F’MFRP 12-18

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare

U.S. Marine Corps


140 121$300 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 5 April 1989 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-18,Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category of publications: reprints of historical works which were published commercially and are no longer in print.

This reference publication is Mao Tse-tung’s thoughts and philosophy of guerrilla warfare. It gives the reader a chance to learn about this type of warfare from one who lived and fought as a guerrilla for most of his adult life. It is important to understand his philosophy of guerrilla warfare because it is the basis of today’s guerrilla forces. The book was translated and published with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith, Brigadier General, USMC (Ret.), in 1961. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

M. P. SULLIVAN Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia



Belle Gordon Nelson Griffith. with an introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith. Reprinted with permission of Mrs. .Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare translated. USMC (Retired).

Tactics.INTRODUCTION 1 11 111 W The Nature of Revolutionary Profile of a Revolutionist Strategy. and Logistics in Revolutionary War Some Conclusions Guerrilla War 3 12 20 27 Yu CHI CHAN (GUERRILLA WARFAIW) Translator’s Note A Further Note 1 2 3 4 5 What 1s Guerrilla Warfare? The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations Guerrilla Warfare in History Can Victory Be Attained by Guerrilla Organization for Guerrilla Warfare Operations? 37 39 4J 51 58 66 71 71 77 82 85 88 94 How Guerrilla Units Are Originally Formed ~he Method of Organizing Guerrilla Regimes Equipment of Guerriks Elements of the Guerrilla Army 6 7 The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance Against Japan APPENDIX 116 .




Their influence will be confined not solely to China in her present anti-Japanese struggle. tube ammunition. Hooked to his belt. –MAO TSWXUNG. the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. . but will be world-wide. At the other end of this spectrum. 1937 consume checked A T ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM. missiles are men who move about them silently. .THE NATURE OF REVOLUTIONARY GUERRILLA WAR . between sandaled his back against a tree. is the with 3 data and spew out endless engineers by intense almost reverently. feet. countdown begins. a tattered shirt.30-caliber a sausage-like his neck. Barrel pressed between butt resting on the moist earth a Browning canvas Draped automatic sacks—one around holding three rifle. . ranks of elecand tronic boxes buried deep in the earth hungrily tapes. In forty minutes. home-made cloth other four magazines loaded with . greasy felt hat. and soiled shorts is seated. two dirty bombs. Scientists confer in air-conditioned offices. Yu Chi Chan. a tired man wearing a his knees.

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla warfare three days’ supply of rice. organized. countries that guerrilla during war. We that there would be other Asian the Chinese of eighty-one that the up. esting to this warning. of international permit. and Workers’ of liberation” ary 6. his group of fifteen men will occupy a previously will flare up in one or more of half a the next breaks may not initially be inspired. pauses. But they will receive the moral support encouragement circumstances as well. silently into the shadows. Unions Trade from when. looks about him carefully. raises a water bottle to his lips. it is probable t]lat they will not be. revolutions he prophesied that would follow Conference pattern. expert advice and material and vocal and where assistance speaking before the Australasian in Peking. slaps tile stock three times. nationalist few years. thority on “national interesting 4 answers: an unin]peachab]e auwars. delegates Communist of “wars later (Januresolved tempo Parties should be stepped liberation the Soviet Premier. indeed. A month paid no attention In December. rinses his mouth. Two Communist. As early as November. of the Browning and disappears ambush. 1961). The man stands. or led by local Communists. prepared corks the bottle. It is probable tionary dozen in nature. China’s Number 1949. we had this assurance Liu Shao-ch’i. He slaps it again twice. 1960. In forty minutes. Communism. and revoluThese outspits out the water.” propounded an interhe provided equally series of questions to which .

This is not a hypothesis. January. ples are dedicated at the conclusion to the perpetuation than we have arrived. against the colonialists. perthat the Western of the political. * Implicit ment is the further infiltrated and assurance captured that any popular by the Communists tin@. 5 . A potential ensure situation where the government consistently it is fact. In the not too distant past. to America. . or and economic status cpo. . to exists in any country fails in its obligation of life for the at least a minimally decent standard * World Marxist Review. Bllt today many of them feel that these aims can be revolutionary strug~]e we will probably oppose. Is there the likelihood of conditions in other countries reaching the point where the CUPof the popular patie7ce overflows and they take to arms? Yes. they are. social. there is. Britain. .lntrodwtion 1s there a lilielihood of such wars recurring? Yes. movewill in ol}r develop an anti-Western own hemisphere coloration. with a clistinctive anti-American that severs] peo- This should not surprise us if we remember hundred millions less fortunate haps reluctantly. Are uprisings of this kind likely to recur? Yes. cl]arocter de~nitcly at least. many of these millions looked hope[ully France for help in the realization achieved only by a desperate Kwolutionary of their justifiable aspirathat tions. These uprisings are directed against the col-rwl)t reactionary regimes. What is the attitude of the Marxists to such uprisings? A most favorable attitude. The Communists support just wars of this kind wholehearted y and without reservations. But wars of this kind are popular uprisings. 1961. there is such a likelihood.

party able to supply doctrine and action. intellectual ineffective. They glasses–examples lose?” When continue to wait passively not always through for improveRed-tinted the struchave we to is incipient. doctors. Their tools. primary schools. understand basic: land. freedom from police oppression. a revolutionary 6 . by the frustrated it represents youth. only one ingredient there are but two classes. Those who have known only poverty have begun to wonder why they should ments. “What guerrilla situation ture of their societies. leadership. They are not particularly of the press. freedom level want first things to interested in freedom as we rags free enterprise better than be put first.Mao Tse’tung great majority organization. is anathema who which usually posits a socialized society and some parliamentary It is also move and the exclusive and tightly knit possessing minority. form of liberal rejected destitute. something needs are more for their children. the rich the relatively lawyers. a package To the illiterate of promises that experi- ence tells them will never be fulfilled. irrevocably toward violent revolution. on Guerrilla Warfare If there also exists even the is needed: the instrument nucleus of a revolutionary for violent revolutionary In many countries. is fragmented and is politically democracy. People who live at subsistence of religion. and the miserably small middle engineers—lacks ceasing factional program. medical attention. class–merchants. of its citizens. see–and of peoples who have changed and they ask. forceful quarrels. or the secret ballot. by unIts to bankers. it. a great many people begin to ask themselves this question. In these countries. poor. houses to replace their shacks. fertilizers.

as well as his less pleasant While it is not always humane. and with a dYtrue of to the orthodox a completely war is a unity of which importance. for success on the ef%cient operation devices. Its basic element is man. whole. and will. in swamps. war is never confined within the bounds Because its purpose is to destroy an society and its institutions and to replace them new state structure. whatever revolutionary are military. psychological. 7 . is dlercfow suffused and reflects. and man is more complex than any of his machines. in varying social. the constituent political. in mount ~ins. This is particularly guerrilla war.Introduction A revolutionary of military existing with action. ones. in depth For this reason. it is human. which is not susceptible frequently type of superficial military treatment by antediluvian doctrinaires. or the accuracy of electronic in any terrain. and air forces. in farmed fields. a dimension it is endowed that their scale. in any climate. I-Ie is endowed Guerrilla warfare man’s admirable with qualities intelligence. If one considers the picture as a apparent. emotions. is dangerously misleading and true only in the technological sense. namic quality wars. which is more than can be said for the strategy of extinction. lack. It is o[ten said that guerrilla generalization advocated This warfare is primitive. Guerrilla highly organized computers. with. and the primitive than war is of logistical It can be form is understood to be in fact more sophisticated navies. and economic. not dependent mechanical systems. in any weather. a paradox is immediately nuclear ventional complex conducted war or atomic war or war as it was waged by conarmies. any revolutionary parts.

guerrilla essays on guerrilla war. than Mao begins even before he is taught The to shoot is an and it is unceasing. cally educated A trained Warfare States. more has since been developed. and propaganda for their most important “We must with patiently monotonous “persuade. the principal the fish. however It is therefore of all leaders to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there. More guerrilla urgently than ten years ago. His indoctrination accurately. I concluded with the further an analysis of warfare demanded suggestion that the problem “serious study of all historical experience. Tse-tung. win over the people.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla In the United out of soldiers.” and much 8 Although a wealth of material existed then. loyal and politically end product alert fighting man. If the political few in number. “Explain. Mao is and guerrillas to lkh. and the people to the temperature will thrive concern they swim. agitation.” regularity they do fighting. or student armed with an antiquated fowling-piece and a home-rnacle bomb.” job is to says “conin explain.” “discuss. workman.” vince’’—these words recur many of the early Chinese has aptly compared water in which right. proliferate. and even more to keep politics the opposite. we go to considerable Guerrillas do exactly trouble to keep soldiers out of politics. leaders spend a great deal more time in orwork instruction. is much more than a guerrilla and thoroughly and disciplined patriotic peasant. no such study . intensely Guerrilla ganization. They go to great lengths to make sure that their men are politiaware of the issues at stake.

to organize a company The appearance considerable of twenty ill-equipped assortment men and boys (Castro’s of this group. “the Swamp Fox. Ho Chi Minh and Ernesto (Che) Guevara were more assiduous. at the age of twenty-seven.lnwoc?zxbz has yet been undertaken aware. borders of the Carolinas. the In 1759. the baby was “not larger than a England lobster and might easily enough have been put into a quart pot. He worked as a farmer. Revolutionary a martial New of guerrilla warfare with Communism.” Marion grew up in South Carolina and had little formal schooling. he had seen enough were overlooking warfare. so far as I am and Cuba. the course much British When accepted Regiment. fighters. by the Communists. raised to fight the Cherokees. of partisan permission realize that the Continentals able field-that and obtained consisted Accordingly. One rather interesting result of their successful activities has been the common identification But guerrilla for centuries.’) warfare was not invented there have been guerrilla hero Francis Marion. provoked . One of the most accomplished of them all was our own Those present at his birth would probably not have foretold future for him. the Revolution a commission broke out. with a heterogeneous of arms and ragged and poorly fitting clothes. Marion in the Second immediately Carolina of the war to a very profithe sought that at first South that of these was later hostilities to be put he joined a regiment who were then ravaging stored He served for two years and in away in his mind the to good use against By 1780. jesting among 9 “base” was twelve men). In Indochina in this country.

garrisons. unable to cope with Marion. in the “Song of Marion’s Men. .Mao Tse-tung the regulars of General Gates. Operating by them. They grasp their arms in vain. branded him a criminal. When. That little dreads us near! On them shall come at midnight A strange and sudden fear. His information timely and accurate. The army to the who fled from Napoleon’s * Bryant. est speed from inaccessible quently. and trains. convoys. which whose plans tactics were frewith the greathe changed heavily cm the British.* However. nor like “a Christian. activities in South Carolina especially Cornwallis. and complained bitterly that he fought neither “like a gentleman” such ubiquitous. And hear the tramp of thousands Upon the hollow wind. waking to their tents on fire. disrupted those of all successful guerrillas.” intangible. And they who stand to face us Are beat to earth again. and a charge orthodox antagonists operations as on a soldiers are wont to apply in all lands and in all wats to deadly Francis Marion. And they who fly in terror deem A mighty host behind.” wrote some lines that showed that he had a better understanding of guerrilla tactics and psychology than many who have followed more martiaf pursuits: Woe to the English soldiery. Marion’s bases. on Guerrilla but Wa+re Marion’s men were not long in proving that the appearance is not necessarily Marion’s guerrilla were continually of a combat soldier soon told a reliable criterion of his fighting abilities. for the people supported The British. he struck his blows in rapid succession at isolated was always him. grand Spaniards the first example of guerrilla scale was in Spain between 1808 and invading 1813.

Cossacks and Napoleon’s Grande Arrm$e as Kutuzov down the iceas Tolstoi of anyone’s with stupid force the Frefich armies to leave covered road to Smolensk. II . They too would But in neither revolutionists. with simplicity. about perfect power. and majestic of the people’s “was raised in all its menacing itself about no question no until fine distinctions. which. with accrues to the works of the man in history. belabored it rose and fell and army had the French the whole invading and a quarter people. the cudgel thousands starving of Russian and freezing. fare receive the potent political injection that was to alter its character radically. been driven out. tastes This dying army felt again and war. consistency. But it remained for Mao Tse-tung to produce twenty-five authority the first systematic that deservedly study of the subject. had been taken from him by the Emperor They were not revolutionists.Introduction mountains were patriots loyal to the ruler whose crown of the French. and troubling or rules. Lenin came on the scene did guerrilla warlater.” A little more than a century feel the fury of an aroused were those who wielded were patriotic Only when Russians. Most did not desire a change in the form of their government. Hitler’s case They armies fell back along the Smolensk the cudgel road. later wrote. His study. peasants pushed again harried it. Their single objective was to help Wellington Spain. A few years later. stumbling. will continue who led the most radical revolution to have a decisive effect in societies ready for change. now endowed almost the years ago.

the status of a “middle” strict disciplinarian. lvas born in I Iunan in central China. secondary schooling was thorough. –MAO TSK+TONG. the man who was to don the mantle of Lenin. described pealed Chinese educational her methods to him. He was a farmer. lHis literary catholic. sciences of many However. were But then opportunities able and Mao’s youth \vas not a happy one. translations ~iograpl~ers. The boy was in constant an ally in his mother. 1938 Province. nese philosophy. His father. and peasant. history Western and romances historians. 12 His indiscriminate poetry. while a pupil at the provincial normal read omnivorously. and political taste was school he Chiand paras well as diet included novelists. history. dustrious M AO TSE-TUNG. in 1893. . had managed with this land. conflict with his father but found tactics” (as he once her husband) his rebellious a tiny minority Nlao’s prinxmy ap son of and of coping the father that with gave only whose “indirect to enjoy. an into acquire several acres.PROFILE OF A REVOLUTIONIST PoLitical power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

day to day at subsistence holdings The politically and economically. 13 laged by tax collectors. Univer- Mao accepted a position as assistant in the Peking sity library. lived from tiny level. pored over Trotand began to study Marx and and Communist speeches. homogeneous. the privilege out for China. read his essays. social. robbed by landlords sustain life. When in Shanghai. of gradual to his country. His studies had led him to reject both democratic ism and parliamentary Time. Mao joined. Lenin. in 1921. Culturally. Tens of millions of peasant food to families owned no land at all. He was piland usurers. in 1917. Mao was a convinced his mission: a man who had discovered China according The China the CCP was organized in the accepted to create a new to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin. but without liberalHistory political. By 1920. But after graduating from normal school. he sought. in them. would he realized. fast. of them. not accord her socialism as unsuited was running change. Here he associated himself with the Marxist study groups set up by Li Ta-chao and Ch’en Tu-hsiu. The peasants. 400 million of course. was chaos. Other millions cultivated from which they scraped out just enough peasant was fair game for everyone. . how? Shortly of a relatively painless To survive to change in the power jungle. the key to the future of China. to change radically. and economic orderly evolution. was not a nation China was. China Mao decided to change sense of the word. here he discovered sky’s explosive Engels. and China success. had to change.introduction titularly appealed to him.

