1953년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

Fr' Srase 20,39pkilblypTatras
1 January 1953
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Copy Nb. 58
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. IN C:Lkoo. NO CHANGE DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANPED NEXT REVIEW DATt:
rya)
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tREVIEWER
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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DOS review(s) completed.
afar
2oninE-431R.079ToWS
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SUMMAR Y
GENERAL
1.
Indian Ambassador is being treated discourteously by Peiping

(page 3).
2.
Peiping asks for representation in Ceylon to handle long-term trade (page 3).
3.
4.
5.
6.
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7.

(page 4).
FAR EAST
SOVIET UNION
Soviet press ignores possibility af Eisenhower-Stalin meethig
Peiping promises North Koreans continued support in war

(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Magsaysay ready to accept Nacionalista nomination for Philippine presidency (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
British influence in Jordan in jeopardy (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE
Gaullists seen ready to support any new French government

(page 6).
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GENERAL
I. Indian Ambassador is being treated discourteously by Peiping:

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ternal Affairs in New
hinese Communist officials in Peiping re treating the Indian Ambassador with 'remote" discourtesy, according to the ecretary General of the Ministry of Exlhi.
Indian envoys in Peiping for the past two years have had more cordial relations with Chinese Communist officials than have any other non-Communist representatives. Although frequently misinterpreting Peiping's position, Indian diplomats have sometimes obtained accurate statements of its intentions, notably prior to the Chinese intervention in Korea,
Comment:
While Peiping has emphatically rejected the Indian truce plan, no Chinese Communist public statement impugning the motives of its authors has been noted.
2.
Peiping asks for representation in Ceylon to handle long-term trade:
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ber stated that in the rice-rubber long-term trade negotiations just concluded in Peiping, the Chinese insisted on representation in Ceylon, but could be persuaded to accept representation through a Ceylonese firm. He added that the Chinese demonstrated how important they considered the long-term trade pact by accepting all
Ceylonese stipulations.

-325X1A
The source also states that the Chinese Communist press is conducting a "rabid" campaign, in which it is denouncing New Delhi for having diminished Peiping's prestige throughout the world by presenting the Indian truce plan for Korea.
The Ceylonese Food Minister on 29 Decem-
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will allow Chinese trade representation at Colombo, despite the Ceylonese Prime Minister's assurance on 27 September to the contrary. Such representation will mark another success in China's campaign to promote Western disunity on East-West trade controls.
Following the Moscow Economic Conference, Peiping set up a trade mission in Berlin to negotiate directly with Western firms, and there is evidence that it plans to organize a network of such missions.
Comment: It is likely that Ceylon eventually
3.
Soviet press ignores possibility of Eisenhower-Stalin meeting:

As evidence of the propagandistic nature of Stalin's replies to the Reston questionnaire, the US Embassy in Moscow cites the fact that the Soviet press has emphasized the answers dealing with Soviet peaceful intentions but omitted comment on a possible Eisenhower-Stalin meeting. The original heavy play given Stalin's answers has considerably tapered off, foreign reactions to the exchange have received only passing reference, and there has been no mention of Mr. Dulles' statement.
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Comment: The Peiping and Satellite press reactions have followed closely the Soviet line that the United States is solely responsible for the cold war and that conditions for peace are inherent in past Soviet proposals.

SOVIET UNION
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FAR EAST
4,
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Peiping promises North Koreans continued support in war:

The China Peace Committee in Peiping has sent a New Year's message to North Korean Premier Kim Ll-sung stating that the "central task" of the Chinese people is "to strengthen the struggle against American aggression and aid Korea." The statement promises that the Peiping regime will "use all its resources... to support you until a final, just and reasonable settlement" of the Korean war is achieved.
Comment: Peiping's New Year propaganda to Chinese audiences also reaffirms the Chinese commitment to North Korea's support, listing it as one of the regime's principal efforts for
1953.
5.
Magsaysay ready to accept Nacionalista nomination for Philippine pregidency:
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He explained that the Nacionalista leaders, fearing Quirino's new tactic of labeling his enemies as Communists, desire to nominate him at an early convention to obtain the protection afforded by his iecord. Magsaysay added that the army would support him on the Nacionalista ticket.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Defense Secretary Magsaysay told the American Embassy on 30 December that so far as he was concerned "the die was cast with the Nacionalistas." They now propose to nominate him at a convention to be called for I March, by which time he will have resigned from the cabinet.
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Another report from Manila states that Quirino is preparing to force Magsaysay out of the cabinet.
Comment: Philippine nominating conventions are customarily held in the late spring or summer. Magsaysay plans to propose that the Nacionalistas meet as early as I February instead of 1 March. This suggests that he hopes to be nominated before any shift in his fortunes causes the Nacionalistas to reconsider their commitment.
6.
British influence in Jordan in Jeopardy:
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The American Ambassador in Amman reports that strong Jordanian resentment over the recent British vote in the UN favoring direct Arab-Israeli negotiations is likely to precipitate open parliamentary debate on all aspects of Anglo-Jordanian relations. The Ambassador states that the debate scheduled for 23 December was cancelled when 17 deputies withdrew in protest against holding the discussions in secret.
Comment: Anti-British sentiment in Jordan, where British influence is stronger than in any other Arab country, will probably aggravate Britain's current problems in other parts of the area, particularly in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
7.
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Gaullists seen ready to support any new French government: On the basis of a conversation with the secretary general and the foreign affairs spokesman of the Rally of the French People, the American

WESTERN EUROPE
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Embassy in Paris concludes that the party, though not General de Gaulle himself, will support the man chosen as the next premier.
Although opposed to the EDC treaty in its present form, these leaders consider that some of its "good" features, such as standardization of equipment, a common uniform, and perhaps even joint services, could be retained.

-725X1A
Comment: This is the first strong indication that the Rally will support the next government regardless of its leadership, thus giving it a broader base than the Pinay coalition.
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swam
Security Intonation:
Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0454, 2 January 1953
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

Militarv Operations
Army
On 31 December and 1 January only minor probes and patrols contacts were reported across the front. A total of 13,636 rounds of artillery and mortar fire was expended during the two-day period. The most noteworthy action was a series of 10 probing attacks on 1 January against elements of the RCK 12th Division east of the Punch Bowl; the enemy was repultad in each engagement, the longest of which lasted 45 minutes*

Navy
A total of 202 naval air sorties was flown on 31 December. Aircraft attacked Pungsan, Kilchu and Wonsan on the east coast, and Channampos Upchori, Ongjin and Haeju on the west coast. Surface units on the east coast bombarded Songjin, Tanchon, Chaho and Wonsan, The area between Amgak to Wolsari was fired on by naval vessels on the west coast. On 1 January, only eight sorties were flown because of foul weather; all the planes involved were from the west coast carrier Badoeng Strait attacking Tanchonni and Haeju.
Air
General Situation
Political
Radio pyongyang announced on 26 December that the North Korean Government had awarded the National Flag Medal, First Class to Kim Ttv-pong, President of-the Presidium of the Supreme People's AsseMbl; and member of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party. (The awarding of the nation's highest honor to Kim, one of the leading members of the Tenon faction is,another indication of the increased Chinese Communist influence in North Korea.)
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Flate control on 31 December flew 661 effective sorties, of which 372 were combat. Only three effective medium bomber nissiOEB were flown during the night and these aircraft engaged in close support and reconnaissance. On 1 January, 532 effective land-based air sorties were flown, including 285 Combat. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered on either day. On the night of 1-2 January, Far East Bomber Command mounted 14 effective sorties. A marshaling yard at Sopo, near Pyonorang, and an ore processing plant at Moktong in north central Korea were attacked by 10 of the B-291s,
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SMRET
Security Information
During Ambassador Briggs! New Year call on President Rhee, the latter criticized the Japanese press and accused it of misrepresenting his proposed trip to Japan. He even stated that he was tempted to cancel his visit, (The Japanese press is anticipating far-reaching results from the visit, and there will likely be considerable popular disillusionment and even indignation in Japan if Rhee ignores Japan's top officialsa In a New Year's Day broadcast, President Rhee declared that the rescue of millions of North Korean "compatriots" can be delayed no longer and that the Korean people will "march to the north, alone if necessary," He predicted that the Eisenhower edmicietration, under the pressure of American public opinion, will take decisive measures to bring a quick end to the war. Rhee again claimed that Korea can be more easily defended along the Yalu than farther south,
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SECRET Security Information

Military Operations
Army
On 2 January two company-size attacks, one in the ROK lst Division 'sector west of Chariwon, and one in the ROK 9th Division sector on Sniper Ridge were repulsed after engageMents lasting almost three hours and one hour respectively. Elsewhere across the front brief probes and patrol clashes were reported. A total of 5,192 rounds of artillery and mortar fell during the day.
A total of 241 naval air sorties was flown on 2 January. Carrier-based aircraft attacked miscellaneous oast coast targets in the vicinity of Dann, Wonsan, Fuson and Chosin. In a strike against a now building area in the vicinity of Sajidong, 28 buildings and 25 barracks were destroyed. Surface units shelled railroad areas in the vicinity of Songjin, Chaho and Wonsan on the east coast. No naval activity was reported on the west coast.
tN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Foroe control on 2 January flew 989 effective sorties, of which 696 wore conthat. During the night, Far East Air Foroe bomber command flew 13 effective sorties, nine of which hit Pyongyang. UN pilots while on patrol in the Yalu area observed 28 MIG,s, four of which were engaged. There were no reports of enemy losses or friendly damage. General Situation
Radio Pyongyang announced on 28 December that 'the North Korean Government had "adopted. .measures to improve the business of the Korean Farmers' Bank." The cabinet decision stated that the bank, in addition to simplifying loan procedures to farmers and fishermen, will mobilize state funds and build up resources in order to extend "necessary financial aid to the farming and fishing industries." (This ordinanee is another indication that the North Korean regime is taking cognizance of the dire plight of the civilian population. Recent decrees have abolished certain past taxes-in-kind for the farmers and called for the free distribution of consumer goods. ) THEC.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION SECRET TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF 1
THIS DOCUMENT.

Navy
Air
Economic
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Political
Ambassador Briggs reports that President Rhea has decided to cancel his visit to Japan. (Rhee reportedly was disturbed beoause the Japanese press oonstruod his visit as official. He has consistently maintained that the Japanese must take the next step in improving Japanese-Korean relations.)
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DA/LY KOREAN BULLETIN

MilitarY Operations
krz7
On 3 and 4 January only minor probes and patrol contacts were reported across the front. The most noteworthy action was a company-size attack on Sniper Ridge against an outpost position of the ROK 9th Division. The enemy was.repulsed after a one-hour engagement. A total of 10,534 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during the two-day period,
Naval air sortiee on 3 January totaled 312. Carrier-based aircraft on the east coast ranged fram Songjin to Wonsan, while Ongjongni, Changyon, Sariwon and Haeju were attacked on the west coast. Surface units in the Japan Sea fired on Songjin, Chaho And Wonsan. The approaches to Haeju were bombarded by west coast naval vessels. On Sunday, only 45 naval air sorties were flown, all on the west coast, as Task Force 77 engaged in replenishing operations. On the west coast, Chinnampo, Chaeryong, Chan,syon and the Ongjin Peninsula were attacked by carrier-based sorties. UN naval vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded both Korean coasts on 4 JanuarY.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 975 effective sorties on 3 JanuarY, of which 640 were combat. UN pilots an patrol in the Yalu River area observed 135 enemy MIGis and engaged 66 at altitudes from 25,000 to 46,000 feet. Ten NIG's were reported damaged with no losses or damage to UN aircraft. pn the night of 3-4 JanuarY, 16 effective medium bomber sorties were flown. An enemy troop concentration near Chongju and a supply area northeast of Pyongyang were bombed by 12 B-291s. On 4 January 945 effective land-based sorties were flown, including 676 combat. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered during the 24-hour period. During the night Far East Air Force Bomber Command mounted 18 effective sorties. Twelve 8-291s attacked a supply area and railroad bridge at Huichon, in north central Korea,

Navy
Air
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lNs material eantalret itionnation *Nadirs din national defense or the United Sates Within the
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs.
793 and 794, 64 kmumisAm a mvelation ci

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prohibited by kw.

Military Operations
Army
On 5 January enemy probes in strengths of one and against outpost positions of the ROK 9th, 3rd, and ?th were repulsed after engagements lasting up to one hour across the front, action consisted of minor probes and two platoons were made Divisions. All probes and a half. Elsewhere patrol contacts.
No report was received concerning naval air operations from Task Force 77 on the east coast, while aircraft from west coast carriers flew 56 sorties on 5 January, attacking Wolsari Peninsula and the area from Unpari to Sinwonni. Four British Sea Ftrys were shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire and none of the pilots has as yet been rescued. Naval vessels off the east coast bombarded Songjin, Tanchon, Chaho and Wonsan. The report on west coast surface activity has been delayed.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 419 effective sorties on 5 January, of which 199 were combat. In the early afternoon, UN pilots on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 14 enemy MSG's of One MIG was which four were engaged at altitudes of 25,000 to 46,000 feet. downed with no damage to UN Sabres, During the night, FEAF Bomber Command mounted 17 effective medium bomber sorties with 11 B-29ts attacking a supply area at Changjin, just south of Pyongyang. In addition, an ammunition dump near Wonsan was bombed by one B-29. T::: BA'S ::0 OBJECTION
Military IntelliRence

Navy
Air
TO THE DECIACCIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.
Ground
No.1
A" 197$
013
Analysis of the enemyts rail and vehicle transportation for the past three weeks reveals three noteworthy developments. One has been the decrease, percentage-wise, in the number of vehicles sighted in areas south of Pyongyang; second, the increase in the number of trains and locomotives sighted in this area coupled with the probability that they have been transferred from the vicinity of Wonsan; and finally, the continued high proportion of vehicle activity on routes from Pyongyang, Yangdok and Majon-ni into the central sector. Far East Air Force comments that it appears that the enemy has transferred his rail capabilities formerly located in the Wonsan area to the Haeju Peninsula to relieve vehicles for duty in the central sector.
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SECRET
Security
Information Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 1360, 7 January 1953

Military Operations
Army
Two platoon-sized probes by Chinese Communists in the vicinity of Sniper Ridge marked the action across the front on 6 January. Elements of the ROK 9th Division repulsed these attacks which lasted 30 minutes and an hour and ten minutes, respectively. The enemy employed 8,630 rounds of artillery and mortar fire during the 24-hour report period.
A total of 73 naval air sorties was flown on 6 January. Aircraft from the US carrier Valley Forge on the east coast ranged from Sinchangni to Sansori, while Chaeryong, Haeju, Chinnampo and Changyon were attacked by west coast aircraft. Surface units in the Japan Sea fired on Songjin, Chaho and Wonsan, while on the opposite coast the approaches to Haeju were fired on.
*Air
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 806 effective sorties on 6 January, of which 466 were combat. UN pilots on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 94 enemy MIGIs during the day. UN aircraft engaged 12 of the enemy planes and damaged two. There were no losses of ar damage to friendly aircraft. On the night of 6-7 January, 15 effective medium bomber sorties were flown, 10 B -291s attacking troop and supply areas near Sinanju.
Military Intelligence
Communist pilots during the week ending 4 January continued to show at times a high degree of proficiency, according to the 'Far East Air Force. A total of 129 MIG's were observed airborne during the week by UN pilots and 20 were engaged. Two MIG's were destroyed, one probably destroyed and ane damaged, while one F-86 was damaged.
The most significant factor in the enemy night interceptor effort occurred on 30 December when, with a full moon, the enemy attacked UN medium bombers near the Yalu River, destroying one B-29 and damaging two others.
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No.

Navy
Air
19m
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General Situation
Political
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2
Commenting on the 5 January arrival in Tokyo of ROK President Rhee, Ambassador Murphy reports that Rhee "has never received a better press in Japan than he has today, and will be hard put to find anything serious to complain about." Murphy believes, however, that this friendly attitude on the part of the prees is the result of "gentle nudging" from the Foreign Ministry, and warns that this may cause the newspapers to read meanings into the visit which are not there. Except for Rheels unusually moderate and amiable tones since his arrival, Mbrphy observes that so far little has occurred to justify optimism or to presage an improvement in JapaneseKorean relations.
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SECRET Security Information Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 1361, 8 January 1953
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793 and 794 04 transmission or renblion S.

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Military Operations
Naval aircraft flew only 37 sorties because of bad weather conditions. Air operations on the west coast were confined to Ongjin, Haeju End Sariwon where railway targets were attacked. Surface units shelled harbor areas and rail equipment on the east coast between the battle line and Wonsan. On the west coast, two troop areas were shelled near Changsangot and Upchori.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control on 7 January flew 609 effective sorties of which 363 were combat. During the night, 18 effective medium bomber sorties were flown, five B-291s attacking a supply area at Kyongyung-ni, and four hitting marshaling yards at Kowan. UN pilots an patrol in the Yalu River area observed four enemy MIGIs but no engagements resulted.
General Situation
The visit of Rhee and his entourage to Tokyo was overwhelmingly featured in the South Korean press on 6 and 7 January. Ambassador Briggs reports that while the press is nearly unanimous in agreeing that it is up to the Japanese to make the first move in improving the present Unfriendly Japanese-Korean relations, these reports indicate a let-up in the hostile attitude wh ch has been characteristic of the Korean press.

Navy.
The only ground actions reported along the front on 7 January were brief probed and patrol clashes. The eneny employed some 40346 rounds of artillery and mortar fire during the report period.
Air
Political
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Military Operations
Army
On 8 January the principal ground action took place in the eastern sector where two attacks of one- and two-company size were made against outpost positions of the ROK llth Division. The enemy was repulsed in each case after a brief engagement. Mestere across the front, action consisted of brief probes and patrol contacts. A total of 4,193 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during the period.
No report vas received concerning naval air operations an 8 January. Surface units on the east coast bombarded Songjin, Tanchon, Chaho and Wonsan, while on the west coast the area near Cho Island was bombarded.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control on 8 January flew 688 effective sorties of which 329 were combat. During the 24-hour period, 61 enemy MIG's were observed and 12 engaged, One MIG was destroyed and two damaged with no losses to friendly aircraft. On the night of 8-9 Jamary, 11 effective medium bomber missions were flown; seven 3-29's attacking a supply area at Hadok-tong, north of Pyongyang, and an airfield at Yonpo, near Hungnam,
General Situation
According to press reports a ROK government source has indicated that diplomatic negotiations with Japan will be resumed in the near future. (Rhee, in a statement made On his departure from Japan, expressed his desire to resume the negotiations which were broken off last April. There have been no official reports, however, that Rhee and Yoshida came to any definite agreement on wil this,)
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No. 1 0 JUL 19711

Navy Air
Political
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Military Operations
ArinY
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 106 sorties on the east coast against targets in the Tanchon, Wonsan, Hamhung and Byesanjin areas. Fifteen close support sorties were also flown by the navy planes. Surface craft in the east bombarded the enemy coast at Songjin, Tanchon and Chaho. In the west, although air operations were suspended due to weather, surface vessels fired on targets near UN-held Cho Island and in Haeju Bay.
Air
Bad weather limited the number of effective land-based aircraft sorties to 267, of which 72 were combat, on 9 January.' No enemy aircraft were encountered. Medium bombers flew 22 sorties, the bulk of which were against transportation installations near the mouth of the Chongchon River in northwestern Korea.

Navy
No.1 0 JUl
TWX) brief enemy probes of up to company size were reported at scattered points.on the front Friday and early Saturday. In the ROK 8th Division sector on the central front, an enemy company which probed outpost positions shortly after midnight 8-9 January was dispersed by artillery fire in midafternoon. The ROK llth Division near the eastern end of the front reported three brief endounters made by enemy troops in up to company strength and lasting up to twenty minutes. In each case the enemy subsequently withdrew. Elsewhere units reported only minor probes and patrol contacts. Nearly 6,006 rounds of mortar and artillery fire fell during the period.
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Military Operations
Arzar
On Sunday, the tempo of enemy ground activity increased as Chinese platoon-sized probes were launched against the US 7th Division in the west, the ROK 9th in the center and the ROK 3rd in the east. Early Monday morning, a North Korean attack in over company strength against the newly-arrived ROK 12th Division in the eastern sector was repulsed after a two-hour fight.
Only 59 naval air sorties were flown on 10 January, all on the west coast against Ongjongni, Kangso Chinnampo and Ongjin, as Task Force 77 on the east coast engaged in replenishing operations. Surface units on the east coast bombarded Songjin and Sohori, while the areas near Cho Island and Changsangot were fired on by west coast vessels. On 11 January, 51 naval air sorties were flown. Again there were no operations,from east coast carriers because of replenishing activity. On the west coast, carrier-based aircraft attacked from Chinnampo to Haeju. Surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded both Korean coasts.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 781 effective sorties on 10 January, including 499 combat. There were no engagements with enemy aircraft during the period, although an F-86 pilot observed approximately 75 swept-wing aircraft on Tatungkcu airfield and 30 to Ito enemy aircraft on Antung airfield. On the night of 10-11 January, FEAF Bomber Command mounted 18 effective medium bomber sorties. Marshaling yards at Sonchon and Anju were attacked by 11 of the B-291s. One B-29, attacking Anju, yeceived major battle damage due to flak and enemy fighters. The crew was forced to bail out near Pyongyang. On 11 January 355 effective sorties by land-based planes were flown, of which 131 were combat. No enemy aircraft

Navy Air
SECRET
During the early morning of 10 January a Chinese platoon unsuccessfully attacked outpost positions of the ROK 3rd Division in east central Korea. The attack, which lasted for nearly an hour and was supported by 1,700 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, was the only major action on Saturday.
'
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were observed or engaged by the UN fighters or fighter-bombers. Axing the night, 15 effective medium bomber missions were flown. Marshaling yards at One Pugwon and Happochan near Anju were attacked by nine of the B-291s. other 13-29 attacked rail installations at Naewonsan near Wonsan.
General Situation
Economic

SECRET
2
US economic observers in South Korea report that.the supplementary budget passed by the National Assembly in early December was exhausted in early January, although it was intended to stretch until April. As a result of this budgetary failure, the salaries of some ROK government employees are as much as four months in arrears.
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Military Operations
Army
The major action on the front took place early Monday morning in the US 7th Division sector in west central Korea where a Chinese company supported by artillery, attacked two outpost positions of the Ethiopian battalion for over an hour before withdrawing. Elsewhere on the front, action was limited to minor probes and patrol clashes. The enemy fired almost 7,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire during the report period.
There were no naval air operations off either Korean coast on 12 January due to foul weather and replenishing activity. UN naval vessels on the east coast bombarded gun positions in the vicinities of Songjin, Chaho and Wbnsan. Weather conditions prevented any surface activity on the west coast.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Fbrce control on 12 January flew 769 effective sorties of which 457 were combat. Included were 66 sorties on close support and armed reconnaissance missions for UN ground activity. UN pilots on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 55 enemy MIG's and engaged five. There was no damage to either friendly or enemy aircraft. During the night 12 effective medium bomber missions were flown; marshaling yarde at Chongju and Kwaksan were attacked by ten of the B-29ts.
General Situation
The Japanese press has recently carried a number of articles with Pusan datelines on the Rhee-Yoshida talks concerning relations between the two countries. One report stated that upon his return to Korea, President Rhee informed his cabinet that Yoshida had agreed to meet with him in Seoul and that Yoshida had admitted to Rhee that "40 years of Japanese exploitation of Korea" was due to the "militarists." Official observers at the conference, according to Ambassador Murphy in Tokyo, have reported observing no such interchange.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 07 THIS DOCUMENT.

Navy Air
Political
SECRET
/4)
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : ClA-RDP191T0117zew0
214313943_1213 -
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Economic
Acting Prime Minister Paek Tu -chin has informed the American member of the UN-ROK Combined Economic Board that the ROK will advance 25 billion won for the United Nations. These won drawings are outside the framework of previous ROK-US agreements and the exchange rate for the transaction has not been specified. US officials in Korea, stating that this interim arrangement will provide for UNC currency requirements until mid-January, doubt that negotiations can be completed and the exchange of notes on permanent arrangements can be concluded by that time. ( The ROK Government had threatened to cut off further won advances which average about 30 billion a month, until full dollar reimbursement
is made.)

SECRET
-"' ApprovedForPtehNumk2001/WW23:Chk-FTERE01172R001420.0130001-6

Military Operations
Army
On 13 January the principal ground action took place in the ROK 9th Division sector where the enemy made three unsuccessful probes of platoon strength. Elsewhere across the front, action consisted of minor probes and patrol actions. A total of 6,010 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire fell during the period.
A total of 32 naval air sorties was flown on 13 January, all on the west coast, as inclement weather again prevented any east coast air operations. No report was received concerning Marine air sorties. On the west coast, carrier-based aircraft damaged buildings and railroad tunnels near Chinnampo and Pungsan and on the Ongjin Peninsula. UN naval vessels on the east coast bombarded harbor areas at Wonsan and troop installations near the front. On the west coast, troop installations and gun positions in three villages in the vicinity of Haeju were fired on.
Air
Communist air activity during the week ending 10 January produced no indication of a change in enemy air capabilities. A total of 302 MIG's was observed airborne, of which 94 were engaged by F-86's in 23 engagements. Communist pilots initiated four of the engagements and used hit-and-run
NO OBJECTION C.I.A. TO THE DECIJASSIIICATION OF THIS DOCUMBNT.
]THE
On 13 January UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 10264 effective sorties of which 920 were combat. During the day, 115 fighters flew close-suppott missions for UN ground troops. Other UN fighter pilots, on patrol in the Yalu River area, observed 160 enemy MIG's, of which 40 were engaged. Two MIG's were destroyed, two others probably destroyed and one damaged with no losses or damage to friendly aircraft. On the night of 13-14 January, Far East Air Force Bomber Command mounted 16 effective sorties. Six B-29's bombed a marshaling yard at Sinanju while five others attacked the Kunu-ri marshaling yards near Anju.
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDIa911-01172Roopoomoms (4;

No.

Navy
Air
7LAS
SECRET
Approved For Relew,2001/05/23 : CIA-NaM11172R0004p130001-6

tactics. Enemy losses were two MIG's destroyed and 20 damaged, while the UN had no losses. The enemy mounted 25 observed night sorties, but made no concentrated effort to intercept UN night intruder aircraft.
Prisoners of War
Two recently captured Chinese Communist officers who claimed, to be "deserters" were exposed as political agents with the mission of creating unrest in the UN POW compounds, according to Far East COmmand. One officer from the 50th Chinese Communist Army stated that he had been trained for approximately 90 days by the political section of the Northeast Military District . in methods of indoctrinating the prisoners and inciting them to escape.' He claimed that a total of 42 others were,in training during the same period: The other.officer, from the 47th Chinese Communist Army, had a similar:mission, but trained for only 30 days- in his division political section, along with 12 other agents.
'
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP91101172R000200130001-6

SECRET
2
Approved For Releriap2001105/23 : C5*fi9a'701172R00042,0130001-6

SECURITY INFORM ATION
Central Intelligenoe Agency Office of Current Intelligence 1367, 15 January 1953

Military Operations
Army
On 14 JanUary the principal ground aotion took place in the eastern seotor where the enemy made two unsuccessful probes of platoon strength against outpost positions of the ROK 7th Division. Elsewhere across the front, aotion was light and scattered. A total of 4,983 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during the report period.
Navalair sorties on 14 January totaled 33, all on the west coast. No report was received concerning Marine air activity. For the third straight day ther, were no air operations on the east coast due to inclement weather. On the west coast, troop and supply areas, railroad tunnels and various buildings in the areas near Sariwon, Ongjin and Haeju were attacked by aircraft from the oarrier Dadoeng Strait. Harbor areas at Chaho and rail lines and a truck convoy at Wonsan were bombarded by UN surface units in the Japan Sea. No report was received concerning west coast surfaoe activity.
Air
of the 13-29's.
General Situation
Economic
-
A substantial increase in US aid will be necessary to sustain or increase the present South Korean military effort, according to Ambassador Briggs. A preliminary analysis of the 1953-54 budget now before the ROK National Assembly discloses that
OBJECTION TO TEE DECLASSIFICATIOM OF THIS DOCUMENT.
THE C. I. A: HAS NO
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flow on 14 January 1,102 effective sorties of which 755 were combat. Included mare 237 missions in support of UN ground activity. UN Sabre jets on patrol in northwestern Korea observed 185 enemy MIG's during the 24-hour report period. Eight MIO's were knocked down, two probably destroyed and eight reportedly damaged with no losses to UN aircraft. It was thegreatest MIG-15 toll taken since 4 September 1952 when 13 were destroyed and four damaged. During the night, FEAF Bomber Command mounted 17 effective medium bomber sorties. An ore-processing area at Kojanbaeji and a marshaling yard at Chongnyong-ni, both to the east of Wonsan, were attacked by 12

Navy
Approved ForRelease 2001/05/23 : wayiyolinRdittrzWatiiibilicz
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Approved For Re lew2001/05/23 : WHOMI7O1172R000W0130001-6

SECURITY INFORMATION
5 trillion won are anticipated for military expenditures, based on a force of 12 infantry divisions plus a training cadre for two additional divisions. In noting that the budget shows total revenues of 3 trillion won and total expenditures of 7.2 trillion won, Briggs warns that this deficit will be further inoreased if it is decided to expand the ROK forcos to 17 or more divisions.
Briggs also warns that it is no longer sufficient to maintain the civilian population at its present living standard, which for the bulk of the people spells misery and growing hopelessness, encouraging social disintegration and rendering South Korea increasingly vulnerable to Communist propaganda.
Approved For Release 2001105/23 : SteRy01172R000200130001-6
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Military Operations
Army
On 15 January the principal ground action took place in central Korea where two enemy groupa of platoon strength briefly probed outpost positions of the ROK 9th Division. Elsewhere across the front, action consisted of minor probes and patrol clashes. A total of 3,966 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during the period.
No report was received concerning naval air and surface activity on 15 January:
On 15 January UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 917 effective sorties of which 612 were combat. In flying close-support missions for UN ground activity, 110 fighters and fighter-bombers attacked enemy bunkers, troop concentrations and gun positions along the enemy front line. Meanwhile, other UN fighters tangled with enemy MIG's in northwest Korea. TWo MIG's were shot down, one probably destroyed and two more reportedly damaged. During the night, FEAF Bomber Command mounted 19 effective medium bomber,sorties. Enemy barracks west of Anju were attacked by ten of the B-29's as the other nine bombers flewclose support, leaflet drop and photo reconnaissance missions. Military Intelligence
Based on recent FCW information, the relief of elements of the 8th Division, I North Korean Corps bythe 3rd Division, VII North Korean Corps, is now accepted by the Far East Command. Far East Commnnd believes that the VII North Korean Corps, moving into the line between the I and III North Kbrean Corps, may possibly have a reinforcing role. Since the III North Korean Corps has been in contact since May 1951 and the I North Korean Corps in contact since November 1951, both units are overdue for a relief.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OP THIS DOCUMENT.

Navy
Air
Army
No.1 0
.1111,
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General Situation
Political
President Rhee may recall Foreign Minister Pyun from the UN to do preparatory work for forming an alliance with Nationalist China and the Philippines, according to reports in four major South Korean newspapers on 13 and 14 January. The acting Foreign Minister informed US officials on 14 January, however, that he had no knowledge of such a plan and understood that Pyun would remain in the US to attend the General Assembly meetings next month. (The PhiliPpines, Nationalist China and South Korea have exchanged opinions on an anti-Communist alliance in the past with negligible results. In addition, the ROK'has periodically proposed the establishment of a Pacific Pact similar to NATO which would include the United States.)
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : StEd9py01172R000200130001-6
A strongly pro-government newspaper reported on 13 December that a draft plan for a general militia corps divided into a veterans' association and a militia would soon be proclaimed by presidential decree.. While the militia, to be comprised of untrained men from 17 to 30, would be responsible to the ROK Army Chief of Staff, the Rome Ministry would cooperate in its organization, recruitment, financing and other operations. (Such a militia would be a severe strain on the econemy and manpower of South Korea. Its establishment, however, would serve a dual political purpose for President Rhee, it would justify his demands for foreign military aid and would provide a large paramilitary force free of UN control for purely internal political purposes.)
Approved ForRelea92001/05/23: 9mt9Al9e1172R00ggp01300m-6


Military Operations
Army
On 16 January the principal ground action took place in eastern Korea, where the enemy made three unsuccessful probes of platoon strength against outpost positions of the ROK 3rd Division. Elsewhere across the front, action consisted of brief probes and patrol clashes. A total of 4,612 rounds of artillery and mortar fell during the period.
No report vas received concerning air operations from Task Force 77 on the east coast on 16 January. On the west coast, 40 carrier-based sorties were flown; the aircraft attacked a railroad tunnel and numerous buildings housing enemy troops and gun positions from Ohinnampo to Haeju. Surface units on the east coast patrolled near Songjin and Chaho, destroyed eight buildings and a mortar position near Wonsan. On the west coast, three troop areas and three gun positions near Wolsari, Upchori and Huryomdong were bombarded by UN naval vessels. No report was received from the 1st Marine Air Wing.
On 16 January, UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 782 effective sorties, of which 467 were combat. Ranging from coast to coast behind the enemy front line, 136 UN aircraft flew close-support missions for UN ground activity. During the night, 17 effective medium bomber missions Were flown under the control of FEAF Bomber Command. Ten B-29's attacked two SuPply areas at Chasan and a troop installation at Yongpung-ni, both to the north of Pyongyang. UN pilots, while on patrol in the Chongchon-Yalu River area, observed 80 enemy MIG-15's. In aerial battles with 12 enemy aircraft, the UN jets destroyed one MIG and damaged another. There was no aemege to UN aircraft.

Navy
Air
14
THEC.I.A.HASNoOBJECTION
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
1
No.
ILI4
378
Oei)
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : ClNce1g11172R000200130001-6
ApprovedForRelea#2001/05/23:CAMR93701172R000400130001-6

Military Operations
Army
On 17 January the principal ground *action took place in the east central sector where two enemy companies supported by teak and artillery fire attacked an outpost position of the ROK 6th Division. The enemy was repulsed after a four-hour engagement. On 18 January an enemy company attacked an outpost s.osition of the US 40th Division and was forced to withdraw after a 40-minute engagement. During the two-day period, the enemy fired a total of 19,589 rounds of artillery and mortar fire.
Naval air sorties on 17 January totaled 164. Task Force 77 aircraft fram the carriers Oriskany and Valley Forge were in offensive operations from .Hoeryong to Wonsan to Yangdok, destroying 37 buildings, 16 railroad cars, 9 trucks and 13 troops. Troop installations near Chinnampoand on the Ongjin Peninsula were attacked by naval aircraft on the west coast. Surface units on the .east coast bombarded'Songjin, Chaho and Wonsan while, on the west coast, gun positions and troop areas near Changsangot and on the Wolf:Sri Peninsula were blasted. On 18 January 149 naval air sorties were flown. These aircraft damaged one power station and a transformer station in a raid on the Pilsen hydroelectric system. In addition, Songjin: Pukehong, Homan and Wonsan were attacked. West coast aircraft again attacked troop installations on the Ongjin Peninsula. Surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded both Kbrean coasts.
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Alr Force control flew 687 and 523 effective sorties on 17 and 18 January, respectively. On Saturday 384 of the total sorties were combat missions. These fighters engaged 24 enemy MSG's of the 77 observed during the 24-hour period. One MIG was destroyed and another probably damaged while one UN Sabre sustained minor damage. There were 255 combat sorties on 18 January. No enemy MIG's were engaged although 30 were observed. FEAF Bomber Command mounted 15 effective medium bomber missions on both 17 and 18 January. Eleven B-29's bombed Radio Pyongyang on Saturday while supply areas near the east coastal city of Hongwonvereittacked.by 12 bombers on Sunday.

Navy Air
1
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS ApcumENT.
0 JUL
15178
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : Vlial901172R000200130001-6
ApprovedForRaleas4,2001/05/23:awymp1172mownool-N
Military Intelligence Guerrilla Activity A US Information Service team, recently returned from a field trip through Eolith Cholla Province, reported that Commlnist elements in rural and remote arias are spreading rumors that President-elect Eisenhower is a Communist and that the populace had better "fall into line." The rumor is made effective because of the poor communications facilitieS in these areas, and the similarity or the Korean-pronunCiations of the words "Bapublican" and "COmmunist." (Southwestern Korea, including South Cholla Province, is the stronghold of the guerrillas in South Korea. Most of the population there is isolated from and indifferent to international and Korean happenings. Despite the decimation of Communist strength in the area, it is probable that a hard core of Communist leaders remaing.)
General Situation
On 14 and 15 January Acting Premier Peek told the National Assembly that although the national income had increased ten percent in the past year, government expenditures had risen much more rapidly. He stated that 50 to 52 percent more foreign aid will be necessary this yea; to Meet the needs Of the wartime economy than vas received last year.
Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : Ratt31701172R000200130001-6

Economic
2
Approved For Relea$4001/05/23 : 172F1000201430001-6 SECURITY INFORMATION This material contains Information affecting die national defense of the United States Within the Central Intelligence Agency moaning of the espionage laws, Tillet8,USC, SIKIL
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation
of
which in any manner to an unauthorized person Is
Office of Current Intelligence 1371, 21 January 1953
anbibiled by law.

Military Operations
Army
On 19 and 20 January enemy action across the army front was characterized by minor probes and patrol clashes. The enemy fired a total of 10,589 rounds of artillery and mortar fire during the two-day period.
Naval air sorties on 19 January totaled 42, all on the west coast, as Task Force 77 on the east coast was engaged in refueling activity. The 1st 'Marine Air Wing flew eight close-support missions for UN troops on the west coast. 'UN naval units on the east coast patrolled and bombarded near Chongjin, Songjin, and Chaho. In addition damage was inflicted on railroad installations near Hungnam and Sohori. On the west coast, troop areas near Changsangot were blasted.
On 20 January no report was received concerning east coast air activity while 49 carrier-based sorties were flown from the Badoeng Strait off the N west coast. These aircraft attacked enemy installations near Chinnampo, Wolsari and Changsangot and on the Ongjin Peninsula. Surface units on the east coast damaged one harbor area and one railroad installation at Songjin and Chaho, respectively. UN naval vessels patrolled aff the west coast with no firing reported. Air
UN land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 618 effective sorties including 338 combat. A total of 57 enemy MIG's was observed during the 24-hour period, 11 of which were engaged by UN pilots. There was no loss or damage to either side. During the night 17 effective medium bomber missions were flown with supply areas to the north of Pyongyang being attacked by 11 of the 3-29's. On Tuesday 194 combat out of a total of 410 land-based sorties were flown. While on patrol in the Yalu River area, UN pilots observed 46 enemy MiGts and engaged nine. Two M1G's were probably destroyed and another reportedly damaged with no loss or damage to UN aircraft. On the night of 20-21 January, 18 effective medium bomber missions were flown. A supply area at Puncho-ril near Hungnam, was bombed by 13 3-29's. //2
Navy
THE C.I.A.HAS NO OBJECTION 30 THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No.1 0 JUL
19711
0;5
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Approved ForReleasj001/05/23 : CSINCREW1172R0002a130001-6

Army
The relief of the I North Korean Corps on the eastern front by the VII North Korean Corps was accepted by the Far East Command on 19 January, based on recent POW information. The I North Korean Corps is now tentatively carried in the vicinity of Marhwi-ri.
Approved For Release 2001105/23 : Sletlyalf01172R000200130001-6
-=' Approved ForRelemp2001/05/23 : C9geitfi7O1172R0002,2p130001-6


Military Operations
Army
On 21 January the principal ground action took place in the eastern sector where two North Korean platoons unsuccessfully probed an outpost position of the ROK llth Division. Elsewhere across the front, action consisted of brief probes and patrol clashes. A total of 4,308 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during the period.
An incomplete total of 65 naval air sorties vas repOrted on 21 January, all on the west coast. These carrier-based aircraft attacked troop concentrations and railroad installations from Chinnampo to Haeju and on the Ongjin Peninsula. Surface units on the east coast bombarded harbor areas from Songjin to Chaho and gun positions and a truck convoy at Wonsan. There was only limited surface activity on the west coast as two UN veasels fired on the Ongjin Peninsula.
On 21 January there were 539 combat sorties flown out of a total of 856 by land-based planes. Enemy troops and gun positions near the front line were attacked by 150 UN fighters and fighter-bombers flying close-support missions for UN ground troops. UN jet pilots on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 79 enemy MIG's during the daylight hours. In aerial engagements with 43 of the MIG's, UN aircraft destroyed seven and possibly damaged six. One F-86 Sabre sustained minor damage. On the night of 21-22 January, 17 effective medium bomber sorties were mounted by FEAF Bomber Command. A troop training area at Kwang-hyon in north central Korea and a marshaling yard at Kowon near Wonsan were attacked by 10 of the B-29's.
MIG sorties during the week ending 18 January were the highest since the last week in April 1952. Far East Air Force states that the increased activity could possibly be explained by the flight of a transport-type aircraft sighted on Antung airfield on 13 January which may have carried highranking Comnunist officers on an inspection of air operations and facilities. THE C. I. A. I'lL; !:I1 On TI,CTIOW
1
TO THE DEC,I.V;S I FICATIOM OP THIS DOCUMENT.

Navy Air Air
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The pattern of the enemy air operations, however, xemained defensive in nature as evidenced by the fact that the majority of the NIG-15's presently being observed are believed to be stationed at rear bases and not, as formerly, on the Antung, Tatungkou and Takushan airfields. Also, during the past week the ComMunists showed little interest in initiating attacks on UN fighters and fighter-bombers. The destruction of two UN B-29's in night air-to-air combat encounters was not believed due to the more efficient use of GCI equipment and techniques, but rather to the bright moonlight and a more effective use of searchlights. General Situation
Propaganda Chinese Communist propaganda media on 22 January were making a big play on Premier Chou En-lai's allegation that a US medium bomber was shot down over Manchuria on 12 January after invading Manchurian airspace. Chou stated that the presence of the B-29 over Manchuria gave evidence of American"preparation for extending the war." (The Chinese Communists have frequently alleged that US aircraft have violated Manchurian airspace, and in Some instances have claimed that such violators were shot down. The issuance of such charges by Chou En-lai, however, is unusual. The US Air Force in the Far East has stated that the aircraft was downed over North Korea.)
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HR70-14 HR70-14
TCIP-SECRET-CANetE
L \ -JbV63 Ct B c
FAR FA13 EAST EAST
1. armies may 1 . Three additional Chinese armies may have have entered Korea: Korea:
Communist High High On On 1 December December the Chinese Communist Command Commandin inKorea Koreamade madearrangements arrangements to move a an additional armv army group into the Penn additional Den- , insula, tnsulad infantryThis army group, group, composed composed of nine infantry divisions and reported& was part of o f the the Second Second and one one armored armored division, division, reportedly Field Army and and was was to to move move into into Korea Korea around around 1 1 January.
Comment:
__
--
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additional armies, which normally comThree additional armies, which an army armygroup, group, would would increase increaseChinese Chinese Communist Communist strength strength in in prise prise an Korea by by approximately approximately 100,000 100,000 men. men.
NR
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HR70-14
frOP SECRET CANOE

FAR EAST
1. Additional Additional Chinese Chinese Communist Communistaarmy reported in Korea: Korea: 1. r m y reported
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Chinese Communist Military 7 Jan 53 53 CANOE - /kg3

7
A Chinese A 7 January January message from a Chinese artillery regiment regiment in in northwestern northwestern Korea Korea artillery menttoned mentionedthe thepresence presence of of two two major major Chinese Communist untts Chinese Communist units not not previously tdenttfied 23rd Army and identified in in Korea, Korea, the 23rd the 73rd Division.
Comment: This latest latestidentification, tdentiftcation, Comment: This coupled o f m December e m b e r mentioning mentioning the 24th 24th Army coupled with with messages messages of late and the 70th and and 74th 74th Divistons, Divisions, strengthens previous indications that an additional Chinese Chinese army a r m y group group of of about about 100,000 100,000 men men ha8 has arrived tn Korea Korea from the the Third Third Field Field Army Army in tn East China. China. arrived in
NR
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PSEGRETCANt9E C A N u E
FAR EAST EAST
c1g
withdrawn from Korea: Korea: 4. Communist 42nd 42nd Army may have withdrawn 4. Chinese Communist
National Security Agency TheChinese ChineseCommunist Communist 42nd 42nd Army may may have have National Agency The withdrawn withdrawn from from Korea between between 11 17 October October and 53 12 Jan jan 53 I C In? - a-3 63 21 November, of enemy enemy CANOE e 1"111 November, according according to to an an analysis of CANOE -ns 9 351 'ns communications. communications. This army was last located located Pyongyang and area by by the the north of Pyongyang andappears appears to have have been been replaced replaced in that area 46th Chinese 46th Chinese Army Army which whicharrived arrived in inKorea Koreain inearly early October. October. The The 42nd 42nd Army was Chinese units was one one of of the thefirst first Chinese units to to enter enter the the Korean Korean war, war, and would be the the first first withdrawn withdrawn since since the the spring springof of 1951. 1951. would be
5.
IL-28 Manchuria practices squadron squadron formation formation bombing: bombing: IL-28 division in Manchuria
Air Force Force Security Service

12 Tan Jan 53 63

-5 5-
Comment: The The Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 23rd and Comment: 24th have recentlyarrived-h 24thArmies Armios have recentlyii in Korea and may be be relieving other Chinese Chinese units units in the east. east.
CANOE CANOE . l L d y k .. 07 07
On and 12 12 January January the the flight flight schedules of of On 10 and Communist 6th Division at the Chinese Communist 8th Air Air Division Tsitsihar in Tsitsihar in Manchuria Manchuria included included "squadron "squadron . formation bombing" jet light bombing" by by IL-28 IL-28 twintwin-jet bomber S . bombers.
.
The i r Force The US USA Air Force comments comments that that this activity, time, is is beyond the the stage stage of of primary primary training training and and observed for the first first time, beyond progress of of the the 8th 8th Air Division Division has been been more rapid rapid may indicate that the progress than was anticipated. Comment: Some Some Chinese Chinese Communist Communist IL-28 IL-28 Comment: will probably be rready combat in Korea Korea by byearly early February, February, while units will probably be e a dfor mm b a t in while crews for f o r all allof o f the the 100 100 IL-28's IL-28's now now in Manchuria Manchuria may may be betrained trained by by early early summer.
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---14c/P-SECRET-CANK,E
FAR EAST EAST
H HR70-14 R70- 4
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additional Chinese Chinese Communist Communist armies armies may 5. may be in Korea: 5. Two additional
An 8 8 January January message from a Chinese Chinese An artillery artillery regiment regiment in in western western Korea mentioned the the presence of mentioned o f two major Communist units not previously identiCommunist units not previously identtAN E CANOE fied in Korea. Korea. The 4r3a81 fled in The message message referred to the 16th 16th Army and the 122nd 122nd Division, Division,heretofore heretofore subordinate to the 41st 4Lst Army.
Chinese Communist Military 8 Jan 53 59
Comment: of Comment: Newly-arrived Newly-arrived elements of Communistarmies, armies, the the 46th, 46th, 23rd, 23rd, 24th, four other Chinese Chinese Communist 24th, and and 25th, 25th, have have been been mentioned menttoned in recent recent enemy enemy communications. communications. would make o f stx Chinese Pending Pending confirmation, confirmation, this would make elements of six Chinese Communist armies armies that may have have entered Korea during the past four Communist months. Only the 42nd 42ndArmy Armyhas hasbeen been reported reported leaving Korea Korea during Only the this period. period.
NR
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]EAST FAR EAST
Chinese Communlsts Communists reportedly reportedly planning a February offensive: planntng a offensive: The The Chinese Chinese Communists Communists will launch.a launch a coordinatecround attack during coordinated air-ground attack during February, February,l
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will employ employregular regular air the enemy enemy will force units in strength as opposed to "the irregular air units orce a s opposed to "the trregular air untts now active. " now active.
The objectives objectives of of thts this offensive offensive are are The and to to demonstrate demonstrate to Asian Asian countries countries that the to capture Seoul and hold the the initiative in Asia. Communists hold
During recent months Comment: During have strengthened both their their air the Communists have streboth atr and and ground ground forces forcesin in Korea Korea and and Manchuria Manchuria and have greatly improved improved their supply their supply position. positton. in mid-February, mid-February, there no offeisive in there have have been beXnTohas predicted predicted. an an offensive indications so far that the in the the enemy enemy plans a major offensive uiffensive Ln indications near future.

