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Case # 1 BROTHERHOOD LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT V. HON.

ZAMORA (1991) Facts: Petitioners-members of Brotherhood Labor Unit Movement of the Philippines (BLUM), worked as cargadores or pahinante since 1961 at the SMC Plant. Sometime in January 1969, the petitioner workers numbering 140 organized themselves and engaged in union activities. Believing that they are entitled to overtime and holiday pay, the petitioners aired their gripes and grievances but it was not heeded by the respondents. One of the union member was dismissed from work. Hence, the petitioners filed a complaint of unfair labor practice against respondent SMC on the ground of illegal dismissal. On the other hand, SMC argued that the complainant are not or have never been their employees but they are the employees of the Guaranteed Labor Contractor, an independent labor contracting firm Labor Arbiter Nestor Lim rendered a decision in favor of the complainants which was affirmed by the NLRC On appeal, the Secretary set aside the NLRC ruling stressing the absence of an employer-employee relationship Issue: Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent San Miguel Corporation Held: YES. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It is the called "control test" that is the most important element In the CAB, petitioners worked continuously and exclusively for an average of 7 years for the company. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked, there is justification to conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary or desirable in the usual business of trade of the respondent. Hence, petitioners are considered regular employees. Even assuming that there is a contract of employment executed between SMC and the said labor contractor, the court ruled that Guaranteed and Reliable Labor contractors have neither substantial capital nor investment to qualify as an independent contractor under the law. The premises, tools and equipments used by the petitioners in their jobs are all supplied by the respondent SMC. It is only the manpower or labor force which the alleged contractors supply, suggesting the existence of a "labor only" contracting scheme prohibited by law It is important to emphasize that that in a truly independent contractor-contractee relationship, the fees are paid directly to the manpower agency in lump sum without indicating or implying that the basis of such lump sum is the salary per worker multiplied by the number of workers assigned to the company. In the CAB, the alleged independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the salaries the workers were entitled to, arrived at by adding the salaries of each worker which depend on the volume of work they had accomplished individually. Therefore, there is no independent contractor-contractee relationship. WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED.

Case # 2 SAN MIGUEL CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION V. BERSAMIRA Facts: Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The employees of these contractors sought to be regular employees of San Miguel saying that Lipercon and DRite are labor-only contractors. San Miguel sought injunction from the RTC to prevent the actions of the employees of the said employees of the contractors. Saying that RTC has jurisdiction because there is no employer-employee relationship between the employees of Lipercon and DRite. Issue: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction because the present controversy is not a labor dispute due to the fact that there is no employer-employee relationship? Held: RTC has no jurisdiction. The present controversy is a labor dispute. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite and, in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-visSanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "labor-only" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the employer to hire strangers outside the working unit;-those are issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor laws, and SanMig's cause/s of action in the Court below are inextricably linked with those issues.

Case # 3 HAWAIIAN-PHILIPPINE COMPANY V. GULMATICO Facts: Respondent-Union, the National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades, filed an action against petitioner Hawaiian Phil Co. for claims under RA 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952). Respondent Union alleged that they have never availed of the benefits due them under the law. Under the said act: the proceeds of any increase in participation granted to planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the following proportions. 60% of the increase participation for the laborers and 40% for the planters. Petitioner argued that respondent Labor Arbiter Gulmatico has no jurisdiction over the case considering their case does not fall under those enumerated in Article 217 of the Labor Code which provides the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Further, petitioner contends that it has no ER-EE relationship with the respondent sugar workers and that respondent union has no cause of action because it is the planters-employers who is liable to pay the workers share under LOI No. 854. Issue1: Whether public respondent Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner Held: NO. While jurisdiction over controversies involving agricultural workers has been transferred from the Court of Agrarian Relations to the Labor Arbiters under the Labor Code, said transferred jurisdiction is however, not without limitations. The controversy must fall under one of the cases enumerated under the Labor Code which arise out of or are in connection with an ER-EE relationship In the CAB, there is no ER-EE relationship between petitioner company and respondent union. Hence, respondent Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case against petitioner. Issue2: Whether respondent union has a cause of action Held: NO.To have a cause of action, the claimant must show that he has a legal right and the respondent a correlative duty in respect thereof, which the latter violated by some wrongful act or omission. In the instant case, it would show that the payment of the workers share is liability of the plantersemployers, and not of the petitioner milling company. It is disputed that petitioner milling company has already distributed to its planters their respective shares. Hence, it has fulfilled its part and has nothing more to do with the subsequent contribution by the planters of the workers share. WHEREFORE, PETITION IS GRANTED. Case # 4 NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES V. LAZARO Facts: The Commercial Bank and Trust Company entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Commercial Bank and Trust Company Union, representing the file and rank of the bank with a membership of over 1,000 employees In 1980, the union, together with the National Union of Bank EEs submitted to bank management proposals for the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement. The following day, however, the

