HouseSelectIntelligenceCommitteeHoldsHearingon DisclosureofNationalSecurityAgencySurveillance Programs

June18,2013
ROGERS:

Thecommitteewillcometoorder. GeneralAlexander,DeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,ChrisInglis,DeputyDirectorJoyceandMr.Litt, thankyouforappearingbeforeustoday,especiallyonshortnotice. TherankingmemberandIbelieveitisimportanttoholdanopenhearingtoday,andwedon'tdoa tremendousamountofthose,toprovidethisHouseandthepublicwithanopportunitytoheardirectly fromyouhowthegovernmentisusingthelegalauthoritiesthatCongresshasprovidedtotheexecutive branchsincetheterroristattacksofSeptember11th,2001. I'dalsoliketorecognizethehardworkofthemenandwomenoftheNSAandtherestofthe intelligencecommunitywhoworkdayinanddayouttodisruptthreatstoournationalsecurity.People attheNSAinparticularhaveheardaconstantpublicdrumbeataboutalaundrylistofnefariousthings theyareallegedtobedoingtospyonAmericansallofthemwrong.Themisperceptionshavebeen great,yettheykeeptheirheadsdownandkeepworkingeverydaytokeepussafe.
ROGERS:

And,GeneralAlexander,pleaseconveyourthankstoyourteamforcontinuingeveryday,despitemuch misinformationaboutthequalityoftheirwork.Andthankthemforallofusforcontinuingtoworkto protectAmerica. IalsowanttotakethismomenttothankGeneralAlexanderwhohasbeenextendedasnationalsecurity adviserinonewayoranotherthreedifferenttimes.That'sapatriot. Thisisaverydifficultjobataverydifficulttimeinourhistory.Andforthegeneraltoacceptthose extensionsofhismilitaryservicetoprotectthisnation,Ithinkwithallofthethe,again,the misinformationoutthere,Iwanttothankyouforthat. Thankyouforyourpatriotism.ThankyouforcontinuingtoservetoprotecttheUnitedStates,again. Andyouhavethatgreatburdenofknowinglotsofclassifiedinformationyoucannottalkpubliclyabout. Iwantyoutoknow,thankyouonbehalfofAmericaforyourservicetoyourcountry. Thecommitteehasbeenextensivelybriefedontheseeffortsoveraregularbasisasapartofour ongoingoversightresponsibilityoverthe16elementsoftheintelligencecommunityandthenational intelligenceprogram. Inordertofullyunderstandtheintelligencecollectionprogramsmostofthesebriefingsandhearings havetakenplaceinclassifiedsettings.Nonetheless,thecollectioneffortsunderthebusinessrecords provisioninSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActarelegal,courtapprovedand
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subjecttoanextensiveoversightregime. Ilookforwardfromhearingfromallofthewitnessesabouttheextensiveprotectionsandoversightin placefortheseprograms. GeneralAlexander,welookforwardtohearingwhatyou'reabletodiscussinanopenforumabouthow thedatathatyouhaveyouobtainfromprovidersundercourtorder,especiallyunderthebusiness recordsprovision,isused. AndDeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,welookforwardtohearingmoreaboutthelegalauthorities themselvesandthestateoflawonwhatprivacyprotectionsAmericanshaveinthesebusinessrecords. Oneofthefrustratingpartsaboutbeingamemberofthiscommittee,andreallychallenge,issittingatthe intersectionofclassifiedintelligenceprogramsandtransparentdemocracyasrepresentativesofthe Americanpeople. Thepublictruststhegovernmenttoprotectthecountryfromanother9/11typeattack,butthattrustcan starttowanewhentheyarefacedwithinaccuracies,halftruthsandoutrightliesaboutthewaythe intelligenceprogramsarebeingrun. Oneofthemoredamagingaspectsofselectivelyleakingincompleteinformationisthatitpaintsan inaccuratepictureandfostersdistrustinourgovernment. Thisisparticularlysowhenthoseofuswhohavetakentheoathtoprotectinformationthatcandamage thenationalsecurityifreleasedcannotpubliclyprovideclarifyinginformationbecauseitremains classified. Itisattimeslikethesewhereourenemieswithourenemieswithinbecomealmostasdamagingasour enemiesontheoutside. Itiscriticallyimportanttoprotectsourcesandmethodssowearen'tgivingtheenemyourplaybook. It'salsoimportant,however,tobeabletotalkabouthowtheseprogramshelpprotectussotheycan continuetobereauthorized.Andthenwehighlighttheprotectionsandoversightofwhichthese programsoperateunder. GeneralAlexander,youandIhavetalkedoverthelastweek,abouttheneedtotobeabletopublicly elaborateonthesuccessstoriestheseauthoritieshavecontributedtowithoutjeopardizingongoing operations.Iknowyou'llhavetheopportunitytotalkaboutseveralofthosetoday. Iplacetheutmostvalueinprotectingsourcesandmethods.Andthat'swhyyou'vebeen,Ithink,so diligentinmakingsurethatanythingthat'sdisclosedcomportswiththeneedtoprotectsourcesand methods.Sothat,again,wedon'tmakeiteasierforthebadguysoverseas,terroristsinthiscase,todo harmtoUnitedStatescitizens,andIrespectthat. Ialsorecognizethatwhenweareforcedintothepositionofhavingsopubliclydiscussedintelligence programsduetoirresponsiblecriminalbehaviorthatwealsohavetobecarefultobalancetheneedfor secrecywhileeducatingthepublic. Ithinkyouhavestrucktherightbalancebetweenprotectingsourcesandmethodsandmaintainingthe public'strustbyprovidingmoreexamplesofhowtheseauthoritieshavehelpeddisruptterroristplots
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andconnections.Iappreciateyoureffortsinthisregard. Fortheseauthoritiestocontinue,theymustcontinuetobeavailable.Withoutthem,Ifearwewillreturn tothepositionwherewewerepriortotheattacksofSeptember11th,2001.Andthatwouldbe unacceptableforallofus. Ihopetoday'shearingwillhelpanswerquestionsthathavearisenasaresultofthefragmentaryand distortedillegaldisclosuresoverthepastseveraldays. BeforerecognizingGeneralAlexanderforhisopeningstatement,Iturnthefloorovertotheranking memberforanyopeningstatementhe'dliketomake.

RUPPERSBERGER:

Well,Iagreewithreallyalotofwhatthechairmansaid. GeneralAlexander,ChrisInglis,youknow,yourleadershipinNSAhasbeenoutstanding.AndIjust wanttoacknowledgethepeoplewhoworkatNSAeveryday.NSAisinmydistrict.Ihavean occasiontocommunicate,andalotofthepeoplewhogotoworktoprotectourcountry,whowork hardeveryday,areconcernedthatthepublicthinkthey'redoingsomethingwrong.Andthat'snotthe caseatall. Andthemostimportantthingwecandoheretodayisletthepublicknowthetruefacts.Iknowthat ChairmanRogersandIandothermembershaveaskedyoutohelpdeclassifywhatwecan,thatwillnot hurtoursecurity,sothepubliccanunderstandthatthisimportant(sic)islegal,whywe'redoingthis programandhowitprotectsus. We'reheretodaybecauseofthebrazendisclosureofcriticalclassifiedinformationthatkeepsour countrysafe.Thiswidespreadleakbya29yearoldAmericansystemsadministratorputourcountry andouralliesindangerbygivingtheterroristsareallygoodlookattheplaybookthatweusetoprotect ourcountry.Theterroristsnowknowmanyofoursourcesandmethods. There'sbeenalotinthemediaaboutthissituation.Someright.Alotwrong.We'reholdingthisopen hearingtodaysowecansettherecordstraightandtheAmericanpeoplecanheardirectlyfromthe intelligencecommunityastowhatisallowedandwhatisnotunderthelaw.Weneedtoeducate membersofCongressalso,withthepublic. Tobeclear,theNationalSecurityAgencyisprohibitedfromlisteninginonphonecallsofAmericans withoutproper,courtapprovedlegalauthorities. Weliveinacountryoflaws.Theselawsarestrictlyfollowedandlayeredwithoversightfromthree branchesofgovernment,includingtheexecutivebranch,thecourtsandCongress. Immediatelyafter9/11,welearnedthatagroupofterroristswerelivingintheUnitedStatesactively plottingtokillAmericansonourownsoil.Butwedidn'thavetheproperauthoritiesinplacetostop thembeforetheycouldkillalmost3,000innocentpeople. Goodintelligenceisclearlythebestdefenseagainstterrorism.Therearetwomainauthoritiesthathave beenhighlightedinthepress,thebusinessrecordsprovisionthatallowsthegovernmenttolegallycollect whatiscalledmetadata,simplythephonenumberandlengthofcall.Nocontent,noconversations.This authorityallowsourcounterterrorismandthelawenforcementofficialstoclosethegaponforeignand
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domesticterroristactivities.Itenablesourintelligencecommunitytodiscoverwhetherforeignterrorists havebeenincontactwithpeopleintheU.S.whomaybeplanningaterroristattackonU.S.soil. ThesecondauthorityisknownasSection702oftheFISAAmendmentAct.Itallowsthegovernment tocollectthecontentofemailandphonecallsofforeignersnotAmericanslocatedoutsidethe UnitedStates.Thisallowsthegovernmenttogetinformationaboutterrorists,cyberthreats,weaponsof massdestructionandnuclearweaponsproliferationthatthreatenAmerica. ThisauthorityprohibitsthetargetingofAmericancitizensorU.S.permanentresidentswithoutacourt order,nomatterwheretheyarelocated. Bothoftheseauthoritiesarelegal.Congressapprovedandreauthorizedbothofthemoverthelasttwo years.Infact,theseauthoritieshavebeeninstrumentalinhelpingpreventdozensofterroristattacks, manyonU.S.soil. Butthefactstillremainsthatwemustfigureouthowthiscouldhavehappened.Howwasthis 29yearoldsystemsadministratorabletoaccesssuchhighlyclassifiedinformationandaboutsuch sensitivematters?Andhowwasheabletodownloaditandremoveitfromhisworkplaceundetected? Weneedtochangeoursystemsandpractices,andemploythelatestintechnologythatwouldalert superiorswhenaworkertriestodownloadandremovethistypeofinformation.Weneedtosealthis crackinthesystem. Andtorepeatsomethingincrediblyimportant:TheNSAisprohibitedfromlisteningtophonecallsor readingemailsofAmericanswithoutacourtorder.Period.Endofstory. Lookforwardyourtestimony.
ROGERS:

Again,thankyouverymuch. Thanks,Dutch,forthat. GeneralAlexander,thefloorisyours.

ALEXANDER:

Chairman,RankingMember,thankyouforthekindwords.Iwilltellyouitisaprivilegeandhonorto serveasthedirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandthecommanderoftheU.S.CyberCommand. Asyounoted,wehaveextraordinarypeopledoinggreatworktoprotectthiscountryandtoprotectour civillibertiesandprivacy. Overthepastfewweeks,unauthorizeddisclosuresofclassifiedinformationhaveresultedin considerabledebateinthepressaboutthesetwoprograms. Thedebatehadbeenfueled,asyounoted,byincompleteandinaccurateinformation,withlittlecontext providedonthepurposeoftheseprograms,theirvaluetoournationalsecurityandthatofourallies,and theprotectionsthatareinplacetopreserveourprivacyandcivilliberties. Today,wewillprovideadditionaldetailandcontextonthesetwoprogramstohelpinformthatdebate. Theseprogramswereapprovedbytheadministration,Congressandthecourts.Frommyperspective, asoundlegalprocessthatweallworktogetherasagovernmenttoprotectournationandourcivil
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libertiesandprivacy.
ALEXANDER:

Ironically,thedocumentsthathavebeenreleasedsofarshowtherigorousoversightandcomplianceour governmentusestobalancesecuritywithcivillibertiesandprivacy. LetmestartbysayingthatIwouldmuchratherbeheretodaydebatingthispointthantryingtoexplain howwefailedtopreventanother9/11.ItisatestamenttotheongoingteamworkoftheCentral IntelligenceAgency,theFederalBureauofInvestigation,andtheNationalSecurityAgency,working withouralliesandindustrypartners,thatwehavebeenabletoconnectthedotsandpreventmore terroristattacks. TheeventsofSeptember11,2001occurred,inpart,becauseofafailureonthepartofourgovernment toconnectthosedots.SomeofthosedotswereintheUnitedStates.Theintelligencecommunitywas notabletoconnectthosedomesticdots,phonecallsbetweenoperativesandtheU.S.andAlQaida terroristoverseas.Followingthe9/11commission,whichinvestigatedtheintelligencecommunity's failuretodetect9/11,CongresspassedthePATRIOTAct. Section215ofthatact,asithasbeeninterpretedandimplied,helpsthegovernmentclosethatgapby enablingthedetectionoftelephonecontactbetweenterroristsoverseasandoperativeswithintheUnited States.AsDirectorMuelleremphasizedlastweekduringhistestimonytothetotheJudiciary Committee,ifwehadhadSection215inplacepriorto9/11,wemayhaveknownthatthe9/11 hijackerMihdharwaslocatedinSanDiegoandcommunicatingwithaknownAlQaidasafehousein Yemen. Inrecentyears,theseprograms,togetherwithotherintelligence,haveprotectedtheU.S.andourallies fromterroristthreatsacrosstheglobetoincludehelpingpreventtheterroristthepotentialterrorist eventsover50timessince9/11.Wewillactuallybringforwardtothecommitteetomorrowdocuments thattheinteragencyhasagreedon,thatinaclassifiedsetting,giveseveryoneofthosecasesforyour review.We'lladdtwomoretodaypubliclywe'lldiscuss.Butasthechairmannoted,ifwegiveallof thoseout,wegiveallthesecretsofhowwe'retrackingdowntheterroristasacommunity.Andwe can'tdothat.Toomuchisatriskforusandforourallies.I'llgointogreaterdetailaswegothroughthis testimonythismorning. Ibelievewehaveachievedthesecurityandrelativesafetyinawaythatdoesnotcompromisethe privacyandcivillibertiesofourcitizens.Wewouldliketomakethreefundamentalpoints.First,these programsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationandourallies'security. Theyassisttheintelligencecommunityeffortstoconnectthedots. Second,theseprogramsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinct purposesinoversightmechanisms.Wehaverigoroustrainprogramsforouranalystsandtheir supervisorstounderstandtheirresponsibilitiesregardingcompliance. Third,thedisciplinedoperationoftheseprogramsprotectstheprivacyandcivillibertiesoftheAmerican people.Wewillprovideimportantdetailsabouteachofthose.First,I'dI'dasktheDeputyAttorney GeneralJimColetodiscusstheoverarchingframeworkofourauthority. Sir.
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COLE:

Thankyouthankyou,General. Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,asGeneralAlexandersaid,and andasthechairmanandrankingmemberhavesaid,allofusinthenationalsecurityareaareconstantly tryingtobalanceprotectingpublicsafetywithprotectingpeople'sprivacyandcivillibertiesinthis government.Andit'saconstantjobatbalancingthis. Wethinkwe'vedonethisintheseinstances.TherearestatutesthatarepassedbyCongress.Thisthis isnotaprogramthat'soffthebooks,that'sbeenhiddenaway.Thisispartofwhatgovernmentputs togetheranddiscusses.Statutesarepassed.Itisoverseenbythreebranchesofourgovernment,the Legislature,theJudiciary,andtheExecutiveBranch.Theprocessofoversightoccursbefore,during, andaftertheprocessesthatwe'retalkingabouttoday. AndIwanttotalkalittlebithowthatworks,whatthelegalframeworkis,andwhatsomeofthe protectionsarethatareputintoit.Firstofall,whatwehaveseenpublishedinthenewspaper concerning215thisisthebusinessrecordsprovisionsofthePATRIOTActthatalsomodifyFISA. You'veseenoneorderinthenewspaperthat'sacoupleofpageslongthatjustsaysunderthatorder, we'reallowedtoacquiremetadata,telephonerecords.That'soneoftwoorders.It'sthesmallestofthe twoorders.Andtheotherorder,whichhasnotbeenpublished,goesinto,ingreatdetailwhatwecan dowiththatmetadatahowwecanaccessithowwecanlookthroughitwhatwecandowithit,once wehavelookedthroughitandwhattheconditionsarethatareplacedonustomakesurethatwe protectprivacyandcivillibertiesand,atthesametime,protectpublicsafety. Letmegothroughafewofthefeaturesofthis.Firstofall,it'smetadata.Thesearephonerecords. Thesethisisjustlikewhatyouwouldgetinyourownphonebill.Itisthenumberthatwasdialed from,thenumberthatwasdialedto,thedateandthelengthoftime.That'sallwegetunder215.Wedo notgettheidentityofanyofthepartiestothisphonecall.Wedon'tgetanycellsiteorlocation informationastowhereanyofthesephoneswerelocated.And,mostimportantly,andyou'reprobably goingtohearthisabout100timestoday,wedon'tgetanycontentunderthis.Wedon'tlisteninon anybody'scallsunderthisprogramatall. Thisisunder,asIsaid,section215ofthePATRIOTAct.Thishasbeendebatedandupfor reauthorization,andreauthorizedtwicebytheUnitedStatesCongresssinceitsinceptionin2006andin 2011.Now,inorderthewayitworksis,thethereisanapplicationthatismadebytheFBIunder thestatutetotheFISAcourt.WecallittheFISC.TheyaskforandreceivepermissionundertheFISC underthistogetrecordsthatarerelevanttoanationalsecurityinvestigation.Andtheymustdemonstrate totheFISCthatitwillbeoperatedundertheguidelinesthataresetforthbytheattorneygeneralunder executiveorder12333.Thisiswhatcoversintelligencegatheringinthefederalgovernment. Itislimitedtotangibleobjects.Now,whatdoesthatmean?Thesearelikerecords,likethemetadata, thephonerecordsI'vebeendescribing.Butitisquiteexplicitlylimitedtothingsthatyoucouldgetwitha grandjurysubpoena,thosekindsofrecords.Now,it'simportanttoknowprosecutorsissuegrandjury subpoenasallthetimeanddonotneedanyinvolvementofacourtoranybodyelse,really,todoso. Underthisprogram,weneedtogetpermissionfromthecourttoissuethisaheadoftime.Sothereis courtinvolvementwiththeissuanceoftheseorders,whichisdifferentfromagrandjurysubpoena.But
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thetypeofrecords,justdocuments,businessrecords,thingslikethat,arelimitedtothosesametypesof recordsthatwecouldgetthroughagrandjurysubpoena. Now,theordersthatwegetlast90days.Sowehavetoreupandrenewtheseordersevery90days inordertodothis.Now,therearestrictcontrolsoverwhatwecandoundertheorder.And,again, that'sthebigger,thickerorderthathasn'tbeenpublished.There'srestrictionsonwhocanaccessitin thisorder.ItisstoredinrepositoriesatNSAthatcanonlybeaccessedbyalimitednumberofpeople. Andthepeoplewhoareallowedtoaccessithavetohavespecialandrigoroustrainingaboutthe standardsunderwhichthattheycanaccessit. Inordertoaccessit,thereneedstobeafindingthatthereisresponsiblesuspicionthatyoucan articulate,thatyoucanputintowords,thatthepersonwhosephonerecordsyouwanttoqueryis involvedwithsomesortofterroristorganizations.Andtheyaredefined.It'snoteveryone.Theyare limitedinthestatute.Sotherehastobeindependentevidence,asidefromthesephonerecords,thatthe personyou'retargetingisinvolvedwithaterroristorganization.
COLE:

