1. G.R. No.

L-8018

October 26, 1955

GIL ATUN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. EUSEBIO NUÑEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Doroteo L. Serrano for appellants. Alfredo S. Rebueno for appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dismissing the complaint for recovery of a parcel of registered land upon a motion to dismiss filed by defendants after plaintiffs had closed their evidence. The land in question is located in Legaspi City and registered in the name of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs, under Original Certificate of Title No. 11696 of the Registry of Property of Albay. The complaint was filed on August 7, 1950. The evidence for the plaintiffs-appellants shows that they inherited the land in question from their widowed aunt Estefania Atun (sister of their deceased father Nicolas Atun), who died without any issue; that they had possessed the land from 1927 to 1930, when plaintiff Gil Atun delivered the same to Silvestra Nuñez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuñez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the Atuns a part of the harvest as rental; that in 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the produce; and that defendant Eusebio Nuñez in turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuñez, but to plaintiffs. Upon a demurrer to the evidence, filed by defendants after plaintiffs had rested their case, the lower Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the period of ten years within which plaintiffs could have filed an action for recovery thereof under section 40 of Act 190 (computed from the time plaintiffs lost possession of the land in 1940), had already elapsed, hence their action had prescribed; and that furthermore, plaintiffs failed to prove their alleged ownership of the land in question, so that the presumption that defendants, being possessors, are the lawful owners thereof, had not been overcome. Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the complaint having been denied, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to us because the appeal raises question of law. The sole issue herein is whether the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint on the ground of prescription of action. The dismissal is erroneous. The land in question is admittedly covered by a Torrens title in the name of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs. Section 40 of Act 496 expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And this Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible, since possession is a mere consequence of ownership. (Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48 Phil., 298, 308; Eugenio vs. Perdido, supra, p. 41; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil., 106.)

We are aware, of course, that title by adverse possession (acquisitive prescription) is distinct from the statute of limitations (extinctive prescription) and the operation and effects of such distinction has been explored during the discussions of this petition for review. But we have finally agreed that, as to the lands registered under the Torrens system, ten years' adverse possession may not be permitted to defeat the owners' right to possession—which is the necessary incident of ownership. Otherwise loss of the land by prescription would be indirectly approved, in violation of sec. 46 of the Land Registration Act. This statute, being a later enactment, may be said to have partially amended the Statute of Limitations established in Act No. 190 in so far as the registered lands are concerned. (Juan Eugenio, et al. vs. Silvina Perdido, et al., L-7083, May 19, 1955.) And if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (new Civil Code, Art. 777; Art. 657, old), the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa. The lower Court also erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show a better title than that of defendants who are presumed to possess with just title. As the land in question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate (Mendoza Vda. de Bonnevie vs. Cecilia Vda. de Pardo, 59 Phil., 486; Gov't. of P.I. vs. Serafica, 61 Phil., 93; Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 45 Phil., 430). Pursuant to the rule that reversal on appeal of a ruling upholding a defendant's demurrer to the evidence imports in civil cases loss of his right to submit evidence in his behalf, in order to discourage prolonged litigations (Arroyo vs. Azur, 76 Phil., 493, and cases therein cited), judgment must be rendered according to plaintiffs' evidence, which supports their claim of ownership of the land in question, and for damages in the amount of P500 (t. s. n., p. 21). Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed; plaintiffs-appellants Gil Atun, Camila Atun, and Dorotea Atun are declared the lawful owners in common of the lot in question; and defendantsappellees Eusebio Nuñez and Diego Belga are ordered to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs, and to indemnify the latter in the amount of P500 by way of damages. Costs against defendantsappellees in both instances. So ordered.

2. G.R. No. L-44837

November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants. Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants. Simeon Bitanga for appellees.

VILLA-REAL, J.: This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads: For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left by the deceased Eusebio Quitco. As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made as to the costs. So ordered. In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court in its aforesaid decision: 1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed. 2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by the right of representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their deceased father who died without any property whatsoever.lawphi1.net 3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500. The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in this appeal are those set out in the appealed decision, which have been established at the trial, namely: In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed (Exhibit A), acknowledging the plaintiff Ana

Socorro Ledesma. a petition which the court denied. executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. 1922. because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco. and as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito. Occ. Negros. Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the committee on claims and appraisal. he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C).000. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim. representing the last installment for the payment of the promissory note Exhibit C. presiding over the First Branch. From the order denying the said petition no appeal was taken.500. P. the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco. 1934.500. who are the other defendants..000). more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. on January 21. with the committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco. 21. raised in the first assignment of alleged error. does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt. of the following tenor: P2. on January 21. alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim. returned said consulta and refrained from giving his opinion thereon (Exhibit C). of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1924. with whom he had four children. the aforesaid commissioners on claims and appraisal. administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this court. Quitco died (Exhibit 5). the remaining one thousand and five hundred (P1. and the commissioners. San Enrique. Lorenzo M. On November 14. and. is whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1. which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure. that is. on August 26. filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment. The first question to be decided in this appeal.500) to be paid two years from the date of the execution of this note. his father Eusebio Quitco also died. that is. has prescribed. 1933 (Exhibit I). 1935. Jan. the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma.500 should be paid two years from the date of the execution of said promissory note. but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. 1932. 1922. 1. The complaint in the present case was filed on June 26. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1. asked for the reconsideration of said order. Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first day of March 1922. the said deceased not being the one who executed the same. Subsequently. authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. upon receipt of said promissory note. . the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco. still later.Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21. Quitco. instead of passing upon it. 1922. On March 9. as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma. and as the latter left real and personal properties upon his death. on December 15. that is. the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43. 6153 of this court. 1933. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos (P2. denied he same (Exhibit H). According to the promissory note Exhibit C. Quitco. and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs. on August 26. 1930. another two hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to be paid on the first day of November 1922. I. the last installment of P1. and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise to this case. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin. elevated the same to this court en consulta (Exhibit F)." civil case No. No. Lorenzo M.

appointed in the intestate of the father. Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors. the appealed judgment is reversed. The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded. because. . in representation of their father Lorenzo M. So ordered. this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother. who died without leaving any property. and the propertiesinherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person. for a monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before him. therefore. as heirs of Eusebio Quitco. For the foregoing considerations. we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim before the committee on claims and appraisal. a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother. and the defendants are absolved from the complaint. appointed in the intestate of his father. well-founded. the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code. Wherefore. does not suspend the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness. as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances. the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory. with the costs to the appellees. Quitco. the third assignment of error is also well-founded.The first assignment of alleged error is. The herein defendants. are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything. consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father. As to the second assignment of alleged error. that is to say. (2) that the claim for the payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before the committee on claims and appraisal.

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows: 1. respondent. and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for. Angel Limjoco. appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction. Rizal. maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan. L-770 April 27.) In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante. whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan. petitioner's brief. 1948 ANGEL T. as existing operators. Tan for respondent. subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief. vs. authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator. petitioner. deceased. 2.3. and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". and Delfin L. a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand. 3. (Pp. through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez. as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install. he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35. pp. Fragante. If Pedro O. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence. and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and business. the Public Service Commission. No. Bienvenido A.: Under date of May 21. Gonzales for petitioner. G. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. 1-2. 4. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. J. Jr. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines. there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. The commission. and in Quezon City". to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Inc. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law. Fragante had not died. 4572 of Pedro O. he would . that the original applicant Pedro O. Rizal.000. which is said to be in contravention of law. rendered its decision in case No. 146. As declared by the commission in its decision.. HILADO. 33-34). LIMJOCO. FRAGRANTE.R. No one would have denied him that right. therefore. 1946.

pages 366. In the case at bar Pedro O. or to the possession of any other person for him. mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator. there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which. the making of an inventory of all goods. unless the action is for recovery of money. and the right to acquire such a certificate. that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The commission declared in its decision. debt or interest thereon. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died. If Pedro O. for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". in his memorandum of March 19. 1947. being placed under the control and management of the executor or . unless otherwise expressly provided by law.440 a month. 2nd ed. by complying with the requisites of the law. or unless. because death extinguishes the right . Such certificate would certainly be property. for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application. section 1. by its very nature. but the situation here is no different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given. any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive. Rule 88. it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. Hence. and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge. provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions. paragraph (a). if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person. In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II.. Of course. in view of the evidence before it. . may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator. belonged to the decedent in his lifetime. admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule. . such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions. . chattels. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. it cannot survive. Petitioner. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1. and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death. Rule 82. and it says that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased". although under the facts of the case. among other cases. 367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him: Therefore. the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. should descend to his estate as an asset".certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. section 2. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. rights. credits. The aforesaid right of Pedro O.

A natural person is a human being. The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.. 57 Am. 6 N. and includes artificial as well as natural persons. 271.) Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O.administrator. 6th ed. and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line". The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. "an option"." 2 Rapalje & L. Pacific. per Elliott. The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. Law Dict.. naming him. p. disposed of this objection as follows: . III. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission. 77. in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate. etc. E. Rep. for they declare that it is sufficient. (Vol.. is a generic term. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act. 11) says that No. . This intention (contention) cannot prevail. to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person. Bank vs. J. Abbot. 304. Ginn . The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. 8 Port. (Ala. First Series. Corpus Juris (Vol. states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana: As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person. consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. Dict. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation. 7 N. 5325). State. if any.. 6. as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species of title. among other things. "The word "person" says Mr. Douglas vs. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are also property for juridical purposes. inchoate or complete. (Emphasis supplied. E.. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. devisees or legatees. Words and Phrases. 55. and the heirs of the decedent. respectively. can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors. ." 2 Abb. Planters'. and embrace rights which lie in contract.) 404. 107 Ind. a forgery committed after the death of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate. p. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted. 763. Manresa (Vol. Co. and on page 748 of the same volume we read: However. 50. "in its legal signification. 954. whether executory or executed. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term. Billings vs. The Court. it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding. 914. these terms (real property. p. Andrews. (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. etc. 4 Cal. property includes. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. 54.

vs. 271.. article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated. there would be no juridical basis for the estate. or creditors. Fragrante is considered a "person". and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration. Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota. In that case.804..69 . 55. there would be a failure of justice in cases where. after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it. 954. the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. represented by the executor or administrator. . 914-915. it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property. as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons. 43 Ind. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged. 46. such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.) In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. 22. that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. and. 717. as held in Suiliong & Co. Dolor. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. (107 Ind.. Chio-Taysan. and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words: . The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35. 56 Phil. citing 2 Rapalje & L. However. instead of the heirs directly. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result. Concepcion. . among the artificial persons . 13. as here. for. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person. . 6 N. since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were. 712.E. — the estate — and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. supra. the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged. State. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime. Collins.00 as found by the commission. devises. Under the present legal system. 54. have an interest in the property. .000. the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made. and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. 12 Phil. or what was the nature of their respective interest. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. rights and assets left by the decedent. to our minds. The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction. Dictionary. Unless we accept this definition as correct. 44. 2 Phil. the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245.vs. although natural persons as heirs. . let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter.

. the estate of Pedro O. . it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . to cite just one example. we hold that within the framework of the Constitution. Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense. or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines". for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law. Within the Philosophy of the present legal system. How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by.recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties". Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. . if successful. no less than natural. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case. we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship. under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana. persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. as the fiction of the extension of personality. State. respectively. the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons. for certain purposes. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical. any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States. him may be paid. copartnerships. as announced in Billings vs. as amended. include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. and surviving. the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which. of course. As stated above. as for instance. and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. when the Supreme Court of said State said: . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. associations. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which. . Hence. and motivated by the same reason. . the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs. The outcome of said proceeding. or the immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. an injustice would ensue from the opposite course. supra. the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person. consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice . particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act.

Decision affirmed. and if they are not. and that is. In the absence of a contrary showing. in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed. both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV).of subjecting his estate. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. in view of the evidence of record. within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act. if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. which does not exist here. his death.000. there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it. which he has already made in the ice plant. Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended. we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding. he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. The situation has suffered but one change. creditors and heirs. from the Public Service Commission of this Court. and as such. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen. So ordered. . as amended. Upon the whole. if he had lived. not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality. we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion. his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein. without costs.

surnamed Nebreda. Jr. defendants-appellants. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21. However. vs.. who are all of minor age. J. 1931. old Civil Code). Dominador. plaintiff-appellee. therefore. AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA. 17 Phil. plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945. the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Province of Pangasinan. cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it . Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. her now co-defendants. Defendants interposed the present appeal. is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda. MARIA DEL ROSARIO. No. After trial.4.As this Court aptly said. it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir. 1953 MARIA USON. Alaras Frondosa. From that moment. Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador. Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1). in consideration of their separation. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario. Estrada for appellant. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21. the late Faustino Nebreda. filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion. BAUTISTA ANGELO. and Faustino.R. at which both parties presented their respective evidence. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. 1931.. was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children. There is no dispute that Maria Uson. one of the defendants-appellants. CONRADO NEBREDA. With this background. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. DOMINADOR NEBREDA. Brigido G. executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and. "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. CONCEPCION NEBREDA. Maria Uson and her husband. L-4963 January 29. Conrado. G. 321). the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested. plaintiff-appellee. his widow Maria Uson (Article 657. before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

12. The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot. 41 Phil. be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation. As regards the claim that Maria Uson. they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253. But defendants contend that. new Civil Code). under the new Civil Code which became in force in June. 1950.. without costs. however.. . and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code. provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right. 531). sixth edition. the decision appealed from is affirmed. inasmuch as it involves no material consideration. WHEREFORE. Tolentino on Civil Code. this much can be said. while her deceased husband was lying in state. 123. partakes of the nature of a donation of real property. said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code. apart from the fact that this claim is disputed. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co." As already stated in the early part of this decision. old Civil Code). and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633. therefore. agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them. new Civil Code). Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation. Osorio vs. old Civil Code). p. while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights. in a gesture of pity or compassion. if any. but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. There is no merit in this claim.be renounced (1 Manresa. Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed. we are of the opinion that said assignment. it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect. the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657. Thus. they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287. of the same origin. it shall be effective at once.

L-4170 January 31. MONTILLA. exhibit his claim to the committee as provided by law. Litonjua be paid. G. C. vs. vs. a motion praying that the interest..000 with legal interest. AGUSTIN B.. It is true that Yap Tico. Enage and Yap Tico. administrator of the intestate estate. because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. JR. because such creditor has no right or interest that call for the protection of the law and the courts. 1952 Intestate of the late AGUSTIN MONTILLA. but it is no less that only after all the debts of the said estate have been paid can it be known what . It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased. PARAS. administrator-appellee. SR. Carlos Hilado and Jose V. as the creditor of the widow and heirs of the deceased Ildefonso. with still less reason can one who is not a creditor of the said deceased intervene in the proceedings relative to the latter's intestate estate and to the settlement of his succession (article 1034 of the Civil Code). PEDRO LITONJUA. Coruña for the administrator.. We quote hereunder pertinent passages of the decision.. CLAUDIO MONTILLA.R. Sr. under the provisions of section 695 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued an order denying the motion. a writ of execution was issued. only after the debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known. Carbonell for oppositor. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co.5. Marquez 6. one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla. Estacion for movant. having claim against a deceased person which should be considered by the committee does not. in the latter's intestate estate be sold and out of the proceed the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in favor of Pedro L. Gaudencio Occeño and Jose Ur.. Jr. Jose M. has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. is entitled to collect what is due him out of the property left by the latter and which was inherited by such widow and heirs. 1950. a movant-appellant.J. it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs. A person who. Litonjua appealed. Sr. Margarito vs. From this order Pedro L. but no property of Claudio Montilla was found which could be levied upon. On June 12. plus costs amounting to P39. except in any remainder which may be found due the heir. deceased. 345.: In Civil Case No.00 In due time. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by Agustin Montilla. 868 of the court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. shall be barred from recovering such demand or from pleading the same as an offset to any action. Pedro L. On August 7. testate or intestate. excepting the case referred to in section 701 of the same. No. Intestate Estate of Agustin Montilla. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the sum of P4. oppositor-appellee. 18 Phil. after publication of the required notice. Litonjua filed in special Proceeding No 32 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. property and participation of Claudio Montilla. 1950 Pedro L.

1027. (Arts. . an heir. 659 et seq.) (pp. because the debts of the deceased must be paid before his heirs can inherit. and it is so ordered with costs against the appellant.. Sr. and 1032 of the civil Code. Code of Civil Code Procedure. and secs. 1026. 1034. Civil Code.net remainder will be left for division among the heirs. 734 et seq. Wherefore.) An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased. aforecited. 350-251) The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar. the appealed order is affirmed. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla. because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla. until the credits held against the latter at the time of his death shall have been paid can the remaining property that pertains to the said debtors heirs can be attached (Art. before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.334 square meters. on December 5. As a result. 3. 221. and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs. From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. On November 9. Consuelo and Ligaya died next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother. now Rule 131. covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Sec. 1946. including ½ of Lot No. (2) Honoria. 3.7..P. on February 26. Ernesto Bautista. 41543. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No. Sec. those of Ligaya went to her son. Rita Sahagun. plaintiffs and appellants. and (4) Adolfo died last — his properties went to his maternal grandmother. vs.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing a suit to recover ownership and possession of 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2) Special Proceeding No. Isabel. in Special Proceeding No. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court]. with an area of 1. Honoria Salak and other members of her family died — massacred by the Japanese. Tomas Besa for defendants and appellees. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. to settle the estates of the Salak family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo. 23. de Carillo (3/4 share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share). 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac. 3 to recover ½ of Lot No. On September 4. Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto Bautista). a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA. Honoria. 1966 PRIMA G. thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first — his properties went to the children Adolfo. Filemon Cajator for plaintiffs and appellants. J. 1946. 23. Severino Salak died. Petra Garcia died on September 21. which the court approved on November 19. On August 16.1 (3) Isabel died next — her properties went to her son Adolfo. and children Adolfo.00 his ½ portion of said lot. Agustina thereby succeeded to the properties that came by intes-state succession from Honoria Salak and Isabel Carrillo. applying the survivorship presumption [Rule 123. defendants and appellees. Sometime in January 1945. 1944. the court a quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. 221 which as aforementioned has been possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz. 1948. Agustina de Guzman Vda. A year later. 1948. 1943. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. two settlement proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. BENGZON. L-22601 October 28. On the other hand. . J. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac. 69(ii). CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP. 221. 221. Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4 each). Agustina. No. 1941.R. G. Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as heir. Honoria. Consuelo and Ligaya).

de Carrillo as well as that of her heirs in the three-fourths share adjudged to the reservista. said court pointed out that: . Such being the case. the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. 213-214) On December 20. On November 6. which reads in part: . the Present plaintiff in this case. Acting on said petition. defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautita filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that the cause of action is barred by prior judgement and by the statute of limitations. 209) On April 22. 1950. Agustina died. 1950. p. . . 1960. Said petition was heard on November 10. it did not totally disregard the defense of prescription. 23. the Court. the lower court issued its order of November 14. therefore. de Carrillo. Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to Us upon questions of law. but rather reverted to the family trunk of the Isabel-Adolfo line. the lower court dismissed Civil Case No.On April 24. Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss: that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of limitations. is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the said three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8. . 1959. inherited by Agustina de Guzman was never released from the reserva. Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. In resume. On June 8. the latter being a party thereto as administratix of the estate of her deceased mother Agustina. . 1950 in Special Proceeding No. . Upon her death on April 24. 1950. 23. so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de Guzman into an absolute one. 1963. definitely terminated. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal. and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de Guzman Vda. On November 19. Thus. 221 against Francisca Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista. after a copy was served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo. 351. 1950. 1950. the court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Although the action was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of res judicata. (Record on Appeal. The order of dismissal reads in part: By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of Adolfo Salak.2 On June 20. the minor Ernesto Bautista. has no cause of action against the defendants. the portion of Lot No. 1963. the property did not pass by inheritance to her legal heirs. 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23. Intestate Estate of the late Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo. (Record on Appeals. 221. finding the suit barred by the order of delivery dated November 14. has become res judicata which cannot be disturbed in this case. 23 for the execution of the judgment therein. and that the reservee. 1963. 221. the estate of Agustina de Guzman. pp. declares all the interest of the said reservista Doña Agustina de Guzman Vda. in view of the death of the reservista. Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special Proceeding No. which included Lot No.

failing in this. the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista. obligacion que pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben complir sus herederos. el derecho para reclamarlos. y transmitirlos a sus herederos. if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties. 23 — when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson). among which was Lot No. which states: The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant. pertenecen a la herencia y se transmiten a los herederos. puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en el derecho al dominio pleno de esos bienes. As of then. Prima Carrillo (even though as administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista claimed to be the sole reservee of all the properties inherited by Da. Soterana Tuazon. por no haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta por la ley. It was her opportunity to assert her right as reservee by opposing the petition or. emphasis supplied) At any rate. when the trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain ground. According to Manresa. who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. the appellate court may uphold the decision below upon some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in favor of the appellant by the trial court. therefore. y en su virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno dominio del ascendiente. 23. Isabel (Adolfo's mother). queda extinguida la obligacion de reservar. como ya se ha indicado. y. can be lost by prescription: Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista. 221 in question. 1950. to contest or to ask to be relieved from the order of November 14. she is also deemed to have been notified of the petition for execution of judgment in Special Proceeding No. or a brother or sister. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido contrario. cambian por completo las relaciones y condiciones juridicas de las personas y de las cosas. this right. Record on Appeal. . La obligacion de reservar se convierte en la de entregar los bienes a quien correspondan. que nacen con la extincion de la reserva. 214-215. this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription. and of the order of November 14. y pertenecen a su herencia conforme al art. pudiendo disponer libremente de aquellos o de este. Castro. Nonetheless. Si a la muerte del reservista se comple la condicion resolutoria de existir parientes dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden. as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios. 943 and Relativo v. she allowed about thirteen (13) years before she commenced the present action. 1950. (Decision. a estos parientes pasa desde aquel momento por ministerio de la ley el dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes. Y si no sobrevive al reservista ninguno de dichos parientes. is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. tenemos por indudable que no tiene el caracter de personalisimo ninguno de esos derechos. 651. 76 Phil. Instead. The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. pp. who acquired them by gratuitous title from another ascendant. por consiguiente. Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code. As ruled in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. 40 Phil. 563. Agustina from the Salak Family.Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of her mother. but she did not file any opposition thereto.

transcurridos. porque no habiendo reserva si no acepta el ascendiente. se extenguira esta. 288-289. una vez necida a compaña al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte. si se disfrutan como libres los bienes por los herederos del ascendiente durante el tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley. es aplicable la doctrina. Vol. Plaintiffs-appellants herein. Tres son.aunque el causante no los hubiere ejercitado por si mismo. 1944 Ed. who has been possessing it in the concept of an owner. Al faltar una de ellas. la reserva muerte. y el ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno dominio de los bienes reservables por su naturaleza. 316-318). therefore. 1.969) .. 14. no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva respecto de el. Codigo Civil Comentado. Muerte del ascendiente. en virtud de la naturaleza condicional de los derechos que crea el art..a. salvo cases de renuncia. 221 — from Francisca Salak de Paz. Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against the reservatarios to cut off their right to the reservable property: f) Prescipcion. xxx xxx xxx Ademas de las tres causas expresadas. entendemos que.a La prescripcion. momento determinante del derecho al ejercicio de la reserva (art. promulgated on June 8. como tal. Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva. as reservatarios. cesa toda obligacion de reservar. Vol. It is clear. xxx xxx xxx Y 5. es lo cierto que la reserva. 1. pueden señalarse otras que expondremos a continuacion.—Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene solo applicacion a los parientes del tercer grado del descendiente. that the right or cause of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24. porque pueden no ejercer su derecho por ignorar la muerte del descendiente opor otra causa. from April 24. 1911 Ed. 1950 when Agustina died. 6. . Dada esta posibilidad. incapacidad o prescripcion. treinta años desde la aceptacion sin que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la constitucion de la reserva. had the right to claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No.—Sea el que quiera el destino definitivo de los bienes.693) (1). (Manresa. Muerto el ascendiente. p. falta el sujeto pasivo de la reserva. pero que no fueron objeto de reserva. pp. por tanto. rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina died. contados desde la aceptacion de la herencia por el ascendiente. 1950. tratandose de un derecho real sobre bienes inmuebles. xxx xxx xxx C) Extincion de la reserva. 1950. Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Español. pues.—Las mismas condiciones exigidas para el nacimiento de la reserva son necesarias para su existencia. And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal. (Scaevola. las principales causas de extincion: 1. prescribira a los treinta años (art. 360). 811.

