P. 1
76697314-Zepke-Art-as-Abstract-Machine-Ontology-and-Aesthetics-in-Deleuze-and-Guattari.pdf

76697314-Zepke-Art-as-Abstract-Machine-Ontology-and-Aesthetics-in-Deleuze-and-Guattari.pdf

|Views: 64|Likes:
Published by smgorodi
Ontology-and-Aesthetics-in-Deleuze-and-Guattari.pdf
Ontology-and-Aesthetics-in-Deleuze-and-Guattari.pdf

More info:

Published by: smgorodi on Jul 01, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

10/30/2013

pdf

text

original

STuDIEs IN PHIIosoPHY
RoniRi BERNAscoNi,

ART AS ABsTRAcT MAcHINE
ONroLoGY AND AEsTHETIcs IN DELEuzE AND Gu vrTARI 1

(;‘eneral Editor
A‘ iii«wu Bis Obseri‘ation Selecnon Iffects Nick Bostrom 1 11V Bi 5V II Sti SPE 0(1 HR Gooo Platonic and Iythagorean T/emes in Kant (ritique o/the Power ofJudgment Mihaeia C. innoc K s\ i 5 CR11 i( \L Pl II i.( )S( )i‘Il 5 Reflcetioni mi Lit/ie,nztica/ I‘raeti>e Lisa Siiabcl
M\i 1 lt 5151 INS IN

1111 R1 1 1V‘>S,(

01 P1l1\0 lEN0I0(,Y 10 01

Pl III 0s0I‘l 0 Scan 1). Kcllv
1 Nt

1

\NN( 5(1

‘i

MINo

B1 1 \R 1 FN 1)111 0 IONIS\I \NI)

(oIu>i SI( IN DI N( 1
Mattlicw t\ h> Cratb

hit (IN>

Risk, AslitRa
l)anici lJlsL>crg

0

soo I)i

isIo

Ii ti-

E\l‘i .SN 51 I0\I 1 1)11 (NO (>1

Silt NI II IN Rcsi 1551

I)orit A. (;iilsoii Nt \\ 11101 >111 Krista 1 awior
s .-\!501 1

ott> lt

Ritt

RLN 1 ISt ()i‘ 5(115 \N D V1( )D•\i l0(1

1 )ag[i nn Follesdal
F\IMSNI[-i 1 IVIN 55 Ithi>>, justwe, >md die Human heyond Being Elisabeth 1 ouise I hornas

Fsssss 0N S\‘vI\11 Jenann isniael 1)ts \Rl Es‘ Mil Roger 1-lorka

1115

\pi 15511 51

Rt

\SON ING

Ess WS

0N liNEalS 1 lt

(2oN

1 iN

1 11V CoNs iiit nox 0V CoNsclot A Study in Analytic Phenomenoiogy Wblfgang 1 luemer

Stephen Zepke

SN1 55

51 \Si 1511Y \NI) II 5 PIIIiO5OI‘I kM SIN III> \\(i

Steven Cross
Ns\IFS \Ni)

1)ot RJ (5 01 liii Bon‘> (oiporeality in the Philosophy ofTW Adorno Lisa Yun 1 cc AR1 55 Aust tosci Ms II INI ()ntology and-1e,t/‘etic in Deleuze anti
Guattari

Not Rachei Barnev

tot IN

Pl

5105 (tt\I\IiS

Rt

51 II \Ni) i\II‘i NE

R StIll II‘> IN

1K \NI

‘s

P1411050155 1)1-

N 511

RE

Stephen Zcpke

L)an ici Wart cii FRl (E \NI) 111V lOGIN Ritt RVN( 1 Kevin (. Klensent l( )I‘I(
5 IN lIlI 01

SENSF

AN1)

Pl III 05011 15

1)1

Ps )SSIB1

1

SX>ORI 1)5

I)anILI Pat tick Nolan
ENDFRS l \ND1N 1 ii‘

\l

SNS

Bvcong-uk

Routledge New York & London

Contents

Abbreviations List of Figures Acknowledgrnen ts
Published in 21)05 by Routledge iaylor & Francis (iroup 270 isiadison Avenue Ness York, NY 10016 Published in Great Brttatn by Routledge 1aylor & Francis Group 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abtngdon Oxon 0Xl4 4RN

VII

xi

xlii

Jntroduction Art as Abstract Machine chapter One The Artist-Philosopher: Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the Critical Art ofAffirmation Chapter 7ivo Spinoza: Mystical Atheism and the Art of Beatitude Chapter Tbree We Need New Signs: Towards a Cinernatic image ofThought C‘hapter Four A Freedorn for the End ofthe World: Painting and Absolute Deterritorialisation C‘hapter Five Songs ofMolecules: The Chaosrnosis of Sensation Chapter Six The Agitations ofConvulsive Life: Painting die Flesh
itt

1

201)5 b laulor & Francis (iroup. L1 ( Routlcdge an imprini nt! ax nr & 1 rancis (iroup
is

11

Printed in the t.nited States of Anierica on acid—free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Numher- 0: 0—41 5—97155—1 (1 Iardcoser) International Standard Book Nuniher— 1 3: 978—0—41 5—97155 3 (1 lardcos er) No part of this book mau be reprtnted. reproduced. transmined. or utilized in any torni by any eleetronic. mcc hanical, or otlier means, now knoss ii or hereatier ins ented, including photocopying, microlilming, and rccording, or tn aity intoimatton storage or rrtrieval system, without ssritten permission from the publishers. ‘I‘radcniark Notice: i‘roduct or corporate narnes may be trademarks or registcred trademarks. and arc used only foi identificatiott and explanatton ss ithout i ntent to infringe.

41

77

1 17

Librar of Congress CataIoging-1nPubIkation Data ( atalog record isavailable from the Library of(‘ongress

151

jjixformaj
i‘.

Visit the Taylor & Francis site http://www.ta3lorandfrancis.com
and the Routledge eb site itt

185

Tas lor & 1 aiiris (hout, the .•‘scademic Dis ot T&[ tntornia ple.
inon

Conclusion A Break, a Becoming, and a Belief

219

ii Thousand Plateaus. Sydney: Power puhlications. Chaosmose. Cinema 1: Limage-mouvement. TheMovernent Jmage. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesora Press. Le bergsonisnze. .(ontents Notes Bibliography Index 231 283 295 Abbreviations AO Gilles Deleuze and F1ix Guattari. Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze and FIix Guatrari. inernaJ. LAnti-Gic/zpe. translated by R. Lane. Habberjam. Ci. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. trans lated by P Baines and J. Tomlinson and B. F!ix Guattari. 1980.u‘rna 2. 1995. C‘inema 2: Jhe Time-Irnage. Chaos F1ix Guattari. Gutes Deleuze. London: Athlone. Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari. Gutes Deleuze. 1983. Paris: Minuit. Paris: Nlinuit. 1988. trans lared by B. 1992. Bergsonism. 1980. translated by H. 1991. Chaosmosis: an ethico—aesthetic paradlg?n. Gilles Deleuze. Mille P/titeaux. Massumi. Paris: Minuit. Gilles Deleuze. AntiOedipus. R. translated by H. L7niage-temps. ATP Gilles Deleuze and F1ix Guattari. New York: Zone Books. 1989. and H. translared by H. Habberjain. 1989. Hurly M. ibmlinson and B. Paris: GaIile. Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis: Universiry of Minnesota Press. B Cl C2 Tomlinson and R. 1983. Gilles Deleuze. Paris: Minuit. Pefanis. Seern. 1966. Gzpitalism ancl Schizophinia. 1972.

1991. 251-267. When a book is quoted which is not listed in the bibliography.W. p. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Gilles Deleuze. New York: Universiry ofColumbia Press. translated by ‘E Conley. full details arc given in the notes. 5inoza et le problme de l‘expression. Gilles Deleuze. Genosko. Logique du sens. Paris: Ga1ile. 1981. ECC EPS References in the text give the page number of the English transiation. Gilles Deleuze.“ The Guattari Reader p. Gilles Deleuze. edited by G. 2002. . Srnith and M. D/rence and Repetition. translated by L). Qust-ce que ha philosophie?.“ Carto graphies Schizaanalytiques. 2003. FB LS NP REA SPP TF Gilles Deleuze. 1990. F1ix Guattari. Nietzsche et la philosophie. Gilles Deleuze and F1ix Guattari. 1996. edited by C. Gilles Deleuze. Le Ph. The tide and page number for other quored sources arc given in the notes. followed by the page number ofthe French edition. translated by H. Greco. Paris: Minuit. Gilles Deleuze. 1968. Oxford: Blackwell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze. 1993. critique et C‘linique. New York: Zone Books. Paris: Presses Univer sitaires de France. San Francisco: City Lights Books. “Ritournelles er Affects existentiels. 1988 . Gilles Deleuze. New York: Columbia University Press. Hurley. 1983. Paris: lVlinuit. Flix Guattari. 1988. What Js Philosophy?. Burchell. with full details found in die bibliography. Paris: Seuil. Boundas. Paris: Minuit.5inoza Philosophie pratique. 1996. 1969. New York: Columbia University Press. Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze. 158-171. 1992. London and New York: Continuurn. Essays criticalandclinical. Gilles Deleuze. 1997. Paris: Presses Universitaires dc France. The Fol€t Leibniz and the Baroque. DifJrence et R‘ptftition.V. translated by R. Lester with C. translated by D. translated by H. New York: Colurnbia University Press. Paris: Minuit. translated by M. Leibniz et le baroque.viii DR Abbreviations Gilles Deleuze. The Logic ofSense. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Abbreviations wP ix Gilles Deleuze and F1ix Guattari. Francis Bacon: the logic ofsensation. 1989. Francis Bacon logique lz sensation. Joughin. Gilles 1)eleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. References to other texts by 1)eleuze and Guattari arc given in the notes. Paris: Minuit. tranalared by P Patton. 1994. Smith. ibmlinson. Paris: Minuit. “Ritornellos and Existential Affects. 1993. Stivale. 1968. 1962. translated by M. Gilles Deleuze. Tomlinson and G.

New York / DACS. © 2004 Andv Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts / Artists Rights Society (ARS). 1913. August 1972. © 2004 Estate of Francis Bacon / Aitists Rights Sociery (ARS). Austrian Film Museum. Jackson Pollock. 1947. 1565-76. 1928. London 147 Figure 6 1 61 Figure 7 190 Figure 8 213 All efforts have been made to beate the rights holders for the still 5 fiom Dreyer‘s La Passion dejeanne DArc and Antonioni‘s Deserto Rosso. © 2004 Estate ofFrancis Bacon / Artists Rights Society (ARS). © 2004 Artists Rights Society (ARS). Tate Gallery London. New York / ADAGf Paris / Succession Marcel Duchamp Francis Bacon. Michelangelo Anronioni.List of Figures Figure 1 Andy Warhol. Trzitych. Virginia Museum of Fine Arts. London. Austrian Film Museum. 1972. New York / DACS. New York Marcel Duchamp. Tate Gallery. 1965. please contact Routledge. 1 963. 1 964. © 2004 Pollock-Krasner Foundation / Artists Rights Society (ARS). London. Porimit ofisabel Rawthorne. catiedraI. La Passion dc Jeanne DArc. National Gallery. 7zjle Elvis. . Philadelphia Museum of Art. Dallas Museum of Art. 34 94 113 137 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Titian. The Death ofActaeon. Bottle Rack. London Francis Bacon. lfanyone has infor mation regarding the copyrighr for these images. New York Carl Theodor Dreyer. Deserto Rosso.

ric Alliez. for which 1 am most grateful. and is this book‘s real condition ofpossibility Many tbanks to all ofyou.—Vi enna .Acknowledgments As is alwavs the case. David Quigley and Arturo Silva gave valuable assistance in the preparation ofthe text. Scott Hayes. Z. Anita Fricek has given her support and love through the long process ofwrit ing. Claudia Mongini. Caynor (Mum). and rny friends Ralph Paine and Karma Percy. Finally. Dan Srnith. Thanks also to my family. this hook has heen all exercise in group production. Eva BrUckner. and Brian Massurni all read and gave important feedback to earlier versions of the text. Paul Patton. Jeanette and Joshua. Nick and Linda. Yves Mettler. and their own work on Deleuze and Guattari has heen a constant source of inspiration. lt has emerged from an assemblage of influence and cooperation to which man)‘ peo ple have contributed. S.

We don‘t want to crash and hurn.“ We are already—as always—in the middle of things. The abstract machine is nothing but this unfolding ofcornplexit a fractal en gineering inseparable from life. a bloorning ofmultiplicity But let‘s step back frorn this complexity that will nevertheless rernain the condition ofour investigation. This book‘s title is not a description hut an imperative.) Deleuze and Guattari give s‘hat seerns a straightforward answer: “The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent. and art as abstract machine will require an artist adequate te the task: a mechanic. lt urges an action. —Friedrich Nicrzsche. Tue Blirb oflrngefI) “Art as abstract machine“ (ATF 496/619). Ifour title is an imperative what does it hid US do? To construct an abstract machine. a new type ofreality“ (ATE 142/177). will not stop coming back to this first principle. Deleuze and Guattari. to test out new directions. it rernains to be done. 2 And sich. A machine has to be constructed. a perpetual departure. philosophy or any thirig else. how to view Sclu)larShip horn the vantagc point oftlic artist and art frozn the vantage oflife. what does it do? (We will see how these questions. a swirling cacophony of questions: A mechanic? A machine? Who? What? Wben? And given all that. an undertaking. but rather constructs a real that is yet to corne. but how? And to risk an other question. for their answers will be the corn ponents of new machines that will thernselves depart. to irnmediately step into I)eleuze and Guattari‘s vocabuTary will hecome indis cernible. whether discussing art. obviously. Art as abstract machine‘s first principle: it is real and not a rep resentation. it . what does this machine produce? And for what reasons? But these questions are the necessary conditions for any construction. not yet. for wherever we start. already. Let‘s try taking one question at a tirne.lntroduction Art as Abstract Machine And the question is still what it was then. even sorne thing real. For each rnachine its mechanic: “The painting machine of an artist-mechanic.

it has no being. Deleuze and Guartari write. On this plane ahstract machines act as guidance mechanisms— . Spinoza will be the permanent sig nature of Deleuze and Guattari‘s immanent niachinery. To open a world. “There is a nec essary joy in creation. Aesthetics then. Jntroduction . they shit and fuck. like the thinkable. any beginning must involve a certain reckless plunge. In the middle oftbings the abstract machine is never an end. 1b construct an abstract ma chine will mean constructing a new experience indissociable from a new real ‘Fhe sensible. because its existence is indiscernible frorn its appear ance in and as experience. First. macl professors no doubt. a material vitalism that doubtless exists evervwhere but is ordinar ily hidden or covered.Art as Abstract Machine iinmediately mplies another—its necessary complirnent—that constructing an abstract machine is to construct construction itseif The abstract machine is the vital mechanism ofa world always emerging anew. it exists. arc die conditions ofthis experience? This question calls to account anotber of Deleuze and Guattari‘s philosophical interlocutors: Kant. nor does it determine the subjecrive conditions of an actual experience qua beautiful. . These chapters Iay out the basic cornponents of Deleuze and Guattari‘s ontology while seeking to show how they work. indiscernible from this experience. clissociated hy the hylomorphic mode!“ (ATI 411/512). (AO. 141/176). how they most be put to work in constructing an expression of the living materiality of the world. We have already sketched—at a speed that no doubt calls out for a subse quent slowness—the underlying structure of this book‘s diagram. (But is ir an inside? As we shall see the question marks a certain limit to an old and no longer useful topological vocabular)) As a result. in orher words. But before we get into the intricacies of this technical philosophical ter minology we should remind ourselves that we arc speaking ofpractical mat ters. an ex aniple of 1)eleuze and Guattari‘s avowed marerialism: “The abstract machine is pure Matter-Furiction“ (ATP. an earrhy directness reflecting the pragmatisrn required by the job at hand. Second. not only the echo of Nietzsche in the abstract machine‘s against. and requires a bit of the mad professor. for Deleuze and Guattari. “art is necessarily a liberation that ex plodes everything. bot although inseparable froin this innovation ofexistence. it is what it does and its immanence is always active. The mechanic is. and arc mapped in the first three chapters of this book. is inseparable from ontology. abstract machines arc neither ideal identities nor categories of being. no niisrake. The abstract machine creates a new reality. a marerialism inseparahle froni a vitalism. What then. “Everything is a machine“ (AO. and thereby re ceives its Nietzschean definition: its being is becoming. to use another of Deleuze and Guattari‘s colorful phrases. Building an abstract machine is more [)IY than techno-science. it is inseparable froin what happens: it is the “non-outside“ living vitality ofmat ter. Third. that arc. it‘s a means. Bergson. and remain entirely unaf fected by any transcendent ambitions. 345/426). But despite the abstract machine having no form.‘ Deleuze and Guattari. The abstract machine is the entirely immanent condition ofthe new. ATl 1 9 0/232)—steerng the world on its “creative fiight“ (AT1 190/233). is nothing but the reniporary conditions . a vector ofcreation. but Deleuze and Guattari‘s mobilization of his ontology of becoming. irreducibly real. of its expression and construction. and is inseparable froni a mechanics of die flesh. These arc the ahstract co-ordinates of Deleuze and Guattari‘s philo sophical machine. as the “life proper to mat ter as such.“ Bot die abstract machine is not an expression implying technophilia either. Kant is less a “fellow traveller“ than an adversary. adopt the language of the construction site. rcndered unrecognizable. Machines eat and sleep. the necessity of Spinoza to any philosophy of immanence. Understanding this ontology will therefore confront us with the im niediate necessity of understanding its appearance in and as life. For now we will unfold the implications of this ontology rather rapidly. to liberate their parts in an explosion that remakes the world. Here. Unlike Nietzsche. The abstract machine is therefore both vital and material. a material process of experirnentation connecting and disconnecring machines. and the site of combat will be the aesthetic. of machines and their constructions. a new world opens up. an operation by which the world appears as obedient and predictable representations. a living world in which norhing is given except creation.“ [)eleuze says. in consrructing an abstract machine. they remind us. At this point it becomes obvious that the onrologv of die abstract ma chine implies an aesthetic. an underst-and ing inseparable from an experience of the new realities that arc forever being created. to ask the question ofaesthetics. to construct a ne‘ type of realit this is the ontological foundation of the world—of this world and of all the others—on an abstract machine guiding its becoming. Aesthetics instead involves the determination of real conditions that arc no wider than the experience itself. machines. The world is a plane of matter force.3 “probe-heads“ (t&es chercheuses. Once more. constructs new ways ofbeing. 1/7) We arc. Our task—to be done with techno-paranoia—is to turn these machines creative. 2/8). once more. Spinoza and Bergson however. Hylomorphism is an Operation that moulds matter into forms according to an ideal mode!. it is the rnechanism ofcre ation operating at die level of the real. For Deleuze and Guattari aesthetics is not the determination of the objective conditions ofany possihle experience. The abstract machine doesn‘t represent anything be cause nothing exists outside of its action. becatise experience is. the abstract inachine against representation. “the cosmic artisan: a homemade atomic bomb“ (ATP.

conditions. each in its realm ofcompetency. “wants to create the finite that restores the infinite“ (X‘R 197/186). a sensation. a sensation. the reality of the world as it becomes noth ing else than itself Art in these terrns is an autogenesis expressing the world (its real conditions) by constructing experience (its real experience). making becoming the being ofa work ofait that. which operates at the level of its constitutive mechanisrn. once more. infinite and finite in the machine of art. whether onto-aesthetics is simply art expressing narure. is a process hy which the hecoming of the world is expressed in a construction which works upon its own conditions. right here right now: “The field ofimmanence or plane of consisreflcv must be constructed. one that transforrns both its ontological and aesthetic dimensions. At this poinr it is not a question ofdisringuishing expression and construction as two dirnensions or moments ofsensation. Deleuze and Guattari‘s uiidersranding of art as sensation will set offfrom Nietzsche‘s statement serving as the epitaph above. as the actual and the virtual dimensions ofduration in a Bergsonian cinema. But. “Everything changes once we deter mine the conditions of real experience. the abstract machine expresses the infinite. Cosmic artisans everywhere setting off their atom boinbs. changes in nature. but also constructs it. as Spinoza‘s affects ofjoy and beatitude in God/Nature. rather. to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itselfin the work ofart. an art-work. Certainly Deleuze and Guartari pass rhrough Romanticism. how can we cre ate a new body. and as Deleuze and Guattari pur it. 68/94). as traits ofcon tent and expression in the absrract machine. which appear as the construction of this reality this art-work. an experiential body ofbe coming. Any consrruction of art then. Our diagram has already grown quite complex. hut this work. before all else. 5 This affirmariorm will be another theme of this book. Art will be nothing (at least not for us) ifit is not this ongoing expression oflife in the construction of living machines. and although they find a stopping place in die inhuman rupture . We could weil ask. an ex perience of and as irs immanent abstract machine in the process of (re)con structing reality Which is to say—or what can be said before we say everything else—art is an experience ofbecoming. to understand the necessary and active immanence of abstract and ac mal. it does nothing ifir does not restore us to our constitutive infinity by creating the world anew. to make art in orher words. The implications arc obvious: there is neither an ontology ofart nor an aesthetics ofart.“ Deleuze writes. An abstract machine determines the real conditions ofexperience. Once more. All that remains is to affirm their identity constructionexpression. each with its own all too serious professors. and that can only be experienced in the work of art (in a machine). and the places. doubled. Inevitably there will be nionstrous cross breeds“ (ATf 157/195). whether Deleuze and Guattari arc offering us a modern version ofRomanticisrn here. following Spinoza‘s “war cry“ (the phrase is Deleuze‘s) “we don‘t even know what a body can do“ (EPS. to view scholarship from the vantage of art—it rneans our investigations only begin when we start to create— and art fiom the vantage of life—meaning our creations inust become alive.“ Deleuze and Guattari write: “lt is constructed piece by piece. Expression and construction arc the doubled dirnensions ofart as absrract rnachine. inasmuch as art is a perma nent research on irs own conditions. The quesrion. echoing in its differ ent terminologies. and finally as the affect and the per cept in sensation itseif In all these cases it is the affirmarion of becoming that puts immanence to work in a feedback loop ofconstruction and expression. mechanics engaged in the prag matic practice of onto-aesthetics. A work entirely experimental. as Deleuze and Guattari pur it. This introduces another of our constant concerns. A sensation of this work. And what is this experience? A simple question that it will take a whole book (and no doubr not just this one) to answer. “which are not larger than the condirioned and which differ in kind from the categories: [Kant‘s] two senses of the aesthetic become one. The world is this genetic plane of inimanence. any sensation. Art is. an experimentation producing new realities. is whether the pieces fit together. ib express an infinite world in constructing a finite art work. lt appears as Nietzsche‘s interpretation and evaluation of will to powel. this sensation. while at the same time the work ofart appears as experirnentation“ (DR. an experience of its real conditions. The work of art understood in this way will give a real experience. as some already have. because they have become indiscernible on the single multiplied plane ofonto-aesthetics. and rechniques arc irreducible to one another. conditions neither subjective nor objective (they have become abstract). There arc arrists consrructing abstrace machines. a cosmic world). The co-implication ofon tology and aesthetics in art as abstract machine—the onto-aesthetics of art—in volves a redefinition of experience by which its objective and suhjective conditions arc dissolved in the real. The ahstract machine expresses the autogenetic and infinite processu ality ofits real conditions (the infinire.4 Art as Abstract Machine Introduction 5 from which an abstract machine departs. this will be an overarching concern ofthis hook. a Bergsonian niultiplicity wbich in being expressed in a finire construction. emerges tbrough an ahstract machine to express an in finite plane by way of an actual becorning whose very specificity and precision involves or infolds a change in its real conditions. and is always constructing new ma chines. 255/234). Art as ab stract machine gives a genetic definition of art. a new sensihility adequate to a life ofontological innovation? Art ernerges here as a privileged site ofcorporeal experimentation. and at what price. Feedback loop.

Mysticism is a physical practice: how do you make yourselfa body without organs? Furthermore. But it is also the guiding thread of Deleuze and Guattari‘s work in a practical sense. with the important addition of its atheist condition. as in each case it is by affirming the immanence ofa funda mentally creative life that the joy proper to mysticism will explode on its lines offlight. that is. No douht Deleuze‘s affirmation of affirmation also has a serious philosophical function as the antidore to that other notahle philo sophical double-banger. Spinoza is the philosopher who thought the “best“ plane of immanence. it is the Spinozian affect of joy that constructs the rhizomatic composirions of power constituting the ever increasing All. Deleuze and Guattari identify the same philosophers as philosophers of affirmation as they did the philoso phers ofimmanence. the construcrion and expression by an abstract machine of a “local ab solute“ (ATI 382/474). 80—! /70). “Jr‘s all good. and their consistent attempts to find our real conditions on a cosmic plane ofproduction. Sirnilarly. Mystical atheism is the real condition of Deleuze and Guattari‘s pragmatic philosophy. for they very rarely discuss art work. whether in the realm of philosophy. a choice for the creative energies of life. Thus. This will be an ethics that will irnrnediately appear in our first chapter on Nietzsche.6 Art as Abstract Machine Jntroduction 7 of the sublirne—a rupture and rapture—they do so only hy changing its Nature. mysticism as an experience of immanence is necessarily atheist. by creating rather than by contemplating“ (B. A change that rejects the sublirne‘s Kantian conditions. but perhaps only half a joke. and that is its ethical dirnen sion. because a true affirmation of immanence will involve the destruction ofnihilism. Deleuze suggests as a slogan. art. All this will be developed later ofcourse. is inseparable from affirmation. hut 1 mention it bete as the first qualification of what is the necessary correlate of the construction—expression equation. Spinoza‘s revolutionary formula introduces an atheist God to phi losophy—an atheisrn inseparable from a true philosophy of immanence-—be cause reason is the way to express God/Nature constructing itseif. of the construction/ex cism replaces transcendence with construcrion/expression. but Deus sive natura. an affirmation capable of entering into the creative process itself “If man accedes to the open creative totality“ Deleuze writes of Bergson. because it cannot involve transcendence of any kind (where to?). (And in a wider sense this would be the rational behind Deleuze‘s refusal to specifically deal with the philosophy of Hegel. is carried into the absolute“ (EPS. hut really. removing art from any rornantic analogy with the divine. as the practical mechanism ofovercoming.“ 8 Affirmation is the mechanism ofimmanence. first of all as a con struction of the body—atheism against asceticisrn. an intuition Bergson associates with artists and mystics. a return that will be our own overcorning. and placing it back among the an imals. is a construction site. of all the resentful negations defining the human. Affirmation is an ethical choice. all too human. “it is therefore by acting. first of all our own. and immanence achieves nothing without this idenrity ofexpression and construc tion. a workshop producing abstract machines with cosmic ambi tion. regarded wirh suspicion by many cornmentators. at least. and culminaring in the mystical affect of beatitude. and in Deleuze and Guattari never stops seeking to become adequate to becoming it self. This vision ofa mystical Deleuze and Guattari is. Deleuze and Guattari describe the atheistic mysticism ofa philosophy ofimma nence. 111/118).) But behind this seemingly banal observation lies an important new el ement to Deleuze and Guattari‘s abstract machine. weIl aware. Atheist mysti This strange atheism that in Spinoza never stops speaking ofGod. the “best“ God. the production ofwhat Michel de Certeau has called. or somewhere else. Here affirmation takes on a critical function. and it‘s a joke. will be the consistent aim ofapracticalphilasophj Philosophy. and Bergson. mys ticism is a creative process that. Mysticism is the experience of iminanence. As . from the visions of cinema‘s seer to Bacon‘s BwO. the holy trinity: Nietzsche. 1 am 7 Nevertheless. lt‘s no accident ofcourse. this seems to me the best way to approach the profusion of mystical formulations in Deleuze and Guattari‘s work. To pur it simply. pression ofthe at once infinite and finite material plane on which everything happens. Spinoza overcornes transcendence because. and is the only way to understand Deleuze and Guattari‘s ironie deification of Spinoza as the “Christ of philoso phers“ (W1 60/59). Deleuze and Guattari are continually coming back to this mystical prac tice. the affirmation ofaffirmation as he puts it. “expression is not sirnply manifestation. Spinoza. “the infinity ofa local 6 From the Nietzschean simulacrum as the superior form ofevery singularity. all the way to infinity Deleuze reads Nietzsche‘s affirmation of will to power. the negation of negation (just as overcorning in this conrext is the overcoming of Aufhebung). which they do not like.“ This is a phrase employed by Deleuze to dc scribe Spinoza‘s philosophy ofimmanence. the door through which we eternally return.“ thing that is to the seed/universe of the cinematic crystal image. an “atheisric mysticism. expressivity. the love by which God/Nature loves itself In Bergson Deleuze finds in the intuition ofrhe !lan vital. the means by which to con struct a joyful expression. as Deleuze puts it. but is also the constitution of God bimself Life. from Goethe‘s differential color theory to Leibniz‘s imperceptible waves infolding perception in the ocean ofexperience. where affirmation returns will to power eternally. because through the attributes the plane‘s (God/Nature) expression in the joy of affectual assemblages is nothing hut the ongoing construcrion of an infinite and divine here and now: God yes. like art.

Jackson Pollock‘s “middle“ period as a di agram for Absrraction opposed ro bis American modernist champions (Chapter Four). and hears“ he man sees to what in rhe world can reconnect To reconnect man to what he sees and hears. breaking matter our of irs overcoded forms. to pur jr back inro contacr with its virality. in order to construct somerhing that expresses life beyond its sad negation. Art as abstract machine therefore in volves an ethical choice. And sensations must he created. this is nothing less than the project ofart. and . affirming its own creative ecsracies. much of this book will talk very specifically ahour art.. immersed in the real. Any creation worth its name will therefore encompass the destructions necessary ro Set t free. a selecrion and conjugation of those marrer-flows which arc in the process of escaping from rhemselves. Art becomes a kind ofbio-politics. “is the impossible s‘hich can only be restored within a faith. This is to . Nothing is sad der than a void. a sensation. and it is a slogan that will accompany us through the course of this book: no creation without destniction. we need a machine to clear rhe canvas (or the screen. First. with its living flows. once more. aestherically and ethically.hegins—for real—when we pur jr to work for and against ourselves. Second. 1 mean art as ir is normally undersrood. because the path so flur raken was neces sary in order to open the question ofwhat art means for Deleuze and Guatrari. A critical project for sure. the page. it dererrirorialises the concrete world.8 Art as Abstract Machine Introduction 9 Nietzsche said. ro achieve an absolute deterri torialisation. or an art move menr. at least not without some recourse ro mollifying images of a rranscendent be yond. Art is the free dom to experiment on our conditions ofexisrence. and as bio-politics. the cosmic infinity ofour here and now is what cannor be experienced or thought. and further rhar their dis cussion ofart can only be fully undersrood within this wider contexr. and their correlate: pairl. the compacr disc) of all the clichs which prevent a crearion. lt is. the rnachine begins to work. This is the bacchanaal ofart. a poison. Venerian Renaissance painting as an abstracr machine (Chapter Four). to transcend the world. serves to emphasise the fict that art is always concerned witb very practical problems. But then. Finally we have arrived at what bis no doubt been a pulzling absence ro this introduction. because art has been overcoded with so rnany merely human ambitions. Just like narure. This unrhought ofrhought. abour arrists. Bur nevertheless. lt is the quesrion to which this book will try to provide some answers. This is art‘s infinire material dimension. Art as erhics. tivs and things. (C2. the creative life of this plane must be expressed in a sensation. Art is a mechanism ro increase our power. and involves violence and cru elty. In eacb case the general philosophical argument of the chapter is taken tip in an example appropriare to im: Andy Warhol‘s “Dearh and Disaster“ series in relation ro the Nierzschean simulacrum (Chapter One). And art can just as easily be these things. a realm ofexperimen tation that opens life up ro alternative modes ofbeing. and new methods ofself-organisation. the readymades of Marcel Duchamp as machines of chaosrnosis (Chapter Five). from within irs narrow and blinkered vision. consrructing flows of marrer-force inro ex pressive sensarjons. and about how art works. an explosion that destroys negation and propels its liberated matter into the new. Let Us not forger: “No art and no sensation have ever been represen rational“ (WI 193/182). for the machine to work. we need an affirmation that is strong enough to acrually create something. to liberare ourselves from the limits of represenration (and the polirical Operation of these limits is a constant subtext of Deleuze and Guartari‘s diseussion). Art must be crirical enough to divert its contents and expressions back ro the plane ofconsistency. nothing so ugly as a black hole. as any artist knows. this is the impos— sible aim of Deleuze and Guattari‘s project. its inhuman and inorganic nature. new communiries. afNrrning new realities. In each case the aim is to show how it is meaningless to isolare Deleuze and Cuartari‘s disui— sions ofarr from their wider philosophical concerns. cinema in rerrns of Bergson‘s ontology of time (Chaprer Three). somerhing must emerge. and folloving Deleuze and Guattari. and jr only. Affirmation. Art. the essence ofarr is a kind ofjoy. is nothing if not criti— cal. Deleuze writes. the lif of matter.. their work. In this way the absrracr machine operates at the interstice between finite and infinire. a life that par ticipates in the world‘s joyful birth ofirself a dancing star. a soporific or worse. [ 1 Only belief 172/223). Not. Eacb chaprer—wirh the exception ofthe second on Spinoza. something must happen. This. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari offer a philosophy ofart-u‘ork. in fact. A motto fir the artist first of all. And how could it be anything else? Because from our subjective perspective. because a con stanr risk ofdestruction is that nothing new will emerge from it. ‘f1usb with the real“ as Deleuze and Guatrari pur jr.“ he affirms. where the introdiiction ofart examples ro a discussion ofa rhinker who barely mentions art at all seems a linie flir-fltched—conrains a more or less lengrhy discussion of an arr—work. the insensible in sensation. Deleuze is a laughing Dionysus: “Yes. absolutely deterritorialisetl. “and this is the very poinr ofart. a contestation in the realm ofexperience with everyrhing rhar seeks ro prevent us from affirming our power of composirion. and is the ethical condition ofany revolution. here. to create a thought. it must affirm only what is the most deterritorialised. a leap into the chaos of the world in order to bring something back. an artist‘s work. so many representational limirations. Affirmation is therefore like a leap offairh. and the mystical onto—aesthetics it enables. an experimenration with life as jr is lived. the creative process of critique. and die work ofFrancis Bacon (Chapter Six). ontologically. but to discover it as it is. Qfcourse jr was never absenr.“ Here art will become a politics of lived experience.

and by wbich art restores the finite to its infinite dimension. but is an experimental process hy which the form of representation is overcome. Will tu Pinie.: NIETZSCHE. This pracrice ofcrearive interpretation affirms an imporranr element ofNietzsche‘s aesthetics. nothing less than the movement of life. Jur Antje/irrst. as Guattari put it. morality and philosoph‘ arc decadent forms nf man. and art‘s “dance of chaos and complexity (Chaos. for Nietzscbe as for Deleuze. lt is not withont profound sorrow that oiie admits to oncsclt that in iheir highest flights the artists of all ages have raised to heavenly transfigura tion precisely those conccptions which we now recognise as false: rhey arc die glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind. The creative movement of life is “enrirely different. and the joyful affirmations it of— fers in their place. a DeleuzeoGuattarianpract/ce.“ Deleuze writes. DELEUZE AND THE NEW Deleuze‘s reading of Nietzsche is in the spirit of Zarathustra‘s words to his dis ciples: “One repays a teacher badly if one alwavs remains nothing hut a pupil. human. will be our. This. lt means that in attempting to understand art as abstract machine we will have to understand its onto—aesthetics. its destruction of inherited opinions about aesthetics and art. Deleuze‘s reading of Nierzsche is therefore artistic. “from the imaginary movement ofrepresentation or the abstract . Chapter One The Artist—Philosonher: Deleuze. Friedrich Nieusclic. Nietzsche‘s aesthetic is inseparable from the ontol ogy that animates it. He wants to produce. Nietzsche.nent: art. This is finallv simply to follow what 1 have oiitlined above. -Nietisclie. he wants those capable of creating some thing new. artists. The emergence of the new is.10 Art as Abstract Machine say that Deleuze and Cuattari offer us an onto-aesthetics. and through which sornething new emerges. that art is not representational. in other words. Our religion. 88/123). its rnystical and yet utterly actual processes of creation. r Nietzsche.“ Nietzsche does not want followers. in the spirit of Nictzsche he creates a new Nietzsche. to get dose to the expiosions it ignites. the genetic process of life ex pressing itselE Consequently. but more importantly it is to show it in action. a practice in which life is both expressed and constructed. and the Critical Art of Affirmation The 110000 of a “bcyond“ is the rkath of lif. All llw Human. Ihe counterrnove.

“ The simulacrum is produced by critique shall see Deleuze ca as an expression of will to power. Creative misunderstanding (wilat. Nierzsche writes. by producing a thing‘s value. and te— quires. “has two inseparahle moments: the referencing back of all things and any kind oforigin to values. Our values arc no longer derived from pre-existing transcendent truths and moral laws. or. and every one ofthem needs a critique on tEe part of mcd ical science. “Every living thing. ernbodied by rhe artist-philoso pher. their origin and derermines their values“ (NP 2/2). This is the extraordinary value of the artist-philosopher. according to whether the forces the embody overcome their lirn its ro become something new.“ 6 We will examine this physiological aspect of interpretation a lit dc later. hut the mechanisrn by which the creativity oflife. but is to create them (NP. Critique is the art ofcrearing values as the direct expressions or “symp toms“ of will to power. “requires first aphysiological investigation and interpretation. “the unexhausted procreative will of life“ (Z. This onto-aesthetic ecology inspires Nietzsche to in troduce another odd conjunction as its agent: the ‘zrtist-philosopher“ (Nietzsche‘s emphasis). hut staving with medical metaphors we can say that interpretation. our own affirmations and nega tions of will to power. ascend or descend depending on wherher they live an affirmative or negative life. Bur these values arc neither pre-given not fixed. hut also the ref erencing back of these values to something which is. the “will to power“ as Nietzsche calls it. Evaluation is therefore pre-individual. (Zritiquc is a “higber concept ofart. all too human culture that seeks to deny it? How. Force.“ (N 1 / 1) perspecrives which reveal the individual as a resentful human negating will to power. is inseparable frorn the second moment of cri tique. but this creation involves the necessary destruction ofwhatever seeks to oppose and negate it. and doing so nieans overcoming whatever reits ir. The will ro power is therefore essenrially creative. in other words. Deleuze writes.“ which establishes the “meaning“ of things according to whether they‘ have an active or reactive value.“ and as such.“ Deleuze argues. hut arc instead created by our own evaluations. not a subjective process. most people arc not creative and prefcr to protect their banality by denying will to power‘s violent vitalit Will to power.“ 5 lEe point is two-fold. isa “Higher concept ofart“ that no longer simply describes an object.12 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 13 movement of concepts that habitually takes place among words and within the mmd of ihe reader. how can life create art? The answer is found in Deleuze‘s reading ofNietzsche‘s method ofcritique. Nietzsche writes. 1/1). Artist-philosophers practice a creative life. and arc themselves the product ofan evaluation (“when one has decided ) by which will to power is expressed in and as our life. “implies“ a “criticalreversal“ (Nl 1/1). Tue problem For the artist-philosopher—the same problem for art and for philosophy—is how to express the will to power despite the forces ofa human. what we 11 a “simulacrum. is it possihle to live as the afErmation of will to power. . This second moment is a “re-valuation ofvalue“ thar makes ofthe individual‘s inter pretation of forces an affirmation or negation ofthe will ro power. Nietzsche clairns. is first of all a process ofself-creation. a practice— cominon to thought and the plastic arts—by which they “survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit thern into an artistic plan until every one of rhem appears as art. or react against this power to confirm things within their limits. And this. an Überinensch whose val ues arc alive wirh joy. an ethical and ontological practice 4 as much as an aesthetic one.“ Art. one has thereby established a canon for the value of bis egoism. 1 believe. is a crearive “symptomatology. as it were. “is always a quesrion ofarr. Humans gain or lose power.“ Interpretation however. This. rhe living power of everything. rarher than a psychological one. or as tEe human overcome. a creative process inseparable frorn art and an art inseparable from life. but. and will to power lives a this expression. Nietzsche calls affirmation) overcornes the old ro produce something new. although perhaps not so strange to artistic ones. “Of Seif Overcorning“). is embodied along these rwo trajectories of expres sion: “Every individual may be regarded as representing the ascending or de scending line of Iif‘e. and expresses will to power jn “perspectives of ap praisal. more simply. a physician of culture. 688). Something leaps up froin the book [or art work] and enters a region completely exterior to it.“ Deleuze writes. Nietzsche argues.‘ Nietzsche claims. for a forces value only ernerges rhrough an evaluation that creates it. Interpretation analyses things as symptoms offorce. CRITIQUE Will to power is an ontological energy. and jr‘s sadly obvious. To create means to become more powerful and requires an affirination ofwill to power. The first moment is “interpretation.“ Ivlisunderstanding before representation! This cry sounds strange to philosophical ears. jr is. This living will seeks to increase irs power. is expressed in a life. their evaluative perspective—the value of their values—is affirmative. This leads ro another reversal: for Nietzsche the prob lem ofcritique is no longer to criticise given values. as Nietzsche famously puts jr. is the warrant for legiti 2 mately misunderstanding the whole of Nietzsche‘s work. “Critical philosophy. “does everything it can not to preserve itself hut to becotne more“ (WtP. This “notion of value. When one has decided which.“ a vital practice of evaluation and selection through which life is returned to us in a radically revalued art-work. as we shall see. to grow.

1i

Art as Abstract Machine

The Artist-Philosopher

15

Aflirmarion is the Nietzscbean condition fir the creaion ofart, and affirmative evaluation defines rhe perspective of the artist-philosopher, who creates (that is interprets) active things or forces. This is a new critical art which encompasses both an affirmative process and the active things it creates. Art is procreative for Nietzsche, it is a critical practice by which things increase thein power, by which things hecome new, and as such is indiscernible from life. “Art and nothing hut art!“ he writes, “lt is the great means ofmaking life possible, die great seduction to life, die great stimulant oflife“ (WtR 853, ii). We have quickly reached the necessary immanence of ontology and aesthetics in Nietzsche‘s philosopby of art, for, as Deleuze puts it, “Nietzsche dernands an aesthetics of creation“ (NR 102/116). For I)eleuze, as fbr Nietzsche, the ascending line of critique embodies an “artistic will,“ because its creative power is “always opening ne‘.‘ ‘possibilities“ (C2, 14l/l85). On rhe descending line however, there is a completely differ ent method of evaluation. Here “ressentiment itseif becomes creative and gives birth to values“ (GM, 1, 10). ‘[bis resentful crearion, Nietzsche writes, is “the other origin of the ‘good,‘ ofthe good as conceived by the man ofressentiment“ (GM, 1, 13). These resentful men and wornen interpret the strength required to overcome as cvii, so that they, the weak and overcome, will appear good. Thus their evaluation negates the creative energy of will to power, and establishes a trutb and moral system that transcends and judges the life of will to power. Nietzscbe pours scorn on all such evaluations, based as they are on “the belief that the strong man isfce to be weak and the bird of prey to he a lamb—for thus they make the bird of prey accountabie for being a bird ofprey“ (GM, 1, 13). This morality of good and evil requires the fallacy ofunderstanding physiolog ical strength according to a psychological cause. The man of ressentiment imag ines that the eagle chooses to kill die lamb, when in fact that is its function and 9 In judging the eagle to be cvii the sweet necessity, its strength and active force. little lambs justify the “goodness“ of their own ilnpotent negations of will to power. These moral judgements arc symptoms of an evaluation based on differ ent ontological assumptions to those ofthe artist-philosopher. The ontology of shcep, of the “herd“ as Nietzsche calls them, projects “ascetic ideals“ to justilr tlieir moral judgements, ascetic because they arc removed from life and attrib uted to a transcendent God, a divine “beyond.“ This moralistic and mortified metaphysics justifies the ressentiment ofthe herd by privileging the negation of will to power over its active strength. Here it is not will to power that lives, hut God. Nietzsche assumes an immanent will to power as the genetic condition of life, hut its ascending and descending iines ofvaluation give different ontoiogi cal expressions of its vitality. Depending on the perspective, evaluation produces

values (interpretations) rhat either af}irm or deny life. ‘lc negate will to power means to deny life and resulrs in nihiiism, whereas to affirm is to create, and so participate in life‘s vital becoming. Whichever way we look ar it, there is no extra dimension in which our evaluations and actions arc judged. We arc hat we do, and we get the life—and the art—we descrve depending on our perspecrive. Nietzsche explains it this way “popular rnoraiity,“ he wrires, “separates strength from expressions of strength, as if rhere was a neutral suhstratum behind the strong man, which was&e to express strength or not to do so. Bur there is no such substratum; there is no “being“ behind doing, effectuating, becoming; the “doer“ is mereiy a ficrion added ro the deed—tbe deed is everything“ (GM, 1, 13). The strong man or woman, the artist-philosopher, is defined by their act, an action that overcomes human nihilism and the delicate ego it seeks to pro tecr, just as it overcomes the herds resentful moralirv Man overcome, or the Overrnan, is no longer made in God‘s image, for God—thc ultimate nihilist— is dead, and with him the moral laws that judge man‘s actions from “beyond.“ The art ofcritique frees life from its divine judgement, from its human limita— tions and moral determinations, and affirms (that is embodies) the will to power as creative life. As a resuit, art must be critical because it is only rhrougb the cri tique of man and bis values that something new anti rruiy heautiful can be cre ated. No creation without destruction, as Nietzsche pur ir, “whoever musr be a creator in good anti cvii, veril he must first be an annihilaror and break values. Thus the bighest evil helongs to the higbest goodness: hut rhis is crearive“ (Z, “Of Seif-Overcoming“). Neirher Nietzsche nor Deleuze can be understood apart from this fundamental aggression. The artist--philosopher, and the art he or she creares, affirms will ro power in the face ofeverything—God, man, culture, morality—that tries to negate it. This is the difTicult crirical affirmation by which ascetic ideals, as the derermin ing truths the “good“ man represents, arc destroved and an active “perspecrive“ of will to power emerges. To understand bow, we must enter furt-her into Deieuze‘s reading of the Nietzschean world offorce. l‘he universe, Deleuze ar gues, is made up offorces. But a force exists only through is dilTerence to otber forces, these forces thcmselves existing through differences, rheir ramifying re lations encompassing, at their limit, everythinig. A force‘s quaiity (die object ir constirutes) therefore appears as active or reactive, noble or base, good or bad, according to the quantitative differences between the forces rhat couisritute it. “Forccs,“ Deleuze writes, “express their differcnce in quanritv bv the qualirv which is due to them“ (NR 53/60). lt is interpretation that fixes a force‘s qual iry and so gives meaning to an event, hut jr is the evaluarive perspecrive of will to power that has first put the forces into conract and established rheir quanri— tative relation. As Deleuze puts it: “The relation of force to force is called

16

Art as Abstract Machine

Tbe Artist-I bilosopher 3

‘7

‘will.“ In critique “force is what can, [and will to power is what wills“ (NP, 1 50/57). Force and will (the qualities and quantities of interpretation and evalu ation) are rherefiwe inseparable, the interpretation of forces expressing the will to powers “fluent, primordial and seminal qualitative elements“ (N1 53/60) of affirmation or negation. But a qualiry is never fxed once and for all. because a force‘s constitutive quantitative relation is rising and falling as it overcomes other forces, or is overcome. In other words, a force is a quantitative becoming beftre it is a quality a (human) being or a fact. Differential relations of force embody ascending or descending lines ofevaluation (afTirmation and negation), becomings active or reactive, and these give risc to interpretations of qualities and their accompanying actions or reacrions. The risc and fall of will to power, its becoming, therefore develops through the linlced operations ofinterpretation and evaluation in critique. Critique is either “artistic“ in affirming the differen tial hecoming of forces as will to power, and produces something new, or it negates a force‘s becoming, giving it an identiry a being, in order to “arrive at a semhiance of affirmation,“ 12 j mans nihilist affirrnations of a moral truth. As Deleuze rather dramatically puts it, reversing the Christian trajectories Nietzsche atracks: “Affirmation takes us into the glorious world of Dionysus, the being of becoming and negation hurls us down into the disquieting depths fi-om which reactive foi-ces emerge“(Ne 54/61).
PERSPECTIVES

The will to power appears as a force‘s quality because appearance (quality) nec essarily implies an interpretation ofa quantity of force as active or reactive, ancl this interpretation in turn requires an evaluation—the affirmation or nega tion—of and hy will to power. Each quality therefore embodies a perspective, an affirmation or negation of will to power that encompasses the differential in finitv that rnakes it up. In this way interpretations arc perspectives constituting the processes oflife. Critique is therefore the expression ofwill ro power, and life is nothing if not critical. Consequently, we cannot interpret by comparing forces ro ouiside (transcendentai, moral) criteria, and critique cannot give a jiidgmenr that stands as a “true fact.“ Interpretation cannot be conceptually dis ringuished from the becoming that gives jr vaiue, for the evaluation it ernbod jes, as the becoming acrive or reactive of will to power, is its real and immanent condition. Will to power is what constructs meaning aiid value, at the same time in meaning and value express its ‘seminal elements.‘ 3 This has radical epis— temological consequences, for the world as will ro power is the permanent be coming of ideas as much as things. Knowledge. as Nietzsche pur it, is “Interpretation, the introduction of meaning—not ‘explanation‘ There arc
...

no facts“ (WtB 604). An understanding of the world is alwavs a question ofcre ative interpretation and the evaluation it implies. For Nierzschc, as Deleuze PUtS it, “creation takes theplace ofknowledse itseif‘ (N B 173/1 99) 1 Cririque is the crearion of knowledge and things through the interpreta tion of qualities, according to an evaluation ofand by will to power. Evaluation is in this sense a mode ofbeing, and the onrological ground ofthose who inter pret. “This is why,“ Deleuze argues, “we always have the beiiefs, feeiings and thoughts we deserve given our way of being or our style ofiife“ (NI 1/2)15 Critique is the production ofour feelings and thoughts (interpretation) accord ing to their immanent will ro power, the mode of existence they embody (eval uation). As a result, Deleuze rells us: “Fundamenrally it is always a quesrion ‘What is it for mc?“ (NJ 77/87). The answer to this question will embody a per spective; at once the value ofmy life and an expression ofthe will to power. As Deleuze writes: “Willing is the critical and generic instance of all our acrions, feelings and thoughts. The method is as follows: relating a concepr to the will to power [interpretation] in order to make ir the symptom ofa will [evaluation] without which it could not even be thought (nor the feeling experienced, nor the action undertaken)“ (NI 78/89). An evaluative perspective is produced by and as will to power, and is expressed in interpretarions. This means life qua will to power, is inseparable from a life that lives it. The crirical quesrion in regard to the art-work is therefore not “what is it?“ nor “whar does it mean?“ hut “what is it for mc?“ Obviously, art always awaits its critique, indeed it requires ir, hecause critique poses the ethical-onrological problem ofwho is ahle to affirm, before it answers questions as to meaning or value. The question posed by the art—work (‘what is it for mc?‘) is nothing but the question ofwho is ahle tobe an arrist-philosopher. In asking “what is it?“ we assume a rnetaphysics ofessence and rruth and an object that represents ehem. The quesrion “what is it for mc?“ however, asks “whar arc the forces which takes hold ofa given thing, what is ehe will that possesses it? Which one is expressed, rnanifested and even bidden in it?“ (NI 76—7/87). The quesrion “whar is it for mc?“ therefore implies another, about what rhis “mc“ is. lt implies a critique of any assumed subjecrive unity as does any “thing“ or ohjecr. In this way cririque detaches experience from ehe subject/objece relation as inuch as from subjecrs and objects as categories of rhoughr. As Nietzsche purs it: “The origin of‘rhings‘ is wholly the work of that which imagines, thinks, wills, feeis. The concepr ‘thing‘ itseif just as much as all its qualities. Even ‘ehe subject‘ is such a created enriey a ‘thing‘ like all others: a simplificarion wieh the ohjecr of defining the force which posits, invenrs, thinks, as distinct from all individual positing, in veneing, thinking as such“ (WtE 556). In other words, “suhjece“ and “ohject“ arc interpretarions that aetempr to detach a thoughe horn thinking as a force,

18

Art as Abstract Machine

1Ie Artist-Philosopher

19

and are negations. For Nietzsche the personal is only ever a symptom or expres sion of the impersonal will to power and must be revalued as such. lt is only in such a revaluation that we will overcome our human nihilism and emerge as artist-philosophers. Henry Miller poses this problem of a transvaluative criti cism precisely: “Why arc we so full of restraint? Is it fear of losing ourselves? Und! we do lose ourselves there can be no hope of finding ourselves. We are of 6 the world, and to etiter fully into the world we must first lose ourselves in it.“ All objective interrogations ofthe form “what is. ?“ must be revalued in an swering the question “what wills?“ a question whose answer in turn revalues the subjective question “what does this mean to mc?“ We lose ourselves in finding the answer, for the answer is neither a subjcct nor an object, but something ex isting between them, a becoming—active or reactive, an affect. Nietzsche puts it in this way:
. .

The question “what is thar?“ is an iniposition ofmeaning from some other viewpomt. “Esscnce,“ the “essential nature,“ is sornething perspective and already presupposes a muhiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies “what is that for mc?“ (for us, for all that lives, etc.) A thing would be dc— fined once all creatures had asked “what is that?“ and had answered the One may not ask: “who then interprets?“ for the interpre question. [ tation itsclf as a torm of die will to power, exists (but not as a “heing“ hut as a proccss, a becomin& as an affect, (Wtf 556) Any perccption of an objcct is always an interpretation offorces, necessarily dif ferent cach time, which gives an answer to the question “what is it for mc?“ in a becoming-activc or rcactive, in an expression of the will to power in an affect, in a risc or fall of powcr. This means that the art of critique will be, as we shall sec, nccessarily physiological. In L)eleuze‘s Nietzschean aesthetics, will to power‘s affirmative or negative evaluations arc expressed in the active or reactive forces of life. But these forces appear in an interpretation that lays hold of them, and constructs their differ ential quantity. This quantity as quality; emerges from an in principle infinite series of differential relations that at their limit encompass the entire genetic conditions of will to power, co-extensive with life. In being interpreted each force receives a value only tbrough the construction ofthe differential series that composes it. At the same time however, this construction is the expression of will to power in an evaluative perspective. Each force therefore constructs a world, the world of will to power, the world each force expresses. Will to power exists in and as this ongoing critical construction, and as affirmation it creates new and by definition active forces (this is Dcleuzc‘s interpretation of Nir7rhP“ prtrnil reriirn‘ nwn h nrnrnr-rrive This rnen. Delell7e

writcs: “The condirions ofa truc critique and a true creation arc the same: the destruction of an image of thought [or art] which presupposes itseif and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought“ (I)R, 139/182). Becoming-active will therefore be Nictzsche‘s critical definition of art, a definition as much ontological as aesthetic, and succinctly expressed by Nietzsche‘s famous statement: “To impose upon becoming the characrer of being—that is the supreme will to power“ (WtT 617).‘ Art and philosophy as critical affirmation, and embodied in the artist-philosopher, do not represent a life outside them, but afTirm life as will to power, in a becoming-active, in their active affects. In the ontology of will to power there is no “being“ behind “doing,“ and this insight will be developed by Deleuze borh in terms of an in organic vitality, and the affects that its becoming produces. With no “being“ in the background there is no truth, meaning aesthetics cannor be a science ofrep resentation, because cjuite simply there is nothing to represent. Art without truth; it means that art is nothing but the creation of falsehood. This is one of Nietzsche‘s most important insights about art, which I)eleuze rcpeats:
The world is neither true nor real hut living. And the living world is will to power, will to falsehood, which is acrualised in many different powers. To actualise the will to falsehood under any qualiry whatever, is always to evaluate. To live is to cvaluate. Thcre is no truth of the world as it is thought, no reality ofthe sensible world, all is evaluation, even and above all the sensible and the real. (NI 184/191—2)

We get the truths, values, and affects we deserve according to the way we live, the way we evaluate, and the perspectives we create, As Nietzsche wrires: “All seeing is essentially perspective, and so is knowing“ (CM, 111, 12).
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE ARTIST-PHILOSOPHER

Bodies, whcther human or otherwise, arc die mechanisms oferirique because, Nietzsehe claims, “all sense perceptions arc permeated with valuc judgments“ (WtP, 305). Sense pereeptions arc interpretations of forces, vision for example emerges from what he calls “the valuc-positing eye“ (CM, 1, 10). This is a Nietzschcan empiricism that is inseparable from a crirical art, beeause “art“ is always an empirieal question, a question ofwhat sornething is for mc as will in power But the “l/eye“ of die subject perceives the idcntity of things too quickly, and only sees itself through the negation of will to power. Human vi sion is, to steal a line from T. S. Eliot, “eycs assured ofcertain certainties.“ 8 This is the tenacious insistence of human nihilism, its self-fulfilling negations find themselves confirmed in every experience appearing under its tcrms.

will turn to a critical art capable of rransvaluing nega tion through the affirmation ofdifference. what is most beautjfui in man is that which is beyond hirn. only man: on this piece of naivety rests all aesthetics. as much as each human. with an imi ° 2 tation frorn without. a “no“ which preserves the human.“ a non-self. and aesthetics isa realrn of moral judgment identifying the heavenly truths—unchanging and essential—that act as transcendent standards bv which art is hoth produced and assessed.“ Nietzsche argues. offering new perspectives.et us immediately add its second: nothing is ugly hut degenerate man—the domain of aestheric judgment is therewirh defined“ (II. but one ofßeing“ (Wt1 507). But to arrive in this new world—which has no other world—we will need a new sensibility adequate to will to power‘s active affects. “we still do what we arc“ (WtI 675). the ascetic ideals by which he confirms the heaury of bis negations. which Nietzsche argues still has the will to power as the living pulse of its sad life. it is thefirst truth ofaesthetics. new worlds. by separating us from what we are not. “Ifwe say im. For Deleuze dialectical representation “poisons“ philosophy and as the product of the slave it is one of bis most con sistent targets (N1 8 1/92).“ ‘ and he 2 Nietzsche claims to “possess an instinctive distrust ofdialectics. hut nervously optirnistic. and how have we created it? For Nietzsche it is human rationality which determines our perceptual certainty through its power of negation. “begins by saying no to an “outside. hecause the dialectic understands die differential forces of will to power (difference itself) as a power of the negative. and what is ugly denies this higber truth. 10). Op position or contradiction. bis own perceptions.20 Art as Abstract IViachine The Artist-Philosopher 21 “Only we have created the world that concerns man“ (GS. As a re sult.e.“ Nietzsche wrires.e. “there is no longer an)‘ place for another world“ (Nl 175/201). it is so only within the confines ofa human thought that makes negation its essence and principle ofexistence (N1 9/10). Thus the arts of man are fundamentally moral. In favour of the artist-philosopher whose creative interpretations change the value of the world in which we live. Nietzsche argues: “Nothing is beautiful. and a new thought ahle to revalue our values. “We already sense the form in which the syllogisrn of the slave has been so successful in philosophy:“ he writes. will to power appears in its negation as an affirmation denied. This optimism extends to nihilism. As Nietzsche explains: “We negate and must negate be cause something in us wants to live and affirm—sornething thit we perhaps do not know or see as yet.“ rnerely create aesthetic confirmations of their human sensi bility and its metaphysical consolations.“ he writes. a world which is forever becorning new. be cause br Nietzsche interpretation is the aflirmation of a frces constitutive di fference—an action producing becoming—whereas the dialectic establishes identity only through negating differences—a reaction which cannot be cre 9 The dialectic therefore negates will to power‘s constitutive difference ative. for with the anti-artist “we have made the ‘real‘ world a world not ofchange and becoming. as Deleuze writes: “For the specularive element of negation. The dialectic. The dialectic ensiaves life because it is unable to affirm the consti tutive difference of will to power. This is nothing but the negation ofNietzschean empiricism in thought. in their affirmations ofwill to power. 307). What is beautiful confirms man because it represents bis higber Being. 220). In this wav we could say Deleuze and Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes. 1. In the critical art of the artist-philosopher however.—This is said in favor ofcriticism“ (GS. Instead the dialecric represents difference as negation. often directly in terms of the fine arts. “tue dialectic. Within this loop. Deleuze clairns that the philosophical method ofnegation is the dialec tic. 1. and as such becomes a question ofsensibiliry . in producing the “arts of man. and that no is its creative act“ (GM. negate it) by giving a representation of truth. These artists. in their artisric constructions. and this at least implies the possibility ofa critical transvaluation. as Deleuze sirnply puts ir. like Francis Bacon—whose phrase jr is—are brally pessimistic (“We deny. “that anything can be done perfectly so long as it is done consciousl) “2‘). 121/139). “Slave ethics. in order to introduce a new body and new thoughts and feelings into philosoph)‘ and art.“ extends his distrust to the dialectic‘s avatar. the object of affirmation and enjoyrnent [jonissance]“ (NI 9/10). the stakes in aesthetics arc shown by Nietzsche to be ontological.‘ by representing it as the negative itself. New thoughts and feelings can only einerge frorn affirmation. Deleuze. the sick and decadent “anti-artist“ as Nietzsche calls hirn or her. dif ference as negation) arc “powerless to create new ways of thinking and feel ing“ (NI 159/183).“ an “other. Both thought and art labour under this nihilistic ideology and its dialectical mcthod in atternpt— ing to represent the truth oflife. Nietzsche also attacks the nihilisrn ofrepresenta tion. 301). assuming that the essential activity of life is its power ofnegation. “begins with hypocrisy. the artist of negation. But what exactly is this world. For Deleuze dialectical systems and their negation ofdifference (i. as the ideologv of ressentiment“ (NP. and bis own art. like Nietzsche. even that of the artist. Inasmuch as dialectical negation is cre ative then. or more accurately. “Expeditions of an Untimely Man. “The profession ofalmost every man. The artist-philosopher will require an en tirely new physiology. In other words. Nietzschc substitutes the practical element of di[ frrence. in attempting to transcend life (i.22 In this way anti artists have always functioned as “the glorifiers of the religious and pbilosophi cal errors of mankind“ (HH.“ Nietzsche writes. Once more. In Nietzsche thought becomes truly creative. with a copying ofwhat is most effective.“ 20).

to the will eo power of the artist as artist“ (NE 102/177). As Nietzsche sings: “1 drink back into myself the flames that break from mc“ (Z. on the other. 28 Dionvsus is neither subjecr nor objecr. “1 feel only my will‘s delight in begetring and becoming“ (Z. D. 1)ionysus is the animal-artist in rhe middle ofthings. requires a physiological transfor mation creating an inhuman body. but the af 2 “The aim of critique. the sensibility of a vital will to power capable of affirming what human consciousness has until this point negated. a reassuring masturbation. does jr have the sobriety to do so. Nietzsche proudly announces. does it stand up. Art is in ihis sense ihe artist—philosophers “pure contempt ofman“ (A. as Deleuze and Guarrari ofren stress. a Nierzschean practice many artists have raken liter ally. But we haven‘r understood. But only if such intoxication gives birth to the animal. Nietzsche argues. will produce an inhuman stare ofanimal health which Nierzsche calls intoxicarion: “the cffect ofworks ofart is to excite the state which creafes art—iiiroxication“ (WtB 821). “the perfect functioning of the regulating. all too human. the artist. The artist-philoso pher. capable of enjoying it. and capable. “On the Blissful lslands“). in its own affirmarion. “The Night Song“). an inseparability of an aesthetics and an ontology of will to power. Man justifies hirnseif through negation. The animal vitalirv of the artist—philosopher will ernerge once we have freed our sensibilities Frorn the nihilist task ofknowing. and give tip your volition. 10). an excitation of the animal functions tbrough the images and desires of an intensified life. and so from our still human pcrspective a rransvalued and animal art appears as a “play ofmirrors“‘ between art and artist. arc inadequare rerrns to describe the new physiology required to creare art. Nietzsche writes. of embodying becoming as heing. hut operating rhrough. 1. and the insepa rability of an art of critique from the art-work it produces. is what enables hirn or her to affirm will to power. This new sensibility. in a construction ofthe art works intensified life. To make art we must get out ofit. an aggression. Art and artist arc. 800) as Nietzsche calls it. was only good for feeling himself. New eyes for what is most distant. preface). uncon scious instincts“ (GM. “is not the firmation of affirmation. a sensibility that isn‘t opposed to the human hut is the animal sensibility of the human. this feeling “ofanimal well-heing and desires constitute the aesthetic state“ (WtB 801). The revalued physiology of the artist philosopher is no longer human. Critique thereby frees a new sensibility an “animal‘ sensibility“ (WtP. Not the negation ofnegation. and has becorne artimal. “stands in the midst of the universe wirh . a paradoxi cal and irrational mystery lndeed we cannor “understand“ it. This will mean the reinvention of man. con structing perspectives iio longer rational and conscious. The revalued physiology of the artist-philosopher. The human. overtaken man. iii the work.—an enhancement of the feeling oflife. and create the new. Alrhough this sounds harsh. and eternally returns all ofwill to power in the living becorning of its differences. a singu larity that affirms (expresses) all ofwill to power in its differenrial genesis. 54). the overcorne man. becorne arrisrs. and—Deleuze makes the point again—“a new way offee1in( (N1 163/188). two poles of an animal perspective that constructs itself. You‘ve got to do it. die verman. Nietzsche wrires. cre— ating a feedback loop of/as will to power. But this conternpt is the destructive side of an affirmation in which man overcomes himself to be come sornething new. because Dionysus cannot tolerate any personal identities based on human negation. it overcomes anti-artistic nihilism to restore life to its ani— mal health. producer and producr.“ Deleuze writes. the inhuman. lapse into unknowingness. 14). as the affirmation that creates their sirnulraneous immanence and singulariry. Instinctual interpretations construct an art-work as a new singularity. The artist philosopher‘s animal vigour is the antidote to the poison of representation and human rationality. has as Nietzsche puts it: “New ears f)r new music. the overcome. of animal-man. Lawrcnce knew the feeling: “You‘ve got to lapse out before you can know what sensual reality is.“ Nietzsche writes. and this is the object of the artist-philosophers contempt. The point ofcritique is not justification but a dif‘ferent way offeeling: an other sensibility“(NP 94/198). in these terms. it‘s not. ends of man or of reason but in the end the Overman. “we have dropped hirn back arnong the beasts“ (A. a stimulant to it“ (WtE 802). H. Nietzsche purs ir clearly: “Art reminds us ofa state ofanimal vigor: it is on the one band an excess and overflow of blooming physicality inro the world of images and desires. and indeed. As Nietzsche writes. and continually overcomes itseif. before you can corne into hei ng. we haven‘t become ac tive. finally. too.“ 25 The artist-philosopher-anirnal will therefore embody cri tique in p[iysiological becomings inseparable from the production ofart. Deleuze explains art‘s feed back loop like this: “According to Nietzsche we have not vet understood what the life of an artist rneans: the activity of this life serves as a stirnulant to the affirmation conrained in the work of art itself. A new conscience for truths that have hith erto remained uiiheard“ (A. once we have becorne an anirnal capable of living the un-known. 27 Art and artist. Through the artist-philosopher‘s critique of man‘s rational nihilism. We need a new concept in which artist and art-work can be undersrood as the becorning of an inroxicated anirnal hody This concepr arrives in Nietzsche‘s figure of Dionysus. an ability to affirm to the point ofover corning man. You‘ve got to learn not to be. Anirnal sensibility affirms active force in its interpretations.22 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 23 “In knowing and understanding. Dionysus. The conternpt of the artist-philosopher is not a negation hut a strength.

“Thus Spoke Zarathustra. and absolutely distinct frorn the images thar represented them. Dionysus no longer denies. The artist and art-work arc nothing but affects. because his or her actions arc physiologically rather than psychologically determined. in thefaith that only what is separate and individ nal may be rejected. is con teilt merely to gossip about art. In Dionysus the will to power lives as becoming. the Dionvsian artist-philosopher introduces art as the material process of life. expressing it without mediation.“ 49).. and in seeing this necessiry in feeling it. “1 want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things.g. Critique rransforms the represenrational fiarms ofnihilism into the affirmative and animal bodies ofwill to power. In aftirmative critique the artist-philosopher becomes animal. who.We could irnagine Deleuze agreeing on this 2 point. a thought fiashes tip like lighrening. e. never abandons his positions in front ofart. and to construct will to power once more. he creates. How could artists have a choice when their affects are determined by the vital feedback mechanism ofart. or things. “ “ SIMULACRA Deleuze suggesrs the concept of the “simulacrum“ as a new image of art. be cause. another nihilist anti—artist. an expressive vitalism expressed in art. 57). Practicing the art of critique. the will to power. hut in the necessity of their construction. each time anew. this for Nietzsche is “the insrinct of the man who says ves to life“ (A. The world ispeifrct. Under these conditions. for Deleuze aixI for Nietzshe—as artist philosophers—is to embody will to power as will to power. and in the Dionysian art-work this creative power is unleashed. and rhrough which will to power creates art—beyond good and evil and true and false. “a kind ofautonomism of the whole muscular system irnpelled by strong stimuli from within“ (WtP 811). This is tFie way we are able to understand the art-work as expression. The artist-philosopher is in this sense. Amorfati let that be my love hence fbrth“ (GS. ‘I‘he art—work is an in dividuation of the world. I what extent the artist is only a preliminary stage. lying b neath things were the degraded simulacra produced by the arts. to treat them as real and so ignore the Ideas. the artist-philosopher is drawn into its affirmative loop. through rhe feelings they evoked. Finally. and as Nietzsche writes. one that meets the ontological. with necessity. a name I)eleuze gives it—the simulacrum. or transvaluation of the ontology and aesthetics of a nihilist anti art. aesthetic and ethical requirements of the artistic methodology of affirmative critique. indiscernibly the affirmation which creates a singular work and the work which expresses all of will to power in its becorning. art represents nothing be cause there is norhing to represent. who. existed in the material world anti were the mere copies of the essences that derermined them. that in the totality everything is redeerned and affirmed-—— he no longer denies (TI. even though he at times fancies himself an artist producing works. lmpelled by an af firmative will to power the artist affirms. The physiology of the artist expresses the necessity and beauty of life in what they create. and as a result it needs a new name.“ pure immaterial essences as the truth of things.2-i Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 25 a joyful and trusting fatalism. Similarly. and this creates art. and these bodies arc what Deleuze simulacrum. embraced in irs eternal return.“ ‘. These images. Art is necessary. jr is the creation necessary for life. On top were “Ideas. There arc many artist-philosophers and man)‘ art-works. Nietzsche notes: “The work of art appears without an artist. Dionysus creates a new totality.“ Nietzsche writes. Art becomes. there is no truth. “face to face with art. nothing but dangerous copies of copies that could cause us. an “involuntary co-ordinarion“ of will to power.“ 6). as a I)ionysian art. Will to power is art and art work. as the affirmative will to power itself This is finally the artist‘s answer to the question “what is it for mc?“ As Deleuze purs it: “[)ionysus. an interpretation constructing a singularity in which the will to power is expressed as an evaluation that constructs itself With the destruction. to becorne wirh it. Plato originally suggested nie concept of the simulacrum as the botrorn rung of his metaphysical ladder. Deleuze . or by transcendental faculties through which they would operate. 276). Art is not the true. as the constructive force of a creative will to power. and as such embody the will to power immediately. as body. that is. in affirming the will to power in a cosmic construction. “Expeditions of an Untimely Man. “One takes. unalteringly formed—l have never had any choice“ (EH. as organization (Prussian officer corps. Jacques Derrida dc— scribes the nihilism ofthe art critic. in its evaluative perspective. and a new aesthetic for art. who never actually ventures to lay his hands on it. “one does not asic who gives. Art‘s beauty is no longer judged by external standards or formal criteria. In the Idea Plato created the definitive structure of metaphysical transcendence and founded. We can contrast the necessity of the work ofart formed in and hy critique with the work of the art critic. is the one that answers it each time it is put“ (NP 77/88). The world as work ofart that gives birth to itself“ (‘X‘tI 796). Here is a new canon for beauty. “then 1 shall be one of those who make rhings beautiful. In no longer denying. and so what they create is necessary and beautiful. in an interpretation expressing will te power giving birth to itself? We construct the world we deserve. thev express will to power again as the eternal return of its differenrial infinity Tbe artist-philosopher is the sin gular animal life that affirms will to power. as we have seen.“ Nietzsche writes. Jesuit order).

This is the art of politics in die most creative sense. the creation of sirnulacra. In this domain an “appearance“ only exists in relation to the ideal “beyond“ it represents and the philosopher will only arrive at truth by transcending this world to arrive at its immaterial esscncc. die model and the reproduction“ (LS. an expression oflife heyond. 257/297))0 The demonic simulacrurn is inferior to the copy be cause it has no true model. I)eleuze writes: “Then truth perhaps takes on a new sense. our world represents a fall. “lt harbors a positive power which denies the orzinal and the copy. Here art gains its active onto-aesthetic dimension. Second. he was. The 54 art of simulacra now begins to take on a political dimension as the ‘ ethical lie (which shouldn‘t be confused with usual political practice). Truth is appearance. where lying—as art—is die ethical practice of affirmation. “with the real world we have also abolished the apparent u‘orId‘ (T1. its model being found in an already impure matter. Plato‘s metaphysics as nuach as Christianity‘s condemn the body in privileging the transcendenr. and jr is no surprise that Nietzsche‘s animal artist an— nounces the death of God as the necessary condition for a living body. Appearance as construction (interpretation) and expres sion (evaluation) now exist on a single plane of immanence—will to power— which is both existence and essence. and escaping Plato‘s system will be a consistent feature of the philosophical lineage Deleuze creates: “In truah. In Christianity Deleuze argues. he is always the same in bis rejoicing: he rejoices as an artist. “art is worth more than truth“ (WtP. he enjoys the lie as his form of power“ (Wt1 853). “For die artist appearance no longer means the negation ofthe real in diii world hut this kind ofselection. Sirnulacra arc non-represen tative.“ Deleuze writes. Deleuze argues once more following Nietzsche. Unsurprisingly Plato is also Deleuze‘s enemy. first. To name the attributes of appearance means to interpret. in abolishing the true world of Ideas along with their appearance as represenrations. As such the sirnulacrum is art. 1 the deliberate transcendentalist and detracror of life“ (GM. to select and affirm active forces. 137/171))‘ For Deleuze. and so to construct an af firmative expression ofand as will to power. correction. the sirnulacrurn is an image without resemblance“ (LS. nevertheless requires a technique. man is made in God‘s image. In this sense. “a moral vision of the world“ (DR. Nietzsche writes.. Truth means bringing of power into effect. and with Nietzsche. “only the philosophies of pure immanence escape Platonism—from the Stoics to Spinoza or Nietzsche“ (ECC. raising to the highest power. 262/302). a creative and radical politics. In this sense. and actively overcoming nihilist art and thought. This metaphysical structure was adopted by Christianity. 35 Art is an affirmative lie for Nietzsche.‘ 2 “The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. In sin then: “We have become simu lacra“ (LS. the simulacrum is free to continually become something else. In Christianity as in Plato. “How the ‘Real World‘ at last Became a Myth“). 54). but also beyond the “be yond“ ofChristo-Platonism. because there‘s nothing heyond di is world of representation. 25). in being destructive. This technique will be critical. it expresses life as sembiance undetermined by any idea of truth. iv). Expression ofthe will to power in . hut through the fall our good image turns to bad. because it is the appearance of becoming (will to power) itseW As this power of the false. Nietzsche writes. the simulacrum as “a Dionysian machine“ (LS. and our sin does nothing hut affirm material life. 127/166). Atheism and art. “whenever man rejoices [i. Nietzsche proposes “a positive notion of the false. 259/298). a univocal formula Spinoza also uses and which we will come back to in the next chapter.26 Art as Abstract Iviachine The Artist-Philosopher 27 claims “the entire domain that philosophy will later recognise as its own: the domain of representation“ (LS. as die basis of artistic creation. fir with die disappearance of essence appearances as representations also disappear) 3 As Nietzsche puts it. Nietzsche‘s own formulation is similar: “What is ‘appearance‘ for mc now?“ he asks. III. “Certainly not the oppo site ofsome essence. Selection is therefore the artistic construc tion ofnew truths as the creative expression oflife. “die copy is an image endowed with resemblance. and contains the danger of illegitimate and evil images dis tracting us from a divine truth. The critical powers of Plato‘s philosopher are therefore spent judging this world according to a truth found in an ideal beyond. and will be. which made full use ofits moral implications. ‘we the artists‘ = ‘we die seekers after knowledge or truth‘ ‘we the inventors of new possibilities oflife“ (NI 103/117).36 The art of appearances. In Nietzsche. Deleuze writes. thereby affirming will to power. Against Plato. redoubling and affirmation. the affirmation of life. Plato‘s Idea‘s were. The resuits of this overturning of Platonism arc dramatic. the simulacrum is the affirmation of a power that escapes the Idea. The simulacrum is Deleuze‘s response to Nietzsche‘s explicit aim of living in semhlance. he enjoys hirnself as power. Plato was in fact one of Njetzsche‘s most cherished targets. not only good and cvii. “the greatest enemy ofart Europe has thus far produced.“ The artist-philosopher selects (in ter prets) what is active in the world. as we shail see. 835. and embodies Nietzsche‘s explicit atternpt to reverse Platon isni‘s phi losophy of representation. is now extended to eveiy problem raised by exis tence. the simulacrum is for I)eleuze the image ofa univocal will to power. affirms]. Without essence as its transcendent determination. 263/303) is a creative surface of interpretation that affrms will to power in escaping the transcen dence of truth. The simulacra arc critical. a question ofselection. which. What could I say about any essence except to name the at tributes of its appearance!“ (GS. 257/297). As Pierre Klossowski puts it.e. are continually co-implicated in Deleuze‘s thought.“ he writes.

The art-work is an action. hut a world without image and without truth. because its action. 69/94). hut this essence only exists as irs appearance in an art-work. we can only have a real experience undetermined by any subjcctive or ohective conditions. “is“ nothing.“ he or she is the one capable of giving an interpretation that constructs sirnu lacra as the affirmative evaluation of will to power itself. In this way aesthetics is divided on the one band into a theory ofsensa tion describing the ohjective conditions of experience. With the simulacrum however. because it is. as with Plato. The con ditions of the sign‘s real experience (will to power) arc therefore the same as the sign‘s real experience (will to power). as the repetition of its constitutive differ— ence in an ongoing series or becoming (Deleuze also calls this a “sign“). The simulacral art-work is a repetition ofconstirutive differences (forces) in an individuated series. as with Kant).“ At this. 68/94). hut is the mechanisrn by which the human. As Deleuze puts it: “To every perspective or point ofview there must correspond an autonomous work with its own self-sufficient sense“ (DR. Each series is consti tuted through. 67/93). There is no “outside“ determining experience (whether this is irnagined to be a transcendent essence.“ Deleuze explains. But it is not “becoming“ in a simple sense. a simulacruni always “becoming“ something else. and ofdifference in the communication berween series“ (L)R. an affirmation in which artist and work arc entirelv immanent in the sensation. a dimension equally ontological. one in which the sensible in general appears according to categories ofpossible experience (in his critique ofPure Reason) and another in which the beautiful was defined according to the conditions of real. without subject or object. as separate identities. its affirmation. The simulacrum appears as a singularity with out identity. Plato‘s inetaphysics of representation defined the transcendental conditions for all possible experiences. In simulacra in other words. An art-work therefore. and on the other as a the ory of the beautiful defining the subjective conditions of experience. or actual. except as pure appearance. Art once more emerges here in irs ethical modality. as the eter nal return ofdifference in the simulacrum. and fulfil the Deleuzeo-Nietzschean conditions of onto-aesthetics: “lt is a matter of . The Kantian division of aesthetics is therefore over come by Nietzsche. In Nietzsche tlien. the will to power “is an essentiallyplastic principle that is no wider than what it conditions. or an im manent transcendental faculty. as ifthis was a simple statement of the type “everything changes. This means the sirnulacrum cannot exist in a dimension “beyond“ the human. because will to power as the being of the sensible. and Kant subsequently maintained these conditions while dividing aesthetics into two realms.28 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 29 appearance is therefore insepatahle from its construction as appearance. experience (in the (}itique ofJudgement) (DR. only exists in and as the appearance ofthe work ofart (DR. “We can only comprehend a world that we ourselves have made“ (WtB 495). all the banal and stereotypical re-productions of habit and clich. a series that is constantly becoming-other as it contin ues to affirm (repeat) its difference From itseif “Simulacra. and the dif ficulty facing everything is to become its own simulacrurn. the simulacral art—work being the si— multaneous unity and irreducible inultiplicity ofa new point of view on/ofthe world. and includes all the others. 68/94). “arc those systems in which different relates to different by means of difference itself What is essential is that we find in these Systems no prior it/entity no in ternat resembiance.“ THE SIMULACRUM AS ETERNAL RETURN Critical art therefore destrovs as it creares. as the oveicoming of“anti-art“ and its “sad“ reperitions. or in God‘s. produces simulacral signs that construcr the world. is impossible. under the impetus of evaluarive affirmation. 299/383). The sirnulacrum is the appearance of this world‘s essence. to eter nally rerurn us to what we already are—the becoming of will to power. and that appears in the revalued physiology—no longer defined subjectively or objectively—adequate to this “affect. aes thetics attains its properly political and ethical dimension. world is overcome in being created anew. because the simulacrum expresses ‚ only its own immanent conditions. to attain the status ofa sign in the coherence ofeternal return“ (DR. of/as the eternal return ofdifference. simulacra arc the superior forms. that changes itselfwith the conditioned and determines itself in each case along witb what it determines“ (N1 50/57). where art must overcome man in creating a sirnulacrum. 69/95). The ontological transvaluation of aesthetics marks another important Deleuzian hreak. Deleuze puts it in bis own anti-Platonic terms: “1 hings arc simulacra themselves. all too human. and on the other it expresses the cosmic dimension of will to power constructing itseif Art hegins as the transvaluation of represen tation. As Deleuze puts it. “The joy in shaping and reshaping—a primeval joy!“ Nietzsche cries. Not a world made in our image.“ Rather the art-work as simulacrum exists only when “everything is change. as the sensation of/as repetition. this time within the tradition ofaesthetics as it is more usually understood. lt is all a matter ofdifference in the series. the ontological affirmation operating in and rhrough the transvaluative power of cririque: “Everything has hecome simu lacrum“ (DR. on the one hand its interpretations overcome the world ofman. as it overcomes itself Once more any distinction of the artist and art work. The artist-philosopher is wbat we could ca 11 will to power‘s “operative. the conditions ofa real experience (the “seminal“ constitutive differ ences of will to power) arc entirely immanent to that experience.

is not only a “conceptual per sona“ but an “aesthetic figure.. As a result. is so only on condition that it expresses a particular will. the essenrial characteristic ofthe modern work ofart“ (LS. Deleuze argues that the creation ofdivergent series. Although Deleuze‘s examples in DffrrenceandRepetition arc Mallarm‘s Book and James Joyce‘s Finnegans Wake. affirmative and artistic way of evaluaring. “above all because it repeats. creating divergent series in which the art-work is continually becom ing-other. All that we have just . an “internal resonance. it repeats all the repetitions. think or feel this particular thing if he did no have a particular will. it reverses capies into simulacra)“ (DR. replacing it with a power of the false. without doubt. 260/300). as for Deleuze. The identity of die object i dissoived in ehe divergent series constituting the affect (art-work as an expression and not an object). But nothing is lost. ofa repetition) coextensive with ehe differential life of will to power.e. a vital power inseparable fiom an artistic life. the simulacrum expresses its genetic differential conditions through affirming them. 261/301). by virtue of an inrernal power (an imitation is a copy. and modern art appears only at this poine of rransvaluation. as diver gent and in a single work. because each series exists only in the rerurn of all ehe others. but constructs a world of simulacra (i. “Art does not imitate. there is such a profound link that the one cannor be un derstood except through the other“ (LS. “Each difference passes through all of the others. particulai forces. as Deleuze puts it: “Between the eternal return and the simulacrum. 57/80).30 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 31 showing. oforiginal and copy. But Nietzsche makes a further claim to die invention of a truly modern art in being one of the few philosophers to have managed to “slip in“ to die realm ofart. Deleuze argues. an imal or being assumes die status of the sirnulacrum. 260 1/300—1). the becoming of a world consrructed into mobile series. an evaluation. because it rransvalues “truth“ as the element from which the value of value dc rives. differentiating and differentiated. The simulacrum is the series produced through i he repetition of its own constitutive differences. Modern art is the affirmation ofa creative becoming. Zarathustra. The simulacrum gives a perspective of will to power.“ a creator ofsensations. to have rejected representation in favour of producing simulacra. defines the Nietzschean arrist-philosopher as the pracririoner of a truly modern art. and overcomes ehe ohject experienced as much as the subject experiencing it. This affective charge is intoxicaring. as the genetic differential relation of forces constituting the becoming of its world. when everything has become a simulacrum . Nietzschean transvaluation is not achieved simply hy changing something‘s value. “only the Dionysian artist takes the power of die false to the point where it is realised. an on-going becoming inseparable from the eternal return and that constructs the world anew. This “forced move ment“ is the affect or “affeceive charge“ (LS. Deleuze and Guattari argue. therefore. but in transformation“ (ECC. Deleuze believes.“ Deleuze writes. modern art shows the way to philosophy. In the simulacrurn. interprets the world) through an evaluation that eter nally returns the world. for Deleuze it is to the cuedit of modern art. not in form. not will to truth“ (WP 54/55). thought is creation. In this sense. it indicates to philosophy a path leading to the abandonment ofrep resenration“ (DR. Nietssche is also privileged in the gen esis ofthe “modern image ofrhought“ as the one who “succeeded in making us understand. In this sense. as Deleuze argues: “Every thing. 126/165). but affirmation nec essarily unleashes an overcoming. as these ex tend to encompass the world. but by achieving a new. Finally. This is the “highpoint of the meditation“ for Nietzsche: “That everything recurs is the ciosest ap proximation ofa world of becorning to a world ofbeing“ (WtI 617). before philosophy.“ Deleuze argues of the one who wills. Deleuze claims. 68—9/94). 67/92). The repetition ofdifference as the compositional principle of modern art produces. 264/305). “is. so that the thinker of erernal return [ 1 can rightly say that he is himself burdened with the supe rior form of everyrhing that is“ (DR. wbo is no longer content ro simply create things or to express themselves. 105/133).“ a “forced movement which goes beyond the series itself“ (LS. This means.. as the affirmative and creative will. The simulacrum is the conrinual creation of the world. it is die sensation of the be coming—the eternal return—of will to power. “it must ‘will‘ itseif or find itseif through all the others“ ([)R. 293/375). Nietzsche‘s concepts of will te power and eternal return arc therefore already at work in aestherics‘ realm ofexperience. Uhis finally is the transvaluation of the creative artist. seen. but this perspective doesn‘t “represent“ will to power. as interpretation. a particular way of being“ (NF 78/88). and Zaruthusrra dances. as in a snapshot. Modernism renounces art‘s ancient metaphysics of true and false.“ Deleuze argues. die immanence of expression and construction in the artistic affirma tion of the will to power means. a sensation ofbecom ing (i. for “when the modern work of art develops its permutating series and irs circular structures. For Nietzsche. and the identiry of the subjecr is dissolved in ehe multiplicity of differences the affece at once infolds and unfolds (artist as a force under con struction and not a subject). but art is simulation.e. “that he could not say. and announces its emhrace of the repetition ofdifference in the eternal return. This means that die simu lacrurn as particular thing. and in rhe serial wan derings of Nietzsche‘s eponymous hero affects as weil as concepts arc produced (WP 2 17/205). and it is in modern art‘s complicarion of its intense “divergenr series“ that the Nietzschean physiology of the artisr-philosopher is fulfilled. “the eternal return concerns only simulacra“ (DR. The simulacrum is not a new truth.

Modernism is therefore defined by the dismemberment ofevery thing which separates art from the life of will to power. “there is no other aesthetic problem than that of the insertion of art into everyday life“ (DR. sought to engage and deconstruct such mythologies—in this he was utterly “modern. This is entirely necessary as both Deleuze and Nietzsche condernn any aesthetic philosophy separating art from life. ‘ We have already 4 seen Deleuze suggest that modern art‘s use of repetition in composing series is simulacral. and is instead an affirmation that revalues painting itself Painting is no longer “expressive. the independence of the work“ (DR. is Deleuze‘s suggestion that Warhol‘s use of repetition does not repeat (repre sent) a model. or in much conceptual art. takes in the case of the Elvis paintings an “Original“ (a postcard of Elvis as he appeared in the film Flaming Star. the most habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works ofart. but is the genetic element immanent to their production. 293/375). the most banal. according to Deleuze. looking at Warhol‘s Tri1e Elvis (1963. Deleuze immediately proposes an example: “Warhol‘s remarkable ‘serial‘ series“ (DR. lt is obvious. but unlike the das sical rnodernism of Clement Greenberg for example. and not just any old photo of Elvis. 4 The Warhol-machine understood perfectly that the work of art had lost its aura as original in the age of mechanical reproduction.“ hut—in Warholian sense—repetitive. Deleuze is certainly not alone in dlaim ing that Warhol reinserts art into life by using the aesthetics of consumerisrn.“ which it “copies. how should we approach art works as they normally appear? This is a problem of irnmedi ate urgency. Deleuze was obviously not the first to define the modernist art work as autonomous. as the emergence of mechanical repetition immanent to modern processes ofmechanical reproduc tion. but this difference is not a consistent object that structures the work (as it would be in Frank Stella‘s paintings or Donald Judd‘s work. and repays exploration. or only in terrns uf the conditions under which the art work appears (pure 9 The eternal return “repudiates these and expels them. But Deleuze provides an ontological interpretation ofthis “insertion“ by affirm ing it as the creation ofsirnulacra. 293/375). even ifironic. but produces a real and simulacral experience coextensive with the creative repetitions of life. the dif fering difference which does not stay the same (it is not a “grammar“). every thing which pre vents its eternal rerurn.“ but also to bring Nietzsche‘s onto-acsthetics into affect within the politics of the everyday. But this still must be explained. for example). hut here he elaborates this suggestion in terms of his concrete exarn ple of Pop.“ and therefore side-steps any appeal to the mythology of the artist‘s subjectivity as the S Indeed. and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it for these other repetitions“ (DR. Each painting is therefore a copy ofa copy. Given the publication date ofDfftrence and Repetition (1968) Deleuze‘s example must refer to the so-called “screen-print“ paintings Warhol begins in 1962 and developed over the next five years in what is known as the “Death and Disaster“ paintings. 69/95). die copy of the copy. Virginia Museum of Fine Arts) for example. nor is there a modei To push die copy. wbich is itselfa “copy“ (ofa stu dio promotional photo. “with all its centrifugal force. such as Sol Le Witt‘s sculptures. as obviously Deleuze is interested in Warhol‘s images. What would prevent the eternal return. Warhol succeeds in producing simulacrum by fore grounding the way an image‘s repetition introduces necessary differences. Warhol‘s whole mediatized personality 4 guarantor of artistic value. 1 This transformation is achieved througb a mechanical technique (the screen print) which retains the in principle infinity of its “Original. More controversial however. which is not in itself such a controversial dlairn about Pop art. this autonomy will not be defined by a formal purity. attained an entirely modern “aura.“ he writes. and instead embraced the living power of repetition it intro duces. “it is al ways displaced in relation to other repetitions. that he transforms a mechanical reproduction through its repetition. as Deleuze dramatically 4 puts it. 294/375).“ that of the simulacrum. This passage dlearly aflirms Warhol‘s use ofcommercial reproduction techniques and their media aesthetic as an insertion ofart into life. He did so by using reproduction technology to produce “original“ art works that had. 90/122). and their inevitable appearance in series. and in . as a mechanical re production. But he refused to mourn this loss.“ Deleuze pression)) writes. Each work in the series differs from the others. lt constitutes the autonomy of die prod uct. “Even the most mechanical. it is not an image originally in tue film). the production of“a canvas whose very Oper ation reverses the relationship of model and copy. THE ART-WORK AS SIMULACRA Given this profound link between the simulacra and eternal return.“ Warhol‘s repetition of the process of mechanical repro duction is not “critical“ in any subjective sense. and is elaborated in an in-principle open (the principle of mechan ical reproduction) series. ° lndeed. and specifically Warhol‘s work. As he said: “The reason 1 am painting this way is that 1 want to be a machine.‘1 Deleuze reads Pop art. is to only unelerstand art in terms of the artist (pure construction). 12 This suggestion is a good example of Deleuze‘s critical method. not just to gain an understanding of our own “real experience. and hence as an art form ‘inserted‘ into everyday life. and affirnied in its very mode of appearing as such. through this process. it is a simulacrumn. and which means that there is no longer a copy. but by its formal vitality.32 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 33 (DR.“ 46 Warhol‘s painting process. to the point at which it reverses itselfand produces the model: Pop art.

and exists only as the always differing rep etition of himselfas “sign. or perhaps especially when this serialitv is seen in a single work (Elvis Ezght Times or Elvis (Eleven TYnies) for exantple). and from representation to repeti tion. Warhol‘s series arc in this way a repetition. as simulacral art-work) appears in the midst of the modern everyday. ‘X‘arhol is not therefore. thev afNrm the will to power as it continu— ally overcomes itself As their serial production has no heginning (no “original“) nor an end (it is in principle open) it is composed only ofa seif-differing repe tition (the technique does not allow homogeneity hetween paintings) as both subject and object of its multiple affects. Just another Elvis comeback. 56/79) . The object must thercfore he in no way identical. “for everyone. What appears on this surface ofevaporation is their own genetic and vital force. a perspecrival art work adequate to the serial processes of the everyday. dissolve their “sub ject“ and themselves as “objects“ in being emptied ofany extra dimension out side that of their own production. Pop art produces a Nietzschean perspectival critique in which the eternal return as repetirion ofdifference (i.“ But this availahility . aml kirn fiOfli its centre. as Warhol said. but instead foreground presence as the differential process appearing as the real experience of mechanical reproduction itseif Painting for Warhol i. [ 1 Divergence and decentring must he affirmned in the serics itself Evcry object. a point we will pick up again later. as sorne would have it..e. Difference must show itselfto he dffrring. The first things we no tice arc the difkrenccs. Warhol inserts the simulacrum into everyday life hy using a commercial production technique and aesthetic to make images of the people and events already being infinitely reproduced in the media. This is Warhol‘s dramaric (and ofcourse utterly banal. Tritile Eluis. like all Warhol‘s series ofthc tirne. 1963. (DR. hut rom asundcr in a difference in which the idcntity ofthe ohjeci as seen by a sceing subject vanishes. or eternal re rum. Figure 1 Andy Warhol. Virginia Museum of Fine Arts. In using already recogniza ble images Pop art was. Warhol‘s genius was to be able ro combine these elements so effectively) revaluation. As such Warhol‘s series arc the perfect elab oration of Deleuze‘s theorv of modern art: each coinposing repetition nust he distored. cliverred. the ul rimate uniry.cct must be— long to the point ofvicw.s not a play of signifiers forever deferring presence. ever5‘ thing must see in o•vn iden tity swallowed up in difference. from signifier to simulacrum. even. cach heing no mere ihan a dilYerence be— tween differences. New York fact rejects the same frorn the process ofserial repetition. This is why Deleuze emphasizes the rial nature ofWarhol‘s work. er tue ob.. Elvis as ohjecr has no identiry in Warhol‘s paintings. because it is in the series that the reperition ofdif ference becomes visible. a proto—post—rnodernist.“ The eternal return is in this way affirmed in the mid die of the everyday process ofconsumption. but the evaporation ofthe signifier in the presence of the self-differing sign. ofwhat is already different from irseif Elvis as simulacrum. Each poinr of view must itsclfhe the object.34 Art as Abstract Machine The Artist-Philosopher 35 The Elvis paintings. Difference must hecome die element. His series do not mulriply perspectives in order to deny any possibility ofpres ence. it must therefore refer to other differences which never iden— tify it but rathcr differentiate it. © 2004 Andy Wirbel Feundation bn tue Vistial Arts / Artists Rights Society (ARS).

