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Modernization: Theories and Facts Author(s): Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 155-183 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996 . Accessed: 09/03/2012 19:43
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MODERNIZATION
Theories and Facts
By ADAM PRZEWORSKI andFERNANDO LIMONGI*

Introduction T JL THAT makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall?Do democ
racies emerge as a consequence of economic development? destabilize democracies? Is there some growth or is it repeating itself in contemporary Does level of less de

V V

rapid economic ropean veloped Our

development beyond which democracies aremore likely to fall? Is Eu
history unique countries?

two theories is to distinguish that relate economic de purpose some facts in to examine and and these of velopment democracy light concern theories. While the interesting the mech ultimately questions anisms that mediate between economic and the dynamics development we must nevertheless of political the facts to be ex regimes, identify we before into stick as close as Hence, plained plunging explanations. nar to pose the question patterns. We possible elementary descriptive the impact of development, rather than rowly, examining exclusively seeking broadly deliberately the world found explain ignore factors income system, to we the dynamic of political regimes. Hence, such as religion, in colonial legacy, position or diffusion, which have been distribution,

by others that our question answers, vergent well understood. In Section count I, we

to influence

the incidence of democracy We believe to di in its own is important it that lends itself right, are not and that it raises methodological issues that reconstruct two alternative In Section II we views of the relation be

tween development and democracy, both put forth by Lipset,1 and we
the cases that fit them. examine the vulnerabil

* We Cheibub, Fernando Cort?s, Larry Dia appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, Jos? Antonio mond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin Lipset, Alejandro Lopez, Jos? Maria Maravall, Guillermo and Susan Stokes. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National Science O'Donnell, no. SES-9022605. Foundation 1 of Democracy: Economic Development and Po Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites litical Legitimacy,'' American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, Political Man: Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Press, 1981). Hopkins University The

WorldPolitics 49 (January1997), 155-83

156

WORLD POLITICS

to economic crises. In Section the III we consider ity of democracies most in criticisms and Section substantive of 's views, important Lipset

IV we study methodological
reflections close

criticisms. Methodological
1 explains

and political
of

the paper. Appendix

our classification

regimes, while Appendix 2 spells out the analytics of regime dynamics. I. Economic Development and Democracy

observation that democracy is related to economic develop Lipset's in 1959, has generated the largest body of research ment, first advanced on any and con It has been supported topic in comparative politics. while several revised and buried and And resuscitated. tested, extended, articles to in the recent Festschrift neither conclusions, Lipset proclaim the theory nor the facts are clear.2 Even a glance at the aggregate such as Figure 1, shows that patterns, the relation between levels of development and the incidence of demo tional a of regimes is strong.3 Indeed, condi regimes probit analysis as on the per we to refer which throughout only capita income, 77 of annual the level of development, 4,126 percent correctly classifies that this classification is not generated

cratic

The probability is chance greater than 0.99. by Yet there are two distinct democracies nomically, or may be more

observations.4

they may

this relation may hold: either eco as countries to emerge develop likely de be established of economic independently

reasons

2 in Gary Marks and "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," Larry Diamond, eds., Reexamining Larry Diamond, Lipset (Newbury Democracy: Essays inHonor of Seymour Martin Park, Calif: Sage Publications, 1992). 3 lead to somewhat divergent results, the While different data sets and different estimation methods most finds that careful statistical study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael economic S. Lewis-Beck, Granger development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88 "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development (December 1994), 903-10. 4 and democ the relation between development A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether to Democratic of Economic Development racy is linear. See Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation and Zehra F. Arat, Science 17 (August 1973), 611-21; American Journal of Political Performance," Modernization Theory Revisited," Comparative Politics 21 "Democracy and Economic Development: is a qualitative or a lim however measured, (October 1988), 21-36. We now know better. Democracy, it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom ited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement; House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, Freedom in theWorld: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88 (New York: Freedom House, 1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the American Sociological Review 45 (June 1980), of Political Democracy," Measurement Comparative can become negative as the level of de no and so on. Hence, index of democracy 370-90, predicted can exceed whatever is the maximum index of democracy tends to zero, and no predicted velopment value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or as can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: logistic, suggested by Robert A. Dahl iswhy we use probit or logit models Yale University Press, 1971). This throughout.

82105 0. ous groups.37895 0. to social structure becomes labor processes require the begin complex. . emerge dictatorships as a result of economic is the same as to say that dictator development as countries ruled by them become ships die economically developed. workers.25263 0. dollars.44211 0. the can no run system longer be effectively by command: too the society is the direct pro complex. As of employees.56842 0. we consider the population of countries as fixed.000 GNP/cap in 1985 6. whether or the bourgeoisie. active 5 is not quite true of our data set. The basic explanation of in this its is of that there is one gen versions.000 Level: 4. For now.06315 * * 157 * * * * * 0 2.000 PPP USD* Probability that a Regime parities 1 Figure is Democratic.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 1.000 8. regime. and new groups emerge and organize.88421 0. by Per Capita Income a1985 PPP USD-purchasing-power to survive in but may be more countries.00000 0.63158 0. since different countries enter and exit the sample at differ This ent moments." two Since we are dealing with democracies emerge only regimes. technological change endows some autonomy ducers with and private civil society information. velopment likely developed We call the first explanation and the second "endogenous" "exogenous. to assert that democracies whenever die.12632 0. a "modernization" The is endogenous theory.S.18947 0. inU. out of is then secreted Democracy by economic develop dictatorships ment. Vari emerges.75789 0. just the amorphous "civil society.5 Hence.94737 0. but see Section IV.69474 0." rise against the dictatorial and it falls. cooperation a result. A story told about country after country is that as they develop.50526 0. and control dictatorial of forms lose their effectiveness. any assumption theory.31579 0.

order. proceed is re of democracy may be one reason the incidence development. that of social changes accumulation progressive to to its culmination. cording democratic countries and of poor authoritarian becoming developing a "threshold. 71-86. the chance that 6 and John D. Some dictatorial of the collapsed maintaining capable uniquely crises. they will become political Ac since it results from development under authoritarianism. is endoge Democracy. University 8 Goran Therborn. 7 Studies in South American and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Guillermo O'Donnell. 1. His Lipset. many European a in the Malv defeat the "modernization. nous. on "The Impact of Economic Development Democracy. 45. because of economic to die and democracies If dictatorships emerge randomly with regard more be democracies is it still possible that there would development. (fh. others: innumerable a society ready Modernization lated tators to economic impute to among incorporation." story repeated by Argentine of the fell in the aftermath inas and elsewhere. are to die and democra that dictatorships equally likely so many cies to emerge at any level of development. emphasized. democratization. quences. "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy. Dietrich Rueschemeyer. and political mobilization. 103 (May-June 9 Lipset 1977).6 s thesis commen and this is the reading most most influential critic. one is to take ones? If countries than among poor among wealthy a nation.8 Some dictatorships Yet suppose for instance?who had been dictator?a of a founding Franco. communication. no. Modernization of California. one one to this events is the of would sequence expect theory. plays privileged not because of of countries because democratized wars. 3."7 then. Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International 1973). urbanization. Diamond (fn. paraphrases rich as the economically advanced nations. more well-to-do at his own word?"The the greater Lipset even if the emergence of the chances itwill sustain democracy"9?then death democracy is independent of the level of development." Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 7 (Summer 1993). 2).158 WORLD POLITICS is but the final stage." some level of once they reach development. Some because of foreign pressures." New Left Review. as as countries become other that "if saying democracy of industrialization.1959). educa eral process of which democratization ization consists of a gradual differentiation structures in a separation that culminates other chains structures consist and makes of sequences a tion. different as no Therborn role. O'Donnell. as well as Evelyne Huber. . 56. Stephens. They may die for conse reasons with all its modernizing that development. Studies.Modern of social and specialization structures from of political causal The specific possible. After all. it is highly probable that Lipset democracies.