. the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of prescription. or more than ten (10) years from April 24." Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein. having been filed only on April 22. WHEREFORE. with costs against appellants. has prescribed. 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force. We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata. This is the applicable law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code [August 30. And having reached such conclusion. 1963. counted from the time the cause of action accrued.Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover real property. 1950. So ordered.

costs. H. Indemnity. H. renewal. agree at all times to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any and all damages. in advance as premium there of for every __________ months or fractions thereof. The twenty counterbonds. the undersigned jointly and severally. November 28. each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. and expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may.. of whatsoever kind and nature. penalties. HEMADY. substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them. L-8437. dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. — The undersigned. at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any extension. losses.8. presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag.] ESTATE OF K. this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect. the various principals in favor of different creditors. jointly and severally. B.. stamps. shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable therefore. on account of the undersigned or any of them. a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them.’s of having guaranteed. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be granted under this indemnity agreement. No. all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or cause to be paid. in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements. DECISION REYES. whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not. from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. J. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof. Q293) for failure to state a cause of action. including 15% of the amount involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorney’s fees. The Luzon Surety Co.. but in no case less than P25. INC. its successors and assigns. vs. or counter bonds.: Appeal by Luzon Surety Co. all contained the following stipulations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Premiums. [G. J. reimburse and make good to the COMPANY. LUZON SURETY CO. xxx xxx xxx . Hemady. — Any and all sums of money so paid by the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest. the capital and interest. Interest on amount paid by the Company.. H. Inc. claimant-Appellant. agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos. — As consideration for this suretyship. 1956. or indemnity agreements. deceased. if not paid. taxes. Philippines Currency. charges.R.. or become liable to pay. L.

no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the indemnity agreement.Waiver. are not chargeable to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor. with 12 per cent interest thereon.” Taking up the latter point first.” (Rec. but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor. The security company has not demanded from K. Whatever loss therefore. App. Before answer was filed.. on two grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady). H. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company. was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled ‘Security by way of first mortgage. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first mortgage. pp. the claim cannot be considered contingent. As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix. the reasoning of the court below ran as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady. H. App. as a contingent claim. his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered. xxx xxx xxx Our Liability Hereunder. honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. a primary one. by order of September 23. 407-408). character. 98. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived. 1953. or to exhaust the property of the principal. and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate. Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the personality. . — It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal upon his default. dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co.) The Luzon Surety Co. since it is the one more far reaching in effects. are not chargeable to his estate. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death.. that is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary integrity. and therefore. prayed for allowance. which was expressly waived and renounced by the security company. integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds. waiving for this purpose any other venue. This Court believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code.” (Rec. and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default. — It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila. Hemady. pp. Upon the death of Hemady. of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds. his liability as a guarantor terminated. the lower cou rt.. the same as that of the principal. because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.102. and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds. may occur after Hemady’s death.

since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person.We find this reasoning untenable. as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257). “ART. — The inheritance includes all the property. The rule is a consequence of the progressive “depersonalization” of patrimonial rights and duties that. rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death. 265). — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property. touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. and. xxx xxx xxx “The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure. Austria. 403. The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees. except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature. in accordance with that principle. has characterized the history of these institutions. rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance. by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party. chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythey take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights. or by stipulation or by provision of law. the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Dolor. the rule is that — “Contracts take effect only as between the parties. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311). Gaz.” (See also Galasinao vs. Fernandez. 91 Phil. 6) p. this Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Under the Civil Code the heirs. 9 Phil. the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be “third persons” in relation to any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance. their assigns and heirs. 774. 2 Phil. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide.” While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him. 2874 and de Guzman vs.” “ART. the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony. The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). Salak. 51 Off. thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted. 776. therefore. with the persons occupying only a representative . (No. of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.” In Mojica vs. 44). as observed by Victorio Polacco. Under our law..

Asi. his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule. sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores. la intransmisibilidad. is contracted intuitu personae. this intransmissibility should not be easily implied. Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante. p. The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are “not transmissible by operation of law”. clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself. in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919).. salvo las personalisimas. “(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf.” (Scaevola. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. 1. porque si no. y para evitarlo. did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la transmision. Similarly. By contract. si asi se quiere.. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death. or at the very least. es menester el pacto expreso. a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns. . barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence. so long as the money was paid to it.. The second exception of Article 1311.position. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryle excepcion. como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica. it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect. y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied. that the Luzon Surety Co. lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus herederos. contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726). expect of K. parental authority (Article 327). the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety. but not that his obligation was strictly personal. is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co.) Because under the law (Article 1311). p.e. Por su esencia. es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido. resulting from an obligation to give. Tomo XX. para la no transmision. the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311. and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable. chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycuando no se quiera esto. H. el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir más allá de las personas que les dieron vida. but must be expressly established. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. as is the case in legal support (Article 300). se impone una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money. usufruct (Article 603). Codigo Civil. — Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y obligaciones. i.

nor by provision of law. so linked to his individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death. It will be noted. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial court’s stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latter’s undertaking strictly personal. which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity. where the late Hemady was a surety. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding. The foregoing concept is confirmed follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary by the next Article 2057. he has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be reduced to judgment. 15 Pla. it should also be true of his integrity. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. Vann. H. capacity to bind himself. give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5. 2057. there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. [Tenn. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co. 553.)” For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor. vs. the creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGibson vs. 814). to the effect that “one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity. his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. 810. Rule 87 (2 Moran. 437. Mithell. 63 Wis. Tan Sit. not his duty. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryMaxey vs. or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part. The case is excepted where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor. and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees”.” From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say. that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. (May vs. — If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty or should become insolvent. 7 Baxt. When he does this. 10 Yarg.. 43 Phil.. The contracts. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt.. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. 2056. Carter. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true of his capacity to bind himself. Pulliam. [Tenn. 1952 ed. the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of the guarantor. 119. The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. not a principal debtor. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may waive it if he chooses. nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves. however. 134. therefore. p. and hold the guarantor to his bargain. The .]. the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted. Nou.The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryErnst vs. chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us.. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking. But the step remains optional in the creditor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary it is his right. 519. 16 Pla.]. 521 Reeves vs. that runs as “ART. “The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead.

the order appealed from is reversed. What the Luzon Surety Co. since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin. the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor. as guarantor. If under the Gaskell ruling. in view of the existing solidarity. had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.. because irrespective of the solution to this question. with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s liability for premiums and stamp taxes. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady. the Luzon Surety’s claim did state a cause of action. Costs against the Administratrix. SO ORDERED. the Luzon Surety Co. and that in such event. since. there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against the estate of Hemady. .Appellee.argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between parties. and its dismissal was erroneous. could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should die. Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death.. The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code. the Luzon Surety Co. Wherefore.

700. 1946 leaving heir the surviving spouse and some minor children. plaintiff-appellant. — That on April 15. the pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision: 1st. by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. Miel appellee. the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. 4th. 7th. 1946. PO.J. The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts. judgment was against the plaintiff. 6th. — That on January 17. de Winstanley. 2nd. one undivided half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold. 5th. the sole question for determination is the validity of the sale to Esperanza M. . As stated by the trial Judge. 1947. 3rd. This question in turn depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy. alleging among other things. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu. TUASON. the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido A. after her appointment as guardian of her children by this court (Special proceeding no. defendant-appellant. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have never been registered up to the date. Quirico del Mar for appellant. the former having died on June 6. L-5064 February 27. J. along with the other half. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife. Tumulak and Conchita F. 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda. Po. — That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property. Ebarle. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy. that she needed money for the support of her children. ESPERANZA M.: This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of sale conveying to the defendant. Daniel P. — That on May 24. No.9. defendant in the instant case. Po.R. which portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses. he left a parcel of land described under Transfer Certificate of title No. — hat upon the death of L. the last purchaser. G. IBARLE. 1953 BIENVENIDO A. — That Leonard j. in consideration of P1. Winstanley. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned above to Esperanza M. vs.

If registration were necessary. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation." in a slightly different language.Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death. still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition. the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share. whether such right be pure or contingent. Manresa. this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777. commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain. (5 Manresa. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title. 317. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. made in said decision.) The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. . says: The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance. of the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. On the other hand.

wherein it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal property. purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. TOMASA OSORIO. On February 28. Petrona Reyes. one-third belonged to D. and THE YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO. which division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May 10. It was agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co. which were included in the inventory of the properties of the deceased Da. the estate of D. 1914. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate. Said sum was deposited with the Steamship Co. the plaintiff. giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. Antonio Osorio. al interest or participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. widow of Osorio. Fernandez and Ansaldo for appellants. The facts of this case are: D. After the death of D. and said administratix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs.66. Ynchausti & Co. Leonardo Osorio. a donation which was duly accepted by the donee D.000. of which P166. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among his heirs. a little over P166.66. Da. among the properties which belonged to the widow Da. the widow of D. at the time of the incorporation of “The Ynchausti Steamship Co.” was P61. No.. which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration proceedings of the state of the deceased Osorio.. executed before the notary D. February 28. 1914.” and the dividends corresponding to them. until the final .. and the donor Da. Tomasa Osorio. for the same reasons stated in the document of February 28. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor of her son D. L-16544 LEONARDO OSORIO.” that is. in the vessel Governor Forbes. Leonardo Osorio. 1915. Petrona Reyes.666. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document. . Carlos Ledesma for appellee. now also deceased. that is. maintaining said donation in effect in the sense that she ceded and donated to her son D.000 as her part in the “share of the estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. with the consent of the heirs. vs. who signed said document with the plaintiff. defendants-appellants.000.10.R. he being the owner of the one-third of the company’s capital.: The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of “Ynchausti Steamship Co. by the Court of First Instance of Cavite. whose estate is administered by the defendant. Leonardo Osorio. Upon his death. Antonio Osorio. Villamor (Ignacio). The project of partition was approved on May 10. to present a project of partition. which was adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D. which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime.. his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. a joint account association for the exploitation of the shipping business. when the partition was yet being effected. Petrona Reyes.. plaintiff-appellee. On that date. Antonio Osorio as having an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. Antonio Osorio. the sum of P94. administratrix of the estate of Petrona Reyes. 1915. equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. 1915. then administratrix of the estate of the deceased. This capital amounted to P500. executed another document dated July 3. Maria Petrona Reyes. 1914.666. J.

I also declare that the present donation does not in any way prejudice the right which may accrue to my other children with respect to inheriting my property and that therefore I can effect this donation. administratrix of the estate of Da. the value of which is P61. Philippine Islands. Leonardo Osorio of all my interest and participation in said company “Ynchausti and Co. 4. the deceased D. supposing said donation valid. delivering to him the dividends corresponding thereto. he is the owner of said shares and of their value which is P61. and denied the counterclaim for the sum of P45. The trial court rendered judgment in the case. and ordered the defendant Da.” which is neither transferred nor burdened in any manner whatever. That my husband. I make a free and expressed donation to my said son D. Petrona Reyes. and donated by her to the defendant in the counterclaim. while the plaintiff alleges that. and the other defendant “The Ynchausti Steamship Co. being in possession of all my senses. The document of donation dated February 28. which is engaged in the business of buying vessels and in the exploitation of six steam vessels acquired from the Compañia Maritima. was a shareholder to the extent of one-third in the joint account association “Ynchausti & Co. Such as the facts which gave rise to this litigation. in summing up their arguments in support of the errors assigned in their brief. Petrona Reyes. by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Da. Antonio Osorio and upon the partition of his estate. Antonio Osorio. in the partition of the estate of D. That in consideration of the continuous services and attention received by me from my son D. 3. cannot be considered as included among them.000.” of this place. to exclude them from the inventory and her accounts. attacked by the appellant. and because of the affection he has always shown and still shows me. before the notary public D. as well as because of the number of children that he has. such being the present condition of our interest in said company. the 610 shares of stock. is as follows: Know all me by these presents: That I. 2. 1906. freely and voluntarily state: 1. Petrona Reyes. The case having been appealed to this court. of age. the article of association of said joint account association having been executed in the city of Manila on July 3. on the ground that said sum represents the dividends corresponding to the P94. of age. Leonardo Osorio.000. The donation made by Da. widow of D. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for. the other half thereof going to our four surviving children. one-half of said one-third part in the business referred to. Petrona Reyes.000. maintain the two following propositions: 1. . 1914. That upon the death of my husband D. Leonardo Osorio. the defendant on the other hand contends that said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Da. Antonio Osorio. married and a resident of Cavite also. Florencio Gonzales Diez.000 adjudicated to Da. That. declaring that the 610 shares of stock in dispute and their dividends belong to the plaintiff. Petrona Reyes. and 2. Tomasa Osorio. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was of no value and effect.” to inscribe them in the name of the plaintiff D. counsel for the defendant and appellant.settlement of the question that had arisen between the heirs of Da. Antonio Osorio and resident of the Province of Cavite. there was adjudicated to me as conjugal property.

widow of D.) CARLOS LEDESMA. of one-half of the one-third part which my deceased husband had in certain shipping business of the association “Ynchausti & Co.with all liberty. Acknowledged before the notary public D. In witness whereof we sign the present document in triplicate at Manila. of age.) EUSEBIO ALBA. married and a resident of the Province of Cavite. I executed a document of donation in favor of my son D. D. through error. Florencio Gonzales Diez. that said half of one-third part of the business referred to was adjudicated to me as my part of the conjugal property in the partition of the properties left by my deceased husband.) PETRONA REYES. The document rectifying the ratifying the preceding is literally as follows: Know all men by these presents: That I. That in said document I stated. in consideration of the same causes mentioned in said document of February 28. 1914. being in the full possession of my senses. 5. Leonardo Osorio. Petrona Reyes. That in order to correct said error.LEONARDO OSORIO. In witness whereof I sign the present document in triplicate of Cavite on July 3. 1914. when the truth was that said partition had not yet been put in proper form or finished. freely and voluntarily declare: 1. (Sgd. state my conformity and acceptance of said donation which my dear mother makes to me. which was adjudicated to me in the partition of the estate of my deceased husband. by): PETRONA REYES. I. all interest or share in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. declaring however in any event that I make said donation subsisting in the sense that I cede and donate to my side son D. on May 10. . Philippine Islands. and approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite. as I reserve for myself what is sufficient for me to live on in the manner which corresponds to my social position and needs. of age. Signed in the presence of:(Sgd.SALVADOR BARRIOS. Florencio Gonzales Diez on February 28. 1915. Signed in the presence of: (Sgd. for which I am greatly thankful to her. Philippine Islands. Leonardo Osorio. 1915. nineteen hundred and fourteen. 3. Leonardo Osorio. That on February 28. Antonio Osorio and resident of the Province of Cavite.ISAURO GABALDON. I so state. (Sgd.” 2. before the notary public of Manila. In turn. this twentyeighth day of February. 1914.

because he cannot dispose of them at the moment of making the donation. which. a future property. cannot be considered as another’s property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner. because the case refers to a vested right of which he may dispose at the time of the donation. Manresa says. The usufructuary for life or for a determined number of years of a vineyard may donate said usufruct to the whole extent that it belongs to him but never the property itself. such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio. the appellant invokes as the legal provision violated. thus connecting two ideas which. beside that indicated in article 1271. 1915. according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of his death. and because in 1914 she did not have the right to all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. cannot be the object of the disposal by the donor. because they are not at present his properties. according to article 989 of the Civil Code. It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Nor do they have the character of future property because the died before 1912. are merged in reality in the subject which we examine and which gives assurance to their application. may legally be the object of contract. 177. Commenting on article 635 of the Civil Code. This definition in reality includes all properties which belong to others at the time of the donation. 831. but he may also donate the usufruct which corresponds to the time that it will go back to him. Furthermore the Civil Code does not prohibit absolutely that future inheritance should be the object of agreement. article 635 of the Civil Code. as such. 1914. and it may be deduced that an inheritance already existing. which is no longer future from the moment of death of the predecessor. but the properties of an existing inheritance as those of the case at bar. Article 635 refers to the properties of third persons but it may be said that id does so in relation to a time to come. Carefully examining said article 635 of the Civil Code. 827. inasmuch as for its efficacy the . for the acquisition of said property retroacts in any event to the moment of death. the donation of which is prohibited by said article. in relation to the worthy opinion of the commentator Manresa. By future property is understood that of which the donor can not dispose at the time of making the donation. for there are certain cases (arts. there can be properties which may latter belong to the donor. which was adjudicated to her on May 10.In support of the first proposition. his heirs acquired a right to succeed him from the moment of his death. we believe that the future properties. but this is not an obstacle. and 1331) in which agreements may be made as to them. although they may or may not later belong to the donor. The bare owner of said vineyard may donate his right of course. A donation being of a contractual nature. although lacking apparently in relation. The right is acquired although subject to the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion. are those belonging to other. They are those of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of making the donation. More of less time may elapse before the heirs enter into the possession of the hereditary property. among other things: To close these fundamental ideas which the spirit of articles 634 and 635 develops we must fix our attention to the definition which the Code gives of future properties. but these properties cannot be donated. because of the principle announced in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code. which says: A donation can not include future property. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on February 28.

Petrona Reyes did not have in 1914 any right to all or part of the share of her deceased husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti and Co. to accept to the donation and notify the donor thereof. in order that the donation may produce legal effect. The testator institutes as his only and universal heirs his said children and granddaugther. This admission of the defendant is conclusive. Maria Petrona Reyes. Maria Petrona Reyes did not donate to the plaintiff more that her share in the shipping business of the firm Ynchausti & Co. 1915. The acceptance is necessary because nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will.. the donor executed the document of 1915. becomes perfect. With respect to the point that Da. The testator declares that all property left by him was acquired during his marriage with Petrona Reyes. Antonio Osorio and that said share amounts to P94. the donor only tried to correct what she believed to be an error in the first. and Leonardo and her granddaugther Soledad Encarnacion Osorio y San Agustin are at present all living and are the only heirs of the deceased. and could legally dispose of her right through an act of liberality. is of no importance. She executed a personal act which did not require the concurrence of the donee. that of the donor and the donee. which was adjudicated to her in the partition of the property of D. and makes it unnecessary for us to enter into another discussion in order to deduce that Da. . Leonardo Osorio. Petrona Reyes had in 1914 a right to a certain part of the interest of the deceased Osorio in the shipping business of the firm Ynchausti & Co. can it be denied that the donor by law had the right to half of said share as her part of the conjugal property? Clearly not. The allegation that the document of July 3. the donation. according to article 623 of the Civil Code.. as a mode of transferring ownership. as she did. We do not have before us the will of D. and could donate it. and legacy. we believe that which may be the object of contract may also be the object of a donation. ibi est eadem legis dispositio. And all this was complied with in the document of 1914. when in fact said partition was yet pending.. The defendant in her answer says: That Da.concurrence of two wills is required. Antonio Osorio the following appears: The widow of the testator.000. 1914. betterment. on February 28. Antonio Osorio but supposing that he had left no property but the share which he had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. 1912. Tomasa. The wills of the donor and of the donee having concurred. it must be observed that in the project of partition of the property of D. wherein it is stated that in the partition of the property of her husband there was adjudicated to her the part of the interest in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. is void. as she had done. leaves to the disposition of his widow and amount equivalent to that set aside by him in payment of one-half part of the conjugal property and orders that the remainder should be equally distributed among his heirs. It is the duty of the donee. to her son D. ratifying and correcting the document of donation. which she donated to her son Leonardo. Petrona Reyes. Ubi eadem est ratio. In the second document. her children Feliza. designates the parts which each of them must receive as legitime. because it does not show the acceptance of the donee. After its approval by the Court of First Instance of Cavite. We conclude that the donor Da. She did not make a new donation. because of the conclusion we have reached in discussing the document of donation of February 28.