('
-1
Communist Communtst aair t r units presently Korea constst operating over Korea consist o of air divisions f regular Chinese Chinese air dtvisions Soviet units units o of unidentifiedsubordination, subordination, They and Soviet f unidentified They cannot cannot be described as "irregulars. "irregulars. " described as
Recent retnforcements reinforcements in the KoreaRecent Manchuria area area have included approximately 100 IL-28 twtntwinhave included 100 IL-28 jet light bombers, liaht bombers./ 1
5-5 -
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se 2047161FOSEWRIMTO
If
27 January 1953
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Sae 21131aRDSRalaW19Tlegar
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Unusually high vehicle activity in North Korea reported

(page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2.
3.
4.
5.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
EASTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
Ceylon asked to buy Southeast Asian rubber for delivery to China (page 3).
Jordan fears Israel plans military aggression (page 4).
Decisive measures against Catholic Church in Poland foreseen (page 4).
Cuban opposition groups reportedly plan demonstrations

(page 5).
25XPArove For Release 2004/08103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010
210001-6
FAR EAST
1.
Unusually high vehicle activity in North Korea reported:

Communist vehicle sightings in North Korea rose to an all-time high of more than 34,000 during the week of 16 to 22
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Far East Air Force concludes that this heavy traffic denotes a major supply build-up in the Haeju-Kaesong area and indicates "unusual enemy operations normally associated with a pending offensive. "
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have also indicated a decided increase in enemy military activity in the area of the western front. Much of this activity is undoubtedly associated with sunnly activity. ,
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Comment:
January, according to the Far East Air orce. c was concentrated on the principal west coast arteries leading from the Sino-Korean border south through Pyongyang to the battleline and was more than double the amount sighted during the previous week.
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Despite these preparations, the bulk of indications still points to enemy defensive intentions.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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2.
Ceylon asked to buy Southeast Asian rubber for delivery to China: The Indonesian and Burmese Governments have unsuccessfully approached
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munist China
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kith proposals to sell rubber jor resale and reshipment to Com-
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-1
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ing contravention of the embargo by means of shipments through
Comment: Although contracts to sell Indonesian and Burmese ruirto the Chinese Communists have reportedly been concluded, Indonesia and Burma are reluctant to permit overt rubber shipments to China because of the UN-sponsored embargo. This report indicates that the two countries are consider-
third parties.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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armistice line are the forerunner of ser ous Israeli military aggression. The Amman government believes that the border disturbances were carefully planned by the Israelis.
The Ambassador further reports "on unimpeachable authority" that the Arab Legion had taken steps to avoid the possibility of clashes along the armistice line.
3.
Jordan fears Israel plans military aggression:
According to Ambassador Green in Amman, Jordanian officials fear that recent border incidents along the Israeli
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4.
EASTERN EUROPE
Decisive measures against Catholic Church in Poland foreseen:
25X1A
The nature of the accusations at the Krakow trial of Catholic priests, together with the government's propaganda
-425X1A
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campaign against the church hierarchy, leads American Embassy officials in Warsaw to believe that a new phase of the utmost seriousness has been reached in the church-state conflict. The "revelations" at the trial may be used by the government to justify the replacement of high church officials in order to undermine the independent position of the Catholic Church in Poland.
Comment: After almost three years of quiescence in church-state relations, the government in late October resumed its campaign of terror and propaganda, leading to the current trial and violentpress attacks on the church hierarchy and the local church organization in Krakow, traditional religious and cultural center.
5.
Cuban opposition groups reportedly plan demonstrations:

Student and Communist youth groups are reportedly planning demonstrations throughout Cuba during the Jose Marti centennial celebration which begins on 27 January. They intend to denounce the present government and also to interfere with government acts of homage to the patriot Marti.
25X1A
The Communist-led Democratic Federation of Cuban Women is also said to be planning a street demonstra tion for 28 January.
Comment: Since the coup of 10 March 1952, Cuban students have held rallies and demonstrated their bitter opposition to the Batista regime on official anniversaries. The Communists have been making strenuous efforts to make these demonstrations as large as possible.
The government, which has in the past alerted its security forces on such anniversaries, should be able to maintain control.

LATIN AMERICA
-5d For Release 2004/08103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000210001-6
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
CANIOE
Za-vx
cie
NR
NorthKorean A Air 3. North.ICorean i r Force Force noted noted in in twin-jet twin-jet bomber training:
USAir Air Force US 27 Jan Ian 53 27 53
CANOE
On 27 On 27 January January 18 1L-28'~ IL-28's took took part part trainingflights flightsfrom fromKungchuling, Kungchuling, in local training Manchuria. The Thepilot pilotin incommand command of d Manchuria. this flight has been previously previously associated th-e North North Korean 11th 11th A i r Division. Mvlslon. with the Air
An An intercepted message of o f 25 January revealed plans for cross-country cross-country flights, fltghts, possibly possiblyfrom fromKungchuling, Kungchuling, by 28 IL-28's. 88 IL-28%.
-/7 17
FAR FAR EAST
is the ffirst Comment: This Is irst observed observed training activity at the KungchuTing Kungchuling airbase, base, recently recently associated air only i r Force. It is i sa a further further indication indication onlYwith withthe theNorth NorthKorean KoreanA Air is the the recipient recipient of d the IL-28 alrcraft ferried to to that the latter latter is aircraft ferried Kungchuhg Kungchulingfrom from the the Soviet Soviet Union Unionin inthe thepast pastthree three months, months.
NR
-4 4-
T P SECRET CANOE CANOE

PPROVED FOR RELEASE APPROVED DATE: ATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
HR70-14 HR70-14
c
FeLa e I
NR NR
2. North force activates activatestwo two new new regiments: regiments: North Korean Korean air air force
US Air US Air Force Japan Feb 53 53 3 Feb CANOE CANOE
C-387 1
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 24-Mar-201 0 24-Mar-2010
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FAR EAST
- 3 3 -
Two Two new newNorth NorthKorean Koreanair airregiments, regiments, believed

jet fighters, to be equipped with with MIG-16 MIG-15 jet fighters, were identified in Manchuria by message in Manchuria by message intercepts intercepts on 3 February. One of of the units, the 58th, 58th, is is on 3 February. One based at Kungchuling while the 56th may be based at Kungchuling 56th operating out out of of Anshan. Anshan. operating
TOP SECRET CANOE
*.
-TCYP-SECRET---GANCYE
Comment: Previously, Comment: Previously, the theNorth NorthKorean KoreanMIGMIG15 fighter fighter strength of two regiments 15 strength consisted consis-o regiments of of the the 1st 1st Air Air Division, Division, of strength probably based based about about 125 125 miles mileseast east ofMukden, Mukden,with witha a minimum, minirnuq strength of 63 63 lbIIG-15'~. MI045's. A of Anumber numberof of recent recentintekcepts intercepts have have indicated indicated the possible atlivery aircraft to as well well a as deliveryof of MIG-16 MIG-15 aircraft to Kungchuling, Kungchuling, as s increased jet fighter fighter activity i in this area. activity n this
/NR
TOP-SECRET CANOE CANDE

FAR EAST
HR70-14
Feta 53 53 3 Feb
c15 cI
4. New NewChinese Chinesearmies armies reported reported in in Korea Korea apparently apparentlyare are replacements: replacements: 4.
National Secur Security ity National Agency - 2 3 b 5 Feb 53 5 53
An analysis of An of Chinese Chinese military communicacommunications indicates that armies which which that three armies arrived Ln Korea Korea in in September September and and October October arrived in armies in in the the Chinese Chinese CANOE replaced veteran armies command communtcations.network. communications.network. The o(ce\h-a command have apparently apparently ceased ceased communications, communications, suggesting relieved armies armies have that they may have left Korea.
Comment: This analysis suggests that the recent identification identification of of new newarmy armyunits units in inKorea Korearepresents represents a major rotation rotation rather than than an over-all increase in strength. over-all in strength.
NR
-6-
TOP SECRET CANOE CANOE

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HR70-I 4 HR70-14
Toz-ECRE-T--CANcvE
Fe4, 5
C tR
NR NR

FAR EAST EAST
2. Army rotation between 2. Army rotation betweenKorea Koreaand andSouth SouthChina China indicated: indtcated:
Numerous troop carryingheavy heavy Numerous troop trains trains carrying equtpment were seen moving moving north equipment from Canton Canton tn in Dece.mber December and and January, January, -
Almost equally heavy troop arrivtngin in Canton Canton during during movements from the north were observed arriving the same same period. period,
moveComment: These reported reported troop troop movethat a ments ments support support indications1 indicationi khat large-scale large-scaletroop trooprotation rotationbetween betweenKorea Koreaand andSouth South China is t s under under way. believed superior tobe be leaving leaving Korea are probably probably supertor way, The Thearmies armies believed to in tothose thosemoving movingfrom fromSouth South China. China. tn equipment and training tratntng to
-1 -3All
Olt
OP
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: DATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009
or
se 20Wi1it5iirA1lit6jFW9TO
I
14 February 1953
Copy No. 5 9
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/OM Hs 70-2
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ZWcr
d For Release 2003109/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010 50370001-9
Y )tz/
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
India allegedly airing new Korean peace proposal before ArabAsian bloc (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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4.
5. 6.
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WESTERN EUROPE
2.
Arabs to ask for recall of UN truce supervisor (page 3).
Communist threat in Berlin seen as diversionary effort (page 5). Bonn government imposes conditions for negotiations with individual Arab states (page 5). Swiss consider controls on transit trade (page 6).
Approved For Release 2003109/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000370001-9
25)Marove d For Release 2003/09102 : CIA-R0P79T00975A0010( 0370001-9
GENERAL
1.
India allegedly airing new Korean peace proposal before Arab-Asian bloc: According to an unconfirmed report India, possibly with support from Indonesia, was to present a new Korean peace proposal to a meeting of Arab-Asian bloc representatives on 13 February. The proposal allegedly was to recommend that the issue of repatriating prisoners of war be left to the political conference which would follow a cease-fire.
Comment: This is the first information suggesting the concrete steps India intends to take in its further efforts to achieve peace in Korea. If accurate, it demonstrates that India has retreated from the stand expressed in its UN Korean resolution of 3 December and adopted the Soviet proposal that a cease-fire precede discussion of prisoner repatriation.
25X1A
Under the Communist plan an 11-nation political conference, in which the four Communist countries represented would have veto power, would be committed to the principle of total repatriation. The reported Indian plan presumably envisages that the conference would decide whether repatriation is to be total or voluntary.
2.
Arabs to ask for recall of UN truce supervisor:
25X1A
Arab members of the Palestine Mixed Armistice Commission agreed. last November to demand the recall of General Riley, chief of the UN.Truce Supervisory Organization, and, in the event of Israeli aggression, to call for Arab "counteraction," according to an American Embassy official in Amman who has seen the minutes of the meeting.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Jordan and Syria have formally ratified these decisions; after similar action has been taken by Egypt and Lebanon, they will be put into effect.
Comment: The Arabs in recent months have repeatedly questioned Riley's neutrality.
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fd
WESTERN EUROPE
4.
Communist threat in Berlin seen as diversionary effort:

merican representatives in Berlin report that despite the threatening proclamation of the Socialist Unity Party on 11 February and further East German measures in the past few days to isolate West Berlin, the East Germans have taken no new actions directed primarily at the West Berlin populace. They believe that the purpose of the proclamation was to divert public attention from the flood of refugees and the bad conditions in East Germany.
25X1A
Comment: The proclamation states ambiguously that West Berlin's inclusion in the Western military system would constitute the final breach of the four-power agreement on Berlin. It also calls for a four-power meeting on Berlin and for free Berlin elections, and warns of further isolation of West Berlin if the treaties are ratified.
5.
Arab states:
25X1
Bonn government imposes conditions for negotiations with individual

The Bonn government may have more
success in negotiating trade agreements with the Arab states individually than it has had with Egypt and the states collectively, in the opinion of a West German Foreign Office spokesman. Bonn will demand, however, that the Arabs issue formal invitations and disavow General Nagib's contention that Germany owes the Arab states an indemnity. Moreover, the Germans will insist that the Israeli reparations agreement is not to be discussed and that the Arabs have no political or economic relations with East Germany.
Comment: It is unlikely that the Arab states will agree to these conditions. Unless the negotiations can be resumed in some form, the Arabs may feel impelled to adopt some form of boycott of West Germany.
25X1A

-5-
Approv d For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-R0P79100975A001000 70001-9
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6.
Swiss consider controls on transit trade:

The American Minister in Bern believes that as a result of recent unfavorable publicity in the United States, the Swiss will soon deny free port facilities to merchants diverting strategic goods to the Orbit. The president of the Basel Free Port Company, with the approval of the Swiss Commerce Department, is sponsoring a plan to refuse transit shipments from suspect firms. This has already resulted in the blocking of a shipment of 100 tons of German aluminum apparently destined for Poland via Antwerp.
25X1A
Comment: Hitherto the Swiss have maintained they could not institute transit trade controls unilaterally. They may take limited steps in this direction to satisfy United States criticism, but are unlikely to institute an effective control system unless other Western countries do likewise.

-625X1A
The Swiss Commerce department has proposed consultations with the American Legation on the problems involved in applying transit trade controls.
Approw d For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000670001-9
HR70-14 HR70-14
CAN--D&PSECRET CAN&E
19 4 53 53 /9 6 feo
CIE
2. Two new new Chinese Chinese a r m i e s mav have entered entered Korea: Korea: 2. Two armies ma have
National Nattonal Security Securtty Agency Feb 53 17 Feb 53
Trafftc analysis analysts strongly suggests that in early early Traffic an unidentified unidentified Chinese Chtnese Communist Communist January an in Korea Korea and and was was apparently apparently Army arrtved arrived in CANOE Advanced attached to the 9th Army Army group. group. Advanced elements of Army, which of the 45th 46th Army, which apparently 1 ele.ctA. t South China on on 22 22 January, January, entered entered Korea in In early February. Stnce September there have have been Comment: Since indications indications that six armie-iiir.-67ntered a r m t e m n t e r e dKorea Koreaand and four four have have withdrawn. withdrawn. On the the basis basis of of communications communicationstntelltgence, intelligence, tt it Iis believed that that a a major On s believed rotation two separate separate a army in East and rotatton between between two r m y groups in Korea and two two In South China Only one r m i e s formerly in Korea, Urea, South Chinats is under underway. way. Only one of of the the a armies formerly in however, has however, has as asyet yetappeared appearedin incommunications communicationsactivity activityin inSouth South China. China.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010
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EAST FAR EAST
-3 3 -
CANOE
#
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e afedlobtoirailaallts-ro
Wars
21 February 1953
25
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
25X1
2.
Stalin displays indifference to India's Korean proposals in Menon talk (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3.
25X1
Egypt will not insist on "unconditional" evacuation of Suez Canal

(page 4).
5.
Hungarian Politburo member reportedly commits suicide (page 5).
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
25X1A
Avprove d For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000430001-2
GENERAL
25X1
2.
5X1A
Stalin displays indifference to India's Korean proposals in Menon talk: According to statements of Indian Ambassador K. P. S. Menon, Stalin failed to use their interview to advance new proposals on Korea and showed little interest in Menon's exposition of

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India's UN resolution. He referred to the question of the US Seventh Fleet and Formosa as an example of the difficulty of dealing with Americans. While agreeing with Menon's suggestion that "there were many good Americans," Stalin observed that "unfortunately, the US was governed by profit motives." The US Embassy adds that British Commonwealth representatives in Moscow have remarked on Stalin's "apparent obsession that capitalism is blocking world peace."
to the discussion of Korean issues suggests continued Soviet intransigence on the repatriation question.
3.
Egypt will not insist on "unconditional" evacuation of Suez Canal:
25X1A
The Egyptian Foreign Minister and a member of the High Committee in charge of negotiations with Britain have assured the American Embassy that Egypt will not deliver a note deman ing "unconditional" British evacuation of the Suez Canal zone.
Ambassador Caffery also reports that Egyptian leaders have agreed to make no further public statements on the Sudan or on evacuation pending the development of forthcoming defense negotiations.
Comment: It was earlier reported that the High Committee was planning to demand British agreement to
unconditional evacuation prior to negotiations. It now appears that the Egyptian leaders hope to create an atmosphere favorable for arranging gradual withdrawal of British troops from the canal zone.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Comment: The interview with the Indian Ambassador may have been intended to mollify Indian resentment over Soviet rejection of India's UN resolution. Stalin's indifference
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430001-2
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5.
2t5X1A
Hungarian Politburo member reportedly commits suicide:
Two independent, usually reliable sources have reported the suicide of Politburo member Zoltan Vas, former director of the Hungarian Planning Office. The American Legation in Budapest believes that the report is probably true.

EASTERN EUROPE
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Comment: Zoltan Vas, who is Jewish and an old friend of Premier Rakosi, was removed from his position as head of the Planning Office on 2 February and assigned as production chief of the Komlo coal mines, which in 1952 reached only 30 percent of their production goals.
Vas is thus far the only Politburo member known to have been affected by the current Hungarian purge, which otherwise has been limited to present and former Jewish officials of the Security Police.

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116-1)-SECRET-CANt)E 3 C A W E
S3 2 2 F*b s
HR70-14
NR / NR
FAR EAST
offensive: Communist message message %e;ests tuggests possible offensive: 5. Chinese Communtst
subordlnate headquarters was also also The subordinate ordered to to "make "make preparations preparationsfor forbeginning beginning your your advance advance and the ordered at the same time." attack on the enemy at time,"
Comment: Isconceivable conceivable that this Comment: It is representsplanniiii/OTT-coordinated p l a n n i m c o o r d i n a t e d ground and message represents and air air attack in Korea.
As the message message was was sent sent in in plain plain language, language, however, the follow within within hours. hours. MoreMorethe attack attackwould would be expected expected to follow over, he usual.indications the usual indicationsof ofan animminent immtnent offensive offensive in in Korea &rea have' have not been observed.
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38P- /
- 5 -
National Security Agency 21 2 1 Feb 53 53
Chinese An unidentified and unlocated Chinese sent an an uncoded uncoded Communist Communist mtlitary military unit sent on 11 February, message on February, apparently to subordinate headquarters, a subordinate headquarters, requesting of "our reports on the the results of "our aircraft attacks on on the the enemy." enemy." attacks
-TOP-SECRET CANOE L CANOE
HR70-14 HR70-14
OP SECRET CANOE.,
NR
FAR EAST EAST
US USAir Air Force Force Japan 53 13 Mar 53 CANOE CANOE c_zl-3-00~8
Two IL28 I1-28 aircraft aircraft assigned assigned to to the the Chinese Chinese Mr Division 8th Air Division were were scheduled scheduled on on 13 13 March training flight flight at at Tsitsihar Tsitsihar in for a night night trainlng in Manchuria. The Manchuria. Theflight flight was was to to be led by a Soviet pilot. pilot.
most serious threat posed posed Comment: The most by IL-28 Manchuria IL-28 twin-jet twin-jet bombers b o m b e in rm c h u r i a is i s that that of of a a predawn predawn attack attack on crowded UN UN fighter fighter bases bases in in South South Korea. This scheduled flight, the first notedto todate, date, ts is the first first posifirst IL-28 IL-28 night night training activity noted posiis increasing tive indication that the 8th Air Division ts increasing its itsnight night flying flying capabilities. capabilit tes.
NR
-6 6-
first night 4. bomber unit unit schedules first night training flight: 4, Chinese jet bomber
( L-\ qN d 53 53 Mac
CA3
TOP SECRET CANOE
~ PPROVED RELEASEDATE: APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: (20-Mar-201 0 420-Mar-2010
I I
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HR70-14 HR70-14
TOP SECRET CANOL

I
3. North North Korean KoreanAir Air Force Force tncreases increases jet 3. let strength: stren~h:
Security National Security The North Korean Korean Air Air Force Force now now has a a minimum minimum Agency of 194 aircraft, including. 97 M1G-15 MIG-15 jet of aircraft, including. 97 jet fighters fighters 12 Mar 53 53 and 39 IL-28 IL-28 jet jet bombers, bombers, according to a corncomCANOE , rnunteations munications analysis by the National Security CANOE 6 p k C Rs s) Agency. Thesefigures figuresdo do not not include inclucte 50 50 proAgency. These eqed-kc.ikx - --t-? 25MIG's MIGb which the prior peller-drtven aircraft and peller-driven aircraft and 25 the NKkF NKAFhad had priorto to last last fall fall but which have have not not been been reflected reflected in tn recent recent communications. communications.
Durtng the past six months months both the the Comment: During NKAF NKAFand andthe theChinese ChineseCommunist Communist Atr AirForce Forcehave havetaken takenaamore more active active role in the defensive air war which which is i snow now largely largely confined conftned to the area between air war area between fndtcattons that the Yalu and Rivers. the Yalu and Chongchon Chongchon Rivers. There There are are no firm firm indications that this expandedfurther further south, south, or that it will change change into Into defensive role will be expanded an offensive offenstve mission mission.
This compares with a total total strength of of 197 197 airairwith a craft in in October October 1952, 1952, of o f which which only 48 craft 48 fighters fighters were jets. Since that date, the NKAF NKAF has toto jet aircraft, has converted convertedone onedtvtslon divisionfrom fromconventional conventional jet aircraft, and created one one and and possibly possibly two two new new jet fighter fighter divisions. divtsions. created
/NR NR
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A N O E
ANOE
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~~~
HR70-14
,..,TOP SEC
2-62 Kos Cr
53
NR /NR
of Chinese Chinese armies armies from 2. Movement Movement of from Korea Korea confirmed: confirmed:
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FAR EAST EAST
In mid-February, mid- February1

I
] t h r three e eChinese Chinese Communist Communis were armies, armies, 1 rans erre rom northeast China areas in China to areas in East East and and Sout:;ilna South( Twoadditional addittonal where they had been been based based prior prior to the Korean war. war. Two
-3-
4,
YAW uld L SECURITY SECURITY INFORMATION
TOP SECRET CANO.,
armies which were still in Korea in in February were were to to be be transferred transferred to armies which were to China proper to strengthen the coastal defense. China proper defense.
East China Korea during during the the past past several several months months represents represents a China to Korea rotation rather rather than thana areinforcement reinforcement of of Chinese Chinese Communist Communist forces in Korea.
previous analysis that thelale troop movement from South movement from Southand and prevloua analysis that t h e m c a l e troop
Comment: Comment:
report tends tends to to confirm confirm This report
NR

-5 5-
TOP SECRET CANOE
.'
5 '
5
HR70-14
OP SECRET CANOE
INFORMATION SECURITY INFORMATION
2 4trU.r f m f -53 2g
Cr
s g
NR /NR
PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE:

124-Mar-201

-3 3 -
2. Molotov Molotovoffers offers tg to intervene intervene on on behalf behalfof ofFrench French internees internees in Korea:
I na a 26 20 March March interview interview with with French In Molotov offered to Ambassador Joxe, Molotov intervene with the North Koreans to of French French internees. secure the release of came in in response response to to the the Ambassador's Ambassador's question question on on the the The offer came relattonshtp of o f Malenkov's Malenkov's statements of of peaceful intentions to relationship a a Korean settlement.
his interview interview as a s one one of of Joxe regards his several Soviet Soviet conciliatory conciliatory gestures gestureswhich which have have cost cost the the Soviet Soviet several Government Government nothing nothing and and have have the the advantage advantage of of relaxing relaxing Western Hedoes doesnot notthink thinkthat that the the USSR USSR will vigilance. He will forfeit forfeit Its its bargaining power any substantial concessions. bargaintng power through any
TOP SECRET CANOE
i * '
I
.
5
%./OP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION
Lee -
The American Embassy recommends tha that the United make a a similar similar approach United States make approach regarding American internees in North North Korea. Korea. internees in
Molotovh has already offered Copment: Molotov a s already Comment: to intervene intervene for for the the r release e l e aof mBritish t i s h internees.
Soviet Soviet reactlon reaction to any American American proposal of of this nature nature would would help to show show whether whether reCf2ht recent Soviet Sovlet conciliatory tactics have the West West or or represent represent tactics have been primarily aimed at at dividing dividing the a modification in policy by the new regime. modification policy new
TOP SECRET CANOE
SECURITY SECURITY l INFORMATION NF0WTION
FAR EAST EAST

4.
Comment on the the Communist Communist offer offer to to exchange exchange prisoners prisoners in Comment on in Korea: Korea: -
Communists' apparent apparent agreement agreement to The Communists' exchange prisoners exchange sick sick and and wounded wounded prisonersin inKorea Koreaprobably probablyrepresents represents an attempt to regain the propaganda propaganda initiative, initiative, not only on on an an issue issue of of wide wide humanitarian humanitarian appeal, appeal, but on on the the whole wholeEast-West East-West controversy controversy of which whichKorea Koreais is the the focus. focus. The Themove move is isconsonant consonant with the recently recently portray the the Soviet Soviet side as as the the "camp "camp of of peace." peace." intensified effort to portray
The Communists' Communists' stat statement e ment emphasizes emphast zes desirefor foran anagreement agreementin inaccordance accordancewith with Article Article 109 109 of of the their desire Geneva Geneva Convention, Convention, which whichspecifically specificallyprovides provides that that no no sick sick or or tnjured injured prisoner prisoner of of war "may "may be repatriated repatriated against against his his will will during during hostilities." Thus,while whilethe theCommunists Communistscould could negate negate the offer offer by by hostilities." Thus, attaching of attaching unacceptable unacceptablestipulations, stipulations, they they could, could, tn in the the interest interest of broad propaganda propaganda objectives, agree agree on on a a partial partialexchange exchange of of their broad sick prisoners without compromising their stand stck and wounded wounded prisoners standon on "total repatriation." "total repatriat\on." They Theycould could continue continue to interpret Article 118 118 as as calling calling for repatriation repatriation of of all allprisoners prisonersfollowing following the the cessation cessation of of hostilities. Recent propaganda has given no indication that the be willing willing to to accept a truce the Communists Communists would would be truce on on anything anything but their own own terms.
5.
Communists in defenses at Wonsan: Communists in Korea KoreastrengthAen strength,en defenses Wonan:
r3
National Security Security National Agency - 9 9b/ 25 53 25 Mar 53 CAN E
An intercepted intercepted Chinese Chinese message message reveals reveals An that an enemy enemy conference conference was was held held on on 23 23 March to implement by 10 April 'detailed detailed plans for for the the defense defense of of the the Wonsan Wonsan area. The plans, which which involved involved both Chinese Chinese 7- 44>7 447-7 7" 01111111111 st North and North Korean forces included the construction of ommun st and Korean forces included the construction camouflaged positions, reconnaissance reconnaissanceo ofterrain, terrain, firing for camouflaged positions, f f o r adadjustment, and and artillery artilleryand andinfantry infantrycoordination. coordination.
-5 5-
' 7 TOP SECRET CANOE
Hirr'OP SECRET CANOE.s ;

'
SECURITY INFORMATION 1NFORMATION SECURrrY
'
is the the first firstmessage messagewhich which Comment: This is preparations against against a a possible possible has detailed the the extent extent oftheenemy's of-WeWay' s preparations UNlanding landingon onthe the east east coast of Korea. of two two Chinese Chinese a armies UN Korea, Elements of rmies were moved moved to during February and March to reinforce the the to this this area during North Korean Korean forces forces normally stationed there.
6.
, ,
Joint Communist Communist air force force conference confeeencebeing being held held in in Manchuria: Manchuria:
7.

6-
Air Force Roundup 27 Mar 53 53 C/NOE
A "joint conference," conference," attended by high-ranking officers of four Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Air DiviDiviofficers of and possibly possibly by by North North Korean Korean and and sions, and Soviet officials, officials, is Soviet isbeing being held held at atAntung Antung on the Sino-Korean border,according advance border, according to advance CG/XConferenceis is apparentlysponsored sponsored by by Joint Jotnt Air f eld reports. The conference apparently Force Headquarters Headquarters at Mukden. Force at Mu.kden.
Comment: Comment: Although Although such a conference may employ air units units in in offensive offensive operations operations be evidence of a decision to employ Korea, there in Korea, there are arefew few indications indications that an air a i r offensive offenstve is is being being Such reports reports as have been been received planned in in the immediate future. Such suggest that the enemy enemy will wtll continue in a defensive-role. defenslve.role.
ET CANOE
dapr07
25X1
se
29061D/WEVR1W79Ttrite
25X1
31 March 1953 25
Copy No.
60
2.

DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS ! DECLASSIFIED
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ Sit"A

AUTH: MR 70-24
r REVIEWER; J
DATE124/
254
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WSSX
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2cY1A
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Comment on Chou En-laPs proposal to resume Korean truce talks

Polish UN delegate will welcome discussion of Burma's complaint
SOVIET UNION
3).
'(page (page 4).

25X1
ire Viet Minh attack on northern Laos expected about 10 April (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.
6. 7.
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Saudi Arabia refuses to arbitrate Buraimi dispute with Britain

(page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
Comment on the 29 March "uprising" in Guatemala (page 7). Panamanian President wants to discuss Canal Zone treaty in Washington (page 8).
***
c5X1A
Approved Fo
elease 2003/10115 : CIA-RDP79700975A 01100020001-6
GENERAL
1.
Comment on Chou En-lai's proposal to resume Korean truce talks:
Chou En-lat's statement calling for the resumption of the Korean armistice negotiations is not only conciliatory in tone but departs from the previous Communist demand for total repatriation. His statement admits for the first time that there are two categories of POW's -- those who insist on immediate repatriation and those "remaining prisoners." The latter would be handed over to a "neutral" state which would ensure "the just solution of their repatriIt is not clear from Chou's statement whether the repatriation agreement is to precede the cease-fire. In this connection; the UN has held that any repatriation agreement must be effected before hostilities are ended. It.is also not clear how the screening and classification will take place.
Chou's return from Moscow only five days ago underlines the probability that the move is closely tied to the current 3oviet "peace offensive." It could also indicate that the Malenkov regime believes that its Cold War strategy would he better served by obtaining a post-hostilities, political confereice on, divisive Far Eastern issues.' In any event, the Communists realized that an apparent concession on "total repatriation" was essential in order to resume the Panmunjom discussions'
ation."
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/10115 : CIA-RDP79700975A001100020001-6
25X1A
Approved Fo soRelease 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 100020001-6
2.
Polish UN delegate will welcome discussion of Burma's complaint:
The Polish representative at the United Nations has told a member of the American 25X1A delegation that Poland "would have a good deal to say" when Burma's complaint against Chinese Nationalist "aggression" is discussed. He said that "everyone knows that the United States is in a weak position" because of its support of the Nationalist units in Burma and claimed to have specific knowledge of the involvement of two American officers.
25X1
The Pole's remarks, together with charges in Izvestia of American involvement, clearly suggest that the Orbit will press for full UN discussion.
25X1
-425X1A
Approved Fo
5X1A
elease 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100020001-6
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Viet Minh attack on northern Laos expected about 10 April:
25X1A
25X1
The decisive phase of the coming Viet Minh offensive will be a two-division attack about 10 April against Sam Neua in northern Laos,
A
rd division will cover this movement. Elements of a fourth division are moving westward from their positions south of the Tonkin delta in what may be a pincer movement against northern Laos. (see map, p.6).
coincident with the drive on Sam Neua, a fifth Wet Minh division will engage in diversionary action against the southern part of the Tonkin delta, although this is not expected to be serious.
Comment: The imminence of a Viet Minh offensive against northern Laos has been indicated by numerous reports over the past two weeks, although no firm date has been established. Despite French reinforcement of several posts in the threatened area, its defenses are still believed inadequate to meet a concerted Viet Minh attack.
5.
Saudi Arabia refuses to arbitrate Buraimi dispute with Britain:

25X1
25X1A
Saudi Arabia will definitely not submit its dispute with Britain over the Buraimi oasis to arbitration. He added that unless there is a change in British policy on'the dispute, his government will have no alternative but to meet force with force or to resort to some other measure, such as presenting the problem to the UN Security
Council.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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told Hare that he agreed with Yassin's observation that the situation had deteriorated so badly that matters could not be allowed to continue in their present state.
Comment: The State Department has explained to Prince Faisal in Washington that the American Government, like Britain,still favors arbitration as the best method of settling the dispute.
6.
Comment on the 29 March "uprising" in Guatemala:
The apparent ease with which the Guatemalan armed forces suppressed the 29 March "revolt" at Salama is evidence that the major portion of the army remains loyal to the Arbenz administration. The "uprising" may be another indication of dissatisfaction among some of the junior officers, and possibly among some troops, in the garrisons distant from the capital.
It is entirely possible, however, that the "revolt" was staged by the government for the purpose of alerting troops to control the crowds in the streets of the various communities during Holy Week. On 30 March the army declared a nationwide
military alert, according to press reports.

Guatemala City

LATIN AMERICA
Salama is about 100 miles north of

25X1 25X1
25X1A
25X1A
Approved FoRelease 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01100020001-6
7.
Panamanian President wants to discuss Canal Zone treaty in

Washington:
25X1A
aao
Panamanian Foreign Minister Guizado told Ambassador Wiley on 28 March that he was proceeding to Washington to request an official invitation for President Remon to visit the United States, and to clarify Panama's position rev s on of the 1936 Canal Zone treaty is essential.
Comment: Remon has sought to dissociate himself from the enthusaarcresponse with which extreme nationalist and anti-US elements greeted his recent decision to seek a revision of the 1936 treaty. It is clear, however, that he does not intend to alter his stand on treaty revision or his determination to discuss the matter with President Eisenhower. Failure to carry through his much-publicized plans would expose him to criticism and possibly weaken his political position.

-825X1A
The Panamanian Ambassador to Washington, who is now in Panama, believes that Remon feels obliged to have some agreement to submit to the National Assembly next fall, because of the Canal Zone resolution approved by the Assembly last November.
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-R0P79T00975A001100020001-6
SFS003/17101pC&IWIDErE17097,1S
2 April 1953
25X1
I
25X
opr
tTol
25

DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. )1t.

OECLASSFIED
CLASS. CHANC.ED TO: TS 3

NEXT REViEW DA-C=:
'
HUM: FIR 7C.2,
4nt
25)
25;10
If
25)0
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
2.1;

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(25X1A
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ase 2003112/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001' 000400014
SUMMARY
y Ze
5.
GENERAL
omment on Soviet support of Chinese proposals for Korea (page 3). . Burma's UN complaint reportedly prompted by pressure from Peiping Arlage 3).
25X1
irFormosa-Burma policy (page 4).
dispute raises new Indonesian suspicions 01 American

SOVIET UNION

Comment on Soviet price reductions (page 5).
25X1
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
v'6General Zahedi seeks Shah's support to overthrow Mossadeq

9. 10.
(page (3).
I
Britain plans to move troops into disputed Buraimi area (page ts). Comment on decree barring Greek-flag ships from Communist China trade (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
25X1
agreement (page 9). Date of Italian EDC ratification increasingly remote (page 9). . toleParty
25X1A
11. Austrian government crisis reportedly ends with
Socialist-People's
Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0011000400014
25X141 Approved For Re se 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0011 0040001-4
GENERAL
1.
Comment on Soviet support of Chinese proposals for Korea:
Molotov's quick endorsement of the Chinese Communist proposal on Korea, in a statement employing Chou En-lai's terminology, provides further evidence that Chou's action resulted from a joint Sino-Soviet decision. Molotov's statement follows an assertion by the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat to a member of the Norwegian delegation, only two hours after the Chinese communique became public, that Chou's proposal was the "real thing."
2.
Burma's UN complaint reportedly prompted by pressure from Peiping:
25X1A
Pressure from Peiping and the possibility that Chinese Communist armed forces might enter Burma to fight the Chinese Nationalist troops there prompted Burma's complaint to the United Nations, according to the m lit ry a viser assigned to Burma's UN delegate.
Comment: Burma's UN delegate has also referred to pressure applied by Communist China and there are indications that such pressure, in part, has been applied through Burma's pro-Communist Ambassador to Peiping, who visited Rangoon recently.
Molotov's statement also indicates that the Communists are seeking not only a resumption of the truce talks at Panmunjom but a full-dress debate on broader issues at the General Assembly. He suggests, for example, that Chinese Communist and North Korean membership in the UN would facilitate cessation of the war. It is not clear, however, whether these political questions are being introduced as a condition for a cease-fire, or simply for bargaining or prestige purposes.
25X1
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25X1
4.
Formosa-Burma dispute raises new Indonesian suspicions of American policy:
The US Embassy in Djakarta believes the situation created by the Chinese Nationalist 25X14 troops in Burma may sharpen Indonesian suspicions of American Far Eastern policy. In the Indonesian view, Formosa is an American satellite and the United States is responsible for the Chinese Nationalists being in Burma.
A friendly Indonesian leader cited the problem as evidence of big-power indifference to the rights of small nations and pointed out that, on the pretext of fighttng Communists, Indonesia too might be occupied and be unable to resist.

-425X1A
g?(4
hiApproved
ase 2003/12103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0011( 0040001-4
While Burma and Indonesia both have favored a neutralWpolicy, they have generally been more inclined to the West than to the Soviet Orbit. American failure to solve the Nationalist problem, despite Burma's friendly orientation, will make Indonesia question the wisdom of closer cooperation with the United States.
Comment:
The American Embassy in Djakarta commented that recent Burmese permission for rubber shipments to Communist China will provide new impetus for existing pressures on the Indonesian Government to allow similar trade.
5.
Comment on Soviet price reductions:
The American Embassy in Moscow reports that the Soviet retail price reductions of both food and manufactured goods are far broader than last year but similar to those for 1950 and
1951.
The wider range of price reductions as compared with last year, along with the latest declarations of peaceful intent and the recent amnesty declaration, are intended to aid the new regime in consolidating itself with the Soviet people. The 50 percent price reduction in fruits and vegetables may have added significance, since they are among the chief products sold by the collective farmer on the open market. The Kremlin may now be moving gradually to eliminate this market by forcing it to compete with arbitrarily lowered state prices.

SOVIET UNION
-525X1A
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bilApproved
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7.
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
General Zahedi seeks Shah's support to overthrow Mossadeq:

Minister of Court Ala told Ambassador Henderson on 30 March that it is generally agreed that Mossadeq must be removed in the near future and that retired General Zahedi is the only available replacement. Zahedi would be supported by Mullah Kashani and other conservative elements within the Majlis and the army.
'Zahedi has visited Ala secretly and has indicated that he would accept the premiership only if the Shah supported him. Ala told Zahedi that the Shah would not act "unconstitutionally" or take part in a coup. The Minister of Court said, however, that he will try to persuade the Shah to make to the Majlis which meets on 5 April a. statement condemning Mossadeq.
-625X1A
25X1A
Approved For Ukase 2003112103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100040001-4
Recent reports have indicated that Zahedi and others are p anning a military coup. Henderson's report suggests that they may be willing to try to remove Mossadeq by parliamentary means rather than by armed action.
Comment:
The Shah still remains the key factor. His inability to make up his mind to take even constitutional action against Mossadeq, however, will discourage Zahedi and his apparently sizeable following.
25X1
25X1A
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Approved For Re ase 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0011000 0001-4
9.
Britain plans to move troops into disputed Buraimi area:
Great Britain intends to move local troops into the disputed Buraimi area and to take other 25X1A measures to make the present Saudi position untenable. King Ibn Saud will be notified beforehand, probably on 2 April, that Britain reserves its freedom of action.
The Foreign Office explains that the Saudi, through their actions, show no intention to carry out past agreements, and that their suggestion for a plebiscite shows they are electioneering in the disputed area.
Comment: The territory involved is technically in dispute between Saudi Arabia and two of the several Britishprotected Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister recently declared that his country would, if necessary, meet force with force or possibly appeal to the UN Security Council. Saudi reaction would also include a strong appeal to the United States.
10.
Comment on decree barring Greek-flag ships from Communist China trade:

The Greek Council of Ministers on 23 March issued a decree prohibiting Greek-flag ships froth calling at ports in Communist China and North Korea.
The Greek-fiag merchant fleet comprises approximately 20 percent of the total Greek-owned merchant tonnage operating throughout the world. The other 80 percent consists of 700 to 800 ships which are registered in ten foreign countries. Five of these countries have not yet prohibited ships in their registry from entering ports of Communist China.
During the last quarter of 1952, only 13 Greek-flag ships were positively identified with Communist China trade. The curtailment of this shipping will attain greater significance when Greek-owned ships under foreign registry are likewise prohibited or withdrawn from the China trade.