IfthatpersonisaUnitedStatesperson,acitizen,oralawfulpermanentresident,youhavetohave somethingmorethanjusttheirownspeeches,theirownreadings,theirownFirstAmendmenttype activity.Youhavetohaveadditionalevidencebeyondthatthatindicatesthatthereisreasonable, articulablesuspicionthatthesepeopleareassociatedwithspecificterroristorganizations. Now,oneofthethingstokeepinmindisunderthelaw,theFourthAmendmentdoesnotapplytothese records.TherewasacasequiteanumberofyearsagobytheSupremeCourtthatindicatedthattoll records,phonerecordslikethis,thatdon'tincludeanycontent,arenotcoveredbytheFourth Amendmentbecausepeopledon'thaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyinwhotheycalledand whentheycalled.That'ssomethingyoushowtothephonecompany.That'ssomethingyoushowto many,manypeoplewithinthephonecompanyonaregularbasis. Oncethoserecordsareaccessedunderthisprocessandreasonablearticulablesuspicionisfound,that's foundbyspeciallytrainedpeople.Itisreviewedbytheirsupervisors.Itisdocumentedinwritingahead oftimesothatsomebodycantakealookatit.Anyoftheaccessingthatisdoneisdoneinanauditable fashion.Thereisatrailofit.Soboththedecisionandthefactsthatsupporttheaccessingandthequery isdocumented.Theamountthatwasdone,whatwasdoneallofthatisdocumentedandreviewed andauditedonafairlyregularbasis. Therearealsominimizationproceduresthatareputintoplacesothatanyoftheinformationthatis acquiredhastobeminimized.Ithastobelimitedanditsuseisstrictlylimited.Andallthatissetoutin thetermsofthecourtorder.AndifanyU.S.personsareinvolved,thereareparticularrestrictionson howanyinformationconcerningaU.S.personcanbeusedinthis. Now,thereisextensiveoversightandcompliancethatisdonewiththeserecordsandwiththisprocess. Everynowandthen,theremaybeamistakeawrongphonenumberishidorapersonwhoshouldn't havebeentargetedgetstargetedbecausethereisamistakeinthephonerecord,somethinglikethat. Eachofthosecomplianceincidents,ifandwhentheyoccur,havetobereportedtotheFISAcourt immediately.Andletmetellyou,theFISAcourtpushesbackonthis.Theywanttofindoutwhydid thishappen,whatweretheproceduresandthemechanismsthatallowedittohappen,andwhathave
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youdonetofixit.Sowheneverwehaveacomplianceincident,wereportittothecourtimmediately andwereportittoCongress.WereportittotheIntelligenceCommitteesofbothhousesandthe JudiciaryCommitteesofbothhouses. WealsoprovidetheIntelligenceandJudiciaryCommitteeswithanysignificantinterpretationsthatthe courtmakesofthe215statute.Iftheymakearulingthatissignificantorissueanorderthatissignificant initsinterpretation,weprovidethose,aswellastheapplicationswemadeforthoseorders,tothe IntelligenceCommitteeandtotheJudiciaryCommittee. Andevery30days,wearefilingwiththeFISC,withthecourt,areportthatdescribeshowwe implementthisprogram.Itincludesadiscussionofhowwe'reapplyingthereasonable,articulable suspicionstandard.Ittalksaboutthenumberofapprovedqueriesthatwemadeagainstthisdatabase, thenumberofinstancesthatthequeryresultsandcontainaU.S.personinformationthatwasshared outsideofNSA.Andallofthisgoestothecourt. Atleastonceevery90daysandsometimesmorefrequently,theDepartmentofJustice,theOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligence,andtheNSAmeettoassessNSA'scompliancewithallofthese requirementsthatarecontainedinthecourtorder.Separately,theDepartmentofJusticemeetswiththe inspectorgeneralfortheNationalSecurityAgencyandassessesNSA'scomplianceonaregularbasis. Finally,thereisbystatutereportingofcertaininformationthatgoestoCongressinsemiannualreports thatwemakeontopoftheperiodicreportswemakeifthere'sacomplianceincident.Andthoseinclude informationaboutthedatathatwasrequiredandhowweareperformingunderthisstatute. Soonceagainkeepinginmind,allofthisisdonewiththreebranchesofgovernmentinvolved:oversight andinitiationbytheexecutivebranchwithreviewbymultipleagenciesstatutesthatarepassedby Congress,oversightbyCongressandthenoversightbythecourt. Now,the702statuteundertheFISAAmendmentsActisdifferent.Underthis,wedogetcontent,but there'sabigdifference.Youareonlyallowedunder702totargetforthispurposenonU.S.persons whoarelocatedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.SoifyouhaveaU.S.permanentresidentwho'sin Madrid,Spain,wecan'ttargetthemunder702.OrifyouhaveanonU.S.personwho'sinCleveland, Ohio,wecannottargetthemunder702.Inordertotargetaperson,theyhavetobeneitheracitizennor apermanentU.S.resident,andtheyneedtobeoutsideoftheUnitedStateswhilewe'retargetingthem. Now,there'sprohibitionsinthisstatute.Forexample,youcan'treversetargetsomebody.Thisiswhere youtargetsomebodywho'soutoftheUnitedStates,butreallyyourgoalistocaptureconversations withsomebodywhoisinsidetheUnitedStates.Soyou'retryingtodoindirectlywhatyoucouldn'tdo directly.Thatisexplicitlyprohibitedbythisstatute.Andifthereiseveranyindicationthatit'sbeing done,becauseagain,wereporttheusethatwemakeofthisstatutetothecourtandtotheCongress, thatisseen. Youalsohavetohaveavalidforeignintelligencepurposeinordertodoanyofthetargetingonthis.So youhavetomakesure,asitwasdescribed,thatit'sbeingdonefordefinedcategoriesofweaponsof massdestruction,foreignintelligence,thingsofthatnature.Thesearealldonepursuanttoanapplication thatismadebytheattorneygeneralandthedirectorofnationalintelligencetotheFISC.TheFISC givesacertificatethatallowsthistargetingtobedoneforayearperiod.Itthenhastoberenewedatthe endofthatyearinorderforittobereupped.
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Now,there'salsothereisarequirementthat,again,thereisreporting.Youcannotunderthetermsof thisstatutehaveandcollectanyinformationonconversationsthatarewhollywithintheUnitedStates. Soyou'retargetingsomeoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.IftheymakeacalltoinsidetheUnitedStates, thatcanbecollected,butit'sonlybecausethetargetofthatcalloutsidetheUnitedStatesinitiatedthat callandwentthere.IfthecallsarewhollywithintheUnitedStates,wecannotcollectthem. Ifyou'retargetingapersonwhoisoutsideoftheUnitedStatesandyoufindthattheycomeintothe UnitedStates,wehavetostopthetargetingrightaway.Andifthere'sanylagandwefindoutthatwe collectedinformationbecauseweweren'tawarethattheywereintheUnitedStates,wehavetotake thatinformation,purgeitfromthesystems,andnotuseit. Now,there'sagreatdealofminimizationproceduresthatareinvolvedhere,particularlyconcerningany oftheacquisitionofinformationthatdealsorcomesfromU.S.persons.AsIsaid,onlytargetingpeople outsidetheUnitedStateswhoarenotU.S.persons.Butifwedoacquireanyinformationthatrelatesto aU.S.person,underlimitedcriteriaonlycanwekeepit. Ifithastodowithforeignintelligenceinthatconversationorunderstandingforeignintelligence,or evidenceofacrimeorathreatofseriousbodilyinjury,wecanrespondtothat.Otherthanthat,we havetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit,andwecan'tuseit.Ifweinadvertentlyacquireanyofit withoutmeaningto,again,oncethat'sdiscovered,wehavetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit. Thetargetingdecisionsthataredoneare,again,documentedaheadoftime,reviewedbyasupervisor beforethey'reeverallowedtotakeplaceinthebeginning.TheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligenceconductonsitereviewsofeachtargetingthatisdone.Theylookat themtodetermineandgothroughtheaudittodeterminethattheyweredoneproperly.Thisisdoneat leastevery60daysandmanytimesdonemorefrequentlythanthat. Inaddition,ifthere'sanycomplianceissue,itisimmediatelyreportedtotheFISC.TheFISC,again, pushesback:Howdidthishappen?Whataretheprocedures?Whatarethemechanismsyou'reusingto fixthis?Whathaveyoudonetoremedyit?Ifyouacquiredinformationyoushould(sic)have,haveyou gottenridofitasyou'rerequired?Andinaddition,we'reprovidingCongresswithallofthatinformation ifwehavecomplianceproblems. WealsoreportquarterlytotheFISCconcerningthecomplianceissuesthathavearisenduringthat quarter,ontopoftheimmediatereportsandwhatwe'vedonetofixitandremedytheonesthatwe reported.
COLE:

WealsotoCongressunderthisprogram,theDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeoftheDirectorof NationalIntelligenceprovideasemiannualreporttotheFISCandtoCongressassessingallofour compliancewiththetargetingandminimizationproceduresthatarecontainedinthecourtorder.We alsoprovideasemiannualreporttotheFISCandCongressconcerningtheimplementationofthe program,whatwe'vedoneandwhatwe'vefound.AndwealsoprovidetoCongress,documentsthat containagain,howwe'redealingwiththeminimizationprocedures,anysignificantlegalinterpretations thattheFISCmakesconcerningthesestatutes,aswellastheordersandtheapplicationsthatwould relatetothat. Andontopofallofthis,annuallytheinspectorgeneralforNSAdoesanassessment,whichheprovides

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toCongressthatreportsoncompliance,thenumberofdisseminationsunderthisprogramthatrelateto U.S.persons,thenumberoftargetsthatwerereasonablybelievedatthetimetobeoutsidetheUnited StateswhowerelaterdeterminedtobeintheUnitedStates,andwhenthatwasdone.Soinshort,there is,frombefore,duringandaftertheinvolvementofallthreebranchesoftheUnitedStatesgovernment, onarobustandfairlyintimateway.I'dliketomakeoneotherobservation,ifImay,onthis.Wehave triedtodothisinasthorough,asprotective,andastransparentawayaswepossiblycan,consideringit isthegatheringofintelligenceinformation. Countriesandalliesofoursallovertheworldcollectintelligence.Weallknowthis.Andtherehave recentlybeenstudiesabouthowtransparentoursystemisintheUnitedStates,comparedtomanyof ourpartners,manyintheE.U.CountrieslikeFrance,theU.K.,Germany,whoweworkwithregularly. AndareportthatwasjustrecentlyissuedinMayofthisyearfoundthattheFISAAmendmentsAct,the statutethatwe'retalkingabouthere,andIwillquote,"Imposesatleastatmuch,ifnotmore,due processandoversightonforeignintelligencesurveillancethanothercountries."AndthisincludesE.U. countries.Anditsaysunderthis,theU.S.ismoretransparentaboutitsprocedures,requiresmoredue processprotectionsinitsinvestigationsthatinvolvenationalsecurity,terrorismandforeignintelligence. Thebalanceisalwaysoneweseektostrivetotoachieve.ButIthinkasI'velaidouttoyou,wehave doneeverythingwecantoachieveit.AndIthinkpartoftheproofofwhatwe'vedoneisthisreportthat cameoutjustlastmonth,indicatingoursystemisasgood,andfranklybetter,thanallofouralliesand liaisonpartners.ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:

Mr.Chairman,Iwillnowswitchtothevalueoftheprogram,andtalkaboutsomestatisticsthatwe're puttingtogether.Aswestated,theseprogramsareimmenselyvaluableforprotectingournation,and securitythesecurityofourallies.Inrecentyears,theinformationgatheredfromtheseprograms providedtheU.S.governmentwithcriticalleadstohelppreventover50potentialterroristeventsin morethan20countriesaroundtheworld.FAA702contributedinover90percentofthesecases.At least10oftheseeventsincludedhomelandbasedthreats.Inthevastmajority,businessrecords,FISA reportingcontributedaswell.IwouldalsopointoutthatitisagreatpartnershipwiththeDepartmentof HomelandSecurityinthosewithadomesticnexus. ButtherealleadfordomesticeventsistheFederalBureauofInvestigation.Ithasbeenourhonorand privilegetoworkwithDirectorMueller,andDeputyDirectoryJoycewhoI'llturnitnowoverto Sean?
JOYCE:

ThankyouGeneral.Thankyouchairmanandrankingmember,andmembersofthecommitteeforthe opportunitytobeheretoday.NSAandtheFBIhaveauniquerelationship,andonethathasbeen invaluablesince9/11.AndIjustwanttohighlightacoupleoftheinstances.Inthefallof2009,NSA using702authorityinterceptedanemailfromaterroristlocatedinPakistan.Thatindividualwastalking withanindividuallocatedinsidetheUnitedStates,talkingaboutperfectingarecipeforexplosives. Throughlegalprocess,thatindividualwasidentifiedasNajibullahZazi.HewaslocatedinDenver, Colorado. TheFBIfollowedhimtoNewYorkCity.LaterweexecutedsearchwarrantswiththeNewYorkJoint

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TerrorismTaskForceandNYPDandfoundbombmakingcomponentsinbackpacks.Zazilater confessedtoaplottobombtheNewYorksubwaysystemwithbackpacks.AlsoworkingwithFISA businessrecords,theNSAwasabletoprovideapreviouslyunknownnumberofoneofthe coconspiratorscoconspirators,AdisMedunjanin.ThiswasthefirstcoreAlQaidaplotsince9/11 directedfromPakistan.Anotherexample,NSAutilizing702authoritywasmonitoringaknown extremistinYemen.ThisindividualwasincontactwithanindividualintheUnitedStatesnamedKhalid Ouazzani.OuazzaniandotherindividualsthatweidentifiedthroughaFISAthattheFBIappliedfor throughtheFISCwereabletodetectanascentplottingtobombtheNewYorkStockExchange. Ouazzanihadbeenprovidinginformationandsupporttothisplot.TheFBIdisruptedandarrestedthese individuals.AlsoDavidHeadley,aU.S.citizenlivinginChicago.TheFBIreceivedintelligence regardinghispossibleinvolvementinthe2008Mumbaiattacksresponsibleforthekillingofover160 people.Also,NSAthrough702coverageofanAlQaidaaffiliatedterroristfoundthatHeadleywas workingonaplottobombaDanishnewspaperofficethathadpublishedthecartoondepictionsofthe ProphetMohammed.Infact,Headleylaterconfessedtopersonallyconductingsurveillanceofthe Danishnewspaperoffice.He,andhiscoconspiratorswereconvictedofthisplot. Lastly,theFBIhadopenedaninvestigationshortlyafter9/11.Wedidnothaveenoughinformation,nor didwefindlinkstoterrorismandthenweshortlythereafterclosedtheinvestigation.However,theNSA usingthebusinessrecordFISAtippedusoffthatthisindividualhadindirectcontactswithaknown terroristoverseas.Wewereabletoreopenthisinvestigation,identifyadditionalindividualsthrougha legalprocess,andwereabletodisruptthisterroristactivity.Thankyou.Backtoyou,General?
ALEXANDER:

Sothat'sfourcasestotalthatwe'veputoutpublicly.Whatwe'reintheprocessofdoingwiththe interagencyislookingatover50casesthatwereclassified,andwillremainclassified,thatwillbe providedtobothoftheIntelCommitteesoftheSenateandtheHouse,toallofyou.Those50cases rightnowhavebeenlookedatbytheFBI,CIAandotherpartnerswithinthecommunity,andthe NationalCounterterrorismCenterisvalidatingallofthepointssothatyouknowthatwhatwe'veputin thereisexactlyright.Ibelievethenumbersfromthosecasesissomethingthatwecanpubliclyreveal, andallpubliclytalkabout. Whatweareconcerned,asthechairmansaid,istogoingintomoredetailonhowwestoppedsomeof thesecases,asweareconcerneditwillgiveouradversariesawaytoworkaroundthose,andattack us,orourallies.Andthatwouldbeunacceptable.Ihaveconcernsthattheintentionalandirresponsible releaseofclassifiedinformationabouttheseprogramswillhavealong,andirreversibleimpactonour nation'ssecurity,andthatofourallies.Thisissignificant.IwanttoemphasizethattheForeign IntelligenceisthebesttheForeignIntelligenceProgramthatwe'retalkingabout,isthebest counterterrorismtoolsthatwehavetogoaftertheseguys. Wecan'tlosethosecapabilities.Oneoftheissuesthathasrepeatedlycomeup,wellhowdoyouthen protectcivillibertiesandprivacy?Whereistheoversight?Whatareyoudoingonthat?Wehavethe deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency,ChrisInglis,willnowtalkaboutthatandgiveyou somespecificsaboutwhatwedo,andhowwedoitwiththeseprograms.
INGLIS: 11

Thankyou,GeneralAlexander. Chairman,RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,I'mpleasedtobeabletobrieflydescribethe twoprogramsasusedbytheNationalSecurityAgencywithaspecificfocusontheinternalcontrolsand theoversightprovided.Nowfirsttoremindthesetwocomplimentary,butdistinctprogramsarefocused onforeignintelligence.That'sNSA'scharge.ThefirstprogramexecutedunderSection215ofthe PatriotActauthorizeshecollectionoftelephonemetadataonly.Asyou'veheardbefore,themetadatais onlythetelephonenumbers,andcontact,thetimeanddateofthecall,andthedurationofthatcall.

INGLIS:

Thisauthoritydoesnot,therefore,allowthegovernmenttolisteninonanyone'stelephonecalls,even thatofaterrorist.Theinformationacquiredunderthecourtorderfromthetelecommunications providersdoesnotcontainthecontentofanycommunications,whatyouaresayingduringthecourseof theconversation,theidentitiesofthepeoplewhoaretalking,oranycellphonelocationalinformation. AsyoualsoknowthisprogramwasspecificallydevelopedtoallowtheU.S.governmenttodetect communicationsbetweenterroristsoperatingoutsidetheU.S.,whoarethemselvescommunicatingwith potentialoperativesinsidetheU.S.,agaphighlightedbytheattacksof9/11. ThecontrolsontheuseofthisdataatNSAarespecific,rigorous,anddesignedtoensurefocuson counterterrorism.Tothatend,themetadataacquiredandstoredunderthisprogrammaybequeried onlywhenthereisareasonablesuspicionbasedonspecificanddocumentedfactsthatanidentifier,like atelephonenumber,isassociatedwithspecificforeignterroristorganizations. Thisdeterminationisformallyreferredtoasthe"reasonablearticulablesuspicionstandard."Duringall 2012,the12monthsof2012,weatNSAapprovedfewerthan300uniquenumbers,whichwerethen usedtoinitiateaqueryofthisdataset. Thesecondprogram,authorizedunderSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct, authorizestargetingonlyforcommunicationsofforeignerswhoarethemselvesnotwithintheUnited Statesforforeignintelligencepurposes,withthecompelledassistanceofanelectroniccommunications serviceprovider. AsInotedearlier,NSAbeingaforeignintelligenceagency,foreignintelligenceforusisinformation relatedtothecapabilities,intentions,oractivitiesofforeigngovernments,foreignorganizations,foreign persons,orinternationalterrorists.Letmebeveryclear.Section702cannotbeandisnotusedto intentionallytargetanyU.S.citizenoranyU.S.person,anypersonknowntobeintheUnitedStates,a personoutsidetheUnitedStatesifthepurposeistoacquireinformationfromapersoninsidetheUnited States.Wemaynotdoanyofthosethingsusingthisauthority. Theprogramisalsokeyinourcounterterrorismefforts,asyou'veheard.Morethan90percentofthe informationusedtosupportthe50disruptionsmentionedearlierwasgainedfromthisparticular authority.Again,ifyouwanttotargetthecontentofaU.S.personanywhereintheworld,youcannot usethisauthority.Youmustgetaspecificcourtwarrant. I'dliketonowdescribeinfurtherdetailssomeoftherigorousoversightforeachoftheseprograms. First,fortheSection215program,alsoreferredtoasbusinessrecordsFISA,controlsand(ph) determinehowwemanageandusethedataareexplicitlydefinedandformallyapprovedbytheForeign
12

IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt. First,themetadatasegregatedfromotherdatasetsheldbyNSAandallqueriesagainstthedatabase aredocumentedandaudited.Asdefinedintheordersofthecourt,only20analystsatNSAandtheir twomanagers,foratotalof22people,areauthorizedtoapprovenumbersthatmaybeusedtoquery thisdatabase.Allofthoseindividualsmustbetrainedinthespecificproceduresandstandardsthat pertaintothedeterminationofwhatismeantbyreasonable,articulablesuspicion. Every30days,NSAreportstothecourtthenumberofqueriesanddisseminationsmadeduringthat period.Every90days,theDepartmentofJusticesamplesallqueriesmadeacrosstheperiodand explicitlyreviewsthebasisforeveryU.S.person,oreveryU.S.identityquerymade.Again,wedonot knowthenamesoftheindividualsofthequerieswemightmake. Inaddition,onlysevenseniorofficialsatNSAmayauthorizethedisseminationofanyinformationwe believethatmightbeattributabletoaU.S.person.Again,wewouldnotknowthename.Itwouldonly bethetelephonenumber.AndthatdisseminationinthisprogramwouldonlybemadetotheFederal BureauofInvestigationatdeterminingthattheinformationisrelatedtoandnecessarytounderstanda counterterrorisminitiative. TheForeignIntelligenceSurveillancecourtreviewstheprogramevery90days.Thedatathatwehold mustbedestroyedwithinfiveyearsofitsacquisition.NSAandtheDepartmentofJusticebriefed oversightcommitteesontheemploymentoftheprogram.Weprovidewrittennotificationofall significantdevelopmentswithintheprogram.TheDepartmentofJusticeprovidesoversightcommittees withallsignificantforeignintelligencesurveillancecourts'opinionsregardingtheprogram. Turningmyattentiontothe702program,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtannuallyreviews certification,whicharerequiredbylaw,thatarejointlysubmittedbytheattorneygeneralandthe directorofnationalintelligence.Thesecertificationsdefinethecategoriesofforeignactorsthatmaybe appropriatelytargetedand,bylaw,mustincludespecifictargetingandminimizationproceduresthatthe attorneygeneralandthecourtbothagreeareconsistentwiththelawandtheFourthAmendmentofthe Constitution.TheseproceduresrequirethatacommunicationoforconcerningaU.S.personmustbe promptlydestroyedafterit'sidentified,eitherasclearlynotrelevanttotheauthorizedpurpose,orasnot containingevidenceofacrime. Thestatutefurtherrequiresanumberofreportstobeprovidedtoboththecourtandtheoversight committees.AsemiannualassessmentbytheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeoftheDirectorof NationalIntelligence,regardin(ph)compliancewiththetargetingandminimizationproceduresan annualI.G.assessmentthatreportscompliancewithproceduralrequirementslaidoutwithintheorder thenumberofdisseminationsthatmayrefertoU.S.persons,thenumberoftargetslaterfoundtobein theUnitedStates,andwhetherthecommunicationsofsuchtargetswereeverreviewed. AnannualdirectorofNSAreportisalsorequiredtodescribethecomplianceeffortstakenbyNSAand addressthenumberofU.S.personidentitiesdisseminatedinNSAreporting.Finally,Foreign IntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproceduresrequireNSAtoinformthecourtofanynovelissuesoflaw ortechnologyrelevanttoanauthorizedactivityandanynoncompliancetoincludetheExecutive Branch'splanforremedyingthatsameevent.InadditiontotheproceduresI'vejustdescribed,the DepartmentofJusticeconductsonsitereviewsatNSAtosampleNSA's702targetingandtasking
13

decisionsevery60days. And,finally,IwouldconcludewithmysectiontosaythatinJulyof2012,theSenateSelectCommittee onIntelligence,inareportreviewingtheprogressoverthefouryearsofthelaw'slifeatthatpointin time,saidthatacrossthefouryearhistoryoftheprogram,thecommitteehadnotidentifiedasingle willfuleffortbytheExecutiveBranchtoviolatethelaw.

