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Vojislav [e{elj, Ph.D.

POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Serbian Radical Party Belgrade 2011

Vojislav Šešelj, Ph.D. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA Director of the publishing sector Ognjen Mihajlović Editorial staff Ivana Borac, Ljubinka Božović, Lazar Macura, Vesna Marić, Ljiljana Mihajlović, Biljana Oluić, Severin Popović, Marina Ristić, Zlatija Sević, Milica Šešelj Published by Serbian Radical Party, Trg Pobede 3, Zemun – Belgrade For the publisher Vojislav Šešelj, Ph.D. Printed by Printing house DOO Dragić, Zrenjanin For the printing house Momčilo Dragić Print run 500 copies
CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji Narodna biblioteka Srbije, Beograd 341.645.5 POLITICAL Instrumentalisation of the International Crime Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia / Vojislav Šešelj. Belgrade : Serbian Radical Party, 2011 (Zrenjanin : Dragić). - 287 str. ; 25 cm Foreward pages 3-4 – Boris Aleksić Tiraž 500. ISBN 978-86-7886-103-1 a) Међународни кривични трибунал за бившу Југославију (Хаг) COBISS.SR-ID 186466828

Foreward
Respected readers, in your hands you have a book by Professor Voislav Seselj, Ph.D., with the selected cables of the US Government which became accessible to the public through the Internet sites of the Wikileaks in the course of 2011. The subject of these documents is the backstage maneuverings in regard to the work of the ICTY. The Hague Tribunal is an extension of the Governments of the US and Great Britain and of their intelligence agencies. By abusing this institution, which was created in 1993, the United States and Great Britain achieve the goals of their foreign policy. Their main aspiration is to justify the crimes they committed with the destruction of the SFRY and to make the Serbs, as their enemies, responsible for all the misdeeds. This is why the Serbs are treated as scapegoats by the ICTY. In order to achieve this, the representatives of the US and GB have included a large number of their agents and associates into the Prosecution, Register, and other services of the ICTY. According to the allegations (presented in the book “Peace and Punishment”) of Florence Hartmann, who was an advisor and spokesperson to the Chief Prosecutor for the Balkans Carla del Ponte, American and British intelligence agencies have interfered with the work of the ICTY Prosecution from the very beginning. Ms Hartmann states that in mid-1994, when “the Tribunal could finally commence its work”, there came 22 Pentagon and CIA officials, with the necessary equipment for the work of the ICTY Prosecution. Military analysts and lawyers, in fact intelligence officers, have been accomplishing strategic tasks in the Tribunal, serving all the time their own Governments. The Anglosaxons have achieved the supremacy in the Tribunal. Florence Hartmann quotes the words of Jeffrey Nice, the NATO spokesman, that were said in regard to the crimes committed against the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohia: “You may be assured that we (the NATO) and the Tribunal are one and the same thing...” and “I am sure that Louise Arbour (the Prosecutor-inChief) will indict only the persons of the Yugoslav nationality, no one else.” Florence Hartmann, the former official of the ICTY Prosecution, has further explained that there was formed a special “Team of Military Analysts” to interfere with the work of prosecutors and their deputies. “The Americans and the British hurried to provide these highly qualified oficials to monitor and control the strategies of the criminal prosecution. Being recruited from the best intelligence agencies, and remaining loyal to their Governments, these military analysts are undoubtfully the most capable personnel of the Tribunal Florence Hartmann further says that the Prosecutor in Slobodan Milosevic Case, Jeffrey Nice, was an agent of the secret British agency, MI6, for many years. According to her allegations, Bill Stuebner, an advisor to the Prosecutor-in-Chief Richard Goldstone, is in fact an agent of the US Defense Intelligence Agency. By the year 2003 at the latest they were joined by the Government of France, which gave its support to the priorities of the Angloamerican foreign policy. Washington, London and Paris want to expand their experiences in the control and abuse of the ICTY to the work of other international criminal courts, including the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague. In a confidential cable (03THEHAGUE1806) of July 15 2003, written in the US Embassy to the Hague there have been cited the words of the ICC Prosecutor-in-Chief Luis Moreno Ocampo, who said before the students of “Humanity in Action” summer course that he was investigating the actions of the British troops in Iraque. On that occasion a British ICTY prosecutor, who was 3

present, “almost fell off his chair”. However, a US associate in the ICC, Bruno Cathala, elected as a Secretary, after serving as a Registrar Deputy, promised the Americans in a confidential conversation that the ICC would not indict American and British citizens. In that regard, Mr. Cathala warned Ocampo “to take care what he talks about”, making the ICC Prosecutor-in-Chief to modify his views. Mr. Cathala also protected the US interests in the ICC. On August 30 2011, the Wikileaks published the confidential cable of the US Embassy in Paris (06PARIS7684), dated December 6 2006. The Cable is entitled “December 1st Meeting of the representative of the US Defence Department Edelmann with Chirac’s foreign policy advisor Gourdault-Montagne”. In the Cable, in regard to Serbia, Montagne explicitely says that it is necessary to do everything possible to prevent Voislav Seselj from coming to power. Already during the year 2004, Montagne started his close cooperation with Ms Condolisa Rice, the-then Security Advisor to the US President. In order to advance the “trans-Atlantic relations” and coordinate the policies in various parts of the World, they two used to meet at least twice a month. While their first meeting was taking place at the top level in Washington, other accompanying meetings were going on in Paris as part of the same activities. In the French capital Jean Louis Gergorin, a former French diplomat, the-then chief strategist of the European Security Company – EADS – arranged the meeting together with the US Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). As the US representatives there were present well-known personalities like Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert Blackwill. According to the opinions of some experts, in that way France has become an instrument of the Angloamerican policy. Zbignev Bzhezinsky is first and for most notorious for his anti-Serbian and anti-Russian views. He was in favor of the agression on Yugoslavia while in his books he used to propose the partition of Russia into three parts. On the other hand, the fact that the EADS Company takes part in this whole process, clearly indicates that the above mentioned group takes part in the production and sale of arms all over the World, making high profits. They take part in the production of missiles, army planes and helicopters. However, EADS also produces parts for the strategic arms, as well as the forbidden cassette bombs, while its officials were involved in bribery scandals in the South Africa. Beside that, the above mentioned French diplomat, Jean Louis Gergorin, as well as Montagne, is under investigation because of the same or similar things. From the cables it is quite clear that the high ICTY officials, including the President himself. Prosecutors-in-Chief and Secretaries, delivered the confidential data to the US Government. In that way they violated not only the rules of the Hague Tribunal but the UN Charter as well, which forbids the UN officials (the ICTY ones being included) to deliver information to the foreign governments. The cables state that in the case of Slobodan Milosevic the US Government officials and the ICTY officials coordinated their joint actions against him, doing their best to speed up the process and to sentence him as soon as possible, regardless of his illness. In that way they caused the deterioration of his health and his very death. The ICTY discriminates the Serbs, which can be clearly seen from the selected cables. The Serbs have been sentenced to thousand years of prison, which is far more than all the others together, while the number of the convicted Serbs is 70 percent. Complete Serbian political and army leaderships have been brought to the Hague, where the indictments against them were written by the agents and associates of the American and British intelligence agencies, who took part in the destruction of the SFRY, committed the crime against peace and armed Slovenians, Croats, muslims, and Shiptars also committing other crimes in the former Yugoslavia. This is evidence of the abuse and a valid legal reason for the revision of the trials before the Hague Tribunal. Boris Aleksic
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The ICTY in Cables Published by the Wikileaks
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Reference id: 00THEHAGUE1664 Subject: Icty: Icty Comments On Usg Proposal For Witness Relocation Arrangements Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Mon, 5 Jun 2000 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2000/06/00THEHAGUE1664.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – SCHEFFER/WARRICK, S/SA – O’BRIEN, DRL – KOH/SPENCER, L – MATHESON, L/EUR – LAHNE, S/CT – SHEEHAN/BAIR, INR/WCAD – DONAHUE/MORIN, EUR/SCE – COUNTRYMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: PHUM [Human Rights], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] Ref: A. A STATE 55166 B. B 99 THE HAGUE 2224 C. 99 THE HAGUE 1324 1. (U) Begin Summary: As a follow-up to Ambassador Scheffer’s 28 March letter to the Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding possible relocation of Tribunal witnesses to the United States (Ref A), Embassy
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legaloffs had discussions with representatives from the ICTY Registry and the Victim Witness Unit (VWU). Although certain aspects of the USG proposal were very well-received, ICTY representatives were generally disappointed by the overall approach being suggested. The Acting Head of the VWU explained that the ICTY only proposes witnesses for relocation if their lives are at serious risk. Consequently, when a request for relocation is made it has to be acted upon quickly. The ICTY‘s overriding interest is in having some commitment from the USG to a quick, flexible procedure that would ensure a fast-track process through the normal INS procedures. ICTY representatives pressed hard on whether it might be possible to achieve some kind of break-through on expedited processing of requests. Specific comments and requests for additional information/clarification of the proposed approach based on existing authorities are provided below. End Summary. 2. (C) In discussions with Embassy legaloffs regarding the possibility of concluding an agreement or arrangement with the USG for relocation of witnesses to the United States, ICTY representatives were candid about their disappointment that the 28 March proposal did not provide for a special relocation procedure, nor a commitment to expedite the existing INS process. Underscoring the fact that the VWU only requests relocation for witnesses whose lives are at serious risk because of their testimonies, the ICTY reps noted that they well understand that a country making a commitment to relocate witnesses must operate within the provisions of its own laws. In that regard, they pointed out that other governments also have relied upon existing domestic authorities in defining the scope of benefits for relocated witnesses. Unlike the USG proposal, however, those other governments have committed themselves to special fast-track procedures for ICTY witnesses. In the case of Canada, for example, provisions are made for witnesses who need to be relocated on an urgent basis. Other agreements provide for the transfer to happen within two months, in the event of urgent cases, even sooner. The ICTY representatives were keen to know whether it might be possible to achieve some kind of break-through on expedited processing of requests. 3. (U) Benefits Package: The ICTY representatives indicated that the benefits package for relocated witnesses as described in Ambassador Scheffer’s letter appeared to be very good. They requested certain details on the various benefits. In particular, the VWU would like to know what benefits witnesses would be entitled to after the initial eight months. In addition, they requested information on whether the witnesses would be entitled to housing, education, and travel documents to enable the witnesses to travel to and from the United States. Finally, they raised the need to relocate close family members (either together with the witness or at a later stage). In this regard they noted that the war in the former Yugoslavia had torn apart many families, and made many children orphans. Such children are often in the custody of distant relatives or even former neighbors. If possible, the VWU would like to ensure that such children or relatives qualify as close family members for relocation purposes. 4. (U) Requirement for Transcript of Witness’s Testimony: The 28 March letter indicated that in order for the INS to assess whether the “persecutor bar” would apply in an individual case, the INS would require a transcript of the testimony of the witness. In response to this requirement, the VWU raised several concerns. First, the ICTY representatives pointed out that in some cases a witness may need to be relocated before any appearance in court. In such cases, no transcript would exist. Second, they reiterated their
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earlier point that the ICTY only proposes relocation for witnesses whose lives are at risk due to the contents of their testimonies. Given the sensitivity of such testimonies, the Judges will normally grant protective measures for these witnesses and proceed in closed session. Thus, the transcripts of the proposed witnesses’ testimonies will normally be confidential (i.e., sealed by the Court). Although some witnesses proposed for relocation may testify in open session under a pseudonym, the transcripts of such sessions are also not available for release. 5. (U) Instead of relying on a transcript of a witness’s testimony, the VWU asked whether the INS would accept a statement from the ICTY that would contain information on the testimony, and explain why the testimony put the witness’s life at risk. The VWU indicated that such a statement would have to be treated as classified by the INS or other authorities. In addition, the VWU representatives informed Embassy legaloffs that for all relocation requests, the Registrar receives a certification from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) that the witness in question is not a suspect or under investigation for any crime over which the ICTY has jurisdiction. The certification from the OTP also typically states that, as far as the Prosecutor is aware, the witness has not committed any other crimes. 6. (U) After Relocation: Assuming witnesses are relocated to the United States pursuant to a request from the ICTY, the ICTY would like to include a provision for the exchange of information so the ICTY can be kept informed of the witness’s status once settled in the United States. For example, ICTY representatives would need to know about any threats that arise or any other problems that develop in relation to the witness’s testimony. Similarly, they would need to know if a witness died or his/her whereabouts became unknown. 7. (U) In a related vein, the ICTY representatives indicated that they would like to include a provision in a relocation agreement or arrangement that in the (unlikely) event of extradition, the witness or any member of the relocated family should not be returned to the territory of the former Yugoslavia without the written consent of both the witness and the ICTY. 8. (U) Fingerprinting: Regarding the request for all witnesses proposed for relocation to be fingerprinted, the ICTY indicated that it is not technically equipped to provide fully legible fingerprint cards. 9. (U) Comment: Embassy notes that USG and ICTY reps have been in engaged in efforts to negotiate a formal arrangement for the relocation of witnesses since September 1998. Despite support for this effort from Executive and Legislative branch officials, nothing concrete has been achieved. Embassy therefore recommends that if there is a consensus within the USG to conclude an agreement with the ICTY on this issue, face to face negotiations between ICTY reps and representatives from all relevant agencies (e.g., INS/DOJ/DOS) officials should be scheulded either in The Hague or in Washington in the near future. Alternatively, if no consensus to accommodate the ICTY‘s request for an expedited process exists, we should inform the ICTY that we are unable to meet its request at this time, but will continue to consider requests on an ad hoc basis under existing authorities. End Comment. Fendrick
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Reference id: 00THEHAGUE1679 Subject: ICTY: Jorda Proposes “ad litem” Judges to Speed Tribunal’s Work Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 6 Jun 2000 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2000/06/00THEHAGUE1679.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – SCHEFFER/WARRICK, S/SA – O’BRIEN, DRL – KOH/SPENCER, L – ANDREWS/MATHESON, L/EUR – LAHNE, S/CT – SHEEHAN/BAIR, INR/WCAD – DONAHUE/MORIN, EUR/SCE – COUNTRYMAN; KIGALI FOR PAGE E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], HR [Croatia], SR [Serbia], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda] 1. (U) Classified by: Allen S. Weiner, legal counselor. Reasons: 1.5(B), (D). 2. (U) Summary: Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), visited ambassador on Tuesday, May 30, to preview proposals he intends to make before the Security Council to improve the ICTY‘s capacity to try cases more swiftly. the key proposals are for: (1) the use of “ad litem” judges to try cases that are ready for trial; and (2) delegation of certain pre-trial management responsibilities to senior legal officers. Jorda intends formally to make his proposals before the Security Council in the second half of June. Embassy believes Jorda’s proposals are a sensible means of addressing an increasingly severe backlog problem, and recommends that Washington seriously consider supporting the proposals. End summary. 3. (U) ICTY president Claude Jorda visited ambassador on Tuesday, May 30, to preview his report on the operation of the Tribunal. After becoming president in November 1999, Jorda initiated a review into the Tribunal’s operations and ways of enhancing its efficiency, and more importantly, of accelerating the rate at which trials are conducted. Jorda submitted the report on behalf of the ICTY‘s judges to U.N. Secretary-general Annan on May 12. Jorda said that he intends formally to make his proposals before the Security Council in the second half of June. 4. (U) In his meeting with ambassador, Jorda said that the judges had reviewed the Tribunal’s existing methods of work and had considered chief prosecutor Del Ponte’s estimates of the additional investigations she intends to pursue and the additional indictments she intends to sign. Jorda noted that Del Ponte had informed the judges at a ple8

nary session that the Office of the Prosecutor (otp) intends to conduct 36 new investigations that will culminate in 29 separate trials covering some 150 individuals. This is in addition to the trials of those who are already in custody and those who have been indicted but remain at large. The ICTY‘s current structure, with three trial chambers, limits the Tribunal’s ability to try cases rapidly. Based on the rate of ICTY trials to date and Del Ponte’s estimates, Jorda estimates that the ICTY will not be able to complete trials (excluding appeals) of all indictees until late 2016. 5. (C) Moreover, Jorda indicated, the problem of lengthy pre-trial detention of indictees awaiting the start of their trials is becoming increasingly severe. He estimated that without changes in the ICTY‘s means of operating, the trial of the most recent indictee brought into custody, Dragan Nikolic, would not start until the second half of 2002 at the earliest. Jorda also said the ICTY had postponed pre-trial management proceedings in the case against Momcilo Krajisnik because there is no available trial chamber; the judges did not want to get the case ready for trial, only to find that they were unable to commence the trial. 6. (U) Part of the problem is that trials were taking too long. This is the fault of both defense counsel, who Jorda said have incentives to extend the length of trials because they are being well paid under U.N. scales, and the prosecutors, who are too “perfectionist” in the way they conduct trials. Jorda expressed the hope that the experience the judges had gained both with the ICTY‘s rules of procedure and evidence, as well as their knowledge of the underlying conflict in the former Yugoslavia, would make future trials go faster. The judges would also continue to work to accelerate the pace of trials through strengthened reliance on pre-trial management practices. 7. (U) Nevertheless, something more needs to be done to address the growing case backlog problem. Jorda told ambassador that the judges had reviewed a full range of options for trying cases more swiftly, including holding trials before a single judge, holding trials in absentia, transferring trials to other countries, or adding a new trial chamber. With respect to most, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. The judges had concluded, however, that two proposals could effectively enhance the ICTY‘s trial operations. 8. (U) First, the judges recommend delegating to ICTY senior legal officers some pre-trial management responsibilities, such as setting deadlines and hearing witness testimony by deposition. Core legal issues would not be handled by senior legal officers, and a judge would continue to supervise the work of each senior legal officer. Nevertheless, this would permit judges to devote a greater portion of their time to trial work. 9. (U) Second, and more importantly, the judges have recommended the use of “ad litem” judges, i.e., judges drawn from a pool of eligible candidates who could serve for a single case once it was ready for trial. This proposal would be flexible, and ad litem judges would work only on an as-needed basis. Countries could support this effort either by designating judges for the pool, or by making voluntary contributions to fund the costs associated with the use of ad litem judges. (Jorda’s report specifically rejects the notion of countries making ad litem judges available on a “gratis personnel” basis, in order to guarantee the independence and impartiality of the judges.) Jorda noted that the judges were divided on whether the ad litem judges should sit together with existing tribunal judges, or whether entire autonomous ad litem panels should be constituted, although he indicated he favored the latter approach to ensure that existing judges would be available for their own trials.
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10. (U) Jorda indicated that the proposals would require some “minor” revisions to the ICTY‘s Statute. His report includes as an annex the changes to the Statute that would be necessary to give effect to the judges’ proposals. Jorda’s report also notes that use of ad litem judges would require additional resources, but indicates that since financing questions are not within the judges’ purview, they have made no recommendations on that point. 11. (U) According to Jorda, although there were some divisions among the judges about the precise modalities of the ad litem proposal (e.g., whether ad litem judges should be elected or appointed, whether they should be integrated into existing trial chambers or serve on autonomous trial chambers), the basic recommendations were unanimously supported by the judges. He noted that Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte also had expressed her approval of the proposals. 12. (U) Jorda said that if the judges’ recommendations were adopted, the ICTY would be able to complete its trials between 2007 and 2009, rather than late 2016. 13. (U) Jorda’s report also addresses possible enhancements to the functioning of the Appeals Chamber. Jorda’s report recommends adding two new judges from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to the Appeals Chamber. Jorda told the ambassador that the Appeals chamber would continue to sit as a five-judge panel, but under the proposal would have a pool of seven judges to draw from in constituting such a panel. (Comment: This aspect of the proposal, however, is not reflected in the written report.) 14. (U) The ambassador congratulated Jorda for thinking ahead on the issue of the ICTY‘s capacity to manage its caseload. She and Legal Counselor cautioned that in view of the severe budget constraints facing the United Nations, the additional expenses associated with ad litem judges was likely to present the most significant hurdle to the proposal. Nevertheless, the flexible nature of the ad litem judges proposal was an important advantage, since judges would only be paid as necessary to handle cases. Ambassador reiterated the USG’s strong support for the ICTY and said the Tribunal’s many friends in the USG would want to play a constructive role. 15. (C) The ambassador also expressed concern that ICTY efforts to stress the severity of the ICTY‘s backlog could work against the Prosecutor’s push for more arrests of at-large indictees. In that regard, Jorda noted that Del Ponte fully supports the report. He also commented that approximately half of the ICTY‘s indictees are still at large. “If that were the situation in any nation,” he commented, “there would be a revolution” in that country. There can be no question, he said, that all indictees must be brought to the Hague, either by voluntarily surrender or arrest. Developing a process for expediting trials might encourage voluntary surrenders. Jorda mentioned that Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodik, during his recent visit to the CITY, said he would like to encourage more voluntary surrenders but cannot given the lengthy pretrial delays faced by those in custody. 16. (U) Comment: The proposal for ad litem judges could be an effective and relatively cost-efficient solution to the growing backlog problem at the ICTY. Particularly if the proposal enables the ICTY to complete its mandate sooner, it would actually result in long-term savings to U.N. member states. As such, Embassy recommends that Washington give serious consideration to supporting judge Jorda’s proposals. Embassy believes, however, that it would be better for ad litem judges to be integrated into panels with regular ICTY judges. Otherwise, the ad litem trial chambers would not be able to benefit from the important experience the permanent judges have gained with the ICTY‘s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and their knowledge of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Embassy cautions, however, that for the approach to be viable, the U.N. will need to fund
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more than the salaries of the ad litem judges. Additional resources for legal assistants, secretaries, and registry courtroom staff will also be required. Depending on the number of trial chambers operating at any given time, it may also be necessary to provide additional courtroom capacity to the ICTY. On this score, Jorda mentioned the possibility of using the court facilities at Camp Zeist currently being used for the Lockerbie trial, once those proceedings are completed. End comment. 17. (U) A copy of judge Jorda’s report has been faxed to the Department (s/wci – Scheffer). Hard copy has been sent to the Department (s/wci – scheffer, via l/cid) by commercial courier. Fendrick

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Reference id: 00THEHAGUE1878 Subject: Icty: Request For Guidance On Proper Disposition Of Vat Refund Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 23 Jun 2000 00:00 UTC Classification: Unclassified Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2000/06/00THEHAGUE1878.html History: First published on Thu, 25 Aug 2011 03:30 UTC (original) Modified on: Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Unclassified
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – SCHEFFER/WARRICK, S/SA – O’BRIEN, DRL – KOH/BARKIN, L – MATHESON, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – DONAHUE/MORIN, EUR/SCE – COUNTRYMAN E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], SR [Serbia], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: 98 THE HAGUE 3665 1. Summary and action request: This is an action request; see paragraph five below. The Finance Section of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has recently renewed its 1998 request for advice as to the proper disposition to be made of a refund (in the amount of NLG 190,165) from the Dutch tax authorities of value-added tax (VAT) paid on goods and services purchased with USG funds and donated to the ICTY. Embassy requests guidance. End summary. 2. In 1994, the USG proposed a donation in kind of a computer system – computer hardware and software and all necessary support, including installation, maintenance, and training – for the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICTY. In 1995, the USG DOJ used a contract with CACI International Inc., a U.S. corporation, to purchase computer
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goods and services. CACI, in turn, subcontracted with Borsu Systema, a Dutch corporation, to provide some of those goods and services in The Netherlands. The goods and services were then contributed by the USG to the ICTY pursuant to the 1994 proposal of an in-kind donation of a computer system. 3. Borsu Systema, the aforementioned Dutch subcontractor, charged VAT for the goods and services it provided. As a consequence, since 1996, the Embassy has been engaged in efforts to recover the VAT paid on those goods and services. In 1998, the Finance Section of the ICTY notified the Embassy that the Dutch Government had deposited into the ICTY‘s bank account a VAT refund (in the amount of NLG 190,165) for VAT that had been paid on goods and services purchased with USG funds and donated to the ICTY. The ICTY asked whether the USG agreed to the money being deposited in the ICTY‘s account. Per reftel, Embassy sought guidance as to whether the refunded VAT could be retained by the ICTY. Embassy also requested guidance as to whether there were any legal or other constraints that would restrict the purposes for which the funds could be used. 4. On 18 May 2000, Embassy received a letter from the Finance Section of the ICTY, renewing its request for advice as to whether the Tribunal could keep the refunded VAT in the amount of NLG 190,165, or whether it must pay it back to the USG. 5. Action request: Embassy seeks guidance as to whether the refunded VAT may be retained by the ICTY. If the ICTY may retain the funds, please advise whether there are any legal or other constraints that would restrict the purposes for which the funds could be used. Finally, if ICTY may not retain the funds, please provide instructions for the ICTY to transfer the funds back to the USG. 6. A copy of the ICTY letter to the Embassy has been faxed to the Department (S/WCI – Warrick). Schneider

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Reference id: 02ROME1230 Subject: GoI Support For USG FRY Priorities Origin: Embassy Rome (Italy) Cable time: Fri, 8 Mar 2002 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2002/03/02ROME1230.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS INFO: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE; AMEMBASSY BERLIN; AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN; AMEMBASSY LONDON; AMEMBASSY MADRID; AMEMBASSY PARIS; PRISTINA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2012 Tags: IT [Italy], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], UN [United Nations]
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CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 ROME 01230 081613Z Ref: A) SECSTATE 42534 B) COPENHAGEN 00738 Classified By: POL MC TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON:1.5 (B)(D) 1. (C) On March 7, Poloff delivered points ref a to MFA FRY desk officer Andrea Pompermaier. After consulting with his superiors, Pompermaier told Poloff on March 8 that the GoI appreciated USG efforts to push the fry on the various issues outlined reftel. The Italian embassy in Belgrade had demarched the GoFRy numerous times on ICTY cooperation and Kosovo Albanian prisoners, and the MFA would instruct the embassy to do so again in light of this new U.S. request. 2. (C) Pompermaier was unaware of the draft statement on these issues being prepared for the NAC (ref b), but assured Poloff that Italy would strongly support any statement calling on the FRY to improve its cooperation with ICTY and Kosovar detainees. He was also unaware of any high level visit to the region in the near future, but promised to keep poloff informed. 3. (U) Minimize considered. Pope confidential > 2002rome01230 – Classification: Confidential

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Reference id: 03ZAGREB107 Subject: Croatia: Three Years Of Post-tudjman Government; A Mixed Report Card Origin: Embassy Zagreb (Croatia) Cable time: Wed, 15 Jan 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/01/03ZAGREB107.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2013 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], HR [Croatia], HRPREL, Political Parties/Elections Ref: 02 ZAGREB 0146 Classified By: AMBASSADOR LAWRENCE G. ROSSIN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B, D) Summary and Introduction 1. (C) With one great exception, the third year of the Racan Government resembled the first two: Croatia made modest progress on some reform issues, stumbling forward
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while spending far too much energy and time on political infighting in a highly dysfunctional decision-making process. On other issues important to Croatia’s future, the Government made no progress at all, squandering opportunities which may never be recaptured. Of course, the year’s most significant event by far was the Racan Government’s mishandling of the ICTY indictment against retired general Janko Bobetko. As everyone (including we) predicted, the political advantage Racan gained by failing to deliver the indictment immediately has already evaporated. The damage done to Croatia’s reputation abroad will last much longer. 2. (C) Difficult as it is to believe, Croatia’s Government will become even more inefficient in the year ahead as political parties both in and out of the Coalition seek to make themselves distinct to voters. The Racan Government will try to get Croatia’s bid for EU membership back on the rails, but it will be challenged to make much progress, since European Governments in the wake of the Bobetko indictment are more skeptical. By law, the Croatian Government can delay elections until early 2004. Racan would like to put off elections as long as possible to make more progress on concrete issues popular with voters. A more realistic expectation is that relations within the Coalition will deteriorate further and at some point will become an unpalatable choice even for Racan’s SDP. 3. (C) On the issues most important to us, the Report Card for the third year of the Racan Government is mixed, with high marks on issues like anti-terrorism cooperation and developing productive relations with the FRY, passing grades on some economic and a few domestic reform issues, low marks on cooperation with ICTY, and failing grades on judicial reform and refugee return and reintegration issues. End summary and introduction. Wasting time on Coalition Politics 4. (C) Fully three years have passed since the elections in which a center-left coalition led by PM Racan’s SDP came to Government. In january 2000, the expectations of Croatian voters – and of the International community – were high, perhaps unrealistically so. That coalition was brought together (with our active encouragement) with a single purpose: to get rid of the HDZ Government responsible for Croatia’s isolation. Once that goal was accomplished, there was little consensus within the Coalition on how to move forward. As time progressed, this lack of shared vision, coupled with PM Racan’s indecisive leadership style, has meant that every tough issue, whether on ICTY cooperation, refugee return, economic reform, social policy or military restructuring, has deteriorated into a bickering battle between Coalition partners. This year, that process resulted in endless threats of resignations and rumors of snap elections so common they were hardly news anymore. 5. (C) For the first half of the year, Racan’s biggest obstacle to getting anything done was his opposition from within the Coalition by Drazen budisa’s Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS). After bending over backwards to appease the obstructionist, imperious Budisa, Racan finally resigned in July, dissolving the Government in a tactical maneuver to reconstitute the Coalition a month later without the HSLS. But getting rid of Budisa did not get rid of Racan’s problems. With the narrowest of majorities in the Parliament, the Government is now hostage to the special interests of each of the small Coalition parties. For the most part, Racan’s SDP has managed to bully its way forward, but not without extreme, time consuming effort, and almost never without the resentment of smaller partners.
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Changing Political Landscape 6. (C) The Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) is now Racan’s second largest coalition partner. Although small in numbers, it is broadly recognized to be the kingmaker essential for the next coalition to form a Government, whether it is led by the left or the right. The HSS sees itself as a traditional right-of-center party, but it is really all about populist constituent service, ensuring that while it is in Government, its electorate is well taken care of. In concrete terms, that has meant risking violating WTO commitments with inappropriate agriculture subsidies, slowing down privatization and insisting on a disproportionate share of positions of authority in the Government. The center-left Croatian People’s Party (HNS) is the other key player in the Racan Government. Although its representation in Parliament is small, its fortunes (and polling numbers) are on the rise. Vesna Pusic, the HNS’ popular leader, is convinced that the longer the Coalition remains in Government, the more voters will recognize the benefits of the economic stability it has brought about. 7. (C) The biggest change on the political landscape in the past year has been the attempts of the opposition HDZ to re-package itself as a “reformed” party. The HDZ appears to be succeeding in changing its image, even if it remains largely unreformed. Now, every decision Racan makes is influenced by his fear of losing political support. Voters who supported his coalition three years ago may now no longer see the HDZ as an unpalatable choice. HDZ president Sanader has worked hard to change the image of his party. After narrowly defeating hard-line Tudjman hatchet man Ivic Pasalic in a bruising battle for the top Party spot in April, he used all means fair and foul to purge the HDZ of his rival’s supporters. While Sanader’s motivation may have been simple political revenge, the result is that some of the HDZ’s most corrupt elements are now on the outside. There are still plenty of unsavory characters in the senior ranks of HDZ. Osijek strongman and war criminal Branimir Glavas comes immediately to mind. But Sanader’s HDZ recently has taken reasonable positions on a number of key issues, including on a new law on minority rights. As 2002 drew to a close, the HDZ was the highest-polling political party in Croatia. Bobetko Indictment and Croatia’s Good Name 8. (C) Racan’s decision to delay serving the Bobetko Indictment was driven by his belief that, if he did not give the public the impression that he was putting up a good fight, his Government would fall and right-wing nationalists would return to power. The initial public reaction to the Indictment was emotional. It shocked many international observers who thought that Croatia had evolved past such visceral nationalism. There was real concern both in and out of Government that hardliners would foment violent unrest and topple the Government. Yet even after the wave of emotional nationalism had clearly passed, Racan seemed intoxicated by the initial positive reaction to what the public perceived as defiance of ICTY‘s indictment “in defense of the dignity of the homeland war.” He was deaf to warnings from the International community that his rhetoric and delays in serving the Indictment were gravely damaging Croatia’s reputation. For weeks after it became clear that his Government was in no danger from the right wing, racan delayed, hoping to score more points, putting domestic posturing before international concerns. 9. (C) Racan’s bump in the polls over Bobetko is long gone. The revulsion of the International community, notably of EU states, at the manifestation of undiluted nationa15

lism remains. At least two have slowed ratifying the EU‘s Stabilization and Association agreement (SAA) with Croatia. No longer are Croatia’s supporters in the EU willing to give Racan the benefit of the doubt on issues like refugee return and property restitution. The Government is facing tough questions about its supposed efforts to apprehend General Ante Gotovina, the 2001 ICTY indictee still at large. Even the Croatian press, pouring fuel on the jingoist fire just weeks ago, now criticizes Racan for failing to show leadership during the crisis. Racan’s SDP has slid behind the HDZ in the polls and seems to be losing more ground every week. 10. (C) The Racan Government does not seem to have learned any lessons from this unfinished affair. In the absence of clear leadership, Croatia will face similar disruptions each time an indictment is handed down. Since the Government has delivered the indictment to the local court of jurisdiction, Croatia can once again formally be considered to be cooperating with the Tribunal, but it is not certain that Racan would ever forcibly send an indictee to the Hague. While Croatian witnesses continue to cooperate with the Office of the Trial Prosecutor, they, together with the indictees, are controlling the pace of Croatia’s cooperation, rather than the Racan Government itself. 11. (C) One of the longer-lasting effects of the Government’s mishandling of the Bobetko Indictment is that Deputy Prime Minister Goran Granic, who remains Racan’s “goto” man on a broad range of issues, has become embittered and resentful and may be less willing to engage on issues important to us. Granic has managed Croatia’s relations with ICTY since the Racan Government came to power. His deeply held emotional view remains that the text of the indictments call into question Croatia’s right to defend its territory and “criminalized” Croatia’s homeland war. That view drove the unhelpful policy and chest-thumping rhetoric at the start of the Bobetko affair. Racan took over direct management of the issue for the peak of the crisis, but now that it is out of the headlines, Granic is again managing the issue and his views have not changed, his resentment is again creeping into his public statements. Stumbling forward, Muddling through 12. (C) Croatia has made progress on some key reforms, but the process nearly always creates so much bad feeling that even committed reformers are losing motivation. The new minorities law is a good example: the result was welcomed by the International community as well as by Croatia’s minorities as a solid step forward, but the process of getting it passed was so acrimonious that the Government managed to alienate most leaders of Croatia’s ethnic minorities, and even made the HDZ seem like the reasonable brokers who finally put the deal together. Unemployment is still very high (16 percent) and remains one of the Government’s biggest political liabilities, but even that indicator is showing signs of improvement. By failing to adequately include unions in the drafting process of a new Labor Law, however, the Government is almost certain to lose the endorsement of labor leaders in the next elections. 13. (C) Croatia passed sweeping defense reforms and a new national security strategy. Implementation of these restructuring programs, including a vital military downsizing plan, has been spotty at best, mired by a mixture of insufficient political will and an insufficient budget. While the resource challenges are real, opportunities for progress were lost to political turmoil and bickering about appointments to senior positions. Nevertheless, Croatia was welcomed into NATO’s Membership Action Plan. Its eagerness to
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join the Alliance will be an important tool to urge this Government and its successors to get necessary reforms on track. 14. (C) The Racan Government has begun to tout its record on creating a climate of macroeconomic stability. Tthroughout this third year in office, it managed to keep interest rates low to encourage investment, keep the kuna rate stable, increase foreign currency holdings and again (after a tortuous process) managed to come to agreement with the IMF on a stand-by arrangement. But these results are slow to trickle down to the average Croatian. Lack of progress on privatization and judicial reform have kept levels of foreign direct investment low. Government debt is reaching worrisome levels, as the Government continues to subsidize loss-making industries. However, by slashing tariffs and keeping interest rates low, there has been a boom in consumer demand which has pumped up growth and improved some Croatians’ standard of living. Getting Better at Regional Relations 15. (C) The Racan Government has always asserted that improving relations with Croatia’s neighbors in the region is a top foreign policy priority, but results have been mixed. 2002 was a better year: Slovenia finally let Racan off the hook for his july 2001 gaffe on Piran Bay (initialing an unratifiable maritime border agreement). Croatia maintained a generally positive stance towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, and while it made no real progress on returns issues (see below), it resolved a long-standing border dispute at Kostajnica and continued to encourage Bosnian croats to strengthen their own country’s central institutions and stop looking to Zagreb. The most progress has been made with Yugoslavia. Croatia and Yugoslavia finally hammered out a durable “temporary” deal on the Prevlaka Peninsula, leading to the closure of the UN Observer Mission there. Capping a year of steadily improving economic relations, Economy Minister Jurcic signed a Free Trade Agreement with Yugoslavia in Belgrade on December 23. Croatia has made encouraging noises about working closely with Macedonia and Albania, the two other “continuing aspirants” for NATO membership. Strong Support for Anti-terrorist Coalition 16. (C) Croatia’s support in the war on terror has been consistently strong. In addition to its contribution of humanitarian assistance in April, Croatia made a significant donation of weapons and munitions to the Afghan National Army, and in December, the Parliament approved the deployment of a unit of military police to Afghanistan in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While the balky Croatian bureaucracy has so far prevented progress on a mio regime, Croatia, with a little direction from US, interdicted and seized the MV Boka Star, a Tonga-flagged ship attempting to smuggle rocket propellant from Montenegro, perhaps for onward delivery to Iraq. Croatia needs to move forward more quickly on ratifying international terrorism conventions identified by UNSCR 1373, especially the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Finance, which is stalled in the Government’s bureaucracy. Failing Grades on Refugee Return and Judicial Reform 17. (C) The most disappointing failure of the Racan Government has been the disparity between rhetoric and reality on refugee returns and property restitution issues. The numbers of ethnic Serbs returning to their homes in Croatia in 2002 remained flat while
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numbers elsewhere were peaking. The Government failed to follow through on its commitments – and its own law – on evicting Bosnian Croats from illegally-occupied homes belonging to Serbs. While budget shortfalls were genuine, the Government could have done much more to encourage returns. Despite consistent urging from the International community, the Racan Government simply did not make these issues a high priority. Now, with an election year in the offing, it is even less likely that the Government will focus on returns. Both we and our European colleagues have made it increasingly clear that Croatia must perform on this issue if it hopes to progress towards EU and NATO membership. This is a message we must continue to hammer home at NATO, as we believe the eu will also in response to Croatia’s application for candidacy. 18. (C) Croatia’s judiciary remains the sector where the Racan Government has made the least progress on reforms. The lack of properly-functioning civil courts has become an obstacle to reforms in other areas like privatization and property restitution. But the problems in criminal courts have more costly effects: poor procedure, lack of organization, insufficient resources and – most importantly – unprofessional jurists subject to political influence have meant that some serious crimes have gone unpunished. The lack of leadership and commitment to judicial reforms has had an impact on our engagement with the Government. USAID recently terminated an assistance program with the Zagreb Municipal Land Registry, after two years of mixed results. The Registry’s multiyear backlog is a major barrier to both foreign and domestic investment, yet the court resisted all efforts to implement meaningful managerial reforms. Similarly, progress on an ongoing joint World Bank/USAID program to develop and implement a new court and case management system in commercial courts country-wide has been slowed to a crawl due to a Ministry of Justice that is uncooperative and resistant to reform. 19. (C) There is some hope for change. Although the Justice Minister continues to disappoint, Croatia passed a new Criminal Code and installed a new, businesslike State Attorney in 2002. While the Lora war crimes trial was a spectacular failure, that ruling could be reversed on appeal. The Bobetko Indictment may have given new energy and urgency to the Government’s efforts to prosecute war crimes domestically. Hopes for EU and NATO Membership 20. (C) EU membership remains Croatia’s top priority, and it has made some important progress toward that goal in the past year. The Government intends to submit its formal application in the first half of 2003. The EU‘s response will be colored by Croatia’s handling of the Bobetko Indictment. The Racan Government has announced a “European offensive” in which the PM will visit most EU capitals in the coming month to try to get Croatia back in the good books of member states. 21. (C) NATO membership remains a high priority for the Government, but has less salience with the public after Prague; the understanding that an invitation is years away has filtered down. With U.S. forces engaged elsewhere, we have less high-profile military engagement with Croatia. Looking ahead 22. (C) As 2003 unfolds and elections approach, the Racan Government will try to focus on a narrower set of goals with easy-to-understand appeal to voters. One political insider told us that the HSS would never call for new elections with a papal visit on the
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calendar for June. Since they would not risk being blamed for disrupting the tourist season either, the most likely date for elections would be October 2003, before the budget has to be passed. Elections must take place before April 2004, within sixty days after the end of the current sabor’s four-year term, which began when the new Parliament first convened in february 2000. That likely means Croatia – and we – face a long campaign season in which little progress is made on the issues most important to us. 23. (C) Polls show that this election is Racan’s to lose: the number of respondents who say they will vote, but have not decided for whom, is larger even than the HDZ’s numbers. Pollsters tell us that this number of undecided voters is increasing in direct proportion to SDP’s losses in the polls. All of the political parties likely to win seats in the next Parliament have announced they will not join a pre-election coalition, but all readily recognize that the days of a single-party Government are gone. That should have the salutatory effect of forcing the HDZ to move to the center, to make it a palatable choice for potential coalition partners. 24. (C) Our strongly held view remains that the HDZ has not yet evolved enough to make it a good choice for Croatia’s future and will not soon. If Racan is to succeed, he needs to use the coming year to convince voters that a Coalition led by the SDP would bring Croatia closer to its goals than the HDZ. It is still in our interests to help him achieve this goal. As Croatia has matured, so has the role of the International community in the political process. Rather than the activist, interventionist policy we successfully implemented to get Racan’s Coalition elected, we intend in this election season to focus on helping Coalition parties focus their messages and get out the vote. 25. (C) We will continue to press the Croatian Government to move forward with reforms on all fronts. While election pressures may make them less responsive to us, our EU colleagues will likely have more leverage, since many voters will make their choice based on how successfully they think candidates will move Croatia towards the EU. This is a good thing, since more than ever, we and the EU are pushing Croatia to make the same choices, and the EU is pushing harder than in the past. 26. (C) Part of the reason we give the Racan Government such low marks is because three years ago we had such high expectations. And yet the Coalition Government has failed to live up to Croatian voters’ and our own hopes, it has made some important progress. Croatia has brought increased stability to Southeast Europe. But if it shows nothing else, the Bobetko Indictment shows how shallow reforms are here. Our continued engagement is vital to ensure that changes begun three years ago are institutionalized. Rossin confidential

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ring Reference id: 03ZAGREB470 Subject: Otp Bombast on Gotovina / Croatian Non-cooperation on Document ShaOrigin: Embassy Zagreb (Croatia) Cable time: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/03/03ZAGREB470.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS CORRECTED COPY (ADDING PRISTINA) STATE FOR EUR, EUR/SCE, S/WCI THE HAGUE FOR JOHNSON/KAYE/WHEATON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6: 5 YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY SECRET PAGE 02 ZAGREB 00470 01 OF 03 052218Z Tags: KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], HR [Croatia], HRKAWC, ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], War Crimes Ref: ZAGREB 305 Classified By: POLOFF ROBERT SILBERSTEIN, REASON 1.6 (X6) Summary 1. (S) Thomas Osorio (strictly protect), Head of ICTY’s Zagreb Office, told us March 4 that recent statements by OTP spokesperson Hartmann and OTP political advisor Joris lambasting the GoC for its failure to capture ICTY indictee Ante Gotovina were “unprofessional.” Osorio told us that he has seen no credible evidence to support recent OTP claims that Gotovina is “moving freely” in Croatia. According to Osorio, the OTP was prepared cite the GoC for non-compliance on technical grounds if Croatia did not serve the ICTY Indictment to General Bobetko, even though the ICTY judge was set to rule that the General’s health precluded a trial. While the OTP’s frustration is understandable, mismanagement of the Gotovina case and piling on over Bobetko undercuts the ICTY‘s credibility with its allies and strengthens the hand of rejectionists just as the Tribunal enters a period of increasing tension with the GoC over non-compliance with document requests related to Croatia’s involvement in Bosnia during the war. End summary. Another Intemperate Blast from the OTP 2. (C) In separate media interviews on February 27 and 28. OTP spokesperson Florence Hartmann and OTP political advisor Jean-Jaques Joris issued statements saying that ICTY indictee Ante Gotovina was “moving freely in Croatia,” and that the GoC failed to use the numerous opportunities it had to catch the fugitive. Joris went on to add that the OTP had provided “evidence” to the GoC on Gotovina, but yet the GoC failed to act. Both Hartmann and Joris also openly criticized Croatian cooperation on document sharing, highlighting specifically its failure to deliver Bosnia-related documents despite numerous ICTY requests.
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3. (C) On March 3, we met with Croatian Police Director Ranko Ostojic to discuss the Gotovina case. Ostojic repeated his mantra that the police faithfully follow up on every lead, but actionable evidence has never been provided (or developed by the Croatians). A special police unit has Gotovina’s family and close associates under surveillance. Ostojic, however, categorically refuted Joris’ charge on Gotovina. Neither he, nor ambassador Krnic, the head of the GoC Office for cooperation with ICTY, who recently visited the Hague on consultations, had received any information from the OTP on Gotovina’s whereabouts. 4. (SBU) Publicly, the GoC has denied that there is any break in Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. Prime Minister Racan commented that, “for various reasons,” people are attempting “to fabricate” a conflict between ICTY and the GoC. OTP not Professional 5. (S) In light of the war of words between the OTP and the GoC, the apparent disconnect between the OTP and the GoC over information sharing and our concerns – expressed reftel – that the OTP does not have a coherent strategy for dealing with Croatia, we met March 4 with ICTY Zagreb Office head Thomas Osorio (strictly protect throughout). While calling the OTP’s handling of the Gotovina case amateurish, Osorio confirmed that the OTP’s complaints about GoC document sharing are valid and are reaching crisis levels. 6. (S) On Gotovina, the OTP is its own worst enemy, Osorio said. As far as he knows, there is no new credible information available demonstrating Gotovina’s presence in Croatia. There were reported sightings of Gotovina in Zagreb around Christmas. However, the OTP investigators, who developed the lead from interviews with other Croatian war crimes suspects, only provided the information to the Croatian police well after the fact. By that time, the lead – if indeed it ever was credible – had gone stale. This error was part of a continuing trend among OTP officials who refuse to verify information with the local Zagreb Office which has been coordinating the Gotovina investigation with the Croatian police from the outset. Instead, OTI investigators pass on those erroneous, stale or circular leads to Joris, Hartmann and Del Ponte as fact. Osorio said that he urgently contacted OTP advisor Anton Nikiforov to intercede with Hartmann and Joris to correct the record. He also asked that Nikoforov ensure that any future statements on Gotovina are supported by incontrovertible fact. Document Sharing: Real GoC “Non-compliance”? 7. (S) Osorio says that the OTP view of Croatian cooperation on document sharing has changed dramatically for the worse since last October, when Del Ponte told the UNSC that she was satisfied with Croatian cooperation. Over the past few months, the OTP has conducted a comprehensive information audit and has determined that the GoC is substantially lagging in responding to document requests on a wide range of issues. As reported reftel, the major GoC failing continues to be the provision of documents on Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia. 8. (S) We asked Osorio to address the Croatian argument, now bandied in the local media, that OTP document requests are too broad. Osorio said that such charges are false. Investigators are putting together the final pieces of their cases and know exactly what they are looking for, he said. In the case of the Bosnia, requests are very detailed, even to
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the point where investigators are seeking specific transcripts of conversations of President Tudjman and then-defense minister Gojko Susak from 1993. These transcripts reportedly show Tudjman deciding which officials should be appointed to the croatian para-government of Herceg-Bosna and ordering specific units of the Croatian military (hv) to enter and fight in Bosnia. According to osorio, in one case, the Tribunal has a copy of such a transcript and merely are seeking a certified copy for evidentiary purposes. Osorio said that the GoC also has failed to provide bank records related to the transfer of funding through Privredna banka to support hv and HVO operations in Bosnia. 9. (S) On January 30, Del Ponte wrote a letter to Deputy Premier Goran Granic, in which, according to Osorio, the ICTY Chief Prosecutor read the GoC “the riot act.” The letter states that the OTP is “concerned and disappointed” that documents “are being withheld” and that Croatia is “not in compliance” with its UNSC and Dayton obligations on the provision of BiH documentation. The January 30 letter states that if the GoC does not hand over the documents in question by April 4, the OTP will request that a judge subpoena them. The OTP also will ask the judge to issue a Search Warrant, armed with which ICTY officials would approach privredna banka to open its archives. Additionally, the OTP will petition the judge to subpoena the GoC – either Granic or Krnic – to explain to the Tribunal Croatian non-compliance. The act of subpoenaing would trigger a report of non-compliance to the UNSC, osorio added. 10. (S) Granic replied to Del Ponte in mid-February, affirming that the GoC would make its “best effort” to find the documents in question, but some documents “did not exist.” Other documents would not be “easy to find” because the information that the OTP provided was not specific enough. With regard to the bank documents, Granic said that GoC efforts to provide the documents were complicated by Croatian bank secrecy laws. 11. (S) While Osorio could not confirm why the GoC was withholding the documents – it is common knowledge that HV units fought in bosnia during the war – Osorio agreed with us that one possible motive could be GOC fear that the documents would confirm direct Croatian intervention in Bosnia from the outset of the war as well as the intention of President Tudjman to carve out of Bosnia an ethnically pure independent Croatian entity. Osorio believed these facts would provide sufficient basis for the GoBiH to file a strong suit against Croatia for war reparations before the International Court of Justice. Bobetko Case Still Simmering 12. (S) Osorio described Del Ponte as being frustrated with both the ICTY presiding judge and the GoC on the Bobetko Case. Del Ponte is “pissed off” with the Presiding Judge because he has not ruled on the medical expert team’s report on General Bobetko and on the General’s fitness to stand trial. The OTP’s expectation still is that the judge will rule that Bobetko is unfit. 13. (S) At the same time, Del Ponte is furious at the Croatian courts for not ordering that the Bobetko Indictment be delivered to the accused or to his lawyers, as is specified under Croatian law. Pointing to a February 13 local press report in which Bobetko received local HDZ officials in the hospital, Osorio said that if Bobetko is fit enough to receive local guests, he is fit enough to receive the indictment. The OTP is preparing a request to the GOC that it – as the OTP’s local agent – file a motion before the presiding Zagreb Judge to request him to serve the Indictment to Bobetko or his legal representatives. Failure of the GoC to act on the OTP’s behalf would be another reason to cite Croatia for
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non-compliance, Osorio said. While he acknowledged that some could perceive this approach as “sour grapes,” he said it was an important point of principal that states comply fully with all their obligations. This is one such case. Comment 14. (C) The OTP’s predilection to issue unsubstantiated statements on Gotovina’s whereabouts and its lack of consultation with its own experts on the ground damages the OTP’s credibility with the ICTY‘s international supporters, particularly with US and the british. The OTP must make clear to US what evidence it has on Gotovina. More broadly, it must do a far better job in managing its croatia portfolio if we are to weigh in effectively on ICTY‘s behalf with recalcitrant GOC officials. 15. (C) The OTP’s mishandling of the, Gotovina case threatens to overshadow what appears to be serious Croatian non-compliance over document sharing. The OTP’s unprofessional behavior on Gotovina diminishes the institution, weakens the few professionals in Croatia intent on capturing the fugitive, and strengthens the hand of the many here that argue that ICTY is only pursuing a purely political agenda. Rossin secret

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Reference id: 03THEHAGUE1417 Subject: Icty: Is Milosevic Holding Up? Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Thu, 5 Jun 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/06/03THEHAGUE1417.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/MILLER, EUR – BOGUE, EUR/SCE – JONES/GREGORIAN, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SPRIGG E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], SR [Serbia], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: A. BELGRADE 810 B. THE HAGUE 209 AND PREVIOUS Classified by: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5 (b) and (d) a nd 1.6. 1. (C) Summary: The last two months have dealt blows to Slobodan Milosevic from Belgrade and within the trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the ICTY, a series of witnesses have hammered Milosevic
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with crime-based details of the joint criminal enterprise of which Milosevic is alleged to be the head. As in the past, such challenges have been coupled with a decline in Milosevic’s health, whether genuinely brought on by the tensions of the trial, manipulated for tactical reasons to prompt a trial delay, or a combination of the two. Meanwhile, the series of actions taken by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro (GOSAM) to round up those connected to the criminal gangs associated with the assassination of Zoran Djindjic has damaged his support network and further increased the pressure on him. In discussions with well-placed officials in the Registry and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and based on their observations of him at trial, Embassy legal officers have gathered a mixed picture of Milosevic’s physical and mental health. End summary. 2. (C) Embassy Belgrade has reported extensively on the law enforcement actions taken by the GOSAM since the March assassination of Zoran Djindjic, which in the process has netted much of Milosevic’s former colleagues in running the former Yugoslavia (ref a, among others). Much of the round-up has hit Milosevic directly. Close observers of the trial, including those within OTP and the Registry, have long believed that Markovic has given general direction to the accused’s defense efforts and led the political efforts on his behalf, supported by Simatovic, Stanisic and a bevy of Serb lawyers and bureaucratic (security, military, police) holdovers from the Milosevic regime. A Registry official has seen evidence that the support such persons provided is now drying up, leaving Milosevic increasingly isolated in his prison cell. 3. (C) In the weeks following the ICTY‘s spring recess (April 21 – 25), lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice (protect), who sees Milosevic in the courtroom regularly, did not detect noticeable changes in his physical appearance or his ability to concentrate on the proceedings or conduct cross-examination. However, Registry senior legal officer Christian Rohde (protect), who sees Milosevic on a weekly basis outside the courtroom and monitors his health closely, gave a markedly different take. He told embassy legal officers that Milosevic had lost “a couple of kilos” in the past few weeks alone. Rohde said that those who see him outside of the proceedings believe that his defense is “totally weakening” and that it appears that he has lost access to his sources of intelligence and finances, something, Rohde averred, that is showing in his diminished level of trail preparation. The Registry has Milosevic’s blood pressure under control at this time, but that is only because he is taking his medication as prescribed. If Milosevic goes off his medication, as he has done before, the health problems that have disrupted the trial in the past could come to the fore once again. On May 27, Milosevic came down with a high fever, causing the trial chamber to adjourn the trial for two days. However, the trial resumed on May 29. 4. (C) Senior trial attorney Dermot Groome (protect) concurred with Nice’s view that, if the accused is suffering physically, his appearance does not reflect it in any worrying way. Embassy legal officers, who see Milosevic far less often than the prosecutors or Registry officials, noted that while Milosevic looked a bit gaunt during some proceedings in May, he did not look ill. Yet during the week of May 13, Groome told an embassy legal officer that, while he did not detect serious physical problems with Milosevic aside from some gauntness, he did notice a few changes in his preparation and courtroom behavior. (Note: Groome cautioned that these were initial impressions and could not be taken to reflect any kind of medical or psychological evaluation.) Groome said that on May 8, the accused showed signs of “disconnected thought processes” in his cross-examination, an area in which Milosevic was usually strong. His questions on cross were dis24

jointed and did not seem to attend toward any particular goal. Groome found particularly disturbing an event in May 9, when, at the conclusion of his cross examination, Milosevic stood around with the amici curiae (the “friends of the court” assisting the defense but not defending him per se) and “giggled and engaged in silly” conversation – something he’d never seen Milosevic do in over one year of trial proceedings. It could be fatigue, Groome suggested, but in a worst-case scenario, it could also spell the beginning of some kind of physical or mental exhaustion. If the latter, Groome worried that the chamber could be put in an even trickier bind than it is currently (i.e., where it must monitor the accused’s blood pressure) because it would need to monitor his ability or competency to defend himself. Moreover, with a series of insider witnesses appearing in the coming weeks, Groome is worried about the possible cumulative effect of evidence and outside pressures on Milosevic’s health. 5. (U) Meanwhile, an outburst by Milosevic during the presentation of “crime-base” evidence by the prosecution over the past few weeks resulted in a significant admission that the prosecution intends to exploit. Protected witness B-1461, a farmer from outside Zvornik, testified to the brutality of a Bosnian Serb paramilitary group under Dusan Vuckovic. During cross-examination, Milosevic asserted that “I and the authorities of Serbia” punished Vuckovic as a war criminal for his actions. While Milosevic may have thought that he was distancing himself from the crimes described, the outburst also provide an admission of a degree of disciplinary authority that he exercised over Bosnian Serb paramilitaries – contrary to his normal insistence that Belgrade had nothing to do with the paramilitaries. 6. (U) On May 20, the trial chamber granted the prosecution’s request for an additional 100 trial days beginning May 16 for it to complete its case. Milosevic did not object to the request reportedly stating to the judges, “Time has been the only consideration in what you call a trial.” The trial chamber concluded that circumstances exist to vary the original order calling for the prosecution to finish its case by May 16, and that it is in the interests of justice to allow the prosecution to call as many witnesses as possible relating to its core case. (There have been more than 50 days lost due to Milosevic’s ill health since the trial began.) The extension means that the trial will most likely continue into 2005. The trial chamber noted that without a final prosecution witness list, it is difficult for the accused to adequately prepare his defense. The prosecution stated that they would finalize the witness list shortly. 7. (C) Comment: Milosevic is entering the final stage of the trial against him in a significantly weaker position than he was just a few months ago. To outside observers, the prosecution seems to have hit its stride, with credible witnesses testifying to terrible crimes committed by those who were affiliated with Milosevic or his supporters. Milosevic seems to lack the resources to intimidate and rattle witnesses as he has done in the past. Meanwhile, his support network is dissipating – it is unlikely that he has spoken to the person closest to him, his wife, since early April, when she was targeted for arrest by Belgrade law enforcement authorities. The big question facing the prosecutors and the bench at this stage is whether the flood of bad news will eventually overwhelm Milosevic’s physical and/or mental health. Milosevic, though diminished, is not near that stage now but the coming weeks should make clearer whether the recent downturn in his health was a another in a series of temporary fluctuations or the beginning of a more sustained decline. End comment. Sobel
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VIII
Reference id: 03THEHAGUE1806 Subject: Icc: A Cautious Beginning With Mixed Signals From The Prosecutor Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 15 Jul 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/07/03THEHAGUE1806.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2013 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KJUS [Administration of Justice], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], KICC Ref: 02 THE HAGUE 3524 Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per reasons 1.5(b) an d (d). 1. (C) Summary: Public documents of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and conversations with diplomats from friendly states parties to the Rome Statute and other members of The Hague international law community have given Embassy legal officers an early glimpse into the formative activities at ICC headquarters. Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo and his key staffers are working to develop principles, rules and regulations to guide their selection of the first preliminary examinations and investigations while at the same time culling through over 400 submissions alleging potential crimes for the ICC to pursue. Ocampo has signaled his interest in examining potential crimes in Congo and Colombia. Less clear are his views on Iraq. While he has spoken of alleged crimes involving British forces in Iraq in semi-public briefings, his private comments indicate that such cases would be highly unlikely candidates for ICC investigations. Meanwhile, in late June, the ICC ended the phase of leadership head-hunting when ICC judges selected Bruno Cathala of France as the organization’s first Registrar. With leadership figures now in place in all three branches of the court, the next key event is Ocampo’s press briefing on July 16 where he will provide an overview of “information received by the Office of the Prosecutor regarding potential situations under the jurisdiction of the Court.” End summary. The Prosecutor Promises Restraint and Focus 2. (C) ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo faces three major tasks at this time – setting out his office’s investigative and prosecutorial policies and principles, organizing the office itself, and reviewing incoming information concerning potential crimes. Ocampo’s early thoughts on prosecutorial policy may be found in a draft policy paper
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OTP published on the ICC website in advance of a June 17-18 OTP “public seminar” (see www.icc-cpi.int/otp/policy.php). OTP seems to be making an effort to cool the passions and lower the expectations of ICC activists who want the prosecutor to issue ambitious indictments soon. Three aspects of the paper in particular give an early view into how Ocampo intends to manage his investigative responsibilities. 3. (C) First, the paper emphasizes the constraints on ICC action much more than the opportunities for investigations and prosecutions. Echoing the new Registrar’s views (see paras 11-13 below), it emphasizes “the logistical constraints that will limit the practical scope of action of the Court” and argues for “a project-oriented as opposed to a static organisation model” for the court. Its emphasis on resource constraints is matched by a stated commitment to complementarity – the principle that national jurisdictions have primacy over the ICC and that the ICC merely complements national systems. It makes a restrained, if rhetorical, claim that the ICC’s success should be measured “by the absence of trials by the ICC as a consequence of the effective functioning of national systems.” Such rhetoric, we have heard from close observers of the ICC, has strongly irritated leading ICC supporters in the non-governmental organization (NGO) community. 4. (C) With respect to complementarity, OTP takes an initial stab at evaluating the content of the Rome Statute’s provision for determining that the ICC may take jurisdiction over a situation if an otherwise responsible state would be “unwilling or unable” to exercise its jurisdiction. It suggests that the prosecutor will need to take a hard look at such situations before proceeding to investigations. The paper emphasizes that “States remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting crimes committed under their jurisdiction and that national systems are expected to maintain and enforce adherence to international standards.” Indeed, the prosecutor seems eager to use his position as much to “help State authorities to fulfill their duty to investigate and prosecute at the national level” as to investigate and prosecute crimes himself. 5. (C) Second, the OTP is clearly heading toward a policy – similar to that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – of focusing its investigative and prosecutorial energies on senior-level perpetrators of crimes within its jurisdiction. Here the OTP appears to be taking a narrower approach than the Rome Statute, which refers to “the most serious crimes of concern” to the international community, by focusing on only the most senior alleged perpetrators of such crimes. The OTP argues that “(t)he concept of gravity should not be exclusively attached to the act that constituted the crime but also to the degree of participation in its commission.” The OTP policy paper concludes that the OTP should therefore “focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly responsible for those crimes.” Embassy legal officers have learned from some participants at the June 17-18 OTP seminar that this aspect of the paper caused the greatest consternation among the NGO community, which decried the emergence of a so-called “impunity gap,” in which senior levels get prosecuted but lower-level criminals escape prosecution. OTP anticipated that charge by stating, in its paper, that “less grave cases” should be returned to national jurisdictions for prosecution – again, a further echo of the ICTY and its “completion strategy”. 6. (C) Finally, the OTP does not fully suggest how it will evaluate information that NGOs and individuals are increasingly submitting as evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. Embassy contacts have noted that the prosecutor seems obli27

gated to evaluate incoming information, whatever its source, pointing to the provision of Article 15(2) of the Rome Statute that the “Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received.” The paper emphasizes that OTP’s Analysis Section “must be strengthened” so that it can undertake “focused and effective” preliminary examinations of incoming information. The OTP especially wants to develop analytic capabilities to identify “complex patterns of criminal conduct” and the presence of elements of alleged crimes. Again, the paper returns to the theme of resource limitations, noting the OTP’s interest in “cost-effective” investigations. 7. (C) A set of “draft regulations” designed to guide OTP’s investigative and prosecutorial activities gives some insight into how it will evaluate whether information provides a sufficient basis for an investigation. For instance, the draft section on preliminary examinations would guide the office from the initial collection of communications submitted to the OTP, to its “assessment of the credibility and reliability of the sources of information” and the preparation of a “preliminary examination report” and “draft investigation plan.” The ultimate aim in this respect would be a recommendation from the deputy prosecutors for investigations and prosecutions to the chief prosecutor as to whether OTP should seek authorization from a pre-trial chamber to conduct an investigation. A draft investigation plan would assess such items as the reasonableness of belief that a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction took place; the role of likely suspects and aims of an investigation; whether a case would meet the complementarity standards of the Statute; a discussion of required resources for an investigation; and other matters. The full text of the regulations may be found at www.icc-cip.int/otp/draft regulations. 8. (C) At the organizational level, the OTP deputy slots remain to be filled (perhaps by a decision of the Assembly of States Parties in September), though Ocampo has initiated an active hiring program that tracks his focus on policies and investigations rather than prosecutions at this stage. The institution remains small, and OTP is looking to hire mid-level investigators and lawyers to guide preliminary examinations of incoming information as well as lawyers with background in public international criminal law. He has hired as his chief of staff and head of the OTP’s “complementarity unit” Argentine diplomat and lawyer Sylvia Fernandez. Fernandez has extensive experience with the ICC, having served as a senior negotiator for Argentina at Rome and as head of the working group looking at the definition of aggression in the ICC Preparatory Commission. A UK colleague indicated that she is considered a reliable and serious person who is rated very highly by FCO lawyers. The experience of some USG delegates to the ICC Rome Conference is less positive and some credit her with the drafting of various anti-U.S. provisions in the statute. We expect that Fernandez’ role and influence will become clearer over time. But Is Ocampo Ready For Prime Time? 9. (C) While Ocampo seems to be moving the OTP in a careful direction with his draft policy paper, his public statements reveal a prosecutor who has not yet mastered his public role. Ocampo will be further tested and subject to public scrutiny when he describes in a July 16 press conference the over 400 submissions received by the OTP thus far, of which over 100 are said to be Iraq-related. In semi-private forums and in private conversations reported to Embassy legal officers, Ocampo has indicated consistently that his initial investigative interests will focus not on Iraq but on the situation in the Congo, in28

cluding the potential involvement of Belgians with financial interests in the diamond industry, and Colombia. In public, however, Ocampo has been less restrained. At a recent presentation before a group of ICTY staff and students participating in a Humanity in Action summer course, Ocampo said that he was looking at the actions of British forces in Iraq – which, according to one Embassy source, led a British ICTY prosecutor nearly to fall off his chair. It was, another participant said, “a complete shocker” and came without any qualifications. Such statements may contain less than meets the eye. Privately, Ocampo has said that he wishes to dispose of Iraq issues (i.e., not investigate them), much in line with what Registrar Cathala is urging (see para 13 below). In addition, some observers of Ocampo believe he has adopted too much of an academic approach – raising situations such as Iraq not to signal areas he wishes to investigate but to illustrate the limits of the ICC’s jurisdiction (i.e., that jurisdiction may extend to UK but not U.S. personnel). 10. (C) Embassy interlocutors have also suggested that Ocampo’s public remarks may be directed at fending off a wave of dissatisfaction among the NGO community about his draft policy paper. According to this reasoning, Ocampo wants to bring attention to the complaints he has received so as to prompt governments to conduct their own investigations and thereby provide a basis for removing these cases from ICC review under the complementarity provision. A colleague at the UK Embassy, who was aware of Ocampo’s remarks concerning the UK, said London was not particularly concerned because any information about UK war crimes, if assessed reliable, would be the subject of investigation by relevant UK authorities and, ultimately, not be subject to ICC investigation. Some Embassy contacts also suggest that Ocampo’s mediocre English skills may give his public remarks a less nuanced and more glib tenor than intended. A Cautious French Administrator for the ICC 11. (C) On June 24, the ICC’s 18 judges selected as Registrar France’s Bruno Cathala – a pragmatist who impressed Embassy legal officers in his former function as deputy registrar of the ICTY. Cathala has been the de facto Registrar since the fall, when the Assembly of States Parties drew him away from the ICTY in order to be the ICC’s Director of Common Services, or chief administrator. (Note: His selection disappointed the Dutch Government, which had expected, as is the tradition with many international legal institutions in the Hague, that the position would go to the Dutch candidate. End note.) A lawyer and civil law judge by training, Cathala has long experience in court and organizational management. The Embassy’s experience with Cathala as deputy registrar of the ICTY is solidly positive; he was a leading force behind the emergence of the completion strategy and a constant thorn in the sides of ICTY judges and prosecutors, whom he pressed daily to stick to ICTY efficiency and completion strategy benchmarks. He regularly made himself available to Embassy officers to discuss ICTY issues, and in our periodic contact with him since his departure from the ICTY, has emphasized his interest in seeing the ICC develop in a decentralized, flexible, measured, and narrowly focused way. See reftel. 12. (C) Sensitive to the ICC’s resource limitations, Cathala believes that the ICC cannot seek to try all war criminals within the court’s jurisdiction but needs to focus its efforts on those most responsible for such crimes. It is a vision derived from his experience at the ICTY and leads him to a different place than many of the ICC’s strongest sup29

porters. While he will not have influence over the prosecutor’s specific investigative decisions, he will be in a position to help steer the ICC in a fiscally responsible direction. An energetic and voluble character, Cathala professes to be a proponent of caution within the ICC, and his control of the purse will undoubtedly influence the OTP and chambers. 13. (C) Cathala (please protect) told an embassy legal officer that he has strongly advised Ocampo to speak very carefully in public and to be extraordinarily sensitive to the way even strictly accurate statements may be perceived. In the face of the media “pushing and pushing” and under the watchful eyes of governments, the “first wrong word,” Cathala said, could easily spell disaster for the court. It will be crucial, he said, for the ICC to dispose easily of “silly things like Iraq”. “We’re not going to run all over the world,” said Cathala, who added that he personally wants relations with the USG to be smooth. Comment 14. (C) Cathala’s personal comments to Emboff and Ocampo’s early OTP documents seem designed to put the USG at ease and assure us that the court will proceed carefully and not launch controversial investigations. Ocampo’s public statements raise concerns less about what he will investigate and prosecute – as one colleague noted to us, the prosecutor has an obligation not merely to throw away complaints but must at least dispose of them according to some logic – than about his ability to avoid embroiling the ICC in controversy even in the absence of any investigations. The proof of Ocampo’s abilities and intentions, of course, will be found in how he selects and investigates his first targets. 15. (C) Despite the seeming transparency of the OTP, many questions are likely to remain unanswered until the first investigations are announced. For instance, how will the OTP sift through its growing in-box, some submissions no doubt legitimate but many more politically motivated and useless for the purpose of investigations? How in practice will the prosecutor determine when a State is “unwilling or unable” to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged crime? Will the prosecutor undertake preliminary investigations even before determining whether a State is “unable or unwilling” to do so itself? What specific crimes will be of the most interest to the OTP, and how high up the chain of command will the prosecutor select his investigative targets? With Ocampo beginning to sift through investigation submissions and new staff coming on board, the coming months should demonstrate more clearly whether the ICC and its leadership have the temperament to pursue and sustain a cautious course. Sobel

IX
Reference id: 03THEHAGUE2611 Subject: Icty: Milosevic Trial Chamber Balances Key Witnesses, Health Issues And Efficient Trial Management Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 10 Oct 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/10/03THEHAGUE2611.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – ROSSIN, EUR/SCE – STEPHEN/GREGORIAN, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: A. THE HAGUE 2568 B. SECSTATE 287657 Classified By: Acting Legal Counselor David Kaye per reasons 1.5 (b)-(d ). 1. (SBU) Summary: Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had its hands full this week as it reconvened to hear the Prosecution’s case against Slobodan Milosevic. Compressed into the new three-day per week schedule, the proceedings balanced the testimony of key witnesses, including General Rupert Smith, Commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995; continued management of Milosevic’s health and defense resources; and procedural mechanisms designed to handle the Prosecution case efficiently. End summary. Key testimony 2. (SBU) On October 9, the trial chamber heard the testimony of General Rupert Smith, Commander of UNPROFOR in 1995 and Deputy Allied Supreme Commander Europe from 1998-2002. His testimony, among other things, placed Milosevic and Mladic at the same meeting on July 15, 1995 in Belgrade. He also testified that the shelling of the market place in Sarajevo in August 1995, which killed and wounded many civilians, must have come from Bosnian Serb positions and not from within the enclave. Smith handled well the cross-examination on this topic, in which Milosevic highlighted discrepancies between an initial French-led investigation and a later, more comprehensive one carried out by Smith’s American-led team. He placed soldiers in “black uniforms” in the assault on Zepa, which occurred directly after the massacres in Srebrenica. The soldiers in black uniforms, Smith testified, were not part of the regular Bosnian Serb forces and wore Serbian Army flashes on their sleeves. They remained in Zepa until they left with Mladic to reinforce an area in West Republica Srpska. He also exposed coded communications which appeared to show that Milosevic was in contact with Mladic through the summer of 1995. Smith testified to his belief that Milosevic must have known of the ongoing Srebrenica atrocities as of the meeting with Mladic on July 15. 3. (C) On the same day of Smith’s testimony, one senior prosecution attorney said that members of the Srebrenica team (i.e., those building the case for Milosevic’s share
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of responsibility for the July 1995 massacres around Srebrenica) were “bouncing off the walls” because of lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice’s failure to elicit Smith’s view that the fact of the massacres – if not the scope – was clearly foreseeable by anybody with knowledge of the situation in and around the so-called UN safe haven. Smith told the prosecution team on the eve of his testimony that he strongly believed this to be true, but, for an unknown reason, Nice failed to ask the relevant questions during the direct examination. Comment: This is especially dispiriting to the Srebrenica team, which is laboring strenuously to build the genocide case against Milosevic. End comment. 4. (SBU) Earlier in the week, the Prosecution called one insider witness who testified to Milosevic’s contacts with key Bosnian Serb leaders and a witness who explained a report regarding statistical analysis of the change in demographics in the Balkans region. Through extensive surveys and analysis of voting records, the report showed how the compositions of different regions of the Balkans radically changed from mixed ethnic demographics to homogenous and separate ethnic populations throughout the duration of the war. The trends were consistent throughout the border regions. The Health of the Accused 5. (C) Milosevic’s health continues to be a pervasive presence in the proceedings. One Prosecution team member told Embassy legal officers that, during the morning break on Tuesday, the first day back in trial after a two-week suspension, a spot-check showed that Milosevic’s blood pressure had spiked to 160/110. After doctors concluded that Milosevic could nonetheless conclude the day’s proceedings, the trial continued in session and Milosevic completed his cross-examination of the witness that day. The Accused, who looked fatigued on Tuesday, looked much better on Wednesday and Thursday in court. 6. (U) Bearing the health concerns in mind, the Trial Chamber, on October 6, ordered that the role of the Amici Curiae be extended to include receiving “communications as the Accused may make to them and to act in any way to protect and further the interests of his Defence.” The Chamber issued the order in light of “the recurring medical condition of the Accused since 18 March 2002; and, the desirability of the Amici Curiae giving greater assistance to the Accused.” 7. (C) Meanwhile, as the trial chamber implemented its new hearing schedule and the health issues remain a key concern for all parties to the trial, members of the Prosecution team are at a very preliminary phase of contemplating whether they could rest their case even before using up their remaining 43 trial days. While they assert that all of their remaining witnesses are critical, some prosecutors are concerned that the trial could be indefinitely postponed due to the accused’s health, or even cut short by his death, leaving the Prosecution unable to present key evidence. One problem, a prosecutor said, was that a premature conclusion of the case would preclude the amici, for example, from filing the equivalent of a “summary judgment” motion under Rule 98 bis of the Tribunal Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Prosecution members believe that the trial chamber would respond to such a motion by ruling that the Prosecution had presented sufficient evidence “to sustain a conviction” (in the words of Rule 98 bis) on many, if not all, of the counts against Milosevic. But if Milosevic were to be incapacitated before the Prosecution rests its case, no Rule 98 bis motion would be presented to the chamber, and the trial could thus be left in limbo without even a modicum of finality.
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Trial Efficiency 8. (SBU) Prior to the testimony of General Smith, the Trial Chamber heard arguments regarding the submission of Smith’s written statement – as opposed to actual direct examination – as evidence-in-chief. Under last week’s Appeals Chambers ruling (ref A), Rule 89(F) provides for the admission of written statements when in the “interest of justice.” Milosevic argued vigorously, and fairly logically, against the submission of written evidence in this case. He referred to the “alleged evidence” in writing as “piles and piles” of paper that the prosecution wants to slip in instead of having oral testimony. The Accused argued that their was no possible way that he could review the documents submitted by the Prosecution. He stated that one could disclose to the court “the existence of the Congress Library” but that would not improve his ability to review every document that it contains. He also argued that while oral testimony can be heard by all in open session, the public has no access to these written statements. 9. (SBU) Lead Prosecutor Nice argued that the primary means of finding discrepancies in testimony occurs during the cross examination, not during the direct. Furthermore, Nice argued that because there is no jury, the professional judges of the Chamber can easily deal with written statements as evidence in lieu of oral testimony. Nice continued that it was in the interest of justice that as much evidence and material be presented to the court as possible. The Chamber ruled in this instance that the written statement would be admitted as evidence-in-chief; however, consistent with the Appeals Chamber’s decision, any material going to the proof of the acts or conduct of the accused must be adduced orally in direct examination. 10. (C) Finally, in a recognition of the dwindling number of prosecution trial days, the Chamber also ordered the Prosecution to submit to the court a finalized witness list within 21 days. Relatedly, the Prosecution intended to file on Friday, October 10, its motion for protective measures for the testimony of General Clark (ref b). The Prosecution is considering whether the testimony of other USG witnesses – including Richard Holbrooke – should be sought. 11. (C) Comment: The week of proceedings was, in many respects, a continuation of recent themes. As it happened, Milosevic showed the ability to persevere through the trial after two weeks off for health reasons, a minor victory in itself. Moreover, he demonstrated a certain engagement in the proceedings – for example, in his cross-examination of General Smith and his arguments against the introduction of Smith’s statement in lieu of oral evidence. Still, the background noise of the trial – the health concerns and the trial chamber’s efforts to maintain a basic fairness to the proceedings – continues to engage the chambers as much as the prosecution’s case itself. Until Milosevic’s health is seen to be stabilizing, that pattern is likely to hold. End comment. Sobel