The Chinese peasant. and no communities officials who in his own plot beneath within no paved were no doctors. commercial.” 14 respects was a reasonably he knew He was right. in fact. An external factor had for almost a century the unrelenting in exacting that were soon to blow it contributed and greed of into and Russians j~lridical. French. and winter of these were with few exceptions called them out summer expressive idiom. afflicted by stark floods. and epidemics. running sewage China and Manchuria.Mm Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare at the mercy of rapacious blights. The in the fierce tens of froze to death. It is difficult for an American of small communities in which water. turned an international the China feudal. good one. there The no electricity. died of disease. and China record in these and to the chaos of China: vied with corrupt financial one another concessions pressure of foreign powers. The slowly starved. His single and was simply to survive. Germans. British. tough ones did. this society were the ingredients to pieces. soldiery and bandits. American from a succession and feeble governments colony. they lived in constant alike fear of army press gangs and of provincial tary roads and dikes. today to conceive in which no public services no schools. winters of North thousands existed. This was feudal China. to work on mili- “ate bitterness” from the time he could Dormant walk until he was laid to rest in the burial the cypress trees. (The that had. inhabitants illiterate. problem others droughts. ) Mao once described as “semicolonial in his youth . no streets. disposal.

in took command 1926. Reduced province can be described to solve the land who fastened as almost a one-man question. the problem landowners to get rid of the gentry constantly to the peasants like leeches and whose exactions impoverished. the honeymoon secret police captured elements. Chiang’s the army the radical labor leaders in Shanghai of its Communist and began In the 15 . 1926. dynamite. nese show. almost over. terms. and redistribution eager such to retain the stabilizing a radical In the circumthis necesof the land. Naturally. was established rated a number the vanguard were marching the revolutionary from Canton Government on the Yangtze. executed to purge 1927. armies incorpoBut by the time the outwas and of Chiang’s army reached skirts of Shanghai. the support in Chisocial kept the people sary reform: of the gentry society). in his native The he waged requisite in was for land reform China how was then.Introduction Shortly National Hunan after Chiang Kai-shek Army. These elements. of Communist divisions in March. of the Kuomintang Wuhan. (historically considered and until eliminated. himself extremely north element solution But in Mao’s view. In April. where a Nationalist in December. revolution While there was only one way to accomplish expropriation the Nationalists. The fundamental to elementary as it had long been. themselves stances. there could be no meaningful unless the power of this class had unpopular armies to been completely Mao was making with the landed gentry in Hunan. Mao campaign of the went to Revolutionary to stir up the peasants.

on G~{errilla Warfare in Wuhan the had broken advisers their was government walked out. were not entirely of that month. then dominated required followed the Communist armies to take the by Li Li-san. ganda patriotic operations supposed nature. an ominous received at Ching Kang Shari from the Central of the Party. This against cities held by the Nationalists. 1928) began to molcl an army. Gradually. In the early summer of 193o. The the left-wing Communists this period. During literally the Communists were having own troubles. District whose operations became landlords under Red Principally these activities were of a propawere “asked” to make secure base area. at Ching Kang Shari. commenced to suppress control expanded. Several more extensive. The movement Those a rugged on the verge of extinction. and from a temporarily against provincial the Reds. the single most vital decision . the territory were dispossessed. troops who were clirective was Committee directive o(fensive that in On soviets were established. was the agrarian agitator in to the mountain local bandit Chu Teh (who had arrived in April. Soviet packed their bags and started for home. borderlands. wealthy merchants contributions.Mao Tse-tung meantime up. chieftains were induced gradually join the Communists. and these were serious. successful a serious Communist the thirteenth 16 defeat at Changsha The campaigns and culminated in September. WI1O managed area in the As various Mao and to to escape Chiang’s assembled haven groups Fukien-Kiangsi drifted secret police had fled to the south and One of the first to reach this from Hunan. stronghold.

Fi- . platoons. revolutionary that the Cl]inese and too apathetic Party. to be carried that sion. doctrine reoriented History the policy of the Chinese has proved was thereafter Moscow And it is for this reason is so frequently infallibility challenged by Peking. In October. equally on the of Mao and Chu Teh. munist Moscow Tevolution Marxist peasant? correctly vinced number the line laid down by Moscow in favor of one of Mao’s own Basically the conflict that split the Chinese Party wide open and alienated revolved dogma gauged about this question: on the to be based Was the traditionalists the Chinese proletariat—as and had was conThis deciout with Mao was that the industrial prescribed–or their was it to be based on the potential. who knew and trusted the peasants. of Kremlin urban proletariat were too few in to make a revolution. in December. with great fanfare was launched really were in the misguided with no difSuppresHow to become by Supa “Bandit was now that he could crush the Communists ficulty. which drastically Communist vigorous right. was a complete to the by battalions. These two agreed that the was to abandon immediately Comin only hope for the movement devising.Introduction in the history of the Chinese the ultimate responsibility shoulders Communist for it rested Party was taken. wrong. the Generalissimo. belief 1930. Government Communists Three more ran away or surrendered all failures. Mao. Campaigns. consistency. apparent. followed this fiasco. flop. ” This Nationalists The campaign by companies. announced weak troops pression the sion Campaign.

This was indeed one of the fateful migrations its purpose. supported peasants hundreds from and loyal “Central” compression area. As they marched toward the borders of and swung north. As the Nationalists and aviation. the plans on Guerrilla Warfare y decided to the Generalissimo of his German well-trained. and the now celebrated of almost 6.Mao Tse-tung nally. columns mountains Tibet How many pitched during however. to a coordinated munist-controlled ward. nist Party. For the first time. Reds fought lished. It was to shift the base to march they had laboriously tion. Chiang’s provincial troops. and the . were under that for days on end their crossed innumerable and subboth tropical and rivers and endured arctic climates. as usual. ineffective 18 were unable to bar the way. and town wired-in inched and they evacuated constructed blockhouses. Communist was taken. The Reds faced many critical tough and determined. adopt in 1933. they sprinkled the route with situations. Every natural obstacle. but they were cadres and caches of arms and ammunition.000 miles was begun. and methodical by artillery every village reluctant advisers and to commit divisions southof the Com- well-equipped. They now be estab- It is known. isolated from the support of the peasants found themselves deprived of food and informathe Commumorale sagged. of history: the to preserve the military power of the Commubattles and skirmishes this epic trek cannot air attack. and there were many. was overcome. Chiang’s in this context Shensi Province first time almost completely troops were slowly strangling that the bold decision nists. for the of mutually supporting converted. The Communists.

Mao had time to reflect on his experiences embodied in Yu Chi Chum and to derive from them the guerrilla war which he theory and doctrine of revolutionary 19 .Introduction exhausted remnants of the Reds eventually found shelter in the loess caves of Pao An. after the base was shifted to Yenan. Later.

1937 control of the state. –MAO TSE-TUNG. In effect. in isolated Here volunteers are trained and indoctrinated. consolidation.IEult STRATEGY. there is thus woven about each base a protective 20 belt of sympathizers . to “persuade” and “convince” and to ento supply the inhabitants of the surrounding countryside willing list their support. and from here. and necessary development in an agrarian-based revolua to tionary war. TACTICS. Mao conceived series of merging organization. the first of which and preservation and difficult through of regional is devoted terrain. agitators and propagandists set forth. individually or in groups of two or three. base areas situated M AO HAS NEVER CLAIMED that guerrilla alone is decisive in a struggle action for political this type of war as passing phases. AND LOGISTICS IN REVOLUTIONARY WAR The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy. natural. but only that it is a possible.

Introduction food. They “voluntary” Their The home guards form an indoctritrained reserve. equipped ceed with As the is to procure particularly guerrilla improve. Military operations will be sporadic. and information. ammunition. direct action assumes an ever-increasing importance. to be a mobile fightand bettering force. clandestine. so that it gradually designed acquires the quality of “mass. the revolution. Phase I (organization. They function as vigiforce merchants particularly to make obnoxious kidnap collect information. weak columns are ambushed. growing and its capabilities indoctrination agents pro“liberated” of the inhabitants OE peripheral districts soon to be absorbed into the expanding area. methodical. arms. One of the primary objectives during the first phases is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement. and progressive. The pattern of the process is conspiratorial. recruits. or destruction . it is a “back-up” for the better-trained nated and partially lantes. function Following preservation) informers and collaborators.” Local “home guards” or militia are formed. The militia is not primarily equipped guerrillas. contributions. It is dur21 Phase 111: decision. is to protect and liquidate local landlords. collaborationists Acts of sabotage and “reactionary are liquidated. medical force political supplies becomes and and better material. The primary purpose of these operations other essential radios. consolidation. In the next phase. and tertorism elements” multiply. Attacks are made on vulnerable military and police outposts. and and Phase 11 (progressive expansion) comes of the enemy.

compromises time Few. and to wear down. ox carts. and that will preserve the unity of the strategic antee the development Intelligence operations. the members service to provide questions. farm laborers.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare ing this period that a significant guerrilla establishment capable of engaging percentage the enemy of the active in convenfor force completes its transformation into an orthodox by “negotiations. economic) from the for the dual purpose (military. This phase may be protracted Such negotiations opposition.” guerrilla What bold. is the state of his equipment. if any. is the decisive factor in planning is the enemy? Where In what strength? intelligent. goats. girls tending schoolteachers. 22 men and women. every person without an agent—old priests. is undertaken to buttress a position by revolutionists arrangements compromise. frustrate. boatmen. scavengers. essential revolutionary concessions and harass the opponent. are not originated rarely the purpose of arriving at amicable Revolutions are made only to further then. intelligence In a guerrilla nets are Guerrilla the answers or poorly trained of their intelligence to these and dozens more tightly organized and excep- area. whose aim is only to create conditions line and guarof a “victorious situation. and well disciplined. are to be expected side. does he propose to do? What his morale? or stupid expect and imaginative soft? Guerrillas detailed pervasive. the strategic design.” with the tional battle. Negotiation. Are his troops Are his leaders and impetuous? tough. tion must be considered boys driving storekeepers. social. efficient. his supply. of gaining political. .



local cadres “put the heat” on everyone, all conceivable it they do. guerrillas deny all information



gard to age or sex, to produce And produce As a corollary, fog. Total inability Campaigns, characteristic thousands

information. of themcomand is a him,

selves to their enemy, who is enveloped to get information during plaint of the Nationalists of the French

in an impenetrable was a constant in China This The

the first four Suppression and Algeria. wars,

as it was later of the Japanese in both Indochina feature of unseen of all guerrilla eyes intently he strikes


stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around study his every gesture. his antagonists Because gage under superior When

his every move,

are insubstantial, information,

out, he hits the air; as intangible as fleeting guerrillas always because enof

shadows in the moonlight. of superior conditions of their own choosing; discomfiture.


of terrain,

they are able to use it to Guerrillas heavflows

their advantoge

and the enemy’s

fight only when the chances of victory are weighted ily in their favor; if the tide of battle unexpectedly

against them, they withdraw. They rely on imaginative leadership, distraction, suTrise, and mobility to create a victorious Sihlation before battle is joined. The enemy is dcccivcd and again deceived. Attacks are sudden, sharp, vicious, nature; enemy to agitate importance and of short duration. to dislocate Many are harassing The in others designed and confuse than the enemy’s plans and mind of the Mao once re23

his commanders.

and the will of his leaders is a target of far more the bodies of his troops.

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


marked, expert situation enemy Usually

not entirely at running






away since they do it so often.


avoid static dispositions; least expects designed

their effort is always to keep the Only in this way can they reof action. trap, to from an “running are must of in into a baited

as fluid as possible, to strike where and when the them. and so be assured of freedom to lure the enemy or to distract his attention offensive. over a wide region commander to commands and applies take advantage

tain the initiative

confuse his leadership,

area in which a more decisive blow is imminent, away” is thus, paradoxically, Guerrilla necessarily be familiar local subordinate operations decentralized. with The This conducted

Each regional same

local conditions

opportunities. districts.

decentralization because

is to some exlack a But has

tent forced upon guerrillas well-developed system

they ordinarily communications.

of technical

at the same time, decentralization many advantages, and bold. particularly

for normal operations

if local leaders are ingenious

The enemy’s rear is the guerrillas’ front; they themselves have no rear. Their logistical fashion: equipment, problems are solved in a direct and elementary source of weapons, Mao once said: We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy’s own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke. 24 The enemy is the principal and ammunition.


If it is a joke, it is a macabre payers are concerned.

one as far as American to tile Communists



Chiang Kai-shek’s American-equipped divisions were numbered in the tens of thousands. When they surrendered, they arms, turned jeeps, in mountains tanks, guns, of Americanimade bazookas, mortars, individual radios, and


weapons. to examine Mao’s strategical to military concept and tactical action of the of Yin-Yang. and male, of the and pervasive. and aggression. In terms

It is interesting This

theories in the light of his principle seems to be an adaptation Chinese philosophical they ancient of

of “unity of opposites.”

Briefly, the Yin and the Yang are elemental opposite polarities, represent is endless. dark and light, Their reciprocal dialectic, cold and heat, interaction recession


they may be likened postulate strength

to the thesis and antithesis theory is that

from ~vhich the synthesis is derived, An important concealed weakness, of minutes. within strength. of the Yin-Yang there is weakness, and within that they

It is a weakness of guerrillas

operate in small groups that can be wiped out in a matter But because they do operate in small groups, rear they can move rapidly and sec~etly into the vulnerable of the enemy. In conventional struction; tactics, dispersion

of forces invites deboth the illusion that the infantry 25

in guerrilla

war, this very tactic is desirable

to confuse the enemy and to preserve guerrillas are ubiquitous. It is often a disadvantage

not to have heavy

dynamic pattern. are not cut to any particular is always governing. to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. Strike [in the] West.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare weapons available. they create pretenses and simultaneously guise or conceal their true semblance. intense heat. wholly Yin. But Mao’s first law of war. and freezing and dangerous. Their tactical cepts. to Here we find expressed fix the enemy’s attention least anticipates Guerrillas traction on the one hand and concentration the blow. in four Chi Hsi. disadvantage. The guerrilla to transport columns to travels light and travels fast. is equally some advantage true: In each The Yin shields his approach In every apparent converse advantage is to be apparent is not lie the seeds of disadvantage.” characters which mean “Uproar [in the] East. It is only the wise general. The cold. nor the Yang wholly Yang. an unsuspecting found. Guerrilla Chinese tactical doctrine pronounced may be summarized “Sheng Tung. and flexible. .” the all-important principles of dison the other. them has until roads and well-used but the very fact of having recently tied conventional tracks. He turns the hazards of terrain to his advantage and makes an ally of tropical rains. and to strike where and when he and disdiscon- are masters of the arts of simulation simulation. heavy snow. who is able to recognize dlis fact and to turn it to good account. said the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu. Long night marches are difficult to but the darkness enemy.

Historical experience is written in blood and iron.


movements content taneity; guerrilla

HE FUNDAMENTALDIFFERENCEbetween patriotic partisan is that resistance and revolutionary gtlerrilla the first usually lacks the ideological of spon-

that always distinguishes is characterized is organized it begins and then movement is rarely

the second. by the quality and then begins. and terminates when movement terminates A revolutionary

A resistance

is organized.

A resistance only when government Historical


the invader is ejected; a revolutionary it has succeeded or is liquidated. experience suggests that

in displacing there

the incumbent is very little

hope of destroying a& it has survived
sympathetic lation. The

a revolutionary guerrilla movement the first phase and has acquired the
segment of the popu-

support of a significant

size of this “significant to an appealing


will vary; a

decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent. In addition port, such factors as terrain; program and popular supthe quality communications; 27

Mao Tse-tung

on Guerrilla


of the opposing


the presence

or absence


material help, technical aid, advisers, or “volunteers” from outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent government movement are naturally relevant to the ability of a situations will to survive and expand. guerrilla for example,

In specific aspects, revolutionary had been objectively analyzed

of course differ, but if the Cam-o movement,

in the light of the factors

suggested during the latter period of its first phase, a rough “expectation of survival and growth” might have looked something like Figure I. Had an impartial analyst applied such criteria to Vietnam six to eight months before the final debacle, he might have produced a chart somewhat like Figure H. Here Determinants guerrillas, in balance. superior tuary. Two others, tactical A, B, H, and I definitely Castro) favored the who also (unlike Although ability the had an available sanchad demonstrated an experi-

C and F, might have been considered Vietminh in guerrilla situations,

enced observer might have been justified in considering “military efficiency” equal; the French were learning. While other determinants may no doubt be adduced, those used are, I believe, valid so far as they go, and the box scores indicative. These show that Castro’s chances of success might have been estimated These analyses may be criticized ated after the even~ outcome

as approximately four to three. my belief have that been


to two, Ho Chi Minh’s as approximately it is, however,

as having been formulthe precould

in Cuba

and Indochina


“s a “la 3 u .

To anyremotely the philosophy war.” to the problem \s being devoted to A good example was reported of this in News- approach Apparently veniently admirals up. “The Periscope. accurate “ July 3. much attention of “gadgetry. it blows up with terrific force. At the present the development restricted week: + PENTAGON—A new and fiendishly ingenious antiguerrilla weapon is being tested by the Navy. tions. one even doctrine we are ensconce armed to assume themselves awaiting that guerrillas will con“fox- in readily the arrival identifiable guns” holes and bunkers” with of half a dozen to march and “flame-thrower-like acquainted guerrilla There with and retire to the nearest of%cers’ club. Seconds later.” 31 .” Weapons in weight. squirted from a flame-thrower-like gun. and ammunition efforts should must be drastirifle weigh- seems to be no technical automatic reason why a sturdy. medical. for of course they will. Constant gical “packs. this sort of thing is panaceas. some time before the respective movements had from the stage of organization and consolidation— time. light.Introductwn dieted emerged Phase I. not hilariously are no mechanical I do not mean to suggest that proper weapons and equiPment will not play an important made to improve cally reduced communication. It’s a delayedaction liquid explosive. squirt. that seeps into foxholes and bunkers. there part in antiguerrilla food. 1961. fed by oxygen from the air. operabe and sur- of revolutionary funny.

