LAW ON TRANSPORTATION

I. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER 1. Definition Article 1732 NCC, De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals Planters Products Inc vs. CA

168 SCRA 612 (1993) 226 SCRA 76 (1993)

2. Characteristics Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Co. 31 Phil 1 (1915) US vs. Quinahon 31 Phil 189 Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals First Phil. Industrial vs. Court of Appeals 3. Distinguished from Private Carrier Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship San Pablo vs. Pantranco National Steel Corp. vs. Court of Appeals

315 SCRA 339 (1999) 300 SCRA 661 (1998) 23 SCRA 24 (1968) 153 SCRA 199 (1987) 283 SCRA 45 (1997)

4. Government Regulation of Common Carrier’s Business KMU Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386 (1994) Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. 241 SCRA 334 (1997) 5. Governing Law Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Nordeutscher Llyod Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC National Development Co. vs. Court of Appeals II. CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS A. VIGILANCE OVER GOODS 1. Extra-ordinary Diligence Required of Common Carriers (Article 1733, NCC) a. “Registered Owner Rule” Gelisan vs. Alday 154 SCRA 388 (1987) Benedicto vs. IAC187 SCRA 547 (1990) Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 273 SCRA 562 (1997) b. Kabit System Santos vs. Sibug 104 SCRA 520 (1981) Lita Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA 148 SCRA 347 (1987) Teja Marketing vs. IAC 148 SCRA 347 (1987) c. Boundary System Magboo vs. Bernardo 7 SCRA 952 (1963) 132 SCRA 529 (1984) 150 SCRA 464 (1984) 164 SCRA 593 (1988)

2. Liability of Carriers for Loss, Destruction and Deterioration of Goods; Exceptions; Presumption of Negligence Articles 1734-1735; Articles 1739-1743 Eastern Shipping Lines vs. IAC, supra Ganzon vs. CA 161 SCRA 646 (1985) Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals 196 SCRA 570 (1991) Sarkies Tours Phils., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 280 SCRA 58 (1997) Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. Court of Appeals 274 SCRA 642 (1997) Yobido vs. Court of Appeals 281 SCRA 1 (1997) 3. Commencement, Duration and Termination of carrier’s responsibility over the goods (Articles 1736-1738, NCC) Compania Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of North America 12 SCRA 213 (1964) Lu Do vs. Binamira 101 Phil. 120 (1957) American President Lines Ltd. vs. Klepper 110 PHIL 243 Servando vs. Phil. Steam 117 SCRA 832 (1982) Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals, supra Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 498 (1992) Macam vs. Court of Appeals 313 SCRA 77 (1999) 4. Stipulations Limiting Carrier’s Liability a. Articles 1744-1745, NCC; Degree of Diligence Reasonable time in the delivery Case: Maersk Line vs. Court of Appeals b. Articles 1749-1750, NCC; Amount of Liability Ysmael vs. Barretto 51 PHIL 90 (1927) Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines 17 SCRA 606 (1966) Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals 91 SCRA 223 (1966) Sea Land Services, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 153 SCRA 552 (1987) Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 544 (1990) Everett Seamship Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 496 (1998) British Airways vs. Court of Appeals 285 SCRA 450 (1998) H.E. Heacock Co. vs. Macondray & Co. 42 PHIL 205 (1921) c. Void Stipulation (Art. 1745, NCC) Case: Sweet Lines vs. Teves 83 SCRA 361 (1978) 189 SCRA 605 (1990) 209 SCRA 67 (1992) 192 SCRA 9 (1990)

222 SCRA 108 (1993)

5. Passenger’s Baggages (Article 1754, NCC) Quisumbing, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals Pan American Airlines vs. Rapadas British Airways vs. Court of Appeals, supra Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Accomodation Passenger Lara vs. IAC 167 SCRA 363 (1988) 2. CA 294 SCRA 19 (1998) D. CA 281 SCRA 717 (1997) Korean Airlines Co. vs. Res Ipsa Loquitur Layugan vs. ‘Utmost Diligence’ Required of Common Carriers (Article 1755. Court of Appeals Calalas vs. Jaymalin 112 SCRA 629 (1982) A. vs. Duration and Termination of Carrier’s Responsibility La Mallorca vs. Passenger’s duty to observe diligence to avoid injury. Exceptions (Articles 1756-1758. Inc. CA 193 SCRA 603 (1991) B. Co. vs. Ltd. SAFETY OF PASSENGERS 1. vs. vs. 884 (1955) 20 SCRA 412 (1967) 5. Court of Appeals Pestaño vs. Paras 104 Phil. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Court of Appeals 324 SCRA 147 (2000) 3. Inc. CA 305 SCRA 14 (1999) Gatchalian vs. Laguna Tayabas bus.B. NCC) Bayasen vs. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) Del Castillo vs. Manila Railroad Co. De Jesus 17 SCRA 739 (1966) Aboitiz Shipping Co. Carrier not an insurer against all risks Necessito vs. Presumption of Negligence: Liability of Carriers for death or injury to passengers.. Commencement. CA 180 SCRA 83 (1989) Negros Navigation Co. 75 (1958) Japan Airlines vs. Negligence or intentional assault by carrier’s employee Gillaco vs. CA 234 SCRA 14 (1999) Fortune Express. Court of Appeals Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals 179 SCRA 95 (1989) Mallari Sr. Valencia 104 SCRA 65 (1958) C. vs. Maranan vs. IAC 189 SCRA 158 (1990) Bustamante vs. contributory negligence . Sumayang 103 SCRA 197 (1981) 304 SCRA 27 (1999) 332 SCRA 356 (2000) 346 SCRA 870 (2000) 4. NCC) Nocum vs. Perez 97 Phil. CA 83 SCRA 386 (1978) Mecenas vs.

Esguerra 117 SCRA 741 (1982) Sweet Lines vs. Inc. Mendoza. supra TransWorld Airlines vs. CA 185 SCRA 110 (1990) B. 266 (1959) Lopez vs. Court of Appeals Isaac vs. CA 106 SCRA 391 C. Alliance Transport 148 SCRA 440 (1987) Marchan vs. MRR & Benguet Auto Line Marchan vs. 2219-2220. NCC) Cachero vs. IAC 153 SCRA 521 (1987) Gatchalian vs. 2199. supra. . Pan American 16 SCRA 431 (1966) Ortigas Jr. Exemplary Damages (Arts. 2203. & MRR 110 PHIL 346 (1960) Villa Rey Transit. NCC) A.. vs. LTB Co. CA 122 SCRA 958 (1983) PAL vs. Recovery for Physical Injuries Soberano vs. 2229. Actual/Compensatory Damages (Arts. Court of Appeals 121 SCRA 769 (1983) Pan American World Airways vs. vs. Moral Damages (Arts. Miranda 105 Phil. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab 101 Phil. CA. vs. 2201. NCC) Prudenciado vs. Delim 203 SCRA 126 (1991) 1. NCC) Cariaga vs. Injury to passenger due to acts of co-passenger or stranger Bachelor Express. DAMAGES (Article 1764. Al Ammen Trans 139 SCRA 87 (1985) 101 Phil 1046 (1957) 6. Court of Appeals 188 SCRA 216 (1990) Fortune Express Inc. CA 165 SCRA 143 (1988) Armovit vs.PNR vs. Damages in case of death De Caliston vs. Court of Appeals 31 SCRA 511 (1970) Pan American World Airways vs. IAC. Mendoza 18 SCRA 732 (1966) 24 SCRA 888 (1968) 2. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. 523 (1957) Fores vs. Inc vs. supra III. Court of Appeals 184 SCRA 476 (1990) PAL vs. Lufthansa 64 SCRA 610 (1975) Phil. 2216-2217. 2232-2233. 2206.

SUMMARY OF CASE DOCTRINES .

Planters Products. chosen and hired by the shipowner. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum". CA It is not disputed that respondent carrier. would be offensive to sound public policy. YSC has not met those conditions." i. a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship. Hardly then can the charterer be charged. with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. the ship captain. provided the charter is limited to the ship only. a stranger to the crew and to the ship. episodic or unscheduled basis. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience. at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). in the ordinary course of business. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such. without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional. notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons.. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship. its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public. Inc. the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened. transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary. Indubitably. although her holds may. Yangco In construing Act 98 for the alleged violation. that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements.e. Court of Appeals Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both. the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives without qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or discrimination. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier.De Guzman vs. that a common carrier becomes private. vs. . the manning of the decks. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience. Fisher vs. the general community or population. operates as a common carrier. for the moment. be the property of the charterer. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability.

that is. there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. for hire as a public employment. one consignee for a special cargo. It is however not believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the handling and transporting of merchandise. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently. Quinahon There is no pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. and there was only “one shipper. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods. Inc. Home Insurance Company vs. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving vehicles or vessels either by land. Under American Jurisprudence. Such policy has no . The law of equality is in force only where the services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are similar. water or air. Loadstar Shipping Co. i. it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route. and transports the goods by land and for compensation.. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. when the same are made for the purpose of increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits. a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier. vs.” The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic. to all persons who choose to employ its services. First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. Absolute equality is not required in all cases. American Steamship Agencies. The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. sea or water is erroneous.The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. occasional. undue and unreasonable discrimination which the law forbids. Inc. episodic or unscheduled. There was a clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. US vs. petroleum products. CA Based on Article 1732 NCC. It is only unjust. The definition of “common carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land. CA Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC.e. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC.

PANTRANCO Considering the environmental circumstances of the case. the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. the conveyance of passengers. Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted. The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen. including their respective liability for damage to the cargo. Hence. private carriage does not involve the general public. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law. It carried passengers or goods only for those it chose under a special contract of charter party. KMU vs. does not transport cargo or shipment for the general public. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or even lakes. San Pablo vs. the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway. CA In the instant case. National Steel Corporation vs. as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and not as a common carrier.separating the land. unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its managers. for loss or damage to the cargo against shipowners. Recovery can’t be had. it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. however. Garcia “The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. which are small body of waters . not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. Consequently. while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's.” . trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service.force where the public at large is not involved. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. are determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private carriage or charter party. Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the highway. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. when as in this case the two terminals. as distinguished from agents or employees. It is a private carrier that renders tramping service and as such. The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier.

there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. real and/or testimonial. and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. However. There is no doubt that Art. public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. Samar Mining Company. there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. Under said article. statistics and such other means necessary. according to all the . the carrier. Thus. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines.By its terms. Intermediate Appellate Court 1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss. By the same token. Garcia In law. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. destruction or deterioration. Inc. the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. among other things. is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC. the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. In sales. or to the person who has a right to receive them. in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. vs. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility. the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. The existence or non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence. (2) Under the Civil Code. is to look out for. a special law. The object and purpose of such procedure. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent. empirical data. Tatad vs. Nordeutscher Lloyd The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld. and protect. actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination. in all matters not regulated by said Code. common carriers. or conversely. the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators.

This is due to the fact that the lease contract in question. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel. supra. under the provisions of the Code of Commerce. The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent. particularly Articles 826 to 839. the shipowner or carrier. or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. The claim of the petitioners that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to 3rd persons. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. CA Significantly. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract. Alday The court has held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code. including the power to contract in the name of the NDC.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish satisfactorily. cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. Gelisan vs. Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may be required to pay. it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss. is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. during or after the occurrence of the disaster. destruction. As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734. the Court said that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. earthquake.circumstances of each case. National Development Company vs. However. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity." and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before. a term broad enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. It is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a Franchise is transferred or lease to another without obtaining the requisite approval. Benedicto vs. Common carriers are responsible for the loss. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage. storm.” However. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734. although not effective against the public is valid and binding between the contracting parties. Intermediate Appellate Court . the transfer is not binding upon the public and 3rd persons.

but will leave them both where it finds them. vs. Article 2194 expressly provides: Art. whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense. the parties herein operated under an arrangement. the injured party. therefore. It is a fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract. 2194. comonly known as the "kabit system". Inc. and joint and several or solidary with the driver. as the registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise. as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service Commission. Sibug Although SANTOS. direct and solidary. vs. like petitioner Philtranco. It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter. direct. 2181. The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Art. Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. This doctrine rests upon the principle in dealing with vehicles registered under Public Service Law. Since the employer's liability is primary. . for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. PHILTRANCO Service Enterprise. as the kabit was the true owner as against VIDAD. Thus. Lita Enterprises Inc. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government . the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof.The prevailing doctrine in common carriers make the owner liable for consequences having from the operations of the carrier even though the specific vehicle involved may have been transferred to another person. Intermediate Appellate Court Unquestionably. private respondents are not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier. Court of Appeals We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. is directly and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to SIBUG. contrary to petitioner’s claim. the "kabit system" is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. As to solidarity. void and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Santos vs. for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary. the latter.

According to Art 1738. destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. in our area. To exempt from liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the “boundary system” on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not only to abet flagrant violations of the Public Service Law but also to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and irresponsible drivers. IAC is upheld. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair the contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody & control of the carrier. in the ordinary course of a voyage. the carrier cannot escape liability. the intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation.Teja Marketing vs. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. . Consequently. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for. Moreover. Magboo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court The ruling in Lita Enterprises Inc. By the delivery made during Dec. the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. In any case. Bernardo The features which characterize the boundary system are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between the parties from that of employer and employee. 1734. and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had admittedly carried in this case. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier. vs. and upon their receipt by the carrier of transportation. particularly in the month of September which. The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid authority for petitioner to carry out. 1956. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of the ship's hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. Ganzon vs. such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery by the carrier to the consignee or persons with right to receive them. he is responsible for the consequences incident to its operation. Ganzon’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss. The defect of in existence of a contract is permanent and cannot be cured by ratification or by prescription. there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner’s employees. The owner continued to be the operator of the vehicle in legal contemplation and as such. Court of Appeals The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master’s report were not caso fortuito but normal occurrences that an ocean-going vessel. CA Petitioner Ganzon failed to show that the loss of the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art. the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies. The mere lapse of time cannot give efficacy to contracts that are null and void. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap of iron. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. 1. Thus. No such evidence exists of record. Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito.

such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law. morals. receipted or paid for. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Compania Maritima vs. a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five day’s use. Moreover. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used is of a brand name noted for quality. unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof. We stress that in a contract of private carriage. Consequently. Court of Appeals The explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event. declared. and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered. Yobido vs. by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them. In the instant case. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. their contract of private carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. Court of Appeals In a contract of private carriage. the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer. It is responsible for the consequent loss of the baggage. Indeed. Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs. or public policy. Court of Appeals Under the Civil Code. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code. Where the common carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and even had it placed in the vehicle by its own employee. Hence. It is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito. having failed to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence. the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving common carriers. the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. of North America . Neither was this required of the other passengers. and this liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of. Thus. common carriers. Insurance Co. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. without asking that they be weighed. actually or constructively. defendant appellant's employee even helped Fatima Minerva Fortades and her brother load the luggages/baggages in the bus' baggage compartment. private carriage does not involve the general public. its failure to collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own lookout.Sarkies Tours Phils vs. public order. There are human factors involved in the situation. petitioners are hereby held liable for damages. A common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from the accident. good customs. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them.

This is a situation where we may say that the carrier losses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for what may happen during the interregnum. so that the bill of landing is applicable to the goods as soon as they are placed on the lighters. Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper. Therefore. vs. Art.” This means that the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. we believe however that the parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still to through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actually turned over to the consignee. although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted in the bill of lading. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that “the laws of the country to which the goods are transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the creation of a contract of carriage. the liability commencing at the time of delivery to the lighter and. the same is of as moment. American President Lines. contemplated in Article 1736. Under 1766 of NCC. The liability and responsibility of the carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on their actual delivery to. destruction and deterioration. where it is the custom to deliver in that way. or to the person who has a right to receive them. because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the Government and the owner cannot exercise dominion over them. said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code. Lu Do vs. Even where it is provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of the bill of lading. Ltd. NCC governs said rights and obligations. the issuance of a bill of lading is not necessary to complete delivery and acceptance.” Art. or receipt by. Binamira While delivery of the cargo to the consignee. and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt or bill of lading. The bill of lading is juridically a documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions agreed upon by both parties. and they cannot be loaded directly on the vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring the goods to it. similarly. Klepper With regard to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should control in this case. and if actually no goods are received there can be no such contract. actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier. Servando vs. where there is a contract to carry goods from one port to another. “in all matter not regulated by this Code. Phil. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws.The receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. the carrier or an authorized agent and delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel. Steam The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of . is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight. the lighters are for the time its substitutes. The liability of the carrier as common carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for transportation. 1736-1738. then it can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been established.

This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. fire . It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion'. are contracts not entirely prohibited. Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier. for that matter. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. morals or public policy. In order that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting the liability of a carrier may arise. There is no law which requires that the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point of time or. the loss is chargeable against the appellant. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. ... he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. (However). . there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. . . . Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading. . Court of Appeals Except as may be prohibited by law. . Jr. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. vs. We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. that is. if he adheres. recitals in a bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure. however. the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question. he gives his consent. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of events. and that they did not sign the same.Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. 'Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. as between the shipper and the carrier. and in the absence of fraud or mistake. the fact must outweigh the recital." Saludo. that the former should precede the latter." a further reading and a more faithful quotation of the authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a contract between the shipper and the carrier. Court of Appeals. As between the consignor and a receiving carrier." There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him. war. This rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of lading with full knowledge of its contents. where the same issue was resolved in this wise: “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. public enemies. It should be pointed out. and acceptance under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. he is estopped from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. . While we agree with petitioners' statement that "an airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the bill. when no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the true facts . the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment therein the following stipulation: Clause 14. . it must .

and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery. other than the consignee. such receipt comes within the general rule. petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. 1736 had. absent the excepting causes under Article 1734.appear that the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. The goods are released to GPC. bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. the right to receive them was proper. if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms. in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. However. and terminates only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance. there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers. we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around two (2) or three (3) years already. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his "people. Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the carrier. Thus. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit. attach and the presumption of fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked. custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. CA The extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been placed in the exclusive possession. conformably with Art. Only when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally established can the liability for loss. CA While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. From the testimony of petitioner. destruction or deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier. of the goods by the consignee or such other person entitled to receive them. the liability of the common carrier commences. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents. Maersk Line vs. Where such a delivery has thus been accepted by the carrier. unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu. his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. unless such common carriers previously . Macam vs. where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that its conditions are to be found on the back. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party. A stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed on its face. And. When mangoes and watermelons are in season. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. and the shipper is held to have accepted and to be bound by the conditions there to be found." In transactions covered by a letter of credit. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which.

assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time. It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion". we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness. are contracts not entirely prohibited. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". In this regard. delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability. In the case before us. Shewaram vs. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. Inc. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. IAC Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines. Court of Appeals While it may be true that the passenger had not signed the plane ticket. if he adheres. . he gives his consent. The passenger is considered not having agreed to the stipulation on the ticket. embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. Sea Land Services. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. petitioner nevertheless. vs. unless such exemption is just and reasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. the liability of common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily by the Civil Code. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the passenger was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. Applying the Civil Code provisions (Article 1749 and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on the consignee. While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment. Ong Yiu vs. A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. Barretto Limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason for less than 1/8 the actual value of the goods is unconscionable and therefore against public policy. Philippine Airlines It can not be said that a contract has been entered into between a passenger and the common carrier. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely. as manifested by the fact that he did not sign the ticket. Ysmael vs.

since the latter was not a party in the contract. It is provided in a clause in the BOL that its liability is limited to US$2. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that the common carrier has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by the shipper. a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss. is binding. CA Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading. stating that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the passenger) to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage. destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid. In this case. The consignee also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading. Furthermore. H. vs. and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss. CA The contract of transportation was exclusively between the passenger and common carrier BA.00/kilo. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation. vs. if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances. as its subcontractor or agent. British Airways vs. When an action is based on breach of contract of carriage.00) Yen. without any objection. The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines. However. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air transportation. Heacock Co. the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies.E. had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.000. Inc. Its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100. it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations. the award based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act.Citadel Lines. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL. vs. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher . if paid. the shipper. the carrier made it clear that all claims for which it may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums. Macondray Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value. Hence. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. and has been fairly and freely agreed upon. CA In the bill of lading. Everett Seamship Corp. the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL.

under Condition No. 2220 of the Civil Code. he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he thus places upon his property. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu. the ends of justice. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first. and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of loss. The condition will thus defeat. the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public policy. Under Art. and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip.appellants employees would come and say. (2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine. We find and hold that Condition No. TEVES Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today. vs. although there is an occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal. Quisumbing Sr. The hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. defendants. petitioner. moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.appellants did not offer to refund plaintiffs-appellees’ tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan. and explosives are introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth. If a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates and if the shipper makes such a choice. Hence. “we are leaving already”. since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who. . it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets. but the third is valid and enforceable. and names his valuation. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature. will not cause inconvenience to. A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value does not conflict with any sound principle of public policy. understandingly and freely. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner in that: (1) Defendants.appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that the vessel would leave within a short period of time. instead of enhance. hand-grenades. as was done in the instant case. 14 is Printed in fine letters.Appellants did not give notice to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the vessel. under circumstances obligation in the interisland shipping industry. Condition No. and second. defendants. petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. on which Condition No.rate of freight. the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. (3) Defendants. 14. much less prejudice. Upon the other hand. Court of Appeals The highjacking-robbery was force majeure. According to an almost uniform weight of authority. dynamite. vs. Sweet Lines Inc. Firearms.

Certainly. Alitalia vs. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. There can be no doubt that Dr.PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. which gradually turned to panic and finally despair. vs. . Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. which is absurd. In the case at bar. The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. PAL could not have been faulted for want of diligence. Rapadas The Warsaw Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. Otherwise. he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when. particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. In the case at bar. Intermediate Appellate Court The Warsaw Convention's provisions. an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal. Pan American World Airways. private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that. to comply with a contract of carriage. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations. having gone to Rome. the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. but without appreciable damage. The provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. Inc. no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline. was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. and Dr. the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. belatedly. if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure. The passenger ticket complies with Article 3. Hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees. upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket. the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. it is true. The passenger. Firearms and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. in bad faith. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety.

She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily, but safely.