X
Reference id: 03THEHAGUE2769 Subject: Icty: Key Witnesses Testify To Milosevic’s Control Of Government And Military Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 4 Nov 2003 00:00 UTC
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Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2769.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – ROSSIN, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/ WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified by Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, for reasons 1.5(D) and 1.6. 1. (C) Summary: Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) heard testimony from political insiders the week of October 20 as the Prosecution continued to present its case against Slobodan Milosevic. Two key witnesses offered their versions of the role Milosevic played in the break up of the Former Yugoslavia, particularly with respect to Belgrade’s support for military and paramilitary forces operating in Croatia and Bosnia. While the testimony was generally strong, Milosevic succeeded in making several assertions during cross-examinations that undermined parts of the testimony. The week of October 27 was highlighted by the appearance of Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt as a witness. Milosevic took the rare opportunity to confront a senior member of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to challenge the legitimacy of the court, accuse the OTP of bias and selective prosecution, blame NATO bombings for crimes, and make vague allegations concerning Kosovar terrorism and bin Laden. Separately, the trial chamber granted in full the protective measures sought with respect to General Clark’s testimony, accepting each of the USG’s conditions for such testimony. Clark now appears likely to testify in December. End summary. Week of October 21-23 2. (SBU) On October 21, the trial chamber heard from Gajic Glisic, Chief of Staff for Serbian defense minister General Tomislav Simovic in 1991. She sought to link Milosevic to paramilitaries, establish his influence over the People’s Army of Yugoslavia (JNA), and show his efforts to create a Serbian Army. Early in her testimony, the witness publicly thanked “Comrade Milosevic” for saving her life. She asserted that her life was in danger after General Simovic was “forced” out of the government, but that Milosevic intervened on her behalf to prevent her “liquidation.” She then proceeded to provide a detailed account of interactions between General Simovic and Milosevic. She spoke of how no one ever disagreed with Milosevic, leaving the Minister of Defense, inter alia, without any real power. Her testimony also linked Milosevic to paramilitary groups by sho34

wing that he provided them equipment and training. She also testified that he supported them militarily through JNA operations. She said she was certain that Milosevic knew of the war crimes that were being committed by the paramilitary groups. Specifically, she recounted how Milosevic ordered the JNA to provide air support to paramilitary commander Arkan when his forces were pinned down in Croatia. Glisic also testified that Milosevic assigned General Simovic the task of drafting a “secret” legislative bill that would create a “Serbian Army,” which would replace the JNA. These efforts were eventually thwarted and General Simovic was removed from office in December 1991. 3. (C) On October 22, Milosevic adroitly cross-examined Glisic. Through his questioning, the Accused drew a distinction between the “volunteers” who signed up with the “Territorial Defense” units under the JNA versus the paramilitary groups. She testified that the Minister of Defense only procured equipment and gave training to volunteers for the “Territorial Defense” units. She did, however, again link Milosevic with paramilitary commanders Arkan and Captain Dragan. The Accused was in unusually good humor, smiling on occasion and at one point joking when the witness offered to give him a manuscript of her book. He noted that it is “good to accumulate as much paper as possible, thank you.” 4. (SBU) On October 23, the Prosecution called Ante Markovic, Yugoslavia’s former prime minister. His testimony sought to give the trial chamber insight into Yugoslavia’s government and the role Milosevic played on the eve of war. The witness did not make eye contact with Milosevic and never faced the defendant directly. The witness asserted that he was eventually politically isolated after his attempts at federal reform were thwarted. He resigned in December 1991. Markovic stated that throughout 1991 the federal government’s power was slowly eroded by Milosevic and other nationalist leaders. He testified that the reforms he proposed failed in no small part because of the actions of Milosevic. 5. (SBU) Markovic explained how Milosevic would routinely say that he supported the federal government of Yugoslavia, yet all of his actions sought to undermine it. Markovic said that Milosevic was “obviously fighting for Greater Serbia,” though he also “used everything he could to ensure power for himself “ if that was nationalism, then he used nationalism. But he was not a nationalist. He was someone who used anything at his disposal to secure power for himself.” Markovic also testified about how he confronted both Milosevic and Tudjman about a secret deal to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia. He stated that both of them eventually admitted to this plan. 6. (SBU) Markovic’s testimony gave further substance to the Prosecution’s argument that Milosevic had complete control over the government and military. He explained how no one under Milosevic ever went against him and stayed in power. However, when Judge May asked for concrete examples of this, the witness did not have a compelling answer. Markovic went on to explain that Milosevic was also responsible for the mobilization of the JNA in Slovenia and its movement into Bosnia and Herzegovina. He discussed how the Presidency had not authorized the military intervention, but that Milosevic had control over the army. Lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice also presented a recorded intercept for Markovic to authenticate which showed Milosevic and Karadzic discussing details of military mobilization. 7. (C) Milosevic began his cross-examination of Markovic on the same day, although time constraints led to an abbreviated examination. Milosevic, composed during the
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questioning, provoked Markovic into emotional responses. At two different points, Markovic asked Judge May, “who is on trial, me or the Accused?” Judge May explained to the witness that the Milosevic was facing serious charges and had a right to present his case. Before the cross-examination adjourned, Milosevic sought to establish that Markovic, not himself, had the legal and actual power over the army. Milosevic attempted to show that Markovic was head of state and thereby had control and was thus responsible for the mobilization of the JNA in Slovenia. The witness refuted such conclusions saying that in actuality the federal government had no power and that, as prime minister, he had no authority to authorize the military interventions. 8. (SBU) At one point, Milosevic produced a documentary review of the federal executive agenda for 1991 providing details of Markovic’s schedule, which Markovic authenticated. Milosevic said that the document came from the federal records archive in Belgrade and then sardonically noted that the entries for December were rather short. Nice then noted that the archives are closed to the Prosecution and wondered out loud how such documents were available for the Accused. Nice later requested that the court retain the original, against the wishes of the Accused, and also asked how Milosevic received this document. The court decide to retain the original and to provide copies to the parties. Milosevic later referred to a transcript of a phone conversation between Markovic and United States Secretary of State James Baker III, in which Baker was alleged to have stated that the Serbian Secretary of Defense, which reports to the federal government, controls the army. The cross-examination was then adjourned and will continue at a later date. Week of October 28-30 9. (SBU) On October 28, the trial chamber heard testimony from two witnesses. Michel Reviere, a journalist, provided the chamber with video footage that he and his cameraman took of the White Eagles, a Serb paramilitary group. Reviere testified to his conversation with two Serbian paramilitary soldiers who approached him in a caf in Pale and proceeded to explain their exploits and methods. The soldiers explained that they were not paid, but were authorized to loot and procure their own weapons and equipment. The two soldiers then invited the journalist to their headquarters. The video showed the paramilitary group preparing for a mission, and then the journalist was allowed to go along with the paramilitary group as they traveled up to a sniper position in the heights around Sarajevo. Shooting from both sides could be heard in the video clip, but no actual sniper activity was recorded. The journalist traveled back up to the sniper position the next day to get better footage. 10. (SBU) The second witness on October 28, a Bosnian Muslim citizen of Sarajevo identified only as B-1345, testified to his experience throughout the siege of Sarajevo. The witness told the court how his wife and father were shot dead and his mother shot in the leg by sniper fire. Milosevic, during his cross-examination, said that there was “no siege of any kind,” and that this was all the “consequence of a civil war.” Milosevic also tried to question the witness regarding the shelling of the Markale Market on February 5, 1994, since the witness had heard artillery fire near the Serb front lines on that day. He asked him whether he had heard of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) report that concluded that there was no way of telling who had fired the shell. Judge May stopped Milosevic’s line of questioning, since the witness would have no way of knowing about the report or its conclusions. Milosevic continued to ask questions to which the witness could not possible know the answer.
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11. (SBU) On October 29, the trial chamber heard from a crime-based witness, Jasna Denona, who testified to a shooting that occurred in 1991 leaving a group of Croatians and one Serbian dead. The incident was investigated in 1995, but no charges were brought. Ms. Denona was shot twice as she attempted to run from the house after the assailants had opened fire. Milosevic tried to show that this was the act of a single criminal rather than an ethnically motivated crime committed by a group of soldiers. The second witness to testify, a detainee in a Serbian camp in Zvornik identified as B-1780, described how the soldiers tortured, mutilated and killed the prisoners. He told the court that had the scars that show the atrocities that were committed during his detention. He placed Arkan’s men, among others, who beat and tortured the detainees. The witness went on to explain to the court the gruesome events that transpired while he was in the camp. He testified that later he was taken to the hospital, where he received nominal treatment for his broken ribs and arm. He told the court how he fled the hospital for fear that he would be taken out and executed. Milosevic tried to show that the witness was active in politics and local paramilitaries, but much of this cross-examination took place in closed session. Blewitt Takes the Stand as a Witness 12. (SBU) On October 30, the trial chamber heard from the Deputy Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt. He testified to the contents of a series of letters written in 1998 from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to then-President Milosevic and to the Security Council regarding the investigations into war crimes in Kosovo. The letters addressed the serious difficulties the OTP was facing in the investigations given the non-cooperative position that Serbia was taking at the time. Milosevic used the rare opportunity to cross-examine a senior member of the OTP as an opportunity to question the objectivity of the prosecution in general and to highlight the alleged bias between the investigations of war crimes committed by the Serbian government versus the investigations of NATO bombing. Judge May repeatedly checked Milosevic and explained to him that the objectivity and credibility of the Prosecution’s efforts was not a relevant subject matter for this witness. Blewitt reminded Milosevic that the OTP had indeed looked into questions associated with the NATO bombing and decided, on legal and factual grounds, not to pursue such an investigation. Judge May held that only the contents of the letters were open to questioning for this witness. Milosevic continued to ask rhetorical questions, repeatedly referred to a report on NATO bombing, and questioned the credibility of the prosecution in general. He attempted to link NATO bombing with supporting and protecting Kosovar terrorism. 13. (SBU) When Judge May repeatedly stopped his line of questioning, Milosevic said it was no surprise that Judge May was sensitive about addressing the NATO bombing issue. At this, Judge May told Milosevic that his statement was entirely inappropriate and asked him whether he had any relevant questions for the witness, otherwise the court would adjourn. Milosevic responded that apparently all of his questions where improper and that this trial was a farce, since the Judge sought to dictate to the defense what questions they are allowed to ask. He went on further to say that limiting his questions to the letters serves as a smoke screen which masks the crimes committed by NATO and the link to Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist activity. Milosevic attempted to draw a chain of events linking Kosovar Albanian terrorism to the Clinton Administration which led to NATO bombings. Milosevic also questioned the legal basis of the Tribunal’s competency.
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He asked Blewitt, as an international lawyer, how the Tribunal could have jurisdiction given that the Serbian State was looking into the crimes. Milosevic also challenged the legitimacy of the case against him, since the prosecution indicted him after only investigation the case for 3-4 months. Blewitt responded that they indicted Milosevic only after they had constructed a case that had enough evidence against him to support the charges. Judge May had to continue to interrupt Milosevic’s overly broad line of questioning and eventually adjourned the hearing. Motion Granted for Clark’s Testimony 14. (C) On October 30, the trial chamber granted the prosecutions motion for protections for General Clark’s testimony. The order, which is presently under seal, has been secure faxed to the Department. It indicates that the trial chamber accepted the motion without modification or caveat and met the conditions of the United States in their entirety. Embassy legal officers are coordinating with Clark’s staff to lock in a date for his testimony. Clark has confirmed that he is ready to testify in December. Comment 15. (C) The testimony over the past two weeks highlighted several interesting features of the current stage of the trial. For one, the Prosecution has attracted significant insiders with apparent credibility to give evidence of Milosevic’s control over key sectors of the federal and state military apparatus. Embassy legal officers understand that the Prosecution has further insiders waiting to testify. At the same time, Milosevic – who seemed healthier and more vigorous and focused than in recent weeks – continued to demonstrate the physical and mental stamina to cross examine witnesses effectively. Equally importantly, he demonstrated that he retains access to Belgrade archival material to support his defense. Nice correctly noted that Milosevic’s access flies in the face of Belgrade’s continued refusal to provide the Prosecution with the access it needs to prosecute fully the case. While such arguments may help demonstrate SAM noncooperation, they do not undercut the utility of such documents, at least when authenticated as genuine, to Milosevic. Milosevic’s cross-examination of Blewitt was in many respects a replay of Milosevic’s approach at the early stages of the trial, featuring sweeping challenges ranging from the legitimacy of the court to the fairness of the prosecution to the culpability of the Kosovars and the international community. While these arguments have little legal relevance, they serve as a reminder that Milosevic is prepared to mount as much a political defense as a legal one. End Comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 03THEHAGUE2835 Subject: Icty: An Inside Look Into Milosevic’s Health And Support Network Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Wed, 12 Nov 2003 16:26 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2835.html
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History: First published on Fri, 21 Jan 2011 20:36 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], SR [Serbia], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: THE HAGUE 2568 Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per reasons 1.5(b)-(d ) 1. (S/NF) Summary: The head of the detention unit of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided Embassy legal officers and USG physician with details of Slobodan Milosevic’s health status, daily regimen, legal and financial network, frame of mind, and contacts outside the Tribunal. Among many revealing details, this official – who sees and speaks with Milosevic more regularly and closely than nearly anybody else – provided information indicating that Milosevic’s heart condition, while manageable on a day-to-day basis, is serious and not readily controlled by medication. At the same time the official discounted reports that Milosevic suffers from diabetes or, at least at present, depression. The official described a confident, engaged Milosevic who with his wife’s assistance ably manages a web of legal and political contacts. Through his Belgrade legal advisers that rotate through the Hague he exercises control over Social Party of Serbia (SPS) activities and coordinates legal strategy with the amici curiae, friends of the court. Meanwhile, the accused’s financial situation is precarious, necessitating a recent hat-passing exercise by the SPS in order to generate funds to pay household staff and the travel of his lawyers. End Summary. 2. (S/NF) Tim McFadden an experienced Irish prison warden and head of the ICTY‘s detention facility in Scheveningen, provided embassy legal officers and USG physician an unprecedented overview of Slobodan Milosevic’s life and activities since coming to trail. McFadden, whom one ICTY Registry official described as “the best of the best,” is in a unique position not only to describe Milosevic’s detention, as he sees the defendant and interacts with him on a daily basis, but also to assess him on a relative basis to other ICTY detainees. Moreover, McFadden is privy to the contents of Milosevic’s monitored telephone conversations and visits as well as the reports of the physicians that have examined him. McFadden has had long experience in managing tough prisoners, as he managed a number of UK prisons holding Irish Republican Army detainees; another Registry official described ICTY detainees as “pussycats” compared to McFadden charges in the UK. Throughout the one-hour discussion, McFadden gave the impression of
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being fully and personally aware of all of the details of Milosevic’s detention, though he noted that Milosevic remains a private man who does not generally share his thoughts. Associates and Frame of Mind 3. (S/NF) McFadden firmly rejected reports that Milosevic was suffering from depression noting that the accused has given “no indication that he would be anything but defiant to the process” of his prosecution and that he demonstrates only a “limited inclination toward depression.” He noted that Milosevic’s inability to see his son, daughter, daughter-in-law, wife and grandson, especially the latter two, causes him substantial unhappiness. On the other hand, McFadden said that Milosevic “has a job that distracts and preoccupies so that he is not apparently inclined to depression.” He calls his wife, Mirjana Markovic, every morning, continuing what McFadden described as an “extraordinary relationship”; Milosevic could manipulate a nation, he said, but struggled to manage his wife who, on the contrary, seemed to exert just such a pull on him. McFadden referred to a broad range of emotions and approaches that Mira Markovic deployed to goad or cajole Milosevic to take particular actions. When he failed to heed her advice, she was not beyond telling him that bad outcomes could have been avoided had he listened to her. Markovic served as a source of information, comfort, motivation, and strategy for Milosevic and he relied heavily on her guidance. When Markovic pressed Milosevic to do something he did not want to do, Milosevic rarely pushed back directly but simply never acted on the particular entreaty. McFadden referred back to the relationship a number of times in the discussion as the central one in Milosevic’s life. McFadden made clear that Milosevic’s blood pressure spike in September (ref) caused serious alarm at the Tribunal, driving registry officers to consider ways in which to reduce his stress and, as one contact had previously said, “make him happy.” McFadden even described his proposal that the Registry find a way to bring Markovic to The Hague from Russia with some immunity from arrest (which the Deputy Registrar noted was not feasible), because McFadden believed so strongly that getting the two together could help keep down Milosevic’s stress and perhaps his blood pressure. He added, however, that even that was a risk because “she can be a very volatile person.” 4. (S/NF) In the absence of his wife, Milosevic himself has had to coordinate the various groups providing him with legal and other assistance, previously her domain. It appears that her absence has left a substantial hole in his ability to organize the various entities purporting to assist him. He tries to maintain what McFadden called “functional contacts” with the SPS and the Freedom (Sloboda) Association, but “the Belgrade crowd doesn’t get on with the internationals,” a relationship that Markovic used to manage and coordinate. Previously, Markovic would keep him up to date on wrangling within the SPS and tell him who he needed to call to patch up feuds, solve conflicts, or provide political guidance to. Meanwhile, Milosevic’s financial position has worsened considerably since the spring (i.e., soon after the assassination of Zoran Djindjic). Milosevic fell five months in arrear in paying his Belgrade household staff and was unable for a period to pay the air tickets of his rotating Belgrade advisers. Ultimately, the condition worsened to such a degree that the SPS was forced to “to pass the hat” to raise money on his behalf. The Registry believes his financial problems will worsen. In an interesting sidenote, McFadden said that his Belgrade contacts organized, and the Registry consented to,
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an evaluation of Milosevic’s medical records by a group of physicians partial to him. The group concluded, following the review about 19 months ago, that his medical treatment (described below) met the requisite standard of care. 5. (S/NF) In the process of discussing Milosevic’s contacts, McFadden illuminated the nature of the relationship among the so-called legal associates (Serb lawyers who have no courtroom privileges but enjoy privileged communications with the defendant), the amici and Milosevic. McFadden said that Milosevic believes that “he is surrounded by fools” both inside and out of the courtroom, though he added in an aside that this was a problem of his own making, as he had surrounded himself with “fools” throughout his career out of a fear of being challenged by more competent and intelligent advisors. Milosevic most relishes the opportunity to examine senior level witnesses of his level and is disdainful of the lower level officials and witnesses paraded before him by the prosecution. The two associates who have spent much of the trial in the trial chamber’s public gallery (Zdenko Tomanovic and Dragoslav Ognjanovic) are, in McFadden’s view, “messenger boys” to (unnamed) associates in Belgrade. McFadden knew little of Branko Rakic, the Belgrade lawyer/law professor recently added as Milosevic’s third legal associate, but his initial impression was that he was contributing a more methodical, “legal and logical” approach to Milosevic’s defense and cross-examination preparations. As a result, McFadden expected Milosevic’s organization of his defense to improve. 6. (S/NF) In contrast to his courtroom disdain of the amici, McFadden said that Milosevic is in fact “fond” of them. Moreover, his public distancing of them actually masks the fact that his legal associates regularly liaise with the amici to discuss and coordinate defense strategy and questioning of witnesses. (Comment. Milosevic’s adept and hereto unknown coordination with the amici is a striking demonstration of his abilities and methods. By using his Belgrade advisers to liaise with the amici in secret he is able to maintain the optically favorable appearance of a single man defending himself against an unfair and powerful international process. At the same time, he takes full advantage of the legal resources the amici offer and ensures that key technical legal points in his defense are covered so that he can focus on tending to the more political aspects of his defense. The fact that senior prosecutors on the Milosevic team are wholly unaware of this cooperation (as were we) underscores Milosevic’s ability to work effectively behind the scenes, through third parties, and leave few fingerprints. End comment). The Registrar noted that, as helpful as the amici might be to Milosevic now, he does not expect the amici to continue in their current role during the defense case. Their departure would be a significant blow to Milosevic’s defense unless he finally decides to accept legal counsel or is at least able to beef up his legal support from Belgrade. Physical Health 7. (S/NF) McFadden noted that Milosevic’s medical records from the former Yugoslavia indicated a long history of hypertension (high blood pressure) that was difficult to control especially when Milosevic was stressed or excessively fatigued. He said that during the past summer a number of things happened that put Milosevic under increased stress and caused excessive fatigue, including the build up of stress from court appearances and trial preparations, his wife’s legal problems that caused her to flee to Russia, the need for Milosevic to give increased time and attention to disputes and problems within the SPS Party (that would have formerly been handled in part by his wife), financial dif41

ficulties, and his gradual loss of attention from media. All of these factors appear to have contributed to the increase in Milosevic’s blood pressure. Physicians consistently found Milosevic had a diastolic blood pressure above 120 mm mercury (normal should be below 90 mm mercury). Despite treatment with high doses of six medications his blood pressure remained dangerously elevated until the trial schedule was reduced to three days a week. (Note. The only information we have about his medications is that he was near the maximum dose of beta blockers and was also taking a medication that has to be stopped intermittently because of dangerous side effects. End note). Milosevic is now on four medications. 8. (S/NF) A reduced trial schedule had been recommended by Dutch physicians (including Dutch cardiologist, Dr. Paul Van Dykman) last year but was rejected by the Court until Milosevic’s blood pressure could not be controlled with standard medications. His long history of hypertension has caused mild heart damage (identified by Serb physicians before he was apprehended and transferred to The Hague) but physicians have seen no evidence of a heart attack, stroke, or kidney damage. Three exercise EKGs have been normal and Milosevic will continue to have an exercise EKG twice a year according to McFadden. The last hypertensive episode ended about 6 weeks ago. 9. (S/NF) McFadden reports that Milosevic’s hypertensive episodes have not correlated with adverse events at the trial or with the appearance of certain witnesses. They have seen no evidence that he is using his blood pressure problems as an issue to slow or otherwise affect the trial. Moreover, Milsoevic understands that he has potentially lethal health problems and is a compliant patient. The only two physician recommendations he has refused are (1) to take sedatives recommended by his doctors to lower his blood pressure and (2) to undergo invasive procedures to look for underlying causes of his hypertension and evidence of end organ damage in the brain. He is allowed to cook for himself, which limits control of his diet, but he nevertheless appears to be following a salt restricted diet. 10. (S/NF) In contrast to previous reports that Milsoevic has diabetes, McFadden stated that there is no evidence in his medical records for this diagnosis and all of his blood sugars have been normal. Milosevic’s cholesterol and other lipids have been normal. His weight has been stable since he lost 12 pounds when he was first brought to The Hague. He has not been observed to smoke much; in a recent conversation with McFadden, he claimed not to have smoked in four days and to have no desire to do so. His only request, McFadden said, is for a glass of red wine, but alcohol is strictly forbidden in the detention unit. 11. (S/NF) Milosevic is said by McFadden to have a nearly photographic memory, saying that he has “never met a man with his memory.” He said that a “very important” detainee, whom he would not identify, warned McFadden early in Milosevic’s detention that Milosevic has a very good memory that would “come back to bite”; with a laugh, McFadden said it had. McFadden has seen no evidence of any deterioration in Milosevic’s memory or other mental capacities. He remains, McFadden said, as “narcissistic a person” as when he arrived in The Hague. On the other hand, unlike other detainees who constantly complain, Milosevic is cooperative and always accepts McFadden’s decisions, often responding, “at least I asked.” In general, moreover, Milosevic believes strongly in his own powers and thinks that he is “winning” in the courtroom, an attitude that reinforces his currently stable health.
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Daily Regimen and Prison Activities 12. (S/NF) Milosevic’s routine varies depending on whether court is in session. Thus, on the three days of court proceedings per week, a typical day begins around 0700 with a wake-up call; after he gets ready, he calls his wife around 0730 and leaves for court by 0800. The court sessions run from 0900 to approximately 1400, with two twenty minute breaks. After court, he returns to the detention center, where he has a meal and is allowed one hour of outdoor exercise (McFadden noted that he will walk for a full hour, “sun, rain or hail”). Following the hour of exercise, he meets with legal advisors, reads the court transcripts, and otherwise prepares for the next court appearance. In the evening, he will typically read a book (he is an avid reader, especially of “rubbish” and potboiler thrillers like Grisham, and he prefers to read in the original English). On days when he is not in court, he may sleep later, sometimes until 0930 or 1000, have additional exercise time, attend “creativity class,” visit with his legal associates, have an afternoon nap, listen to Sinatra discs, and perhaps watch one of the DVD’s that a privileged visitor (i.e. most likely his Belgrade lawyers) have smuggled in to him. 13. (S/NF) Milosevic has access to a laptop computer but is not allowed on the Internet and cannot use E-mail. His access to the outside world is via phone calls or visits. He is allocated 75 euros per month for phone use, but can make an unlimited number of calls beyond that as long as he pays for the calls – something he has consistently been able to do. He is allowed an unlimited number of free calls to recognized legal associates on a special detention unit phone. All of his phone calls and visits, except those with the recognized legal associates, are monitored. 14. (S/NF) Within the detention community, Milosevic is well liked and respected by other prisoners. Many of them take care to monitor his health and encourage him to watch his own diet, McFadden said. He has refused to see a psychiatrist individually but does participate in the group sessions with the other prisoners on his floor, which are monitored by the detention unit. The psychiatrist who conducts these sessions tells McFadden that she has seen no evidence that he is depressed or has any other significant clinical problem. 15. (S/NF) Comment: Slobodan Milosevic’s health surely puts him, in McFadden’s words, at “higher risk of accident” than similarly situated persons of his age who do not suffer hypertension. Yet his health seems to have stabilized for the time being, particularly since the trial chamber’s decision to go to three days per week. Whether Milosevic can maintain such a schedule will be tested when the defense case begins (perhaps not before September 2004). Some in the Registry and in the Office of the Prosecutor speculate that the courtroom schedule will be further reduced to one day a week in order to allow Milosevic two days of defense preparation and, as the doctors have ordered, four days of rest. The end of the trial seems ever more distant when put in this light. Even with his health stabilized, the impact of the move to the defense phase will cause further pressures of a financial and legal nature which could in turn trigger a downturn in his health. For now, however, Milosevic remains comfortably on top of his game. End comment. Sobel
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XII
Reference id: 03THEHAGUE2867 Subject: Icty: Lord Owen’s Testimony A Mixed Bag For Prosecution’s Case Against Milosevic Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 14 Nov 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/11/03THEHAGUE2867.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – ROSSIN, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: THE HAGUE 2835 Classified By: Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, for reasons 1.5(D) and 1.6. 1. (C) Summary: Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) heard testimony from Lord David Owen the first week of November. As an international negotiator, Lord Owen insisted that the Trial Chamber call him as a neutral witness rather than being called by the Prosecution. His testimony in some ways tracked his self-proclaimed neutral position, sometimes characterizing events in ways that undercut the Prosecution’s case. For lead prosecutor Nice, however, Owen provided helpful evidence in building a case of omission against Milosevic (see para 11). The Trial Chamber also heard testimony from a protected witness testifying to crime-based events largely in closed session. Additionally, Milosevic completed his cross-examination of David Harland. The trial chamber also issued an order allowing it to sit in session with a judge absent due to health related issues. End summary. Lord Owen’s Testimony 2. (C) On November 4 and 5, the Trial Chamber heard from Lord David Owen, former Bosnia peace mediator and one-time British foreign secretary. He initially turned down a request by the Prosecution to appear before the court in the Milosevic trial, refusing even to speak with lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice about such testimony and preferring to be called by the Trial Chamber itself in order to maintain his supposed neutrality in the matter. Lord Owen emphasized his view that evil was committed on all sides, tho44

ugh more so by Bosnian Serbs than Bosnian Croats or Muslims. He repeatedly stated that blame for the events in the Balkans is carried by many parties including the United Nations Security Council and even himself. Senior prosecutor Dermot Groome commented to Embassy legal officers that Owen was a very credible witness, especially since he testified that he held himself to be partially responsible for the mass murders that occurred in Srebrenica. 3. (SBU) Owen submitted a 42 page statement to the prosecution which outlined his role as an international negotiator in the Balkans and his experiences with the Accused in that role, largely drawing upon relevant portions of his book, Balkan Odyssey. The statement provided detailed accounts of the relationships that Milosevic had with political rivals and other leaders including, among others, Corsic, Panic, Karadzic, Mladic and Krajisnik. Lord Owen characterized Milosevic as “not fundamentally racist – he’s a pragmatist who wanted Serbs to be in the majority. I don’t think he was an ethnic purist.” 4. (SBU) Milosevic and Owen established a cordial and respectful rapport during the cross-examination. Milosevic was composed and effective during the cross-examination, adroitly leading the witness to praise the “peacemaker” role Milosevic played in the Balkans. Indeed, Owen offered occasional praise and justification unprompted by the Accused. At one point, when Milosevic offered that great atrocities were being committed against the Serbs and the JNA was trying to prevent further conflict, Lord Owen sidestepped the question by stating that he wasn’t sure whether Milosevic was helpful in that case, but that he was very helpful in the Vance-Owen peace negotiations. Further, Owen suggested that Milosevic had a “justified grievance” against the West since they accepted maps that were drawn in 1944 rather than ones in 1991 that reflected the actual ethnic populations. 5. (SBU) Owen also cast Milosevic as someone committed to, and an active participant in, the peace processes. However, he did suggest that Milosevic did not do enough for peace. Owen’s chief complaint against Milosevic was that he had not put enough pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan. He stated that by refusing to threaten the Bosnian Serbs’ supply of oil and weapons flowing from Serbia when they rejected the peace plan, Milosevic was responsible for delaying the peace process for two and a half years. Lord Own stated that he wished Milosevic had used his influence earlier to support peace. 6. (SBU) Owen contrasted Tudjman’s “blatant” use of Croation Army forces in Bosnia with Milosevic’s “clever” way of using Serbian forces in the war. Yet Owen did some serious damage to Milosevic regarding the presence of JNA troops in Bosnia. Milosevic claimed that once the independence of Bosnia was recognized that no JNA troops were active in Bosnia, except for one small exception. Owen dismissed this statement saying that the JNA was involved and that Serbs not born in Bosnia were active there. He stated that JNA were more subtle in disguising their presence than their Croatian counterparts. 7. (SBU) During the cross-examination, Owen reserved his harshest comments for Milosevic’s political rivals. He suggested that Milosevic lost much power and influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership after Karadzic revoked his signature from the VanceOwen peace plan. He commented that Karadzic signed a lot of documents while holding and espousing opposite views in other forums. Owen showed that he holds particular contempt for Mladic. In responding to Milosevic’s assertion that Mladic was not capable
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of the atrocities in Srebrenica, Owen stated that he did not share this view of Mladic and that there was a “brutality about the man.” He also stated that Mladic was a racist and that he could have ordered, been complicit, or acquiesced to a massacre of Muslims. 8. (SBU) Owen went on to say that Milosevic was very helpful in preventing Mladic from taking Srebrenica in 1993. He stated that Milosevic was “well aware of the dangers” if Serbs went into Srebrenica, given the historic tensions and conflicts there, and even referred to the risk of a “massacre.” There was similar recognition of the risk in 1995. Owen lamented that the events in Srebrenica in 1995 was the worst episode of the conflicts in the Balkans and he partially holds himself responsible for not telling more people of the danger. He also placed part of the blame on the Security Council, which knowingly declared Srebrenica a safe area without providing the requisite troops. 9. (SBU) On another issue Owen partially came to the Accused’s defense stating that Milosevic gave up the idea of a “Greater Serbia” after 1993. He noted that as a pragmatist, Milosevic realized that once the Vance-Owen peace plan started that some Serbs would have to live outside of Serbia. When Milosevic pushed the point to say that the leaders of Republica Srspka also never held a “Greater Serbia” view, Owen responded that this was a reasonable view, but that he personally does not accept that interpretation. Owen went on to say that Milosevic and others likely had aspirations for a different map. 10. (SBU) Owen ended his cross-examination by Milosevic with a lofty statement that “sometimes leaders must lead their people against public opinion and against ultranationalistic views.” He went on to say that, “some of the greatest acts have occurred where leaders have acted against the majority opinion.” However, the Amici, through their cross-examination, pointed out that many of the positions for peace that Milosevic took were politically unpopular and even in some cases resulted in substantial loss of influence. The Amici also pointed out that after Pale had rejected the peace plan, the leaders in Pale felt they could reject Belgrade and could make their own political decisions. Owen seemed to accept this characterization and even when so far as to add that the Amici’s line of questioning showed the “wisdom of the chambers to have the Amici to insure a fair trial.” 11. (C) Lead Milosevic prosecutor Geoffrey Nice, while acknowledging the mixed nature of Owen’s testimony was confident that it was helpful to the prosecution. He said that Owen demonstrated that the risk of a massacre in Srebrenica was apparent from 1993, testified that Milosevic himself had alluded to the danger of a “massacre” in 1993, and showed that the risk was recognized again in 1995. Against this backdrop of awareness was testimony that during this period the VRS was supported by Milosevic and Kardzic had lost control over Mladic leaving Milosevic as his main influence. For Nice all of this added up to, essentially, a case of omission against Milosevic. Nice said that he would pursue evidence of direct responsibility where he could find it but that for legal purposes a case based on the accused’s failure to act would suffice. explained the value of Owen’s testimony in a conversation with Embassy legal officers. Other Testimony – Nov. 5-6 12. On November 5, the Trial Chamber also heard from a protected witness, identified as B-1531, who offered crime-based testimony. Much of the witness’ testimony was taken in closed session. On November 6, the Trial Chamber heard the completion of the cross-examination of David Harland, UN civil and political affairs officer in Sarajevo.
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Harland’s evidence-in-chief and the start of the cross-examination occurred on September 18, 2003. During his initial testimony, he spoke of his experiences during negotiations with the leaders in Pale, notably Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, and of his experience with shelling and sniper activity in Sarajevo. He also spoke about the command structures in Pale and related his experiences that showed how Pale could control snipers and paramilitary units when they wanted to. He also spoke about the methods used by the Bosnian Serbs when they ethnically cleansed Muslim towns. In contrast to the tone of Owen’s testimony, Harland described Milosevic as “holding the hand” of Pale through his influence on the military. He testified that the Pale leadership was frustrated with Milosevic for staying their hand in many cases. He later recounted how a major report he researched and drafted for the UN Secretary General made no connection between the massacres in Srebrenica and Milosevic, yet he concluded personally that Milosevic must have known about the military actions to take the town. 13. (SBU) Harland in general testified to the support Milosevic and the JNA provided Pale. He spoke about how General Mladic would openly acknowledge that he had 100s of tanks supplied by the JNA and how these forces were used to ethnically cleanse Muslim towns. Harland also stated that there was a clear link between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serb Army. He noted that at critical moments, Belgrade was able to influence the behavior of the Bosnian Serb Army. Harland concluded, given that Milosevic could assert control over the Bosnian Serb Army when he wanted it, that Milosevic must have acquiesced to the shelling in Sarajevo, the sniping, the attacks on safe areas, and even the massacre that followed the fall of Srebrenica. He claimed that Milosevic could have done vastly more to prevent these attacks given that the Bosnian Serbs were almost entirely dependent on support from Serbia. Harland charged that the cause of peace was not advanced by “giving the Bosnian Serbs the full military support they needed to secure, ethnically cleanse, and hold very large territories.” 14. (SBU) On November 6, Milosevic concluded his cross-examination of David Harland. During this segment of the cross-examination the Accused asked questions primarily regarding the circumstances in Sarajevo. When Milosevic asserted that Serbs “allowed” Muslims to leave their enclaves, whereas the Muslims did not allow the Serbs the freedom to leave, Harland corrected Milosevic stating that the Serbs “forced” the Muslims to leave. Harland also discussed the varied treatment that different ethnicities received through the various controlled areas of Sarajevo. He also addressed the two Makale Market shellings. Milosevic made his usual argument that the preliminary report concluded that it was a Muslim attack. Harland noted that later reports could not conclude the source, since it was too close to the confrontation line. However, he noted that for shells that they could detect the source almost all shells falling on the Muslim side came from the Serb lines. Judge Robinson Ill 15. (C) On October 21, the Trial Chamber issued an order under Rule 15 bis allowing the Trial Chamber to sit in the absence of Judge Robinson due to medical reasons on November 25 and 27 and on December 2, 3, 4 of 2003. While Embassy is unfamiliar with the nature of Judge Robinson’s illness, prosecutor Dermot Groome commented to Embassy legal officers that Judge Robinson’s health may further impact the Milosevic case in the future.
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16. (C) Comment: In his courtroom confrontation with David Owen, Milosevic demonstrated a feistiness and focus consistent with the observation of those who see Milosevic regularly (reftel) that he tends to relish the opportunity to cross witnesses he views as his “peers”. His vigorous, engaging cross-examination brought out the complex nature of Owen’s views, which were not altogether helpful to the prosecution. In that sense, the accused can claim this witness as a success. Still, the negatives remain for Milosevic, especially Owen’s testimony concerning the presence of JNA troops in Bosnia and the fact that Milosevic was aware of the risk of a massacre in Srebrenica. Ultimately Owen’s value to the prosecution will depend on whether other witnesses can fill in the gaps and whether the chamber is prepared to convict Milosevic on a case based largely on acts of omission. The coming weeks will see additional testimony from witnesses, including former State President Boris Jovic who will testify next week, that will present an even more mixed bag for the prosecution. End comment. Russel

XIII
Reference id: 03THEHAGUE3027 Subject: Icty: With Strugar Balking At Return, President Meron To Report Sam Noncompliance At 0900 Est Tomorrow Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2003/12/03THEHAGUE3027.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], SR [Serbia], NL [Netherlands], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: A. (A) KAYE DECEMBER 4 EMAIL B. (B) BELGRADE 2926 Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per reasons 1.5(b)-(d ) 1. (C) Summary: The President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Theodor Meron, told embassy legal officers that he would report to the UN Security Council Belgrade’s noncooperation by 0900 EST on Tuesday, December 9, if indictee Pavle Strugar fails to return to The Hague for his trial, scheduled to begin on Wednesday December 10. Meron said that the failure of Serbia and Monte48

negro’s Government (SAM) to effect Strugar’s surrender would have grave consequences for the ICTY‘s willingness to grant provisional release to Serb indictees in the future. End summary. 2. (C) Meron, who alerted Embassy legal officers to his serious concerns about Strugar’s efforts to avoid return to The Hague last Friday (ref A), firmly rejected any procedure short of Strugar complying with the ICTY trial chamber’s order that he return to The Hague for trial immediately. Meron said that the SAM ambassador to The Hague had explained to him last Friday a process according to which a Belgrade court would order Strugar’s transfer, but that Strugar would have the ability to appeal. (The procedure was described similarly in ref B.) Meron told the SAM Ambassador that any such process, especially the right of Strugar to appeal, was “completely unacceptable.” In a conversation with emboff, he added that it would be as if an accused out on bail in the United States were allowed to appeal his apprehension to the marshal when called to trial. He explained that the original decision in 2001 to grant Strugar provisional release was premised on both a commitment from the accused to return immediately to The Hague when the trial would so require it and from the Government to guarantee his transfer. Strugar’s failure reflects poorly enough on the accused, who, Meron mused, may simply be hoping that he can drag out an appeal and see whether this month’s elections give him a government less likely to meet its commitments to the Tribunal. According to Meron, it reflects even worse on Belgrade which guaranteed Strugar’s return and whose credibility with respect to any future requests depends on its ability to deliver on such assurances. 3. (C) As a result, Meron plans to send a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council not later than 0900 EST on Tuesday, December 9, detailing the noncompliance of the SAM with the order of the Tribunal that Strugar return for trial. He conceded that if Strugar were en route to The Hague or if the SAM were to guarantee that Strugar’s departure was imminent (i.e., within twenty four hours), he would hold off on such a letter. He would, he said, be firm that SAM had to meet the commitments which formed an essential part of the ICTY‘s agreement to Strugar’s provisional release. Meron added that such noncooperation, which has caused the postponement of the trial’s start date, undermines the ICTY‘s ability to do its work efficiently and therefore compromises its ability to meet the completion strategy goals. 4. (C) Comment: A failure by SAM to effect Strugar’s transfer to The Hague will have a seriously negative impact on future provisional release considerations, by both the Office of the Prosecutor and the Chambers, involving Belgrade. Meron is firm that that this transfer must happen imminently to avoid a report of noncompliance to the SC and we do not expect him to blink. End comment. Sobel

XIV
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE271 Subject: Icty: New Stresses In The Milosevic Trial Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 3 Feb 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/02/04THEHAGUE271.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN, USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: FIVE YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: THE HAGUE 176 Classified By: Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, for reasons 1.5 b, d 1. (C) Summary. The trial of Slobodan Milosevic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) careens towards an interesting, difficult and potentially explosive final few weeks of the prosecution’s case. In terms of testimony, the biggest grenade could come in the form of the compelled February 10 testimony of Biljana Plavsic, former co-President of Republika Srpska (RS), who many in the Office of Prosecutor (OTP) believe is more likely to hurt rather than help the prosecution case. The biggest risk, however, may be less substantive than health related. While the accused has the flu, leading to a cancellation of proceedings on February 3, more significant is that Presiding Judge Richard May, the dominant figure in the courtroom, is suffering from an undisclosed illness that could require his near term departure from the Tribunal – casting the future of the trial into question. Against this backdrop, the Milosevic prosecution team, though racked by infighting and potential personnel changes, worked to finalize its remaining witness list. During the week of January 26, it presented three expert witness who, in contrast to the drama behind the scenes, testified soberly to the crimes committed in Bosnia and the relationship between Serb and RS militaries. End summary. Judge May Il 2. (C) Embassy legal officers learned February 2 that Judge Richard May, the presiding judge in the Milosevic case, has fallen ill with what may be a serious and progressively worsening condition. Some prosecutors before his trial chamber had begun to notice some abnormalities in his behavior, such as incomprehensible statements from the bench (May is well known to be an articulate and precise speaker when presiding). Last week he received a medical evaluation, the results of which are not yet known. The situation is being considered very discretely by a small circle in the ICTY. A number of sources consider the condition serious enough that it may require May to step down from the proceedings. They are focused on “getting through” the next two weeks until the Prosecution adjourns in the hope that a substitute judge, if needed, would have the three month break to get up to speed on the case by the time Milsovic begins his defense.
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(Comment. Embassy legal officers had not noticed a significant change in Judge May’s behavior, nor have press observers. While the reports of May’s illness are credible and corroborated, until we obtain further details it will not be possible to assess the full impact of his condition on the case. End comment). Plavsic and Perisic 3. (C) A trial chamber order granting the prosecution’s request to add Biljana Plavsic as a witness remains under seal, though senior Tribunal leadership remained certain that she would testify against Milosevic on February 10 (originally scheduled for February 4). See reftel. Her testimony has become another point of contention between senior prosecutors on the Milosevic team, but Emboffs understand that Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has insisted on seeking the subpoena that will bring her to The Hague to testify. 4. (C) Embassy legal officers also learned that the courting of Momcilo Perisic ended in failure, with one prosecutor calling Perisic’s interviews in The Hague “terrible.” There had been some hope within OTP that Perisic – a one-time senior military adviser to Milosevic, an important link between Milosevic and Mladic on military matters, and a potential indictee in his own right – would provide substantial evidence against his former boss. The interviews conducted in The Hague proved otherwise, with Perisic displaying a truculence that led him to being quickly returned to Belgrade. His status as an investigative target will be reported septel. Personnel Changes on the Prosecution Team 5. (C) The intensity of focus on the closing weeks of the prosecution case has not distracted the lead prosecutors from their long-running clash over the prosecution itself. The main source of friction, a poisonous relationship between lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice and senior trial attorney (for the Bosnia portion) Dermot Groome, may be coming to an end once the prosecution rests. Embassy legal officers have learned that the chief prosecutor has decided to pull Groome from the case once the prosecution rests and will ask Groome to focus attention on Stanisic and Simatovic and take control from Nice of the Perisic investigation/indictment. Groome, disappointed by the move, has asked the Chief Prosecutor to reconsider, having told her that he would not seek renewal of his contract in May should he be taken off the Milosevic team. A Week of Expert Witnesses 6. (SBU) Dean Manning (OTP Investigator): The prosecution called OTP Investigator Dean Manning to testify about a report he prepared at the request of OTP on mass graves found in and around Srebrenica. Manning has been investigating mass graves around Srebrenica for over five years. He testified that 2541 individuals have been found in the mass graves. He noted, however, that this is an extremely conservative number because the Serbs dug up and transported bodies from primary grave sites using heavy machinery, crushing the bodies and making accurate counts very difficult. Milosevic suggested that the majority of the bodies found in the mass graves around Srebrenica were those of men killed in combat, and he asked the witness to testify as to the gender and age of the victims, as well as to acknowledge the fighting that occurred in the area. Manning countered Milosevic’s assertion by testifying about the forensic evidence – noting that many of the victims were shot in the back or the head, that their posture indicated that their hands were tied, and that they often wore blindfolds from the same cuts of fabric.
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7. (SBU) Reynaud Theunens (ICTY Military Analyst): The prosecution called ICTY military analyst Reynaud Theunens to testify about a report he prepared at the request of OTP that analyzed the role of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in the Croatian and Bosnian conflicts, specifically on its command and control of Serbian armies, armed paramilitary and volunteer groups. Theunens testified that the JNA developed into a mainly Serb force whose goal was to consolidate Serbia’s control over Serb-populated regions of Bosnia and Croatia. He stated further that this transformed JNA trained, supplied, and assumed command of local Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia, reporting that “documentary evidence indicates that Serb TO (territory defense) units and staffs operated under single, unified command and control with the JNA.” The witness further testified that JNA assistance was authorized at the highest levels of the JNA army and the Yugoslav presidency, which prior evidence has shown was controlled by Milosevic. Notably, Theunens provided documentation showing that Milosevic received a daily combat report of the army of the breakaway Serb republic, Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK), which included information on what material support had been provided to the RSK by the JNA. 8. (SBU) Theunens also testified about documentation that showed that retired and active duty JNA officials served in Serb armies in Bosnia and Croatia while continuing to receive pay, benefits, and credit for time served from the JNA. He went on to testify that JNA support was critical in Bosnia, as the breakaway Serb republic, Republika Srpska, had almost no independent war production capability. On cross examination, Milosevic tried to characterize the JNA as an intermediary that was separating warring factions in Bosnia and Croatia, trying to set the JNA apart from the actions of the Serb armies and paramilitary units. He also tried to discredit the witness, highlighting his employment by the ICTY as motivation for bias. Ultimately, however, the voluminous military documents introduced through Theunens provided significant evidence linking Serbia and the JNA to the military actions committed by Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia. The testimony provided the Chamber with a fuller understanding of the command and coordination between the JNA and the multitude of Serb military, paramilitary, and volunteer forces in Bosnia and Croatia. Most importantly, the testimony indicated that Milosevic was far from ignorant of this huge military apparatus and was in fact influential in its decision-making. 9. (SBU) General Ferenc Vegh (Expert witness on military command and control): Like Theunens, Hungarian General Vegh was called to testify about a report he prepared at the request of OTP, which focused on the military command and structure of the JNA army. Vegh is the former commander of the Hungarian army, and his credentials include a stint at the U.S. Army War College. The prosecution’s primary interest in Vegh was his finding that Serb military and paramilitary units in Bosnia and Croatia lacked the ability to carry out independent military activities. From passing out munitions to local forces, to coordinating sophisticated offensives, Serb military and paramilitary forces required superior orders from the JNA, which he noted had become a tool for Serbia to achieve its political objectives. Milosevic’s cross-examination broadly attempted to couch the JNA’s activities as simply “raising the level of combat readiness” in light of the proliferation of hostile organizations such as the Croatian National Guards Force and the Patriot League (an armed coalition of Muslim soldiers in Bosnia). It was clear to the Cham52

ber, however, that Milosevic was using his cross-examination time to speech-make to the gallery (which was packed to capacity for the first time in several months due to visiting model-UN teams) about Bosnian and Croatian militarization. Judge Robinson delivered an unusual scolding to Milosevic, stating “normally I support your requests for time-extensions... I will not do so this time.” Comment 10. (C) The Milosevic trial faces a new and very tough challenge in the form of Judge May’s undisclosed illness. In a courtroom of large personalities, May emerged long ago as the dominant personality – holding the prosecution to schedules, keeping Milosevic on a fairly short leash but allowing him reasonable room to represent himself, and generally maintaining decorum in the face of a difficult environment. His absence would be a significant loss, even if a substitute judge were to be appointed. Moreover, a decision to proceed with a substitute judge is subject under the Tribunal Rules to an appeal directly to the full bench of the appeals chamber. Even if such an appeal were denied (as is more likely than not), the public perception of the trial may well be tainted. 11. (C) In the trial chamber itself, the week presented a juxtaposition of the two sides of the Milosevic prosecution: On one side, observers saw the sober, careful presentation of expert witnesses designed to explain to the chambers the complex nature of Milosevic’s relationship to Bosnian crimes and Belgrade’s military relationship with Bosnian Serb forces. On the other, the long-simmering personality clash between Nice and Groome continued to roil the prosecution team. The options for Carla Del Ponte, who has tended to play one off against the other and thereby contributed to this tension, are not appealing: if she removes Nice (extremely unlikely), she risks a major media storm, as the removal of the public face of the prosecution would prove to be a story of some note. Yet if she removes Groome, she will lose the prosecutor most versed in the Bosnia counts – which are, incidentally, the hardest of the indictments to prove. 12. (C) Despite the personnel crises, the still important questions concern how the prosecution will rest. Placing General Morillon last on the witness list ensures that the prosecutors will leave the chambers with a strong impression created by an important witness. Yet the possibility exists that Plavsic’s testimony this week could set off fireworks that ultimately undermine the prosecution’s case. The selection of Plavsic as one of the last witnesses suggests, at the least, that some members of the prosecution team are anything but confident about some key aspects of their case. End comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 04ROME549 Subject: Operation Balkan Vice III – Italy on Board With Visa Ban, will “be Creative” on Asset Freeze Origin: Embassy Rome (Italy) Cable time: Fri, 13 Feb 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN
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Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/02/04ROME549.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR EUR (STEPHENS), EUR/SCE (GREGORIAN), S/WCI (PROSPER) TREASURY FOR OFAC (NEWCOMB) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2014 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], MOPS [Military Operations], EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], ZL [Balkan States], IT [Italy], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], EUN [European Union] Classified By: POLMINCOUNS TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.5 (B)(D). 1. (S) MFA Balkans office director Fernando Gentilini told Poloff on February 12 that Italy was “on board” with USG view that imposing travel entry/travel bans and freezing assets of PIFWC’s and their material supporters are important tools for achieving our shared objective to stabilize the region. Implementing travel restrictions on the individuals named in ref a would pose little problem, he said, and promised to transmit the list to appropriate border and immigration authorities. 2. (S) Gentilini said that as with previous requests of this type, asset freeze would not be that straight forward. A number of EU member states continue to hold that freezing assets of PIFWC supporters without criminal or civil proceedings would not stand up in the courts. That said, italy would continue to “be creative” in attempts to freeze assets of PIFWC supporters. Gentilini said that at the February 12 coweb in Brussels, Italy supported Irish Presidency proposals to “test the waters” on asset freeze with the three UNSCR 1503-named indictees – Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina. An EU wide asset freeze against these three may gain unanimous member state support and stand up in the courts, paving the way for actions against “less serious” PIFWC supporters. Gentilini said that he would explore possible bilateral action, but did not hold out much hope for that strategy. 3. (S) Roberto Ciciani, Director of the Office of Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, said that without an EU implementing directive, the GoI can not freeze assets of the individuals listed in reftel. finance will share the names with the Central bank’s Ufficio italiano dei cambi, which will, in turn, instruct banks to search databases to see if there are matches of accounts. This would be done in anticipation of an EU directive. Finance will ask the Ministries of Justice and Interior to determine if there have been any judicial rulings in Italy against the listed individuals. Sembler
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XVI
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE498 Subject: Icty: Milosevic Prosecution Limps To Close Its Case Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Thu, 26 Feb 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/02/04THEHAGUE498.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN, USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 5 YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Deputy Legal Counselor David Kaye per reasons 1.5 (b)-(d ). 1. (C) Summary. The Milosevic Prosecution team of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) closed its case in the anti-climactic form of a motion to Trial Chamber III on February 25. The recent melodrama of the Milosevic prosecution – the rancorous internal debates over potential witnesses such as Biljana Plavsic, the expectations of introducing what some considered “smoking gun” documents, the dramatic deterioration in Presiding Judge Richard May’s health, a return to illness for the accused, the near-resignation of lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice – had turned the prosecution into what Nice called “a muddle”. The Prosecution is now trying to clean its own house and turn its attention to wrap-up elements of its case and preparations for the defense phase, which the trial chamber scheduled to begin on June 8. The uncertainties of the past weeks overshadowed some interesting evidence adduced in the final weeks of the proceedings. End summary. The Anticlimactic Closing 2. (C) Prosecutors filed on February 25 a “notification of the completion of its case and motion for the admission of evidence in written form” with trial chamber III. While the bulk of the motion deals with some evidentiary wrap-up issues, the motion leads off by noting “with great regret” the illness and resignation of Judge May, which although effective May 31 was announced by President Theodor Meron on February 22. (NB: It is understood that Judge May is no longer participating in the trial chamber’s substantive deliberations and that Judge Patrick Robinson, the next senior judge in the trial cham55

ber, is likely to be bumped up to preside.) It went on to suggest that “the resignation may pose serious difficulties for the overall timetable of the case,” though such difficulties “are not entirely predictable” at this time. It suggested that the difficulties may delay the start of the accused’s case and could be due in part to the need of a newly assigned judge to become familiar with the case (noting the relevance of Rule 15bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence). It concluded its short introductory section by saying that, “(w)ith these consideration in mind and with concern for the due administration of justice and judicial economy the Prosecutor closes the case by this filing on the basis of all evidence already adduced...” 3. (U) The trial chamber responded unprecedentedly quickly to the motion, suggesting that the kabuki had been rehearsed. According to an ICTY press release, the trial chamber “confirmed that ‘the Prosecution case is hereby closed.’” It made several further noteworthy orders: – The trial chamber ordered that “any motion under Rule 98bis shall be filed by the Accused or Amici Curiae by Monday, 8 March 2004,” to which the Prosecution shall respond by March 22. A Rule 98bis motion is a motion for summary judgment, according to which the accused/amici may seek acquittal on “one or more of the offences charged in the indictment”. – It required the accused to produce a list of witnesses he intends to call and exhibits he intends to offer by April 12. – It scheduled a “predefence conference” for May 17, 2004. – It scheduled the commencement of the defense case for Tuesday, June 8, giving the accused 150 days to present his case. (At three days per week, the allotment of days amounts to nearly one year; based on holidays and other anticipated weeks off due to sickness or other difficulties, it should be expected that the defense – assuming use of all 150 days is made – would extend well into the summer of 2005, if not beyond.) The Tumult of Recent Weeks 4. (C) Senior prosecutors and investigators shared with embassy legal officers in recent days their disappointment in the closing weeks of the case. Geoffrey Nice called it “a muddle” and said that the past three weeks – during which he vigorously sought a revelation of Judge May’s situation to the accused – were the hardest of the two-year-plus trial for him. Because of the internal battles, especially with Carla Del Ponte over whether the prosecution had an ethical obligation to advise the accused of Judge May’s likely resignation, he expected as of the end of last week that he would resign the case. May’s resignation, however, has put that trouble behind them, and he said that he and Del Ponte were “in a period of dtente.” Dtente or not, Nice expects further friction with Del Ponte, who has participated more actively in Milosevic team’s trial decisions since the new year than she had ever done previously. For her part, Del Ponte told Embassy Legal Counselor that she had “worked well” with President Meron on the May situation and that she had to show Nice that she was the boss. 5. (C) At the heart of internal troubles on the team was Nice’s relationship with senior trial attorney (STA) Dermot Groome. While there is little sign that the relationship has improved, Groome told embassy legal officer late February 26 that Del Ponte has asked him to oversee the Bosnia portion of the defense case. As a result, he feels confident now that he will remain on the Milosevic team beyond May, when his contract expires.
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6. (C) Other prosecutors and investigators were disappointed with their inability to introduce further evidence into the record. Biljana Plavsic, for instance, had been scheduled to testify at the beginning of February, but the accused’s illness and strenuous debate within the Milosevic team put it off to a point where the team realized that it would not be possible to call her. Similarly, there was hope that the prosecution would call Carl Bildt; in the absence of such an opportunity, the prosecution, with Bildt’s apparent consent, is likely to ask the trial chamber to call Bildt as a court witness. According to STA Groome, a key insider had been set to testify this week on Belgrade-Pale connections, while some expert testimony by a demographer would have demonstrated the “ethnic cleansing” effects of Republika Srpska Army (VRS) actions. Some of the evidence, Groome hopes, will be introduced during a short rebuttal phase of the proceedings following the defense. Looking Ahead to the Defense 7. (C) Several members of the prosecution team are now looking ahead and preparing for the defense phase. Lead among them is STA Groome, who told emboff that Milosevic apparently does intend to submit a witness list of 900 individuals. Groome’s main interest will be in undermining, at a very early stage, the credibility of the witnesses Milosevic calls. He noted that in the Brdanin case, prosecutors so effectively undermined the defense witnesses that the defense ultimately rested without calling over fifty individuals on its witness list. Groome hopes that he can obtain a “demonstration effect” so that Milosevic understands that his witnesses are not giving him the help he needs. 8. (C) Groome and others also believe that they will have far beyond June 8 until the defense case begins. Two main problems exist: First, it remains unclear when the replacement judge for Judge May will join the chamber. While there is some discussion of finding a judge who can “read into” the case even before an official appointment, Nice and Groome have identified a host of problems with such an approach, including funding. Secondly, a new judge will have nearly 50,000 pages of documents to review, following which he or she will need to “certify” familiarity with the case. Finally, the summer recess would intrude just as the defense begins. All in all, Groome believes the defense case will not in fact begin until well into September, if that. Final Witness Testimony 9. (SBU) Despite the tumult of recent weeks, the prosecution was able to put on some important witnesses during the final days of its case-in-chief, focusing on Srebrenica. The prosecution used witness testimony to establish that Milosevic had knowledge of the siege of the city, that JNA troops were complicit, and that Milosevic had the control and influence to reign in the Bosnian Serbs. Witnesses during the last week of the case included General Phillipe Morillon, the French UNPROFOR commander who famously promised the Bosnians in Srebrenica that the UN would “never abandon them.” Also testifying was the Venezuelan perm rep to the UN during the war in Bosnia, who in his testimony sharply criticized the UN for not doing more to prevent genocide in Bosnia. 10. (C) Throughout the last week, after a week’s postponement due to illness of the accused, Judges Robinson presided over a Chamber that included only himself and Judge Kwan. The only allusion made to Judge May’s empty chair was Robinson’s comment that Judge May was “indisposed” and that he and Judge Kwan were sitting pursuant to
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Rule 15 bis (which authorizes that, in light of the illness of a judge for a short duration, the remaining judges can continue to hear the case for a period not to exceed 5 working days). Robinson was somewhat more tolerant of Milosevic’s speech-making than May had been, periodically interrupting or stating quietly, “it is time to ask the witness a question now, Mr. Milosevic.” Judge Robinson has also been very accommodating to Milosevic’s requests for more time for cross-examination, where Judge May was normally stingy in giving additional time. Still, Robinson showed some skill in controlling Milosevic and seeing the proceedings through the completion of this phase. 11. (SBU) Testimony of General Philippe Morillon (Former Commander of UNPROFOR): In his capacity as commander of UNPROFOR between 1992 and 1993, Morillon went to Srebrenica to assess the humanitarian situation of the tens of thousands of Muslim civilians who had fled there to escape the Serb offensive in surrounding areas. Morillon made the visit to Srebrenica in March 1993, when the city was surrounded by hostile Bosnian Serb forces. Following his visit, Morillon met with Milosevic in Belgrade and warned him that a terrible tragedy would take place in Srebrenica if Milosevic did not intervene. (Morillon refused to be specific about how he know a tragedy was imminent, but during that period the Muslims could no longer hold their defensive positions against the Serbs, and the town was also on the brink of starvation). According to Morillon, Milosevic was able to clamp down on Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic, whose troops were poised to take the town. The implication is that Milosevic had some level of authority over Bosnian Serb leadership and was able to temporarily avert Srebrenica’s fall to the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic countered that it was Mladic who was responsible for the siege of Srebrenica and the subsequent massacre of its people in 1995, to which Morillon retorted, “Mladic obeyed none but himself, but when I went to Belgrade, I went to save the people of Srebrenica, and he was still obeying you. He stopped obeying you. But thanks to you, I was able to meet with him in Belgrade.” Morillon also testified that he sought Milosevic’s aid to stop the Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo temporarily. For the prosecution, his testimony seemed to be a mixed blessing because, while he was clear that Milosevic initially exerted influence over Mladic in 1993, he was muddled over whether Milosevic could control Mladic in the lead-up to the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. 12. (C) Morillon’s testimony was both compelling and emotional. When he traveled to Srebrenica in March 1993, he was effectively taken hostage by the Bosnian leadership there and released only when he promised to go to Belgrade and negotiate an end to the Serb assault. While in Srebrenica, he gained notoriety by unilaterally promising UN support to the besieged population, walking onto a public balcony and proclaiming into a loudspeaker “I will never abandon you”, an act which ultimately forced the UN to designate Srebrenica as a UN “safe haven.” Morillon’s anger and feeling of personal responsibility for the massacres in July 1995 around Srebrenica was palpable in his testimony. During cross examination, for example, he angrily told Milosevic, “History will tell that you are one of those responsible for having sowed this fear, for having armed, for having pushed those who were unleashed, became enraged and escaped your control.” 13. (SBU) Diego Enrique Arria (Venezuelan permrep to the UN): Arria served as Venezuela’s permanent representative to the UN during the war in Bosnia. The prosecution’s primary interest in Arria was his testimony that Milosevic knew about extremely inhumane conditions in Srebrenica. Through Aria, the prosecution introduced into evi58

dence numerous reports reviewed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) that documented inhumane conditions, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, including letters from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and a ruling from the ICJ requiring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take immediate action to prevent genocide from occurring in Bosnia. Arria testified that the Yugoslav ambassador to the UN prepared informed reports about this documentation, indicating that all of the information reviewed in the UNSC was available to the accused. The testimony serves as evidence that Milosevic had notice that the Bosnian Serbs were on the brink of committing genocide in Srebrenica in 1993; it also serves as a serious condemnation of the UN and the international community, who were also on notice about the imminence of the genocide (Arria characterized it as “slow motion genocide”) but allegedly remained largely indifferent to the conflict. In the course of his testimony, Arria made harsh accusations against the UN, stating that the international community paid more attention to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and did nothing to protect Bosnia because it feared the presence of a Muslim state in Europe. Comment 14. (C) The Prosecution case against Slobodan Milosevic ended with a barely audible whimper. Prosecutors were too busy licking their wounds from bruising internal battles while the remaining Milosevic investigators (and STAs on other teams) could only shake their heads in disbelief at the self-destructive antics. While the team appears to have moved into a general period of, in Nice’s word, dtente, the poor handling of the closing weeks does not bode particularly well for the next phase of the case. On the other hand, Groome’s remaining on the team would appear to provide the team with a vision and the wherewithal to deal with the dozens of witnesses Milosevic is likely to call to his defense. One can only hope that Nice and Groome in particular can find an m.o. according to which they can operative effectively. 15. (C) Beyond the prosecution, however, the chambers now face a new set of priorities, the resolution of which could have a major impact in how the trial is viewed beyond The Hague. First among them is finding a replacement for Judge May. Just how that will be done in the light of an end-of-May effective date for the resignation is unclear, and we have some concern that it has not been well thought through. For instance, if his resignation is only effective May 31, it remains difficult for a judge to be selected before then to replace him on the trial chamber. As a result, one can expect delays well beyond June as a new judge is selected (or elected by the UN General Assembly) and then familiarizes himself or herself with the thousands of pages of transcripts and evidence introduced since the trial began over two years ago. Moreover, one can only speculate as to how Milosevic or the amici will respond to May’s departure. The trial may continue “only . . . with the consent of the accused,” according to Rule 15bis, which Milosevic is unlikely to give in light of his long-stated non-recognition of the Tribunal’s legitimacy. In that case, the remaining judges may continue the trial “if, taking all the circumstances into account, they determine unanimously that doing so would serve the interests of justice.” Such a determination is subject to appeal “by either party,” and one might expect that the amici will be given leave to make such an appeal if Milosevic does not do so. In any event, the June start-date of the defense case would appear unrealistic.
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16. (C) Even apart from the final days of crisis at the Tribunal, observers are already assessing whether the prosecution did what it had to do to obtain a conviction on some or all of the counts of the indictment. Some clarity in this respect may come with the summary judgment motion likely to be filed by the amici and the response to be filed by the prosecution, giving observers a useful opportunity to see whether the chambers believe the prosecution made out at least a prima facie case on key counts of the indictment. (Even here, however, May’s departure raises a concern as to whether a two-judge chamber can rule on the summary judgment motion, or whether judgment on the motions may be delayed until long after a replacement judge comes on board.) Many consider the Kosovo case to have been made exceptionally well, the Croatia case somewhat less so, and while the Bosnia case was also well-done, it presented the prosecution with its most difficult evidentiary tasks of all. 17. (C) Nice in particular is fond of reciting his concern for the place of the Milosevic prosecution in the history books. One hopes that his prosecution team will use the months ahead not only to reflect on the history of the trial’s close, but also whether there are any lessons that they may apply to conclude the case in a less rancorous, more effective way. Sobel

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Reference id: 04THEHAGUE985 Subject: Icty: Senior Former Usg Officials On Milosevic Witness List Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04THEHAGUE985.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d). 1. (C) Summary: Slobodan Milosevic – in one of his first filings before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – submitted to the trial cham60

ber on April 13 a confidential document describing the witnesses he may call during his upcoming defense case. While the list itself remains under seal, Embassy Legal officers have confirmed reports that it includes over 1600 individuals, although only 300 or so of them are named in the document. Of these, the list names the following current and former American officials: former President Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Ambassador Christopher Hill, General Wesley Clark, and former Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. OTP sources are confident that the trial chamber will permit only a fraction of the 1600 individuals to be called as witnesses. End summary. 2. (C) On April 13, Milosevic filed with the trial chamber a confidential document describing the witnesses he intends to call to support various parts of his defense. The document is not strictly speaking a witness list; rather, it is a memorandum divided into sections keyed to the indictments. After each section, the document lists the individuals whose testimony he believes would rebut that particular charge. Most of the 1634 individuals referenced are described with general placeholders, such as their position or role. Only about 300 of them are specifically named. 3. (C) In a meeting with Embassy legal officers on April 16, Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte confirmed that the document included USG officials. Reading directly from a list drawn from the filing, she said that the filing included former President Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Ambassador Christopher Hill, General Wesley Clark, and former Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. She said that it also included a long list of Russian officials, followed by French and British officials, and finally, in the words of a senior adviser, Anton Nikiforov, a number of Chomskyite anti-globalists whose proposed contributions are somewhat mysterious. Nikiforov was perplexed by the Russians listed, noting that a number of them would be damaging rather than helpful to Milosevic. Del Ponte said that the list indicated that Milosevic was planning a primarily political defense. 4. (C) The filing is now with the trial chamber and the Prosecution will have an opportunity to respond to it at a May 17 pre-defense phase conference in chambers. Given that the defense has been allocated 150 days for its portion of the case, it is inconceivable that the trial chamber will approve anything more than a fraction of the list. (NB: By contrast, the OTP called nearly three hundred witnesses during its case, though its witness “wish lists” involved substantially more names and placeholders as well.) Further, any decision with respect to specific witnesses is not likely to occur for some time given that Milosevic has to decide first to call the witness, request that the witness appear, and then justify and pursue a court order if the witness refuses. The USG would have an opportunity to weigh in at the stage a court order is sought, if not sooner, and Del Ponte has agreed to keep us informed of developments with respect to Milosevic’s witness requests. 5. (C) Comment. Milosevic’s filing does not come as much of a surprise as Milosevic has been saying for over two years that he would call former senior officials of the United States and other governments. While Del Ponte may be right that the list reflects a political rather than a legal defense, the proof of that will be not in the three hundred witnesses identified but in the remaining 1300. Some of these witnesses may be insiders from the Milosevic regime who would be in a position to challenge specific aspects of the Prosecution case. Until those witnesses are identified, it will be difficult to characterize the defense phase with any definite degree of certainty. End comment. Sobel
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XVIII
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE1016 Subject: Icc: Otp, Still A Work In Progress, Looking At Africa Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/04/04THEHAGUE1016.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, L – WTAFT, L/UNA – MATHIAS/COGAN, L/AF – GTAFT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2010 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes] Ref: A. KINSHASA 707 B. WWW.ICC-CIP.INT/PHP/NEWS Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per reasons 1.5(b)-(d ). 1. (C) Summary: The International Criminal Court (ICC) remains very much in a nascent stage even as the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) considers whether to open formal investigations of situations in northern Uganda and the Congo, based on referrals from Kampala and Kinshasa (refs). The lack of any formal investigation – let alone indictments or cases – has allowed the competing visions of the institution to develop into policy and personality disputes within its organs and among its senior leadership, though at this stage it is difficult to tell whether such disputes are merely early growing pains or something else. Early signs, however, are that Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo is firmly stamping his vision on the OTP. End summary. 2. (C) The ICC is, as one UK colleague reports, “very much a work in progress.” It is growing both in terms of staff and workload, though the former is outpacing the latter. Each of the four organs of the ICC – the Presidency, Chambers, Registry and OTP – has been focusing for the past year on organization and recruitment, while the senior management also engages in substantial outreach (speeches, travel, etc.). Most of the personnel growth is occurring in the OTP, which envisions a staff of over 100 by the end of 2004. The senior leadership interacts through a Coordination Council bringing together the Prosecutor, Registrar and President, or their respective deputies or chiefs of staff, who work on items of mutual concern. Form and Substance Mesh in OTP 3. (C) Structurally, the OTP is becoming the most sophisticated and complex of the ICC organs, as the judges bide their time by working on regulations to govern their work (nb: unlike the ICTY, the judges of the ICC have no power to promulgate Rules of Pro62

cedure and Evidence, a power which rests with the ICC Assembly of States Parties) and the Registry works principally on infrastructure and administration. The OTP has organized itself into an Investigations Division, headed by a deputy prosecutor from Belgium, Serge Brammertz; a Prosecutions Division, whose division chief position remains vacant and likely to be filled in September; and a unique Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCD), headed by Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s chief of staff, Silvia Fernandez. 4. (C) The OTP structure is revealing, particularly as the JCD points not only to a complicated set of relations among the key personnel in the office but also to the way in which Ocampo sees the OTP’s role. At this time, the JCD is a small section largely staffed by former foreign ministry-type lawyers and other analysts, whereas the other divisions involve small numbers of prosecutors and investigators from a mix of national jurisdictions and international tribunal (mainly ICTY) experience. As described to embassy legal officer, the JCD is the entry point for any communications claiming criminal violations within the jurisdiction of the ICC (approximately 700 received since July 2002) and is the first stop for analysis of whether available information provides a basis for initiating investigation. Its two principal analytical questions are, first, whether the information on its face falls outside ICC jurisdiction, and second, whether a national jurisdiction may already be in a position to handle the allegations in its own criminal justice system. As a result, Ocampo has put complementarity – i.e., the question of national competence and capacity to try crimes domestically rather than at the ICC – in a priority place in his office structure. 5. (C) The primacy of the JCD, particularly at this early phase of the OTP’s development, rankles the other sections of the OTP, especially the investigators, who see their role of assessing and developing information as a primary one for the OTP. According to an embassy contact, the investigators and JCD officers do cooperate and the distinctions between their functions have not led to strict firewalls. Nonetheless, JCD officials have the lead role in the current phase of OTP work. Moreover, JCD officers tend to see investigators as unnecessary at the current phase, preferring instead regional experts and political analysts who can assess the reliability of information. 6. (C) In matters of perspective, key JCD officers also differ from others in OTP. This derives not only from their non-prosecutorial background but also from some officers’ previous positions in governments that had substantial information-sharing programs with the ICTY. For example, two key officers are from the UK Foreign Office and Canada’s DFAIT, respectively). In part as a result of their backgrounds, these officers see it as essential to the OTP’s success to develop positive relationships with information-providers, particularly governments. They are in the process of holding ‘educational’ discussions with key governments, particularly in Africa but also with major ICC supporting governments such as the UK. 7. (C) With this background in mind, JCD officers believe that governments are unlikely to share sensitive information with the OTP in the absence of strong protections against their further disclosure without consent. According to one, however, they are facing a significant hurdle with investigators and Chambers, which is said to be ready to adopt regulations that would require the OTP to disclose potentially exculpatory information to a trial chamber even if the information derives from a provider that does not consent to such disclosure. This dispute, which rings similar to the long-running but almost
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nearly resolved questions of whether the ICTY‘s Rule 70 (information-sharing) trumps its Rule 68 (exculpatory information), is putting some JCD officers in the position of having to tell potential information-providers that they cannot guarantee at this stage that sensitive information would not also be shared with an ICC trial chamber. This fact leaves JCD uneasy and concerned that governments will be hesitant to share the most sensitive lead and background information with the OTP. 8. (C) Finally, the backgrounds of the respective officials in the OTP continually play a role in how they see the OTP’s mission. The former government lawyers, for instance, do not appear to see their missions in strictly prosecutorial terms. As one JCD official put it, when looking at a situation for possible investigation, he needs to consider not merely whether a crime occurred and whether a particular person or persons may be subject to prosecution; he also needs to consider whether prosecution would promote justice more generally, just as Article 53(2)(c) of the Rome Statute provides that the Prosecutor may decide not to proceed with a prosecution that is “not in the interests of justice”. Ocampo is said to see his role in similar terms. The investigators reportedly do not see it the same way; rather, they see their role as following the information and evidence wherever it leads. They are ready to scour potential crime sites for evidence before the assessment is made as to whether an investigation/prosecution would likely be permitted, whereas the JCD officials see it is as fundamentally important first to gain the trust and cooperation of those potential governments in whose territory crimes might have been perpetrated. Uganda and Congo 9. (C) The result of the JCD-investigators divergent perspectives is seen, to some extent, in the early efforts to gather information from Kampala and Kinshasa. The Presidents of both countries have now made referrals to the OTP. The referrals on their own, however, do not require the OTP to open a formal investigation, though Emboff contacts all believe that formal investigations will be opened over the next several months. One reliable source has reported that the OTP is operating on the assumption of investigating three situations in 2005. Both JCD and investigative officials have made numerous trips to both capitals in an effort both to encourage cooperation and begin the process of collecting information. Investigators have gone on these trips prepared to begin the process of information-gathering, whereas the JCD officials have been taking a go-slow approach, using the visits more to build relationships with responsible government officials. Personalities 10. (C) It remains difficult to assess, from the Embassy’s distance, the impact of the key personalities on the ICC’s early work. Some trends evident, however, and chief among them is that the three principals – President Philipe Kirsch, Prosecutor Ocampo, and Registrar Bruno Cathala – eye one another with a mixture of suspicion and bemusement. Ocampo is seen to be the wildcard by some on his staff – a seemingly laid back Argentine who is less concerned with the details than “the vision” and his mission. The meetings between this rumpled-suit prosecutor with a half-shaved beard, the smooth, pinstriped Kirsch and the voluble, dynamic Cathala are said to be comic in appearance – but not settings for clear understanding. Cathala, emboffs are told, has committed some misdemeanors of overreach, seeking to use his control of infrastructure issues as a wedge in64

to what Kirsch sees as his turf. For one thing, Cathala’s early vision of a flexible institution able to contract and expand according to the demands of the proceedings, appears to have been shelved in favor of a more traditional, solidly growth-oriented agenda. For his part, Kirsch seems to be presiding over a restive set of judges, many of whom come from distinguished backgrounds and are now simply waiting for OTP to give them something real to do (and move beyond development of what is described as a several-inch thick set of judicial regulations). Comment 11. (C) Comment: One year after they joined the ICC, the principal ICC officials continue to work on shaping and building their institution. It should be expected that any such process will cause strains, particularly against the backdrop of healthy egos, ambitious junior officials, the NGO and States Parties’ microscope, and an unclear mandate. Still, two factors of particular strain have come to the fore at the OTP. First, unlike other international tribunals, the ICC lacks a specific geographic and temporal charge that can give its investigators and prosecutors some sense of the possible. The result, in part, is that the sense of mission is somewhat diffuse – in contrast to the ICTY‘s early rallying call of bringing an end to crimes in Bosnia the ICC mission at present is more to find a case or cases that can demonstrate the ICC’s seriousness and value. 12. (C) Here, then, is the second problem for the ICC – a difficulty in defining what “seriousness” and “value” mean. Investigators and prosecutors are said to see it as meaning that the ICC should be in a position to prosecute serious crimes. But the Chief Prosecutor himself seems to see the ICC’s role as, perhaps principally, ensuring that domestic jurisdictions have the ability to prosecute cases in their own systems. He has said numerous times that a sign of ICC success would be when domestic jurisdictions, and not the OTP, prosecute cases – a line that seems to zero out the job of investigators and prosecutors. The early prominence of the JCD seems to concretize this point, which appeared merely rhetorical at first. As the OTP heads towards more formal investigations into the Congo and Uganda, the outcome of this internal maneuvering will likely become clearer. End comment. Sobel

XIX
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE1592 Subject: Icty: Preview Of Del Ponte June 29 Address To Un Security Council Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 25 Jun 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/06/04THEHAGUE1592.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header
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Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d). 1. (C) Summary: In her June 29 oral report to the UN Security Council, Carla del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), will highlight several issues from her written report submitted to the Security Council in May. In addition to the expected items concerning the current budget crisis, confirming that she will conclude all investigations and seek final indictments by the end of 2004, and castigating SAM for lack of cooperation, she may also raise four less expected issues with potentially serious implications: the likelihood that the Tribunal will slip from its 2008 completion target, her notion that certain “high-level” indictees may need to be transferred to the region for prosecution by local authorities in order to meet completion strategy targets, the allegation that several fugitives may be in Russia, and a six month deadline for Croatia to apprehend and transfer Gotovina. End summary. 2. (C) Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte will speak on June 29 immediately following the presentation of ICTY President, Judge Theodor Meron (a preview of Meron’s remarks will be reported septel). According to Jean-Daniel Ruch, senior political adviser to Del Ponte, she will repeat the main themes of her written completion strategy report to the Council, which was submitted on May 21. In particular, she will emphasize her commitment to completing the work of the Tribunal according to the strategy endorsed by the Security Council in Resolutions 1503 and 1534 (i.e. concluding all investigations by 2004, all first instance trials by 2008, and all appeals by 2010), but she will note that the timeline for trials and appeals is jeopardized by the degree to which states fail to cooperate in apprehending fugitives, local jurisdictions remain incapable of receiving and trying fairly cases transferred from the ICTY, and the budget crisis forces her to cut important resources. 3. (C) Conclusion of investigative/indictment phase: Del Ponte will express confidence that OTP will conclude its investigations and issue all remaining indictments by the end of 2004, the target of the completion strategy. She will report a number of staffing and budget decisions that are being made consistent with the reorientation of the OTP to a trial-support mode. This includes the closure of the ICTY office in Skopje, and the scaling down of its office in Pristina, in preparation for closure. She will update her written report by noting that since its submission, the OTP has ceased one investigation, leaving six investigations outstanding that are comprised of eleven suspects. This will result in the need for the ICTY to hold four new trials, as two of the targets could be joined with existing trials. Del Ponte will also report that two indictments referenced in the written report have been confirmed and will be presented to the relevant authorities very soon (reported separately).
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4. (C) Del Ponte will express doubt, however, that all trials in the first instance can be finished by the end of 2008. She and President Meron had warned during their Fall reports that slippage was likely and we can expect her to emphasize the increased likelihood of this in her upcoming oral report. (Comment: She has said on a number of occasions that she sees her responsibility primarily in terms of meeting the 2004 deadline and that it is the Trial Chambers, responsibility to meet the 2008 deadline. This elides the fact that the ability to meet the 2008 deadline depends in large measure on the number and nature of the indictments brought before the Tribunal by the OTP and the efficiency with which the cases are tried by the prosecutors. End comment.) 5. (C) Transfer of cases to domestic jurisdictions: Del Ponte will note that an essential factor in the ICTY‘s ability to meet the 2008 target is the ability to transfer cases and investigations for trial in local jurisdictions. Her report describes three categories of cases, of which the first is most relevant for completion purposes: – Indicted Cases: Twelve cases involving twenty-two indictees below the senior-level threshold, “mostly older cases concerning relatively lower-level perpetrators.” These cases would be transferred pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Tribunal’s Rules which authorize the chambers to refer ICTY indicted cases, irrespective of whether the indictee is in custody, for trial in the territory where the crime was committed, the accused was arrested, or (pursuant to a recent rule change) a third country with jurisdiction. – Non-indicted Cases: Nineteen cases involving sixty-seven “medium-level perpetrators” who were not indicted and whose investigations were suspended in 2002. Del Ponte hopes to refer these cases to domestic courts for further investigation and prosecution. Fourteen cases (involving about 50 suspects) would go to Bosnia and Herzegovina, three (involving about 10 suspects) to Croatia, one (involving about six suspects) to Serbia and Montenegro, and one (one or more suspects) to Macedonia. (NB: These would not fall under Rule 11bis but would need to be “referred” under an as-yet identified mechanism.) – Rules of the Road and other cases: OTP “has identified thousands of individual perpetrators in respect of whom some evidence has been gathered” but no indictments issued. With respect to these cases, largely drawn from the Rules of the Road program, Del Ponte intends to compile a brief supporting dossier for local prosecutors, who would have responsibility for deciding whether to proceed. 6. (C) One additional category is likely to be controversial. In her written report, Del Ponte suggests, “In order to keep with the timeframe set by the Security Council, it will probably be necessary to transfer to local courts under Rule 11bis a greater number of cases (i.e. more than the 12 involving 22 perpetrators described above), even some involving high-level accused.” She is likely to repeat this during her oral presentation. This approach is strongly opposed by ICTY President Meron (see septel). It is also at odds with the Security Council’s mandate in UNSCR 1503 that the Tribunal concentrate on “the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction” and transfer “cases involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility.” Moreover, the successful transfer of cases even at a lower level of responsibility depends on the capabilities of local courts, about which Del Ponte herself expresses concern. Del Ponte notes “several instances of witness intimidation,” and even some “murders (of) witnesses due to appear at the ICTY.” In her written submission Del Ponte is dubious of the institutional capabilities of Balkan courts.
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7. (C) Rule 28: Del Ponte is also in conflict with Meron over a recent amendment to ICTY Rule 28 that requires judges, before confirming an indictment submitted by the OTP, to ensure that it involves senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for war crimes. Although the amended rule closely tracks the text of paragraph five of UNSCR 1534 and is positive step by the judges to implement that provision, Del Ponte’s written report alleges that it is contrary to the Tribunal statute and inconsistent with her independence. Ruch has urged Del Ponte not to reiterate this criticism in her oral remarks because he believes it will invite the Council to expressly reject her interpretation and voice support for the amendment. (Comment: While we are reasonably confident that Del Ponte will heed Ruch’s sound advice, it is important for the USG and other Council members to express strong support for the Judge’s implementation of the UNSCR 1534 through the recent rule amendment if she persists in questioning it. End comment.) 8. (C) Budget Crisis: Del Ponte will report that the ICTY budget freeze, memberstate arrears and a cash-flow crisis are having a significant impact on both OTP morale and its ability to meet completion targets. The budget freeze has made the contract status of many staff uncertain, resulting in many of the best and most experienced individuals looking for work elsewhere. The current prohibition on hiring has meant that OTP has been unable to replace lost staff. Del Ponte will undoubtedly raise this budget crisis as an element that is undermining her ability to implement the completion strategy. 9. (C) State Cooperation with the ICTY: Del Ponte will assess the level of cooperation she is receiving from Zagreb, Sarajevo/Pale and Belgrade, much as she did in her written report. Del Ponte is pleased with the cooperation OTP is receiving from Croatia, stating that she is “convinced (that) the Croatian government is currently doing everything it can.” Del Ponte, however, will note that Zagreb has still been unable to arrest Ante Gotovina, and she plans to use her statement before UNSC to set a deadline for Croatian success of six months, phrased as “before my next visit to this body.” In Bosnia and Herzegovina OTP notes “increased activities by OHR and SFOR aimed at arresting ICTY fugitives” but laments the lack of success thus far. Her criticism will be phrased by reference to “authorities in BiH,” rather than just Republika Srpska because, Ruch says, she wants to implicitly include SFOR in her criticism. Serbia and Montenegro represents, in her view, the least obliging Balkan state as it “has practically suspended any cooperation with the Tribunal.” Her oral report will be “a bit stronger” than her pointed criticism of SAM in her written report, where she states that over 100 requests for documents and 50 requests for waivers are outstanding,” and that the authorities “have proven through their behavior in the recent months that they are not ready to execute (ICTY) arrest warrants.” She concludes that “Serbia and Montenegro is therefore in breach of its international legal obligations.” 10. (C) Russia: In a real break from her written report, Del Ponte may also raise the possibility that some fugitives are in hiding in Russia, suggesting the collusion of Moscow authorities. According to Ruch and Chief of Investigations Patrick Lopez-Terez, OTP has received information that several indictees are in Russia and two actually have known addresses in Moscow. She will tell the Council that she has informed the Russian authorities of this intelligence and is “awaiting their response.” (Comment: It remains unclear if this statement will make it into the final speech. End Comment.)
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Comment 11. (C) One needs to be prepared for any number of eventualities when Carla Del Ponte makes public appearances because she often departs from the script. Nonetheless, it is possible to anticipate several areas where a U.S. intervention could be warranted. These include (1) a restatement of the U.S. opposition to the transfer of senior figures to domestic jurisdictions for trial; (2) support, if the issue is joined, of the recent amendment of Rule 28 so that the judges can verify that new indictments are indeed of senior level individuals most responsible for war crimes; (3) the continued U.S. concern regarding the non-cooperation of various governments in the region; (4) a welcome of OTP’s announcement that it will meet the end of 2004 deadline for the end of investigation and the various initiatives OTP and President Meron have undertaken to improve efficiency of the ICTY process; and (5) our continuing commitment to the ICTY financially and concern about the perilous budget situation and its impact on the ability of the Tribunal to fulfill its mandate. Sobel