.000. after its acquisition the Ynchausti firm accounted to the estate of D.33 and to the widow Da. states that the Forbes was purchased with money which the shipping business of Unchaisti & Co. Antonio Osorio did not bring in any new capital for the purchase of the vessel. supposing that said donation was valied. that the 610 shares.33. and (4) because. the accruing to each P11. stating that when the steamer Forbes was acquired in 1912. is one of the fact and must be resolved in view of the evidence adduced at the trial. It is no argument against this conclusion that the heirs of Osorio signed with Ynchausti & Co. which are the subject matter of the suit. Antonio Osorio. which is the object of this suit. made a deposition before the notary public D. and. and the heirs of Osorio for the purchase of the vessel Forbes. Julio Gonzales. D. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff. D. that the sum of 61. The question whether the streamer Governor Forbes was or was not purchased with money furnished by Ynchausti and the heirs of Osorio. in which D. with the others. The appellant herself admits that his vessel took part in the general shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. which one-half part accrued to the widow in the distribution of the properties of Osorio. including the profits obtained in the shipping business. but only a general account. except Da. All of the above shows that the estate of Osorio had a one-third part of the steamer Forbes represented by the capital which was distributed among the heirs. besides said guaranty. it clearly results. were mortgage. witness for the defendant. and the widow Da. or the corresponding . Leonardo Osorio. Soledad Osorio. the guaranty which the bank required.333. manager of the firm Ynchausti & Co. and (2) that the plaintiff appellee has recognized that the capital used in the steamer Forbes is distinct from the money used in the purchase of other vessels in which the deceased Osorio had an interest. (3) because no new partnership was formed between Ynchausti & Co. by agreement of the parties and with the approval of the court. the guaranty required by the bank where the money used in the purchase of the Forbes was taken: (1) Because the guaranty is for the purpose only for securing the payment of the amount indebted and not for excluding the estate of Osorio from the result of that banking operation. for no new partnership was constituted for the purchase thereof. in which the Governor Forbes was but one of several vessels. cannot be considered as included in the donation made by Da. had. Antonio Osorio for the profits obtained and the dividends to be distributed and no separate account was made of the earnings of the vessel. donating it to her son D. Soledad Osorio who did not sign the guaranty. but signed jointly with Ynchausti & Co. Antonio Osorio and his estate had an interest. In our opinion the evidence shows conclusively that the vessel Governor Forbes forms part of the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. by agreement of the interested parties.000. there accruing to the widow.000. this sum was distributed among said heirs. indepedently of that former partnership in which the deceased Osorio had an interest. that is. agreed with the heirs of Osorio in that his share in the steamer Forbes was P108. Petrona Reyes having disposed of this half. Florencio Gonzales Diez.We will not pass to the second proposition of the appellant. including Da. And this sum being part of the one-half of one-third of the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co. 833. Joaquin Elizalde. when Unchausti & Co. but obtained money for its purchase by mortgaging the vessel itself and other vesseles of the company. the other vessels of the joint account association of Osorio and Ynchausti & Co. in our opinion. Petrona Reyes P61. (2) because. secretary and accountant of the firm Ynchausti. The reasons alleged by the appellant are: (1) That the steam vessel Governor Forbes was purchased after the death of D. with money borrowed and furnished by the heirs individually and not by the estate.. and that the heirs of D. the sum of P61. the Ynchausti firm did not bring in any new capital.

and therefore belong to the plaintiff-appellee. the judgment appealed from should be. There is nothing in said letter which indicates how the Governor Forbes was acquired.. as trustee. when the question between the heirs of Da. We have carefully read the letter in question and what appears is that said plaintiff agreed that the P61. affirmed. we are of the opinion that the evidence justifies the conclusion of the trial court that they are the profits or dividends accruing to the P94.000. Petrona Reyes in the distribution of the estate of the deceased Osorio and which were donated by her to the plaintiff. naturally or artificially. or is united or incorporated thereto. according to the result of the present suit. which were adjudicated to the widow Da. and as such profits they belong to the latter. with costs against the appellant.) In view of what has been said. Petrona Reyes had already been terminated. The other reason alleged by the appellant in support of her contention is that the plaintiff has recognized in his letter addressed to the defendant corporation. that is to say. 353 of the Civil Code. With respect to the counterclaim of P45. upon the principle of law that ownership of property gives right by accession to all that it produces.609.” are included in said donation.000 should be deposited with Ynchausti & Co.shares of the new corporation “The Ynchausti Steamship Co.91. as it is hereby. . to be distributed with its accumulated dividends. (Art. and inserted in the answer presented by the latter that the Forbes was acquired with money different from that of the joint account association theretofore mentioned. So ordered.

00 in favor of the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. L-25049 August 30. and JOSE EGUARAS. as security for a loan of P2. a writ of execution was issued for the sale of the mortgaged property. the obligation was not fully paid.. defendants-appellees. Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. decision was rendered decreeing the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and the sale thereof. G. Filemon Ramirez was appointed administrator of the estate. Monica Ramirez and Jose Eguaras. 1968 FILEMON RAMIREZ. within ninety days from finality of the decision. docketed as Civil Case No. Upon the demise of the mortgagor. It appears that on 6 January 1959. plus the expenses of the sale and the Sheriff's fees. on motion to dismiss. On petition of the plaintiffs. against the spouses Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. qualified for the office. filed a complaint for foreclosure of the aforesaid mortgage. ANGELES. Eduardo M. on 16 January 1961. Tomas P. administrator of the estate who. SC-319 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. 1äwphï1. made and executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. then a deputy clerk of court. ET AL. as deputy clerk of court.ñët On 16 August 1961.888. No.170. The defendant-administrator was duly served with summons but he failed to answer. whereupon. Peralta for plaintiffs-appellants. who happened to be the plaintiffs themselves. plaintiffs-appellants. in his capacity as administrator of the estate . SC-99 wherein said mortgages. SC-292 for the Foreclosure of the Mortgage". filed a complaint designated "For the Annulment of all Proceedings in said Civil Case No. Victoriana Eguaras single. Filemon Ramirez. Tirso Caballero for defendant-appellee Artemio Diawan. The case was referred to a commissioner to receive the evidence for the plaintiffs.: On appeal from an order dismissing the complaint. the Sheriff sold the property at public auction to the highest bidder. ARTEMIO BALTAZAR. MONICA RAMIREZ. J. in due time.11. and Artemio Diawan. however. in Civil Case No.R. Anonuevo for defendants-appellees Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. the court appointed Artemio Diawan. in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. alleged that Filemon Ramirez and Monica Ramirez are the heirs of the deceased. as creditors of the deceased. for the sum of P2. The judgment not having been satisfied. the sale was confirmed by the court on 26 January 1962. in his capacity as administrator of the estate. SC-292 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. against Artemio Diawan. vs. the mortgagees. having failed to qualify. as petitioners. on petition of the plaintiffs said defendant was declared in default. on 16 September 1960 filed a petition for the intestate proceedings of her estate. owned by her in fee simple. the mortgagees. On 6 February 1962. and defendant-administrator. docketed as Civil Case No. posting and publication of the notice of sale. and after compliance with the requirements of the law regarding the sending. if. the first two being the heirs named in the petition for intestate proceedings. On 19 April 1961. acted as such hearing commissioner.50 covering the amount of the judgment.

contained in the complaint in said Civil Case No. reasoning thus: that "upon consideration of the evidence. (2) in ruling that there was no collusion or connivance among the defendants-appellees. Under the circumstances and with the apparent disinterestedness of Filemon and Rolando to qualify as administrator when appointed. defendant Diawan likewise moved to dismiss on two grounds: that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no cause of action. (c) in presiding as hearing officer in the ex parte hearing in Civil Case No. 1962. they have no cause of action against defendants. said defendant could not have offered any evidence to avoid the foreclosure of the mortgage which the Court found to be in order. and until such status is so fixed by the Court. It is also alleged that it was only when the property foreclosed was published for sale at public auction that the heirs came to know about the foreclosure proceedings.ñët Despite vigorous opposition interposed by the plaintiffs against the aforesaid motions to dismiss.of Victoriana Eguaras. SC-319. deliberately and in fraud of the plaintiffs: (a) in allowing the reglementary period within which to file an answer to lapse without notifying and/or informing the said plaintiffs of the complaint for foreclosure. 1äwphï1. despite the fact that . 292.548. and that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue since their status as legal heirs of the deceased has yet to be determined precisely in Special Proceeding No. notwithstanding the fact that there was another deputy clerk of court available who could have acted in his stead. in his capacity as deputy provincial sheriff of Laguna." Reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied. Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. the defendant administrator could have interposed a counterclaim because payment in the sum of P1. as a result of which he was declared in default to the prejudice of the estate which he represents. dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. to receive evidence for plaintiffs therein. acted in collusion with the other defendants Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores. SC-99. the court also denied plaintiffs' petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from entering and taking physical possession of the land in question on the ground "that possession thereof was effected and delivered by the Provincial Sheriff to Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores on February. there could not have been any connivance and/or collusion between plaintiffs in this case and Artemio Diawan as administrator". The defendants spouses. and (f) in refusing to help the heirs seek postponement of the auction sale. with the additional averments that the defendant Diawan. on 13 March 1962. (d) in allowing judgment to become final without notifying the plaintiffs. the court. the deputy clerk of court appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue. allowing the 90-day period within which to make payment to expire without notifying the heirs. the plaintiffs took the present appeal where they assigned the following errors: (1) in holding that plaintiffs-appellants have no legal capacity to sue until their status as legal heirs of the deceased is determined in Special Proceeding No. and Silverio Talabis.52 had been made and received by the mortgagees on account of the debt. deceased. as a result of which the said heirs were not afforded an opportunity to make payments ordered by the Court in its decision. SC-99. (b) that had the plaintiffs (Monica and Filemon) been notified of the pendency of the case. SC-319 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. (e) in deliberately. as a result of which an anomalous situation was created whereby he was a defendant and at the same time a commissioner receiving evidence against himself as administrator. docketed as Civil Case No. In that order of 13 March 1962. The facts hereinabove narrated are. succinctly.

not factual. We are not. We fully agree with the plaintiffs-appellants that the lower court had gone too far in practically adjudicating the case on the merits when it made the observation that "there could not have been any connivance and/or collusion between plaintiffs in this case and Artemio Diawan as administrator. At this stage of the proceeding. and (3) in denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. in availing themselves of the defense that the plaintiffs-appellants had not been declared to be the heirs of the deceased Victoriana Eguaras. two of herein plaintiffs-appellants. the cause of action is based on Section 30. and considering the nature of the case before Us. let it be remembered that the defendants-appellees. however. at this time. to the prejudice of the latter. PREMISES CONSIDERED. and the records be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. The administrator is being charged to have been in collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property of the deceased. are the heirs of the deceased. Undoubtedly. Costs against defendants-appellees.1 While. Since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated. such a question is. Pascual. the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. Insofar as defendants-appellees are concerned. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. have overlooked the fact that the (defendants-appellees) themselves in their petition for intestate proceedings (Case SC-99) have alleged that Filemon Ramirez and Monica Ramirez. And who else but the heirs. On the second point raised." A thorough scrutiny of the allegations in the motions to dismiss filed by defendantsappellees does not indicate that that question was ever put at issue therein. the formal declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation. the controversy — on the existence or inexistence of collusion between the parties as a result of which judgment was rendered against the estate — is the very core of the complaint that was dismissed. At the outset. in accord with the third assigned error — the denial of the motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction — for it puts at issue the factual finding made by the lower court that the defendants had already been placed in possession of the property. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. this case should fall under the exception. it would be farfetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate.3 it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings. would bring the action? Inevitably. beyond the competence of the Court. The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Department of Justice for its information. as a rule.2 In Pascual vs. the order appealed from is hereby set aside insofar as it dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. it is our opinion that they are estopped from questioning the heirship of these two named persons to the estate of the deceased. who have an interest to assert and to protect. SC-319." A similar situation obtains in the case at bar. .the issue in the motion to dismiss is purely legal. under special circumstances. this rule admits of an exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place. this Court has. allowing its foreclosure without notifying the heirs. On the other hand. rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate.

a writ of execution was issued and pursuant thereto.00. 1962 of the Hon. the sheriff required petitioners to post an indemnity bond in the amount of P2. 7866 mentioned heretofore. all surnamed De Borja. respectively. as an heir of the decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja. respondent Jose de Borja. Eufracia. G. Contending that it was not their duty to file such bond. 1966 JUAN DE BORJA. Crisanto de Borja.000. petitioners. in Civil Case No. JACOBA DE BORJA and OLIMPIA DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA. MARCELA DE BORJA. to set aside the order of May 19. J. L-20609 September 29. 2414. was rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja in Civil Case No.: Original petition filed by Juan.". vs. 2414 of the Court of First lnstance of Rizal. SATURNINA DE BORJA. DIZON. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. as well as his order denying their motion for reconsideration. 2414 entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Marcelo de Borja. interest and participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties in the province of Rizal. David Guevara for respondent J. No. Saturnina.210. and to compel him to cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the final judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. Said decision having become final. this Court hereby holds that whatever interest. filed with the respondent sheriff a third-party claim alleging that the properties levied upon were in custodia legis in connection with the settlement of the estate involved in Special Proceedings No. Administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (CFI-Rizal-7866). DR. respondents. Tolentino and Garcia for petitioners. Eulogio Mencias. On October 17. HON. Marcela.12. Acting upon this claim. whose estates were then pending settlement in Special Proceedings Nos. etc. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The record discloses that a money judgment involving the sum of P46. as administrator of the estate of Josefa Tanco. 1958 the respondent judge issued an order whose dispositive part reads as follows: WHEREFORE. plus interests. Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja (CFI-Rizal. petitioners filed a motion praying that the court order the sale of the properties levied upon. the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the rights. Thereafter.78. Leonardo Almeda for respondents.R. without the need of their filing such bond. claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against . de Borja.500. Jacoba and Olimpia. EUFRACIA DE BORJA. 2414) and JOSE DE BORJA. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL. Administrator. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court. EULOGIO MENCIAS.

the . It further holds that there is no sufficient reason for requiring the judgment creditors to file an indemnity bond. L-4170. No. Montilla. 1955 also of this court. No. Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. 2414. to be well-taken and notwithstanding the opposition filed thereto.1awphîl. the same are hereby granted. claim or right have been legally levied upon and consequently can be sold by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of the petitioners herein. which motion was granted in an order dated February 26. 2414. after the attachment or levy in execution.R. interest and participation Crisanto de Borja has in certain real properties under judicial administration in Special Proceedings Nos. G. 7866). the filing of the so-called third-party claim notwithstanding. of the following tenor: Wherefore. 1955) and the testate estate of Josefa Tangco (CFI-Rizal. interests and claim of Crisanto de Borja in the aforementioned estates upon compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court. It is a fact that whatever rights. respondent-administrator Jose de Borja appealed to us (G. L-14851). The question to be resolved here is whether or not. petitioners filed with the respondent judge a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. in accordance with the provision of Section 9. promulgated on January 31. the Court hereby orders the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to continue with his proceedings in the first writ of execution which had already been issued. 1962. 1962. on May 19. Their motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted order having been denied. interest and participation are subject to attachment and/or levy in execution in accordance with Section 9. No. which reads as follows: Considering the two motions for reconsiderations dated March 23. respectively. that said interest. 1962. On the other hand. Said decision having become final and executory. in their capacities as administrators of the intestate estate of the deceased Francisco de Borja (CFI-Rizal. the amendatory order subjectmatter of this action. and the order of the Court dated February 26. the respondent judge issued. 7866 also of this Court. and March 20. and praying that the sheriff be directed to proceed with the execution accordingly. Let another writ of execution with respect to the costs adjudged in the last decision of the Supreme Court issue. pursuant to Section 9. 1961 illegally modified the final judgment of the Supreme Court in G. were properly levied upon pursuant to the writ of execution issued by said court in Civil Case No. on the ground that the rights and interest of the judgment debtor (Crisanto de Borja) in the aforesaid estate could be sold only after final settlement of the latter. (Section 9 of Rule 57 of the New Rules of Court).the said heir. the Court hereby directs the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to proceed with the sale of the rights. and on August 31. His motion for reconsideration of the above order having been denied.R. Rule 59 of the Rules of Court and in conformity with the doctrine laid down in the case of Litonjua vs.R. and in the estate of the deceased Francisco de Borja subject of Special Proceedings No. respectively. We rendered judgment affirming the appealed order. 1962. is hereby amended in the sense that the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal be ordered to garnish whatever share or interests the judgment debtor may or might have by way of share or inheritance in the estate of the deceased Jose Tangco subject of Special Proceedings No. 1961. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. filed by Crisanto de Borja and Jose de Borja. L-14851 which directed the sale of the properties levied upon for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of petitioners in Civil Case No. As a consequence. 1962. it is beyond question that such rights.nèt Upon motions for reconsideration filed by respondents Crisanto de Borja and Jose de Borja. F-7866 and 1955 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. petitioners filed the present petition claiming that respondent judge's order of May 19.

judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondent court to proceed accordingly. . interest and participation may be adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates. modifying and/or clarifying the appealed order in the manner stated in the next preceding paragraph. must be answered in the affirmative. in our opinion. WHEREFORE. interest and participation of Crisanto de Borja in the estate left by decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja may be sold at public auction to satisfy the money judgment rendered against him.rights. Without costs. and that delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above. provided it is understood that the sale shall be only of whatever rights. The above question.

surnamed Rodriguez. Abelardo and Antonio. petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. namely. Bulacan. J. 1963 before the Court could act on the petition. Branch III. The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A. MARIA RODRIGUEZ.. Maria. Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque.R. HON. Maria. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court.B. ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN. G. as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. that on March 11. 1963. and that on March 12. aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Fr. which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction. and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. de Borja vs. the same was withdrawn. the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate. for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. REYES. 7792. vs. that on March 8. Tan and De Borja. G.: Petitioners Angela. through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. 1963 in the City of Manila. that he was buried in Parañaque. ET AL.L. Quezon City and Bulacan. 1963. 1331. No.M. Proceedings No. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12. No. . Rizal. citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. and that he left real properties in Rizal.M. Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners. 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque. 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.13. 1963. that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy. on the same date. that on March 12. Sp. Rizal. J. Torres and Torres for respondents. petitioners. that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. L-21993 June 21. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1955. among other things. 1966 ANGELA RODRIGUEZ. JUAN DE BORJA. Rodriguez. Annex 0).. Cavite. that on March 4. from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963. Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez. on March 12. Rodriguez alleging. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case". July 27. 1963. The records show that Fr. respondents. through counsel.R. in this wise: It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela. 1963 (Petition. dated June 13. that Fr. Fr.

and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country. Where estate of deceased persons settled. shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. motu proprio. July 27. The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament. Rule 77. have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will. that. and that movants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. since they filed a petition to examine the same. 1963. in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. came to this Court. Court to appoint time for proving will. while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12. as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other. and his estate settled. 1963. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent. previous to the time appointed. as early as March 7. even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later. or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in. of the old Rules): SEC. deposited in the Court of Bulacan. relying principally on Rule 73. on the other hand. The jurisdiction assumed by a court. because upon the will being deposited the court could. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will. and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively. and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3. — When a will is delivered to. or of the location of his estate. movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez. Reconsideration having been denied. or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death. 1955. The Court of First Instance. Since the testament of Fr. and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12. of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4. whether a citizen or an alien.ñët . 1963. But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself. movants. as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent. in the original case. Notice thereof to be published. now petitioners. SECTION 1. L-7792. shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding. the Court having jurisdiction. the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. eight days later. Tan and De Borja. section 1 of the Rules of Court.1äwphï1. in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death. such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof. except in an appeal from that court. take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4. and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Rule 76. or letters of administration granted. his will shall be proved. We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4. even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan. the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. 3.

the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy. 74 Phil. and consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque. since the same enjoins that: The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. 46. Dy Buncio & Co. 48206. because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. 48). 523..) The law of jurisdiction — Act No." and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. Petition. 136. fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. 676). and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco. (Cf. Bernabe vs. Rodriguez is deceased. G. there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines. Rec. Neither party denies that the late Fr. as we have said time and again.R. could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter. however. petitioners object. Reyes vs. or that he left personal property in Hagonoy. providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided. Annex "H". without taking venue into account. That is sufficient in the case before us. the Law of Procedure. 190. Bulacan (1930-1963).. section 600. 1942). province of Bulacan (t. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal. 20 Phil. procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. Of them only one could be of proper venue. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other.1 Since. Thus.) Motion for reconsideration is denied. section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction. Rizal. (Sec. We can not disregard Fr.But. p. 73 Phil. 190. but even if we do so. section 1. Act No. Furthermore.s. that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. 1) This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. Vergara. the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75. Diaz. section 600 of Act No.. 239. Section 56. No. (Attorney General vs. No. Manila Railroad Company. p. after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to . December 31. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter. 1963. Tanunchuan vs. the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. 73 Phil. In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that: ". and. As ruled in previous decisions. even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court. yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked. hearing of June 11.n. 484.

was in bad faith. The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. The other reason is that. the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person dies without a will. or with a void will. and no right of accretion takes place. vs. In such case. and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. Wherefore. proceedings. et al. since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate. (4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding. 307. . Therefore. with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. (2) When the will does not institute an heir to. 10 Phil. as ruled in Castro. "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question. or if the heir dies before the testator. Martinez. or one which has subsequently lost its validity.the Court of Bulacan. except in cases provided in this Code. (3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled. 960. or repudiates the inheritance. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants. patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed. in our system of civil law. there being no substitution.