While this argument seems to fit wirh Warhol‘s “Dearb and Disasrer“ series. But this repression is their repetition in disguise. Perhaps. as from one distinerive Oflt 10 anorher. srereotyped and subject to an accclerated reproduction ofobjccts of consumpuon. and in these simulacrum the destruction of man is nec essarily connected to die creation of this vital life of die everyday. and as what disguises. witb and wirhin rhc variations. from orte privileged insrant to another. most everyday manner. This ineans generic forces rend to be repeated in forms (masks) which dissipate their becoming. and within die commercial economy of that sign. Could we link rhis disappearance to Deleuze and Deleuze and Guarrari‘s move towards articulating art‘s modernirv through die question of color? This hyporhesis is strengthened by the facr that Deleuze makes no further reference to \Varhoi. lt is not underneatb rhe masks. Warhol‘s Death and Destruction series produced simulacrum. Warhol succeeded in transforming mechanical reproduction into me chanical repetition. death is the realm of instinctuai drives—the Freudian rerni for the ‘seminal qualitative elements‘ of rhe will ro power. hy affirming the former to the point where the distinction of model and copy arc lost in productive difference. which effectively produced an image with nothing behind it—a pure sur face. after Dif/‘rence and Repetition and coinciding wirb bis collaboration wirh Guattari. that which constirures itselfonly bv disguising irseif. for it made visihle the way mechanical processes extended from “Form“ to “content“ in popular culture. “Once you ‘got‘ Pop. that the transformation in our perspective 5 again. Deleuze makes this link explicitly: The more our daily life appears standardised. lt is interesting to speculare at this point about the disappearance of the term “simulacrum“ froni Deleuze‘s work after Dij5trence and Repetition. the only possible lived reaiiry ofgenetic difference.36 Art as Abstnict Machine Tbe Artist-Philosopher 27 . The dearh instinct is then. rather. most everyday matters“ (GS. (DR. making dearb (qua rhe un livable) the generic principle of repetition itseif As Deicuze purs it: Repetirion is rruly that which disguises irseif in constituting itself. In this way Pop art exem plifies Nietzsches own artistic straregy. ir is the only possihle reperirion. because the arc by na ture a-subjective. These drives can only be lived by being repressed. within. 17/28) This last sentence would seem an appropriare descriprion ofWarbol‘s celebrity series. There Deleuze reinrerprers Freud‘s grounding ofsympromatic repetition in the death drive. And once you thought Pop you could never see America the same way ° This is [)eleuze‘s point. as our life. apart front the brief discussion of bis films in Cinema Indeed. Warhol is the artist ofthe linie difference. hut is instead the genetic prin ciple of repetition which operates beneatb‘ its sympromatic representation and which this represenrarion represses. (DR. the more art must he injected into it in order ro exaract frorn it that linie difference which plays simultaneously between other levels of repetition. 293/3 75) Frorn the suhlirne to die ridiculous: Marilyn Munroe to 7ina Fish Disaste The relation ofrepetition to death in Warhol‘s work can be understood in terrns of Deleuze‘s discussion of Freud in Dz&rencc and Repetition. and even in order to make the two extremes resonate—namely the habirual series ofconsump tion. the rerurn ofthe repressed as disguised.1/ nevertheless carried with it a transformanve charge. Warhol thereby affirms the eternal return of will to power in life.“ he said.“ achieved by Pop art operates at once on the level of the ontology of the sign (as surface). The masks do not hide anything exccpr orher masks. which draws a liiie between ir and its instanriation and radicalises irs appearance as dearh. given Warhol‘s use ofpop culture technologies and subject matter we could say he was the poet of bis life in die smallest.e. in simulacra. in D//rence and Repetition Deieuze emphasizes the role of disguise in any appearance of the repetition of difference. but is trmed froni one mask to anorher. As such. in other words. as most interprerations of Freud would have it. Deleuze argues that this drive is not a return to a pure inanimate matter. Deleuze moves away fiom many of the rerms and fiwmulations ofDt Jerence and Repetition he had connected to Pop art. Warhol‘s “Dearh and Disasrer“ series affirm this in foregrounding the mask as a reperition ofdif ference (eternal return) inseparable froni death. qita dearh. ir also tends to beate generic will to power in an orherworldly sphere in relation to our own experience (i. 5 This is one way Deleuze tends ro elahorare difference as being cancelled in irs extensive represenrarions. The mask as simulacrum does not disguise a reality behind it. and they have no realiry other than becoming disguised. hut bis affirmation of mechanical repetitions nevertheless produced a new relation between art and the world. For example. 1 the reperi don ofmasks is the living reality of the genetic power. and ortl)‘ very few exemplary art works arc able ro reveal die viralirv of masks rhemselves. as death). “you could never see a sign the same way again. Warhol succeeded in bringing these levels together to show how life was nothing more (hut also nothing less) than the creation of difference through mechanical repetitions. “we want to be poets ofour life—first of all in the smallest. lt is this aspect of Dzf/‘rence and . everyday life. 299). hut ratber than their reperirion of masks beitig a critiqiie of either the morbidity or the entropy of popular culture as some have argued. and the instinctual series of dcstrucnon and death.

and therefore transformative. This then. 111/147). they arc nothing less than an overcorning of human sad ness. Deleuze argues the third synthesis must affirm the other two. T‘he third. ‘Fhe first. possibilities. Deleuze‘s equation of the simulacrurn and eternal return implies a radical transformation inseparable from death. the destruction of representation will remain the “eternal truth of painting“ 55 throughout Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari‘s work. and despite Deleuze ahandoning its vocabulary-. and its con struction and expression in the art-work. in a work ofart that eternally returns the inhuman vitality of will to power. but these the matics arc rethought and so require a new vocabulary. in line with Deleuze‘s later work. Many of them. habit. and through this repetition institutes the realm of consciousness and thought. Nevertheless. . Deleuze argues. And this indiscernibility. however. These paintings embody the resonance be tween the everyday habits ofconsurnption and the eternal return ofmechanical repetition produced by the sirnulacrum. in discernible that is from Lifr. will continue to he a fouis ofour dis cussion. The criti cal question for art would therefore be how to produce the third synthesis of time as it appears (i. an overcorning of our memorial sentiment. where repeti— tion produces “complete novelry“ (DR. sim ulacra and death—along with Pop art itself all fade from his work. who intro b 1 have also tended to 5 duces a less disguised/disguiing value to ontogenesis. Specifically the univocity of will to power as both critical and genetic principle. As we hae seen. Affirmation as the necessary “motor“ ofa vital repetition ofdifference will also be a feature of Deleuze‘s onto-aesthetics we will continually come back to. in which we will now turn. it is what disguises as lt is disguised. and is replaced by a much stronger emphasis on the philosoph‘ of Spinoza. 293/375) which is in fact a reference to his theory of the three syntheses of time. memory. Nevertheless. as the freeing ofdifference in the genetic repetition ofa living future. This resonance is what inay “lead us from the sad repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of mernory. beyond its living cancellation. avotd this interpretation in my reading of the simulacrum. creates a past which die present be comes. 57 We will be turning to this philosophy of color in later chapters. Similarly. operates the material rep etitions necessary for the functioning oforganic processes. The second. This is the “critical and revolutionary power“ ofart. remain important thematics for Deleuze (the centrality of Nietzsche and the powers of the false in Onema 2 for example). reperition.e. is finally the very freedom ofart. In the third synthesis time is the repetition ofwhat is to come. but in doing so it operates its law ofeternal return. and The Artist-Philosopher 39 then to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played out“ (DR. that eternally repeats its difference in a simulacrum inseparable from our own dearb. the eternal return and repetition find their paradoxical politics—in the death necessary for life. it is also possible to follow another trajectory through the Nietzschean assernblage of Pop art that ernphasizes its critical. inuch of the Nietzschean assemblage does drop out of Deleuze‘s account.Art as Abstract Machine Repetition that Deleuze moves away from after meeting Guattari. and it is exempli fied in Warhol‘s paintings of Elvis. would be Deleuze‘s afErmarion of Warhol‘s Death andDestruction series. This will finally be where the simulacrum. as it disguises itself) in the other two. dissolving subject and object in a pure differ ence that refuses any identity and is “precisely“ the death instinct (DR. series. 293/375). and Warhol‘s death and disaster paintings seem the perfect expression of this conjunction. eternal return. is the tinie of the future. immanent to the banalities ofmaterial and subjective life. In the reahn of art this shift introduces the centrality of color for Deleuze and I)eleuze and Guattari as the locus ofa sensation that is understood as a living embodiment ofdifference. much of what we have seen hirn develop here re mains the focus of our ongoing exploration of an onto-aesthetics. Despite this (only seemingly) morbid end for the Nietzschean artist philosopher in the sirnulacrum‘s eternal return of death. But death is not a pure outside. but here it is worth noting how this assemhiage ofterms Deleuze uses to articulate Pop art—masks. ‘Ib do this we must return to Deleuze‘s reference to “different levels ofrepetition“ ([)R. and fixes life in apure present that passes. the eternal return. 90/122).

The world is expressive. This means. —---Spinoza. and God exists oniv in being expressed in life. For Spinoza God is immanent and univocal. 1 am God nmost of the time. Again. to make the obvious connection to the previous chapter. Of course with Spinoza the terminoiogy will change. that is expressivity is carried inro the absolute“ (EPS. “a circle whose cen tre is everywhere and circumference nowliere“ (EPS. Fclix Guattari. but nevertheless the univocitv ofbeing. 2 INTRODUCTION “There is. ‘a philosophy of‘life‘ in Spinoza. hut is also the constitution of God himseif Life. and this very indiscernibility will be the principle of a creative life..“ Deleuze writes. we seem far from Nietzsche‘s overcoming of man through the deaeh ofGod. Already the tone has changed from the death and disaseer of Warhol‘s simulacrums. the more we understand God. Spinoza‘s philosophy of life understands ehe individual as an expression ofGod. Once rnore art understood as expression will be inseparahle frorn a process ofconseruceion. it consists precisely in denouncing everything that separates us from life“ (SIi 26/39). as s‘hat is both expressed and constructed in becorning. But perhaps not. 1 6/ 160). meaning its essence is its existence and. God‘s being is becoming. for in Deleuze‘s reading of Spinoza God exists only as the continual trans formations and creations of the actual world. “expression is not sirnply manifestation.Chapter Two Spinoza: Mystical Atheism and the Art of Beatitude The morc we understand singular things. as Deleuze weites. will be Ehe conimon OH tological insight Deleuze draws from both Nieezsche and Spinoza. . 80—1/70). 11v FtI‘. a God Deleuze describes in an old myseical formulation as.

Accordingly “one“ and “many“ become rwo ways efdescribing the same thing. and hence expressions of the essence efSubstance.“ 3 There is ne hetter understanding of Deleuze‘s Expressionism is Deleuze‘s term for the univocity of becoming. Substance expresses itself. 14/10). from which it must be forrned“ (Ethics. must be gene beyond in the critical process by which art overcornes its rational and re active forrns. the expressed (Substance) has no existence outside of its expression (modes). and in univecal being. This radical departure frern traditional Christian theology is implied by Spinoza‘s univocal onteiegy. then this one will step hack from the explicirly artistic realm to expiore its ethi cal and “mvstical“ dimensions. or vitalist process of beceming. 1. nor does he privilege certain aesthetic practices as “ethical. 1. Nature is the infinite unfolding ofwhat expresses it self the explication ef the One in the many. Spinoza wrires: “By Substance 1 understand ‘hat is in itselfand is conceived tbrough it— self. P15) Simply. every actual thing (er mode) is an expression ofGod. D3). which exist as the continual inter-action—---the continual construction— of Nature. a becoming of life inseparable from the heing ofSpinoza‘s univocal and immanent God. a process in which. D6). the genetic. he argued. 39/57). “acts frem the same necessiry frem which he exists. “an expression. God as Substance consists ef an infinity ofattrihutes. that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing. Attribute and Mode. which argues that God only‘ exists as expressed in Nature. For we have shown that the necessity of nature from which he acts is the same as that frem which he exists“ (Ethics. as Deleuze cornments. “er Ged/Nature. But this process is sirnultaneously an implication. This gives risc te Spineza‘s heretical fermula “Dezis sit‘e natum. because an immanent cause is only present in its effects. at certain points 1 will try to show how these concepts can be used to think about art werks as mech anisms of expression. as it were. SUBSTANCE There arc three basic distinctions in Spinoza‘s ontology: Substance. be cause modes express the essence (attributes) ofwhat expresses itself This means. “all things arc in absolute proximity“ (DR. as causa sui or cause ofitself. that is. the One-All ofGod. 37/55). nor discuss “art“ in any specific sense. and so Nietzsche‘s aesthetics arc equally an ethics. God is therefore ab solutely non-hierarchical. Fer Spinoza. and truly begins to live. and God er Substance is the essence ef all existing ex pressions. 1. God exists as active expression in the medes. 1. As Spinoza writes. P25d). is not a suppielnental dimension. lf God as Substance is under— stood only through itseif. all . has an ab solutely infinite power of existing (Ethics. because jr means my ex istence is an expression ofGod. flut this distinction ofessence and existence only appears within the deciaration: “Spinoza and Us.“ he writes. “the whole of narute is one individual. Pref). most of this chapter will move through the key concepts of ihe Ethics. ifin the first chapter we were immediately placed within the context ofa critical art practice. God. As a result. each mode being a modification of Substance. then our understanding ofGed will always be a part ef God. by which the One is censtructed by its mulritudinous expres sions. (Ethics. as Deleuze com ments.“ that God is necessarily immanent in its exprcssions. and as Walt Whitman wrires. Modes express Substance in an actual and determinate way. ofexpressien itself“ (EPS. Modes in relation to the attributes arc. that is. This is an aesthetic formula.42 Art is /lbstritct Machine 43 ongoing process of expressionism. We saw in the previous chapter how Nietzsche‘s concept of art attacks artists who produce nihilistic cultural expressions. and is understood in all its forms as through itself God. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Spineza argued that it is through the things of this world that God is known. Each of these describes a necessary aspect ofa philosophical system in which. defines a way of living. Fer Spinoza. in Spinoza. IV. Pils).“ The univecity of being is expressive because of the rele playecl hy the at tributes. “a song make 1 ofthe One form‘d out of all. DeleuLe writcs. “univocal being is said immediately of individual dif ferences or the universal is said of the most Singular independent of any media tion“ (DR. and refers to art oniy as an implicit ex ample of the ethical world of expression. as SpinoLa famously puts it: “God‘s existence and his essence arc one and the same thing“ (Ethics. as the process ofconstruction expressing will to powel. So in a schematic sense. but this being is univocal. Spinoza argues. each one expressing an eternal and infinite essence of God (Ethics. In Spinoza we will find the definitive formulation ofthis eth ical-aesthctics.“ Indeed. attributes and modes therefore comprise die sysrernatic immanence ef essence and existence in expressive and univocal being. even though he does not consider traditional aesthetic questions. Substance. Nevertheless. attributes express its essence. Nature is beceming because Ged‘s expressive essence exists only in its action: “That eternal and infinite being we call God. expressed according to the essence of each attribute. Substance describes being inasmuch as it is everything. Spineza writes: “Ged must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause ofhimself“ (Ethics. as we shall see. rather than tbrough his revelation in scripture. Consequently Spinoza does not set his ethics against art as a cultural product and practice in the way Nicrzsche does. 1. while medes arc expressions within the attributes. P20). the infinite (un)folding of being in life. is‘hese parts. This is what we could ca 11 Spinozas mys tical “head-start. 1. That is. or Nature. These. Art. and whatever exists cannot bc conceived without God.

Spinoza writes: “By attribute 1 understand what the intellect per ceives ofa Substance. And so it is impossible for us to conceive that God does not act as it is to conceive that he does not exist“ (Ethics.“ tion is nothing. Thought and extension arc parallel attributes for Spinoza because. but in being the formal constituents of God‘s essence they arc also the mechanisms of God‘s expression in differentiated things. the more we experience. “the moral principle“ (EPS. and its living expressions can be equally “natural“ or “unnatural. according to what Deleuze calls the “rule ofconvertibility“ whereby “the essence is not only that without which a thing can neither be not be conceived. and God‘s existence. As Spinoza puts in “God‘s power is nothing except Gods active essence. 9 Spinoza claims we only know two attributes. but is conversely that which cannot be nor be conceived outsidc the thing“ (EPS. P10). and this reading was very influential in the subsequent philosophical demonisation ofSpinoza as an atheist. and what is expressed.“ it‘s perfect. Attributes arc therefore common to Substance and modes. 1. This convertibility of the attributes means they sirnultaneously constitute God‘s essence. that negation becomes purely epistemological. vary in inf:inite ways. and the distinction of attributes. P13s).“ and eludes any distinction between nature and culture. or to anything else“ (Ethics. hut a devaluation of moral consciousncss as the intentional and guiding mechanism of an otherwise . as constituting its essence“ (Ethics.“ Deleuze writes. as we shall sec. P13L7s). 1‘his opposes what Deleuze calls. reason provides a way of understanding God not as an object outside ofus. “the mmd and the hody arc one and the same thing. III. each essence (attribute) being an unlimited. This parallelism has important conse quences. ideas nor bodies arc privileged over the other. this is the beauty of Spinoza‘s philosophy. or being acted on in rnany ways at once. existing only as an incomplete understanding of Substance‘s expression. Spinoza‘s Nature is nothing to do with the “natural. Nature is in stead a name for a vital and inorganic Substance. P25). rejects Hegel‘s claim that we need negation in order to understand being. As a result. expressed in the affectuab relations ofmy body and ideas. just as it does not pre-exist its ac tual expressions. against Spinoza. the labor ofthe negative is a bad of 7 For Deleuze. without any change of the whole individual“ (Ethics. “arc correlates that together constitute expression. The parallelism of the attributes means neither mmd nor matter. The affirmative activity of Substance will be the occasion for Deleuze to extend his critique of “that imbecile Hegel“ and his dialectic. Within the attribute the mode. these modifications occurring in the same order in two parallel series. in it “nega crap. As ideas and bodies arc strictly parallel. now under the attrib ute ofextension“ (Ethics. the more we know about God (Sli 91/118—19). 256/235) running frorn Plato to Descartes (and beyond) in which the mmd or sotil is imagined to be what dc terlilines the body‘s actions. “The unity of Substance. The distinction ofat trihutes is nothing hut the qualitative composition of an ontologically single Substance“ (EPS. II. This does not. II.“ ATTRIBUTES Attributes animate Spinoza‘s system. in its essence and as Gods existence. 1. hut as an immanent and constitutive infinity. which we in 5 Hegel claimed Spinoza troduced in relation to Nietzsche in the last chapter. to rest. Substance (God/Nature) does not pre-exist its attributes. Spinoza puts it simply: “The body cannot deter mine the mm to thinking and the mmd cannot determine the hody to motion. The attributes form the qualita tive composition of an ontologically single Substance. infinite quality of Substance. P3s). is always a certain degree or quan tity of this quality The philosophy ofexpression then. be cause we can only conceive as infinite those qualities—body and mind—that constitute our essence. they arc both expressions ofGod. As Deleuze rather bluntly puts it: “When Hegel says. “ah that one never understood anything ofthe labor of the negative. “in proportion as a body is more capable than others ofdoing many things at once. as he puts it. God is the cause of all things and all ideas. or to act. Attributes arc the way in whicb God remains One/All. III. 11. D4). 117/1 02) as Deleuze calls it. 47/38). Consequently.44 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza 45 bodies. Essence is in finite. Clearly then. because absolutely nothing ever lacks anything“ (SPP 96/125). whose qualitative essences arc ex pressed in its attributes. which is conceived now under the attribute of thought. mean a devaluation of thought in relation to the body. extension and thought. as each is conceived through itself(Ethics. The absence ofdialectical negation in Spinoza‘s ontology means. where every affict of my body corresponds to an affect in my mmd. 6 Deleuze‘s reading ofSpinoza‘s expressionism as implying an entirely active essence and an enrirely affirmative existence. and the intellect can not produce true ideas about Substance without Substance expressing irself in these ideas. This implies an “epistemobogical parallelism“ (EPS. so its mmd is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once“ (Ethics. in its individual expres sions. there is no connection or causal ity berween attributes. begins and ends with an entirely active and affirmative Substance. The attributes arc the immanent formal elements that consti tute God‘s absolute nature. did not understand negation. God‘s essence and ex istence arc expressed in and through the attributes. for. Deleuze argues. and each attribute is an unlimited quality of Substance. P2). and whose quantitative existence is expressed in the ac tions of its rnodes. as Spinoza writes. 182/166).

and through which we participate in the One. “a kind of mystical atheist experience proper ro Spinoza. and only as. 173/157). Spinoza‘s God/Nature is. The Christian God builds on the Platonic concepr of the “Good. This leads us onto a mysric path to wards God seeking ro leave our human being behind. 1 causally. and as we shall see. lt is creative in Nietzsche‘s sense. for whorn: “Only Nature is divine.“ 20 In other words. for expressionism is riothing hut die construcrjon ofnew possibilities for life. in which the whole or One is emanarive. Emanation gives risc to a hierarchy of being as closer or further away frorn the One. A metaphysics ofrhe divine cannot be maintained on the plane of univocal being. we have with it “nothing in com— mon.“ and the neo-Platonic concept of the “One. it avoids a distinc tion between being and non-being. This path finaliy tra-lscends being because being as exisrence is subordinared and outside the transcendent essence ofGod. IG In other words. to deny Spinoza‘s mysticism. not essenrially. will develop his concept ofa univocal and immanent God/Nature in opposition ro hoth. once niore. Finally. any negative theology any method of analogy an)‘ hierar chical conceprion ofthe world“ (EPS. this means that God exists as. God‘s essence is the transcendental caitse ofexistence. and she is not divine. everything is God and tlius God loses bis place.“ ‘This is a strange atheism in which Spinoza ralks of nothing but God. and implies thar God as crearor is outside being. and so cannot be said ofGod. as its immanent bur nonetheless negative shadow. and this will be his irnplicit “anti—Platonism. Here God is the cause of being while remaining in himseif being is his gift but not bis essence. irs expressions. as Deleuze purs ir. God on this account is expressed in the world in representations which cannot lay hold of bis essential (non)being. This project of knowing God. making the One tran scendent and insuring that.“ 18 lt was necessar‘.“ Deleuze explains. express- . as it avoids a diaiectical rnysticisnl working rhrough negation. Deleuze writes: “Immanence is opposed to any cmi nence of the cause. 170/154).“ and stands in direct contrasr ro Spinoza‘s God whose essence is enrirely irnma nent in exisrence. bur imparricipable in itselfor as it self therebygroundingparticipation“ (EPS. As Deleuze explains it: “Ernanation is at once cause and gift: causality by donation. paradoxically. and not in a transcendent dimension. atheistic because its essence ex ists only as its expressions.‘ Spinoza‘s univocal and immanent God is also an alternative to the Christian doctrine of creatio ex frlihilo.U “The giver is above irs gifts. But we only participate in the One rhrough what it gives (being) (rather rhan our being constructing rhe One directIy. As Psuedo-1)ionysus. in which God creates the world from nothing. bur ° For Aquinas. Spinoza‘s Substance exisrs as the affirmative expression of its essence. “asserts and ible and transcendent as the objecr ofa negative rheologv thar denies ofhirn all that is affirmed ofhis immanence“ (EPS. This mysrical spirirualism rests on a rranscendenral metaphysics. “atheism has never been external to religion: atheism is the artisric power at work on religion. univocal being iniplies for Spinoza the rnystical possibil iry of knowing God as God knows itseif Spinoza‘s univocal and immanent God is therefore the conceprual condirion for what Deleuze calls. a bit like the poet Pessoa. Spinoza. because for hirn God as Nature exisrs only as this world. mean ing our knowledge of the world must also be direct knowledge ofGod.“° The “Good“ and the “One“ are rranscendent rerrns frorn which our lives arc de rived.“ 1 Spinoza OOSS rhis tradition. differs radically from the traditional Christian concept of a transcendent God.“ 14 For negative theology God can not be grasped in bis essence. like Njetzsche. ATHEISTIC MYSTICISM expresses himseif in the world as immanent cause. This creation assumes a non-being pre-exisring being. just as it is mvsrical in an arheistic sense. and argues that any statement ofthe type “x is“ is said ofbeings.“ Christianity‘s theology of rranscendence—as a religious Platonism—is exemplified by ‘[‘homas Aquinas‘ sraternent: “God is the essence of all. Similarl) Spinoza‘s God deparrs from the neo-Platonic mys tical tradition emerging frorn Plotinus. parricipable through what it gives. In this sense. 178/161). Meister Eckhart‘s elaborarion of this idea is the most weil known example of this doctrine. 11 The One produces being. “as it is above irs products. 1) Deleuze argues that Spinoza‘s atheist “God“ is in fact the condition ofhis “radical emanciparion“ from both a religious and philosophical rranscendence. This is not however. despite surface sirnilariries. and is expressed in Meister Eckhart‘s claim: “Scripture always exhorts us ro go out of this world. and againsr which they arc judged. and as Deleuze argues in relation to Spinoza. and laid out on a mysrical path of redernption/reabsorprion. for Spinoza to talk ofGod in die seventeenth centtiry aithough jr did not pre venr bis excommunicarion from rhe Jewish church. ofcourse. as a gift that we receive. nor name nor knowledge of jr. Spinoza provides a new body along with new ideas to understand jr. as second order realities. hut by productive donation“ (EPS. and. but to affirm thar in formulating a mysrical un derstanding ofGod‘s univocity Spinoza deciares his atheism. 171/155). and who remains inexpress The aim ofSpinoza‘s ethics will be to know God—God as Nature—but. an important early exemplar of this tradition purs it: “l‘bere is no speaking of it [die divine]. becanse this is by definition outside of human in telligence. Nevertheless.46 Art as Abstract Ivlachine Spinoza 47 inert bodv—the hodv is set free. Spinoza‘s atheism is a mystical affirmation of God‘s immanence in life. as Plotinus argues.

But as we bave seen. “im has to be construcred if one is to live in a Spinozist manner“ (SP1 123/165). as we have seen. The ethical question of how ro live therefore becomes a question of how one constructs rhis plane ofimmanence.Art as Abstract A‘Iachine ing a God/Nature enrirely immanent in its expressions. Deleuze suggests that Spinoza‘s univocity retains a hierarchi cal distinction between Substance and modes. a rrajectory that is.. that is. my account of a Spinozian ethical—aesthetics will explore its arheistic mysticism. P6d). 111. and has an infinite power ofexpression. in order to experience our real conditions (God/Nature) as they arc constructed in our expressions. as Narure. the Spinoza versal aecording to wliicli being is said of bccoiuing. As a resuir.r tip cII “-h r—r. is this permanent becoming. which. am this poinr. of an emanative Being. Unlike Substance. “is no Ionger the affirma tion ofa single substance. 24 In Di/J‘rence andRepetition Deleuze seems to question the univocity of Spinoza‘s Substance hy confionring jr with Nietzsche‘s formulation ofeternal return. 21 Spinoza‘s mystical atheism will therefore he the formula f‘or an ethical-aestherics that is critical in Nietzsche‘s terms. Nietzsche appears here as the necessary (Deleuzian) condition ro understanding Spinozian Substance and its “expres sive immanence. Deleuze argues that Substance is consrituted by an infinity ofartributes. be the simultaneous construcrion of an immanent (and therefore atheist) God in its essence. as Deleuze puts it. as the overcoming of religious transcendence in order to live a creative life.e. etc. ihere still rcmains a difterencc hetween Substance and the modes: Spinoia‘s Suhsrance appears indcpendenr ofrhe inodes. but rather the laying our ofa common plane ofimma nence on which all bodies. in the form ofpar ticular things. culminates in an understanding ofGod in which we find our higbest expressive power. 1. while the rnodcs arc dcpcnd ein on Substaiice. indiscemnible from Deleuze‘s construction of wh. which is the cause of all things“ (Ethics. inasmuch as ir is. all minds. “or modes by which God‘s attrihutes arc expressed in a cerrain and dererminare way“ (Ethics. P36d). 1. the modes arc being in something else (Ethics. Deleuze wrires.“ 22 For Spinoza art mnust be arheistic in order to escape a meraphysics of representation. but through their constantly variable relations this is a dynamic whole undergoing conrinual transformation. by affirming a univocal being in hecoining (i.“ Spinoza writes. KT. which express the essence ofSubstance 25 This will allow tbe modal expression of Substance in existence to (arrribures). while simultaneously and inseparably expressing God‘s essence in the existence of the modes. (DR 40/59) 49 “transformation of constraints into a means of creation. Such a condition can be satisfied oniv at the orice oFt more pelleral caft oricai re— Deleuze believes thar unless Subsrance is said only of the modes Spinoza‘s God runs the risk of re-introducing a transcendenr term. As a result God. D5).-L “2( . Extrinsic parts (modes) form a whole. immanent to the modes and is expressed only in and as the process ofmodal becoming wbich constructs it. Substance is. Suhsrance must itseif be said ofrhe modes and only ofthe inodes. in the creation ofGod/Nature itself.t ‚ln-t-. and requires a Nietzschean “correction“ to become truly immanent. They arc modifications ofSubstance. to realize univocity in die form ofrepetition in die eternal return“ (DR. As Deleuze and Guarrari pur it: “Whar we arc talking about is not the uniry of substance bot the infiniry ofthe modificarions that arc part of one another on this unique plane of life“ (AFP 254/311). 2 MODES AND TIIEIR AFFECTS.“ Deleuze explains. and about I)eleuze‘s changing evaluation of Spinoza‘s philosophy of iinmanence. the one ofrhc multiple. 304/389). The modes arc the expression ofGod. 1. univocal being as the repetition of eternal return). a plane of immanence. just as it must be mvsrical in expressing the univocity of God/Narure. for. identitv of that which is diffcrent. as Spinoza says quite specifically: “Whatever exisrs expresses the nature. This will mean the trajectory Deleuze takes after 1968 does not follow the “correcrion“ of Spinoza bv Nietzsche. In response to this problem Deleuze posits a Nietzschean Spinoza: “All that Spinozism needed to do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was to make Substance turn around the m odes—in other words. and all individuals arc siruated“ (SPP 122/164). but suffice to say ir is the trajectory of Spinozas apotheosis in Deleuze‘s rhoughr. or essence ofGod in a certain and determinate way. but insread rends ro privilege Spinoza‘s system inasmuch as it was already Nietzschean. the “categorical rever sal“ Deleuze requires to fully afDrm Spinoza‘s Substance can he found in bis reading of Spinoza‘s attributcs in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. and as expressed in the modes. P25c see also Ethics. This raises many interesting questions abour Spinoza‘s relation to Nietzsche. wharever exists expresses in a certain and dererminate way the power of God. “What is involved. Undersranding whar this could mean will form the bulk of whar follows. Spinozas mystical atheism is therefore Christianiry‘s own artistic power. and their expressions in modes exist on the same plane. 1 argue. The aerributes borb constirute God‘s essence as Substance. This means Subsrance (being) is defined en tirely in terms of the modes (becoining). which is being in itseif. where rhe attributes simulraneously con stimme the essence of Substance.“ This reading would avoid the danger Deleuze indicates. “Particular things arc nothing but affections of God‘s artrib utes. and forming an infi nitely changeable universe. published the same year as D/J‘rence andRepetition (1968). hut as tbough en sornctbing otber than tbcmsclvcs.

although.“ and in this echo ofArraud kilis God just as surelv as we will see Artaud kill man‘s or 28 ganism. as one who had heen humiliated and punished. punishing our guilt when ir is not obeyed. ofour joy and sadness. 1. quite sirnply. There is no prewritten divine plan. Christianity is the obvious example of such a system. rather than judge an object rhrough a moralistic aesthetic. we must always attend to those things which arc good in each thing so that in this way we arc always determined to acring from an affect ofjo/‘ (Ethics. As Spinoza writes. Spinoza explains.“ he writes. Life is a question ofselection and affirmation.P39s). Existence is com posed of bodies continually commg into contact with other bodies in chance encounters. More usually. V. Once more. What is good always remains to be discovered. bot of sensing whether ibey . Modes arc determined through their continual interaction. IV. replaces Morality which always refers existence to transcendenr values“ (EPS. And hy sadness. and that as we change for the better or worse. the art-work. Spinoza uses the terms “joy‘ and “sadness“ to describe these changes. is maximum joy. Aesthetic experience in Spinoza‘s terms is always under con struction as the ethical process of selecting those encounters that increase our power and perfection. As a result. this also changes our concept of the subject. for. We arc. What is perfect and therefore good is sim ply what increases our power to act. in art could ever hear on the work to corne? lt is not a question ofjudging otber existing beings. The art-work exists wirhin an affecrual economy ofemergence. in the heart ofa participatory critical process that defines the artwork. II. These modal (de)compositions constitute the tenor ofour lives. not ofjudgment. which is itseif the effect of some other thing. estahiishiiig God as the ex ternal authority on behalf of vhich one judges. a hall ofjudgment. Deleuze is explicir on this point: ‘X h 1 at expert judgment. This typology ofaffect can obviously be used in considering art. and our typol ogy is always conditional on each new encounter. once again. Deleuze argues. every finite thing being an effect of another thing. and appears onl according to its local and singular condirions. Thomas Bernhard gives a beautiful description of this horror: “Whenever 1 entered the chapel. App. P28). P16). the more a mode is positively affected. “1 shall understand in what follows that passion by which the mmd passes to a greater perfection. and cannor be “understood“ (in the precise sense we will see Spinoza give ro this rerm) by any kind ofjudgment. But our joy and sadness arc not predetermined.“ 2 Spinoza‘s Ethics “Have Done with judgmenr. we arc required to sense the real forces at play in the artistic field. and this is defined only by the immanent conditions ofeach encounter. Spinoza‘s Ethics offers a practical program for the production of joy which is underermined by any metaphysical concepts by which we could judge it. PlOs). This modal relation forms an affecr ‘ctus) as either the greater (composition) or lesser (decomposition) perfec— 2 («fl tion ofthe mode resulting from irs interaction with other modes. But such a system is always despotic. Spinoza‘s Ethics is therefore an tithetical to a morality and is another reason it appeals to Deleuze: “Ethics. As Spinoza sug gests: “The idea of any mode in which the human body is affected hy external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same rime the na ture of the external bod‘ (Ethics. “a thing is never separable from its relations with the world“ (SPP 125/168).I11). “even at the age offifteen or twenty. 1. For Spinoza joy is found in a process of perfection that doesn‘t assume a pre-existing concept of the perfect. aa‘ iifinitwn (Ethics. “in ordering our thoughts and images. 111. 269/248). The modes as affections (afJcrio) arc deter mmcd on this infinire plane of modal interaction by their dynamic relations. and is produced in the experimenral relations we have with the world. the more jr can act. Deleuze writes. lt is irnpervious to lived particularity and dc— mands oniy obedience. 128/160). as Spino7a rather sar castically points mit: “Men have been so rnad as to believe that God is pleased by harmony‘ (Ethics. and “condemns Us tO an endless servitude and annuls any libratory process“ (ECC. Perfection is measured in terms ofa mode‘s power ofacting. emerging only in the affectual selections that arc made. V. lt seemed to mc a place ofterror and damnation. that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection“ (Ethics. For Spinoza as for Nietzsche.“ he writes. a process understood as an increase or decrease in power rather than as an ohject already determined. “we live in continuous change. which results in maximum power. and this would be the starting point ofa Spinozian ethical aesthetics. which is ro say a typology of immanent modes ofexistence. Spinozian ethics involves making a typology ofour modal affects. The affect of oy causes the body to be afIcted in a greater numher of ways. as the subject is similarly processual.50 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza 5] Let‘s take a closer look at the modal world ofbecoming. (Ethics. which presupposes an otherworldly truth represented by metaphysical idols and moral symbols. we arc called happy or unhappy“ (Erhics. as the changing appear ance offorces that arc no longer simply “subjective“ in an organic or psycholog ical sense. and in this sense they arc “images or corporeal traces“ (SP1 48/68) ofeach other. is this process ofconstruction. This is what Deleuze means when he says Spinoza‘s is an ethics ofaffirma tion. Pils). “By joy. or the work ofart. 1 could see the relentless fingers ofthe udges pointing down at mc. a lofrv courtroom where sentence was passed on mc. erhically un derstood. and 1 always left the chapel with nw head bowed. lmportantlv. The aim of life. God‘s judgmenr descends on us frorn on high and damns us for our sins. P38) whereas sadness decreases a body‘s power to be affected. and maximum ac tion.

Existing modes arc composed of an infinity ofextended parts in relations of movemerit and rest. as he puts it. Modal essences exist in a reciprocal and differential determination ofeach other. an existence that expresses God. both find their cause in God. hut is Deleuze writes. In Spinoza‘s ethical-aesthet ics the question ofart would be. That is. ac cording to their essence or degree ofpower. to the rigors of organitation. Pref). in the studio. that is. This necessity is that of an idea comprised in the idea ofGod. all too human form ofunderstanding: our imagination. V P22d). P7). the second modal existence. it is through the capacity ofthe modes to affect and to be affected. Spinozti 53 ‘lb have done with judgment in evaluating art means overcoming the organiza don ofthe subject and object. an ethical practice. “a sort of ultimate determination re sulting fiom the essence‘s cause“ (EPS. “an actually infinite collection. (a becoming—“Affects are becomings“ (ATI 256/314)) and emerges in a pt) of participation. in which each essence conforms with all of the others. as the increase or decrease in a body‘s power to act. In other words. and requiring transcendeiital values to maintain every thing in its proper place (art in the gallery the market. or force. and entering the artwork to construct its process of expressive emergence. an idea caused hy God. Before consider ing this culminating moment of understanding however. we will understand the in dividuation ofmodes. since to pose the problem in ernis offirce. that is. already surpasses all subjectivity. an actually infinite whole“ (EPS. understanding modal essence will mean under standing the expressive power of the infinite whole ofGod in its actual expres sion as existing modes. “to make exist. modal essence does not cause modal existence. 1. or whether they return us to the miscries of war. but that ofwhich it is said differs“(DR. 184/167 see also 198/181). For Spinoza: “God is the cause. 36/53). MODAL ESSENCE All modes have an intensive and extensive quantity. Thus God direcdy produces each essence together with all the others. according to the intensive quantity chat consti . and as we shall see. Tbis essence or power is caused by and exists in God eternally. each of which is infinite. Beyond this essential threshold a mode simply exists as something else. . That is. III. Art as affect is constructed in this proces sual life of modes. existing modes themselves have God as their direct cause“ (EPS. [ ] Tliis is not subjecrivism. anti the passions it evokes. defines the mode‘s power to persevere in its being (Ethics. whether or not the mode itselfexists. as Deleuze puts it. and form a plane immanent to all modes. hut also of its essence. it is as such that it expresses the imma nent infinity of God/Nature. As Spinoza had said. 1361169) . that difference emerges in modal becoming. “consider[s] human actions anti appetitesjust as 29 Art is therefore it were a question oflines. (ECC. A Spinozian ethical-aesthetics. but as long as a particular rela tion of movement and rest exists berween modes. The essence of a mode is immanent to its existence. and under stands this expression as a becoming through which God constructs and so tmderstands itself This will be the atheistic mysticism of art. to the poverty ofthc dream. as what lives. 194/176). a system of mutual implications. forming as Deleuze puts it. by a certain eternal ne cessity. on the wall. Art does not appear in a judgment assuming our ex teriority to die work. 194/177). hut because modal essences exist on a univocal plane of being immanent to existence. not to judge“ (ECC. “each finite heing must be said to express the absolute. This implies a revaluation of the subject-object relation as it is usually understood. Spinoza argues. which there fore must be conceived through the very essence ofGod. but not in our life. Consequently. and as it operates in aesthetics. Existence is not added to essence as a distinct actuality (for they remain immanent). The art work is constituted by modes and their affects. by the joy or sadness which defines its becoming. P24). For an ethical-aesthetic will affirm joyful affects in con structing a new mode ofexistence. Essences all agree on their immanent plane. The first constitutes modal essence.“ Deleuze argues. whether they bring forces to us. and not in other terms. The composition ofextended nature fluctuates in the con tinuous variation ofits affections and affects. which thereby find their cause in God. How is this possible in a univocal ontol ogy? Modal essence. it expresses a modal essence or power. but nevertheless exists independendy ofthe modes existence. not only ofthe existence of this or that human body. and this concept must be in God“ (Etbics. these affects emerging in a perception of the work that constitutes a singular body defined by its increasing or decreasing power and perfection. Spinoza writes: “The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence“ (Ethics. and as such expresses an increase or decrease in power. not as a question oflife ). In understanding modal essence. Deleuze states. Modal essences form an important part of Deleuze‘s interpretation of Spinozian univocity for it is essence as degree ofpower that will provide the mechanism by which: “Being is said in a single and same sense ofeverything ofwhich it is said. it is a problem of love and hate and not judgmcnr. as opposed to an object or idea which finds its cause in relation to other objects or ideas (modes). which express a degree of intensity (modal essence or power). planes anti bodies“ (Ethics. This will lead us otit of our human. 135/169). Art emerges it is created—in our experimental relations. “essences form a total system. III. we must consider the rest of Spinoza‘s system. “Thus. and in which all essences arc involved in the production of each.52 Art as Abstract Machine agree or disagree with us.

142/128). and with out a consciousness—idea. III. III. and because each modal essence is deterrnined through its relation to all others. At this point however. 139/125). Individuation for Deleuze. without an organism-body. as each mode increases or de creases its power in the vibration of inorganic life. As a result. As Spinoza writes: “The irnages of things arc affections of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies as present to us“ (Ethics. 1971180). II. Once more. This idea of an object is the objective reality of the idea. This apparent problem for univocity finds its answer in Deleuze‘s insistence the mutual implication ofessences. and requires us to consider more closely how understand ing ernerges and operates. “the things we know ofGod belong to God in the same form as that in which we know thern. modal essence as power is simply a certain capacity to aff‘ect and be affected. and as moda] essence. to the degree of its power“ (EPS. But every idea also exists in the attribute of thought as a rnodal essence. That is. Ifwe wish to reach a true understanding of art according to a Spinozian ethical-aestbetics. it is said to imag inc. Insofar as the mmd has such representative ideas. Ethical-aesthetics will therefore begin with the epistemological prob 1cm of the proper way to think. or other essences. Because modal essence exists in God as it does in modes. hut it is a consciousness that will no longer be subjecu and will be Inasmuch as we have ideas. ThL existence and the essence of the modal idea together titute con sciousness. How? Every iclea has as its object something that exists (i. the . and as such it is independent ofthe mmd that thinks it. lt means we imagine that an artworlc is heautiful. P27d). as Deleuze posed it in DfJ2‘renceana‘Repetition. there remains the problem of the independence of Substance. As Deleuze puts it. which in the attribute of thought. This essenrial aspect of the idea constitutes the formal realitv of the existent and objective idea:° liiese two re alities of the idea coexist in any given idea as its reflexive (objective) and expres sive (formal) aspects. according. This introduces another impor tant aspect to Spinozas philosophy. but each one corresponds to a specific degree of power different from all the others“ (SPI 651100). What we must now understand is the process of reason re quired to adequately understand ideas in their modal essence. Unsurprisingly. hut we dont understand this affectual relation in its essence. For in fact all modes express an essence. and to creatures who imply and know them“ (EPS. or in Deleuzian terms. an)‘ understanding of God will be found in the ideas.e. INADEQUATE IDEAS Within the attribute all essences agree because they share God as their ef ficient and material cause. This subjectless and eternal thought is the thought of God. As we have seen.“ This thought. able to think itself as divine. we are not fiir away frorn Deleuze‘s reading of Nietzsche‘s will to power as a quantity of force appearing in qualities. and it is what we strive for in our understanding. we will have to overcome imaginative representations and the subjcctive consciousness that supports them. is always in tensive. hut arc simply representations ofobjects relative to us (Ethics. and speed and slowness (Ethics. understanding modal essence will be a matter of understanding modal relation. and together form God‘s infinite whole under that attribute or essence. and is the aim ofSpinoza‘s nwstical atheism. This knowledge however ordered. op erates in eternity and without a subject. As Deleuse puts it: “They [essences] are all compatible with one an other without limit. is inadequate as it imagines our experience ofthe world entirely in terms of the affects of objects upon Us. either a thing or another idea). hecause all arc included in the production ofeach one. These images arc what Spinoza calls inadequate ideas because they teIl us nothing ofour. This means a materialist thought as inuch as a materialist mysticism. that any means of understanding essence must he immanent to existence. they arc representative ideas and shouldn‘t be con fused with the idea that we arc. tbat is. but not all essences involve existence. This implies—contra Descartes—a thought without an “1 am. in knowing a modal essence we will know God. in a form com mon to God who possesses them. This means consciousness no longer implies a subject as a psychological character or a moral entity consciousness heitig simply the af fect or “trace“ (objective idea) of an essence (formal reality) found in the attrib ute of thought. that is. l3ut modal existence is constantly hecoming. inasmuch as this constitutes our essence or formal reality We don‘t have this idea we arc immediately. P23d). which means all modal existence expresses all the modal essences. I)eleuze savs. The ideas that we have on the other hand. reflexive ideas represent our random encounters and the consequent variation of affects according to their imagined causes.Art as Abstract Machine SpillOZil tutes its essence. and this will mean understanding how the becoming of modal existence expresses the cre ative dvnamism of God. and how they ex press God‘s immanence in existence. a capacity which determines the individuated lirnits ofmodes in their constitutive relations of motion and rest. arc those given to us through perceptions of affections and affects. these aspects being. PI3LI). in Spinoza as much as in Nietzsche. and this idea can in turn become the object of another idea. despite the fiict that not every modal essence has a modal existence. arc both ours and Gods. “one and the same thing“ (EPS. which Spinoza will develop in the third type of knowledge. As a result. the proper image of thought.

just as therc arc none betwccn the natural and artificial: “Artifice. Although joy is rclated to what is good. ADEQUATE IDEAS / COMMON NOTIONS Spinoza argucs that good and bad can only be undcrstood in tcrrns of actual mocial relations. Therefore the liberation of man‘s understanding from its human limitations will also mark a new mode of existence for art. or reduces. and in this sense. “1 call bondage. as the affcct of somcthing on US from outsidc. that all the notions hy which ordinary people arc accus— tomed to cxplain Naturc arc only modcs ofimagining. ‘ As a result. to understand our relations to die world. Rather it is lack ofpowcr that is bad. “lack ofpowcr consists only in this. and an inability of the mode to ac tivcly express thc power of its cssencc. caught in an in complete understanding. 1 retain this same imaginative cpistemological relation. 1 ca 11 themn beings. For the man who is subjcct to affccts is under thc control. therefore. and the power to act that is good. This ncw way of understanding involves a radical revaluation ofvalue. Spinozas ontology therefore carries remarkable episternological consequences: “There is nothing positive in ideas. [ 1 For the pcrfection oftbings is to be judgcd solely froni their nature and powcr i. But whar dctermincs good and bad as thc increasc or decline ofmy power ofaction? As we bavc seen. and what is good for us agrees with our nature and incrcascs our power of action (Ethics.“ 32 For in the inadequate idea of an imagina tion. Spinoza argues. and the flcsh combining with the dashboard. even those that arc. 1. III. things arc not more or less pcrfect hccausc rhcy please or offend meu‘s senscs. as ifthey were lnotionsl ofbeings existing outsidc the imagination. or at least our way of imagining such negative affects. “Man‘s lack ofpower to modcrate and re strain the affccts. for it is only frorn our point of vicw as human subjects that a relation could be bad. bad things.e. General definition ofthc Affects). As we shall sec. Pref). Deleuze‘s example is a car crash in which the fire that burns.“ Dcleuze writes. What is bad for us iS contrary to. sad affects 3 and all other negations arc simply symptoms of an inadequate and anthro pocentric uncierstanding (we could say “evaluation“) of the world. indicates a lack ofpower.“ Spinoza writes. in the midst of its constant compositions. On the other hand. or imagination. 1 still expcriencc what Spinoza calls a passion. Whencvcr we regard something as false. Modes arc captured by their imaginative representations. and how these feel ings determine our judgmcnrs of jts qualities. one in which we will have understood nothing. from our perspective. only the constituuon of the imagination. (Ethics. or incompatible with. rather than by anything intrinsic to art. as effected. a failure to select and affirm. our powcr ofac tion. II. determines the mmd to think ofthis rather than that“ (Ethics. by which the iiiind afTirrns ofits body. We sec. wherher good or bad. not ofhirnsclf hut offortune. and do not indicate the nature of anything. In Nature. ifwe remain at the level of the human imagination. according to the quality of our affccts as they express the changes in our embodied power. This determination ofwhat the mmd thinks by an imagined outsidc causc. understanding life in its real conditions will mean overcoming the false consciousness ofhumans. in Deleuze‘s hands. die pas sions ofjoy and sadness arc not the same as what is good and bad. in whose power he so grcatly is that often. accorcling to Spinoza. though he sees thc better for himsclf he is still forced to follow the worse“ (Ethics. A ncw image of thought will mean a new artistic image. this will becomc a libera tion from the human itself We can casily sec how art exists on the level ofthe imagination. and negate it. or because they arc of use to. however. “a confused idea.56 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoztz 57 process of representation operates through a human consciousness.I11) Spinoza offers a new evaluative framework for our understanding oflife. ofart or ofanything. is that cach onc has judgcd things according to the disposition of his brain. even ifthese arc joyful. “is fully a part ofNature“ (SPP 124/167). as the causc ofour feelings ofjoy or sadncss. or of some part of it. 1 have only a “privation ofknowlcdge“ (Ethics. This means humanity. P33). csscnccl. The problem witb this. arc all compositions. Spinoza libcratcs man from the bondage of the passions and. and could decompose our modal integrity From the point of view ofNature every relation is affirmative and expresses an increase. hecause it requires a pre-existing subjectivity. human naturc. IV. thc passions ofjoy and sadness always arise from the imagination. P29—30). we arc sirnply having an inadequate idea. there arc no distinctions between the human and inhuman. Thus wc can only imaginc passions. 1 understand only the cffect (as decomposition) and not the cause (the composition in Nature). P35). a greater or a lcsscr force of existing than before. As Spinoza has it. that a man allows himsclfto bc guided by . in which life is simply a series ofcauses and effects taking place betwcen individual things. II. or rat her has acccptcd affcctions of the imagination as things. As Deleuze rather wryly comments: “Sadness makes no one intelligent. “on account of which they can be called Luise“ (Ethics. App. which. will only be a hindrance to understanding God/Nature. Like Nietzsche. the air that cscapes its comptession in the tires. But we can also sec how art‘s cx istencc as thc causc of those fcclings is dercrmined by man‘s faculty of imagination. IV. or when we arc ourselvcs negated and feel sad. when it is givdn. not ofreason. This means good and bad do not exist outside the material fluctuations ofour own being. disasters. And be— causc tliey have names. when 1 understand an effect as causing mc joy. rather than understand them.“ he writes. but ofimagmanon.

and a thing is no longer identified by asking “what is it?“ but by the question “what does it do?“ what is jr for mc? Deleuze explains the consequences: “Concretely. that is. This revaluation removes art from its representarional and inadequate frarne of the subject-object.“of God. V. and leads to a clear and distinct idea of what is shared hy two modes. that a clear and distinct idea ofwhat is common to the bodies in question. Alternatively we feel sad ness for the opposite reason. you will define it by the affects ofwhich it is capahle“ (SPP. for there is no pleasure in that—this is the part of the wise man“ (Ethics. differences. P32). As a result our understanding of affects. You will define an animal. The art of creating joyful af fects will in this way find its “higher concepr“ in an understanding indiscernible from an atheist rnysticism.] For no one has yet corne ro know the strucrure of the body so accurately that he could explain all its functions“ (Ethics. as Deleuze puts it. the more we must participate in the divine nature. In understanding we turn our attention frorn irnagined effects to modal affect. P3c). to the point wbere we arc disgusted with them. involves the nature of the idea. And as a result: “The second principle question of the Ethics is thus: What must we do to produce in ourselves active affections?“ (EPS. and oppositions“ (Erhics. will come through knowing our body‘s “agree rnents. IV. many things change. for then it is determined to action by noth ing other than its own power (i. demands“ (Ethics. III. 274/253). how may we create and understand joy? How may we understand the world from our own point ofview (from our active force). and reposes the question of its function in terms of understanding its affects. P45s). we know noth ing aborit a body until we know what it can do. “transcends . As a restilt. How arc we to have adequate ideas of the essence of things? The first step. and our ethical abil ity to select the good ones. and its functions. P2s). and when the understanding grasps this essence it has an adequate idea. Ethology starts with an understanding of the affects. lt will be by doing what its own nature demands. forming a true (clear and distinct) idea ofit (Ethics. in its essence. and the less the mmd is acted on by it“ (Ethics. and not as a subject either. [. 255/134). or a human being. lt is rhrough joy therefore. not what his own nature.e. and particular ro. IV. Thus. as a passion. Deleuze finds this “higher concepr“ in what he calls Spinoza‘s “war cry“(EPS. This is when it will trulv be active. and what it is that enables the joyful affect they produce. and is equally in the part and in the whole ofeach ofthem. their “common no tion“ as Spinoza calls it emerges. our understand ing of its essence will begin from an inadequate understanding of its affect. To use things. 11. P59d). therefore. its organs. Spinozas claim that “no one has yet determined what the body can do. form the “second“ kind of knowledge through which we will be able to pass to the “third.. or compose a more powerful hody. P3). P29s). Spinoza ex— plains: “The more an affect is known tO us. This path ro the absolute requires a rigorous program of experi mentation. according to capacities of affect and af fection rather than any pre-existing identificatory schema. These questions compose a Spinozian ethical-aesthetics. For Deleuze. Spinoza offers philosophy a new model with this war cry—the bod 3 but the body as a process of material experimenration. But in fact these questions include those concerning the production of art. and whether its relations with other bodies decompose it. As Spinoza argues. ‘«An affect which is a passion. or adequate ideas. and this change introduces US to what Deleuze calls “ethology“ Bodies now appear. when our power ofaction has been decreased by another mode. This will be Spinoza‘s “higher concept“ ofart. as we have noted before. As we can only experience an affect.. “ceases to be a passion as soon as form a clear and disnnct idea of it“ (Ethics. at least initially.58 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza 59 things outsidc hirn. the human body and certain external bodies by which the human body is usually affected. 1241166).“ Spinoza writes. Common notions. then. and from the realrn ofrhe passions. That is. We know that when we feel joy it is hecause joining forces with that of an other mode has compounded our power of action. 1)2). 11. in acting according to its essence or power that a mode will do good. 273/252). and to be determined by thern to do what the common con stitution ofexternal things demands. ifyou dc fine bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected. IV. not by its Form. and take pleasure in them as far as possible—not. right up to the overcoming of its own limits in the mystical stare of heatitude. Ethology takes us beyond the form to understand the affectual dynamic of life. and as it is related to all other essences in and as God? These may seem questions unrelated or only distantly related to those ofart. II. This makes joy the prerequisite and first step towards understanding modal essence in common notions. V. its idea will he ad— equate in the mmd“ (Ethics. each in crease gives the body more power and more understanding (for Spinoza knowl edge is power). As Spinoza puts it: “ifsornething is common to. of course. the greater the perfection ro which we pass. as an external body acting upon ours. typical for the sevenreenrb cenrury. This leads Deleuze ro clearly state the line ofethical af firmation laid out by Spinoza: “The primary question of the Etliics is thus: What must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions?“ (EPS. What is shared in a joyful affect is a common modal essence. what its affects arc. the more it is in our power. and revalue thern as ethical and ontological questions. by irs real conditions) and by an understand ing that is entirely adequate (Ethics. “the greater the joy with which we arc affected. The more affections a body is capable ofthe more joy it experiences. P39). considered in it seif. it is reason that separates an aftct frorn its imagined external cause. as experirnentation is the way a body.

Concepts.60 Art as Abstract MaL hine Spinoza 6! its limits in going to the limit ofwhat it can do“ (DR. gives us an anti-Platonic physiology ofart. that is. in its drunkenness. will always be determined by the capacity of our body to experience life—our real conditions—and the process of understanding God (as weil as ofcreating art) will alwavs he carried out through a process ofexperimenta tion with the body. As a result: “Tue moreper/t‘ction each t/‘ing has. For Spinoza. “pure aFfects impiy an enterprise ofdesubjectification“ (ATI 270/330). for Deleuze. The result of acting according to ethical reason. inasmuch as understanding is an afNrmation ofour power to act in which an imagined joy expresses a common notion. ro what is good. We arc now in a position to understand more fuily the role ofaffirmation in Spinoza. each finite being must be said to express the absolute. that which it has to overcome to reach thinking. For Spinoza the formula is a simple one. that is. or which fol Iows adequately from his virtue“ (Ethics. 37/55). . 197/180). This path begins from discovering our maximum possible numher ofaffects. affirmation is the mechanism by which God is expressed.: The mind‘s striving. [ 1 ‘We do not even know what a body can do‘: in its sleep. that Spinozas Ethics like Nietzsche‘s thought. in forming common notions. II. is its very essence. thoughts in which an unknown body as the unknown of thought emerges.“ 3 The path ofreason.“ he writes. or power. Deleuze says: “Experimentation on oneseif. or at least the radical minimization ofpassions (Ethics. or posits. and this will have impor tant consequences for an aesthetics constructed on its basis. we understand our jov as the result of a common flotion. and Deleuze‘s reading of Spinoza quickly pushes beyond such inadequate ideas. in its efforts and resistances. according that is. To the point where. “is no longer the obstaclc that separates thought from itseif. This means. according. this existence now being understood in its essence and hence as an expression of the absolute. overcomes the human in us understanding of essence and ultimately of God.: He wbo has a hody capabic of doing a great many diings is least rroubled by cvii affects. V P20s). This process will culminate with the removal. the more we understand the essences it expresses. So he has the power of ordering and connectmg the affec— tions of his hody according te the order of the inteiiect—consequently. The nawre of our ideas therefore. IV. As Spino7a puts it. to the degree of its power (EPS. involve knowledge ofour selves. “insofar as he is determiried to do something from the fact that he understands. from imagination to understanding. he acts. V. (Ethics. and as this is in princi ple infinite. V. Art.Beyond our um— its we have thoughts that overcome our consciousness. is our only identity. this essence being in itseif an expression ofGod. P23d). hut in direct relation to Spinoza. “1 say concept rather than perception. in order to reach the unrhought that is life. an expression and affirmation ofour own power ofacting (ofour essence. its capacity.e. Spinoza will argue. but the mind‘s essence (as is known through itseif) affirms oniy what the mmd is and can do. In an art of common riotions experimentation is nothing bist the expression of . Spinoza writes: “7 w 7 mmd strives to imaine only those things which posit its power ofacting. subjective represen tations. anti converset» the ‚nore it acis. but as expressions of immanent essences. lt is on the contrary that which it plunges into or must plunge into. (SPI 17/28) This “un known“ is so only from the point ofview ofthe limits of human consciousness and organic integrity however. . But concepi seems to express an action ofth mmd‘ (Ethics. P54). D3. Dem.“‘ Understanding. for it is through affirming my power ofauting that 1 express myselfas essence. the more affects the hody is capable of the more knowledge it will have (Ethics. on rhis .“ I)eleuze writes in (inema 2. its postures“ (C2. P14). an understanding of our affects not as imaginative. Through this process of understanding tbought opens out to an understanding of its own infinity Spinoza argues that the move from the first to the second kinds ofknowl edge. As Deleuze and Guattari succinctly put it. forever seeking what the body cari do. ac cording to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence. their modal essence) constitutes risc singularity of their modal existence. is nothing hut this experimental construction of common notions eventually leading to ideas ex pressing a mystical knowledge ofand as God. “The body. the more it acts anti the less it is acted oiz. by affccts contrary ro our nature. Affirmation is the active expression of essence. II. its power ofacting“ (Ethics. essence as the production. P40). adequately understood. III.Exp. involves the transformation of per ceptions of objects mnto concepts of essence. So it strives to imagine only what affirms. the more perfrct it is“ (Ethics. As Spinoza writes: He w/o has a body capable ofa great many things has a mmd whose great Dem. P39) est ptlrt is eterna!. WC till— derstand how it is an action. not what it is not and cannot do. of a new bod a bodv con structed of common notions. in order to understand the eternal essence(s) of (od. that is the construction. will be acting ac cording to what increases our power. To think is to learn what a non-thinking body is capable of. that is does sornething which is perceived through his essence alone. As Deleuze puts it.). The degree ofeach things power (i. 189/246). or formal reality). we must live in a constant process of experimentation. of bringing it ahout that all the affcctions of the body arc reiared to the idea ofGod. “because the word perception seems to indicate that the mmd is acted on hy die object. I‘he more we know of what a body can do.

To have an adequate idea or concept of an essence means to have an adequate understanding of all essences. Ii. hut it is an inadequare one that must assume a position ourside of irs ob jecr in order ro create an analogical sign for it. but cannor be understood as such. what iorcllect must necessarily be iii Nature. and there arc no affections other than those which arc in God and which can neither he nor hc conccived without God. P48). hut these affects arc derermined by the modal essences they express. dispenses wirh the inadequate idea of free will. one we have al ready seen hirn develop in relation to Nierzsche: art adequately undersrood no longer appears as a represenrational image. expressions rarher than representations arc univocal. ro use a term Deleuze introduces in (Jinerna 2. those oftbinking or lcnowing.62 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza 63 account involves a knowledge that emerges Froni the affirmation of essence (conceprs). But art adequately undersrood cannor be representational in this way and has becorne a concept that is truly expressive. the more we act and think as imma nent expressions of God. God. and bcing or acting. The more we act according to essence. as the expression of God. Furthermore. will. hut in an ongoing affirmarion of life. i‘his introduces another crucia] element of Deleuze‘s onto-aesrherics. In understanding the realm of modal essence.od‘s artrihutcs and God‘s affcctions. and in a was‘ expresses it. lt is only the consciousness ofinadequate ideas which gives risc to the subjective illusion of freedom. Spinoza purs ir this way: ‘1n the ‚nina‘ there is no absolute. we shall say that jr irnagines“ (Ethics. In understanding common notions we construct affectual assemblages expressing God/Narure. hut which is appropriare here. In understanding therefore. most comprehcnd (. Representarion is ofcourse. In this way. objective and formal idea come together in the concepr. As Spinoza purs ir. for when we understand and afTirm a common notion we understand jr as entirely necessary in irs relation to all orher essences. This process of under standing. and so free will only exists in a subject which imagines its passions as caused by outside objects. P17s). or risc absolute in nvo ofirs powcrs. ana. And when the mmd regards bodies in this way. orfiee. and as such dissolves subjective and representational distinctions (imaginative perceptions). Common norions arc conceprs.‘ An expression on rhe other hand. and affects arc necessar We hecorne. and notlung cisc. (Ethics. bat the mina‘ is deterrnined to will this or that by a cause which is iikewise deterinined by anothet and this again by whose ideas presenr exrernal bodies as present tO us. encompasses object and idea in expressing rheir essence as a common no tion. we shall ca 11 images of things. as they constiture any singular in the attribute. hut ar a decper level idea and objecr express something tliat is at oncc common to thcni. Undersranding art as a lepresenra rional image means for Spinoza rhar we experience jr through the affecrions thar make jr present to us.‘ so an to injinity“ (Ethics. II. constructs a body heyond human perception which lives as the expression ofits real immanent power or essence. are actions always already dc termined bv the infinire and necessary connection of essences in God. ART AND ETHICAL AESTHETICS A truc idca most with that itseif). As Deleuze wrires: an idea represents an object. and like Nietzsche. Bur Nature there is only one Substance. in vhich subjective imagination is redundant. Common notions express modal essences. Reason will be the way in which we may un derstand these affects not as effects caused hy other modes. whether finite or infinite. As Spinoza explains: essence anothe. ir is expression rhat is adequare ro rhe parallelisrn of ideas and bodies. and as God. “the affecrions of the human body In understanding the common norion. or of modes and rhe God/Narure they express. modes break out of the recursive imagination of causes and effects. and the more we understand and aflirm that essence in common notions. and yet helongs to each: a powcr. as only rhey give an jdea thar is equalh‘ in Substance and mode. 35 For Spinoza. hut as acrions ex pressing the modes essence in a common notion. to express their immanent essence as the expression ofGod. Spinoza provides a way for our human. 170/221) capable of understanding and Iiving the necessary relation of man and the world. all to human subjective imagination to overcome itseif. as represenration implies rhar one affects the other. The affects of the modes arc generated from their chance encounters. Rcprescnrarion is thus Iocatcd • • . 1. in which concepts ofcommon notions emerge through an experimen tation at the limits of what a body can do. a kind ofknowi edge. Thcrcfore. as Spinoza famously ar gues. is (as is known through is containcd ohjccuvciy in the in We have seen how the affectual hody construcred bv an understanding ofcom mon norions arises fiom perceptions. beiiig acrions determined entirely by their essence. namely. Pi0d) agrce its object. everything is already de cided. but more than this the under standing that constructs common notions gives an adequate idea of an essence‘s formal reaiity in the attribute. a actual intellcct. though they do not reproduce [exrernall figures ofrhings. This means that the actions of an intelligent person. not once and for all. a “spiritual auromaron“ (C2. Consequently inodal action properly understood. as is art when jr is adequarely undersrood.

meaning the work ofart. Under these conditions art must be understood in terms of Deleuze and Guattari‘s state ment. Aesthetics is always a quesrion about “what happens?. to select the good encounters and construct frorn them the maximum number of joyful af‘fections.‘ I)eleuze does not tire in making this point: Uhere is clearly a theory of the sign in Spinoza.‘ ‘1he understanding of art-works gained through this practice will be conceptual rather than perceptual. But common notions arc not only constructed through an ethics that could be broadly described as artistic. and will be an art ofcommon notions rather than represenrational signs. with what affirrns our power to act. How do we reach this concept ofart. ethical-aesthetics will not ask what an artwork means or represents. and is proces sual. and expresses structures that cross the boundaries of the organisrn. Experiencing art. the art of the Erhics itself: organiz ing good encounters. 335/3 17) Spinoza 65 This means the duality between suhject and object required by representation will be transformed. even inadequately as an image. is al ready a dynamic experience of relation. This is the sense in which ethical life requires a certain artistry.“ lt seems to mc that both in the last chaprer and in this one. as Deleuze puts it: “Everything in Nature is just composition“ (EPS. Aesrhetics in these terms is an ethical-aesthetics. imagination will nevertheless be the starting point for this process. and is simply the name for the action ofaffirmation tliat emerges f‘rom modal en counrers properly understood. Unly by asking whar the artwork does. where cach elljoys an ex— picssivitv over and ahove representation. In understanding common notions life hreaks free of i ts imaginative represen tations. resumed each time the work is perceived or encountered. will we understand it. indis— cernible from this action as its emhodiment and expression. “which consists in relating the sign to the most confused understanding and imagination in the world. The artist has hecome critical. an art-work that is inseparable from the works it creates. This is entirely appropriate given the ontological assumption ehat. This means the art assemblage includes on the one hand the affects emerging from its en counter. the idea of the sign does not exist. what joys it brings arid what essences it expresses. Deleuze states this expandecl concept of art clearly: “The common notions arc an Art. Ethical-aesthetics al ways begins wirli what we like. There are expressions. and consrructs new affectual assemhlages. Expression includes neither suhject nor object inasmuch as it is their common notion. This rneans that although understanding art will produce a concept expressing modal essence. and cannot be a signifier (“a crazy concept for Spinoza. an abiliry ro compose our selves. As a result. and in the world such as it is. a practice rather than a theorv of the object. there are never signs. however. in imposing a kind of assembiage o. but as adequate expression. because such an understanding most start from its joyful affects. Similarly. As Deleuze puts it: “Spinoza‘s whole Operation consists in making. (EPS.“ 8 Art for Spinoza will consist ofexpressions. art does not represent an ohject for a suhject. hecause all understanclings have their parallel in a bodily encounter from which common notions emerge. Common notions therefore provide the beginnings of an art practice which is: 1) Specific to the body of the affectual assemblage constructed and the essence which is expressed. whether art expresses common notions in a way that could be identified as belonging specifically to something called “art.Art as Abstract Machine in a ccrtain exirinsic relation of idea and object. composing actual relations. the practice of composing affectual relations into common notions. This exper irnental art defines a practice. forming powers. or artwork is never separate frorn the be coming of the assemblages it is part oE 2) This participatory practice is capable ofproducing new concepts in response to new conditions. Art will be the construction of assembiages of affects through an erhological understanding of the world. a construction thar ex presses modal essence. and is experienced as an increase or decrease in our power to he affected. an expression of God/Nature‘s essence. 3) Under these conditions the criteria for successful art-work arc no dif ferent than those determining any successful creation whatsoever. and the consciousness that maintains theni. Spinoza introduces a new understanding of art. but understanding art as ir ap pears through a bodily encounrer means forming an adequate idea. These assemblages arc always changing as their rela tions change. 237/216). An expressive artist is the one who affirms new common notions.“ he writes. This is not to say that art transcends the hody.‘ Deleuze comments). no longer as inadequate representation. Art is al ways under construction.“ about the process ofcomposition iliat is expressed in a work. and on the other remains open to connections yet to come. of subjects and objects. according to Spinoza. The question reniains. does it involve the body? The physical perception of objects given in an imagined image al ready involves an affect. The artwork is. constructing an experimental body as a real expression of its real conditions. ofjoy and sadness. and undetermined by any material or formal givens. and lrnw. but what it is capable of. experi— menting“ (SPl 119/161).faJJcts which implies likewise a critique of representation. precisely. what lt expresses. But this understanding is not once and for all. or essence that is expressed. “art includes no other plane than that of aesthetic composition“ (Wl . similar to las hapter. they arc also rransformative in a way we have already seen I)eleuze make a condition ofarr. Art practice becomes an empirical experiment with what art can do. as it is from the common notions it constructs and expresses. Deleuze is consistent in calling for an art and an aesthetics which is ethically and ontolog ically defined.

that we will now go on to exarnine further. as expressions ofGod. they all constitute God‘s eternal and infinite intellect“ (Etbics. is that this plane of aestheric composition cannot be understood except as the plane ofetbical action. Deleuze. exclude an understanding of art as a particular aesthetic practice. An idea we have is essentially true. that of the third type ofknowledge (Ethics. V. materially. only then can we understand God as expressing himself in essence“ (EPS. ‘Vhat Spinoza shows us however. This is an important moment in Spinoza‘s “mystical“ thought. 299/279) us into a new domain. and we shall look in detail at those developed for cmerna and for painting. and makes ofthe understanding an atheistic mysticism. or imagination. and we reach the bearitude of knowing how we arc ourselves modal expressions of the essence of God. that is. P22). wbich is determined by another eternal mode ofthinking. This knowledge of common notions emerges from the affirmation of oy. “give us direct knowledge of God‘s eternal infinite essence“ (EPS. “We begin. we perceive affects as caused by outside bodies. hence. “our mmd. as a part which expresses God‘s necessary and interconnecred whole. express the idea of God as their eJficient cause“ (EPS. The becorning active of ethical-aesthetics makes the art ofethology the expression ofGod. in terms ofwhat Deleuze and Guattari will call sensations. 280/259). P43s). But art as an ethical-aesthetics in a Spinozian sense can not be lirnited to these rnechanisrns. but only from a modal point ofview and not yet as ideas that God has ofit seif That is. arid so on. 301/280). is an eternal mode of thinking [i. and gives the third kind of knowl edge. V. insofar as it perceives things truly. and this means die revaluation ofart within a wider frarne of ethical-aesthetics. but from the inside. leading to a point where. Adequate knowledge understands the affects as they arc in their modal essence. In the second type of knowledge we understand what is common to our body and another. P6d). and by which “art“ becornes art. As Spinoza explains it. in and by God] to exist and produce ef fects“ (F. so that together. one that 1 ex perience as it is in God. TOWARDS GOD: BEATITUDE. This immanent plane ofcernposition defines art in rerrns of its affec mal relations. and Deleuze and Guattari develop van ous typologies witbin specific arts in order to explain parricular aesthetic processes ofcomposition. for in the third type ofknowl edge. and as a result. and construct an affectual assemblage or common notiori. and gives instead the conditions by which life—including those things we cornmonly ca 11 “art works“—can be understood as expressive. This becoming active is the creation ofa new body. but immanent in God. it is as necessary that die minds clear and distinct ideas are true as that God‘s ideas are“ (Ethics. 265/243). Such knowledge does not exist subjectivelv as ifofan object. the revalued thing (as affectual assemblage) affirms or denies (expresses) something of it self(essence) in us (SPF 8 1/79). The less the mmd is acted upon by passions the more ideas it understands adequately. 1 in ins wa)‘. suhjective consciousness is overcorne in the understanding. or common notions express essence. insofar as it understands. V.e. Common notions therefore express essences. and charts an etllology in which we be come active. lt is this claim. which in expressing God‘s essence only point towards its adequate understanding. 279/258). as he puts it. Knowledge constimted by adequate ideas is not the operation ofa subject hut of an “eternal mode of thought. The conimon notions arc the f)lds from the human to the divine. “common notions arc ideas that areforrnally ex plained by ourpower ofthinking and that. which in turn exists only through its combination with others according to the eternal laws ofGod/Nature. they express the immanence ofmodal existence and substantial essence. P40s).“ one that affirms the idea qua essence in the attribute ofthought. In the first type of knowledge. acting as an adequate idea. In the adequate knowledge ofcommon notions we begin to know God not frorn the outside as in vere. This idea expresses an essence. This does not however. and as such find their necessity in their relations to all the other essences making up the infinite at tribute of thought. to infinity. lrideed. when we understand in as an expression ofGod‘s essence rather than as an expression ofa niodal essence (the second kind of knowledge). . Beatitude is the expression of univocity in life. essenceJ. with its own mecha nisins ofexpression.66 Art as Abstract Machine StlflOZa 67 195/1 85). as they arc in God. Our ideas act as representational signs of these ex tninsic deterrninations. As a result. Common notions remain ideas about the essences of perceived bodies and their relations.e. as God‘s expression. As Deleuze writes. 11.thics. marking the high point of Spinoza‘s path ofreason. is part of the infinite intellect of God.“ Deleuze wnites. according to Spinoza: “The mmd understands all things to be necessary. where we do not affirm or deny anytbing of a thing (imagination). Deleuze writes: “A reasonahle being may [. common notions express God‘s essence but do not give an ade quate (clear and distinct) idea ofit. Here our knowledge ofGod is no longer restnicted to common notions. “our mmd. atid means. But in doing so corn mon notions “propel“ (EPS. reproduce and express the effort of Nature as a whole“ (EPS. as God‘s modal essences (Ethics. To under stand how this is possible we must rernember certain distinctions Spinoza . and to be determined by an infinite connection ofcauses [i. ORTHE THIRD KIND OF KNOWLEDGE Adequate ideas. “by forming common notions that express God‘s essence. . in relations to the objects that affect US. P28). and this again by another. V.

and which will require the final overcoming of“our“ intellect to become a singular idea God has of itseif. [-bw is this possible? First of all. and the rhimd kind ofknowledge will give an adequate idea of this divine essence. God‘s infinite intellect. “ . An idea has a cause inasmuch as it has an essence that ir expresses. Beatitude will be an understanding of God such as God has ofitself Beatitude will arrive in an idea of the absolute immanence of God and the modes. or this or thar rhought. according to Spinoza: “God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect“ (Ethics. consequence of Spinoza‘s rheory of parallelism. Spinoza amgues: Thefrrrnal being ofideas admits God as a cause only insofar as he is explained as a thinking thing. This “name“ is the univocal attribute of rhought. ideas. “whatever fillows formally from God‘s infinite narure follows objectively in God from bis idea in the same order and with the same connection“ (Erhics. and the most obscure point of Spinoza‘s Ethics. Beatitude will mark the mystical moment of thought where an objective idea of God will be adequare to and expressive of its formal being. P5). But this overcoming will emerge from “our“ intellecr inasmuch as it understands. md not insofar as he is explainea‘ by any other attribute. but Godhirnsef insofir as he isa thinking thing“ (Erhics. differs frorn our inrellect horb as to its essence and as to its existence. which expresses an etemnal and infinite essence of God. which constitutes God in bis essence. 1. As we have already seen. we have the opportunity to understand our thought as God‘s inasmuch as. admit not die objects themselves. These rwo senses of idea meet in the uni vocal attribute ofthought. That is. (Etbics. and cannot agree with it in anything ex cept in name“ (Ethics. as it is both the culminarion. and of God‘s infinite essence fiorn die modal essences and existences thar express jr (Erhics. this simply means that the modes find their formal essence in God‘s at tributes. God is the cause of all thinking and acting things (Ethics. “the idea ofGod is the idea in its ohjective being. in an idea expressing this cause itself So what constirutes this “rrue idea“ ofthe third kind? God‘s essence is for mal in the artributes that constirure bis narure. and which is thought as another idea. and these compose all modal bodies and ideas in the infiniry of affecrual assemblages according ro their di vine order. including rhe formal being of thought irself This is the final. When inadequare. This idea exists within the attribute of thought. and is inseparable from bis power of thinking as this con stiwtes the formal attribute ofthought. remarkable. P5d and P6d).“ Deleuze writes. because this understanding finds its condition in the univocity of the attribute. arc modes which express Cod‘s narure in a certain and dererminare way. insofar as we are concemned. is irs infinire intellect and body. and the modal essence of an idea is found. God‘s formal essence. As Spinoza explains: “God‘s inrellect. As Spinoza ex plains. as Deleuze has it. including ideas. different fiom the idea in its essence and existence. bot!.“ and God‘s power of thinking being the essence or “formal being of ideas“ (Erhics. but vill nevertheless maintain the distinction of Substance from modes. The artribures therefore constiture the formal heing of all things and ideas. and through which they arc also conccived. in which God‘s essence as intellect is constituted. But every idea also has God as it‘s formal cause. and as the formal being of bis essence. comprehend God‘s essence in its formal being as rhinking thing. 1. Spinoza began the Ethics by assuming the univocity of God. God‘s power of acting being the essence or “formal being of things. in constituting bis essence in the attribute ofthought. as the neces sary co-implication of all things and ideas within the attribute ofthought. P16c1). which is expressed in modal form as ideas in their essence and exisrence. 80/90—1). II. Thought is one of Cod‘s infinite attributes. rhere can be an objective idea ofanyrbing. or die things perceiz‘ed as their effi cient cause.68 Art as Abstract Iviachine Spinoza Singular rboughts. The rwo aspects are inseparable. Spinoza writes. “in which. P1 c3). Objecrive ideas find their necessity and order in being caused by God‘s for mal essence. P8). these ideas understand their cause as an idea ofanother body. because it is only the attribute of thought which has the capaciry to express all the other artributes and their modes in objecrive ideas. 11. ar irs furrhest reach. Reason will. which meant God could only be understood through itself This in rum imnplies. constitutes the essence and existence of all ideas (Ethics. Pl d) 69 makes. and opens up the mysrical power ofunderstanding. This means. Consequently. 1. ofGod attributes and ofsin gular things. Fherefore there belongs to God an attribute whose concept all singular thoughts involve. P7c). and the infinite intellect is the same idea considered in its for mal being. As a result. “rhe effect is produced and hy which the cause acts“ (SP1 53/78). or God is a thinking thing. that is. This transformation ofthe understanding into beatitude obviously needs careful explanation. 11. one cannot dissociate the first as pect from the second“ (SPP. insofar 6 as it is conceived to consriture rhe divine essence. The idea ofGod 1 have is an objective idea. Beatitude will be an idea adequate to the attribute as God‘s essence. 11. 1. The idea giving the third kind ofknowledge therefore explains its essence qua attrib ute as formal cause. 11. As Spinoza has it: The formal cause ofall ideas is God‘s infinire intellect in its essence as attribute. of God as thinking heing. P16s11). and remains at the second level of knowledge inasmuch as it arises through my understanding of rnodal essence. Beatitude will only ememge in rhought however. P17s11).

hut as an idea of God expressing itseif in other words. Fiiially. “from an adequate knowledge ofcertain attributes ofGod. as expressing the whole of Nature. To put it in other. whiJ necessarily expresses the interrelated co-determination of essences constituting the attribute of thought. and its whole import is ro free univocal Being from a state of indifference or neutrality. An understanding ofessence in the third type of knowledge however. Finally then. and this. “without escaping its own order. insofr as the latter is expressed in the infinity of all its attributes. P22d). The salvation of man then. to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things“ (Ethics. inasmuch as God‘s formal essence in the attribute of thought is its cause. and the in finity of modes in their essence and existences. Jr is therefore possible fbr a finite intellect to know everything. In beatitude. and so comprehends God‘s essence in all its attributes and modes. Pierre Macherey describes this final stage ofreason nicely. because it is an understanding ofmy own essence and existence that comprehends and expresses the infinity of all that is. it is the adequate idea of my essence. In this way. expressed in modal existence as an idea. remembering Spinoza: “ihe One expresses in a single meaning all ofthe multiple. An objective idea of God as for mal cause of that idea is therefore an adequate idea of Gods essence. “Our essence. inore personal words (Spinoza‘s). so expressing the “greatest human perfection“ (Etbics. is a becoming-divine. the third kind of knowledge understands an idea as caused by God. As a result. . once more evoking the mystical path of reason: “The path of salvarion is the path of expression it seif: to become expressive—that is. because one‘s perfection is expressed rhrough a purely “intellectual love“ of God. 333/309). A4 [‘The knowledge of an af fect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause‘]) and this concept must be in God“ (Ethics. Deleuze writes: “We think as God thinks. the over coming of man. to an idea of the whole 1 ofGodlNature as cause of and expressed in. in the third kind of knowledge an idea comprehends its formal reality. V. In the second kind of knowledge we have an idea ofGod.But this joyful expression ofones own perfecrion is beyond all affecrions ofjoy or sadness. V. “is a part of God. 308/287). This love is only found through ideas of the body and irs essence.“ An idea in the third type of knowledge expresses all ofGod. the thinker expresses everyrhing in their idea ofGod. This is a move from knowledge ofessence in its attribute. “1 am God most of the time. to knowledge of God‘s essence as attribute. ac cording to Spinoza. and the idea of our essence a part of the idea of God. and includes an idea of everything.“° The final end of pbilosophy for Spinoza is the point where we understand the formal cause of our objective ideas as God‘s infinite intellect. which is acrually realized in an expressive pantheism or immanence“ (EPS. Deleuze writes: “In Spinoza the whole theory ofexpression supports univocity. Between the second and third types of knowledge therefore. Being expresses in a single meaning all that differs“ (ATI 254/3 1 1). Ideas of the third kind will therefore be ideas we have of God‘s essence at the same time as they will be ideas of our essence as God conceives them. hut it is expression that ensures their relation mainrains their distinction whilc being enrirely dynamic and co-determining. as Deleuze explains.snder stand its own constitutional infinity as the formal heing of God. This is an understanding of our existence as the univocity ofGod in the immanence of its formal essence and objective expression. as inadequate (imagination) or adec uate (understanding). This is why Spinoza calls the rhird kind ofknowl edge the “salvation of man.70 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza -7 hut when they are adequate they understand and express their essence in a com inon notion. as Deleuze and Guattari pur it. At this point our power of comprehension would be the same as our power of expiession. 320/298). the high point ofreason. which contains the infinity ofattributes that make up his essence. or an atheistic mysticism proper to Spinoza. quite precisely. we move. 309 10/288 9).“ because. the formal reality of God not being one of these notions (EPS. to make jr the objecr of a pure affirmation. and is the meaning ofthe phrase of Guattari‘s that began this chapter. will be.“ he writes. to express God‘s essence. In the third type of knowledge then. to be oneself an idea through whicb the essence ofGod explicates itself to have affections that are explained by our own essence and express God‘s essence“ (EPS. “by returning into it seif. we experience the very feelings ofGod“ (EPS. expresses the firmal reality of God as thinking thing as the immanent cause of this idea. V. For in the third kind of knowledge. hut only through the common notions that express it. only to the extent that God‘s essence explicates itself through ours“ (EPS. iii its formal essence. “which therefore must be conceived througb the very essence ofGod (by 1. and we would know and express God as God knows and expresses itseif This is the culmination of Spinoza‘s mystical atheism. P25d). meaning it understands its cause not in terms of its own power as an essence.“ Delenze writes. attained in the second kind of knowledge. 309/288). in the final moment of an ethical-aesthetics. thought discovers everything contained within Substance. and is not itseif an extended thing. in this intellectual love. an objective idea has moved from an idea ofaffects. it is the univocity of the attribute that is capable of render ing God and modes fully immanent in the third kind ofknowledge. to become active. At this. P27d) and the greatest joy. to t. we reach the full reversibiliry of Substance and mode Deleuze calls for in Df7‘rence anti Repetition. In the third type of knowledge the modes and Substance become entirely immanent to each other on a single univocal plane. because the becoming active of man is bis or her becoming ex pressive. this idea (beatitude).

This knowledge ofthe body is. insofar as he can be explained rhrough the human mmd. That is. V. Spinoza finds the mystical word beati tude or active affect. This is ivhat Deleuze elsewhere calls a “percept“ (ECC. P30d). P29s). “not only that love. contemplates himself. lt‘s no longer even joy. V. A body capable ofa great many things has ethically optimised or affirmed its composirional jov. V. the ethical ordering ofaffecrs implies ideas that arc adequate ro these affects. “is this world of intensities. We have become purely formal elements in the systematic explication of God/Nature. and under stands rhe essence ofGod only inasmuch as jr involves existence. There. rhink ing is the expression of “the essence of the body under a species of eternity“ (Ethics. and indeed this is what Spinoza argues. P3 c). “but also that the appetites. with the accompanying idea of himself [as the causej“ (Ethics. it is the univocity of the attrib ute of thought whicli is crucial here. in under standing the part we understand the whole. in understanding our or another‘s essence as eternal we conceive things. Or as Deleuze and 6 Guartari pur it.“‘ The concreteness of intensities is therefore quite different from that of things. is to conceive things insofar as rhey arc conceived through God‘s essence. V. con sidered under a species ofeternity. a purely “explicative logical formalism“ (EPS. THE AR1‘ OF ATHEISTIC MYSTICISM Knowing what the third kind ofknowledge is namrally leads us ro the question ofhow we rnay attain it. lt is precisely the empirical compositional experiments that the body has made in discovering what it can do. as Deleuze calls it. As ideas arc always parallel to bodies. as real . P36d). P31). Consequenrly as Spinoza purs it: “To conceive rhings under a species oferernity therefore. “What interests nie in this mystical point. P23s). or desires. it emerges from an experimenral understanding of rhings. V.72 Art as Abstract Machine Spinoza 73 or beatitude. and does not express affects contrary to its nature. P39). that has lead to the un derstanding of intense essence as an idea ofGod. 148/184) or “directvision“ (EPS. and although their ideas lead to knowledge. As Spinoza has it. as real and yer intense beings (Ethics.“ Spinoza explains. and rhis is a term we will come back to in Chapter Five. which means it has an intense existence rather than an extended duration. it widerstands notfrom thefact that it conceives die body pres ent actual existence. 1. V P14) making the body immanent to. part of God‘s attribute of tbought) that it can have knowledge of the tbird kind (Ethics. This is not to finally privilege ideas over the body. Finally then. 326/303). the impersonal mv of “ God/Nature as ir affirms and expresses itself As Spinoza writes: “7he mind. As he puts it: Whatever die mintlunderstands under a species ofeternitv. through God‘s esseuce. we have become indiscernible hecause we have hecome the world. The third kind is a world of pure intensities. vhere it play an important part in art‘s production ofsensation. hut distinct froin the mind‘s love o[God (Ethics. all affections and images of things arc related to the idea ofGod. As Spinoza writes: “Ile who bas a body capable ofa great mmiy diings has a mmd w/‘ose greatestpart is eternal“ (Ethics. our salvation. that is to say the auto-affect. “an action by which God. . the third kind ofknowledge is the for mula for Spinoza‘s mysticism: “God‘s love of men and the mind‘s intellectual love of God arc one and the same thing“ (Ethics. inasmuch as God is its cause. P16). the condition for the cternal and intellectual love of beatitude. (Etbics. hut insofar as he can be exp/ained by die human mind essence. and extended subjects behind. the mind intc/icctual love of God ispart ofthe injinite /ove hy which God loves himseif‘ (Erhics. in the mystical and intellectual love of God everything attains its concrete existence as intensity and in eternity Our greatest perfection. \/ P36) The in rellectual love of God is an action in which the mmd contemplates itself. for although the eternal is “a certain mode ofthinking“ (Ethics. as it is only insofar as the mmd itselfis eter nal (i. Such a body affirms its own power of acting and has succeeded in ordering ancl connecting its affects according to the necessary order ofessences as rhey con stiture the attribute. But this remains quite concrete. caniiot be excessive“ (Ethics. As a result. Deleuze develops this understanding of bodies in tcrms of intensity Bodies arc always extended things. P29). V. In the tbird kind of knowledge it is precisely the body‘s essence that is understood as the eternal and infinite essence ofGod (Ethics. will involve bodies hut not be bodies. not merely formally but in an ac complished way. Again. 301/281) ofGod. leav ing. will therefore leave all notions of ourselves as volitional. and entered the “impersonality of die creator“(ATP 280/343). spiritual automatons in which all “human“ affects have been over come. you arc in possession. V.e.“ Deleuze says. 2 In place oF the human suhjective emo tions is an inhuman intellecrual love that surpasses them. but God can only be truly expresscd in die beatitude of the idea. as we have seen. as a result. V. iv P4s). the third kind ofknowledge is. P23s). Although the third kind of know‘ledge is entirely in rellecrual. that is. Things exist in God. DeC8). hut frorn die fict that it conceives the body essence under a ipecies ofeternity“ (Ethics. The rarefied realm of the rhird kind ofknowledge is therefore insep arable frorn an ethical-aestherics as the critical practice oflife. Beatitude. V. that extended things exist in durarion. in becoming the rhoughts ofGod. which usually arise from stich an affecr.‘ in tellectua/ love ofGod is die very love ofGod by w/iich Gon‘ loz‘es hinise//‘ not insofrr as 1w is injinite. Ariy form ofpsychological consciousness has evaporated. bodies are not themselves knowledge. hate. and the like arc destroyed. In contemplating ourselves we contemplare God. whereas essences exist eternally (Ethics. God‘s essence exists in eternity. affective. V. This means it is not troubled by bad affecrs. the world of ideas being purely intense.

We can. its proper erhicai dimension (as we shall see. The body under these conditions expresses irs intense eter na! essence. 1 a theory ofexpression seeks to make the cause present. ethical-aesthetics transforms my relations into a question ofart. Once more then. most importantly the definition ofa new image ofart. produce a mystical but atheist art.“ Spinoza offers an alternative understanding of art. A system of signs does not recognize being as a productive dynamic. and gives its proper ontological importance. and is understood as intense expressions of the infinitude of God/Nature. is that art cannot be thought outside the par allelism of ehings and ideas. as much as the thinking of ideas expressing God‘s essence. even ifthis has taken us weil away from wbat we may have previously con sidered it to be. as weil as to bis and Guattaris dis cussions of painting. P30d). Furthermore. can be seen as an affirmative creative process constructing affecrual as semhiages as expressions of intense essence. Only in re lation to this immanence of existence and essence cari we understand the mind‘s ideas as eternal. Its answer awaits a consideration ofart‘s various types ofmate riality and bow these Form their specific affectual assemblages. rather than marking our distance from essence. The question as to arts specific modality within Deleuze‘s ethical-aes thetics. Art thought through Spinoza‘s Ethics exists only in its composirional rela tions and their affectual becomings. Together this expenmental body and its intellectuai understanding. V. and an atheistic mysticism as a new belief in immanence. This mystical understanding is aiready a libera tion ofart from its duties ofrepresentation. and offers an understanding ofthe way we are folded into the infinite. Art is the expression of this living communion wirh God. In a broader sense however. God has appeared. and as such is the continual emergence of new expressions (new exis tences. no doubt remains. and as an understanding ofeternal essence as this consti tutes GodlNature. rather than simply as expressing God. Art in these terms is inseparable from beatitude. But ethicai—aestherics in these terms is not particular to art. such as selection and affirmation couid be broadly defined as “artistic. Spinoza‘s ethics. which de fines the univocal expressions of an ethical aesthetics. Art is an experirnental practice expioring what the body can do. Michael Hardt puts it clearlv when he argues that Deleuze‘s use ofexpressionism “constirutes a polemic againsr semiology on on tological grounds. as life and in life. an art of the common notions. to bring us back to an ontological foundation by making clear the geneaiogy of being. it does not help us understand being rhrough irs causal genealogy. is only understood in the mmd. could be regarded as telling us much about art‘s specific forms of expression. both sum up. The point. it challenges me to experiment with joy in order to create common notions which connect mc to the world. Eternitv is not gained by transcending the bod 3 but through under standing its affects. But this promissory declaration shouid not detract from whar has already been achieved. an art of living as a living expression ofGod. As a result mir attention will now rum to Deleuze‘s work on cinerna and Francis Bacon. the constructjon of an immanent spiritual dimension. Spinoza‘s iiitellectual love of God is not a transcendence of the body hut is the true im manence of God‘s essence and existence in the attribute ofthought. as our sensation. Parallel to this emergence is an understanding of these expressions in a true idea ofGod. new affectual assembiages. . . even ifit involves. and look forward to the work yet to be done.i1 Art as Abstract Machiue Spinoza 75 beings. at this point. and its properly cosmic nature. This art exists as the expression ofa dynamic world of affectual assernblage. Eternal essence is expressed in bodies but this essence as God. This is an art theory that gives the proper weight to the work of art. inasmuch as this emerges from the construction ofaffectual bodies (assemhlages). even if‘ it does not yet describe its specificity. in relation to art. and is clearly the prepararory work necessarv to the more specific examinations of a “mysti cal“ art that are to follow. . and its confinement along the sub ject/ohject perceptual axis. or insofiir as through God‘s essence they involve existence“ (Ethics. as Deleuze says. Spinoza gives a new Image of art. Spinoza‘s erhical-aesthetics ofexperimenta tion expresses the intense Substance of God. we return to our previous problem regarding the status of art as we would usuaily understand it. and once more to finish in an ecstatic register as appropriate to a discussion of Spinoza as to Nietzsche. properly understood. This is alread a lot. The minds mystical comprehension of the essence of God. one in which it expresses the produc tive dynamics of being. Art must be the construction of ethical bodies through a critical practice.“ None of this however. considered as an aes thetics. and so piaces its ontological foundation on the same plane of immanence as its expressive existence. [. new becornings) of intense essence. important aspects of an ethical practice. as it has so flur emerged from bis readings of Nietzsche and Spinoza. This will teil us much more about how art operates within the broader definition of an onto ethical—aesthetics so &r undertaken. offers a beatific image of art. Ciearly the mystical understanding of the intense world ofdivine essence does not exciude art from a beatific knowledge. a dimension which is also political). and wbose ideas. cuiminate in a rnystical love ofGod/Narure.

and as the condition of possibility of these contributions. gives a fresh ac count of cinema‘s historical development. jr provides an explicit ontology of perception.“ 1 can‘t pretend eo exhaust his store ofexpiosives here. Cinema is a machine for the production ofsigns that both affect the body in a new way.Chapter Three We Need New Signs: Towards a Cinematic Image ofThought My eyes arc useless for they render back oniv die image oftlie known. offers a new ontology ofcinenia itself Deleuze has given cinema studies new signs. ne er dwindling. Deleuze bases his discussion ofthe cinema on the werk of Henri Bergson. moving with an ever greater rapidiry. and in stead will limit myseif to tracing Deleuze‘s ontology of cinema‘s temporal signs. in order to explore the ways it gives us a new image ofthought. the simultaneous directions of art‘s constant movement. Deleuze will hegin then. making it directly contemporary to the new artform of cinerna. My whole hody musr becorne a constant beam of light. never arrested. from the idea that Bereson‘s hook . there is nevertheless an art composed specifically of movmg im ages: cinerna. a taxonomv that develops a new serniotic ofcinema. Deleuze‘s rwe books on cinema will explore this body-brain through a highly innovative taxonomy ofits signs. These arc. Second. we could say. Although much ofwhat he finds there will echo what we have alreadv encoun tered in the first two chapters. Although this movement defines the onto-aesthetic realit ofart as such. and give us a new image ofthoughr. never looking back. and the resuits of his startling generosity undouhtedly remain “to come. F1enry Miller. First. Deleuze‘s use of Bergson in relation to cinema also has its own necessity. which Deleuze takes primarily from Bergson‘s A[atterandMemory. INTRODUCTION We have seen the affect emerge within Nietzsche‘s physiology of overcoming and Spinoza‘s mystical trajectory ofreason as the at once singular body and mic unity of art. Jvpic fCapricorn. this book was published in 1886.

a Set of relanonships front which tbe variable present oi/y flows. This means that it is not enough for a film to be produced after the war for it to produce a tilne-image. Cinenia invents a neis‘ type of sign. its political dimension. ready drawn. Hollywood after the war. modern cinema hreaks wirb these conditions and directly expresses duration in a time-image. that is. all too human. as categories ofthought.“ Deleuzc writes. the position Deleuze. Space and time. First. calls “duration“). through already given conditions ofpossibility. writes: “lt cannot be said that one is more important than the other. into a kind of fascism which brought togerher Hitler and Hollywood. Hollywood and Hitler“ (C2. All that can he said is that the movement image does not give us a tirne-irnage“ (C2. Deleuze caustically remarks. with immobile sections“ (Cl. Deleuze positions the time-irnage as an aesthetic intervention into this realm ofthe Spectacle.“ Bergson writes. (C2. Bergson argues thar previous philosophical atternpts to represent movement through abstract categories of tbought failed. and due ro its own historical conditions (although these remain stirn mary and peripheral in I)eleuze‘s account). this rirne in the Bergsonian register Deleuze believes is appropriate to cinema. an “im mobile section“ of the constantly moving aggregate ofimages—each acting on every other—constiruting die becoming of the universe (this is what 2 The second. Deleuze finds in Bergson. Second. But cm- erna develops Bergson‘s philosophical insights in its own directions. The most irnportant is the time-image. Deleuze begins by outlining two possibilities for cine-rhought. the human. Before examining this difference in detail. and think movement as a se quential numerical passage appearing as a line drawn through space and time. to make visible. he argues. 22/36). 264/345). it is important to point our that the difference between these two cinematic im ages is neither hierarchical nor strictly chronological. which create new temporal experiences forcing us to think be yond the clich. 164/2 14).na 1 with a “commentary“ on Bergson‘s concept of movernent. in fact. is never to he con— fused with what it represems. but is a difference in kind—they ernerge from different ontological co-ordinates. 270/354). but indirectly. Bergson‘s explicir position. “it would still count the same number of correspondences between the states of rhe objecrs or systems and the points of the line. “has degen erated into state propaganda and manipulation. This introd uces another i mpo rtan t aspect of Deleuze‘s ci ne-rhoughr. in cinema as in painting.“ Deleuze paraphrases. In fact. and will require—indeed it almost seems to anticipate—the new philosophy of irnages Bergson provides. Movement is thereby reduced to points on a graph. ontological. and its first and last bastion. relationships of time which cannot he seen in the rcprescnted object and do not allow them— selves to be rcduccd to the present.“ The cinema hooks develop in detail two cinematic expressions of rirne. its repressive politics. which would be then the ‘course of . 4 Cinema‘s interventions act as a “shock-therapy“ (appropriately administered in part bi‘ Antonin Artaud. acting as a kind of experimental laboratory for his ideas that soon produces remarkable new inventions. opposing the political passivitv produced and re produced in the consumption of mass media. Deleuze could no longer be thoughr through its representation. The cinema of the masses. through L)eleuze‘s interLession.. 1/9). sees cinema invent a new image capable ofperceiving and extending this universal movement in a “mobile secrion ofdurarion“ (Cl. which in its hands has degenerated into a politicaliv repressive form. as 50011 as it is creative. an experimenrer in the realrn ofcine-thought. So although eacli image emerges at a specific tirne (movement-images before. whether more beautiful or more profotind. a proposition Deleuze will test in relation to irs contemporaneous instantiation. trans late movement into their abstract coordinates. the movement-image ofclassical cinerna expresses the whole oftime (du ration) as its immanent cause. “‘Fhe numher r would al ivays stand for the same thing. is to niake perceptihlc. In fact. sees cinema‘s photographie technology as lirniting it to a “snapshot“ of the present. their difFerence cannor be reduced to historical factors and is. inberits the Nazi dc— velopmenr of cinema‘s power of producing “psychological automaton“ (C2. [ What is specific in the image.. the cinema. lt is as ifthe modern exemplar of‘Nietzsche‘s artist plulosopher is a film-maker. “with positions in space or instants in time: that is. which moves beyond Bergson and. “You cannot reconstitute movement.“ This alternative repeats the by now familiar Deleuzian distinction be rween representation and expression. What is in the prcscnt is what the image ‘rcptescnrs‘. offers cinema back to philosophy as a new image ofthought. following Bergson. as we shall see). The image itsclfis ilse system ofihe relation— ships hetween its elements. and time-images after WWII). THINGS RE-ENTER INTO EACH OTHERS 5 Deleuze begins cine. ‘hut not the image irself which. which we could call cinema‘s before and after. xii) . The first. Deleuze claims that Hollywood persists in using the formulas of the movement image.78 Art as Abstract Machine We iVeed Neu‘ Srns 79 gives the philosophical elaboration of cinema‘s great discovery: the moving— image. Bergson proposed in Matter anti Memor)‘ that “real“ movement Here Deleuze succinctly defines the Bergsonian conditions of cinerna‘s onto aesthetics—the constiuctiori of an image capable ofexpressing duration in “re lationships of time.