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Reference id: 04THEHAGUE1715 Subject: Icty: Milosevic’s Poor Health Trigger’s “radical” Review Of Case By Court And Paves Way For Imposition Of Defense Counsel Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Thu, 8 Jul 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/07/04THEHAGUE1715.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR/SCE – STEPHENS/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d). 1. (C) Summary: The trial chamber hearing the case against Slobodan Milosevic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) postponed the July 5 commencement of the defense case due to the Accused’s poor health. During the hearing, Milosevic accused the Tribunal of damaging his health by ignoring his requests
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for additional time to prepare his defense case and rejected various suggestions by the Chamber and Prosecution to ease the trial burden. In an order issued on July 6, the Chamber decided to commence the defense case on July 14 and then recess on July 21 until August 31. The order expressed the Chamber’s view that a “radical review of the future conduct of the trial” was in order, while noting that there was “no evidence” to suggest that Milosevic was unfit to stand trial at all. Signaling that the likely outcome of this review was the imposition of stand-by counsel on Milosevic, the Court ordered the Registrar to identify trial counsel who might be assigned to the case. End Summary. From Trial to “Administrative” Hearing 2. (C) Complaining of illness, and supported by reports from his cardiologist, Milosevic did not give his much anticipated opening statement – the first stage in the defense component of the case– at the July 5 proceedings. Instead, presiding Judge Patrick Robinson (Jamaica) convened the hearing to discuss the “administrative” issues raised by the Accused’s continuing ill health. A July 1 medical report received by the Court, which Robinson read in Chambers, noted Milosevic’s very high blood pressure (200/130) and the injury to his heart that the ailment has already caused. The report noted that when under stress the pressure is increased further, but with rest the “situation returns to normal.” The report contained a recommendation from the consulting cardiologist, Dr. van Dykman (a highly regarded Dutch physician), that the Accused be allowed to rest at least until July 9. (Comment. Embassy legal officers observed that Milosevic, while speaking firmly, appeared somewhat worn and moved a bit stiffly, wincing once (a touch theatrically) near his left shoulder. End comment.) 3. (SBU) Robinson asked the three parties present for their comments on the report. Milosevic angrily protested his presence in the courtroom, stating that a doctor who had examined him that morning at the detention facility told him that he was not fit to stand trial at this time. Claiming maltreatment and further loss of preparation time due to sickness, Milosevic demanded an additional month to prepare. He noted that court appointed physicians had previously advised that he should work only three days a week. Given the need for preparation time, he was essentially proposing that the court hold no more than one or two trial sessions each week. He reiterated his categorical refusal to accept the appointment of counsel. He also rebuffed any of the Court’s suggestions about ways to alleviate his stress, such as Judge Bonomy’s suggestion that he deliver his opening statement in writing or the notion, raised by Chambers, that he participate in the proceedings via video link at the detention facility. Amicus Steven Kay stated that the Accused’s “pronounced decline in health” raised not only the issue whether the accused was fit to present his own case, but also whether he was fit to stand trial at all. Lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice, repeating OTP’s long-held position, argued that counsel must be imposed on Milosevic, contending that the reason his blood pressure was so elevated was due to the stress of preparing his defense. A Solution? 4. (SBU) In its order of July 6, the Court stated that a “radical review” of the trial’s conduct was necessary and set forth the key factors that will guide its decision. The Court noted that Milosevic’s poor health has resulted in numerous interruptions of the trial and the loss of 66 days during the Prosecution’s case. Further, Milosevic’s poor health
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was likely to recur. At the same time, the Court noted that “there is no evidence that the Accused is not fit to stand trial at all, but there is evidence that the health of the Accused is such that he may not be fit to continue to represent himself, and that his continuing to represent himself could adversely affect the fair and expeditions conduct of the trial.” Further the Court noted that when it had last declined to impose defense counsel on Milosevic in April 2003 it had stated that “the right to defend oneself in person is not absolute ... there may be circumstances ... where it is in the interest of justice to appoint counsel.” The Court then referenced the imposition of stand-by counsel in the Seselj case and said that “it may be necessary to assign counsel to the Accused, and/or adopt other measures to ensure a fair and expeditious conduct of the trial.” Noting that it is “in the interests of the Accused and the broader interests of justice that this trial be conducted and concluded within a reasonable period of time” the Court concluded that it was “incumbent upon the Trial Chamber to identify measures for the continuation of the trial which are efficient, sensitive to the health of the Accused, and conducive to the fair an proper presentation of the defense.” 5. (C) The Court’s order stopped short of determining the specific measures it would impose; instead, it set the stage for a later decision by ordering that the defense will commence on July 14 for one week and then go into recess from July 21 until August 31. Second, the Registrar will identify counsel who might be assigned to the case if the Court requests it. The chamber also requested that a new cardiologist, with no prior involvement in the treatment of the Accused, examine Milosevic and “report to the Trial Chamber on the fitness of the Accused to continue to represent himself and the likely impact on the trail schedule should he continue to do so.” The purpose of this seems aimed less at Dr. van Dykman, an eminent physician agreed upon by both sides whose conclusions are not contested, than at establishing a fresh opinion on the extent to which Milosevic’s health can handle the stresses of mounting a defense and the costs in terms of trial time if he were to continue to do this alone. Comment 6. (C) The hearing crystallized two issues that have had a dominant impact on the trial from its inception. First, Milosevic again proved himself a master at stage-managing the proceedings. He threw the judges off balance at the outset of the hearing by demanding why the Court had insisted on his presence when the detention facility physician had pronounced him unfit that morning. (He did not mention that the physician had thought he was attending a full trial session rather than an administrative hearing). He also skillfully played the health card to present himself as the victim of a Tribunal that is predestined to convict him, blaming the Court for deliberately injuring his health by refusing his requests for additional preparation time. At the same time that he was portraying himself as a victim, he defiantly refused every suggestion by the Court and Prosecution for measures that might ease the stress on his health. The result was to place the Court in a position where, short of discontinuing the trial, any other measure it took to help Milosevic would be over his strong objection. 7. (C) The second issue highlighted during the hearing was the ongoing impact of Milosevic’s unstable health. With the trial moving to a defense phase, where Milosevic must not merely respond to Prosecution evidence but advance a defense, the stress on his health will continue to increase. The Chamber is therefore faced with the untenable op71

tion of allowing the trial to limp ahead uncertainly for years with a day or two of hearings per week or take “radical” action. The Chamber’s order strongly hints that it is poised to do the latter, and we expect it to impose stand-by defense counsel this summer. By buying additional time for an assessment of the situation, foreshadowing the appointment to the public, granting Milosevic more time to prepare his defense, and getting a second medical opinion on which to base its decision, the Court is skillfully laying the groundwork for the imposition of counsel. While this course of action, realistically the only way forward, is defensible legally and manageable in terms of public perception, whether it will actually work is an open question. Some basic level of cooperation between Milosevic and such counsel is essential, and it remains to be seen whether Milosevic will seek to push the trial to a crises point through noncooperation or be content, as he is with the Amici, to castigate them publicly while working with them behind the scenes to advance his defense. End comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 04THEHAGUE2736 Subject: Icty: “who’s Running This Court?” Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 22 Oct 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/10/04THEHAGUE2736.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS; EUR/SCE – GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L – LAHNE/GTAFT, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: THE HAGUE 2494 Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d). 1. (C) Summary: A rare appeals chamber hearing in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) case against Slobodan Milosevic heard sharp and well-presented arguments this week on the imposition of counsel on the accused. Defense counsel Steven Kay pleaded with the appeals chamber to restore to Milosevic substantial control over the presentation of his defense, admitting that counsel (i.e. his team)
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have become “ineffective” and unable to say they are acting in the best interests of justice and the accused. Milosevic, back on the stage again, made a vigorous, impassioned, and cogent – if often factually misleading – presentation for the chamber to “restore” his right of self-representation. Lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice, with chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte sitting silently by his side, asked the appeals chamber to affirm the trial chamber, wondering aloud, “who’s running this court, the judges or the accused?” The hearing came following another week of witnesses failing to appear for Milosevic’s defense. End summary. Counsel Appeal 2. (C) President Theodor Meron, presiding judge of the Appeals Chamber, opened the hearing by noting that the question of assigning counsel to Milosevic “has been percolating in one form or another since very early on” in the trial. He reviewed the main elements of the appeal and the prosecution’s response. Three central thematic questions appeared relevant to Meron: One, to what extent can the individual right to defend oneself as one chooses be modified in order to ensure a fair and expeditious trial? Two, does the Tribunal need additional and more current information on Milosevic’s health – including an examination by a physician of the accused’s own choosing and consideration of whether he is manipulating his health – in order to affirm the need for imposed counsel? And three, has the decision to impose counsel so changed the dynamics and reality of the defense that it has proved to be unworkable in practice? Throughout the hearing, Meron also expressed a separate, juridical worry – namely, the extent to which the appeals chamber may review a trial chamber decision concerning imposition of counsel. (Comment: Given this appeals chamber’s previous exercise of broad discretion to review trial chamber decisions, this may signal less a legal constraint than an unwillingness to reopen a difficult decision by the trial chamber. End comment.) He also assured the litigants, in response to a comment from Kay, that the completion strategy “has no bearing” on the chamber’s assessment of this appeal, as “we are here to do justice.” 3. (C) Defense counsel Kay contended that the trial chamber imposed counsel following a “concerted attack” by the prosecution on Milosevic’s right to represent himself, and he gave a bleak picture of the course of his efforts to defend the accused. He asked the chamber not to consider the prosecution’s arguments that Milosevic manipulated his health to obstruct the trial and, in response to a follow-up question from Meron, suggested that a new medical exam, including by one of the accused’s own doctors, should be conducted (as Milosevic requested in September). The prosecution had argued that Milosevic had not raised this issue in a timely manner, but Kay said that the imposition of counsel – the “most extreme” of the options before the trial chamber – came as a “complete surprise” to the accused. Meron quickly interjected, “how could it?”, to which Kay gave a raft of reasons suggesting that the trial chamber had led Milosevic to believe that it would do something less than impose counsel in the way that it did, such as impose stand-by counsel available to assist or in case of the accused’s ill-health. (Note: Emboffs learned from a Registry source with regular contact with Milosevic that he was actually prepared to accept a stand-by counsel proposal. The decision to not only impose counsel on him but give that counsel the lead and authoritative role in his defense – putting Milosevic in the second chair, so to speak – likely surprised Milosevic as much as it did other court observers. End note.)
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4. (SBU) Kay argued that irrespective of how the Court got itself to this point, the bottom line was that one risk – delays in the trial caused by ill health – had been replaced with another, the denial of a real defense case in the face of non-participation of witnesses and the accused. Kay concluded that he and his co-counsel “are ineffective” and that, as a result of the trial chamber’s decision, Milosevic is not obtaining a real defense. His suggested remedy was one he had put forward to the trial chamber in September: Milosevic should appoint counsel or represent himself, putting the responsibility on him to conduct his own defense; if that means taking only one day a week to conclude the case over the next several years, that would be acceptable to him. But to determine whether that would in fact occur, he said, the court needs a new medical report. 5. (SBU) Milosevic expressed his “deep conviction” that the trial chamber acted as it did not for health reasons but for “political reasons,” the result of a “campaign conducted not to permit me to speak.” He challenged the prosecution’s assertion that he manipulated his health, saying that a good percentage of his sick days were from the flu, not from his chronic hypertension. He added that his blood pressure had improved over time, adding that the stress of putting on the case in what he defined as a short time allotted by the trial chamber contributed to his poor health (though he did not see that this presented an argument for imposing some form of counsel in itself). 6. (SBU) Milosevic, aside from points relating to his health and some typical political posturing, mostly limited himself to making a legal case for self representation. He cited a “petition” of lawyers from around the world arguing that his right to self-representation could not be modified or minimized, and referred to U.S. constitutional protections under the Sixth Amendment. “I would like for my right (of self-representation) to be restored to me,” he said, and he saw no middle-ground in the assigning of a “stand-by counsel” to assist in his work. He has “no objection” to Kay continuing to ask questions of witnesses, much as he did when he was the amicus curiae (friend of the court). But “the only thing I can see as just, fair, logical and reasonable is to give me back my right to call witnesses myself, to examine them, and to lead evidence in my defense case.” This is, he said, guaranteed him under international law, including “your own Statute.” Finally, he said, “I cannot agree to anything less because that is my principled position, one from which I do not intend to retreat so much.” 7. (SBU) Nice would have none of the appeals for sympathy sought by Kay and Milosevic. Instead he argued that everything Milosevic said “show(s) that this man is not capable now of presenting a case before what is manifestly a straightforward criminal court trying him for criminal offenses.” He should not, Nice said, be allowed to “carry on” before judges “whom he has quite wickedly impugned.” He presented an alternate account of the way in which the chamber came to assign counsel, showing that the prosecution had repeatedly urged the trial chamber to impose counsel to assist, but not necessarily overtake, Milosevic’s defense. That said, the prosecution “entirely support” the trial chamber decision and its “modalities” (i.e., the placing of defense counsel in the lead role and forcing Milosevic to seek permission to examine witnesses). Nice further suggested that the modalities could change if Milosevic were to show himself behaving in a rational, sensible and cooperative manner in the courtroom. Summing up, he noted sharply, “who’s running this court, the accused or the judges who have been appointed to do so?”
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8. (C) Meron closed by suggesting that the chamber may seek further supplemental briefing from the parties on specific issues. However, in a later conversation, Meron told Emboff that “the fog is clearing” in the way he views the case and that a decision should be expected soon. Separately, Nice asked emboff, sounding anxious, what he thought of the proceeding. When the question was turned around, Nice said that one of the members of his team thought the defense had the better of it. Nice expressed concern that any change in the modalities by the appellate chamber could lead to a situation where the accused, more than ever, believes he can dictate his views to, and manipulate, the trial chamber. The Defense Muddles Along 9. (SBU) The trial chamber met briefly on October 18 to review Kay’s newly filed witness list and discuss his prospects for getting witnesses to appear. The list, which is not public, is divided into experts, internationals, and insiders and, as best could be divined from context, includes 138 names with contact information, as well as the status of the defense’s efforts to contact each witness and persuade him/her to testify. Kay is still having virtually no success – there was the usual rehashing of witnesses refusing to testify in opposition to the assignment of counsel – but the judges did focus in on a few prospects. Two are Germans awaiting approval from either the German government, the EU, or OSCE – the Registry has put in the request on Kay’s behalf but it is unclear which institution is holding up the process. One, Henning Hensch from the OSCE/KVM, appears likely to testify soon. With respect to the other, Dietmar Hartwig, former head of the ECCM, Judge Robinson explicitly said to Kay that &if the necessary consents have been given, that witness still refuses to come, you may want to invite the Chamber or request the Chamber to issue a binding order.8 10. (SBU) The defense on October 19 examined Leona Kanelli, an independent member of the Greek Parliament connected to the Communist Party. Kanelli, also the publisher of the magazine Nemesis, visited Aleksinac in southern Serbia shortly after NATO started bombing in 1999. The substance of her testimony centered on pictures she took and reports she published about the destruction of the town, but much of her actual testimony took the form of dramatic and combative monologues about the innocents killed by NATO bombing and the tragedy of war in general. The trial chamber was patient with her but, when she called into question the legitimacy of the court itself, Judge Robinson interrupted to inform her that her comment was &completely out of order.8 Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice’s cross-examination went to Kanelli’s assertion that there was no military target in Aleksinac, producing a Human Rights Watch report already in evidence that detailed the intended target, the Aleksinac Deligrad military barracks. Kanelli’s irreverence toward the court and Nice was striking, to the point that many in the audience gallery were by the end of cross-examination laughing at her. 11. (SBU) Milosevic did contribute slightly to the defense examination of Kanelli. He at one point helped the court in trying to locate Aleksinac on a map of Serbia and, when given the chance to examine Kanelli, did ask one question. He asked her, in English, if she had been asked all the agreed questions. She responded that Kay had asked only a small portion of them. When prompted by Judge Robinson to fill gaps in the examination in chief with his own questions, Milosevic said he would not enter the trial on the merits until his rights were restored.
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Comment 12. (C) Meron has called the appeal of the imposition of counsel issue the most difficult decision of his tenure. If his chamber reverses the trial chamber, the case is certain to be held hostage once again to Milosevic’s uncertain health. If he upholds the chamber’s decision without modification, it seems equally certain that Milosevic will not engage the proceedings and that only a feeble and truncated defense will be put forward. The stakes are high: the legacy of the case, already shaken, depends on observers viewing the proceedings as legitimate, meeting the highest standards of fairness to the accused, and providing a persuasive basis for conclusions as to whether the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Prosecution seems uniquely content to have the case conclude within weeks and allow the trial chamber to move toward judgment. For others, who have in mind the larger legacy of the Tribunal – and its ability to bring reconciliation to the region – there is hope that the Appeals Chamber will strike the right balance between imposing counsel on Milosevic and permitting him to retain a reasonable degree of control over his defense, so that whatever the outcome, the credibility of the proceedings and the institution will withstand the test of time. End Comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 04THEHAGUE2793 Subject: Icty – Tribunal Officials Highlight Concerns About Serb Noncooperation And Budget Freeze In Meetings With S/wci Ambassador Prosper And Eur Stephens Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Mon, 1 Nov 2004 17:55 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/11/04THEHAGUE2793.html History: First published on Mon, 17 Jan 2011 22:27 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS, EUR/SCE – GAUDIOSI/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: FIVE YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, Reason 1.5(b)-(d).
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Summary 1. (C) In a series of meetings on September 28 at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), President Meron, Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte, and Registrar Holthuis struck consistent themes with Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper and EUR DAS for Southeast Europe Kathy Stephens. All ICTY officials lamented the continued lack of cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro on fugitives and welcomed the USG’s renewed tough message to Belgrade. ICTY officials were similarly receptive to efforts by the USG to coordinate a similar policy line with the Europeans, linking the EU accession process with progress on cooperation. While describing efforts to facilitate the transfer of cases to the region, ICTY officials underscored their deep concern about the continuing hiring freeze imposed on the Tribunal by the UN and noted its significant negative impact on the ICTY’s ability to meet completion strategy goals. End summary. The Prosecution 2. (C) Ambassador Prosper joined by EUR DAS Stephens, EUR/SCE officer Jennifer Mitchell and Embassy legal officers, opened their visit by meeting with Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte and her senior staff. Prosper and Stephens expressed deep concern with the lack of cooperation by Belgrade and stressed the need to reevaluate current policy in the region in order to increase pressure and incentives on Belgrade to cooperate with the ICTY. Del Ponte welcomed this objective but expressed concern that earlier USG remarks about the possibility of transferring the four generals to Serbia for trial were premature, being used as a pretext by Belgrade to cease all efforts to bring about the transfer of fugitives below the Mladic level, and, more generally, encouraging Serb officials and fugitives to try to wait out the ICTY’s completion. Prosper explained that Belgrade had been given an opportunity to produce results and that the policy of showing an openness to support transfers back to the region for domestic trail “hasn,t worked to date.” What is needed, he said, is a stronger message to “make clear in the region that noncooperation will result in extending the life of the Tribunal.” Del Ponte and her staff supported the idea of a firmer message but advised that the USG should avoid stating specific requirements of cooperation because SAM would respond by only meeting those requirements, and then only to draw out the process of cooperation on those few things. Senior political adviser Jean-Daniel Ruch urged that the message should be, “you know what to do, start doing it.” 3. (C) Ruch said that he would urge his contacts in Brussels, on the staff of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, to reinforce the tough message on Belgrade’s cooperation. He pointed out that in June 2004, the EU had stated that as long as Mladic, Karadzic, and Gotovina remained at large, the Tribunal should not close its doors. Del Ponte welcomed Stephens’s focus on coordinating a tough message with the EU as “extremely important” and said she supported a unified message of the sort announced by the EU ministers and endorsed by Ambassador Prosper. Note. On October 4, Del Ponte met with Solana and urged him to deliver a stiff message to SAM on the need to cooperate fully in order for their to be progress on EU accession issues. End note. 4. (C) Speaking to OTP’s overall frustration with Serb noncooperation, Del Ponte reported that, according to a conversation she had with the chairman of the National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY, Rasim Ljajic, “Kostunica believes the United Sta77

tes only wants Mladic and that is the reason they are not arresting the others.” Chief of Investigations Patrick Lopez-Terres cited RS police sources who complain that the Belgrade police are not helping them. But he also expressed concern about the “complete radio silence” with respect to search operations conducted by Serb authorities and the lack of feedback with respect to fugitive information passed by the ICTY. Increasingly, he said, his office cannot track Belgrade’s work on fugitives. The Court 5. (SBU) President Theodor Meron, joined by chief of staff Larry Johnson, focused on the ICTY’s budget crisis, which he called a “real plague” on the Tribunal. Meron noted that the main result of the crisis is the hiring freeze. It has affected all of the Tribunal’s main activities, from judicial decisionmaking (although the Chambers received permission to fill nine vital clerkship positions, new vacancies have since arisen) to OTP investigations and prosecutions (OTP is hemorrhaging senior investigators and prosecutors to places like the Oil For Food investigation and the International Criminal Court and is unable to fill the vacancies) to transitioning cases to the region (OTP cannot staff a new transition team to facilitate the transfer of cases to the region until it can fill vacancies). Meron urged the USG to provide its assessed contribution as soon as possible in order to convince U/SYG Bertini to lift the freeze. Meron was pleased to learn that the United States expected to make a 13 million USD contribution by early October and that another 10 million USD would follow this autumn. (Note. Post understands that both Russia and Japan, the other major contributors in arrears have now paid all or most of their outstanding balances. The US paid $14.3 million in October and expects to pay the remaining balance of $8.8 million shortly. End note.) 6. (C) Meron expressed concern that the BiH State Prosecutor’s Special Department for Organized Crime and Corruption has complicated the process of creating the war crimes chamber in Sarajevo by issuing a war crimes indictment before the chamber has been established, thereby sending mixed signals regarding the readiness of BiH to adjudicate domestic war crimes cases . Prosper and Meron agreed that cooperation from local governments is a critical dimension in the success of the 11bis trials referred to the local courts. Meron said that the Tribunal must be “very careful” about the transfer of detainees who might be considered senior-level, not only because of the Security Council expectation that such persons would be tried in The Hague but also because of the signals that could send to senior-level fugitives. Meron also expressed a willingness to work with the USG in particular on urging Belgrade to develop domestic capacity to prosecute war crimes, noting that he had good relations with the local SAM Ambassador and other SAM officials. The Registry 7. (SBU) Registrar Hans Holthuis echoed Meron in focusing on the hiring freeze, which has forced the Tribunal to maintain a fifteen (15) percent staff vacancy rate, well above the normal 3 to 4 percent rate. This includes positions lost to normal attrition that remain unfilled. Prosper indicated that he would follow-up with USUN and the UN leadership in an effort to lift the hiring freeze, at least to fill vacancies due to normal attrition.
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8. (SBU) Holthuis described various initiatives under way to enhance Tribunal efficiency and further progress towards completion. He said that the Registry is examining ways in which to schedule more than the present six trials in its three courtrooms, noting that it might be possible to schedule contempt hearings and other short proceedings during gaps in the major trials. Holthuis also reviewed outreach and training efforts underway in Croatia, SAM, and BiH to help build up local trial capacity. 9. (C) Comment: The budget crisis is severely testing the OTP’s capacity to carry out its remaining pre-indictment investigations and the Tribunal’s capacity overall to continue with its six-trial maximum schedule. A quick lifting of the hiring freeze is essential not only to permit the Tribunal to complete its work on time but also for it advance the transfer of cases involving mid and lower level perpetrators back to the region for trial. All ICTY leaders are focused on the capacity of jurisdictions in the region to prosecute war crimes cases at a level that meets international standards. OTP and Chambers are particularly focused on the capacity of the Sarajevo war crimes chamber to handle 11bis cases as early as this January, since this constitutes by far the largest category of cases eligible to be transferred. OTP has also begun testing Belgrade’s capacity to conduct effective and fair war crimes trials by providing the special war crimes court there with complete investigative files in two cases. If these cases go well, the Tribunal is prepared to add others in the pipeline. ICTY and USG officials shared the sense that cooperation with Belgrade is at a crossroads. The promising start of domestic war crimes trials points a clear way towards the future, but that opportunity as well as progress towards European integration will be squandered if political levels fail to produce the long overdue results with respect to fugitives. End comment. 10 (U) This cable has been cleared by S/WCI Prosper and EUR Stephens. Sobel

XXIII
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE2869 Subject: Icty – Appeals Chamber Returns Lead In Defense Case To Milosevic Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 5 Nov 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/11/04THEHAGUE2869.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS, EUR/SCE – GAUDIOSI/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: FIVE YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE
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Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: A. THE HAGUE 2792 B. THE HAGUE 2736 Classified By: Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, Reason 1.5(b)-(d). 1. (SBU) Summary: On November 1, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) upheld the Milosevic trial chamber’s decision to impose counsel on the accused but reversed the trial chamber’s decision to give assigned counsel a lead role in the case. Finding that the trial chamber erred in both the law and the facts, the appeals chamber ordered a return to Milosevic of the “lead in presenting his case.” The ruling will place counsel in the stand-by mode it should have been in to begin with, and is all but certain to lead to Milsevic’s reengagement with the case. While this will enhance the legitimacy of the trial, it will also confront States once again with Milosevic’s politicized defense and requests that former senior officials testify in the trial. End summary. 2. (SBU) In a widely-anticipated opinion issued on November 1, the Appeals Chamber, presided over by ICTY president Theodor Meron, acknowledged the trial chamber’s difficulty conducting the trial while Milosevic’s health deteriorated. Describing at length the trial chamber’s many health-related obstacles in hearing the case, including thirteen suspensions for a total of 66 days and doctors, prognoses that there was a “real risk that a life-threatening hypertensive emergency would develop if (Milosevic) continued to represent himself,” the Appeals Chamber concluded that “although the question is close” the trial chamber did not abuse its discretion in assigning counsel over the objections of the accused. 3. (SBU) The Appeals Chamber “part(ed) ways” with the trial chamber, however, in its interpretation of the appropriate relationship between Milosevic and his assigned counsel. Since imposing counsel intrudes on Milosevic’s right to represent himself, the opinion states, the intrusion should be “limited to the minimum extent necessary to protect the Tribunal’s interest in assuring a reasonably expeditious trial.” The chamber went on to instruct the trial chamber to devise a scheme that “minimizes the practical impact of the formal assignment of counsel,” so that Milosevic will again take on the primary role in his defense, as he did before counsel, Steven Kay and Gillian Higgins, were assigned. The opinion notes that, “(I)n practice, if all goes well, the trial should continue much as it did when Milosevic was healthy. To a lay observer, who will see Milosevic playing the principal courtroom role at the hearings, the difference may well be imperceptible.” It continued, “If Milosevic’s health problems resurface with sufficient gravity, however, the presence of Assigned Counsel will enable the trial to continue even if Milosevic is temporarily unable to participate. The precise point at which that reshuffling of trial roles should occur will be up to the Trial Chamber.” 4. (C) Participants in the trial have reacted variously to this balanced decision, all with a tinge of criticism. Lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice is, predictably, upset that the Appeals Chamber rejected the hard line position (i.e., that keeping defense counsel in the lead is essential and that only Milosevic is to blame for the problems in the trial) adopted by the trial chamber at his urging. Steven Kay told emboff that he found the decision “weak-kneed,” and in the same breath suggested that his “ethical” obligations require him to continue to seek withdrawal from the case. See reftels. His “position has not changed” on
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withdrawal Kay says, although he retains “a duty” to continue functioning as defense counsel. Kay further suggested that he will reevaluate his position following the resumption of the case on Tuesday, November 9, when the trial chamber’s implementation of the appeals ruling will be clearer. (NB: The trial chamber, according to one Registry source, has ordered the parties to be prepared to discuss the withdrawal issue on November 9, after which it is expected to issue an order dealing with that and any other issues necessary to getting the trial back on track.) 5. (C) Embassy legal officers have learned that, as expected, Milosevic is happy with the ruling and expects to begin retaking the lead of his case next week (though he could use more time to prepare, it is said). However, a Registry source says that the “bridge” between Milosevic and Kay “has been burned” and “will take some time” to repair. For instance, a group associated with Milosevic has filed a complaint against Kay before the Dutch bar, apparently arguing that his disclosure of medical records violated the confidentiality of those records. (Separately, the group has filed a complaint against the Dutch physician, Dr. van Dijkman, on similar grounds.) The import of the claim against Kay is unclear, including whether it is something that Milosevic can and will withdraw if relations with Kay improve. In any event, Emboffs understand that the Registry is striving to avoid the loss of Kay and Higgins, who know the case well and, in its view, are best prepared to participate as stand-by counsel. 6. (C) Comment: The decision of the Appeals Chamber reorients the defense case back to where it should have been at the time counsel was imposed, with Milosevic in the lead but supported by a stand-by counsel in (the likely) case that his health again affects his ability to participate in the proceedings. Whether this decision will get the case back on track depends on two key wildcards: whether Milosevic takes the bait and returns to active participation in the trial and whether the defense counsel continue to pursue their request to be removed from the case. If Milosevic reengages fully, including with counsel, Kay and Higgins, reasons for seeking dismissal will be measurably diminished, and they would be likely to remain on the case. That in turn will help ensure a credible and visible defense, albeit one that will extend the trial well into 2006 and present states with the politicized defense and senior official witness demands that are at the heart of Milosevic’s approach. End comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 04THEHAGUE2932 Subject: Icty: Milosevic Trial Chamber Focuses On Appointed Counsel And Government Witnesses Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 12 Nov 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/11/04THEHAGUE2932.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS; EUR/SCE – GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L – LAHNE/GTAFT, INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 FIVE YEARS AFTER CLOSURE ICTY Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], NL [Netherlands], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Ref: THE HAGUE 2869 Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson per 1.5(d). 1. (SBU) Summary: The trial chamber in the case against Slobodan Milosevic before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) continued to deal with defense counsel issues during the week of November 8. Its three days of hearings – a full schedule for this case – were devoted to defense counsel Steven Kay’s application to withdraw from the case. Meanwhile, Milosevic, acting vindicated by the Appeals Chamber decision returning the lead of the case to him (reftel), has taken on a renewed interest in the proceedings, seems to be preparing for his case to begin in earnest and is renewing old demands of the judges. His oral request for subpoenas against former senior USG, UK and German officials was met with stiff, and judicious, resistance by presiding Judge Robinson. End summary. 2. (SBU) Defense Counsel Steven Kay’s application to withdraw from the case received the full attention of the trial chamber this week. Presiding Judge Patrick Robinson and Judge Iain Bonomy seemed highly skeptical of Kay’s arguments that he should be allowed to withdraw in light of the lack of cooperation he is receiving from Milosevic. Kay told Embassy legal officers that he felt the chamber very much wanted him to stay on, an impression confirmed by the nature and tenor of questions from Robinson and Bonomy. After nearly a full day of discussion of whether the trial chamber had jurisdiction to rule on Kay’s application to withdraw, Kay did his argument no favors when he argued on the third day of the hearings that, in fact, his UK codes of conduct, to which he is bound, do not require him to seek the leave of a court to withdraw from a case. This prompted a confused exchange in which the judges seemed annoyed by the suggestion that the hearings were unnecessary. Milosevic cut through much of this debate with the pointed assertion to the judges that “the Trial Chamber put the Mr. Kay in the position he is now in ... it would be logical to assume that it has jurisdiction to resolve the situation.” Judge Robinson, chuckling, acknowledged that it was “a very pragmatic approach.” Milosevic made clear that he would be happy to see Kay leave the defense, while lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice – clearly downbeat and frustrated by a proceeding that had nothing to do with the case he rested last February – presented arguments against enabling Kay to withdraw. 3. (SBU) Toward the end of the hearing, Milosevic was asked by the chamber whether he had anything “administrative” he wished to raise. Milosevic indicated that he wan82

ted the Court to call former President Clinton, former Secretary Albright, Prime Minister Blair, Prime Minister Schroeder and former Defense Minister Scharping before the end of this year. He said that they are “need(ed) to provide a general overview of the situation, and they pertain to all of the issues contained in the indictment.” He then added that he wanted to recall General Wesley Clark. (Note. Kay in an informal meeting with Embassy legal officers expressed his view that the Chamber would not allow Clark to be recalled since Milosevic had already had a chance to question him.) 4. (SBU) Judge Robinson responded firmly that “there are procedures to be followed.” He continued, “First you have to show that you yourself have made an effort to contact the witness, to get the witness, and the witness is not willing to come. Then you have to satisfy us as to the evidence that the witness is going to give, that it is going to be useful and relevant evidence.” He told Milosevic to follow the procedure used by the Prosecution in seeking government witnesses. Milosevic then said, falsely, that “by conclusive action it has been shown that they are not willing to appear.” (Note. Milosevic, through the Registry Liaison Officer (RLO), requested the appearance of the named witnesses in May; the Embassy, coordinating with the Department, responded with a letter explaining the process by which such requests are made and then considered by the USG. The Embassy received no further communication from the accused or the RLO. We understand that neither have other embassies in receipt of similar requests – the UK, France, Germany – received responses.) Robinson usefully concluded the dialogue with Milosevic by saying, “You must make a written submission. I am not going to issue any subpoena on your oral statement. You must make a written submission setting out the circumstances which show that they’re unwilling to come and setting out the evidence that you want them to give. That is what the Prosecution had to do, and that is what you will do.” 5. (SBU) Kay intervened to note that U.S. Embassy reps had informed him of the steps the USG considers necessary in order to process a request for the testimony of former USG officials. He usefully noted that the USG considers requests from both the prosecution and defense according to the same criteria. (NB: In a later conversation with the RLO, Embassy legal officer noted that requests for senior USG officials are scrutinized with particular rigor, and that a request for a former president’s or secretary of state’s testimony would receive the strictest scrutiny. Emboff reminded the RLO that the USG needed to be persuaded not just of the relevance and necessity of the requested testimony but also that only the requested person could provide such testimony.) Judge Robinson responded to Kay’s intervention by reiterating the importance of making a written submission that “will have to satisfy the Court . . . that the witnesses are not willing to come, because if it is not necessary, why should a Court issue a subpoena?” 6. (U) Milosevic pressed for additional time off from the trial in order to prepare his case and his witnesses, but the trial chamber largely demurred. The trial will resume on Tuesday, November 16, for only one day next week, leaving Milosevic the rest of the week to prepare. Thereafter it will resume on Monday, November 22, with the expectation of a return to the three days weekly schedule. Judge Robinson noted sternly that if Milosevic “choose(s) to use the time set aside by the Court for sitting to carry out proprietary work, or for any other reason you are responsible for the time court does not sit, the period of time will be regarded as falling within the 150 days” allotted for the defense case. 7. (C) Comment: While Milosevic has returned to take what he sees as his rightful place in the center of the trial against him, the defense case has not yet begun with him
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in the lead. The chamber seems determined to keep Kay on board, but the ruptured relations between him and Milosevic make this a difficult, if not counterproductive, proposition. Meanwhile, Judge Robinson has usefully emphasized to Milosevic that the trial chamber will not call government witnesses without it being shown that they are relevant and necessary to his case. The fact that Kay echoed these requirements in court further isolates Milosevic, making it more difficult for him to get traction on subpoena requests when he has not done the bare minimum to meet governments’ (and the trial chamber’s) requirements. End comment. Sobel

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Reference id: 04BRUSSELS4874 Subject: Eu Council Response On Quint Icty Demarche Origin: Embassy Brussels (Belgium) Cable time: Mon, 15 Nov 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/11/04BRUSSELS4874.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN THE HAGUE FOR CLIFF JOHNSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2014 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], EUN [European Union], USEU BRUSSELS Ref: STATE 241651 Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 1. (S/NF) We delivered reftel points to Stefan Lehne of High Rep Solana’s office on November 15. Lehne noted that, since this was a Quint initiative and there was no agreed position from the EU at 25, the Council Secretariat could not participate in an external representation of this sort. This was an issue appropriately handled by the five governments alone (he also did not think it would be appropriate to include the Dutch EU Presidency). 2. (S/NF) Lehne agreed the points generally reflected the Quint agreement. He added that del Ponte had stated quite clearly in her meetings in Brussels at the beginning of November that the Haradinaj indictment would be sealed. Lehne also said that the call for del Ponte to give the Quint “more time and warning” in order to prepare for reactions in Kosovo was a better approach than the option discussed among the Quint of simply urging a delay of the indictment for as long as possible. Lehne said UNMIK SRSG Jes84

sen-Petersen had told Solana on Nov. 11 that it might be better to deliver the indictment earlier and avoid the destabilizing impact of continued rumor and uncertainty. Lehne urged the USG to discuss assessment of the situation with Jessen-Petersen. 3. (S/NF) Lehne was also very appreciative of the suggested points for use with Haradinaj. Solana has received letters from both Haradinaj and Rexhepi about the pending indictment, and Lehne said he would use the suggested Quint points as a model for drafting Solana’s replies. Schnabel

XXVI
Reference id: 04THEHAGUE3210 Subject: Icty – Prosper Warns That Tribunal May Continue Past 2008/2010 Deadline If Sam Non-cooperation Continues Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Wed, 8 Dec 2004 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04THEHAGUE3210.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS, EUR/SCE – GAUDIOSI/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – KJOHNSON, L/AF – GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR ROSTOW/WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: FIVE YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], PHUM [Human Rights], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations] SR [Serbia] Classified By: Legal Counselor Clifton M. Johnson, Reasons: 1.5(b)-(d). 1. (C) Summary. On December 6, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper met with officials from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). During the meeting, and later with the press, Prosper emphasized that a lack of cooperation on fugitives from states in the region, particularly Serbia, could jeopardize the ICTY‘s ability to complete its work by the 2008/2010 target and necessitate its continuation. OTP officials welcomed this approach and outlined their current views of noncooperation by Serbia and Montenegro (SAM) and Croatia, their efforts to conclude all investigations by the end of this month (reported septel), and the debilitating effects of the ongoing budget freeze on their ability to meet the strategy’s longer-term target dates. End summary.
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Completion Strategy and Belgrade Noncooperation 2. (C) Ambassador Prosper, joined by Embassy legal officers, met for nearly an hour on December 6 with Deputy Prosecutor David Tolbert, Chief of Investigations Patrick Lopez-Terez, and politcal advisers Anton Nikiforov and Jean-Daniel Ruch. Prosper reiterated the U.S. position that Serbia and Montenegro (SAM), and to a lesser extent Croatia, have not cooperated adequately with the ICTY on transfering fugitives to the Tribunal, thereby jeopardizing the Tribunal’s ability to meet the 2008/20010 targets for completing its work. Prosper observed that if if SAM’s lack of cooperation continued, the ICTY may have to advise the UN Security Council (UNSC) that the completion targets were at risk and suggest new target dates in its next report to the Council in the spring. Prosper explained: “2008 (for completing all ICTY trials) is a goal, not a deadline.” Tolbert welcomed this message, noting that its expectation that all indictees must come to The Hague before the Tribunal could finish its work helped close an important gap in previous USG statements that had focused exclusively on the transfer of Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina. Separately, Political Adviser Ruch noted that the recent provisional release of Franki Simatovic and Jovica Stanisic was extremely worrisome to OTP, which is concerned that the two will engage in witness intimidation and, in any event, will not return to The Hague. (NB: He asked that the USG monitor the activities of the two to the extent possible, given his view that they had the ability to destabilize the situation in Belgrade.) Croatian Cooperation 3. (C) OTP’s views on Croatian cooperation have soured since the Chief Prosecutor prematurely gave Zagreb high marks earlier this year, when she affirmed to EU interlocutors that Zagreb was ‘fully cooperating’ with the ICTY. OTP Chief of Investigations Lopez-Terez described Croatian cooperation now as “good, but not outstanding.” With respect to documentary access, one area where Zagreb has been strong for some time, Lopez-Terres said that OTP investigators had recently discovered a cache of important documents that had been hidden from them while having been made available to defense attorneys. He suggested that some of the material could have been relevant to the prosecution of General Tihomir Blaskic, whose sentence was drastically reduced earlier this year. Lopez-Terres, despite satisfaction with access to certain police and intelligence sources, continues to see a strong support network for fugitive Ante Gotovina within the state at different levels. “Who is Croatia?” is the question on his mind, as he is unsure who in the government bears principal responsibility for failing to apprehend Gotovina. The recent surrender of Miroslav Bralo – who was transferred to Bosnia and SFOR by Croatian authorities just a day after they informed the OTP that they could not locate him – suggested to Lopez-Terez that the Croats “shot themselves in the foot.” Lopez-Terres surmized that the GOC’s desire to claim public credit for the surrender had overridden their need to remain consistent with their previous denials. Lopez-Terez said that this incident suggested that Zagreb could apprehend wanted indictee Ante Gotovina if it chose to make that happen. Budget Freeze 4. (C) OTP officials continued to lament the lack of ICTY resources resulting from the ongoing hiring freeze. The freeze was resulting in a record high vacancy rate at the Tribunal and preventing the OTP from staffing a team to help transfer cases to the region for domestic trials. Hopes were high, however, that a meeting this week of the UN Sec86

retary General with Tribunal heads would break a stalemate over the budget freeze. As reported in septel, legal officers subsequently learned that SyG Annan had committed to lift the freeze as soon as Japan paid its outstanding contribution. (NB. Japan owes roughly 10 million dollars to the ICTY and roughly 8 million dollars to the ICTR, and has promised to pay both by year’s end). Press 5. (U) Prosper spoke to members of the press in the ICTY lobby, stressing the message that Prime Minister Kostunica bears responsibility for the lack of Serb cooperation with the Tribunal, that SAM inaction on transfers risked an extension of the Tribunal’s work, and that, until cooperation improves, the United States could not support transfer of trials to the region. He reiterated these points later in meetings with reporters from the leading Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad and Le Monde. Subsequent reports from the wire services, which were picked up in the International Herald Tribune and other papers, emphasized the point that the Tribunal might continue its work past 2008/2010 deadlines if Serb non-cooperation on fugitives continued. 6. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Prosper. Russel

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Reference id: 05THEHAGUE2309 Subject: Ambassador’s Parting Thoughts On Taking The Dutch To The Next Level Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Mon, 22 Aug 2005 17:01 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05THEHAGUE2309.html History: First published on Thu, 16 Dec 2010 10:15 UTC (original) Modified on Fri, 21 Jan 2011 20:36 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Fri, 18 Mar 2011 01:31 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: La France à l’ONU: ”Une puissance intéressée” – Survie France Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], ECON [Economic Conditions], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], NL [Netherlands], EUN [European Union], USUN Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 1. (S) Summary: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch
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ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands’ solid European and international credentials create a powerful “multiplier” effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006. 2. (S) (Summary continued) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add “eyes and ears” on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far beyond Dutch borders. 3. (S) (Summary continued) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch “tolerance” and “identity.” The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. End summary. Leaders in Europe 4. (S) Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a founding member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain’s strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an influential voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16 million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” and therefore expect to be heard. While the Dutch “no” to the EU’s constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the vote revealed that the search for EU integration and consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the 90’s with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein’s proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to protect Dutch national interests. 5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree on finances, leadership opportunities for
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the Dutch are growing. This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make or break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to attend a “group of six” meeting recently proposed by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative. The British Ambassador here recently confided that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations remain high on the European agenda. The leaders of the Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to EU Council and other high-level EU meetings. 6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are “go-to guys” for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed restructuring NATO’s decision-making and funding mechanisms to make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for productive cooperation. Political-Military Cooperation Beyond the EU 7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests outside Europe warrant their attention and leadership, especially in the political-military sphere. For example: – Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez’ meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F16’s) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez’s destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region. – Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time since the 1960’s. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both to continue to make significant contributions, and to push others to do more. – Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are considering expanding their military presence in Africa to include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, adding new “eyes and ears” on the ground. The Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions with the U.S. and other allies. One objective of the Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance programs in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of assistance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a 110 million Euro Stability
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Fund for security sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch deployments in Africa have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an aspect of development provides an attractive justification for potential European partners. We should not only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a “clearinghouse” for other interested parties. – Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental in providing early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two controversial extensions. Although the Dutch have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if other countries would make comparable contributions. We should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO partners to do more in Iraq. – Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for “balance” almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot’s expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest through participation in the Forum for the Future and other initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances, might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well. 8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” in practice by committing real resources – money, troops, hardware, and political capital – to tackle real problems, as well as their “multiplier” effect in the politicalmilitary realm. The fact that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU’s new monitoring mission in Aceh is the latest example of their assuming leadership of an important international mission in a region where they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot’s historic decision this year to attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian independence). 9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp and Berlijn believe firmly in the “use or lose” principle, and have accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations – such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the military’s capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions merit Tier II status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 elections. The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16’s, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on meeting the90

ir Prague Capability Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations outside the European theater. Counterterrorism Cooperation 10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being considered in countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE’s Megaports program, U.S. Customs’ Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers. China has engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID technology. It will be important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to participate in DHS’s “Centers of Excellence.” While the EU was arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch hosted an EUwide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist financing issues and have offered to host a major international conference on the same subject in 2006. The Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its entirety and to strengthen the EU’s “Clearinghouse” designation process. Given their record, we should continue to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues to the top of the European agenda more generally. Development Assistance 11. (S) The Netherlands is among the world’s leading aid donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid is now directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting publicprivate partnerships world-wide. USAID’s involvement with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as a model. Dutch creativity and credibility in development makes them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with the U.S. We should also take advantage of their experience and insights to help shift global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term development. Center of International Law and Human Rights 12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran91

U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal institutions all located in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the Balkans is unique. With a historical interest in international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms and practices. This tradition made them the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi jurists. While their legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped sway the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign Minister Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances. Economics and Trade 13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax. The Dutch share with the British a vision of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their efforts to shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to promote innovation and competition are creating additional opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in navigating the EU’s regulatory environment and removing obstacles. Drugs and Trafficking in Persons 14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of difficulty. Despite fundamental differences regarding “soft drugs” and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government has worked to prevent these differences from defining our relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share information on the health risks of new strains of marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to “soft drugs” in general. The Dutch are addressing drug tourism – a recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such initiatives actively.
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Balkenende Solid Internationally... 15. (S) We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an outward-looking partner for whom working with the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch presidency of the EU. On two issues of great importance to the U.S. – the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for Turkey – the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from following an EU “consensus” set by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In both cases, Bot and Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided – a pattern we have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot began the EU presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a “done deal.” Later, however, he actively intervened to prevent a lift on “his” watch, saying that he did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. Despite Balkenende’s personal skepticism about bringing Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully implemented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the relationships they developed during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right direction as October 3 approaches. 16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and frustration here, but President Bush’s visit to the Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that these emotions are passed to the next generation. In this effort, the President’s youth roundtable in Maastricht and former Secretary of State Powell’s town hall meeting with young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can serve as models for future efforts. Given the disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we should expand our active exchange programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation. ...But Faces Domestic Challenges 17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This division will become more pronounced as the parties prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende’s center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining. Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a strong chance that a centerleft government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 – or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt national elections. 18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a PvdA-led government would present new challenges. PvdA le93

ader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic “bridge builder” than as a follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left flank. The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest both to support the current government’s transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the opposition to shift them in a favorable direction. The Islamic Factor 19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of the population. USG-sponsored polls show that 83 percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an institution. While the problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines following the van Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. We expect our experiences here will provide good indications of broader European trends as well as opportunities to influence their direction. Conclusions 20. (S) The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society. Prevailing myths about the Dutch – e.g., they are homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.– do not accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch potential to influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see themselves as “balancing” between Europe and the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and international factors. 21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them early through high-level consultations and exchanges. Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace. 22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off royally. Dutch credentials, credibility, and capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic regions and substantive issues. 23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the “next level.” Sobel
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XXVIII
Reference id: 05VATICAN516 Subject: Del Ponte Makes “ugly Impression” At The Vatican Origin: Embassy Vatican (Vatican) Cable time: Fri, 26 Aug 2005 14:10 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05VATICAN516.html History: First published on Wed, 4 May 2011 10:48 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT. FOR EUR/WE (TCUNNINGHAM), EUR/SCE (BBELL, MFOOKS) E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/26/2015 Tags: KIRF [International Religious Freedom], PREL [External Political Relations], SOCI [Social Conditions], NL [Netherlands], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], VT [Vatican City], OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Ref: HAGUE 2263, 04 VAT 1231 Classified By: Peter Martin, Political Officer, POL, STATE. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) Summary 1. (S/NF) Holy See Balkans Director Maury described to us August 22 the “undiplomatic behavior” of ICTY Chief Prosecutor del Ponte on her recent visit to the Vatican foreign ministry (HAGUE 2263). Maury said the Vatican would not respond to the strong letter sent by del Ponte to the pope after the visit, criticizing the Holy See’s dealings in the case of accused war criminal Ante Gotovina. Maury insisted that the Vatican had investigated the Gotovina case and did not believe the Franciscans in Herzegovina or Croatia were harboring him. He said the Holy See would not call for Gotovina to be handed over to the Hague, as making that type of public statement would be a matter for the local Church to consider. The Gotovina case aside, Maury said that “all levels” of the Vatican were now active in trying to resolve the situation with the Franciscans of Herzegovina, for some time now a thorn in the Vatican’s side. The situation is complicated; the Holy See resents the Franciscans holding out against Church authority, but has a keen appreciation for what it sees as their heroic stand in maintaining the Catholic faith for generations against hostile forces. End Summary. Visit to the Vatican 2. (S/NF) Holy See Balkans Director Monsignor Miguel Maury described to us August 22 the “very ugly impression” ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte made on her recent visit to the Vatican foreign ministry (HAGUE 2263). Though he did not attend
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the meeting himself as he was on leave, he recounted del Ponte’s session with Vatican FM Lajolo and described del Ponte’s behavior as very undiplomatic. According to Maury, she came on very strong, certain that accused war criminal Ante Gotovina was being hidden among the Franciscans. She was also abrasive, he said, when pressing for a meeting with Pope Benedict, claiming that Gotovina himself had been granted an audience with Pope John Paul II. (Maury was unaware of any such audience but surmised that if it was true, it was likely that Gotovina had been one of many people typically directed to approach the pope for a handshake or kiss of the ring at the end of a general audience.) 3. (S/NF) It was unclear whether Maury had seen del Ponte’s subsequent letter to the pope (HAGUE 2263), but he said her general attitude and behavior had left Holy See officials shaking their heads. “She showed who she is,” he concluded. When asked if the pope would respond to the letter, Maury said there was nothing to respond to. “The pope wouldn’t respond in a case like this,” he said. Gotovina Investigation 4. (S/NF) Maury told us the Vatican took very seriously accusations that Gotovina was being hidden in Franciscan monasteries in Herzegovina or Croatia. Maury insisted that the papal nuncio (ambassador) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) had investigated the situation and concluded that Gotovina was not being hidden by the Franciscans. “Was he there at one time?” Maury asked, “I don’t know.” “In any case,” he continued, “he’s not there now.” The Gotovina situation aside, Maury told us in a previous meeting that “all levels” of the Vatican were now involved with the question of the Franciscans of Herzegovina. In practice this means a rather complicated assortment of Vatican departments that plays a role in BiH. The Secretariat of State (foreign ministry) is only one, although the most important, player on that front. 5. (C) The Herzegovina Franciscans have been a thorn in the Vatican’s side for some time, Maury said, refusing to yield to Church authority on certain issues. Maury said the Vatican was frustrated that they remained in violation of longstanding orders to quit certain of their churches. The Holy See, however, certainly did not want to get the government or law enforcement involved in the dispute. They hoped the Church could handle this internally. Public Comments 6. (C) Maury had no knowledge of any public comment about anti-Catholicism contributing to hesitation on Croatia and the EU (HAGUE 2263). When asked if the Holy See would consider making a public appeal for Gotovina to be turned over to the Hague, Maury said it would not. “It is for the local Church to consider whether to make such a statement,” he said. “The Vatican would not make a specific appeal in a case like this.” Comment 7. (C) Post had raised the issue of obstructionist Catholic influence in Mostar to several officials here last year including FM Lajolo. Former OSCE Bosnia Chief Beecroft also made his case to the Franciscans and the Vatican foreign ministry (04 VAT 1231). The bottom line at that time: all listeners were sympathetic to us and Beecroft, but the extent to which they were willing or able to engage Bishop Peric of Mostar or the Franci96

scans was limited. Now Maury is outlining a more active approach by the Vatican, likely a combination of fatigue and incredulity at Franciscan intransigence. Maury told us that the Holy See had learned that one of the Franciscans had (in violation of canon law) presided at a confirmation ceremony recently – and read a forged note of blessing from Pope Benedict XVI. 8. (C) The dynamic here is complicated. The Vatican resents the Franciscans holding out against Church authority, but has a keen appreciation for what it sees as their heroic stand in maintaining the Catholic faith for generations against hostile forces. This sentiment is also reflected in Maury’s comments on Bishop Peric. In previous conversations mentioned above with Lajolo, with Maury’s predecessor, and others, interlocutors were hesitant to criticize the Mostar bishop, even as they agreed on the need for more forward-looking approaches to reconciliation efforts among Catholics in Mostar. Maury, however, went even further in our conversation, comparing Peric to legendary Catholic figures like Poland’s Cardinal Wyszynski and (more controversial – though beatified) Croatian Cardinal Stepinac, holding their people together in difficult circumstances. We can work with the Vatican on these sensitive issues, but need to tread carefully. Sandrolini NNNN 2005VATICA00516 – Classification: SECRET

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Reference id: 06BELGRADE176 Subject: Del Ponte Confident Of Mladic Handover Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Tue, 7 Feb 2006 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06BELGRADE176.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: DCM Roderick Moore, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (c) Summary: Despite public criticism of SaM efforts to date on ICTY cooperation, del Ponte told assembled ambassadors she is convinced she will have Mladic in The Hague by the end of February – but only if the EU exerts maximum pressure on Kostunica by conditioning SAA talks on Mladic’s being handed over. We should encourage the EU to do so, and recommend an early certification decision by the Secretary as additional pressure. End summary.
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2. (c) ICTY chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte’s public remarks following her February 6 visit to Belgrade were typically gloomy, belying an uncharacteristically upbeat appraisal in a private briefing to the diplomatic community at the end of the visit. Del Ponte met with a host of GoS and GoSaM officials during her one-day visit, including PM Kostunica, intel chief Rade Bulatovic, ICTY Cooperation Council chair Rasim Ljajic, local war crimes special prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic, and Defmin Stankovic. Following her meetings, the prosecutor issued a brief statement to the press critical of Serbia’s lack of cooperation to date. She stressed that Mladic is still at large and that ICTY access to documentation is still insufficient. Kostunica’s remarks following the visit, meanwhile, emphasized Serbia’s national interest in fulfilling its obligations to the Tribunal. 3. (c) Del Ponte’s typically critical public remarks, however, were balanced by a much more hopeful assessment during talks with resident ambassadors at the end of her visit. A visibly excited del Ponte told the group she is convinced/convinced she will have Mladic in The Hague by the end of February. She said her assessment is based on the results of her private meeting with Kostunica, at which intel chief Rade Bulatovic was also present, wherein she said Kostunica passed her a document with detailed information and specifics about the government’s efforts and progress that she said gave her confidence that Mladic could be wrapped up (she did not go into further detail, but noted, inter alia, that the government had shown proof that they had tracked Mladic “much more recently” than 2003). She noted that her confidence is somewhat tempered by past experience with unfulfilled expectations from the GoS, but said she nevertheless believed Kostunica could deliver Mladic soon. Del Ponte highlighted that Kostunica told her there would be little domestic fallout from the arrest, as recent polls showed a majority of Serbs were in favor of Mladic’s arrest. She noted, though, that they did not discuss the likely reaction from the Radical party. 4. (c) Del Ponte caveated, though, that Kostunica would only come through if the pressure remained on the GoS to deliver. She said it would be critical for the EU to continue to seriously threaten the suspension of SAA negotiations as the most credible pressure point to keep the GoS to its word. She said she had already made this pitch to Enlargement commissioner Ollie Rehn directly, and urged local ambassadors to support this request in their capitals. She emphasized that this was uncharacteristic of her – usually she declined to take a stand on political pressure, as such activity is out of her sphere of authority. She stressed, though, that the current moment is different – that it represents perhaps the last, best window of political opportunity to capture Mladic before other events (read Kosovo and Montenegro) would make any such action impossible. Del Ponte said once Mladic is in The Hague, Tolimir would quickly follow, and Karadzic would likely also follow soon thereafter. 5. (c) Further details: del Ponte said it looks most likely that Karadzic is currently in Montenegro, but admitted there was no solid lead in this regard, and that other reports had him in Serbia. Regarding her meeting with Defmin Stankovic and VBA chief Kovac, she said it was significant that the military for the first time admitted that it supported Mladic until 2002, something they had been unwilling to say before. She said she was briefed by Kovac on his oral report to the Supreme Defense Council, and that the report had uncovered some 300-400 people who had been at one time in the Mladic support network from 1997-2004. She also said it now appeared civilian and military intelligence services were finally working together on Mladic. On documents, she said she was ple98

ased with the proposal to improve access by ICTY investigators, and said they would test the system in the coming weeks. 6. (c) Comment: Del Ponte’s excitement was palpable – she truly seems to think Mladic’s transfer is a possibility by the end of the month. She is equally convinced, though, that it will only happen if the pressure is kept on at a high level. We strongly support her proposition that the EU seriously threaten repercussions on the SAA talks if Mladic is not delivered by the end of February, and would encourage Washington to engage in Brussels to that effect. In addition to coordinating with the EU, we recommend Washington announce that the Secretary will make a certification decision at the end of February, and that her decision will be driven by Belgrade’s actions on Mladic. In the event Mladic is not handed over by the end of February, we would recommend the Secretary not certify and that certain direct assistance to the Serbian government be suspended. Polt

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Reference id: 06BELGRADE395 Subject: Reactions, Plans After Milosevic’s Death Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Mon, 13 Mar 2006 00:00 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/03/06BELGRADE395.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS VIENNA PLS PASS DAS DICARLO JUSTICE FOR ALEXANDRE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary 1. (c) The Belgrade body politic is just in the initial throes of reacting to Milosevic’s death. Current debate swirls around his funeral arrangements and increasing speculation that the former dictator was at best medically neglected, at worst actively poisoned during his incarceration in The Hague. Milosevic’s death, coming on the heels of the Babic suicide and the unfettering of Haradinaj’s ability to engage in public life are leading to an increase ) even among some democrats ) in the belief that ICTY is anti-Serb. The Radicals and Socialists will undoubtedly do what they can to use this to bolster their political standing and re-orient the government’s ICTY policies. End summary.
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Saturday 2. (u) The initial cautious response by local networks to news of Milosevic’s death on March 11 gave way later in the day to more prominent coverage on Belgrade TV stations. There were interviews and commentary by the Radical and Socialist party ) mostly anti-Hague diatribes and unhelpful commentary on the bias of the court and its alleged role in the deaths of Milosevic and Milan Babic, who committed suicide in his cell on March 5. Head of the DS caucus in parliament Dusan Petrovic gave a helpful interview on RTS rejecting any suggestions that there would be any change in the government’s policy towards The Hague or any reason to reconsider its international legal obligations. CNN and other international coverage was perhaps more pervasive throughout the day, and included phone interviews with current and former regional leaders, but consisted mostly of empty speculation and commentary on the unreformed and unrepentant parts of Serbian society and the tragic events of the Milosevic era. The Ambassador’s statement was quickly picked up by local TV stations and aired prominently. Sunday 3. (u) By Sunday, March 12, media attention had slackened considerably on local stations, with most channels showing regular programming for most or all of the day. So far, there have been no large organized or spontaneous public gatherings related to the news, though Socialist Party headquarters announced over the weekend they would open a condolence book and would encourage placement of flowers outside the party’s offices on Studentski Trg. Over the weekend, a line of (mostly) pensioners numbering in the hundreds formed at the party headquarters, and moderate numbers also placed flowers or lit candles at the Studentski Trg location and in other party offices throughout Serbia and in The Hague. 4. (c) The Ambassador spoke with President Tadic, Deputy PM Labus, and FONMIN Draskovic on the occasion of a commemoration of the third anniversary of the Djindjic assassination to prepare the path for discouraging any kind of official funeral or commemorative event. Draskovic used the opportunity to push again his long-held belief that ICTY conditionality on PfP membership and the EU membership process should cease, so that a Euro-Atlantic embrace could be used to counter Radical and Socialist opposition to Serbia’s integration. Tadic, Draskovic, and Labus firmly opposed any state funeral arrangements for Milosevic, while Tadic added that he would oppose any &pardon8 for Milosevic widow Mira Markovic in order for her to attend funeral events in Serbia. (Note: Markovic faces arrest on an Interpol warrant on charges of inciting abuse of public office if she returns to Serbia. It is unclear if, under current circumstances, GoS officials would be prepared to enforce that warrant. The Milosevic family lawyer on Monday filed a motion in Belgrade district court to have the warrant rescinded and the charges dropped. End note.) Monday 5. (u) By Monday, March 13, all major print media were also carrying the news from the weekend, along with initial reactions from various political parties, including re-hashing of the SRS and SPS’s predictable positions and expressions of regret by PM Kostunica, who promised that the government would ask for a full report from The Hague on the circumstances of his death. He noted the political custom in Serbia at difficult times
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for Serbs to put all political differences aside. Tadic’s office expressed condolences for the family ) sources there have expressed their concern that there was no way to react without benefiting the Radicals. The most vitriolic response came from Draskovic, whose SPO party was a target of Milosevic. Draskovic said any grief over Milosevic’s death shown by Serbian citizens was shameful in light of the pain Milosevic had inflicted on Serbia. Also on Monday, the Supreme Defense Council of SaM met (by telephone) and rejected proffering any military honors on Milosevic if a funeral is held in Serbia. And the Days ahead 6. (c) Speculation now has turned to where and under what circumstances Milosevic will be buried. Tadic has said publicly that a state funeral would be out of the question, a position publicly shared by ruling coalition partners G-17 Plus and SPO. Kostunica’s DSS and the government have so far been silent on the issue, while SPS and SRS seem to be pressing hard for Milosevic to receive full head of state honors. UK Ambassador Gowan raised the funeral issue with Kostunica’s Foreign Affairs Advisor Vladeta Jankovic and received an icy response and a comment about interference in internal affairs. Jankovic refused to pass along Gowan’s concerns absent a formal written demarche. Meanwhile, Markovic is rumored to have argued alternately for Milosevic to be buried in Moscow or in his hometown of Pozarevac. 7. (c) There is some confusion regarding who has final authority to grant Head of State honors and interment in the special section of the Belgrade Central Cemetery reserved for historically important figures and former presidents. The city council (run by DS Mayor Bogdanovic), which has a role in the approval process, has already balked at approving Milosevic’s burial in the special section, and absent a specific request form the family for such treatment (we understand none has been made yet) to force the question, it would appear a Belgrade funeral with full honors is unlikely. Furthermore, the Supreme Defense Council’s decision would, on the face of it, preclude the possibility of a state funeral in any location in Serbia, as such an event would include a color guard, caisson procession, fusillade, and/or similar honors that the military now will not provide. However, funeral plans are still in the wildly speculative stages, so it may be a few days before this all plays out. 8. (c) We understand from reliable sources that the Radicals and Socialists are already cooperating on plans for public events and commemorations aimed at touching off another round of anti-Hague fury. It is not clear how well such demonstrations (or the funeral) might be attended – the SRS rally in support of Seselj several weeks ago was a dud – but there is likely to be more support for any protest against the ICTY following Milosevic’s death. Indeed, despite the low opinion of Milosevic and his regime, recent events in The Hague ) a more permissive attitude towards Haradinaj’s public life, the Babic suicide (under what locally are considered suspicious circumstances), the interpretation of Chief Prosecutor del Ponte’s recent comments that the tribunal is sensitive to political pressure, and the recent assertions by Milosevic himself that he was given improper medication (which Monday reprints of Dutch TV reports of the autopsy did nothing to dispel) – have intensified a local perception of anti-Serb bias in the tribunal. Even pro-Western Serb politicians, most prominently former PM Zivkovic, have criticized the recent series of unfortunate events in The Hague as a disgrace to the tribunal.
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Impact 9. (c) There is a good chance that this chain of recent events, and their locally scandalous nature, will, in this fertile ground for conspiracy theorists, lend support to those looking to stall any more cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. The government will face real pressure – at the very least on humanitarian and medical grounds – to review its ICTY policy and to reconsider domestic prosecution for indictees who have not been turned over or are in pre-trial release, to ease any kind of efforts on delivering Mladic (not rumored to be in the best of health) or cooperating with The Hague in general. There are several Serb indictees on pre-trial release (e.g., Simatovic, Pavkovic and Stanisic, the latter two with their own serious health problems) and we expect they will use their influence and connections to encourage this debate. The government may try and make the case for de-linking EU accession from the Hague issue to avoid any “political instability.” At the very least, we should expect SPS to use its position as “kingmaker” for this minority coalition government to extract maximum political gain from the situation ) to include a rehabilitation of Mira Markovic and a hard push for full state honors for the deceased dictator. We are engaging with the PM’s office to elicit their plans for the coming days and to encourage them to stand with SPO, G-17 Plus, DS, and most average Serbs to oppose a state funeral for Milosevic. Polt

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Reference id: 06SARAJEVO1664 Subject: Bosnia: Organized Crime And Corruption Origin: Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Cable time: Tue, 25 Jul 2006 10:47 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06SARAJEVO1664.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHVJ #1664/01 2061047 ZNY SSSBB ZZH O 251047Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0219 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 0193 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0207 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4015 INFO RUCNIFO/IFOR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0084 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE Hide header Secret SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, FOOKS), EUR/ACE (VISOCAN, LONGI), INL (MAKALOU), DS/ITA, S/CT (BLACK), S/WCI (HODGKINSON), INR, THE HAGUE (JOHN102

SON), NSC FOR BRAUN, VIENNA FOR LEGATT (DIETDERICH), OSD FOR FLORY, USDOJ FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION – ICITAP (DELCORE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2016 Tags: PINR [Intelligence], KJUS [Administration of Justice], MOPS [Military Operations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], KCRM [Criminal Activity], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ref: A. 05 SARAJEVO 2954 B. 05 SARAJEVO 2324 C. 05 SARAJEVO 2352 D. 05 SARAJEVO 1177 E. 05 SARAJEVO 2848 Classified By: CDA JUDITH CEFKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) 1. (C) Summary: Ten years after the war, Bosnia remains in many ways a traumatized, post-Communist, post-war society. Crime and corruption are serious problems and touch nearly every aspect of life. Criminal clans aligned with politicians and political parties are still prospering and are described as a major obstacle to EU accession. The nexus between organized crime and the war criminal support networks is also clear. Money laundering, tax evasion, corrupt privatization schemes, narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and smuggling of cars, oil, lumber, and cigarettes all provide sources of illicit income. This is not surprising given the still limited economic opportunities and high unemployment rate. This report is broken down into the following sections: I. Corruption II. Organized crime III. Major types of organized crime groups IV. Possible links between oc groups and terrorist organizations V. Leading oc figures and groups VI. Comment (End Summary) I. Corruption 2. (U) According to a March 2006 report published by the BiH Ministry of Security – Strategy for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption in BiH – 84% of Bosnians believe it is necessary of offer bribes to officials to get them to do their jobs. Administrative delays and paperwork also contribute to this atmosphere. The average period in the Balkans required to register a company is about 30 days, but in the Federation it is 124 days and in the Republika Srpska (RS) it is 56 days. In 2005 Bosnia was ranked 88 out of 158 countries rated by Transparency International (TI) in its corruption index, but with a score of only 2.9, placing it below Romania and Mexico but above Serbia. TI considers anything below 5.0 an indication of “serious corruption problems.” 3. (S/NF) Number of leaders of the major political parties have had criminal charges filed against them and/or are widely believed to participate in corrupt activities. Among them are former BiH Tri-Presidency member Dragan Covic (HDZ), current RS President Dragan Cavic (SDS), former RS PM Dragan Mikerevic (SDS) current BiH Foreign Minister Mladen Ivanic (PDP) current RS PM Milorad Dodik (SNSD), Branko Dokic (PDP), Hasan Cengic (SDA), Ante Jelavic (HDZ), a President of the BiH Constitutional Court Mato Radic. 4. (S/NF) Leading nationalist parties in BiH – the SDA (Bosniak), SDS (Serb), and HDZ (Croat) – have for years abused their positions in senior government institutions, state-owned firms, and private companies to gain profits for personal and political gain. Local OC groups in both the Federation and the RS use connections to these ethnicallybased ruling nationalist parties (along with other parties such as the RS-based PDP) and their representatives in virtually all levels of government. Much of the corruption at the
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political level is focused on the abuse of such institutions as the customs agency, tax administration, wood processing sector, and the energy sector. It is within these key moneymaking ventures that the prospects are best for the intermingling between organized crime and politics. Politically connected individuals also have the ability to manipulate government institutions, law enforcement and judiciary. This involves application of legal provisions to slow down investigations, stalling court procedures, and obstructing enforcement of criminal statutes. They are also involved in the issuance and forgery of travel papers (ID cards, passports, visas) which enable criminals to travel freely. 5. (U) A good example is the recent case of the Bosanski Brod Oil Refinery where fraud charges have been filed against 27 persons involving USD 75 million. Included in the group is former RS PM Dragan Mikerevic. II. Organized Crime Narcotics 6. (U) The “Balkan Route” for drug smuggling into Europe is reportedly still very much in use. Bosnia occupies a strategic position along the historic Balkan smuggling routes between drug production centers in South Asia and markets in Western Europe. One of the main Balkan trafficking routes begins in Albania, continues into Montenegro and enters BiH through a border point close to Trebinje. From BiH the drugs pass to Croatia and Slovenia and then on to Central Europe. BiH is also a small but growing destination for drugs (reftel A). Illicit Arms Trade 7. (S/NF) Trade in arms mostly involves residual arms left over from the war, often stolen from military warehouses. Many weapons remain in the country, posing an internal security threat while arms from BiH are also smuggled to Albania, Kosovo, and EU countries. Human Trafficking 8. (U) While the situation has improved, and BiH has moved up from Tier Three to Tier Two, the problem continues to exist. Most trafficking victims are women and teenage girls, although there are some reports of trafficking in children, especially Romani children, for forced labor. A number of Chinese nationals (men and women) who have transited through BiH may have been trafficked for forced labor. In 2005, the majority of prostitution-related trafficking cases involved either local women or women from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro. Illegal Immigration 9. (U) BiH is largely a conduit to Western Europe with a majority of illegals coming from Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Albania. The strengthening of the State Border Service and security at the Sarajevo and Tuzla airports (through U.S. assistance) has led to a reduction in the number of illegals entering the country. However, once in the country, it is difficult to track foreigners. There is no integrated information system or alien detention center. In 2005, 465 persons were arrested for immigration violations and most were simply released pending status adjudication. Only 60 were actually deported. In 2005 BiH created a new state-level immigration service and plans to build a much-needed 60-bed alien detention center by the end of the year.
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Money Laundering 10. (C) OC groups attempt to “launder” or recycle money gained from illicit activities through legitimate businesses as quickly as possible. The recycling of illegal funds is suspected to have played a role in inflated real estate prices in certain parts of the country. Virtually all OC groups are believed to have front companies including: banks, gas stations, restaurants/bars, betting parlors, jewelry stores, security firms, demining companies, construction companies, energy and petroleum companies, forestry companies, telecom companies, and import/export firms. Momcilo Mandic, for example, currently in custody charged with war crimes, embezzlement to aid war crime fugitives, and bank fraud in the Privredna Banka Srpska Sarajevo case, is suspected of using his chain of Mandic Fuel gas stations in the Republika Srpska to launder funds. III. Major Types of Organized Crime Groups Federation 11. (C) Sandzak Clan. The Clan is highly organized, locally influential and internationally connected. Sandzak is a region between Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo mostly populated by Serbian Muslims. Most of the clan’s members have ties to the region and began moving into Sarajevo in the 1970s. The numbers started increasing significantly in the 1990s when a large number of “new businessmen” originally from Sandzak started investing in privatizations of profitable public companies, major construction projects (malls, hotels) and real estate. Much of the money came from illegal activities, such as narcotics trafficking and the smuggling of arms and otherwise legal goods such as lumber and cigarettes. Over the years the Clan has been able to infiltrate administrative, political and law enforcement circles, and has close links to the dominant Muslim party in BiH, SDA. 12. (C) Albanian Clan. Albanians started moving to the Sarajevo region and BiH in the second half of the 1990’s. Their numbers significantly increased after the 1999 war in Kosovo. Upon arrival, many started traditional small businesses such as grills, bakeries, candy/cake shops, and bars. These businesses were often funded through loans provided by OC groups. This enabled the Clan to create networks for money laundering, smuggling, and distribution of various illegal goods. Albanian OC groups are also involved in extortion rackets, prostitution, and human trafficking. In the last few years they have started developing legitimate businesses and buying political protection from the SDA, which is part of the governing coalition at the national level. 13. (C) Herzegovina Clan. Clans in largely Croatian Western Herzegovina are involved in money laundering, fraud, tax evasion, and are linked to the dominant Croatian party HDZ, which has received millions of off-the-books contributions from Bosnian Croat diaspora in Croatia. Narcotics also pass freely from Montenegro through Western Herzegovina to the Croatian coast. Republika Srpska 14. (S/NF) There also are important Serbian OC groups, controlled by both Bosnian Serbs and Serbs from Serbia, often with connections to Russia. There is a great deal of overlap between the Serbian war criminal support network, nationalist Serbian politicians, RS police, the SDS party, and Serbian OC. Money from state-run enterprises in the RS is diverted to off-shore accounts for the personal gain of individual party members, to party coffers to support political activities, and to the support networks of PIFWCs such as Ra105

dovan Karadzic. In the RS, such activities have involved organized criminal groups from Serbia and Montenegro such as the Zemun Clan, associated with the assassination of Serbian PM Djindjic in 2003. A good example is Momcilo Mandic, former Justice Minister in the wartime RS government (see paragraph 10) who was designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a key financial supporter of ICTY fugitive Radovan Karadzic. Similarly, recently arrested ICTY indictee Milan Lukic was reported in the media to be part of the war criminal support network for Karadzic, and was once a major heroin trafficker. 15. (C) A particularly egregious example is former Republika Srpska (RS) Police Director Dragomir Andan, who resigned in April 2006 under pressure from ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte. In a letter to RS PM Dodik del Ponte states: “We have an extensive and detailed profile of Andan whose record includes numerous allegations of criminal conduct before, during and after the war. He was undoubtedly in close relationship (including personal) with ICTY fugitive Ratko Mladic.” IV. Possible Links Between OC Groups and Terrorist Organizations 16. (S/NF) Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Bosnia, while not openly advocating violence, have made some progress in radicalizing small segments of the population and providing support networks to foreign Mujahideen who remained in Bosnia after the war in the 1990s (reftel B). Some Bosniak firms (e.g. security companies, import/export firms) have been linked to Mujahideen in Bosnia, and, via those individuals, to groups involved in terrorist financing. However, there is no hard evidence of systematic linkages between organized crime groups and terrorist organizations. There are some reports that Mohamed Ali Gasi, a well-known ethnic Albanian OC figure, has ties to Albanian arms dealers. It has been reported that Hasan Cengic, one the founders of SDA and a prominent Muslim member of parliament, is also an OC ringleader who has ties to Muslim terrorist elements and to TWRA (Third World Relief Agency). TWRA, a Muslim NGO, was operational in BiH during the war and is reportedly linked to al-Qaeda. Though Cengic was recently acquitted of corruption charges in the BiH State Court, the prosecution has appealed the verdict. V. Leading OC Figures and Groups 17. (S/NF) The profiles below are of active OC organizations and individuals. Some of this information is in the public domain, some not. Much of the information was provided by contacts in law enforcement institutions at the state, entity and cantonal level. Of particular help (strictly protect) were Dragan Lukac, Director of the Criminal Investigations Department at the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), Vahid Alagic, Deputy Director State Border Service, Ljiljana Trisic, Ministry of Security, Zoran Mandic, new Director of the East Sarajevo Public Security Center in Pale, and a number of former U.S. police officials embedded with local law enforcement agencies under the U.S. Department of Justice (ICITAP) program. Still, due to the nefarious and shadowy nature of the individuals and their activities, some of this information must be characterized as no more than intelligent speculation. SIPA Targeting Seven OC Groups 18. (S/NF) Jahorina/Pale East Sarajevo Group This group has over 100 people, half of whom are current RS police officers. The SDS is believed to have originally establis106

hed the group to raise money to support PIFWCs, including Radovan Karadzic. Momcilo Mandic, Milovan Bjeljica, and Mirko Sarovic, all of whom are in jail awaiting trial for bank fraud and money laundering, once directed the group. All of the following are believed to have links to the Jahorina/Pale East Sarajevo Group. Radomir Kojic, former police officer, launders money through his Crystal Hotel in Jahorina. Reportedly runs Zdrale and Elez (see below). Dorde “Dzoka” Zdrale group – former police officer linked to 14 unsolved murders, protection rackets, murder for hire, drugs. Linked to Sarajevo OC figure Remiz “Celo” Delalic (from the Sandzak area of Montenegro) in trafficking narcotics to Sarajevo. Reportedly (with Slaven Vukajlovic, Jovan Skobo) had killed OC figure Milorad Todorovic (2005) and his brother Zeljiko and sister-in-law (2004) because Milorad refused to pay protection money. Police consider him to be a typical muscle man, hot-tempered, not too bright. Has been seen recently in Trebinje. Zdrale is also linked to Belgrade-based Rakovicki Clan and their leader Nebojsa Stojkovic who has sent professional killers to BiH. Darko Elez group – involved in armed robbery and murder for hire (USD 20,000/murder). He fell out with Zdrale and Skobo, and is now in Serbia. On June 29, 2006, he allegedly stopped a Privredna Bank Sarajevo cash truck and stole 2.2 million Euros. On July 10, the Sarajevo Prosecutors office issued a warrant for his arrest. This is the sixth major bank robbery in 2006 in the Federation. Police consider him smart, tactical, and well organized. Elez recently contacted SIPA looking for a deal, claiming he has information on the Rato Spajic murder. Spajic, a Pale OC figure, was murdered in March 2005 reportedly for defying the Pale mafia by refusing to pay protection money (SIPA tells us Spajic held a BiH diplomatic passport). Elez and Zdrale were close (Elez was Zdrale’s best man) although recently they have become bitter rivals. In fact, in July 2006 Elez reportedly tried to kill Zdrale by planting three anti-personnel mines on the side of the road in East Sarajevo. Jovan Skobo is a former Pale Police commander and linked to war crimes, Karadzic’s support network, drugs, money laundering, and racketeering. His son, Miroslav, is part of his group. Mirko Subotic, currently East Sarajevo Public Security Center Uniformed Police Chief, is reportedly connected to Jovan Skobo. Ljuban Ecim is a leading East Sarajevo crime figure and former chief of Banja Luka State Security. He was for many years an important link in the protection of PIFWC indictee Radovan Karadzic. 19. (S/NF) Igman Group Bosniak Ismet “Celo” Bajramovic was a wartime commander of a Bosnian special army unit and has good connections with Sarajevo police. He has reportedly been involved in extortion, blackmail, kidnapping, theft, and murder for hire. Muhamed Ali Gasi is a well-known ethnic Albanian OC figure and a suspect in a number of crimes including car-bombings, narcotics trafficking, and has ties to Albanian arms dealers. Nasar Kalemidre is a very visible ethnic Albanian who owns the Casa Grande hotel in Sarajevo and drives a red Ferrari. In 2005 he applied for an export license in the U.S. in order to buy two armored vehicles (his request was denied, of course). He is connected to former Kosovo military commander and PM Ramus Haradinaj. He is involved in drugs and arms trading, with possible terrorist connections. There is also a possible Hasan Cengic/SDA connection. Also connected to Kalemidre is Acik Kan, a Turkish member of the SDA. Brothers Haris and Hamdo Dacic. Sandzak connection, reportedly laundered USD 12 million through hotels owned in Sarajevo. 20. (S/NF) Sava Group Ramo Kujovic (currently in pretrial custody), Sead Causevic, and Sadik Kevric. Operate in the Tuzla/Brcko corridor, involved in drugs and
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TIP (Serbian, Ukrainian, Moldovian women). Initially involved in trafficking Kurds. Connected to Ferid Okic who was sentenced to 22 years in 2006 for murder, kidnapping and robbery. He reportedly is stll involved with running the organization from pison. 21. (S/NF) Trebinje Groups Slaven Vukajlvic, involved in narcotics, murder for hire, car theft, linked to Trebinje bombings (see below). Also implicated – Drazen Sinikovic, Velibor Alesic, and Drazen Radic. Zeljko Tasovac was arrested by SIPA on June 29, 2006, along with six other individuals, including Nebojsa Vukoje. The so-called Tasovac group is implicated in 11 bombings in Trebinje over the last year, targeting cars belonging to a judge’s son and law enforcement personnel. They have been linked to car thefts, forgery of official documents, drug running, and interfering with judicial processes. They are reportedly linked to SDS and used RS power company trucks (Electropriveda) to transport drugs and turn off power during drug transit runs. These individuals will likely be charged with murder, OC, and interfering with judicial processes. 22. (S/NF) Bijelina Group Ugljesa Aranitovic (aka Goran Petrovic DOB 6/26/76, POB Sarajevo) is involved in drugs, arms trafficking, racketeering, and protection. Associated with Zemun Clan in Serbia, which was responsible for the assassination of Serbian PM. Also implicated – Veljko Dosic, Mile Lakic. Aranitovic reportedly was connected to PIFWC Zeljko “Arkan” Raznativoc, who was murdered in 2002. 23. (S/NF) Mostar/Herzegovina Group Ante Jelavic allegedly funneled millions of dollars illegally to the HDZ through Hercegovacka Banka. In October 2005, he was convicted of bank fraud and sentenced to ten years, but he escaped to Croatia, which has refused to extradite him. Mladen Dzidic, Almir Serdarevic, Denis Cetialovic, said to be involved in drugs, TIP, and prostitution. 24. (S/NF) Bihac Group Hot Velia, Zijan Muratovic, and Muso Mujkle purportedly involved in TIP and document forgeries. VI. Comment 25. (C) While this report paints a grim picture, the news is not all bad. The U.S. and the international community have invested millions of dollars over the years to establish viable rule of law institutions and we can point to many successes. We helped create and stand up the State Border Service, the FBI-like State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the state-level Ministry of Security, and the BiH State Court and Prosecutor’s Office (reftels C, D). Bosnia has moved from Tier Three to Tier Two status as a result of progress addressing the problem of trafficking in persons. Post, in conjunction with the Department of Justice (reftel E), will continue to provide funding, technical assistance, and training aimed at developing state-level law enforcement capacities. We will continue to assist SIPA’s CT, OC, and financial crime units develop, and help establish administrative procedures for seizing and forfeiting assets of criminal enterprises. We will assist the new immigration service (Foreigners Affairs Service) get off the ground, and continue working with the State Prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Security to improve organized crime, financial crime, narcotics trafficking, and TIP prosecutions. End Comment. Cefkin
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XXXII
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1294 Subject: Serbia: President Tadic On Upcoming Trip To U.s. Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 16 Aug 2006 08:12 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BELGRADE1294.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO1495 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #1294/01 2280812 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 160812Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9165 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUFGSHD/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1175 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RXFEAA/HQ AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY Hide header

