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FOR THE LPG STORAGE PETROLEUM ASPROPYRGOS
P. D. Petrolekasa and I. Andreoub
SPEC Process Services S.A., 75 Patission Str., Athens 104 34, Greece
Safety and Hygiene Department, Aspropyrgos Industrial Complex, Hellenic Petroleum S.A., 193 00 Aspropyrgos, Greece Abstract This study examines domino effects related to the LPG storage installation of Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos, in accordance with the new SEVESO II Directive requirements. The analysis involves a systematic procedure for the evaluation of potential domino accident scenarios, based on a set of damage-toequipment criteria. The results show that the main concern is for a potential BLEVE accident in the nearby LPG handling establishment, which could result to a BLEVE accident in the refinery LPG installation. 1. INTRODUCTION The LPG storage installation of the Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos, includes four 4000 m3 LPG storage spheres, two 1600 m3 propane spheres, an 1800 m3 butane sphere, an 800 m3 LPG sphere and a truck loading station. Figure 1 shows the layout of the installation, which is located across the southern fence of the refinery establishment. Nearby installations include refinery process units, oil storage tanks, an oil truck loading station, and an LPG handling terminal. The latter establishment includes eight cylindrical LPG storage tanks, 170 m3 each, incoming pipeline from the refinery, truck loading and packaging facilities. The Safety Study of the refinery LPG installation , performed according to the SEVESO I Directive requirements, examined accident scenarios resulting from failures in the installation itself, and assessed their consequences to people and the environment. This Study, performed in accordance to the SEVESO II requirements, examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in nearby installations and could have an impact to the refinery LPG installation. This is particularly important with respect to the identification of external hazard sources for the facility . In addition, the study examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in the refinery
2. describing a sequence of accidents. (b) Assessment of domino effects zone. the presence of protection (e.20 minutes. This involves assessment of the initial accidents consequences and evaluation of domino effects zones according to a set of damage-to-equipment criteria. (c) Evaluation of the secondary accident. the duration of exposure. 2. accidents in the refinery LPG installation that could cause secondary effects to nearby installations. etc. the duration of exposure is considered to be of the order of 15 . METHODOLOGY The domino effects analysis involves identification of domino scenarios. Practical ‘rules of thumb” found in literature. The extent of the damage depends on radiation or overpressure intensity. . This involves identification of potential accidents in all installations involved. AIChE considers heat flux of 37. and thus may initiate a secondary accident. for rupture and deformation of structural elements. Concerning explosion consequences. This is also important with respect to a complete off-site consequences evaluation. thus leading to a secondary accident.LPG installation and could have secondary effects to nearby installations. provide values of thermal radiation or overpressure corresponding to a given degree of damage.5 -1 bar can cause cylindrical tank displacement or failure of connecting pipes. The procedure is employed for the identification of domino scenarios resulting from accidents in nearby installations that could have an impact to the refinery LPG installation. This involves visualisation of domino effects zones into suitable plot plans and identification of the equipment in nearby installations that could be subjected to high loads and fail. as well as.5 kW/m2 as the limit for severe damage to process equipment . respectively . In both cases. the type of material. TNO suggests that overpressures of 0. while TNO identifies critical radiation intensities of 100 kW/m2 and 25 kW/m2.g.1 Damage criteria Thermal radiation and explosion overpressure produced during an accident can cause severe damage to nearby process equipment. water deluge) systems. by means of systematic process hazard analyses. using the following procedure: (a) Identification of the initial accident. and overpressures above 1 bar can cause failure of spherical tank supports .
