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Yanga Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino she promulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organic act for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. The court declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later on February 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) which includes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay the separation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees. Issue: 1.Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional. 2.Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220. 3.Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220 Ruling: In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations. On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is no such thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law. The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR. [G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001 FELIPE SEVILLE in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and/or FELIPE SEVILLE, EMILIA ESTRADA, MARIA S. TELLDER, MA. ISABEL SEVILLE, MA. TERESITA LICARDO, FRANCISCO SEVILLE, RAMON O. SEVILLE, JOSE MARIE SEVILLE, GEMMA ALVAREZ-ASAYAS, ANNABELLE ALVAREZ-GONZALES, SYLVIA ALVAREZ-LIOK, ADOLFO O. ALVAREZ JR., DIANA ALVAREZ-DABON, MARIA SALVADOR O. POLANCOS and JOAQUIN ORTEGA II as successors-in-interest of JOAQUIN ORTEGA and his estate, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LEYTE SAB-A BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATED SMELTING AND REFINING CORPORATION, LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORPORATION, CALIXTRA YAP and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, Respondents. DECISION Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into ownership. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the November 29, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals [1 (CA), as well as the May 19, 1997 CA Resolution [2 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint. The counterclaims of appellants are denied. Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.[3 The Facts The appellate court narrated the undisputed facts in this manner:
Leyte. 2. On June 14.00 as reimbursement for attorneys fees and the further sum of P50. 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. 3. Inc. 1292 and 4251 under the name of said vendor. 7. [a] decision is hereby rendered for [petitioners] and against [respondents]. 2.000. 625. 1983 in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA. 962 authorized LSBDA to acquire privately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way of negotiated sales with the landowners. The subject property was leased to [Respondents] Philippine Associated Smelting & Refining Corporation (PASAR). and PHILPHOS are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of TWO MILLION EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P2. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464. the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE. 1989.920 square meters. 2 of the Lease Contract between NDC and PASAR. 5.333 square meters real property subject of the present action and defendant NDC is ordered to segregate the same area from OCT P-28131 and CONVEY the same to the Estate of Joaquin Ortega.60) as accrued rentals of PHILPHOS from 1979 to present. 4. 1980 in favor of LSBDA. 3181. 6. (Exhibit PP and 25) conveying the subject property to said LSBDA is declared NULL and VOID ab initio. NDC. plus accrued interest pursuant to par. Letter of Instruction No. (LEPANTO).00 as indemnity for the value of the ancestral home. [Respondents] LSBDA.1. 1982. 4.000. (Exhibit 54) 5.846. 3579.398. PASAR. 3. Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. After due notice and investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands. [Respondent] Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 1990. empowered to acquire real property in the successful prosecution of its business. On December 14.000. 1. a complaint for recovery of real property. rentals and damages against the above-named [respondents] which complaint was later on amended on May 11. After trial. NDC. The Deed of Sale executed by Calixtra Yap on June 14.00 as expenses for litigation. Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) was created to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned development and balanced growth of the Sab-a Basin in the [P]rovince of Leyte. located at Barangay Sto.086. On June 1. covered under Tax Declarations Nos. Upon the segregation of the 735. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. [Respondents] are also ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] the sum of P250. 1988. On November 29. 7508 square meters. plus the accrued interest for non-payment pursuant to paragraph 2 of the same Lease Contract cited above. [Respondents] are ordered to pay jointly and severally [petitioners] P200.333 square meters from OCT No. LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to its [Co-respondent] National Development Company (NDC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on March 2. . The intestate estate of JOAQUIN ORTEGA is declared the owner in fee simple of the 735. [Respondents] filed their respective Answers.00) as rentals due from 1979 to the present. appellant LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering said lot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA with an aggregate area of 442. the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial administrator Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City. 3425. P-28131 was transcribed in the Registration Book for the [P]rovince of Leyte on August 12. 1980.. Rosario. P-28131 the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte is ordered to issue a new title to the said portion in the name of the Intestate Estate of Joaquin Ortega. [Respondents] LSBDA. are ordered to pay jointly and severally to [petitioners] the sum of FOUR MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SIX PESOS (P4. Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS) and Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.784. Isabel. 9353 was issued in the name of [Respondent] LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No.