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SIPDIS SIPDIS EMB CLEARS SHARING MESSAGE WITH AHTISAARI E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], MW [Montenegro] Classified By: POL COUNSELOR GUSTAVO DELGADO PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D). 1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with President Tadic on 9 August to discuss preparations for his upcoming visit to the U.S., scheduled for the first week of September. Tadic returned to the usual broad themes ) the need for elections before the end-game on Kosovo; the need to work closely with Kostunica’s DSS (and the IC) in organizing a &democrats vs. radicals8 campaign; vague assurances that he will move quickly to turn the page and focus on post-Kosovo issues after status is settled. Tadic is ready to talk about a strategic partnership that goes beyond Kosovo status but his trademark caution still raises questions about what he is willing to do to make it happen. 2. (U) We will need Washington’s input on the SOFA NLT 8/21 if we are to have any chance of getting it through the GOS in time for the Secretary to sign it with Tadic. A scene-setting message for Tadic’s trip will follow septel. End summary 3. (U) Tadic started by reviewing items pending before he departs for the U.S. He said it was important to confirm General Ponos as Chief of the General Staff quickly, ideally before his trip. He referred to ratification of the SOFA agreement in the same vein, noting the need to get the green light from the U.S. so he would have enough time to work it through the government when it reconvenes on 17 August. He referred to ongoing pri109

vate discussions with the PM’s staff and efforts to arrange a meeting between him and Kostunica to push Ponos and the SOFA through and to begin talking about more coordinated efforts in preparation for possible elections. 4. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question on whether he was prepared to appoint Ponos unilaterally if Kostunica refused, Tadic demurred, noting his need to preserve maximum space for future collaboration with Kostunica. Tadic said he feared that if he pressed the issue on his own the government might withhold desperately needed funds from the military as a way to undermine his authority over the armed forces. Tadic said Kostunica’s recent effort to claim authority over anti-terrorist forces in the army was a &dangerous move8 and he was heartened that the Defense Minister had clarified the comment in the press several days later. Tadic urged us to use our contacts with the government, including the Finance minister, to push the pending defense related items. 5. (C) The Ambassador touched on several points in preparation for Tadic’s visit to Washington. The Ambassador encouraged Tadic to actively engage in his meetings on ways of strengthening bilateral ties in the future. ICTY cooperation was critical. The Ambassador reminded Tadic of our 11 action points passed to the GOS and him. Tadic said he would continue to do everything he could to support the government’s efforts and acknowledged the need to add more details to the government’s own Mladic Action plan. 6. (C) The Ambassador observed that while the outcome of the Kosovo settlement talks was generally known and likely be difficult for Serbia, it would be manageable. There was no expectation that Serbia would &welcome8 the outcome; the important thing was to quickly move on in a constructive way. Tadic recalled what he had told Ambassador Wisner during his recent late July visit to Serbia: he would begin the day after the settlement to strengthen his relations with the three axes of Serbia’s foreign policy (U.S., Europe and Russia). The trip to the U.S. would allow him to get a jump start on that effort. For that reason, he hoped to sign the SOFA agreement with Secretary Rice and planned to continue on to Ohio to meet with the head of the National guard there. (Tadic agreed that it made sense to also meet with the governor and other local civilian leaders in Ohio to talk about the full range of cooperation opened up under the State Partnership Program (SPP).) 7. (C) The Ambassador praised Tadic for his positive response to the recent Contact Group demarche and for his help in ensuring that Serbia stayed engaged in Vienna. Tadic said that he was reassured by Kostunica that the PM had no intention of pulling out of the talks. Tadic said, however, that he was concerned about reports that Ahtisaari, in a private meeting with Serb negotiators after the minority rights discussion in Vienna on 8 July, had said that Serbia was &guilty as a nation for what happened in Kosovo.8 Tadic said he was surprised given the IC’s focus on individual responsibility; a public statement by Ahtisaari to that effect would create huge problems for Tadic. The Ambassador noted increasing concern about developments in northern Kosovo and urged Tadic to commit to using his influence as well as his authority as commander in chief to ensure against any dangerous mischief. Tadic said he would do so, but noted his own worries how things would develop on the ground. 8. (C) Tadic returned to his oft-repeated arguments about the need for early elections before the Kosovo settlement is announced. The Ambassador said that the we would be ready with an aggressive Get Out the Vote (GOTV) campaign to help get democratic voters to the polls; was Tadic ready to do the coalition building that would be necessary?
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Tadic said he would be working with the PM as well as with all the small democratic parties to defeat the Radicals. He would not be able to support FM Draskovic to continue as FM (&my party would revolt if I did anything to block early elections8) but would consider enlisting his SPO party further down the line. The next election, said Tadic, would be the most important in Serbia’s history. It would be important to work closely in the GOTV and to carefully control the NGO’s involved. 9. (C) Comment: Tadic showed once again his preference to discuss Serbia’s future, after Kosovo. He is committed to a stronger relationship with the U.S. and with Europe if not always willing to push decisively in the right direction. His upcoming visit will offer an opportunity to engage him in a direct way on his vision of the future as well as his plans for getting there. Moore

XXXIII
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1325 Subject: Icty Action Plan Update Number 3: August 18, 2006 Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 10:15 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BELGRADE1325.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBW #1325/01 2341015 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 221015Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9199 INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0248 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0490 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1361 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1181 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0606 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0239 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], SR [Serbia] Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) Summary This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan implementation as of August 18, 2006. 1. (c) One month into the announcement of the Action Plan (AP), there is still no sign of a sustained and public senior-level effort to prepare the ground for a Mladic handover. Visiting ICTY officials shared our disappointment at the pace of work on the ac111

tion plan, and agreed that the ultimate success of the plan will depend in large part on PM Kostunica’s willingness to engage personally and committedly – both to signal to the public a change in policy away from “voluntary surrenders,” and to signal to operational people that they will in fact get the political cover/backing they need if they succeed in locating and arresting Mladic. While statements by Ljajic and others over the weekend of August 19-20 show some movement on a media campaign, the few statements from the top levels of the government continue to refrain from calling for Mladic’s arrest and instead consist of the usual half measures of affirming the government’s commitment to “fulfill its international obligations.” End summary. ICTY Meetings 2. (c) Prior to our weekly meeting with Ljajic, DCM and poloff met August 18 with ICTY chief investigator Patrick Lopez-Terres at the local ICTY headquarters. He had come out of some preliminary Belgrade meetings August 14-15 and a trip to Montenegro August 16-17. He was scheduled to meet with the AP team after meeting with us (more on that below). It was clear after our discussions that we are of the same mind with regards to actions so far, i.e., unimpressed. Lopez-Terres said del Ponte is increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress, and still suspects local officials are withholding information. Lopez-Terres was a lot more focused on Vukcevic and his role, and was apparently looking for ways to put pressure on Vukcevic to do more to produce results. In particular, Lopez-Terres criticized Vukcevic’s “hands-off” approach to the operational aspects of the Mladic hunt – in contrast to Croatian prosecutor Bajic’s more energetic role in the Gotovina process. We shared with him our impression that Vukcevic, while honest and forthright, is not going to be in a position to make something happen until and unless Kostunica gets on board and makes it clear to his people that he is on board. Actions 3. (c) Ljajic told us later in the day that the government had made a decision to dismiss General Krstic from his post at the Southern Serbia coordination body because of his pro-Mladic comments (as he had hinted in our first meeting – SEPTEL). We welcomed the news, but asked why this fact wasn’t made public, as what would seem an obvious part of a vigorous media campaign. Ljajic somewhat sheepishly said going public would give Krstic a soapbox, so they didn’t want to force the issue. We responded that this would just present another opportunity to move a vigorous media campaign forward, and reiterated that the government was missing an opportunity to show it is willing to act forcibly against those who contradict their (presumed) commitment to wrap up Mladic. 4. (s) Ljajic also told us the GoS had a new lead ) a friend of Tolimir’s wife was spotted taking some medications into Banja Luka ) the indication being that they had some fresh leads on picking up Tolimir, but nothing more specific (though he did say at the end he was hopeful there would be something more substantial to report in the next 10-12 days). 5. (c) Ljajic said the GoS assessment now is that Mladic has developed a new support network, and they are trying to penetrate it, but they also had to face the possibility that Mladic might never be caught. 6. (c) Finally, Ljajic said Lopez-Terres had declared himself “impressed” after meeting with the AP team later in the morning. He said the team had passed to Lopez-Ter112

res all their new activities (comprising just those items we have reported from our last two meetings – SEPTELS), and that Lopez-Terres seemed satisfied. We question whether Lopez-Terres would have been impressed with the modest additional information generated to date, given our conversations with him. Media Plan 7. (c) Ljajic said a media team will be formed in the next week to develop a comprehensive plan that would include TV and radio spots on war crimes, leaking of investigative details to the press (as mentioned in previous meetings – SEPTELS), roundtables and seminars with prominent Serbian analysts and academics about war crimes and facing the past, and brochures and pamphlets explaining some of the war crimes committed during the Balkan wars. He also said he has a meeting scheduled with Kostunica the week of August 21, in which he will urge the PM to come out with a definitive public statement about Mladic (Note: The Ambassador plans to see Kostunica August 24, when the USG 11-point proposal will be high on the agenda. End note.). He asked for our help with (a) paying salaries or giving other financial support to the media team, and (b) appointing someone at the Embassy who could liaise with the team and help them craft their message. Ljajic was somewhat despondent on the ability of any media campaign to reverse public opinion overnight. We reminded him that the public needs little preparation for GoS action against Mladic – the GoS media strategy should be executed as additional pressure points on Mladic and his supporters. 8. (u) Following our meeting, there was a spate of ICTY-related statements in the local press throughout the weekend. Some were good – Ljajic noting his expectation that Mladic would have to be arrested, Fonmin Draskovic’s (apparently uncoordinated) statement that the government should prepare a media plan to explain to the Serbian people the heinous crimes of which Mladic is accused, and a statement by Bishop Grigorije of Hercegovina that his congregation would not tolerate war criminals walking the streets of their town (Trebinje). In addition, local media (quoting unnamed government sources) reported on Krstic’s removal as deputy chief of the southern Serbia coordinating body (SEPTEL) for making pro-Mladic statements. 9. (u) Unfortunately, the “government source” portrayed the removal as at the insistence of the international community, not as the principled act of a responsible government. Notably, there has been no official statement from the government about the removal. In addition, both Kostunica and Local Government Affairs Minister Loncar made ICTY-related statements over the weekend, but both sidestepped the issue of arresting Mladic and instead stuck to repetitions of the “fulfilling Serbia’s international obligations” line (though both did refer to Mladic’s “handover” to ICTY). Government spokesman Djuric made a similar statement, forgoing an opportunity to call for Mladic’s arrest but putting particular emphasis on the need to arrest former Bosnian commander Dudakovic (for his command responsibility in war crimes appearing on recently-released videos from Operation Storm and/or other engagements). Comment 10. (c) Operationally, Ljajic seems confident new leads are developing, though he cautioned that they are no nearer the “final prize.” Political buy-in from the high level people who matter is still far from apparent one month into the AP. We reminded Lja113

jic that del Ponte may make an assessment as early as mid-September; that this assessment would have a significant impact on the EU’s decisions regarding restarting SAA talks; and that MINFIN Dinkic has promised to pull G-17 Plus out of the government (and perhaps bring it down) if talks haven’t restarted by the end of September. The lukewarm (at best) reception Dinkic got for his “Plan Plus” proposal in Brussels August 17 ) Rehn essentially just reiterated that Mladic has to be in The Hague for talks to restart ) only reinforces what we see as the EU’s skepticism (shared by us) of Belgrade’s political will. Moore

XXXIV
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1371 Subject: Icty Action Plan Update #4; August 25, 2006 Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 30 Aug 2006 07:49 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BELGRADE1371.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHBW #1371/01 2420749 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 300749Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9242 INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0251 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0492 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1363 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1183 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0608 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0241 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3516 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR SWCI E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations], PROG, PHUM [Human Rights], SR [Serbia] Ref: BELGRADE 1325 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan Implementation as of August 25, 2006. Summary 1. (c) This week saw the most action to date on the media campaign portion of the Action Plan. Kotunica made a public statement about Serbia’s reolve to hand over Mladic to The Hague – if he isfound on the teritory of Serbia. While the PM’ statements were welcome, we have continued to pus him to be more explicit on arrest and to sustin his personal engagement in a stepped up campaign (septel). Operationally, the GoS is expres114

sing confidence that they may see some results in the near future on fugitive indictees – though not on Mladic. End summary. Actions 2. (s) Co-Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic told emboffs during their weekly Action Plan implementation briefing that the GoS is working on three tracks now ) Hadzic, Tolimir, and Mladic. Regarding Hadzic, he said the GoS is going after his financiers in Novi Sad, leaning particularly hard on one individual to force him to talk or go bankrupt. (NFI). 3. (s) Regarding Tolimir, he said they were seeing additional progress over what was reported last week. He said BIA chief Rade Bulatovic told him something could happen very soon. He noted Tolimir’s wife had been extremely well briefed on communications procedures, keeping very tight rein on her cellphone and landline conversations, making only one small mistake in the past two years (NFI). 4. (s) Regarding Mladic, he said they had recently expanded surveillance measures against people known or suspected of being in Mladic’s new support network (ref) ) to include some number of active military officers. All the subjects under surveillance are in Belgrade. He said he thought arresting the previous supporters had been a mistake, as it drove the network underground and forced Mladic to use new faces. Media Plan 5. (c) Ljajic was intensely interested in the Embassy’s reaction to the Kostunica statement. Emboffs told him that this was a generally positive step, but not entirely sufficient. He asked what the international community still needed to hear. Emboffs responded that, while unable to speak for all interested parties, at least three main changes to Kostunica’s approach would be helpful: first, he should eliminate the qualifiers, stopping at the need to apprehend Mladic and not adding the shopworn “if found on the territory of Serbia”. Second, Kostunica should explicitly say Mladic will be arrested – saying Serbia is committed to “hand him over” to The Hague (local media translated it as “extradite”) does not signal to Serbia’s people or its law enforcement and intelligence communities that the government will and should arrest him. Finally, the PM and other government spokespeople should stop drawing parallels between Mladic and Dudakovic. The Action Plan is about Hague indictees, especially Mladic, and that ) and that alone ) needs to be the focus of the statements. Emboffs also reiterated that the PM’s message would only register through repetition ) we needed to see a concerted, week-in week-out campaign, not just a one-off. Ljajic seemed to take the points seriously. (Note Ambassador raised the issue directly with PM Kostunica in a 8/29 meeting ) see septel. End Note) Other Issues 6. (s/nf) Ljajic said he talked to del Ponte by video link on August 23, and she told him (in strictest confidence, so please protect) she would not give a report to the EU in September. She told him she could not give a positive report now due to lack of progress to date, but thought giving a negative report would be counter-productive – i.e., would “de-motivate” the operational people who, she said (according to Ljajic), seemed to be making more serious efforts. She told Ljajic she would not issue a positive report until Mladic was located (Note: not captured), and preferred to stay quiet until that time to al115

low Bulatovic and other operational professionals to do their jobs. Ljajic said they discussed Dinkic’s dilemma, about claiming he would quit the government – thereby forcing new elections – if talks didn’t restart by October 1. Ljajic surmised that, if there was some substantial movement (emboffs inferred that to mean apprehension of Tolimir or Hadzic) in the meantime, that might give Dinkic enough political cover to stay his decision temporarily. Comment 7. (c) The statements we saw on the 25th were the most direct so far, and were delivered live by Kostunica himself – not through a government spokesperson. We believe this to be a necessary, but not sufficient, element to a successful media campaign – a campaign that should ideally include the Serbian equivalent of an Oval Office address from Kostunica to the Serbian people. As for Dinkic, he and other G-17 Plus senior officials continue to be adamant that they will withdraw support from the government if SAA talks do not resume by October 1. Since the EU sounds increasingly intransigent on the matter, and with del Ponte seemingly unprepared to issue a report absent solid information on Mladic, Dinkic may soon find his hand forced. Moore

XXXV
Reference id: 06PARIS6042 Subject: French Agree With U.s. On Serbia’s Need To Cooperate With The Icty Origin: Embassy Paris (France) Cable time: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 15:15 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06PARIS6042.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO5287 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #6042 2511515 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 081515Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1143 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0660 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 6345 RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0324 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 5824 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0432 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 1375 RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0528 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 1209 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 1004 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0377 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6230 RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG PRIORITY 0370 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 2402 RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0433 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0457 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 0166 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 7971 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 1419 RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0307 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY
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Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], FR [France; Corsica] Ref: STATE 146343 Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO NS 1.5 (b) and (d) 1. (C) French MFA officers responsible for the Balkans confirmed on September 7 that the GOF was “completely in line” with U.S. thinking on Serbia’s need to demonstrate effective cooperation with the ICTY. France, he said, had been skeptical about the EU “Action Plan” from the start and was now convinced that it had only served to complicate the situation. French officials continue to encourage Serbia to take concrete steps to apprehend Mladic and deliver him to The Hague. 2. (C) MFA officials noted that not all countries in the EU shared France’s resolve and that the Finnish Presidency, EU High Representative Solana, the Italians, Germans, and the Austrians might be willing to overlook Serbia’s lack of cooperation with the ICTY, in order to restart SAA negotiations. Many EU members, they added, thought it was necessary to give Serbia some sort of incentive as Kosovo final status negotiations enter the end game. The GOF hoped that Carla Del Ponte’s upcoming report might give France’s position more traction in the EU. The French stressed that lacking real Serbian commitment to the Action Plan, France would lobby against reopening SAA negotiations. They added, however, that the GOF was not likely to block consensus. The Croatia experience had shown them that it was not worthwhile; bilateral tensions with Zagreb persist as a result of France’s holdout position on SAA negotiations last year. 3. (C) The French surmised that EU demands for greater cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition to reopening SAA negotiations would not put significant pressure on Serbia. The principle, however, is important. Serbia still viewed EU membership in the abstract; the visa regime has more immediacy and is, they said, the most effective tool Europeans had to pressure Serbia. That said, when asked what France thought about using Schengen talks as a stronger political tool, our MFA interlocuters noted that there is a great deal of sympathy in the GOF for the Serbs’ visa situation. It was in no one’s interests to block your average Serbian citizen from access to EU countries where they could better learn western values and discover business opportunities that would eventually assist the recovery of the Serbian economy. Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton
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XXXVI
Reference id: 06ROME2535 Subject: Icty: Italy Cautiously Supports Increased Pressure On Belgrade Origin: Embassy Rome (Italy) Cable time: Fri, 8 Sep 2006 14:46 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06ROME2535.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO5276 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #2535 2511446 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 081446Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5880 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0277 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 1653 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1277 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 1252 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 1709 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 7617 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 1823 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0367 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2016 AGS: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PINR [Intelligence], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], IT [Italy] Ref: STATE 146343 Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). (C) Poloff delivered reftel points to Director of the Balkans Office of the Italian MFA Raimondo De Cardona on September 8. De Cardona stated that as a member of the Contact Group, Italy was a strong supporter of the ICTY and believed that compliance continued to be an unconditional obligation for the Serbian government. De Cardona agreed that the current Serbian action plan on ICTY needed to produce results and Italy would continue to press for the transfer of Mladic and Karadzic. Italy, however, continues to urge caution on the part of the international community with regard to pushing the current democratic and pro-Western Serbian government too hard simultaneously on ICTY and Kosovo status in advance of possible parliamentary elections in Serbia. Spogli

XXXVII
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1566 Subject: A/s Fried’s Sept 25 Meetings with Serbian Leaders Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia)
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Cable time: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 08:01 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06BELGRADE1566.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO2718 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHBW #1566/01 2710801 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 280801Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9429 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1195 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0610 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 3528 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PBTS [National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty], YI [Yugoslavia], SR [Serbia] Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: In separate meetings on September 25 in Belgrade, Assistant Secretary Fried delivered to Prime Minister Kostunica, President Tadic and Foreign Minister Draskovic the following unambiguous messages: Kosovo will be independent, Serbs and Serbian culture in Kosovo will be protected, and the USG is committed to support Serbia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Trying to hold on to Kosovo through destabilization will fail and derail Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration while action on ICTY will accelerate it. As usual, Kostunica gave legal arguments against Kosovo independence and said Serbia’s future in Europe is “beyond dispute.” Tadic, by contrast, thinks he can avoid “losing Kosovo” in the eyes of the electorate if certain church/minority guarantees are in place and hopes we can provide him a boost (such as PfP) during elections. Draskovic, closer to Tadic on the way forward, stressed the need to arrest Mladic. The three men are already in campaign mode and expect elections before 2007. End Summary. Kostunica 2. (S/NF) The Prime Minister, uncharacteristically upbeat and joined by advisors Aleksandar Simic and Vladeta Jankovic, wanted to talk about the past despite the opportunity A/S Fried provided him to discuss how best the USG can help him and other democrats after Kosovo status is resolved. Kostunica said that standards were always a precondition to status (the PM cited Kai Eide’s 2005 report) and a lack of returns, freedom of movement and security from ethnically motivated crime are all indications of this. The PM seemed energized in deploying his customary legal arguments, saying he “feels good, even if alone, on the side of international law.” A/S Fried noted frankly that Kosovo was gone. He made clear Serbia’s choice: either go Milosevic’ route to “a dark nationalist place” by fomenting insurrection in Mitrovica, Republika Srpska and elsewhere or
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take the road to Europe and an improved economy, more jobs and a better future for all Serbs. The day after Kosovo status, A/S Fried emphasized, would be critical to determining along which path Serbia proceeds. Kostunica assessed that Serbia’s European vocation was unquestioned despite reiterating his refusal to accept an independent Kosovo on legal grounds. 3. (S/NF) Kostunica repeated his position that “all possible things are being done” to deliver Mladic (whom he called “an obstacle” for Serbia) to The Hague and said it is simply “a matter of time” before this is attained. A/S Fried reminded the Prime Minister of the USG’s recommendations of action the GOS should undertake and handed him again our 11 suggestions. Kostunica was generally dismissive, saying “we can’t have two action plans.” Tadic 4. (S/NF) The President, joined by advisors Vuk Jeremic and Branko Radujko, responded very differently from Kostunica by wanting to focus on the future after Kosovo status. Tadic told A/S Fried that Kosovo’s independence does not necessarily mean a “loss” if properly defined in the minds of the electorate. He elaborated that ethnic violence, an exodus by Kosovo Serbs or the loss of rights would all certainly mean they “lost Kosovo.” A/S Fried posited that protections for Kosovo Serbs and “Serbian-ness” (church, minority and other protections) might mean avoiding such a loss. A/S Fried underscored that now is the time for Tadic to discuss these arrangements with Special Envoy Ahtisaari. 5. (S/NF) Tadic said that he left New York with the impression that some EU countries are considering relaxing PfP conditionality if there is more evidence that the GoS is actively pursuing Mladic. A/S Fried acknowledged that clear actions by the GoS to arrest Mladic might provide a basis “for some” to argue for taking another look at PfP conditionality. 6. (S/NF) Tadic also raised Bosnia, affirming his opposition to redrawing borders or partition of the country. A/S Fried pushed Tadic to make that clear to RS PM Dodik and work against his calls for a referendum. Tadic commented that USG pressure on Dodik in this regard is a positive factor. Referring to the recently agreed on “special relationship” between RS and Serbia, Tadic said Serbia planned to offer the same to the rest of Bosnia, including a plan under consideration to offer Serbian citizenship to all Bosnians. A/S Fried strongly criticized this idea, citing similar and destabilizing offers by Russia in places like Abkhazia. Draskovic 6. (S/NF) Draskovic expressed his usual arguments against Kosovo independence: a new Berlin Wall between Serbia and Kosovo, instability in Albanian regions in Macedonia and Montenegro, precedence for “frozen conflicts” like Ossetia and Transdnister, and “turbulence in Bosnia.” Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister responded favorably to A/S Fried’s commitment of USG support for Serbia’s integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Draskovic said that in Serbia the call for such integration “is no voice in the wilderness,” citing overwhelming support in polls for EU membership. On ICTY, Draskovic said that Mladic is a “disgrace to his nation” and that he is committed to repair the damage.
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7. (S/NF) Comment: A/S Fried central message – the overriding importance of Serbia’s European future – was clearly heard in his private and public messages during this visit. Neither Serbia’s leaders nor its public are really in doubt about the Kosovo outcome. What is lacking is clear communication between the leadership and the citizens about the hard truth. Ambassador Fried pushed hard on encouraging that dialogue. End Comment. 8. (U) A/S Fried cleared this message after departing post. Polt

XXXVIII
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1567 Subject: Icty Action Plan Update #5; September 27, 2006 Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 08:01 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06BELGRADE1567.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHBW #1567 2710801 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 280801Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9431 INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0254 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0495 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1373 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1197 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0244 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0612 RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3530 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR SWCI AND EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations], PROG, PHUM [Human Rights], SR [Serbia] Ref: (A) BELGRADE 1547 (B) BELGRADE 1371 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) 1. (U) This is the most recent in our weekly reports on GOS efforts on the Mladic Action Plan. Last week’s report was included in reftel (a), the reporting cable of Ambassador Williamson’s (S/WCI) visit to Belgrade 12-14 September and our subsequent discussion with Ljajic on the 15th. Prior reports in reftel (b). This report covers the period from 18-22 September. 2. (S) Summary: ICTY Action Plan co-coordinator Rasim Ljajic had very little to report in this week’s (18-22 September) review of Action Plan developments. He confirmed that co-coordinator Vukcevic had sent the latest progress report to ICTY earlier this
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week and engaged in a “disappointing” DVC with Carla Del Ponte on September 21; he pledged that the pending law providing access to intel reports and jurisdiction regarding the activities of the Mladic support network would be passed next week; and he referred to the latest leads in the surveillance operation of suspected Mladic supporters. End Summary. 3. (S) Ljajic expressed frustration with Del Ponte’s critical comments during the September 21 DVC. Del Ponte, he said, seems to have now adopted a uniformly negative view of Belgrade’s efforts. She told Vukcevic that he was not sufficiently involved in the effort and that she was dissatisfied with results. Ljajic echoed his comments to us last week, complaining about Del Ponte’s “mixed messages” and observing that in was unrealistic to expect either Coordinator to be as involved operationally as she now seemed to suggest. Ljajic said that Del Ponte seems to have fixed on references in the interrogation reports which had Pavkovic remarking that “if you want information about Mladic you should ask VBA head Kovac; he knows everything.” According to Ljajic, Del Ponte told them in the DVC that she was sure Kovac had all the answers. 4. (S) Ljajic said that Vukcevic’s latest report had been transmitted to The Hague earlier in the week, but played down its significance. It recounted details of interviews and surveillance reports which only reflected Belgrade’s long shot approach: pursue small fish in the network in the hope of inadvertently netting a big catch. Ljajic said that Tolimir’s wife had showed up at the VMA, apparently trying to link up with a cousin who had checked out earlier in the morning. She had been able to evade her handlers for several minutes and may have been able to exchange information with several Doctors. There were strong indications that Tolimir was quite ill and was in need of critical medical attention. Ljajic also noted that Jogo had sent a threatening letter to Kovac’s deputy warning him to back off. 5. (S) Ljajic said that he expected the draft law that would provide access to files on the activity of the support network, the same law that would give Vukcevic jurisdiction over accomplicies aiding and abetting fugatives, to be adopted by parliament the week of September 25. He noted that the law will likely allow the government to prosecute Lugonja, who had been under surveillance for some time. (Note: Lugonja’s arrest was reported in the press on 9/22; Ljajic says he was immediately taken custody at the airport before departing Serbia.) Ljajic noted that Zarko Stojanovic, a military policeman shown saluting a picture of Mladic earlier in the week in the Belgrade daily Glas, had been suspended without pay. He played down press reports that there were leads about PFWC Hadjic’s whereabouts. Polt

XXXIX
Reference id: 06BELGRADE1644 Subject: Disappointing Del Ponte Visit To Belgrade (icty Action Plan Update No. 6, Sept 25 – Oct 3) Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 6 Oct 2006 09:16 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06BELGRADE1644.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO7383 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #1644/01 2790916 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 060916Z OCT 06 //ZDS// FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9505 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0261 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0497 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1204 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0614 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0247 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS CORRECTED COPY– PARAGRAPH CLASS MARKINGS CHANGED STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM STATE ALSO FOR S/WCI E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia] Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.5 (b,d) Summary 1. (C) As foreshadowed by ICTY Action Plan Coordinator Ljajic late last week, the Serbian government presented lots of promises but reported little substantive progress in October 2-3 meetings with visiting ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte. At the end of her visit, CDP told us that her assessment of the GOS’ implementation of its Mladic Action Plan is “absolutely negative.” Ljajic’s Weekly Report: No Good News 2. (C) In his weekly meeting with polcouns on September 29, Ljajic had nothing new to report. He appeared unhappy about the arrival of Del Ponte and seemed resigned to an unpleasant visit. He noted her critical remarks after her meeting with EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn, but was adamant that the government was doing everything possible to locate Mladic and the other remaining PIFWCs. He said that Del Ponte would receive a detailed report of the intelligence and activities related to the Mladic search, but it would add nothing new from prosecutor Vukcevic’s most recent report. On the postponement of the trial of Mladic supporters announced earlier in the week, Ljajic stated that while the judge had handled it less than optimally, there was no real surprise in the defendants’ efforts to accuse the government of complicity. He did not expect that to alter the likely guilty verdict. 3. (C) When asked about how recent political events – the resignation of G17 Plus and the passing of the new constitution by Parliament – might impact GOS efforts on Mladic, Ljajic said, “that is the exact question I posed to the Prime Minister this mor123

ning.” He commented that the package that had been approved in connection with the constitution (parliamentary vote, referendum, follow-on elections) was a “total farce; unbelievable even by Serbian standards.” While Ljajic opined that the election-related activities were a sham, i.e., a backroom deal among the major parties that would make the referendum and elections only about Kosovo, Ljajic insisted that the PM’s, his and the Action Team’s efforts on Mladic were serious, transparent, and without reservation. Del Ponte Disgusted With Serbian Efforts 4. (C) Del Ponte’s arrival several days later confirmed Ljajic’s bleak prognosis. In her outbrief to local embassies following two days of meetings with Serbian Government officials, Del Ponte said that she was “dissatisfied” with the implementation of the Action Plan for three main reasons. First, she considered the outflow of information among the key players to be poor. Second, she was disappointed with the lack of coordination among the Serbian State Intelligence Service (BIA) and the Serbian Military Intelligence Service (VBA). Third, she said that the GOS lacked a focused and coherent strategy and was merely “fishing around” in Mladic’s support network. On this point, she cited inconsistencies in the GOS reports on Action Plan implementation and claimed that the GOS had absolutely no promising leads. She opined that if there was no significant change in these areas, the GOS would “never catch Mladic.” Del Ponte announced she was assigning an analyst in Belgrade to liaise with the Action Plan players to provide her daily briefings and updates. 5. (SBU) Del Ponte criticized Serbian Prosecutor for War Crimes Vukcevic’s efforts, claiming he was “coordinating” and not “directing” and that the results were erratic and inconsistent. She noted that BIA Chief Bulatovic and VBA Head Kovac made numerous claims in her meetings of which Vukcevic was not aware. She ended by alleging that her office has 2-3 pieces of “concrete evidence” proving that the GOS is not cooperating with the ICTY, citing lack of political will to seriously go after Mladic. Del Ponte Asks For US Advice 6. (C) At a dinner with the Ambassador, Del Ponte asked how she should approach her meeting with Prime Minister Kostunica. She described her five-hour meeting with Vukcevic earlier that day as “five hours of trash.” The Ambassador encouraged Del Ponte to press Kostunica to kick off an intensive media campaign with an “Oval Office-type” speech to the public calling for Mladic’s arrest and extradition. Del Ponte wondered whether she should push Kostunica to fire Bulatovic and Kovac since they had produced no results. The Ambassador doubted that Kostunica would take any such action, but agreed it would not hurt to make such a suggestion as a technical move to suggest the seriousness of our approach. Del Ponte finally admitted to the Ambassador that she was wrong in March when she defiantly insisted that Kostunica would turn over Mladic by April, but said she still had “a gut feeling” that something positive would happen with regard to Mladic by the end of the year. Kostunica’s Empty Promises 7. (SBU) According to Del Ponte, Prime Minister Kostunica told her that he was willing to give Vukcevic all the authority he needed to head the search for Mladic, including support for legislation that would give the prosecutor the ability to target support net124

works. Comment: Since Parliament is likely to be in recess until after the constitutional referendum, Kostunica’s assurances will have little practical effect in the near term. End comment. Although Kostunica also assured Del Ponte that there were no political obstacles to apprehending Mladic, she remains extremely skeptical. She claimed that the Action Team confirmed to her that the GOS missed an opportunity to arrest Mladic in February, instead opting to communicate with an intermediary in an attempt to entice him to voluntarily surrender. 8. (C) Del Ponte told local Embassies that she had pressed Prime Minister Kostunica to make an Oval Office-type address as well as to lead a more aggressive public campaign, which could create a more conducive climate for Mladic’s arrest. Kostunica, who Del Ponte described as “calm” and “quiet” claimed that he would seriously consider these options and was “ready to do more,” but his watered down and uninspired public statement after their meeting indicates that he probably has no intention of taking more aggressive action. 9. (C) CDP bemoaned the fact that “she alone” is looking for Karadzic. NATO’s departure from Bosnia and EUFOR’s lack of a clear PIFWC mandate made the picture even bleaker, she said. CDP said that the OTP believed that Karadzic was frequently on the move between the RS, Montenegro, and Serbia, but that OTP’s “current information” is that Karadzic is not/not in Serbia. CDP’s team also reported that the GOS believes that PIFWC Goran Hadzic is not in Serbia. Comment 10. (C) Del Ponte’s visit did not bring any new revelations on the Action Plan or the search for Mladic. Ljajic seems increasingly dejected in our weekly meetings; while Vukcevic in our private discussions seems to be getting nervous that he will be everyone’s fall guy for any dramatic failure. Clearly frustrated, Del Ponte indicated she would probably present a highly negative assessment to the EU Troika later this month. Kostunica continues to promise full cooperation, but refuses to take any significant action on this issue, and with the constitutional referendum, elections, and Kosovo, it is likely to become increasingly difficult to get the GOS to focus more intently on this issue. Polt

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Reference id: 06BELGRADE1960 Subject: Seselj’s Hunger Strike Increasing Attention For The Radicals Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Tue, 5 Dec 2006 06:30 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For official use only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06BELGRADE1960.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO6222 RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEH125

SR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHBW #1960/01 3390630 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 050630Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9837 INFO RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3605 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1260 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC Hide header

Unclas Section
SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958:N/A Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], KDEM [Democratization], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations] Summary 1. (SBU) The Serbian Radical party is keenly focusing its campaign for parliamentary elections in January on the continuing hunger strike of their leader, Vojislav Seselj, currently on trial in the Hague. As the campaign trail heats up, the Radicals will likely continue to exploit Seselj’s latest antics as a way to ramp up a campaign message that is anti-Hague, and anti-West. Despite the surprise NATO announcement on PfP that could complicate the anti-West strategy, and some discord between the leadership in Belgrade and their leader in the Hague, the Radicals are mobilizing throughout the country to gather signatures and stage rallies in support of Seselj and his hateful and anti-Western message. End Summary. Hunger Strike Garnering Sympathy 2. (SBU) Fresh off the controversial death of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic while in custody at The Hague, Seselj’s hunger strike over alleged ICTY mistreatment is again rousing anti-Hague sentiment amongst the populace. Seselj is demanding that the tribunal allow him to chose his own defense council, unrestricted visits from his wife, that all documents submitted to him be in Serbian (not Serbo-Croatian), and the latest, that all his foreign currency assets outside of Serbia, specifically in the US, be unfrozen. Seselj has been on his self-imposed hunger strike for approximately three weeks now in protest. He was moved into the hospital wing of the detention center on November 30the SRS says against his willover concerns that his health condition is endangered. 3. (SBU) Seselj is echoing Milosevic’s accusation that the Tribunal was set up by secret international agencies, and accusing the US and the west of plotting to kill him. Seselj refused to appear during the first day of his trial on November 27, and therefore lost his right to conduct his own defense. The trial is now adjourned indefinitely because of concerns over Seselj’s condition. 4. (SBU) Ljiljiana Smajlovic, editor-in-chief of pro– government daily Politika, stoked the anti-Hague sentiment in a commentary on November 28, asserting the Tribunal was making a mistake by imposing council on Seselj and accusing him of obstructing the trial, a charge she called ludicrous given that he has been waiting four years for his trial to even begin. Smajlovic said that the tribunal is weakening itself even further in Serbian public opinion by its latest actions.
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5. (SBU) Seselj’s hunger strike will likely continue to hold the attention of Serbia, both through media, and SRS rallies and booths set up in Belgrade and Serbia-wide to collect signatures in support of Seselj. The Radicals held a rally on November 23 near the parliament building, carrying Seselj’s pictures, waiving party flags and shouting “Release Seselj.” A much larger event was held on Saturday, December 2 in front of the US Embassy, with 20,000-25,000 people showing up carrying banners with pictures of Seselj, Mladic and Milosevic. Speeches by the SRS leadership were hate-filled harangues accusing the U.S. of using the Hague Tribunal to murder its leadership and destroy Serbia. The Radicals also attacked Tadic and Kostunica as U.S. lackeys. Their campaign continued on December 3, with party leaders publicly reading out Seselj’s last will and testament, which called on them to never to abandon their ideology of a “Greater Serbia” and to oppose Serbia’s entry into NATO and even the EU. Campaign Theme for the Radicals: The Hague not Kosovo 6. (SBU) The demonstration in front of the Embassy on December 2 suggests that the SRS is opting to focus on a backward looking anti-Hague, anti-West campaign message instead of responding to the economic frustrations of its base. Because the DSS has already seized Kosovo as their main rallying cry, the SRS has been content to echo and reinforce the PM’s hard line on the Kosovo issue. Asked by reporters if the SRS would try and avoid leading the next government in order to blame Tadic and Kostunica for losing Kosovo, Deputy SRS leader Nikolic said he would not accuse anyone in Serbia for a bad outcome on Kosovo’s final status. “How can I accuse them for a solution that will be passed by Marti Ahtisaari? If the solution is negative, i.e. if Kosovo gains any form of independence or if the present state remains, then that solution will be unacceptable for all of Serbia and it will simply have to react,” said Nikolic. 7. (SBU) NATO’s surprise decision to invite Serbia to participate in PfP may complicate the Radicals strategy as the announcement has been viewed positively both by the public and by the NGO’s that have been strongly supportive of the ICTY. The Radicals have not commented on the PfP decision as of yet and their silence has not been raised by the media or challenged by the other parties. In any event, we expect the Radicals’ rhetoric against the West to increase in the weeks leading up to the election. It will be interesting to see how they balance the anti-West themes in their anti-Hague effort with the public’s largely positive reaction to PfP membership. 8. (SBU) The party emerged from the Constitutional referendum and the subsequent passage of the Constitutional law, looking very much as winners: they foiled Kostunica’s alleged promise to the DS of joint presidential and parliamentary elections before the end of the year and took credit for adding references to the Constitution that strengthened Serbia’s national claim on Kosovo. By supporting the referendum, the Radicals enhanced its image as a “nation-building” party, dedicated to defending the country’s territory and sovereignty. The media’s gingerly treatment of the Radicals and the PM’s careful avoidance of any public criticism of their rhetoric, has deepened suspicion among some that SRS, SPS and DSS are reserving their options for some variation on a possible National Unity Government that would bring all parties together in a Serbian government united against an independence outcome in the Kosovo talks. 9. (SBU) Most recently, however, the SRS has lashed out at the DSS in reaction to damning testimony in the high– profile trial on the killing of former PM Zoran Djindjic,
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and accused the government of manipulating a key witness to suggest an SRS hand in Djindic’s death. In its “anger,” the SRS publicly claimed it would never join in coalition with the DSS and would only rule alone or in partnership with ethnic Bosniak and Hungarian minority parties, an offer which both flatly refused. The DS exploited the breach by calling on the DSS to declare before the elections which parties they would and would not be in coalition with. The DSS has refused to answer but the SRS continued to attack the DSS and Kostunica in person during its rally over the weekend. The PfP decision and the process that Serbia faces to accept the invitation, will give the DS additional fodder for pushing the DSS to come clean and clarify its electoral plans. Discord Amongst the Radicals? 10. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Radical leadership, including Nikolic and the young ambitious Secretary-General, Alekandar Vucic, are reportedly frustrated with Seselj’s antics and heavy handed directives from the Hague. Despite Seselj’s reportedly poor condition, our sources tell us Seselj has access to a cell phone and calls his wife and party officials regularly to try to continue organizing the day-to-day activities of the party. The SRS continues to follow Seselj’s guidance, support him in The Hague and consult with him on official party business. He is listed first on the party’s ballot list which is officially named: “Serbian Radical PartyVojislav Seselj.” However, Nikolic and Vucic reportedly continue to look for ways to circumvent his orders, while still publicly maintaining their fierce loyalty. Comment 11. (SBU) The controversy over Seselj’s condition at the beginning of election season will likely provide at least a small boost to the Radicals as they exploit the anti-Hague sentiment already boiling in Serbia. Even with the trial suspended, we expect the Radical’s to continue banging on the anti-Hague drum with any worsening in Seselj’s condition playing to their advantage. Seselj’s personal involvement in the Radicals electoral campaign may backfire: extending their anti-West message even to the EU, which the vast majority of Serbs support as the key to Serbia’s future is a dangerous tactic that party leaders here have sought to avoid. Polt

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Reference id: 06PARIS7684 Subject: Dod U/s Edelman’s December 1 Meeting With Chirac’s Diplomatic Adviser Gourdalt-montagne Origin: Embassy Paris (France) Cable time: Wed, 6 Dec 2006 13:08 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06PARIS7684.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: VZCZCXRO7796 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHFR #7684/01 3401308 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 061308Z DEC 06 FM AMEM128

BASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3587 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1046 Hide header Secret SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016 Tags: FR [France; Corsica], IS [Israel], KDEM [Democratization], LE [Lebanon], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SY [Syria] Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S) Summary: In a December 1 meeting with DoD U/S Edelman devoted primarily to Syria/Lebanon, French NSA-equivalent Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) assessed that Syria was the weakest link in the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis and wondered whether Israel could apply more pressure on Syria, a question he said he would put to his Israeli counterpart later in the month. He assessed that the recent spate of high-level European visitors to Damascus had not been helpful, and said rumors about the Iraq Study Group’s possible recommendations on engaging with Syria had further complicated matters. MGM noted that Pierre de Bousquet, head of the DST (French internal security service), had quietly visited Damascus to warn the Asad regime that it would be held accountable for chaos in Lebanon and for any attacks against UNIFIL. Bousquet also cautioned the Syrians that French policy vis-a-vis Lebanon would not change even after President Chirac leaves office in 2007. With respect to the current political crisis in Lebanon, MGM said France was putting “maximum pressure” on Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, although it was unclear what Berri could do under the circumstances. 2. (S) Summary cont’d: MGM discussed continuing French efforts to end Israeli overflights of Lebanon. On Turkey-EU, MGM said it was not in France’s interest to burn bridges with Turkey, and pointed out that President Chirac had taken a political risk by speaking out against legislation on the Armenian genocide. On Serbia, MGM said that “we need to do everything we can” to prevent Serbian Radical Party leader (and indicted war criminal) Vojislav Seselj from being elected. Riga summit discussion septel. End summary. Participants 3. (U) DoD U/S Eric Edelman, accompanied by DCM, DATT, DoD DAS Daniel Fata, and Poloff (notetaker), met December 1 at the Elysee with Maurice GourdaultMontagne (MGM), French national security advisor-equivalent. MGM was accompanied by Dominique Boche, President Chirac’s advisor for the Middle East; Admiral Edouard Guillaud, the president’s military advisor; and strategic affairs advisor Laurent Bili. Dealing with a Recalcitrant Syria 4. (S) After a quick discussion of the Riga Summit (see septel), conversation immediately turned to the Middle East. U/S Edelman and MGM agreed that Syrian behavior on a broad range of issues – support for Iraqi insurgents, interference in Lebanon, and sponsorship of Hamas, Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – had not improved.
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MGM assessed that Syria was the weakest link in the Hizballah-Syria-Iran axis and therefore the logical target for international pressure. However, he confessed to being somewhat puzzled by Israel’s failure to take a more aggressive line with Syria. He said he would use a meeting later in December with PM Olmert’s military advisor, Major General Gadi Shamni, to discuss strategy and to explore whether Israel could apply more pressure. 5. (C) MGM assessed that the recent spate of high-level European visitors to Damascus had been unhelpful, and had only reinforced Bashar al-Asad’s perception that the West needed him. Noting that Asad’s European interlocutors had left Damascus emptyhanded, MGM said he had warned British envoy Nigel Sheinwald that his visit would prove counterproductive, particularly if it became public. Although Sheinwald was “upbeat” following his discussions in Damascus, MGM observed that the Syrians (with Iranian complicity) had lost no time in “pulling the rug out from under” the Lebanese government by engineering the resignation of the Shiite Ministers and the assassination of Pierre Gemayel. MGM pointed out that rumors about the Iraq Study Group’s (ISG) forthcoming recommendations, and in particular the expectation that the ISG would recommend some sort of U.S. dialogue with Syria, had further complicated matters. De Bosquet Visit to Damascus 6. (C) MGM noted that, unfortunately, the French found themselves obliged to talk to the Syrian regime on matters relating to the interdiction and prosecution of French jihadists seeking to enter Iraq via Syria. To that end, the French had recently despatched Pierre de Bousquet, head of the DST (French internal security service) to Damascus, where he held talks with Syrian military intelligence chief Assef Shawkat. MGM said Bousquet made the following points: – Syria will be held responsible for any chaos in Lebanon; – Syria will also be held accountable for any attacks against UNIFIL; – Constructive Syrian behavior would elicit a positive reaction; – If the Syrians behaved, France would support a resumption of talks on the Golan Heights. 7. (C) Finally, Bousquet warned the regime against miscalculating the future direction of French policy. While it was true that President Chirac was nearing the end of his mandate, France would still be France even after Chirac’s departure – and its Lebanon policy would be the same. (MGM noted parenthetically that he was pleased to see that France’s Socialist Party was on board with that message. Socialist presidential candidate Segolene Royal, then in Lebanon, had made this clear.) Intriguingly, Shawkat invited Bousquet to make those same points directly to Asad, a request that the French interpreted either as evidence either that Asad did not listen to Shawkat, or that the latter needed Bousquet to personally reinforce the message. MGM said the Bousquet-Asad conversation had not yet taken place. Brammertz Investigation 8. (C) Turning to the UNIIC investigation, MGM said Brammertz had done “serious work” and that the Syrians were desperate to avoid an international tribunal. He noted that France had “tried its best” to persuade the Russians to facilitate a speedy establishment of the tribunal. In addition, he said both France and Saudi Arabia (Prince Bandar met with President Chirac the week of November 19) were putting “maximum pressure” on Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to end the current political crisis. “We
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need Berri to play a role,” said MGM, who nonetheless questioned whether Berri could deliver. Israeli Overflights 9. (C) With respect to Israeli overflights of Lebanon, MGM said the French were trying to dampen down the “crisis” that the overflights had engendered in Franco-Israeli relations. He noted that France continued to develop a package of security measures aimed at reducing the need for such flights, and said that the French military and the IDF had held consultations in that regard. He thanked U/S Edelman for U.S. assistance in sensitizing the GOI to France’s concerns. Noting that air defense rules of engagement did not leave much margin for error, he said it would be tragic if a UNIFIL soldier were open to fire simply because he was following the rules of engagement. 10. (C) Nonetheless, he expressed frustration that the Israelis had not fully taken on board France’s concerns. He pointed to the fact that, while there had been a slight reduction in the number of overflights, the flights continued. He stressed that of fourteen recent violations of Lebanese airspace, eleven took place over French UNIFIL positions. “We have asked the Israelis not to misbehave, and we have warned them that our soldiers are not Fijians,” said MGM. In addition to the dangers of an unwanted confrontation, such overflights undermined UNIFIL’s credibility. MGM noted that he had given Israeli Ambassador Shek a blunt warning: If the overflights continued, the French peacekeepers might simply announce that the Israelis were impeding them from doing their job and go home – which would not be in Israel’s interest. Turkey/Serbia 11. (C) Recalling U/S Edelman’s prior service as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, MGM noted that France had “no interest in burning bridges” with Ankara over the question of Turkey’s admission to the EU. He added that President Chirac had taken a personal political risk in speaking out against the National Assembly’s attempt to criminalize denial of the Armenian genocide. He questioned whether Turkish PM Erdogan would attempt to win the Turkish presidency in 2007. Turning to Serbia, MGM said “we need to do everything we can” to prevent Serbian Radical Party leader (and indicated war criminal) Vojislav Seselj from being elected president and that France would push for SAA to be extended to Serbia at the EU Summit. 12. (U) U/S Edelman has cleared this cable. Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton

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Reference id: 06PARIS7755 Subject: A/s Fried And French Nsa-equivalent Gourdault-montagne Discuss Russia-georgia, Russia-kosovo And Turkey-eu Origin: Embassy Paris (France) Cable time: Tue, 12 Dec 2006 13:05 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06PARIS7755.html
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History: First published on Thu, 2 Dec 2010 02:01 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: WikiLeaks Archive – Russian’s Killing in London – NYTimes.com Russia rejects WikiLeaks claims – Americas – Al Jazeera English Crowdleaks: Breakthrough in Litvinenko case WikiLeaks cables condemn Russia as ‘mafia state’ | World news | The Guardian WikiLeaks cables: Alexander Litvinenko murder ‘probably had Putin’s OK’ | World news | guardian.co.uk Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO2827 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHFR #7755/01 3461305 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 121305Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3715 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0399 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], FR [France; Corsica], EUN [European Union], NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], UNO [United Nicaraguan Opposition], SR [Serbia], YI [Yugoslavia], TU [Turkey], CY [Cyprus] Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 1. (S) Summary: EUR A/S Dan Fried’s December 7 meeting with presidential diplomatic advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) focused largely on Russia, with France in a defensive posture. MGM raised the aborted Putin-Chirac dinner on the margins of the NATO Riga Summit, saying it had been instigated by Russia, and portrayed France as having attempted to steer in a way compatible with Latvian interests. In contrast to French Political Director Araud (septel), he showed reluctance to see the Kremlin’s hand in the Litvinenko poisoning, preferring to ascribe it to rogue elements. MGM claimed to support Georgian independence while suggesting that NATO Article 5 obligations precluded Georgian NATO membership. On Kosovo, he reviewed France’s plans to persuade the EU to agree to offer Serbia an SAA agreement not linked to fulfillment of its ICTY obligations but worried above all about Putin’s explicit threat to veto a UN Security Resolution mandating independence; there was a risk of instability and partition if the West did not exercise sufficient care in managing the Russians. Fried countered that the West needed to be prepared to proceed in extremis without the Russians, and warned against allowing the Russians to hold up a decision through the threat of a veto. 2. (C) Summary cont: On other issues, MGM reviewed the Franco-German proposal for a review of Turkey’s implementation of its Ankara Protocol commitments between 2007 and 2009, assured Fried that France wanted to avoid a train wreck, but insisted it was incumbent on the Turks to make a gesture. Fried reminded MGM of the strategic importance of keeping Turkey tied to EU; MGM agreed in principle but insisted Turkey had to play by the EU’s rules and noted the difficulties of managing domestically public
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sentiment against Turkey. Fried and MGM agreed that France and the U.S. had worked well together at the NATO Riga Summit. End summary. 3. (C) EUR A/S Daniel Fried, accompanied by the Ambassador and POL Deputy (notetaker), met December 7 with President Chirac’s diplomatic advisor (NSA-equivalent) Maurice Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) to discuss a number of European issues that revolved largely around Russia. MGM was joined by Presidency Middle East advisor Dominique Boche and strategic affairs advisor Laurent Bili. Putin-Chirac at Riga 4. (C) Noting at the outset that he had been directly involved in the aborted PutinChirac dinner on the margins of the NATO summit, MGM assured Fried that French actions had been above board. Kremlin advisor Pridhodko had originally proposed that Putin meet Chirac privately at a Paris airport November 29 in order to express his birthday wishes (MGM cited Putin’s meeting in Hannover with former Chancellor Schroeder as a precedent). France had agreed, while noting that the dates coincided with the Riga Summit. Pridhodko suggested Riga, which France dutifully vetted with the Latvians with the understanding that they would have to host such a dinner, and assuring the Latvians that France was prepared to say “no” to the Russians if a meeting would in any way cause them embarrassment. The Latvians were prepared to proceed, so long as the Russians also agreed to a bilateral meeting, which MGM conveyed to Pridhodko. Pridhodko had suggested that this could be “difficult” given negative Russian public opinion toward Latvia. The Latvians told MGM that the Russians had refused to meet at the official palace or residence, but were considering the Latvian cultural center. MGM said he had encouraged the Russians to accept the last offering, and they had proceeded as if it might be acceptable. Late Tuesday, however, they balked, apparently because the center was located about 200m from the Latvian museum of occupation. 5. (C) MGM concluded his presentation with the argument that such a meeting would have been positive for Russian-Latvian relations and would have helped to blur dividing lines between NATO and Russia. He complained over Latvia’s going “public” with the cancellation by querying NATO SYG Hoop de Scheffer as to whether “we are allowed to receive” the Russian president. He commented that, had they remained silent, the cancellation would have been a non-event. Fried countered that the Latvians had been right to inform NATO and thus avoid a surprise. He contrasted the Russians’ clumsiness in managing the dinner with the Latvians’ transparency, suggesting that it was time for the Russians to accept the independence of the Baltic states. He added pointedly that the U.S. would no longer accept putative Russian concerns about Latvian treatment of their citizens at a time when they were still rounding up Georgians on the basis of ethnicity. MGM commented meekly that the timing had not been right for the visit and agreed that the Latvian government no longer had a problem of non-citizen ethnic Russians. Litvinenko Case 6. (S) Fried commented that the short-term trend inside Russia was negative, noting increasing indications that the UK investigation into the murder of Litvinenko could well point to some sort of Russian involvement. MGM called attention to Chirac’s statement encouraging the Russians to cooperate in the investigation. He wondered aloud who might have given the order, but speculated the murder probably involved a settling of ac133

counts between services rather than occurring under direct order from the Kremlin. Fried, noting Putin’s attention to detail, questioned whether rogue security elements could operate, in the UK no less, without Putin’s knowledge. Describing the current atmosphere as strange, he described the Russians as increasingly self-confident, to the point of arrogance. Georgia-Russia 7. (C) Fried, noting he had discussed Georgia the previous evening with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud (septel), said it was important to support Georgian sovereignty against Russian pressure for three reasons: the situation overall in Georgia was improving under Saakashvili’s leadership; violation of Georgian territorial integrity would set a dangerous precedent; and Germany and Central and Eastern Europe had a strong interest in ensuring that gas and oil pumped from Azerbaijan and Central Asia did not travel exclusively through pipelines owned or controlled by Russia. MGM responded that France supported Georgia’s independence but wondered how to accomplish this within existing structures. The heart of NATO was Article 5, and it was doubtful that NATO would declare war on Russia over Georgia; it was therefore important to bypass Article 5 and find a “specific way” that did not involve NATO membership. If Georgia joins, Armenia may follow. Even in the case of Turkey, was its Kurdish problem one for Europeans, MGM asked. 8. (C) Fried assured MGM that the U.S. was not seeking membership for Georgia soon, but it was important not to close the door in order to continue to promote Georgian reform and development. It was incumbent on the West to support Georgian sovereignty and maintain a united front against Russia, he argued. He related that he had urged Saakashvili not to seek crises with Russia, since crisis worked only for Russia, and time was on Georgia’s side so long as it moved quietly. In five years, a burgeoning Georgian economy had the potential to dramatically change the politics of the region. MGM agreed in principle, but suggested one could differ on ways and means. Serbia and Kosovo 9. (C) Fried explained that the U.S. had decided to offer PFP to Serbia as a means of supporting democratic forces in the upcoming elections; President Tadic had made a strong case for Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic future. Similar considerations had prompted the U.S. to support Ahtisaari’s recommendation to postpone tabling his proposals on Kosovo status. But it was critical to move quickly after January 21. Additional delay would encourage the Serbs and others into thinking the West felt intimidated; it was time to push onward to supervised independence. Fried said that while Russia could be expected to cause difficulties, in the end he believed it would abstain on a UNSCR, although he could not be certain. What was certain was that the Russians must not be allowed to believe that the threat of a veto will work, because they would exploit any opening. The West therefore had to send the signal that it was prepared to move without them if necessary, because no signal would be interpreted as tacit acquiescence in Russia’s raising the bar. This was a terrible option, but paralysis was worse. 10. (C) MGM reviewed the history of French-Serbian relations (back to the Salonika Front of WWI, on which MGM’s grandfather had served), judged PFP as a positive offer, and said Chirac had proposed to Merkel that the EU move to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, even in the event of insufficient ICTY coo134

peration. Merkel had initially responded negatively, citing Tadic’s failure to request it, but France continued to believe that offering SAA could make a difference in the January elections. If the Germans were not on board by early January, France would move on its own to propose SAA. As for the Ahtisaari proposals, MGM said Putin had told the French “Russia will not hesitate to veto any solution that does not enjoy the agreement of all the stakeholders.” MGM urged great caution in moving forward, citing Putin’s purported concerns about the risks of a partition and a merging of the north with Serbia and the south with Albania, leading potentially to a radicalized Muslim state in the heart of Europe. 11. (C) Fried responded that the Serbs and Albanians had been told that Kosovo would be independent, and that it would be a mistake to turn back. Perhaps the Russians were bluffing, but even if they were not, wavering would lead to disaster, beginning with riots by Kosovars that risked turning KFOR into an occupying force and could led to the very radicalization we had successfully avoided so far. MGM said France was not advocating further delay, but was nonetheless concerned that independence could have unintended consequences. Public opinion could change, and Russia might become yet more irrational in the run-up to legislative and presidential elections. Fried agreed on the desirability of negotiating a UN Security Council Resolution that would be acceptable to the Russians – perhaps even leaving out the word “independence” – but the West needed to be prepared in extremis to move forward without Russian support. Russia would seize on any paralysis to try to raise the bar. MGM agreed in principle, but urged again finding ways to “coddle” Russia. Turkey-EU 12. (C) During a discussion cut short by a summons from President Chirac, Fried asked MGM how France planned to avoid a Turkey-EU train wreck. MGM said France supported Turkey, but Turkey needed to play by EU rules and fulfill its commitments. It was not the EU’s fault that the UN Cyprus plan had not been approved by referendum, but this could not be used as an excuse for not implementing the Ankara Protocol. It was critical that Turkey “start to implement” the protocol through a gesture. MGM said that Chirac and Merkel had agreed (on the basis of the Commission proposal) not to open eight chapters and not to close any other chapters; but they had also agreed to insist on a review of Turkish implementation – to serve as the basis for a further EU decision – in the time frame between a 2007 Commission report and 2009 European parliamentary elections. Although Erdogan had told Merkel not to expect any further Turkish gestures, MGM nonetheless hoped the Turks would find a way, as they had so often in the past, to do something at the last minute. 13. (C) Fried described the U.S. approach of encouraging Turkey to respond constructively, expressed the hope that the EU would not be too one-sided in its judgment of the Ankara Protocol implementation, but reminded MGM that the EU also had not followed through on its promises (which MGM hotly denied). Fried continued that the U.S. wanted to be helpful but was avoiding taking a public stance. He reiterated that the stakes were high, given Turkey’s strategic value. 14. (C) This message was cleared by A/S Fried. Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton
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XLIII
Reference id: 06USNATO711 Subject: Usnato Reinforces Need For Icty Reference In Serbia’s Partnership Presentation Document Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Wed, 13 Dec 2006 15:12 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06USNATO711.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHNO #0711 3471512 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131512Z DEC 06 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0300 INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1313 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0866 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE Hide header

Confidential
Tags: NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], PREL [External Political Relations], EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council], SR [Serbia] Ref: A. BELGRADE 01994 B. 12/12/06 OLSON-HARTLEY E-MAIL Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (B,D) 1. (C) USNATO Charge Olson advised Serbian Special Envoy to NATO, Ambassador Branco Milinkovic, on December 12 that it is essential that Serbia’s Partnership for Peace Presentation Document include ICTY compliance language. This, he suggested, could follow the lines of President Tadic’s letter to President Bush. Milinkovic acknowledged that the current draft of the document does not include such a reference because it was drafted months ago on the assumption that Serbia would be ICTY compliant by the time the document was presented to NATO. He took on board the need to have the language in current circumstances, and in fact said he had so recommended to Belgrade the day before. 2. (C) Milinkovic confirmed that Serbia will not introduce its Presentation Document at the December 14 Partnership Framework Document signing ceremony. Belgrade is considering delivering the Presentation Document only after the installation of a new Serbian Government. Olson

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Reference id: 06USNATO716 Subject: Accession Of Bosnia-herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia To Nato’s Partnership For Peace, December 14, 2006 Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Thu, 14 Dec 2006 17:02 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN
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Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06USNATO716.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHNO #0716/01 3481702 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 141702Z DEC 06 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0307 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR EUR, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE, PM, IO, E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2016 Tags: NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], PREL [External Political Relations], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], XB [East Asia and Pacific (Pacific Basin)] Ref: SECSTATE 198801 Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary 1. (C) In a historic and emotional morning at NATO HQ on December 14, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace by signing the PfP Framework Document in back-to-back meetings with the North Atlantic Council (NAC). BiH trilateral Presidency Chairman Nebosjsha Radmanovic, Montenegrin President Filip Vujanovic, and Serbian President Boris Tadic headed the three delegations to NATO. Ambassador Nuland met separately with Tadic to stress the importance the U.S. places on Serbia’s commitment to ICTY cooperation, regional stability, and continuing domestic reforms. Tadic forcefully acknowledged his support for those goals, both to the Ambassador and to the NAC, but showed clear ambivalence about how Kosovo’s final status would play out. UK, Norwegian, and other delegations made strong interventions emphasizing the importance of ICTY compliance, and the UK called for a cooperative approach to Kosovo final status. Radmanovic and Vujanovic stressed the positive role that accession to Partnership would play in their own nations, reforms and future domestic development. See text of Tadic address in para 12. End Summary. A Pull aside with Tadic 2. (C) Ambassador Nuland met privately with Serbian President Tadic before his session with the NAC. Drawing on reftel, she made clear that President Bush’s decision to support PfP for Serbia at Riga was intended to boost democratic elements in the nation, responding to Tadic’s personal appeal. In betting on a positive democratic future for Serbia, the President expected President Tadic to live up to his public and private assurances regarding ICTY compliance and a constructive approach to Kosovo status. Tadic responded that he understood the President’s intent and his expectations in supporting PfP, particularly regarding ICTY compliance. He assured Ambassador Nuland that he shared U.S. goals and would work to achieve them in Serbia’s own interests. He also highlighted the benefits that Serbia had obtained from bilateral defense ties, noting specifi137

cally military-to-military cooperation with the Ohio National Guard, and introduced his new CHOD as a “new broom.” 3. (C) In separate meetings with the NAC, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Montenegro, and Serbia acceded to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) on December 14. BiH Chairman of the Trilateral Presidency Radmanovic, Montenegrin President Vujanovic, and Serbian President Tadic signed the Partnership Framework Document at one-hour intervals in the presence of NATO PermReps and the press, with each signing followed by individual “26 1” meetings with Allies. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Partnership of Entities 4. (C) President Radmanovic, accompanied by DefMin Nikola Radovanovic and CHOD LtGen Sifet Podzic, acknowledged Bosnia’s debt to the Alliance for providing a “security umbrella” at its founding. Coming from the Republika Srpska member of the Presidency, his promises of full compliance with ICTY the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had added significance. Radmanovic said this “great day for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina” would further stimulate economic and defense reforms, and represented “the first step on a long path toward full membership in the Alliance and the EU.” 5. (C) Greece (NATO’s Contact Point Embassy in Sarajevo) voiced confidence that Bosnia’s Partnership would further strengthen its domestic reform efforts ) citing police reform and political dialogue on the constitution as well as ICTY compliance. Netherlands (lead nation for the NATO/PfP Trust Fund to resettle redundant military personnel in Bosnia) pointed to the Partnership tools that could help the reform process through development of an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) and eventually a much more ambitious Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Canada called on BiH to serve as a model for building a multi-ethnic society, to respect its commitments to the ICTY, and to contribute to stability in the Balkans as Kosovo attained its final status early the next year. Radmanovic responded that none of Bosnia’s entities had any doubt about the need for ICTY compliance. Montenegro: A Fast Track from Independence 6. (C) NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer lauded Montenegro’s quick progress since independence in June 2006 to membership in PfP. President Vujanovic described Montenegro’s progress in more detail, focusing on building defense institutions under democratic civilian control and achieving interoperability with NATO to allow participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. He also alluded to the need for economic development, hoped that joining PfP would encourage international investors, and that EU and NATO membership would follow. 7. (C) Allies Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Belgium responded, pointing to the need for further work on strengthening the rule of law, building an efficient government administration, fighting corruption, instituting economic reform, and bolstering regional cooperation in the critical period following the determination of Kosovo’s final status. Slovenia stressed that the values and principles enshrined in the PfP Framework Document were strongly shared by all Allies and that PfP tools would help Montenegro to achieve its reform and interoperability goals. Belgium applauded Montenegro’s speedy accession to the UN and OSCE, as well as PfP, and endorsed its aspirations to join NATO and the EU.
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Serbia: Commitment to ICTY... 8. (C) President Tadic was accompanied by MGen Ponos, Presidential Counselors Jerenic, Ratkovic, and Krspic, and Special Envoy to NATO Milinkovic. His meeting with PermReps was the most anticipated and dramatic of the three. (The SYG’s Private Office sought in advance to limit the number of Allied interventions, and settled on Serbia’s alphabetical third-place appearance to allow more time for the session if needed.) At the launch of the meeting, in front of the press, the SYG drew on Riga Summit language to emphasize NATO’s expectation that Serbia would cooperate fully with ICTY, and that the Alliance would closely monitor its actions. Still before the cameras, Tadic promised that “Serbia is going to cooperate with the ICTY fully, arrest all indictees, and finalize this process.” He described Serbia’s Partnership as “the end of isolation.” 9. (C) Tadic’s presentation in closed session was even more emphatic. He insisted that arresting war criminals was a “moral imperative” and reflected Serbia’s own values. It would show not “weakness or cowardice, but facing up to the dark days of the 1990s when crimes were committed in the name of our nation.” He said Serbia had to take this values-based stand “for the sake of our children.” On Kosovo, he was more nuanced. He first called for a compromise solution that accommodated “Serbia’s legitimate demands.” But he went on to promise that “whatever the outcome, Serbia is committed to help keep the peace in this region.” He termed Serbia’s Partnership as the culmination of his personal efforts since serving as Defense Minister in 2003. But Ambivalence on Kosovo 10. (C) Norway, Italy, the UK, Germany, Hungary, Romania, and Spain responded to Tadic’s inspiring presentation. Each of them saluted his commitment to bring war criminals to account, and reiterated that this was essential for Serbia to join what Spain called the Euro-Atlantic family. Norway celebrated the “landmark day” for both the Balkans and for the Alliance, stating that with ICTY compliance, “there is no limit how far NATO-Serbian relations can go.” The UK took the most uncompromising stand, addressing Serbia’s responsibility to contribute to regional stability (e.g. Kosovo settlement) and to ICTY obligations (calling for this to be acknowledged in Serbia’s PfP Presentation Document). Hungary stressed that Partnership “is not a reward, but a tool” for domestic reform. 11. (C) An emotional Tadic responded by pointing to the “unbelievable changes” in Serbian attitudes toward NATO since the low point of NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force bombing campaign to today, when 60% of Serbians support PfP and 40% support NATO membership. He reiterated that he would do “all in my power to implement” further reform and the apprehension of fugitives. Regarding Kosovo, he insisted that Serbia would “defend our interests” while at the same time thinking about regional stability. He said that a “compromise settlement” was the best hope for regional stability, and opposed “new fragmentation of borders in the Balkans” which could become a broader regional problem. Text of Tadic Address to the NAC 12. (C) Begin text of Tadic address: Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends, It is my honor to address the North Atlantic Council on the day the Republic of Serbia formally enters NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The decision to invite
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us to join is of great historical importance not only for my country and our region, but – I believe – for all the countries represented in this room. For me, this date will mark the day the Euro-Atlantic community of nations actualized Sir Winston Churchill’s call at Fulton for “a new unity in Europe from which no nation should be pennanently outcast.” Today, the soul of Europe has grown stronger: the values we share with passion and conviction have triumphed anew. Today, a fresh chapter in the history of democratic freedom in South East Europe begins. Of course, today marks just a beginning, not an end. Our joining the PfP family is only the first step in the process that will culinate in the region’s full integration into te Alliance. Ladies and Gentlemen, Serbian Armed Forces have come far since the day when, as my country’s Minister of Defense, I addressed this same chamber. On that day in 2003, I spoke of my intention to begin the process of defense reform. On this day, I speak to you with a happy sincerity that comes from knowing that the recognition of our achievements has arrived at last. On behalf of the democratic forces of Serbia, I want to express my gratitude for the support you have extended to my country. You have emboldened those who believe that together more can be attained than separately. You have encouraged those who insist that traumas of the past cannot stand in the way of the promise of a better tomorrow. And you have strengthened our resolve to fight at home with renewed vigor against the notion that our desire to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic family of nations is a sign of weakness and cowardice. I firmly believe that to be courageous in the Western Balkans means to face up to the awful deeds committed during the dark decade of the 1990s. It takes the courage that comes with responsible leadership to say that crimes were committed in the name of one’s nation. Failure to do so dishonors us in the eyes of our children. I therefore consider it a moral imperative that all fugitives from justice, Ratko Miadic in particular, be located, arrested, and extradited to the Hague. Serbia goes to the polls on January 21St. I am greatly optimistic that the new democratic government will be fully committed to extraditing all the indicted war criminals. I have pledged to commit all relevant resources to that end, and I intend to keep my promise. Membership in the community of values that is the Partnership for Peace only increases my determination to see them brought I before the Tribunal. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is likely that very soon a proposal on the future status of the province of Kosovo and Metohija will be recommended by President Ahtisaari to the Contact Group and the Security Council of the United Nations. The Republic of Serbia has consistently argued for a compromise solution that seeks to reconcile Belgrade’s legitimate demands with those of the Kosovo Albanians. We continue to believe that a negotiated, mutually-acceptable solution is the best way forward and presents the best hope for regional stability. Others champion a more one-sided solution. But whatever the outcome, the Republic of Serbia remains fully committed to help keeping the peace in our region. Our membership in Partnership for Peace only enhances this commitment, for it provides us with mechanisms to respond to security challenges in a constructive way, jointly with our allies. Ladies and Gentlemen, I will end with a few old words that are in my opinion very pertinent to the meaning of the new unity of Europe. The preamble to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty reads, in part, that the parties to the treaty “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” For me today, those words are as powerful as on the day they were written. I believe that never before in the history of South East Europe has such a concrete opportunity to overcome regional strife and conflict, as the one before us
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now, presented itself to those willing to grasp its promise of prosperity. Thank you very much for extending the Partnership for Peace to the Republic of Serbia. Nuland

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Reference id: 06SARAJEVO3203 Subject: Bosnia – High Rep Presses For “real Assessment” On Ohr Closure At February 2007 Pic Origin: Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Cable time: Wed, 20 Dec 2006 06:46 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06SARAJEVO3203.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: VZCZCXRO9570 OO RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHVJ #3203/01 3540646 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 200646Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5074 INFO RUCNMEN/EU MEMBER STATES RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0311 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0038 RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE 0216 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0032 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA 0096 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0278 RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC Hide header

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SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR DICARLO, EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ref: SARAJEVO 2752 Classified By: Ambassador Douglas McElhaney. Reason 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (S) Summary: Prior to the December 6-7 meeting of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Brussels, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rosemary DiCarlo meeting with High Representative (HighRep) Christian Schwarz-Schilling. Schwarz-Schilling urged the U.S. to support a “real review” about OHR’s future at the February 2007 PIC and outlined two contingency plans for keeping OHR open. He told DiCarlo that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte had approach him about using his Bonn Powers to remove the Republika Spska (RS) Minister of Interior, if PIFWC Stojan Zupljanin were not arrested in 30 days. On police reform, Schwarz-Schilling cautioned that it was too early to bring police reform negotiations to a head. Finally, Schwarz-Schilling proposed establishing in January a secretariat to manage a second phase of constitutional reform. End summary
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A “Real Review” Before OHR Closes 2. (C) Schwarz-Schilling opened the meeting by making a plea for a “real review” about OHR’s future when the PIC meets in February 2007. Some countries see closure in June 2007 as already decided and the February review as a formality, he explained. As HighRep he had a responsibility to ensure the February 2007 PIC did more than act as “a rubberstamp,” Schwarz-Schilling said. OHR would distribute its own assessment 10 days prior to the February 2007 PIC, which he said would provide the basis for discussion. The assessment would examine regional factors, particularly Kosovo, security in Bosnia, and “internal dynamics,” such as the functionality of state institutions and the political situation. OHR’s future should not hinge on the status of one or two reforms, but a “holistic, systematic view of the stability of Bosnia,” he added. 3. (C) Though the PIC would not decide OHR’s fate at the December meeting, it would still need to discuss alternative options for maintaining an OHR presence in Sarajevo, Schwarz-Schilling said. The HighRep told DiCarlo that OHR staff had outlined two options for keeping OHR open. The first was a straight forward 12 month delay with OHR continuing to operate at whatever staff level existed on March 1, 2007 while parallel steps were taken for a gradual build-up of a reinforced Office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The second involved continuing the transition to a reinforced EUSR, while the EUSR retained his separate position as HighRep and the Bonn Powers. He would be supported by a small “Bonn Powers team.” 4. (C) DiCarlo agreed that no decision on OHR’s future should be taken prior to February 2007. The U.S. supported a thorough assessment at that time, but hoped to be in a position to close OHR on schedule in June. In the United States’ view, OHR needed to focus on creating the conditions required that would allow OHR to close. With regard to the two options for keeping OHR open, DiCarlo stressed that the U.S. could not support maintaining a small Bonn Powers office in a dual-hatted reinforced EUSR/OHR. If an extension were required, the U.S. preference would likely be to keep OHR as it is in March. DiCarlo added that the OHR assessment should not add new benchmarks for closure. The current benchmarks, spelled out in OHR’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) were clear and what the PIC had decided OHR needed to accomplish to complete its mandate. ICTY – The Metric Remains “Full Cooperation” 5. (C) Turning the ICTY, DiCarlo expressed concern that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla DelPonte was “raising the bar” on SAA conditionality for the Bosnians. DelPonte had often failed to make clear to the Bosnians precisely what type of cooperation she required from them or what kind of support she required from the international community. Schwarz-Schilling agreed, adding that DelPonte often made claims about the whereabouts and travels of war criminals without backing them up. This approach had frustrated the Bosnians and undercut her credibility with them, he said. Schwarz-Schilling said he had told DelPonte that OHR could not support her work based on unsubstantiated assertions. 6. (S) DelPonte told him that she believed RS Minister of Interior Cadjo know the whereabouts of ICTY indictee Stojan Zupljanin, Schwarz-Schilling continued; and she informed the HighRep that she had given Cadjo an ultimatum to arrest Zupljanin and
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transfer him to The Hague within 30 days. If Cadjo failed to deliver, DelPonte wanted him to use his Bonn Powers to remove Cadjo from office, Schwarz-Schilling said. Aspects of DelPonte’s case against Cadjo appeared credible, but he needed evidence. He was prepared to use his Bonn Powers, but only if he could verify the information Del Ponte presented him. Police Reform 7. (C) Schwarz-Schilling told DiCarlo that he expected the Police Directorate to issue its final report on December 20. Until then, he was not prepared “to force the issue,” he said, adding forcing it too early risked causing RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik to walk out of political talks. Schwarz-Schilling’s Principal Deputy Larry Butler noted that Dodik had not agreed to transfer budgetary competencies for the police from the entity to the State. This and transfer of legislative competencies were critical to a police reform deal. Otherwise, there was “plenty of room” within the three EC principles on police reform for the RS to maintain its police force. Butler also warned that if Dodik acted on his threat to submit the Police Directorate report to the RS National Assembly (RSNA) and the RSNA voted against it, it would make it even harder for Dodik to reach a compromise on police reform. Dodik’s threat to hold a referendum on police reform would have even more dire consequences, Butler continued, as a police reform referendum could become a surrogate for a referendum on RS independence. Constitutional Reform 8. (C) Turning to constitutional reform, Schwarz-Schilling stressed his continued support for the U.S.-brokered package of constitutional amendments, but admitted that he was not optimistic about its prospects. It was important to maintain the momentum on constitutional reform and signal to Bosnia that a second phase would take place. With this he in mind he proposed establishing a “Constitutional Reform Secretariat” within the Bosnian parliament in January. Taking this step would not require abandoning the U.S.-brokered package, he quickly added, as OHR could frame the secretariat as intended to support both phases of constitutional reform. He asked whether the U.S. would provide USD 1 million to support the secretariat’s work and said that he requested the same amount of money from the EC. 9. (C) DiCarlo thanked the HighRep for his support for the U.S.-brokered package, but suggested it was too soon to make any definitive judgments about its prospects. This would have to wait until a new government was in place. In the meantime, the U.S. would not support taking any steps, including establishing a “Constitutional Reform Secretariat,” that might provide Bosnian political leaders with an excuse to walk away from the constitutional compromises they reached in March. Finally, DiCarlo urged Schwarz-Schilling to refrain from publi discussion about plans for a second phase of constitutional reform which would undermine prospects of passing the existing amendment package. McElhaney
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Reference id: 06BELGRADE2065 Subject: Religion And Politics In Serbia – The Political Role Of The Serbian Orthodox Church Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 06:55 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06BELGRADE2065.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3535 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #2065/01 3600655 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 260655Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9963 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL. 12/20/16 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], SOCI [Social Conditions], KIRF [International Religious Freedom], SR [Serbia] Classified by: POLCOUNS Gustavo Delgado, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) Summary: The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has played an important political role since the end of the Milosevic era, increasingly collaborating with conservative nationalists to promote a mutually beneficial agenda that encourages conservative values at home and school, discourages strong action on ICTY compliance, and supports a hardline position on Kosovo. The church is likely to remain hardline in the near future as the status of Kosovo is determined, but moderate voices in the church could come to the fore if reformists lead the next coalition government after parliamentary elections January 21. End Summary. Brief History 2. (SBU) The SOC grew out of the tradition of eastern Christianity, following Constantinople rather than Rome after the Great Schism. Under Ottoman rule, the church became closely associated with Serbian resistance, which linked it to Serbian national identity and the resulting Serbian monarchy. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, the atheistic state officially discouraged all forms of reigion, severely limiting the SOC’s role in sociey. With the collapse of communism and the resurence ofnationalist movements in the 1980s and 90, the church saw a mild religious revival and an increase in its power. 3. (SBU) Th SOC played a controversial role in the Yugoslav wars, sometimes giving mixed messages. On the one hand, the church called for peace and reconciliation, but also issued a number of official statements voicing its support for Serbia keeping the conquered territories, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some individual bishops even went as far as to conduct services blessing soldiers just before important bat144

tles (as infamously portrayed in the “Scorpions” video from Srebrenica). In the aftermath of the October 5th movement which ousted President Milosevic, the church has moved to establish greater ties to the Serbian government, finding a willing ally in Prime Minister Kostunica, and has begun a campaign of desecularization. Factions within the Church 4. (SBU) Church member and critic Mirko Djordjevic described to Emboffs the divisions within the SOC as generally continuing along the same lines of pro-war versus anti-war that arose in the 1990’s, with current Patriarch Pavle maintaining a balance between the two. However, he added, there are no clearly defined groups of hardliners and moderates, but rather a spectrum of views that vary based on the issue. Observers have noted that the more hardline bishops seem to be gaining in power at the expense of the moderates, as evident in the promotion away from the center of power of prominent moderate Irinej Dobrijevic (recently named Bishop of Australia and New Zealand), and the ascent of outspokenly conservative Bosnian clergymen at the last Bishops Conference. Some observers have also claimed that the influx of refugees into Serbia has helped contribute to the rise of the hardline faction, as these groups tend to be more conservative. SOC Relations with Political Leadership 5. (SBU) While various parties maintain contacts with the factions within the SOC, the party with the strongest church ties is the DSS. Aside from PM Kostunica’s personal family ties to church leaders (his wife is neice to Metropolitan Amfilohije), observers remark that he and his party are actively working to ensure SOC support on a number of issues, most prominently the final status of Kosovo. A church insider commented that the DSS generally pushes for the advancement of the hardliners within the church, and is opposed to moderates gaining power. The SOC has also had traditionally strong ties to DSS members who have been Education Ministers, especially the previous minister, Ljiljana Colic, who frequently referenced the church in her decisions and called Saint Sava “the ideal of the Serbian education system.” Dr. Milan Vukomanovic, a religion and sociology professor at Belgrade University, said the SOC is so linked to the DSS that its fortunes will ascend or descend based on DSS performance at the polls. The SOC played a central role in helping Kostunica get his constitution passed, with Patriarch Pavle garnering extensive media coverage as he was carried from his sickbed to cast a “yes” vote in the constitutional referendum. 6. (SBU) Other parties, while not as influential as the DSS, also have church ties. Observers say the DS has recently moved to improve relations with moderate church leaders, with some claiming Tadic is hoping to keep a hardline conservative from becoming the next Patriarch. Djordjevic and other observers claim that some church officials also have strong ties to the Radicals. Additionally, some analysts hypothesize that if the monarchist SPO develops closer ties to the royal family (to include perhaps putting family members on the party list), they could gain more support from the SOC, since the church is one of the most outspoken proponents of restoring the monarchy. However, with SPO polling under 5 percent in recent election surveys, and with Crown Prince Aleksander more of a mind to start his own monarchy party (on those occasions when he considers a political life), this scenario is unlikely.
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Desecularization 7. (SBU) Critics of the SOC claim that the church is pushing more and more for official integration into the Serbian state. In the current constitution, the SOC is not recognized as the official state religion, but it is granted “special status” as first among a list of 7 “traditional faiths” in Serbia. The SOC has publicly requested that it be given official status as the state religion, but so far this has been rejected by the government. Observers note that it already has de facto official status, particularly when considering the very close ties to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights says “behaves almost like an external government ‘service’ of the SOC.” 8. (SBU) The Kostunica government has shown itself to be willing to compromise with the church on this issue, as evident in the Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations of July 2004, which granted the clergy of the SOC public immunity and solidified its primus inter pares status relative to other religions. The Religion Law was originally vetoed by President Tadic as clearly inadequate to European standards for protecting human and religious rights, but was passed over his objections by the parliament as a sidebar issue in an emergency session early this year. 9. (SBU) Although the new constitution explicitly states that Serbia is a secular state, the attitudes espoused by the current government tend towards ever more cooperation and accommodation with the SOC. Indeed, many political analysts and constitutional scholars see a heavy SOC hand in the drafting of the constitution, especially in the areas of social/family, religion, and education law. In addition, since the ouster of Milosevic, the SOC has been permitted (as have other religions) to provide religious instruction in public schools, revealing the lack of commitment to secular education. Djordjevic notes that while this religious instruction has shown little results in promoting religion among young people, it has been an effective tool for spreading the church’s political message, which is most frequently represented by priests who teach students that the recent Yugoslav wars were justified and that Serbia should defend its territorial claims. SOC Kosovo Policy 10. (C) The church’s official stance is that Kosovo must remain an integral part of Serbia, with independence or autonomy out of the question. On this issue, the church has made some of its most outspoken statements. Leaders of the SOC even went as far as to call for Serbs in Kosovo to boycott elections and not participate in the Pristina government. However, there are factions in the church pushing for a more practical response to the situation. The leading figure of the moderates on this issue has been Bishop Teodosije, who pointed out that the SOC has survived in many states under many circumstances, from the Ottomans to the communists, and that it would continue to survive in Kosovo no matter what the outcome. In fact, observers say that the most likely response to an independent Kosovo would be for the SOC to gain the same kind of status it has currently in Croatia. Many now believe the SOC would accept an outcome that Kostunica and the Radicals would oppose, so long as it adequately protected SOC rights and properties in Kosovo. So far, however, the government?s cooperation with SOC hardliners has kept the church from engaging constructively with Ahtisaari on the issue, so neither the clergy not the congregation has a clear idea of what protections are being considered.
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SOC ICTY Policy 11. (C) Internally, we are told, there are bishops on both sides of the debate over whether to turn accused war criminal Ratko Mladic over to the Hague Tribunal. Damjan Krnjevic-Miskovic, an advisor in President Tadic’s office for religious affairs told us that privately, most of the leading figures in the SOC are in favor of Mladic’s extradition to The Hague– either on religious/moral grounds or for realpolitik reasons of moving Serbia forward. Nevertheless, the SOC publicly continues to hold the line that the Tribunal is biased against Serbs, and that “only the Serbian crimes are singled out.” There has never been an official apology issued for the church’s role in some of the crimes of the recent Balkan wars, despite its documented involvement. SOC on Euro-Atlantic Integration 12. (SBU) According to church-watchers, the SOC is fundamentally opposed to what it sees as an overly-secular Western culture, and has frequently commented that integration would threaten the very identity of Serbia. Djordjevic points out that the SOC is wary of Serbian accession to the EU due to the fact that orthodox communities make up only a tiny minority of those religious organizations represented in the EU, and the church sees the Vatican as having much more influence. The SOC considers NATO membership to be an equal threat, and takes a pointedly anti-American stance on this issue, even going as far as to initiate the canonization process for a 3-year-old victim of the 1999 NATO bombings as a public reminder. Relationship with Other Religious Communities 13. (SBU) According to Dr. Vukomanovic, the SOC at present is an inward-looking group of old men who, with the help of the current government, cling to the past and reject ideas of ecumenicalism being suggested by younger and more western-exposed clergy. Instead of working with the civil societies to increase understanding between the various ethnicities and confessional communities and build a positive new society, the SOC takes a retrograde stance, focused on building its political power base and righting historical wrongs. It has rejected the visit of the Pope to Serbia based upon old grudges from the two World Wars (in particular the Roman Catholic Church?s support of the Nazi encroachment) and the late John Paul II’s desire to enfold the Orthodox Churches into the embrace of ecumenicalism. The new Pope?s expressed desire to visit Serbia is meeting continued resistance. In addition, the SOC has rejected the establishment and acceptance of other orthodox churches (i.e. the Macedonian and Montenegrin) in Serbia. Prospects for the Future 14. (C) The priesthood is aging. There were only 40 applicants for 300 fully-funded slots offered by the Faculty of Religion for students interested in studying for the priesthood. Church critics and some moderates believe that new ideas are stifled and those who have exposure to the West (particularly clergy drawn from the Diaspora) are shunted to areas where their voices will not be heard. Insiders and critics alike seem to agree that the church is definitely headed in a more conservative direction, especially when talking about the rising leaders. Both Vukomanovic and Djordjevic believe that the next Patriarch will most likely come from the group of more hardline Bosnian bishops, suggesting either Vladika Vasilije Kacavenda or Metropolitan Nikolaj as the two most probable successors.
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15. (C) As long as conservative nationalists dominate the government, the GoS and SOC hardliners are likely to use each other to mutual advantage. The state helps secure a privileged place for the SOC in Serbian law and to encourage more conservative, revanchist ideology in schools and homes, which in turn builds support for a hard line from the SOC on Kosovo and ICTY, which in turn lends moral authority to the current government’s policies. Should reformist democrats like the DS lead the next coalition government, though, there may be more support for moderate viewpoints in the church. Polt