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Mecenas vs. CA The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While the failure of Capt. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, such failures doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels. The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry. Under these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises. Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CA

The Duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. (Same Ruling with Mecenas)

Korean Airlines Co., LTD. vs. CA The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Fortune Express Inc. vs. CA Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by the PC. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. Gatchalian vs. Delim

The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them that it was normal. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver. Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. Del Castillo vs. Jaymalin Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. In this he failed. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. The bus driver's

and an injury results. In this connection. since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. hence. A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care. and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment. Necessito vs. CA The doctrine. Paras While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers. As the doctrine is usually stated. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. he has no remedy against him. Bustamante vs. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Thus. the injured person is entitled to recovery. and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. Lara vs.conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. Valencia The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. "The rule is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. assuming such calculation to be correct. CA . is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. while the carrier usually has. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier. the carrier cannot be held liable. stated broadly. Therefore. and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law. In other words. the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants. All premises considered. the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Japan Airlines vs.

but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. cannot be charged to JAL. what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Layugan vs. It follows that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable. It is clear therefore that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when. In this regard. La Mallorca vs. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus for her safety under the contract of carriage. aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. 1991. that the accident arose from want of care. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient. making the employer of the driver liable for the negligence of his employee. an employee of the private respondent. there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. CA The liability of the carrier for the child. the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event. under the circumstances involved.Accordingly. still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. IAC Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. after alighting from the car. it affords reasonable evidence." the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. persists. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter. And. . Corollarily. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

vs. a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent. Moreover. so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. the petitioner. and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney. Cervantes vs. a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. from petitioner's vessel. Further. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers. which he had every right to do. without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. vs. as in the instant case. Under Art. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. When the accident occurred. CA Clearly. the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of a passenger of the jeepney. such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. for example. CA The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises.Aboitiz Shipping Co. and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Mallari Sr. in case of death or injuries to passengers. Bayasen vs. after reaching his destination. 1755 of the Civil Code. CA It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads. Under Art. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. under Art. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier.. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. 2185 of the Civil Code. 1759 of the same Code. pursuant to Art. CA . it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case. the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes. It may occur without fault. who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. the skidding being an unforeseen event. unless there is proof to the contrary. 1756 of the Civil Code. Once created.

and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal. with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. Furthermore. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. The driver of jeepney did not carry “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. Pestaño. when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority. as a professional driver operating a public transport bus. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee. But. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. there is no assumption of risk by the passenger. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority. should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. not in actions involving breach of contract. unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. CA It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned. the obligation is created by law itself. In such a case. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. the jeepney was not properly parked. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code. owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. Calalas vs. In case of death or injuries to passengers. he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents. Gillaco vs. some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary. 1755. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. he is to blame. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Therefore. the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. Manila Railroad . First. the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. Pestaño vs. and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent. Sumayang In the case at bar. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. Art. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

1759. Art. he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable). In the present case. the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. Likewise when the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time. and social attitude. there was negligence. Maranan vs. the common carrier is negligent. Ammen Trans. to their total personality. nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. Accordingly. moral fibers. and pursuant to established doctrine. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. neither did the train stop. . Under the second view. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law. which is the minority view. it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. including their patterns of behavior. the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances. evidently follows the rule based on the second view. Perez The basis of the common carrier's liability under NCC for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art.While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby. Under the first. CA When a train boarded by the deceased passenger was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train.L. Co. but also. PNR vs. upheld by the majority and also by the later cases. no less important. since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability. it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train. despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. Isaac vs. A.

CA Life expectancy is. It cannot however relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. of a purely arbitrary standard. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion. Cariaga vs. it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. However. LTB had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith. no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption. petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence. the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. Bachelor was negligent. an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein.If the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency. In this case. Inc. . and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law. also. Bachelor Express Inc vs. he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise. as a young "training assistant" and when the deceased’s potentiality and capacity to increase his future income was not considered said liability may be enforced upon finality of the decision. By placing his left arm on the window. the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus. which are those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. be required in the absence of such emergency.00 a year. Villa Rey Transit. When the liability of common carrier had been fixed at a minimal rate of only of P2. the bus was speeding from a full stop. but. in the case at bar. LTB Co The income which deceased could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category provided for by Art. which is the annual salary of deceased at the time of his death.184. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. 2201 of the Civil Code. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount. 1762). LTB could not be held liable to pay moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. such as a four-year rule. in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. CA The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. vs. not only relevant.

unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. Attorneys fees may only be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest. An award of attorney's fees is also in order. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved.Pan American World Airways vs. plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable. but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right. The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. having found bad faith on the part of defendant.757.000. moral damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin. not her husband Jose. to provide an example or correction for public good . defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages. who sustained the bodily injuries. Mendoza It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer. or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid. however. rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76. In view of it nature. MRR In case of physical injuries. therefore. It is to be observed however. nor counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents. The Soberanos. to compensatory damages." Now. The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off non. It will be observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5. among others. . In this case it was Juana Soberano. Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff in bad faith. it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in the future by defendant and other airlines.Caucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable.76. the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. Soberano vs. it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages. Self enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises. just and demandable claim. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition. IAC By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight. but it is malice nevertheless. plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. Bad faith was also present. that in the complaint. as the name implies. nor proof. in effect. Marchan vs. it need not also be alleged.

000.00 paid to the herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance. not of his beneficiary. Philippine Airlines vs. The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which Dalmacio was responsible. Even in the absence of local statute and case law. whichever is shorter. resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified. Therefore. . at bottom. there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. However. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10. Court of Appeals The deletion of the P10. the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased.000. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of said Article because the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. The present action was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for moral damages and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such demand.000. Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and. as established by authorities. plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for moral damages as his case does not come within the exception of paragraph 1 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. However. . Manila Yellow Taxi Cab While under the law. The present case does not come under any of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. in the present case.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not die. On the other hand. specially of paragraph 2 thereof. does not maintain his action against all the persons who might be liable for the damages caused but on an alleged breach of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer alone. For the settlement of the issue at hand. The one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the driver of defendant's taxicab but he was not made party defendant to the case. the P5. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. arises from the same culpa. employers are made responsible for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.De Caliston vs. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary. because defendant's failure to meet its responsibility was not the cause that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interests. Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code. the defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal offense resulting in physical injuries against the plaintiff. plaintiff. Cachero vs. CA 185 SCRA 110 Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is. on which point this Court agrees. foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive.

wounded feelings. that entitles the spouse. To award moral damages for breach of contract. Pan American As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. such as in this case. A consideration of the attorney’s prominence as well as comparison of the defense counsel’s fees could well establish the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees.00 is appropriate. they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them. Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. At stopovers. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino. A written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. 2220. inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. therefore. . as required by Art. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. But the exceptional rule of Art. Ortigas Jr. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. But in the instant case. only to be found among the tourist passengers. Lufthansa It is Our considered view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage. an award of P100. who may not be discriminated against with impunity. And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. the proper arrangements therefor having been made already.Fores vs. descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased". serious anxiety and mental anguish. it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such. and in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore.000. What worsened the situation of was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping Ortigas as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class accommodation at the next stations. contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. the latter suffered social humiliation. therefore. vs. Miranda The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. 2206. Lopez vs. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers. the breach appears to be of graver nature. when in truth such was not the case. For the moral damages sustained by him. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant.

he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. after it deprives him of his space in order to favor another passenger. CA Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy.A passenger contracts for first class accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price therefor. after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly confirmed and validated. Trans World Airlines vs. a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. no moral damages are recoverable. Philippine Airlines vs. both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. In other words. in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. and it is certainly not for the airplane to say later. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages. class. The Court of Appeals found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road. CA 106 SCRA 391 . The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger. More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances. the private respondent was a practicing lawyer. particularly as to their convenience. which he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time. he is transferred over his objection to economy. Esguerra Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. Armovit vs. amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. even if death does not result. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. that economy class is anyway just as good as first class. At the time of this unfortunate incident. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in all cases wherein. This being the case. as in the instant case. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. CA The gross negligence committed by private respondent(Northwest Airlines) in the issuance of the tickets by the erroneous entry of the date of departure and without changing or correcting the error when the tickets were presented for re-confirmation and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages.

Much more. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some. One month prior to the crash-landing. to provide an example or correction for the public good. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. And therefore there is causal connection between the accident and said after-effects. headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crashlanding. it was raining that time and the roads are slippery. coming from Ayala Boulevard. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment. as the name implies. private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice. Alliance Transport Dra. considering that the traffic was clear. even if he was sick. . justifying the recovery of moral damages. her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary person. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident. Respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right along Taft Ave. As to exemplary damages. private respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao.” The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision. 2219(2) is applicable. Failing to notice petitioner's car. Otherwise stated. when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence. Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts. having tumor on his nose. serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness. applying the provisions of Article 2220. The dizziness.There was gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. Being a doctor by profession. she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. Prudenciado vs.

I. CONCEPT OF COMMON CARRIER
DE GUZMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendaña is a junk dealer who was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two six-wheeler trucks which he owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to different establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular commercial rates. Petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from its warehouse in Makati to petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta. 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee. Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and the cargo. Petitioner commenced action against private respondent demanding payment of P22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that private respondent, being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force majeure. The RTC ruled that private respondent was a common carrier. CA reversed the decision and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual occupation”, a sideline to his scrap iron business. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier. 2. Whether or not respondent is liable. Held: 1. Yes. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability. That liability

arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory requirements. 2. No. Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers; and (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Article 1735 also provides as follows: In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. The hijacking of the carrier's truck does not fall within any of the five categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier's vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent. Petitioner argues that in the circumstances of this case, private respondent should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk. We do not believe, however, that in the instant case, the standard of extraordinary diligence required private respondent to retain a security guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper. Article 1745 provides in relevant part: Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy: (6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished. In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. Accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence or force. In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: PPI purchased from Mitsubishi metric tons of Urea fertilizer which the latter shipped aboard the cargo vessel owned by KKKK from US to La Union. Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel

was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan. Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, they were all presumably inspected by the charterer's representative and found fit to take a load of urea. After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage. A private marine and cargo surveyor, Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), was hired by PPI to determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped. The survey report submitted revealed a shortage in the cargo and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating was contaminated with dirt. PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier, KKKK, for the cost of the shortage in the and the diminution in value of that portion contaminated with dirt. SSA explained that they did not respond to the consignee's claim because it was not a formal claim, and that they had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment. PPI filed an action for damages. The defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because they have become private carriers by reason of the provisions of the charter-party. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff, stating that “common carriers are presumed negligent, all that a shipper has to do in a suit to recover for loss or damage is to show receipt by the carrier of the goods and to delivery by it of less than what it received. After that, the burden of proving that the loss or damage was due to any of the causes which exempt him from liability is shifted to the carrier, common or private he may be. Even if the provisions of the charter-party are deemed valid, and the defendants considered private carriers, it was still incumbent upon them to prove that the shortage or contamination sustained by the cargo is attributable to the fault or negligence on the part of the shipper or consignee in the loading, stowing, trimming and discharge of the cargo. This they failed to do.” CA reversed the decision, relying on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc., it ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterer-party. Accordingly, the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar. Issue: 1) Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party. 2) Whether the shipowner was able to prove that he had exercised that degree of diligence required of him under the law. Held: 1.) Not necessarily. It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can the charterer be charged, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer. Respondent carrier's heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, is misplaced for the reason that the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation in the charter-party exempting the shipowners from liability for loss due to the negligence of its

when they unloaded in the port of Currimao 5. Clearly.) Yes.C. SC held that respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome. and charged the provincial treasurer 10 centavos for each sack instead of 6 centavos which they have been regularly charging for the . At any rate. a stockholder of YSC. the rules governing common carriers. powder or other explosives" from any and all shippers who may offer such explosives for carriage can be held to be a lawful act. with a variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading. Also shown. F. 2. does not find application in our jurisdiction. the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the explosives without qualification or conditions may have the effect of subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or discrimination. then covered with 3 layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. the prima facie presumption of negligence. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. In an action for recovery of damages against a common carrier on the goods shipped. was that the hull of the vessel was in good condition. powder or other explosives. It was shown during the trial that after the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship’s holds. filed a petition for prohibition.agent. more particularly. Fisher.986 sacks of rice belonging to Ilocos Norte Provincial Government from Manila. SC agreed that the bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. for we have observed that the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and /or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws. the RTC’s statement on the requirements of the law was reiterated. Held: No. US vs. as was the case at bar.YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY Facts: The board of Yangco Steamship Co. Issue: Whether or not the refusal of the board of YFC to accept for carriage "dynamite. as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss. QUINAHON Facts: Defendants were charged for violation of Act 98. foreclosing the possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel. In construing Act 98 for the alleged violation. The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such that it is within the power of the State to impose such just regulations in the interest of the public as the legislator may deem proper. FISHER vs. Moreso. The Collector of Customs suspended the issuance of clearances for the vessels unless they carry the explosives. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship’s boom. adopted a resolution which was ratified by the stockholders declaring classes of merchandise which are not to be carried by the vessels of the company and prohibiting the employees to carry dynamite. by clear and convincing proof. respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods unless it appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination for such is reasonable and necessary. and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. the rule in the United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier. YSC has not met those conditions. the steel pontoon hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids.

This case however is not applicable in the case at bar for the simple reason that the actual settings are different. on the date in question. on its way to Manila from Nasipit. There was no charter party. Loadstar submits that the vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC. Absolute equality is not required in all cases. INC. Issue: Whether or not the defendants as common carriers caused prejudice to the Ilocos Norte Government. when the same are made for the purpose of increasing their business and to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits. hence they appealed to the higher court.COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On November 19. It is however not believed that the law prohibits common carriers from making special rates for the handling and transporting of merchandise. was insured by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance. There is no pretense that it actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. occasional. The vessel. The goods were insured with Manila Insurance Co.. LOADSTAR received on board its M/V Cherokee goods(certain types of wood) for shipment. where the Court held that a common carrier transporting special cargo or chartering the vessel to a special person becomes a private carrier that is not subject to the provisions of the Civil Code. Further. As a result of the total loss of its shipment. 1984. They were convicted. LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO. 1984. There was a clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited by the law. episodic or unscheduled. In support of its position Loadstar relied on the 1968 case of Home Insurance Co. however ignored the same.(PGAI) for P4 Million. v. Held: Yes. and this character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic.(MIC) against various risks including “TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL LOSS OF THE VESSEL”. the consignee made a claim with LOADSTAR which. but only a general provision to the effect that the M/V Cherokee was a general cargo carrier.” The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. vs.unloading of the same kind of merchandise and under virtually the same circumstances and conditions. Loadstar being the party insured. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC. and there was only “one shipper. American Steamship Agencies. The trial court rendered judgment for MIC. The records do not disclose that the M/V Cherokee. 1985. PGAI averred that MIC has no cause of action against it. The law of equality is in force only where the services performed in the different cases are substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are similar. in turn. Inc. It is only unjust. undertook to carry a special cargo or was chartered to a special person only. one consignee for a special cargo. As the insurer. Agusan del Norte. MIC paid the insured in full settlement of its claim. On November 20. it did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route. MIC filed a complaint against Loadstar and PGAI. Issue: Whether or not Loadstar is a private carrier. the vessel sank off Limasawa Island. Held: No. PGAI was later dropped as a party defendant after it paid the insurance proceeds to Loadstar. Loadstar claimed force majeur. alleging that the sinking of the vessel was due to the fault and negligence of Loadstar and its employees. the bare fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for . prompting Loadstar to go to the CA which affirmed the decision. undue and unreasonable discrimination which the law forbids. On February 4. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement.

Home Insurance filed for reimbursement from Luzon Stevedoring and American Steamship Agencies. for hire as a public employment. to all persons who choose to employ its services. petroleum products. Petitioner argued that as a pipeline operator with a government concession engaged in transporting petroleum products via pipeline it is exempted from payment of tax based on gross receipts.one shipper." Petitioner is already paying 3% common carrier's tax on its gross sales/earnings under the National Internal Revenue Code. especially where. NCC. which appears to be purely coincidental. water or air. there is no doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle. paid SMB P14. CA was also mentioned. Home Insurance Co. Respondent treasurer required petitioner to pay a local tax based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year in 1993 pursuant to the Local Government Code. ASA appealed. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES. Based on Article 1732 NCC. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY vs. 587 of the Code of Commerce makes the ship agent civilly liable for damages in favor of third persons due to the conduct of carrier’s captain and that the stipulation in the charter party exempting owner from liability is against public policy under Art. CA decision is hereby affirmed. (De Guzman Ruling upheld) Respondent’s argument that the term “common carrier” as used in Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code refers only to common carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving vehicles or vessels either by land. The definition of “common carriers” in NCC makes no distinction as to the means of transporting as long as it is by land. declaring that Art. as in this case. . Held: No. The doctrine enunciated in the case of De Guzman v. To tax petitioner again on its gross receipts in its transportation of petroleum business would defeat the purpose of the Local Government Code. Respondent refused to make reimbursement on the ground that petitioner is not a common carrier engaged in transportation business by land. It is clear that the legislative intent in excluding from the taxing power of the local government unit the imposition of business tax against common carriers is to prevent a duplication of the so-called "common carrier's tax. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay a local tax based on gross receipts since it is not a common carrier. petitioner paid the amount of tax for the first quarter under protest. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying goods. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case. The cargo arrived in Manila and was discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring Co. In 1995. INC. that is. When the cargo was delivered to SMB there were shortages. To avoid hampering its operations. owner and operator of the vessel. and transports the goods by land and for compensation. i. 1744. The lower court absolved Luzon after finding that it observed the required diligence but ordered ASA to reimburse Home Insurance.000 after its demand. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. Facts: A Peruvian firm shipped fishmeal through the SS Chowborough consigned to the San Miguel Brewery and insured by the Home Insurance Co. petitioner applied for a Mayor’s permit in Batangas City. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under RA 387 to contract. Loadstar fits the definition of a common carrier under Article 1732 of the NCC. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. install and operate oil pipelines. water or air. The first pipeline concession was granted in 1967 and was renewed by the ERB in 1992. It undertakes to carry for all persons indifferently.e. is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a common carrier to a private carrier. it was shown that the vessel was also carrying passengers. sea or water is erroneous.

trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. . the conveyance of passengers. that it proposes to operate a ferry service to carry its passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and Matnog in connection with its trips to Tacloban City. a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only becomes a private carrier. PANTRANCO claims that it can operate a ferry service in connection with its franchise for bus operation in the highway from Pasay City to Tacloban City for the purpose of continuing the highway. SAN PABLO vs. a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is valid. Recovery can’t be had. when as in this case the two terminals. On March 27. as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single party. Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law. PANTRANCO Facts: PANTRANCO offers PUB service for passengers and freight. not the shipowner is responsible for any loss or damage of the cargo.Sorsogon and Allen.Samar that will provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have to cross San Bernardo Strait. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied. Issue: W/N a land transportation company can be authorized to operate a ferry service or coastwise or interisland shipping service along its authorized route as an incident to its franchise without the need of filing a separate application for the same. Issue: Are the provisions of the NCC applicable? Held: No. and Epitacio San Pablo and market conditions in the proposed route cannot support the entry of additional tonnage. It operates passenger buses from Metro Manila to Bicol Region and Eastern Samar. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed valid. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. which are small body of waters . unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its managers. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when crossing rivers or even lakes. the said proposed ferry operation is merely a necessary and incidental service to its main service and obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City to Tacloban City. Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved.1980 it requested MARINA for authority to lease/purchase a vessel for its project to operate a ferryboat service from Matnog.This was not given due course because the Matnog-Allen run is adequately serviced by Cardinal Shipping Corp. the charterer. It wrote the Chairman of the Board of Transportation (BOT). Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the highway. Held: No.separating the land. for loss or damage to the cargo against shipowners. however. which is interrupted by a small body of water. to which the petitioners opposed. As a private carrier. The BOT granted authority to PANTRANCO to operate a private ferry boat service. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation of the highway. The NCC provisions on common carriers should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private carrier. as distinguished from agents or employees. Under American Jurisprudence. Considering the environmental circumstances of the case. PANTRANCO nevertheless acquired the vessel.alleging that under the provisions of the Charter Party referred to in the bills of lading. Such being the case there is no need to obtain a separate certificate for public convenience to operate a ferry service.

GARCIA . The Court does not see any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just for the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen.The contention of private respondent PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier. RTC ruled against the plaintiff. nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. hence the appeal. carrying and safekeeping the cargo. This was affirmed by CA but modified the award of damages. that VSI “shall not be responsible for losses except on proven wilful negligence of the officers of the vessel. affirming the RTC decision in favor of defendant and dismissing the complaint is Affirmed. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier. the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC.” The NANYOZAI Charter Party(an internationally recognized Charter Party Agreement). equipped and supplied.18 but defendant refused and failed to pay. not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. private carriage does not involve the general public. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On July 17. PANTRANCO does not deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen. 1974. plaintiff NSC as charterer and defendant VSI as owner. are determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private carriage or charter party. It is a private carrier that renders tramping service and as such. the MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North Harbor Manila. which was incorporated in the parties’ contract of transportation. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner. It is clear from the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire. entered into a Contract of Voyage Charter Hire whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel. stating that the vessel was seaworthy and that there is no proof of willful negligence of the vessel's officers. Plaintiff filed with the defendant its claim for damages suffered due to the downgrading of the damaged tinplates in the amount of P941. NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION vs. does not transport cargo or shipment for the general public. The cargo was discharged and unloaded by stevedores hired by the plaintiff. NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by VSI’s wilful negligence or failure to exercise due diligence in making MV Vlasons I seaworthy and fit for holding. PANTRANCO cannot pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a private carrier and not as a common carrier. Held: It is a private carrier. KMU vs. the burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement. Hence.145. When the vessel’s 3 hatches containing the shipment were opened by plaintiff’s agents. It carried passengers or goods only for those it chose under a special contract of charter party. unless the same was caused by its lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the same was “properly manned. further provided that the shipowner shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the cargo arising or resulting from unseaworthiness. including their respective liability for damage to the cargo. Ineluctably. it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to the general public. In the instant case. the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier.” In view of the above. Issue: W/N VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or as a private carrier. The CA decision. Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted. Consequently.

1994. Held: While the authority of the DOTC and the LTFRB to issue administrative orders to regulate the transport sector is recognized. dated March 30. 92-587. the rates to be approved should be proposed by public service operators ii. a public hearing should be held for the fixing of the rates The chairman added that to allow bus operators to charge fares 15% above the present LTFRB fares in the wake of the devastation. 1994 in Case No. 92-587. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines. death and suffering caused by the July 16 earthquake will not be socially warranted and will be politically unsound. . availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing.92-587. Petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares. viz: (a) DOTC Memorandum Order 90-395. 1992.Facts: The following memoranda. providing implementing guidelines on the DOTC Department Order No. finding the MO not legally feasible submitted a memorandum to DOTC Secretary Orbos as it contravenes the Public Service Act for the following reasons: i. and (e) LTFRB Order dated March 24. the Court found that they committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOTC Department Order No. Issue: Whether or not the assailed orders/circulars are valid. (d) LTFRB Memorandum Circular No.” (c) DOTC Memorandum dated October 8. private respondent PBOAP. (PBOAP) filed an application for an across-theboard fare increase of P0. circulars and/or orders are sought to be nullified by the instant petition.085 per kilometer. 92-587 and LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. (b) DOTC Department Order No. Sometime in March. LTFRB Chairman. 94-3112. 92-587. defining the policy framework on the regulation of transport services. LTFRB dismissed the petition hence the present one. Among the salient provisions of which include: “In determining public need. the said administrative issuances being amendatory and violative of the Public Service Act and the Rules of Court. Bautista alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant and unreasonable. 1992. and Perla C. laying down rules and procedures to implement Department Order No. The burden of proving that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with the oppositor(s). the presumption of need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. Inc. dated June 26. there should be a publication and notice to concerned or affected parties in the territory affected iii. Fernando. The said increase was granted by LTFRB. Inc. It was opposed by Philippine Consumers Foundation. 92-009. 92-009 promulgating the implementing guidelines on DOTC Department Order No. 1990 relative to the implementation of a fare range scheme for provincial bus services in the country. announced a fare increase of 20% percent of the existing fares. allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year.