095 (United States in 1989).730 country years. of democracy Rather. and the United States $18. which 11 Readers used to the UN or theWorld Bank GNP figures should be aware that counting incomes at to increase significantly the levels for poor countries and to decrease purchasing-power parities tends to know what different slighdy the numbers for rich countries. data for economic growth are avail revenues. to 1985 PPPUSD..10 Altogether. tran development.576. which here and use throughout does not include six countries that derive at least half of their income from oil are available for 4. and regimes").073. "Entry" year refers to or to the first country became independent. The facts we report concern 135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990. gence brought as a deus ex machina. Indonesia had $1. dictator more as countries become more affluent. since the not is about by development.S.973. regimes higher as per rises income of sitions are increasingly likely capita dictatorships but only until it reaches a level of about $6. All the regimes that 1990 or to the last year when or dictator as democracies occurred during this period were classified use term with "authoritarian latter the (we interchangeably ships we observed 101 democratic 224 regimes.) The lowest level we observed in the entire sample is $226 (Burma in 1950)." country product countries and survive in the wealthier Are we splitting hairs? Examine first some descriptive a patterns." but "modern. the highest is $18. is the number of observations able for only 4.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS fluent country. Thus. Spain $9. The sample comparable economic data.094. year the data are available. 1950. dictatorship happens wealthy to die in an affluent country. The we describe we took from the Penn World Tables 5. While political data in most analyses. but to die in the poorer ac ones.126 country years.6. opment democracy likely when In levels of authoritarian reach fact. Above that. is there to stay (see democracy Appendix emer is therefore no longer a modernization 2). Czecho slovakia $4. We would thus expect to observe democracies 159 to appear such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an af randomly with regard to levels of development. are and "exit" year refers to data available. It may be useful for future reference numbers describe: by 1990. This theory. Dictator become stable ships 10 1 and in in Appendix and the resulting list of regimes are described Our regime classification Alvarex et al. Nigeria had a per capita income of $995. or to the year when economic for which 123 authoritarian.11 as a result of economic devel If the theory that democracy emerges more to be is transitions would true. parities Mike . history gradually a since every time cumulates democracies. survives if a It appears exogenously democracy a not it is is of "modernization. refer (Thus all $ numbers U.000." Studies in International Comparative Development reason for selecting this period and the sample is the availability of internationally (forthcoming). rates are power The references expressed and expressed in constant to levels of and growth development at dollars computed purchasing in 1985 prices. "Classifying Political Regimes.

" remind. As we see. that we do not distinguish Note Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah.0294.50. WORLD POLITICS or at least succeed one another. then itwill embrace democracy. $7. for those dictatorships with incomes over $1. it seems. 1968). 13 Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Samuel P.115. Belgium.000. in and Mexico for many years after these countries enjoyed Argentina. Italy.000. in countries with incomes between and $4. 43. test whether dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of instability"13 estimate Huntington. which Austria. the probabilities increase until the $5.000 To we it is 0. and Norway did not have by 1950. per capita corresponds Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization theory. reached the ones which 12 If President Viola succeeds President successive dictatorships. Bulgaria. Whatever dig the grave it in the threshold at which development is supposed to health. 0.000 it is 0. the transition conditional given probabilities of the observed presented inTable its square (see Appendix 2). that those countries Even disregarding ships passed good revenues more from than one-half derive of their oil. consequences modernizing most dic But for time to accumulate.12 in the invariably are somewhat less stable almost and even less so those under $1.160 ships survive.000.0206. But if they reach the level of $6. over $5. Singapore. of dic 2. Table 3 lists the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the was above regime is democratic predicted by the level of development to income of which $4.000. Press. for authoritarian land.000 it is 0. Spain.0333.001 above $4. closely and then decline.000 in countries range that were the nonlinearity The results are tatorships falling.000. p^.001-$6. comes above $5. They very poor countries.0641. over $6. Germany. dictatorships in East flourished USSR.As the lower panel of Table 1 (PADcol umn 4) shows. the probability of any dictatorship dying during any year is 0.0484. on level and. patterns. dictatorships They survived for years wealthy. this prob over ability is 0. this premise is vacuous: only 19 dictatorships?to tatorships over out of 123?did of time and longer periods develop us more these examine thus countries. Ice France. predicted by the level of development correspond to those observed. The hypoth over a esis implied by this theory is that ifa country develops longer pe so that all the have riod under dictatorship. Germany. it is clear that many dictator regimes. Taiwan." Let that developed under authoritarianism and became "modern.000 $1. Indeed. Huntington. .Netherlands. we treat it as one continuous spell of dictatorship. closely "modernity. was correct with regard to these patterns can be predicted by per capita income. transitions to democracy become less likely.

0329 0. a for the total of 3.0206 6 18 8 3 6 5 2 1 49 915 727 290 186 122 78 32 30 2380 0.991.0242 9 14 7 5 2 1 1 0 39 72 245 184 150 107 113 121 619 1611 88 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 0.0124 0.0023 0. we lose 135 observations.0333 43 25 17 14 8 3 1 1465 738 448 262 140 62 30 0.0083 0.0152 0.0243 0.0314 0. and. having experi dictatorships. Bulgaria.0380 0.1250 0.0339 0.0534 0. reached the level democracy remained under likely regime.0248 0. and re long period.0379 0.0221 TTR TOT -1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001 AU Above 15 32 15 987 972 474 336 229 191 153 649 3991 0. more and eighteen are the three countries and Yugoslavia that experi increase in income over.0014 0.0625 0.0333 0. Spain.0101 0.0167 0. enced a sustained teen. The following that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions TOT is the total number PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number particular level year of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy we will take arbitrarily to mean that at some time a per they had capita income of $4.0147 0. dictatorships eventually only many Hungary enced .0333 0. and Malaysia Singapore over a countries that became wealthy. Taiwan.0066 0.0015 0.0349 0.0276 0.0571 0.0484 0. and but fell.0316 0.0000 0.0050 0.0088 0. developed now.0294 0.0081 0. a series of economic are the two crises.115.0492 0.0202 0.0196 0. dictatorships Germany.0238 0. seven was the at which years. respectively. (SeeTable 4.0641 0.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS Regime Transitions Table by Lagged (annual Low-High 161 1 Per Capita data) PAD TRD TA PDA TRA TD Income (Level)" PJK 0.) Gabon. twelve.0015 73 41 26 18 10 4 1 3004 2032 1558 1222 993 802 649 0. mained In East until USSR.0042 0.0161 0.0195 0. Syria.0571 0.0000 30 16 9 1539 1294 1110 960 853 740 619 "Since per capita income are used: abbreviations is lagged.0187 0.