-825X1A
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WESTERN EUROPE
11.
Austrian government crisis reportedly ends with Socialist-People's Party agreement: People's Party and Socialist representatives have reportedly reached an understanding which will permit the announcement of a new Austrian Government this week, under Chancellor-designate Raab of the People's Party.
25X1A
Comment: The important decisions which appear to have been postpoEIT-itWest that the new coalition will not be a strong one, Barring some unforeseen reconciliation between the two parties, the probability of new elections within a year is therefore very strong.
12.
Date of Italian EDC ratification increasingly remote:
25X1A
Premier De Gasperi told Ambassador Bunker on 30 March that the recent Communist-led riots in Parliament have made it inadvisable for him to issue a public statement of the government's intention to push ratification of EDC, as he had previously promised. He said that he would do his utmost for ratification after the national elections late this spring, but that he could not now risk another debate in either house.
Ambassador Bunker believes that under present circumstances final approval of the treaty is unlikely before late autumn.
Substantial agreement has reportedly also been reached on a 1953 budget and on bipartisan parliamentary support for an agreed "government program." The coalition voting agreement will not, however, extend to all parliamentary issues.
25X1A
TOP SECRET CAN01.; O r

SECURITY SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION
HR70-14
Apr
c
FAR EAST EAST
1. 1 .
Communists halt movement movement of of goods goods into Korea:

Agency 3 Apr 53 53
National Security National
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE PPROVED FOR 24-Mar-2010 DATE: 24-Mar-2010
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2.
Unusual unexplained stoppages in Unusual and unexplained North Korean shipping shipping and and rail rail activity are are revealed revealed from from analysis analvsis of of recent recent North North C NOE Korean 1 On mrean Jon o Ire I R.- 15;. -S3 10 March, March, rall rail officials officials halted halted the the shipment shipment riof petroleum of petroleum into into Korea Korea from from Tumen, Tumen, Manchuria, Manchuria, while whileaa local local k maritransportation office office revealed revealed that that all allshipping shipping had had been time transportation been disconas of of 16 16 March. tinued as
Comment: Comment: Although Although these these messages messages prepreceded ceded the the Communist.truce Communist truce proposals proposals by by 6ome some two twoweeks, weeks, it it is is possible that that the the above above action action may may have have been taken in anticipation of of an early cease-fire. cease-fire. In stoppages have have been been occasioned occasioned by by In the past, stoppages the lack lack of o f storage storage facilities damaged rail in North North either the facilities or damaged rail lines in Korea, but but these factors factors are arenot not known known to Korea, to be be responsible responsible in in the the prespresent case.
South defense pact pact with with US: US: SouthKorea Korea urges urges bilateral bilateral defense
South South Korean KoreanForeign Foreign Minister Minister Pyun has that the the US US Government Government strongly urged that into a bilateral enter into bilateral defense defense pact pact with with Brims suggests suggests Korea. Ambassador Ambassador Briggs Korea. that \such such a a pact pact may may be be aaquid quidpro proquo quo for forthe thewithdrawal withdrawal of of South South Korean Korean opposition opposition to to an an armistice. armistice. Comment: This is is the first firstsuggestion suggestton that Comment: the South South Korean Governmeagree to an armistice which would Korean Government might agree to an armistice which leave Korea Korea divided. divided. During the past week, week, South South Korean Korean legislative legislative and executive executive officials officials have have expressed expressed oppositton oppositionto toan anarmistice armistice as currently contemplated contemplatedby bythe theUN. UN. currently
-3 -
-TO-P-SEeRET-GANOE
NSC.
gap, 3-3
A
...
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TO
RR INFORMATION
HR70-1
14.-.
THE THE NEW NEW COMMUNIST'PROPOSAL COMMUNIST 'PROPOSALON ON POW'S
&
arch proposal
Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Premier P r e m i e r Chou Chou En-lai's E n - l a i ' s 30
on the POW's came came o only four days after his return on t h e disposition d i s p o s i t i o n of of POW'S nly f our d ays a fter h is r eturn from were quick t to endorse the from Moscow, and and Soviet S o v i e t spokesmen spokesmen were o e ndorse t he
proposal both b o t h privately p r i v a t e l y and and publicly. publicly.
Evidence Evidence is is convincing convincing
based on o n Sino-Soviet S i n o - S o v i e t consultation c o n s u l t a t i o n and and joint j o i n t decisions. decisions.
that Korean war war c continues be o n t i n u e s to to b e t h a t the t h e Communist Communist position p o s i t i o n in i n the t h e Korean
~~ ~
more c conciliatory attitude Other O t h e r recent r e c e n t evidence e v i d e n c e reflects reflects a a more onciliatory a ttitude
of the Soviet Union toward the West
FOR
These tactics appeat.,
D-
DATE: 09-Dec-2009 LP_PROVED
ENT NO NO CHAN_ _. CLACS. i i DECLA3S:F1E CHANGL:r./ T3: NE X"; REV:EV/ DATE: HR 70-'1
1.1
DA IE.
_11"ViEWER
37 ?_:'14.4.
..
RITY INFORMATION
vttis
tigis
designed at at least least to to obtain obtain negotiations negotiations on on various outstanding designed u outst nd issues and may foreshadow foreshadow a new tactical approach to East-West issues
achieving achieving basic basic cold cold war war objectives. objectives. Chou's proposal proposal is is a a major major departure departure from from the the previous previous
in that it provides for the immediate repaCommunist position in

triation POW's willing to return and for the transfer triation of those those POW'S
to a a "neutral "neutral state" state" of of those those POW's POW'S unwilling unwilling to to be be repatriated. repatriated.
UN conditions conditions regarding the timing of a cease-fire, nor does it

define a make clear the disposition disposition a "neutral state," nor does it make
of POW'S POW's who remain unwilling to be repatriated after Communist

rvexplanations" to them. them. "explanations" to
of total total repatriation. repatriation. principle principle of
POW's who who have refused refused repatriation repatriation have have done done insist that all POW'S
so only because so because of of UN UN pressure pressure on on them. them.
The The Communists Communists continue to to affirm their commitment to the Moreover, they continue to Moreover, to
The Communists Communists thus thus may seek an immediate cease-fire without They may also also
surrendering their total-repatriation total-repatriation principle. principle. surrendering their
designated as as the "neutral state" state" one one which which attempt to have designated
would, sooner or would, or later, later, return return all all of of their their POW's POW'S to to them. them.
which is to They may try to obtain veto power in the body which
process the the POW's. POW'S.
may seek a provision provision enabling enabling them Or they may
make "explanations" to POW's indefinitely. to make to the the POW'S indefinitely. The UN
the Communists Communists detailed detailed commander in Korea has requested from the
suggestions for implementing implementing Chou's Chou's proposal.
,*
;
The proposal proposal does does not n o t commit commit the the Communists, Communists, however, however, to to meet The
acuity INFORMATION
Caia
Despite Despite the the many possible possible stumbling-blocks stumbling-blocks in Chou's
proposal, observers feel feel that that it it signifies signifies a a Communist Communist proposal, most observers
intention repatriation intention eventually to forego the fact of total repatriation
i f not the the principle. principle. if
The Communists appear appear to to believe believe that that
their "explanations" "explanationsf' will will induce induce a a change change of of mind mind in in the the great great
majority of of those those prisoners prisoners unwilling unwilling to to be be repatriated. repatriated.
The The
Communists may well feel that they can accept and explain away Communists
Molotov's Molotov's statement statement endorsing the proposal suggested that

willing willing to to make make peace. peace.
seek to transfer the truce talks from Panmunthe Communists Communists may seek
Assembly and may may again press press for admission admission jom to the UN General Assembly
of Communist China, China, North North Korea, Korea, and and Outer Outer Mongolia Mongolia to to the the UN. UN.
There There is is also a l s o the the possibility of a Soviet or neutralist resoreso-
lution in the UN couched in in terms terms which, while failing to to commit commit while failing
the Communists, would attract broad popular support and would
place the the United States States in in the the apparent position place position of being un-
Assuming Communist sincerity in the new new proposal, proposal, the Commu-
demands for a nists may be expected to reassert their earlier demands
the continued continued refusal refusal of of a a few few thousands thousands of of POW's. POW'S.
general conference general conference on on Far Far Eastern Eastern questions. questions.
Both sides sides have
agreed to conference within within 90 days of an to recommend such a conference Communists would would certainly attempt to raise, raise, in The Communists
armistice. armistice.
which they know a wide wide difference difference such a conference, issues on which
opinion to of opinion to exist exist among among Western and and Asian Asian non-Communist non-Communist states. states.
TOP
INFORIMIO
Western military military forces Among these issues are the presence of Western
in the Far East, Communist China's China's and North Korea's Korea's claims claims to to
Peiping's assertion seats in the UN, Pelping's assertion of sovereignty over over Formosa, Formosa,
in Indochina Indochina and and Malaya, Malaya, the growing strength of Japan, the wars in
and the activity of Chinese Nationalist forces and forces in in Burma.
In such a conference, conference, the Communists Communists would would strive strive to to promote promote
Western sentiment discord among anti-Soviet anti-Soviet allies, to stimulate Western favoring disengagement from costly and indecisive Far Eastern
widespread ignorance of of and and apathy apathy toward toward Communism Communism the still widespread
in the Far East.
conflicts, to fan anti-Western anti-Western sentiment, and to capitalize on
Fref 4.
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Iresse,A200,f-fidisigratir
25X1
9 April 1953
5
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLE
CLASS. CHANGED 70: TS S In,

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acii1011/44
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Approved For Release 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 100100001-7
25X1A
SUMMARY
25X1
SOVIET UNION
2.
Ignatiev affair receiving careful treatment in Soviet press (page 3)
25X1
North Korean airfield reconstruction possibly linked with cease-fire

(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6.
7.

(page 6).
SOUTH ASIA
French general sees planned Vietnam Army build-up as inadequate
Pakistani Foreign Minister reportedly may have to resign (page 6).

25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
9.
Inadequate economic planning imperils French defense build-up

(page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
25X1A
10.
Comment on Guatemala's charges of foreign intervention (page 8).
ill
FAR EAST
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elease 2004108103 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100100001-7
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25X1A
25X1A
2.
Ignatiev affair receiving careful treatment in Soviet press:

The American Embassy in Moscow considers the Central Committee plenum's release of S. D. Ignatiev from the party Secretariat an indication that the doctors' affair was discussed by a relatively large group of high party officials. The Embassy feels that Ignatiev was probably also deprived of membership on the Central Committee, although this has not yet been announced.

SOVIET UNION
-325X1A
Approved FohRelease 2004108/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001100100001-7
25X1A
The Embassy points out that the unusual procedure of limiting coverage of the decision to Pravda while other papers merely reprinted its editorial on the dismissal may indicate that the Ignatiev issue is so delicate or obscure that other editors have been ordered to reprint the Pravda interpretation rather than paraphrase it.
Comment: Evidence is still lacking as to whether Ignatiev's dismissal was necessitated by a decision to eliminate the doctors' conspiracy as inconsistent with the new regime's "liberal and peaceful" character or was the result of an internal power struggle.
25X1

-425X1A
25X1
5.
North Korean airfield reconstruction possibly linked with cease-fire:
25X1A
signed to expand the enemy's intercept capabilities, will allow the transfer of a arge num at aircraft into Korea just prior to a cease-fire. This would give the North Koreans an air force on their own soil greatly outclassing that of South Korea, and would make the detection of a future build-up of Communist air strength nearly impossible.

FAR EAST
Far East Air Force reports that renewed Communist activity in reconstructing airfields in North Korea, while possibly de-
-5-
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Comment: The portion of the draft armistice already agreed on provides that combat aircraft in Korea cannot be reinforced following the end of hostilities, but worn out or damaged aircraft
can be replaced with equipment of the same type.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6.
French general sees planned Vietnam Army build-up as inadequate:
at only about 6,000.
The American Embassy in Saigon states it is unable to corament on the accuracy of Alessandri's figures until he provides further evidence, as he has promised.
Comment: Current French-Vietnamese plans call for an increase in the Vietnamese Army in order to enable troops now used only for static defense to engage in offensive operations against the Viet Minh. These plans would be vitiated if French forces are withdrawn within the next two to three years. Other French authorities, however, have not indicated that they plan such a disengagement.
7.
Pakistani Foreign Minister reportedly may have to resign:

Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan told the American Charge in Karachi on 7 April that Prime Minister Nazimuddin was seeking to oust him from office. Zafrullah
25X1A

SOUTH ASIA
General Alessandri, French military adviser to Bao Dai, believes that current plans for 25X1A enlarging the Vietnamese Army are "completely inadequate" and will result in only a minor increase in combined French-Vietnamese strength. Apparently basing this view on an anticipated rapid withdrawal of French forces, he estimates the net increase in French-Vietnamese strength over a two-year period
-625X1A
relApproved r Release 2004/08103 : CIA-RDP79100975P
001100100001-7
25X1A
also stated that Nazimuddin, who was recently forced into suppressing agitation against Zafrullah Khan and the Ahmadiya religious sect to which he belongs, is now reacting by encouraging persecution of the
Ahmadiyas.
;
25X1
25X1

-725X1A
Nazimuddip is unlikely to want the resignation of Zafrullah Khan, one of the key men in his cabinet, chief Pakistani spokesman on Kashmir, and a pro-Westerner, at a time when the Kashmir issue is again before the 1JN Security Council and when Pakistan is seeking military and economic assistance from the United States. Furthermore, Nazimuddin's recent drastic actions to eliminate political opposition would be largely nullified if he acquiesced to opposition demands for Zafrullah's resignation.
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
The French have stated that present economic trends in FraTie tThWaten to reduce 1954 defense expenditures
Comment:
below the 1953 level.
Military equipment appropriations originally frozen until 31 March have not yet been released, and Premier Mayer may continue to block these funds rather than take more unpalatable means of covering the serious budgetary deficit.
10.
Comment on Guatemala's charges of foreign intervention:
Guatemala, charging that its sovereignty is threatened by an "international conspiracy" involving former high US officials and the governments of neighboring countries, announced on

LATIN AMERICA
American diplomatic and economic representatives in Paris agree that no increase in French 25X1A military expenditures ls likely in 1954. They warn that the government lacks plans to promote the growth of the economy, and is apparently resigned to economic stagnation.
-8-
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9.
Inadequate economic planning imperils French defense build-up:
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25X1A
7 April that it had sent to the United Nations a notice of its withdrawal from the Organization of Central American States. This action provides Communist and nationalist propagandists in Latin America with effective material for use in their campaign to undermine US prestige and hemispheric solidarity. The Guatemalan decision may also stimulate neighboring Central American governments, which genuinely fear the spread of Communist activity, to implement their plans for action against the Communist-influenced Guatemalan Government.

-925X1A
TOP-SECRET-e-ANOY
sEcuRrn, INFORMATION
2_, (yr S.3

NR NR
2. 2,
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 ATE: 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED

FAR EAST
Chinese Communist attack 14 April: April: attack in Korea scheduled for 14 National Security A tank-supported tank-supported Communist Communist attack attackof of unknown unknown Agency size has been scheduled for 14 April, scheduled for 14 April, according 11 Apr Apr 53 message. A to an intercepted Chinese message. A tank tank unit CANOE located in the Chorwon Chorwon area area and supporting eleLg C Ca-3 : f 4 I T 1T Ssr7 ments the Chinese23rd 23rdArmy reported on on S--7 ments ofof the Chinese Army reported
-3 3 --
..iTOP SECRET 4TOP SECRET CANOL-/ CANOW

SECURITY SECURlTT INFORMATION INFORMATION
11 April April that all combat combat preparations preparations had had been been completed completed and that take part part in the action. eight tanks would would take
On the night of of 23-24 23-24 March Comment: On elementS of the the Chinese Chinese 2 23rd Army, by this same elements of 3 @ 7 , supported by same tank tank unit, unit, captured "Old "Old Baldy" o r 14 14 Baldy" west west of of Chorwon. Chorwon. The attack planned f for April probably probably also has a limited objective objective since no indications of of a major offensive are apparent.
Such attacks a are Such attacks r e probably probably designed designed to gain key terrain prior to any cease-fire which might result from the the curcurkey terrain to any which might result from rent negotiations. negotiations.
NR
4-4
TOP SECRET SECRET CANOE
HR70-14
....TOP SE
EAST FAR EAST
New dtvtstons divisions from Southwest China m may be in Korea: 2. New Southwest China a y be National Security National Agency 14 Apr 53 53 CANOE //004/ O O ( /& L / A SB P w / o o @ &z Asti PAc/oocil.
The presence in in Korea of o f two two Chinese dtvtstons, 33rd and 37th, divisions, the 33rd 37th, normally associated with the 11th and and 13th 13th Armies, Armies, was tndicated n a 10 April which indicated I in April message which
dtscussed plans for for the thedefense defenseof of Wonsan. Wonsan. discussed plans
11th Army on south south Szechwan Szechwan and the 13th Army has has Army has been based on been located located in in Yunnan Yunnan near the Indochina Indochtna border since since1950. 1950.
is not not clear whether whether these Comment: It it is dtvistons represent ddlttomgtho ra r e replacements. The divisions represent aadditiOarifFeigth or are replacements. The
nlne divisions dtvlsions of o f the the 2nd 2nd Field Army, to towhich which the the 11th 11thand and 13th 13th nine Armies belong, would would be 1 January. January. Armies belong, be ordered ordered lnto into Korea Korea shortly after 1 message suggests suggests that at a t least least some some of of these these units units have recently This message arrived. arrtved.
NR
-4
FOR RELEASE I ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 'DPPROVED
T - TOP SECRET CANOE CANOE
I2004ZREP 6ERRA70017Wer
I
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18 April 1953
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Copy No.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLET

AS. CI :AN
DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASCIFIED
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State Department review completed
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
2.
Probable Communist reaction to UN truce proposals (page 3). Foreign correspondents invited to World Peace Council meeting in Budapest (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Three Viet Minh divisions identified in drive for Laos (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
25X1A

4.
Comment on removal of Pakistani Prime Minister and cabinet

(page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
5.
British propose generous gesture to the USSR on Austrian treaty (page 5).
Approved For Ralease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 00180001-9
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Probable Communist reaction to UN truce proposals:

The Communists will probably object to at least three of the proposals in the UN Command's note of 17 April which calls for a resumption of the Korean truce talks suspended last October. They are likely to nominate as the neutral country a state more friendly to them than Switzerland, such as India. Two sources in contact with the Communist command have reported that Switzerland is unacceptable.
2.
25X1A

Budapest
The Communists are also expected to press for a much longer period than 60 days in which to make "explanations" to the prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated. Chou En-lai has at least twice expressed a belief that the great majority of prisoners could be induced to return if the Communists are given sufficient time to persuade them.
Finally, there will almost certainly be an attempt to prevent any neutral state from exercising complete control over the prisoners in its custody and from determining their final disposition. In the past, the Communists have insisted on veto power in the body which decides the prisoners' fate.
Foreign correspondents invited to World Peace Council meeting in

The date for the World Peace Council meeting has reportedly been set for 22 May in Budapest. About 80 foreign correspondents have been invited.
Comment: Several leading American newsmen are known to have been invited. Soviet Willingness to allow this penetration of the Orbit may reflect satisfaction with the propaganda benefits resulting from the recent Moscow visit of ten American editors.
-325X1A
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25X1A
people would be eased in the future, may foreshadow a concerted Orbit campaign to give the impression that the Iron Curtain is a myth.
These developments, along with a recent hint that restrictions on Western diplomats' contacts with the Polish
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Three Viet Minh divisions identified in drive for Laos:
4.
Comment on removal of Pakistani Prime Minister and cabinet:
The resignation of Prime Minister Nazimuddin and his cabinet at the request of Governor General Ghulam Mohammad demonstrates that strong elements in Pakistan have decided finally to end the weakness which has characterized Nazimuddin's government during the past year.
It also represents a clear-cut effort to establish Pakistan as a secular state and to curtail the power of religious groups, whose recent agitation against the proposed Pakistani constitution and Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan has resulted in riots and political confusion. In taking his action, Ghulam Mohammad is supported by the army, and probably by the civil service.
25X1A

SOUTH ASIA
Prisoners taken by the French in northeastern Laos come from three Viet Minh 25X1A divisions, according to General Salan, the French commander in Indochina. He stated that while some observers had believed the Viet Minh threat to Laos was only a feint, he had realized from the beginning that it "portended serious action."
Comment: French headquarters in Saigon stated on 15 April that, according to reports from local inhabitants, a fourth enemy division was moving into Laos from the east. Salan's reference to prisoners is the first official indication that the opposing forces are in contact.
-4-
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Pakistan's foreign policy will continue to be Western-oriented, since the individuals who apparently motivated the change of government are all pro-Western. Mohammad Ali, the new Prime Minister, has been Ambassador to the United States since early 1952. He is pro-Western, fairly competent, but not an outstanding statesman. In the immediate future the new cabinet can do little to improve Pakistan's internal economic situation beyond streamlining the ministries which must combat the prospective food shortage and ominous financial situation.
5.
Britain has recommended that the Western powers make as "grand a gesture" as pos25X1A sible toward meeting the Soviet position on an Austrian treaty, even to the extent of unconditional withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty draft. The British do not believe that the USSR desires a treaty, and consider that the Western initiative should be designed to debunk Soviet "peace" moves and convince those Western elements which are impressed by them.
Comment: The United States has consistently opposed dropping the abbreviated treaty as a condition for the resumption of negotiations.

WESTERN EUROPE
British propose generous gesture to the USSR on Austrian treaty:
The British share the French and Austrian view that the short treaty is of limited effectiveness in obtaining concessions from the Russians and that the extraterritorial rights which would be granted the Russians under the long treaty could be counteracted once Soviet troops were withdrawn.
-5-
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7.
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22 April 1953
Copy No. 6 0
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
kete" . Soviet official agrees on necessity of Korean truce (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA
'be Viet Minh accompanying Laos invasion with increased activity

3.

SOUTH ASIA
4.
with India (page 4).
Comment on Pakistani Prime Minister's statement on relations

25X1
25X1A
in Tonkin delta (page 3). Cambodian King reportedly may abdicate in protest against French policy (page 4).
For R
eiApproved
ase 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100210001-5
25X1A
SOVIET UNION
1.
Soviet official agrees on necessity of Korean truce:

During Ambassador Bohlen's presentation of credentials, Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin expressed complete agreement that a truce in Korea was essential to any future improvement in the world situation. Neither Pushkin nor Klementi Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, commented on Bohlen's statement that the United States could never accept any agreement which would involve the forcible repatriation of prisoners.
25X1A
2.
Viet Minh accompanying Laos invasion with increased activity in Tonkin delta:
25X1A
Governor Tri of Tonkin has expressed considerable apprehension over the fact that Viet Minh operations in Laos are apparently being accotripanied by a serious re va o ac v y n e delta. He referred specifically to a strong guerrilla attack on 21 April against a town near Haiphong.
Comment: An increase in guerrilla activity in the delta has in the past accompanied Viet Minh offensives. If French reinforcements are sent to Laos from the delta, the latter's security, which has never been particularly strong, can be expected to grow proportionately weaker.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1A
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25X1A
3.
Cambodian King reportedly may abdicate in protest against French policy:

The King of Cambodia believes that French plans for administrative reorganization in Indochina will lower his status within the French Union, and he may abdicate unless France makes political concessionsi The King resents the cool treatment accorded him in Paris recently by Minister of Associated States Letourneau.
25X1A
25X1
4.

SOUTH ASIA
Comment: The King spoke out strongly against the French in a recent press interview in New York, in contrast to his usual practice of endorsing French policy.
Abdication at this time, when the Viet Minh threat to his country has sharply increased, might be interpreted in Cambodia as a repudiation of the policy of cooperation with France and would facilitate efforts of the Wet Minh to extend its influence.
Thdia:
Comment on Pakistani Prime Minister's statement on relations with
The 20 April statement of Pakistan's new Prime Minister regarding Indo-Pakistani relations was more likely intended to cause future embarrassment to India than to improve relations between the two countries. By stating that he is prepared to give Nehru the respect due the leader of a moreS important nation, by saying that he would not stand on ceremony, by agreeing to visit New Delhi if invited, and by even expressing a willingness to discuss common defense with India, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali has put the onus on India for the failure of any future negotiations between the two countries.
-425X1A
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/ /
.
I
SUMMARY
SOVIET TJNI0/4
/New pattern in top leadership emerging in USSR (page 3).

Diplomats in Moscow differ on nature of Soviet reply to Eisenhower (page 4).
25X1
I
Peiping slogans for May Day ignore Malenkov and honor Mao
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
FAR EAST
25X1
6.
Burmese Army chief orders slowdown on attacks against Chinese Nationalists (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7.
8.
Tudeh strength in Iranian armed forces estimated at 1,600

(page 6).
Iranian note issue increased over 40 percent (page 7). boor Comment on rumored Iraqi expansionism (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
East Germans act to meet "very serious" food situation (page 13).
****
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SOVIET UNION
1.
New pattern in top leadership emerging in USSR:

The new pattern of government and party shifts in at least two Soviet Republics suggests that the top position is no longer the First Party Secretaryship as it was under Stalin. The Georgian and Azerbaijan Party Buros, which correspond to the All-Union Party Presidium, now list as the first or most important member the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.
His present shift out of the Secretariat to head the government while retaining the number one position on the Republic's Party Buro exactly parallels Malenkov's shift on the AllUnion level, and suggests that Malenkov's request for release from the Secretaryship may not have reflected a loss in power.

-325X1A
This pattern is particularly clear in Azerbaijan where M. D. Bagirov, appointed Chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers, was released at his own request as the Republic's First Party Secretary, but retained his top listing--out of alphabetical order--on the Buro. who had been First Secretary in Azerbaijan since 1933,Bagirov, is unquestionably the top figure in the Azerbaijan hierarchy and following Stalin's death was elected an alternate on the All-Union Presidium, the new name for the old Politburo.
He was the only addition to that body in March, when it was cut from 25 members and 11 alternates to 10 members and 4 alternates. The appointment of a regional Party Secretary at that time was contrary to the pattern of the reduction, in which five of the six members who were local Secretaries were dropped.
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2.
Diplomats in Moscow differ on nature of Soviet reply to Eisenhower:
25X11
Ambassador Bohlen reports a difference of opinion among diplomats in Moscow on the possible Soviet reaction to President Eisenhower's foreign policy speech on 16 April.
Some diplomats consider that the Kremlin may prefer to remain silent to avoid taking a definite position at this time; that to attack the speech and reject the implied challenge would be in direct contradiction to the recent relatively temperate official statements. On the other hand, to welcome it might commit the USSR to courses of action on which it has not yet made up its mind.

-425X1A
Others argue that silence would strike a serious blow at the Soviet peace campaign, and would in effect be tantamount to a rejection.
Bohlen suggests that some form of official reaction will be forthcoming, possibly not immediately, either through a communication to the United States or an inspired editorial.
Comment: Distribution of the address at the diplomatic level almostden-rids an official reply from the Kremlin. An early reply would in all probability be motivated primarily by propaganda considerations.
Factors favoring a delayed response might include: the need for time to develop a well-coordinated line, and to consider effective countermeasures; a desire to avoid giving advance warning of Moscow's stand before the trend of the NATO conference becomes apparent; and an intention to use the Korean negotiations as a means of dissipating the effectiveness of the American initiative.
25X1A
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4.
Peiping slogans for May Day ignore
25X1A
Soviet Premier Malenkov. The place of on the list last went to Stalin, described as "great leader honor of the working peopleyear of the world." This year it goes to Mao Tse-tung, "great leader of the Chinese people."
Comment: line since Stalin's death in emphasizing Peiping has followed the Soviet the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party rather than that of any individual. It has also demonstrated its belief that Mao's personal prestige is greater than that of any living Soviet leader.

FAR EAST
Malenkov and honor Mao:
The 55 slogans issued by Peiping for use on May Day 1953 in China do not mention
25X1
25X1A
-5-
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6. Burmese Army chief orders slowdown on attacks against Chinese Nationalists:

.
25X1A
The Burmese Army commander, General Ne Win, on 21 April ordered commanders in north Burma to proceed with caution in further attacks against the Chinese Nationalists, I Ne Win was said to believe that an earlg cease-tire and evacuation of the Nationalists was possible.
This is the first indication that the Burmese Government rajr-Ticri curtailed its operations against the Chinese Nationalists.
Comment:
25X1
7.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Tudeh strength in Iranian armed forces estimated
at 1,600:
25X1A1
A commission of high-ranking Iranian Army officers appointed to examine Tudeh strength in the armed forces estimated a total Tudeh
25X1A
25X1t4e4
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membership of 900 in the army, 300 in the air force, and 200 each in the Military College and Military High School.
The commission concluded that the Tudeh hopes to become well entrenched in the armed forces within five years, and recommended that known Tudeh members be court-martialed and publicly stripped of their military insignia.
8.

Iranian note issue increased over 40 percent:
indicates Tudeh's emphAsis on long-range planning to influence the army.
membership in the services is less than one percent, the fact that approximately 20 percent of the two military schools are members
Comment:
While the percentage of Tudeh
A successful purge of Tudeh members in the armed forces would depend on government support.
Iranian Minister of Court Ala recently toll

25X1
25X1A
that the note issue has been increased by about $98,000,000, more than 40 percent above the authorized level.
Comment: Last September Prime Minister Mossadeq secretly authorized a 20-percent increase in the note issue. The subsequent expansion indicates the magnitude of Iran's present financial crisis and suggests that this may continue to be the only way in which Mossadeq can meet essential government obligations.
9.
Comment on rumored Iraqi expansionism: With the approach of the coronations on 2 May of two members of the Hashemite family, King Feisal of Iraq and King Husein of Jordan, reports indicate a growing Middle East
-725X1A
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belief that Iraq is planning some move toward realization of the traditional ambition of the Hashemites--union of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the former Palestine.
Syrian dictator Shishakli has reported an Iraqi conspiracy with former Syrian army officers to turn Syria into an Iraqi-ruled state. Press reports from Syria and Jordan speak of a federation between Iraq and Jordan to be consummated shortly after the coronations.
25X6 25X6
None of these reports has been established as valid. They reflect Iraqi enthusiasm for Arab unity, however, as well as non-Iraqi suspicion of the Hashemites. The Hashemites and Iraqi elder statesman Nazi Said have worked since 1920 for union of these states; they may consider the forthcoming celebrations an auspicious occasion to attempt it.
25X6
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
East Germans act to meet "very serious" food situation:

In view of the "very serious" food situation in East Germany, the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party reportedly decided on 14 April to reduce the number of ration cards by 1,200,000 and to ask the USSR for a respite in food reparations deliveries, direct assistance, and permission to draw on strategic food
25X1A
reserves.
.25X1A
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have been in short supply twut the winter and food reserves were
Comment:
Meat, fat; sugar and potatoes
drawn on in January to meet critical shortages. The tight food situation is expected to continue through the spring.

-925X1A
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24 April 1953
Copy No. 60
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Malenkov reportedly invites Mossadeq to visit Moscow (page 3).

FAR EAST
4.
British internee from North Korea confirms brutality (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1'
%rne
25X1A

U.
14.
7.
Laos wants Viet Minh aggression put before United Nations (page 4). French general foresees Viet Minh bridgehead in Thailand (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
republic (page 6).
Continent on Ma lan's statement in favor of a South African

EASTERN EUROPE
uomment on increased Arab-Israeli friction (page 6).
8.
Satellite policy conference reportedly held in Moscow (page 7).
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GENERAL
1.
Malenkov reportedly invites Mossadeq to visit Moscow: According to a member of the Soviet Legation in Baghdad, Premier Malenkov has extended an official invitation to Prime Minister Mossadeq to visit Moscow.
25X1
25X1A
2.
25X1A
after their capture, claims that during the march north there was a 68-percent death rate with the number of prisoners in Lord's group declining from 722 to 289. Stragglers were shot.
He revealed that food conditions for internees improved greatly in August 1952 when the Chinese began to provide the food supply. Lord also states that while North Korea has been leveled and the people reduced to living in caves, present bombing only increases their will to resist.

FAR EAST
Comment: It is unlikely that Mossadeq would leave Iran as long as his political position remains unstable. The Iranian Foreign Minister emphatically denied a 5 April press report of such an invitation.
Mossadeq has repeatedly tried to obtain concessions from the West by threatening to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union.
British internee from North Korea confirms brutality:

Salvation Army Commissioner Lord, a British internee from North Korea who was with elements of the US 7th Division
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Comment: This is the first eyewitness report from a non-American civi ian of Communist brutality toward UN prisoners.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Laos wants Viet Minh aggression put before United Nations:
25X1A1
4.
25X1A

Southeast Asia.
The Laotian Foreign Minister told the American Charge on 22 April that his government wants the question of Viet Minh aggression officially put before e ne a ons. e Crown Prince is to meet with high French authorities on 24 April to determine whether France is willing to present a Laotian appeal and, if so, in what manner.
I
Comment: In mid-April an official of the French Foreign Ministry,M-72reTring to action against Laos; stated that the problem in Indochina was one of "civil war" and that an appeal to the UN would probably be made only in the event
the Chinese Communists cross the border. This statement reflects

the consistent French policy of opposing any UN role in Indochina.
French general foresees Viet Minh bridgehead in Thailand:
General de Linares, French commander in Tonkin, believes the Viet Minh may be attempting to reach the Thailand-Laos border and to join with Communist elements in northern Thailand. If this is accomplished; he says; the "roads would be open in all directions" for a Communist advance into
-4-
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The American Embassy in Bangkok states that Thai officials are seriously worried that the Viet Minh offensive may be a prelude to a deep thrust into Southeast Asia. The Embassy feels that after the seizure of Laos and the establishment there of a puppet government, the Viet Minh may use the same strategy in Cambodia, thus splitting Southeast Asia in two. There also may be a future link-up between a "Free Laos" government and the Peiping-sponsored Thai autonomous state in southern Yunnan.
Comment: There are 50,000 Vietnamese living in northern Thailand, most of whom are sympathetic to the Viet Minh. There have been recent reports of paramilitary activity among these people, possibly timed to coincide with the present Viet Minh offensive.
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-525X1A
Because of the rapidly approaching rainy season and extended supply lines, it will confine its current campaign to seems likely that the Viet Minh northern Laos and leave further objectives for a future campaign, possibly in October.
SX1A
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A series of minor Arab-Israeli armed clashes and incidents has been magnified and publicized by both parties to dramatize the unsettled situation and, if possible, to place side. This publicity appears timed in anticipation the onus on the other of Secretary Dulles' visit in early May. While the acrimonious exchange of charges and threats will increase local tension and make any approaches to settlement more difficult, there is no indication that there will be a change in the status quo.
7.
Comment on Malan's statement in favor of a South African republic:
Prime Minister Malan's 22 April statement that a South African republic will be established soon as he considers the country ripe for it suggests that he now feelsas strong enough to push toward this goal.
A. South African republic long been a Nationalist objective, but Malan took no overt steps has toward it during his first five years in office and reference to the issue was soft-pedalled in the election campaign. A South African republic with status comparable to India's would not necessarily withdraw from the British although this course is favored by Nationalist extremists. Commonwealth,

-625X1A
6.
Comment on increased Arab-Israeli friction:
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EASTERN EUROPE
8.
Satellite policy conference reportedly held in Moscow:

The American Minister to Hungary has been
25X1
25X1A
informed I
conterence was held in Moscow sometime between 12 and 18 April.
I that a Satellite foreign policy
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Comment: Although there is no information available to corroborate this report, such a meeting may have been held in order to acquaint Satellite leaders with current Soviet policy developments and organizational changes planned for the Satellites.
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Hungarian Deputy Premier Gero and Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov are reported to have led their respective delegations.
HR70-14 HR70-14
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SECURITY SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION
ekyl
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2.
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FAR EAST
-3-
independent military military action in Korea: Rhee reportedly planning planning Independent
21 April and urged that plans be drawn 2 1 April drawn up up campaign in in the the event event of of a a truce u or p an e in n ependent d e n t South South Korean campaign Korea without the unification of Korea.
I President Rhee Rhee convened convened a ' I meetinn meeting of of all all available general general officers on on
ee expremea-me*Knee expressea me the belief that that "regardless "regardlessof ofwhat w Washington thinks or does," the American army armywould would have no other choice chotce but to support support a aSouth South Korean offensive. offensive.
25X1
s4ase 265110ROff.BILlaBgrt9T0e
2.May 1953
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oiL7 Tr;71)
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1.
2.
Soviet ambassador seeks clarification of US intentions (page 3). Molotov receives Yugoslav diplomat (page-3).
FAR EAST
3.
Ambassador Briggs says South Korean people would support armistice (page 4)
25X1
5.
6.
7.
8. 9.
25X1A
10.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
United States pictured as opposing Cambodian demands for greater independence (page 5). French officials foresee satisfactory end to Cambodian negotiations
(page 5).
to UN (page 6).
French foreign minister explains his opposition to Laotian appeal

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Britain discouraged by Egyptian attitude in defense talks (page 6). Israel wants Palestine problem linked to Anglo-Egyptian talks
(page 7). WESTERN EUROPE
Adenauer expected to press for definitive Bundesrat vote on EDC

(page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Soviet ,ambassador seeks clarification of US intentions: During a courtesy call by Ambassador Dillon in Paris, Soviet Ambassador Pavlov, speaking of President Eisenhower's speech, said that it appeared that Secretary Dulles did not agree with President Eisenhower and that "this created a difficult situation." He emphasized that the fundamental question was whether the United States accepted the possibility of co-existence based on the choice by all countries of their own form of government without outside interference.
25X1A
2.. Molotov receives Yugoslav diplomat:

25X1A
ve
According to the Yugoslav charge, the only remark of significance was Molotov's offer to include Yugoslavia as a nation sharing the desire for world peace.
Comment: Yugoslav leaders have indicated they would not accept any Soviet gestures of reconciliation unless they were accompanied by concrete steps toward a reversal of Soviet and Satellite policy toward Yugoslavia.

een rece ve
Commenting that the future of the world lay in the hands of the American and Soviet people, Pavlov stated that no other country had any real importance. When questioned regarding China's role, Pavlov said China has a 'lot of people" but "does not compare" in importance with the United States and the USSR.
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov received the Yugoslav charge on 29 April for a courtesy visit. It was the first time since the 1948 break in relations that a Yugoslav representaor any purpose by the Soviet foreign minister.
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FAR EAST
3.
Ambassador Briggs says South Korean people would support armistice:

In contrast to adamant government opposition to a cease-fire, the majority of the South Korean people are passive and war-weary and would accept an armistice "honestly described as a mbassador Briggs reports.
25X1
ep
peace
Comment: Officially inspired opposition to an armistice, probably de7Iiiilaro secure major American guarantees, has implied that South Korean troops will be ordered northward if the UN concludes an unfavorable armistice. Statements attributed to South Korean Army Chief of Staff Paek Sun-yop, however, stressing the army's inability to hold the battle line without continued American material aid and supporting units, suggest that South Korean military officials are taking a more realistic view.
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25X1A
He states that wartime hardships and economic insecurity override any desire for unification, but that the present official attitude prevents an expression of popular opposition.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
5.
United States pictured as opposing Cambodian demands for greater independence:
25X1A
The charge points to the danger of the United States being put in a position of apparently opposing Cambodian desires for a fuller degree of independence within the French Union.
Comment: The high commissioner's distorted presentation of American views will tend to confirm an opinion widely held in Asia that the United States supports French colonialism.
6.
French officials foresee satisfactory end to Cambodian negotiations:

French-Cambodian negotiations now in progress in Paris will probably end in a settlement acceptable to the Cambodians, according to French officials in Saigon. The French diplomatic counselor stated that a formula was under consideration which would permit Cambodia a greater degree of military and judicial authority, but that economic concessions were "more difficult."
25Xlrt
Comment: The current demands of the king and other Cambodian spokesmen go far beyond such limited concessions as the French are apparently contemplating; and there is little chance that these will satisfy the Cambodians in their present mood.

-525X1A
he French high commissioner in Phnom Penh Ihas been telling members of the royal family nd others that the United States has officially enounced the Cambodian king's demands for greater autonomy, according to the American charge. Representatives of the palace have questioned the embassy on the veracity of the high commissioner's assertions.
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25X1A
7.
French foreign minister explains his opposition to Laotian appeal to UN:

In explaining to Ambassador Dillon his opposition to a Laotian appeal to the UN, French Foreign Minister Bidault stated his stand was based on fear that France would not be treated airly in t g He admitted that Premier Mayer, President Auriol, and Minister for Associated States Letourneau favor an appeal.
25X1A
8.
Britain discouraged by Egyptian attitude in defense talks:
25X1A
Egypt has confronted the British negotiators with a reversal of attitude on the establishment of technical subcommittees to discuss British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base. According to the British Embassy in Cairo, no progress was made during the first days of the talks.
Egypt insists that "complete Egyptianization" of the base and the right to determine the nationality of foreign technicians be recognized in the terms of reference of the subcommittee.
General Robertson, a British delegate, has told Ambassador Caffery he will be most discouraged if this stand proves to be more than a tactical maneuver.
Comment: There is no indication whether this apparent change in affiliWW1 the conference table represents a tactic or an unyielding position. Britain will not accept exclusively Egyptian control of the base.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
-625X1A
Dillon has learned that Bidault's stand may be due also to his apprehension that a UN appeal would damage French prestige in the French Union and set a precedent for UN jurisdiction on North African questions.
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9.
Israel wants Palestine problem linked to Anglo-Egyptian talks:
Israel believes that a Palestine settlement can be achieved if the United States promises to help 25X1A Egypt reach a favorable agreement with Britain in return for an Egyptian settlement with Israel. This opinion was voiced by Israeli UN delegate Rafael in New York, who suggested that the first step in this direction should be an American declaration regarding the importance of a Palestine settlement. This could then be followed by appropriate diplomatic action. Israeli Ambassador Eban later similarly suggested to Ambassador Lodge at the UN that the two problems be linked. He recommended that Secretary Dulles when in Cairo make clear that the United States expects a settlement between Egypt and Israel on the basis of direct negotiations.
Comment; Any effort to tie Arab-Israeli peace settlements to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Suez Canal zone would seriously endanger the talks and would have unfavorable repercussions throughout the Arab world.
10.
Adenauer expected to press for definitive Bundesrat vote on EDC:
West German Government officials generally believe that Chancellor. Adenauer will make 25X1A another effort to secure a showdown vote on the Bonn and Paris treaties in the Bundesrat. The US High Commission believes that this can be accomplished only if the present Bundesrat delegation from Lower Saxony is replaced by one favorable to the government, since there is now little prospect of changes in Reinhold Maier's Baden-Wuerttemberg delegation.
If Adenauer is unable to effect changes in the Bundesrat, he may be obliged again to ask President Heuss to promulgate the treaties without upper house action, or to ask the Constitutional Court for a prior advisory opinion on the treaties' legality.

WESTERN EUROPE
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Comment: There is still a possibility that Reinhold Maier will assent to an early vote. Otherwise he will face severe criticism from his party colleagues at the Free Democratic Party convention next month.

-825X1A
da2004/C770f!
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opy No.
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25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
May. Day celebrations emphasize peace (page 3).

FAR.EAST
3.
Long detention of Korean war prisoners might reduce opposition to repatriation (page 3). Peiping propaganda may be designed to deter Thailand from aiding French (page 4).
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GENERAL
1. May Day celebrations emphasize peace:

May Day celebrations throughout the Communist Orbit played down the past theme of military strength and stressed instead the current campaign of conciliation. Major speeches offered no concessions on any important issues and left the current state of divisive issues between East and West essentially unchanged.
12.
25X1A
Long detention of Korean war prisoners might reduce opposition to repatriation:
Ambassador Briggs fears that a long detention of Communist prisoners now unwilling to be repatriated might cause many of them to change their minds. He notes that this would create ser ous embarrassment for the United States and a propaganda victory for the Communists.
Briggs recommends that the Chinese and North Korean prisoners be handled separately. He urges that the neutral trustee be given the power of final decision, making possible a speedy transfer to South Korean authorities of the 32,000 North Koreans who are opposed to repatriation. He also suggests that the Chinese prisoners, most of whom say they want to go to Formosa, be retained initially in Korea. He fears that an attempt to send them elsewhere would make them apprehensive
that eventually they would be returned to Communist control.

FAR EAST
-3-
25X1A
Editorials and speeches from Moscow reiterated the collective character of the new Soviet Government In Communist China, contrary to the past practice of featuring Stalin along with Mao, Malenkov and other Soviet leaders were given secondary rank following portraits of Mao and his lieutenants.
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President Rhee informed General Clark on 27 April that his people would never permit removal of North Korean prisoners from Korea, and that the prisoners themselves would resist it. Although Chou En-lai appeared interested last October in a distinction between Chinese and Korean prisoners, Peiping now insists that all prisoners must be physically removed from Korea so as to free them from "apprehensions."
Comment:
3.
Peiping propaganda may be designed to deter Thailand from aiding French:

The American consul general at Hong Kong believes that recent Chinese Communist propaganda attacks on Thailand, alleging Thai military aid to the French, are designed both to deter the Thais from giving aid to Laos and to prepare the ground for possible future action against Thailand from Laos.
25X1A
He comments that there is no doubt that the Chinese Communists intend eventually to bring about the downfall of the Thai Government, but he does not foresee any early Chinese military action.
Comment: The Chinese Communist press, after failing to mention the Laos invasion until 29 April, now reports it as the work of a "Laotian People's Liberation Army."
As yet no 'liberation" movement has developed in Thailand for Peiping to support. The "Thai Autonomous Government" established in Southwest China last February can be used in a long-range program to subvert the Thai Government.

-425X1A
25X1

HR70-14
1. Soviet Soviet official official links Korean Korean and and Austrtan Austrian issues: 1.
=
_/./ln
-
* I SECURITY INFOMTION INFORMATION SECURITY
TOP SECRET CANOE., -ANOL

GENERAL GENERAL
In an tnformal informal conversation with Western In representatives, representatives, the theSoviet Sovietdeputy deputy political adviser in Austria flatly stated that a a Korean before an an Austrian agreement must be concluded before treaty could e said that the USSR USSR would be He would beat atI agreat great distreaty could be be signed. stgned. H advantage if if subsequent subsequent to to withdrawal withdrawalof ofits its forces forces from Austria an extension of of the the Far East extenslon East conflict conflict resulted resultedin inSoviet Sovietinvolvement involvement In in a general war.
Comment: The USSR USSR may may well well exploit exploit a stalemate as Korean stalemate asa aconvenient coiGiGXexcuse for further further stalling stalling on on an major issues. Austrian peace treaty and other major
2.
MIG-15build-up build-up in in Manchuria Manchuria may may be under way: MIG-15 way:
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FAR EAST EAST FAR
3-3 -
He tmportance of He stressed stressed the importance of restoring mutual confidence, that an an Austrian Austrian peace peace treaty could then then be be settled settled confidence, adding that easily.
At a Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet air conference conference at a tAntung Antung in March, March, it it was was reportedly reportedly decided decided to assign additional MIG-15 KIG-15 aircraft to to each of of stx six 100 additional aircraft of The rehabilitation airfields in Manchurta. airfields in Manchuria. The rehabilitation of a e s n o h Xorea Korea was also discussed at the conference, conference, but but the ranking Soviet air adviser adviser indicated indicatedthat that the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Air Force Force could could operate operate "more ''more efficiently effictentlyfrom fromManchurian Manchurian bases." bases."
Comment: Intercepted messages confirm confirm that a joint air by airconference-WE-Ed conferencemd byhigh high Soviet, Soviet, Chinese Chineseand and North North Korean officers officerswas washeld heldat atAntung Antung in in March. March.
United Nations pilots pilots reported sighting United Nations sighting on on 22 22 April an MIG-15aircraft aircraft at Antung airfield an unprecedented unprecedented 400 400 to 500 MIG-15 Antung airfield and atTatungkuo. Tatungkuo. and an an equal equal number number at
CANOE
.-
,,-0P-SEGREL CANOT, CANOE,

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-4
-CANOE
RET CANOE
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25X1
8 May 1953
25X1
Copy No.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
\.r.omment on new Communist proposal in the Korean talks (page 3). t.-C British views regarding UN appeal on Laos (page 3).
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
25X1
De Gaulle's break with followers may delay Mayer's downfall

(page 5).
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GENERAL
1.
Comment on new Communist proposal in the Korean talks:
In their new proposal for settling the POW issue, the Communists, while moving toward a cease-fire, still appear determined not to accept any arrangement which would result in failure to repatriate a substantial number of prisoners.
Should the United Nations reject this proposal, the Communists eventually might accept as an alternative the disposition of the unwilling by the five-nation commission, which includes India.
2.
British views regarding UN appeal on Laos:

,
The British Foreign Office believes that an appeal to the United Nations on Laos should 25X1A be extended to embrace all Indochina and should specify Communist China as the supp er o war ma er s. Otherwise, the Communists are likely to claim that the struggle in Indochina is a civil war over which the United Nations has no jurisdiction.
The 7 May proposal offers certain compromises, but does not alter the Communist position on the critical point regarding the disposition of prisoners unwilling to return after Communist "explanations" to them. The Communists continue to propose that the fate of these prisoners be decided by a political conference.,
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WESTERN EUROPE
5.
De Gaulle's break with followers may delay Mayer's downfall:
25X1A
As a result of the break between General de Gaulle and his followers, a showdown in the French Parliament over Premier Mayer's program may be delayed while the nonommun $ par es vie for the deputies just cut adrift.
The Embassy believes that no more than one third of the Gaullist deputies will remain in opposition. An important number may shift toward the Independents, and others are expected to join the Radical Socialists, the Popular Republicans, and the Socialists.
Comment: The dissolution of the Gaullist parliamentary group remr:o7gFiETstrongest rallying point for nonCommunist critics of close French cooperation with United States policy. While it makes more certain the support of some Gaullist deputies for the EDC, no great change in government policy on key issues can be expected before the national congresses expected next
month.
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da.12Approved
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
(4"7 Ambassador Bohlen reports no evidence of change in Soviet

.
policy toward Germany (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
France will not oppose appeal to UN on Laos if brought by Thailand (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
2<omment on withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Laos (page 3).

25X1
India approves of latest Chinese offer on Korea (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6.
Acting Iranian minister of court reveals plans for new government (page 6). Ambassador Caffery comments on Anglo-Egyptian impasse
(page 7).
25X6
7.
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Ambassador Bohlen reports no evidence of change in Soviet policy toward Germany:
Ambassador Bohlen reports that articles published by East German Communist 25X1A leaders Grotewohl and Ulbricht in the Moscow press on the anniversary of German surrender do not indicate a change in Soviet policy toward
Germany.
of a policy change are without foundation.