(a private corporation organized under the laws of HongKong) in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium. the ownership of EDSA LRT III which is a public utility. or a corporation or co-partnership. as amended.. among other things. only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the requirements. empirical data. statistics and such other means necessary. the following requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted. at least 60 % of its stock or paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines. Ltd. It is understood that there must be proper notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC. No grave abuse of discretion however was committed in the issuance of DOTC Memorandum Order No. is to look out for. real and/or testimonial. 90-395 and DOTC Memorandum dated October 8. While adopting the foregoing requisites for the issuance of a CPC.Fare Range Scheme: The 20% fare increase imposed by PBOAP without the benefit of a petition and a public hearing is null and void and of no force and effect. The guidelines states: “The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. entered into an "Agreement to Build. After prequalifying the bidders for the construction of the said transit. represented by Secretary Garcia. Ltd. GARCIA Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA referred to as EDSA Light Rail Transit III (EDSA LRT III). DOTC sought the approval of the President but the same was denied. public convenience and necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing facilities do not adequately supply. 1992. TATAD vs. (ii) the applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to its operation. Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" so as to clarify their respective rights and responsibilities and to submit Supplemental Agreement to the President. question the constitutionality of the two agreements between DOTC and private respondent. As one of the basic requirements for the grant of a CPC. DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation. to wit: (i) the applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines. provides for yet incongruous and contradictory policy guideline on the issuance of a CPC. a foreign corporation. Petitioners. LTFRB Memorandum Circular No.. public convenience or necessity generally means something fitting or suited to the public need. the interests of both the public and the existing transport operators. signed into law the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law. DOTC. 92-009. it was found that out of all the applicants. Presumed Public Need: A CPC is an authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation services for public use as required by law. They contend that it grants EDSA LRT Corp. and private respondent entered into a supplemental agreement—“Revised and Restated Agreement to Build. Then President Aquino. The existence or non-existence of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact that must be established by evidence. Secretary Garcia and private . the same being merely internal communications between administrative officers. Part IV.” By its terms. Thus. in their capacity as Senators and taxpayers. The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant. in a public hearing conducted for that purpose. while the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's. and protect. The object and purpose of such procedure. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act. association or joint-stock company constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines. and (iii) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner. Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" under the terms of the BOT Law.

the consignee at the port of destination—Davao. The goods were however never delivered to. hence the appeal. Public Service Board. they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. rail stations. INC. M/S SHWABENSTEIN. private respondent and DOTC agreed that on completion date.. It will have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. Thereafter. Issue: Whether or not the various clauses and stipulations in the Bill of lading is valid. Section 1. terminals and the power plant. INC. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof. rolling stocks like the coaches. contend that the nationality requirement for public utilities mandated by the Constitution does not apply to private respondent.F. SAMAR of one crate Optima welded wedge wire sieves through the M/S SCHWABENSTEIN a vessel owned by defendant NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD. In law. the importation was unloaded and delivered in good order and condition to the bonded warehouse of AMCYL. not a public utility. there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve the public. vs. loss or damage occurring before the goods enter ship’s tackle to be loaded or after the goods leave ship’s tackle to be discharged. The carrier undertook to transport the goods in its vessel. Issue: Does the fact that EDSA LRT Corporation. C. private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. Germany. private respondent. which shipment is covered by Bill of Lading No. Bill of lading. 18. Clearly. the goods were to be transhipped by the carrier to the port of destination or “port of discharge of goods”. during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical maintenance and repair services to DOTC. INC. or conversely. while the freight had been prepaid up to the port of destination or the “port of discharge of goods”—Davao. states: “The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any delay. 18 duly issued to consignee SAMAR MINING COMPANY. xxx” The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. a foreign corporation. NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD Facts: The case arose from an importation made by plaintiff.. No. transhipped or forwarded. Upon arrival of the aforesaid vessel at the port of Manila. nor received by. paragraph 3 of Bill of Lading No. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public. Ltd.respondent on the other hand. what constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public. EDSA LRT Corp. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. Ltd. private respondent will immediately deliver possession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks. own the facilities and equipment of the LRT III mean it also own the LRT III as a public utility? Held: No. As ruled in Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co.. Therefore. It is DOTC which shall operate the EDSA LRT III. v. . In the case at bar. 18 sets forth in the page 2 thereof that the goods were received by NORDEUTSCHER LLOYD at the “port of loading at Bremen. SHARP & CO. does not own EDSA LRT III as a public utility. (represented in the Philippines by its agent. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility.). only up to the “port of discharge from ship”—Manila. SAMAR MINING COMPANY.

from possession in its own name as carrier. The stipulations in the bill of lading in the PHOENIX case which are substantially the same as the subject stipulations provides: “The carrier shall not be liable in any capacity whatsoever for any loss or damage to the goods while the goods are not in its actual custody. There is no doubt that Art. At the hiatus between these two undertakings of appellant which is the moment when the subject goods are discharged in Manila. Appealed decision is REVERSED. they incur no liability for the loss of the goods in question. LTD. and the actual apprehension of corporeal possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody or disposal. 1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. or to the person who has a right to receive them. Under said article. UNITED STATES LINES. vs. as erstwhile carrier. The validity of stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in its actual custody has been upheld in PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO.) “The carrier or master. vs. The first is FOR THE TRANSPORT OF GOODS from Bremen. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to their port of destination. in effect.” (Par. morals. the carrier. Thus. and were stored in the warehouse of a third party when last seen and/or heard of. actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal possession by the seller. The actions of appellant carrier and of its representative in the Philippines being in full faith with the lawful stipulations of Bill of Lading No. 2.. its personality changes from that of carrier to that of agent of the consignee. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT . In sales. the appellant. INC. THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF THE SAME GOODS from Manila to Davao. By the same token.Held: Yes. Article 1736 and 1738. the character of appellant's possession also changes. shall be considered solely the agent of the shipper and consignee and without any other responsibility whatsoever or for the cost thereof. Germany to Manila.” (Par. last subpar. The said article contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the carrier. there is actual delivery in contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. Upon such delivery. as applied to the case. Article 1736 is applicable to the instant suit. into possession in the name of consignee as the latter's agent. Plaintiff-appellee's complaint is DISMISSED. Two undertakings appeared embodied and/or provided for in the Bill of Lading in question. there was. actual delivery of the goods from appellant as carrier to the same appellant as agent of the consignee. the carrier may be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to the consignee. good customs. public order or public policy their validity was sustained. ceases to be responsible for any loss or damage that may befall the goods from that point onwards. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. The court a quo found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its duly authorized agent. with appellant acting as agent of the consignee. in making arrangements with any person for or in connection with all transshipping or forwarding of the goods or the use of any means of transportation or forwarding of goods not used or operated by the carrier. Such being the case. 22 SCRA 674 (1968). This is the full import of Article 1736. 18 and in conformity with the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers. A careful perusal of the provisions of the New Civil Code on common carriers was looked into by the Court particularly. 16) Finding the above stipulations not contrary to law. The second. agency and contracts.

Inc. the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code. destruction.R.” This Petitioner Carrier has also failed to establish satisfactorily. In this case. according to all the circumstances of each case. As the cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines.” However. is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.R. Enroute for Kobe. No. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. 5. Respondents filed a claim for reimbursement from petitioner. the M/S ASIATICA. It does not fall within the category of an act of God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or calamity. sometime in or prior to June. from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy. However. And even if fire were to be considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734 of the Civil Code. the vessel caught fire and sank. in all matters not regulated by said Code. The respective respondent Insurers paid the corresponding marine insurance values to the consignees concerned and were thus subrogated unto the rights of the latter as the insured.. a special law. and two cases of surveying instruments consigned to Aman Enterprises and General Merchandise. . As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the exception in Article 1734. Japan. Petitioner Carrier claims that the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the phrase "natural disaster or calamity. during the same period. Common carriers are responsible for the loss. the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. (2) Under the Civil Code.. In G. The RTC ruled in their favor to which the petitioner appealed. earthquake. This must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or by human means. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. Inc. it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and only cause of the loss. a vessel operated by petitioner loaded at Kobe. Japan for transportation to Manila. the rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws. 71478. 1977. to Manila. The burden then is upon Petitioner Carrier to proved that it has exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods. Issue: (1) Which law should govern the Civil Code provisions on Common carriers or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act? and (2) who has the burden of proof to show negligence of the carrier? Held: (1) The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss. the same vessel took on board 128 cartons of garment fabrics and accessories consigned to Mariveles Apparel Corporation. 69044. Thus. destruction or deterioration. supra. Both sets of goods were insured against marine risk for with respondent.000 pieces of calorized lance pipes consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills Co. common carriers. during or after the occurrence of the disaster. the Court said that fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood. No. have proven that the transported goods have been lost. and 7 cases of spare parts valued consigned to Central Textile Mills. Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734." and that the carrier has "exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before.Facts: In G. lightning or other natural disaster or calamity. as subrogees of the cargo shippers. resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. Petitioner Carrier has also proved that the loss was caused by fire. the respective Insurers. which it failed to do. storm. The 128 cartons were insured for their stated value by respondent Nisshin and the 2 cases by respondent Dowa.

Japan. Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel. unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier. California and Tokyo. It appears. and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters.200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to Manila Banking Corporation. which deal exclusively with collision of vessels. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code. that the fire must have started 24 hours before the same was noticed. Plaintiff (DISC) as insurer. Inc. It is provided therein that: Sec. The foregoing suffices to show that the circumstances under which the fire originated and spread are such as to show that Petitioner Carrier or its servants were negligent in connection therewith. however. CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Plaintiff filed complaint for reimbursement from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent respectively. who represents Riverside Mills Corporation. as a fact. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from (b) Fire. The E. Book Three of the Code of Commerce. paid the respective claims of holders of the negotiable bills of lading duly endorsed to them. 4(2). no regular inspection was made as to their condition during the voyage. shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert appraisal. the fire was already big. . MCP and NDC interposed their appeals. it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco. it is evident that the laws of the Philippines will apply. California. and that after the cargoes were stored in the hatches. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court. The RTC rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC. Issue: Which law shall govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters. Japan with a Japanese vessel as a result of which 50 bales of aforesaid cargo were lost and/or destroyed. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: An agreement was entered onto between defendants National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) in accordance of which. The vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay. More specifically. Philipp Corporation of the New York loaded on board the vessel “Dona Nati” at San Francisco. in effect. Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or due to a collision which was found to have been caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. and the extent of liability? Held: This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. Consequently. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. v. the complete defense afforded by the COGSA when loss results from fire is unavailing to Petitioner Carrier. found. that there was "actual fault" of the carrier shown by "lack of diligence" in that when the smoke was noticed.Nor may Petitioner Carrier seek refuge from liability under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. IAC (150 SCRA 469-470 [1987]) In the case at bar. so that no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles 826 to 839. Manila and the People’s Bank and Trust Company. NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean-giving vessels including one with the name “Dona Nati” appointed MCP as its agents to manage and operate said vessel in its behalf. acting for and in behalf of Pan Asiatic Commercial Company. that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code. such as Ise Bay. a total of 1. Under the above ruling. the owner of the vessel at fault.

CONTRACTUAL EFFECTS A. Defendant Bienveido Gelisan and Roberto Roberto entered into a contact underwhich Espiritu hired the same freight truck of Gelisan for the purpose of hauling rice. It also agreed that Espiritu shall bear and pay all losses and damages attending the carriage of the goods to be hauled by him. did not deliver the fertilizer to the Atlas Fertilizer bodega at Mandaluyong. including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. being the registered owner of the truck. CA decision is affirmed. Espiritu. the shipowner or carrier. Significantly. a trucking operator had known Roberto Espiritu. Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the conduct of the voyage. sugar. Alday met Espiritu at the gate of Pier 4 and the latter offered the use of his truck with the driver and helper. Espiritu made two hauls of zoobags of fertilizer per trip. The fertilizer was delivered to the driver and helper of Espiritu with the necessary waybill receipts. North Harbor. flour and fertilizer. II. CA ruled that Bienvenido Gelisan is likewise liable for being the registered owner of the truck. to its Warehouse in Mandaluyong. Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu. under the provisions of the Code of Commerce. is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain. Held: Yes. particularly Articles 826 to 839. being the registered owner of the truck. Vigilance over Goods GELISAN vs. The claim of the petitioner that he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and between him and Roberto Espiritu which exempts him from liability to third . a term broad enough to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from contract. however. On appeal. Benito Alday.which provides that if the collision is imputable to both vessels. The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent. Issue: Whether or not Gelisan should be held solidarily liable with Espiritu. Alday had a contact to haul the fertilizer of the Atlas Fertilizer Corporation from Pier 4. ALDAY Facts: Bienvenido Gelisan is the owner of a freight truck. Thus. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel. Benito Alday was compelled to pay the value of the 400 bags of fertilizers to Atlas Fertilizer Corporation and filed a compliant against Roberto Espiritu and Bienvenido Gelisan with the CFI of Manila. The Court has invariably held in several decisions that the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused to any of the passengers therein. each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes. The CFI of Manila ruled that Roberto Espiritu was the only one liable. The offer was accepted by Alday and he instructed his checker to let Roberto Espiritu haul the fertilizer.

Luisa Benedicto. cruz in the presence and with the consent of driver Licuden. private respondent bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany. On May 15. There is no dispute that petitioner Benedicto has been holding herself out to the public as engaged in the business of hauling or transporting goods for hire or compensation. Benedicto is liable for the undelivered or lost sawn lumber as registered owner.. supervised the loading of sawn lumber with invoice aboard the cargo truck. The cargo truck was registered in the name of petitioner Ma. IAC Facts: Private respondent Greenhills Wood Industries Company. To effect its first delivery. In this regard. The registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the identity of the alleged transferee. 1980. the proprietor of Macoren Trucking. The trial court ruled against Benedicto and Luciden. is valid and binding between the contracting parties. although not effective against the public for not having been approved by the Public Service Commission. Still. Thus. in brief. The latter then informed Greenhills’ resident manager. Bulacan. the Manager of Blue Star called up Greenhills’ president. contracted Virgilio Licuden.persons. Held: Yes. had no evidentiary value not only because .000 board feet of sawn lumber with the understanding that an initial delivery would be made on May 15. It is settled in our jurisprudence that if the property covered by a franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval. The prevailing doctrine on common carrier makes the registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of the carrier. a company in Bulacan 100. private respondent is not required to go beyond the vehicle’s certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier. even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred to another person. private respondent’s resident manager Dominador Cruz. the IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. private respondent Greenhills filed criminal case against driver Luciden for estafa and also against petitioner Benedicto for recovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber plus damages before the RTC of Dagupan City. Thereafter. since the lease contract in question. the driver of a cargo truck to transport its sawn lumber to the consignee Blue Star in Valenzuela. the public has the right to assume that the registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof. a lumber manufacturing firm. informing him that the sawn lumber on board the subject cargo truck had not yet arrived in Bulacan. The Court ruled that the petitioner is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner. Inc. 1980. BENEDICTO vs. had not been approved by the Public service Commission. a business enterprise engaged in hauling freight. being the registered owner of the carrier. Sometime in May 1980. However. Blue Star had not received the sawn lumber and were constrained to look for other suppliers. cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease contract. It would be very difficult and often impossible as a practical matter. the transfer is not binding upon the public or third persons. Inc. adverted to. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law. On appeal. for members of the general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. should be held liable for the value of the undelivered or lost sawn lumber. Gelisan is not without recourse because he has a right to be indemnified by Roberto Espiritu for the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to Benito Alday. Petitioner Benedicto is. (“Blue Star”). the letter presented by petitioner allegedly written by Benjamin Tee admitting that Licuden was his driver. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Benedicto. a common carrier. In the case at bar. operates a sawmill in Quirino.

its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine. Such fault or negligence. Santos became what is known as a kabit operator.delict. INC. Also. but for those of persons for whom one is responsible. CA Facts: The victim Ramon Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along Calbayog City. . if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner of a public service is liable for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver. defendant Philtranco driven by defendant Rogasiones Dolina Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. The said defendant drivers stopped the Philtranco bus. the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle. SANTOS vs. petitioner Philtranco as the registered owner is still liable. Further. On appeal. the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. P/sgt. for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver is primary. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that. but the latter did not listen. is called a quasi. “the obligation imposed by Art. thereby bumped on the victim Ramon. petitioner Santos was the owner of a passenger jeep. which was to be a private document presumably to be registered if and when it was decided that the passenger jeep of Santos was to be withdrawn from the kabit agreement. Vidad executed a re-transfer document to the former. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. Thus. there being fault or negligence. To permit the ostensible or registered owner to prove who the actual owner is. For the protection of Santos. Santos then transferred his jeep to the name of Vidad so that it could be operated under the latter’s certificate of public convenience. like petitioner Philtranco. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that. but he had no certificate of public convenience for the operation of the vehicle as a public passenger jeep. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally pay the private respondent. direct and solidary. instead. Yabao who was then jogging approached the bus driver defendant Manilhig and signaled him to stop. In the case at bar.Benjamin Tee was not presented in court to testify on this matter but because of the afore mentioned doctrine. As a result. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. direct. As the bus was pushed. SIBUG Facts: Prior to April 26. would be to set at naught the purpose or public policy which infuses that doctrine. The Court ruled that the Petition fro Review is Denied. prior to said date. Thereafter. it proceeded running. and joint and severally or solidary with the driver. fell and was ran over by the bus. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES. 1963.delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi. its engine started thereby the bus continued its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Since the employer’s liability is primary. So. Vidad was duly authorized passenger jeepney operator. Held: Yes. Still. is obliged to pay for the damage done. vs. the bus did not stop although it had already bumped and ran over the victim. As the engine of Philtranco started abruptly and suddenly. The court ruled that the petition is partly granted. Also in Calbayog City. the police officer introduced himself and ordered the latter to stop.

the Sheriff of Manila levied on a motor vehicle. franchise certificates. five Toyota Corona Standard cars to be used as taxicabs. collided with a motorcycle whose driver. INC. 1963. the injured party. as the registered owner/ operator and grantee of the franchise. Emeterio Martin. is directly and primarily responsible and liable for damages caused to Sibug. Florante Galvez. privileges. Thus. Santos had fictitiously sold the jeepney to Vidad. the IAC modified the decision. Held: Yes. In the CFI of Manila. Although Santos. lessee or operator thereof. but Lita Enterprises allegedly refused. 1965. without the approval or authorization of the Commission previously had(g) to sell. Issue: Whether or not a jeepney registered in the name of Vidad. 20 (g) of the Public Service Act provides: “it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner. On Appeal.On April 26. It is true that Vidad had executed a resale to Santos. who had become the registered owner and operator of record at the time of the accident. as the kabit. registered in the name of Vidad. respondent Nicasio Ocampo decided to register his taxicab in his name. and scheduled the public auction sale. This ruling is based on the principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public Service commission. an authorized public utility operator but is actually owned by Santos (the kabit operator). On October 14. instituted an Action for Damages and Injunction with a prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Santos. as a result. Santos presented a third-party claim with the Sheriff. a writ of execution was issued and one of the vehicles of respondent spouses was levied upon and sold at public auction. one of said taxicabs driven by their employee. encumber or lease its property. CA Facts: Sometime in 1966. the latter. filed a complaint for damages. Sibug sought relief from respondent Appellate Court. Since they had no franchise to operate taxicabs. or rights. died from the head injuries sustained. mortgage. the spouses filed a complaint. for the use of the latter’s certificate of public convenience in consideration of an initial payment of P1. Respondent Court held that Santos may not be permitted to prove his ownership over a particular vehicle being levied upon but registered in another’s name in a separate action. In the case at bar. The court ruled that the petition for review filed by Santos is dismissed. or any part thereof. alienate. Judgment was rendered in favor of Sibug. Thereafter. The CFI of Manila ordered Lita Enterprises to transfer the registration certificate. which bumped Sibug be sold at a public auction to satisfy the court’s award. branch X affirmed Santos’ ownership of the jeepney in question. Thus. The next day. About a year later. . Sec. they contracted with petitioner. the jeepney under the “kabit system” which bumped Sibu can be sold at public auction to satisfy the court’s award. petitioner Lita Enterprises was adjudged liable for damages as the registered owner of the taxicab. but the document was not registered. A criminal case was filed against the driver while a civil case was filed against Lita enterprises seeking for damages. was the true owner as against Vidad. the spouses Nicasio Ocampo and Francisca Garcia. LITA ENTERPRISES. On April 10.000 and a monthly rental of P200 per taxi cab unit. 1964. as a consequence of the negligent or careless operation of the vehicle. Hence. vs. private respondent Sibug was bumped by a passenger jeepney operated by vidad and driven by Severo Gragas. herein private respondent purchased in installment from the Delta Motor Sales Corp.

1975. as well as the insurance coverage of the unit. Held: Yes. The court ruled that the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. the kabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore.00.700. The plaintiff made demands but just the same the defendant failed to comply thus forcing plaintiff to consult a lawyer and file this action for his damage. It also appears and the court so finds that the defendant purchased the motorcycle in question and the Court so finds that defendant purchased the motorcycle in question. void and inexistent under Article 1404 of the Civil Code. Petitioner Teja Marketing and/or Angel Jaucian filed an action for the “sum of money with damages”. The kabit system has been identified as one of the root causes of the prevalence of graft and corruption in the government transportation services.000.Issue: Whether or not the parties entered into a “kabit system” Held: Yes.00 with a promise that he would pay plaintiff the balance within sixty days. court will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract. On appeal. The defendant. the plaintiff appears to be the owner of the unit. Thus. per agreement. the court cannot allow either of the parties to enforce an illegal contract bu leaves them both where it finds them. TEJA MARKETING vs. Although not outrightly penalized as a criminal offense. the defendant bought from the plaintiff a motorcycle with complete accessories and a sidecar in the total consideration of P8. the decision was affirmed in toto. whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. particularly for the purpose of engaging and using the same in transportation business and for this purpose said trimobile unit was attached to the plaintiff’s transportation line who had the franchise. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government.00 of rits registration. the parties entered into a “kabit system”. it appears to have been agreed further between. Issue: Whether or not kabit system applies in the instant case. The city court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. but will leave both where it finds them. the plaintiff and the defendant. failed to comply with his promise and so upon his own request. Abuse of this privilege by the grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. the parties operated under an agreement called “kabit system”. however. Out of the total purchase price the defendant gave a down payment of P1. IAC Facts: On May 9. . Furthermore. The parties herein operated under an arrangement. The assailed decision of the IAC now the CA is AFFIRMED. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege conferred by the government. the defendant gave to the plaintiff the amount of P82. Thus. commonly known as the “kabit system”. This is a system whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public convenience allows another person who owns motor vehicles to operate under such franchise for a fee. for the registration of the unit for the year 1976. The Court ruled that the decisions rendered by the CFI of Manila and IAC are hereby annulled and set aside. that plaintiff would undertake the yearly registration of the unit in question with the LTC. Thus. the period of paying the balance was extended to one year in monthly installments until January 1976 when he stopped paying anymore. the concept of Kabit system being contrary to public policy and void and existent. so much so that in the registration certificate.

actual or constructive. CA Facts: In 1965. private respondent delivered the scrap iron to the captain for loading. accompanied by three policemen. The features which characterize the boundary system. When half of the scrap iron was loaded. private respondent Tumambing contracted the services of petitioner Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles. Conrado Roque was prosecuted for homicide thru reckless imprudence before the CFI of Manila. The gunshot was not fatal but he had to be taken to a hospital. Pursuant to Article 1736. A receipt was issued stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. The .00 from private respondents. The contract between Conrado Roque and defendant Delfin Bernardo was that Roque was to pay to defendant the sum of P8. Bataan on board the latter’s lighter. the fact that the driver does not receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the amount of fares collected by him over the amount he pays to the jeepowner. Pursuant to their agreement. The Acting Mayor. which he paid to said defendant.carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss.namely. ordered the captain and his crew to dump the scrap iron. such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery. The Court ruled that the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Thereafter. the petitioner. to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3. destruction or deterioration of the goods commenced. BERNARDO Facts: The spouses Magboo are the parents of the 8-year old child killed in a motor vehicle accident.owner and a driver under a “boundary system” agreement. and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation. the vehicle owned by the defendant Bernardo.00. with the rest brought to Nassco Compound.are not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer. petitioner is guilty of breach of the contract of transportation. By the said act of delivery.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. As a result of the accident. by the carrier to the consignee. for privilege of driving the jeepney. Conrado Roque pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to a jail term. Consequently. which the latter refused to give. Held: Yes. prompting the Mayor to draw his gun and shoot at him. there exist an employer-employee relationship under a boundary system arrangement.employee. it being their agreement that whatever earnings Roque could make out of the use of the jeepney in transporting passengers from one point to another would belong entirely to Conrado Roque. or to the person who has a right to receive them. Mayor Advincula demanded P5. Held: Yes. Consequently. and that upon arraignment. and that the gasoline consumed by the jeepney is for the account of the driver. At the time of the accident.MAGBOO vs. the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. said passenger jeepney was driven by Corado Roque. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier. the jeepneyowner is subsidiarily liable as employer in accordance with article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. GANZON vs. 000. Conrado Roque served his sentence but he was not able to pay the indemnity because he was insolvent. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of breach of contract of transportation and in imposing a liability against him commencing from the time the scrap iron was placed in his custody and control have no basis in fact and in law. Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between a jeepney.000.