And the search for new and effective weapons must continue.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare ing a maximum of four to five pounds cannot be developed. of aid is often critical. If extended to the aid must be given while it is still the movement. materials. to one side or the other to intervene this is a political for a decision naturally The role devolve upon the head of state. of a third party should and technical The possible timing incumbent revolutionary to advice. Basically. government. in a revolutionary and scope of the has become matter. From a purely military point of view. assistance sponsibility however. aid must be made available quite literally a matter same critical period. Isolation studies. Any assistance given should. nature. photographic sibly infiltration 32 and physical reconnaissance. antiguerrilla and eradication. given great importance. if to the during the is vulnerof life and operain combat. In the brief definitions tions may be summed up in three words: location. would of reto a The position of active third parties guerrilla war and the timing. But we must realize that “flame-thrower-like guns” and bullets challenging are only a very small part of the answer and complex problem. when the movement able and its existence death. stop short of participation be restricted training. of each term. involves . to isolate and eradicate side. that is. Location that these activities careful of base area or areas requires of the movement. isolation. it are not terrain and possePawill be well to bear in mind rigidly compartmented.

stantly attacked. during he is correct. thesis will not stati too close an examination. the dynamic characteristic there is the question counterguerrilla of whether it is possible flourish guerof the are the his sug- to create effective of fish. defections and take prisoners. must Co7nrnanJers and leaders at every echelon be selected these Officers and NCO’S who are more than competent normal conditions when confronted situations Finally.Introductwn ration of guerrillas from their sources of information movement and resettlement reliable fl~xibility and presupposes and food. It may require communities. under different ineffective tion of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation. Parachutists and helicopter-borne troops are essential. on this point. Russians (which valid criteria. and demands mando-type of entire information a high com- Eradication extreme operational degree of mobility. will frequently with of guerrilla be hopelessly and totally warfare. occupation Mao is definite If the guerrilla he cites) cannot. Can two shoals of the other. But. Imaginative. each intent forces. must be used against effort must be made the guerto induce They must be constantly Every harried and con- The tactics of guerrillas rillas themselves. with The best source of informaand bold speci~c leadership qualities is absoin mind. . he is experiences on destruction that in the same medium? convinced White history they rilla war” is impossible. lutely essential. “counterrevolutionary or of Mikhailovitch hand. intelligent. on the other in Greece certain of the movement indicates the German This 33 that under circumstances.

it is that military measures alone will not suffice. contends on Guerrilla Warfare political analysis of relevant situation. to control experience such phenomena and eradicate from appearing. 34 . and are he is). that the phenomena (and I believe them.Mao Tse-tung gests the need for a careful factors in each individual Mao Tse-tung considered predictable. about we have it is or. If he is correct possible to prevent they do. if guer- are subject to their own peculiar laws. revolutionary And if historical teaches us anything rilla war.

YU CHI CHAN (Guerrilla Warfare) .


a member political which in 1937 and has been widely distributed of the Chinese commissar Mao Tse-tung. “Sheng Tzmg.TRANSLATOR’S NOTE . The tactics of Sun TZL1 are in large measure tics of China’s guerrillas today. 1941. laid out by Mao Tse-tung the pamphlet was published “Free China” Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla at 10 cents a copy. Chi is no [in the] East. surprise. The influence of the ancient thought military philosopher Sun Tzu on Mao’s military will be apparent to those and guerrilla troops has qualified who have read The Book of WaT-. is no novice in the art of war. I warfare. Actual battle experience with both regular him as an expert. One for unlimited most significant ganization of the struggle people of the Chinese The development of this warfare has followed and his collaborators Warfare). Strike [in the] West”). and Japan features the undeclared war between has been China of the the orguerrilla the in in will enter its fifth year. Sun Tzu wrote that speed. less valid today than it was when he wrote it 2. 37 the tac- .400 years ago. pattern N JULY. and deception were the primary essentials of the attack and his succinct Hsi” (“Uproar advice. Party and formerly Communist Red of the Fourth Army.

but are no other hisas thoroughly and economic primitive of view as those in China. as yet encountered strictly limited guerrilla I have tried to present as the Chinese language dium for the expression We in the Marine relatively Corps have war. I have taken matter that was to delete from the translation USMC 38 . nothing a new military process. the transla- tion of some of the modern idioms not yet to be found in available dictionaries is probably arguable. with vast time and space factors. suitable the author’s ideas accurately. orpoint and since there hostilities political. SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH Captain. established This seems a true statement torical ganized examples of guerrilla from the military. is not a particularly of technical thought. I cannot vouch for the accuracy the liberty purely repetitious. 1940 Virginia of retranslated quotations. what Mao has written but me- of this new type of guerrilla war may be of interest to us. Thus.Mao Tse+ung on Guwrdla Warfare Mao says that unlimited guerrilla warfare. Quantico.

standard Japan. “The that this war of itself from hope he might have itself from the masses of the people that it dissociates Japanese. Mao wrote YZJChi Chan during China’s struggle against consequently referThese For inences to the strategy to be used against the Japanese. English but have been unable to do with is always possible in any rendering I have not been able to identify titles all the works cited by Mao. there are. HE PRECEDINC NOTE Was written (1937) tWenty-One with one Problems was issued years ago. when resistance of ultimate dissociates victory Mao writes. “and from hope of ultimate victory over the forces 39 . is frequently essays entitled War). There are some similarities in these two I had hoped to locate a copy of Yu Chi Chan in the Chinese to check my translation so. but I see no need to amplify it. Some improvement from the Chinese. Peking. naturally. in no way invalidate stance. Yu Chi Cbz confused of Mao’s later ( 1938) K’attg Jih Yu Chi which Chaiz Cheng Ti Chan Lueh Wen T’i (Strategic the An ti-jizpanese GuerrilLz in an English version in 1952 by the People’s Publishing IHousc.” over the is the precise moment added. Mao’s fundamental moment numerous thesis.A FURTHER NOTE T h works.

” he said.) Mount ]Z@. “is the creation of a national united anti-Japanese front.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare of Chiang at that illusion Kai-shek. USMC (Ret. the type of revolutionary war described tracted and ultimately successful process of doing so. of course. because time both sides were attempting to preserve the of a “united front. GRIFFITH Brigadier General. not the basic policy of the Chinese Communist was to seize state power. 1961 Maine 40 .” Party then.” “ Our basic policy.” However. he did not do so. Its basic policy guerrilla by Mao was the basic weapon in the pro- This was. or at any other time. Vernon. SAMUEL B.

If we fail to do this. these hostilities imperialists. result They are but one step in the oppressor of their at a time Revolution.n WHAT IS GUERRILLA WARFARE? I stances. in People and when the people were unable to endure “A people’s insurrection any more from the revolution 41 a people’s . This is particuof a people a nation larly true in a war waged for the emancipation who inhabit a vast nation. we will find it operations must not be considered struggle. natural. whose techniques and victorious characterized This are undeveloped imperialism. total war. dented N A WAR OF REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER. confronted Under and whose communicawith a strong these circumwarfare tions are poor.@lerri]]a operations are a necessary China part. one aspect of the revolutionary are the inevitable and oppressed extdurance. as an They difficult to defeat the enemy. guerrilla independent form of warfare. She finds herself Japanese the development warfare of the type of guerrilla be developed by the quality must of mass is both necessary and to an unprecewith the operations degree and it must coordinate of our regular These armies. is such a nation. Lenin. Japanese said: when the latter reach of the clash between the limits began and In our case.

Mao Tse-tzmg on Gwmrilla Warfare are not only natural operations cause they. our hostilities clearly defined political goal and firmly established responsibilities. 42 Our basic policy is the creation of a national . Thus the regularly organized troops. and occupies and society there is no doubt that conoffer by the obstacles to his progress and may be used to advantage those who oppose him. Both in its development guerrilla policy. of resisting and defeating we turn these gradually forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the regular army.” the quality We consider gue~illa are of to agin as but one aspect of our total or mass war beof independence. distinctive of guerrilla resistance characteristics. warfare We to national must have a political result of this will be victory. those guerrillas who have attained that status. country first discuss the relationship Because warfare has certain ours is the of a semicolonial against an imperialism. peculiar itself. There that level of decombine to form the military power of a national can be no doubt that the ultimate and in its method of application. guerrillas to the purpose warfare. It is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment gressor nation. ditions of terrain. themselves Guerrilla lacking but inevitable. and objectives incapable of providing warfare has qualities may employ When a solution to the struggle. During develop the progress into orthodox of hostilities. In guerrilla advantages enemy. climate. and those who have not reached velopment revolutionary war. against a more powerful pierces deep her territory in general the invader into the heart of the weaker country a cruel and oppressive manner.

and assistance cannot is thus revolutionary . guerrilla accord warfare with are certain fundamental of this policy. 6. unification is no reason to consider conducted in complete separately antiof of from national Japanese guerrilla political policy. 3. There in order emancipa- to gain our political goal. to wit: the people. “The one. There and Achieving Establishing Equipping Recovering Destroying Regaining and organizing internal bases. guerrilla ple? Without aspirations warfare as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the of the people and their syrnpath y. forces. Arousing 2. enemy’s national lost territories. Such a simple point of view will of guerrilla goal.” Those who maintain this simple view have lost sight of the political effects of guerrilla defeat. cooperation. politically. national strength. On the contrary. What is the relationship a political cause the people to lose confidence goal and the political and will result in our warfare warfare to the peomust fail. 5. This policy we pursue people.Yu Chi Chan [Gawn-illu War/are) united anti-Japanese front. The essence of guerrilla On the other 43 in character. 7. be gained. 4. strength. it must be organized national question point guerrilla and not a policy. It is only those who misinterpret hostilities is purely a military matter action who say. action. which is the complete tion of the Chinese steps necessary in the realization 1. as does Jen Ch’i Shari.

is the organization bands that spring from the masses of the peoat the time of their all guerrilla ple suffer from lack of organization formation. All guerrilla units must have political and military leadership. This is true regardless of the source or size of such units. nificant Shari). army units troops with or they may consist of regular . Such units may originate locally. guerrilla say: action. in a war of counterrevolutionary place for guerrilla hostilities. from an admixture people. there is no warfare by them. “Only There the distinguishing if it separates There and regular who are those who do of a people’s can carry because insigCh’i who.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare hand. in the masses of the people. itself from therefore do guerrilla basically derives from the masses and is supported it can neither their sympathies not comprehend not understand guerrilla on guerrilla action. they all have in common a basic quality that makes organization possible. 44 of regular they may be formed groups of the intact. Because nature. who troops operations. have exist nor flourish and cooperation.” say: they do not believe mistakenly in the ultimate “Guerrilla success of guerrilla is an (Jen in which and highly specialized Then type of operation there is no place for the masses of the people” there are those who ridicule by wildly asserting of the war undermine Ch’ing. resistance that the masses and the people (Yeh no understanding for one). qualities are others warfare war. of resistance The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment victory What that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate for guerrilla warfare? Though over the Japanese.

be well educated in revolutionary technique. and able to such which In short. we have mentioned. contribute to vic- tory and those who attack the movement and anarchism action. that Neither might nor that there are people who under the movement of organization. as a combination the nature is a haven (Jen into disguerrillas. these leaders must As the war progresses. there no help for it. at first prevails. sincere. phenomena efficiency. They hoping militarists. their combat efficiency. were we to judge and temporary study the corrupt has at the present symptoms guerrilla phenomena the guise of guerrillas do we deny that of a lack be serious We should to eradicate and to inis indeed time symptoms warfare and guerrilla “This solely by the corrupt attempt warfare.Yu Chi CJzan (Guen-illu Warfare) And mere quantity hundred does not affect this matter. overcome the lack of discipline. they will estabhsh discipline them and increasing guerrilla warfare victory will be attained. leaders will gradually strengthening Thus eventual Unorganized of banditry of guerrilla Ch’i Shari). and the problem cannot be solved immedi45 . indulge severe discipline. Such units of several men. or a regiment All these must have leaders who are unyielding policies–Iesolute. them in order to encourage crease its military is hard work. of several thousand and fobust. repute. be models for the people. cannot in their forces. do not understand say: “This movement vagabonds for disappointed and bandits” thus to bring the movement We do not deny that there are corrupt in unlawful activities. in their men selfThese may consist of a squad of a few men. must loyal. a battalion men. -confident. able to establish cope with counterpropaganda.

of the people. 194–208. Only and annihilated. and other vulnerable and there hausted he must be harassed. the enemy’s rear. We must educate them and reform them in the light of past experience. The whole people must on Guen-ills Warfare try to reform themselves during the course of the war. dispersed. When deliver a lightning engage a harass guerrillas wart’are. from the east and attacking the hollow. 2. him when he stops.” What is basic guerrilla strategy? Guerrilla mobility.G.B. seek a lightning decision. situation. withdraw. Mao refers here to the essay that has been translated into English under the title “Partisan Warfare. It the the be based primarily must be adjusted weather. with the effort of the regular are made in the matter based on the principles tioned and carried on over a vast extent of territory in which “ Presumably. enemy. blow. strike him when he is weary.–S.” See Olbis. they withdraw when he advances. to come from the west.Mao Tse-tung ately. to the enemy existing lines of communication. strategy must and attack. and in activities that are anarchism. 1958). But. In guerrilla strategy. in of command. attacked. 46 .” Warfare. Evil does not exist in guerrilla undisciplined On Guerrilla warfare but only in the unorganized said Lenin. and the situation In guerrilla attack stronger the relative strengths. spots are his vital points. No. on alertness. select the tactic of seeming attack. we have men- carry out their mission of independent coordination victory Guerrilla spite of the most complete if mistakes warfare preparation. pursue him when he withdraws. II (Summer. the terrain. flanks. exin this way can guerrillas guerrilla there action and can be no armies. avoid the solid.

Of this type. flourish. and to national directly contradicts Russian guerrilla those organized in Abys- develop as long as they are not contrary warfare development. we may by the White and Kolchak. tremenand contwo types guerrilla is imAs hos- emancipation distinction warfare. churia here cite the examples furnished by Denikin to exist. All such have oppressed the to the true interests of the They are easy to in the people. of the Abyssinians the Italians those of the Reds for the on past three years. against character. those organized by the Italians sinia. and those that will be organized traitors. destroy because they lack a broad foundation . those of the last seven years in Manchuria. the interests of the whole people or the greater part of them. all had a broad basis in the national been in accord with the laws of historical They have existed and will continue The second type of guerrilla the law of historical units organized by the Japanese. those supported by Chinese They by the puppet governments in Manand Mongolia. examples of the former type we may cite Red guerrilla tilities during in China. must be firmly opposed.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) communications dously sequent towards are inconvenient ultimate defeat will contribute of the Japanese people. policy. All these struggles have been carried on in manpower. of the Chinese The A careful of guerrilla warfare possible itself mean must be made between fact that revolutionary of guerrilla is based on the masses of the people does not in that the organization units in a war of counterrevolutionary the Russian Revolution. and the vast anti-Japanese in China guerrilla war that is carried today. and all have development. 47 masses and have been contrary people.