354 3991 (0.026 (0.024) (0.007) 0.021) (0.424) 0.125) 0. Uruguay should never have been a dictatorship.990 (0.959 (0.956 (0.961 (0.D.953 (0. k=A.000) 0.875) 0. Observed transition p*D Table 1) are in parentheses.064) 0.992 (0.977 (0. passed the threshold again in 1985.019) 0.967) 0.983 (0.017 Probabilities Income and 2 Predicted Its Square3_ PM N PD* 0.999 (1. countries This is not to say that democracies did not wealthy.902 (0.004 (0.862 (0.008 (0.047 (0.962) 0.975) 0.047 (0.017 (0. But emerge .033) 0. it reached history of Poland an economic in 1974.758 (0.049) 0.191 987 972 474 336 229 191 153 649 by Lagged Level <1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 3001-4000 4001-5000 5001-6000 6001-7000 7001- PDA 0. it climbed with downs and ups to $4. The probabilities pv j=A.038) 0. Given its 1974 income level.051 (0.951) 0.974 (0. Greece Czechoslovakia.072 PDD 0.985 (0. The the threshold is similar: by our criteria. off more or less at the same threw dictatorships are few. See Appendix 2.983 (0. levels.015 (0.326) 0. are the dream and perhaps Portugal. and passed the threshold of $4.028) 0.921 (0. is the equilibrium proportion of democracies.965 (1. years after they had reached the critical level of income.039 (0.561. recovered to surpass the 1974 level only by 1986.057) 0.979) (0.928 0.304) 0.953 (0.199 by 1983.466) are of tran rates (from * Based on a dynamic probit model. In turn.992) 0.155 in 1989. and became a democracy in 1989.600 (0. it experienced of democracy crisis in 1979 and a mass movement for democracy in 1980.967) 0.063) 0.008) 0.388 (0.028 (0. collapsed to $3.044 (0. The eco nomic history of the Chilean dictatorship is convoluted: its income in 1974 was $3.876) 0.972) 0.025) 0.972 (0.984) 0. Brazil.016) 0.000) All 0.936) 0.092 (0.010 (0.887) 0.981) 0.991) 0. exactly the year of transition.720) 0.976) (0.993) 0.162 WORLD POLITICS Table Regime Transition _Per Capita PAD 0.943) 0.D sitions and survival.950 (0.053) 0.033) 0.937) 0.050 (0.0006 (0.028 (0.996 (0.009) 0. became income sometimes that developed under a dictatorship. cases of a modernization even South Korea These and are and they be theorist.130 by 1981.098 (0.000) 0.

818 0.553 0. dictatorships fall for the same reasons in all countries. periods must be some level of there is to have any predictive power. put otherwise. .923 5650 5218 5162 5117 5102 5080 4668 4657 4541 4355 4220 0.809 0.637 0. theory sure can one at the that be relatively income which country will throw for that satisfy the premise of the modernization theory.992 0.620 0.769 0.568 0.977 0.690 0.687 0.851 0.) is the cdf of the nor cause countries necessarily tion may advent tion do not modern. Thus moderniza became democracy was established in countries that de even it these countries had waited for its veloped over a long period But ifmoderniza of time that cannot be predicted.513 l-F(a+?*LEVEL). One is hard put to find this level.625 0.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 163 Highest 3 Table of Per Capita Income (Level) under Which in different dictatorships survived countries Levels Year Country Singapore East Germany Iraq Taiwan USSR Spain Gabon Venezuela Bulgaria Argentina Mexico Iran Argentina Yugoslavia Hungary Greece Uruguay Malaysia Poland South Korea Syria Portugal Argentina Argentina Suriname * The 1990 1988 1979 1990 1989 1976 1976 1957 1988 1980 1981 1976 1972 1979 1987 1973 1981 1990 1978 1987 1981 1974 1962 1957 1981 Highest Level 11698 10433 8598 8067 7744 7390 6969 6939 6866 6505 6463 6434 5815 5674 prob(reg=dem)? 0. It is calculated as PROB(reg=DEM) where the parameters are estimated by the probit model and F(.530 0.776 0. however: among the countries range of levels atwhich dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list inTable 4). mal distribution.875 0.772 0.630 0.815 0. the "explain" why off the dictatorship.569 0.623 0.895 0. is the probability that a regime is democratic given the level.705 0.

which developed rapidly.63 0. Finally.53 0. Sup predict is not the same as to explain. which in 1961 had a per capita income of $968.88 0.48 0.57 0. per capita Entry is 1951 or the year after the country became independent or the year after economic data became available.53 0.80 0.Consider Taiwan.50 0. that itwould be a fell. if ever.80 0. racy at that time.02 of dying for reasons not related to develop ment. as predicted dictatorship transition gives the year the dictatorship democracy. the Taiwanese dictatorship faced a probability of 0.51 } 0.61 0.51 0.85 0.55 0.63 0. and the probability of democ Moreover.99 0. It thus had what about a 50 percent have been just chance of not being around by haz We may therefore attribute to 1995 even if it had not developed at all.10 of being a dictatorship in 1990.52 0.82 0. the particular by per capita income.57 0.90 0.55 Dictatorship Transition Year never at PROB Country Gabon Brazil Year Chile Uruguay South Korea Malaysia Singapore 1961 1965 1974 1974 1961 1957 1965 1961 1952 1981 1964 1971 1967 1971 1971 1951 1951 1961 1961 1969 1864 3561 4148 911 1282 1845 1607 968 4216 1654 4995 3308 3657 3109 1314 2205 2536 2073 Syria Taiwan Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Greece Hungary Germany Poland Portugal Spain USSR Yugoslavia 1973 1980 1981 1989 1974 1985 1982 1972 1978 1979 ? 1989 ? 1970 1974 1974 1985 1973 1964 1971 1974 1976 1980 1981 1989 1981 1988 1990 1990 1981 1990 1989 1989 1988 1974 1987 1978 1988 1974 1976 1989 1979 1978 no 1989 0.50 is the year when the country reached per capita income of $4.85 collapsed that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached income of $4.47 0. Passes PROB=0.115.164 WORLD POLITICS That Developed and Reached Entry 4 Table over Long Incomes Passes Level PROB=0.62 0.115.98 0.69 0.68 0. development may a culmination of random .61 0. even if to ing" can easily entail an ex post fallacy. andwhich in 1995 elected its president in contested elections for the first time.115a Peak PROB 0.68 0.69 1975 1976 collapsed 0. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under aThis table lists countries and the probability. "explain pose that every year during all this time. passing by 1979 our threshold of $4.52 0.115.50 Year Countries under Periods above $4. which on the basis of its income level had a probability of 0.68 1985 1988 never never never post 1990 1989 1989 1990 1974 1989 no 1989 0.

capita an out himself for These cry thought Lipset explanation. the probability that a democracy would die dur particular life year was 0. countries As Table monotonically ing was a incomes above $6.14 reasons. our measure is The has a strong impact on the survival of democracies.16 eight of about duration for an expected 0. August 28-September 1. findings is that wealth survive in affluent countries that the reason democracies moderates is a plausible in various ways explanation the intensity but not easy of distributional to prove conflicts. Poole. theTaiwanese dictatorship most likely democratized in bringing dicta premise riod. attribute this death to development 15 The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 in lower: we guess fell in Europe were an order of magnitude comes.18 14 An analogy may be useful. To during each year of her life and that is to conclude that she died of old age. Expected 18 at the Survive in Affluent Countries?" Adam Przeworski. in a country with a per capita in regardless of everything come higher than that of Argentina 736 in 1975: $6.055.0571.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS for ones.And.974 in Finland $1.17 survives increases 1 shows. $1. else.814 in Italy in 1922. $1.000. but the levels at which democracies in 1933.125. the probability that democracy In countries with per capita with per capita income. which implies that their expected was this Between and $2. . no democracy ever fell. Few authoritarian torships of modernization theory.055 years with spent out of democracies while sixty-nine thirty-nine that were poorer. (Paper presented "Why Democracies annual meeting of the American Political Science Association." World Politics 42 (January 1990). years. per capita income. San Francisco. In turn. not for economic geopolitical of economic the causal Thus.001 probability years.01 of dying from accidental at the age of seventy-eight causes she gets hit by a falling brick. Above eighteen could expect to last forever. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0. democracies analysis. and the Seizure of Executive John B. predicts when of the level of development. the results of which income are shown inTable 2 (column 1).15 Thirty-two and not one did fall in democracies collapsed. Londregan and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to Power. than the the among among poorest likely 17 life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state. simple fact that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before.000. confirms that per is a good predictor of the stability of democracies. And even ifmost of those that did develop eventually became regimes satisfy the over a that is. In their sample of 121 countries between to occur wealthiest countries. Statistical $6. the Coup Trap. The This intu itive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the rigorously. 1996). 16 and Keith T. Londregan times more 1950 and 1982 coups were twenty-one coups.055. $1. that would democracies. 165 ards.474 inGermany it to have been $1. indeed. power development down appears paltry. and in 1930. income under $1. "Poverty.825 inAustria in 1934. few developed long pe no level of income occur.