bank suspended negotiations with the union. The bank entered into a merger with BPI which assumed all assets and liabilities. The Union went to the CFI Manila, presided over by respondent Judge Lazaro, and filed a complaint for specific performance, damages, and preliminary injunction against private respondents. Private Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint partook of unfair labor practice dispute and jurisdiction over which is vested in the labor arbiter. Issue: Whether courts may take cognizance of claims for damages arising from labor controversy Held: NO. The SC sustained the dismissal of the case and held that the act complained of involves collecting bargaining which is categorized to be an unfair labor practice. Under the Labor Code, all cases involving unfair labor practices shall be under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. As correctly held by the respondent court, an unfair labor practice controversy is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not necessarily by the nature of action. In the CAB, PD No. 442, as amended by Batas Blg. 70, has vested jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters, a jurisdiction the courts may not assume. WHEREFORE, PETITION DENIED

G.R. No. L-68544 October 27, 1986 LORENZO C. DY, ZOSIMO DY, SR., WILLIAM IBERO, RICARDO GARCIA AND RURAL BANK OF AYUNGON, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER ALBERTO L. DALMACION, AND CARLITO H. VAILOCES, respondents. NARVASA, J.: FACTS: Carlito H. Vailoces, was the manager of the Rural Bank of Ayungon (Negros Oriental), a banking institution duly organized under Philippine laws. He was also a director and stockholder of the bank. A special stockholders' meeting was called for the purpose of electing the members of the bank's Board of Directors. Petitioners Dy, Ibero and Garcia were elected president, vice-president and corporate secretary, respectively. Vailoces was not re-elected as bank manager, Because of this development, the Board relieved him as bank manager. Vailoces filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages. In their answer, Lorenzo Dy, et al. denied the charge of illegal dismissal. They pointed out that Vailoces' position was an elective one, and he was not re-elected as bank manager because of the Board's loss of confidence in him brought about by his absenteeism and negligence in the performance of his duties; and that the Board's action was taken to protect the interest of the bank and was "designed as an internal control measure to secure the check and balance of authority within the organization." Executive Labor Arbiter: Found that Vailoces was Illegally dismissed.

The NLRC: bypassed the issues raised and simply dismissed the appeal for having been filed late. ISSUE: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: No. The matter is an intracorporate controversy of the class described in Section 5, par. (c), of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, namely: (c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations. explicitly declared to be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and recommends that the questioned resolution of the NLRC as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter be set aside as null and void. There is no dispute that the position from which private respondent Vailoces claims to have been illegally dismissed is an elective corporate office. He himself acquired that position through election by the bank's Board of Directors at the organizational meeting of November 17, 1979. 10 He lost that position because the Board that was elected in the special stockholders' meeting of June 4, 1983 did not re-elect him. And when Vailoces, in his position paper submitted to the Labor Arbiter, impugned said stockholders' meeting as illegally convoked and the Board of Directors thereby elected as illegally constituted, 11 he made it clear that at the heart of the matter was the validity of the directors' meeting of June 4, 1983 which, by not re-electing him to the position of manager, in effect caused termination of his services. G.R. No. 118088. November 23, 1995.] MAINLAND CONSTRUCTION, CO., INC. vs. MILA C. MOVILLA Facts: Ernesto Movilla was originally hired as a Certified Public Accountant by Mainland Construction Co. and was later promoted to the position of Administrative Officer. During an organizational meeting, the board of Directors elected him as Administrative Manager. Meanwhile, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted a routine inspection on petitioner corporation and found that it committed irregularities in the conduct of its busines. Thus, it ordered the said corporation to pay its 13 employees, which included Movilla, their salaries, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay differentials, unpaid wages and 13th month pay. All the employees listed in the DOLE's order were paid by petitioner corporation, except Ernesto Movilla. This prompted him to file case against the corporation and/or Lucita, Robert, and Ellen, all surnamed Carabuena, for unpaid wages, separation pay and attorney's fees, with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Arbitration, Branch XI, Davao City. The corporation contends that since Ernesto Movilla was a corporate officer, the controversy as to his compensation is within the jurisdiction of the SEC as mandated by P.D. 902-A and not with the NLRC. The Labor Arbite dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by this decision, Movilla, who was substituted by his heirs, appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC ruled that the issue in the case was one which involved a labor dispute between an employee and petitioner corporation and, thus, the NLRC had jurisdiction to resolve the case. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the controversy. Held: Yes. In the case at bench, the claim for unpaid wages and separation pay filed by the complainant against petitioner corporation involves a labor dispute. It does not involve an intra-corporate matter, even when it is between a stockholder and a corporation. It relates to an employer-employee relationship which is distinct from the corporate relationship of one with the other. Moreover, there was no showing of any