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Reference id: 07SKOPJE120 Subject: Macedonia: Deputy Prime Minister On Icty Return Of Cases & Nato Priorities Origin: Embassy Skopje (Macedonia) Cable time: Fri, 9 Feb 2007 15:13 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07SKOPJE120.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3449 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSQ #0120/01 0401513 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091513Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5719 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK Hide header

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SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], MK [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Ref: A. SKOPJE 39 B. SKOPJE 102 Classified By: P/E Chief SHubler, reasons 1.4(b) & (d). Summary 1. (C) Deputy PM Konevska agreed with the Ambassador during a February 7 meeting that the Macedonian judicial and political system is not yet ready to accept the return of four unindicted ICTY cases involving eAlbanians linked to the two main eAlbanian political parties here. Reminded that time is running out for Macedonia to complete numerous priority tasks before it can be considered a strong contender for NATO membership, Konevska said the GOM is committed to implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement and is working to address the curjQjQQvdifficult to go after “big fish” invol148

ved in past corruption scandals because of mutual protection “deals” the previous two governments had concluded. Our message to the GOM continues to be that, at the end of the day, what will count for NATO membership will be deeds, not words, and results rather than excuses. End Summary. ICTY Return of Cases: Delay and Sequence 2. (C) In a February 7 meeting, the Ambassador told Deputy PM for Euro-Integration Gabriela Konevska-Trajkovska that the USG believes it would be prudent to delay the return to Macedonian jurisdiction of four unindicted ICTY cases from The Hague (ref A). In addition, we thought the return should be phased, with cases coming back one-byone. She suggested to Konevska that the GOM consider appointing an ad hoc government focal point to oversee the various elements of the politically-contentious return of cases, all of which involve allegations against ethnic Albanians linked to either the main eAlbanian opposition party (DUI) or the eAlbanian junior governing coalition partner (DPA). 3. (C) Konevska agreed on the need to delay the return of cases and to ensure the cases return sequentially. She said, however, that ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte recently had told her the cases should be returned by July and in one batch, taking into account del Ponte’s impending departure from The Hague. Konevska said a further delay would be justified by the fact that the judiciary still required extensive training to deal with such cases. In addition, neither the draft law on cooperation with the ICTY nor the draft law on the public prosecutor had been passed by the Macedonian Parliament, and the recently-approved law on courts was only in the early implementation phase. Politically, eAlbanian reactions to the return of cases could be potentially damaging to Macedonia’s NATO and EU candidacies, Konevska believed. 4. (C) Konevska said she was aware of the need to manage public expectations regarding the four cases, especially given the fact that an ICTY case against former Macedonian Minister of Interior Boskovski and an accomplice was scheduled to begin before the summer. She had underscored to both Boskovski and his accomplice, during a recent visit to The Hague, that the GOM would not try to link their cases and the return of the four cases against eAlbanians. Konevska confided that she was serving as a de facto government focal point on these issues, although the GOM believed it was better not to formalize that appointment. NATO Membership – We support You, but You’ve Got to Earn It 5. (SBU) The Ambassador told Konevska that the USG still supported Macedonia’s NATO candidacy and wanted the country to succeed in achieving that goal. But there had been an unmistakable slowdown in some key reform areas since the new government took power in August of 2006. The current political gridlock (ref B) and lackluster progress in implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement suggested Macedonia might not be ready for membership by the end of 2007. Time was short, and it would be important to positively change the country’s political image by September or October of this year. The country needed to demonstrate more progress on combating corruption – with a specific focus on cases involving “big fish” – and on effectively fighting trafficking in persons (TIP).
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6. (SBU) Konevska said she and a fellow Deputy PM had met recently with parliamentary whips to stress to them the importance of 2007 as a year for completing NATO and EU membership-related reforms. The government would press for active FWA implementation, and agreed on the need to work for political consensus on reform priorities, she said. Konevska had told government MPs not to respond to provocation from the opposition, but to concentrate instead on practical approaches to political dialogue. 7. (C) Praising USAID’s recent work with the GOM on a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, Konevska said she believed it would produce measurable results and bolster the country’s progress toward EU membership. The government did not want to be seen as engaging in revenge prosecutions of corruption cases, but the leaders of the previous two governments had cut private deals among themselves to prevent “big fish” cases from being effectively prosecuted. Konevska added that the government had been discussing at the highest levels the need to intensify efforts to combat TIP. EU Agenda – Completing National Program for Adoption of EU Acquis 8. (U) Noting that Macedonia’s National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquis (NPA) was in its final stages before being adopted by the government, Konevska said all government ministries and relevant working groups had been consulted in putting the NPA together. She added that the European Commission already had commented positively on the document, which she hoped to present to the Macedonian Parliament in March. 9. (U) Konevska said she wanted to promote greater involvement of civil society – including academics, NGOs, and business leaders – in the adoption of laws related to the EU accession process. The Prime Minister would invite the opposition SDSM to chair a National Council for European Affairs in the Parliament, which would give opposition parties greater buy-in to the EU integration process. Comment – Deeds, Not Words; Results, Not Excuses 10. (C) Konevska’s assertion that the previous two governments cut deals with each other to protect against future prosecution in major corruption scandals may be correct. That does not, however, mean that the current government should avoid going after “big fish” corruption cases, especially those for which a good deal of evidence already has been collected. We have made it clear to the government that, as far as NATO membership is concerned, what counts are deeds, not words, and results rather than excuses. We will continue to hammer home that message until the government takes notice and begins acting on it. Milovanovic

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Reference id: 07USUNNEWYORK226 Subject: Brammertz Agrees To Make Procedural Case For Lebanon Tribunal Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Tue, 20 Mar 2007 23:59 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN
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Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/03/07USUNNEWYORK226.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO0712 OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUCNDT #0226/01 0792359 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 202359Z MAR 07 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1559 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE Hide header

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SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2017 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], UNSC [UN Security Council], SY [Syria], LE [Lebanon] Ref: A. STATE 34691 B. USUN 182 Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. During a bilateral meeting with UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Chief Serge Brammertz on March 19, Ambassador Wolff said the U.S. would support an early extension of the Commission’s mandate for up to one year and urged Brammertz to make the case for an extension in his quarterly briefing to the UNSC on March 21. Noting the Council might be called upon to act to establish the Lebanon Special Tribunal given the political impasse in Beirut, Ambassador Wolff also encouraged Brammertz to make procedural, non-political arguments in favor of creating the court. Predicting the investigation would need to continue for at least one more year, Brammertz agreed to support the UNIIIC extension by arguing for continuity in the investigation as early as possible. He also undertook to tell the Council – in response to questions asked of him during consultations – that establishing the court could help the Commission’s work and doubts about its creation could hinder its investigation. He also said he could transfer files to a prosecutor’s office “at any time” and that UNIIIC intends to present a consolidated list of such evidence in June. 2. (C) Summary, contd. Asked about the progress of his investigation, Brammertz asserted that, as his latest report shows, UNIIIC had moved forward substantially on the political context surrounding Hariri’s assassination and expressed surprise that neither the Syrian nor Russian ambassadors had objected to those findings. If he had been asked just to present the conclusions of his investigation rather than assemble evidence to meet a certain burden of proof, Brammertz said he could wrap up his work in six months. But putting together a case that could succeed at trial would require more time, as well as “inside information” from witnesses that have yet to emerge. Brammertz reported no major problems with Syrian or third-country cooperation with the Commission. Asked about his personal plans, he said he must decide whether to resign his ICC position in June 2007, but would be willing to stay with the UNIIIC for six more months if the UN could find him another job afterward.
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Progress of the Investigation 3. (C) Brammertz began by expressing hope that the Security Council “would understand where his investigation is going” even if UNIIIC cannot be as forthcoming as it might like due to the confidential nature of a judicial proceeding. Noting that he remained “very satisfied” with progress in the investigation, Brammertz asserted that the investigation had moved forward substantially in terms of the political context surrounding Hariri’s assassination and expressed surprise that neither the Syrian nor the Russian ambassadors had objected to this part of the UNIIIC’s last report. Asked how close the Commission is to completing its work, Brammertz said an optimist might conclude UNIIIC is 80 percent done because it understands who was threatening whom and who was in charge in Lebanon at the time. But in order to meet the evidentiary burden of a court, the UNIIIC still needs some “inside information” to connect all the dots. A pessimist, therefore, might conclude that UNIIIC is only 20 percent done with its investigation because the “three inside witnesses” have yet to emerge. While he said the investigation would need at least one more year to conclude its work, Brammertz clarified that had the UNSC decided not to create a tribunal and instead asked him to present the conclusions of his investigation rather than to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a certain standard of proof, he could present his conclusions in six months. Ensuring that a case that goes to trial has the evidence to be successful, however, takes longer. Early Extension for UNIIIC 4. (C) Ambassador Wolff told Brammertz that the U.S. would support a resolution to be introduced following the March 21 UNSC consultations that would extend UNIIIC’s mandate for up to one year from June 15, 2007. Recalling that Brammertz had welcomed an extension of UNIIIC’s mandate in his March report but had not specified when it should be extended, Ambassador Wolff predicted that several UNSC members might question the rationale for early Council action (Note: The UNIIIC’s mandate expires on June 15, 2007. End Note.) Due to uncertainty over the timeline for the completion of the Commission’s investigation and the establishment of the tribunal, certain delegations might also suggest extending the UNIIIC’s mandate for six months instead of one year. Noting it would be more effective for Brammertz to answer these questions given his apolitical position, Ambassador Wolff urged Brammertz to address these issues in his remarks during closed Council consultations on March 21. 5. (C) While he declined to tell the Council when it should extend UNIIIC’s mandate on the grounds that that is a fundamentally political issue, Brammertz undertook to respond to such questions, if asked, by noting that it would be useful to ensure continuity in the investigation as early as possible. Although the UN had already worked out arrangements to give UNIIIC staff employment contracts until the end of 2007, Brammertz agreed that an early extension of the mandate would encourage Commission staff to remain in their jobs. In response to questions about the duration of the mandate, Brammertz said he could not advise the Council to adopt either a six month or one year extension, but he could predict that the investigation would need at least one more year to conclude its work. Given the possibility that the tribunal could be established and become operational within one year, he opined that the resolution could stipulate that the prosecutor’s office could take over from the UNIIIC as appropriate if the tribunal becomes operational during UNIIIC’s mandate.
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Procedural Arguments for Tribunal 6. (C) Turning to the tribunal, Ambassador Wolff argued that the best solution to the current impasse would be for the Lebanese parliament to ratify the UN-GOL agreement establishing the court. But since that solution appears unlikely, the Council would probably have to consider its own role in ensuring that the tribunal is established. Recalling that Brammertz had told him in December 2006 that the Commission would benefit from early establishment of the tribunal because witnesses would be more likely to come forward to testify, Ambassador Wolff emphasized that the best arguments in favor of early establishment are legal, not political. If Brammertz were to say, for example, that he had files to transfer to a prosecutor, that would create a legal reason for the Council to act if the Lebanese fail to do so. Ambassador Wolff asked Brammertz if the UNIIIC would be in a position to make such arguments now. 7. (C) Emphasizing that he was now “fully aware” of the political situation surrounding the tribunal, Brammertz agreed to make several procedural arguments in favor of establishing the court if asked during consultations. He mentioned, for example, that doubts about whether the court will be created could damage the Commission’s work. Many Lebanese witnesses had offered their testimony to the UNIIIC on condition that it not be shared with the Lebanese authorities, but are already asking whether, if no tribunal is ever established, the Commission turn over its files to the Lebanese. Conversely, establishing the tribunal could help the Commission’s work by encouraging more witnesses to come forward – since they would know their testimony would actually be used – and by creating a witness protection program outside Lebanon to assuage potential witnesses, security concerns. Brammertz said he could transfer evidence “at any moment” to a prosecutor’s office, and that UNIIIC intends in its June report to include a consolidated report of such evidence – several thousand pages of crime scene evidence, interviews, a DNA database, etc. The prosecutor would then have to determine which evidence to use to prove certain charges. 8. (C) Brammertz also undertook to addresss the issue of the transition from the Commission to the tribunal. He said he had already explained to the Russians and others that it is not logical to insist that the Commission conclude its investigation before the tribunal is established, given that all other international tribunals had conducted their own investigatory work. Although it made sense not to establish the tribunal one year ago because it would not yet have had a case to try, Brammertz said that argument no longer held water. The Commission cannot prepare indictments, which only the prosecutor can do. Moreover, the tribunal could be established in phases – first a prosecutor would take over the Commission’s staff, then judges would be hired, a seat located, etc. Since it would take up to ten months to make the tribunal operational once it is established on paper, Brammertz said it was important to move forward soon. He also opined privately that it would be much more difficult to set up the tribunal after the “targets” of the Commission’s investigations become clear. (Note: It was not clear how such targets would become known if UNIIIC will only hand over its files to a prosecutor. End Note.) Syrian and Third-Country Cooperation 9. (C) As described in his report, Brammertz said Syrian cooperation remained “generally satisfactory,” although some of the answers given by some SARG mid-level witnesses were of a “variable quality.” Referring to the Commission’s recent visit to Syrian
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Military Intelligence (SMI) archives, Brammertz said he had not expected to find any documents implicating Syrian officials in the Hariri attack, but that the visit had yielded a “great picture of the chain of command.” UNIIIC had copied several thousand documents it found in the archive. When asked, Brammertz said there was no need for public statements from the USG on Syrian cooperation, because that could serve to politicize the cooperation UNIIIC already enjoys. 10. (C) Turning to cooperation from third countries, Brammertz acknowledged the controversy surrounding the January 2007 Russian initiative to demand the names of non-cooperating states, and said he had explained to the Russian Ambassador in Beirut at the time that the demand was not helping the Commission. He had also assured the Russian Ambassador that all UNSC members were cooperating fully with UNIIIC. As for the ten non-cooperating countries, Brammertz reported that he had explained to those countries, ambassadors that he might be forced to disclose their non-cooperation to the SYG on March 12 if the UNIIIC’s requests were not answered. All cases have now been resolved to the Commission’s satisfaction. Brammertz’s Personal Plans 11. (C) Asked how long he planned to stay with the Commission, Brammertz said he would have to decide whether to return to his job with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in June 2007. The ICC had granted him a six-month extension in December 2006 to allow Brammertz to oversee the transition from the Commission to the tribunal, for which the UNIIIC was then trying to lay the groundwork. If he made that same request again, especially given the uncertainty about the establishment of the tribunal, Brammertz said he would lose all credibility with the ICC. He did seem willing to resign from his ICC post and accept a six-month extension as Commissioner – he again ruled out becoming the tribunal’s prosecutor because that would represent a conflict with his current job – as long as the UN could find him an alternate position once his term with UNIIIC expires. (Note: USUN learned separately that Brammertz is interested in succeeding Carla del Ponte as the ICTY prosecutor, but French Mission staff advise that del Ponte has recommended that her deputy succeed her. End Note.) Wolff

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Reference id: 07BRATISLAVA262 Subject: Ambassador Williamson Discusses Icty/r And Guantanamo Detainees In Bratislava Origin: Embassy Bratislava (Slovakia) Cable time: Thu, 3 May 2007 13:07 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07BRATISLAVA262.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO4470 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSL #0262 1231307 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031307Z MAY 07 FM
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Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], PHUM [Human Rights], PINR [Intelligence], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], LO [Slovakia] Ref: A. STATE 37005 B. BRATISLAVA 195 Classified By: Ambassador Rodolphe Vallee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson visited Bratislava on April 23-24, 2007 for meetings with MFA interlocutors to discuss the close out of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the upcoming election of a new ICTY Prosecutor, and the possible transfer of low-medium threat detainees from Guantanamo Bay to European countries. End summary. 2. (U) Ambassador Williamson met seperately with Deputy Foreign Minister Diana Strofova and her staff; with Emil Kuchar, Director of the Human Rights Department; and with Ambassador Igor Grexa, Director General for Legal and Consular Affairs, who was accompanied by Dr. Milan Kollar, Director of the International Law Department, Peter Klanduch, a specialist in international criminal tribunals, and Ambassador Vladimir Lomen from the UNSC Coordination Unit. ICTY/ICTR Close out 3. (U) The planned close-out of the ICTY and ICTR and ways forward on legacy issues were discussed in all three meetings. All interlocutors expressed interest in residual issues related to the closing of the tribunals. State Secretary Strofova and the Director General and staff of the International Law Department all promised to begin consideration of the issues and to work with USG counterparts in New York, Washington and Bratislava to reach a common position. They likewise all stressed, however, that most important would be for the EU to reach a common position. Ambassador Williamson, however, noted that, although the United States would seek input broadly, decisions would ultimately be made in the UN Security Council. Klanduch in particular seemed well informed about the legacy and residual issues involved, and will be a valuable interlocutor within the GoS. 4. (C) Kuchar, who is leaving his position in May to become Slovakia’s representative to the Council of Europe, said EU level decisions on both ICTY/ICTR close-out and the election of a new ICTY Prosecutor would more likely be made by the European Commission than by the EU Presidency, and recommended that USG concentrate its lobbying efforts at that institution. Kuchar recommended that Post begin to engage MPs on both issues and specifically recommended Boris Zala (Smer-SD), Miroslav Ciz (SmerSD), Rafael Rafaj (SNS), Zdenka Kramplova (LS-HzDS), Pal Csaky (SMK), and Jan Carnogursky (KDH) as appropriate interlocutors. Election of a New Prosecutor for ICTY 5. (C) Strofova and Grexa both said they understood our message in support of ICTY Deputy Prosecutor David Tolbert as the next ICTY Prosecutor but made no com155

mitment to support him and again emphasized that this issue will be discussed – and hopefully agreed upon – at the EU level. Kuchar was particularly sharp in his criticism of current ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte. Transfer of Guantanamo Detainees to Europe 6. (C) Strofova and her staff asked several questions about the Guantanamo detainees the U.S. is seeking to transfer to European countries, and gave indications that the request is being treated seriously by the GoS. Strofova said the request is currently with the Interior Ministry, but that the GoS is aware that it owes the U.S. an answer on this issue and that one will be forthcoming as soon as possible. (Comment. As per ref B, post continues to evaluate the chances of Slovakia accepting transfers from Guantanamo Bay as poor. End comment.) 7. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Clint Williamson’s office. Vallee

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Reference id: 07PARIS1882 Subject: French Views On Taking Care Of Brammertz. The Icty Option Origin: Embassy Paris (France) Cable time: Fri, 11 May 2007 15:32 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07PARIS1882.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO2674 OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #1882 1311532 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 111532Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7099 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0505 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0294 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 2762 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1228 Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], UNSC [UN Security Council], SY [Syria], LE [Lebanon], FR [France; Corsica] Ref: BEIRUT 645 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas ons 1.4b,d 1. (C) France is backing Serge Brammertz to succeed Carla Del Ponte as ICTY Chief Prosecutor from a belief that Brammertz will otherwise refuse to extend his mandate
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at the UN International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), an outcome the French characterize as disastrous. MFA UN/Middle East Action Officer Salina Grenet explained to Poloff on May 10 that Brammertz was conditioning any prolongation of his UNIIIC duties on a guarantee – by June 15 at the latest – of a suitable onward assignment. While the ICTY position represented an optimal solution for Brammertz, Grenet did not exclude other solutions and invited USG suggestions. The overriding priority was to identify a package that would keep Brammertz in place at the UNIIIC through December 2007. MFA Cabinet Director Pierre Vimont was personally directing the French effort to accommodate Brammertz. 2. (C) Grenet stated that the MFA had initially explored trying to create a new position for Brammertz in New York as a Deputy UN Legal Counsel. The MFA had abandoned that scenario as impracticable in the near term since adding a new UN position would require obtaining broad agreement within the UN system. The UN moreover was already coping with the bureaucratic fallout of SYG Ban Ki-Moon’s envisioned reform of DPKO, which itself could entail an additional 400 positions, she suggested. 3. (C) With Del Ponte set to retire in September, current Deputy Prosecutor Tolbert would manage the transition until Brammertz’s arrival. Grenet acknowledged that the outcome was not positive for Tolbert, an AMCIT, whom she called an excellent candidate in his own right to succeed Del Ponte. She volunteered moreover that the UK had raised doubts about whether Brammertz possessed the right profile and competence for the ICTY position. 4. (C) Grenet conceded that Brammertz, on leave as Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), should technically be able to resume his prior function; however, she claimed that ICC Prosecutor Ocampo, whose personal relationship with Brammertz has continued to deteriorate, has effectively shut the door on that possibility. Grenet strongly rejected the suggestion that Brammertz might be bluffing his way to a promotion via ICTY. 5. (C) Separately, in a May 11 meeting with NEA Watcher, Basile Yared, the Parisbased representative of Saad Hariri, emphasized the need “to take care of Brammertz” so that he does not prematurely depart the IIC in June. Brammertz’s departure “would be a catastrophe for the investigation” into Rafik Hariri’s assassination, said Yared, who appeared uninterested in whatever particular position Brammertz might receive, so long as the inducement sufficed to keep him at his present function at the UNIIIC. Please visit Paris’ Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton

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Reference id: 07USUNNEWYORK429 Subject: International Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia (icty) Prosecutor Vacancy Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Thu, 31 May 2007 23:51 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07USUNNEWYORK429.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0009 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0429 1512351 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 312351Z MAY 07 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1991 INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8884 Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 Tags: KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KJUS [Administration of Justice], UN [United Nations], XT [Western Europe], ZL [Balkan States], XF [Middle East] Ref: SECSTATE 70877 Classified By: Amb. Wolff for reasons 4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: In a conversation with the UN Legal Counsel, Amb Wolff again urged that the Secretary General delay filling the soon to be vacant ICTY Prosecutor’s job in order to allow time to identify another suitable UN position for the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Chief Serge Brammertz. Brammertz is pressing the UN to make the appointment now, effective at a later date when he has completed his current assignment. Brammertz subsequently called Wolff to reiterate his concern, expressed in an earlier conversation, that he have clarity before June 15, when he would otherwise return to his position at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Brammertz insisted on a written UN employment commitment but agreed to remain flexible as to the nature of his future UN appointment. End Summary. 2.(C) Amb Wolff, May 25, contacted UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel for a response to his earlier demarche to Michel and the Secretary General’s Deputy Chief of Staff Woo-Soo Kim concerning the ICTY Prosecutor vacancy (reftel). Michel said that he had been awaiting the return of the Secretary General before responding and will consult with the SYG’s staff when they return today. Michel indicated that the UN had agreed to give Brammertz a written commitment concerning his future employment by June 1. 3.(C) Subsequently, Serge Brammertz, Commissioner of the UNIIC called Wolff from Beirut to explain that time is running out and he must let the ICC know whether he will be resuming his duties there as Deputy Prosecutor, before his June 15 contract expires. Repeating the position he expressed when he and Wolff met on May 16, Brammertz said that he needs clarity about his future with the UN before relinquishing his position at the ICC. Brammertz had discussed the ICTY Prosecutor vacancy with the UN and sought to receive a commitment in writing by June 1 to be nominated for the ICTY job. He agreed to remain flexible concerning the timing of the appointment, provided the commitment to appoint him “sometime later this year” was transmitted in the June 1 letter. He also acknowledged that he remained willing to consider a job as a senior UN inspector general but noted that such a position has not been established and was unlikely to be for the foreseeable future. Khalilzad
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Reference id: 07SARAJEVO1212 Subject: Bosnia: Good News And Bad News On War Criminals Origin: Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Cable time: Fri, 1 Jun 2007 17:06 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07SARAJEVO1212.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3037 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHVJ #1212/01 1521706 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 011706Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6358 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/JCS WASHINGTON DC RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC Hide header

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SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR EUR(DICARLO), EUR/SCE(STINCHCOMB/HOH), S/WCI(WILLIAMSON/LAVINE); NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 Tags: PHUM [Human Rights], KCRM [Criminal Activity], KJUS [Administration of Justice], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PINR [Intelligence], PREL [External Political Relations], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Murphy for reasons 1.4 (b ), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: In the past seven days two distinct but significant events connected to bringing war criminals to justice occurred in the Republika Srpska (RS). The first, a major success, happened on May 31, when police from the Republika Srpska (RS) apprehended ICTY-indicted Zdravko Tolimir. He was transferred into ICTY custody at The Hague today (June 1). The second, a major set back, occurred on May 25 when convicted war criminal Radovan Stankovic escaped from custody en route from Foca Prison to a local hospital. Stankovic’s escape is a serious blow to the credibility of domestic law enforcement and judicial institutions and to the reconciliation process in Bosnia. Stankovic’s escape highlights the need for a maximum security state prison. Tolimir’s arrest by RS authorities and the Stankovic escape paint a mixed picture of RS handling of war crimes issues. End Summary. Zdravko Tolimir Arrested 2. (S/NF) Shortly after 4pm on May 31, Republika Srpska (RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik called Ambassador to inform him that RS police had detained ICTY-indicted war criminal Zdravko Tolimir. According to Dodik, Tolimir was arrested at an illegal
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border crossing near Bratunac and the RS police intended to transfer him to The Hague. (Note: In 1995 Tolimir was Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Main Staff of the Arm of Republika Srpska with the rank of general. A close associate of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Zdravko Tolimir was indicted in the ICTY for genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, extermination, murder, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, and forcible transfers and deportations. Many of these charges relate to his role in events around Srebrenica on/about July 11, 1995, and the extended 44-month siege of Sarajevo. End Note) Arrest Details Sketchy 3. (S/NF) We have received conflicting information about the details of the arrest. Press reports suggest the RS police cooperated with the Serbian police in detaining Tolimir. Dragi Milosevic, head of the RS Police War Crimes Unit, indicated that Tolimir was arrested alone and on foot near the Serbian border with little money and without any passport or other documentation. It is unclear at this time if Tolimir was brought to the Serbian border against his will, or whether as some have claimed, he was caught attempting to secure medical assistance. Tolimir was held in Banja Luka overnight and then transferred to Sarajevo Camp Butmir. Early this afternoon (June 1) Tolimir was transferred by a EUCOM aircraft to the Netherlands. At 15:55 local time today, we received confirmation from General Wightman’s Office that Tolimir arrived at The Hague. Stankovic escapes from Foca Prison 4. (C) Early afternoon on May 25 during transport from Foca prison to a hospital for unspecified medical treatment, Radovan Stankovic allegedly overpowered nine guards and escaped in a waiting getaway vehicle. Stankovic, the first 11bis case transferred from ICTY to the BiH State Court, had been convicted of crimes against humanity for multiple acts of enslavement, rape, torture and murder in Foca and had been sentenced to 20 years incarceration. The escape vehicle was found later that evening not far from the Montenegrin border. According to the RS Police, Stankovic telephoned someone in the Foca Prison later that same night. They claim the call was traced to a location in Serbia. Because Stankovic is from Foca, there was immediate speculation that the escape was an inside job. Foca Prison Director Aleksandar Cicmil denied allegations that some of the prison guards were Stankovic’s relatives, but he did not exclude the possibility that Stankovic had smuggled a mobile phone into prison and used it to arrange the escape. 5. (C) The Stankovic escape prompted numerous accusations about who was at fault. BiH State Court President Meddzida Kreso laid the blame on the Foca Prison Administration, which falls under the jurisdiction of the RS Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Others, particularly Bosniak political leaders, blamed the RS police. (Note: RS police were not involved in Stankovic’s transfer from the prison to the hospital. The prison guards involved work for the RS MoJ, not the RS Ministry of Interior. End Note.) RS Prime Minister Dodik attacked the State Court for having sent Stankovic to a prison in his hometown in the first place. Kreso explained that Stankovic was sent to Foca prison based on the 2005 Justice Ministry Book of Rules guidelines, under which prisoners are assigned to jails on the basis of their place of origin. (Note: We are told that in light of the Stankovic escape the Council of Ministers at its next session will discuss amendments to the law on implementation of criminal sanctions and imprisonment. End Note)
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RS Actions to Capture Stankovic 6. (C) Dodik claims the RS police are doing all they can to track down Stankovic. Privately, RS Minister of Interior Stanislav Cadjo told us that the RS Ministry of Justice, in charge of the entity prison system, had made mistakes, but that the RS police quickly responded once they were notified of Stankovic’s escape. According to Cadjo, the RS police quickly notified other police agencies of the event, sealed off transport routes, and sought cooperation from Serbian and Montenegrin authorities. Although press reports blame a five day delay in issuing an international arrest warrant on the RS police’s failure to request one, responsibility for issuing such a warrant falls to the state. According to OHR, the 5-day delay was the result of a bureaucratic dispute between the state-level Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Security over which Ministry was supposed to issue the warrant. SIPA Actions 7. (C) The State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA) has created a task force headed by Criminal Investigation Division Director Dragan Lukac and supervised by BiH Chief Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic to coordinate the hunt for Stankovic. The SIPA Task Force has asked EUFOR and Bosnia’s Intelligence Security Agency to provide them with any available intelligence. According to one source, SIPA is excluding RS police from its investigation. SIPA has contacted Serbian police and a delegation is scheduled to go to Belgrade to discuss the issue. However, as of today SIPA has no confirmation of Stankovic’s current whereabouts. Immediate Fallout 8. (C) According to RS sources, Head of Foca Prison Aleksandar Cicmil has been fired and the nine guards on duty when Stankovic escaped are on suspension, pending investigation. OHR has asked EUPM to provide investigators that will examine how this even could have happened and to monitor any subsequent disciplinary and criminal proceedings. OHR will also examine the MoJ Book of Rules relating to the execution of criminal sanctions. Due to the threat Stankovic poses to those involved in his case, the State Court announced that the Presiding Judge in his case, Davorin Jukic, and Lead Prosecutor Vaso Marinkovic would be placed under protective custody. Comment 9. (C) Zdravko Tolimir’s arrest and Radovan Stankovic’s escape present a mixed picture in terms of the RS performance in handling war criminals. The Tolimir arrest is significant not only because he was one of six ICTY indictees who until yesterday remained at liberty, but also because Tolimir was the first major war-crimes suspect ever arrested by the RS police. In the past, RS authorities had arranged for war crimes suspects to turn themselves in. Stankovic’s escape highlights systemic weaknesses in the RS’s prison system. If it was an inside job, the escape suggests sympathizers with war criminals remain employed within the RS bureaucracy. Just as disconcertingly, Stankovic’s escape is likely to have a chilling effect on witnesses in war crimes cases, who may now wonder whether someone they testify against will actually remain behind bars after a conviction. Finally ,the escape highlights the need for the construction of a maximum security State Prison to house convicted war criminals and other high profile convicts. End Comment. McElhaney
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Reference id: 06/07USNATO357 Subject: North Atlantic Council Readout June 6 2007 Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Thu, 7 Jun 2007 12:35 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07USNATO357.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO8458 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV DE RUEHNO #0357/01 1581235 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 071235Z JUN 07 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0939 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0141 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0129 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0288 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 1364 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0566 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY 0105 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0481 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0330 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0605 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0168 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 1097 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0203 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0626 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0545 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0301 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 3951 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7093 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0538 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 2344 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0901 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0412 Hide header

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SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017 Tags: NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], PREL [External Political Relations], AF [Afghanistan] Classified By: DCM Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (S) Summary: – Afghanistan: SYG stated that force generation is a top priority for the Alliance in the run-up to the Defense Ministerial. Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) briefed on: next steps in long-term Afghan National Army (ANA) training; support to ESDP police mission in Afghanistan and fielding Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, (OMLTs); counter-IED shortfalls at ISAF HQ; Operation Adalat; Danish troop increase; and additional Bulgarian forces deploying to Kandahar. – Balkans: SYG noted that Kosovo independence would be a key topic at the Defense Ministerial. Nor162

way, supported by several delegations, proposed inviting the new Serbian government to meet with the NAC regarding PfP. SYG reported that he will meet Serbian Defense and Foreign Ministers in June, and shared that Serbs have already proposed a NAC plus one meeting for September. – Somalia: SYG outlined Military Committee advice on NATO airlift support for the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia. SYG agreed to issue an SG under a short silence for NAC approval. – Iraq: SYG detailed the recommendation of the Senior Resource Board on NTM-I; SG for NAC approval expected soon. – NATO Special Committee: Chairman of the NATO Special Committee presented a briefing on &Developments in Iraq Affecting NATO and Its Member States, Security.8 – Energy Security: SYG presented draft language on a modified tasking to be put under silence until June 8. Note: The June 6 NAC included an exchange of views with Croatia’s Prime Minister Sanader, Defense Minister Roncevic, and State Secretary Biscevic on Croatia’s progress in the context of the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Reporting on this session will be by septel. End Note. End Summary. Afghanistan 2. (C) Looking ahead to the June 12-13 force generation conference at SHAPE, and the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels June 14-15, Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer stated that ISAF force generation remained a top priority, and that he expected concrete results over the coming week. He stated his expectation that Ministers will discuss the need for greater coordination between ISAF and OEF, as well as civilian casualties. 3. (C) The CMC, General Henault, briefed that the Military Committee (MC) had provisionally agreed advice on potential NATO long-term training initiatives for the ANA, and non-NATO troop contributors were in the process of associating themselves with the advice, after which it would be passed to Council. The MC is currently deliberating on draft advice concerning possible NATO support to the planned EU police mission in Afghanistan. CMC also stated that he had distributed to the MC a proposal by D/SACEUR to streamline requirements for fielding NATO embedded trainers, OMLTs, with the ANA, by establishing a &lead nation8 system whereby ISAF Regional Commands would help coordinate logistics and provide other services to help smaller nations establish multinational OMLTs. 4. (C) IMS AD for Operations Maj Gen Fenton provided the operational brief, and attributed a recent spike in &troops in contact8 incidents to aggressive ISAF operations, rather than any organized Taliban offensive. He highlighted the continuing shortfalls in counter-IED capabilities in ISAF HQ, stressing the imperative to fill these slots as the number of IED incidents and their lethality continue to rise. In RC-South, he noted that Operation Adalat, aimed at helping to establish the Afghan Development Zone in northern Kandahar, will replace Operation Achilles (in the Sangin area of RC-S) as ISAF’s main operational effort; timing for the transition will be conditions-based, at COMISAF’s discretion. 5. (C) The Danish PermRep informed the NAC of the Danish Parliament’s recent decision to beef up the Danish presence in Afghanistan by 200 (to a total of 640), which will deploy in the fourth quarter of 2007 with the UK’s Task Force Helmand. The Bulgarian PermRep stated that the Bulgarian mechanized infantry company had arrived in Kabul, along with 5 additional staff officers for ISAF HQ. The 200-soldier Bulgarian for163

ce protection unit for Kandahar airfield is set to deploy in the coming week, per the availability of strategic airlift. Norway noted its Defense Minister was in Afghanistan, and would commemorate the opening of a 10-million Euro Norwegian-built camp for an ANA Kandak in Meymana. Balkans 6. (C) The SYG noted that this would be an important topic at next week’s Defense Ministerial. He welcomed the May 31 tabling of a new UNSCR draft that expresses support for the provisions in Special Envoy Ahtisaari’s proposal. He stated that the current text meets NATO’s future requirements for a post-status presence. The SYG also noted this issue will be discussed at the G-8 meeting in Heiligendamm, Germany, and cautioned that the longer it takes to find an agreement on this, the higher the risks ) a quick settlement was in everyone’s interest. 7. (C) CMC reported that the security situation is relatively calm, but the potential for violence continues. Violence currently is limited to criminal and inter-ethnic disputes. CMC also noted that the operational reserve force from Italy is scheduled to reach full operational capability on June 9 and will be in Kosovo until month’s end, primarily in support of the task force in the north. 8. (C) The Norwegian PermRep (supported by IT, GR, HU, SI, SP, NL, RO and BU) argued that we should expect progress on PfP initiatives from the new government and that the NAC should consider inviting a high ranking delegation from Serbia. The purpose of such a meeting would be to present Serbia’s plans regarding PfP and to remind the Serbs of their ICTY obligations. He additionally noted the positive news of the arrest of General Tolimir. The Italian PermRep said that Italy, as the Contact Point Embassy in Belgrade, had observed much interest from Belgrade in PfP and that the timing would be right to send a signal by extending such an invitation. The SYG reported that he will meet with the Serbian Defense Minister next week on the margins of the EAPC meeting, that the Serbian Foreign Minister has requested a meeting on June 27, and that the Serbs have proposed a NAC plus one meeting for September. The SYG also noted that he might travel to Belgrade after the Defense Ministerial to continue this positive momentum. Somalia 9. (C) The SYG outlined the quickly delivered military advice stating that NATO can support the AU’s request for airlift for the AU mission in Somalia using procedures established in Darfur. The only additional piece will be to establish a temporary liaison cell in Addis Ababa for the AU. He noted that it will depend on nations to provide this airlift and suggested that the NAC approve airlift support for an initial period of six months. The German PermRep said that while they can agree to this in principle, they cannot agree to it without a written SG for their government’s approval. He also stated that Germany would not be in a position to contribute airlift for this mission. Ambassador Nuland commended the MC’s quick work and noted this allows nations to contribute to AMISOM under a NATO umbrella, giving NATO credit for working with the AU. She urged the SYG to issue a quick SG under a short silence procedure; he agreed to do so.
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Iraq 10. (SBU) The SYG said that the Senior Resource Board (SRB) was working on a recommendation regarding NTM-I eligibility for common funding, which should be forwarded shortly for NAC approval. (Note: The SRB actually issued this recommendation on June 1; the International Staff is working to rectify this and we expect to see an SG issued soon. End note.) CMC said that the autumn 2007 PMR would include more details on the content of the gendarmerie training and that a start date of September is planned, pending mission approval. Report on the Activities of the NATO Special Committee 11. (S) Ambassador Ioannis Corantis, Director-General of the Greek National Intelligence Service and Chairman of the NATO Special Committee and Frank Jensen, Danish Security Intelligence Service presented a briefing on Developments in Iraq Affecting NATO and Its Member States, Security. The report posited that NATO itself is not a specific target for terrorists operating from Iraq. However, NATO member states involved in Coalition operations are at increased risk because terrorists use Iraq as a pretext for attacks. If nations involved in Iraq withdraw, the long term terrorist threat will diminish, but not disappear. Grece, Turkey, Germany, Slovakia, The Netherlands ad Poland all commented on aspects of the report,putting emphasis on the complex nature of radicaization and observing that terrorist are using other pretexts than just Iraq are used to “legitimize their actions. Ambassador Nuland registered diagreement with the analysis that the withdrawal f member states from Iraq would make NATO memberstates safer. In fact, if withdrawal occurs without leaving peace and stability, she said, then trrorism from Iraq will become an even greater theat. Energy Security 12. (C The SYG presented draft language for a tasking to NMAs on energy security stating he was aware of differences in opinions among delegations on the subject, but hoped that the new language would be enough to bridge gaps. Ambassador Nuland commended the text, but noted disappointment at its lateness; she suggested editorial fixes, which the SYG and Allies took on board. The Netherlands foreshadowed difficulties with the text if, as currently drafted, the tasking asked NMAs to look at only military risks to critical infrastructure, yet ignored other, likely more pertinent risks, such as terrorism. France objected to any language in the tasking which potentially prejudged the Alliance’s response to eventual military advice, such as assigning a lead committee to carry work further, or asking NMAs to identify possible avenues for addressing threats. Rather, the French PermRep stated a desire to wait for advice on potential risks to be produced, and proceed in a step-by-step manner after the NAC evaluated that advice. GM supported the French objections on new oversight instructions. The SYG expressed &utter disappointment8 at the NAC’s inability to agree a tasking since the Riga tasking in November 2006. He intends to circulate a new draft (which will reflect the U.S. editorial amendments) under a silence period that would end June 8. The SYG noted the NAC was close to putting him a position where he would have to tell Ministers that Heads of State and Government &got it wrong8 at Riga. Nuland
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Reference id: 07BELGRADE814 Subject: Del Ponte Overly Bullish On Serbia’s Icty Cooperation Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 15:17 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07BELGRADE814.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO9973 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #0814 1591517 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081517Z JUN 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0984 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], SR [Serbia] Ref: BELGRADE 797 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (c) Carla del Ponte’s decidedly upbeat briefing to Belgrade’s diplomatic corps June 6 highlighted the recent arrest of Zdravko Tolimir as evidence that Serbia is cooperating with the ICTY. Del Ponte told the group her June 18 report to the Security Council would “most likely” be positive, and said she had asked Serbian President Tadic to make sure Rade Bulatovic stayed in his position as Serbia’s intelligence chief until Mladic’s capture was secured. She said Tolimir’s arrest had signaled that the remaining fugitives are in Serbia, and said she now believed Belgrade had the political will and the capacity to bring them in. She confirmed that Tolimir was apprehended in Serbia, but that the arrest had not been formally processed until he crossed the border into Republika Srpska. 2. (c) More troublingly, del Ponte used the briefing to plead with the assembled Ambassadors not to make any decisions regarding Kosovo status until Mladic had been handed over– something she said she was confident could be done by September (coincidentally also when she plans to step down as ICTY chief prosecutor). When asked to clarify later in the briefing whether that request was from her or a re-transmittal of a request from the GoS, she conceded that both Tadic and Kostunica had asked her to make the case to stall the Kosovo status process until ICTY cooperation could be completed. 3. (c) Comment: It would be a serious mistake to use promised ICTY cooperation as the crutch on which to support a dragging out of the status process. This government has proven several times over the past three years, and most recently by rolling up Tolimir, that it has the influence and capacity needed to bring in even senior PIFWCs, and consistently does so when it is seen as being in the interests of Serbia or portions of its ruling elite. Invoking Kosovo is simply another attempt by the government to stall the sta166

tus process – where there is a political will to find and hand over PIFWCs, there is a way. Any promise to put status on hold while ICTY cooperation is completed would have the opposite effect, giving the GoS an incentive to drag out the “search” for Mladic as long as possible. Simply put, we believe the government can deliver on the remaining PIFWCs. And if it can’t, it will not be because Kosovo retards their capabilities. 4. (c) Visit addenda: Del Ponte also announced that during this visit, the GoS had handed over a copious volume of requested documents – so much so that ICTY had to secure a truck to transport them all to The Hague. She said a few key documents remained missing, notably Mladic’s performance reviews for the period covering the Bosnia conflict. Polt

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Reference id: 07USUNNEWYORK499 Subject: (icty) Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal Prosecutor Reviews Carla’s List Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 15:16 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07USUNNEWYORK499.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0018 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0499 1711516 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201516Z JUN 07 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2103 INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0159 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8894 Hide header

Confidential
USUN NEW YORK 000499 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2017 Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KJUS [Administration of Justice], SR [Serbia], XH [Eastern Europe], MW [Montenegro] Classified By: Ambassador Wolff for reasons 1.(b) and 1 (d). 1. (U) Summary: In a farewell call, ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte described her work and plans for the months between now and September when her resignation from the Tribunal takes effect. Earlier she told the Security Council that, “the fact that four persons remain at large, in particular, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, is a permanent stain on our work.” Del Ponte told Ambassador Wolff that Serbia’s cooperation with the Tribunal has improved somewhat and she hopes that this factor, along with the recent arrest of Zdravko Tolimir, may lead to further arrests of key fugitives during the next few months. Del Ponte also urged the USG to support her Deputy, David Tolbert (US) to succeed her as ICTY Prosecutor. End Summary.
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2. (C) Carla del Ponte, ICTY Prosecutor for the past eight years, met with Ambassador Wolff on June 18. She was accompanied by the Deputy Prosecutor, David Tolbert. While reflecting with satisfaction on the achievements of the Tribunal, del Ponte clearly had one thing on her mind – “Carla’s list” (A movie of the same name has been produced to highlight the Tribunal’s work). Del Ponte said that she had seen some progress in Serbia’s cooperation, albeit guarded. The Tadic government has pledged to assist her in locating the key fugitives and she believes the Chief of Intelligence, Rade Bulatovic, knows in which locale Mladic is hiding. She described the May 31 arrest of Zdravko Tolimir and subsequent arrest of Vlastimir Djordjevic in Montenegro. Both have now been transferred to The Hague. Del Ponte described how the Serbs played a key role but distanced themselves from the arrest of Tolimir. She said that Belgrade has tried to link the situation in Kosovo to the apprehension of Mladic, saying that if the UN acts on Kosovo independence, people will be protesting in the streets and the political situation will be too fragile to bear the arrest of such popular leaders as Mladic or Karadic. Wolff noted that such linkage is unacceptable. Del Ponte said the Serbs have Mladic’s family under surveillance and she remains hopeful that Butalovic, whose assignment ends in July, will deliver Mladic before the end of that month. 3. (C) Del Ponte seemed less optimistic about getting Karadic and said better intelligence support from KFOR, NATO and the US would be welcome. “Just tell me where he is – Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, she said. Then I can work with that country.” Ambassador Wolff assured del Ponte that the apprehension of these key fugitives remains an important US policy objective. He asked del Ponte what conclusion she would draw if by the end of July Mladic remains at large? Del Ponte responded that she had not envisioned that situation but it may mean that he is no longer in Serbia. She said that there is a window of opportunity now. It is not enough for the Serbs to say he is not there. They must give evidence that he is not and reveal where he is. Del Ponte added that Tolimer had been Mladic’s “right hand man” and she hopes to meet with him and is “prepared to make a plea agreement” in exchange for information leading to Mladic’s arrest. That meeting will take place as soon as he had obtained defense counsel. 4. (U) Turning to the future of the Tribunal, del Ponte expressed support for Tolbert’s candidacy to succeed her as Prosecutor. She said she had spoken with UN Legal Counsel Michel but did not get much information on the appointment of her successor. Ambassador Wolff assured them that the Secretary General understands the issue and has not yet filled the job. Wolff

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Reference id: 07USUNNEWYORK554 Subject: Proposed Appointments Of Prosecutors For The International War Crimes Tribunals For Yugoslavia (icty) And Rwanda (ictr) Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Fri, 6 Jul 2007 20:50 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07USUNNEWYORK554.html
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Confidential
SIPDIS FOR: IO/UNP, S/WCI E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KJUS [Administration of Justice], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations] Classified By: Ambassador Khalilzad for reasons 1.4(b) and 1.4(d) 1. This is an action request. Please see Para 5. 2. (C) UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs, Nicolas Michel, informed USUN on July 6, that the Secretary General plans to take action to extend the terms of the current Prosecutors for the ICTR and ICTY. The Statutes of the Tribunals provide that the Prosecutors shall be appointed by the Security Council on nomination by the Secretary-General. Michel indicated that he is consulting with the permanent members prior to informing the Security Council of his recommendations. 3. (C) ICTY. Carla del Ponte, ICTY Prosecutor announced several months ago that she would be resigning effective in September. No replacement has been named, although both her Deputy, David Tolbert (US), and Chief Investigator of the International Investigation Commission for Lebanon (UNIIIC), Serge Brammertz (Bel), are interested in the position. Brammertz recently resigned his position as Deputy Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court and has been promised a job with the UN. Although he wants the ICTY Prosecutor position, he has indicated some flexibility. Comment. Extension of del Ponte as Prosecutor would give Brammertz time to complete his work on the Commission. It would also keep options for filling the ICTY Prosecutor position open. End Comment. 4. (C) ICTR Prosecutor. Hassan Jallow (Gambia) was appointed as Prosecutor for the ICTR on September 15, 2003 for a four year term. Pursuant to the Statute of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor is eligible for reappointment. The Secretary General intends to nominate Mr. Jallow for another term, the duration of which would be four years or less, if the Tribunal concludes its work before four years. 5. (C) Action Request. USUN requests instructions to inform the UN that the United States will support the extension of Ms. del Ponte as Prosecutor until January 2008 and the re-appointment of Mr. Jallow. Khalilzad
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Reference id: 07USNATO484 Subject: Fm Jeremic Discusses The Kosovo Conundrum And Partnership Presentation Document With The Nac Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Thu, 6 Sep 2007 14:42 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07USNATO484.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0030 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNO #0484/01 2491442 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 061442Z SEP 07 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 1403 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1156 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], SR [Serbia] Ref: A. SERBIA’S PRESENTATION DOCUMENT (E-MAILED TO EUR/RPM) B. BELGRADE 1223 Classified By: Charge Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d). Summary 1. (C) Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic discussed Serbia’s Partnership Presentation Document and possible ways forward on Kosovo with NATO PermReps on September 5. Jeremic was forward-leaning on engagement with the Alliance through PfP, but acknowledged Serbians’ love-hate relationship to NATO would not go away. While voicing “cautious optimism” that a compromise solution could be found for Kosovo, and arguing that negotiations would proceed more quickly without a deadline, he did not offer any hope that Serbia would accept independence for Kosovo. Virtually every NATO PermRep told Jeremic that NATO bashing has got to stop and hard compromises are necessary on Kosovo. However, some Allies were soft on the negotiating deadline and on the need for a new UN Security Council resolution on Kosovo. End Summary. Syg Summarizes a Complex Relationship 2. (C) NATO Secretary General (SYG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer welcomed FM Jeremic to the NAC, saluting Serbia’s Partnership Presentation Document (PD ) REF A) as clear, concise, and ambitious. He noted that Serbia needs to conclude an Information Security Agreement in order to fully participate in many of the proposed areas of cooperation. He applauded the PD’s strong commitment to meeting obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and affirmed NATO’s support for Serbia to take its rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic community. Referring to the vi170

triolic rhetoric emanating from other high officials in Belgrade (REF B), however, he called on the Serbian Government to “speak with one voice,” reminded Jeremic of Belgrade’s agreement to avoid statements or actions that might jeopardize security in Kosovo, and said that unless otherwise informed NATO would assume that the PD represented the authoritative GOS position on NATO. On Kosovo, the SYG hoped that the November 17 elections would advance normalization of relations between Kosovar Serbs and Albanians. He affirmed full support for the current round of Troika-led negotiations, but concluded that if they did not lead to a compromise agreement, the Ahtisaari proposal was “the best way forward.” Jeremic Professes “Cautious Optimism” 3. (C) Jeremic frankly acknowledged that Serbians would “never forget the tragic events of 1999” (the NATO air campaign) but said Serbs want “to look forward, not backward.” He insisted that the PD represented Belgrade’s “clear readiness to play a constructive role in building a new security architecture for Southeast Europe,” and said the Information Security Agreement would be signed and a Serbian Mission to NATO opened soon. But like most Allies, his mind was on Kosovo. He expressed “cautious optimism” that the current round of Pristina-Belgrade talks could lead to a mutually-acceptable compromise, looked forward to direct Serb-Kosovar talks in New York as a bellwether (although he repeatedly referred to the Kosovars as “Albanians”), and asked Allies to support lifting the Troika’s 120-day deadline to make the Kosovars “negotiate seriously.” Jeremic closed by quoting Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural address: “With malice toward none and charity toward all...” Serbia would contribute toward a lasting solution. Allies Call for an End to “NATO Bashing“ 4. (C) Ambassador Nuland told Jeremic that an open-ended negotiating period would not produce results, and said plainly that “NATO bashing has got to stop.” She also hailed Jeremic’s optimism, and pointed to the many positive elements in the PD, including its ICTY reference and ambitious program of cooperation. She noted Jeremic’s invocation of Lincoln and reminded the Serbian delegation that Lincoln was regarded as one of our greatest Presidents because he led the nation through a period of difficult sacrifices. Sixteen other Allies intervened along similar lines, virtually all calling for moderation in Belgrade’s public comments and for real flexibility on the Kosovo talks. Spain asked about Serbia’s level of ambition with NATO (as the PD does not address that point), to which Jeremic responded, “full membership” ) reminding the NAC that President Tadic had said as much to the SYG. To those calling for implementing the Ahtisaari proposal in the absence of an agreement, Jeremic asked rhetorically why the Albanians would show flexibility if Allies were going to give them everything they wanted for stonewalling. Bulgarian Ambassador Ivanov unhelpfully affirmed the position that Kosovo’s final status should be “validated by a new UNSC resolution.” Other than that, Allies did not break ranks, but a few showed where their sympathies lie: Romania insisted that NATO was “not taking sides, but seeking a secure environment for all.” Norway, Italy, Slovakia, and Spain also made calibrated presentations showing they are Serbia’s friends at the NAC table. Olson
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Reference id: 07BRUSSELS3192 Subject: Eu And W. Balkans: Carrots Not Always Effective; Sticks Largely Unused Origin: USEU Brussels (Europe) Cable time: Fri, 19 Oct 2007 12:35 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07BRUSSELS3192.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO4210 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #3192/01 2921235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 191235Z OCT 07 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS NOFORN ALSO FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/ACE PLEASE PASS TO USAID/EE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2017 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], ZL [Balkan States], EUN [European Union] Ref: BRUSSELS 3120 Classified By: Acting POL Chief Vincent Carver for reasons 1.5 (b/d). Summary 1. (C/NF) The EU has repeatedly reaffirmed the “European vocation” of the countries in the Western Balkans. It is committed to membership for all countries in the region and the Commission plans to contribute almost USD two billion over 2007-09 to help prepare them for eventual membership. While the W. Balkans will be one of the upcoming Slovenian Presidency’s priorities, we are not sanguine that it will have great achievements in the region – much like the Austrian Presidency (2006), other than to secure an ESDP mission in Kosovo. The EU has little strategy on containing fallout from Kosovo final status in Serbia. On BiH, the EU is realizing that it may have to play harder ball given that the promise of a Stabilization and Association (SAA) Agreement has not produced police reform there. Decision-makers in London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin likely will continue to have more influence over events in the region than those in Lisbon and Ljubljana. Enlargement Commissioner Rehn will continue strongly to support the accession process for the region, with HR Solana helping channel member state thinking on Serbia, BiH, and Kosovo. (Reftel addressed the EU and Kosovo; EU relations with Croatia are not handled by EU officials covering the W. Balkans.) End Summary Slovenian Mission: W. Balkans a Top Priority 2. (C/NF) Both the Slovenian Mission’s W. Balkans expert and the Slovenian serving as BiH desk officer in the Council Secretariat (who will serve as the Slovenian Presidency’s coordinator with the Council Secretariat) told us recently that the W. Balkans
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will be one of the top priorities of the Slovenian Presidency. Given the pace of events, maintaining EU unity over post-status Kosovo is of paramount importance, both stressed. Launching an ESDP mission in Kosovo, even without a new UNSCR (both said neither the U.S.-EU-Russia Troika nor the UNSC would produce a last-minute negotiated settlement) will be “messy” given some member states’ questions over legal interpretations of a mandate. Nevertheless, a mission “almost certainly” will be launched, in part because member states recognize that the EU’s credibility will be damaged absent such a mission. A Priority, but Little Strategy 3. (C/NF) Asked about Slovenia’s and the EU’s strategy for strengthening Serbia’s and BiH’s ties to the EU, the Slovenian Mission rep noted that the EU’s leverage is not terribly strong. The Commission will continue its plans to support the Instrument for PreAccession (IPA) in both countries (contributing approximately USD 800 million in Serbia and USD 316 million in BiH from 2007 to 09). According to our contact, while Slovenia (reportedly supported by Austria, Italy, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic States, and Greece) would like the EU to take a more “flexible” approach on police reform in BiH and on ICTY conditionality in Serbia in order to proceed with the SAA processes in both countries, other member states, particularly Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, oppose any loosening of EU conditionality. The UK and France, previously supporters of strict conditionality are softening somewhat, our contact added. He stressed that the Presidency, as honest broker, will have to try to find common ground between the hard-line camp and those wanting to ease the SAA process for Belgrade and Sarajevo. 4. (C/NF) The Slovenian Council Secretariat contact had a different perspective. In her view, the EU has stressed publicly and at length the links between police reform in BiH and full Serbian cooperation with ICTY with signing an SAA. For the EU to weaken these links now for an “immediate goal” would undermine the EU’s credibility with both countries over the long term, she reasoned. Serbia: How to contain Fallout from Kosovo 5. (C/NF) While officially the accession process for Serbia is not related to Kosovo, many contacts have privately confirmed that several member states will block progress if Serbia acts “aggressively” on post-status Kosovo. All predict that Belgrade will protest vociferously after status is finalized. Our contacts are divided over what, if any, concrete actions Belgrade will take. 6. (C/NF) A few predict that Belgrade will interrupt energy supplies. Others note that the Serbian Radical Party and hard-liners within the military will support paramilitary activity in northern Kosovo. A plurality, however, believe Serbia will neither take nor tolerate any such action, and therefore the accession process can continue. 7. (C/NF) Asked how ICTY cooperation factors into the equation, one contact noted that the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia is ready to be initialed and could even be signed in 2007 if Belgrade demonstrated significant progress leading to the arrest of Mladic. Even without this, however, the EU believes Belgrade will continue to promulgate legislation and implement reforms as outlined in the SAA, so as
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not to lose too much time in the process and with the hope that Mladic eventually will be seized and an SAA will be signed. Bosnia-and-Herzegovina: How could they refuse Police Reform? 8. (C/NF) Many EU and member state officials seemed actually shocked that the Bosniak and Republika Srpska leadership continued to block police reform despite HR/EUSR Lajcak’s last-ditch efforts in late September. One Council Secretariat official working on BiH told us recently that the Commission and several member state officials believed the BiH leaders would compromise at the last moment, given the tremendous importance of signing an SAA with the EU. The fact that this “carrot” did not bend the BiH leaders’ political will should serve as a wake-up call, particularly to the Commission, on the tough nature of Balkan politicians and their unwillingness to be kowtowed by EU bureaucrats. 9. (C/NF) All of our contacts noted that the Commission is extremely hesitant to use its funding (consolidated in the “Instrument for Pre-Accession” – IPA, begun this year) for strictly political ends. Rather, the IPA’s raison d’etre is to promote infrastructure projects, enhance a country’s administrative capacity through training and exchanges, and support freer markets, not to pressure officials in the region to accept EU political views. Asked about possible visa restrictions on intransigent BiH officials, one Council Secretariat contact told us that the EU has not yet considered this option, with some member states likely to oppose its use based on “intransigence” rather than human rights abuses or criminal activity. HR Solana, she noted, has only in the last few weeks devoted attention to BiH. His office reportedly has increased the demand for briefing papers on BiH dramatically as a result. Macedonia: Not Going Well 10. (C/NF) The Slovenian Mission has told us that the lackluster pace of reforms and continued problems in genuinely integrating the ethnic Albanian parties into collaborative decision-making on the national level combine to make Macedonia a problem case for the EU – officially it is a candidate country, but without a date for accession negotiations to begin. Several of our contacts told us earlier this year that the EU might give Macedonia a date in 2008 to begin negotiations. Our contacts are less optimistic lately. They do not rule out giving a date next year, but stress that Macedonia must “get its act together” and demonstrate greater political maturity to overcome resistance from some member states. Macedonia’s position on Kosovo has helped in this regard, but, in the view of one Council Secretariat official, Skopje’s “provocations” of Greece are not helping its case. None of our contacts would reveal where Greece is coming down on granting a date for accession negotiations with Skopje, with all saying “officially” that NATO deliberations over a potential membership invitation are not affecting EU discussions. Albania: Making slow but steady Progress 11. (C/NF) The EU appears satisfied and even a bit surprised that Albania’s accession process is moving forward, albeit slowly. The EU remains concerned about crime, corruption, and administrative capacity in Albania, but sees recent elections there as a sign that the country is slowly moving in the right direction.
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Montenegro: A Relative Success Story 12. (C/NF) Given its smaller size and relatively good economic policies, Montenegro may advance more quickly in implementing its SAA commitments, according to a Commission contact. Its use of the Euro must be addressed (but one contact predicted that the EU ultimately will not force Montenegro to adopt a new currency), and as with Albania, the EU has serious concerns about organized crime. Several contacts voiced the hope that Montenegro’s expected progress with its SAA would “shame” BiH and Serbia to overcome its problems and allow their respective SAAs to be signed. The Broader EU Context 13. (C/NF) The EU has a less than stellar record in leveraging the “carrot” of membership to obtain concrete political results in the region. Brussels generally remains loathe to use “sticks” to promote immediate goals in the region. Rather, the EU, particularly the Commission, views the accession process as a necessarily multi-year endeavor in building a strong foundation for these countries’ “European identity.” Increased skepticism among the European public regarding enlargement – “enlargement fatigue” – and the general consensus in Brussels that Romania and Bulgaria were not ready for accession in 2007, are contributing to a stricter interpretation by the Commission of implementation of SAA commitments. Two of Enlargement Commissioner Rehn’s advisors have told us that the EU wants to address problem areas in candidate and aspirant countries earlier, rather than later, to avoid having to take the largely political decision to admit not-quiteready candidates, as was the case with Romania and Bulgaria. Comment 14. (C/NF) The last stage of the Portuguese Presidency and the first few months of the Slovenian Presidency will be full of challenges: maintaining EU unity on Kosovo while securing agreement to launch the ESDP Mission, offering support to HR/EUSR Lajcak in BiH while maintaining some level of “local ownership” in BiH, containing damage to the EU’s relationship with Serbia in light of final status for Kosovo while keeping the pressure on Belgrade to deliver Mladic to The Hague, prodding the Macedonian leadership to make and implement genuine political reforms, and maintaining credibility with the European public for enlargement in general. 15. (C/NF) From what we have seen, the EU, the Portuguese Presidency, and the incoming Slovenian Presidency have little in the way of a coherent strategy to address these issues, other than to reiterate the “European vocation” of the countries of the region. Visa facilitation and IPA assistance are not enough to ensure that the region continues on its European path. The key to taking critical decisions regarding the Western Balkans remains in key member state capitals, not Brussels. Rehn will remain a strong champion of membership for the countries in the region; Solana is the official, however, who can help move member states on critical issues, such as the ESDP mission in Kosovo and confronting obstructionists in BiH. If the draft EU Reform Treaty is ratified, the High Rep position will be even more capable of moving the EU in the right direction in the region, given the marriage of his responsibilities with Commission financial resources. Gray
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Reference id: 07BELGRADE1532 Subject: Serbia: Vojislav Seselj Goes On Trial In The Hague While Saa Initialed In Brussels Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 9 Nov 2007 16:28 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07BELGRADE1532.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3223 RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHBW #1532/01 3131628 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 091628Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1753 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE Hide header

Unclas
SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Summary 1. (U) Notorious Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj’s November 7 war crimes trial in The Hague attracted only moderate media attention in Belgrade and no public pronouncements or protests. With the concomitant press of Serbia’s initialing of a Stability and Association Agreement Seselj popularity’s at least this week has been neutralized, as Serbia focuses on a European future, but is reminded of its bloody past. End Summary Moderate Media: Coverage of Proceedings 2. (U) Media: interest in the case was muted. The influential pro-government newspaper “Politika” on November 8 dedicated a page to the trial, reporting the prosecution’s opening remarks, trial’s history and Seselj’s past inflammatory statements. Most other dailies documented the opening remarks without analysis or commentary. The government RTS television station aired the pre-trial hearing, November 6, drawing 21% of the viewing audience, but the broadcast of the first day of the trial commanded only a 13.61% audience share, with 382,130 viewers. On November 8, trial coverage airing Seselj’s opening statements attracted 34.01% of the viewing audience. Radicals Unlikely to Gain in the Polls 3. (U) Although the popular wisdom argues that the trial of Slobodan Milosovic, from 2002-2006,at first boosted his popularity, this time around local analysts do not expect the Radical Party (SRS) to profit from renewed scrutiny of Seselj’s crimes. Independent journalist Dejan Anastasijevic told emboff that “speculation that the trial will boost
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Radical’s popularity is overrated. Instead, the trial will bring back ugly memories that even SRS supporters would like to forget,” Anastasijevic said. Presenting a different view, Sonja Biserko of Serbia’s Helsinki Committee told emboff that, with Seselj the link between the state and the paramilitary forces, the importance of the trial is to expose the criminality underlying the Yugoslav wars. Initialing the SAA: Moving Towards Europe 4. (U) Coinciding with the trial, Serbia’s initialing of its Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Commission on November 7, played positively in Belgrade. The initialing became possible only after The Hague’s Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte confirmed Serbia’s continued cooperation with the Tribunal. Most acknowledged that the event brought Serbia one step closer to EU membership, while recognizing that Serbia must still fully comply with ICTY. 5. (U) The governing coalition applauded the initialing of the SAA and presented the EC a new action plan towards full EU integration. The action plan calls for Serbia to sign the SAA by the end of January 2008, to be on the EU’s white Schengen list and to be an EU candidate country, both by the end of 2008. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said on November 6 he looked forward to a final signing as soon as possible, noting that the SAA would lead to new investments and a “better standard (of living) for Serbia’s citizens.” President Boris Tadic said on November 7 the initialing proved Serbia could become a full member of the EU, and hoped the SAA could be signed in the next couple of weeks, once Serbia achieved full cooperation with The Hague. .Mladan Dinkic, leader of the G-17 Plus said on November 6 he hoped Serbia would have EU candidate status by the end of 2008. Opposition was more cynical, saying Serbia’s EU future was not yet guaranteed. SRS MP, Zoran Krasic (and lawyer to Seselj), on November 7 criticized the public optimism surrounding the SAA, saying that the initialing was insignificant and guaranteed Serbia nothing. Media Reaction: Mostly Positive, but Realistic 6. (U) Local media extensively covered the initialing of the SAA. While positive on the initialing, the media was also astutely aware that it was primarily symbolic. Pro-government paper “Politika” on November 8 called the initialing Serbia’s entryway into Europe. “Politika” also carried an interview with Russian Ambassador to Serbia Alexander Alekseyev, who said Russia supported the SAA process and congratulated Serbia on the initialing. Only tabloid “Kurir’s” negative coverage stood out. Under the November 8 headline “Exchange for Kosovo?” Kurir speculated that the EU’s sudden goodwill in moving the SAA process along could be compensation for impending loss of Kosovo Comment 7. (SBU) Seselj’s trial began at an auspicious moment for Serbia. As Serbia moves closer to European integration via the SAA process, providing the public with a healthy dose of the truth will assist the country, or at least provide an opportunity for the country, to face the consequences of its past. Looking towards the future, the initialing of the SAA also comes at a particularly good time for Serbia’s democratic forces who can claim this as a major accomplishment and point towards Serbia’s now clearer path to the EU, once Serbia fulfills its commitments to The Hague. End comment. Munter
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Reference id: 08USNATO21 Subject: North Atlantic Council Readout – January 16, 2008 Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 16:57 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08USNATO21.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3785 OO RUEHBW DE RUEHNO #0021/01 0161657 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 161657Z JAN 08 ZDK CTG UR SVC 02211 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1564 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0225 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0486 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0178 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0445 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 1455 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0677 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0239 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0443 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0805 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0304 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0457 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 1134 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0334 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0732 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5866 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0616 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0555 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0434 RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 4014 RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK PRIORITY 0059 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0674 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0248 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 0040 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0978 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0563 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0091 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0561 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS Tags: NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], PREL [External Political Relations], AF [Afghanistan] Classified By: CDA Richard G. Olson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C/NF) Please note a typo in the Afghanistan portion of last week’s notes. The corrected sentence should read: “UNAMA assesses that the areas of Badghis province that were the site of recent fighting are now stable enough for relief agencies to operate.”
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2. (S/NF) Summary from the NAC Meeting: – Membership Action Plan ) Croatia: PM Sanader’s meeting with the NAC on Croatia’s performance in the Membership Action Plan will be reported septel. – Afghanistan: Secretary General (SYG) de Hoop Scheffer said he had spoken to UN SYG Ban Ki Moon about the Terms of Reference for the new UN senior civilian coordinator in Afghanistan and shared his impression that the UN SYG would nominate the individual very soon. Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee (D/CMC) Eikenberry anticipated continued terrorism in Pakistan throughout 2008 and the International Military Staff briefed that Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) are taking a “wait and see” approach in RC-South following the retaking of Musa Qala. Ambassador Nuland briefed on the U.S. troop plus-up, plus ANA expansion plans, and Turkey announced plans to deploy two Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs). The Serena Hotel bombing led the NAC to focus on the security situation in Kabul, and Norway thanked the U.S., Turkey, Czech Republic, and others for assistance to Foreign Minister Stoere’s delegation following the attack. – Balkans: The SYG said new Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci had assured him that any future steps in Kosovo’s status would be taken in coordination with Allies and the EU and that Pristina would do nothing to undermine the safe and secure environment during Kosovo’s transition. The Italian Operational Reserve Force (ORF) Battalion will deploy to Kosovo February 4. – Darfur: No discussion. – Iraq: Italian PermRep Stefanini reported the first class had graduated from NTM-I Carabinieri training at Camp Dublin. – Maritime Operations: The D/CMC described Russian naval deployments in the Mediterranean as “very interesting” and “something that hasn’t been seen in a very long while.” – AOB: The SYG said that a letter to Russian President Putin inviting him to attend the NATO-Russia Council at the Bucharest Summit in April will be sent via departing Russian Ambassador Totskiy. Dutch PermRep Schaper raised the issue of noise pollution in the Netherlands caused by the take-off and landings of NATO AWACS in neighboring Germany and termed an interim NAPMO report on the problem “insufficient.” He requested that the AWACS issue be discussed at the Vilnius Defense Ministerial in February. Although the final NAPMO report is not due until March, the Private Office will consider the Dutch request. End Summary. Afghanistan 3. (C/NF) The SYG stated that he is sending Deputy Assistant Secretary General Maurits Jochems to Kabul January 25 through the end of February as the temporary Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), following the departure of SCR Ambassador Daan Everts. He told the NAC that he had spoken informally with UN SYG Ban Ki Moon about a new UN senior civilian coordinator for Afghanistan, stated he had communicated his views about that individuals terms of reference as they relate to interaction with ISAF (to which Ban expressed understanding, he said), and shared his impression that the individual would be nominated very soon. With this development, he asserted, the naming of a new NATO SCR was crucial, and encouraged nations to move quickly to put forward a formal candidate (comment: the SYG noted he has received informal queries from two Allies. End comment). De Hoop Scheffer announced that Mark Laity, who was SCR Spokesman in 2006, would be returning to the job for 2008. A new Icelandic voluntary national contribution would serve as Laity’s media advisor, which the SYG welcomed. Later in the discussion, he expressed regret that, somehow, the dates of the NAC’s Febru179

ary trip to Afghanistan had ended up in the Afghan press. In light of the Serena Hotel bombing NAC options may have to be revisited, he said. 4. (C/NF) D/CMC Eikenberry spoke on Pakistan and reminded the NAC of ISAF’s unfilled Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). On Pakistan, he shared with the NAC the International Military Staff’s assessment that following the Bhutto assassination, Pakistan’s internal turmoil would continue, and that terrorists would continue seeking to disrupt the cohesion of political parties, and derail the electoral process. Internal political violence would likely remain steady or increase in 2008. 5. (C/NF) Deputy AD for Ops RADM Moreno gave the operational update. He stated that the January 14 attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul illustrated the OMF goal to seek dramatic asymmetric attacks in Kabul as part of their information operations strategy and create an impression of insecurity. He said they will continue to try to infiltrate Kabul to conduct similar operations. In RC-South, he stated that OMF had taken a “wait and see” approach, and were monitoring locals, Afghan forces, and ISAF, watching for a change in the balance of the security presence. Musa Qala was presently secured by ISAF Forward Operating Base Edinburgh and three ANP checkpoints; two ANA kandaks and the ISAF theater task force remained in the district center, with ANSF and other ISAF units providing an outer ring of security. The goal, he stated, is to establish an enduring security presence that eventually will enable ISAF to hand over responsibility for Musa Qala district center to the Afghan police. 6. (C/NF) Ambassador Nuland highlighted to Allies President Bush’s January 15 approval of a one-time deployment of approximately 3,200 troops to Afghanistan. She noted the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), consisting of approximately 2,200 soldiers, would be placed under General McNeill command for use at his discretion in RCSouth, and 1,000 would chop to MG Cone at CSTC-A to assist in training Afghan National Security Forces, most probably as force protection to allow robust police training efforts in RC-West and RC-South. Underlining that this deployment was short-term, temporary, and that the U.S. had dug deep under tremendous resource strains to come up with forces that COMISAF needed to succeed this coming spring, she challenged Allies to do the same. She told PermReps to expect a strong push diplomatic push from the White House for Allies to come to Bucharest with offers to backfill the MEU in Fall 2008 when its deployment ends, and to fill the ISAF CJSOR on a long-term basis. 7. (C/NF) D/CMC Eikenberry stressed to PermReps in response that the U.S. offer was significant and would have great impact while deployed, but that it did not cover all CJSOR shortfalls, and regardless, was a short-term deployment. For planning purposes, he underscored, Allied nations should presume no change to the ISAF CJSOR based on this temporary U.S. deployment. 8. (C/NF) Ambassador Nuland also told the NAC that the United States expected the Afghans at the February 5 – 6 Tokyo Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board meeting to ask for a 10,000-troop increase in the force structure of the Afghan National Army, which the U.S. supports. She urged Allies to support this proposal at the JCMB, while noting that the future force structure of the ANA is under evaluation, and that she would stay in touch with Allies on any further developments. 9. (C/NF) The Turkish PermRep announced that Turkey had approved the deployment of two Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs), which would work with
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the headquarters of the ANA Second Brigade, 201 Corps. He stated that Turkey will work the details of the deployment through SHAPE, and offered no timelines. 10. (S/NF) Interventions by the Greek, Portuguese, Spanish, and Norwegian PermReps represented the concern in the NAC over the January 14 Serena Hotel attack. Greece asked if an impact assessment were underway as to the effect of the attack on civilian operations in Kabul. Portugal noted a January 14 SHAPE intelligence assessment stating OMF were planning high-profile attacks in Kabul. Spain, supported by Ambassador Nuland, asked for more information on the status of OMF intentions and abilities to operate in Kabul. Spanish PermRep Benavides did note the quick reaction of Afghan security forces was encouraging. The Norwegian PermRep stated that they did not believe the attack specifically targeted FM Stoere and expressed official appreciation from Oslo for Allied help in the attack’s aftermath, praising U.S. and Turkish forces, as well as the Czech field hospital whose doctors and nurses treated the wounded. 11. (C/NF) Canadian PermRep McRae thanked the SYG for his update on efforts underway to name a UN senior civilian coordinator for Afghanistan. He stated that if the UNAMA mandate is expanded, NATO will need to look at the recently agreed terms of reference for the NATO SCR, to ensure maximum cooperation. He expressed hope that the new UN coordinator could attend the February 6 – 7 Defense Ministers meeting in Vilnius. The SYG said he would be in touch with the new coordinator immediately after the announcement of his appointment and would look for early opportunities for him to be in contact with NATO and the NAC. Balkans 12. (C/NF) The SYG reported the UN Security Council would meet January 16 to discuss Kosovo and UNMIK’s quarterly report. In the report, UN SYG Ban Ki Moon will announce the readiness of the EU to undertake the ESDP mission and reconfirm NATO’s commitment to maintain KFOR at its present level as reaffirmed by NATO Foreign Ministers in December. The SYG mentioned his phone call with Kosovo’s new Prime Minister, Hacim Thaci, in which the PM assured the SYG that any future steps in Kosovo’s status would only be done in coordination with Allies and the EU. He also assured the SYG that Pristina would eschew provocations to undermine the safe and secure environment during Kosovo’s transition. The D/CMC updated the Council on the deployment of the Italian ORF battalion to Kosovo saying that the deployment, originally scheduled to begin on January 21, has been delayed until February 4 in order to take into account the end of the Serbian presidential election period. The deployment will last for one month. 13. (C/NF) Slovenia gave a readout of its foreign minister’s meeting in Belgrade with Serbian FM Jeremic in which he stressed the importance of continuing efforts to finalize a stabilization and accession agreement (SAA) with the EU, further ICTY cooperation, and ensuring that the upcoming presidential elections strengthen Serbia’s credentials as a European democracy. He said the complex issue of Kosovo should not be linked to Belgrade’s move toward Europe. The Serbian FM responded by acknowledging that Serbia is at a crossroads, pressing for early signing of the SAA, arguing for no linkage between Serbia’s EU aspirations and Kosovo (although he called for further negotiations on status), and placing President Tadic’s chances of re-election at “fifty-fifty.” Jeremic said that Tadic’s Radical opponent was a real competitor. Ambas181

sador Nuland briefed that the U.S. has entered into an intense bilateral engagement with the new Kosovo government on ensuring that, in the event of a declaration of independence, Pristina would commit to doing all in its power to prevent violence and adhere to the principles inherent in the Ahtisaari plan. The engagement is focusing on getting the Kosovo parliament to formally adopt and legalize the elements of the plan and thus ensure a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The UK PermRep followed by stressing the importance of NATO having a public diplomacy strategy on Kosovo. The German PermRep requested that NATO and KFOR provide any additional information regarding reported Serbian plans following the adoption of their “secret plan of action.” The SYG concluded by supporting the UK’s point on the importance of public diplomacy and the need to monitor Serb reaction. Iraq 14. (C/NF) Italian PermRep Stefanini reported on the December 18th graduation of the first class from NTM-I gendarmerie-type training conducted by the Italian Carabinieri at Camp Dublin. The graduation ceremony was well attended by Iraqi government officials, including Interior Minister Bolani, and received excellent media coverage. The second class of 450 Iraqi national police (1st Battalion, 2nd Brigade) started training at Camp Dublin last week. Stefanini said that the aim of the Carabinieri training is to establish basic police procedures – such as investigation technique, combating terrorism, anti-corruption, and crowd control. Maritime Operations 15. (C/NF) The D/CMC, for the sake of brevity, decided to forgo his formal presentation on Russian naval deployments in the Mediterranean, instead, referring PermReps to his weekly operational report to obtain the information. He described the deployments as “very interesting” and “something that hasn’t been seen in a very long while.” AOB 16. (C/NF) D/SYG Bisogniero asked PermReps if the SYG could send a letter to Russian President Putin inviting him to attend the NATO-Russia Council at the Bucharest Summit in April. The PermReps concurred and the letter will be sent via departing Russian Ambassador Totskiy. 17. (C/NF) Dutch PermRep Schaper raised the issue of noise pollution in the Netherlands caused by the take-off and landings of NATO AWACS at NATO Air Base Geilenkirchen, Germany. Reiterating the issues raised in his January 8 letter to the SYG, Schaper underscored that the negative environmental impact caused by the aircraft is becoming a significant political issue in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Council of State has revoked the Dutch government’s plan to cut down trees in the vicinity of the airport runway, as was requested by NATO. In addition, the Dutch Parliament had extensive debate in its early December session asking its government to resolve the issue before March 2008. Without a resolution, Schaper said, “Parliament could impose flight restrictions on the AWACS when flying in Dutch airspace.” He termed an interim NAPMO report on the problem “insufficient” as it did not thoroughly examine the business case for switching the AWACS engines, as stipulated in his letter to the SYG. He reported that a Dutch delegation will visit the three American engine manufacturers to gather relevant
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information needed for the business case model. He also requested that the AWACS issue be discussed at the Vilnius Defense Ministerial in February. 18. (C/NF) D/SYG Bisogniero responded that NAPMO will continue to work with the Dutch on this issue, but noted that NAPMO’s final report is not due until March 2008. He also said that the Private Office will consider the Dutch request to discuss the issue at the Defense Ministerial in Vilnius. Olson