occupation thereof in the concept of owner. petitioners submit the following issues for the consideration of the Court: A. respondents and the appellate court maintain that petitioners have not shown that the land had previously been classified as alienable and disposable. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Second. [petitioners] and [respondents] are ordered to sit down together and discuss the possibility of a compromise agreement on how the improvements introduced on the landholding subject of the present suit should be disposed of and for the parties to submit to this Court a joint manifestation relative thereto. the Court is called upon to determine the validity of LSBDAs title. cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. possession thereof. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Main Issue: Validity of LSBDAs Title Petitioners argue that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate was void. all the lands of the public domain belong to the State. absent any showing that the land had been classified as alienable. Fourth. To overcome such presumption. Whether or not the issuance of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of Title in favor of LSBDA was valid. the property had been untitled before the issuance of the Miscellaneous Sales Patent in favor of the LSBDA. petitioners challenge to LSBDAs title cannot be granted. We agree with respondents and the appellate court. petitioners were guilty of laches. because they had failed to apply for the judicial confirmation of their title. The Issues In their Memorandum. Whether or not the sale by Calixtra Yap of the Estate of the Late Joaquin Ortega in favor of LSBDA was null and void. Disputing these contentions.8. . Ruling of the Court of Appeals Citing the Regalian doctrine that lands not appearing to be privately owned are presumed to be part of the public domain. Republic. there was no competent evidence to prove that the property in question was private in character. Absent such classification. could not ripen into ownership. no matter how long. before the issuance of the title. Whether or not petitioners are guilty of laches. having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap who had no right to it. the CA held that. First. petitioners could not have become owners thereof through acquisitive prescription. first. petitioners further claim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court. no matter how long. Indeed. [8 In Menguito v. C. because it is based on a wrong premise and amounts to a collateral attack. Public Character of the Land Under the Regalian doctrine. if they had any. Fifth. There was no showing that the land had been classified as alienable before the title was issued to LSBDA. [9 the court held that [u]nless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State. would not ripen into ownership. it remains part of the inalienable public domain. In the main. it will also ascertain whether. Second. which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. B. the land was private or public. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the remedy of reconveyance and the damages awarded by the trial court. no matter how long. In resolving this issue. In the absence of any such compromise agreement. there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of LSBDA in dealing with Yap regarding the property. D. Finally. which is not allowed by law. hence. because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for more than thirty years. Third. such improvements shall be disposed of pursuant to Article 449 of the New Civil Code. [7 Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings. they argue that possession of it.
1073. Ortega arose from a suit for quieting of title. they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land had previously been classified as alienable. Deeds of Sale. [15 in which the Supreme Court allegedly recognized the private character of the disputed property. [10 paragraph b of the aforecited provision applies only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Moreover. The question remains: What was the character of the land when Ortega purchased it? Indeed. absent any showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable. Absent such evidence. and Decisions of the trial court and even the Supreme Court. pursuant to Section 48 of the Public Land Act. and who are the compulsory heirs of the deceased Joaquin Ortega. But petitioners failed to show that. . and annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land. In that case. which provides: SECTION 48. which Joaquin Ortega and several vendors executed. the land sought to be registered remains inalienable. since June 12. and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore. under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership. let alone of the private character of the land. they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. [14 the Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership. are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open. if any. CA. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c). The following described citizens of the Philippines. but whose titles have not been perfected or completed. [16 The Court did not all make any ruling that the property had been classified as alienable. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest. who are the legitimate children. 1184-O. at the time. [11 Instead. into an action for the declaration of who is the legal wife. the vendors were already its owners. which subsequently declared that the land was public. At best. do not prove that the land was private in character. occupying lands of public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon. 1945. Although they claim that their title was based on acquisitive prescription. [17 The present respondents as well as the Bureau of Lands. for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. In any event. or that the land was already classified as alienable. are not bound by that ruling. [12 Petitioners arguments are not convincing.incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. The provision reads: SEC. to wit: (b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open. 4. the Deeds of Sale of portions of the disputed property. may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims. A person in open. because they were not impleaded therein. [13 In Spouses Palomo v. CA. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on this crucial point by saying that it was without factual basis. declaration of nullity of sale. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall he entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. continuous. continuous. Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. That title may be the subject of judicial confirmation. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership. Chapter VIII. the sole issue was whether the respondent judge xxx acted in excess of jurisdiction when he converted Civil Case No. an action for quieting of title. a vendee acquires only those rights belonging to the vendor. exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain. of the Public Land Act. under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. It should be stressed that petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed property. an action quasi in rem that was binding only between the parties. continuous. they maintain that the private character of the land was evidenced by various tax declarations. exclusive an notorious possession of a public land for more than thirty years acquires an imperfect title thereto. under the Land Registration Act. Also misplaced is petitioners reliance on Ortega v.