B. said: “When is the basis of a struggle of class type. Its basis is. whereas war. applied at the conclusion well diminish units from among the people. guerrilla unification of different the problem the use of propaganda. therefore. I. no matter are developed. we have but to remember the historical experience of revolutionary struggles. Gusev. warfare One in a civil struggle class may be easily united in a national class groups. revised in 1921 and published by GIZ. Moscow. 48 . reprinted in 1958 by the Military Publishing House. In civil war. Of a general guerrilla war. Further. the whole people of a nation. of the than the much broader struggle that is an instrument policy. ate their effect when guerrilla between the two types of gue~ We might it is likely that we will exaggerby an invader. we must distinguish general revolutionary wars from those of a purely “class” type.” Such a conclusion our confidence in guerrilla As far as this matter is concerned. Mao refers here to Lessons of Civil War. Moscow. first published in 1918 by the Staff Armed Forces. it has been organizing extent guerrilla a nation is invaded.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare If we fail to differentiate rills hostilities arrive might mentioned. (Civil War they do not produce The same results as when they are formed to resist an invasion by foreigners” feature perhaps lutionary of internal necessitates of internal in Russia). Both types of guerrilla WPresumably.-S. by S. “the invader that can organize warfare. people become sympathetic guerrillas to one another and all aid in to what the units. carry on a guerrilla national without regard to class or party. units are faced with fight with great effect. In the former case.” one strong is its quality and revoThis of guerrilla purity.G. Ukraine.

has employed varying implements as times.” Lenin.” the historical 49 If. period conditions. The guerrilla and those employed The guerrilla the against French aspects those of the fighting in Manchuria in China conthe and warfare today are all slightly diflerent. we fail to apply .” “It is necessary formulas to be completely unsympathetic to and rules and to study with and economic aspirations. every period must have its init is uncondiin order to theory of war. said: “As regards the form of fighting. sympathy situations These the conditions in accordance and the progressive of the actual fighting. the conditions the state of eco- nomic progress. Again: abstract and the political ideas that obtained. therefore. customs. dependent tionally discover have independent War- and. be investigated of environment. was not exactly similar to that which we conduct differences express the characterAlthough fact we “Wars in of all these peoples in different periods. today in China.Yu Chi Chan (Guem”lka Warfare) war are. in today’s struggle. the national characteristics. however. This in On War: forms and must recognize. requisite that history in On Guerrilla fare. every similarity in the quality wrote. with the political of the in conditions people’s for these will change realization changes create new methods. Moroccans These differ. and degree of civilization. are dissimilarities Clausewitz independent in form. though historically of the same consistency. National guerrilla warfare. similar in that they both employ the same military methods. peoples. and conditions of the Opium War. since the Mukden ducted Spanish by the incident. istics of different there is a general there struggles.

of the characteristics rived placing national peculiar war. simply be beating will be unable against Japan? although alone To summarize: our heads against What to profit from guerrilla is the guerrilla of producing It is one aspect of the entire incapable diminishes tacks the enemy in every quarter. atof and the extent strength. the decision. It is one of the strategic instru- It is the one and inwith we can- of anti-JaPanese policy. we will fall into the Hsi Sheng army. armies. assists our regular pure expression military separable strength area under his control. It is a powerful which we resist the Japanese not defeat them. it is special weapon which by the active people and without from them. which. “the that under the unit % guerrilla mechanized function.” These opinions are harmful.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla War-fare truths of revolutionary error of believing impact of Japan’s has lost its historical olden days. 50 . that is to say. increases our national ments used to inflict defeat organized on our enemy. guerrilla with guerrilla Tou war. our hostilities guerrilla struggles. we wilI a stone wall and we hostilities.” warfare Jen Ch’i Shari writes: was part of regular strategy but there is almost no chance that it can be applied today. but insist on applying from past history. war of resistance war. If we do not make an estimate to our anti-Japanese to it mechanical guerrilla deof formulas the mistake we are making in the same category as all other If we hold this view.

mand. as individual men. that is. 51 . in the responsibilities. of equipment the standard order. of several score of organ- bers. or the regiment. in conception of military considered equipment. As a result of this. matter JVhen HE GENERAL FEATURES of orthodox hostilities. or several hundred several thousand. of the terms “front” and ‘(rear”. A primary feature of guerrilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and other depends guerrilla groups.2 THE RELATION OF GUERRILLA HOSTILITIES OPERATIONS TO REGULAR T organization. com- ment. differ fundamentally are other readily apparent armament. from the point of view of total numcombat units. There differences such as those in supply. to the battalion This they may vary in size from the smallest. tactics. guerrilla units are many. and they must depend for their sustenance upon what the locality affords. organization In the case of is of a low primarily largely upon local circumstances. is not the case in regularly ized units. units. the war of position and the war of movefrom guerrilla warfare.

partial deployment. into a positional features deployment. a certain degree in principle. their be remembered. In guerrilla general general war. that the transdefensive and develare of a moving situation never arises. The of reconnais- sance. and there must be no excessive interference with their activities.” it must do have bases. and tactically. also in the matter of leadership warfare. adjacent Only this is not arms in all districts but impossible. subordinates. In guerrilla warfare. is manifestly unlike There is that employed as the basic tactic of the former is constant is nothing characterizes formation situation opment There comparable orthodox activity and movement. units of the regular by the quality they must cooperate activity nor is it prima- army. small units acting independently play the principal role. there to the fixed. 52 .Mao Tse+ung The on Guerrilla Warfare strategy of guerrilla in orthodox warfare operations. in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle. but In orthodox warfare. not common in guerrilla of the attack that are usual in mobile warfare are differences and command. passive defense war. their activities degree. When to any degree. particularly of initiative command highest all supporting in a moving situation. to the guerrilla Stratewith those is accorded is centralized. In the case of guerrilla only undesirable units can coordinate of the regular with adjacent strictures units. gically. their activities can be roughly correlated forces. But there are no of cooperation of many on the extent of guerrilla rily characterized we discuss the terms “front” that while guerrillas and “rear. This is done because all units and must coordinate warfare.

however. and Suiyuan. Further tinction must be made in order to clarify this matter. From the foregoing between guerrilla seen that it is improper the Eighth campaign summary activities with those of the regular that exist it can be dis- warfare and orthodox to compare the two.000 miles.Yu Chi ClIan (Guerrilla Warfare} primary field of activity is in the enemy’s rear areas. and the characteristics in the battle Kuan and in other engagements. to harass and weaken communication. Eighth China Route for it operates forces to of orthoat P’ing in the enemy’s rear. In this connection. the operations of Central Shansi. to force the and to coordinate armies on distant of differences warfare.–S. troops were more guerrilla than orthodox in nature. Sea Introduction.G. it cannot can. to attack enemy bases capable lines of to establish operations of supporting all these battle in the enemy’s rear. On the other hand. Army commanders dox mobile Hsing warfare have concentrated were evident powerful strike an enemy in motion. enemy to disperse his strength. units operating operate as guerrillas As to the matter of military responsibilities. those of the guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy. after the fall of Feng Ling Tu.B. independent large forces.000-mile* of certain march of the Red Army or as in the case in Shansi Piovince). Chapter 11. * It has been estimated that the Reds actually marched about 6. On occasion. While Route Army is a regular army. They themselves have no rear. its North is essentially guerrilla in nature. fronts. Because an orthodox army has rear installations (except in some special cases as during the 10. 53 .

exhaust as such. If we consider both types of warfare guerrilla single subject. which.Mao Tse-tung on Gu-mills Warfare the precise out guerrilla temporary identity necessary orthodox temporarily Likewise. activities Japan. to Imperial perishing. While they may be compared him. they not only lines but often found it of the fact that in the situation. that they will find that their victim is not only exhausted It is for this very reason are a source of constant orthodox mental it is improper with guerrilla it is equally improper to consider that there is a do exist. may to do so. and as they grow and attain practically guerrilla While operations. ultimately selves as unendurable as a group devils. We exaggerate 54 mobile operations war. to confuse proportions. employ the tactics of orthodox these units function innumerable gnats. these orthodox Chiang’s instruccarry their tions to the effect that independent brigades units would retained In spite of such and after the fall of Feng Ling Tu. of Generalissimo should be recalled. This armies may. mobile war. While differences ities appear under certain conditions. when operating to into regular as guerrillas. function guerrilla develop is an example to changes formed units were able to fight along orthodox due units as guerrillas. we fall into this error: of guerrillas . from the people and. gradually character operations activities. They gigantic make and by biting a giant both in front themhateful but our worry of cruel and in rear. similarand this fact must be clearly the relationship as a warfare and with the minimize chasm between appreciated between the two. if we wish to establish or if we confuse of orthodox the function the two.

“Guerrilla strategy of a people seeking is the primary itself. a result the failure The concept that guerrilla regular that guerrilla activities is an end in itself and forces is incorrect.” we may certainly warfare on a victory to be gained by the regular of the anti-Japanese can be divorced from beginning armies over the enemy. who believes that “Guerrilla strategy is the only strategy possible for an oppn?ssed people. strategy if the theory that guerrilla actually we would be divided would decline. would be weakened. us take advantage be led to assume discharge varying opinions sibilities they to turn them to their own uses to undernot successfully us. “Let us transand do not place expect to see as war of resistance. What these zealous friends niche. If we agree with warfare to emancipate Chang Tso war Hua.” we are exaggerating the importance of guerrilla operations hostilities. . If we assume that guerrilla fare does not progress elementary guerrilla hostilities forms. we have failed to recognize can. the important guerrilla function of coordinating activities only with the regular were forces would applied. we cannot I have just quoted them do not realize is into their proper Then. In the meantime. who says. not of our responand that this: If we do not fit guerrilla promote only would mine those who oppose would realistically. warfare regular in purpose.Yu Chi Chan (Guen-illu Warfare) that of the regular armies. guerrilla hostilities form the regular our first reliance If we say. under the fact that develop 55 specific conditions. from those of the warits to end beyond forces into guerrillas. be neglected. but guerrillas could sllo~lld properly be carried out by orthodox forces.” or with Kao Kang. is our forces and the Furthermore.

They say. parHowbecause its paramount time and temporarily rear is concerned. These people will not admit the fundamental sity for guerrilla bands that spring from the armed people. forces have guerrilla forces and development and their proper combinations. their under to the status of the former. develop forces are of primary it is they who are alone capable of producing assists them in producing forces and may under the latter regular may. but isolates it.” This theory is a mistaken one and would lead to the abolition of the people’s guerrilla war. the existence Equally the purely of guerrilla war. “Only the regular forces are capable of conducting guerrilla operations.Mao Tse-tung on Gawrrilla Warfare An opinion that admits of such war. if we view the war as a whole. operate both conditions. respective 56 warfare Orthodox as guerrillas. and other corrupt used as a screen in bribery tices. operations ticularly conception effort of the relationship and that of the that exists beregular forces is guerrilla during insofar We believe it can be stated this way: “Guerrilla the anti-Japanese become as the enemy’s war may for a certain feature. is the concept This opinion corrupt their rilla war on the ground that war has no other aspects than expressed phenomena behind which of some certain those who have seen the guerrilla regimes. is one that that condemns is often does not properly estimate the potentialities dangerous orthodox. observed have seen them persons have indulged lack of discipline. certain the decision. guerby and pracneces- and assume orthodox characteristics.” . A proper tween essential. importance. ever. this favorable conditions certain own However. there can be no doubt that our regular Guerrilla decision.

hostilities. it is equally evident it is true true that after the For mobile war often becomes may be reversed. must be mobility. assign it the primary orthodox forces. The possibility of more have been raised. we of the war. will become each form may combine prevailing example. of equipment in a general strategical counterattack to recapture key cities and lines of communication. as a necessary we must neither as conducted by warfare strategical auxiliary to orthodox operations. we may say that general element exists that the principal the war of position. Both ~f these are asIt is true that on the positional. the point must again be made that our fundamental strategical form must be the war of movement. standards with the other. position stitute it for mobile and positional warfare in our war strategy nor sub- 57 . times combine sisted by general battlefield that this situation such combination the war of movement. In sum. However. cannot arrive at the victorious while we must promote solution guerrilla If we deny this. it would be normal to use Loth mobile and positional methods.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfar-e) To clarify the relationship orthodox agreement war and guerrilla With guerrilla between the mobile aspect of of our strategy we may at war.

. have their points their peculiar their varying proc- esses and conclusions. 1812. recognize the necessity for guerconfirm them in confidence of course of swallowing head of a great army infantry. From of wars and opprespossibilities. At that time. experience help the fighting Chinese rilla warfare and should .ultimate victory. totaling several Napoleon. the Frenchman all of Europe. the experience What China and we must respect and profit by gained durof of those whose blood was shed in them. it has great fought by every class of men against invaders sors. Under The difference. it has been a feature conditions. Our only gained should from the several conflicts that have been carried on against us by foreign imperialisms. hundred in the thousand Russia was invaded Russia at the ln September. many guerrilla wars in history characteristics. and artillery. 58 cavalry. of days.3 GUERRILLA WARFARE IN HISTORY ihe earliest G UERRILLA WARFARE is neither China nor peculiar historical suitable a product of to the present day. wars waged hostilities But by the peasants that a pity it is that the priceless experience cannot be marshaled today to guide has been that ing the several hundred experience in guerrilla us.

the function the regular extremely country was almost entirely captured many officers. in their operations and arms was insufficient. and rifles. were forced and fight a in the rear of the army 59 in occupied real war. of organized sians formed nine guerrilla men each. the Russian Soviets. the operations. blocked the way and. In Siberia and Alashan. guerrilla and the supply of equiPIf we use the Russian ‘the fist and the saying. in combination Russian guerrillas troops. Though various factors. carried French on partisan Army. men.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) weak and her ill-prepared most important on guerrilla of Cossack cavalry army was not concentrated. it was a case of a battle between ax’ “ (Ivanov). At times. rear. anand defeating cold and starving. After giving up Moscow. of peasants The phase of her strategy and detachments was the use made to carry the Ruspeasants. . and the guerrillas cannon. From 1918 to 1920. because of the opposition internal to organize and intervention themselves of foreign imperialisms territories and the disturbances of White Russian groups. “The corrupt and poorly organized that was Russia defeated and destroyed an army and won the war guerrilla groups her ability to organize led by the most famous soldier of Europe in spite of the fact that were hindered ment regimes was not fully developed. These. carried out counterthem. When with warfare divisions of iibout five hundred and continually harassed and vast groups the French regular Army was withdrawing. pursuing attacks on the French The army of the heroic Napoleon nihilated. and depended army. the victory was the result of largely on the activities of of the partisan groups was important.

These not only disrupted and destroyed the communications in the enemy’s rear but also frequently occasion. doctrine were quick and principal to oppose those who con- it. The old men organized into propaganda groups known as “silver-haired units”. These. Kolchak. and the Poles. Experience tells us that “orthodox power. there was a suitable guerrilla activity for the middle aged.B. of and lVatw-e of Gu. guerrilla the fundamental to them and assist in the accomplishment Many of the guerrilla until in battle mission assigned the regular War in Russia). of extreme amlies are units are of the who carried although warfare.–S.G.erriL!u Action). troops from the im- not only guerrilla” manpower but he found himself of guerrillas there in strength. to cope with the time had only groups aged. guerrilla demned secondary Among the leaders were determined on general they political opposed work among the for the Communists the people. the young men formed combat units. Denikin. destroyed been defeated On one by regular a retreating Army that had previously Red forces. owing to the necessity of staving off the attacks of guerrillas. and there were even groups children. there were many Red Russian guerrillas. 60 . were front. development thousands the stage where were detached micldle themselves young. 48 n.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare of the traitor Denikin and in the rear of the Poles. White the guerrillas prevented completely his advance.” forces” (Lessons of the Civil regimes in Russia they were able to dis- gradually developed “ See p. “Thus poverished ever-moving The reached several forced to withdraw was the (The regular enemy’s unable at that old. the Japanese.

and of the lost their war against Italy.000 that period. with the result that they were unable In addition Even small and sparsely populated to this. was never a combination large-scale adopted the AbYssinians fense. fastly continued.000 During operations a mechanized force of 400. passive deto defeat the is a was con- of mobile warfare. activities In 1841 and 1842. from seven months in 1935 and 1936. ing 140. the English. of movement Ultimately. guerrilla again from 1850 to 1864. and casualties been Had this policy sions when a war of movement several cities were retaken were inflicted. scale guerrilla Moreover. relatively tributory. it would have been difhcult to have named At the present time. winner. when brave people from San Yuan Li fought Taiping Uprising. there were several occawas combined with largetotalsteadto strike the Italians heavy blows. the fact that Abyssinia country in spite of the fact that were not modern. guerrilla and if the internal an extension of such activities quesis political in Abyssinia. the Abyssinians political reasons’ that there were disparty. The cause of defeat–aside the most important sentient unstable war political groups. The army of the famous General During Galen was entirely derived from guerrillas. in the Boxer to a remarkable 61 . be solved. There with no strong government policy—was the failure to adopt a positive policy guerrilla a purely operations. War. during tactics were employed the and for a third time in 1899. Italian the Abyssinian she was able for Army and its equipment to withstand seven months. the ultimate continue tions can probable.Yu Chi Chan (Gwen-ilk charge functions of organized Warfare) regulars. Italians.

who were armed with weapons inferior to those of their opponents. the Chinese most continually At the very and employed beginning. regimes were developed their efforts with for the forces. was adopted. haps there was a lack of coordination. the the Taiping and operations most extensive exhausted troops were often completely and forced of guerwere not or per- to flee for their lives. From 1927 to 1936. new guerrilla regimes a wide area. there were no guiding rilla action. when Ch’ing Particularly guerrilla was this so during were Warfare War. These those of the regular and from guerrilla into regular coordinated armies. They developed 62 . This policy accounted many victories gained by guerrilla troops relatively few in number. a positive Red Army fought policy alguerrilla tactics constantly.Mao Tse-twzg on Guerrilla degree. Perhaps these guerrilla with regular carried out in conjunction victory guerrilla was not gained principles hostilities operations. combined guerrilla both strategically The leaders of that They period properly primarily operations and tactically. Reds were able to develop armies fought. activity but rather But the fact that of any lack in of was not because because of the interference of conquering politics in military affairs. They stressed the correct basis for both political affairs and military operations. Experience ence is not given to the question shows that if precedthe enemy in both political and military affairs. and if regular hostilities are not conducted with tenacity. the As these over Many bases were established. with a war of movement depended upon alertness. guerrilla operations alone cannot produce final victory. In these wars. bands.