The probability that a democracy will die during any partic an income above ular year in a country with two in a thousand since at such years. the "catch-up" from destroying war for at lower levels of wealth. 1 is that while observe in Figure countries. The of survival survives when observations of democracies education of level. triple. In wealthy a income the from rather than of total all contrast. And the rate of 5. it is impregnable in the are less stable when democracy rich ones. expect in the long run democracies initial distribution. democracy the more likely that itwill survive.000 die at levels dictatorships that independently of the would Even times constitute if wealthy 96. In turn.19 percent of regimes torships died at a double. struggle for dictatorship for ex there are always alternative One. that * 19 where p stands for tran In the long run the proportion of democracies equals p^/ PDA)> (p^ 2. interpretations. the pattern we generates is terribly fragile in poor one would percent. Obviously. in which risking costly but which gives the victor all of the income. theory. numbers in the text are derived from Table 1.166 distribution democratic share of of income competition. reason we observe the relation between once and the incidence to survive ships But what levels of development are almost certain is that democracies of democracy are established in countries. See Appendix ("authoritarianism"). rich True. or whatever higher rate. The sition probabilities. total income. Hence.7 zero: is practically $4.1 dicta is. gain winning struggle dictatorship smaller. are more to embrace democratic the ac values. and the recuperation from destruction is more attractive in poorer countries. destroying capital stock is lower. part by gain getting is smaller is slower. in such wealthy countries. WORLD POLITICS choose or between the verdicts of with complying some case each can to expect get a over is which fight dictatorship. . But while likely people an cumulated of of the labor years of education average member measure stocks we have?does increase the force?the of educational probability of income stronger. if the production function has diminishing marginal a part of it dur in capital stock. a proxy for education more educated is is income that and just ample. A for dictatorship and D for democracy.000. Now suppose that the marginal is lower at higher levels of con utility of consumption is the Thus the from for sumption. These Lipset nation. the in is faster ing dictatorship a accu countries is the value of dictator and the poor greater becoming returns mulated cost of countries. and indeed it ismuch exogenous the more version well-to-do of a s the confirm strongly is Once established. the effect independently is controlled. dictator they they reach the per capita income of $4. Hence.

with die expected they growing. 1976) 19. wealthy II..MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS even if development made transitions all the difference endogenous theory there are no grounds To conclude.9 percent.0173. democracies such fell poor democracies those with per are in the face capita income under $2.25 Moreover.4. introducing is yet another to between the pre-industrial sharp discontinuities more rather than less extremist working-class Here Lipset and company democracies could not have and industrial movements been more situation. Rapid the in life the to irony Lipset why democracies s growth is not destabilizing for democracy (and neither is it for dicta at in incomes. likely to survive in ones. Even among 20O.000. torship). No Easy Choice: Political Participation Samuel P.20 the "benign line" in the language of Huntington son. while those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0. breeds democracies: Lipset's 167 to much more democracy likely.) What ismost of economic twelve striking is how fragile crises. and certain die in poor countries and Nel in to it and those that do scatter along are democracies established. could make to believe that economic develop equation.Ups or Downs? There cited several theory. In poor countries. product occurred "Wherever industrialization velopment.0523 rate of less than 5 percent per annum."24 wrong. 21 inDeveloping and Joan M.23 s view. 23 (fn." as O'Donnell ment "optimistic dubs it. 16) with regard to coups. This finding parallels again the results of Londregan which they found to be less likely when the economy grows. When rate of 0. at years. In when destabilized Lipset and com democracy originated with "extremist movements"?fascism was a as he saw it. an comes are at the rate of 0. 13).7). . extremism of rapid de munism?because. While Lipset and factors Olson22 survive. once random directions. Huntington 24 54. of the 107 years during which a decline of incomes oc curred. anticipating explain were more to be he that democracies likely thought Huntington.21 has few countries running In turn. democracy under conditions the following is about life of year: the expected nine years. democracies that of sixty-four grow slowly. Huntington Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (SeeTable 5.Donnell(fn. face a decline they die can to when but be expected last nineteen and years. is 3. 1. "Rapid Growth Voice? Journal ofEconomic History 23 (De cember 1963).0160.1981). (fn. 22 as aDestabilizing Mancur Olson Jr. emerged. 25Lipset and Poole (fn.0132. Nelson. this threat to countries grew rapidly. rapidly. die at the rate of 0.

33 0.29 4.43 1.52 2.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.92 6.83 3.08 1 2 52 134 122 32 90 78 19 59 2.41 10.06 3. a for the total of 3991. by Lagged Rate of Economic Lagged All Per Capita Growth3 Income and Dictatorships Democracies TA PDA TRA TD 72 23 49 Level Growth Total G<=0 PJK 1.67 3.00 153 6.87 4.00 2.32 2.55 1.75 2.96 8.96 14 7 7 7 3 4 5 2 3 2 245 84 161 184 41 143 150 41 109 107 22 85 113 16 97 121 29 92 619 107 G> 0 3001-4000 Total G<=0 2.70 0 39 19 20 512 1611 363 1248 G>0 a Since per capita income are used: abbreviations is lagged.15 0.19 2.06 2.50 21.25 4.48 3.42 5.16 4.92 1.75 1.Observed Rates Table 5 of Transitions.61 1.86 3.78 2 32 2 0 1 0 1 49 21 28 5 27 30 3 27 2380 803 1577 0 0 0 G> 0 Total Total G<=0 0.21 3.71 8.38 6 4 2 18 7 11 8 3 5 3 915 397 518 727 215 512 290 80 210 186 12.61 1.55 2.35 3.71 G> 0 6001-7000 Total G<=0 2.06 3.03 0.44 6.00 649 110 539 88 40 48 3991 1166 2825 3.49 5.53 5. The following that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions TOT is the total number PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number particular level year of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy .16 5.68 0.14 5.23 353 336 93 243 229 54 175 191 35 156 G> 0 4001-5000 Total G<=0 2. we lose 135 observations.15 2.39 2.33 4.25 34 40.49 4.18 0.80 3.00 1.38 3.88 G> 0 2001-3000 Total G<=0 2.76 3.70 2.14 TTR 15 9 6 32 14 18 15 6 9 TOT 987 420 567 972 299 673 474 121 PAD TRD 0-1000 G> 0 1001-2000 Total G<=0 1.80 7.60 G> 0 5001-6000 Total G<=0 2.33 4.01 0.74 8.44 0.56 1.82 G> 0 7001 Total G<=0 0.00 0.23 1.66 1.56 8 3 5 1.26 2.00 119 0.