In all the documents. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion. subject to her lifetime usufruct. Floserpina Chavez. with their mother. also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister. ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista. vs. On July 11. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division). on May 2. the following stipulation appears: Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina. Concepcion. L-68282 November 8. likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. with the conformity of her mother. gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang nabubuhay pa ang aming ina. J. Presentacion Chavez. Concepcion Chavez. No. Concepcion thereby became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares. kung kaya ito ay hatiin naming anim (6) na mga magkakapatid. Jose L. Concepcion.R. for the same price of P450.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26. petitioners. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children. with the conformity of her mother. and (2) declared that the earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. DE CHAVEZ. Floserpina and Raquel. Manuela Buenavista. Rosario. GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. GRIÑO-AQUINO. 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G. Narra for petitioners. G. were the defendants in Civil Case No. No. ANTONIO CHAVEZ. Raquel. bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang paghihiwatig o partition. with the conformity of her mother.R. Two years later. named Antonio. 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. 14. Edmundo A. ROSARIO CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ. for P 450. HON. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three. ako bilang isa sa anim na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa.14. The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the decision dated December 21. Lapak for respondents. siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa nasabing pag-aari. Raquel.) . C and D) signed by Manuela and her children constituted a valid partition of the land. respondents. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 1958. Rollo. On May 19. executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her sister. Branch 1. A. Presentacion and Floserpina. The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil Case No. 2) and the subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer. 1960. (p. 1990 RAQUEL CHAVEZ. B. 1960. 1934.

Rosario and Concepcion. 1968. Camarines Norte. and declaring further that the documents (Exhs. signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter. in equal proindiviso shares. even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A. On March 26. reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her lifetime. . 64708R). F) with right to repurchase. which his now pending probate in the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons. The plaintiffs. Manuela Buenavista.. B. nevertheless its validity ceases from the time that she executed the Last Will and Testament .00. C and D are valid. After the trial. Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. Gerardo Jimenez. judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint. 1934 against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. 7. we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. Vinzons.R. . Camarines Norte.meaning that the owner. The court did not award damages. 2) and the sale in favor of defendantappellee Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio. her paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas. Raquel Chavez. de Chavez. (pp. The owner. on August 27. without pronouncement as to damages and costs. dissolving the preliminary injunction it had previously issued.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 1969 (Exh. That the Last will and Testament . . appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. Rollo. the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others: 3. Antonio. and her husband. 17. Thereupon. 1984. In the case at bar.630. Antonio. A. Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier.. Manuela Buenavista. will finally affect the property — hence. Camarines Norte. subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime. and there is now a pending petition for probate of said last will and testament before the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons. (p. C and D) are evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her children. one of the defendants-appellees. on February 4. No. Rollo. 88-89. 9303 and assessed at P1. On October 7. B. 1968.) . Barrio Calangcawan Norte. Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer. 1984. there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the decision-pending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament of the late Manuela Buenavista. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: WHEREFORE. was found lately to have executed during her lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT . 1934. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. . with an area of 4.) On April 5. however. and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. had assigned or distributed to her children. because the execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela Buenavista. xxx xxx xxx 6.

B.) We find those contentions not well-taken. that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds of Sale. 1969. 1080. however. the petitioners allege: (l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 203. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate. (2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article 1347 of the New Civil Code. Civil Code of the Phil. the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her thumbmark only. and C) in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and . as provided in Art. provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. (p. all surnamed Chavez (Exhs.) Art. 1969. 1984. In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. more than one year after the filing of the complaint for annulment on October 9. et al. 196. either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. 744. A. 2. it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills. Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. C and D) as a partition by an act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela Buenavista. and need not be in the form of a will.Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument.) In the instant case. 1347. 78 Phil. Floserfina and Raquel. such partition may even be oral or written. Rollo. (Hernandez vs. par. On June 28. when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos. by Padilla. 1987 Edition. the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion. p. the partition by the parent. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance. 126. is a case expressly authorized by law (Art.. In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. when she supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament. When a person makes a partition by will. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. that the supposed Last Will and Testament was executed on December 11. B. A. that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on December 11. A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty. when said Manuela Buenavista was already senile and not of disposing mind. Andal. 1968. exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto.

or to proceed contrary thereto.. is valid. A.. it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. As the defendants freely participated in the partition. SO ORDERED. the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts. 858. (Ralla vs.. 172 SCRA 858. July 31. executed by the property owner herself. and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioner's knowledge. The petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. No. (Joaquin vs. 678. 1951. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs." WHEREFORE. Mitsumine 34 Phil. .. and C) are not contracts entered into with respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Encarnacion and De Borja... Judge Untalan. L-4681. B.R. They cannot attack the partition collaterally . with costs against the petitioners. No. . Such partition inter vivos. CV-64708. citing the case of Torres vs. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.) Where a piece of land has been included in a partition. they are now estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of their own voluntary acts. the same is affirmed in toto. 89 Phil. it would run counter to the doctrine that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another.her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. 865. finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.) As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum.

as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. a fact not found by the Court of Appeals. ELEUTERIO NERI. Violeta. No. but upon the belief. 1941 Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. 1931. a little less than eight years before the death of said Agripino Neri y Chavez. mistaken though it was. Such belief conclusively negatives all inference as to any intention to disinherit. or for a cause the truth of which. that the children by the first marriage had already received more than their corresponding shares in his lifetime in the form of advancement. which should belong to Ignacia Akutin. betterments. 1923. had by his first marriage six children named Eleuterio. Rosario and Celerina. though ineffectively.. petitioners. but the legacies. or whether the will may be held valid.R. the children of the first marriage. the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the children of the first marriage as sole heirs of the testator. Godofredo. and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin. not upon the desire to disinherit. to said children of the second marriage. five children named Gracia. Carmen. who died on December 12. Alberto and Minda. daughter in the first marriage. Luz. vs. and Emma. if contradicted. but upon a cause not stated or not proved. True. . J. At the hearing for the declaration of heirs. Getulia. but the denial was predicated. Encarnacion.: Agripino Neri y Chavez. died on October 2. which was admitted to probate on March 21. that is. In Agripino Neri's testament. upon the foregoing facts. respondents. There is nothing in the will that supports this conclusion. shall annul the institution of the heir in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with the modification that the will was "valid with respect to the two-thirds part which the testator could freely dispose of. unless his statement to that effect is prove to be deliberately fictitious. and was survived by seven children named Remedios. at least with respect to one-third of the estate which the testator may dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath as betterment. in so far as they do no encroach upon the legitime. a situation which does not obtain in the instant case. "This judgment of the Court of Appeals is now sought to be reviewed in this petition for certiorari. . the trial court found.. The decisive question here raised is whether. IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN. The situation contemplated in the above provision is one in which the purpose to disinherit is clear. that all his children by the first and second marriages intestate heirs of the deceased without prejudice to one-half of the improvements introduced in the properties during the existence of the last conjugal partnership.. he willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate. Trinidad. The appellate court thus seemed to have rested its judgment upon the impression that the testator had intended to disinherit. and other testamentary dispositions. Agapito. ET AL.15. is not proven. G. the testator expressly denied them any share in his estate. Agripino. The Court of Appeals invoked the provisions of article 851 of the Civil Code. 1932. contrary to what the testator had declared in his will. MORAN. Estela Maria. L-47799 June 13. Getulia. which read in part as follows: Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause. shall be valid.

354355. according to articles 825 and 828 of the Civil Code. without expressly being disinherited.) In the instant case. which read in part as follows: The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line. shall void the institution of heir. "Mejoras" or betterments must be expressly provided.(Cf. Were it not for this mistake. neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. o naciese despues. 814 of the Civil Code). 1909. on the other hand. "no existe hoy cuestion alguna en esta materia: la pretericion produce siempre los mismos efectos. whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator. Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" (art. as may be clearly inferred from his will. no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. aplicando en el primer caso la doctrina del articulo 851. y en el segundo la del 814. and of involuntary preterition of the children by the deceased Getulia. therefore. 6 Manresa. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them. maintain that the case is one of voluntary preterition of four of the children by the first marriage.) In the instant case. 1908 and February 27. whether voluntary or involuntary. either because they are not mentioned therein. 6 Manresa. It is. (6 Manresa. 346. though mentioned. they were not accorded any share in the heriditary property. the law would presume that the testator had no intention to that effect. (Art.) But it must be observed that this opinion is founded on mere principles (en el terreno de los principios) and not on the express provisions of the law. is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest. o se ignorase su existencia. de aquel en que. (Cf. the testator's intention. Este ultimo grupo solo puede hacer relacion a los descendientes legitimos. seria distinguir el caso en que el heredero omitido viviese al otorgarse el testamento. a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. but the legacies and betterments shall be valid. ya se refiera a personas vivas al hacer el testamento o nacidas despues. .The Court of Appeals quotes Manresa thus: En el terreno de los principios. Civil Code. siempre que ademas tengan derecho a legitima. 814. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. and is thus governed by the provisions of article 814 of the Civil Code." (6 Manresa.) In the will here in question. preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. Manresa himself admits that according to law. and where no express provision therefor is made in the will. they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. or. siendo conocida su existencia por el testador. la solucion mas justa del problema que hemos hecho notar al comentar el articulo. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed. while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will. with costs against respondents. would have been to divide his property equally among all his children. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of June 17. 479. in so far as they are not inofficious. no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second marriage. also of the first marriage.) Appellants. without prejudice to the widow's legal usufruct. 381.

1977. EVANGELINA G. The FIRST PARTY shall keep possession of the aforementioned deeds of sale. in which she alleged that she had signed the said deeds of sale without knowing their contents and prayed that Evangelina and Elisa be ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof to her. sold five parcels of land to her niece. also a daughter of Pedro Baranda. The sales were made.16. obligated themselves to "execute absolute deeds of sale covering the above-mentioned properties in favor of the First Party. TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA VICTORIA as Attorney-in-Fact. Evangelina Baranda. Mabanta. Baranda.000. in exchange for such withdrawal. 4 under which the defendants. 1 under which Paulina L. That any time that the FIRST PARTY desires to sell. according to the documents. HERMINIA BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION BARANDA. The questioned sales were effected through three deeds denominated "Bilihan ng Lupa" and dated January 29 and February 3. two of the claimants had already taken over her properties by virtue of certain supposed transfers which are in fact that reason for this petition. 3 This complaint was later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated August 2. for the total consideration of P105." meaning the plaintiff. as Attorney-in-Fact. the SECOND PARTIES shall execute the proper documents in accordance with the desire and wishes of the FIRST PARTY. BARANDA.: We are faced once again with an all-too-familiar if distasteful controversy: an old woman dying without issue and without a will and her collaterals wrangling over her properties like the soldiers in Mount Calvary casting lots for the seamless robe of Jesus. J. d. No. which are in the hands of the SECOND PARTIES. petitioners. Buenaventura.R. CRUZ. The difference in this case is that even before the owner's death. 2 What made these transactions suspect was a subsequent complaint filed by Paulina Baranda against her nieces on August 1. BARANDA. Elisa. 1977. respondents. as wen as the Transfer Certificate of Title of the above-listed properties.00 duly acknowledged as received by the transferor from the vendees. Alarkon and Valero for petitioners. Assisted by Husband. Romulo. 1987 FLOCERFINA BARANDA. ELISA G. Paulina's brother. . ELIAS FABON. vs. It was also stipulated in the said agreement thatc. Sayoc and Delos Angeles for private respondents. TORRENTE. a widow. 1977. and a sixth parcel to her other niece. G. and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT. mortgage or otherwise dispose of or encumber the abovementioned properties. in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 73275 May 20.

to wit. b) ordering the defendants to execute the necessary instrument to transfer the lots in question to the estate of the late Paulina Baranda.000. although not in those words.000. Especially intriguing is the source of the said purchase price. filed a complaint against Evangelina and Elisa Baranda in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the lots.000. both being then fresh college graduates aged 25 and 26 years old. claiming to be the legitimate heirs of the late Paulina Baranda. the herein petitioners. only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her. in the amounts of P25. 13 The tale of the mysterious and generous "balikbayan" is something "out of this world. the certificate of title over the lots in question were still in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. stressing that they were public documents and that their authenticity could further be sustained by the testimony of the private respondents.000. The curious part about the supposed deeds of sale is the consideration allegedly agreed upon. P30. the validity of the three deeds of sale allegedly signed by Paulina Baranda without knowing their contents. in dismissing the complaint. for reasons to be discussed presently. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs: * a) declaring the deeds of sale null and void. 12 At the time of these transactions. her sister Evangelina lent her P15. 9 Such evidence.000.000. The respondent court.00. also required the complainants to pay P50. 10 According to Evangeline.00 and she raised another P15. We disagree.000. 11 and 6.000. 6 On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court.00 from her grandmother in the province to complete the P30. and we are inclined to agree. respectively. The respondent court. 1982. This Court is itself rather perplexed that the respondent court should have accepted this tissue of lies so readily. upheld the questioned deeds. with damages.000. and when Paulina died in 1982. While it is true that a notarized instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents." in the language of the trial court.00 for lots 9. in the total amount of P105. The petitioners are now before us to challenge that decision. 7 We address ourselves first to the basic issue.00 as moral damages.00 as exemplary damages. rejecting the findings of the trial court.000. 5 This was the factual situation when on April 26. the plaintiffs the sum of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25. jointly and severally.000.00 for lot 8 which Evangelina testified as having been actually paid to their aunt on February 3. has been sufficiently established in this case. c) ordering defendants to turn over to the estate of Paulina Baranda the sum of P24. the sum of P100.000. ** the decision of the trial court was reversed and the deeds of sale were held valid and binding. with interest at 12% per annum. neither Evangelina nor Elisa was gainfully employed or had independent sources of income. Galos.000. which by the testimony of the private respondents was paid by them in cash to their aunt in the office of Atty. as the Court sees it.00 for litigation expenses. and P30.00 was given to her by a "balikbayan" boy friend. P50. and d) sentencing defendants to pay. considering its .00 a year from February 1982 until the administrator of said estate takes over the management of said properties. and it was from this amount that she paid her share of the purchase price of P75.000. and P20.00. 11 According to Elisa.00 for attorney's fees. 8 this rule is nonetheless not absolute but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.000. who notarized the deeds of sale. P20. Evangelina never complied with the agreement.00 due from her for the lot she was buying.As it turned out. 1977.00 for lots 4 and 5.00) for and as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

or at least to protect his investment. presumably out of love for Evangeline.00. 18 There is no evidence of such deposit or purchase. where she was presumably making a living.00 she paid came as a loan from Evangelina's boy friend's P100.00 and the other P15. or. that Paulina Baranda intended to bring it somewhere else.) 14 Strangely.000." 20 The nieces explain away this complaint by saying it was merely simulated. let alone other personal circumstances to give him bone and body. There is no evidence of this whatsoever. As Elisa puts it. that from the house where they and Paulina Baranda were living together they carried the amount of P105. without even a name at least.000. willingly delivered P100. The sisters made another incredible claim. but in the house of Paulina Baranda. if we go by Elisa's testimony this time.000. significantly. indeed.. It also simply disappeared like the "balikbayan" who never returned. she persuaded her grandmother to sell her lands in La Union. in a preposterous pantomime that invites laughter. no evidence at all of where that money went after it was supposedly received by Paulina Baranda on the date of the alleged transaction.obvious falsity.00. Paulina Baranda and the grandmother were strangers.000. government from discontinuing her pension as a war widow on the ground that she had squandered her .000. At any rate. or for the purchase of some property. Galos where they delivered it to Paulina Baranda. Paulina Baranda herself denied under oath that she ever sold her lands to Evangelina and Elisa. for example.00 in cold cash to the office of Atty. not belief. with whom she and her sister were themselves living.00 in cold cash to her and thereafter disappeared completely. however. alleging in her verified complaint that she "never executed any deed" conveying the title to her properties and "was surprised and shocked to learn" later that her transfer certificate of title to her lots had been cancelled and new certificates of title had been issued in favor of the private respondents. They could have shown.000. All we can glean from the record is that he is an exceedingly trusting and generous person who. Evangelina was still unmarried. According to her. Paulina then brought it back to the same house where it came from in the first place. Elisa did not present any document to prove that her grandmother did sell her properties to raise the P15. The "balikbayan" is a hazy figure. who were themselves in a way also living off Paulina Baranda in the latter's house.00 was given to her by her grandmother. half of the P30. (Five years later. if we go by his own girl friend's testimony. viz. 17 Apparently. for deposit in a bank. that she had any property at all to sell. 15 This grandmother was another generous if also improbable figure.S.00 is equally imaginative and was obviously part of the fabric — or fabrication — woven by her sister to conjure what now appears to be a non-existent fund. to prevent the U. such as the ticket to the United States where she was allegedly planning to migrate. assuming their love was as strong as ever. and would make them out as three silly persons from some inane nursery rhyme.19 She withdrew this complaint only after her nieces agreed in writing to reconvey the properties to her "in order to preserve family solidarity and in order to avoid litigation among the parties. to give her the purchase price of P15. Elsa's explanation of how she got her own P30. and with her second husband (who was not even related to Elisa and Evangeline) to live off her granddaughters. say. Why the nieces did not pay the money in the house instead of bringing it all the way from the house and back is something that has not been sufficiently explained by the private respondents.000. this amorphous sweetheart was not even presented at the trial to corroborate his beloved. 16 not in her own house. it is hard to believe that this old woman would agree to sell her own properties in La Union. and to come with her husband to live with her in Manila.000.

As heirs. including the private respondents. By offering this explanation. as the private respondents kept insisting. The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following: Art. There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who. or a surviving spouse. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line. and the latter per stirpes Art. 1003. In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or brothers or sisters. as well as petitioners Flocerfina Baranda. under Article 777 of the Civil Code. If there are no descendants. the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Art. by two brothers. illegitimate children. namely. and the children of another deceased sister. it is claimed by the private respondents. Considering that. the private respondents are in effect asking this Court to condone and approve their attempt to deceive and defraud the government of a sister state. Salvacion Baranda. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant." While they are not compulsory heirs. are not the proper parties to question the validity of the deed of sale. but never in the ascending. whether they be of the full or half blood. She was survived. who are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood.named persons. children of two deceased brothers and a sister. there would have been no difficulty in their acceding to her request for a resale of the properties to protect her pension. and Alipio Baranda Villarte. one might well wonder why it was necessary at all to commence litigation as a mere resale of the properties would have been sufficient and easily effected without the asperity of a civil complaint. there was never any misunderstanding between them and their aunt. and several nephews and nieces. 21 If that was her only purpose. "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Pedro and Teodoro. ascendants. 1005.property. together with Pedro Baranda. 972. as argued by the private respondents. as. but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982. the former shall inherit per capita. the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. 22 The above. who was not joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents. The reason given is that they are not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the challenged transactions. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces. It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct descendants or ascendants. however. they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so. The fact that the complaint had to be filed shows they were unwilling to reconvey the properties after the aunt demanded their return following her discovery of the fake deeds of sale. an unwillingness further manifested when Evangelina refused to comply with this aforesaid agreement and never reconveyed the lots supposedly bought by her. or compulsory heirs. since they . are the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.

