 of 1947 hereinbefore referred to. The first was issued by Lord Mountbatten and the letter by the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in their capacities as Governor-General of their respective countries. These two Orders implied that the Central Board of Revenue constituted as a legal entity in 1924 continued with necessary adaptation for each Dominion and it was on that assumption that without staging its recreation or reconstitution various powers, functions and directions were given or assigned to it, because, otherwise there was no justification to quote or make mention of Central Board of Revenue for Pakistan and Central Board of Revenue for India in those two Orders when no such Boards as alleged by the petitioner existed then and thereafter. We were told that neither in India nor in Pakistan there was staged any re-creation or re-constitution of the Central Board of Revenue afresh and that both the countries acted on the premises that the Central Board of Revenue constituted in 1924 was a legal entity which had duly come into being in that year and later on only appointments of its members were to be made whenever necessary. It was on that construction of the relevant law that both the countries uptil now worked. The Central Board of Revenue is referred to in (i) Income Tax Act XL of 1922 (ii) Central Board of Revenue Act VI of 1924; (iii) Excess Profits Tax Act XV of 1940; (iv) Business Profits Tax Act XXI of 1947; (v) Central Excise and Salt Tax Act I of 1944; (vi) Sea Customs Act VII of 1888; and (vii) Land Customs Act XIX of 1924. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted it will mean that almost whole of the revenue financial laws of the country came to a stand still due to non-creation of the Central Board of Revenue as alleged. Obviously we cannot endorse such a plea. If the contention as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted that

204
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

will create complications and confusions for all concerned leading to a great deal of chaos in the country and will throw open all the actions taken, functions performed, orders passed and directions issued by the Central Board of Revenue after 1947 up to-date or, as a matter of fact, onward from 1924. On the other hand, the view taken by us will not lead to any destructive results. It is well settled that courts should follow that construction of law which does not lead to startling results or destructive ends.
Cases referred to : Bashir Ahmnad Khan v. Mahniud Ali Khan Chowdhury (PLD 1960 S.C 195); United Netherland Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (PLD 1965 S.C. 412); [1965] 12 TAX 57 and Nazir Ahmad v. Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 S.C. 453).
_______________

TERMS AND PHRASES USED IN ONE STATUTE

Commissioner of Income Tax, Rawalpindi v. Noon Sugar Mills – [1975] 32 TAX 273 (H.C.Lah.)
351.

Phrases used in one statute borrowed as aid in support of the interpretation of a different statute meant for a different purpose and dealing with a wholly different subject matter is not always safe.

It is not always safe to borrow the meanings attached to terms and phrases used in one statute as aid in support of the interpretation of a different statute meant for a different purpose and dealing with a wholly different subject matter. It is of course permissible to have recourse to the ordinary dictionary meanings in interpreting a statute.
Cases referred to: Littlewood v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. British Overseas Airway Corporation (1953, 2A. B.R. 915); Roberts v. Roberts L (1962, 2 A.E.R. 697); Wallance Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay (1938) 16 ITR 240; Chatturam Horilram Ltd. v. Commissione of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa (1955) 27 ITR 709; Radhashyam Agarwala v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan (PLD 1960 S.C. 187); (1960) 2-TAX (III-211) (S.C.).
_______________

205
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

MARGINAL NOTES TO THE SECTION OF AN ACT CANNOT BE REFERRED TO FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSTRUING THE ACT

Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore v. Aziz Din – [1976] 33 TAX 258 (H.C.Lah.)
352.

Marginal notes to the section of an Act cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act.

But in this connection before us reliance was strongly placed on the marginal note to section 46 of the Act which speaks of the “Mode and time of recovery”. It was, therefore, contended that sub-section (I) of this section recovery of imposition of penalty is nothing but a provision for mode of relating to the tax and a part of the machinery provided to facilitate the recovery of tax. It is lever and a handle to exert pressure on the assessee and even to force him to pay the arrears of tax due from him. But we see no force in this contention. These marginal notes do not form part of the section. These observations were cited with approval by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax, East Bengal v. B.W.M. Abdul Rehman Manager, Taki Bara Taraf Wards Estate [(1973) SCMR 445] and the Court observed that in interpreting a fiscal statute only the letter or the law must be looked to and there is no room for any intendment. Also in Mssrs Hirjina & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd.. Karachi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Central, Karachi [(1971) SCMR 128], the Court held that in interpreting a taxing statute the Courts must look to the words of the Statute and interpret it in the light of what is clearly expressed. It cannot imply anything which is not expressed, It cannot import provisions in the statute so as to support assumed deficiency. In the instant case, we find that in the adaptation order passed by the Central Board of Revenue, it is not expressly stated that the penalty provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 46 of the Income Tax Act are applicable to the amount payable in virtue of Martial Law Regulation No. 43/48 and it is not permissible to import any such construction into that order by implication.
Cases referred to: Sushil Kumar v. Emperor (AIR 1943 Cal. 489); Sutton v. Sutton [(1882) 22 Ch.D 511]; Balraj Kumar and annher v. Jagat Pal Singh [(1904) ILR 26 All. 393]; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ahmadbhai Umarbhai & Co. (AIR 1950 S.C. 134); Cap Brandy Syndicate v. In land Revenu Commissioner [(1921) 1 K.B. 64]; Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax v. B.W.M. Abdul Rahman, Manager Taki Bara Taraf Wards Estate [(1973) SCMR 445]; Hirjina & Co. (Pak.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1971] SCMR 128]; [1975] 31 TAX 78 (S.C.); Rajba v. Lala and another

206
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

(PLD 1971 Lah. 1056) and Siraj Din v. Mst. Iqbal Begum (PLD 1968 Lah. 639).
_______________

PRINCIPLE OF LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Eastern Textile Mills Ltd., Chittagong v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca / and / G. Merajuddin and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca – [1966] 13 TAX 145 (H.C.Dacca)
353.

Provisions should be interpretated in accordance with the plain meaning of the language used therein.

It is an accepted principle of interpretation that a statute is to be understood in accordance with the plain meaning of the language used. in it. “If there is one rule of construction of statutes and other document, it is that you must dot simply anything in them which is inconsistent with the words expressly used”. Noor Hussain, Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dacca – [1963] 7 TAX 113 (H.C.Dacca) = 1963 PTD 161 = 1963 PLD 373
354.

Statute should be given its ordinary meaning.

Interpretation of one statute by analogy to interpretation of another is unsafe, particularly when two statutes not pari materia. Proper way of construction is to give effect to all words of relevant provisions dispassionately. Fiscal statute must be strictly construed in favour of assessee. Golden rule is that statute must prima facie be given its ordinary meaning.
_______________

DOCTRINE OF FAVOURABLE INTERPRETATION

Barnala Commission Shop, Chak-Jhumra v. Income Tax Officer, B-Ward, Lyallpur – [1963] 7 TAX 153 (H.C.Lah.) = 1963 PTD 534 = 1963 PLD 311
355.

Doctrine of favourable interpretation applies to charging and not to machinery provisions.

Fiscal provision in case of ambiguity should be interpretation in favour of subject. This doctrine applies to charging provisions of Act and not to collecting provisions.
CASE APPROVED: [1961] 4 TAX 94 (Trib).
_______________

207
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

DEPARTMENT CAN GO BEYOND A TRANSACTION

Mian Muhammad Allah Buksh v. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1962 PTD 603 (H.C.Lah.)
356.

Department can go beyond a transaction.

In case of splitting into four subsidiary firms of partners of an existing firm the deponent could decide whether it constitutes „transaction‟ designed to evade tax liability. Burden of proof rests with the department, which can go behind transaction to find affirmatively whether there was intention to evade tax.
_______________

APPLICATION OF TAX RATES THROUGH A FINANCE ACT EXPLAINED

Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. Wahidur Rahman, Income Tax Officer, Companies Circle IV, Chittagong [1961] 4 TAX 135 (H.C.Dacca) = 1961 PTD 1110 = 1962 PLD 104
357.

Application of tax rates through a Finance Act explained.

The assessee, an Income Tax Officer, received a sum of Rs.4,581 as his salary for the period from 1st April, 1956 to 3rd March, 1957. Under section 18(2) of the Income tax Act tax was deducted at source from month to month at the rates laid down by the Finance Act, 1956. In making the assessment for the assessment year 1957-58 the assessing Income Tax Officer worked out the total income at Rs.4,585, including his income chargeable under the head “salaries”. The income was assessed to tax at the rates laid down by the Finance Act, 1956 and after giving credit for the tax deducted at source, provident fund contributions, etc., a net amount of Rs.4/2/- was found payable by the assessee. The assessee filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner contending that for the assessment year 1957-58 the minimum taxable income was fixed at an amount exceeding Rs.5,000 and as his income during the year 1956-57 was below the limit of Rs.5,000 he was not liable to be assessed and pay any tax at all. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepting the contention reversed the assessment order. The Department filed a second appeal and contended before the Tribunal that the proviso to the Schedule to the Finance Acts of 1956 and 1957, providing for exemption of income not exceeding Rs.4,200 and Rs.5,000 respectively, are inseparable parts of the rate structure and in the case of salary earner what should be considered to be immune from taxation for the taxing year 1957-58 is

208
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

Rs.4,200 under the proviso to the Schedule to the Finance Act, 1956 and not Rs.5,000 under the proviso to the Schedule to the Finance Act, 1957. The Tribunal could not accept the contention of the Department and affirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On a reference by the Department the High Court upholding the order of the Tribunal: Held, that: (i) sub-section (3) of section 17 of the Finance Act, 1957 is only applicable to those cases where the assessee himself is chargeable to Income Tax under section 17 of the Finance Act of 1957. If he is not chargeable, there is no scope for application of sub-section (3) of section 17 of the Finance Act of 1957; and in section 17(3) of the Finance Act, 1957 the reference to the Finance Act, 1956 is only for the purpose of calculation of income tax on the salaried portion of the total income and in doing so it may be on the basis of the exemption amount of Rs.4,200, provided his total income is chargeable i.e., exceeding Rs.5,000.
_______________

(ii)

ACT IS TO BE READ AS A WHOLE

Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan v. Aizuddin Gazi and others – [1960] 2-TAX (III-474) (H.C.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 727 = 1960 PLD 535
358.

Act is to be read as a whole.

Act should be so construed as not to render other parts superfluous, void or insignificant. It should be construed as a whole. It is court ‟s duty to reconcile different provision of law especially in case of taxing statute.
_______________

STATUTE SHOULD BE READ AS A WHOLE

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hoosen Kasam Dada Karachi – 1960 PTD 574 (H.C.Dacca)
359.

Statute should be read as a whole.

One section in statute should not be read independently of all others and should be given unreasonable interpretation.

209
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Judicial analyses : CONFIRMED by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Commissioner of Income Tax, East Pakistan Dacca v. Hossen Kasam Dada, Karachi 1961 SCC 102 = [1961] 4 TAX 96 (S.C.Pak.) with the following observations: “Such a reading of the provisions of Business Profits Tax Act appears to us not only to be reasonable but also the one which produce a consistency with the various provisions thereof. To hold otherwise would produce the anomalous result that whilst a dishonest assessee would be protected from harassment after the lapse of four year, an hones assessee would remain exposed to the harassment for even 10 to 50 years. It is difficult to impute such an iniquitous intention to the Legislature.
_______________

SECTION VS. RULE

Commissioner of Income Tax, South Zone, Karachi v. Radio Hotel, Karachi – [1959] 1-TAX (III-407) (H.C.West Pakistan, Karachi) = 1959 PTD 707 = 1959 PLD 539
360.

Rules cannot be called in aid to interpret sections of the Act. In case of discrepancy in language of section and rules, section is to prevail.

Three references were simultaneously decided by a joint order. In all these references the partnership deeds were executed after the lapse of the relevant year of account and on this ground the Income Tax Officer had refused to allow registration under section 26A of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal in all these cases had allowed registration. At the instance of the Department the Tribunal referred the following question of law to the High Court “Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee firm which came into existence by verbal agreement, long before the relevant year of account is entitled to be registered under section 26A of the Income Tax Act, in respect of the assessment year 1951-52 relevant to the previous year ending the 31st March, 1951, when the instrument of partnership was drawn up on the 16th April, 1951, that is to say, after the expiry of the relevant „previous year‟.” Following the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rashid Motors [(1957) 32 ITR 101] it was held that it is not necessary to bring a partnership into existence, that such an instrument may legitimately

210
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

record the previous history of the partnership and that what is being registered is not the instrument but the firm.
Judicial analyses : FOLLOWED BY - Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rashid Motors [1957] 32 ITR 101, wherein it was held that it not necessary to bring a partnership into existence, that such an instrument may legitimately record the previous history of the partnership and that what is being registered is not the instrument but the firm. Cases relied: Dwarkadas Khetan and Co., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City [AIR 1956 Bom. 321] and Commissioner of Income Tax, East Bengal v. Messrs. Rashid Motors, Chittagong [PLD 1957 Dacca 459]. Cases descended from: R. C. Mitter & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal [AIR 1956 Cal. 303]; Kalsi Mechanical Works, Nandpur v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Simla [AIR 1953 Pb. 301]; Messrs. Padam Parshad Rattan Chand of Delhi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi [AIR 1954 Pb. 188] and B. N. Dheer & Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi [AIR 1958 Pb. 463].
_______________

PRINCIPLE OF APPROBATE AND REPROBATE

Guarantee Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and another – [2000] 82 TAX 131 (H.C.Lah.)
361.

Principle of approbate and reprobate explained.

Mere reading of sub-clause (2) of clause 54* clearly reveals that petitioner has to pay income tax in accordance with the prevailing Income Tax Law of the Government of Pakistan, therefore, petitioner is estopped to agitate the matter before High Court on the well-known principle of approbate and reprobate as per rule laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ghulam Rasool‟s case (PLD 1971 SC 376). The petitioner wants enforcement of contract, through constitutional jurisdiction which is not permissible as per principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the following judgements:PLD 1958 SC 267 (The Chandpur Mills Ltd. v. The District Magistrate, Tippera etc.) PLD 1962 SC 108 (Messrs Momin Motors Co. v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dacca etc.). 1999 YLR 950 (Muhammad Insar etc. v. Administrator, Town Committee, Kabirwala and 4 others).
_______________

* This is subsection (2) of section 54 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872)

211
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

HIGH COURT IS COMPETENT TO ENTERTAIN WRIT WHERE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IS INVOLVED

Bank of Punjab v. Federation of Pakistan – [2000] 81 TAX 390 (H.C.Lah.)
362.

High Court is competent to entertain writ where interpretation of law is involved.

The fate of this case turns upon the interpretation of section 53(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 and the said dispute can very well be decided by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction without insisting that the petitioner should follow the remedies provided by the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979. Furthermore, it appears that the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax was influenced by Circular No. 13 of 1997 issued by the Central Board of Revenue which had been declared as without lawful authority by this Court. In view of what has been said above, this petition is allowed, the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax to the extent it disallowed the petitioner to deduct the tax paid by it under section 50 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 while computing the payment of advance tax payable under section 53, is declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect.
_______________

GENERAL RULES IN RESPECT OF WRIT PETITION

Chairman, Central Board of Revenue v. Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd. – [2001] 83 TAX 119 (S.C.Pak.)
363.

Petition challenging order under section 53 held to be maintainable.

The petition under Article 199 of the Constitution was maintainable and the learned members of Division Bench of Sindh High Court rightly held so. Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi & other v. N.V. Philip’s Gloelampenfabriaken, Karachi – 1993 SCC 1022 = [1993] 68 TAX 35 (S.C.Pak.)
364.

Conditions for maintainability of writ petitions explained.

“………We may now revert to the question, whether the appellant was justified to file above constitutional petition against the order of the Tribunal instead of invoking section 136 of the Ordinance for making

212
Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

a reference to the High Court. According to Mr. Rehan Naqvi, a reference under the above provision would not have been adequate and efficacious remedy as it would have taken years before it could have been heard. The same could be true for a onstitutional petition. The tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service constitutional jurisdiction of the court has developed lately which is to be discouraged. However, in certain cases invoking of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing of remedy provided for under the relevant statute may be justified, for example when the impugned order/action is palpably without jurisdiction and/or malafide. To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach a forum provided for in the relevant statute may not be just and proper. H.M. Abdullah v. Income Tax Officer Circle V, Karachi & 2 others – 1993 SCC 1018 = [1993] 68 TAX 29 (S.C.Pak.)
365.

Constitutional circumstances.

jurisdiction

only

in

extraordinary

Income Tax Ordinance is a complete code in itself which creates rights in favour of an assessee and in certain circumstances in favour of the Revenue as well, and also provides remedy for redress of the grievances of the aggrieved party. In every tax case, constitutional jurisdictions as an alternate remedy in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be availed. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observations appearing in Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies II, Karachi & others v. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) Pakistan 1992 SCC 957 = [1993] 67 TAX 1 (S.C.Pak) = PLD 1992 SC 847 at p.861: “In cases where any party resorts to statutory remedy against an order he cannot abandon or bypass it without any valid and reasonable cause and file constitutional petition challenging the same order. Such practice, in cases where statute provides alternate and efficacious remedy up to High Court, cannot be approved.”

213
SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1

Shagufta Begum v. Income Tax Officer, Circle XI, Zone B Lahore – 1989 SCC 715 = [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S.C.Pak.)
366.

Writ jurisdiction can be invoked in cases of mala fides action by the departmental authorities.

In case of mala fides, particularly when the allegation, is that the departmental authorities on account of political or other reasons would either be not free to decide correctly or on account of their own departmental compulsion be prejudiced in rendering a particular verdict, writ jurisdiction under Article 199 is the appropriate remedy.
367.

Extraordinary jurisdiction is not necessarily a speedy remedy.

In practice it takes longer time for disposal of writ petitions than departmental appeals. For example in this very case the writ petition was filed in September 1984. About five years have passed but the matter has not yet been disposed of. This has happened despite the dismissal of the writ petition in limine. Had it been admitted to hearing it might have taken much longer period to reach the Supreme Court. It is accordingly in the interest of litigants themselves first to choose the speedier remedy with the Department Authorities and thereafter if needed they can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. Income Tax Officer – 1988 SCC 710 = [1989] 60 TAX 52 (S.C.Pak.)
368.

The assessee has other options like filing a complaint with Ombudsman.

In case the petitioner has not allowed any relief by the departmental authorities (despite the observations by the Supreme Court) the petitioner would have no immediate remedy at all against the highhandedness of the department. In such circumstances amongst other remedies, he can file a complaint/grievance application before the Federal Ombudsman, who can provide effective redress. Muhammad Khan v. Shamsuddin and others – 1969 SCC 319 = [1975] 31 TAX 94 (S.C.Pak.)
369.

Order passed without giving opportunity of being heard is not sustainable.

On merit the point raised in the writ petition falls within the principle laid down by this Court, in the case of Dina Sohrab Katrak [PTD (1959) S.C. 45]. The order of the Provincial Government setting aside the sale without hearing the appellant cannot be upheld.

High Court can exercise constitutional jurisdiction in a case where alternate remedy is only illusory in its nature and on the face of order it is clearly misapplication of law. the Province of West Pakistan. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.) Ltd. in this respect reference is invited to Khawaja Muhammad v.Lah. Gujranwala – [1999] 80 TAX 262 (H. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and it is declared that the order dated the 5th July 1955. Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others – [2000] 82 TAX 135 (H. Respondent No. passed by the Government of Sindh. The Income Tax Officer and 4 others – 2000 PTD 306 371. Learned counsel is correct in pointing out that the Central Board of Revenue having adopted the stated interpretation of the . Kawther Grain (Pvt. Reliance of the learned counsel in this regard re: Jullien Hoshanj Dinshaw Trust (supra) is relevant and pertinent. The principle of law that orders in contravention of mandatory provisions of law are a nullify and no limitation runs against such orders seems well settled. Pakistan Electric Fittings Manufacturing Co. I will also agree that the alternate remedy in the facts and circumstances of the case is only illusory in nature.C. was passed without lawful authority. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. is directed to dispose of the applications for setting aside the sale filed by respondent Nos. 4. Ahmed & Company (supra) approved the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by this Court. 1 to 3 after notice to the appellant.) 372. Hussain Bakhsh PLD 1976 SC 37. In such situation the apex Court in re: Collector of Customs v. It is also an established principle of law that when the petitioner failed to avail himself of the remedies available to him under any statute he would have no locus standi to file a Constitutional petition in the High Court to challenge the legality and validity of the orders. As far the maintainability is concerned. v. I will agree that the assessment order in question on the face of it is a clear case of misapplication of law.M. No time limitation for illegal orders. through Directors v. Marduman Babar Kahol 1987 SCMR 1543.Lah.214 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C. As a result the appeal is allowed.) 370. Remedies not availed disentitles the party from relief if constitutional petition also fails. Ltd. S. also see Ali Muhammad v. Islamuddin and 3 others v.

Collector of Customs (PLD 1972 Karachi 210).C.M. Writs held to be maintainable vis-a-vis doctrine of exhaustion as no bar. (1969) 19 Tax 97 (S.) = (PLD 1990 SC 399). C.Pak.R. Collector of Customs.Pak. Central Board of Revenue Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1964 SC 113). 424. Income Tax Officer (1963) 7 Tax 442 (S. Cases referred to: Messrs Hirjina & Co. Government of Pakistan and others – PTCL 1999 CL. EduIji Dinshaw Limited v. Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. Customs House Lahore and 3 others v.) = (1993 SCMR 1998).C. Messrs Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust and others v. Muhammad Younus v.) = (1993 SCMR 1195).Pak. Karachi (1971) 23 Tax 230 (S.B. Khizar Hayat PLD 1977 Lah.C. Hazoor Bakhsh v.Pak. Gatron (Industries) Ltd. Ahmad & Company (Pvt. Income Tax Officer (1993) 68 Tax 29 (S. v. Star Vacuum Bottle Manufacturing Company v. Income Tax Officer (1990) 61 Tax 105 (S. Steel Brothers & Co. Abdullah v. The Income Tax Officer (1968 SCMR 1035). is a rule of convenience and discretion .215 SHORT TITLE. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 provisions in question no Officer in the hierarchy in all probability would show indulgence for the petitioner.Pak. Trust Ceramics Industry v. See Qamar-uz-Zaman v. Lyallpur v.C.) Ltd. Pakistan (1993) 68 Tax 176 (S. flow from doctrine of exhaustion as embodied in Article 199 of the Constitution. It is hardly necessary to reiterate that this doctrine does not absolutely bar the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate such petitions if other remedies are available against the impugned orders/grievance. Deputy Collector CE & LC. Commissioner of Sales Tax Central. 359 = 1999 SCMR 1072  The rule about invoking the constitution jurisdiction only after exhausting all other remedies. Justice Aftab Hussain in Haji Muhammad v. H.) = (1992 SCMR 250).) = (1971 SCMR 128). Government of Pakistan v.C.Pak.C. (1991 SCMR 138). Nagina Silk Mill. v. v. Nagina Dal Factory v.) = (PLD 1963 SC 322). Islamabad (1999 SCMR 138). Messrs S. In highly exceptional circumstances this Court definitely will come to the rescue of the affected party as pointed out by a celebrated Judge Mr. Hashwani Hotel (PLD 1990 SC 68). (Pakistan) Ltd.M.C. v.) = (1968 SCMR 374). Zila Council Bahawalpir 1990 MLD 1748. Doctrine of exhaustion is regulatory in nature. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the orders/proceedings/actions of functionaries of State under attack are in excess of authority or totally destitute of authority it had power to come to the relief of the affected party in exceptional circumstances. While parting with this order we are inclined to reiterate that rules enunciated above.Pak. Rahimyar Khan and 12 others – PLD 1999 Lahore 417 373. Income Tax Officer (1992) 65 Tax 102 (S. Senior Superintendent of Police.

further proceeded to direct that the petitioner shall not sell or deal with any property belonging to her except with the permission in writing to that effect granted by the .) Ltd. I am of the considered view that in the peculiar circumstances of this suit. Recovery Rules framed under subsection (5) of section 93 of Income Tax Ordinance.) = 1997 PTD 821  I have give my anxious consideration to the arguments addressed at the Bar. the jurisdiction of this Court is not barred. the present writ petition was still maintainable as in such circumstances where the efficacious and speedy remedy was not available the writ petitions are maintainable. Tri Star Industries (Pvt. Commissioner of Income Tax Companies-I. For this view. v. by which the Court regulates its proceedings and it is not a rule of law affecting the jurisdiction. It is very clear from the impugned notice that the respondent had under Tax.C. I am fortified by the observations made in the case of Al-Ahram Builders (supra). A constitution petition is competent if an order is passed by a Court or Authority by exceeding its jurisdiction even if the remedy of appeal/revision against such order is available. as provided under Chapter VI of the Act. Mrs.C.Kar.) = 1998 PTD 3923]  Keeping in view the allegations of the plaintiffs as levelled in the plaint and for the facts and law stated hereinabove. depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper‟.216 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.Lah. Reliance is placed on Premier Cloth Mills v.C. No doubt the petitioner directly approached this Court without availing the rights of appeal. for example when the impugned order/action is palpably without jurisdiction and/or mala fide. revision and reference etc. also reported in (1993 SCMR 29) where at page 38/39 it was held that „in certain cases invoking of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing of remedy provided for under the relevant statute may be justified. Tahmina Daultana v. Sales Tax Officer (1974) 29 Tax 199 (S.Pak = PLD 1972 SC 257 and Nagina Silk Mills Ltd.Pak) = PLD 1963 SC 322.C. Hafiz Naeem-ud-Din – (1997) 75 TAX 261 (H. & 8 others v. Income Tax Officer and another (1963) 7 Tax 442 (S. Karachi & 5 others – [1999] 79 TAX 255 (H. 1979.

was infringed.1. 1979 on 29. – [1989] 59 TAX 115 (H.217 SHORT TITLE.301 for the year 1993-94 and Rs. It cannot be denied that interference of notice can be made by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction where the proposed action lacks jurisdiction on the part of authority . 1963 do not cure the irregularity or omission on the part of the respondent in not issuing the notice in the format prescribed under Wealth Tax Act. The provision of section 45-A of Wealth Tax Act. Income Tax Officer etc.)  The learned counsel for the respondent.Kar.4. resulting in substantial prejudice to the petition. v. very vehemently argued before us that mere issuance of notice could not furnish any ground to the petitioner to approach this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction as the Income Tax Ordinance 1979 provided adequate and efficacious remedy in this regard which should have been exhaust by the petitioner before approaching this Court. in cases where an action is alleged to be mala fide or is obviously without jurisdiction or where vires of legislation is in question.10. Central Board of Revenue. etc. In view of the above the notices issued to the petitioner under section 85 of Income Tax Ordinance.Kar. It is clear from the contents of the notice impugned that prejudice in fact was caused to the petitioner and a legal right to appeal which was available to her and which was to be notified to her in Form-C. Car Tunes v.)  While it is true that where alternative remedy is provided by a statute those remedies should first be resorted to before seeking relief under Article 199 of the Constitution. 1963.C.1. however. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Tax Recovery Officer.02.1995 for payment of tax assessment at Rs. – [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. format of notice under section 30 of the Wealth Tax act.C.138 for the year 1994-95 and notice under section 93(2) of the said Ordinance for payment of assessed amount under section 93(2) thereof are declared to be without lawful authority and without any effect against the petitioner. Although detailed reasons are not given in the above quoted order but it is quite clear that existence of another remedy under the relevant law was not considered as a bar for issuance of direction under Article 199 of the Constitution.” Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd. the petition under Article 199 would be maintainable.

4. Case referred to: Civil Appeal No. is available. We accordingly accept this petition and declare the notice dated 11. 5-K of 1986.4. . In these circumstances no useful purpose will be served by allowing the continuation of proceedings in pursuance of the aforesaid before the hierarchy of Income Tax Department.. cannot be refused.C. Islamic Republic of Pakistan – [1981] 44 TAX 59 (H.J&K)  Ordinarily a person aggrieved of an order of a statutory authority under the Income Tax Ordinance. was passed by the said authority without jurisdiction or in exercise of a colourful jurisdiction or the spirit of natural justice was violated or the order was passed without providing an opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved person and it was patently illegal and no adequate remedy was available against it.5.C.1987 issued by the successor Income Tax Officer is based merely on a change of opinion which could not in law justify reopening of the case under section 65 of the Income Tax Ordinance. unjust and mala fide even in cases where alternate remedy by way of appeal etc. We have already reached the conclusion in this case that the notice dated 11. Deputy Collector Excise & Taxation – [1988] 57 TAX 14 (H.218 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. must avail of himself the remedies provided in the Ordinance and he is not entitled to by pass those remedies and seek Civil judicial review of the said.1987 issued by the respondent as without authority.Kar. Abdul Hamid & Others v.A. initiating the action or on the basis of admitted facts the action proposed by the authority is shown to be unsustainable in law. Hussain Sugar Mills v. in exercise of the powers vested in him but if the order sought to be reviewed or quashed.).C. dated 16. the relief sought for by way of writ petition.)  It is now a settled law that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 is always available to the party in cases where the impugned orders are without lawful authority.1988 (S. right away when the order was passed by the authority. partial.