13). to cite Diamond and Linz. Huntington contended democracy occurs a country come unstable when which modernization. J. and the Soviet Union were all sys tems in which it is the "the government governs. again with stability of regimes and did not care or authoritarian. "The problem. none ever fell. (survival) analyses lagging growth one year of Both show that past does not matter: procedures growth to economic crisis is enough effects. And could expect this happened: these democracies a occurs: in miracle above the 252 $6. Kinks: Modernization While ences there are important between Huntington theoretical Theory and even both Revisited sharper political differ a argued that there is and O'Donnell.. years during which economic democracies crises. crisis common one of the most to democratic threats represents stability. "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti 26 in Latin Amer and Juan J."27 Hence. he insisted. Democracy inDeveloping ica (Boulder. theUnited Kingdom. Society. undergoes at some in levels of development. III. or the president matters "was not to hold elections but to create organizations. ticularly poor democracies. O'Donnell. Huntington . intermediate turn. 27 (fn. little. level beyond which further development decreases the probability that that both regimes be will survive.055 then. and Democracy Larry Diamond Countries: Latin Amer ica." in L." the cabinet. Colo. a decline of in comes resulted in the fall of six democracies in 120 years during which to last 20 years.000. "concerns not their the of government. the produce political of economic Table crises are immediate: Thus the hypothesis that rapid growth destabilizes regimes is simply it is true that "economic In turn.: Lynne Rienner. eds. are extremely vulnerable to bad economic performance." among but their degree told. Lipset. Diamond." Whether politburo." Indeed."26 are economic What destabilizes crises. and democracies. 17. we were countries. wealthy experienced is that the political effects Another striking feature of these patterns occur one year later. J.001 and $6. "Introduction: Politics. Linz. and S. 1.M." was concerned democratic at some intermediate level. Linz. a country exhausts "the easy tend to die when claimed that democracies stage of import Huntington were whether they distinction political form substitution.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 169 countries with incomes between $2. 1989).We tried to they over a account into 5 longer period and taking growth reproduce more we did statistical than one year. of government United States. par regimes false. "The most important he told us.

Reflecting rem that "Chapter I is now an archeological longer necessary to demonstrate that and/or show. column 5) proportion $2.6 per the equilibrium cent between $3.000 lapsed 28 29 Ibid. 204. 30 Studies in South American Politics. and 72. Ibid. some level of development relating beyond which democracies of democracies are to more likely to die than before? Note that the function observed values (returning toTable 2. Modernization ed.001 and $4.000: the are 42.31 O'Donnell a tant outlier: is the only country where fell at an democracy Argentina income above $6. . O'Donnell economies Is there develop. political at least within the range mediate levels of modernization. 7. 2d and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: O'Donnell.000. who treated it as applicable almost everywhere. only in the concept of the modernization' characterized political passed areas."28 explicitly referring Lipset. O'Donnell for various in retrospect.001 and $4. Instead a trend toward of and modernizing' competitiveness was an erosion of a to auto there and democracy. The probability of a democracy dying declines monotonically with per against Lipset. are associated with non-demo and the lower levels of modernization are found at inter democracies cratic political while systems. 1979). Argentina is also the only country where one col at an income between two democra and $6. But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" captured the imagination of scholars around the world. Only $5.001 per capita income has a kink at levels between $3.001 and $5.000.32. we should observe fall as that democracies observed by O'Donnell. 35-36. University 31 was careful about not was to O'Donnell making general claims: his purpose explain the downfall of democracies in the Southern Cone."29 Anticipating Huntington. stability there were repeated coups and revolts. is not a com studied a country that turns out to be a dis peting theory. the higher asserted..' political is that in contemporary South America.000.. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships ally stable in this range.000. democracy' tendency cratic military and of Instead .4 percent between and $3. is finished: series not foster methodological he observed it is no raked Lipset through the coals nant?testimony of data of a debate that in 1971 had recently begun and today to lead the reader 'socio-economic through tedious does development' "30 What the data on his criticisms transgressions." Hence. 'democracy stability.0 percent between $4. Hunt some of the tendencies encom "in that observed ington actuality. While his account of the rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism are exception are less stable.170 mate WORLD POLITICS never to While public order. Studies.000. (Berkeley: Institute of International of California. one-party regimes regimes. rather than that democracies did find a countercase O'Donnell capita income.

outside Argentina. Huntington University ers 135 countries. eleven out of fifty-five of democracies the proportion among these "new" coun cent).0 percent) newly independent democracies (14.398.3 out of forty-two the numbers were subsequently. except inArgentina. But the story of the countries countries seven were that became in 1960. Thus. back to thirty-nine in 1984 and to forty our count to the "old" countries.034.923. Hence.000: one of them inArgentina. By thirty-five pendent to increased these countries of democracies 1960 the number among was still in to fall to 1968.Does History Since our observations begin as a result of either Repeat Itself? came in 1950. In turn. according Huntingtons32 roughly agrees (1) the "secondwave" of democratization began in 1943 and ended in 1962.6 percent) in 1978. and the other inUruguay. and (3) the "thirdwave" of democratization began in 1974. sample. the no waves tries grew slightly with rolling down in the world during of democracies of the aggregate decline proportion new rather than countries of the 1960s is largely due to the emergence to transformations of old ones. only five democracies fell in countries with incomes IV. with regard by 1990. Indeed.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 171 cies fell in countries with incomes between $4. . above $3. Hence. and Greece in 1967 at $3. 16. hence.000: in Uruguay in 1973 at $4. Five democracies fell between $3. 1991).957. afterwhich eight it climbed. from cross-sectional of "modernization" torical process 32 in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The Third Wave: Democratization Samuel P. Fiji in 1987 at $3. Studies Lipset observations.176. (2) the "second reversewave" started in 1958 and ended in 1975. Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the country the more likely it is to sustain democracy.000: again one of them inArgentina. percent) independent after 1950 is entirely different. considered 74 countries while our sample cov of Oklahoma Press. Huntington.000 and $4. to which oceanic with analysis. Suriname in 1980 at $3.000 and $5. 1978. (16. the regimes we observed or the en of two effects: their dynamic into being or at least into our trance of new countries into the world. It thirty-one by only thirty-one thirty-nine. and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17. the data are not exacdy comparable. or up. Chile in 1973 at $3.6 per Since observations of any limited period of time combine dynamic contro and entry effects. inde in our sample that were countries the seventy-three Consider of them had democratic in 1950. when regimes. Three out of twenty-five (12. the question whether repeats itself is history tradition assume it does: they infer the his in the versial. in 1968.