" are entitled to protect their share of successional rights." Assuming then that the petitioners are proper parties to challenge the validity of the private respondents title to the land in question. As Justice J. by the supposed sales of her properties. however. Otherwise. the property allegedly conveyed never left the patrimony of the transferor. Neither can it be argued that the petitioners cannot assail the said contracts on the ground that they were not parties thereto because as heirs of Paulina Baranda they are affected.." 23 There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate. or by stipulation or by provision of law. and adversely at that. provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. it is expressly and specifically provided in the Civil Code that: Art. their assigns and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature. such property would pass to the transferor's heirs intestate and be recoverable by them or by the administrator of the transferor's estate should there be any. 1311.. even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented. but to the estate itself of the decedent. had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties. 24 The real party-in-interest in an action for annulment or contract includes a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in the contract if he is PREJUDICED in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties. the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale. as her intestate heirs. 26 speaking of a similar situation. not to them. . Reyes said in his concurring opinion in Armentia v. 25 Moreover. In the instant case. no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees. who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception. for distribution later in accordance with law. may it not be argued that the right to do so had nevertheless already prescribed when they filed the complaint in 1982? The Civil Code provides in Article 1391 that an action to annul a contract on the ground of vitiated consent must be filed within four years from the discovery of the vice of consent. This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. Patriarca.L. In fact. and upon the latter's death without a testament. . As this Court has held — A person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent. the petitioners.B. Contracts take effect only between the parties."stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit. question is the validity of such transfer or disposition for if it could be established that such disposition was invalid. "what petitioners.

however, we are dealing not with a voidable contract tainted with fraud, mistake, undue influence, violence or intimidation that can justify its nullification, but with a contract that is null and void ab initio. Paulina Baranda declared under oath in her complaint that she signed the deeds of sale without knowing what they were, which means that her consent was not merely marred by the above-stated vices, so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all. We are also satisfied that there was no valid consideration either for the alleged transfers, for reasons already discussed. Lack of consent and consideration made the deeds of sale void altogether 27 and rendered them subject to attack at any time, conformably to the rule in Article 1410 that an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts "does not prescribe." Act No. 496, which was in force at the time the complaint was filed, provided that the action to annul a registration of land under the Torrens system should be filed within one year; otherwise, the same shall be barred forever. 28 This is not an absolute rule, however, as the Torrens system is not supposed to be used as an instrument for wrongdoing or to validate an illegal acquisition of title to the prejudice of the real owner of the property registered. We have consistently ruled that when there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of the property. The action for the purpose is also imprescriptible. Public policy demands that a person guilty of fraud or at least, of breach of trust, should not be allowed to use a Torrens title as a shield against the consequences of his wrong doing. (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil. 620). An action to compel reconveyance of property with a Torrens title does not prescribe if the registered owner had obtained registration in bad faith, and the property is still in the latter's name. The reason is that the registration is in the nature of a continuing and subsisting trust. (Caladiao v. Vda. de Blas, L19063, April 29, 1964). A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds. (Ignacio vs. Chua Hong, 52 Phil. 940; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). As long as the land wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner. Provided only that the property has, as in this case, not passed to an innocent third person for value, such an action is permitted. We have held that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers' name is not to set aside the decree after one year from the date thereof. Respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, he may nevertheless bring an ordinary action for reconvevance or for darmages if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. 29 It was in conformity with this doctrine, in fact, that the petitioners filed on April 26, 1982, their complaint against the private respondents for annulment of the deeds of sale and for reconveyance of the lands subject thereof which were illegally registered in the names of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda. We deal with one final matter that should be cause for serious concern as it has a direct relevance to the faith of our people in the administration of justice in this country. It is noted with disapproval that the

respondent court awarded the total indemnity of P120,000.00, including attorney's fees and litigation expenses that were double the amounts claimed and exemplary damages which were not even prayed for by the private respondents. Such improvident generosity is likely to raise eyebrows, if not outright challenge to the motives of some of our courts, and should therefore be scrupulously avoided at all times, in the interest of maintaining popular confidence in the judiciary. We therefore caution against a similar recklessness in the future and call on all members of the bench to take proper heed of this admonition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the trial court is REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents. SOORDERED.

17. G.R. No. L-33924

March 18, 1988

MARIA BALAIS and PETRONILO ERAYA as successors in interest of JUAN BALAIS and JUANCHO BALAIS, petitioners, vs. BUENAVENTURA, ADELA, ROSITA, and TERESITA, all surnamed BALAIS, respondents. Ledesma, Guytingco & Associates for petitioners. Sergio F. Apostol for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: Pursuant to its Resolution of June 30, 1971, 1 the Court of Appeals 2 certified this case to the Court. The Appellate Court declined to render a ruling, it being of the opinion that the case "involve[s] purely questions of law over which [it] [has] nojuriscliction." 3 Specifically, the questions put to the Court are two-fold: (1) does the court have jurisdiction to decree a partition in an action for reconveyance? (2) may it apply the provisions of the new Civil Code in determining the successionary rights of heirs where the decedent died during the effectivity of the old Code? 4 questions undoubtedly legal in character. In forwarding the appeal to this Court, the Court of Appeals invokes, specifically, the provisions of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 5 We quote pertinent parts thereof: SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.— xxx xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in — xxx (3) xxx xxx

All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;

(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; xxx xxx xxx xxx

Under the Constitution then in force: 6

revise. decisions. or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies. xxx xxx The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (2) Review and revise. reverse. finally. or commissions except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. reverse. [T]he Supreme Court [shall have] jurisdiction to review. certiorari.SEC. or writ of error. as the law or the Rules of Court may provide. the provisions of this Act. We quote: From the decision of the Court of First Instance of L. 2. as the law or the rules of court may provide. xxx xxx xxx All cases in which an error or question of law is involved. xxx xxx xxx All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. 8 the Court of Appeals exercises: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments. . modify. final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx All in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.qqqeyte the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS. modify. or affirm on appeal or certiorari. or affirm on appeal. We turn to the facts. the Court hereby renders judgment: . orders. final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue. instrumentalities. Under. the Judiciary Reorganization Act.. and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. resolutions. an exclusive jurisdiction of the Court since aimed under our subsequent Constitutions: Section 5.. boards.

811 for recovery of real property and damages (p. Rosita and Teresa. otherwise stated. Rosita and Teresa all surnamed Balais filed a complaint against Petronilo Eraya in the CFI of Leyte docketed therein as Civil Case No. two (2) parts of which shall belong to the two (2) legitimate children Juan Balais and Maria Balais one (1) part to the widow Eutelia Masalig which is hereby deemed included in the sale of the property to the defendant Petronilo Eraya and the remaining one (1) part to the illegitimate children Buenaventura. Maria.2/5) of the share of either Juan Balais or Maria Balais provided that their total shares in this particular case shall not exceed one-half (1/2) of the free portion after the share of Eutelia Masalig is fully satisfied (Article 895. paragraph 3. Adela. Adela. all surnamed Balais successional rights and adjudicating to them one-fourth (1/4) of the share of their deceased father Escolastico Balais which consists of one. Rosita and Teresa. 2. versus Petronilo Eraya including the dispositive portion granting to the illegitimate children. the hereditary estate of the deceased which consist of one-half (1/2) of the whole parcel of land described in the complaint shall be divided into four (4) parts. 1964 — Juan. one-half (1/2) of which is hereby adjudicated to bis two legitimate children Juan Balais and Maria Balais (Article 888. all surnamed Balais. . Buenaventura. if he fails to do so within the specified period.half (1/2) of the conjugal partnership property.00 for attorney's fees and P100. Declaring the sale of one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land more particularly described in paragraph 4 of the complaint by the widow Eutelia Masalig to the defendant Petronilo Eraya null and void and ordering the latter to execute within thirty (30) days after the judgment becomes final a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of one-half (1/2) of the said parcel of land minus one-fourth (1/4) thereof which is hereby declared validly sold to him by the widow and. let judgment be entered divesting the title of said Petronilo Eraya to the property and vesting it in the plaintiffs and such judgment shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. namely Buenaventura. the share of each of the plaintiffs Buenaventura. August 5. Adela. new Civil Code) which share of the widow shall be equal to the share of each of the legitimate children (Article 999 Civil Code).(1) Dismissing the complaint with cost against the plaintiffs: (2) Maintaining its decision in toto in Civil Case No. the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 1. Rosita and Teresa. rendered its judgment. C811 entitled Juan Balais et al. 1965 — The lower court. Giving rise to the present case are in their chronological sequence as follows: April 22. and (3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of P400. folder of Exhibits). Ordering that the hereditary estate of the deceased Escolastico Balais consisting of one-half (1/2) of the whole parcel of land described in paragraph 4 of the complaint be divided into two-halves.00 for expenses of litigation. 13. all surnamed Balais shall be equal to two-fifths (. plaintiffs Maria Balais and Petronilo Eraya have taken an appeal to this Court. Adela. new Civil Code).

To pay the costs of the suit. 10. There is no doubt that as far as the instant case is concerned. 1966 — The aforesaid motion to set aside order for the issuance of writ was denied (p. the Court of First Instance exercises original jurisdiction: . March 10.. 1967 — The lower court rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint (pp. 13-26. however.3. over the subject matter. the parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings inasmuch as the defendants have admitted the material allegations of plaintiffs' complaint. over the person of the defendants (not incidentally. Ordering the defendant to render an accounting of the value of the products of the shares of the plaintiffs as above indicated from the time of the filing of the complaint.). as well as the latter's documentary evidence. in particular. in general. the jurisdiction of the trial court 10 to order the partition and distribution of the estate in the course of an action for recovery of real property is contested. It will be noted that the plaintiffs' cause in Civil. or over the issues framed in the pleadings. is either one over the nature of the action. the trial court is held to be in error for applying the provisions of the new Civil Code. 1967 — Maria and Juan Balais and Petronilo Eraya filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte. granting to so-called spurious children the right to a share in the estate of the deceased who perished in 1946 and consequently. Under the judiciary law then in force. 16-19. put to question here). whether for reconveyance or partition. May 12. the Court of First Instance is vested with the jurisdiction to try either case. 1966 — The lower court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution of the aforesaid decision. RA. 1966 — Defendant Eraya filed a motion to set aside the order of execution for the reasons therein stated (pp. 11 Jurisdiction. folder of Exhibits). March 28. Despite this. 1967 — Buenaventura Balais and his co-defendants filed through counsel an answer with counterclaim whereby they sought for the dismissal of the aforesaid complaint. Apart from such a jurisdictional challenge. 811 was for the recovery of property-and not for partition of an estate. prior to the effectivity of the new Code. and 4. July 29.) 9 xxx xxx xxx As we have indicated. the Judiciary Act of 1948. Case No. Civil Case No. Articles 887 and 895 thereof. RA. February 23. the lower court proceeded to distribute the estate of the late Escolastico Balais. When the case was called for trial. and to deliver the share to the plaintiffs together with their shares. C-893 against defendants for the annulment of that portion of the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. June 27. 811 awarding to the latter who are illegitimate children of the late Escolastico Balais (1/4) of the hereditary estate of their deceased father.

(b) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this Act upon city and municipal Courts; 12 What is asailed however is the competency of the lower court to distribute the estate on a simple complaint for reconveyance. In other words, what is disputed is the jurisdiction of the court to pass upon issues not raised in the pleadings. There are instances, and upon the acquiescence of the parties, when issues not in fact alleged may be heard by the court. Section 5, of Rule 10, of the Rules of Court, provides, in part, as follows: ... When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. ... 13 In such a case, amendments may be had on the pleadings: ... as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment: ... 14 But failure to amend, the Rule further tells us, "does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." 15 The court, in that event, acquires jurisdiction over such issues. It may likewise be that although the court lacks the jurisdiction, it acquires one subsequently as when the defendant invokes it, say, by asking for affirmative relief 16 In that case, jurisdiction by estoppel arises. 17 Noteworthy is the fact that in the case at bar, in spite of the broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that under the old Civil Code — the statute in effect at the time of the death of the deceased in 1946 — illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights. Otherwise, they do not contest the delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the proportions decreed by the court. In that respect, they do not deny the court's jurisdiction to order partition. In their complaint, 18 they therefore prayed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff;, thru their undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court respectfully pray: (a) That the plaintiffs be declared the absolute owner of the portion of 1/4 of the intestate estate of Escolastisco Balais now possessed under claim of ownership by herein defendants; That the part of the decision in Civil Case No. C-811, adjudicating one-fourth (1/4) of the intestate estate of the illegitimate children of Escolastico Balais be declared null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction and being contrary to law, particularly Art. 2263 of the New Civil Code; (c) That defendants be sentenced to pay the amount of P200.00 for every year they remain in possession of the property subject of this suit; P 500.00 as attorney's fees and P300.00 for expenses of litigation and costs; and (d) That the plaintiffs be granted whatever remedy they may be entitled in equity and justice. 19

The appellants must therefore be considered to have accepted the lower court's jurisdiction. To reject that jurisdiction with respect to the part of the decision unfavorable to them and to accept it as regards those portions favorable to them is to assume inconsistent stances. Either the court has jurisdiction or it does not. Estoppel is a bar against any claims of lack of jurisdiction. This is not to say, however, that the trial court — in both suits, the original action for reconveyance and the suit for annulment of judgment — did not err in granting in favor of the appellees a share in the estate pursuant to Article 895 of the Civil Code, 20 the decedent having passed away during the regime of the Civil Code of 1889 under which bastards, in bulgar parlance, were entitled to no share in the state. In Uson v. Del Rosario, 21 we said that the rights given to the adulterous children under the new Civcil Code have no retroactive application. Thus: xxx xxx xxx

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vestedor acquired of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first timein this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act and the event which give rights thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the date her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the right to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Aricle 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the inpairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands dispute. 22 xxx xxx xxx

But as we stated, the error of the court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. And, as noted by the trial court itself, it is the case that has become final and executory, and in fact, in the process of execution. 23 A decision, no matter how erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality. 24 WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

18. G. R. No. 4275. March 23, 1909.] PAULA CONDE, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROMAN ABAYA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION ARELLANO, C.J.: From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears: chanrobles virtualawlibrary I. As antecedents: chanrobles virtualawlibrary that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate. II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in reply to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof. III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court below entered the following judgment: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “That the administrator of the estate of Casiana Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the Petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya. ” IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented the following statement of errors: chanrobles virtualawlibrary

The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuous possession of the deceased children of Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya. but who survived the person who. As to the first error assigned. the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge. may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court. the court erred in not having declared that said property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree. has been fully proven in these proceedings. 2. was his natural father. may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.1. that is to say. and in not having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the property to those who might fall within the reservation. also deceased. 3.) cralaw The main question with regard to the second error assigned. ” This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimental vs. In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only foundation: chanrobles virtualawlibrary . is whether or not the mother of a natural child now deceased. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the determination of such controversy. he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding. not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial decision. or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law. as heir to the latter. within the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section. under oath and signed by witness. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child. Rep. might be brought in special probate proceedings. it is claimed. 436. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code. in the special proceeding itself. whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of the deceased. the mother of such presumed natural child. may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to be his natural father. and 4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula Conde. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. as improperly found by the court below. but asking at the same time that. According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure — “If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the deceased person are. an action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived. the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate.

’ (See Commentaries to arts. It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive. “Art. 137. In any case such right of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still great. lacks legal and doctrinal foundation. that which unites him to the family of the father or the mother who recognizes him. upon which even an approximate conclusion could be based. the acknowledgment of the natural child is. must still less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions. advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code. as is shown hereafter. “The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs. It may be laid down as a legal maxim. such person as legally represents them. undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. or in connection with their rights. and affords him a participation in the rights of the family. they were not. among illegitimate ones. Thus. A private action is in question and the general rule must be followed. or during their lifetime. as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the family and with succession in relation to the members thereof. however. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during the life of the presumed parents. when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death of the presumed parents. as is supposed by article 137. because up to the present time no argument has been presented.) cralaw’ The above doctrine. that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children. if it has not lapsed before then. and still less to his mother. Vol. 118. Civil Code.“In resolving a similar question Manresa says: chanrobles virtualawlibrary ‘An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit. ’ On this point no positive declaration has been made. except in the following cases: chanrobles virtualawlibrary . “Art. I. or that the document supporting his petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child to his descendants cannot be sustained under the law. in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code nothing is more logical than to establish a comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy. such death perhaps occurring after his parents had died. relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother. It is not supported by any doctrine. the mother may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he is under her authority. In such cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action. Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs. Elsewhere the same author adds: chanrobles virtualawlibrary ‘It may so happen that the child dies before four years have expired after attaining majority. and should they be minors or otherwise incapacitated. and one to enforce acknowledgment. If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child. 135 and 137. granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws. limiting in form. should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. placed upon the same plane as legitimate ones.

that is. there exists the most radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to be legitimate. Hence the other difference. the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation. ” On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child. may be transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article. and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said presumed parents. it cannot be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents. but only relatively and as an exception. but not the second. the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: chanrobles virtualawlibrary (1) That the right of action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118. as a general rule. before unknown. or to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation. some instrument. after the death of the father or mother. independently. while the action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents. As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter’s action to claim his legitimacy. “2. that is. that the right of action to secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted. So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation. while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly. but it does not say a word with regard to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation. with the exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above. (2) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers. in which case the la tter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its majority. to his heirs. as a general rule. conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child. or. not even as an exception. as a rule. that an action for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter. or indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter. it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents. If. while the second does not endure for life. the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. for the purpose of claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child. it is seen that the code grants it in the first case. “In this case the action must be instituted within the six months following the discovery of such instrument.“1. Consequently. inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents. . it can always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself. derived as a consequence. With regard to the question at issue. while the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime. should be discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged. can never be transmitted. as a general rule. or to acknowledge the natural filiation. for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case. Therefore. and. independently. It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation. If the father or mother died during the minority of the child. or to recognize the natural filiation. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which.

in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child. as a general rule can only be exercised against the latter. upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child. when. In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited: chanrobles virtualawlibrary Sanchez Roman. to claim his legitimacy. ” (Vol. while for those of the natural child. as an exception. or their heirs. that of a legitimate child. and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and questionable matter. since it does not last during his whole life. whether he had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death. or to his ascendants.No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension. and in three cases only. if he died during his minority. but nothing more. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may. “There is an entire absence of legal provisions. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life. the position of a natural child is no better than. as we have said. for the simple reason that for the heirs of the legitimate child. and at most. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants. under article 118. From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived: chanrobles virtualawlibrary The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life. although on the other hand there is none that prohibits it. it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child. be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: chanrobles virtualawlibrary first. As an exception. there is no provision in the code authorizing the same. nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no basis for the greater one.) cralaw . he may exercise it either against the presumed parents. But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. V. or after action had been already instituted. it might be deemed admissible as a solution. because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than those of the legitimate child. and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. but depends on that of the presumed parents. nor even equal to. while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter. and decides it as follows. executed by the father or mother. propounds the question as to whether said action should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child. only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. or while insane. to wit. and second. Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains exclusively to him. that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate child. the said article 118 exists. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one. as a matter of fact. and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts. while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child. in his Treatise on Civil Law.

the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be more favored than one for legitimate filiation. the action to pass on to the heirs. The theory of the law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. The existence of a provision for the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. ” (Ibid. and even authorizes the transmission of said right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof. although it does not prohibit it. 1844) that the right of investigation forms a part of the estate of the child. it limits it to the life of the parents. it does not fix such a long and indefinite period for the exercise of the action. and for that reason it might be deemed on general principles of law to consent to it. say: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “Article 118. which in the Roman Law expressed the general rule that an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs. for the . grants them the right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime. were we to admit the doctrine of the court of Rennes. if the child die during his minority or in a state of insanity. excepting in the two cases mentioned in said article. however. 171. as does article 118. but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one. certain things which the heir held and could transmit.. The majority. Now. and along with his patrimony is transmitted to his heirs. II. 2. not transmissive to the heirs. But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural child.) cralaw In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one. because it cannot be conceived that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child. inasmuch as. however.Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on “The Civil Code as construed by the supreme court of Spain. and as already seen. Such was the law and the right to accept the inheritance. This would be absurd. The court of Rennes held (on April 13. and it cannot be understood that the provision of law should be the same when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. This theory. ” (Vol. such a supposition is inadmissible for the reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not.” commenting upon article 137. Vol. Some persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to natural filiation. an omission. ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law. are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right. taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children. included at the same time the idea that if the inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it. Really there are not legal grounds to warrant the transmission. and that in this conception the heirs of the natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by article 118. 229. the right of action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an absolute right. and it does not allow. If it were correct the same thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed. nor can it be. and consequently. there were. but under certain limitations and circumstances.) cralaw Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Codigo Civil) raises the question: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “Can the heirs of a natural child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation to acknowledge”? And says: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “Opinions are widely divergent.

And it is evident that the right of action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his heirs. in order that it may constitute a portion of the child’s inheritance. So that. without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance. among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action for his acknowledgment against his father. would and should have been extinguished by his death. and therefore. the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child is. and obligations of a person.existing reason that all rights. If it were so. This right of supposed transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy. as stated in one of the above citations. the right that the child held during his lifetime. but. Therefore. in principle and without exception. rights. not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by his death. The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. “the inher itance includes all the property. and if it is unreasonable to compare a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a legitimate child would not only be unreasonable. there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. such right. which are not extinguished by his death. it said right of action formed a part of the child’s inheritance. For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts. it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in article 118 shall be present. shall pass to the heir. is transmitted to his mother as being his heir. On the other hand. during the life of the latter. and cannot be transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child. most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the general principles thereof. being personal and exclusive in principle. both real and personal. it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. and the latter. where no express provision like that of article 118 exists. According to article 659 of the Civil Code. but as any other right which might be transmitted after his death. ” If the mother is the heir of her natural child. extinguished by his death. quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. which is a portion of his inheritance. and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in question. as a general rule not susceptible of transmission. or after his death in some of the excepting cases of article 137. it would be necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child. not limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a legitimate child. . since without them.