Reason produces this representation by defining movement as a difference of degree berween abstract points that in themselves remain the same. At the same time as the movement-image appears in cinema then. because it is the becomingofspace and time. “duration means invention. and duration as all of time co-ex istilig with the present. and produces the movements we perceive. 24/14). j precisely because they arc the conditions of real experience.“ 8 The conditions of our experience of movement. For Deleuze cinema functions in this way—like a brain—and conseruces moving-images. for in the movement-image time and space no longer form the autonomous transcendental conditions of all possible experience. These snapshots cancel the genetic movernene ofduraeion. thae would be capable of perceiving ehe real ontological conditions of‘ each actual prception. even ifit is at 24 frames a second. arc found in the virtual dimension ofduration. 9 For Bergson the infiniee movements ofduraeion and ehe fiiite rnovemene of images arc not differene in . Bergson suggests. and this will require both a moving—image. As such. ehe open “itself“ ehe virtual dimension both ex pressed and construceed anew in actual inovemene. “The brain is ehe 10 This changes evervthing. to reveal “the inhuman and superhuman“ condi— eions ofcinema and ehought—duraeion (B. rowards a ment-image expressing its conditions of real experience (B. such systems arc never in that real. failure to understand the difference between rwo sorts of time. 58/85). but “these conditions can and must he grasped in an intuition [. . As Bergson puts it: “The systems science work with arc in an instantaneous present that is always being renewed. reason (ehe projeceion ofsnapshots) anti intuition (moving images on the screen). and get cioser to it“ (Cl. Science deals with a present that dies and is reborn again at every instant. Bergson argues. As Bergson argues: “The first only unwinds a roll ready prepared. making of each present instant a frozen image ofdura tion that does not reveal the changes occurring herween these fixed points.“ (MM. Ii). and a ne‘ perceptual (and indeed concep— tual) mechanism to produce ie. In principle. and so rehabilitares einerna within Bergson‘s philosophy. ie mighe be accomplished almost inseantaneoush like releasing a spring. and only give a fiozen image ofwhat escapes thern. Movement becomes measurement. This affirmation of intuition as ehe rnechanism ofa new cine-brain takes us “bevond ehe human condirion“ and ies inadequate raeionality.“ new percepeion—a new intuition—emerges. 27/17). This diseinction Deleuze makes berween “descent“ and “ascene“ is one rnade be eween ewo images of rnovemene. 302).“ one Deleuze ofeen calls for. [we] could go backup towards ehe acentred stare ofehings. as becornings. of which ehe present is its expression. This “spiritual“ movernene is imparted ehrough ehe percepeual process of intuieive ebought—ehe of ehe cine-brain—ehae returns to things eheir living hecoming in duraeion.22). Duration can‘t be said to be in space or time. Opposed eo this snapshor. endures essentially. Duration is the immanent and on togenetic life of becoming. to ehe screen. Deleuze calls this inhuman dimension ofduration—and it is a term he takes frorn Bergson—a “spirieual realiey“ (Cl. concrete duration in which the past remains hound up with the present“ (CE. This snapshor depends on ehe mech anism that produces it. Deleuze seeks a real image ofduraeion. The temporal conjunction of Bergson‘s phi losophy and cinema‘s invention takes us. ehe spirieual reaiiey of duration is hoth atheist anti mystical. as for Bergson. 28/19). for Bergson. which corresponds eo an inner work of ripening or creaeing. on a ment. Deleuze‘s use of ßergson in relation to cinema therefore converges with bis attack on Kantian aesthetics that we have already discussed. which only by freezing movement produces its representaeion. But Zeno‘s paradoxes bad already shown the impossihiliry of thinking movernent in such a way. As Bergson puts ir. “scientific“ and represented move 6 This (mis)representation of time hy tbought rests. 11/22). which is inseparable from it“ (CE. 23) hut these vibraeions keep every ehing “open somewhere hy the finese ehread which at taches it to ehe rest of ehe universe“ (Cl. and revealed its diffrence in kind from this numerated. Deleuze argues duration is an open see. 9). as Deleuze vriees: “lnseead ofgoing frorn the acentred stare ofthings to cenered perception. . kind. intuition is a “superior ernpiri— cism. or perhaps beeter. for the latter arc the actual expressions of the former once rhey have passed through the brain (B. which although not actual is never theless real. These ewo images emerge from their cerebral rnechanisms. for on ehe brain-screen a new image and screen. II). heyond a scientific as the general and abstract condition of experience. 8/18). Now. but as the immanent All. “only a snaps/ot view o/‘a transition“ (CE. anti imposes its rhythm on ehe firse. inas— much as it exists as eneirely material “cerebral vibraeions. inasmuch as the past is no longer understood as a nurnbered line leading to the present. a new image of rhought capable of thinking it appears in Bergson‘s concept of intuition. But the ascending movement. L)eleuze argues. by shifeing our perceptual rnechanism from the projector and its projection of snapsboes. the rather too slow machinery of reason. expressing their real and immanent conditions: “a change in duration or in ehe whole“ (Cl. 10/21). When irnages arc understood as representations of objects moving in space and time they give. the creation offorms. in producing these “immobile sections“ of time reason remains unable to think the movement ofchange—becoming—and is therefore unable ro account for its own genetic dimension. a scientific present that is continually coming to pass. Deleuze provides both.80 Art as Abstract Machine W‘ Need New Sigus 81 time“(CE. For Deleuze. the coneinual elabo radon ofthe absolutely new“ (CE. Duration is the past. ehe whole oftirne in its continual interaction that constructs the becoming of the present.

59/88). Deleuze puts jr like this: The tliing and the perception ofthe thing arc one amid the same thing. Cinema‘s movement-image “perceives“ the world in a “mobile section“ of its movemenrs.“ as Bergson puts it. speak of ‘ego. a meracinema“ (Cl. But for “things“ to exist as perceptions an image niust be removed from the infinite movenments ofaction and reaction comprising duration. and of images and lighr. and refers to nothing transcendent. To understand die movement image. move— ments thar express the infinite connectiviry and creativity of the open and im manent plane ofduration. in other words. The materialit ofcinema‘s moving-image is luminosity.‘ 2 The movement-image emerges fiom this Bergsonian equivalence of light in its mareriality and an image in movement. “the universe as cinema itself. 249). a radical physics that posits the equivalence of matter and irnages. Ithenl the movement-imnage and die light-image arc two facets of one and the Same ap pearing“ (Cl. the universe is cinematic. Deleuze (once more following Bergson closely‘) argues that duramion is a consistent plane of images making up moving matter. 59/87). Spirit then. As a resuk. duration does not appear directly in this image. This interaction is further complexified by the fact that perception is not outside this process hut participates in jr. and irs connection to other shots in montage. CINEMA-BRAIN Although pre-war cinema produces a new image of movement as a movement image of duration. and 1 return movement: how could images be in mv consciousness since 1 am my— selfimage. he wrires: “The move ment-image and flowing matter arc strictly the same thing“ (Cl. Montage extends (or “ascends“) shots by constructing an “out of frame“ they express. is not a Christian concept. ex pressed in the perceptive rnechanisrn ofthe brain as it constructs the new. 8/19). A NEW PRACTICE OF IMAGES AND SIGNS The conjunction of cinerna and Bergson is an obvious one. while these changes arc in turn re constructed by die world montage has created. The problem for Deleuze will therefore he to show how the cine-brain “ascends“ the immanent and virtual plane ofduration vithout transcending its actual images. and becomne a “sign. for as Deleuze puts it: “How could iny brain contain images since it s one image among others? External images act on mc. The implication is that eye. inasmuch as for l3ergson: “The identity of the image and movement sterns from the idenrity of matter and light“ (Cl. Perception has ceased to he representational. but related in one or otber of two systems of rcfer— . as Bergson showed“ (C2. transmit movement to mc. it is a propagation ofenergy as lighr. This life is what I)eleuze believes the Spirit ofcinema discovers as the vital movernent that animates its images. perceptions) as movernents of matter. movenient? And can 1 even. each shot expressing changes in die world. shors and their out of frame world being in reciprocal presupposition. ofbrain and ofbody?“ (Cl. and the duration it both expresses and construcrs we niust therefore understand the cine-brain that produces ir.82 Art as Abstract Machine Nd Vew Signs 83 “Spirit. and lt is onlv this interval that is capable ofcon stituring a “point ofview“—a perception. This means the movement-image 110 longer implies a human eye ar the apex ofa cone ofvi sion. The cosmos-cinemna rherefore involves a new brain. This is the simple staternent by which Deleuze shifts cinema‘s mechanism from projector to screen. Deleuze. if “light is movement. “horrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores thern to matter in the form of rnovernents which it has stamped with its own freedom“ (MM. hut a cine-brain as the fold of duration. hut one rhat takes us beyond the rational limits of human being. 33/49).e. a series ofimages of duration. and has become expressive movement. 58/86). 1 The question now is to understand this expressive mnovement as im appears specificaliv in the cinema. as luminous rnoving matter arc “vibrations“ (CI. As Deleuze puts it: “IMAGE=MOVEMENT“ (CI. lt is the immanent and inorganic life ofduration. 58/86). This is the materialism Deleuze takes from Bergson: “1 he movement-image is matter irself. Bergson‘s “spirit“ is immanent to life as s‘hat gives life.‘ of eye. following the first chapter of Bergson‘s Matter and Memory. Iniages. a type of thought utterly mate rial. Deleuze argues. The brairm is a screen. As a “mystical“ movement simi lar to that we found in [)eleuze‘s reading of Nierzsche and Spinoza. because as Deleuze points out. now dissolves rational consciousness into the universal action and reaction of images in movement. to show. and “perception“ must beconie the ascending movement expressing their duration. 49/73). at this level. and as Deleuze suggesrs. one and the same image. The brain too is marter in movement he argues. that is. This makes of a film an open whole where world and image arc conrinually interacting to compose a film‘s duration. brain and body arc all images. and on this plane. 60/88). this section being composed of die skot. Things arc irnages (i. This is the most cosmic and cinematic hrmulation possible of Bergson‘s ontology.“ This happens with the inmroduction of an interval between the auromatic ments constituting the plane. how the cine-brain constructs images in such a way as ro express rheir spirirual dimension. one that perfectly expresses Deleuze‘s ontologi cal approach ro aestherics. Deleuzejus tifies this sbift by Bergson‘s physics. rather than stade anti immaterial representations ofrhis movement. But this relation is dynamic.

or lack of it. “must have a real physical connection with the thing it signifies so as to be affected by that thing. ad infinitum. The thing is the Image as lt is in itself. and the analysis of this action transrnits vibrations to the body enabling it to make the appropriate reaction. Once more. But this passage through the interval nevertheless involves a further stage. according to Deleuze. Peirce puts it in slighdy different terms: “A sign. Perception represents the movement of external bodies to the brain. and which only retains a partial action froni it. Given that the brain is a screen. 36). and its reactions to die otlier. as lt is related to all the other iniages to whose action ii completely submits and on which it reacts im— mcdiately. is that Bergson suggests in bis ontological analysis of human perception. In other words. in other words.is 85 We must be careful to keep these rwo sides of the thing. Bergson writes. He will do so by turning to the work of the American serniorician Charles S. or as Peirce puts it: “A sign is something which stands für another thing to a mind. as in Bergson. for Bergson (as für Deleu7e). 63/93) We Need New Si. Once more this has a slightly different formularion in Peirce. which is to subiract from the image all the movements of duration which do not directly involve die interval‘s own interests. “there is a virtual endless series of signs when a sign is understood. as body—brains whose temporal continuiry is maintained hy rational processes in which. which Deleuze (and Bergson) calls “affection. (Cl. ‘l‘he “special image“ that “frames“ the thing as image. What rernains for Deleuze to do. 65/95). and is inseparable from an endless movement of thought as its condition ofpossibil ity. who emphasises how in being thought a sign becomes a thing connected to another sign that signifies it. Deleuze writes: “One passes imperceptibly from perception to action“ (Cl. the basic division of the cinema‘s movemen t-image Deleuze uses: perception-images. as image and as per ception. and as what returns it to its constitutive infinirv (für Peirce and Bergsün both. affecrion. and accordingly the centre they constitute is a sensory-motor.“ he writes.1 ‘This “living“ interval is. 30/45). “Thus. The subtraction ofa percep don-image is immediately connected to memory.. the Operation ofwhich remains entirely material.images and action-images. is “an instrument of analysis in regard to the movernent received and an instrument ofselection in regard to movement execured“ (MM. this is the “virtual“). But ihe perception of the thing is die same Image related to an— other special image which frames it.“ 8 In other words. that of the signs “triadic relations. which relates perceived movement to a “quality“ or a lived state (an affection).] Peirce begins from the phe nomenon or frorn what appears“ (C2.“ 16 Furthermore. the image as sign is material rather than linguis tic. 65/96). But in doing so the interval performs a further operation. is to develop these images into a taxonolny of cinerna‘s signs. Pci rce‘s serniorics is therefore compatible with Bergson‘s ontology as in both the sign shares a materiality wirb what it expresses. because Deleuze will tend to use the same term—“rnove ment-image“-—for both of them.“ Deleuze writes. In fact. As we have seen. not as a function ofdeterminants which were already linguistic. which will determine oHr reaction. 30). Peirce. the perception-inlage is the degree-zero ofa Peircean-Bergsonian serniotics of the cinerna because it is the simple fact of . the sign is für Peirce. As a result. To understand how this works we must explain Peirce‘s most famous idea. Cinema before the war.“ Peirce writes. This interval extracts the thing from its infinite rela tions in duration by confining the reception of these movements to one ofits sides. an image is prüduced in the interval-brain. is an interval. 301). from the same point as Bergson. Peirce provides Deleuze with a semiotic system adequate to Bergson‘s ontology of the image.“ which is “the way in which the subject perceives it selfor f‘eels itself‘from the inside“ (Cl. the sensory-niotor describes cinematic movernent-images as much as jr does die images we in f‘act arc. The brain is constituted by the “cerebral vibrations“ ofa things ac tion upon it. thought is a movernent eneompassing the whole of image-matter. “when he invented semiotics. bis comrnentary on Bergson now over.“ Peirce begins. The movements of‘ duration now appear relative to the interval-brain operating as a screen. 62/92). assumes the same perceptual mechanism für its actors as do our actions. was to con ceive of signs on the basis of images and their combinations. the brain. For both Pierce and Bergson. which then determines a corporeal response. they arc no longer images strictly speaking. and as a result this “signaletic material“ is not reducible to representation (C2. Bergson writes. they are “pictures“ (MM. as the image is for Bergson.8q Art as Abstract Machine ence. This is the function ofperception that enables the interval to take the appropriate actions eriabling it to develop and survive (Cl. the sign is the emergence of the movements of duration in thought. with the perception-image. in separable from the brain and its cerebral vibration—thought. in mmd. [. The brain. “rhe qualities of matter arc so many stable views that we take ofits [duration‘s] instability“ (CE. ofwbich the last quote was a succinct statement. Perception and action are the rwo sides and the rwo functions of the brain-interval. 33/49)..“ 17 This is Peirce‘s way of emphasising the material conti nuity of thought. für. ‘l‘hrough this process we arc able to function as or ganisrns. PEIRCE‘S SEMIOTICS OF THE “SIGNALETIC MATERIAL‘ “Peirce‘s strength. and onlv reacts 10 it mcdiately. it means that Deleuze‘s investigation into the einerna will be at once ontological and aesthetic. in which.

make thought itself the objcct of an image. and “reconstitutes the whole ofthe movement with all the aspects of the interval“ (C2. inasmuch as eine thoughr finds its own path beyond the sensory-motor in which indirect move ment-images arc replaced by a “detour through the direct“ (Cl. Deleuze argues. which no longer produces signs expressing the organic and understand ahle relation berween subject and world. involving its own triadic relations. 98/139) Deleuze writes. a gap that pro duces signs that cannot be understood vithin the hahitual rnechanisms ofa co herent mental-image. affections and actions.“ in “relation-images. But Hitchcock.21 Relation-images. this new regime ofcine-thoughr implies a new brain capable ofthink ing beyond its Bergsonian conditions: “The soul of the cinema dernands in creasing thought. 205/276) and in this role arc able to re-exainine the “nature and stattis“ ofmovement-irnages themselves. For Deleuze. or the incredihle vortex of ¼‘rzo. These images arc “interpretations which refer to the element ofsense. 206/278). which in turn returns us tO firstness as this interpretation also exists as a sign. because the sigit no longer pre supposed rhc movement—irnage as material that it represenred in its speci— ficd forms. where Hitchcock‘s characters arc “assimilated to spectators. lt is. or the dizziness of the detective in Vertio. such as the broken leg of the photographer in Rear Window. thought gives interpretations accord 20 Thirdness therefore appears ing to “a sense of government by a general rule. “t is as it is for itselfand in itself. This is a change in the brain of cinema. and so beyond Pierce and Bergson. images that arise from a rupture of the sensory-motor. in other words. that “introduces the mental-image into the cinerna“ (Cl. and arc thrust outside the interval.“ he writes. and is the appearance of the af fection-image. but set about presenting die othcr image whose material it was to spcci and forms it was to constitute. 34/50). froin sign to sign. lt is Hitchcock. Thirdness gives an image of thought as it operates in and as the movement image. This is a necessary leap. The sign‘s first element. “Thirdness“ refers to the necessiry of these rwo moments of the sign heing in terpreted in thouglit.“ (Cl. The hero reduced to the pure uncomprehending eye of his telephoto lens in Rear Window. also pushes these images to their limit. Sign and image thus reversed their relation. This leap is cine-thought‘s escape frorn the sensory motor and its Peircean-Bergsonian image-sign. but be fore discussing each sign in more detail we will look at the relation-image. Deleuze writes. is a quality or power as an affect. 98/139). As the cinema moves beyond the movernent-image it moves beyond Peirce‘s conception of the sign (C2. 31/47). lt is in developing his theory of the time-image that Deleuze will part ways with Peirce. 205/276). “an image which no longer simply expresses movement. l)eleuze writes. and rhought. perceptions and affections on which the cinema had fed tip to that . These characters can no longer give a rule to the signs that confront them. despite creating an image of thought. hut like Scott‘ in lrtio. an action-image.“(C 1.86 Art as Abstract Machine W Neei/ Neu‘ Signs 87 appearance. 197/267). Each moment in Peirce‘s triadic sign finds expression in cinema. the “secondness“ ofa sign appears in the action an affect gives risc to. This “beyond“ emerges at the limit of the rnental-image. This re-examination. not to affections. The time-image therefore ernerges beyond the sensory-motor. and is in Deleuze‘s terms. and actions of the sensory-motor (Cl. hecause the “ground-zero“ ofthe perception-image does not take us tO the real genetic element ofvision— duration—which only appears indirectly.“ or “mental-images“ as Deleuze sometirnes calls them. and by the be ginning of cinerna 2 he writes: “We therefore take the term ‘sign‘ in a com pletely different way frorn Peirce“ (C2. is provoked by “the rupture of the sensory-motor links in a particular character“ (Cl. but according to a relation or law. the scnsory—motor link was broken. On die other hand. “even ifthought begins by undoing the system of actions. which will constitute for cinema. where thewhole plot seems eo leap inro the irrational void that opens within the detective. and makes us spin along with hirn. where Deleuze sees something that goes beyond it. and the interval of mo erneut pro— duced the appearance as such of an image otlier t/ian the movement—image. 198/268) inasmuch as the relation-image gives an image of the rules gov erning the perceptions. This is a feeling which refers only to itseif. For Peirce. Peirce‘s “secondness“ refers on the one hand to the affect‘s “real physical connection“ to sornething else. But is this also a move beyond Bergson? The answer to this can only be yes and no. “a new. into “a pure op tical situation“ (Cl. relationship with thought. 34/50) Cinema was going to need a new brain. according to the conditions of the sensory-motor. The smooth inental functioning of these characters stumbles over a gap that opens in their sensor —motor interval.“ (Cl. Yes. but to intellectual feelings of relations“ (Cl. 32/48). which does not determine the sign in an arbitrary fashion. Deleuze describes this crucial developrnent as follows. its “Firsmess“as Peirce puts ir. be cause here we gain a first glimpse of the way cinema moves beyond movement-iniages. 203/274). 205/277). (C2. 32/47). direct. leaps into rhe chasrn ernerging between what is seen and what can be thought. Hitchcock‘s films often revolve around the struggle of the protagonist to “understand“ im ages that confound them. in a cinema that ascends directly to an image ofduration. affections. it is “what is what it is in relation to a second“ (CI. but the relation between movement and the interval ofmovement“ (C2. showing the laws ancl habits which interpret and con nect sensory-motor perceptions. 200/27 1). to produce time-images. according to l)eleuze. In this way any sign passes through thought.

This is not to say that the movement-image is a formally restrictive category. and approached the limits ofthe movement-irnage. as die brain of cinema. 29/46) and as such is the concepmal/perceptual Operation of the interval-brain as niuch as of cinema. 35/51). but through a dialectic in matter. conditions which were real. But. is the “principle act of cinema. Deleuze argues. THE CLASSIC. This plane is not composed in the manner of Eisenstein. buildings. GRANDIOSE CONCEPT OF THE MONTAGE KING Deleuze often describes the move from the movement-image to the time-image. was ro see what the human eye could not. The function ofthe camera. 40/61). because it is “de duced from movement-images and their relationships“ (CI. from ciassical to modern cinema. Deleuze‘s analysis priv ileges these cases by always searching for the genetic element to each ofcinema‘s Bergsonian-Peircean signs. Montage. incorporating the freeze-frame . The larter position would be occupied by images that seem to move outside the confines of the movement-image bur which nevertheless re tain its logic. all appear on the same plane. Duration emerges in the time-image for itself and cinema dis covers after the war. an ascension that l3ergson himselfcouldn‘t make. they would be hased on certain unknown aspects of these images“ (Cl. a Bergson beyond Bergson. as an “image oftime“ (C2. Vertov argued. Vertov‘s “kino-eye. 14/51). But the montage ofclassical cinema necessarilv constructs an indirect image of duration. 31/49)22 These alternations take on formal characteristics in the different montage techniques. a whole produced hy montage according to die intervals own laws of rhought. conditions that retain a Bergsonian duration.“ exemplified by Man with a Movie (Jamera (1929). Vertov‘s montage explores an inhuman whole that exists beyond the human sensory-motor. is the mechanism ofcine-thought.88 Art as Abstract Machine We Need New Sius 89 polin“ (Cl. images that appear otitside to the movement Image (“separate from“) would be images operating according to another logic. Indeed. “a powerful organic representation [thatl produces the set and the parts. “to what extern they would be separate from movement images. the creative inovement of duration is transformed into a whole relative to the perceptions and actions in which lt appears. But as Deleuze‘s other example of the breakdown of the relation-image—the Marx brothers— suggesrs. The movement-irnage expresses duration.“ throtigh a “rhytbmic alternation“ (Cl. ihe Inovement-image is constituted on one side by single shots in which the positions ofobjects in space vary and on the other by a whole that “flows from montage“ (C2. as the mechanism of this ciassical cine-thought. 29/46). and he extended this idea ro montage. by which “the whole merges with the infinire set of matter.“ (Cl. in abandoning the sensory-motor cinerna ascends to its truly Bergsonian conditions. ciassical cinema itselfoften undid the logic of the sensory-moror.“ (C2. 39/57) We can begin ro see Deleuze‘s answer in his discussion of the work of Dziga Vertov. but lt is a duration which has been produced from within one of its parts as it were. In this way: “Montage is the determination of the whole. because jr distinguishes an outside in the movemenr-image. Some of these compositional rhythms however. Deleuze asks of these images. but which nevertheless mediated duration‘s presence to itselE As a resulr. in rhe differ ent rhythms of composition typical to cach great school of pre-war cinema. machines. The sensory-rnotor schema. introduces a new materialisrn to dinema by revealing a plane ofmo lecular and “non-human matter‘ (Cl. How? Vertov‘s films arc enrirely Soviet inasmuch as they retain its quintessential theme of Nature being rransformed by man inro a new communist world. But Vertov no longer identifies the camera with a human point ofview. as a disjunction or break. 206/278). from an outside ofthe move ment-image. that element that ascended the furthest. through a dl alectical montage of the human and bis world tbat both urges and assumes their organic connection. operated Deleuze writes. and its consistent airn of raising the masses‘ consciousness rhrough this dialectic. and begins to construct images directly ex pressing duration itseif The brain-screen oF cine-thought thereby attains new ontological conditions (and as we shall see opens out a new aesthetic set ofpos— sibilities). produce in their most exem plary moments images tbat exceed the sensory motor and hroacb another regime ofcinematic images unaccounted for by the Inovement-image. 34/51) and is the Operation tbrough which movement-images give an image of the whole. like a telescope or micro scope. This is an important question. hut that das sical cinema worked within it as under a certain epistenlological regime. 29/47). In looking at some of these examples we will understand better both the Bergsonian char acter of early cinema and the way cinema after the war passes beyond lt. and offers an alternative to the Soviet dialectic of man and Nature. and the interval merges vith an eye in matter“ (CI ‚40/61). but one rio longer thought within the conditions of the movernent-image and irs interpretive gen eration ofsigns. In Vertov‘s films. and to what extern conversely. selected images and montaged them according to conditions lt itseifset. and here is the no ofour answer. humans and most importantlv cinema itself. Montage. On the other hand. The movement-image therefore expresses duration wirhin an organic relation between the brain and a whole the brain constructs in its own Image. Montage then. This distincrion will prompt Deleuze to ask the question that defines his over all project: “How are we to delineare a modern cinema whicb would be distinct froin ‘classical‘ cinema or from the indirect representation oftime?“ (C2.

40/58). 40/58. This is also the classic expressionist story-line ofcourse (Lang‘s M (1931). ehen. a distancing between two con secutive images hut.“ and is caiied bv Deleuze “the feeling ehing. 52/77). this time ideal rather than material. Sternberg‘s The Blue Angel (1930). “points to a ‘negative oftime‘ as the ul— timate product of the movement-image rbrough montage“ (C2. • We lose our organic sensory-moeor in Expressionism‘s black and inorganic nighe. expressionisrn unleashes “a non-psychologicallf ofihe spirit. A sublime outside of the sensory-rnotor is also found in expressionise cm erna. hut this retains the epistemological coordinates of the interval (perceprion and action) in overcoming their human dimensions and extending them ro the en tire universe (Cl. finds a universal variation “which goes beyond the human limits ofthe sensory-moror schema rowards a non-human world where movement equals matter [ 1. This is not. provides anorher example of the way ehe movernene-image retains an mdi rect image ofduration in seeking ies beyond. Vertov‘s montage breaks with the sensory-motor interval and its indirect image oftime. an idea. 50/75) the deep dark negation oforganic life. AS EXPRESSED BY A FACE Deleuze‘s discussion of ehe affeceion-iinage. 55/8 1). as a formless power which overwhelms organic life. But the organic cohesion of ehis ligbt is forever failing back irieo the black and cvii non-organic night. a radical ourside which can only be thought as the “negative oftime. Deleuze writes. inasmuch as Vertov‘s theory of the inter val “no longer marks a gap which is carved out.“ (Cl. 2 In Vertov‘s kino eye Deleuze finds an entirely material dialectic enacting the “correlation be tween a non-human matter and a super-human eye“ (Cl. .“ that Lang shows pro voked by the sublirne cvii ofM. one that perceives an unrepresentable duration/variarion. [ 1 it expresses ehe possible . 96/1 36). a feeiing.anic l/ ofihings. without leaving. in breaking with human perception in favour of the kino-eye.90 Art as Abstract Machine Neeil Neu‘ Signs 91 and single-frarne editing to give effects weil beyond those the human eye was capable of 23 lor Vertov the kino-eye embodies a raised consciousness in which Nature and man (whole and interval) have become merged in a new material collective achieving the consciousness of matter. like orher privileged moments in pre-war cinerna. 54/81) of tue “spirieuai abstract Form“ (Cl. There. but otil>‘ to take us bevond its suhlime conditions “to discover in us a supra-organic space which dominates ehe whole inorganic life ofehings“ (Cl. and even Murnau and Flaherey‘s sun-drenched L‘zhu (1931)) wbich figures duration (non-organic life) in ehe terms of Kant‘s dynarnic sublime. 40/60). 82/118). 40/58). againse whicb light. or Siegfied (1924). with a new oneology where duration is no longer expressed in eerms of an interval. as we have seen. As a result. is in Peirce‘s eerrns a “firstness. 54/80). As wieh Vereov. or simply images which were previously unknown to the ciassical regime? In fact. in which we find a spiritual redemption which reconfirms ehe organic conditions of the movement-image. we find irnages of “fu/je noa-oy. 288/58). Vertov‘s man with a movie camera is for 1)eleuze. which in carrying perceprion into mat ter and action mto universal interaction. 80/116) and produced an “identityofa community of matter and a commumsm of‘ man“ (Cl. does Vertov‘s montage tech nique give us images other than movement-images. A new cinema emerges after the war. One need only think of the ethics of the criminal com munity aceing no doube under a “categorical imperative. . and ies expression of an affeet in ehe face. they erect a machinic inter val (the “kino—eye“) which re—invents. Deleuze points out. Deleuze goes on to elaborate Peirce‘s def inition: the affect as firstness “is not a sensation. the spiritual relaeionship in whicb we arc alone with God as light“ (Cl. Expressionism breaks with ehe organic relation ofthe sensory-moeor and ehe whole ie indirecely represents. but instead discovers the way ehe movement-image can be “shattered from ehe inside“ (C2. not even one that is sub urne. . Vertov‘s montage thus enabled the cinema to “regain the system of universal variation in itseif“ (Cl. But as in Kant‘s dynarnic sublime our destruc tion in this dark immensity of an inorganic Nature is sirnultaneously our pro jection into a transcendeneal subjeceiviey As Deleuze puts ie. Modern cinema ehen. This super-natural and supra-sensible divine lighe breaks wieh organic composition. on the contrary a correlation of two images which are distant (and incommensurable frorn the viewpoint ofour human perception)“ (Cl. Vertov‘s films remain within the classical regime because. . feeling or idea.“ or “the eneiey“ (Cl. arguing tliar Vertov‘s camera. only to discover a sublime world. This negation appears firse of all in the deep blacks in the Image. produces a sublime movement-image. or luminosity defines organic forms in their distance frorn the black zero. Deleuze affirms the latter.“ which is “the divine part in us. 40/6 1). On Deleuze‘s account. a negation. hut an image that remains “indirecr or dc rived“ despite its inhuman and communist reality (C2. But to return to our initial question.“ The sensory-motor is discarded in favour ofa machinic consciousness. just the opposire) the philosophical conditions of ehe move ment-inlage. only eo gain the “ideal surnmie“ (Cl. italics added). an Image in which life = 0. take Vertov‘s route of ateempting to escape its human conditions to gain a rad ical material exteriorit-y. lt is here the movernent image attains the sublirne“ (C2. but the quality of a possible sensation. . in overcorning the sensory-rnotor. (and this shouldn‘r be read as a criticisrn. 40/60). hut is absolutely immanent to the image. 83/121). does not . nothing less than “the overman ofthe Future“ (Cl. The affection-image. lt seems that Vertov. This is a material suhlime.

whilst making it a complete mode“ (Cl. exjsts only as the production of exisrence. and does not exist outside of this event. Her miniscule trembies and tear tip lifted eyes arc signs for her faith. the rrajectory ofmartyrdom. Deleuze argues. 211/273). “retroactiveiy fabricated in the image ofwbat resembles it“ (DR.92 Art as Abstract Machine Need New Sins 93 withont actualising it. norablv bv the work ofarr)“ (Cl. give jr jr‘s proper moving context“ (Cl. The virrual.“ The icon‘s bi-polar composi tion. despire Deleuze employing both terms in his description of rhe affect. is the eml)ryo of being. 107/151). The point for Deleuze is that the exteriority ofthe possi hie (as mere firstness or affect) appears in an affection-image. whose affection-images lead awav frorn the clichs of human sensihilitv and actions. “serves. nor an expression ofa psycliological state. their difference being. fir an affecr is the change in stare existing between an image‘s per ceprion by a nmtor nerve (a perception-image) and its instanriation in a motor action (an action-image). coming to— gerher and separating. “The affect. jr only refers to the faces which express it and. Bergman will accelerate these savage relations ro the point of an ambiguous schizophrenia merging the women in Persona (1966).“ Peirce notes. he argues. expressing singular aF}ects rather than intensc ments that achieve suspensions of individuarion that teeter on the edge of the void. is explored and defined by Deleuze in L)/f‘rence and Repetition. T‘his distinction of possible and virtual is decisive for our purposes here. although jr is disrinct from ir. face or proposirion“ (Cl. In both Dreyer and Bergman the affect emerges for itself suspends individuation.“ The aFfecrion—imagc is neither an actualisarion ofaffect in action. the expression ofa spir itual heyond found in Carl Theodor Dreyer‘s Passion o/7oan of‘Arc (1928). as he rather dramatically puts it. Cries and Whiipers (1972) is surely the finest. “a mere possibility. There Deleuze distinguishes the possi ble from the virtual. 100/142). into or away from the void. arc “pure possibles“ (Cl. as a possible) by “the virtual conjunction assured by the expression. to attain salvation and peace in irs divine beyond. Deleuze is once again combining Pejrce‘s semjorics of signs with Bergson‘s physiology. This affect is the “inhuman“ content ofthe film‘s narrarive. where the affecr is in a permanent proximity to death. “The affect is mdc pendent of all dererminare space-rime. and as a possible “break“ in rhe smoorh funcrioning of the movement-irnage of cine-thought. “rhe affective film par excel/ence. Classical cinema constantly created new afEcts. 106/151). joan. in which it is acrualised and ex pressed. Everything in Bergman seems ro play against this backdrop ofdeath. 66/97). hut on the orher there is her fairh. hut a sign ofa “purely possible“ mode of being (the affecr) expressed by a fttce (Cl. is “that part of the event which does not 1er itselfbe actualised in a dererminate milieu“ (Cl. the “likeness“ jr embodies between affecr and affecrion-image. or sensory-moror) tisat condirions the exteriorirv of the affect.“ Deleuze writes. 105/149). “this inexhausrihle and brilliant part which goes beyond its own actualisation“ (Cl. on rhe other band. The affect as a possible “power“ or “qualiry“ expressed in an affection-image therefore emerges within the sensory-motor “between“ perception anti action. 212/273). towards what Deleuze calls. 99/141).“ there is on the one band rhe bis torical state ofaffairs. . This exteriority of the affecr. This is precisely the ontological status of the cinematic affect. and rogether affect and affection-image form. hut it is this state ofaffhirs (as the inrerioriry of the subject. In Passion of Joan ofArc.2 The affect doesn‘t exist independently of its expres sion. her accusers and the law.“ I)eleuze writes. an a-subjeerive out side ro the sensory-motor schema. hut this expressed does not refer to the stare of things.e. in Deleuze‘s Peircean vocabulary an “icon. and the nihilist sensualimy of Ingmar Bergman‘s magnificent women. The film focuses on this inrerrup— tion ofthe spirir. and in dicates how this “exteriority“ defines an important creative aesrhetic dimension of the movement-image. lt is not nothing. as possihle. Here Deleuze defines both the ontological status of the affecrs “indcpendence“ from. For the affect. is the specifically cinematic way the possible is always . “ro convey ideas of things rhey represent simply by imitaring thein. the annihilation of Joan‘s individuality in her 29 becoming-sainr. 99/140). while nevertheless remaining outside this state of affairs. 102/145) which “constitute the ‘expressed‘ ofstates of things“ (Cl. and “exteriorir‘ to states-of-affairs (as produced by that state-ofiaffairs).“ 2 The qualities of affects therefore. a pure affecr “outside“ tbe bistorical suite of affairs and ex pressed so beautifully on Falconetti‘s face. Peirce puts jr rather nicely. “hut it is none the less created in a hisrory which produces ir as expressed and the expression ofa space and a time. exists in relation ro a stare of affairs that pre-exisrs it. and his highly formalised dramas arc often reduced to a simple turning toward or turning away of the face. where the women arc no longer characters hut pure affects-faces. “is like the expressed of the stare of things. Bergman‘s faces on rhe otber band arc more monumental. lt is not existence. and creates a powerful possibility. [ ] Possibility the mode of being of Firstness. who ex change faces in a place “where the principle of individuation ceases ro hold sway“ (Cl. and the moving wayJoan attempts ro remain faithful to it. it is produced as a uniry (i. ‘l‘his inhumanity can be understood rhrough rwo of L)eleuze‘s examples which conveniently lie at opposire ends of the facial spectrurn. “a question ofexisrence itself“ (DR. 98/139). This is because although the affect is in irselfa complex virrualiry ofsin gularities in variable relations. the trial. of an epoch or a milieu (this is why rhe affect is the ‘new‘ and new affecrs are ceaselessly created. This then. explaining that the quality ofa firstness is in itseif. “an inhumanity much greater than that ofanimals“ (Cl. 106/151). 102/145). locked into a series ofviolenr pirouettes. The possible.

This “open ing“ is sublime in “overcoming“ the “formal obligations and material con straints“ of physical space and the sensorv-motor. a beyond acting in a Kantian fashion as a supersensible guaranree of the necessary unirv of man and durarion (however this is figured). or delirium). Deleuze writes. 117/165). and expresses this corporeal dissolution in a sign detached from its motor continuation in the sensory-motor (paralysis. inasmuch as it acrs as “the absolute condition for movement. In both cases however.“ or the act of choosing choice (what Deleuze calls an “auto—affection“) to rhe point where it “takes upon itself the linking of parts“ (Cl. and just about any of Bresson‘s films. a “theoretical or practical evasion“ (Cl. This new dimension appears in various ways depending on the director who creates it. as pure possible. Pickpocket (1959). “to“ a “spiritual“ world of the affect. 117/165). autism. making it the site of an infinite number of possible -: Figure 2 Carl Theodor Dreyer. This new and extra dimension of the affect. Ausrian Film Museum linkages. and where übe affect is raised to its pure genetic power or potentialitv (Cl. a new ontology that will find its bistorical possibility after tbewar(C1. 40/58). or a pureiy spiritual affect (Dreyer and Bresson). and being explored in the second as a crucial new element of cinema after the war. onto a pure indeterminability. a “super—human world which speaks for a new spirit“ (Lang). 101/144). In cboosing choice the sensory-motor is opened onto its outside. operating— as pure possible—as a super-sensible Idea. one discovered by italian neo-realism. With the “any space-whatever“ we have the unusual insrance of a term traversing the two cinema books. Deleuze sug. and in this way the directors who arc their masters attain sublirne movement-irnages. affects as pure possibles are determined by the limits of the sensorr-niotor thev exceed. 120—122/168 172). 110/156) inasmuch as the schiza pbrenic experience is a turning away from identity into a space of tactile bound iessness. We have seen Bergman create this opening through a turning away of faces onro death (perhaps most explicitly in the last scene of5hame.“ ro find “a non-hurnan world where movement equals mat ter“ (Vertov). But despite its undeniable beauty and power the affection-image is not an image ofduration. and is. or A Man Escaped (1956) to mention a few of the most famous ones). it produces an opening of the sen sory-motor beyond its limits. La Passion deJeanneDArc. A direct image oftime must await a new ontology ofcinema. “go beyond the state ofthings. 1968). and in a Kanrian manner. or Gcrtriu/e (1964). an “any-space whatever“ is a singular space that has lost any homogeneity imposed by an exte rior standard of measure. the re-founding of an ontological continuity between this world and its metaphysical dimension.94 Art as Abstract Machine We Need New Signs 95 These a-subjective affects appear in affection-images—-faces—that. 1928. Diary ofa C‘ountry Priest (1950). Finally then. ‘1 he films of Dreyer and Robert Bresson achieve ir in a difhrent wa by discovering this schizo any-space-wbatever through a “spiritual opening“ (Cl. “Schizophrenic“ images no longer take place in rational time and space. “the movement-image remains primary and gives risc only indirectly to a representation oftime“ (C2. Schizo-images exist outside the sensory-motor interval in an “any-space-whatever.“ (Cl. 110/156).“ Deleuze writes in relation to ciassical cinerna. This new dimension is not a state-of-affairs. In Bergman the affection-image tends towards “the effacement of faces in nothingness“ (Cl. 101/144). being introduced in the first in relation to the affection-image. nor are they the representative signs of human thought (thirdness). grasped as a pure locus of the possihle“ (Cl. “a space ofvirtual conjunction. This is übe Kantian operation ofthe affection-image. 1 13/159). as Deleuze calls it. but this “opening“ is metaphysically determined by the “decision“ which takes us “from“ the suhjec tive physical space it disrupts. .“ as the “genetic el ement“ or “differential sign“ ofaffection-irnages (CI. in Dreyer the affection-irnage opens up tise fourth anti fifth dimensions oftime and spirit (Cl. “lt is. 117/165). 107/152). hut opens at the limit of the lived. 109/1 55). just enough to open up in space a dimension ofanother order“ (CI. a pure possibility or any space-whatever acting as a space ofvirtual conjunction. the supersensible becomes. This “evasion“ finally “restores“ the metaphvsics of the move ment-image by elevating the “decision. to trace lines offlight.gests. In opening onto this beyond of the affects.“ As a re sult. When the sublime movernent-image “goes heyond the human lirnits of the sensory-motor. Common to both is this “discovery“ being indisringuisbable f+om the act of choosing it (Dreyer‘s Passion o/‘/ean ofArc. is “schizophrenic.

20/32). The visionary artist. within rhe mental space of an interval-brain the sensory-moror schema rranslares the matter/image ofduration inro perceptions. There is no knowing how far a real image may lead: the importance of becoming vision ary or seer [visiannaire au voyant]“ (C2. according ro Deleuze. If we remember.“ once our inrerests have turned spiritual or super sensible (C2. What is this hidden “rhing. This is nothing less ehan a claim for ehe mystical immanence of acrual images and virrual vital forces (duration). Alrhough these images arc a wonderful testament to the creativity of the movement-image. 20/32). and combat irs “conspiracy. in seeking “the establishment of a contact. 21/32—3). it is this imperus itself“ lhis vital imperus an— imates those mystics. in order to understand rhe transition jr undergoes berween the cinema books. who go beyond ehe forms of man.“ These directors “extracr an Image frorn all the clichs ro Set it up against them“ (Cl. The “visionaries“ ofcinema. nor of ehe social one. “Vision“ operares in this sense as the absolute immanence of duration and the image. “[ein the other band. “a simulraneous change in our conception ofrhe brain and our relationship to the brain“ (Cl.. but in hiding something in the image“ (C2. Art would eherefore share myseicism‘S task of finding new forms eo express the fundamentally creaeive energy of life ieself Both then. The figure of the visionary.“ so that even in its “sublime“ moments we perceive only “what lt is in our inreresr to perceive. for Bergson. Here Deleuze picks up Bergson‘s own extension of his philosophy of viealism ineo a mysrical understanding of are.“ Mysricism.“ Deleuze explains. those “visionaries“ as Deleuze Puts it. at the same time. as an onto genetic vision ofduration‘s consrrucrion/expression. “a civilisarjon ofthc clich wbere all the powers have an interest in hiding images from us. the same challenge facing all the arts. Although at their limit these images pass into a sublirne outside of rhe sensory-motor. CLICHIS EVERVWHERE. ‘Xe rnust now briefly return to our initial discussion ofBergson‘s ontology. In this way great directors arc arrists in being ar once political activisrS (against the “dark organization ofclichs“). 210/283).96 Art as Abstract Machine We Need Neu‘ Srizs 07 ‘1 NOTHING BUT CLICHiS. In this way (Jinerna 2 brings us back to the mystical and yet atheist dimension of Deleuze‘s ontol ogy we have alrcady encounrered. this outside is nevertheless conditioned by openings produced by the sensory-motor. Cinema‘s biggest challenge. In this sense Deleuze echoes Bergson. ] We therefore normally perceive only clichs“ (C2. Deleuze writes. The seer or visionary will be ahle to go beyond the sensory-motor without reconfirming its movement in a subhme outside. vital in tuition“ (C2. to combat. “the image constantly sinks to the state of cliche: hecause it is introduced into sensory-motor linkages“ (C2. 21/33). rowards ehe genesis of ehe vital iinpetus irseif Such visionary areises arc like rnyseics. they arc nevertheless exceptions and more generally Deleuze defines the movement-image as a clich. on the one hand. consequently of a parrial coincidence with ehe creaeive effore of which life is ehe manifeseaeion. those directors considered arrists (i. and develops it further. l)eleuze claims the historical conditions of the new image in cinema lie in ehe collapse of subjective cerrainty after rhe war. in Bergson‘s words. who helieved the force of mysticism “is exactly that of the vital imperus. and acrions and their cinematic signs.“ Doing so will involve not only the production of new images.°This collapse of ehe suhjective and objecrive assumpeions of the movemene-image marks the condirion ofpos sibility of cinema‘s seif-transformarion. not necessarily in hiding the same thing from us. a “time-image. or as Deleuze calls ir. [. ro get out of the clicb. and man‘s form (the sensory-moeor). ontological be fore jr is historical.“ Deleuze claims. is able to see and produce rhe new directly. “consise in working back from ehe ineelleceual and social plane to a poine in ehe . irs own real conditions.. 22/33—4). This change is however. Bergson claims. Modern cinema is de[ined lw rhis rransvalua tion ofits own onrology in turning irs power of rbougbr against itself againsr its own clichs. “the dark organizarion ofclichs“ and “‘commir‘ the ir reversible. and remain indirect images of duration. auters). but ofa profound. hut also in irs realizarion ofa crearive response to this irnper aeive. the image constanrly attemprs ro break through the clich. 20/32) and. There is. As a result. not only in ies search for ehe cre ative basis of life. has a fundameneally areiseic aspece. as the production of a new image and of a new image of thought. formal innovarors (break ing with the montage techniques of rhe movemene-image).“ and how can we see it? lt is the image “it self“ the image inasmuch as it expresses duration. “mir sensory-motor schemata jam or break“ (C2. in a direcr image. whose “combi nation“ can only be “seen“ in an “aestheric intuition“ or “vision“ as ehe construc tion of an inhuman image expressing irs own genesis. 210/283).‘ In ehis sense Deleuze‘s vocabularv is Bergsonian when he weites: “lt is necessary ro combine the optical-sound image with the enormous forces that arc not those of a sim ply jntellectual consciousness. Deleuze clairns. The sensory-motor schema therefore installs a perceptual that maintains itselfeven in being passed “beyond. er “opinion“ as he and Guatrari finally call jr.. “ar— tack. 2 1/33). recurs in Deleuze‘s discussions of art and is always associated with a resistance to tlw cIich. and philosophers (crearing a new image ofehoughO. an image which will allow us. is to produce images that arc not clichs.e. beyond the breakdown of the sensory-motor.“ We perceive this image through a double movement. “A clich. affections. hut also a new image ofart. “is a sensory-moror image of the rhing. as we shall see in later chapters.

“death. mu tants who “saw rather than acted. 17/28). 1 12/1 18). the movernent-image was only ahle to answer the question ofits limit with an image ofduration that confirmed the genetic powers of the sensory-motor. an inhuman eyc that is in duration. Deleuze writes in bis hook on Bergson. This is an important distinction. The soul within which this demand dwells may indeed have felt it fully only once in its life time. himseif infiuenced hy Bergson.“ Such creators. These arc images in which the virtual reaim ofduration is directly expressed in an actual image. In this ascension-descension. ahle to “see“ time in its simultaneous emergence as the whole of the past being created in the passing present of an individuation. that is of matter and in matter. In ciiema after the war Deleuze finds a new image. “at once fantasy and report“ (C2. “for the artist creation begins with vision. Seers embody a type ofexperience that no longer finds its genetic conditions in perception-irnages. they were seers“ (C2.“ 36 What arc seen/created by modern cinema. hut instead produce visions ofgenesis. Vision becomes autonomous and active. blackness“ (C1. Cinema construets a new eye. and demolish our selves?“ (Cl.“ as in both these arc cfe ated hy “visionaries.98 Art as Abstract Afachine Need New Szns 99 soul from which there springs an imperative demand for creation. The movements of die time-image give a perspective on all oftime. xi). an inhuman power ofexpression adequate to its vital and artistic essence. the time-image constructs duration at the same time as it expresses ir—there is no otitside—and this is the creative and artistic “essence“ of the vision of the seer. as expressions ofa living du ration that is constantly constructing itseif new Now we must see how this mystical art appears in the cineinatic image. a construction expressing duration. an impuise. the world Czanne knew. Deleuze argues. but is die creation of the world as it already was. its images constructing (thinking) time as the expression of duration. hut that its historical aiid political dc— velopment must first be understood ontologically. vho invent an expression ofit whose adequacy increases with its dynamism. where the escape from vision is figured by. [ ] the mystical soul actively p y the whole of the universe. hut it is always there. Art in its essence—it is a definition Deleuze will repeat in relation to painting—is the creation ofvisions. and bv wbich the cine—hrain will think time itseif The trajectory of the cinema books can pethaps he summarized by Deleuze‘s question. arc “the great souls. senses into direct relation with time and thought“ (C2. and ofa new viewer. So even if the Second World War introduces the historical conditions for cinema‘s transformatioi. irnmobility. a perspective which did not exist before. The painter Henri Matisse. ihus the movement of the time-image constructs a vision of all rirne. once “movement has become automatic“ and “the artistic essence of the image is realized“ (C2. at the limit. representation is surpassed in a vision that is. 22/34).“ irnages oftime in its pure state. Cinema after the war creates images which arc ade quate to a creative power “before man. 66/97). breaks with the sensory-motor schema and its movement-image. 68/100). automatic and unmediated images “which bring the emancipated ages ofduration appearing through a crack in the sensory-motor. In this way the inhuman eye is a new cine-brain. 156/203). “play with the whole ofcreation.“ 3 Mysticism and art therefore come together in the creative art of“visions. These di rect images arc the visions ofa new breed ofcharacters. Deleuze argues . 1 hese arc what Deleuze will go on to ca 11 “crystal images. “How can we rid ourselves ofourselves. a unique emotion. As we have seen. new ideas woulcl have to be created.“ who. Here the mystical “ascension“ ofcinema toward the plane ofduration cannot be separated from a simultaneous descending movement of individuation.68/99). bad already pointed this out.“ hefore and not bevond rhe sensory motor. “time is no longer the rrieasure of movement hut movernent is the per spective oftime“ (C2. Deleuze writes. . and implies a time-image which does not represent sornething pre-existing it. These statements describe a new way to think as much as a new image. As a result. the real impetus for this change is abistorical. im THE EYEWE DO NOT HAVE Cinema after the war Deleuze argues. 19/30). in order to expiore pure optical and sound images that appear under new ontological conditions. one in which our dernolition does not assurne a super—sensible duration as our bevond. before our own dawn“ (Cl. “the world before man. 1 and reproduces the opening of the Whole“ (B. arc pure optical and sound situations. The movement-image‘s answer to this appears in Samuel Becken‘s Film (1965). rnovements (acrion-images and affection-images) that express duration in the clichs of the human. and here we come back to tbe most imporrant as pect of Deleuze‘s mystical aesthetics. and as Deleuze puts it. as Deleuze puts it. After the war direct images of tirne appear that no longer perpetuate in their delay tbrough the sensory-motor interval. it is the vital impetus shared by artists and rnystics—tbc impetus to create a “vision‘ ofand as life itseif This is not to say that cinerna is ahistorical or apolitical. as the hecorning ofduration itseif. the folding of (and not an opening onto) the plane of immanence as cine-thought. and whose construction exisis as the continual emergence of the new. To obey it completely new words would have to be coined. an impetus re— ceived from the very depth of things.“ the “artists and mystics. it has neither conditions ofpossibility nor indeed any super-sensible outside which vould dc termine it. To see is itseif a creative operation. This would be a kind ofcin ematic summation ofthe way the movement-image figures our escape from the sensory-motor as an opening onto its sublime outside. .

Attentive recognition produces a “mecollection-image. there is. as to the character of the film (C2. producing new actual images that in tumn conseruct the new virtual memories it expresses.“ Deleuze wrires. Here Deleuze quotes Bergson. and in its place die lovers Claudia and Sandro seem to “wander“ through disconnected any-space-whatevers. one which fol lows the Bergsonian intuition: “Wherever anything lives. as the poles of a single time-image rhey produce between them. hecause jr is the emergence of rather than in. time. THE CRYSTAI IS EXPRESSION emptiness (thus exemplifying Antonioni‘s pessimistic assumption that Eros is sick). The time-image emerges prior to the distinction ofsubject and object. On the other hand. constitute a seer who can see in life what is inore than sensory-organic life. Attentive rnemory is continually producing these images by cre ating new virrual connecrions in vision. On the one hand we have our automatic or habitual recognition. is the failure of memory When ehe organism cannot remember. the visionary part“ (C2. vibrating in its difference from itselfi And this consrructjon works in both directions at once. and therefbre its construction remains representational. 16). but simply ehe aceualisarion ofeach suc cessive virtual dimension. Bur al though the recollection image transforms itselfthrough the process ofmemory Deleuze argues. “ehe recollection-image does not deliver the past ro us. 8/16).“ Deleuze points out. and dissolving the interval in a virtual infinity. These mark out a new temporality. a register in which time is being inscribeil“ (CE.100 Art as Abstract Machine We Neea‘ New Szns 101 that this thinking-eve of the visionary helongs as niuch to the viewer. and the films of Michelangelo Antonioni are some of Deleuze‘s f‘avourite examples) 7 For example. and fi nally what will give us images making visible the fully reciprocal immanence of the actual and the virtual.“ something never seen before.“ in which virtual and actual arc perceived in dynamic and creative relation ((22.motor coherence (the affair is played out as a series of convulsioris which exist “despite“—or to spite—the couple‘s rational protes— tations). Whar is truly disruptive to this. is what Bergson calls “am tentive“ recognition. The viewer and the character. The vision ofa child. . 46/64). “‘[‘bis is w‘hy. as the immanence ofvision and visionary in a seer. 54/75). hut instead animates an affair between her boyfriend and best friend. but byopening the actual up. which “enters into relations wirb genuinely virtual elements“ . the real condirions cinerna now ex presses. interpolations and infin itesirnal injections of atem— Bergson will introduce the philosophical framework fhr Deleuze‘s direct rirne image in a distinction he makes regarding Inemory. and its virrual relations arc fed back inro spatio-eemporal and suhjective normality. and un folds according to a seemingly spontaneous rhythm. This is a Deleuzean vitalist cinema. wbosc increasirigly destructive movernents make them vic tims of the absence they arc both pursuing and pursued by. Deleuze will argue. . a perception ofsornething as truly “new. 8/16)) has become the “subject“ of cinerna. wbere duration as the univocal ge— netic element ofimages is expressed oaly as it is construcred: time-image. not by acfualising its infinite interconnectedness in a sublime break of the interval. pursued by it or pursuing it. and give new images ofduration. and instead this absence becomes cre ative and generates a series ofdisarticulated and intense affects. ofeach “layer“ of rnemory it acrualises. T‘he disappearance ofAnna early in the film does not make it rotate around her absence. The film no longer expresses duration through the actions and reactions of characters moving through an ordered and pre—existing tirne and space. “tbe part that cannot be reduced to what happens: rbat part of inexhaustible possibility [the virtual as duration] that constitutes the unbearable. the visions ofa visionan an image unin telligible to our sensory-motor schema. open some where. the disappearance ofa woman in L‘4vventura (1960) does not give risc to a series ofactions leading to the res olution ofthis situation. 3/9). the situation existing berween the lovers is extraordinary. “subject to. cannor represent ehe vireual in a “new“ actual image. “it will be seen thar the pmogress ofattention results in creating anew. ‘“e see an image that is continually changing. instead the film is con— structed around a genetic element (the woman‘s disappearance) which dislo cates sensory. The recollection-image is therefore already integrated into die remporal lineariey along which the sensory-moror organisni moves. But this account should not lead one to think that Antonioni has struc tured the film around a lack. “rapid breaks. it is not in itselfvireual. rather than engaged in an action“ ((22. in which the characters become the passive spectators of their porality“ (C2. 19/30). not only the object perceived. a emuly new image appears.“ and duration as the ge netic virtuality of the image (even when this is understood by Antonioni as the sickness ofchronos itself expressed in sympromaeic images (C2. Time has become “unhinged. On the other. 19—20/31 ))6 This is the mvstical dimension ofa vitalist cinema. This is what ex plains both the slowness of the film and its unpredictable trajectory On the one hand nothing seerns to happen because the narrative cohesion suggested by Anna‘s disappearance is quickly ignored. continually under construction. hut also the ever-widening systems with which it may be bound up“ (C2. 46165). but who “is prey to a vision. hut onlv represents the for rner presene that the past ‘was“ (C2. This break with the movement-image is accomplished by Italian neo-realism. bv which we recognize objects according to the memories of our sensory-motor schema. the intolerable. who no longer acts. both confirmation ofand con fbrming to the world we live in.

‘a linie eirne in its pure state‘: a direct time-image. does not pass on. A “genuine relation“ with the virtual will be forged in the crystal-image. once more. heing “toraii‘ reversible“ (C2. The crys tal-image as indiscernibility or “smallese circuit. as he begins the task of classifying crystal images. 17/27). nothing isgiven except the to come. again. and so when virtual and actual arc torally re versible in ehe crystal-irnage. the indiscernibiliry ofvirtual and actual has “always accornpanied art without ever exhausting it. ehe whole universe. as actual change. not does time sirnply ure what happens. As Deleuze puts it. 80/108). What exactly is this “special image“ and how does it appear in the cmerna? Deleuze argues that the actual image is always present. the infiuiite and the fi nite. it is an image ofboch the passing present and all of the past at ehe same tirne. is the Deleuzian condition ofart.“ I)eleuze wriees. As we have seen. At this point Deleuze‘s taste for taxon omy once more comes eo ehe fore. inasmuch as ehe eryseal eraverses these at once microscopic and cosmic dimensions. 80—1/108) The cryseal-image is myseic inasmuch as seed and universe exise in co-impii caeion within je. arc rnyseical images in which. Deleuze claims. as from ehe sensory-moeor ofa subject. appears in a differential relation to the unchang ing vase as the form of time (the duration of the virtual). Hallucination is ehe art of seeing the . Still pious because it still seelcs the super-sensible. disengaged from spaeio temporal aprioris. as splitting“ (C2. 54/75). He finds the first in the films of Yasujiro Ozu. 75/101). The sensory-rnotor has broken down. the virtual frorn “ehe actua! presene of which it is the past. as je becomes boeh seed and uni verse. but that this pres eilt passes as eacb new present arrives. To hallueinate an objece as a cryseai image is eo “see“ the oneogeneeic spiit in eime. which has become speceacle.38 That Deleuze‘s language should get particulariy poceic here.102 Art as Abstract Machine Need New Signs 103 (C2. ahsolueely and sirnuitaneously“ (C2. in its largest circuie. “the image with nvo sides. “l‘here is becoming. non-organic Life which grips the world“ (C2. Deleuze describes this cosmic image with the appropriately mystica! meeaphor of an ocean. in which images “bathe or plunge to trace an actual shape and bring in eheir provisional harvest“ (C2. The little crystalline seed and ehe vast crystallisable universe: everything is included in ehe ca— pacity for expansion of the coilection conseieuted by ehe seed and thc universe. time itself which does not change. 69/93). and identifies one technique in ehe film Late Spring(1943). (C2. In the crystal-image the virtual and actual. a vision. This. variable and teshapable envelope. hecause art found in thern a means ofcreation for cerrain spe cia! images“ (C2. For ehis co-exjstence is in no way seatic. “the who!e of the real. quite sirnply. This visionary inhuman. actual and virtual at the same time“ (C2. The differential relation of these simultaneous and “heterogeneous directions“ of eirne Form the image in its “most funda mental Operation“ (C2. Deleuze suggests as much: “In the crystal-image there is this murual search—hlind and halting—of matter and spirit: heyond the movement image. ie construces the universe which is expressed in the seed. “The visionary ehe seer. the mystical expression of a vital rnaterialism. 18/29) does not perceive things through passive sensory reception. hut also outermost.“ This hallucinatory‘ perception. means the crysta!-irnage is adequate to and expressive ofduration. 81/109). 81/109). means: “The presene is the actual image. The rwo aspccts of the crystal image arc indiscernihle. which gives what changes ehe unchanging form in which ehe change is produced“ (C2. What happens no longer takes place in time. But the form ofwhae changes does not change. hcyond even moments ofworld. as Deleuze puts it. each conseruceing and expressing the other in their processual immanence. eime and its image. as it passes in the present and inc!udes all of ehe past. the “continual exchange“ (C2. and its contemporaneous pase is the virtual image“ (C2. The crystal image is oneogenetic. as jr muse when. “one and the same horizon links the cosmic to ehe everyday“ (C2. This genetic and differential relation. This is time. where ehe crystal image is delineated in its mystical dimension. 69/94). Only a myseic seer can produce this image. conseruces a vision of the vireuai jr expresses in an aetna 1 image. ‘in which we arc still pious“ (C2. life in its entirety. should be no surprise. time itself. 70/95) of the acrual and the virtual. is the ontological process of a “powerful. “change. and whae he sees is the gushing of eirne as divid— ing in ewo. 79/1 06—7). arc truly indiscernible. at ehe edges ofthe world. in which a sbot ofa vase is inserted into a sequence sbowing the daughter‘s half smile and tears. 76/103). The change in the character. and we have arrived at a mysticisnl that is entirely atheist.“ Deleuze writes. lt is the virtual dimension of the image that preserves all of the past. all of duration itselE Cryseal—images eherefore. but this has produced a vi sionary funcrion that becornes crearive.“ ofaceual and virtual passes. He continues: ‘Ehe crystal—ilnage has these two aspects: internal limit of all the relative circuits. but conseructs eime-images in s‘hat Deleuze calls “hallucinations. “is the one who sees in ehe crystal. an actuai expression rhae conseruces a virtual universe. This reversibility. 81/108). ie is a erait of Deleuze‘s writing which is as expressive as the image he is attempe ing to describe. Here ‘irtual and actual arc distinct but indiscernible. 79/106). in accordance with the demands ofa pure opeical and sound perception“ (C2. They arc images of the present and its own past. 17/28). passage. “ehird eye“ (C2. 84/122). virtual and actual arc ful!y reversible in a cryseai-irnage.

. its images rinsed of clich and crystallising in their hallucinatoryellipses a little time in its pure stare. the crystal-image in this sense has many other names in Deleuze‘s work and in his work with Guattari. each time. I)eleuze writes. 126/165). Hallucination constitutes the “cinema ofthe seer“ (C2. and marks the return. and depends on a process of experimentation. like a sieve. In this way a crystal—image “stands for its object. each image a present which enfolds and unfolds its past and Future. the site (the sight) ofrhe splitting of time. 126/166). “What can be more subjective than delirium. a halluci nation?“ [)eleuze asks. or the merge of fantasy and realiry in Fellini for example. Deleuze provides an interesting discussion of documenrarv Film to illus trare this poinr. . J in favor of the false and irs artisric. [. Despite the crystal bathing in the cosmic infinite. the “image vithout resembiance“ (LS. and the crystallisation of the universe. though not by its old name. Briefl Ophüls‘ crystalline diagram operates at all levels ofcomposirion: in the Film‘s specific images (crys tal chandeliers. In other words. and the ‘crystals‘ they produce. A crysralline cine-thought emerges anew. 126/165). The seer has a vision. and contains all ofthe past. ‚ IN FAVOUR OF THE FALSE AND ITS ARTISTIC POWER This emphasis on the constructive powers of the crysral-image has important philosophical consequences For ci nema. Deleuze examines a wide range of these diagrams. in the famous camera movements and shots full of faceted reflections. life freed itself of appearances as weil as trurh: neither rrue nor false. a dream. consrrucring a virtualiry. Modern cine-thought is no longer defined by a tri partite sign and its sensory-rnotor. This is the decisive Nierzschean intuition for Deleuze: “By raising the false ro power. (1953). a crystal through which the universe is refracted.‘ Don Pennebaker‘s film hier Strauss (1965) for example. for “it is Nietzsche. although as we shall see and have seen. the ‘here and now‘ ofcrystal-images is entirely unpredictable and sponta neous. a world with no “heyond“ but the “to come“ ir creates. of the sirnulacra. 150/l96). In the cinema each modern direc tor creates his or her own crystals through a unique diagram that at once constructs acrual images as the passing present. 76—7/111). hut is a pure vision in which the subject and object are dis— solved in an image of and as an image as. as the visuality of matter itseif. but hy a break it creates through which the brain will escape. because it has no extra dimension thar would verify or deny irs trurh. . nor is it a represenration.. focussing on the so-called “direcr“ cinema appearing at the be ginning of the 1960s (C2. “But what can be cioser ro a materiality inade up oflu minous wave and molecular interaction?“ (CI. but an “internal outside.104 Art as Abstract Machine ihr Fourth century ana‘ Beyond 105 image as actual virtualiry as. as the vision matter creates for itselfas it emerges in images. 91 / 121). both ereates and erases it“ (C2. and resolves the crises of rrurh. Each this will have to be dc scrihed--—it means creared—in its singularity. this visionary image can no longer be understood in Peircean or any other linguistic terms. it is the “bursting forth of life“ (C2. an undecidable alternative. 83/111). The crystal-i mage produces move ments that arc essentially “false. Constructing this diagram is the action ofcine-thoughr. and cinema after the war hecomes hallucinatory Needless to say. it is the specificity of this vocabulary to the particular “artistic-machine“ jr dc scribes thar focuses our cosmic and mystical enthusiasms on this world. but unlike the movemen r-image‘s pre-existing conditions ofappear ance. under the name of‘will to power. wanring ro settle it once and for all. Does this mean art exists only in the crystal? In ontological terms this is true. 39 Art is hallucination. (C2. 00 longer a duration as the “outside“ oftime. 145/189). At their outer limit all crystal—images rnerge into the single refrain ofa cosmic inorganic life. who. The . hut a good example is thar of Max Ophüls as jr constructs his film Farrings ofMadinne D. but they retain a simultaneous parricularity that is their present actuality lt is here and now that crystals express themselves. inasmuch as it creates an acrual state-of-affairs at the same time as this actuality is itselfcreative. replaces ir. again. The Vision and the viewer come together in the seer. but power of the flulse. and in the deelopinent ofrhe story whose increasingly complex virtual dimension emerges in series of crys talline circulations and refractions fioin which there is 00 escape (this is rrue of other Ophüls‘ films as weil. is a portrait of the governor ofMunchen in this sryle.‘ substitutes the pmver ofrhe false for the form of the rrue. the crystal-image enjoys the p ver of the false ontologically.40 The crysral-image is not a resemblance. mirrors.“ a crearive “will“ of cine-thoughr ernerging in a new cinemaric aesrhetics.“ the false continuirv and ump-cuts ofGodard. This is the Bergsonian vitalism of a crystalline artistic process. 257/297). 131/172). a realirv that is ro come. for ir is the vital power constructing and expressing an absolutely immanent and univocal durarion. creative power. I)eleuze finds in these developments a Nierzschean inspiration. a materialist cinematics where the “seer“ is an eye in matter. an eye that is no longer an interval organising the dialectic of man and Nature. as the necessary condition to all art-work. The crystal-image is an image as the splitting of time. lndeed. not a description. Nietzsche is crucial at this point of Deleuze‘s accounr. which i‘ to say art is creation. differentiation is just as important for its crystalline life. Lola Montez (1955) or L r Ronde (1950) for exam 1 ple) As Deleuze stares: “Ophüls‘s images arc perfect crystals“ (C2. the “sole decomposed and multi plied object“ (C2. The crystal is diagrammatic. material innovation—the universe as cinema itseif. the earrings of Madame D). decisive will“ (C2. the virtual dimension mb which it plunges.

“the artist or outpouring life“ (C2. over or under the present as empirical progression: in this case. and in and as an ethics of the artist.“ but constructs it. But in either case. 3 17). In such a cmerna of immanent evaluation we once again return to the onto-aesthetics we have already explored in relation to Spinoza and Nietzsche. He has a “vision“ in which a “before“ is inseparable from an “after. This ontological definition of art will find irs specificity in par ticular art forms. but only in becoming good or bad. 271/355). at this point in Deleuze‘s account he talks not of cinema. not in form. duration exists onlv in its in— direct representation. he writes. . it has to he created“ (C2. 298—9). Indeed. would have the same problem Spinoza‘s univocity was found to have by L)eleuze in . of time rather than move ment. What Deleuze writes ahout Pierre Perrault‘s “cinerna of the lived“ applies equaliy to Strauss. 146/191). seemingly “frorn within. the perpetual flux ofthings“ (CE. and how do we avoid simply “crossing over“ and giving an image ofduration as rhe sensory-rnotors outside? Such an Image finally. they arc immanent evaluations of the life they involve. if“we must accus tom ourselves to think being directly. “as he himselfstarts to ‘make fiction. “Degrade the immutable ideas. by that alone. . 150/196). but a.“ in a crystal-image embodying. telling the story without voice over or comment. but the truth ofcinema“ (C2. but the becoming with which he has merged. but they differ in the respective images each regime gives of duration. withont rnaking a detour. the second does not. 277/362).“ he writes.“ as a Inystical seer or visionary who produces crvstal-images as the expression and affirmation ofthe “artistic becoming“ of—and here L)eleuze‘s rerminology becomes entirely Nietzschean—“the will to power“ (C2. 137/ 179 80). is Zarathustra. the cinema of the time-irnage is “direct“ cinema inasmuch as it desrroys all models ofthe true in becorning the creator of truth. behind all artists. hut is itselfthe number or measure ofmovement (metaphysical represenration)“ (C2.‘ when he enters into the ‘flagrant offence of making up legends‘ and so contributing to the invention of bis people“ (C2.106 Art as Abstract Ivlachine We Need Neu‘ Signs 107 camera follows Strauss in his day to day activities. In this way. arc ethical images rather than moral representations (C2. hut of the “artistic will or ‘virtue which gives. . Once more we re turn to this mystical equivalence of the artist and life. “the passage from one to the other“ (C2. But how do we do this. Quite simply the first assumes a pre-existing rcality. This number of time is eirher its minimum unity found in the interval (Joan‘s spiritual face as pure affect for example). Becoining is at the beart ofduration in both regimes. Bergson suggests. This is the Nietzschean-Bergsonian reality of a cinema of becoming rather than being. whether the artistic power of the false marks Deleuze‘s creation of the indiscerniblity of Bergson and Nietzsche. One duration. exists for the movement-image and one for the time-image.‘ [asl the creation of new possibilities. 141/185). individual and Nature) in which the movements of duration arc relative to the actions of the sensory-motor interval.“ the film document ing Herr Strauss‘ tireless efforts on behalfofthis world-to-come.“ in which “the move— ment-inlage gives risc to an image o/‘time which is distinguished from it by‘ ex— cess or default. 277/361—62). the continual appearance of new “befores“ and “afters. But tliis is the artist not as suhjective genius.‘ hut this “like“ is precisehr the haHucinatory power of the crystal image whicb no longer represents the truth.“ The camera is so dose it is “like being there. These images can express good or bad.s an exte not “reality“ its movements represent. as something it “reports“ or “docu— ments. This is the “general system of commensurability“ quired by the classical image (C2. Once again: “Only the cre ative artist takes the power of the false to a degree which is realized. because truth is not to be achieved. one for the organic regime and one for the crystalline. or direct image of time will come fi‘om the disin tegration of the sensory-motor and its spatio-temporal apriori is at least hinted at by Bergson. or perhaps more generously. and the eponymous hero of Hier Strauss is Seen prornoting a new united Europe. That the crystal-image. The carnera is not dissolved in the “truth“ it represents. but in transformation. for what we see in Hier Stizuss is not the “re— ality“ o the central character. [ ] What the artist is. as part of an organic whole (inside-outside. Furthermore. by transforming themselves in an affirmation of becoming or hy negating themselves in representations of truth. hut as Nietzscbe put it as “pure mouthpiece. “you obtain. 147/192). At this point we coulcl weIl ask whether mod ern cinema finaily traveis under a Nietzschean banner rather than a Bergsonian one. Crystal-irnages arc not judge ments of life in the name of the higher authorities of the true and the good. the movement—image therefore is an “in direct or mediate representation“ of tirne (duration) (C2. forrned.“ With the introduction ofNietzsche the crystal-image becomes ethically as weil as ontologically distinct frorn representation. Behind all the film makers and all the painters. Nietzsche‘s appearance in the cinema hooks allows Deleuze in make a dis tinction between two concepts ofduration. 142/185). The organic sensory-motor assumes an open whole. I)eleuze inrends this comment literally. “install ourselves within it straight away“ (CE. The movernent—irnage constitutes time in its “empinical form. rather the carnera dissolves the true in finding its power ofthe false. and one which changes. I)irect cinema will not.“ then we must. tirne is no longer measured by movement. 3 a hyphen ation giving tue name to a Bergson beyond Bergson. 151 / 197). Deleuze claims. 150/196). or whole. or reproduced. 42 This has remarkahle consequences. in other (Nietzschean) words. “be a cinema of the truth. is creator oftruth. or it is the maximum of movement in the universe (Vertov‘s materialist dialectic). This is how the film reveals the splitting oftime. in the ourpouring becoming“ (C2.

because it ne longer travels rhrough a sensory—rnoror that carries perceptions into action. act as metaphorical descrip tions of Guiliano‘s mental state. because Guiliano‘s “visions.“ and lending it hallucina tory qualities that are doubly disturbing.“ which arc ours too. First. The empty and torten industrial landscape of IlDeserto Rosso often appears out of focus.“ its indiscernibility from the expression/construc tion of duration itseif Deleuze returns this image-thoughr ro its Bergsonian origin. “How die ‘Real World‘ at last Became a Myth“). but hallucinates pure optical and sound situatiolis tliat construct a crvstal oftime.“ 8) and irs famous consequences. The ahstract color composirions of Antonionis any-space-whatevers do not. We have already seen Deleuze privilege Nietzsche‘s ontological equiva lence of being and becoming as univocity‘s true formula. lndeed it is precisely the detachment of her visions from any encompassing strucrures (from their cause. Deleuze finds Antonioni‘s rypically banal. Duration may contain all irnages. install itselfdirecdy in the real. These images express rirne in durarion. “wben we have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps But no! With the real world we have also ahalis/ed the apparent world“ (Tl. not hecause they arc confused. This unknown constitutes the position ofGuihjano and die . Second. which is only sketched. Here ruhe is no longer subordinate to a movernent which measures it and niovement—now understood as die vibration of time Splitting in the crys tal—creates images adequate to it. thar the introduction ofNietzsche into Deleuze‘s account ofcinema reintroduces the figure of the artist—philosopher. This is the vi talism of cinematic “vision. touching the nervous and cerebral system tlirectly“ (C2. hut only by constructing or hallucinating its movements. hut it apphies very precisely to 11 Deserto Rosso. and in cinerna this equivalence means die abolition of real and apparent worlds in the crystal regime. Deleuze finds in tue crystal-image a cinema adequate to Nietzsche‘s deciaration that “nothing exists apart from the whole. 11 Deserto Rosso (1964). in the sense in which this of‘ seems at once subjecrive (arc they point of view shots?) and objecrive (the ab stract qualities of die landscape arc not hallucinatory hut real). 5/12). “hat the artistic essence of die image is realized: producing a shock iv thought. hut only by discovering a new way to think. and the eye thinks“ (WI 195/184). in die situation. hut as the outside of the sensory—rnotor it can only exist as the intense possibility or as a sublime impossibility of any expression. a wornan struggling with her nienral health. hut only by breaking with die sensory-moror as its interval. and from any narrative developmenr—very little “happens“ and die film begins and ends with almost idenrical iniages) that ehm inates action as such. These two as pects of abstraction and hallucination often werk together. 5 This thought is equivalent to a new vision. becausc the space is detached from the character. making the image swim in an entirely non-representational manner. Here. Duration is seen and thought in an image that expresses it. does not pre—exisr die vision—thought which grasps lt. deserted and evervday any-space-whatevers absorb ing all characters and their actions (C2. Here the image‘s power ofthe false is co-extensive with philosophy‘s power ofthought. therefore.108 Art as Abstract Machine W Need New Signs 109 Difti‘rence and Repetilion. by thinking it according to a new image of thought. Duration. only in other words. The eye has seen something new. “we ne longer know what is imaginary er real. “The Four Great Errors. hut it is a condition of their aesthetics which also applies to cinema). only when an image expresses the plane by constructing ir. as when an out of focus shot picks out certain objects by color rarher than form. and is called the “spiritual automaron.“ and whose automatic image-thoughr is the appearance ofthe moving matter of du ration in a nervous-cerebral shock. emphasising its abstract color compositions over its representational “reality.“ Deleuze writes. can no longer act. because the question is no longer one ofdelirium ordescription. No doubr it is no longer die point whether what we see is the vision ofa character or the camera. because this Vision thinks and construcrs it in its expression. This would make the movement-image imma nent to the whole. physical er menral. no longer a sensory motor inrerval. hut because we do not have to know and thcrc is no longer even a place from which to ask“ (C2.‘“ (Tl. hut die wav these come to gether in a modern vision as crystal image. As Deleuze writes of neo-realist film in general. 7/15). and makes distinguishing between images of subjective hallucination and objective description impossible. as visions ofrhe character. A new body brain must emerge adequate to the modern image-thought. life in irs entirety as time. because these hallucinatory images appear as an indirect discourse. A good example of the “spiritual automaten“ appears in Michelangelo Antonioni‘s beautiful film. arc not located in relation to an)‘ “outside“ by which they could be judged. hut die whole remains transcendent to the movement-image. In relation to cinema diis figure emerges froni I)eleuze‘s discussion ofAntonin Artaud. This new thoughr of the seer escapes the interval-brain and its sensory—motor in order to.“ die seer whose visions exist “flusli wirh die real. following Bergson‘s advice. hut a direct nervous and ceucbral shock: “lt is ollly whcn movement becomes automatic. lt is not surprising then. “vision is through thought. As Deleuze and Guattari pur it elsewhere (in relation to painting. inasmuch as Guiliano. They mark the dissolution ofthe sensory-motor interval into pure and “truly false“ visual and auditory situations which arc nei— ther subjective nor objective. We artive at die plane ofduration. an image that is inseparable from a genetic impulse that is always construcring duration anew. communicating vibrations iv the cortex. 1 56/203). These irnages ne longer appear in die inrerval brain. and a time-image adequate to the plane‘s becoming. and in fact this distinction ceases to he important.

lt is an extinction or a dis appearing. both arc cast inro a perceptual uncertainty which is not resolved but ex plored. In these spaces the compositions of abstract color in the frame act as “the virtual conjunction of all the objects it picks up“ (Cl. become visionaries“ (C2. a dead end in the sea and not the bridge she thought. those who “know how to exrract from the event the nart that cannot be reduced to what happens: that part of inexhaustible possibility that constitutes the bearable. and Antonioni shows it ro us. the intolerable. Guiliano‘s struggle to integrate her experience of the “whole“ into a social framework of expectations and roles leads to further hallucinatory passages and 46 But she fails. shots composed of abstract colors constituting a world both fresh and frightening. hut a beyond she cannot reach because—as beyond—ir does not exist. This neurosis is a sensory-motor limit beyond which lies the psychosis of the “spiritual automaton. Guiliano yearns for such a world. Iiiis is. Color marks . “all the more charged with potential“ (Cl. a space opening out into a void ofthe sensory-motor indiscernible frorn the unthinkable plen • itude oflife. by the room. opposed to the genetic element. beautiful but not extraordinary sensual hut not sensational. nor her husband. Her vision is a pure becoming in which she cannot maintain her identity and which hecomes increasingly ab stract. This is a life that can barely be lived—and Guiliano barely lives—and appears in images which arc often unbearable. not her lover. Indeed. In JlDeserto Rosso it is through Antonioni‘s use of color thar a new world emerges. Color is an abstract force encom passing viewer and image in the emergence of a new reality a Vision thar is indiscernibly ofbeing. overwhelmed. it is simply a fact. to the point of being a ‘mouthpiece‘ of thoughts she cannot control hut only react to.“ But she sees it. where everything sings. the cream/purple hotel room. quite precisely. nor does it attempt a higher order oftruth (there is no rornanticism in the wornan‘s rnad ness. arc both detached frorn any pre-existing world—as pure optical situarions—and arc themselves creative hai lucinations of an unbearably vital world at die heart of this one. on the other as abstract and tranquil spaces giving refuge frorn the active neurosis of the human interval. nor any pity). and “carries space as far as the void“ (Cl. Iris color then. follow her. This coloring void is not however. 119/168). 119/167). a world in which the virtual and creative powers of co-existence emerge for themselves. the noisy functionality of her husband‘s factory). the virtual duration ofactual events appearing in a time-image. 120/168). one. 19/30). Guiliano‘s nervous and cerebral events. hut is its emergence in any-space-wharevers (ofwhich Guiliano‘s life is full— the red shack. 205/267). which at its abstract limit tends. Their vision is not other-worldly in any transcendental sense.“ having “eliminated that which happened and acted in it. sinking below and rising to its surface. and the film registers both aspects in opening up spaces of virtual emer gence. Deleuze writes. and jr is in color that “the character or the viewer. to “efface“ what it describes. as the dura tion created by and expressed in this actual image. Deleuze writes. in a continual fade. spaces on the one side unbearable and experienced as madness. as ifto deny her the fatal ahnte of dissolution in a constantly moving ocean. by the shop. and whichproduces being. Antonioni pushes bis abstracr colorism as far as possible in II Deserto Rossa. a point her lover acknowledges without knowing how to change it. a sensation as participation. 19—20/31). pure and sun drenched. which is life. because then she loses interest in what happens on land.“ In her confusion Guiliano remains here and now and of this world. hut she is lost in sensory-motor banalities. 120/168). Once more. In one scene she drives ro the end ofa pier. this is achieved through Antonioni‘s colorism. a neurosis which represses her. not as a representation ofmadness. and the two to gether.“ a schizo-sensation or vi sion of matter in its emergence. hut one which is not opposed to the genetic element“ (CI. Antonioni afflrms both the beauty and the pain of this utterly modern vision. There is something terrible in real ity“ she exclaims. Guiliano and us. This is life seen by rhe seer. Sinking fitrther into an emptiness where others cannot ek-stases. her visions. a spiritual automaton who sees this unbearable excess of life. whether this is imagined as a spiritual “ascension“ or a psychological “decent. and the image and its abstract color compositions give avision ofa virtual infinity uncontained by any shared time. hut nevertheless existing as a creative becoming. the half-painted empty rooms of her shop. die visionary‘S part“ (C2. In JlDeserto Rosso the void of the any-space-whatever also has an amorphous enveloping power. But Guiliano‘s wanderings never “cross the bridge“ to the “orher“ side. Guiliano becomes a vision ary. Guiliano‘s sensory-moror is overpowered by this any-space-what ever of color. hut in extraordinarily beau tiful shots which envelop tu. and Guiliano is continually shocked. effaced by the mist. an ocean she cannot look at she says. But in this void emerging around and in Guiliano a new life and vision appears. who arc all uI with action.110 Art as Abstract Machine W Need New Szns 111 viewer. the part Guiliano experiences. that is able to trans— form the space ofaction into a space ofvirtual construction. with their meaningless lives. This experience exceeds sen sory-rnotor perception. Her Vision of the young girl alone on a beautiful beach perfectly ex presses Deleuze‘s words: “The world awaits its inhabitants who arc still lost in neurosis“ (C2. Deleuze describes Antonioni‘s voided space as “arnorphous. both Guiliano‘s and our own. “and 1 don‘t knowwhat it is. the fact of a banal and everyday world stripped of its rational nariatives and appearing in its pure visuality. appearing in the white mists of Ravenna in which the film‘s colors seem to swim.

and gives the shock required ro make the cinerna think.‘ why can‘t we arrive at ehe point ofsaying ‘paine a filrn‘“ 47 Such a colorism will require a new brain. Deserta Rosso. a crystal-image that creates as it expresses a perspectival and virtual whole ofduration. the whole has hecorne a hole. 168/2 18). . Artaud‘s BwO.112 Art as Abstract Machine UYe Neee1 New Signs 113 the genetic explosion of the world. This crack is the nerv ous vibration which disrupes the organism. 118/166). becomes adequate to the modern world in this genetic encounter with color (e. Antonioni is in full agreement wieh this when he commenes: “People often say ‘write a film. “points a way through fot life. For hoth. finds a way ehrough ehe cracks.“ a . 1964. which will be our subject in the chapters to come. and ehe crack through which ehis (ineernal) outside ehinks. ehe impossibiliry of thinking the vhole except as impossible. its pure oprical and sound situations in which we are animaeed by an image which forces us to think. it gives an image of “ehe inexistence of a whole which could be ehought“ (C2. a Body without Organs (BwO). CINEMA CRACKS UP. Deleuze‘s equation ofAntonioni‘s color with mod ernism is consistant with Deleuze‘s discussion of painting. To construct a world with color will be Deleuze and Guattari‘s definition ofartistic modernism. a crack“ (C2. Guiliano undergoes cinema‘s final meeamorphosis. but Arraud‘s Bw() is. cinema expresses ehe powerlessness of human thoughe. her Figure 3 fvlichelangelo Antonioni.“ 18 Art in this sense gives an image to the disruptive force which cracks open our ehought. I)eleuze writes. an explosion entirely cerebral and cinernatic. and becomes an Artaudian body. Modern cinema conseruces this new physiology in ies visions. in Antonioni‘s ab— straction (C2. crack tip. the modern body-brain of cinema and of art. a “vision“ ahstract and real. fit‘s not blood. In II Deserto Rosso it is conseruceed by whae Antonioni calls his “psycho-physiology . nothing but (Guiliano‘s) schizo-sensation. For Artaud.“ Deleuze has said. The brain. an art which will be anti-repre sentational. it‘s red‘ is the for mula ofcolorism“ (CI. and whose ontology will be shared equally by cinema and painting. not a sensory-motor. For Deleuze this is ehe power of the crysral. The BwO is not a spatio-temporal body. a “neuro-physiological“ vi bration as Areaud put it. an image of einie itseif as the crack—and no longer the interval—of thought: Guiliano‘s visions. 167/218). as ehe (w)hole of thought which forces us eo ehink. or (w)bole of thought. In ehis final ineolerable vision of the life which exceeds her. “Any work ofare. “rruly false.g. “hole in appearances“ (C2. 167/218). but only as a “figure of noehingness. meets Nieezsche‘s power of ehe false to provide an abyssal cinenia ofcryseal-im ages. and which she lives. Ofcourse je had eo happen. it is the “innermost realirv“ of ehe cinema. but an in organic or crystalline body. lt may seem paradoxical to say the cmerna can exist without organs. bur it can only be conceived ofas “a fissure. Areaud‘s crack. a brain de tached frorn the sensory-moeor and operating as a “void“ through which and as which thought ernerges as the “virtual conjunceion“ of“vision“ with an abstrace. an expression of die virtual in the actual (or an implosion of the actual in the virtual color con junction). Deleuze claims. an image which is both the (w)hole which could not be ehoughe. withour the organization of the organism rather than without or gans. /\ustrian Film Museum. as ehe internal outside. “Godard‘s formula. and ehe cryseal-image 15 a hole in ehoughe.“ hut nevertheless actual hallucination. finds in Nieezsche‘s power of ehe false a revalued physiology. In Artaud this body-image has a par ticular ontological status. 317/266)). as we shall see more fully in Chapter Six. The cryseal-image is this crack.

but rnore than this our own image. The “ourside“ of thoughr is not “out there. 168/219). joining images in a break (breaking the movement-image) through which duration is expressed. be qualified by die 5 definition given hy Deleuze and Guattari: “I)uration is in no way indivisible. thought and seen as the being and becoming of thought itself As ontological ground therefore. no longer structuring the flow of time to give an indirect image ofduration. in its modern form. is instead the “berween“ ofthe cinemaric time—image. A cinema of concepnon/perception produces a vision.1 l-i Art as Abstract Afachine W‘ Neet-/ New Signs 115 9 Here. “a changing whole which was expressed in die set of associated images“ (C2. 180/235). Now we can see how rhe Bergsonian definition ofdurarion Deleuze gave as “whatdii‘rsfi-om itse‘f“ ° must.“ lndiscernihly virrual and actual. conf‘ronrs an inside. 179/234). At each division. In this xva classical cinema created an out-of-field as. duration as crack. a break which changcs duration‘s nature. die virtuality of duration isactualised and expressed. constructing image-cracks or visions through which duration can emerge as what it is. This image-thought can only be false. finds its own “vision“ in expressing durarion through its con strucrive—and 110 longer rea‘ucgive—break. an inhuman convul sion ofcolor as a living thing which attains a new determination beyond the sensory-rnotor. ‘berween rwo images. as what sees (construction) and what is seen (expression). it is instead a crack in the world hv which cinema goes beyoiid die true and the fhlse to create the new. it is our very groundlessness. “This is why thought.‘ wbich does awaywith all cinema of the One“ (C2. whole and part. offers im narrarive ciosure. the Bergsonian image we have never stopped being. a division made by die “secrion“ or “perspective“ of vision. or internal ourside. The whole.. be cause thoughrs and images are themselves this “berween. we believe in breaks which take on an absolute value and subordinate all association“ (C2. the ontogenesis ofduration. The whole is rhis consrant crearive vibra tion. a visionary power of inorganic life as die unthinkable that makes us think and see something impossible to think andsee. when it cracks open thought and appears as what was im possible ro think. it produces an image of “what does not let itself be seen in vision“ (C2. as die creation ofa perspective on dura tion (once more we think ofBergson‘s famons cone) as die process of its infinire and virtual movement (construction). but continually re-constiruting the rhing according to die changing perspectives of its construction and comprehensiori in vision. But perhaps this is simply the cine-aesrheric of the contemporary itself die moder . but only by making duration change in narure. 179/233). Guiliano‘s increasingly nervous agitation and automation of color. is born from an outside [durarion] rnore distant than am‘ exter nal world. this is also what Deleuze and Guattari will find in painting.“ no matter how dose this may be. The break or gap. as we have seen. the BwO. This inrer— stice of images however. Montage takes 011 its modern meaning. Deleuze argues that when the crystal-image suspends the world with its aherrant movement. rather than an outside the movement—image expresses. “the poinr is quite difIrent“ (C2. As we shall see in the following chapter. 2 12/276).“ Deleuze wrires. it is die abvssal splitting of time irseif within the image. which they simultaneously arc. but is that which cannot be divided wirhout changing in nature at each divi sion“ (ATl 483/604).. . their actual individuation emerges from the virtual (w)hole (expres sion). 278/363). an expression ofhecoming in separable from its very construction. in orher words. a BwO. and. this un thinkable crack. but with the duration that emerges through its cracks. The whole is the virtual dimensionalitv to everv actual thing. as power which does not i‘et exist. [ 1 Thoughr outside itselfand this un-rbought within thought“ (C2. But what emerges in their place is a purely ahstract vision. should not he thoughr ofas the berween ofimages. Avision ofthe (w)hole itself a coloring void-vision. not pre—existing die thing. die whole was the open. THE METHOD OF BETWEEN In the organic regime. deeper than any internal world. “as power which has not always existed. This (w)hole of duration is not totality it is not a reassuring organic whole which is iepresented in our relations with die world. A modern cinema appears here that is not concerned with die movements of narrative. be cause t 110 longer has an outside which it represents. an un thinkable or unthought. and culminates in her increasing distress in the tbroes ofa hallucination turning the room purple. the consummation of Guiliano‘s afEair.“ open onto a gap in her vision—her inahility to see herseif as whole—and she falls into this hole where things and people merge in an indeterminable mist. exprcssed in a remporal interval that produced an image tliat was always indirect. it is the (w)hele as hreak. the climax of 11 Deserto Resso. hut the acrual image in its virtual virality the actual image as the expression and the construction of its virtual becoming. Not rhen die virrual und die tual. the creative power oflife. Cinema becomes in modern times “die merhod ofBETWEEN. but operating as a disjuncrive conjunction. An impossible thought and vision that requires a new hody and brain. the rhytbmic beatings ofcrystal-life. inseparahle and indiscernible. But if the whole is neirher ourside nor inside. As Deleuze has it: “We no longer believe in an association o irnages—even crossing voids. As a result. a hole in/of the world. Deleuze poinrs out. is what is produced when we approach the reciprocity ofvirtual and ac tual in the imace. This oroduces a break in our sensorv-motor. and requires the transformed regime of expression that emerges across the break between the two Cinema volumes.

is itselfunrepresentable. Thcy ject something new. art‘s affirmation gets eap tured in forms which negate it. which imagine it as something sad. a whole supernarural which makes the world ex— plode. since the act proeeeded frorn an individual live creature. The poinr is not to set painting up in. a mcmbranc which puts an ontside aiid an inside in con— tact. the aesthetics of creation presupposes no material or meaning. the “art“ of absolute deterritorialisation as it will be developed in this chaptei. Art ‚ Fvpericiee. confronts them or makes thern clash. The inside is psychology die past. the future. Deleuze and Guattari argue. makes them present to cach other. is the creative force of life inasmuch as this expresses an immanent whole jr constructs. a possibiliiy we will come back to. Tbis cinematic transformation parallels an ontological mutation of the whole that ceases being the One-Being. hut rather a limit. is at work everywhere. involution. is a productive machine thar does not represent anything. a dialectic between its specific representations or forms and their absolute deterritorialisarion. organicise. signifies botli an action amt its result. and consistent with what we have already seen in the last three chapters. Cinema is in this way an atheistic and mystical practice. this revolutionarv force onlv appears within a specific milieu. On the one hand. cinematic or otberwise. and therefire apart from vision. igliore the contrihution whiclt makes the ob— john Dewev. and our route through Bergson arrives at the same poinr as those we took through Nietzsche and Spinoza. like all the other arts. 2061268) Chapter Four A Freedom for the End of the World: Painting and Absolute Deterritorialisation Expression. On the other hand. evolution. does not form a whole. Nevertheless. painring resists this “capture“ on two fronts. paint— ing also finds a way through the cracks. in more or less concrete assemblages. the production of a crystal-image in which. /1 5pace Odyssey (1968): The identity of world am! brain. INTRODUCTION The artwork.116 Art as Abstract Machine nity of any and eveiy age. [heories that seize upon “expression“ as ifit denoted simply die ohject. and temporalise its inorganic consistenc and emergent becomings. Once again. or as. (C2. the automaton. a whole psychology of depths which cxcavate the brain. In this sense the creative process. But. The uutside is die cosmologv ofgalaxies. like construction. in paint ings as such. always insist to die uttermost that rhe objeet of art is purcly reprcsentativc of otbcr objects already in existence. and becomes the constitutive “and“ ofthings. but to . Painting too. and which subjectivise. the sirnultaneous construction and expression ofa vital becoming. Art. and operates as a critical practice that resists its formalization and departs on its thousand lines of flight. as Deleuze writes of Stanley Kubrick‘s 2001. like all the other arts. and is precisely what escapes stich presuppositions in creating the new. Deleuze‘s ontological aesthetic oftbe cinema therefore culminates in this univocity ofbecoming. and exisrs only as the conunction ofmaterial flows and their traits ofexpression. lfthe two meanings arc separared the object is viewed in isolation froin the Operation which produccd it.