. Jr. The results of these calculations presented are not that these the democracies that existed however. And we know that (1) the probability that a democracy is born iswidely scattered with regard to the level of development. Social Origins ofDictatorship Barrington Moore 34 in office between parties occurred is Czechoslovakia. increases with Western Were these probabilities different beforeWorld War II in (1) and elsewhere? Were different the (2) postwar pe they Europe during countries and that existed before 1950 ("old" countries) among later that became ("new" countries)? independent we can a full set of data for the prewar Without period. 1965). European can be used to infer historical theWestern processes on some ex that regimes survive or die conditional are the same across (in our case per capita income) cross sections. Indeed. . however. Cross-sectional observations country became independent. only as as War II. and cratic regime the probability that a country has a demo these level. (2) the probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with per capita income. most of the democratic regimes that emerged Europe in the aftermath of World War I collapsed after the first election. countries.172 Followers claiming not to be of Moore33 that WORLD POLITICS contest the validity of such inferences. rising at low levels and declining at high levels. approximate which democracies were established and fell in some of the present OECD are inTable 6.34And must have been at the and Uruguay relatively wealthy Argentina in income Latin Amer of the the average per capita century. variables. Southern well before World several Latin European American while while countries in Eastern experienced relatively long spells of democracy. The exception but note that no alternation in the history of Eastern Eu during this period. probabilities periods about the validity of inferences The based on cross-sec controversy can be formulated in a number tional observations of alternative ways: (3) as a result. The question. if the probabilities variables ogenous repeated. iswhether were the same in different or conditional regions. while the average income in Eastern Europe was only 33 and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press. Note. the first alternation resulting from elections rope occurred in Poland in 1991. was route to democracy unique. the region. beginning in 1913 ica was about one-half of that of the present OECD countries and in 1950. Although riod those with after the prewar period are not comparable those at our disposal we to guess the made heroic assumptions levels at 1950. then. so that the a country has a par different that probability on the realized values of these ticular regime at any time depends only or the time when the rather than the period. only make to economic with the first data for guesses regard question.

eRobert Dahl male date democracy in Switzerland to circa 1880. in France to 1884. and Stephens dBothTherborn electoral register was established.: World Bank. slightly higher. Democratization on a partisan basis and (2) legislative sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage ganized came later. 1870-1939: A Test of theMoore Thesis. D.Maddison to 1970 by Therborn. dates in participation. (2) they did not differ between Western and (3) once established.1. but scholars who use universal as the criterion date it to 1918. democracies likely Bank. The World Economy is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections or OECD. and other parts of the world. does Since we do not take participation not provide a figure for 1830. 16. we interpolated the numbers using 1820 and 1840. Appendixes I. parentheses b1920 figures were used. from 1828 by Huntington The dating of democracy (fn. II. The question mark for France ogy 94 (1989). 32). we date it early. 1989). 35 World Table 1. World Bank Development Report 1991 (Washington. as a criterion. but perhaps enough to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before World War IIwere highly scattered. by the extent of franchise are for the year of independence.C. using the index numbers for GDP and the pop in the Twentieth Century (Paris: ulation figures provided by Angus Maddison. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951 for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD. .MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 173 Approximate 6 Table at the Per Capita Income Time of Democratization in Some of the Present oecd Countries3 First Democratization Date Level Reversal Present Democracy Level Date 1934 Level 1825 Date 1901 1951 1919 1920 1901 1944 1875 1949 1946 1884 1918 1870 1911 1830 Australia (1901) Austria Belgium Canada (1920) Denmark Finland (1917) France Germany Italy Norway (1905) Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States 1901 1918b 1919b 1920 1901 1919 1875c 1919 1919 1884 1918 1870d 1911e 1830f 3733 1545 2960 3838 2213 1184 1748 1072 1920 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119 none 3733 2535 2960 3838 2213 2636 1748 2567 1708 1228 1919 2226 3016 1119 none none none 1930 none 1933 1922 none none none none none 1974 (?) 1474 1814 "Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. Europe were more to fall in the poorer countries. when the first national uses 1911 to date democracy in the United Kingdom. whichever numbers or For countries that became independent after 1871.35All this is not much to stand on." American Journal of Sociol tion and Breakdown as one of consolidation. See Dahl. suffrage Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale Press. "Democratic Transi cTherborn (fn. but not to the crown or a nonelective (rather than responsibility upper chamber). refers to the period 1875-84 refers to the Vichy regime. University f in the United States ranges widely. 8) dates democracy in Europe. while John D. Stephens. 1991). 1992).

36 Compar ground answering are more "new" countries shows that democracies the and the "old" ing are more to die in brittle in the new countries while dictatorships likely the old ones. coun the effect of levels at which We may be confusing. Hence. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dra matically with level in both groups of countries: indeed. Now sub RACY]=REG(t)=F[a+?LEVEL(t)]. pointed out that the levels of develop atwhich different countries permanendy institutions vary widely. effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of develop is the model we estimated.888. between since the time of entry differ greatly effects of development increases much the two groups of countries. INI+?DDEV(t)].000.000. To had average income of $2." see Rustow. Democracies stable and more brittle in countries either when that were wealthier.000 before the war. however. the level of development again has powerful effects. But that is too many guesses to take seriously.103?than poorer?their were an first observed. Rustow. asTable 7 shows. 37 to level is Pr[R?GIME(t)=DEMOC relates regimes that the function which Suppose where F stands for a normal or logistic distribution. after 1990. A "Transitions Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970). And. Defining LEVEL(O) as INI andLEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0) asDEV(t). independent are as are are as when when stable 1950. this probabil ity is the same once countries reach an income above to increases with of a transition democracy probability after But among the countries that became old countries. tries were first observed and the effect of development they experienced the the new countries were much under scrutiny. The level among the $2. war indicates at the levels at which democracies emerged before and after the rough guess comparing that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower.This ?[LEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0)]}. of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many But the distribution countries enjoyed incomes above $4. dictatorships they they wealthy in new countries with incomes above fifteen dictatorships poor. early democracies. dictatorships But the in 1950 or whenever first observed they became independent.37 The effects of the entry level are about the development are more same for the two groups of countries. and allowing the (cross-sectional) ment yields REG(t)= F[a+?c . by dynamic probit.000. 1. If in addition to the guesses presented the two distribu also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America. The stability of democracy 36 A $2. we can tries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming occurred before the war with the distrib of levels at which democratization compare the distribution inTable 6 we ution in the postwar period truncated at $4. And during period the old ones?which average income was $1.174 We are on firmer WORLD POLITICS the second question. A. Lipset s established democratic was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the (fn. to get REG(t)=F{cc+?LEVEL(0)+ tract and add ?LEVEL(O) within the square brackets.1981) rejoinder to Democracy. we show inTable distinguish to the entry levels and to the with sition regard separately probabilities since then. in Suriname in ment third question has also been posed: when D. tions will be highly similar.613?when they 1988 of the tran 8 the derivatives these effects. in the Seychelles. At most. only one fell during their 185 years until 1990. and only one more. Among at $2. we do not know how long the coun democracies.

1200 (0.0544) 7 42 1211 1169 0.0277 stands for countries 0.0124 (0.0225 3 38 347 1695 0. Derivatives are based on a dynamic Appendix . and by Groups of Countries51 TRD TA PDA TRA TD All New 0.0554 New -0.0578 (0.0058) 0.0054 (0.1183) 0.0464 (0. see aLevel ismeasured for countries that existed in 1950.Table and Predicted Observed Regime Lagged Per Capita Income (level) Low-High PJK TJK TOT PAD 7 by Transition Probabilities.0058) 0.0279) 6 18 1036 606 0.0191 -0. Derivatives 8 Table of Transition with to the Probabilities Regard the and Initial Level Development Accumulated ("Entry") at the Means by Groups of Countries51 Evaluated with Regard to Initial Level Development Derivative Pda Pad of Old -0.0203) 0.0377 15 32 1111 848 0.1480) 0.0340) 11 28 237 1374 Old -2000 New 0.0359 (0.0086 0.0124 0.0297 (0.0123 (0.0058) 0.0156) 2 14 162 1132 Old are used: aThe following abbreviations that either regime dies during PJK is the probability TTR is the number of transitions TOT is the total number PAD is the probability TRD is their number TA is the total number PDA is the probability TRA is their number TD is the total number New Old Numbers stands for countries in parentheses a particular level year of regime years at a particular of transition to democracy of years under authoritarianism of transition to authoritarianism of years under democracy that did not exist in 1950 that existed in 1950 stands for countries are values predicted by the dynamic probit model.0204 (0.0427 (0.0707) 9 14 75 242 Old 2000 New 0.0383 in thousands.0275 18 70 1448 2543 0.0190 stands 2.0112 that did not exist in 1950.0966 New -0.0135 0. 0.0552 Old -0.0676) 1 24 185 563 0. New 0.0058 (0.0058 (0. Old probit model.