1918. Consul General for Spain. 1918. Herrero for respondents. September 13. a Spanish subject resident in the Philippine Islands. the purpose of which is to vacate an order of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila admitting to probate the will of Juan Pons y Coll. order was entered admitting the will to probate. under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. requesting them to look after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband. No. and to cause the application for probate to be set for rehearing in the Court of First Instance. vs. the cause is now here heard on petition and answer. for upon that date an attorney employed by her in Palma de Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson. Street. Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila and to the lack of adequate means of communication between the two places – a difficulty then greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European War – the petitioner received no information of the probate proceedings until after November 14. Publication was accordingly made. For the purpose of the solution of the questions arising in this case.R. no formal proof having been as yet submitted. 1918. attorneys in the city of Manila. . Consul General for Spain in the Philippine Islands. and asked that it be admitted to probate. 1918. J. be set aside in order to allow the petitioner to enter opposition. produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila a document dated on March 16. This application was made under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure and was denied by the Court of First Instance on the ground that more than six months had elapsed since the date of the order of probate and prior to the filing of the motion. Said communication was not received by the attorneys mentioned until November 11. and the Honorable Pedro Concepcion. 1918. when promptly began the investigations necessary to enable them to act in the matter. VICENTE PALMAROLI. The respondents having been required to answer. however. She had. Judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. 1919 G. 1918. and on May 20. 1918. as already stated. Wolfson and Wolfson for petitioner. 1918. and on November 29. 14851 ANTONIA RIERA Y BOTELLAS. in the city of Manila. The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December 21. 1918. 1918. the facts may be taken to be as follows: Juan Pons y Coll. they appeared in the Court of First Instance in behalf of the petitioner and moved that the order of probate of May 20. On April 19. received information of the fact of her husband’s death on or before June 19.: This is an original petition filed in the Supreme Court under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Antonio Riera y Botellas. VICENTE PALMAROLI. respondents. Antonio V.19. petitioner. Administrator of the Estate of Juan Pons y Coll. died on April 16. The petitioner is the widow of the deceased and was at the time of her husband’s death residing in Palma de Mallorca in the Balearic Islands. the respondent Vicente Palmaroli. purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll.

compliance with the requirements of our local laws relative to the execution of wills was not necessary. Palanca (37 Phil. it being alleged that she will was not executed with the formalities required by law and hence was improperly admitted to probate? In the case of the Estate of Johnson (39 Phil. and the petitioner claims that. as a party interested in the estate. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature. 921) that the remedy conceded in section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is supplementary to that conceded in section 113 of the same Code. obtain from the Supreme Court. then it must be treated as void. for failure to comply with various requirements – unnecessary to be here stated in detail – of the Spanish laws in respect to the manner of execution of wills. upon a showing from a person interested in the estate to the effect that the order of probate was erroneous and that the applicant had been prevented by conditions over which he had no control from appearing at the original hearing and opposing the probate of the will. if the will was in fact provable as the will of a Spanish subject. to deprive the petitioner of participation in the testator’s estate – a step which the test at or says he was authorized to take under the foral regimen prevailing in the Balearic Islands. pursuant to authority contained in the Treaty between the United States and Spain proclaimed on April 20. under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. it is void for failure to comply with the requirements of Act No. 2645 requires. In the second place it is said that if the will in question be considered as the will of a Spanish subject. and was admitted to probate as such. apparent that the probate of the will was in fact prejudicial to the petitioner. In the first place it is said that if the will be considered with reference to our statutes generally applicable to wills. procure a judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation. It is therefore. under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. having been prevented from appearing and contesting the original application by circumstances over which she had no control. Rep. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that the will is not signed on the left margin of each page by the attesting witnesses and the pages are not numbered as Act No. 1918. an order for a rehearing in the Court of First Instance. and who has been prevented by inevitable conditions from opposing the probate of the will. the will having been executed before him on April 16. provable under the special provisions of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As will be at once apparent from an examination of section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1918. The order of the Court of First Instance of May 20. to set aside an order admitting a will to probate and to grant a rehearing of the application to admit the will. The question here presented in therefore this: Can a party who is interested in the estate of a deceased person.. for reasons stated therein. is attacked by the petitioner on grounds having relation chiefly to the formalities incident to the execution of the will. 156). and it was added that apart from these remedies there is no other means recognized in our procedure whereby a defeated party can. she is entitled to be heard in the matter of the probate of the will. against which relief is sought. under that section. as alleged. Rep. In such case the provisions governing the execution of the will are to be sought in the laws of the country of which the testator was a subject.The will to which reference has been made purports. by a proceeding in the same cause.we held that a Court of First Instance has the power. . as stated in the petition. is that the document produced in court and actually proved as the will of the decedent was not the original but a copy certified by the Spanish Consul General in this city from the records of his own office. Another irregularity in the admission of the will in question to probate. 1903.. It was also suggested in Banco Español-Filipino vs.

whenever the Court of First . In many American jurisdictions. In our judicial system a Court of First Instance exists in each province. the words “When . however. SEC. “contemplated in section 113.” A moment’s inspection of the entire section is sufficient to show that the quoted words are not homogeneous with the remainder of the section. . Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment. With this prefatory observation we proceed to consider the restrictions placed upon the use of the remedy conceded in section 513. and this we consider to be its true meaning. and a clerk is maintained at the place appointed for the holding of court. It is quite obvious. To this end it is desirable to confront the text of the provisions in question: SEC. and moreover they are not well adjusted to the sense and effect of section 113. West of Scotland Insurance Office. 994). the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned” can only be understood as referring loosely to cases where the Court of First Instance has by the affluxion of time lost all power to set aside or modify its judgment. whose duty it is to receive and file applications. accident. . other conditions concurring. To a person whose mind is imbued with this idea. When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default. mistake or excusable negligence” of section 513. inadvertence. or excusable negligence. and filed in the court. and not thereafter. the party so deprived of a hearing may present his petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment. but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment. if a judgment is procured by concealed fraudulent practices the party injured may sometimes at least be relieved on the ground that there was an excusable neglect on his part in failing to discover and defeat such practice. mistake. The mere fact of adjournment cannot really have the effect of shortening the period of six months allowed in section 113. setting forth the facts and praying to have such judgment set aside. order. The inference is plain that they were inserted in section 513 probably by way of amendment and by a person other than the original author. . By comparing these two provisions it will be seen that the operative equity which is contemplated as the basis of relief is similar. 113. but as was indicated in Mortera and Eceiza vs. petitions. surprise. The first point to which we direct our comment has reference to the lack of an adequate remedy in the Court of First Instance. . The consequence is that the remedy conceded in section 513 is available. Consequently when an application for relief against any judgment is properly made under section 113. inasmuch as the “mistake. . That application therefor be made within a reasonable time. accident. 513. The person who wrote these words evidently supposed that by the mere fact of adjournment a Court of First Instance loses the power to entertain an application for relief of the character here contemplated. order.. if not identical. It is true that fraud is not mentioned as aground of relief in section 113. in relation to each other and with special reference to the facts now before us. or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake. however. surprise or excusable neglect. the ending of the term of court terminates absolutely the power of the court over its judgments. It is expressly declared in section 513 that the remedy granted thereby is available only in case “the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court. inadvertence. or excusable neglect: Provided. or proceeding was taken. Ltd. (36 Phil. that the power granted in section 113 continues for six months regardless of the adjournment of the court. in both cases. the matter is before the judge for action upon the convening of the next session. and complaints of all sorts. and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court. Rep. is substantially the same as the “fraud.We shall now proceed to consider somewhat more closely the effect of the two sections of the Code of Civil Procedure above cited. and a party thereto is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud.

but the same idea may be accepted. has finally adjourned. We consider this interpretation incorrect. grant relief under section 113. It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction.Instance is powerless to grant relief. If such were the idea. and the reference to final adjournment in section 513 is to be taken merely as explanatory of the want of remedy in that court and not as embodying any absolute restriction upon the remedy conceded in section 513. the provision in question is. no . and more especially those of a remedial nature. for under section 113 the power of the Court of First Instance to grant relief is limited to applications made within six months after entry of the judgment against which relief is sought. superfluous. the intention shall prevail. It can hardly be supposed that section 513 would have been incorporated in the Code if the only idea was to enable a party having a right to relief in the Court of First Instance under section 113 to direct his petition to the Supreme Court only when the Court of First Instance has adjourned prior to the end of six months after judgment entered. In this view the sole function served by section 513 is to make sure that a person may obtain relief in the Supreme Court whenever the Court of First Instance had adjourned before six months after judgment entered. The real purpose of section 513 in our opinion is to enable an injured party under the conditions stated to apply to the Supreme Court without reference to the six months limitation expressed in section 113. there is no absolute limit to the period within which the application may be made. Statutes of this kind are liberally construed to promote the object which the legislature may be supposed to have had in view. But of course if relief from a judgment is sought by timely application in the Court of First Instance. and the expression “when the Court of First Instance . . or at most. and then only when it should appear that the lower court had finally adjourned before the six months within which it could have granted relief had expired. as we have already seen. It may be argued that the words “and the Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no adequate remedy exists in that court” were intended to be applicable exclusively to the case where the Court of First Instance might. It is declared in article 1281 of the Civil Code that if the words of a contract appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties. The sense of this construction may perhaps be further elucidated by saying that the controlling idea is the want of adequate remedy in the Court of First Instance. and the application is there denied. and no relief could be granted by the Supreme Court upon applications made after the expiration of eight months from the date of the judgment. . but it gives to the provision an application so narrow as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator. the literal meaning of the words used may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the legislature had in view. the relief grantable by the Supreme Court under section 513 would also be necessarily limited to applications made within six months.” as used in section 513. within sixty days after the expiration of six months. must not be understood as referring exclusively to adjournment within six months after judgment entered. and apart from the requirement that the application must be made to the Supreme Court within two months after the petitioner first learns of the rendition of judgment against which relief is sought. If the meaning be as here suggested. without regard to the six months limitation fixed in section 113. but is prevented from so doing solely by reason of the fact of adjournment. This would seem at first blush to be the literal sense of the words used. From what has been said it will be seen that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain a petition of the character of that now before us begins in point of time when the period has passed within which it was competent for the Court of First Instance to entertain an application under section 113. This rule is there stated with respect to the interpretation of contracts. as applicable in the interpretation of statutes. if not already adjourned. though guardedly.

). and although notice of the application is published. Rep. and this is necessarily fatal to the petition before us. provided none of the reasons specified in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure for disallowing the will are found to exist. legalizing the will of Juan Pons y Coll. 6 Phil. it is not a judgment rendered upon default even though no person appears to oppose the probate.petition based on the same ground will thereafter be entertained in the Supreme Court under section 513. the power of the Supreme Court under section 513 is limited to granting a new trial upon judgments rendered upon default. But if fraud had been charged – as. If any interested person opposes the probate. if any exists. without any fault on the part of the petitioner or her attorneys. From such judgment any interested person may appeal to the Supreme Court within twenty days. order or proceeding whatever. she has been deprived not only of the opportunity of opposing the will and appealing from the order of probate but also of the opportunity of applying to the Court of First Instance for relief under section 113. would not be found in a proceeding under section 513. As a result of this decision it cannot be denied that.337. the court may allow the will on the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses only (sec. It thus becomes unneccessary to inquire whether the will in question was in fact executed in conformity with the requirements of law – either of these Islands or of Spain. 161. it is noteworthy that while the power of the Court of First Instance to grant relief under section 113 extends to the setting aside of any judgment. Moir and Rances. (Rabajante vs. as the proper remedy in that case would be to appeal from the action of the Court of First Instance. 631. for instance.. but in an original action in the Court of First Instance. 28 Phil. It is manifest from this that the remedy given in section 513 can have no application to the order of May 20. or that the document probated is any other than a testamentary memorial in which the decedent actually gave expression to his desires with regard to the disposition of his property. nobody is bound to appear and no order for judgment by default. (Sec. The proceeding to probate a will is not a contentious litigation in any sense.) . Now what is the meaning of “judgment rendered upon default. Even assuming that she could have procured the disallowance of the will by either of those methods – a point upon which no pronouncement can here be made – it is obvious that the impossibility of her thus obtaining relief was due to circumstances peculiar to this case. Code Civ Proc. (Simon vs.) Proceeding now to a further comparison of sections 113 and 513. It is not alleged that any fraud has been attempted or committed. can only arise in contentious litigation where a party who has been impleaded as a defendant and served with process fails to appear at the time required in the summons or to answer at the time provided by the rules of the court. Code Civ. because nobody is impleaded or served with process. Rep. 781. is ever entered. supra. Castro and Castro. if it were alleged that the purported will is forged document – the remedy.. and the possibility of occassional hardship cannot affect the validity of our procedure for the probate of wills (Estate of Johnson.) Though the action taken by a Court of First Instance in thus allowing or disallowing a will is properly denominated a judgment. the court hears the testimony and allows or disallows the will accordingly. 335. If the application is not opposed. It is a special proceeding. 1918. This consequence follows regardless of any irregularities that may have occurred in the Court of First Instance in admitting the will to probate and regardless of any error which that court may have committed in the action taken upon the proof submitted at the hearing.) A default. Proc.” as used in section 513? The reference is of course to the default mentioned in section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure. such as is there intended.

Where the defect apparent in the petition is of a sort that might be cured by amendment. upon the distribution of the estate of Juan Pons y Coll. and upon this idea the decree of probate is held binding on all persons in interest. for the purpose of explaining the situation more clearly. The action of the court in admitting a will to probate has all the effect of a judgment. with the formalities prescribed by law. The proceeding is not a contentious litigation. and so far as we can see. whether they appear to contest the probate or not. but inasmuch as the petition is in our opinion insufficient. and when it is found at any stage of the proceeding that the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief of any sort. and as such is entitled to full faith and credit in other courts. and though the persons in interest are given an opportunity to appear and reasonable precautions are taken for publicity. the order of dismissal is made conditional upon the failure of the petitioner to amend within a period stated. in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its provisions. This fact. After the resolution embodied in the preceding opinion had been adopted by the court. The step indicated would be proper if the facts stated in the petition had been found sufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an expression of our opinion upon the legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon the statements contained therein.A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted. on the facts before us. The proceeding by which this is accomplished is considered to be in the nature of a proceeding in rem. it is our practice to enter an order upon our own motion dismissing the petition. In this connection it may be well to estate that when a petition for relief in the exercise of our original jurisdiction is presented to this court. In the course of the preceding discussion we have. is incontrovertible and apparent from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. If. while conclusive as to its due execution. But if the will in question was in fact proved as the will of a Spanish subject under section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the probate of a will. among which is the provisions that after death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court. the making of the order suggested becomes unneccessary. the will must necessarily yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail. we are accustomed to consider the case as being at all times before us for the purpose of determining the legal sufficiency of the petition. therefore. and such appears to be the correct practice. upon designation by him of the time and place therefor. As has been repeatedly stated in the decisions of this court. as where we state that the will purports to disinherit the petitioner. they are not impleaded or required to answer. however. Moreover. The petitioner is therefore free to appear in the Court of First Instance at the proper juncture and discuss the questions of the validity of such provisions of the will as affect her interests adversely. permitted ourselves to refer to at least one detail not stated in the petition. if not admitted. the point that no decisive influence on the decision. to control in a certain degree the disposition of his property after his death. the attorneys for the petitioner moved that an order be entered for the submission of evidence and that the clerk of this court be appointed commissioner to take the same. On the other hand where the defect is manifestly incurable it is proper to make the order of dismissal absolute. the intrinsic validity of its provisions must be determined under the Spanish law applicable to this testator. it should appear that any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case. but before the decision had been promulgated. . this is her only recourse.

and judgment absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs. The defect from which the petition suffers is therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be aided by the taking of proof. the inability of this court to grant relief in the case before us is really due to the fact that the remedy conceded in section 513 admitting wills to probate.As will be discovered from the opinion. The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied. .

J. finding that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had signed each and every page of Exhibit A were cured by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument appears to be signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Buhain for respondent. respondent. incorrect. Considering that the witnesses' only business at hand was to sign and attest to the testatrix's signing of the document. 4940). 3rd Suppl. signed and published by testatrix Pilar Montealegre and she declared that the said instrument is her last will and testament. the attestation clause. The opponent objected that this clause did not estate that the tetratrix and the witnesses had signed each and every page of the will or that she had signed the instrument in the presence of the witnesses. the absence of the require statement in said clause may not. Leynes vs. on the date above-mentioned. that in our presence and also in the very presence of the said testatrix as likewise in the presence of two witnesses and the testatrix each of us three witnesses signed this a testament. Written in the local dialect known to the testatrix." The premise of the conclusion is. its language exceedingly ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to understand. 40 Off. The testatrix was survived by the husband and collateral relatives. the court held the second objection well taken and thus concluded: "The question whether the testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses can not be verified upon physical examination of the instrument. 57 Phil. and that the only actors of the proceeding were the maker and the .. were disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth therein. reads: The foregoing instrument consisting of three pages." But granting the correctness of the premise. petitioner. Rallos. Gaz. The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged defects of the attestation clause. was executed. Hence. L-4888 May 25. Moises Ma. Gaz.R. No. 47 Phil. deceased. be offset by proof aliunde even if admitted without any objection. (October 18. along with the husband. Leynes.: This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales denying the probate of the last will and testament and so-called codicil. 528. of Pilar Montealegre. Ticson vs. but from a close examination of the whole context in relation to its purpose the implication seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence of the witnesses. 4938. some of whom. 44 Off.20. pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court. PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS. Gorostiza. Margarito 21. Rallos vs. 152. as translated into English in the record on appeal. It must be admitted that the attestation clause was very poor drawn. (1932). 510. TUAZON .. in our opinion.. The Appellate Court dismissed the first objection. 1939). Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.. Abad. Mojal. vs. (1924). Primicias. identified as Exhibits A and B. 1953 JOSE MERZA. Cotto vs. G.

even free of such formal of literary imperfections as are found in Exhibit A. it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be made. to take effect after his death. However. In the absence of any legal provision to the contrary — and there is none in this jurisdiction — it is the general. adhered to in numerous later decision of this Court and affirmed and translated into inactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827). in the said Exhibit A. is only an addition to. the will. The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. a simple affidavit. Exhibit B is entitled to probate as an independent testementary desposition.) "It could have been the intention of the legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the execution of a will to shackle the very right of the testamentary disposition which the law recognizes and holds sacred. Leynes. No other inference is possible. . Gorostiza." and. The verb could not be other than signed and the subject no other than the testatrix." Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. As seen.witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the first person. supra.. "there being no disposition as to the disinheritance of the oppositor. "Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation clause is desirable. may not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition. which is. with the formalities prescribed by law. can not imply anything but the testatrix signed before them." (Leynes vs. 885) and provided that the statutory requirements relative to the execution of wills have been complied with (Id. as above stated. supra. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a persons dispose of all his property or a portion of it. disinheritance "may not be made in any instrument other than the will of Exhibit A.) With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the document having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil." Furthermore." and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted." used as it was in connection with the process of signing. The prepositional phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and the verb a subject. as each of the witnesses sign in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate. It denotes that. well-established rule that two separate and distinct wills may be probated if one does not revoke the other (68 C. In consonance with the principle of the liberal interpretation.J. 881). so the testatrix sign in similar or like manner — in their presence. Being of testamentary character and having been made with all the formalities of law. the phrase "in our presence. the Court of Appeals observed. or modification of." The Court of Appeals added that "the content of Exhibit B are couched in the language of ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such. Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a will. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it. as the word implies. Exhibit B comes within this definition." (Ticson vs. Pedro Lopez Porras (the surviving spouse). as expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code. we are constrained to hold the attestation clause under consideration sufficient and valid. it is quite clear that he can not be disinherited in any other instrument including Exhibit B.

" It is our judgment therefore that the instruments Exhibit A and B admitted to probate. and it is so ordered. with costs against the appellee.It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of Spain does not. subject of courts to the right of the disinherited person under particle 850 to contest the disinheritance. as the appealed decision seems to insinuate. require that the disinheritance should be accomplished in the same instrument by which the maker provides the disposition of his or her property after his or death. This article merely provides that "disinheritance can be affected only by a will (any will) in which the legal cause upon which it is based is expressly stated. .

(Sec. There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. It was therefore executed in conformity with law. JOSE E. vs. and once for all. plaintiff-appellee. ALEMANY. that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. 625. or whether the person so appointed was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust. It can not decide.R. Herrero for appellee. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. defendant-appellant. therefore. Ledesma. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in his proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased. The grounds upon which a will may be disallowed are limited to those mentioned in section 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The fact. . It could not in this case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her children by her first husband. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or. All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. if he does sign it. the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will. 1904 G. No. They all have to do with the personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. WILLARD. The mistakes in translation found in the first Spanish edition of the code have been corrected in the second. Antonio V. The English text of section 618 is very plain. for example. (2) To establish conclusively as against everyone. is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will.22.: (1) The evidence in this case shows to our satisfaction that the will of Doña Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the presence of three witnesses. The court erred in holding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the execution of the will of Doña Juana Moreno. as the proof shows that the said will was not written in the presence of under the express direction of the testratrix as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sumulong and Quintos for appellant. that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. J. March 19. 1439 ANTONIO CASTAÑEDA. that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testratrix and of each other.

however.It is claimed by the appellants that there was no testimony in the court below to show that the will executed by the deceased was the same will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was had. In their argument in that court. No suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for the appellants that it was not the same instrument. But we think that we are justified in saying that it was assumed by all the parties during the trial in the court below that the will about which the witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. In the last question put to the witness Gonzales the phrase “this will” is used by the counsel for the appellants. .” The costs of this instance will be charged against the appellants. the clause “el cual debera ejecutarse fiel y exactamente en todas sus partes. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. found on page 15 of the record. as should have been done. they treat the testimony of the witnesses as referring to the will probate they were then opposing. eliminating therefrom.