anti-Japanese in all three provinces.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla their guerrilla mined Warfare) bands into trained innumerable units. They then deterwhich upon a ten-year period of resistance difficulties during time they overcame lately reached and have only in the anti- their goal of direct participation Japanese war.in In Chi Lin. constantly and Ssu Ping Wei established Heilungkiang. from September 18. Principal among them is the fact that guer- rilla success largely depends upon powerful who work unceasingly to bring about internal unification. strong anti-Japanese guerrilla campaigns were opened in each of the three northeast provinces. Chu Army were led by Wang Te Lin and Lu and others 63 . SLlcb leaders must work with the people. the National In Feng Tien. exploded years. and in spite of the fact that her armies have occupied the land and oppressed the people for the last seven periods. There is no doubt that’the internal unification of China is now a permanent and definite fact and that the experience gained during our internal imperialism. to January. an anti-Japanese regime . cruelties Guerrilla activity persists there in spite of the at the exand deceits practiced by the Japanese pense of the people. 1931. they must have a correct conception of the policy to be adopted as regards both the people and the enemy. After September 18. struggles to us are There has proved many to be both necessary against Japanese and advantageous in the struggle valuable lessons we can learn from the experience political leaders of those years. 1931. which extended 1933. The struggle can be divided guerrilla Ma Chan Salvation irito two activity Shari Army During the first. Li Tu and the Self-Defense respectively.

and. the harassed the Japanese because there was an indefinite leadership. for the Japanese month. finally. proper political result and to work with the people. and local importance there are still some weak points. For instance: defense policy has not been sufficiently developed. improved. improper commancl and army. Communists educated in the anti-Japanese war. portant guerrilla the second period. failure to coordinate operations to delegate whole unified. . failure functions to the was feeble. at the same time. The influence political military of these forces unceasingly. During January. but goal. and because of guerrilla or eight platoons after of the fine work of the volunteer the people and in the northeast.Mao ‘Tse-tung on Gt{errilla Warfare commanded was great. a Nationalist are not merely of transient contribute kIowever. and its strength was not the camby our from of organization As a direct of these conditions. the situation by the enemy has greatly have deof the have This has come about because great numbers because of the participation units. cided Chinese finally warfare. Such but directly revolution victory. paigns failed and the troops were finally defeated which has extended 1933. inspire These and their activities make it necessary month and undermine activities units hamper the Japanese their control in the northeast. and powerful regiments to the meaning Already it has again become an imseven of independent after them influence. The guerrillas people who have been oppressed to resist him. and a number to send troops have been formed. guerrilla They units. enemy. National 64 to our ultimate while. they in Korea. to the present time.

We campaigns being waged Historical in China present must point out that the guerrilla Their influence today are a page in history that has no precedent. in spite of the cruelty of the Japanese extinguish provinces.participation organization of the people is not general. internal political is still in its primary stages. all these weaknesses will’ be overcome. if the present anti-Japanese guerrilla activities in the they cannot three northeastern The guerrilla tionary necessa~. experiences such of China and of other counnatural and prove that in a war of revoluare possible. and the force the Japanese and the puppet policy governments is continued ExperiBut if present used to attack tenaciously. such hostilities must expand tremendously. is not yet sufficient. will not be confined solely to China in her war but will be world-wide. experience is written in iron and blood. proportions and people. nature They tries that have been outlined prove that hostilities war for the emancipation of the masses of the Chinese people is to gain ultimate victory. anti-Japanese 65 . ence proves that guerrilla the many methods war will develop to even greater they have devised to cheat the and that.

the strong Japanese During she had made comparative production bandit nation is an absoin the techniques of the course of her invasion of China. But in spite of this industrial progress. and her financial and insufficient to maintain to meet the situation a vast area. more extensively.4 CAN VICTORY BE ATTAINED BY GUERRILLA OPERATIONS? the war of resistance against Japan and the answer to the question of whether or not they can produce ultimate victory can be given only after investigation of all elements The of our own strength particulars of such a comparison and are comparison with those G UERRILLA HOSTILITIES are but one phase of of the enemy. and air force. navy. of the invading 66 . an absolute of inferior physical Her manpower. a feeling that is shared by the soldiers is not Japan’s army. materials. China by the junior officers and. Furthermore. she remains endowments. First. manifested Added resources are all inadequate her in protracted warfare or by a war prosecuted feeling over now presented to this is the antiwar by the Japanese people. industrial several. progress and in the development of excellence monarchy her raw and skill in her army. lute monarchy.

YIJ Chi Chan (Guerrilla only enemy. forces speedily at strategic communications. spare more as she must hold any other possible considerato a vast primary she cannot. it will be most difficult for Japan the strain. If we can holcl out for three years. and fight in a number tact. she will be able at will to concentrate units in decisive battle. The cities as most inlbe in- for her are that her rear be stable to wage war over a vast She cannot of places. It is for these reasons 67 . than a million men for this purpose. Their speedy tions. for use against bandits Because of these importaqt in a protracted can hope neither struggle nor to conquer be one of lightning war and or more decision. her own insufficient finances. the invading strategy Japanese must Warfare) to employ her entire strength at most. and to augment it is not to her to forgo these benefits. in excess of that number opponents. nor to be forced to dis- sipate her energies in a type of warfare in which the gains will not compensate for the losses. Certainly. and and that her lines of communication lines of communication. nese objective is to profit from the industries. In the war. be victorious area. Japan is unable in the attack on China. the Japanese lines of communication routes for the transport portant considerations and peaceful brigands to bear up under must depend upon linking the principal of war materials. It is not to her advantage area with disrupted disperse her strength her greatest ruption powerful organized manpower advantage fears are thus eruptions in her rear and disIf she can maintain points to engage important them our Japa- of her lines of communication. Another in captured areas and with strength.

and Anhwei has absolutely China country backward. country facilities a country established is a country that This the truth of this assertion. change Thus will become of his forces and dissipation in the relative position the time will come when evident a gradual ourselves and our enemy. in many at once. We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal his strength. they all favor the application The establishment the anti-Japanese bases behind mobile warfare and guerrilla enemy’s places lines will force him to fight unceasingly expends people. He thus endlessly We must unite the strength we must strike of the army with that of the spots in the enemy’s of of the weak flanks. both to his front and his rear. his resources. in his front. favor a protracted of innumerable war. it is a is politically. and when that day comes. in his rear. half colonial and half feudal. Experience in the five northern provinces as well as in Kiangsu. Chekiang. is great. operations. and the of these factors is an inescapable the terrain with great resources in which for communication and tremendous is complicated All are poor. it is unorganized. economically It is a vast population. militarily. it will be the beginning Although The 68 of our ultimate victory over the Japanese. . and conclusion.Mao Tse-tung that guerrilla territory warfare conducted on Guerrilla Warfare in each bit of conquered over a wide area will be a heavy blow struck at the Japanese bandits. invaded our country not China’s population bandits have This is a weakness Japanese which must be taken into account.

the unor’ toward the goal of pro- great energy. China Abyssinia. the rapprochement Nationalists war front has laid the foundation that is constantly being for an anti-Japanese and ex- panded. For this comwithout rapacious. we shall still gain final victory. what enemy can we not conquer and who can say that ultimate victory will not be ours? The Japanese are waging a barbaric war along uncivi- lized lines. pelling murderous which is the extinction reason. are waiting to be used. iNot only must those behind in every part of the country. Japanese of all classes oppose tllc po]icics of their governnlent. The standards of literacy among the masses have been raised.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla merely to conquer and territory Warfare] but to carry out the violent. policy of their government. It is not like today is at the point of her greatest hisof Communists strengthened and torical progless. and people are all working with resources and the economic nation. the raw-material of the nation ganized people is becoming an organized These energies must be directed tracted war so that should the Japanese occupy much of our territory or even most of it. government. they would prefer and death traitors who accept the slavery arc many. regard to race. strength army. Japanese as fathers oath that have taken our lines organize The for resistterritory those who to abject ance but also those who live in Japanese-occupied are few in number. For that reason. as do vast international 69 . China today is not the China of old. of the Chinese we must unite the nation to parties or classes and follow our policy of resistance the end. If wc resist with this spirit.

we have sympathy most important reason why Japan will lose and China will war of resistance facts. our countrymen countries. This is perhaps to oppose the invader. and that guerrilla our regular forces will produce rilla hostilities.wzg on Guerrilla Warfare groups. because China’s cause is righteous. win. The will be in accord correlated with these of operations with those of to guerincluding of all classes and parties are united. in many foreign the even Japan itself.Mao Tse+. On the other hand. victory is the conviction the many patriots who devote their entire strength 70 . The progress Chinese people guerrilla of the war for the emancipation of the will be in accord with these facts.

b) From regular army units temporarily purpose. not know in what GUERRILLA UNITS ARE ORIGINALLY FORMED unit may originate in any one of the following a) From the masses of the people. 2. c) From regular army units permanently detailed for the detailed. they can arrive at no sound decisions. they are questions those who have had no experience stand and on which indeed. 4. These are: bands formed? of arming guerrillfi band? thk are guerrilla How are guerrilla elements bands organized? bands? constitute pertaining in guerrilla a guerrilla me the methods are all questions to the organization which of armed guerrilla units.3 ORGANIZATION FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE F 1. 71 . What What OUR POINTS MUST BE CONSIDERED under subject. How The ways: they would hostilities do not undermanner to begin. These How 3.

movements. where masses (relying upon is not determined of the people its officers have and their sincere desire to resist Japan and succor the country) the people to resist. and those without in Shansi. units are organized. and thus a gtterrilla unit begins.Mao Tse+urzg on Guerrilla d) From the combination unit recruited f) e) From the local militia. the guerrilla the people. who are willing to exert themselves Chekiang. and they respond. last drop Chahar. employed. Upon the arrival army to oppress and slaughter to resist. all these sources will be unit is formed from the people. Orders have already been issued throughout ple to form guerrilla other such where combat. guerrilla of this kind. This is the fundamental of the enemy most valorous their leaders call upon elements. them type. blood. . professional of their fall upon the shoulders other educators. leaders If the local governments they the local government all fled. Kiangsu. no doubt. artisans. men. They arm them the nation with old rifles or bird that call upon the peoand for and aid In some or the call many of a among approve guns. 72 fixed profession. professors. local to the Hopeh. soldiery. In circumstances usually Thus. From deserters of a regular Warfare army unit and a from the people. from the ranks of the enemy. Anhwei. Shantung. the on the sympathy places. and bandit groups. Recently. the duties of leadership young students. g) From former bandits In the present hostilities. units both for local defense cannot fail to prosper. assemble the In the first case above. teachers. Suiyuan.

army may.” student”. extensive guerrilla hostilities have broken out.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) and other provinces. The second type of guerrilla ized from small detached commenced. You must have courage. who organize guerrilla from themselves. since hostilities many groups have been temporarily A regiment warrant. when you are organized. divisions. hostilities are the university times valiantly of war. form a guerrilla company. The amount of such activity is the best proof of the foreThe more such bands there are. which. of the regular detached from armies. if for the 73 circumstances be dispersed into groups . For example. is no profound but not military difference and the soldier. soldiers who will not be your peers. All these are organized and led by patriots. the farmer “I can discuss literature There This is incorrect. When military units. and if you have education. and brigades and have been assigned duties. several you take your arms in hand. the better be. of guerrilla should be squads. is so much the better. of guerrilla warfi~re units the fountainhead is in the masses of the people. simply leave your farms and become soldiers. Each district. will the situation able to organize a great number when assembled. and after and aggressively. That you are farmers is of no difference. There are those who say: “I am a farmer. you become you become soldiers. Guerrilla you have fought well-known Without directly you may become a leader of troops. or.” You that between going statement. each county. guerrilla units unit is that which is organ- of the regular forces temporarily for the purpose. and there will be many regular question. “I am a arts.

Second. 74 area. assigned guerrilla duties. to the organization after the departure As the guerrilla status of regular their leaders must lend all possible support of guerrilla units from among the people. there is the Eighth as an army. it is divided on guerrilla coordination hostilities.. regular of guerrilla of regular Historical hostilities with regular can be develshows us that the hardships The leaders must be oped on a grand scale. in guerrilla operations extremely adaptable. that they hold together of reguof the regulars. of this. Warfare puTose Excluding of carrying on guerrilla As an example China. in North the periods when it carries on mobile operations into its elements and these carry unit is essensituations. Along units from the Eighth Route Army have . discipline. is but temporary. in mobile-warfare is necessary.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla operations. Its post is somewhere in the rear of the enemy. and the employment of stratagems are all of the units utmost importance. They must study the methods of guerrilla war. we may take the Wu Tai Shari district in the heart of the Hopeh-Chahar-Shansi these provinces. and there it becomes the backbone of guerrilla organization. As an example of this type of organizathe borders of tion. the operations This type of guerrilla activities tial for two reasons. until guerrilla missions but regulars. there is no one to carry out guerrilla experience army units are not able to undergo campaigning units engaged over long periods. This These units must be so disciplined The third type of unit consists of a detachment lars who are permanently type of small detachment does not have to be prepared to rejoin the regular forces. of guerrilla Route Army. First. They must understand that initiative.

In every North has been used. unit. this is one feature be neglected. the to obey this mandate. a platoon. In the Wu Tai Shari area. it becomes the core of the applied. in miliwhich is placed at the disposal of the local If a small group experienced affairs is sent. conduct If. operations operations in the enemy’s in the Shanghaiof regular forces. guerrilla commander. The government has issued a mandate to depart county. many detachments have been organized and the area of guerrilla activity greatly expanded. forces may dispatch a squad. methods militia. As an example of this. These several methods are all excellent. some units are left behind. we have the guerrilla bands now their independent area in spite of the withdrawal The fourth type of organization is the result of a merger between small regular detachments and local guerrilla units.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla established a framework Warfare) for guerrilla operations. the intensity of guerrilla warfare tary and political local guerrilla and if properly can be extended. at the time guerrilla the regular from a certain area. cannot withdraw there is a possibility this system should of cutting be us?d. Around these small cores. They 75 chief of police are all required . The officer in command of the the commander of the peace-preservation unit. The regular or a company. to the effect that the people are not from war areas. In areas in which of supply. these should continuing Woosung rear. each of these above is formed from the local home guards. there are now many of these groups. from police and The fifth type mentioned China province. and they should be formed in every locality. the enemy’s lines Severing enemy that forces supply routes destroys his life line.

The concord of the leaders and the assent of the men must be gained. differences Many bandit groups to them. . in their ranks. must be carried out with utmost vigor lest the enemy use such bands to his own advantage. correct their political beliefs to convert In spite of inescapable types of guerrilla great mountain a vast sea of guerrillas. guerrilla militarily. they must be received into our ranks and organized. the rivers and seas are deep because they absorb the waters of small streams. built politically and reorganized been accomplished.” ment and organization every source action will increase of guerrillas of every type and from is something the potentialities war. it may be said that political work among them is of the utmost importance. and the units reOnce this has units. pose as anti-Japanese guerrillas. is that formed although difand brigands. they become successful In regard to this type of unit. This in the anti-Japanese patriots will not neglect. ficult. it is possible to unite them to form The ancients because it does not scorn the merest handAttention paid to the enlistof guerrilla that ful of dirt. “Tai Shari is a and it is only necessary bands. from troops that ‘(traitor troops” Chinese The sixth type of unit is that organized come over from the enemy—the employed disaffection ganda by the Japanese. and foment It is always possible to produce mutinies among such troops. and we must increase our propa- efforts Immediately after mutinying.Mao Tse-tting cannot stations retreat on Guerrilla Warfare at their with their forces but must remain and resist. The seventh type of guerrilla from bands of bandits organization This. in the fundamental said.