ALEXANDER:

Sotowrapup,Chairman,firstI'dliketojusthitonwhenwesaysevenofficials,that'sseven positionsthatatNSAcandisseminateU.S.personsdata.Today,thereare10peopleinthose positions.OneofthoseisourSIGINToperationsofficer.Everyoneofthosehavetobe credentialed.ChrisandIaretwoofthoseofficials. Idowanttohitacoupleofkeypoints.First,withourindustrypartners,underthe702program,the U.S.governmentdoesnotunilaterallyobtaininformationfromtheserversofU.S.companies.Rather, theU.S.companiesarecompelledtoprovidetheserecordsbyU.S.law,usingmethodsthatareinstrict compliancewiththatlaw. Further,asthedeputyattorneygeneralnoted,virtuallyallcountrieshavelawfulinterceptprograms underwhichtheycompelcommunicationproviderstosharedataaboutindividualstheybelieve representathreattotheirsocieties.Communicationprovidersarerequiredtocomplywiththose programsinthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.TheUnitedStatesisnotuniqueinthiscapability. TheU.S.,however,operatesitsprogramunderthestrictoversightandcomplianceregimethatwas notedabovewithcarefuloversightsbythecourts,Congress,andtheadministration.Inpractice,U.S. companieshaveputenergyandfocusandcommitmentintoconsistentlyprotectingtheprivacyoftheir customersaroundtheworld,whilemeetingtheirobligationsunderthelawsofU.S.andothercountries inwhichtheyoperate.AndIbelievetheytakethoseseriously. Ourthirdandfinalpoint,asAmericans,wevalueourprivacyandourlibertyourcivilliberties. AmericansasAmericans,wealsovalueoursecurityandoursafety.Inthe12yearssincetheattacks onSeptember11th,wehavelivedinrelativesafetyandsecurityasanation.Thatsecurityisadirect resultoftheintelligencecommunity'squieteffortstobetterconnectthedotsandlearnfromthemistakes thatpermittedthoseattackstooccuron9/11. Inthose12years,wehavethoughtlongandhardaboutoversightandcomplianceandhowweminimize theimpactonourfellowcitizens'privacy.Wehavecreatedandimplementedandcontinuetomonitor monitoracomprehensivemissioncomplianceprograminsideNSA.Thisprogram,whichwas developedbasedonindustrybestpracticesandcomplianceworkstokeepoperationsandtechnology alignedwithNSA'sexternallyapprovedprocedures. OutsideofNSA,theofficerofthetheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,Departmentof Justice,andtheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproviderobustoversightaswellasthis committee.Idobelievewehavethatbalanceright. Insummary,theseprogramsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationand ourallies'security.Theyassisttheintelligencecommunity'seffortstoconnectthedot.Second,these programsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinctpurposesand
14

oversightmechanisms.Third,thedisciplinedoperationoftheseprogramsprotectstheprivacyandcivil libertiesoftheAmericanpeople. Asyounoted,Chairman,thepeopleofNSAtaketheseresponsibilitiestoheart.Theyprotectour nationandouralliesaspartofabiggerteam.Andtheyprotectourcivillibertiesandprivacy.Ithasbeen anhonorandprivilegetoleadthesegreatAmericans.IthinkBobLitthasacoupleofcommentsto make,andthenwe'llturnitbacktoyou,Chairman.

LITT:

Yes,Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,Ijustwanttospeakverybriefly andaddressacoupleofadditionalmisconceptionsthatthepublichasbeenfedaboutsomeofthese programs. ThefirstisthatcollectionunderSection702oftheFISAAmendmentsActissomehowalooseningof traditionalstandardsbecauseitdoesn'trequireindividualizedwarrants.And,infact,exactlytheopposite isthecase.ThekindofcollectionthatisdoneunderSection702,whichiscollectingforeignintelligence informationforforeignersoutsideoftheUnitedStateshistoricallywasdonebytheexecutivebranch underitsownauthoritywithoutanykindofsupervisionwhatsoever. AndasaresultoftheFISAAmendmentsAct,thishasnowbeenbroughtunderajudicialprocesswith thekindofrestrictionsandlimitationsthathavebeendescribedbytheotherwitnesseshere.So,infact, thisisatighteningofstandardsfromwhattheywerebefore. ThesecondmisconceptionisthattheFISAcourtisarubberstampfortheexecutivebranch.And peoplepointtothefactthattheFISAcourtultimatelyapprovesalmosteveryapplicationthatthe governmentsubmitstoit. ButthisdoesnotrecognizetheactualprocessthatwegothroughwiththeFISAcourt.TheFISAcourt isjudges,federaldistrictjudgesappointedfromaroundthecountrywhotakethisoninadditiontotheir otherburdens.They'reallwidelyrespectedandexperiencedjudges.Andtheyhaveafulltime professionalstaffthatworksonlyonFISAmatters. WhenweprepareanapplicationforforaFISA,whetherit'sunderoneoftheseprogramsora traditionalFISA,wefirstsubmittothecourtwhat'scalleda"readcopy,"whichthecourtstaffwill reviewandcommenton. Andifandtheywillalmostinvariablycomebackwithquestions,concerns,problemsthattheysee. AndthereisaniterativeprocessbackandforthbetweenthegovernmentandtheFISAcourttotake careofthoseconcernssothatattheendoftheday,we'reconfidentthatwe'representingsomething thattheFISAcourtwillapprove.Thatishardlyarubberstamp.It'sratherextensiveandseriousjudicial oversightofthisprocess. Thethirdpoint,thethirdmisconceptionthatIwanttomakeisthattheprocesswehavehereisonethat simplyreliesontrustforindividualanalystsorindividualpeopleatNSAtoobeytherules. AndIjustIIwon'tgointodetailastotheoversight,becauseIthinkit'sbeenadequately describedbytheothers.Butthepointis,thereisamultilayeredlevelofoversight,firstwithinNSA,then involvingmyagency,theOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceandtheDepartmentofJustice andultimatelyinvolvingtheFISAcourtandtheCongresstoensurethattheserulesarecompliedwith.
15

AndthelastpointthatI'dthelastmisconceptionIwanttoaddressisthatthisinformationshouldn't havebeenclassifiedanditwasclassifiedonlytotoconcealitfromtheAmericanpeopleandthatthe leaksofthisinformationarenotdamaging. And,Mr.ChairmanandMr.RankingMember,youbothmadethispoint.Theseare,asGeneral Alexandersaid,extremelyimportantcollectionprogramstoprotectusnotonlyfromterrorists,butfrom otherthreatstoournationalsecurity,awidevariety. Andtheyhaveproducedahugeamountofvaluableintelligenceovertheyears.Wearenowfacedwith asituationthatbecausethisinformationhasbeenmadepublic,weruntheriskoflosingthesecollection capabilities.We'renotgonnaknowformanymonthswhethertheseleaksinfacthavecausedustolose thesecapabilities.Butififtheyiftheydohavethateffect,thereisnodoubtthattheywillcauseour nationalsecuritytobeaffected. Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:

Thankyouall,verymuch.Iappreciatethat.Ijusthaveacoupleofquickquestions.Iknowmembers havelotsofquestionshereandIwanttogettothem. Mr.Inglis,justfortherecord,youcanyoudescribequicklyyourcivilianroleasthedeputy?You serveasthatroleinaciviliancapacity.Isthatcorrect?

INGLIS:

Yes,sir.AcrossthehistoryofNSA,therehasalwaysbeenaseniorservingmilitaryofficer,that'sthe directoroftheNationalSecurityAgency,andatthesametimeaseniorservingcivilianauthority,and thatwouldbethedeputydirector,andthat'smyrole.

ROGERS:

Allright,andbutyouhavealsohadmilitaryservice.Isthatcorrect?
INGLIS:

Sir,Idid.Iservedforaperiodof13yearsonactivedutyintheUnitedStatesAirForce,andthen transitionedtotheNationalSecurityAgency.
ROGERS:

Soyourosetotherankofof?
INGLIS:

IwasbrigadiergeneralintheAirNationalGuard.Asinallthings,it'scomplicated. (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:

Yeah.ButIjustwantedtogetontherecordthatyoudohaveyouhavemilitaryserviceaswellas yourcivilianservice. (CROSSTALK)

INGLIS: 16

Ido,sir.AsItransitionedfromtheactiveAirForcetotheNationalSecurityAgency,Iretainedmy affiliationwiththereservecomponentsandwaspleasedandproudtobeabletoserveintheAir NationalGuardforanother20years.

ROGERS:

Great.Well,thankyouforthatservice. Youmentionedin"queriesoflessthan300,"whatdoeswhatdoesthatmean?
INGLIS:

Ineachofthosecases,sir,therewasadeterminationmadeananalystatNSAthattherewasa reasonable,describable,articulablesuspicionthatannumberofinterest,atelephonenumberofinterest, mightbeassociatedwithaconnectedplotofaspecificterroristplotoverseas,andthereforeadesireto seewhetherthatplothadaconnectionintotheUnitedStates. Theprocesstheygothroughthenisasdescribed,onewheretheymakeaa... (CROSSTALK)

ROGERS:

Well,describetheinquiryit'snotputyoudon'tputinaname?
INGLIS:

Wedonot,sir.
ROGERS:

Soyouputin... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:

Theonlythingwegetfromtheprovidersarenumbers.Theonlythingwecouldpossiblythenbounce againstthatdatasetarenumbers,themselves.
ROGERS:

Right.Sotherearenonamesandnoaddressesaffiliatedwiththesephonenumbers.
INGLIS:

No,therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:

OK.Justphonenumbers.
INGLIS:

That'sright,sir.
ROGERS:

OK.Goahead.
INGLIS: 17

Soananalystwouldthentrytodeterminewhethertherewasadescribable,itmustbewritten, documentationthatwouldsaythatthereisasuspicionthatthisisattributedtoaforeignterroristplotand theremightbeaU.S.nexus. Afterhavingmadethatdetermination,theywouldmakeafurtherchecktodeterminewhetheritis possibletodiscernthatthismightbeassociatedwithaU.S.person.Thewayyouwouldinferthatisyou mightlookattheareacodeandsaythatareacodecouldlikelybeintheUnitedStates.Weallknow thatwithinthisarea,thatifyouseeanareacodethatbeginswith301,thatwouldbeMaryland.That wouldbeyouronlyinsightintowhetherornotthismightbeattributabletoaU.S.person. Ifthatweretobethecase,thenthecaseforareasonable,articulablesuspiciousmustgetafurther reviewtoensurethatthisisnotasituationwheresomebodyismerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendment rights. Ifthat'sallthatwas,iftheyweremerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendmentrights,howeverobjectionable anypersonmightfindthat,thatisnotabasistoquerythedatabase. Ifitgetsthroughthosechecks,thenatthatpoint,itmustbeapprovedbyoneofthose20plustwo individuals20analysts,speciallytrainedanalysts,ortheirtwomanagerssuchthatitmightthenbe appliedasaqueryagainstthedataset.Again,thequeryitselfwouldjustbeanumber,andthequery againstthedatasetwouldthendeterminewhetherthatnumberexistsinthedatabase.That'showthat queryisformed.And,again... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:

Sotheresponseisnotanameit'sanaddress.It'saphonenumber.
INGLIS:

Itcannotbe.Ifitweretobeanameorifitweretobeanaddress,therewouldbenopossibilitythatthe databasewouldreturnanymeaningfulresults,sincenoneofthatinformationisinthedatabase.
ROGERS:

Justaphonenumberpopsbackup.
INGLIS:

Justaphonenumber.Whatcomesbackifyouquerythedatabasearephonenumbersthatwerein contact,ifthereareany,withthatnumber.And,again,theotherinformationinthatdatabasewould indicatewhenthatcalloccurredandwhatthedurationofthatcallwereweretobe.

ROGERS:

Again,Ijustwanttomakeveryclear,therearenonamesandnoaddressesinthatdatabase.
INGLIS:

Therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:

OK.Andwhyonlylessthan300queriesofphonenumbersintothatdatabase?
18

INGLIS:

Sir,onlylessthan300numberswereactuallyapprovedforqueryagainstthatdatabase.Thosemight havebeenappliedmultipletimes,andtherefore,theremightbeanumbergreaterthanthatofactual queriesagainstthedatabase. Butthereasontherearesofewselectorsapprovedisthatthecourthasdeterminedthatthereisavery narrowpurposeforthisthisuse.Itcan'tbetoprosecuteagreaterunderstandingofasimplydomestic plot.Itcannotbeusedtodoanythingotherthanterrorism.Andso,therefore,theremustbevery welldefineddescribablewrittendeterminationsthatthisisisasuspicionofaconnectionbetweena foreignplotandadomesticnexus.Ifitdoesn'tmeetthosestandards... (CROSSTALK)

ROGERS:

Arethosequeriesreportedtothecourt?
INGLIS:

ThosequeriesareallreportedtotheDepartmentofJustice,reviewedbytheDepartmentofJustice.The numberofthosequeriesarereportedtothecourt.Andanytimethatthereisadisseminationassociated withaU.S.person... (CROSSTALK)

ROGERS:

Isthereacourtapprovedprocessinordertomakethatqueryintothatinformationofonlyphone numbers?
INGLIS:

Yes,sir.Thecourtexplicitlyapprovestheprocessbywhichthosedeterminationsweremade,andthe DepartmentofJusticeprovidesarichoversightauditingofthatcapability.
ROGERS:

Great.Thankyou. GeneralAlexander,istheNSAonprivatecompany'sserversasdefinedunderthesetwoprograms?
ALEXANDER:

Wearenot.
ROGERS:

IsistheNSAhavetheabilitytolistentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremailsunderthesetwo programs?
ALEXANDER:

No,wedonothavethatauthority.
ROGERS:

DoesthetechnologyexistattheNSAtoflipaswitchbysomeanalysttolistentoAmericans'phone
19

callsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:

No.
ROGERS:

SothetechnologydoesnotexistforanyindividualorgroupofindividualsattheNSAtoflipaswitchto listentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:

Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:

WhenMr.Joyce,ifyoucouldhelpusunderstandthat,ifyougetapieceofanumber,there'sbeen somepublicdiscussionthat,gosh,there'sjustnotalotofvalueinwhatyoumightgetfromaprogram likethisthathasthismanylevelsofoversight.Canyoutalkabouthowthatmightworkintoan investigationtohelpyoupreventaterroristattackintheUnitedStates?

JOYCE:

Investigatingterrorismisnotanexactscience.It'slikeamosaic.Andwetrytotakethesedisparate piecesandbringthemtogethertoformapicture.Therearemanydifferentpiecesofintelligence.We haveassets.Wehavephysicalsurveillance.Wehaveelectronicsurveillancethroughalegalprocess phonerecordsthroughadditionallegalprocessfinancialrecords. Also,theseprogramsthatwe'retalkingaboutheretoday,they'reallvaluablepiecestobringthatmosaic togetherandfigureouthowtheseindividualsareplottingtoattacktheUnitedStateshereorwhetherit's U.S.interestsoverseas. So,everydot,asGeneralAlexandermentioned,weheartheclichefrequentlyafter9/11about connectingthedots.Icantellyouasateam,andwiththecommitteeandwiththeAmericanpublic,we cometogethertoputallthosedotstogethertoformthatpicturetoallowustodisrupttheseactivities.
ROGERS:

Thankyou. Giventhelargenumberofquestionsbymembers,I'mgoingtomovealong. Mr.Ruppersberger,forabrief...

RUPPERSBERGER:

Firstly,Iwanttothankallthewitnessesforyourpresentation,especiallyMr.Coleaverygood presentation.Ithinkyouexplainedthelawinaverysuccinctway. Youknow,it'sunfortunatesometimeswhenwehaveincidentslikethisthatalotofnegativeorfalse informationgetsout.Ithink,though,thatthoseofuswhoworkinthisfield,intheintelligencefieldevery day,knowwhatthefactsareandwe'retryingtonowpresentthosefactsthroughthispanel.That's important. ButIwouldsaythatIweren'tinthisfieldandifIweretolistentothemediaaccountsofwhatoccurred

20

inthebeginning,Iwouldbeconcerned,too.So,thisisveryimportantthatwegetthemessageoutto theAmericanpublicthatwhatwedoislegalandwe'redoingittoprotectournationalsecurityfrom attacksfromterrorists. Now,thereareoneareathat,Mr.Litt,youyouaddressedthisbutIthinkit'simportanttojust reemphasizetheFISAcourt.Youknow,again,it'sunfortunate,whenpeopledisagreewithyou,they attackyou.Theysaythingsthataren'ttrue.WeknowthatthesearefederaljudgesintheFISAcourt. Theyhaveintegrity,andthattheywillnotapproveanythingthattheyfeeliswrong.Wehave90day periodswherethecourtlooksatthisissue. Iwanttoaskyou,though,GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelinanywaythattheFISAcourtisa rubberstampbasedontheprocess?Ourforefatherscreatedagreatsystemofgovernment,andthat's checksandbalances.Andthat'swhatweare.That'swhatwedointhiscountrytofollowour Constitution.It'sunfortunatethatthesefederaljudgesarebeingattacked.
ALEXANDER:

Idonot.Ibelieve,asyouhavestated,thefederaljudgesonthatcourtaresuperb.Ournationwouldbe proudofwhattheydoandthewaytheygobackandforthtomakesurewedothisexactlyright. Andeverytimewemakeamistake,howtheyworkwithustomakesureitisdonecorrectlytoprotect ourcivillibertiesandprivacyandgothroughthecourtprocess.Theyhavebeenextremelyprofessional. Thereis,frommyperspective,norubberstamp. It'skindofinteresting.It'slikesayingyoujustrana26milemarathonsomebodysaid,"Well,thatwas justajog."Everytimeweworkwiththecourt,thedetailsandthespecificsofthatthatgofromusup throughtheFBI,throughtheDepartmentofJusticeandthroughthecourtoneachoneofthoseorders thatwegotothecourt.Thereistremendousoversight,complianceandwork.AndIthinkthecourthas doneasuperbjob. Moreimportantly,ifIcould,whatweworkedhardtodoistobringallofthesealltheseundercourt supervisionforjustthisreason.Imean,we'vedonetherightthing,Ithink,forourcountryhere. Thankyou.
RUPPERSBERGER:

Thankyouforthatanswer. ThesecondareaIwanttogetinto,GeneralAlexander,thepublicaresaying,"Well,howdidthis happen?"Wehavewehaverules.Wehaveregulations.Wehaveindividualsthatworkinintelligence gothroughbeingpersistentlybeingclassified.Andyetherewehaveatechnicalpersonwhohadlost somejobshadabackgroundthatwouldn'talwayswouldbeconsideredthebest. Wehavetolearnfrommistakeshowthey'veoccurred.Whatsystemareyouorthedirectorofnational intelligenceoftheadministrationputtingintoeffectnowtomakesurewhathappenedinthissituation, thatifanotherpersonweretototurnagainsthisorhercountry,thatwewouldhaveanalarmsystem thatwouldnotputusinthispositionrightnow?

ALEXANDER:

So,thisisaverydifficultquestion,especiallywhenthatpersonisasystemadministratorandtheyget
21

greataccess...
RUPPERSBERGER:

Whydon'tyousaywhatasystemadministratoris?
ALEXANDER:

Well,asystemadministratorisonethatactuallyhelpsoperate,run,settheconditions,theauditingand stuffonasystemoraportionofthenetwork.Whenoneofthosepersonsmisusestheirauthorities,this isahugeproblem. Soworkingwiththedirectorofnationalintelligence,whatwearedoingisworkingtocomeupwitha twopersonruleandoversightforthose,andensurethatwehaveawayofblockingpeoplefromtaking informationoutofoursystem.Thisisworkinprogress.We'reworkingwiththeFBIonthe investigation.Wedon'thaveallthefactsyet.We'vegottogetthose.Andaswe'regettingthosefacts, weareworkingthroughoursystem.DirectorClapperhasaskedustodothatandprovidingthat feedbackbacktotherestofthecommunity.

RUPPERSBERGER:

OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback.
ROGERS:

(OFFMIKE)
THORNBERRY:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andthankyouallforbeinghere,andformakingsomeadditionalinformationavailabletothepublic.I knowit'sfrustratingforyou,asitisforus,tohavethesetargetednarrowleaksandnotbeabletotalk aboutthebiggerpicture. GeneralAlexander,youmentionedthatyou'regoingtosendustomorrow50casesthathavebeen stoppedbecauseoftheseprograms,basically.Fourhavebeenmadepublictothispoint.AndIthink therearetwonewonesthatyouaretalkingabouttoday.ButIwouldinviteyoutoexplaintousbothof thosetwonewcasesMowlin(ph)andtheOperationWiFicase.Andoneofthemstartswitha215 oneofthemstartswitha702. AndsoIthinkit'simportantforyoutoprovidetheinformationabouthowtheseprogramsstopped thoseterroristattacks.
ALEXANDER:

OK.I'mgoingtodeferthis,becausetheactualguyswhoactuallydoalltheworkand(inaudible)isthe FBI,andgetitexactlyright.I'mgoingtohaveSeandothat.Goahead,Sean.
JOYCE:

So,Congressman,asImentionedpreviously,NSAontheOpWiFi,whichisKhalidOuazzanioutof KansasCity.ThatwastheexamplethatIreferredtoearlier.NSA,utilizing702authority,identifiedan extremistlocatedinYemen.ThisextremistlocatedinYemenwastalkingwithanindividuallocated

22

insidetheUnitedStatesinKansasCity,Missouri.ThatindividualwasidentifiedasKhalidOuazzani. TheFBIimmediatelyservedlegalprocesstofullyidentifyOuazzani.Wewentuponelectronic surveillanceandidentifiedhiscoconspirators.Andthiswastheplotthatwasintheveryinitialstagesof plottingtobombtheNewYorkStockExchange.Wewereabletodisrupttheplot.Wewereableto luresomeindividualstotheUnitedStates.Andwewereabletoeffecttheirarrest.Andtheywere convictedforthisterroristactivity.