Comment:
other recent pronouncements of Ulbricht and follow the familiar pattern of East German propaganda extolling the socialization of East Germany.
Recent rumors of a Soviet policy change toward Germany appear in some cases to be plants designed for French consumption or to be mere speculation.
2.
Comment on withdrawal of Viet Minh troops from Laos:
Numerous reports from official and other sources describe a large-scale withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos. French troops have completely lost what limited contact they had with the enemy, thus further clouding the confused picture of Viet Minh unit locations and intentions.
The firmest indications that the major offensive in Laos is drawing to a close are the withdrawal of the bulk of two divisions toward Tonkin and the easing of pressure

SOUTHEAST ASIA.
He believes that the articles, which are similar to those written during Stalin's lifetime and set forth a socialized East Germany as a model for a unified Germany, may be an attempt by the East German leaders to show that rumors
The articles are similar to
-325X1A
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on Luang Prabang. The reported retreat may have been brought
about by a combination of factors, including the imminent onset of heavy rains, shortages of supplies, troop fatigue, and French reinforcements.
The Viet Minh probably will not abandon
3.
France will not oyaose appeal to UN on Laos if brought by Thailand:
French Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Maurice Schumann has informed Ambassador 25X1A Dillon that France "would certainly not oppose" Thai sponsorship of the Laotian case before the UN. Schumann believes that an appeal by a fully independent Asian country would not directly expose French Union policies to attack as would an appeal by France.
Comment: Schumann's statement probably does not yet represent an agreed government position, since President Auriol and Premier Mayer have sided with Foreign Minister Bidault against a French initiative in the UN. Bidault has also opposed any UN discussion of the issue on the ground that this might provide a sounding board for anti-colonial charges against France.
A UN appeal by Thailand, rather than France, over aggression against a member of the French Union would further lower Francet.s prestige in the three Associated States.

-425X1A
Laos completely. A sizable force of up to one division was last reported in the Xieng Khouang area, and elements may be probing southward to establish a bridgehead on the Mekong River. The consolidation of territorial gains and the pinning down of isolated French garrisons would be logical aims for the rainy season and would be possible with comparatively few troops.
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5.
India approves of latest Chinese offer on Korea:
According to the Indian foreign secretary, the Chinese Communist Government has kept India informed of the progress of negotiations at Panmunjom, and the government believes t t e atest Chinese proposals are based on a genuine desire to end Korean hostilities. Noting the similarity between the Chinese offer and the 3 December Indian resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly, New Delhi considers that the stage has been reached where settlement is possible.

SOUTH ASIA
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The Indian Government also believes that an armistice in Korea might lead to decreased tension in Southeast Asia.
Comment: India has apparently restored relations with Communist China to the status existing prior to the Communist denunciation of the Indian resolution last November. India's judgment probably is blurred by its strong desire to play the role of peacemaker.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6.
25X1A
Iran's economic crisis must be solved, and that if this is to be done, he and his suppor ers must control the security forces. His brother, General Mahmud Amini, is already in charge of the gendarmerie and their friend, General Modaber, heads the police. The three are maneuvering to replace Army Chief of Staff Riahi who takes his orders from Mossadeq.
Amini stated that the differences between the shah and Mossadeq must be reconciled in order to isolate the Tudeh. He emphasized that his program could be carried out without violence and suggested that Mossadeq might be encouraged
to retire.
I

Comment:
25X1
I
Acting Iranian minister of court reveals plans for new government:

Acting Minister of Court Amini told an American Embassy officer on 6 May that
25X1
It is unlikely, however, that Mossadeq would 15X support any plan which would undermine his position and which would concentrate control of the security forces in the hands of men not personally loyal to him.
Ii
-625X1A
SX1A
Approved F
elease 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01100370001-8
Amini and his associates appear to be suave and powerful Iranian landlords who may be seeking to take Iran over completely. It would be difficult, however, for them to outwit
Mossadeq.
7.
Ambassador Caffery comments on Anglo-Egyptian impasse:
25X1
The result in the case of Egypt, Caffery says, has been not only hatred but an almost ineradicable suspicion and didtrust of the British. He adds that while he appreciates the tremendous difficulties a change in British policy would entail, there is the possibility of violent upheaval in the area which would affect the entire Middle East.
8.
Comment on moves to speed EDC passage in German Bundesrat:
The assurance given by Minister President Maier of Baden-Wuerttemberg to Chancellor Adenauer that he would vote for the two EDC contractual laws requiring Bundesrat approval seems to promise an end of the parliamentary impasse on the Bonn and Paris treaties. The upper house will consider the treaties at its 15 May session.
The importance of Maier's attitude is heightened by the decision of Waldemar Kraft, leader of the refugee party, not to alter the government of Lower Saxony, a move he had been considering in order to give the Bonn government a Bundesrat majority.

WESTERN EUROPE
American Ambassador Caffery in Cairo believes that the impasse in which the British now find themselves in Egypt stems from a mistaken long:range Middle East policy. He states that with the deterioration of the British position in the Middle East, the Foreign Office in London has been tragically incapable of developing a new basis for satisfactory relationship with peoples of the area.
-725X1A
SX 1A
Approved F oci Release 2003112103 : CIA-RDP79T00975Af 01100370001-8
of the treaties do not require Bundesrat approval. There is still, however, opposition from the Socialists in the Baden-Wuerttemberg Government. Maier will discuss the matter with them and possibly
Socialist Chairman 011enhauer on 11 May.
State leaders of Maier's Free Democratic Party have agreed that two other laws containing the major portion

-825X1A
rit/ filifiAse WISOffe6EpERdisibToteler

0 25X0
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Copy
kr
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DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. f DECLASSIF!ED CLASS. CHANOLD TO: I ;ENT rIEVI.7.;:itt:JiH t.UIH: 7C)',
TS S C
DA1
25X$
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+elease 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79700975

SUMMARY
75114
001100400001-4
GENERAL
eneral Nagib adamant on Egyptian position (page 3).
to new UN truce ro osals (page 4).
6.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Devaluation of piaster stirs strong reactions in Indochina (page 6).

25X1
25X1A
Approved F H Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 01100400001-4
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
General Nagib adamant on Egyptian position: General Nagib told Secretary Dulles on 11 May that he foresaw a worsening of Anglo-Egyptian
25X1A
relations, adding: "an agreement I could make with the United Kingdom now, I will not be able to make in a month or two." He predicted that if Anglo-Egyptian differences are not resolved, the resulting situation in Egypt might be exploited by "the United Kingdom, the Communists, and others who have an interest in chaos."
The general stated that Egypt insists on full control of the Suez base, and that anything else would be an infringement of Egyptian sovereignty.
Nagib told the Secretary that no Arab government could go against the will of the people, who "hate the British" and are bitter against the United States and France for supporting Britain. A defense agreement will be possible only if confidence is re-established between the United Kingdom and Egypt. "If I and my people feel oppressed, there is no point in making an agreement with us," he declared. He charged that within a week of the conclusion of the recent Sudan agreement, British officials "began to undermine it."
Nagib stated that "after the British get out, I am pretty sure I can reach an agreement" on peace with Israel. The general added that he was prepared to discuss informally with the United States the question of planning for area defense.
Comment: Indefinite British occupation of the canal zone under present arrangements could develop into a catastrophe for Western relations with the Arab world. Britain accordingly faces the choice between unconditional withdrawal in the hope that subsequently Egypt will agree to some Western participation in maintaining the base, and remaining in the canal zone at the risk of serious disorders. There is no indication that Britain is willing to yield on its stand.

-325X1A
Approved Fo
elease 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001 100400001-4
25X1A
2.
Probable Communist response to new UN truce proposals:
The Communists are expected to reject flatly the current proposals of the UN Command regarding prisoners unwilling to be repatriated. The United Nations has suggested that the unwilling Korean prisoners be released as soon as an armistice is signed, and further, that those Chinese be released who remain unwilling to return after 60 days of Communist access to them.
Communist negotiators have consistently refused to agree to any arrangement which, in their view, would be likely to result in the nonrepatriation of a substantial number of prisoners. They have shown no interest in recent months in distinguishing between Korean and Chinese prisoners. They have demanded a lengthy period for "explanations" to all of the unwilling and, for those who remain so, disposition by a political conference. The Communists have most recently sought four months for "explanations," after first seeking six; they are unlikely to compromise on Less than three. Relying on India as the fifth member of the five-nation neutral commission, the Communists, if threatened with a recess in the talks, might eventually propose that the fate of those who remain unwilling to be repatriated be decided by that body.
25X1
25X1

-425X1A
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6.
25X1A
The reaction of the Vietnamese Government to the French devaluation of the piaster on 10 May has been emphatically unfavorable and it has formally protested France's failure to consult n conformity with the FrenchVietnamese economic agreement. Laotian officials are reported to be even angrier than the Vietnamese at the failure of the French to consult them. A high French official expects the Cambodians to use the devaluation as a pretext for withdrawal from the Indochinese monetary union.
A significant unofficial Vietnamese attitude is that devaluation indicates the inherent weakness of France and favors greater Vietnamese direction of their own affairs.
25X1
Devaluation of piaster stirs strong reactions in Indochina:
25X1A
SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1
Approved For Release 2003111104 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0011004000014

SBA
I25X1
se 2062011161EGR -Thr
WS
16 May 1953
Copy No.
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25X

No CHANGE IN CLASS
I
7
rYECLASS;FIED
CLASS. ci :ICIZED TO: TO Ste D rE

AUTH:
DOCUMENT NO
-/^!-,Alf
L.A.,12.44 n :::vi:wan:j
hi
25X
25X1
TOP SECRET
rsad
25X1
For more information on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
25X1A
F
oiApproved
Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100420001-2
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
tecthee persists in desire for security treaty with United States (page 3).
2
Yoshida likely to head next Japanese government (page 31

SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1
\\dils.raos dissatisfied with Thai security measures on border (page 4).

Native troops in Indochina mutiny against French (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
Adenauer reportedly disapproves of Churchill proposals (page 7).
25X1A
Approved F
5X1A
Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01100420001-2
FAR EAST
1.
Rhee persists in desire for security treaty with United States:

Ambassador Briggs and Adviser Murphy report that South Korean support for an armistice is doubtful unless the United States agrees to a security pact with the Rhee government.
25X1A
The difficulties inherent in any security arrangement are complicated by the emotional attitudes of government leaders on the Korean unification issue. For example, Foreign Minister Pyun said on 14 May, as Rhee had earlier, that South Korea would "rely on its own forces" to push into North Korea rather than await the outcome of postarmistice negotiations on unification.
2.
Yoshida likely to head next Japanese government:
25X1A
Financial interests are exerting pressure on the Progressives to support Yoshida's Liberals in an effort to stabilize the government. There are also reports that some 30 Progressives may back Yoshida, which would make it possible for the Liberal Party to gain a working majority.

Comment:
Murphy states that President Rhee is becoming more reconciled to a truce based on the UN 7 May counterproposals, but that he will continue to create difficulties for American policy unless he secures some "satisfactory" security arrangement.
American officials in Tokyo believe that the re-election of Shigeru Yoshida as prime minister early next week is virtually assured. Yoshida probably will be forced to form a single-party minority cabinet because of opposition to a coalition within the Liberal and Progressive parties.
-325X1A
Approved F
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Release 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100420001-2
25X1A
The mechanics of the vote and him of being one of the candidates Yoshida's strength apparently and the likely winner in the decisive second ballot which is a run-off between the two highest candidates on the first ballot.
Comment:
25X1
4.
Laos dissatisfied with Thai security measures on border:

The American charge in Vientiane reports that the Laotian government is dissatisfied with Thailand's efforts to neutralize the proViet Minh Vietnamese along the border. The government compla ns that no control has been exercised over the Vietnamese' most dangerous leaders, who are now crossing the Mekong River into Laos.
The charge comments that an early solution to this problem is necessary since a renewal of a major Wet Minh campaign against Laos in the fall appears to be "almost certain."
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
-425X1A
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100420001-2

%itApproved
25X1A
The American embassy in Bangkok had already reported that Thai efforts to control the Vietnamese have been cautious in order to avoid unnecessary incidents. It is highly unlikely, in any event, that Thailand will ever be able to seal the border completely.
Comment:
5.
Native troops in Indochina mutiny against French:

Two companies of troops of the Muong ethnic minority at a garrison in the Tonkin delta mutinied on 11 May and deserted to the Viet Minh, according to Governor Tri of North
Comment: Only one incident of mutiny has been admitted by the French in the past.
25X1

- 5 -
Vietnam. This episode climaxes long-standing dissatisfaction at the treatment accorded the Muong by their French superiors. Governor Tri further stated that about three months ago an entire Muong battalion had mutinied, but that the episode was hushed up.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1

Approved F oi Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100420001-2
25X1A
25X1
10. Adenauer reportedly disapproves of Churchill proposals:

Adenauer informed French toreign minister Bidault on 13 May of his objections to Uhurchill's recent speech in the House of Commons, and maintained that there s ould be no Allied-Russian negotiations until the EDC becomes operative. The chancellor was particularly upset by Churchill's references to a possible "eastern Locarno" formula for easing East-West tensions in Europe.
1Chancellor
25X1
25X1A
IBidault unsuccessfully attempted to urge Adenauer to support a bid for talks with Moscow, with disarmament as the first agenda item.
25X1

WESTERN EUROPE
-725X1A
Approved F644 lease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00' 100420001-2
25X1A
Despite his basic opposition to four-power talks at this time, Adenauer may now publicly adopt a more positive attitude to improve his position on German unity prior to the September national elections.
Comment:
Bidault's proposal, first put forward on 25 April, has already been rejected by American and British officials. He may, however, insist on sending formal notes to the Allies requesting that such an approach be made to the Soviet Union.

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17 May 1953
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Copy No.
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Pr

DOCUMENT NO.
UE::i;;LI.IEW DATE:

NTH: FIR 70A,
DAT431,!-" ' REVIEWER:I
r0: TS S
Co-/Wu.
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0
IVP SECRET
f
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For info on OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
5X1A
Approved F
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A
1100430001-1
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
%Peiping states Communistswill "never" accept immediate release

/5f Korean prisoners (page 3).
25X1
4.
Ado
7.
25X1
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
(page 6).
3.
New information substantiates earlier report of Satellite policy conference in mid-April (page 4). Comment on Czech release of Oatis (page 5).
Outlook brighter for European Political Community (page 5). EDC further delayed in French Assembly (page 6). French urge prevention of return of Otto Strasser to Germany
EASTERN EUROPE
5X1A
Approved Fo
elease 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100430001-1
FAR EAST
1.
Peiping states Communists will "never"accept immediate release of Korean prisoners:
Comment: The Communists are undoubtedly encouraged by the unfavorable comment from other UN allies on the
first proposal, and they will almost certainly persist in rejecting it. They appear disposed to compromise on other points, although there is still no evidence that they are prepared to accept any arrangement which would be likely to result in nonrepatriation of a substantial number of prisoners.
A long editorial in the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party on 16 May em25X1A phasizes that the UN Command's proposal to release with an armistice all Korean prisoners unwilling to be repatriated "can never be accepted." Less emphatic language is used in objecting to other UN proposals regarding the work of the neutral commission, arrangements for Communist access to the unwilling, and the release after 60 days of those who remain so.
25X1
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3.
New information substantiates earlier report of Satellite policy conference in mid-April:

Recent reliable information that the Czech and Bulgarian premiers were absent from their respective countries in April adds credibility to a previous report that a meeting of Satellite leaders was held in Moscow sometime during the week of 12 to 18 April Ito ld the American legation at that time that they were fairly certain that Hungarian Deputy Premier Gero was attending such a meeting.
I
25X1
25X1
On 21 April the Bulgarian foreign mini,ster Ithat Premier Chervenkov "was back from his trip." A Czech Foreign Ministry official told Ambassador Wadsworth on 12 May that Prime Minister Siroky had been "away part of the time" during the past month. During this period, the Polish and Rumanian premiers made no public appearance in their respective countries.
told I
The meeting would presumably have been held to inform Satellite leaders on recent developments in Soviet policy and possible organizational changes planned for the Satellites.

EASTERN EUROPE
-425X1A
Approved Fo
4elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A001100430001-1
25X1A
4.
Comment on Czech release of Oatis: The pardon of AP correspondent William Oatis is one more conciliatory Communist gesture to the free world without cost to the USSR. The quick follow-up in Pravda and the fact that the pardon was granted within four days aire-r-rmbassador Bohlen's approach to the Soviet foreign minister on the question are clear indications of Moscow's participation in the decision. It is probably timed to take advantage of differences now developing among Western countries over negotiations with the Soviet bloc. In addition to contributing to the Kremlin's "peace offensive," the Czech government probably considers that this pardon will lead to the restoration of its overflight privileges over western Germany and the reopening of the American market to Czech exports. The American embargo in late 1951 virtually eliminated Czechoslovakia's dollar income and seriously curtailed its ability to obtain strategic commodities from the West.
5.
Outlook brighter for European Political Community:
25X1A
According to Ambassador Bruce, Chancellor Adenauer and Premier de Gasperi were gratified at the progress made by the foreign ministers of the six "Little Europe" coun r es a e r recent European Political Community meeting, which was an unexpected success. They attribute this to the improvement in Bidault's attitude since their meeting last March in Strasbourg.
The final communique on the meeting was the first outright commitment of the six foreign ministers to the creation of a political community as called for in the EDC treaty.

WESTERN EUROPE
-525X1A
Approved
FOP% Release
2004/01/16 : CIA-R0P79100975A01:11 100430001-1
25X1A
6.
EDC further delayed in French Assembly:
25X1A
Chancellor Adenauer's refusal to sign the EDC protocols is delaying French parliamentary consideration of the treaty, according to the American embassy in
Paris.
French spokesmen are not optimistictthat Adenauer will sign now, despite Bundesrat approval of the treaty.
Comment: A Foreign Ministry spokesman recently admitted that the EDC has been "temporarily shelved," and increasing pressure for four-power talks has aroused new hope for an East-West understanding on a neutralized Germany.
Adenauer now plans to submit only a verbal summary of the protocols for Bundestag approval. The procedure of signing the protocols by the foreign ministers may cause a parliamentary demand for formal ratification which would give the Social Democrats another opportunity to defeat the treaty.
7.
25X1A
French urge prevention of return of Otto Strasser to Germany:
American officials in Bonn report that French illightcommissioner FrancoisPoncet s turbed over the possible return of Otto Strasser, renegade Nazi leader now in Canada. A German court recently decided in favor of his readmission. Francois-Poncet feels that the Allied High Commission should take action to keep 14m out if the Bonn government is not able to do so.

-625X1A
The French, who regard the protocols as an integral part of the treaty, say they must be signed by the foreign ministers of the six EDC countries, following the precedent set in May 1952. Adenauer maintains that signature by the respective ambassadors would obviate submission of the protocols to the Bonn Parliament for approval.
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975

dithApproved
01100430001-1
25X1A
The West German Ministry of Interior intends to appeal the Strasser ruling but must await a cabinet decision, which is expected next week. The government is particularly interested in preventing Strasser's return prior to elections.
Comment: Because of his prominence as leader of the proletarian faction of the Nazi party and his flight from the Hitler regime after the 1934 purge, Strasser is regarded by some Germans as a legendary representative of the "good" in National Socialism and might serve as focal point for discontent with the Pres-

-725X1A
ent regime.
aiiklAse zoopgjogsmlittrprooVinier
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Copy No. }du
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DOCUMENTNO. NO CHANGE IN CLAS 12,01.AKIESED GL.,.r. C: IANC.;ED TO: TS
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DATE.aw.
r4.:7:: 1.....1:V.: DATE: ALID-E Hii 70.2
_.;aCrt
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^C
IIEVIEWER:
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ARMY, DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP791009750001100460001-8
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
\e"."Britain seen preferring Communist proposals in Korea to collapse

IVIolotov asks India to serve on Korean commission (page 3). 1/2,(f
talks (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5.
let"Li Mi believes one third of his force can be evacuated (page 5).
6.
25X1
ve Popularity of Egyptian military regime reportedly at low ebb (page 8).

WESTERN EUROPE
we' East German Communists reportedly plan compulsory military

training for party members (page 8).
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Friction within Burmese cabinet reported (page 5). French overstate successes in Laos (page 6).
3.
USSR timber surplus reportedly at prewar levels (page 4).
Approved Fon Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 Dli 00460001-8
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Britain seen preferring Communist proposals in Korea to collapse of talks:

The British government would prefer UN acceptance without substantial change of the latest Communist proposals to a breakdown in the negotiations at Panmunjom, accor ing to e mer can embassy in London. The British believe that prolongation of the current stalemate will make more difficult any eventual compromise, and consider that the present situation ties up funds and troops needed in areas of much greater strategic importance.
25X1A
The embassy believes that British public opinion will make it increasingly difficult for the government to give full suppcirt to the UN Command if the truce talks collapse.
2.
Molotov asks India to serve on Korean commission:
25X1
Foreign Minister Molotov called in the Indian ambassador on 16 May to inquire whether India was prepared to serve on the neutral commission which would have oy p ner u illing to accept immediate repatriation. He stressed the importance the Soviet government attached to India's membership but gave no indication of the Soviet attitude on any particular points.
The ambassador replied that India would accept membership and added that, in India's view, the Communist proposal of 7 May, although subject to modification, appeared to be in general harmony with the Indian resolution adopted by the United Nations last December.

-325X1A
Approved Foi Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 1100460001-8
25X1A
Comment: This is the second recent approach indicating Moscow's willingness to use its influence officially to promote the armistice negotiations. It suggests that the Communists believe a five-nation commission with India in the key spot would assure the return of the bulk of the prisoners either during the "explanation" period or later through disposition by the commission.
3.
USSR timber surplus reportedly at prewar levels:

An official of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade told Harold Wilson, former president of the British Board of Trade, who is now in Moscow, that the USSR has an exportable timber surplus roughly comparable to that exported before the war.
25X1A
Wilson believes the estimate to be greatly exaggerated, but warns that Soviet exports even remotely approaching prewar levels would have a very serious effect on the world timber market.
Comment: Soviet exports of wood and its products in 1953 will probably remain at about 3,500,000 cubic meters of round wood, the approximate annual level over the past few years. This is roughly one fourth of the prewar level.

SOVIET UNION
The recent Indian, British and Burmese contention that current Communist proposals approximate the Indian plan endorsed by the United Nations on 3 December is erroneous. The Indian plan of 17 November proposed, as the Communists now propose, that the fate of prisoners who remained unwilling to return be decided by a political conference, where the Communists could indefinitely block their release. The amended version of 3 December, bitterly denounced by both Moscow and Peiping, provided for the United Nations to decide the prisoners' fate if the political conference could not reach an agreement on the issue in 30 days.
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Approved Foll4Release 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79700975A0 Dl 100460001-8
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If the resources of the Satellites were included, considerably more than this amount could be exported, but only at the expense of domestic requirements. Such shipments could depress world prices to the extent that exports from Finland, Yugoslavia and Scandinavia would be unprofitable, thus giving the USSR a strengthened position in bargaining for desired Western commodities.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Nationalist foreign minister has told Rankin that Chiang Kai-shek might not permit Li to leave Formosa for fear of losing control of him.
25X1
5.
Friction within Burmese cabinet reported: A serious split is developing in the Burmese cabinet between the Socialists, led by Minister of Industries Kyaw Nyein, and members of the moderate faction led by Premier Nu, I
The American consulate general in Singapore also reports that the British have received
25X1A
25X1
25X1A
General Li Mi told Ambassador Rankin in Taipei that Chinese Nationalist units 25X1A in Burma were now concentrating in the Mong Hsat area. He said that 6,000 to 7,000 men had now assembled there and that one third could be evacuated if properly handled. Li emphasized, however, that he would not assist in any withdrawal before a cease-fire.
4.
Li Mi believes one third of his force can be evacuated:
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For R ease 2004107108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0

VIApproved
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evidence that Kyaw Nyein is attempting to force the removal of three cabinet officers,
all of whom are supporters of the premier.
Comment: Although these reports differ regarding personalities, the cleavage between the moderates and Socialists is clear in both.
The Socialist group has been less friendly to the West than Premier Nu and his followers. In showdown the Socialists, through their political organizations andany organized armed supporters, could easily win out.
6.
French overstate successes in Laos:
25X1A
French military sources in Vientiane state hat the reoccupation of Xieng Khouang is nly the beginning of a sizable operation hich will be played up as a "major counterffensive." The American army attache in aigon states that General Satan is obviously rying through wide publicity to dispel the idea at he is not offensive-minded, but that ctually the French action thus far has been an a reconna ssance in force. The attache expects the French will next attempt contact with Viet Minh units operating south of Xieng Khouang.
French post of Muong Khoua, 90 miles north of Luang Prabang, has fallen and guerrilla
Meanwhile, the long-besieged
activity in the Tonkin delta is seriously increasing. The army attache states that the lack of reserves has reduced French policing activities in the delta to a small scale.
Comment: The limited French contacts with the Viet Minh in Laos have not confirmed the rumored withdrawal the Wet Minh 304th Division, last reported in the Xieng Khouang of area.

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Tonkin delta security may be expected to deteriorate still further in the near future as infiltrated enemy forces, taking advantage of the dispersal of French mobile reserves, increase their "rice offensive."
25X1

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8.
Popularity of Egyptian military regime reportedly at low ebb: The popularity of the Egyptian military regime is at a low ebb,1 25X1 I This situation is largely due to the economic distress of the Egyptian peasants, whose living conditions have not been improved despite the promises of land reforms.
I
25X1
I
25X1
There is also wide dissatisfaction among the middle classes with the leadership of the young, inexperienced officers of the Revolutionary Command Council.
25X1
There is no indication that dissident groups could overthrow the military regime at this time. Elements in the army, however, have for some time been opposed to the policies of the Nagib government.
9.
East German Communists reportedly plan compulsory military training for party members:
25X1A
American army observers in West Germany suggest that the reported program may be designed to provide the nucleus for a party militia, or that it is a preliminary to introduction of compulsory military service.

WESTERN EUROPE
other indications of growill-driFiiis action. The increasingly nationalistic line adopted by the Revolutionary Command as evidenced by recent speeches, probably reflects an effort toCouncil, rally waning popular support.
Comment:
District headquarters of the East German Socialist Unity Party reportedly held countrywide conferences on 13 May on plans for compulsory three-month physical-military training for all male party members and candidates between the ages of 18 and 30.
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25X1A
ing would appear intendedaEi7ve a maximum of discipline among
Comment:
At a minimum, the enforced train-
participants while forcing out of the party those persons whose membership is only nominal. The current strength of the party is estimated at 1,300,000, mostly male.

-925X1A
_.
SBXWI"Y SECURITY INFORMATION
HR70-14
2(e Nt,v 53 CIS
..
FAR EAST
4. 4.
may be be planning planningheavier heavier attacks attacks on central central Korean Chinese Communists may Korean front: lront:
Chinese Comm Comm Military y Militar 23, 24 24 May 53 53 CANOE CANOE
preparationson on Intercepted messages reveal preparations the central Korean front front for an attack some time,after after 28 28 May May on scale than than the time ona a larger larger scale battalion-size actions of weeks. While of recent wee.ks. While limited-objective attacks are are probably probably planned, planned, T -1.3"g3 be involved. involved, may be of two Chinese armies armies may
-4-4OP SECRET CANOE

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TOP SECRET CANC:.,

a y message A 24 24 M May messagefrom froman anartillery artillery unit which 24th Army Army stated stated whtch normally supports supports the Chinese Chinese Communist Communtst 24th that it tt was mobilizing mobilizing for combat, that that adjustment adjustmentfiring firingwould would take place on the 27th, and that other elements would would enter enter staging staging posiposiAnother artillery artillery unit on on 23 23 May Mayreferred re/erred to the tions on on the 28th. 28th Another "combat plan from the 23rd 23rd Army."
NR

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28 May 1953
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DATE:
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elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 01100520001-1
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Belgrade embassy discounts Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement (page 3).

FAR EAST
2.
South Korean army reported planning independent offensive (page 3).
4.
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
3.
French seen facing two alternatives in Indochina (page 4).
Bidault reported strongly critical of Churchill's 11 May proposal

(page 4).
71-0
8-J4e-et,
Lh. ezz
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Approved F - Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1100520001-1
SX1A
GENERAL
1.
Belgrade embassy discounts Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement:
25X1A
The American embassy in Belgrade notes that a Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia based primarily on Soviet concessions would cost Moscow heavily in prestige, both in the Satellites and in the West European Communist Parties. Any conciliatory gestures toward Yugoslavia, it believeg, will be designed merely to appeal to such elements as the Cominform sympathizers in the Yugoslav Communist Party. Tito could be expected to control these disruptive forces.
Although a Soviet offer to establish a Balkan Communist federation under Tito's leadership might be such "tempting bait that Yugoslav leaders could not resist rising to it," the embassy considers that such a basic change in Soviet policy in the near future is not likely.
2.
South Korean army reported planning independent offensive:
25X1P1
narrow neck of the peninsula.
The American army attache comments that it is questionable whether the chief of staff is seriously considering going through with the operation, since it was discussed in the presence of an American, who could have been expected to report it to his superiors.

FAR EAST
In the embassy's opinion, Belgrade would assess the value of any rapprochement with the USSR in realistic terms. In view of the material support and international standing acquired by Tito since his break with the Soviet bloc in 1948, it is difficult to see what inducements renewed membership in the Cominform might offer.
The acting chief of staff of the South Korean army has ordered plans prepared for an independent offensive. The operation is to consist of an amphibious landing on the east coast in the vicinity of Hamhung and a frontal
nju
The objective is to establish a line across the
-325X1A
Appr ffigi1154(1 Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A00 1100520001-1
Comment: A high-ranking South Korean army officer earlier inforTiair Arrierican officials that President Rhee on 21 April had urged army officials to prepare plans to carry on the war alone. While it is probable that Rhee has ordered such planning to support his opposition to the armistice, it is unlikely that he could gain the cooperation of the army leaders for an undertaking which they recognize as unrealistic.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Offroy added that support in France for the Indochina war came from elements who were opposed to granting further political concessions. These elements, he believed, lacked the foresight to support a policy designed to obtain increased native support by granting concessions to Indochinese nationalism.
25X1A
4.
Bidault reported strongly critical of Churchill's 11 May proposal:
On his recent trip to Athens, French foreign minister Bidault denounced the Churchill proposal for four-power talks without prior agreement on the agenda, according to the Greek thQault approved the United States position. ore gn minister.

WESTERN EUROPE
The counselor of the French embassy in Saigon, Raymond Offroy, told an American embassy 25X1A officer that he believed France might eventually have to negotiate a settlement with the Viet Minh or "turn the Indochina burden over to the United States." He believed that French disillusionment with the Indochina war might reach a critical point in six months.
-4-
25X1A
3.
French seen facing two alternatives in Indochina:
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Approved F
Release 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 1100520001-1
The Greek foreign minister told the American ambassador that both Greece and Turkey believe the time is not ripe to carry out Churchill's proposals.
While Bidault's dissatisfaction with the Churchill speech had been expressed earlier, this is the most forthright statement of his attitude. Most European government spokesmen expressed private disapproval of the speech, which they regarded as untimely and impractical.
Comment:

-525X1A
With the Bermuda talks pending, Bidault's close connection with French foreign policy over the past eight years suggests that he will continue as foreign minister in the next French government.
Az
alAe 20caRait Soilfaitierroo

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30 May 1953
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Copy No.
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NC C. UANGF: IN CLASS. DECL AUS:FiEr.)

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SUMMARY
GENERAL
problems (page V West Soviet diplomat comments on East-West issues (page 4).
3).
ZChou En-lai opposed to transfer of prisoners to United Nations (page 3). toe French Foreign Ministry disapproves Western initiative on EastFAR EAST
4.
Possible Chinese Communist invasion of Tachen Islands indicated (page 5)
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6.
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9.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Bao Dai plans ultimatum to French on Vietnam army build-up (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
Preliminary Yugoslav-Italian talks on Trieste reportedly stalled (page 8).
Approved For lila lease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00' 100540001-9
25X1A
GENERAL
1
Chou En-1st opposed to transfer of prisoners to United Nations:
25X1A
After a two-hour conversation with Chou En-lai on 26 May, the Indian ambassador in Peiping informed his British colleague that the Chinese premier seemed genuinely interested in a peaceful solution but was "firmly opposed" to entrusting to the United Nations the fate of prisoners who remain unwilling to be repatriated. Chou was "obdurate" on the latter point and rejected the ambassador's counterarguments.
Comment: When the new UN truce proposals were presented on 25 Mal,Thelinior Communist negotiator stated that the proposals for the ultimate disposition of prisoners unwilling to return-either to release them in Korea or to transfer the issue to the UN General Assembly--"could
At the 1 Tune meeting in Panmunjom, the Communists are expected to reject officially this critical posals and to reaffirm their demand for indefinite point in the UN proconsideration of the prisoners issue by a political conference where the prisoners' release could be blocked. In view of Nehru's recent public endorsement UN's proposals, the Communists may no longer regard favorablyof the a possible alternative proposal for disposition of the prisoners by majority vote of the five-nation custodial commission.
2.
French Foreign Ministry disapproves Western initiative on East-West problems: French Foreign Ministry experts on the Soviet Union, including Ambassador Joxe, think that the present Western "impatience" for talks with the USSR is "most unfortunate." oscow should be forced to take the lead in any overtures. They feel
25X1

not be agreed to."
-3-
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The Foreign Ministry spokesman who relayed these views to Ambassador Dillon believes that there will be leaks of any disagreements at the forthcoming Bermuda talks. Although a final agreement to make concessions to the Russians would be "ill advised," the absence of one would be condemned by Western public opinion as "intransigence."
The French official agrees that it would be desirable to avoid any linking of the three-power talks to four-power talks, but believes that this connection would be impossible to avoid.
25X1
dence of the USSR's peaceful intentions.
He personally saw no reason why Germany could not be unified on the basis of the Oder-Neisse frontier and with general elections on a proportional basis for East and West Germany, without outside influence.
The secretary also said he was convinced that there would be an armistice in Korea. He pointed out that the hostilities in Korea had been a severe drain on the USSR and China as well as the US.
Comment: The secretary's remarks suggest that the USSR is trying to create the impression that it is still willing to settle outstanding East-West issues despite recent difficulties over Austria and Korea.

-425X1A
The first secretary of the Soviet embassy in London told an American embassy officer that the Austrian question must be settled in connection with the German problem. He said that Secretary Dulles had overemphasized the Austrian treaty as evi-
Soviet diplomat comments on East-West issues:
25X1A
oilApproved
FAR EAST
4.
Possible Chinese Communist invasion of Tachen Islands indicated:

25X1
indications of an imminent Chinese Communist operation 25X1A against the Tachen Islands. Transport planes have appeared in the nearby Choushan Islands, Communist naval units in the Choushans have reng ene and are more aggressive, and Ningpo airfield on the mainland opposite the Tachens is now operational.
of the Nationalist-held islairs7rithe China coast, lie about 200 miles
south of Shanghai. About 6,000 Nationalist troops, 2.000 marines and 10,000 guerrillas are available for their defense.
A Chinese Communist invasion of the islands was reported as imminent at this time a year ago and has been reported four times since February. Chinese Communist forces along the Chekiang coast now number at least 70,000 men and could capture the islands whenever they care to make the effort.
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Comment:
- 5 -
The Tachens, the northernmost
25X1A
In addition, an individual arrested in the Tachens recently allegedly carried documents describing landing sites in the islands.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6.
Bao Dai plans ultimatum to French on Vietnam army build-up:
25X1A
Vietnam's new defense minister has informed the American consul in Hanot that Bao Dai is currently working on a plan for a Vietnamese army of 500,000 within the next three years. Bao Dai reportedly stated that the present Vietnamese military establishment is stagnating and that the time has come to make a "last offer" to the French, indicating that unless they support his army plan, he will turn to the United States.
Assuming adequate foreign aid, a Vietnam army of 500,000 is conceivable, but unless the government gains greater popularity the reliability of such an army would be questionable.
25X1

-625X1A
Comment: The French-Vietnamese program for the build-up of the Vigilatimy is considerably behind schedule. Bao Dai's principal purpose in making demands on the French is probably to strengthen his political position in Vietnam.
25X1

Approved F o
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WESTERN EUROPE
01100540001-9
9.
Preliminary Yugoslav-Italian talks on Trieste reportedly stalled:

In reply to a Yugoslav approach to Italy offering a settlement of the Trieste question along the present zonal boundaries, the Italian Foreign Office countered with a plan which would cede Zone A and the coastal strip of Zone B to Italy. Following this meeting on 22 May, the Yugoslav negotiator reported that nothing had been accomplished and that previous progress was jeopardized.
Comment: Italian officials view the Yugoslav approach as a maneuver to relieve American pressure on Tito for concessions on Trieste before the Italian elections. In the light of Yugoslavia's previous conditiohs and its obvious apprehension over assumed Western plans for a solution favorable to Italy, the sincerity of the Yugoslav approach is questionable.
25X1A
25X6

-825X1A
---
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HR70-14 HR70-14
5 3t.A.,.4..
CI
NR :NR
3. Llmited 3, Limited combat activitv activity to be extended to to central Korean front:

FAR EAST EAST
Chinese Chinese Comm Comm Military 1 1 June 53 53
in west central Korea stated that preparations 7 would be to 7 would be completed, completed, presumably presumably prior to CA and indicated indicated that June, and that "the "the entire regiment" enter battle.. battle.. r - 6 87se 8 7 ~would would enter have been Comment: There have been several several other suggesting t h a t v s l postponed y postponed actionis messages suggesting thatTigiraily action now is nowimminent imminent on the central front. This area area has has been been relatively relatively quiet quiet during during the the western sectors. recent attacks in the eastern and western
The use of regiment, normally o f a tank regiment, normally 40 40 tanks, presumably for for artillery artillery support, presumably support, suggests suggeststhat that the the action action will will be be on on a wider scale scale than recent attacks. attacks. There is is no no evidence evidence that it it would would objectives. have more than limited objectives.
A 1 June Chinese tank unit A1 June message from a Chinese
NR
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ATE: DATE:24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010 'DPPROVED
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.. .
'
-.
TOP-SECRET CANOL
SECURITY INFORMATION INPORMATlON
s3
c
HR7o-14
FAR EAST EAST

3.
SouthKorean Koreancabinet cabinetreportedly reportedly decides decides against against unilateral unilateral military South militarx action : action:
Comment: Political r e still Political leaders leaders a are still opposed the truce agreiiingiir opposed to the a g r e mFit t apparently are are coming coming to to the the conclusion previously that conclusion previously reached reached by by ranking ranking military military officers that independent independent military action action to to secure secureunification unificationwould would be highly highly this time. time. Rhee's Fthee's fanatical opposition opposition to the conimpractical at this tinued tinued division division of of Korea Korea continues continues to to be be the the controlling controlling factor factor in South stand. South Korea's Korea's truce truce stand.
NR
PPPROVED APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 16-Dec-2009 16-Dec-2009
-7-TOP-SECRET CANOE CANOE
The South Korean Korean cabinet and a group of of influential lnfluentlal National National Assemblymen decided decided Fthee on 8 June to recommend recommend to to President Rhee that no at the Republic Rewblic of of Korea army army take take no -un a era m m itary itaryaction,j action, un 1 Most Most of of these these officials believed that Rhee wouldagree agree to to their their recommendation. recommendation. They Rhee would They urged, urged, however, however, that antitruce demonstrations continue, continue, stating it would would be be "disgrace"disgraceful" ful" to accept the the truce truceunconditionally. unconditionally.
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13 June 1953
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DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS I DECLASSIFIED
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For more information on PDF Compression and OCR go to our website
F
4gilApproved
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
le<rench-Soviet trade agreement seen dependent on sale of ships

to USSR (page 3).
FAR EAST .
2.
Yoshida reportedly plans increase in Japanese defense forces

a).
Majority of Korean people seen favorable to armistice (page 4). \e(page

25X1
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
1/4,Turkey raises Middle East defense problem in NATO (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE
Austrians discount Soviet overtures but anticipate long-run improvements (page 6). tC Further Soviet gestures on German unity anticipated in Bonn
6.
(page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
8.
Plan to dismiss commanding general may split Colombian army

(page 7).
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GENERAL
1.
'USSR:
French-Soviet trade agreement seen dependent on sale of ships to

The Soviet Union, in offering to conclude
25X1A
a three-year trade agreement with France, has requested three tankers, five 5,000-ton cargo ships, and five cargo ships of between 8,000 and 10,000 tons. French Foreign Ministry official Charpentier believes there will be no agreement unless France meets this request
The Soviet delegation has also requested lead, important industrial goods, and about $9,000,000 worth of textiles; it is offering corn, 35,000 tons of chrome and 6,000 tons of asbestos, as well as some manganese, pitch, anthracite and gasoline.
Comment: The Russian offer to purchase this unprecedented amount of textiles will appeal strongly to the French, whose textile industry is seriously depressed. If these proposals are accepted, the annual value of French-Soviet trade from 1953 to 1955 will be at least four times the 1952 trade turn-
over of $24,000,000.
This new willingness to purchase larger quantities of textiles and other consumer goods along with strategic industrial items will provide the USSR with a strong bargaining lever in trade negotiations with other Western European countries.
2.
Yoshida reportedly plans increase in Japanese defense forces:

25X1
25X1A
25X1
Premier Yoshida has approved a fiveyear plan for modest increases in Japan's ground and naval forces and the creation of a small air force Yoshida considers that the planned 200,000-man force is within Japan's political and economic capabilities.
I

FAR EAST
-325X1A
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%siApproved
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Okazaki has approached the American ambassador to arrange for opening MSA aid negotiations. He indicated he would seek Yoshida's approval to discuss the whole aid problem with Progressive leader Shigemitsu
in an effort to secure his party's support.
Majority of Korean people seen favorable to armistice:
25X1
Ambassador Briggs reports indications that the people- and some of the leaders in South Korea do not support President Rhee's intransigence on the armistice. ieves that a large majority would accept the armistice under present conditions, although a small minority is ready to join Rhee in an effort to forestall a settlement, or to follow him in reckless military adventures.
Briggs states that political leaders and others dependent on the administration's favors continue to express support for the government's position, but that many informed Koreans regard the proposal in President Eisenhower's letter as a generous offer. He warns, however, that public opinion is far from being the controlling factor in South Korean politics.

-425X1A
Comment: The Japanese government, under pressure from the public and from business circles to arrange for American assistance in view of the impending decline in income derived from the Korean war, has displayed an increasing but cautious interest in obtaining MSA aid. Japanese officials have indicated that the government prefers to emphasize the economic and minimize the military aspects of such aid.
25X1A
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r Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T0097 5A001100650001-7
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5.
Turkey raises Middle East defense problem in NATO:
25X1A
Turkish representative Zorlu emphasized to members of the NATO Council, now in session in Paris, his government's great anxiety over possible British withdrawal from e uez area. e pointed out the strategic importance of Middle East defense to the free world and the necessity of establishing a regional defense organization to fill the vacuum, if the British should pull out. Drastic measures accordingly should be taken by the NATO powers to organize a Middle East defense system without Arab or Israeli participation, leaving the door open, however, for their ultimate membership.
Turkey's awareness of Middle East weakness has long caused it to press for more adequate defense in that area.
Comment:

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
-525X1A
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WESTERN EUROPE
6.
Austrians discount Soviet overtures but anticipate long-run improvements:

Chancellor Raab and Foreign Minister Gruber agree that with two exceptions the easing of Soviet occupation contiols in Austria is more apparent than real. They do attach importance to the abolition of transit permits for most goods crossing the demarcation line to the Western zones, and to the unexpected recognition of Austria's full sovereignty implied by the elevation of the Soviet high commissioner to ambassadorial status.
25X1A
the past week have in no iiilliElardized its political, economic, or strategic position in Austria. They are, however, important
concessions to Austrian and Western opinion, toward which they appear primarily to have been directed.
7.
Further Soviet gestures on German unity anticipated in Bonn:

Bonn government leaders show no anxiety over West German reaction to the latest developments in East Germany and have adopted an attitude of "watchful waiting. " of Soviet unity gestures designed to undercut ey an c pa e a the government parties in the general elections in September.
25X1A
They believe that Soviet high commissioner Semenov, in order to foster public hope for unity and weaken support for EDC, will soon propose a meeting of the high commissioners. They also expect that shortly before the September elections, the Russians will send a note making ostensible concessions to the Allied position on German unity.

Comment:
Raab and Gruber believe the Soviet Union was motivated by a desire to counteract locally the effect of its refusal to resume negotiations on the Austrian treaty. The Soviet Union's moves of
-625X1A
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Chancellor Adenauer is preparing a campaign to keep alive German distrust of Soviet intentions.
Comment: West German officials probably thel'IWWeiman developments than the are less disturbed by Although further Soviet gestures will American press suggests. stimulate public desire for four-power talks, they will probably not dispel West German insistence on free elections.
8.
Plan to dismiss commanding general may split Colombian army:

the Colombian president has orcterea [rat the commanding general of the armed forces, Rojas Pint Ila, be retired before 15 June. His succes or is to be General Mariano Ospina Rodriguez.
I
LATIN AMERICA
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25X1
Rojas Pinilla's supporters, who are in the majority in the army, have reportedly designated officers to take charge of the Bogota garrisons if he is replaced.
Rojas Pinilla has for some time been carrying on a personal feud with the war minister over military policy and has been resisting efforts of the clique in power to remove him. Meanwhile, a group of fellow officers has been urging him to take over the government. The traditional army attitude in Colombia, however, has been one of noninterference in politics.
Comment:
Should there be a split in the army, the scattered domestic disorders which have plagued Colombia for the past four years might expand into a full-scale civil war.
Ospina Rodriguez has a pro-American reputation and is one of Colombia's best officers, but his personal following in the army is small.
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0mml7OAPCSIECREffibs7
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14 June 1953
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Copy No. 6
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLE IN

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STATE, USAF reviews completed
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eiiiApproved
ase 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00118 0660001-6
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
'France objects to limited scope of "greater sanctions" state-
/ment
3. 4.
on Korea (page 4). Chinese Communists introduce new interpretation of Korean POW agreement (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
VJapan desires participation in postarmistice Korean political

(page 7).
7.
8.
I
9.
016.

(page 5).
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Comment on Melnikov ouster from Ukrainian party position
Soviet high commissioner urges increased Western trade with East Germany (page 5).
conference (page 6). Japan moving toward expansion of relations with Communist bloc
British freighter apparently violated restrictions on China
shipping (page 7). Diminution of anti-American propaganda in China noted (page 8).
Vietnamese officials fear impact of Korean armistice on
Indochina (page 8). Comment on Cambodian king's \light to Thailand (page 9).
-2-
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

11. Iraq requests US advice regarding Arab League defense proposals (page 10). 12. Turkey and USSR reach agreement on joint irrigation project (page 10).
EASTERN EUROPE
13.
Finnish government crisis reaching climax (page 11).