change in the duties being performed by complainant as an Administrative Officer and as an Administrative Manager after his election by the Board of Directors. What comes to the fore is whether there was a change in the nature of his functions and not merely the nomenclature or title given to his job. [G.R. No. 141093. February 20, 2001] PRUDENTIAL BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. CLARITA T. REYES, respondent. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Facts: Clarita Tan Reyes filed against Prudential Bank and Trust Company (the Bank) before the labor arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary damages, gratuity, fringe benefits and attorneys fees Prior to her dismissal, private respondent Reyes held the position of Assistant Vice President in the foreign department of the Bank, tasked with the duties, among others, to collect checks drawn against overseas banks payable in foreign currency and to ensure the collection of foreign bills or checks purchased, including the signing of transmittal letters covering the same. The auditors of the Bank discovered that two checks, No. 011728-7232-146, in the amount of US$109,650.00, and No. 011730-7232-146, in the amount of US$115,000.00, received by the Bank on April 6, 1989, drawn by the Sanford Trading against Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Jurong Branch, Singapore, in favor of Filipinas Tyrom, were not sent out for collection to Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation on the alleged order of the complainant until the said checks became stale. The Bank created a committee to investigate the findings of the auditors involving the two checks which were not collected and became stale. After a review of the Committees findings, the Board of Directors of the Bank resolved not to re-elect complainant any longer to the position of assistant president pursuant to the Banks By-laws. On July 19, 1991, complainant was informed of her termination of employment from the Bank by Senior Vice President Benedicto L. Santos. Judgment was rendered by Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan finding the dismissal of complainant to be without factual and legal basis and ordering the respondent bank to pay her back wages for three (3) years in the amount of P540,000.00 (P15,000.00 x 36 mos.). In lieu of reinstatement, the respondent is also ordered to pay complainant separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, in the amount of P420,000.00 (P15,000 x 28 mos.). In addition, the respondent should also pay complainant profit sharing and unpaid fringe benefits. Attorneys fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total award should likewise be paid by respondent. Issues:1) whether the NLRC has jurisdiction over the complaint for illegal dismissal; (2) whether complainant Reyes was illegally dismissed; and (3) whether the amount of back wages awarded was proper. Held: 1) Petitioner Bank can no longer raise the issue of jurisdiction under the principle of estoppel. The Bank participated in the proceedings from start to finish. It filed its position paper with the Labor Arbiter. When the decision of the Labor Arbiter was adverse to it, the Bank appealed to the NLRC. When the NLRC decided in its favor, the bank said nothing about jurisdiction. Even before the Court of Appeals, it never questioned the proceedings on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It was only when the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. The Bank actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this