LXI
Reference id: 08BEIRUT350 Subject: Lebanon: Uniiic Commissioner Vows To Leave No Stone Unturned – But Needs U.s. Assistance Origin: Embassy Beirut (Lebanon) Cable time: Fri, 7 Mar 2008 14:14 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08BEIRUT350.html History: First published on Fri, 22 Jul 2011 14:28 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16545 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16461 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16546 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16605 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16606 http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/16703 Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO8705 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHLB #0350/01 0671414 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 071414Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1237 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1107 RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2030 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2293 RHEHNSC/NS WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AB FL PRIORITY Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PRM/FO, INL/FO, IO/FO, L/FO, AND PM/FO NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/GAVITO TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, DEPUTY SECRETARY KIMMITT JUSTICE FOR OIA DIRECTOR WARLOW DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2019 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations],
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PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PINR [Intelligence], PREF [Refugees], MASS [Military Assistance and Sales], SY [Syria], IS [Israel], LE [Lebanon] Ref: BEIRUT 166 BEIRUT 00000350 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Sec tion 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary 1. (C) This is an action request. See paragraphs 13-14. 2. (C) UNIIIC Commissioner and Prosecutor-Designate Daniel Bellemare is as determined as ever to succeed in his mission, but warns that it will take more time and resources before he will be able to issue indictments. Bellemare, who is scheduled to present his next report to the UN Security Council on April 8, would like to travel to Washington April 9 to meet with senior-level USG officials to discuss USG assistance. End summary. Focus, Stamina, and Help from the U.S. 3. (C) The Charge, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, paid an introductory call on UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) Commissioner and Prosecutor-Designate Daniel Bellemare and UNIIIC investigator Stacy de la Torre at UNIIIC headquarters on March 6. Bellemare reiterated his previous message that “failure was not an option,” since it would send a bad message to terrorists in the region. To achieve success UNIIIC, however, needed to keep at it with focus, stamina, and the best possible resources, including help from the U.S. 4. (C) UNIIIC’s workload of 21 cases (the 2005 Hariri assassination plus 20 others) was a “massive” investigation, he stressed. UNIIIC is looking at similar investigations, such as the FBI investigation into the attack on Khobar towers, to understand better how to conduct its business and enlist the cooperation of local authorities and in the international community. Primary Need is Investigative Leads 5. (S) Stressing that time is of the essence, Bellemare reiterated his appeal for member states’ assistance, both in terms of providing intelligence leads and TDY experts on the ground. As Commissioner, he needs investigative leads provided through what UNIIIC would consider “anonymous” tips that would allow him to develop admissible evidence that, once he dons his prosecutor hat, can be used to make indictments. 6. (S) The intelligence community can provide hints on where to look, or where not to look, he said, citing an ICTY example where, following a source’s tip that a certain video existed, the ICTY eventually was able to find this important piece of evidence. For example, Bellemare said, UNIIIC has sketches of potential witnesses whom it will need to identify, but security reasons prevent it from mass distributing them. The U.S. could help by using its network of informants to help identify these people. 7. (C) I will “leave no stone unturned,” Bellemare vowed, “but I need U.S. assistance. Casting the net to see what you catch is fine, but at some point you need to know what you are fishing for.” Bellemare reiterated that the general “menu” of types of assistance needed was an attempt to make it easy for member states to say yes. In terms of personnel, Bellemare said the U.S. could help most by providing experienced investigators to
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conduct “normal police-style” interviews on the ground in Lebanon. He offered to travel to Washington on April 9 to meet with USG officials, adding that meetings with “high level contacts who can open doors” would be greatly appreciated. Fortress UNIIIC 8. (C) UNIIIC operates out of the Monteverde Hotel in the hills outside of Beirut, which is now used exclusively for UNIIIC offices and accommodation for UNIIIC personnel. The “fortress” is protected by 500 military personnel in three perimeters of defense: UN security, Internal Security Forces (ISF), and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Bellemare himself leaves the compound only when necessary and surrounded with a 50-vehicle motorcade. Even his international travel is kept under tight wraps and involves the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (when in Canada) and other security details. Managing Expectations on Indictments 9. (C) Stating that he was confident UNIIIC “will resolve this, but it won’t be overnight,” Bellemare stressed the need to manage expectations on when the Tribunal would be able to issue formal indictments. Repeating what he told us on January 31 (reftel), Bellemare said names of suspects will not be in his next report but will only appear in the indictments. UNIIIC needed to be pragmatic given the challenging security environment. However the report, his first, which he will present to the UN Security Council on April 8, will differ in style and approach and be more direct, he said, sending “clear signals in terms of expectations.” 10. (C) The Charge asked about recent leaks that Hizballah was involved in at least some of the assassinations. Bellemare, who also had heard the rumors, said the information did not come from UNIIIC. (Note: UNIIIC sent us a January 26, 2008 Stratfor article claiming Hizballah carried out the January 25 bombing that killed ISF Captain Wissam Eid, as well as the January 15 attack against a U.S. Embassy vehicle. End note. 11. (C) Bellemare stressed that UNIIIC’s investigation would not be finished on June 15 (when its mandate expires), but he did not know yet how and when UNIIIC would evolve into the Tribunal. The Secretary General must consider three things when deciding when to begin the Tribunal’s operations: finances (i.e., has the UN received funding for the first three years?), the political circumstances, and the progress of the investigation. It was best to avoid a long period between the operational start-up and the first indictment, Bellemare said, to avoid having judges sitting there idly waiting. 12. (C) Bellemare further recalled that indictments in the ICTY and ICC took two years, and the Oklahoma bombing indictments did not happen overnight either, not to speak of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks. “We are not miracle workers,” Bellemare, so there should be “no illusions of immediacy.” However, the fact that the Tribunal had been created despite the fact that the investigations were not complete sent a political message that there would be an end to impunity and that the process was irreversible. The question now was not if but when the Tribunal would get to the end results. “I don’t believe in the perfect crime,” he said, “It’s just a matter of time.” Action Request 13. (C) Bellemare would like to visit Washington on April 9, the day after he presents his report to the UN Security Council. Post requests Department schedule (at a mi185

nimum) meetings with NEA A/S Welch and IO A/S Silverberg. We also strongly recommend a meeting with the Secretary and/or Deputy Secretary, if available. Post requests Department also schedule meetings with the NSC, FBI, and DEA (investigators) at the highest levels appropriate/possible. It would also be useful for a member of Director Mueller’s delegation to stop in Beirut to meet with UNIIIC on the margins of Director Mueller’s upcoming visit to Amman. 14. (S) On assistance, we urge Washington agencies to be forward-leaning in meeting UNIIIC’s requests, especially in terms of providing investigators to conduct interviews and intelligence-sharing. End action request. Sison

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Reference id: 08USUNNEWYORK294 Subject: Fifth Committee Approves Decision Setting New Salary For Icj, Icty And Ictr Judges Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Wed, 2 Apr 2008 21:29 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08USUNNEWYORK294.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0294/01 0932129 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 022129Z APR 08 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4031 INFO RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013 Tags: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences], UUNR, UNGA/C-5 [UN General Assembly Adm and Budget Committee, UN General Assembly Fifth Committee] Ref: A. IO-USUN 03/27/08 E-MAIL B. USUN 232 C. SECSTATE 30035 1. (U) Members of the Fifth Committee (Administrative and budgetary), including USUN as instructed (ref a), formally approved a decision March 28 (full text – see para 10) to set the annual net base salary of members of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) at 158,000 United States dollars plus corresponding post adjustment. The General Assembly is expected to adopt this decision sometime during the week of March 31. The Fifth Committee also approved the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to retain the existing standards of travel for ICJ judges and to maintain the current level of assignment grants afforded ICJ judges. However, Fifth Com186

mittee members did not take action on possible changes to the retirement benefits provided to ICJ members, pending the Committee’s review, expected in May, of a SecretaryGeneral’s report on pensions. 2. (U) The Fifth Committee approved the draft decision on judges’ salaries March 28, following several lengthy and, at times, contentious discussions concerning remuneration for ICJ, ICTY and ICTR judges. The respective registrars of the three courts appeared several times before the Fifth Committee to answer Member States’ questions regarding conditions of service for judges and to advocate paying the judges 170,500 USD per year as previously approved in 2005 by the General Assembly. Select members of the EU, in particular Germany, countered that the GA had revised the salary level for judges in resolution 61/262, bringing such payments in line with the common system by setting annual remuneration per judge at 133,500 USD plus post adjustment. However, taking into account the concerns expressed by the ICJ that proceeding with the salary changes approved in resolution 61/262 would create inequities among the judges, in purported contravention of the ICJ Statute as claimed by ICJ members, the German representative, along with discussion coordinator Tomas Micanek (Czech Republic) and representatives of Japan and some G-77 members, met informally with ICJ Registrar Philippe Couvreur March 14 outside of the Fifth Committee to consider a possible compromise plan based on the following elements: – in the future, a salary system for ICJ, ICTY and ICTR judges will consist of a baseline plus post adjustment as authorized by the General Assembly in resolution 61/262; – the judges’ salary of 133,500 U.S. dollars called for in resolution 61/262 will be revised to a total figure approximating 165,000 Euros (base salary plus post adjustment), but the formula of baseline salary plus post adjustment previously approved by the GA in 61/262 will be maintained; – judges already serving on the courts would receive a one-time compensation payment (lump sum) to balance their reduced salaries. No specific figure was cited as to the amount of the one-time payment. 3. (SBU) In subsequent Fifth Committee discussions, Argentina, on behalf of the G77, said G-77 members supported the notion of equality of salaries for all judges, new and old alike. Second, as per the ICJ Statute, Argentina said that G-77 members felt there could be no decrease in the salaries of currently serving judges. Third, given the GA’s recent experience with Resolution 61/262, the General Assembly should not act if the ICJ judges oppose the Fifth Committee’s views. Singapore asserted that the G-77 would not support any arrangement other than full equality among all the judges. 4. (SBU) USUN/MR said the U.S. endorsed bringing the judges’ salaries in general conformity with the common system approach as decided by the GA in Resolution 61/262 – namely, a base salary plus post adjustment. USUN/MR indicated that the U.S. agreed with those who felt we should not get into the legal issues concerning equality of salaries for judges. The principal matter before the Fifth Committee was a policy one of how much the judges should be paid. USUN/MR also noted that the proposal discussed with the ICJ Registrar, however tentative it might be, to pay the judges a “one-time lump sum” raised concerns that merited further discussion among Fifth Committee members. The proposed salary amount of 155,000-158,000 U.S. dollars per judge also was a matter for further Committee consideration, both in view of the 133,000 USD level adopted in 61/262 and in view of the salaries paid to under secretaries-general. 5. (SBU) With time in the Fifth Committee’s first resumed session running out, G77 members modified their negotiating position and accepted the proposed compromise
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salary figure of 158,000 USD for the judges plus post adjustment, but NO lump-sum payment. EU members as well as Japan and members of the CANZ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) also committed to proceed with this approach as the only viable way forward, since ICJ Registrar Couvreur subsequently advised the Fifth Committee that the ICJ judges would be willing to accept this proposal. Consistent with guidance to keep salary levels in the general range of that set in 61/262 and with a view that the salary of the next highest paid official in the Organization is set at 164,000 USD (i.e., the administrator for UNDP, just behind the D/SYG and SYG), the U.S. joined consensus and agreed to support the compromise language contained in the draft decision that was formally approved by the Fifth Committee on March 28. Retention Incentives 6. (U) The respective Chiefs of Administration of ICTY and ICTR were present for the Fifth Committee’s informal consultations on the proposals as outlined in the SYG’s Report (A/62/681) to offer incentives to retain the services of ICTY and ICTR personnel as each tribunal moves closer to completing its mandated tasks. Member States were in agreement on the importance of encouraging both tribunals to offer their respective staffs non-monetary incentives to remain with the Courts as long as possible. ICTY‘s Chief of Administration noted that both of the tribunals already were implementing measures, such as in-house training workshops, permission to seek short-term assignments with other UN bodies, and assistance in securing onward assignments, that were designed to ease the concerns of tribunal personnel regarding their employment opportunities once the tribunals complete their work. 7. (U) Views among Member States regarding the offer of financial incentives to retain tribunal staff varied. G-77 members, as articulated by Argentina, expressed support for the proposal contained in the Secretary-General’s report to offer tribunal employees one month’s additional salary for every full year worked. Although the SYG report capped such additional payments at 5 months’ salary, even for those who had worked for the tribunals more than five years, Argentina said the G-77 supported the notion of offering long-serving employees up to 10 months’ salary as a retention incentive. Germany, on behalf of the European Union, sought information concerning the cost of extending contracts for current personnel to the end of each tribunal’s mandate, rather than pay one month’s salary for each year worked. By contrast, both Japan and Russia opposed payment of any financial incentives, since, as Russia pointed out, such incentives were not a part of the common system. Japan reiterated its support for non-monetary incentives, but ruled out bonus payments as proposed in the SYG’s report. In light of continued disagreement among delegations, the Fifth Committee took no action on the SYG’s proposal to offer tribunal personnel retention incentives. Judges’ Pensions 8. (U) Concerning possible modification of existing retirement benefits for ICJ, ICTY and ICTR judges, Sandra Haji-Ahmed, Officer-in-Charge of Human Resources Management, advised the Fifth Committee that the Secretariat was poised to hire a consulting firm (Mercer) to study possible options pension schemes, which will be reported to the Committee during its second resumed session in May. Fifth Committee members therefore decided to defer consideration of this matter until May.
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Comment 9. (C) The decision brings the approach to determining the salaries of ICJ judges generally into line with the common system (i.e., salary plus post adjustment), to be adjusted on a regular and objective basis as with other participants in the common system. This approach avoids the sui generis approach to these matters previously followed. It also should obviate the practice of the Chief Judge and other judges on the ICJ from lobbying Member States on these issues. This practice has been criticized by Member States because of the apparent conflict of interest of judges lobbying Member States that are or may be appearing in cases or matters before the Court, although Member States were reluctant to raise this issue publicly. It was felt that the matter of salaries of the judges should be left to the SYG, the Controller and the Secretariat to address with the GA in a regular manner, with the Chief Judge participating only in a formal manner in presentations to the Committee. Having resolved the issue of salaries, this conflict of interest concern should not again arise in that context. However, there is a risk that this issue of apparent conflict may arise in connection with the outstanding issue of pensions. USUN urges the Department to consider how to deal with the issue if it does arise in that or other contexts. End comment. 10. (U) Text of draft decision approved March 28 by the Fifth Committee: Begin text: Draft Decision Submitted by the Vice-Chairman following Informal Consultations The General Assembly, having considered the report of the Secretary-General (A/62/538 and Add. I) and the related report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/62/7/Add.36): a) endorses the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as contained in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its report; b) Decides to set, effective 1 April 2008, the annual net base salary of the members of the International Court of Justice and judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at 158,000 United States dollars, with a corresponding post adjustment multiplier equal to 1 per cent of the net base salary, to which would be applied the post adjustment multiplier for the Netherlands or the United Republic of Tanzania, as appropriate, taking into account the adjustment mechanism as proposed by the Secretary-General in paragraph 77 of his report; c) recalls paragraph 11 of its resolution 61/262 of 4 April 2007, and decides to revert to the issue of the pension scheme during the second part of its resumed sixty-second session. End text. Khalilzad

LXIII
Reference id: 08USNATO130 Subject: Readout Of North Atlantic Council Meeting – April 9, 2008 Origin: Mission USNATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Cable time: Mon, 14 Apr 2008 05:20 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08USNATO130.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments
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VZCZCXRO7003 OO RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV DE RUEHNO #0130/01 1050520 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 140520Z APR 08 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1783 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0536 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0202 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0513 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0701 RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0566 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0488 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0886 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0484 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 1176 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0386 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0779 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0484 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0724 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0624 Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 Tags: NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], PREL [External Political Relations], AF [Afghanistan] Classified By: Charge Walter S. Reid for reasons 4.1 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary from the NAC Meeting: – Afghanistan: The NATO IS was tasked to lay out how ISAF’s &internal plan8 agreed at Bucharest will be implemented. Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) General Henault announced the opening of a Border Coordination Center in Nangarhar. SHAPE anticipated a gradual increase in the presence of enemy fighters and attacks over the 2008 fighting season. The Canadian PermRep called for a discussion on reconciliation issues in Afghanistan. The UK PermRep said poppy eradication was off to a slower start this year compared to last, though the GIRoA had targeted some formerly &untouchable8 high-level targets this year. Lithuania announced a 50,000-euro contribution to ISAF’s Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund, and Denmark requested a tally from NATO of new ISAF force offers at Bucharest, and the resulting status of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). – Balkans: Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer highlighted the urgency of UNMIK-EU coordination following adoption of Kosovo Constitution, and stated that he will discuss and issue an Initiating Directive to allow national military authorities to develop a revised Balkans Operational Plan. – Africa ) Support to the AU: SYG informed Council about his meeting with AU Commissioner Jean Ping when they discussed AU’s request for NATO’s assistance to the African Standby Force. – Iraq: The SYG reminded PermReps of PM Maliki’s visit to NATO next week, in which he will give his assessment of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and his perspective on the future of Iraq’s engagement with NATO. The CMC noted that during the last two weeks, there has been a significant increase in the number of attacks on Coalition Forces in Baghdad in reaction to the GOI operations in Basra. – CMX ‘08: The Director of NATO’s Crisis Exercising and Management System briefed the NAC on the NATO Crisis Management Exer190

cise 2008 (CMX-08), NATO’s annual political-military exercise involving NATO Headquarters (IS/IMS), ACO, ACT, and the 26 allied capitals. UNDPKO, UNOCHA, UNHCR, OSCE, and EU have been invited as observers. – Update on HQ Management Issues: The A/SYG for Executive Management (EM) briefed PermReps on a wide range of management issues currently under discussion in the Civil Budget Committee (CBC), including the fragile state of the current building’s infrastructure, the ongoing “selective refit” aimed at improving public/visitor areas in the present building, the need for expanded space following the membership invitation issued to at least two new allies during the Bucharest Summit, the ongoing effort to revitalize the HQ information technology (IT) infrastructure, HQ reform and issues related to transitioning to a new NATO HQ building. Several nations weighed in on the budget implications these issues might have. – Statements on Political Subject:s: The Italian Deputy PermRep provided a readout of recent discussions at the United Nations on peacekeeping operations. – AOB: DCM Olson remarked on the adoption of travel restrictions on Iranian officials due to Iran’s continued violation of prior UNSC resolutions regarding nuclear proliferation. End Summary. 2. (C) Afghanistan: The SYG stated that now that Heads of State and Government had endorsed NATO’s internal, classified &Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan,8 he had tasked A/SYG for Operations Martin Howard with proposing a way ahead to implement the actions outlined in the plan. Howard will report to PermReps &in short order.8 The SYG also looked forward to the April 16 NAC with UN SRSG Kai Eide, which will be in ISAF format. 3. (C) CMC General Henault briefed on the March 29 establishment of a Border Coordination Center (BCC) along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Camp Torkham, Nangarhar province, near the Khyber Pass. A second BCC is scheduled to be established near Lwara, Paktika province, in late summer. CMC Henault stated that ultimately there will be a total of six RC-E BCCs, three on the Afghanistan side of the border and three on the Pakistan side. Calling the BCCs a &decisive step forward,8 and a tangible deliverable from the Tripartite Commission, he briefed that the intent of the BCCs is to establish, at the tactical level, a forum for the daily liaison and coordination between RC East, the ANSF, PAKMIL and the Pakistan Frontier Corps. BCCs will also work closely with the Joint Intelligence Operations Center at ISAF HQ, which is jointly manned by Afghan, Pakistani and ISAF personnel. 4. (S) SHAPE Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations MG Wright noted that the seasonal infiltration of hardcore fighters from Pakistan into Afghanistan is underway, though SHAPE intelligence assessments expect the movement to be more gradual than in years past. SHAPE anticipates the 2008 fighting season for Opposing Militant Forces (OMF) to begin slowly and gradually increase, with continued emphasis on small-scale direct and indirect attacks, and the use of large-scale operations exclusively against isolated, poorly protected District Centers and isolated, weak Afghan National Security Forces. In RC-S, it is assessed the OMF will attempt to expand their influence in Pashtun areas with low ISAF and ANSF presence, the Haqani network will continue to pose a threat in RCE and seek to threaten RC-Capital, while the OMF will seek to exploit opportunities in Pashtun pockets of RC-N and RC-W. On Pakistan, MG Wright noted that it is too early to judge the effect of the new government’s policies on ISAF and the PAKMIL, but current assessments indicate the government is moving away from the use of military force in the border regions, and that the Pakistani Taliban has taken a hard bargaining position
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in response to initial entreaties from the government for talks. MG Wright briefed that the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit has reached full operational capacity, and its first task will be to establish a company-sized FOB at Camp Rhino on the Kandahar-Helmand border by April 20. 5. (C) In the following discussion period, Canadian PermRep McRae, citing a recent update from the NATO SCR circulated to PermReps, stated he would like SCR Jochems to brief the NAC on the status of Afghan-led reconciliation efforts, to include National Front talks with the Taliban and the role of the PTS program. The SYG said he would pass along the message, as Jochems would brief the NAC via DVC in the coming weeks. 6. (C) UK PermRep Eldon gave a quick eradication update, citing that 6,000 hectares of poppy had been eradicated thus far, but that based on where we are in the growing season, which started later this year, eradication numbers are comparably worse thus far than they were in 2007. He noted reports of significant Governor-led eradication in Nangarhar and Kandahar provinces, but the UNODC has been unable to verify figures thus far. He did state that for the first time, ex-Helmand police chief Haji Abdul Rahman’s extensive fields were eradicated, costing him approximately 20% of his crop, and speculated that some of the recent attacks on the Poppy Eradication Force have resulted from the Afghan government finally breaking this &bubble of impunity8 around some key figures. 7. (C) Lithuanian PermRep Linkevicius announced a 50,000-euro contribution to ISAF’s Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund. 8. (C) Danish PermRep Poulsen-Hansen asked that the NATO International Military Staff and International Staff provide a consolidated summary of all ISAF force contributions made at Bucharest. The SYG admitted that tallying new contributions, versus old contributions simply confirmed at Bucharest, and which contributions applied to the CJSOR and which did not had been difficult, and CMC Henault stated that NATO military authorities were working on a consolidated list that would show new contributions, as well as the status of ISAF’s CJSOR post-Bucharest. 9. (C) Balkans: The SYG noted that Kosovo’s draft constitution, adopted by the constitutional commission in Pristina, was certified by International Civilian Representative Peter Feith on April 2 as in compliance with the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo status settlement. Kosovo authorities signed the document which was now being considered by the Kosovo Assembly for its ratification with an entry into force scheduled for June 15. In this regard, the SYG stressed the urgency for ensuring adequate preparations for the upcoming transition between UNMIK and the EULEX Missions, a theme he underscored to U.N. SYG Ban-Ki Moon during their bilateral in Bucharest. The SYG also noted for the Council that ICTY’s not guilty verdict of the former Kosovo Prime Minister Haradinaj could have a potential impact on politics in Kosovo, particularly upon the return of the latter to Pristina. The SYG noted that the next meeting of the International Steering Group will take place in Vienna on April 17 and that DA/SYG for Operations, James Pardew, will represent NATO at this meeting. Lastly, the SYG informed the Council that he will issue the NAC Initiating Directive which will provide NATO’s national military authorities with the necessary guidance to develop the 3rd revision of the Balkans Joint Operations Plan to be endorsed by the Military Committee and approved by the NAC no later than 90 days after the issuance of this directive. The SYG intends to
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first have an informal discussion on this directive with PermReps next week prior to seeking their approval. 10. (C) General Li Gobbi from IMS provided a situational update in Kosovo, informing that recent visits to Kosovo by Serbian politicians such as SRS leader, Tomislav Nikolic, have drawn large crowds in the Serbian enclaves, but so far have not incited violence. Likewise, the announcement of the Haradinaj verdict led to celebrations from Kosovo Albanians in the western region. KFOR continues to have an increased operational tempo and that the German ORF Battalion, having just completed operational rehearsals in Kosovo, will stay in Kosovo until the end of May, past the Serbian elections on May 11. On April 4, COMKFOR added the Courthouse in northern Mitrovica to the KFOR list of Properties Designated with Special Status (PrDSS) and, as a result, will enable COMKFOR to ensure that adequate protection is provided including designating an exclusion zone around the courthouse in the event of further violence. In response to a Polish question, Li Gobbi said that UNMIK continues to secure the courthouse, but KFOR maintains a visible presence. 11. (C/NF) Slovenia informed the Council of the results from the March 28-29 meeting of EU Foreign Ministers, which was notable for the attendance of Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremic and Kosovo Prime Minister Thaci. Belgium, highlighting the SYG’s concern regarding synchronization of the international actors on Kosovo, requested to know if it was possible for all three organizations – UN, EU, and NATO – to start having an intensified dialogue regarding the transition and, if so, how could that be accomplished. The UK, while supportive of the idea, cautioned that Allies need to think carefully beforehand in order to achieve what we want from the coordination. While Spain noted general support for the Belgian idea, and toward receiving the NAC Initiating Directive, the Spanish PermRep noted the importance of monitoring the debate in New York over UNMIK’s future. He then inquired as to KFOR’s role regarding a recent revision of planning for a KFOR fragmentary operational order (FRAGO) on deterring &civil disobedience,8 stating that the NAC needs to be kept informed of any change to KFOR’s mandate. General Li Gobbi responded by saying that KFOR has a role in support of this mission in accordance with its mandate and promised to keep NATO’s military authorities properly informed. The SYG concluded by responding to the Belgian proposal noting the difficulties of getting the three bodies together to discuss Kosovo, but that he hoped General DeKermabon would be able to brief the PSC next week on how the EULEX mission will transition into Kosovo. The SYG also highlighted that the emphasis on transition and any reconfiguration of UNMIK needs to be discussed in New York, and that currently there is no agreement on the Security Council regarding what course to follow. 12. (C) Africa ) Support to the AU: SYG informed Council about his meeting Monday with AU Commissioner Jean Ping. Ping stressed the desire by the AU to deepen relations with NATO, and he reiterated the AU’s request for NATO’s assistance to the African Standby Force. 13. (C) Iraq: The SYG reminded PermReps of PM Maliki’s visit to NATO next week, saying that the PM would give his assessment of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), as well as his perspective on the future of Iraq’s engagement with NATO. 14. (C) The CMC noted that during the last two weeks, there has been a significant increase in the number of attacks on Coalition Forces in Baghdad, especially in the Sadr City and New Baghdad neighborhoods, a reaction to the GOI operations in Basra. Fifty193

four of the attacks targeted facilities used, or frequented by NTM-I personnel. One NATO soldier – a Hungarian – was slightly injured during the attacks and returned to work the same day. These attacks have not had any impact on NTM-I training. 15. (C) CMX ‘08: Mr. Ilay Ferrier, Head, Crisis Exercising and Management System to briefed NAC on the NATO Crisis Management Exercise 2008 (CMX-08) to be held 16-22 April. CMX is an annual political-military exercise involving NATO Headquarters (IS/IMS), ACO, ACT, and the 26 allied capitals. NATO partners Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Israel, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, and Ukraine are invited to participate. UNDPKO, UNOCHA, UNHCR, OSCE, and EU are invited as observers. The purpose of the exercise is to practice NATO’s Crisis Management procedures and to test NATO’s ability to respond to a developing crisis. 16. (SBU) The CMX-08 area of operations includes a fictitious island in the Indian Ocean. Key catalysts for possible NATO assistance / intervention include the breakdown of internal security, tensions with neighboring states, humanitarian and IDP problems, and an emerging CBR and terror threat to the international presence. 17. (SBU) As part of the exercise scenario, there will be a fictitious UN invitation to NATO to conduct non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation under a UN mandate aimed at enhancing stability and regional security. 18. (C) France, commenting on the scenario, underlined that NATO could not deploy without an additional UNSCR and questioned the extensive list of partners planned for involvement in the exercise, including the incorporation on non-EAPC partners. (Note: the two new partners are from the Mediterranean Dialogue: Israel and Morocco. We presume France is alluding to a reluctance to include Israel in this exercise planning, even though France already agreed to all the partners, inclusion in earlier planning conferences. End Note.) The Netherlands suggested NATO’s mandate could be based on a more flexible foundation and asked whether the scenario addressed an invitation by the fictitious host country, which an exercise coordinator later confirmed the scenario would have the host country provide. 19. (C) Update on HQ Management Issues: The A/SYG for Executive Management (EM), Doug Dempster, briefed PermReps on a wide range of management issues currently under discussion in the Civil Budget Committee (CBC). His purpose was to make PermReps aware of these issues early. The CBC will discuss the same issues next week at an away day. The NAC will take them up again next month, in an informal setting, as it considers the 2009 – 2013 Medium Term Financial Plan (MTFP). Topics covered include the fragile state of the current building’s infrastructure (evidenced by large portions of roof that blew off the Norwegian Delegation’s space in March), the ongoing “selective refit” aimed at improving public/visitor areas in the present building, the need for expanded space following the membership invitation issued to at least two new allies during the Bucharest Summit, the ongoing effort to revitalize the HQ information technology (IT) infrastructure, HQ reform (including human resource management improvements) and issues related to transitioning to a new NATO HQ building. For the 2009 – 2013 MTFP, A/SYG Dempster identified “push” (immediate impact) and “pull” (future impact of issues already on the horizon) factors that may influence the MTFP. While he did not state so explicitly, A/SYG Dempster’s implication was that the budgets will have to be reconsidered. Several nations, including France and Germany, called for strict inter194

pretation of NATO’s zero real growth policy. Other nations, including the United States, Canada and The Netherlands, accepted the concept of zero real growth, but emphasized the need for flexibility to respond to issues as they arise. 20. (C) Statements on Political Subject:s: The Italian Deputy PermRep provided a readout of recent discussions at the United Nations on peacekeeping operations. He noted the delivery of reports on the success of sanctions against North Korea and on the progress made by UNAMIG, which will be discussed on Monday with an eye towards renewing its mandate. It was also emphasized that UNAFIL has also recently been an important topic of discussion at the UN. 21. (C) AOB: DCM Olson remarked on the adoption of travel restrictions on Iranian officials due to Iran’s continued violation of prior UNSC resolutions regarding nuclear proliferation. He urged Allies to remain vigilant to the de facto travel ban on selected individuals. Reid

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Reference id: 08BELGRADE452 Subject: Serbia: If The Radicals Win Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 7 May 2008 13:37 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BELGRADE452.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO7448 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #0452/01 1281337 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 071337Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0258 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0367 Hide header

Confidential
E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/7/2018 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], PHUM [Human Rights], Tags:, SR [Serbia] Classified By: Jennifer Brush, DCM, Embassy Belgrade, State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) Summary 1. (SBU) A victory of the war crimes indictee Vojislav Seselj-led Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the May 11 parliamentary elections would bring to power a leadership with no international experience and little common ground on the U.S. or EU priorities for democratic and economic development in region. A Radical-led government would fight for Kosovo, fight corruption, oppose privatization and economic reform, fight western influence in regional affairs, and establish closer ties with Russia. Cooperation with
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the international war crimes tribunal would stop and, with it, formal progress toward Serbia’s membership in the European Union. Government support for human rights and other civil society concerns would decline or disappear. Given the reactionary nature of a Radical government, public support might be short-lived. Democratic Party insiders suggest that President Tadic might refuse to approve a Radical government list and would in short order call for new elections, with the hope of mobilizing a greater democratic turnout, in reaction to what they would bill as a brush with disaster. End Summary. Populist Platform 2. (SBU) Serbia’s May 11 parliamentary elections are too close to call, but the most recent and reliable polling data available to the Embassy puts the Radical Party less than two percentage points ahead of President Tadic’s “For a European Serbia” coalition. While SRS local leader Tomislav Nikolic (Seselj, the party leader runs the party in absentia from a jail cell in the Hague) has invited Prime Minister Kostunica to declare his party’s coalition interests, neither the PM nor any other major party leader has done so, presumably for fear of losing votes of those on the political extremes of their respective parties. In any event, Embassy, and most local political analysts, believes DSS support would be essential and might be sufficient for SRS to achieve a parliamentary majority to form a government. 3. (SBU) SRS campaign literature and speeches reflect a platform that addresses bread-and-butter issues of Serbia’s middle and lower economic strata. The principal planks are: – Keeping Kosovo; – Eliminating official corruption and crime; – Returning to a heavily subsidized economy and reducing unemployment; – Addressing privatization of Serbia’s public assets; – Making private housing affordable; – Developing/prioritizing the agricultural sector through the development of cooperatives and an agricultural bank; – Pension reform; – Free healthcare; and – Free education. The SRS platform has remained constant while the party has been in opposition, and has successfully won the party the largest share of seats in Parliament, currently with 82 of 250. A Radical Government 4. (SBU) In forming a government, the SRS leadership would face two significant hurdles: a party president leading from a prison cell and lack of talent and experience. Braca Grubacic, the editor of the widely-distributed VIP English language news digest, told poloff on May 5 that staffing the ministries would be a challenge, with no more than 30 or 40 SRS members capable of serving in government. Grubacic said that Seselj still influenced the party, planned to return to Serbia, and would try to reclaim the party presidency. Seselj, Grubacic said, would try to block Nikolic from becoming Prime Minister and insist, instead, that SRS cede the post to Kostunica, in exchange for DSS support. Nikolic would presumably serve as Deputy PM. Even War Criminals Can’t Get along 5. (C) In a February meeting with a local OSCE official, Nikolic himself revealed a strained relationship with Seselj. Seselj, he said, had tried to take over active leadership of the party and election campaigning from The Hague, a dangerous step in Nikolic’s opinion, and one that led Nikolic to consider leaving the party. Nikolic told the OSCE official that “times had changed” and, he implied, Seselj’s time had passed. He said that Se196

selj was “a stubborn personality who would never seek compromise with other political leaders.” Novi Sad Mayor Maya Gojkovic told DCM on two occasions that she had left the Radicals because Nikolic refused to stand up to Seselj and move the party out of the shadow of an indicted war criminal. 6. (SBU) Nikolic has publicly stated that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the party of former Serbian President and indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, would not be part of a ruling coalition with SRS – despite the SRS having previously served alongside SPS during the Milosevic era. Nikolic has stated he expected SRS would be able to “destroy” SPS during the campaign. SPS, on the other hand, is enjoying its role as kingmaker with its projected 7%, and at this point is only saying its natural role is with Kostunica and DSS. Though SPS President Dacic continues to deny in the press he would agree to govern with Tadic’s coalition, senior DS advisors tell us the SPS deal is “done” in exchange for DS support for SPS candidacy for the Socialist International. Foreign Affairs 7. (SBU) The SRS lack of experience in foreign affairs would make them particularly vulnerable to pressure to cede the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the DSS. This would be a mistake, said Grubacic, since Kostunica’s currency with the west was so low. Kostunica could sink them before they started, he said. 8. (SBU) A Radical government, Grubacic said, would have one foreign policy objective: to convince the country and the international community of Serbia’s political and economic stability. Nikolic has publicly stated that he welcomed international investment and he told Grubacic that he would respect pre-existing deals, even with the west. Grubacic thought that the Radicals would lean hard on Serbia’s foreign currency reserves to “ride out” the first six months and keep Serbia stable. (More on the Radicals probable economic policy to follow septel.) 9. (SBU) Grubacic claimed that the Radicals did not really care about the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, which Serbia signed (and the DS celebrated) on April 29, over the objection of PM Kostunica. In fact, the SRS has hardly mentioned it during the campaign, and Grubasic said that SRS Secretary General Vucic had told him that the party did not believe it would influence voters significantly. Nikolic has repeatedly said that he did not oppose Serbia’s joining the European Union, insisting that it do so “on Serbia’s terms – i.e., with Kosovo. No Cooperation with ICTY 10. (SBU) One of the SRS’s main campaign planks was stopping cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), a prerequisite for EU ratification of the SAA with Serbia. “Nobody in Serbia will be indicted by The Hague Tribunal... and not one Serb will be handed over to The Hague,” he told a Moscow daily. Cooperation with Russia and Select Friends 11. (SBU) Nikolic insists that an SRS government would not lead to Serbia’s isolation; but has made clear that he seeks to prioritize strengthening Serbia’s relationship with Russia. In an interview with a Moscow daily, quoted in online news outlets on May 6, he said, “We plan to develop relations with Serbia’s true friends, among whom Russia holds a crucial place. Serbia also has to cooperate closely with China, India, Arab and African
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countries, as well as with the EU.” In the same interview, Nikolic suggested that, after the elections, Serbia would address Russian-Serbian political-military cooperation. Demonstrating the SRS special friendship with Russia, at a May 2 SRS rally, the Russian Ambassador to Serbia appeared onstage, at Nikolic’s side. At the SRS closing campaign rally in Belgrade, May 6, Heinz-Christian Strache, head of the Austrian Freedom Party (of Jorge Haider), spoke onstage in support of the Radical Party. Radical MOD 12. (SBU) SRS leadership could stall the most positive element of the U.S.-Serbia bilateral relationship– our political-military relationship. – Serbia’s Constitution reserves to the Presidency oversight of the military, and Serbia’s Chief of Defense (CHOD), General Ponos, reports to President Tadic. While an SRS MinDef would have the authority to halt military cooperation and joint exercises, and could equip and move troops, he would lack authority to deploy them in battle. Only the CHOD, under presidential order, could send the armed forces into combat. The general belief is that President Tadic will insist that General Ponos stay on as CHOD if the SRS assumes the position of MinDef. This would give the President some leverage with the SRS MinDef. The bottom line with an SRS led Ministry of Defense would be stagnation. Cooperation with NATO would likely cease. Interior 13. (SBU) SRS will need this ministry to fulfill its anti-corruption campaign promises and some analysts variously suggest Vucic or party Vice President Dragan Todorovic for the job. DSS will likely try to hold onto this post, although the incapacitation of current Interior Minister Jocic (paralyzed in an automobile accident in early 2008) has left a void at the head of the ministry, now run out of the PM’s office. Other Ministries 14. (SBU) In addition to the PM’s office, Interior, and Intelligence, DSS may put up a fight for the Kosovo Ministry. SRS vice presidents and party leaders would likely fill remaining cabinet seats. The list below is purely speculative, especially with respect to specific ministries, but might include: Milorad Mircic (Agriculture), head of the Vojvodina Radicals, member of parliament, and Minister for the Diaspora in the 1998 government of Mirko Marijanovic; Dragan Todorovic (Economy), president of the SRS Executive Council, engineer, member of parliament, Minister of Transportation and Communications in the Marijanovic government; Gordana Pop Lazic (Local Administration), Mayor of Zemun, Minister of Local Self Government under Marijanovic, former MP, SRS vice president; Jorgovanka Tabakovic (Finance), MP, economist; Nemanja Sarovic (Youth), head of Belgrade SRS branch; Bozidar Delic (Defense): Retired general (under Milosevic), MP, member of defense and security committee; and Zoran Krasic (Justice), lawyer, Seselj defense advisor. A Chill on Civil Liberties 15. (C) A Radical government will threaten civil liberties. In a live debate televised on B92 on May 5, SRS VP and Mayor of Zemun, Gordana Pop Lazic said that the SRS “will have to fight the media that supports Euro-integrational forces, because these for198

ces are destructive, and with the NGOs that are doing the same thing.” NUNS, the independent association of journalists released a statement in response to Lazic’s remarks, noting that this was “not the first time that the SRS openly frightened journalists, politicians, and citizens of Serbia who do not think radically.” NUNS recalled that the previous Radical government introduced legislation authorizing censorship and “one of the worst media laws ever.” The youth NGO No Alternative to Europe similarly expressed concerns that “when the Radicals come to power, there will be no freedom of speech.” To the OSCE, Nikolic said, “We don’t mind if you internationals stay, but don’t expect government support.” Comment 16. (C) For nearly eight years, democratic forces have struggled with reform in Serbia. For the first time, their opponents (with a boost from Prime Minister Kostunica) may be able to halt the reform process. If this happens, it will be in part because of the democrats’ failure to end corruption or contain unemployment. It would also be a result of nationalist forces exploiting anger over Kosovo’s independence. Should the Radicals come to power, Serbia’s reforms will stall. 17. (C) Comment continued: For the U.S., a Radical government will be a hostile government. While we must remain engaged with a country that has strong economic and military potential and is a natural leader in the region, we will need to calibrate any response to a Radical government carefully: we must continue to support those in Serbia who envision a free and democratic future in Europe while making it very clear to such a government when its actions are unacceptable. End Comment. Munter

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Reference id: 08BRUSSELS748 Subject: U.s.-eu Consultations On Western Balkans Issues Origin: USEU Brussels (Europe) Cable time: Mon, 19 May 2008 07:30 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BRUSSELS748.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO8392 PP RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #0748/01 1400730 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 190730Z MAY 08 – ZDK – FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018
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Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], EUN [European Union], ZL [Balkan States] Ref: USEU BRUSSELS 714 BRUSSELS 00000748 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Larry Wohlers for reasons 1 .4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary: EUR/SCE Director Chris Hoh discussed Kosovo, Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina, Macedonia, and the EU’s enlargement process with EU and member state officials during the May 7 U.S.-EU troika consultations on Western Balkans (COWEB) and during separate meetings on the margins. On Kosovo, EU interlocutors highlighted positive political developments in the fledgling country, but noted that the slower-thanexpected pace of international recognitions of independence was worrying. The EU discussed their late-April signing of a Stabilization and Association agreement with Serbia and its value to pro-European parties ahead of elections. The U.S. and EU sides agreed that whatever the electoral results, Belgrade’s policy on Kosovo would not change. Hoh pressed the EU on quickly signing an SAA with Bosnia, and while EU interlocutors supported the objective and said that the agreement would be signed in mid-June, they argued that Bosnia should be focused less on the politics of the timing of the signing and more on the reforms that will soon be required. EU and member state officials emphasized Macedonia’s European perspective, but some interlocutors privately told Hoh that the Greece-Macedonia name issue was becoming increasingly difficult to handle within the EU. Finally, European Commission officials promoted their efforts to reaffirm the European future for all the countries in the region. End Summary. Kosovo 2. (C) Council Secretariat Deputy Director for the Western Balkans Michael Giffoni opened the discussion on Kosovo by describing internal political developments as positive, noting that parliament has adopted the bulk of laws required for settlement implementation, with the rest to be adopted by 15 June. He drew attention to Prime Minister Thaci’s 100-day report, noting that it provoked authentic political debate in Kosovo. Giffoni articulated the EU’s policy on recognition, which is that each member state will recognize on its own accord. While allowing that 19 out of the 27 EU members have recognized, he argued that the international process of recognition is a more worrying one, and emphasized that increased rcognition among the developing world countries would have a positive impact on Kosovo’s prospects at the UN and international financial institutions. He underscored the need to make progress with Kosovo’s regional neighbors as well, and noted recent encouraging statements from Montenegro and Macedonia. (Note: Discussions on UNMIK reconfiguration and EULEX Kosovo are reported reftel). 3. (C) On economic and assistance issues, Genoveva Ruiz Calavera, Head of Unit for Kosovo Issues at the European Commission (EC), said that the EU has not yet announced the date of the Kosovo donor’s conference – anticipated to be July 11 – for fear of affecting the May 11 Serbian election outcomes. Noting that some technical details still need to be discussed, she said that the EU will invite nations at the level of Western Balkans Directors and hopes to include representatives from countries who have not recognized Kosovo in addition to officials from nations that have recognized. She added that the World Bank will not co-sponsor the conference but will provide technical support and the EU will continue to work to ensure that the Bank does not stray from its commitments. Ruiz Calavera said that working with the Kosovo government has been difficult
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because the government has not yet appointed the relevant ministers. Speaking privately to Hoh on the margins of the meeting, she said that the EU could not match the funds being provided to Kosovo Serbs by Belgrade. She added that the Commission was having difficulty spending the assistance targeted for the Serb populations due to hardline intimidation of those who want to cooperate. 4. (C) In response to a question about U.S. efforts on increasing recognitions from French Director for Europe Jacques Faure, EUR/SCE Director Hoh said that the U.S. has focused recently on Latin American nations. He also noted that Kosovo recognitions have been coming faster than in almost all recent cases of new states and emphasized the efforts the U.S. has made working with Islamic and African nations, noting that there could be specific opportunities to work with Africa at the African Union Summit later this summer. Hoh encouraged the EU institutions and governments to engage with other international partners and underscored that lobbying for recognition is likely to be more successful if it is seen as a European project. Alix Everhard, Counselor for Balkans issues at the French Permanent Representation to the EU, separately expressed concern to Hoh about the pace of international recognitions, noting the need to maintain momentum. She said that the French are focusing especially on Africa and Latin America, specifically Ecuador and Colombia. Everhard added that the stability of Kosovo and deployment of the EULEX mission will be key priorities under the upcoming French EU presidency. 5. (C) In a separate conversation, European Commission Director for Western Balkans Pierre Mirel (please protect) privately bemoaned the lack of leadership on Kosovo both within the EU and within the government of Kosovo. Mirel worried that the new administration in Kosovo was not working hard enough on making reforms and argued that the GoK needs to make a better effort to explain its new laws and constitution to the municipalities. Mirel also drew Hoh’s attention to the upcoming election of a new patriarch for the Orthodox Church in Kosovo, likely in late May. Noting that the new leader would be sure to have an impact on political developments, he explained that he had proposed bringing together bishops from Serbia and Kosovo for a conference on “What is the EU?” and was hoping to receive confirmation from the bishops soon. Serbia 6. (C) Slovenian Head of Southeast Europe Division Leon Marc started the discussion on Serbia by highlighting the EU’s April 29 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) signing. He noted that the internal discussion among EU Ministers was long and demanding, but the move gave the Serbian pro-EU forces the boost that they needed ahead of the May 11 elections. Because implementation of the SAA is subject to unanimous agreement by member states and Serbia’s compliance with its ICTY obligations, the credibility and legitimacy of the accession process was preserved. Marc went on to highlight the announcement of the EU’s visa liberalization roadmap with Serbia which further demonstrated the “tangibility of the European perspective.” He added that France and Germany have recently increased scholarship opportunities for Serbian students. Marc concluded by warning that the U.S. and EU should not expect changes in the way that Serbia deals with the Kosovo issue, but added that whatever new government emerged after the elections should be judged by its deeds, not its rhetoric, a sentiment that was separately shared with Hoh by Everhard and UK Counselor for CFSP, ESDP and Enlargement Issues, Angus Lapsley.
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7. (C) Hoh underscored the U.S. commitment to working with the EU to help Serbia on its path to Euro-Atlantic integration and expressed appreciation for the EU’s creative approach to signing the SAA ahead of the elections. He agreed with the EU’s assertion that we must judge the new Serbian government by its actions, and noted the importance of holding a democratically-elected government to the same standards as we would elsewhere. The U.S. and EU will need to maintain a clear message to Serbia about what is expected for full partnership. Bosnia-Herzegovina 8. (C) Leading the conversation on BiH, Hoh highlighted a number of positive recent political developments which could signal a more pragmatic approach from the leadership, including a compromise on electoral rules in Srebrenica and agreements on moveable defense property and police reform. Saying that the EU is “a powerful incentive for Bosnia,” Hoh noted the EU’s April 29 announcement of readiness to sign the SAA with Bosnia. He warned, however, that delaying the signature until June feeds into BiH cynicism regarding the political timing of the Serbian SAA, and that the expectations created and not yet fulfilled by the EU are damaging international credibility in Bosnia. The SAA process can help make a significant difference in Bosnia in terms of political structures, but maintaining the momentum of reform will be a challenge, especially given the intensive level of international engagement required to achieve the current progress. We should expect Dodik and Silajdzic to continue to pursue a narrow set of interests as well as anticipate a surge in the rhetoric from all sides. Hoh went on to discuss the need to assess progress on completion of PIC objectives toward the closure of the OHR, and underscored that the transition to the EUSR will require substantial engagement. 9. (C) The EU agrees with the U.S. that it is important to sign the SAA as soon as possible, and shares the same concerns about the dangers of certain types of rhetoric in BiH, said Marc. The next important phase in the process will be for Bosnia to make progress on constitutional reform. Marc expressed the EU’s satisfaction with HiRep Lajcak’s progress in bringing the EU perspective to Bosnia, and he noted that the European Commission will soon start a visa liberalization dialogue with BiH. In a related vein, Pierre Mirel separately requested Hoh’s assessment of the activities of fundamentalist groups in Bosnia. He explained that now former Commissioner for Justice, Freedom, and Security Frattini refused to open visa dialogues with BiH due to problems with Islamic fundamentalist groups. 10. (C) In separate meetings after the formal COWEB session, Hoh again strongly pressed his interlocutors on signing the SAA with Bosnia as soon as possible, ideally at the late-May GAERC meeting. EU Balkans Director Stefan Lehne said that the delay in signing was “not an important issue,” and explained that the latest plan involved the EU signing the agreement in June, and speeding up the implementation so that BiH could “catch up with Serbia.” Giffoni told Hoh that the delay in signing was partly due to a delay in receiving necessary paperwork from BiH, and said that the negative local reaction to the delay demonstrated a “lack of maturity” among the leaders. Everhard separately admitted that the EU needed to do a better job of managing expectations, but noted that scenarios which would have some member states signing sooner than others would create a “dangerous precedent” in the EU that would go beyond specific Western Balkans
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issues. The issue needs to be approached with unanimity. She also noted that the Bosnians’ comparisons of themselves to Serbia were somewhat spurious, given that despite being signed later, Bosnia’s SAA would actually be implemented while Serbia’s would not until conditions are met. 11. (C) Speaking from a European Commission perspective, Helene Holm-Pedersen, a member of Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn’s Cabinet, told Hoh that Rehn was unhappy with the delay in signing and she expressed frustration with the slow pace of legal translation into all EU languages. She also expressed her own disappointment that the Bosnians were focused on Serbia’s SAA instead of preparing for their own EU integration process. She added that the EU has done as much as they could in the timeframe available in terms of being generous on conditionality and accelerating the technical work. She noted that after the SAA is signed, the EU loses its ability to be flexible and generous on the requirements for membership, and the standards to which BiH will be held will become increasingly challenging. After the SAA is implemented, the EC will look at Bosnia’s track record in implementing the provisions in terms of evaluating the country for eventual candidate status, specifically whether they are developing institutions capable of implementing the acquis and whether they are able to speak with one voice. They will evaluate progress on public administration reform, human rights and rule of law, as well as economic indicators. Mirel expressed similar sentiments, arguing that while the EU’s not being able to sign the SAA in April as promised was a “big mistake,” Bosnia should focus less on Serbia and more on the reforms that will soon be required. Macedonia 12. (C) Hoh began the formal discussion of Macedonia by underscoring that the good coordination between the U.S., EU, NATO, and OSCE must continue during the post-Bucharest period of “demoralization.” Macedonia must be assured of its clear European perspective. He noted that the U.S. would use FM Milososki’s May 7 visit to the United States to demonstrate clear American support for Maecondia. We would also advocate continued flexibility and a near term solution to the name issue. In advance of the June 1 elections, Hoh explained that the U.S. was helping to fund a media campaign for free and fair elections as well as an election monitoring mission. After the June 1 elections, the U.S. and EU should work to encourage Ohrid framework implementation and support multi-ethnicity, whether in the government or opposition. On border demarcation, Hoh warned that we should expect challenges, and noted that technical experts have been sent to brief both sides. 13. (C) Faure responded for the EU, explaining that the EC’s March 2008 Western Balkans communication reinforced the European perspective for Macedonia and encouraged reforms. Ruiz Calavera added that the EC has put forth eight key benchmarks to assess Macedonia’s capacity and capability to undertake accession negotiations. She said that the Commission had implicitly urged Macedonian leadership to focus on reform rather than spending time on elections to no avail. Faure emphasized that the EU supports the Nimetz efforts to find a solution to the name issue. 14. (C/NF) Hoh’s French and UK member state interlocutors later explained separately to Hoh that the Macedonia name issue had become problematic within the EU. The Greek position has become increasingly hard line since the NATO Bucharest summit,
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and Everard said that the issue has permeated many technical discussions to the detriment of progress. She added that the EU has “no real leverage on the issue.” British interlocutors told Hoh that the UK has so far managed to push back against Greek attempts to officially link resolution of the name issue to accession conditions for Macedonia, but Lapsely cautioned that the “UK needs Greece on other issues,” specifically Kosovo, and without support from other EU member states, the UK cannot keep up its opposition indefinitely. Officials noted that the next major decision point for the EU will come this Fall, when the EC issues its recommendations on whether to begin accession negotiations with Macedonia, a decision that Greece will certainly veto without a solution to the name issue. Other Regional Issues 15. (SBU) Stabilization and Association: Speaking generally about the Stabilization and Accession processes for the Western Balkans, Ruiz Calavera said that 2008 would be a crucial year for the region; the European perspective needs to be made more tangible to citizens. She explained the EC’s plan to reaffirm the European perspective for the countries of the region, allow for the possibility of acceleration of the process in some circumstances, and devise new initiatives to make the process more accessible to the average citizen. She noted that Croatia could be a catalyst for other countries in the region by serving as an example that the path can be accelerated by meaningful progress. Mirel separately indicated that he was thinking about a more expansive and forward-leaning approach to EU integration for the whole SE Europe region. 16. (SBU) Albania: Faure explained that while Albania has made some progress on the functioning of its government institutions, he noted that much remains to be done in terms of establishing “normal cooperative relations” between the government and opposition. He added that simplifying electoral rules would increase government stability. Faure said that the Albanians are eager to benefit from the visa facilitation agreement with the EU. The EU welcomed Albania’s closer links with NATO post-Bucharest, and would continue to urge the nation to do more work on reforms. In response, Hoh noted the GoA’s good work against crime and corruption. He added that Albania needs to make progress on dealing with hazardous waste and munitions stockpiles as well as to complete the electronic network linking their rule of law agencies. On hazardous waste, Hoh provided a heads-up that the USG thought the EU could assist Tirana and that USEU would separately raise this issue in greater technical detail with appropriate EU interlocutors. 17. (SBU) Montenegro: Faure cited corruption, trafficking of various kinds, and reinforcement of administrative capacity as areas still needing improvement in Montenegro. He expressed concern about the growing presence of private Russian business. Faure added that the EU appreciated the GoM’s moderate response on Kosovo. Hoh noted that the positive political climate that has developed could speed up the reform process. The U.S. believes that the GoM should focus more on rule of law issues and building institutions. 18. (C) Faure explained to the U.S. side that the new GoM was considering the possibility of asking for candidate status, and while this was a good idea for the future, the EU told the GoM that it was too soon. Mirel subsequently told Hoh that Rehn told the Montenegrins to wait until the Treaty of Lisbon ratification process had been completed by the member states. He elaborated that Barroso and the incoming French Presidency
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were concerned that an application by Montenegro would trigger an application from Albania, and member states that have not yet ratified the treaty would perceive it as a negative tool enabling the EU to throw open its doors. He added that if the EC recommends opening negotiations with Macedonia later this year, there will be pressure to do the same for Montenegro. Hoh cautioned Mirel against packaging the two, as the Greece-Macedonia issue could prevent Montenegro’s progress. 19. (U) Regional Cooperation Council/South East European Cooperation Process: Faure lauded the RCC transfer of responsibility for regional cooperation to the countries of the region. He noted that regional ownership and accountability has been strengthened, and the role of the international community has been appropriately reduced to providing advice and assistance. These accomplishments are a good start, but more needs to be done. Hoh agreed that the establishment of the RCC was an important milestone; local ownership is meaningful. 20. (U) EUR/SCE Director Hoh has cleared this message. Murray

LXVI
Reference id: 08THEHAGUE556 Subject: Icty: Witness Troubles At The Seselj Trial Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 27 Jun 2008 17:28 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08THEHAGUE556.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments O 271728Z JUN 08 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1678 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PRISTINA IMMEDIATE DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE Hide header

Confidential
DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – WILLIAMSON/SHIN/LAVINE/VIBUL, EUR/SCE – STINCHCOMB, L/CID – KJOHNSON, INR/GGI – MARGULIES, USUN – WILLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2028 Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], SR [Serbia], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], PREL [External Political Relations] Ref: THE HAGUE 0081 Classified By: Legal Counselor Heather A. Schildge, Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d). 1. (C) Summary. The Seselj trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is behind schedule and witness issues threaten to slow it further.
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Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) Senior Trial Attorney (STA) Daryl Mundis claims to have evidence that Vojislav Seselj’s supporters, perhaps even his legal advisors, have threatened OTP witnesses, including a US-based witness. Seselj claims the OTP’s witnesses freely chose to be Defense witnesses. One of these witnesses, Lubisa Petkovic, was Seselj’s deputy during the war and awaits trial for contempt of court after he failed to appear as a Trial Chamber witness. The Trial Chamber will be hard pressed to investigate claims of witness intimidation and still sustain the delicate and distasteful balance that keeps the Seselj trial in motion. End Summary. 2. (U) Slow Progress. Allocating hours to the parties at the start of the Seselj trial in November 2007, the Trial Chamber estimated the case would take 18 months, and projected that the OTP would conclude its case shortly after the ICTY‘s 2008 summer break. In May, Presiding Judge Antonetti observed that the OTP had consumed half of its allotted time, but presented only around one third of its witnesses. On June 19, he directed the OTP to wrap up by the end of 2008, and made a vague reference to the trial concluding in 2009. Frustrated by the Trial Chamber’s pressure on the OTP to cut time while the Chamber itself rejected time-saving measures, Mundis replied that the OTP would ask for substantially more time should the Trial Chamber require live testimony from all remaining witnesses. In response, Antonetti advised the OTP that the Trial Chamber was considering issuing decisions regarding the time remaining for the OTP to present its case, suggesting that it may cut the OTP’s time. 3. (C) OTP Claims Defense Pressuring Witnesses. Also on June 19, Vojislav Seselj, who is self-representing, asked that the Chamber prevent the OTP from calling witnesses who have said they want to be Defense, and not OTP, witnesses. Signaling support for Seselj’s request, Antonetti commented to STA Mundis that the OTP would no longer need the time allotted for witnesses who would instead testify for Defense. Mundis urged the Trial Chamber to delay making such a decision, asserting that these witnesses were pressured into agreeing to be Defense witnesses. Mundis then announced that the Prosecution intended to file a motion with the Trial Chamber regarding witness intimidation on 27 June and would request that the Trial Chamber appoint counsel for Seselj. In a private conversation with Emboff, Mundis said Seselj’s legal advisors are associated with a campaign of intimidation against at least a dozen Serbia-based insider witnesses who had agreed to testify for the OTP. He said that many of these witnesses asked the OTP to subpoena their testimony, as they feared openly supporting the OTP by voluntarily appearing. 4. (C) Intimidation Evidence. OTP Deputy Chief of Trials Division, Bob Reid, told Emboff that there is clear evidence of attempted intimidation of three witnesses. One of these witnesses, Isak Gasi, resides in the U.S. According to Reid, Gasi reported that a Serbian friend in Belgrade, Mirko Nisovic, was being pressured to convince Gasi to not testify against Seselj. Nisovic told Gasi that Seselj’s “associates” threatened to destroy Nisovic’s restaurant if Gasi testified. Gasi forwarded a letter to the OTP that Nisovic supposedly believed to have been drafted by Seselj’s legal advisors for Gasi to sign and return. The letter included a statement that Gasi would only appear for Defense. According to Reid, two other witnesses provided the OTP with copies of similar letters, each claiming to be facing pressure to not testify. According to Reid, Gasi, a former Olympic kayaker, is tough and remains committed to testifying. 5. (SBU) Trial Chamber Twist. One former OTP witness, Lubisa Petkovic, was Seselj’s deputy in the Serbian Radical Party during the period of the Seselj indictment. Upon
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receiving Petkovic’s notice in April that he wanted to be a Defense rather than OTP witness, the Trial Chamber requested via confidential subpoena that Petkovic appear instead as a Chamber witness. After Petkovic failed to appear as ordered, the Trial Chamber issued an order in lieu of an indictment for contempt of court and a warrant for his arrest. The Trial Chamber lifted confidentiality over these matters once Serbia transferred Petkovic to the ICTY on May 28. Petkovic entered a “Not Guilty” plea when he made his initial appearance on 29 May. Petkovic asked for Serbian-speaking legal representation, which Registry hoped to secure by the end of June. The Trial Chamber will schedule the next hearing once Petkovic has accepted legal representation. 6. (U) Seselj’s Edge. Since January, Seselj has actively participated in the trial process, and is almost respectful of the Trial Chamber. However, Seselj shows little regard for witnesses, regularly labeling testimony as a lie. At least two witnesses addressed remarks to the Trial Chamber regarding Seselj’s harsh treatment of them. While the Bench frequently advised Seselj against using such intimidating tactics, it has not directly confronted Seselj. The Trial Chamber instead reigned in some of Seselj’s excesses by modifying procedures that apply to both parties. The Trial Chamber recently began deducting from Seselj’s allotted cross-examination time when Seselj disrupts the Prosecution’s presentation with matters he should raise during cross-examination. This has cut Seselj’s interruptions, but not influenced his abrasive tone. 7. (C) Comments:. Although witness intimidation has been alleged in numerous ICTY trials, the Trial Chambers rarely receive the concrete evidence that would allow them to address the issue directly. Should the OTP present the Trial Chamber with compelling evidence of witness intimidation in the Seselj case, the Trial Chamber is likely to handle the matter confidentially and seek to buy time, as it is poorly positioned to confront the issue head on. Antonetti’s strategy has been to obtain Seselj’s cooperation through acceding to most of his demands and seeking to flatter him. While this has enabled the trial to progress significantly, there remains an unspoken threat that Seselj may stop participating in the proceedings, as he did during his 2006 hunger strike. Given the impact of witness intimidation on the judicial process, it is hard to see how the Trial Chamber could avoid confronting Seselj should it be presented with compelling evidence of such behavior. The consequences of such a confrontation, however, are highly unpredictable. Gallagher

LXVII
Reference id: 08THEHAGUE834 Subject: Subject: Ambassador-at-large Williamson Warns Icty That Russia May Make Tribunal Issues More Difficult Origin: Embassy The Hague (Netherlands) Cable time: Fri, 3 Oct 2008 19:07 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08THEHAGUE834.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments 0 Comments: VZCZCXYZ0028 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #0834/01 2771907 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 031907Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RU207

EHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2047 INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1821 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0233 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1993 Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS STATE FOR, S/WCI, L/EUR – JOYCE, L/UNA – SCHILDGE/JOHNSON, INR – MARGULIES/MORIN, EUR/SCE – STINCHCOMB E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2018 Tags: BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], HR [Croatia], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], SR [Serbia] Classified By: DENISE G. MANNING, LEGAL COUNSELOR, REASON(S) 1.4(B) AND (D) Summary Amb. Williamson has Successful Visit with ICTY Officials. 1. (SBU) On September 16, 2008, Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson met separately with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) President Fausto Pocar, Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, and Registrar Hans Holthuis. The meetings were successful, with Williamson delivering a clear message that hard times might lay ahead for the ICTY as a result of worsening relations with Russia. Williamson also received updates on ICTY activities, including case scheduling, the ICTY’s $30 million supplementary budget request, and the latest developments in the Karadzic trial. Coping with the New Russian Reality 2. (SBU) USG Warning of Tough Road Ahead. Ambassador Williamson delivered a clear message in all his ICTY meetings: that the U.S.’s and the West’s deteriorating relations with Russia could spill into ICTY issues. Williamson explained that the USG is concerned that Russia will be more difficult on a wide range of issues, including the ICTY supplementary budget request and proposals to continue certain ICTY activities after the ICTY’s closure (“Residual Issues”). Williamson stated that France and the United Kingdom shared these concerns. Williamson also noted that the Chinese appear to be sending signals that they too will be more difficult. While assuring ICTY officials of continuing USG support, Williamson warned ICTY officials that they would need to be mindful of the new political realities in their thinking and planning (including with respect to their supplementary budget request and any Residual Issues proposals). He also indicated that the ICTY needs to prepare for worst-case scenarios. 3. (C) Tribunal Responses to Warning. ICTY officials took these warnings on board, and had a range of reactions. Pocar responded by differentiating among the ICTY proposals requiring Security Council action, noting first that he did not think Russia would block his proposal to extend judicial terms, because Russia “can,t stop ongoing trials.” With respect to Residual Issues, he speculated that when the Belgian chairmanship of the U.N.’s Working Group on Tribunals ended in December, the Russi208

ans might seek to move back to a monthly rotating chairmanship, resulting in a slow down of the Residual Issues work. In response to concerns about a Russian reaction, Brammertz asked Williamson if he had gone to Moscow to discuss Tribunal issues; Brammertz said his own trip to Moscow earlier this summer had gone well. (Brammertz met with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who asked about the Completion Strategy, and in particular whether it was possible to send remaining cases to the region for trial. Lavrov also noted the Haradinaj acquittal and allegations about KLA organ trafficking stemming from Carla del Ponte’s book. Brammertz described Lavrov as very proper but said he took a firm line regarding Russian expectations on the ICTY completing its work.) The discussion with Holthuis centered around the early October visit of the Security Council’s Working Group on Tribunal Issues, and in particular, whether the Russians would be on that visit. (Comment: The Russian Qthe Russians would be on that visit. (Comment: The Russian representative did come.) Holthuis also indicated that he hoped that the Registry would be providing the Working Group within a couple of weeks with financial scenarios on the Residual Issues, and it was suggested that the Working Group should receive such information before its visit to the ICTY. (Comment: At a subsequent meeting with Registry Officials, Embassy officers were told that OLA had a bootleg copy of a preliminary financial scenarios paper, but that the paper does not cost out the various needs that it projects, but instead provides personnel numbers. Registry staff did not comment on possible Russian reactions to the supplementary budget, but noted that Russia is fully paid up on its assessed contributions.) Trial Scheduling Remains Elusive 4. (SBU) Trial Completion and Scheduling. Holthuis indicated that four trials are likely to extend into 2010: Prlic, Tolimir, Djordjevic and Zupljanin. (Comment: Karadzic will clearly extend into 2010 as well, as should Perisic, which is predicted to take 24 months.) Pocar did raise concerns about the schedule, including expressing frustration at UNSC delay in extending the ad litem judges. Pocar explained that due to this delay, he did not have a bench for the Perisic trial, scheduled to begin on October 1. Pocar also noted his October 14th UNGA speech would need to address trial status, and consequently, he may need to report trial delay because the mandate for ad litem judges had not been extended. (Comment: The start of the Perisic trial was in fact delayed by one day, until the ICTY had received official confirmation that the UNSC had adopted a resolution extending judicial tenures. Note, however, that the tenures of the permanent and ad litem trial judges were extended until December 2009. Since some trials, including Perisic, will most likely extend beyond that date, further UNSC action will eventually be required.) 5. (C) ICTR Delays Create Looming Appeals Crisis? Pocar also expressed concern about a possible Appeals Chamber crisis in 2009 and 2010. Pocar claimed that the ICTR is “misbehaving” in that it has not issued any judgments recently. ICTR handed down its last judgment in December 2007, he said, and 17 judgments are still pending. Pocar expressed concern that this will cause an appeals log-jam next year. He indicated that it is not clear how this issue should be dealt with, speculating that the Appeals Chamber may need to be expanded or a second Appeals Chamber created – a move, he noted, that might risk destroying the cohesion of the case-law.
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ICTY Makes $30 Million Supplementary Budget Request 6. (C) The Supplementary Budget. According to the Prosecutor and Brammertz, the ICTY recently sent a supplementary budget request, for $30 million, to New York. Apparently, the supplementary budget would postpone the scheduled 2009 downsizing to 2010, retaining all personnel who were tentatively slated for cuts. Holthuis stressed that the supplementary budget was necessary because they are still running at full steam with the arrival of four new fugitives, including Karadzic, Zuplajanin, Tolimir and Djordjevic, noting that they continue to run the same number of trials and will do so for some time into the future. After some pressure from Ambassador Williamson, however, both Brammertz and Holthuis admitted that the ICTY had a Plan B if their supplemental budget request was not accepted. (Comment: Pocar did not mention a “Plan B”, and Brammertz and Holthuis did not provide details on the “Plan B”. However, in a separate conversation, Pocar’s Chef de Cabinet advised Embassy Officer that Pocar’s Plan B was to transfer additional cases to the region.) Developments in the Karadzic Trial: Timing, the Bench, and Pro Se Assistance 6. (C) Conversations with ICTY officials revealed information on the timing for the Karadzic trial, on-going speculation about the future trial bench, the efforts to amend the indictment, and the establishment of a new pro se office within the Registry. With respect to timing, ICTY officials seemed in general agreement that the Karadzic trial would start by the middle of next year, perhaps before Brammertz indicated he thought the trial wouldtake about 18 months. (Comment: According to a draft trial calendar seen at a subsequent registry meeting, however, the Karadzic trial was marked as potentially starting next fall, after the conclusion of the Gotovina case.) As to the trial bench, Qconclusion of the Gotovina case.) As to the trial bench, currently only the PreTrial Chamber has been appointed. Pocar explained that he wants three permanent judges on the Trial Chamber, in part to avoid the need for extensions of ad litem judges. (Comment: Although the ICTY President appoints the Trial Chamber, Pocar may not be making that decision if he steps down as expected in November.) Brammertz appears to believe that Judge Bonomy will be on the bench, but an Embassy source indicated that this has not been decided. Regarding the Karadzic indictment, the OTP stated that they have been working “day and night” to file a motion proposing revisions to the 11-count indictment, which they expect to complete by September 22 at the latest. They indicated that the revisions were intended to create a stronger and leaner indictment, which would include cutting the number of municipalities and reducing the timeframe on the shelling of Sarajevo. Additionally, in revising the indictment, the Prosecution would also be taking into account adjudicated facts. (Comment: The motion to amend the indictment, which was filed September 22 and is on the ICTY website, did cut the number of affected municipalities by approximately 1/3, from 41 to 27. It also proposes two new counts: it split the existing single counts of genocide into two (to cover different localities and times) and also added a count of unlawful attacks on civilians.) Brammertz indicated that the OTP had separately begun reviewing the indictments of the two remaining fugitives, Mladic and Hadzic, so they would not be caught in the same predicament again. With respect to the pro se office, Holthuis also advised that the Registry has set up an office dedicated to pro se issues, from which he
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expected Karadzic and the other pro se defendants to benefit. According to Holthuis, a similar office had been used during the Milosevic trial. Comments: Visit Provided Excellent Opportunity to Change Tone of Discussion and Expectations 7. (C) Ambassador Williamson’s visit provided an excellent opportunity to change the tone of discussions regarding Residual Issues and address ICTY’s expectations in this respect. Having earlier received a copy of a comprehensive Belgian draft security council resolution regarding Residual Issues, ICTY sources, both with the Registry and Chamber, had high expectations with respect to Residual Issues. The Embassy believes Ambassador Williamson’s visit assisted in tempering ICTY expectations. Culbertson

LXVIII
Reference id: 08BELGRADE1097 Subject: Serbia: Prospects For Completion Of Icty Cooperation Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 22 Oct 2008 14:28 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BELGRADE1097.html History: First published on Sun, 12 Dec 2010 11:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO3507 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHBW #1097/01 2961428 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 221428Z OCT 08 ZDS FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0554 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC Hide header

Secret
CORRECTED COPY – CORRECTED CAPTION NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], KWAC, SR [Serbia] Ref: A. A) BELGRADE 577 B. B) BELGRADE 718 C. C) IIR 6 904 0010 09 D. D) BELGRADE 616 E. E) BELGRADE 958 BELGRADE 00001097 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Jennifer Brush for reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary 1. (C) The Serbian government’s cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has increased since parliamentary elections in May and took a dramatic step forward just after the July formation of the new government with the
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arrest of wartime Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic. The new government, unhindered by uncooperative Democratic Party of Serbia officials in the Security Information Agency and the Interior Ministry, appears better able to investigate the fugitives’ whereabouts and act on leads. Cross-border information sharing with NATO in Bosnia has also enhanced the government’s capabilities. The new, pro-Western government, which ran on an EU integration platform, clearly has the will to fulfill Serbia’s cooperation obligations. Political leaders are for the first time talking about the moral obligation to apprehend fugitives, not just the economic benefits of joining the EU. While technical cooperation, including providing wartime documents and finding witness, will continue until the Tribunal concludes its work, the government will need to make good on its promise to capture and extradite the remaining fugitives and close that chapter of its cooperation obligations once and for all. End Summary. Government Cooperation Increased 2. (SBU) Following parliamentary elections in May, the Serbian government stepped up activity to locate and arrest the remaining four fugitives indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Serbian government arrested two of the remaining four ICTY fugitives, Karadzic advisor Stojan Zupljanin on June 11 (Ref A), as coalition negotiations were being finalized, and Karadzic himself on July 21, just two weeks after the formation of the new Democratic Partyled coalition government (Ref B). Karadzic’s arrest fueled speculation that the new, European-oriented government would soon arrest Bosnian Serb wartime military leader Ratko Mladic, who is accused of master-minding and executing the mass execution of Bosnian Muslims during five years of war in Bosnia. Observers had long thought that the arrests of Karadzic and Mladic, the best known of the remaining four indictees, would be the most difficult politically for the government given that many Serbs still deny that the atrocities for which they are accused took place. 3. (C) On October 8, the office of the War Crimes Prosecutor announced that it had summoned for questioning seven individuals suspected of helping hide Zupljanin. War Crimes Prosecutor spokesman Bruno Vekaric said the individuals were identified in a police investigation into Zupljanin’s support network, which revealed links to the support networks of other ICTY fugitives, including Mladic and Karadzic. The investigation had already yielded 30 names, and the operation would continue for several more days, according to the statement. (Note: the War Crimes Court has its own police unit.) War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic told us privately that the first interrogated suspect, former Vojvodina Executive Council President Koviljko Lovre, admitted to assisting Zupljanin. New Government More Capable and Willing 4. (C) Observers have long speculated whether the previous government knew where Karadzic and Mladic were. Many believed that the previous government had enough information to locate the fugitives had it undertaken a vigorous investigation. Details that have been surfacing about the arrest of Karadzic suggest this may be true. B92 reported on September 29 that Security Information Agency (BIA) director Rade Bulatovic (DSS) had had information on Karadzic’s whereabouts for months. Both Bulatovic and former DSS Prime Minister Kostunica publicly denied that they had known Karadzic’s where212

abouts. A close advisor of Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic told us that Bulatovic had received the information six months before the new government formed but did not act on it, because of DSS Prime Minister Kostunica’s ideological kinship with Karadzic and a lack of international pressure. When the government changed, Bulatovic had presented the information – in exchange for the promise of an ambassadorship – to Tadic and his National Security Advisor Miki Rakic, who then planned the arrest (Ref C). (Note: There are rumors that Bulatovic will be appointed as Ambassador to Syria.) National Council for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal President Rasim Ljajic publicly affirmed that the government had begun developing information on Karadzic earlier – but did not specify when – and had arrested him when the security risk was lowest. Vukcevic told us the arrest had come after a month of tracking Karadzic’s support network and that only three people in the country had known about the operation in advance, including himself, new BIA director Sasa Vukadinovic, and Rakic, who reportedly orchestrated the Zupljanin arrest as well (Ref D). 5. (S/NF) Whatever the truth about when the government became aware of Karadzic’s whereabouts, several observers note that the absence of DSS from the current coalition is key to the renewed enthusiasm for capturing the fugitives. Humanitarian Law Center Director Natasa Kandic told us that with Kostunica gone, the DS now had the political will to complete ICTY cooperation. ICTY Belgrade chief Deyan Mihov told us that the atmosphere at BIA was completely different with Sasa Vukadinovic in charge; cooperation with ICTY Belgrade had improved markedly. Mihov said Bulatovic was evasive and “could sell you anything.” Bulatovic had consistently avoided answering Mihov’s questions about whether BIA had collected any DNA or fingerprints in its investigations of Karadzic’s whereabouts. Our contacts with BIA have also improved since Vukadinovic took over; he welcomes visits from the Embassy’s Special Assistant Office and has said he wants to be sure that Mladic is captured on Serbian soil to show that Serbia is a law-abiding country. President of the Special War Crimes Court Judge Sinisa Vazic told us that previous Interior Minister Dragan Jocic (DSS) had politicized ICTY cooperation and had not operated transparently, hindering previous cases. 6. (SBU) Mihov told us he thought international pressure had in part been responsible for the government’s recent actions, but that it was clearly willing and able to complete the arrests with continued encouragement. According to Mihov, President Tadic told ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz (Ref E) that he knew Serbia needed to bring Mladic in to lift Dutch opposition to Serbia’s EU integration, but that Serbia would capture Hadzic as well because ICTY cooperation was both a moral and legal obligation. Mihov said Brammertz was cautiously optimistic that Serbia would capture Mladic within the next several months. 7. (SBU) Vukcevic’s office told us it now had better information to conduct its investigations, thanks to ongoing meetings that began in June 2008 between the War Crimes Prosecution and NATO/U.S. Corp Bosnia, which post facilitated. Vukcevic said the information exchanged, particularly on the networks of supporters, enhanced Serbia’s ability to search for ICTY fugitives. Government’s Message of Moral Responsibility 8. (SBU) In the months since Karadzic’s arrest, President Tadic, Ljajic, Vukcevic, and other officials have made several public statements about the importance of captu213

ring the remaining fugitives, not just for pragmatic reasons but also because of the need for reconciliation with the past. DS Vice President Dusan Petrovic assured us that the government placed importance on helping the public to understand and overcome the past and promote reconciliation. 9. (SBU) ICTY Coordination Council Director Dusan Ignjatovic informed us the government planned a series of public discussions to explain the events of the 1990s and the importance of ICTY‘s work. In cooperation with the OSCE and ICTY Belgrade, the ICTY Coordination Council held its first program on August 18 in the eastern Serbian town of Zajecar. Speakers from OSCE, ICTY, and the Coordination Council appeared on a local prime time television talk show and took calls from viewers. Ignatovic said the government was considering expanding the program to other towns and eventually broadcasting the discussions on national broadcaster Radio-Television Serbia. He said that Serbian citizens would not experience any epiphanies in their understanding of the events of the 1990s but with careful messages would eventually come to terms with the past. Ignjatovic said this message was a tough sell with most Serbs, since the acquittals in 2008 of Bosniak commander Naser Oric, acquitted July 3 of murdering Serbian prisoners of war, and Kosovo Liberation Army commander Rasmush Haradinaj, acquitted April 3 of targeting and killing civilians, heightened a sense that ICTY was biased against Serbia. 10. (SBU) Mihov told us the challenge for the government would be to compete with sensationalist, nationalist coverage in the tabloids, which still had a chief role in forming popular opinion. Mihov said Tadic had confided to Brammertz that he felt the government had missed an opportunity to educate people about war crimes immediately after Karadzic’s arrest when the tabloid press was consumed with sensationalizing details of Karadzic’s false identity as a natural medicine guru. The government needed to show ICTY indictees as criminals, not heroes, Mihov said. Beyond the Arrests 11. (SBU) The capture of the remaining indictees remains the most high profile aspect of ICTY cooperation, but there are other important elements to Serbia’s ICTY cooperation, such as handing over documents to the prosecution and serving subpoenas to ICTY witnesses. Although these elements are not as high-profile, ICTY Belgrade’s Mihov told us it was essential for Serbia to continue to cooperate in these areas in order to obtain a favorable report from Brammertz. Mihov said Serbia was mostly compliant with this technical cooperation. For the most part Serbia was complying with document requests, he said, although ICTY had had to go to court to obtain some national security-related documents. The government was still holding out on one document, but Mihov had high expectations of receiving it. Mihov said there were also some issues with locating witnesses but most were not contentious. He added that the ICTY had no complaints about how the government was handling allegations of witness intimidation. According to the war crimes prosecution’s statement on the investigation into Zupljanin’s network, one of the elements under investigation was witness intimidation. 12. (SBU) Serbia is also prosecuting a number of war crimes cases domestically. War Crimes Court President Judge Sinisa Vazic told us that cases in the war crimes special court were proceeding slowly, in large part due to space issues. Vazic said there was
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not enough space to handle the 11 ongoing war crimes trials and 25 ongoing investigations. (Note: The war crimes court, built with USG technical and financial support, has only three courtrooms equipped for multi-defendant trials and only two courtrooms for investigative interviews, and it shares this space with the Corruption Special Court. The courtrooms operate in two shifts, but each case can be heard only threeto four days per month.) Vukcevic told us he was proud he had made significant progress in 2008 on several cases that had previously been moving slowly, including the Zvornik, Lovas, Bytyqi Brothers, Suva Reka, and Ovcara cases. Comment 13. (S) We welcome the shift in the government’s message that ICTY cooperation will not only bring economic rewards – which opinion polls show to be the biggest concern of Serbian citizens – but is also a moral obligation. The new government at least is talking about shared values with the West and being a good neighbor. Having gone to great lengths to demonstrate its will to capture and hand over the remaining fugitives, the Serbian government now needs to deliver. There is a window of opportunity of high expectations. If Serbia wishes to reap the rewards of European integration and truly move beyond its painful past, now is the time to make the final push in seeking out and capturing these fugitives. Whether for pragmatic or more elevated reasons, we now believe the government will do its utmost to bring in Mladic and Hadzic. End Comment. Munter