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Vid.
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Colombian kmy Chief tsumes ftresidency (page 12).
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alApproved
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GENERAL
1.
on Korea:
25X1A
France objects to limited scope of "greater sanctions" statement
French undersecretary for foreign affairs

Maurice Schumann has made a strong complaint to Ambassador Dillon in Paris b ecause Southeast Asia is not covered in the proposed statement by the sixteen powers with troops in Korea threatening greater sanctions in the event of renewed aggression following the armistice. He said that it would be "very difficult" for France to agree to any statement which did not include Indochina.
2.
25X1A

china.
- 4 -
Schumann said that the absence of such a statement would be construed in France as an indication of lessening American interest in Indochina, and would greatly strengthen the arguments of those elements in the French assembly which favor reducing the French effort or withdrawing from Indo-
Comment: France has been pressing for some means of connecting a Korean settlement with at least a warning against greater Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh.
Chinese Communists introduce new interpretation of Korean POW agreement:
Peiping's deputy foreign minister told the Swedish ambassador on 10 June that the phrase "neutral nations" in the prisoner of war agreement means only the members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (India, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) and implied that these nations are obligated to admit prisoners who desire entry.
The United States has informed Sweden that the matter has neither been raised nor discussed at Panmunjom. Sweden will discuss the matter with India and Switzerland.
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Comment: The terms of the 8 June POW agreement are sufficientliTiTnEWirous to permit a Communist attempt to block a change in the prisoners' status. They specify that after 30 days of consideration by the political conference, the prisoners unwilling to be repatriated "shall be changed from the POW status to civilian status by declaration of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission"and that those who choose to go to "neutral nations" shall be assisted to do so by the commission.
SOVIET UNION
3.
Comment on Melnikov ouster from Ukrainian party position:
4.
Soviet high commissioner urges increased Western trade with East Germany:
Soviet high commissioner Semenov expressed to the Belgiiim ambassador his
25X1A

-525X1A
L. G. Melnikov's removal as first secretary of the Ukrainian Republic follows a two-week-old Ukrainian press campaign directed against Stalinist Russification concepts and harsh economic policy. In this respect, it is a clear continuation of the new regime's ostensibly more liberal policy exemplified in such measures as the amnesty of civil prisoners and in a reduction in the MVD's power base.
The criticism of Melnikov makes it likely that he will also be ousted from his higher position on the All-Union party presidium. He was elected a full member of the presidium at the October congress and was retained as an alternate when that body was drastically reduced following Stalin's death. It may be that his ouster has resulted from a struggle between two possible factions in the Soviet leadership with Melnikov identified with a minority favoring continuation of Stalin's extreme emphasis on coercion.
interest in closer commercial relations
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between East Germany and Belgium, which need not include strategic goods.
He remarked that the new East German Politburo and government de'crees are a good indication of a number of significant changes which are taking place.
Comment: This is a f urther illustration of the strenuous Soviet bloc attempt to increase trade with Western countries, in some cases with less insistence than before on the inclusion of strategic goods. Semenov's remarks illustrate the new atmosphere of conciliation and suggest that further moves along such lines will occur.
5.
25X1A

FAR EAST
Japan desires participation in postarmistice Korean political conference:
Foreign Minister Okazaki has indicated Japan's desire to participate as a member or an observer in the political conference following a Korean armistice. When informed that Japan's nonbelligerent status and South Korea's opposition seemingly preclude participation, Okazaki suggested that Japan's interest in the future of Korea and its provision of bases and facilities for UN operations should qualify it for at least observer status.
The government's position is also supported by both the Progressive and Rightist Socialist parties.
Japanese officials have previously expressed their frustration over Japan's exclusion from Far Eastern decisions of the Western powers which involve vital Japanese interests. Premier Yoshida proposed in mid-February that a tripartite conference between the United States, Great Britain and Japan should be held to discuss major Far Eastern issues.
Comment:
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6.
Japan moving toward expansion of relations with Communist bloc:
25X1A
7. British freighter apparently violated restrictions on China shipping:

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The American embassy comments that sentiment for expanding relations with the Communist bloc once the Korean war ends has broad political support and should not be underestimated.
Comment: Japan has hitherto maintained a higher level of export control on trade with Communist China than any other major country except the United States and Canada.
The British ship Taichungshan, en route from Swatow to Tientsin when intercepted on 24 May by a Nationalist gunboat, was carrying, among other cargo belonging to the People's Bank of Swatow, 12 tons of steel, 53 empty POL drums, and 337 empty oil drums.
Comment: The British voyage-licensing system adopted on 31 MarCrtiriting Kong prohibits British vessels f rom carrying semifinished and finished iron and steel items to or between Chinese Communist ports.
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The Japanese government has recently reversed several anti-Communist administrative policies, thus indicating a growing trend toward placing its relations with Communist-bloc countries on the same basis as those with other nations and toward expanding orbit trade to the maximum permissible limits. Significant policy changes include granting passports to delegates to a Communist conference, admitting Soviet technicians to supervise ship repairs, and issuing a public statement that the government is considering sending a trade representative to Peiping.
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Diminution of anti-American propaganda in China noted:
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The Swiss consul general at Shanghai, who left that city in late May, reports a marked diminution of anti-American slogans beginning last April. The American consul general in Hong Kong, noting that an absence of such slogans was also reported by witnesses of the May Day parade in Peiping, comments that this development is probably due to Peiping's desire to end the Korean war and to fall in line with the world-wide Communist "peace offensive. "
9.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
Comment: Peiping Radio has also taken a milder tone toward the United States during the "peace offensive" and the Korean talks.
Vietnamese officials fear impact of Korean armistice on Indochina:
peace in
The Vietnamese premier and finance minister have expressed apprehension that a Korean armistice will result in an overwhelming popular demand in France for a negotiated oc na, according to the American embassy in Saigon.
In this connection, the embassy points out that the Viet Minh could easily propose that a plebiscite be held under neutral auspices to determine whether Vietnam remain in the French Union or become an independent republic. An honest election would undoubtedly result in a vote for independence and, in effect, deliver the country to Ho Chi Minh.
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Comment on Cambodian King's Flight to Thailand:
The King of Cambodia's decision to seek "asylum" in Thailand, professedly in order to make his position better known outside his country, brings relations between France and the Associated States much closer to a crisis. Unless the French soon make some dramatic political concession, native support for the war against Communism may be irretrievably lost could even be diverted eventually to the Viet Minh.
independence.
The King's flight will emphasize in the French Assembly the need to agree quickly on a new Premier and cabinet. In view of the rapidly increasing sentiment in France for some means of relieving its burden in Indochina, it is likely that the National Assembly will now be forced to accept broader concessions to the Associated States. It is probable that for the moment France will try to delay action, however, and that direct negotiations will not be undertaken until after the July meeting of the Council of the French Union.
It is now more possible that a definite promise of independence, with dominion status and at a specific date, will be forthcoming, but greater pressure for increased US financial aid and possibly a plea for support by American troops can be expected to accompany any such concession.

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The King, obviously dissatisfied with the limited concessions recently offered by the French, has reiterated the demand of Vietnamese Premier Tam for membership in the French Union similar in status to that of the nations of the British Commonwealth. While Tam criticized the King's flight, he undoubtedly will exploit it in pressing the French to relinquish their controls in Vietnam. Nationalist elements in all three Associated States will be stimulated by the King's decision, thus increasing the urgency already felt by Indochinese leaders to move repidly toward complete
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11.
Iraq requests US advice regarding Arab League def ense proposals:
Iraqi foreign minister Suwaidi has asked Ambassador Berry whether Iraq should 25X1A support the Arab League Collective Security Pact or whether it is better at this time for the in ivi ual Arab states to develop bilateral agreements with the Western nations. He said that Baghdad was proposing an Arab meeting on area def ense in Cairo for 22 and 23
June.
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12.

Comment:
When Berry inquired-about the existence of Arab jealousies which might prevent agreement, Suwaidi replied that it was unrealistic to expect all the Arab states to join in creating an area def bnse system. He said that his government had already received intimations. that Egypt was interestesl tItimarily in an Egyptian-Iraqi defense agreement, to which other Arab nations would later adhere.
defenses against the Soviet threat.
substantial American andWassistance in building up its
Last March Iraq requested
The Arabs generally have maintained that their own pact is preferable to any Western proposal. Their maneuvers in connection with the Cairo meeting again reveal, however, the strong antagonisms which threaten to delay if not prevent the realization of a joint Arab defense system.
Turkey and USSR reach agreement on joint irrigation project:
The Turkish minister of public works told parliament qn 10 June that his government had *seed to accept a Soviet offer allowing Turkey to use the facilities of the Serdarabad dam on the Turkish-Soviet border. The dam would help irrigate northeastern Turkey, and Ankara would pay
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one half of the construction cost, which the USSR estimated at

$400,000.
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EASTERN EUROPE
Finnish government crisis reaching climax:
The likelihood of the early fall of the Finnish cabinet has sharply increased as a result of the decision by Agrarian Party leaders to reject final Social Democratic proposals for a solution to Finland's current economic problems. The Agrarians will support the program suggested by Prime Minister Kekkonen who, following conversations with the president, will hold a meeting on 15 June with the Council of State.
Comment: It is expected that the cabinet crisis, which has arisen over proposed price and wage.reductions, will reach a climax early this week. In the event the present government resigns, it appears likely that Kekkonen will be asked to head a new coalition government formed on the same basis -- Agrarians,
Social Democrats- add a thinor_party.
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Colombian Army Chief Assumes Presidency:
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Commanding General of the Armed Forces, assumed the Presidency of Colombia at 10 p. m. on 13 June. Reportedly he has the backing of the armed forces, the police, and all elements of the Conservative Party, save the die-hard clique of ousted President Laureano Gomez.
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In a midnight speech to the nation, Rojas Pinilla announced that the army would take charge until a new government is organized. He promised that free elections would be held and that Colombia would honor its international obligations. He then appointed an all-Conservative cabinet of three military men and ten civilians, most of whom appear to be supporters of ex-President Ospina Perez, leader of the moderate faction of the Conservative Party.
The Gomez clique, the dominant faction in the Colombian government up to the time of the coup, represented the extreme right wing of the Conservative Party and was hardly representative of the Colombian people.
Rojas Pinilla's assumption of the Presidency appears to make Colombia's prospects for settling its guerrilla problem, ending its state-of-siege, and returning to political normalcy brighter than they have been at any time during the past three and one-half years.
Rojas Pint lla, formerly Colombia's representative on the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington, and most of the members of his Cabinet are known to be proAmerican. This government can be expected to maintain the Colombian battalion in Korea.

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the sudden return to the PTaircy by Gomez, who had been in retirement because of his health since November 1951, and his firing of General Rohas Pint lla. Thereupon, the army, remaining loyal to the latter carried out a bloodless coup.
Comment: The coup was precipitated by
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19 June 1953 25
Copy No.
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AUTH.:
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Further progress made in Greek-yugoslav-Turkisli defense planning (page 3).

SOVIET UNION
tpet Comment on release of North Korean prisoners of war (page 4).

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5. 6.
7.
B.
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FAR EAST
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Comment on Lithuanian party criticism of internal Soviet policy (page 3).
Inflationary trend becoming more acute in Iran (page 5). King's interference in politics causes new crisis in Libya (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
New Soviet gestures predicted in Austria (page 6). Comment on Berlin rioting. (map 71
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1.
GENERAL
Further progress made in Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish defense planning:

Greek Foreign Office and military officials state that the Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish military talks concluded last week provide a basis for further progress toward Joint defense planning. ugos av representatives were frank and unreserved in revealing specific weaknesses and strengths of their southern forces, in agreeing to hold general maneuvers in the south with Greek and Turkish observers present, and in approving an exchange of visits between commanders.
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2.
The first evidence of such a reversal appeared in the dramatic Georgian shake-up in April with its charges that officials had provoked feelings of national enmity and interfered with native Georgian leaders. More recently the ouster of L. G. Melnikov as first party secretary in the Ukraine was officially attributed, in part, to his not using local officials to administer those oblasts acquired from Poland and Czechoslovakia after World War IL

SOVIET UNION
The Greeks plan to propose shortly that a permanent Joint staff be established.
Comment: These are the first practical steps toward integrating the defense planning of the three countries.
The results of the meeting also suggest that the three governments have not yet been diverted by Soviet conciliatory gestures.
Comment on Lithuanian party criticism of internal Soviet policy:
The recent announcement that the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party had convened to condemn and correct distortions in the application of Soviet nationality policy supports previous indications that the new regime is repudiating Stalin's harsh Russification of the many national minorities in the USSR.
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Much of the local dissatisfaction in both the Lithuanian and Ukrainian republics appears to be with the sycophantic attitude which the centrally appointed collective farm chairmen displayed toward everything Great Russian. Furthermore, their overzealousness in consolidating the collective farms has caused, considerable disapproval in Moscow because of ensuing production losses. This latter point was particularly stressed by Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress.
3.
Comment on release of North Korean prisoners of war:
The Communists will almost certainly assert that President Rhee's release of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist POW's was taken in collusion with the United Nations Command, undermines the basis of the truce talks, and "proves" a lack of good faith. While they may recess the talks pending assurances against future releases and will fully exploit the propaganda value in the incident, it is doubtful that they will break off the talks on this issue.
Rhee has several other possible weapons at his command, short of independent military operations, to hamper or block a truce, embarrass the United States, and emphasize South Korean opposition to an armistice. Measures which he may still adopt include refusal to sign an armistice, refusal to remove South Korean troops from the demilitarized zone, withdrawal from the UN Command, and employment of force against Indian troops.
While there is a real danger of South Korean unilateral military action, Rhee will find it more difficult to gain the army's cooperation for such a move than was the case with the rear area troops which are under the command of a "political!' general completely loyal to the president.
Whether Rhee will make any further unilateral moves probably depends on the reactions which follow the prisoner release. In addition to his efforts to undermine the truce, Rhee apparently hopes to secure major concessions from the United States without making commitments. Any success he might have could change the widespread indecision in South Korea to support.
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Inflationary trend becoming more acute in Iran:
Inventories of foreign goods formerly acquired relatively favorable exchange rates have been largely exhausted and must be replaced at two and one half times the former cost. The Iranian government appears to be unable to stop the inflationary trend.
- 5 -

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
rates.
Iran's economic difficulties are now beginning to appear in price rises and increasing demands for higher wages, the US embassy reported on 16 June. Business is no longer counting on an oil settlement and is now mainly concerned over the instability of the foreign exchange
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Comment: This report suggests that the Iranian economy may now be entering a new inflationary phase and that the government may be unable to carry out its intention of stabilizing the currency without the aid of oil revenues.
6.
King's interference in politics causes new crisis in Libya: King Idriss' summary dismissal of the governor of Tripolitania and two members of the provincial council, during Prime Minister Muntasser's absence in London, has precipitated a new crisis in the growing conflict between the king and his pro-Western premier. Muntasser has returned to Tripoli reportedly determined to resign as a result of Idriss' latest interference in Libyan politics. Even if Muntasser agrees to remain in office, his efforts to cooperate with the West will be complicated by the continuing cleavage between himself and the anti-Western Cyrenaican clique which surrounds
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the king.
7.
New Soviet gestures predicted in Austria:

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/Soviet officials will abolish post ana teiegraph censorship there before 1 July and will also grant amnesty to iiolitical prisoners detained in Austria on Soviet authority. These moves are planned to coincide with the official installation of the new Soviet ambassador.

WESTERN EUROPE
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now in the USSR.
Comment: The release of locally held prisoners would be in addition to the recently promised release under the Soviet amnesty law of some of the Austrian prisoners
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8.
The government has obviously been frightened by these events and continues to alternate of generous concessions with threats of severe punishment. promises It is probable at various levels the government has been compelled to relinquishthat authority to the Soviet military establishment.

Comment on Berlin rioting:
The situation in East Berlin been brought under control. Soviet troops continue has apparently to back up East German police, and numerous arrests have reportedly made. Public transportation in East Berlin was still disrupted been on 18 June, however, and Soviet zone traffic into the city irregular. Strict controls over intersector travel have been imposed.
There are numerous unconfirmed reports of strikes and disturbances in other areas of East Germany, and martial law has reportedly been extended to some of them.
Itentatively attribute the riots to popular suspicion that the recent conciliatory moves of the East German government were a confession of weakness and that demonstrations would be dealt with less ruthlessly than in the past.
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FAR EAST EAST FAR
Comment on on COmmUnt8t Communist letter letter of 20 June on Korean talks: talks: effect have have bow 'now suggested suggested The Communists in effect UN Command o f action toward to the UN Commandin inKorea Koreatwo twoalternattve alternative courses courses of Syngman Khee, prove difficult to carry They Syngman Rhee, both both of of which whichwould would prove difficult to carryout. out. They clearly believe believe themselves themaelvesto to be be in in a astrong strongposition positionto toawait await developdevelopclearly ments. ments.
-3 3-
One One course is is to to conclude conclude a truce truce which which includes In thts this event,the Communists Communists request request assurances assurances that that the the UN UN South Korea. In Command can and andwtLl willcontrol controlRhee. Rhee. They further demand Command can They further demand the recovery of of the released have releasedprisoners, prisoner8,who who havedisappeared disappearedamong among a afriendly friendly Korean Korean populace. recoverthem themwould would be largely unsuccessful unsuccessful and populace, An An effort effort to to recover could lead Lead to to bloodshed. bloodshed.
The other alternative is i s to to conclude conclude a truce In this event, event, the Communists seek assurances assurances Communists seek South Korea. In which excludes South the UN UN Command Command can that the can and andwill willimplement implementthe thearmistice armistice agreement agreement despite Rhee's opposition. oppositton. This course, course, which which the the Communists Communists probably probably despite Rhee's prefer, might prefer, mightinvolve tnvolvearmed armedconflict conflictbetween betweenSouth South Korea and other other UN UN forces forces and and would would in in any any case case make make It it difficult or impossible for Rhee to obtain outside support support in in resisting resisting a later obtain outslde later invasion tnvaston from from North North Korea.
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FAR EAST
Comment on Comment onRhee's Rhee's23 23June June"compromiset' "compromise"armistice armistice proposals: proposals:
Having virtually satisfied by unilateral Having virtually action his desire for for the the immediate immediate release of of North North Korean action Korean prisprisopposing repatriation, President Rhee Rhee has has now now offered three oners opposing repatriation, President "conditions"as asthe theprice pricefor forhis hissupport supportofof an armistice. As As rere"conditions" an armistice. ported by theseinclude includethe theimmediate immediatewithdrawal withdrawal of of by the press, press, these Chinese the simultaneous simultaneous withdrawal withdrawal of of all Chinese Communist Communist troops troops or the foreign forces, aaUS-South US-South Korean Korean mutual mutual security security pact, pact, and a QO-day on the conference. 90-day time time limit on the postarmlstice postarmistice political conference.
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This information information confirms confirms Rhee's Rhee's continued continued opposition oppositionto toany anytruce truceexcept excepton onhis histerms, terms, and and his his preference preference for continued hostilities. knows that that the Communist8 Communists will will not accept continued hostilities. Rhee knows first and and third third conditions, conditions, and and the the second second must be as a a the first be regarded as further attempt to gain unconditional military guarantees from the further attempt to gain unconditional from the United States. States,

WESTERN WESTERN EUROPE
Rhee's objective is is to block a truce Rhee's objective truce dividing dividing Korea, either eitherby byproposing proposing unacceptable unacceptable conditions conditions or or by by undertaking undertaking unilateral action. action. Technically i s demands Technically the the US US has has already already met met h his a military military pact, pact, substantial substantial military military and and economic economic aid, for a aid, and retenand naval naval forces forcesin inKorea Koreapending pending a aSouth South Korean tion of American air air and build-up, build-up, after an an armistice. He may now believe that his stubborn may now believe that stubborn reiteration of of demands demands for guarantees guarantees will will cause cause the the US US to reiteration to meet meet these demands prior demands prior to an an armistice.
5.
,111 NR
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GENERAL
1. 1.
Cb
of Soviet Soviet diplomats: Comment on on departure departure of
recall during the past past few few weeks weeks of of The recall during the Vyshinsky and high-ranking Soviet Soviet diplomats, including including Vyshinsky numerous high-ranking Partsand and Washington, Washtngton, suggests that ambassadors to to London, London, Paris the ambassadors talksmay may soon soonbe be held heldin inMoscow Moscow on outstanding internainternahigh-level talks The talks wouldprobably probably cover the current current difficulties difficulties tional issues. The talks would in East Germany Germany and and Eastern Eastern Europe, Europe, Korea Korea and and other other Far Eastern subjects, Balkan Balkan policy, policy, and general tactics for for breaking breaking Western oolidar solidarity. ity.
There are are indications Lndications that that the the Kremlin still desires desiresaaKorean Korean armistice armisticefollowed followed by Eastern political political still by a a Far Eastern TheUSSR USSR will probably make every effort to to exploit exploit conference. The US-UK-French US-UK-Frenchdifferences differencesover oversuch suchproblems problemsas as the the status status of of ForFormosa and the 'recognition secognitiano f and UN UN membership CommuriiGt China. China. bf menibership for for Communist
N
FAR EAST
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3. North Korean Korean IL-28 IL-28 let jet bombers have "combat" 'kombat" mission: mtssion:

Air A tr Force Force Security Service
15 July 53 53 CANOE CANOE cr G C 6 3*tt 3*r0 M Gca
There is is evidence evidence that past past TU-2 TU-2bomber bomber flights fltghts have have utilized this same same route route to to engage engage in in flights flights over over Korea. Korea.
twiii-jet bombers Three North North Korean 1L-28 IL-28twixi-jet scheduled to to fly fly from from Kungchuling, Kungchultng, ManManwere scheduled churia, possibly possibly to to Antung Antung or Sinuiju, Sinuiju, Korea, 15 July July on on a a "combat11 "combat" mission. on 15
Thts flight may have been been for Comment: This the purpose of area area f familliiiiiirEn prior of a larger purpose of a m i l n priorto tothe the commitment commitment of unit to combat. conducted similar similar "combat" combat. MIG-15 MIG-15 units units have have often conducted "combat" familiarization flights fltghts into into Korea.
The North Korean Korean a air t r force force now now has approximately 40 IL-28's, 1L-28's, and and the the crews are are believed to have been ready for believed been combat since May, since May.
NR /NR
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FAR EAST Korean front: front: korean
Chinese Communists Communtsts may may be planning planning late late July July offensive offensive on on western western
A f r o m the headquarters of the A message from Chinese 21st Regiment Intercepted intercepted Chinese 21st Artillery Artillery Regiment on 15 "an offensive offensive is being on 15 July July states states that "an planned planned for for the the near near future," future," and and that that "a little more than ten days" are left for tratntng. than ten days" are training.
Comment:
The 21st Arttllery Regiment Artillery Regiment
Chinese Communist Chtnese Communist Military 15 July July 53 53 CANOE
the American American I Corps sector. Recent Recent messages have suggested that other artillery artilleryunits untts are arealso alsomoving moving to to this this area, and an a n increase increase in in area, and tank strength from from two two to four regiments regiments has has been been noted. noted.
1s to be be taking taking up up new new positions on front opposite opposite is believed to on the the western western front
-3 3 --
CANOE TOP-SEeRET CANOE
,..,-TeP-SEeRET--CANOL v
INFORMATION SECURITY INFORMATION
There are are indications indications that an offensive offensive by by There that an the North North Koreans on on the eastern front also may be planned for late the eastern front also may be planned for late July.
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FAR EAST
North Korean Korean aircraft aircraft reportedly reuortedlv concentrating concentrating near near Yalu Yalu River: 5. North
USAF USAF
16-17 July 53 16-17 july 53

CANOE CANOE
Alma" 'ItL- / I ?
''*
Scheduled fltghts Scheduled flights of of North NorthKorean Koreanatrcraft aircraft strongly indicate a during the past few days days maesing of other elements of the North Korean massing of of North air air force force in in the the Yalu Yalu River River area, area, in in addition addition MIG's already to the MIG's already there, there.
On On 16 16 July, July, two separate separate groups groups of of 24 24 piston fighters and IL-10piston pistonground-attack ground-attack aircraft, using using the the same same frefreand 20 IL-10 aircraft, fighters quency, quency t were werescheduled scheduledfor forflights flightssouthward southwardinto tntoKungchuling, Kungchultng, with with at at least to an an unidentified unidentified airfield believed belteved to least the the former formergroup groupproceeding proceeding to In the border area. On On15 15 July, July, from fromthree threeto tosix slxIL-28 IL-28twin-jet twin-jet be in bombers bombers landed landedat at an an airfield airfield in bombers and and two two TU-2 TU-2Conventional Conventional bombers in area; these these aircraft aircraft had the Antung Antung area; had been been scheduled scheduled for a "combat" %ombat" mission. mission
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Comment: o this apparent Comment: The purpose of nearthe thecombat c o a is -matknown. known. It is i s conceivable conceivable concentration near area is .not. that the Communists are are planning to give air support to a large-scale planntng to give air support to a large-scale North Korean-Chinese offensive which may be planned for be planned for late July. offensive which These moves could also also be preparatory to to the the North North Korean Air air force entering just before before an an armistice armistice comes entertng ICorea Korea just comes into into effect. effect.
IR

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FAR EAST FAR EAST

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SouthKorean Koreanforeign foreignminister ministerthreatens threatens to to prevent preventarmistice: armistice: I. South 1.

Ambassador Briggs reports Ambassador reports that thatSouth South Korean foreign minister minister Pyun Pyun on on 21 21 July made made an "unequivocal,reckless reckless and and last-minute" last-minute" threat "unequivocal, to torpedo" torpedo" the the armistice armistice by demanding demanding "clar"clarifications" of the the assurances assurances which chief negotiator negotiator Harrtson Harrison i f i ~ a t t o n son ' ~ two of which UN UN chief Communists on on 19 19 July. July, Speclfically, made to the Communists Specifically, Pyun Pyun and and Prime Minister what Harrison meant X n i s t e r Paek Paek Tu-chin Tu-chin wanted wanted to to know know what meant when he would"maintain "maintainthe thearmistice" armistice" if it were said that the UN UN would were violated violated by by SouthKorea, Korea, and and would would "protect*! "protect" neutral nation nation personnel personnel authortzed authorized South enter South South Korea, to enter
Implying Implying that Robertson had shown bad faith demanded in his conversations, conversations, Pyun Pyunand andPaek Pa&also also demandedto toknow know whether States would wouldgive give9noral "moral and and material material support" support" in case the United United States case of of unilateral South Korean and whether whether it it would would grant unilateral South Korean military action, and of mutual mutual defense defense pact pact he he requested on 9 July. Rhee the type of Comment: I
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CC
__.
In the the past Rhee's opposition to the the truce truce has In opposition to has risen whenever risen whenever it seemed seemed imminent. imminent. It is i s possible possible that Rhee Fthee plans to unsettled issues in in the Rhee-Robertson Rhee-Robertson agreement in L na exploit the unsettled last-minute effort effort to to block block a truce or or gain gain further further concessions concessions from from the United United States. Statee.
2. Enemyilanning action Enemv DlanntnPr actionin inKorea Koreaon onwide wide front: front: Chinese Comm Military A Comm Military A19 19 July July message message revealed revealed that thattwo two tank tank 19, 19, 20 20 July July 53 53 unidentified tank regtcompanies from an unidentified regiment had had been been instructed instructed to proceed to the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communiet ~ y rmy ptio1 94 /3/ L3 ~ immediately to Another message sector and support that army in sector and in combat. combat. Another dated dated 20 20 July July from froman anunidentified unidentified unit unit mentioned mentioned moving moving to the the 46th Army Army sector sector to to participate participatein in combat. combat.
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.b
.,TOP SEC
Comment: These Comment: These messages, messages, the the first first to referto toparticipation participationof of the m 24th and d 46th refer 46thArmies, Armies, suggest that action on The 24th Army on a a wide wide front front is Is being being planned. planned. The Army is is located central Korea while the 46th in central 46th is is located located in in western western Korea, Korea, just east of east of Panmunjom. Panrnunjom. A Anuinber nuinberof of messages messageshave have indicated indicated a a pending pending offensive orabout about 25 25 July July in in eastern easternKoreaKorea and offensive to take place on or werstern western Korea Korea near nearChorwon. Chorwon.
NR .NR
HR70-14
TOP SECRET CANOE,,,,,,

T1ON
2.14
3.
4. Hea concentration indicated indicated in in central Korea: Heavy Chinese Communist Communist concentration
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EAST FAR EAST
Agency Agency 22 July July 53 53
Trafftc analysis analysis suggests suggests that that by by 12 12 July Traffic Chinese Communist Communist 12th 12th Army had the Chinese . moved from its its mid-May mld-May location location near nearWonsan Wonsan CANOE on the east coast to positions near the 21st FI (42 q Of cc..-MIR-q Army, believed believed to be Army, be in in the the central central sector. CINCFE Telecon -d4rff CINCFE Telecon PP? In addition, In addition, two two recently recently captured captured prisoners prisoners 22July 22-JUly53 53 the 15th 15th Army left the the report being being told told that that the report SECRET SECRET National Security Securtty
%rp,E-
Tep-sEek-t-.CANOE
I T E CANOL CANOL i.TOrSECRET

SECURITY INFORMAnGN INFORMATION
Wonsan area area in late June located somewhere somewhere near near Wonsan June and and was now now located the central front. the
Comment: Several intercepted messages, one one as a s late lateas a s - 23 Ally, have have strongly strongly suggested suggested that major Chinese Chinese and North North Korean Korean attacks attacks may may take place place The movement movement of a wide wide front front within withinaa few fewdays. days. The of the along a 12th Chinese 12th and and 15th 15thArmies Armiesto tothe the central central front front places three Chinese front to to exploit exploit a break-through. armies closeenough enough to the front armies close The 54th 54th and and 16th 16thArmies Armieswere were first first reported moving 24 June. June. Since moving to the central central sector sectorabout about 24 mid-iune, and possibly mid- June, therefore, therefore,two two and possiblyfive fiveChinese ChineseCommunist Communist armies have apparently apparently moved moved into sector between between armies have into the the central sector Chorwon and distance of of approximately approximately 40 40 Chorwon andthe the Pukhan PukhanRiver, River, a distance miles, four armies already there. there. milee, to toaugment augment the four
5.
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29 July 1953
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1
Comment on Pravda editorial on Korean armistice (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1
3.
4. 5.
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7.
8.

SOUTH ASIA
Burmese suggest; Peiping's aid may be sought in ousting Chinese Nationalists (page 4).
India contravenes Battle Act provisions (page 4). Indo-Pakistani prime ministers' talks producing no results (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Egyptian foreign minister to contact British delegates intormauy

(page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
Bulgaria reportedly willing to resume relations with US (page 7).
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F
gilApproved
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GENERAL
1.
Comment on Pravda editorial on Korean armistice: Analysis of the 28 July Pravda editorial on the Korean armistice suggests that Soviet conciliatory tactics will continue. The editorial describes the armistice as a "supremely important" vindication of the current Soviet position favoring settlement of international questions by negotiation, and not by the "policy of force."
As regards the political settlement, Pravda's repetition of earlier demands that the destiny of Korea should be determined by the Koreans themselves, without foreign interference, may foreshadow an early Communist demand for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.
In line with past Communist propaganda, Pravda places full responsibility for the actions of the South Korean government on the United States.
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Pravda repeats another familiar propaganda claim that the truce represents a victory for "peace-loving forces" in that the UN allies were compelled by the pressure of world opinion to enter the armistice talks. It stresses Moscow's role in this marshalling of world opinion, and repeats Malenkov's 27 July promise of support and help from the USSR and "other democratic countries" in restoring Korean national unity and rehabilitating the national economy.
Approved Fc r Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A 01200320001-2
25X1A
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Burmese suggest Peiping's aid may be sought in ousting Chinese Nationalists:

Acting Foreign Minister Kyaw Nyein told Ambassador Sebaldin Rangoon on 23 July that he is seriously considering recommending that Burma seek some arrangement with Peiping to use Chinese Communist troops in ousting the Chinese Nationalists. He said that his government is convinced that Taipei has decided not to withdraw the troops.
25X1A
Comment: The Burmese government has been wary of Chinese Communist involvement in the Nationalist problem, but its growing impatience with the lack of progress toward solution of the problem has been evident for some time. Other government leaders and the progovernment press have previously alluded to
a request for Chinese Communist aid; as a last resort, the government may seriously consider taking such action.
4.
India contravenes Battle Act provisions:
25X1A
According to the Indian finance minister, Prime Minister Nehru personally authorized the 17 July /shipment from India to Communist China of 2,248 pounds of thorium nitrate. The issuance of an export license had been delayed for 30 days "in view of the international situation," but the commodity ts now enroute to China via Colombo, Ceylon, aboard the Polish vessel
Mickiewicz.

SOUTH ASIA
Sebald believes that Kyaw Nyein's remarks should not be taken too seriously in view of his previous known stand against communism, but that it is possible they reflect the thinking of some Burmese leaders.
-425X1A
Approved Fc 1: Release 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 01200320001-2
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The Indian government has been informed that under the terms of the Battle Act the United States will have to terminate all aid to India if the shipment is not off-loaded in Ceylon. Both the Indian finance minister and the foreign secretary assert that only the prime minister can authorize the off-loading and that it will be difficult to find a legal basis for doing so. According to the foreign secretary, neither he nor the prime minister had been aware of the implications of the shipment.
5.
Indo-Pakistani prime ministers' talks producing no results:

Pakistani foreign minister Zafrullah Khan on 27 July told the American:charge in Karachi that the talks between Prime Ministers Nehru and Mohammad Ali had made no progress toward agreement on Kashmir or any other issue, The Pakistani cabinet was indignant at Nehru's unwillingness to come to grips with the problems, but finally agreed that the discussions should be continued tn New Delhi if Nehru should so desire. The cabinet also agreed to do everything possible to keep the public calm and to prevent any anti-Indian outbreaks.
25X1A
Comment: The Pakistani public has become used to the failure of Indo-Pakistani negotiations and is unlikely to react strongly in this instance, though some bitter statements will probably appearS in the press.
5

25X1A
High officials have publicly emphasized that India is free to trade at will with all countries. Furthermore, Nehru's personal pride and freedom of action are now involved, and he may therefore be disinclined to recall the shipment.
Comment: Nehru presumably was responsible for holding up the export liceziirior 30 days, and he probably was generally aware of the strategic nature of the shipment and of the American reaction to be expected.
25)ftRroved F or Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A )01200320001-2
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7.
Egyptian foreign minister to contact British delegates informally:

British charge Hankey and General Robertson , military'delegate for the Anglo-Egyptian talks, will meet Egyptian foreign minister
Fawzi I
25X1A
soon, accor ing to Ambassador Caffery.
25X6
Fawzi also said that the Pakistani charge in Cairo had invited him to dinner with Hankey and Robertson on 30 July.
Comment: These two proposed meetings should offer the necessary opportunity to arrange a resumption of the Anglo-Egyptian talks, which have been suspended since 6 May.
-625X1A
Approved F or Release 2003/11104 : CIA-R0P79100975A001 200320001-2
25X1A
EASTERN EUROPE
8.
Bulgaria reportedly willing to resume relations with US:
25X1A
Comment: A Bulgarian willingness to resume relations with the US would be in accord with recent Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia and the West. Baudier, however, has not always been accurate in his reporting.

-725X1A
US minister Ravndal in Budapest notes that the Bulgarian minister there had made several friendly gestures at recent diplomatic receptions.
Bulgarian officials recently told French minister Baudier in Sofia that they were willing to resume relations with the United States but would not make the first move, according to a. Baudier told the charge of similar statements in April, but said that immediately after the Berta purge he had been told that there were enough "imperialist agents" in Sofia and no more were desired.
HR70-14
c;OP-SECILE-TCANOE 'gore
A
-3
C
-3
s3
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FAR EAST
4.
movement of of North into Korea noted: Possible movement North Korean Korean aircraft aircraft into
On On 27 27 July July two two North NorthKorean Koreanaircraft, aircraft, were noted noted airborne in in possibly possibly TU-2's, TU-2's, were the Antung area and may.have Antung area may.have landed at Utju, Ulju, just south south of o f the the Yalu YaluRiver, River, at 8:55 8:55 p. p. m, m.,according according to to intercepted intercepted flight 3-aw, service c . 3-a r t y servtce messages. messages. Other Other call call signs signsnoted noted suggest that three IL-28 IL-28 twin-jet twin-jet bombers and three three MIG-15's MIG-15's took off off from from the the Antung Antung field at approximately the same time. time.
Air Force Force
Security Service Japan 28 July July 53 53 CA OE CANOE
Comment: The cease-fire agreement agreement went went m . The into into effect effect on on 27 27July Julyat atl 10:00 p. m. The armistice armistice agreement agreement proprohibits any subsequent movement movement of into Korea. Korea., of aircraft aircraft into
No have been based on No combat combat aircraft aircraft have in the war. war, It has long long been North North Korean Koreanairfields airfields since early in suspected that the the Communist's Communists would at wouldmove moveacross across the the border border at the last last moment moment all all North North Korean planes hitherto based in in Manchuria. Manchuria. The North North Korean Koreanaair at least least150 150MIG-15's, MIG-l5's,39 39 t r force possesses at TU-2's. IL-28's and and 13 13 TU-2's.
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3 TOP 3M SECRET B 3 E F CANOE CANOE
7_74.
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2 AuguSt 1953
Copy No. t)
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ro.-.!..Tt
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REVIEWER: _I

AVM:
DATia4P 17
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For info on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
Approved F
elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 01200360001-8
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
SieUSSR may not seek place in Korean political conference (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. , Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkin (page 3).
25X1
5.
6.
25X1
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief program (page 5). France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina
(page 6).
25X1A
2 August 53
Approved F
25X1A
elease 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AC 01200360001-8
GENERAL
1.
USSR may not seek place in Korean political conference:
25X1A
Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin, in separate conversations on 31 July with a UN Secretariat member and a US delegate, pointed out that the Korean armistice agreement calls for a political conference "of both sides." He indicated his inability to understand the belief among UN delegates that the General Assembly had the specific responsibility for naming participants in the conference.
The Kremlin may consider that overt participation would have disadvantages overbalancing the propaganda opportunities of the forum. Its alliance with Peiping would require it to support fully China's demands concerning the UN and Formosa, and thus Jeopardize its attempts to improve relations with the Western powers. The USSR may also calculate that it can better exploit differences among the non-Communist powers over Far Eastern questions from a flexible, behind-the-scenes position.
25X1A
2.
Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkin:
The chief of staff of the French air force in Tonkin, commenting on the sabotage of a military DC-3 at Gia lain airfield near Hanoi by a time-bomb, states that Tonkin airfields can operate safely only by excluding all Indochinese personnel. The American consul notes that the pattern of sabotage has now been extended to include all forms of communication in Tonkin.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Comment: These statements suggest that the USSR may wish to avoid galificriii overt role in the political conference called for by the Korean armistice. 'Tsarapkin's remarks,after discussing alternative possibilities a few days earlier, probably reflect Moscow's instructions to express a preference for a limited conference.
-325X1A
2 Apgust 53
Ag414or !Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 01200360001-8
Comment: The Viet Minh during the past few months has stepped' up, its program of sabotage within the delta and has demonstrated improved techniques against rail and rbad communications and supply installations. The apparent ease with which such activities are conducted illustrates the fundamental insecurity of this heavily in-
filtrated area.
25X1

-425X1A
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elease 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79100975A00 1200360001-8
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5.
New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief program:
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
American officials in Germany believe that the East German government may approach High Commissioner Conant, directly or tlirougjL Soviet officials, to demand the release of blocked East German funds in the United States for the purchase of food. Premier Grotewohl recently demanded release of the funds and said his government ng to buy merican food at world market prices.
-525X1A
2 August 53
25X1A
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 1200360001-8
US officials in Germany fear that any increased attempt to.publicize the American role in the Berlin food relief plan might be used as an excuse,not only for further Soviet intimidation of persons bringing food parcels across the border but also for the closing of the East-West Berlin border and for new interference with food shipments from West Germany into Berlin.
far been limited to isolateTilfiles of food and identity cards, pre-
Comment:
Communist retaliation has so
6.
France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina:
25X1A
French commissioner general Dejean told Ambassador Heath in Saigon on 29 July that Paris has agreed to initiate the "Navarre plan," but cannot carry it out completely until un s are ava a ccording to the reported decision, nine battalions will be sent from France on 1 October and the battalion now in Korea will be added if the UN Command consents. Additional cadres, noncommissioned officers, specialists and cargo planes will also be sent. Dejean pointed out, however, that these reinforcements and the formation of new Vietnamese battalions would not enable Navarre to undertake an all-out offensive in the next few months, but only a stepping up of limited offensive moves.
Comment: Navarre is reported to have requested 15 battalions ft-OW-ranee. The reinforcements now promised are not scheduled to leave France until the time autumn hostilities usually begin in Indochina.
This policy of reinforcing Indochina, apparently a triumph for Foreign Minister Bidault, cannot be expected to survive over the long term unless the military situation undergoes marked improvement in the coming months.

-625X1A
sumably because harsher measures would seriously hpset current Soviet conciliatory policies. Officialequests to.lanrchAle.fohdrfrourthe blocked account might bolster the weak Communist propaganda response to the food program, even though the account totals only about $1,400,000.
2 August 53
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Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0C 1200390001-5
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
U?.Ctomment on Soviet note on foreign ministers' conference

(page 3).
2.
South Africa agrees to gradual withdrawal of air squadron from Korea (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
13/Taipei orders partial evacuation of Nationalist troops from
25X1
25X1A

-225X1A
Burma (page 4).
6 Aug 53
Approved F Dr Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A3 01200390001-5
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Comment on Soviet note on foreign ministers' conference:
25X1A
for a foreign ministers' conference with a broad agenda lessens the possibility of four-power talks. The Kremlin's proposal apparently is an effort to appeal to world opinion and create a propaganda forum on its own terms. On Germany, the USSR seeks to avoid the issue of free elections by calling for a discussion of German unity and the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The West Germans will probably regard the note as Moscow's "no" to unification, because of the absence of any clear Soviet position on such questions as free all-German elections and German neutrality.
The USSR's 4 August counterproposal
25X6
25X6
As part of the Soviet effort to maintain maximum maneuverability in any forthcoming negotiations, the USSR raised an additional obstacle to negotiation by making an appeal, though not a demand, for Chinese representation in big power deliberations. France probably will welcome the Soviet call for inclusion of Communist China as offering a chance of easing the Indochina burden.
2.
South Africa agrees to gradual withdrawal of air squadron from Korea:
25X1A
Prime Minister Malan has refused to reconsider his decision to withdraw the South African fighter squadron now in Korea, but has agreed to make the shift in gradual stages and without any further public statements.
- 3 -
25X1A
6 Aug
53
Approved Fo r Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79100975A0( 1200390001-5
25X1A
Malan added that a token force could and would remain in Korea, but he refused to say definitely for how long, since South Africa's present policy is to undertake no new postarmistice commitments.
Withdrawal of South Africa's 18-plane contingent, announced by Malan on 28 July, is the first formal postarmistice withdrawal of one of the UN forces. Several other UN members, including Colombia and the Philippines, have previously discussed the departure of their forces following a truce. Any withdrawal of forces would weaken the UN's bargaining position at the forthcoming political conference.
Comment:
3.
Taipei orders partial evacuation of Nationalist troops from Burma:

Chinese Nationalist foreign minister Yeh informed Ambassador Rankin in Taipei on 4 August that his government had cabled Mong Hsat directing the evacuation from Burma of 2,000 to 3,000 Nationalist troops. According to Yeh, it is hoped that two groups will be evacuated by 1 September. He added that Li Mi will issue a statement dissolving his "Yunnan anti-Communist national salvation force."
25X1
25X1A
Comment: Yeh's statements may indicate a significant departure from previous Nationalist efforts to stall implementation of the evacuation plan adopted by the four-power
committee in Bangkok.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
-425X1A
6
Aug 53
Approved For Release 2003/11/04 : CIA-R0P79100975A001200390001-5
Approv ?.d For Release 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1200390001-5
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-525X1A
6 Aug 53
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ase 2Cirepffil9M0frigq79TO
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9 August 1953
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DOCUMENT NO
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DAT8-1. I
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l'Z'.1;EW DATE'
I " REViEWER: 4
h:
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7i.
*DOE REVIEW COMPLETED*
25
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arilApproved
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
12(7-Comment on Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet (page 3). 2. Coordinated statement by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee on Malenkov's claim that the USSR possesses a hydrogen weapon (page 5).
Japanese Communist front activity may presage Soviet overture on prisoner of war issue (page 5). 0/Comment on the North Korean purge (page 6).
3.
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
VUSSR proposes bilateral talks with France on German problem

(page 7).
25X1A
-225X1A
FAR EAST
9 Aug 53
Approved F
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SOVIET UNION
1.
COMMent
on Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet:
25X1A
Heavy industry will continue as the prime objective of economic development.

I
Malenkov described the material welfare of the population as "the main task" of the current Five-Year Plan. He stated that production of consumer goods will be increased "at the expense of other sectors" of the economy.
25X1
Malenkov's speech to the last session of the Supreme Soviet reaffirmed the policies effected by the new regime since Stalin's death and indicated his pre-eminence among the top leaders. Emphasizing the necessity for improving the welfare of the Soviet people, Malenkov assured them and the world that a reduction of international tension through negotiation was both possible and desirable.
25X1
indicate that plan goals for three basic industries, coal, oil and electric power, will not be met in 1955.
The reappointment of Presidium member M. Z. Saburov as head of economic planning suggests that he is considered the most experienced and capable administrator for carrying out the considerably modified objectives of the Five-Year Plan and for the further reorganization of economic ministries which Malenkov indicated was under consideration. The fact that the Supreme Soviet was not asked to ratify the plan is further indication that it will be kept under constant review.
In outlining the government's drive for greater consumer goods production, Malenkov placed particular emphasis on increases from the agricultural sector. These are to be accomplished by new conciliatory measures to the collective farmers that contrast sharply with Stalin's plans for the Soviet peasantry. To increase their incentive, the state will pay the farmers more for their produce and will demand smaller obligatory deliveries from their private plots.
- 3 -
25X1A
9 Aug
53
25X1A
Approved Fbrflelease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01200420001-1
With regard to foreign affairs, Malenkov reaffirmed the conciliatory post-Stalin policy for reducing international tension. At the same time he called upon foreign governments to meet the USSR half-way and served notice that the present Soviet power position will be defended.
The premier also reaffirmed the value of negotiations with the Western powers, but made no specific proposal for talks and gave no hint that there would be concessions. He advanced a particular bid to France to solve its problems concerning Germany and the European Defense Community by bilateral arrangement with the USSR.
Malenkov's treatment of the recent "Berlin provocation" may have been intended to serve notice that the USSR will defend the East German government and implied a warning against interference in the Orbit.
The timing of Malenkov's claim concerning the hydrogen bomb probably reflected a desire to assert to the world and the Soviet people that neither internal stresses, such as Beria's purge and the current unrest in the Satellites, nor the present emphasis on conciliation were indications bf a wdakness 'of the new- Soviet regime.