These are conditions that ocean. who went to petitioner’s office.Tensioning Philippines in Manila.fact that part of the shipment had not been headed the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier. Issue: Whether or not rains and rough is considered as caso fortuito which would exempt petitioner from liability for the deterioration of the cargo. “common carrier are bound to observe extraordinary vigilance over goods according to all circumstances of each case. for delivery to stresstek Post.” Further Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that. thirteen coils of uncoated 7. which caused it to pound and roll heavily. That rain water (not sea water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of ships hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the cargo holds of the ship. it was discovered that only one bag had remained in the baggage compartment. vs. Art. It appears that while en route. but the driver ignored them and proceeded to Legaspi City. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On August 31. albeit still unloaded. 1978. The coils which were wrapped in burlap cloth and cardboard paper were stored in the lower hold of the hatch of the vessel which were rusty on one side each and it was found that the “wetting” was caused by fresh water that entered the hatch. The Court ruled that the petition is DISMISSED. 1984.going vessels would encounter and provide for. heavy rains and rough seas were not caso fortuito. Some of the passengers suggested retracing the route to try to recover the items. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES. passport and visa. for the days. Fatima reported the loss to her mother. Her belongings were kept in the baggage compartment and during the stopover at Daet. or deteriorated. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. from whom the consignee’s broker received for delivery to consignee’s warehouse.stressed concrete were shipped on board the vessel “Jupri Venture” owned and operated by petitioner. destroyed. but normal occurrences that an ocean. the carrier has failed to establish any caso fortuito. trial contact lenses. “if the goods are lost. filed this petition. CA Facts: On September 4.going vessel. which she turned down. Razon. On appeal. Since. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier applies.” In the case at bar. Fatima boarded petitioner’s De luxe bus in Manila on her way to Legaspi City. INC. Razon in RTC. Her brother helped her load three pieces of luggage containing all of her optometry review books. Petitioner merely offered her one thousand pesos for each piece of luggage lost. Fatima asked the help of radio . the vessel encountered very rough seas and stormy weather. materials and equipment. in the ordinary course of voyage. such is not considered caso fortuito which would exempt from liability for the deterioration of the cargo. is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. The said cargo was insured by respondent operator E. Only Eastern Shipping Lines. Inc. the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. Manila was dismissed. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. Held: No. The Court ruled that the petition is DENIED. The complaint that was filed by the first Nationwide Assurance Corporation (insurer) against Eastern Shipping Lines and F. 1737 of the Civil Code provides that. particularly in the month of September. SARKIES TOURS PHILIPPINES vs.wire stress relieved for pre.

short landing. After trial. public order or public policy. almost all the baggage was lost to the prejudice of the paying passengers. good customs. vs. Pursuant to Article 1306 of the Civil Code. As a result of this lack of care. such stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law. Under the Civil Code. Respondents. through counsel. In the case at bar. CA Facts: Valenzuela hardwood entered into an agreement with Seven Brother Shipping Corporation whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V Seven Ambassador the formers lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of Isabela for shipment to Manila. Held : The stipulation in the instant case is valid. Thus. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the liability of South Surety and Insurance Company. the charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that the “owners shall not be responsible for loss. exempting the ship-owner from liability for the loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship captain. Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common . In a contract of private carriage. Petitioner apologized through a letter. split. demanded satisfaction of their complaint from petitioner. Held: The petitioner is liable for the lost baggage’s. Petitioner insured the logs against loss and/or damage with South Sea Surety and Insurance Company. This stipulation is deemed valid as it is undisputed that private respondent acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioner’s lauan logs.stations and even from Philtranco bus drivers who plied the same route.” and this liability “last from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of. The said vessel sank resulting on the loss of plaintiff’s insured bags. and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered. the cause of the loss was petitioner’s negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage compartment of its bus were securely fastened. one of Fatima’s bags was recovered. the court held that the proximate cause of the los is the negligence of the captain and the stipulation in the charter party limiting respondent’s liability is void being against public policy citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party exempting the ship-owner from liability for the loss of the cargo arising from the negligence of its captain valid. “unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof. by the carrier to the person who has a right to receive them. breakages and any kind of damages to the cargo”. actually or constructively. petitioner is held liable. “common carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence and vigilance over goods transported by the. Thus. the parties may validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer. VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY INC. morals. On appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the lost baggage’s of Fatima. After more than nine months of fruitless waiting. respondents decided to file the case. Thus. In the case at bar. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. but modified it by holding that Seven Brothers was not liable for the lost of the cargo. the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification. Both respondent and insurer denied liability.

COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children boarded a Yobido Liner bus at Surigaodel Sur. along Picop Road. Leny claimed that the was running fast in a winding road which was not cemented and was wet because of the rain. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. “in case of death or injuries to passengers. The Court ruled that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. There are human factors involved in the situation. They also claimed that the bus was running as speed pr “60 to 50” and that the tire was brand-new. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality.carriers which were cited by the petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their charter party. Issue: Whether or not the tire blow out is considered a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners from liability. it is settled that an accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a case fortuity that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence.” Further. first by telephone and later confirmed by a formal written booking issued by Macleod and Co. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Leny filed a case of breach of contract of carriage against petitioners. a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. They claimed that the bus was not full as there were only 32 passengers out of the 42 seating capacity. contracted. Two lighters of the petitioner loaded said cargo from Macleod’s wharf at Davao . Agusan del Sur. The incident resulted in the death if Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to other passengers. YOBIDO vs.” In the case at bar. the services of the petitioner Campania Maritime for the shipment of bales of hemp from Davao to Manila. COMPANIA MARITIMA vs. Thus. Respondents on the other hand. OF NORTH AMERICA Facts: Macleod and Co. petitioners are hereby held liable for damages.. The bus fell into a ravine around the three feet from the road and struck a tree. Held: The tire blow out is not considered as a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioners from liability. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. INSURANCE CO. the explosion of the new tire may not be considered a fortuitous event. the left front tire of the bus exploded. The petition is denied by the Court. Moreover. asserted the violation of the contract of carriage was brought about by the driver’s failure to exercise the diligence required of the carrier. Article 1755 provides that “a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Alberto and Cresencio Yobido raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito. resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode within five days use. Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that. Be that as it may. The owners of Yobido Liner Bus.

it is not indispensable.63. the carrier or its authorized agent. This is a situation where the carrier loses control of the goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be made responsible for any loss or damage that may be caused to the goods during the interregnum. As to the issuance of a bill of lading. or receipt by. 350 of the Code of Commerce provides that the shipper as well as the carrier may mutually demand that a bill of lading be issued. The ship arrived in Cebu and discharged her cargo. Judgment reversed. Lower Court held that the carrier liable. Petitioner denied the liability on the grounds that there was no bill of lading issued thereby resulting to the non-existence of carriage contract. placing it in the custody of the arrastre operator appointed by the Bureau of Customs. although it may become obligatory by reason of the regulations or as a condition imposed in the contract by the agreement of the parties themselves. BINAMIRA Facts: Delta Company of New York shipped six cases of films and photographic supplies to Binamira. The Code of Commerce does not demand as a necessary requisite in the contract of transportation.awaiting the arrival of another vessel of the petitioner for loading. The barges or lighters were merely employed as the first step of the voyage. it was stipulated that the carrier in no longer liable for the cargo upon its delivery to the hands of the customs authorities. One of the lighters sunk which Macleod suffered damage P54. The cargo was later delivered to Binamira and a marine surveyor found that some were missing valued at P324. These stipulations limiting liability is not contrary to morals or public policy. .55. On the contract of carriage. Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract of carriage. there should be no limitations as to form. however. Held: There was a complete contract of carriage the consummation of which has already begun when the shipper delivered the cargo to the carrier and the latter took possession of the same by placing it on a lighter manned by its authorized employees. A bill of lading is not essential to the contract. The cargo was checked both by the stevedoring company and the arrastre operator and was found in good order. of the goods. it can be said that provided there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights and obligations. but gives the right to both the shipper and carrier to mutually demand of each other the delivery of the said bill. the parties may agree to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods have still to go through the inspection of the customs authorities before they are actully turned over to the consignee. that the sinking was due to a fortuitous event and that the respondent has no personality. the delivery of a bill of lading to the shipper. As regards to the form of the contract of carriage. Judgment against petitioner is affirmed. although Art. under which Macleod became entitled to the privilege secured to him by law. 018. The responsibility of the carrier commenced on the actual delivery to. however. Issue: Whether or not the stipulations limiting the liability of the carrier is valid. Held: While delivery of the cargo to the customs authorities is not delivery to the consignee of the person who has the right to receive them as contemplated in Article 1736 of the Civil Code because in such case the goods are still in the hands of the government and the owner cannot be exercise dominion over them. LU DO vs.

was found short of one piece waster cone and one piece Main Relief valued. In actual damages. at its warehouse. cargoes of rice and colored paper as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the carrier. 602956. Negros Occidental. 1963. CA Facts: American President Lines (APL) vessel President Washington(Carrier for short) receive and loaded on board at Los Angeles. for carriage from Manila to Pulupundan. the same is of no moment. Issue: What law is applicable the Civil Code provisions or COGSA? Held: The Civil Code. SERVANDO vs. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides that “the laws of the country to which the goods are transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in case of loss. the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by Special Laws. aforementioned. at P28. covered by Commercial Invoice No.(Arrastre0. complete and in good order condition. destruction and deterioration. A-08851. Inc. destroying Servando’s cargoes.” This means that the law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. where the said shipment was examined and inventoried.58.. Facts: Clara UY Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the Philippine Steam Navigation vessel. showing signs of having been previously tampered. thru Forwarders Direct Container Lines. On the same date. 842. said section is merely supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code. filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against APL. Private respondent FGU Ins. and the one box discharged from the CARRIER’s vessel in bad order condition. vs. Corp.m. Marina Port Services. With regard to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should control in this case.. for P481. Under 1766 of NCC. FS176. with one box in bad order condition. 1987. Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the bill of lading limiting the liability of carrier is valid. unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. the shipment was discharged and turned over to Marina Port Services. About 2:00 p. Inc. CHI-MNL120. The CARRIER. LTD. The cargo remained with the ARRASTRE for ten days until it was withdrawn on April 16. said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin. issued its clean Bill of Lading No. although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and asserted in the bill of lading. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. the subject of the shipment of one (1) unit of Submersible Jocky Pump. NCC governs said rights and obligations. The trial court found in favor of private respondent and ordered APL to pay private respondent the amount of P28. complete and in good order. Inc. 248. Inc. The shipment was insured by FGU Ins.. Held: The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment on question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736. of the same day. 248. on September 6. Art. 1736-1738. and LCM Brokerage Co. per invoice. and since the burning of the warehouse .” Art. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan in the morning of November 18. the consignee. contained in (3) boxes.AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES. “in all matter not regulated by this Code. 1987 by the defendant broker which delivered the same to the consignee. and Packing List. the cargoes were discharged. covered by a Turn over Survey Cargoes No. California. Therefore.24 The defendant CARRIER transshipped the shipment in Hongkong on board the vessel MS ‘Partas’. It was for transport to Manila in favor or Lindale Development Corporation.58. which arrived at the Port of Manila. hence. Corp.

thru his employees. to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT “Batman. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles. morals or public policy. destruction. and that they did not sign the same.” Ganzon then sent his lighter “Batman” to Mariveles where it docked. dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters. war. accompanied by the three policemen. By the said act of delivery. Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the back of the bills of lading.” That the petitioner. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common carrier and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation. GANZON vs. actually received the scraps is freely admitted.occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees. Mayor Advincula of Mariveles. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. captain of the lighter.00 from Tumambing. . However. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals.” There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier in delay in the performance of its obligation nor that was the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom’s warehouse in anyway attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. the petitioner-carrier’s extraordinay responsibility for the loss. Mayor Advincula drew his gun and fired at Tumambing. 1956. Bataan. The rest was brougth to the compound of NASSCO. xxx fire xxx. 1956. However. Bataan. the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. Issue: Whether or not the scrap iron were already delivered. ordered Captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked. The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be taken to a hospital in Balanga. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated argument. arrived and demanded P5. parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage cause by force majeure. the private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Niza for loading in the lighter “Batman. Held: Petitioner Ganzon insists that the scrap iron had not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control to make him liable. for treatment. there is nothing therein that is contrary to law. or deterioration of the goods commenced. that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question.” We sustain the validity of the above stipulation. Consequently. On December 1. But on December 4. Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza. 000. Bataan. Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron. When about of the scrap of the scrap iron was already loaded. public enemies. for loading which was actually began on the same date by the crew of the lighter. 1956. he completely agrees with the respondent Court’s finding that on December 1. Acting Mayor Basillo Rub. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed “owner’s risk” unless such damage is due to negligence of carrier. the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. “While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. the loss is chargeable against the appellant. Such provisions have been held to be part of the contract of carriage and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter’s lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation. “Clause 14. After some time.

Losing a loved one. vs. The court absolve the two airline companies of any liability. TWA’s apathetic stance while not legally reprehensible is morally deplorable. The foregoing observations. was especially condemnable particularly in the hours of bereavement of the family of Crispina Saludo. They were entitled to the understanding and humane consideration called of by and commensurate with the extraordinary diligence required for common carriers. JR. atleast to nominal damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code make it clear that nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition . Held: The records reveal that petitioners. in fact. intensified by anguish due to the uncertainty of the whereabouts of their mother’s remains. especially one’s parent. contending that Trans World Airlines and PAL were liable for misshipment. unattended to and without any assurance from the employees of TWA that they were doing anything about the situation. It was from PAL that they received confirmation that their mother’s remains would be on the same flight with them. it could have easily facilitated said inquiry. 1738. and of the discourtesy of its employees to them. do not appear to be applicable to respondent PAL. the casket bearing the remains of plaintiff’s mother was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened there. Somehow the two bodies were switched. but it turned out that there were two bodies in the said airport. actual or constructive.Pursuant to Art. or to the person who has a right to receive them. TWA’s personnel were remiss in the observance of that genuine human concern and professional attentiveness required and expected of them. rather than just shrug off the problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no knowledge about it. No attribution of discourtesy or indifference has been made against PAL by petitioners and. Crispina Saludo. albeit unloaded. Common sense could and should have dictated that they exert a little effort in making a more extensive inquiry by themselves or through their superiors. such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery. albeit. With all the modern communications equipment readily available to them. The CA affirmed such decision. by the carrier to the consignee. agonised for nearly five hours. however. The imperviousness displayed by TWA’s personnel. The shipment was immediately loaded on PAL flight and arrived on Manila a day after it expected arrival on October 29. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: After the death of plaintiff’s mother. belatedly and eventually laid in her final resting place is of little consolation. SALUDO. Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for damages. over the possibility of losing their mother’s mortal remains. Pomierski and Son Funeral Home of Chicago brought the remains to Continental Mortuary Air Services which booked the shipment of the remains from Chicago to San Francisco by TWA and from San Francisco to Manila with PAL. is a painful experience. The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier. Petitioner’s right to be treated with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by every common carrier was violated by the TWA and this entitles them. particularly Maria and Saturnino Saludo. and not the cold insensitivity to their predicament. The remains were taken to the Chicago Airport. Plaintiff filed a damage suit with CFI of Leyte. 1976. Our culture accords utmost tenderness human feelings toward and in reverence to the dead. petitioner Maria Saludo testified that it was to PAL they repaired after failing to receive proper attention from TWA. the eventual delay on the delivery of the cargo containing the remains. even for just that fraction of time. That the remains of the deceased were subsequently delivered.

The real issue is whether respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee. The shipment was bound for Hongkong with Pakistan Bank as consignee and Great Prospect Company of Kowloon. Consolidated Banking Corporation(SOLIDBANK) paid petitioner in advance the total value of the shipment of US$20. From the testimony of petitioner.00 and fresh mangoes valued at US$14. Petitioner returned the amount involved to SOLIDBANK.273. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which. COURT OF APPEALS . in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Subsequently. GPC failed to pay Pakistan Bank such that the latter. Hence petitioner sought collection of the value of the shipment if US$20. conformably with Art. Petitioner’s depository bank. not to Pakistan Bank. his shipment to GPC using the facilities of respondents is twice or thrice a week. 1736 had.950. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner Benito Macam shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang. through local agent respondent Wallem Philippines Shipping. watermelons valued at US$5. other than the consignee.of a right violated or invaded.” In transactions covered by a letter of credit. refused to pay petitioner through SOLIDBANK.223. Since SOLIDBANK already pre-paid petitioner the value of the shipment. we gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for around 2 to 3 years already. and without the required bill of lading having been surrendered. and then demanded payment from respondent WALLEM in writing but to no avail.46. The goods are released to GPC.46. When mangoes and watermelons are in season. the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. bank guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to releasing the goods. PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was notifying party. They are recoverable where some injury has been done but the amount of which the evidence fails to show.223. there was not a single instance when the bill of lading was first presented before the release of the cargoes. the shipment was delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to GPC. Issue: Whether or not respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee? Held: Under Art. Inc. In his several years of business relationship with GPC and respondents.46 from respondents before the RTC of Manila. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his “people. However. it demanded payment from respondent WALLEM but was refused. the right to receive them was proper. 1736 of the Civil Code. MACAM vs. bases on delivery of the shipment to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and bank guarantee. Hongkong as notify party. MAERSK LINE vs. Upon arrival in Hongkong. petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are already fully paid. the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them. still in possession of the original bills of lading.

While there was no special contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival of the subject shipment. USA and then transported back to Oakland. at Manila to be shipped to Surigao.”the Carrier does not undertake that the goods shall arrive at the port of discharge or the place of delivery at any particular time.. The consignee refused to take delivery of the goods. and persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery.”) and that its liability under the law attaches only in case of loss. filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner and shipper. YSMAEL vs. 1977. An examination of the subject bill of lading shows that the subject shipment was estimated to arrive in Manila on April 3. was very well aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive as indicated in the bill of lading itself. California. Petitioner alleged that the goods were transported in accordance with the bill of lading(.. Barretto denied all the allegations against him stating that the said merchandise was never delivered to him. delivery of shipment or cargo should at least be made within a reasonable time. The shipper alleged that the mis-shipment was due solely to the gross negligence of petitioner. The goods finally arrived in the Philippines on June 10. . The lower court rendered its judgment in favor of Ysmael & co. In the case before us. Private respondent alleging gross negligence and undue delay in the delivery of the goods. Barretto also alleged that in provision 12 of the bill of lading. The Memorandum of Shipment provides that the shipper advised the consignee that the goods were already shipped on board the vessel of petitioner for shipment to the Philippines via Oakland. CA affirmed said decision. which is the alleged value of four cases of merchandise which it delivered to the steamship Andres. there arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it would be a mere superfluity. SC said that it was necessarily so and that it is a settled rule that bills of lading are contracts not entirely prohibited.000 empty gelatin capsules for the manufacture of his pharmaceutical products. plaintiff’s right of action is barred for the reason that it was not brought within 60 days from the time the cause of action accrued. petitioner nevertheless. 1977.940. Virginia. He also stated that under the provision of paragraph 7 of the printed condition at the back of the bill of lading. Issue: Whether or not the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of defendant of not more than P300 is valid. With respect to the ruling that contracts of adhesion are void. California. For reasons unknown. a domestic corporation seeks to recover from Barretto P9. The said merchandise was never delivered to the consignee Solomon Sharuff. hence the present petition. said cargo of capsules were mishipped and diverted to Richmond. Held: Yes. Inc. While it is true that common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise. he is not liable for the excess of P300. BARRETTO Facts:Ysmael. The specified date of arrival was April 3. unless such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time. destruction or deterioration of the goods as provided for in Article 1734 NCC. 1977 or after two months from the date specified. Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to damages resulting from delay in the delivery of the shipment in the absence in the bill of lading of a stipulation on the period of delivery. RTC ruled that the stipulation in the BOL is in the nature of contract of adhesion and therefore void. In this regard.Facts: Private respondent(consignee) ordered from Eli Lilly.(shipper) 600. we find that a delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness.00 for any package of silk unless the value and contents of such package are correctly declared in the bill of lading at the time of shipment. The RTC dismissed the complaint against the shipper and ruled in favor of the consignee.

The lower court also points out that the conditions in question "are not printed on the triplicate copies which were delivered to the plaintiff. his suitcase did not arrive with his flight because it was sent to Iligan. the plaintiff delivered to the defendants 164 cases of silk consigned and to be delivered by the defendants to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao. to be delivered to Salomon Sharuff in Surigao. a suitcase and two other pieces. Based upon the findings of fact of the trial court which are sustained by the evidence. Also.500.00 only. embodying the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. INC. Issue: Whether or not the limited liability rule applies. In this situation. as this was its limited liability as stated in the ticket. the limit of defendants' liability for each case of silk "for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason" would put it in the power of the defendants to have taken the whole cargo of 164 cases of silk at a valuation of P300 for each case. If that rule of law should be sustained. or less than one-eight of its actual value. unless such exemption is just andreasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES. unless such exemption is just and reasonable. SHEWARAM vs. destruction or deterioration of the goods it has undertaken to transport. and that the value of each case was very near P2. a paying passenger on defendant's aircraft flight from Zamboanga City bound for Manila. (“The liability. The carrier cannot limit its liability for injury to or loss of goods shipped if such was caused by its own negligence. 1923.Held: No. PAL however was ordered to pay damages of P100." and that by reason thereof they "are not binding upon the plaintiff. 1922. When plaintiff Parmanand Shewaram arrived in Manila. There is no merit in the appeal. for loss or damage to checked baggage or for delay in the delivery thereof is limited to its value and. An appeal was then brought up by plaintiff. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Facts: Shewaram. the value shall be conclusively deemed not to exceed P100. . In the case before us We believe that the requirements of said article have not been met. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for the exemption from liability. unless the passenger declares in advance a higher valuation and pay an additional charge therefor. no silk would ever be shipped from one island to another in the Philippines. An action for damages was instituted against PAL. The limited liability rule shall not apply.”). He checked in three pieces of baggages. It was found out that it was mistagged by defendant’s personnel. the stipulation is not valid. if any." The evidence shows that 164 "cases" were shipped. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed on April 17. Four of such cases were never delivered to the consignee. Such a limitation of value is unconscionable and void as against public policy. and the evidence shows that their value is the alleged in the complaint. It can not be said that the appellee had actually entered into a contract with the appellant. or a little less than six months after the shipment was made." The clause in question provides that the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage from any cause or for any reason to an amount in excess of P300 "for any single package of silk or other valuable cargo. Defendant admitted that the two items (Transistor Radio and the Rollflex Camera) could not be found inside the suitcase. the goods in question were shipped from Manila on October 25. RTC ruled that the loss of the articles was due to the negligence of the employees of PAL.00 for each ticket. The requirements provided in Article 1750 of the New Civil Code must be complied with before a common carrier can claim a limitation of its pecuniary liability in case of loss. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from liability. The station agent of the PAL in Iligan caused the baggage to be sent to Manila for delivery to plaintiff. Held: No. The fact that those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the presumption that the appellee was aware of those conditions such that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions.