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Reference id: 08BELGRADE1189 Subject: Serbia: New Configurations On The Serbian Right Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 19 Nov 2008 11:52 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08BELGRADE1189.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO4680 RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV DE RUEHBW #1189/01 3241152 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 191152Z NOV 08 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0647 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], SR [Serbia]
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Ref: A. BELGRADE 1108 B. BELGRADE 1072 C. BELGRADE 913 Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Thatcher Scharpf for reas ons 1.4(b/d). Summary 1. (C) The aftermath of the September split in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has ushered in a period of realignment on the Serbian right as parties struggle to define themselves as alternatives to President Tadic’s dominant Democratic Party (DS) coalition. While ex-Radical Tomislav Nikolic’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) claims to be targeting the political center with pro-European rhetoric, the SRS continues to occupy the ultranationalist space with unreformed rhetoric and tactics. Meanwhile, Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party (DSS) of Serbia has aligned itself with the New Serbia Party (NS) and ex-Radical Maja Gojkovic’s recently-formed People’s Party (NP) in an attempt to present themselves as a viable nationalist alternative. Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) at the same time is claiming the mantle of the pro-European Serbian right. While the pro-European rhetoric from the SNS and SPO is encouraging, we still await more evidence of pro-European political will on the political right. End Summary. Progressives: Targeting the Moderate Center-Right 2. (S) The emergence of the SNS, founded by former Radicals Tomislav Nikolic and Aleksandar Vucic, has been the catalyst for recent realignments on the Serbian right. Diplomatic and political contacts have reported that the split between ICTY-indicted war criminal Vojislav Seselj’s Radicals and Nikolic’s Progressives was in large part prompted by the pragmatic recognition by Nikolic and his tycoon financiers that the Serbian electorate was turning toward Europe. In addition, Midodrag Rakic, a close adviser to President Tadic, told the DCM on November 3 that Tadic had tasked him six months earlier with encouraging Nikolic to split with the SRS because the SNS support base would be important for advancing Serbia’s pro-European agenda. Our media contacts report that Rakic actively sought press coverage for the SNS founding congress on October 21. Nikolic publicly has denied speculation that the SNS would form a coalition with the DS but has been careful not to rule out post-election scenarios. 3. (SBU) Recent national polling showing the SNS as the second most popular party nationally behind the DS was recently supported by the SNS’s first electoral test in four municipal elections on November 9. The SNS came in second behind the DS in Ruma, Vrnjacka Banja, and Prijepole, and came in third in Knjazevac. In all contests the SNS outpolled the SRS by an average of two-thirds. In the municipality of Ruma, a Seselj stronghold, the SNS won over 17% to the SRS’s 8%. Party leaders on November 12 confirmed that the victorious Sandzak Democratic Party in Prijepole would seek to form a coalition with the SNS and the DS-led coalition bloc. A national Medium Gallup poll released on November 8 showed that the DS was supported by 38.9% of the electorate, while the SNS and SRS won 22.7% and 10.8%, respectively. 4. (C) A key part of the SNS political strategy is to present a moderate image of SNS leadership while seeking to disassociate the party from the ideas Nikolic and Vucic had embraced during their days with the SRS. Pamphlets distributed at kiosks around Belgrade in recent days have highlighted SNS’s principles of preserving territorial integrity, assisting Serbs everywhere, equal justice under law, tolerance, neutrality, anti-corruption,
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and social justice. In a mid-October conversation with Poloff, SNS spokesman and member of the presidency Nebojsa Stefanovic noted that the top priority of the SNS would be to focus on economic development to assist Serbia’s impoverished regions. The party’s first policy proposals in this realm, Stefanovic said, would be made public in November. (Comment: The SRS has long catered to the unemployed, pensioners and others who lost economic standing during the transition. End Comment.) Stefanovic said that the SNS has been successfully winning over the SRS electoral base as well as attracting moderate members of the DSS, NS, and even the DS-linked oligarch Miodrag Nikolic Feman from Jagodina. The SNS, Stefanovic said, does not adhere to ideology but to a party &idea,8 which is less rigid than ideology and merely &gives people something to stand for. 5. (C) Commenting on foreign policy, Stefanovic said that Nikolic and Vucic would condition the Serbian public to realize that the idea of Greater Serbia was &a dream that could not be realized.8 Quickly disavowing Greater Serbia would make Nikolic and Vucic appear like hypocrites or opportunists, Stefanovic said. (Vucic on October 30 publicly stated that Greater Serbia was &unrealistic policy.8) Stefanovic reaffirmed his party’s desire for Serbian membership in the EU, and estimated that a permanent resolution to Kosovo could be achieved within 4-5 years. The EU, however, needed to be more conscious of sending positive signals before the electorate would be prepared to accept a Kosovo solution. Regarding Bosnia, Stefanovic stated that the SNS would not support separatist groups or movements in the Republika Srpska (RS), but would support RS independence if Bosnian Serbs vote for it. SRS: Still the Ultranationalist Refuge 6. (SBU) While the SNS tries to demonstrate that its moderate stance is a credible break from the past, the SRS continues to offer ultranationalist, chauvinistic rhetoric and remains under Seselj’s firm control. In response to post’s Defense Attache’s request to meet with Dragan Todorovic in the latter’s capacity as chairman of the Defense Committee, the SRS on October 21 issued a vitriolic public statement condemning U.S. policy toward Serbia and Kosovo. The statement emphasized that Radicals do not meet with officials of countries that have recognized Kosovo, and that the SRS would not meet with the U.S. representatives &because Washington is the creator of the NATO state of Kosovo and heads the campaign for its recognition, thus seriously threatening Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.8 (Other non-Radical members of the Defense Committee criticized Todorovic’s statement, complaining they were not consulted in the matter and saying the committee needed to have dialogue with foreign diplomats.) The SRS continues to obstruct the work of Parliament without offering alternative policies, and has pledged never to work in conjunction with the SNS. 7. (SBU) The SRS is seen as a threatening force that is not reluctant to employ physical violence. Multiple press reports indicate Seselj ordered the SRS to &make a little war8 in Hrtkovic, an SRS base with enormous symbolic significance where Vucic and SNS supporters planned to rally on November 2. The rally was banned by authorities in advance. Though an SRS spokesman denied claims that the SRS had provided firearms to would-be protestors, some press reported that Seselj himself sought to have Vucic assassinated. Vucic and SNS colleagues eventually held a rally in Hrtkovic
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on November 5 without major incident. (Seselj’s Hague indictment accuses him of ordering the deportation of Croats from Hrtkovic, thereby lending the city additional historic significance.) DSS, NS and NP: The New Nationalist Opposition 8. (SBU) As the SRS maintains its ultranationalist bent, Vojislav Kostunica’s DSS and Velimir Ilic’s NS have attempted to create a modern nationalist front while espousing conditional support for Serbian EU membership. On November 4, ex-Radical and former Novi Sad Mayor Maja Gojkovic signed a coalition agreement between her NP and the DSS and NS. The agreement lays out broad principles *such as preserving the &highest moral principles8 in politics, protecting Serbia’s territorial integrity, seeking European integration, combating poverty, and fostering economic development * with no specific policy prescriptions. (Comment: The early alignment between DSS, NS, and NP appears to be a shrewd political move, probably instigated by Kostunica, to deprive the SNS of coalition partners and thus keep the SNS isolated. End Comment.) One of the bloc’s first moves was to call for a motion of no confidence in the government, a move co-sponsored by the SRS with the support of the SNS. A date for a vote on the motion has not been set. The DSS-NS-SRS motion would fall short of succeeding, even with promised SNS support, unless 18 other votes could be won. The unlikelihood of this scenario indicates that the no-confidence motion is an effort by the DSS to regain the initiative as the most credible political alternative on the right to the current government. 9. (SBU) The DSS may be facing growing internal divisions. According to the weekly Daily Telegraf and several Belgrade magazines, top DSS officials complained to Kostunica about the role of chief of staff Aleksandar Nikitovic at a late October meeting of DSS leadership to discuss party modernization. Claiming that Nikitovic for too long held unjustified influence over party affairs, the DSS officials told Kostunica that even Dejan Mihajlov, former secretary general of Kostunica’s government, agreed with their position that Nikitovic needed to be reigned in. Kostunica reportedly agreed with the &insurgents,8 but other DSS officials, including Slobodan Samardzic, Predrag Bubalo and Zoran Loncar, remained supportive of Kostunica’s chief advisor. The DSS remains Kostunica’s creature, however, and there are no signs that Kostunica’s role will be challenged (Ref C). SPO: Seeking to Lead Pro-European Conservatives 10. (SBU) Though bound by its role in the governing coalition, the SPO in recent weeks has attempted to take the initiative in redefining its conservative ideas and role on the Serbian right. At a party congress on October 18, SPO President Vuk Draskovic unveiled its program for the &European Serbian Right,8 which sought to protect the &national, development, security and spiritual interests8 of Serbia. The twenty-page document describes the development of the European Union and argues on historical, religious, and economic grounds for Serbia’s membership in the EU. According to one contact, efforts by Draskovic to strip the platform of calls to return the Serbian king were blocked by SPO delegates. 11. (SBU) After the publication of the European Serbian Right platform and subsequent interviews, Draskovic was pilloried in the press for commenting that Serbia would enter the EU without Kosovo. Explaining his statement to the Ambassador on
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October 24, Draskovic asserted the need to speak the truth and it was important for the public to recognize that Serbia lacked traditional sovereign authority over Kosovo since 1999. The only way for Serbia to regain Kosovo, he said, was through gaining EU membership and reestablishing Serbian authority over Kosovo within ten years. Claiming the moral high ground as a conservative who spoke the truth, Draskovic condemned the SNS and its leadership as tools of Milosevic’s secret police, claiming that the SRS split was only the consequence of the Milosevic cadre realizing that Serbia’s future now lay in Europe. Portraying the SPO’s program as reclaiming Serbia’s pro-Western conservative tradition from the 19th Century until World War I, Draskovic voiced confidence that the SPO would attract 90% of NS voters, 90% of DSS voters, and &many8 unnamed intellectuals. Despite his confidence, Draskovic does not appear to have developed a clear political strategy to win these voters. Some SPO contacts have told us that younger SPO members have been looking for ways to sideline Draskovic and his wife to ceremonial positions in the party so as to provide stronger political leadership. Comment 12. (C) Of the parties on the Serbian right, the SNS at present has the greatest potential to tap into the widest cross section of the Serbian population disenchanted with the status quo and seeking a pro-European orientation. However, the combination of Nikolic’s pragmatism and his objective to win over SRS and DSS constituencies makes us cautious to believe that the SNS will be able to permanently relinquish its ultranationalist heritage when pro-European rhetoric becomes politically inconvenient. Support for the DSS-NS-NP coalition, the SRS, and SPO will likely pale in comparison to the SNS, and the parties over the next several months will seek to portray themselves as the true Serbian conservatives as they search for successful political strategies. Each of these parties face an uphill climb toward becoming a viable center-right alternative to Tadic’s increasingly powerful DS. End Comment. Munter

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Reference id: 08USUNNEWYORK1159 Subject: Financing Of Ity And Ictr Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Wed, 10 Dec 2008 23:46 UTC Classification: Unclassified Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08USUNNEWYORK1159.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXYZ0002 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #1159/01 3452346 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 102346Z DEC 08 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5501 Hide header
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Unclas
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences], AFIN [Financial Management], KUNR [UN Reform], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda], UNGA/C-5 [UN General Assembly Adm and Budget Committee, UN General Assembly Fifth Committee] 1. Summary: The Fifth Committee will begin discussing the financing of International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on Monday, December 15, 2008. Member States will consider the First Performance Report for ITY (A/63/559) and ICTR (A/63/558), the revised estimates arising in respect to Security Council resolution 1800 (2008) on the appointment of additional ad litem judges at the ITY, and further discuss the issue of establishing a possible financial retention incentive for the Tribunals. End Summary. 2. First performance reports for the ITY (A/63/559) and ICTR (A/63/558): These reports reflect the Secretary-General’s (SYG) request for additional appropriations for the Tribunals. The increased requirements reflect changes with respect to exchange rates, inflation, and standard salary costs. For the ICTR, the SYG report requests the General Assembly (GA) to approve an additional amount of $7,831,700 gross ($6,948,00 net) to the ICTR Special Account for the biennium 2008-2009. For the ITY, the GA is requested to approve an additional appropriation for the biennium 2008-2009 in the amount of $13,117,900 gross ($11,404,700 net) to the ITY Special Account. The Department may wish to take into account the observations and recommendations in the report of the ACABQ, which will be transmitted when available. 3. Security council resolution 1800 (2008): This SC resolution decided that the SYG may appoint, within existing resources, additional ad litem judges upon the request of the ITY President in order to conduct additional trials, notwithstanding the fact that the total number of ad litem judges appointed to the Chambers will from time to time temporarily exceed the maximum of 12 provided for in article 12 (1) of the International Tribunal statute. The SYG’s report on the revised estimates arising in respect of SC resolution 1800 (2008) (A/62/809) estimates that the requirements for the appointment of up to four ad litem judges at any one time over the maximum of 12 would amount to $374,500. However, the report claims that during this early stage, the Tribunal is not in a position to determine whether the additional costs can be met from within the approved appropriation. The GA may wish to take note of the present report and request the SYG to submit a report on the implementation of SC resolution 1800 (2008) in the context of the second performance report for the biennium 2008-2009. The ACABQ report on this matter (A/62/7/Add.38), however, expects the appointment of additional ad litem judges will indeed be implemented from within existing resources. Unless otherwise instructed, USUN will endorse the conclusions of ACABQ on this item. 4. Retention incentive: In its resolution 61/274, the GA requested the SYG to submit a report on possible measures for staff retention no later than the first resumed session of the 62nd UNGA. That report is contained in document A/62/681 and up for discussion during the current 63rd UNGA. The SYG recommends a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives, of which the former is considered the most effective. The SYG would like the GA to approve a financial incentive for staff who remain in
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their posts until their functions are no longer needed. The SYG report analyzes three alternative approaches to the calculation of the amount of a retention incentive. Option A: The incentive would apply to eligible staff having completed at least two years of service with the Tribunals at the time the incentive is due. The incentive will be calculated in accordance with the recommended methodology in A/61/824, which recommended that authorization be granted to the SYG to apply the termination indemnities set out under the heading “Permanent appointments” in annex III to the Staff Regulations and Rules for the specific and sole purpose of approving payments related to the retention incentive package for the Tribunal staff. The financial implications are estimated at $11.2 million for the ICTR and $12.1 million for the ITY. (paras. 30 to 35 of A/62/681) Option B: The retention incentive would apply to eligible staff having completed at least five years of service with the Tribunals at the time the incentive is due, with all other conditions remaining unchanged as in Option A. The financial implications are estimated at $6.9 million for the ICTR and $7.2 million for the ITY. (paras. 36 to 38 of A/62/681) Option C: The retention incentive would apply to eligible staff having completed at least five years of service with the Tribunals and be capped at an amount to be set for the GA, either in terms of a fixed number of months of salary or a fixed incentive payment. The financial implications will depend on what limits are approved of in the GA. (paras. 39 to 40 of A/62/681) 5. The SYG report recommends that this retention incentive apply to eligible staff who have completed at least five years of service with the Tribunals at the time the incentive is due as outlined in Option B. Moreover, the SYG report claims that designating this incentive to a limited group of “key” staffers would be perceived as giving unequal treatment and could undermine staff morale. The SYG recommends that the retention incentive be applicable on an as wide a post coverage basis as possible. 6. The ACABQ report as contained in document A/62/734, however, recommends a different scheme. Noting that a retention incentive is not provided for in the existing Staff Regulations and Rules, the ACABQ recommends that the GA authorize, on an exceptional basis, the payment of a retention incentive to staff required to remain with the Tribunals until their services and posts are no longer needed, as set out in the drawdown plans of each Tribunal, targeting staff with a minimum of five years of service in the Tribunals as outlined in Option C in the SYG report. The ACABQ also recommends the amount of the incentive be capped at five months’ salary for all staff members, irrespective of the number of years of service at the Tribunals beyond five years. This decision should be done on an ad hoc basis and not on an amendment to the Staff Rules. 7. The International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) 2007 report as contained in A/62/30 advises that (a) special financial retention incentives for the ICTR and ITY are not considered appropriate because they are not provided for in the common system and as such would set a precedent, which should be avoided; (b) the existing contractual framework should be used to grant contracts that would remove the uncertainty with regard to future employment; (c) other non-monetary incentives should be made available; (d) those staff from the Tribunals who are offered appointments in another common system organization should have their reporting date for the new assignment to coincide with completion of their work with the Tribunal. 8. Unless otherwise instructed, USDel will continue to uphold the previously provided US position that the retention incentive as envisioned by the Tribunals is inappropri221

ate. USUN would draw from the following points: US is concerned with the Tribunals’ inability to target the incentive to those who actually need to be retained through the completion of the Tribunals’ work. This retention incentive was not meant to be a universal bonus, which may perpetuate the problem of grade inflation, but rather it should be used to ensure that the most critical staff stay with the Tribunal as it works towards the completion strategy. US notes the ICSC recommendations, which clearly state that providing a financial incentive is not necessary and such an incentive is not provided in the common system and would thus set a precedent. US does not support the proposition that all or the majority of current staff are crucial and need to be given a retention bonus to retain their services. Khalilzad

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Reference id: 09STATE11937 Subject: (u) Secretary Clinton’s February 5, 2009 Expanded Meeting With French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner Origin: Secretary of State (United States) Cable time: Tue, 10 Feb 2009 03:28 UTC Classification: Secret//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09STATE11937.html History: First published on Wed, 1 Dec 2010 00:01 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: France pressed U.S. on Khadr as Ottawa stood silent: WikiLeaks – The Globe and Mail Comments: 0 Comments: O 100328Z FEB 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE INFO USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KYIV IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE Hide header

Secret
NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019 Tags: OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders] (CLINTON, HILLARY), PREL [External Political Relations], KPAL [Palestinian Affairs], FR [France; Corsica], IR [Iran], RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands], NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], UK [United Kingdom], CN [Comoros] Classified By: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARCIE RIES, ACTING FOR REASONS 1.4 (D)
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1. (S) Summary: Secretary Clinton and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner met on February 5 for 30 minutes in their first bilateral meeting. The warm and open exchange followed a one-on-one working lunch and preceded a 20-minute press conference. The two agreed to coordinate closely on a wide range of issues including the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, the Balkans, GTMO detainees and Africa, especially Darfur. On Afghanistan, Kouchner emphasized the need for greater “Afghanization” and international “access” to everyday Afghan people, and asked for U.S. support to hold a second “Neighbors” conference to follow up on the initial December 14, 2008 event. On GTMO, the FM indicated Europe would help on a case-by-case basis, and asked the U.S. for assistance with a 15-year old Canadian national, Omar Khadr. The FM asked for a reaction to its Transatlantic paper, passed to the U.S. during France’s 2008 EU presidency. As the meeting closed, the Secretary joked that the FM was “not even in her league” concerning criticism when the FM mentioned a new book critical of him that might spark press questions. End Summary. Middle East 2. (C) The Secretary opened the meeting by welcoming FM Kouchner and expressing appreciation for French leadership on a broad agenda of cooperation, which she said President Obama hoped to deepen. Kouchner congratulated the Secretary and said he looked forward to the pleasure of working together on a first name basis. The two then summarized topics discussed in their one-on-one meeting, beginning with the Middle East. 3. (S) The Secretary said she understood that the issue of the Middle East was of grave concern to France. She expressed appreciation for French leadership on interdicting weapons into Gaza and with the Copenhagen process. She thanked President Sarkozy for his ideas and for French work in providing assistance to the people of Gaza. FM Kouchner said that he had met with Palestinian Authority (PA) PM Abu Mazen three days prior and found him completely isolated. There was a game being played among Arabs, most of whom, Egyptians excepted, did not care. He said “Abbas is lost. You tried, we tried but nothing has happened. The key, he said, was to figure out how to build up Abu Mazen in a government of national unity. Salam Fayyad was a fantastic PM who had ideas about how to open the Gaza crossing, specifically a tax paid by a group of people who would be acceptable to both sides just to get the crossing operating.” It was especially important, he continued, to offer the Palestinian people a sign that the crossing was open because of Abu Mazen’s involvement. He had to be seen as a leader. He said it would take weeks and noted that Hamas does not want to talk to Mazen. Still, it was important to help convince the Israelis to open the crossing. Kouchner cautioned that it would be difficult to get anything done ahead of the Israeli election on February 10. 4. (S) The Secretary concurred that the situation was difficult. She added that confidence building measures were needed so that the Israelis would feel committed. It was important to persuade the new Israeli government to participate in the peace effort and be convinced that they could work with the PA. If Abu Mazen’s government of national unity is to work, Israel needs to understand that it should work with him and that this development could help. She was encouraged by the actions that the Egyptians had taken against the tunnels. She said there was much to coordinate and supported the role of the Quartet, but agreed that little could happen in advance of the Israeli elections. She noted that the U.S. was conducting a review based on Mitchell’s work.
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Afghanistan 5. (S) The Secretary said that the U.S. was working on a comprehensive strategy and thanked the FM for France’s contributions and cooperation. Kouchner noted that France had increased its troops to 3000 from 3300. He said there was progress in several areas, including civil society, but presented a mixed picture overall. He returned several times to problems with access to the population and suggested that this was the key. He also promoted Afghanization, saying it was important “for the people to take their own problems into their own hands.” He expressed pride in the French hospital in Kabul as an example of what was possible noting that Afghan patients were being treated by Afghan doctors, and even the Taliban presented themselves for treatment. He said that Kabul is not Afghanistan, but that Kabul works because it has been “Afghanized.” The rest of the country needs the same, but it will take years. He was also concerned about growing Iranian influence, noting that a huge Shi’a mosque had recently been built with Iranian funds. 6. (C) FM Kouchner asked for the Secretary’s support for a follow-up event to the December 14, 2008 “Afghanistan Neighbors conference” that Kouchner hosted in Paris. The FM said the meeting had been very interesting, despite the Iranians not showing at the last minute, and should be repeated if the U.S. agreed. Kouchner put the conference in the context of a broader approach, stressing “there is no military solution in Afghanistan.” 7. (C) The Secretary took note of the proposal, but made no commitment on a follow-up conference. She said the U.S. believed that there had been some success with building the Army, but more problems with the police. Both commented on the strength of the new Minister of Interior. The Secretary said that the Minister of the Interior was an interesting person but that it might be necessary to deal with some of the more radical people whether we wanted to or not. On reconciliation, Kouchner said that there were some very bad people involved, but they were nationals of Afghanistan and it was important to start negotiations, including the negotiations in Saudi Arabia. Finally on the presidency, Kouchner said “Karzai is somebody. We have to talk to him, but there may be other candidates.” He said Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi was such a person but, while interesting, he probably couldn’t win against Karzai. The Secretary noted that Richard Holbrooke would travel to the region. Guantanamo 8. (C) The Secretary expressed appreciation for French leadership within the EU on this issue. She said she was proud of President Obama’s commitment to close the facility, calling it “a cancer” the U.S. wanted to take care of, but would take time. She said this was complicated, so we were asking friends and allies to consider taking some detainees. FM Kouchner said the EU 27 had not yet reached consensus, but that they “accepted the idea,” but would consider detainees on a case-by-case basis; Europeans do not want to create legal problems for themselves. They were working with three categories of individuals. First were “the best cases.” Second, were those who had made individual requests for resettlement in specific countries and third without legal problems. There were many outstanding questions, such as whether they had refugee status, but because of the Schengen visa requirements, it was necessary for the EU to address this together. At the end of this discussion, the FM handed the Secretary a paper concerning Omar Khadr, a 15-year old Muslim of Canadian origin. The Secretary agreed to review the case.
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Iran 9. (S/NF) The Secretary opened the discussion by alluding to the private conversation with FM Kouchner and their agreement that it was important to prevent further development of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and its missile program. Iran’s recent space launch complicated this effort noting that the Iranians had respected none of the internationally recognized requirements for a space launches specified in UN Security Council resolutions. The FM said he welcomed the U.S. willingness to consider direct talks between the U.S. and Iran. He said that the Iranians were waiting for the U.S. The launch had surprised the Russians, of whom he said “they are more affected than we being 2000 kilometers closer.” He added that the sanctions seemed to be having some effect on the domestic population, but he ended by repeating the need for a Quartet meeting. He said that it was important for any approach to be done together with the Germans and the Russians, particularly since the Russians are closer to Iran and could be more easily targeted. Kouchner suggested not including the Chinese because the Chinese are “absolutely not useful” in this process. The Secretary said it was important to follow up, possibly with U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband on the margins of the G-20 Summit in London. Russia/Georgia/Energy 10. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary that France had been surprised by the Georgian invasion. “We did stop it, but we didn’t solve it.” He continued that the South Ossetians and Abkhaz are a “sort of independent people” but he worried that there is no humanitarian access to the population. He said that Georgian PM Saakashvili had been “badly inspired; he fell into the trap.” But the FM said the Geneva process should continue, though it might take months or years. On energy, he said the EU had been united, but then Poland, Romania and others had been completely cut off and that both Russia and Ukraine had been “absolutely awful.” He said “a group of Europeans were trying to secure a pipeline from one country to the other.” But he cautioned that the U.S. position on Missile Defense was also a factor. He complimented Medvedev as “a normal guy, at least better than Putin,” and credited him with what he believed to be the sound decision not to put Iskander missiles in Kalinigrad. He said things were now more complicated with the Iranian space launch. On the whole, things were frozen, which was “not bad” as a place to be for the moment. 11. (C) Continuing on Russia, Kouchner said that the main thing for the U.S. and Russia to begin to work together. “Let’s talk to them,” he said. He said that the Russians are “rough, rude, and brutal,” but we should still engage them. Kouchner said Russian FM Lavrov was one of the most brutal, but was among the cleverest FMs. In any case, they were an important player and had to be included. Balkans 12. (C) FM Kouchner said that Bosnia remained a problem, but, it was important to simply “follow the road.” It was important to push the Serbian government closer to the EU, though he conceded this was difficult due to Dutch and Belgian objections to the failure of the Serbs to hand over Ratko Mladic to ICTY. Presumably referring to EULEX, he said there was success on the ground in Kosovo as the two sides were not killing each other and concluded that things were not in a bad place for the moment.
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Darfur 13. (C) FM Kouchner told the Secretary he thought the International Criminal Court (ICC) would soon issue an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al– Bashir. He complimented the Qataris for playing a useful role with their work in Doha. He said they were working with both sides, including the Islamists. He said it had taken two years to build toward success. EUFOR, a contingent of 17 nations deployed in Eastern Chad and northern Central African Republic, was a success and he expected a resolution before March 15 when EUFOR will hand over its responsibilities to the UN (MINURCAT II). On the humanitarian front, he estimated that half of the displaced persons in Eastern Chad, mainly women, would begin coming home in Darfur by March Book and Transatlantic Paper 14. (SBU) As the meeting ended, the Secretary said there was a lot to digest and do. It would require cooperation. On a lighter note, FM Kouchner said that waiting journalists might raise the issue of “The World According to K,” the expose published yesterday accusing him of enriching himself as a consultant in Africa, tarnishing his humanitarian image. The Secretary dismissed the book, saying “One book? I have 25. You’re not even in my league!” He said that “the first one hurts a little more than the others.” The FM asked the Secretary for US reaction to the Transatlantic paper passed to the U.S. during the French presidency. The Secretary said she would review the issue and respond. Note: EUR passed the paper to S staff on 2/5/09 and is preparing a response to the FM). End note. 15. (U) Participants in the Bilateral: United States The Secretary SCA – A/S Richard Boucher EUR – PDAS Marcie Ries NEA – DAS David Hale PA – Robert Wood EUR/WE – Pamela Spratlen (notetaker) NSC – Toby Bradley Interpreter France Foreign Minister Kouchner Ambassador Vimont Eric Chevallier, MFA Spokesperson Philippe Errera, MFA Counselor Emmanuelle Lenain, Embassy Spokesperson Aurelien Lechevallier, Notetaker Interpreter Clinton

LXXII
Reference id: 09USUNNEWYORK208 Subject: Kosovo: President Sejdiu Meets Ambassador Rice Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Wed, 4 Mar 2009 22:37 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09USUNNEWYORK208.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO9840 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO DE RUCNDT #0208/01 0632237 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 042237Z MAR 09 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 1402 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5990 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLEC226

TIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2019 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], ICJ [International Court of Justice], UNSC [UN Security Council], SR [Serbia], KV [Kosovo] Classified By: Ambassador Susan Rice for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) Summary. The President of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, asked Ambassador Rice on March 2 to help Kosovo obtain recognition from additional states, particularly from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan and OIC members; and to help ensure that likeminded states, including non-European states, submit briefs to the International Court of Justice in support of Kosovo’s position on its 2008 declaration of independence. President Sejdiu welcomed the recent deployment of the EU’s EULEX rule of law mission, and said he would not reopen discussions with Belgrade on SYG Ban’s six point dialogue or on Kosovo’s status. Sejdiu reaffirmed that he would soon put a representative in New York to engage directly with UN missions. Ambassador Rice affirmed U.S. continuing support for Kosovo’s independence and obtaining recognitions, reinforced the need for a Kosovar representative in New York to develop personal relationships with UN missions, and encouraged Sejdiu to broaden Kosovo’s relationship with the UN beyond DPKO. End Summary. 2. (C) Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu told Ambassador Rice on March 2 that he was pleased with his early and warm reception in Washington by the new administration, and thanked her for the leading role played by the U.S. and the U.S. Mission to the UN in Kosovo’s independence. Sejdiu said that in the year since Kosovo’s independence, Kosovo had been given a chance to prove itself, and had adopted a constitution and a number of laws in accordance with the plan presented by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari. Kosovo had also developed excellent relations with all of its neighbors, except for Serbia, which was still trying to exert pressure on Kosovo to destabilize it. 3. (C) President Sejdiu had been pleased, he said, to receive reaffirmation in Washington of the administrations’s willingness to help build support for additional countries to recognize Kosovo, and he asked Ambassador Rice to help in New York with UN Permreps, specifically mentioning members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Sejdiu thought Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt could be convinced to recognize Kosovo with some encouragement from the United States, and that other OIC members would then follow the lead of these countries. He also asked Rice to weigh in with Pakistan and Brazil. Ambassdaor Rice reaffirmed U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence and unquestioned sovereignty, and offered to continue to work with Kosovo to obtain recognition by more member states. She said she thought recognitions would come faster if the Kosovars were to establish a permanent presence in New York, since success at the UN often depends on the strength of strong personal relationships. Sejdiu said that he planned to put a representative in New York soon.
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4. (C) The Kosovo President thought it would also be important for as many likeminded states as possible to submit written statements to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the April 17, 2009 deadline on the question of the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Between 10-12 countries from Europe had confirmed that they would submit briefs in Kosovo’s favor, he said, but it would be important to get like-minded countries outside of Europe, such as Japan, Malaysia, Australia or Panama to submit briefs as well. Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic had sent letters to over 80 countries asking them to weigh in on Serbia’s behalf. Sejdiu believed that a written brief from Japan would be especially important, since a Japanese judge would be among those sitting on the panel. The President understood that Japanese legal experts had been preparing a brief, but that Japan had not yet made a decision whether to submit it. Sejdiu said he had spoken to the Japanese Ambassador to the United States about the issue during his recent visit to Washington. Kosovo had also made a direct request to Kosovo’s International Steering Group (ISG) to submit briefs on Kosovo’s behalf. He also thought the February 16 ruling of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) against five former Serbian officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo would help Kosovo’s case in the ICJ. Sejdiu thought Serbia had not yet come to grips with its responsibility, and believed the government was still protecting criminals from the Kosovo war. 5. (C) Sejdiu said he had no plans to meet with UN officials during his current visit to New York, but would likely seek a meeting with the Secretary-General when he returned for the March 23 debate on UNMIK. Kosovo welcomed the deployment of the EULEX rule of law mission in December 2008, but Sejdiu said he had rejected the SYG’s six-point dialogue, which he thought had violated the Ahtisaari plan. He believed that Serbia was still trying to reopen the issue of Kosovo’s status, and he made clear that he would only discuss issues with Serbia “as two sovereign states.” He hoped that the EULEX mission would be fully deployed by the end of March 2009, and that UNMIK would accelerate the pace of its drawdown. Kosovo had moved on to a new stage in its development, and was now focused on obtaining membership in the international financial institutions, attracting investment, and stabilizing Kosovo internally. 6. (C) Ambassador Rice encouraged President Sejdiu to maintain a broad view of Kosovo’s relations with the UN beyond its relationship with DPKO. Long term cooperation with other UN agencies, such as UNDP, for example, could be beneficial for Kosovo. Rice

LXXIII
Reference id: 09BELGRADE399 Subject: Serbian Government Hunting For Mladic Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Wed, 6 May 2009 17:31 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09BELGRADE399.html History: First published on Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:47 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
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Media: WikiLeaks cables: Serbia suspects Russian help for fugitive Ratko Mladić | World news | The Guardian Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO7886 RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBW #0399/01 1261731 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 061731Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1264 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNS/NSC WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], KWAC, SR [Serbia] Ref: 08 BELGRADE 1097 Classified By: Acting DCM Troy Pederson for reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary 1. (C) The Serbian government continues to publicly emphasize its efforts to capture war crimes indictee Ratko Mladic, and Serbian officials responsible for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) privately tell us the current government is very supportive of their work. ICTY Belgrade’s chief, who sits in on operations discussions, agreed that Serbia was looking hard for Mladic and was also providing all document and witness assistance required, in contrast to the previous government’s efforts. Serbia also continued to prosecute domestic war crimes cases, and the war crimes court recently issued verdicts and sentences in two high-profile cases. The current government clearly wants to find Mladic, a prerequisite for moving ahead with EU accession and Serbia’s future. End Summary. Looking for Mladic 2. (C) With the upcoming visit of ICTY Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz, the main question regarding Serbia’s ICTY cooperation – and the key to the Dutch unblocking Serbia’s frozen Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU – is whether Serbia is really doing all it can to find the remaining two ICTY indictees, particularly Bosnian Serb wartime military leader Ratko Mladic. Government officials continue to state publicly that Serbia is making every effort to find Mladic and fellow indictee Goran Hadzic. Chief of the War Crimes Investigation police Aleksandar Kostic told visiting S/WCI representative Julie Vibul-Jolles May 5 that the current government had the will to find the fugitives, but that so much time had passed that it was hard to track them down. He said there was no information to suggest Mladic was in Serbia but there was no information that he was anywhere else either. Police continued to search for leads, including surveilling known associates and family members. Regional intelligence sharing was helpful and had led to the arrests of Stojan Zupljanin and Radovan Karadzic, Kostic said.
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3. (C) ICTY Belgrade Office Head Deyan Mihov told us May 5 that he believed that the search for Mladic was very active. The current government was engaged with ICTY, a “big change compared to the past.” Mihov said the Security Information Agency (BIA) and Military Intelligence Agency (VBA) were now working well together and supporting each other’s efforts. Mihov said he attends weekly meetings of the Action Team as an observer and receives detailed operational information and plans concerning the search for both fugitives. Mihov told us that the meetings of the Action Team, which was officially co-headed by President of the National Council for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal Rasim Ljajic and War Crimes Prosecutor Vladimir Vukcevic, were really led by Presidential Chief of Staff and National Security Council Secretary Miki Rakic, which he viewed as a strong indication that the search for Mladic was a personal priority of President Tadic. Mihov said Rakic had provided the same information to Brammertz each time he visited and also requested Brammertz’s help obtaining specific intelligence assistance. Mihov emphasized that the government could use any additional intelligence assistance the U.S. could provide. Mihov said he was impressed that the Action Team was trying equally hard to find Hadzic, even though the political payoff for Serbia from his capture would be much less than for Mladic. Technical Cooperation with ICTY 4. (SBU) Serbia’s technical cooperation with the ICTY, while not as high-profile, is also essential. Director of the ICTY Cooperation Council Office Dusan Ignjatovic told us May 4 his office had granted all of ICTY’s and defense lawyers, archive access requests, delivered all subpoenas to witnesses, addressed all witness protection issues ICTY had identified, and complied with more than 98% of document requests. Mihov confirmed that technical cooperation was close to 100% with no outstanding problems over documents, another improvement over the past government. Domestic Trials 5. (SBU) Domestic war crimes trials also continue, with verdicts recently in two high-profile cases. War Crimes Prosecutor Vukcevic told us May 5 the current government was much more supportive of domestic war crimes trials. On April 23, the court convicted four former policemen for murdering 50 ethnic Albanian civilians in Suva Reka, Kosovo in March 1999. Two of the defendants were sentenced to 20 years in prison, one to 15 years, and the fourth to 13 years. Three of the defendants, including the principal defendant, were acquitted. Vukcevic told us that he was pleased that the case had established that a crime had been committed but that he would appeal the acquittals. The War Crimes Court also completed on March 12 a retrial in the Ovcara (Vukovar) case, convicting 13 members of the Vukovar Territorial Defense for torturing and killing in November 1991 200 Croatian prisoners of war who had surrendered. Five individuals were acquitted, and one received a much lighter sentence in the retrial (6 years versus the original 15), and the War Crimes Prosecutor’s spokesman announced the prosecutor would appeal that sentence and the acquittals. Comment 6. (C) In contrast to the approach of the previous government, the current Serbian government is working hard on ICTY cooperation. The pressing domestic political need
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to unblock the SAA and move closer to European Union membership is clearly a major motivating factor, made all the more important by the worsening economic situation. While the term “fully cooperating” may be elusive, it is important to acknowledge the current government’s efforts and not allow the dead weight of the past to hinder Serbia’s future. End Comment. Munter

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Reference id: 09SARAJEVO922 Subject: Bosnia – Extending The Presence Of International Judges And Prosecutors Origin: Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Cable time: Wed, 29 Jul 2009 14:34 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09SARAJEVO922.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO9394 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHVJ #0922/01 2101434 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291434Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0582 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC Hide header

Confidential
NOFORN EUR (JONES), EUR/SCE (HYLAND, SILBERSTEIN, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB), S/WCI (WILLIAMSON, VIBUL-JOLLES), EUR/ACE (KEETON), INL (CARROLL, SIMIC), INR (MORIN); NSC FOR HELGERSON; OSD FOR BEIN; DOJ PASS TO OPDAT (ALEXANDRE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2019 Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], KCRM [Criminal Activity], KJUS [Administration of Justice], ASEC [Security], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ref: SARAJEVO 732 AND PRIOR Classified By: Ambassador Charles English for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 10. 2. (C) Summary. We are reaching a critical point in our and the international community’s efforts to extend the presence of the international judges and prosecutors working at the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office. The Council of Ministers’ (CoM) July 23 decision to extend the presence of internationals working on war crimes may not be decided by the Parliament until early November or later. The decision would come only weeks before the internationals are scheduled to depart Bosnia. We believe that by then most of the remaining internationals would have decided to depart Bosnia and to take their hard-earned institutional memory with them. Their departure would set
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back our rule of law agenda in Bosnia and may jeopardize our substantial long-term investment in Bosnia’s State-level judicial institutions, which remain fragile and are operating in an increasingly hostile environment. We also remain concerned that the Bosnian government has significantly reduced funding to the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office, such that their normal operations are hampered and they are unable to replace all the internationals with nationals. Principal Deputy HighRep Raffi Gregorian told the Ambassador recently that HighRep Valentin Inzko would be prepared to use Bonn Powers if the Bosnian government fails to extend the internationals working on war crimes cases. Given what is at stake, we believe that the international community must be prepared to decide whether to take decisive action on this issue. End Summary. Background 3. (C) Last February, Bosnian State Court President Meddzida Kreso and State Prosecutor Milorad Barasin began discussions with key donors about the possibility of extending the presence of international judges and prosecutors working in the Special Departments for War Crimes and Organized Crime past a legislatively-mandated December 2009 departure. From the start, we agreed with their assessment that the internationals still have a critical role to play in the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office. They provide cover to nationals, who work in an increasingly difficult environment; assist nationals in becoming more familiar with certain aspects of the adversarial legal system; help Bosnia meet its obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); ensure that new policies and practices that were put in place to make the processing of war crimes and organized crime cases more efficient and effective (e.g. case selection criteria) are further refined and evaluated; and, help build public confidence in the work of the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office. 4. (C/NF) For months, our European colleagues resisted engaging on the issue. They later began providing political support after a Swedish-government study released in December confirmed our assessment. Then, after stalling for over a year, BiH Justice Minister Colak in May sent to the Council of Ministers legislative amendments needed to extend the presence of the internationals, but the amendments walked back much of what Kreso and Barasin sought. They extended the presence of internationals working only on war crimes, but not organized crime cases, and provided for a two-year rather than a three-year mandate. Colak, whose proposal only allowed for international judges to work at the appellate level, rejected the Court’s request to permit first instance trial judges to finish their current cases past December, even though he was aware that the government may have to pay between five and ten million konvertible marks (about 3.63 and 7.26 million USD) to restart these cases. Still, the CoM on June 4 voted down Colak’s amendments, with the Bosniaks arguing that it did not go far enough since it did not allow internationals to work on organized crime cases. Despite this, we succeeded in convincing Colak to re-submit his amendments and to incorporate all of our suggested changes to his amendments, except for allowing internationals to work on organized crime cases. Subsequently, Javier Solana, HighRep Inzko, ICTY President Patrick Robinson, and the head of OSCE in Sarajevo, Ambassador Gary Robbins, all sent separate letters to Prime Minister Spiric, urging him and the other members of the CoM to extend the presence of the internationals.
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Where We Are Now 5. (C) The Council of Ministers on July 23 adopted Colak’s imperfect legislative package. The Serb and Croat Ministers voted in favor of the amendments. Ministers from (the largely Bosniak) Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) – Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj and Human Rights and Refugees Minister Safet Halilovic – voted against the measure on the grounds noted above (i.e., that the proposal did not go far enough). The two ministers from the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) were absent (Defense Minister Selmo Cikotic was traveling in Afghanistan and Security Minister Tarik Sadovic was in the midst of being removed from office). The amendments will be considered by Parliament in regular procedure in September, after the summer recess, though Prime Minister Nikola Spiric had promised Ambassadors from the “EU Troika” countries that it would be sent in urgent procedure. What the CoM Vote Means 6. (C) Prime Minister Spiric’s decision to send the legislative amendments permitting the extension of internationals in regular procedure is significant. This means that, unlike in urgent procedure, delegates could amend the draft legislation and that a final vote on amendments will not take place until November. Even if the vote took place at that time and the presence of the internationals working on war crimes cases were extended, most of the existing internationals (almost all of whom have contracts until December) would probably leave, taking all of their hard-earned institutional memory with them. It would also take the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the body that appoints judges, prosecutors, and other judicial staff, at a minimum, six-months, to fill vacancies. This would cause significant case management problems, and the international community would have to incur the additional cost of re-starting the operations of the Registry, the body that is in charge of managing the international presence at the State Court and the State Prosecutor’s Office, which is in the process of shutting down. 7. (C) The CoM vote also means that international prosecutors working on over two hundred organized crime cases involving senior politicians, including RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, would depart, leaving these cases in limbo. It is unlikely that the nationals, who are already swamped with a burgeoning caseload and who lack expertise in investigating complex organized and financial crime, corruption, and terrorism cases, will want to take on such politically sensitive cases. Some nationals have privately expressed to us their fear that there will be increased efforts to intimidate them and that some colleagues would put these cases aside out of fear for their safety and that of their families. (Note: We have recently heard allegations that locals and internationals investigating a terrorism case were being followed by individuals who appeared to be Wahabbis. End Note). Speculation in the media over the weekend that, in voting for the measure, the ministers from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) had broken ranks with RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik is, in our opinion, disingenuous, since we believe that the Serb ministers would never stray from Dodik’s instructions on the matter. Dodik and the Serbs, however, may have no intention of voting in favor of the legislative amendments adopted by the Council of Ministers. The media has reported that delegates representing Serb parties in both houses of Parliament, including the SNSD, have vowed to reject Minister Colak’s amendments.
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Our Options and Deadlines 8. (C) We will need to make a decision by early September on the way ahead for international judges and prosecutors. We concur with OHR that inaction by the international community past this date will jeopardize the secondee program even if there is an eventual partial extension of the presence of international judges and prosecutors. We believe that the international community has the following options: a) Await a vote in Parliament on the extension in normal procedure. This would likely not take place until November, which would probably result in the loss of current judges and prosecutors and long delays before new international judges and prosecutors could begin work. This option would also risk the possibility that Parliament would reject the measure. b) Have the HighRep use his Bonn Powers to impose the CoM decision in September so that we can retain most of the current judges and prosecutors working on war crimes cases and ensure that their hard-earned institutional memory is not lost. 9. (C) As noted above, option A carries substantial risks. Even if Parliament adopted the legislative package, we might lose all of the internationals currently working on war crimes cases, including Srebrenica. Option B would ensure that we would secure the continued employment of those internationals who want to remain (we think the vast majority of them), but may draw ire from the Serbs for the use of the Bonn Powers. We could argue that an imposition would reinforce what the Council of Ministers had decided. Additionally, an imposition would help Bosnia fulfill its ICTY obligations – both ICTY President Robinson and Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz have expressed public support for the extension – as well as the implementation of the National War Crimes Strategy (the adoption of the strategy was a “5 2” rule of law benchmark). Principal Deputy HighRep Raffi Gregorian told the Ambassador in a July 28 meeting that HighRep Valentin Inzko would be prepared to use Bonn Powers to extend the presence of internationals working on war crimes cases if Parliament does not take timely action. Gregorian also said that the HighRep has no intention of using his Bonn Powers to extend the presence of internationals working on organized crime and corruption cases. Action Request 10. (C) We recommend that Washington support HighRep Inzko’s inclination to use the Bonn Powers to extend the presence of the internationals working on war crimes cases in the event that the Bosnian government fails to take timely action and that we seek broad support in Quint and other key justice sector donor countries (the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) for such action. English

LXXV
Reference id: 09PARIS1731 Subject: S/wci Rapp’s Consultations In France (december 14) Origin: Embassy Paris (France) Cable time: Mon, 21 Dec 2009 09:38 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09PARIS1731.html
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History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments: VZCZCXRO1626 PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO DE RUEHFR #1731/01 3550938 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 210938Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7939 INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0020 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 7147 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 7140 RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0522 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 1872 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0260 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 3275 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0294 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3063 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 2766 RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 Tags: KJUS [Administration of Justice], KCRM [Criminal Activity], PHUM [Human Rights], YI [Yugoslavia], RW [Rwanda], SL [Sierra Leone], FR [France; Corsica] Classified By: Wallace R. Bain, Political Officer, for reason 1.4 (b/d) . 1. (C) Subject: French officials on December 14 told S/WCI Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp that they would advise consideration of a French contribution to support the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) but cautioned that GOF budgetary resources were quite limited and that a contribution might not be possible. They welcomed U.S. participation as an observer to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and agreed that the UN Security Council needed the ability to exercise an oversight function over any attempt to label an action as an “aggression” subject to international sanction. The French agreed with Ambassador Rapp on the need for residual mechanisms during the closing phases of the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). End Summary. 2. (C) S/WCI Ambassador Stephen J. Rapp, accompanied by S/WCI Special Assistant Todd Anderson and Embassy AF-assistant, held two meetings with MFA officials in Paris on December 14. The meeting with Jean-Luc Florent (PDAS for Legal Affairs), Olivier Guerot (DAS-equivalant for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs), and Ginette de Matha (Advisor to the A/S for Legal Affairs) focused on the SCSL, the U.S. and the ICC, and issues related to the end phases of the ICTY and ICTR. The second meeting, with MFA AF DAS-equivalents Stephane Gruenberg (AF/C) and Frederic Clavier (AF/E), centered on the DRC and its war crimes and human rights problems. Sierra Leone 3. (C) In the meeting with Florent, Guerot, and Matha, Ambassador Rapp began by describing the SCSL as a success story that was nearing the completion of its function with all trials completed except for the trial of Charles Taylor, which was taking place in
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the Hague. However, because of the way the court was established, it had always been necessary to conduct fund-raising to sustain its operation. Florent noted that the UN had paid some costs, but Ambassador Rapp explained that that had been a one-time injection of emergency funding during the court’s second year of operations, which the UN was not likely to repeat. The SCSL’s budget was declining as the number of trials decreased. Sending SCSL convicts to Rwanda had gone well. The Taylor trial, including appeals, was likely to end in mid-2011. Florent commented on the large sums paid to Taylor’s lawyers; Ambassador Rapp agreed but commented that such costs were probably warranted in a case involving a head of state. 4. (C) Ambassador Rapp said that the U.S. would probably contribute about $7.5 million of the SCSL’s expected budget of about $20 million for 2010, deliverable in August 2010. In the meantime, the court could face shortages as early as February 2010. Hence the need for additional contributions. He noted France’s modest previous contributions in 2006-2008 but the absence of a contribution in 2009. Guerot, who had worked on IO budgets before moving to the human rights portfolio, provided a careful explanation of GOF budget difficulties. He said that any contribution would have to come from the Cooperation budget; there was no funding, or very little, remaining in the UN/IO accounts. He noted that the MFA’s budget for voluntary contributions to international organizations had been cut 25 percent in 2009, after having been cut 25 percent in 2008, resulting in severe cutbacks. He said that even making France’s mandatory contributions was a strain. 5. (C) Florent said that he and his colleagues would signal to their political leaders the need to consider contributing to SCSL but he asked that the U.S. understand France’s financial difficulties. He said that the tight budgetary situation would persist indefinitely, especially with respect to voluntary contributions. 6. (C) Addressing the costs of war crimes tribunals more generally, Ambassador Rapp and the French agreed on the need for more efficient use of resources at the tribunals, the desirability of sharing resources (such as courtrooms) more readily, and, across the board, adoption of sensible measures to reduce expenses. Guerot commented that ICC costs were soaring and that Japan (working with France) was one of the few countries engaged in trying to reduce ICC expenses. International Criminal Court 7. (C) The French welcomed the USG’s recent decision to participate in certain ICC activities as an observer. Ambassador Rapp provided background on the decision to work with the ICC, albeit on a limited basis, which he believed would further U.S. interests and provide useful input to the ICC. He observed that the level of U.S. engagement in the ICC would remain a sensitive political issue in the U.S., making it difficult to predict whether U.S. involvement would increase. Ambassador Rapp said the U.S. would attend the ICC Assembly on State Parties Session in New York in March and he believed the U.S. would also be represented at the ICC Review Conference in May/June 2010 as an observer and try to make a positive contribution to the proceedings. 8. (C) The most pressing concern, with which the French fully agreed, was the ICC’s intention to define “aggression” in the context of a potential criminal act subject to ICC jurisdiction. Ambassador Rapp said that the U.S. would oppose ICC action in this area unless the UN Security Council were given an explicit power to approve or disapprove
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ICC labeling of a specific act as “aggression.” The French agreed that a control mechanism of this sort was necessary and expressed confidence, shared by Ambassador Rapp, that the other members of the P-5 shared that point of view. They agreed that raising this clearly with ICC member states would be an important priority between now and the Review Conference and at the conference itself on appropriate occasions. End-Phase for ICTY and ICTR 9. (C) The French agreed with Ambassador Rapp on the need to begin planning for the closing down of the ICTY and ICTR, bearing in mind that a “residual mechanism” would have to be established and maintained to address issues that would arise after the two tribunals finished conducting trials. These issues would include records retention, appeals issues, enforcement of judgments, witness protection, possible new claims or cases, treatment of prisoners, and other similar matters that could emerge long after the tribunals themselves ceased trying cases. Ambassador Rapp discussed the ICTR and the 11 fugitive cases (three “high value” cases and eight of lesser value). In lieu of keeping the ICTR fully up and running in case of apprehension of the fugitives, it might be better (and far more cost effective) to transfer the cases to Rwanda. The ICTR’s judges, however, might balk, believing that Rwandan standards of justice were not adequate to prosecute the cases fairly. Ambassador Rapp said that one solution might be to allow non-Rwandan judges to participate in any trials in Rwanda, a matter that he had discussed recently with Rwandan President Kagame, who seemed receptive to the idea. Transferring these cases to Rwanda could be a way to ease one of the remaining obstacles to fully winding down the ICTR. 10. (C) Florent expressed agreement with this approach, saying that he had met with ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow on December 11 and that Jallow said that he was increasingly impressed with the Rwandan justice system. Florent thought, based on Jallow’s comment, that the ICTR judges might be more willing to transfer cases to Rwanda if a foreign judge were included in the panel trying a case. Florent cited the need to continue discussion in New York. He understood that creating an exit strategy for ICTY and ICTR would continue over the next three or four years. There were real challenges and many ambiguities, and UNSC members might not all share the same perspective. He said that France favored a “light structure” to carry out residual functions, that should by no means include the possibility of reconstituting the courts. Ambassador Rapp reiterated the value of being able to transfer cases to national courts. He also hoped that a system would be developed for safely storing tribunal archives that would allow for easy electronic access while preserving original materials. He also said that a residual office should be maintained in the region (rather than in the Hague or other distant place) to ensure a local presence and as a sign of the international community’s continuing commitment. Meeting with MFA Africa Experts 11. (C) During his later meeting with MFA DAS-equivalents Stephane Gruenberg and Frederic Clavier, Ambassador Rapp covered in abbreviated form the main points of his discussion with Florent. Discussion then focused on the ongoing violence in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC, and the dynamics within and among the FARDC, FDLR, and CNDP, elements of all which continued to commit violent acts aga237

inst each other and against civilian populations. Violence seemed to be on the rise once again. Gruenberg asked about CNDP Chief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda and his whereabouts. Ambassador Rapp stressed the need to try him for a range of crimes, including the use of child soldiers. He had apparently returned to the bush but was reportedly seen recently in Goma, indicating that he had not “disappeared.” Ambassador Rapp regretted that there seemed to be a lack of will to apprehend him. On Kimia II, Gruenberg expressed concern about MONUC’s support of the FARDC (and mentioned in passing that the next mandate renewal would be for a “five-month duration”). 12. (C) On programs to reform and improve the justice system in the DRC, Gruenberg said that France was “not a main donor,” noting that France had just completed a 3 million euro (about USD 4.5 million) project for the justice system, which he described as support for infrastructure and laboratories to assist criminal investigators. He repeated that these were all done on a relatively small scale. Ambassador Rapp reviewed U.S. assistance programs to the DRC and to MONUC, with Gruenberg marveling that such assistance was at a “completely different level” from France’s. Gruenberg said he hoped that France could become more supportive of Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs, which he thought might gain traction with the new roadmap the upcoming MONUC mandate might delineate. Gruenberg described some of the legal cases involving Rwandans and others from the region who were residing in France or elsewhere in Europe and the legal difficulties of bringing some of them to justice. 13. (C) Clavier expressed disappointment with Kenya and its failures on the justice front. He said that France and the EU had contributed to developing the Kenyan legal system but the Kenyans were not using what they had available to them, a point the French had made to PM Odinga, who had recently visited France. Clavier said that he had discussed with Jallow the issue of reforming Rwanda’s justice system, which would not be easy, in Jallow’s view. After a brief discussion of Sudan and the ICC, Clavier briefed on the re-establishment of relations between Rwanda and France, noting that the GOF was waiting for Rwanda’s agreement for the proposed French ambassador (not identified by Clavier). He said that an advance team would soon travel to Rwanda to assess what would be needed to get France’s embassy up and running quickly. 14. (U) Ambassador Rapp has cleared this message. Rivkin

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Reference id: 10USUNNEWYORK1 Subject: Ambassador Dicarlo Meets With Icty‘s Chief Prosecutor Serge Brammertz Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Tue, 5 Jan 2010 18:18 UTC Classification: Unclassified Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10USUNNEWYORK1.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments
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VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0001 0051818 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 051818Z JAN 10 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7969 INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0019 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 9187 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 3389 Hide header

Unclas
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PREL [External Political Relations], UNSC [UN Security Council] 1. (SBU) Summary: Serge Brammertz, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), met with Ambassador DiCarlo December 1 prior to the ICTY‘s biannual briefing to the UN Security Council. Brammertz focused his discussion on recent developments with respect to Croatia’s cooperation with providing evidentiary documents to the ICTY, saying Croatia’s Government has made some progress but not enough. End Summary. 2. (SBU) Brammertz said that Croatia’s Prime Minister, Jadranka Kosor, established an interagency working group to investigate the whereabouts of evidentiary documents requested by the ICTY. Brammertz said that the working group is comprised of approximately 60 people but that it has focused more on whether Croatia’s Government has conducted an appropriate investigation to find the documents rather than looking for the documents. He said that he delayed his report to the Security Council hoping that he would get some new evidence from Croatia but didn’t receive anything until the last weekend in November. Kosor provided a document that is an order issued in 1998 to all military commands in Croatia directing them to collect all documents related to “Operation Storm” and put them in a safe place and to destroy all duplicate copies of such documents. Brammertz said although Kosor’s gesture signals some cooperation, the document only confirms that there are documents that have been hidden that the ICTY needs. He said he planned to interview the people who issued the orders. 3. (U) Regarding Serbia, Brammertz said that he is satisfied with the efforts it has made and recognizes the professionalism and commitment of the Serbian Government to cooperate with the ICTY. He attributed such cooperation mainly to the notion that Serbia can say to the European Union (EU) that it is doing its job. Brammertz said that Serbia’s cooperation and efforts are five times better now than one year ago and three times better than six months ago. 4. (U) Ambassador DiCarlo commented on the Karadzic case and referred to the many delays in the trial. Brammertz said there is a lot of drama in The Hague with respect to Karadzic’s case and noted that Karadzic recently filed a motion that challenges the legal decision that created the ICTY. He also said that the case shows the limitations of self representation in that the accused is not free to move around freely to prepare his case. Rice
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LXXVII
Reference id: 10BELGRADE26 Subject: Serbia: Rasim Ljajic Unveils Social Democratic Party Of Serbia Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 8 Jan 2010 09:38 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10BELGRADE26.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO3242 RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHBW #0026/01 0080939 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 080938Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0548 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE RUCXJAC/JAC MOLESWORTH JCDX RAF MOLESWORTH UK Hide header

Unclas
SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], SR [Serbia] Ref: 09 BELGRADE 771 Summary 1. (SBU) The new Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDPS), led by popular Minister of Labor and Social Policy Rasim Ljajic, held its founding party congress in Belgrade in mid-December. Marking Ljajic’s ascension from leadership of the regional Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP) to a nation-wide political movement (reftel), the SDPS congress attracted President Tadic, coalition partners, and members of Serbia’s nationalist opposition. With its principles of promoting efficient state institutions, economic development, normal political dialogue, constitutional patriotism, and caring for the disadvantaged, the SDPS is positioning itself to capitalize on Ljajic’s personal popularity and to advocate modern European values on Serbia’s left. End Summary. Ljajic Officially Forms SDPS 2. (SBU) Political, labor, and intellectual figures descended upon Belgrade’s Sava Center on December 12 to mark the formal creation of the SDPS led by Minister of Labor and Social Policy Rasim Ljajic. The SDPS founding congress attracted such luminaries as President Boris Tadic, Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, Education Minister Zarko Obradovic (Socialist Party of Serbia-SPS), Diaspora Minister Srdjan Sreckovic (Serbian Renewal Movement-SPO), National Investment Plan Minister Verica Kalanovic, League
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of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) head Nenad Canak, SPO president Vuk Draskovic, Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) deputy president Aleksandar Vucic, Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) economic council head Nenad Popovic, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) MP Kenan Hajdarevic, Democratic Christian Party of Serbia (DHSS) head Vladan Batic, Together for Sumadija (ZZS) deputy president Sasa Milenic, United Serbia (JS) MP Jasmina Milosevic, and representatives from sister parties in Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. An array of labor syndicates, left-leaning intellectuals, and non-governmental organizations also attended the proceedings as did numerous ordinary citizens, many of whom the SDPS brought in by bus in order to pack the 3,600 seats of the Sava Center’s main hall. Nearly all high officials of the SDP (which Ljajic formally led until recently) also attended, but without any public role. 3. (U) The party congress began with the national anthem followed by an introductory film highlighting the values of the SDPS. Featuring short interviews with activists, youth, pensioners, and workers on the street, the film emphasized the space existing in Serbian politics for a viable social democratic party and lauded Ljajic’s personal leadership. Reiterating the party’s slogan “one Serbia,” the film also emphasized the key themes of the SDPS platform including building up the state, constitutional patriotism, protecting the development of democracy, decentralization and regionalization, fight against crime and corruption, and social democratic economy. Coalition Partners Sing Rasim’s Praise... 4. (SBU) President Tadic headline a series of speeches from government coalition partners praising Ljajic’s vision and character. Tadic said that social democratic parties must take into consideration the most vulnerable segments of the population, as well as preserve the stability and financial sustainability of the state and promote economic growth. He emphasized the need for business owners to assume social responsibility. Describing the SDPS as “the closest sister party” of the Democratic Party, Tadic said both parties agreed that “the best social policy is the policy of development and growth” and social policy based on budget expenditures was not sustainable. (Comment: Strikingly absent from Tadic’s comments was any mention of EU integration.) 5. (SBU) Other speakers were similarly laudatory of Ljajic. Canak (LSV) followed Tadic in offering congratulations to Ljajic and welcoming the existence of a nationwide social democratic party. Draskovic (SPO) noted that despite being on the opposite end of the political spectrum, he supported Ljajic since “we are both parts of the same body of Serbia.” Draskovic provided the most catchy sound bite of the congress, commenting that everyone from those living in difficult conditions to Serbia’s Prime Minister (responsible for finding Hague indictee Ratko Mladic) all turned to Ljajic to say “Rasime, spasi me” (“Rasim, save me”). Obradovic represented SPS head Ivica Dacic (who was traveling) in welcoming another voice on the left for Serbia’s disadvantaged. Representatives of sister social democratic parties from Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the United Independent Serbian Party from Croatia also gave short speeches. ...As Does the Opposition 6. (SBU) The SDPS congress also featured remarks by two key Serbian opposition party members. In strikingly undiplomatic comments, Vucic (SNS) said he wished Tadic had not left the congress early because Vucic wanted to tell Tadic that there would always be a place for Ljajic in the SNS-led future government after the SNS beat the DS in the
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next elections. Popovic (DSS) offered more boilerplate language complimenting Ljajic’s focus on development and economic issues while stopping short of suggesting DSS cooperation with the SDPS. Ljajic’s Vision 7. (SBU) Following over an hour’s worth of congratulatory speeches, Ljajic took the stage flanked by roughly fifty young people waved long-stemmed roses above their heads. Ljajic stated that the diversity of parties represented at the congress reflected the SDPS’s goal of encouraging a peaceful and normal dialogue between all parties of the government. Serbia needed to develop stable institutions, efficient administrations, a government with no more than 15 ministers, and a National Assembly of roughly 150 MPs, Ljajic said. Describing Serbia’s membership in the EU as one of his party’s primary goals, Ljajic noted that Serbia needed to sort out its affairs at home in order to be a good neighbor and a reliable partner, adding, in particular that Serbia needed a dialogue and consensus over basic state issues such as decentralization and the status of Kosovo. Ljajic declared that the SDPS would not take a single cent from any tycoon because the SDPS would not “be a corporation from which anybody will profit.” Ljajic closed by reiterating his commitment to Serbia’s youth through advancing the values of equality and protection of the disadvantaged. Comment 8. (SBU) The high-level representation from the entire Serbian political spectrum at the SDPS congress was testament to Ljajic’s popularity and political astuteness . By leaving behind (albeit nominally) the regional minority SDP to lead the national-level SDPS, Ljajic is banking on his popularity and social democratic message to appeal to a wider audience, including Serbia’s disadvantaged. However, political analysts have pointed to the poor track record of social democratic movements in Serbia and expressed skepticism to us that the SDPS could meet the five percent threshold in national elections without going into an electoral coalition with the DS; Ljajic has said he would welcome that. Much of the impetus to form the party has come from Ljajic’s desire to enhance his personal image and political influence. Ljajic is an energetic and dedicated minister who reaches out to and has the pulse of the ordinary citizen. The only coalition politician to regularly speak about the need to support the ICTY, Ljajic is well placed to be an influential voice in advancing the European values that Serbia must embrace to emerge from its troubled past. End Comment. Brush

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Reference id: 10ZAGREB26 Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With Prime Minister Kosor Origin: Embassy Zagreb (Croatia) Cable time: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 14:29 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10ZAGREB26.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
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Confidential
SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], HR [Croatia] Ref: A. ZAGREB 006 B. ZAGREB 009 Classified By: James B. Foley, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. Summary: I saw Prime Minister Kosor for 75 minutes January 11 to discuss the fallout from the Sanader “political coup” attempt (reftels) and a range of issues, including Croatia’s EU accession negotiations, ICTY cooperation, energy relationship with Russia and prospects for improving ties with Serbia. Kosor felt she had emerged stronger from the crisis but was by no means out of the woods. She thought Sanader would likely try again to destabilize the government or at least to leverage policy concessions, presumably meaning limitations on Kosor’s anti-corruption drive. Kosor implied she was negotiating with other political parties to forestall such a scenario, but described her ultimate strength as a willingness to go to elections rather than compromise on principle or her policy priorities. She expressed optimism that invigorated GOC efforts to cooperate with the ICTY would be recognized and lead to unblocking of the final key chapters in Croatia’s EU accession process, but I countered this and suggested that she and President-elect Josipovic would have to make the case directly with key EU counterparts. Kosor pledged a renewed effort to improve ties with Serbia and acknowledged my warning, in anticipation of her upcoming visit to Moscow, to avoid overdependence on Russian energy supplies, but without engaging on the specific points I raised. Overall I was impressed with Kosor’s determination to achieve her reform agenda, but it is clear that 2010 will be a year of vulnerability as well as opportunity for her and for Croatia. A successful visit to Washington, which Kosor is pushing for, would provide marginal help in this regard, but what she needs above all is the rapid opening of blocked EU accession chapters and successful conclusion of accession negotiations by the end of 2010. End Summary 2. The Prime Minister began the meeting by expressing her personal gratitude to Secretary Clinton for her warm reception of Foreign Minister Jandrokovic in December and for the Secretary’s public words of support for Kosor’s anti-corruption efforts. She ticked off her top goals for 2010 – improving the economy, completing EU negotiations, burnishing Croatia’s credentials as a “model” NATO member, and strengthening the fight against corruption. 3. Kosor volunteered that she had emerged strengthened in the wake of former Prime Minister Sanader’s failed attempt to reassert control over the HDZ-led government and said she now enjoyed a “very stable” position within the party and government. She
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described Sanader’s maneuver as “especially dangerous” because he had jeopardized Croatia’s EU path by criticizing the Arbitration Agreement with Slovenia and implicitly accusing her of treason. She intended to forge productive relations with new President Josipovic, and looked forward to the upcoming visit of Slovenian Prime Minister Pahor and the unblocking of the remaining chapters in the EU accession process. Finally, she expressed confidence that the work of the Task Force investigating the 1995 artillery logs sought by the ICTY prosecutor would result in recognition by the Hague Trial Chamber of Croatia’s full cooperation with the ICTY. 4. Kosor gave a more nuanced perspective when I asked about the prospects for her maintaining a majority within the Sabor. She repeated that the situation appeared stable “right now” but noted that Sanader could choose to reactivate his parliamentary mandate anytime going forward. The danger was that he might threaten to do so in order to extort policy concessions. In such a scenario, Kosor estimated Sanader could garner the support of two to four members of parliament, thereby provoking a crisis. She said the government was in discussion “with others” to preempt this, noting that Sanader’s actions last week had been condemned by all political parties. 5. Continuing, Kosor noted that while stability of the government could be maintained, she was not willing to pay any price to achieve it and stated that she placed Croatia’s interests above party interests. She declared she would opt for early elections rather than go along with a “rotten compromise” for the sake of clinging to power: “I think he (Sanader) and others know this, so the key is in my hands.” That said, she would do her utmost to avoid early elections, which she said would reduce the government to caretaker status for six months and paralyze all that she was trying to achieve in terms of EU negotiations and the fight against corruption. This, she said, would be a “catastrophe.” 6. We discussed at some length a potential visit by her to Washington (details to be reported separately). Kosor noted that she wanted to ensure that any visit not be subject to the interpretation that she was viewed as less important than Sanader had been. But she highly appreciated Washington’s consideration of a visit and understood the importance of acknowledging what the U.S. was doing on behalf of Croatia and the region. 7. On the election of the opposition SDP’s Ivo Josipovic as President, Kosor expressed confidence that any problems between them would be quickly overcome. She believed his vote in the Sabor against the Arbitration Agreement with Slovenia was merely a tactical political maneuver, noting that he was after all “a pro-European lawyer.” She looked forward to an early opportunity to clarify in person with Josipovic any doubts he might still harbor about the agreement. She felt similarly about his previous criticisms of the GOC’s cooperation with the ICTY, which she also saw as politically motivated. Her plan was to have Justice Minister Simonovic, a close personal friend of Josipovic, brief him on the work of the Task Force and convince him that the government had the political will to cooperate fully with the ICTY: “he will understand that there is nothing that cannot be subject to investigation by the Task Force.” 8. I took the opportunity to underscore the importance of continuing the Task Force investigation and engaging diplomatically with the EU countries who were blocking the opening of Chapter 23 over the ICTY issue. Kosor referred to her upcoming luncheon on January 14 with EU and NATO Ambassadors, which would also be attended by the Task Force leaders and would enable EU member states to better understand the full extent of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. I welcomed this step but stressed it would still li244

kely be necessary for the GOC, including Kosor herself, to engage in EU capitals, notably London and The Hague. I noted USG advocacy in this regard, including S/WCI Ambassador Rapp’s planned meetings with HMG officials in London January 18, but repeated that GOC diplomatic efforts would be essential as well. I suggested she seek assistance from Chancellor Merkel during her February 3 visit to Berlin and also suggested that incoming President Josipovic be enlisted to engage with key EU counterparts. 9. Turning to the energy question, I referenced Kosor’s anticipated trip to Moscow and our understanding that Croatia was seeking arrangements for increased supply of Russian gas for the coming years. While the U.S. had no objection to this in principle, I said that a key pillar of our overall policy in Europe was to promote diversification of energy supplies, and avoidance of overdependence on Russia, which carried obvious political risks. I also noted concerns in the region that Croatia not reach understandings with Moscow that came at the expense of their own interests, and specifically urged that the project to build an LNG terminal be rapidly approved. Kosor responded emphatically, but only in general terms. She stressed repeatedly that she would be guided by her sense of Croatia’s duty as a NATO member. She described herself as an “extremely responsible person” and that she regarded Croatia’s NATO membership as a “great honor” and would act accordingly. She said she knew the U.S. understood the importance of energy “independence and security” for Croatia’s economy, repeated her pledges of fealty to NATO, but otherwise would not be drawn into specifics on this issue. She noted that the itinerary and details of her visit to Russia were still being worked out. Kosor welcomed the information that Ambassador Morningstar would be visiting in late February and looked forward to discussing these issues with him. 10. Finally, I noted that in 2010 we hoped that meaningful progress could be achieved in establishing positive relations between Croatia and Serbia. Kosor replied that it had been her policy since becoming Prime Minister to strengthen “our neighbor’s” path to the EU. She complained that the GOC had received “no credit whatsoever” for its recent decision to share translation of the EU acquis communitaire documents with interested neighbors. She pledged to seek a new beginning with Serbia using her newly established channel to Tadic, State Secretary Bozinovic, but emphasized that both sides needed to be committed to the endeavor and underscored the importance of avoiding inflammatory public statements. (Note: Kosor’s advisor Davor Stier told me after the meeting that Tadic’s foreign policy advisor, Jovan Ratkovic, would be making an unpublicized visit to Zagreb January 18. Stier requested that we keep this information quiet.) 11. Comment: I was struck by Kosor’s reference to herself as “extremely responsible” and her vow not to sacrifice national interests for the sake of political survival. This apparent attachment to principle is the source of her current political strength both with the public and, consequently, within the governing coalition. Her tenure therefore represents a window of opportunity for Croatia to achieve necessary, but politically difficult progress in the rule of law and other areas connected to EU accession. Indeed the other striking impression Kosor gives is of someone who is singularly focused on accomplishing in a compressed time period a relatively small number of specific objectives. She seems to be methodically checking the box to do all that is necessary to secure Croatia’s EU membership by the stated goal of 2012. 12. The road ahead in 2010, however, will not be easy. Kosor’s popularity – and political staying power – will be tested by tough decisions she will undoubtedly have to ma245

ke in the area of budget revisions and other economic measures and reforms, which could create new opportunities for mischief-making by Sanader and others. This underscores the stakes in achieving a rapid opening of the remaining chapters in Croatia’s EU accession process – notably Chapter 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights, currently blocked by the UK and Netherlands over the ICTY cooperation issue. Failure to open this and four other chapters early in 2010 will push Croatia’s accession timeline beyond 2012 and prove damaging not only to Kosor but more importantly to stability in Croatia and the region. End comment. Foley

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Reference id: 10BELGRADE118 Subject: Scenesetter For The U.s. Visit Of Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 22 Jan 2010 15:40 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10BELGRADE118.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO5400 RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHBW #0118/01 0221542 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 221540Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0659 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK Hide header

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SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (P. PETERSON) E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], ASEC [Security], KCRM [Criminal Activity], SR [Serbia] Ref: 10 BELGRADE 90; 09 BELGRADE 469; C) 09 BELGRADE 924 Summary 1. (SBU) Ivica Dacic, who wears three hats as First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior, and head of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), is perhaps the most savvy and intriguing member of the Serbian government. As the head of strongman Slobodan Milosevic’s former party, Dacic has laid out and is aggressively pursuing a strategy to le246

gitimize and transform the Socialist Party into a modern, democratic, pro-European party. To do so, he is using his government positions to demonstrate action – on cross-border crime, corruption, visa liberalization, the deployment of Serbian police to Afghanistan with EUPOL, and even a certain degree of pragmatism on cooperation with EULEX on Kosovo. He makes little effort to hide the fact that his long-term goal is to run the Serbian government. He has a long way to go, however, to rebuild a voter base still traumatized by his decision to modernize the party and enter into a governing coalition with Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party. Dacic has a transactional approach to doing business, including diplomacy – in return for the international credibility he expects to receive from his visit to Washington, he will likely be prepared to offer movement on the issues we prioritize. End Summary. First Deputy Prime Minister 2. (SBU) Thanks to the vagaries of Serbia’s proportional electoral system, Dacic wound up as the kingmaker following May 2008 parliamentary elections. After protracted negotiations during which he was courted by both the democrats and the nationalist bloc of former Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Dacic opted for the pro-European course. He exacted a heavy price on Tadic, however, obtaining the First Deputy Prime Minister title for himself as well as five cabinet positions and the Speaker of Parliament for his party. The Socialists’ representation in the 27-member cabinet is disproportional to their 20 seats in the 250-member Parliament. 3. (SBU) Dacic’s status as first among the government’s four deputy prime ministers gives him a certain protocol rank which he clearly enjoys, but he has not attempted to assert his theoretical authority over the other ministries which fall into his security portfolio such as the Ministry of Defense. He appears to realize that he should not push his luck; this reticence also allows him to skirt issues which remain politically radioactive for his party, such as the question of Serbia’s eventual membership in NATO and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Minister of Interior 4. (SBU) Dacic’s primary focus within government is on his work as Minister of Interior. He was a surprising and, to many, an alarming choice for the job. Although his father was a policeman, Dacic had no prior experience in law enforcement or the judicial system. Many Serbians were concerned that he would not pursue reform but rather would use the position to place Socialist Party cronies in police positions around the country and protect corrupt SPS officials by stalling investigations. In the past several months, however, several leading human rights activists have confessed to us that – to their own astonishment – they now view Dacic as one of the most effective Ministers of Interior in Serbia’s recent history. Most notably, he led the Serbian government’s efforts to fulfill the lengthy checklist of steps required for placement on the Schengen “White List,” i.e. EU visa liberalization (Ref A). 5. (SBU) One of his early priorities was establishing cooperation with Serbia’s neighbors on cross-border crime. He has signed police cooperation agreements with his counterparts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Hungary, Belgium, Switzerland, Russia, China, Austria, France, and Israel, and has followed up with a series of high-profile arrests of organized crime figures (including the notorio247

us Joca Amsterdam, Ref B) and narcotics traffickers operating in the Balkans. In August 2009 he signed a cooperation agreement with EULEX which we understand has resulted in a certain degree of practical cooperation on border issues; they also reportedly collaborated on the investigation into the October 2009 drowning deaths of over a dozen Kosovar Albanians being smuggled from Serbia into Hungary across the Tisza River. More could still be done, particularly with regard to combating organized crime. 6. (SBU) Dacic has focused on the need to combat trafficking in persons, appointing early in his tenure an experienced, dynamic individual to fill the long-vacant AntiTrafficking National Coordinator position. Dacic has thrown his political support behind the Coordinator, who has the challenging job of coordinating all of the country’s victim protection, law enforcement, and prevention efforts across several ministries. While funding for victim protection and awareness is still inadequate, enforcement is on the rise. Dacic personally issued an instruction to all police on how to recognize and treat a trafficking victim, leading to a significant increase in victim identification. Reacting to our letter to the Council to Combat Trafficking, in which we raised our concern with lack of funding for TIP victims shelters, Dacic asked the Finance Minister to allocate $85,000 for that purpose. The Ministry is working with post to design a comprehensive anti-TIP training program for police officers, social workers, labor inspectors, judges, and prosecutors. 7. (SBU) While Dacic focuses most of his energy on cooperating with neighboring countries, he takes great pride in working with U.S. law enforcement as well. He has been very open to cooperation with ICITAP advisors and DS-ATA programs, and shared information with us discovered during the course of an unrelated investigation that led to the arrest of a U.S. citizen on child pornography charges in New Jersey. 8. (SBU) Under Dacic’s leadership the Ministry of Interior is working to increase the participation of Serbian police in peace stabilization operations around the world. At present, Serbian police are serving in MINUSTAH in Haiti and in UNMIL in Liberia. Dacic recently wrote to the European Union’s Robert Cooper to offer the services of Serbian police trainers in a EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. He explained to us that Serbia’s ability to contribute police is limited only by financial rather than political constraints; he is willing to send a significant contingent on international missions if funding could be provided. 9. (SBU) Dacic and his Ministry need to do more on one particular area of cooperation with the U.S., however: ensuring that justice is done in the case of the Bytyqi brothers (Ref C), killed by Ministry of Interior personnel in Serbia in 1999 and buried in a mass grave. As a result of a continued conspiracy of silence among the police, and a lack of political will by previous governments to get to the bottom of the case, the investigation has gone almost nowhere. In a very frank conversation with us on January 15, Dacic confessed that he had only become aware of the details of the Bytyqi case – and the level of obstructionism within the MOI – in recent months. He told us that he was resolved to do his utmost to get to the truth, including if necessary firing anyone who would not cooperate with investigators. He was optimistic that some progress could be made if a different approach was taken in the investigation, i.e., to identify the shooters and work back up the chain of command, rather than starting at the top as before. His goal was to produce “concrete results” in the first half of 2010, although he could not guarantee that the effort would be successful. In order to unblock the investigation, Dacic must send a
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clear signal to impress upon all MOI personnel that silence or perjury will no longer be tolerated. We have suggested that he make a public statement announcing his commitment to finding the truth, and that he appoint a single high-ranking point person within MOI to lead an interagency task force and be responsible for producing results after a decade of inaction. 10. (SBU) Police reform and ICTY cooperation are two other areas where Dacic is not as forward-leaning as he could or should be. The OSCE has been working with the Ministry of Interior on police reform for several years, and while changes have been made at the margins there has not been a top-to-bottom reorganization and purging of the organization. Public confidence in the Interior Ministry is increasing – in a recent OSCE poll, 29% of citizens indicated confidence in the ministry compared with 24% in 2008, one of only two government ministries or agencies to show an increase. There nevertheless remains a significant perception that the organization is corrupt and repressive. On ICTY cooperation, Dacic walks a fine line between his political constraints as leader of the Socialists and his desire to show respect for European standards: he emphasizes that Serbia must fulfill its international obligations to cooperate with the tribunal and bring war criminals to justice, while at the same time making it clear that his Ministry will follow orders to arrest suspects if located but will not take the lead on the investigation. (The government’s Action Team coordinating the hunt for Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic has long been run as an intelligence operation rather than by the police.) Dacic very publicly distanced himself and the ministry from the July 2008 arrest of ICTY indictee Radovan Karadzic. Socialist Party 11. (SBU) Dacic remains both the public face and the behind-the-scenes leader of the Socialist Party. Although the SPS did relatively well in the May 2008 parliamentary elections, garnering 15 seats in Parliament (20 total with electoral coalition partners United Serbia and PUPS), its support levels dropped off considerably after Dacic opted to form a governing coalition with the Democratic Party. Party leaders tell us that they are focused on rebuilding the party from the ground up and attracting new members from the ranks of the previously unaffiliated and the right by demonstrating that SPS’s ministers produce results. They claim an increase in SPS members under 30 over the past year. (Comment: Given Serbia’s long tradition of political patronage, young people often join governing parties in hopes of landing a public sector job.) With the party still only polling 5% in December 2009, Dacic is not eager for new elections and appears focused on assuring the stability of the current coalition. U.S. Visit 12. (SBU) Dacic plans to visit Washington and New York from January 28 – February 5. In Washington, he is seeking meetings with the National Security Council, State Department, Department of Justice, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and Congress. He will attend the National Prayer Breakfast on February 4, the first time a representative of the SPS has been invited. In New York, he plans to meet with Commissioner Kelley and visit the Joint Terrorism Task Force. As a former member of the Milosevic government, Dacic needed a waiver in order to obtain his U.S. visa for this visit; he proudly announced to the press in December that he had received a five year A-1 visa.
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Comment 13. (SBU) Dacic views the opportunity to visit Washington as a turning point in his political career and validation of his efforts to legitimize the Socialist Party of Serbia. His achievements as Interior Minister are in large part the result of his desire to show the U.S. and the EU that he is a forward-leaning, modern, European leftist politician. We should acknowledge the good work he has done to improve regional police cooperation and congratulate him on visa liberalization, while pushing him to do more on the Bytyqi case. Although it is outside his comfort zone, Dacic also has the ability to act as a check on others in government who are advocating an aggressive post-ICJ strategy focused on new Kosovo status negotiations; he should hear a clear message that such an approach would have negative consequences for Serbia’s European aspirations. End Comment. Warlick

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Reference id: 10ZAGREB56 Subject: Icty Task Force To Continue Once Chapter 23 Opens, Justice Minister Skeptical Of Results Origin: Embassy Zagreb (Croatia) Cable time: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 15:34 UTC Classification: Confidential//NOFORN Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10ZAGREB56.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO8381 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHVB #0056/01 0261534 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 261534Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9854 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE Hide header

Confidential
NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE AND S/WCI; THE HAGUE FOR OLC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], HR [Croatia] Ref: ZAGREB 731 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Political Officer Chris Zimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) 1. (C/NF) Summary: Ambassador Foley briefed Justice Minister Ivan Simonovic on his trip to London to discuss Croatia’s investigation into missing war crimes documents and the UK’s block on Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) in Croatia’s EU accession negotiations. Although some in the British Government still hold a skeptical view of Croatia’s cooperation with ICTY, the UK is willing to open the chapter and move
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a final decision on Croatia’s cooperation to a closing benchmark. The focus now shifts to the Netherlands as apparently the sole holdout on Chapter 23 and Simonovic is trying to use his contacts in the Dutch Government to convince their PM and Foreign Minister to accept the British position. The Ambassador stressed the need to continue the work of the Task Force once Chapter 23 is opened and to hold people accountable for stealing and/or destroying documents. Simonovic doubts that the documents will be found nor will sentences for destroying documents become more severe, but assured the Task Force’s investigative work will continue. End Summary. 2. (C/NF) Ambassador Foley called on Justice Minister Simonovic on January 25 to brief him on his trip to London with Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes Stephen Rapp to discuss with British officials the prospects for unblocking Chapter 23, one of the final hurdles for Croatia’s EU accession. The Ambassador described the division of opinion in London on Croatia’s progress in cooperating with ICTY and on the GoC Task Force’s work to find the missing documents in the Gotovina case or to uncover what happened to them. He noted that the British decision to move forward on Chapter 23 and transform the issue of ICTY cooperation into a strong closing benchmark was taken with reluctance and that British officials are giving Croatia the benefit of the doubt. Foley stressed that both the US and UK expected the Task Force to continue a vigorous investigation into the missing documents, and to follow the evidence wherever it led. 3. (C/NF) Simonovic said he is refocusing on the Netherlands. He spoke to the Minister of Justice and a MOJ State Secretary, who are both personal acquaintances and from different coalition partners. They told him that they would speak to their Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and urge them to lift the blockade. Simonovic also said that other officials at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended to the FM to open Chapter 23. He said that the Belgians and Finns have taken the British position and the Dutch are now isolated on Chapter 23. 4. (C/NF) A strong closing benchmark is not a problem, according to Simonovic, although he doubts the Task Force will be able to find the missing documents as they are “too well hidden” by those who stole them. He agreed with the Ambassador that, if the documents are not found, it will be critical to uncover the details of the conspiracy to conceal the documents and hold the perpetrators responsible. The Ambassador expressed concern that the sentences meted out thus far have been weak 6-month suspended sentences. Simonovic responded that the punishments were within Croatia’s sentencing guidelines, he could not instruct judges to hand out harsher sentences, nor did he think future convictions would result in harsher penalties. He did believe, however, that the Task Force would be able to determine what happened to the documents and even reconstruct what was in the documents. 5. (C/NF) Simonovic said that President-Elect Josipovic, known throughout Europe for his early support of ICTY (which was very unpopular domestically at that time), will be supportive of Croatia’s efforts to open Chapter 23 and reform the judiciary and his election should show to other Europeans that Croatia is not the same country it was in the 1990s under Tudjman. He already spoke to Josipovic about utilizing the February 18th inauguration as an opportunity to discuss with European leaders the progress Croatia is making in the investigation and in cooperating with ICTY. 6. (C/NF) Comment: GOC officials appear to understand the need to continue a strong effort to locate the documents once Chapter 23 is opened and are aware that com251

placency or triumphalism could have negative ramifications for closing the chapter. We are encouraging the Croatians to bring Dutch and British officials to Zagreb to meet with those involved in the Task Force to get a better understanding of the investigation. Post will continue to monitor the Task Force’s work to ensure that its aggressive approach is maintained. Foley