-425X1A
The main overtures were made to countries bordering on the Orbit for a bilateral improvement of their relations with the USSR. The statements on Italy and Japan were tailored to exploit local dissatisfaction with American-sponsored export controls and US military influence. Malenkov underlined Soviet willingness to expand trade with all countries.
9 Aug 53
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F
AlApproved
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001200420001-1
2.
Coordinated statement by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee on Malenkovts claim that the USSR possesses a hydrogen
weapon:
25X1A
Up to 1530 EDT, 8 August 1953, no Soviet explosion of a full Scale or intermediate thermonuclear device has been detected. We do not consider that a militarily significant weapon exists until such a test has been conducted.
However, we have no evidence of a high priority effort in the thermonuclear field. The Malenkov statement may be pure propaganda, or it may be inspired by the attainment of a specific stage of development short of an actual test.
3.
Japanese Communist front activity may presage Soviet overture on prisoner of war issue:
Japanese Communist front organizations r ecently have begun whipping up the issue of returning Soviet-held Japanese war prisoners in a manner which the American em tassy ee s may oreshadow a Soviet move on this question. The embassy believes recent Communist gestures are designed to test Japanese policy and American reactions to possible closer JapaneseSov iet relations.
25X1A

FAR EAST
A capacity exists in the USSR for the limited production of the critical materials required for a thermonuclear weapon. The fundamental thinking regarding the thermonuclear reaction is known to the Soviets and they have the technical competence to have carried on advanced research. A field test of a device involving a thermonuclear reaction is within their capability at any time.
-525X1A
9 Aug 53
25X1A
F
OilApproved
Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01200420001-1
Japanese officials thus far seem cautious, but the embassy doubts that Japan would insist on a formal treaty as a condition for specific trade or prisoner of war negotiations.
Responsible Japanese officials apparently believe that a formal Soviet request for negotiations may soon be forthcoming.
4.
Comment on the North Korean purge:
The convictions may represent a shake-up of the agencies responsible for penetrating South Korea in view of their previous lack of success, and may presage increased political warfare and guerrilla activities against South Korea.
The convictions, however, actually weaken the North Korean position since the leaders affected are those on whom Pyongyang would have to depend primarily for communizing South Korea. Therefore the convictions.may also mean that the North Koreans have abandoned hope that they can secure control over the entire peninsula in the foreseeable future, by elections or other means.
It is also possible that the domestic faction held nationalist views on unification unacceptable to over-all Communist objectives or was believed to have been penetrated.
There is no information connecting the convictions with the Berta purge or with possible differences between the Soviet and Chinese-oriented factions of North Korean leaders.

25X1A
The identities of the twelve North Korean leaders convicted for treason on 7 August indicate that the North Korean purges are aimed primarily at an important part of the domestic faction of North Korean Communist leadership. This group, the South Korean Labor Party, has in the past been chiefly responsible for guerrilla activities against the Rhee government.
25X1A
9 Aug 53
Approved F r Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A001200420001-1
25X1A
25X1
6.
USSR proposes bilateral talks with France on German problem:
25X1A
1
According to the secretary general of the French Foreign Ministry, the new Soviet ambassador in Paris on 31 July and 1 August suggested to French ambassador Joxe, then in Paris, that bilateral French-Soviet talks were the best means of settling the German problem. Joxe immediately rebuffed the suggestion.
In the course of the conversation Soviet ambassador Vinogradov asserted that both France and the USSR had reason to fear German rearmament and questioned whether EDC was really in France's interest. He also stated that current Soviet policy is based on the possibility of "durable coexistence" of the Communist and capitalist worlds as well as on the principle that revolution is not an exportable commodity.
- 7 -

WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A
9 Aug 53
25X1A
Approved Ric Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001200420001-1
This is the clearest indication to date that the USSR regaTalWroaches to France, particularly for preventing Germany's integration into Western Europe, as the best means of weakening the Atlantic alliance. Last October Important elements in the French Foreign Ministry gave serious consideration to Vyshinsky's similar approach to Ambassador doxe. Now, however, the relaxation of tension in East-West relations affords the government various opportunities for meeting public demand for a detente.
Comment:

25X1A
9 Aug 53
se 20949p0SIDENREW79T0
F.
14 August 1953
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Copy No.
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DOCUMENT NO.
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25
was
TOP SECRET
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Approved Fo
elease 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79100975 01200460001-7
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1.
British Foreign Office comments on Malenkov speech (page 3).

FAR EAST
2.
3.
Japanese set conditions for the renewal of relations with USSR
4.
5.
6.

SOUTH ASIA
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Viet Minh reportedly to concentrate on delta during next campaign season (page 5). Moslem dissident organization in Indonesia allegedly extends its activities (page 5).
Comment on disorders in Ceylon (page 6).
Comment on changes in North Korean leadership (page 4).
(page 3).
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1.
British Foreign Office comments on Malenkov speech:
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The British Foreign Office comments that, on first analysis, the economic aspects of Malenkov's speech give an impression "of very great power."
The Foreign Office feels that the new economic program is genuine. It sees no indication of the slackening of industrial development or armament program, but states that the Soviet Union now appears able to devote more efforts and resources to consumer goods.
The concessions in the agricultural field indicate to the Foreign Office an intention to correct the imbalance between the peasants' contributions and their rewards. The fact that the army is largely recruited from peasants may be a factor in these concessions.
Comment: The agricultural concessions appear to be aimed at improving production through increased incentives. It is unlikely that these concessions were intended to appeal to peasant sentiment in the army.
2.
Japanese set conditions for the renewal of relations with USSR:
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Japanese Foreign Ministry officials believe Malenkov's remarks on Japan in his recent speech represent no change in Soviet policy toward Japan, but were merely further tactics to build up popular pressure to overthrow the Yoshida government.
They publicly assert that the USSR must make the first move for a renewal of relations, and set as conditions Soviet acceptance of the substance of the San Francisco treaty,

FAR EAST
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return of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands, abrogation of the part of the Sino-Soviet treaty directed against Japan, and return of Japanese war prisoners.
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;
3.
Comment on changes in North Korean leadership:
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Recent changes in North Korean leadership, as disclosed by Pyongyang broadcasts, indicate that the Soviet-trained Korean faction has increased its power, largely at the expense of domestic elements formerly associated
with the South Korean Communist movement.
While the tightening of Soviet control is not reflected in the government line-up, in which there seemt4 to be a balance among the Soviet, Chinese and domestic factions, it does appear in the more important party apparatus. Soviet-Koreans have been appointed to four of the five positions in the newly-reorganized central political committee of the North Korean Labor Party and to the majority of posts on the central organization committee.
Moscow's decision to allocate one billion rubles, approximately $250,000,000 at the official exchange rate, for North Korean economic rehabilitation is another indication of Soviet efforts to control North Korean affairs.

- 4 -
The Japanese have maintained a cautious Soviet gestures as they are aware that no official Soviet commitment has been made. Popular Japanese pressure for trade and the normalization of relations with the Soviet bloc probably will make it difficult for the government to rebuff a bona fide offer for the renewal of Japanese-Soviet relations.
Comment: toward
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4.
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Viet Minh reportedly to concentrate on delta during next campaign season:

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a high-level Viet Minh conference was held in mid-July to plan operations for next fall. It was allegedly decided that two divisions would be used against the southern part of the delta and three divisions against the northwestern part.
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There have been indications that the Viet Minh offensive in Laos will be renewed this fall, but the two divisions which are unaccounted for in the alleged plan are not well located for such an operation.
5.
Moslem dissident organization in Indonesia allegedly extends its activities:
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effort to obtain support
The Darul Islam, Moslem dissident organization which seeks the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, has sent representatives to other Moslem countries in an
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Comment: The new leftist-dominated government has stated that it will give a high priority to military action against the Darul Islam which has about 10,000 armed men. In the past the Darul Islam's activities have been limited to Java, but there are now indications they are being expanded in other areas.
Various individuals in the Masjumi, the principal, opposition party to the new leftist cabinet, reportedly have connections with the Danl. Islam, but any extensive rallying to its support would seriously divide the government's opposition.
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6.
Comment on disorders in Ceylon:
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The widespread strikes, disorders, and

sabotage which occurred in Ceylon on 11 and 12 August may be interpreted as an organizational triumph for Ceylon's leftist parties, including the Communists. These parties have never before worked in such close cooperation as they apparently did on this occasion and they have never before successfully capitalized on popular discontent.
The Ceylonese government may be faced with a critical problem if the leftists continue to work together to keep the populace aroused.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice conference (page 3).

FAR EAST
(page 4).
2.
Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in Japan

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SOUTH ASIA 4.
Pakistani army remains calm over Kashmir crisis (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan (page 5).
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GENERAL
1.
USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice conference:

oviet UN delegate Vyshinsky on 13 ugust suggested to the UN secretary
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limited to the "two sides" in the dispute, presumably without Soviet participation, and argued that the General Assembly had no responsibility under the armistice agreement to name the participants.
Vyshinsky's shift in approach may be in response to strong sentiment among UN members, including Britain and France, in favor of inviting the USSR as well as India to participate in a broad conference. The US favors a conference with the General Assembly designating representatives from among the 16 UN nations which fought in Korea with the Communists deciding on their own representation, which could include the USSR. The Kremlin may now see an opportunity for gaining indirect recognition of Communist China by a UN recomme@ttion for Peiping's participation in the conference. The Kremlin probably also wishes to avoid having a Soviet bid for participation rejected and accordingly may be waiting for a coalescence of Western sentiment before taking a firm position on the membership question.
delegate Tsarapkin exprellidiT:reference for a conference

Comment:
eneral that a postarmistice political onference should include all main groups, countries and viewpoints interested in the general issues, but stated that he had no definite instructions from his government. He referred to the fact that in its prearmistice proposal for the prisoner of war commission the Soviet Union had suggested a group of 11 nations, including itself. Vyshinsky added that the General Assembly should decide on the nations to take part in the conference.
On 31 July Soviet UN
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FAR EAST
2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in Japan:

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The return of the Amami Islands to Japan on 8 August may have reversed the tide of anti-Americanism which had been gathering momentum during the past six months, in the opinion of the American embassy in Tokyo. It is also the first American postoccupation action to have a significantly favorable effect on the generally leftist Japanese intelligentsia and publicists.
The return of the islands removes a major source of friction between the United States and Japan. The Japanese press contrasted their return with the Soviet Union's failure to recognize Iapan's historic rights to the Habomai and Shikotan islands north of Japan. The press also acknowledged that American retention of the remaining Ryukyu and the Bonin islands was necessary for Japanese security.
Comment:
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4.
Pakistani army remains calm over ICashmir crisis:
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Pakistani army headquarters near Kashmir is maintaining an attitude of complete calm with regard to the recent developments in Indian-held Kashmir, according to the American army attache in Karachi. The Paidstani army is not contemplating cancellation of leaves and does not plan to move additional troops into the area.
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Commept: Pakistan, as in previous crises, is apparently taking all possible precautions to avoid a
SOUTH ASIA
conflict.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5.
Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan:

Ithe sultan of Morocco probalaly will not be deposed. It is anticipated
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that despite conflicting rumors the resident general and the sultan will reach a compromise, the exact nature of which may not be made public. An acceptable compromise must enable the French to claim that the sultan has accepted their demands and yet not alienate the sultan's following.
rival factions exists, it is not probable that large-scale disturbances will occur since the 56,000 French security forces are capable of maintaining order. Basic tensions will not be alleviated, however, and El Glaoui and his supporters will continue to be a source of trouble.

-625X1A
While the possibility of clashes between
The American embassy in Paris reports that Premier Laniel, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Resident General Guillaume are confident they can use the current situation to force the sultan to accept the French reform program. The French authorities are also in a position to bring sufficient pressure on El Glaoui, the sultan's chief opponent, to prevent him from upsetting the status quo.
15 Aug 53
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probably introduced into North North Korea 2. Aircraft Aircraft probably Korea since truce:
possibly North North Korean, Korean, may may Aircraft, possibly have been operating on 15 15 August from CANOE the Namsi atrfield airfield approximately approxtmately 15 15 T. Moos' miles north on the the west west coast, T x : / 9805 north of of Chongju Chongju on acordthg to a aChinese Chinese military message. message. The The message message sent sent by a a cor gto "main depot" stated: "On "On15 15 August August during depot" to to several several recipients stated: the Korean review review of of the the 70 70aircraft, aircraft, the the line line of of flight will will be be from Namsi to Pyongyang, then return to to Namst." Namsi." Namsi Pyongyang, then
M i l Comm Mil Chinese Comm 15 Aug 53 53

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TOP SECRET CANOE W E

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: DATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010
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above message, message, although Comment: The above although not stating specifically that the 70 aircraft landed at Namsi Namsi airfield, not speclftcally t h m a i r c r a f t strongly suggests that they were based at that field or Rethat they were based at that field ornearby. nearby. Recent returning prisoners reported reportedthat thaton on15 15 August August returning American war prisoners they saw twin-engine twin-engine jet jet bombers and and jet Jet fighters fighters in an air air show show over the North Korean capital.
when I lwhen the cease-fire wasonly only an an insignificant insignificant numcease-fire became becameeffective effectivethere therewas o f combat combat aircraft North Korea The armistice armtstice agreement agreement ber of aircraft in North Korea. The on 27 27 July July prohibits prohibits the the reinforcement reinforcement of of combat combataircraft aircraft in signed on Korea by either either side side except except for for the the replacement replacement of of damaged damaged or wornout out aircraft.
NR
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Comment on indication of Soviet attendance at Austrian treaty

(page 3).
Reports of new Soviet moves in Iran (page 3). Vmeeting

SOVIET UNION
FAR EAST
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/ efforts (page 5).
6.
7.
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WESTERN EUROPE
South Korean officials say Communists intensifying penetration
Adenauer objects to text of proposed Western note on Germany

(page 6).
Comment on Vatican-Spanish concordat (page 7).
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VComment on the Moscow Air Show (page 4).
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GENERAL
1.
Comment on indication of Soviet attendance at Austrian treaty meeting:
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the Western invitation to attend a deputy Ioreign ministers' meeting on an Austrian state treaty scheduled for that date.
the USSR may accept
By agreeing not to introduce this short treaty for consideration, the West has removed a major Soviet excuse for not attending the meeting.
2.
Reports of new Soviet moves in Iran:
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According to press reports, the Soviet ambassador also has offered Zahedi aid to meet Iran's urgent financial crisis. Other press reports state that on 27-28 August the Soviet trade representative met with the Iranian minister of national economy to discuss the signing of a new supplementary agreement for the exchange of goods, which was followed by a statement from the Iranian minister to the effect that the agreement would be signed on 29 August.

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On 25 May the USSR rejected a bid for four-power discussion of an Austrian treaty and emphasized the futility of further discussions on the deputies' level. The Soviet note of 31 July, however, stipulated withdrawal of the abbreviated text as the only condition for attendance at a meeting.
Prime Minister Zahedi told Ambassador Henderson that the Soviet ambassador in Tehran has protested to the Iranian government about anti-Soviet demonstrations on 19 August which included attacks on the Soviet information center.
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would probably be offerecrar I annex to the June trade agreement, or possibly through a new agreement resulting from the negotiations soon to be resumed in Tehran, rather than as an outright gift.
Comment:
Any Soviet aid to Iran
Prime Minister Zahedi and the shah would not be averse to using an alleged or actual offer of Soviet help to stimulate American aid.
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Included in the annual Soviet air show over Moscow's Tuschino airport on 23 August were 54 single engine jet fighters similar to the MIG-15, but with a longer and more slender fuselage. No new bomber types were shown although it is known that prototypes have been built.
In the past prototypes of new aircraft have been demonstrated for Western observation at the air show each summer. Some of these types never get into production while others may be operational at the time of their appearance in the show. The appearance of the new fighters at this year's show points up the continued Soviet efforts to improve air defense and confirms that exhibition of new aircraft has not been discontinue& The failure to show new medium or heavy bombers suggests that these were not available, at least in quantities commensurate with the scale of the rest of the
show.
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'seen Iwhat appeared to be seven or eight type 31 heavy bombers and a possible prototype of a new swept-wing bomber at

In late July,'
3.
Comment on the Moscow Air Show:
SOVIET UNION
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Ramenskoye Airfield, a test field for the Flight Research Institute. It has not been possible to determine whether these sightin s indicated the existence of a new jet medium or heavy bomber
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FAR EAST
4.
South Korean officials say Communists intensifying penetration efforts:
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South Korean officials are concerned over Communist penetration since the armistice, according to General Van
The American embassy comments that while infiltration and penetration will undoubtedly be accelerated, the South Korean government also has an interest in establishing publicly that this has taken place in order to justify its possible withdrawal from the political conference.
Comment: The recent North Korean purges eliminated among others virtually all the Communist leaders charged with the unsuccessful subversion program in the south. It can be expected that the new leaders will intensify their penetration efforts not only to avoid the fate of their predecessors but to promote the current Communist unification themes.
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soon as the armistice was signed, Communist agents began flocking south, some in the guise of returning prisoners of war and others sifting through the demilitarized zone or coming by sea. Van Fleet said that the South Korean government has not yet devised adequate measures to cope with the problem.
Fleet. These officials state that as
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6.
Adenauer objects to text of proposed Western note on Germany:
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In the opinion of American representatives on the tripartite drafting committee in Paris, revising the text to meet Adenauer's insistence that any four-power meeting be confined to the question of free elections would give the Soviet Union a perfect pretext for evading discussions. Furthermore, it would expose both Adenauer and the West to charges of insincerity from the West German opposition Social Democrats.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Chancellor Adenauer believes that unless the proposed Western note to Moscow on the German and Austrian questions is amended, it may damage him in the 6 September elections and jeopardize the "German position." He objects in particular to any implication that the Western powers would discuss a peace treaty before the formation of an all-German government.
-629 Aug 53
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Comment; On the eve of the elections, Adenauer is probably undu y concerned over any implication that the West does not fully support his views on unification. This concern will probably be intensified by the Social Democrats' strong foreign policy declaration on 28 August that a Germany allied with the West can never be unified, and that any four-power conference must discuss not only un ification but Germany's future role in international affairs.
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Internally, it represents a severe setback for nonleftist opposition groups already demoralized by the anticipated success of the US-Spanish base rights negotiations. Liberal Catholic elements had contended that past Vatican reluctance to negotiate a concordat reflected Pope Pius XII's displeasure at the regime's excesses. Anti-Franco monarchists had maintained that the Vatican regarded the Franco government as merely provisional and would not sign a concordat until the monarchy had been restored.

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'
The fact that a concordat between Spain and the Vatican was signed on 27 August after 19 months of secret negotiations represents an important victory for the Franco regime. The agreement in effect provides the first official Vatican endorsement of the present government. The text has not yet been released.
7.
Comment on Vatican-Spanish concordat:
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61
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Britain prefers Satellite candidate for Security Council seat

(page 3).
VC
British seen favoring limited aid for Iran (page 3).

FAR EAST
4.
PeComment on press report that Nasr will assume Egyptian

premiership (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6.
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(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
le
Comment on mission of North Korean delegation to Moscow
Regular airlift of supplies to Chinese. Nationalists in Burma indicated (page 4).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
American officials in Bonn see Adenauer election victory fairly certain (page 6).
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GENERAL
1.
Britain prefers Satellite candidate for Security Council seat:
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Preliminary British views call for permitting a Soviet-designated Satellite to occupy the UN Security Council
seat normally reserved for an Eastern European state. Members of the British UN delegation believe that a major conflict over the seat might deter what may be a developing Soviet initiative to reduce world tensions.
In 1951 Britain unsuccessfully supported Byelorussia rather than Greece for the East European Security Council seat on the grounds that a past understanding permitted the Eastern European states, like the Commonwealth countries, to choose their own representative.
2.
British seen favoring limited aid for Iran:
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The British Foreign Office recognizes that the Zahedi regime will probably need financial assistance to survive, but hopes the United States will limit any sue a order to maintain pressure on Iran to settle the oil question. The American embassy in London also has the impression that Prime Minister Churchill is eager to pave the Way for a resumption of diplomatic relations.
The Foreign Office is now studying the question of possible forms of settlement. The embassy feels the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company may adopt a "more enlightened" attitude toward a settlement than previously, but detects no inclination to favor a lump-sum compensation payment.
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Comment:
The British Foreign Office, however, wishes to avoid disagreements with the United States such as occurred over Indian participation in the Korean political conference.
-32 Sept 53
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Comment: The British are still not optimistic about reaching-iii-Efrettlement with the new government. Their readiness to see Iran receive even limited aid, however, implies a recognition of the probable consequences should Zahedi fall.
FAR EAST
3.
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Comment on mission of North Korean delegation to Moscow:
ist on economic affairs, and the minister of railways.
The other members -- Premier Kim 11-sung, the vice chairman of the central committee of the Labor (Communist) Party, and the minister of foreign affairs -- would be likely to participate in either economic or political discussions. No military officials are included in the delegation. The possibility that the group also may receive instructions on strategy for the Korean political conference is suggested by I that Peng Teh-huai, who headed the Chinese delegation at the truce talks, has also left for Moscow.
None of the members is associated with the Chinese,?trained faction of the North Korean governinent This reinforces previous indications that the Chinese faction will not play a major role in future internal Korean developments:
The composition of the six-member North Korean delegation which Radio Pyongyang announced had departed for Moscow on 1 September suggests that implementa: tion of the $250,000,000 Soviet loan for rehabilitation and reconstruction will be an important topic of discussion between the two governments. Members of the delegation include the chairman of the state planning committee, a vice premier who is a special-
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4.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Regular airlift of supplies to Chinese Nationalists in Burma indicated:

Burma has confirmation from "unimpeachable" sources that the Chinese Nationalists in Mong Hsat have been supplied regularly
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throughout the monsoon season by air from Thailand. According to a high official of the Burmese Foreign Office, his government has received specific details, including data on the planes and companies involved.
The American embassy in Rangoon adds that the Shan ruler of Kengtung State, where Mong Hsat is located, reported on 26 August that as many as two or three flights a week were arriving at the Nationalist headquarters.
Comment: Last spring the Nationalist government promised that supply flights to Mong Haat would be suspended. In July both CAT and Fushing air lines, the two organizations most frequently mentioned as being involved in these operationa, denied that any of their planes had flown into Burma during the preceding two months.
There have been numerous reports since then however, of a continuing airlift to Mong Hsat. Such activity would tend to confirm suspicions of Nationalist insincerity in promising to cooperate in the evacuation of its troops from Burma.
5.
Comment on press report that Nasr will assume Egyptian premiership: man of the ruling army clique, may soon take over the premiership appeared on 31 August th an Arab News Agency release from Cairo. I
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iThe first public statement that Colonel Naar, gyptian vice premier and strong

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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It is unlikely that the news agency would report General Nagib's possible replacement as prime minister without at least the tacit approval of the authorities. The release of a press report at this time suggests that Colonel Naar is ready to complete his assumption of overt authority in Egypt.
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Nasr's assumption of the premiership would publicly confirm the existing power situation in Egypt. Cabinet changes, which may accompany such a move, would be more important, however, particularly if young, inexperienced army officers replace such capable ministers as those of foreign affairs and finance.
WESTERN EUROPE
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The US high commission in Bonn states that Adenauer's retention of the chancellorship following the 6 September elections can be anticipated "fairly safely." It is highly un ike y e oppos tion Social Democrats can win 200 of the 484 Bundestag seats, the approximate number necessary to defeat him. Moreover, Adenauer's potential parliamentary support is now greater than it was in 1949 since two small parties, the Bavarian and Center, have already pledged him their Bundestag votes.
6. American officials in Bonn see Adenauer election victory fairly certain:
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
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American embassy comments on North ICorean delegation to

Moscow (page 3).
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(fif Comment on new Iranian-Soviet trade agreement (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Aimee 4).
4.
Quirino may appoint political general as secretary of defense

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i
6.
.
Ratification of Anglo-Libyan treaty encounters new difficulties

(Page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
Yugoslavia requests tripartite intervention in Trieste crisis

(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
/British move to modif y moratorium on discussion of Chinese UN

representation (page 7).
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GENERAL
1.
American embassy comments on North Korean delegation to Moscow: The US embassy in Moscow considers that the visit of the North Korean delegation to Moscow probably indicates that the USSR has decided to throw its full weight behind the regime in much the same way it did with East Germany. The
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embassy feels that Pravda's recent statement that a political conference held on the basis of the US resolution is "doomed to failure" supports the view that at present Moscow has no serious plans for
The embassy suggests that the Moscow conversations may cover some kind of bilateral security agreement, arrangements for formalizing the Soviet Union's recent promise of aid, and North Korean rail reconstruction in which the USSR is vitally interested. From the composition of the delegation, it appears that the conference has been called to discuss economic or political matters. The explosive character of the Korean situation is likely to deter the USSR from making a formal security commitment.
Comment:
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Korean unification.
4 Sept 53
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3.
Comment on new Iranian-Soviet trade agreement:
On 31 August, Prime Minister Zahedi told Ambassador Henderson that Iran planned to sell nonstrategic surplus goods to the USSR in exchange for commodities that could be bought advantageously from the Soviet Union. Zahedi assured Henderson that it was not in Iran's interest to strengthen Soviet military power and asked to be informed of Iranian exports considered by the United States to be strategic.
Regardless of the new Iranian government's willingness to cooperate with the United States, the 10 June and 3 September trade agreements strengthen Moscow's economic ties with Iran and advance Soviet propaganda capabilities.
4. Quirino may appoint political general as secretary of defense:

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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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The commodities to be exchanged under the terms of the Iranian-Soviet trade agreement reportedly signed on 3 September, the details of which have not yet been announced, are probably similar to those included in the 10 Juno agreement. This made the USSR Iran's largest customer for nonstrategic commodities.
The American embassy in Manila has been reliably informed that President Quirino has offered the position of secretary of defense
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to former chief of staff Mariano Castaneda. The embassy comments that the general feeling in Philippine military and political circles is that Castaneda's appointment would be detrimental to free elections and army efficiency.
were used to ensure Quirino's election. He was removed in 1950 by Magsaysay, who was then defense secretary, because of inefficiency and corrupt practices.
chief of staff during the frent 1949 elections when military forces
Comment:
Castaneda served as armed forces
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F
giApproved
001200640001-7
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6.
Ratification of Anglo-Libyan treaty encounters new difficulties:
25X1A
The Libyan senate has postponed consideration of the British treaty, which has already been approved by the chamber and cabinet, and has recessed ostensibly to await assurances that the British payment of 1,000,000 pounds annually for Libyan economic development, as provided in the treaty, will be considered as Libya's contribution to the According to the American embassy in London, the British Foreign Office is not optimistic that a suitable formula for a compromise on control of the British contribution can be reached, in which case Prime Minister Muntasser might resign and the treaty die.
If the Libyan position were accepted, it would deprive the British of control over the use of this money.
Comment:
7.
Yugoslavia requests tripartite intervention in Trieste crisis:

On 2 September, Yugoslav undersecretary for foreign affairs Bebler asked for intervention by the American, French and British governments to assure normalization of Italian military dispositions in the Yugoslav-Italian border area.
25X1A
Bebler asserted that if the Italian military measures are not canceled, Yugoslavia will be forced to take "corresponding measures." He noted also that Marshal Tito would "of course be deeply influenced" in his 6 September speech by whether Italian troops had returned to their original locations.

EASTERN EUROPE
Libyan Development Agency.
-625X1A
4 Sept 53
Approved F
A0012Attp$01-7
Yugoslavia is basing its threat on unconfirmed Rain:Tress reports that Italian troops have been moved into the border area.
Comment:
Yugoslavia has an infantry brigade with supporting tanks and artillery occupying Zone B of Trieste, and one infantry division, one tank brigade and one mountain infantry brigade in the general area near Italy. Major Italian units normally located near Yugoslavia consist of two infantry divisions and a mountain infantry brigade, and there also are two armored divisions which just completed summer maneuvers in the area.
WESTERN EUROPE
8.
British move to modify moratorium on discussion of Chinese UN representation:
25X1A
ritish UN representatives in New York have requested American views on a proposed weakening of the Assembly resolution imposing a moratorium on discussion of the Chinese representation issue. The British government feels that the "changed situation" resulting from the armistice should be reflected in a new formula which would not freeze the situation unalterably for the next twelve months.
In London the Foreign Office has stated that it would have difficulty continuing support of the moratorium if, for example the Chinese Communists were to release all foreign internees and make concessions to British businessmen, or give satisfactory guarantees on Indochina. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists make difficulties at the political conference, the British would see advantages in maintaining the older arrangement. Comment: Reflecting a dominant public attitude, the British press has virtually unanimously taken the view that the Korean armistice has made possible and desirable the early admission of Communist China to the UN.

-725X1A
4 Sept 53
25X1

ea
itilease 20q4OPISEGValar9TOOrfritiar
13 September 1953
I
Copy No,
67

DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
n DECLASSIFIED
.---
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE
AUTH: HR 70-2
20 09
DATE: ./..942i.7:9_ REVIEWER:
TOP SECRET
t
1
1
Fo
elApproved
elease 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 300020001-4
25X1A
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
%/Comment on Krushchev's appointment as first party secretary (page 3).

FAR EAST
Rhee seen violating both armistice and agreement with United States
(page 4).
25X1
/Aer Burmese report to UN accuses Taipei of insincerity (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
ye
6.
VArgentine ambassador may be intermediary for re-establishment of

Soviet diplomatic relations with Latin American countries (page 7).
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
Iranian prime minister Zahedi presses for more American aid (page 5).
Proposed draft of new Austrian note to USSR accedes to Moscow's demands (page 6).
-2-
25X1A
13 Sept 53
Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300020001-4

oriApproved
25X1A SOVIET UNION

1.
Comment on Khrushchev's appointment as first party secretary:

The USSR Central Committee plenum has elected N. S. Khrushchev as first secretary of the Communist Party, thereby confirming him in a position which he has in fact held since G. M. Malenkov left the Secretariat on 14 March. This action, which is further evidence of the close ties between Khrushchev and Malenkov, does not appear to change the power relationship which has existed since Beria was purged.
25X1A
Khrushchev, an agricultural expert, is generally considered to have been the instigator in 1950 of the policy of amalgamating collective farms into larger units. Under this policy the number of farms decreased from 254,000 at the beginning of 1950 to 97,000 by October 1952. However, a concomitant part of Khrushchev's idea, the resettling of peasants into agrogords or large towns, was seriously criticized in the press and never implemented. A report on agricultural shortcomings which he presented to the plenum just prior to his election indicates that he is now directly responsible for Soviet agricultural affairs, a field with which Malenkov has been particularly concerned since
1946.
Although the full text of the Central Committee decree resulting from Khrushchev' s report is not yet available,it appears to follow closely the program for agriculture which Malenkov outlined at the recent session of the Supreme Soviet. The decree reveals that the Ministry of State Farms has been re-established. This move supports other indications that the merger following Stalin's death of the various ministries concerned with agriculture resulted in too large and unwieldy an administrative unit which will now be broken up.
25X1A

-3-
Khrushchev, who is 59 years old, has been a member of the Central Committee since 1934. After serving as first secretary in the Ukraine from 1938 to 1949, he became first secretary of Moscow oblast and a member of the Central Committee's Secretariat in 1949. In 1939 he was made a member of the Politburo and has recently been ranked third in Soviet listings of Presidium members, following Malenkov and Molotov. His position as first secretary of the Central Committee, however, probably means he is second only to Malenkov in actual influence.
Approved F 4ar,telease 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 13000200014
25X1A
FAR EAST
2.
Rhee seen violating both armistice and agreement with United States:
25X1A
Comment: Article 15 of the armistice agreement states that naviriFF "shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korean It is doubtful that President Rhee would consider the dispute related to the armistice agreement, and he
would probably take the position that he is not bound by any deci-
sion which impairs Korea's sovereign rights or its "national survival."
25X1

25X1A
Briggs states that the US may sooner or later have to face Rhee's intransigence with the full weight of its power, including sanctions.
-413 Sept 53
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-1213P79100975A0013000200014
Ambassador Briggs believes that President Rhee's action to expel Japanese veksels from international waters adjacent to Korea in violation of UN Command orders not only contravenes his agreement with Secretary Dulles of 8 August, but may be a violation of article 15 of the armistice as well. He notes that if this challenge to the authority and responsibility of the UN Command is not effectively countered the UN-South Korea command relationship might be undermined.
25X1
4. Burmese report to UN accuses Taipei of insincerity:
25X1A
To support their charges of bad faith, the Burmese cite the blunt refusal of General Li Mi to cooperate, the evasive actions of the Chinese representative on the committee, and the continued flow of financial and material aid from Formosa to
Mong Hsat. Comment: The American embassy in Rangoon has warned that the tension which may develop in the UN as a result ota re-examination of this problem may force Burma to request drastic actions against the Chinese Nationalist government.
5.
Iranian prime minister Zahedi presses for more American aid:

NEAR EAST- AFRICA
The Burmese government in a report to the UN asserts that the four-power committee in Bangkok is not likely to achieve "spectacular" results in its efforts to evacuate the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma because of Taipei's insincerity. The report, to be released i n a few days as an Assembly document, states that any withdrawal which may take place will be only a gesture designed by thp Nationalist government to save face.
25X1A
Prime Minister Zahedi told his cabinet on 9 September that he was ready to resign because of his issatisfaction over the scale of American financial aid.
I
25X1
25X1
-525X1A
13 Sept 53
F
otApproved
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01300020001-4
25X1A
25X1
the possibility of sending a special emissary to Washington to seek additional American aid prior to the opening of Congress. Reportedly he was himself considering visiting President Eisenhower.
After a conversation with Ambassador Henderson on 11 September, however, Zahedi seemed less upset.
Comment: In spite of Zahedi's declaration that he has no inteption of bargaining with the United States he appears to be doing so. It is unlikely that he would resign his position only because of disagreement over the scale of American financial aid.
6.
Proposed draft of new Austrian note to USSR accedes to Moscow's demands:
25X1A
Western officials in Vienna have received the text of a proposed Austrian note to the USSR which states that Austria will no longer support the short draft of the state treaty nor upholdia previous declaration that negotiations on the old draft are impossib e. The new note also appeals to the Soviet Union to make it possible for Austria to fulfill "from its own re-' sources" the burdens of the treaty, and requests Moscow to adviSe Vienna if the prerequisites for a treaty have now been provided.
Comment: The proposed note follows assurances from Foreign Minister Gruber that no immediate action on the treaty was contemplated and that Austria is at this time chiefly concerned with establishing a propaganda position. Nevertheless, it accedes to the Soviet demand for a "definite" Austrian commitment on the short treaty and seems to invite Moscow to impose still further conditions.

WESTERN EUROPE
Zahedi would probably not seriously consider visiting the President without American encouragement and before the domestic situation in Iran had stabilized.
-625X1A
13 Sept 53
F
olApproved
Release 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79700975A0 01300020001-4
25X1A
Since Soviet rejection of the short treaty draft indicates unwillingness to eaSe the treaty burden, the Austrian request for leniency is likely to be ineffective.
LATIN AMERICA
7.
Argentine ambassador may be intermediary for re-establishment of SoViet diplomatic relations with Latin American countries:
25X1A
Comment: The Soviet Union at this time maintains diplomatic relalicWe57-vtth only three Latin American
countries -- Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico.
25X1

-725X1A
Ambassador Bohlen reports that rumors in the diplomatic colony in Moscow suggest that Argentine ambassador Bravo is acting as intermediary in efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and certain Latin American countries. Bravo was evasive when Ambassador Bohlen raised the subject.
13 Sept 53
...e TOP SECR T CANC.,

HR70-14 HR70-14 I
5 .Ciee C3
c
NR /NR
2. North Korean may be entering entering North North Korea: Korean air units may
There are are indications indications that headquarters of five North Korean divielements of Korean air diviCANOE CANOE sions stone may recently have have moved moved from 3073 cc...3- 307v, Manchuria intoNorth NorthKorea. Korea. AccordManchuria into 0.14, CO-3. co-3ing to recent traffic analysis, $g analysis, elements elementsof of the the5th 5thDivision Division may may be located at Mirim, east eastof of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, elements of of the 3rd and 21st Divisions at Taechan, Taechan, thirty miles Divisions miles north north of of Sinanju, Sinanju, and elements (Seemap, map, p. p. 4.) of on the the east east coast. (See of the 4th Division at Chongjin Chongjin on
US Air Force Japan USAir Japan 10, 12 12 Sept Sept 53 53

CCO-J-
L~PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 1

IDATE: ATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010 [DPPROVED
FAREAST FAR EAST
-3 3-
=BP%BUTCANOE TOP SECRET CANOE

16 Sept 53 53 15
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126 126 128 128
124 124
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W 30914 14
-CANOE -14071E6RET_ CANOE
INFORMATION SECURITY 1NFORMAnON
traffic analysis analysis Comment: Recent traffic also suggests that thatelements e l e m e of n tthe s o 1st fst Division,which whichis is MIG-15 also suggests Division, aa M1G-15 m a y have have moved moved from from Manchuria Manchuria to to Uiju Uiju in in northwest northwest Korea, Korea, unit, may force headquarters headquarters has ha8moved moved from Sinuiju, Sinuiju, just south south and that air force Pyongyang. No No large movement movement of of the Yalu Yalu River, River, to Pyongyang. of atrcraft aircraft into Korea has has been noted, however. however.
Any strengthening Any strengthening of of forces forces in Korea country would would be from outside outside the country from be a a violation violation of ofthe thearmistice armistice agreement.
NR
-5 5-
A N O E -TOP-SEGRET-CANOE
1 5 Sept 53 53 15
HR70-14 HR70-14
4
0c,i- 5
c16
I
NR NR
3.
Ranking Ranking South SouthKorean Koreanarmy armyofficer officer opposes opposes northward northward attack: attack:
E l
group.

1
Comment:
of Following a 30 September conference of Following high-level South Korean military officers, high-level South Korean military officers, Chong 11-kwon, of General Chong Il-kwon, commander of stated that if the army were the II II Corps, Corps, stated to drive drivenorthward northward without without American aid, he hewould would not not ordered to ordered senior officer officerwould, would,/ obey and belteved believed that no other senior
_.
Chong reportedly General Chong reportedly believes that Prestdent Rhee Rhee might might issue orders orders any any day day for a drive drive to to the the north, north, President South Korean Incapable of of defeating the Chinese but that the South Korean army army Is is incapable Communists and conquering North Korea without without American American support.
. military military commanders commanders rep-a-FEht representthe t e only significant significant internal
fears of of South South Korean The fears
limitation to precipitate While this limitation precipitate actions by by Rhee. Rhee. While might be effective effective if i f they they become convinced convinced that Rhee is heading for national disaster, dtsaeter, they theydo donot notnow now form a a united united or o r cohesive cohesive
1-14 0-14
RELEASEDATE: ~~PROVE D RELEASEDATE: FOR 6-Dec-2009 1 1 1PPROVED
40 c t 53 53 Oct
rt. wTOP S m -i FiieTf TO SECURITY. 1NFORMATION

SECURITY. INFORMATION
HR70-14 HR70-14
8ocf s3 53
ca
'NF

FAR EAST EAST FAR
the Yalu River.
2. Large influx Chinese Communist troop troops intoNorth North Korea Korea reported: reported: 2. Larr Influx ofof Chinese Communist into
y per o
60,000 approximately approximately 60,000 Chinese troops troops ente?ed entered Korea Korea in in a fourManpojln port on ng September through the Manpojin port of of entry on
bridge number.
stated that since some of these troops crossed an adjacent the total it could not
3
FOR RELEASEDATE: FOR RELEASEDATE: 1 1 6-Dec-2009 1PPROVED
(APPROVED
9 Oct 53 53 9 Oct
?,
%se
TOP SECRET FROT1....

Chinese Communist Communist Three Chinese Comment: Three armies, approximately approximately 115,000 115=n, reliably reported reported to to have have armies, men, are reliably C h h from Korea, probably just returned to China Korea, probably just before before the the armistice armistice These60,000 60,000 troops may be was was signed, signed. These be part of of their replacements, although technically s in although technically this this movement movementi is in violatlon violationof ofthe thearmistice armistice agreement, statesthat thatonly only 35,000 35,000 troops can can be agreement. The agreement states rotated into into Korea by on a man-for-man man-for-man basis in In any any rotated by either side on one calendar calendar month. month.

-4 4 --
-10P-SEeRE-T-FROTH
9 Oct 53
25X1
ase 2719FIQW:CPM779TO
tj
25X1
16 October 1953
Copy No,
67
25X1
DOCUMENT NO TO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED
e/v

MASS. CHANCED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE Pnr99

AUTH: HR 70.2
25X1r '
25X
25X1
DATE.P02/C9 REVIEWER.
4,
"4
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1A
Approved F
elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975 4001300300001-3
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Britain proposes sale of trawlers to Soviet bloc (page 3).

FAR EAST
2. 3.
Crisis in Japanese-Korean negotiations seen by end of October Substantial numbers of Korea war prisoners may elect repatriation
(page 4).
25X1
"Trieste decision may have caused differences among Yugoslav

party leaders (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
tC, Italy maintains "firm attitude' on Trieste (page 6).
10.

EASTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
25X1A
Trieste population depressed and alarmed (page 6).
Pro-EDC leaders in West Germany reported increasingly restive at French delays (page 7).
"Economic colonialism" to be stressed by Brazilian president in forthcoming speech (page 8).
(page 3).
16 Oct 53
Approved F
Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300300001-3
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Britain proposes sale of trawlers to Soviet bloc:

Britain has asked COCOM to approve the sale of five old steam trawlers to Poland and 27 n ew diesel trawlers to the USSR.. The British request failed to cite a specific quid pro quo for the trawlers, an argument which has previously been used to justify deviation from controls. Instead, it pointed to the importance of maintaining a healthy shipbuilding industry and counteracting signs of unemployment, and argued that the proposed sale might lead to a reversal of the present decline of British-Soviet trade.
25X1A
Comment: This request apparently ends British support of the American efforts to control Western sales of ships to the Orbit. In view of the strong pressures by most COCOM countries to relax controls, such a British policy reversal might well threaten the entire COCOM trade control program.
2.
Crisis in Japanese-Korean negotiations seen by end of October:
25X1A
Japanese officials feek that their current negotiations with Korea will reach a crisis by the end of October, at which time Korea's willingness or unwillingness to modify its proposals sufficiently o perm a se emen will be apparent, according to Ambassador Allison. The Japanese believe that the Koreans have increased their previous demands and that the latter are confident that continued pressure will force Japan to accept.
The ambassador notes that the Japanese appear willing to make substantial concessions on the fisheries issue by proposing the reservation of areas for Korean fishing on a prewar basis. They also have indicated a readiness for mutual cancellation of property claims.

FAR EAST
25X1A
16 Oct 53
Approved Fo1N1 1 elease 2004107108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01300300001-3

.
25X1A
Comment: A member of the Korean mission in Tokyo on 15 October expressed the opinion that United States mediation would be necessary to save the conference.
3.
Substantial numbers of Korea war prisoners may elect repatriation:
25X1A
prisoners to elect repatriation.
Comment: While only 10 Chinese out of 500 decided to return home during the first explaining session on 15 Octiiber, large-scale shifts to acceptance of repatriation remain possible as a result of sustained, individual questioning.
The prisoners are currently divided into compounds of about 25 men, each under the control of a compound
functory explanation to the bulk of the prisoners followed by concentrated questioning of the Leaders, hoping that if the leaders can be persuaded to change, the remaining prisoners will elect to return also.
25X1
leader. The Communists are expected to make a more or less per-

25X1A
According to Ambassador Briggs there is growing concern among American correspondents in Korea that the rules covering e xplanations to prisoners, which make possible protracted and repeated questioning of individuals, may enable the Commun sts to separate anti-Communist leaders from their prison compounds and cause "very appreciable numbers" of
-416 Oct 53
ApprovJVAelease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975ACI 01300300001-3

25X1
25X1A
6.
leaders:
Trieste decision may have caused differences among Yugoslav party
The American charge in Belgrade reports that there are credible rumors in Belgrade that the Trieste decision has precipitated quarrels in high party circles. He believes that these disagreements may be manifesting themselgres in the current attempts to close the US information centers, which has always been a goal of the left wing 6ff the party.
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
-516
Oct 53
RailApproved Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T0097 A001300300001-3
25X1A
Comment: Since the break with the USSR, there have been reports of differences among Yugoslav Communist leaders over the speed and degree of rapprochement with the West and the extent to whith Yugoslavia should allow Western influences in the country.
The Anglo-American decision on Trieste has no doubt brought these differences to the surface, but probably does not represent a threat to the basic loyalty of the party to Tito.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Trieste population depressed and alarmed:

25X1A
Most of the Trieste population is fearful hat Tito will march into Zone A, I Many of the prom nen talian irridentists have left the city, and more than twelve billion lire ($20,000,000) was reportedly transfered out of Trieste n the first five days following the 8 October announcement. Business has reportedly been very hard hit.
25X1 25X1
8.
25X1A
Com ent: Most of the Trieste political parties are extremely dissatisfied with the Anglo-American decision. The Independentist and pro-Yugoslav parties are particularly worried about their future under Italian rule, while most of the pro -Italian parties fear that Zone B has been lost for good. There is strong belief in most political circles, however, that the Allies will not actually withdraw from Zone A.
Italy maintains "firm attitude" on Trieste:

An Italian Foreign Ministry official told Ambassador Luce on 14 October that his government still adhered to its original -
-625X1A
16 Oct 53
Approved
25X1A
Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T0097! A001300300001-3
position that the 8 October solution is only provisional and that Italy must be th effective possession of Zone A before agreeing to a conference. He also dismissed the concept of a demilitarization of both zones, saying that such a move would still leave Yugoslav forces encirclthg the entire Free Territory and make a constructive solution impossible.
Defense Minister Taviant suggested, however, that Pella might offer to make a public statement repudiating aggressive action to fulfill Italian claims to Zone B.
25X1
9.
Pro-EDC leaders in West Germany reported increasingly restive at French delays:

American officials in Bonn warn that pro-EDC politicians in West Germany are growing impatient with continual French procrastination on ratifying the EDC. Heinrich von Brentano, Strong supporter of the treaty and probably minister for European affairs in the new cabinet, told American officials on 13 October that unless the EDC treaty comes into force by March 1954 at the latest, West Germany will be forced to insitt on new arrangements for a defense contribution.
25X1A
a prp-EDC leader in Wesr Mni---la'ry suggesting a deadline after which the Bonn government would formally ask that an independent German army be admitted to NATO.
Comment: This is the first statement from
25X1A
16 Oct 53
FoiApproved r Release 2004/07/08
: CIA-RDP79T009
A001300300001-3
25X1A
LATIN AMERICA
10.
"Economic colonialism" to be stressed by Brazilian president in forthcoming speech:
25X1A
25X1
Since the inauguration of a petroleum refinery is to be the occasion of the speech, Vargas presumably will publicly endorse the recent congressional action excluding foreign participation in Brazilian oil exploitation, thereby making it more difficult for his government to admit foreign companies under administrative rulings in the future.
Comment: Vargas' address can be expected to give added impetus to the current Communist upsurge in Brazil. Agitation against "economic colonialisni' has been one of the most successful Communist propaganda lines in recent years.
President Vargas will use "the end of economic c olonialism" ate his theme in a public address next week at the inauguration of a new petroleum refinery, according tol the American embassy in Rio de Janeiro. The speech will allegedly be related to a 12 October pronouncement favoring the independence of European colonies in the western hemisphere.
25X1
25X1A
16 Oct 53
HR70-14 HR70-14
FROTL; w 400 TOPSEeRE-T FROT SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION

liSOc4-
Cig
GENERAL GENERAL
1, 1,
USSR orders substantial fuel shipments to Korea: USSR orders

Soviet Soviet Internal Fp p
29 Sept 53 53 FROTH
A A 29 29 September September message message from Moscow Moscow ordered ordered the chief .chief of of customs customs in Grodokovo Grodokovoin in the the MariMari-
Elmg Territory release to to North North Korea Ulm,' Territory to release 8,000 8,000tons tons of ofjet jet fuel fuel T-1, T-1, 10,000 10,000 tons of oil. motor gasoline, and and 1,000 1,000 tons of bunker bunker oil.
- /8 xa ga S a //s--1
2.