Revenue Division and Chairman.C. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply has submitted that this writ petition be converted into a reference under section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance. Islamabad and another – [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H. 1979. According to respondents SRO 484(I)/92 allows exemption from Customs duty and . I am afraid this cannot be done firstly because the last order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on review petition was made on 14. The question to be considered in all such cases is whether the remedy available under the law is adequate. This would hardly justify the conversion of this writ petition to a reference which has now been patently and hopelessly time-barred. Per Amanullah Abbasi. v.11. Tax Recovery Officer-04 Coys Zone.C.R. However..Kar.C. Even otherwise all the factual and legal issues have been thoroughly thrashed at the level of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show me any material from which a question of law may be framed under section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance.)  It is also now well established that it is a rule of practice and not of law for this court to entertain a petition despite the fact that another remedy was available. efficacious.) = 1998 PCTLR 440 = 1998 PTD 874 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 International Body Builders v.Lah. C.219 SHORT TITLE. Interim relief in the form of release of goods on furnishing of indemnity bond held reasonable.Kar. Writ cannot be converted into appeal under section 136.The arguments and contentions of the petitioner and respondents have been examined.Lah.C.1991. instead of availing a proper remedy under section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.4.1993 and the reference was required to be filed within 90 days of the date of original decision of the Tribunal which was rendered on 3.) 374. J. .) 375. Needless to say that the reference in the High Court is to be dealt with by a Division Bench if at all it is to be preferred.B. Tharparkar Sugar Mills Ltd. speedier and shall provide a petitioner with the relief claimed? Abdul Hameed Awan v. the petitioner opted to move a miscellaneous application against the decision of the Appellate Tribunal. Sales Tax Officer. Income Tax Building at Rawalpindi and 3 others – [1997] 76 TAX 238 (H. Lahore – [1980] 41 TAX 60 (H.

Ghous Muhammad.1995 and bill of entry was also submitted before this date. v. It is stated that vessel arrived on 30. Cases referred to: Associated Trading Co. Union of India (1980) 122 ITR 227.C.In view of these facts as also because of the reason that the Government of Pakistan.12.6. lnayat Hussein v. The petitioner wants the machinery for installation as allowed and the respondents want duty/taxes.1996 we order that the machinery in question be released to the petitioner on furnishing of indemnity bond to the satisfaction of Collector of Customs. 68). Accordingly it can be said that benefits of SRO 484(I)/92 were available in all cases where import General Manifest was filed prior to 30. The learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that vested rights were created because all contracts were prior to 30.) = (1994 PTD 581). Guilstan Textile Mills v. Karachi. Al Samrez Enterprise v.6. (PLD 1987 Kar 63). This SRO cannot be made applicable to the goods which arrived after 30. The petition may be fixed for regular hearing within three months. especially because the petition already stands admitted on this score vide admission orders of any other bench dated 17. Assistant Collector Customs (1966) 14 TAX 176 (H.Dacca) = (PLD 196 Dacca 276).R. Ahmed Mujtaba Memon Asstt Collector Customs mentions that duty is chargeable on standard rate of duty/taxes. Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917). Kamran Industries v.1995 and manifest was filed after 30.1995. The value and rate is determined as on the date the manifest is delivered and bill of entry is field. . Ltd. .B.1995.Kar. Finance Division.) = (PLD 1996 Kar. Usmania Glass Sheet Factories Ltd. The counter affidavit filed by Mr.6.C. The amount is not mentioned.6. C. Per Dr. J.6. I have come to the conclusion that the petitioner has a prima facie case which warrants further probe and analysis and it would be very unreasonable to deny interim relief in the form of release of goods till disposal of the petition.220 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. (Investment Wing) in 2 letters attached as Annexures C-1 and E-3 has confirmed that any delay is not attributable to the sponsors/petitioners and that the petitioner‟s project has been politically victimized.Kar.95. In similar cases to Hon‟ble Supreme Court and Lahore High Court following the order of Supreme Court in Petition No. There is_ a dispute of few days Only and according to petitioner delay was caused because of political victimization otherwise he was entitled to benefits of SRO 484(I)/92.6. v.1995 after the expiry of SRO 484(1)192. The goods of petitioner arrived on 30. Federation of Pakistan (1994) 70 TAX 272 (H.2.1995 but ft has not been clarified in the affidavit as to how much amount is payable by petitioner. Collector of Customs (1995) 72 TAX 223 (H. Sales Tax to machinery imported during the period commencing from 1st December 1990 and ending on 30. 695-L/1995 dated 11.C.6.1995.

Pakistan through the Secretary.Queeta) 376.P. Metro Shipbreakers and another v. Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan (1994 PTO 1422). Since the facts of C. No.C. Income Tax Officer. Federation of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1905).P. Pakistan Paper Products v.B. 261 of 1994 C.221 SHORT TITLE. Federation of Pakistan. Abdullah & Co. C. v.R. Kamran Industries. We accordingly held that the petition is maintainable also because it appears to be a point of first impression which has to be decided as to . Abdul Cadir Adam Saedat v. No. No. Federation of Pakistan. Nasir Flour Mills (Pvt. Also of this stage. Salochistan Textile Mills Ltd. 193 of 1994 are common and law points involved are also similar and indentical. Collector of Customs (Exports) Karachi and Others – [1995] 72 TAX 223 (H.Kar. Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to enforce the rights which were not in existence at the time when the offending enactments were passed.P. Trustees of Port of Karachi v. International Tea Traders v. (1984 CLC 2192). Collector of Customs (PLD 1992 Kar. once the petition has already been admitted if we were to non-suit the petitioner only on grounds of maintainability the petitioner would be left without any remedy since the 30 day statutory period for filing the revision petition under section 196 of the Customs Act has long expired. In the light of what has been discussed above. Karachi v.) 377. M. and C. etc. Statutory period for filing the revision petition has long expired . Islamabad. Govt. S. 262 of 1994. therefore all the petitions are disposed of by this common judgment and keeping in view the above discussion being devoid of force merit dismissal.Whether petitioner could non-suit only on the ground of maintainability . Federation of Pakistan (1994 PTD 1421). It can be safely inferred that the import fee was legally charged from the petitioner at the relevant time when Letter of Credit was opened in view of the Provisions as contained in Import Fee Order.C. v.Y. – [1996] 73 TAX 85 (H. 1993. v. Considering that his view of the recovery drive the alternate revisional remedy was hardly efficacious.. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Inter Ocean Cargo Services Karachi v. Manzoor Sans Corporation (1993 SCMS 69) and Ashique Hussain v. Ministry of Finance. Molasses Trading v.Held no. The State (PLD 1994 SC 879). of Pakistan (1994 SCMR 2123). We feel that the facts and circumstances of this case would not justify us to dismiss the petition only on grounds of maintainability. 258). Mansoor Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 PTD 1411). which have nat been challenged. Electronics Industries (Pvt) Ltd.) Ltd.

C. Government of Pakistan v. Writ petition admitted to regular hearing to consider the vires of legislation. 244) and Nagina Silk Mills v. We. Sardar Ghulam Nabi Khan v. C. whether the Customs authorities have any jurisdiction to question into the valuation and scrutinize the description of the goods imported into the EPZ. Kamal Khan (PLD 1990 SC 1051). Central Excise and Sales Tax. 364). Akbar Ali v. Central Excise and Land Customs. direct that no further action will be taken for recovery of the tax on account of profits on sales of assets. Central Board of Revenue. v. Safia Begum v. etc. Sheikhupura [1995] 72 TAX 218 (H. Deputy Superintendent. Zainab v.) 379. – [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. South British Insurance Co. Deputy Collector Customs.424/. Salah ud Din v.Pak.T. we are of the opinion that the petition having been admitted to regular hearing. Mst. 458).M.C. lmdad Ali (1969) SCMR 708) Latif Bors. Mananwala Circle. Fazal Rehman (1982 CLC 1286). Friends Sugar Mills (PLD 1975 S. Mst. [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. S.Lah. Cases relied on: Premier Cloth Mills v.98.) = (PLD 1963 S. The State (PLD 1973 Kar. (1972 SCMR 257) = (1974) 29 TAX 199 (S.Kar. Malkani and another (PLD 1965 Lah. demand could be stayed. etc. Lahore (1992 SCMR 1083) and Mst.subject to the petitioner furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Nazir of this Court to the extent of that amount plus profits thereon @ 24% per annum from the date of demand till payment. to the extent of Rs. therefore. Cases referred to: S.).66. 1990 but whether the same was efficacious also is to be seen in the circumstances of the writ petitions. 322). Income Tax Officer.222 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.B. Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd.Pak. In the circumstances. 217).C.C. Moulvi Ahmad Saeed (NLR 1982 Rev. Basharat Ali and another v. 659). (PLD 1975 Kar. Chittagong v. The Collector. v. If remedy provided under the law is not efficacious and speedy petition is maintainable. Barkat Ali v.C. 145). 576). No doubt the remedy of appeal and revision was provided under Sales Tax Act. Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir (1984 CLC 325). . I am of the view that the remedy provided under the law was not efficacious and speedy so far as the carriers were concerned. Muhammad Sarwar v. Ehsan Elahi (PLD 1980 Lah.C. (PLD 1959 SC Pak.R.O. Ltd. Eastern Rice Syndicate v. it is necessary that further action not recovery of the amount mentioned in the application be stayed.) 378. Anwar Sethi v.

f. Income Tax Authorities – [1993] 68 TAX 173 (H. Learned counsel for the respondents has no objection to the fixation of the period of one month for decision of the cases.Lah.Held yes. It is observed.223 SHORT TITLE. Mr. Eastern Poutry Services v.C. I and. today. As against the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 404 of 1990 case of the petitioner Nos. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Saleem and Co. Resultantly. Government of Pakistan and others – [1993] 68 TAX 171 (H. Muhammad Ilyas Khan. therefore. Exemption of assessee from payment of Income Tax was refused by the Income Tax Authorities . the respondents have no objection to the acceptance of both the writ petitions and setting aside of the impugned order and remission of the cases of the petitioners to respondent No. set aside the impugned orders and remit the cases of the petitioners which have been decided and direct that their cases as well as the cases of other petitioners which have not been decided as yet and which are pending adjudication shall be decided within a period of one month w.1 and 2 has been decided so far whereas the case of other petitioners in still pending adjudication with respondent No.High Court set aside the order of refusal of exemption and remitted the cases of assessee for decision according to law with the consent of parties and with a view to avoid delay.C. in order to avoid the piecemeal decision of the matter in issue. The assessment of income tax as against the petitioners shall not be finalised till disposal of the cases by respondent No. the period of one month may be fled for decision of the cases of all the petitioners. 1. they shall be at liberty to move this Court again. v.e.1 for decision thereof in accordance with law. however that in case the petitioners are not satisfied after the matter is finally decided by the respondents. He submits that stay cannot be granted in view of the provisions of Article 199(4) of the Constitution.Whether argument was without merit . The argument is without merit.) 381. Advocate learned counsel for the respondents has contended that in Writ No. Learned counsel for the petitioners has accepted the offer made by the learned counsel for the respondents and has stated that in view of the apprehension of the petitioners that decision of the cases shall be delayed.Kar. Respondent‟s contention that stay shall not be granted unless the prescribed Law Officer has been given notice of the application and an opportunity of being heard . . we accept both the writ petitions.) 380.

Cases referred to: (PLD 1960 Kar. has to seek remedy under the relevant law on the subject. 179). D-69 85 in an identical writ petition filed by the present petitioner has granted the stay subject to furnishing security in respect of the tax amount. under these circumstances.) 383. (PLD 1981 Kar. (AIR 1981 SC 1284).3. 383). Any person who is affected by the order of any authority. Mirpur and 2 others – [1992] 66 TAX 226 (H. Muhammad Ismail v. No party can be allowed to avail writ jurisdiction without first availing the remedies available to it under the relevant law. Operation of notices under sections 56 & 61. (AIR 1949 FC 135).C. (PLD 1965 SC 479). As said in the early part of the order. Commissioner of Income Tax. Income Tax Officer. High Court can grant stay of recovery of tax. Stay granted for extension of short period could be given beyond six months cannot be held. Such notice and opportunity have been given in this ease.224 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. (PLD 1982 Lah. 7). (PLD 1970 Kar. Income Tax Officer and another – (1987) 56 TAX 120 (H. Siddique Trust v. we would grant the . Stay granted could not be given beyond six months. the right of appeal under section 129 was available against the order of Income Tax Officer dated 20. Article 199(4) provides that stay shall not be granted unless the prescribed Law Officer has been given notice of the application and an opportunity of being heard. Since another Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 5. – [1987] 56 TAX 78 (H. (AIR 1962 Bombay 92). (PLD 1971 SC 242).C. The petitioner had not availed this remedy. (PLD 1975 Lah.1989.9.) 384. (AIR 1960 SC 56).AJ&K) 382. (PLD 1973 Kar. Therefore. Extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked without first availing the remedies available under the relevant law.Kar.1937 passed in Constitution Petition No. 174). The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court could be invoked only in cases where efficacious and alternate remedy is not available.C. (PLD 1973 SC 589). etc. Even a right of appeal has been given before the Supreme Court. 123). the order of assessment passed by the Income Tax Officer had attained finality. (PLD 1979 SC 44). first of all. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) v.Kar. 452).

The scope of interference in this case. Exercise of jurisdiction of high Court is confined only to consideration whether authority had acted with or without jurisdiction. Karachi and two others – [1981] 43 TAX 92 (H. limited to the inquiry.). If the answer in the affirmative. No. therefore. on closer examination. Lahore v.225 SHORT TITLE. Begum Nusrat Bhutto v.C. Income Tax Officer. the petitioner is not entitled to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court by way of writ petition. Circle V.C.) Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust v. The petitions are not competent under Article 199 of the Constitution as the petitioners have other alternate and equally efficacious remedy. confined only to consideration whether the authority had acted with or without jurisdiction. Escorts Limited v. Case referred to: Paramount Electric Company. Income Tax Officer Central Circle 1. The exercise of jurisdiction is. Muhammad Hanif Monnoo v.Lah. Income Tax Officer. this Court will stay its hand and will not substitute its belief for that of the Income Tax Officer. Lahore – [1984] 50 TAX 37 (H.C. Where alternate and equally efficacious remedy is available. The precedents cited at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Commissioner of Income Tax. the remedy of appeal is not an adequate remedy and in such cases the constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked.) = 1981 PTD 53 386.C. Circle XVIII.). Income Tax Officer. South Zone. Lahore Zone [1974] 29 Tax 77 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 stay but subject to furnishing bank guarantee of the amounts involved in three writ petitions (either a joint bank guarantee or three separate bank guarantees) within a month and thereafter the above petition as well as the other connected petitions be fixed for regular bearing as Case. have been found to be not applicable to the facts of the present case. an appropriate writ may be granted. 423 385. Lahore [1975] 31 Tax 164 (H. the learned counsel for the respondents is on much firmer ground.Lah. Rawalpindi [1980] 42 Tax 59 (H. however. In .Kar.C. There is no cavil with the proposition that where the question of jurisdiction of the authority passing the impugned order is raised.Lah.) = PLJ 1984 Lah. If the answer is in the negative. 1. under Articles 9 of the Provisional Constitution order is. whether the Income Tax Officer had definite information on the basis of material on record or he had already obtained previous approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.Lah.

v.) = 1977 PTD 183 = 1977 PLD 797 387. Habib Ahmad v.226 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Provisions of the Income Tax can be challenged constitutional grounds inspite of alternate remedies. since the questions raised in these petitions relate to the challenge of the provisions in the Income Tax Act. Rekhi v. 861). inspite of alternate remedies.C. the first two petitions the petitioners have still an opportunity to raise their plea before the Income Tax Officer and in case of an adverse decision file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and eventually the matter can come up before the High Court in a reference under section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance. Chittagong (PLD 1962 SC 113). The submission is obviously sound and is sustained. Thus.Lah. . Bashir Co. First Income Tax Officer – [1950] 18 ITR 618 (Punj. Lahore v. writ of prohibition cannot be issued. lastly. Further. to declare the same to be invalid. that as the impugned provisions are being challenged on constitutional grounds. It is submitted that a Court interpretation the Constitution finally is an appropriate forum to raise the questions.) 388. on The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there is no right of appeal against the impugned orders and that a revision or reference is no right of a litigant. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another – [1977] 36 TAX 8 (H. Cases referred to : Burmah Oil Co. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1971 Lah. where there had been suppression of material facts in the affidavit which was filed by the petitioner. Highway Petroleum Service (Regd. Income Tax Officer (1968 SCMR 997). v. Income Tax Officer (1972 SCMR 631) and Colony Textile Mills Ltd.C. Trustees of the Port Trust. A writ of prohibition is issued only where there is something done in the absence of jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. the petitioners have a right to challenge the same by means of a petition under the Constitution and that. the court would refuse a writ of prohibition without going into the merits of the case. U. It would not be possible for the authorities created by the Income Tax Act itself. Where there has been suppression of material/facts. Judicial Review: OVERRULED by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1993 SCC 777 = (1992) 65 Tax 102 = 1992 SCMR 250 = PTCL 1992 CL 181.).

Exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction is not called for even where relief ought to be granted on ascertainment of facts as High Court cannot assume functions of Income Tax Authorities. it became the duty of the Commissioner to grant relief if the entitlement was clear. Judicial Review: OVERRULED BY . In writ court cannot assume jurisdiction of income tax department. that ignorance of law was no excuse. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance.” _______________ WRIT HELD MAINTAINABLE Pak-Saudi Fertilizer Ltd. on a ground which was legally not supportable.C. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Singer Sewing Machine Co.Pak).) = 1999 PTD 4061 390. Islamabad and 4 others [2000] 81 TAX 119 (H.Kar. v. owing to misapprehension of the correct position. That may be conceded. through Managing Director v. All these factors go to establish the bona fides of the assessee-company in claiming that the assessment in question was not appealed against. on an erroneous view of law by the Commissioner. of which it availed itself and the relief was denied to it. That such a proceeding in revision would be a judicial proceeding and not merely departmental affair. Their Lordships observed: “.The Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1965 SCC 234 = [1965] 11 TAX 364 (S. . according to judicial principles.C. It must be found as a result of the above discussion that the Commissioner declined to exercise his undoubled jurisdiction in the case.227 SHORT TITLE. The High Court has observed. we still feel that in the present . Though we have held that the impugned order under section 53 is appealable under section 129. . In the circumstances. The power of revision has to be exercised.) = 1964 PTD 554 389. We allow the appeal and quash the order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax in this case. Writ is maintainable where order is illegal notwithstanding the availability of alternate remedy.” “. . This fact calls for correction of his order. The provision of section 33A(2) apparently envisages a remedy alternative to a regular appeal from assessment. Commissioner of Income Tax and others – [1964] 9 TAX 273 (H. .Kar.C. but section 33. The learned Commissioner apparently misdirected himself in holding that he had no power to interfere in the matter. in this connection. sub-section (20 provided on alternative judicial remedy to the assessee.

Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education v. it was incumbent upon the respondents to see and apply conscious mind to the facts that they had wrongly deducted the income tax on the securities belonging to the petitioner which were admittedly exempted from payment of income tax. When an order is void and made without lawful authority this Court has the jurisdiction to deal with the matters in order to determine the legal rights of the parties. Collector of Customs PLD 1996 Kar. it would be a travesty of justice. as in the present circumstances. – [1999] 79 TAX 28 (H. the question of alternative remedy is not available to the respondents. mala fide. 68. which reiterates this principle yet again. The provision of section 50 and the provision of section 48 of the Income Tax Act on its bare reading explain that it relates to a person who is liable to pay tax in excess of what was required from him. The order on its face is a void order and made without lawful authority. It is settled law that availability of alternate remedies would be no bar to the maintainability of Constitutional petitions where impugned orders are completely without jurisdiction. v.) 391.Lah. unlawful and of no legal effect. therefore. Central Board of Revenue. Therefore. to decline relief as the impugned exercise of power goes to the very root of the jurisdiction.C. Therefore. it was incumbent upon the respondents to refund the income tax on Securities illegally deducted by them. Writ is the appropriate remedy where order is void and without lawful authority The instant writ petition has been admitted to regular hearing.228 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. and which was earlier echoed by this Court in Kamran Industries v. 1999 SCMR 1072. It does not apply to one who is exempted from payment of income tax. In the instant case admittedly the petitioner on coming to know about the illegal deduction had filed numerous reminders and appeal before the respondents and the limitation of four years as envisaged in section 50 and section 48 of the Income Tax Act was obviously not applicable to the petitioner‟s case. When it is amply demonstrated that the impugned order is completely without jurisdiction. . circumstances the petition would be maintainable since the impugned order is completely without jurisdiction and extraneous to the very powers conferred under the 1979 Ordinance on the Assessing Officer. etc. The latest pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in this regard in Gatron (Industries) Ltd. Government of Pakistan.

C. was not sustainable in law. petition is I would now like to deal with the objection of the learned D. political victimization. from tax exempted security. 353]. 72).R. Revenue Division and Chairman. was void ab initio.Pak.Pak.A. Case referred to: Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1996] 74 TAX 141 (H. Where a finding of fact not based on evidence or where material evidence ignored.C.) = (1993) SCMR 1810) and The Commissioner of Income Tax. N. Karachi [1993] 68 TAX 35 (S.) = (1993 SCMR 1798). Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak. Tharparkar Sugar Mills Ltd.) = (1993 PTD 865). Settlement Commissioner and another (PLJ 1974 Lah.G.C. Karachi and 2 others v. Islamabad and another [1996] 73 TAX 215 (H. was not governed by the provisions of Income Tax Act.C. reference under section 136 is maintainable.C. Shaukat Fazal and 4 others [1993] 68 TAX 145 (S. 598). [1974 PTD 207]. Syed Nazir Hassan v..).Ind). Cases referred to: [PLD 1958 (S. therefore. and arbitrary in nature.C. C. maintainable. 151]. He was making hectic efforts but all the respondents were misapplying their mind holding that the claim made by the petitioner is time barred which was not time barred as their original action of illegal deduction of income tax. v. Wealth Tax Officer and another v. [PLD 1976 Lah. Where any authority guided and governed by law exceeds jurisdiction and interferes in any person ‟s right by passing a void order. Adamjee Insurance Company Ltd. this Court in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction can determine the rights of such party against a void order and writ jurisdiction is available to such party. that the petition is pre-mature and warrants dismissal since no bill of entry has been filed and no assessment or evaluation thereon has been made by the Respondents to examine whether in the first place the .B.229 SHORT TITLE. Philip‟s Gloeilampen Fabriaken. Karachi and others (1982 PTD 274) = (1983) 47 TAX 10 (H.C.Kar.) 393. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 The petitioner was not liable to pay income tax. From the perusal of the authority quoted herein before it follows that a finding of fact not based on evidence or where material evidence is ignored a reference to the High Court will be maintainable. Islamabad and 5 others [1993] 68 TAX 176 (S.Kar. Fazal Be and 6 Others v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1956 F. Mst.V.C. [1962] TAX 239 and [1953] 24 ITR 506. In case of writ. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary.AJ&K) 392. Pakistan through the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan in the Ministry of Finance. The Punjab Province v. v.

In the end a lot would depend upon the facts and nature of each individual case and the above are only some guidelines.O. I am of the view that there is nothing wrong with the course adopted by the petitioner who became aggrieved the moment the subsequent notifications dated 4. however. in identical petitions the Lahore High Court in W. No.R. petitioner is or not entitled to the sought exemption. The stance taken by the learned D.P. I. 1174/95 and W.O.1995 were issued by the C.B. Article 199 of the Constitution clearly spells out that the High Court in a writ jurisdiction has not only the power to pass a corrective order by curring a defect in an existing order but it also has the power to prohibit a functionary from passing an illegal order.R.G. I feel that the courts while granting interim relief in a tax mailer ought to consider that It would be completely against the concept of writ jurisdiction to give such terms to the assessee which would amount to directly or indirectly depositing the demand amount.A. If the assessee is an identificable person and also holds assets it can be asked not to sell or dispose of that property whereon some lien or charge can be created or otherwise the assessee can be asked to arrange an insurance guarantee to the satisfaction of Nazir of the Court according to the directions given by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Trustees of Port of Karachi v. I am of the view that this objection is not tenable.10.230 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Although I was inclined to direct release of goods upon submission of an insurance guarantee to the satisfaction of Nazir and/or upon an undertaking of the petitioners that till disposal of the petition the factory shall not be sold. 484 subject to the petitioner furnishing an indemnity bond . in this regard is quite at variance with the stance taken in the counter-affidavit wherein it had been categorically stated that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under S. 1221/95 has granted an interim relief by directing the Respondents to release goods in terms of S. Manzoor Sons Corporation (1993 SCMR 69). accordingly hold that the petition is not premature while in doing so I may also point out that nowhere in the counter affidavit has this objection been taken. Such interpretation is quite apparent from the language employed in Article 199(1)(a)(i). No. In other words the High Court under Article 199 has squarely the power to pass a prohibitory order of restrain against a threatened action as well. I have also noticed that in income tax matters since the assessees are associated with the exchequer not only in a one-off transaction the courts have been willing to grant unconditional stays. 484.1995 and 29.10.P.R. There is every indication that assessment on the bill of entry is a mere formality as is also apparent by the stance taken in the counter affidavit.

The Central Board of Revenue has already issued a circular in this regard indicating a process to be followed by the Assessing Officer while applying the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 80-C of the Ordinance. GEC Avery (Pvt. Many instances can be found where even the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has been found to endorse the opinion held by the Board of Revenue. in view of such clear instructions issued by the Board in the said Circular.B. the superior Courts have always stepped in to prevent excess. would have resulted into a tax liability equal to the presumptive tax paid.2. which if taxed at normal rates. in cases involving fiscal rights. Any sum in excess of that amount is to be regarded as unexplained investment with reference to the relevant provisions of section 13. In view of the delay occasioned in disposing of the listed interim application we direct the Collector of Customs to comply with the instant order as expeditiously as possible without any further delay. Accordingly the respondents are directed to release the goods of the petitioners as per list enclosed as annexure F-3 and F-4 (i.Kar. High Court can step in to prevent excess..) Ltd.e. Islamabad and 2 Others – [1995] 72 TAX 81 (H. committed by public functionaries. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 for the disputed amount. if any.5.1996 in Civil Petition No. Now. Government of Pakistan through C.1992 upon the petitioner submitting an indemnity bond to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs.R. Even otherwise.) 394. By working backward. adequate and effective remedies available to the petitioner. in another identical mailer the Lahore High Court directed the petitioner to submit a bank guarantee instead of indemnity bond while on appeal in that matter the Supreme Court through order dated 11.C.6.1995) of the petition in terms of S. interestingly. for goods where contracts are finalized prior to 30. In cases involving fiscal rights even if alternate. . It would not be out of point to cite Ashique Hussain v.R.231 SHORT TITLE. as has been held by the Supreme court in the case of Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust. 484(I)/92 dated 14. The State (PLD 1994 SC 879) wherein a full bench of the Supreme Court has sternly admonished the courts below to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.O. 695-L/96 modified the order of the Lahore High Court and directed release of goods on furnishing of indemnity bond to the satisfaction of Collector of Customs. a figure of income is to be first determined. v. it cannot be understood what useful purpose would have been served if the assessee had first availed the remedies provided in the Ordinance.

232 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C.C. [1971] 22 TAX 229 (S. We are. it will be appropriate to first decide the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding maintainability af the above petitions.Kar. Hamdard Dawakhana (Waqf) Pakistan v.. Commissioner of Income Tax Central Zone.Pak) = (1990 PTD 155). committed by public functionaries. Before considering the arguments on merit.) = (PLD 1971 SC 205) and Edulji Dinshaw v. It is accordingly contended that the petitioner having opted for availing of the departmental remedy in the cases under the Ordinance. the admitted position in the cases is that the appeals filed before the Tribunal by the petitioner against the .) = (1992 PTD 1). Income Tax Officer [1992] 65 TAX 102 (S. though for different years.C. was not entitled to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court without having first exhausted all the remedies provided under the Ordinance. the fact that the controversy involved in the above petitions rests mainly on the interpretation and affect of the Judgments in cage of the petitioner by the Supreme Court. therefore. we are of the view that the above petitions cannot be dismissed as not maintainable. the petitioner filed further departmental appeals before Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which are still pending. Income Tax Officer [1990] 61 TAX 105 (S.Pak. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. not inclined to consider the preliminary objection. The Contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner in all the above cases while filing petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution against the orders of Income Tax Officer had also simultaneously filed the departmental appeals which were subsequently decided during the pendency of these petitions and thereafter. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations of the learned Judges of the Division Bench and applying the test laid down in the above case to the present cases.T. Besides.O.Pak.3.) 395. (reported in PLD 1980 SC 84) and that of the Division Bench of this Court in Civil Reference No. 5 of 1966 dated 24.1981 with reference to Clause 93 of the Second Schedule to the Ordinance.C. S. ‘B’ Karachi and another – [1990] 62 TAX 98 (H. v. in the above cases. if any. Writ held maintainable even during the pendency of appeals when demand of taxes was huge and ran into millions and the department was pressing hard for its recovery but orders passed were against the law as held earlier by courts. Cases referred to: Julain Hoshang Dinshaw Trust and others v.