Even among those who have military there are some who know nothing they are lacking The subject because in that particular of experience.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla War-fare] THE METHOD OF ORGANIZING GUERRILLA REGIMES Many activities of military knowledge. there and political the necessary pointed. both military headquarters. officers. the aides. the supply are controlled with acts in accordance organization. orders the political headquarters. areas are subdivided with local geography. geographical comfjanies divisions. This area may comIt must be subdivided formed to accord or battalions prise many counties. are apcommander Under all guerrilla of such organization. . The locally. military in accordance and the state of guerrilla development. cxamp]e to the organization activities of specific units the area where we may take a and individual with the sub these. and the meclical perby the chief from the commander. who In staff. sonnel.” a military are appointed. Control of these is vested in the political chairmen. as well as for students affairs. To this “military commissioners area. In the military These will be the of staff. area in the enemy’s rear. regimes of those who decide do not know to participate in guerrilla For the methods of organization. ol%cers. there are bureaus of propaganda people’s mass movements. the matter whq have no knowledge is a problem of guerrilla type of such of organization that requires solution. and political. such people. but includes As an of the organization within regimes is not confined the regime functions. and miscellaneous into smaller districts the enemy situation Each 77 of affairs.

should be organ- ized in each area and district. in each county. Although correspond functionaries guerrilla harmonize committee with are organized.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare these smaller divisions within the area is a district. In each county. units in order to take advantage 78 of their manpower. Tasks are assigned troops availof the number of guerrilla the names of the officers in the “district” “area. Regular combatant into one of three general three types of unit. The The is the small unit. a military commander and several political commissioners are appointed. unit should be organized belongs to the county in wllicb it was organWhile in areas other with local their it must operate in conjunction ized. . troops that come from different military operations of from seven to nine members This and local political committee. the battalion fundamentally than its own. bers of which are selected by the troops and the local political officers. All the people in an area should arm themselves organized bat group.” the number assigned in the former case should be reduced to handle and to affairs. the other a self-defense and be into two groups. In order to unify control. to those in the larger to the least possible. military and political headquarters in accordance able. Under their direction. to six units may be organized. each of which may consist of from two to six counties. the platoon or company. To each district. a the memsources. One of these groups is a comunit with but limited guerrillas are organized first of these second While type is the unit military quality. One such of from two to four companies. should function as a forum for the discussion of both military and political matters. it may operate in other counties.

assistant signed work. swords. leader. it is aspropaganda the officer to carry on political may have about ten rifles. not deprive should be superior.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) knowledge information of local terrain of the enemy. Two to four This. 79 . A squad. which consists of from two to four of the above-mentioned battalion units. Two to four of such units form a company. such squads form a platoon. and big which. of organizaof from unit. spears. a ‘guerrilla brigade of from two to four regiments tion. with remainder of its weapons being bird guns. The battalion and its personnel from company units entirely of the areas in which organized is formed unit must be more thoroughly than the smaller units. regular guerrilla dispersed over it. too. has a leader and an acting independently. like the platoon. leader. If. has a strength Each of the units has its own peculiarities nine to eleven men. and their The third type is the guerrilla regiment. the smallest may be formed. a political The platoon and when the leader and the assistant with rifles of local Its arms may be from two to five Western-style men armed bi~d guns. there is a peace-preservation the militia. If sufhcient manpower is available. or big swords. If a battalion units. in a corps. a branch units should not be small area. or police. All these units are under commanders the direct super- vision of the military they operate. and local customs. ofhcer. lances. and a an assistant leader. political has a leader. with the remaining manufacture. it should and better equipped Its discipline subordinate of of their manpower and their arms. including rifles.

the basis of which is voluntary service. they must both military arresting suppression and harass combatant procure arms. these units. in the tables. These to the regiment. panies. securing information traitors.–S. carriers to take food to the troops. responsibilities of the enemy. him. and three battalions form a brigade.G. preventing armed enemy propaganda. to certain have areas to deceive. other functions. of a guerrillaweapons hinder. Thus. and comfort missions to provide q See Appendix. three platoons per company. As a first step.Mao Tse-twzg on Guerrilla Warfare The guerrilla unit next in size to the battalion is the regiment. In an independent guerrilla regiment. In North lished. there may be ten men per squad. * All the people of both sexes from the ages of sixteen to forty-five must be organized into anti-Japanese self-defense units. the They with what units there are. All these units from the lowest to the highest batant guerrilla units and receive their supplies central government. When dissemination the enemy launches drive. of from two to four comare comfrom the are shown of such regiments a Each of these units has a commander. three companies per battalion. cavalry units should be estab China. self-defense furnish stretcher-bearers to transport the wounded. This must be under more severe discipline than the battalion. and a political guerrilla may be regiments Two oficer. three squads per platoon. are assigned guerrillas. 80 . or battalions.B. vice-commander. They assist the Details of their organization are: local sentry duties. then they must Their the be given and political and training.

the government is only a knife. for the orthodox and Suiyuan. system was. have been of some help. Thus the people the traitors canthe peace of to assist the step in not hide nor can bandits and robbers disturb will continue and supply manpower of self-defense of universal to our re~ular armies. Each member of these groups must have lance. are in their native towns. therefore. and when a weapon even if the weapon necessity are they ordered this is done. ‘(The is a transitional forces. locality. cooperation negligible. 81 organize within themselves a small guerrilla to leave its native group of perhaps from three to ten men armed with pistols This group is not required . and which their effect the people was thus not gained. Honan. widespread. these~lf-defense units should or revolvers. a pistol. reservoirs of manpower Shensi. of supplanted by the new-type of the members of these them- organizations. They have been such organizations were formed tions in di{Eerent provinces of educating However. a must support them.Yt4 Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) the troops with tea and rice.” for some time in The youth organizafor the purpose of conscription. or a spear. they support selves. In all places where the enemy operates. and the confidence organizations was almost These were they were not voluntary. Such units are units the development There Shansi. voluntary are organized When on the principles the members and non separation from their native organizations localities. not This the young. guerrillas organization unit as we have described. If a locality can organize such a self-defense the people. Only in case of military to remote places.

standard it must of equipthe that guerrillas are lightly armed attack groups. The organization of such areas and districts is shown in Table 6. this table. keeping order in the rear. of duties assigned. Equipment “ Unfortunately. in China.B. equipment of low-class guerrilla units is not as good as that of higher-class units. was omitted from the edition of Yu Chi Chan available to me. 82 . but must be based on what cannot be furnished is for their use.+ anti-Japanese to establish military organization a system of military important. as well as Table 6. it will be The organization army similar to that we have mentioned of a self-defense is shown in Table In order to control as a whole. untarily.G. to cooperate We must not force them. for if we do. The equipment of guerrillas cannot be based on what the guerrillas want. For example. those who are as- signed the task of destroying railroads are better-equipped than those who do not have that task. EQUIPMENT OF GUERRILLAS In regard to the problem of guerrilla be understood which ment require is based simple equipment. ineffectual. upon the nature The equipment. and replenishing the ranks of the regulars.—S.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla self-defense Warfare units is menfor the and politbe organvol- The puToses organization of inculcating of these tioned in this book because such units are useful the people with military These groups should ical knowledge.” ized not only in the active war zones but in every province “The people must be inspired This is extremely 5. it is necessary areas and districts along the lines we have indicated. or even what available they need.

The question ply. materials. we will capture be established hand In this respect. bridges. with of equipment includes the collection. it is necessary to gather tounit of railway trackage. Guerrilla at the time the unit in the people are spears. ammunition. furnished Other for propaganda is established. and stations materials. transport successful ment by capturing companies attack. elementary are added and as many newAfter a period type rifles as are available 0( resistance. distribution.Yu Chi Chan (Guen-illu War(are) immediately but must be acquired gradually. particularly this problem pistols. communication is most difficult. and facilities and ambe solved big work. the for in any transport. weapons swords. it is possible to increase the supply of equipit from the enemy. bayonets. supand replacement of weapons. These are points to be kept in mind. too much on an armory. munition eventually. each man shall have at least two summer-weight two hats. territory. are distributed. in each regiment. but ‘of weapons can bird always guns. blankets. must not depend and repair of rifles and for the grenades. and land mines and mortars of local manufacture. disare the easiest to equip. bancls that originate Ievolvers. requirements. the enemy’s An armory should production Guerrillas in each guerrilla and trict for the manufacture of cartridges. The supply transport. The enemy is the principal For destruction in enemy-controlled gether demolition preparation must be organized As for minimum one suit of winter source of their supply. clothing clothing. a pair of wrap put 83 . Troops must be trained and a demolition in the and use of demolitions. these are that uniforms.

all the clothing be furnished stationed confiscate clothing in each guer- mentioned These men representatives of the government traitors or ask contributions them. and at bases in par- army in general. they must. Comup should be and staffs of units from companies a riding animal each. . and a blanket. In subordinate Telephone from those best able to afford are unnecessary. in If Western medicines China for some portion depend are not available. two officers will have to share a horse. is more vital in North than in the south. each man must have an overfor it is forbidden captors to take clothing high morale equipment district. This material the regular In the guerrilla forces and by capture from the enemy. Small guerrilla units need no animals. but regiments manders furnished nature 84 and brigades will find them necessary. In the north. but all units from regiment both. coat. with from is not necessary in lower up are equipped by contributions groups. In order to by the from forces. the enemy. medicines must be procured.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare tees. from their prisoners. uniforms and radio equipment can be obtained groups. in guerrilla should may we cannot depend or on for a bag for food. general. there must be a high standard of medical equipment. for in the south all that are necessary are mules and horses. Although guerrillas can depend on the enemy supplies. Besides the services of the doctors. At times. The problem of their medical upon contributions. In acquiring captures maintain and rilla made from Each man must have a haversack this clothing. ticular. Officers whose duties are of minor do not have to be mounted. lccal medicines of transport must be made to suffice.

it is necessary and military of guerri]la maps. An these things. of the guergroup fights in a protracted men whose qualibe b~ave and positive rilla army. the headquarters officers of tile varito get for oLls war zones sl]oLlld do their best to supply the guerrillas they actually I-Iowever. Every large unit should have a printing press and a mime~ graph stone. An officer should have the following ties: great powers of endurance .Yu Clai Clzan (Gwen-ills Warfare) Propaganda guerrilla materials are very important. there this should be a printing press or a lead-type press. effect will be to weaken ELEMENTS OF THE GUERRILLA ARMY The term “element” refers to the personnel. listed above. They must also have paper on which to print propaganda leaflets and notices. equipment guerrillas it must that guerrilla will in the main depend If they depend on the efforts of the on higher officers too the guer- much. the psychological rilla spirit of resistance. compasses. They mirst be supplied with chalk and large brushes. For the purpose of printing training material is of the greatest importance. entire its officers must loyalty as used in the title to this section both officers and men. instructions. themselves. In addition accomplished to the equipment guerrilla to have field glasses. war. In ‘guerrilla areas. hostilities of the National- group will acquire Because of the proved importance in the anti-Japanese ist Government with what and tile colnmanding war. need and are unable be repeated themselves. Since each guerrilla is dedicated to the cause of emancipation so that in spite of any 85 of the people.

his spirit and that of the men must be one in strengthening the policy of resistance to the Japanese. that should receive The officers in a group should be inthe group is organized. his social condition but only men bear the hardships war. natural qualif it is loyalty to the idea of people’s emanthe others will develop. it is this quality attention. that every guerrilla of such qualities. group with officers enduring I do not mean group can have. with nothing If this is present. particular habitants civilians. not present. It is a mistake to impress people into service. As long as a person is willing to fight. ity is that of complete cipation. at its inception. 86 or position is no consideration. can be no disagreements officers native to one place and those from other localities. When officers are first selected from a group.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare hardship he sets an example to his men and is a model for them. an ofEcer mabetween effort must be made to train and educate the people so these and the potential terial increased. can be done. and determined can in a protracted who are courageous of guerrilla campaigning . officers so chosen would there If in any locality men of sufficiently high qualifications qualities may be developed There to become officers. which can be developed The most important The officers must be men naturally dowed with good qualities the course of campaigning. he must study tactics. he must be able to mix easily with the people. of the locality in which relations In addition. A guerrilla group ought to operate on the principle that only volunteers are acceptable for service. If he wishes to gain victories. them and the local be familiar are not enough between as this will facilitate conditions. A guerrilla officers of this caliber would be unbeatable.

out to those who have In all such cases.Yzt Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) breaks regulations must be dis- A soldier who habitually missed from the army. their reorientation or as groups. 87 . people who are lacking in conscience them to join the guerrillas them. thus arousing their hatred and detestation for traitors. patriotism and the soldiers in them. It is a fact that during and patriotism the purpose continually and induce of betraying educate Victory in ‘guerrilla the war the enemy war is conmay take for the membership pure and clean. This will prevent the success of traitors. the work of eliminating with dleir elimination Chinese nments and bandits traitors in the army begins goverbe from among the people. They should be well But care should be used during those whose idea is to to distinguish fight the Japanese from those who may be present for other reasons. meted influenced summon and expelled. If an officer is discovered to be a traitor. Vagabonds and vicious people must not be accepted for service. The traitors who are in the ranks must be discovered punishment been should and expulsion by them. some prudence must be used in the punishment adjudged. However. and inculcate therefore. ditioned advantage and a soldier who cannot upon keeping of certain break himself of the habit should be dismissed. Officers must. who have been converted should soldiers who have served under puppet welcomed as individuals treated and repatriated. the officers the soldiers and relate the facts to them. This procedure will serve as well as a warning to the other soldiers. The opium habit must be forbidden.

(3 THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE political 1 N CHAPTER 1. and if it is forgotten. activities Through depend them. One must not feel that he is anti- Japanese merely because he is a member of a guerrilla unit. I mentioned troops should goal of the struggle the fact that guerrilla of the organization have a precise conception and the political to be used in attaining that goal. political trination mitted of both idea of anti-Japanism. First of all. This means that both organization and discipline of guerrilla troops must be at a high level so that they can carry out the political that are the life of both the guerrilla tionary warfare. become shaken we may succumb to the temptations In a that the peoare likely to to understand or be overcome with discouragements. Without . those whose conviction is not deep rooted ple must be emancipated the general education 88 in their faith or actually that enables everyone revolt. upon leaders the indocwith the military and political activities armies and of revolu- the idea is trans- to the troops. The anti-Japanese idea must be an ever-present conviction. of the enemy war of long duration.

we will lack the soldiers objectives of imare some this war and of the anti-Japanese portan t for officers of guerrilla militarists minded only in the profession militarists exists between is a method front is particularly There who say: ‘(We are not interested in politics but that action military of arms. Military goal. ” It is vital that these simpleaffairs. The war that we are 89 .our goal of driving out Japanese ing a free and happy China. exist between of the political troops. zon’es and their national a concrete not only to guerrilla with the realizahas issued a for Organization cated to inhabitants consciousness awakened. to isolate one from the other. which should troops but to all those who are concerned goal. A study and comprehension organization. viction The political goal must imperialism and establishconindiof the soldiers fight without be clearly and precisely explanation and lose their determinant ion. of guerrilla Hence. The Sys&nz of National be widely distributed that should Kuomintang throughout guer- rilla zones. there is no doubt that it will be followed by an unprecedented epoch of peace. No matter how long this war may last. The vast majority beings have already pre- to fight a war that will bring justice to the oppressed peoples of the world. the political systems used is important tion of our political pamphlet entitled War. If we lack national the essential unity and t}le people. It is to be hoped pared or are preparing that the world of human it is impossible is in the last era of strife. While be made to realize the relationship politics and military used to attain a political affairs and political affairs are not identical.

This discipline ranks is not as severe as in the ranks because only when it is. like this is difficult for the simple-minded be carefully must exto grasp and it must therefore matters that be conactivities. the enemy. as applied to the people. spiritual the army. and. and we are fighting to establish will be a part of that new world order. as applied unification spiritual first. Guerrilla entitled in Anti-Japanese Warfare. to question of political These are political second. and. concrete in detail Political of officers and men within of the army and the people. The methods for achieving these unities are discussed in pamphlet Activities Number 4 of this series. there is unity of purpose as far as both officers and men are concerned. A revolutionary army must have discipline democratic that is estabobedi- lished on a limited basis. therefore. third. discipline in guerrilla forces. ence of the subordinates for guerrilla \Vith discipline to their superiors must be exacted. A conception militarist plained There sidered to him. second. is ineffective. as applied problems to the troops.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare fighting today for the emancipation happy. a discipline In any revolutionary army. the necessity is self-imposed. In all armies. are three under the additional broad activities. and. and liberal of the Chinese China that is a part of the war for the freedom the independent. is the soldier of orthodox must be self-imposed. 90 . discipline. for discipline Although exists. destruction of the unity of the enemy. but the basis conscience. last. of all human beings. The fundamental unification are: first. within such an army. must be the individual of compulsion This is true in the case of guerrilla guerrillas.

l-his within strength completely why he fights and why he becomes a tower of type of discipline the relationship the army. and vertical. A discipline self-imposed is the primary acteristic of a democratic system in the army. in such an army. man is truly harmonize and soldiers. A secondary liberties accorded characteristic is found officers and soldiers. Thus things. not only be tolerated liberty and propaganda must not differ Further. enjoy political but discussed. In any system where the relationship characterized that discipline exists between by indifference of the one to the other. ljut there must be equality of existence in accepting and dangers within we may attain of the ofhcer and soldier groups. for example. and this is particularly their men. for that is the only way in which they can gain from their men the admiration war. and it is the only type that can that exists between of%cers is externally officer and imposed. OKlcers should much. be encouraged. It is incorrect the hardships the unification both horizontal and confidence so vital in in all to that to hold to a theory of equality of war. The the idea that officers can physically beat or severely tongue-lash their men is a feudal conception feudal type will one and is not in accord with discipline. internal Discipline and unity of a self-imposed destroy of the fighting charof strength. the soldiers live under of the emancipation in the degree In a revolutionary and the quesmust too as of the people must army. 91 . the mode of livtrue in the case of guerrilla the same conditions ing of the officers and troops. all individuals tion.Yu Chi (Xan [Guerrilla Warfare) able to understand must obey. the group a unity itself.