The first will involve a discussion ofart‘s “abstract machine. A painring‘s content as “thing“ consists ofthe substances jr is formed frorn. infi nite“ (Chaos. 44/58). which it combines into forms (once more. once for expression and once for content. a general ac count of the terminological and theoretical terrain on which this “double enunciation“ ofpainting takes place. an art of creation that in its finite processes of construction absoluteiv detertitorialises the world (destratifies ir Deleuze and Guattari will say) and expresses its destratified and infinite “plane ofconsistenc“ This chapter will therefore have rwo main objectives: First. the abstract line. as when an art historian writes about a paint ing). What is required. when it is truly art. Here the sign gains an auronomy from the “thing“ it represents. die Earth is constantly conglomerating and concretising ac cording to varions axiomatic relations of content and expression. and as such: “Every stratum is a judgment ofGod“ (ATP. Thus. its coding. Signs emerge in the erganic and linguistic strata. the “choosing“ offunctional srruc tures determjnes a substance ofexpression (the genre ofa painting for exam ple). This auronomy ofexpression means it can on the one hand rerer ritorialise a material formlsubstance as its content—consrrucring a sign—and on the other. exisrs on another level and emerges through a formal organisation of funcrions er 2 Neverrheless. is an athe ism that attacks these judgments. both relative and absolute. things and signs being produced through differenr tech nical and linguistic regimes. lt will come as no surprise that one of the first signs ofpainting. where expression operates in a dimension separateci frem its content. the two elements of this chapter will provide us with a new image of abstraction. giving its form—this painting).and re-rerritorialisarion of content for new expressions). rocal presupposition for a painring—as sign—to exist. At the organic level. the Earth. this expression.“ a semiotic practice that Deleuze and Guattari call schizoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari suggest three levels of strara. hut the sign takes on its real meaning when this process is extended to language. STRATIFIED The material world. as the example ofpainting shows. and the work of Jackson Pollock. Tliis prevides us with die components ofa semiotics capable of revaluing the “sign.“ The contours ofthis relation arc. however. Content consists of a formed matter (the “chosen“ or territorialised matter being its substance—--canvas and paint in painting for example—and the order jr is chosen in. This introduces [)eleuze and Guattari‘s concept of modernism. Strata are actualised by what Deleuze and (iuarrari ca 11 “machinic as semblages. On the other band. Deleuze and Guatrari argue. and how these articulate the relations between the strata anti the plane ofconsistency. In both cases. and substance die ter ritory formed.“ The strara impose limits on the autogenesis of the Earth as if from above. on one sitte rhey face rowards the plane and employ “abstract machines“ ro “extract“ a matrer-function. and on the other the strata formalize this marter-function into “concrere assem blages. a genetic flux ofun formed matter/energy existing at ontological ground zero. This double articulation of the strata is doubled again hy the distinction of form and substance. and the rechnical Opera tions that form them. and haptic experience. (expression in one relation can be the content ofanother. one that departs from the work ofWilhelm Worringer. The painring‘s expression.“ while the second will extend this discussion to its painterly components. irs historical trajectory of material substances and processes offormation have undergone conrinual change. is “a double enunciation: finite. an articulation ofits finite and infi nite dimensions. die geologcal or physiocheniical. The second airn of the chapter will be the exploration of the schizoanalysed sign through the examples of Venetian Renaissance painting.118 Art s Abstract Machine A Freedomfrr the End oftle World 119 understand how paintings are already the immanence of an absolutely deterrito— rialised plane and its territorialised formalization. The strata consist of various axiomatic relations of content and expres sion that determine t-hings md their meanings. the sign appears rhrough the process ofre production (life and dearb being the constant dc.“ These work in rwe direcrions. 55/82). territorialised and incorporeal. as Guattari points out. form is the code. conrenr and expressien must be in recip forms of expression. which will be taken up and dc veloped in the next chapter. Central ro this account is an understand ing of the concepts ofdeterritorialisation. and the nioe rom a cave painting to Antonioni‘s cinematic painting thar we saw last chapter would describe onl one possible hisrory of painting‘s innevation of material . But. the meaning ofthis genre painting). Meaning and rbings (die meaning o[‘things) arc therefore pro duced through die reciprocal presuppesirion ofcontent and expression and their mobile relations within and between strara. The rwe regimes nevertheless operare in recipro cal presupposirion. smooth space. or whar ir lepresents. and challenges die ciassic modernist ac count of Pollock hy Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. and the linguistic.“ the actual things and sratements which ernerge through the srrata‘s “pincers“ of content and expression. The technological axiomatjc rhat produces a painting. is a plane ofconsistency. first ofall. rhe organic. dynamic and mulrifaceted. Painring is. a “double ar ticulation“ of the Earth emerging through what they call the “strata. bur rhey remain dis tinct from each orher as “meaning“ and “thing. it can itseifbe deterritorialised and re-formed as rhe content of anorher sign.

not to mention the history of the meaning of painting (expression‘s substance). “in radical oppo sition to the scenario of the signifier“ (ATP 66/85). the long dehate around the relative merits of line over color marks only one possihle “phylum“ of the shifting rneani ng ofpainring. Here. but on irs other side ir faces the plane of consistenc 5 where irs “abstract“ machine composes material flows inro trairs ofcontent (degrees ofinrensiry. on this accounr. Within the regime of expression there is also an extremely open process at work defining a painring‘s historical meaning (the form ofex— pression). and engaging wirh this process be gins with a “semiotic ofsigns“ opposed to a “semiology of the signifier“ (ATE 65/85). As w‘e shall see. ABSOLUTE DETERRITORIALISATION Content and expression allow US to undersrand the way signs only appear in a “specific. who sought an alternative to the signifier/signified ofstructuralist Iinguistics. and jr will create a sensation that assumes a new way to think. A painring. and now we must take the necessarv further steps towards its absolute deterritorialisarion. an “oversimplified“ model in which the painting as sub stantial “thing“ is “subjugated“ to the “increased despotism“ of the regime ofsig nification (ATI 66/85—6). 66/86) Deleuze and Guatrari posit the Hjelmslevian sign. some aspecrs ofpainting‘s expressive regime have remained stable. Against the “signifier enthusiasts“ (Äl‘P. which in turn assumes a subjective idenrity—a “Seif“ as the unity and ground ofcornmon sense—and an objecrive idenrit) in what the facuiries sense and represent (DR. This under sranding of the sign is rherefore onrological. such as clear obscure. imagination and memory constitute a “com mon sense“ shared hy all. For example. most notahiv a content-expression relation deter mined by what Deleuze and Guattari ca 11 the “imperialisrn of the signifier“ in which “the sein jotic ofsigns is necessarily linkecl to a semiology of the signifier“ (AFI 65/84—5). We arc not signified. and stands.But this “concrete assemblage“ ernerges from a deeper “machinic as semblage“ it actualises. . variable assemb!age“ necessarily involving both meaning and things (ATE 66/85). Here. Deleuze and Guatrari claim. because jr purs the sign back into contact with rhe material and vital plane of consisrency that consrirutes it. whose conrent expression relation has. Any perception presupposes this common sense. painting appears in a perceprion that has already been determined as a represen tation ofart object for a subect. we arc stratified. resisrance. whose recipro cal presupposition with the techniques of formed substances (“things“) remains. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari propose a critical semiorics that will reveal the signs abstract machine. is the figure seated nexr ro Christ in Leonardo‘s Last Supper a woman. or closed-open form). Signifiance implies the autonomy of meaning from materiality in a seemingly free circularion ofsignifiers. but this substance of painting is over coded by the meaning it represents as a sign. and is therefore entirely relevant to a discussion ofart. Deleuze and Guattari argue. in being experienced. signifiance and 3 subjectivation arc the two facers ofa representationa! economy that defines not only the meaning ofpainring (as what jr means to paint). Deleuze and Guattari‘s understanding of a semiotics of content and expression rests on the work of Louis Hjelnislev. Painting‘s meaning now exists within linguistic assembiages ofexpressions (signifiers) and contents (signifieds). a representational relation is irnposed on content and expression. but as particular assemblages of material forces and functions srratified inro relations of conrent and expression. as he calls it. assumes an “1 rhink“ which pre-ex ists and determines perception. ATi 65/85). it will no longer be representative. as the condition of possibility ofany perception. is only the first step towards a reval uation of painting. that ofthe subject. conducrivirv heat and speed) and traits ofexpression (“tensors“ or funcrions operaring as differenrials. In DifJ?renceandRepetition Deleuze explains the co-implication ofsignifi ance and subjectivation in terms of a representational image of thought. ‘I‘his revaluing of the sign however. The understanding ofsigns ac cording to a signifier/signified relation implies for Deleuze and Guattari an in dividual subject who expresses it. The machinic assembiage operates the arricularion ofcon tent and expression on its side facing the strata. but this freedom hides the face of another despor. In this xvay. line-color. a representation given nleaning by the signifier which expresses it and which gives its content. but also what it means to think. an object whose materiality is al wars already taken up in this representational economy ofthought. where semiotics becomes semiologyand structuralist Im guistics becomes the dominant model. judgment. and in so doing free a sign‘s material becomings frorn the strata. 4 This “dogmatic“ image of thought. Nevertheless. Deleuze is critiquing the Kantian rationalist mode! where the fac ulties of conceiving.S But structuralism is only the latest symptom of a representarional image of thought which has dominated thinking since Plato. Signs do not. as one recent theory has it? Similarly.“ and “we‘re still spreading rhe same canker“ (le marne gangr/‘ne. becomes determined by “common sense“ as a subjective sign representing a singular and selfsame object. In this sign expression is kept in direct contact with its material dimension. appear as signifiers or as representarions. when painting emerges in its materiality or more precisely when the consrruction ofits mate rial becomes expressive. 226/291). As a result. lt‘s “the same circle. “the advantage of breaking with the form-content dual ity“ (ATI 43/58).120 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedom for the End ofthe World 121 and technique. Painting‘s materiality and the processes that form it therefore find expres sion onl through the constant circulation of signifiers. or “significance“ as Deleuie and Guattari ca! 1 it.

tbrough. and the real mnatcrially writes“ (ATF 141 / 177). a “destratification.‘ as “the abstract machines absolute positive deterritorialization“ (ATT 142/177). operating before its territorialisation and coding into signs. In other words. and traits of expression arc “tensors“ inseparable from matter and determining its tendency in relation to irs immanent functions. by which the sign appears as destratification. [as] it inscrihes directly upon the plane of consistency“ (ATB 65/85). Here rhe abstracm machine con structs continuums of intensity which appear as particles-signs. This brings US tO the second part of our answer. These signs appear when relations of content and expression no longer define the ab stract rnachine.and re-ter ritorialisation (relative that is to the axiomatic limits of the strata). accelerating (or decelerating) deterritorialisamions to an absolute speed. The question for painring is how its signs appear as ptrticles—signs. as Deleuze and Guattari ca 11 it here. how painting is sensible beyond the common sense ofsubjects.“ creating new possibilities for life. just what this appearance could be we shall now go on to see. “given a certain machinic assemblage. bow is the ah stract machine stratified. or we will be absolutely deterritorialised. destrati fied in the creation of a new reality. First. we know. either within the strata which “harness“ it and turn its deterritorialisa— tions relative. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in an ex ample that equally applies to painting: “Writing now functions on the same level as the real. but is the immanent operation of the abstract machine in stratification. rraits of conrent arc ahsolutely deterritorialised contents (marter-flows). ifthey have gone into ab solute deterritorialisation?“ (ATE 70/90). “becomes relative oniy after stratification occurs on that plane or body: lt is the strata that arc always residue. that absolutely deterritorialised “variables“ appear under their own. is the “destratified“ element that avoids any distinctions hetween con— tent and expression. As we have seen. The answer has two parts.“ The immanence of the ahstract machine implies that the new realities it creates do not exist apart from the strata. signified and subjectified in a stratifed body and thought. while immanent to the sign. as the non-rep resentative “asignifying traits“ (FB.6 Absolute deterritoriali sation does not introduce an “excess or beyond“ (ATP 56/74) to the strata. operating on the plane of consistency where “it is no longer even possible to teil whether it is a particie or a sign“ (ATF 141/176). or forms and substances is inrroduced. and . with their destratification. they arc composed from rraits of content and trairs of expression as the matter-function of the abstract machine. in order to make thc operation of their abstract machines sensible. 56/74). new type ofrea/ity“ (ATP 142/177). destratified conditions. in lines offlight a “passage to the absolute“ (ATl 144/180). But second.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. This problem has as its condition Deleuze and Guattari‘s assurnption of the “perpetual immanence of absolute deterritorializa tion within relative deterritorialization“ (ATl 56/74). such a sign appears tbrough the conjugation of deterritorialising movemenrs in the strata. The abstract machine conjugares certain traits ofcontent to construct a material plane ofconsistencv. 100/94) which constitute the plane. and it is this plane tliat the abstract machine‘s functions express (in irs traits ofexpression). achieves this. l he abstract machine appears according to rwo “complementary“ move ments. arc asignifying traits. on the ahsolutely deterritorialised plane of consistency the abstract machine oper ates in a “piloting role. a “schizoanalysis. their objects. creating a real to come. First. and Deleuze and Guattari ask it. The task of semiotics will therefore be to interpret stratified signs in order to revalue (destratiy) them. the possibility ofsigns no longer defined by distinctions betveen contents and expressions. “This absolute deterritorialization. ‘X‘ith the absolute deterritorial isation of signs. Although the strata subjugate matter-function through processes of relative dc. ‘X“e shall shortly see how Venetian Renaissance painting and the work ofJackson Pollock. as particles-signs. as the crack through which something new emerges. This absolute deterritorialisation of the ab stract machine has two important elements that arc necessarily related. but as their hvphenation sug gests. The semi otic problem is therefore how to approach signs in their absolutely deterritori alised stare. and it emerges “flush with the real. not the opposite“ (ATP. The abstract machine. According to these two modes ofeffectuation we will either remain organicised. How? Particles—signs. and are the “primary“ elements ofany machinic assembiage. “how can one still identify and name things ifthey have lost the strata that qualified them. Once more this begs the question. hut only appear in the absolute deterritorialisation ofthe strata. ‘hat is its relation ofeffectua tion wjth the abstract rnachjne?“ (ATi 71/91). each in its own way. emerging as a new I/eye adequate to its “properly diagrammaric experience“ (ATP 145/180—1). and in what ways does the assemblage open onto destratification? This question is not easy to answer. because its answer must be construcred through a process ofcritique.122 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedoinfor the End oft/e XVorla‘ 123 allowing them to be sensed in themselves. it appears within the strata as the absolute deterritorialisation of content and expression. or as the absolute deterritorialisation of the strata. As a result our question becomes. The abstract machine is the “pure Matter-Function“ of sign. the abstract maclline is always seeking to conjugate these movements into an absolute deter ritorialisation. This process frees “variables“ to “op erate in the plane of consistency as its own functions“ (ÄT1 70/90). Abstract mach ines are ahsolutely deterritorialised. This second sense of an ahstract chine “inscribing“ “flush with real“ implies that in destratifving signs the ab stract machine does not sirnply “return“ them to the plane of consisten but that particles-signs construct the plane at the same time as they express it.

“ (AO. and ii is here rhar the hreakthrough—not the breakdowii----—occurs. a lalce. they express an abstract machine as the “diagram“ of the plane. SCHIZOANALYSIS IS LIKE THE ART OF THE NEW Schizoanalysis vili he. or line of flight frorn the strata that introduces something new. sundcred hy what penctrates it. lt is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible. a montage ofdesiring machines. . the analysis ofstratified matter that lib erates its deterritorialisations and turns them absolute. Particles—signs will therefore appear in painting both as its destratifleation. an explosion. 140/182). 147/183). a continued experimentation. a pragmatics. in the asubjective sensations of the schizophrenie. 322!384). “The completion of the process. and is “the onl‘ wav you will be able to dismantle thern [strata] and drawyour lines offlight“ (ATP 188/230). A-subjective and a-signifying particles-signs arc released by the imperceptible and conrinuous variation of matter-function. But in another sense. Gothic art. lt is not the given hut that by which the given is given. “the negative or destructive task of schizoanalysis is in no way separable from its positive tasks—all these tasks arc necessariiy undertaken at the same time“ (AO. 322/385).“ a line without outline or contour (i. “stores up bis treasures so as to creatc an imme diate explosion“ (AO. Fie or she is a “handyman. hut a world created in the process of its tendency. Their example is ihrner‘s late land and seascapes. The mc chanical nature of this process is important.“ a hreak down through which matter-functions “break through“ the strata. and especially his last watercolors. “is never a scholarly exercise in search ofwhat is signified. because it suggests the way in which lt is achieved through direct material interventions rather than through a psychoanalytic interpretation of symbols. Consistent with its immanence to the material it attempts to destratify. as tIie insaniry ofcommon sense. 105/98). an intervention rather than an interpretation. Everything becomes mixcd and conftised. a radical break wirb. one we will see them trace in Venetian painting. its coming undone. This explosive qualirv (its anti— romantic quality will become important in the next chapter) of the line will be a constant fearure of Deleuze and Guattari‘s painting diagram. But how does the artist achieve this.‘ The “schizoanaly‘sis“ of particies— signs is a material process. schizoanalysis is a process and not a goal. 130/177). a force of construction by wliich the plane‘s vital togenesis is expressed in signs. as what escapes the stratifying articulations ofcon tent and expression. wbich produce an “explosive line. Deleuze and Guattari devote a particularly beau tiful passage to Turner‘s “breakthrough“ paintings: tbe canvas turns in on itself. its dc— territorialisation“ (AO. intensive. and as a new reality they construct. then so is their sensation. their meaning changed.e. 106/125—6).“ Deleuze and Guattari write. in tense. 32/39). a destratifled. The canvas is truly broken. In this way. and the imperceprible ofra tional perception. Schizoanalysis attempts to acceler ate (or decelerate) the deterritorialising movernents of the strata beyond their threshold of reproduction and towards an irrevocable “hreakdown. “who neither allows himselfto be represented nor wishes to represent anything“ (DR. desubjectivised sensibiiity adequate to the asignifying particies-signs lt produces. Rather it is a productive use of the literary machine.322/384—5). a tor— nado.“ and pro duces fiom their ruin “asubjective affects.124 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedorn jbr die End ofthe World /25 tiieir representational image.“ one who destrarifies signs in order ro create a new reality 8 In this way. They can oniy be sensed ourside of the schema of subjects and their objects. “Sorneone“ Deleuze teils us. No creation without destruction. Destratification fractures our harrnonious common sense to con struct a new sensibiliry. signs without significance“ (ATP. A particle—sign will therefore re— quire a new sensibility because it “is not a sensible being hut the being ofthe sensible. a never-enditig process of revolution that leaves “physical and semiotic systems in shreds. or signifier. lt is the imperceptible precisely from the point of view ofrecognition“ (DR. it is picrced by a hole. a flame. And if particles-signs are flush with the real. Particles-signs express a destratifica— tion. a schizoid exercise that exrracts from the text its revolutionary force“ (AO. 132/1 57—8)° There arc a couple of important points to note here. traversed in depih [iv whar bas just sundercd its brcadrh: the schiz. and the work ofjackson Pollock and Francis Bacon. hy which the ahstract machine constructs and expresses the plane of consistency.“ DeleuLe and Guattari stare. 1)cleuze and Guattari write. that what appears in this work is preciseh‘ the “breakdown“ . Schizoanalysis will be the continual process of freeing matter from its determination by the strata. “The artist. quite precisely. Schizoanaiysis is an analysis of stratified signs. that “makes the painting itseif an unparalleled catastrophe (instead ofillustiating the catastrophe rornantically)“ (FB. The first is one 1 have al ready mentioned.“ Deleuze and Guattari write in a passage clearly also applying to painting. schizoanaly— sis will construct serisations as particles-signs. “is not a promised and pre—existing land. “For reading a text. how does he or she consrrucr the new? The artist and art-work begins by ereating a “catastrophic“ breakdown. ‘l‘be thernes oftlic preceding paintings arc ro be found again here. All thar remains is a hackground of gold and fog. still iess a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. The schizoanalyst isa“mechanic“ because “schizoanalysis is solely functional“ (M). it is non-representational). ihey arc iriad rather than meaningful. Deleuze and Guattari argue. and appear.

Jesus Christ Superstar. the very nexus of my dreams is brokcn and dissolved and rny guts spill out in a grand schizophrenic rush. hut not enough to deepen it irreinediahly? [ j How is thispolitics. But ehe face is not an expression of impartial or universal judgmene. and in ehis political dimension it is easv to see how the ubiquieous production of faces wiehin ehe ares is only one aspece. as an atemporal and intense matter. to the point where. The face and its faciality machine have eheir corrclate in the landscape. Quiee simply. Their punishmenes include racism. a madness. alehough it likes eo appear as such. L)eleuze makes this poine in a weil— known passage from The Logic ofSense. facialiey is ehe means by which all faces may be cornparecl ehrough a siiding scale ofsirnilarity ehat dc eerrnines their relative positions. Commenting on the alcoholisrn of Malcolrn Lowry and F. The schizophrenie. and a linie crazy. poverey. 18/25) expe riences matter as destratified. who‘s ehought must not simply repa-esent the schizo—produceion ofothers. a “deviance deteceor. The schizo-areisan in his or her glory is however. Deleuze asks: Arc we Co become ehe professionals who give talks on these topics Arc we to wish only that thosc who have bem struck down do not abusc themselves too much? Arc we gomg to take tip colleetions and creatc spe cial journal issues? Or should we go a sliort wav further Co SCC for our— scives. is divergence from ehe white-man‘s face. a terrifying and painful autism. Schizoanalysis experiments with straeified signs in order to bring them as dose as possible to the matter they alreadv arc. ATHOUSAND EINES OF FLIGHT. “The schiz ophrenic. this full guerrilla warfare to be attained? (LS. 19/26). In this sense. 34 1/407—8). ehe rypical European. and especially with the forces stifled hy this milieu“ (WP. “you‘ve been recognized. in schizo analysing our own lives. As such. in his or her “miery and glory“ (AO. But this break is productive. a Linie suicidal. be a littic alcoholic. Scott Fitzgerald. with Hrn Morrison. withoue oueside. to a hurning. This means the “breakthrough“ of‘the painting is not utopic in thc sense in which it. clearly disein guished from the rnisery of the schizophrenie clinically defined. 181/222). for all ehere is. perhaps. “scales the schizophrenic wall“ (AO. an evacuation that leaves mc tce to face with the Absolute. schizoanalysis is a utopian pragmatics.“ Deleuze and Guattari wriee. Not least the thinker. for. “There arc oniv people who should he like us and whose crime ie is not to be“ (AT1 177—78/21 8).‘‘ The schizo-artisan on the other hand.“ 12 As ehe passage froin Miller implies. something we must accomplish for ourselves. and not nec essarily ehe worse. a linie ofa guerrilla—just cnough ro cxtend the crack. in its ontological emergence as a sensa tion. hut muse take a lirele of their ‘mad— ness‘ in oider to construce sonieehing new. The schizo phrenie as patient escapes the strata of signifiance and subjeceivation only at the price of bis or her abiliey to produce signs.“ which inscribes any ateempe eo escape ies norma tive System within its houndaries. of its pernicious powers. nor a purely theoretical aphasia. as in Turner. and the “schiz“ appears as intense matters-func tions at work on/in the plane. for ehe face is ehat ofthe White Man himself. The utopia oTurner‘s paintings is not another world. the “artisan“ paines 1ush with tue real.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. but is die appearance of this world in irs reality.“ a mixture ofa wbiee wall (signifiance) and black holes (subjectivation) dreating faces as recognizable forms of our generic humaniey and individual identiey (ATP 138/172). confinement or death. kiss the sky). 69/8 1) and makes what they arc escaping from escape itseif Their artistic creativiey lies in being able to destratif‘ an asseniblage and through this process express its immanent material flows in particles-signs (AO. would break 011 through to the other side (although it does. 157—8/184) . and facialiev “has you inscribed in its overall grid. 99—100/95—6). living frorn ‘the other side‘ an opposi tion beeweeii ehe strata and plane ofconsiseency that the strata enforce. time stops. The schizophrenic steps into a silene and painful outside. imposing phvsical and psychological hier archies (deeermining my “place“ in the world) ehat complirnent ehe process of . in its being as becoming. hut a practice. Obviously: “The face is a pol itics“ (ATP. We don‘t have to look frr amongst artists eo find examples ofa schizoanalytic practice. This polieics ofseif-schizophrenization will emerge more fully in ehe nexe chap eer. . Landscapification codes ehe world. hut je is also implicie in Deleuze and Guateari‘s suggeseion—a suggestion 1 have eried eo exeend—ofa schizoanalysis ofVenetian painting. THE CASE OF VENETIAN PAINTING Deleuze and Guaetari argue ehae ehe strata of signifiance and subjectiflcaeion form a “seicky mixture. and a schizoanalytic life. living centre of matter“ (AO. “is as dose as possible to matter. Henry Miller describes it beaueifully as ehat moment when “the world ceases eo revolve.“ Faciality is uleimately a fonn of polic ing. and on Artaud and Nietzsche‘s mad ness. as Deleuze and Guattari explain: “Utopia does not split offfrom infinite movernent: etymo logicallv it stands for absolute dererritorialisation but always at the critical poinr at whicb it is connected to the present relative milieu. schizoanalysis is neither a psychotic brcakdown.126 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedornfrr the End ofthe World 127 ofstratifled sigus by which the particles-signs of the plane appear as a “break through“: an absolute dererritorialisarion necessarily immanent to the strata. .

Although these deterritorialisations will be reterritori— alised by the classical aesthetics dominant in central Italy. and faceless.“ 15 At this time. maintained . its face-landscape ma chine. pushing it to extremes: “Christ‘s body is engineered on all sides and in all fashions. Venetian art fulfils one of Deleuze and Guattari‘s dlearest affirmations ofa vital art: art is never an end in itself. wbere the semiotic components (traits of expression) arc inseparable from their material elements (traits of content). that painting turns against the church. This latter process is painting‘s “brighter side“ (ATP. using the face of Christ to produce every kind of facial unit and every degree ofdeviance“ (ATI 178/218—9). it is certainly true that iconography at this time breaks with the rigid codes of Byzantine and Gothic art. This movernent of deterritorialization einerges in painting with the shift in the Renaissance towards a theology of the incarnation. taking refuge in art. In this way. with the Venetians.“ Deleuze and Guattari rather generously argue. 369/442—43). Venerian painting of the Renaissance is a “reactivation of corporeality“ and a “liberation of line and colour“ that introduces material and icono graphic innovarions (new traits of content and expression) to painting. with this shift in theolog Child. on the one hand enabling its reproduction. Deleuze argues. some drapery. and all those activc escapcs that do not consist in flecing into art. painting discovers the atbeisrn that is the creative part ofChristianity. tbe “radical break“ in painting that occurs around 1450. What is crucial however is that these deterritorial isations of the expressive regime are conjugated to others taking place on the level of content. whicb developed a new iconography centling on the passion story. their techniquc and use of color inventing a new painting machine. where painting breaks with representation be cause “the semiotic components arc inseparable from material components and are in exceptionally dose contact with molecular levels“ (AT 334/4 13). in which “the flows of painting go insane. Debates about the meaning of the incarnation were explored in painting. a locus of connection for all the machines of desire. This will be the abstract machine of modern painting. “the painter can easily be indifferent to the religious subject he is asked to repre sein“ (EB. 16 lnstead. but 011 the other creating deviations from its noamarive axiomatic. (ATl 187/230) At this point however. a reality painting will not exhaust. Painting will become. 124/117). This “accident. or by a liberation of lines and colors. the descent of the divine into the flesh. 125/117). 178/218) where. playing the role ofa full body without organs [i. and the Madonna and 4 But more fundarnentally. in othcr words all ofthose real bccomings that arc not produced only in art.“ They mention: “Christ-athlete at the fair. Even homosexual Christs“ (AO. but a material vitality that finds expression in the construction ofa new reality. Althougb this last claim seems optimistic.‘ ical focus God is no longer a pure transcendent essence. lt is not a representa tion ofthe ideal and eternal. Venetian painting emerged in part from a Byzantine tradition of images especially present in Venice. a sense both aesthetic and political: “The ‘problem‘ within wbich panting is inscribed is that of the face-landscape“ (ATP 301/369)) Painting approaches this “problem“ from two sides. an athe ism that would liberate painting in a dramatic way: “Christianity contains a germ of tranquil atheism that will nurture painting. lt becornes a small step for the painter to use the accident of Christ on the cross to explore completely different concerns: a landscape.“ Deleuze argues. but instead sweep lt away wirh them toward the realrns of the asignifying. most importantly the introduction of new painting materi als in ltaly at this time. but has become its opposite. Cbrist-Mannerist queer. the plane ofconsis tency]. a locus of sadomasochistic exercise where the artist‘s joy breaks free. Christ-Negro“ (ATF 178/219). Deleuze claims. a materialist-vitalism no longer representational but real. and be gins to experiment with this new corporeality. lt is not the case however. the event or “accident“ ofa man‘s death. and here Deleuze and Guattari are beginning to talk about the Venetians: “Painting has taken the abstiact white wall/black hole machine of faciality in all directions. This is. and this will be its valuc for Deleuze and Guattati. or borh at the same time“ (ATI 301/370). the Venetians will project the deterritorialisation of material into the absolute.“ especially as it appears in painting. and all of those positive dcterritoriali7ations that never reterritorialize on art. how it achieves this. it is only a tool for blaiing life lines. Venetian art succeeds in making painting live. “has always been the deterritorialisation of faces and landscapcs. Under Byzantine control early in its history Venice. or other more bizarre twists of the imagination. and does so in a way rliat attacks its representational regime. either by a reactivation of corporeality.e. we must turn to a inuch more precise account ofVenetian art to understand.128 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedomfor the End oftle World 129 flicialisation. Painting becomes a deterritorialisation machine: “The aim of painting. embodies Christianity‘s inherent atheism. asuhjective. Deleuze and Guattari write: “The most prodigious strokes of madness appear on canvas under the auspices of the Catholic code. a materialist experimen tation inseparable from the vitalism of the plane. even once independent. pulled in all direc tions. In this sense. An atheist painting produced frorn within the church structure that nurtures it ernerges when “the form begins to express the acci dent and no longer the essence“ (FB. Here painting emerges in partidles-signs. and starts to disbelieve. exactly. to this very day (there is no “death ofpainting“).

which merely provided the material elements of the picture. Plotinian mysticism dernanded a dematerialization ofthe soul that was also a radical negation ofconsciousness. Deleuze and Guattari write.“ (PB.130 Art as Abstract Machine A Freea‘omfrr the End ofthe World 131 significant economic links to (Zonstantinople and its empire. dominated the city physically and aestheticaHy. This final step in rerracing God‘s ernana tion into being travels up. and light merely gave volume to the forms a line defined and revealed their color. and this spiritual path was one Venetian painting re jccted. The colors of each obect had also been determined in advance. that light was separate from color. Line was the fundamen tal means by which art could approach the ideal. 22 This was a more optimistic response to Plato‘s view of the material world as a dirn and dc ceptive shadow of the transcendent realm of ideas and essences. for the alternations of “black shores and white surfaces“ (FB. Venetian painting before 1450. both ofthe thing and of the medium used to represent it. Nevertheless. a reversal the Venetians accelerated into the ab solute dererritorialisation ofcolor) 9 In the Byzantine mosaic. its lusb decoration and spectacular mosaics being an imporrant influence on Venetian painting. and these were applied fol lowing the linear contours. Byzantine art was in fact typified by an extreme emphasis on the face of the “old despot. 129/121) and this was a deterritorialisa— tion of both organic representation and the human essence it represented. ° But this ascension inro pure light meant 2 more than a break with the beautiful classical body and its representation. while light was only a secondary element that revealed it. The first account of such a method appeared around 1390 in . line was the first step in a painting‘s compo sition. San Marco. To ascend into this divine light means transcending our organic form. and operated as a mould. This ‘reversal‘ provided a means ofcomposition Venetian art was to exploit against the ciassical emphasis on line favoured in the Renaissance of central ltaly. the great Byzantine church. In taking up the Byzantine mod ulation of light in its own ways (ways we shall have to elaborate) Venetian painting broke with the classical line. Byzantine art expresses the philosophical transition froin Plato to Plotinus. and by the middle of the fifteenth century was achieved by making a fuJi scale cartoon. inro the light defining the spiritual and visual pres— ence ofGod in San Marco. Byzantine mosaics offered an alternative to the ciassical subordination oflight to line that dominatecl the Italian Renaissance. this function heing privileged over light and color. Representation was first of all the representation ofthe organic world. the function ofByzantine mosaics wirhin die church was to provide a path by wbich the viewer could transcend their body and regain the di vine realm of the spirit. and the church in this sense was a machine through which we could achieve this transfiguration. This approach drew on the ciassical philosophical tradition articulated by Aristotle. 17 These are some of the reasons why Venicc. 18 Beyond their aesthetic influence however. 128/120) composing Byzantine figures involved an equally rigid system offa ciality. hut it will do so through affirming ratber than negat ing corporeality and the materiality ofpaint. 21 Venetian painting will borrow the Byzantine dissolution ofclassical line in the modulation oflight. unlike central Italy. which was then transferred to the painting surface. who dc vated form over matter and the intellectual over the sensuous. For painrers of central Italy line was the most important element in painting because it defined form. and in many ways continued its lines of research. In bis Poetics Aristotle privileged line over color hecause it bad the clarity necessary to trans late the intellectual act of invention. who appeared in hieratic iso lation in tbe upper reaches of the church. This Byzantine deterritorialisation nevertheless introduced its own reterrito rialisations. and inasmuch as light and shadow created an obects volume these effects were gained through the mixture of the “non-colors“ white and black with the color. Deleuse writes: “Beings disintegrate into light. whereas color was merely a property of matter. As Venice was with out ciassical ruins. and using instead the modulation of areas of light and shadow to consrruct form. Byzantine art developed an alternative to this type of representation in abandoning the contour-line. hut is the spiritual “grace“ of a heavenly world appearing in the brilliance of the mosaic‘s divine light. and found in art the possibility of representing the essential and true. This vertical hierarchy works to lead us towards our essence—that to which we are compared and that to which we aspire—but this essence doesn‘t define our “natural“ organism. Color theory at this rime also appealed to an Aristotelian metaphysics. In this sense. an alterna tive the Venetian painters developed in their own direction. Ciassical representation utilized the line as an expressive contour impos ing an ideal and organic form on matter. of man‘s world. “molds itself to the Byzanrine code where even the colors and the lines arc subordinated to a signifier that determines their hierarchy as a vertical order“ (AO. and in the realm ofarr it was first of all the line that described this world. As the most important dc mein in the construction ofform. once more inherited from Aristotle. hut more importantly it broke with this line as it was “re-born“ in central Italy in the fifteenth century. Being must disintegrate in ligbt. allowing our gaze to pass through the black holes of God‘s eyes in order to gaze upon the internal abyss frorn which Plotinus‘ God emanates bis gift. and every effort was made to retain a color‘s purity as a supplement to the painting‘s linear clariry An important element in this prac tice was the belief. The ciassical line was hylomorphic. in order to discover the divine void. it meant the evaporation of all materiality into a spiritual void. 369/442). did not break with the Byzantine influence in paint ing.“ God the father and the son.

Deleuze will claim that this liberation from the sys tematic addition of white and black to create a color‘s value will be the defini tion ofcolorism. and the condition ofpossihiliry ofa painrer being able tu paint inorganic forces. and the colors of the objects sur rounding it. This deterritorialisation ofthe Renaissance line-color value sys tem did not ernerge in isolation however. a practice often producing rnurky effects. Finally they directly mixed colors together. and two lighter tones were then mixed by adding white. and black no longer needed to he mixed with a color. Alberti‘s coding of color retains the ciassical empbasis on a true. and with one another“ (A0. eternal appearance. As we shall see. Accademia. and the influence of the work he did there (especialiv the al tarpiece for S. and this led rhein to revalue color‘s value. which claimed to explain Giotto‘s painting technique. This development is usually attributed to the 4 painter Antonello da Messina. In empirical experience an object‘s color is insepa rahle fiom the quality of light illuminating it. and then modelled “up and down“ through the addition ofbiack and white according to the degree ofillu minarion. The light source was fixed at a right angle to the picture plane. In these was the Venetians ahsolutely deterritorialise the ciassical line tu start painting with color-light. written in 1435—6. a series of reds and pinks achieved through the layering ofdifferent intensities of each). They began to overlay glazes ofcomplementary colors to create shadows (the so-called “colored grey“). giving a greater depth and vibrancy tu color than that acbieved by mixing the pigments with egg tempera. In Cennini‘s system. or the weather conditions (a good example is Giorgione‘s La 7mpesta. These were concentrated in . wbich gave a much more re alistic light effect. The Venetians accelerated the possibili ties of‘ the oil medium heyond its use in central Italy in numerous ways. where light and dark is achieved through the mixing of pure color.“ where the pure color was placed in the shadowed areas of an object. because its color system ignores empirical experience. Cassiano. now in die Kunsthistorische Museum. and gave the direcrion and strength ofthe sbadows and highlights. adding “broken tones“ to their palette. This involved the practice of “modelling tip. giving central Italian painting its timeless. 2 Additionalk some of van Eyck‘s works had come to ltaly. Black was still used in the monochrome under painting that gave the lighting structure ofa scene. colors had different value ranges depending on the inrensity of their pigments. and was conjugared tu other impor tant “traits ofexpression“ ofthe new oil medium. 369/442). contra vene the classical demands of “pure“ color and its condemnation of “corrupt“ colors (those created through direct mixing) as in glazing eacb color retained its integrity. their color determined by drawing an imaginary line through their centre. which was helieved to have no color. They also began tu inflect an object‘s shadow with color from nearby objects. They realized that light did not effect color through a simple binomial graduation ofvalue. c. meaning the inseparability of light and color in nature could find its adequate expression in a painting technique. 011 as a medium dramatically effected Renaissance painting. and only similar colors were overlaid. and so most projected part of the object. where die lines are deterritorialized. Vienna) was an important factor in its quick adoprion.1509. The most significant of these fictors was the introduction to Ital ofa new medium—oil—in the 1 60s. 23 Although giving greater naturalism. hut a color‘s value could now be controlled through the overlay ofdifferent amounts ofsimilar pigments (for example. Vasari claims Da Messina learnt the technique directly from Jan van Eyck. But before we analyse this change in the Venetian regime ofexpression we will have to turn to the var ious new materials being introduced at the time that made it possible. Another difficulty from the point of view of naturalism was that the pure pigments placed in the shadowed areas tended to project forward because oftheir intensity counteracting the painting‘s illusion of depth. painters in Venice began to explore the empirical lighting effects of the time ofday. and began to experiment with other forms ofmixingwbich lead ro what Deleuze defines as a Modern colorism. but da Messina‘s presence there in 1475—7. making consistent modelling a problem. This “true“ color was revealed but not produced by ligbt. The ohject‘s color was understood (once rnore following Aristotle) as being a “local tone“ or true color belonging tu the ohject itseif apart fom any visual factors such as light condirions or proximirv to other colors. This practice did not however. Most importantly it meant that the lay ering of glazes could create shadow.132 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedomfrr die End ofti. where the perspective system and the color theory of‘ the Renaissance appeared in a sysrematized h)rm. and alrhough we now know this was impossible (van Eyck died before da Messina was born). and now only refer tu the relations they entertain amongst themselves. most notably hy Giovanni Bellini. Venice 2 ). recent research indicates he rnay have visited Flanders to learn the technique. Albertis system solved both problems by placing the pure color in the middle. Alberti proposed a rnethod whereby a space was defined by perspective. Starting with Giovanni Bellini. ideal color consistent with its metaphysical com mirments. and standardized the tonal range of all colors by adjusring thern both “tip“ and “owu“ through the addition of black and white. Central Renaissance painting idealises color and light effects. an otlier art. Deleuze and Guattari put it very succinctly: “whar would appear to be another world opens up. and the painters Rogier van der \Veyden and Perrus Christus had visited bv this time.e World 133 Cennino Cenninis Libro d(‘llArte. the colors arc decoded. forms vere drawn within this space. Oil began being used in Venice in the early l470s. and were used to create plasticity l‘his method bad mu tated by the tirne of Leon Battista Albertis Della Pittura. The Venetians were the first to respond to these conditions.

more inruitive and empirical.“ producing what he calls “a painterly impression. ‘ Wölfflin explains how 3 a “depreciation“ ofthe line emerges in “die emancipation ofth masses oflight and shade till thcy pursue each other in independent interplay. 28 “Titian. or his patron. and amplificd the softer and more diffused modclling prcferrcd by the Venctians. the movc froni gcssocd pancls as sup port to canvas. whcn colored undcr painting lying in the recessions of the wcavc showcd through a color applicd over it with a fast brush. breaks out of die eternal forms of Renaissance painting to di rcctly involve us. This disturbcd the linear qualities of thc stroke. here die expressivities of the brush. and adding the color last.“ Deleuze and Guattani note. By juxtaposing and overlapping daubs of unbroken paint. hut in an “all over“ affcct in which “everything was cnlivened by a mystenious movcrncnt.134 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedorn fr the End ofthe World 135 technique.] making the painting process the process ofcreation. and rcflectcd die elevation of the artist above mere craftsman. Like Byzantine art then. Venetian painting rcjccts the linc for an exprcs sion that “has its roots only in the eye and appeals only to die eye. but in Deleuze and Guattani‘s terms arc “prior to“ history (ATI 142/177).. and disrupted the application of the paint. Light and color were applied togetber in the gradual working up of the forms. we arc not only following Deleuze and Guattari. Venetian painters. not to make oudines to fill in. a process rely ing less on a preconceived drawn plan. than a series ofcontinual reworkings. “began his paintings in black and white.. the composition was worked out through the process of painting. The central Renaissance painters bad a three step practice. . rather than line. drawing the forms. Wölfflin‘s Principles of Art History is a remarkable forerunner to what we could call a ‘diagrarnrnatic‘ understanding of art. Painting no longer simply rcpresented the idca of the painrer. [. Titian develops this technique to a point in the late paintings where there was no longer a clear distinction between the “under painting“ and the applica tion ofcolor (Tintoretto also used this rechnique extensively). Wölfflin argued. and suited their ernpbasis of thc lilie. Truly an artist painting flush with the 29 real! In emphasising the importance of the Venetian deternitorialisation of the line in a painterly construction ofcolor-light. but one of their major art-histonical references on this point (and on others). where oil‘s greater fluidity and siower drying time enabled the painter to work up the composition on the canvas. with the painter responding to problems and inspirations generated through the material process ofpainting. its paint-painting machine. But it was also a technique that Titian developed into an alternative to the layening of glazes. and Titian after hirn. stopped working out their compositions in detail before beginning to paint. as Marcia Hall points out: “Color.“ 3 This new “intcrflow. the Vcnetian renunciation ofrhe line and their use of the new medium ofoil lcd to an emphatic “handling“ of die paint. each separate and distinct. enfolding us into the diagram of/as their real con ditions. bad a weave that when pronounccd remained visible. is the pn— mary nieans of constituting the image. In the late Titian opaque and translucent paint and dark and bright colors arc applied simultaneously. Each function was bi-polar (linear-painterly. Furthermore. and this required a new technique. First of all faster. closcd-open form. lt also in troduccd a new possibility for producing broken tones. arc dirccdy connccted ro the ncw ma terial traits of content libcrated in thc Venetian abstract machinc Titian conjugatcd this deterritorialisation of die brush stroke with an other innovation on die levcl ofcontent. inultiplicity-unityand clear-unclear) and an art work. 26 Tbis is another major break with central Renaissance methods.“ 32 The art work no longer appears according ro the linear determination of forms. but began to express its matter-force. begins with a very broad laying-in of light and dark areas within which colors arc increasingly integrated. Form now appeans through the composition of colored patchcs punctuated by the terscr passages of impasto. the activity of bis brush adding drama to bis scenes. and in this way the paintings appeal to our sensual rather than cerebral or religious instincts. Thc painters ofcentral Italy prefcrred gessoed pancls because they provided a very smooth surface that reccivcd die brush much like papcr received chalk. and Wölfflin‘s pninciples arc important examples of how traits of expression appear in die realm ofart. starting with Giorgione. and the force of the brushes movement bccame immcdiately visible in the work. some passages in die later work seem to have been applicd witb Titian‘s fingers. applying a rnonochroine lighting scheme. he could modulare color-light in a fastcr and morc calligraphic stylc. and to explore the affects of a much freer brushwork.“ As Wölfflin‘s pninciple suggests. 5 Once more this innovation sbows how traits of exprcs sion. Drawing im longer prede termined the composition. for. Canvas howcver. appeared in relation to these poles)° Wölfflin‘s pnin ciples arc not outside history.“ along with thc brokcn tones and loosc brushwork wc will shordy examine.“ a movernent in which an “interflow ofform and light and color can takc cffcct. but as a matrix for each of the colors to come“ (ATP. We must reconstimte thc painting through thc active Partici pation ofour eye. Giorgione. the German art historian Heinrich Wölfflin. and provides a taxonomy of five “tensors“ or functions through which to understand art. 173/212). This was partly a change in Venetian taste.“ The picture‘s cornposition and color scheme were often 27 reworked duning painting. plane-reession. The most important ofWölfflin‘s principles for our purposes arc those of linear-painterly and clearness-unclearness. This is the position of die abstract machine.

tu the contiarv. Semiotic and material dirnensions arc in absolute proximitv This is where the Venetian abstract machine constructs a plane ofconsistencv. 56/74). before extending it into a new col orism where relations of light and dark arc not added to. sprung froni ‘l‘his ncw regime of light takes the luminism the Venetians inherited from Byzantine mosaics and deterritorialises it.“ “Für classic art. The pietorial appearance no longer coincides with the maximum of ohjective ciearness. 565-76. claims. different. ‘Ehe haroque emerges from the absolute deterritorialisation of the organic line ofclassical representation into folds. Wölfflin anticipates Deieuze here. In a remarkable afflrrnation of the new materiality of the Venetian ab stract machineTintoretto sornetirnes seems to have mixed his dark grounds sim ‘ At this point. 31—2/44-5) the painring is transformed. hut its transfiguration. forces ofcolor. the “‘ . This introduces new traits of expression that no ionger function through line.“ Deleuze will push this dia Figure 4 Titian.‘. The Deat/. hut evades it. it is worth noting as a broader abstract machine that functions within Venetian painting as weil as philosophy and mathematics. London. the inorganic life it expresses. absolute clearness is obscured even where a perfect render ing of facts is ainied at. He did so through the practice of working 011 dark grounds. like the Alhertian value scale. “all beauty meant exhaustive revelation ofthe fbrm. the line works by over coding matter). at every pount and at every moment. but on becoming and change. This is not the abandoning ofline. which in Venetian paintilig is folded by the brush into expressive and abstract patches ofcolor-light to reveal Form. Aithough it is not my intention to focus on Deleuze‘s work an the baroque bere. it ii hy virtue of the iiew regime oflight. The representa tional line. arguing that the baroque is a new regime of expression ernerging within the rensor “clearness-unciearness. folds that give Form by de scending ro and rising from a dark obscurity The dark obscurity of matter it self.136 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedomfor the Ena‘ oft/ie World 137 Tintoretto employed all of these material and expressive innovations in his work. lt is the new visual clarity ofcolor—light. Deleuze 3 ply by scraping together all the paint on bis palette. they argue “proceeds hy articulating segments“ in order to delimit form (in other words. new ways to paint. National Galler‘. claiming that jr is “the inseparability of clarity from obscurity“ which produces “the effacement of the contour“ (TF. hut through “the architecture of planes and the regime ofcolor“ (WT 179/170). hut not with out unleashing new traits ofexpression. Thereby color has achieved quire a new life. grammatic definition of the baroque even further however. on wliich he laid on ligbt areas with a rapid and often translucent stroke. In Venetian painting as “baroque“ machine (Tintoretto is Deleuze‘s specific example): Things jump out of the backgrouncl. Not least of these is the discovery of color-Iighr. I)eleuze and Guattari give an account of the deterritorialisation of the line by color that can easily be appiied to Venetian painring. hut constructed by. Venetian painting becomes “baroque“ inasmuch as in it everything iIlu minated emerges from an infnity ofshadows. ofActaeon. draws “a metastratum of the plane of consistency“ (ATP. The deterritorialised matter-function ofVenetian color-light the other hand. colors die common base that attests to their obscure nature. invents a new materiality ofpainting. Once more Wöifflin describes this new living dimension ofVenetian color in a beautiful passage that could he Deleuze‘s: “We see that the emphasis Iies no longer on being. lt eludes definition and is. which will make Venetian painting adequate to the material-vitaiism. hut he pushed the Venetian reversal ofthe Renaissance separation ofcolor and light to a new levei. Yet this is not in op position tu Iight. and its hazy. (TF. in baroque art. figures arc dcfined by tlicir coverung niore tlian tlicir contour.“ Wölfflin svrites. 32/45). flowung forms in Venetian painting that is inseparahle from its dark material ob— scurity (‘l‘intoretto‘s scraped palette).

art‘s modernity—its abstraction—appears in concrete historical assemblages that arc obviously very different. 370—1/445).138 Art as Abstract Machine A Freea‘oinfor the Ena‘ oftlie World 139 Venetian response to Deleuze and Guattari‘s cry: “Free the line“ ATI 295/362). and here we arc once rnore approaching Pollock‘s paineings. its ahstraction. truly abstract and mutant. even if aesthetic. This line-point s stern establishes an extensive space of mcasurcs and propcrries through perspeceive. which only holds jr by ehe middle. but deforms je through a continual move ment. “Wieh Pollock. Sinooth space is traversed bv the absoluecly free lirie.“ and joins the absolutely deterritorialised traits of content. Deleuze and Guattari write. The ahsrract line. because ir melds wieh a plane of consistcncy upon which ie floaes and t/iat it creates. 298/366. Pollock does not dissolve the line in lighe. 130/122). In fact. 193—4/183). for in them it is “the material thatpasses into sensation“ (Wl 193/183). for which ehey offer another famous example. This free and abserace line eraverses ehe plane of consiseency in seruceing its maeeer-flows and expressing its functions. wieh process. their paganisrn“ (WP. a conseant changing ofdirection in which it is eieher “splitting in break— ing off from itseif or eurning back on itself in whirling movement“ (FB. 105/98—9).“ Deleuze writes. but was hidden under aims and objectives. nor are they formed by semiological and technical stratifications of the plane. 298/366). “an absolute thae is one with becoming itseif.] gives it a specific thickness in dependent of any perspective or depth. With the Venetians. hut compose a moving visual block ehat returns striated space to srnooeh. modern. sincc jr always belongs off‘ ehe painting. A line becomes a contour when ir moves from one Oflt eo another. Venetian painting is in this respect. hut neverthe less performs a similar deterritorialisation. lt is ehe absolute of passage“ (ATl 494/617). is “wirhoue origin. Deleuze and Guattari argue. “the line has become abstract.“ swirling lines ofpaine someeimes coalescing into patches ofcolor. One. “By this token. is to dissolve the representational line in ehe pure opeicality of light-color. or when je is irselfa sequence of poines dc lirniting inside from oueside. the painter Jackson Pollock. Deleuze identifies two general directions that modernist painting assemhlages may take. This line is very different from ehat ofthe Venetians. a phylum defined by its non-representational abstract machine. and populates ie wieh signifiers and subjeces. Pollock‘s abstract line is clearly both material and non represeneational. lt is at this moment thar the figures of art free themselves from an apparent transcendence or paradigmatic model and avow their innocent atheisin. ir is withour lo— calizable conneceion. 129/121). This finally defines Venetian par ticles-signs.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. as a color-point or line-point“ (ATP. because it has lost noe only its represenrarive funcrion hut any function ofourlining a form ofany kind—by this token. ABSTRACTION—THE RETURN TO SMOOTH SPACE Pollock‘s paintings arc composed of “drips. But rather ehan dissolving the lilie fltO color light.. the technical plane “ascends into the aesthetic plane ofcoinposition and. “Smooth“ and irs anripode “seri— aeed“ arc terms for ehe ontological “space“ of ehe plane of consisrency and ehe strata respectivelyi 9 Lines and eheir trajeceories appear within seriaeed space according ro their articularion of poinrs. to emerge again in matter-iows ofcolor animating the surface of the painting. dc fined by in other words. for ir is “never ehe outline of an)‘— thing“ (FB. the line loses “any function ofontlining a form of any kind. The other direction available to ahstraction is ‘hat Deleuze and Guattari ca! 1 the “Goehic“ line. ehe line has becomc abstract. In the abstract ma chine of Venetian painting matter and function arc co-extensive. they arc no longer representational. truly abstrace“ (ATP. In this sense. . “this line—trait and this colour patch will be pushed to their functional limit: no longer the transfor mation ofthe form hut a decomposition of matter which ahandons us eo Im eamenes and granulations“ (FB. and will require a new terrni nology to describe it. iralics added). ‘Abstrace lines“ cscape the “false problem“ ofperspec eive by no longer appearing within its seriations. and color and technique arc the inseparable elements of its construction and expression ofa new plane ofconsistency for painring. as Dclcuzc and Guaeeari will say. taken by the Venetians. hv unleashing its abstract vitality. its thick skeins ofpaint weaving a “smooeh“ space wiehout depth and in which relations arc dynamic. as the Venerians did.. jr is wjrhour coordinaees. The “living blocks“ ofVenetian color-light arc no longer preformed by common sense into an object the subject represents. [. This means the technical plane (the new trairs of content and expression affecting the painting‘s construction) is inseparahle from the sensation expressing the aesthetic plane of composirion. Pollock frees the line from ieself. This isa succince searement ofehe transition we will now make from Venetian painting to ehae ofPollock. Here. a line thar enoys infiniee movement and is. This transitiOn will involve new materials and new techniques. Nevertheless. and underneath recodings or axiomatics: the pure process that fulfils itself and that never ceases to reach fulfilment as it pro ceeds—art as experimentation“ (AO. ehey do not represent ehings. and under these conditions the poinr assumes creative functions again. frorn ehe transformation of form eo ehe decornposieion of matter. ‘art accedes to its authentic modernity which simply consists in liberat ing what was present in art from its beginnings. a visual block. Deleuze and Guaetari wriee. What ernerges in Venetian painfing is a “pure“ process of experimentation comprising the modern “phy lum“ ofart.

and it is the one we have seen the Venetians take. 127/119—20). on die contrar toward the iniposition ofa violent manual space“ (FB. even though.140 Art as Abstract Machine A Freec/ornfr the Enel ofthe World 141 The first matter-force. 129/121). Deleuze writes. no more artist. . “a speed. the colour—lighr of the Venetians ] oi. “In several of bis ‘sprinkled‘ canvases of 1950. and a life the eye can barely follow“ (FB. draws heavily on the German art . meaning the Venetian abstract machine retained a certain subjective dimension. ABSTRACTION AND EMPATHY Deleuze and Guartari‘s understanding of Pollock‘s abstraction. a hand that extends be yond the organism. Venetian painting clearly retains a degree ofrep resentation and narration. No more representation. There seems little danger of narration appearing in Pollock‘s work of 1947—50 (the period of the “drip“ paintings). “can only move in one of the following two directions: cither towards the exposition ofa purelv optical space. and develops thern witbin the still subjecrive atmos phere of irs color-Iight effects. from every side and even walking through lt. Venetian painting constructed form through the modulation of color-light. Second. executes Pollock‘s work. In this manual. each have their own beauty and achievernent wbich shouldn‘t be heirarchised in being identifiec! as different. but rather. wbich is freed from its references to even a subordinated tactilitv [je. This 40 new physical relation to paint and canvas liberates the artist‘s hand frorn tradi tional signs of ‘handling. Furthermore. The other is through the Gothic line. expressing the “plane of consistency upon which it floats and which it creates. without any optical distance. Pollock‘s abstract lines “assernble a new type ofreality. which dc spite its radicality remained within an optical regime.lied with sticks. The “drip“ is important for two reasons. a pure abstract figural dimension (‘abstract‘ in the sense ofabstract painting). . First. but with Greenberg‘s argument that the results arc enrirelv optical. Through this absolute deterritorialisation of painting sornething “abstract“ ap— pears. allowing hirn to work ‘within‘ it. this evaluation should not be seen to privilege Pollock over the Venetians (as we shall see Deleuze will point out otber problems with Pollock‘s abstract machinc in bis book on Bacon). its farnous descent onto the floor of Pollock‘s studio. 134/126). and on the other his refusal to use value—the interplay of light and dark—to create form or depth.‘ producing new asubjective traits.“‘ Deleuze‘s difference with Greenberg is not over Pollock‘s “pulverising“ ofvalue effects. and even icing syringes. a violence. Second. its gravity speed and projection. a “homely atmospbere“ as L)eleuze calls it (using Francis Bacon‘s term). removed from the human hody and its organic representation through a pure activity. as with the classical and modern regimes ofcinema.“ In this way. the rernoval of the painting from the wall deterritorialises Pollock‘s relation to it. but which can only be under stood in I)eleuze and Guattari‘s terms as something real. haptic space. whicb turns the “drip‘s“ matter—force expressive in a new way (no sign in Pollocks painting of the ‘vertical drip‘ and splasb favoured by bis contempo raries). the line Pollock takes.“ that it be done at dose range.“ Although it is true that rnodernisrn and the abstraction that defines lt have a long history For Deleuze. but lt is an aspecr of their ab stract machine that is deterritorialised in turn bv a painting that is even more abstract. and more specifically their reading ofhis abstract line. Pollock thereby exemplifies Deleuze and Guattari‘s “law of the painting. an absolute deter ritorialisation of painri ng‘s content into matter-forces (traits of content) insep arable from the absolute deterritorialisation of paintings expression onto new functions (traits of expression). freeing it frorn conscious control to release new traits of expression. or trait of content of Pollock‘s ahstract line is the “drip. . and did not entirely aban don a representational Function. he had literally pulverized value contrasts in a vaporous dust of interfused lights and darks in which every suggestion of a scuiptural effect was obliterated. ap . “a non-figurative and nonsvmbolic unconscious. he interprets it in a very different way from Deleuze. flows-schizzes or real-desire apprehended below the minimum conditions of idcntity“ (AO. Pollock‘s “drip“ is the 1 catastrophic hreakdown of traditional techniques in a manual power that de composes the paint material. which escapes the optical to become haptic. and how its experiments have a definite history. lt is the band and not the eye that operates as an organ of rouch and connection. two things need to be noted. lt implies the hor— izontality of the canvas. as we shall see. sornething Pollock called the unconscious. and although this process was ahsrract. the face was not significantly cleformed by it. This abstract dimension ernerges in Pollock‘s “drips“ and their abstract lines. the hand is dis-or ganised.“ both the paint and irs various forces of fall and spiatter. For Deleuze there are two possible rejections of the represenrational line. Before going on ro elaborate this Gothic line. First. sponges. This does not negate the absolute deterritorialisation Venetian painting achieves. The human face emerged frorn color-light.“ Greenberg writes. jr is important to see how its ahstract machine does not rernain the same. Everything works here through continuiry and conjunction. “One and Lavender Mist as weil as iVumber One (1948). one. and Pollock‘s use of lt. This is Pollock‘s schizoanalytic diagrarn. a very different way from the Venetians.2 We can already feel that just such a hand. 351/421). which “still conserves a menacing relation with a possible narration“ (FB. On tbc one hand there is his non-represen tational line. these “traits ofexpression“ of bis abstract machine. Painring. and remains op tical. is through light. Clement Greenberg bad already ernpbasized this aspect of Pollock‘s work.

In the Gothic abstract line. The man or woman who loses their seif in going hevond themselves is. 41). Through empathy.“ a pleasure in other words.“ Metallurgy acts as an expressive “will“ of matter itself.“ on die other hand. who in expressing this movement creates nomad art.“ (AE. is an ab stract tine that is no longer ‘crystatline‘ hut has become mobile and expressive. The infiniry of the absrract line. ‘Ib understand this “prirnordiat duality“ and its relation to the abstract line however. a touch revealing the cer tainty of inorganic truths. 41). 14). 108). different tvpes of “will to Ernpathy is an “objectified self-enjoyment. as Deteuze and Guattari pur ir. a subjective ap preciarion of the beauty of “nature. Empathy tends towards an aesthetics of organic naturalism. This movement does not express an organic thing. first of all what Deleuze aiid Guattari ca! 1 a “vagabond monorheisrn“ whose abstract constructs line a smooth space. he finds the value of aesthetic value in die “will“ (to art). 498/623). 117) an inorganic life construcring. This revaluing ofaesthetics in ontological terms is clearly very important kir Deteuze and Guattari. to use a phrase from Worringer which Deleuze and Guattari take as their own. a search inspiring an “ecstasy ofmove ment“ (FG. The ahstract line of Gothic art Worringer argues. is none other than our own. in our apperceptive activity and organic vitalit As Worringer . expresses die “cloudy rnysticisrn“ of the German peoples of northern Europe (AE. or what they here call a “focal absolute“ (ATI 382/474). 9)). Empathy is. “barbarian. beauiiful and “purely organic being“ (AE.“ pleasure taken in an object as die affirmation and confirmation of human “volition in motion. purs it: “In die forms of the work of art we enjoy ouiselves“ (AE. Worringer a bues that Gorhic archirecrure is inorganic because the mechanical energies ofrhe stone thar it re . the aim ofabstracrion is “de-organicising die organic. His book Abstraction and Empathy develops the opposition of ciassical and non—ciassical regimes of artistic expression as different types of aesthetic enjoyment. 117) hut this infinity is constructed by die niechanical forces of an immanent inorganic life. “all the more alive for being inorganic“ (ATP.“ Deleuze and Guattari note. We can understand Deleuze and Guattari‘s point. through their respecrive discussions of die Gothic carhedral. The Nomad shares some features with Worringer‘s northerner. Unlike the mystics of medieval times however. 115). understood in its onto-aesthetic antipodes ofempathy and abstraction. northern man “finds himself only by losing himself. by going out beyond himseif“ (FG. and irs deviation from Worringer. which expresses this vital niarerialism rhrough the “science“ (hut jr is equall)‘ an aes rherics) of “merallurgv. Gothic art carries us irno die infinirc in an “extravagant ec stasy“ (AE. Gothic. Like Nietzsche. as they peel the abstract line away from the necessary connection it retains für him with religious worship. harmonious.“ (AE. This “free use“ begins with Deleuze and Guartari‘s understanding of in organic life as a vital materialism. for Deleuze and Guattari. it is forever searching for crystalline vision. and as such is a schizoanalyric work. This abstract line is divorced froni organic life hut is. 17). Worringer writes (and it is a line Deleuze will also echo). The world ofPoussin. nomadic monothe ism is. we must pass through Worringer‘s discussion ofwhat he calls the “northern line. in ciassical terms. Finallv I)etcuze and Guattari replace Worringer‘s Opposition with their more “primordial duality“ (ÄH 496/6 19) ofthe smooth and the striated. Worringer writes: “l. Worringer writes. Worringer argues. ‘ihe northern lilie. Jr is nomad art (“and irs successors.“ and Deleuze and Guattari‘s understanding of this as the defining feature of Gothic art. not ofPollock. hut nevertheless Worringer‘s duality of empathy and absrracrion is not sufficient for them. 33). in other words. As such.“ hut a hybrid “will“ in which ernpathy turns away from the human to discover die “mechanical laws“ of a “living“ matter (AE. making free use of these norions“ (AT 493/6 1 5). 87). lt‘s cloudy because it never achieves the clear necessity and regularity ofa transcendental absrracrion. 107). As a result in the haptic world ofabstraction. De!euze and Guattari clailn. flush wirh the real. This marks the beginning of Deleuze and Guatrari‘s deviation from Worringer. is “directly opposed to the empathy impulse“ (AE. 129) in order to hecome “part ofan increasing order supe rior to all that is living“ (FG. inasmuch as it overcomes die in dividuated perspectives ofhuinan consciousness by giving us an experience of our shared. the “vitatized geometry“ (FG. 41) ofGothic art. and modern“ (ATE 492/614)). because the ab stract alternative to classical organic representation is a wholly transcendent one. Worringer achieves for aesthetics a Nietzschean “revaluation ofvalues“ (which is how Worringer puts it (FG. or positioning schernatised figures on a fiat plane that does not imitate space. [and] we merge into an infinite niovement which annihitates all finite con sciousness“ (FG.“ Here: “Man was at horne in the world and felt hirnseif at its centre“ (AE. Apollonian. 24). Abstraction seeks these transcendent essences in order to express thern through an “abstract eternalisation of existence in the crystalline body“ (Ah. once “we lose the feeting of our earrhly bonds.142 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedomfor the End ofihe World 1 L3 historian WiliheIm Worringer. 113). 48 lndeed at this point the “take some risks ourselves. as die “irrefragable necessity of [an object‘s] closed material individuality“ (AE. the nomad.ife as such is fett to be a disturbance of aestbetic enjoyment“ (AE. “chaos becomes cosmostS The “urge to abstraction. “singularl)‘ atheistic“ (AFP 383/475). Abstraction rejects the organic and optical world ofclassical art in favour ofa haptic sensation. These mechanical laws determine the “living movement offorces. 14). Abstraction therefore departs from mimetic natura! ism and favours geonierric designs. or an ideal and transcendenr “non—thing. 102).

The definition ofPollock‘s line by Michael Fried to which l)eleuze and Guattari refer is one Fried shares with his contemporary. modernist) painting rejects both the representational line. “You become. the great modernist critic Clement Greenberg. “only by touching it with one‘s mmd.“ according to Greenberg. selfiess and in a sense . ° and its production 5 of “sensations. Greenberg saw Pollock as a crucial moment in painting‘s move towards its constitutive essence. Gothic construction was not achieved through a transcendent plan. and this. one closes off a surface and ‘allocates‘ it according to intervals. The haptic. For Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari on the other hand argue that Gothic cathedrals were constructed according to a “nomad science“ that rather than using ff-it and oll-paper plans which provided a hylomorphic form ancl required a uniform ly prepared matter. an absolutely unrepre sentational line both mystical and atheist in its expression/construction ofinor ganic life. makes it “atheist. The mmd parricipares in whar ir sees. The ahstract lilie. The abstract line draws a smooth space in which one senses this force (and has a haptic sensation). 411/512). beyond stih ject or object (and beyond signifiance and subjectivation). and lodges on the level ofthese connections.“ Tbe spectator can no longer escapc into it front the space in which he srands.“ As Deleuze and Guattari describe it: “In striated space. [. 52 lt is interesting to note the seeming similariry to Deleuze and Guattari‘s ac count. in the smooth. become intercliangeablc. and m duces an asubective affect. “this vital force specific to Abstraction is what draws smooth space“ (Äl1 499/623). . precisely because place is not delimited“ (ATI 494/617). open ended “work in progress. The haptic eye produces a met allurgical vision. and in so doing expresses its construction of smooth space. inasmuch as in both the painting exisrs in a corporeal space.“ CERTAIN WORKS BY POLLOCK. and more specifically painting? As Deleuze and Guattari ask: “What then should be termed abstract in modern art?“ Their an swer follows directly: “A line of variable direction that describes no contour and delimits no form .144 Art as Abstract Machine A Freedomfor the End ofthe World 145 leases are not material hut mystical. Rather than search for the transcendent.. which means that you become. it is by optical rath( r than pictorial mneans: by relations of color sud shapc largely divorced ftmn desLriptivc connotations. its material flatncss. how should we understand it in relation to art. obviously enough. This abstract line is immediately refer enced to Michael Fried‘s definition of the line in “certain works by Pollock“ (ATE 575/624). a participatory modulation of the plane of consisrency as an .e.“ 5 For Greenberg “pure“ (i. the irreducible elements ofexperience. assigned breaks. and often by manipulations in which rop sud bonom.“ Deleuze and Guattari‘s abstract line is neither abstract nor Gothic in Worringer‘s sense. one ‘distributes‘ oneseif in an open space. The building is no longer a form that defines a space. the works. 106). The metallurgist—a nomad schizoanalyst—produces art in which a “dynamic connection between support and ornament replaces the matter-form dialectic. of 1947—50. was in fact “the intuition of metallurgy“ (ATP. lfthe abstract line is the vital force specific to Abstraction. Pollock‘s abstract line and the smooth space it draws produces a mystical modernity one whose description is now somewhat familiar. perhaps. and value con trasts in creating a new kind ofspace: The picture has now becorne an entity belonging tu mhc same order of space as our bodies. hut a construction of abstract lines expressing the continual variations of the stones matter-force. “all attention. the nomadic abstract linefollows a vital mat ter. these schizo-scientists—metal lur gists—constructed their cathedrals through on-the-ground projections which took into account the singular properties and forces ofeach material element. in a sensation insep arahle from the action of a force. In these works the line has been set free and attains its Gothic dimension. Gotbic arcbitecture expresses these abstract and spiritual forces of transcendence despite the stone. not even by way of the eye“ (ATI 494/616). nor the expression of immaterial and ideal forces. as Worringer‘s Gothic line does. (ATF 499/624). 1 his required cutting stones according to their particular Position in relation to all the others. and was achieved by a technique of “squaring“ rather than with a template. for the moment. If jr deceives bis eye at all. by negating stone‘s ma terial properties (FG. it is no longer thc vehicle ofan imagmncd equivalemit of that order. rather than that which attempts to transcend it. ] Nomad artfiillows the connections between singularities of matter and traits ofexpression. Pictorial space has lost its “insidc“ and become all “outside. is the tactile function of the eye. . . but without the mmd becoming a finger. a “grabhing“ or “touching“ specific to a “connective function“ of the gaze. in Pollock‘s work “the absolute is local. as weil as foreground and background. the “prodigious idea of Afonorganic Lfi“ that Worringer considered the invention of the Barharians. whether they be natura! or forced“ (ÄF1 369/457). for Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari write: “lt is as if Gothic conquered a smooth space“ (A1T 364/451). Smooth space therefore emerges through this material participation of the eye—its “touch“—which constructs “visual-blocks“ by fol lowing the matter-force on the inorganic plane. In this way. because its inorganic vitaliry is immanent to its material. according to frequencies and in the course of ones crossings“ (ATE 48 1/600).

54 Pollock achieved this ßyzantine cffect in bis “middle period“ (1947—50) where the aluminium paint and “interlaced threads of light and dark pigment“ ofthe paintings dome forward “to fiu the space between itself and tbe spectator with its radiance. as for Greenberg.“‘ Thus. Greenberg argues. Once more. but only bv leaving the body to arrive at its spiritual “be yond.“ But it is precisely at this point of seeming sirnilarity that we can begin ro map their divergence. C‘athea‘ral. Dallas Museum ofFine Arts) do not reveal the glowing ligbt of tue transcendent. but ratber the pouring ofa metal lurgist. 62 Fried writes that Pollock‘s line “is a kind ofspace-fill ing curve of i in mense com plexity responsive to the slightest impulse ofrhe painter and responsive as weIl. Where Greenberg sees Pollock as a Byzantine. then modernism does somerhing similar through its paradoxical invocarion of the material against itseif Modernism‘s purity of material and flatness ofsurface can finally only be seen. Fried Figure 5 Jackson Pollock. Dallas Museum of Art. this optical participation transcends the body.“ 57 If l3yzantine art dematerialised reality by invoking a transcendental one. and reaches an essence thar escapes representation by being addressed to eyesight alone. This op ticality is essential ro modermsm as such.“ Our merge with the painting is achieved only in our disembodiment. according to Deleuze and Guattari. “die picture repeats its instantaneous art. we‘re back to Plato. and also located it in the ‘quasi-abstract‘ use Byzantine mo saics made of light and shade. because it enables painting‘s “spiritualizing escape“ towards its “fundamental language. am! in becoming purely optical it is dematerialised. and Greenherg‘s still spreading the same canker. that at which he starts talking abeut the “disembodied energy“ 64 and the “negation of rnateriality“ in Pollock‘s paintings. Gothic. New York . in favour of affirming the flatness of pictorial space. Pollock‘s line.“ unity like a mourh repeating a single word. one almost feels.“ 55 Despite this affect being achieved through the materiality of Pollock‘s paintings. the “radically transcenden tal and the radically positivist“ extremes of art. to one‘s own act oflook ing. Greenberg argued. but for Fried.“ 59 Modernist abstraction therefore achieves an optical mysticism in which painting is ahle to transcend its repre— sentational function. Byzantine and modernist art. ° The aluminium 6 patches of Pollock‘s work (Qithedral. For Grcenberg. Deleu7e and Guattari part ways with Michael Fried ar a similar point. Greenberg was also sensitive to the importance of the Byzantine hreak with das sical representation. ‘1 his dissolved the scuiptural illusion ofvolume. © 2004 Pollock Krasner Foundation / Artists Rights Sociery (ARS). perception begins to approach participation. finally for Greenberg it “uses the most self-evidently corpo real means to deny its own corporealiry“ Greenberg argues that Pollock‘s paintings “deceive the eve“ into leaving the body for a pure opticality. 1947. meer in a “counter-illusionist 8 “For the cultivated eye. he is. 1947. and its truth is ideal iather than haptic.146 Art as Abstract Machine entirely identified with the obect ofyour attention.“ he claims.

But ehis hiseory. infinite. a way of becoming with ie. and their expression ofmovemene cannot be separated from the con tinual variation of their material plane. and describes a smooth space“ (AT1 498/62 1). a body whose affectual capacities are no longer organ ised and subjectivised—a vision that is 110 longer optical.“ his pure “opticality“ transcends all the— atricality (representation) in Fried‘s account. Painting‘s task has al ways been to render forces visible. but it is an un changing eternal. it is the ideal beyond). a “local integration mov ing from point to point and constituting smooth space in an infinite succes sion of linkages and changes in direction“ (ATP 494/617). “Every so ofeen. hut one ehae makes hirn sirnplv one of “ehe key staging poSts“ of“ehe modernise-formalist genealogies ofvisua/ahsrraceion. Pollock‘s line is.“ ing. painting in Pollocks work forms. precisely. Not a divine facialiev hut an aeheistic and myseical interface. on ehe one side con jugating matters-forces into new traits of coneent (ehe “drip“). by ehe expression of ehe abserace and inorganic forces from which they arc conseruceed. most imporeaneiy ehose ofvereicalirv. ropy line “ehat is conseanely changing direceion. 66 Ummmmmmmmrn. a ‘conrinuum‘ in which the viewer is in indissoluble connection with eternity. between subject and object. in this sense. but the hapeic eye conseructed by Pollock‘s paineings and ehe visions they produce. The materialism of Pohlock‘s paintings is not. The abstract line construces a haptic sensation. an eye in matter. . Then ehere could be neu‘ paineings again. Fried and Greenberg argue. eheir smooeh space does not coneradice their visual flaeness. making the painting curiously monosyllabic. ehrough a sinuous.“°‘ Pohlock‘s paintings have a depth ehat is not spatial but ineense. and genetic processuali ap pearing in a molecuiarised matter. and a stri aeed depeh. but oniy in an apotheosis arriving at its transcendental conditions of possibility the ideal conditions of sight it 5 This “visual plenum“ transcending subject and object and uniting eye and self. whieh make his work so importane in the hiseory of modern km.“ they wriee. Pollock‘s visions arc. Rarher than a disembodied and disin eerested eye. Fhen Pohlock did ie. as it is wrieeen bv Greenberg and Fried. “space is not visual. represeneaeion. and the result is a new kind of space—if it still makes sense to call it space—in which conditions ofseeing prevail rather than one in which 64 We have ohjects exist. Pollock‘s absrract line is “visionary“ in the sense we have seen Deleuze dc fine jr in relation to modern cinema. The “vision“ ofthe abstracr line is achieved through and in the body. irreducibly physical. He busted our idea ofa piceure all to hell. simplv defined by their materialiey but by eheir material viealism. breaks down in a “pictorial 5 in a sensation othe painting that isa way of being (in) ehe paint vitalism. the mysterious 67 We repetirion of as Greenberg put it. arc very different from the purely opti cal percepeion Greenberg cannot get beyond (because. This new painting machine deterritorialises the subjective and objective poles ofvi sion absolutely.“ Pollock‘s “purity. as pareicles-signs ofsensation.Art as Abstract Machine writes. lt would only be in ehis sense that we couid understand Fried‘s observation: “There is no inside or oueside to Pollock‘s lilie or eo ehe space ehrough which it nioves. Here ehe ab stract line is the mateer-functjon of ehe Pollock machine. a single word. The rnateriality of his pigment is ren dered sheerly visual. nonoptical func tion“ (ATI 494/6 16). “addresses itseif to eyesight alone. or rather the eye itseif has a haptic. and as Deleuze and Guattari wriee je. Deleuze and Guattari take Fried‘s defini tion of Pollock‘s abstract line and understand it in eneirely different A Freedomfor die End ofthe Vørlcl 149 ontological terms: the ontological eerms of ehe abseract machine. as Deleuze and Guattari write. and creates an eye freed from any optical function conditioned by a eranscen dejital commori sense. I)eieuze and Guaetari arc ex plicit on ebis point: “That is whv ie is so wrong eo define sensation in modern painting by ehe assumption ofa pure visual flatness: ehe error is due perhaps eo ehe face that thickness does not neecl to be pronounced or deep‘ (WT 194/183). Willem dc Kooning said. figuraeion. Pollock‘s paintings express this merge at ehe same eime as ehey conseruce it.“ left a perspcctivised space for a pure material fiatness. lt is ehis vital element that turns ehe celebraeed ehickness of Poliock‘s paintings haptic. an “ab stract expressionism“ of the vieality ofies inorganic life. hut as soon as we have done so his materiality evaporates in a disembodied “opticality“ existing as the “conditions ofseeing. creaeing a smooth space in which we arc always (in) the rnid— die. and in their respective accounes.“° lt was Pollock‘s break wieh those definitions of paineing which had acted as ies cri eeria. Tue paint is alive. Deleuze and Cuaetari see Pollock‘s work as producing (and being produced hv) a schizo-eye/I. Greenberg and Fried figure Pollock as a radical deeerritoriali saeion ofpaineing. Picasso did lt wirh Cubism. “Where there is dose vision. a eransformaeion that has as ies condition our imphication in ehe parneings‘ ab strace machine. beginning or end and that is as ahive as a constane variation—such a line is eruly an abseract liiie. fiat shapes are juxtaposed or physical events rranspire. on Deleuze and Guateari‘s account. As a result.“ 71 Pollock is con sequently reeerrieorialised as ehe modernise represeneaeive of an opeical idealism. but conneces ehis surface eo an immanent. form or background. our part in its ongoing process. Czanne did it. a mueane line wbich is wieboue outside or in— side. is not ehe same. a paineer has to deserov paint ing. have arrived ar a space far away frotn that created by Pollock‘s writhing and ca cophonic surface oflines. Pollock is not ehe same painter. Pollock‘s abstrace line construcrs a haptic space in which the distinction between what is mate rial and what visual. and on the other releasing the traits of expression of a new type of abstraction.

1 hear the trained soprano . it is a grand opera. Stccped amid honcycd morphinc. . Pollock‘s “abstract expressionism“ is defined by the inorganic and material traits of expression it discovers. an artisan ofimmanence.150 Art as Abstract Machine Deleuze and Guartari on the other hand. which is the inorganic life expressed in constructing the painting. Let up again to fee! the puzz!c ofpu7zlcs... This chapter will continue to ex plore art‘s (in)finitude. We saw in the previous chapter how the absolutely dcterritorialised particle-sign emerges in painting as the expression and construction ofa plane ofconsistency having simultaneously finite and infinite dimensions. The orchestra whirls inc wider than Uranus flies. This creates. “The painting has a life of its own. the refrain and . Pollock seems to have sensed the vitai-materialism of bis paintings. because the painting has a life of its own. an easy give and take. “1 don‘t know what 1 am doing. in a beautiful description ofa Pollock painting. we sec. . when he does not take a step back frorn it. cut by bitter and poisoncd hail. INTRODUCTION In Whatls Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari give a concise definition ofart: “Art wants to create the finite that restores the infinite“ (Wl 197/186).“ he said. my windpipc squcczcd in die lilkcs of dcarh. dc 72 stroying the image. Walt Whirman. waves. . . 1 hcar the chorus. lt is only when 1 lose contact with tbe painting that the resuit is a mess.she convulses mc like the climax of my love-grip.“ and following its production ofthc affect. then he is one with the life that creates the painting. 1 have no fears about making changes. “Song ofMyself“ 1 . lt sails Inc. lt throbs mc to gulps of the farthest clown horror. this indeed is music! A tenor large and fresh as the creation fills inc. of course.“ Pollock the mechanic. lt is only after a sort of get acquainted period that 1 see what 1 have been about. and the new abstract machine of matter-funetion jr constructs witli them (AlI 499/623). Delcuze and Guattari write: “Traits of expression describing a smooth space and connecting with a matter-flow“ (ATl 498/622). . The orbic flex of bis mourh is pouring and filling mc full. .. . this tirne beginning from the “chaosmosis“ ofGuattari‘s “aesthetic paradigm.“ Chapter Five Songs of Molecules: The Chaosmosis of Sensation 1 hear the violincello or man‘s heart complaint. . Otherwise there is pure harmony. When he is in contact with the painting. rhcy arc lickcd by thc indohnr . . “Wben 1 am in my painting. etc. see Poliock‘s paintings as particles-signs cornposed by schizoanaiytic abstract lines. . And hear the keyed cornet or else the echo ofsunsei. when he participates in it.“ he says. 1 dab with bare feet. a “stationary whiriwind“ (Äl‘e 499/623) both expressive and ahstract. . and the painting comes out weil. . ‘1 try to 1er ii come through. In Pollock‘s paintings then. 1 am exposed. lt wrenches unnameable ardors froni my breast.. And that we call Being.

art experiences are real.. This ineans that aestlierics for Guattari. “a crucial etbical choice: either we ohjectif we reif we ‘scien tifize‘ subjectivity or else we attempt ro seize ir in irs dimension of processual 3 creativit“ In this erhico—aesthetic dimension.“ and deterritorialising die fixed subject onto die plane of subjectivation (Chaos. as jr is wirb Deleuze. is more than a phenomenology (we will see precisely why nexr chapter).“ die network of associations und feelings evoked hy this particular sensory evenr (the sunset as a planetary event. “sticks just as weil to die suhjectivitv of the one who is its utterer as it does to die one who is its addressee“ (REA. and propose in its place their own concept of“rnodernism. this fluid process of “individualised subjectivising“ (REA. my mmd drifts towards thedistant hills. planes landing make mc miss ab sent friends. But how are these experiences produced. as this was suggested by Ciement Greenberg.“ 2 the continual emergence of new affectual individuations that arc not produced by an “1“ as their subjective reference point. as it does for any creation. To under stand the art work in terms of this becoming means rransvaluing the suhject. hut from a creation which itself indicares a kind of aesdietic paradigm“ (Chaos. The shift to the aesthetic paradigm. Guattari argues. 158/251). especially as Deleuze and Guattari give it in their last book. These deterritorialising affects. 1 58/251) witbout discursive lirnits. as Guatrari purs it: “Affect is a process of existenrial appropriarion through die con tinual creation of heterogeneous durarions of being“ (REA.“ as he puts it. This finally will involve an understanding of sensation. 6/17). and is the fundamental aesrhetic process constituring (die experience of) a work ofart. Guattari claims it is die comhination of a “sensory affect. but that the art work. In the aesthetic paradigm affects arc only nominally unified under a subject. of which “1“ uni merely the “fluctuating intersecrion“ (REA. as affect. 159/252). Guattari wrires: “One creates new modalities of subjectiviry in die same way that an artist creates new forms from the palette“ (Chaos. introducing all sorts of temporal und emotional flows. this one will focus on what can provisionally be called art‘s “suhjective“ processes. 160/255). 160/255) taking place in and through an in-principle (and in-effect) infinite network of affects.“ In its aleatory affecrual events subjecrivation is always coming-inro-being. and are determined by their real and immanent conditions. does not issue “from readv-niade [‘Wej 1‘] dimensions of subjectivitv crystaiiised into structural complexes. 7/19). Perception is. that we shall discover the process rhrougb which subjectivation attains an exisrentiai con sisrency. and at this level..152 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 153 sensation. Tbis process is “subjectivation. as sembling itself or. etc. is the onto-aesthetic dimension e have already encountered an im 1 active in die experience of die work of art? \X portant element ofour answer. \Ve will . An asubjective consistency for. and lives beyond these limits. 7/19). und on the other from ontological processes both cosmic and chaotic (restoring the infinite).“ a modernisrn that is on die one hand inseparable from actual practices (creating the finite). “Modernism“ as Deleuze and Guattari describe it will therefore require distinction from its usual understand ing in the realm ofart. This means that not only do 1 pass from sensory to problem atic affect continuously und without noticing. This plane. and problematic affects precede sensory ones. lt is in die associative and crearive power ofaffect rather than in subjects or objects. und once freed from their subjective over-coding find a seif-organising consistency as a refrain [ritournelle]. ro use a term which is by now farniliar. Guattari argues. but produce it as part of a wider ontological process of creation constituting what Guattari calls die erbico-aestheric para diga. “a rnulti-headed enunciative lay-out [tgencernent]. deterritorialises die assumptions ofscience (intended in its widest sense—die human sciences— und so including aesthetic philosophy). Suhjectivation is a crearive process of self-organisation (the selforganisation of die affect beyond the “self“) compos ing a continuous Variation of affecrs. suhjectivation is die ongoing emer— gence of new affecrive connections opening onro die ourside ofa subjective “1. This aesthetic paradigm constirures die fundamental onrological condi tion of art. Then we will have to show how despite surface sirnilarities—not least in the quote from What is ‘? with which we began die chapter—Deleuze and Guattari reject 9 Philosopl Rornanticisni as an aesthetic model. and what makes them aesthetic? After replying to these ques tions we sIlall look at Guattari‘s “detachment“ of the readymade from Marcel Duchamp as a case stud)‘ ofa revalued aesthetic experience. How in other words. how do they work.. Guartari argues. ibgerher the sensory und probleniatic aspects of die affict consti— tute what Cuattari calls a “polyphonic and heterogenetic comprehension ofsub jectivity“ (Chaos. as Guattari puts it.and object co-ordinates given bv tradirional aesthetics into “vecrors ofpartial subjec riviry. becoming. or their perceptual relation. In die problem— atic affect connections arc niade beyond my immediate sensual experience. Guattari suggests. and a “problem atic affect. 22/39). This new paradigrn is ethical as weil as aesdieric because ir implies. The affect is in this sense a “pre personal category“ (REA. make experience the nexus of series of affectual con nections. because widiin it affects precede sub jects.). AFFECT We begin from the perception in which any work of art first appears. Where the previous chapter was primarily concerned with art‘s mate rial and technical aspects.“ the simple empirical percep tion (die views 1 bave frorn the window as 1 work at my desk).

but introduced machinic processes inro art thar allowed their work to explore new modes of subjectivarion. and on the other affirms the virtual in its proper place. as the immanence ofvirtual and actual. iinplies new questions: not “what is it?“ hut “what does jr do?“ or “what does it beconie?“ not “what thing or idea does ir represent?“ bur “what virtual universe does ir embody or express?“ We can understand this change in inter rogarory mode by considering Deleuze and Guattari‘s brjef analysis of arrists who painr machines.“ Guattari argues. posits it seif in irself die most subjective will be the most objective“ (WP 11/16).“ 1 These art works do not represent machines. the cre ation of ‘an existential territory‘ EVERYTHING IS A MACHINE The problemarising affect operates. In this sense.“ Deleuze and Guattari argue. making any quesrion as to the virtual‘s existence entirely fractaL 6 Such a question always in volves a multipliciry ofothers. onrology. “Leger. “self-positing. according to Guattari.b0 In this sense: “Art is not chaos. “machinic. 313/384). Consequently. hut jr is an inorganic life. inorganic) because it is the chaosmic composition ofa plane ofvirtual and tual—infinite and finite—consistency inro living abstracr machines “which. a composed chaos—nei ther foreseen nor foretold“ (WP 204/192). of infinire and finite dimen sions. the onrological ground zero of rhe aes thetic paradigm. once more. Subjectivarion is such an autopoietic and machinic process. a coming-into-being wbich (rc)creares the affecr‘s finite exisrence “to finally give back some infinity to a world which rhrearened to smorher it“ (Chaos.h1 On this chaosniic plane of composition a new world emerges (the world is conrinually ernergent). as chaos‘s own “cc stasies“ (ATP. so that it consrirures. as Guatrari puts it. Chaosinosis is. 96/133) berween chaos and com plexity. subjecrivation is. we cannot ralk about a virtualiry separate from irs actual ernergence. at the whim of irs own economy. Subjectivation.“ 12 Life is machinic (i. synchronic distributions and diachronic be cornings“ (REA. Artjsts ljke Leger and Picabia did not represent chines. hut rhe autopoiesis of chaos inro an expressive matter. neither subjecrive not ohjecrive. This critical mode of producrion emerges withour an intentional subject as an “autopoiesis. in the processes ofsubjectivation. hut for now it is our first glirnpse ofarr as a finite creation (a subjectivation). meaning die virtual cannot be experienced in irse1f or. for in rerms of irs creative powers. its “in-irseif“ only exists as experienced. as the active onrological element expressed in the actual. 161/255) ofthe subject. independently and necessarily. In this sense. what Deleuze and Guarrari call die raw aestbetic “rnomenr“(ATT 322—3/395--6). Deleuze and Guarrarj argue.“ 8 Autopoiesis is rhe machinic infolding of die affects‘ virmal dimensions in rhe unfolding of irs new actualiries. then. Chaosmosis is die virrual and infinite genetic plane on and through which rhe actual world appears and becomes. Guatrari writes. artisric as weIl as scientific and technical possibiliries. is an autonomous seif-organising process that gives consistency ro a multiplicity of different vir mal elements and expresses their cohesion in a process of becoming. “the complex ceases to be propped upon the elemen tary (as in the conceprion that prevails in scientific paradigms) and organises. Deleuze and Guatrari argue. is not chaos. chaosmo sis is not chaos itseif. and as 1 have al ready repeatedly argued. The embodiment ofchaosmosls in an art work.“ “Whar depends on a free creative activiry‘ rhey write.e. as Joyce says. hut is the energetic and material plane in its onrogenetic process ofsuhjectivarion. Guattari writes. as a “virtual fractalisation. through which an infinite connectivity emerges as the intense and virrual dimension expressed in actual experience (sensory af 5 Thjs infinite virtual dimension does not exist outside ofis actualisation fects). in other words. as Brian Massumi has suggesred: “Which virtual? Under which mode of accompaniment? How appearing? How fully does the virtual range of variations actualize in any given appearing? How fully does die virtual range ofvariations actualize in any given object or substance?“ 7 The care ftl cririque required to answer these questions introduces on the one hand a movernent of deterrieorialisation that frees the virtual from its subjective and semioric deterniinations. whose processualiry re stores the infinire (irs affecrual aestheric dimension). When we understand af fects as non-subjecrive but nevertheless consistent and communicating networks. 161/255). rhey “show how humans arc a component part of die machine. “bur a composirion of chaos that yields die vision or sensa tion. 96/134). This is what makes these “machinic paintings“ interesting. a world ofautopoietic living machines.‘54 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 155 come back to this refrain and consider ir fully a little later. as presenr in machines as it is in man. ‘is also that which. as Samuel Butler wrote: “The difference between rhe life ofa man and that ofa machine is one rather ofdegree than ofkind. or combine with something else to co stiture a machine.“ 13 To understand art in terms of this new aesthetic paradigrn will mean changing terminology methodology. and once more this is a term we shall return to.“ Deleuze - . Affectual autopoiesis is die “f}ee crearive acrivity“ proper to the aesthetic para digm. Chaosmosis is living composition. a “chaosmic see-sawing“ (Chaos. perhaps better. a chaosmos. Cliaosmosis is the emergence of the “directional componenrs“ of chaos. “never cease producing new. Chaosmosis is. and most importandy. but. crearing new “existential universes“ rarher than sirnply renroducinu a “self.“ 9 This orocess emernes from the fundamental onrological stare of rhe aesrheric paradigm chaosrnosis.“ and is. Chaosmosis. hut arc ma chjnes operating at the interface of the acrual and the virtual.“ (REA.