It is also admitted before us that demand of taxes against the petitioner on account of rejection of their claim for exemption is huge and runs into millions and the department is pressing hard for its recovery and as there is no stay. The appealable orders are mentioned in this section. STO (1972 SCMR 257) and Husein Sugar Mills Ltd. Raraehi v. Writ maintainable provided order is unlawful although alternate remedy available to the petition.Pak) = (1989 PTD 544).C. Income Tax Officer [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S. C. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd.233 SHORT TITLE.C. Cases referred to: Tripura Modern Bank Ltd. therefore. 236).C.Pak) = (1968 SCMR 1035).AJ&K) 396. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (PLD 1987 S. Muhammad Afzal Advocate has referred to me section 30 of the Income Tax Act of 1922 = section 129 of the Income Tax Ordinance of 1979.). Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust v. Income Tax Officer. Income Tax Officer (1979 PTD 461) = (1980) 41 Tax 25 (H.).C.C. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another (1981 PTD 169). Replying to the point whether there is an alternate remedy.Kar. v. and. the above writ petitions are not maintainable. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Pakistan (PLD 1963 SC 322). Syed Guulam Abbass Shah v. Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. Income Tax Officer [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. Khan Bahadur Khalilur Rehman & 3 others (PLD 1971 S. the petitioner had to agree to pay the same in instalments of ten millions each. Income Tax Officer [1968] 18 TAX 1 (S. Nagina Silk Mills Lyalpur v. Income Tax Officer (1972 SCMR 556). Mirpur and 3 others – [1985] 51 TAX 157 (H.). The impugned order does not fall under this section.C.Pak. We.C.B.C. Eruch Maneckji and 2 others v. (1968 SCMR 374) = (1969) 19 Tax 97 (S. therefore.Pak. We are. Raja Habib Ahmad Khan v.C. v. Nagina Dal Factory v. Shagufta Begum v.Kar. the learned counsel fox the petitioner has submitted that he filed a Revision Petition before the learned Commissioner Income Tax and when the learned Commissioner Income Tax rejected the said revision . do not agree with the learned counsel for the department that in the circumstances of the cases. Steel Brothers and Company Ltd. of the view that the departmental appeals of the petitioner pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal since 1986 in the circumstances of the case can neither be treated efficacious nor a speedy remedy so as to dis-entitled the petitioner from invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Ch.). Lyallpur v. 447). EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 order of 1st Appellate Authority in 1986 have not been heard and disposed of as yet and the learned counsel for the department is still unable to state when these are likely to be decided. v. therefore.R. Income Tax Officer (1981 PTD 53) = [1981] 43 TAX 92 (H.

AJ. Commissioner of Income Tax (1984) 49 TAX 34. it will necessarily follow that such a permission has been granted by the Court or otherwise the court while allowing withdrawal in such a case cannot refuse to grant permission. Mr. contended that in view of the fact that the Court did not specifically grant the permission it should be presumed that the permission to bring a fresh petition asked for was declined.K.) unreported Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v.C. Income Tax Officer [1980] 41 TAX 136 and Abdul Karim v.234 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Cases referred to: United Builders v. As soon as be came to know about the Recovery Certificates he approached the learned Commissioner income Tax in Revision Petition but when his revision petitions failed. We may also mention here that Mr. An order which is a nulty in the eye of law is not an order at all and can be ignored all together even if no Writ Petition is moved to impeach it. Commissioner of Income Tax (H. I do not think that the petitioner was guilty of any laches or delay. In our view in the absence of an express order by the Court granting permission to file a fresh proceedings while allowing withdrawal under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order XXIII.P. he came to the High Court and invoked its constitutional jurisdiction.Kar. there was no other remedy available to him. Khalid . Pakistan – [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. and therefore.C. The above observations on the contrary support the contention of petitioner in the present case as it is an admitted position that the petitioner specifically prayed before the Court while with drawing the earlier petition that he reserves the right to bring fresh petition on the same cause of action and the Court allowed withdrawal of the earlier petition but did not specifically grant permission to bring the fresh petition. Dr. he knocked at the doors of the High Court and invoked its constitutional jurisdiction under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974. the objection of laches and delay or acquiescence is not available to the respondents in this case because the impugned Recovery Certificates have been issued without a Notice of Demand and have been issued for the Recovery of the liabilities against a dead person (assessee). Even otherwise. C. Mahtab v. We are unable to accept this contention.K. Fazeel. petition. Reference application pending disposal before the High Court held not a bar to maintainability of constitutional petition challenging wires of law taxing “free reserve?‟ to Income Tax. H.) 397.C.

The following observations were made by the Indian Supreme Court at page 1465 of the report with which we fully agree. Cases referred to: Karim Bakhsh v. .235 SHORT TITLE.C.1980. enquired from the learned counsel for the respondents about the dates of these orders but they were unable to give the same. From the statement made in the counter-affidavit it appears that the objection regarding delay is founded on the ground that the impugned orders are challenged after about 10/12 years of the creation of liability against the petitioner. AIR 1961 S. 981/79 was filed by them challenging the action of respondents and the vires of legislation but the petition was subsequently withdrawn in the circumstances stated above and as the matter was not settled amicably the present petition was filed in this Court on 10. Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Shahzad Gul 1978 SCMR 141 and Durvao and others v.Kar. State of U. Karim Gul v. 1979 and immediately thereafter Petition No. It is. 1457. We may mention here that the respondents did not mention in their counter-affidavit the dates of orders impugned in the petition and from the certified copies of the orders produced in the petition we were unable to ascertain their dates.Lah. therefore contended that there was no delay at all in filing the present petition. therefore. Pakistan – [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Anwar the learned count-self or the petitioner also referred us to the case of Durvas and others v.C. The petitioner in its rejoinder has denied that 10/12. We. Constitutional petition before High Court challenging vires of taxing “free reserves” to Income Tax held cannot be dismissed on ground of laches in view of nature of relief claimed and the circumstances of the case. Jan Muhammad PLD 1977 . on 30th May.P. 1033.1.) 398.years period had passed when the liability was created against them and it is claimed that the final order imposing penalty was passed against them only.P. Keeping in view the nature of relief claimed in the petition and the circumstances stated above we are satisfied that the present petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of ladies alone. State of U. [AIR 1961 SC 1457] in which the Supreme Court of India considered the scope of applicability of principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata to constitutional petition.

Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1968 SC 131). Controller of Estate Duty and others (PLD 1961 SC 119) = [1962] 6 TAX 84 (S.C. Pakistan through the Secretary to Government of Pakistan.C. Since show-cause notice has been issued without there being any sufficient reason or legal authority we should not decline to exercise on jurisdiction. A-Ward. for. Pakistan this Court has held that where a statutory functionary acts mala-fide or in a partial. partial. Ltd.) 400.) 399. Cases referred to: Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v.C. unjust and mala-fide even in cases where alternate remedy by way of appeal etc. Abdul Ghani and another v. Where alternate remedy available but not efficacious and statutory functionary acting mala-fide or in a partial. . In the case of East and West Steamship Co. Sales Tax Officer.C. is available. Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC 41) Hussain Sugar Mills v.) and the Murree Brewery Co. Nagina Silk Mills.C. Lyallpur v. Burmah Oil Company (Pakistan Trading) v.. High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant relief to the aggrieved party. Qazi Ziauddin (PLD 1962 SC 440). v. etc. The Income Tax Officer. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others – [1981] 44 TAX 93 (H. It is now a settled law that the jurisdiction of this Court tinder Article 199 is always available to the party in cases where the impugned orders are without lawful authority. Lyallpur and another (PLD 1963 SC 322) = [1963] 7 TAX 442 (S. The availability of alternate remedy in every case is not a ground to refuse the relief when the remedy is not efficacious. on petitioners failure to pay the same. Chittagong v.. The Trustees of the Port of Chittagong (PLD 1962 SC 113). Karachi & Another – [1983] 47 TAX 162 (H. the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant relief to the aggrieved party. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. Chittagong (PLD 1971 SC 125) = [1970] 22 TAX 229 (S. partial. unjust and oppressive manner. Pakistan and another v. unjust and mala-fide held assessee can invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court even if alternate remedy is available by way of appeal.).236 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. v. Kassam Haji Abbas Patel v. Syed Ali Abbas and others v. if in spite of showing cause any additional amount bad been assessed the same could have been recovered through coercive process. unjust and oppressive manner. Income Tax Officer.). Contractors Circle.Kar. Order passed without lawful authority.Kar. Vishan Singh and others (PLD 1967 SC 294). v. Works Division and others (PLD 1972 SC 279) Case relied on: East and West Steamship Co.

Pakistan etc. Lyallpur v. 726) and [1968 SCMR 1035]. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. Pakistan and another v. Abdul Ghani and another v. of Pakistan and another (PLD 1976 Lah. Burmah Shell Storage and Distributing Co. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Income Tax Officer and another (PLD 1963 SC 322) = (1963) 7 TAX 442 (S. Raja Habib Ahmed Khan v.Pak. Lahore and another (1971 PTD 513) = (1972) 25 TAX 133. Tayyaba v...C. (PLD 1972 SC 279). Batala Engineering Co. Ltd. The Burmah Oil Co. The writ is not competent where an appeal is pending or where a reference under the provisions of the Income Tax Act can be made to the High Court.C). Miss. Usmania Glass sheet Factory Ltd. Collector of Customs. Nizamuddin Ahmad V. Cases referred to : Murree Brewery Co.C.). Income Tax Officer (1974) 29 TAX 209 (S. Karachi v. Commissioner of Income Tax. First National City Bank. Karachi (PLD 1959 S. . The Trustee of the Port of Chittagong (PLD 1962 SC 113). 552) = [1976] 34 TAX 1 (Kar. Col. Ltd. Haroon and others v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 In the present case as observed by us that the impugned orders passed by the Income Tax Officer under the provisions of section 18A and 45A(b)(ii) were without lawful authority and unjust. Subedar Shoedar Khan Co.C. Writ petition in the High Court challenging the jurisdiction held competent even during the pending of appeal.C) and The International Body Builders v. Chittagong (PLD 1971 PLD 205) = (1970) 22 TAX 229 (S. Lyallpur v. v. Where there is another adequate and efficacious remedy open to the petitioner. Nagina Silk Mills. Sales Tax Officer. Chittagong v.). 481). 177).A.). Commissioner of Sales Tax and 3 others (1975) 31 TAX 71 (S. Chittagong v. Frontier Sugar Mills (PLD 1975 SC 244). v. Pakistan (PLD 1972 SC 279). (Pakistan Trading) Ltd. C. Salahuddin and others v. The Sales Tax Officer (1972 SCMR 257). Begum Nusrat Bhutto v.).C. and others (PLD 1968 SC 131). Sales Tax Officer (PLD 1971 SC 205) = [1970] 22 TAX 229 (S.C). Officer.‟s case (1974) 29 TAX 190 (S. Where the question of jurisdiction of the Authority passing the impugned order is raised. the remedy of appeal is not as adequate or efficacious as the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and consequently in such cases a petition under Article 199 would be competent. Controller of Examinations (PLD 1976 Kar. Municipal Committee Multan v. Karachi (PLD 1976 Kar. Circle-V.Lah. Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 SC 119) = (1961) 3 TAX 165 (SC). But one essential condition for applicability of this rule is that the alternative remedy should be adequate and efficacious. Ltd.237 SHORT TITLE. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd. Income Tax Officer. The Murree Brewery Co. Lt. Income Tax Rawalpindi – [1980] 42 TAX 59 (H.) 401. Cases referred to : S. a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973 would be incompetent unless the legal remedies including remedies as provided in the Income Tax Act are exhausted. Qazi Ziauddin (PLD 1962 SC 440). v.Pak..

) = 1979 PTD 461 403.C. 322) = (1963) 7 TAX 442 (S. Pakistan (PLD 1972 S.C.). v. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others – [1980] 42 TAX 47 (H. Eruch Maneckji and others v.). (See PLD 1972 SC 279). however. Ltd.C.Kar.C. a fiscal authority. it was held that where a dispute arises between the parties in respect of a fiscal right based upon a statutory instrument the same can be easily determined in writ jurisdiction. Sales Tax Officer. Pakistan (PLD 1972. v. acts in a partial. In PLD 1971 SC 205. Ltd. the learned counsel for the respondent Income Tax Officer had a limited contention to raise and that was that the order made was within jurisdiction and this Court will not interfere merely because the order made cannot be justified for reasons given therein. It is. Karaciu – [1980] 41 TAX 25 (H.. In the presence of assessee‟s objection to exercise of jurisdiction on ground of bias assessment was made without taking decision on the specific objection held that even existence of alternate remedy would not operate to debar the assessee from invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court.C. Sales Tax Officer (1972 SCMR 237) = (l974) 29 TAX 199 (S. unjust or the oppressive manner the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction has the power to grant the relief to the aggrieved party.C.238 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Cases referred to : Nagina Silk Mills v. Cases referred to : Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. unjust and oppressive Mr. Chittagong v. v. SC 279).Lah. Sheikh Akhtar Ali v. Income Tax Officer (PLD 1963 S. 1922 and for.C. Income Tax Officer.) and Murrey Brewery Co. . (PLD 1975 S.) 402. Central Circle III. Frontier Sugar Mill and Distillery Ltd.C. well settled that where a statutory functionary and more so. High Court is empowered to grant relief to aggrived party in writ jurisdiction where order passed by a fiscal authority within jurisdiction but partial. Mansoor Ahmad Khan. Chittagong (PLD 1971 SC 205) = (1970) 12 Taxaiion 229 (S. 279) and Salahuddin v. 244). It is contended that the petitioner in this case had an adequate alternate remedy available to him by way of reference under the provisions of section 66 of the Income Tax Act. that reason it was not open to the petitioner to have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. After giving the matter our anxious consideration we are of the view that the alternate remedy in this case was not adequate and equally efficacious and even the existence of an alternate remedy would not operate to debar a petitioner from invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Murree Brewery Co.

Province of-East Pakistan v. Karachi v. Income Tax Officer. Abdul Wali Khan (1976 PLD SC 57).Lah.C. Abdus Sobhani Sowdagar (PLD 1964 SC 1) and Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. First National City Bank.Kar. High Court competent to interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction where fact for determination was whether receipts supported by payment certificates produced by assessee were genuine and correct and claim was rejected without application of mind to this aspect The learned counsel for the respondent finally submitted that in any case the orders passed by the authorities below cannot be said to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect in view of the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Gulberg.239 SHORT TITLE. Nusrat. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Shahid Hameed.” The contention of the learned counsel that the High Court cannot interfere in its constitutional jurisdiction in a case of this nature is not correct. S. v. Lahore and another [1976] 34 TAX 31 (H.A.) 404. I have no option but to declare the impugned orders to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Sales Tax Officer (PLD 1971 SC 205). In view of what has been discussed above. Karachi and another – [1976] 34 TAX 1 (H. [1970] 22 TAX 229. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory Ltd. Abdul Waheed Khan and others (PLD 1974 SC 331). Zafarullah Khan (PLD 1964 SC 865). Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 S. writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked even if alternate remedy is available.) = PLD 1976 Kar. The Income Tax Officer is directed to reconsider the return filed by the petitioner and complete the same in accordance with law.C. Abdul Jabbar and others v. Cases referred to : Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v.C. 552 405. If impugned action is patently without jurisdiction. Income Tax Officer. Mr. Film Circle. Advocate for the respondents submitted that the petition is not maintainable as the petitioner had not availed of the . it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. 139). Lahore v. Sikandar and others (PLD 1974 SC 139). the relevant portion of which reads as under: “It is well-settled that where a Court or tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question.

Lt. (1963) 7 TAX 442 (S. relief in Constitutional petition cannot be refused on the ground that an alternate remedy is available. the learned counsel for the Income Tax Department contended that the petitioners should in the first instance.) and Murree Brewery Cold v. afforded adequate remedy.C. Mr. not incumbent upon the petitioners to avail themselves of the remedies provided to them under the Income Tax Act or even to wait for adjudication of their appeals or references.A. But. v. Cases referred to: Nagina Silk Mill. 279).) and Nagina Silk Mill. A-Ward. Controller of Ectate Duty and others (PLD 1961 S.Col. which requires the Tax Recovery Officer to proceed to investigate the objection. and it is.C. But where the impugned action is patently without jurisdiction. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd. No doubt upon receiving the recovery notice from the Tax Recovery Officer dated 9. therefore. Central Board of Revenue and 3 others – [1975] 31 TAX 114 (H.240 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.C. . Nusrat. Cases referred to : Muhammad TufaiI v. the petitioner could have objected to the attachment of the money under rule 9(1) of the said Rules. The order of the Tax Recovery Officer was also appealable under 74 to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. 119) = [1961] 3 TAX 165 (S. The Income Tax Officer.Kar. in our opinion. 1922. 322 = [1963] 7 TAX 409 (S.C.Pak).). Karachi v. without availing of remedies available under the law. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. have exhausted the remedies available to them by way of appeal and reference under the Income Tax Act. as is also provided in section 30(A) of the Income Tax Act A further revision and review is also provided. Sales Tax Officer (1972) SCMR 257.Pak 20.. Income Tax Officer and others (PLD 1963 S. or in proposing to assess. Lyallpur v. the petitioners to income tax is without jurisdiction altogether. in fact some appeals filed by the petitioners are still pending for adjudication. Nusrat stated that. S.C.A. if any. other remedies provided under the Income Tax Recovery Rules. Lyallpur v. Abdul Ghafoor and others PLD 1958 S.1975.5. Mr.C.C. 322).C.. Pakistan (PLD 1972 S. Sind Industrial Trading Estate Ltd.C. 1969 which according to him. the fact of the Income Tax Department in assessing. Lyallpur and another PLD 1963 S. (1974) 29 TAX 199 (S.C.) 406. S. writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked. If assessment is suffering from lack of jurisdiction.

otherwise deserving dismissal in limine. in certain cases involving of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court instead of availing remedy provided for under the statute may be justified. v... Petition otherwise deserving dismissal in limine admitted to hearing. Chak-Jhumra v. Barnala Commission Shop.the pronouncement made in the case of Ahram Builders Ltd. for example when the .C.Lah. Ward.. completed beyond time.) = 1963 PTD 534 = 1963 PLD 311 408. However.C. without waiting for result..Kar.. Writ admitted maintainable. Tapal Energy Ltd. Lyallpur – [1963] 7 TAX 153 (H. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Gulistan Textile Mills Ltd.. Income Tax Act (XI of 1922). B. admitted to hearing since point of objection arose also in several other petitions. Federation of Pakistan and others –1999 PTD 4037 409. Writ is maintainable where action is malafide or without jurisdiction or vires of law is challenged Writ challenging action alleged to be mala fide or without jurisdiction or vires of legislation calls into question is maintainable though appeal is pending the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. CBR – [1994] 70 TAX 272 (H. Petition.241 SHORT TITLE. v. Writ maintainable in case where forums provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper We are of the view that the aforesaid Constitutional petitions are maintainable notwithstanding the fact that the adequate and alternate remedy by way of first and second appeal. since point of objection arose also in several other petitions.) 407. Objection was not raised to any part of proceedings on any ground at any stage before income tax Officer. v... assessee preferring petition invoked writ-jurisdiction of High Court. Alternative remedy by appeal under Income Tax Act (XI of 1922) availed but. during the pendency of appeals held Failure of Income Tax Officer to comply with provision of condition precedent to issuing notice to assessee under section 34(1). Income Tax Act (XI of 1922). Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (1993 SCMR 29) to the following effect would be attracted: The tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service the Constitution jurisdiction of the High Court has developed. Income Tax Officer. Income tax assessment proceedings under section 34.

C.242 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Adamjee Insurance Co.. v.” Republic Motors Ltd. this Court discouraged the tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute to press into service Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. v. To force an aggrieved person in such a case to approach the forum provided under the relevant statute may not be just and proper. in the first instance.. Apart from the bald assertion that the impugned order is void ab initio there is nothing on record to substantiate the above plea.” _______________ WRIT HELD NOT MAINTAINABLE Amin Textile Mills (Pvt. After availing normal remedy switching over to constitutional petition is not maintainable in the absence of justifiable reason. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (1993 SCMR 29).) 412.. The High Court was right to observe that the petitioner should... Writ petition is not maintainable in the presence of adequate alternate remedy under the statute. and others v.. v.) Ltd. approach the hierarchy of the forums provided for under the Ordinance instead of filing a Constitutional petition. impugned order/action is palpably without jurisdiction and/a mala fide. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance – 1993 SCC 1080 = [1993] 68 TAX 176 (S.) Ltd. Once the appellant had opted to avail of the hierarchy of forums provided for under the Ordinance upto the stage of filing of appeal before the Tribunal. Income Tax Officer & Others – [1990] 62 TAX 8 (H. Commissioner of Income Tax and 2 others – PTCL 2000 CL.Pak) 411. it would have been proper on his part to have invoked section 136 of the Ordinance for making a reference to the .As notice under section 65 was without jurisdiction all subsequent orders passed by the same authorities or other authorities the whole series of such orders will be void. Ltd. the aggrieved party is entitled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction without availing or exhausting the alternate remedy. 316 (S. In the case of Al Ahram Builders (Pvt.) = 1990 PTD 889 410.C..Kar. How an appellate order which confirms such an order can become valid.. Writ is maintainable where notice is without lawful jurisdiction “.where the action of any authority is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction..C...Pak.

Pak) 415. is not permissible. If adequate remedy is not exhausted. recourse must be had to those remedies first.) 413.Pak. which are created by the special law itself. and another – 1968 SCC 316 = [1968] 18 TAX 1 (S. Once a party opts to invoke the remedies provided for under the relevant statute.) 414. in terms. the High Court correctly held that no relief could be granted under Article 199 of the Constitution. Partner v. Direct access to the High Court for relieve in writ jurisdiction thus bypassing the special forums.C. at his sweet will. Circumstance where writ is not maintainable. The High Court has declined to give relief on the ground that the petitioner firm has invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 98 of the Constitution without first exhausting its statutory remedies as provided by the Act. Income Tax Officer. precludes action under it where another adequate relief is available. Nagina Dal Factory through Allah Ditta. When a statute under which action is taken itself provides remedies. Where adequate alternate remedy is available writ under Article 199 is not maintainable. he cannot. Since the petitioner has availed the right of appeal. switch over to constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court in the mid of the proceedings in the absence of any compelling and justifiable reason. Article 98. Such practice.C. Wealth Tax Officer & Other v. Income Tax Officer – 1988 SCC 710 = [1989] 60 TAX 52 (S.C. in .243 SHORT TITLE. In the present case it is not disclosed that the impugned action suffered from lack of jurisdiction for invocation of writ jurisdiction by the High Court directly without first availing of the other remedies as provided by the special law. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 High Court instead of filing of constitutional petition.Pak. Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. Shaukat Afzal & 4 Others – [1993] 68 TAX 145 (S. Before parting with the judgment we may observe that in cases where any party resorts to a statutory remedy against an order he cannot abandon or bypass it without any valid and reasonable cause and file constitutional petition challenging the same order. writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. We can see no fault in the order of High Court. One of the conditions for grant of relief in writ jurisdiction of the High Court is that the petitioner before it should not have any alternate adequate remedy.

cannot be approved or encouraged. it is permissible for an aggrieved person to go directly to the High Court against the issuance of a notice without approaching the authority concerned in this behalf in the first instance.244 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Shagufta Begum v.Pak)  In all such cases where a Tribunal lacks jurisdiction and this aspect is discoverable on the record. it takes longer time than the normal departmental remedies. mainly. . Income Tax Officer.C. Zone-B. Income Tax Officer Mirpur & another – [1993] 68 TAX 132 (S. invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. cases where statute provides alternate and efficacious remedy up to High Court.Pak)  Income Tax Ordinance is a complete code in itself which creates rights in favour of an assessee and in certain circumstances in favour of the Revenue as well. Income Tax Officer.C. Circle-II. In every tax case.C. Constitutional Jurisdiction as an alternate remedy in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution cannot be availed. The High Court only directly entertains a writ petition if it finds that alternate remedy is not adequate. because wastage of time spent before the departmental authorities could be avoided by expeditious disposal of the writ petition in the High Court and if the matter is brought higher up in the Supreme Court it would still be a speedier remedy. It is accordingly in the interest of litigants themselves first to choose the speedier remedy with departmental authorities and thereafter if need be. difficult to agree in the light of prevalent constitutional provisions that if an interpretation placed by an executive authority is palpably wrong and leads to miscarriage of justice and High Court can directly entertain a writ petition.M. H. therefore. and also provides remedy for redress of the grievances of the aggrieved party.AJ&K)  It is. Lahore – 1989 SCC 715 = [1989] 60 TAX 83 (S. In practice. In our view existence of another adequate remedy is a rule of law which ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court and we hold accordingly. We do not agree with this submission. Abdullah v. The oratical speaking it might be correct. Circle V Karachi – 1993 SCC 1018 = [1993] 68 TAX 29 (S. Abdul Rehman & Another v.

C.C. Income Tax Officer – 1972 SCC 400 = [1974] 29 TAX 208 (S. We see no ground for grant of special leave to appeal in the circumstances of this case and dismiss the petition.” Steel Brothers and Company Ltd. have been allowed to simultaneous pursue an alternate remedy under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. then it brings the case of petitioners in the . That decision is being challenged in the reference. He had elected first to follow that remedy. Mohammad Fazlur Rehman that in respect of the years mentioned in the reference.. Data Distribution Services v. apparently given a decision in favour of the petitioner-Company in respect of the apportionment of the Managing Agency income. once settled.Lah. in the High Court. The petitioner should have been left to pursue his remedy by the appeal which he had already filed. the petitioner has been successful in obtaining a reference to the High Court. It would be circumventing the provisions of the Income Tax Act if parallel proceedings are started. London v.C. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another – [2000] 82 TAX 156 (H. accruing to the petitioner-Company and on some other points. as also filed a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962. would apply to all the assessment years and it is conceded by Mr. to deal with the same questions.)  In case aforesaid paragraphs of parawise comments and writ petition are put in juxta position. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has.)  The assessee preferred appeals against the assessment orders.245 SHORT TITLE. Commissioner of Income Tax.Pak. under Article 98 of the Constitution. on behalf of the department. He should not. therefore. Dacca – 1968 SCC 313 = [1969] 19 TAX 97 (S.)  We are not convinced that the matter in dispute here will not be adequately determined in the reference pending in the High Court. On some other points going against the petitioners in proceedings before the Tribunal. Supreme Court while deciding the petition for leave to appeal held that: “That the writ petition was misconceived and not maintainable. the same question of law is being agitated as would apply to the other years. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Raja Habib Ahmad Khan v.Pak. The principle of law.

2 is well within his right to deduct the income tax from the petitioner to the tune of 5 per cent on the basis of provisions of Finance Act. v. 1995-96. Ministry of Finance.246 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.‟s case (supra). area of disputed question of facts. Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary. As mentioned above I have already dismissed the writ petitions qua the similar controversy on the question of law in Pak-Arab Fertilizer (Pvt. It is settled proposition of law that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputed question of facts in Constitutional jurisdiction as the principal laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Younas Khan‟s case (1993 SCMR 618). Guarantee Engineers (Pvt.C. Islamabad and another – [2000] 82 TAX 131 (H. It is settled proposition of law that Court should save the laws instead of declaring them ultra vires. It is settled proposition of law that previous decision should have been accepted and binding on me as per principle laid down by the Hon ‟ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Muzafar Khan v. Muhammad Yousaf Khan (PLD 1959 SC (Pakistan) (9). therefore. 3 and Article 25 of the Constitution.) Ltd. The only express limit imposed upon the power of retrospective legislation is that Legislatures cannot make retrospective penal laws meaning thereby any other law including .)  The contents of the writ petition as well as contentions of the learned counsel of the petitioner do not reveal that the petitioner has challenged vires of the provisions of the Finance Act. v.) Ltd. The Articles of the Constitution do not reveal prohibition that the Pakistani Legislature/Parliament and Provincial Assembly do not possess the right to make retrospective legislation which every sovereign Legislature possesses. Deputy Commissioner Income Tax (2000 PTD 263) and cited almost all the case law which was considered by this Court and laid down principle that writ petition is not maintainable against show-cause notice and also observed that party cannot be allowed to by-pass jurisdiction vested by law in special Tribunal. responsent No.Lah. It is settled proposition that Constitution should be read as organic whole. The petitioner‟s counsel appeared in Pak-Arab Fertilizer (Pvt.) Ltd. I am fortified by the following judgements:PLD 1995 SC 432 (Multi National‟s case) PLD 1983 SC 457 (Fauji Foundation‟s case) The learned counsel of the petitioner does not mention any provision of Finance Act in the contents of the writ petition which was framed by the competent authority which is in violation of Articles 2A.