Conclusion Whether terministic. project rather than in terms of deterministic conditions. 40 and Philippe C Schmitter.176 more with development WORLD POLITICS in the old than in the new countries. 6) go back just a few decades but the question remains: Huber. appear emphasis approaches on the the issue of democratization irrelevant when political appeared in the struggles for democ The protagonists agenda in the mid-1970s. remained V. not just of conditions. was terms actors in of and couched nell-Schmitter strategies. democracy couched in the language theories perspective. proved to be particularly futile precisely with regard to thoseThirdWorld coun tries towhich itwas supposed to offer hope. Democracy and the Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press. albeit within past. those in Eastern Europe. the probability of transitions democracy tatorships as new countries declines under authoritarian rule.40 38 and Stevens (fn. did in the end fall. corollary s Moore theory. the old an increase of per capita and lowered income of one thousand dollars raised the probability of dictatorship the old countries But at least "modernization" falling by only 1. Most of the new countries. that the fate of their countries would racy could not and did not believe be determined either by current levels of development or by the distant democratization constraints. including long-standing dictatorships. Rueschemeyer. In turn. 1991). develop the promise that development would breed democracy Hence. social transformations. Johns Hopkins University . that. Hence. not earlier or later? conditions would found why 39 Market: Political and Economic Reforms inEastern Europe and Adam Przeworski. poor. of them poor when the great majority just they became independent. Development during the postwar period just did not have much of an impact on the collapse of dictatorships: among countries.90 percent among the new in the right direction in worked where most countries. and those few that did develop remained authoritarian. or perspective were de of the origins of democracy no one does to bring theory anything and the by economic development of the modernization Class actors determines do move at a distance of centuries: in history the agrarian the historical In the modernization it is secreted about. while development decreases slightly the probability of survival of dic to in old countries. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Guillermo O'Donnell Press. in the 1920s cause events in the 1960s.12 percent it by 1. They maintained was an outcome the O'Don of actions. 1986).38 As years this made both deterministic served. but they operate class structure of the seventeenth tries settle on the regimes coun century two or three hundred ob Przeworski39 later.

circuitous 41 Walter one. Huntington Political Science. Labor and Economic Development Galenson. . W." and Jorge I. 3 (Reading." Economic Development Karl de Schweinitzjr. Wiley. I.. 60. de the vision of the relation between Viewed from this perspective. put it. and racy is pursuing by political once it is estab at any level of it can be initiated Only development.. The emergence strongly validate is not a of economic Democ democracy development. Polsby. Greenstein and "Political Development. percentage have GDP devoted to consumption was driven down from 65 percent in 1928 to 52 percent tained in 1937. the resources invest of from the diversion is. 42 Labor Controls and Democracy. generally that like a expansion itwould the of per in receive of consumption a nondemocratic system. vol. 3.000 economy per capita growing an income between that de than in a country with $1. Industrialization.000 clines democ If they succeed in generating development. Mass.. Handbook 1975). eds. N. . while devel in this view dictatorships Since generate development was to to to be a said the best leads way democracy opment democracy. 1959). for instance. lished do economic are constraints a role: the chances for the survival play of democracy is richer. Yet even the cur the country greater when to sur rent wealth ismore of a country is not decisive: democracy likely vive in a income with than less $1. a revolution It is unlikely from above competitive this.44 porarily. that dominated mood and the intellectual and democracy velopment war years appears the cold served to orient U.MODERNIZATION: Our findings THEORIES & FACTS 177 of this latter approach. greater government ment to De Schweinitz argued that if the less devel consumption.43 party system would sus are needed to generate and As Huntington development. and Cultural Change 7 (July 1959). Yet common sense would indicate that in order to to Galenson. .."41 must limit democratic "are to grow economically. Huntington . While Lipset were is the inevitable his contemporaries that dictatorship persuaded a more democratic "the of claimed that Galenson price development. Dictatorships tem at must least be held Nelson "Political down. foreign policy during as exogenous.000 and $2. participation economic in order to promote development. by-product or actors is not established their goals. economically. 23. 43 in F. treated development strangely convoluted. 21). "Introduction" (New York: ed. they oped countries And thiswas also the belief of Hunt participation in political affairs/'42 ington The sonal and Dominguez: interest of the voters a higher to leads parties the give vis-?-vis investment than priority In the Soviet Union. of 44 and Nelson (fn..: Addison-Wesley.S. racies can survive even in the poorest nations. Samuel P. Dominguez.

II error: a regime passes closed the legislature and rewrote the the previous three rules. Whenever as democracies in incum which only those systems them. today or the time when they were overthrown Alternation where a single in office overrides party lost an election?was office having yet yielded subsequently legislature as democratic classified during the entire period." the lesson of our analysis is development. Type favor. (fn. at one time held the party rule. Contestation chance of winning we classify filled that two kinds of offices are filled by elections. being not lost an election. Rule 3. regime at least one of these conditions held. Rule 2. Shaw warned And. With Appendix 1:Classifying Political Regimes45 offices are filled as has two parts: "of of is some is a regime inwhich governmental Democracy a consequence of contested elections. are the We code the regime that pre rules Our timing following. This definition fices" and "contestation. Legislative selection: the legislature is not elected. that which that this flourish tells us that the world it is the best countries. dictatorships. bent parties that has some there exists an opposition as a consequence in of elections. see Alvarez et al. power on December 45 For a full explanation and historical details. came even to at if it vailed the end of the year. democracy strengthen even that "common if G. B. 10). torship if Rule 1. this rule applies if (1) there were tenure in office no parties. democracy time in poor guide. whether directly or in and the seats in the effective legisla as a consequence as democratic a regime doubt. Party: there is no more than one party.178 strengthen WORLD POLITICS support sense is can we should not democracy. Specifically. Executive selection: the chief executive is not elected. What the chief directly: tive body. did lose actually a was classified as a if none of the democracy regime Operationally. the incumbents held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two terms or without they have and until elected. as a dicta was classified a four rules listed below applied. Jamaica? of the seats in the 100 percent . only or of a nonparty one-party current rule. Thus." are all offices governmental to is essential considering executive occurs when office office In no regime elections. ended up or (2) there was in the establishment one or (3) the party. 31. or (4) the incumbents unconstitutionally rules Rule in their 4. Hence. is flat.