Crearion here nieans inorganic life. As if. In the face ofa rhrearening and dangerous chaos we atrempt to shelrer in a moment of calmness and stabilirn lt‘s onlv natural. The same refrain emerges in A ThousandP/ateaus in an account ofcom mon experience. is made up of immanent intensive and energetic traits or frrces (“singularities“) whose differential relations both determine Form. in a caim centre we recognise and which pre-exisrs tu. rhyrhms and orchesrrations.“ Modulation. Deleuze says. We arc always in the middle of this process of dc and reterriroriahsation. a mulniplicity of sonorous. 17/33). All we wanr isa lirtle consisrencv Finally the home opens. Nevertheless the creative process of rbe refrain begins with dererritorialisation. Guartari writes. one which will radically change our understanding ofarr‘s experience rhrough ins “immense complexificarion ofsuhjecriviry“ and irs producrion “of new and unprecedenred exisrenrial harmonies. and can only bc properly undersrood according ro the immanent “pre-individual“ (intense and differential) singularities ir expresses. as Simondon‘s vocabulary teils us: “Individuation must be grasped as the hecorning of the being and not as a ° The finite individ— 2 mode! ofthe being which would exhaust its significarion. eliminarion and extraction. “Form will never inspire anything but conformities“ (DR. with the result that there is a con 8 Matter is chaosmic. one created by rhe circle itseif“ (A‘FE 311/383). This ontology of individuation is in fict one we arc already familiar with.“‘ longer a matter of asking about painters as subjects. as an auropoienic machine op eraring in the aesrhetic paradigm ir is applicable ro all art forms. polyphonies. itseif least of all. is “moulding in a continuous and variable manner. furnier dererritorialisarions creating the becomings ofour world. as a fiincrion ofrhe w‘orking forces jr shelrers“ (ATB 311/383). or paintings as objects. “hut [ro] another region. as the Figure of the mould suggests. “demonstrated convincingly that the inachine did not represent anyrhing.“ 22 Despire the refrain being a musical rerm.“ but is autopoietic and expressive. This ethico-aesrhenic paradigm is rhere fore a new onrology of art.“ ‘ ‘I‘he artist deraches some ma 2 terial. and tinuous variation of matter across equiiibrium stares. ‘I‘he differenr componenus conserve their heterogeneiry. and maintain tite inherent dynamism ofform. as Deleuze puts it: “The painting machine of an artist— 16 mechanic. with “rhe detachment of an exisrential “motif“ (or leit motiv) which installs irself like an “attractor“ within a sensible and significational chaos. frees the motif so that jr can atrracr and compose new sensations and senses—new affects—according to a new refrain. acting as a filter or sieve rhrough which it exrracts what jr needs ro trans— form and resist chaos. a world. “a blind trust in the movement ofdeterritorialization at vork. including the . Deleuze and Guattari ca! 1 this composinonal process a “refrain. Art is composed through th is conrin na! process of dererritorial isation. changes ontological registers. a motif rhat enacts a processual conversion ofchaos inro a spatio-remporal rerritory in which we can exisr. and rherefore requires. gesrural and motor forces which bud inro “lines ofdrift“ producing new complexities in the inirial refrain. “Hylomorphic“ is a terin composed of hyle meaning matter. and it is in the process of subjectivarion that a machinic and iiirnroierir rr nricriu‘u‘ bec‘onws indiscernihle front the arr—work jr oroduces. and describes the Operation ofa pre-existing mould imposing form on matter. I)eieuze and Guattari reject this Aristotelian disnnction of matter and Form because. as if from the “out side.“ ujlibrium states) in refrains that both resolve the 1 finds consistency (expressive ec “problem“ posed hy pre-individual heing. dividuarion of matter. because any “motif“ is detached from another refrain that composes it.‘ Simondon argues that matter can no longer be thought of asa simple or homogeneous substance receiving its form from an exterior model. through rhyrhmical processes ofselecrion. a window or door leads us not inro chaos. hut arc nevertheless captured by a refrain which couples them ro die existen tiai Territory ofmy seif“ (Chaos. Not however.“ Art machines operate in the aesthetic paradigm under “molecular condi tions. rhe cir dc “tended 011 its own to open onro a future. and morphic meaning form. The refrain con strucrs an existential terrirory or “horne“ our of “landmarks and marks of all kinds“ (ATE 311/382). Deleuze and Guattari suggest. 134/166). and keep this problem active in a 19 The in tinual modulation producing the living emergence of individuation. hut a calm we creare with the comforting rhythms of a song. no longer understood hylomorphically.“ nal is therefore only the most limited aspecr of the process of individuation. This is the understanding Deleuze and Guattari develop in relation to art as a “refrain. Through doors and windows opening onto the fu ture the rerritory extends lines of improvisation or experiment (a “prospecrion“ ofvirtual universes as Guatrari purs it). or to change. This home prorecrs and exrends rhe gerntinal forces ofthe ter rirory. but as autopoietic. but of understanding. because it was itseif the production ofor— 5 Understanding art in the aesthetic paradigm iS 110 ganised intensive states. through an im manent process of “modulation. A modularor is a mould which constantly changes the measuring gricl that ir imposes.“ COMPOSITIONAL REFRAINS In art it is modulation that composes the affectual assembiages constituting a subjectivation.“ vliich he gins. Deleuze‘s reection of hylomorphism rests on the “profoundly origi nal theory“ of Georges Simondon.156 Art us Abstract Machine Songs ofi‘vfolecules 157 and Guattari write. he argues. To derach a motif is already to cre— arc.“ Here matter is not forrned by a hylomorphic code. Guartari argues. Matter.

the refrain is not contained by an objectively defined “art werk“ existing apart from this process in which it is continually recreated. In art preperly so-called. destratifying subject-object distinctions and the schemas of space and time they assume. and argue that it removes these ferms. volumes and colours—its “land rnarks or marks“—into a “rough sketch“ (ATE 311/382). in rupture with signification and denoration—erdinary aesthetic cate gorisations lose a large part of their relevance. 164/259—60). and ceunter te. adelescent solitude) and cennetations ef a cultural and economic order—the time when bottles were still washed with the aid ofa bottle brush (REA. Guattari writes. the refrain has a double function. As we saw with Warhol‘s paintings. Reference to ‘free figuratien. Here. 1 59). lines.158 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 159 visual arts. 131 / 181) actual coordinates from their stratified systems..“ er “Leporte bouteilles“]..] passes through a preliminary deconstruction of the structures and codes in use and a chaesmic plunge into the materials ef sensation. gives an example of his ewn.. Guattari hewever. Hew is this reading different frem mere traditional understandings ef the readymades? The readymade has eften been interpreted as producing an infinite range efaffects. This two-step dance is the onto-aesthetic process of art. and hevend the artworks and artists we love. “— THE BOTTLE RACK CHANGES DIRECTION Guattari‘s example is Marcel Duchamp‘s Bottle Rack [“Egouttoi. The fecus ef artistic activity always remains a surplus-value of subjectivity“ (Chaos. “a deterministic chaos“ (Chaos. This sketch is elab orated in various affectual rhythms that both express and compose a refrains virtual infinity a singular assembiage ofaffects that is in continual variation.“ Deleuze writes. But it is another claim to argue that this multiplicity ofaffect individuates in a way undefined by.‘ er ‘conceptualisrn‘ hardly matters! What is impertant is te know if a werk leads effectively to a mutant productien of enunciatien. namely. 80/113).‘ ‘abstraction.“ hut further by arguing that the ready made in particular exemplifies the aesthetic process ef the refrain‘s “ontelogical creationism. the rays of light upon spider webs..“ Questions leading us beyend the answers we know. And both tegether. This werk. one of the first readymades from 1913. and is the compositional prin ciple ofa werk of art. 90/126). 14/29). Duchamp‘s bottle-rack seems to answer te Deleuze‘s imperative te insert art inte life (DR. lt lives. In the aesthetic paradigm questiens about an art-werk‘s “meaning“ must be retheught in the light of their “intolerable nucleus of entelogical cre atienism“ (Chaos. and reopening contact with their virtual infinity On the ether hand this process produces an autopeietic node er “motif“ through which virtual universes compose themselves. In the aesrhetic paradigm “we arc not. differenrly. but as the werk of art. the readymade is an example ef an art werk in ‘s hich . Similarly. 80/113) between virtual and actual dimensions. “is a little ritornello“ (ECC. because the “artist“ is simply the inhuman and asubjective process of subjectivation. as Guattari ex— plains: “Formations of sense and states ofthings arc thus chaotised in the very movement of the bringing into existence of their cemplexity“ (Chaos. “the ex pressive material becemes formally creative“ (Chaos.“ er “umbilical point“ (Chaos. There is a deterriterialisation of actual things inte a chaotic virtuality and a reterritorialisation of this virtual chaos inte an au topoienc actuality (an “existential territory“). and as all efour examples have repeatedly shown. but only as their mutual becorning. “The image is not an object.“ Guattari writes. but threugh the expres sive and autepoietic functions (refrains) ef their chaesmic material-affects.“ Guattari writes. “The image. . Guattari writes “functions as the trigger for a constellation of referential universes engaging both intimate reminiscences (the cellar of the heuse.23 An image is composed of it composes. 2 1iiis means that producing an art-work—as refrain—is not the exclu sive realm of the human artist. The refrain is this two feld and simultaneous Operation of “unclasping“ [tcrochages (AT1 326/402) er “unframing“ [&cradagej (Chaos. meaning ne longer emerges according te the pre-existing poles of artist and viewer. “but a ‘process“ (ECC. ne lenger as artists er artworks. 25/44). The refrain assumes a chaesmic cosmos. an enrichment of the world [. 1 59). 80 1/114).“ . “in the presence ofa passively representative image.] a proliferation not just ofthe forms but of the modalities efbeing“ (Chaos. one very different frem that ofpainting. er at least makes them subsequent te the chaesrnic emergence they ernbedy. 293/375). first by claiming that the affect is in itself“pre-personal. as refrains of chaosmosis. 83/117). The refrain then. This is precisely what Guartari dees. As such. 59/86) from which it emerges as a “chaosrnic folding“ (Chaos. a certain winter. gaining consistency te the peint ofexpression in a subjectivation. ib make this claim one must radicalise the reaclymade.“ Deleuze writes. Out ef them a recomposition becornes possible: a recreation. but ofa vector of subjecrivatien“ (Chaos. “Viewed frem the angle of this existential functien. is the machinic “interface. But enly te return them again. where “every aesthetic decentring of points ofview [. . Guattari argues. 80/ 113). molecularising them. The readyrnade‘s affectual heterogeneity means its individ uating instance can ne longer be identified with an ebject er a subject. 131 / 181). as an in-principle open field ofassocia tive pessibilities. On the one hand it acts as a “vacuole of decompression“ (Chaos. subjective and objective dis cursive forms. 111/154) er “nucleus ofchaosmosis“ (Chaos. in order te “grasp“ (compose) new virtual universes in an on going and actual becoming.“ As such. as the lines of our ewn beceming. Art begins with this refrain: “different questiens.

it is. “2(. These regions are those ofexistential emergence. Gtiatrani‘s detachment of Duchamp‘s Bottle Rack would follow Duchamp‘s own starernent. The important thing is not the final resuir but the fict that the cartographic method co—exists with the process ofsubjectivation and that a reappropniation. By this 1 mean that the success ofDelcuze‘s “ventriloquisin“ of bis philosophical interlocutors.160 Art as Abstract Machine artists “not only create [affects] in their work. depends on their “change in direction“ being articulated by the philosophers themselves. that “it‘s a bottle rack that has changed direction. to take two ofour examples.‘ he generously writes. and thus dc termines its Ineaning according to his own. xxi/ ). to be fair.“ This “change in direction“ would be the crucial definition of an aesthetic practice ofcreative subjectivation. © 2004 Artists Rights Sociery (ARS). In this sense we could say Cuattari uses I)uchamp in much the same way as he ar gues the readvmade as subjectivation works itseif lt is an extraction or detach ment of an object frorn its discursive field in order to open it tip to new mutations. 100—1/140—1). and the readymade the fundamental work of art. orie that Deleuze affirms in bis philosoph ical. they draw US into the compound“ (WE 175/166). Elsewhere Guattari has coupled Duchamp with Bakhtin to make the argument that this process of subjectivisarion is a “transfer“ berween the creator and “on looker“ of a work of art. This is what would make Duchamp the archetypal artist.“ he wnites in the preface to Dzffi‘rence anti Repetition. Philadelphia Museum of Art. “a philosophically clean-shaven Marx. as the continual affectual van— ation the work in fact is. 25 l‘he readymade restores infinity to rhe creative process. no less than what Guattari calls on orhers to do with hirn: “[W}e invite our readers. “One irnagines a philosophically bearded Hegel. This would Figure 6 Marcel Duchamp. Akhough 1 will go on to argue that in many ways this is a problematic use of Duchamp. continually re-opening new temporalisations and smoorh spaces. the way it pro duces a new Nietzsche or Spinoza. revealing a creative liFe immanent to thein own concepts and systems. but no less Duchampian terrns. As Guattari Suggests: “With art the finitude of the sensible material becomes a support for the pro duction ofaffects and percepts which tend to hecome more and more eccentred with respect to preformed structures and coordinates. New York / ADAGP Paris / Succcssion Marcel Duchamp . they give them tO US and make us become with them. and iristalls it in the art work‘s actuality. 4 But one can also irnagine that shaving Marx would be considerahly more work than changing the bottle rack‘s direction. The problem wirh (iuattari‘s reading of Duchamp is that in changing the direction of the Bottle Rack he seems to ignone Duchamp‘s own dinection. Bottle Rack. Marcel Duchamp dc clared: ‘art is the road which leads towards regions which are not governed by tirne and space“ (Chaos. new virtual universes. ‘to freelv take and leave the concepts we advance. very different rules. in the same wayas a rnoustached Mona-Lisa“ (DR. an autopoiesis of the means of production of suhjectiviry are inade possible. 1913.

in other words. hut also in describing an anirnal process of art con strucning a terrirory. Guattari atternpts to consolidate his appropriation of the readyrnade througb [)uchamp‘s farnous affirmation of the artist‘s indifference towards an)‘ aesthetic qualities in the object. but the shifting of art‘s definition onto a purely conceptual act. a trajectory developing the practice of art as a “language garne. For Deleuze and Guattari tben. ro the celehration of “language garnes.“ “Take everything and make it a matter ofexpression. Guattani‘s use of the Bot-tle Rack as an example ofsubjecti vation is not convincing. and this is a poinr we shaH return to. Rather. ° The readyrnade in this sense would be the denial of 3 an asubjective aesthetic paradigm of expressive mareriality.“ For clearly Duchamp did not see the rejection of art achievecl in the readymade as expressing the “murant desire“ of a genetic material plane of composition.“ and rnust he placed in opposition to Deleuze and Guattari‘s ontology of the aesrhetic parad igm. opens onto the realm of the signifier. Deleuze and Guattari‘s use of the term “readvmade“ in A ihousand Piateaus and What is Philosophy? is therefore non—Duchampian.“ Where Guattari seeks a democratisation ofart by removing its condition of human subjectivity. not only in its ontological comrnitrnents. which is the readymade‘s condinion of possihiliry3 8 Giiattai i clainis that this “indifference“ detaches the work frorn the discursive field ofart. that is to say. shows hirnself to be a true individual capahle ofgoing beyond the animal phase.. an act of transcendence rather than transversality. one rhat could do nothing hut rep resent suhjects for other signifiers. and from which Guattari quoted.) indeed. the readyrnade does not operate as the machinic composition ofprob lematic affecrs into refrains and subjectivations. In this sense.“ Iric Alliez has gone the farthest in this crinique ofL)uchamp. Dtichamp seeks a democratisation through a nomination depending entirely on an inherently subjective power of signifi canon. and the best that could be said ofit is that it is a provocative. because it establishes ins own condition in a nominanion that depends on the subjective act ofsignification.“ Duchamp said. that artist of onanism and “celibate machines. arguing that bis reduction of art to the infinire play of signifiers enacts tbe Lacanian cut between the Symbolic and the Real. 1 j niere this freeing of matters of expression in the movernent of rerriroriality: the base or ground ofart“ (ATI 316/389).162 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 163 be an over-coding rather than a trans-coding. This process. as man. and animal construcnions ofa ternirory rhrough the “unciasping“ ofpre-existing ma terial. they argue.“ one that “consummates“ ins “disinterestedness. Art is an opening roward regions \vhich arc not ruled byspace and ‘ Art. lt is this indifference. Finally then. and opens jr to a “murant desire. quotation out ofcontext. We can immediarely see that this definition ofart is travelling in a \‘ery different direc nion ro Duchamp‘s. Duchamp argues. 27 The readymade is nothing hut the question “is this art?“ and the insistence that art‘s condinion is the discursive act—“this is art. lines and sound to con struct an existenrial territory—a subjectivisation—as an expression ofthe vital forces of an inorganic life. The artist-animal uses readymade colors.“ Deleuze and Guartari teil Us: “The stagemalcer bird practices art brut.“ 2 But it is precisely this moment of consummation that seems most problernatic in re lation to I)uchamp. But in the case ofGuatiari‘s references to Duchamp and the readymade this is not the case. “Territorial rnarks are readyrnades.. arguing that with it art “depends on the simple ‘opin ion‘ ofa spectator wbo derermines whether or not to ‘materialize‘ the sensation. . In other words. lt does not succeed—in Guattari‘s own terms—in .“ Deleuze and Guattari explicidy re ject this direction for art. Duchamp‘s readyrnade is “de—onrological. 69/81—2). (Art is a natura] expression. Artists arc stagemakers“ (ATR 3 16/389). the work ofGuattari and Duchamp seem to move in opposite di recrions. “[thev arc >. “1 believe. a rtIn thar 3 time. art escapes human suhjectivity to become—animal. The readymade in Duchamps sense is not priinarily a proliferation ofaf fect.“ transcends the animal and guarantees art‘s immaterial realiry by grounding ir within human thought. “that art is the onlv kind ofactiviry in which man. Guattari wishes to escape the overdetermination of the subject in a sig nify‘ing system through a material expression of chaosrnosis (a subjectivation) inseparable frorn an actual creation. decides whether or not it is art. is already art hecause it is the con srruction of an affectual assemblage in which matter becornes expressive. at least with the animal that carves out a territorv“ (WB 183/14). but Narure has been “dc narured. and this is the dynamic of the aesthetic paradigm we have seen Guattari developing. as in the hehaviour of the srage-maker bird. in favour of an immaterial process of linguistic construcnion. We remember one of Deleuze and Guattari‘s definitions of the schizo as heing ahle to make what they are escaping from escape from it self(AO. the readyrnade abstracts art f‘rom vital processes by reducing it to an infinire cham ofsignifiers. Duchamp on the orher hand. and perhaps playful. In fact. A conclusion confirmed by Duchamp himselfin the 1955 interview he made vith James Johnson Sveeney. [Les marques territoriales sont des ready made]“ Deleuze and Guattari write. Deleuze and Guattari claim “art begins with the an imal. This would be the direction the ready made takes towards conceptual art. This is a lot ofefforr to find ordi nary perceptions and affecrions in the infinire and to reduce the concept to a doxa ofthe social body or great American metropolis“ (‘VR 198/187). is “nearly the birth of art.“ an imporrant point we will come back to in mir discussion of Kant and Romanticism.this consnirunion. wishes to es cape materiality by embracing a symbolic system in which art appears only on condition of its semiotic nornination. Alliez argues.

96/134). “all this cor responds to something happening in the contemporary world. its seif-organisation in an aesthetic composition of the chaosmic plane.]You see. 1 summon being to exist differently and 1 extorr new innensities from it“ (Chaos. however. when we slip away from the assignable Scif. When we become the least bit fluid. but in so doing jr also brings us to a new chaosmic paradigm ofbeing. the readymade as an ontological revaluation/revolution of everyday life. the aesthetic paradigm ofthe readymade is not the irnpossibility of defining art. ereative expression!construction in permanent revolution wirh any preconceptions.“ as Deleuze said in 1968. once more understood by Deleuze and Guattari in a cornpletely different way to Duchamp. for example (Chaos. “allows an ‘ungluing‘ of the dominant realities and significations by creating conditions which permit people ro ‘make their territory‘ to conqucr rheir individual and collecrive destiny wirhin the most dererrirorialized flows.“ Guarrari uses the same paradigm when discussing rhe innovative practices an La Borde elinic. Guartari‘s privileging of art and artists in this process remains crucial. according to Guartari.“ Guattari argues. This excess operates. 91 / 1 27). political. art. not least for the way it points beyond Duchamp‘s conceptualism and rowards art‘s renewed political engagement. creates a subjectivation always in ex cess of any limited identity (ofa polirical subject as much as an artistic one). 69—71/99--102). a careful construction capable of expressing chaosmic forces. as the eternal return ofthe ready inade. As a result.“ A communist pol ines is therefore inseparable from aesthetic processes of ereation. (Duchamp called the readymade “a form of denying the possihiliw of defining arr“) but its redefinition as a living. anti in fact Guatrari uses almost idenrical rerms to describe them. in a Nietzschean sense. Bur beyond being simply another name for a viralist onnologv. he wrires with Antonio Negri. in which we arc freed ro express our inhuman ma terial becomings. How arc the new fields of the possible going to be fitted out? How arc sounds and forms going to be arranged so that the subjectivity adjacent ro them remains in movement. ro undersrand this crearive expression!consrruction requires our own ‘unciasping. and really alive?“ (Chaos. In orher words. 90/126). “—a term which ought to be changed because jr can just as easily be ahsence ofwork—1 carry out a complex ontological crysrallisanion. THE POLITICS OF CHAOS The subjectivation emerging in the refrain is an ontological force of resist ance—a permanent revolution—acting against systematic controls ofcreative 52 ‘Fhe ontology of the aestheric paradigm is cherefore inherenrly becoming. As Guartari suggests: “Perhaps artists today constitute the final lines along which primordial existential questions arc folded. our own embrace ofa po litical aestherics capable of creating a people yer ro come.“ in excess of all represen rational systems and any metaphysical determinarions. “has become the paradigm for every possible liheranion“ (Chaos. Similarly. an alterificarion of heings-there. rbis onto-polirical definition ofart collapses old dis tinctions between creation and consumption onro a single plane ofproduction. 133/184). and rraversing all sorrs offields not ally considered “artistic. when there is no longer a person on whom God can exercise bis power or hy whom He can be replaced. and extends “polirical art“ ro include any act thar is truly crearive. be a critical practice ofse lection and affi rmation. because through it we escape our stratified image ofthought—and its representational politics—to restore an infinite freedom to the finite world. “When 1 ‘consume‘ a work.. it also serves to ernphasise frorn a methodological point ofview that a ‘blind trust‘ in deterritorialisation must nevertheless. Political art—jr means an onto-aesthetics. as its inorganic life as a repetition ofcreative differences.“ 3 Freed from irs Duchampian definition. In this sense then. This “unciasping“ is accornpanied by the refrains political moment. the police lose it.164 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 165 co—implicating the detachment of art from its discursive structures with a “chaosmic pitinge into the materials of sensation“ (Chaos. This extension ofart into the everyday is preciseiv rhe mark of its polirical power and necessiry. anti in its Nietzschean modality. [. Rather than simply disquaIif‘ing Guattari‘s argument. “But most importanrly. Guarrari argues rhar “aestheric machines“ arc “the most advanced models“ for effecrive resisrance to capitalisnic subjecriviry because they directly confront capital‘s “deafness ro true alterity“ (Chaos. art also has a privileged connection to the aesthetic paradigm as a realm ofexperimentarion .. As a result. The ready-made. on rhe one hand jr resisrs actual politica] forms of oppressiori. the readvinade embodies the pol itics of the aesrheric paradigm as an autopoieric subjecrivarion expressing irs in organic Life. his atternpt at appro— priating Duchamp‘s readymade casts in grearer relief both the difficulty and the radicality of what he is proposing. ereaning alternative subjec rivinies (relative deterritorialisarions). A plane completely unrestricred to art. At this point the proh lems of polirics arc aesthetic. liideed. the forces of repression always need a SeIf that can be assigned. the readymade as an chist politics. 107/149). they need dc terminate individuals 011 which ro exercise their power.‘ our own redefinirion as subjectivation. Art—polin— ical pracnice works in borh dimensions of the aesrhetic paradigm. Communism today. implications that shall now he exainined. These ques tions take us beyond 1)uchamp to an interrogation ofthe aesthetic paradigrn in rerms of its “ethico—political implications“ (Chaos. 3 This keeps the ready-made in a constant process of“unclasping. 9 1/127). The politics of birds.

they “offer us the most advanced models—relatively speaking—for these blocks of sensation capable of extracting full meaning from all the empty signal systems that invest us from every side“ (Chaos.“ Guateari wriees. and muse be. The “pre-personab voices“ of ehe refrain. to re-creaee it. etc. deeerrieorialisation of ehe object and the subject as sensation‘s conditions of possibility. ofbeing appropriaeed “after ehe face“ by ehe fine-ares syseem. a myseical efTusion“ (REA. Bue art‘s double life confronts it wieh a double danger. and eo celebraee. because “aesthetic machines“ al ready operate as refrains. not in order eo leave die world. and is indiscemnible from saying “1 am a polieical areise. that 1 am a subject. once again. Guaetari wriees. us the artists againse ehem. “W‘ lack re sistance to thcpresent“ (W1 108/104). “art does not have a monopoly on creation. precisely because je is always in danger ofcolbapsing“ (Chaos.“ hut what is ehe right war machine? lt is al— ways a queseion of means and not ends. The polieics of such a myseicism imply an atheist heresy ehae refuses a subjeceivity conform ing eo God‘s image. 130/180). but in order to re-eneer it. Opinions arc the corre spondence of perceived qualities and subjective affections. “arc is only suseained by ieself This is because each work pro duced possesses a double finality: eo insere iesebf inco a social nerwork which will either appropriaee or rejece ie. begins . ehe aesehetic paradigm animaees a mate rial realm it shares with opinion. “ehe paineer muse confrone ehe chaos and haseen the deseruceions so as eo produce a sensation that defies every opinion and clich (how many eirnes?)“ (WF 204/192). “although equal in principle with the other powers ofthinking philosophically. “1 am God“ is a myseical and atheist seatemene we have already seen Guaeeari rnake. The question is not which is “right. In this way. and as infiniee becoming: “Fabricated in ehe socius. and which frees ehe material to express its chaosrnic ma chinery in construceing sensations. like politics. for only a permanent revolution can resist the incessant reappropriation of art in the spectacle ofcomrnodified “poses“ and fashionable accessories. 165/262). Consequently. but also express all the constitutive and stratified opinions which make such expressions possible. but which ie retains a prior relationship with. Aestheeic singularity and its creative lines of flight always await to be produced. But for Deleuze and Guattari it takes a new meaning. Whae ehen. and ieselfaspires eo God‘s vision. on ehe one hand. As a result. ehe Universe ofare as such. “We lack creation. from ourselves as areists. in its at once aesthetic and political dimension. Each eime.“ he writes. speceacula ised according . not eo mention hirn. “The aesthetic power offeel ing. knowing scientifically. or which 1 wish to impose. ae once finiee.“ But nevertheless. eo wrest the affece from affec tions as the transition from one staee to another: to extract a bbc of sensa tions. “Because the picture stares oue covered with clichs.“‘ 7 The aesthetic process of subjectivation is just such an apprenticesliip for in ie the artist “has forgotten the world. This task ofresisting ehe opinions of ehe presene gives the firse co-ordinate ofart‘s indis cernibility frorn polieics: rnaterialisrn.or herself. what thought is. 101/141). No doubt this privilege would have to be analysed in detail to understand art‘s political possibilities. seems on the verge of occupying a privileged position within the collective Assembiages of our cra“ (Chaos. “all opinion is already political“ (WP 145/138). . Guattari sees art‘s production ofaffects as being an es pecially important process ofpolitical resistance. or es pecially. the airn of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions ofobjects and the states ofa perceiving subject. unforeseen and unthinkable qualities of being“ (Chaos. No doubt contemporary art has been generally unable to do this. art against the all too human artist) revolutionary power. When 1 express an opinion 1 not only express the orthodoxy 1 be lieve in. How rnany eirnes? Every eirne ehe finite is creaeed which reseores ehe infinite. What is re quired is. Aesthetic resistance breaks with our re ceived understandings and perceptions—our “opinions“—the clich4d feelings and expressions which define our present. 8 lt is not simply a matter ofpicking sides. as the Poet Pessoa pur ie: “An appreneiceship in unlearning. This is ehe deseruction which muse pre cede any true creation. muse be done? The politi cal artist‘s first task is eo clear his or her material of all ehe clichs by which opinion predetermines its possibilieies. 106/147).“ Deleuze and Guattari claim. a pure being ofsensations“ (WI 167/158). Deleuze and Guattari write.“ Guattari writes. As Deleuze and Guattari pue ie: “By means of the material. 90/126).“ Deleuze and Guaeeari write. aeseheeic creaeion im plies an ongoing and aueopoieeic subjectivisaeion ehae composes affeces inco myseical expressions. for Deleuze and Guattari “ehe misfortune of the people cornes from opinion“ (WE 206/194). . that art and politics share the same on tological and ethical imperative: to create! The same imperative to face the same problem.“ The political art work on this account leads a double life. again. acting politically. Art.“ as Nieezsche said. “Patently.166 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 167 in which new ways of understanding and living in the world arc constantly ap pearing. not least because ofits insistent retreat into a postmodern “conceptualisrn. Just the opposite. “Revolurionary art“ is hardly a Slogan tO conjure with. but it takes its capacity to invent mutant coordinates to extremes: it engenders unprecedented. that 1 think. No longer suhjeceive. such that these cor respondences constitute an orthodoxy operating in the realm of the lived. from this absolute. or perhaps we could say oneobogical. The firse liberaeion will he from ourselves—ehe first clich—even. As if such group identificaeions were enough to produce an effective politics. But art has one advantage. induce “an aeseheeic ecseasy. This is not ro claim artists arc the new revolutionary heroes—God forbid—but to affirm art‘s (precisely.

“ Deleuze writes. The political question therefore. This is the double danger. and is re vealed in a “vision. to einbody our own refrains. the empire ofpoverty and thercby becoming visionary to produce a means of knowlcdge and action out of pure vision“ (C2.“ ROMANTICISM Deleu7e and Guattari distinguish three “ages“ ofart.“ Deleuze gives the example of Rossellini‘s Strombo/i (1950). Deleuze and Guattari write. Their relation to Romanticism however. wo metaphysical—but to sing with this voice. Art functions to subject a chaotic and unclean matter to the pure beaury of an ideal form. Deleuze seems to be clainiing for modern cinema a new aesthetics of the sublirne. As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “There is always a way in which absolute deterritorialisation takes over from a relative deterritorialisarion in a given field“ (WE 88l85). Modern cinema. but arc not determined by thern. acting as the precondition to any cre ation. each refcrring instead to the diagrammatic features ofdif ferent ahstract machines. is not to sirnply strive for the absolute dei-erritorialisation of the refrain in the cosmos (as we shall see. As we saw last chapter. groundlessness operaring as a lost or hid den foundation which the artist-hero sets out to find. an absolutely deterritorialised chaosmic matter is prior to. The purely optical and sound image of modern cinema.“° The romantic artist. Nature. where Ingrid Bergman‘s Karin is finally overwhelmed by the beauty and power of the volcano and seeks divine consolation. on the other.“ and. in other words. and is projected outside any attempt to express it. 1 hese dangers arc really the Same one. “outstrips our sensory-motor capacities. Although this connection to Romanticism re mains purely gestural in Cinerna 2. unbearable aspect of this creative and cosmic infiniry (chaos mosis). even ifit is immedi ately reterritorialised. we recall. abandons the classical proiect of imposing universal forms on the chaos of matter. Art must fight these dangers with its OWfl dual action. Deleuze argues. what makes the actual autopoietic. but rather to realise this movement as precisely what gives the (our) subjectivation its consistency. intense. This would justif one presumes. can art—bete and now—speak the voice ofchaosmosis. 18/29). but another is the intolerable. To recall our discussions of last chapter. This process proceeds with a “one-two. and instead creates territorial asseinblages which express the Earth as their intense and infinite essence. There they clearly reject Romanticism as a diagram for artistic practice. an act ofcreation reproducing an organic milieu that is the same borb inside and outside the fi-ame. a deteriitorialisation end ing in a black hole annihilating its own expression. and as we have seen their fonnulations re garding art often have a romantic ring to them. Indeed. Classicism. Guattari‘s “blind trust“ in deterritorialisation. is not simply to “hear“ this voice—too easy. begun to hear a cer tain romantjc tone to Deleuze and Guattari‘s aesthetics. and this articulation is crucial for our understanding of arts political power and function. What this might be and how Deleuze and Guattari ‘unclasp‘ it from Kant‘s famous use of the term can be understood through their discussion of Romanticism in A Thousanr/ J‘Lateaus. an interrogation Dcleuze and Guattari undertake thernselves in relation to their most musical concept. ofcourse. and posit instead a new definition of“modernism. as it assaults and overpowers our perception. The Earth as “Nature“ contains all the forces of the universe. the classical artist represenrs the formed substances of this world through a hylomorphic line. Deleuze and Guattari arc obviously not classicists. one life. This is the classical form of form. for the romantic. How. and “rejoin the songs of the Molecules“ (A‘T1 327/403). Romanticism and Modernism.“ “Romanticism. as resistance to the control ling forces of the inside (relative deterritorialisation). The immanence of an infinite Nature to its expression in life is one example that we will return to. found today as much as at other times (AT1 346/428). too romantic). The classical artist confronts chaos as a iaw untamed matter upon which he or she imposes form. is a subterranean. This priority means that the relative deterritorialisations of an experimental art al— ways materialise (subjectivise) this ontological dimension. our problem as artists. finds something too strong for the human sensory-motor. This search for the imma nent forces of Nature as our true reality will lead the romantic artist back to the . But this depth transcends our ability to com prehend it. all metaphysical atrempts at its reterritorialisation. something that shatters it. Deleuze and Guattari argue.“ the bi nary differentiation of form. of collapsing into a chaos which cannot be actualised in a composition. a tone already echoing in the various ecstasies and mystic moments we have attributed to art. This double life of art is. the “refrain. and has priority over. for both reinscribe art into a system in which it exists either as inside or out. as finite or infinite. and con stitutes the deepest level ofreality. is not so clear. and as expressive refrains unleashing the forces of cbaosmosis (absolute deterritorialisation). “either leading us back to the opinion from which we wanted to escape or precipitating us into the chaos that we wanted to con front“ (W1 199/188). Now has come the tirne to interrogate this possible Romanticism.168 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofmolecules 169 to all the clichs which make it “art. and the articulation of these forms in series. Deleuze points out this affinity with Romanticism in C‘inerna 2. as it were. and do we have the strength to believe it Our problem ofcourse. With this last quotation we have. “bad already set out this ajm for itseif: grasping the intolerable or the unbearable. All three arise within certain historical conditions. perhaps.

and the appearance of an excess. as a result. which is able to comprehend die supcrsensihle “substratum“ of infinity and return the sublime to die imagination as the pres entation of the 4 unpresentable. In assigning pred icates to perceptions according to the apriori categories of the understanding. even ifthese begin from it. those abstract rhythms which emerge from chaos . before being used as variable units of measure in judgments.“ At this moment the rhythms ofaesthetic com prehension that form the basis for perceptions and judgments arc “drowned in chaos.1S “The sublime in nature is only negative. creares “a new type ofaccord“ (DR. Deleuze ar gues. and compels us subjccrivcly to think nature itsclf in its totality as a presenta— tion ofsomething supcrsensible. “the faculty concerned with the independence of the absolute totality. happens in front ofcertain “sublime“ natural phenomena whose “intuition vey the idea of their infinity. Kant claims that the ex perience of the sublime actually propels us out of our senses. But. But rhytlim is constantly changing and as a re— sult I)eleuze says. This “emancipation of dissonance“ (ECC. and the rhythm is indeed sornething which can indeed per haps return to chaos. The breakdown induced by the sublime allows die breakthrough to the tran scendental. Th do so Deleuze develops Kant‘s exploration of “aes thetic comprehension“ in the critique ofJudgement.“ “My whole structure ofperceprion. Perception emerges from the fac ulty of the imagination. As such. a path Deleuze will partially follow. inaking it Deleuze and Guattari say. the truth of the supersensible as understood by our “pure intellectual judgment. and this is the faculry of Ideas. The dynamic sublime is therefore “pure“ Nature. “is in the process of exploding.“ Deleuze says. or as Deleuze wryly notes: “When sornething doesn‘t work [for Kant]. 35/49). to com prehend the transcendental realm of Ideas. “dogmatic“ (ATI 313/385). Second. Thus the sublime. in constant variation. Experience. Aesthetic comprehension. and [)eleuze will read Kant (a Kant. and Deleuze and Guattari will extend this positive function of the sublime (although without using this term) to art in general in What Is Philosophy? Nevertheless. This. for Kant.“ 2 Rhythms arc composed from chaos by aesthetic com prehension. we could say.170 Art as Abstract Iviachine Songs ofmolecutes 171 transcendentaL This path is laid out in the “profoundly rornantic“ (ECC. and despitc its suhlime appearance. 35/49) as Deleuze puts it. through the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction mi a sensible manifold (given by intuition) and within die a pri ori forrns of space and time. vhere. produces a refrain that expresses our comprehension of a chaotic Nature in a rhythm. he invents something which doesn‘t exist. Kant argues. The latter is a material force filling tirne and space (“Nature“). witliout our hcing ahle to effectuare this prcSentation objecnvelv. We have already seen how Deleuze wants tobe done with judgment. Three points need to he made here. for Deleuze and Guattari the Ideas arc in fact die forces ex pressed by a chaotic Nature. 170/221).hl The synthetic judgement producing a concept of an ohject is ‘metrical‘ hecaiise ir applies categories to nur perceptions that are in all cases the same. and this is only possihle Kant argues. ventriloquising Kant: “The rhythm is something which comes out ofchaos. as Deleuze puts it: “Kant held fast to the point of view of conditioning without attaining that of genesis“ (DR. “lt is a feeling of imagination by its own act depriving itself of its freedom by receiving a Final determination in accor 6 The sublinie dance with a law other than that of its empirical enjoyrnent.“ or reason. hefore inaking it change direction entirely. or an intensive infinity (the dynamic sublime). and here Deleuze is still following Kant. This unit is not given Ii priori. by‘ the sublinie]. a “discordant accord“ (ECC. The perceptual syntheses produced by apprehen sion and reproduction nevertheless remain to be recognized as an object.“ 1 This explosion is caused by either an extensive infinity (the math ematical sublime). rhythin dissolves into chaos when something exceeds mir subjective ahiliry ofcomprehension. both the ground of our experience. in the Third Critique Kant will discover anorher fhculty “saving“ us from chaos. the final synthesis ofrecognition produces a concept of the object or what Kant calls a synthetic judgment. is deterrnined by various tran scendental and apriori forms and processes. 33/47) philosophv of Kant.‘ “awakens“ the faculty of reason.e. and is in this sense con trasted to metrical dogmatism.“ Kant writes. First. hut that cannot be compre hended and coded hy the faculties. There Kant discovers that the syntheses of imagination in perception presuppose a unit of measure. Deleuze and Guattari will seek in Nature not the transcendental conditions of life. is itsclf a presenrarion of the suhjective Finalitv of the imagination in the interests ofthe mind‘s supersensihle province. lt is this sublime excess that modern cinema discovers in the breakdown of the sensory-motor. an “outstde to the human organism and its dogmatic judgements. without his sock garters) as wanting the same thing. hut is suhjectively determined OH a case by case basis and is.“ 8 As Kant writes: the feling ofthe unartainability of the idca hv mcans of die imagination [i. hut its genesis. we can understand this breakthrough proper to art oni hy indicating the ways it deviates from Kant‘s account. because perception presupposes an object form (object=x) as the necessary correlate of the cogito (“1 think“). but also its groundlessness. A rhythm is undeterrnined by a concept. as jr were. 321/187) be tween the faculties.“ ° Here then is the point at 5 which Deleuze and Guattari change directions. the subliine is die limit of our possible perception and understanding ofNature. or Reason. in overpowering imagination opens onto reason.

These forces are precisely what can— not be thought or sensed by our all too human common sense and rational representations. jr will be determining for the whole of German Romanticism. there is for Deleuze and Guattari. Thus. For Deleuze. or a dissolurion. will re quire a “superior empiricism“ (I)R. a death by which we may enter the mysteries of the spirit ofthe world. as it were. Art doesn‘t function to overwhelm our finitude in the infinity ofNature. 54 This Kantian iconography of Romanticism is inseparable from its affects of subjective desolation and dislocation. as for Kant. to the percepts and affects making up a sensation. as ii were. in the refrains of an artis tic life. and. The artist must venture into this catastrophe-chaos in order to bring something out of it. These “sublime“ forces. not least. the distincrive feature of the romantic Lie‘/ “to set out . and requires the inventions ofgreat art—inhuman percepts and affects (mutant sub jectivations) emerging from the difficult task of overcoming the human. the boundless ocean rising with rebellious force. its chaosmosis. they regard chaos as the genetic and immanent plane oflife (Nature). For Kant chaos marks the limits ofour humanity. like Kant. these arc not reified into a transcen dental plane determining our subjectivity. from which rhythmical refi-ains ernerge to construct existential spatio-temporal ter ri tories—subjectivations-—‘that express the 1 iving dynamism from which they were born. the trajec tory of the wayfarer. what both overpowers us and restores us to the divine. a process that will involve pain. deep ravines and torrents raging there. Third. This was. not “Nature“ hut t/yis Nature. This makes the romantic refrain disso nant and despairing. The best a romantic artist can achieve through this disjunction is a transcendence hv which ve can contem plate Nature from above. as it was for Kant and the romantics. They had all read it. Hamburger Kunsthalle. As a result. thundcrciouds piied tip to the vault ofheaven. Art in this sense is no longer romantic for Deleuze and Guattari. that of the stagemaker bird. for Deleuze and Guartari chaotic Nature is the genetic impulse of Life (chaosmosis). but projects us beyond them. hut modern. This means that although Deleuze and Guattari. Kant could be describing not only the iconography. The Romantics took this dissonance as their thematic.“ 52 For Deleuze and Guattari the intolerable is precisely what is already expressed in the natural rhythms of life. Romanric art. our plane of composition—our becoming—our inhuman life. as what composes those rhythms. a pure constructivism. an always deterritorialised soul (ATP 340/418—9). present. not does it seek to restore the infinite to us as supersensible and transcendentai Ideas. but unlike Kant this is not a source ofterror. thc high watcrfali ofsornc mighty river. hut whicli nevertheless are the genetic movements of our thoughts and sensations. but the clichd affects of generic Romantic scenes: “ Bold. the infinity of nature and its dynamic chaos that he or she can never comprehend except as disjunction. hut not as the unpresentable. it doesn‘t do so in the romantic sense of the sublime. Ofcourse reconnecting with these forces is not easy. voicanoes in all their vjolence of destruction. therefore. posit ‘Nature‘ as life‘s immanent field offorces. for Kant and for Deleuze and Guattari. 258/375). mutating our metrical concepts into the rhythms of an immanent and infinite inorganic life. but js a destruction that transforms tbe human. 143/186) adequate to their intolerable and inhuman experience. Deleuze argues. If. finds in the sublitne the expression of a personal longing [Sehnsuchtl for what is forever beyond the artist. adequate. a mournful cry expressing a subjectivity ofexile. Kant is the “hinge“ between Classicism and Romanticisrn. ihreatening rock. born along with flashes anti peals. as in Casper David Friedrich‘s Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (c. “something intoler ahle and unbearable“ in life. [ Ehe astonishmcnt am000ting almost to ter ror. cleep shadowed solitudes that invite tu brood— ing melancholy. when he vrites of the sublime. 1815. Nature‘s expressivity is. for I)eleuze and Guattari “the plane of Nature“ is not “a product ofthe imagination“ (ÄFP. Nature is chaos or chaosmosis. but form instead and in a Spi nozian manner. or refrains. and does not reveal our transcendental Ideas. Deleuze will argue. as we shall see. not as a “beyond. but ihe heginning ofour transcendental essence.“ on the sublime fbrmlessness paradoxically founding our accordance with Narure. and his idea that it introduces a sublime and intolerable element into sensihility they arc no romantics because they do not seek life‘s redemption in the sublime‘s “supersensible destination“ ofa “tran scendental origin. hurricanes leavilig desolation in their track. to construct something of it. because the Critique ofJudgmeut is “the great book which all the Roman tics will refer to. chaotic nature is not. that ofchildhirth. This means that if art creates the finite that restores the infinite.172 Art as Abstract Machine 1 Songs ofmolecules 173 as its genetic movements. they understand its affects in completely different ways. So al though Deleuze and Guattari take Kant‘s concept of “aesthetic comprehension“ as the rhythmical expression of Nature. Rather art seeks to ure ate the finite sensation through which the infinite is restored. Finally then this is what distinguishes Deleuze and Guattari from Kant. Hamburg). the awe and thrill ofdevoot feeling that takes hold ofone when gaz ing upon the prospect of mountams ascending tu heaven. overhanging.“ hut as the finite‘s immanent and genetic infinity. meditating end lessly on “the pull of the ground. as it is being expressed and constructed right here and right now. as Nietzsche said. lndeed. like Kant.

This attempt ro reconcile an infinite Nature with man‘s infinite spirit in a dialecti cal negation of human finitude. tor 1 am truly dead to thc world and repose in tranquil realnis. jr is what renders an art ‘“pure. and he set jr directly against “die dogmatism and intransigence of the ‘non-objective‘ or abstract‘ purists of painting today who support their posirions wirh metaphysical preten 1 Abstract paintirig therefore explored in a self—critical way its apriori sions. and a transformation of “Nature“ “niechanosphere“ (AT1 343/423). but expression through construcrion. in an immanent plane of composition (ATI 343/423). and the artist sings with longing of its impossible presence and sublime glory. and on the other the expression of “sensations.“ MODERNISM Modernism. Modernism will overcome die romantic groundless/ground dialecric. knowing that: “The signpost now only indicates the road ofno return“ (AT1 340/4 19). Greenberg thoughr. the molecularisation of matter. “disinreresred contem 63 This disembodied and disinreresred machine eye was capable of piation. and then the harnessing of cosmic forces. (Pollock crowned) was in fact a reflecrion ofits teleological rranscendence oJlife in discovering its own transcendent trurh. hut the Forces of an immanent. 1 live alone in my heavei i.“ Modernism isart‘s self—critical impulse. definition of rnodernism given bv Clement Gieenherg.“ and capable ofwhar Greenberg calied.‘ 55 In painting. Modernist painting finds its “essence“ by abandoning rep resentation fo r abstraction (Greenberg‘s farnous “flarness“). nonfornial. painting was sinking. this “self-purifi “ initiaily served to free jr from the theatrical representarions of 5 cation“ literature. 104/132). Painrings self—crirical “unclasping“ froin irs lirerary and kitsch rraditions is imagined by Greenberg as an immanent and dialecricai process that finds its teleological accomplishmenr (its “absolute opticaliry“) in “American-type“ ab 64 The teleological trajectory of Greenbergian Modernism in life stracrion. is an artan abstract Maehine—whose matrer-function no longer oheys a rornantic or classical form. and is enrlrely different from Deleuze and Guattari‘s proposal for restoring infinity rhrough art: “Modernism. From these melancholic depths.“ Deleuze into a and Guattari write. This modernist niachine needs to be disringuished from the canonical. is the age of the cosmic. it was capable. and as sume a chaosmos in which molecularised matter directly “harnesses“ and ex presses cosmic forces in a “continuurn“ [consistantj. for Greenberg. to an art capable of constructing the universe. As die sad voice in Mahler‘s Ruckert Lieder sings. and still Kanrian. and here die echo wirh Deleuze and Guattari is uncanny. Nothing has heen heard o mc or so long that thev may weil think inc dead. 1 have lost touch wih the world witere 1 once wastcd too much of my time. revealed the machine unaided by the mmd. and ofSpirit as it reconquers itseif in itself This conception was irnplied as the di— alectical development ofa totality which was still organic“ (Cl.“‘ material conditions.“ duction of marter-sensations. through art. 54/80). 56 The territory is swepr away in the chaos of Nature. In rhis wa>. but constructs a material expression adequate ro the c(ha)osmic forces it has released—no longer expression tbrough disjunction. like Jackson Pollock. and piaces us in the modernist machine.“ and in its “puriry“ finds die of its stan dards ofquality as weil as of its independence. Modernism. Greenberg thought. Neirher can 1 dcny it. is the Hegelian destiny of Romantic art. I)eleuze argues. seeking “a reconciliarion ofNature and Spirit. and energetic Cosmos“ (AT1 342—3/422 3). This im mediately remoyes US from a sublime and romantic Nature. ofSpirit as it is alienated in Nature.“ making a universal aesthetic judgment. in niy‘ song. and finds in the specificiry of each art‘s medium the apriori conditions of an objective and absolute aes thetic judgement. die irreducible elements of experi 62 Modernist abstract painting revealed its a priori essence in the pro ence. and despite bis “modern“ guarantee eye ‘as a . This. which painting bad been trying to imitate since the seventeenth century. of identifying “good“ art as that which exceeded its hisrorical and represenra tional tradition in giving a sensation ofits apriori trurb or essence. Greenberg conceived of 6 inasmuch as Modernisin is an elaboration Kant “as the first real Modernist“ in the realm ofart of Kant‘s critical philosophy. Greenberg argued that modernism is the “intensificarion“ ofwestern civilisa don‘s “self—critical tendencv. materialist. in my devotion.1 7 / Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofmolecules 175 from the territory at the ca 11 or wind of the earth“ (ECC. Deleuze and Guattari announce. following Kant. and subsequently from die equally pernicious state of kitsch. into which. “arc no lollger those of the earth. I)eleuze and Guattari argue. Modern ist abstraction was thus. Romanticism reveals its dialectical logic. on the one hand the painting‘s flarness and color. This implies a move heyond Rornanticism as a pure expressionism. The machinery of modernist art produces a molecularised material and captures and renders sensible its chaosmic forces. Once more this is a two-stage process: first. “The forces to be captured. which still constitutes a great expressive Form.

“hut dues so. “still less the artist“ (AT1 345/426). 67 This “mark ofdeath“ is nothing but the condition for the artist reaching the “sacred source“ (VI 172/163). For Deleuze and Guattari Modernism is neither chrouo. Cosmos. nur is its a priori essence revealed in a disinterested judgement. so that lt can [ 1 capture the inute and unthink— ahle forces of the Cosmos“ (AT1 343I423). tu discuss an operation that must be precise?“ (ATI 337/416).68 From relative deterritorialisations. make a cosmic people. and as Guattari. and in their place we must hecome the truly mod ern figure of “the cosmic artisan: a homernade atom 1)0mb‘ (AFP 345/426). The sensation is the modernist condinon ofart because art is created. Artist anti art—work become indiscernible in this cosmic matter—vision. a “passage“ from finite tu infinite . The crucial term here is “create. The “cosmic-artisan“—it begs Deleuze and Guattari‘s question: “vll)‘ so enor— mous a word. is not a representarion of the unrepresentable. in the hands ofthe modern artist. in answering. Art is. 168/265). perhaps. Indeed] it is difficult to say where in fact the material ends and sensation begins“ (‘1 166.“ Deleuze and Guattari‘s conception of Modernism is therefore clearly opposed to Greenberg‘s. 1 look out my window. Modern art therefore creates the finite which restores the infinite. life in its capitalized form. (WF 180/171) and back again.nor teleo-logically dc termined.“ in order to grasp die rnovernents ufchaosmosis. hut it is a return through which everything changes direction. not least life itself and puts on the artist the suhjective artist—“the quiet mark of death“ (WI 172/163). “in order tu grasp the trace ofcreation in the created. The modernist problem is therefore. here. jr is an actual expres sion ofthe constant consrruction of its virtual and chaosmic plane ofcomposi tion. “How can we convey how easy it is. Indeed.e.176 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofmolecules 177 vocabulary. then. The death of man will be the necessary condition for the emergence ofa sensation. becomings the artisan makes visible. Matter caprures. Art creates a finite work. hut in it a problernatic universe ofvirtual affects opens in which “1“ am dissolved on lines offlight.“ because it indicates how the relation of finite art works to the infinity of chaos(mosis) (Nature) is not premised on a destruction ofsubjective experience that restores a transcendental trutli. as Deleuze and Guatrari \vrite. there. The modernist artist cannot harness the cosmic forces ofchaosmosis without both molecularising the matter he or she works with. the most microscopic and the . hut vith the moleculaiisation of matter (its absolute de territorialisation) allowing the immanent forces of the chaosmos to be “har nessed“ in consistent and autopoletic blocs of sensation. a banal act. make it consistent. we arc back tu the beginning of the chap ter. a pure heing/becorning ofscnsations (WB 167/157). Once more. fijl lowing Klee unce more. locallv“ (ATF 346!427). a cosmic earth—that is the wish of the artisan—arrist. the forces ofan energetic cosmos. by cre ating a finite refrain which is forever restoring the processual infinity of its own becoming. the catastrophe rendered hy con fronting chaos (absolute deterritorialisation) is die necessary condition of any truc creation. But Modernism avoids rhe romantic reconstirution ofa transcendental expression ism (as the imagination‘s break down and redemption in a sublime beyond). and Guattari‘s definition of the affect. . frorn deterritorialisation. becoinings the artist puts into affects. Modern isni therefore.. In a sen sation molecular matter is constructed by. “how to consolidate the material.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. The artisan hegins simpl) bv looking around hirn or herself. of any sensation. must be overcome. attain the absolute! This means the romantic clichs of the child. the inorganic life of chaosmosis. a cosmic localir As Deleuze and Cuattari put ir: ‘From depopulation. when “the plane of the material ascends irresistibly and invades the plane ofcomposition ofthe sensations themselves to the point of being part ofthem or indiscernible from them. j All the material becomes expressive. but only as the actual expresslon of chaosmic emergence. Rather.167/1 57). The modernist aesthetic paradigrn assurnes a Nature of “material-forces“ (ATI 342/422) and begins frorn the romantic problem of the sublime: their expression. but also as a Hegelian dialectician on the path to “Absolute Sensation. Materialism and empiricism arc the two conditions of modern art‘s con— struction in and expression of this “molecular pantheistic Cosmos“ (ATfl 327/403). a chaosmic) material that lt is possible to create a block ofsensations. hut the creation of a sensation inseparable from its infinite plane of composition. the two aspects of Greenberg‘s accounr that would seem at first glance to intersect with Deleuze and Guattari‘s account. . as an inhuman subjectivation ofthe vital matter of the universe. As such the refrain creates itselfas jr unfolds. and die extent tu which we du it every da>‘?“ (ATF 1 59—60/198). This process doesn‘t begin with the purification ofart. whose firces emerge and arc expressed through the refrain that composes and expresses rhern. Greenberg remains Romantic. [.. of course. the mys tical modern artist exclaims: “No inore than to the cosmos do 1 recognise an)‘ limit tu myself“ (REA. and so expresses—“renders visible“ (as the painter Paul Klee pur it)—the immanent forces of inorganic life. not sin4)ly as a Kantian. his empiricism and his rnare rialisrn. Deleuze and Guattari assume a molecular and chaotic matter. (a catastrophic materialisrn extending to their own humanity) and becoming a “visionary“ ca pahle of giving a sensation ofthis process (their “superior ernpiricism“). evaporate into a prior—and indeed ii priori—optical-ideality Deleuze and Guattari‘s Modern isin is both more materialist and more empirical than Greenberg‘s.66 lt is only by means immanent to a molecularised (i. the lunatic. by composing finite sensations (refrains or subjectivations) that express (that ex press by constructing) matter—forces on a cosmic plane ofchaosmosis.

“One is then like grass. The wurk of art is a being ofsensanion and nothing else: it exisrs in irseif“ (WP 164/155). “the mutual embrace of life with sorne thing that threatens it“ (W1 171/161).“ like Walt Whitman. 3 171 / 161).“ “Walt Whitman. or by words. the “unciasping“ of vision and experience frorn our human sensibility. “No art and no sensation. For Deleuze and Guattari: “AJ72‘cts arcprecise/y these nonhu man becomings of man. Each artist does ir in their own way. Deleuze and Guattari‘s discussion of art hegins from a revalued physiobogy ofarr. uses precise techniques ro achieve in. that is to say. a universe“ (WI 177/168). An art work. Thjs is why rhe affect is inseparable fruin a percepr. In this sense rnodernism is a rnysticism. sounds. The percepr is wban Debeuze called in relation tu cinema a “hallucinarion“ ur “vision. on the canvas. and be come inhuman. Perceprion is a subjective stare induced by an ob ject. They could be said tu exisr in the absence of man hecause man. colors. because ins becom ing is only the expression ofits real condirions. Sensatiuns. Artists and their works arc “Leaves of Grass. and we shall see nexr chaprer how one.“‘ SENSATION How can we understand this mystical modernism in relation to actual art works. The sublime. because they do nur exist in reference to another thing. into a becoming“ (ATI 280/343). and ro the way art actually works? In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari give a variety ofanswers that all circle around the sensation. The affecr is nonhuman rhen. chaos. liave ever been represen tarional“(WP.. modern art begins as an art of destratification. one of rhe roughs. a cornpound of percepts and affects“ (WV 164/154). ufthe percepr or “nonhuman landscape“ in which jr emerges. Bccuming is the affecr ofpassage between. 193/1 82). How? As we have seen in our discussion ofGuattari. the affect is the becoming-orher of rhe assemblage. a kosmos. and represent a srratified state of affairs. the lightest touch can contain a new world of infinite movement. To create the finite that restores the infinite. the percept rhe empirical experience iinplied by this hccoming.. is himseif a cumpound of per ceprs and affecrs. “Who need be afraid ofthe 9 merge. Percepts and af fects arc first of all the absolute deterritorialisation ofour human perceptions and affections. art is rhe language ofsensations“ (WP 176/166). is “a bbc ofsensations.178 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 179 most cosmic. Deleuze and Guarrari wrire. something unhearable. inas much as the refrain isa sensation (Wl 184/175). the confrunration with chaos every artist must pass through in order tu compose something from the matter molecularised in rhis passage. and always remains to be created. norhing bot the question.“ Walt Whirman. everybody/everything.“ and in What Is Philosoph ‘? Deleuze and Guartari call jr a “creative fabulanion“ (WP. The condirions ofvjsion rherefure. This s why an arrwork must “stand up for itself“—because jr most find a way tu get ro its feer once jr has abandoned the support of rhe subject or objecr. Deleuze and Guatrari wrire. their ex planarion of this concept building on what we have already developed. because the Absolute ofchaosmosis is never given. . Sensarions. The monu menr [rhe art workj does not acrualizc the virtual event hut incurporates or emhodies it: it gives jr a body a life. nie painrer Francis Bacon. . Bot the artist does not discover the transcendental truth of life through this threat (like Kant). that “caresser of life wherever moving. and “sensory becoming is otherness caught in a matter ofexpressiun. or stolle. arc the heing and the becotning. one has made the world. and affections arc the subjective increases or decreases of power (“feel ings“) a perception induces. Perceptions and affections arc therefore suhjecrive responses tu objects.The sensation is the specific realm ofarts appearance: “Whether through words.‘° Perccpts and affects arc not found “in“ an artist or a viewer. as he is caught in srone. the expression ofthe former being inseparable from the construction ofthe lat ter. and the modernist artist is an atheist-mystic creating a local-absolute. but ernbraces the danger as the necessity of transforining life into something that is truly living. and an affecr is not an affec tion because jr is not the stare of a perceiving suhject. Deleuze and Guattari state. by which artists go beyond the perceptual and af fective states ofthe lived in order to see. is a scnsury becurning. Modernist art re stores a mystical Absolute. Once more. just as percepts [ 1 arc nonhuman /andrcapes of nature“(WI 169/160). And why Simply to inake a work (ATT 337/4 16). a cor poreal (re)composition expressing rhe cosmic plane of Narure in a Spinozian sense.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. As such. or as Deleuze and Guarrarj also like tu say. Percepts arc not perceptions of an objecr. the life of a people yet to come. a “narural“ differentiation of places or rhings. The affect. because jr exceeds the bounds ofrhe “living“ in being a sensation ufthe crearive movement of inorganic bife.71 An affect isa risc or fall of power within a machinic assembiage. nor arc they art works or the mean ings these works may contain. A sensation emerges in the detcrrirorialisation ofthe perceptual co-ordinates of the subject-objecr through a carastrophe. a cosmic infinity by constructing a finite local work. The affecr we could sav is a material change. ofa zone of indiscernibiliry irnmediarely preceding. the “percept“ and “affect“ ofa modern art. as we shall see. In having a sensation we pass ourside the subect and object. Perhaps no inore than a few strokes of the pen arc required. “arc beings whose validiry lies in rhemselves and exceeds any lived. arc nur given (conrra Kann) and jr is visiun—a perccpt—that consrrucrs nhe nun-human landscapes ofnarure.

Dalloway suggests. life and art becorne cocxtensivc in the acsthetic par adigm. here. that affect us. by way of aesthetic composition. who felt herselfeverywhere.“ she advises. The affect and percept can be seen as consistent with our previous dis cussions of art. and she tapped the hack of the seat. make us become“ (W1 1821172). a sclection thar involves necessary destruction. to un derstand the sensation we must uncierstand how they necessarily appear to gether. as a becoming which expresses the immanent chaosmos as our infinite plane of composirion. we become by contemplating it. to creatc a world. Composition is the real condition of sensation then.“ Deleuze and Cuattari write in a mystical formulation. but here Deleuze and Guattari coin a new term. “can rcach and pencrrate them in its enterprise of co-crc ation“ (WP. The percept is a perspective that constructs a world.“ as the ma chinic process specific to art. So that to know her. “we become with the world. chaosmic plane of forces. and only art. But ofcourse they inust be brought together. 171/162)72 landscape where “becornings unfold. and we become with this world—as the world giving birth to itseif. whcn art creates a sensation it is nothing lcss . She wavcd her hand. then bete. She was all thar. everyone/cvery thing. “an irreducible viewpoint which signifies at once the birth of the world and the original character of a world. and what is not composed is not a work ofart“ (WP. sorne man behind a counter—even trees.. even the places. or harns. 7 Art composes sensations as the expressive movements of all that is. the before and after. 173/169). and arts crcativc fabulation. whilc ceasing to be singular and precise actual individuated expressions. going up Shafteshury Avenue. the selfand other. and envelops a landscape or immaterial site quite distinct from die site where we have grasped it. as art creatcs thc world. not “hcre. But through this aesthetic composition we arc returned to an ontological plane inseparable from art. but this creation is inseparable from its expression in affects. its “odd affinities“ arc life‘s absolute dc territorialisation in art. these visions will be expressed in the art-work. The percept con srructs the virtual. here“. deadness. and “cubist“ (WP. and rather than originating in an individual. The plane ofcomposition. or rather. and art cmbodies it in scnsations. a release of new traits ofcontent for arts modern machine. 191/181). Eliminate cverything of our current and livcd percep tions in order to have avision. a vision of the infinity we arc: “Present at the dawn of the world“ (ATP. in order to “pur everything into it“ (WP 172/163 and also ATP 280/343). Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to. new artistic visions.. “We arc not in the world.“ 7 A percept is in this sense a perspec tive.“ 75 ‘1 he “superior viewpoint“ of the percept creates a world. “is not abstractly preconceived but consj-ructecl as the work progresses“ (W1 188/178 italics added). 280/343). The percept and affect form the two “pincers“ ofaesthetic composition: “The clinch of forces as percepts and becomings as affects. percept and affect arc “completely complementary“ (WP. but also forms a specific world absolutely difftrent from the others. Deleuze and Guattari write. wbere “everything in Nature is just composition“ (EPS.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. it is itself a “principle of individuation. agglomerates in the same transversal flash the subject and the object. and super fluity. The percept is a cosmicization offorces releasing new traits ofexpression. an affirmation. the material and incorporeal. If with Nietzsche the high point of the meditation is that being is becoming. “colnposition is the sole definition ofart. As Mrs. lt‘s a process of critique. 93/130 italics added). How then do we create a sensation. “the prin ciple ofcomposition itseif must be perceived. Composition is aesthetic. “expanded to infinity“ (WP 188/179). heaving. Living. while the affct simultaneously actualises this plane in a subjectiva don. Composition is the action of the percept and affcct. Only such an absolute deterritorialisa tion will enable us to walk into everything. “a block of percept and affect.“ as Deleuze writes in his book on Proust. cannot but be perceived at the same time as that which it composes or renders“ (ATI 281/345). it is the construc don of a sensation in which the infinity of the Chaosmos (percept) is imma nent to the finite material which expresses it (affcct). some woman in the street. “Lifc alone crc ates such zones where living bcings whirl around. 182/173). a material becoming. Guattari gives a good explanation. a rendering visible of “the imperceptible frces that populate the world. not as an abstract and transcendental condition of all sensation. “a kind ofsuperior vieupoint.“ 74 This viewpoint or percept is not suhjective. hut cverywhere. becoming. 237/2 16). “Visions“ arc percepts ofthe mobile. “aesthetic composition.“ As such. Everything is vision. As if. but as the condition of this sensa tion. or be comings. art takes on its modern Spinozian modaliry. how clo we become artists and com pose art works? 1)eleuze and Guattari take advice from Viiginia Woolf: “Saturate every atom./80 Art as Abstract Machine Songs ofMolecules 181 Once more. The percept gives the plane of consistency in which forces compose matter. is this proccss ofcrcation. We have seen the abstract machine fulfil this function. or any one. one musr seck out the people who completed them. but in themselves arc cosmicizations of force. the actual becoming expressing this plane. In sensation everything happens at once. We become universes“ (W 169/160). The afft‘ct emerges from a molecularisation of matter in a non human becoming.“ (Chaos. As Deleuze and Guattari write. that is inorganic life. 76 This is Mrs Dalloway‘s reality. eliminate all waste. as the real conditions of the affect.

182

Art as Abstract Machine

Songs ofivlolecules

183

than life, inorganic life, a subjcctivation. Such a creation, such a work ofart has im formal or material preconditions to its modernity; nothing is given, except what is created. “The artist,“ Deleuze and Guattari write, “must cre arc the syntactical or plastic merhods and materials necessary for such a great undertaking, wbich re-creates everywhere the primitive swamps oflife“ (WP, 173—4/169). Art‘s onrological status as creation, its ontological creationism, is pre cisely what makes it appear and exist only as a particular sensation. Art is al ways ihis sensation. This sensation makes it impossihle for US tO be lost in the rornantic and mystical mist of an ecstatic transcendence. Art cannot exist apart from its actual singularitv, its now—here, which is precisely what restores its infinite aml cosmic plane of composition, its no wbere. Erewhon, Samuel Butler discovered it, is the land of such great reversals. But Virginia olf has her own version, of course, Mrs. Dailoway-Shaftesbury Avenue Everybody/everything, all together in an immanent mysticism. Each particu lar and artistic creation, each work of art, or sensation, is therefore the creation ofcreation as such (how many times? just One, One eternally return ing). In crcating a finite that restores the infinite art embodies an ongoing arid infinite crcationism. Sensation is, as Guattari puts it, “a permanent ‘work in progress“ (REA, 167/264). This final, mystical evaporation ofa distinction between art and its cre ative chaosmic 1.ife, reinscribes art as a political force. Art first of all acts against art as it is traditionally understood, to open a realrn of aesthetic free dom, a realm where we regain the real, to gain the freedom to live. Art, in the sense of “fine arts,“ Deleuze and Guattari blundy state, “is a false concept, a solely nominal concept“ (AT1 300—1/369). Fine art isolated from life avoids and obscures the vital processes of its aesthetic paradigm, and this is its repres sive politics. Deleuze refuses such an art, writing in relation to Beckett: “We will not invent an enrity that would be Art, capable of making the [represen tative] image endure“ (ECC, 161 ).8 The absolute deterritorialisation of art as a nominal concept is inherently political, hecause it refuses the given; all the opinions, perceptions and affections which teil US who we arc and that pre vent us from creating—from truly living. In this sense, Deleuze argues, “there is a fundamental affinity herween the work ofart and the act 79 ofresistance.“ l‘his “resistance“ begins by rejecting nominal concepts of art, and proceeds through the radical isation of certain movements of deterritorialisation in ex pressing their absolute ontological conditions (as we saw with Venetian paint ing and Pollock in die last chapter). The absolute deterritorialisation achieved by art in the sensation is finally a process of permanent revolution in the name ofthe future, in the name oflife, in the name ofall things yet to come. When

art is creative its ontology is political, because “promoting a new aesthetic par adigm,“ Guattari writes, “involves overthrowing current forms ofart as much as those ofsocial life. 1 hold out mv hand to the future“ (Chaos, 134/185). This future unfolds in a Cosmic genetic experiment. the becom ing-an imal of the world. Art is a bio-aestbetics: “Not onlv does art not wait for human beings to begin,“ Deleuze and Guattari wrirc, but we niay ask if art ever appears among human beings, except under artificial and helated condi tions“ (AT1 320/394). Art is the becorning-animal of die world, it creates new forms of life outside our stratifications, our comfortable organicisnl, and opinionated thoughts. Art seethes in the “primitive swamps oflife“ currenrlv confined to the edges of our biological maps. hut appearing in sensations that overflow human perceptions and affecrions to take us somewhere else.
According to Deleuze and Guattari‘s map: lt is within (aur civilisation‘s telnpcrate surroundings that eqiiatorial or

glacial zones, which avoid thc differentiation of genus. sex, orders, and kingdorns, currcntly function and prosper. lt is a question onulv 01 our— selves, bete and now; hut what is animal, vegetable. mineral, or human in US tS now indistinct—even thongh we ourselves will espcciallv aequite distinction. The maximum of determination conues from this bbc of neighhourhood like a flash (WP 174/164 5).° This flash ofindividuation appears as a sign. a sign ofthings to come, our be— corning—animal, our sensations ofa promiseuous anti humid heterogenesis in which art and life arc indiscernible. The readymade returns—against Duchamp—in the song of a bird. Art is “haunted“ hy the animal, and art works arc “ritual monuments of an animal mass that celebrates qUalities be fore extracting new causalities and finalities from them. i‘his ernergence of pure sensory qualities is already art“ (VP, 184/174). Art works emerge as the intemperate politics ofa life which cannot be lived, but which lives in art and its mutational molecular matter ofsubjectivating sensation. Art and politics as an animal line offlight; mount the witcbes brooni for the tropics!

Chapter Six

The Agitations ofa Convulsive Life: Painting the Flesh

And 1 join my sliine, niy cxcrenent, ny nadness, ny ecstasy to the grear circuit which flows through the suhterranean vaults of the flesh. All this unbidden, unwanred, drunken vonnt will flow on endlessly rhrough the minds of those Co come in the inexhaustible vessel that contains the bis tory ofthe race. Side by side with the human race there tuns another race ofbeings, the inhuman ones. the race ofartists who, goaded bv unknown impulses, take the lifeless mass of humamty and hv the fever and ferment with which thcy inhue it turn this soggy dough into bread and thc brcad into wine and the wine into song. Out of the dcad compost and inert slag
they

breed

a song

that

contanunates.

—1—Ienry 1v! iller, Iropic ofCancer

INTRODUCTION

Deleuze develops a “logic ofsensation“ ehrough his encounter with ehe work offrancis Bacon, a logic that is horb explicitiy Bacon‘s, and stands as Deleuze‘s most developed staeemenr of his thinking about painting. I)eleuze‘s logic therefore, iS 011 the one hand a critical pracrice, ehe elaborarion of an onto aesthetic merhodology via a detailed discussion of Bacon and bis oeuvre, and on the other a broader discussion of ehe hisror‘ and function ofpainring in relation to irs crucial term, sensation. Of course, this double register of Deleuze‘s work on art, its at once “micro“ and “inacro“ Operation IS ehe very process we have been following throughoue this book, the process of “Art as abstract machine.“ Tbis machine is explored here rhrough what Deleuze calls Bacon‘s “diagram,“ ehe way he, and by extension any paineer, composes chaos mic forces and expresses ehem in sensarions.‘ Examining this process will therefore involve us direceiv in Bacon‘s work, as weil as allowing a final and full statemenr of art‘s ontological implications. To irnmediately give an example, one which will be occupving us at length here, Deleuze advances the rerm “flesh“ [thairl as both an enrirelv appropriate

186

Art as Abstract Machine

The Agitations ofa C‘onvulsive L/

1 0/

7 07

description o Bacon‘s Figures, flayed open or otlierwise disarranged like so much meat. and a philosophical concept for a new corporeality of experience achieved by painting a sensation. Furthermore, the figure of the “flesh“ is im ioitaiit for phenomenolog and we will spend some time clarifjing Deleuze‘s relationsh i p to this other norable philosophical engagement with pain ting. Bacon‘s diagram will also intersect with rnany of the themes we have already dis— cussed, including a ne‘ configuration ofan “Egyptian“ line and the “colourism“ of Qzanne and the post—impressionists. Also important arc Deleuze‘s explo— rations of the wider philosophical connotations of Bacon‘s diagram in terms of Alois Riegl‘s concept of “haptic“ space, and Goethe‘s theory of color. Through these various investigations we will see how the “logic ofsensation“ operates on an indiscernibly ontological and aesthetic surface, the surface of flesh, which once again will open onto an immanent, mystical and “spiritual dimension.“ ‘l‘he immanence of aesthetics and ontology in Deleuze, as we have re peatedly seen, is the necessary result of the ontological ground of his philo sophical system being becoming, tbe continual construction of new actual forms expressing their immanent and productive chaosmic dimension ofmat ter-force, But the cosmic genesis of art is 110 reason to abandon its careful analysis in favour of abstract metaphysical speculations. Just the opposite in fact, because it will only be through a detailed analysis of Bacon‘s paintings and statements that Deleuze will arrive at the chaosmic forces that animate them. The “logic of sensation“ Deleuze finds in Bacon‘s work is therefore sys tematic in hoth an abstract and particular sense, but it is first ofall articulated hy the artist and his paintings. Consequently, in understanding it we will have to overcorne a common problem: “We do not listen enough to what painters have to say“ (FB, 99/93). “We“ arc no doubt philosophers, who have of course, only rarely listened to artists, let alone seriously considered their work. In his book 011 Bacon Deleuze seeks to recrily this problem by giving Bacon‘s paintings as much philosophical weight as that given to any of the individual philosophers he has written about. Bacon‘s “logic ofsensation“ is for Deleuze, eniirely philosophical, and Bacon‘s paintings function as, and give risc to, thought. That a “logic ofsensation“ could he a form of thought is an assertion that rests on their shared genesis in an encounter of forces. “All hegins with sensibility“ (DR, 144/188) Deleuze writes, because a sensation ofontogenetic force can give risc to a painting or a concept, and 011 this level both share the same “logic.“ 2 We will come back to this point repeatedly, as it is crucial to my argument that a “logic of sensation“ not only describes a thinking painting, but is also a mode ofthought. 1)eleuze addresses the ontological, art historical and painterly aspects of Bacon‘s “logic ofsensation“ tlirough the concept of the “diagram,“ the abstract

machine that composes matter and force into a paineing. Wirh the diagrarn we arc immediately within the Deleuzian double dimension ofaesthetics, for the diagram creates a finite w‘ork thar simultaneouslv restores to it an infinite ontological dimension. This restoration will begin with a destruction, one in which, as I)eleuze clramatically puts it, “it is as if ehe two halves of the head were split open by an ocean“ (FB, 100/94).
THE DIAGRAM

\Ve begin our discussion of Bacon‘s painrings, appropriately, with a funda mental violence; a Splitting of the head through which we see “the emergence ofanother world“ (FB, 100/94). This other world can he oceanic as weIl as a “Sahara,“ (Jet ofWate 1979, private collection, Sanldune, 1981, Foundation Beyeler, Basel) having the ambiguous geography ofare‘s plane ofconsiseency, the infinite ernergence of its mateers-forces. Bacon‘s diagram hegins with a ca tastrophe by which chaos appears on the canvas, and proceeds by composing this chaos inCo a sensation. As Deleuze pues it: “The diagram is indeed a chaos, a catastrophe, but it is also a gcrm oforder or rhyehm“ (FB, 102/95). Bacon‘s diagram is eherefore “modern“ in ehe sense we developed last chapter, je molecularises matter and cosmicizes forces ehrough a caeastrophe, and ehen composes these mateers-forces into sensations. Nevertheless, Bacon‘s diagram is his own, and like all great artists he finds bis own wav to embrace chaos and assemhle a piceorial order from it. This suggests a “diagramrnaeic“ art hisrory in wbich we can trace differ ences and similarities between diagrams, rather than rehearse ehe biographies of the artists wbo provide their names. Deleuze is not ineeresred in writing a Lives ofthe Artists, although bis diagrammatic art hisrorv is just as precise as an‘ other. “Not only can we differentiate arnong diagrams,“ Deleuze writes, “but we can also date the diagram of ehe painter“ (FB, 102/95). Dating ehe diagram gives it a historical specificity that is potentially misleading. The di agram is neither a eranscendeneal determination ofa hiseorical event, nor is ir simply reducible to a historical evene. Rather ehe diagram operaees a fold he tween chaos and history by which the aceual gains a new power of expression coextensive wieh the new vireual plane of composition ehe diagram draws. Each diagram therefore confrones chaos, dives ineo je, hut only in order to cre ate “a new type of realiey.“ As a result, Deleuze and Guaeeari wriee, “je does not stand outside hiseory hut is instead always “prior to“ hiseory“ (A‘I‘P, 142/177). This “priority“ is ontological rather than temporal, and like ehe prioriey of sensation to thought, ehe diagram acts as hiseory‘s immanent condirion, hut does not exist apart frons ehe history that actualises ie. That‘s why it can be

and the new reality it creates.“ . for the history which has supposedly led up to lt. however recent they may be. and does not mention another—Ingres—at all. is “not syncbronic but het— erochronic“ (Chaos.“ drawing us into their process to both experience and parricipate in the ongoing chaosmosis immanent to a paintings actual historical appearance. Perhaps we could say that the diagram begins and ends in history. its mechanisms ofseif— creation. 8 Although line and color give the conditions shared by all paintings as such. into questions about painting‘s ontological machine. each one of its breaks reanimating the others. Obviously Deleuze is not the trst ro do this. two very important figures for Bacon. hoth its actual mat ter and the material processes that form jr. but somewhere in the middle it leaves it. and making them creative once more. and both move through a series of “stopping places“ that rhey compose into a new diagram.188 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa ConvuIsit‘e Lifi‘ 189 dated. 96/92). and the first is found iii Nietzsche‘s famous pronouncement that there is no creation without destruc tion. “that is not transhistorical and does not come up frorn behind or proceed by way of a liberated line“ (ATP. given that Deleuze barely mentions Picasso and Velzquez. which similarly “discovers“ (a discovery inseparable froni an invention) a materialist— vitalist tradition opposed to the representational and organ-isational image of thought. as I)eleuze and Guattari put it in What Is Philosophy?. 4O/62).“ ihe artistic diagram is therefore both “visionary“ in construct ing an artwork from chaos. is introducing a catastrophe onto the canvas that destroys the representational qualities of figuration. but arc also ontological. that is to say. painting diagrams—as abstract ma— chines—create sensations that put us “flush with the real. 6 lndeed. 122/11 5)) Furthermore. This is finally the meaning of the “hete rochronic“ diagram.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. even to shred. “The painter does not paint on an empty canvas. This heterochronic tradition is therefire fractal rather than historical. this is going ro require a new form ofvision. lt is in this sense that Bacon‘s dia gram recapitulates the hisrory of painting in his own way. hoth theoretically and in its quite specific “historical“ for mulations (FB. This should not be taken as a weakness of Deleuze‘s reading however. To begin. preestablished clichs that lt is first necessary to erase.“ hut nevertheless immanent ontological conditions. hut we saw three possibilities emerge in the last chapter with the Ciassical. The diagram creates a new reality out ofheterogeneous reali ties. and on the other.“ I)eleuze and Guattari wrire. to clean. Deleuze argues. one begin fing with the Egyptians and encompassing a rather dizzying trajectory through Byzantine. what Deleuze will here ca 11 a “haptic eve. and focuses on those diagrams Bacon recapitulates in construcring his own. ihe diagram isa way to understand art history as the emergence ofnew artistic realities according to “prior. “still designates only the set ofconditions. and in doing so recapirulates (perhaps we could say revitalizes) art history by constructing a new genealogy. In other words. so as to 1er in a breath ofaii fmom the chaos. this tradition is itselfcomposed ofcreative hreaks that hoth constiture jr and have created lt anew each time. The point is that both Deleuze and Bacon undertake an ontological “reinvention“ of bistory. On the one hand. the Romantic and the Modern. This is a significant reconfiguration of our understanding of art histor) focussing nil the ontological work ofpainting. This is necessary because. all diagranis share certain features. lt is to these abstract ontological and particular aesthetic processes of Bacon‘s diagram that we shall now rum. just as obviouslv painting employs very different compositional practices verv different diagrams. In doing so. This “creative“ art his tory obviously shares a method with Deleuze‘s history of philosophy. but as a symptom of its creative energy: “There is no act of creation. Venerian. and thereby creates a new realiry. . L)eleuze is more interested in Bacon‘s precise process ofpainting. and as part of an art historical reality that pre-exists and determines this emergence. 99/93). a new diagram is not simply the simultaneous appearance of various other art styles according to a new com bination. Deleuze transforms subjective questions of artistic in tention or influence. Deleuze‘s reading of Bacon‘s “recapitulation“ of history art is itseif a recapitulation. from wbich one turns away in order to become. each diagram determines a different set ofma terial and formal relations. and formal questions of technique or iconography. (W1 204/192). in order to cre ate somerhing new“ (WP. to flatten. and Deleuze mentions line and color for painting. rather than a historical revisionism. 296/363). Bacon‘s diagram creates a new reality for painting.“ Deleuze does not give an ex haustive account oftbese “wills“ here. in re lation to them. but also for the time that has been. As we have repeatedly seen. These diagrams are not simply “artistic“ however. An absrract machine‘s date. Guattari writes. that while jr composes its own tradition. Each art Form is derermined by these material conditions. The “preparatory work that belongs to painting fully“ (FB. not just for the time to corne. and he draws freely on Alois Riegl‘s concept of a “vilI to art“ [Kunstwollen] here. The “catastrophe“ cleans the painting of clich in the obious sense of removing . We will see this lilie in action more preciselv when we rum to Bacon“s use of the Egyptian contour. each diagram embodies a different “will to art. Deleuze places great importance on art‘s materialirv. sound for music. “History today. anti is expressed in a “vision“ (the haptic vision of the art work) that renders it visible. Gothic and abstract art. [hecause the] canvas is already so covered with preexisting. and moving light for the cinema.

London. and as the pictorial diagram. Bacon achieves this carastrophe by making random marks ([)eleuze calls these lines—tIaits). in order for other Forces to appear. dissecting die face verrically (Stua for a seifportrait. All this will he necessarv in order for a sen sation to render the diagram‘s plane ofcomposirion visible. “a frenetic zone in which the hand is no longer guided by the eye and is fbrced upon sight like another will. private collection. Is uhar an accidcnt-? Perhaps one could say jr‘s not an accident. © 2004 Estatc ofFrancis Bacorl / Arrists Ri‘br‘ Snci. lt trans forms itselfby the actual paint. because jr bc comes a selective process which part of this accident one chooses to prc serve. 1 forescc ir. using another Nietzschean figure. they arc Bacon‘s hand throwing the dice Deleuze writes. Po. or the involuntary“ (FB. because it is instead a catastrophe in which “form collapses“ (FB. hori zontally (Paintin 1946. These traits and patches produce. 137/129). Oiw is atternpting. which appears as chance. 14 1 / 176). die diagram “has rio form of its own“ (ATP. a throw thar eternally returns in the act of painting. or more commonly.‘rv (ARS New MrIc / flAC T mrlnn This is a wonderful description of the catastrophic aspect of Bacon‘s diagrarn. and wiping the canvas to Pm— duce “clearings“ on it (Deleuze calls these color-patches). our own dissolution. . hut in a niore dramatic sense it breaks with its representational function. This split is a catastrophe that deterritorialises the representational aspecrs of the face.orne. These traits and patches are destrarified lines and colors aceing as bodi die desrruction of rep resentational form and their clichs. of course. 1 usc very large brushes. 135/127). accident. Bacon‘s “insuhordinate color-patches and traits“ (FB. lt is worth listening to Bacon‘s own account to get a sense ofhis method: my casc all painring ] is accidcnt. as we shall go oH to see. die basic “sieve“ through which chaos can be composed. . and introduce the catastrophe inro the eye and its optical space. 1965. as a “mashing“ of the face occurring without an axis (Three stuc/iesfrr the portrait oflsabelRawthorne. Norwich).. Split heads arc uhiquitous in Bacon‘s work. As a result. MOMA. New York). which employs material and manual rather than menral or optical compositional . beginning. \‘iiu kHow in . Deleuze writes. So 1 forcsce ir in my mmcl.tmit ofisabel Rawt/. Tate Gallen. and yet 1 hardly cver carry it 0111 JS 1 foresec it. 1982. Figure 7 Francis Bacon.The Agitations oJ‘a ConuuIsive Life 191 predictable and received meanings. 1965. and in the way 1 work 1 don‘t in facr know very oftcn what die paint will do. New York). automatism. and it docs many rhings which arc very much bcrrer rhan 1 could niake it do. Let‘s return to the splitting of the head with which we began our account of the diagram to sec how this works. University of East Anglia. and yet preservc a conrinuiry. These “accidental“ movements of the hand introduce chaos into die process of creation. 156/146) arc purely manual (marks and wipes). to keep the vitaliry of rhc accidcnr.

. 123/1 15).“ In this way form and ground arc re-solidified and their rever sal controlled (FB. The contour thereby creates a shallow space in which neither optical nor manual functions dominate. relief. and if nothing ernerges from it.. hut it is a germ ofrhythm in relation to the new order of the painting“ (FB. but the purely optical effects it creates subordinate the hand. 100/94). but unite in a “haptic function“ of the eye that “discovers in itself a specific function of touch that is uniquely its own. How? Bacon‘s contour draws a “place“ in which exchanges occur berween the “material field“ ofcolor and what appears in tEe armature. 129/121) within wbich the eye cannot dis— tinguish forrns. Paint is rnolecularised in the accident. But Deleuze will not trace the development of Bacon‘s diagram in terrns of historical influence. The “accidental“ traits and patches of paint are pure matter-force dis located from both a represented object and an expressive subjectivity (Bacon is sirnply the manual component of bis diagram). We have repeatedly encountered this formula because on the ontological level all aes thetic expressions share the same problem. the sensations of Figures. This means the diagram “must remain operative and con trolled“ (FB. it “is a violent chaos in relation 10 the figurative givens. 56/57))0 Bacon‘s diagram escapes figuration in order to compose the rhythms ofchaos into new sensations. although ele ments of both appear in the fiat colored grounds and random gestural marks which arc the constant features of bis work. but deterritorialises the Egyptian line‘s fig urative. they arc the liber ation of“lines for the armature and colours fr modulation“ (FB. 134/126). con tour. In the Egyptian assemblage however. and which undergoes in Bacon‘s “Egyptian“ contour an ongoing series of “logical rever sals and [ . (we will examine both a little later) and arc the beginning ofa compositional process which will culminate in the “fact“ ofa sensation. 159/149). so that “a new Egypt rises up“ (FB. and micrometric. Bacon‘s contour characteristically marks an armature deniarcating a shallow space from a fiat colored ground. 135/127). .192 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa Convulsive Li/ 193 process. I)eleuze follows Riegl in defining Egyptian art according to the space ofbas-relief. 11 Even a perfunctory view of Bacon‘s paintings shows that he does not conform to either approach. THE FIGURE We have already encountered Deleuze‘s argument that in the “entire“ history of Western art the destruction of classical organic representation has taken one of either two paths. The canvas has become a space undecidably microscopic or cosmic. a vision that emerges between the optical and manual poles of painting. Here there is movement without rest. But despite this chaotic landscape. 128/120). This “third way“ breaks with the figuration of organic representation to produce a “Figure. The optical pole utilises manual techniques to create the appearance ofdepth.“ a production whose condition of possibility is the hete rochronic assemblage of Bacon‘s diagram.j substitutions“ (FB. composing the forces ofchaos into a sensation. a rhinoceros skin: such is the suddenly out-stretched diagrarn“ (FB. 110/103). 155/146). Bacon‘s reinvention of the “Egyptian assembiage“ exemplifies this “passage“ and such it is the first stopping point of bis diagram. giving a world of infinite smallness and infinite largeness. The diagram there fore has a dual operation. in order ftr the emergence of what Deleuze. calls “possibilities of fact“ (FB. explores a “third way“ which avoids botb these poles. according to the same proviso. Creation emerges from destruction—Chaosrnosis. in which form and ground appear on the same plane. something is going to happen: “The essential thing about the diagram is that it is made in order for sornething to ernerge from it. These two poles find their modern expression in geometrical abstraction and abstract expressionism. Deleuze and Guattari call this the eye‘s “cutaneous Vision“ (AT1 1 51 / 187). units were substituted for the figurative unit. etc. or rather because of it. so wbile the haptic space lt produces deterritorialises an organic repre sentational schema. Bacon. 127/119—20). witbin which the Figure appears. bis own recapitulation of the bis tory of painting. Deleuze argues. 102/95—6). At the other pole there is a free-action ofthe hand creating a “manual“ space that subordinates the eye. botb separated and united by a contour op erating as their common limit. He takes the haptic space ofbas-relief.“ 01 towards “a vi olent manualspace“ (UB. a “pure activ ity“ and “nonorganic vitality“ (FB. hecause a diagram is always com posed of active re-inventions. . breathing the air of chaos and infolding its infinite distances. it simultaneously reterritorialises die images onto a “for mal and linear presence that dominates the llux of existence and representation. A Sahara. quoting Bacon. Deleuze suggests. distinct from its optical function“ (FB. These “possibilities of fact“ arc the other side of l3acon‘s catastrophic marks and wipes. “no art is figurative“ (FB. 154/145). that towards “apurely opticalspace.2 Bacon‘s selective recapitulation of the Egyptian assembiage is “scrambled“ (FB. 124/116) because only partial. it fails“ (FB. Instead Deleuze isolates the basic “assernblages“ that act as Bacon“s “stopping points and passages“ (FB. In the first. the contour was used to isolate an essential form. 121/113). or even cosmic. essentializing and unitary functions. 101/95). “as ifthe units of measure were changed. the contour described hy a line (figuration) is submerged hy a “purely optical play of light and shadows“ in which the tactile elements arc “annulled“ and which produces the form “through an inner relationship that is specifically optical“ (FB.

hut an embodied defrmation. This produces a “violent comedy“ (FB. breaks with facialiry. 22/28). in order to flesh it out more precisely. 13 The contour deforms the human organisrn. those of contraction-dilation.k As Deleuze points out. Or rather. and in parricular die “uniry“ of sensing and sensed it implies. FB. begins with a spasm internal to the body “in which. Merleau-Ponry sees in Czanne‘s landscapes norhing less than the ontogenesis of die visible. gives and receives die sensation. very differently. Deleuze seems ro share not only the phenomenologists‘ vocabulary. die eveilt). Nevertheless. fiowing berween the poles of subject and object. C&anne‘s paintings arc a perception . Bacon‘s diagram of random marks and wiped zones wrecks die face. but only in order for some thing to emerge. 18/25). Bacon‘s diagram operates anorher defrirmation. Caracas).“ Deleuze writes. a common molecular mat ter traversed bv intense forces producing in die Figure an animal athleticisrn. produc ing a Figure in attempting to dissipate into die field.“ “temperanlent“—a whoie vocabulary common to both Naruralism and Czanne). But in fact Deleuze understands sensation. convulsive contractions and dilations into die field. hut also encompass die act of Vision.“ (FB. a deformation neces sary for die eyc to become capable ofthis “vision. but also their understanding of Czanne‘s sensations. 1970. 21128). ‘l‘his is. 15/23) ofconfinement in which die contour becomes an apparatus for die Figure‘s gymnastic leaps into die field of color (Tritych. In the first formula die field confines die body. The creation of a haptic space deforms the eye which sees it. and here he breaks with the Egyptian diagram to introduce new forces. “instiner. The second formula.‘ Deleuze direcrly acknowledges and engages with. jr has im faLe at all. it is both things indissolubly.194 Art as Abstract A!achine The Agitations ofit (‘onvulsive Lifi‘ 195 These exchanges occur according to two formulas of what Deleuze calls a “derisory athletics“ of the Figure (FB. which arc combined with other mat ters-forces to create a new Figure and a new sensation. and we must now disenrangle Deleuze‘s account from its phenomenological formulations.“ This is the reinarkable con sequence of Bacon‘s diagram. DELEUZE AND PHENOMENOLOGY Phenomenology is a rernarkable instance of philosoph>‘ taking painring seri 5 As such iris an important forerunner to Deleuze‘s work on Bacon. 14/22). sensation has one face turned towards the suhjcct (the nervous system. one in die other. one thronth die orher. for the phenomenologists. 1w reaching die unity of the sensing and the scnsed. National Gallery of Australia. As a spcctalor. 1 61/151). which in attempting to escape is projected into a Figure. nodiing less than a vision of the world as a sensation of “being-in-rhe-world. one ously. 12/21). This vocahulary oftbe “flesh“ as both seer and die seen immediately suggests the phenomenological project of Maurice Merleau-Ponry. Bacon‘s Figures arc not deformed in die same way as those of Egyptian art. The “fiesb“ of Bacon‘s pain tings emerges from this double—deformation. the vital noveinenr. 178/39) because he makes visible a pre-rational world of sensations in which suhject and object arc not clearly differentiated. 34—5/39—40) On the face ofit then.“ die place. Canberra). 1976. 1 76/31) animal traits. as the “common fact“ emerging be rween man and animal (FB. which is implied by the first. 16/24) (Figure standing at a washbasin.“ Deleuze seems bappy ro adopr this phe nomenological vocabulary. as the phenome nologists say: at one and die same rime 1 become in die SenSation and soinething happens rhrough die sensation. phenomenology regards Czanne as die painter par excellence (FB. Haptic space implies a new vision and a new visibility. In this way die contour establishes a series of necessary reversals hetween the field and the body (in this it is “Egyptian“) which “makes deformation a destiny“ (FB. The becoming-animal of die Figure is not a represented transformation. And at the limit. coextensive with die sensation. “the body at ternpts to escape from itself through one of its organs in order to rejoin the field or material structure“ (FB. and ‘hat crawls from die wreckage arc “completely anti illustrational“ (FB. This “sornetbing“ can be seen in Bacon‘s paintings of die face. it is the same bodv which being both suhjecr and object. and bis use of this vocabulary will take on a very different sense. ii is I3eing-in-the—\Vorld. In the first: “The material structure curls around die contour in order to imprison the Figure“ (FB. and onc ficc tnrned toward the ohjcct (die “facr. ir is an expression of die meat‘s escape frorn organic form mb the “cutaneous Vision“ of die painting‘s flesh. the ontological insight of Czanne.14 This common fact is what Deleuze calls their “flesh or meat“ (chairou viande. writing. The deformation of the Figure only becomes a sensation rhrough a deformation ofthe eye. its deformations and reinventions cannor be limited to the painting. “a haptic vision of die eye“(FB. liberating the eye from its role in the organism as die apex of optical space. 1 experience the sensation only hy entering die paiming. operating in the other direction. the flesh of the Figure inciudcs die seer and the seen. Bur Deleuze is not a phenomenologist. Museo dc Arte Contemporaneo. To understand this break we must understand a little ofMerleau-Pontv‘s philosoph>‘ ofpainting. while in die second the bodv‘s escape passes through itseif.