THORNBERRY:

OK.JustsoIonthatplot,itwasunderthe702,whichistargetedagainstforeigners,thatsome communicationfromthispersoninYemenbacktotheUnitedStateswaspickedup.Andthenthey turneditovertoyouattheFBItoservelegalprocessonthispersonintheUnitedStates.

JOYCE:

Thatisabsolutelycorrect.Andifyourecall,under702,ithastobeanonU.S.personoutsidethe UnitedStates,andthenalsooneofthecriteriaislinkedtoterrorism.
THORNBERRY:

OK.WouldyousaythatthistheirintentiontoblowuptheNewYorkStockExchangewasaserious plot?Oristhissomethingthattheykindofdreamedabout,youknow,talkingamongtheirbuddies?
JOYCE:

Ithinkthejuryconsidereditserious,sincetheywereallconvicted.
THORNBERRY:

OK.Andandwhatabouttheotherplot?October,2007,thatstartedIthinkwitha215?
JOYCE:

Irefertothatplot.Itwasaninvestigationafter9/11thattheFBIconducted.Weconductedthat investigationanddidnotfindanyconnectiontoterroristactivity.Severalyearslater,underthe215 businessrecordprovision,theNSAprovidedusatelephonenumberonly,inSanDiego,thathad indirectcontactwithanextremistoutsidetheUnitedStates. Weservedlegalprocesstoidentifywhowasthesubscribertothistelephonenumber.Weidentifiedthat individual.Wewereableto,underfurtherinvestigationandelectronicsurveillancethatweapplied specificallyforthisU.S.personwiththeFISAcourt,wewereabletoidentifycoconspiratorsandwe wereabletodisruptthisterroristactivity.

THORNBERRY:

I'msorry.Repeatformeagainwhattheywereplottingtodo.
JOYCE:

Heasactuallyhewasprovidingfinancialsupporttoanoverseasterroristgroupthatwasadesignated terroristgroupbytheUnitedStates.
THORNBERRY:

Buttherewassomeconnectiontosuicidebombingsthattheyweretalkingabout,correct?
23

JOYCE:

NotintheexamplethatI'mcitingrighthere.
THORNBERRY:

Oh,I'msorry,thegroupinSomaliatowhichhewasfinancing,that'swhattheythat'swhattheydodo inSomalia,correct?
JOYCE:

Thatiscorrect,andasyouknow,aspartofourclassifiedhearingsregardingtheAmericanpresencein inthatareaoftheworld.
THORNBERRY:

OK.OK,thankyou. Chairman(OFFMIKE)
ALEXANDER:

IfIcould,Congressman,justjusthitacouplekeypoints.It'sover50cases.AndthereasonI'mnot givingaspecificnumberiswewanttherestofthecommunitytoactuallybeefthoseupandmakesure that(inaudible)wehavethereisexactlyright.I'dgiveyouthenumber50X.Butifsomebodysays, "Well,notthisone."Actually,whatwe'refindingoutistherearemore.Theysaid,"Youmissedthese threeorfour."Sothosearebeingaddedtothepacket. Onthetopofthatpacketwe'llhaveasummaryofallofthese,thelistingofthose.Ibelievethose numbersarethingsthatwecanmakepublic,thatyoucanuse,thatwecanuse.Andwe'lltrytogiveyou thenumbersthatapplytoEurope,aswell,aswellasthosethathadanexusintheUnitedStates. Theissueontermsofreleasingmoreonthespecificoverseascasesis(inaudible)ourit'sourconcern thatinsomeofthosenow,goingintofurtherdetailsofexactlywhatwedidandhowwediditmay preventusfromdisruptingafutureplot. Sothat'ssomethingthatworkinprogress.Ourintentistogetthattothecommitteetomorrowforboth bothIntelCommitteesfortheSenateandHouse.
THORNBERRY:

Great.Thankyou.
ROGERS:

Mr.Thompson?
THOMPSON:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Thankyouallverymuchforbeinghereandforyourtestimonyandforyourservicetoourcountry. Mr.Litt,beforegoingtoahearing,doesorhastheFISAcourteverrejectedacasethat'sbeenbrought beforeit?

LITT: 24

Ibelievetheanswertothatisyes,butIwoulddeferthattothedeputyattorneygeneral.
COLE:

Ithashappened.It'snotoften,butitdoeshappen.
THOMPSON:

Thankyou. Mr.Cole,whatkindsofrecordscomprisethedatacollectedunderthebusinessrecordsprovision?
COLE:

There'sacoupleofdifferentkinds.Theshorthandandit'srequiredunderthestatuteisthekindsof recordsyoucouldgetwithagrandjurysubpoena.Thesearebusinessrecordsthatalreadyexist.It couldbeacontract.Itcouldbesomethinglikethat. Inthisinstancethatwe'retalkingaboutforthisprogram,thesearetelephonerecords.Andit'sjustlike yourtelephonebill.It'llshowanumbercalled,thedatethenumberwascalled,howlongthecall occurredanumberthatcalledbacktoyou.That'sallitis,notevenidentifyingwhothepeoplearethat's involved.

THOMPSON:

Haveyoupreviouslycollectedanythingelseunderthatauthority?
COLE:

Underthe215authority?
THOMPSON:

Correct.
COLE:

I'mnotsurebeyondthe215andthe702thatansweringaboutwhatwehaveandhaven'tcollected hasbeendeclassifiedtobetalkedabout.
THOMPSON:

OK. Itwassaidthatthere'sbeencaseswheretherewasdatainadvertentlyormistakenlycollectedandthen subsequentlydestroyed.Isthat...

COLE:

That'scorrect.
THOMPSON:

Andandthereactuallyhasbeendatathathasbeeninadvertentlycollectedanditwasdestroyed, nothingelsewasdonewithit?
COLE:

That'scorrect.Thethisisaverystrictprocessthatwegothroughinthatregard.Youcangeta wrongdigitonaphonenumberandyoucollectthewrongnumber,somethinglikethat.Andwhenthat's
25

discovered,that'stakencareofinthatway.
THOMPSON:

Andwhodoesthechecking?Whowhodeterminesifsomethinghasbeeninadvertentlycollectedand thendecidesthatit'sneedstobedestroyed?
COLE:

Well,I'llI'llreferovertoNSAinthefirstinstance,becausetheydoaveryrobustandvigorouscheck internallythemselves.Butthenasanafterthefact,theDepartmentofJusticeandODNIandthe inspectorgeneralforNSAalsodoauditsandmakesurethatweunderstandalltheuses.Andifthere's anycomplianceproblemsthatthey'reidentified,thatthey'regiventothecourt,they'regiventothe Congress,andthey'refixed.

THOMPSON:

IIdon'tthinkIneedanythingmorethanthanthat. GeneralAlexander,canyoutelluswhatSnowdenmeantduringthischatthingthathedidwhenhesaid thatNSAprovidesCongresswith,andIquote,"aspecialimmunitytoitssurveillance"?

ALEXANDER:

Ihavenoidea.
THOMPSON:

Anybodyelse?
ALEXANDER:

I'mnotsureIunderstandthecontextofthespecialimmunity.
THOMPSON:

IIdon'teither.That'swhy... (CROSSTALK)
ALEXANDER:

Wetreatyouwithspecialrespect. (LAUGHTER)
THOMPSON:

Hesaidwitha"specialimmunitytoitssurveillance."
ALEXANDER:

IIhavenoidea.Ithinkitmaybeintermsofdisseminatinganyinformation,let'ssay,notinthis programbutinanyprogramthatwehave,ifwehavetodisseminateU.S.personsdataorathreattoa U.S.memberofCongress,we'renotallowedtosaythenameunlessit'svaluabletooneofthe investigationsor(inaudible). Sowecan'tjustputoutnamesandstuffinourthings(ph).Sopartoftheminimizationprocedures protectsthewho.

26

Didyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS(?):

No,IwouldsimplyhavesaidthatyourstatusasU.S.personsgivesyouaspecialstatus,aswe've describedthroughoutthishearing.
THOMPSON:

Ifyouifthatdoessurfaceandyoudofigurethatoutyou'llgetthatinformationtous? Alsothepresidentkindofsuggested,Iguess,inhistelevisioninterviewtheothernightthattheNew YorksubwaybombercouldnothavebeenorwouldnothavebeencaughtwithoutPRISM.Isthat true?

JOYCE:

Yes,thatisaccurate.Withoutthe702toolwewouldnothaveidentifiedNajibullahZazi.
THOMPSON:

Thankyou.Ihavenofurtherquestion. Iyieldbackthebalanceofmytime.
ROGERS:

Mr.Miller?
MILLER:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. GeneralAlexander,whichagencyactuallypresentsthepackagetotheFISAcourtforthemtomake theirdecision?

ALEXANDER:

Well,it'sactuallybusinessrecords,FISA,it'stheFBI(inaudible). Goahead.
JOYCE:

TheFBIispartoftheprocess.ItthengoesovertotheDepartmentofJustice.Andtheyaretheones iftheDAGwantstocommentonthat.
COLE:

TheformalaspectofthestatuteallowsthedirectoroftheFBItomakeanapplicationtothecourt.The JusticeDepartmenthandlesthatprocess.Wemaketheputallthepaperworktogether.Anditmust besignedoffonbeforeitgoestothecourtbyeithertheattorneygeneral,myself,orifwehavea confirmedassistantattorneygeneralinchargeoftheNationalSecurityDivision,thatpersonis authorized.Butithastobeoneofthethreeofustosignitbeforeitgoes.

MILLER:

Thecourtisasinglejudge?
COLE: 27

Thejudgessitkindofininrotationinthecourtpresidingoverit.TheseareallArticle3judges.They havelifetimeappointments.Theyhavetheirdistrictsthattheydealwith,andtheyareselectedbythe chiefjusticetositontheFISAcourtforaperiodoftime.Andsotheywillrotatethroughandbethe dutyjudgesthatarerequiredforthis.

MILLER:

Iguessthecruxofmyquestionis,wouldtherebeawaythatifyoudidnotgettheanswerthatyou wantedfromacertainjudgecouldyougotoanotherFISAcourtjudgeandaskforanotheropinion?
COLE:

IIthinkthatwouldbevery,verydifficulttodo,becausethestaffattheFISAcourtdoesagreatdeal oftheprepworkandthey'regonnarecognizewhenthey'vethrownsomethingbackthatifyou'recoming backandyouhaven'tmadeanychangestocorrectthedeficienciesthatcausedthemtothrowitback, myguessisthey'llthrowitbackagain.

MILLER:

AndIthinkoneofthethingsthatalotofpeopledon'tunderstandanditwasalludedtobyMr.Litt andIthink,Mr.Cole,youhavealsodiscusseditandthat'sthereadaheaddocumentthatthecourt gets,theopportunity.Alotoffocushasbeenmadeonthefactthatasmycolleague,Mr.Thompson said,court'sarubberstamp.Buttheydohaveanopportunitytoreviewthedocumentspriortorendering adecision.

COLE:

Theydo.Andit'sbynomeansasarubberstamp.Theypushbackalot.Andwhentheyseesomething theseareverythickapplicationsthathavealotinthem.Andwhentheyseeanythingthatraisesan issue,theywillpushbackandsay,"Weneedmoreinformationaboutthisarea.Weneedmore informationaboutthatlegalissue.Weneedmoreinformationaboutyourfactsincertainareas.' Thisisbynomeansarubberstamp.Thereisanenormousamountofwork.Andtheymakesure they'retheonestomakesurethattheprivacyandthecivillibertyinterestsofUnitedStates'citizensare honored.They'rethatbulwarkinthisprocess.Sotheytheyhavetobesatisfied.

MILLER:

There'sbeensomediscussionthismorningontheinadvertentviolationofacourtorderwheredatahas beencollectedandthendestroyed.Buthasthereeverbeenanydisciplinaryactiontakenonsomebody whoinadvertentlyviolatedanorder?

COLE:

NotthatI'mawareof.AndIthinkoneofthestatisticsthatMr.Inglishadincludedinhiscommentwas thatinthehistoryofthis,therehasneverbeenfoundanintentionalviolationofanyoftheprovisionsof thecourtorder,oranyofthecollectioninthatregard.Sothethenatureofthekindsofanomaliesthat existedweretechnicalerrors,weretypographicalerrors,thingsofthatnatureasopposedtoanything thatwasremotelyintentional.Sotherewouldbeinthoseinstances,noreasonfordiscipline.Theremay bereasontomakesureoursystemsarefixedsothatatechnicalviolation,ortechnicalerrordoesn't existagainbecausewe'veidentifiedit.Butnothingintentional.

28

LITT:

CanIjustaddonethingtothatpoint?AnimportantpartoftheoversightprocessthattheDepartmentof Justice,andtheODNIengageiniswhencomplianceproblemsareidentified,andthevastmajorityof themareselfidentifiedbyNSA,butwhenacomplianceissueisidentified,wegoandlookatitandsay, OKaretherechangesthatneedtobemadeinthesystemsothatthiskindofmistakedoesn'thappen again?It'saconstantlyimprovingprocesstopreventproblemsfromoccurring.

MILLER:

Thankyou.Iyieldback.
ROGERS:

Ms.Schakowsky?
SCHAKOWSKY:

ThankyouMr.Chairman.GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelthatthisopenhearingtodayjeopardizesin anywayournationalsecurity?
ALEXANDER:

Idon'tthinkthesharingitselfjeopardizesit.Ithinkthedamagewasdoneinthereleaseofthe informationalready.Ithinktodaywhatwehavetheopportunityis(sic)sowhereitmakessense, provideadditionalinformationontheoversight,thecomplianceandsomeofthethestatistics,without jeopardizingit.Sotoansweryourquestion,no.We'rebeingverycarefultodothat,andIappreciate whatthecommitteehasdoneonthat.

SCHAKOWSKY:

HowmanypeoplewereinthesamepositionasSnowdenwas,asasystemsmanagertohaveaccessto thisinformationthatcouldbedamagingifreleased?
ALEXANDER:

Well,therearesystemadministratorsthroughoutNSAandinourallourcomplexesaroundthe world.Andthereisontheorderofathousandsystemadministrators,peoplewhoactuallyrunthe networksthathave,incertainsections,thatthatlevelofauthorityandabilitytointerfacewith...

SCHAKOWSKY:

Howmanyofthoseareoutsidecontractors,ratherthan...
ALEXANDER:

Themajorityarecontractors.Asyoumayknow,asyoumayrecall,about1213yearsagoaswetried todownsizeourgovernmentworkforce,wepushedmoreofourinformationtechnologyworkforceor systemadministratorstothecontractarena.That'sconsistentacrosstheintelligencecommunity.

SCHAKOWSKY:

IwouldIwouldarguethatthisconversationthatwe'rehavingnowcouldhavecouldhave happenedunlikewhatyousaidMr.Litt.Andperhapswedisagreealso,GeneralAlexander,thatthe erosionoftrust,themisconceptionsandthemisunderstandingsthatresultedandwhywouldassumethat whenthere's1,000arethereanymorethan1,000bytheway?

29

ALEXANDER:

Well,we'reactuallycountingallofthosepositions.I'llgetyouanaccuratenumber.
SCHAKOWSKY:

Thatthatsomeofthisinformationwouldnothavebecomepublic.Andthattheeffortthathasto convincetheAmericanpublicofthenecessityofthisprogram,Ithinkwouldsuggestthatwewouldhave beenbetteroffathavingadiscussionofvigorousoversight,thelegalframework,etceteraupfront,and howthiscouldpreventperhapsanother9/11,andinfact,50orso,attacks.Letmeaskyouthis,Mr. Cole,youknowyouyouweretalkingabouttransparency,andyouweresayingthatessentiallythat whiletheVerizonphonerecordsorderlookedbadonitsface,thatthereareotherFISAcourtorders thattalkinmoredepthaboutthelegalrationale,aboutaboutwhatwe'rewhatwe'redoing. So,willyoureleasethosecourtopinionswiththenecessaryredactions,ofcourse?Andifnot,why?

COLE:

Well,I'mgoingtoreferthatovertoMr.LittbecausetheclassifyingauthorityonthatwouldbeDNI.
LITT:

Asyoumayknow,wehavebeenworkingforsometimeontryingtodeclassifyopinionsoftheFISA court.It'sbeenaverydifficulttask,becauselikemostlegalopinions,youhavefactsintermingledwith legaldiscussion.Andthefactsfrequentlyinvolveclassifiedinformation,sensitivesourcesandmethods. Andwhatwe'vebeendiscoveringisthatwhenyouremovealloftheinformationthatneedstobe classified,you'releftwithsomethingthatlookslikeSwisscheese,andisnotreallyverycomprehensible. Havingsaidthat,IthinkasasGeneralAlexandersaid,there'sinformationoutinthepublicdomain now.There'sthedirectorofnationalintelligencedeclassifiedcertaininformationabouttheseprograms lastweek. Andasaresultofthat,wearegoingback,takinganotherlookattheseopinionstoseewhether,inlight ofthatdeclassification,there'snowwecanmakeamorecomprehensiblereleaseoftheopinion.So theanswertothatis,wearelookingatthatandandfranklywewouldliketoreleaseittothepublic domain,asmuchofthisaswecan,withoutcompromisingnationalsecurity.
SCHAKOWSKY:

IthinkGeneralAlexander,sowhatothertypesofofrecordsarecollectedunderthisSection215? Cancanyoutalkaboutthatatall?
ALEXANDER:

Yeah,forNSAtheonlytheonlyrecordsthatarecollectedunderbusinessrecords215isthis telephonydata.That'sall.
SCHAKOWSKY:

Andisthereauthorizationtocollectmore?
ALEXANDER:

Under215forus?No,thisistheonlythatwedo.Nowitgetsintootherauthorities,butit'snotours. AndIdon'tnowiftheI'llpassthattotheattorneygeneralbecauseyou'reaskingmenowoutsideof
30

NSA.
COLE:

215isgenerallyisageneralprovisionthatallowstheacquisitionofbusinessrecordsifitsrelevanttoa nationalsecurityinvestigation.Sothatshowinghastobemadetothecourttoallowthatsubpoenato issuethatthereisarelevance,andaconnection.Andthatcanbeanyanynumberofdifferentkindsof recordsthatabusinessmightmaintaincustomerrecords,purchaseorders,thingsofthatnature. Somebodybuysmaterialsthattheycouldbuyanexplosiveoutof,youcouldgotoacompanythatsells thoseandgetrecordsofthepurchase.Thingsofthatnature.

SCHAKOWSKY:

Whataboutemails?
COLE:

Emailswouldnotbecoveredbybusinessrecordsinthatregard.Youwouldhavetounderthe ElectronicCommunicationsPrivacyAct,yougetspecificcourtauthorizationforemails,that'sstored content.Ifyou'regoingtobelookingattheminrealtimewhilethey'regoing,you'regoingtohavea separateFISAcourtorderthatwouldallowyoutodothat.Itwouldn'tbecoveredbythebusiness records.

SCHAKOWSKY:

ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:

CouldIjustmakesureoneclearpartonthesystemadministratorversussowhatyougetaccess toishelpingtorunthenetwork,andthewebserversthatareonthatnetworkthatarepubliclyavailable. Togettoanydata,likethebusinessrecords215datathatwe'retalkingabout,that'sinanexceptionally controlledarea.Youwouldhavetohavespecificcertificatestogetintothat.Iamnotawarethathehad he,Snowden,hadanyaccesstothat.Andonthereasonablearticulablesuspicionnumbersandon whatwe'reseeingthere,Idon'tknowofanyinaccurateRASnumbersthathaveoccurredsince2009. Therearerigorouscontrolsthatwehavefromatechnicalperspectivethatoncethenumberscanis consideredRASapproved,thatyouputthatnumberin.Youcan'tmakeamistakebecausethesystem helpscorrectthatnow.Sothatthatisatechnicalcontrolthatwehaveputinthere.

SCHAKOWSKY:

Thankyou.Iyieldback.
CONAWAY:

Well,thankyougentlemen.GeneralAlexanderthankyouforyourlongservice.Mr.ColeandMr.Inglis wentthroughthroughaveryextensivearrayoftheoversightandinternalcontrolsthatareassociated withwithwhat'sgoingon.Inabusinessenvironment,SarbanesOxleyrequiresthatcompaniesgo throughtheirentiresystemtomakesurethat,notonlydothedetailstreeswork,butthattheforest worksaswell.Isthereanyoneatinthevastarrayofwhatyouguysaredoingthatstepsbackand says,allright,we'rethegoalistoprotectprivacyandourcivillibertiesandwe'redoingtheverybest wecan.

31

Isthereaaninternalcontrolaudit,sotospeakthatlooksattheentiresystemthatsays,we'vegotthe waterfrontcovered?Andwe'redoingwhatweneedtodo?
COLE:

I'llstart.ImeantherearetheseperiodicreviewsthatI'vedescribedthatauditeverythingthatisdone underbothoftheseprogramsbybothNSAandtheDepartmentofJustice,andtheOfficeofthe DirectorofNationalIntelligence,andwereporttothecourt,andwereporttoCongress.Soallofthat isdonelookingatthewholeprogramatthesametime.

CONAWAY:

IguessIMr.ColeI'mlookingatthetheprogramofthat.Iunderstandthatthosepieceswork reallywell,andthatthat'stheirdesigntotogoatitandcreatethethatkindofauditprocess.Butis thereanoveralllookatateverythingthatisdonetosay,we'vegotitallcovered?Orandifwe don't,andtherearesuggestionsthatweneedtoimproveit,wheredothosesuggestionsgetvetted?And havewehadsuggestionsforimprovementthatwesaid,no,wedon'tneedtodothat?