There echelons. Be honest in your transactions. 92 . All actions are subject to command. Do not steal from the people. 3. It is only when such units can be said to be powerful is also a unity of spirit ihat should exist between The Eighth Route Army put Rules and the a code known as “The Three troops and local inhabitants. Replace what you break. Remarks: 1. 6. Do not bathe in the presence Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. Be neither selfish nor unjust. into practice Eight Remarks. from lower to higher unity is present that combat factors. 7. Be courteous. of women.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare is. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept. Replace the door when you leave the house. The Red Army adhered to this code for ten years and the Eighth Route Army and other units have since adopted it.B.” Rules: which we list here: 1. Return what you borrow. hlany people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy’s rear. 4. 2. 3. 8.G. Such a belief reveals lack of com- + In summer. doors were frequently lifted off and used as beds. –S. 5.* 2.

Yu Clzi Chan (Guerrilla prehension of the relationship Warfare) that should exist between the people and the troops. strengthen and by caring for those of his wounded If we fail in these respects. by treating It is only undisenemies the enemy and by cannot live. the solidarity of our enemy. How may it be said that these two cannot exist together? ciplined We troops who make the peo~le further our mission who. like the fish out of its native element. of destroying propagandizing his troops. who fall into our hands. 93 . The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. soldiers we their his captured with consideration.

In such a case. Because Japanese the territory garrison functions exterior 94 troops. today progressed guerrilla to the point where it has become possible war characterized such is not actually Although these may at first glance to adopt the policy of a protracted operations. military power is inadequate. to conduct lines. T HAs BEEN DEFINI~LY DECIDEDthat in the strategy of our war against Japan. seem to be abnormal case.7 THE STRATEGY OF GUERRILLA RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN I question example. a weak country The quesof vast size. has by the arise if our country tion exists because China. in the rear of the enemy. activities of the regular guerrilla strategy must If this were out army and be auxiliary to fundamental a small country. that is. coLdd be carried close to the scene of operations directly complementary be no question of guerrilla and able speedily to them. is without the such are three: circumstances much of suflcient primary a war on her armies have overrun Under of guerrillas first. second. or heterodox. for to eject an invader. to . Nor woLlld the were as strong as Russia. there would strategy as such. guerrilla orthodox methods.

The Japanese are apparently recall a past that saw the Yiian extinguish the Ch’ing conquer of the British as China fantastic equipped the Ming. and a new type hostilities is a part of that equipment. that witnessed to North Central America Empire attempting to the Sung and the extension that As far are and India. and guerrillas. If our disand makes of guerrilla too optimistic aster. from of guerrillas is inseparable from the actual conduct of orthodox peculiar of these hosoperations. with the war areas. war. the focal point of which China today. Though war strategy tilities Each methods enemy fails to take these facts into consideration an estimate he courts the strategy as a whole. saw the Latins overrun and South America. it differs the conduct has methods type of warfare suitable to regular warfare cannot be applied with that confront aspects of guerrilla success to the special situations Before we treat the practical on which strength. This can be stated: destruction policy based on this axiom is con95 .” all military A military might be well to recall the fundamental “Conservation of one’s own strength. such dreams of conquest and without reality. Today’s China is better than was the China of yesterday. today is concerned. its vast time and space factors. Iishes a new military process. last.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) establish guerrilla purely Such bases. and. strategical conestab is in the war is not merely a matter of tactics but involves siderations. of the situation. to extend participation local guerrilla war. to itself. Thus. axiom of combat of enemy action is based.

What and of the conservation and the destruction that of the enemy? The essential requirements are the six tactical attacks in a war of strategical in a war strategically terior lines in a war conducted 2. All guerrilla methods should development listed below: 1. the state and the destruction It is in furtherance applies its military strength. 96 . tactical operations units start from nothing we select to ensure of our own strength and grow. All the considerations from this axiom. Retention of the initiative. carefully planned defense.Mao Tse-tung sonant with a national of a free and prosperous of Japanese demanded imperialism. tactical speed on exprotracted. A clear understanding 3. establishment of bases. Conduct of operations regular 4. 5. of mobile operations. by war in conflict with the idea of self-preserthe enemy and to preserve vation? Not at all. army. alertness. that government on Guerrilla Warjare policy directed Chinese towards the building of this policy Is the sacrifice are necessary ourselves. The between 6. strategically on interior lines. The sacrifices demanded both to destroy sacrifice of a part of the people is necessary to preserve the whole. Its application and strategical conceptions of military action are derived is as apparent in all tactical as it is in the simple case of the soldier who shoots at his enemy from a covered position. The development Correct command. to complement those of the of the relationship that exists the attack and the defense.

are strong numerically considerations but weak as to quality. hand. protracted in lines. While attack in a violent and deceptive form. and it is true 97 ments may be disrupted The enemy is much stronger . river crossings. lines in a war that. conditions. such places as If a delaying ckLles. and push tactics of defense The have no place in the realm of guerrilla is necessary. of guerrilla In the latter. speaking. on the other in the devel- quality of his troops and their equipment. and villages offer the most suitable for it is in sLIch places that the enemy’s arrangeand he may be annihilated. Our strategy and conducted along interior is based on these conceptions. the enemy and the action entered in the execution or passive speedily. procrastination of a negative rapidity. speed is troops must be secret must be taken can be no of there are fewer opportunities there are during guerrilla essential. is strong in the we. There of plans. These have been taken into account on exterior is defensive opment of the policy of tactical offense. there may be cases where the attack will extend an enemy group). tactical speed.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrillu Warfare) The enemy. and tactical operations cally nature. strategiin character. of surprise is not absent in orthoto apply it than hostilities. though numerically weak. The movements and of supernatural unaware. in the conduct Although dox warfare. no assumption dispersion The basic method is the clefense. an attack action with it is more profitable maximum speed. than we are. the element They must be kept in mind of all operations. to over a period of several days (if that length of time is necessary to annihilate launch warfare. no great forces in many local engagements.

whole lines in order to surround surround destroy them. ture them. warfare.l~hen goes on between the. to gain and retain sides. we can at least partially w’c can calJ- kill the Japoncse. and the matter in warWhat is meant by initiative of the opposing forces. and destroy him only if we disperse our own forces. is the warfare of such dispersed units. for it is its and the opposing that has liberty of action. tendencies destroy Japanese of careful We will next discuss initiative. of it a prolightning-like in proper on exterior If we and warfare desirThus.Mao Tse-tung on Gz~en-i!la Warfare that we can hinder. it faces the danger It is more difficult to obtain the initiative ing on interior 98 when defendon exterior lines tl~an it is wllilc attacking . of defeat an army loses the initiative. our enemy. disperse. passive. if we cannot and destroy armies. planning. combined ~vitb the to cause and tile revoluwill be sufficient for China’s in Japan. alertness. Although able to concentrate the principle weaker enemy tracted tactical in order to destroy to guerrilla positive guerrilla an enemy. distract. The total effect of many local successes \vill be to change the relative strengths destruction international tionary of Japan’s military sympathy evident imperialism. a struggle the initiative .side that ilolds the initiative role becomes destruction. it is sometimes of concentration is applicable by gaining by employing of force against a relatively and make \Ve can prolong war only decisions. it loses its liberty. fare? In all battles and wars. The power. this struggle our manpower and by operating concentrations cannot and dispersions.

however. manpower There are. with both guerrillas from the hostilities commenced. a strategy of mobile enter the second phase of the war. but because 0[ the weaknesses day will come-indeed. another areas. For instance. which. tvitll each of initiative day. her attack must be limited in some areas—when she will be forced into a passive role. at the same time. she has been in China in the over plans of strengtl]. and the genera] stupidity tile conduct of operations. the many arguments and disposition loss of good opportunities are frequently for improvement of troops have resulted of her strategical the Jalmncse more than of rcsourccs. China was passit’e. The Japanese ened by insu~]cicncy the barbarism continues conquer When suing passing JapanH!. but as we warfare.Yu Chi Chan (’Gwen-ills Warfare) lines. we find ourselves purand regulars operating on exterior lines. unabated. China. ina(lequacy of l]er troops. they l)ave never yet been able to capture a few. direction gradually operations have been of her military compelled is her cruelty to the inhabitants is concerned. in extent. her manpower while.]ins tllc fact that although able to surround military large bodies of Chinese is thus being \veak- troops. The out. ThLIS. that Fler offensive pointed Sl]e can never alrea(ly has posi(ion. we seize some degree 99 . This is what Japan is doing. has Characterized machine of manpower. for the task. of conquered military of many of Chinese between productive to increase forces. a third which mistakes has rein the cliques. This exp]. One of several weak points as far as Japan these is lack of sufficient is tl)e underestimation sulted in the differences in turn.

With by orthodox groups are small makes it desirable to appear liberty and disappear such activities. weaknesses while. The Guerrillas in mind superiority is especially serious for guerrilla unknown to reguand the lack of if they keep of the forces. can operate over and a barbarian. who must face critical situations of the enemy unity and experience within our own ranks may be cited. the weak points because gain the gain the initiative enemy’s insufficient vast territories. A similar can rarely the enemy attacks the guerrillas one column. Some of our weaknesses are apparent only and are. our own are remedied. For example. at the same time. They will then find themselves beat off the attacks of the enemy. with more than the initiaof into to the enemy of action and for them in the is simply be to cope. guerrillas Because can. the very fact that most guerrilla advantageous enemy’s unable obtained When rear. forces. the situation it is difficult for the latter to retain tive. guerrillas Both guerrillas can manpower. sources of strength. ers. guerrillas countrymen. of the enemy. of their he is a foreigner confidence of millions because of the stupidity and regulars must of enemy commandexploit these enemy can make full use of their own cleverness. It is apparent arrangement pessimistic 100 that we can gain and retain of the situation and political only by a correct estimation of all military estimate the initiative and a proper factors. however. Any error. A too will operate to force us into a passive . in the estimation is likely to result in forcing the guerrillas unable a passive role.Mao Tse-tung ow Guerrilla Warfare The matter of initiative lar troops. in actuality. no matter how slight.

is not so at all. It and seizes is at such times that the good leader recognizes the moment when he can regain the lost initiative. an overly opti- with its rash ordering of factors. But there are times when seems hopeless and. run away. of the situation a poor estimate is to extricate on the situation. Leaders must be alert to sense changes modifications The leader them. Let us revert to alertness. will pro- study and estimate unit.Ya~Chi Clzan (Guer-rillu Warfare) position. the enemy. in these factors and make necessary tions to accord with fisherman. with and to pLIll them water. that may foul them. realize that to operate in gaining the initiative tive situation To conduct one’s troops with Leaders must factor alertness is an essential of guerrilla command. Guerrilla the enemy situation. who. the strength obstructions in troop disposimust be like the of the of any controls 101 his nets. if necessary. No method employed situation can be prescribed from the enemy. It is the intelli~nt and political either loss of initiative. As the fisherman . alertly is the most important and vital in its effect on the relaour forces and those of adjust their operations and to prevailing to local that exists between commanders to the terrain. is able both to cast them of the depth or the presence out in awareness of the current. duce the same result. No military leader is endowed to seize the initiative. as the method will. in reality. in every case. through of the military the part of its leader or pressure into a passive position. conditions. to be One the its first duty for this. so after a careful arrangement When a guerrilla by heaven with an ability leader who does and on factors involved. is forced itself. with consequent mistic estimate. depend can.

and demoralize When by the enemy. Guerrillas ments over a in order to promote wide area. guer- of supplies limits action. is in these ways that In general. the lead ropes. must be exercised large group should 1. In this way. 4. 102 specify a place to which . him. harass him. disperse to and the enemy force cannot encircled the nature be concentrated against him. guer- rillas must disperse. his position.Mao 7’se-tung on Guerrilla Warfare his nets through maintains fisherman commander. The remainder of the troops should into groups of absolutely equal size. guerrilla 1. so must the guerrilla change guerrillas employ their concentration. When rillas disperse. When the availability disperse limits action. they mass move- disperse. 5. A relatively be retained central divided force. 2. 3. When sufficient 2. position–it strength. units disperse to operate: is in overextended defense. of the circumstances caution that prevail at the time in certain matters: as a not be Regardless of dispersal. the leader is in a position that may arise. guerrillas of the ground withdraw. Each dispersed Orders to deal with any circumstances have clear and definite to unit should should responsibilities. so the guerrilla over his units. constant leader As the of contact with and control must change Dispersion.

is serious. method the time of proceeding. and there is opportunity . and in that must move the enemy. of destroying for the task. to tile dispersion and concentration of guerrillas.” the leader must understand the enemy feels the danger send troops out to attack must consider the situation and decide at what time and at what place they wish to fight.Yu Chi Chan [Gwerrilla Warfare) proceed. and the place. ” we do not mean the assembly of all manpower but rather of only that necessary remaining guerrillas are assigned and delaying of conducting In addition When generally the enemy. it and destroy a an enemy detachment Sometimes. them. tempt. When Their the situation in a certain area. the guerrillas with the fluidity of water and the ease of the blowing wind. time. The of hindering isolated groups. area to attack after a guerrilla at one place. to another For example. he will guerrillas missions mass propaganda. it will not be profitable for a unit to become engaged case. group has destroyed may be shifted second detachment. and confuse They must lead the enemy to believe that they will attack 103 . Concentration is on the defensive may be desirable and guerrillas when the wish to destroy isolated detachments in particular localities. of assembly. By the term “concentrate.to fall upon him and destroy enemy him. tactics must deceive. they must immediately shift. and Guerrillas concentrate when the enemy is advancing upon them. If they find that they cannot fight. The what is termed “alert shifting. it must move immediately. or of forces. Then the enemy may be destroyed piecemeal.

to be maneuvered that is. watches the ever-changing the right moment and thoughtful Careful guerrilla understand planning observers. is necessary of guerrilla situation constantly and is able to seize on for decisive action is found only in keen if victory is to be won in method do not action. include war. but even so. tion. Skill in conducting guerrilla they will be led to passive positions understanding intelligence the things that lies not in merely The quick have discussed but rather in their actual application of battle.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare him from the east and north. either to seize the initiative that guerrillas The initiative or to operate alertly. and they must then strike him from the west and the south. A plan is necesa prudent studied. field severely damaged. It is true plans. and equipment. and the alert shifting of forces. If guerrillas and obstinate. on the in dispersion. They must move at night. Without and the matter the matter of supply with local it is impossible of cooperation study of these factors. and those who fight without the nature sary regardless of the regiment. then of the size of the unit involved. Plans plan is as necessary in the case of the squad as in the case an assignment must both political and military instruction. then concentraare stupid and we operations. and retained can make only limited can be secured the factors we have mentioned ing a positive victory that results from attack. They rapidly disperse. The situation of duties must be carefully made. only followThe attack must must be considered. must be made on guerrilla not permit 104 themselves initiative. guerrillas into a position . Guerrilla initiative is expressed must strike. civilians. however.