ONG YIU vs. Upon arrival. Held: No. Exemplary damages can only be granted if the defendant asked in a wanton. Issue: Whether or not PAL acted with gross negligence. fraudulent. reckless. petitioner claimed his luggage but it could not be found. no value was indicated in the BOL. He was scheduled to attend the trial in the Court of First instance . It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion". the baggage liability assumed by it under the condition of carriage printed at the back of the ticket. as the plane ticket in the case at bar. he checked in one piece of luggage. the later denied. 946-R from Mactan Cebu bound for Butuan City.00. if he adheres. PAL exerted diligent efforts to locate the plaintiff’s baggage. The plane left Mactan Airport. Hence the present petition. While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket. "Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage. he gives his consent. and valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation". SEA-LAND SERVICE. Petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for breach of contract of transportation. received from Seaborne Trading Company in California a shipment consigned to Sen Hiap Hing. It was the duty of PAL to look for petitioner’s luggage which had been miscarried. As a passenger. a foreign shipping and forwarding company licensed to do business in the Philippines. Br. which loss. vs. aside from the two gift items for his parents-in-law. oppressive or malevolent manner. it was only after reacting indignantly to the loss that the matter was attended by the porter clerk which however. in accordance with the stipulation written at the back of the ticket is limited to P100 per luggage plaintiff not having declared a greater value and not having called the attention of the defendant on its value ad paid the tariff thereon. he found out that the folder containing documents and transcripts were missing. PAL did not act in bad faith. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner was paying passenger of respondent Philippine Airlines on board flight No. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. reversed the judgment of the trial Court granting petitioner moral and exemplary damages. A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own negligence. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely.Shewaram did not agree to the stipulation on the ticket. Petitioner is neither entitled to exemplary damages. but ordered PAL to pay plaintiff the sum of P100. According to petitioner. CA held that PAL was guilty only of simple negligence. When the luggage was delivered to the petitioner with the information that the lock was open. he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. The lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages. and while awaiting transshipment to Cebu the cargo was stolen and never . The shipper not having declared the value of the shipment. The shipment was discharged in Manila. Butuan City at past 2pm of the same day. INC. Cebu City at about 1pm and arrived at Bacasi Airport. as manifested by the fact that Shewaram did not sign the ticket. II thereat. IAC Facts: Sea-land. in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the other. a bull maleta. are contracts not entirely prohibited.

On or about March 17. Since the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question were shipped from the United States to the Philippines. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Petitioner is the general agent of the vessel “Cardigan Bay/ Straight Enterprises”. by the Code of Commerce and special laws. INC. . the unrealized profit and attorneys fees. Even if Section 4(5) of COGSA did not list the validity and binding effect of the liability limitation clause in the bill of lading here are fully substantial on the basis alone of Article 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. or damage to. containing the cigarettes were placed in two containers due to the lack of space.The shipment arrived at the port of Manila Pier 13 and the container van was received by E. as the consignee is the importer of the subject shipment of Dunhill cigarettes from England.000 which is the market value of the goods. The justices of such stipulation is implicit in its giving the owner or shipper the option of avoiding accrual of liability limitation by the simple expedient of declaring the value of the shipment in the bill of lading. supplementary. goods being transported under said bill. CA affirmed the decision of the lower court. the liability of Sea-Land has Cue is governed primarily by the Civil Code. There is no question of the right of a consignee in a bill of lading to recover from the carrier or shipper for loss of.00 per kilo. Thereafter. both of them duly padlocked and sealed by the representative of the carrier. the carrier’s headchecker discovered that one of the container van had a different padlock and the sealed was tampered with. as evidenced by a Bill of Lading. the consignee filed a complaint against the arrastre. CITADEL LINES. 180 Filbrate cartons of mixed British manufactured cigarettes called “Dunhill International Filter” & “Dunhill International Menthol”. The lower court sentences Sea-land to pay Cue the value of the lost cargo. although that document may have been drawn up only by the consignor and the carrier without the intervention of the consignee. Inc. in all matters not cluttered thereby. Based on the investigation conducted by the arrastre. The carrier admitted the loss in its reply letter but alleged that the said matter is under the control of the arrastre therefore. made applicable to all contracts for the carriage by sea to and from the Philippines Ports in Foreign Trade by Comm. vs. Issue: Whether or not the consignee of seaborne freight is bound by stipulations in the covering bill of lading limiting to a fixed amount the liability of the carrier for loss or damage to the cargo where its value is not declared in the bill. Razon an arrastre. The stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of Sea-Land for loss or damages to the shipment covered by said rule to US$500 per package unless the shipper declares the value of the shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on Cue. One of these supplementary special laws is the Carriage of goods by Sea Act (COGSA). Issue: Whether or not the stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier contained in the bill of lading is binding on the consignee. The consignee filed a complaint against the carrier demanding P315. The lower court decided to absolve the arrastre form any liability. 65. the cargo was not formally turned over by the carrier. the vessel “Cardigan” loaded on board at England for carriage to Manila.1979. and as ordained by the said Code.recovered. The CA affirmed the decision. Act. On May 1. One shipment was delivered and the other. It was found out that 90 cases of the cigarettes were missing. while private respondent Manila Wine Merchants. 1979. Clause 6 of the bills of lading issued by the carrier states to limit the latter’s liability to US$2. the container van containing two shipments was stripped. Held: Yes. hence the petition.

and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of possible profits or any consequential loss. if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances.Held: Yes. the award of P315. the maximum amount stipulated in clause 18 of the BOL. Held: No. It is provided in Clause 6 that its liability is limited to US$2. goods in an amount exceeding One Hundred thousand Yen in Japanese Currency (Y100. Furthermore. the stipulation is valid.60. The bill of lading shows that 120 cartons weight 2. a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. The consignee also admits in the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the bill of lading. if paid. A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the liability of the common carrier for the loss. Since 90 cartons were lost and the weight of said cartons is 2. imported three crates of bus spare parts from Japan from its supplier Maruman Trading based there. Petitioner now comes to SC arguing that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in ruling that the consent of the consignee to the terms and conditions of the bill of lading is necessary to make such stipulations binding upon it. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the actual value and not the maximum value recoverable under the bill of lading.233. Hence. . The judgment of CA is hereby modified. Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law." The bill of lading subject of the present controversy specifically provides. is binding. In this case. among others: 18. Upon arrival at the port of Manila.000 based on the alleged market value of the goods is erroneous.552. particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code. (2) in holding that the carrier's limited package liability as stipulated in the bill of lading does not apply in the instant case.80. destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid. unless the shipper declares or a higher value is sanctioned by law. The carrier shall not be liable for any loss of or any damage to or in any connection with. Everett Orient Lines. and (3) in allowing private respondent to fully recover the full alleged value of its lost cargo. damages of cargo to a certain sum. the stipulation on the carrier’s limited liability applies.500. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent Hernandez Trading Co. The Court of Appeals deleted the award of attorney's fees but affirmed the trial court's findings with the additional observation that private respondent can not be bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading because it was not privy to the contract of carriage. EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION vs. the carrier’s liability amounts only to US$4.82kilos/carton. it is required that the stipulation limiting the common carrier's liability for loss must be "reasonable and just under the circumstances. and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.00/kilo. Respondent made a formal claim for the recovery of the actual value of the lost spare parts contained in the missing crates.000 yen was offered by petitioner.467.00.000. unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value.978 kilos or 24. it was discovered that one of the crater was missing. ordering petitioner to pay Y1. The crates were shipped from Japan to Manila on board a vessel owned by petitioner’s principal. An appeal was brought by petitioner only 100. All claims for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums. and has been freely and fairly agreed upon.00) or its equivalent in any other currency per package or customary freight unit (whichever is least) unless the value of the goods higher than this amount is declared in writing by the shipper before receipt of the goods by the carrier and inserted in the Bill of Lading and extra freight is paid as required. Basic is the rule that a stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading.

India. Unfortunately.00) Yen. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Mahtani obtained the services of a certain Mr. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation. however since it had no ticket flights from Manila to Bombay. To defeat the carrier's limited liability. Mahtani had to take a connecting flight to Bombay. Prior to his departure. The commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo as contended by private respondent. INC. HEACOCK COMPANY vs. since the latter was not a party in the contract. Since the instant petition was based on breach of contract of carriage. H. had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier. After plaintiff waited for his luggage for one week. the liability of the carrier under the limited liability clause stands. at most. he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives. Gemar to prepare his travel plan to Bombay. the carrier made it clear that its liability would only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hong Kong log of the former’s journey to PAL. he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. Mahtani can only sue BA and not PAL.The above stipulations are. without any objection. only to the amount stated in the ticket. with extra freight paid. MACONDRAY & COMPANY. Gemar purchased a ticket from British Airways. Conditions of contacts was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay. The Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act.000. which CA affirmed. to our mind. confident that upon reaching Hong Kong. as its subcontractor or agent. the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. E. the shipper. Mahtani filed his complaint for damages. Mr. thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay. The contention of BA with respect to limited liability was overruled although it is recognized in the Philippines. BA finally advised him to file a claim. hence the instant petition. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani. Facts: The plaintiff shipped Edmonton clocks from New York to Manila on board a vessel of the defendant. reasonable and just. Issue: Whether or not BA is liable for the compensatory damages. BRITISH AIRWAYS vs. BA alleged that there should have been no separate award for the luggage and the contents thereof since Mahtani failed to declare a separate higher valuation for the luggage and therefore. The third-party complaint was therefore reinstated. The BOL has the following stipulations: . stating that BA had waived the defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage. the aforecited Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper should have declared in writing a higher valuation of its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier and insert the said declaration in the bill of lading. The contract of transportation was exclusively between Mahtani and BA. Maruman Trading. it had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations. BA filed a third-party complaint against PAL alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the luggage was due to the latter's late arrival in Hongkong. when Mahtani arrived in Bombay. Held: Yes. These requirements in the bill of lading were never complied with by the shipper. In the bill of lading. its liability is limited. However. Mahtani checked in the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects. hence.

by stipulations inserted in the bill of lading. Issue: May a common carrier. therefore. The claim of the plaintiff is based upon the argument that the clause in the bill of lading. vs. since many passengers were bound for Surigao. or damage to. in proportion for any part of a ton. And the third is one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value to obtain a lower rate does not conflict with any sound principle of public policy. if a common carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol. and names his valuation. while defendant tendered only P76. In view thereof. contends that clause 1 is valid. a contractors bought tickets for Voyage at the branch office of petitioner. is valid and enforceable. Tandog and Tiro. and clause 9 should have not been applied by the lower court." Private respondents alleged that they were. INC. 9. if the shipper makes such a choice. that in the event of claims for short delivery of.1. on the other hand. the proportionate freight ton value. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. SWEET LINES. they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard. during the trip. went to the branch office for proper relocation to another vessel. Both appealed. It is mutually agreed that the value of the goods receipted for above does not exceed $500 per freight ton. private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence. understandingly and freely. but the third is valid and enforceable. The clocks were not delivered despite demands.36. the carrier shall not be liable for more than the net invoice price plus freight and insurance less all charges saved. and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of loss. private respondents per advice. even by the carrier's negligence. This motion was premised on the condition printed . A reading of clauses 1 and 9 of the bill of lading here in question. or. the market value of the clocks. he cannot thereafter recover more than the value which he thus places upon his property.02. The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such liability to an agreed valuation. the lower of the conditioned upon his agreeing to a stipulated valuation of his property in case of loss. and any loss or damage for which the carrier may be liable shall be adjusted pro rata on the said basis. the invoice value plus freight and insurance. limiting the liability of the carrier. a shipping company transporting inter-island passengers and cargoes. Plaintiff claimed P420. Three kinds of stipulations have often been made in a bill of lading. null and void. The trial court decided for the plaintiff for P226. unless the value be expressly stated herein and ad valorem freight paid thereon. are contrary to public order and. the first and second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to public policy." "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits. clearly shows that the present case falls within the third stipulation. limit its liability for the loss of or damage to the cargo to an agreed valuation of the latter? Held: Yes. at Cagayan de Oro City. however. Also. According to an almost uniform weight of authority. cargo being made. The defendant. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. to wit: That a clause in a bill of lading limiting the liability of the carrier to a certain amount unless the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight. Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity." and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. Thus. TEVES Facts: Private respondents Atty.00.

Contending that the "aforesaid loss is a result of breach of PAL's contractual obligation to carry them and their belongings and effects to their Manila destination without loss or damage. will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu. There was an exchange of gunshot between a Senior NBI agent Villarin and the four armed hijackers one of which was “Zaldy” who is a suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez. And. petitioner has branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. 998. wallet and cash amounting to P1. which reads: “It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket. .. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage tickets purchased by private respondents. Condition No. vs. 14. Issue: Is Condition No. which limits the venue of actions arising from the contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu. QUISUMBING. We find and hold that Condition No. irrespective of where it is issued. Quisumbing suffered a shock for a gun had been pointed at him by one of the hold uppers. pursuant to Civil Code articles 1754. much less prejudice. Quisumbing and Loeffler brought suit against PAL to recover the value of the property lost by them to the robbers as well as moral and exemplary damages. 2) Whether or not PAL was negligent to overcome the hi-jacking-robbery. since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers located in different places of the country who. the ends of justice. 14 is Printed in fine letters.at the back of the tickets. Condition No.00 and Leoffler with his watch.700. instead of enhance. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Norberto Quisumbing Sr. under Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature. 14. and second. as the 'use of arms' or 'irresistible force' was not taken advantage of by said armed robbers in gaining entrance to defendant's ill-fated plane in questions. and constitutes a serious dereliction of PAL's legal duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the same. SR. petitioner. as was done in the instant case. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu. Upon the other hand. Issue: 1) Whether or not hijacking-robbery was force majeure. with respect to said Civil Code article 1998. on which Condition No. it is not essential that the lost effects and belongings of plaintiffs were actually delivered to defendant's plane personnel or that the latter were notified thereof. will not cause inconvenience to. The robbers divested the passengers of their belongings including Quisumbing who was divested with his jewelries and cash amounting to P18. shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first. The plaintiffs declared that their suit was instituted ". Hence.650. Considered in the light of circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in the country today. The four hijackers succeeded in their escape upon arrival at Manila. 2000 and 2001 and on the ground that in relation to said Civil Code article 2001 the complained-of act of the armed robbers is not a force majeure. Hence the instant petition.” The motion was denied hence the instant petition. under circumstances obligation in the interisland shipping industry. he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. valid and enforceable? Held: No.. and Gunther Leoffler were among the passengers of PAL’s plane from Mactan City Cebu to Manila. The condition will thus defeat. the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental. it is not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets. Zaldy then announced to the passengers and the pilots that it was a hijacked and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS.The CFI dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the CFI’s decision.

The petitioner exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service. this petition. the place of departure and the place of destination. The Warsaw Convention. He then gave his attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in for him. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache case. he acceded to checking it in. Firearms and grenades are brought to the plane surreptitiously. RAPADAS Facts: Private respondent held Passenger Ticket and Baggage Claim Check for petitioner's Flight with the route from Guam to Manila. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State. whether or not there be a breach in the carriage or a transhipment. 2 as follows: (2) For the purposes of this Convention. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining hijackers. and explosives are introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost cunning and stealth. Rapadas filed the instant action for damages. as amended." observing that: hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. Rapadas received a letter from the petitioner's counsel offering to settle the claim for the sum of $160. PAL could not have been faulted for want of diligence.Held: 1) Yes. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS. particularly for failing to take positive measures to implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Firearms. Rapadas was ordered by petitioner's handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attache case. Issue: Whether or not a passenger is bound by the terms of a passenger ticket declaring the limitations of carrier’s liability Held: Yes. Refusing to accept this kind of settlement. although there is an occasional use of innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is given to the hijackers' complete disposal. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport. the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which. PAL was not negligent so as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking. par. even if that State is not a High Contracting Party. Carriage between two points within the territory of a single High Contracting Party without an agreed stopping place within the territory of another State is not international carriage for the purposes of this Convention. The lower court ruled in favor of Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving notice to the baggage liability limitation. Hence. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him. according to the agreement between the parties. "the highjacking-robbery was force majeure. The petition is denied and appealed decision of CA is affirmed. On appeal. 2) No. ("High Contracting Party" refers to a state which has ratified or adhered to the Convention. but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. specifically provides that it is applicable to international carriage which it defines in Article 1. Jorge Rapadas to request for the search of the missing luggage. He sent his son. Hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent fury. . INC. the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. vs. Upon arriving in Manila Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. However. hand-grenades. The Court ruled that under the facts. dynamite.00 representing the petitioner's alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passenger's personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and PAN AM. or which has not effectively denounced the Convention [Article 40A(l)]).

Thus: "The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability. Felipa Pablo. Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline. which it did not fail to state in the plane ticket and which it deemed to have been read and accepted by the private respondent will be considered by this Court as adequate under the circumstances of this case. is such a detailed notice of baggage liability limitations required. As earlier stated. ALITALIA. loss or damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any wilful misconduct. which provides: (c) a notice to the effect that. private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. Her luggage consisted of two suitcases. The suitcases were not actually restored to Prof. The Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger ticket. bad faith. She was however told by the petitioner’s personnel there at Milan that her luggage was delayed inasmuch as the same was in one of the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan. What the petitioner is concerned about is whether or not the notice. recklessness. or destruction. Moreover. Nevertheless. Pablo by petitioner until eleven months and four months after the institution of her action. the Court finds the provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line. IAC Facts: Dr. it should become a common. She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. The facts show that the private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. or otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or . The passenger ticket complies with Article 3. upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket. the baggage check is combined with the passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger. In the case at bar. Issue: Did petitioner acted in bad faith so as to entitle private respondent to damages? Held: No. Italy. slight reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or injury to person. an associate professor in UP. Dr. as amended. safe and practical custom among air carriers to indicate beforehand the precise sums equivalent to those fixed by the Convention. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations. was invited to a meeting of the Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of UN in Ispra. was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. the Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage. But the other flights arriving from Rome did not have her baggage on board. To fulfill this engagement. The Warsaw Convention does not exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier. ALITALIA vs. or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The alleged lack of enough time for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of limited liability. if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure.Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention.

in bad faith. The Convention's provisions. in short. from the time she learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed-a breach of its contract of carriage. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita. or for some particular or exceptional type of damage.' Nor may it for a moment be supposed that if a member of the aircraft complement should inflict some physical injury on a passenger. but safely. to attend which she had traveled hundreds of miles.00.employee for which the carrier is responsible. tardily. at the prestigious international conference. exercise the extraordinary diligence required? . the Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to determine the carrier's liability to the passenger. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. to her embarrassment and the disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. Otherwise. Issue: Did LTB Co. or maliciously destroy or damage the latter's property. or ignored. which is absurd. is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. but without appreciable damage. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety. entitled to be compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. Laguna. that some species of injury was caused to Dr. was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers. do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or misconduct of its officers and employees. The fact is. it is true. the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered-and this Court agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at P40. to be sure-with the result that she was unable to read the paper and make the scientific presentation (consisting of slides. and there is otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. Municipality of Bay. There can be no doubt that Dr. Certainly. nevertheless. In the case at bar. of course. may be vindicated and recognized. tables and tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored over. and Dr. She is however entitled to nominal damages-which. Safety of Passengers NOCUM vs. depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. 'an air carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal. Facts: A passenger boarded the respondents bus carrying a box which such person attested to the conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items.000. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her. She is not. Appellee. which gradually turned to panic and finally despair." B. to comply with a contract of carriage. It is in this sense that the Convention has been applied. As already mentioned. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. as the law says. having gone to Rome. contained in the box brought by the co-passenger. her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila. autoradiograms or films. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage. belatedly. she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in the conference. who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline.

inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible. vs. CA Facts: M/T "Tacloban City. not to speak of his own. Whether or not Capt. were indicative of the kind and level of diligence exercised by Capt. As a result of this collision. While the failure of Capt. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. the behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted. Under these circumstances. the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished. did not cause the collision by themselves. such failures doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life and. but beyond this. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after collision. there is. having unloaded its cargo. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners. CA . The record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. a presumption of gross negligence on the part of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner arises. the weather fair and visibility good. When the collision occurred. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers. Among the ill-fated passengers were the parents of petitioners. could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain." a barge-type oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and operated by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC Shipping). the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas. MECENAS vs. Issue: Whether or not the respondents were negligent? Held: Yes. allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other miscellaneous. fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers.Held: Yes. Santisteban not only of the "imminent danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself " There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry. the sea was calm. as suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge. left for Negros Occidental when it collided with a carrier ship named Don Juan. when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary. In other words. Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial. constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. no such thing as "off-duty" hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. as in the case at bar. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search. The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he had failed to inform Capt. Calling a policeman to his aid. moreover. in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection. both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2) vessels.

injurious language. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners exercised the extraordinary diligence required? Held: No. he was unable to report for his work in Saudi Arabia within the stipulated 2-week period and so lost his employment. CA ." which meant that he could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. Inc. vs. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination. As with the Mecenas case. four special cabin tickets for his wife. Issue: Whether or not KAL committed a breach of the Contract of Carriage? Held: Yes. indignities and abuses from such employees. Lapuz. Initially. this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the voyage. KOREAN AIRLINES CO. As he was about to board the said airline a KAL officer pointed to him and shouted "Down! Down!" He was thus barred from taking the flight. FORTUNE EXPRESS vs.. Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness. So it is that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. with the M/T Tacloban City. When he later asked for another booking. his ticket was canceled by KAL.Facts: Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co. the M/V Don Juan sank. KE 903. Lapuz was supposed to leave via Korean Airlines. This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. daughter. When two of such passengers did not appear. The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion boarding the Don Juan. (2) in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to carry more passengers than it was allowed to carry. Also. Consequently. was contracted for employment in Jeddah. CA Facts: Juanito C. His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. he was "wait-listed. Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait in Mindoro. As a result. respect. an automotive electrician. Saudi Arabia. an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. but the four members of private respondents' families were never found. Lapuz and another person by the name of Perico were given the two unclaimed seats. courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. the duty to exercise due diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are within the carrying capacity of the vessel. The business of the carrier is mainly with the traveling public.

turned turtle and fell into a ditch as a result petitioner sustained injuries. They started pouring gasoline inside the bus. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers. Issue: Whether or not the private respondent were negligent. if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of a breach of the contract of carriage? Held: Yes. including two Maranaos. "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and. The Constabulary officer found out that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Diosdado Bravo. instead told them that it was normal. A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan. the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Lanao del Norte. went off the road. No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased. Held: The record yields affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous . While the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc. Caorong pleaded with the Maranaos to spare the bus driver but the Maranaos shot him. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. DELIM Facts: Petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent's mini bus. such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager. Under the circumstances. before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito because there was already a warning by the PC. Notwithstanding this document. seized a bus of petitioner at Linamon. On November 22. preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors. respondent Delim paid for the hospitalization expenses and had the passengers sign a waiver stating that they were no longer interested to file a complaint. Bauang. simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers. three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers. resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. A passenger Atty. Union. shortly thereafter. it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees. GATCHALIAN vs. that the necessary precautions would be taken. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. As she and several others were confined in a hospital. 1989. The armed men actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. petitioner Gathalian filed a complaint.Facts: Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road. Art. The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was heard and made known to him by the passengers. as the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun then ordered the passenger to get off the bus. In the present case.