B. The Central Board of Revenue Govt.R. ft is not borne out and is not in accordance with notification issued by C. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the leading judgement of the subjection by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Salauddin‟s case PLD 1991 SC 546.R. be made with retrospective effect under the Constitution. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and Others – [2000] 81 TAX 224 (H.Lah. preferably within one month. this writ petition is not maintainable. after receiving the order of this Court. He is also directed to issue direction in the light of notification.C.400/. v. Pak-Arab Fertilizers (Pvt. is misconstrued by the subordinate functionaries of C.R.2 to respondent No. dated 18.R.B. therefore.per sq.R.1993. Islamabad. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Taxation Law may. let a copy of this order judgment be sent to Chairman C. In view of these circumstances. Leather Connections (Pvt) Limited v. In the present case as mentioned above there is no retrospective effect of the Finance Act since the contention was raised by the learned counsel of the petitioner and the contention of the learned counsel of the Petitioner has no force on the basis of the aforesaid judgement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.B.247 SHORT TITLE.)  In view of what has been discussed above. In view of clause 54(2) of the Contract executed between the petitioner and respondent No. of Pakistan.5.1993 under the aforesaid Section 50(7BB). after comparison of the rates mentioned by different departments in the Notification or the Chairman C. The Notification of C. who is directed to issue general instructions to all the functionaries to issue letters to the Administrative officer concerned in accordance with law and Notification dated 18. The letter does not contain any comparative rates of the other departments. same is not sustainable in the eyes of law.7.1996 by fixing cost of construction at the rate of Rs. 3 on 16.Lah. Any how the letter issued by respondent No.) = 2000 PTD 263  The nature of controversy between the parties to the petition by itself falls in the area of factual controversy. 2 principle of Reciprocal Promises is not attracted.B.B. Islamabad through its Chairman – [2000] 82 TAX 42 (H. The aforesaid proposition of law is also supported by the judgement of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Haider Automobile Ltd.) Ltd.C. must issue a notification and fix rate either yearly basis for each area or 2/3 years so that poor citizen should not be penalized. Pakistan (PLD 1969 SC 623). In case the contents of writ .7. therefore. v.

and writ petition cannot be invoked. In this view of the matter writ petition is also not maintainable as per principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Ismail‟s case PLD 1996 S.Pak) = (1968 SCMR 997) in which it was held that a party cannot be allowed to by pass jurisdiction vested by the law in special tribunal.C.) 416.B. writ petition is not maintainable as per principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the following judgments: 1974 SCMR 279 (Khuda Bakhsh‟s case) PLD 1981 S. The tribunal below have given finding of fact against the petitioner that bags were not warehoused at Karachi with the connivance of the petitioner in original condition whereas the case of the petitioner that petitioner is not responsible for that mis-chief. Even otherwise writ petition is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bashir & Company‟s case [1968] 17 Tax 207 (S. .C. Government of Pakistan through C. 246 (Muhammad Sharif‟s case) PLD 1981 S. v. Kohinoor Industries Ltd.C. Writ held not maintainable where disputed question of fact involved. this writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Therefore. This fact brings the case in the area of disputed question of fact and this court has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputed question of fact in a Constitutional jurisdiction as per principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Younis‟s case 1993 SCMR 618. In the present case learned counsel for the respondents or any official of the respondents did not give any concession. petitions and parawise comments are put in juxta position which cannot be resolved in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court.R. Islamabad – [2001] 83 TAX 17 (H. special remedy is available under the Income Tax Ordinance.C. Petitioner has alternative remedy for resolution of the disputed question of fact by filing civil suit under section 9 of the CPC before the competent court.Lah. In view of that has been discussed above. It is also settled principle of law that this court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own decision in place of the finding of the tribunal below as per principle laid down by the Division Bench of this court in Mussaduq‟s case PLD 1973 Lahore 600. It is the Paul Corporation who committed this mischief. I am fortified by the judgements of Abdul Rehman Mayet‟s case (1988 SCMR 1712). 246.. 522 (Abdul Rehman Bajwa‟s case).248 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. It is admitted fact that tribunals below have given con-current finding of fact against the petitioner.C.

etc. In presence of arbitration clause in the agreement executed between the parties. Government of the Punjab. [1997] 75 TAX 109 (H. 5 of his own free will which contains the arbitration clause. Since the petitioners have voluntarily executed an agreement with arbitration clause with the respondents then the petitioners are stopped to challenge the same in writ jurisdiction on the well known principle of approbate and reprobate as the principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Haji Ghulam Rasool‟s case PLD 1971 S.C.). It is settled principle of law that contractual obligations cannot be enforced through a writ petition as the petitioners have alternative remedies to invoke the jurisdiction of a . Administrator Town Committee. Board of Revenue 1981 SCMR 604. etc.) 418. The writ petition is also not maintainable on the well known principle of approbate and reprobate. the writ petition is not maintainable. It is also settled proposition of law that the contract cannot be enforced through Constitutional jurisdiction as the petitioner has alternative remedies either to file a civil suit or invoke arbitration clause. It is settled proposition of law that specific arbitration clause has been provided in the agreement as mentioned above and if the petitioners have got any grievance against the contents of the said agreements they can avail their remedies before the appropriate forum as it needs a detail inquiry.249 SHORT TITLE. Administrator Town Committee Kabirwala District Khanewal and 4 others – [2000] 81 TAX 60 (H. Secretary. v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Amir Nawaz Khan. Cases referred to: Muhammad Ansar. etc. etc.Lah. 376. Bismillah & Co.Lah.C.). through Secretary Finance. District Khanewal & 4 others [2000] 81 TAX 60 (H.C. – [2001] 83 TAX 397 (H. It is admitted fact that petitioner executed agreement with the respondent No. Writ is not maintainable where parties themselves agreed for arbitration in bilateral contracts. Shameer v.) 417.Lah. Kabirwala. v. the writ petition is not maintainable.C. Adam Khan Mirza v. Islamabad. Muhammad Sultan PLJ 1975 SC 21. Muhammad Ansar etc. It is also settled proposition of law that leave granting order by the Honorable Supreme Court is not judgment. v.Lah. Government of Pakistan.C. In presence of Arbitration Clause in the agreement executed between the parties. v.

In support of this proposition reliance is placed on the cases of Syed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v.C. 387 and PTD 1962 SC 108. which application if filed will be decided by the Tribunal. Writ petition not maintainable when remedy of seeking reference under section 136 of the unamended provisions of Income Tax Ordinance is available to the assessee at the relevant time. Lah. PTD 1986 Quetta 181 (Pakistan Mineral Development Corp‟s case).250 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Government of Punjab and others .C. Income Tax Officer – [1999] 80 TAX 273 (H. The petitioner may. Keeping In view the circumstances noted supra. on the plea of proceedings in due vigilance in the Constitutional jurisdiction. ” Islamuddin and 3 others v. This writ petition is disposed of with the observation that present writ petition is not maintainable as the remedy of seeking reference under section 136 of the unamended provisions of Income Tax Ordinance were available at the relevant time. Writ not maintainable in case where no right to appeal or reference is provided in law itself. in accordance with law and on its own merits. apply for reference to the Appellate Tribunal alongwith application for condonation of delay. 604 (Shameer‟s case). Crescent Sugar Mill v. Province of Sindh and another reported in 1996 SCMR 1165 and Abdul Wahab Khan v. The Income Tax Officer and 4 others – 2000 PTD 306 419.C. reported in PLD 1989 SC 508. The petitioner having once approached the authority in the hierarchy of jurisdiction is required to exhaust his remedy before invoking the Constitutional jurisdiction. Civil Court by means of regular suit. It is also an established principle that where a statute does not provide the remedy by way of appeal or Reference against the order then the same cannot be challenged by way of a Constitutional petition as it would amount to rendering the provision of statute which does not provide an appeal for a reference or any other remedy against a particular order.) = NLR 1999 TAX 170 420. I am fortified by the following judgements of Hon‟ble Supreme court of Pakistan:(i) (ii) (iii) PTD 1981 S. if so advised. . PTD 1958 S.

Pak.) and re: H. For what has been discussed above.) 422.M.C. In such situation. the entertainment of the petition or to make the kind of declaration prayed for by the appellant will not only frustrate the whole scheme of the law providing for various stages and forums of appeal but also will amount to pre-suppose an order by a judicial authority namely the Customs Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In the first reported judgement the assessee respondents were before the Tribunal for the redressal of . this writ petition is dismissed in limine. petitioner is not entitled to get any discretionary relief under Article 199 of the Constitution.C. The contents of the writ petition revealed that the petitioner has concealed material facts from this Hon‟ble Court qua the appeal filed by the petitioner before the appellate authority against assessment order. Circle-V. v.251 SHORT TITLE.C. Income Tax Officer. Ronaq Ali‟s case (PTD 1973 S.Pak. Lahore v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Nawab Sons.C. Malik‟s case (1990 C. Saif Ullah‟s case (PTD 1989 S. – [1999] 80 TAX 9 (H. 326). Writ petition is not maintainable where appeal is pending before any authority. Rana Arshad‟s case (1998 SCMR 1462). therefore.L. The petitioner has already travelled through some of the forums provided under the law. Karachi and 2 other (1993) 68 Tax 29 (S.). Shaukat Afzal and 4 others (1993) 68 Tax 145 (S. – 1999 PCTLR 387 421. I am fortified by the following judgments:C. Abdullah v. 1783).) Ltd.M. These are reported as re: Wealth Tax officer and another v. Saleem Automotive Industries (Pvt.C. writ is not maintainable. as the petitioner did not approach this Court with clean hands as well as the petitioner has availed alternate remedy which is pending adjudication. Two cases decided by the Supreme Court are directly relevant on the issue. His appeal before the Customs Tribunal is still pending in which injunction order restraining the recovery of disputed amount has also been made in his favour.C. I am not inclined to exercise discretion in favour of petitioner who concealed the material facts from this Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The Assistant Commissioner Tax etc.Lah. 166). The view of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court on the issue is quite clear. Where the petitioner conceals material facts. Central Board of Revenue etc.

. In the presence of statutory remedy under the Income Tax Ordinance approach to the High Court through a writ petition is disapproved.P.. – [1997] 76 TAX 138 (H. Learned counsel for the petitioner has attempted to argue that notwithstanding filing of the appeal by the petitioner. the petitioner has already filed appeals which are pending before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal where they have raised the same depute as to whether or not any Income Tax is payable on the cement development funds received by the petitioner company under Ordinance. During the pendency of the appeal. submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed W. Rehmania Hospital v.252 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.1994.) this Court refused to entertain a Constitutional petition under Article 199 of the constitution and rejected the contentions similar to those now being made by the learned counsel before me.C. In case of availing the remedy of appeal writ is not maintainable.” State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.. is that in the presence of statutory remedy under the Income Tax Ordinance approach to the High Court through a writ petition is disapproved. however.C. v. “.C. Commissioner of Income Tax –[1997] 76 TAX 110 (H.. No. 6584 of 1994 which was disposed of with the direction that the plea raised in the Constitutional petition may be repeated before the Commissioner of Income Tax before whom the proceedings are pending.Pesh) = 1997 PTD 1805 423. Lahore (1996) 73 Tax 106 (H.) = 1997 PTD 1104= 1998 PCTLR 520 (H. Government of Pakistan etc... learned counsel for respondent has raised a preliminary objection that against the decisions of respondent dated 7.Lah.Lah.) 424.8. their grievances. II of 1979.C. these petitions are maintainable as it has been held by the Supreme court in various . they approached the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction which was allowed by a division bench of Sindh High Court whereby the order passed by the Wealth Tax Officer treating the disputed properties as “assets” of the assessee was declared as without lawful authority and of no legal effect. it seems the preponderance and the recent trend in the judgments of the Superior Courts ...) Ltd.C. of Income Tax.. This is not denied by the learned counsel for respondent who has.Lah. Before these petitions could be argued on merits. A. Like-wise in a recent judgment reported as re: Sameer Electronics v.

C. As the petitioner has chosen its remedy by filing appeals before the Appellate Tribunal.253 SHORT TITLE. these petitions are held to be not maintainable at this stage and dismissed. 1. all available objections. Lahore and Another – [1997] 75 TAX 259 (H. The petitioner cannot be allowed to bypass the normal procedure.1994 has rejected the same and against his order the petitioner has gone to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.Lah. Commissioner of Income Tax. Zone-B. Special Officer. these petitions are clearly not maintainable. Assessing officer did not give appeal effect being challenged by the department. No doubt the petitioner had raised various pleas before the Commissioner of Income Tax who by his detailed order dated 7. If so advised. assessee cannot be allowed to bypass the available adequate remedy. the petition being premature Is dismissed in limine. therefore. Since the petitioner had alternate statutory remedies in the hierarchy of the income Tax Department as already mentioned above. Income Tax and Others – [1997] 75 TAX 117 (H. However. It is also to be noted that if the decision of the Appellate Tribunal goes against the petitioner. writ petition is not maintainable.8. it can come to this Court by filing an application under section 136 of the Income Tax Ordinance. In view of what has been stated above. may be taken before the appropriate forum.) = 1997 PTD 819 425. 3 against the impugned order recorded by respondent No. this petition is not maintainable Accordingly. Sante International (Pvt. As an adequate remedy has been made available to the petitioner under the relevant law. It may be stated at the very outset that the petitioner can file an appeal before respondent No.) Ltd. There may not be any cavil with this proposition but here the position is different as the petitioner has itself invoked the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal by filing appeals and there is no reason also as to why the Appellate Tribunal should not be allowed to decide the questions which are arising in these petitions. 1979 which is to be heard by a Division Bench of this Court. leaving the parties to bear their own costs. he cannot be .) = 1997 PTD 7 426. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 cases that it is not essential to file a departmental appeal when the matter relates to the interpretation of statutory instrument and the matter can be brought directly to this Court.Pesh. Including the one relating to the Jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer. and Another v. Haji Gula Khan v.C. Where alternate statutory remedies available.

The respondent No. The writ petition even otherwise being devoid of merits is not maintainable. Zone ‘A’ Lahore – [1996] 73 TAX 106 (H. and proceedings have already been initiated by the respondent by issuing the mandatory notice under section 62 of the Ordinance. The manner. Writ is not maintainable where facts are controversial.3. as the income Tax Ordinance itself is a complete Code and procedure for referring a question of law to the High Court has been provided under section 136(1) of the income Tax Ordinance. 1 in the said letter alleged that the petitioner is carrying on the business of releasing Indian films after obtaining expensive master prints from Karachi and hundreds of films are .) 429. Lahore and 4 Others – [1996] 74 TAX 215 (H. Sameer Electronics v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax.1995. Agha Ice Factory. of the view that this writ petition is misconceived. Central Region. the petitioner. Regional Commissioner Of Income Tax. Circle-B.C. We are. The respondent No. Income Tax Officer – [1996] 74 TAX 21 (H. Legality and correctness of a factual controversy could not be resolved in constitutional jurisdiction. who has already submitted the returns in response to the notice under section 65.) 428.C. therefore.C. 1973. ft is undesirable for the petitioner to switch over to the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court at his sweet will in the mid of the proceedings in the absence of any compelling and justifiable reasons.254 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. have been sought by the petitioner is unwarranted and misconceived.Lah. I am of the opinion that it is a controverted question of fact and such a question cannot be resolved In constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. Section 65(2) of the Income Tax Ordinance provides that no proceedings under sub-section (1) shall be initiated unless definite information has come into the possession of the Income Tax Officer and he has obtained the previous approval of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax in writing to do so.) 427. without prejudging the issue.Lah. 1 positively is in possession of information as indicated in his letter dated 11. Zam Zam Traders v. Sheikhupura v. Selection of return for audit challenged through constitutional jurisdiction held not maintainable.Lah. answers to questions raised in the petition. allowed to by pass the same and approach this Court straightaway under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

The petitioners were provided proper opportunity to represent their facts and were properly heard by the Assessing Officer. Peshawar and others (1993 SCMR 618). The petitioner vide his letter dated 20.Pesh.C. constitutional petition is not the proper remedy. Abdul Rasheed and 2 others (1983 SCMR 168) and Muhammad Younas Khan and 12 others v. in the first instance. (a) In the first instance the questions of fact have been raised and the High Court cannot go in the domain of such controversy.Lah.255 SHORT TITLE. Peshawar and others (1993 SCMR 618) as it is a consistent view of Supreme Court that in cases where factual controversies are involved. the nature of controversy. particularly the legality and correctness of “releasing” Indian films is a factual controversy.B.W. Cases referred to: Julian Hoshang Dlnshaw Trust and others v. for the redress of his grievance.P. v.C. Muhammad lsmail v. the petitioner instead of seeking adequate and alternate remedy from the department concerned.R.F. Income Tax Officer – [1995] 72 TAX 1 (H. through Secretary Forest and Agriculture. such a question cannot be resolved in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court and refrains (sic) from substituting Its own finding of fact as observed by their Lordships in case Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v.P. (b) Muhammad Jameel v.W. Income Tax Officer (1992 SCMR 250). rather the conduct of petitioners remained objectionable and did not appear . Peshawar and 3 Others – [1995] 72 TAX 274 (H. Saif Nadeem Electro Ltd. In the next place. it may be mentioned here that the petition in hand cannot be entertained unless all the remedies available and open to the petitioner are not exhausted.1995 in response to the said notices denied the fact of “Releasing” Hindi films being without any evidence and proof and added that neither the import of Indian films is allowed to Pakistan nor violated any provision of law in that regard. through Secretary Forest and Agriculture. Government of N. has straight away came to this Court. Collector of Customs and Central Excise/Commissioner of Sales Tax. Government of N. High Court cannot go in the domain of factual controversy. including the C.) 431.) 430.F. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 available in the Video Market bearing the name of petitioners concern. Writ petition not maintainable where adequate and alternate remedy available.3.

Cases referred to: Julian Hoshang Dinshaw Trust and others v. who have not come with clean hands before this Court even otherwise have remedy by way of appeal. Multan and others – [1995] 71 TAX 216 (H. and it is not that pure and simple legal proposition.C. with which this Court was approached in the matter. as also misconceived and the object is to derive an undue advantage. Azmat Farooq v.Pak) = (1992 SCMR 250) and Hafiz Muhammad Arif Dar v. In view of the above observations made by their Lordships. Writ cannot be entertained where adequate remedy is available.C.256 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. The instant petition is not entertainable and is dismissed in limine. which calls for a determination by this Court. and proceed to dismiss the petition.C.Lah. It is a field. 1979. Income Tax Officer. which this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot possibly undertake. for the move made is illintentioned. and it would not be correct to say that a writ petition is the only remedy. if genuinely aggrieved. by making the Income Tax Authorities helpless in the matter. Circle-8. can avail of the remedies available under the Income Tax Ordinance.) 432. I am not at all convinced about the competence of the writ petition. evidently involves a factual inquiry. That being so.Pak) = (PLD 1989 SC 109). I am of the view keeping in view the conduct of petitioners.) 433. which could be invoked for redressal of the grievances in question. This ground alone will disentile the petitioner to the discretionary relief. Income Tax Officer and anothers (1992) 65 TAX 102 (S. Be that as it may. the Regional . Estimation of income etc. Regional Commissioner of Income Tax Central Region Lahore and another – [1993] 68 TAX 74 (H. before him with clean hands.Lah. As already observed the Income Tax Ordinance is a complete code in Itself. Factual inquiry involving controversial facts cannot be undertaken by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. experts of which are the Income Tax people. as also bona fides of the petitioner. it stands admitted that no revision at all was filed by the petitioner before the Commissioner but only a representation was made to the Regional Commissioner of Income Tax who forwarded it to the Commissioner of Income Tax.C. The petitioner concern. There is no worth-while explanation forthcoming to the inordinate delay of two years and two months. Income Tax Officer (1989) 60 TAX 52 (S. Allied Cans v.

East Zone. it was incumbent upon the petitioner to keep track or the case and it could not take shelter under the plea that one Mr. writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked. it is evident that the assertion regarding the undervaluation of the properties is incorrect. 5-K of 1986). Moreover.Kar. Zakaria Loya had appeared before Income Tax Officer in the first instance and had taken time. Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. Mansoor Ahmed who had appeared for him before the Income Tax Officer was not entitled to appear. Cases referred to: Arafat Woollen Mills Ltd. Circle XVIII. Case applied: Commissioner of Income Tax Zone-D. The Income Tax Officer. the receipt of notice issued by the Income Tax Officer on 24th January. Income Tax Officer. Income Tax Officer.C. called for in the exercise of this Courts Constitutional jurisdiction at this stage.Kar. Jennings Private School [1992] 66 TAX 156 (S. of the view that we cannot at this stage hold that the impugned notice is without jurisdiction as to warrant the interference by this Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction and deprive jurisdiction of the hierarchy of the forums provided under the Ordinance. therefore. v. Karachi [1986] 54 TAX 1 and Wali Traders v.C.257 SHORT TITLE. it is open to the petitioner to demonstrate this fact before the Income Tax Officer and to satisfy him that the properties in question were not undervalued.A. however.C. Karachi v. Zafar Usman v. was certainly entitled to interfere. Brilliant Farbics & Silk Factory. Karachi (C. Issue being controversial involving inquiry into is not a fit case to be determined under supervisory constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. therefore.) 434. Companies Circle C-1. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Commissioner. – [1989] 59 TAX 86 (H. We are. On the other hand we find that Mr. Income Tax Officer etc. Companies Circle E-1.) 435. His submission was that the person who had appeared before the Income Tax Officer was not authorised by him.Pak). No. learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to argue that even on the basis of the material which has been annexed by the respondents alongwith the report to this petition. If that be so. to whom the representation was addressed being an officer higher thin the Commissioner of Income Tax. West Zone. Karachi v. No interference is. No affidavit . Karachi & others – [1987] 56 TAX 24 (H. In the end. The Income Tax Officer. v. 1983 to the petitioner is not denied and. If Income Tax Officer‟s action is jurisdictional. Karachi [1988] 58 TAX 29.

Arafat Wollen Mills Limited v. Income Tax Officer – [1986] 54 TAX 1 (H. the same could have been agitated only before the higher income Tax Authorities. which has knowledge of such facts. is not entirely correct. Therefore. the petitioner is not entitled to seek the intervention of this Court which has supervisory jurisdiction and it should not exercise its discretion in favour of a wrong door. as shown in this petition. It is common knowledge that different associates of the lawyer firms or be Income Tax Consultants appear before the Courts or the relevant Authorities and they ate allowed to appear as such. The petitioner has not sought any damages from Zakaria Loya & Co. Mansoor was an associate of Zakaria Lays & Co.C. 1983. this becomes a controversial matter of fact and not fit matter of controversy in the supervisory constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore. Assessee‟s factory was still in process of erection and installation and had not yet started commercial production. for not having represented the petitioner or for having sent a person who was not authorised to represent Zakaria Loya and Co. 1983/18th January. the submission that the petitioner was not property represented is unfounded. Mansoor was not an associate of Mr. Zakaria Loya has been filed before us to substantiate allegation that Mr. of Mr. Assessee cannot avail remedy of constitutional petition before High Court being dissatisfied with the notices. Zakaria Loya. Moreover. therefore. therefore. Petitioner had three opportunities in the Department but with no success. The Department in its comments has clearly stated that such a letter of the assessee was never received by them and we find that in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner there is no further contravention in respect of the receipt of the Mid alleged letter of protest allegedly sent by petitioner to the Department. is binding. The position that the petitioner was immune from scrutiny.258 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. and the said finding coming from the concerned department.) = 1986 PTD 316 436. in the assessment order passed by the Income Tax Officer and the appellate orders the findings are that petitioner has been guilty of concealment and suppression. has been taken up by the petitioner from the initial stage.Kar. The learned counsel has also tried to show that certain findings of the Income Tax Officer were not justified but we are afraid that we are not the appellate authority in respect of these findings and. These findings are findings of facts and they have not been shown to be completely wrong and. The appellate authority has stated that Mr. or the petitioner for that matter. Income Tax Officer made . by a letter of 10th. January.

We may however. In cases where no such conditions exist and an alternate remedy is provided under statute then High Court would not entertain writ petition. Constitutional remedy could be availed of. which laid down the criteria for determining „free‟ and “unfree . In case where an authority had taken action when it had no jurisdiction on subject-matter of dispute and where absence of jurisdiction was apparent on face of record. The question of satisfaction of the Commissioner could not be challenged in writ petition. Pakistan – [1984] 49 TAX 76 (H. in that case also High Court might entertain petition. issued in this regard were referred by Mr.259 SHORT TITLE. So also where alternate remedy was cumbersome and not effectual and would not give proper relief. No such case is set out by the petitioner in the petition and in the absence of any specific allegation in the petition in this regard we cannot examine the same. basic principle before Court would be that case could be decided on basis of available material and it did not require a detailed enquiry and facts were admitted and only question of law and its interpretation required decision of Court. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 assessment after due scrutiny and tax demand created which was paid by the assessee.C. observe that several instructions issued by Central Board of Revenue. which may not legitimately fall within the meaning of „income‟. Proposition that extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court cannot be sought on each and every case where alternate remedy available is not universal proposition of law. The learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that the „free reserves‟ of the petitioner were consisted of several sums of money received by the company through different sources which may also have included scale of some of the capital assets of petitioner and revaluation of some of the capital assets of the company on account of devaluation of Pakistan currency etc.Kar. Judicial Review: OVERRULED by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1988 SCC 672 Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. But while dealing with matter on Constitutional side. Khalid Anwar. Commissioner was satisfied on the material placed before him that an action has to be taken against assessee. Assessee filed appeal before Commissioner of Income Tax against the Income Tax Officer‟s order during pendency of appeal Income Tax Officer issued notices which were replied by the assessee.) 437. Assessee can not avail remedy of constitutional petition before High Court being dissatisfied with the notices. High Court cannot examine the question of controversial facts in Constitutional jurisdiction.

Remedies available under the law should be exhausted before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. an ample authority on the proposition that where the question of jurisdiction or the authority passing the impugned order is raised. If the petitioner feels that its „free reserves‟ were not constituted of those items as arc declared by the Central Board of Revenue as „free reserves‟ he may agitate it before appropriate forum.Kar.260 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. They clearly lay down that in such a situation an illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction by the assessing authority would confer jurisdictions on this Court in the Constitutional Petition rather than an assumption alone as has been done in the instant case. 1981 would be incompetent unless the legal remedies as well as the remedies provided in the Ordinance are exhausted. the remedy of appeal is not .C. IICircle. Gulzar Cinema. Income Tax Officer Contarctors Circle-Il.. I of 1981 is not maintainable unless the petitioner exhausts adequate legal remedies of appeal and revision available under the Ordinance. 37). be clear that the assessing authority would in the first instance exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence and the documents before it as to whether the property in question is liable to assessment of taxes and to what extent and that the available remedies are exhausted under the ordinary law before the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court is invoked in the Constitutional petition. writ petition is not maintainable. Province of Punjab and others (PLD 1975 S. Karachi & another [1982] 45 TAX 17 (H.P. if available to him under the law. therefore. B. Meraj Sons. Nawab Din and two others (1981 CLC 284). Cases referred to: Managing Director Pakistan Agricultural Storage Service Corporation Ltd. Karachi v. v. etc. There is.) 439. however.C.. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned Deputy Attorney-General that the Writ petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order No. a petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order. Biscuit Factory Ltd.) = 1981 PTD 217 438. It would. Wealth Tax Officer. If question of jurisdiction of the assessing officer is not challenged. Contractors v.C. Lahore and another v. Pakistan through Ministry of Defence v. Government of Pakistan and 4 others (PLD 1978 500).Lah. I agree with the learned Deputy Attorny-General that where there is another adequate and efficacious remedy open to the petitioner. reserves” of the company. Lahore – [1982] 45 TAX 2 (H.