Ross. one of the brothers of the deceased. in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions. 36 Phil. provides the following: Nevertheless. whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. No. JUAN MICIANO. G. L-22595 November 1. among other things. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. Lawrence and Selph for appellant. Brimo is in question in this case. vs. He. for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which. inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter. however.. Brimo. administrator. and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.) It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. (Lim and Lim vs. The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. and in the absence of evidence on such laws. so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business. The court. opponent-appellant. J. himself. they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. .R. Camus and Delgado for appellee. Collector of Customs. 472. ROMUALDEZ. (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition. petitioner-appellee. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. 1927 Testate Estate of Joseph G. approved it. acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point. and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause. Andre Brimo. ANDRE BRIMO.23. legal and testamentary successions. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition.: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance. opposed it.

as the herein oppositor who. and. lawphil. I like desire to state that although by law. not in accordance with the laws of his nationality. according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted. but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will. taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence. in the light of the legal provisions above cited. I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G.net Therefore. my will. by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator. In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee. be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands. not being contrary to our laws in force. it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this. being contrary to law. inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will. and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property. I am a Turkish citizen. is null and void. this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice.The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. that the said condition is void. The institution of legatees in this will is conditional. is considered unwritten. Said condition then. being contrary to law. otherwise. however. There is. It is discretionary with the trial court. and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. which says: Second. for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following: Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid. and to the condition imposed upon the legatees. as expressed. even should the testator otherwise provide. having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess. the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous. . nor by nationality and. on the other hand. therefore. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when. must be complied with and executed. requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish. is prevented from receiving his legacy. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which. such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. any legatee who fails to comply with it. It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it. The fact is.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law. and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects. . the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees. Therefore. without any pronouncement as to costs.

Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children. from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30.000. approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. Mallen.1äwphï1. Miriam Palma Bellis. J.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. S.R.P. by his second wife. Amos Bellis. in trust. 1952. The People's Bank and Trust Company. Amos G. J. Amos G. Bellis. . 1958.ñët Subsequently. Bellis. R. Edwin G.ñët The facts of the case are as follows: Amos G. Texas. BELLIS.S. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. born in Texas.. Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman. or on July 8. and Dorothy E. obligations. Maria Cristina Bellis. in which he directed that after all taxes. as executor of the will. Henry A. he had five legitimate children: Edward A. paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY. Jr. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. heirs-appellees. BENGZON.000. Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Bellis. various amounts totalling P40. 1964. Bellis. Ozaeta..00. Mary E. Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. namely: Edward A. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies. Violet Kennedy.00 to his first wife. who survived him. L-23678 June 6. his distributable estate should be divided.1äwphï1. Jr. executor. Allsman. Macasaet and Jose D. in equal shares. Villena for oppositors appellants..00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied. EDWARD A. Jr. he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis. et al.24. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Paredes.000. G. George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy). whom he divorced. 1967 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. Walter S. BELLIS. Bellis.: This is a direct appeal to Us. ET AL. Amos Bellis. or P40. Walter S. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15. Mary E. oppositors-appellants. vs. Bellis. Bellis. or a total of P120. U. Vicente R. 1958. Mallen. Bellis. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS. in the following order and manner: (a) $240.000. and expenses of administration are paid for. which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. and finally. 37089 therein.000.. upon a question purely of law. et al. Poblador. Henry A..00 to his three illegitimate children. J. B. the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. Bellis. deceased. No. A. Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman. Bellis. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis.A. Bellis." By his first wife. On August 5.000. (b) P120. Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.

1963. On January 17. but would still refer to Texas law. (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will.00 each or a total of P120. the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account. therefore. Article 16.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern. In the absence.. oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. In the present case. report and administration and project of partition. January 31. 2. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country. Jr. 1964.00. inter alia. the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.00. Christensen Garcia. proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27. the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law.000.On January 8. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. and (d) the capacity to succeed. in intestate or testamentary successions. on April 30. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40. (b) the amount of successional rights. 1964. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240. the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. 1039 of the Civil Code. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and. renvoi would arise.1 After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings. 1964. the lower court. which did not provide for legitimes. and the legacies of Amos Bellis. Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported. Amos Bellis. They provide that — ART. applied by this Court in Aznar v. it applied the national law of the decedent. the doctrine of renvoi. Jr. Rather. render applicable the national law of the decedent.000. Nonetheless. with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession. issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account. if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated. In the project of partition. 1964 by the executor. Relying upon Art. par. since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11. compulsory heirs of the deceased. it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. 16. the parties do not submit the case on. 16 of the Civil Code. it should not be presumed different from ours.000. interposed no opposition despite notice to him. 1964. they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. nor even discuss. which in this case is Texas law. preparatory to closing its administration. In this regard. of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas. however. and a domicile of another. As stated. and Art. . L-16749. they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments.

17 of the new Civil Code. 17.. inter alia. the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. ART. a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law. both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. there are no forced heirs or legitimes. which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. to the decedent's national law. their acts or property. or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration. paragraph three.However. for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. under Art. 16. So ordered. This is not correct. Brimo. of the Civil Code. whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Appellants would however counter that Art.A. "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. it would not alter the law. public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. 1039.S. par. Wherefore. . 1039. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. 870. Congress added a new provision. Accordingly. Precisely. Congress deleted the phrase. and that under the laws of Texas. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Bellis. stating that — Prohibitive laws concerning persons. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will. with costs against appellants. The parties admit that the decedent. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. 867. prevails as the exception to Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. and those which have for their object public order. 50 Phil. For it has specifically chosen to leave. was a citizen of the State of Texas. while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. As further indication of this legislative intent. 16 in the new. the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto. Bellis. Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Amos G. intestate and testamentary successions. the amount of successional rights. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. is illegal and void. It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes. U.

vs. we think it may safely be inferred that there was some good and sufficient reason therefore.: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros. The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore that the testator. G. as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line. the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed. Ubag was not of sound mind and memory. counsel for appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction. when because of death. who was present when the will was made. they as well as the third subscribing witness. and this especially in cases such as the one at bar. contestants-appellants. and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament.25. proponent-appellee.. was of sound mind and memory. however. absence. but since counsel for the contestants makes no comment upon his absence. wherein there is a contests. sickness. and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed. testified in support of the will. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in bed and signed his name to the will. Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ET AL. signed by him in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses. and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate.R. which we think is more apparent than real. while the other testified that he was assisted into a sitting . and appears upon its face to have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure touching the making of wills. No. it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate. and that in his presence and in the presence of each other. it may be well to observe that. and that after its execution food was given him by his wife. at the time of its execution. The instrument was propounded by his widow. It does not appear from the record why the third subscribing witness was not called. who are brothers and sisters of the deceased. FRANCISCO UBAG. Bingtoy and Catalino Mariño. Catalina Bugnao. Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants. CARSON. deceased. J. if probate were denied. Fernando Salas for appellee. Despite the searching and exhaustive crossexamination to which they were subjected. Two of the subscribing witnesses. In passing. Victor J. or for any other reason. 4445 September 18. and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will. admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag. however. the sole beneficiary thereunder. The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and testament of Domingo Ubag. and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself. the reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record. 1909 CATALINA BUGNAO. and probate was contested by the appellants.

to understand. We think the evidence discloses that his wife aided the sick man to sit up in bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument. The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving that at the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified that the will was executed. or both before and after he attached his signature to the will. Canuto Sinoy. he and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior to the one particular occasion as to which testified.position. where the incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was present must have been directed to it. To say that the sick man sat up or raised himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with the fact that he received assistance in doing so. and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical and mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. On cross-examination. or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident. promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was not his brother's signature. and that one witness might remember the former occasion and the other witness might recall the latter. and where the contradictory statements in regard to it are so clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or probability of mistake. explicit. Two of these witnesses. a brother of the testator. but it is not quite clear whether this was immediately before or after. at or about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed. and it is not at all improbable or impossible that nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the will. one is a contestant of the will. might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the witnesses could not possibly have been present. and that at that time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house. although neither witness could recall both. this being the time at which the witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. and was given something to eat before he signed his name. and he admitted . admitted that they were not in the house at or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on which the will is alleged to have been made. and is so convincing and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire confidence and belief. or as to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the instrument. and the other. Macario Ubag. but this witness in his anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will. his close relative. we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one or the other witness. he was forced to admit that because his brother and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos. however this may have been. Of the other witnesses. together. a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed. where he was lying ill. and that he was given nourishment while he was in that position. But the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence. and on the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such clear. and only corrected his erroneous statement in response to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently gave him to understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own cause. but the apparent contradictions in the testimony of the witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a to their veracity. But. or to make himself understood. Of course. is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses. and the alleged testator was so sick that he was unable to speak. These witnesses swore that they were in the house of the deceased. at the time when it is alleged the will was executed. and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. it clearly discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs. to which his attention may not have been particularly directed. upon crossexamination. An admittedly genuine and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for comparison with the signature attached to the will. and detailed account of all that occurred. and readiness to swear to any fact which he imagined would aid in securing his object. these witnesses were not in the house with the testator. as to the precise details of an unimportant incident. In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation. and to that end an utter disregard of the truth.

at the time of its execution. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill. an admittedly genuine signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence. that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable to see. We do not think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the execution of the will. and wholly fails to make any provision for his brothers or sisters. and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not speak. in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma. or as to the manner and from in which it was executed. These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist between the two signatures. and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out therein. that. is strong evidence of his testamentary capacity. and that they did not even attend the funeral. that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed. that the subscribing witnesses to the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution on the very day. but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity. who held in this connection as follows: No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two signatures. when this interested witness happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness. If the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true. but the court finds that the principal strokes in the two signatures are identical. he was of sound mind and memory. they contend that this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the will. that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position. and the presiding judge of this court does not claim to possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures. and the other fact. indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property. Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his widow.further. and indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will. we are wholly of the opinion of the trial judge. the court has compared these two signatures. that the testator was seriously ill. at no time thereafter did he or any of the other members of his family visit their dying brother. and at the precise hour. and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his name every day. and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make so unnatural and unreasonable a will. who declined to have any relations with . In the course of the proceedings. It is true that the signature which appears in the document offered for authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber was more deliberate in his movements. but two facts must be acknowledge: First. it would be a remarkable coincidence indeed. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending line. and does not find that any material differences exists between the same. That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that. and upon a comparison of this signature with the signature attached to the instrument in question. so that the testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing witnesses. nevertheless. that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him from his brothers and sisters. although he lived near at hand.

that. L... . or its impairment by disease or other causes" (Greene vs. in a greater or less degree. although some of them lived in the vicinity.). 62 III. Vancleve. Few indeed would be the wills confirmed.. and that "it is probable that no court has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will. Pain. J. or great bodily infirmities or suffering. It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to determine the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been everywhere recognized. Newell. 293. weaken. J. would. and that degree of mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy. break in upon.. but the derangement must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den.3 P. (Del. or from age. Scott. . or consequences of the act she is engaged in" (Manatt vs. provided he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about. and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or sisters. and while on one hand it has been held that "mere weakness of mind. R.. But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay down a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases which may present themselves. The question of soundness is one of degree" (Boughton vs. Weakness of intellect. were present at the time of his death or attended his funeral. and grows out of the inherent impossibility of measuring mental capacity. Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity. Lodge. will not render a person incapable of making a will. that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. that "it has not been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. 5 N. effects. P. because. "To constitute a sound and disposing mind. endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States. 203. who themselves were grown men and women. debility of body. the testator was. 203). 106 Iowa. or partial imbecility from the disease of body. without appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs. there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity. 264. it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired. 145 III. Knight. and while is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of proof of some of these elements. and how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs. 196. proof of the existence of all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary capacity. or derange the mind. on the other hand.. Maxwell. St. 302). J. according to its violence or duration. providing such weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or appreciating the nature... sickness. at the time of making the instrument under consideration. Rep. it has been held that "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. from age or infirmity. by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife. whether it arises from extreme old age from disease. 68 Am. there can be no question that. Eq. may render the testator incapable of making a valid will. 563). . & D. vs. . 42 L. 276). if this is correct. or in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.680). a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will. 3 N. we think the fact that the deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and made no provision for his brothers and sisters.the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the Aglipayano Church. 64. 418). in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances. 2 Houst. Greene. or from all these combined. 25). as will be seen from what has already been said. unshattered by disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. and. L.

p. that it was made in strict conformity with the requisites prescribed by law. The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed. 71. with the cost of this instance against the appellants. at the time of its execution. 23.Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction which the testator is engaged at the time. the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased. vol.) In our opinion. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia of Law. to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator. the deceased was of sound mind and memory. . (Cf. second edition. and executed the instrument of his own free will and accord. and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. and that.

November 4. Panis for appellant. In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals. who had been sickly for about two years. plus interests. adjudicating the same to her. plaintiff-appellant. 1942. and for money loaned to the plaintiff. she had been suffering for sometime. to the Court of Appeals for Manila. her thumbmark appearing on said document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney. In the meanwhile. for the recovery of one-half (½) of the property mentioned and described therein. against Encarnacion's will. 1942. Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision. The defendant filed an answer admitting that the property mentioned and described therein was community property. 1942. 1942. on November 4. could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra. at the instance of Trinidad Neyra.000. 1942. but at the same time ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727. dated November 3. the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to one-half (½) of the said property. who had died since November 4. After the trial of the case. 1939.A. defendant-appellee. and that as a matter of fact she died the following day. No. allegedly from heart attack. 1946 TRINIDAD NEYRA. vs. asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the Court of Appeals. by virtue of said agreement or compromise. which was filed in the case the following day. demanding at the same time one-half (½) of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant Encarnacion Neyra. claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement. C. pursuant to the to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties. and on November 10. claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra. DE JOYA. Lucio Javillonar for appellee. unexpectedly died. . dismissing the appeal.26. 1942 at the age of 48. and other relatives of hers. Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister. Alejandro M. 1942. in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila. 8075 March 25. ENCARNACION NEYRA. as Encarnacion was already dead at the time. when the alleged agreement was filed on November 4. and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra. and which had been previously divided equally between the two extrajudicially. for money spent. during the last illness of their father. as shown by the corresponding document. by virtue of said counterclaims. dated November 23. dated November 3. attacking the execution and validity of said agreement. Encarnacion Neyra.: On October 25. said appeal was dismissed. and that the court had no more jurisdiction over the case. which had been left by their deceased father. filed a petition. dated November 10. Severo Neyra. J. 1942. 1942. and at the same time set up counterclaims amounting to over P1. it was claimed. as she was already then at the threshold of death. Lucio Javillonar. dismissing the appeal. Atty. alleging several errors. Encarnacion Neyra. as a consequence of Addison's disease from which.77.

and in the Court of Appeals. that after the mass. sent for Atty. That Encarnacion Neyra. named Teodora Neyra. that the two sisters greeted each other in most affectionate manner. by his first marriage. holy mass was solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro Garcia. has fully established the following facts: That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila. filed in March 31. in connection with said petition for reconsideration. after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her house at No. 8162). who had become her bitter enemy. Mons. In the first case. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made. leaving certain properties and two children. so that she might take holy communion. concerning said properties. That after the death of Severo Neyra. and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will. they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila. is whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra. 1939. who had remained single. 1939. on November 3. and became reconciled and two had a long and cordial conversation. Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative. 1942. for their consideration and acceptance. instead of preparing a new will. executed a will on September 14. and said decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her. Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters. also of the Quiapo Church. the instant case being the second.R. she sent for her religious adviser and confessor. took holy communion. Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. after due deliberation and consideration. at about noon of the same day (November 1. 1942). merely prepared a draft of a codicil.The principal question to be decided. testimonial and documentary. that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation. that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra. disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives. that Atty. Sikat. The voluminous evidence. the two sisters. the latter decided to make a new will. and they agreed to have the latter dismissed. sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad. 1943 (G. on December 21. 1939. 366 Raon Street. amending said will. on the . who remained in bed. and who had no longer any ascendants. Trinidad Neyra. after March 31. and so serious were their dissensions that. on November 1. marked Exhibit 16. as a matter of fact. on May 6. in this case. Encarnacion Neyra. de Blanco. had serious misunderstandings. Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill. in the court of first instance. No. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession. making no provision whatsoever in said will. named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. 1939. said religious organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra. 1942. and for that purpose. again naming said religious organization. City of Manila. who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon. Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. that Mons. in connection with the properties left by their deceased father. 1938. dated September 14. on which occasion. among others as beneficiary. Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. Ricardo Sikat. in favor of her only sister of the whole blood. suffering from Addison's disease. and the second is the instance case. Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants. and. adduced by the parties. but it was also rejected. and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of religious organization. and other children by his second marriage. Encarnacion accepted said advise and. Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. In the meanwhile. 366 Raon Street. in the course of which they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila. about one week before her death. and on October 31. 1942.

in the presence of attesting witnesses. Dr. Alejandro M.condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra. when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement. slowly and in a loud voice. in duplicate. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra. Teodora Neyra. on her bed in the sala. and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and testament. as party. Teodora Neyra. in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra. while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character. Trinidad Neyra. who had known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix. and by Dr. Panis. B. at the request of Encarnacion Neyra. thumbmark was affixed to the will. daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. 1942. Strange to say. that in the afternoon of that day. Moises B. to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement. and who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes. thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco. Alejandro M. Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's. de Blanco. . however. November 2. and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. 1942. 1942. and Presentacion Blanco. she was sleeping on her bed in the sala. 1942. after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will. Dr. Abad. when Encarnacion was already dead. 1942. only in the morning of November 4. Petitioner Teodora Neyra. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel. Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified. Panis. a protege. by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del Barrio. half sister of Encarnacion. as witnesses. Eladio R. or if she wanted any change made in said documents. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza. Dr. Dr. of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra. in duplicate. in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia. Abad. Eladio Aldecoa. They also agreed to send for Atty. The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra. Aldecoa and Atty. who are all trustworthy men. as they were in the caida. that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament. and of each other. Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents. in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra. placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents. and. that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change. that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question. But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra. with the help of a son of Trinidad. and her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz. with reference to the signing of documents. substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra. and asked for the pad and the two documents. naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein. M. and others. Moises B. but Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day. since the morning of November 3. and were ready for signature. and that the attesting witnesses were not present. pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions. in the afternoon of November 3. in the sala near her bed. and the two documents were prepared. dated November 3. that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion.

and that as the disease progresses.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition.) Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will. these circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will. V. in spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary. be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease. 1250-1253. 485. 44 Phil. as to the nature of effects of Addison's disease. to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu. Tablizo.. 3d ed. who had known and talked to the testators. in several cases. Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly.. due to a heart attack. to the effect that she was very weak.) Presentacion Blanco. remain unimpaired. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.) And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4. nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign. 1935. was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity.. 48 Phil. McCrae. more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts. Textbook of Medicine. is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs. in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3. at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. (Yap Tua vs.) The testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days. persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as ten (10) years.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis. the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons. therefore. insomnia or diabetes. pp. 272-279. (Cecil. In connection with mental capacity. It may.. 3d ed. thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis. on account of the sleep they enjoy. 27 Phil. 1942. nor ill health. after an illness of about two (2) years.The testimony of Dr. According to medical authorities. Calderon.. but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him. like the testatrix in this case. in the course of her cross-examination. and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis. Osler's Modern Medicine. 400. they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. asthenia sets in. being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. Tablizo. 573. Vol. 1942. 579. in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires. 20 Phil. they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death. (Samson vs. Dionisio Parulan. at the age of 48. Corrales Tan Quintin. 48 Phil. neither old age. alleged medical expert. frankly admitted that. pp. is absolutely unreliable. (Amata and Almojuela vs. was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. in spite of the testimony of two doctors. partly due to the fact that. 485. who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will. this court has considered the testimony of witnesses.. although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted. . (Caguioa vs. Insomnia. prior to his death.. and complications of the heart also appear. while others die after a few weeks only.

in the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses. by executing said agreement. It was. as the latter is the nearest relative of the former. (Jaboneta vs. Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. petitioners have erroneously placed great emphasis on the fact that. 728. and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors. as in the case of a reconciliation. 735. 1939. had they chosen to do so. at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question. therefore. 1942. and . absolutely unworthy of belief. and that to forgive is a divine attribute. and they are. up to October 31. (Gonzales vs. It violates all sense of proportion. who had been demanding insistently what was her due. dated November 3. they have testified to deliberate falsefoods. dated September 14. dated November 3.. most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her generosity. is untenable. but eliminated from the will. and the execution of the two documents. Mauricio. and yet not impossible. 1942. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu. Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation. It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3. the two sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation. on her bed. at the time of the execution of the agreement and will.. within their view. 541. as she did not want to go to her eternal rest. under her last will and testament. and that the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the agreement. at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. 1942. her only sister of the whole blood. therefore. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents. dated November 3. in the sala. 1942. 1942. And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal aphorism — falsus in uno. and end all her troubles with her. Furthermore. the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses. in the morning of November 4. the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity. and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question. and hope and charity. while she was sleeping. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness. Gustilo. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth. when she was already dead.) To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation. It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters. but whether they might have seen each other sign. 579. with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head. and that she had always been just to her sister.Judging by the authorities above cited. They had also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than that embalmed in tears. falsus in omnibus. They had forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian faith. in the sala of the house. as they are children of legatees named in the will. and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. They were banking evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent. where the testatrix was lying on her bed. 5 Phil. as they were allegedly in the caida. 27 Phil. The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present. (Yap Tua vs. to the effect that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. on November 3. The approach of imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. is absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth.) Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present. 53 Phil. 1942.. in their presence. 1942.

and some of her relatives. is hereby re-affirmed. Encarnacion Neyra. on behalf of a client. . dated November 10. is hereby denied. So ordered. and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila.that she was compos mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the time. without costs. in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 1942. 1942. the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. on November 23. who have appeared. dismissing the appeal. Lucio Javillonar. who had been dead since November 4. 1942.

but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties. On January 7. . Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator. and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death. thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Vicente F. Lopez. Tomas Rodriguez. heir. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian. and the testator. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. and secondly. in effect. Lopez died. appellee. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Marcaida.27. We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code. when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. It is there declared. STREET. special administrator. first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares. with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives. 1926 In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez. 1924. No. 772). or only four days after the will above-mentioned was made. decedent. The will referred to. MANUEL TORRES.R. opponent-appellant. had been judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin Vicente F. while the appellee. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us. Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that. Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament. 1924. Lopez. defining the right of accretion. G. and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. MARGARITA LOPEZ. 1924. claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir.. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno. my cousin Vicente F. no testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved. L-25966 November 1. and Margariat Lopez appealed. vs. Margarita Lopez. Tomas Rodriguez. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F. that accretion take place in a testamentary succession. Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.: This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez. in the second clause of which he declared: I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property. died on February 25. Delgado and Recto for appellant. J. and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO. Luz Lopez de Bueno. Lopez and his daughter. and after having been contested. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part. claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3. deceased. 48 Phil. Capili and Ocampo and Camus. The appellant. as guardian.

intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder). There was no error whatever. As between articles 912 and 983. that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to inherit. and that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir. not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take. . Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the legacy. a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession. as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. In addition to this. accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two. among other things. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared. that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Margarita Lopez. The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid. among other things. The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that. therefore. one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator. in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion. defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand. In addition to this. the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better right. In case of conflict. Luz Lopez de Bueno. article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible. in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate. A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take. Indeed. as it does. this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. but also the half which pertained to him. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the Code. and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. under paragraph 4 of article 912. under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982. therefore. while. and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far as possible. Besides. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982. with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific. yet it must be so understood. Lopez and that this half has descended to the appellant. giving due effect to all. in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to.Luz Lopez de Bueno. dealing. and its effect is to give to the survivor. notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912. and in case of conflict between two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. to the same inheritance without special designation of shares. by which the more specific is held to control the general.