A cursory examination of the purported waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating condition. DEL CASTILLO vs. it must not be contrary to law. This liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. son of plaintiff Severo del Castillo boarded a bus of private respondent bus line. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according to Articles 1733 and 1755. For a waiver to be valid and effective. constituted wanton disregard of the physical safety of the passengers. and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. a deaf-mute. Held: No. In this he failed. especially one on the face of the woman. public policy or good customs. JAYMALIN Facts: Mario del Castillo. if that integrity is violated or diminished. invading and eventually stopping on the . Issue: Whether or not respondents exercised extraordinary diligence. the jeepney which was then running on the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn. is a violation of bodily integrity. A scar. common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). Upon alighting from the bus. resulting from the infliction of injury upon her. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. Because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence. so it was running in an unbalanced position. coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers. The conductor was apprised of the fact that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. IAC Facts: Catalina Pascua with several others boarded the jeep owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo bound for Carmen. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body. Respondents contend that the proximate cause of Mario's death was his recklessness and gross negligence in jumping out of the bus while in motion. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.occasions. morals. Upon reaching Tarlac the right rear wheel of the jeepney was detached. actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. With this knowledge the conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of the said passenger. Pangasinan. as a result of which. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES vs. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus. we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. Rosales. All that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. he fell and died as a result. Manalo stepped on the brake.

During the incident. which Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8. 1983. Cavite. to Baclaran. entitled to recover only the share which corresponds to the driver. contradictory to the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code. Cavite. which set aside the trial court’s decision. the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger. From said decision. ripping off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat.western lane and was hit by the petitioner company’s bus causing the death of Catalina Pascua and two other passengers. The principle about "the last clear" chance. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. In other words. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. only defendants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto Montesiano. and which the latter transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18. Among those killed were Rogelio Bustamante and his spouse and children. owner and driver. several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained. while the passenger bus was driven by defendant Susulin. even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In view of this. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. with a line from Naic. Hence the present petition. assuming such calculation to be correct." It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. for his driver's negligence is his. CA Facts: A collision occurred between a gravel and sand truck. Metro Manila. would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. 1981. that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of merely vicarious and consequently. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case. Issue: Wether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar? Held: No. Due to the impact. The rationale behind this is readily discernible. respectively. under a franchise. if We make the driver jointly and severally liable with the carrier. BUSTAMANTE vs. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. Firstly. and a Mazda passenger bus along the national road at Calibuyo. and vice versa. the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano and owned by defendant Del Pilar. Secondly. Tanza. is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. the trial court reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons. the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the passenger. the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. and in the event of contractual liability. Paranaque. of the sand and gravel truck have interposed an appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by defendants Magtibay and Serrado. the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his driver nor share it with him. and several others. .

798-799). had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am.Issue: Whether the respondent court has properly and legally applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case despite its own finding that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto Montesiano was admittedly negligent in driving his cargo truck very fast on a descending road and in the presence of the bus driver coming from the opposite direction. 4th Ed. Torts and Damages. and an injury results. All premises considered. Therefore. if he. is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant. 2d. Lara went to said concession upon instructions of his chief to classify the logs of defendant which were about to be loaded on a ship anchored in the port of Parang. As the doctrine is usually stated. might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. the injured person is entitled to recovery. the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants. should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case. The defendant is engaged in the business of exporting logs from his lumber concession in Cotabato. 1986. the carrier cannot be held liable. . "The rule is established by weight of authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation. Jur. (Sangco. 165). Issue: Whether or not the respondent failed to exercise the ordinary diligence required? Held: Yes. stated broadly. notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Thus. pp. A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence. In other words.. the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril. a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident. Lara boarded with several others a pick-up bound for Davao and were seated at the back on an improvised bench. and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel." The doctrine. LARA vs. or according to some authorities. or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril. The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff. and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law. the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability. The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. VALENCIA Facts: The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry stationed in Davao. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care. Held: The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance. aware of the plaintiffs peril. Lara accidentally fell from the pick-up and as a result he suffered serious injuries which lead to his death. since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.. by exercising reasonable care and prudence. p.

Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable Held: While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight to Manila. Pinatubo eruption rendered NAIA inaccessible to airline traffic. CA Facts: Private respondents boarded the JAL flights to Manila with a stop over at Narita Japan at the airlines' expense.the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. private respondents' trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely. Severina Garces. The mother. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment. Corollarily. the son. While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the fortuitous event. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. PARAS Facts: Severina Garces and her one-year old son boarded passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. he has no remedy against him. It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. the consequences of which the passenger must assume or expect. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. 1991. cannot be charged to JAL. Severina Garces. private respondents went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. Pinatubo eruption. the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was breast deep. the driver lost control. The next day. Hence. it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. but the front wheels swerved to the right. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified private . was drowned. and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails. Held: No. The truck entered a wooden bridge. due to the Mt. Upon arrival at Narita private respondents were billeted at Hotel Nikko Narita for the night. was drowned. Issue: Whether or not JAL was obligated to answer for the accommodation expenses due to the force majeure. In this regard.NECESSITO vs. The mother. hence. JAL then booked another flight fort the passengers and again answered for the hotel accommodations but still the succeeding flights were cancelled. while the carrier usually has. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. the son sustained injuries. JAPAN AIRLINES vs. In this connection. However. the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier." the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.

Isidro concludes. If he did he could have discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut. Moreover. it affords reasonable evidence. Issue: W/N defendant is absolved by virtue of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. that defendant's truck. who claims to be a helper of the truck driver. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case. Held: No. alleging that while at Baretbet. Respondent Isidro's contention is untenable. as in the case at bar. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property. driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff. it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner. Bagabag. or. Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway. Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he (petitioner) himself. who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck. that as a result. LAYUGAN vs. to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. while the immobile cargo truck had no business. by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time. It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. would. like that required by law. Absent such proof of care. The trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff. so to speak. Likewise. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Nueva Vizcaya. like a parked truck. plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. to our mind. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro. to be there. and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. as found by the respondent court. and could have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. that the accident arose from want of care. the fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving. hence the present petition. which was reversed by the CA. poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway. his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road. the petitioner herein. we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. provided an early warning device. are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial The private respondent or his mechanic. place. for. IAC Facts: Pedro T. . Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner. the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander. as previously claimed. evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper. that the driver was licensed. who must be competent. under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. and the fact that he had no record of any accident. not a truck helper being a brotherin-law of the driver of said truck and hence must suffer the damages.respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the responsibility of Aboitiz to the victim ceased when it disembarked from the vessel. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. After said vessel had landed. Issue: Whether or not the deceased is considered to be still a passenger of the bus to which the petitioner could be held liable. ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel. It is a recognized rule that the relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s premises. pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane. and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him. Hence the instant petition. . Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage. boarded a La Mallorca bus.LA MALLORCA vs. Said vessel arrived at Pier 4. Occidental Mindoro. Firstly. In this case. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later died. The Lower Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA. Manila. Here the presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Secondly. although stopping the bus. North Harbor. the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-servant rule. she was no longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage had terminated. it started operation by unloading the cargoes from said vessel. Instead of using said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on the third deck which was on the level with the pier. Held: Yes. went back to the vessel. holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict. The crane owned by the third party defendant and operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa was placed alongside the vessel and one hour after the passengers of said vessel had disembarked. a gangplank having been provided connecting the side of the vessel to the pier. the vessel was completely under the control of Pioneer as the which handled the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz. there was no utmost diligence. at the port at San Jose. to be determined from the circumstances. La Mallorca contended that when the child was killed. Upon arrival at their destination. Aboitiz appealed the same to respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of of the trial court except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas. the Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the third party defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and defendant Aboitiz. It is also averred that since the crane operator was not an employee of Aboitiz. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. who was near the bus. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage. together with their minor children. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plantiffs. he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident. DE JESUS Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife. and the passengers therein disembarked. the driver. bound for Manila. While the crane was being operated. was run over and killed. Raquel. CA Facts: Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel owned by defendant ABOITIZ. plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters away from the vehicle. the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. did not put off the engine. The trial court absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly established a case of negligence against the crane operator which the court ruled is never presumed.

All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers. such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage. its driver Felix Angeles. The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants Alfredo Mallari Sr. the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not indubitably established. common carriers like Aboitiz. for example. and likewise inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten months from the institution of the suit against it. as claimed by petitioner.Held: No. Hence this petition. and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.V. he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. As found by the Court of Appeals. the evidence does not show that there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. the appellate court ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. CA Facts: The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. after reaching his destination. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles. Once created. . and the corresponding presumption of negligence foisted on. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries. Instead. filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and also against BULLETIN. vs. The widow of the victim. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier. and the N. from petitioner's vessel. considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. Pioneer had taken the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were concerned. and Alfredo Mallari Jr. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time. MALLARI SR. the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has. Hence. Parenthetically. Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence required of. which he had every right to do. Bataan. who admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway. Consequently. On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his employer. Aboitiz is negligent. Dinalupihan. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if. respondent BULLETIN. Netherlands Insurance Company. under the foregoing circumstances. a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant. the trial court held that BULLETIN and Felix Angeles are jointly and severally liable. When the accident occurred. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are negligent. we are not inclined to accept petitioner's explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught with serious peril. his presence in petitioner's premises was not without cause. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo. the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes. driver of the Bulletin delivery van. Hence. Thus.

having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction. drove along Suyo Municipal Road. careless and imprudent manner. (a) and (b). there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. As found by the appellate court. Further. Sagada. a passenger of the jeepney. by his own admission. who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. under Art. the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. 2185 of the Civil Code. the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes. 1756 of the Civil Code. unless there is proof to the contrary. of RA 4136 as amended.. the petitioner was found guilty of the charge. it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided That on a highway. After trial. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. In the instant case. pursuant to Art. nor upon a curve in the highway. 1755 of the Civil Code. petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Under Art. hence the instant petition. Sec. . was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction. petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption. in case of death or injuries to passengers. pars. BAYASEN vs. Moreover. petitioner Mallari Jr. within a business or residential district. 1759 of the same Code. by the contract of carriage. The Court of Appeals correctly found. The decision was affirmed in CA. a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently.Held: Yes. (b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction when approaching the crest of a grade. a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances. that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. Under Art. 41. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. 41. the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. Said jeep fell over a precipice in the abovementioned place causing thereby the death of Elena Awichen. Clearly. unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety. and any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Clearly. being then the driver and person incharge of Rural health Unit Jeep. CA Facts: Petitioner was charged of Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence. Mountain Province in a negligent.

for breach of contract of carriage. therefore. as in the instant case. according to the Court of Appeals. 1990. unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. The said agents. and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent. he is to blame. without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. which ticket expressly provided an expiry of date of one year from issuance. But the said complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. and it was confirmed for the April 2. the moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded. the skidding being an unforeseen event. be charged to the petitioner. he was not allowed to board. It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving at "an unreasonable speed". acted without authority when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. he wanted to play safe and avoid the embankment. Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was necessary. 1990 flight. 1990. entitled to acquittal. he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The PAL personnel concerned marked the following notation on his ticket: "TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY. Under the particular circumstances of the instant case. petitioner made arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight In San Francisco instead of boarding in Los Angeles. because as he said. Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco. It may occur without fault. On appeal. 1990. parallel to the slope of the mountain. when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco. Issue: Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the period of validity of petitioner's ticket. CA Facts: PAL issued to the petitioner a round trip plane ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-HonoluluManila. Held: No. when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority. he immediately booked his Los Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office. Petitioner knew . four days before the expiry date of subject ticket.e. therefore. so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. his guilt of the crime charged has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The negligence of the petitioner not having been sufficiently established. the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. i. the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal. until March 27." Petitioner Cervantes filed a Complaint for Damages. unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. and considering that he would be there on April 2. It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day. 1990. On April 2. Held: Yes. he promptly drove it to the left hand side of the road. He is. Furthermore. hence the instant petition. the lower court’s decision was upheld.. the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent. On March 23. No negligence as a matter of law can. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code. the petitioner.Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to acquittal on the ground that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the proximate cause of the death of Awichen was the petitioner's "negligence in driving at an unreasonable speed" is openly contrary to the evidence of the prosecution. In fact. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority. CERVANTES vs. In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage. the petitioner used it.

so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. No injury resulted on the part of petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with the use of subject ticket. it is the parties themselves who create the obligation. filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva. In such a case. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan.there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject ticket. What the employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. But. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. On appeal to the Court of Appeals. took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. Such kind of damages is imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. for quasidelict. where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers. should be binding on Sunga. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Calalas. and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. There is no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. CA Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga. the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor. alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence. an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat. Sunga was injured. the obligation is created by law itself. 3490). the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. this petition. filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena. the owner of the Isuzu truck. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned. In quasi-delict. Neither can the claim for exemplary damages be upheld. CALALAS vs. in this case the common carrier. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle. holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. As a result. some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. in which the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. 3490. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas. Hence. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. Just as she was doing so. the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage. whereas in breach of contract. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. failed to transport his passenger . He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Issue: Should be petitioner be absolved if his contentions are considered? Held: No. and the existence of bad faith is established. on the other hand. Negros Occidental. The appellate court dismissed the thirdparty complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. Should there be a finding of bad faith. not quasi-delict. not in actions involving breach of contract. then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University." a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney.

owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee. the motorcycle driver should have slowed down until he had been overtaken. As an exception. Pestaño should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. Said decision was affirmed by CA. SUMAYANG Facts: Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the national highway in Ilihan. Seeing that the left side of the road was clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic. its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. In case of death or injuries to passengers. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon. based on the testimony of the witnesses. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. First. 1755? We do not think so. This explains why the damages on the bus were all on the right side . Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus. they were hit by a passenger bus driven by Pestaño and owned by Metro Cebu which had tried to overtake them. 2206(3) of the Civil Code. SC disagreed with this contention and considered the findings of CA. Pestaño accelerated his speed to pass the motorcycle. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Pestaño. 2220. This contention has no factual basis. Cebu. Petitioners contend that Pestaño was not under any obligation to slow down when he overtook the motorcycle. because the deceased had given way to him upon hearing the bus horn. with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. Art. there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Petitioners also aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been properly functioning. as provided in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. The cases were consolidated. PESTAÑO vs.the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator grill were bent and dented. As they came upon a junction where the highway connected with the road leading to Tabagon. but that the latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding bus. sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the pavement. The lower court found petitioners liable. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons.safely to his destination. such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger.In this case. Respondent-heirs. and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith. Having given way to the bus. They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road nearest to the junction but was on the inner lane. Now. in relation to Art. Riding with him was his friend Manuel Romagos. Tabagon. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide. the jeepney was not properly parked. As a general rule. it was found out that as the two vehicles approached the junction. wherein. hence this petition. 1764. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. filed this civil action for damages against petitioners. moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. as provided in Art. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the . Issue: Whether or not petitioner Pestaño was negligent Held: Yes.

Laguna to Manila. In the Gillaco case. no liability attaches to it as employer of the Emilio Devesa because the crime was not committed while the slayer was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service and that no negligence on appellant's part was shown. Emilio Devesa had a long standing personal grudge against Tomas Gillaco.operators could be held liable for damages Held: Yes. on October 18. the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. PEREZ Facts: Rogelio Corachea. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Lieut. was a passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad Company from Calamba. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees.. Tomas died. Simeon Valenzuela. since the contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination. While appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals. in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. and pursuant to established doctrine. 1960. Tomas Gillaco. A complaint for damages was filed by the victim’s widow. Now here. because of this. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet. MARANAN vs. 884. Held: No. Damages were awarded to the plaintiff. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable). nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. hence the instant petition. where he was going to report for duty. Appellant's contention is that. the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. In other words. Issue: Whether or not defendant. Devesa was convicted of homicide. upon seeing him inside the train coach. 97 Phil. husband of the plaintiff. Hence the instant petition. Rogelio's mother. the resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby. GILLACO vs. Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Antonia Maranan. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. filed an action to recover damages. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas and was found guilty. Devesa shot Gillaco with the carbine furnished to him by the Manila Railroad Company for his use as such train guard. Issue: Whether or not appellant could be held liable for the acts of its employee. unlike the Gillaco . Emilio Devesa. Manila Railroad Co. When the train reached the Paco Railroad station. was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver. The court decided in plaintiff’s favor. that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. In the present case. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances. the responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. a train guard of the Manila Railroad Company happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which would take him to Tutuban Station.supervision of that employee. the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger.

the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based on the second view. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. wherein PNR raised for the first time. (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law. including their patterns of behavior. . delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law. There. therefore. inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers. 1759. Unfortunately. to their total personality. held PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage. upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena. Under the first. not subject to garnishment or execution. the doctrine of state immunity from suit. for repairs. Camarines Sur. which is the minority view. is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger. as a defense. since it. the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs.The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers. husband of plaintiff. 1759 of the Civil Code. Camarines Sur. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from AngloAmerican Law. the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers. the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties. no less important. as a paying passenger bound for Manila. upheld by the majority and also by the later cases. and (3) as between the carrier and the passenger. Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. but above all. the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which. boarded a train of appellant at Libmanan. has power to select and remove them. the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. moral fibers. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or separate personality of its own. Quezon. The decision was sustained by the appellate court hence the present petition. but also. from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety. Moreover. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. Under the second view. it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. As can be gleaned from Art. did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. Due to some mechanical defect. and not the passengers. it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case. and that its funds are governmental in character and. CA Facts: Winifredo Tupang. Accordingly. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. unlike the present Civil Code. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. Upon complaint filed by Rosario the lower court after trial. therefore. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. the train stopped at Sipocot. and social attitude.case.

The appellate court found. he required in the absence of such emergency. incidental or conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation. as correctly ruled by the respondent court. he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise. reckless. Notwithstanding all these efforts. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like any other corporation. that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. is PNR negligent? Yes.” . Section 4 of the said Act provides: The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers: a. It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury. This finding of the lower court was sustained. The driver of the bus upon the speeding pick-up truck swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road. Issue: Whether or not the common carrier is liable.Issue: Whether or not PNR can raise the defense of doctrine of state immunity from suit. Such contributory negligence. and b. it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. The bus collided with a pick-up truck which was coming from opposite direction trying to swerve from a pile of gravel. of the carrier’s employee is confronted with a sudden emergency. the PNR has all the powers. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train. the petitioner does not deny. Now. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. his left arm was completely severed. Generally. he is guilty of contributory negligence cannot relieve the carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary. oppressive or malevolent manner. Held: The bus was running at a moderate speed.L. AMMEN TRANS. Also. Under the foregoing section. the rear left side was hit. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton. Held: No. while not exempting the PNR from liability. Neither did the train stop. he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. Said driver would not move the bus further without endangering the safety of his passengers. A. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time. As a result. 1762). CO. to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law. the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence. By placing his left arm on the window. ISAAC vs. nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages and exemplary damages. Plaintiff brought an action for damages which the lower court dismissed holding the driver of the pick-up car negligent and not that of the bus. The PNR was created under Rep. the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the Corporation Law. fraudulent. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law. as amended. Facts: Plaintiff boarded defendant’s bus as paying passenger from Albay. Plaintiff chose to hold defendant liable on its contractual obligation. Act 4156. this is a circumstance which further militates against plaintiff’s position. Thus.

vs. the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still running. the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. Bachelor is presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code. Butuan City. the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by the police. Inc. INC. There is no question that Bachelor is a common carrier. the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus. states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the common carrier did not have any control. The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the road.BACHELOR EXPRESS. Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion.CA .CA Facts: The bus owned by Petitioners came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City. Hence. CA reversed the decision. a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. In effect. the bus picked up a passenger. FORTUNE EXPRESS. that about fifteen minutes later. while passengers of the bus. In this case. pursuant to Article 1756 of the Civil Code. of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage. private respondents herein filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor Express. Bachelor is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. The liability. Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of a bus belonging to Bachelor and. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident.. Art. The lower court dismissed the complaint. However. with a due regard for all the circumstances. Consequently. Held: Yes. in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law. and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law governing common carriers. hence the instant petition. if any. the petitioner. the bus was speeding from a full stop. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force majeure. Bachelor denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut in that their death was caused by a third person who was beyond its control and supervision. suffered injuries which caused their death. 1732. 1755 and 1756 are applicable. vs. 1733. its alleged owner and the driver Rivera. When the bus stopped. In the case at bar. in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. Thereafter. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent. Bachelor was negligent.. The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as warranted by law. While at Tabon-Tabon.

" Thus. Issue: Was there breach of contract of carriage? Held: Yes. Under the circumstances. Court of Appeals. A constabulary agent investigated and found out that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. In the present case. Atty. before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional rights. it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect the passengers from injuries cause by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. Lanao del Norter. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers. In the present case. Art. Court of Appeals. in De Guzman v. the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible. Court of Appeals. Mananggolo. In Pilapil v. such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers. violence. with due regard for all the circumstances. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. with petitioners contention that the acts of the Maranaos is caso fortuito. resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney. What apparently angered . three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers seized a bus petitioner bound for Iligan City and set it on fire. hence the instant petition. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. including two Maranaos. despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken. Four days after the accident. The operations manager of petitioner was advised to take precautionary measures. if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. that the necessary precautions would be taken. not its passengers. nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers. it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioner's employees. Caorong did not act recklessly. On the other hand. using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Talib Caorong. and De Guzman v. The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. or force. Diosdado Bravo. The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage. As already stated. Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. whose heirs are private respondents herein was a passenger of the bus and was shot and killed during the incident. Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioner's operation manager. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the violence were petitioners and its employees. Court of Appeals.Facts: A bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan. we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen. the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus. it was ruled that a common carriers is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistable threat. But Atty. Art. this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. The petitioner contends that Atty. Complaint was dismissed in the lower court but its decision was reversed in CA. ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors.

and dismissing the cross-claim against the Manila Railroad Company.them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. III.00 as compensatory damages to Edgardo. the sum of P18. The present action was filed to recover from the LTB and the MRR Co. and for Edgardo’s parents. in not awarding them actual and moral damages. Laguna. this act cannot be considered an act of negligence. Held: The findings of the trial court was sustained. when it bumped against the engine of a train passing by. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. denied liability upon the complaint and cross-claim. and for actual and moral damages. 1953 up to April of the same year Edgardo stayed in a private house in Quezon City. medical and miscellaneous expenses incurred from June 18. virtually an invalid.The Cariagas claim that the trial court erred: in awarding only P10. Actual/Compensatory Damages CARIAGA vs.490. and in not sentencing appellant LTB to pay attorney's fees. let alone recklessness. the train whistle had been sounded several times before it reached the crossing.75 representing the expenses paid to Edgardo.00 daily during his convalescence.00 as compensatory damages. and many passengers including Edgardo were injured.964. From January 15. he is now in a helpless condition. rendered judgment sentencing the LTB to pay Edgardo the sum of P10.. for not providing a crossing bar at the point where the national highway crossed the railway track. both physically and mentally.490." The impression one gathers from this evidence is that. where the national highway crossed a railroad track.00 as actual. Certainly. DAMAGES A. compensatory. that another LTB bus which arrived at the crossing ahead of the one where Edgardo was a passenger.194. Firstly. a fourth-year medical student of the University of Santos Tomas was a passenger in one of the buses of LTB. the driver of the bus died. paid heed to the warning and stopped before the "crossing". alleging that it was the reckless negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident. Upon the whole evidence on the matter. moral and exemplary damages. The lower court held that it was the negligence of the bus driver that caused the accident and. as well as attorneys fees. The front part of the body of the bus was wrecked.45 for all the hospital. and for this reason filed the corresponding crossclaim against the latter company to recover the total sum of P18. The LTB disclaimed liability claiming that the accident was due to the negligence of its co-defendant. . LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY Facts: Edgardo Cariaga. From this decision the Cariagas and the LTB appealed. the LTB having agreed to give him a subsistence allowance of P10. 1952 to April 1953.000. Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to an increase in compensatory damages.00 in the same concepts. The Manila Railroad Company. when it reached that part of the Poblacion of Bay. with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the coinplaint. as a result of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo Cariaga. that due to the replacement of the right frontal bone of his head with a tantalum plate Edgardo has to lead a quite and retired life because "if the tantalum plate is pressed in or dented it would cause his death. the Manila Railroad Company.000. in turn. secondly. as a result. the total sum of P312. the lower court found that the removal of the right frontal lobe of the brain of Edgardo reduced his intelligence by about 50%. The LTB paid the sum of P16.