Nagina Silk Mills v.C. Ltd. v.1971. Col. v.C. v.1971 and the appeals were filed on 9.V.C. Municipal District of Sugar City No. The writ petitions fail and are dismissed. held writ petition against such order was not competent. Basappa (AIR 1964 SC 1873). Frontier Sugar Mills (PLD 1975 S. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v.). 205) = (1970) 27 TAX 229 (S. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd... Sales Tax Officer (1972) SCMR 257.C.. and the Muree Brewery Co.C.). 219). (Pakistan Trading) Ltd. Each one of the orders passed by the authorities in the hierarchy of the Income Tax Department is perfectly within their jurisdiction and in accordance with law.). 1977]. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeals holding that the appeals were barred by time as the demand notice was served on 29. Yousuf Ali v.C.C. Commissioner of Income Tax v. 440). Chittagong v.C. E. Usmania Glass sheet Factory Ltd.).C. 113).) 440.C. Rahimyarkhan and another – [1975] 31 TAX 153 (H. Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 S. a petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution would be competent. The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the decision and held that the delay in filing appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner remained unexplained and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rightly refused to interfere with the orders of assessment.C. Calgary Ltd. Chittagong v. Abdul Ghani and another v. Salah-ud-Din and others v. Karachi [PLD 1959 S. Chittagong (PLD 1971 S.C. 131). The Income Tax Officer and another (PLD 1963 S. Pakistan and another v.1. Sales Tax Officer. Mubarak Ahmad (PLD 1972 Lahore 787)..C. Miller (PLD 1959 SC (Pak) 219) = (1959) 1 TAX I (SC). 322) = (1963) 7 TAX 442 (S. Pakistan etc. v. Income Tax Officer (PLD 1963 SC 322) = (1963) 7 TAX 422 (S. Nagina Silk Mills. Collector of Customs. Cases referred to : Commissioner of Income Tax v.Haroon and others v. The Sales Tax Officer (1972 SCMR 257) = (1974) 29 TAX 199 (S. Muhammad .C. Premier Cloth Mills Ltd.3. On these facts the High Court: Held that the petitioners have not succeeded in bringing their petitions within the ambit of Article 199 of the Constitution. Cases referred to: S. 5 (PLD 1951 PC 78). 244). Sales Tax Officer (PLD 1971 SC 205). EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 adequate and efficacious as the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and consequently in such cases. Qazi Ziauddin (PLD 1962 S. Provincial Government of Madras v.Pak.A. 119) = (1961) TAX 165 (S. The Burmah Oil Co. Ghulam Rasool v.). (PLD 1972 S. Bennet & White. Lyallpur v. J S.Lah. Subedar Shoedad Khan Company and other (PLD 1968 S. Lt. The Trustee of the Port of Chittagong (PLD 1962 S. Where appeal was dismissed by Appellate authorities on ground of limitation and this order was in accordance with law.261 SHORT TITLE. Income Tax Officer. Usmania Glass Sheet Factory v.C.

the petitioner is nevertheless disentitled to any relief in the exercise of the equitable writ jurisdiction of the Court. 829. 77). 608]. State of Assam and others (1957) S.Lah. Pannalal Binraj and others v. Writ not maintainable in the presence of adequate and efficacious alternate remedy.C.)  The Income Tax Act provides a complete machinery for assessment of tax and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper or illegal order passed by the Income Tax authorities and an assessee cannot unless . 416. The application dated 19. Williams Phillips. in a given case. Hafeezuddin v.) 442. 1974 S. Lahore v.12. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1964 S.C. Colony Textile Mills Ltd.Lah. Central Board of Revenue. Federation of Pakistan v.C. the present writ petition is. Exparte [(1914) I. there is a bar for the High Court to entertain a petition. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others (P. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Pak) & another [1972] 25 TAX 140 (H. etc.C. therefore. If this be the correct position. Shamim Ali and others v.262 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. then even if the impugned order is found to have been passed without lawful authority. 397) and Rex v.Lah. Abdul Hakeem v. Sales Tax Officer D-Circle Lahore – [1972] 25 TAX 145 (H.KB.C. of Pakistan and another – [1973] 27 TAX 51 (H.Lah.J.C. Lahore v. Taj Din Maula Bux. premature. – [1975] 31 TAX 105 (H.1970 submitted by the Advocate of the petitioner. 104) and Sisil Kumar Das Purkhayastha v.C. Govt. Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Ziaur Rehman (PLD 1973 (S.) 49.) 441. Aslam Zia (PLD 1958 SC Pak. clearly shows that the petitioner agreed to be assessed on consolidated income for the “years agreed at” and according to the Authorities he has been assessed to tax strictly according to his agreement. Writ is not maintainable where adequate alternate remedy exists As adequate alternate remedies exists for correcting any assessment made to the detriment of a particular party or made in an unjust and oppressive manner. Cases referred to: State v.C. Union of India and others (AIR 1957 S.L.T. Mian Khadim Hussain (PLD 1965 Lahore 439).C.)  That remedy provided under Article 98 is a discretionary remedy and when an aggrieved person has an adequate relief elsewhere. Sh.

under the pretext that the rule of interpretation of a fiscal law in this behalf.263 SHORT TITLE. in preference to the contrary so-called accepted rules of interpretation under the other jurisprudential concepts and fiscal laws were no exceptions in that behalf. As a necessary conclusion drawn from the foregoing. application and enforcement wherein discretionary judicial elements were involved.” Mian Aziz A. Commissioner of Income Tax Investigation Lahore – 1989 SCC 718 = [1989] 60 TAX 106 (S. it can be safely held in this case also that on the touchstone of Islamic Rules of Interpretation.Pak) 444. 1973] their interpretation. It was noted that the courts were bound to apply Islamic rules of interpretation. Sheikh v. _______________ MISCELLANEOUS Commissioner of Income Tax v. Siemen A. Unless excluded otherwise.G.C. – 1991 SCC 773 = PLD 1991 SC 368 443. Islamic jurisprudence and rules of law are equally applicable to fiscal laws. is different. Neither legislature under the command contained in Article 227(1) of the Constitution has power to enact a law in any field including . invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him under the Act itself. the income tax authorities cannot change the nature of the contract intended by the parties thereto. its common law and jurisprudence. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 the order impugned. So long as the existing statutes were not brought in conformity with the injunction of Islam [Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Islamic jurisprudence and rules of law are equally applicable to fiscal laws. is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. which unless excluded otherwise. only that course will be adopted which was in accord with the Islamic philosophy. under the present Constitutional set-up the courts are bound to apply in preference to the contrary so-called accepted rules of interpretation under the other jurisprudential concepts (and the fiscal laws are no exception in this behalf).

under the command contained in Article 227(1). . In other words whatever a decision is contained in any such judgment of any such functionary which lays down a rule of law or declares so as a rule of law the superior Courts. which is repugnant to Injunctions of Islam. It is command to all law-making bodies and functionaries. “only in the manner provided in this part (Part IX)”. nevertheless it permits the functionaries of the State at all levels to go on enacting rules like those of evidence which have the force of law and which are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. It is true that with regard to the statutory enactments Article 227 in its Clause (2) commands that: effect shall be given to the aforediscussed negative command in Clause (1). as distinguished from exercise of law-making or statutory rule-making authority. has the power to enact a law in any field including those relating to Taxes. which is repugnant to Injunctions of Islam. Article 227(1) not only requires that all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam but it also commands as a mandate that “no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions”. quasi-judicial or other spheres involving exercise of judgment. those relating to taxes which is repugnant to injunctions of the Islam nor any other functionary including the Income Tax Authorities have any such power to lay down any un-Islamic rule which has a force of law. It will be anomalous to assume that although in Article 227 there is a command to all the legislative bodies not to enact any law which is repugnant to Islamic Injunctions.e. But. It is in this context that the earlier made remarks about the conduct of State functionaries in Pakistan get illustrated. nor any other functionary including the Income Tax Authorities has any such power to lay down any unIslamic rule which has a force of law. shall be within their competence in a properly instituted proceedings to strike it down both under the general mandate contained in Clause (1) of Article 227 as well as under Article 2A read with the Objectives Resolutions. i.. they take decisions. this prohibition in Clause (2) of Article 227 does not apply to decisions by functionaries of State where in the judicial. And thus it may be argued. neither the legislature. none would ever assert that he has power or would lay down a rule having the force of law. In the context of the present case. it also applies to Statutory Rule. The assessing officer cannot lay down in their judgment a rule which goes against Islamic Law. 445.264 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.

in the case of Miss Benazir Bhutto. a rule of evidence which goes against Islamic Law and jurisprudence. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 This is in addition to the reasoning which prevailed in the case: Muhammad Bashir v. it was not only open to the Courts but they were duty bound to apply common law of Islam. That being so. Income Tax Officer Lahore – 1973 SCC 403 = [1974] 29 TAX 190 (S. The power has been delegated to the Board to frame rules so as to determine the market value of the asset. Besides. The result is that the Income Tax Tribunal was not „right in holding that the sum of Rs. The Income Tax Act is a complete code by itself and any grievance in regard to the assessment can be remedied within the four corners of that Act. yet.50.072 was properly included in the income of the assessee under section 16(3)(iii) of the Income Tax‟.Lah.C.265 SHORT TITLE. for it requires that the value should be . is answered in the negative. It has to be set aside and declared as of no effect. Additional District Judge. quoted in Paragraph 5 supra. Remedy to be sought within four corners of Act.Pak) 446. what has been held and enforced from amongst the principles of policy by this Court. to the decision of the Income Tax Authorities laying down in their judgment.C. while setting aside the High Court judgment the question referred to the High Court. can now be further supported with reference to Articles 2A and 227(1) of the Constitution.) = 1998 PTD 3900] 447. Munir Ahmad & Others v. In the first place.C. as also. What was held in Muhammad Bashir‟s case and for that matter Haji Nizam‟s case. 139) which had approved the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Haji Nizam Khan v. Batala Engineering Ltd. Lyallpur and others (PLD 1976 Lahore 930). Federation of Pakistan – [1998] 78 TAX 217 (H. The foregoing rules of interpretation. though with respect wrongly. prima facie. would apply to the present case. The State (PLD 1982 S. in fields which were not occupied by statutory dispensation. its jurisprudence and philosophy. It was upheld by the High Court. a suit does not lie under section 67 of Income Tax Act. the petitioner had a remedy under the Income Tax Act under section 30 and 33. v. The approach then was that although it was not possible for the Courts to enforce Islamic Law in those fields which were fully occupied by statutory dispensation. Various examples of those subjects are enumerated in the concluding part of the judgment of Haji Nizam‟s case. Power to make rules is subject to certain limitations. The use of the word „market‟ is not without significance.

Zakat is not realized only on new income of the individuals rather it is levied on the entire belongings of an individual even if there is no income.e.C. Ushr.) = 1998 PTD 2884 449. 1979. Civil suit does not lie against tax authorities unless order is malafide or illegal. such which a willing buyer shall pay to a willing purchaser.266 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. 448. In the present day world. it was argued that money collected a turnover of business become the property of the individual and cannot be snatched away through the imposition of taxes. otherwise provisions of Section 162 of the Ordinance. v. In so far as the violation of Islamic Provision is concerned. Jaziah are various forms of taxes. Further more. illegality and absence of jurisdiction to pass such order.C. the state is managing various affairs and also provides different services to the people in the shape of.Kar. valuation fixed has no reference to the market value. Basis of taxation in Islam. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & 2 others – [1998] 77 TAX 1 (H. The rule is thus clearly discriminatory. If this measure has been adopted for fixing the value of the share. 1979 will come into play. The rule provides for working out the market value i. mala fides.AJ&K) 450.e. Zakat. defence. it would be ultra vires of the Act as it is against section 46. In order to maintain a suit challenging any order passed under the Income Tax Ordinance. break up value of the share. Sharoff and another v. The tax on the turn over a business is thus of a lesser gravity than that of Zakat. the imposition of taxes has a background. Even in Islam. . Khawaja Textile Mills Ltd. Jaziah is realized from non-Muslims. there could possibly be no objection. for defence services rendered by the state. if in the case of listed companies it is either the listed value or the face value whichever is less which constitutes the market value. Abbas S. it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show presence of these three elements i. Discrimination in rule-making is ultra vires. Income Tax Officer and Others – [1998] 78 TAX 119 (H. the same treatment should have been meted out in case of non-listed companies by providing that the value shall be either the face value or the break up value worked out by the Wealth Tax Officer whichever is less. If in a rule. I am of the considered view that a suit seeking setting aside or annulment of an assessment order passed by Income Tax Authority will not be maintainable.

injustice and switching of the property of the petitioners through „Zulam‟. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 health. deception. The notice. so the assessee be prepared to meet the consequences of reopening of an assessment. Baby-own v. dated 21. The various references made by the learned counsel to the books on Islamic jurisprudence. education and so many other developments for the benefits of the citizens. the assessing officer is required to apply his mind cautiously and to indicate the assessee under section 65(1) under what reason his assessment is sought to be reopen as reopening of a case to some extent is a penal action. firstly. Income Tax Officer – 1997 PTD 47 451. do not support his contention. cheating.1995 under section 65 aforementioned issued to the petitioner does not indicate under what subsection of the section has been issued. The Islamic Shariah does not prohibit the collection of taxes. Thus the taxes have to be levied for different purposes in different shapes on different classes of persons. falsification. The categorization of the people for the purpose of realizing the tax is not against the injunctions of Islam. Without taxes. All this requires a huge sum of money which has to be collected from the people.267 SHORT TITLE. or assessed at too low a rate or has been the subject of excessive relief for a refund and thirdly if assessment is made under section 59(1) and there are reasons to believe that any of the aforementioned defects exists in assessment order. which is misconceived. secondly income has been underassessed. the income chargeable to tax has escaped. the entire proceedings are null and void. is understood that the notice has been issued under sub-para (c) of section 65(1) of the Ordinance. as under the law. the learned counsel for the department contended that as already show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. when confronted. The learned council for the petitioners had argued that realization of this type of tax is fraud.2. lie. Provisions of section 65 stipulate three conditions for issuance of notice under section 65 of the Ordinance. If notice is prima facie defective and error is incurable. to which the petitioner had submitted explanation. from any particular class of persons in the Islamic Society. it is not possible for a Government to defend the country and to provide other services and facilities or perform certain functions for the welfare and well being of the people. The question of classification has been discussed in detail in the judgement delivered by the Supreme Court and justified. As the notice prima facie is defective and the error is not curable as it does not indicate the reason to reassess the said income already .

) Ltd.C. Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt.Lah. We are also of the view that section 5 and 9 of the Act have different scope and operate in different fields and are. section 4 of the Act . Lahore v. It will be seen from the above that Protection of Economic Reforms Act. while interpreting section 5. assessed in the hands of the petitioner. Government of Pakistan. not complementary to each other. It is also to be seen that as section 4 and 5 of the Act.268 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. Ministry of Interior. Islamabad – [1997] 76 TAX 302 (H. There may be no cavil with the principle of interpretation relied upon by the learned single Judge that various provisions in the Act must be read together and the Act should be construed as a whole but that principle has no application in the present case. the Government time and again introduced various schemes with a view to attract investment particularly in foreign currency in the country. All these measures are part of fiscal policies which a Government is entitled to lay down keeping in view the national and economic interest. In our opinion on its plain reading. Pakistan through Secretary. section 9 applies to transactions other than those in foreign currency.) 452. section 5 not only grants full immunity to the holders of foreign currency accounts but also provides that complete secrecy be maintained in respect of the transactions in these accounts. 1992 override Income Tax Law to the extent protections are provided in the former enactment. In the past. foreign currency bearer certificates and foreign deposit bearer certificates.. all principles of interpretation of Statutes are nothing but tools which the Courts employ to find true legislative intent which cannot be defeated by relying upon some abstract principle. The grant of immunity to the foreign exchange accounts is not something new or unique. therefore. These include the issuance of foreign exchange bearer certificates. Provisions of Protection of Economic Reforms Act. both deal with foreign currency. The entire proceedings are null and void. While section 5 of the Act in itself provides complete code so far as foreign currency accounts are concerned. Be that as it may. 1992 was promulgated pursuant to the Policy of the Federal Government to protect various economic reforms undertaken by it in order to provide incentives to investors and to encourage inflow of foreign currency into Pakistan. While interpreting such a law relating to economic matters the Courts should so far as possible adopt that interpretation which furthers the object for which the same has been promulgated.

Gujranwala v. Apportionment or distribution or work among the various officers of the Income Tax Department is essentially an administrative matter and is to be regulated by considerations mainly of convenience. That being so. Commissioner of Income Tax Gujranwala Zone – [1996] 74 TAX 89 (H. This clearly brings out the legislative intent that no question can be asked from the person holding any foreign currency in respect of the same. difficult to accept the .Lah. the holders thereof. have complete immunity from inquiry and scrutiny and complete secrecy must be maintained in respect of those accounts which cannot be violated by any Agency or functionary. we have reach the conclusion that so far as foreign currency accounts are concerned. This argument need not be adverted to as almost on the similar ground the petitioner had challenged the order of the Central Board of Revenue by filing writ petition which was dismissed with the following observations: I do not think I can accept the contention of the learned counsel. no inquiry either into the source or the holding of the foreign currency can be initiated or made by any agency especially when non-obstante clause in section 3 of the Act provides that the Act shall over-ride all other laws. It specifically provides that no person shall be required to make any foreign currency declared at any stage and also ordains that no one shall be questioned in regard to the same. On consideration of various provisions of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act. It is.) Ltd. The Central Board of Revenue stands at the apex in the hierarchy of Income Tax Authorities. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that Central Board of Revenue had exercised its authority with law by assigning the cases to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Central Zone. hold. That being so.C. Lahore. therefore. Under section 8 of the Income Tax Ordinance it can give binding directions to all other Income Tax Authorities. Powers of CBR Territorial & Administrative Jurisdiction. neither the Income Tax Authorities nor Federal Investigation Agency had any jurisdiction to hold any inquiry in respect of the transactions in the foreign currency accounts nor could the same be made basis of criminal prosecution. It provides complete freedom to all citizens of Pakistan and all other persons to bring. sell and take out foreign currency in any form.) _ 453. 1992. (Pvt.269 SHORT TITLE. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 cannot be lost sight of. National Electric Co.

mere statement of intention or a promise de futuro does not create an estoppel. therefore. . Islamabad – [1996] 73 TAX 85 (H. or which otherwise relates to. circumstances or thing. or any past event. The order passed by this court was upheld by the Supreme Court. in our view the same are without legal sanctity behind it and the Minister‟s speech is of no importance till the policies as highlighted in such speeches are given legal effect or cover by way of notification or instruction duly issued by Ministry concerned. Insofar as such speeches are concerned. The possibility of exaggeration in such speeches cannot be ruled out. deny. an existing fact. The petitioner cannot. contention of the learned counsel that in exercise of its powers under section 8. describe. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance. Not doubt that the Minister‟s speech has created false hopes and high expectations which could not be materialized but the speech having no legal sanctity behind it at the best it can be declared as „promise-de futuro‟ which cannot be enforced by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this court. be allowed to reagitate the same matter again. The Minister‟s speech can be termed as representation made on behalf of Government to highlight certain fiscal policies intended to be formulated but it must not be lost sight of that a „representation must relate to an existing fact or a past event. METCO Shipbreakers & others v. it can not transfer a case or a class of cases from one authority to another.C. Such speeches are usually motivated by political consideration and there is considerable difference in between such speeches and that of a policy recognized by some statute or enactment. Budget speech has no legal sanctity. We have also focused our attention to the budget speech of the Minister made before National Assembly and the relief claimed for also resolves around it.270 Section 1 Income Tax Digest. in order to give rise to an estoppel must be a statement which purports to affirm. A representation.Quetta) 454. The pivotal question is whether the points as highlighted in the speech or the policy intended to be formulated was subsequently given effect by issuance of a notification based on some enactment or statute meaning thereby that whether any legal coverage was given or otherwise.

) Ltd. it has been clearly laid down in the judgement that this doctrine has no application to a person who has not been appointed to a post and starts functioning without any order. It is trite law that a notification which has the effect of imposing liability or obligation cannot operate retrospectively in the absence of any legal sanction in the statute itself. 1979 in tribal areas has absolutely no relevancy because income tax deductions are based upon entitlement of persons for receiving salaries from State exchequer.AJ&K) 456. We. However. Muhammad Bashir – [1994] 69 TAX 109 (S. v. Bashir Sons (Pvt. Therefore. Ch. without any bar of locality. – [1995] 71 TAX 45 (H. we are inclined to respectfully observe that reference to above quoted judgment or bar under Article 227 of the Constitution which considering liability of Government employees regarding payment of Income Tax has no nexus with the proposition under consideration. he automatically becomes liable to pay tax on his income. A notification purports to impose a new liability or obligation cannot operate retrospectively. Coram non judice functions performed by such a person would not qualify for validation under the de facto doctrine. Perusal of above provision manifestly discloses that every Government employee.C.C. therefore. v.) 457. Income Tax Officer. CBR – [1993] 67 TAX 395 (H. receiving salary from Federal Government. feel no difficulty in concluding that once Government employee is receiving his salary from State exchequer. place of posting or nature of work.C. place of service or nature of duties unless specifically exempted. The de facto doctrine which is to the effect that if an appointment order is found to be defective the acts performed by a functionary are not invalidated. . valid or invalid. The de facto doctrine. Provincial Government or any local authority of Pakistan is bound to pay income tax at prescribed rates irrespective of his status of residence. Province of Balochistan etc. The question about applicability of Income Tax Ordinance.Lah.271 SHORT TITLE.Quetta) 455. Government employees working in non-taxable territories are liable to pay income tax. Mirpur & 2 others v. EXTENT AND COMMENCEMENT Section 1 Sanaullah Khan etc.

The proceedings under the Income Tax Act.) 460. Karachi v.C.Kar.C.) 458. We may observe here that when reference is made in any law. That jurisdiction vests in the legislature and those problems are. Olympia – [1988] 57 TAX 46 (H. CBR & others – [1969] 19 TAX 198 (H. really for the legislature to solve and not for the courts and tribunals to worry about. Sh.Kar. Legal theories relating to vested rights never contemplate vested rights of state. legal language or law book or dictionary. 1922 are judicial proceedings. about vested rights. It is the duty of the legislature and not of a court to save income from escaping assessment. Commissioner of Income Tax v. We may observe here that the appellate tribunal or the courts can barely assume themselves the position of saving the income from escaping assessment. Highland Manufacturer (Pak) Ltd. . therefore. Diwan Mohammad Mushtaq Ahmad. legal document. Only natural/legal persons have the vested rights and not the government/state. the reference is to the vested right of a person natural or legal. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (West) Karachi – [1985] 51 TAX 66 (H.Kar.272 Section 1 Income Tax Digest.) 459. Proceedings under the Income Tax Act are judicial proceedings.C. and never to vested right of the state.

PLD 1948 PC 259 = [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) In order to determine whether income is agricultural income or not regard must be had to the source of such income.C.) Unless there is cultivation and employment of skill and labour. 285 * Corresponding to section 2(1) of the 1922 Act.) 281 463. 504 = AIR (1924) Cal. 668 = 84 IC 31 284 468. 284 LAND USED FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES 467.-1) (H. land cannot be said to have been used for _ agricultural purposes. _ [1948] 16 ITR 380 (PC) Application of human skill and labour are essential _ ingredients of agricultural income. Annual rent received for wasteland leased out for housing refugees temporarily held not to be agricultural income.Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1050 = PLD 1960 Dacca 34 Income derived from pasturage is income “derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes” within the meaning of the section 2(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and is therefore exempt from assessment under section 14(3)(viii) of the Act. 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (III207) = PLD 1959 SC 453 If income received by assessee falls within agricultural income. _ [1940] 8 ITR 416 (Pat. 462.) = (1924) ILR 51 Cal. [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. 283 466. _ [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. 282 464. 283 465. Term „agriculture‟ is used in a narrow sense.273 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Section 2(1)* Agricultural Income PAGE NO SCOPE OF TERM „AGRICULTURE‟ 461. = [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = PLD 1959 SC 453 _ 1959 SCC 68 281 “Agricultural purpose” and “Cultivation” of lands and “basic _ operations” explained. . _ 1 ITC 284 (Cal. in what character assessee receives it is immaterial.

Dividends distributed by a company to its shareholders out of “agricultural income” are “agricultural income” in the .e. _ Position prior to Income Tax Ordinance. Revenue whilst it may be a species of agricultural income _ has a wider meaning than rent. [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) _ 285 286 287 470. [1937] 5 ITR 118 (Cal.) _ Position prior to Income Tax Ordinance.) 287 474. 471.) 291 291 DIVIDENDS TO SHAREHOLDERS OUT OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ 483. “Market” connotation of. 478. 1979.) _ Ginning of cotton. 476. _ [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 _ The term “such lands” explained. Onus to establish agriculture income is on the assessee. 4 ITC 259 (Pat. In case of land situated in Burma. If there is a market for produce in its original form. 1979. 477. land used for stacking timber) is not “agricultural income” or income “derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes” within the meaning of the section 2(1)(a) of the Act and is therefore not exempt from tax. 4 ITC 259 (Pat. 4 ITC 375 (Nag.) [1945] 13 ITR 122 290 LAND MUST BE ASSESSED TO LAND REVENUE 481. [1945] 13 ITR 122 (Mad.). Income derived from fisheries and from sthaljat (i. 475.)(FB) _ Condition as to vicinity to land. etc. 482.) _ „Flue curing‟ of tobacco. no process performed on it can be said to be a process necessary _ for rendering it fit to be taken to market. 473. [1946] 14 ITR 554 (Sind).) Conditions as to requirement of building as a dwelling _ house. CONNOTATION OF 479. (Mad. AGRICULTURAL PROCESS 472. [1944] 12 ITR 1 (Mad.) _ Sisal fibre from aloe plants. [1946] 14 ITR 356 (Oudh) 287 288 289 289 289 290 RENT / REVENUE. 4 ITC 15 (Pat. PAGE NO 469. [1955] 28 ITR 732 (Cal.274 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom.)(FB) _ 290 LAND MUST BE SITUATED IN PAKISTAN 480. 4 ITC 15 (Pat.

Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for _ agricultural purposes is not agricultural income. [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC). [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All.). [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. 489. [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All. [1943] 11 ITR 546 (Cal. 294 487. [1945] 13 ITR 309 (Pat.) Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for _ agricultural purposes is not agricultural income.). [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC). _ 1979.) = 1956 PLD 45 = 29 ITR 296 SALE OF TREES OF SPONTANEOUS GROWTH – NOT AGRICULTURAL INCOME _ 291 484. 301 .).275 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) PAGE NO hands of shareholders and are exempt from tax. [1946] 14 ITR 787 (Oudh). [1947] 15 ITR 98 (All. [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. [1943] 11 ITR 546 (Cal. 293 486. 1979 so as to be exempt from income tax under clause (1).) 293 485. [1965] 12 TAX 136 (H. [1947] 15 ITR 181 (Oudh). _ [1946] 14 ITR 788 (Oudh) _ Grass of spontaneous growth. [1946] 14 ITR 788 (Oudh) In case of income from sale of grass. [1946] 14 ITR 356 (Oudh).) 298 492.).) Sale proceeds of fruits of trees of spontaneous growth.C. Part I of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance. determination of exempt portion as agricultural _ income held to be necessary.-49) (H.Lah. 490. moonj and forest trees _ which were not grown by actual cultivation. [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 Income from forest of spontaneous growth without any aid of _ human skill and labour is not agricultural income.Dacca) Income from sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth is not _ _ agricultural income. 298 INTEREST ON ARREARS OF RENT 491. [1945] 13 ITR 74 (Oudh).C. [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. Income from the sale of forest trees growing naturally on the soil does not constitute “agricultural income” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance.). 6 ITC 63 (Mad. [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad.). [1949] ITR 445 (PC) Income from sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth and self planted. 295 298 298 488.

_ [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) Rent collected by receiver and paid over to mortgagee of land _ is not agricultural income in mortgagee ‟s hands. [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) 303 SALARY / REMUNERATION 497. [1942] 10 ITR 267 (All. 304 501. it does not imply that any part of remuneration paid to managing agent is agricultural _ income. [1935] 3 ITR 404 (Lahore) Remuneration to partner of a firm having agricultural income. 504. PAGE NO 493. 305 306 502.) 307 307 . 304 500. 6 ITC 41 (Rangoon) 301 301 ANNUITY 495.) _ Where loan was repaid in form of agricultural produce. [1935] 3 ITR 237 (PC) 302 COMMISSION 496. RENT 503. Where portion of income of managed company consists of agricultural income. [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad. is not agricultural income. [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) Remuneration paid to mutawalli of wakf having _ agricultural properties. Commission received by owner for selling agricultural _ produce of tenants is not agricultural income. [1943] 11 ITR 295 (PC) Where Remuneration to mutawalli held as agricultural _ income. annuity _ is not agricultural income.) 303 498. Where agricultural land is exchanged for annuity. for managing estate.) Remuneration received by the lambardar for collecting land _ revenue is not agricultural income. Rent received for site of flour mill is not agricultural income. [1948] 16 IR 380 (PC) Allowance paid to co-owner of agricultural land for _ managing land is not agricultural income. is not agricultural income in _ partner‟s hands. [1941] 9 ITR 56 (Mad. [1944] 12 ITR 351 (Pat. 304 499. 494.276 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for _ agricultural purposes is not agricultural income.