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Reference id: 10BELGRADE19 Subject: Serbia: Ambassador’s First Meeting With President Tadic Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 29 Jan 2010 17:50 UTC Classification: Secret Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10BELGRADE19.html History: First published on Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:47 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO1757 RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL DE RUEHBW #0019/01 0291750 ZNY SSSSS ZZH R 291750Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0678 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK Hide header

Secret
SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/29 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], SR [Serbia], KV [Kosovo] Classified By: Mary Warlick, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) Summary 1. (C) In a January 28 meeting with Serbian President Tadic, the Ambassador emphasized her desire to expand bilateral cooperation on defense and economic issues, as
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well as to increase high-level contacts between our governments. Tadic welcomed the intent but expressed frustration that he had not been able to visit Washington for over four years. Echoing comments made in his public remarks during the Ambassador’s credentialing ceremony (para. 12), Tadic warned that U.S. policy toward Kosovo threatened democracy in Serbia by strengthening the nationalist opposition. The Ambassador reiterated U.S. support for Serbia’s EU aspirations and urged continued strong cooperation with the ICTY. Tadic expressed appreciation for U.S. support on EU integration and explained that Serbia was pursuing the remaining ICTY indictees because it was in its own interest to do so. Similarly, as a Dayton guarantor Serbia would continue to support the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tadic said. He told the Ambassador that he would work with Croatian President-elect Josipovic, an old acquaintance, to address the many difficult issues dividing Serbia and Croatia. On Kosovo, Tadic emphatically stated that Serbia would not change its position on its own territorial integrity. He expressed the desire to pursue a dialogue after the International Court of Justice renders its advisory opinion, as the current situation was untenable. The Ambassador responded that the dialogue should begin now in order to find the best way to manage reaction to the ICJ’s opinion and move forward on the many pressing issues related to Kosovo. End Summary. 2. (SBU) After presenting her credentials on January 28, the Ambassador had a 45 minute working meeting with President Boris Tadic. Tadic was accompanied by his foreign policy advisor Jovan Ratkovic and MFA State Secretary Mirko Stefanovic. Bilateral 3. (C) The Ambassador told Tadic that she was eager to work with him to build on the strong foundation created by her predecessors, noting that Vice President Biden’s May 2009 visit to Belgrade had opened a new chapter in our bilateral relations. She said that the military-to-military relationship was strong, but it was time to take it to the next level through increased joint training and exchanges, Serbian contributions to peacekeeping missions, and participation in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities. The Ambassador also told Tadic that she would focus on expanding economic and business ties, including new investments, and supporting the completion of Serbia’s WTO accession. She also emphasized her commitment to seek opportunities for additional high-level contacts between our governments. She noted President Tadic’s visit to UNGA last fall, the recent visits of Defense Minister Sutanovac and Foreign Minister Jeremic to Washington, and Interior Minister Dacic’s meetings this week. The Ambassador pointed to two upcoming congressional delegations to Serbia and the February 10 groundbreaking for the New Embassy Compound (NEC) in Belgrade as early opportunities to continue our engagement and further highlight the relationship publicly. 4. (C) Tadic said he was pleasantly surprised to hear about the scheduled groundbreaking event, as he had worked with four different U.S. ambassadors going back to his tenure as Minister of Defense to identify a suitable location for the new U.S. Embassy and facilitate the sale. He commented that he was encouraged to see countries such as the U.S. and China investing in modern diplomatic facilities in Belgrade. He also stated that it was time for the Serbian government to reconstruct its own buildings damaged during the 1999 NATO intervention. 5. (C) Shifting topics abruptly, Tadic voiced a complaint that despite all the talk of expanding the bilateral relations and the strong ties between Serbia and the U.S., he him253

self had not visited Washington in over four years. (Note: To our knowledge this is the first time that Tadic has expressed an interest in doing so in several years.) He commented that concrete results of high-level engagement were lacking, and cautioned that U.S. policy toward the Balkans, in particular on Kosovo, had implications for democracy in Serbia. Recalling his own early involvement in the democracy movement and the month he had spent in jail for his activism, Tadic said that his government was committed to continued democratic reform; it had to contend with a significant nationalist opposition, however. The Ambassador reiterated the USG’s commitment, following on the Vice President’s May 2009 visit, to sustained bilateral engagement with Serbia on all issues, including those areas where we do not agree. She offered to continue to explore possibilities for high-level visits on both sides to keep our bilateral channels open. European Integration and ICTY Cooperation 6. (C) The Ambassador recalled Vice President Biden’s expression of support for Serbia’s European aspirations and congratulated Tadic on his government’s recent achievements with the EU, including visa liberalization, implementation of the Interim Trade Agreement, and submission of its membership application. The U.S. saw the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union as a key priority and remained prepared, working with the EU, to support this process. She underscored the importance of continued engagement with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and U.S. readiness to support the hunt for Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. 7. (S) Tadic expressed appreciation for U.S. help with the EU accession process. On ICTY cooperation, he explained that Serbia was working intensively to capture Ratko Mladic “for our own reasons,” not due to pressure from the international community or the ICTY, but to demonstrate its own resolve to capture war criminals. He emphasized Serbia’s commitment to reconciliation in the region, pointing to its responsibilities as a guarantor of Dayton. He also underscored Serbia’s commitment to cooperation with the U.S. on a range of threats, including organized crime, corruption, terrorism, and narcotics, pointing to the success of several recent joint counternarcotics operations. Tadic stated that undertaking such sensitive operations was politically risky and Serbia would continue to do the right thing; in return, however, Serbia hoped for similarly strong bilateral engagement in other areas and expected support from the U.S. on these efforts with other countries in the region. The Ambassador expressed U.S. appreciation for Serbia’s strong cooperation in these important areas and said she would be glad to discuss any areas of specific concern. Regional Cooperation 8. (C) The Ambassador noted the important role that Serbia can and needs to play on regional relations and stability, particularly with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. She conveyed appreciation for the Serbian government’s constructive support of the Butmir process and urged Tadic to remain engaged with the parties, including RS leader Milorad Dodik, in particular. She expressed USG concern about the prospect of any referendum moving forward in the Republika Srpska. Tadic said that Serbia believed the preservation of BiH’s territorial integrity was paramount; as a guarantor of the Dayton Accords, Serbia sought a peaceful solution on constitutional reform that would be consistent with Dayton principles and preserve the model of two entities, three constituent pe254

oples. Tadic noted that he was seeking a parliamentary resolution on Srebrenica to recognize the gravity of the crimes committed there. 9. (C) With regard to Croatia, Tadic said that he had known President-elect Ivo Josipovic for a long time and wanted to work with him to address the many different open issues such as the “huge problem” of refugees and property rights. He said he expected the U.S. to support Serbian efforts to improve that relationship and address the outstanding issues. Tadic told the Ambassador that he would soon visit Albania and commented on the enormous organized crime problem facing Montenegro, where he also requested U.S. support. He emphasized that Serbia supported the independence and territorial integrity of its neighbors in the region, but many issues needed to be addressed. 10. (C) Turning to Kosovo, Tadic told the Ambassador “I must be as clear as possible with you – Serbia will not change its views on its territorial integrity. I want to be direct with you, as I have with your other colleagues. After the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issues its advisory opinion, we want to pursue dialogue and find a way to address the issues related to Kosovo, as the current situation is untenable.” The Ambassador responded that despite our clear differences, the U.S. and Serbia needed to keep the channels of communication on Kosovo open. While the Vice President had conveyed our agreement to disagree on Kosovo, it was important for Serbia to focus on practical ways to improve the lives of Serbs in Kosovo and on resolving outstanding issues. She emphasized the need for Serbia to take a responsible and forward looking approach after the ICJ opinion, consistent with President Tadic’s own forward looking approach toward European integration, that would not do harm to stability in the region nor to the other important work on our bilateral agenda. She recommended both sides begin a dialogue now about how to manage the way forward and said she hoped to continue discussions with Tadic’s foreign policy advisor, Jovan Ratkovic, on this subject as early as next week. Comment 11. (S) Comment: President Tadic made clear during the meeting and in his public statement that he does not intend to back down on Kosovo. At the same time, he demonstrated that he is open to dialogue and told us what he wants: a warm reception in Washington and continued high level engagement across the U.S. interagency, cooperation on sensitive security issues, public support for Serbia’s efforts to improve regional relations, and sensitivity to the domestic political constraints he faces on Kosovo policy. Now is the opportune moment to lay out for Tadic and his key foreign policy advisors what we expect of him, namely a constructive and coordinated response to the ICJ’s upcoming advisory opinion accompanied by increased pragmatism in establishing a modus Vivendi with Kosovo, and continued forceful engagement with Milorad Dodik to preserve stability in BiH. In the coming months, high-level Washington engagement with Tadic will be essential to drive these messages home. The other sine qua non is a strong, consistent message from the European Union that continued antagonism and inflexibility on Kosovo after the ICJ opinion will hamper Serbia’s progress toward membership. End Comment. 12. (U) Text of President Tadic’s remarks (translation provided by the Presidency): Address by His Excellency Mr. Boris Tadic, President of the Republic of Serbia, on the occassion of the present a tion of the letters of credence by Her Excellency Mrs. Mary
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Warlick, Ambassador extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Republic of Serbia Belgrade, 28 January 2010 Excellency, It is my great pleasure to receive the Letters by which the Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States of America is accrediting you as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Serbia. May I ask you, Excellency, to convey to President Obama my cordial greetings and the assurances of my highest consideration. The relationship with the United States of America is one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia. Ever since the times when the interests of our country in the United States of America were represented by the diplomat and the well-known scientist of Serbian origin Mihailo Pupin, the bilateral relations between our two countries have been characterized by friendship and alliance at all turning points in the world’s history of the twentieth century. Such relations and all-round cooperation were damaged at the time of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Following the democratic changed in Serbia, we have restored our close cooperation which entered a new quality phase after the visit of Vice-President Biden. Today, Serbia is a truly democratic country. In the past ten years of the democratic transition we have successfully implemented many reforms guaranteeing the respect of human rights, minority rights, media freedoms and free elections. We are very grateful for the assistance by the United States of America in this democratization process in Serbia. We are particularly satisfied with the successful cooperation that we established with the United States of America in combating international terrorism and organized crime. Excellency, Large Serbian community in America has for centuries provided a link between our two countries and contributed to the creation of American society. Serbia is a sister state with the State of Illinois and the main partner of the Army of Serbia is the National Guard of Ohio. We are particularly pleased with the fact that American companies are among the biggest foreign investors in Serbia. Madam Ambassador, Becoming a full member of the European Union is the strategic goal of the Republic of Serbia. We are convinced that the European Union will not be complete until Serbia and other Western Balkan countries are integrated into it. The support of the United States of America in that regard is of exceptional importance. Madam Ambassador, Serbia will continue to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in Kosovo by political and diplomatic means. We would like 2010 to be the year of peaceful, compromise and realistic solution of this issue, after the International Court of Justice renders its advisory opinion. Despite different positions that we have regarding the status of Kosovo, we hope that American policy will respect legitimate Serbian interests and that it will not jeopardize democracy in Serbia. At the same time, Serbia is very much concerned about the plans of Pristina to forcefully establish its rule over the majority-Serb northern Kosovo. If this strategy were to be implemented it would have unforeseen consequences for the stability of the region. Excellency, Serbia is strongly committed to strengthening the regional cooperation and good-neighbourly relations. Without a stable, democratic Serbia it is not possible to imagine the stable and prosperous Western Balkans. Serbia respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its internal arrangements defined by the Dayton Accords as well as the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Excellency, You begin your mission at the very important time for the Republic of Serbia but also for the further development of the relations between our two countries. I wish you every success in the discharge of your responsible duties. l am convinced that with your know256

ledge and experience you will make an important contribution to the development of the overall cooperation between our two countries. Warlick

LXXXII
Reference id: 10BRUSSELS119 Subject: Eu Foreign Affairs Council, January – Haiti Dominates The Discussion Origin: USEU Brussels (Europe) Cable time: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 06:13 UTC Classification: Confidential Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BRUSSELS119.html History: First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXRO2680 PP RUEHAG RUEHKW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #0119/01 0320613 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 010613Z FEB 10 FM USEU BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFITT/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY Hide header

Confidential
SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 Tags: PREL [External Political Relations], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHUM [Human Rights], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], AF [Afghanistan], MASS [Military Assistance and Sales], EUN [European Union], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina], SR [Serbia], SO [Somalia], YM [Yemen], HA [Haiti], IR [Iran], HU [Hungary], CH [China (Mainland)] Ref: A. USEU BRUSSELS 00090 B. USEU BRUSSELS 00088 Classified By: USEU POL M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). 1. (C) Summary: Meeting in Brussels on January 25, EU Foreign Ministers focused their attention on the situation in Haiti and discussed how the EU could better support international community relief efforts taking place there. Following an overview of Spanish presidency priorities, discussions in the General Affairs Council (GAC) chaired by Spanish FM Moratinos centered on the role of the body under the Lisbon Treaty. Led by High Representative Ashton for the first time, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) engaged primarily in Haiti-related discussions following readouts from both HR Ashton and Development Commissioner de Gucht’s recent travels. Ministers agreed to stand up a
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Brussels-based coordination cell to assist UN efforts and to increase Gendarmerie force levels in Haiti to 300 personnel. Concerning the EU’s military operation in Bosnia, Ministers agreed to maintain its executive mandate with a view to expanding the role of the mission to include non-executive functions such as training. During the January 26 EUSerbia political dialogue, Serbia was told not to expect its EU membership application to be referred soon to the European Commission. Asked at the concluding press conference to comment on remarks by the Spanish ambassador in Beijing about the status of the EU’s China arms embargo, Moratinos said that Ministers were debating possible changes, citin@ouncil Conclusions. End airs Council tinos noted (FAC) centered on Haiti. The Council discussed the cordination of the EU’s overall response to thQ earthquake in Haiti. Following on its extraordinary meeting of January 18, it agreed that Member States would provide a collective EU contribution of at least 300 police personnel as a temporary reinforcement of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti’s (MINUSTAH) police capability (ref A). In addition, the Council agreed to set up a cell – EUCO Haiti – in Brussels to coordinate Member State military and security support contributions in response to the UN’s appeal for such assistance. The purpose of the cell will be to match contributions to needs and maximize the speed and efficiency of the EU’s response, avoiding duplication. EUCO Haiti will complement the coordination of the Member States’ civil protection contributions by the Commission Monitoring and Information Center (MIC). 4. (U) During the post-Council press conference, Ashton said that the purpose of the day’s discussions had been to “further reinforce our contribution.” She noted that she had just returned from Washington and New York where she had meetings with Secretary Clinton, at the UN, and the World Bank. She announced that Member States had agreed to “provide engineering expertise and equipment.” Ashton noted that “maritime capabilities” would also be provided, but shared no details. Concerning police officers, she reported a “collective contribution to “reinforce police capabilities (to ensure security for the relief effort) of at least 300.” Ashton said that ministers had also agreed to her proposal to set up a “light coordination cell in Brussels” to “facilitate our contribution to the UN.” She said she had briefed the Council about all aspects of her meetings and that the Council had invited her to continue playing a role. 5. (SBU) After Ashton listed EU contributions (Note: fact sheet e-mailed to EUR/ERA), Development Commissioner Karel de Gucht reported on the recent fact-finding visit he made to Haiti with the Directors General of DG Development and DG Humanitarian Aid. De Gucht said they sought information on how to proceed with rehabilitation, noting that he was positively impressed at the organization of the international community there. De Gucht reported being struck that surgeons and nurses were working day and night in circumstances akin to war. (Note: De Gucht, a Belgian, may have had in mind the controversy, played up on CNN, over a Belgian medical team leaving a makeshift clinic in Port-au-Prince one night for security reasons. End note) De Gucht put at over 150,000 the number of people seriously injured and said that the distribution of water and food was functioning, although not always smoothly. 6. (U) With 250,000 people currently living in parks and outdoor places, de Gucht said the next urgent problem was setting up more camps. With state structures “practically disappeared,” de Gucht stressed the importance of MINUSTAH, despite its own losses during the quake. He put at years the reconstruction effort. He said that at the Ja258

nuary 25 Montreal Conference (later that same day) the EU would be “very closely involved” in reconstruction planning. 7. (U) Asked why she had asked French FM Kouchner to speak on her behalf in Montreal (vice the Spanish presidency), HR Ashton answered that she and FM Moratinos had to be in Brussels for the GAC/FAC, so asking Kouchner made sense since he was already going to be there, without taking anything away from the Spanish presidency. Asked if the 300 police officers were above the 220 already there, Ashton said “the overall capacity is 300 as I understand it.” Asked about adoptions, Ashton said we must “support children appropriately.” Asked why the coordination cell would be located in Brussels and not on the ground in Haiti, Ashton said that there would also be coordination on the ground. Concerning questions as to whether she could have done better, Ashton replied “I’ve been on the job six weeks, we will look at lessons learned, and I will come forward with proposals.” Foreign Affairs Council – Other Issues 8. (U) Bosnia – The Council decided that the EU would begin to provide non-executive capacity building and training support within EUFOR Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia. It agreed that EUFOR’s executive mandate would continue in accordance with UNSCR 1895 and it underlined its readiness to maintain an executive military role to support these efforts beyond 2010 – under a UN mandate – should the situation so require. Drawing from the FAC’s written conclusions, Ashton called ALTHEA a “major success.” When pressed about the mission’s future, Ashton said “our conclusions were not about the future of Bosnia, but we are very clear that Bosnia is one country with different communities and we hope that part of the election campaign will be about their path to the EU – we need to think beyond the elections.” 9. (U) Somalia – The Council agreed to set up a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) operation to contribute to the training of the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) National Security Forces in Uganda. The intent is to launch the operation, which will take place in Uganda, with the next intake of trainees, scheduled to start in spring 2010. Ashton confirmed the agreement to set up the training mission in Uganda, telling the press that it was requested by the Somali transitional government. She added that Ministers remained very concerned about the situation in Somalia and would carefully assess it before launching the operation. 10. (U) Yemen – Concerning the January 27 London meeting, Ashton said, “We want to listen to the government of Yemen to see how we can do more in terms of aid, but the government of Yemen needs to do more, too.” Yemen itself, she added, needs to have “a national dialogue.” Contacts in the German and Italian missions told us that the EU wants to focus more on development than on straightforward counter-terrorism or security operations, and wants to coordinate with the U.S. on Yemen policy. 11. (U) Afghanistan – Looking ahead to the January 28 London conference, Ashton told the press, “We want to talk to the government about Afghan ownership.” She further reported, “We are looking to see how we can bring resources on the ground more effectively – all things that help to create a society – this is an important moment in the debate in terms of what more we can do.” 12. (U) Iran – Ashton said, “We continue to regret Iran’s reluctance to discuss the nuclear issue, they did not respond favorably to our proposal, we have started to consider
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appropriate further measures, and the discussion will continue in the UNSC.” When pressed to say whether the EU and U.S. were headed towards sanctions even without consensus in the UNSC, Ashton said the international community has rules and “obligations within the rules.” She added that the Council would consider the result of discussions in the UN Security Council, not preempt them. Pressed to say what kind of measure would be most effective and how long before the EU would consider unilateral action/measures, Ashton apologized for having to give a standard “wait and see” what happens in the UNSC; then “we will then return to the subject.” EU-Serbia Political Dialogue 13. (C) On January 26, the EU held its first “political dialogue” (formerly known as Troika) meeting with Serbia since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. At the meeting, chaired by FM Moratinos (per delegation of HR Ashton) and assisted by outgoing Enlargement Commissioner Rehn, we understand that Serbia was told not to expect the Council Secretariat to refer Serbia’s EU membership application to the European Commission for its opinion any time soon, despite Serbian FM Jeremic’s repeated insistence that this happen as soon as possible. Serbia was told that as a prospective member, it was expected to mirror more closely the decisions of the EU in international bodies, and that recent Serbian votes in the OSCE related to human rights matters (where Serbia aligned itself with Russia) and on the Israel Nuclear Capabilities Resolution (where Serbia aligned itselpplication, Rehn said the Commission was ready to start work on its opinion, but Moratinos said the EU-27 were still holding internal consultations on the appropriate timing for the Council to transmit the Serbian application to the Commission for its opinion. Pressed to elaborate on the timetable for the Council’s decision, Moratinos only said: “We hope it will happen. The sooner the better.” FM Moratinos added that the January 26 dialogue enabled the EU and Serbia to discuss “the constructive role that Serbia can play in the Western Balkans,” with the main focus on Bosnia and Kosovo. Moratinos also announced plans for holding an EU-Western Balkans Summit in Sarajevo at the end of May, at which Kosovo would, “of course,” be represented. 15. (U) Jeremic said his country was “determined to match the success (in EU-Serbia relations) of 2009 in 2010.” The Serbian government would continue to do its part in “cooperating fully” with the ICTY. Jeremic expressed hope that the process of ratification of the EU-Serbia Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) can start “as soon as possible.” He recognized the “critical significance” of regional cooperation in Western Balkans as “one of the key prerequisites for the process of integration into the EU,” adding that the Serbian government was committed to “stay the course.” Regarding Kosovo, Jeremic said his government “can consult with whomever has a legal mandate.” It was “extremely important,” he said, “that we work in consultation” with the EU, and Serbia would “stay constructive.” Jeremic said Serbia was hoping that “a compromise acceptable to all stakeholders will be found” regarding Kosovo, adding, “We hope the entire region can be integrated in the EU.” China Arms Embargo – Unexpected Topic 16. (U) While not a topic for discussion during the FAC or subsequent meetings, the EU’s China arms embargo came up during the press point which followed the EU-Serbia dialogue. Asked about press reports based on remarks by the Spanish Ambassador in
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Beijing (according to which Spain was hoping to “deepen discussions on lifting the ban” currently applied on China by the EU), Moratinos began his reply by making general remarks on “the new role which China is assuming in the world,” and the desirability “to improve relations with China to ensure the best possible dialogue.” He then referred to “the most recent decision” by the EU on the subject matter, which was “to review the decision on the arms embargo,” adding, “We will be weighting the pros and cons.” Moratinos further said that a decision on the lifting of the embargo was “subject to the will” of the EU-27 and that “it will be up to the Member states to decide on the best way forward.” 17. (U) The following is an excerpt from the December 2009 European Council Conclusions: Begin text: The European Council welcomed the results of the seventh EUChina Summit that took place in The Hague on 8 December. It invited the Council and the Commission to further explore the feasibility of a new EU-China framework agreement and possible cooperation on issues such as re-admission and market economy status. The European Council confirmed that EU-China relations have developed significantly in all aspects in the past years. It is looking forward to further progress in all areas of this relationship as referred to in the EU-China Joint Statement, in particular the ratification of the International Covenant on civil and political rights. In this context the European Council reaffirmed the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo. It invited the next Presidency to finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision. It underlined that the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. In this regard the European Council recalled the importance of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular criteria regarding human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries. The European Council also stressed the importance in this context of the early adoption of the revised Code of Conduct and the new instrument on measures pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo countries (‘Toolbox’). End text. 18. (SBU) USEU Note: The EU arms embargo on China, which was established after the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, was imposed by decision of the European Council (read: the EU heads of state and government) and not by way of a CFSP Common Position, the legal basis for which did not exist at the time. EU contacts privately told us at the time of the 2004 debate on the possible lifting of the embargo that the original decision by the leaders could therefore only be amended by the leaders (meaning at the level of the European Council operating by consensus). Any discussion with EU officials on the question of the China arms embargo will inevitably touch upon the issue, including the status and effectiveness of the EU code of conduct on arms exports, which has been revised since the 2004 debate. The position of individual Member States can vary over time, depending on the political outlook of their leaders. Germany under Chancellor Schroeder in tandem with then-President Chirac of France, pushed for the lifting of the embargo in 2004. Angela Merkel, by contrast, has resisted lifting the embargo. Other Meetings 19. (U) Ministerials with the Kazakh OSCE Presidency and a political dialogue with Cape Verde were also held in conjunction with the FAC. Kennard
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LXXXIII
Reference id: 10BELGRADE188 Subject: Serbia: Scenesetter For The February 17-19 Visit Of Codel Voinovich Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 13:21 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BELGRADE188.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0015 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHBW #0188/01 0390735 ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY-ADX1CE238-TOQ6365-413) R 051321Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0702 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC Hide header

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SENSITIVE CORRECTED COPY (SENSITIVE CAPTION ADDED) SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], ECON [Economic Conditions], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], SR [Serbia] Summary 1. (SBU) Your visit to Belgrade comes at a time when Serbia’s pro-European government is stable and recently achieved key milestones in its path to EU membership. To keep making progress, however, Serbia must stop allowing the Kosovo issue to undermine its broader foreign policy approach and shift its focus to the economic and political reforms necessary for membership in the EU. Reforms to date have been uneven, with significant progress in the defense sector and many challenges ahead in the economic sphere, particularly as the economic crisis threatens to lead to sustained labor and social unrest. End Summary. Domestic Politics 2. (SBU) Serbia’s democratic, pro-European government has remained intact since its installation in July 2008 despite its razor thin parliamentary majority. President Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) is the main party in the ruling coalition, and also controls Serbia’s largest city governments. Tadic’s ultranationalist nemesis, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), splintered in autumn 2008 when top SRS officials split to form the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Claiming a pro-European orientation while cultivating its nationalist electoral base, the SNS is now Serbia’s largest opposition party; it polls roughly even (at around 30%) with Tadic’s DS. However, despite recent local electoral victories and a nationwide petition effort, the opposition is unable to provoke early elections. The main threat to the governing coalition’s stability continues to be political infighting among the governing parties.
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Euro-Atlantic Integration 3. (SBU) Top Serbian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Serbia’s top foreign policy objective is to gain EU membership. Over the past several months Serbia has achieved significant milestones including gaining visa liberalization with Schengen countries on December 19, formally submitting an application for EU membership of December 22, and “unfreezing” and implementing the Interim Trade Agreement with the EU on February 1. (EU ratification of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement remains conditioned on Serbia’s full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); most notably, Serbia must capture and extradite ICTY indictees Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic.) Over the past year, however, Serbia’s proEuropean foreign policy focus has been blurred by Belgrade’s efforts to cultivate closer relations with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), China, and Russia. – The NAM has been a particular focus as part of Serbia’s efforts to slow down Kosovo recognitions, and China and Russia as appreciation for their support on the UN Security Council in regard to Kosovo. 4. (SBU) While Serbia cooperates with NATO via the Partnership for Peace Program, it does not intend to pursue NATO membership in the foreseeable future. This is partly due to lasting public anger over the 1999 NATO bombing campaign which forced then-President Slobodan Milosevic to halt his ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. It also reflects both Serbia’s interest in walking a fine line between Russia and the West, and its limited institutional and financial capacity to undertake numerous simultaneous international commitments. Public debate on NATO has increased in recent months as nationalist figures attempt to use the issue to gain political traction and some in the governing coalition make increasingly forward-leaning statements in favor of the Alliance. Kosovo and Regional Relations 5. (SBU) Despite the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by 65 countries and its membership in international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, Belgrade continues to claim that Kosovo is part of Serbia. Since Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, Serbia has launched a diplomatic offensive in the UN and around the globe to prevent additional states from recognizing Kosovo. During his May 2009 trip to Belgrade, Vice President Biden clearly stated that the United States and Serbia have “agreed to disagree” over Kosovo’s status. This spring the International Court of Justice is expected to issue an advisory opinion to the UN General Assembly on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, as Serbia requested. Regardless of the opinion, Belgrade may attempt to force a reopening of status talks on Kosovo. While we do not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo, we continue to encourage the Government to find a modus vivendi with its neighbor so it can address the necessary quality of life issues for Serbs in Kosovo. Failure to do so will complicate Serbia’s path to the EU. 6. (SBU) Serbia has defined regional cooperation as one of its top three foreign policy priorities and has sought to repair relations with its neighbors with mixed results. While improving relations with Hungary and Slovenia, Serbia has yet to make amends with Macedonia and Montenegro, particularly after the two countries recognized Kosovo in October 2008. Serbia has generally played a constructive role in the Butmir process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We expect Belgrade to take advantage of the opportunity to im263

prove troubled political relations with Croatia after incoming Croatian president Ivo Josipovic assumes office in mid-February. Security Issues 7. (SBU) Defense reform is a priority of the Serbian government, and an area where significant progress has been made. The Serbian Armed Forces have been right-sized to about 28,000 troops, with further cuts on hold for the time being, pending reevaluation of the security environment. Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac (DS) has overseen significant soldier pay increases, training improvements, and legislation to codify defense reform, as well as improvements in strategic planning and procurement. The Ministry has also made progress on disposing of some excess materiel such as MANPADS, which we are funding. Further reforms, including a reduction in civilian staff, are needed. Serbia is an active participant in the National Guard’s State Partnership Program with Ohio, which has been publicly well received and touted as an example of successful bilateral cooperation. Economic Issues 8. (SBU) Serbia’s economy is still shaped by the wars, sanctions and economic neglect of the 1990’s. The country is trying to make up for lost time, but the economic liberalization process has been drawn out, with limited tangible benefits for average Serbians. When the global financial crisis hit, Serbia was quick to reach out to the IMF and in May 2009 signed a $4 billion Stand-By Arrangement. Since then, the Serbian dinar has been relatively stable; however, in recent weeks, the dinar has come under pressure. The IMF agreement constrains the Serbian government budget deficit to 4.5% for 2009 resulting in a freeze on pensions and public sector wages. With limited new foreign and domestic investment over the last two years the economy is struggling to create jobs and labor pressure is building. Strikes and acts of civil disobedience have increased as more companies fall behind on payments and face bankruptcy. Because unions do not have strong central leadership, local pressures have not become national. Bilateral Issues 9. (SBU) Vice President Biden’s May 2009 visit to Belgrade added a new impetus to our bilateral relationship, which had been strained following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. Our diplomatic relations have now returned to normal and we are working to reinforce the Vice President’s message that we can agree to disagree on Kosovo’s status while building on other areas of our bilateral relationship. Our main priorities include assisting Serbia on its path to Europe, building on our positive mil-mil relationship, and expanding economic and business ties. In the coming months we will also be seeking to update a woefully outdated extradition treaty with Serbia. Comment 10. (SBU) Now is an important time for Serbia to decide whether it wishes to spend the year in a quixotic quest to reopen Kosovo status or devote full attention to winning EU candidacy status. Our consistent message to our Serbian interlocutors is
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the importance of overcoming domestic political rivalries and grievances with neighboring countries in order to demonstrate the political maturity and responsibility necessary for EU membership. With nearly all key political figures viewing you as a favorite son, you will be well positioned to deliver the messages Belgrade needs to hear. End Comment. Warlick

LXXXIV
Reference id: 10USUNNEWYORK66 Subject: Un Request Payment Of U.s. Assessments For The International Tribunals Of The Former Yugoslavia And The Territory Of Rwanda For 2010 Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 19:03 UTC Classification: Unclassified Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10USUNNEWYORK66.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0003 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0066 0391903 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 081903Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8118 Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: UN [United Nations], AORC [International Organizations and Conferences], AFIN [Financial Management] 1. This is an action cable please see paragraph 4. 2. USUN has emailed to Department (IO/PSC-Tammy Pomerleau and EURIO/EX/FM-Alice Green) two notes from the SYG dated January 20, 2010 concerning the financing of the international Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Territory of Rwanda (ICTR) for the period January 1 to December 31, 2010 which have been assessed and remain payable by the U.S. government as follows: Net Outstanding Assessment Amount for Total For 2010 Prior Years Payable – ICTY $38,763,985 $6,625,760 $45,389,745 ICTR $29,948,967 $5,396,519 $35,345,486 3. The note states that funds are urgently required for the financing of these operations and are due within thirty days of receipt of the notes. The bank accounts to which payment may be made are also contained in the notes. 4. Action requested: Department is requested to facilitate payment as noted above in paragraph 2. Rice
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LXXXV
Reference id: 10USUNNEWYORK77 Subject: Ambassador Rapp (s/swci) Holds Meetings In New York On The Icc, The Scsl, And The Transfer Of Ictr Cases To Rwanda Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 22:42 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10USUNNEWYORK77.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0007 RR RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0077/01 0422242 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 112242Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8136 Hide header

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SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PREF [Refugees], PREL [External Political Relations], UNSC [UN Security Council] 1. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Stephen Rapp (S/WCI), held meetings in New York February 1, 2 and 5 to take the pulse of the P5, Austria, and Rwanda on the possibility of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) transferring cases to Rwanda’s national judicial system where an international judge would participate. There was general support for the idea although Russia had concerns about UN assessed funding for the international judge. The UK and Austria had some procedural/technical questions with respect to how cases would be transferred. Rwanda confirmed its continuing support for the idea. China, in a meeting on February 5, said that it would welcome ways in which the ICTR could finish its work sooner. With France and the UK, Ambassador Rapp also discussed issues related to the ICC, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). End Summary. International Judge Sitting in Rwandan National Court? 2. (SBU) In all of his meetings Ambassador Rapp emphasized the desirability of transferring cases from the ICTR to Rwanda as a way for the ICTR to finish its work sooner, and to eliminate the need for the residual mechanism (RM) to try cases, resulting in significantly reduced costs. He explained that the ICTR’s prosecutor, Bubacar Jallow, intends to request the transfer of eight of the eleven “fugitive” cases to Rwanda within the next few months as many previous obstacles have been overcome, including solitary confinement and the death penalty for example. According to the Ambassador, Jallow has also indicated he would request the transfer of the three high level fugitives to Rwanda if they have not been apprehended within the next couple of years. Ambas266

sador Rapp said that including an international judge (likely from the ICTR’s roster) on the panel of Rwandan judges would go a long way in eliminating concerns that Rwanda’s judicial system lack’s independence. He said the international judge would be funded by UN assessed contributions as would costs for translation. He also said that it is within Rwanda’s Chief Justice’s power to include an international judge on a panel of judges to hear a national case and that Rwanda has already done so in civil, commercial cases. Procedurally, Ambassador Rapp acknowledged that adoption of a Security Council resolution adjusting the ICTR’s statute or possibly the rules of procedure is necessary to facilitate inclusion of an international judge in a Rwandan national panel that would hear ICTR cases. 3. (SBU) RWANDA: In his meeting with Rwandan Mission to the UN’s Legal Adviser Alfred Ndabarasa, Ambassador Rapp said that Rwanda’s President and Justice Minister had both supported the idea when he presented it to them last November. Ndabarasa said his government highly appreciates the work S/WCI has done so far and confirmed that Jallow plans to go to Kigali to present several cases for transfer. Ndabarasa also confirmed that Rwanda’s president and justice minister are aware of and support the proposal and that his sense is that Kigali would like all ICTR cases resolved as soon as possible. Ambassador Rapp said that once a case is transferred to Rwanda from the ICTR, it would take significantly less time to complete than it would if it were to remain in the ICTR. Ndabarasa, switching gears, told the Ambassador that the ICTR’s archives should be located in Kigali once the ICTR finishes its work. Ambassador Rapp said he would look at the issue very carefully but pointed out that access to original documents, information related to the protection of witnesses, and Rule 70 material by the RM is necessary. 4. (SBU) RUSSIA: After Ambassador Rapp outlined the proposal, Gennady Kuzmin, the Russian Mission to the UN’s Legal Adviser, said that Russia would like to speed up the ICTR’s work. Kuzmin said the problem with transferring cases to Rwanda is that some judges in the ICTR, in particular Russian judge Egorov, are convinced that Rwanda lacks the ability to prosecute such cases. He said that in theory, Russia could support the proposal for including an international judge in a Rwandan proceeding, but money would be a concern. Kuzmin explained that Russia’s UN financial assessment increased when the most recent scale of assessments was adopted in December. He asked whether the international judges that would sit on a Rwandan panel could be funded from voluntary contributions. Ambassador Rapp explained the problem the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has had with raising adequate funding to finish its work and the even more difficult time it will have to fund its residual mechanism once awareness of the crimes that occurred begins to fade. He said that the longest sentence in the SCSL is 52 years which means any SCSL residual mechanism would potentially have to exist until the year 2055. As a result, he said that assessed funding for such a mechanism would ensure its viability and stressed that assessed funding to pay for an international judge for ICTR cases tried in Rwanda is non-negotiable. Kuzmin replied that in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), sentences should have been served in the country of the prisoner’s origin rather than incurring such a burden on the European countries that now have them. The Ambassador said that many of the sentences that are being served in European countries are coming to an end and that the ICTR’s cases are not comparable.
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5. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp told Kuzmin that ICTR President Byron is enthusiastic about the idea. Kuzmin responded that the majority of the ICTR’s judges are “comfortable” with their current status and implied that they are not motivated to finish the ICTR’s work quickly as only one substantial judgment was rendered in the past year. Kuzmin also said that Austria’s proposed RM for the ICTY/ICTR has a huge number of functions and is far-fetched in its current form. Ambassador Rapp acknowledged that the RM needs to be small and efficient but explained it still must be able to deal with the rights of the accused. In closing, Kuzmin raised the issue of the perception of the lack of objectivity resulting from white, international judges sitting on a Rwandan judicial panel hearing cases of African criminals. The Ambassador said that the international judges could also come from Africa and said that in any case Kigali is satisfied with the approach that has been proposed. 6. (SBU) France and the UK: After Ambassador Rapp presented the Rwandan proposal to the UK Mission the UN’s Legal Adviser Catherine Adams and the French Mission to the UN Legal Adviser, Sheraz Gasri, Adams recalled that in the ICTR cases that denied referrals, solitary confinement (now fixed through legislation) and witness protection were the issues, not the independence of the Rwandan judicial system, and asked whether if we go down this route, we are satisfied that the witness protection issues are solved? Ambassador Rapp responded that even though the Appellate Chamber had overruled a trial chamber that found problems with independence, he thought the problem was still there, even if not stated in the four corners of the decisions. With respect to witness protection he noted that, as it is, ICTR relies on the GOR. The only witness protection ICTR offers is through the use of pseudonyms and anonymity. If a witness is harassed, ICTR instructs him/her to contact the local policy chief. He thought some NGO’s would support the independent judge idea (although Human Rights Watch may not.) 7. (SBU) Adams noted that the statute/rule change should occur before the Prosecutor moved for transfer. Ambassador Rapp said that the Prosecutor was willing to defer if need be. The most likely vehicle for a change would be the SC resolution in June to extend the terms of the ICTY/ICTR judges. It could be done in the RM resolution, but it appears that resolution will take longer, as defining the RM will need to take account of progress on ICTR transfers and Mladic and anyway there won’t be a need to have an RM up and running before 2012. 8. (SBU) Adams said she was trying to conceive of what the ICTR/RM Statutes would need to say. If the GOR doesn’t need to legislate, there would need to be an undertaking by the GOR that they would include an international judge on the panel when a fugitive was tried in the future. Ambassador Rapp responded that the judges could transfer the case conditional on the GOR appointing a judge from the ICTR (or RM). No matter what, the RM is going to need the capacity to do a trial in Arusha if necessary. He added that there were issues raised by transferring a case in the absence of a fugitive. Presumably the judges would appoint an attorney to represent the fugitive as has been done in previous cases. There would then be an issue of appeal. Because the defendant would not be present, his time to appeal would not run until he received actual notice, although perhaps the prosecution could argue that the appeal could also be done in absentia. If it was decided that the appeal could not be taken until after the defendant was detained, then ICTR would have to stand up an appeals chamber again. This was not an ideal situation, but was the reality.
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9. (SBU) Gasri asked whether the international judge/ICTR/RM would retain any competence over investigations in a transferred case. Ambassador Rapp answered that, while it is possible that the RM Prosecutor could be given authority to assist in investigations, the theory was that the national jurisdiction would handle the necessary steps after transfer. Gasri said that France was “obsessed” with the potential costs of the RM, and if we ended up with international judges plus a big RM to investigate, we could be looking at a lot of money. Ambassador Rapp said that the USG wanted the RM to be tiny, but able to deal with review petitions, witness protection, etc. When ICTY cases have been transferred, he noted, the ICTY Prosecutor has no further obligation to do anything. The Russians, he said, had expressed the concern that the RM not outlive its usefulness. 10. (SBU) Gasri then asked what would happen if a fugitive were arrested now. Ambassador Rapp said that, as for the three high level ICTR fugitives (Kabuga, Bizimana and Mpiranya), if they are apprehended in the next year or two, they should be tried by ICTR. As for the other eight, a date should be established and anyone who is detained after that date should be transferred to the Rwandan courts. Adams said that Brammertz had seemed quite optimistic about arresting Mladic. Ambassador Rapp said that “everyone realizes this is the year that we have to get Mladic,” and explained that the USG was very active on this front, through offering rewards, etc. 11. (SBU) Adams added that the thinking seemed to be that if Mladic were arrested, Hadzic would be referred. Ambassador Rapp explained that the situation was complicated because Hadzic is a Vukovar case. In a previous Vukovar case, then-ICTY-prosecutor Del Ponte decided that because of the “victor’s justice” perception, the case should be tried in the Hague rather than Croatia. On the other hand, Zagreb had to date received only one transferred case from the ICTY and the Croatian prosecutor had demonstrated integrity. Perhaps a similar solution to what we are proposing for the ICTR fugitives could be worked out, with an international judge being deployed in Croatia. He thought that in the end, if there was only one remaining ICTY fugitive, the decision would be to transfer the case and not keep ICTY open for one fugitive. 12. (SBU) AUSTRIA: In his discussion with Austrian Mission to the UN Legal Adviser Konrad Buhler on the proposal, Ambassador Rapp pointed out that the Security Council would have to adopt a resolution amending the ICTR’s statute in order for an international judge to be included in a Rwanda panel of judges that would hear ICTR cases. The Ambassador suggested that the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals (IWGIT) might include this language in the resolution it would adopt in June on the extension of judges or in the RM resolution. He also said that if Jallow moved this spring to transfer cases and failed, the next time he would be able to request transfer again would be in 2011. Explaining that he had discussed this with Jallow, Ambassador Rapp said that Jallow is willing to hold off on requesting transfers until the IWGIT deals with the proposal. Buhler responded that Austria is very open to any flexible and creative ideas and that the RM should be relieved as much as possible from the burden of dealing with lower level cases that can be transferred. He said that Austria would look at the legal framework of the proposal and would be concerned with issues such as “due process” and “fair trial”. 13. (SBU) Buhler outlined several aspects of the proposal that would need more consideration. He questioned whether, in a panel of three judges (two Rwandan and one international), the Rwandan court could actually be independent as the two Rwandan jud269

ges would be in the majority. He expressed doubt that any Security Council member’s Chief Justice has the authority to appoint international judges to preside on a panel of judges in one of their national courts. He added that such a thing would be unthinkable in Austria and a process as serious as this should not be “so easy”. Buhler said he would have to look at the overall proposal and would be happy to discuss it in the IWGIT. He suggested that the UN’s legal office (OLA) draft a short paper in reaction to the proposal that would include draft elements for a Security Council resolution. Ambassador Rapp responded that the UN’s Deputy Legal Counselor, Peter Taksoe-Jensen, was intrigued by the proposal. Buhler queried whether even though Rwanda supports the transfer of all remaining “fugitive” cases, the international community wants all cases to go to Rwanda. The Ambassador said that rewards have been offered for the three high level ICTR fugitives. And unlike the Mladic case in the ICTY, there is a possibility that all three of these cases could be tried in Kigali. Although Buhler said he is skeptical the IWGIT would support the transfer of these three cases to Rwanda, he said such transfers would be ideal in that they would eliminate the need for the RM to conduct trials. 14. (SBU) Buhler also questioned whether there would be a problem with placing international judges on Rwandan judicial panels in criminal cases. Buhler said that Russia was concerned about the monitoring of transferred cases but if an international judge is assigned, there would be built-in monitoring. Buhler also raised the possibility that once a case is transferred and an international judge assigned, Rwanda might say it doesn’t like the judge. How Buhler asked, would the issue be resolved? Could there be a withdrawal of the referral (deferral)? He questioned whether the RM or the Security Council would make such a decision. Ambassador Rapp responded that Rwandan law allowed nonRwandan judges to sit in Rwanda’s courts and that a referral could be made conditional on acceptance of the judge designated by the ICTR or RM. He said the present rules allowed for a deferral of a case back to the ICTR but the provision might be revised if the international judge idea were approved. 15. (U) CHINA: Ambassador Rapp also met with Chinese Mission to the UN Legal Adviser Xiaomei Guo to discuss the issue of transferring the remaining ICTR “fugitive” cases to Rwanda and enhancing the ability to do so by including an international judge on Rwanda’s national judicial panel that would hear such cases at both the trial and appeals level. Xiaomei’s response was somewhat positive in that she welcomed any idea that would allow the ICTR to finish its work earlier. She said she had to report the proposal to Beijing before she could have an official reaction and also said that she thought it should be discussed in the IWGIT. International Criminal Court (ICC) 16. (SBU) France and the UK: Ambassador Rapp mentioned the upcoming gathering at Glen Cove and indicated that Legal Adviser Koh hoped it might be possible to reach a consensus solution there. 17. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp said that the argument that works best with NGOs is the “just don’t go there” argument-that taking on the crime of aggression would politicize the court and undermine its core work of punishing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He expects that some NGOs will write editorials and take positions arguing against including aggression in the ICC’s jurisdiction.
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18. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp explained that the U.S. position was that there must be a Security Council determination of aggression (a SC trigger). The question the USG hasn’t answered, he said, is whether if we could get the SC trigger, we would accept the definition of aggression. He noted that the USG still has problems with the definition, e.g., the term “manifest” violation, which simply means a clear violation, not an egregious one. 19. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp asked what the UK and French legal advisers had heard from their capitols. Adams, stressing that this issue was handled out of London, said that based on her contacts with Daniel Bethlehem and Chris Whomersley, she understood that the UK was focusing on the SC trigger rather than the definition, “which seems to be agreed to a large extent.” One argument the UK is looking at, she said, is that it would be ultra vires (inconsistent with the Charter) for the ICC to prosecute aggression absent a SC determination of aggression. Gasri said that the French position is that the SC must make the determination of aggression, but the definition of aggression is OK. 20. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp noted that we were concerned that the aggression definition being worked on, especially without a SC trigger, would make it harder to build coalitions in the future. He added that, assuming the 121.5 alt proposal is adopted, the crime of aggression provision won’t apply to Parties that don’t ratify or to non-Parties. This will create a patchwork, not a system of universal jurisdiction. Gasri noted that the Security Council could make it universal. Ambassador Rapp came back by saying that the Security Council could refer cases to the ICC, as he thinks they would have been prepared to do in 1991 with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Again, he noted that the argument that resonates with NGOS (or at least some of them) is that the court will be overrun with aggression cases. He could imagine, for example, border incursion cases coming from Latin America. If there were a SC trigger, only the most egregious cases would be tried, the ones that shock the conscience, such as what happened in 1991. 21. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp added that he wasn’t sure this was accurate, but he had understood that Sweden at one point had been talking about a proposal where countries would agree to an ICC aggression trial after the incident, almost like an arbitration. He noted that this again would create a patchwork, but that the USG might find it to be the least objectionable “at the end of the day.” 22. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp asked whether the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) meeting in NY from February 22-25 offered potential for defining the debate on aggression. Adams responded that she thought that progress could only be made outside formal meetings. Ambassador Rapp noted that most of the meeting was going to be devoted to stocktaking in any event, with only one short session on aggression. On the subject of stocktaking, he noted that if Kampala ended with no agreement on aggression, people would say it was a failure. One way to counter this would be to achieve results on stocktaking. One possibility, which his office was exploring, was to focus on complementarity, but with an emphasis on the more positive aspects of capacity-building and assistance. He thought this would be popular with the Africans, among others. Adams responded that it would be good if the Review Conference could do something substantive beyond the Belgian proposal. At the same time, there were risks. Complementarity would evoke Bashir, etc. She noted that the SG and the Ministers are currently slated to come at the beginning of the meeting, probably because they were not expecting big results at the end. Her personal view was that there should be a Ministerial Declaration worked out in
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advance that would be quite general and that everyone could agree to. Possibly there could be more specific results on stocktaking as well. 23. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp wrapped up the discussion by saying that various sources, including NGOs, had told him that so long as the P-5 stick together, there would be no outcome on aggression. He made clear that if the RC ended up with a pre-trial chamber deciding whether aggression had occurred, the USG’s ability to contribute to and cooperate with the ICC in the future would be seriously and adversely affected. He noted that the USG was currently doing a review of the ways in which we could currently assist the ICC, with decisions to be taken soon. 24. (SBU) CHINA: Ambassador Rapp said that the USG is trying to be tactful in its approach and explained that when he and Harold Koh attended the ICC meeting in The Hague in November they received a warm welcome but clearly stated that including the “crime of aggression” in the ICC’s statute is not a good thing and that there needs to be a SC trigger. He added that the USG is thinking about ways we might be able to assist the ICC “in kind” in special cases. For example, Rapp said the USG could help the ICC with providing information or by assisting with investigations in certain cases. He also said that the USG wants to take part in the stocktaking exercise as ICC cases are taking much too long and it needs to do more to improve its efficiency. Rapp also said that we want to work with the ICC on the complementarity issue. 25. (SBU) Returning to the crime of aggression, Rapp said that Prince Zaid, Christian Wenaveser, Belgium, Germany and Greece are the only real supporters of it. He explained that the USG would prefer to see this issue discussed in Kampala and then deferred. If that’s not possible, then he said we would need a SC trigger. Xiamei agreed that a SC trigger is critical and said that she thought there would be a P5 legal advisers meeting on this issue before Kampala and added that the P5 should do something before the conference and at a minimum, France and UK, as parties to the ICC, should convince others that it (crime of aggression) should be blocked. Rapp asked how we’d block with only 2 votes? He also said that lots of states would agree with our points, but in the end won’t block it. He said there is a possibility some more EU states will join us and possibly Colombia in South America but the rest of South America and Africa would have a negative view of the SC and hence would not support including the crime of aggression with a SC “trigger”. Ambassador Rapp said that there will be a meeting in Glen Cove 3-5 March to discuss the issue and that this meeting would be a good place for interested states to reach a compromise (before the review conference) – if we wanted a compromise – but we don’t want a compromise! Ambassador Rapp said that UK Deputy Legal Adviser Whomersley has already said that we’re going to lose on this issue and that he would put out a statement indicating the decision is “ultra vires” in that under article 39 of the UN Charter only the SC can determine what constitutes a crime of aggression. Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) RM 26. (SBU) France and the UK: Ambassador Rapp summed up the issue by saying that fundraising for the SCSL is so challenging now that it may run out of funds in the middle of the Charles Taylor trial and we have to ask how it will be possible to raise $500,000 (or maybe $250,000) a year for the next 50 years. The most promising solution seems to be having the SC establish the SCSL RM and fund it via assessed contributions. 27. (SBU) Gasri suggested that the USG should make a demarche in Paris. Altho272

ugh Paris had said that France did not support this initiative, she did not think the decision had been made at a very high level. 28. (SBU) Ambassador Rapp noted it was not certain when the Taylor judgment will be delivered, but it is believed that the current presiding judge will try to deliver a judgment before her term expires in January 2011. In that case, the appeal should be done in six months, and the court should close soon after that. He observed that the Canadian chair of the Management Committee kept raising the idea of a UN subvention. The USG and UK had said firmly when a subvention was done (painfully) four or five years ago, that they would never support such an initiative again, but it might be an alternative if worst came to worst. Another possibility was an “endowment” through a trust fund. 29. (SBU) Adams argued that it made sense to bring all of the ad hoc tribunals together in their final phase. If this was to happen, we need to make progress on the ICTY/ICTR RM. In her view, there had been no progress in the last twelve months. The reality was that there needed to be a P-5 discussion. The UK has clear legal redlines. While the Chinese keep repeating that virtually all of the ICTY/ICTR functions should be sent to national jurisdictions, they don’t really give details about how that could be done. The Russians are key. They have very political issues about ICTY, but don’t seem to be bothered by ICTR. It was unfortunate that Gennady Kuzmin was leaving in the summer, because he understands the situation. One issue Adams found particularly difficult to deal with was contempt-should we stand up a whole tribunal to deal with contempt of court? Ambassador Rapp thought the contempt issue could be contained over time. He believed the rules permitted use of a single judge and a simplified procedure. Also, if a witness were assaulted or murdered, the local courts should be able to deal with that. 30. (SBU) Adams opined that it was key to agree on the statute for the ICTY/ICTR RM. She briefly raised the Lebanon tribunal, for which she heads the Management Committee. She said she understood that Patricia O’Brien had a “lively” conversation with the Prosecutor in the Hague last week in essence pressing for concrete results. She felt there was a sense of “impending doom,” that the donors will lose interest, if nothing happened by the end of the year. Ambassador Rapp responded that he had spoken with the Prosecutor who seemed very optimistic about having something to show by the end of the year, and mentioned that the USG was doing its best to help. Rice

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Reference id: 10BELGRADE244 Subject: Serbia: Scenesetter For The February 18-21 Visit Of Codel Pomeroy Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:11 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BELGRADE244.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments
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SENSITIVE CODEL SIPDIS H FOR LYNNEA SHANE E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], ECON [Economic Conditions], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], PREL [External Political Relations], OREP [U.S. Congressional Travel], SR [Serbia] Summary 1. (SBU) Your visit to Serbia comes at a time when Serbia‘s pro-European government is stable and recently achieved key milestones in its path to EU membership. To keep making progress, however, Serbia must stop allowing the Kosovo issue to undermine its broader foreign policy approach and shift its focus to the economic and political reforms necessary for membership in the EU. Reforms to date have been uneven, with significant progress in the defense sector and many challenges ahead in the economic sphere, particularly as the economic crisis threatens to lead to sustained labor and social unrest. End Summary. Domestic Politics 2. (SBU) Serbia’s democratic, pro-European government has remained intact since its installation in July 2008 despite its razor thin parliamentary majority. President Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) is the main party in the ruling coalition, and also controls Serbia’s largest city governments. Tadic’s ultranationalist rival, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), splintered in autumn 2008 when top SRS officials split to form the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Claiming a pro-European orientation while cultivating its nationalist electoral base, the SNS is now Serbia’s largest opposition party; polls roughly even (at around 30%) with Tadic’s DS. However, despite recent local electoral victories and a nationwide petition effort, the opposition is unable to provoke early elections. The main threat to the governing coalition’s stability continues to be political infighting among the governing parties. Ongoing Political Reform 3. (SBU) EU accession benchmarks for Serbia require additional improvements in judicial independence and efficiency, improved rule of law, and sustained economic growth, as well as reducing opportunities for corrupt practices. While the current government has made significant progress on reform compared to preceding governments, it relies upon a cumbersome multiparty coalition, which at times leads to poor governmental coordination and fragmented reform efforts. Serbia must approach reform comprehensi274

vely – reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law and embracing good governance and a more active role for ordinary citizens in public decision-making. Euro-Atlantic Integration 4. (SBU) Top Serbian officials have repeatedly emphasized that Serbia’s top foreign policy objective is to gain EU membership. Over the past several months Serbia has achieved significant milestones including gaining visa liberalization with Schengen countries on December 19, formally submitting an application for EU membership of December 22, and “unfreezing” and implementing the Interim Trade Agreement with the EU on February 1. (EU ratification of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement remains conditioned on Serbia’s full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); most notably, Serbia must capture and extradite ICTY indictees Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic.) Over the past year, however, Serbia’s proEuropean foreign policy focus has been blurred by Belgrade’s efforts to cultivate closer relations with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), China, and Russia. The NAM has been a particular focus as part of Serbia’s efforts to slow down Kosovo recognitions, and China and Russia as appreciation for their support on the UN Security Council in regard to Kosovo. 5. (SBU) While Serbia cooperates with NATO via the Partnership for Peace Program, it does not intend to pursue NATO membership in the foreseeable future. This is mostly due to lasting public anger over the 1999 NATO bombing campaign which forced then-President Slobodan Milosevic to halt his ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo. It also reflects both Serbia’s interest in walking a fine line between Russia and the West. Public debate on NATO has increased in recent months as nationalist figures attempt to use the issue to gain political traction and some in the governing coalition make increasingly forward-leaning statements in favor of the Alliance. Russia recently has begun to raise the rhetoric’s temperature with anti-NATO op-eds from the local Russian Ambassador, and comments from the Russian Ambassador to NATO that Serbia would have to “choose between NATO and Kosovo.” Kosovo and Regional Relations 6. (SBU) Despite the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by 65 countries and its membership in international organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and Miss Universe, Belgrade continues to claim that Kosovo is part of Serbia. Since Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, Serbia has launched a diplomatic offensive in the UN and around the globe to prevent additional states from recognizing Kosovo. During his May 2009 trip to Belgrade, Vice President Biden clearly stated that the United States and Serbia have “agreed to disagree” over Kosovo’s status. This spring the International Court of Justice is expected to issue an advisory opinion to the UN General Assembly on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, as Serbia requested. Regardless of the opinion, Belgrade likely plans to force a reopening of status talks on Kosovo. While we do not expect Serbia to recognize Kosovo, we continue to encourage the Government to find a modus vivendi with its neighbor so it can address the necessary quality of life issues for Serbs in Kosovo as well as serious trans-border issues such as drug trafficking and trafficking in persons. Failure to do so will complicate Serbia’s path to the EU.
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7. (SBU) Serbia has defined regional cooperation as one of its top foreign policy priorities and has claimed to seek to repair relations with its neighbors with mixed results. While improving relations with Hungary and Slovenia, Serbia has yet to come to terms with Macedonia and Montenegro, particularly after the two countries recognized Kosovo in October 2008. Serbia has generally played a constructive role in the Butmir process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We expect Belgrade to take advantage of the opportunity to improve troubled political relations with Croatia after incoming Croatian president Ivo Josipovic assumes office in mid-February. Security Issues 8. (SBU) Defense reform is a priority of the Serbian government, and an area where significant progress has been made. The Serbian Armed Forces have been right-sized to about 28,000 troops, with further cuts on hold for the time being, pending reevaluation of the security environment. Minister of Defense Dragan Sutanovac (DS) has overseen significant soldier pay increases, training improvements, and legislation to codify defense reform, as well as improvements in strategic planning and procurement. The Ministry has also made progress on disposing of some excess materiel such as MANPADS, which we are funding. Further reforms, including a reduction in civilian staff, are needed. Serbia is an active participant in the National Guard’s State Partnership Program with Ohio, which has been publicly well received and touted as an example of successful bilateral cooperation. Economic Issues 9. (SBU) Serbia’s economy is still shaped by the wars, sanctions and economic neglect of the 1990’s. The country is trying to make up for lost time, but the economic liberalization process has been drawn out, with limited tangible benefits for average Serbians. Average Serbs perceive the privatization process as a disaster, seeing their once prestigious firms sold for fire sale prices to shady investors, who later declared bankruptcy and fled. When the global financial crisis hit, Serbia was quick to reach out to the IMF and in May 2009 signed a $4 billion Stand-By Arrangement. Since then, the Serbian dinar has been relatively stable; however, in recent weeks, the dinar has come under pressure. The IMF agreement constrains the Serbian government budget deficit to 4.5% for 2009 resulting in a freeze on pensions and public sector wages. With limited new foreign and domestic investment over the last two years the economy is struggling to create jobs and labor pressure is building. Strikes and acts of civil disobedience have increased as more companies fall behind on payments and face bankruptcy. Because unions do not have strong central leadership, local pressures have not become national. Bilateral Issues 10. (SBU) Vice President Biden’s May 2009 visit to Belgrade added a new impetus to our bilateral relationship, which had been strained following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. Our diplomatic relations are now slowly returning to a productive level and we are working to reinforce the Vice President’s message that we can agree to disagree on Kosovo’s status while building on other areas of our bilateral relationship. Our main priorities include assisting Serbia on its path to Europe, building on our positive mil-mil relationship, and expanding economic and business ties. In the co276

ming months we will also be seeking to update a woefully outdated extradition treaty with Serbia. Your Return to Kraljevo 11. (SBU) In contrast to its more prosperous times in the 1970s, the city of Kraljevo today is firmly ensconced in Serbia’s rustbelt and suffers from sustained high unemployment exceeding 25%. Kraljevo’s once vigorous industries that sustained the local population were sold to unreliable investors that led to the unemployment of thousands of local blue-collar workers. Once a thriving military locale, the drawdown of the local military presence also has diminished employment opportunities. Local politics is infused with resentment stemming from the lack of economic opportunities and aggravation with the influx of displaced persons and refugees from the 1990’s who have settled in Kraljevo. Of the municipality’s estimated population of 100,000, about 20,000 are displaced persons from Kosovo and roughly 700 are refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After 2000, Kraljevo’s city government was largely run by a bloc of nationalist parties; however, in March 2009, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) – the party of Milosevic – joined forces with Tadic’s coalition to give the DS-bloc a one-vote majority in the local assembly. Mayor Ljubisa Simovic (DS) assured us last autumn that his government is stable despite its narrow majority. Potential Turkish investments in roads and Kraljevo’s airport may be the start of a revival of a regional role for the historic and proud city. Comment 12. (SBU) Now is an important time for Serbia to decide whether it wishes to spend the year in a quixotic quest to reopen Kosovo status or devote full attention to winning EU candidacy status. Our consistent message to our Serbian interlocutors is the importance of overcoming domestic political rivalries and grievances with neighboring countries in order to demonstrate the political maturity and responsibility necessary for EU membership. Your return visit to Kraljevo after so many years will send an important personal message that we continue to engage with Serbia on all levels and that our friendship is a long-term investment in Serbia and its people. End Comment. Warlick

LXXXVII
Reference id: 10BELGRADE274 Subject: Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Djelic Talks Kosovo To Competitiveness In Ambassador’s Introductory Call Origin: Embassy Belgrade (Serbia) Cable time: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 17:52 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BELGRADE274.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments
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SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: ECON [Economic Conditions], PREL [External Political Relations], EINV [Foreign Investments], TSPL [Science and Technology Policy], SR [Serbia] Ref: BELGRADE 172 Summary 1. (SBU) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Science and Technology Djelic told the Ambassador that Serbia sought a more “balanced” solution for Kosovo, otherwise Serbia would be isolated from the EU and would not advance toward Europe. Djelic thanked the United States for supporting Serbia’s progress toward EU accession in late 2009 and outlined an ambitious goal of achieving EU candidate status in 2010. With regard to his S&T portfolio, Djelic said he hoped to sign a bilateral S&T cooperation agreement in the United States in April and would be reinvigorating Serbia’s scientific research with a forthcoming government approved strategy and new financing. End Summary. Kosovo Dominates Initial Discussion 2. (SBU) In his February 17 introductory meeting with Ambassador Warlick, Deputy Prime Minister for EU Integration and Minister of Science and Technology Bozidar Djelic opened with a long discussion of Kosovo. Djelic said that he was not a policy maker on Kosovo, but rather a policy taker and policy influencer on the issue. However, he highlighted the importance of Kosovo to Serbia’s EU accession process and said the Cyprus example meant that EU members would not allow Serbia to join the EU without resolving Kosovo issues. Djelic said that no Serbian politician would recognize Kosovo in order to open Serbia’s EU path. Djelic was heartened by the fact that there was not a singular European position on Kosovo and that even recognizing countries were asking the Serbian government about solutions for Kosovo. He said that during Belgian Prime Minister Leterme’s visit to Belgrade that day, Leterme had asked President Tadic to describe Serbia’s legal outline for a status solution. Djelic said a “more balanced” solution was necessary, and that the international community could do better than a solution that was “pushed down the throat of Serbia.” Djelic made a point of saying that he had family ties to Kosovo and that he spoke privately at international meetings with Kosovo Finance and Economy Minister Ahmet Shala. 3. (SBU) Djelic repeated the newly deployed core Serbian government talking point that Belgrade recognized that Serbia could not govern Kosovo Albanians, but Pristi278

na must also recognize that it could not govern Kosovo Serbs in the north. Djelic also repeated that Serbia would use only legal and diplomatic means and be “predictable” in its actions regarding Kosovo. He said that the government would not manipulate the situation in Kosovo and would continue to fight organized crime and remove or isolate extremists. He mentioned Bosnia as an example of a balanced compromise, but would not be drawn out on this point. 4. (SBU) The Ambassador responded firmly that the United States and several of our European partners had just made clear to the government in coordinated messages that Kosovo status was settled and that Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity were not up for discussion. She added that we wanted to hear Serbia’s proposals for improving the lives of those in Kosovo and ideas about a way forward following the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion on Kosovo’s independence declaration. The Ambassador pointed to Vice President Biden’s statement in Belgrade in May 2009 that we would agree to disagree on Kosovo, but needed to cooperate on practical issues and deepen our bilateral relations in other spheres. Goal for EU Path: Candidate Status in 2010 5. (SBU) Djelic’s thanked the Ambassador for U.S. support with European leaders to advance Serbia’s EU accession process at the end of 2009. Djelic said the first review of the Interim Trade Agreement by the European Commission would be in Belgrade on March 2. Djelic outlined Serbia’s next steps with the EU following the upcoming June report from ICTY prosecutor Brammertz. Djelic said that his recent three hour meeting with new EU Enlargement Commissioner Fule had gone well. He said that Albania and Montenegro had given Serbia had copies of their EU application questionnaires and Serbia would use them to draft answers in advance of receiving their own questionnaire from the Commission. Djelic’s ambitious scenario was to receive the questionnaire officially in June and then return it with answers “before the summer,” with the goal of candidate status by the end of 2010. Djelic said that he had tasked all Serbian ministries to prepare draft answers to the questionnaire by the end of April. 6. (SBU) Djelic acknowledged that Serbia faced challenges with Germany, France and the Netherlands to move ahead with ratification of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in June. He expressed concern that some voices were suggesting that Serbia’s EU path should be conditioned on Serbian cooperation in Bosnia and Kosovo. Djelic argued this would be counterproductive as it empowered radical elements in Bosnia to halt Serbia’s EU accession. Djelic said that Serbia’s goals were to achieve candidate status by the end of 2010 and open negotiations on membership in 2012, just before the government would have to call new parliamentary elections. Science and Technology 7. (SBU) Speaking about his science and technology portfolio, Djelic said the Ministry would soon respond to the bilateral S&T agreement language that the Embassy passed to the Ministry in early February. His goal was to have Serbian government approval for the agreement so that he could sign it in the United States during his planned visit ahead of the spring World Bank/IMF meetings April 25-26. Djelic said the government would approve a science and technology strategy soon. In addition, Djelic planned
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to sign an agreement on March 4 with the European Investment Bank for $275 million in financing for science infrastructure. He was also interested in supporting technology start up firms with a $135 million regional technology fund that would include funding from the EU, countries in the region, international financial institutions and others. Djelic said he had spoken with George Soros and that Soros was willing to contribute $13 million once the fund was launched. The Ambassador noted U.S. Serbian cooperation at the Vinca nuclear research facility as an example of our positive cooperation. Djelic responded that Serbia appreciated U.S. assistance on nuclear issues and that Serbia would be a partner on IAEA issues this year, alluding to past issues of support for Iran in return for Iranian support for Serbia on Kosovo. Economy Woes 8. (SBU) Djelic moved to a discussion of the economic challenges the government faced in recovering from the financial crisis. He said that Serbia had chosen to go to the IMF early, well ahead of its neighbors, and had managed to stabilize the dinar, but this had come with a cost. The IMF had mandated pension and wage freezes that had eroded average Serbian purchasing power by 30%. The government needed to lift these freezes, Djelic said, in order to keep from slipping in the polls. Striking a similar theme as PM Cvetkovic in his introductory meeting with the Ambassador (reftel), Djelic said that Serbia’s ratings from the international credit rating agencies were too low and because of Serbia’s history were rated on par with much smaller and less developed economies. Djelic was optimistic, however, as Serbia’s rating with two agencies had shifted from negative to neutral even with the financial crisis. Djelic thanked the United States for assistance to Serbia’s Competitiveness Council, which he chairs, and for the positive role of U.S. investors like U.S. Steel, Ball Packaging and Microsoft. Regional Partnership Opportunities 9. (SBU) Djelic outlined three areas where Serbia hoped to build regional cooperation. He said that Serbia was lobbying to host the secretariat for the South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO) in competition with Tirana. According to Djelic, Serbia would like to become an active participant in a regional Danube strategy to build on the transport and tourism potential of the river. He also said that the countries in the region needed to resolve refugee and internally displaced persons issues. Spain, in its EU Presidency role, was working on this issue and Djelic hoped that a conference on refugees would happen in March. Comment 10. (SBU) Djelic has rarely discussed Kosovo publicly in the past, leaving the issue to others. In recent press appearances, Djelic has begun using language on Kosovo that comes straight from Foreign Minister Jeremic’s playbook. Like others in the Serbian government, the candid private words from several EU members that Serbia will not be able to join the EU without a modus vivendi with Kosovo has gotten Djelic’s attention. Djelic spent a significant portion of his initial meeting with the Ambassador focusing on an issue he admitted was outside of his portfolio, but which he clearly recognizes threatens the ambitious EU agenda that is at the heart of the government’s plans for maintaining public support and eventual reelection. The key question, of course, is how the Serbian
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government itself chooses to manage its policy toward Kosovo going forward. End Comment. Warlick

LXXXVIII
Reference id: 10USUNNEWYORK101 Subject: Un Acknowledges Receipt Of U.s. Contributions Origin: USUN New York (United Nations) Cable time: Wed, 24 Feb 2010 14:49 UTC Classification: Unclassified Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10USUNNEWYORK101.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0004 PP RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #0101 0551449 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 241449Z FEB 10 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8222 Hide header

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SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences], AFIN [Financial Management], UN [United Nations] Ref: A. 2009 SECSTATE 126693 B. 2010 SECSTATE 6073 Usun has faxed to IO/EX/OB-Alice Green official receipts from the United Nations confirming receipt of U.S. contributions as follows: ICTY $15,578,394 Minustah $34,546,577 Unmil $38,014,296 Rice

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Reference id: 10SARAJEVO182 Subject: Inl-funded Program Update: Focus On Opdat Technical Assistance Origin: Embassy Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) Cable time: Thu, 25 Feb 2010 08:22 UTC Classification: Unclassified//For Official Use Only Source: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SARAJEVO182.html History: First published on Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Media: Comments: 0 Comments VZCZCXYZ0002 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHVJ #0182/01 0560822 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 250822Z FEB 10 FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO TO RU281

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SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, S/WCI (ANDERSON), EUR/ACE (KEETON), INL (CARROLL’sIMIC); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR KARL ALEXANDRE E.O. 12958: N/A Tags: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance], EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs], KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes], KCRM [Criminal Activity], KJUS [Administration of Justice], BK [Bosnia and Herzegovina] Ref: A. 09 SARAJEVO 1430 B. 07 SARAJEVO 1405 C. SARAJEVO 21 D. 09 SARAJEVO 971 1. (U) Summary. The work being done by INL-funded Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance Program (OPDAT) remains crucial to our rule of law agenda in Bosnia. In addition to its training programs, OPDAT is providing technical assistance to the State Prosecutor’s Special Department for Organized Crime (SDOC) aimed at beefing up Bosnia’s ability to investigate and prosecute terrorism, organized crime, and corruption cases. This assistance has come into even greater demand following the December 2009 decision by High Representative Valentin Inzko to extend the mandate of international judges and prosecutors working on war crimes cases but not on organized crimes cases at the State Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court. OPDAT is also promoting discussions about needed judicial reforms in support of Bosnia’s aspirations of integrating into the EU. The following is a review of key OPDAT training programs and justice-sector initiatives from September to December 2009. End Summary. OPDAT Boosts SDOC’s Fight Against Terrorism 2. (SBU) OPDAT is continuing to provide technical know-how and mentoring to prosecutors and legal officers working on terrorism and terrorism finance cases in the State Prosecutors Special Department for Organized Crime (SDOC). Intermittent Legal Advisor (ILA) Scott Hulsey, who replaced ILA Rick Willis, arrived in November for a six-month assignment. Hulsey’s expertise is especially crucial to SDOC given HighRep Valentin Inzko’s decision in December extend the mandate of international judges and prosecutors working on war crimes cases but not on organized crime cases (Ref A). While Inzko’s decision provides for international advisors to work in SDOC given the continuing need for technical expertise and transfer of technical know-how, it will take some time for all of the (four) advisor slots requested by Barasin to be filled and for nationals to replace five positions vacated by internationals. 3. (SBU) ILA Hulsey, whose work has already been singled out for praise by Barasin, is advising on several terrorism cases of interest to the USG. These cases include that of two defendants accused of bombing a local shopping center, which killed one individual and severely injured several others. ILA Hulsey is providing one-on-one mentoring to the prosecutor working on the case by observing the trial and advising on trial techni282

ques and strategy. He is also providing guidance on a terrorism financing case involving a Middle Eastern-based charity that is an umbrella organization for several charities operating in Bosnia, purportedly to assist war orphans. Bosnian officials have been working on the case for over seven years. To date, the State Investigative and Protective Agency (SIPA) investigators have found significant discrepancies between monies these organizations claimed were spent on charitable programs and funds actually spent. ILA Hulsey is helping to coordinate joint meetings of prosecutors and investigators working on the case, collate and analyze evidence collected, and develop investigative and prosecutorial strategies. 4. (U) In addition, ILA Hulsey is assisting SDOC in reviewing 76 possible terrorism cases that were recently handed over by the General Crimes Department, and by promoting police-prosecutor cooperation on specific, high-profile cases. (Note: Acting on OPDAT’s recommendation, State Prosecutor Milorad Barasin had the General Crimes Division transfer all of its terrorism cases to SDOC, which was already processing terrorism finance cases. End Note) State Court Confirms High-Profile Terrorism Indictment 5. (SBU) As a result of OPDAT’s mentoring, the State Court in mid December confirmed a 300-plus page indictment filed by the State Prosecutor’s Office against Rijad Rustempasic and four other suspected terrorists and weapons traffickers. The defendants were initially arrested in March 2008 on terrorism charges but were subsequently released with the consent of a prosecutor (from the overburdened and ill-equipped General Crimes Department), who apparently concluded that there was insufficient evidence of criminal activity in the case. The case was revived after a new prosecutorial team from SDOC was assigned to the case and after it began receiving technical assistance from OPDAT (first from ILA Willis then Hulsey), to develop charges and a case strategy. Owing to this much-needed technical support, Rustempasic and the other defendants were subsequently re-arrested and indicted. The trial against Rustempasic et al is to begin on February 19, 2010. (Note: To date, Bosnia, with USG assistance, has successfully prosecuted one terrorism case. See Ref B. End Note). Study Trips to ICTY, European Court for Human Rights 6. (U) From October 18 to 23, 2009 OPDAT sponsored a legal study visit to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for 12 judges from state-level, entity, and cantonal courts as part of its long-standing efforts to improve the processing of war crimes and to strengthen the operations of courts and prosecutor’s offices nation-wide. The judges participated in discussions on topics they had identified as being of particular interest to them, including the use of ICTY case law; witness support; case management; appellate practice; and use of the ICTY Manual on Best Practices. Particularly noteworthy were the discussions between the ICTY and Bosnian judges on the issues of dissenting opinions and joint criminal enterprise. The ICTY judges were surprised that their Bosnian colleagues did not publish dissenting opinions – a topic that is being debated in Bosnia – and both groups of judges exchanged views on problematic aspects of the concept of joint criminal enterprise. 7. (U) While at The Hague, the group also paid a visit to the International Criminal Court. It attended a presentation on the differences between an ad hoc tribunal and a per283

manent international court and another on the different approaches taken by common and civil law judges. The judges also had the opportunity to sit in on court proceedings at both Courts. As others have done in the past, several commented on the conduct of judges, witnesses, prosecutors, and defense counsels, noting that generally speaking, Bosnian judges need to exert stricter control of courtroom proceedings, such as by insisting that court proceedings begin and end on time. 8. (U) From November 15 to 19, 2009 the RLA accompanied eight judges from the State Court, the Federation and Republika Srpska Supreme Courts, the state-level Constitutional Court, and the Sarajevo Municipal Court to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. The study visit stemmed from observations by international judges working at the Court that Bosnian judges lacked understanding of some aspects of the European Convention for Human Rights. It is part of a wider Embassy initiative to support Bosnia’s efforts to move towards the EU, especially since the country is falling behind its neighbors on its path to the EU. 9. (U) The judges met the Bosnian judge on the Court and discussed aspects of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that were of interest to them. They also heard presentations from by Bosnian experts, who, among other things, provided general descriptions of pending cases filed against Bosnia. Of particular interest to the Bosnian judges was the general discussion on the high-profile Sejdic/Finci case, in which a Roma and a Jew alleged they were being discriminated against since the Bosnia’s constitution prohibited individuals who identified themselves as “Others” (i.e., Jews, Roma, individuals of mixed ethnic backgrounds) from running for the Presidency and the House of Peoples. ECHR interlocutors underscored that the Sejdic/Finci case be the first case involving a possible violation of Protocol 12, which deals with general discrimination. (Note: As noted in Ref C, the European Court for Human Rights subsequently found Bosnia in violation of the ECHR. End Note) The Bosnian judges also learned how the Court implements its decisions and how to effectively use the Court’s database to review case law. Additionally, they sat in on proceedings involving a property rights case against Turkey. Several judges noted that the case was similar to property rights cases of nonSerbs who were forced to leave what is now the RS during the 1992-1995 war. OPDAT Brings Focus to Needed Reforms 10. (SBU) On September 28-29 and later on October 1-2, OPDAT organized two presentations on its findings on trends at the State Court’s Appellate Division to fifty State and entity-level judges as part of its efforts to promote needed reform at state-level institutions, which remain a top Embassy priority. International judges working on the appeals panel had long complained of the need to significantly revamp the work of the panel. They have cited among other complaints, opaque standards of review; the tendency of the appeals panels to not only review the merits of cases before them, but to essentially retry cases; and the absence of sentencing guidelines. International prosecutors working at the State Prosecutor’s Office had also complained to OPDAT about what they deemed to be a high rate of reversals, revocations or modifications of verdicts which often called for relatively light sentences for egregious crimes – particularly in organized crime, economic crime, and corruption cases. 11. (U) OPDAT’s exhaustive research, which examined decisions in over 400 cases over the course of several months, drew attention to the inconsistency in prison senten284

ces handed down by appeals panels, the fact that some trials were too lengthy, the poor quality of written decisions, and the need for appeals panels to narrow the scope of what facts should be viewed as decisive facts, i.e. facts that could change their decisions. OPDAT’s research also revealed that a much lower rate of verdicts were modified, revoked, or reversed (30 percent, not 95 percent as have been reported previously). The discussions that followed the presentations of these findings were led by the Honorable D. Brook Smith of the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals whose visit was sponsored by OPDAT. The Bosnian judges and judicial staff welcomed the opportunity to have frank discussions on the work of appeals panels, noting that OPDAT’s initiative had drawn attention to the need to reform the work of appeals panels nation-wide. 12. (U) As a follow-up to discussions it spearheaded outlined in Ref D, OPDAT also hosted two roundtables on prison reform on October 6 and October 8, 2009. OPDAT invited representatives of key missions following the issue (OHR/EU Special Representative, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, and the EU Police Monitoring Mission), ICITAP, as well as key Justice Ministry officials to discuss these issues. OPDAT introduced the concept of electronic bracelets for individuals convicted of lesser crimes to free up space for individuals convicted of graver crimes. (Note: Construction of a state prison is expected to start in 2011 and end in 2013. End Note) Several key Bosnian judicial officials have embraced the concept of electronic bracelets and are planning to establish a working group to examine the issue. They expressed willingness to begin working on draft legislation to make the use of electronic bracelets legal in Bosnia and have asked OPDAT to participate in this working group. Improving Trial Advocacy Skills 13. (U) During November 5-7, 2009, OPDAT sponsored the visit of Judge Charles Simpson of the U.S. District Court from the Western District of Kentucky, who traveled to Bosnia to help Bosnian judges and legal officers improve their trial skills, particularly common law elements with which they are still somewhat unfamiliar. Judge Simpson led a roundtable with 20 State Court and Sarajevo Municipal Court judges and legal officers covering a wide range of topics. They included: how to present evidence, conduct direct and cross examination, and handle objections; whether judges should be allowed to write dissenting opinions; and the importance of status conferences – an initiative introduced by U.S. judges at the State Court designed to improve courtroom scheduling. The judges found this discussion helpful and came to understand the value of dissenting opinions. Many of them admitted that they did not know how to handle objections and would like to have training in this area. English Language Training in High Demand 14. (U) Judges and judicial staff at the State Court continue to attach great importance to the English language program offered by OPDAT. They have repeatedly asserted that the program is valuable as the Court receives a great number of documents from the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in English and English language skills are essential for communication and cooperation with other countries, including some in the region. Given this great demand for its classes, OPDAT sought assistance from the Embassy’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA) to assist with its ongoing English-language program. In response to OPDAT’s request, OPA made it possible for a Fulbright scholar,
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who had experience teaching legal English, to teach an English-language class for fifteen judges and legal officers. The class, which includes State Court President Meddzida Kreso, began November 19, 2009. In addition, the RLA and an American judge teach legal English classes every week for 15 legal officers from the State Prosecutor’s Office and the State Court. While learning English, participants are learning trial advocacy skills (i.e., direct examination, cross examination, and closing argument). Other Notable Activities 15. (U) As part of its ongoing effort to improve donor coordination and to seek opportunities to co-train and hence reduce costs, OPDAT sponsored a second roundtable on October 27, with 14 providers of technical assistance. During the roundtable, donors shared information about planned training programs for the next six months, which OPDAT collected to update its training calendar. The calendar is shared with all donors as well as the Judicial Training Centers in the Federation and Republika Srpska. As a result of this effort, different institutions have been able to combine their funding and do joint training. English

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