Surro in which the damages were computed on a four year basis. Both parties appealed. INC. it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. The case cited is not. have been duly proved. Said petitioner contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event.00 as damages. Upon consideration of all the facts this Court is of the opinion. because this case does not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.719. Pampanga. Pangasinan. VILLA REY TRANSIT. including attorney's fees. In addition. Notwithstanding the medical assistance. penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of deceased. The protruding end of the bamboo pole.90 years. Petitioner is not entitled to recover attorney's fees. When the vehicle was nearing the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. brought this action against petitioner for breach of the contract of carriage to recover the aggregate sum of P63. about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart. Upon this premise it claims that only the actual damages suffered by Edgardo consisting of medical. but only as regards the amount thereof. Petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in placing the life expectancy of Quintos at 33-1/3.00. As a result the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place. despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old. none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. Much is left to . provided such damages. according to Art. CA Facts: An Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the petitioner left Lingayen. Policronio Quintos. vs. hospital and other expenses in the total sum of P17. In the Alcantara case.750. but this pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. and so holds. and had a life expectancy of 28. 2199 of the same Code. both of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver. is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. however. Jr.Appellant LTB admits that under Art. that the income which Edgardo could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus. he being over 29 years of age at the time of his demise and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when moral damages may be covered and the case under consideration does not fall under any one of them. guilty of a breach of contract but who acted in good faith. which caused several wounds. It even declared “that the determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis.75 are within this category. Domingo. that the compensatory damages awarded to petitioner should be increased to P25. LTB had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be considered an obligor in good faith. Issue: Did CA erred in its award of the damages to the heirs of Quintos? Held: No. hit the right side of the windshield of the bus.000. the Quintos died. at the time of his death. 2201 of the Civil Code the damages for which the obligor. The present action cannot come under Paragraph 2 of said article because it is not one of quasi-delict and cannot be considered as such because of the pre-existing contractual relation between the Laguna LTB and Edgardo. controlling in the one at bar. the case had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be used in the computation of damages. Neither could LTB be held liable to pay moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its contract of carriage because it did not act fraudulently or in bad faith. Hence the instant petition.The claim for moral damages and attorney's fees is denied. The private respondents. municipality of Minalin. We are of the opinion however. for Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and awarded the amount of damages as prayed for. proprietor of Cavite Household Appliances and Rowena's Handicraft. whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later.00 a year. he was supposed to have a better job and be promoted from time to time.000 in said contract but since she wasn’t able to board the flight. INC. an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. Tinitigan. one of the reasons why the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at bar. unlike the Alcantara case.000. exemplary damages of P200. petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now. in the present case. In other words. Lilibeth Warner. While in Sto. to sign her contract or lose it. at the time of his death. if not considering the growing importance of trade. whichever is shorter. Phil. the former said that she (plaintiff) must be in San Juan that same day. in the case at bar. This argument is basically true. the lower courts did not consider.00. Jr.184.15. no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption.. Findings of fact show that plaintiff.00. Inc. of a purely arbitrary standard. 431 from Sto. such as a four-year rule. Domingo. to earn more. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages was proper. Indeed.). and this is. commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income level of officers and employees therein much more. after talking thru the telephone with a certain Mrs. Held: Yes. but. New York City USA. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount. on which petitioner relies. and so it has been said that there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation. the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2. and. although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein. Jr. is an important factor. Republica Dominica to San Juan. Plaintiff expected to make a profit of $1. hence.000. Said decision was affirmed hence the instant petition. Domingo and thus causing her to suffer mental anguish. the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that. Puerto Rico notwithstanding the fact that she possessed a confirmed plane ticket purchased from Pan Am’s Office at Sto. Domingo. life expectancy is. the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of Policronio Quintos. attorney's fees of P100. which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos. Defendant denied that plaintiff was a confirmed passenger since the ticket issued to her was on an open space basis which meant that she could only be accommodated if any of the confirmed passengers failed to show up at the airport before departure.000.” Thus. IAC Facts: Private respondent Teofista P. With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed. a businesswoman and a multimillionaire in her own right as evidenced (proprietor of Sampaguita Restaurant. besmirched reputation. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS.00 and actual damages sustained by her in the amount of US$1. Phil. was on a business trip with a Pan-Am ticket.the discretion of the court considering the moral and material damages involved. Just the same. not only relevant. Other instances which caused moral damage to the plaintiff are the following: . The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary. perhaps.. wounded feelings and social humiliation She prayed that she be awarded moral damages of P500. but subject to modifications. Treasurer of the Molave Development Corp. but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. said profit was lost. vs. Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income. filed a complaint against petitioner for damages arising from defendant's alleged refusal to accommodate her on Pan Am Flight No. as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement Industries. In short.546. serious anxiety. also. upon the conclusion of his training period.

turned turtle and fell into the ditch. a contract or carriage perfected between plaintiff and defendant for the latter to take plaintiff to her place of destination. It was a good thing that the Hotel people remembered her because they do not usually accommodate female guests.1. plaintiff was made to pay the room accommodation petition in advance.00) Pesos and the attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand (P20. without any luggage to stay in the hotel. Self enrichment or fraternal interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of defendant. . to provide an example or correction for public good . actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. The rational behind exemplary or corrective damages is. plaintiff's passport was stamped accordingly. therefore. When the plane took off without her but with her luggage on board. if that integrity is violated or diminished. it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in the future by defendant and other airlines. The award of actual damages in the amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Forty Six American dollars and fifteen cents (US$1. the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road. Upon medical examination.00) Pesos.Caucasian to accommodate whites is very regrettable. And these show that plaintiff was indeed a confirmed passenger of defendant's Flight 431 for San Juan. At the immigration section. La Union bound for Bauang. a “snapping sound” was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and shortly thereafter. but it is malice nevertheless. By refusing to accommodate plaintiff in said flight. she saw that her seat was given to a white man. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body. While the bus was running along the highway.546. GATCHALIAN vs. Plaintiff was made to pay the fare and terminal fee. We believe. Despite her Pleas she was not allowed to board the aircraft. DELIM Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded respondent’s minibus at a point in Aringay. She was forced to return to her hotel without any luggage much less an extra dress. 2.15) computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment is hereby retained and granted. petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg. it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages.000. While normally. a Pan Am employee ordered her in a loud voice to step out of line because her ticket was not confirmed to her consternation and embarrassment in the presence of several people who heard and order. While plaintiff was standing in line preparatory to boarding the aircraft. Issue: Is petitioner entitled to actual and compensatory damages? Held: Yes. Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff in bad faith.000. It is clear from the evidence that defendant issued a Passenger Ticket and Baggage Check with assigned seat and the corresponding pass and baggage claim symbol. arm and forehead. An award of attorney's fees is also in order. defendant had willfully and knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with plaintiff. And as if to add insult to injury. hotel accommodation was paid before departure. Plaintiff's name was included in the passenger manifest. Bad faith was also present. as the name implies. There was. however the amount of some damages awarded to be exorbitant: We therefore reduce the moral and exemplary damages to the combined total sum of Two Hundred Thousand (P200. having found bad faith on the part of defendant. Rene Nolasco. In view of it nature. The fact that plaintiff was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a white man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for bumping off non.

the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. the bus hit a stone embankment. especially one on the face of the woman. hence the present recourse. Held: The Soberanos initially contend that the lower court erred in disallowing their claim of P200. This claim was correctly denied by the lower court. SOBERANO vs. and some personal belongings which she needed in that trip. Juana brought with her 3. About three kilometers away from Baguio City. The reservation is ineffective as to Caccam as it did not include him among those against whom their rights had been reserved. serious anxiety and fright they suffered as a consequence of the mishap.219. In case of physical injuries.76. The Soberanos next contend that the lower court erred in denying their claim for moral damages in the sum of P15. driven by Santiago Caccam. giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her condition ante. The lower court rightly denied the claim for moral damages as far as Jose Soberano is concerned. this claim must be considered as having been impliedly adjudicated in the criminal case.000. her husband. The offer was rejected. to recover from them damages in the total sum of P76. It may be argued that the Soberanos could not have recovered this sum in the criminal case because Juana Soberano expressly filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages. Later the MRR offered to settle the case extrajudicially. We consider that the amount of P15. for among other things. allowances. demanded from the defendant companies the value thereof amounting to P370. hospitalization. (MRR). 104 Phil. The lower court denied this claim on the strength of the oft-reiterated ruling of this Court that moral damages cannot be recovered against the employer in actions based on a breach of contract of carriage in the absence of malice. resulting from the infliction of injury upon her. but such reservation did not preserve whatever rights they had against Caccam on the basis of the latter's imprudence. moral damages are . mental anguish. or bad faith.000. Because of the loss of the eggs and the destruction of the personal effects that Juana brought with her in that trip. as well as the service fees of her caretaker. along the Naguilian road. causing it to fall into a 65-foot deep precipice. dismissing at the same time the complaint against Caccam.00 to recover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable. is a violation of bodily integrity. And the Soberanos not having intervened in the criminal case. fraud. In that trip. and cannot therefore be ventilated in the present action. 529. Jose Soberano. Juana Soberano did not intervene in the criminal case because she filed a formal reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages and indemnity against the MRR and the BAL. subsistence. this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages. bound for Baguio City. of which sum the MRR paid P300. The MRR has paid a total sum of P4. After due trial. The Soberanos moved to have the decision reconsidered. In Araneta v. A scar. The MRR also paid the daily expenses. Issue: Whether or not the amount of damages awarded is adequate.024 chicken eggs to be sold in Baguio City. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY Facts: Juana Soberano boarded a bus of the Benguet Auto Line (BAL).000. representing the expenses of Juana Soberano in attending as a witness in the criminal case and attorney's fees incurred in connection therewith. resulting in death to two of its passengers and serious physical injuries to Juana and loss and destruction of all her belongings. Areglado.757. because these expenses were properly taxable in the criminal case.Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before mishap. the lower court rendered the decision appealed from. medical fees and medicines of Juana Soberano. and the Soberanos filed the present action against the defendant companies and Caccam. for the physical suffering. a subsidiary of the Manila Railroad Co.66. tendering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

The Soberanos aver that they were obliged to file a separate civil action for damages against the defendant companies. who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries. MENDOZA Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday. the nature and extent of the physical injuries suffered by Juana Soberano has the effect of making her live an abnormal life. especially so if we take into account that plaintiff was only 26 years old when he met an accident and taking the average span of life of a Filipino. or when the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid. which provide that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest.000.000. It will be observed that the defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the Soberanos the additional sum of P5.35.00 a month from the business of his father-in-law as Assistant Supervisor of the small fairs and his income of P100. or to incur expenses in connection with the litigation instituted by them.00 a month which he derived as a professional boxer.00 awarded by the court as compensatory damages is quite reasonable and fair.000. Lastly. he may be expected to live for 30 years more and bearing in mind the earning capacity of Arsenio Mendoza who before the happening of this accident derived an income of almost P100. The amount of P40.024 chicken eggs which she brought with her in the trip and which were destroyed.00 as compensatory damages was affirmed by CA. . de Darrocha (a USVA pensioner) who died instantly.00.757. This claim is predicated upon paragraphs (2) and (5) of article 2208 of the New Civil Code. She should also be awarded the sum of P45.00 as exemplary damages and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5.76. who sustained the bodily injuries.recoverable only by the party injured and not by his next of kin. The Soberanos. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages was proper. Held: Yes. the defendant companies that compelled the Soberanos to litigate. representing unrealized profits from the 3. Bulacan. In this case it was Juana Soberano. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities. DE CALISTON vs. It however added the amount of P30. MARCHAN vs.000 in compensatory damages awarded to her for loss of earning capacity is inadequate.000. but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver. rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the total sum of P76. considering that plaintiff Arsenio Mendoza had suffered paralysis on the lower extremities. private respondent Geronimo Dalmacio ran over Juana Sonza Vda. The claim for attorney's fees was also properly denied by the lower court. while travelling on its way to Manila. the herein petitioner. It was not. which will incapacitate him to engage in his customary occupation throughout the remaining years of his life. the amount should be increased to P15. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. Gloria Darrocha de Caliston.000. An action was brought to recover damages against petitioners predicated not only on a breach of contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their destination. The award of P40.000. Considering all the facts this Court is of the opinion that the sum of P5. CA Facts: While driving a passenger bus in Bacolod City. not her husband Jose. just and demandable claim. therefore. however. his wife and child. survived by her only child. Polo.

P5. In its answer. It had been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.00 for loss of pension and credited him for the amount of P5.00 for loss of pension which the deceased had failed to receive. On Appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto. the P5. 1973. one hour and fifteen minutes after takeoff . single.000. Among the fatalities was Nicanor Padilla. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. and to pay the costs. On appeal. ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines. P5. . P10. Starlight Flight No. vs. The pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by her death for which Dalmacio was responsible. the damages sought were excessive and speculative. It had flown almost 18. 1960. Vda. Inc. and that.000. As a result of her son's death.Prosecuted for homicide thru reckless imprudence. Mindoro.000. to pay the plaintiff Natividad A.00 for burial expenses and P10. arises from the same culpa. On August 31.00 as attorney's fees. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. Padilla filed a complaint (which was amended twice) against PAL.00 as moral damages. on its way to Manila. INC. Since the civil liability (ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is subsidiary and.00 awarded for loss of pension is justified? Held: The deletion of the P10.00 paid to the herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which figured in the accident may be deemed to have come from the bus owner who procured the insurance.00 which is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one year if she did not die. the former Court of Appeals modified the CFI decision by absolving Dalmacio from the payment of the P10. Natividad A.000. 26 of the Philippine Air Lines took off from Iloilo. de Padilla.00 as moral damages.00 previously paid to the herein petitioner under a vehicular insurance policy obtained by the bus owner. Baco. Dalmacio was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.000. with 33 persons on board.000 hours at the time of its illfated flight.00 as award for the expected income of the deceased Nicanor. On the other hand.00 awarded for loss of pension is unjustified. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. PAL denied that the accident was caused by its negligence or that of any of the plane's flight crew. at bottom.000. The plane did not reach its destination but crashed on Mt. He was 29 years old.00 for the death of the victim. de Padilla the sum of P477. Issue: Whether or not the deletion of the P10. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos.000.The plane was Identified as PI-C133. plus exemplary damages and P60. Mrs. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. was his only legal heir.000 as attorney's fees.000. sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay the herein petitioner P15. a DC-3 type aircraft manufactured in 1942 and acquired by PAL in 1948. Vda. P10.000.000.000 as actual and compensatory damages. His mother. including the plane's complement. demanding payment of P600.000. the insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant driver. moreover.000. CA 185 SCRA 110 Facts: On November 23. the surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10. the trial court promulgated a decision.000.

MORAL DAMAGES CACHERO vs. B. For the settlement of the issue at hand. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter . the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased. Gregorio . had no earning capacity at the time of his death. 1764. until it is fully paid.Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in computing the awarded indemnity on the basis of the life expectancy of the late Nicanor A. The articles provide: Art. Even in the absence of local statute and case law. 1973. this Court determined not only PALs liability for negligence or breach of contract. The decision of the trial court is affirmed with modification. In the case of Davila vs. with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of the judgment on August 31. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. foreign jurisprudence is only persuasive. the life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. 2206. Pedro Davila. Facts: Atty. Padilla rather than on the life expectancy of private respondent. there are enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence.delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. the petition is dismissed. Held: Petitioner relies on "the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in determining loss of earnings arising from death is.. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book. INC.000). Under Article 1764 and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code. PAL. MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB CO. Art.. but also the manner of computing the damages due the plaintiff therein which it based on the life expectancy of the deceased. On passing Oroquieta between Doroteo José and Lope de Vega streets. 49 SCRA 497 which involved the same tragic plane crash.000 (not P477. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and owned by the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. and thus erred in awarding what appears to the petitioner as the excessive sum of P477. Inc. WHEREFORE. whichever is shorter. such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court. However. as established by authorities. concerning Damages. unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant.000 as indemnity for loss of earnings. Jr. not of his beneficiary. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi. resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a controversy. Costs against the petitioner. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. The petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent or her heirs death indemnity in the sum of P417..

upon his plea of guilty the Municipal Court of Manila sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor. The Taxicab Co. and to pay the costs. Issue: Whether or not the defendant demanded an exorbitant moral damages? Held: In all cases. but instead he is submitting his case to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable damages allowable by law.050. it would be a blessing. but the latter refused and insisted on his demand for P72. So plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila. we do not hesitate to say that the demand of this case.. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only agreed to reduce his demand to the sum of P72.20 as his only basis for settlement which.000 awarded by the Lower Court to the plaintiff. without pronouncement as to costs. slight in nature. thus adding a clearly petty case to the already overflowing desk of the Honorable Members of this Court. he makes in his brief as appellee the categorical statement that he "DOES NOT NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to collect from the defendant all the damages he had claimed in his complaint. It is so ordered.050.20 as the only basis for settlement. then respect and sympathy give way to something else. for plaintiff has already deprived the Court of Appeals of the occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over this case which he recklessly dumped to this Court. sympathy and understanding are added thereto." This case was instituted by a lawyer who. we do not hesitate to say that the demand of P72. But when a person starts demanding P2.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and an insignificant contusion in 'he chest. with the result that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the vehicle to the ground. and when said right consists in injuries sustained due to a breach of a contract of carriage with us.000 and by eliminating.Mira Abinion bumped said taxicab against a Meralco post. 1953. Wherefore. even at its generous although erroneous best. the moral damages of P2. the defendant.. It is time to fight. to avoid the expense and time of litigation. suffering thereby physical injuries. injuries for which the trial court. 1953. in our humble opinion. offered to settle the case amicably with plaintiff. Tranquilino F. and because the facts of the case. This is neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount for attorney's fees. to compensate the plaintiff of the suffering and losses he had undergone and incurred because of the accident oftentimes mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff was injured". there is nothing more loathsome nor truly worthy of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for other purposes than just rectification. This acknowledgment comes too late.000 to P2. the decision appealed from is hereby modified by reducing the amount awarded as unearned professioral fees from P3.000) and naturally the defendant did not and could not yield to such demand. to be injured. was not accepted by said company. The plaintiff himself must have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when after receiving defendant's brief as appellant. of course. We admire and respect at all times a man for standing up and fighting for his rights. which was followed by another of January 6.050.20 for a solitary bruise and sprain. should be the first in helping Us in the administration of justice. has not even the semblance of reasonableness. . Inc. "Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage with the plaintiff. If plaintiff's claim is granted. 1952. The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal and on February 26. We cannot declare that he erred for not awarding to plaintiff any such fees in this case.900. as have been shown. the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. We certainly cannot look with favor at this attitude of plaintiff. could only grant P5. Cachero addressed a letter to the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. for. mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only. and after going over the record of this case.The present action was instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for moral damages (P60. Said decision is in all other respects affirmed. as an officer of the courts. As We agree with the trial Judge on this point. not a misfortune.050. which he asks for damages. On December 17.

under the circumstances. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. it appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm. Five of the passengers were injured. ART. At the time of the trial. the driver lost control thereof." By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that: (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus).. The CA awarded moral damages to respondent hence this petition. the first on May 23. (appellant herein) and that the vehicle even had the name of "Doña Paz" painted below its windshield. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties. registered in the name of Paz Fores. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages given by the CA was valid? Held: No. A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21. wanton or deliberately injurious conduct. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach. she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman. when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it just and equitable. among other things. and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. 2220." "ART. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. is obliged to pay for the damage done. 1953. Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation.e. 1953. 2219. He was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment. is essential to Justify an award of moral damages. who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the incident. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 1953. not only because Art. Quezon City. Petitioner’s contention of loss of income and payment of attorneys fees cannot be the basis for the award of the damages on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal. but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. such damages are justly due. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed. that it carried plate No. 2219. and a third one to remove such splint. While the vehicle was descending the Sta. 2176. if there is no pre-existing . since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement of his expenses and the said loss of income. and later was subjected to a series of operations. effected to insert a metal splint. The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as that belonging to the petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found. a second. including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. TPU-1163. which provide as follows: "ART. Such fault or negligence. i. (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. No evidence to the contrary was introduced by the petitioner. MIRANDA Facts: Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall. or one day before the accident happened. and (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.FORES vs. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22. there being fault or negligence. series of 1952.

descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased".PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS Facts: Reservations for first class accommodations in Flight No." The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger. but that fact must be shown in evidence. Mrs. that entitles the spouse. without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant. First class tickets for the abovementioned flight were subsequently issued. his wife Maria J. "ART. 2220 is untenable. In contracts and quasi-contracts. 1756) "ART. In view of the foregoing considerations." "ART. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier. But the exceptional rule of Art. the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the award of P5. therefore. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith.contractual relation between the parties. LOPEZ vs. Jr. bad faith.." The distinction between fraud. but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced. In case of death of or injuries to passengers. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries. would be to violate the clear provisions of the law. and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. The suggestion that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach of the passenger's confidence. by "Your Travel Guide" agency. 2206. .000. and Art. 2220. 2 of Pan American World Airways from Tokyo to San Francisco were made. if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier. his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano. for then Senator Fernando Lopez. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. As scheduled Senator Lopez and party left Manila by Northwest Airlines. 2201. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 1756. justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code. Jr. In case of fraud. bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored. for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith. 1762. Lopez. natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. that this difference was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice. PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed the reservations. in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed. the damages forwhich the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that arc the.00 by way of moral damages the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently (and not maliciously). while under the law (Art. and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's employees. To award moral damages for breach of contract. and his daughter. and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith. moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. and it would be never accountable for simple negligence." It is to be presumed. as required by Art. and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. malice or wanton attitude. Alfredo Montelibano.

For the given reason that the first class seats therein were all booked up. as to moral damages. an award of P100. Considering also the physical discomfort of the wife of Senator Lopez as well as the members of his family. For plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. And he was former Vice-President of the Philippines. Since the flight involved was still more than a month away and confident that reinstatement would be made. they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them. out of racial prejudice against Orientals. International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. P25.000. and in fact he had a second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate President Pro Tempore. reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation.000 attorney's fees plus costs. then. Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid and confirmed. the latter suffered social humiliation.000 actual and moral damages. Now on the issue of amount of damages. when in fact they had none. it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such. defendant willfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its contracts with plaintiffs. In this light. . Held: Yes. P100. It said that the first class reservations of Senator Lopez and party were made together with those of four members of the Rufino family. it is in effect admitted that defendant through its agents first cancelled plaintiffs. it should be imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages.000 exemplary damages. but his aforesaid rank and position were by no means left behind. serious anxiety and mental anguish. From the foregoing evidence of defendant. Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against PAN-AM. First.00 as exemplary or corrective damages. PAN-AM filed its answer. wounded feelings. PAN-AM's Tokyo office informed Minister Busuego that PAN-AM could not accommodate Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class passengers. that is. At stop-overs. including those of Senator Lopez and party.000. defendant acted in bad faith because it deliberately refused to comply with its contract to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs. Court of First Instance rendered its decision in favor of plaintiffs. however. defendant's evidence would seek to establish its theory of honest mistake. Herranz forgot the matter and told no one about it except his co-employee. however. All the time. The reservations employee mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had been reserved. only to be found among the tourist passengers. but the latter firmly reiterated that there was no accommodation for them in the first class. plaintiffs asked for P500. Senator Lopez thereupon gave their first class tickets to Minister Busuego for him to show the same to PAN-AM's Tokyo office. Plaintiff prayed for an increase in the award.00 is appropriate. Both however appealed the decision. Senator Lopez was going to the United States to attend a private business conference of the Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company. For bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will. we find it just to award P75. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant. They were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers. contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. in legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. According to plaintiffs. Against the foregoing. stating that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class therein. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same. For the moral damages sustained by him. asserting that its failure to provide first class accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its employees. therefore.As soon as they arrived Senator Lopez requested Minister Busuego of the Philippine Embassy to contact PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their first class accommodations for that evening's flight. As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers.