Composite rent for agricultural/non-agricultural land.) If a person who lends a sum of money on security of land of which he takes a mortgage with possession on condition that he will receive an annual payment during term of mortgage.) _ 308 INCOME FROM MORTGAGE 506. where held as agricultural _ income. usufructuary mortgaged to him.277 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) PAGE NO 505. 313 . and indenture provided that (a) lessor-mortgagor was to convey agricultural lands to lessee-mortgagee.) Income from lease of land for grazing cattle required for _ agricultural pursuits is agricultural income. but obtains a further mortgage deed for arrears due and finally purchases land and receives payment by way of deduction from sale money agreed upon of original sum loaned plus annual recurring payment due. 2 ITC 152 (Mad. payment received for such _ lease will not be agricultural income in assessee ‟s hands. Income from mortgaged land. 2 ITC 495 (All. [1935] 3 ITR 305 (PC) Rent received under mortgage. [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 308 508. _ 3 ITC 308 (Lahore) Where assessee-money-lender made loan under a zarpeshgi lease with usufructuary mortgage. [1948] 16 ITR 350 (Mad. 310 311 511. Whether lease rent is agricultural income or not has to be determined not with reference to purpose of lease when originally let out but by reference to use to which land has _ been put in relevant previous year. [1940] 8 ITR 378 (Cal. and (b) certain rent was reserved to mortgagor as thika rent and mortgagee was to take balance of profits. profits received by assessee was agricultural _ income.) 308 Income received by assessee money-lender from usufructuary _ mortgage of agricultural land. 3 ITC 33 (Mad. LEASE RENT 512. 507. to mortgagor. does not receive payment stipulated upon. 309 510. _ [1940] 8 ITR 550 (Pat. is agricultural income.) 312 513.) Where assessee money-lender leases land. 308 509. sum received in excess of original loan be regarded as interest and not as agricultural income.

(III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 _ Pasturage. 2 ITC 425 (All. 2 ITC 281 (Pat. [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All. 523. 529. 532. is not agricultural _ income. 263 (Cal. 518. [1937] 5 ITR 569 (Lahore) Maintenance received by widow out of agricultural income of estate of her deceased husband. 2 ITC 52 (Lahore) _ Fisheries. 516.) [1959] 1-TAX 316 316 317 317 317 317 318 318 318 Sale of water from Water canal held not to be agricultural _ income. 315 521.) _ Sale of earth.) _ 313 SALAMI (LUMPSUM PAYMENT) 515. „Forestry‟ and „agriculture‟ not synonymous. Salami for letting out agricultural land. Unjust exactions made by landlord while renewing lease. 2 ITC 363 (Mad.) Maintenance received by widow out of agricultural income of estate of her deceased husband. 519. 528. is not agricultural _ income.) _ Relinquishment of estate for monthly allowance.) MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCE 517. 3 ITC 428 (Mad. [1948] 16 ITR 350 (Mad. _ are agricultural income. [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. [1933] 1 ITR 379 (Oudh) _ Allowance to daughters. ITC 158 (Pat. 526. In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member _ / others out of impartible estate.) .) _ Salt manufacturing.) _ Lac cultivation.) [1945] 13 ITR _ 314 3 314 Salami paid to landlord for recognising transfer of land. 531. „FORESTRY‟ AND „AGRICULTURE‟ NOT SYNONYMOUS 524. 9 ITC 35 (Oudh) _ 314 314 314 520.) _ Brick-making. [1934] 2 ITR 186 (All. 5 ITC 42 (Pat. PAGE NO 514.278 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.) In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member _ / others out of impartible estate. 527. 315 315 316 522. 530. [1935] 3 ITR 356 (Oudh) In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member _ / others out of impartible estate. 525. 5 ITC 493 (Bom.) _ Quarries. [1945] 13 ITR 174 (Mad.

) Question as to whether forest trees are of spontaneous _ growth or not is a question of fact.279 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) PAGE NO 533. [1938] 6 ITR 145 (Rangoon) It is entirely a question of fact whether in the year in question the rent was derived from land which was used for _ agricultural purposes. 324 . [1940] 8 ITR 378 (Cal. [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom. Rule 8 is applicable only in respect of a seller who manufactures tea which he had himself grown and which he _ himself sells.) 321 COFFEE MANUFACTURERS 542. 2 ITC 99 (Cal. 539. [1936] 4 ITR 114 (Lahore) _ 318 319 319 _ 319 319 319 320 321 Jalkar/Hat/Ghattagi/Terries/Moorings. 1 ITC 303 (Pat. 538. 323 546.) _ Bankar/Lahkar/Phalkar. 540. expenditure for earning _ agricultural income is not allowable.) _ Malikhana. 535. [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) _ Mutation fee.) _ Toddy. it will still be _ „agricultural income‟. [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag.) 323 545.) _ Nazrana. [1946] 14 ITR 287 (Cal. 323 547. [1939] 7 ITR 48 (PC) 322 SUGAR MANUFACTURERS 543.) _ Dharat. 537.) TEA MANUFACTURERS 541. 534. Although income from coffee growing in certain cases may be treated as income from business. Where business income comprises both agricultural and non-agricultural income. Question as to whether income derived from a business is _ agricultural income or not. [1942] 10 ITR 322 (All. [1933] 1 ITR 78 (Mad. is not a question of fact. [1941] 9 ITR 313 (Pat. [1938] 6 ITR 194 (Rangoon) 322 REFERENCE TO THE HIGH COURT 544.) Question as to whether the process employed by the assessee agriculturist is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator to render the produce fit to be taken to market. is essentially _ a question of fact. 2 ITC 470 (Mad. Fisheries. 536.

PAGE NO 548.) Question as to whether the process of „flue curing‟ was a process coming within section 2(1)(b)(ii). is a question of _ fact. [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom. 324 . [1944] 12 ITR 1 (Mad. Conclusion of the Tribunal that process employed by assessee is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator is _ one of fact.280 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.) 324 549.

sowing of the seeds. East Bengal v. 462. subsequent operations * Corresponding to section 2(1) of the 1922 Act. Basic operations would require the expenditure of human skills and labour upon the land itself. however. Unless there is some measure of cultivation of land. planting and similar operations on the land. No assistance is to be sought from the meaning ascribed to the word “agriculture” in other statutes. It means that an operation to qualify as “agricultural” must involve or to be connected with the cultivation of the soil. The word “agriculture” is not used in its extended meaning. The cultivation of land does not comprise merely of raising the products of the land in the narrower sense of the term like tilling of the land. There are. sowing of the seeds. “Agricultural purpose” and “Cultivation” of lands and “basic operations” explained. Cultivation in the strict sense of the term is restricted to the tilling of the land. Where the assessee has made no contribution by way of cultivation no question can arise either of the land being used for agricultural purposes or of the trees grew on such land and the income they produce being the result of agriculture. The term “agriculture” has been used in the Ordinance in a narrow sense. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & others – 1959 SCC 68 = [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = PLD 1959 SC 453 461. it cannot be said to have been used for agricultural purposes. some expenditure of skill and labour on it. . planting and similar work done on the land but also includes the subsequent operations.281 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Section 2(1)* Agricultural Income SCOPE OF TERM „AGRICULTURE‟ Commissioner of Income Tax. Term „agriculture‟ is used in a narrow sense.

if it is derived from land of a certain type. Miller [1956] 29 ITR 296 (Lahore) with the following observations: “. Raja Bahadur Vishweshwara Singh v. S.V. then it did not matter in what character the assessee received it. Commissioner of Income Tax [1957] 32 ITR 377 (Pat. such income does not assume the character of agricultural income by reason of the source from which it is derived. harvesting and rendering the produce fit for the market. Commissioner of Income Tax [1954] 26 ITR 573 (Pat. But if the income received falls within the definition of agricultural income. Note: See also Commissioner of Income Tax v. . One cannot dissociate the basic operations from the subsequent operations even though they are divorced from the basic operations. whether he received it as shareholder or managing agent or mortgagee. that is to say. . Ltd. Maddi Venkatasubbayya [1951] 20 ITR 151 (Mad. tending.H. The later would all be subsequent operations when taken in conjunction with the basic operations. pruning. or the method by which it is calculated. it earns exemption. Ltd. digging the soil around the growth. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC). . ” (p. v. CAIT [1969] 71 ITR 108 (Ker. But if it possessed that character. Ramaraj v. Rice Mill & Marketing Society Ltd. Premier Construction Co. FOLLOWED IN .) and Commissioner of Income Tax v. v.). Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. necessary to be performed after the produce sprout from the land e. Judicial analysis: EXPLAINED IN . Mahasamund Kissan Co-op.Commissioner of Income Tax v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 380 (PC) is that the source was of no importance if the income itself was not of the character of agricultural income. E. [1976] 103 ITR 499 (MP). Where an assessee receives income. removing of undesirable undergrowths and all operations which foster the growth and preserve the same not only from insects and pets but also from depredation from outside. cutting. weeding.). Mrs. not itself of a character to fall within the definition of agricultural income contained in the Act. What follows from Premier Construction Co. If income received by assessee falls within agricultural income. in whatever character the assessee receives it.Commissioner of Income Tax v. .g. 317).A. or even as a cast-iron moneylender who peeled off agriculturists like Newton apples. in what character assessee receives it is immaterial.282 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.). It would be agricultural income. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 380 (PC) 463. .

Agricultural is the art or science of cultivating the ground. some expenditure of skill and labour upon it. Application of human skill and labour are essential ingredients of agricultural income. Not only must he labour to reap the _ harvest .) and Benoy Ratan Banerji v. and as the Privy Council had held in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v.that of course he must do else there could be no income but he must also labour to produce it. though it must always be difficult to draw the line. .A. Judicial analysis : EXPLAINED IN . it cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Act. Unless there is cultivation and employment of skill and labour. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. even when it is extended to include „forestry‟ is the application of human skill and labour. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 98 (All. income arising to the assessee from such land is not agricultural income. land cannot be said to have been used for agricultural purposes. East Bengal v.283 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh v.Commissioner of Income Tax.) approved. Commissioner of Income Tax – PLD 1948 PC 259 = [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 465. The burden being on the assessee to bring himself within the purview of the exemption. Kumar Ram Naryan Roy Chaudhry & Other [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the following words: “The entire finding on points was fully extracted in the statement of the case. Without that it can be neither art nor a science. It is essential that the income should be derived from some activity which necessitates the employment of human skill and labour and which is not merely a product of man‟s neglect or inaction except for the gathering in of the spoils. Case review : Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. No assistance is to be got from the meaning ascribed to the word „agriculture‟ in other statutes and. yet. Commissioner of Income Tax.) 464. 268. and he not having proved that the forest was „cultivated‟ by him in the sense that its produce was due to the skill and labour which he expended on it as opposed to produce which would come in any way from natural causes despite inaction on his part. From this finding it follows that the trees sold during the years in question were of spontaneous growth without any human effort or skill. [75 I. Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 92 (Mad. unless there is some measure of cultivation of the land. The essence of agriculture.

On a reference. 1948 P. 259]. the High Court held that both the items were rightly treated as income and assessed to tax.000/. The amount of the salami (Rs. .as salami. The transaction was purely contractual and the land continued to remain the property of the assessee although burdened with a lease during the period of war. .Dacca) = 1960 PTD 1050 = PLD 1960 Dacca 34 467. and Rs.5. Bengal Mufassil v.000/. ” Commissioner of Income Tax v. Where the assessee had been granted annual ex gratia amount in 1936 on resumption in 1919 of the thikadari lease given to the assessee‟s ancestors in consideration of some services rendered by them in the remote past. _______________ LAND USED FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES Commissioner of Income Tax.C.000) and the rent (Rs. . The acquisition of the land by the Government was not compulsory. the Tribunal on an application of the assessee thought it fit to make a reference. Assessee‟s contentions that the salami was by way of compensation or in the nature of capital receipt and the rent (even if treated as income) were both agricultural income were overruled both by the Income Tax Officer and Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Burdhan Kuti Wards‟ Estate – [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. it was held that the ex gratia amount could not be regarded as agricultural income as the source of the income was the order granting ex gratia amount and not land.C. Nevertheless. In order to determine whether the income is agricultural income or not regard must be had to the source of such income. Annual rent received for wasteland leased out for housing refugees temporarily held not to be agricultural income.5. .284 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. there was no necessity for a reference. . the Tribunal agreed with the contentions of the assessee. In order to determine whether income is agricultural income or not regard must be had to the source of such income.L. P. .50. Pandit Dhaneshwardhar Misra – [1940] 8 ITR 416 (Pat.000)/-) received by the assessee was assessed to tax. On a further appeal.) 466.-1) (H.50. the Income from the sale of such trees was not “agricultural” income within the meaning of the Act. the Government took on temporary lease about 500 bighas of waste land of the assessee in order to house and accommodate refugees from Burma and agreed to pay Rs. as yearly rent to the assessee.D.

In the application of the assessee it is thus described:“For the purpose of collecting the rent of the forests periodic leases are granted to parties permitting them to fell timber. Emperor v. in the case of a permanently settled estate. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1949 PC 13 and Maharajadhiraj Sir Rijoy Chand Mahtab [1940] 8 ITR 378. Rent in kind is realised by a share of the timber felled or by a share of the sale-proceeds thereof.e. The timber so felled is not subjected to any process of manufacture. sub-section (3). 668 = 84 IC 31 468.) = [1924] ILR 51 Cal. and I agree with the Commissioner and the learned Vakil who appears for the Crown in thinking it to be reasonably plain that income from pasturage is “derived from land which is used for agricultural purpose”. within the exemption given by section 4. in the circumstance that income is derived from fees realised from graziers who graze their cattle in the forest areas and waste lands there is nothing to render inapplicable the definition of “agricultural income” contained in clause (a). Income derived from pasturage is income “derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes” within the meaning of the section 2(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and is therefore exempt from assessment under section 14(3)(viii) of the Act. 504 = AIR (1924) Cal. land used for stacking timber) is not “agricultural income” or income “derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes” within the meaning of the section 2(1)(a) of the Act and is therefore not exempt from tax.285 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Judicial review: It was an established fact in the case that during accounting period the land was not used for “agricultural purposes”. Income derived from fisheries and from sthaljat (i. Mustafa Ali Khan v. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Cal. It was held that under section 2(1) of the Act it is the actual use of the land which is to be looked into as the decisive factor and not the purpose of lease. clause (a). sub-section (1). Commissioner of Income Tax [AIR 36 1949 PC 13] was followed. Cases referred to: Mustafa Ali Khan v. 469. clause (viii) of the Act to “agricultural income” as defined by section 2. and is. The last question for decision relates to what is called sthaljat or rent received for the use of land for stacking timber. therefore. The question as regard income from pasturage is not now in dispute. The lessees stack the felled timber at places for the purpose of sale and .

I am not convinced that the legislature. Commissioner of Income Tax. Onus to establish agriculture income is on the assessee. in the letter of reference to this court says: The land is used not by the applicant for the sale of his agricultural produce. must reach so far as to establish that land rented to purchasers of timber whereon they conduct operations of and incidental to the business of selling timber is land used for agricultural purposes by reason that the timber is bought from him. but by persons to whom the applicant gives the right to cut. and all that the assessee is required to show for the purpose of earning the exemption is that the . transport and sell timber. I am of opinion that the profits of the persons who work the timber arise from „business‟ and are therefore assessable to Income Tax. again. or is in some manner calculated there. however. The language of the section is quite plain. The Commissioner of Income Tax. I think that this is to stretch ordinary language beyond its reasonable limits. Assam. the question is whether this rent is “derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes” under section 2(1)(a) of the Act. The learned Senior Government Pleader declines to concede that there is anything in the Income Tax Act which exempts income derived from forestry and contends that in any case this income is not a part of forestry income. Consequently rent received by the applicant is rent received from business premises and therefore does not come under the head of „agriculture‟ and is taxable”. The contention of the assessee is that this rent is part of his income from the forest. convert. The contention of the assessee.286 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. and that the income in question is liable to assessment. that the site is within or adjacent to his forest and that the amount due to him is paid there. Here. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & others – [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 470. East Bengal v. While the profits arising to the landlord from forestry are exempt from Income Tax. payment of rent and for such stacking they pay rent of the site under the name of sthaljat. if it intended to include “even „forestry‟” would have been content to say “agriculture” but in the circumstances I desire to prejudice this question no further than by an expression of this doubt. That the land is used for purposes of forestry and that forestry is within the meaning of the term “agriculture” as used in Act.

Where the assessee grew sugarcane. Burdhan Kuti Wards Estate [1949] 17 ITR 191 (Dacca).) 472. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 471. The produce must retain its original character in spite of the process unless there is no market for selling it in that condition.M. would be covered by the definition.] _______________ AGRICULTURAL PROCESS J. Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 259 (Pat. Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. If there is no market to sell the produce. Casey v. “Market” connotation of. and the finding of fact was that the sugarcane grown by the assessee-company could either be sold to other factories or utilised by the factory to produce gur or sugar: Held that the income from the sale of gur was not agricultural income since there was a market where this sugarcane could be sold without passing through any process. The term “such lands” explained. Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v.Commissioner of Income Tax v. If there is a market for produce in its original form. the expression „such land‟ in sub-clause (b) refers back to the land mentioned in sub-clause (a) and must have the same quality. Whether exemption is sought under section 2(1)(a) or section 2(1)(b) of the 1922 Act the primary condition that must be satisfied is that the land in question is used for agricultural purposes.) 473. then any process which is ordinarily employed to render it fit to reach the market. v.287 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) income in question was derived from the land which is “used for agricultural purposes”. no process performed on it can be said to be a process necessary for rendering it fit to be taken to market. Judicial analysis: FOLLOWED IN . . where it can be sold. but instead of selling it in raw form it made gur and sold this product. The word „market‟ in section 2(1) implies a real centre of economic exchange and the purchase by jails is merely an artificial condition having no relation to a market for agricultural produce. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom.

. Commissioner of Income Tax [1965] 56 ITR 503 (Guj. said: „Reading the words used in the definition section with their natural meaning they must mean that the produce must retain its original character in spite of the process unless there is no market for selling it in that condition. as he then was. the process employed by the assessees in converting it into gul could not be said to be a process ordinarily employed to render it fit to be taken to market where it can be sold.M. Now it must be conceded straightaway that.‟ The learned judge agreed with the Patna High court in J. . . Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 375 (Nag. the process would not be a process within the intendment of section 2(1)(b)(ii). in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dooars Tea Company Ltd. But this much is certainly established by this decision. the statement contained in the passage quoted above can no longer be regarded as good law in so far as it says that if there is no market for selling the produce in its original character. Although it may be distinctly advantageous.” (pp.) 474. it cannot be said that ginning cotton is essential in order to enable the produce to be „fit to be taken to market‟. 515-516) Seth Sheolal Ramlal v. It is now clear that the produce must retain its original character and if the effect of the process is to alter the character of the produce. Kania J.. where it can be sold.Sakarlal Naranlal v. . the character of the produce may be altered by performing a process necessary to render it fit to be taken to market and such a process too would be covered by section 2(1)(b)(ii). In Brihan Syndicate‟s case [1946] 14 ITR 611. Ginning of cotton.288 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. after referring to section 2(1)(b)(iii). If there is no market to sell the produce then any process which is ordinarily employed to render it fit to reach the market. if there is a market for the produce. would be covered by the definition . no process performed on it can be said to be a process necessary for rendering it fit to be taken to market. . Judicial analysis: EXPLAINED IN . Casey‟s case AIR 1930 Pat. 44 that market must mean a ready and available market where produce of the kind grown by the assessee is bought and sold and observed that since the statement of the case itself showed that there was a market for sugarcane. . .) with the following observations: “ .‟s case [1962] 44 ITR 6 (SC). namely. even from the mere point of view of transport to have the cotton ginned first.

„Flue curing‟ of tobacco.‟ Whereas the very „requires‟ is separated by a comma from the grammatical subject and the phrase „by reason of his connection with the land‟. If he should not occupy any of these positions in connection with the land he is not entitled to claim. The department did not claim to recover tax on such portion of his profits as was attributable to the production of the aloe leaves but it was contended that the manufacture of the fibre from these leaves constituted a manufacturing process as opposed to an agricultural process the profits from which were not exempt as agricultural income. The word „requires‟ in proviso to section 2(1)(c) means that the assessee demands to appropriate the building for the purpose of a dwelling house. Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 15 (Pat.M. Sisal fibre from aloe plants. or the fact that he is a receiver of rent in kind entitles him to claim any building as a dwelling house. Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 259 (Pat. In other words. Casey v. or as a store house. Held that the department‟s case was not sustainable. Thus. the expression „by reason of this connection with the land‟ is merely used to explain the nature of the class of persons entitled to exemption. Katragadda Madhusudhana Rao – [1944] 12 ITR 1 (Mad. Of course there must be a bona fide use .) 476.289 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Commissioner of Income Tax v. etc. Conditions as to requirement of building as a dwelling house. Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. it has been said that punctuation must not be used in construing a statue other than as a mere temporanea expositio. J.)(FB) 477. the conclusion is that this phrase has a qualitative and not a quantitative significance. and for this limited purpose it may be noticed that the words are not separated by a comma or otherwise from the words „the receiver of the rent or revenue or the cultivator or the receiver of the rent in kind. a store house or an out-building. or other out-building and the words „by reason of his connection with the land‟ mean that only the fact of his being a receiver of rent or revenue or the fact of his being a cultivator. as tax free accommodation of the kind specified.) 475. Process of „flue curing‟ can be termed as the process ordinarily employed by the cultivator of virginia tobacco to render it fit to be taken to the market. The assessee among other activities of an agricultural nature cultivated aloe plants and from them by means of machinery prepared sisal fibre which he sold in the market.

The same definition is contained in section 2(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance. 1979. CONNOTATION OF Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. _______________ RENT / REVENUE. Income from agricultural land in Burma is not covered by the definition given in section 2(1)(a). In case of land situated in Burma. Condition as to vicinity to land. Note: It refers to repealed Act of 1922. Where the finding of fact was that the residential house was at a distance of 16 miles from land. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1945] 13 ITR 122 (Mad. store house or out-building and the assessee is not at liberty to claim arbitrarily the exemption of any building which he may at his own choice describe as dwelling house. it was held that the Tribunal was right in not allowing exemption as the building could not be deemed to be in the immediate vicinity of land. the Income Tax authorities have no jurisdiction to determine what portion of the building is as a matter of the fact required by the assessee in his capacity of receiver of rent or revenue and that the assessee is entitled to claim the entire annual value as agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(c).290 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 356 (Oudh) 478. Revenue whilst it may be a species of agricultural income has a wider meaning than rent. _______________ .) 480. Nawab Nawazish Ali Khan v. store house or out-building without regard to the actual facts. Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 15 (Pat. Further held that on the finding that the building is required by the assessee by reason of his connection with the land. The word „revenue‟ is not to be construed as ejusdem generies. „Revenue‟ whilst it may be a species of agricultural income has a wider meaning than rent. of the building as a dwelling house. _______________ LAND MUST BE SITUATED IN PAKISTAN Chockalingam Chettiar v. with rent. „Rent‟ has characteristics which are well known to lawyers.)(FB) 479.

where the produce of agricultural land situated in native State was sold in British India. 1979.291 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) LAND MUST BE ASSESSED TO LAND REVENUE Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 122 (Mad. Miller / Mitchell R. Position prior to Income Tax Ordinance. For the purposes of section 2(1) for a land to be assessed to land revenue in British India or subject to a local rate. (c/o The Colyana Estate. V. In re [1937] 5 ITR 118 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1955] 28 ITR 732 (Cal. Jhamandas Devkishendas [1946] 14 ITR 554 (Sind). a shareholder. H. Note: Kumar Jagadish Chandra Sinha v. _______________ DIVIDENDS TO SHAREHOLDERS OUT OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Commissioner of Income Tax v.) was approved in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dividends distributed by a company to its shareholders out of “agricultural income” are “agricultural income” in the hands of shareholders and are exempt from tax.) = 1956 PLD 45 = 29 ITR 296 483.-49) (H. Mohanpura Tea Co. Section 4(3)(viii) of the 1922 Act did not exempt income derived from lands assessed to land revenue in an Indian State. Chockalingam Chettiar v. A. Carew & Co. Position prior to Income Tax Ordinance. the income derived from sale was not agricultural income.-The dividends distributed by a Company to its shareholders out of agricultural income is agricultural income in the hands of such . Commissioner of Income Tax [1955] 28 ITR 732 (Cal. Kumar Jagadish Chandra Sinha v. A.) 482. it must be land situated in British India and rate should be collected by officers of the Crown (Government of India). Accordingly.) 481.Lah. Ltd.). On appeal the Tribunal held that the dividends declared out of agricultural income retained the character of agricultural income and as such was not assessable.. Okara) [1960] 2-TAX (Suppl. Per KAYANI. 1979. The dividends declared out of agricultural income of the Company were included by the Income Tax Officer in the total income of the assessee. J. [1979] 120 ITR 540 (SC). E. Mrs. (as he was then). On a reference by the Department it was „held that.C.

Guzdar v. tried to argue that this case is no more valid.Pak) = 199 SCC 777 observed that “if receipt is basically outside the purview of taxing statute. that is to say. (ii) (iii) Judicial analysis : The main principle highlighted was that agriculture income is exempt in every one‟s hands received directly or indirectly. the department on the strength of section 151. is distributed amongst its shareholders. mediately or immediately. of the Income Tax paid by the Company also unmistakably point to the conclusion that the Act treats the income of a shareholder received by way of a dividend the same as the income of the Company. and The real test in all cases is whether the recipient has received the income of the Company in pursuance of a right to receive it as such. in Julian Hoshange Dinshaw Trust v. it is enough that it has been received as of right. however. or refund. Judicial review: UPHELD by the Honourable Supreme Court (1959) 1-TAX (III-1) = 1959 SCC 53. Hungerford InvestmenI Trust [1936 P. Cases referred to: Commissioner of Income Tax v. Bacha F. Governor-General v. Later on. the dividends arising out of agricultural income of a company received by them are nothing but agricultural income. Raleigh Investment Co.C. Since the sharesholders have right to participate in the income of a company.292 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. The dividend out of the agricultural income of a Company is agricultural income in the hand of a shareholder because the latter receives it in recognition of his right to it. 219]. Provisions in the Act entitling a shareholder to benefit. Commissioner of Income Tax (1952) 22 ITR . Guzdar v.C. The Honourable Apex Court. specifically inserted in the Income Tax Ordinance. Mrs. It is wholly immaterial for the purposes of the Act whether the agricultural income has been received directly or indirectly.(i) The definition of “dividend” in subsection (6-A) of section 2 clearly indicates that it is the profits of „the Company which are distributed amongst its shareholders. 1979 in the wake of this decision to nollify its effect. J. this section [section 151] has no validity at all as such a receipt cannot be brought under chargeability when received for the second time by a person other than the original recipient”. it is agricultural income itself which. Bacha F. Income Tax Officer (1992) 65 TAX 102 (S. Commissioner of Income Tax (1955) 27 ITR 1. Per AKHLAQUE HUSAIN. [1944 ITR 265]. in part or in whole. Mrs. shareholders within the meaning of section 4(3)(viii) of the Income Tax Act.

Commissioner of Income Tax. Commissioner of Income Tax. 178]. Part I of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance. 1946 A.C. 1979 so as to be exempt from income tax under clause (1).Dacca) 485.C. Cases distinguished : Canadian Eagle Oil Co. 1979 so as to be exempt from income tax under clause (1). Style [1892 A. Bihar & Orissa v. Mymensingh – [1965] 12 TAX 136 (H. Dacca v. Commissioner of Income Tax.C. On a reference. 1979.” On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner excluded the forest income from the assessment.C. 1979.C. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & Others – [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 484. P. 581). 119] and Income Tax Commissioner. Bombay City [PLD 1948 P. The Appellate Tribunal affirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Hamilton v. Maharajkumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh v.C. Income from forest of spontaneous growth without any aid of human skill and labour is not agricultural income. F.293 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) 158.R. Canadian Eagle Oil Company Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943 ITR 295 and The Premier Construction Co.H. 119). Part I of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Ordinance. Commissioner of Income Tax. at the instance of the department: . The assessee leased out its forest to the Government and derived income in various kinds. Nawab Habibulla v.NOT AGRICULTURAL INCOME Commissioner of Income Tax. 224). Income from the sale of forest trees growing naturally on the soil does not constitute “agricultural income” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance. The income so derived was charged to tax by the Income Tax Officer on the ground that as admitted by the assessee himself “the forest was of spontaneous growth without any aid of human skill and labour. The income from the sale of forest trees growing naturally on the soil does not constitute “agricultural income” within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Income Tax Ordinance. Suresh Prosad Lahiri Chowdhury. Kamakhaya Narayana Singh (PLD 1948 P. Bihar & Orissa [1935 ITR 237]. _______________ SALE OF TREES OF SPONTANEOUS GROWTH . Vishweshwar Singh v. v. [1928 ITR 50 All. The King (L. Gresham Life Assurance Society v. v.C. Income Tax Commissioner (AIR 1954 Pat. The King [1946 A. Makund Sarup v. U. 309]. 495]. East Bengal v. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (16 T. 213).