“ Merleau-Ponty writes. and it is this impossibility which reveals the inevitable chiasm between sensi bility and its sentience. The flesh is the condition of both seer and seen and as such is “die formative medium of the object and die suhject“ (VI. and the inside ofits outside“ (VI. These formulations carry all the Heideggerian implicarions ofMerleau Ponty‘s flesh. which “is in my body as a diagram ofthe life of the actual“ (EM. which in both accounts expresses an im manent.“ but this appearance requires both a sensibility which “sees“ and a sentience which recognises it. ex presses tue pllenomenological reality of the world. 142) the Sensible in general. “The painter. it expresses the “texture ofthe real“ as Merleau-Ponty calls it. except as a chiasmic reversibility which coheres in and folds the flesh. it is not an obst-ade between them. therefore. As Merleau-Ponty puts it. and ajlesh ofthings“ (Vi. The flesh is therefore die condition of possibility of the visible. Once again L)eleuze and Merleau-Ponty‘s projects seem to converge on the body. This is a crucial formulation. 126). hut is never fully present it selE The reversibulity of seer and seen in die flesh tberefore revolves around this central ungraspable cavity forever “niaking itself die outside of its inside.. once more anticiparing Deleuze‘s vocabulary while producing a very different meaning.“ that Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty‘s dif ferences become fully visi ble.“ he writes. 147—8).“ and irs relation to the “flesh. emerges from virtual and differential relations between ied things. 148) dasting an ideal light into the flesh as the invisible condition of its visibility. lt is this interminable pulse ofiden— tity and difference which constitutes the flesh and its “paradox ofexpression“ (VI. ilnplying a certain “redness“ which is in itselfinvisible but which is the condition for the appearance of red things. it is their means of communication“ (VI. hut a possibility. As . In this way die flesh is die “overlapping and fssion. hut then us hold on the world is interrupted.“ 7 Painting then. 148). a non-being“ (VI. a vision. die coincidenee edlipses at the moment of realization. we would find anew the tissue that lines thern. and “brings to birth a ray of natural light wbich illuminates all flesh and not just my own“ (Vi. 147). living. The “lived body“ Merleau-Ponty argues. The “flesh. a latency. but it depends on an ahstract hut nevertheless immanent principle that Merleau Ponty calls the “Sensible in general. 146). “recaprures and converts into visible objects [ 1 the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things. as Merleau Ponty writes. “My left hand is always on the verge of tonching my right hand teuching the things. a “fold“ (VI. which involves perception in the genetic emergence of die visible. between vision and its inisible ontogenesis. is “less a color or a thing. Red. 126 italics added). identity and difference“ (VI. The flesh. enconipasses subject and ohject in its vision of flesh. 142). the flesh appears in the vision ofa “lived body.“ of “an anonymous visibility. Sentience and sensibility never dome together. In our sensation ofa color. The point is that i cannot touch touch itseif.“ The “Sensible in general“ enahles. incarnates a “reversibility“ an “inter— twining“ or “chiasm“ between die visible and invisible world. is “folded“ around a “central cavity“ (VI. an armature of “lines of force and dimensions“ (VI. “the thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for the thing of its visibil ity as for die seer of his corporeity. the flesh of the world. 135). is illustrated by his famous example ofa band touching a hand which touches. and serve to distinguish it from Deleuze‘s. Nevertheless. What then is “Sentience“? Despite its priority it cannot be dlearly separated from sensibil— ity.“ for Merleau—Ponty.18 The flesh is therefore incarnated in a lived body. hut is the insepa rability of sentience and sensibility around which the flesh is folded and the body and the world “adhere to one another“ (VI. he argues. nourishes them and which for its part is not a thing. 148). meaning red. 149). a mornentary crystallization of colored being or of visibil ity Bet-ween the alleged colors and visibles. and one of two things always occurs: either my right hand really passes over to die rank oftouched. The flesh of things therefore appears in a “carnal adherence of die sentient to the sensed and of the sensed to the sentient“ (VI. Sentience in general domes “before“ (VI. than a difference between things and colors. invisible and visible being arc intertwined. its constituent element. he argues. 148). hut then I do not really touch it—my right hand touching“ (VI. A sensation emerges from this fold as an ungraspabic moment of re versibility between sentience and sensibility ‘Ibis moment of “hiatus“ (VI. 142). 142) ofa Sentience and a Sensible in gen eral. and genetic diagram. 144). for it im— plies that vision involves a process ofreflection by which it is able to “see“ . in which a virtual “redness“ becomes a “red“ thing in the “carnal formula‘ of the “lived body“ (EM. 142). 146).196 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa convulsive Lf 197 of die invisible genetic world in die visible and actual one. sustains them. Merleau-Ponty argues. 132—3). 142). in and as a lived body. 144). Merleau Ponty argues.. The flesh is therefore illuminated by a “Senrience“ which renders it sensible. Merleau-Ponty in die famous fiurth chapter of The Visible anti the Invisible describes this intertwining or chiasm in terms of die color red. and is the “ele ment. it is the medium in which things become visible. But it is in their concepts of this bodily “diagram. as Merleau-Ponry calls it. “hut 1 never reach co incidence. “the return ofthe visible upon itself“ (Vi. which is “not an ontological void. and together they form what Merleau-Ponty calls. In other words. For Merleau-Ponty the flesh is folded around an “interior armature which jr conceals and reveals“ (VI. or it retains its hold on the world.“ the “incarnate principle.“ or “vision in general“ (VI.

which animates thc “flcsh“ of Bacons Figures. an immanence which enahles painting to construct its ge netic conditions (the eternal return ofthe catastrophe). but this being-in-tbe-world is a presence-absence. a logic hy which thc dia graui hoth constructs these conditions while remaining enrirely immanent in thc sensation.“ its diagram transcends it and it is mcrely a “thermometer“ (WP. each time they arc ex prcsscd in sensations. a negativity that is not nothing. whercas Deleuze posits the complete immanence of the diagram and flesh. Flesh acts as a “screen“ (VI. “the experiences of the visible world are [ .“ and the “flesh“ re mains a subjective category. 1 the invisible ofthis world. “is perhaps insufficient hecause it merely in vokes the lived body. But this convulsion expresses forces ehat come fiom the field. lt is sensation then. “all consciousness is consciousness ofsomething. Deleuze argues.“ hut is nevertheless too “pious“ (‘VP. Painting expresses this “fission“ inasmuch as it reveals the “coming—to—itself of the visible“ (EM. This takes us back to Bacon‘s diagram and its “Egyptian“ contour. for Merleau-Ponty. 146). and firially they arc “the Being of this being“ (VI. constituting “consciousness“ which is transcendentally determined. and this virtual color “imposes my Vision UOfl mc as a continuation of its own savereign existence“ (VI. 141). Merleau-Ponty posits the ideas as immanent to the flesh. [. This is why phenomenological “flcsh“ is finally “too tender. and fails to experiende its real genetic conditions. a Being that casts its light on the flesh in which 1 am one witb what 1 sense. colored being is the actualisation of an idea (“red sence) ness“) in flesh. because it gives a sensation of the flesh‘s “duplicity of feeling“ (EM. Deleuze dlearly marks his break with phenomenology here: “The phenorne nological hypothesis. as a pure ideality that can never be actualised. Merleau-Ponty‘s flesh therefore incarnates a metaphysical ideal. 152).. they arc the invisibility the flesh embodies. in being a pure expressionism. The ideas arc what die sen tient-sensihle flesh forever circles. re-introduces a “proto-con sciousness“ to the “lived-body“ which is determined by the “a priori materi als“ which transcend the lived (WP. 60/89). but this does n‘t get us very far because. This produces a poctic “mixture of sensuality and religion. Deleuze and Guattari arguc that for this to be possible the flesh requires a “second element. 149). or more exactly become through the relation of field and Figure as they arc articulated in and by the coneour. for being present from within at the fission of Being only at the end of which do 1 dose up into myseif“ (EM. But the liVed body is still a paltry thing in comparison with a more profound and almost unlivable Power“ (FB. which constructs an armature. ‘Phe diagram creatcs the finite that restores thc infinite. returns us to a classical philosophy where the light ofspirit illuminates the darkness of matter (CI. Sentience. The house. Merleau-Ponty remains determined by Husserl‘s ftunous phenomenological formula. 151). 126). as the example of the touching hands showed. the invisible diagram of ideas. is not an idea incarnatcd in the flesh ofthe lived hody.“ but it remains in itseif sovereign. it is the means given mc for being absent from myself. 150) which simultaneously reveals and conceals these invisible ideas. through which . but remains determined by the transcendental on tological dimension it enfolds hut never reaches. A visibility of “a certain absence. hut is the vital force emerging from chaos to be experienced in a sensation. “Seeing. which remain invisible. As a result. This dooms phenomenology‘s account of the flesh to a countlcss retelling ofwhat I)eleuze and Guattari call “the mys tery ofthe incarnation“ (WJ 178/169). As Deleuze points out. Deleuze and Guattari argue.“ Ideas arc “trajectories of truth. is being-in-the-world. but in its pathic rather than haptic space it can only actualise a virtual idea it cannot touch or sec.“ a “house“ or “framework“ in which the flcsh can “bIos som“ (WE 179/169). As a result. the “lived hody“ can only ever express its conditions of possihle experience. and renders it visible“ (VI. 151). which. and creates a pathic space in which flesh “feels“ its paradoxical foundation/fission as the visibility of an in visible Being. 150). 178/169). Painting then. “is not a certain mode of thought or presence to seif. This “duplicity of feeling“ occurs in flesh according to its “strict ideality“ (VI. 179/169) or “developcr“ of this dia gram (WF 183/173).198 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa Convulsive Li/ ‚99 Merleau-Ponry writes.. phenomenology. constitutes the immanent conditions of “natural perception“ in the “lived body. a “house“ in which the flcsh of his Figures is convulsed. as Deleuze and Guattari put it: “They arc not sud cessive contents of the flow of immanence but acts of transcendence that traverse it. that which inhahits this world. 1 the ex ploration of an invisible and the disclosure of a world of ideas“ (VI. The eye is in the flesh. is a diagrammatic opening onto an ineense chaosmos. “retreat in the nicasure we approach“ (VI. 44/47). in Merleau-Ponty the eye becomes a hand. As a result. For Deleuze the genetic conditions offlesh exist according to a “logic ofsen sation“ different to that of the phenomenologists. 178/168) and remain its “meaning of meanings“ (WF 210/197). . Immanence is only ever expressed in an incarnation of its genetic ab 9 To return to color. and operates a passive synthesis.“ he writcs. in other words.This unliV ahle powcr oflife. . a chiasmic intertwining. a veiling/unveiling of an invisible Being in vision.“ for Merleau-Ponty. The dia grarn. Phenomenology remains Romantic then. 2 The natural perdeption of the lived body as sumes the common sense of a sentience-sensible in general. 131 italics added). in giVing this “natural light“ to vision.“ and as such constitute an “Urdoxa“ of “orrina1 opinions as proposit-ions“ (Wi 142/135).

lt is the di agram which consrructs the cosmos-chaos into a house. but construct a house rhrough which the flesh of the world becomes a world. 25 This implies.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. There he ar gues: “Every phenomena refers ro an inequality by which ir is condirioned“ (DR. for as Goethe purs it.“ irs differ enrial equarion. a “digital“ overcoding of a color‘s tone. “Art be gins. as we have seen. For “jr is through and in color.“ 27 The eye does not see color. in one ofCzanne‘s formulations often repeated by Deleuze. The phenomenological flesh is “too tender“ for such a construction and in order for the Sensation tO stand up on its own it needs the armature of a diagrarn. and expresses its forces in the convulsed flesh of the Figures which inhabit it. “when the eye sees a colour it is immediarely excited. “that the architecture will be found“ (WP. because ir replaces an oprical space defined by a perceiving eye/l and produced through the repre senrational code of light and dark values. gives the world be fore man but conipletely in man. 139/130). The modulation of pure color is rhe “properly haptic funcrion“ (FB. Czanne‘s diagram employs just this kind of colorism: “Planes in color. planes!“ Deleuze and Guattari quote Cizanne. resroring the infinite to sensation. for the painting exists at “The colored place where the heart of the planes is fused“ (‘WE 179—80/170). and this borh cm phasises his difference from pbenomenology. FB. Ctzanne‘s diagram composes chaos rhrough constructing colored planes. This mystical colorism encompasses rbe viewer as much as die painter. This is a Goethean theory of color in which we see “the aspirarion of each color to totality by appealing to its complimentary color“ (FB. and jr is its narure. by a specific sensation.“ Deleuze and Guattari wryly comment. ir consrructs the universe by color. the tendency ro universaliry. crearing and joining planes through the modulation ofcolor rarher than rhrough a modelling achieved by adding black and white. Consrructing value through the addition of black and white is. This inequality or difference is the colors “intensiry. expansion—conrrac— tion). Meaning that art begins with a diagrarn. each color being constituted by a hererogeneous series ofdif ferences. 24 Against this long tradition of painting Czanne recapitulates an “analog“ colorism. arc their use ofcolor.26 The differenrial composirion of color can be understood in terms of Deleuze‘s descriprion of the sensible in DzJ/i‘rence and Repetition. producing a landscape or an apple that. and the modulation of color will construct the architecture of its expression. “in so far as rhis is the reason of the sensible“ (DR. As Deleuze wrires. on one side the sections ofcolor making up the house (percepts). . ‘ A diagram that neither transcends the 2 chaos it constructs nor the flesh in which jr is expressed. 2 THE HAPTIC EYE AND THE MODULATION OF COLOR The two signs ofgenius in great painters. but assumes that color itself is nothing hut a variable differential relation “on which everyrhing else depends“ (FB. As ric Alliez has pur it.). 22 Czanne consrructs form through the modulation ofcolor. an “infinirely doubled difference which resonates ro infinity“ (DR. “not wirb flesh but with the house“ (WP. color neverthe less remains central to this debate. because a color is nothing hut a vi sion of all the differential relations which make up a cosmos. and constructs form by modulating the differential rela tions between “cold“ and “hor“ planes. wirh a ronal surface agitated by differ enrial color-forces (hor-cold. 139/130) involves replacing conrrasts of value v ith contrasts oftone. Bacon‘s paintings arc “agitations ofa convulsive life“ (LS. 222/287). and introduces another impor rant “stopping place“ for Bacon‘s diagram.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. 222/286). whicb builds a house from the chaos it unleashes. C&anne‘s colorism (and Deleuze suggests this is the for mula for any colorism. artracrion-repulsion. 192/182). but marks the imma of their planes in the painting. Deleuze and Guartari say. Color will be the material of sensation for Deleuze. a colorisrn that not only modulates the relations berween colors. yellow and blue (hot and cold). and the care with which they use it to join up planes to create the picrures depth (Wl 179/170). 222/287). composes chaos. and on the other the non-human be comings embodied in the intense movements of the Figures (affects). Czanne‘s paintings do not sirnply make visible an invisible cavity which determines and transcends thern. 133/124) of pain ting. “The difficult part. A single colour ex cites. and through which its forces arc expressed in flesh. 186/177). a don-negation etc. 139/l30). “if you push color ro irs pure inrernal relations (hot—cold. rhen you have everyrhing“ (FB. and assumes a light that tran scends ir. because ir gives the genetic conditions ofthe world as this world. painting forces is no longer a matter ofexpressing the flesh in color. Although rnomentarily on the edges ofour discussion. whose differential relations produce all the others.200 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa C‘onvulsive Lfi‘ 201 forces are composed into a “cornpound“ ofsensation. Every color appears as the differential equarion ofrwo colors which arc rhem selves differenrials. spontaneously and ofnecessity ar once ro produce another which with die Original colour comprehends the whole chrornaric scale. and by connecting rhein expresses these chaosmic forces ofthe world on the canvas. but ofconstruct ing the universe by color. Deleuze finds the conditions for this modularion of color in Goethe. “is not to join hands but to join planes“ (WP 179/170). who argued rhar there were two fundamental colors. as forces composed into sensation. Deleuze develops this architectural colorism in relation to the painrer (2zanne. in Bacon‘s case the con tour. 139/130). 82/101). for Deleuze.

as weil as the differential mixtures of complementary colors in ehe “broken tones“ that define the figures (FB. “1)ifferential calculus. As we have . through which the whole painting is pur into circulation. as Deleuze quotes Czanne. as Nature and in Nature.1/ictoire. runs the risk of “reconstituting a code“ (FB. Finally. Bacon finds the solution to ehe two problems Czanne‘s diagram posed. Ohjects 110 longer appear in optical space. This dose-vision marks our indisccrnibility frorn the painting in sensation. Tbis. Czanne‘s colorism modulates color following the order of the spectrurn. there is the difference between the differentials constituting the fiat fields and the broken tones. of some apples. he constructs with color sensations. constructed from colors that exist “within sight itseif“ (FB. while on die other to also pre serve the specificity or singulariry of a form in perpetual variation“ (FB. Arts Council collection. For Czanne. We rnight say that the painting diagrarn then. whereas Bacon‘s forces will deform the body. and implies a “haptic function of the eye“ (FB. Painting writes with the analogical language ofa differential colorisrn. and vision is coextensive with the construction of Nature by color-forces. Bacon‘s diagram will therefore set off from Gauguin‘s and Van Gogh‘s solutions. and “we find ourselves before fiows of color“ (FB. but never theless within a haptic eye. Deleuze writes. through the same process as that of Nature itself. Colorism then. and. contour and Figure. they introduce a further set of differentials to painting‘s dia gram.28 This poetic image of ascension is the process by which die stubborn geometry of the frame as the “possibility offacts“ become sensations. First. operating as an analogical synthesiser forever cre ating avision. The unique solution Bacon‘s diagram offers for the C&annean problem emerges. Figure and contour. sionists. 141/132—3).“ ir neither “reflects“ a pre—existing object. both painting md Nature emerge in the same way. they erect fiat fields of color that provide an armature within which specific forms can ap pear. and recapitulate them in his own way. whereas Bacon‘s paintings form a shallow space. The solutions to these problems arc found in Van Gogh and Gauguin. both ehe distribution ofeach element and the way these act on each oeher. a pictorial naturalism. nor its tran— scendental conditions of possibility hut is instead the necessary immanence of sensation and the differential relations it embodies. independent of the organism. or ofthe landscape ofProvence (AT 343/423). and in this sense Bacon is entirely C&annean. With Van Gogh am! Gauguin‘s modulation of the dif ferentiais of the fiat fields and the broken tones of ehe Figure. Bacon‘s paintings also differ from the post-impres xii-xiii). lt is even the form through which analogy becornes a language. “Painting.“ C&annc‘s diagram is analogical in this sense. 32 But Bacon also departs fiom Czanne.“ 1)eleuze argues. 140/131). it connects natural forces and planes of color. the automatism that at once and inseparably plunges into obscu rity and determines clarity“ (TF.“ Deleuze clairns. 149/141). become “facrs. 29 Rather than representing Nature then. the armarure. “merely claims to give this haptic sense back to sight“ (FB. The autonomism of vision i5 determined by the differenrial caiculus of Nature. “is the analogical art par excellence.“ This “fiame“ passes through the catastrophe to give risc to color light. Bacon‘s colors differ from Gauguin‘s inasmuch as his catastrophe frees them from the outline. Deleuze argues. Similarly. 141/132). Deleuze writes. “converge on color. 133/124). London). vision as being-in the world. is a way “the real materially writes“ (ATI 141/177).202 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa Convulsive 203 requiring our involvernent in a “closevision“ (FB. they arc the necessary and analogical sensa tions which render visible the infinite and obscure (and not “invisible“ in the phenomenological sense) forces of Nature‘s becoming. in color“ (FB. Czanne constructs a “strong depth“ (FB. 133/125). when its three distinct elements. “the earth to risc towards the sun“ (FB. and in this way. Color cre ates a haptic space where color is within the eye. or uniey ofground as though it were a per pendicular armature for chromatic progression. the “very fine differences ofsaturation“ in the bright tones of the field. 144—5/137). they pass through a catastrophe in order for their “geologic lines“ to appear as a “stubborn geometry“ or “frame. Czanne‘s modulated colors do not represent Nature.“ where the modulation of colors “takes On a completely new meaning and function. constructing sensations of Montagne Samt. “art is a har rnony parallel iv nature. Indeed. “how. Czan ne‘s diagram constructs a sensation of Nature (Natura naturata) as Nature expressing itself (Natura naturans) )° As Czanne said. Bacon will depart from Van Gogh‘s homogeneous surface of brushstrokes in the articulation of his three basic elements of armature. This con vergence means that modulation composes ehe uniey of the painting. is the visionary part ofpainting. to preserve the homogeneity. even if he specifically addresses Van Gogh during his “malerisch“ phase (Study frr Portrait of Van Gogh IV 1957. Q. 117/1 10). 33 Clearlyhowever. Vision is automatic because it is not outside what it “sees. As a result they produce a different deformation by unleashing different forces. or finds its own lan guage: by passing through a diagram“ (FB. Second. distinct from Czannean modula tion“ (FB. Similarly. “is the psychic mechanism of perception. 90/119). as this is expressed in a sensation. 133/125).4zanne does n‘t represent Nature. 11 l/105). 119/112) where bis planes join. C&ianne dc forms the landscape and the still life to deterritorialise perspe(tive. hut arc “in“ the eye. Bacon‘s diagram therefore changes direction from that of Czanne to arrive at this new postimpressionist “stopping point. as does the fixed size of Czanne‘s “patches. on the hand.“ which tends to homogenize the forms they ereate. 140/132).

is where the sensation emerges. Bacon‘s portraits). At this point. . 142/133). Aesthetics is never a quesrion ofrepresentation.‘ ‘Virginity of the world. The brain is on one side “an absolute consisrent form thar surveys ‚ . is a haptic thought. in other words. I)eleuze writes. consrructing its differential rela tions into analogical expressions. and in doing so gives the “place“ for the Figure to arise in its “broken tones. as we have seen widi the example ofcolor. This consrructs a “color contour“ that articulates the Figures relation to the field. Gauguin‘s and Bacon‘s diagrams (and. We become universes“ (WP. ““Colorism. Deleuze writes. Sensation. but in its “very fine differences of saturation“ (FB. and poly-mono chroine. through die visions of an eye we do not have. becoming. hut that the sensation it is constructs the world. the feld of color approaches a dif‘ferential infinity not through differ of value. but we will do so only by constructiaig an eye capable ofseeing it. 58/58). hut neverthe less according to their own disrinct differential economies. 192/1 25). This produces the “flow“ ofcolor in Bacon‘s paintings. The painter‘s haptic cc and its modulation ofcolor in sensation arc ab stract in the sense we have already seen. 209/197). The painter‘s “haptic vision“ is of and in color. once more disringuishing themselves from phenomenol— ogy. 3 Deleuze wrires: “Universal variation. existing as the simulta— neous construction of the world by the eye. How can one make invisible forces visi ble?“ (FB. This will be where seer and seen come together for Deleuze. By switching our attention at this point from their differences to their shared “ontological creationistn“ we can understand in more detail how creation is always the function of colorism in painting. Deleuze and Guattari argue.204 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitatioizs ofa Convulsive Li/‘ 205 seen. “we become with the world.g. all express the inorganic life of the world hy composing it into ana logical sensations. Modulation. and Bacon‘s answer. but ofinvention. universal interaction (modulation) is what Czanne had already called die world before man. a linIe late r.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. and sets them apart f‘rom Czanne and the post—impressionists. ix). 150/141 2). we could add. And this problem is not confined to the artist or to his or her work. broken-complete tone. where color reriders visible the exercise of a force on a zone of the body or head (FB. 169/1 60). “seems to us to he irreduciblv haptic“ (FB.“ and Bacon‘s diagram creates a new colorism. ‘dawn of ourselves. The modulation ofcolor construcrs a coloring sensation in which the eye both has and is this sensation. between these and the Venetian‘s and Pollock‘s). but only insofar as they touch with their eyes“ (FB. lt is in this color-flow that “color-structure gives way to color-f2n‘ce. Bacon‘s diagram is therefore composed of its three “basic“ elements working in reciprocal presupposition. Nevertheless. Deleuze writes: “One might say that paintels paint with their eyes. expressing its infinite differential conditions only by constructing them anew in its haptic vision. we become by‘ conremplating it. each sensation. Vision is not “pure“ in any optical or ideal sense. and acts as “a colored pressure that ensures the Figure‘s balance.‘ lt is not surprising that we have to construct it since ii is given only to the cye we do not have“ (Cl. how to create something new. “trajectories constituted svithin a field of forces“ this “Vision“ operating as “a surve‘ of the entire feld‘ (WP. and this baptic vision means tlmat die eye is not just in the world. painring has an immediate access to this new world through irs ability to construct a sensation. 81/1 17). has “nothing to do wjth resemblance“ (C2. 152/143). ‘T‘ogether these arc visions as “colouring sen— sations. and ofthe eve hy the world. a qustion ofhow to escape formula and clich. emerges from the fields ofcolor. it is the ontological problem of how to re-create die world. and all create new diagrams for doing so through their re spective use of color. neither the resemblance of an image to its object (e. a haptic-eye whose visions construct matter at die same time as perceiving it. COSMIC RECAPITULATION Despite these differences between Czanne‘s. The conrour. The brain. This perpetual variation is expressed through three differential relations. “one of the most marvellous responses in the history of painting to the question. Everything is vision.“ and to express a perpetual varia tion ofcontraction/dilation in relation to the field. In the brain each sensation involves. they argue. we must construct this ontogenetic world in color. nor the self identical subject (the painter) such a resemblance implies (modulation works through die di agram). hut purely material and entirely in things. because in them die immanent and ontogenetic universe is rendered visible. broken flat field. 27/41 —2). We will turn to this question. all ofwhich con verge in the modulation ofcolor. and makes one regime of color pass into another“ (FB. We can under stand these ecstatic lines better by returning to mv suggestion at the hegin— ning of the chapter that sensation was painting‘s way of thinking. In other words. 35 l‘his rather odd statement can be ex plained in terms of Deleuze and Guattari‘s account of the brain. This making visible of defiguration will be the “primary function“ [la fonction primordiale] of the Figure. Van Gogh‘s.“We arc not in die world. The birth of die world before man . and is. in the “pure Vision“ ofa non-human eye.“ Deleuze writes. the haptic eye whose sensations both construct and express the inorganic vitaliry of the world.‘ ‘iridescent chaos. lt is “pure“ in the sense of having im outside. 155/146). Coloring sensations arc therefore the “sumniit“ of a logic of sensation (FB. we could say.

“ (FB. 160/1 50). therefore. “at the limit. “X/e have. and expressing it in a sensation. 213/201) of color. not so much to sense the forces the painting expresses (lt is not a thermometer). up to this point. its convulsions. There is no inside and outside. sensing and sen sation. 160/150). as the “single continuous flow. examined the visions of the hody—brain antI its haptic eye. an expression of its immanent differential universe achieved in the percepts (vi sions) and affects (becomings) it constructs. Once more. The hody is a result. Sensation bowever. “and the relations between colors that form this haptic world and haptic sense“ (FB. the world as spatiurn.“ a “seif“ extending to the Cosmos inasmuch as it is inhabited by an infinity ofdifferential rela tions as “so many inseparable variations“ (WB 210/198). the spatializing energy ofcolor“ (FB. and the importance of this passage justifes irs repe tition. The passage to the haptic eye. no Being and being. gives and receives the sensation. by reaching the unity of the sensing and the sensed“ (FB. The coloring sensation is a haptic thought in which our brain‘s nervous system (the body— brain. because the brain as a nervous system is immersed in matter. “is the great moment of the act ofpamnting. an affectual flesh enfolding the seer and the seen. / / hen you will have made hirn a hody without 7 organs. 157/147). sensibility is contemplation. On the other side lt is an actual sensation. and now we must enter their flesh to better experience its physical becomings. ‘X hat emerges in Bacon‘s paintings then. Contemplation therefore. its vibration ofvibrations. but a set of ‘ornplctely diffrrcnt relations“ (FB. As a spectator. How? Bacon‘s paintings. This. and he appears once more in Deleuze‘s discussion of Bacon‘s flesh. For Artaud the organs are organised into an organisrn by God‘s judgement. PAINTINGS HYSTERICAL FLESH. will be painting‘s great moment. This “contemplation“ is the irreducibly sensual movement ofthought. as we have seen. “neither an inside not an outside. as a visual sense of toucb. for as Artaud famouslv pronounces. as Deleuze and Guattari put it: “Sensation itselfvibrates because it contracts vibrations“ (WP. constructed in the con templative vision s and compulsive affects of the eye-brain. 35/39—40). which gathers together all the elements of the painting (including us) in an image that “no longer represents anytbing but its own movements“ (FB. or BwO) constructs a new differential universe (a “vision“ or percept) in a “contemplation“ that is expressed in an affect. only the mutual infolding and unfolding of an eye—brain in matter. / then voii will have delivered hirn from all his autornatic reactions . 160/1 50) hecause lt is the culmination of the logic of sensation in the expression/construction of “the fact itseif“ (FB. “Colouring sensations“ are therefore the ana logical expressions of the continuous variation of matter-force “within sight itseif“ (FB. 7 nor representation.206 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa C‘onvulsive Li/2‘ 207 itscf independently ofany supplementary dimensions. finally. that articulates an expression ofmatter-forces with the construction ofa haptic eye necessarv for its real ex perience. but only a continuous creation ofspace. 1 experience the sensation only by entering the painting.“ 39 This opprcssed organism is the reason fir Artaud‘s feo cious attack on God. its continuous move ment. being both subject antI object. (FB. implies a new sensibilit a new physiology in Nietzsche‘s terrns. lt is sensation therefore. Coloring sensation is the ongoing birth ofthe world.“ as Deleuze writes of Michelangelo. but as die condition of possihilit of lt being a sensation at all. and as such. employ a colotism inseparable from sensa tion. and a color is a direct action upon lt. “there is nothing more useless than an organ. as the becoming of being. 138/129).“ Deleuze writes. 134/126))8 l3acon‘s “Figures“ now expand to embody a vital flesh (a body-brain) in which seer and seen and painting and viewer become indiscernible.“ The “contemplation“ of the ere-brain isa dose and cutaneous Vision folding the flesh. is not narration. re turns the plane to itselfas something new. This takes us beyond the too “tender“ phenomenological flesh. of this becoming. as Czanne said: “Color is theplace where aur brain and the universejoin up. the eye and the world. one with its flesh. and into thar of the Body withour Organs. it is the same ody whicb. A sensation therefore. is irreducibly haptic: “lt is color. This haptic eye. differential relations whose cosmic and particular vibrations compose the ab solute locality of this Figure. and as such are the structure of our servitude and ofour suffer ing. to appropriate Milton‘s wonderful phrase. As Deleuze writes. The “ftict“ is sensation as being—in—the— wor1d. the move— ment ofa nervous thought constructing the universe. the contraction of all these vibrating variations (dif ferentials) into an expression or “contemplation“ (‘WP. The col oring sensation of one of Bacon‘s paintings is just such a contemplation. of “the tyranny of heaven. which in being inseparable from the construction of the universe it expresses. 133/125). must be in the painting. does not take place in a dimension apart from a chaosrnic matter-force. The coloring sensation is this at once cosmic and quite particular becoming. its coloring sensations. 211/199). its eternal and i nfinite movements of construction. whose flesh is strong enough to express its immanent becoming. THE BODYWITHOUT ORGANS Antonin Artaud lias been a frequently visited “stopping place for our recapit ulation of Deleuze. as Deleuze puts it.“ 6 This is a Deleuzian “eye-brain“ as opposed to a phenomenological “Eye and Mmd. 52/53) The aesthetics of painting is in this sense both a materialisrn and an empiricism.

“is what rernains when you take everything away“ (ATP 151/1 88). and die BwO borh gives and receives the sensation (FB. 34/39). and the BwO. the atheistic divinity creared by the paintings‘ catastrophic disjunction. arc the “facts“ which emerge in and as a haptic sensation/eye. and on the other it is die Figure which produces sensations within us. the BwO is the destruction oforganic representation: “Norhing here is repre sentative. is “die sensible form related to sen sation. Arraud ar— gues.“ and is deprived of this organisation of the organs through which one judges and is judged“ (ECC. because we hasre created sornething new.“ before or beyond God. 13/19). 130—1/164). consrrucring an infnire virrual body as the immanent condition ofirs particularity. when it attracts to itseif the entire process ofproduction and serves as its miraculate. jr is all life and lived experi— ence“ (AO. Bacon‘s diagram opens the body to forces that defbrin it. emerges frorn the “pressing urgency of a need“ to abolish the “idea“ of God and replace it with the “explosive necessity. means dismantling the organic body. These convulsions.“ or “asserrion“ ofthe body. To be done with judgment then.“ Artaud‘s organs arc a battle ground. The BwO is a dis-organisation that takes us to “the limit of the lived body“ (FB.208 Art as Abstract Machine ‘e Agitations ofa onvulsive Li/i‘ 209 and restored hirn to his true freedorn. tbe spirit is the body itselF‘ the hody without organs (FB. “This is ss‘hat 1 mean by Flesh. on the onc hand forces con vulse the Figure. 35/39—40). as Deleuze adds in his discussion of cincrna. or better its “contemplation. and as Deleuze wrires.“ Artaud writes. 46/48) and God‘s transcendental judgement. “1 do not separate my rhougbt frorn my lif. 19/26).“ Deleuze and Guattari wrire. We have seen how Bacon‘s diagrarn constructs Figures convulsed by forces. wbich is of rhe flesh“ (FB. “whoever savs flesh also says sensibility“ ‘ and. but also one of spiritualizing its dust“ (TF. jr acts irnrncdiately upon the nervous system. enchanted surface. “von arc forever attaining it“ (ATP 150/186). “rarher. the BwO is more a trajectory than a thing. “opposed less to the organs than to the organization ofthe organs we call the organism“ (FB. whether in painting or elsewhere. Deleuze writes: “The task of perception entails pul verising the world. Deleuze writes. its chaosmic vibrations and the sensations which express jr. which produce breaks and disjunctions in its normal organic functioning. “neuro—physiological vibrations. first by raking everything away in the catastrophe.“ The life offlcsh. express these unrhinkable forces in sensarions. and second by producing the “colouI-ing sensations“ in the flesh ofhis Figures.“ Deleuze writes. We can only understand this double dimension of die Figure througb rhe BwO. This is also the fight waged by Bacon‘s diagrarn. The BwO. Sensation exprcsses die action ofa force on a BwO. thev write. which encompasses painring and viewcr in its flesh. 4 1/45). 44/47). This sensation is therefore a spasm or it. The BwO is.“ Artaud writcs. the site ofa cosmic combat over the body‘s construction rights—over its “spiritual“ dimension as Deleuze calls it—between the immanent ontogenetic firces of“a powerful and nonorganic life“ (FB. now expanding (or contract ing) beyond the paititing‘s surface and as far as the cosmos in a truly mystical “fact. This gives risc to a strange double dimension in Bacon‘s paintings. the ecstasies of chaos itseif. For Artaud then.“ “There is a mmd in the flesh. hut this be comes a sensation only in the flesh that encompasses it. rhe convulsions ofa living BwO. 1 hought. inscrib ing it in each and every one of its clisjunctions“ (AO. A force traverses the painted Figure. and the sensations which arise when forces meet die flesh arc. and free a new kind of mystical perception. The Figure is a BwO. as Artaud puts it. quite the contrary. Bin this spirituality is a spirituality of the body. something previously un thought or unsensed. their breakthrough into the living immanence—the construction/expression—of the flesh. T think—con vulsed with life—does not mean for Artaud “1 am. This sensation is a contemplation. and which is “experienced as susraining this sensation“ (FB. A baroque vision where. because on rhe Bw() horb arc analogical vi— brarions ernerging from the dirccr action of forccs. hecause “you can‘t reach Deleuze and Guattari say. ‘ 1 ‘Ihis is the body as a “physical system.“ a “nervous matter. and as such “surveys“ irs spiritual dimension in irs act ofappcarance. a corporeal crusade which. What is painred is a body a living Bw() that emerges in a haptic eye. 1 he body “escapes judgement. The Figure in this sense. 87/116). 46—7/49). “all the more inasmuch as it is not an “organisrn. vhoever says sensation also says thoughr. 8/14). The flesh of the living BwO will be inseparable from its perception. “attests to a high spiritua/ity. Deleuze and Guatrari write: “The body without organs is not God. since what leads it to seek the elementary forces beyond the organic is a spiritual will. as Deleuze stresses. with as Artaud puts it: “These unformulated forces which be siege mc. lt is the living matter of the BwO wliich is constructed by Bacon‘s diagram. or in having a sensation.“ And in thinking this unthought force. LJnsurprisingly then. in the haptic eye ca pable of such a vision.“ “ . What remains is living matter. But the energy that sweeps through it is divine.“ ° The body witbout organs. “is the hodv without an image“ (AO. exists in a flesh thar einbodies life‘s confrontation with the unthought. Indeed. 44/47). it is the point at which the rhythmical ontological conditions of chaosrnosis arc expressed as they construcr sensations.“ hut that rhe BwO becornes. we truly live. The BwO is the limit of the lived inasmuch as it is the poine of emergence of the Iived. In this way Bacon reveals the immanent spiritual dimension of die BwO.

for each sensation has its own organ or hapric eye. hysteria becomes art“ (FB. arising froin “the action ofinvisibleforces on the body“ (FB. because jr bas no orher level than that on which forces become visible. its haptic eyes adequate ro these sensations. 52/53). the lines and colors they liberate in sensations. in its rhythrnical Hesh the chaosmos destroys me. a “theatre ofmetamorphosis“ (DR. hursting the body‘s organic co-ordinates. This requires Bacon‘s diagram. Organs.210 Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations o/‘a (‘onvulsive Li/i‘ 21] vibration of the flesb at once in the painting and in the specrator. both arc a thearre thar “is in reality the genesis 46 A thearre oflife.“ “Sensation is vibration“ (FB. or figural whole). In a sensation. see also ATP. Painring. Hysteria enjoys a special relation with painring because. and what emerges from it according to the series of thresholds and levels ir leaves behind as “possibilities of fact. 5 1/53). hut also for the violent movemenrs by which one organ seems to move inro anorher (rhe eye-mourh. As such. 44/47). 1967. Painring gives Us . but they are not visible accept in their affects. arc defined by “a presence acring direcrl on the nervous system“ (FB. in modularing color. 42—3/46) The ßwO emhodies rhythm. and in ancl through it 1 become with the world. Brera Museum. hut it brings somerhing back. But rhere seems to be an immediare problem. 44—5/47). 48/50). sensation gives an analogical expression of the BwOs inrense movements. 41/45). This accounts not just for the appearance oforgans in Bacon‘s work. in a vision and its affecr. 47/49. hecause its thresholds arc continually coming into con tact with new forces. This “wave“ is at once the catastrophe. and once more. Bacon‘s diagram is just such a plunge. Deleuze wrires. hut nonetheless organs arc popping our everywhere. as we saw last chapter. The BwO is the rnechanism of rhe Deleuzian definition of absrracrion: “malcing rhe invisible forces visible in themselves“ (W1 182/172 italics added). The BwO how ever. the “fact irseif“). and like hapric eyes. aren‘r Bacon‘s paintings full oforgans? Escaping their eviscerared bodies. is the onrogenetic power of life itseif. 5 1—2/53). not represented hut real (FB. By doing so. These organs appear exactly at rhe point where the wave flowing through the RwO crosses a threshold or changes gradienr and encounrers ex rernal forces (FB. rhar is experienced as this sensation. for its vibrations arc not visible signsfrr an invisible level. new sensations or “facts. As a result. does not mean the absence oforgans.“ a thearre of the inorganic and vital life ofchaosmosis. Painting is the privileged medium for hysrerical art hecause “color is a direcr action on the nervous System“ (FB. in Bacon‘s accidents. ofcreation. and is whar both construcrs the BwO and is expressed in the sensation. In the sensarions of the BwO Bacon‘s diagrani meers Arraud‘s theatre ofcruelty (FB. vibrares wirh forces. 52/53). inro a becoming taking place on the level of its conditions. “which is essentially rhythm. Milan). at that point “where rhythm itseif plunges into chaos“ (lB. gives risc to the organ as a sensation. This “hysterical“ presence.“ Deleuze writes. So what are these “invisihle forces“ expressed in the Figures “affective athieticism‘? They are not the invisible as such.“ (FB. the other ro make something cir culate on it or pass across it“ (ATP. and rhe sensation irseif (what happens. in this sense. or nose-ear ofFour studies/r a setfportrait. which would be the ma terialist definition of Bacon‘s paintings. thev are the “obscure“ forces. as they synrhesize the vibrations ofthe universe into an analogical sensation. 240/3 10).“ or. the eye becomes virtually the polyvalent indeterminare organ thar sees rhe body witbout organs (rhe Figure) as pure preselice. 1 become-universe. 152/188). In rhis sense the BwO is the great analogical machine. “the temporary andprovisionalpresence of dererminare organs“ (FB. which I)otb constructs sensations‘ genetic conditions (through the ca— tastrophe of the BwO) and allows something tu emerge from them (the figure. As Deleuze and Guattari expiain ir: “One phase is for the fabricarion of the BwO. of chaosmos. to express them in a colored sensation. 45/47).. that “profound and almost unlivable Power“ (FB. The BwO is fabricated by the ontogenetic rhyrhm of inorganic life. hut uni)‘ as the universe creating itseif (FB. 42/46). The BwO is drawn by a wave that “traces levels or thresholds in the body ac cording to the variarions of its amplitude“ (FB.“ We have already encounrered the BwO then. as 1)eleuze calls ir. “Rhythm“ (FB. The BwO is rhe immanent genetic condirion for each ofirs organ sensations. it expresses this urilivable power in rhe convulsion of the Figure. The BwO is both pro duced and producer. “Paint the sensation. Painring is hysterical be cause jr is the atrempr tu release “presences“ which lie beneath represenrarion. 72/71). 45/48). but each sensation expresses these invisible condirions by con srructing a new organ adequare ro irs particular vision. or undergoing fhcial spasms perhaps. there is a full reciprociry and simulraneiry of arrs dou ble dimension. 57/57). 45/47) Deleuze writes. The BwO is therefore both the genetic condition for sensation (irs “fibricarion“ or construction through the catastrophe as the “pos— sibility of fact“). How? The diagram‘s dual operation ofconstruction and expression forms the rwo phases ofthe BwO. 153/189). as Deleuze finally puts it.. convulsions “in direct contact with a vital power. makes them visible in themselves through its construction of provi sional and remporary organs. and con— structs mc anew as a BwO. Deleuze explains the BwO of Bacon‘s diagram precisely and in detail. a convul sion or sensation. When a sensation expresses a BwO jr raises irseif ro its own conditions (FB. But these accidents arc inseparable from the rhythms rhey release. 1)eleuze wrires: “With painting. and is in fact defined hy. which provoke new vibrations. Rhythm.. as Deleuze puts it.

but a rendering indiseernible (in this sense I)eleuze calls jr “passive“) in which a single “faet“ eommon to the rwo figures emerges. jr is rhyrhm that becomes Figures“ (FB. And eaeh is produced by the other: the pure presence of the hody beeornes visihle at the same time tliat the eye beeoines the desnned organ of this pres ence. As we have already seen. Deleuze makes an “empiri cal list“ ofthe forees Bacon “derects anti eaptures [. and by wbieh the BwO beeomes—visihle. objeenvely. for there the Figures and eouples remain separared and arc connected by something other than resonance. ] like a detecrive“ (FB. (FB. 63/62). and through it. 1 be coupling of energies does not depend on two figures however. 68/67) (Jhree Stutlies of‘Figures on Beds. he argues. lt exists wherevcr there is a “resonanee“ of firees as the condition ofsensation. This new rhyrhm is what Deleuze will call the “rhythm-attendant“ {rythme tmoin]. Through this foree ofisolation deforming forees emerge in the spasms gripping the body or head of the Figure. a single Figure which ex presses the foree of eoupling itself. This means the triptychs have a different “common faet. eoupling does not explain the triprych.212 Art as Abstract Machine eyes all over. 73/7 1 italies added). To discover how this hap pens 1)eleuze asks a simple quesrion: “What is a Triptych?“ The only possihIe response to this question. which ceases to be organic in order to beeome a poly— valent and transitory Organ... ii invents die eye. more eomplex deformations and dissipations become visible when Figures un dergo a eoupling within the painting and rhythm is liberated into the diverse levels of different sensations. 01 l nes and eolours freed rom organic representation. 74/73). Baeon eaptures forces ofisolation by wrap ping the field around the eontour to produee the Figure. 52/54) In hysteria the eye as undetermined (inorganic) organ is immanent to the sen sation jr has and is. Switzerland). private collecnon. “it is the rhythm itsefthat beeomes sensation.. 1972. Switzerland). Coupling is not a merge of two Figures. [ . and can be dis emhodied. it brings before us die realiry of a hodv. Nevertheless. and forees of dissipation beeome visible wben the Figure eseapes inro the field.“ and a different type of rhythm that is ahle to produce it. But other. THE COMPLEXITY OF BACON‘S DIAGRAM Rerurning to the speeifieity of Baeon‘s diagram. emerges from their very precise “empirieal study“(FB.lThis is the double definition ofpainting: subjeetively. 1 00 Z . private collection. its “eombat of energies“ (FB. In these simple “aetive“ sensations rhythm appears in the Figure as a physieal vibration (the vomiting and defecating Figures in Triptych May-June 1973.

77—9/76—7) For our purposes what is important about these differential oppositions is not so much their precise operations. depending mi the value one considers“ (FB. and the active fall. the naked and the clothed.j The fall is precisely the active rhythm“ (FB. which Deleuze lists in relation to their empiri cal appearances in the triptychs. sufficient to expiain how its differential relations in their inherent variability appear as such. 76/74—5). “can coexist.“ active. The BwO: “Proa‘uction ofthe real as the intensive magnitude starting at zero“ (AT 1 53/189—90 italics added). they arc a part of this irrational logic. as weil as an addi tional rhythm given in the “attendent-function“ L. 83/79). the differential relations our perspective ernbod ies. The active and passive rhythms arc visible in various differential distri butions of force (resonances). an active and passive rhythm related to the actions and couplings ofthe Figures. for doesn‘t it simpiy reiterate whar we have known from the beginning? Doesn‘t it simply repeat the catastrophe of Bacon‘s diagrarn and the resonance of forces that ernerge from it to create a sensation? Despite its complexity the “law“ of the triptychs seems to return us to this fundamen tal Operation of the diagram that was in place from the beginning. of the logic of ontogenetic emergence as = .“ as Deleuze and Guattari put it. diastolic—systolic. I)eleuze writes: “The fall is what is most alive in the sensation. which appears in itself. Thus the “figural-attendant“ is an “attendant wirness“ [t6moin suivant]. 75/73 4). 83/80). beause it is—as a 13w0 continually coming mb contact with new forces.“ no longer a figurative element of the paint ing but a “figural-attendant“ [telmoinflgural] or “rhythm-attendant“ [rythme t!moin] (FB. 153/189). a precise empirical list of the differential forces of a triptych constructs a “perspective“ of (we could say it “witnesses“) tbe “combinatorial freedom“ of the painting. The empirical taxonomy of the triptychs‘ forces therefore leads us back to a point. it is constantly being recomposed in new visions or per spectives. These “explicit“ attendants can be found throughout the triptychs. the wirness rhythm=0. the combinatorial freedom ofa Bacon painting is in principle in finite. with new eyes. and rnerely reiterates the ontology of sensation that we by now know by heart.. This “real“ emerges. or this logic ofsensation. or at least to each of its perspectives. that through which the sensa tion is experienced as living. the double dimension in which Bacon‘s paintings exist as and rhrough their sensations. Indeed. and is the rhythm which emerges as specific to each triptych. as producer and produced. August. 1972. To explain this we must look to the condition ofthe perspective—the witness-function—and understand more precisely how it works. 80/77). Furthermore. that constitutes painting“ (FB. Deleuze seems to confirm this. and augrnentation-dirninution. This takes us back to the argument of chapter one regarding I)eleuze‘s conception of Nietzschean critique: “Everything. a combinatorial freedom which means. but Deleuze quickly discards them as being too “superficial.214‘ Art as Abstract Machine The Agitations ofa C‘onuulsive Li/‘ 215 The triptychs arc composed ofthe three rhyrhms. But equally the BwO is dc fined by what happens on it. a kind of ground-zero. The figural-attendant is defined by “its horizontaliry its almost constant level“ (FB. its specific sensation. in which “The active is thefall“ (FB. This means the empirical analysis ofa triptych‘s differenrial forces op erates through the “witness-function“ to construct a perspective. or “constant value“ by which the other two rbythrns can be evaluated (Triptych. even before Bacon. Deleuze‘s argument calls on Kant at this point. 80/78). but the fact that these always appear in relation to the attendant function acting as the paintings rhythmical condition.. (FB. such that rhythrn “has itseifbecome a character“ (FB. the “matrix of intensity. a perspec tive-rhythm which simultaneously gives the painting its specific empiriLal form. “no list can ever be complete“ (FB. Tbis perspectival reality of the triptych however. passive and witness. But the “highpoint of the meditation“ seerns at this point a linie hollow. and constructs the BwO this form expresses. 79—80/77). descending-rising. and the Opposition can vary or even be reversed depending on the viewpoint one adopts. which L)eleuze descrihes in detail. 82/79). This means that when forces appear as sensations they embody a change in state that is understood in relation to the intensity=0 of the witness-function as a fall (“everything that develops is a fall“ FB. the law of the triptychs involves all of die rhythms so far delin eated. What he is interested in is the way these witnesses transform into a “more profound attendant. 82/79). The BwO is. In other words. [. is not. 75/74). Finally. 81/78). We recall that the BwO was what appeared when everything was taken away.“ Deleuze writes. This gives a seemingly paradoxical formula to Bacon‘s diagram.fbnction t‘rnoin1 that ob serves these couplings. according to Deleuze. London). in the primacy he gives to descent. the triptychs arc cornposed directly by rhythm. “intensity 0“ (ATP. according to the specific character of Bacon‘s diagrarn. In other words. which emerge only in relation to this ground zero. writing: “These laws have nothing to do with a conscious formula that would simply need to be applied. the three “rhythm figures. Tate Gallery. This means the law of the triptych “can only be a movement ofmovements. or a state of complex forces“ (FB. who defined the prin ciple of intensity as an instantaneously apprehended magnitude appearing only in relation to negation=0 (FB. The differential forces ofa sensation arc experi enced in Bacon‘s paintings as a fall. and arc entirely hysterical. Ifintensity is defined in this way then the differential relations of forces appear as sensations through their re lation to the witness-rhythm 0. that is. As a result.“ too figurative. the becoming-visible of the other rhythms.

this body. these sen sations simultaneously construct a perspective in whicb sornerhing happens. as a real sensation. 8 1/78). from the viewpoint both oftheir nature and their relations.—as an ontological unity wbich the variety of BwOs would all in their way express.216 Art as Abstract Machine 7 ‘ 1 e Agitations ofa (‚onvu/sive Lfi‘ 217 such. or as an . the One—All ofSubstance. was badly posed. Our question then. Bacon‘s diagram and all the orher con structions of the BwO do not come together in a single unity. Bacon‘s diagrarn shares a certain abstract machinic consistency wirb other painting diagrams. as if they were op posed terms. One more time.. ° This leads to the question as to exactly what in Deleuze‘s account of the triptychs is specific to Bacon‘s diagram. all the BwOs constructed as its expressions? (ATP. But everything falls differenrly. in tbe expression of an always mobile constructive difference. duration. these BwOs construct this substance differently in their expressions. the abstract or the specific. lfdifference is the ontological ground ofDeleuze‘s system. This paradoxical coniluence is not hy chance. bur arc constructed in bis diagram. What I)eleuze writes of the laws of Bacon‘s triptychs could therefore equally apply ro Deleuze‘s ontologi cal structure as a whole. with no loss ofspecificity: “The constants thev implv change depending on the case at hand. This is clearly seen in the work done by Deleuze‘s concept ofthe fall. or a state of complex forces. Finally then. lt seems as if all of Deleuze‘s painstaking empirical work has finally evaporated into an ontological structure which was in place frorn the start. Deleuze argues: “Most artists [ ] seem to have encountered the same re sponse. 1 54/191). that is. As a result. inasmuch as move ment is always derived from the forces exerted upon the body“ (EB. in the inorganic life of Bacon‘s Pigures. more or less visibly. 85/81 1 of the Bss‘O. as “a fusional multiplicity that effectively goes be yond any opposition hetween the one and the multitude“ (ATP. arguing that it is not in fact a ques tion of the Otw or the multiple. except. This prob lem is critical inasnsuch as Deleuze will finally claim that all Bacon‘s paintings operate according to the triptychs‘ logic. because hecoming is the immanence of singularity and unity in life. and that empirical appearances arc entirely determined by a higber spiritual. The ontological ground zero of I)eleuze‘s sys tem. a necessity by which painting begins with the con struction of a BwO. but how is it constructed bv this diagram. hut of Deleuze and uattaris ontolog— ical system. Each fall is different because the fall is sirnply the activity of difference itself. etc. This means that although all the BwOs form an “ontological uniry ofsub stance“ (ATP. Deleuze and Guattari turn this question on its head. and what is simply the application ofa more generalised account ofthe BwO. as Deleuze and Guattari say. that is. in their own way and according to their own laws. as it is in fact the necessary result of Deleuze‘s ontological assumprions. the ground zero these BwOs share is not an ontological Substance prior to their activity. composed like triptychs“ (FB. already in place? 1 f this is true tue logic of sensation Deleuze finds in Bacon‘s paintings would be on OHC side an elegant and precise analysis ofone painter‘s work. 85/81). in this perspective. because it is not a matter of understanding the ground zero of the BwO—chaos. There they ask whether there is a BwO of all BwOs. Could it be possible that [)eleuze‘s painstaking “empirical“ analysis of the triptychs discovered nothing that wasn‘t. expression of anything hut itself THE BwO is therefore indistinguishable from the infinity of BwOs which constitute it. is a fusional rnultiplicity that only exists as Being orld. The point is not what “is“ the BwO. and on the other already entirely explained by the most ahstract formulations of Deleuze‘s onto-aesthetics. even the isolated paintings arc. as whar they would simply express. or at least conceptual. 83/80). and can only exist in its consirnetion. a higher One in which all its attributes (presumably including Bacon‘s diagram) can be comprehended. in sensations which construct and express our living flesh. They govern extremely variable terms. is there a single ontological entity (THE BwO) which would finally comprehend and encompass all its instances. then it does not appear in relation to. Deleuze and Guattari suggest a rather elegant riposte to this problem in A Thousancl Plateaus. in and as the sensations of Bacon‘s painting. to the immanence of aesthetics and ontology which has been our topic throughout. and as t/lis sensation? This is finallv the frac tal logic not just of Bacon‘s paintings. the difference in intensity is experienced as a fall“ (FB. for example. Bacon‘s paint ings express the affects of forces on a BwO (as ground 0) in sensations. 154/191). this sensation. perhaps in the form ofa “secret“ Frst principle. we can say that it is precse1y at its most ahstract dimension that Deleuze‘s account of Bacon‘s paintings attains its greatest specificity The moment the BwO as ground 0 emerges in Bacon‘s paintings in terms no longer their own is also the moment Deleuze bas produced the most empirical construc tion of their expressive forces. The ontological conditions of Bacon‘s paintings do not pre-exist them. for “there arc nothing but triptychs in l3acon. differenciation means infinity at every level. its “spiritual dimension“ exists. 7 in—the—‘( . This means. in which the BwO lives. There arc so many rnovements in Bacon‘s paintings that the law of the triptychs can only be a movement of movements. 154/190—1). and on the other appears as a concept necessarily con nected to the degree 0 of intensit) and already widely used in the conceptual definition of the BwO. which on one side is described as the specific mechanism of Bacon‘s triptychs. this painting. a likely enough claim. but the real conditiori for the construction of this Substance. This leads to other common principles.. reality they simply express. and which their activiry expresses. difrence. The “monochromatic eternir‘“ (FB.

in nocturnal smog. because tue infinity it restores to sensation is nothing but its own living process: a life. to succeed in a becoming-universe? lt requires a mystical art capahle of consrructing and expressing a universe in a sensation. die adobe air. Deleuze and Guattari‘s world as much as Pynchon‘s. finds a way through the cracks. grinning like chimps. Art is the construction of a living world ofsensation. And the hreak also composes chaos. . ‘ then. a machine that finds in the cracks a means of escape and discovery.“ Deleuze writes. a world of creative breaks through which chaos spills. ‘in‘Iand. it creates by breaking. ahove die heads of TV watchers. How to break with the human. “points a wav through for life. But bow to break and how to compose? These arc the questions of art. down the eorri— dors ofthe surface streets. mbytes at maus leuing out. its organic thought? How to brealc through these limitations on life in oider to extend our composirions as far as the infinite. “Any work of art. the broken world. all too human.“ 2 Art is a guidance device. the smell of disrant fireworks. the broken world. lovers iander tue overpasses. Art . Because “Art as abstract machine“ hoth breaks and cre ates. soon wrapped. a world that never stops becoming something else. and a Belief. speeding like bulleis. deserters. Fireworks. canopied bcncath the paim trees. a Becoming.Conclusion A Break. its self-ohsessed egoisrn. THE BROKEN WORlD The spilled. 1 homa Pvnclu n. lt‘s a disjunctive conjunction. flirters. with its clichs. a world from and in t/Yis sensation as a sensation of this world. This has been a constant refrain for us: no creation . brtght gas Station oases in pure fluoreseent spill. an eternally remrning ‘and Chaos spills into life—chaosrnosis. is as atheist as lt is mystic. . never stops emerging as somerhing new. the spilled. never stops breaking and composing. wilnps and piiflps.

“ a radical break with a transcendenr God. The abstract machine flees material forces (traits of content) to coni pose new signs (traits of expression). This is the direct image of time in “modern“ post—war cinema. how can we understand what is beyond man and yet entirely within man. 195/252). the vital process hy which the will to power is expressed. the break be tween the sensory-motor and a duration it givcs an indircct image of.‘ Deleuze writes. and rhe different cine-brains they irnply. is the ver Force constructing God‘s pantheistic becoming. an epistemology of the /‘ere and now that leaves behind man‘s sad imaginations to actively pursue a joy adequate to an infinitely cre ative God as Nature. constructing a work that expresses the world. a corporeality of paint. not only producing images that express their ontological conditions. This affirination pro duces a new image. This is the first condi— tion of art. heyond an>‘ pre-given conditions of possibility. a ne‘. Art as affirmation gives a real experience of its real conditions. implies a new type ofperception as much as a new srvle. and overcomes his negation of living will to power. anti the preconditions on perception rhey im pose. And the break between these breaks. Anti it means. images as ptire optical and sound situations. This affirmation produces a new image of art and artist. beyond the Kantian double definition ofaestbetics. opening tip a Future that is unknown. or rather a series of breaks. and breaking through a subjecrive oprics. who push jr in their own directions. again. This is a hreak wirh horb rbe artist as intentional agent ofcreation. a hreak thar at its limit appears as the suhlime. and vitb rhe art work as pure expiession. a vision ofGod!Nature in which 1 see how 1 am (iod. Painring also appeared according to this logic. We saw this in the Nietzschean artist-philosopher and his or her art of cririque. In doing so art emerges as a compositional process creating new realities. and expressing in a work the unending construction of the universe. Second hreak: the simulacra. the same problem: How can we break rhrough man‘s inade quate understanding o the world? lt means. Spinoza‘s art of beatitude emerges as this “atheist rnysticisrn. the eine brain of a “neuro-physiological auromaron. a perceprion ca pable of breaking down a subject‘s distance from the canvas. to consrruct a smoorh and hapric space ofsensa tion. the ontological break herween the move ment-image and the rime-image. how can we understand the infinity ofGod as we construct and express it in Nature. Affects no longer understood according to the subjects that have them and the ohjects that cause them. Modernitv emerges here as an art form exper imenring on irs own immanent anti real condirions. as an onto—aesrbetic definition of art and not simply a formal one. In the face of this to come. bur according to the common notions rhey create. capable of thinking the splitting oftime. lhird break: an art ofimmanence. This new corporeality anti the powers of composirion it unleashes usher in a new modeiniry for painring.“ an auromatism capable of ex pressing durarion as it is constructed. in a vision of God/Narure as the continual construction ofrhe world.‘ way of feeling. a crirical or “schizoanalvtic“ process by which onro-aestherics finds irs specific co-ordinates in an abstract ma chine. This is the abstraction of both Jackson Pollock and Francis Bacon. is essence existence? Once more. Art operates as a libratory innovation. rhrough vhich visions emerge. Critique as affirmation brcaks wirh man‘s nihilism. and ir emerges rbrough the “crack“ constiruring a new brain. Deleuze‘s cinerna books arc also consrituted around a break. an art-work as a mobile affcmal as semblage thar is both autopoietic and machinic. how in other words. it is a question ofnew feelings. each time. hut construcring irnages as ontological machines. to its creative eternal return. This is a break with represenrarion as an image of thought in which painting acts as a signifier. a world in the process ofheing composed. Through understanding common notions another world appears. as the work ofart. parricles-signs expressing a new corporeality. Firsr break: the Overman. or leaving this world his plane of composition. or as Spinoza puts it. That which determines the movement-image. to its powers of the false. one in which color and line break wirh their representarional funcrions rn hecome absrract. Nature‘s creative difference fiom itseif Art is nothing without joy. With cinema images begin ro creare rime. the artistic element of the present—the contemporary itself—is in a permanent process ofcracking open: “Works are developed. one determined by breaking down the strata ofsig nifiance and subjectivation. In Spinoza. Beatitude begins with the common notion. an “aesthetic paradigm“ . to break with the ontological and aesthetic assumptions that negate its life. a breakdown of the sensory—motor. an image adequate to becoming. “around or on the basis of a fracture they can never succeed in fihling“ (DR. and where its material niovements arc subordinated to a regime of “meaning“ overcoding it. This non-optical space is wherc affect breaks free from its subective co ordinates to consrrucr a subjectivarion. Abstraction. Venerian Renaissance painting exem plifies painting‘s powerofbreakthrough. Once more we find a new onro-aestheric dimension. anti in which the will to power is forever constructed anew. a creative power always operating n the principle of to conle. Anti then anorher break. anti art opens onto a “to come“ that becomes the definition ofits true conremporaneitv. of affects. their differing durations. This affirmation gives us a new physiol— ogy.220 Art as Abstract Machine Conclusion 22] withour destruction. withour (3od either abandoning infinity. our love. To express this God!Nature is nothing but understand ing how our joy. This is the definition of art as an active immanence. First of all the artist achieves a breakrhrough.

Jr is not immanence ro life. thar of Deleuze and Guarrari‘s machine. A matter freed ro embody the chaosmic forces of the world. the break thar allows it ro creare the spilled and broken world. and Deleuze and Guarrari arc forever serting machines in motion which break with their previous derermi nates in order ro creare somerhing new. in order to urilise this power in its own way. the internal—ourside of pure immanence. Art does not live in the world. A break wirh orringer to free the Gorhic line.“ And each of these hreaks is itseif produced by anorher.“ and irs visions ofa rransversal “flesh. This implies a further break. a for mal diagram of unerring precision. This makes Deleuze and Guartari‘s onrology inseparable from aesrherjcs. because jr is rhrough rhe break which somerbing will emerge. spill inro being if you like. bur more also. moving beyond rheir semioric theories in purring them ro work in their own wa) The list goes on. and rogether rhey define rhe 1 3 edl a— ramerers of I)eleuze and Guarrari‘s marerialisr-viralisr onrology: a brcak releasing vital marters-forces. in and as art. by which jr expresses a new construcrivist Nature. This is also art‘s break with Romanticism. Sensation is the heing ofsensarion difference— bur rhis differential essence only exists as affects (hecomings and visions (per— cepts). a series of engagements wirh historical art sryles by whicli he rakes less than their whole. expressed in rhe srrucrion of sensarions. nor in US. A break with pbenomenology ro find Bacon‘s painring as heing in-rhe-world.“ Here. Bacon arrives in his work at the “Iiicr“ of a hodv beconiing. an art work is an affectual subjectivation that expresses a percept. A life is rhe immanence ofimmanence: ir is complere power. as life. As such. But this chaos is itself‘artisric. in art and as art. and on the orher urterly cosmic. an embodiment of painring beyond irs ohjecrive or subjecrive conditions. Bur of course. ir has no “in itself“ and only exists as rhe becoming-new in rhings. This plane of composirion is a differenrial plane of forces.222 Art as Abstract Machine (onc1usion 22$ in which the creative processes ofchaosrnosis arc seen at work “flush with the real. inasmuch as pure immanence is whar appears. a modern nature or “Mechanosphere“ in which the art-work is composed through the cosmic forces jr embodies in an inhuman and animal sensation. as rhey consrruct the world. by discovering a crack in the sensory motor rhrough which a crysral-image emerges to express and consrrucr durarion. an atheisric onro—aesrherics against any rranscendenr or emanarive onro-theology Deleuze‘s cinema will break wirh Bergson. these two things happen rogerher. not just rhose of Bacon‘s figures hut our own. ir lives as this immanent plane of composirion. a vision of the universe cm bodying thc construcrive owers of chaosmosis. plunging into chaos to bring back somerhing new. and so break wirh ir again. as the Arisrorelian concept ofa hylomorphically formed matter is replaced by a molecularised matter. Our major example ofrhis revalued art practice was the work ofFrancis Bacon. a break 7 ‘X with modernisr art—theory ro produce a nindern painring no longer oprical hut haptic. Bacon composes these forces rhrough his fractal art hisrory. What appears is sensation. the forces consrrucring a becoming-world. and nothing else. Bacon‘s absrracr machine is on one side entirely acrual. a perspecrive—in other words: a life. just as Deleuze and Guartari will break wirh Peirce and Hjelmslev. a vitaliry in which its construction is a direcr expression of its ontological conditions. its crearion ofa new onrological space for painring. at once cosmic and mo— lecular. to make the same thar which rerurns difference. THE SPILL The spilled and broken world. Sensation must be consrrucred in experience. an essence consrructed by an acrualiry givingjoy. and defines the conditions for any work ofarr. a merge made visible in rhe consrrucrion ofa “hapric eye. somerhing will be creared. and consrrucred by sensario n‘s living refrains of colors and absrracr lines. as each ‘recapitulation‘ is a reinvention.“ Pure immanence is onrology as the theory and practice ofa crearive life. and as we have repeat ‘ seen. a Body without Organs.“ Deleuze writes. This is rhe desrrucrion-creation ofrhe aesthetjc paradigm. hut the immanent thar is in notbing is irselfa life. jr consrrucrs a world whjle sirnuira neously expressing ir. The BwO is a painring-body operaring as an Arraudian “nerve-merer. “thar ir is A LIFE. Perhaps we should reverse Pvnchon‘s phrase. inasmuch as it rakes eacFi style‘s break. because we cannor rhink rhis onrological power “in irself“.“ expressing irs chaosmic condirions rhrough a srricr consrrucrivism no less rigorous for being hysrerical. complere bliss. Art is rhis process ofcrearjon. Whar is consrructed is a poinr of view. in other words ir only exisrs in ana‘as e. “X7e will say of pure imma— nence. for irs infinite and onrogeneric . Deleuze breaks with Spinoza ro make the artribures the mechanism by which modal existence ex presses a differenrial essence.perience: a life.‘ it contains the creative forces that arc expressed in being composed hy Bacon‘s diagram. expressed in a life. in art. whose paintings operare a catastrophic “diagram“ that breaks with the clichts occupying the canvas by introducing a chaos that wipes them away. Bacon‘s crearive breaks compose a new body. I)eleuze breaks wirh Njerzsche‘s eternal return ofthe same. No creation wirhour desrrucrion. the art-work finds a new life. Bacon‘s break with an historical style is enrirely affirmative. a break wirb rhe romanric sublime. as whar appears—whar appears when essence is exisrence. an irreducible doubled dimension. Through the attributes immanence becomes a univocal reality in which ex pression=consrrucrion.

The constant variation of the modes. a “haptic“ vision in which the eye “touches“ the painting. hut a corporeal convialsion encompassing a becoming indiscernibly in the work and of rhe world. how art does this. a composition ofa virrual plane of immanence expressed in an affectual assemhiage rhat is enrireiv acrual. and on the other rhe parricular evenr of construction. Finally. Painting has become the rnaking visible‘ ofsensation. is a revalued artisric technique capable ofproducing ir. apart that is from the producrion of feelings or sensations that borh express and construct the material and energetic world. Deleuze uses Bergson‘s term for a creative and univocal being in the cm— eina books. wbich never theless has a double sense in relation to art. Vision is no longer the passive receprion ofa separate I/eye. the construcrion of an infinite plane expressed in a work of art. Everyrhing is vision. we become by con templating it. The autopoietic abstract machine appears as a refrain or sensation. rben we must say as precisely as possihle. ART AS ABSTRACT MACH INE The abstract machine on the one hand composes the matter and force mak ing up a plane ofconsistency. an anirnal vitaliry or “flesh“ of the BwO. art is an expression that constructs the world. Durarion emerges in this absolutely contemporary moment consti tuting the fracture of time. implies a Deleuzeo-Guattarian onto-aesthetics as the always doubled interrogation ofart. rhey broke wirh representation. \vliat is it. Inasmuch as art creates a sensation then. “We are not in the world. Each art form does so according ro irs parricular mate rial modaliry. Along wirh rhe revalued sensibilirv involved in having a sensation. lhis involves freeing color from its overcoding by the line so that form ernerges through the mod ulation of color as a set of differential relations. Modern cinema‘s visionarys or seers produce im ages of rhis split. but sings a song ofmolecules. becorning. the artist. In Nietzsche Deleuze finds the ontological conditions for appearance in the will to power. it is possible to know God as God knows himseif: beati rude. and art‘s expression of life‘s genetic conditions is norhing but the re-crearion ofthese condirions. In the later chapters. this bas various fields of resonance wirhin Deleuze and Guaeeari‘s work. the visionary. Spino7a. Nothing is given. duration. On rhe one side.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. and on the orher expresses jr in an actual blage. inasmuch as any machine involves a “practice. Duration as the past. In Spinoza Deleuze finds a univocal ontologv of God/Nature. and freeing die line from its . a sen sation which construcrs and expresses the world. expresses the affect‘s essence. and its cosmic conditions. as becoming. this work of art. Art as Abstract Machine operates specifically in sensation. Finite and infinite. jr means a trans formation of sensibiliry. Again. and it is bv using line and color against its representarional functions that painting expresses the immanence of inorganic life directly in a sensation. the life. Sensation is at once this sensation. Artists arc those strong enough to affirm will to power. all ofwhich shared a basic necessity. The re frain or sensation is rhe creation of art. an essence which is itselfdetermined only by the differential relations it maintains wirh the infnite essences consti— tuting God. lt is on the one band a general rerm for the onto-aesrherics ofcrearion. This is to undersrand the other (artistic) side of I)eleuze and Guatrari‘s abstract machine.224 Art as Abstract Machine Conclusion 225 plane of matters-forces. or have said. Art as abstract machine therefore means autopoiesis. i‘hrough a Vision of affectual essence then. in the sensation a finite work produces an ex perience restoring it to irs infinire and immanent plane of composition. that Deleuze and Guattari offer an ontology which cannot be thought apart from its creative processes. God‘s constant becoming. and Bergson. its simulacra. a break witb human pel-ceprions and meanings in order for the being ofsensation to appear directly as sensation. its differential field. hut will to power is never outside of its expressions in the world. Painting‘s rnaterialiry involves line and color. As a resulr. The BwO embodies a new sen sihiliry defining art‘s bio aesrhetic dimension. a dimension in which art is no longer simply the realm of human expression. Ifwe can say. of art. the simulacral art work embodies the eternal return of will to power as difference. this revalued or transformed sensibiliry emerged in a haptic. through an art of common notions. not previous to the present but coexisting with it. We becorne universes“ (W1 1 69).“ We looked ar various examples. smoorh space co-extensive witli tbe operation ofa hap tic eye. and an expressionism in the modes and through the artribures. We have seen this visionary art emerge in each of the chapters of this book. art as the consrruction of affecrual bodies or subjecrivations expressing an infinite virruality rbey actualise. and how does it appar? Inseparable questions. in the abstracr lines of Pollock and rhe complex diagram of Bacon a new vision of painring enlerges. images which construcr time‘s bifurcations as an expression ofits virtual infinity Similarly. only exists as such. Haptic space and the eye rhat is irs producrive condition appear ro gether in an affecrive assemblage or subjectivation. the autopoiesis of the chaosmos. the mystical atheist. This is rhe practical‘ side of the abstract machine. an(l a counter-actualisation that constructs the virtual and infinite world anew. “we become with the world. producing the image as it is forever splitting into past and present. 1 have suggested that this double dimension ofsensation. art cieates the finite that re stores the infnite. We have al ready mentjoned its relevance to our discussion of Nierzsche.

but each in their own way approach an abstraction in wbich color is able to render the forces of tue plane of composition visible.226 Art as Abstract Machine 1 Conclusion 227 represenrational function so as to give it a non-striated movement. as weil as the variety of artisric examples we have discussed—is a creative mma nence. ‘What is common to all of these examples is the necessarily double di mension oftheir absrract machines. then. Pollock‘s paintings not only create a new type ofabsrraction. Affirmation is the engine of Deleuze and Guattari‘s constructivism. This materi ality ofcinema is nevertheless whar its images borh construct and express and I)eleuze offers an intricate and precise taxonomy of the ways cinema achieves this. To return to cmema 2. Guatrari‘s “blind trust in the movement ofdeterritorialization at vork. and we looked closely ar the way both the Venetian painters of the Renaissance. the mechanics of their philosophical crearions (even when what is constructed is not altogether convincing. that ofduration. and we saw how the Venetian break with the painting diagrams that preceded and accornpanied it expressed both the dy narnisms of new materials. the absrract inachine is not a “thing. and Francis Bacon. ObviousIy this reality is not the same for the Venetians and for Bacon. and as Deleu7e and Cuattari often stress. ours first of all. allow for new mechanisms ofcon srruction and expression to emerge. of making a leap offaith inro the unknown that we will have a sensation. a use of color‘s differential relations that opens painting onto infinity. Here sensation is gained through colorism. a vital materialism both expressed and constructed hy the work of art. Nevertbeless. and cannor he represenred. and inhuman condirion ofits sensation. should bring us hack to that most human qualiry. materialist. as in the case ofGuattari‘s image of Duchamp). by attempting this operation ofinvention. Pollock achieves this breakthrough by inventing a new compositional machine. each in their own way. Affirmation is the hreak necessary for something to happen: “Hence the sole thing thar is divine is the nature of an energy of disjunctions. “Paintings erernal ohject is this“: Deleuze and Guatrari write. inscrihing it in each and every one of its disjunctions“ (AO. while cornposing a world. In both cases. These. This is once inore the imperative ofthis books tide. as multiple in Bergson‘s rerms—in a vision of and as the becoming oftime. . to which this materiality was conjugated. do this. the very condjtion of its actuality Affirmation would he. when it attracts ro itself the entire process of produc— tion and serves as its miraculate. bevond any optical perceprion (beyond that is. but carry abstraction to its limit. where the universe exisrs as moving images of light. a plane of abstract machines. In certain ofjackson Pollock‘s painrings it is the line that is freed from any descriptive function. and that we can aspire to the ritle of artist (or of art as abstract machine). and art produces a sensation. trust or belief Wby thun is belief necessary? Because belief in this world is the atheist. Nevertheless. so utterly materialist. and musr be the starting point for any approach ro their system made in good faith. that God is Nature. and through the catas trophe with whicb Bacon‘s diagram begins. one that unleashes new abstract and vital forces in paint. be describes ihe spiritual automaton. But what is the meaning of this seemingly banal pre-requisire of Deleuze and Guattari‘s pbilosophy—af firmation? What is affirmed in each case—Nietzsche. and one of Deleuze‘s most beautiful passages. it is precisely what cannot be rhought. “to paint forccs“ (WI 182/172). In a sensation. With time-images cinerna discovers the way ro move beyond its Bergsonian condirions to direcrly express duration—as whole and as part. which must be undertaken each rime. the “pure opricality“ of Greenberg‘s modernist reading) in a haptic smooth space where the viewer-painring relation is replaced hy rhe vital movemenrs of ab stract lines that traverse ir. a painting‘s color— forces emerge in niovement. aml >‘er it is that which our deranged senses arc forever feeling. by which its materi ality is able to beco nie expressive. to affirm finally. For painting. and older traditions such as Byzanrine art. ‘Fo believe in the break. And more than iust a simple deciaration offaith in a divine creation. In both cases this process involves an absolute dererritorialisation of painting‘s material el ements. colorism emerges in painting according to specific historical contlitions. anew. andj2r real. defining a new reality of painting. so avowedly atheist. in cinerna we saw a different materiality. Because in the end we cannot think rbis inhuman world. and irs most important moment is no doubr its crearion. Finallv. and its processes of composition.“ THE LEAP OF FAITH Jr seems paradoxical that I)eleu7e and Guattari‘s philosopby. both its matter. or the will to power returns. what is involved is a “rnolecularisation“ of matter. This means that in both cases an abstract machine is in Operation through which art becomes adequate to its real conditions. and our perceptual participation in color‘s differ ential quantities enables a becoming to take place both on and in front of the painting‘s surflice. to affirm a disjunction in which product and production arc in absolute iminanence.“ it is a process. Spinoza and Bergson. and able to “clasp“ chaosmic forces in a sen sation. and so ecstarically inhuman. ir is pre cisely this affirmation that is the way that immanence works. I‘his returns US tO the necessity ofaffirmation. enchanted surface. hecause it is onlv hy experi menting. because “Art as Abstract Mahine“ means norhing unless we do it. 13/19). is the very condirion ofart‘s possi bility. in escaping the overcoding ofa ciassical line in the Venetian case. this nieaiis composing a coloring sensa tion.

the belief necessary to art. or the painter hirn or herseif—Pollock “in“ his painting) the one who has received a shock. in love or life. As . fi nally. and must be replaced with soinething else. We discover in a sensation. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears“ (C2. “the erasure of the unity of man and the world. who alone has. and has seen avision ofthe world in its infinite becoming. the necessity for a mystical and yet atheistic belief in man and the world. and Deleuze is at his most affirmative here. according to Nietzsche. in their irreducible and incomprehensible link. . sometimes painful. but in a link between man and the world. with belief There is. lt is the beliefofDionysus. Which. not in a different world. and a certain sort oflife. 170/221). this is a certain sort of rhought. becomes our most difficult task. ifas nothing else. it exists. “thefiith that only what is separate and individual may be rejected. But believing in art in this post-modern world is not so easy. ofthe world as new. 172/223). Again. But as the expression ofa life. Spinozas man of beatitude. in this life. and is now “the impossible which can only be restored within a faith. then at least as an expres— sion of belief . 75/72). An art that fulfils Deleuze and Guattari‘s fundamental ontological. or the task ofa mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane ofexistence today“ (WP. in favour ofa break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world“ (C2. So perhaps this book has been norhing but a staternent of belief Could there be a more perverse ending to a book of pbilosophy than a starernent of belief? No doubt this is not the first. the atheism ofart. is the subtle way out? To believe. This is the faith of the truly intoxi cared. often uplifring. any expression of this world. and is. 170/221). lt exceeds our human life and thougbts and must be believed in. is what comes after man‘s organic relation to the world is broken. “Expeditions of an Untirnely Man. nothing less than the belief in “the identity of thought and life“ (C2. But art in these terms is precisely what cannot be thought or lived. [. to believe in this as in the impossible. What to do in the face of such an image? Ofcourse we react.228 Art as Abstract Machine &nclusion 229 (but lt is equally Nietzsche‘s Dionysus. “The spir itual automaton is in the psychic situation ofthe seer. 1 lie art of belief waits to be created. Our connection to the world has changed ontological co-ordinates. Deleuze and Guattari warn us: “lt may be that believing in this world. an atheistic belief in this world as a being-in-the-world. we feel and we see. the inhuman univoc ity of the reciprocal construction/expression of the seer and the world. Here all organic complernentarities between man and world are broken. This is the belief that our sensation encompasses man and the world in a cosmic co-creation. and belief becomes the complete bliss of pure imma nence. Ofcourse. 188/245). then. in art as it is understood by Deleuze and Guattari.“ 49). the un thinkable. requires belief. think. “who sees better and further than he can react. the particular expression and niost cosmic construcuion ofa mystical aesthetics. chaosmic thought. a mystic mate rialism without any transcendental dimension. but no longer with eyes which can represent. our belid in art. Any construction. which none the less cannot but be thought“ (C2. The visionary sees more than his or her humanity can bear.“ Deleuze writes. or a mmd which can explain. that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirrned—he no longer denies (TI. aesthetic and ethical condition—to create. Belief as inorganic thought. that is.

22. Volume L Ti?e Sixtet‘nth and Seveurceurb Centuries. 134. Dc Certeau‘s work retrievcs inystical cxpressions from theit scientific objectifica fion. Michel dc Cerreau. 1 953—1974. (illes Deleuze. p. thar he was leaving fr the mystenions world. See also The Mystic Fahle. or across tbem. 4. 1953—1974‘. bis poison garden“ (ATP 73/93). ahstraet machines) ex— isting across a wide fange of disconrses .“ Pliotogenic Fioziring.e. i).“ Diacritics. Challenger mutrered that he was taking the earth wirb him. and many otbers concerning Delcuze and Gtiatrari‘s pbilosopliy of art. 3. textes et entretiens. 12. 1 use “Deicuac and Gnatjaii“ here. w reler 10 nie work done bv Deleuzc alonc. . 6. p. 1 was fortunate enough to arrend ric Allicis seminar at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien from 2000 2003. when they arc relevant 10 onr diseussion. “Mvsticism. “Cold and 1 leat. t pro ided an ininial 2. 186) This forniulation comes front Iric Allie.2.Notes NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION Cilles Delenze. p. . and Iw die two trgerher. ‘herc 1 am discussing the work Delenze or Cnattari bave done separatelv this will be indicated in the text. and considers rhein instead as “formalities“ (i. as 1 du in tue bonk‘s ndc. pays an immeasurahle debt to bis work. (“Mysnique ei masochkme.“ L‘!/e D/serte er Aurres 7?xtes. lw (uattari alone. summer 1992. to bis latest. 64. 5. and my under— standing of this point. We nced only i-hink of Professor Challenger from A Tbousand Plateain: “Disarticulated.“ Desc‘ri Is/dfldS and Ot/ier 7/‘xts.is will ans‘ divergences hetween their oeu— vrcs. who has explored us implications from his earliesr work in La Signature du monde: On questce que /i pbzloso— pure de Deleuze er Guattari? (a translauon is fortbLoming froin (Zontinuum) where it is stated ar the end ofthe first appendix. “Mystieism and Masoehism. deterritorializcd.md practices. 1 ‘Oeil-cerveau. Dc lii peinture moderne (willi Jean-CIet Martin) and La Penuie_Matise (wirb j ean—Claucle Bonne) (borb arc forthcoming Front Senil and Gallimard re— specniveh‘) where he develops its iniplications in ici ms ofa new genealogy of modern art.

“ Pure hn. 357) 3.3—1 94.“ LYIe De‘serte et Atitres Ttvtes.“ L‘Fle d/serte et autres texts. 1 (Nietzsche.“ Deleuze writes. 73. Similarly. where artisis und phibosophers and doctors and patiems can corne togethc‘r. and cosntos. p. Gillcs Dcleuze “Coldness and Cruelty. As he writes elsewhere: “There is always a great deab of art involved in the group— ing of symptoms. p. 7) Similarly ifless caregorically. “is we can .“ Pure Immanence. in the organisation of a tu hie whcre a part icttbar symptom is dissociated from anothei jnxtaposcd to a third. All references to this book now found in rhe text folbowing thc ahbreviation “WtP“ 5.392) 9. On the Genealotj ofMorals.“ “Mysticism arid Masochism“ Desert Islands und Other Ji‘xtes. suggest— ing a construuivist understanding ofmysticism tltat 1 have also tried to pur— sue. 1. 141/185). (Nietzsc/ie. textes et entretiens. Friedrich Nietische. to isolate it from the tcxts that exhaust themselves trying to express it. has written: “lt is a sharne to present hirn 1 Deleuzel as a metaphvsician and nature mystic. 1953—1974. 186) lt would be as an art ofsymptoinatobogy that we can tmderstancf Delctizc‘s tahle of types and qual— ines in bis book en Nietzschc. 1. Deleuze has writtcn titat “syinptontatobogy is bocated almost outsidc medicine. textes et entretiens 1953 1974. Ronald Bogue writes: “Though this blending of bodies and sensations. at a 10. with interpretation und evaluation. 17).“ 4.‘ the crcation of new possibilities.“ (“lntroduction. The passage diese quetations come front aus as a succinct Deleu. (“Mvstiquc et masochisme. The Will to Power 795. Ftsays an A Lfi‘. All rcfcrences tu tltis book now found in the text folbowing the ahbrevi— atioit “11.. 12. 65. “E‘cpeditions ofan Untimely Man. p . 15). und theArts.‘ 2. p. p. The Nietzschean art ofcreativc critique will remain a conditien of‘ Dcleuze‘s ptejecr till the cnd. Clinicians whe arc ahle tu renew a symptomatobugi— cal tahlc produce a werk ofart. a zero point. 74. Thus Spake Zarathustra. the discovcry ofthe true. ‘Jii‘ilight of tie Idols. 17) . Gilles Deleuze. ‘3Ve can ne more ahstract values from the standpoint ftom which they draw value than ahstract incaning frem the standpoint from which it drasvs its signification. 281. hut the latter is norhing niere tItan will—to—doniinatc in dc cxliansted hecoming oflik. anti is affirmed in thc last book hc s‘rotc vith Cuattari: “Ctiticism implies new concepts (of thc thing criticised) just as much as the most positive creation“ (WIi 83/80). p. of people.“ Tl‘e l“/ew /“hetzsche. art—works. textes et entretiens 1953—1974. To evabuate is to determine the will to power whieh gives value to a thing. and forms the new figtire ef a disorder or illness. NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1. This introduces the necessitv of a taxonomy of syrnptorns.serte etAutres Textes. Pure Inimaneuce. p. 6. p. “Mysticism and Masochisni. 13. p. coHvcrsclv. Hence Nietzsche‘s fatnousline: “BeyondGoadandFvii—At least tbis docs not mean ‘Beyond Good anti Bad“ (CM. 186) Notes to chapter One 233 8.illes Deleuze. p. which 1 shall cx— amine in chapters 3 and 6. p. “Nietzsche. Thcrc is will tu power on hotli sidcs. “Of the Bestowing ofVirtue. Friedrich Niettschc. while the hase kind can ne bonger do so. p.nanence. (. Friedrkh Nietzsde.54/55).“ 6. All refircnces to this book now found in the text following the abbreviation “GS. while the former is artistic will er ‘virtue which givcs.“ 33. p• 25) “To interpret.ian gboss to the lines frem 7it‘iiiht of‘the Idols circd ahovc: “According to physicists. bis discussien ufthe “clinical essence“ of eacli art is also a symptomatology (FB. Tliis is part of the rather hilarious interview “Faces and Surfaces.“ Gilles Deletize. 1953—1974. p. 1953—1974. textes et entretiens. 14. ‘l‘his is a precise definition of niysticism in terins of the expression— ism=constructivism equation.“ 7. 195. 1 1 they arc clinicians ofcivilisarion“ WS. The Gay Science.“ Dclcttie te determiiie thc forcc wltich givcs to a thing. (“Pens& Nomade. Dc Ccrteau argiles: “Ehe Other that organizes the text is not an outside ofthe text.“ Cilles Deleuze. FriedriLh Nictzsche. 290. in the outpouring becoming“ (C2. “Nierzsche.“ Pure hnmanence.“ L‘ile d6serte et autres texts. it is based on a coherent theory of nature as creation“ (Deleuze an Music. All refcrences to this book 110W found in the text following the ahbreviation “CM. Essays an A Lift. Gillcs Deleuze. 237/276). p. Bcvond the wcak man‘s “bad“ morality ofgeed and evil. would be tantarnount to exorcising it hy providing it wiih its own place and name“ (The Ivfystic Fahle. 134. 24) Cilles Deleuze.“ Li‘le l)c. 9. Painting. (“Mysrique et masochisme. (“Faces et Surfaces. “Nictzsche. 134. lt is not an imaginary ohject that one inight distinguish from the movement bv which it is sketched. De Cericau also reccts any separation ofthe ontological elements of mystical discoursc frorn their expressions. 1953—1974. 14. 145.232 Notes to hapter One inspiration for my project liere. p. artists arc clinicians. fh beate it apart.“ 3. the strength of the eaglc is geod. Essays an A Lifr. “Nomad Thought. 8.“ !vfasochisrn. (Nietzsche. p. 170). As Deleuze writes: “Nietzschc rcplaced thc ideal ef kiiowledge. ncutral point.. 11. (N1 146/166) Similarlv.“ Desert Jslands und Other Jats. Friedrich Nictzschc. Essa ‘s an A Lzfl‘. niay sound lilce sheer rnysticistu. The will te power as gencalegical element is that fiem which scnses derive their sigitificance und vahtes their valucs“ (Nli 54/61).“ Desert Islands und Other 7xts. a criticai and clinica/ taxonolny. p. 7. All reference to this hook now found in the text following the abbrevia— “Z. John Rajchman for example. writes. “noble energv is the kind capahle oftransfornting itself.

question wbicb remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to thar question (beHre it lias bcen given a response)“ (DR. contradicrion is inevitably earried mm being. 19. All references to this book now found in die text following die abhreviauou “A. . “Preludes. is hecoming.“ This implies. as multiple affirina tion. he has hiniseifbecorne a work ofart. 159/206—7. p. the shadow of difference alongside the affirmation produeed. as Deleuze is fond of potnting mir. moreover. 72. 24). preface. 2). S. p. 10. All fig. 125. Nietzsehe writes.“ L1Ye Dtfserte et Autres lixtes. “Nierische. The Antichrist. The World ofSex. One of Deleuze‘s most important arguments. 1 972. Intoxication is not rh same as inebriarion. The Heidegger quota tions arc froni Nietz. See Daybreak.“ Friedrich Nierzsche. (Nietzsche. . As Niettsche puts it: “For assuming that one isa person. p.“ 9). and 92. interpret— ing Nicrzsche as die “last metaphysician. will io power makes on being: “lt is primary affirmation (becoming) wlsich is being. New York: Grove Press. hut throughout bis oeuvre. As for negation. who is considered a self—porrrait of Lawrence. Similarly. Nierzsehe writes of‘ tlse Dionysian artist: “No longer artist. Once wc confuse (non)-being wirh the negative. 14. DR. Deleuze writes: “Difference is not die negative. die illusion projecred by the problem. 85. Nierzsche introduces the concept of risc [)ionysian in bis firsm hook. for Deleuze will to power has im basic eharaeter and is not a metaphysical category because it is always under construction. risc “Arrcnspr At A SclfCiiticisni“ of 1886). 26. To explain bow a philosopher‘s most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been ar— rived at. In this scnse. 22. N1 187/215). the producmive power ofmhe whole universe is now manifest in his rransport.“ this passage “suggests that l3ecoming only is if lt is grounded in Bcing as Being. 51. 1985.“ Pure Immanence. Essays on A Lift. For Heidegger. but there is a big difference.“ Affirmation in irselE Deleuze argues. tJnpublished Letters. 17. 254) 16. and dereby being as a whole with regard to its basic character“ in art. (“A quoi reconnait—on le structuralisme?. Human. their riehes and strengths“ (GS. finds rhe principle of its genesis. . quoted. in otbers. p.“ Because art is the way will to power. we always get the thoughts and feeling we deserve. is rherefore entirely Nietzschean. Gilles Deleuze. on the conrrary. The Birth ofTragedy. 25. 20. eternally 1 am yaur afjirmation“ (Nictzsche. p. 270. make rhein leaner“ (Tl. 34) Deleuze and Guamtari suggesm a kind of inroxieated sobriety. In sorne it is their deprivations that philosophise. Nietisehe writes: “Ii has gradually become elear to mc what every great philosophy bas hitherto been: a confession on die part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir. This passage elearly marks the differences berween Deleuze and Martin Heidegger‘s wcll-known interpretation ofNietzsche. 269.“) Nierasche progressively distanees himself from this early oppositional fisrmulamion and its Romantie influcnces and gestures (especially in risc seeond Preface. or will to power. p. The song of the artist philosopher: “Eternal affirmation qfbeing. Friedrich Nietzscbe. As we sball see. “Expedirions ol an Unrimely Man. not just in relation to Nierzsebe. quoring Henry Miller: “To succeed in getming drunk. p. 1953—1974. hut contradietion is only rhc appearance or die epiphenomenon. lt is always weil (and wise) to ask oneseif first: what inoraliry does this (does he-) aim at?“ (Beyond Goodana‘Evi4 6) This means. 8). to the glorions satisfa. And hisrory is in f‘sct rich in such anti— arrists. the shadow of a . his anti-Hegclian affirmation ofdifftrence. 50. Eliot. where rhe indiscernibility of arr-work and artist in inroxica— don is already presenr. Women in Love. Human. p. 48.schc rrics to sublate in the Greek art of rragcdy: “1iagedy is an Apellonian crnbodiment of Dionysiac insigbts and powcrs“ (The Birth of 1agedy. Fiiedrjch Nierzsche. p. 27.sche vol. 39. London: Faber and Faber. “Birth ofTragedy. anti-art gives witness 10 “a specific anti-artis miealimy of instinet—a mode of hcing which impoverishes and atenuates rhings and makes thein consumprivc. The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari: Intersections and Anirnatiopis. an op position Niet. These words arc spoken by Birkin. in such srarvelings of life. always erearing the perspectives constituting its becoming. (Ecce Homo. 188. inspoverish thens. 21. This sublarion will nsean mbar The Jlirth of 7iagedy “smells of fensively Hegelian“ to Nicrzsche hy risc end of bis working life.S. 23. 1 ondon: Pengtun. 64/89). non—being is diffcrence [ 1. 1965. 19.“ lt will be possible to “grasp will to power itself in irs essence. textes et entretiens. See. 1. that “for Nietzscbc will as will to power designates the essence of Being. 18.“ 1 Referenees mo this hook now found in die text fiuiow ing the abhieviation “EH. or Being. who neeessarily havc mo take things to thcm selves. one nceessarily also has the philosophy that belongs to that person.tion of the primordial One“ (The Birth of Tragedy. that die moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have every time consti— tutcd die real germ of life mir of which the entire plant has grown. Nl 104/119. becomes “geiiuiilely visible. 2 December 1887. Will to Power as Art. 94. Letter. hut only as the objecr of the second affirmarion“ (NP 186/214). and “Flow Do We Recognise Structuralism?“ C. this is only a shadow of the highesr prineiple. Stivale. In The Birth of iagedy tue Dionysian is opposed tu an Apollonian art of representarional forms. ofan interpretation. hut on pure ivater“ (ATB 286/350). p.23 t Notes to Chapter One Notes to Chapter One 2$ 5 15. T. Henry Miller. Heidegger argues. p. as Nieusche ofren stressed. 28. This (non)— being is die differential element in whieh afdrmarion. For Deleuze the imma— nence of being and becoming is central to bis univocal ontology.“ The Wastelandana‘atherpoems. . But as rhe object ofanother afflrmarion. All references to this book now found in the text fbllowing die abbreviarion “1 IH. 24.

. lt most 1w pointecl ont howevcr. 33. “Overturning Platonisrn. 124.. ro the univocal power of Being“(J)eleuze: 7. theo the world of beings is the thearre ot die simulacrurn of Being. bciuig in its becoming. Badiou‘s key suggestion is haar simnulacna arc mercly equivocal eases ol nnivocjly. style is the expression of the imuna— nence of will to power ‚tod hann. lt is as rliongh rhe paradoxical on super—eminent One imrnanently engenders a procession of heings svltose univocal sense it distrihutes. where Rerunning is heing bot only the beiuig of hecorning. As Nietzsehe savs abour philosophers: “Thev know wltar ilwv have ro prove. 132. Alliei argues: “Badiou enects an image of Deleuze ‚isa metaphysician ofthe One. For Deleuze. ‘nivoeal Being. 223. Of‘ course.. This implies.“ Deleuze vnites. Van Gogh. Alliez omi the otben band. bot j‘. Sryle. “uses its spur as i niean ofprotecnon agaifl$t die terrifving. (‘simu— lacrum ofBeing“) and so conform to a Neoplamonie rnetaphysics ofexpnession in which the univocal One neunajns transcendent. Badiou wnitcs. 36. Deleuze wrires. Deleuze writes. jVieszsc/. philosophen. by reinserting the distinction hetween essence and appearance (idca and copy) into rhe heart ofDeleuze‘s acconnt of univocal hciuig. and wbene Badiou broadens bis enitque to suggest Delenze most sacnifice a real niulriplicirv in order to maintain a 1. whose producrivc presence is forever veiled/iinvejed in an artists work. beiuig and beeorning arc continuallv const rucrcd ‚tod expnesscd. which obsriuiarely rhrusts itselfinto view.“ p. 7 — 26 Badiou‘s “nevensal“ of Deleuze is ironicallv Deletuzian. 4 1/59) njc Alliez has attempted bis owut “neversal“ of Badiou‘s rejecnion of Deleuze‘s work with Guarmani. heginniuig widi the Ansi—Oedipus. is a rnechanisrn of deference that “writes“ will to power‘s presence/absence in a work. See “The BwO Condition or. [ J jr is necessary to affirm the nighrs of siunulaera as so many equivocizl cases oJ‘univocity thar joyously attest . Klossowski goes 011 ro say. unveils the difference berween that sylt ich prcscnts rselfand its prcsenration. 31. 35. ). 30. 77. 34.. truth—on die condition at least that jr sliould not a/reatly be thar gaping chasrn whiclu has been deflowered iii tlw uuivciling ot cliffcrence. haar jr is only in heiuig constructed hy will ro power that “rhis“ world expnesses will to powel. . namel‘ a sirnu/izcrnm.“ in Biogmpbu‘n des wganlosen Jöipe. for Detrida will 10 0WCt is a 1 leicleggercan Being. The Politics of Sensarion. bot which has nevertheless left hehind a rnaik. p. Tliis expres— sive/constructivc power of univocity Deleuze finds in Niemasche is norhing hut die power of the erernal rettirn. whar mean— ing is ro hc given to rhe Nierzsclican program Deleuze constandy validates: rhe overrurning of Plaronisrn? [ 1 Deleuzianism is fiindamentally a Platonisin with a diffirenr accentuation. every multiplicity whose onrological starus is tliar ot‘ the One. In this sense. and diene is no slupplernentanv dimension to die platte of immanence (will to power) 011 which rhe 0mw and die rnauuy. in a faseinating attack on Deleuze. 127/167).t‘ (%arnour of ]3eing. mortal threar (of rhat) which preseuts itseif.“ Derrida writes. “omeans denviuig the pnivacv of original over copy. ‘ . In other words. Dcleuie is ever the gcncrous adversary liowever. Jacqucs Derrida. and in the Coiicept of the sinulacra Deletuze will find Plato escaping hiuiusclf By affiruning the sirnu— lacrurn.. the thing iuself meamng. beconnes a “hm —polirics“ tbai overcornes his earlier “bio—philosophy“ after Deleuze hegins to wonk with Guattani. “1/spediriomis of an Untimely Man.ca/ P/n/osoph um.id.“ 42). Alain Badiou. attcrnprs a “reversal“ of Deleuzianism on the site of de simulacra. p.e und die Vicions (‘ircli. rhe conseqiueuice has a Platonic. but througli sb we liave lost uhe likeness wliile renlaining in the image sim— Illacra arc prcciscly dcmonic images. while they refer to ts power and liave onlv a seniblance of heing. iuiasmueh as he at— renlpts to producc a “unutanr child“ rhrotugli this veuitniloqtuisnl. Srrangcly.“ (DR. as artists have often onderstood rhein wonk as simolacna. Art. for Derrida.. subrraeted as jr is from the ‘mcx— haustible vanicty of die conerete‘ and frorn the anarchie confosioui of die wonld—can and must cause 05 10 disuniss the wonks co—authored wirh Flix Guattani.“ in R. Bot in rluis case. A/reaa‘J4 such is the name tor s‘hat has been ef— ftced ot suhtracted hclorehauud. 66/92). as simulacruun. manch-april 2004.‘“ Tue Politics of die Anti— Oedius—Thirtv Years Out. p. for Cxaiilple. as we have already sbown. rhey arc lmr1cticsl in tham—thev recoguiise otte anotben liv rhein agrecrnent over ‘trorhs. the content. blinding. for Deleuze die simulacrum is not of Being. jr is Ort only philosophens wllo hecorne ard is iii these tenms.236 Notes to Chapter One Notes to Chapter One 2. ofmodel oven image. or even Neoplaronic. argues diar Deicozian philosophy becornes troly alive. rhene is no Being apart fnom becorning. glonifying die reigim ofsimulacra and refiecrjons“ (DR. And style rhereby protccts the pres— ence.‘—‘Thou shalt not lie‘—an plam words: uake cane. a signarure whiclu is rerracred in rliat very rhing hoin which ir is with— drawn“ (Spurs. its intoxicating prescnce in the self—over— cotning—rhe hecoming—of forins. This is rhe problem witb philosophens as opposed mo artisis. rhey don‘r know how ro 1 ic. Ile is “dernonstrating rhc anti—Platonisrn at the heart of Platonjsin“ (DR. “eveny authentic artist is conscioos ot producing sonierhing haar is fit/se. thar Derrida‘s Interpretation of Nietzschc differs markeclly horn Deleuze‘s.57 and replaces lt vitli a concept of the Dionysian as the critical anirnal artistic stare necessary ro will to powers transvaluanon. Pierne Klossowski. 128/167). “man is in the image and bkeness of God. not to teIl the tnoth (T1. au artists “style. This is the crueial pojnt. and is die signature of the foniters vi thd tawal 10)111 the lauer. Klossowski‘s hook ‘aas verv imilluential fon Deleuze. wliose essentiat 010— notony—in itseifindiftrens so diffrrences. 29. As 1 sliall arguc liow— even. Spiiis. 32. on this account. 39). air to it. srnipped of rescmblance“ (DR. “ifone classes—as one should— evcry difkrerice wirhont a real status. Similarly.s. .

Thus. reworkings.‘ 1967. 307. Regamdimsg Two Eh‘is Series.‘ A Facto. Dcleuze‘s gloss on this passage is bclpfnl. 731. 39. ‚ .otogenic Painting. Raiji Kuroda. 337). the exact nunther of the Elvis series is not knowmi.“ Art in 7 ‘eorj 1900—1 990. summer autunin 1887. ahsorhing things into the heart of the cye that contemplates tisemn. fbrces vihrating the world. suicides (most faniotmsly‘ die young woman lying on a car after jumpitsg te her death flora thc Emiipire Stare huilding) and die first series of Electric (. well—a lie if you hkc—-but truer titan die litcral truth“ (Vincent van Gogh.“ “Of Images and Worlds: Tbsvards a Geologv of the Cinema. Gerard Mabamsga.“ in The Brain is ii Screen: Gilles Deleuze md the Phi/asophy ofCinema. p.“ 24). On thc intricat-e repetitions of the varietms Elvis p mmigs. with strong colour and great intensity So inten— sify vour own healtli and strengtis and life. among others.mrhol‘s assisramir ar this timne. Nietzschc writes sonsething similar. Mere te die peint is Warhul‘s ewn af— firmation of this process as “like a Factory woubd da it. 7 london: Penguin. Mirror r f‘His urne. ainsless. 47.s of Vincent van Gag!. since rhe brain is becorning world even as life euters painting. the very bei ng of the sensible: differcnce. poremial difference and difference in inten siry as ilse rcason hehind qualitative diversity. 43. The problem is that with the artist. cditcd bv C. 38. The artist seleus.“ Gretchen Berg. 46. for as Nietzsche argues. See. after all. 41. Aesthctics heconies an “apodictic“ discipline.“ an interview with Andy Warhob. An Antho/ogy ofGhanging Ideas. perhaps onby the manure of Notes to (Jiapter One 239 40. Letter to Theo. 1996). “man bccomes the transfigurer ofcxistencc whemi hc learns tu transfigure himsclf“ (‘sVtl 820). tbe shimmering golden wbeat field arc nothing hut matter in movement. ‘Gui Gogh‘s painnngs arc no douht a good cxalnple eI simulacrum. July 1885. bcgimm with the !llarilyn paintings (started in die ninmimh of her suicide). lnterestingly enough.srrisun ammd P ‘/(‘ood. in most cases. “only when we apprehcnd directly in the sensible that whicb can only he senscd. “‘Nothing tu Loose. tbte soib from which it grows. alniost always preduced in serics. the snrface of die pailiting that turned its hack an things. 111. 155). in other words. “Collapsimsg/Collapsed Diseourse ort Warhol.AJtes to Chapter One who wrote: “1 bug most of all tu learn 1mw to produce those very abcrrations. this was finally the limit separating inside trum outside. 1 l. This is the meaning of Nietzsclsc‘s aflirmation ei selcctioms: “What dees all att da? Does ii not praisc? Docs it not higbbight? Bv doing all of this it strengthens tsr u‘eakens certain valuations Is this na niere than incidental? An accident? Something in which thc instimict ef mlie artist has mio part what— cver? Or is it not the prerequisite for die artist hcing an artist at all is bis basic instinct directed towards die nseanimsg of art. “Expeditiomis of an Umstinely Mami. fimids rhis unlikeby. Deleuze writes.‘ lt is not heimig tbat returns hut ratlser returnimig itseif that constitutes bcing inso— far as it is affirmcd ofbeconming and of tisar whicis passes. Thus he is. amsd also givcs bis rather ingenious interpretation ofthe Nietzschean ctcrnal return ofthesame. He writes te bis sister Wils. translated by A. “Collapsing/Collapscd Discoursc cmi \X/arbob. Andy Wir/jol.‘hair werks. Now this herder is over with. Gilles Deleuze. on the contrary.‘ that phenomena Flash their meaning like signs“ (DR. food poisomsing ( liinaflsb Disasted. lt is in difference that move— mcnt is produced as an ‘efticr.a f ½ncent van Gogh. “tliis suhtlc power tisu— ally‘ comes tu an end where art cnds and life hegimis“ (GS. and comstinuc with scrics of Liz Taylor (painted whilc slme was criticalk‘ ill). The memhrane separating the Seen froni die seer has opcmied tip. 42. . nasmuch as their agitated colors and hrush strokes. their writbing Ines anti vibrant colors embody in an immcdiate materiality the vital life they alfirm. identiry in rhe eternal rettmrn does not descrihe tlse nature ofthat which rctmmrns hut. lt is not some onc rhing thar rerurns hut rather returning itsebf is die one thing that is affirmed ofdiversty er nsulriplicity. as may turn into.“ Andy iXitrhol 1956—86 Mirror of‘I]is Dme. Regardimsg Twa Elvis Series. p.“ in Gilles De/enze and the Theatre of‘ 4 p. and in selecting makes thimsgs mnore heaimriful. 3 Philosoph. Nietische writes. Andy Warhob. indeed van Gogh often seems to echo Nictzsche in his letters. something that must lw iiargortemi ifone wants to emmter tise full cnjoyment ofthe werk“ (CM. “Interview ‘mvith Gemic Ssvamsson. “Gold and licat. 1992. jean-Clct Martin lias discussed van Gogh‘s work in these terms: “The wall that Vincent dreamned cl‘ passing through. in 7 . GertrdFromanges p 65.. whieh is lift? Towards a a‘esideratum oflift? Art is die great stinsulus to life: how could it he tlsotight purposeless. a vital sensation appears in wbicb crows. 37. 75. Oxford: Blackwcll. and wlmose lifi appears only in the inhuman affirmation which interprets it. wrifing: “Tu die extern that Warhol‘s work still pbays witlm tlsc idea ef represemitation. ‘l‘hese paintings. risc prohlcni of “art“ is the selection of forccs that overcome tlse artist as human. of patiently croding. see Raiji Kuroda. the fact of rcturning kir that which diffcrs“ (NP. it is not tue most appropriate aesthetic correlare tu Deleuzc‘s non—rcpresentatiomsal conceptien of thouglit“ (“Armti—Platonisni amsd Art. Paul Pan-on. a material world ofwhich 1 am a part. 56—7/79—80). 1 ‘e Lette. 299). sud to take Imins bess seriously than ii. that‘s the best study“ (letter. 44. p. for example. lt is weIl knosvn that most of these werks were acttmallv execmmted liv W. 45.e Lette. hart pour lart“ (Tl. p. csr crashes. 1 . . Vati Gogh‘s paint— ings arc not representational hut processual. only a condi— tioms of die work. that soll. “rememher that wbat peoplc demand in art nowadays is somcthing very mnuch alive. 48/5 5).:)4 unpaginated. 4). lic is. “it is always ivell to divorce an artist frons his werk.“ Andy Warhol 1956—86. die sky. }ackic Kcmsned Elvis. aflirming at one poinr the necessary connection ofa vital art to a vital life. Pomerans.“ P/. transbornianons of reality. “We misinterpret risc expression ‘eternal rettirn‘ ifwe understand it as ‘rettmrn ofthe same.