rule presupposes that laches or estoppel has not supervened. In this regard, Baaga vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,[11] is most enlightening. The Court therein stated: This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Here, the principle of estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings. 2) Upon this point, the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of confidence and that it is sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, is not absolute. The right of an employer to dismiss employees on the ground that it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for an employees dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employees separation from work (Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183). After painstakingly examining the testimonies of Ms. Joven and respondents other witnesses this Office finds the evidence still wanting in proof of complainants guilt. There are other factors that constrain this Office to doubt even more the legality of complainants dismissal based on the first ground stated in the letter of dismissal. The non-release of the dollar checks was reported to top management sometime on 15 November 1989 when complainant, accompanied by Supervisor Dante Castor and Analiza Castillo, reported the matter to Vice President Santos. And yet, it was only on 08 March 1991, after a lapse of sixteen (16) months from the time the non-release of the checks was reported to the Vice President, that complainant was issued a memorandum directing her to submit an explanation. And it took the bank another four (4) months before it dismissed complainant. The delayed action taken by respondent against complainant lends credence to the assertion of the latter that her dismissal was a mere retaliation to the criminal complaints she filed against the banks top officials. 3) Jurisprudence is clear on the amount of backwages recoverable in cases of illegal dismissal. Employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21, 1989 are entitled to backwages up to three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally dismissed after are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.[20] Considering that private respondent was terminated on July 19, 1991, she is entitled to full backwages from the time her actual compensation was withheld from her (which, as a rule, is from the time of her illegal dismissal) up to the finality of this judgment (instead of reinstatement) considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals on account of the strained relations brought about by the litigation in this case. Since reinstatement is no longer viable, she is also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.[21] Lastly, since private respondent was compelled to file an action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter, she is likewise entitled to attorneys fees [22] at the rate above-mentioned. There is no room to argue, as the Bank does here, that its liability should be mitigated on account of its good faith and that private respondent is not entirely blameless. There is no showing that private respondent is partly at fault or that the Bank acted in good faith in terminating an employee of twenty-eight years. In any event, Article 279 of Republic Act No. 6715 [23] clearly and plainly provides for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees. 8. Pepsi Cola vs Martinez G.R. No. L-58877 March 15, 1982

PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, COSME DE ABOITIZ, and ALBERTO M. DACUYCUY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his official capacity, and ABRAHAM TUMALA, JR.,respondents. ESCOLIN, J.: FACTS Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]? Tumala was a salesman of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co in Davao City from 1977 up to August 21, 1980; that in the annual "Sumakwel" contest conducted by the company in 1979, Tumala was declared winner of the "Lapu-Lapu Award" for his performance as top salesman of the year, an award which entitled him to a prize of a house and lot; and that petitioners, despite demands, have unjustly refused to deliver said prize. Under the second cause of action, it was alleged that on August 21, 1980, petitioners, "in a manner oppressive to labor" and "without prior clearance from the Ministry of Labor", "arbitrarily and ilegally" terminated his employment. He prayed that petitioners be ordered, jointly and severally, to deliver his prize of house and lot or its cash equivalent, and to pay his back salaries and separation benefits, plus moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. He did not ask for reinstatement. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. Petitioners further alleged that Tumala was not entitled to the "Sumakwel" prize for having misled the company into declaring him top salesman for 1979 through various deceitful and fraudulent manipulations and machinations in the performance of his duties as salesman and depot in-charge of the bottling company in Davao City, which manipulations consisted of "unremitted cash collections, fictitious collections of trade accounts, fictitious loaned empties, fictitious product deals, uncollected loaned empties, advance sales confirmed as fictitious, and route shortages which resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bottling company in the amount of P381,851.76." The alleged commission of these fraudulent acts was also advanced by petitioners to justify Tumala's dismissal. ISSUE Whether or not Labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case HELD We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In Presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: xxx 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other

benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; xxx 5. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code. xxx Under paragraphs 3 and 5 of the above Presidential Decree, the case is exclusively cognizable by the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission. It is to be noted that P.D. 1691 is an exact reproduction of Article 217 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442), which took effect on May 1, 1974. Article 217 of the Labor Code words amended by P.D. 1367, which was promulgated on May 1, 1978, the full text of which is quoted as follows: SECTION 1. Paragraph [a] of Art, 217 of the Labor Code as amended is hereby further amended to read as follows: [a] The Labor Arbiters shall have exclusive jurisdiction hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1] Unfair labor practice cases; 2] Unresolved issues in collective bargaining, including those which involve wages, hours of work, and other terms conditions of employment; and 3] All other cases arising from employer-employee relations duly indorsed by the Regional Directors in accordance with the provisions of this Code. Provided, that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. It will be noted that paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 217 were deleted from the text of the above decree and a new provision incorporated therein, to wit: "Provided that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages." This amendatory act thus divested the Labor Arbiters of their competence to pass upon claims for damages by employees against their employers. However, on May 1, 1980, Article 217, as amended by P.D. 1367, was amended anew by P.D. 1691. This last decree, which is a verbatim reproduction of the original test of Article 217 of the Labor Code, restored to the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC exclusive jurisdiction over claims, money or otherwise, arising from employer-employee relations, except those expressly excluded therefrom. The claim for said prize unquestionably arose from an employer-employee relation and, therefore, falls within the coverage of par. 5 of P.D. 1691. Indeed, Tumala would not have qualified for the content, much less won the prize, if he was not an employee of the company at the time of the holding of the contest. Besides, the cause advanced by petitioners to justify their refusal to deliver the prizethe alleged