R. Case review: Decision of the Oudh High Court in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v.Vikram Deo Varma.Commissioner of Income Tax. Case referred to : Gopal Das Choudhury v. East Bengal v. (pp.) and Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy v. exempt from income tax under clause (1) Part 1 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Ordinance. if was not only admitted that the trees had grown on land naturally.294 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. East Bengal [4 P. Held. Judicial analysis : FOLLOWED IN . R.L. it was admitted that the trees grew without the intervention of human agency and the forest was of spontaneous growth. Commissioner of Income Tax [1956] 29 ITR 76 (Orissa) on the ground that in the case before the Prvy Council. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & Others [1959] 1-TAX (III207). that it is claimed even on behalf of the assessee that “forest is of spontaneous growth without any aid of human skill and labour”.). . Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1949] ITR 445 (PC)  Income derived from the sale of forest trees growing on land naturally and without the intervention of human agency. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 486.C.) DISTINGUISHED ON FACTS IN . is not „agricultural income‟ within the meaning of section 2(1) of the 1922 Act and is not. 1979. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Where there was nothing to show that the assessee was carrying on any regular operations in forestry and that the jungle from which trees had been cut and sold was of spontaneous growth. Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. even if the land is assessed to land revenue. it was held that income from the sale of trees was not agricultural income. Income from sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth is not agricultural income. This would not constitute an agricultural income. 1959 SCC 68. 95-96) Sri Rajah Ravu Venkata Mahipathi Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur. Case applied : Commissioner. 439 (Dacca)]. therefore. Rai Shamsherjang Bahadur [1953] 24 ITR 1 (All. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhury and others (1959) 1-TAX 207 (S. Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax.B. whereas in the case on hand. East Bengal v. Maharaja of Jeypore v. of Income Tax. but the assessee had claimed that he was carrying on regular operations in forestry under expert advice. Commissioner of Income Tax [1953] 24 ITR 70 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 98 affirmed.

Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 356 (Oudh). The assessee owned an area of 6. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1947] 15 ITR 181 (Oudh). Agl. the nature of those operations would have to be examined to see if they are performed in conjunction with the basic operations of cultivation of the land. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1945] 13 ITR 74 (Oudh).) Maharaja of Kapurthala v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 787 (Oudh). the assessee performs subsequent operations on these products of land which are of wild or spontaneous growth. Nawab Nawazish Ali Khan v. Raja Bahadur Major Raja Durga Narain Singh v. There is no process of agriculture involved in the raising of these products from the land.Viswanatha Cettiar v. determination of exempt portion as agricultural income held to be necessary. If so. and the only work which the assessee performs here is that of collecting the produce and consuming and marketing the same. Maharaj Sir Pateshwari Prasad Singh v. The forest was . Income Tax Officer [1965] 55 ITR 692 (Mys. however. the product can be treated as agricultural product. Where. Benoy Ratan Banerji v. There are no agricultural operations performed by the assessee in respect of the same. Income from sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth and self planted.).000 acres of forest land assessed to land revenue and grown with sal and piyasal trees.) 487. Judicial analysis: FOLLOWED IN .295 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Case review: Decision of the Madras High Court in Yuvarajah of Pithapuram v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1947] 15 ITR 98 (All. and the land cannot under the circumstances be held to be used for agricultural purposes nor can it be held that any process of agriculture is being carried on It is agreed on all hands that products which grow wild on the land or are of spontaneous growth not involving any human labour or skill upon the land are not products of agriculture and the income derived therefrom is not agricultural income. Rani Tara Kumari Devi v. No agricultural operations have been performed and there is no question at all of the income derived therefrom being agricultural income within the definition given in section 2(1) of 1922 Act. Commissioner of Income Tax [1946] 14 ITR 92 affirmed. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All. Mere regeneration and preservation of trees cannot be said to be expenditure of human skill and labour upon the land itself.

But then. (d) clearing. (c) felling. that is to say. Considerable income was derived by the assessee from sale of trees from this forest. few and far between. originally of spontaneous growth. was that the whole of the income derived from the forest could not be treated as non-agricultural income. Regarding item (g). the normal process being that whenever a tree was cut. In view of the fact that the forest was more than 150 years‟ old. This went on perpetually unless an area got otherwise completely denuded. not grown by the aid of human skill and labour and it had been in existence for about 150 years. (e) cutting of channels to help the flow of rain water. trees had completely fallen and the proprietors had planted fresh trees in those areas. it would have been possible for the Income Tax authorities to ascertain how much of the income was attributable to . The question was whether the impugned income was agricultural income. (b) weeding. It could not be denied that so far as those trees were concerned. If the enquiry had been directed on proper lines. therefore. The staff was employed by the assessee to perform the following specific operations: (a) pruning. The tribunal had found that the forest was occasionally parcelled out for the purposes of sale and space from which trees sold were cut away. it had also been found by the Tribunal that the forest was more than 150 years‟ old. If there were no other facts found. The position. (f) guarding the trees against pests and other destructive elements. it found that the said operation had been performed only occasionally and over a small fraction of the area where the original growth had been found to have been completely denuded. Such occasions were. though portions of the forest had from time to time been denuded.296 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. The Tribunal found that the employment of human labour and skill on items (a) to (f) was necessary for the maintenance and upkeep of any forest of spontaneous growth. Held that forest in question was of spontaneous growth. the income derived therefrom would be agricultural income. however. a stump of about 6” height was left intact which set forth offshoots all round bringing about fresh growth in course of time. and (g) sowing of seeds after digging of the soil in denuded areas. was guarded by forest guards to protect offshoots. and they had performed operations for the purpose of nursing the trees planted by them. that would entail the conclusion that the income was not agricultural income. the areas which had thus become denuded and replanted could be considered to be negligible. however. It had been satisfactorily proved that considerable amount of human labour and care was being applied year after year for keeping the forest alive as also for reviving the portions that get denuded as a result of destruction by cattle and other causes.

Having regard to the magnitude of this figure. it must be remarked. ” (p. the operations of planting and nurturing trees would be agricultural and the income derived from sale of such trees would be agricultural income .17. They only mean that if a considerable portion of the forests is found to have been planted. . found . WERE EXPLAINED IN . . . we think that a substantial portion of the income must have been derived from trees planted by the proprietors themselves. Ramakrishna Deo [1959] 35 ITR 312 (SC). [1993] 200 ITR 453 (Calcutta) with the following observations: “. Commissioner of Income Tax [1957] 32 ITR 587 (SC). And this too. .459) FOLLOWED IN .17. These observations do not lay down that if considerable amounts are expended in the maintenance of forests. Commissioner of Income Tax [1953] 24 ITR 70 affirmed. the strength of which must depend on all the facts. Ramakrishna Deo [1959] 35 ITR 312 (SC) in the following words: “. The expenditure shown by the assessee for the maintenance of the forest was about Rs. .51. Commissioner of Income Tax v.000.Commissioner of Income Tax v.000 as against a total income of about Rs. then it must be held that the trees were planted by the proprietors. . .000. where the trees have been planted and nurtured. As no attempt had been made by the department to establish which portion of the income was attributable to forest of spontaneous growth. Case review : Decision of the Calcutta High Court in Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy v. . . is only a presumption of fact.” EXPLAINED IN .Commissioner of Income Tax v. the view of the Supreme Court appears to be that. it was not desirable to direct any such enquiry now. Ltd. Jyotikana Chowdhurani [1957] 32 ITR 705 (SC) and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy [1957] 32 ITR 466 (SC): “The expenditure shown by the assessee for the maintenance of the forest is about Rs. the impugned income was agricultural income.51.Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. . . Judicial analysis : The following are the significant observation of Commissioner of Income Tax v.297 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) forest of spontaneous growth and how much to trees planted by the proprietors. a substantial portion of the income must have been derived from the trees planted by the proprietors themselves. . Having regard to the magnitude of this figure. . . Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. . But no such enquiry had been directed. and in view of the long lapse of time. . a substantial portion of the forest income may be taken to have been derived therefrom.000 as against a total income of about Rs. .

moonj and forest trees which were not grown by actual cultivation. Province of Bihar v. moonj and patwar and forest trees which had not grown as a result of actual cultivation is not agricultural income. Grass of spontaneous growth. Radhika Mohan Roy Wards Estate. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad. but it is not revenue derived from land. Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes is not agricultural income. though it is received in respect of it. even though the land on which they were grown is assessed to land revenue. Pethaperumal Chettiar v. nor is it an accretion to it. Manager. P. Income from sale of fruits of trees of spontaneous growth is not agricultural income.). VR. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya * Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC) . It is no doubt true . Raja Pratap Bikram Shah v. in re [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 546 (Cal.).).P. Income from sale of grass of spontaneous growth is not agricultural income. Commissioner of Income Tax 6 ITC 63 (Mad. _______________ INTEREST ON ARREARS OF RENT Commissioner of Income Tax v.298 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.C. Interest payable by statute on rent in arrears is not such a payment. Raja Bahadur Major Raja Durga Narain Singh Commissioner of Income Tax – [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All.). It is not part of the rent. Rent is a technical conception. its leading characteristic being that it is a payment in money or in kind by one person to another in respect of the grant of a right to use land. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 788 (Oudh) 488. Raja Pratap Bikram Shah v. Sale proceeds of fruits of trees of spontaneous growth.) 491. Income from the sale of grass. In case of income from sale of grass. Rajah Inuganti Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim Bahadur Varu v. Equally clearly the interest on rent is revenue. Interest clearly is not rent. V. Al.) 490. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 788 (Oudh) 489. Kumar Deba Prosad Garga v. Lal Choudhury [1945] 13 ITR 309 (Pat.

in re [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. which has suffered the accident of non-payment.) in the following words: . Its use in the definition indeed demands an enquiry into the genealogy of the product. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 309 (Pat. The mere fact that for a considerable period Income Tax authorities had not treated interest on rent in arrears as taxable. VR. but the immediate and effective source is rent. Mst. There was indeed no evidence that the Legislature was aware of the practice. The word „derived‟ is not a term of art. interest on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes is not agricultural income within the definition of that phrase contained in section 2(1) of the 1922 Act. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 137 (All) and Srimati Lakshmi Daiji v. V. Commissioner of Income Tax [1952] 22 ITR 158 (Bom.Mrs. The source from which the interest is derived has not thereby been ascertained. land indeed appears in the second degree. It could not be assumed that a practice purporting to give effect to a definition had resulted in the creation of such a generally received meaning embodying that practice as would justify the inference that the attributed meaning had been silently adopted by the Legislature. Pathaperumal Chettiar v. Bacha F.) approved.299 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) that without the obligation to pay rent .there could be no arrears of rent and without arrears of rent there would be no interest.not land . Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad. But the enquiry should stop as soon as the effective source is discovered. Sarju Bai v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1944] 12 ITR 428 affirmed. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 380 (PC). and that in their Manuals published from time to time this view was openly stated. But the affirmative proposition that interest is derived from land does not emerge from this series of fact. And rent is not land within the meaning of the definition.) and AL. Note: See also Premier Construction Co. Judicial analysis: EXPLAINED IN . All that emerges is that as regards the interest. Manager. was not a valid contention so as to draw the inference that the Legislature had by the repetition of the debated phrase adopted the meaning attributed to it by the taxing authorities. Ltd.and rent is obviously derived from land . Accordingly. land rent and nonpayment of rent stand together as cause sine quibus non. Case review: Decision of the Patna High Court in Zainuddin Hussain Mirza v. Radhika Mohan Roy Wards Estate. In the genealogical tree of the interest. There is no commercial connection between the interest and the rented land and effective source .P.has become apparent. Guzdar v. v.) overruled.

. Malayalam Plantations Ltd. J. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Trust v. N. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC)] restricted the effect and the meaning to be ascribed to the word „derived‟.e. . Commissioner of Income Tax/CEPT [1953] 23 ITR 143 (Bom. If one were to trace the genealogy of gains or profits arising from transfer of lands.Manubhai A. the inquiry was required to be stopped as soon as the effective source is discovered. . [1948] 115 ITR 624 (Ker.). Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948] 16 ITR 325 (PC)] in terms emphasises that in order to give a meaning to the word „derived‟.D.107-108) DISTINGUISHED ON FACTS IN o ITAT v. Nirgudkar. Commissioner of Income Tax v.Hindustan Lever Ltd. B.300 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Sheth v. Maddi Venkatasubbayya [1951] 20 ITR 151 (mad.” (p. 175) EXPLAINED IN . whereas in the case on hand. .194) CAIT v. Guzdar v. you must not go right back to its ultimate source. but was not of much assistance in deciding what should be the outgoings therefrom under an essentially different statutory scheme. . v. (p. one ought not to go any farther. on the ground that. . which are revenue would be land. Second Income Tax Officer [1981] 128 ITR 87 (Bom.). (p. in the case before the Privy Council the nature or character of the relationship between the parties underwent a legal change.K. Mr. The moment you come to an immediate and effective source. .Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. ” (pp. The fact that section 45 uses the words „arising from the transfer of a capital asset‟ makes no difference. although you may look back into the source of the income. We fail to see how this decision supports the case of the respondents.).) in the following words: “The Privy Council [in Commissioner of Income Tax v.) with the following observations: “.627) o PRINCIPLES REGARDING SOURCE FOLLOWED IN . [1983] 142 ITR 185 (All. (P. the business of export of carpet and the sale of import entitlements was part of the same business of the assessee. 961) DISTINGUISHED IN . From this it does not follow that profits or gains arising from the transfer of land is not revenue derived from land . “This decision [i. Commissioner of Income Tax [1980] 121 ITR 951 (Bom. In its view if an inquiry was to be made as to the genealogy of the item under consideration. . This revenue would not have been earned but for the land which has been sold. Province of Bihar [1949] 17 ITR 202 (pat.). . Hill & Co.). the immediate and effective source of such gains or profits. Commissioner of Income Tax [1952] 22 ITR 158 (Bom.) Ltd.” (p.) since the Privy Council decision merely illustrated what would not constitute agricultural income. Bacha F.

Cochin Co. Kumar Deba Prosad Garga v. (Wvg. Gauri Shankar Agrawal [1981] 131 ITR 27 (All. M. [1968] 69 ITR 62 (Ker.). Income Tax Officer [1958] 34 ITR 764 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1943] 11 ITR 546 (Cal.). Commissioner of Income Tax v. Saraf Trading Corpn. Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes is not agricultural income. v.)(Export profits).) (dividends). Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Where loan was repaid in form of agricultural produce. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Manager. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Addl. Income on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes is not agricultural income. [1978] 113 ITR 545 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1984] 150 ITR 292 (Kar. Commissioner of Income Tax v.). Sir Kameshwar Singh v. in re [1940] 8 ITR 460 (Cal. Narayanan Tratan Namboodiripad [1967] 64 ITR 57 (Ker. Ahmedabad Mfg.).G. Agrl. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1983] 143 ITR 590 (MP)(import entitlements) and Sterling Foods v.). & Calico Printing Co. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. CAIT v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1963] 49 ITR 842 (All.). Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax [1978] 114 ITR 822 (Ker. Commissioner of Income Tax [1954] 26 ITR 573 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax [1954] 26 ITR 121 (pat.) 492.L. Interest on arrears of rent payable by a ryot to a landholder under section 61 of the Madras Estates Land Act is not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a). V. Pethaperumal Chettiar v. VR. Imam Saheb [1969] 71 ITR 724 (Mad.)(dividends).)(profits from new industrial undertakings).P. Commissioner of Income Tax [1982] 137 ITR 616 (Guj. who was a landowner. v.) 493. Commissioner of Income Tax v.S.) (land compensation).).301 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Jyotikana Chowdhurani v. Puthuthottam Estates (1943) Ltd.)(import entitlements). Goenka [1981] 129 ITR 260 (Bom. Radhika Mohan Roy Wards Estate. Narasimhiah Setty v. claimed that income from loans on the sabape system made to his tenants was agricultural income. v. AL. Raja Bahdur Vishweshwara Singh v. The assessee. Hajee Cassim Tayoob Surty v.). Commissioner of Income Tax [1954] 26 ITr 424 (Assam)(SB). All India Tea & Trading Co. . Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 532 (Mad. v. Challapalli Sugars Ltd. D. Commissioner of Income Tax – 6 ITC 41 (Rangoon) 494. Income Tax Officer [1965] 55 ITR 616 (Mys. Income arising from interest on arrears of rent under section 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a). Fakir Chand v.) (interest on mortgage).) Co. K. Agrl. [1979] 116 ITR 255 (AP).

the covenantor was at liberty to make the payments out of any of her moneys. it was not rent or revenue derived from land. (p. Sheth v. and claimed that the annuity was agricultural income. Where the assessee had exchanged his agricultural land for a certain annual sum payable for life. _______________ ANNUITY Maharajhumar Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Case review: Decision of Patina High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v.D. annuity is not agricultural income. 109) _______________ . Commissioner of Income Tax – [1935] 3 ITR 237 (PC) 495. it was held that it was impossible to hold that this annual payment was agricultural income within the meaning of the Act.Munabhai A. it was money payable under a contract imposing a personal liability on the covenantor the discharge of which was secured by a charge on land.). Nirgudkar. the income accruing to the assessee therefrom was not „agricultural income‟ within the meaning of that term in section 2(1)(a). N.302 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Where agricultural land is exchanged for annuity. since the case before the Supreme Court turned upon its own facts and the question of capital gains did not arise in that case because at that time no capital gains tax had been leviable. Judicial analysis: DISTINGUISHED ON FACTS IN . The excess in value of the paddy received by the assessee over the cash lent by him to the cultivators was taken as his taxable income from this source. Gopal Sharan Narain Singh [1934] 2 ITR 264 affirmed. Loans made on the sabape system were loans made in cash at the beginning of the cultivating season and repayable in paddy at harvest time. and was bound to make them whether the land was sufficiently productive or not. these transactions being loan transactions. Held that as the sabape loans under consideration were transactions between a lender and a borrower the mere fact that the lender happened to be the landlord of the borrower was nihil ad rem. payment of which was secured by creating a charge on land. Income Tax Officer [1981] 128 ITR 87 (Bom.

Held that the assessee received no agricultural income as defined by the Act.10. Commission received by owner for selling agricultural produce of tenants is not agricultural income. Where the assessee had undertaken to sell the produce of the tenants either to Government or in the market. and if.000. but out of any . or the method by which it is calculated. but it received remuneration under a contract of personal service calculated on the amount of profits earned by the employer. and was entitled to a minimum annual salary of Rs. The assessee was the managing agent of a company. which was payable irrespective of whether or not the principal company had made any profit. not in specie out of any item of such profits. in whatever character the assessee receives it. v. it was held that the net profit from commission did not fall within the definition of agricultural income under section 2(1).303 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) COMMISSION H.T. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 IR 380 (PC) 497. then the agent got remuneration calculated as a percentage upon the profits of the principal company. not itself of a character to fall within the definition of agricultural income contained in the Act. such income does not assume the character of agricultural income by reason of the source from which it is derived. The question for consideration was whether any part of the managing agency remuneration could be treated as agricultural income.10. Where an assessee receives income. Conville v. Part of the managed company‟s income was agricultural income. it earns exemption. in any year ten per cent of the profits made by the principal company exceeded Rs.000. without regard to the sources from which those profits were derived. But if the income received falls within the definition of agricultural income. Where portion of income of managed company consists of agricultural income. payable. it does not imply that any part of remuneration paid to managing agent is agricultural income. _______________ SALARY / REMUNERATION Premier Construction Co. Ltd. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) 496.

remuneration received by the lambardar for collecting land revenue is not agricultural income. v. but as remuneration due to him for work done as manager of the property. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1944] 12 ITR 351 (Pat. moneys of the employer available for the purpose. .Choudhary Md. Section 2(1) applies to the case of a person who gets agricultural income from the use of the land by direct operation. Thus. Conville v. while the assessee in the case before the Supreme Court received remuneration under a contract of service. was agricultural income. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1935] 3 ITR 404 (Lahore) 498. E. Nazirul Hassan v. the mere fact that its ultimate source is agricultural property will not make it agricultural income because the payment is received not as part of his profit from the agricultural property. Danby v. Allowance paid by one co-owner of agricultural estate to another coowner to manage it is not agricultural income. 394-95) Major Conville v. is in the nature of „salary‟. Such remuneration. It is not applicable to a person who gets certain fees which constitutes his remuneration for the work of the collection of the land revenue.) 499.304 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 391 affirmed. Judicial analysis: DISTINGUISHED ON FACTS IN . for managing estate. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) 500. for managing estate is not agricultural income in the partner‟s hands.C. T. Case review : Decision of the Bombay High Court in Premier Construction Co. owning agricultural estate. Remuneration paid to the partner of a firm. the assessee in the case on hand was entitled to be treated as a beneficiary. Remuneration received by the lambardar for collecting land revenue is not agricultural income. is not agricultural income in partner‟s hands. (pp. Allowance paid to co-owner of agricultural land for managing land is not agricultural income. even though the property managed is agricultural.) on the ground that. and not as a servant of the trust by contract. Remuneration to partner of a firm having agricultural income. H. State of Bihar [1957] 31 ITR 385 (Pat. therefore. No part of the remuneration.

) in following words: “. Jawad Ali Shah v.). E.V. albeit the income received by the wakf estate was within the definition of agricultural income in section 2(1) of the 1922 Act. Tax Tax Tax Tax . v. Commissioner of Income [1950] 18 ITR 95 (All. Commissioner of Income [1964] 51 ITR 467 (Mad. the sums drawn therefrom as remuneration by the assessee were not agricultural income received by the assessee. Commissioner of Income [1945] 13 ITR 391 (Bom.Premier Construction Co.). FOLLOWED IN . and their Lordships express no opinion thereon. . Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 380]”. the observations of the Privy Council in this decision cannot prevail over the concluded opinion of the Privy Council in the subsequent case [of Premier Construction Co.Obiter dicta was explained in Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. nor on the amount of the income derived therefrom by the wakf estate.305 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Nawab Habibullah v. Under the scheme the assessee had only powers of management of the wakf estate and those powers were limited in certain respects by the control of a Committee of management. in re [1941] 9 ITR 292 affirmed. Held that. (p. Mrs. . Agrl. The assessee was the mutawalli of a wakf and was entitled to monthly remuneration. . Obiter dicta: “Their Lordships desire to add that a different question might have arisen if the appellant‟s remuneration had been by way of a fractional part of the income of the wakf estate. and on the assessee‟s performance of his duties of management as mutawalli. Miller [1956] 29 ITR 296 (Lahore). Mathew Abraham v.” Case review: Decision of the Calcutta High Court in K. or by a percentage commission. . is not agricultural income. The wakf had agricultural properties and the recovery of the rents depended on the rights of the wakf estate. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1943] 11 ITR 295 (PC) 501. That case may be considered if and when it arises. The question for consideration was whether the remuneration received by the mutawalli could be treated as agricultural income. Ltd.392) DISTINGUISHED ON FACTS IN . Commissioner of Income Tax [1957] 32 ITR 377 (Pat. Remuneration paid to mutawalli of wakf having agricultural properties. Habibullah.H.) and Bhagavandas Narayandas v. v.Commissioner of Income Tax v. Judicial analysis : EXPLAINED IN .). Income Officer [1968] 70 ITR 128 (Mad. and the amount of his remuneration did not depend either on the nature of the properties or assets which constituted the wakf estate.

The mutawalli was required to perform the functions of his office and. Syed Mohammad Isa v. In each case he was a beneficiary with an obligation attached to his enjoyment of the benefit.) 502. that there was a composite fund for the income from zamindari and for the income from non-agricultural property. Therefore. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1942] 10 ITR 267 (All. was agricultural income in the hands of the assessee within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. he was entitled. The question for determination was whether the assessee. in consideration for these services. lost its character as agricultural income and passed out of it as assessable income. the question which fell for consideration was whether the agricultural income having once passed into this common fund. one from zamindari and the other from urban property. the effect of which was that the money which passed into his hands as beneficiary ceased to be agricultural income. in the process of passing through his hands as mutawalli into his hands as beneficiary. one as mutawalli and the other as beneficiary. a new source was created. he „received‟ it as agricultural income within the meaning of section 4(3) of the 1922 Act or whether. it remains agricultural income after it has passed into the hands of the beneficiary. There is thus no change of source and no alteration in the character of the income. He had two capacities. This finding. to appropriate the residue of the profits. Held that the trustee is the channel through which the beneficiary receives the money. The Act made no provision for such a case as the present one and it seemed that some equitable method must be evolved which will operate justly both as regards the assessee and as regards the . therefore. however. the money received by the assessee on the assumption that it all originated from zamindari property.306 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. The corpus in each case consisted of landed as well as house properties. it was not suggested that two separate funds were maintained by him and that payments therefrom were separately made and recorded. Presumably the two sets of income formed a composite fund in the hands of the mutawalli. did not dispose of the reference. it lost its character of agricultural income. for. Assuming. Where Remuneration to mutawalli held as agricultural income. and the latter is for all intents and purposes the direct recipient. so long as he did so. when as beneficiary he appropriated the money from the fund held by himself as mutawalli. whether in other words. He was to realize the income from agricultural and non-agricultural properties and distribute a portion thereof among the charitable institutions. The assessee was the mutawalli in respect of three trusts. in this particular case there were two classes of income.

K.T. In the present case the balance of the income from the zamindari property goes through the mutawalli to the beneficiary (who happens to be one and the same person) by virtue of an obligation imposed under the terms of the trust-deed itself upon the income of the property”. who collected the rent of mortgaged land and paid it over to the assessee-mortgagee who was not even in the position of a sufructuary mortgagee but he held a simple mortgage and the title of * Affirmed in Nawab Haibullah v. in re [1941] 9 ITR 292 (Cal. “The facts of that case were distinguishable. it cannot be regarded as agricultural income. and therefore. 276) _______________ RENT H. The obvious method to apply was to treat the residue in the hands of the assessee as being composed of agricultural and nonagricultural income in the same ratio as the total of these two classes of income bore to each other at the time when they passed into the common fund. from the facts of the case which is now before us in two respects. the rent of the site of the flour mill does not fall within any of the other provisions of section 2(1). Where in a suit for recovery of debt a receiver was appointed under a compromise decree. Rent collected by receiver and paid over to mortgagee of land is not agricultural income in mortgagee‟s hands. Thus. Case review . The rent of the site of a flour mill cannot be regarded as rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes. AL.307 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) department.VR. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1941] 9 ITR 56 (Mad. and in the second place the remuneration was payable either out of income or out of the corpus. Rent received for site of flour mill is not agricultural income. The working of a flour mill is not an agricultural operation. (p. Habibullah. In the first place the remuneration received by the mutawalli took its origin from a scheme of administration which was drawn up under a compromise decree. Commissioner of Income Tax [1943] 11 ITR 295 (PC).)* distinguished with the following observation. ST. . Conville v. Veerappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1936] 4 ITR 137 (Lahore) 503.) 504.

Subramanya Sastrigal – 2 ITC 152 (Mad. those annual payments be excluded from the assessment of the profits and gains of his business as being agricultural income within the meaning of section 2(1)(a).) 508. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 495 (All. is agricultural income. it is open to the Income Tax authorities to apportion it and assess the portion attributable to non-agricultural land to Income Tax. Where assessee money-lender leases land. Rani Bhubneshwari Kuar v. _______________ INCOME FROM MORTGAGE Mukund Sarup v. which amount to a definite percentage (8-1/2 in the instant case) on the sum advanced.) 506. Commissioner of Income Tax – 3 ITC 33 (Mad. Income received by assessee money-lender from usufructuary mortgage of agricultural land. Composite rent for agricultural/non-agricultural land. usufructuary mortgaged to him. and the income from the mortgaged properties was enjoyed by the assessee-mortgagee with possession: Held that the income derived from the mortgaged lands was rent derived from land used for agricultural purpose and thus exempt from assessment. to mortgagor. Where in the course of his money-lending business.E. payment received for such lease will not be agricultural income in assessee‟s hands.) 505. Commissioner of Income Tax v. If a person carrying on money-lending business lends money in the course of such business on the security of lands of which he take as usufructary mortgage and if he immediately leases those lands back to the mortgagor with a stipulation for fixed annual payments.308 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.) 507. the estate had not vested in him. Income from mortgaged land. it was held that the rent received by the mortgagee was not agricultural income.K. T. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1940] 8 ITR 550 (Pat. Where the assessee money-lender lent money in interest-free simple usufructuary mortgage of agricultural land. but . Where a single amount is received as rent for agricultural and nonagricultural land. the assessee lent money on the security of lands usufructuary mortgaged to him. Ibrahimsa Ravuttar v.

it was clear that the mortgagee was only entitled to a fixed sum in consideration for the money lent. the lease amounts were added to the principal mortgage amount. the sum received in excess of the original loan be regarded as interest and not as „agricultural income ‟ within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act. Held that the mortgage. sum received in excess of original loan be regarded as interest and not as agricultural income. does not receive payment stipulated upon. Commissioner of Income Tax – 3 ITC 308 (Lahore) 509. was entitled to receive lease amounts from the lessee already in possession. but obtains a further mortgage deed for the arrears due and finally purchases the land and receives payment by way of deduction from the sale money agreed upon of the original sum loaned plus the annual recurring payment due. the lease amount was added to the mortgage amounts for being recovered from the mortgagor. Under a possessory mortgage of lands the assessee-mortgagee. and had otherwise no concern in the produce of the land . For such successive defaults. the annual payment could not be taken as agricultural income. If a person who lends a sum of money on the security of land of which he takes a mortgage with possession on the condition that he will receive an annual payment during the term of the mortgage. though described as with possession. after paying sale price less lease amounts aggregated in the above manner.309 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) simultaneously the assessee leased the lands to the mortgagor with stipulations for fixed annual payment as rent: Held that since the mortgage was taken in the course of business. If a person who lends a sum of money on security of land of which he takes a mortgage with possession on condition that he will receive an annual payment during term of mortgage. does not receive the payment stipulated upon. Khan Muhammad Yakub Khan & Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan v. The assessee claimed that the lease amounts so adjusted. was in fact a simple mortgage and. from its terms. a money-lender. but obtains a further mortgage deed for arrears due and finally purchases land and receives payment by way of deduction from sale money agreed upon of original sum loaned plus annual recurring payment due. and in case of default in payment by the lessor. Ultimately the assessee purchased the lands. were his agricultural income.