LITT:

Mr.ConawayifImightspeakonthat,thereareatleasttwolevelsatwhichthattakesplace. OneisbystatutewithintheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,thereisthereisacivil libertiesprotectionofficerhisnameisAlexJoel,who'sanincrediblycapablepersonwhosejobitisto takeexactlythatkindoflookatourprogramsandmakesuggestionsfortheprotectionofcivilliberties. Outsideofoftheintelligencecommunity,there... (CROSSTALK)

CONAWAY:

Andthatpersonwouldhavetherequisiteclearancestoknowallthedetails? (CROSSTALK)
LITT:

Absolutely.Heisheis,infact,partofthisauditprocessaswell,hisofficeis. Thesecondthingisthatisthatoutsideoftheintelligencecommunity,thepresident'sCivilLiberties OversightBoard,whichhashasfiveconfirmedmembersisalsochargedwithevaluatingtheimpactof ourcounterterrorismprogramsonprivacyandcivilliberties. Theyalsohavefullclearances.Theyhavetheabilitytogetfullvisibilityintothisprogram.Infact,they haverecentlybeenbriefedontheseprograms,andIknowtheyare,infact,lookingatthemtomake exactlythatkindofassessment. (CROSSTALK)

CONAWAY:

Andwhowhodotheyreportto?Isthatreportpublic?
LITT:

It'sthepresident'sboard.Isuspectthattotheextentthey'remakingaclassifiedreport,itwouldnotbe
32

public.Totheextentthattheycanmakeanunclassifiedreport,it'suptothemwhetherornotitbecomes public.
CONAWAY:

Severalofyoumentionedtheterm"minimization"andthenalsofiveyeardestruction,rollingfiveyear windowontheonthebusinessrecordissues.You'veusedtheword"purge,""getridof,""destroy." Inanelectronicsetting,canyouhelpusunderstandexactlywhatthatmeans?IunderstandwhenIshred apieceofpaperintothethousandandonepieces,that'sonething.Butgiventhenumberoftimesyou backupdataandalltheother,canacitizenfeellikethatoncetheminimizationworked,thatthis electronically,wehaveinfactdeletedallthesethingsthatarethatwe'resupposedtodelete?

INGLIS:

SoI'llstartatthat.Yes,sir,Ibelievethatwecan.WehaveafairlycomprehensivesystematNSAthat wheneverwecollectanything,whetherit'sunderthisauthorityorsomeother,weactuallybindtothat communicationwherewegotit,howwegotit,whatauthoritywegotitundersothatweknow preciselywhetherwecanretainitforsomefixedperiodoftime. Andifitsimplyagesoff,asinthecaseoftheB.R.FISAdatawetalkedabout,attheexpirationofthose fiveyears,itisautomaticallytakenoutofthesystem.Literallyjustdeletedfromthesystem.

CONAWAY:

OK.Andit'smechanicallyoverwrittenandallofthebackupcopiesofthataredoneawaywith,and...
INGLIS:

Yes,sir.
CONAWAY:

OK.
INGLIS:

It'sitgetsfairlycomplicatedveryquickly,butwehavewhatarecalledsourcesystemsofrecord withinourarchitecture,andthosearetheplacesthatwesayifitifthedataelementhastherightto exist,it'sattributabletooneofthose.Andifitdoesn'thavetherighttoexist,youcan'tfinditinthere. Andwehaveveryspecificlistsofinformationthatdeterminewhattheprovenanceofdatais,howlong thatdatacanberetained.Wehaveontheothersideofthecoinpurgeliststhatifwewereauthorized ifwewererequiredtopurgesomething,thatitemwouldshowupexplicitlyonthatlist.Andweregularly runthatagainstourdatasetstomakesurethatwe'vecheckedanddoublecheckedthatthosethings thatshouldbepurgedhavebeenpurged.

CONAWAY:

Allright. Onequickone:AnyindicationthatthetheFISAcourthasaproblemwithresourcesnecessarytorun itsoversightpiece?

INGLIS:

NotthatI'mawareofrightnow.But,obviously,thecourtsaresufferingundersequestration,like
33

everybodyelse.SoIdon'tknowwhat'sgonnahitthemaswegoforward.
CONAWAY:

Thankyou,sir, Iyieldback.
ROGERS:

Mr.Conaway. Mr.Langevin?
LANGEVIN:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andgentlemen,Iwanttothankyouallforyourtestimonyheretodayandforyourservicetoourour country. I'masmembersofthecommittee,Ihavebeenbriefedontheprogram,andandIknowtheexcess ofduediligenceyou'vegonethroughtomakesurethatthisisdoneright. SoIthinkit'simportantthatthisdiscussionisbeinghadthismorning.Andhopefullyit'sgonnagive greaterconfidencetotheAmericanpeoplethatalltheagenciesinvolvedhavedottedtheiri'sand crossedtheirt's. Iespeciallythinkit'shelpfulthatwehavethediscussionabouttheFISAcourttodayandandhow detailedthetherequestshavetobebeforetheygetapprovalandit'smadeclearthatthesearenot justonepagedocumentsthatarepresentedtoaFISAjudgeandthenit'srubberstamped. Itactuallygoesthroughexcessiveduediligence,andandbeforeitevengetstothepointwherethe judgeseesit.And,obviously,iftheifallthecriteriahavebeenmet,thenitgetsitgetsapproved, andifit'sifthecriteriahavenotbeenmet,it'sgonnaberejected. So,Iwon'tbelaborthatpoint,exceptingthat'sbeenhadbeenaveryfruitfuldiscussion. ButcanyoutalkfurtherabouttheagaintheroleoftheI.G.andgointothatthatthatprocessa littlemoresothatthetheamountofreviewtheI.G.does,onceaqueryhasbeenmadeintermsofthe rangeofqueriesthathavebeenmade,Ithinkthat'swouldbeimportanttoclarify.
INGLIS:

Iwouldjuststartwiththat,andthendefertotheODNIandtheattorneygeneraldeputyattorney generalforsomefollowup. Andso,atNSA,anyanalystthatwantstoformaquery,regardlessofwhetherit'sthisthisauthority oranyother,essentiallyhasatwopersoncontrolrule.Theywoulddeterminewhetherthisqueryshould beapplied,andthere'ssomeonewhoprovidesoversightonthat. We'vealreadylearnedthatunderthemetadatarecordsthatarecapturedbytheB.R.FISAprogram, thatthere'saveryspecialcourtdefinedprocessbywhichthat'sdone. ThoseareallsubjecttotheI.G.,theinspectorgeneral'sreviewonaperiodicbasis,suchthatwecan lookattheproceduresasdefined,theproceduresasexecuted,reconcilethetwoandensurethat

34

internaltoNSA,thatthat'sdoneexactlyright.ThereareperiodicreportsthattheI.G.hastoproduce onthesevariousprograms,andtheyarefaithfullyreported. ButIthinktherealchecksandbalanceswithintheexecutivebranchhappenbetweenNSAandthe DepartmentofJustice,theOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence.AndbecauseNSAalsohasa footwithintheDepartmentofDefense,theDepartmentofDefenseentersintothataswell.Theyhave intelligenceoversightmechanisms. Andbetweenthosefourcomponents,thereisrichandrigorousoversightwhichvariesintermsofthe thingsthattheylookfor,basedupontheauthorities.B.R.FISAisaparticularlyrigorousauthority.But theyallhavechecksandbalancestotranscendjustNSA.

LANGEVIN:

OK.
COLE(?):

And,Congressman,ifIifIcouldaddtothat,andIreferyoutoarecentreviewbytheDOJinspector generalonthe702programthatwashighlycomplimentaryofallthechecksandbalancesthatwerein place.

LANGEVIN:

Thankyou. SoletmeturnmyattentionnowtoIknowtheseprogramsprimarilytargetnonU.S.persons,butcan youandthisisprobablyaquestionforyou,Mr.Joyce,justtoclarify,you'vesaidthatifaU.S. personoratheoverseasortheUnitedStatesoranonU.S.personlivingintheUnitedStates,thatif they'rewebecomeawarethattheymaybeinvolvedinterroristactivitythattheyareserved processed. Canyougointothatlevelofdetailofwhatthenhappensandhowthecourtsareinvolvedwithifwe becomeawarethataU.S.personisinvolved?

JOYCE:

SosoIthinkeithermaybeImisspokeororyoumisspoke.Wewewearenotlookingat allatU.S.persons.The702isanyoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.AndevenifaU.S.personisoutside oftheUnitedStates,itdoesnotincludeitinthe702coverage. OK,soit'sanonU.S.personoutsidetheUnitedStates,andithastohavethere'sthreedifferent criteriaitgoesthrough.Oneofthoselinksisterrorism.Sothatiswherespecificallyonlycertain individualsaretargeted.Thoseones,oneofthecriteria,linkedtoterrorism. Onnumerousoccasions,asI'veoutlinedinsomeoftheexamples,thoseindividualsoutsidetheUnited StateswerediscoveredcommunicatingwithsomeoneinsidetheUnitedStates. Wethenthatis,beingtippedfromtheNSA.Wethengothroughthelegalprocesshere,theFBI does,regardingthatU.S.person.Sowegoandwehavetoservewhat'scalledanationalsecurityletter toidentifythesubscriber.It'smuchlikeasubpoena. Followingthat,ifwewanttopursueelectronicsurveillance,wehavetomakeaspecificapplication
35

regardingthatpersonwiththeFISAcourthere.
LANGEVIN:

That'swhatIwaslookingfor.Sothankyouverymuch. Iyieldback. (OFFMIKE)

ALEXANDER:

Sir,ifIcould,justtofollowonandandtoclarify,'causeaswe'regoingthroughthis,Iwanttomake surethateverythingwesayisexactlyrightfromfrommyperspective.Andso,asSeansaid,NSA maynottargetthephonecallsoremailsofanyU.S.personanywhereintheworldwithout individualizedcourtorders.

LANGEVIN(?):

OK.Thankyou.
ROGERS:

That'sanimportantpointwecan'tmakeenough. Mr.Lobiondo?
LOBIONDO:

Thankyou.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. GeneralAlexanderandteam,thankyouforhelpinghelpingusunderstandinsomanyclosedsessions andhopefullyhelpingthenationunderstandwhatwe'redoing,whywe'redoingit,andhowwe'redoing it. Iwanttofocusalittlebitmoreon702,ifwecould. And,GeneralAlexander,couldyoucouldyouexplainwhathappensifatargetofsurveillanceis communicatingwithaU.S.personintheUnitedStates?

ALEXANDER:

So,under702,IthinkthebestcaseissomethatSeanJoycemade.Ifwesee,ifwe'retrackingaknown terroristinanothercountry,sayPakistan,Yemenorsomeplace,andweseethemcommunicatingwith someoneintheUnitedStates,andithasaterrorismnexus,focusedondoingsomethingintheUnited States,wetipthattotheFBI. Soourjobistoidentify,seethenexusofit.Itcouldbeinanothercountryaswell.Sosometimes,we'd seesomebodyinthatoneofthosecountriesplanningsomethinginEuropeorelsewhere.Wewould thensharethatthroughintelligencemeetingstothosecountries. ButwhenitcomesintotheUnitedStates,ourjobends.We'retheoutsideandweprovidethattothe insideFBItotakeitfromthere.Sothey,then,takeitandsay,"Doesthismakesense?"They'llgoup,as Seanexplained,lookattheprocessforgettingadditionalinformationtoseeifthisisaleadworth following.
LOBIONDO: 36

AndwhatdoesthegovernmenthavetodoifitwantstotargetaU.S.personunderFISAwhenthey're locatedabroadwhenthey'renothere?Whatwhatwouldbetheprocessforthegovernment?
COLE:

ThatwouldbetheafullpackagegoingtotheFISAcourt,identifyingthatpersonidentifyingthe probablecausetobelievethatthatpersonisinvolvedineitherterrorismorforeignintelligenceactivities andindicatingthatwehavethentherequesttothecourttoallowustointercepttheircommunications becausewe'vemadetheshowingthatthey'reinvolvedinterroristorforeignintelligenceactivities. Sowe'dhavetomakeaformalapplicationtargetingthatpersonspecifically,whetherthey'reinsideor outsideoftheUnitedStates.

LOBIONDO:

Andwhatifyou... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:

And,sir,ifImight.Andagain,thatcouldnotbedoneunder702.There'saseparatesectionofthe ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActthatwouldallowthat,butitwouldnotbedoableunder702.
LOBIONDO:

Andandwhatifyouwanttomonitorsomeone'scommunicationintheUnitedStates?
COLE:

Samething.Again,adifferentprovisionofFISA,butwewouldhavetoshowthatthatpersonisinfact withprobablecauseinvolvedinforeignterroristactivitiesorforeignintelligenceactivitiesonbehalfofa terroristorganizationoraforeignpower.We'dhavetolayouttothecourtallofthosefactstogetthe court'spermissiontothentargetthatperson.

LOBIONDO:

So,Ijustwanttoreemphasizethat.YouyouhavetospecificallygototheFISAcourtandmake yourcaseastowhythisinformationisnecessarytobeaccessed.
COLE:

That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:

Andwithoutthat,youhavenoauthorityandcannotdoitanddonotdoit.
COLE:

That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:

OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS: 37

Great.Thankyouverymuch. Mr.Schiff?
SCHIFF:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andthankyou,gentlemen,foryourwork. Onthebusinessrecordsprogram,thegeneralFISAcourtorderallowsyoutogetthemetadatafromthe communicationsproviders.Thenwhentherearereasonableandarticulablefacts,youcangoandseeif oneofthenumbershasamatchinthemetadata. Onthose300orsooccasionswhenyoudothat,doesthatrequireseparatecourtapproval?Ordoes thegeneralFISAcourtorderallowyou,whenyouranalystshavethereasonable,articulablefacts,to makethatquery?Inotherwords,everytimeyoumakethequery,doesthathavetobeapprovedbythe court?

COLE:

Wedonothavetogetseparatecourtapprovalforeachquery.Thecourtsetsoutthestandardthat mustbemetinordertomakethequery,initsorder.Andthat'sintheprimaryorder.Andthenthat's whatweauditinaveryrobustwayinanynumberofdifferentfacetsthroughbothexecutivebranchand thengiveittothecourt,andgiveittotheCongress. Sowe'regiventhat90dayperiodwiththeseparametersandrestrictionstoaccessit.Wedon'tgoback tothecourteachtime.

SCHIFF:

Anddoesthecourtscrutinizeafteryoupresentbacktothecourt,"thesearetheoccasionswherewe foundreasonablearticulablefacts,"dotheyscrutinizeyourbasisforconductingthosequeries?
COLE:

Yes,theydo.
SCHIFF:

GeneralAlexander,Iwantedtoaskyou.Iraisedthisinclosedsession,butI'dliketoraiseitpubliclyas well.Whataretheprospectsforchangingtheprogramsuchthatratherthanthegovernmentacquiring thevastamountsofmetadata,thetelecommunicationsretainthemetadata,andthenonlyonthose300 orsooccasionswhereitneedstobequeried,you'requeryingthetelecommunicationsprovidersfor whethertheyhavethosebusinessrecordsrelatedtoareasonablearticulablesuspicionofforeign terroristconnection?

ALEXANDER:

IthinkjointlytheFBIandNSAarelookingatthearchitecturalframeworkofhowweactuallydothis programandwhataretheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofdoingeachone.Eachcase,asyouknow fromourdiscussions,ifyouleaveitattheserviceproviders,youhaveaseparatesetofissuesinterms ofhowyouactuallygettheinformation,thenhowyouhavetogobackandgetthatinformation,and howyoufollowitonandthelegalauthorityforthemtocompelthemtokeeptheserecordsforacertain

38

periodoftime. Sowhatwe'redoingiswe'regoingtolookatthatandcomebacktothedirectorofnationalintelligence, theadministrationandthentoyouall,andgiveyourecommendationsonthatforboththeHouseandthe Senate.Idothinkthatthat'ssomethingthatwe'veagreedtolookatandthatwe'lldo.It'sjustgoingto takesometime.Wewanttodoitright. AndIthink,justtosetexpectations,thetheconcernisspeedincrisis.Howdowedothis?Andso that'swhatweneedtobringbacktoyou,andthenIthinkhavethisdiscussionhereandletpeopleknow whereweareonit. Anythingthatyouwantedtoadd?

SCHIFF:

IwouldIwouldstronglyencourageustovigorouslyinvestigatethatpotentialrestructuring.Even thoughtheremaybeattendantinefficiencieswithit,IthinkthattheAmericanpeoplemaybemuchmore comfortablewiththetelecommunicationscompaniesretainingthosebusinessrecords,thatmetadata, thanthegovernmentacquiringit,eventhoughthegovernmentdoesn'tqueryitexceptonveryrare occasions.

ALEXANDER:

Soitmaybesomethinglikethatthatwe'dbringbackandlookat.Sowearegoingtolookatthat.And wehavealreadycommittedtodoingthatandwewilldothat,andgothroughallthedetailsofthat.
SCHIFF:

Mr.Litt,IwantedtoaskyouabouttheFISAcourtopinions.Thisweek,I'mgoingtobeintroducingthe HousecompaniontothebipartisanMerkleybillthatwouldrequiredisclosureofcertainFISAcourt opinions,again,inaformthatdoesn'timpairournationalsecurity. Irecognizethedifficultythatyoudescribedearlierinmakingsurethoseopinionsaregeneratedinaway thatdoesn'tcompromisetheprograms.Youmentionedthatyou'redoingareview,andIknowone's beengoingonforsometime.Inlightofhowmuchoftheprogramshavenowbeendeclassified,how soondoyouthinkyoucangetbacktousaboutwhetheryou'regoingtobeabletodeclassifysomeof thoseFISAcourtopinions?

LITT:

I'mhesitanttoansweranyquestionthatbegins"howsoon,"partlybecausetherearealotofagencies withequitiesinthis,partlybecausethere'salotelsegoingoninthisarea.Mytimehasnotbeenquiteas freeuptoaddressthistopicasIwouldhavelikedoverthelastweekandahalf. IcantellyouthatthatI'veaskedmystafftoworkwiththeotheragenciesinvolvedandtrytopress thisalongasquicklyaspossible.We'retryingtoidentifythoseopinionswherewethinkthere'sthe greatestpublicinterestinhavingthemdeclassified,andstartwiththose.Andwe'dliketopushthe processthroughasquicklyaspossibleatthispoint.

SCHIFF:

AndIwouldjustencourageinthelastsecondthatbeyondthetwoprogramsatissuehere,tothedegree youcandeclassifyotherFISAcourtopinions,Ithinkit'sinthepublicinterest.
39

LITT:

Yes,Ithinkthat'spartofwhatwe'redoing.
SCHIFF:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
COLE:

CongressmanSchiff,IjustwantedtocorrectalittlebitoneofthethingsIsaid.TheFISCdoesnot revieweachandeveryreasonable,articulablesuspiciondetermination.Whatdoeshappenistheyare givenreportsevery30daysintheaggregate.Andifthereareanycomplianceissues,ifwefoundthatit wasn'tappliedproperly,that'sreportedseparatelytothecourt.

ROGERS:

Doyouhaveafollowup?
SCHIFF:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.IjustwanttomakesureIunderstoodwhatyoujustsaid.Apriorcourt approvalisnotnecessaryforaspecificquery.Butwhenyoureportbacktothecourtabouthowthe orderhasbeenimplemented,youdosetoutthosecaseswhereyoufoundreasonablearticulablefacts andmadeaquery.Doyousetoutthosewithspecificityordoyoujustsay"on15occasions,wemade aquery"?

COLE:

It'smorethelattertheaggregatenumberwherewe'vemadeaquery.Andifthere'sanyproblemsthat havebeendiscovered,thenwewithspecificityreporttothecourtthoseproblems.
SCHIFF:

Itmaybeworthconsideringprovidingthebasisofthereasonableandarticulablefactsandhavingthe courtreviewthatasaasafurthercheckandbalance.I'djustmakethatsuggestion.
ROGERS:

Mr.Cole,myunderstanding,though,isthateveryaccessisalreadypreapprovedthatthewayyouget intothesystemiscourtapproved.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:

That'scorrect. Thecourtsetsoutthestandardswhichhavetobeappliedtoallowustomakethequeryinthefirst place.ThentheapplicationtheimplementationofthatstandardisreviewedbyNSAinternallyat severallevelsbeforetheactualimplementationisdone.It'sreviewedbytheDepartmentofJustice.It's reviewedbytheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence.It'sreviewedbytheinspectorgeneralfor theNationalSecurityAgency.Sothere'snumerouslevelsofreviewoftheapplicationofthis.Andif thereareanyproblemswiththosereviews,thosearethenreportedtothecourt.

ROGERS:

Andandjusttobeclear,soiftheydon'tfollowthecourtapprovedprocess,thatwouldbea
40

variation,thatwouldhavetobereportedtothecourt?
COLE:

That'scorrect.
ROGERS:

OK.Butyouaremeetingthecourtapprovedprocesswitheveryquery?
COLE:

That'scorrect.
INGLIS:

Andsir,ifImightaddtothatthateveryoneofthosequeryisaudited,thoseareallreviewedbythe DepartmentofJustice.Thosearethereviewsthatwespokedaboutspokeaboutat30and90days. Andthere'saveryspecificfocusonthosethatwebelieveareattributabletoU.S.personsdespitethe factthatin(inaudible)FISAwedon'tknowtheidentitiesofthosepersons.Andsothecourtgetsallof thosereports.

SCHIFF:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. IIjustpointout,allthoseinternalchecksarevaluable,butthey'restillinternalchecks.Anditmaybe worthwhilehavingthecourt,ifnotprospectivelyatleastafterthefactreviewthosedeterminations. Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.