“ where “the shade of Elvis is now an anarchy ofpossi— hilities. Tue Et/‘ics. “‘Nothing to i oosc. 50. As a resnlt. 278/264). also suggcst some continuities in Deleuze‘s approach in relation to our diseussion bcrc. New fijrk: Douhlcday. 24/37). This terni is v hat lies “bcncath“ srructuralism—namelv nothi ng—hecausc all structurcs arc thc repetirion of the ohject=x in series. the appcarancc of Nietzsche in Cinerna 2. and irs retennon ofa paradigm ofsignification. Bcnedicr dc Spinoza. 52. 57.“ (C2. and will hc dealt wirh more full>‘ in Chapter Three. Thc orders of die structurc dn not commumlicame in a common site. Eric Alliez has expiorcd this tcnsion in Dcleuie‘s work hciwecn that done be— forc Guartari and that after—in tcrms of the eonccpt of the BwO—in “Thc BwO Condition or. J acqnes Lacan.“ This “objeet“ “has no idcntiry exccpr in order to be displaced in relation to all places. 1991. than how man can hecome thc God hc already is. Toronto: 4 Dover.“ Biographien des otgan/osen Körpers.‘ an interview wirh Andy Warhol“ (1967. dcmnonsrratiom-ms (cl). . As Warhol fainously suggested: “If you want to know anything about Andy Wtrhol just look at the surface of tny paintings and films and mc.“ Selected Poems. Fot cxaniplc. lt is inter— esting to note that while the term “simulacra“ does fill out of Deleuzc‘s vo— cahulary. “Collapsing/Coiiapsed Discourse on Warhol. Although Elvis was obviously alive whcn the scrics bearing bis name was cre— ated.S 1. 1Vait ‘X‘hitnian. Paris. in a spade dar entails as manv direetions as ordcrs. which carries a similar meaning (C2.iect=x is die crnpty or perforated 1tc tltat permims mhis order to he arriculared wirb die orhers. is arguing that mechanical repetirion is en— tirelv adequate to rhc etcrnal return as cleath. xviii. and therc 1 am. p.‘ an interview with Andy Warhol. Flarning &a. Felix Guarrari. Gretchen Berg. its undcrstanding ofhecoming in terrns ofserial strue— turcs. Defimtitions (D).“ (Zbaosophy. ).“ Dclcuzc argucs ihat thc diffcrcnciating demneni. a sense which has a good deal of historical precision. 1991.t. perhaps. The Politics of Sensation. “1 Am God Most Of‘l‘he Timnc. p. on thc contrary. 56/79). There‘s nothing behind it. p.“ Spinoia writcs. appcndix (App.“ Photogenic Paintint. That is. not dearh“ (Ethics. “A freeman thinks ahour nothing lcss titan death. Deleuze discusses Warhol‘s films in terms of an “cvcrvdav thcatricalization of the bodv. “Saturday Disasters: Trace and Reference in Early ‘Warbol. in A Spinoza Read‘. IV. A good cxample of this reading is Hai Foster. A “sign.: All refemences to this hook now found in die text according ro mhe standard fiarns. Thc question hecomes lcss how to ovcrcornc man.“ Andy Warhol 1956—86: Mirror ofHis Tme. See For example Thomas Crow‘s infinential reading of these works as a hu manist Intervention by Warhol “in which the mass—producecl image as the bearer of desires was exposed in us inadequacy by rIsc reality ofsuflering and death. ‘1 bis two—sided aspect of thc sign is devel— opcd hy Delcuic. “ammd bis knowledge is a meditariomt on life. in relation to cinema‘s “powers ol‘ die false“ does echo many of the concerns of this cliapter. Lcninia (L). is the uninsaginahle element “object=x.“ See Raiji Kuroda. Thomas Crow. Deleuze‘s description of ‘X“arhol‘s films in cinerna 2 seems to echo Diflrence and Repetition. Bot in Anti—Oed. after bis “death. “Cokl and Heat.“ Deleuze writcs. The tide refers to the Indian belief that thc “fiaming star ofdcath“ is seen just hefore one dies. 2. “[Ilt is the maskcd. A Factory. Gerhard Fimnangc. P24. colloquitmmns (c).rcnee oh onc sidc.“ Deleuic argucs. For Dcleuze the meaning of srrucrmmralism and its series is fbund in this term without placc amtimating arne structurc. The Et/ncs.“ Gretchen Berg. Dead Elvis. V. proposition 24.). The film it advertises. For a fascinating giimpsc iHto the continued “lifc“ of the simulacrum Elvis. 192/249) or in thc terms of Dijfrrence and Repetition “a verita hIe theatre of mnetamorphoses and permnutations“ (DR. 49. Foster understands Warhol‘s simulacrai series as a play of signifiers over an unsigmhahle and traumatic Real. This would also be one way to undcrsrand the movc from Nietzsche ro Spinoza as Deleuzc‘s crucial philosophical referemice. nnpagi nated). Rcgarding Two Elvis Series. 53. “the disguiscd or the costumcd which tnrns out to bc thc truth of the uncovered“ (DR. p. which like death is what causcs elifferences to repcat hut is not iiself given in die rcpceition. exprcsscs diffi. he mentions the timc—inlage‘s “sunulation“ in relation to cinema‘s powcr ofthc fiilse. 67 p 58. . hoth in Di/Jrence and Repetition and in the arm ide “1 bw do we Recognisc Structuralisrn?“ in tcrrns of “stru(turc“ and “strueturalisrn. ana‘ Montreal 1945—1964. This does. hut on tbc other “tends to eancel it“ (DR.240 Notes to chapter One Notes to chapter lvo 241 48.148/194). for each order of structtire the oh. 318. the image itselt‘ is redolent with death. teIls the story ofa halflmidian (Elvis) whose mother and fther arc killed in the coursc of conflict berween Indians and whites. and in thc film both Elvis and bis mothcr otter the words: “1 can see the flanting star of death. “‘Nothing to Loosc. 20/31). Dcspite heing published cightcen years later. hut no less suggestive than the man hirn— self“ sec Griel Marcus. The Return ofthe Real The Avantgartle at the End ofthe C‘entu. and Prcfisec (Pref) also appear as ahhreviarions after quorarions cired in tlme text. Pop art wommld he type of smructuralism. Ccrtainly. A (]hronicle ofa cultural Obsession. 56. In this sense. hut mhey all Comniunicate rhrough their empt plsec or respcctive ohjcct=x“ (DR. 55. 65. and rejccts hoth its negative ontology (as the expression of a real hut ernpty placc). die above quote is Ethics. p. 54.“ Reconstructing Modernisrn: Art in iVew }rk. 3.us.“ 51. “Srarting frorn Pattnsanok. hook \‘. Delcuie. Andy Wzrhol. NOTE TO CHAPTER TWO 1. a stain off}eedom less clear. Deleuzc rurns on structuralisni amid on one of its major ligures. scholia (s).

Quotcd in Phillip Goodchild.“ in “Exposure. For Dcleuie. 333/309). without thc nsodal construction ofNature. p. “The Pioblem oftbe Attributes. in the flesh. “Why is Philosophy so compromised with God?“ Deleuze andRehzion.“ Deheuze anti Rehzgion. 6 11. lt is the attributes however. and which dominated the ancient world till the beginning of the sixth. 14 January 1974. Plotinus. while expressing itseif in its modes (produced within itseif). as natura naturata.“ ihe New Spinoza. Pasolini in thc flesh.“ Timefor Revolution.. however. Spirituab capareality anti Political pirituahisy. According to Deicuze. 172/156). hut rather all is fitlly realiied. is weil known. Nevertheless differcnces and tensions bctween their readings cxist. without rcrnajiider. For a discussion of Hegel‘s reading of Spinoza in these terrns. shadow. p/i7.2 1 4. sOmc ofwhicli will be the subjecr offurther footnotes. p.3 4 38. and the structure ofexpres— siomsm each involves.242 Notes to Chapter Two Notes to Chapter Two 243 4. 5. 5. Deleuze is often vehement in his opinion of Hegel: “What 1 detested more than anything cisc was F Iegehanism and the Dialectic. Plato‘s metaphysics were revived in a neo—Platonism which emerged in the middlc ofthe third century. whicb articulare the absolute immanence ofCod‘s univocity.“ Seminar an Spinaza. Notlung: phantasm./s not lte signified because it is “in truth beyond all statenlcnt“ (Enneads. Plotinus and Meister Eckhart. p.“ he writes. 171—2/155—6). “Spinozism. superstition. Hart.“ As an intereseing alternative ac count.“ Negri writes. 14. Michael I-lardt has suggested a provocatis e atheist version of incarnation in these terms. the most im— portant being St. 1 6. expres— sionism would “free univocal Being from a statc ofindifference or neutrality. 25 November 1980. fully ex pressed. Antonio Negri. Augusrine‘s hook city of God codified in Christian tcrms the rejeuion of the body and the embrace of the spirit he bund in neo—Platonic mysticism. to make it the ohject of a pure affirmation. because the at— tribuics as essence constitute the natura naturans. Augustine. Quoted in Jeremy R. London: Routledge. Seminar Session On Scholasticisin anti Spinoza. whicls is actually reali. This tradition passed into Christ ianity through numerous thinkers. Deleu. O. “tue One does not come out of itself in order 10 produce Being. p. 2000. “Prefice“ to The Afew Spinoza. lt is op position. Quotcd in Olivier Davies.ed in an expressive pantheism or immanence“ (EPS. Seminar Session On Scholasticism anti Spinoza. inasinuch as it remains witinn a pamheistic rcalni in which God is in Nature. . None of beitig or God or Nature remains outside existence. Carrette. This implies a static divine rather than a God/Nature under construction. for: “Expressive immanence is grafted onto die theme of emanation. 1 0. a comparative study ofGilles Deleuze. Fauauht anti Reh. as weil as being what is ex— pressed by modes as natura naturata. see also EPS. “Incarnation. 6. hut our mystical comprcbension ofGod is Iimitcd to retracing bis emanations. Finally. The distinction between Substance. p. that the Otte can— 4 p. writing: “There is no dialectic. O‘Meara. see. 178/162. Gilles Deleuze. Quoted in Ray L. lt would be over the question of Spinoza‘s iinmanent/emanativc Substance that Negri and Deleuze would 12. nonbcing is nothing. As Deleuze cxplains Plotinus. Montag. Aiberto Toscano dis cusses “the compulsive ritual of exorcisni which German pbilosophy bad submitted itseif to with regard to Spinozisrn. Being is being. 7. and this is the distinction 1 will pursuc in relation to Spinoza‘s “mysticism. 14 January 1974. and is precisely what Deleuze seeks to avoid. p. hut Being comcs out of the One. V. “resortcd to mysticism. because if it came out of itseif it would become Two. Deleuze cannot allow for an emanative interpretation of Spinoza‘s Substance as this would lead to a pure expressionism. in bis important book The Savage Anomaly understands Spinoza‘s ontology in a similar way. The question of Deleuze—Spinoza‘s relation to Plotinus res olves around Ilse relation ofan ernanative to an univocal ontology.“ quoted hy Brian Massumi. lts most important figure was Plotinus. “Thinking Difii‘rence. Also. 220). whose lee— tures aixl notes were edited hy Porphyry. and tbrougb mysticistn there re— emerged the old and always repeated pantheistic illusion of the immobility of heing. especially in relation to their respective work on Spinoza. 8.ion. 1 shall re 7 turn to this spiritual flcsh in Chapter Six. and appeared as the Enneatis. which in part encourages it. Eapressianism afier f)eleuze anti Guattari. For an accounr ofAugustinc‘s relation to neo-Platomsm see John D. 180/163). 15.“ in “Fanaticism and Production: On Schelling‘s Philosoplty ofindifference“ in Ph. lt is an obstacle ofthc constructive project“ (p. 255/294. “is first of all a metaphysical thesis that the essence and thc exisrcncc ofbeing arc otte and the same. GiHes Deleuze. ric Alliez explores the conflueticcs of Dclcuze and Plotinus in capitab Times: Tales ftom the canqiiest af Dme. Deleuze also gives a brief account ofneo-Plaronism in LS. first part ways. The mutual ad— miration of Negri and Dcleuze. Studies in Augustine anti Eringena. Deleuze argues tliat cmanation represses expressionism becausc it cannot (10 without a “nsininsal transcendence“ (EPS. sees Spinoza‘s ontology as cm anative. 8.e‘s rcading of Spinoza‘s expres sionism is directly oppossed to Negri‘s ott this point.l 5. 13). and in part represses it“ (EPS. p27. attributes and modes can bc understood according Lo a scholastic distinction Spinoza sometimes employs. Dcleuze therefore d istinguishes an emanative ontology/the ology front a univocal and immanent otte. 1999. “Translators lntroduction“ (ATi 517). There is rio on tological essence that resides heyond thc world.“ A Shock ta Thought. Pierre Macherey. “God and Creature in the Etcrnity and “lime of Nonbeing (or Nothing): Afierthinking Meister Eckhart. Negri however. God ex presses irseif in itseif as natura naturans. quoted by Ddeuzc (EPS. This is the very formula of the emanative cause. 13. this relation is not always clcar.72—3. Eckhart‘s God is similar to Plotintis‘ One in this respect. 9.“ ilse Otherness fGad .l 00.

Translatcd and edited by E. the BwO. Negotianons. nranslatcd hy D. “The Keeper of Shecp.“ he argues. in the most Spilto7ist sense of die word. 308. lt is God‘s immanence that is articulated through creativity.st. Für an interestilig comparison of Dclcuze and Whitchead framed in terms ofthc enianativc/iininancnt relation 1 havc already discussed. writing thar: “Perhaps Cliristianity docs not produce coneepts except through its atheism“ (WI 92/88). as it is expressed (being). “The hody withoun organs. 22. . San Fransisco: City Light ßooks. “The judgement ofGod‘ l‘)eleuze and Guartari svrite. By doing so we make rhe divinutv worldly hut do not eliminate it. and as we shall see. this is not a rcstriction because God‘s ideal unity is nothing hut die immanence of God in the multiplicity of müdes. 197/18(1) Deleuic finds in Spinoia‘s Suhsrance. No.“ Jnsurgencies. an organisation oforgans ealled die organism. The BwO therefore secms to specifieally replv to Deletize‘s initial ohjection ahotit Spinoza‘s ontologv. “the System ofnlie jtidgernciit of God. Thomas Bernhard. In terms of Ncgri‘s political concept of constituent power. 756—7. see Yirniiyahu ve1. this comnion projecr of Nietzsche and Spinoza is niarkcd hy highly divergent means. 1972—1990. 1998. Gilles Dcleuzc. In A Thousand Plateaus Dcleu7c and Guattari oder a similar reading of Spinoza.2 The Adventures ofimmanence.“ Deleuze and Guattari write. ahhough 1 believe it lies implicit in much tliat 1 wrote thcre. lt scems to mc that the critical expressionl cmi— struction of will to powcr. The creanve project wonld he bot!. hecause God‘s unity exisus oniv in the neecssary multiplicity of its creative movenicnts. “Deleuze and Guartari and the Philosophy of Expression. They arguc that the BwO is an unformed matter with an “intensirv = 0“ (ATP 1 53/189) and thus conforms to the “qualitative identity of die absolute“ (EPS. it is not a question of unity hut of immanence. and ii hardiy needs pointing out that Nietzschc‘s athcism will ins oive thc death of God. Artatid‘s BwO is Spinoza‘s God/Nature.1 single substance. This would not seem a prob 1cm für Delcuic. just as it defines thcir mysticism. “the great hook ol die BwO“ . the crcativitv of Spinoza‘s inul— titude is rcstrictcd hy its retentiott ofan ideal unity in and as God. “effectivcly goes hevond anv Opposition hetween the oiie anti die multiple. BwO. and finds us propcr name as. Ofcourse. as a nnivocal heing which is continually hecoming iii its intensive individuations. p. immanent hmit“(AT1 1 54/191). Dcleuzc‘s formulation of Spinoza‘s immanent anti expressive God. Extinction. finds explicit cchoes in Alfred Notih Whitchcad‘s “proccss“ philosophv. Für Deleuze ott Whitehcad sec TF.“ Ca.Power anti the Modern Statt. Gilles Deleuze. “is die immanent suh— stance. 1 lonig and S. is preeisely die operation of 1 le who niakes an organisin. 18.od is constructed (hecoming). London: Penguin.“ The Poems ofFernando Pessoa. 28. infemally divinc ( 7he Anticl‘r. while Spinoza‘s involves his true undcrsanding. the rheological system. This “identity“ is elahorated in Deleuze‘s discussions of Nietzsehe and Spinoia‘s shared devaluajion ofcon sciousness and inorality. 25 November. 26. 27. The BsvO is niodificd in quantitative individuanions measured as intensities. 21. 1996. understood as rhe genetic process in which (. Artaud and Spinoza seem mi die fiiee of in an unlikely comhination. . and thcir sharcd atheisni. Similarly. Spinoza‘s EtIiics heing. p. hut that crcativity as stich s die athcisrn proper to religion. 1980. “Deleuze et Whitehead. art. 141/184—5. 24 January 1978. constituenj. Seminar Session osi Spinoza. 20.iadjan Revieu‘ of (Jinnparative Literature. The uninterrupted couti auutn of die BwO. and the signifi— cance ofhis hackground as a Marrano Jew. p. 1 did not develop an argument für Nictzsche‘s atheistic niysticism in die previous cltapter. . see Arnand Viliani. involves an athcistic mysticism which culminates in.2. 1996. 61). hecausc He can— not bcar the BwO“ (ATl 158—9/106—7). Spinoza and Other Heretitz vol. [ 1 ‘There is a conninutim of all tue antrihutes Ot genus‘s of in— tensity under .“ Spinoza‘s atheisin would in this way rcmain wirhin rhc Christian tradition in retaining “the ultimate defin— ing characieristic of die religious concept of creativity. hut für Deleuze thcy hoth rceonstruet die hody outside of God‘s judgemeut. 19. 327/390). McLintock. N1 39/44—5. creativ— ity‘ cloes not rcmain unified in God. nevertheless warns that it docs not avoid “in a dcfinitivc manner“ rhat point in dc judeo—Christian tradition where all experience is hrought back to unity. as what we alreadv arc. so “ 24. while acknowlcdging diat atheisin is the creativc moment in Spinoza. 011 Deleu7e‘S accouflt. inas— much as it. Deleuze and Guatrari wdl extend this idea to philosophy. and the powcr of die false it implies and emhod— ies in die simulacra.ion an Spinoza 25 November 1980. and expressed in acnual bodies and ideas (we will sec that Deleuzc reads Spinoza in preeisely these terms). Für the story of Spinoza‘s relationship ro the Jewish church. Negri. A eonununm ofali suhstanees in intensity and ofall intensities in substance. For Delenze however. 76—82/103—1 2. This implies a siligle plane of immanence. or Dcity. “1b cxpropriate Cod of us creativity is not decisive. As Nictzsche wrote. Seminar Ses.“ in Reime dc MetapIi‘sujue et dc Monde. they say.24i Notes to chapter 7vo Notes to chapter 1o 245 17. 25. who does not claim Spinoza‘s creative atheism is not religious. this Linie through die intcrcession of Antonin Artaud. anti the partial ohjeers arc like its ultimate attrihutes“ (AO. Brown. Art as ereation therefore defines hoth Nietzsche and Spinoza‘s atheism. In other words. p. Seminar Session on Spinoza. immanence. and in Deleuze‘s discussiou of ihe affeet as an immanent es aluation in C2. 23. ifwe allow cre— ativitv to hc defined still hy thc unity of rhe crcativc project. 20. anti a continuum of‘ die intensities ofa ecr— tain genus tnider a single t) pe or attribute. Gilles Deleuze. Fernando Pcssoa. (illes Delcuie. Für Deleuze and Guattari on Pcssoa‘s work see W1 167/1 58. this is: ‘An art so divine. unifed and multiple on this account. 188. See SPR chapter 2. Für a short account of Pessoas relation to Deleuze and Guattari see Brian Masstuni.

Longitude and latitude give us a cartography to understand the becom— ing of affect. 181—2/165). The body is akvavs in movement. Aeeordingly. as formulated hy Thomas Aquinas. Dialogues. Bodies arc mate rial llows distinguishcd hy their inovement and specd. 8 Gilles Deleuze.“ Rethinking Marxism. hut also on a plane whieh is itsclf alive with he vital niovements of nonorganic lif. 40. abthough it would he a faseinating haie for further research. Nothing bot af— feets and bes 1 movements. Negri‘s appeal to die “void“ in flmefi. p. p. 37. sud towards the cntirelv prodtictive plane of iinmanence where die constructioli of Suhsrauce is immanent wirh its expressioli. To gesture at Spinoza‘s conneetion to it is all that can 1w done here. and Delenze.“ they write. This Spitiozian body of affeet is developed bv Deleuze and Guattari in A ihonsand Plateans. Obs iously a fa ll 1 discussiou of die relation of Negri‘s work to Deleuze‘s. p. Lantude sud longitude arc the rwo elements ofa carrography“ (AT1 260—l/3l 8). 24 January 1978.2i6 Notes to chapter Two (ATP 153/190). where Cod is unrcpresentab!e and yet inore real than his catthly representations. 41. “is not defined by the form that dc— termines it nor as a determinate substance or subject nor hy thc organs it pos— sesses or rhc functions it flilfils. and to which corre— sponds a degree of power that deterntines hodies‘ power to act. 18) See Gilles Deleuze. There is of course. For s first ap/roaeli to this quesrion however. The credit goes ro Spinoza for calling attention ro diese two dimensions ofthe Body. Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze. Strophic Poenis) iii eontinne this gesture flauv rd.il1 Delenze and Clairc Parnet. although analogv becamc the orthodox Christian position. 43. Session an Spinoza. or 2) an analogical niodel whcre God‘s heing is different front ours.r Revolution as being that with which heing eonfronts itself in its ptoecsses of hecoming eehocs Deleuze‘s use of “death“ and the “oh— ject=x“ in DiJf?rence arid Repetition as die genctic element in the lepetition of difference. 15 001— side the scope ofthis book. die sum total ofthe intensive affects it is ca— pable of at a given power or degree of potential (latitude). The ethical question for botb is the same. 36. 31 32. “A body. 35. es pacitics to affict and be affected“ (ATP 261/3 18). 1. 1 3 january 1 981.3 Januar‘ 1981 Antonio Negri regards this final moment ol Spinoza‘s Ethicsas the point where bis “aseetieism“ imposes on ulilvocitv a separation ofthe divine front lifi ihat denies a total immanencc of beitig sud hecoming. In being anti—reprcsentational a Spinozian theory ol art will hreak with these or thodox rhcologies.“ i/o‘ iVeu Spinoza. Guattari. its reality as an idea in itselfis “the thing the idea is or the degree of reality or perfcction it possesses in irselE audi is its intrinsic character. 7 (1994). and so assumes a diffirent sort of being. a body is a‘efined on/y by a longitutle and a latitude: in othcr words the sum total of the mate rial elemems belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest. 33. For Deleuze‘s account of the role of analogy in representation. . 1 87). 34. Hadewijch of Anrwerp writcs ofthe fenuniue sud loving God: “Iftliev love bier (bove) with the vigour of love.“ In othcr words this is its essence and cxpresses (jod. not just in material and intense transforinations. Negri argues. speed and s!owness (longitude). and the essential affectual capacities available to a given mate rial assemhiage. . 1iiis capacity or power gives a “mode ofindividuation“ (ATP 261/318) vcry difkrent from a person. (Dialogues. they will soon be one with love in love“ (1 ladewijch of Antwerp. for cxamplc God heing ro man as man is to au art. “The Problem of the Attributes. “Reinvcnting a Physiology ofColleeiive Liberation. 24 January 1978. Seminar Session On Scholasticism and Spinoza. 13 Jannary 1981 “The opposition of ex pressions sud signs S one of die fundamental prineiple.ffrrence and Repetition. philosophical sud lneaary expression. Seminar Session of3inoza. ir also spesks in Henry Miller‘s words: “Everytliing stands in a certaill av ii s certain place. Theologies of equivoeity and analog) both require representation as their tlieoretieal mechanisni. in separating itself from the produetion ofdesire touches upon the notion ol heatitude without appropriaring it“ (Tzrnefir Revolution. see Kenneth Surin. Gilles Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze. p. see DR. 42. 137—8/179—80. 14 Januarv 1974. 24 January 1978. 30. “forms an image of beatittade that. however.“ (oing ‘beyond Marx‘ in the IVlarxisni(s) of Negri. Spinoza‘s attack on representatiott implied by bis conccpt of univociry is also a dircet attack upon orthodox theologieal models. hut is un— dcrstood thiough a proeess ofanalogy. hceause it assured a Notes to chapter ivo 245‘ 29. (. 39. These assutned 1) an equivoeal mode! of being. Deleuze argues that an idea‘s firmal reality. For example. cominon measure and hence a eoinprehensibi!itv to the otherness of God. 11.. This argument takes iii back to Deicuze‘s “correction“ of Spinoza through Nietzsehe in Di. Pierre Macherey. Session an St. and for having defined the plane of Nature as pure longitude sud laritude. sud visa versa. a strong tradition of bove—mystieisnt sshieh eonstitutes a transversal lilie finding religious. “How Do You Make \burselfA Bodv Withont Organs?“ We will piCk up this question again in Chapter Six. italics added. . Deleuze and Cuattari ca!l this mode of individuation a “haecccity. Seminar an . 38.“ which “consists emirely of relations ofmovcmcnt sud rest hetween molecules or particies. lndeed.Stinoza. Spinoza‘s asCcti— cism. Seminar Session of. 9.s ofSpinotism“ (EPS.Spinoza. Debeuze ahandons these terms in turn— ing Spinoza avay from the problem of the separation of Substance front tlic modes. to beconte atheist in die terins we have alreadv discussed. one could ilnagine the differeuee hetween Deleuze sud Negri on ihis point in the same terms as die diflcrenee betwecn Diffrrence and Repetition sud Deleuze‘s later work. Gilles Deleuze. differemial speeds. Seminar Session fSpinoza. 13 Januar‘ 1981. thing or substance. Session an Spinoza. Gilles Deleuze.noza. On the plane efconsistency. subject. As we have seen.

1. 309/288).. 46. “we hardly du anything else than set going a kind of cine rnatograph inside us. while being entirely Bergsonian.: du ratiois is what di/frrsfro. not added from “abovc“ as the general conditions of natural perceprion. “imrncdiatcly gives usa rnovenlent-image. of course. we rnight add Dcleuze hirnseif to this abstract line of love nwsticisrn.“ he writes. 58/85).“ Tue iVew Bergson. lt does give us a section. Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeshzo in Philosophy. Deleuze insists on Matter anti Mernorv as an initial affirniation of cinensa counreracdng Bergson‘s Liter rejection of it. In the cuurse of this scarch culture as a separatc spherc is ohliged tu negate itself“ (secrion 180). Delcuze explicirly disrin— guisbes die “whule“ fruni sers. which the works ofthe poets and artists have hefttoforc rnerely rep— resented‘ (section 187). p.‘ L‘ile Dserte etAutres Textes 1953—1974. (“La conception dc la diffcrence chez ergson. “thc love of a (4od vho is hi usd1 joyful. Dcleuzc reverses Bcrgson‘s view. Through God. “Cinenia Year Zero. bv the Eact that Bergson‘s critique is pretnkcd oti bis plulosophy of die mm erneut— image found “in die brilliant Orst chapter of sWatter and Mernory“ (Cl 58/85). “Bergson and Cineuia: Fticnds or loes?. 6. For a discussion ui Bergson‘s relation tu cincrna sec Paul Douglas. which he coun ierposed to the religion ofthe church. 31/22). Bergson discusscs Zcno‘s paradoxes in CE. 5. not an iminobile section + ahstract rnovcment“ (Cl. and everidung whicli is closed is arri— ficiallv closed. Deleuzc argues. In l3ergson Deleuze finds an (ntology of cinenta capable of aflirming its coexistence wirli life itselE The phrase is Bergon‘s (CE. Not Cod hut life is love.“ l3crgson argued that cinenianc irnages opcratc in the same way as conscious peiception. 306). X e may therefore stirn tip what we have becn saying in 7 the conclusion titat the rnechanism ojour ordinary knowledge is ofa cinemato giiplnctil kinil“ (CE. all refcr— ences to this hook now found in the text following thc abbreviation “CE“). (Translated by D. Love 22 is also the culminating state of vital rnysticisrn for Bergson. . bv now fantiliar tu Us: “What in elkcr is duration?“ Deleuze asks. p. He writes of the mystic that. Flenri Bergson. 199). Crcgory Flaxinan. 305. “Bergsun‘s conception ufdiffcreuce. 51) 3. converts the movement olduration mb a “series of snapshors. 22/12). 319).. p. Ncw York: Zone Books. 1995). This rather odd statcmcnt is just ilicd. and is the conceptual inedsod adequatc tu tinse hecause ii presupposes duration. he clairned.“ Tue Neu‘ Beigson. ‘Ihe plnlosophical iinplications of this universal variation arc. 108. it is the love of God for all men. or evcn perceive ir. p. wltich arc in fact different in kind (See B. Nicholson—Smith. p. Ott the Deleuic—l3ergson relation in die cinema buoks sec. who in the third kind of knowledge flnds. in the strengrh of God. who loves hinisclfand loves us with the same love bv vhich we love hirn‘ (EPS. l)e/euze und ti‘e Philosophy ofCineina. 3 [ p. Deleuze argucs. 3 (“La conception dc la diff&ence chei Bcrgsun.“ 2.“ 1 ‘le Dt‘serte it Autres Textes 1953—1974. 2/11). Gilles Deleuze. 1 ike Deleuze. but a sec don whicli is mobile.“ The New l ergson. ‘it consisis in thinking in remis of durarion“ (B. to City Debord‘s Sociery /‘ die Spectacle. Sers arc closed. “is the locus ofthc search fir lost unity.3/1). placing creation [sack mb thc midst of life. Delcuse dcvclops die rnerhodology uf intuition itt lengtls in Bergsonism. or express it. is a inap ol uur love. 9. Michael Flardt. As an example ofnatural perception Bcrgson thought the cinerna could only give an image of movernent which was a fast succession of frozeat attitudes.Notes to Chapter Three a mir nnnds stands n telation to Gocl. p. at least as Deleuie explains thern. Dchord also proposes an acstheric ofteniporal contestation: “ilw point is tu rake ei— fecnvc possession of the eoinmunity ofdialugue. For Dcleuze. the separation ofart and li1i has alwavs bern produced throngh CIsc assumptions. Love. The reference is. “Intuition is Ilse rnethod of Bergsonisrn“ (B. love. as wc shall sec. in its visihle. runs contra tu Bcrgson‘s ciwn theory of the “cinernarogr aphical niechanisin. “the love which consurnes hirn ii no longer sirnply the love of man for God.n itsef“ “Bergson‘s conception ofdif— fcrence. Zeno‘s paradoxes show how our rational euuccpt of muvement is inadequate hecause it confiates duration and extcntion. Notes ta C‘hapter Three 249 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1. ihe iropic o/‘Cspricorn. understands this reitisertion through thc operation of the 1-legeliatt dialectic. The Two Sources ofRelzion and 3 Morality. I)cLtiie ßnds Bergson‘s onrology so tlioroughly‘ cinernaric that he 4. Cinerna. 44. arguing that movernent belongs to cinema‘s image direcdy. hut on die contrarv that . 48. Deleuze‘s insistence on the carly‘ Bergson is both an implicit cririque of Bergson‘s retreat irom the possibility ui percciving duration and bis re—empliasis of a stahle perceptual mechanisin in C‘reative b‘olution. 8. Matter andMernor references to this book now found in the text following the abhreviation “MM. Finally. 7. “Everything that Bergson says ahout duration always comes hack tu du‘. The world. Debord however. 308—3 13. 1 1 The whole is not a closed set. lovc“ (Henry Miller. Consciousness. Dehord affirms die polirical nccessiry uf‘ re—inserting art mb the evervday. writing: “The wholc anti the wholes‘ must not be confused wirh sds. 2—3.“ Bcrgson argues. 1982). London: BCA. he loves all mankind with divine love“ (Henri l ergson. and tlic playful relationsliip tu tinle. 49) The onrological status of tlus open “whole of duration is anothcr of ilse stakcs in Main Badiuu‘s dispute witb Dcleuze. according tu Deleuze. p.“ and throws thern on a screcn “so that thcy rcplacc each other i‘ery rapidly“ (Creative Evolution. “Culture. Deleuie‘s ontological valorisation of cinema. tangible Substance. clainis: “Even in bis crit ique of die cinema Bcrgson was in agrcclnent wiili it“ (CI.“ 7/je ßrun is t/e Setzen. “Whctlier wc would think becorning.

This ontological rnovcmcnr is also found in images produced hy other art forms. 11.we ofir. 366. it is color whicb crcates them“ ( Tue C‘ubist Painteia: A esthctic iieditations. and which rc!atcd niovement to die anv—instant—wbatever“ (Cl. writ ing in 1913: “Color is saturated with cnergy and its outmosr points arc pm— longed in space. ininianenec excludcd the All and the only possihle end point of the multi ple. hut less than thar which the realist calls a thing—an cxistence placcd ha!fway hetween the ‘dung‘ uid the ‘representation. The ereative properties ofthe cvent arc thereforc generated by the disjunctive and genetic power of the void‘s radical exteriority. Indeed.“ The Brain is the Screen. Multiplicities. constructs images in which lighr is inovetncnt. Deleuze and the Philasophy of Cinerna. and as with bis reading of Deleuze‘s simulacra. lt would seem that it is not vcry easy to definitively abandon the presupposinons of the dialectic“ (Deleuze: The (%amauro/‘Bein. Badiou. As do tbe films ofJacques Rivette (C2. understands dc multiple (duration in Deletize‘s Bergsonian terms) as a inul— tiplicity of aetna! or closed sets whose becorning is gencrated not by their opening onto each other in tue “open“ universe of durarion.. picto— . 11). 48) Badiou elahorates bis argument vith Deleuze over die omology olset rheory in. see also 282 3/20). hut a seif—existing image“ (MM. they ‘were not“ (Deleuze: The 7amour of Being. “ir‘s not blood jr‘s rcd“) and revalues die action ofibe eve. oti the pre-war Frencb scbool offilm-makcrs. Painting and cinema iherefore horb develop a movement—image. die ohjcci is. as rein stating a type of Plaronism. 46). Badiou sees rhc Deleuzian whole (durarion) as rran scending the actual. eacli in their own medium.eatre ofPhi/osopiy. This is precisely. it moves in a cerrain fixcd direcrion. as 1 hope to show. 10/21). Badiou presents bis opposition to Delcuze as. Against realisni and idcalism. Or as Bcrgson lias in “Our sun radiates hear and lighr heyond the flirtbest planet. Building mi the scicntiflc work done by Eugcne Chevreuil. In its materialism I)elauney‘s painting shanes an onrological ground with cineina. wcre ahandoning figures md poses ro release val— ucs which were not posed.‘ iheoretical Writings.“ Giftes Deleuze und die ii. the other a fasrer . wbich is akvavs the multiple of niultiples (and ncvcr the multiple of Ones). 41). on die other hand. “there S 110 essential difference“ hetween “light and movements (MM. Bergson argues thar pereeptions ol‘ tbings—iinages in tbe eve arc “vihrations oflight. Delauney.“ This means. This is a phrase of Deleuzes. continuous move— incnt of coinplemenrarv colors. Matter.) Guillaume Appo!linaire exp!ains the materialist aesrbetics of Delauney rather weIl. distinctions herween die arts accordmg ro their modalities of exprcssion—cinema at this time was not concerned wirb color fon exaluple. 11/20). which “owes much to Delauney‘s colonism“ (CI ‚45/72). the objcct exists in itse!f. anti. like cinema. especially die work of Robert Delauney wbicb drcw 011 conternporarv scientific theories ofcolor as a radiant encrgy.ind uneu cn movement of jarring. New York: Wittenborn Schultz inc. “even painting. “fir mc. Multiple. by directly assigning the chance of thought to a discernible division of its objects. is an aggregate of ‘images. discovered die differcut moe— ments ofsun and 1110011 ligllt. Nevertlieless ir is along this thread that is transinitted down to the smallest particle of rhc world in wbich we live the duiation iiiuiii1icnt tu the wliolc of the universe“(CE.‘ l‘his conception of • matter is silnply that ofcornmon sense. Color 110 lollger depends on die dree known dimensions. “Cilles Deleuze: Tbe Fold: Leibniz and thc Baroquc. for hirn. ncver cornplctely shel tered. in our vicw. De!euze writes. An Anthology of Ghanging Ideas. The thrcad attaching it tu the rest of rhc universe is doubdess very tenuous.‘ And by ‘image‘ we niean a certain exislene which is more rhan that which the idealist calls a represen— tation. As a result. T‘his cnergetic—marerialist thcory ol color rejected pai ntiiig‘s representational lunction flur an exploration of die vihrarious produced hy die simultaneous contrast ofco!ors. Dcleuze argues. then. l 15. “The Brain is thc Scrcen: an interview with Cilles Deleuze. Painting explored ihe movemeilt of matter tbrougb its experimenrations vith color. p. around the same rune as cineina‘s hirth die other arts. (Delaunev explicirlv claiins this for bis work in “Oii thc Construcnion ol Rcaliiy in Pure Painung“ Art in Theory 1 900—1 990. Bergson argues. p. on the other hand. Deleuze clainis. and in ‘One. in contrast to Deleuze. 9—10).. 251 by virtuc of which the Set is never absolutely closed. in itself. each art form will require a taxonomy specific ro ir. And. “one constituting a circular. 1 na Furrhcr on. Abel. This sbared ontology nevertbeless admits. Finally. iridescenr colors. This is entire!y consislemit sith Deleuze‘s Bergsonian . Color is strippcd of any representarional ftinetion (as Codird so lamotisly stated. 6—7/16). was the multiple ofnothing: the empry set“ (Deleuze: The C‘larnour of Being. multiplicities ‘wcre‘ sets. translated hy L. which now construcrs a material vihrarory thread envcloping brain and world. a mistake also to make ofit a thing ahle to produce in us pcrceptiolls. [ For conimon seusc. what Deleuze attenipts to avoid in bis reading of Bergson. 1 2. that which keeps it open by tbe finest thread which atiaches it to the rest of the universe“ (CI.250 Notes to Chapter Three Notes to Chapter Three . De!auncy then. not measured. 10. and iiidced requires. and his exploration ofsimultanc— ous conrnasts was influennial. For hirn rhere is a problem with “this providcntial markirig as to the theory of the two—the virrtial and the acrual—parts of the object: lt sorely p1115 untvoeiry to the test. This has impli— cations for paintmg similar tu those Deleuzc flnds for cinenia. hut by opelling onto the void. hut in itselfis ofanothcr nature than they. 85). 1945).. the rwo together making tip and projecting an eter— nal mirage on ro the earth“ (C2. p. 11/20. For Badiou. draw— ing with it dc planers and their satellites. Following bis quotation of the latter part of the ahove passage Badiou succinctlv presents one of his major ohjections to Dcleuie. “it is a inistake to reduce mat ter to the perception svhich we h. as we perccivc ir: image jr is. Herc it is die medium s‘bich is the reality. 13..

2 (1893—1913. 1999. 5elected Philosophical Writings. “possihlcs. especially his suggestion that Vcrtov‘s material consciousness is a eilte— tnatic answem to die sovier problem of ‘sclf—conscious dcmocracy‘ (p.“ Bounda?y 2. by adding transi tional images moving from aftction to action (die impulse—image) and from action to relation (die reflection—image). Both techniques appear in Man with a Movie C‘arnera.). 31. 23. Deleuze will argue that Peirce finally makes ofthe sign some thing linguisric. lnysticism. while also point— ing out die ways in which Peirce himselfdeparts from it. p. Peirce. “whilc mysticism is not kfcrred to cx— plicitly hy Deleuze in bis works on cinema.“ The Essential Peirce.“ “What is a Sign?. . Deleuze says: “Peirce can sometimes find himselfas much a linguist as the scmiologists“ (C2. Qualisign).“ Deleuze and Religion. percepti n “limits itselfto the objects which acrually influence our organs and prepare our movements“ (MM. lndeed. 76 Definitions ofthe S. 14. Index ofequivoc— ity. This is an echo of Peirce. 4 (MS-380). Peircc. Peirce. The nature of this “partial conformity“ can be seen in comparing the disnncnons of Deleuze‘s schema with those Peirce makes in “Sundry Logical Conceptions.). 31/46). 29. In fact. Selected Philosophical Writings. hut an show how cinema remakes die world. hut which also have a genetic aspect rdflecting their genesis in the “ground zero“ ofthe perception image. each division in rum implying a change in the metrical prineiple of its measure (B. and an “affcct“ (aflctus) is the passage froni one statc to anothem as this indicates abc incrcase or dc creasc of a bodics power. which contains almost thc cntirety of Deleuze‘s historical contextualisation ofcincma‘s production of time—iniages. die new consciousness of minomities. Affection-image ([cnn of power. Idol. 21. which is neither indivisible nor iinmeasurable. avoids die shot—reverse shot constmuc tions which tend to establish suhjective telations. Vector). Charles S. 5. p. 17.ogical Conceprions. 19. 15. Selectecl Phi/osophica1 Writings. As Michael Goddaad has poinaed out. 40/31—2.“ while “affect“ refers to qualities or powers extracted dom affcctions and treated as pure. as the Perception image (Dicisign. p. and in A T iousandPlateans. the influence on thc cinema of the ncw modes of narrative with which literature bad expemimcnted. p. lmprint). This enahlcs hini to focns on the intensive affects ofthe face as die real “suhjects“ ofthc film. Sclectez/ Philosophical Wrztzngs. We will see in what ways classical cinema was ahle to open its mon aagcd sets. au tonoanous. die crises of Hollywood and its old genres (Cl. Reume. As a result. in favour ofthe “virttaal cnn— junction“ of“flowing closc—ups“ (CI. 268—9. it is called Feeling.“ The Essentzal Pezrce. the unsreadiness of the ‘American I)aeain‘ in all its aspects. as wc have seen.e. and cinema. 18. 3 1/46).). Peirce. Reflection-image (Figures of attraction. hut a symptomatic one. In thc Cinema hooks “affcction“ and “affect“ arc known as “perception-image“ and “aftection—image. Delcuze notes. Discnrsivc sign). Dclcuze is bete referming to his carlicr disctission of the relation of the “open wholc‘ ofdnraaion as plane ofconsistcncy to the artificial closure ofsets (sec note 9). “Dziga Vertov and the Film ofMoney. is not so much in— tercsted in showing how the world affects cinema. 16. 5 (Collccted Papers 7—356). 2 (1893—1913. Charles S. hut whose division implies a change in nature. Demark. Binomial. Action—image SAS (Synsign. and reattach a thread connecting them to the universe. But Deleule‘s purpose is not to pmovide a histomical reading of the time— image.“ and “Nomenclatnre and Divisions of Triadic Relations. and its opeaation ofopening to a direct image ofaime and ofahe vir— tual.3. is a parallel process In die mystical metanioiphosis ofsnhjectivity iden— tified by Bcrgsnn. 76 DeJinitions ofthe Sin. Thus Deleuze iclentifies six types of images. Peirce. 30. the Impulse—image (Fetish. Vol. The reasons for this bmeakdown. who descrihes it as a “Feeling.“ lhe Essenual Pehce. 206/278).‘n. 2 (1 893—1913). Deleuze exrends Peirce‘s model in applying ir to the cincma. 2 (1893—1913). the risc and inflation of images hoth in the extemnal world anti in people‘s rninds. 27. “Standry I. Dclcuic atgues. “What Is a Sign?. Vol. because no “material that cannor he reduced to an utterance survives. Charles S. Peirce.“ The Essential Peirce.“ “Thc scattering of tinte crystals: I)cleuie. We may wondem at the telegmapliic natume of this sentencc. Figumes of inversion. Deleuze (and Guattari) will. Charles 5. 26. Charles 5. Vol.“ The Essentia/ Peirce. wcae “the war and its cnn sequences. and ATT 483/604). Relation-image (Mark. The six types ofvis ible movement images and their compositional and genetic signs arc listed by Deleuze “in partial conformitywith Pierce“ (Cl. 76 Definitions ofthe Szn. “borrow his terms. 165). Se/ectea‘ Philosophical Writzngs. Deleuze uses this initial “strengrh“ of Peirce. the centraliay of the cmystallinc regime. “What is a Sign?. In relation to Spinoza. Symptom). Gramme). Once again Deletaze focuses on montage as the creative mechanism of Dreyer‘s affectual film. 5. Dreyer. 62. 25. For I3ergson. 22. Charles 8. Symbol) (Sec also C2. Peirce. in othcr words. without compulsion aaad withour reason. 4. as they say. and ASA (Index oflack. 142/198). 24. [con of quality. p. “affcction“ (afli‘ctio) is 1 a state of the body as it is affected hy another hody. 4. and hence [Peircel reintroduces a subordmation ofsemiotics to a lan— guage system“ (C2. Vol. 16 (MS-599). 26. 107/152).). Deleu./. 20. Jonathan Bellor has devcloped Deleuze‘s reading of Vemtov in intcresring ways. 32/48). As we shall see. We should note bete a changc in Dclcuic‘s tcraninology. “What Is a Sign?“ The Ersential Peirce. Notes to Chapter 7 Yree 253 14. even while ehanging their connotations“ (ATE 531/177). p.252 Notes to Chapter Three understanding of duration as a multiplicity. Selected Philosophical Writings.“ 28. Peirce describes it as “a stare of mmd in which something is present. each ofwhich aac orgamsed in an opposition reflecring rhe two sides of the sensory-motor interval.“ Charles 5. 2 (1893—1913. 2 (1893 1913. 14il. 179).

Berkeley: University of Califirnia Press. a1tr— word tu tue English translatiun). Representing Rea/itj fssues anti (Joncepts in I)acuroentvy. and which arc ‘always ready tu ciysta/lizi‘ into uttered words“ (MM. Dt‘leuze himself stggests such a projection uf Bergsutt when lw claims liii “returt tu Bcrgson“ ii “a renewal ur ati extension of bis prujeu tuday“ (B. 123/161—2). Hcnri Bergsun. Dclcuzc suggests this when he wrires. 133/174). tu “haptie“ signs. in defitting an aestbetics uf time—itnages. 43. 37. wliich takes the place of the faee itself for the UtOSC of the affects. 1995. a itt ict definition uf neo—realism tu later Italian dircctors. 39. Constrtietion hecomes thc “sttbject“ uf ute fi!nt... . 40.“ “Midday. hut argui ng tlte‘ buth aclueve a cittematic cuttstruct ivism in which distinctions between trutli and fislsitv arc dissulvcd itt the prucess uf constructing imagcs. like external perception.“ Tue Brani 15 ii Sereen: Gilles Deleuze anti hie Phizlosop/y of C‘int‘ma. 33. 1 7 7vo . 188. read ing the paper. p. ?he 7i‘o Source3 ofAforality anti Religion. 295 anti 297.. As we have seen.ind haptic fruns die art hisrorian Alois Riegl. ifwe follow Riegl‘s firinula fiar indicat— ing a tunching which is speeifie tu the gase“ (C2. a “touehing“ in wluch subject and ubject merge.“ “This Intention.“ its disappearanee ii unlv nominal. in uther wurds. j. Bergson argues. But we can cuneeive an inqtnry turned in the same direcrion as art..Source o/‘Mora/ity anti Re1iion. “on cundi— nun dmt the hand relinquishes its prehensilc and motor lunetions tu content itse!fwith a pure touching. and which in tue area ufperceptiun. ita!ics added). 1 it ii possible for the wurk of art tu suceeed in ittventittg these paraluxical hyp— notic and hallueinatory shects whuse prupertv ii tu he at unce a past and al— wavs tu cume“ (C2. becuines the mode ofeonstruction ofa spaee which is adequate tu the decisions of spirit. 35. whu hai suggested ihat Deletize finds in die Cinema huoks. whose name appears in the first sentenee of Cinema 2. atid it ii still in upei atiott in cinema 2 as cinema‘s “puwer uf‘ die false. and die question is nut so much that of percepriun by the eye. This intruduces a theme whieh ofren appears in Deleuze‘s discussions ofart. Flenri l3ergson. p.“ 34. This formulation curnes hum ric Alliez. The hapnc “flesh“ of the tirne—image is bricfly explored in cineni i 2 in rerms Deleuze also crnploys in other eontexts. 57—62/53—7..“ he writes. 36.“ Deleuze suggests. 12—13/22). Here Delenzc closely fulluws the wurk of Andre Bazin. an analuguus proeess can be triggered tu) extraet nun -ehronulugieal time.25i A/otes to Chapter Three Aites to Chapter T/iree 255 32. There Bergson writes uf the “double curretit“ sshteh gues fruni actual image tu tlie ‘thousaitci individital images‘ ss‘hicli arc its virrua! eqiliv— alent in mernory. the barrier that space puts up between hirn and bis mode!. Bluotningtuti lndiatia Universitv Preis. The pruufufthis is that die least cunviticing seene uf Ihr Strauss (at least as far as its “reality“ is cuncerned) is titau in whiclt we find Strauss at home. lt is i-rue that this aesthetic intuition. tor Matisse‘s Bergsonian approach to painting see.“ Deleuze confiates direct cinema witli cinema verite at tlns point diseussing thern. Deleuze takes die dis titictiun uf uptic . and especially whcn we arc uursekcs theautliur. frorn that tnotnent.. . 162). p. tite static nature ufhuth action anti camera ironically re—estab— lishing mir exteriurity at exacdy tlie moment when die “urne“ Strauss supposedly ernerges. [ ] The hand then... “die power of die Ctise cannut he sep— arated from an irreducible inultiplicitv“ (C2. 162. Deleuze fulluws these criteria and expands thern beyond . 217. takcs on a role in the image sshich gues inhnitely beyund the sensory—niutor demands of the action. Ihe 7vo Sources ojMorality andRe1iion. . in placing hitnselfhack wirh the object by a kind of sympathy. hut uf a cunstruetiuti of space by the hand. This taetile image marks the transition from an “upncal. p. which wuuld take life ingeneral for its object. tu die puint uf ineludittg tue Lutistrttction uf the film irseif. . and further tu Europcan cinema after die war. Fur a mure traditiuttal readitig. “Notes ofa Painter“ (1908) in the same volume. only atrains the individual. \X/e see here that although Deleuze abandons die eutleept ufihe “siinttlaera. which attempts tu make a rigorutis distinetion between “direct“ ein— erna anti cinema verite.“ or sensurv—niotur regime uf signs. in breaking down. a “Bergsonism beyondßergson 1 1 a Bcrgsonism projectcd beyond die cacsura hetween the inetaphysical intttitiuii uflife anti the philosuph‘ of thc cuncepr. Deleuze takes horn Bazin what he dc— scribes as the “fundamental requirernent of formal aesthetic criteria“ in order tu dehne the ontulugical hreak in cinema initiated by Italian neu—re— alism (alt hottgh Bazin tinderstands this in phenumenological rather than Bergsunian terms). cleansed of ans‘ spiritnalism uf presence. new tactility ofthe image. by an effort ufintuitiott. ‚ . “whett we read a huuk. 38. this tnaterialism is a ttecessary part of Deleuze‘s acsthetics. and we will returit tu it in eltapters 4 aitd 6. . wateli a sliuw. see Bill Niehols. ur look at a painting. Ii ii at this puint tltat Delettse rel‘rs tu Bergsun‘s faitiotts “eune diagrain (IvIM. 201. This questiun will be takett up and discusscd at lengrh itt Chaptcr Six. hut. 1 Ienri lkrgson. Pur Deleuze‘s rnure detailed discussion uf this diagram see B. . 42. 1991. “is just what the artist tries to regain. 115. p. dehnes a space uf sensation in which the sensory—rnutor distine— nun dues nut operate. Matisse on Art. p 32—75. Plam cd. 1 The hand doubles its pre— hensile functiun (uf object) by a eottnective ftinction (of space). Midnight: The Einergetice of Cine—Thinking. “Perhaps. Henri Matisse. The haptic. “it is 1 the tactile whieh c«tti constitute a pure sensory image. This cre— w ative lifi is hat l3ergson calls in (rarive Evolutwn life‘s “Intention. frum die ab— stractiun uf representation tu the reality of sensation. 217. or at least their representative dirccturs Duti Petinebaker attd Jean Ruuch separatcly. it is the whole eye svluch doubles its optical function by a speeifically ‘grabbitig‘ [ha/tiqueJ one. 41. 44.

er micropowers“ (ATB 531 / 175). absolute deterritorialisation is present in the strata as die revo— lUtionary practice which acts as die cendition of their possihle Operation.“ The Guattari Reade. London and New York: Continuum. Alliei. fL. while appearing to rerurn us te the cireles starting peint. Italian C‘inerna. Foucau/t. Quoted in Bondanello. Te anticipate the next chapter. Niotiations 1972-4990. 48. 82. chapter 2 “Force.“ The Guattari Reacier. Art us Eperience.“ Detix Rejrnes dc fus.“ and “The Place of the Signifier in the 1 nsriturion. 51) so makes ereation relative to the powcr of die strata. 49. 151. Italian (Jinema. The artisan. 8. if sehiio—analvsis must exisr. a co—fittictiening“ (“Dsir et Furrherntore. At one point she cxplains that her doctor told her she most love her husband. and therefiire makes creation “prior te“ power. showed the way fot a diagrammatic analysis ofhisrory. and 2. Seniiotic Enslavement. 2002. has in fact fractured ir hy constr6cting a new rcality. 220.‘ The New Berson. Deleuze and Guattari give a diagrani of pragniatics in which its processual creation of destratifyiug signs appears as a circle with four stages. her job or her dog. hut not hushand—son—job—dog. 4. p. or schizoanalysis is this critical process ef erernal return. 47. the processual ruprures “ . 46. her son. 5. 7. The epitaph is froin John Dewey. Foucault. edited hy E. anti not just aniong schizephrcnics. Gilles Dcleuze. which arc not pltenoniena ef resistance er ceunterattack in an assembiage.“ they write. er melecular fecuses“ (ATB 537/265).‘ Li‘le Dserte et Autres Jxtes 1953 1974. Cilles Deleuze. anti pos‘er seems to be a stranfied dimension ei the assemhiage. ‘Bergson‘s coneeption ei dilTerence.“ Briari Massumj leaves both terms untranslated in A Thousand Plateaus. Dclcuze anti Guattari provide a uscful dia— gram. “There could mtevcr he a schizo—analyst tcchni— cian. 6. p 114). in fact. 293/375. Deleuze anti Cuattari write that Hjelmslev was “the only linguist to have ac— tualiv hroken with die signifier and significd“ (ATR 523/85). a material vitalism that deuhrless exists everywherc hut is ordinarily hiddemt er covened. p. See.es. p.“ “The Place of the Signifier in the Institution. inasmuch as he gave a “machinic“ understanding of power that encompassed beth its “minitiarized mechanisins. a machinicp/y— mm“ (ATP 409/509). rendered unrecogiusahlc“ (ATB 411/512). This is. anti (illes Dcleuzc. p.us. “Our onlv points ci dis— agreement with Feucault arc rhe fellowing. ‘hew abstracr ma— chines arc effectuated in cencrcte asseinblages“ (ATI1 146/182). 145. NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR The first part ei the tide comes froin DR. Ciuliano‘s schizophrenia is a form ofvisionary mysticism. Samsanow and E. ATB 146/182.256 Notes to (Jhapter Four Notes to hapter Four 257 45. “(1) ro us the assent— blages seeni fiindamentallv to he assemblages not ei power hut of desire (desire is always assenihled). “Semiological Subjection. textes et entreliens J95—J995.ind die films of Carl Theodor Dreyer in “Believing in the BwO: Arraud-Delcuze-Drcycr. textes et e)/tretjefls 19‘5—]99.“ Biographien des otganlosen Kö. Deleuie anti Guatrari claini that ‘artisaii“ is a better terin than “artist“ flur the sLltizoanalyst ef art. but cutting edges of creation anti detcrritorialisation“ (ATR 531/176). it is because it already cxists evervwhere. This final stage. Tor a good ilUCOttilt ei Deleuze and Giiatrari‘s theory of die content—cxprcs— sion telation. Thc second stage is the allalysi. and operating as its cendirion. These actual assemhlages were singularities of an abstract ‘diagram‘ or ‘hiopolitics of population‘ as an ahstract machine“ (AT1 531/175). The final “machinic“ cemponent returns us to the actual world. the lines of escapc. 48. p. Pragniatics. lt begins with an analysis ofregimes ofsigns in terms ei thcir expressive forms. (uoted in Peter Bondanella. Gilles Deleuze.: Deleuze and Guatrari draw heavily on die work of Michel Feucault in their aceeunt of absrracr niachines and their diagrammatic operation. Guattari in particular has worked extensively on Hjelmslev. “this would he a eontiadiction in terms. in assum— ing the priority of power relegates creative ferces to reactions to power. tbey say. As Deleuie writes elsewhcre. “Sur lcs principaux concepts dc Michel Foucattlt. Plix Guattari.“ I)cleuie md Guattari writc. Cuattari directly oppeses this “cosnsic artisan“ (ATP 345/426) te the “schizo—analy‘st technician. ene which assunies the pewer ef absolute deterrirorialisatien as im manent te evcry relative deterritorialisatien. in order to show hew it appears rhrough.ied in such a way as te fellow a flow ei matter.“ he says. “dcsirc is hut one with a given asseniblage. 50. As Guattari puts it: “The signifying machine was based on the system ofrep resentation. Dcviationsfrom Deleuze and Guattari. sec l3rian Massumi. a vital state efmat— ter as such. and is conditioned by.pers. “lii show. p. and their cernposi den in “asseinblages of power. See also. From Neorealism to the Present. “is derermi. A User Guide to C‘apitalism and Schizophrenia. In line with this suggestion. a fundamental te—orientation of die Foucauldiait inodel. 219. Vienna: Turia+ Kant. 2003.s ef how regimes of signs transform (dc— and re—territerialise) each ether. 1 have dcveloped Deleuze‘s 6 gure of the “spiritual automaton‘ in relation to Arraud . Plaisar. in ficeimig “a life proper re mauer. 3.i conception dc la diffrence Jez Bcrgson. p. the destrarifying break praglnatics has iiistiruted.“ Deux Reimes dc 14. Foucault‘s analysis. (2) the diagram and ahstract machine have lines offiight diat arc primary. bot in die schii. and the content they determine. Alrhough Deleuze md (uattari give a favourable account ci Foncault‘s inediod they also point out their diffrrences from it by emphasising the way die diagram functions to create a new reality. Ihc rhird “diagram— matic“ component extracts particles—signs front the regimes by censtructing “abstract— real machines“ which absolutely dctcrri ton al ise the strata. they write.

stitutc a priVi— leged exploratory path or other ontological modes of production in that they disclose aspects ofexcess and limit experiences. such beauty il/umines the c/mrch. Chicago: Universiiy of Chicago Press. . . hecause it is not so inuch the end that matters hut the “middle“ itseif“ “Instirutional Schizo—Analysis. a pre—egoiC. lor an extended account of Dtleuze and Cuattari‘s understanding of these paimings hv Turner sec.“ Deleuze and Cmtattari write. hut wlmich arc niote tlian humnan—superhuman in a Nietzschean sense‘ (Chaos. element ofvictory and triumph. W.‘ As Delcuze wrires: “lt is not a qucstion ofopposing ro the dogmatic image of thought another image horrowed. for example. moreover. 1-je was involved in the institution of La Borde that at— rempted to treat schizopbrenia along anti—psychiatry lines. the altarpiece of San Marco. 18. hut rather of reinemhering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact hut also i possihility fir thought—one. wants to make a more radical claim. Steinberg‘s major argument in ihe Sexuality ofhrist in RenaissanceArt und in Modern Ohlii‘ion is that ne matter hew hizarrc we might find paintings of the Christ child wirb an erection. he nevertheless acccpts that schizophrcnia as a clini— cal condiuon is the ground ofan effective sehizoanalysis. 19. lor example.“ LÄrc43.“ Gilles Deleuze. James Williams. uniqtaeh‘ posirioned across an intensive continuum whose discursive atails arc not perceptihle by an appa— ratus ofrepresentation hut by a pathic. itbvphallie crtmcifled (Zhrists. 3. he seen as exemplary ofan ethical—aesthetics of cx— . it loses die mulri—dimensional character of many of rhein. For an account of Deleuze‘s “stark hiend“ of materialism and viralism. The Se.“ Byzantine i‘vfonuments in Attica and Boeotiu.“ he writes. In his description of the eleventli cenaury church in die mnonastery of Hosious Loukas. Both Deleuze and Guattari re— peatedly‘ cinphasisc the difference herween schizophrenia as a clinical condi— tion. 71—2/1(12—3).“ SouthAtlantic Quarterly. significandy quali6ed: “Thc problem of schizophrenization as a eure consists in this.“ Soft Subversions. 13.vua/itj‘ of‘ C‘/rist in J?enaissance Art und in Modern Ob/ivion. For a fiiscinaring account of soane of alle tobte surprising results—--itllyplial— lic Christ Childs. . in this regard. “The complexions of the psychotic real. This privileging of schizophrenia is howcver. 14. incltading die four horses on us reof and die enamels of the Pala d‘Oro. existential absorption. clarifies all the fi)rms ‚mnd mi its diurnal course. and niore. p. Its goal? One could say that jr doesn t liave any. pe manem symbol of Christ in eeelcsiastical phrase— ology. London: BCA. the introducajon of classical approaehes to drawing amid modelling appeared in die early fintrteenth cenaury with Giotro and Cimahue. For Guattari schizophrenia can. Mosaic Painting und G/ass 1250—1 550. 1 2—3. see Ronald Bogue. . 96. 17. “tue high mnosaics with their gold grounds shine: such /iht. Seminar Session on %inoza. iii certain specific ways. This involved ex— perimenting with the disrinctions hetween a clinical schizophrenie and schizoanalytic bealth worker in order to elahorate a “schiio“ ruiconscious cnierging hcvond instittational ciisti ictiuns of doctor and patient. 68/98). autopoietic characier of the partial nuclei of enuntiation“ (Chaos. does not allow it to appre— hend tue pathic. Carastrophism in philosophy?“ De/cuze und Phi/osop/y: The DzjJ/‘rence Engmeee 11. The Nature ofFlows. 16. 12. M. For Cuaatari on La Borde see “La Borde: A Clinic Unlike Any Orher. So although Guattari states: “Schizoanalysis ohviously does not consist in miming schizo— phrenia‘ (Chaos. “hew can schizophrenia be disengaged as a power of/?umaniiy and ofNature withotir a schizophrenie thcrcby heing prodticeal?“ “1 synthese disjonctivc. For a detailed explanation of painting‘s Csee—landscapc problem. Cbadzdakis wrimes. 79/111). In central Italy. Painting. “Delcu7e aml Materialism: One or Several Matrers?. masturhating Christs.258 Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapier Four 29 whid arc fiicilitarcd by a cartographic auto—orientation. Gilles Deleuze. chaptcr %ur. were hrought dircedy from Constantinoplc after its sack aimd leotmg hy ehe Crusaders in 1204. The relationship bctwccn schizophrcnia as a clinical condition and as a critical practice is anore ColflpleX in Gtiartari‘s work. 20. which can only be revealed as stich throngh abc aholition of that image“ (DR. pre identificatory agglomeration“ (Chaos. 11011 disciirsive.. As Guatrari writes.‘ Marble. p. 250. 1982. Deleuze on M‘usic. 10. doniimsates ahreughont. 148/192). In fact. vivifies the flowing surfaces and transmutes abc material into preeious spin— rtmal substance. Dcleui. p. “in deir clinical emcrgence col. seminar I4th December 1971. 1997.“ C‘haosophy Henry Miller. as we shall see. M.‘ Vnetian co/mir. p. Turner. the analysis of die Unconscious should hc recentred on die non—hunian processes ei‘ suhjectivation dat 1 call machinic. 15. Thc light. 47. these were accepaed hy the church as valid theological saatements of Christ‘s incarnarion. 1996. arguing daat it is die chtmrch diat supplies “nothing hut die conditions of his ]the artist‘s] radical emancipa— tion. sec John Mallurky. as weil as tue extensise decuration of the church heing Bvzanaine in style. Deleuze how— cver. from schizophrenia. 9. [ 1 Here a sense ofheing in—itself is esrablished hehre an)‘ discursive scheme.. and have vigorously defended theit use ofthe terin “schiioplirenia“ against this charge. much ofirs material wealth. jnlieritcd from Saussurian structuralism. and schiioanalysis or “schizophrenization“ as an “ethical—aesthetic paradigm. “schizoanalysis“ is a war machine against psychoanalysis. “The Lacanian Signilier homogenises the variotas semiotics. Peter Hills notes: “Such inaerchangc henveemm ohscurir and brilliance lw— canic [ ] vital to the eolouring of sixteeimah—centamrv Venetian paimg. “Deleuze on J. pression: “Just as the sehizo has broken moorings with subjective individtaa— tioti. sec Lee Stcinherg. lopic ofcance. 276. 25th November 1 980.c anti Cuatrari have received ‚a lot ofcriricism over their supposed glam— orisation ofa tragic psyd ic condition. und the Arts. Its fundamental lincarity. 72/103).

“smoeth space is cnn— stantly being translated. 34.“ than “makcs pietnrcs secm alivc. p. ‘I‘he ncecssiry efaffiimative evaluation however. p. p. 25. 1 2. niere than just a 1i6. Marcia Hall. p. 71. Painting andiheAris. Heinrich Wölfflin. p. Dcleuze anti Guantari‘s descriptite repoiegy tcnds ne lay out these poles in their pure state. 35. and aidieugh die absnract lilie reqtnires srriated spacc in whiehi tu operate. 272. 36. hut rhis is enly in order te operate a syniptematelogy (a schizo—analysis) that returns striated spaces ne snioethness. p.‘tIJistory. which wouid serve as die niiddle ground.“ Deleuze and Guattani note. i. and Wilhelm Werringer‘s organic—abstract. sec Ronald Boguc. 458. tlicn with a strokc ofwhite Iead. 39. and only then. and in is only through these than a desnratified smoenh space will ap— pear. Neverthcless.20.conardo put it .z Puinting ]i‘chniques. 27. and in panches of coleur. with die same brush then clippcd in red. Titian‘s assistann and well—known painter in his own right. Princz/es ofArt History p 1 9. 29. C‘apital Ti‘rnes: Tales orn the C‘onquestofTirne. Princzles /iIrt Ilistoiy. 24. p. 59. Practice and Theory in Renaissance Painting. A fine example efall these aspecrs ofTitian‘s tate srvle is The Death ofActaeon (1565—76. in terms of cause and efl‘ect. 30. Princzp/esofA. “Tinian‘s Painring Techniques. striated space is where relative denernitorialisatiens oceur. which allow us to see the re workings of the painting lying beneath its surface. The most radical example in Gioigione‘s work is the repiacemenr in La Ti‘rnpesta of a bathing woman by die young man iii die lower Ich coruer of‘ die picture. Principkt of‘Arr History. That is.“ Lwes of the Artists./urne 1. 57—64. This gave. p. in striared space we sec rhings in terms efebjects and their represennatiens. whieh inchude as many opportuninies tor openings as risks ei‘ clesurc er stoppage“ (AT 486/607). Heinrich Wölfflin. An Exarninrtion of‘/ate 12‘netia. And in this waywith four strokes ofthe hrush he was ahle re suggcst a magnificent fi. For a detailed account ofDeIeuze‘s un derstanding of I3yiantinc art. Dclcuie and Guatnari suggest than die extension ef a striated representational space gives smoodi space a nulieu ofpropaganien anti renewal. vigorouslv applied with a loaded brush of pure red ochre. \‘asari writcs ofGiorgione.260 Notes ta chapter Four Notes to (Jiapter Four 261 21. Heinrich Wölfihin. p. 26. can die artist form a sound judgemenr concerning nie mterventions he has conceived. “ro evaluate rhe creativc petentialities of srriated space anti tmw it can simultaneously emerge from risc smooth and give evt thing a wische new impetus“ (ATP 494/616).1 mask wirh— our whieh it [snsooth spacej could neither breanhe ncr lind a general Form of expressien“ (AT 486/607). Deteuze poinns eur their importance for hini. Pruetice and 71 ‘eon‘ in I?enaissance Rzinting p. pp. 28./urne 1. i\Iarcia Hall. 1 myself have seen such under painting. stri— ated spaee offers a “richness and neccssiny of translations. transverscd into a si riated space: snriatcd space is eonstantly bemg reverscd. Vasari notes that drawing is die neccssary first stage in the painring process. London). And indeed. 413—4.rni. in rerms finally. For die Piotinian aspects of Bviantine art sec ric Aliiez. Pntctice und Theory in Renaissance Painting.“ Quored in Emmachia Gustina Ruscelh.sts. Snrianed space is ncver in itseif creative. Heinrich Wölfflin.“ which ive shall tuns to in Chaprer Six. Light and shadow neverthclcss rctained their ideal value despite the greater naturalism affordcd by Alberti‘s value system. 233.“ Live o/the Art. and beconscs “based en synsptoms and evaluanions ranher than measures and properries“ (AT1 479/598). Heinrich Wölfflin. rcturned ne a sniooth space“ (A‘l P. sweeping strokes. FB. 22. Snriated spaee herc becomes “. perception changes. Tliis proccss has been made visible by thc twcntieth cenrury techniques of die x-radiograph and the infrarcd rcflectograph. “l‘hc idea which the artist has in his mmd must be translated into what the eves can see.“ Only when the abstract linie draws or “absrracrs“ a vital inat— . National Gallery. 23. C‘o/or und A‘Ieaning. “lt ii less easy. l4duitie 1. and is always atternpting to resrratify things in its various “appara tus ofcaprure. 1 96. 21. In other werds. Smooth space is a spaee of evaluative cenneetion whercas striated space inspeses distinctions and limins. Deleuze on Music. Princt/es ofArt History. Deleuze also draws on Wölffl in‘s Renaissance und Baroquc in TF. Vasari notes hew Titian‘s last werks “arc exeeured witis hold. This developmenr lias an obviotis echo in Deicuze‘s diseussion ofBacon‘s “paiches.a“true“ shadow. with die assistance ofhis eyes. In sniooth space hewever. ef‘an apriori space and rime that condirien these relations. “he feil so deeply in love with die bcauties of na— ture that he would represenn in his works oni what he copied directly from life. 31. 33. he creared the tighr and dark areas dat give die effecn ofreliel. Consistent with our earticr diseussien cl die relation ei‘ the plane and die strata in relative and absolute deterritorialisatien. remains. black or yellow. 190/119. 32. because shadow and light werc created only by mixing black or whine with the local color.“ 1 ines of‘ die Artisis. witlietit which ins censis— tcney iniglit remain unexpressed. stippert. 19. 143 4. For a discussion of the rechniques uscd in this work see jill Dunkerton. (Jo/or anti I!eaning. as l.“ in Titian. 4‘4/593). Pairna Giovane. Marcia 1 Liii. 37. 210. (Z‘o/or andMeaning. Deleuzc fiivoured tliis kind of art lustorical symptomotogy of functions and also draws on die haptic—eptic tensor of Alois Riegl. 14. p 52. 38. and especially the importance of the work of llcnri Maldinay in this regard. captures die drama ef this proccss. Giovane wrote ofTitian‘s method: “He blocked in bis pictures wirh a mass of colors that served as the ground tipon which he would theo build.

but to delve inro the artistic voli— art of thc don lKunstu‘o//en] belund works of art and to discovcr why they arc the way thev arc. p.c. This concept of die “will to art“ [K. 35. its abstract machine. Politics anti Art Historical Metliod in the 1930s. and SO forth. 228. 1 12. “Jackson Pollock‘s Abstraetion. p 32—3. 45. “Wherc die abstract lirie is rhe exponent of the will ro form. “B‘zantine Paralleis. 54. Greenberg writes: “Becattse fiarness sas the only condition painting sharcd with no other art. tirne and matter.sm.“ in The 1/ienna School Reittier. “Byianrine Paiallels. Wilhelm ‘X‘orringer. Wot ringer belicved these form 5 appear in the earl test art fornis and so arc t source of art.“ An anti (‘ultun‘. “Bi‘zantine Parallels. Kinstu‘ollen is therefore a syrn pto rnmatological tax0110nlic tool. Alois Riegl.“ Ricgl wrotc. expresscd emotional or phvsiological trurhs that we recognize by‘ finding theni in ourselves. and so firth. 87. Aestherics therehy beconies the study of art‘s ontological condirions. Clcmcnt Crccnbcrg. 1 69.instu‘olIenj also cornes froin Riegl. 1. p.“ Art anti (7ulture. but were shared with die s iewcr of thc work as weIl. 66/97). 63).“ 7he Collected Fsrays anti C‘riticism. p. From Jmpressionism iv Kandinsky. “is not simply to find the things in the that appeal to modern taste. p. 69. Vol. Delcnie and Cnattari also rcjcct ‘X“ot unger‘s rathei negatie understanding ofabstracrion as the produet ofanxiety.sm.tlattai i‘s use ol Pollock. Delcuie anti Cuattat i pat t ways witlt ‘Woi rittger on this point. “Abstract. Riegl regarded art vorks as sy‘mptoms of a historical people‘s experience of space. “art is transcendental. but hy a iransccndcntal vital energy that Lipps believed was that of orgaltic life. “The Case for Absrract At iYe Collected Essays anti C‘ritic. 55. “Towards a New Laocoon.262 Notes to C‘hapter Four ter front its rcprcscntaoonal signs is an ahsolutely deterritorialiscd smooth spaee created. Cleinent Greenberg. Chernent Crecnberg. 48. Fo. What is significanr about this approach is that it did not under— stand enipathy . and could only be interpreted by disregarding the more obvious representational or symbolic intentions of thc work.“ Wot ringcr writes.“ Art ana‘ Cultur‘. Paris anti Montreal 1945—1964. Referenees to this bouk 110W found in die text following the abbreviatiori “PC.ays an. 14. 231). Representational. Art ex— presses die “artisric will“ ofa culture. as they arc found in die viewers “empathy“ or “participation“ in the work. Art.“ An ‚in.! (‘ultuic. p.“ ReconstructinglVlodernism: Art in New York.“ Although it seems that Pollock did view his paintings on the wall. 57. 52. Theodor 1 ipps. Sec Timothy J. 53. 1 shall cxamjne the immanent critical process hy which Grccnherg defines modernist art in the next chap— ter. 81 . is conditioned hy die need for deliverance“ (PC.“ The (ja//rt teil Es.m in (‚‘oth. hcfore low ering them again for reworking.“ Riegl thoughi. “Abstract. “Bv7antine Parallels. 167—8. in whid feat is rlte impulse foi crcct— ing monuindnts to “the cternity of an In—Itself“ 1 sliall retut n to some of these points in connection ro Fianeis Bacon‘s tisc of Eg ptian art. In ehapter 4 of this book. tlte optic with s‘isual sensation. Clement Creenhctg. p. writing. Deleuze and Guattari criticise Crringer fit this crystallisation of the ab— stract hitie into ‘die most rectilineal frtns possihle‘ (Al P. (References now found in die text following die abbrcviation AE‘) Lipps argued that art ex pressed its inner and psychological conditions. and dernolish ouisclves?“ (Cl. and shorii of its ethnographie pretensions provides a way in which a rigorous analysis of formal qualities could move heyond die art ob— cct and towards its ontological rnechanisms. (. and that Worringer quotes in Abstraction anti Empati A Contribution to the Psychology ofStyle. conditions that were not sirn— ply confined to the subjective intcriority of the artist. ‘ c have alieady heard die echo in C‘inema 1: “How can we rid ourselvcs of 7 ourselves.‘! Cric. 496/619). 56. p. See also. “is always determined hy what mav he tcrmed the conception of die world [Wltanschauung1 at a given tirne“ (Late Roman Art Jndustiy p. Fot Ricgl die haptic was associated with tacrile sensation. 14‘lume 4 Modernum with a 1ngeaiue.“ Art anti (‘nltuu‘.“ 46. Volume 4 Motii‘i ‚inni u‘zth a Vengs‘ance. 136—7. 41 . ph Notes to Chapter Four 263 40. Vol. “The characrcr of this volition Wn‘/enl. Ciement Creenherg. p. On Lipps see Moshc Barusch. Reprcsentational. 51 . p. 81 Ciernent Creenberg. 21. This isa significant reinterprctarion ofRiegl‘s terrns. Clement Greenberg. 49. “The Case f‘ur Ahstract Art. Clemetit Greenberg. p. and by suspending judgernents of value. according to Lipps. in (‘hapter Six. Rachman offers a critical i iew of Delettic and ‚“ 58. quoted in John Rajchman. 44. “we do not undcrstanci the aesdietic motis ation >f thc abstiact linc in die same way or its identity witlt die begtiuung ol art“ (ATR 496/620). and an artwork appears whieh is truly “abstract. Dcleuc and Cuattari take the conecpt oF the “haptic“ horn Alois Riegl‘s Late Roman Art fndustry. p. Peceptions antiJudgemenrs 1939—41. rhrough empathy. 30. p. Perceptions and /udgements 1939—44. (jonst. 170. Clemenr Greenberg. p.‘rittcal Essays. The phrase is horn thc founder of die Einfühlung tradition of German aes— thetics.“ ihr (‘ollected L‘uay anti Criticxsm. (jritica/ Essays. “The Place of tue \spheio Cups in the History of Art.“ “Modernist Painting. 43. p. ucuons.“ Art anti Qiluire. 59. Consistent with bis assumption of an organic sensibility Riegl saw thoughr as subsc— quent to eirher experience. 42. (. 47. 50. 67). Clernent Crcenberg. Theories ofArt3. 1.is dctermincd hy snhjcctive factors in the viewer. and why thev could not have been otherwise“ ( The Group Portraiture ofHollani4 p. Modernist painting oriented itself to llatncss . “The mis sion ofour diseipline.is it did to nothing cIsc. Clark. 169.

“Subjectivitics: Pur Bettcr and fiar \X‘orse. p..“ Art and Objecthood. 5. p. 68. 65.“ Art and Objecthood. p. Bttt the unconscious is nuneiheless ac— live.il‘sis. in relation tu his own work.“ Sofr Subversions. p. Michael Fried. last ehapter we saw irs negative connotatiotis dcveloped. 235) 6. Issays anti Reviews. Indeed. london: Penguin.“ Gartographict Schizoanalytiques. an ambiguity of words‘ (FB. Frank Stelia. lnstcad thev heconte part of a niaehinic set—up cntirely on the text‘s surface. Arrogant I‘upose. Greenhei also cails Poliock a “Cothic painter“ (“The Present Prospects of American Painting ami Scuipture. 62. Joachimides and N. The Optical Unconscious. John Welchman. p. p. as “a quarrel over words. 63. “Morris Louis. 226.‘ Guattari wrires. Michael Fried. 78. “without seenling to give this rerni the frdl meaning it assurnes in ‘/Corringcrs analysis“ (FB. 233. Of particuiar interest is their relation to the risc of intervention Existentialisin. and in itself dues not carry any pejorative or positive sense. 271. Rosanthal.“ American Ait in the lis‘entieth (Jentury. and one that ohscures tlw signifkant differenccs in rheir positions. Fried‘s argument (and this applies equally weil tu Greenherg) only works when the viewer is an ideal distance from the work. 224. Michael Fried.“ The Guattari Reade. Cowiey cd. at which the “surface volati es. 10/24). 1993.“ The (Jo/lected Essays anti Criticism. as Deleuze points our. whcrcas in this one Guattari‘s use of rhe terni takes Ott an afiirniativc sense. 224—5. p. crcating a “dircctional spacc“ which “doesn‘t have a dimension higher than tliat which moves througli it or is inscrihcd on it“ (A‘I‘I 488/609). Rather than he unutilatcd bv svmholie cas— trarion. is usothing else rhan Ilse manifistarion of suhjectivatiouu in irs carlicsr stagcs. 1 98. unrehued tu dass interesis or agency. Michael Fricd. Ftlix Guattari. For a crincism of Crcenherg in these terms see Rosahnd Krauss. Delcuie puts it niore hluntly in a suhscqucnt passage when he wrires: “By lih— ei ating a space that is (wrongly) ciainwd tu he purely optical. lines 598—610. 107/100). p. Modernism Relocated.“ Reconstructing !tiodernism: Art in Neu‘ )4rk. “Sung of Mvsclf“ 26. Pur Cuanari the uneonscious is what cannot he exprcssed in ternis ofthe snh— jeet. 3. and is what suhjectivity‘ represses. Juies Olitski. Clark notes. (“Les rituurnclles dc I‘trc et du Sens. “[ljt is not necessary to oppose risc basic logic of latent contenis. semiotic componelits which rnay interfere. Frank Stella. 61. 223. p. “Three American Painters: Kenncd Noland. ihis hook gives a faseinating account of Pollock and Crccnberg‘s development in rcrms of the intellectuai context of posr—\X“ar Aincrica. 83. Michael Fricd.e has elsewhere descrihed the “American critics“ definition ofAhstracr Exprcssionism as “the creation ofa purely optical space“ as “curious. p. ‘Ilse unconscious is the virtual dimension of affect which fractalises the suhjeet in processes uf subjectivation.ite fractalisation which enahles sonuething tu appear wherc the aceess bebte was hlocked. and is never figured as a lack. This term is Ich untranslated in die English translations of (4uattari‘s work. 186/101). Frank Stella. 2. meaningful disturtions im lotiger arise Front au in— terpretatious of underiving contents. whcre it is rcpcared: “I‘vly pcrspcctive involves shifring the httnian and social sciences From scienrific paradignis towards ethico—aesthetic paradignis“ (Chaos. 4. 106. 7iu.ards a cultural studies of visual modernity. 71. and Montreal 1945—1964. 69.“ So/l Subi‘i‘rsions.“ “Jackson Polloek‘s Absrraction. rhc ahstract cx— pressionists in fiict did nothing otlier dan to inake visihle an exclusively manual space“ (FB.“ ‘At five feet away. “Three American Painters: Kenncth Noland. and irs roie in redefining Socialisns as a politics ol indis idual within historical processes. This sccins a very gcncrous evaluation hy Dcleuze. 166) hut. ““l‘he Refrain uf Being and Meaning. Then. “‘l‘hree American Painters: Kenneth Noland. tu that of repression.“ Art and Objecthooa Etsavs and Reviews. lt is the deterrirorialising opening. iialics added. “Ahstraet Expressionisin. NOTES TO CHAPTER FWE 1.“ Art anti Object/iooa Etsays and Reviews. “i‘hree American Pairuers: Kenneth Noland. or else wbole and willi continttal variation in directiuis (ATE 486/607). p. Although this term is deseriptive. Municls: Prestal-Verlag. “ . 0. 236. Ersays and Reviews. Quotcd in Irving Sandler. Leai‘es of Grass. recurring incomplete goals act instcad as atutonuunotts purvevors of suhjectivation. As Timothy J. Deleuze and Guatrari explain tlsis fractal ontolug in A Thousand P/izteaus: “Fractals arc aggregates whusc niumber of dnnensions is fractiunal radier thaus whulc. 45. Thc phrase comeS from John Weichman‘s description of Poliock‘s work in Modernism Re/ocatt‘d.“ Art anti Object/iood. lt must he noted that this is the same word Deleuzc and Cuattari use in A Jhousand Plateaus. The rupture. 1959. Paris.26i Notes to Chapter Four Notes to Chapter Five 265 61). Pollock quorcd in Nancy Jachec. 66. 72. Frank SrelIa. 223. 64. “it simply doesn‘t work. Jules Olitski. lt is the nccessarv adcqu. Fhx Cuattari lnstiwtionai Sclnzo—An. 106—7/99). Walt Whitman. p. M.“ he very practically points out. die breach of nseaning. Suhjectivatiun operates on this model. /uine 2. Essays and Reviews.“ and ti— nally. p. Clearly this statement prefigures the task of chaosmosis. p.. Deleui. Jules Olitski. 1945—49. Strangeiv enough. Analysis ufa Dream. p. Jules Olitski. The Philosophy and Politics ofAbstract Espressionism 1940—1960. and that we discussed in Chaprer Four. M. “lt is possible tu use a model in which the unconscious is open tu the future and ahle ro integrate atsy heterngencous. 67. Tou‘ards a cultural studies ofvzsual modernity. p. Edited by C. 307—8.

“ lnco. p. No. [ 1 [Ajutopoietic niachinesare unities whose organization is dcfined by a particular netsvork of processes (relations) ot producuon of cornponems. 9 p. Gillcs Deleuze. 64. is not just a no—where. p. The qilotations come (rom p. p. p. (“Gilberr Simondon. 10. Gilles Deleuze. p. “Chaos iii the ‘Total Field‘ of Vision. Uindividu et st genese physico-hi— ologique. Seminar Session tu Vincennes. “So \Vhat. 61ff and Brian Massumi.“ chaosopI . col— lccrive entiries. anti docs this in an endless turnover ofcomponcnts under condirions of contin— nous perttnbations and conipensation of perturbation. 114—1 15/159). See also. 14. Gilles Deleuze.“ Deert hlandr and Other 7xts 1953—1 974. “lnstitutional Schiio—Analvsis. 1 28. The maehinic world of Erewhon.. 196. Finnegans Wake. constants and stares of things can graft theniselves“ (Chaos. This acrualisation of difference carries otit an aggregate selection 1010 which limits. 86. 26. Gilles Deleuze and Ftlix Guartaii. 24. hut this ean never eradicare irs colistitutive difTrence. inasniuch as they limit it to the unitary inclividiiations of “living‘ or organic bodies. “Snbjeetivities: For Betrer and for Worse. London: Penguin. 93/1. “an au topoietic inachine continually generates and specifies its own organization through irs operation as a system of produerion of its own componcnts. Being artempts to solve its non—identity through individuation. 200. Deleuze and Guattari suggest. 72. Tue affect is an “atttopoietic“ machine in prcciscly the sense the biologists Hnmbcrto Maturana and Francisco Varela first proposed the term: “the produet o their operation is their own organisation. 16. 23.eu‘hon.“ in Samuel Becken. joyee writes.“ The Guattari Reade. “Suhjcctivities: For Better and for \Vorse. p.“ TI‘e G. Georges Simondon. “Cold and Heat. “The Genesis of the Individual. the Subjccr and thc big other in general“ (Chaos.porations. (“Gilbert Simondon. Similarly. 18. Deleuze‘s essa. Gilles Deleuze..96. ‘Balance—Sheet Prograni für Desiring Machines.“ Sofi Subversions. Quad. 19. 13.“ (. 21. “Art and Territory. “every person. “Balance—Sheet Prograin fot Desiring Maehines. “Not only is 1 an other.30). wiih whar alters ir. 219. . “Ltpuis. . This inhcrenr non—identirv of beitig takes the form of a problem Simondon argues. ihe ihree Ecologies. hut simultaneonsiy a now—here (WT 100/96). 27 Febrnar‘ 1979. 31).“ Quorcd in The Three Ecologies. 27. 1992. p. Guartari qualifies his usc of iViaturana and Varela‘s term however. rarher than being implacably closed in on themselves. p..“ he wrires.. 311. This was Kandinsky‘s argument in . p. Brian Massuini. 15. “The Exhausicd“ is not found in die French edition of &ztique et (J/inique. 12. Flix Guartarj. Gilles Deleuze. p. E.3. p. as Guattari specifically sug— gcsts (Chaos. 11. “Subjetiviries: For Bettet and for Worse. “The Autonomy of die Affeet. p.“ Hyperplastik.“ L‘ile des‘rte ei anires textes 1953—194. 8.“ Deleuze: A C‘ritica/ Reade p. p. a problem which is autopoictic inasmueh as it is that “lw whieh the incompatihiliry within the unresolved System becomes an organising dimen sion in its resolution. p. The essay this quoration comes from.“ Incoiporations. Simondon atgues thar individuation is the resuli ofihe non—identiry olbeing with itself. “On Gilbert Sintondon.“ P/atogenic R‘zinting.baosopI p. 25. 100. For an accotint of Matnrana and Varela‘s relation to Deleuze and Cnattari. the autopoietic ncr— work. Lindividu et san gense physieo—bi ologique. p. (iuatrari deseribes the autogeneric properries of chaos as follows: “The chaotic nothing spins and unwinds cornplexity. Kunst und Konzept der Wzhrnehmung in Zeiten der rnental rmagely.‘ Quoied in F1ix Guattari. London: Penguin. Vol. This reading of Ducltamp has been cxhaustivcly developed bv ‘l‘hierrv dc Duve.“ L‘i/e De‘serte et Autres Ttxtes 1953—1974) 20. 255. 102. Gerard Fromanget. Fclix Cuattari. For an aecount of Deleuze‘s risc of Simondon see Ronald Bogue. This is another site of Cuartari‘s break with Lacan. 1 1 Thus wc will view au— topoicsis from the perspeetive ofthe ontogenesis and phylogenesis proper to a mecanosphere superposed on the biosphere“ (Chaos. 22. Summer 1997. which keeps any mdi— viduarion open and in progress (tiw power of repetitioll in Deleuze‘s terms). Ineaning its utopian topos ol vir— tual creativity does not transcend our world but eontinually infuses it with an immanent and revolurionary alterity.attari Reade. p. 120—1. “On Gilbert Sinioncion. 39—40/62) This means that art can be understood as autopolette.“ A Deleuzian C‘entury? The South Atlantic Quarterly. which maintain diverse types of relations to aherity. purs it in relation with itself and what is other tu ir. 276. Guanari opposes a process of “automodelization“ to that involving prc—cxist ing niodels in “Insututional Sehizo-Analysis. Dc Duve argues that die readymade was Duchamp‘s ironie response to painting‘s contcmporaneous re—foundation 011 pure color as the expression of an etertial langilage of abstraetion. Fiilix Gtiattari.266 Notes to hapter Five Notes to hapter Five 26 7. 198—201. Samual Butler. 1986.“ The Guattari Reader. .“ C‘haosophy. 227ff.“ Janies Joyce. Quaa Paris: Minuir. 9. “hut jr is a mulritude of modalities of altcriry Here we arc no longer floating in the Signifier. 268—9. place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected with die gobblydumped turkcry was moving and changing every part of die time. 17. Againsi this limitation Guattari argues: “Autopoiesis deserves tu be rethought in terms of evolutionary. Flix Guattari. Gilles Deleuze and Fclix Guattari. Deleuze and Guauari. p. 96/134). 118. Flix Guattari. 120) 18. see Ronald l3ogue. “The Genesis of the Individual. ‘Lpuis‘ appears in Sainuel Beckcrt. 1992.“ Sq/I Subiersions. 72. p.“ Desert Lt/ands and (»her 7i‘xts 1953—1974. As Maturana and Varela write.

“ Delenze and Cuarrari‘s assumption of a producrive chaos as the privileged ontologieal state has becn criricised hy Anronio Negri and Michael Hardt in tlmeir book Empire (Cambridge (Mass. Machines produce.1 Je also quotes another of Duehamp‘s interviews wirh Sweeney (1946) where he claims: “This is the di reerion that art musr rake: intellcctual expression rather than animal expres— sion. 198. ‘l‘heir regulative idca was tue specif. lt is ironie thar Hardr and Negri shotmld eritieise Dcleuze and Guarrari in this way when rheir own book seenis tu rest mi just stich an tmmmgraspahle evenr. die conhing to power of the mulritude. an addinonal reflexive twisr whieh turned it into a referent fi.): Fiarvard Universiry Press. and not a lirrlc strategie. appararus‘ of eapttmre. Quored in j. ically pietorial: bis was about the spccifically pietorial. roward conrintious mnovcnient and absolute flows. or something which you dislikc. production of val ues. Civen their artempr to reinvigorate a politics of the left in terms they take from Deleuze anti Guattari. Caumont. jr becomes a ready niade. tbc creative elenicnts and the radical omology of the produetion of the social remain insubstanrial and impotcnt. one Duchamp was farniliar with after bis stay in Munich in 1912. jr scemns strange. As al most thc last words of their hook. hut manage to articulate it only su— perficmally anti ephemerally. ‘Ibseano of an arriele which orig— inally appearcd in 7sors publics 20 ans dc cration dans les Fonds reionaux dzrt contemponun. Paris: Flammnarian. First. an best ttn— generous. hy a “peopic yen tu eome. cspecially in relation tu their own projeer. 61). unpaginated. affects. 33. Irtsrcad of choosing something wltich you like. 2003. 411). rhis criticism seenmeat least a little hasr Sceond. “On die Eye-Brain of Modcrnity“ at die Akademie der bildenden Kinsre Wien. “Thar which is or returns has no prior constituted idetitity: things arc re— duced tu die ciifferenees whjch fragment thcnt. bis was a philosophy abont that name. ‘T‘he most chaosmic evemtr mav be “ungraspable..“ thcs‘ write. where Ile prcsented these arguments in de tail. “‘l‘he ommly event. and as nie culmination elf nhcir implied promises of a determinatc and graspable produetion elf the multiple. you choose soinething that has no visual inrercst fbr rhc artist. Cough—Coopcr and J. In orher words w arrive ar a stare of indiffcrcnee towards this objecr. they write. Ncgri and Hardt arc also antcmpning an ontologv ofthe so— cial which would scek tu express its most lihratory immanent furees cif creation. 29. and ar wurst misleading. this eriticismn is important. Wc do not havc any modcls tu offer for this cvcnt. a trajecrory of “vital absrraetion“ that finds its most important exponent in the painrer Hcnri Matisse. indeterimmimiate horizon marked by the ungraspable event“ (p. Deleuze and (tiartari. at that moment. Marcel f)uchamp. jr seems as if Flardt and Ncgri finally accept Deleuze and Cuannari‘s supposcd conimitmemit tu an ontologieal rev— olunion necessarily unknown. secm to bc ahle tu conceive positively only die tendencies Notes to C‘hapter Fiue 269 28. Third. RIix (tiarrari.“ hut it is. rie Allica points diis ont in “Rewriting Posrmoderniry (Notes). Dc Duve‘s Duchamp is the post—modern hero. or rather thc insurgencc. and tlius in their thouglit too. howevcr.“ “The dtterrito— rialisitig power of the multirude. given die extensive dcvelopmemmr hy Deleuze and Guatrari of the “negative“ pole of prodmmeti ity in strara. as a cliaotic. the rc—founda— tion of art on an act of pure nomi ation is an attack on rhe spiritual claims made by Kandinsky for modern abstract art. 32.“ unpub— lished transiation by C. as we have seen. 2000). whielt operates as rhe immanent onrological power unravelling stable struetures.“ 1 Iardt anti Negri teil us. “foeus our attention clearly on die ontological sub— stanee of sotial produetion. 1 attcndcd Alliez‘s seminar. faces. etc. As witit Dclcrtzc anti Cuanrari‘s aes thenic paradigmn. 28). the early abstracnonists. Thc mulnirude acrs as the politieal expression ofan onrological and affirmative matter/force whieh is forever over-coded hy Einpirc. “rhat we arc awaiting is thc constrtmcrion. 31 . Malerei. The consrant funcrioning of 1 maehines in their various apparatuses and assemhlages produces rhe soda world along with the suhjcets and objects that constitttte it.268 Notes to chapter Five üncerning the Spiritual in Art. Their criricism of Delettze and Cuarnari scemns nhcrefiire. in Deleuze and Guattari‘s words. Only the multitude through its pracrieal experimentation will offcr the mod— eis atid derermine when and how die possible becomes real“ (p. imevertheless enrirely immanent ro die acrtialitv that expresses ir. atsd tu all die differenccs .r bis own idca. Dc Duve makes much of Duchamp elainling the tube of paint as the first readymade. the anti-paiiiter. Deleuze and Cuattari. 165. thar Hardt . this is more than a litde disappointing. Duchamp‘s well—known statement is: “There is no art.md Negri should call “superfieial“ one of die most importanr thcorcm ical umiderpinnings of rhcir own project (whieh rhcv presumablv correet and eomnplcte). The rcadymade is.“ The Guattari Reader. AlIiea ha. bccomings). Hcre.tct vcry dose tu Hardn anti Ncgris own risc of die term “mulnirudc. hut imevertheless embodied. a kind of pictorial nominalism‘ Kitnt Afier Duchamp. on dc Duvc‘s accounr.“ This specific sense elf Deleuze and Cuariari‘s indetcrmninate and ungraspable eveitr.s devclopcd this crititue as part of bis wider projeerion of an alter native direerion to (post) modernism. hrn whieh forcver escapes jr. Deleuze and Cttattari diseover the productivity of social rcproduction (ereative prodtietion. and argues thar in so doing Duchainp “switched from one regulative idea to another by giving thar ofhis colleagues. seems in l. p. Theirs was gcared to establish their ciafr‘s name. of a powerful organisation. 2002—3. 30. social relations. “is the produetise farce that sustains Empire and an the same time the fiircc thar calls fur anti makes nec— essary its destruction“ (p. die mdc— rerniinahle and ungraspable evenr bas a specific plmilosophical meaning in Deleuic and Cuattari whieh is omily superficiallv rcduecd tu dicir commnon rneanings. “Subjeetiviries: For Betrer anti fir Worsc. p. My accounr is heavily indehted to the work he developed there. Penwarden and A.