FAR EAST
1
of jet fuel mentioned mentioned Comment: The amount of would providefor for up upto tov8,000 ofjet jetfighter fighterflying flyingtime. time. The u hours r s of The would provide North is currently currentlyestimated estimatedto tohave have170 170 MIG-15's MIG-15's North Korean Korean air air force is and 40 40 jet light bombers.
Chinese people yeoyle being beingtold toldKorean Koreantruce truce i is s temporary: temporary:
reports that reports that Chinese Chinese Communist Communist officials that the Korean are stating statingin inpublic public'thzit there are only temporary, temporary, as it will "in"intruce is only by Americans." Americans." evitably be broken by
-
to / / a c c o raccording d i n g to tc! the the North North Korean pilot p i l o who r n o defected to West recently, recently, military the West military units unitsin in North North Korea Korea are arebeing being told told that the truce is is merely merely a a breathing breathing spell. believes that such such statements statementsmay may indicate a aCommunist Communist intention intention' to break the truce, truce, but butthat thatthey they are aremore moreprobably probablyintended intended to to keep the troops alert alert and to perform perform taaks tasks and to to get the populace populace to set by by the State. Itate.
indicate!
internal propaCommunist internal Comment: Communist ganda throughout throughout the the p period truce taka talks followed followed a a similar similar e r of m the e truce line.
-3IAPPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 23-Mar-2010 [DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 [DPPROVED
TOP SECRET FROTH
18 Oct 53 53
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR go to ThePaperlessOffice.org
Sase ofronE-celmr9TOWS,
2
25X
30 October 1953
25X1
Copy No.
25X1

NEXT REVIEW DATE.
DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. El DECLASSIFIED
42
P009
AUTH: HR 70-2
25X1
DATE: ZW/a/r9 REVIEWER:
25X0
25X1
DIA and DOS review(s)
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1A
Approved Rob Release 2003/12109 : CIA-RDP79100975P 001300420001-0
SUMMARY
25X1
11,tommunists sending large quantities of materials to North Korea

(page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
P. Viet Minh reportedly to attack northern apex of Tonkin delta

(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
7.
25X1
gyirSoviet Adenauer dashes hopes for early Saar settlement (page 8). ** ** 25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
- 2 -
FAR EAST
Iraq renews request for US military aid (page 6).
diplomat sets forth policy on Austria (page 7).
25X1A
30 Oct 53
25X1

Approved
Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP79T0094A001300420001-0
25X1A
25X1

FAR EAST
4.
Communists sending large quantities of materials to North Korea:
25X1
25X1A
in Korea, told Ambassador Dean on 28
-425X1A30 Oct 53
25X
Approved PQ&telease 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300420001-0
October that a huge quantity of construction materials had been observed coming into North Korea, and that enormous efforts were being made to aid the economy.
25X1
said the Communists apparently want to show that they can rebuild the north before the United States can rebuild the south. He believes further that the Communists want a political conference for propaganda purposes to cover their frantic rehabilitation efforts.
Comment: Reports from an NNSC team state that Communist rail shipments into North Korea have been stepped up, indicating that Moscow may have begun to implement its billion-ruble aid program for North Korean reconstruction. Members of the neutral nations teams are permitted to make only limited inspections and have not been able to determine whether the materials arriving thus far are for military purposes or industrial rehabilitation.
5.
Viet Minh reportedly to attack northern apex of Tonkin delta:

I
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Viet Minh is planning to attack the Vinh Yen-Phuc Yen area at the northern apex of the Tonkin delta,
25X1
As of 27 October, one small unit of the vts on a rea y moved toward the area, and the 308th Division has reportedly moved southward from its summer quarters at Thai Nguyen.
3
25X1 25X1
25X1
have predicted a major enemy attack from the north and anticipate that it might begin between 7 and 14 November.
Comment:
25X1
25X1
Vinh Yen, located near the enemy headquarters, is often described as the gateway to Hanoi. It was the scene of the largest battle of the Indochina war in January. 19509 when the French threw back a strong Viet Minh frontal assault.
-525X1A
30
Oct 53
25X1A Approved Fifil Release 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300420001-0
25X1
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7.
Iraq renews request for US military aid:
25X1A
Iraqi prime minister Jamali has inquired about the American attitude toward Iraq's 22 March request for a military grant. His government, Jamali told US ambassador Berry, is just as eager as its predecessor for favorable American action. The new Iraqi chief of staff has expressed the same hope to the US military attache.
Comment: Small favors planning with the United States for the defense of the Middle East. Iraq wants to carry out a four-year army expansion program, under which the army would serve as a British corps in the event of war, with the mission of defending the northern and eastern frontiers of Iraq.

-625X1A
30 Oct 53
Felease 2003/12/09 : CIA-RDP79T0097

WD
11Approved
004)6V6001-0
8.
Communist connection with Mau Mau suggested:

25X1 25X1
25X1A
there is a loosely organized group of cardcarrying Communists in Kenya who receive instructions and help from Communist groups in London, Bombay and
Johannesburg.
before the end of the current emergency, there will be more than enough evidence to prove that both local and foreign Communists are actively
supporting the Mau Mau.
Comment: This leaflet is the first evidence of direct Communist influence in Mau Mau. Previously known Communist interest had been limited to propaganda and to overt legal aid in connection with the Kenyatta trial.
9.
Soviet diplomat sets forth policy on Austria:
25X1A
Foreign Minister Gruber has reported that at a dinner given by Soviet high commissioner Ilichev on 27 October, the latter said that the USSR favored Austrian participation in treaty negotiations, on the assumption that Austria would "play a good part" in them. According to Gruber, the Austrians are attempting to work out a communique with the Russians. Austrian officials believe that the Soviet reply on Lugano will be merely a further discussion of the agenda and that the Austrian question can not be settled separately from the German problem.

25X1
A mimeographed Mau Mau leaflet, The Red Flag, which has been found in many parts of the Kikuyu reserve, faithfully parrots the Communist Party line. It has already been proscribed by the government.
WESTERN EUROPE
-7-
25X1A
30 Oct 53
25X1A
Fig+Approved elease 2003112109 : CIA-RDP79T0097
001300420001-0
Another Soviet official said that the problem of German assets could not be settled prior to a treaty and discounted the prospect of increased Soviet-Austrian trade at this time.
Comment: The Soviet approach may foreshadow an attempt to comniinustria in advance to the Soviet version of a treaty.
10.
Adenauer dashes hopes for early Saar settlement:

Chancellor Adenauer told Ambassador Conant on 27 October that he did not believe his government could reach an agreement with France on the Saar within
25X1A
the next two months. He will nevertheless resume his preliminary talks with French ambassador Francois-Poncet on 3 November, and he expects to talk with Foreign Minister Bidault on 26 November in
The Hague. Comment:
suggests that Adenauer beliWgnil bargaining position on the Saar improves with time and that he may seek American and British mediation to moderate French terms.
Meanwhile the minor coalition parties in Bonn are becoming more vocal in their opposition to the FrenchGerman agreement in principle for "Europeanizing" the Saar. Adenauer, however, can probably secure Bundestag support for such an arrangement if it is reviewable in five to ten years.
Ambassador Dillon in Paris believes that even if a Saar agreement were reached before the mid-December presidential election, the French National Assembly could hardly commence debate on the EDC before late anuary.
25X1A

-8-
Accumulating evidence
Austrian officials have had some hopes of negotiating the return of Soviet-held German assets prior to a treaty. In negotiations for a trade treaty with the Soviet Union, the Austrians have often insisted that exports from the Soviet-held enterprises be included as Austrian exports.
30 Oct 53
25X1
ase 2q0MA/151.041Thpy79TOr
31 October 1953
25X1
Copy No.
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 9 C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DOCUMENT NO a NO CHANGE IN CLASS. El DECLASSIFIED
zry'
PO 0 9
25X1
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:20//ela. REVIEWER:1
25X
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1
1.
Approved Fg4eIease 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1300430001-9
25X1A
SUMMARY
25X1
FAR EAST
II/British propose Korean unification in five stages (page 3).
Political considerations still impede Iranian oil settlement (page 5). 6 ..Iranian minister of court reportedly may resign (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
5.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3.,,pRhee rejects mutual defense pact with Nationalist China (page 4). Or Yoshida plans drastic action against South Korea (page 5).
25X1
8.
Call-up of Yugoslav reservists apparently continuing (page 7).
**
25X1A
-2-
25X1A
31 Oct 53
25X1A
Approved FlaoiRelease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300430001-9
25X1
2.
British propose Korean unification in five stages:
25X1A
The British position paper for the Korean political conference calls for establishing a unified and neutralized Korea in five successive stages, according to the American embassy in London The steps would be internationally supervised elections in all of Korea; establishment of an all-Korean government; unification; neutralization guarantees by the great powers plus Korea; and finally withdrawal of foreign troops. The paper also states that the UN should resist any proposal by the Communists for the formation of a joint North-South Korea government along the lines they have proposed for Germany. If unification is impossible, the British suggest a modus vivendi to permit withdrawal of at least part of the UN forces and the creation of a buffer zone in central Korea under a joint or neutral commission.
25X1A
3

FAR EAST
31 Oct 53
Approved FHRelease 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975 14001300430001-9
25X1A
Comment: The latest Communist proposals on Korea and Germany have called for unification through the creation of a joint legislature, which would then formulate plans for "free" elections, and this again seems to be the likely pattern. The Communists may propose, however, that troop withdrawal be accomplished prior to any discussions on unification.
3.
Rhee rejects mutual defense pact with Nationalist China:

On 29 October President Rhee informed Ambassador Briggs that he had rejected as "impractical" a Chinese Nationalist proposal for a mutual defense treaty between Formosa and South Korea, and had suggested instead a joint statement or declaration to the non-Communist Asian peoples. He told the Chinese emissary that, since the Nationalists "occupy no mainland territory," it made little sense to speak of Nationalist assistance to South Korea and that the latter was too preoccupied with fighting aggression to help the Nationalists invade the mainland.
Comment: Chiang had previously stated that since both South Korea and Nationalist China draw their strength from the United States, a bilateral pact would have little value unless it included American guarantees. There is no evidence available to indicate the reason for this Chinese Nationalist initiative.
25X1A
Both Chiang and Rhee would favor a multilateral Pacific pact similar to NATO in which the United States was a party.

-425X1A
Elections to cover all of Korea would be opposed by President Rhee, who insists that the 100 vacant seate in the South Korean legislature be filled by elections limited to the north. The remaining 150 seats are occupied by assemblymen largely under Rhee's control.
31 Oct 53
Approved Fg.RaIease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A301300430001-9
25X1A
4.
Yoshida elans drastic action against South Korea:
Comment: Both Japan and Korea have indicated to American officials that they desire a renewal of negotiations with Americans participating as official observers. Since preconference concessions probably are a prerequisite for any reasonable assurance of success, drastic Japanese action would seriously jeopardize resumption of the talks. Yoshida's sudden move may be designed to meet expected Diet criticism.
5.
Political considerations still impede Iranian oil settlement:

Prime Minister Zahedi told Ambassador Henderson and Herbert Hoover, Jr. on 28 October that it would be extremely difficult for him to agree to an oil settlement raman oil production under foreign control. Negotiations for reestablishment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran would be impossible, although Iran might be willing to sell its products to a group of distributing companies in which AIOC played a minor role.
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
A second official later informed the embassy that Yoshida had already instructed the foreign minister to ask for the Korean minister's recall. Both officials urged immediate American intercession as the only recourse.
-525X1A
An official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry on 30 October made an "urgent secret appeal" 25X1A to the American embassy for help in dissuading Prime Minister Yoshida from ordering retaliation against South Korea for the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels and their crews. He stated that Yoshida had rejected the ministry's advice, and instructed it to prepare plans for the expulsion of the Korean minister and closing of the mission, the use of force, and the arrest of Korean residents in numbers equal to the detained fishermen. These plans would be presented to the cabinet on 3 November.
31 Oct 53
Approved HRelease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01300430001-9
25X1A
Zahedi also emphasized the difficulties he would face if he accepted the formula tn force elsewhere in the Near East, which would split the oil profits evenly between Iran and an operating company.
The prime minister suggested that it would be easier for the Iranian government if negotiations were carried on through the International Bank rather than directly with a group of operating companies.
Comment: Zahedi's approach to the oil negotiations appears to Mir-essentially the same political considerations as governed Mossadeq's actions. While Zahedi may be willing to reach an agreement on the basis of a commercially feasible arrangement, he would face considerable opposition unless Iranian public opinion were first prepared for it.
6.
Iranian minister of court reportedly may resign:
25X1A
Iranian minister of court Hossein Ala may resign because of personal friction with the shah, I
25X1 25X1
The shah reportedly reappotnted Ala to the post after the fall of Mossadeq in order to "rehabilitate" Ala's prestige, but now wants a less conservative man.
for the post.
Ala Sohetli is reportedly being considered
Comment: Hossein Ala, a former Iranian ambassador to the United States, has been a staunch supporter of the shah and a capable adviser.
Soheili, who has the reputation of being pro-British, was the Iranian ambassador in London in 1950 and 1951 and remained in England after diplomatic relations were broken off. He returned to Iran following Mossadeq's ouster and immediately announced that he was a candidate to succeed Zahedi as prime minister.
-625X1A
31 Oct 53
25X1A
Approved Fa4elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01300430001-9
25X1
8.
Call-up of Yugoslav reservists apparently continuing:

25X1
25X1A
special commissions nave been going irom village to village in central Yugoslavia, possibly as late as 27 October, to conscript men, horses and vehicles for military use.
Comment: Previous reports have indicated that the call-up of reservists, while extending to various parts of the country, has been concentrated in the northwest area. It has been estimated that as many as 100,000 have already been called up. Yugoslav troop strength in the area around Trieste is currently estimated at 44,000 with an additional 5,000 in Zone B.

EASTERN EUROPE
-725X1A
31 Oct 53
ease
25X1
20M18{9.4cte/R2179TOOWS
25X1
1 November 1953
Copy No.
25X1

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED
4 4SC
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _an 0 AUTH: HR 70-2

CATE:
25X1 25X1
ilraREVIEWER:
25X1
rats
25X1
TOP SECRET
raa
For more information on PDF Compression and OCR visit ThePaperlessOffice.org
25X1A
Approved Nitlitelease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300440001-8
SUMMARY
25X1
fre,
.
FAR gA ST
4.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
peace (page 4).
French propose troop withdrawal as first step toward Korean
Viet Minh propaganda takes new line (page 4).
25X1
WESTERN EUROPE
6.
French government's case against Communist deputies stymied

(page 6).
25X1A
-2-
25X1A
1 Nov 53
25X1

HApproved elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300440001-8
25X1A
3.
FAR EAST
French propose troop withdrawal as first step toward Korean peace:

The French working paper for the Korean political conference calls for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces to precede country-wide elections, the establishment of an all-Korean government, and "reciprocal guarantees:' The French assert that unless withdrawal occurred first, free elections would be almost impossible.
25X1A
The primary French proposal differs strikingly from the 29 October British proposal in that it calls for the withdrawal of troops as the first step toward Korean unification. The alternate French proposal bears resemblance to a plan which the British have warned against.
Comment:
4.
25X1A
Viet Minh propaganda takes new line:
A 28 October brbadcast from the Viet Minh Peace Committee described the longing of the "Vietnamese people" for peace and friendship with the French people and their willingness to be linked to the French by economic and cultural ties. The broadcast, which was addressed to the French Peace Committee, blamed ill will on the part of the French negotiators for the failure of the negotiations in 1946 between France and the Viet Minh.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
As an alternate proposal, the French suggest federation of the existing North-South Korean regimes under international supervision. Dual governmental functions would be eliminated gradually and the neutralization of Korea would be the ultimate goal. The American embassy in London comments that the French may have similar plans in mind for amalgamating the rival regimes in Indochina.
-425X1A
1
Nov 53
elease 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01300440001-8

qhjiApproved
25X1A
Comment: This line is a modification of the strongly belligerent EnTFTTErch the Viet Minh had continued
to take despite Peiping and Moscow hints in recent months that a negotiated peace in Indochina might be possible. The adoption of a peace line in this form is probably designed to increase neutralist sentiment in France without committing the Viet Minh authorities to a less belligerent policy.
25X1

-525X1A.
1 NoV 53
Approved
elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975 001300440001-8
25X1A
6.
WESTERN EUROPE
French government's case against Communist deputies stymied:
25X1A
The French Parliamentary Immunities Committee's rejection on 29 October of treason charges against four Communist deputies substantially rednees the likelihood of further prosecution in the opinion of the American embassy in Paris.
The embassy fears that this development will have an adverse effect on further government action against the Communists, whose hand has now been strengthened in their current bid for joint action against the EDC and the Indochina war.
Comment: This decision has been hanging fire since spring, when it first became apparent that the French government's anti-Communist campaign was weakening. Since the
government crackdown following the anti-Ridgway demonstrations in May 1952, the Communists have changed their provocative tactics and regained considerable prestige by promoting labor issues without political slogans. They also continue to profit from the Soviet peace offensive.

-625X1A
1 Nov 53
HR70-14 HR70-14
3 e F s E e R mFROTL, TOP-SEeRETSECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION
s N.)ov S3
cI
FAR EAST EAST
4. North Korean light bombers bombers may may be be based basedat atPyongyang: Pyongyang:
Mil North Korean Mil 28 Oct 53 53
err-27r 8 114 - s3 S3 EyHTr? IL-
A message from a North Korean antiantiA North Korean aircraft 28 October October aircraftunit unit intercepted intercepted on on 28 Type-2"aircraft aircraft seven "T17 "TU Type-2" stated that seven were scheduled "fly from fromPyongyang." Pyongyang." scheduled to to "fly
to the the armistice. be there prior to
The North North Korean Koreanair air force presently The Jet fighters and 100 conventionalfighters fighters and and ground-attack ground-attack has 150 150 jet 100 conventional aircraft based than dozen aircraft based in in Korea, Korea, whereas whereasless less thanaa dozenwere wereknown known to
Messages intercepted since since the the armistice armistice Messages intercepted suggest that some been transferred transferred to area. some TU-2's TU-Z's have been to the the Antung Antung area. The above aboVemessage messageis is the the first first indication that TU-2 bombers bombers a are indication that re now operating tnside inside Korea Korea and and may may actually actually be be based based there. now operating
The aircraft aircraft mentioned are mentioned a re Comment: The probably win-engin emm b e r s . The The North North Korean Korean air probably TU-2 TU-2 ttwin-engine light bombers. force has has approximately approximately 30 30 of of these planes, last lastknown known to to have have been based at at Kungchuling Kungchuling in Manchuria. Manchuria.
,,'
NR NR
-5 5 --
3 B M K CRET R E T FROTH FRCYTH

PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
5 Nov 53
To learn more about PDF Compression and OCR visit our website
ase
29.08(nEMIT79TOr
25X1
7 November 1953
25X1
25X

DOWMENT NO
4-9
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Ci DECLASSIFIED

AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE.POAP/79 REVIEWER: I
NEXT REVIEW DATE. P003
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET
/./
25X1
Approved rsw9elease 2003/11104 : CIA-RDP79100975 4001300490001-3
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
we
2.
India reportedly decides against American position on prisoner release (page 3). Soviet note reaffirms position on Korean conference (page 3).
25X1
4.
VI( Comment on Trieste disorders (page 5).
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE
Satellite industrial growth declines sharply (page 4).
-225X1A
7 Nov 53
elease 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79100975 001300490001-3

bpiApproved
25X1A
GENERAL
1,
India reportedly decides against American position on prisoner release:
25X1A
Ambassador Allen comments that Nehru may have taken this position to exert pressure on the United States to accept Peiping's terms for holding the conference.
Comment: Since interpretation of the POW agreement rests with the NNRC Commission, India's attitude could result in indefinite confinement of the prisoners. There is no indication that any of them would reject Formosa or South Korea as their final destination.
2.
Any attempt to extend the explanation or detention period is likely to provoke violent reactions from the prisoners and from the South Korean government. President Rhee has already said that since India is violating the terms of the armistice, South Korea is free to take any action it desires to protect the prisoners.
Soviet note reaffirms position on Korean conference:

The 3 November Soviet note did not essentially change the already defined Communist position on a Korean political conference. It made more explicit Moscow's claim that the West's exclusion of neutral countries "makes the participation of the USSR in the conference impossible."
25X1A

-3-
did not meet.
interpret the Korean armistice agreement as requiring the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to hold a full 90-day explanation period and to retain custody of the prisoners until 30 days after the political conference meets. According to the Swiss minister in New Delhi, who conveyed this information, the Indian argument is based on the "humanitarian grounds" that prisoners who desire to be sent to some country other than Formosa or South Korea would be denied that right if the conference
The Indian government has decided to
7 Nov 53
elease 2003111/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300490001-3
25X1A
iiiApproved
The note provided additional evidence that the Communists will persist in their rejection of the United Nations recommendations on the composition of the conference. It strongly suggested a desire to avoid substantive negotiations for a Korean settlement at this time.
25X1A
25X1
4.
Satellite industrial growth declines sharply:

Official reports published by the major Satellites during the last week show that their rate of industrial growth declined sharply this year. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and East Germany the rate dropped from approximately 24 percent in 1952 to 12 percent in 1953, while in Poland it declined from 21 to 18 percent.
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
-47 Nov 53
Approved q
Ffitelease 2003/11/04 : CIA-RDP79T0097, A001300490001-3
25X1A
Heretofore the announced rate of industrial growth of the Satellites has been approximately double that of the USSR. However, the decline in rate of growth and the downward revision of Satellite industrial goals since June indicate that Satellite industrialization is now proceeding at about the same rate as announced for the Soviet Union. The greater availability of consumer goods called for by revised Satellite plans is partly designed to increase the workers' incentives and so to correct the decline in industrial productivity.
25X1A
5.
Comment on Trieste disorders:
Premier Pella's formal protest to the United States and Britain against the shooting of Italian students in Trieste strongly suggests that his government is interested in keeping the situation stirred up and intends to make political
moil-al of the riots.
25X6
Pella probably considers that his chances of remaining in office will be improved if he can exploit disturbances to force early implementation of the 8 October decision or at least the introduction of Italian police into Zone A.
25X1A
ing of the Yugoslav attitude. Belgrade can now be expected flatly to refuse to attend a five-power conference if Italy receives any additional authority in Zone A prior to or concomitant with a conference. The Yugoslav press has already noted the failure of the Western-
controlled police to maintain order, and is emphasizing that further grants of power to Italy in Zone A will create an impossible situation.

WESTERN EUROPE
The riots will certainly result in a harden-
-525X1A
7 Nov 53
HR70-14
TOP SECRET FROTI2

//-f
0 i S3
2.

EAST FAR EAST
USSR USSRapparently apparentlyintends intendsto tokeep keepits its ftghter fighter units in Manchuria:
the Intercepted messages indicate indicate that that the Sovtet Union Union intends Soviet intends for for the time being to maintain maintatn tn in Manchuria Manchuria the the fighter ground elements elements aircraftand andsupporting supportingground aircraft which participated in the Korean war. Virtually all all Soviet Soviet GCI GCI and which radar facilities facilitiesappear appear to havebeen beenwithdrawn withdrawn from from North North Korea Korea radar to have 27 July cease cease fire, fire, but butthe thenine nineand andpossibly possibly eleven eleven Soviet Soviet since the 27 insoutheast southeastManchuria Manchurta have have been been exexfighter regiments regimentsstill stillbased basedin fighter active in in advanced advanced flight tratning, tremely active training, with emphasis on interintercept and ground support practice.
Comment: The continued activity of Manchuria Iis s further further evidence evtdence Sovtet Soviet ftghter fighter elements in southeast Manchuria state of of combat combat readiness. of Communist efforts efforts to maintain a state
-3-
3
~PPROVED RELEASE FOR RELEASE [DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 )ATE: 23-Mar-2010 1PPROVED
14 Nov 53
diallAse 2osermszannTooWellia,
21 November 1953
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1/,
DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I-I DECLASSIFIED

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
60
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C AUTH: HR 70-2

DATE:
":0 0 9
eo/ig/rs REVIEWER:1
25X
25X14
25Xltd,
/1;
r/2
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07108 : CIA-1201379100975A001300600001-0
Fo
nitApproved
lease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975A0 1300600001-0
25X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
25X1
Military capabilities of North Korea seen superior to South Korea's

(page 3).
4.
5.
25X1
7.
25X1
9.

SOUTH ASIA
Navarre foresees defensive war in Indochina until next summer

(page 4).
Comment on first Afghan reaction to reports of US-Pakistani military aid pact (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
Finnish foreign minister disturbed by public disclosure of Soviet offers of assistance (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
French Communists press advantages against government (page 8).

****
25X1A
25X1A
SOUTHEAST ASIA
21 Nov 53
Approved F
25X1A
1.
elease 2004107108 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01300600001-0
FAR EAST
Military capabilities of North Korea seen superior to South Korea's:

A study by the Far East Command concludes that in the event of a renewed conflict between North and South Korea, and in the absence of foreign forces and overt logistical support, u ma e y be defeated. Although South Korea could withe so wo stand an offensive for a short period, the FEC believes that North Korean air superiority and long-range covert logistical support would be decisive.
The study notes that while the South Korean army has more manpower, it has a higher proportion of support peraonnel and lacks armor and antiaircraft artillery. The south's superiority in artillery would be counterbalanced by the north's superiority in
25X1A
25X1

-325X1A
mortars, tanks and self-propelled guns. Removal of the UN air threat would also permit the north to use its antiaircraft artillery units in a ground role.
21 Nov 53
25X1A
Approved
Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975 001300600001-0
25)6
4.
Navarre foresees defensive war in Indochina until next summer:
25X1A
General Navarre told Senator a Alexander Smith on 19 November that he must fight an essentially defensive war until next summer, at which time he expects to be strong t IVIinh in decisive battle. In the meantime he enoug o engage e will be able to carry out tactical offensives and clean-up operations inside the Tonkin delta.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
-425X1A
21 Nov 53
lease 2004107108 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300600001-0

qr4Approved
25X1A
Navarre hopes to defeat the enemy's regular forces decisively by the spring of 1955, leaving only a guerrilla problem that can be handled by the Vietnamese army. He emphasized the problem of instilling in these troops a really warlike spirit.
Comment: This more moderate estimate of French capabilities is somewhat at variance with Navarre's presentation to an American group last summer.
5.
Comment on first Afghan reaction to reports of US-Pakistani military aid pact:
The first Afghan reaction to reports of a possible military aid pact between Pakistan and the United States is critical. The Kabul newspaper Anis which is published by the government press department and presumably reflects official Afghan opinion, foresees that any such alliance will lead to World War IlL
Like India, Afghanistan opposes any increase in Pakistan's military strength which would make Karachi less susceptible to pressures such as the Pushtoonistan campaign for the independence of Pakistani tribal areas. The threat of World War III probably looms less large in the Afghan mind than in the Indian, though it makes a convenient talking point.
Despite its opposition Afghanistan is unlikely to make any move that would materially alter its relations either with Pakistan or the United States.
I

SOUTH ASIA
Navarre's plans are based to a considerable degree on the build-up of an effective V1etnamese national army. While newly formed light battalions are being activated approximately on schedule, several of those that have seen action have made a very poor showing.
-5-
25X1
25X1A
21 Nov 53
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elease 2004107108 : CIA-R0P79T00975A0 1300600001-0
25X1
25X1A
7.
Finnish foreign minister disturbed by public disclosure of Soviet offers of assistance:
25X1A
Finnish foreign minister Torngren considers ex-premier Kekkonen's public disclosure of Soviet offers during his term of office an "incredible development." Torngren may ring about considerable unrest among the almost ears half-million displaced Karelians in Finland. Torngren told the American minister that his personal knowledge of the matter was limited to one discussion in which Soviet minister Lebedev vaguely referred to a possible loan to Finlandiand the possible use by Finland of the Saimaa Canal, which is in that flart of Karelia lost to the USSR during World War H.
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
-621 Nov 53
Approved Nye Release 2004/07108 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001300600001-0
25X1A
The American minister in Helsinki believes that the disclosure, which Kekkonen probably made in order to establish himself as the only leader who can ensure continuation of good relations with the USSR, may boomerang.
If the Soviet Union, which has been highly critical of the n7cvlirrEish government, fails to carry out
CommenL
these offers, the disclosure will seriously embarrass the new government. The displaced Karelians may be encouraged to agitate for the return to Finland of parts of their former homeland lost to the USSR in World War II.
25X1

-725X1A
21 Nov 53
Approved
25X1AH
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9.
French Communists press advantages against government:
25X1A
.
The French Communist Party is attempting to force the government to drop legal proceedings against Benoit Frachon and other Communist leaders for whom warrants have been issued but not yet served.
The American embassy in Paris, noting the considerable publicity given Frachon's recent attendance at a labor meeting, believes that the Communists hope to make the government's antiCommunist campaign look still more ineffectual.
Comment: The recent vote in the National Assembly not to lift the immuntty of Communist members showed the extent to which the Communist Party has improved its position in the assembly in recent months, partly because other deputies were aligned with it in opposition to the EDC and on the Indochina question.
Communist leaders are probably eager to exploit this advantage both to create dissension in parliament prior to next month's presidential election and to show labor that the present government can be flouted with impunity.

-825X1A
21 Nov 53
,,-TOP-SECRET-FROT m R O T 4
SECURITY INFORMATION INFORMATION SECURITY
t 22. k--)av
CLB
:NR NR
2. Possible of six sixChinese Ohlnese armies armiesfrom fromKorseaniront Koreannfront indicated: Possible withdrawal withdrawal of
reports based based on on communicommuniNational National Security SecurityAgency Agency Preliminary field reports 20 Nov 53 cations changes changes indicate indicate that that the the Chinese Chinese16th, Mth, FR9TH FROTH 2ls4 21st, 54th, 54th, 67th, 67tli, and and perhafistthe peshapstthe 46th armies, "armies, are nOrthwArd ..frota O/C tN/iQ s-7-ra s7-rd are.prepttring ,prepBringto to withdraw with@aw_nbrthwiird .froin 6/G E Korean front; movement of s the 1Corean front; the poasible possible movement of the the 1st Army Army westward westward i is also suggested. suggested. These These armies racently have beenlnoted in incontact contact with with armies recently have beenInoted located in northern and western Korea, which logistical headquarters located Korea, which development tn would would be be a a normal development in a a planned pranned movement movementto tothese these areas areas (see map p. 4 ). (see map,p. 4

FAR EAST
- 3 3 -
53 22 Nov 53
-7014-SECRET-FROTH W R C K H
APPROVED PPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: 24-Mar-201 124-Mar-201 0
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rear areas.
above armtes armies except except the Comment: All the above is believed 67th are accepted as asbeing being on the front line. The 67th if3 67th are presently accepted If these armies withdraA to be in immediate reserve on the central central front. front. I f these wtthdrareserve on only one one Chinese Chinesearmy, army, the Nrd, 23rd, would remain on on the theltne, line, andme, and one, the only would remain 24th, in immediate immediatereserve. reserve. There armies in 24th, Thereare arefive fiveadditional additional Chinese Chinese armies h
NR 'NR

- .5 22 Nov 53
FROTH
:7 ft gra 21413411"dgaTMcfrWal,
25X1
254
24 November 1953
Copy No.
4
er
84
t. ex;

DOCUMENT NO. 62.,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED
rs,/
NEXT REVIEW DATE: POOR

AUTH: HR 70.2
DATE' Zafra REVIEWER:1
250_,
25te
-4
254:
TOP SECRET
25X1
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25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. 2.
Possible Yugoslav demands for Trieste settlement (page 3). Britain recommends drastic change in East-West trade controls
(page 3).
FAR EAST
Comment nn Chinese Communist-North Korean pact (page 5).
5.
6.
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
25X1
French paratroop drop connected with defense of Lai Chau

(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Nasr critictzes lack of US assistance to Egypt (page 8).
-225X1A
24 Nov 53
Approved For Re lal se 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00
00620001-8
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Possible Yugoslav demands for Trieste settlement:

25X1
25X1
25X1
that Yugoslavia believes it should receive a corridor to the sea at Servola-Zaule in return for an Italian corridor along the coast throu h the "Yugoslav territory of Duino-Aurisina" (see map, p. 4). Yugoslavia could not be satisfied with free port facilities in t e city of Trieste, since Italy might revoke such an arrangement at some future date.
Comment: Members of the Yugoslav delegation in Trieste have been used in the past to present official Belgrade thinking on the Trieste question. This proposal may be the position Yugoslavia will uphold in any conference, in contrast to its public claims to all of Zone A except the city of Trieste.
Italy has consistently opposed giving up the economically valuable port and industrial facilities in the Servola-Zaule area, which has been mentioned several times by Yugoslavia as a desirable corridor site. Italy has demanded port towns on the north coast of Zone B in return for cession of a fringe of Zone A bordering Yugoslavia and free port facilities in Trieste.
2.
The reference to coastal cities coming under Italian control may be a hint that Yugoslavia might be willing to give up certain towns in Zone B.
Britain recommends drastic change in East-West trade controls:
25X1A

-3-
In order to facilitate the movement of Italians through any Yugoslav corridor and to encourage the commerce of those coastal cities which may come under Italian control, Yugoslavia would be willing to permit Italian nationals carrying only identity cards to travel into nearby Yugoslav territory.
A British statement calling for replacement of International List I and II by a very short embargo list from which virtually no exceptions
24 Nov 53
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Approved For Re
se 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP791-00975A001 W0620001-8
441
Monfalc
YUGOSLAV CLAIM
(estimated)

YUGOSLAV CORRIDOR
Servola
(estimated)
GULF OF TRIESTE
Capodistria
Isola D'Istria
Pirano
YUGOSLAV
PROPOSED CORRIDORS
5
7
Statute Miles
31123
25X1A
Approved For R eigai e 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975A001 00620001-8
25X1A
will be authorized indicates the United Kingdom's desire for a fundamental change in strategic trade controls, according to the United States delegation attending bilateral talks in London on East-West trade. Britain argues that such a change would facilitate maintenance of a control system for an extended cold war, and would satisfy the need for expanded export markets arising from the growth of a buyers' market, the competition of German and Japanese trade, and further reductions in American aid.
May 1951. This prohibited shipments of arms, ammunition, and
implements of war to Communist China and North Korea.
3.
Comment on Chinese Communist-North Korean pact:
The ten-year economic and cultural pact between Communist China and North Korea signed on 23 November is in line with previous Sino-Soviet professions of military and economic support for North Korea and ensures the continuation of a major Chinese role in North Korea.
The Soviet-North Korean negotiations of September 1953 resulted in a Soviet grant of about $250,000,000 for Korean reconstruction and the "deferred payment" of previous Soviet credits. Pyongyang's newest pact calls for Peiping to provide reconstruction materials worth $350,000,000 over a four,year period and for cancellation of all Korean war debts to China. Peiping's propaganda has indicated an intention to guarantee North Korea's military security by retaining some part of its forces in Korea indefinitely.

Comment:
FAR EAST
mending an embargo list Mirth the one passed by the UN on 18
Britain appears to be recom-
-525X1A
There is a basic difference between the American and British views on decontrolling items not of a "near military" nature, and the British have agreed that a COCOM meeting on this subject should not be held until the divergencies are resolved.
24 Nov 53
25X1A
For R
NilApproved
ase 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00130 0620001-8
This pact runs counter to the apparent trend in North Korean internal affairs in recent months, which had suggested a possible return to the prewar status with the USSR indisputedly dominant. Communist China's own military and economic dependence on Moscow makes it unlikely, however, that Peiping is challenging Soviet leadership. I
25X1
25X1A
5.
French paratroop drop connected with defense of Lai Chau: General Navarre told Ambassador Heath on 20 November that the three-battalion paratroop drop on Dien Bien Phu in northwest Tonkin is part of a plan to defend Lai Chau, a French outpost 50 miles to the north which is important for the expansion of guerrilla operations. Navarre believes that defense of Lai Chau itself would require 12 battalions, but
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
24 Nov 53
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A8056A20001-8
25X1
Approved For Release 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79700975A0013006200014
F
sisoiApproved
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975 001300620001-8
25X1A
that he can thwart an expected Wet Minh attempt to take it with the help of friendly guerrillas and by holding Dien Bien Phu. According to the American army attache in Saigon, the French dropped two more battalions on 21 November. The objectives of the operation, according to French briefing officers, were to destroy large enemy rice stocks reportedly in the area and to harass Viet Minh units preparing for offensive operations.
Comment: Prior to 20 November Lai Chau was defended by three battalions plus 19 companies of Thai auxiliaries. It is not clear how long the French intend to remain in Dien Bien Phu. Temporary retention of this communications point might well disrupt reported Viet Minh preparations for an offensive against pro-French guerrillas and against Lai Chau. Indefinite retention, however, would probably require additional reinforcements and would constitute a departure from the general policy of withdrawal from isolated outposts.
6.
Nasr criticizes lack of US assistance to Egypt:
25X1A
Ambassador Caffery comments that Colonel Nasr's criticism of American aid as empty promises in his speech of 20 November reflects the latter's "broodng on e a ure o he United States to grant the Egyptian military regime any positive support.
Nasr told Caffery that his regime had made important concessions in its negotiations with Britain on the Suez base under pressure from the United States in the expectation of receiving military and economic assistance, which has not materialized. Were it not for the United States, Nasr claimed, Egypt would have broken off negotiations long ago.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
-825X1A
24 Nov 53
, I AI
25X1
ase 2CISE1SECWAITT9TO
27 November 1953
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Copy No.
25X

DOCUMENT NO 6
4- [KZ
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I.1 DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2 n 0 9 AUTH: HI 70-2

DATE: a2/24.Vra REVIEWER:1
25X1 25X1
25,
rsa
TOP SECRET
25X1
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01300640001-6
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
India reportedly to return Korean prisoners to each side in January (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4.

(page 4).
25X1
Comment on Sharett's selection as Israeli premier-designate

25X1
25X1A
-225X1A
27 Nov 53
Approved Paiikelease 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975 4001300640001-6
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
India reportedly to return Korean prisoners to each side in January:

According to Ambassador Allen, Indian officials are preparing the ground for the possible return of the Korean prisoners to the detaining sides if the political conference does not meet by 22 January. He says this move has the purpose of relieving India of the responsibility of actually unlocking the gates and freeing the prisoners.
The Swedish ambassador in New Delhi told Allen he had heard that 24 January was being considered as the release date, perhaps to demonstrate the custodial force's token "right" to detain the prisoners beyond the deadline without incurring responsibility for holding them longer.
Comment: Previous reports have indicated that India was undecided on a course of action but was inclined to favor retaining custody of the prisoners until either the UN or a political conference had reached a decision.
25X1A
The UN Command has consistently maintained that the prisoners cannot be detained by the neutral commission beyond 22 January, and the above report suggests that India is preparing to accept this terminal date. Such a move would place on the respective sides the responsibility for converting the prisoners to civilian status and for their final disposition.
25X1

-325X1A
27 Nov 53
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4. Comment on Sharett's selection as Israeli premier-designate:

The selection of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett as Israeli premier-designate by MAPAI, the dominant party, brings to the fore a more moderate man than the strong-minded Ben-Gurion, who has held office since 1948. Earlier reports had stated that a MAPAI leader favored by Ben-Gurion would be appointed.

-425X1A
27 Nov 53
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25X1
Sharett, who is considered pro-Western, has served continuously with the outgoing premier, but he has frequently opposed the latter's aggressive policies. He disagreed with Ben-Gurion's policy on the Jordan River diversion project I Sharett may accordingly attempt to soften Israel's strong-arm policy toward the Arabs, although conciliatory gestures may arouse direct opposition from other influential leaders in Israel.
J
25X1
Lacking the stature of Ben-Gurion, Sharett will find his leadership severely tested when he attempts to handle Israel's complex problems. He faces an acute short-term debt problem. Within his own party he must contend with potentially strong opposition from such leaders as Pinhas Lavon, newly proposed defense minister. He must also win the backing of the country's second largest party, the General Zionists, who are already demanding a larger share in the government.
25X1
25X1A
- 5 -
25X1A
27 Nay 53
To learn more about OCR and PDF Compression visit ThePaperless
25X1

. .
HR70-14 HR70-14
di
NR
EAST FAR EAST
accents nations as observers observers at 2. 2. Rhee acceDt s NNRC NNRC nation s as at Korean Korean nolitical DO^ itical conference: confer-:
I
TOP
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE: 22-Mar-201 0 [DPPROVED
President his cabinet cabinet have have accepted accepted President Rhee Fthee and his Ambassador Dean's proposal Dean% proposal to to include include India, India, Sweden, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland Poland and and Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia,
-3Nov 53 53 29 Nov
cI c@
TOP S SECKf: i 7 G I ' L

SECURITY SECURITY INFORMATION
the members of of the the Neutral Neutral Nations Nations Repatriation Commission in
Korea, as Korea, asnonvoting nonvoting observers at a t the the Korean Korean political political conference. conference.
Foreign Foreign Minister Pyun told Ambassador November that that South SouthKorea Korea would wouldnot notforce forcea a rupture rupture Briggs on 27 November of either either the preliminary talks or if the Indians of o r the the political political conference conference if Indians designated as as "neutrals." "neutrals." were seated as a s observers, observers, provided provided they they were not designated
27 November, November, the Communists proposal, which 27 Communists rejected Dean's Dean's 11-point 11-point proposal, which
omitted because it it did did not not include include omitted references references to neutral participation, because the four "Asian "Asian neutrals" neutrals" whom whom they they had previously designated. designated.
Panmunjom on Comment: At At the meeting at Panmunjom
3. Three Chinese withdraw 3. Chinese artillery artillervdivisions divtsionspossibly r>ossiblv withdraw from Korea:
National Security Agency 27 Nov 53 53 FROTH FROTH
Traffic analysis indicates the possible withdrawal withdrawal of of three three Chinese Chineseartillery artillery divisions from Korea. Korea. The The2nd 2nd and and 61st 61st last noted noted in in communication communkation Divisions were last o /GEN Q / C E /A N / 4/ ALS'a I - ~ ~ headquarters on on 12 12 November, November, with army headquarters and contact between headquarters headquarters and and a a third third unidentified unidentifiedartillery artillery contact between unit has has not not been observed observed since since 26 26 October. October,
r evlous ly Communications patterns Communications patterns have p previously indication of Communicabeen an indication of the the withdrawal withdrawalof ofChinese Chinesearmies. armies. Communications intelligence independent stillsupports supportsthe thepresence presenceof o f11 11 independentChinese Chinese intelligence still artillery artillerydivisions divisions in in Korea. Korea.
based Comment: Preliminary field reports based on communications changes through 20 November November indicated indicated that four and perhaps five five Chinese Chinese armies armieswere wereengaged engaged in in unusual unusual communications communications activities, towithdraw withdraw northward northward activities,suggesting suggestingthat thatthey theymight mightbe bepreparing preparingto from the movements The movementsindicated indicated above above may be related related the Korean Korean front. The to the activity of these five armies. the activity of these armies.