[1962] 46 ITR 560 (Bom. Ltd. while the establishment of . the assessee‟s father. In 1929. Sir Kameshwar Singh (Maharaja of Darbhanga) [1934] 2 ITR 107 affirmed. This fixed sum. lessee-mortgagee. or with the possession thereof.). The exemption is conferred indelibly on a particular kind of income and does not depend upon the character of the recipient. Held that thika profit received by the assessee. Where assessee-money-lender made loan under a zarpeshgi lease with usufructuary mortgage. profits received by assessee was agricultural income. Commissioner of Income Tax 2 ITC 495 (All. made a loan under an indenture described as a „zarpeshgi lease with usufructuary mortgage‟. Such income does not become assessable as business profits merely because it is received by the assessee. and (b) certain rent was reserved to mortgagor as thika rent and mortgagee was to take balance of profits. A certain portion of the rents was reserved to the mortgagor as thika rent and the mortgagee was allowed to take the balance of the profits after deducting the expenses as thika profits in consideration of the loan. Asian Assurance Co. Judicial analysis : DISTINGUISHED ON FACT IN o Commissioner of Income Tax v. on the ground that. therefore. By this deed the lessormortgagor conveyed to the lessee-mortgagee certain land for a period of fifteen years. who carried on an extensive moneylending business. and indenture provided that (a) lessor-mortgagor was to convey agricultural lands to lesseemortgagee.) approved. could not be said to be income from the land. not as an ordinary landlord or proprietor. Mukund Sarup v. was agricultural income. Sir Kameshwar Singh – [1935] 3 ITR 305 (PC) 510. Commissioner of Income Tax v. but as a a part of the income profits or gains of a money-lending business carried on by him. The question was whether thika profit received by the assesseemortgagee was agricultural income. The indenture further provided that the thika rent should form part of the yearly payments which the lessormortgagor thereby undertook to make in reduction of the loan and should be increased as the amount of the loan diminished by 6 per cent on the sums with a corresponding reduction in the thika profits. Agricultural income is excluded altogether from the scope of the Act. Case review: Decision of the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v.310 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.

13. 567-568) o Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh v. and described as a „usufructuary mortgage deed‟ was executed by the Raja of Nanpara as mortgagor in favour of the Court of Wards.311 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) the fact that a particular income was agricultural income was sufficient to take it out from the total income of the assessee. K. Rent received under mortgage. The question was whether the sum paid as rent in respect of lands used for agricultural purposes and assessed to land revenue was in the hands of the assessee „agricultural income‟ and as such exempt from tax.45. Rs.).862.1. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITr 330 (PC).) and Manubhai A.862 to cover both principal and interest. The mortgagor paid to the assessee in the relevant previous year a certain sum towards the annual rent. a deed of mortgage of certain Nanpara Estate Property dated 4. Sheth v. At the same time. since the earlier decision was concerned with the nature of the primary receipt by mortgagee and not with the appropriation made under the covenant of the deed of mortgage. Commissioner of Income Tax [1961] 41 ITR 169 (SC).D. N. Syed Mohammed Isav.).12. as mortgagee. the assessee.Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. 174) FOLLOWED IN .11. . Simultaneously. (p. (pp. Second Income Tax Officer [1981] 128 ITR 87 (Bom. and also as part of the scheme. the Court of Wards acting on behalf of the assessee leased back to the Raja of Nanpara by a lease of the same date the whole of the mortgaged property at an annual instalment payable under the mortgage.45. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 511. Nirgudkar. Under a compromise of a long-standing dispute between the Raja of Nanpara Estate and the Raja of the Utraula Estate. Commissioner of Income Tax [1942] 10 ITR 267 (All. State of Bihar v. and should be liquidated by equal annual instalments of Rs. the Raja of Utraula.1937. namely.Simrathmull v. where held as agricultural income. it was agreed between the parties that there was due from the former estate to the latter a sum of Rs.079 and a scheme for liquidation of this sum should be funded and liquidated over a period of 10 year bearing interest at 3-1/2 per cent per annum on the unpaid part of the principal amount in the meantime. merely establishing that a particular income was income from house property built between 1946 and 1956 was not sufficient to claim the benefit of section 4(3)(xii) of the 1922 Act. and as part of the liquidation scheme. acting on behalf of the assessee. Commissioner of Income Tax [1967] 64 ITR 166 (Mad. Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh Bahadur of Darbhanga [1952] 21 ITR 382 (Pat.).1.

the impugned sum was agricultural income. 1882. But it was unnecessary to pursue this question. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 98 affirmed.312 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. in re – [1940] 8 ITR 378 (Cal. _______________ LEASE RENT Maharajadhiraj Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab Burdwan. Case review : Decision of the Oudh Chief Court in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. for the rent of agricultural land received by a usufructuary mortgagee was agricultural income not because he was a usufructuary mortgagee but because. being a usufructuary mortgagee. being a mortgagee. insofar as any part of it was in respect of a principal sum. that principal sum was itself an aggregate of a principal sum and interest. .) 512. Janab Haji Muhammad Sadak Khoyee Sahib [1935] 3 ITR 1 (Mad. it would be in his hands agricultural income and exempt from tax. usufructuary or other.) approved. So also the assessee. The salient and decisive fact was that the assessee being in possession of the mortgaged property was entitled to receive and received the rents thereof. if the assessee was not such a usufructuary mortgagee then. Bahadur of Whether lease rent is agricultural income or not has to be determined not with reference to purpose of lease when originally let out but by reference to use to which land has been put in relevant previous year. he had gone into possession and received the rent. Commissioner of Income Tax v. and in that capacity received the rent in question. had gone into possession and the rent that he received was agricultural income. Thus. It was conceded that if the assessee was truly a usufructuary mortgagee within the meaning of section 57(d) of the Transfer of Property Act. For this reason the revenue was at pains to show that the mortgage in question was not a usufructuary mortgage within section 57(d) of the said Act. It is entirely a question of fact whether in the year in question the rent was derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes. But it was contended that. Held that it was immaterial whether any part of the sum in any account as between mortgagor and mortgagee was or ought to be appropriate to the payment of principal or of interest or to any other purpose and it was also not necessary to analyses the payment nor to consider whether. notwithstanding that he went into possession and received the rent. it was not agricultural income.

it is for him to show that the income was derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes. Income from lease of land for grazing cattle required for agricultural pursuits is agricultural income. _______________ . even if the further exactions were reprehensible. it was held that as the assessee got the additional sum also as owner of the agricultural lands in connection with the renewal of leases. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 350 (Mad. is to be deemed to be agricultural income as in such a case the land would be deemed to have been used for agricultural purposes. Thus.) 513. Manavikraman Rajah – [1945] 13 ITR 174 (Mad. Where the assessee. Chellaiah Pillai v. such additional sum was also agricultural income. took from the lessees some money in addition to the usual renewal fee before granting them renewal of the leases. If the zamindar wishes to bring himself within the exemptions from taxation provided by the Act in the case of agricultural land. whether lease rent is agricultural income or not has to be determined not with reference to the purpose of the lease when originally let out but by reference to use to which land has been put in the relevant previous year. it must be deemed to be used for an agricultural purpose. A vital point of distinction exists between mere sale of grass and lease of land for purpose of pasture for cattle used solely for agricultural purposes. income derived from the land leased for the grazing of cattle required for agricultural pursuits.313 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) It is not a question what the land was leased for originally or what it was used for when the lease was originally made. are agricultural income. In a case where land is leased for grazing of cattle required for agricultural pursuits. Thus. Commissioner of Income Tax v.C. K. That is a question of fact. Unjust exactions made by landlord while renewing lease.) 514. who had leased certain agricultural lands owned by him to tenants.

i. In re – [1934] 2 ITR 186 (All. In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member / others out of impartible estate.) 516. _______________ MAINTENANCE ALLOWANCE Commissioner of Income Tax v. Salami paid to landlord for recognising transfer of land. a junior member of the impartible Hindu Raj. Kunwar Kartar Singh v.e. Where the assessee.) 518.314 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. . it was held that it was not agricultural income inasmuch as the immediate source of the income to the assessee was not the original source through which the estate received the money. but the bounty or gift of the estate. Where descent of jagir was approved by Government on condition of successor paying fixed allowance to junior member „out of the * It means “subjects of landlords ”. In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member / others out of impartible estate. is agricultural income. Salami received on letting out of agricultural land is agricultural income. was given allowance from the income of the impartible estate. Where a junior member of an impartible estate was under an agreement to be paid a certain allowance. which though made a charge on the estate. Commissioner of Income Tax – 3 ITC 158 (Pat. Lal Suresh Singh – [1935] 3 ITR 356 (Oudh) 517. Salami for letting out agricultural land. the agricultural estate.. Nazar or salami paid by the raiyats* to the landlord in consideration of latter‟s recognising the transfer of a holding which is not legally transferable or the legality of the transfer of which is doubtful. SALAMI (LUMSUMP PAYMENT) Jyotirindra Narayan Sinha Chowdhury. could be paid from any source. it was held that the allowance was not rent or revenue and was not agricultural income. Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. In case of maintenance allowance received by junior member / others out of impartible estate. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1937] 5 ITR 569 (Lahore) 519.) 515. Maharaja Kumar of Vizianagaram. in re – [1945] 13 ITR 263 (Cal.

900 and the rent of the bungalow were liable to Income Tax. with absolute remainder in favour of his daughters. Allowance to daughters. The assessee was a widow of the deceased who left a will under which the assessee was given Rs. which allowance was made a charge on the Raja ‟s taluqdari estate. Held that she was not given a part of the estate or a part of the income but she was given out of the estate a monthly sum of Rs. is not agricultural income.100 a month for maintenance. in re – [1933] 1 ITR 379 (Oudh) 521. it was held that it could not be allowed exemption as agricultural income.) 520. The widow subsequently applied to the court for a greater allowance by way of maintenance and the High Court ordered that she should get maintenance at Rs. It might be payable out of the income or it might be payable out of the corpus and the mere fact that if it was payable out of the income. therefore. The contention of the assessee was that the estate of her husband consisted of land of an agricultural character. that income itself might not be subject to tax was wholly irrelevant. the monthly maintenance of Rs. Commissioner of Income Tax – 5 ITC 493 (Bom. is not agricultural income. the income of the estate was not liable to Income Tax having regard to section 4(3)(viii) of the 1922 Act and thus her allowance by way of maintenance was to be treated as really giving her a part of the estate of her husband and. Sundrabai Saheb v. Under a will executed by the zamindar. Maintenance received by widow out of agricultural income of estate of her deceased husband. Where monthly allowance was paid to the widow of a late Raja. something which was free of Income Tax. therefore. Maintenance received by widow out of agricultural income of estate of her deceased husband. There was a further provision directing that if at any time during the . which was agricultural income. Saltanat Begum.) 522. the allowance received by junior member was also agricultural income. his wife was appointed as executrix and was given a life interest in the whole of his agricultural properties.900.900 a month and be allowed to reside in her present bungalow. Commissioner of Income Tax – 3 ITC 428 (Mad.315 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) assignment‟. Vellanki Lakshmi Narasayamma Rao Bahadur (Sree Raja) Zamindarini of Tiruvur v.

) 525. Chellaiah Pillai v. Held that the payment was not agricultural income. . Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 350 (Mad. such daughter should be paid by the wife an allowance of Rs. The expression “forestry” is not synonymous with “agriculture”. but from the legacy bequeathed to her by the testator. Relinquishment of estate for monthly allowance. Commissioner of Income Tax – 9 ITC 35 (Oudh) 523. Where the assessee relinquished his claims in a taluqdari estate in consideration of a monthly allowance. Kumar Ram Narayan Roy Chaudhary & others – [1959] 1-TAX (III-207) = 1959 SCC 68 = PLD 1959 SC 453 524. it was held that allowance was not agricultural income even though the allowance was secured by a charge on the estate as the estate holder was at liberty to make the payments out of any of his moneys. On the question whether arrears of legacy allowance so paid were to be treated as agricultural income. The income was in this case derived by the petitioner-daughter from the legacy bequeathed under her father‟s will. Pasturage. „Forestry‟ and „agriculture‟ not synonymous. East Bengal v.600 per mensem. _______________ „FORESTRY‟ AND „AGRICULTURE‟ NOT SYNONYMOUS Commissioner of Income Tax. It could have been paid out of the non-agricultural income of the estate just as much as out of the agricultural income and it was not contended or proved that the ultimate source from which the executrix found the money to pay the daughter was identifiable. Even if this had been the contention it did not affect the character of the income so far as the petitioner was concerned. for she derived it not from any land which she owned or possessed. Lal Suresh Singh v.316 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. which was a charge on the estate. The will itself did not direct the executrix to pay the allowance to the petitioner from any specific land or lands used for agricultural purposes. A vital point of distinction exists between mere sale of grass and lease of land for purpose of pasture for cattle used solely for agricultural purposes. lifetime of his wife either of the daughters should desire to live separately from their mother.

Linga Reddi v. is to be deemed to be agricultural income as in such a case the land would be deemed to have been used for agricultural purposes.) 526. Quarries. Commissioner of Income Tax [1949] 17 ITR 454 (Nag. The assessee was the owner and occupier of certain cultivable lands. R. such rent and royalties are income chargeable to tax and are not agricultural in nature. which were not actually cultivated.) 527. Shib Lal Ganga Ram v. income from such cultivation is not agricultural income. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Held that the said profits from the quarries could not be said to be agricultural income. Emperior v. Rai Shamsherjang Bahadur [1953] 24 ITR 1 (All. it must be deemed to be used for an agricultural purpose. Salt manufacturing.) 528. Note : Decision in Mahendralal Choudhari v. Maharani Janki Kuer v. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy [1957] 32 ITR 466.317 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) In a case where land is leased for grazing of cattle required for agricultural pursuits. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. Brick-making. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 425 (All. The lands contained valuable stone quarries. Lac cultivation cannot be regarded as agricultural operation and.). Lac cultivation.). therefore. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 363 (Mad. Commissioner of Income Tax – 5 ITC 42 (Pat. It would be a gross misnomer to hold that „agricultural purposes‟ could be held to cover the process of flooding the land occupied by letting in . Thus. Probhat Chandra Barua 1 ITC 284 (Cal.) 529.B. income derived from the land leased for the grazing of cattle required for agricultural pursuits.) does not hold good in view of the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh v. the assessee was paying land revenue to the Government and was assessed upon the basis of the rental value arrived at by taking into account the profits derived from the working of the quarries. Where the assessee-landlord has received rent and royalties for granting licences to brick-makers to erect brick kilns on his and to take away earth for manufacturing bricks. Thus.

the income in question not being derived from land. Commissioner of Income Tax [1947] 15 ITR 235 (All. Where the owner of a permanently settled zamindari derived income by leasing the right to fish in tanks and irrigation supply channels used for agricultural purposes and situate on land assessed to land .S.318 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest.) 533. is not agricultural income. Fisheries. i. The assessee received from the owners of the land irrigated by the surplus water a fourth share of the produce. Colonel Malik Sir Umar Hayat Khan v.) 530. The assessees who were owners of private canals were drawing water directly from a river. V. Probhat Chandra Barua – 1 ITC 284 (Cal. This water was used by them (i) to irrigate their own land. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 52 (Lahore) 531. The mere fact that it was paid in kind instead of in cash did not affect the question. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 281 (Pat. the sea water and then extracting the sodium chloride from it by eliminating the other chemical constituents. and (ii) to irrigate the land of others.e. Income derived from fisheries and land used for stacking timber. The income was directly derived from the sale of water and not from the land to which the water was supplied so far as the assessees were concerned.) 532. Emperior v. could not be regarded as agricultural income. Sale of water from Water canal held not to be agricultural income. Sevuga Pandia Thevar – [1933] 1 ITR 78 (Mad. Maharaja Guru Mahadeo Ashram Prasad Sahi Bahadur v. as to whether the income derived by the assessees from the owners of the land irrigated by the surplus water could be held to be „agricultural income‟. Therefore. Held that the direct source of the income was the supply of the water and the income was simply the price paid for the water supplied. settlement of the right to collect a particular kind of earth in a particular area for the purposes of extracting salt petre. Income from Nimksayar.) & Raja Bahadur Major Raja Durga Narain Singh v. is not exempt from assessment.T. Sale of earth. The question arose. Fisheries. Commissioner of Income Tax v.

i. and (ii) nazrana. it was held that these receipts were not agricultural income. If the income is obtained by a person who has not produced the trees from which the toddy is tapped. their natural element is the water and their cultivation and the welfare depend in no sense upon agriculture. Jalkar/Hat/Ghattagi/Terries/Moorings. .) 534. it was held that the income so derived was not agricultural income as fish are not the produce of the land. Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga v. The following income is held to be not agricultural as it is not derived from cultivation of land. or has not done any agricultural operations whereby those trees have been raised. Commissioner of Income Tax – 1 ITC 303 (Pat. Nazrana. whether owner or lessee of the land on which the trees grow. and were taxable. Income derived from toddy is agricultural income when it is received by the actual cultivator. Toddy. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 470 (Mad. i. Bankar/Lahkar/Phalkar. Dharat.) 537. are not agricultural income. it is not agricultural income within the meaning of the Act. Province of Bihar v. The rent paid for jalkar (fishing rights).) 538. Kunwar Bishwanath Singh v. ghattagi (terries or moorings). Commissioner of Income Tax – [1942] 10 ITR 322 (All. hat. Probynabad Stud Farm. an amount to grant permission to build a house. Where the assessee-ruler of a native State used to customarily receive (i) zar-i-chaharum.319 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) revenue. Maharaja Pratap Udai Nath Sahi Deo of Ratugarh – [1941] 9 ITR 313 (Pat.e. collections from person who are permitted to erect temporary stalls on agricultural lands on weekly bazar days.e. Income from dharat. one-fourth of the sale price on all transfers of property in his State.) 535. In re – [1936] 4 ITR 114 (Lahore) 536. is not income derived from agriculture. Yagappa Nadar v.

where trees grow naturally without the intervention of human agency. Lac is a substance produced by certain insects which are placed on certain trees. who held right to a small feudal tribute and to manorial dues. The amount of the malikhana was fixed by a settlement decree and was not variable. They. Therefore. however. constitute agricultural income. could not manage their estate properly on account of the continued warfare between the neighbouring estates. . Lahkar: This is income derived from letting land and trees for the cultivation of lac. It was used for agricultural purposes or not or whether it yielded any profits or not. and it cannot be said that the fruit gathered is the result of the cultivation. Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. The land was in no real sense its source. called the malikhana. Phalkar: This is income derived from wild jungle fruits. Malikhana. The assessee‟s ancestors. and even if it was to be regarded as secured by a charge on the land that was no more decisive of the question. Bankar: Income from sale of wood from virgin jungle or jungle land not actually cultivated . therefore. It was admitted that suits for the recovery of this due were cognizable by the Civil Courts and not by the Revenue Courts.320 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Nothing appears to be done beyond placing the insects on the trees. Held that malikhana would never have become payable to the ancestors of the assessee had they not been feudal proprietors of the land. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC) 539. In doing so they surrendered all their zamindari and proprietary rights and lost all their title to real property in respect of those villages. The impugned receipt would not. Lac does not seem to be the result of any cultivation but is the creation of a particular insect when placed on particular trees. But that did not mean that it was now rent or revenue derived from the land: on the contrary it was paid just because the original proprietors relinquished their claims to the land and it represented the consideration for the relinquishment. retained the right of a small annual cash payment by virtue of their position as the old „pargana lord‟. made grants of or sold a large number of villages to certain persons for monetary consideration. It was payable whether the land on which it was supposed to be a charge was used for agricultural purposes or not or whether it yielded any profits or not. The question for consideration was whether the malikhana so received by the assessee would constitute agricultural income. they transferred.

Mutation fee.Implications flowing from above decision in the case of Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Judicial analysis : EXPLAINED IN . were stated in Pydah Suryanarayana Murty v. but it would not be agricultural income. Khan Bahadur Waliur Rahman – [1946] 14 ITR 287 (Cal. Commissioner of Income Tax [1961] 42 ITR 83 (AP) in the following words: “. . _______________ TEA MANUFACTURERS Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rule 8 is applicable only in respect of a seller who manufactures tea which he had himself grown and which he himself sells. The Income Tax Officer treated the tea manufacturing business as a partnership. Raja Rajendra Narayan Bhanja Deo v. or as stone quarries or for erecting shops. Commissioner of Income Tax [1945] 13 ITR 98 affirmed. Commissioner of Income Tax [1948] 16 ITR 330 (PC). such as. Commissioner of Income Tax – 2 ITC 99 (Cal. but jointly purchased a tea manufacturing factory to manufacture and sell their own tea.” (p. 1982. for the use of potteries or as brick fields.) 540. The question was whether rule 24 of the 1922 Rules was applicable to the tea manufactured by this firm. Narayanan Tratan Namboodiripad [1967] 64 ITR 57 (Ker. Province of Bihar [1949] 17 ITR 202 (Pat. Commissioner of Income Tax – 4 ITC 15 (Pat. A and his wife owned their separate tea estate. Rule 24* of the 1922 Rules is applicable only in respect of a seller who manufactures tea which he has himself grown and which he himself sells. the income derived therefrom may be indirectly referable to land. .Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. * Parallel to rule 25 of the Income Tax Rules.321 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) Case review : Decision of the Oudh High court in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. because it is not derived from the carrying on of agricultural operations.). . Mutation fees paid by the assessee‟s tenants upon succeeding to holdings or tenures by inheritance are covered by the term „agricultural income‟. . 90) FOLLOWED IN .) 541.) and CAIT v.)(FB). Nawabzadi Mehar Bano Khanum v. . Where the agricultural land is let out for purposes other than agriculture.

rule 24 was not applicable. whether the income could still be treated as income from agriculture.L. The expression „such profits or gains‟ in clause (ix) of section 10(2) of the 1922 Act does not include agricultural income and consequently.R. _______________ COFFEE MANUFACTURERS Commissioner of Income Tax v. The cured coffee was insured against fire till sale. Diwan Bahadur S. and the fact that agricultural operations formed an element in the business did not render it anytheless a business. Case review : Decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. _______________ SUGAR MANUFACTURERS Commissioner of Income Tax v.322 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. Where business income comprises both agricultural and nonagricultural income. expenditure for earning agricultural income is not allowable. the mere circumstance that income was to be placed under the head „business‟ had no effect to negative its being agricultural income as defined by section 2(1) of the 1922 Act. tool. the impugned income was agricultural income. spray materials. Concern – [1938] 6 ITR 194 (Rangoon) 543. On the other hand. it will still be „agricultural income‟.. Although income from coffee growing in certain cases may be treated as income from business. etc. . Mathias – [1939] 7 ITR 48 (PC) 542. The question was whether the assessee was running a business and if so. Mathias [1937] 5 ITR 435 reversed.S. N.L. crop bags. The assessee got the green coffee cured at M by persons owning curing factories on payment of a commission to them. Thus. Diwan Bahadar S. The profits as the assessee derived from his possession of land were derived by means of a business. The assessee had coffee estates on which coffee was grown by labour recruited by him mainly at another place M where manure. The crops were harvested by labour and brought to M in raw state because there was no market for raw coffee. were also purchased. Held that the assessee was carrying on a „business‟ within the meaning of that word in section 2(4) and 10 of the 1922 Act.A. Held since the tea estates were not the assets of the partnership.

the assessee is not entitled under section 10(2)(ix) to deduct from such other income the expenditure incurred for the purpose of earning the agricultural income. Question as to whether income derived from a business is agricultural income or not. That is a question of fact. the income from which was the subject-matter of assessment. Bahadur of It is entirely a question of fact whether in the year in question the rent was derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes.) 546. Beohar Singh Raghubir Singh v.) 545. It is not a question what the land was leased for originally or what it was used for when the lease was originally made. Question as to whether forest trees are of spontaneous growth or not is a question of fact. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1948] 16 ITR 433 (Nag. _______________ REFERENCE TO THE HIGH COURT Kokine Dairy v. It is entirely a question of question of fact whether in the year in question the rent was derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes. is not a question of fact. . The question whether income derived from a business is agricultural income or not is not a question of fact but a question of law. it is for him to show that the income was derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1938] 6 ITR 145 (Rangoon) 544. and other (taxable) income. and that the trees. Where the Tribunal clearly found that there was no plantation of trees by the estate authorities worth the name. Maharajadhiraj Sir Bijay Chand Mahtab Burdwan. In re – [1940] 8 ITR 378 (Cal. must have been of spontaneous growth.323 DEFINITIONS OF „AGRICULTURAL INCOME‟ Section 2(1) when the business of an assessee comprises both agricultural income as defined in the Act. If the Zamindar wishes to bring himself within the exemptions from taxation provided by the Act in the case of agricultural land. it was held that it was a finding of fact which was binding on the Court in a reference.

Conclusion of the Tribunal that process employed by assessee is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator is one of fact. is a question of fact.) 548. Question as to whether the process of „flue curing‟ was a process coming within section 2(1)(b)(ii). is a question of fact. is essentially a question of fact. Katragadda Madhusudhana Rao – [1944] 12 ITR 1 (Mad.) 549.324 Section 2(1) Income Tax Digest. The question whether the process of „flue curing ‟ was a process coming within section 2(1)(b)(ii). Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. is essentially a question of fact. Question as to whether the process employed by the assessee agriculturist is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator to render the produce fit to be taken to market.) 547. . Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom. Brihan Maharashtra Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. v. Commissioner of Income Tax v. The question whether the process employed by the assesseeagriculturist is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator to render the produce fit to be taken to market. Commissioner of Income Tax – [1946] 14 ITR 611 (Bom. The conclusion of the Tribunal that the process employed by the assessee as mentioned in section 2(1) is a process ordinarily employed by a cultivator is one of fact.

326 ASSESSEE VIS-A-VIS .) A registered firm does not cease to be “assessee” after _ apportionment of tax liability between the partners. 552.Lah. _ [1936] 4 ITR 114 (Lahore) 326 326 551.Pak.) = 1974 PTD 28 “Assessee” is a person who is in control of income of trust. .) Word „assessee‟ in the definition has not the same meaning _ as in sections. Custodian of “enemy property” is an “assessee” so long as _ company remains an “alien enemy”.C.C.Kar. 328 * Corresponding to section 2(2) of the 1922 Act.325 DEFINITION OF „ASSESSEE‟ Section 2(6) Section 2(6)* Assessee PAGE NO SCOPE OF DEFINITION 550. [1974] 29 TAX 64 (H. 1978 SCC 453 = [1978] 38 TAX 132 (S.C.TRUST 553. 24. 64. [1976] 33 TAX 99 (H.

C.. Income Tax Officer. Lahore Range.Lah. 1979.) 550. Karachi – [1976] 33 TAX 99 (H. 24. 1965 has ascendancy over all other laws including the Income Tax Ordinance. therefore.. v.C.Pak.) 551. Lahore and others – 1978 SCC 453 = [1978] 38 TAX 132 (S. . Custodian of “enemy property” is an “assessee” so long as company remains an “alien enemy”. whether paragraph (b) should be given a different meaning in the context of the provisions of the Act. Sheikh Miran Bux Karam Bux Ltd. He is. after The definition of the term „assessee‟ read with the charging section 3 and section 23(5) of the Act go to show that a registered firm does not * Corresponding to section 2(2) of the 1922 Act. Sh. Section 2(6)* Assessee SCOPE OF DEFINITION Associated Cement Companies Ltd.Kar. 64. in a given case. 1979. Commissioner of Income Tax. Lyallpur v. It will have to be seen.326 Section 2(6) Income Tax Digest. as in the case of the term „assessee‟. The provisions of section 4 of Defence of Pakistan Ordinance. Company Circle 12. A registered firm does not cease to “assessee” apportionment of tax liability between the partners. Therefore. Karachi v. as is defined in section 2(2) of the Act. for the purposes of section 2(6) of Income Tax Ordinance. Ihsan Ilahi & Co. “the Custodian of Enemy Property” would be an assessee having supplanted the company in Pakistan for all purposes so long as the company remains an “alien enemy”. Commissioner of Income Tax. Word „assessee‟ in the definition has not the same meaning as in sections.) = 1974 PTD 28 552. which has not given the same meaning in section 24 and 64. Rawalpindi Zone (West Pakistan) – [1974] 29 TAX 64 (H. justified in representing the company before the Income Tax authorities and paying the income tax dues on behalf of the company.C.

shall be assessed and the sum payable by him on the basis of such assessment shall be determined. The income of the firm is computed in its hands as that of an entity irrespective of the fact whether the firm is registered or unregistered. It is by itself a unit of assessment and chargea