our enemies is entirely of our efforts must be directed for it is only by attack that we can extinguish useless as far as extinguishing of only temporary forces is concerned. types of cooperation and orthodox groups. Since that time. Tactical cooperation. expend group for if they can one round of in its advance 105 the enemy or l~inder one enemy . who harass the enemy’s rear installations are weakening of resistance. no functions For example. Strategical 2. These are: cooperation. their function of strategical kill one enemy. and preserve ourselves.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrillu Warfare) where they are robbed of initiative careful planning and where the decision to attack is forced upon them. that exists between is important there and are three must be appreciated. of strategical the guerrillas cooperation until the war in China started. all our toward a resumption of the attack. spirit They and Guerrillas hinder the national his transport him and encouraging are cooperating in Manchuria with orthodox had forces strategically. an)munition. Battle cooperation. Even in defense. rillas and regular This troops. 3. that is to say. A defense or a withdrawal our enemies is concerned and is valid both for guerare of degree of execution. guerrillas and the value as far as the conservation principle The differences only. in the manner The relationship orthodox Generally between forces guerrillas speaking. 1. cooperation make is evident. Any victory will result from and alert control.

of tactical cooperation.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare southward. would operation 106 to harass their in rear areas and those in comwith the situation. to determine morale. undermine pendent. our powers of resistance here are proportion- ately increased. Such guerrilla action has a positive action Another Chin-P’u. when guerrillas in an effort to we may cite the both north and restore the lost territories. from tactical cooperation from strategical In order to accomplish . and was intensified forces counterattacked. units disposiand to indecotheir and the activities of the regular forces both there and in the defense campaign. guerrilla action in Shansi complemented Similarly. with cooperated the army’s operation mand of regiments must cooperate function tions. while. at the same time. during cooperation by the guerrillas along the P’ing-Sui. action were It is their assigned to operate with orthodox weak points to disrupt in the enemy in accordance them. it encourages of strategical operate our own countrymen. attacked. As an example operations at Hsing-K’ou. the period example who Tungwhen on the enemy nation and on its troops. and Cheng-Tai the invader when he held garrisoned our regular railways. guerrillas Guerrilla of small operating bases were established. A number organized of Honan. south of Yeh Men destroyed the T’ung-P’~1 railway and the motor roads near P’ing I -lsing Pass and Yang Fang K’ou. This cooperation continued began when cities in the areas. their transport. If guerrilla result the results to be obtained be lost and those that greatly diminished. during the south Shantung in the frve northern commanders provinces on the Hsuchow front. Pu. is furnished P’ing-Han.

base may be defined as an area. a strategical until tured precise with regular to act as outposts from the commander forces. This is so because this war is a cruel and procounterattack. by the enemy task to develop Thus the enemy intensive his rear area. In area and convert the enemy’s rear into an additional will never order to subdue the occupied to become increasingly A guerrilla territory. two-way radio sets are recombattle area are responforces. but this does not mean that guerof base areas. in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training. problem of establishment as well as any others to the general success. without regular The contribute importance. these missions. and become guerrilla most of it–may warfare tracted struggle. The lost territories the enemy is well into China. Their transport. strategically located. should be assumed. of bases is of particular can be restored only by carry out some be capConsequently. self-preservation and development. guerrilla com- must be equipped some means of rapid munication. History rillas can exist and function the development . and this we cannot indeed. and sentinels.Yz~ C/Li Clzan (Gwn-rilk Warfare) mission units and improve the degree with of cooperation. the enemy will have severe and oppressive. be able to stop fighting. part of our country-or. Guerriila For this purpose. It is our over this vast front. mended. Ability to fight a war without istic of guerrilla without a rear area is a fundamental over a long period characterof time shows u: I07 action. prinEven of the that to gather forces in the immediate are to hinder and instructions enemy sible for close cooperation cipal functions information.

The establishment The development Guerrilla bases may be classified accor{ling to their locabases. 3. Guerrilla areas and base areas. areas are evident. second. and bay bases. T~il~eng Shari. Plains country operating fare cannot be established Hopeh case. The extent of guerrilla we can count development or that bases cannot to be the and west Shantung proves the opposite on the use of these bases . Yen Shanj and Mao Shari. of peasant revolts that were unsuccessful. the importance subject and military equipment. The advantages lished are at Ch’ang are strongly protected. P’o Chan.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare many examples and it is fanciful ized by banditry guerrilla prehend The consider: 1. of bases. Tai Shari. Lut this does not mean that guerrilla flourish in such country there. if we to believe that such movements. Whether 108 is generally bases. of bases in tion as: hrst. plains bases. leaders seem to think that those qualities and before such leaders can comof base areas in the long-term understood their minds must be disabused of this idea. river. of improvecl communication ent in today’s movement. Those which are now estabWLL Tai Shari. of bases. and. and brigandage. mountain mountainous last. of bases may be better The various categories of bases. characterSome could succeed in this era are preswar. lake. 2. 4. “Il~ese bases Similar bases S11OU1LI be established not satisfactory for guerrilla warin in all enemy rear areas.

We can.Yz. the water routes. An area completely is a “base area. nature. establish small bases of a seasonal our barbaric This we can do because not have the manpower run and because in plains country crops are growing. Guerrillas shift from base to base on the theory that they place the next.tClzi Ckan (Gz~errillu Warfare) over long periods of time is questionable. and the terms base area and surrounded by territory Tai Shari. and Taiheng On the other hand. when advances. and this is one little attenexamples of the establishment must be one place one day and another There are many historical aspect of our activity tion. between so as to deny him access to. Red guerrillas Lake region. bay. however. Upon plains area are the first to engage drawal into mountainous country. is so numerous Seasonal when bases when the the population that a base can be established may be established Temporary in the winter the rivers are frozen over. is a guer109 area. and in the summer the enemy is otherwise the guerrillas occupied. of Wu Tai of base areas. they should leave behind them guerrilla groups dispersed over the entire area. that has so far received establish held out for man y years in the Hungtze should bases in the Hungtze in territory and Tai areas and along rivers and watercourses con trolled by the enemy There guerrilla occupied is a difference by the enemy free use of.” Wu Shari are examples Tai Shari. We of bases in river. enemy simply does or temporary to occupy all the areas he has overof China anywhere. and lake country. When bases may be established the enemy bases in the their with- who have established him. Shari (the the area east and north border zone) Shansi-Hopeh-Chahar .

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Wm\are rills area. organized mountains. guerrilla bands. Eventually. East Hopeh. Ixxwll]c guer- rilla areas due either to our own mistakes or to dle activities Obviously. l“lleir political 110 instincts must be sharpened and their nlar- . Such a task is extremely diilcult. This doctrine must be spread among the people. A puppet the WU Tai of this guerrilla functioned in the guerrillas transformation area into a real base area. base areas might of the enemy. These are unable to drive guerareas remain to the railroads. to organize units. it may be lost to the Japanese between to see that either is assured. who must be organized into anti-Jap:~nese groups. from for example. Guerrilla or it may be divided leaders should endeavor last of these situations Another point is the cooperation the combatants. rather there. was at first a guerrilla government the people. Such areas can be controlled while they actually physically departure. such as the cities and zones conthe guerrillas out. control reverts to a puppet by guerrillas only their area by occLIpy tl~em. and inspired assisted than a base area. At od~er times. for it is largely dependent upon the degree to which the people can be inspired. the Japanese and puppets rilla areas. in any given area in the war zone. to arm and puppets. In certain tiguous garrisoned areas. any one of three situations may develop: The area may remain in Chinese hands. Upon pro-Japanese gover- nment. the first or the essential that must exist between of armed resistance self-defense rilla bands and the people. All our strength to spread the doctrine the people. in the establishment of bases tl~c ar!nct] gtlermust be used and to train to Japan.

and the children they will never realize their own antiOnly the united strength of the people recover the measure of political and improve what factors in our the economic be proprotection traitors. thus policy the policy as well as the national to organize. Fanners will be required traitors. at other times. problems in an en- deavor to consolidate over a number to extinguish bases by dispatching of different bodies of troops routes. tiJe interpret tection” to mean that people must contribute money in proportion to tile nloney they nave. Confiscation.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) tial ardor increased. This will afford us equip. organization. except in the case of businesses run by Our activities must be extended thus strengthen opportunity furthering of protracted of the base area if we wish to attack the enemy’s bases and and develop our own. and conserve we still retain. eliminate If the workers. and train the people. and we must also mention aspects of the problem. to furnisl~ a certain is pro}libited. the women. we must emphasize the devel- opment and extension of base areas. We have already touched What on geographic economic discussion of bases. of liberty. adopted? to commerce policy should “reasonable Any such policy must offer reasonable and business. the farmers. guerrilla war. Each guerrilla of attack guerrilla base will have its own peculiar In general. his gains. the enemy. At times. over the entire periphery share of tllcir crops to guerrilla troops. This must be anticipated 111 . or equipment of the people. Japanese can the young power. power that has been lost. are not organized. will attempt numerous and defense. the lovers men. training.

Guerrillas and communication. we should plan on usto continual hindrance ing our main forces to attack one of them by surprise harassment. the inhabitants be extended have been inspired. expanded. and organized. the strength and diminished. attacked 112 Then our military activities and our organization the masses of the people It is of great must be zealously of the enemy that importance and with equal zeal. we may turn our attention four or five military base area as large as Wu Tai Shari. As such and and isolate enemy columns are without devote our secondary effort reserves. At the same time. trained. work among . of. We must not attack an objective we are not certain of winning. We may hold these at periods. we must advantage of the period he requires for reorganization to press home our attacks. for example. in these subhe came. equipped. or the area from which a secondary force harasses and hinders the enemy After defeating him. cities and to include ne~v volunour operalines of All teers accepted. in any area. while take divisions must cooperate to form a primary force to counterattack the enemy. least for temporary (if not for permanent) these are our duties in offensive strategy. communication We must confine our operaand small areas and destroy the enemy not strongly held.Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare and the encirclement broken by counterattack. subdivisions. tions to relatively When tions may traitors in those places. Tl~eir object is to lengthen the period that the enemy must remain on the defensive. other forces should When one column enemy garrison troops and operate on their lines of supply has been disposed In a there are to one of the others.

men must join the armies. of training must be improved. Hence. a gradual regimental internal from of equipment the tech- and our organization. Exactly be no question warfare scale. The standards munication standards equipment of discipline must not be forgotten. and hygiene units. war on a national of the relation ment.Yu Chi Chan (Guerrilla Warfare) guerrilla units be rested and instructed. ment must be raised and types of weapons increased. both the quantity troops must be improved. In order and qualmore trainbe hostilities into mobile Primarily. must be provided. attention and military. 113 . to the creation supply. there would be no question and the war of movethe case. discipline guerrilla must our weapons. formations bureaus to orthodox At the same of suitable of equip Corn’ Orthodox The necessary be paid both political time. then the quality jng must be emphasized nique The of handling Our improved. If China were able to of long-term but essential. Political is actually of guerrilla the opposite to ensure the development warfare of an orthodox ity of guerrilla md standards of guerrilla nature. During such times as the enemy is on the defensive. must be established. may be carried out. rest and instruction The development desperate conquer the troops may get some of mobile warfare ‘is not only possible war is a struggle. our tactics—all must be strengthened. This is the case because our current and protracted the Japanese there bandits would speedily and to recover her lost territories. must must be and staffs. medical. soldiers must be educated change organization. There politically.

the commancl must be centralized and decentralized command units. guerrilla coordinated. can be bet~veen in orthodox communications strategy In a ~vord. determined true lower and the tactics to apply to concrete only as these various warfare echelons tvill provide when break higher policy activity. or less complete 114 . proper and inde- guerrilla pendent Each turn for unified districts and these in are divided Each subdivision plans may alc has its made the appointed by higher by inferior commander. In guerrilla for strategical general purposes of the war- base areas.Mao Tse-t~tng on Guerrilla Because Wm-fure guerrilla cannot formations act independently of armed centralized. and while The the nature into situations arise. c[rective. This coordination zone commander and his staff. Centralized management tion within will result strategical of all guerrilla war zones. activities. as.nc it. cause they are the most elementary command be too highly If it were. 1 llLIs local control. Beyond this. ift guerrilla action would be too limited in scope. cerned. for tactical purtakes care of the their coordinapolicy regmding of commmd units. commanders. commanders. time. is naturally. to be most with regular not only insofar the same must be in as they themselves is a function are con- but additionally troops operating the same areas. This poses. centralization subordinate situations down. and the general in interference with guerrilla base areas. and beformations. general of actions former is determined su~~cst natul-e inferior of the action groups have to be taken more but cannot (~c[. guerrilla area into is divided subdistricts.


1. Each squad consists of from 9 to 11 men. In case men or arms are not sufficient, the third platoon may be dispensed with or one squad organized as company headquarters. 2. The mobile propaganda unit consists of members of the company who are not relieved of primary duties except to carry out propaganda when they are not fighting. 3. If there is insufficient personnel, the medical section is not separately organized. If there are only two or three medical personnel, they may be attached to the administrative section. 4. If there is no barber, it is unimportant. If there is an insufficient number of cooks, any member of the company may be designated to prepare food. 5. Each combatant soldier should be armed with the rifle. If there are not enough rifles, each squad should have two or three. Shotguns, lances, and big swords can also be furnished. The distribution of rifles does not have to be equalized in platoons. As different missions are assigned to platoons, it may be necessary to give one platoon more rifles than the others. 6. The strength of a company should at the most be 180, divided into 12 squads of 11 men each. The minimum strength of a company should be 82 men, divided into 6 squads of 9 men each.

TABLE ORGAmZATION 1 COMPANY OF AN INDEPENDENT GUERRILLA Company Commander Officer Political Mobile t Officer Propaganda Unit Executive r Company Headquarters Message Section Administrative Section First-Aid and Hospital Intelligence Section Section Fir~hird Platoon I Squad Platoon I Squad Platoon 1 Squad TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. RA~ Company Leader Political Officer Executive Officer Company Headquarters Message Section Chief Signal Administrative Section Public Relations Duty Personnel Barber GUERRILLA COMPANY ARM Pistol Pistol Pistol PERSONNEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 Chief Rifle Rifle Cooks Medical Section Chief Assistant First Aid and Nursing Intelligence Section Chief Intelligence Platoon Leaders Squad Leaders Nine Squads (8 each) TOTAL 10 1 1 4 1 9 3 9 72 122 Rifle Rifle Rifle Rifle Rifle 3 Pistols 98 Rifles .

A heavy machine-gun squad has from 7 to 9 men. one squad should be mounted. Machine-gun squads may be heavy or light. Total headquarters of an independent guerrilla battalion may vary from a minimum of 46 to a maximum of 110. or locally made shotguns. The intelligence section is organized in from 2 to 4 squads. omit them and use the cooks or ask aid from the people. If no men are available for stretcher-bearers. at least one of which is made up of plain-clothes men. 5. A light machine-gun squad has from 5 to 7 men. 3. regimental organization should be used. big swords. .TABLE ORGANIZATION 2 OF AN INDEPENDENT BATTALION Commander GUERRILL4 Battalion Politicai Officer Headquarter’s Executive and Three Companies Officer Battalion I Intelligence Section I Machine-Gun Section Message Center I I Administrative Section Medical Section I First Company Second Company Third Company -——— —-----i I 1 Fourth Company NOTES 1. 6. When there are 4 companies to a battalion. The remaining weapons may be bird guns. Each company must have at least 25 rifles. If horses are available. 2. 4.

m ii P .

1 1 1 1 5 1 2 15 137 Pistol Pistol 60 Pistols 36 Carbines 124 Pistols 300 Rifles 184 Pistols 936 Rifles 1323 1460 . GUERRILLA REGIMENT RANK Regimental Commander Political Officer chief of Staff Operations Section Operations Officer Clerks Intelligence Section Intelligence Officer Personnel ‘E RSONNE1 t 1 1 1 1 15 1 36 1 36 ARM Pistol Pistol Pist 01 Pistol Pistol — Pistols Pistol Carbines Pistol Pistol —— Personnel Administrative Section A~ministrative Officer Clerks Runner Transport Section Chief of Section Finance Traffic Manager supply Drivers Medical Section Chief of Section Doctors Nurses Total. Regimental Headquarters Three Battalions (441 each) TOTAL 1.TABLE OF ORGANIZATION.

Signal Section Administrative Section Section Chief Runner Public Relations Duty Personnel Barbers supply Cooks Medical Section Medical O~ficer Stretcher-Bearers Nursing Intelligence Section Section Chief Intelligence Machine-Gun Section Total. GUERRILLA (INDEPENDENT) PERSONNEL 1 1 1 2 1 1 10 2 3 1 Carbine Carbine Carbine Pistol Pistol Pistol BATTALION RANK Battalion Commander Political Officer Executive Officer Battalion Headquarters —.TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. Headquarters 10 I 6 4 1 30 As Available Pistol Pistol As Available 34 Pistols 12 Carbines 9 Pistols 288 Carbines 43 Pistols 300 Rifles I I I 75 366 441 Three Companies (122 each) TOTAL .