While petitioners refer to the trial court proceedings supposedly recognizing the private character of the disputed property. Indeed. Clearly. that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was public. [22 Moreover. Semantics aside. once registered. In fact. P-28131 issued to LSBDA. or that the Bureau of Lands is a party thereto. [19 Petitioners insist. -. Petitioners insist that they are not seeking the re-opening of a decree under the Torrens system. not to private entities. Moreover. [21 This disputation is mere quibbling over the words. After compliance with the notice and publication requirements. because the Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the absolute owner in fee simple of the xxx described property. the present suit. who was allegedly not the owner of the property. having acquired the rights of Yap. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands. the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and found that the land was part of the public domain.333 square meters of land. the burden of proof that the land has been classified as alienable is on the claimant. Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based. petitioners filed the amended Complaint only in 1990. This argument is devoid of factual or legal basis. enlarged or diminished. or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Supposedly. modified. objections thereto should be raised not by petitioners but by LSBDA. they make no claim that these cases directly involve the classification of the land. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. is tantamount to a collateral attack not sanctioned by law. It has been held that a certificate of title. purportedly filed for the recovery of real property and damages. Hence. the title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration and issuance. the assailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. which allegedly encompassed even a parcel of land allegedly belonging to them. [20 It is scarcely necessary to address this point. the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance demonstrated its position that the disputed land was part of the public domain. Hence. . in a public auction. Section 48 of PD 1529. modified. Hence. the contracting party obviously aggrieved. their possession of the disputed property. the Property Registration Decree. or 73 hectares more or less from the OCT No. To begin with. altered.A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. In any case. Otherwise. resorted to a confirmation of her imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Yap merely conveyed a claim. except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands. the decree of registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. 48. however long. petitioners failed to discharge this burden. not a title which she did not have. should not thereafter be impugned. the power to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State. petitioners are effectively seeking the modification of LSBDAs OCT. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDAs subsequent application for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and. but on Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. however. [23 Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that [u]pon the expiration of said period of one year. Petitioners assume that LSBDA. the reliance on registered titles would be lost. LSBDAs Title Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is void. cannot ripen into ownership. [18 In the present case. expressly provides: SEC. the pronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property. As earlier stated. changed. plain and simple. its purchase of the property from the Bureau of Lands. not on the conveyance made by Yap. It cannot be altered. Any person aggrieved buy such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud. Collateral Attack There is another reason for denying the present Petition. Hence. they are only praying for the segregation of 735. after LSBDA had filed an application for patent. Although LSBDAs title was registered in 1983. they claim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap.
such as the boring of tunnels. the prayer for reconveyance and.Reconveyance Petitioners also claim that the disputed property should be reconveyed to them. If petitioners believe that they have been defrauded by Yap. Finally. 1929. Benguet Province. From the date of its purchase. the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. challenge a certificate of title that has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. According to the application. which has since then been in open. and its payment of annual taxes thereon. in the proper courts. not in these proceedings. L-43938. Court of Appeals & De La Rosa. Inc. in the name of the [Republic] of the Philippines. petitioners have no standing to ask for the reconveyance of the property to them. LSBDAs title was derived from a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. 1934. as to Lots 1-5. not from Yap. the entire case of petitioners rest on the theory that they have acquired the property by acquisitive prescription. by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children. continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. without any right or authority. The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection. for that matter. Costs against petitioners. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2. which may be instituted only by the Office of the Solicitor General. its affidavits of annual assessment. Atok Big Wedge Corporation. Conclusion In the light of our earlier disquisition. Verily. sold the same to LSBDA. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. situated in Tuding. who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14. The trial court denied the application. in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. 1930. The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated. The proper remedy is an action for reversion. G. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22. Moreover. by Atok. Benjamin and Eduardo. April 15. For its part. and recorded on January 2. WHEREFORE . Republic of the Philippines. Moreover. 101. Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto. In support of the application. no matter how lengthy. and by the Republic of the Philippines. they have not become owners of the disputed property. and its payment of taxes on the land. and that Yap. 1988 Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. the theory has no leg to stand on. the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. Itogon. its geological mappings. they should seek redress. 1909. by reason of its nature. but in a proper action in accordance with law. holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. cannot ripen into ownership. their possession thereof. The land. 1931. continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims. 217 dated February 16. Benguet had been in actual. Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11.R. This cannot be allowed. arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 1965. In other words. The classification must be categorical. in 1964. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25. 1931. Absent any showing that the land has been classified as alienable. pursuant to section 101 of the Public Land Act. by a collateral attack. as evidenced by its construction of adits. SO ORDERED. No. by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly. . petitioners cannot. geological samplings and trench side cuts. as to lots 1-9. which reads as follows: SEC. as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9. through the Bureau of Forestry Development. Considering that the land was public before the Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued to LSBDA. Victoria. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead. respectively. both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. Benguet & Atok vs. it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. is intended for the benefit of the State. J. industrial. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription.‖ is correct. This is also difficult to understand. subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. or underneath. The classification must be categorical. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon.e. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. even if only partly so. including the registered owner thereof. Republic v. invoking their superior right of ownership. as they did. to Benguet and Atok. Court of Appeals – 160 SCRA 228 [Half agri / half mining]CRUZ. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party. By such act. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court. subject to separate claims of title. not of private persons. as its name implies. such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time. because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land. especially in its practical application. the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein. he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. Regalian Doctrine: ―thedoctrine reserves to the State all minerals that m ay be found in public and even private lands devoted to ―agricultural. As the land had become the private property of the locators. D: Rights over lands are indivisible: it cannot be part alienable and part non-alienable. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is ―no conflict of interest‖ between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub -surface rights. for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. it did not cease to be so and become agricultural. the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. In the instant case.The applicants appealed to the respondent court. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Held: Granted. In other words. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain.: Respondent registered a land that was used for agriculture. the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to ―agricultural. This is rather doctrine. which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant. they had the right to transfer the same. without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. i.‖ Thus. This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which. the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface. the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. commercial. commercial. Held: No. Under the aforesaid ruling. against even the government. his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong. Petitioners (mining companies) claimed that they had right over the land because of mineral deposits under the contested land. nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. Issue: Whether respondent court’s decision. but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. ―the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim.‖ . as already observed. residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered. For the loss sustained by such owner.
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