-4-
India, Sweden, Sweden, and and Switzerland Switzerland have have become disillusioned over the the behavior behavior of of the the Communists Communists with with whom whom they have disillusioned over had to deal in implementing the truce. truce. Their willingness to participate had implementing the in the political conference conference is is questionable. questionable.
29 Nov Nov 53 53 29
-e
se
2o15:03/11*RfaCtahro
25X1
3 December 1953
25X1
Dopy No.
01
25X1

OCCUMERrhto
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LI DECLASSIFIED
772,1

NEXT REVIEW DATE
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AUTH: HR 702 DATE ,agegyaa REVIEWER: I
0
25X0
TOP SECRET
rsr
25X1
Fo sa lease 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975

lApproved
01300690001-1
25X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Communists may be planning to break off Panmunjom talks

(page 3).
2.
No secret pact reported as result of Rhee-Chiang talks (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4.
25X1A

Nixon (page 4).
Tudeh reportedly plans demonstrations against Vice President
-225X1A
Bao Dai fears French may accept Ho's offer (page 4).
3 Dec 53
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Approved Fo
lease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01300690001-1
FAR EAST
1.
Communists may be planning to break off Panmunjom talks:
25X1A
Dean thinks that opposition to the political conference is being cloaked by an insistence on "neutral" participation, which the Communists know is unacceptable to the United States.
Comment: The Soviet and Chinese Communist grants of substantial aid to North Korea seem designed to integrate the latter further into the bloc and do not support the Communists' contention that they are seeking the unification of Korea. Communist propaganda has not yet suggested, however, an intention to break off the Panmunjom talks.
2.
No secret pact reported as result of Rhee-Chiang talks:

The Chinese Nationalist foreign minister told the American ambassador on 30 November that nothing had been "signed" as a result of South Korean president Rhee's visit to Chiang Kai-shek and that no mention was made of using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. The foreign minister, who claims to have been present at all the Rhee-Chiang conversations, states that they agreed that "nothing could be accomplished" without American approval and support.
Comment: In Seoul the South Korean foreign minister stated publicly that Rhee had "made no secret agreements" during his visit to Chiang. He also observed that "even the Chinese don't think the time has come" for an operation against the mainland.
25X1A

-325X1A
Ambassador Dean believes that the Communists may be preparing to break.off the preliminary talks at Panmunjom. He notes that the Soviet Union is now "holding back" on the political conference and adds that oviet an nese plans to rehabilitate North Korea, Peiping's ten-year pact with Pyongyang, and the military importance to the Communists of their territories bordering on Korea all militate against the UN objective of peaceful unification of that country.
3 Dec 53
25X1:11 Approved Fo lease 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01360690001-1
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Bao Dai fears French may accept Ho's offer:
Discussing the Viet Minh peace feeler with Ambassador Heath on 1 December, Bao Dai was bitterly critical of the initial 25X1A reaction of Secretary of State for Associated States Jacquet, which he interpreted as indicating a serious intention on the part of the French to conclude an armistice. He said that certain French expeditionary units were already asking why further sacrifices
were necessary. Rather than agree to any armistice, Bao Dai said, he
would go into exile and later attempt to reconquer Vietnam.
Comment: Even if the French were eager to deal with Ho, they would probably find Vietnamese opposition to an armistice an unsurmountable barrier. Vietnamese leaders are convinced that an armistice would result in early Viet Minh control of the country. Bao Dai's insistence on the conclusion of a new French-Vietnamese treaty and his decision to remove Tam promptly, the only Vietnamese authority who has admitted the possibility of dealing with Ho, are contrary to French predictions that he would retire to an inactive role if an armistice were considered.
25X1
4.
Tudeh reportedly plans demonstrations against Vice President Nixon:

The Tudeh party is planning violent demonstrations during Vice President Nixon's visit to Iran between 9 and 12 December,1
25X1 25X1

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
He pointed out the urgency of a strong FrenchVietnamese alliance, attractive to Vietnamese nationalist aspirations, and stated that Premier Tam would be removed immediately after his return from Paris.
-4-
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3 Dec 53
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elease 2004/01116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00130 0690001-1
Comment: Demonstrations may be attempted in connection with the Nixon visit, but they are not likely to disturb significantly the political equilibriuin in Iran. The swift action taken by the security forces during the attempted pro-Mossadeq demonstration on 12 November indicates their ability to prevent serious disorders.

-5-
3 Dec 53
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9 December 1953
Copy No. 4
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00CumaltNO. 7"4NO CHANGE fN CLASS. El DECLASSIFIED

NEXT REVIEW DATE

AUTH: HR 702
-P 003
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DATE: do4z/rs REVIEWER: .7-1,
254
4
25
ARMY and DOS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
ZA
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4elease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975

SUMMARY
01300740001-5
GENERAL
1.
India plans to release Korean prisoners after 22 January (page 3).
25X1
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4.
25X1
6.
25X1A

-225X1A
Navarre discounts possibility of negotiations with Viet Minh (page 4)
Strife in Indonesian armed forces reportedly sharpenmg (page b).
3.
Japan seen unable to accept ts defense goals (page 4).
9 Dec 53
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 CIA-RDP79T00975A001300740001-5
25X1A
Approved For
lease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79100975 1300740001-5 400
GENERAL
1.
India plans to release Korean prisoners after 22 January:

After.consultation with Prime Minister Nehru, Foreign Secretary Pillai has confirmed to Ambassador Allen that India is planning to return the remaining prisoners in Korea to the original retaining sides if no other disposition is agreed on prior to 22 January.
General Thimayya, head of the custodial forces, told an American military officer on 6 December that he would withdraw the guards from the enclosures after 22 January unless both sides agree that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission should continue to maintain custody of the prisoners.
25X1A
Comment India has shifted from its earlier view that the release of the prisoners would be contingent on the holding of a political conference. It may, however, attempt to have the UN General Assembly reconvened to consider the problem, in which case support for the prisoners' release seems assured.
25X1

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9 Dec 53
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01300740001-5
25X1
FAR EAST
3.
Japan seen unable to accept US defense goals:
25X1A
Ambassador Allison believes that the Japanese public's apprehension of a rapid military build-up and the government's vulnerability to leftist attack on rearmament make it impractical for Tokyo to accept the minimum defense goal for 1957 of a 325,000-man ground force as proposed by the United States. He doubts that the government can be persuaded to revise substantially the defense program it has informally presented to the United States, which provides for a 180,000-man ground force.
In view of the recent progress toward conservative unity, Allison thinks that encouragement of a prompt build-up from the present 110,000-man force might lead the Japanese government to adopt a more realistic defense policy.
4.
Navarre discounts possibility of negotiations with Viet Minh:

General Navarre told Ambassador Heath
in Saigon on 6 December that he is not
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
worried over Ho Chi Minh's peace offer
-49 Dec 53
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Approved For. Release 2004107/08 : CIA-RDP79100975A001300740001-5
25X1A
which appeared in the Swedish press, as there are "no practical possibilities of negotiating peace" now. Heath concurs in this view.
Navarre believes the peace feeler may have a salutary effect in causing the Vietnamese to think more seriously about their danger and the necessity of agreeing to some form of association with France which would justify the latter in continuing its efforts in Indochina.
Comment: It would be virtually impossible for the French to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh without the full participation of the Vietnamese government, which is strongly opposed to such a course.
25X1
6.
25X1A
Strife in Indonesian armed forces reportedly sharpening:
There are increasing signs of an approaching political and military "eruption" in Indonesia, 25X1 I This deteriorating situation has een aggrava ed by the activities of the Moscow-trained minister of defense, who was hand-picked by President Sukarno for his job.
- 5 -
25X1
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9 Dec 53
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1300740001-5
This official is reorganizing the Ministry of Defense in order to obtain control over the armed forces and has appointed three suspected Communists as deputy chiefs of staff.
Sharpening disagreement in the armed forces between those who favor a nonpolitical military establishment and those who support Sukarno in his desire for a "people's" army loyal primarily to himself, is leading steadily toward civil war. It is uncertain whether opposition political groups can bring about a change in government peacefully before the military resorts to force. The American ambassador in Djakarta reported on 4 December that there was ample evidence of dissatisfaction among some army circles with the defense minister's appointments, policies and programs. He also stated that the recent movement of artillery and heavy equipment out of Djakarta could have been in preparation for an army coup. Anti-Communist political leaders, however, have reportedly been trying to dissuade their military contacts from taking overt action for at least six months.
Comment:

-625X1A
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Copy No. 8 4
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TS" DOCUMENT 610 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED
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DATE: egkelz.9.6.9NIEWER:i
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Vyshinsky hints at Soviet support of Japanese UN application

(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. 3.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Rhee again seeks American commitment to renew hostilities in Korea (page 3). Non-Communist diplomats impressed by tour of Manchuria (page 4).
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5. 6.
Economic deterioration threatens Thailand's military capabilities

(page 5).
Lai Chau evacuated by French (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7.
Oil settlement delay may undermine Iranian government (page 6).
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GENERAL
1.
Vyshinsky hints at Soviet support of Japanese UN application:
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In response to an expression of hope that the Soviet Union would support Japan's application for UN membership, Vyshinsky told the Japanese UN observer, "In the near future."
Comment: Vyshinsky's remark and the Soviet abstention in the recent vote on Japan's application for adherence to the International Court of Justice statute are signs that Moscow is modifying its long-standing opposition to Japanese participation in international affairs. This may encourage the Japanese government to take steps which could lead to a restoration of at least limited diplomatic relations. It may also foreshadow a new Soviet package proposal on UN admissions including Japan.
The USSR has refused to recognize the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and last year it vetoed Japan's application for UN memb_ership, terming Japan an American satellite.
2.
Rhee again seeks American commitment to renew hostilities in Korea.
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President Rhee has apparently decided to exploit America's desire for a political conference in an effort to force the United States into some new agreement, according to Ambassador Dean. After rejecting the latest UN proposal to the Communists, Rhee to d Dean on 7 December that he would give the United States complete freedom of action in arranging the conference in return for a commitment to resume fighting after 90 days of political discussions. When informed that this was impossible, Rhee accused the United States of a lack of courage in fighting the USSR, stating, "If you don't want to fight, get out."
Dean believes that Rhee has decided now is a better time to force the United States into fighting than after the conference convenes.
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FAR EAST
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Comment: Rhee probably is making one more attempt to gain American support for efforts to unify Korea militarily. He may also still want to block the conference which he feels could result only in compromising South Korea's position.
Since Rhee is under no illusions regarding American determination not to resume hostilities, however, he may have revived this issue in an attempt to gain new concessions. These could include a firm American commitment to build up South Korea's air and naval forces, meeting Rhee's terms on the economic program, prompt Senate ratification of the mutual defense treaty, or support for South Korea's position in the proposed talks with Japan.
3.
Non-Communist diplomats impressed by tour of Manchuria:

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Chinese Communist industrial progress made a "strong impression" on the Indian, Pakistani, Burmese, Swedish, and Swiss chie s o mission uring their recent tour of Manchurian cities. Their Chinese Communist escorts emphasized Soviet assistance in the construction program.
comments that any favorable impressions the Asian diplomats transmit to their government may prepare the way for Soviet overtures toward those states.
The diplomats undoubtedly were shown numerous new construction projects in Manchuria which have received Soviet equipment.
Comment:
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Asian governments recognizing Peiping have proved susceptible to the argument that the regime is primarily an expression of Chinese nationalism aiming at popular welfare. They have in the past proved vulnerable to coordinated maneuvers by Moscow and Peiping to exploit "neutralist" sentiment in the Far East.

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5.
Economic deterioration threatens Thailand's military capabilities:

A three months' study has convinced American officials in Bangkok that Thailand's economic position is deteriorating at a rate which will not permit the government to continue military expenditures at current levels for more than two or three years. Even now, the Thai armed forces are only barely capable of maintaining internal security.
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The officials believe that without increased American support, Thailand's effectiveness as an anti-Communist force will certainly deteriorate.
Comment: In the postwar period Thailand enjoyed a greater prosperity than the other Southeast Asian countries. Its present economic difficulties derive from the present buyers' market in rice and the decline in prices of other exports.
6.
Lai Chau evacuated by French:
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Comment: One enemy division, the 316th, is near Lai Chau, which as the capital of the Thai federation had long been the base for French-supported Thai guerrilla operations. Dien Bien Phu, also in Thai territory, is more easily defended and is better located for stopping a thrust into Laos from the north.
7.
Oil settlement delay may undermine Iranian government: Ambassador Henderson reported on 6 December, while visiting Baghdad, that unless the British make energetic moves to settle the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, the Iranian government is likely to lose the self-confidence necessary for decisive action and fall.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
rench forces evacuated Lai Chau in northwest onkin during several days prior to 9 December, ccording to the American army attach in aigon. The garrison of three battalions and 7 auxiliary companies is now at the new French stron point of Dien Bien Phu, south of Lai Chau. Meanwhile the Viet Minh 304th Division has moved northwestward in the direction of Dien Bien Phu.
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Henderson pointed out that the government is in a mood to move quickly, and courageously toward an agreement which will restore oil revenues while taking account of the nationalization laws. He cautioned, however, that this mood is sure to change if the British procrastinate in opening negotiations and then introduce clearly unacceptable demands.
The Iranian government, he warned, would prefer resignation to a capitulation which would permit the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to regain its former position in the country.

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2. 2. Rhee apparently apparently determined to sabotage political conference: conference:

FAR EAST EAST
-3 3 -
Ambasfiador Brtggs Ambassador Briggs believes believes that that President President a Rhee has made up his mind to sabotage a conference unless unless the the United United Korean political conference
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assures him States assures him it itwill will resume resumethe thefighting fighting if if the the conference conference fails from Korea fails to to achieve achieve withdrawal withdrawal of of the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists from days. Rhee settle for a after 90 days. Rhee implied, implied, however, however, that he might might settle promise of logistic and materiel support support if if the the United United States were unwilling unwilling to fight.
Briggs believes Brtggs belteves Rhee is is motivated motivated by a deep-rooted suspicion susptcion of of attempts to secure secure unification unification through negotiations, a a belief belief that thatthe theCommunists Communists have have no no intention intention of relinquishing Korea, and reltnqulshing North Korea, and concern over increasing increasing Chinese Chinese Rhee apparently apparently believes that the talks influence there. Rhee talkswould would Influence merely give the Chinese Chlnese time to to consolidate coneolidate in in North North Korea.
29 November November Comment: On On his return on on 29 from talks with Chinese leaders in Taipei, Rhee repudiated an agreetalks with Chinese Rhee ment made three days observers to days before before to to invite invite nonvoting nonvoting observers to the the conference.
3.
Reactivation North Korean Korean corps indicated: Reacttvation of of two North

Security National Security Agency 9 Dec Dee 53 53 FROTH FROTH 0 /G t u If? 6 9-S 0/Gtv/4. e1Si
Comment: Comment: The The reactivation reactivation of of these these two two corps, which were accepted as deactivated in 1952, would make a total which were accepted as deactivated in 1952, would make a of 24 divisions divislons in the North Korean army. of eight corps corps and and possibly 24 North Korean divisions normally have but presently have a strength strength of 11,000 but are arebelieved believed to tohave haveabout about 9,200 9,200men. men.
Analysis of addresses addresses on messages since Analysts of mid-September mid-September from Supreme Headquarters in Pyongyang to units units believed believed of of corps corps level Pyongyang to suggests that that the theNorth NorthKorean KoreanVI VIand andVIII VI11 suggests been reactivated. Corps have been
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. 2.
Armenian purge underlines Khrushchev's growing stature (page 3). Soviet gold sales to Western Europe continue at a high rate (page 3).
FAR EAST
3.
Peiping spokesman prepared to "stay till spring" at Korean talks

(page 4).
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6.
4.
Thimavva reports extensive military construction in Korea (page 4).
Defense minister's policies may result in showdown in Indonesia

(page 6).
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. 8.
British modify stand on control of Iranian oil consortium (page 6). Comment on incidents in the Suez area (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9.
Austria may request revision of state treaty draft (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Armenian purge underlines Khrushchev's growing stature: The purge of Armenian party boss G. A. Arutinov announced on 9 December appears to reflect the influence of N. S. Khrushchev, whose power has been increasing rapidly since he was appointed all-union party first secretary in September 1953. Arutinov was in 1951 the first Soviet official to criticize publicly Khrushchev's ideas on agricultural organization.
Khrushchev's public participation in the removal in late November of Leningrad party leader V. M. Andrianov, long considered a Malenkov associate, and his earlier failure to give Malenkov any credit for the new agricultural program suggest the development of rivalries within the framework of the USSR's collective leadership.

-325X1A
Besides assuming public supremacy in the important agricultural field, Khrushchev has apparently been able to gain an increasingly important role in top personnel appointments. Former Khrushchev associates who have been promoted recently include L. R. Korniets, new minister of procurement, and V. P. Mzhavanadze, first party secretary in Georgia.'
-
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2.
Soviet gold sales to Western Europe continue at a high rate:
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The British Foreign Office has informed the American embassy in London that recent sales of Soviet gold in the United Kingdom amount to the equivalent of
approximately $30,000,000.
Comment: Since mid-October, known Soviet gold exports to the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland have totaled at least $60,000,000. If continued at this rate,the total annual export of gold would be over three times the estimated Soviet and Satellite average in the past four years.
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In recent months the Soviet Union has expanded its imports of consumer goods from the West and has cut back its shipment of such important export commodities as grain and timber, probably using the export of precious metals as an alternative source of foreign exchange.
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FAR EAST
3.
Peiping spokesman prepared to "stay till spring" at Korean talks:

Huang Hua, Chinese Communist spokesman at the Korean talks, told a senior Indian official in Korea on 9 December that he was "prepared to stay until spring" at these talks. Huang and the North Korean representative seemed "unable to understand" Ambassador Dean's rejection of the USSR as a neutral and "appeared incredulous" when the Indian stated
that Dean's position would not change.
4.
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Comment:
The Indian official believes that Huang's insistence on the USSR's "neutrality" is due in part to Peiping's sensitivity about appearing subordinate to the Russians at the Korean conference, which the Chinese consider to be their own concern.
it describes the impasse in the Korean talks as "grave," suggests an intention to avoid taking the initiative in breaking off the talks.
Moscow and Peiping appear to have agreed from the start on the USSR's "neutral" status. to give Moscow maximum maneuverability in the future.
Thimayya reports extensive military construction in Korea:

General Thimayya, Indian chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, believes that the Communists in Korea are working furiously on airfields, gun emplacements, and on an intricate system of tunnel defenses, according to Ambassador Dean.
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Communist propaganda, although
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Thimayya, who is permitted to go north of the demilitarized zone, reiterates that the Communists can move men and a large amount of supplies through the tunnels without interference. Dean points out that the general, not being allowed south of the demilitarized zone, "constantly questions" whether full advantage of the armistice is being taken to build up South Korean defenses.
Comment: These firsthand observations reinforce other reports that the enemy is strengthening his forward positions, preparing underground storage space, and extending forward his line of communications.
Thimayya's statement underlines his increasingly sympathetic attitude toward the West.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6.
Defense minister's policies may result in showdown in Indonesia:
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7.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
The American embassy in Djakarta reports that five of the Indonesian army's seven territorial commanders are unwilling to accept the pro-Communist defense minister's reorganization plan, which would curb their power. At the same time the government, by supporting the defense minister's activities and by favoring the Nationalist Party in making government appointments, has caused serious dissatisfaction among the small non-Communist parties represented in the cabinet. Thus for the first time there is a chance for the opposition to break the present coalition.
Defection of the government's moderate support would not necessarily bring about the cabinet's fall but would leave it wholly dependent on the support of the Communists, who could then dictate its policies. To accept this course, the embassy believes the government must risk forceful action from the military groups opposed to the defense minister.
Comment: The army commanders opposing the defense minister include those of West Java, where Djakarta is located, and Central Java. The commander in East Java is the only one fully supporting the government.
British modify stand on control of Iranian oil consortium: Foreign Secretary Eden indicated at Bermuda that London is willing to push forward as quickly as possible with negotiations for a
-6-
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settlement of the Iranian oil dispute. He gave the impression that Britain would not insist on AIOC control of the Iranian oil industry or on a majority British share in any consortium established to market Iranian oiL For domestic however, the British feel that their own analysis of thereasons, situation must precede any cabinet decision.
insisted that British companies must hold at least a 51-percent interest in any consortium.
Comment:
London has heretofore
8.
The increase in minor in the Suez Canal area and the reported British military incidents retaliation are not expected to result in a breakdown of law and order. government, frustrated over the apparent unwillingness The Egyptian of Britain to make further concessions as well as over the delay of American economic aid, may be condoning some local expressions of anti-British sentiment.
Egyptian military leaders are aware that unrestrained terrorist activities endanger their regime accordingly can be expected to counter this threat when necessary. and For the time being they will probably
continue to press for the Suez issue and for direct American aid. a negotiated solution of
I
Austria may request revision of state treaty draft:

Foreign Minister Figl informed the American embassy in Vienna on 10 December that he intends to urge his government to request
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Comment on incidents in the Suez area:
WESTERN EUROPE
Direct negotiations with Iran are unlikely for some time, pending solution of many complicated financial and legal problems involved. There are indications that AIOC representatives may be reluctant to adopt a position acceptable to Iran.
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formal consent to participate in the proposed four-power conference in Berlin. He "expects" any Austrian representative at the conference would make a strong plea for revision of Article 35 of the draft treaty.
have previously consented ristrian participation in future treaty negotiations provided the Soviet Union concurs. Thus far Vienna
Comment:
The three Western powers
has been unable to obtain a formal Soviet commitment to Austrian participation, although Soviet authorities in Austria have unofficially stated that this would be possible provided Austria "plays a good part."
An Austrian plea at the Berlin conference for revision of Article 35 would greatly assist Western efforts to revise the economic articles of the treaty. British and French support of these efforts is currently conditioned on Austrian initiative in urging revision.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Comment on Communist response to break in Korean talks (page 3).

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4.
5.
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WESTERN EUROPE
French deputies fortified in anti-EDC attitude by visit to Poland

(page 5).
Italians reportedly not opposed to Yugoslav attendance at informal talks on Trieste (page 5).
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GENERAL
1.
Comment on Communist response to break in Korean talks:
Peiping radio's prompt comment on the break in the Korean talks is a further indication that the Communists do not want a Korean political conference at this time except on their own terms. They apparently believe they can escape the onus for a complete breakdown of the talks.
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Moscow and Peiping appear to have agreed to reserve decision on a Korean political conference pending the results of Soviet proposals for four-power and five-power conferences on other major questions. I

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The first communique from the Communist side after Ambassador Dean's walkout on 12 December stated that it was still prepared to negotiate and accused South Korea rather than the United States of "perfidy" in releasing the 27,000 prisoners last June. A later broadcast, while reiterating that the Communist side insists on the resumption of the talks, interpreted Dean's action as a sign that "the American government might commit further perfidies" and blamed the break on the "contemptible cold war policies of the United States."
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WESTERN EUROPE
4.
French deputies fortified in anti-EDC attitude by visit to Poland:

Eight of the nine French National Assembly deputies who recently visited Poland as guests of the Polish government are satisfied that the reconstruction and industrial program there is without military significance and that consequently there is no need for EDC and German rearmament. They made clear to French embassy officials in Warsaw that their purpose was to seek information with which to combat the EDC in the assembly, according to the American embassy in Warsaw.
Comment: Since their return two of the deputies have insisted publicly that the Oder-Neisse line between Poland and East Germany should remain. This may foreshadow a drive to encumber French EDC ratification with a demand that West Germany formally renounce any claim to Polish-held territory. Such a demand would seriously embarrass the French government, which shares the Allied position that disposition of this area should be reserved for a final peace treaty.
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5.
Italians reportedly not opposed to Yugoslav attendance at informal talks on Trieste:
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Premier Pella hopes to discuss the Trieste issue with Secretary Dulles and Foreign
Secretary Eden during the current NATO meetings in Paris.I J
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ine cable quotes a senior Italian Foreign Office official" to the effect that Pella would not object to the presence of the Yugoslav ambassador at the discussions.
Comment: Italy's position heretofore has been that implementation of the Anglo-American declaration of 8 October must be begun before it could participate with Yugoslavia in any discussions on Trieste.
The Yugoslav government would probably be willing to have its ambassador attend such informal talks, since it has repeatedly said it would attend any type of conference without preconditions.
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IC< bec
GENERAL
Cig
1. Chinese Communists Communists want Korean talks talkscontinued: continued: 1.
:
The Swedish Swedish ambassador ambassador in Peiping was told by by a Chinese Communist vice foreign minister on on 14 14 December that the the CommuCommuminister nists wish to talks wish resume the Korean talks but will not retract the remarks to which Amertcan envoy Dea will not retract the remarks to which American envoy Dewhad_ob_-, Jected. The ambassador's impression, impression, which which he he conveyedl conveyed was that the Chinese Chinese desire destreboth both a a continuation continuatton of the preliminary prelimtnary talks talks and and a a convening convening of of the the Korean Korean political political conitself. ference itself.
YFI
2. 3.

-3-
The vice vice foreign foreign minister's Comment: The days. line follows P e i p m p a g a n t l a of follows precisely precisely PeipMvrilnopaganda of the the past past several several days. Even r e resumed, there thereis i s noevidence evidence that that the the CommuCommuEven if if the the talks talks a are no nists wlll compromise compromise on the main issues. nists will
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UN discussionon on Koreanprisoners: prisoners: 3. yelion 3, MenanseeLg_cin seeking UN discussion Korean

According Lodge, Indian Indian ccording to Ambassador Ambassador Lodge, told a group of Latin delegate Menon elegate Menon told of American delegates on on 16 16 December December that merican delegates he General Assembly should the should be convened convened before efore 22 January to consider constder disposition dieposition of f the nonrepatrtated nonrepatriated Korean Korean prisoners. prisoners. e said that the lack of He o f a political conference nce confronted Indian Indian custodial custodial troops with with
a potentially dangerous situation. Menon made it clear that the Latin Americans should use their influence to bring the United States around
to the Indian viewpoint.
with with the British Brltish delegate. delegate.
Menon Menonleft left a a memorandum memorandumto tothe the same same effect
Comment: Menon's Menon's maneuvers maneuvers and India's reported denial denial of of T h i m a y y m m e n t favoring Thimayya's statement favoringrelease release of of the the prispris22 January January represent a reversal oners on 22 reversal of o f previously previously stated stated views. views. Since have been braken off, off, India India may may wish wish to to avoid avoid CommuCommuSince the talks have nist charges that releasing the prisoners prisoners would would violate violate the the armistice armistice agreement.
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1.
Moscow propaganda reiterates call for prohibition of atomic weapons

(page 3).
2.
USSR reportedly considering gold loan to Finland (page 3).

FAR EAST
6.
7.

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Comment on Indonesian government's reply to army commanders

(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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9.
Istael threatens imminent resumption of work on Joraan silver diversion (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
France apparently supports' Yugoslav'position on Trieste (page 0.
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3. 4. 5.
Rhee rejects Japanese bid for resumption of talks (page 4). Chinese reportedly suggest means of resuming Korean talks (page 4). Indian official at Panmunjom preparing biased report on prisoner issue (page 5). Thimayya plans to release Korean prisoners after 22 January (page 5).
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SOVIET UNION
Moscow propaganda reiterates call for prohibition of atomic weapons.: The Soviet press on 18 December carried 25X1A a statement by the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Women supporting World Peace Council demands for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen for "an energetic struggle bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. "
1.
Ambassador Bohlen notes that the Kremlin has on occasiOn used demands by such organizations as the forerunner for an official statement.
Comment: This USSR's official position oliais-rmament statement reaffirms the and semiofficial Soviet comment on President Eisenhower's atomic proposal. Both Vyshinsky and Pravda noted his omission of plans for the banning of atomic weapons.
2.
USSR reportedly considering gold loan to Finland:
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Negotiations concerning a Soviet loan in gold to Finland are to begin in Moscow before the first of the year. The Finns reportedly wish to borrow no more than $10,000,000, part of wh ch might be repaid in goods. They hope to use part of the loan for purchases of machinery to improve the efficiency of their woodworking industry but think the USSR may require that it be used for industries primarily supplying the Soviet market.
A Finnish Foreign that he was convinced that some agreement Ministry official stated Soviet attacks on the present government. would be reached, despite
Comment: In considering a gold loan to another government, the USSR is departing from its usual practice of confining its lending activity ruble credits. Finland is the first non-Orbit state to be offered to such terms and this loan may aid it to import materials from the West to meet its export commitments to the USSR qf manufactured
goods.
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3.
FAR EAST
Rhee rejects Japanese bid for resumption of talks:

South Korean foreign minister Pyun informed an American embassy official on 18 December that the draft Japanese statement delivered three days before on the resumption of talks to settle outstanding differences with South Korea was not acceptable to President Rhee. A leging that Japan wants the United States to intervene in order to "lure South Korea into a trap, " Pyun stated that his country could not agree to resume the talks unless Japan apologizes for remarks made by Japanese representative Kubota in previous sessions.
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The embassy comments that there is no longer any doubt that Rhee is uninterested in seeking a settlement with Japan without a total acceptance of his demands.
Comment: The proposed Japanese statement, which dissociates the government from Kubota's remarks, is about as far as the Yoshida government can go because of legal and domestic political considerations.
Failure of Rhee to renew the talks will create more agitation in Japan for resorting to force to protect Japanese fishing vessels.
4.
Chinese reportedly suggest means of resuming Korean talks:

The two Chinese Communist representatives at the Korean talks sought out Indian officials there on 15 December in an apparent attempt to explore American intentions and means for resuming the talks. The senior Chinese, asserting that Ambassador Dean had charged the Peiping regime with being a Soviet "stooge, " which he regarded as a far worse insult than the Communist charge of American "perfidyp intimated that the Communists would withdraw its accusation if the United States would also retract. The Chinese did not raise with the Indians any of the substantive matters in the suspended talks.
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Comment: Peiping has not repeated its "perfidy" charge since 15 December and daily has reiterated that the talks should be resumed. On 16 December, however, Peiping radio stated that the American proposal of 8 December remained "on every fundamental question . . . utterly unacceptable. "
5.
Indian official at Panmunjom preparing biased report on prisoner issue:
agree to a single report. Since the Poles and Czechs also were critical of Haksar's draft, they thought it likely that three separate reports would be submitted to the UN General Assembly.
'
Comment: General Thimayya, who has been generally sympathetic to the UN viewpoint on the prtsoner issue, presumably will modify the Indian version before final action is taken by the NNRC. Most Indian officials, however, still persist in their belief that the prisonerm-were thoroughly indoctrinated by the UN Command prior to their turnover, and that American agents among them are preventing them from returning to the northern side.
6.
Thimayya plans to release Korean prisoners after 22 January: General Thimayya's plan for the release of the Korean prisoners after 22 January, if the two sides do not agree otherwise, has been approved by Prime Minister Nehru, according to the Swiss and Swedish repree eu ra Nations Repatriation Commission.
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A draft report on the Korean prisoner impasse, prepared by Indian political adviser Haksar 25X1A for submission to the UN General Assembly, is termed "impossible, red-colored, and catastrophic," by the Swiss and Swedish delegates to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The report was so strongly biased against the UN Command that the Swiss and Swedes refused to use it even as the basis for discussion in subcommittee.
The two officials believe the NNRC will never
2110 Dec 53 se 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79700975A011400060m-9
Approved ForA 'Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001400060001-9
25X1A
Thimayya, who believes that the authority of the Indian custodial forces expires on that date, plans to ask both sides to take back custody of the prisoners. If the Communists refuse, he intends to turn the pro-Communist prisoners loose.
The Swedish representative indicated that Thimayya would probably arrange for "orderly opportunities" for the anti-Communist prisoners to be released and be received by the UN Command in a phased process.
Comment: Krishna Menon, Indian representative at the UN, is attempting to have the General Assembly reconvened in early January to discuss the prisoner issue. The Indian foreign secretary told Ambassador Allen on 18 December that India is still uncertain whether the final decision should be
7.
Should the commanders accept the government statement, the way is open for increased leftist penetration of the army. Should they continue their opposition, there is an increased prospect of armed rebellion. I

made by the UN or the NNHC.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The position of the Indian government on the prisoner release question, which reportedly is to be considered when Krishna Menon returns from London, may be announced by Nehru in his scheduled policy speech to parliament on 23 December.
Comment on Indonesian government's reply to army commanders:
On 18 December the Indonesian government announced that recent staff changes in the army are entirely legal and that it would not tolerate public statements by army officers on matters "which are the exclusive concern of the government." The announcement is in reply to an ultimatum by four of Indonesia's seven territorial commanders that unless the government dismisses new army staff appointees by 23 December, they will no longer recognize the defense minister's authority.
-6Approved For Relea25 pe-
25X1A
000egwatst 53
Approved Forlie1 _ase-24:14:14/04146GIA-ROP74400076A11400060001-9
25X1A
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
9.
Israeli ambassador Eban told Ambassador Lodge at the TJN that Israel "would simply 25X1A resunie work" on the Jordan River diversion project if the Security Council does not adopt the UIC-US-French resolution empowering General Bennike to use his discretion in settling this issue.
President of the Security Council Kyrou of Greece doubts that the joint resolutioa,vigorously, opposed by the Arabs, could obtain the necessary seven votes.
incite the Arabs to further denouncements of the West. WhileS the Arabs would probably not attack Israeli forces protecting workmen on the project, immediate enlargement of "border incidents" would probably result.
work on the diversion proiainer present circumstances, would

Comment:
Approved For Rele
Israel threatens imminent resumption of,work on Jordan River diversion:
Any move by Israel to resume
25X1A
20 Dec 53
. CIA-RDPT9TOO9T5AO 1400060001-9
Approved FoNliktease400444146-4-64A-RDRALT41613761ki01400060001-9
25X1A
WESTERN EUROPE
10. 25X1A
France apparently supports Yugoslav position on Trieste:
A proposal for a Trieste conference was made by Foreign Minister Bidault to Foreign Secretary Eden on 16 December. This proposal, which was also communicated to Yugoslavia as the new French position, is almost identical to the one expressed on 8 December to the French by the Yugoslav ambassador in Paris.
I
Comment: In the past, the French have generally supported the Ita ian position on Trieste. The reason for the apparent shift in the French position is not known. The terms outlined in the new proposals would probably be considered unacceptable by the Italians.
-8Approved For Rele mv-2004/0-Ittt-:-CtArRIDPITSTE1191A00140006010-fbec 53
25X1A
25X1 25X1
rerg
Sava, Mate
Ag4c3ritX009
wa
23 December 1953
Copy No. 8 4
25X0

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L i DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
-

AUTH: HR 70-2
PO 0 9_
DATE:21.0Eg3gaimeuEn. :}
25X0
25X1,
:
tri
25X14;
.C1/110
/ DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
2004210V6 t9CIACRIF7/T009Witlffe, A:
Approved Fo
elease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79100975
01400080001-7
25X1A
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1.
Bohlen comments on Soviet reply to president's proposal (page 3).

FAR EAST
2.
Chinese Communists reportedly control North Korea (page 3).

25X1
4.
25X1
6.
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
French base in northwest Tonkin getting heavy reinforcements

(page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
Brazilian president hints at nationalization of electric power

(page 6).
***
Approved Fohlillease 2004101/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975
01400080001-7
25X1A
SOVIET UNION
1.
25X1A,
Bohlen comments on Soviet reply to president's proposal: Ambassador Bohlen reports that Foreign Minister Molotov had nothing to add orally to the text of the Soviet note on atomic control, but drew his attention specifically to the conclu ing paragrap s w ich indicated the Kremlin's willingness to participate in the conversations suggested by President Eisenhower and its intention to propose renunciation of atomic weapons. Both points are printed in boldface type in the Soviet press. Molotov said that the Soviet proposal for renunciation was not a precondition for talks, and Bohlen believes that the USSR is awaiting specific suggestions from the United States as to place and type of conversations.
The ambassador regards as a tactical shift the Soviet proposal for a Geneva-type ban on use of atomic weapons. Such a ban would leave governments still in possession of stockpiles of weapons; therefore the suggestion represents a shift from the previous Soviet demands for abolition plus international inspection subject to Security Council veto.
The ambassador considers this proposal to be the chief substantive element of the Soviet position. He believes that such a Geneva-type renunciation would remove one of the strongest deterrents to local Communist aggression, such as Chinese intervention in Indochina. It would probably not have much effect in case of global war, however, since a cold-blooded aggressor would hardly be restrained by a piece of paper.
2.
Chinese Communists reportedly control North Korea:

bust back from a two-week inspection tour oi Worth Korea reported on 21 December that the Chinese appear to be "running the country

FAR EAST
25X1
25X1A
-323 Dec 53
25X1A
Approved For ReIrstr 2004101118: -CtAMDP79T0097SA001400080001-7
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1400080001-7
25X1A
and are there to stay. " He stressed that he was met and looked after by Chinese officials, and that it was useless even to speak to North Korean officials since they had to get instructions from the Chinese.
All cities visited were heavily garrisoned by Chinese troops, which considerably outnumbered the North Korean soldiers. 'large numbers of Chinese settlers had recently come to Korea.
I
25X1
25X1

-425X1A
Since Soviet-trained Koreans still occupy the most important party and government posts, it is likely that major policy decisions are still subject to Moscow's approval.
Approved For Releese-20041Ottte-retARDP-79T-0139-75A0fr40008019A-Pec 53
by any Western observer about Communist China's growing influence in North Korea, although others, including Ambassador Dean, have been impressed with Peiping's commanding position.
Comment; This is the strongest statement
25X1A
Approved For Fase 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 400080001-7
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4.
French base in northwest Tonkin getting heavy reinforcements:
The American army attach in Saigon comments that this heavy build-up, requiring the removal of from the critical delta area, appears justified only if Navarre planstroops to launch significant offensive action from Dien Bien Phu.
Comment: Wet Minh tactics suggest that the enemy will not risk an attack PreVious on so strong a post. The Viet Minh may attempt merely to contain it, while further consolidating their control in northwest Tonkin; or they may by-pass the post entirely and laynch an attack against northern Laos.
25X1

-525X1A
American officers who on 20 December 25X1A visited Dien Bien Phu, the French strongpoint in northwestern Tonkin, report that it s being heavily fortified. The French are flying in al.55mm howitzer battalion this week and plan to stab lize troop strength there at 12 infantry battalions. One hundred transport sorties are being flown daily the buildup stage; maintenance will require 30 C-47 sorties a during day.
Approved For R 3Iease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 01400080QQ1v.7

c.3
ec 53
Approved For Release 7004101116 CIA-R111779T1111975A1Kl1400080001-7
25X1A
25X1
6.
Brazilian president hints at nationalization of electric power:

Brazilian president Vargas on 20 December announced that if funds could not be found to develop a national electric power industry, the government would then have to take over existing establishments "which are not giving the desired results. " He referred to the large foreign companies' failure to supply adequate power and indicated that they were causing an excessive drain on Brazil's foreign exchange resources by their profit remittances. Both the power shortage, caused by rapid industrialization and made more acute by drought conditions, and the foreign exchange difficulties are popular issues. Vargas therefore is apparently attempting by an appeal to ultranationalism to divert popular dissatisfaction from his administration.
25X1A

LATIN AMERICA
-625X1A
Approved For Release 2004101116 : CIA-1201779T00975A0
1400080m7Dec 53
Approved Forliallnasri 7884M1/18 CIA-R11P704T(1(197
1400080001-7
25X1A
Brazilian Traction Light and Power Company, owned jointly by Canadian, British, and American investors and the recipient of recent loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development totaling 90 million dollars, supplies more than half of Brazilian electric power. The American-owned American and Foreign Power Company supplies about one fifth.
25X1A

-7Approved For Re le
25X1A
. CIA-RDPTSTO0ST3AO 140008000237Dec 53
r, ///dasase2097opisEgmusw9Towets,
25 December 1953
25X1
25X1
copy
NO.

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED I I
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

Po o 9
SC
25X1
AWN: HR 70.2 DATE: _rty.
ReVIEWER:
To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
Sera 20041dW6) ft4041;0097WISS
-1
Approved For Rblease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A044400100001-4
25X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Neutral report on Korean prisoners may intensify Indian demand for UN discussions (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Viet Minh task force rob s
25X1
25X1
25X1A
to oft 03
Approved For KISase 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ae1400100001-4
25X1A
FAR EAST
1.
Neutral report on Korean prisoners may intensify Indian demand for tIN discussions:
The American embassy in London reported on 23 December that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission's report on Korean prisoners might "renew" Indian pressure for Iresh General ssembly instructions before the period of neutral custodianship ends on 23 January.
2SX1AI
2.
Viet Minh task force probes central Laos:
25X1A

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Comment: Prime Minister Nehru's suggestion on 23 December that early General Assembly discussions be held on the Korean prisoner issue appears to confirm the embassy's observation. India probably recognizes, however, that the UN can do'little to solve the problem, and it is likely that the NNRC will have to decide the issue itself.
Elements of the Viet Minh 325th Division have captured a small French post in central Laos and have attacked another, the
25X1
The French believe these attacks are designed to draw their reserves from the delta. They are not overly concerned in view of the large front, difficult terrain, and the limited number of Viet Minh troops involved.
by the Viet Minh has been EirreiTaTed. The forces involved are small and could constitute only a secondary effort against that country. Any major attack would be launched against northern Laos from Tonkin, where the bulk of the enemy forces are located.
Comment: A penetration of central Laos
-325X1A
Approved For Re lease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79700975A0 01400100001-4
25 Dec 53
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79700975A0014001000014

/SifflanomoR&uasimboar
31 December 1953
25X1
I
TA
25

DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECLASSIFIED
NEXT REVIEW DATE: DATE:
/J. wi,/
AUTH: HR 70.2 all
"7 03
ntSa:SThEVIEWER:
9 VI
25>0
254
25)
,. ....9w sta200
Approved For Roilease 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A41400130001-1
25X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
25X1
3.
Chou En-lai says Peiping can guarantee Korean peace without

(page 4).
Ub
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4.
5. 6.
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Vietnamese official fears political consequences of Viet Minh offensive (page 5).
Prospect of American aid to Pakistan encourages defense discussions in Middle East (page 5). Egypt may be reassessing its foreign policy (page 6).
25X1

Approved Folio/lease 2004101116 : CIA-R0P79T0097. 001400130001-1
25X1A
25X 1
3.
Chou En-lai says Peiping can guarantee Korean peace without USSR: Chinese Communist premier Chou En-lai recently told the Indian ambassador in Peiping that the Chinese are "eager" to have a Korean political conference and that the American insistence on Soviet participation with a vote is "unreasonable and ridiculous."
25X1A
Arguing that the American attitude implies a lack of confidence in Peiping's signature as a guarantee on Korea; Chou indicated that necessary guarantees should be provided by Communist China, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.
Despite Peiping's frequent hints that it resents being regard-Tr iirsimple instrument of Moscow, it is believed that the two parties have agreed to have Peiping present the Communist position in any Korean talks and to preserve Moscow's freedom of action.
Comment:
Chou's remarks suggest that the Communists may propose to drop the Soviet Union from the conference altogether.

-4Approved For Rele
400130001-1
31 Dec 53
-4
Approved For RIN6ase4004/0444-6-i-CIA-RDP79-T-00875A011400130001-1
25X1A
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4.
Vietnamese official fears political consequences of Viet Minh offensive:
25X1
drive across central Laos, in the eyes of Vietnamese nationalists, is the manner in which it can be played up in France to strengthen elements in that country favoring a negotiated peace, according to Governor
Tri of Tonkin.
The immediate importance of the Viet Minh
Comment: The political problems posed by the enemy's move across Laos were reportedly responsible for the French decision to reinforce the troops in the area. The American army attach in Saigon has observed that this reinforcement enabled the Viet Minh to gain its primary objective, the dispersal of French reserves.
5.
Prospect of American aid to Pakistan encourages defense discussions in Middle East:
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
In a conversation with the American consul in Hanoi on 28 December, Tri cited the "specious but plausible" analogy that has been made to the 38th Parallel in Korea. He feared that if the Viet Minh can consolidate its position on the Mekong, while carrying out maneuvers in northwest Tonkin susceptible of intense propaganda treatment, it can effectively appeal to that portion of French public opinion which already favors negotiations.
The Pakistani prime minister implied in a talk with Ambassador Hildreth on 28 December that the Iraqi king and prime minister might discuss regional defense arrangements during their visit to Karachi on 17 January. Mohammed Ali emphasized that his government will be acutely embarrassed if the United States has not decided by then to give military assistance to Pakistan.
-525X1A
Approved For Rel
se 4 I r
IP F. 'set in..]
VAGT
I
j..
400130001-1
31 Dec 53
Approved For FS ert 70nAmipiR CIA_PIND79TWAMA41400130001-1
25X1A
Also on 28 December, the Turkish prime minister told Ambassador Warren that the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara had recently expressed interest in Iraq's early adherence to a possible defense pact between Turkey and Pakistan.
Comment: Reports that the United States may grant military aid to Pakistan appear to have stimulated regional defense thinking in Pakistan, Turkey.and Iraq. American assistance to Pakistan would probably further encourage local initiative in Middle Eastern defense planning.
6.
Egypt may be reassessing its foreign policy:
campaign threatening neutralism, the present consultations in Cairo appear to be aimed at achieving a firm Egyptian position before the meeting of the Arab League Council scheduled for 9 January.
The lack of progress in recent informal Anglo-Egyptian talks will probably encourage Egypt to push strongly in the League sessions for a neutral pan-Arab position.
Despite the probable continuation of strong anti-Western propaganda, closer Orbit relations are not envisaged, and Egypt is unlikely for the present to take steps which would close the clior to American economic aid.

25X1A
Egypt's recall for consultation of its envoys to Moscow, Washington, London, New Delhi, and Karachi indicates that the Nagib regime is now engaged in a serious attempt to reassess its future policy toward the West.
Following the recent propaganda
-625X1A Approved For Re vase-zoozttavir:tatATROPT9T00975A1 01400130001-1
31 Dec 53

1953년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

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1953년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

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Fr' Srase 20,39pkilblypTatras

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DOS review(s) completed.

25X*proved For Release 2003109102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000010001-8

Indian Ambassador is being treated discourteously by Peiping

Soviet press ignores possibility af Eisenhower-Stalin meethig

Peiping promises North Koreans continued support in war

British influence in Jordan in jeopardy (page 6).

Gaullists seen ready to support any new French government

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000010001-8

Approved For Release 2003109102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000010001-8

I. Indian Ambassador is being treated discourteously by Peiping:

ternal Affairs in New

Peiping asks for representation in Ceylon to handle long-term trade:

The Ceylonese Food Minister on 29 Decem-

Approve I For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-R0P79100975A0010 )0010001-13

241semied For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00100 010001-8

Comment: It is likely that Ceylon eventually

Soviet press ignores possibility of Eisenhower-Stalin meeting:

-42 5X1A Approv d For Release 2003/09102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010000 10001-8

RRiad for Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00101)0010001-8

Peiping promises North Koreans continued support in war:

Magsaysay ready to accept Nacionalista nomination for Philippine pregidency:

203wf wed For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010 00010001-8

British influence in Jordan in Jeopardy:

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

RAMSed For Release 2003109102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0010 00010001-8

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001000010001-8

Approved For ReleaaUf1ie5/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R6442,1,30001-6

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

ra C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTrON

TO THE DECLASSIFICATION Of 1 Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : ClA-RDP91T01172R0002a1MOW

For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website

Approved For Relequp01/05/23 : CIA-RDP911-01172R0092,Q,P30001-6

Approved For Release 2001105/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200130001-6

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Approved For Releav4991/05/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200UP001 -6

Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0455, 3 January 1953

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

For more information on OCR and PDF Compression go to our website

Approved For Relea4eie01/05/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000404.1080001-6

Approved For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002001300014

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Approved For Relew02001/05/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R0002Q,9130001-6

Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0456, 5 January 1953

DA/LY KOREAN BULLETIN

TM:C.I.A. HAS !.007T:CTION TO THE DECIASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

NO) 0 JUL T973

ApproVed For Release 2001/05/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000200130001-6

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Approved For Relewi2001/05/23 : ClAAKRIT01172R0002,08130001-6

793 and 794, 64 kmumisAm a mvelation ci

DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

TO THE DECIACCIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.

Approved For Release 2001/05123 : CIA-Ratefttf01172R000200130001-6

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DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

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Approved ForReleaut2001/05/23 CMONTO1172R0002,00130001-6

Approved For Release 2001105123 : CIA-RDP91701172R000200130001-6

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