NUNES:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Mr.Cole,reallywhat'shappenedhereisthatthetotalityofmanyproblemswithintheexecutivebranch hasnowtarnishedthefinefolksattheNSAandtheCIA.AndIjustmadeashortlisthere,but,you know,rightafterBenghazitherewasthere'sliesafterBenghazi,fourdeadAmericans.Fastand Furious,theCongressstillismissingdocuments.WehavedeadAmericansanddeadMexicancitizens. YouatleasttappedintoorgotphonerecordsfromAPreporters,FoxNewsreporters,includingfrom theHouseGalleryrightherewithinthisbuilding. Lastweek,asyouknow,A.G.HolderhasbeenisbeingaccusedbytheJudiciaryCommitteeof possiblylyingtothecommittee. Andthentotopitalloff,youhave,youknow,anIRSofficialwhowithotherofficialsranlikeacovert mediaoperationonaFridaytohelp,youknow,trytoreleasedocumentstothinkthatthiswouldjustgo awayaboutthereleaseofpersonaldatafromU.S.citizensfromtheIRS. Sonowyouknow,Iunderstandwhenmyconstituentsaskme,"Well,iftheIRSisleakingpersonal data"GeneralAlexander,thisquestion'sforyou"howdoIknowforsurethattheNSAandthe and(inaudible)peoplethataretryingtoprotectthiscountryaren'tleakingdata?" SoMr.Mr.Rogersaskedthequestionabout,youknow,howdoweknowthatthatsomeone fromtheWhiteHousejustcan'tgoturnaswitchandbegintolistentotheirphoneconversations?
41

SoGeneral,Ithinkifyoucouldclarifythekindofthedifferenceinwhatthepeoplethataretryingto protectthiscountryaredoingandwhattheygothrough,therigorousstandards.Ithinkitwouldhelp,I think,fixthismessfortheAmericanpeople.

ALEXANDER:

Thankyou,Congressman. Ithinkthekeythekeyfactshere.Whenwedisseminatedata,everythingthatwedisseminateandall thequeriesthataremadeintothedatabaseare100percentauditable.Sotheyareauditedbynotonly theanalystswho'sactuallydoingthejobbuttheoverseersthatlookandsee,didhedothatrightorshe dothatright. Ineverycasethatwehaveseensofarwehavenotseenoneofouranalystswillfullydosomething wronglikewhatyouyoujustsaid.That'swheredisciplinaryactionwouldcomein. WhatIhavetooverwriteunderwriteiswhensomebodymakesanhonestmistake.Thesearegood people.Iftheytransposetwolettersintypingsomethingin,that'sanhonestmistake.Wegobackand say,nowhowcanwefixit?Thetechnicalcontrolsthatyoucanseethatwe'readdinginhelpfixthat. Butisitisourintenttodothisexactlyright. Inthat,oneofthethingsthatwehaveistremendoustrainingprogramsforourpeoplethattheygo through.HowtoprotectU.S.personsdata?HowtointerfacewiththebusinessrecordFISA?The rolesandresponsibilitiesunderFAA702.Everyone,includingmyself,atNSAhastogothroughthat trainingtoensurethatwedoitright. Andwetakethatveryseriously.Ibelievethebestintheworldat(ph)termsofprotectingourprivacy. AndIwouldjusttellyou,youknow,theotherthingthat'ssometimesconfusedhereisthat,"Well,then they'regettingeverybodyelseintheworld."Butourourapproachisforeignintelligenceyouknow, it'sthesamethinginEurope.We'renotinterestedininwell,one,wedon'thavethetime.And, two,oursistoprotectourcountryandourallies.Ithinkwedothatbetterthananyoneelse. Now,Chris,anythingifyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS:

No,Ithinkthat'sexactlyright.WhensomebodycomestoworkatNSA,justlikeelsewhereinthe government,theytakeanoathtotheConstitutionnottoNSA,nottosomeparticularmissionbuttothe ConstitutionandtheentiretyofthatConstitution.Coverstheissuesimportantlythatwe'rediscussing heretoday:nationalsecurityandtheprotectionofcivilliberties.There'snodistinctionforus.They'reall important.

NUNES:

SoIwanttoIwanttoswitchgearsalittlebithere,GeneralAlexanderandperhapsthisisagood questionforMr.Joyce.ButIjustfinditreallyoddthatrightbeforetheChinesepresidentcomestothis countrythatalloftheseleakshappenandthisguyhasfledtotoHongKong,thisSnowden.AndI'm reallyconcernedthatjusttheinformationthatyoupresenteduslastweek.Thisisprobablygonnabe thelargestleakinAmericanhistoryandthere'sstillprobablymoretocomeout.Canyoujustexplain totheAmericanpeopletheseriousnessofthisleakandthedamageyousaidearlierthatit'sdamaged

42

nationalsecurity.Canyougointoafewofthosespecifics?
JOYCE:

Veryno.Really,Icancommentverylittleotherthansayingit'sandongoingcriminalinvestigation.I cantellyou,aswe'veallseen,theseareegregiousleaksegregious.Ithasaffectedwearerevealing infrontofyoutodaymethodsandtechniques.Ihavetoldyou,theexamplesIgaveyou,howimportant theyhavebeen.ThefirstcoreAlQaidaplottoattacktheUnitedStatespost9/11weusedoneofthese programs.AnotherplottobombtheNewYorkStockExchange,weusedtheseprograms.Andnow herewearetalkingaboutthisinfrontoftheworld.SoIthinkthoseleaksaffectus.

NUNES:

General?
ALEXANDER:

Italsoitalsoaffectsourpartnershipwithourallies,becausethewayitcomesoutandwith industry.Imean,it'sdamagedallofthose.Industry'stryingtodotherightthing,andthey'recompelled bythecourtstodoit.Andweusethistoalsoprotectouralliesandourinterestsabroad. AndsoIthinkthewayit'scomeoutandthewayitlooksisthatwe'rewillfullydoingsomethingwrong wheninfactwe'reusingthecourts,Congressandtheadministrationtomakesurethateverythingwedo isexactlyright.AndasChrisnoted,wealltakeanoathtodothat,andwetakethatoathseriously.

NUNES:

Andinfact,justinclosinghere,Mr.Chairman,weknowfromtheMandiantreportthatcameoutthat othergovernmentsarebusydoingthisandexpandingtheircyberwarfaretechniques.AndIjustwantto saythat,youknow,itissovital,asthechairman'spointedoutmanytimes,forthefolksandthework thatyou'redoingatNSAandallofyourfolks,howimportantthatistonotonlytoday'ssecuritybut tomorrow'ssecurity. Sothankyouforyourservice,General. Iyieldback.

ROGERS:

IIwouldjustdisputethefactthatothergovernmentsdoitanyanyway,shapeorformcloseto havinganyoversightwhatsoeveroftheirintelligencegatheringprograms. Ms.Sewell?

SEWELL:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Ialsowanttothankallofourwitnessestodayforyourservicetothiscountryandforhelpingtomaintain ournationalsecurity. I'dliketotalkalittlebitaboutthesecuritypractices.You'vespentalotoftimereallyexplainingtothe Americanpeoplethevariouslevelsofcomplexityinwhichyouhavejudicialoversightandcongressional oversight.Howdidthishappen?Howdidarelativelylowleveladministratorservicesystems administratorIthinkyousaid,GeneralAlexanderhaveclassifiedinformation?Andisitanacceptable

43

risk? Igetthatyouhave1,000orsosystemadministrators.Itisextremelyfrighteningthatyouwouldgo throughsuchmeasurestodothebalancingactinternallytomakesurethatwe'rebalancingprotection andsecurityandandprivacy,andyetinternallyinyourowncontrols,therearesystemadministrators thatcangorogue.Isitanacceptablerisk?Howdidithappen?Andisthereoversighttothesesystem administrators?

ALEXANDER:

Well,thereisoversight.Whatwearenowlookingatiswherethatbrokedownandwhathappened. Andthat'sgonnabepartoftheinvestigationthatwe'reworkingwiththeFBIon. Iwouldjustcomebackto9/11.Oneofthekeythingswaswewentfromtheneedtoknowtotheneed toshare.Andinthiscase,whatthesystemadministratorhadaccesstoiswhatwe'llcallthepublicweb forumsthatNSAoperates.Andthesearethethingsthattalkabouthowwedoourbusiness,not necessarilywhat'sbeencollectedasaresultsofthatnordoesitnecessarilygivethemtheinsightsofthe trainingandtheotherissuesthattrainingandcertificationprocessandaccreditationthatourfolksgo throughtoactuallydothis.

ALEXANDER:

Sothoseareinseparateprogramsthatrequireothercertificatestogetinto.Thoseareallthingsthat we'relookingat.Youmayrecallthattheintelligencecommunitylookedatanewinformationtechnology environmentthatreducesthenumberofsystemadministrators. Ifwecouldjumptothatimmediately,Ithinkthatwouldgetusamuchmoresecureenvironmentand wouldreducethissetofproblems.It'ssomethingthattheDNIisleadingandthatwe'resupporting,as youknow,acrossthecommunity.Ithinkthatisabsolutelyvitaltogetto.Andtherearethereare mechanismsthatwecanusetherethatwillhelpsecurethis. Please.

SEWELL:

Sothetobeclear,Snowdendidnothavethecertificatesnecessarilynecessarytoleadthatpublic forum?
ALEXANDER:

Soeacheachsetofdatathatwewouldhaveand,inthiscase,let'ssaythebusinessrecords,FISA youhavetohavespecificcertificatesbecausethisisacordonedoff.Sothatwouldbeextremely difficultforhimyou'dhavetogetuptoNSA,getintothatroom. Othersrequirecertificatesforyoutobeworkinginthisareatohavethat.Ithewouldhavetogetone ofthosecertificatestoactuallyenterthatarea.Doesthatmakesense?Inotherwords,it'sakey.

SEWELL:

Well,IthinkthatIwouldencourageustofigureoutawaythatwecandeclassifymoreinformation.I thankyouforgivingustwoadditionalexamplesofofofterroristattacksthatwehavethwarted becauseoftheseprograms.ButIthinkthatprovidinguswithasmuchinformationasyoucanonFISA courts'opinionshowhowthatgoeswouldhelptheAmericanpublicdemystifywhatwe're

44

doinghere.Ithinkthattheexamplestheadditionalexamplesthatyougavetodayweregreat. ButIalsoamconcernedthatwehavecontractorsdoingIgetthatwecannotthattherewasa moveatsomepointtotonothaveasmanygovernmentemployees,andsowesortofoutsourcedit. Butgiventhesensitivityoftheinformationandtheaccess,evenforforrelativelylowlevelemployees, doyouseethatbeingaproblem?Andandhowdowegoabout...

ALEXANDER:

Sowedohavesignificantconcernsinthisarea.Anditissomethingthatweneedtolookat.The mistakesofonecontractorshouldnottarnishallthecontractorsbecausetheydogreatworkforour nation,aswell.AndIthinkwehavetobecarefulnottothroweveryoneunderthebusbecauseofone person. ButyouyouraisedtwogreatpointsthatIthinkwewewilllookat.One,howdoweprovidethe oversightandcompliance?AndItalkedtoourtechnologydirectoraboutthetwopersoncontrolfor systemadministratorstomakeanychange.Wearegoingtoimplementthat.AndIthink,intermsof whatwereleasetothepublic,Iamforreleasingasmuchaswecan.ButIwanttoweighthatwithour nationalsecurity,andIthinkthat'swhatyouexpect.Thatthat'swhattheAmericanpeople...

SEWELL:

Absolutely.
ALEXANDER:

...expectus.Sothat'swhereIneedtoreallyjointhatdebateonthissidetomakesurethatwhatwedo isexactlyright.Ithinkonthingslikehowweminimizedata,howwerunthisprogram,thethosekinds ofthings,Ithinkwecanwewe'retryingtobethat'swhyChriswentthroughthosegreatdetails. IthinkthosearethingsthattheAmericanpeopleshouldknow.Becausewhattheyfindoutisshoot, lookattheoversight,thecompliance,andthetrainingthatarepeoplearegoingthrough.Thisishuge. Thisisn'tsomerogueoperationthatagroupofguysupatNSAarerunning.Thisissomethingthathave oversightbythecommittees,thecourts,theadministrationina100percentauditableprocessona businessrecordFISA. Youknow,that'sextraordinaryoversight.AndIthinkwhentheAmericanpeoplelookatthat,theysay, "Wow,forlessthan300selectors,thatamountofoversight"andthat'swhatwejointlyagreedtodo. Ithinkthat'stremendous.
SEWELL:

Idotoo.IIIapplaudtheefforts.IjustIthinkthat,giventhenatureofthisleak,youknow,we don'twantoureffortstobefornaught,if,infact,whathappensisthatthetheleaksgettheAmerican peoplesoconcernedthattheywerollbackontheseprograms,andthereforeincreaseour vulnerabilityasanation.Ithinkthatallofusthat'snotinanyone'sbestinterest. Goingbacktosortofthedifferencebetweenprivatecontractorsandgovernmentemployees,istherea differenceinthelevelofsecurityclearancethat...

ALEXANDER:

Samelevelofsecurityclearanceandthesameprocessforsecuringthem.
45

SEWELL:

OK. Thankyou.Iyieldbacktherestofmytime.
ROGERS:

Thankyou. Mr.Westmoreland.
WESTMORELAND:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Mr.Cole,asMr.Nuneshadmentionedaboutsomeoftheotherthingsthathavecomeoutaboutleaks andsoforth,couldyoubecausemyconstituentsaskmethedifferenceandmaybewhattheattorney generaldidingoingtothecourttoontheRosencasesayingthathewasanunindicted coconspirator,becausethatwasactuallyaboutaleakalso.Whattypeofprocessorinternalreviewdid y'allgooverbeforeyouaskedforthosephonestobetapped?And,tomakeitperfectlyclear,thatwas notinaFISAcourt.Isthatcorrect?

COLE:

Numberone,thatwasnotaFISAcourt.IntheRosencase,therewerenophonesbeingtapped.Itwas justtoacquireacoupleofemails.Andthereisavery,veryrobustsystem.It'ssetoutinregulationsthat theDepartmentofJusticefollowsofthekindsofscrubbingandreviewthatmustbedonebeforeany subpoenalikethatcanbeissued. Youhavetomakesurethatyou'veexhaustedallotherreasonableavenuesofinvestigationthatthat's donebeforeyouevengettothedecisionaboutwhetherornotsuchaaprocessshouldbeused.You havetomakesurethattheinformationyou'relookingatisvery,verytailoredandonlynecessarytruly necessarytobeabletomovetheinvestigationforwardinasignificantway. Therehastherearerestrictionsonwhatcanbedonewiththeinformation.Anditgoesthroughavery longprocessofreviewfromtheU.S.attorney'sofficethroughtheUnitedStatesattorneyhimorherself, intothe,usually,thecriminaldivisionoftheJusticeDepartment,throughtheassistantattorneygeneralof thecriminaldivision,throughthedeputyattorneygeneral'sofficeandup,ultimately,totheattorney generalsigningit.Itgetsalotofreviewbeforethat'sdoneunderthecriteriathatwehaveinour guidelinesandourCFR.
WESTMORELAND:

SosotheDOJdidn'tbecause(inaudible)asecurityleak,theDOJdidn'tcontacttheFBIorthe NSA,ortherewasnocoordinationwiththat?ItwasstrictlyaDOJcriminalinvestigation?
COLE:

Well,theFBIdoescriminalinvestigationwith...
WESTMORELAND:

Iunderstand.
COLE: 46

...theDepartmentofJustice.Andtheywerecontactedinthatregard.ButitwasnotpartoftheFISA process.ItdidnotinvolvetheNSA.
WESTMORELAND:

AndIthinkthat'swhatweneedtobeclearof,is...
COLE:

Correct.
WESTMORELAND:

...thatitwasabsolutelynotpartoftheFISAprocess.Andthatisalotmoredetailedandalotmore scrutinizedasfarasgettinginformationthanwhatthiswas.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:

Well,they'rebothverydetailedandveryscrutinizedprocesses.They'retheyhavedifferentaspectsto them.Butthey'rebothveryunusually,frankly,detailedandscrutinized,bothofthoseprocesses.
WESTMORELAND:

Thankyou. And,General,goingbacktowhatMs.Sewellhadaskedaboutthedifferenceofclearancethatyou wouldhavewithacontractororagovernmentemployee,whenyouhave1,000differentcontractors Imean,Iknowthefrommyexperienceonhavinghadoneofmystaffgothroughasecurity clearance,it'sprettyit'sait'saprettydetailedoperation.AndIknowthatthisgentlemanhad previously,Ibelieve,heardthathehadworkedfortheCIA.Hadtherebeenanyfurtherclearancegiven tothisindividualwhenhebecameacontractorafterhelefttheemployeeoftheCIA?

ALEXANDER:

Noadditionalclearance.Hehadwhat'sneededtoworkatNSAoroneofourfacilities,thetopsecret specialintelligenceclearance.Andthatgoesthroughaseriesofprocessesandreviews.Thedirectorof nationalintelligenceislookingatthoseprocessestomakesurethatthoseareallcorrect.Andandhe statedhe'stakenthaton.Wesupportthatobjective. ButtoworkatNSA,whetheryou'reacontract,agovernmentcivilian,oramilitary,youhavetohave thatsamelevelofclearance.

WESTMORELAND:

Doesitbotheryouthatthisgeneralhadonlybeenthereforashortperiodoftime?Oristhereany oversightorrevieworwhateveroftheindividualsarethatcarryingoutthiswork?Isthereanytypeof probationtimeororanything?Because,youknow,itseemsthathewasthereaaveryshort periodoftime.

ALEXANDER:

Sohehadworkedinacoupleofpositions.HehadjustmovedintotheBoozAllenpositioninMarch. Buthehadworkedinainformationtechnologypositionforthe12monthsprecedingthatatNSA Hawaii.Sohe'dactuallybeenthere15months.Hemovedfromonecontracttoanother.

WESTMORELAND: 47

Sowouldhehavebeenfamiliarwiththeseprogramsathispreviousjob?
ALEXANDER:

Yes.AndIbelievethat'swheregoingoutonwhatwecall,thepublicclassifiedwebserversthathelp youunderstandpartsofNSA,thathegainedsomeoftheinformation,andandtooksomeofthat.I can'tgointomoredetail.

LITT:

Mr.Westmoreland,ifIjustmight...
WESTMORELAND:

Yes?
LITT:

...makeonepointthere?Whenyousay,wouldhehavebecomefamiliarwiththeseprograms?Ithink partoftheproblemthatwe'rehavingthesedaysisthathewasn'tnearlyasfamiliarwiththeseprograms ashe'sportrayedhimselftobe.Andthusthisiswhathappenswhensomebody,youknowseesatiny cornerofthingsandthinksthatitgivestheminsightandviabilityintotheprogram.