fraudulent manipulations committed by Tumala in connection with his duties as salesman of the company involves an inquiry into his actuations as an employee. Besides, to hold that Tumala's claim for the prize should be passed upon by the regular court of justice, independently and separately from his claim for back salaries, retirement benefits and damages, would be to sanction split jurisdiction and multiplicity of suits which are prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, and respondent judge is hereby directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 13494, without prejudice to the right of respondent Tumala to refile the same with the Labor Arbiter. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80774 May 31, 1988 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO VEGA, respondents. FELICIANO, J.: Facts: In line with an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner San Miguel Corporation, private respondent Rustico Vega submitted on 23 September 1980 an innovation proposal. Mr. Vega's proposal was entitled "Modified Grande Pasteurization Process," and was supposed to eliminate certain alleged defects in the quality and taste of the product "San Miguel Beer Grande:" Mr. Vega at that time had been in the employ of petitioner Corporation for thirteen (1 3) years and was then holding the position of mechanic. Petitioner Corporation, however, did not find the aforequoted proposal acceptable and consequently refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a cash award. A Complaint was filed against petitioner Corporation with Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII (Cebu City), claimed entitlement to a cash prize of P60,000.00 (the maximum award per proposal offered under the Innovation Program) and attorney's fees. Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction, Mr. Vega having improperly bypassed the grievance machinery procedure prescribed under a then existing collective bargaining agreement between management and employees, and available administrative remedies provided under the rules of the Innovation Program. Labor Arbiter, noting that the money claim of complainant Vega in this case is "not a necessary incident of his employment" and that said claim is not among those mentioned in Article 217 of the Labor Code, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: WON Labor Arbiter and the Commission have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. HELD: No. Where the claim to the principal relief sought 9 is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed

to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. The Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner Corporation to its employees to submit innovation proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to employees who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions, in the judgment of the Corporation's officials, satisfied the standards and requirements of the Innovation Program 10 and which, therefore, could be translated into some substantial benefit to the Corporation. Such undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual (facio ut des) 11 obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts. G.R. No. 157010. June 21, 2005.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. FLORENCE O. CABANSAG Facts: Florence Cabansag was temporarily appointed as Branch Credit Officer in the Singapore Branch of the Philippine National Bank. Prior to the said appointment, she filed an application with the Ministry of Manpower of the Government of Singapore for the issuance of an Employment Pass and the same was approved for a period of 2 years. She was likewise issued by the POEA an Overseas Emploment Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker for Singapore. Barely 3 months in office, she was asked to resign from her job because General Manager Ruben Tobias needed a Chinesespeaking Credit Officer. Due to her insistent refusal to submit her letter of resignation, Tobias terminated her employemnt with the Bank. Cabansag returned to the Philippines and filed a complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City. Petitioner contends that Cabansag was "locally hired"; and totally "governed by and subject to the laws, common practices and customs" of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Both the labor arbiter and the NLRC ruled in Cabansag's favor. When the case was elevated to the CA, it held that even though respondent secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry of Employment, she did not thereby waive Philippine labor laws, or the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over her Complaint for illegal dismissal. In so doing, neither did she submit herself solely to the Ministry of Manpower of Singapore's jurisdiction over disputes arising from her employment. Hence, this present petition. Issue: 1. Whether or not the arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has jurisdiction over the instant controversy; 2. Whether or not the arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Region is the most convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the instant controversy.

Held:

1. Yes. Based on Article 217 of the Labor Code and Section 10 of RA 8042, labor arbiters clearly have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas Filipino workers. Prior to employing respondent, petitioner had to obtain an employment pass for her from the Singapore Ministry of Manpower. Securing the pass was a regulatory requirement pursuant to the immigration regulations of that country. That permit, however, does not automatically mean that the non-citizen is thereby bound by local laws only, as averred by petitioner. It does not at all imply a waiver of one's national laws on labor. Absent any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such permit simply means that its holder has a legal status as a worker in the issuing country. 2. Yes. Undeniably, respondent was employed by petitioner in its branch office in Singapore. Admittedly, she is a Filipino and not a legal resident of that state. She thus falls within the category of "migrant worker" or "overseas Filipino worker." As such, it is her option to choose the venue of her Complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The law gives her two choices: (1) at the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) where she resides or (2) at the RAB where the principal office of her employer is situated. Since her dismissal by petitioner, respondent has returned to the Philippines specifically to her residence at Filinvest II, Quezon City. Thus, in filing her Complaint before the RAB office in Quezon City, she has made a valid choice of proper venue.