Asia. the plaintiff once more requested a transfer to first class but was also told by the Lufthansa agent that he had not received any communication about the change and the request could not be granted. Inc. Ortigas' ticket for all these different legs of his journey was first class.. In New York. After an argument with the employee. the plaintiff requested the Lufthansa agent to transfer him to first class but the agent said he could not and that he did not receive any communication from Rome to that effect. the place of departure. Ortigas checked out of his hotel and took a taxi to the terminal. he said he would not as a . for his appointments there the next day. with the promise that he will be transferred to first class in Cairo and onward to Hongkong. He was constrained to agree with the arrangement. At Dharham. After calling. vs. JR. On her request. told Ortigas that the Lufthansa had no first class. included in his original itinerary. and that the defense counsel’s fees is more than half the said amount. ORTIGAS. and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand. Ortigas immediately asked him to get the seat and to see to it that his ticket be confirmed and validated for the flight and a first class seat. He left Manila as scheduled. The man at the counter of the Alitalia office told him it had no flight on Monday but the Lufthansa had. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES Facts: The Sharp Travel Service. where his Filipino nationality appears. the travel department of C. Upon arrival in Cairo. and then back to Manila. General Agents of the defendant. The amount of P25. The man thereafter asked for Ortigas' passport and other travel papers and attached a validating sticker on flight coupon No. that the employee call other airlines to inquire if they had flights to Hongkong that day but he once more turned down the plea and insisted that Ortigas travel economy. In concluding. which she did by calling it up. Inc. to Hongkong. He unloaded his baggage and proceeded to the counter in charge of the Lufthansa passengers. 4 which corresponded to the Rome-Hongkong leg of his TWA Ticket. An employee in the airport asked for his passport and other papers and. after talking to an employee thereof. 000 is reasonable. To be sure he could fly first class to Hongkong. the place of destination. Lufthansa German Airlines issued to the plaintiff First Class Pan American Ticket which would take him from Manila. The lady at the counter told him that Lufthansa had no space for him that day. said he could not board the plane that day because his seat would be given to a Belgian..A written contract for attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Ortigas went to the office of the Alitalia to book passage. political. he decided to leave out some cities. considering the attorney’s prominence in the legal profession. Ortigas made another request. she apologized and said the plaintiff's ticket was in order and would be confirmed and validated. Ortigas requested her to check with her main office. for several appointments he had there. The employee afterwards informed Ortigas that the Lufthansa had a first class seat available. various cities in the United States. the Far East. let it be stressed that the amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering the official.. Sharp. but only economy seats available. Europe. Ortigas arrived in due course in Rome. He was furthermore asked to pay 800 liras for bus fare and 700 liras as embarkation tax. F. to be in Hongkong. In Calcutta. Ortigas once again requested a transfer or that he be assisted in booking passage on other planes but was also refused. social. The following Monday. the majority interest-in-which is held by Rocha y Cia. It was only in Bangkok when the chief steward asked him if he wanted to move over to first class but having been already embarrassed and humiliated and the trip to Hongkong being only three hours. Ortigas was not willing to take an economy seat and requested the employee to call up other airlines. Ortigas had his luggage weighed and was given the free luggage allowance of a first class passenger. and the business and financial position of the offender on the other. after examining his passport. The man thereupon called up the office of the Lufthansa and.

It cannot be said the breach was the result of an honest mistake or excusable negligence. inattention and lack of care on the part of the carrier resulting in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages in accordance with Article 2220 of the Civil Code. similar false representations were made to him at Dharham and Calcutta. There is evidence that the defendant acted with bad faith and in willful disregard of the plaintiffs rights. both moral and exemplary. he is . said plaintiff can easily be taken for a European or white more than his own witness Amado Castro and besides. We have uniformly upheld the right of a passenger to damages in all cases wherein. there were other Orientals in the same flight on that occasion.. the proper arrangements therefor having been made already. the economy class accommodations are not much different from first class and Ortigas was not delayed in his trip. Worse. which is the general agent of the Alitalia in the Philippines. "Manual of Traffic Conference Resolutions" and that telephone calls for reservation by one airline to another is in fact accepted procedure in accordance with the official airline guide of the Air Traffic Conference and International Air Transport Association. and it is certainly not for the airplane to say later. from Bangkok to Hongkong. in which an award of moral and exemplary damages was ordered and now subject of an appeal. testified that space reservation through telephone calls between airlines is permitted by IATA's. after it deprives him of his space in order to favor another passenger. when the plane reached Cairo. Thus. since it would certainly be damaging to its own business. A passenger contracts for first class accommodations for many reasons peculiar to himself and pays a higher price therefor. but a specific act of Lufthansa employee at the airport of giving preference to a Belgian after examining Ortigas passport wherein his Filipino nationality is noted. the Lufthansa employee who had indifferently told him about his downgrading paid very little attention if ever to said request. Moreover. Held: Yes. for what appears from the evidence is not really a case of a general policy of discriminating against Orientals or non-whites. In the light of all the foregoing. if only to make patent his displeasure and indignation at being so inconsiderately treated in the earlier part of his journey. that economy class is anyway just as good as first class. the breach appears to be of graver nature. The foregoing facts resulted in the filing of the case by the plaintiff against defendant. Ortigas was at last informed that he could have a first class seat in that leg of the flight. Although molested and embarrassed to the point that he had to take nitroglycerine pills to ward off a possible heart attack. Inc. after having contracted and paid for first class accommodations duly confirmed and validated. It is argued that any such policy would be self-defeating. however.sign of protest. when in truth such was not the case. general manager of Filital. since the preference given to the Belgian passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino. Again. there can be no doubt as to the right of Ortigas to damages. Issue: Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages. he was told by the Lufthansa office there that no word at all had been received from Rome and they had no space for him in first class. We cannot see the point. since his luggage was already in the plane. There was. Manuel Otayza. As found by the lower court what worsened the situation of Ortigas was that Lufthansa succeeded in keeping him as its passenger by assuring him that he would be given first class accommodation at Cairo. instead of complying with the request of Ortigas that other airlines be contacted to find out it they had first class space for him. the next station. a valid and binding contract between Lufthansa and the plaintiff to transport him as a first class passenger from Rome to Hongkong. Lufthansa contends. who may not be discriminated against with impunity. But in the instant case. It was only at Bangkok where for the first time. This Ortigas rejected. it is argued. Ortigas hardly had any choice. this ratiocination is untenable. and this agreement the defendant violated by compelling the plaintiff to travel as an economy passenger. To his disappointment. therefore. that there could not have been any possible discrimination by reason of race against Ortigas because from his appearance. It is Our considered view that when it comes to contracts of common carriage.

Inc. together with their respective drivers. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES. Pampanga. He was immediately brought to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital in Malolos. . Calumpit. 1961. Repairs having been accomplished. The Court of Appeals found that the two vehicles sideswiped each other at the middle of the road.. close to the window. the same is affirmed. even if death does not result. the vessel lifted anchor again on July 10. praying that judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants requiring them to pay. Inc. bound for Catbalogan. was coming from the opposite direction. This being the case. in view of the provisions of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the New Civil Code. litigation expenses and costs. actual and compensatory. class. the judgment appealed from is modified by raising the award of moral and exemplary damages to plaintiff Ortigas to P150. including as to the payment of interests on the said amounts. In other words both vehicles were in their respective lanes and that they did not invade the lane of the other. as in the instant case. CA Facts: Private respondents purchased first-class tickets from petitioner at the latter’s office in Cebu City. no moral damages are recoverable. 1972. He boarded the said bus at the Manila terminal about four o'clock in the afternoon of November 6. Instead of departing at the scheduled hour of about midnight on July 8. respectively. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE. Bulacan. This Court has repeatedly held that moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation. The exceptions are (1) where the mishap results in the death of a passenger. which he has to take in order to be able to arrive at his destination on his scheduled time. only to be towed back to cebu due to engine trouble. They were to board petitioner’s vessel. The left arm was amputated. Western Samar. breaking the bones into small fragments while the soft tissues of the muscles and the skin were mascerated. arrving at about 4:00pm n the same day. INC. bound for San Fernando. and the Transport Contractors. In all other respects. M/V Sweet Grace. The window glass near the driver's seat of the Rabbit Bus was detached and the left side of its body was damaged. He sat at the left-end of the fourth row behind the driver.000. SWEET LINES vs. and (2) where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith. 223 of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages is proper Held: No. The left forearm of Patrocinio Esguerra was hit by a hard blunt object.transferred over his objection to economy. It cannot be said therefore that there was fraud or bad faith on the part of the carrier's driver. 1972. vs. a freight truck owned and operated by the Transport Contractors. the vessel set sail at 3:00am of July 9. 1972 at around 8:00am. The vehicles sideswiped each other. The Court of Appeals affirmed CFI’s decision. Inc.000.00 and P100.00. As the bus approached barrio San Marcos.ESGUERRA Facts: Patrocinio Esguerra was a paying passenger of Bus No. moral and exemplary. Bulacan for treatment. Plaintiff filed a case against the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. jointly and severally damages. Inc. The contention of petitioners with respect to the award of moral damages is meritorious.

Hamburg. 1979. Vinluan is a practicing lawyer who entered into a contract for air carriage for valuable consideration with Japan Airlines first class from Manila to Tokyo.. the scheduled time of the departure being 11:00 o'clock A.00 to P3. New York. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES vs. aside from the fact that we find it faithful to the meaning of bad faith enunciated thus: “Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. Private respondents had no recourse but to disembark and board a ferryboat to Catbalogan. Honolulu and back to Manila thru the same airline and other airlines it represents for which he was issued the corresponding first class tickets for the entire trip. 41 with its New York office. we find the award of moral damages excessive and accordingly reduce them from P75.Instead of docking to Catbalogan. He was informed that there was no first class seat available for him on the flight. “we are leaving already”.00 respectively for each of the private respondents. He asked for an explanation but TWA employees on duty declined to give any reason.. On April 18. (2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine. moral damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Judgment MODIFIED . Under Art. decided in favor of plaintiffs. defendants. Moscow.appellants employees would come and say. Vinluan reconfirmed his reservation for first class accommodation on board TWA Flight No.M.appellants did not offer to refund plaintiffs-appellees’ tickets nor provide them with transportation form Tacloban to Catbalogan. When he . Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of petitioner in that: (1) Defendants. Los Angeles. 1972. at about 8:00 o'clock A. affirmed by the CA.000.appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that the vessel would leave within a short period of time.” Under the circumstances. this suit for damages for breach of contract of carriage which the Trial court. the vessel proceeded direct to Tacloban at around 9:00pm of July 10. however.000. Hence. Paris. 41 from New York to San Francisco. Zurich.M. Issue: Whether or not moral damages may be rightfully demanded. but it is malice nevertheless.Appellants did not give notice to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the vessel. while in Paris. and when plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip. That the finding of bad faith is binding on us. CA Facts: Rogelio A. Vinluan presented his ticket for check-in at the counter of TWA at JFK International Airport at about 9:45 o'clock A.M. Held: Yes. since it is not the function of the court to analyze and review evidence on this point all over again. he went to the office of Trans World Airlines (TWA) and secured therefrom confirmed reservation for first class accommodation on board its Flight No. He was advised that his reservation was confirmed. may have been the motive. Self enrichment or fraternal interest. and not personal ill will. (3) Defendants. 1979. A validated stub was attached to the New York-Los Angeles portion of his ticket evidencing his confirmed reservation for said flight with the mark "OK " On April 20. defendants. which was the first port of call. 2220 of the Civil Code.

a certain Mr. Inc. a senior partner of a big law firm in Manila. Vinluan filed an action for damages against the TWA in the Court of First Instance of Rizal alleging breach of contract and bad faith. ARMOVIT vs. the moral damages should be reduced to P300.S. It was twice confirmed and yet respondent unceremoniously told him that there was no first class seat available for him and that he had to be downgraded to the economy class. I have a very bad temper. the award of moral and exemplary damages by the respondent court is in order. the petitioners decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and friends in the Philippines.00. rudely threatened him with the words "Don't argue with me.began to protest. the private respondent was a practicing lawyer. Considering the circumstances of this case and the social standing of private respondent in the community. He was a director of several companies and was active in civic and social organizations in the Philippines. and the exemplary damages should be reduced to P200. Held: Respondent had a first class ticket for Flight No. The CFI ruled in favor of Vinluan which was affirmed by the Court of appeals with some modifications.000. to Manila and back. On February 15. This award should be reasonably sufficient to indemnify private respondent for the humiliation and embarrassment that he suffered and to serve as an example to discourage the repetition of similar oppressive and discriminatory acts. so they purchased from private respondent. As he protested. Worst still. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in the handwriting of private respondent's tickets sales agent contains the following entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return flight: from Manila to Tokyo. Indeed. Vinluan noticed that other passengers who were white Caucasians and who had checked-in later than him were given preference in some first class seats which became available due to "no show" passengers. amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award of moral damages. private respondent had shown that the alleged switch of planes from a Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing 707 was because there were only 138 confirmed economy class passengers who could very well be accommodated in the smaller plane and not because of maintenance problems. Such inattention and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration. . Braam. he saw that several Caucasians who arrived much later were accommodated in first class seats when the other passengers did not show up. NW flight 002. he was arrogantly threatened by one Mr.00. while he was waiting for the flight. date 17 January. Issue: Whether or not Trans World should be liable for damages. (Northwest Airlines. Petitioner sacrificed the comfort of its first class passengers including private respondent Vinluan for the sake of economy.M. Status. one of the TWA employees. 41 of petitioner from New York to San Francisco on April 20. particularly as to their convenience. though not involved in the suit. OK.COURT OF APPEALS Facts: In October 1981. plus three (3) tickets for the rest of the children. At the time of this unfortunate incident. 41. 1980.) three (3) round trip airline tickets from the U. Braam. time 10:30 A. Consequently. he was angrily rebuffed by an employee of petitioner. 1979. The discrimination is obvious and the humiliation to which private respondent was subjected is undeniable." To be able to keep his schedule. However.000. he is entitled to the award of moral and exemplary damages. Vinluan was compelled to take the economy seat offered to him and he was issued a refund application" as he was downgraded from first class to economy class. 5 More so in this case where instead of courteously informing private respondent of his being downgraded under the circumstances. While waiting for the departure of Flight No.

On their return trip from Manila to the U. Petitioners suffered anguish. petitioners were compelled to file an action for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. but were assured of this flight only on the very morning of that day. The departure time in the three (3) tickets of petitioners was not changed when reconfirmed.m. The contention of the CA that the appellees did not take the witness stand to testify on their "social humiliation. and 308.S. so that they experienced anxiety until they were assured seats for that flight.300. petitioners did not use their meal coupons supplied because of the limitations thereon so they had to spend for lunch. and serious anxiety day and night of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the flight that day. took the witness stand for he was there from the time they checked in until the time they were rudely informed that their flight had already taken off. wounded feelings.. dinner. scheduled flight time recited in their tickets. 1982. that the petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18. 1982.S. Previous to the said date of departure petitioners re-confirmed their reservations through their representative Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the private respondent's Roxas Boulevard office. Atty. exemplary damages and nominal damages to the plaintiffs but the CA eliminated the award for moral and nominal damages. The RTC awarded actual damages. Nevertheless. Armovit had to forego the professional fees for the medical appointments he missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight.00 while waiting to be flown out of Manila. Armovit. 306.M.S. . The names of petitioners appeared in the passenger manifest and confirmed as Passenger Nos. wounded feelings and anxiety" and the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent was without merit. Armovit told the said check-in-officer that he had to be accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his appointments in the U. Angered and frustrated Dr. Armovit. which is a good one (1) hour and fifteen (15) minutes ahead of the 10:30 A. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his appointments with his patients in the U.S. scheduled on January 17. 307. and breakfast in the sum of P1. was already taking off and the 10:30 A. The CA overlooked the fact that a year after the incident there was a turmoil in the country because of the assassination of Benigno Aquino and that violent demonstrations in the country were sensationalized in the U. media so petitioners were advised to refrain from returning to the Philippines at the time when they were scheduled to testify. Because of the refusal of the private respondent to heed the repeated demands of the petitioners for compensatory damages arising from the aforesaid breach of their air-transport contracts. Held: Yes. moral damages. that while petitioner had to accept private respondent's offer for hotel accommodations at the Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and wait for their flight out of Manila the following day. flight time entered in their plane tickets was erroneous. petitioner arrived at the check-in counter of private respondent at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning. Flight 002. that Dr.M. brother of Dr. Petitioners were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 a. Herein petitioner Dr. that petitioner Jacqueline Armovit also complained about not being able to report for work at the expiration of her leave of absence. Issue: Whether or not the elimination of the CA of the award for moral damages.

private respondent warned him that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. by imposing legal rate of interest on the unearned income of Samson. These more than prove what private respondent had complained of. taking care of their accommodations while waiting and boarding them in the flight back to the U. Hence the instant petition. Disregard thereof by PAL is condemnable. The dizziness. the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish that private respondent committed a breach of contract which entitles petitioners to moral damages. on grounds of physical disability Samson was discharged from PAL’s employ. wounded feelings and social humiliation that petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off. The jolt caused injuries to Samson. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident. Judgement was rendered in favor of Samson in the lower court which was affirmed by CA with some modification. Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory damages. the following day. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs.No doubt Atty. Now. when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet. COURT OF APPEALS 106 SCRA 391 Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with Captain Delfin Bustamante in a plane belonging to petitioner PAL. Issue: Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident and the subsequent periodic dizziness.000. And instead of PAL giving Samson expert and proper medical treatment it referred him to a general medical practitioner. the Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P100. Wherefore the decision of the CA is modified providing the award for moral damages. having tumor on his nose. the pilot would hit the Mayon Volcano had not the plaintiff warned him. There was also gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. PAL denied liability on the ground of fortuitous event. The deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. considering the circumstances of this case whereby the private respondent attended to the plight of the petitioners. the gross negligence committed by private respondent in the issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight. when it did not maintain the required pressure on the brakes and notwithstanding the diligent efforts of Samson. The plane hit outside the airstrip.S. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. One month prior to the crash-landing. However. The airplane crash-landed beyond the runway due to the slow reaction and poor judgment of said captain.00 each. Raymund Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the serious anxiety. which further warrants the award of damages? Held: Yes. and that the physical headaches and dizziness experience by Samson were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required upgrading course given by PAL. Also. Doctors presented by PAL even admit the vital facts about Samson’s brain injury. headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. which caused him to file a complaint for damages. . even if he was sick. headache and general debility allegedly caused by the accident and private respondent’s discharge from employment. In another instance.

Held: No. The lower court found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence. that before crossing Taft Ave. The grant of compensatory damages[P204. it will be observed that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic.451.Having affirmed the gross negligence and casual connection of the after-effects of the accident. P5. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of damages by the trial court. private respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice. near the island thereof.00 as moral damages. On the other hand. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM. the damages imposed by the lower court should be reduced to more reasonable levels. 2219(2) is applicable. Exemplary Damages PRUDENCIADO vs.000.451. The grant of moral damages[P50. Inc. reducing the amount of moral damages from P25. suddenly bumped and struck petitioner’s car. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there is an employee-employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment.00 as exemplary damages.. P25.000 to P2. CA modified the award.000] was also justified. In fact. Alliance Transport System. suffering more particularly brain concussion while her car was damaged to the extent of P2.00 as attorney's fees. failed to prove to the satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good father of the family in the selection.000] by computing the basic salary per annum at P750.000. the award of damages was likewise affirmed. in addition to the other consequential damages prayed for. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict and therefore Art. to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold classes. it was nonetheless not disputed that an . to warrant the damages awarded by the trial court.27 for actual damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff.000 and eliminating the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. with costs against the defendants. actually took place. which appears to be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.00 a month for extra pay for extra flying time including bonus every year is justified. She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph.000. and the further sum of P3. applying the provisions of Article 2220.00 a month and P300. While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner. The award was P2. a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be established.27. C. INC. Inc. justifying the recovery of moral damages. to pass the test of reasonableness. having considered the bad faith of PAL. thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her body. Jose Leyson who was driving People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport System. Unquestionably. Hence the instant petition. A careful review of the records makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by petitioner are not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be. Both defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff as well as for the damage to her car. therefore. Facts: Petitioner was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left. not to mention the fact that such were not supported by the medical findings presented. but when she was almost at the center. The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190. she stopped her car and looked to the right and to the left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on first gear to cross the same. supervision and control of its employees.00. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondents.

000. which became the basis of the award of exemplary damages that respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right along Taft Ave. plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant's carrier. It however added the amount of P30.accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the respondents that Dra.451. It is to be observed however.000. It is argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary damages since there was no allegation nor prayer. to provide an example or correction for the public good.00. nor counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents.00 as exemplary damages and sustained the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5. in which this Court finds that it has erred. he failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to avoid the collision. nor proof. in effect. The award of P40. The findings of the trial court is apparent. that in the complaint. since the body of the complaint sought to recover damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and since exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages. Much more.00 as compensatory damages was affirmed by CA. while travelling on its way to Manila. The lower court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. As to exemplary damages. plaintiffs "prayed for such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and equitable. An action was brought to recover damages against petitioners predicated not only on a breach of contract of carriage for failure to safely convey the plaintiffs to their destination. who were then inside the bus as passengers were thrown out to the ground resulting in their multiple injuries. coming from Ayala Boulevard. considering that the traffic was clear. MARCHAN vs. Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides: “In quasi-delicts. therefore.00 as attorney's fees. his wife and child. as the name implies.000. she is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering. Held: Yes. but also on account of a criminal negligence on the part of defendant driver. MENDOZA Facts: A passenger bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines which was then driven by Silverio Marchan fell into a ditch somewhere in Barrio Malanday.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the repair of her car. Arsenio Mendoza suffered the most serious injuries which damaged his vertebrae causing the paralysis of his lower extremities. This however was overruled by CA and did not subscribed to the fact that the driver was grossly negligent. Failing to notice petitioner's car. the court is called upon the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or pleaded in the plaintiffs' .” The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is. it was raining that time and the roads are slippery. (1) the sum of P2." Now.000.00 as moral damages.000. No pronouncement as to costs. (2) the sum of P15. her fears can be more real and intense than an ordinary person. and respondents are ordered to jointly and severally pay the petitioner. serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness. and (4) the sum of P3.00 as exemplary damages. Otherwise stated. Bulacan. the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the award of damages is concerned. DISPOSITIVE: PREMISES CONSIDERED. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of under the premises. As a result of which Arsenio Mendoza. Issue: Whether or not there should be an award of exemplary damages. (3) the sum of P5. Polo. Being a doctor by profession.000. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion which although mild can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some. The frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed demands corrective measures. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with grave negligence.

. Exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition. to compensatory damages.complaint. and the reason is obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the court may award as compensatory damages. among others. but that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right.000 attorneys fees. their determination depending upon the discretion of the court. There is no reason to consider that the lower court erred in awarding the P5. Respondents are entitled to interest for the amount of compensatory damages from the date of the decision of the lower court and legal interest on the exemplary damages from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals. If the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved. it need not also be alleged. A modification of the decision however is proper.