Immanuel Kant. 85. 56. 40. 1 hopc the reasons fiar this will he obvious in what follows. the great refrain iii the lirtle refrain. C‘ritique of‘ Judgment. 28 Marcli 1 978. Although these connccrioris arc no doubt acrivc in Dcleuze and Guattari‘s work. 38. General Rcmarks upon the Exposition ofAcsthetic Reflexive Judgnicitts. Translated by j. 62. 88) Immanuel Kant. p.“ Desert lslandt and Other 7xts 1953—1974. a numher of commentators have claimed that Deleuze and Guattari arc Romantics. while pointing out that Deleuze “avoids a ftill rolnantic mythology of cxpressiveness. 50. 367. 28. as ratio cucndi. ThirdLesson on Kant. 1 91) Marcel Duchamp. As a rcsult: “The same is said of that which differs and remains diffcrcnt“ (DR. (“L‘id& dc genise datis l‘csthctiquc dc Kant.“ The (. 1999) argues that Gcrman Roinanticism is a “central“ infiucncc on Dclcuze and Guatrari in its projcct of “lollowing naturc“ (p. . p. 86. 138. !Vlodernisrn 0/th a Ingeance. p. London: Penguin. 42. 26. 52. those sensations ihat speeific sociohistorical inscriptions have hlocked and reificd into social etiqucltcs and srulrifying patterns of representation“ (“Francis Bacon. 1 0).“ Die (Johlected Essays anti Criticism. 58.‘ohbccti‘el Essays anti &iticisn/. is alwavs in dis junction wirlm the territors‘: and the territorv as the coHdition of “knowl— edge. Dana Polan for example. C‘ritique ofJudgrnent. 1).“ anti a di— vine immanence as the “unity in tnultipliciry and multiplicity in unity“ (p.270 Notes to hapter Five which arc implicatcd in it aml through which thcy pass“ (DR. 4 Apiih 1978.: Dcath is a recurring Romantic motif. “The ldea ofGencsis in Kant‘s Esthctics. Neverrhcless. Scllers strangcly ignorcs their discussion of Romanticism in A Tljousand Plateaus. p. ment can be litund in Kznt (Jritical Philosophy: The Doctrine oftiie Faculties.iede. Duchamp. (. fit Gay Science. 55. Romanticism. “The Idca of Genesis in Kanr‘s Esrhctics. Clement Greenberg. Grccnbcrg writcs: “Thc essenee of Modernism hics. 54. 62.FJudgmcnt. lt is one they repeat: “Deformations destincd 10 harness a great forcc arc alrcady prcsent in the small—form refrain or rondo 1 J thc cosmic force was alreadv present in the material. C‘ritique ofPure Reason. Gilled Deleuzc. Gilled Deleuze. 159.“ in SelectedFoems. Clcnicnr Grcenberg. as 1 sec ir.“ Dcsert Jsfands und Other lxts 1953—1974. hut its descrip— tion as rom. 43. p.uts l‘csthtiquc dc Kant. “1lodcrnist Art. C‘ritique o. 36. 18/29). Imnianuel Kant. Nictzschc.‘ D‘le Dtserte et autres textes 1953—1974. Griffen. Immanuel Kant. Fernando Pessoa. Sehers traces connections from Deleuze and Guattari to Friedrich Schlegel‘s concepis ofa “dircct mcdiator. “Communist Proposirions. 126/165). This is possibiv the most direct statcmcnt ofthe viralist and materialist ‘per— nianent revolution‘ ot the aesihctic paradigin. Gustav Mahiher. 35. Immanuel Kant. Immanuel Kant. ThjrdLesson on Kant.“ The Guattari Reader. 67/92). p. 10. In a inorc ‘archacological mode John Sehers (in “Thc Point ofVicw of the Coiuos: Dcleuic. Deleuze specifically makes this point (C2. 28 and General Rcmarks. p.ll Deleuze. (Jritique ofJudgment.“ l‘2‘he Deserte et autres textes 1953—1974.“ and as such part of “thc larger romanric projecr of Deleuze: to go bcyond the surface fixities ofa culture and fincl those Fi)rces. Fourth Lesson on Kant 4April1978. 48. 47. “On Nictzsche anti the Image ofThought. those energies.“ Giftes Deleuze anti die Theater ofPhilosophy. 49. Modernisrn with a Vengeance. ss. p. 1974. a simulacrum or image without resemblancc. Flix (uattari and Anronio Negri. p. A Biogiziphy p. p. 45. A68/B93. Volume 4. p. Kant writes: “The stihlime may bc describcd in this way: lt is an objcct (of nature) the rcprescntation ofwhich dererinines the ntind 10 rcgard the eleva— tion of nature hcy‘ond our reach as equivalcnt to the presentation ol ideas“ Immanuel Kant. not in order to suhvcrr it bttt in order ro cntreneh it more firmly in its area ofcompcrcncc“ (p. 1. and was often used as a deseription of the artist‘s journev front individual to universal eonsCiousness.. 5 1—2. Nictzschc discusscs the painter Miraheau‘s creative ability of h)rgctnhig in On die Gcneiilogy ofMorals. and chooscs ro instcad lind cvidence for the connec tions betwccn Schlegel and Dclcuzc and Guattari in their shared interest in . hut the lack of rheir eritical asscssmcnt in hight of what Deicuze aitd Guattari thcnisclvcs writc about Romanticisni.“ nevertheless calls Delcuzc‘s book on Francis Bacon “quasi-romantic. 53.“ ratio cognoscendi. The logic of sensation. 67/93). thosc fluxes. 88) Gilles Deluze. 28 March 1978.“ Rucitert 1.“ Desert Jslands anti Other T/‘xts 1953—1974. Fourth Lesson an Kant.“ LWe deserte et autres textes. The problem hcre is not Polan‘s descriprion of Deleuze‘s projcct. ss. 51. quoted in Calvin Tomkins. “Modcrnist Art. Notes to (Jhapter Five 2J 34. Gihles Dclcuze. 57. Deleuze‘s reading ofihis ntove— 46. ss. Once again thc problem 15 not die conncctions Sehers draws per se. (‘L‘idc dc gcn&sc d. (Jritique ofJudgmern. 44. In this sense Deleuze and Guattari proposc a rigorously Nictzschcaii tcadymadc. 1953—1974. ss. Stoicism“ in Ph 8. which “atrains thc status ofa sign in the coherence of eternal return“ (DR. in rhc use of cltaracteristic methods of a discipline to criricisc thc discipline itsclf. 28. 255. 230). 81.. 1lurne 4. 41. Gillcs Deleuze.mric. 39. 85). C‘ritique ifJudgnent. As Deleuze and Guattari dcscrihc Romanticism: “lt is ccrrain rhat thic Earth as an intense poini in depth or in procction. is ahways in disjunction with the earth“ (ATP 339/418). Gillcd Delcuzc. “Ich bin der ‘/Vch abhanden gekommen. the great manoeuvre in the Ii ttle manoeuvrc“ (ATI 350/432). 37. “The Keeper of Shcep. (‘Sur Nictzsche er l‘image dc Ja pcns&. General Remarks upon the thc Exposition of Aestbetic Reflexive Judgnients. rhc Stoics. p.

272

Notes to Chapter Five

Notes to Chapter Five

273

59. Clenient (reenlicrg, t\ierican-Fype‘ Painting,“ Art anti culture, (Jritical Essays, p. 208. 60. Clenient Creenberg, “Modernist Art,“ The C‘oiiected Essays and criticism, I4ilume 4, Modernism with a Vengeance, p. 85. 61. Clcinent Greenberg. “Towards a Newer Laocoon,“ The (Jollected Etsays and crttictsm. lunie q, !tlodernzsrn ivith ii 4‘ngeance. p. 23. 62. Cleinent Creenherg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon,“ The C‘ollected Essays and . 0 Citiczsm, 14ilume 4. ilfodernisrn u‘zth a l/‘i‘ngeance, p.3 The C‘ol/ected Euays and Laocoon,“ Newer “Towards a Crccnbcrg, 63. Clement ii Vengeance, with Moa‘ernism p. 29. “The picturc,“ (.)iticism, Volume 4, it produces“ p. 34. Sensation visual the itseif in Creenberg wi ites, “exhausts decline is die most asa ahstraction such art after 64. That Creenberg rcgarded dc Duve, Kant Tliieriy See, teleology. modernist ohvions symptom of his a/ier Ducliamp, p. 216—248. 65. 1—bw. in other words, does art make these forces visible? Deleuze and Gtiattari often quote Paul Klee iii this regard. particularly the line: “Art does not reprodnce die visihle; rarher jr makes visible.“ Paul Klee, C‘reative credo, 1. Deleuie and Ctiattari‘s nse of Klee as the spokesman for Moclernism is ironie, considering the usual association of bis work and thought (not least bis own) wirb Romanticism. (See, Robert Rosenblum, “Other Romantic currents: Klee and Ernst,“ in Major European Art Movements, 1900—1945) But Klee‘s frniulations tbat liave been taken as Romantic arc also open tO Deleuze and Gnattari‘s eoneepr of Modernism. For example. Klee writes: “There, wbeie die power-house of all time and space—call ir brain or hearr of creation—activates every fnnction; who is the artist who would not dwell there?“ (On Modern Art, p. 49). Obviously, space and time arc not apriori categories, but elements of ‚i creation that niakes this there a here, and im— plies a brain and a creative chaosmos wbich arc immanent to each otber in theproduction ofart. This reading is supported by Klee‘s rejection ofwhat he calls tbe “crass emotional phase of Romanticism,“ in favour of a “eool Ronianricism,“ a “new Romanricism“ whieh rejects the heroic solitude ofthe romanric artist in order to “emhrace tlte life force itself,“ at “the souree ofcre— ation‘ (On Modern Art, p. 49). Such an art would be, in Klee‘s words, “a Romanticism wbich is one with tbe universe“ (On Modern Art. p. 43) and would flnd us deflnitively modern statemellt in the words Klee piaced on his own tombstone: “1 cannot he grasped in imnianetice.“ Finally, and impor— tanrly For Deleuze and Guattiri, Klee will ahandon romantic feelings oflong ing and disjnnction, in realising that a “modern Romantieism“ calls for die crcation of a people to come (On Alodern Art, p. 55). 66. This materialisin would he the ground of Guattari‘s ohjections to post—mod— ernismn; tbat it fmils to open irselfro cosmic forces, to niolecularise and deter— ntorialise itself sufficiently, and rhereby accepts a romanrie disjuncrion of diseursive sy‘stemns and wbat grounds themn. Thar is, it is not materialist

enough. As a result, there is no true resistance in post—modernismn hecause there is no true ereation. ‘Ehe virtual etbical and aesmhetic abdication of postrnodern thought,“ Cuattari writes, “leaves a kind o black stain upon bis— tory.“ “Postmoderriism and Eduical Abd icat ion,“ ihr Guattari I?eade7 p. 116. The postmodern projeci of “deconsrructing“ cliehtS and opinion would not be the same as its absoltite detertitorialisation, preciselv because the first operation involves a suppiemental dimension of ironv and die second does not (Derridean differanee cannot. 1 believe, be eqnated to Deleuiian difflr— emice, as tbey do not share die same ontological grounds). Deleuie and Cuattari re—viralise tnodernism ratber than suggest a post—modernism, be— eause tbey far prefer modernism‘s ontobogical ambition to post—modernism‘s epistemobogical pessimism. As Deleuze ssrites, paraphrasing 1). 11. Lawrence on painting, “tbe rage agains! cliclis does not lead to mtich if jr is content only to parodv tbeni; malrrcated, mutilatcd, destroy‘ed, a Clich is not slosv
to he reborn from its asbes“ (Cl, 211/284). 67. This is Deleuze and Cuattari‘s version of die “death of the artist,“ and is ex tcnded by‘ Deleuze‘s suggestion that tlie art ivork is a gravestone: “Art is dc— fined as an impersonal process in wbich the work is eoniposed somnewhat like a cairn, with stones carried in hy different voyages and beings in beconung“ (ECC, 66/87). 68. In this sense, Modernism mnarks the point where “Art and pbilosopby con— verge,“ inasrnuch as horb, on Deleuze audi Guattari‘s aucount, enmerge ar a point at whieb, “die constitution of an earth and .1 people tbat arc lacking [ard the correlare of crcation“ (W1 108/1 04). Tbis is not to demiv their very different marerialities—concepm anti sensation—hut to undersrand their

69. 70.

71. 72.

comnion ontobogy, atid tbeir sbared process of cbaosmmmic consrructiomm/ex— pression. Deleuze suggests, and liere perbaps expresses bis agreenient witli Guattari‘s privileging ofart, War philosopby begins witb sensation, ina.smtich as ‘the path that leads to that which is to be tbought, hegins with sensihility. 1 The privilege of semmsihiliry as origin appears omilv iii the fact thar, in an eflCounter, s‘bat ftrces sensation and ilmat whieb cami oniv he semised arc one and rhe same thing“ (DR. 144—5/188). WaIt Wlmitmnan, “Song of i\lyself“ Leai‘es ofGmss, limies 226. 505, and 136. Deleuze and Guattari‘s rerms of percepr and affccm involve a rerniinobogical reconhgurarion iii relation to the work of Spinoza, front where the mcmi “af— feet“ comes. As Deleuzs and Guattari explain, what is biere callcd “pereep rion“ and “affection“ arc whar Spinoza bad prcviously called “affection“ and “affectus“ (Wl 154/145—6), amid wbat Deleu,e anti Guattari bad in ATP called “affeetion“ and “affect“. See B, 28—9/19—20 for a discussion of rbe percept in simnilar terms. Deleuze and Cuartari‘s association of Cuhisni wirb the plane of conipoitiomi is perhaps even more ironie than their exploration of Klee‘s anti—Ronianticism, and musr he rreated as a mnerapbor. Despite die Cuhisrs interest in Bcrgson and

274

Notes to Chapter Six Nietzsche, the weil known Cubist “ca! 1 to order“ is an idealism rather than an crnpiricism, an attempr at ‘ohjectiviry‘ franied in the Kantian terms of a tran— scendental subject. For an art historical account of the Cubist interest in Bergson and Nietzsche see, Mark AntliW Inventing Begson, C‘ultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Especialiy chapter 2 “Du C‘ubisrne between Bergson and Nietzsche,“ Gilles Delen,‘e, Neotiations 1972 1990, p. 146—7. Gilles Deienze, Proust and Sins, p. 97. (Proust et les sines, p. 54) Gilles Delenze, Proust andSzg‘n, p. 98. (Proust et les sznes, p. 56) Some of Delenze and Guattari‘s most beaurifiul passages evoke this creative mystical immanence: “The Cosrnos is an ahstract machine, and each world is an assembiage effeetuating it. If one reduces oneseif to one or several ab srract lines that will prolong itseif in and conjugare with others, producing immediately, direcdy a world in which it is the world that becomes, then one bccomes-evcryhody/everything“ (ATP 280/343). Virginia Wooif, Mrs. Dal/oway, p. 154—55, London: Penguin, 1996. Gilles Deleuze, “Lpnis,“ in Samuel Beckett, Quad Minuit, Paris, 1992. p. 77. Gilles Dcleuze, “1 laving an ldea in Cinema,“ Deleuze and Guattari New Mapping3 in Po/itics, J‘/u/o.ophy and (‘ulture, p. 18. (Qu‘este-ce que L‘acte dc crtanon, Deux R«imes dc Fous, 7xtes et Entretiens 1975 1995, p. 300) 1‘his is a favonrite set of images Deleuze often uses. In relation to Nierzsche: “There arc dimensions here, times and places, glacial or torrid zones never moderated, the entire exotic geography which characterises a mode of thought as weil as a style of hfe“ (LS, 128/153). “lt is tip to us to go to ex— treme places, to extreme times, where the highest and the deepest truibs live and risc tip. The places of thought arc the tropical zones frequented by the tropieal man, not temperate zones or the moral, methodical or moderate man“ (N 110/126). And in relation to German expressionist cinema: “lt is the hour sshen it is no longer possihle 10 distinguish hetween sunrise and sunset, air and water, water and earth, in the great mixture ofa marsh or of .1 tempeSt“ (CI, 14/26).

Notes to Chapter Six

275

73 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79.

80.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX
1. Deleuze and Guatrari wrirc: “An ahstract machine is not physieal or corpo real, any more than it is semionc; it is diagrammatic“ (ATl 147/176). 2. “The privilcge of sensibility as origin,“ Deleuze writes, “appears in the fact that, in an encountcr, what forces sensation and thar which can oniy be senscd arc one and tlw same thing.“ (DR, 144—5/1 88) Sensation marks the inuflanence of ontological and aesthetic dimensions, and is what must be thought, in nng as in philosophy.

3. This date refers to the appcarance ofa diagram or ahstracr maclune. In ATP each plateau carries such a date, for exampic ott November 28 1947 Antonin Artaud announees thc Body without Organs (BwO), As wt. shall sec, this is an important date for Ddeuze‘s aceount of Bacon‘s diagram. 4. For a brief account of Riegi‘s concept of Kunstwollen see Cbapter Four, note 43, 5. The chapter this quotation comes from, “Mahinic heterogenesis“ gives a good account of die machinic history Deleuze is employing in relation to Bacon‘s diagrani. “lt is at the intcrseuion of heterogeneous machinic Universes, ofdifferent dirnensions and wirh unfamiliar ontoiogical textures, radical innovarions and once forgon-en, then reactivated, aneestral ntachinie lines, that die niovement ofhistory singularises itseif“ (Chaos, 41/63). 6. The diagram is “prcsent,“ Deleuze and Guattari write, “in a different way in every assemblage, passing from ont to the other, opening one onto the other, outside any dxed order or determined scqnence“ (ATl 347/428). 7. For an interesting account of Bacon‘s “diagrammatic“ use of Vehizquez and Ingres see, Norman Bryson, “Bacon‘s Dialogues with the Past,“ in Francis Bacon and the Tradition ofArt. 8. Deieuze writes: “Painting invents entirely different rypes ofbiocks. These arc neither blocks ofconcepts nor blocks ofmovemcnts/durations, hut blocks of line/colors,“ Gilles Deleuze, “1 Javing an Idea in Cinema,“ Deleuze und Guattari New Mapping in Politics, Philosophy and culture, p. 1 5. (“Qn“esr cc que l“acte dc crarion?,“ Deux R«imes dc Fous, textes et entretiens 1975--1995, p. 293) 9. David Sylvester, Interviews wit?, Francis Baron, p. 1 6—7. 10. “Paintings eternal object is this:“ Deleuze and Guauari writc, “to paint firces“ (WI 182/172), II. Spiritual or “geometrie“ abstraction, Deleuze argues produces a pnreiy opti cal space without taetile connections, within which the “spiritual“ (transcen— dent) values of the abstract forms signif‘ according 10 a still classical inodel ofrepresentation. In “spiritual“ abstraction color and form arc undeistood in an entirely symbolic way, as representing highcr truths (fi)r example, Kandinsky‘s understanding ofcolor in On the $piritua/ in Art, or Maievich‘s understanding ofform in Suprematism). Abstract expressionism is the other pole, and produces a catastrophe enveloping the entire canvas. Abstract Expressionism, Deleuze writes, “grounds itsclf in a scrambling“ (FB, 117/111). F-lere, optical space disappears in favour ofa manual line that pro duces a sensation that is “irreniediahly confused“ (FB, 109/102). Deleuze‘s critiquc of “spiritual“ abstraction and abstract expressionism, it must be notcd, is specific to Deleuze‘s evaluation ofBacon‘s practiee, and will not pre vent Deienze fiom affirming hoth diagrams elsewhere (he affirms both Pollock and minimaiism as cxpressions of the Baroque fhld (TF, 27/38, 160/168), and gives a posirise evaluation ofMondrian (WB 183/173). We

26

Notes iv Chapter Six

Notes 10 Chapter Siv

27

have already seen Deleuze and Guattari‘s affirmation of Pollock in ATR The point is that different diagrams answer different questions, as Deleuze cx plains: “The important question is: Why did Bacon not become involved in either of die two preceding paths. The severiry of his reactions, rather than elaiming to pass judgement, simplv indicate what was not right for him, and explains why Bacon personally took neithcr of these paths“ (FB, 109/101 —2). As a result, l3aeons “middle way“ between geometrie ahstrac— nun and ahstraet expressionism “is called a “middle“ way only from a very external puint of ‘iew“ (FB, 118/111). 12. \Ve recall froni Chaprer Four that this is the aspect ofWbrringcr‘s aceount of Egyptian art Deleuze and G uattari criticize. 1.3. Deleuze takes the rerm “Figtire“ from Jean—Francois Lyotard‘s book Discoii;s,Fzgiire. Lyotard is priniarilv concerned wirh Freud‘s ropological con— struction of the unconselons in whieh surface elements ofa narrative appear as fignrative transformations of an invisible system of uneonscious relations. L.yotard argues that the uneonscious produetion ofeonscious meaning does not ocetir through a process of interpretation—rhat is rhrough the signi— fier—and this is the “iniportance“ of the book fir Deleuze (“Remarks (on Jean-Franeois Lyotard),“ L)esert ts/ands anti Other ]‘xts 195.3—1974, p. 214). (L“ile D6serte et Autres 7xtes, textes et entretiens 1953—1974, p. 299) Instead, meaning enterges through an invisible “matrix“ that exists outside ofany laws of representation and discourse. For Lyotard rhe visible is strucrured by this invisible and uneonseious matrix whieh becomes visible in the Figure, or “figural,“ as the deformation of figurative representations. The matrix, ac— cording to Lyotard, “resides in a space that is beyond the intelligihle, [andj is in radical rupture with the mIes of Opposition; we can already see that rhis property of uneonseious space, whicli is also thar of the lihidinal body, is to have many places in one plaee, and ro block together what is logically incom— patihle. This is the seeret of tlie figural: the transgression of the eonstitutive intervals of discourse and the transgression of the constitutive disrances of representation“ (Lvotard quoted in Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind E. Krauss, ForinlessA (Jsert Guitic, p. 106—7). Deleuze, while adopting the deforinative aspeet of Lyotards Figure. and acknowledging the “extreme importance“ of his hook (AO, 243/289) discards its psyehoanalytie focus. This is hecausc al rhough Lyorard identifies the “fignre—matrix“ wirh desire, correetly in Delenze and Cuattari‘s opinion. he limits desire, and indeed “eastratcs“ it (AO, 244/290) bv bringing it hack “roward the shores he has so recently left behind“ in redueing die Figure 10 “rransgressions“ whieh remain seeondary to whar tliey defiarni (AO, 244/290). For an aecounr of Deleuze‘s relation to lyotard, see Ronald Bogne, Deleuze an Miisic, Paintin anti the Arts, p. 113—16.

14. In A Thorisand P/ateaus Deleuze and (iuatlari argue that the flice finds us be— coming—aninial in a liead—hody. The head—body is eomposed of “/iciality traits,“ wbieh “elude the Organisation of the fee“ (AFP 171/209). 15. That is, it considers painting as an onrological praetice. See Mauriee Merleau—Ponty, The Visi6 ie anti the Jnvisih/e (referenees now fbund in die text following ibe abbreviation “VI“), and Ins essays “Eye anti Mmd,“ and “Clizanne‘s Douht,“ in Tue Merleau—Ponty Aesihetics Read‘r: Phi/osophy anti Painsing (referenees to “Eye and Mmd“ arc now found in the text following die abbreviarion “Eid“). 16. Apart froni Merleau—Ponrv‘s work, Deleuze also draws 01] and diseusses orlier phenomenologieal aeeonnts of Ctianne, cspeeiallv Erwin Straus, 77o‘ Primaiy V1“ir/ti of the Senses, and Henri Maldinev, RevyI, Iilio/e, Espace. For an aeeonnr of Deleuze“s relanonship to Stratis and Maldinev see, Ronald Bogue, Deleuze an Music, Painting anti tln‘ ilits, p. 116—121 (fiar Straus), and p. 139—145 (on Maldiney). For other aeeonnts of Deleuze‘s relation to phe— nomenology see, Daniel W Smitb, “Delenze‘s Theorv of Sensation: Overeoniing die Kanrian Duality,“ in L)eleuze: A G;itica/ ReatiL‘,; anti Tudv Purdom, “Mondrian anti the destruetion ot space,“ in Hypeiplastik, Kunst und Konzepte der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der inental imagery 17. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Clizanne‘s Douhr,“ 7he Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reatier; Phi/osop/y anti Painting, p. 68. 18. As Merleau—PoHty writes, “it is not 1 wlio Sees, liot he WhO sees, heeause an anonymous visibiliry inhabits horb ofus, avision in general, in virtue ofdiat prirnordial property that belongs to the flesh, heing here and now, of radiat— ing everywhcre and forever, being an individnal, of being also a dimension and a universal“ (VI, 142). 19. Merleati—Ponty‘s “pathic“ flesb is elearly distinguislsed froin Deleuze‘s “bap ne“ one in terms of this ropology of absence. if we recall Merleau—Ponty‘s pathic topology of “rhe ourside ofirs inside md the inside ofits outside“ (VI, 144), we ean eontrast this direetly vitIi Deleuze‘s liapnie topologv of a plane of composition whieh “is not internat tu die self hut neither does it eome froni an exrcrnal selfor a non—seif Rarher it is like die absolute Qutside that knows no Selves hecausc interior and exrerior arc eqnally a part ofthe inima— nenn in wbich rhey have fused“ (ATP 156/194). 20. This is inevirable, Deleuze wrires, for “A conseiousness is nothing witliont a svnnhesis of nnificanion. bot nhcre is no synthesis nf unifleanion withour the form of the 1, or the poinn ofview of the SeIf“ (LS. 102/124). 21. “The quesnion of whether fiesh is adeqnate no art,‘ Deleuze anti Cuattari wrirc, “can be pur in this way: ean in snpport pereept anti affict, ean it con— sninurc die heiiig ofsensation, or most ii not irseifbe suppotted and pass inro onher powers oflife?“ (WB 178/169). 22. Interestingly, Cizanne is more of a stopping place for Deleuze‘s recapitula tion of Baeon, than for Bacon himself As Baeon said of Czanne: “I‘m tior

1 can sec that he has been important. while die fiat colored grounds and the use ofan arniature to fratite the figatres is closer ro Gattgttiti.titgcr Bacott‘s “malerisch“ period shares with the eariy. 35. Comnton to the niountains and to Czannes paintings. in Czantte‘s paintings as in Natttre. W‘dc. Muse d‘Orsay. were the real paintcrs ofphenonienoiogy.“ unpag— inatcd unpublished paper. The lmpressionists rhen. Sensation. Goethe offers a whole range of tcrms to descrihe die differenrial relations of yellow and blue (Theo. Seqortrait. In C‘onversation with Michae/Archimbaud. The hroken tones ofBacott‘s figures arc muclt closer to Vati Gogh‘s “nialerisch“ technique. thermal and tnagnetic forces. Anisterdani. sprinkle thc arca of plain. “recuvers a fitnction that is derived front tlic lialos of pretnodern painting“ (FB. For Goethe: “Two pure original principles in contrast arc die foundation of die wltoie. and depended ott an “optical mixture of colors‘ in an au— tonomons eye (WI 165/155).Gauguin. ‘hie forces of thc earth emerge in inseparable traits ofeontent and expression.‘ This independent ligbt illuminating things obviously recalls our discussion of plicnomcnology. 25. 2000. “Some Remarks on Color in Conternporary Philosophy.:tand der Farbe.“ and this tio doubr a very Delcuzian criticism.“ Rather. homogeneous. Bacott does not. “is in the body.es !ttiserab/es. Theory ofcolours. Notes to Chapter Six 279 23. 27. Josefliwitz col lection. or todav Bacon. Wlicre Baeon rentains Czattnean. cach on its own aceounr. Kunst und Koizzepte der W4dirnehmung in Zeiten der menta! imagcry 32. There is also a d. “is in the extreme elabo radon ofpainting as analogical language“ fF13. fbr although the Impressionists suc— cecded in dissolving form. Deleuze generally sticks to hot and cold. Deleuze says. from being alrcady dctermined hy die differcntial relation of two eolors that we cannot dctect“ (TP. Deleuze expands on Czarine‘s “lesson against the inipressionists. to “paint the Sensation“ (1B. 185. More specifically. This would he the only point at which tny aecount of Deiettzc rcadittg of Bacon differs front the odierwise immaculate description Rotiald Bogite . Indeed. onlv “ohvions“ dif1retices hetween Bacon . Alliez devclops this idea here in some detail. Deleuze ar gues.“ p. 696) many of which describe die relations of forces—Repulsion/Attraction.28 Notes to Chapter Six sure what place he has in thc history of painting. in other words. 143/134). Action/Negation. The forces ofthe earth (fiirces offolding. (zatitte painrs Nature.“ with colors beitig dicir “traits of expression“ (ATR 14 1/176). There arc. 34. Gerhard Fromanger. Anti nothing impedes eithcr yellow or bitte. 35/40). 707. in fJpeip/astik. To thc ColiSiStclit material virtual discov— ercd by die old (‘annc. solid bodics o colur that do not melt into the air. 1888. they form sensations (particle—signs). 1 52/142). forees of gerrnination) enierge in Czanne‘s paintings aceording to an abstract geonietry. Deleuze writes. writing. p. 28. this dissolntion was achieved in light. that ofa “hietiditig“ itt the broken tones dark “ ening the painting (FB. is “irrcducibly sytitheric. fiir example. to the matter and movement of paint as expresslons of colors—constructions. 37/41—2). iti their shared project. Quoted in fric Alliez. “in Vati Gogh. Deleuze and Guattari argue. Vincnt vati Gogh Foundatiott. 88/117). is what Deleuze and Guattari cdli “traits of content. the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien.“ hecause ii is its nature “ro envelop a constitutive difference of level“ (FB. as many people arc. Paris). 1889. 26.“ Deletize and Guattari write. 1889. 42. This is a device Gauguin frequendy entploys (/eepin (Jhi1a 1884. Deleuze gives die example of die color “green: yellow and bitte can surely he perceived hut ifthcir perccption vanishes hy dint ofprogressive diminution. Mus& d‘Orsay. In this latrer re spect Deletize argues that Bacon sliares a “cloissotiisttt“ with Gattguitt s hielt. \Ve can understand Czanne‘s rela tion to die lmpressionisrs in this ivay. ric Alliez. sensation is in die body. “Hallucitiating Cciatttte. “Vati Gogh ‚md Gauguin. This absttact geolnetry. 29.y qf C‘olours. See also Deleu7e‘s discussion of die painter Grard fromanger in diese terms. given at die conference chroma Drama. Czanne said “Monet is hut an eye. thev enter into a diffrentiai relation (dbldy) that determines green. 35/40). But these differettces arc ttnitcd. in “Cold and 1-leat. The separation of light troni color introduces an optical space and iniplies a discrete eye to see it.“ iheory of‘Golours.“ Photogenic Fainting. Paris). uniform eolor with litde bttitchies offiowers so as to turn it iitto wall paper on wbich the face stands out in hroken tones“ (W 1 82/173). La Be//eAnge/e. is the differential caiculus of Nature aitd gives an analogical expres_ sion of die heconting of its forces. and not in the air“ (FB. 24. Gauguin. not (zanne. Ctzantic paints landscapes atid stiii-liFcs. sensation emerges in the construction of colored planes. “Color. Here we arc not fhr from Spinoza‘s fbrniula 6 r heatitudc -t percept itt which 1 think or experience God/Nature as God/Nature dtitiks itself 31. vivid anti saturated colotir“ P 7 (“X 181/171).“ Michael Archimbaus. “we see die immediate tetision hetween flesh and die arca ofplain. Francis Bacon. 120/113).‘ 1 .“ writing that a sensation is not achieved through “die ‘free‘ or disembodied play oflighr and color (impres sions). Vision.“ Deleuze writes. 33. 805. unifirtii color surging fiirth. for both. In Vati Gogh the “wahlpaper“ tends not so much to die floral as to a swirling pattern (Serpor trait. hut 1 must admit l‘ni not madly enrhusiastic about hint. hetween die flows of broken tones [tons rompus] atid die infi nite band of a pure.ind Czatine. 30. Bacon also took otber things front Gauguin anti Vati Gogh. “Deleuze reverses the order in perceptions supposed in Merleau—Ponty‘s phenomenology ofart and instead of thc painter following thc birth of the rhing in its actualisation—a niove frotn the virrual to the actual—has the painter dissolve the thing and niove froni thc actual to thc virtual. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Bacott intcriors.

1999—2003 ‚See ric AlIiez and jean-Ciet Martin.sions. Camphell. 39. 1992. L‘Oeil cert‘eau. Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze‘s discussion ofihe three dilierent rlivihms coine front die coinposer Olivier Messiaen.“ he ‘.“ Pure Immanenec: Essays an A Lif. 46.“ Deleuze and Guatrari wrire.“ p. “Situation of the Flesh. A theatre borh Artaud‘s and Bacon‘s. Gilles Dcleuzc. 165/215). p. hook 1. 42. 251/323. at the Akademie der bildenden Künste Wien.“ Boguc argues. 40. Dc la pcinture moderne. Negotiations 1972—1 990. including their uncerrainties and failtires. litradise Lost. “Instirutional Schiio-Analysis. “Individuation. NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION Thomas Pynchon. secret and pro6mnd“ (C2. As we shall see ths is perhaps simply a “quarrd oVer words. ‘[‘he lirst quotation is Antonin Artaud. 245/316). P 571 Antonin Artaud.“ ‘l‘hought has no other reason to function than its own birth. John Milton. in The (7omplete English Poems. sec DR. “‘Ib F lave Done with the Judgenient of Cod. anti that the image must produce a shock. Antonin Artand. 38. p. 4. in Aiiti-0ec/ipus Deleitac and Gnattari wrirc: “lt must not he thought that thc intensities themselves arc in Opposi tion to one another. hardly gets ns out of the sphere of opinions. “thought dc— pends on maos relations with the world—with which the brain is necessar— ily in agreement heeausc it is drawn frons these relations. F‘or Deleuze‘s aecount of ihe spatzurn as the intensive differenciation of spa— tio—temporal dvnamisms particular to the Body without Organs. bot this aseent of phenomcnology be)-ond the brain towards a Being in the world. 585. London: ?\lincrva. Deleuze argues: “{Artandl savs that the cinema is a matter of nettro—physio logical vibrations.“ Selected Witings. line 124. “Accord ing to plienomenology. p. 246/317). ‘registers direetly OH the nerves without passing through the brain“ (p. 44.s lites. 1 have also taken the concept of the eyebrain which fillows from Eric Alliez. 14S. conld say it is the act ofpainting. p. 23 1/298. The refcrcnces in ATP have alreadv heen given. 41. Antonin Artaud. 110. Flix Gtiattari. 565. 49. 111.“ Selected iitings. 43.“ Quoted in 1ric Allie. 47. tor example. lt often appears as such. p. Paris: Senil. anti t1‘e Arts. Antonin Artaud.“ SaH Subve. 2. “lmmancnce: A 1 ife.280 Notes to Chapter Six gives in Deleuze an 31usic.“ Selected Wriun‘s.“ and in relation to Bacon . 266—7. 16S/215). Pitintin. 158).. “Situation of die Flesh. 37. arriving at a state of balance arotnid a neutral state. 161. not the brain“. lii The second is an unreferenced quotation of Artaud by Deleuze (C2. 3. On the conrrary. along the lines ofdiffeiznciation ‘md within the qnalities and extensities it ereates“ (DR.“ Selected Wiitnigs. “1 lallucinating Czannc. p. p 27. cdited hy C. Deleuze and Cnattari discuss the “rbytlinnc characier“ in ATl 318/391. Vine/ant4 p. And thev nndergo relanve i ises or falls depending on the complcx rclationship between them and die variations in the relative strength ofattraction and repulsion as determining fictors“ (AO. final letter to Paule Thevenin. 48. p. Antonin Artaud. “Situation of the Plesh. who devcloped it in hi seminar 012 tI‘e Eye-Brain ofModernity. 144. or meaning of meanings“ (WP 209—10/197). Notes to the Conclusion WC 281 36. in which “lt is intcnsity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio—teniporal dvnaniisms and which determines the ‘indistincr‘ differential relation in a distinct qnalitv and a distinguished extensity“ (DR. New York: Alfred A. 276. p. Knopf. Deleuze also discusscs Kant‘s theory of intcnsity in DR. “for thought is a rnatron who has not always ex— isted. a nerve—wave whieh gives risc to thought. “Man thinks. Fcbruar‘ 24 1948. Selected W‘itzngs. 45. 2005. .“ Selected W‘ritings. Deleuie calls this process “individuation. thcy arc all positive in relation to the icro intensity that desig natcs die full hod‘ it ithout organs. lt leads us only‘ 10 an Urdoxa posited as an original opinion. 1990. “Sensation. rhrough a double criricism of inechanism and dynamism. “is die act hy which intensity dcterniines diftrejitial relations to hecome actualised. as cxcitations arc drawn from the world and reactions from man. “To 1 lave Düne with the Judgemcnt of God. This is die theatre of what Deleuze calls dramatisation. 19/25). Further down the page thcy mention Kant‘s theory of intensive quanrity.

iransiared 1w \l. 1989. Dirence and Repetition. The Movement Image. Paris: Minuis. translarcd by D. ‘lomlmson and R. textes et entretiens J953_J974. Di‘rence et Rep6tition. rranslared hy M. 1996. cinema 2. Paris: Minuit. 1991. New York: Zone Books. 1 98v. Le beigsonisme. }oughin. imlinsnn anti 13. 1968. Ncw York: University of Colurnbia Press. J)ialogues. Eile Diserte etAutres 7ates. 1996. “Coldncss and Cruclry. 1968. 2002. cmeinal. Mmneapolis: University of Miimcsota Press. translatcd by 1 1. Paris: Presses Universitaires dc France. 1997. 2003. Paris: Minuit. Paris: Minoir. Cilles Deletize and (laire Parnet. 1989. Hahberjani. rranslated bv 1—!. 1992. translatcd hv H. Y ie 7me—Image. Ihmlinson and 13. Dialogues. . 1983. Books. 1980. New York: Columhia University Prcss. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. cinnrn 2. Paris: Minnir. Taorinina. \cw \ork: Zone Books.m.B ibl iography GIIIES DELEUZE—BOOKS Bergsonism. cinema 1: Lirnage-moniemtnt. 1993. Deux Reimes dc fitus textes et entretlens 19‘5—]995. L7mage-temps. Essays critical anti clinical. Minncapolis: Universiry of Minnesota Prcss. Crceo. Desert idanib nd Other ]vts 1953—] 9Tt. 7 Calera. liamlinson and 13. rranslaicd by 11.“ itlasochL. Minneapolis: Univcrsirv of Mi Inesota Press. Paris: Minuit. }1. translared by P Patron. 1966. &itique et C‘linique. Spinoza et Ieprohli‘me dc 1apression. translatcd lw McNeil. New York: Semiorext( c). Paris: Flammarion. 2004. Cilles Deleuze. Flabbcrjam. Cilles Deleuze and Clairc Parner. Smith and M.ihlwrjim. Ncsv York: Zone J. Paris: Presses Universitaires dc France. 1991.

(English and French) translatcd by 1). Neu‘ Mappings in Politics. 1989. 1. London: Penguin. seminar. Roberis. translated hy 1-1. Toinlinson and B. 1988 Foucault. M. Paris: Galihle. Francis Bacon: The Logic ojSensatzon. Sydney: Power pubtications. Stivale. ibinlinson and G. New York: Semiotext(e). Fontenay-sous-Bois: Enere. —Mi//eJ‘/ateaux Paris: Minuir. La r/volution moleculaire. Session on Spinoza. Gera rd Fromanger. The Logic of Sense.jrd/esson on Kint. 1992. XlcMahon. Murphy. translated hv 1. Boundas. seminar. Theoiy qf‘AfuIti/icities in Beigson. Flabberjam. I‘roust et les sines. translated hy T S. meta1/uigj musjc. 1994.“ Deleuze anti Guattari. Proust andSins. 1 loward. and H. Paris: Minuit.l. 1992. The Guattari Readei. Ncw York: Columbia 9 iVietzscbe anti Philosop/ Press. New York: Zone Books. 1983. Joughin. seminar. edited by (.284 Bibliography The Folel: Leibniz anti the Baroque. 27 Fehruary 1979. Hand.XleXlahon. The Nature ofFlows. edited byJ. R. Xlurplw. Boyinan. translated hv T S. Loique du sens. 1 999. Massumi. . Pindar and P Sutton. Paris: Presses Lnivcrsitaircs dc Francc. Piulosop/iiepnttique. rranslated hy R. translatcd by D. Seem. . 1991. 25 November 1980. Paris: Prcsses Univcrsitaires dc France. London: Atlilone Press. 2001. London: Pcnguin. Husserl. translated by F{. translated by 1 S. 14 Decembcr 1971. Paris: Minuit. chaosmosis: an ethico-aestheticparadim. 28 Mareh 1978. Universiry Nieizjche et li /iI‘ilosophie. Hurly.‘X‘ Smith. Lotringer. 14 january 1 974. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Spinoza: Practical PhilosopIy translated by R. New brk: Columbia University Press. Kaufman and K. 5pinoza. 1 996. Murpliv. 13 Januar‘ 1981. Erancis Bacon /oiqiie Ja sensation. Ocana. 1964.“ Photogenic Painting. Metal. Paris: Minuit. LoHdon and New York: Coiitinuuin. Mullarkey. “L‘1puis. Rvan. edited by 5. Paris: Galik:e. 1990. 5. 1996. Tomlinson. Essays on A Lif. Negotiations 192-—199O. 1981 Bibliography 285 GILLES DELEUZE—SEMINAR TRANSCRJPTS (ALL FOUND AT WWWIMAGINET. translated by A. What Js Philosophy?. Lotringer. 1988. translated hy R. 2002. 2003.“ ihe Brain is the Screen: (id/es Deleuze anti die Philosophy of Cinema. A Thousand Plateaus. — — — — DELEUZE AND GUATTARI—BOOKS Anti-Oeditnts. trans lated hy T. translated hx 1. translated 1w B. translated bv Xl .e. Genosko. translatcd by T Conlcy. “Cold and 1 leat.4nti—(Ea‘. Qu‘est-cequelaphi/osophie? Paris: Minuit. 5.“ Samuet Beckctt. 1977 SofiSubversions. XIurphv. Simondon. 1972. 1995. 1988. Ncsv Yrk: Colunsbia Univcrsity Prcss. seminar. London: Black Dog Publishing. translated by XI. 2000. 1993. editcd by CV. 1980. The Three Ecologies. Pbi/osopliy anti (u/ture. (Jhaosophy cdited by S. 1962. london: Athlone. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Oxtbrd: Blaekwell. Seminar Session on pinoza. 1 94)5. Js‘int: Synthesis anti Tnne. 1972.FRJDELEUZE) Semjna. translared by R. (wirh Antonio Negri). New York: Semiotext(e). Xlnrphv. Kiiite Critical Philosophy: The Docirine f the Eiculties. 1965. 1984. Paris: Prcsses Liniversitaires dc France. Lane. C‘apita/ism andSchizophrenia. 24 Januarv 1978. Lt /‘lz. (“Qu‘est-cc que l‘aetc dc crario ?‚“ Dt‘ux Regimes dc Fous. S. — - — FLIX GUATTARI—BOO — GILLES DELEUZE—ARTICLES “Bergson‘s conception ofdiffcrence. Hurlcy. Pure fmmanence. Seminar Session of‘Spinoza. Burehell. Flaxman. Murphy. edited [w E. “Having an Idea in Cinema. Murphv. T/. Seminar Session 3 Mav 1977. JnicauIt. 1983. 1988. textes et entretiens 1975—1995) ‘Thc Brain Is The Scrccn: An lntcrvicw with Gutes Deleuze. Paris: v1iiiuit. translated by P Baines and J. J• Heller. translatrd lw T. Pefsnis. cartographies Schizoanalytiques. Molecular Revolution. (Jommunists Like (Zt. Seminar Session On Scholasticism anti Spinoza. Vincennes. New Ybrk: Semiotexr(e). 1984. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. cdited by G. translated hy H. 1995. 1 9(9. 1986.“ ihe New Bergson. Shced. Leibniz ei Je haroquc. Lester with C. New York: Columhia University Prcss. 5. San Francisco: City Lights I3ooks. ranslated by K. translatcd by S. translated by M. seminar. Paris: Minuit. translared hv XI. 1990. 14 Xlarch 1 9‘8. translated hy T. On Music. chaosmose. Paris: Minuit. Paris: Scuil. iVietzschc. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Prcss. Quad. translated h XI.

edited by E.3.vteenth und Sei‘enteent/. 1 il. Audra and C. 23. “Cilles Deleuze: The Fold: Leibniz anti the Baroqtte. Eshlenun wirll B. Milan: Skira. 2003. von Samsonow and E. translated bv M. Deleuze. Witt‘hflelds anti Ruck . Francis Bacon. Routledgc. translated hy G. One. 1999. ihe S. 2003. Deleuze anti Religion. 2000. “TIte BwO Condition oi. London: Routledgc. Manolis Chadzadikas. 1994. ric Alliez. Minncapohs. Berkeley: University of Califirnia Press. Discourse 2(1.“ rranslatcd by M.‘ Jhe (darnour of Being. 1985. Burehill. Gerrninal Lift. Theories ofArt .M. ric Aliez. “Thinking. New York: Zone Books. edited In‘ 1. 1994. edited arnd translated by R. translated by L. Antonin Artaud.3. Matter andMemory.tion to iVietzsche as Political Thinke: Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press. From Jrnpressionisin to Kandinsky. translatcd by R. Mary Bryden editor. . (Fall 19911).“ Radical Philosopl no.‘ Gi/les Deleuze and t/le Theatre of Philosop/y. Kieth Ansell Pearson. Olkowski. edited by W Montag and T. London. 1 oiidon: Routledgc. Alliez. Recounting. 1977. The Alystic Rible.. Moshe Barasch. “Cillcs Deleuze: The Aesthetics of Force. Keith Ansell Pearson. Buchanan. Michael Arehimbaud. KeitIl Ansell Pearson. “1 lalhicinating Cezanne. mareh. Cilles Deleuze anti die Theater ofPhilosophv Ncw York: Routledge.“ unpub lished paper given at the conference chroma. Ctpital Times: ldefroin the onquest of7ine. Part One: Spinoza.96.“ Hypep1astik. (summer 1992). Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss. University of Minnesota Press. 1994. ric Alliez. 1998. London: Macmillan. Henri Bergson. Byzantine Monumenis in Attica und Boeotia. London anti New York: Continntim. Midnight: The Einergence ofCme—thinking. The 7ivo Sources ofA‘Iorality and Religion. No.“ Deleuze: A C‘ritical Reader edited by R Patton.“ A Deleuzian (entury? The South Atlantic Quarter5s (Summer 1997). 22. translated by A. 2000. 2000. Deleuze and Guattari.“ diacritics.“ Deleuze: A Critical Reader. 1935.e‘s l3ergsonisin. “Rewriting Posnuodernity (Notes). Bryden. Main Badiou. (Jreative Evolution. Brammer. Perspectives an Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition. Ronald Bouge. 1996. Paris: Flaminarian. An Jntrodu.286 OTHER BOOKS AND ARTICLES Bibliography Bibliography 287 — — —— — 1rie Alliez. The Polities ofSensation. iranslated iw N.i. Paul and WS. 1997. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski cditors. Stolze. Constanrin V.april 2004.“ Biogwphien des organlosen f2ispeis.is les l‘onds re‘gionaus dzrt cantemporain. edited by E. Ross and A. ilador.“ Nietzsche—Stud. Selecttd Iitings. Flaxman. edited by P Patton. London and New York: Coflri nllttfll. Deleuze. Alain Badiou. ihscano whid onginally appeared in 7‘iesors publics 20 ans de cre1tion di. Moshe Barasch.“ Discourse 20. Runting. und 1l‘e Arts. 1ric Alliez. 1rie Alliei. translated by M.. “Some rcmarks on Colonr in Contemporary Philosophy. “The Polincs of Anti-Oedztrns—Thirty Years On. edited by M. 1956. Raymond Bellour. London: Routledge. 201)4. Ronald Bogue. Ronald Bogue. ‘The cincma of Cilles Dclcuzc. 19‘6. Smith. Vienna: Akademie der bildendeit Kfinsre. Henri Bergson. “Pure reserve. Keith Ansell Pearson. C‘enturies. Yheoretical V‘tings. Palmcr. 124.. “On Dcleu. Keith Ansell Pearson. [he Signature of‘ the World O. philosophy and immanenec. Vielma: Tnria+Kant. “The Only Materialist Tradition. Toseano.): MIT Press. Ness‘ York: New York Universiry Press. The diffierence anti repetition ofDeleuze. “Mvsticism. 2004. Michel dc Certeau. The Binin is the Screen: (‚‘illes Deleuze and the Philosop/ ‘ of cinenia. David B. Theories of‘Art From Plato iv Wnckeb. l3rereton. 1995.“ The New Spinoza. “1wards the Ubermenseh: Relleetions on the Year of Nieti. 2003. 1992.S‘cre‘nns: W‘n‘ksßoni tin‘ Final Period. Alliez. Constantin Boundas. edited hy G. Michel dc Ccrteau. Boston: Exact (lange. London: Phaidon. “Art and Terrirory. McMahon. Main Badiou. 9 Irie Alliei..en. Penwarden and A. 1-lenri Bcrgson. Widerstand der Farbe. Tiscano.“ Deleuze anti Religion. The New sVietzsche: (onternporarv Styles of Intepretatusn. cdited by C.3. What is Deleuze anti Guattarii Philosophy?. \ Bonndas and [). VOll Samsonow jod E. Vol. 2001. Mitchell. Norman Bryson. 1 997. cditcd by S. Ncw York: Henry Jioh.. Cambridge (Mass. Kunst und Konzepte der W‘ihrnehmung in Zeiten der mental irnagely. 1993.“ an unpublished translatiofl hy C. Lotus Ahbusser. Allison editor. Viroid Lift.3 (Fall 1998) ric Alliez. 2000. ric Allic.a..“ Francis Bacon und die Tradition ofArt. Deleuze on Afusic. Van Den Abbeele. “Bacon‘s Dialognes witlt the Past. In C‘onversation u‘ith MichaelArchimbaud. ‘Midday. Brassier ‚md A. Antollin Ariaud. Sontag. 2003. London: Routlcdgc. Minneapolis: University of Millilesota Press. 1911. Athens: Arhens Editions. 1989. Ronald Boguc.sche‘s Davbreak. New York: Routledge. Vicnna: Tttriai-Kanr.2. “Deletize—Bcrgson: an Ontology of the Virtual. cd— ited and translated by C. translated by E. Minneapolis: University of Minnesora I>ress.

288

Bibliography

Bibliography

289

Mark A. Cheetham, Kant, Art, md Art T[istory. Cambridge: Cambridge Utiiversity Press, 2001 Timothy j Ciark, “Jackson Pollock‘s Ahstraction,“ Reconstructing Modernism: Art in iVew York, Palis, anti Montreal 1945 1964, cdited hy S. Cuilbaut. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1990, Ihomas Crow, “Sarurday l)isastcrs: Trace and Refcrence in Early Warhol,“ Reconstrncting Zvjotiernism; Art in Neu‘ York, Paris, anti Montreal 1945—1964, cdii cd by S. Guilbaut. Cambridge (Mass.): Mii‘ Press, 1990. Oiivicr Davies, “Thinking Dilference. a comparalive study of Gilles Deleuie, Plon mis sud Meister Eckhart,“ Deleuze (lud Relzion, edited by M. Brydcn. Thicrrv dc Duvc, Kant Afier Duchamp. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1996. Robert Dciauncy, ‘On the Construction of Reality‘ in Pure Painring,“ Art in iieory 1 900—l 990 An AntholoK)‘ of changing Ideas, cditcd hy C. Harrison and R od. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. Jacqucs l)errida, Spurs, translatcd hy‘ B. Harlow. Chicago: Univcrsity of Chicago Prcss, 1979. —John Dcwev, Art as Eperience. Ncw York: Pcrigree. 1934. Paul Dougia. Bergson sud Cincina: iricnds or Foes,“ The Neu‘ Begson, cd— ited by‘ J. Muilarky. Grcgory liaxman cdiror, The Bonn is the Seiten: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy ofcinema. Minncapoiis: Minnesota University Press, 1999. Grcgory Fiaxman, ‘Cincma Ycar Zero‘, Ehe Brain is the Screen: Gilles Deleuze anti the Philosophy qf Cinema, cdited by B. Fiaxman. Hai Iostcr, The Return ofthe Rea1 7‘he Avant-garde at the Enti ofthe century Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1996 Michael Fried, Art anti Objecthood, Evsays anti Reviews. Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss, 1998. —John Gagc, ColourantiMeaning. /lrt, ScienceantiSyrnbolism. london: Thanies and F 1 udson, 1999. John Gage, Colour anti (ult,ire. Practice anti Meaning fivm Antiqisity to Abst,action. London: Thames and Htidson, 1993. Gary Genosko, “Guarrari‘s Schizoanalyric Scmiotics. Mixing Hjelmslev and Pci rcc,“ Deleuze anti Gnattari: Neu‘ M‘appings in Polities, Philosop/y anti cultnre, editcd hy E. Kaufhian and K. J. Heller. Michael Goddard, ‘The scattering of rime crystals: Deleuze, mysricism, and cinema,“ Deleuze anti Religion, cdired hy M. Bryden. Johann W)Ifg.tng von Goethe, ii?eoly of Colours, translarcd by C. L. Eastlakc. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Prcss, 1970. Philip Goodchild, Delenze anti Gnattari, An Introducison iv the Polities of‘Deszre. London: Sage, 1996. Phillip Coodchiid, “Why is philosophy so compromised with God?“Deleuze anti 1?eligion, editcd by M. Bryden.

— — ——

——

Hudson, 1993. Clement Grecnberg, Art anti Culture, Critica/ Essays. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961. Ciement Greenberg, The Collecteti Eoays anti (.iticisrn, Volnrne 1, Perciptions anti jutigements, 1939—41, edited by j. O‘Brian. Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss, 1985. Clement Grecnberg, Th‘ C‘ollecteti Risays anti riticism, Volume 2, Arrogant Purpose, 1 945—1949, edited by J. O‘l3rian. Chicago: Iiniversity of Chicago Press, 1986. Clement Grceuherg, The (Jollecteti Essays anti Crmcism, Volume 4 ilotiernism with a l mgeance, edited by J. O‘Brian. Chicago: Universitv of Chicago Press, 4 1993. Marcia I—iall, C‘olour anti Meaning, Practzce anti iY‘eory in 1?enaissance Riintint. Cambridge: Cambridge Universit-y Press, 1992. Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze An zpprenticeship in Philosophu \Iinneapolis: Univcrsity of Minnesota Press, 1993. i\Iichacl llardt, “Exposure, Pasolinj in the Ficsh,“ A Shock in Thought, Expressionisni «fier Deleuze anti Guattari, edired by B. Massumi. London: Routiedge, 2002. Martin Heidegger, Nietziche Volurne 1: The Will in Pou‘er as Art, transiatcd hy D. Krell. New York: 1-larper and Row, 1979. Paul Hills, Venetjan C‘o/our: Marble, Mosaic, Painting anti Glass 1250—1550. New Haven: Yale LJnivcrsity Prcss, 1999. Peter Humphrcy, Painting in Renaissance 14‘nice. Ncw 1 laven: Yale Univcrsity Press, 1995. Nancy Jachec, The Philosophy anti Politics ofAhst niet E\pressionisrn 1940—1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Galen E. Johnson, “Ontology and Painting,“ T/e iWerleau—Ponty Aesthetics Reittier: Philosoph 7 anti Painting, edited bv (. A. johnson. Evatiston: Northwestern University Prcss, 1993. Fredric Jamcson, “!vlarxism and Dualisin in Dcleuje,“ A Deleuzian (Jentuiy?, The Soitti Atlantic Quai‘terly, cdited hy 1. Buchanan, (Summer 1997), VoI.96, No.3. Immanuel Kant, critique of Pure Reason, translatcd lw N. K. Smnith. London: Macmillan Press, 1 933. Immanuel Kant, C}itique of‘Jutigement, transiatcd by 5. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hacker Puhlishing, 1987. E. Kaufman sud K. j. Heller editors, De/enze anti Guattari: Neu‘ iVappings in Politics, Philosop/iy anti Culture. Minneapolis: Jniversity of Minnesota Press, 1998. Paul Klee, On Motiern Art, transiated by P Pindiey. London: Faber amid Fahcr, 1948.

J. Gough-Cooper and J. Caumont, Marcel Duchamp. London: ‘I‘hamcs sud

290

Bibliography Paul Klee, (Jreative (Jretlo, www.ubmail.ubalt.edu Pierre Klossowski, Nietzshe anti the Vicious circle, translated by D. Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. Rosalrnd E. Krauss, T6e Optical UnconsLious. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1993. Rosalrnd E. Krauss, 7he Originality ofthe Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. Cambridge (Mass.): M1I Press, 1985. Rosalind E. Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois, Formless A User Guide. New York: Zone Books, 1997. Raiji Kuroda, “Collapsing!Collapsed Discourse on Warhol, Regarding Two Elvis Series,“ Andy Wirhol 1956—86. Mirror ofhis urne. Pitrshurgb: Andy Warhol Museum, 1996. Alphonso Lingis, “The Will Tu Power,“ ihe New Nietzsche: contemporazy Styles ofinterpretation, edired hy D. 13. Allison. Alex Mclntyre, “Comniunion in joy, Will tu Power and Eternal Return in Grand Politics,“ Nietzsche-Studien, 25, 1996. Pierre Macherey, “The Problem of the Atrrihures,“ The New Spinoza, edired by W Montag and T. Stolie, Pierrc Macherey, “Jhe Encounrer with Spinoia,“ in Deleuze: A Reader edited by P Parton. John Mullarkey ediror, The New Bergson. Manchesrer: Machester Universiry Press, 1999. John Mullarkey, “Deleuze and Marerialism: One or Several Marrers?“ A Deleuzian C‘entury? SouthAtlantic Quarterly, vol. 96, no,3, 1997, edired by 1. Buchanan. Laura U. Marks, “Signs of the Time, Deleuze, Peirce, and the Documenrary Image,“ The Brain is the Screen: Gilles Deleuze and the Philosophy ofGinerna, cd ired by (. Flaxinan, Jean—Cier Martin, “Of Images and Worlds: Towards a Geology ofrhe Cinema,“ The Bmin isa Screen: Gutes Deleuze anti the Philosophy of Cinema, edited by C. Flaxnan. Brian Massumi, A User Guide tu (apitalism andSchizophrenia, Deviationsfrorn Deleuze anti Guattari. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1992. Brian Massumi, “1‘he Auronomy ofAffecr,“ Deleaze: A C‘ritical Reade edired by P Patron. Brian Massumi, “Deleuze, (uatrari, and the Philosophy of Expression,“ Qtnadian Review of (‘omparative Literature, Vol. XXIV, no. 3, (Sept. 1997). Brian Massurni, “Chaos iii tbe ‘total field‘ of Vision,“ Hyperplastik, Kunst und Konzepte der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der mental imagery, edited by E. Vor‘ Samsonow amt ric Alliez. Vienna: Turia+Kant, 2000. Brian Massumi, “The Diagram as Technique of Exisrence,“ (hrorna Drama: Widerstand der Farbe, edired by E. VOfl Sarnsonow and ric Alliez. Vienna: ‘Fnria+Kant, 2001.

Bibliography

291

Todd May, 7 Y,e Political Philosophy of‘Poststructuralit Anarc/nsm, Pennsyl ania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994. Maurice Merleau—Ponry, The l/isihle und the Invisible, editcd by C. Lefort, trans— lated by A. Lingis. Evanston: Norrhwesiern UniVersity Press, 1968, Maurice Merleau-Ponry, “Eye and Mmd,“ The Merleau-Ponty Aesthegics Reader: Philosoply anti I‘ainting edited by C. A. Johnson. EVanstol,: Norrhwestern University Press, 1993. Maurice Merlcau Ponry, “Ceiannc‘s Doubr,“ 7he Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader.‘ Philosophy anti Painting, edited by C. A. Johnson. EVanston: Norrhwcstern University Press. 1993. Nick Miller, “The Third Eye,“ The Journal of Philosophy anti the Visual Ans, No.6., edited hy A. Bcnainin. 1 ondon: Academy Edirions, 1995. —NickMillet, “The Fugitive Body: Bacon‘s Fisrnla,“ TheJournalqfPhi/osoplyand ilse Visuaf Anis, No,4, edired hy A. Benjaniin. London: Academy Edirions, 1993. “W Montag and T. Stolze edirors, The Neu‘ .Spinoza. Minneapolis: Minncsota Universiry Press, 1997. Antonio Negri, “Relzqua Desiderantur: A Conjecrurc for a Definition of rhe Concept of Democracy in the Final Spinoza,“ The Nein Spinoza, edired hy W Montag and T. Stolze. Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly, tise Power of Spinoza Metaphysics anti Politics, translared by M. Hardr. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991. Antonio Negri, Insurgencies, Constituent Power anti the Modern State, rranslared by M. Boscagli. Minneapolis: Minnesota Universiry Press, 1999. Antonio Negri, Timejisr Revolution, translated hy M. Mandarini. London and New York, Continnum, 2003. Friedrich Nierische, The Birth ofTraget translared by F. Colfling. New York: Don bleday, 1956. Friedrich Nictzsche, Human, All Too Human, translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1 996. Friedrich Nietz.sche, Daybreak, rranslared by R. J. 1 lollingdalc. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Versiry Press, 1 997. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, rranslared hy W. Kaufmann. New York: Vinrage, 1974. Friedrich Nierzshe, 7hus 5ake Zarathustra, translated hy R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good anti Evil, rranslated hy R. J. Hollingdale. London: Pengumn, 1984. Friedrich Nicrzsche, On ilse Genealogy ofMorals, translated by E Colffing. New York: Douhleday, 1956 Friedrich Nier7sche, The Gase ofWagnei rranslarcd hy W Kaufinan. New York: Vintage, 1967.

292

Bibliography Friedrich Nierische, iivilight qf‘ the Idols, ranslared by R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1968. Friedrich Nicrische, The Antichrist, translated hy R. J. Hollingdale. London: Pengnin, 1 968. Friedrich Nicrzsche, Ecce Homo, translared hy R. J. Hollingclalc. London: Penguin, 1979, Friedrich Nierzsche, Unpublished Lettc,s, rranslated and edited hy K. Leidecker. Lond )n: Peter Owcn, 1960. Friedrich Nietische, Selected 1 etters of Friedrich Nietzsche, uanslatcd by C. Middleron. Chicago: Universiry of Chicago Press, 1969. Friedrich Nictzsche, Selected I.etters, rranslared hy A. N. Ludovici, edited by 0. Levv. London: Soho Book Conipany‘, 1985. Friedrich Nierzsche, lhe Will iv Powe; rranslarcd hy ‘X‘ Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Ncw York: Vinrage, 1967 Dorothea Olkowski, “Nierzschc‘s DiceThrow: ‘1agcdy, Nihilism, and the Body Without Organs,“ Gilles Deleuze anti the Theater ofPhiiosophy, cdired by C. V. Boundas aml D. Olkowski. John D. O‘Meara, Studies in Auguszine anti Eringena. ‘llLshingtoii: The Catholic
University of America Prcss, 1992.

Bibliogr4phy

293

Alois Ricgl, “The Main Charactcristics of the 1 ate Roman Kunstwollen,“ The Vienna School Reade,; Politics andArt !Jistoricil Met/iod in the 19305, editcd bv Christopher S. ‘ool. Alois Riegl, “‘The Place of the Vaphcio Cups in the 1 listory ol Art,“ 7 ‘e Vienna 1 School Reade;; Politics anti Art Ilistorical Method in the 1930s, edited hy Christopher S. Wool. David Rodowick, Gilles Deleuzei Time—hlai bine. Raleigh: Duke Univcrsitv
Press, 1997.

——

——

——

Paul Patron, Deleuze ana‘ the Political. London: Routledge, 2000. Paul Patron ediror, Deleuze: a (ritical Reizt/ei: Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Paul Patron, “AntiPlatonism and Art,“ Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of‘ Philosoph)‘, edited hy C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski. Vincent P Pecora, “Deleuie‘s Nierzsche and Post—Srructuralist Thoughr,“ in Substance, voll , no. 4 8, 1986. 4 Charles S. Peircc, The Essential Peirce, Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 2 (1893—1913), The Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Charles S. Peirce, 6 De/initioiis af‘ the Sin, edired by R. Marty. http://www.d d 6 efS oor.net/arisbe/menu/L[BR .ht ARY/rSoUrc m esI7 Dana Polan, “Francis Bacon, The logic of sensation,“ Gilles Deleuze anti the Theater ofPhilosophF edited hy C. V. Boundas and D. Olkowski. ludy Purdoiu, “Niondrian and the destruetion of space“ Hyperpiastik, Kunst und Kimzeple der Wahrnehmung in Zeiten der mental image7, edlted by E. von Samsonow and ric Alliez. Vienna:‘luria+Kant, 2000. John Rajchman, (Jonstructions. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 1998. John Rajchman. The Deleuze C‘onnections. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 2000 Alois Riegl, tate [?o,ii,z Art Industry, translated by R. Winkes. Rome: Ciorgio Brctschneidcr, 1985. Alois Riegl, ihe Group Portraure ofilolland, edired hy E. M. Kam and D. Briff Los Angelus: Gctrv Research Institute, 1999.

Robert Rosenblun;, “Orher Roniantic Currcnts: Klee and Ernst,“ Ma,vr Furopean Art Movements 1900—1945, A GriiicalAnihology edited hy P Kaplan and S. Manso. New York: F. R Dutton, 1977. Emmachia Gustina Ruscelli, ‘An Examin,uinn of 1.ate Vcneti,;n Painting Techniquc,“ http://wwwglar.gl/arr—l .pdl‘ John Sellars, “The Point of \‘iew of the Cosmos: Deleuzc, Romanticism, Sroieism,“ Ph 8, 1999. Georges Siniondon, “i‘hc Genesis of die Individual,“ fnco;poiations, edited h J. Crary and S. Kwinrer. New \ork: Zone, 1992. Danial ‘E Sniith, “Deleuze‘s Theorv of Sensation: Overcoining Kantian Duality,“ Deleuze: A Critical Reade;; edited bv P. Patton. Danial W Smith, “A Life of Pure Iinmanenee“: Delcnie‘s ‘Critique ei (]inique‘ Projeet,“ introductjon to Gilles Deleute, essays criticalandchinical. Daniel W Smith, “The Pl,ice of Erhics in Delenze‘s Philosoph‘: TInce Quesrions of lanmanence,“ Deleuze znd Guattari, iVeu‘ illappings in Pohitics, Philosophy anti Culture, ediied Ev E. Kaufman and K. j. Heller. Daniel W Smith, “Tlae doerri ne of imivocalitv,“ Deleuze anti Rehiio,i, editcd hy
M. Bryden.

Benedicr dc Spinoza, The Ethics, “A Spinoza Reader,“ translated by E. Curlcy, Princeron: Prialce[on Universitv Press, 1994. David Sylvester, Intervieu‘s u‘ith Francis Bacon. London: Thames and 1 ludson, 1999. Titian, exhibirion caralogue. London: National Gallery, 2003. Calvin Tomkins, Duchamp, A Biography New York: Flenry Holt, 1996. Giorgio \‘asari, Lives ofthe Artisrs, rolume 1, translatcd lw G. Bull. London: Pengnin, 1987. Arnaud Villani, “Deleuze et Whitehead,“ Revue dc Aletaphysique et dc Morale, No.2, 1996. Christopher \X4snr, “Form witlaout form: Revalnating Grecnberg‘s Kant,“ dc—, —, ex—. 14t/uine 1 Ex—cai‘ating Modernism, edited lw A. Coles and R. Bentlev. 5 du London: BACKIess books, 1 996. Andy Warhol, Antiy Warhol 1956—86: Mirror oJ [Ii.; tinie. Pitrsbnrgh: ‘l‘he Andy Warhol Museum, 1996. Andy Warhol, Antiy Wzrhol: A Esctor‘, New York: Solonian R. Guggenheim Museum, 1999,

51 2. 281 »‘.221. 46 Aristotle. —‚ 1 i. 1 $‘ 8. 1) 80.36 Analog-. Francois Zourabichvili. 81 3. 231 uS. 253 n.8.23. 77. 19 21. 1 50. 163 9. 117. 133.. 151. 17. 210 Action-image. Deleuze.sm Relocated. Acrualisation. 200 Art. Prohlematic aftc. 2. Wilhelm Worringer.“ IY‘e Brain is the Sereen. Reading Nietzsche after Heidegger. Wiitchcstcr. 268 n. 4. »‘3-4. Spinoiian alkct. 140 50. 138. 209—11 Anarchkm. Artaud. Art historv. 86. 51. 108 13. 110. 84. 25. 175. 118. 105. 200. 245 n. New York: Dover.‘ Gilles Deleuze and the Phzlosophy qf C‘inema. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. The Adventures of Jmmanencc. 20. 1997. 221. 255 n.11 Ahstraction andEmpath 142 3 Ahstract mc. 225 Aestherics. Nlichelangelo. 45.97-8. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 261 n. ‚10 32. 1950. 100 1. 20 1.“ Deleuze: A Reader edited lw R Patton. 60. Holt inger. 154 7. 135—8. 9. 205. 253 n.205. Politics andArt Historical Met?od in the 1 9jOs. Geometrie abstracrion. translated bv M.25 and 2$ Artisan.44. Derria‘a. ‘1u‘ards a culturalstudies ojvisual moder— nitjs Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 109 11 Aquinas. 227. 109-15.211. 6 7 Absrract macliine. 209. 1“6. 185. 48—6o. (ol editor. 124-6. 85 6. 59 60. A (Jontribution to the Psychology oJStyle. 64. 156. 35. 118. 20»‘ 12. 2r—8 Accident. 112. 1 83. 74. 124.294 Bibliography John Welehman. 1995. 104.image: see (tfecjjmmn Aflirmation. 1967. 223 8. 220 1. 92-5. James Williams. in Nietische. 121. 126. 219. 132. Dziga Vertov and Bcrgsonian ? Iodernisin. A.ja11 af[ection. London: Routledge. 86—»‘. 112 5. 85—6. . Wilhelm Worringer.48. 162./es ofArt Histoy. 81. 1 »‘8 83. 129. 8 tt. edited hv (‚. 222 Armature. 62 3. Heinrich Wölfflin. 188.65 Abstracrion. 222. The Vienna SchoolReader. 131 2. 223. 222. 1(11 —3. 92. S$ ‘4. 22»‘. 55. 59. Nietzsche Aesthetic iirn. 118—9.24 30. 138. 2‘6.56. 150. 119. 3 10. 106. 55 7. 31. 109—14. 12»‘. 200. 12 4.24. Abstraction and Empathy. translated hy M. 98: S jm). Modern. 74-S. Bulloek. 200. 11—3.3. 240 n. New York: Sehocken Books. 51 2. 64 5. 138. 193. Read.226. 183. Yirmiyahu Yovel. Aesthetic com position. Fric.3 6. Aesrlseti para— digm. 152. “Six Notes on the Percept. 94 5. 121 4. 245. 149. 9. 1 50. Francols Zourabiehvili. 177 223—4. 235 n. 119 Any-space-whatever. 137 Alliez. 223. Ncw York: SUNY Press. ». 222—. 2. 1 0. 180 1. 224. 56 59.224 Affection. 163. 1 eon Ilattista. 162: Seinorv af fect. Catastrophisrn in philosophy?“ Deleuze and Philosophy: The Diffi‘rence Engineei editcd by K. 18. 1967. Anronionj. 164 Aninsal. 49 51. 206 21 0— 11. “The Eye of Montage. 1989. 222. see Onto aestberics Affect. D. 202. 1 52 3. 28 9. 237 rm. 80. 1 57—60. 1994. See Deterritorjajjsatjon Abstract expressionism. Art wort‘. 100. 41 2. 166—»‘.Sinoza and Other Heretics vol. 221. 2. translared by H. 55 6 Alherti. 98 Actual. 159. (‘osmic artisan. 151 5. 1 ‘2 3. New York: Zone Books. 125. »‘1 2 Affection. 61. J4‘inc. 163. Janies j. ‘. 220. . 200(1. 191—2.30. 154. 1111. 1 »‘7—83. lisomas. 22. 275 6it. 92. Index A Absolute deterritorialisation. 194: see Becoming-animal Anti-Oedipus. 182—3. l‘orm in Gothic. 188. 193. 224. 225. 193. 238 n. (‘onnter—ac— tualisation. Pearson. 180. Antonin. Flaxmnan. 16-8.37. 151 159. 280 n. “1)cleuie on J. 138—49. 141). Modern arm. 96.2: Affection-image. 225: Animal— traits. 18--8. 163-»‘. The Problem ofthe Development of Style in Liter Art. 274 n. Christopher S. 6. 33. 16q. 177.27. 44 5. 102. 28 n.2. 65. W Turner.32. 176. 1(11). 63 0. 223. 1S8. 22»‘. 64 5. 152 3. 168. M.

225. 118 24 Continuous variation. 48. 154. 279 n. 221. 141 145. Machinic assembiage. 221. 166 7. 37 8. 51. 108 Autopoicsk. 46 Cittensa. 226 Czanne. 222. 15. 7. 80 100.225. 71. 137. 222. 23. 128 9. 98. 208 Bazin. 149. 143. 99. 174. 15. 157 8. 198. 51 Body. 171 2. 167.1736. 136. 227. 80-1. 18 9. 19. 134 5. Carl 1 heodor. 119. 203—4 Butler.3. 297 Derrida. 24. 163. 222 (Jsaosmosis. 148. 118. 193 4. 148 50. l7i. 193. 66. 225 6. 171.30. 168. 145. 220 1. 108. 7. 153.32. 15 Assemblage. Affectual assensblage. 186. 172. 112. Willern. 176 9. 167 Carastrophe. 263. 133. 115. 119. 138. 93. 176 9. 9. 56 7. 227 8. 114 5. 181 2. 163. 16. 165. 111 2. see Body-brain. 186. 106. 226 8 Badiou. 128 39. 224.80 1. 101. 19. 45. 169. 81 99. 27 8. 64 7. 110. an ethico-aesthetie paradigm. 274. 2(17 Fternal retutn. 195. 4. 251 2. 6. 118. 26. 96 8. 146. 77 116. 93 5.153 9. 179. see Force Coloring sensation. 17. Relative dcrerri torialisation. 2 . 60. 18. 10. 104 5. 158. 206. 173. 135. 80. 68 74. Paul. 108. 267 8 n. 248 n. 152. 180.82. 137 9. ES. 105 6 Dreyer. 2!. l6 8.247. 279. 163. 165. 220. 54 5. 124. 45. 163.186. 248 53. 96. Guy. 235 8. Autonomisin. 77 88.189. 108. 235 n22. 202. see Ja unsinn dc Jeanne DArc Duchamp.60. 89. 221. 167. 45 6. 222. Conrour. 199 200. 117 8. 221. 79. 72.205. Sarnual. 72 4 ‘. 105. 151 9. 123. 206. 29 32. 205 6.92 3. 235 n 28 1)ocunicntary. 208. 33 4.see Opinion Cnlor. 210. 129 31. 75. 206 7 11 24. 193. 167 9. 102. 191. 6. 23 4. 42 6. 20 1. 118. 206. 186 196. 156.4 Dc Certeau. 182. 9.222. 123.79. 4. 46. 14. 93 4 Bergson. 79.69.25 and 28 Rüttle Rack.245 is. 219 24. 16. 114. 168. 200 4. 205. 249 n. 182 Becoming. 109. 55 Deterrirorialisation. 192.6 Dc Kooning. 188 9. 154 60. 208 Cnmrnnn notion. 220 Asceticism. 106 8. 178. 3. 121 4. 10 Critique. 158. 223 Creatiue &iolution.211. 95. 236 n29 Descartes. 122. see Artnature. 179. 20 1. 18. 169. 221 4. 262 n44 1 mpiricisns.219. 228. 172. 177. 182. 205—6. 189. 226. 226. 193 4. 12!. 5 6. 43. 137 Dehord. 39. 220. 157—60. 142 5.8. 176. 12—17. D Da Messina. 182. 164. 117. 220 1.27. Becoming-anirnal. 225. 183. 200. 92. 49. 128. 224. 240 1. 84. 162. 128 30. 45.37 Beatitude. 233 n10 Crysral-image. 15. 104. 207. 169. 95 Broken tones. 280 1 Dionysus. 161 Brain. 80 1. j74 5 Diffcicncc. 254 5.223. 164 73. sep Rüttle Rads. John. 25. 210. 50. 204. 220. 130. Cottcrete assemblage. 77.26 Body-brain. 35 9. 183.71.85 91. 170. 4. 162. Readynsade Duration. 151. Figure. 122 5. 155. 280 Classicism. 9. 9.296 Artist. 155.26!. 6. 7. 222.31. 136. 202.48 9.2078. 104. 139 40. Michel. 209 11. 160. 185 217. 228 Beckett.257. 115 6.214 17. 66 75. 133 5. 79. 224. 188. 120. 246 n. 191. 265. 116. 12 Egyptian art. 90. 270. 71 4. 233. Possihilities of E Fcology. 224. 26. 29. 270. 244 n. 224 Automaton. 180 Cnntour. 217. 1 homas. Francis.95 116. 189. 205.108. 199 Ilan vital. 145. 163. 138. 81 9. Marccl.2 1. 167. 96 9. 255 Bernhard. 74. 252 6. 121. 49.39. 266 n. Rene. 141. Anronello. 58 67. Artist—mechanic. 1 3. 226 c Capitalisns. 65 6. 157 8. 8. 163 4. 155. 7. 224 Conrent and Expression. 26. 180 3. 127. 207. see Assernblagc Consciousness. 224. 149 . see also Sttperior Fmpn icisns Essays Gritical antI (2linical 26. 165 Conceprual art. 222. 5. 32. 164. 120 9. 195. 243 nIl and 13 Fmpathy. 99. Anti—artist. 168 9. csct llaroque. 166 8. 133 Dearh. 5. 222. 112. 141. 1 Ienri. 8. Body withour Organs (BwO). see Selforganisa tiofl Index 226. 13!. Aninsal-artist. 156. 36. 52 3. 1 63. 240 n. 156. 81 96. 176. 12. 281 Attribute.65. 2. Ingmar. 177 Jhe Death ofAcraeon.222.47. 49—55. 195. 125. 1 59 61. 99. 59. 164 7. nlosaics. 224. 93. 34. Absolute dcterri— totialisation. 176. 28. 118. 219. 123 4.122 4. Alain. 196. 25. 227 8.21)1.12(1. 183 Being-in the World. 113. 221. Jacques. 11 1 )iagrans. 179 Atheism. 104. 167 8. 228 Contemplation.10 Chaosmos. 231 n. 114. 259 n20 ‚ Index (Jinerna 1 Jhe Mouernent-Jrnage. 6. 177 Dewcy.20 1. 60. 38. Color—patchcs. 274 7. 48 9. 35. 47. 238 n38 Fterniry. 266 n. 125. 22 8. 24. 27 8. 62. 177. 27. 54 6. 199 2r. 208 9. 121.167. 156. 220.31. 72 Consrruction/Expression.41 2.38 9 L)iffiwice and Repetition. 19 25. 173 4. 175. 168. 49. 129. 169 70. 80 1. 109 15. 100 110. 219. 172 8. 29.200 6. Andre. Samuel. 226 1)ialccrk. 28 32. 236 n. 177 182. 249. 99. II 12.. 60. 165. 170 1. Iliptychs. Chrisrianity. 53 1. 224—7.52 Fmanarion. 203. 228.9 Bacon. 249 50 n. 189 (iiclu. 176 80. 181 2 Chaosmosis. and Intuition. Eye-brain Bresson. 140. 209 Contemporary. 2s 5. 8. and 1)urarion. 20 12. S_67. 7 Eliot. 240. 219 24. 220 Communism. 174 (Jinerna 2 7 w flme-Jmage.174. 100. 51 2. 30. 185. 2. Artist— philosopher. Christian rheology. 97 8. 173. 9.97 J3ergsonism. 22‘. 42 3. Robert. 183.210 11. 114. 165. 212 7. 13$. 226. 21 3. see Mysticism A IlsousandPlateaus.28 Chaos. 253 n29. 84. 164. 204. 212 Creation/Destruction. 228 Belieb 228 9 Bergman.164 5. 104. 1‘2. 102 8. 1. 178. 277 8 n22. 159 60. 266 n. 126. 19 Flvis. 158. 155. 8. 187 9. 189. 36 9.12 Byzanrine art. 51 2. 25$. 166 Concrete asseniblage. 9. 6 7. 152 9. 199. 30. 159 65. 187 9.198. 254 5 n. 136. 135. 198. 43. 178 80. 115 6. 38. l 9 l l 9.

227 8.othic line. 188 (. 125. 13. 224 6. 194. 272 n. Jan van. 67. 227. 55. 225 Experimentation.3. 1(11 Merlean. 1“5 81. 59 60. 194 200. Spinozian jov. 19“ JheI‘old. 1 On. 27.205-6. 13 lirzgerald. 57. 8—9. Inadequare ideas. 168 Expressionlcoiistruction: ‚cc Construetion/expression Expresstonism in Philosopht‘: S‘inoza. 26 Gift. 203 Hitchcock. 92.59 75. 109 14. 206 14. 138 9. 126. 114. 176—7. 11“.6. 26 n . 221 imagination. 156 Ingres.91. 19 20. 179 llapriceye. 180. 66—73.225 6. 1 6 —8 H 1 lallucination. 222 Joyce. 5n. 105. Fdmund. 139 -40. 1 “9. 93 ---5. 194. 128.owrv. Formal realirv of. 222.201 2. 28 9. 132 EyeandMinel. ‘1. 65. Janses. 146 9 Friedrich. 128. 136.e. l6 7. 153. Immanuel. 93. 200 5.17 Hier Striniss. E Scorr. 81 4 Matter-floss-. 49. 141 2.10 Event.ove. r9 n33 Gas‘ Science. 242 n. 185. Fritz. 104. 4 1 Memorv. 189. 121. henry. 181 2. 55 7.or) 79. 172.6. 12‘ 8. 19“. Jean—Luc. 234 5 n. and common sense. 1 “5 81. 50 2. 176 — F Facialitv.58. 31. 44 5. Sensation li‘c / ogic ofSensation. 26 3(1 1.5 Hollywood.65 Klossowski. 261. 118. 106. Pierre. 222 Index Image ofehought. 202 Form an€1 Gothic.34 Kuhrick. 225 FoId. 199. 198 Hvloinorphism. 245. Johann lVolfgang von. 63. 220. 200 1. Bna ii. 201. 220. and Kant. 5“ K Kant. 160. 185—6.30 1 lusserl. 58. 27. Jean Auguste Dominique. 1“8.4 5.30. 143—4. 199. 68 70.210—11. 155. Henri. 1 ‘0—73. 20‘-8. 228. Karl. 197. 23. 97. 130. 174. Gottfried WiliheIm. 56. 6 G Gauguin. 32. 202. Plaronic ideas.25 Gothic art. ‘S. 148. 58—9. Sigmund. 156. 61—4. Paul. 203 4. 192 5. 113 La Borde clinic. 155 6. 196. 118 123 Foncault. 19. 207. 205. 235 nr Intuition. 55. Matrin. 222--3.27 ‚ —‚ L 1 ldea. 73 5. 254 n. 91. 2“1 n. 26n. 67 Evaluation. 189 Inorganic 1 ife. 141.19. 68 70. 132 God. 146. 72—5. 155. 2“8 n. 150 Meat. Casper flavid. 48. 206 Index (. 193 4. 223 (rreenberg. 2““ n. 233 n. 18“.ustsv. 154 Matisse. $ —9. 145 6. 211—2. 126. 6. 245 Fyck. 141. 1‘8. ist Abstract line 1 ines offlight. 160 Massum i. 206 10. 65. 1 n2. 70. 199. 165. 28. 57 61. ee Belief Fellini. 1“l 2. 19 20. 169. 82. 2“. Reversibility. 225 Haptic space. 228. 179.41 54. 23“ n. 123. Adequate ideas. 194. 62. 192. 208 l. 183 1 ived bodv.207—15.ition.16. 194 Fairb. 196. 30. 97. 24. 275. IOn. 192 3 Figure. 199. 266 n. 226.ogic ol Sens. 54.24 Giotto. 206 Eve-brain. 12I. 106. 86 Hjclinslev. 31 Man with ii Mouie (‘amera. 94 Iger. 138. 188. I.iealo‘ ofMorals. 63 7. 224. 129. 105 Figurarion. 38. 6—7. Etc anti Mmci. 220 ‘ M Maclierey. ‚36—“ Fried. 2‘ 8. 163 4. 146 1 mc. 173 Future. 185 6. 145. 6!. Lonis. and Opticalitv. 3. 42. 73—5. 112 Intoxication. 31. 118. Plienomenologv. 37. 132 3.Pon iv. 223. 108 111. 46. 199 204. 55—7. 21“ Intensit 2 4 Interpretation. ice Phenomcnology Indivicluation. 165 Mahler. 155 Leibniz. (. 15“. 276 n. 130 41. 186. 169—76. 256 n. 260 n. 13. 71 3. 6.2l Godard. 53 5. 127. 127.n. 95 La Passion dejeanne DArc. 217. 112 (. 261. 95. 64. 127 FlesIt. Sol. 169-6. Stanley. 91. Paul.ived bodv. 222. 2. 41.lO interval. 200. 14 5. 64. 33 Judgement. Line—stait. 220. 243 n. 98 Matter anti l1en. 227 Goethe. 167. ‘cc 1 igsc /Sensation. 142—4 Form and substance. 193. 142—6. 220 lncarnarion.209. 182. 208. 120. I)onald. 256. 244 n. 139. 103 4.43 1 . 42 75 Ethology.221. 278 Force.2 —‚ — J Joy. “9.26. 177 Mallaimsi. 222 Hvstcria. 220. Y4. 144. Michael. roI. Maurice.e1lf.111. 211. 20 1. 6n—‘.15. 28. 38. 206 223—4 Matier-funetion. Alfred. 253 n. ‘l 5. 174. 152. and Mndernism. 24.16 hegel. 16v. 6. 24“ n. 77ie Visihle anti the invisihie Mera1Iurgs 143 4 Michelangelo. and the Critiqne ()JJliden. Ethical—aesthetic Pam— digm. 33 1 ighr. 124. 226: color force. 55. 102. 62. 84. 2“9 Hv‘ Logic of ‚Scn. 91. 192. 55. 140. 164. 172. 25—7 11 Deserto J6ssso. r6. 235 n. 191 5. 67. 15. 28. 1“7. 243 n. Objective reality of. Michael. 141. G.e. 128. Frederico. 137. W E. 1 8 and 1 9: Sec Bei ng—i n die— \Xorld. 3 4. 145 50. 120 1. 216. 43. 1 2 1 ‚votard lcan Francoi s. 59. \ Ialcolm. See Bcrgson 299 1 ewirt. 138. 165 1 andscapification. Michel. Clement. 88 Marx. ri n. 157 Ethics. 1 20. 13 23. 150. 21)1 r. 33. 32.od/Nature. 130 138. 118. 105 6 Historv. 18. 123. 1 Q5—200. 2“5 6. 143—5. 234 n. 121 6. 15 7. 186—“. 89 90 Marx brotheis.36 1 lardt. 36 . 130 1. 1 8‘ 8. 150 Marter-force. 207 Miller. 189. 153. 29. 131 Giorgione. 185. 144. 204 5. 60.6 Freud. 71. 5!. 197. 127— 8 Lang.207. 122. 8. 129. 186. 191.1 1 Judd. and transcendental Ideas. 129. 70 Machinic life. 52. 89—90 Klee. and tlte suh— lilne. 91. 125. 77. 185 6. 186—“. 224. 13 8. 156—7. 2 3.298 Fihical aesthetics. 196 7. 43 8. 198. 9. 194 Meister Fckhart. 125. 29 -3(1.5 and 6 Heidegger. 84—90. 51 —2. 1 1—3 Kino-eye. 233 n. 59. Stephan. Pierre. Fernand. 119. 214. and aestherics.

188 9. 183 Recollection image. 64. 46. 212. 3. 121—3. 223. 168 Reversihilitv. 148 9. 194. 60. 186. 271 n. 187. 25. 119.9 Neo—realism.13. 19 25. 25—39. 41. 125.. 22. Critique. 35. 45. 2“0 1 u. 220 Picahia. 51. 189. 9. 220. 1 20. 21‘). 125. A1oi.58. 118.68. ? lax. 120 1. 1‘8 83. 268 9 n. 69. 31. 157 8. 56—8. 267 n. 190. 119. 205. 222. 12‘) Sensation. 253 n. 226. [bus Spake /aoxthustra. 21n 5 Riegl. 77. 9. 56 65. 13(1. 43. see lntcrval Seties.2 1 24“ n. . 35. see Affirmation.9 Plotinus. 38. ()vercoining. 55. 9. 5 8. 244 n. 1“<) -2. 1 0. 219. 166—7. 31. 1. 156. 96.3‘) n. 5 9. 52. Repetition. 223. 22 n.8. 4“—9. 126. Francis. 112. 12. of tinte.23. 2(19—1(1.88 Selection. 1056. 121. l96Rh‘. 136. 145 50. 118. see clich ()pticality. 228. 9. Nierischean per spective. 3—4. 126. 152. 162.2. 223 Phenomenology. 75. 2v“ n. 54. 66.32 Neo—Platonisin. 226 Pantheism. 82. 98 Permanent revolution. 242 n. “s. 191 7. 1 52—4. 125 Signifier. 12. 38. 139 50.28. 73 Particle—sign. 21.113. 45. 21<) Post—impressionisin. 26. 166. 160. 6. 48—‘S. 67. 84. 208. Jim. 225 Relative deterrimorialisation. 88—9 1. 131. 3. 44-5. 5. 120 2. 226 Plane of consistencv. 170. 265 n. 221 Significance. 11 Science.5 Pynchon. 2. 167. 181 Movement-image.82. 221 Schiiophrenia. 49. 121 Semiotics. 220. 188. “9 80. 169—70. Ceorges. Antonio. 12“. 9. 42. 172 ()verman. 219. 12. 15—6. 121.3. 28. 125. 29. 129. 201. 22. 204. 224 8.15 and 21 Pennebaker. 221. 258. 8.202. 224: Modal essence. 167.3 7 Q QuaJitv. 252 n.6. 14. 263 ts. 202.224. 152. 191 Possibilities of fact. 62—3. 156—‘). 1(11 Refrain. 72 3 Mode. 181. 164 5. 45. 226 ()rgartic.152. 185 217. Don. 44. 123—129. 125. 118 26. 206.—8. 127 41. 96 100. 1(19 19 24. 225 Plato. 20 Reterritorialisation. 199—202.8. 105 8. 5. Roherto. 118.ttion. 1l. 130. 169 6. 185. 131. 126 Mrs. 221—2. 20—12 ()vercoming. 159.. 181. 58—62. 74—5. 166 -‚ 175 8. 56.1 1. Pablo. 200—5. 193. ‘ht oftiie Idols: Will tu Power 5 In i1i . 122. 49. 50— 1 Momson. —0.60. 130 1. 146. 70. 46 8. 18. 9‘ 8. 55. 163—4. 54. and will to art. 22. 2. 66. 106. 83. 162. 86-103. 183. 220. 156. Dionvsus: Fternal re— um. 61—4. 42—3. 148. 15. 126. 6“. 122. 172. 180. 69 78. 243 n. 57-8. 8.-lffi‘cts. 1. 186. 84. 59. 223. 152. 14—16. 77. 122 6. 47 Psychoanalysis. 221. 224 Modernism. 28. 100.14. 220 Parallelism. 36. 38 Sign. Perspective. 185. 29 30. 1. 1‘ransvalu. 204. 160. 66 Patton.32. 189. 31 2. 143 4 Nonorganic life. 192. 180. 205. 92. 205 17. 223 Perception.8 81. 262 0 oh painting. 10. 38.42. 35. 13. 182 Rotnantieisni. Atheistic mysticism. 149.‘. 4 5. 172. 18“. 19 Simulacra. 159 65. 224. 25“ n. See Sign Passion. 152. 52 -5. 206. 182. 56 Negative theology. 2“. 136 41. 64. 231 n.3 1. 168-76. 22-8.83. 94. 126 144 Signified. 85—8. 220 Pragmatics. 1 Smhiioanals 1s. 139. —‚ Physioh gy. 207 Mmd.45 6. 18 25. 15. 81—4. 1 82--3. 93 4.iel fr. 80 Sereen. 53. 176 181. 142. see Autopoiesi Semiology. 102—4.300 Miln. 25. 124.41 Percept. 85. Yastijiro.31. 2“. Ovenuan. 130. 221 2.8. 176—7. 151. 63.30. 129. 185.. 188. 16‘). 192. 2“. 8. N Nature. 258 9 n. 10 Psuedo—Dionysus. John. 222 Negation. 46. 1 92. 239 n. 158. 15 9. 143.77 8. 3.3 Polities. 119. 11. 222—8. 7 Nomadisni. 146. classical. 244 n. 145 6. 220 Ozu. 124. 11 —39.55 Rossellini. 92 Quantitv. 155 Picasso. 223 —‚ 301 Rsvtentiment. Ressentiment. 5% -9. 49. 18. 268 9 n. 78 99. 90. n. see ( olori ng Sensation Sensible. 123 144. 10. Charles S. 12(1 1. 32 9 Portrait ofLtabel Rawtlsorne. 18. (‘inentatic sign. 25—6. 182 3. 226.essnilog) o/Alortilt Interpretation. 1W.164. 14. 202. 115 6. 54. 117 121. 171. 1>artiele-sign. 22—3. 242. 8. 233. Nietzsche und Philosophy. 255 n. 107. 92 R Rajchman. 31. 189.42 Peirce. 226. 202. 200. 122. 142—3 ()rganisin. Jackson. 50 2. 224. 225 Perception-inage. sn‘ Inorganic life. 174. 271 n.49. 126. 4. 11<).-thm. 8“. 141. 46. Modernity. 4“ Negri. 115. 164 8. Gay 3c.40. 20. 6 Mvsticism. 162 3. 225 Montage. 52. 5. 228. Friedrich. 138 50. 132 138 ()nto-acsthetics. 16. 221 Mvstical athcism.8. 37 (. 280 n. 116. 168. 16—$. 85. 138—50. 165. 203 4 Powers ofihe false. 77—116.16. 104. 131. 102 Pimmel/us i. (. 178. 152. 118. Ivaluation. 48. 191.49 Representation. 29. see Deterritorialisarion. see Ahsrraci line Pop art. 222. 189 Plane of composition. 41—2. 1578. —‚ ‚ P Painting. 15 6. 198. 251 n. 12—3. 195—200.ence. Thomas. 44. 55 6. Paul. 222. 29. 73 5 Nihilisns.v. 151. 32. 45. 61 5. 17. 162.40 SeIf—organisation. 164. 105 ()pinion.tential . 1 56. 9. 138. 44. 6. 39. 274 Nietische. 224 ‘ - “. 221—2. Daiowuy. 6. 180. 1‘9. 132. 37. 2n2 n. 142. 113. 224 5 OlpliiiIs. 1“. 169 s Sadness. 1‘l. 142. 221 Modulanon. 105—9.83. 167. 223—4. 61. 1 2. 225 1>lane ofimmauence. 32. 223. 124 5. 165. 51. hic/ex Index Physiology. 154.3—4 Sensorv—moror. 114 Moralitv. 107 Repression. 221 Simondon. 73. 182 Perspective.31. . 91—2. 112. 202. 221. 32—40.4. 39. 129. 8. 232 n. Pragmatism. 28 9. 13 29 30.7 Readvmade. 63 4. 15“. 242 n . John. 4-5. 136. 47. 153-4.33 9. 6 ‘l. 84. Venetian painting. 191 3. 35. 8) —2. see Pci manent revolution Pollock. 84.

123. 228 U Understanding. 19.28 1 raits n content. 68 Spirit. 214 Tmurh. sec Attribute. 134 7 1 ( . 58 9. 1iternit . 81 2. 165. 49 50.“4. 8. 225 6. 222. 163. 41 5. 126.21 4. 19 -80. 160. 8 8. 121. 238 n. 27—8. Univocal being hilosop/.121 7. 198 201. 141 4.46 303 Ih1e hivis. 151. Modal Fssence. 80 1iptvch. 4! 2. 82. 139. 227 Willto Pou‘e 11—2. 225 Suhlinte. 171. 100—4. Substance. 188 9.223 w lensor. 108. 107. 9. 1 52—4. 24. 204—5. 162 4. 81. 109 15. 126 v Van Gogh. 90 1. 1 nlagination . 33. Mode: Parallelisni. 12. 97 104. q3.39 Snapsbot. In: 1 ove. 46 7 ‘Iiansvaluarion.49. 188.55. 0— 1. August 1972. 106 181. 129. 261—2 n. 25. 25 8. 40. 3 7. 203 4. 228 Vitalism. 212 17 ßzötych. 22-3 Time. 149. 108. Common Notion. 239 n. 224. 96—8. Virginia. 53. 45.33 Veliiquez. 14. Andy. 100. 78. 180. Walt. 180. 26 7.36. 226 lime—image. 137. 11. 26 Strata. 263 n. 107. 16—.39 ) t Structuralism. 95. 104. 118 9. 159. 27 Turner. 114. 32. 30. 167 Smoorli space. 120. 177. 5 Spinoza: I‘ractica/ J 54. 4--5. see Painting Verrov. 104. ii 39. 180. 93. Heinricb. 102. 221 1 ratS of espression. 105—8. 28 31 Warbol. 134 6 litian.Index Singula6ry. 220. 85. as appearance. 55 59 60.48. 260 n. Substance. 17 9. 11)8. 275 80 Wbitnian. 39. 42 9.3 4. Sadness. 154—5. 78. Fthologv. 116. 23.9. 244. 125 6 Twilight of‘the Idols. ‘O 2. 137 8. l7. Suhjecrivation. 110 5. M. 60. 160. 224 5 Vision.30 ölfflin. 139. 46 9. 233 n. 9. 58. 166—8. 1O Stoics. 56. 221. 97. 95 6. 126 15o. 181—2 Worringer. 169. 83. Index Woolf. 16. 100—5. 107. 38. 7.41 Weyden. 15.y. 1 56.138 Striaied space. 116 Utopia. 62 3. 151 -2 154—5. 182 3. 160. 202. 118. Passion. 189 Venetian painting. 228 Visionarv. 1 Symptom. 34 Z 71 11. 42—3. 51—2. 221. 81 Spinoia. 20 1. 169. 36. and Art. 66—7. 154. 80. 32 40. 137 8. j. Man with a Movie (Jamera Virtual. 144. 209. 65. 258 n. W.96—116. 105 6. 92. 54—64. 03 6. 224—8. 145. 202. Understanding. 100. 180 1. 95 6. see Kino-eye. 213. 162 3. 24. 21‘ Superior Fnipiricism. 77. 65. 19. 158. 5—6. 133. 1‘2. 226. 133 What Is Philosophy. 21. 89—91. 174 Ihus ‚Soake Zarathustra. 172. Adequare understanding. 279 n. “0 Umvocal heing. 121. 97. 233. 221 1anscendcnce. 211.7 ‚ —‚ ‘. 109—11. 158. 31. 118. 95. 157. 67 8. 142. 220. 121—3. Wilhelm. 224. 128 9. 108. 20. Dziga. 123. Diego. 223. 240 n. 13. 221. 119.221. 61.211. 68—70. 178 Will to power. 121.261 2n. 6. 27. 56 Symptomnatology. 134 ierritnry. and risc dearb and disaster paintings. 148 9. 221. 223: see Kant. 134 7. 220—4. 140. Beatitude. (od. 128-9. 17 8. 19. 16 8. 31 zeno‘s paradoxes. 2. 12. 241 n. 226 Tintoietto. Rogier van der. 142 SO. 266. Ideas. 138. 1“6—83. 194—5. 150.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->