WESTMORELAND:

Thankyou.Iyieldback.
HIMES:

ThankyouMr.ChairmanandItoowouldliketothankthepanelforappearingheretodayandforyour servicetothecountry.IthinkI'vetoldeachofyouthatinmylimitedtimeonthiscommittee,I'vebeen heartenedbyyourcompetence,andbythecompetenceoftheagenciesinwhichyouwork.I'llalsoadd thatI'veseennothinginthelastweek,weekandahalftosuggestthatanyoftheseprogramsthatare beingdiscussed,areoperatinginanywayoutsidethelaw.AndIwouldaddthatthecontrolsthat appeartobeinplaceontheseprogramsseemseemsolid.I'llalsosaythatIdon'tknowthatthere's anywaytodooversightwithoutapostureofskepticismonthepartoftheoverseers. AndsoIhopeyou'lltakemyobservationsandquestionsinthatspirit.AndI'dliketolimitmyquestions andobservationspurelytoSection215andtheVerizondisclosures,whichquitefrankly,troubleme. Theytroublemebecauseofthebreadthandthescopeoftheinformationcollection.Theytroubleme becauseIthinkthisishistoricallyunprecedentedintheextentofthedatathatisbeingcollectedon potentiallyallAmericancitizens.Andthecontrolswhichyou'velaidoutforus,notwithstanding,Ithink new(sic)forthiscountry.Weknowthatwhenacapabilityexists,there'sapotentialforabuse.Mr. NunesranthroughalotofcurrentissuesgoingbacktoJ.EdgarHooverbuggingthehotelroomsof MartinLutherKing,toNixon,toconcernsaroundtheIRS. Ifacapabilityexists,fromtimetotimeitwillbeabused.AndoneofthethingsthatI'mconcernedabout isthisindividualwhoIwho'sresumewouldIthinkmakehimmakeitunlikelythathewouldgetan unpaidinternshipinmyoffice,hehadaccesstosomeofthemostsensitiveinformationthatwehave. Andperhapshecouldhave,orsomeonelikehim,couldhavechosenadifferentpath.Couldhave accessedphonenumbersandthoughwespentalotoftimeonthefactthatyoudon'tgetnames,we allknowthatwithaphonenumberandGoogle,youcangetanameprettyquickly.
48

HecouldhavechosentomakeapointaboutCongressmanHimesmaking2:00amphonecallsoutofa barinWashington.OrtheCEOofGooglemakingphonecalls.Oranythingreally.Informationthatwe holdtobeprivate.SoIguessI'vegottwoquestions.IguessIdirectthisoneon215toMr.Littand thenMr.Cole.Wheredowedrawtheline?Soinotherwords,solongastheinformationisnot informationtowhichIhaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyunderMarylandv.Smithandunder Section215powers,wheredowedrawtheline? Couldyou,forexamplehavevideodata?AsIwalkaroundWashingtonmyIsupposethatyoucould probablyreconstructmydaywithvideothatiscapturedonthirdpartycameras.Couldyoukeepthatin awaythatisanalogoustowhatyou'redoingwithphonenumbers?Andagainwithallofthecareful guardsandwhatnot,couldyounotreconstructmydaybecauseIdon'thaveareasonableexpectation ofprivacyaroundIknowthat'sahypothetical,butI'mtryingtoidentifywherethelineis?
COLE:

Well,Ithinkthetherealissuehereishowit'saccessed?Whatitcanbeusedfor?Howyoucan actually...
HIMES:

III'mstipulatingthatthatsystem,eventhoughweknowit'snotperfect,I'mstipulatingthatthat systemisperfect.AndI'masking,whereisthelimitastowhatyoucankeepinthetank?
COLE:

IIthinksomeofitisamatterfortheUnitedStatesCongresstodecideaspolicymatters,andthe legislatingthatyoudosurroundingtheseacts,astowhereyou'regoingtodrawthoselines.Certainlythe courtshavelookedatthisanddeterminedthatunderthestatuteswehave,thereisarelevance requirement,andthey'renotjustsayingoutofwholeclothyou'reallowedtogatherthesethings.You havetolookatitalltogether.Andthey'reonlysayingthatyoucangatherthisvolumeunderthese circumstances,undertheserestrictions,withthesecontrols.Withoutthosecircumstancesandcontrols andrestrictions,thecourtmaywellnothaveapprovedtheordersunder215toallowthatcollectionto takeplace. Soyoucan'tseparatethatout,onefromtheotherandsay,justtheacquisition,whatcanwedo? Becausetheacquisitioncomestogetherwiththerestrictionsonaccess.
HIMES:

Andifthoserestrictionsandcontrolsareadequate,there'stheoreticallynorestrictiononyourabilityto storeinformationonanythingforwhichIdonothavethereasonableexpectationforprivacy?
COLE:

I'llreferbacktoNSA... (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:

Letme... (CROSSTALK)
49

HIMES:

...Idohaveonemorequestion. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:

Yeah,thisistheconversationIdohaveonemoremuchmore...
ALEXANDER:

CanI...
HIMES:

...specificquestion.
ALEXANDER:

...canIhit...
HIMES:

Yeah.
ALEXANDER:

...ifIcould.I'llaskformoretimeifIcould,becauseIdothinkwhatyou'veaskedisveryimportant.So yourquestionis,couldsomebodygetoutandgetyourphonenumberandseethatyouwereatabar lastnight?Theanswerisno.Becausefirstinoursystem,somebodywouldhavehadtoapprove,and there'sonly22peoplethatcanapprove,areasonablearticulablesuspiciononaphonenumber.Sofirst, thathastogetinput.Onlythosephonenumbersthatareapprovedcouldthenbequeried.Andsoyou havetohaveoneofthose22breakalaw.Thenyouhavetohavesomebodygoinandbreakalaw. Andthesystemis100percentauditable,soitwillbecaught. Thereisnowaytochangethat.Andsoonthatsystem,whoeverdidthatwouldhavebrokenthelaw. Thatwouldbewillful.Andthenthatpersonwouldbefoundbythecourttobeinviolationofacourt order,andthat'smuchmoreserious.Wehaveneverhadthathappen.
HIMES:

Yeah.No,IIthankyou.Iappreciatethat,andIIsortofIthinkit'sreallyimportanttoexplore thesethesebrightlinesaboutwhatyoucankeepandwhatyoucan't.Again,Idon'tseeanything aboutthecontrolsystemsthataretroubling,butIdohaveonelastquickquestionifthechairmanwill indulgemein.General,thisisIguessforyouandit'sit'ssomethingthatIaskedyouinclosedsession. Asweweighthis,becauseobviouslywe'reweighingsecurityagainstprivacyandwhatnot,asweweigh this,Ithinkit'sreallyimportantthatweunderstandexactlythenationalsecuritybenefit.AndIlimit myselfto215here. 50episodes.Idon'tthinkit'sadequatetosaythat702and215authoritiescontributedtoourpreventing 50episodes.Ithinkit'sreallyessentialthatyougradetheimportanceofthatcontribution.ThequestionI askedyou,andandyoucananswernow,orI'dreallyliketogetintothis.Howmanyofthose50 episodeswouldhaveoccurred,butforyourabilitytousetheSection215authoritiesasdisclosedinthe Verizonsituation?Howessential,notjustcontributingto,buthowessentialaretheseauthoritiesto
50

stoppingwhichterroristattacks?
ALEXANDER:

OK.Forclarityover50.Andin90percentofthosecasesFAA702contributed,andin50percentI believetheywerecritical.Wewillsendthattothecommittee.
HIMES:

Thisis702you'retalkingabout?
ALEXANDER:

Thisis702.
HIMES:

OK.
ALEXANDER:

Now,shiftingtothebusinessrecordFISA,andI'lldoaMuttandJeffhere,I'mnotsurewhichoneI am.There'sjustover10thathadadomestic.Andthevastmajority...
HIMES:

10ofthe50weresection...
ALEXANDER:

Justover10. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:

Andhowmanywouldyousaywerecritical.
ALEXANDER:

No.No,you're...
HIMES:

I'msorry.
ALEXANDER:

...letmefinish.
HIMES:

DidIgetitwrong?
ALEXANDER:

Yeah,youdo.Overjustslightlyover10,andIdon'twanttopinthatnumberuntilthecommunity verifiesit,sojustalittleover10wereadomestichadadomesticnexus.Andsobusinessrecords FISAcouldonlyapplytothose?So,seetheonesinothercountries,itcouldn'tapplytobecausethe dataisnotthereanditdoesn'tcomeintotheU.S.Soifwenowlookatthat,thevastmajorityofthose hadacontributionbybusinessrecordFISA.So,Ithinkwehavetobecarefulthatyoudon'ttrytotake thewholeworldandsay,ohwellyouonlydidthosethatwereintheUnitedStatesandonly,youknow

51

somelargemajorityofthat. Idothinkthis,goingbackto9/11,wedidn'thavetheabilitytoconnectthedots.Thisaddsonemore capabilitytohelpusdothat.Andfrommyperspective,whatwe'redoingherewiththecivillibertiesand privacyoversight,andbringingtogether,doeshelpconnectthosedots.Goahead,Sean?

HIMES:

IfIcouldjustII'moutoftime,butIthinkthispointisreallyimportant.Ifmyconstituentsare representativeofthebroaderAmericanpublic,they'remoreconcernedfranklywiththeSection215 gatheringofAmericandatathantheyarewiththeforeigndata.AndsoIreallyhopeyou'llelucidatefor usspecificallycasebycasehowmanystoppedterroristattackswerethoseprograms,215,essentialto?

JOYCE:

IwouldjustaddtoGeneralAlexander'scomments. AndIandIthinkyouaskedanalmostimpossiblequestiontosay,howimportanteachdotwas. WhatIcantellyouis,post9/11Idon'trecognizetheFBIIcameinto26yearsago.Ourmissionisto stopterrorism,topreventit.Notafterthefact,topreventitbeforeithappensintheUnitedStates.And Icantellyoueverytoolisessentialandvital.AndthetoolsasIoutlinedtoyouandtheirusestoday havebeenvaluabletostoppingsomeofthoseplots.Youask,"Howcanyouputthevalueonan Americanlife?"AndIcantellyou,it'spriceless.

HIMES:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:

(OFFMIKE)
BACHMANN:

Thankyou,Mr.Chair,forholdingthisimportanthearingtoday. Ijusthaveaseriesofshortquestions.Myfirstoneis,youhadmentionedearlierinyourtestimonythat datamustbedestroyedwithinfiveyearsofacquisition.Ibelievethat'sinsection215phonerecords.Is thatthat'strue,withinfiveyears?

INGLIS:

Thatistrue.It'sdestroyedwhenitreachesfiveyearsofage.
BACHMANN:

Andhowlongdothephonecompaniesontheirownmaintaindata?
INGLIS:

Thatvaries.Theydon'tholdthatdataforthebenefitofthegovernment.Theyholdthatfortheirown businessinternalprocesses.Idon'tknowthespecifics.Iknowthatitisvariable.Ithinkthatitranges fromsixto18monthsandthedatathattheyholdis,again,usefulfortheirpurposes,notnecessarilythe government's.

BACHMANN: 52

Sothenmyquestionis,didtheFISAordersgivetheUnitedStatescompaniesachoiceinwhetherto participateintheNSAbusinessrecordsorinthePRISMprograms?Werethesewasthisvoluntarily voluntarycomplianceonthepartofthesecompanies?

INGLIS:

No,thesearecourtordersthatrequiretheircompliancewiththetermsofthecourtorder.
BACHMANN:

Soletmejustfortherecordstate,isNSAspyingtodayorhaveyouspiedonAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:

WewedonottargetU.S.personsanywhereintheworldwithoutaspecificcourtwarrant.
BACHMANN:

AnddoestheNSAlistentothephonecallsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:

WedonottargetorlistentothetelephonecallsofU.S.personsunderthattargetingwithoutaspecific courtwarrant.
BACHMANN:

DoestheNSAreadtheemailsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:

Sameanswer,ma'am.
BACHMANN:

DoestheNSAreadthetextmessagesofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:

Again,wedonottargetthecontentofU.S.personcommunicationswithoutaspecificwarrant anywhereontheearth.
BACHMANN:

HastheNSAevertrackedanypoliticalenemiesoftheadministration,whetherit'saRepublican administrationorDemocratadministration?Haveeitheroftheadministrationsyousaidyou're100 percentauditable,soyouwouldknowtheanswertothisquestionhaveyouevertrackedthepolitical enemiesofanadministration?

INGLIS:

InmytimeatNSA,no,ma'am.
BACHMANN:

Doesthegovernmentkeepthevideodata,likeMr.Himeshadjustquestioned?Doesthegovernment haveadatabasewithvideodatainit,trackingmovementsoftheAmericanpeople?
INGLIS: 53

No,ma'am. (CROSSTALK)
BACHMANN:

I'msorry.That'snotthemicrophoneisn'ton.
INGLIS:

NSAdoesnotholdsuchdata.
ALEXANDER:

Yeah,andwedon'tknowofanydataanybodythatdoes.SoIthinkthoseareheld,asyouseefrom Boston,byindividualshopownersand(inaudible).
BACHMANN:

Butbutdoesthefederalgovernmenthaveadatabasewithvideodatainittrackingthewhereabouts oftheAmericanpeople?
JOYCE:

TheFBIdoesnothavesuchadatabase,noramIawareofone.
BACHMANN:

DowedoestheAmericangovernmenthaveadatabasethathastheGPSlocationwhereaboutsof Americans,whetherit'sbyourcellphonesorbyanyothertrackingdevice?Isthereaknowndatabase?
INGLIS:

NSAdoesnotholdsuchadatabase.
BACHMANN:

DoestheNSAhaveadatabasethatyoumaintainthatholdsthecontentofAmericans'phonecalls?Do youhaverecordingsofallofourcalls?Soifwe'remakingphonecalls,isthereanationaldatabasethat hasthecontentofourcalls?

ALEXANDER:

We'renotallowedtodothat,nordowedothat,unlesswehaveacourtordertodothat.Anditwould beonlyinspecificcasesandalmostalwaysthatwouldbeanFBIlead,notours.
BACHMANN:

SodowemaintainadatabaseofalloftheemailsthathaveeverbeensentbytheAmericanpeople?
ALEXANDER:

No.No,wedonot.
BACHMANN:

Doweisthereadatabasefromourgovernmentthatmaintainsadatabaseofthetextmessagesofall Americans?
ALEXANDER: 54

NononethatIknowof,andnoneatNSA.
BACHMANN:

AndsoIthinkwhatyouhavetoldthiscommitteeisthattheproblemisnotwiththeNSA,thatistrying tokeeptheAmericanpeoplesafe.You'vetoldusthatyouhave100percentauditablesystemthathas oversightbothfromthecourtandfromCongress. Itseemstomethattheproblemhereisthatofanindividualwhoworkedwithinthesystem,whobroke laws,andwhochosetodeclassifyhighlysensitiveclassifiedinformation.Itseemstomethat'swhereour focusshouldbe,onhowtherecouldbeabetrayaloftrustandhowatraitorcoulddosomethinglikethis totheAmericanpeople.Itseemstomethat'swhereourfocusmustbeandhowwecanprevent somethinglikethatfromeverhappeningagain. Letmeaskyouropinion:HowdamagingisthistothenationalsecurityoftheAmericanpeoplethatthis trustwasviolated?
ALEXANDER:

Ithinkitwasirreversibleandsignificantdamagetothisnation.
BACHMAN:

HasthishelpedAmerica'senemies?
ALEXANDER:

Ibelieveithas.AndIbelieveitwillhurtusandourallies.
BACHMANN:

Iyieldback,Mr.Chair.
ROONEY:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Iwanttothankthepanel. Youknow,oneofthenegativesaboutbeingsolowonthetotempoleuphereisbasicallyallthe questionsthatIwantedtoaddresshavebeenasked. AndIthinkI'mreallyproudofthiscommitteebecauseonbothsidesoftheaisle,alotofthequestions wereverypoignant.AndIhopethattheAmericanpeopleandthosethatareintheroomhavelearneda lotaboutwhathappenedhereandlearnedalotaboutthepeopleonthepanel. Icansayspecifically,GeneralAlexander,mytimeontheIntelligenceCommittee,Ihavemorerespect foryou.AndI'mgladthatyou'retheoneuptheretestifyingsotheAmericanpeoplecanseedespite whatthey'rewhat'sbeingportrayedandthesuspicionsthatareoutthere,thatthereisnobodybetter toarticulatewhathappenedandwhatwe'retryingtodothanyourself. SoIwanttothankyouforthat. WeweI'llaskacouplebasicquestionsthatIthinkthatmighthelpclearsomethingsup. Mr.Cole,youtalkedabouthowthetheFourthAmendmentisn'tapplicableunderthebusiness recordsexceptionandthePatriotActSection215,applicablecaselaw,Marylandv.Smith,etcetera.
55

Andthenweheardabouthowtotobeabletolookatthedataunder215,therehastobevery specificsuspicionthatispresentedtoacourt,andthatcourtisnotarubberstampinallowingusto basicallylookatmetadatawhichisstrictlyphonerecords. Oneof,Ithink,problemsthatpeoplehaveoutthereisthatitwassuchalargenumberofphone numbers.Andwhenyoutestify,wheneverybodytestifies,thatit'sveryspecificandonlyalimited numberofpeopleareabletotobasicallyarticulatewhoweshouldbelookingatandthenyouhear thisnumber,millions,fromVerizon,canyoucanyouhelpclearthatup?

COLE:

Certainly.Firstofallweaswesaid,wedon'tgivethereasonablesuspiciontothecourtaheadof time.Theysetoutthestandardsforustouse. Buttheanalogy,andI'vehearditusedseveraltimesis,ifyou'relookingforaneedleinthehaystack, youhavetogetthehaystackfirst.Andthat'swhywehavetheabilityunderthecourtordertoacquire andthekeywordhereisacquireallofthatdata. Wedon'tgettouseallofthatdatanecessarily.Thatisthenextstep,whichisyouhavetobeableto determinethatthereisreasonable,articulablesuspiciontoactuallyusethatdata. Soifwewanttofindthatthereisaphonenumberthatwebelieveisconnectedwithterrorist organizationsandterroristactivity,weneedtohavetherestofthehaystack,alltheothernumbers,to findoutwhichonesitwasincontactwith. And,asyouheardMr.Inglissay,it'saverylimitednumberoftimesthatwemakethosequeries becausewedohavestandardsthathavetobemetbeforewecanevenmakeuseofthatdata.Sowhile itsitsthere,itisusedsparingly.
ROONEY:

DidyouoranybodythatyouknowattheNSAbreakthelawintryingtoobtainthisinformation?
COLE:

IamawareofnobodywhohasbrokenthelawattheNSAinobtainingtheinformationinthelawful sense.There'sotherissuesthatwehavewiththeleaksthathavegoneonhere.
ROONEY:

AndmaybethisquestionisforGeneralAlexander:Basedoneverythingthatwe'veheardtoday,doyou seeanyproblemswitheither702or215thatyouthinkshouldbechangedbythisbody?
ALEXANDER:

Notrightnow.Butthisissomethingthatwehaveagreedthatwewouldlookat,especiallythestructure ofhowwedoit. IthinkCongressmanSchiffbroughtupsomekeypoints,andwearelookingatallofthose.Andwhat wehavetobringbacktoyouistheagility,howwedoitintheoversight,isthereotherwaysthatwecan dothis. Butattheendoftheday,weneedthesetoolsandwejustgottofigureouttherightwaytodoitorthe nextstepfrommyperspective,havingthecourt,thisbodyofCongressandtheadministrationdo

56

oversight. IthinkiftheAmericanpeopleweretostepthroughit,theywouldagreethatwhatwe'redoingisexactly therightway.

ALEXANDER:

Sothosearethestepsthatwewillabsolutelythey'llgobackandandlookattheentirearchitecture andthat'sacommitmentthatFBIandNSAhasmadetotheadministrationandtothiscommittee.
ROONEY:

Finalquestion,Mr.Joyce,what'snextforMr.Snowdenwecanexpect?
JOYCE:

Justice.
ROONEY:

Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.Thankyou. (CROSSTALK)
POMPEO:

Great.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Thankyouallforbeingheretoday.Youknow,thishasbeenthishasbeenagreathearing.Ithinkthe Americanpeoplewillhavegottenachancetohearfromfolkswhoareactuallyexecutingthisprogramin animportantway,andthey'llhaveachoicewhethertobelieveMr.InglisandGeneralAlexanderora felonwhofledtocommunistChina. Forme,there'saneasyanswertothat. Therearethosewhotalkaboutthewaronterrorwindingdown,theysaywe'retowardtheendofthis, theseprogramswerecreatedpost9/11tocountertheterroristthreat,butforthesoldiersfighting overseasandouralliesandforusintheStates. GeneralAlexander,Mr.Joyce,doyouthinktheseprogramsarejustasmuchneededtodayasthey wereintheimmediateaftermathof9/11?
ALEXANDER:

Ido.
JOYCE:

Ido,too.AndIwouldjustadd,Ithinktheenvironmenthasbecomemorechallenging.AndIthinkthe moretoolsyouhavetobeabletofightterrorism,themorewe'regonnabeabletoprotecttheAmerican people.

POMPEO:

Thankyou. We'vetalkedalotaboutthestatutorybasisforSection215andSection702.We'vetalkedalotonall theprocessthatgoeswiththem.AndIwanttospendjustaminutetalkingabouttheconstitutional

57

boundariesandwheretheyare. We'vegotFISAcourtjudges,Article3.Mr.Litt,thesearejustplainoldArticle3judges,inthesense oflifetimetenure,nominatedbyapresident,confirmedbytheUnitedStatesSenate.Theyhavethe samepower,restrictionsandauthorityasallArticle3judgesdo.Isthatcorrect?

LITT:

Yes,that'scorrect.
POMPEO:

WehaveArticle2beforeusheretodayandwe'vegotArticle1oversighttakingplacethismorning. IwanttotalkaboutArticle1'sinvolvement.Therehavebeensomememberswhotalkedaboutthefact thattheydidn'tknowabouttheseprograms.GeneralAlexanderormaybeMr.Inglis,canyoutalkabout thebriefingsthatyou'veprovidedformembersofCongress,bothrecentlyandasthissetoflawswas developedsetoflawsweredeveloped?

INGLIS:

So702wasrecentlyreauthorizedattheendof2012.Intherunuptothat,NSAinthecompanionship withtheDepartmentofJustice,FBI,theDNI,madeaseriesofpresentationsacrosstheHillsome numberoftimesandtalkedinveryspecificdetailsattheclassifiedlevelaboutthesetupofthose programs,thecontrolsonthoseprogramsandthesuccessofthoseprograms. ThereauthorizationofSection215ofthePatriotActcameearlierthanthat,buttherewasasimilarset ofbriefingsalongthoselines. Atthesametime,wewelcomeandcontinuetowelcomeanyandallCongresspersonsorsenatorsto cometoNSAorwecancometoyouandattheclassifiedlevelbriefanyandalldetails,That'sa standingoffer.Andsomenumberhave,infacttakenusuponthatoffer.

POMPEO:

Doyouhavesomethingtoadd,General?
ALEXANDER:

That'sexactlyright.Infact,anyplace,anytimewecanhelp,wewilldoit.
POMPEO:

Good.Iappreciatethat.I'vebeenonthecommitteeonlyashorttime.Ilearnedabouttheseprograms actuallybeforeIcameonthecommittee,soIknowthatmembersoutsideofthiscommitteealsohad accesstotheinformation.AndIthinkthat'sincrediblyimportant. Asascommitteeoversightmembers,that'sonething,butIthinkit'simportantthatallthemembersof Congressunderstandthescopeoftheseprograms.AndIappreciatethefactthatyou'vecontinuedto offerthatassistanceforallofus. Acoupleofjustcleanupdetails,goinglast.IwanttomakesureIhavethisright. GeneralAlexander,fromthedataunderSection215that'scollected,canyoucanyoufigureoutthe locationofthepersonwhomadeaparticularphonecall?

58

ALEXANDER:

Notbeyondtheareacode.
POMPEO:

Doyouhaveanyinformationaboutthesignalstrengthortowerdirection?I'veseenarticlesthattalk aboutyouhavingthisinformation.Iwantto... (CROSSTALK)

ALEXANDER:

No,wedon't.
POMPEO:

...we'vegotthatright.
ALEXANDER:

Wedon'thavethatinthedatabase.
POMPEO:

Andthen,lastly,Mr.Litt,youmadeareferencetoSection702.Youtalkedaboutitbeingarestriction onArticle230,notanexpansion.Thatis,Article2,thepresidentsofbothpartiesbelievedtheyhadthe thepowersthatarebeingexercisedunderSection702longbeforethatstatutoryauthoritywas granted. SoisitthecasethatyouviewSection702asacontrolandarestrictiononArticle2?