that a country. "Liberal Democracy: Measures.. Michael "Measuring Polyarchy." Validity and Method American Journal of Political Science 37 (November 1993). Bollen. are to the classification of regimes. andWill H. We believe regimes the situation about not be considered de others. however. See Factors in Cross-National Kenneth A. alternative Nonetheless. 47 and Wolfgang H. are more some than democratic that while scale.2 percent of our classification.2 per cent of our there is no reason to think that our results regimes." Studies in Comparative Interna . that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. sures of dimensions similar results. The generate highly democracy or to what extent a is demo used to assess whether regime particular no measure seem to make the is cratic little difference. and State Power The Growth of Democracy. International Development 48 American Sociologi of Development. Note.5 percent. In the few cases where ernment. 572-87. unless offices are contested. 1990.MODERNIZATION: as. regimes began and ended within our is and the alternatives The main difference between approach rather than a polychotomous that we use a dichotomous classification. Moore. "Introduction. from a practical point of view. Bollen. Transitions arrived in Nigeria dictatorship a are etat. and the two scales jointly predict 94. regime lasted sixmonths (for example... and exogenous endogenous has an authoritarian i= 1. idiosyncratic particular Appendix Some algebra may tween 2: Dynamics of Regimes in the distinction be is entailed help elucidate what mechanisms. State: "The Transformation of theWestern since 1800.. Autocracy. Alex Inkeless. 85 percent." and the Timing Kenneth A. to democ Transitions coup d signaled by are of the time elected of dated the the gov racy inauguration newly by a democratic not of the election.. the Gurr49 scales of Au scale predicts tocracy and Democracy for 1950-86 jointly predict 91 percent.. covering the period from 1972 to his scale of civil liber 93. 49 Ted Robert Gurr. Reinicke. be pA(it).. tional Development 25 (Spring 50 Gastil (fn.N. they should mea mocratic. The Gastil50 scale of political liberties. 1990). 51-72. for example." Studies in Comparative International Development 3-6.. predicts ties predicts 91.46 Our exception: Coppedge-Reinicke47 the Bollen48 1965 scale for 1978 predicts 92 percent of our regimes." 46 25 (Spring 1990). Hence.T. theDominican Republic in 1963) or where mation several times (Bolivia in 1979)." Studies in Comparative Coppedge 25 (Spring 1990). Keith Jaggers. authoritarianism THEORIES & FACTS 179 to in 1983. Let the probability a t= the subscript 1. where regime during particular year. "Political Democracy cal Review 44 (August 1979). the infor changed that the same year is lost. that it has a demo and the probability A stands for "authoritarian. 4).

probabilities/' over time and the same for all countries. to increase whatever over time to these are likely to be probabilities that regimes die during any particular year fact they are low?this convergence of one type of regime will the proportion the other to decline. that is. and the proportion came democracies. If pDA(it) 180 the evolution of regimes by pD(t+D pA(t+D The proportion therefore on the Pdd Pda Pad Paa Po(t) PaW that are democracies next year depends from the cur of regimes proportion rent year. that died. be of dictatorships pDD.D. that these "transition being p.k. Similarly. then. if Pad + pDA < 1. j A. And equilibrium will be monotonie. Given the transition rates. Let ship dies from one year to another be pAD(it).51 As continue that is. the long-run on not on the relative rates at which their initial distrib they die. so that the probability that it survives is p^iit) = 1 pAD(it). constant then we can describe WORLD POLITICS cratic regime be pD(it) = 1 the probability that a dictator pA(it). dictatorships. there exists a distribution disturbances. the proportions of regimes will oscillate .= are k = A. otherwise. of regimes that. only 51 is monotonie Convergence around the equilibrium. and of of regimes depends distribution time passes. if reached. will remain stable in the absence of exogenous of democracies that survived These equilibrium probabilities are = Pd Pad + Pda Pad and Pda Pa Pda Moreover. since the values.D. same holds for The pAD. let the probability that = 1a democracy dies be we assume for the time pDD(it). tions will low?in + Pad the tend initial distribution their propor of regimes.

00. dictator Every a it sur is established. while democracies die at the same rate at either level. The transition probabilities are thus ~ Level = Low Pdd Pda Pad Paa the long-run Level =High LOO Pdd 0. they are certain to die. At the low level. immediately pDA run a time the long all countries will be democracies. continually in time. and. democracy on rate at vives forever. Now consider two pos and high (H). both regimes have some probability of ismore than zero simple. the of democracies but accumulation die. pD*(L) pD*(H). The of the which this process depends speed is inexorable. to return to the probabilities To keep matters dying that are not constant at stake. sibilities. once it is established.00 Pda proportion of democracies at the low level will and while = + at the high ievel itwill be pD*(H) 1/(1 Pm/?Pad'PdaX < pDA). Thus. are two levels: low (L) suppose that there only issue and less than one. ship dies. then was lower in the long run there will than this proportion be more will democracies 181 than dictatorships in the world and if at the beginning the proportion of democracies crease over pD*. once One is that while p^L) dictatorships pass the threshold = that defines the high level.00 Paa . endogenous? of the explanation. < 1. developed p^L) = = never die once in turn democratic while they regimes pAD. pAD(H) are established so that in affluent countries. die. now that while die at some constant annual dictatorships Suppose = 0.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS ution. so that p^H) 1. are then probabilities Level = Low Level =High Pdd Pda Pad Paa LOO Pad 0. dictatorships Now. You see never so democracies that that in rate. If Pad > pDA. that these transition imagine but depend on the level of development. modernization?version at But suppose alternatively that authoritarian exactly the regimes die same rate whether or so in poor countries that ones. the proportion of democracies will be be pD*(L) higher = are more at the because democracies high level of development as a result of to emerge is the This likely development. transition The pDA=0.

Hence. R = P(t) R.) = where R for democracy stands for regimes.. of both sides yields P(R=D p(R=0) where k=0.l. a first-order data Our Markov processes. the level of development relation and the incidence aggregate are even to emerge at democracies of democracies though equally likely even if under that authoritarianism does not is.p. 1985).k 1.rl)] = Now = Pda? + [PAA^-PDA^?-rD of the exogenous variables. to decide which mechanism we the relation between generates to need determine how the respective with the level of development. ments p k(t). regime between Thus. Assume that let X be the vector = pDA(t) F(XA ?).A the and is matrix of transition with ele P(t) dictatorship. a democratic and democracy. at the high level all countries will we will observe an in the long run. Such processes by: the previous = P(t)Rt. = ?.Rt_2. any level.l.. .. the Hence Paa Pad Pda Pdd p(R. R=D and R=A for D.182 and we have already know WORLD that while POLITICS the long-run proportion of democra cies at the low levelwin be pD*(L) < 1. j=0. sum of columns = + p(R=l Rtl) p^top?R^-l) p^WR^O) | = = + PAAttpdVrD PDA(t)[l-p(R.rD p(Rt-rO) of the transition matrix. obey myia. Hence. Taking expectations + u. development transition change probabilities we mate the impact of level on transition probabilities. Amemyia. This country will become probability then the exogenous version. 11.52 on the present regime depends regimes during only are defined but not beyond. 52 Takeshi chap. Advanced Econometrics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. probabilities.1. the year.1. To esti on Ame rely that is. E(R=l|R. = PAA(t) F[XJcc+?)]. development a increase the that is democratic.

k(t) is the probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in state k at time regime Hence. t.^ FQit_? + + {FtX^a+j^-FQi^pCR^l) = + FQ^aMR^l) ?Q?tJ one can calculate all we need pDA and pAA. Given that whenever a transition during occurred this year.R. on to do is probit xt.) is the CDF of normal distribution. and thus pDD = 1 pDA and pAD = 1 -p^.1=l) = = FCX. Note that p. This is the model we used to generate results inTables 2 and 8.MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS 183 where F(. The derivatives used inTable 8 are = dPpA = ?)? and dpAD -f [XJa + ?)](a+?). lag the X Then p(R=l |RJ = pDA(t) + [pAA(t)-pDA(t)]p(Rt. we code the as the one we that became s. fQC^ dX dX . from which Hence. to estimate a and /?.with R(0) as observed.. installed the probabil ity of transition between (t-1) and t depends on the conditions at (t-1).?).

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