Pool fires can occur when a significant quantity of liquid is released and immediately ignited. explosions are unlikely. if ignited. unless the cloud is confined in a building. Any equipment on which that flame jet impinged would be subjected to very high thermal loads. the fireball radius is defined as the domino effects radius. in case of releases from LPG or gasoline road tankers. For modelling purposes.5 kW/m2. Flame jets. the centre of explosion may be assumed to be very near to the point of release. A large release of superheated liquid (e. may burn as a fireball. could lead to a flash fire burning that part of vapour cloud within the flammability limits. e. the risk for domino effects is small. These can be confined. but the radiation levels are intense e. often exceeding the capacity of fixed water sprays. Release and dispersion of LPG. >1t).7 bar is considered as the domino effects limit. the danger is mainly for the people that may be affected by the radiation. but due to the short duration of the phenomenon. Therefore. Therefore.g. However. will burn as a flame jet. if immediately ignited. the evaluation of domino effects zones is based on a set of damage-toequipment criteria. In such cases. but duration can be long. can be significant. e. Radiation levels are generally moderate. The fireball grows larger and moves upward continuously because of buoyancy. fire in a crude tank following failure of floating roof.g. the domino effects zone is defined by the length and width of the jet. Outside the flame jet itself radiation hazards are very small. Beyond this. are considered as confined pool fires. A high-pressure release of vapour or vapour/aerosol into free space. the radiation at fireball surface can be up to 200 kW/m2 . for an LPG pool fire the radiation at the surface of the flame is about 100 kW/m2 . Within the burning cloud. e.g. the domino effects radius is defined as the distance from the centre of pool to a thermal radiation of 37. there may be ignition of equipment. Overpressure 0. LPG). if ignited. which were derived taking into account the literature guidelines and the specific characteristics of the various phenomena: • Fireball. • • • . Vapour cloud fire and explosion. the ignition of a vapour cloud may result in an explosion. defined by blast overpressure.g. or unconfined. Therefore. Within the radius of the fireball there will be severe damage to process equipment and buildings. there is sufficient mass within the cloud (e. The effects of an explosion. or semi-confined in a heavily congested process plant. If however. e. The duration of the fireball is small (< 40 sec).g. tank fires.g. Pool & tank fires. in case of releases into containment dikes.In this study.g.
3. . The results show that. flame jets associated with catastrophic failures of LPG pipelines. Fire in a refinery oil storage tank. Catastrophic failure of an LPG road tanker in the LPG handling establishment leading to fireball (BLEVE) or vapour cloud explosion.g. It can be seen that the domino effects zone includes the refinery four 4000 m3 LPG spheres. BLEVE of a refinery LPG sphere will have a substantial impact to nearby installations and could cause several. The first step in the domino effects assessment is the identification of potential accidents in nearby installations. accidents in the other refinery installations do not appear to involve any potential effects to the LPG installation. The assessment of domino effects zones leads to the identification of domino scenarios.3. These include: • • • • • Catastrophic failure of an LPG tank in the LPG handling establishment leading to fireball (BLEVE) or vapour cloud explosion. secondary accidents (Figure 1). In addition. do not appear to have an impact to nearby installations.2 Domino scenarios due to accidents in the refinery LPG installation The identification of domino scenarios that result from accidents in the LPG installation is also performed according to the procedure described above. and thus there is danger for them to BLEVE. Conversely.1 Domino scenarios due to accidents in nearby installations Accidents in nearby installations could be an important external hazard source for the refinery LPG installation. there is concern for a potential BLEVE of an LPG road tanker that could cause further BLEVEs in the nearby LPG establishment. Catastrophic failure of a liquid LPG pipeline in the LPG handling establishment leading to flame jet. Similar analysis shows that BLEVE of an LPG road tanker in the nearby LPG handling establishment can also cause BLEVE of a refinery LPG 4000 m3 sphere. RESULTS 3. though smaller. Figure 1 presents the results for the case of a fireball due to BLEVE of an LPG tank in the nearby LPG handling establishment. Failure of a gasoline road tanker in the refinery loading station leading to unconfined pool fire. Smaller accidents e.
Domino effects zones of BLEVE accidents in the LPG handling terminal (solid line) and the refinery LPG installation (dotted line).LPG terminal 200 m Figure 1. . Plot plan of the refinery LPG storage installation and the nearby installations. are presented.
3. Papadakis and A. 2. Due to the high safety standards of Hellenic Petroleum. JRC (1997).4. EUR 17690 EN. (1996). Guidance on the Preparation of a Safety Report to meet the Requirements of Council Directive 96/82/EC (SEVESO II). the danger for a major accident. “Yellow Book” CPR 14E. The Netherlands(1989). 5. A. The control of such hazards could be achieved by enhancing communication on safety issues between the two companies. . Centre for Chemical Process Safety. The analysis indicates that: • • BLEVE accidents in the nearby LPG handling establishment could involve potential domino effects to the refinery LPG installation. Flash Fires. Methods for the calculation of physical effects.. 2nd Ed. General of Labour . BLEVE accidents in the refinery LPG installation could cause secondary effects to nearby installations. G. Amendola (Eds).A. This study identified external sources of hazard related to the nearby LPG establishment. Voorburg. Director General of Labour. Hellenic Petroleum S. Labour Inspectorate. Voorburg. Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions. AIChE (1994) 4. Dir. is very low. “Green Book” CPR 16E. such as BLEVE. CONCLUSIONS This study examined domino effects related with the LPG storage installation of the Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos. in accordance with the SEVESO II Directive requirements. Methods for the determination of possible damage to people and objects resulting from releases of hazardous materials. REFERENCES 1. Safety study of the LPG storage installation at Hellenic Petroleum Aspropyrgos Refinery. The Netherlands(1992). and BLEVEs.
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