LITT:

Yes.
POMPEO:

Great. Mr.Chairman,Iyieldback. (OFFMIKE)

KING:

Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.I'llmakethisbrief. Iwanttofirstofallthankallwitnessesfortheirtestimony,fortheirservice,andforallyou'vedoneto strengthenandmaintainthisprogram. Myquestion,GeneralAlexander,isistoyouandalsoperhapstoMr.Joyce, Severaltimesinyourtestimonyyoureferenced9/11andhowandIrecallafterSeptember11ththere wasawasaloudchallengetotheintelligencecommunitytodoabetterjobofconnectingthedots,be moreaggressive,beyouknow,bemoreforwardthinking,trytoanticipatewhat'sgoingtohappen, thinkoutsidethebox,allthoseclichesweheardatthetime. AndasIseeit,thisisaverylegitimateandlegalresponsetothatrequest. Iwouldaskyou,GeneralAlexander,oryou,Mr.Joyce,Ibelievereferencedthecase,afterSeptember
59

11thwheretherewasaphoneinterceptionfromYemenwhichenabledyoutofoiltheNewYorkStock Exchangeplot, It'salsomyunderstandingthatpriorto9/11,therewasphonemessagesfromYemenwhichyoudidnot havethecapacitytofollowthroughonwhichperhapscouldhavepreventedthe9/11attack. CouldeitherGeneralAlexanderorMr.Joyceorbothofyouexplainhowtheattackcouldhavebeen prevented?Orifyoubelieveitcouldhavebeenprevented?

JOYCE:

Idon'tknow,Congressman,iftheattackcouldhavebeenprevented.WhatIcantellyouisthatisatool thatwasnotavailabletousatthetimeof9/11.Sowhentherewasactuallyacallmadefromaknown terroristinYementoKhalidMihdharinSanDiego,wedidnothavethattoolorcapabilitytotrackthat call. Now,thingsmayhavebeendifferent,andwewillneverknowthat,unfortunately. Sothatisthetoolthatwe'retalkingabouttodaythatwedidnothaveatthetimeof9/11. Movingforward,asyoumentionedaboutthethestockexchange,herewehaveasimilarthingexcept thiswasunder,again,the702program,whereNSAtippedtousthataknownextremistinYemenwas talkingorconversingwithanindividualinsidetheUnitedStates,welateridentifiedasKhalidOuazzani. AndthenwewereabletogouponourlegalauthoritieshereintheUnitedStatesonOuazzani,whowas inKansasCityandwereabletoidentifytwoadditionalcoconspirators. Wefoundthroughelectronicsurveillancetheywereactuallyintheinitialstagesofplottingtobombthe NewYorkStockExchange. So,astoreallysummarize,asImentionedbefore,allofthesetoolsareimportant. AndasCongressmanSchiffmentioned,weshouldhavethisdialogue.Weshouldallbelookingfor ways,asyousaid,thinkingoutsidetheboxofhowtodoourbusiness. ButIsitherebeforeyoutodayhumblyandsaythatthesetoolshavehelpedus.
KING:

General?
ALEXANDER:

IfIcould,IthinkonMihdharcase,MihdharwastheterroristtheA.Q.terroristfromthe9/11plotin CaliforniathatwasactuallyonAmericanAirlinesFlight77thatcrashedintothePentagonwhat whatwedon'tknowgoingbackintimeisthephonecallbetweenYemenandthere,ifwewouldhave hadthereasonable,articulablesuspicionstandard,sowe'dhavetolookatthat. Butassumingthatwedid,ifwehadthedatabasethatwehavenowwiththebusinessrecordsFISAand wesearchedonthatYemennumberandsawitwastalkingtosomeonethisCalifornia,wecouldhave thentippedthattotheFBI. Anotherstep,andthisanassumption,butletmeplaythisoutbecausewewillneverbeabletogoallthe waybackandredoallthefiguresfrom9/11,butthisiswhysomeoftheseprogramswereputinwasto

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helpthat. IdeallygoingfromMihdhar,wewouldhavebeenabletofindtheotherteams,theotherthreeteamsin theUnitedStatesand/oroneinGermanyorsomeotherplace. SotheabilitytousethemetadatafromthebusinessrecordFISAwouldhaveallowedus,webelieve,to seesome. Now,soit'shypothetical.Therearealotofconditionsthatwecanputthatwecouldputonthere. You'dhavetohavethisright.You'dhavetohavetheRASright. Butwedidn'thavethatability.Wecouldn'tconnectthedotsbecausewedidn'thavethedots. Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vegothereisthatoneadditionalcapability,onemoretooltohelpuswork togetherasateamtostopfutureattacks.AndasasSeanhaslaidout,youknow,whenyoulookat this,youknow,theNewYorkCitytwoandothers,Ithinkfrommyperspective,youknow,those wouldhavebeensignificanteventsforournation.Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vejointlydonewith Congressishelpedsetthisprogramupcorrectly.
KING:

I'lljustclose,General,bysayinginyouropeningstatementyousaidthatyou'dratherbetestifyinghere todayonthisissueratherthanexplainingwhyanother9/11happened. SoIwanttothankyouforyourserviceinpreventinganother9/11andthere'stheZazicase.AndI knowsomeyou'reveryclosewithyourknowledgeofthat.AndIwanttothankallofyouforthe effortthatwasdonetopreventthatattack. Mr.Chairman,Iyieldback.

ROGERS:

Justacoupleofclarifyingthingsheretotowrapitup. Mr.Joyce,you'vebeenintheFBIfor26years.You'veconductedcriminalinvestigationsaswell. Sometimesyougetasimpletipthatleadstoabroaderinvestigation.Isthatcorrect?

JOYCE:

Thatiscorrect,Chairman.
ROGERS:

Andso,withoutthatinitialtip,youmightnothavefoundtheotherveryweightyevidencethathappened subsequenttothattip.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:

Absolutely.
ROGERS:

So,inthecaseofofMalalin(ph)in2007,theveryfactthatunderthebusiness215records,there wasasimpletipthatwas,wehavesomeonethatisknownwithtiestoAlQaida'seastAfricannetwork callingaphonenumberinSanDiego.That'sreallyallyougot,wasaphonenumberinSanDiego.Isthat correct?

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JOYCE:

Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:

AndandaccordingtointheunclassifiedreportthattipultimatelyledtotheFBI'sopeningofafull investigationthatresultedintheFebruary2013conviction.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:

Yes,itis,Chairman.
ROGERS:

Sowithoutthatfirsttip,youwouldhavehadyouyouweren'tuponhiselectronics communications.Youdidn'treallyyouwerenothewasnotasubjectofanyinvestigationpriorto thattipfromtheNationalSecurityAgency.

JOYCE:

No,actually,hewasthesubjecttoapriorinvestigation...
ROGERS:

Thatwasclosed.
JOYCE:

...severalyearsearlierthatwasclosed...
ROGERS:

Right.
JOYCE:

...becausewecouldnotfindanyconnectiontoterrorism.
ROGERS:

Right.
JOYCE:

Andthen,ifwedidnothavethetipfromNSA,wewouldnothavebeenabletoreopen...
ROGERS:

Reopenthecase.Butatthetime,youweren'tinvestigatinghim?
JOYCE:

Absolutelynot.Itwasbasedon... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:

Right,andwhentheywhentheydippedthatnumberintothetothebusinessrecords,thepreserved businessrecordsfromthecourtordertheydippedaphonenumberin,andaphonenumbercameout inSanDiego.Didyouknowwhothatpersonwaswhentheygaveyouthatphonenumber?

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JOYCE:

No,wedidnot.Sowehadtoservelegalprocesstoidentifythatsubscriberandthencorroborateit. AndthenwelaterwentuponelectronicsurveillancewithanorderthroughtheFISC.
ROGERS:

Andandwhenyouwentupontheelectronicsurveillance,youusedacourtorder,awarrant...
JOYCE:

Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:

...asubpoena?Whatdidyouuse?
JOYCE:

WeusedaFISAcourtorder.
ROGERS:

Allright.Soyouhadtogoback.Youhadtoproveastandardofprobablecausetogouponthis individual'sphonenumber.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:

That'sright.Andasbeenmentioned,hopefullyseveraltimestoday,anyoneinsidetheUnitedStates,a U.S.person,whetherthey'reinsideoroutside,weneedaspecificcourtorderregardingthatperson.
ROGERS:

Allright. AndMr.Cole,Ijustjustforpurposesofexplanation,ifyouweregoingtohaveaanFBIagent cametoyouforanordertopreservebusinessrecords,dotheyneedacourtorder?Dotheyneeda warrantforthatinacriminalinvestigation?

COLE:

No,theydonot.Youcanjustgetagrandjury'ssubpoena,and,separatefrompreservingit,youcan acquirethemwithagrandjurysubpoena.Andyoudon'tneedtogotoacourttodothat.
ROGERS:

Right,sothatisalowerlegalstandardinordertoobtaininformationonaU.S.citizenonacriminal matter.
COLE:

That'scorrect,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:

SothewhenweandIthinkthisisanimportantpointtomake.Whenwethesystemissetupon thisforeigncollectionandIargueweneedthishighstandardbecauseitisinaclassifiedorusedto beinaclassifiedsettingyouneedtohavethishighstandard.Socanyoudescribethedifference? IfIweregoingtodoacriminalinvestigationgettingthesameamountofinformationthethelegal

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standardwouldbemuchlowerifIwereworkinganembezzlementcaseinChicagothantryingtocatch acounterterroristcounterexcuseme,aterroristoperatingoverseastryingtogetbackintothe UnitedStatestoconductaplot.

COLE:

Someofthestandardsmightbesimilar,buttheprocessthatyouhavetogothroughismuchgreaterin theFISAcontext.Youactuallyhavetogotoaacourt,theFISAcourtaheadoftimeandsetout factsthatwillexplaintothecourtwhythisinformationisrelevanttotheinvestigationthatyou'redoing, whyit'salimitedtypeofinvestigationthatisallowedtobedoneunderthestatuteandundertherules. Andthenthecourthastoapprovethataheadoftime,alongwithalloftherulesandrestrictionsabout howyoucanuseit,howyoucanaccessit,whatyoucandowithit,andwhoyoucandisseminateitto. Thereisamuchdifferentprogramthatgoesoninanormalgrandjurysituation.Youhaverestrictions onwhoyoucandisseminatetoundersecrecygrounds,buteventhosearemuchbroaderthanthey wouldbeundertheFISAgrounds.

ROGERS:

Right.
COLE:

Andyoudon'tneedacourtaheadoftime.
ROGERS:

Soso,intotal,thisisamuchmoreoverseenand,bytheway,onacriminalembezzlementcasein Chicago,youwouldn'tbriefthattoCongress,wouldyou?
COLE:

No,wewouldnot,notasanormalcourse.
ROGERS:

Yeah,andsoyouhaveawholenotherlayeroflegislativeoversightonthisparticularprogram.And, again,IarguethenecessityofthatbecauseitisaasIsaid,usedtobeaclassifiedprogramofwhich youadditionaloversight.Youwantmembersofthelegislaturemakingsurewe're(ph)ontrackthatyou don'tnecessarilyneedinacriminalmatterdomestically.

COLE:

That'scorrect.InanormalcriminalembezzlementcaseinChicago,youwouldhavetheFBIandthe JusticeDepartmentinvolved.Andthat'saboutit.
ROGERS:

Right.
COLE:

Inthis,you'vegottheNationalSecurityAgency.You'vegottheODNI.You'vegottheinspectors general.You'vegottheDepartmentofJustice.Youhavethecourtmonitoringwhatyou'redoing,if there'sanymistakesthatweremade.YouhaveCongressbeingbriefedonaregularbasis.Thereisan enormousamountofoversightinthiscomparedtoagrandjurysituation.Yettherecordsthatcanbe

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obtainedareofthesamekind.
ROGERS:

Right,thanks.AndIjustwantacoupleofclarifyingquestions. Mr.Joyce,ifyouwill,doesChinahaveananadversarialintelligenceservicedirectedattheUnited States?

JOYCE:

Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:

DotheyperformeconomicespionageactivitiestargetedatU.S.companiesintheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:

Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:

Dotheyconductespionageactivitiestowardmilitaryandintelligentservices,bothhereandabroad,that belongtotheUnitedStatesofAmerica?
JOYCE:

Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:

Dotheytargetpolicymakersanddecisionmakers,DepartmentofStateandotherotherpolicy makersthatmightengageinforeignaffairswhenitcomestotheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:

Yes.
ROGERS:

Wouldyouhowwouldyouratethemasanadversarialintelligenceservicegiventheotherintelligence servicesthatweknowareadversarial,theRussians,theIranians,theothers?
JOYCE:

Theyareoneofourtopadversaries.
ROGERS:

Yeah.AndyouhavehadastringofsuccessesrecentlyinprosecutionsforChineseespionageactivities intheUnitedStates.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:

Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:

Andso,thathasbeenbotheconomic,and,ifIunderstandit,aswellasthemilitaryefforts.Sothey've beenveryaggressiveintheirespionageactivitiestowardtheUnitedStates.Isitwouldyouisthata
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fairassessment?
JOYCE:

IthinktheyhavebeenveryaggressiveagainstUnitedStatesinterests.
ROGERS:

GeneralAlexander,dotheyhowwouldyoudescribe,inanunclassifiedway,theChinesecyber effortsforbothespionageandtheirmilitarycapabilitytoconductdisruptiveattackstowardtheUnited States?

ALEXANDER:

Verycarefully. (LAUGHTER) Withalotoflegaloversight.IIthinkoneofthethingsthatyouknow,it'spublicknowledgeout thereaboutthecyberactivitiesthatwe'reseeing.ButIalsothinkthatwhat'smissing,perhaps,inthis conversationwiththeChineseiswhat'swhat'sacceptablepracticeshere.AndIthinkthepresident hasstartedsomeofthatinthediscussionswiththethenewpresidentofChina. AndIthinkthat'ssomeofthestuffthatweactuallyhavetohave.Thisneednotbeanadversarial relationship.IthinkourcountrydoesalotofbusinesswithChina,andweneedtolookat,howcanwe improvetherelationswithChinainsuchawaythatbothourcountriesbenefit?Becausewecan.AndI thinkthat'sgoodforeverybody. Whatconcernsmeisnowthisprogramandwhatwe'retalkingaboutwithChina,asgotIthinkwe've gottosolvethisissuewithChinaandthenlookatwaystomovetomoveforward.AndIthinkwedo havetohavethatdiscussiononcyber.Whatiswhataretherightstandards,havethatdiscussionboth privatelyandpublicly.Andit'snotjustourcountry.It'sallthecountriesoftheworld,aswellasChina.
ROGERS:

Allright,andIIappreciateyoudrawingtheline,butwouldyousaythatChinaengagesineconomic cybereconomicespionageagainstintellectualpropertytostealintellectualpropertyintheUnited States?

ALEXANDER:

Yes.
ROGERS:

Wouldyouarguethattheyengageincyberactivitiestostealbothmilitaryandintelligencesecretsofthe UnitedStates?
ALEXANDER:

Yes.
ROGERS:

IIjustIthinkthisisimportantthatweputitincontextforseveralthingsthatIthinkAmericans wanttoknowabouttherelationshipbetweenMr.Snowdenandandwherehefindshometoday,and thatweknowthatwe'redoingafullinvestigationintopossibleconnectionswithanynationstatewho

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mighttakeadvantageofthisactivity. AndtheonethingIdisagreewithMr.Litttoday,thattheyhaven'tseenanythingofanychanges.AndI woulddisputethatbasedoninformationI'veseenrecentlyandwouldaskanyonetocomment.Doyou believethatAlQaidaelementshavehavejusthistorically,whenthey'vebeenwhenissueshave beendisclosed,changedthewaytheyoperatetotargetbothsoldiersabroadintheirterroristplotting activities,movements,financing,weaponization,andtraining.

LITT:

Totobeclear,whatIwhatIintendedtosayandifIwasn'tclear,Iapologizewasweknow thatthey'veseenthis.Weknowthey'vecommentedonit.Whatwedon'tknowyetisoverthelongterm whatimpactit'sgoingtohaveonourcollectioncapabilities.Butyou'reabsolutelyright.Weknowthey watchus.Andtheytheytheymodifytheirbehaviorbasedonwhattheylearn.

ROGERS:

Andandwealsoknowthatinsomecasesincertaincountriestheyhavemodifiedtheirbehavior, includingthewaytheytargetU.S.troopsbasedoncertainunderstandingsofcommunications.Isthat correct?

LITT:

Ithinkthat'sthat'scorrect.
ROGERS:

I'llguaranteeit'sabsolutelycorrect.Andthat'swhat'ssoconcerningaboutthis. Idoappreciateyourbeinghere.Iknowhowdifficultitistocomeandtalk. General,didyouwanttosaysomethingbefore... (CROSSTALK)

ALEXANDER:

Yeah,IIwantedtosay,ifIcould,justacouplethings,becausetheydidn'tcomeupininthis testimony.But,first,thankstothiscommittee,theadministrationandothers,inthesummerof2009we setupthedirectorDirectorateofCompliance.Putsomeofourbestpeopleinittoensurethatwhat we'redoingisexactlyright.Andthiscommitteewasinstrumentalinhelpingussetthatup.Sothat'sone point. Whenwetalkaboutoversightandcompliance,peoplethinkit'sjustonceinawhile,buttherewas rigorousactionsbyyouandthisentirecommitteetosetthatup. Thesecondis,intheopenpressthere'sthisdiscussionaboutpatternanalysisthey'reouttheredoing patternanalysisonthis.Thatisabsolutelyincorrect.Wearenotauthorizedtogointothedata,norare wedataminingordoinganythingwiththedataotherthanthosequeriesthatwediscuss,period.We're notauthorizedtodoit.Wearen'tdoingit.Therearenoautomatedprocessesrunninginthebackground pullingtogetherdatatryingtofigureoutnetworks. Theonlytimeyoucandopatternanalysisis,onceyoustartthequeryonthatqueryandwhereyougo forward.Youcan'tgoinandtrytobringupyouknow,Ihavefourdaughtersand15grandchildren.I
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can'tsupervisethemwiththisdatabase.Itisnotauthorized,andourfolksdonotdoit. Andsothat'ssomeoftheoversightandcomplianceyouandtherestoftheOversightCommitteesee, butIthinkit'simportantfortheAmericanpeopletoknowthatit'slimited.Inthiscase,for2012,less than300selectorswerelookedat,andtheyhadanimpactinhelpinguspreventpotentialterrorist attacks,theycontributed.AndIthinkwhenyoulookatthatandyouyoubalancethosetwo,that's prettygood.

ROGERS:

AndIdoappreciateit.AndIwanttocommendthefolksfromtheNSAhavealwayswe'venever hadtoissueasubpoena.Allthatinformationhasalwaysreadilyprovided.Youmeetwithus regularly.WehavestaffandinvestigatorsattheNSAfrequently.Wehaveanopendialoguewhen problemshappenwedodealwiththeminaclassifiedway,ininawayIthinkthatAmericanswould beproudthattheirelectedrepresentativesdealwithissues. AndI'mnotsayingthattherearesomehiddenissuesouttheretherearenot. Iknowthishasbeendifficulttocomeandtalkaboutverysensitivethingsinapublicway.Inorderto preserveyourgoodworkandtheworkonbehalfofallthepatriotsworkingtodefendAmerica,Istill believeitwasimportanttohaveameetingwherewecouldatleast,insomeway,discussandreassure thelevelofoversightandredundancyofoversightonaprogramthatweallrecognizeneededanextra careandattentionandlotsofsetsofeyes.Ihopetodayinthishearingthatwe'vebeenabletodothat. IdobelievethatAmericahastheresponsibilitytokeepsomethingssecretasweservetoprotectthis country.AndIthinkyoualldothatwell.Andthedarndestthingisthatwemayhavefoundthatitis easierforasystemsanalystorasystemsadministratortostealtheinformationthanitisforusto accesstheprograminordertopreventaterroristattackintheUnitedStates.Andwe'llbeworking moreonthoseissues. Andwehavehadgreatdialogueaboutwhat'scomingonsomeotheroversightissues. Again,thankyouvery,verymuch.Thankyouallforyourservice.AndIwishyouallwelltoday.

ListofPanelMembersandWitnessesPANELMEMBERS:
REP.MIKEROGERS,RMICH.CHAIRMAN REP.MACTHORNBERRY,RTEXAS REP.JEFFMILLER,RFLA. REP.K.MICHAELCONAWAY,RTEXAS REP.PETERT.KING,RN.Y. REP.FRANKA.LOBIONDO,RN.J. REP.DEVINNUNES,RCALIF. REP.LYNNWESTMORELAND,RGA. REP.MICHELEBACHMANN,RMINN.
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REP.JOEHECK,RNEV. REP.TOMROONEY,RFLA. REP.MIKEPOMPEO,RKAN. REP.JOHNA.BOEHNER,ROHIOEXOFFICIO REP.C.A.DUTCHRUPPERSBERGER,DMD.RANKINGMEMBER REP.MIKETHOMPSON,DCALIF. REP.JANSCHAKOWSKY,DILL. REP.JIMLANGEVIN,DR.I. REP.ADAMB.SCHIFF,DCALIF. REP.LUISV.GUTIERREZ,DILL. REP.JIMHIMES,DCONN. REP.EDPASTOR,DARIZ. REP.TERRIA.SEWELL,DALA. REP.NANCYPELOSI,DCALIF.EXOFFICIO
WITNESSES:

GENERALKEITHALEXANDER(USA),DIRECTOR,NATIONALSECURITYAGENCY CHRISINGLISDEPUTYDIRECTOR,NATIONALSECURITYAGENCY JAMESCOLE,DEPUTYATTORNEYGENERAL SEANJOYCE,DEPUTYDIRECTOR,FEDERALBUREAUOFINVESTIGATION ROBERTLITT,GENERALCOUNSEL,OFFICEOFTHEDIRECTOROFNATIONAL INTELLIGENCEGENERALCOUNSEL

69