G.R. No. 91980 June 27, 1991 ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), HON. CARMEN TALUSAN and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents. NARVASA, J.:p FACTS: The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as " Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, "working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages. But the Union claims that "demand was ignored:
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The . . . COMPANY ignored said demand by offering a measly across-the-board wage increase of P7.00 per day, per employee, as against the proposal of the UNION of P25.00 per day, per employee. Later, the UNION reduced its proposal to P15.00 per day, per employee by way of amicable settlement. When the . . . COMPANY rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION the members thereof, on their own accord, refused to render overtime services, most especially at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting October 16, 1989.

The Union's position (set out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers' refuse "to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16, 1989" as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees. This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. Thereafter, on October 18, 1989, SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards. Then on December 8, 1989, on the claim that its action in the Arbitration Branch had as yet "yielded no relief," SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members thereof, this time directly with the National labor Relations Commission, "to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order. It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. It is, SMC argues, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Union. The argument is correct and will be sustained. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike/slowdown committed by the Union is illegal. HELD: Yes. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute, In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor. It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or abitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment 12 pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. 13 Section 16, Chapter I of these

implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, " Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter's demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, 14 also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue "involving or relating to wages, hours of work, conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations." The partial strike or concerted refusal by the Union members to follow the five-year-old work schedule which they had therefore been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing correction of "wage distortions," was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on this account, illegal. 12. PAL vs NLRC G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents. MARTINEZ, J.: Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint for illegal dismissal tiled before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions? Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction 2enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal. In granting the writ, the NLRC considered the following facts, to wit: . . . that almost two (2) years ago, i.e. on April 15, 1993, the petitioners were instructed to attend an investigation by respondent's "Security and Fraud Prevention Sub-Department" regarding an April 3, 1993 incident in Hongkong at which Joseph Abaca, respondent's Avionics Mechanic in Hongkong "was intercepted by the Hongkong Airport Police at Gate 05 . . . the ramp area of the Kai Tak International Airport while . . . about to exit said gate carrying a . . . bag said to contain some 2.5 million pesos in Philippine Currencies. That at the Police Station Mr. Abaca claimed that he just found said plastic bag at the Skybed Section of the arrival flight PR300/03 April 93," where petitioners served as flight stewards of said flight PR300; . .

petitioners were administratively charged, "a hearing" on which "did not push through" until almost two (2) years after, i.e, "on January 20, 1995 . . . where a confrontation between Mr. Abaca and petitioners herein was compulsorily arranged by the respondent's disciplinary board" at which hearing, Abaca was made to identify petitioners as co-conspirators; that despite the fact that the procedure of identification adopted by respondent's Disciplinary Board was anomalous "as there was no one else in the line-up that with the hearing reset to January 25, 1995, "Mr. Joseph Abaca finally gave exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any participation or from being the owners of the currencies, and at which hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca volunteered the information that the real owner of said money was one who frequented his headquarters in Hongkong to which information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael Khan," just as petitioners "thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received any summons/notices on the intended "additional hearings" mandated by the Disciplinary Board," they were surprised to receive "on February 23, 1995. . . a Memorandum dated February 22, 1995" terminating their services for alleged violation of respondent's Code of Discipline "effective immediately"; that sometime . . . first week of March, 1995, petitioner Pineda received another Memorandum from respondent Mr. Juan Paraiso, advising him of his termination effective February 3, 1995, likewise for violation of respondent's Code of Discipline; . . . ISSUE Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes. HELD Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party ; . . ." (Emphasis Ours) Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows: Sec. 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute . A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission , which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.

xxxxxxxxx The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case, but excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. 7 (Emphasis Ours) From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing. maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." 8 The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute." 9 A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue." 10 Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for; reinstatement of private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees. As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural. The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take cognizance of, hear and decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portions of which reads: (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private respondents' petition

for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes." 12 Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, 18 or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. 19 In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no "irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction sought for. Finally, an injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. 20 It has been the policy of the State to encourage the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. 21 Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated April 3, 1995 and May 31, 1995, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), in NLRC NCR IC No. 00056395, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.