— a presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator. without being limited. so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject. to the extent supposed in appellant's brief. 186). . 4th ed. 372. VII. 285-287. by provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa. pp. amounting to a mild presumption. partial testacy systems a presumption against it. or he renounces the inheritance or legacy. (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia. tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912. against partial intestacy.. In Roman law. 34. . and it is so ordered. . p. vol.net In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal intendment. The judgment appealed from will be affirmed. 310. vol. if he dies before the testator. as is well known.The opinions of the commentators. 311. I. 16 Mucius Scaevola. Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will. id. 13 Mucius Scaevola. or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. pp. with costs against the appellant.)lawphil. . if the condition be not fulfilled.. Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español. 373. 225.

28. ETC. a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following: A. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas.: This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to declare the orders of respondent Judge dated July 16. petitioners. LUIS B. and none other than they. In said Last Will and Testament.R. DE ARANAS. Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents. VDA. No. Aranas (Tingting). my brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office. because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew. without bond. The special administration is perpetual. should be the first special administrator of said properties. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and placed under a "special administrator. died on January 19." The special administrator of these lands. Vicente B. by ruling that the properties under Group C of the testate estate of the late Fr. respondents. He had executed on June 6.. ADELIA B. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Fr. . Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can hold the said office of special administrator. vs. Fr. Their father. L-56249 May 29. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. 1980 and September 23. 1953. PARAS. MANTA. should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses for the administration. G. RAMONA B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr. but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas. 1956. his said sons will have power to select the one among them ourselves. 1946 his Last Will and Testament which was admitted to probate on August 31. VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. Teodoro Aranas. Said pertinent provision 1 reads as follows: Fourth. for his office. J. a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator's soul. until his death or until he should not want to hold the said office anymore. ET AL. C.. and the other half of the produce should be received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul. 1987 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B. B. ARANAS. 1980 as an exercise of a gross abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.Teodoro Aranas are subject to remunerative legacies. Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator from his parents. FATHER TEODORO ARANAS. ARANAS-FERNANDEZ.

Teodoro Aranas. coheirs of Administrator Vicente Aranas. Fr. and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of the portion of the estate of the late Rev. 303) "Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition. reopened in order that other heirs. It also declared that "the removal of Vicente Aranas will. if still alive or one selected by his sons if. 87. 1977 is "set aside and in the interest of justice. petitioners now come before Us by certiorari raising the issue that the lower court erred in setting aside its order dated November 17." 3 However. Article 605. 870. 564 and 603 of the New Civil Code). is nun and void after twenty years from January 19. 870 of the New Civil Code to wit: Art. during his lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. successors-in-interest of Felino Aranas. administered by Vicente Aranas. particularly the Archbishop diocese of Cagayan de Oro City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick H. Cronin over one-half of the proceeds of the properties under Group "C. Carmelo Aranas. as in the case of the heirs of Aniceto Aranas and Carmelo Aranas. upon his death or refusal to continue such usufruct. particularly with respect to the portion of the estate taken by the heirs of Aniceto Aranas. (Article 562. is dead. 1977 and in not applying the provisions on Usufruct of the New Civil Code with respect to the properties referred to as Group "C" in the Last Will and Testament.. the lower court declared in its Order. 1954 . 1977 ruled." (Article 603. not serve the ends of justice and for the best interest of all the heirs. he. 1980. 1980 that the Order dated November 17. 563. represented by the petitioners herein and the rest of the heirs of Carmelo." 6 Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the lower court in its order dated September 23. petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine laid down in Art. the abovesaid Order was subsequently set aside upon the "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Declare Testate and Intestate Heirs of the late Fr. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas. Teodoro Aranas. . Pursuant to the Will. Rollo) Assailing the aforementioned ruling. 5 could likewise assert their claims. The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties (Group "C") is subject to the following: 1. 2. New Civil Code). Proc. Teodoro Aranas.The lower court in its Order 2 dated November 17. New Civil Code) and to last for a period of Fifty years from the effective date of the legacy. who." filed by the administrator Vicente Aranas on the allegation that said order was violative of due process and without legal and factual basis because only the issue for the removal of the administrator was heard and not the matter of the declaration of heirs. 4 dated July 16. represented by the intervenors. and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.. and. Thus. " and declared in the same order the heirs of the late Fr. Carmelo." p. No. (Annex "L-14. may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their father. upon petitioners' (in Sp. therefore.

Aranas that he was instituted as a remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of usufructuary. 50 years from the date of the effectivity of said legacy. To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties. and provided further. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. 1977 has not yet become final because it was received only on January 12. subject to the limitations provided in Art. the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to Vicente's continuing usufruct. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Respondents in their Memorandum allege and it is not disputed by petitioners that the order of November 17. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other usufructuary legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation. after which period. or in special cases its equivalent.A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as administrator in which case. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property. his sons will have the power to select one among themselves. the property can be properly disposed of. with the obligation to return. shall be valid and shall take effect. . either the same thing. was also established. that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator. provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. Such contention is not worthy of credence. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution. that is. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. As to petitioners' allegation that the order of July 16. 1978 was filed by the said respondent within the reglementary period. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator. the instant petition is hereby dismissed. at the designated time. it was proven conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the determination of heirs. said Article says: A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance. the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion for reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs. the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death. 7 WHEREFORE. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. 1980 is without basis. It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated November 17. 1977 was already final and not subject to correction as what was set aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination of additional heirs. 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17.

with particular attention to any reference to or ruling on article 669 of the Civil Code but we have failed to find any case wherein that particular codal provision has been discussed or applied. FILEMON ABRINGE and FRANCISCO ACADEMIA. After hearing. and that a will of that kind is neither contemplated by Act No. Capistrano for appellant. Pedro Basa. Sandiong and Quinciano Vailoces for appellees. among other grounds. on a single page or sheet by the deceased Victor Bilbao jointly with his wife Ramona M. We have made a rather extensive study of the cases decided by our Supreme Court covering the field of wills. vs. then article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of joint wills whether reciprocal or for the benefit of a third party should be considered as having been repealed and superseded by the new law. which petition was filed by his widow and cotestator Ramona M. RAMON N. declaring it either repealed or still in force. DALMACIO BILBAO. 618. J. and all of our conjugal properties. that "Chapter XXXI. Chapter I) on the matter . Lamberto Macias and Francisco R. appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of execution of wills and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon." The petition for probate was opposed by one Filemon Abringe. CATALINA BILBAO. oppositors-appellee. The only assignment of error made in the appeal is that "the lower court erred in not finding that a joint and reciprocal will particularly between husband and wife is valid under the present law. Navarro. The two testators in their testament directed that "all of our respective private properties both real and personal. Perpetuo A. a near relative of the deceased. G. particularly sections 614.R. or who may remain the surviving spouse of the other. CLEOFAS BILBAO. and any other property belonging to either or both of us. that the alleged will was executed by the husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit and therefore not valid." that inasmuch as the present law on wills as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure has been taken from American law. No. EUSEBIA BILBAO. BILBAO.29. Navarro. 1943. either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental denying the petition for admission to probate of the last will and testament of Victor S. it should be interpreted in accordance with the said law. therefore . The will in question was executed on October 6. and that it was not executed and attested to as required by law. be given and transmitted to anyone or either of us. petitioner-appellant. MONTEMAYOR. 1931. known as the Code of Civil Procedure nor permitted by article 669 of the Civil Code which provides: Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same instrument. Act 190. The sole question and issue squarely raised in this appeal is. and because joint and reciprocal wills are neither regarded as invalid nor on the contrary they are allowed. the trial court found the will to have been executed conjointly by the deceased husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit. Bilbao who died on July 13. 190. who may survive the other. L-2200 August 2. 1950 In re Will of Victor Bilbao. and that it must be deemed to have impliedly repealed the provision of the Civil Code (Title III." The thesis of the appellant is.

where the will was executed in the year 1908. The will involved was executed in 1915 when the Code of Civil Procedure was already in force. 463).. Natividad vs. After examining said case we find the contention untenable. It is also contended that in the case of Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Nacianceno (19 Phil. articles 662 and 663 of the Civil Code regarding capacity and incapacity of persons to dispose by will. we have found a number of cases decided by this court wherein several articles of the Civil Code regarding wills have not only been referred to but have also been applied side by side with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.. Gabino (36 Phil. In the study we have made of this subject. 240). but there was no appeal from the order approving the will on the ground of its validity. 838). Title III of the Civil Code on the same subject matter. realizing the importance and far-reaching effects of any doctrine to be laid down by us in the present case. 238). It is true that the will already described was allowed probate by the trial court. but merely ruled that a testator may die both testate and intestate. In the case of Torres and Lopez De Bueno vs.. In the cases of Postigo vs. article 666 of the Civil Code regarding mental capacity of the testator has been cited and applied together with section 614 and 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding a will executed in 1924. Lopez (48 Phil. 333). Saavedra (51 Phil. have been cited and applied together with section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding requisites of wills. In the case of in the matter of the will Kabigting (14 Phil. which was made jointly by husband and wife in the same instrument. We cannot agree to the contention of the appellant that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on wills have completely superseded Chapter I. Borjal (13 Phil.. was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and the decision was affirmed by this court.. article 667 of the Civil Code was cited in the dissenting opinion of Mr. depending upon the properties sought to be disposed of by him and those to be inherited by his heirs on intestate succession when not covered by the will. 772). As a rule this Tribunal does not pass upon the . meaning that said article has already been repealed. In the case of Marin vs. thereby proving that this tribunal has disregarded the prohibition regarding the execution of wills conjointly under article 669 of the Civil Code. particularly the sections regarding wills.one of first impression and naturally we are constrained to act and to proceed with care and caution.. 267) a will executed in the year 1923.. resulting in the complete repeal of said Civil Code provisions. Naval (41 Phil. In the case of Samson vs. The Supreme Court never touched this point of invalidity nor the applicability of article 669 of the Civil Code. In re Estate of Calderon (26 Phil. article 675 of the Civil Code regarding interpretation of wills was cited and applied.. article 739 of the Civil Code regarding revocation of wills has been applied in harmony with section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Justice Torres. but only on the manner the properties involved were to be distributed or otherwise disposed of. The above-cited authorities all go to show that it is not exactly correct to say that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding wills completely cover the subject matter and therefore have superseded the provisions of the Civil Code on the point. 663) wherein the wills involved had been executed after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure.

especially as regards husbands and wife is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument. The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. where the will is not only joint but reciprocal. the testator Rodriguez instituted his wife his universal heir and the latter in her separate will equally instituted her husband Rodriguez as her universal heir. are of the opinion that the provisions of article 669 of the old Civil Code are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure. II. reference to this article 669 of the Civil Code. In conclusion. 1627 -R. wicked. And we are not alone in this opinion. The reason for this provision. The implication is that the Philippine Legislature that passed this Act and approved the New Civil Code. In view of the foregoing. enforceability. 1948. knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor. faithless. Lastly. as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills. or applicability of a law unless that the point is raised and put in issue. on page 18 believes that this article 669 is still in force. 386).legality. we believe and rule that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force. Vol. and it is necessary to rule upon it in order to determine the case. may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other. Sinco and Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code. In the case of Testate estate of the late Bernabe Rodriguez (CA-G. No.R. the decision appealed form. 46 Off. at least not expressly. we find that this article 669 has been reproduced word for word in article 818 of the New Civil Code (Republic Act No.. including the members of the Code Commission who prepared it. and that article 669 of the Civil Code is not incompatible or inconsistent with said provision of the Article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force. is hereby affirmed. Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed. Opposition to the probate of the will of Rodriguez was base on the prohibition contained in article 669 of the Civil Code. . Gaz. The Court of Appeals said that what the law prohibits under said article is two or more persons making a will conjointly or in the same instrument and not reciprocity in separate wills. in other words they were reciprocal beneficiaries in their respective separate wills. either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous. though indirectly. or desperate. is not unwise and is not against public policy. the spouse who is more aggressive. page 33. And. with costs. July 1. favorably cite Justice Willard's opinion that this article is still in force. we believe and hold that the provision of the Code of Civil procedure regarding wills have not repealed all the articles of the old Civil Code on the same subject matter. In the will involved therein. Judge Camus in his book on the Civil Code does not include this article among those he considers repealed. Justice Willard as shown by his notes on the Civil Code. stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. Mr.

the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine. sister of the deceased. after several days of trial. 1952 TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO. They have impressed the court as simple persons who had intervened in the execution of the will out merely of deference to the testatrix whom they had served for sometime and had known to be a good and respectable woman. that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written. These witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence. G. and after she had signed it in the places where her signatures appear. he was asked also to witness the signing of the will. the issues may be boiled down as follows: 1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will (Exhibit "C") are genuine. 1945. This is the substance of what they have testified and from an examination of their testimony to the court entertains no doubt that they had told the truth. The second was a laborer whose job was is to fix bed made of rattan. oppositor-appellee. While petitioner imputes nine errors to the lower court. There is nothing in their testimony which may in any way reflect against their credibility nor has the oppositor proven fact or circumstance which may give rise to the suspicion that they testified out of personal interest or pecuniary consideration. de Catindig. L-2862 April 21. they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law. vs. and 3) whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will. Jose Sotelo Mati and Agustin Alvarez Salazar for appellant. that for purposes of this appeal of discussion of some would be sufficient. DE VIDAL. JUAN REYES. Jose Perez Cardenas for appellee. 2) whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was written. On December 21. de Pando who died in the City of Manila on October 29. BAUTISTA ANGELO. Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. And. petitioner-administratorappellant. Thus. the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. filed an opposition based on several grounds. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero. 1. a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. however. 1945.R. petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. and in one of those days he went to the house of the deceased to work. deceased. . de Vidal. 1945. And the third was a neighbor of the deceased for many years who was also requested to act as an instrumental witness. we believe. On November 6.: This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga Vda. she requested to act witness to the execution of the will. and in one of those occasions she went to her house to bring ice. Dolores Zuñiga Vda. The first used to provide the deceased with ice every day. DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. and that even if the signatures are genuine. No.30. at which both parties presented their respective evidence. J.

only for emphasis. thereby concluding that said signatures are not genuine. And in his testimony as well as in his memorandum.) If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double that number. 1936. Thus.What evidence has the oppositor presented to contradict the testimony of these instrumental witnesses? only one expert witness. if possible. on January 24. 1945. we find that the opinion of this expert witness has been rebutted by another expert witness Jose C. 1945. And our reason for reaching this conclusion is the fact that the standards of the comparison used by Espinosa are more reliable than those used by Villanueva in the comparison are two signatures appearing in two documents executed on November 10. The standards should. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the document. He also examined one affixed on March 12. certain important facts and circumstances which make us differ from this opinion of the lower court. The lower court gave full faith and credit to the opinion of this expert witness. And this is because the passing of time and the increase in age may have a decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. the standard of comparison must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. a half signature appearing in a letter written on October 8. 1941. Edward Arnold & Co. and one signature appearing in a letter written on January. 1945. The closeness or proximity of the time in which the standards used had been written to that of the suspected signature or document is very important to bring about an accurate analysis and conclusion. and one on September 24 1945. whose opinion." (Page 139. Jose G. Forensic Chemistry and Scientific Criminal Investigation by Lucas. one on January 2. In the first place. to our mind. There are. 1935. London. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question appears . whereas the disputed signatures appearing in the will were affixed on October 29. the selection of the proper standards of comparison is of paramount importance especially if we consider the age and the state of the health of the author of the questioned signatures. deserves more weight and credence. He followed the standard practice in handwriting analysis. But such was observed in the study made by Espinosa. On the other hand. 1945. Villanueva. who made a comparative analysis of the signatures appearing in the will in relation to some genuine signatures of the deceased. (Page 423 "Modern Criminal Investigation" by Soderman and O' Connell. 1945. however. 1945. Espinosa. so that one part comes from the time after the origin. one signature appearing in a letter written on July 16. other four signatures that were affixed in October 1945. Funk and Wagnalls Company. 1943. It for this reasons that the authorities of the opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis.. New York and London. this witness has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is not the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures he had examined and which he used as basis of his analytical study. and decreed as a result that the will cannot be admitted to probate. the standards used by Espinosa in making his comparative study bear dates much closer to that of the disputed signatures. one signature in an identification card affixed in April 1940. 1942. have been made by the same time as the suspected document. he examined four genuine signatures that were affixed on October 16. and in fact testified on the analysis and study he has made of said signatures and submitted a memorandum on the study and comparison he has made. a signature affixed in 1941 may involved characteristics different from those borne by a signature affixed in 1945.) 2. Such was not followed in the study made by Villanueva. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion deserves more weight and consideration.

and made several trips to Spain. And finally. 750). demuestra que ella no se daba cuenta de sus actos por no hallarse mentalmente sana. Gonzales vs. this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important requirement of the law has not been complied with. Exhibit C. To the same effect is the testimony of Consuelo B. There is. She said that her impression when the deceased signed the will was that she could still talk and read. Laurel. sin escribir su verdadero nombre. These facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written. we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a mestiza española. In the second place. only that she was weak. and it reached this conclusion. Reglamentos de los Tribunales.to have been written. The above conclusion is contrary to what the instrumental witnesses have said on this point. Recaredo Pando. And the wall was disallowed. In the first place. de Catindig. which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan vs.. 3. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people and. was married to a Spaniard. According to the lower court. it appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this technical omission. . A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression. no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground. this is only due to her age and state of health rather than to a defective mental condition. or weak condition of the writer. There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question. And this presumption has not been overcome. therefore. in our opinion. far from showing lack of genuineness. but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will was written. Abangan. and judging from the way she spoke she was of the impression that the deceased was of sound mind at the time. 476. On this point the lower court said: El Juzgado es de opinion que aunque se admita que las firmas arriba indicadas feuran de Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando. Cornelio Gonzales de Romero stated that she spoke to the deceased before the signing of the will. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause. These statements had not been contradicted. the law requires that the will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven. oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. They give an idea of mental condition of the deceased in the will differ from each other in certain respects. Exhibit C. sickness. pues el hecho de que en una sola ocasion la repetida Maria Zuñiga Vda. Si esto es asi. In fact she read the will before signing it. But. They give an idea of the mental had not contradicted. the probate of the will must fail. las mismas revelan que ella no estabe en el pleno de sus facultades mentales cuando la hicieron firmar el documento. we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. disponen que solamente pueden otorgar testamento las personas que al tiempo de su otorgamiento estaban en el pleno goce de sus facultades mentales. but simply because the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will. de Pando firmo dos veces. 46 Phil. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish language. porque el Articulo 614 de la Ley 190 y el Articulo 12. no se debe legalizar como testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Maria Zuñiga Vda. 40 Phil. not because of any direct evidence on the matter. are indicative of the age. de Pando el documento.

often actually indicate genuineness rather than forgery even though they are very unusual and not exactly like those in the standard writing. perfectly evident repetition (figure 184). distorted and illegible.Abbreviated. Questioned Documents by Osborne. The Court admits the will Exhibit C to probate. This careless. Under conditions of weakness due to diseased or age. with costs against the appellee. which in themselves are distinctly divergent as compared with signatures produced under conditions of strength and health. 2nd Edition. and remands these case to the lower court for further proceedings. which are sufficiently free and rapid. may forcefully indicate genuineness . the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. of the opinion that the lower court erred in disallowing the will Exhibit C. therefore. parts of a genuine signature may be clumsily written over a second time not at just the same place and in a way when clearly shows that the writer either could not see or was so week and inattentive as not to care what the result might be. unlike the painstaking and delicate retouching of the forger. Those who write of difficulty or hesitation through some physical infirmity may sometimes produced broken and unfinished signatures and these results. . 1927. Wherefore.) We are. (Page 365. forms. often indicates genuineness.

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