Matabuena v.

Cervantes [GR L-28771, 31 March 1971] En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a commonlaw relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs. 1. Prohibition of donation between spouses apply to common-law relationship While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy (JBL Reyes, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 1954). The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), ‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage. 2. Spirit of the law Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. “El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'’ It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. 3. Lack of validity of donation does not result in exclusive right of plaintiff on property The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage. She is therefore his

widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.

People v. Santayana GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25) Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designated to sit in 2nd division Facts: On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was appointed as “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undated certification to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possession of firearms Held: The appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People v. Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. Application of license was unnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was issued, according to Capt. Adolfo Bringas as he was already appointed as a CIS agent. Even if the case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, years after the accused was charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santayana, canceling the bond for his provisional release; with costs de oficio.

and rendered decision on 22 July 1972 after due hearing. Estenzo GR L-35376. but not so included in RA 6236. the express mention of one thing in a law. As correctly pointed out by petitioners. without pronouncement as to costs. is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. Respondent Aotes filed on23 February 1972 a petition to reopen the decision of the Cadastral Court under Repuplic Act 931 as amended by Republic Act 6236. 11 September 1980 (99 SCRA 651) First Division. declaring Lot 4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the Aoetes in undivided interest in equal share of ¼ each. the extension as provided for by the RA 6236 makes no reference to reopening of cadastral cases as the earlier law. petitioners filed the instant petition. the extension provided for by RA 6236 applies only to the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case. no similar provision is found in RA 6236 expressly extending the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land declared public land. . Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court. Lot 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land. Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to 31 December 1980. Issue: Whether the extension provided for under RA 6263 also applies to Re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings. The intention to exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were declared public land in RA 6236 is made clearer by reference to RA2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases. If RA 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to reopening of cadastral cases. Truly. Held: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction. expressio unius est exclusio alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion). This rule. RA2061. The judge denied the opposition for lack of sufficient merit on 9 May 1972. it would have so provided in the same way that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. RA 6236. as a guide to probable legislative intent. the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until 31 December 1980. means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. as a general rule. It will be noted that while RA 2061 fixed the time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond 31 December 1968. the very law on which Aotes bases his petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for respondents’ contention.People v. Thus. a proceeding entirely different from “filing an application for a free patent or for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.” The Supreme Court set aside the 22 July 1972 decision of the respondent Judge and reiterating the 28 September 1940 decision of the Cadastral Court. expressly did. de Castro (p): 5 concur Facts: In a decision dated 28 September 1940 by the Cadastral Court.

hats. shirts. hats. shirts. matches. lighters. Fernando (p): 7 concur. and the like. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. and cigarettes. pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970. . Petitioner impugned the act of respondent as violative of his right to free speech.” It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material. under the phrase “and the like. fans (of whatever nature). 1 concur in separate opinion Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc. bandanas. from using “jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers” on 22 October 1970.” Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis. whether of domestic or foreign origin. the general words following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. wallets. mention being made of pens. a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. and concluding with the words “and the like. Comelec GR L-32717. athletic goods or materials. request or distribute sample ballots. 26 November 1970 (36 SCRA 228) First Division. Respondent however contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act. lighters. flashlights. matches. produce. or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens.” Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase “and the like. The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution (distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets. 2 on leave. bandanas. Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited. fans.”). The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped jingle. athletic goods or materials. which made it unlawful for candidates “to purchase. wallets. flashlights.Mutuc v. cigarettes. without pronouncement as to costs.

Hence. a person. The maxim “casus omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. 1 took no part. and justices of the peace. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs.” including therein all kinds of judges. there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration. The application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature. the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. Substitution of terms is not omission. Thereafter. Manantan GR L-14129. where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Regala (p): 7 concur. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. like judges of the courts of First Instance. 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) En Banc. as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge. it is said. the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.People v. and even jurors. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. judges of the courts of Industrial Relations. For in its most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity. 1 on leave Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province. object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est. holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. In Section 54. Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations. but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person. the appeal by the Solicitor General. the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. including justice of the peace. Macaraeg. as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code. . Acting on various motions and pleadings. who are judges of facts.

If persons affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals. seeking reversal of said resolution of dismissal. section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal mentions among others. and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs. On the other hand. Held: Section 7 of Republic Act 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. creating said tax court. the Commissioner of Customs. . While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections. Montemayor (p): 10 concur Facts: Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg. and his right to review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would. additional customs duties in the amount of P1. Germany. the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment. holding that under the Customs Law and RA 1125. dismissed the appeal on the ground hat it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila. instead of Collector of Customs. filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal.966. the CTA has no jurisdiction to review by appeal decision of the Collector of Customs.Lopez vs. in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature. Lopez & Sons appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. CTA GR L-9274. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier invoices. 1 February 1957 (100 Phil 850) En Banc. Issue: Whether the decision of the Collector of Customs is directly appealable to the Court of Tax Appeal.59 were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties. The Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation but merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute. it is more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act. Subsequently. the Legislature meant and intended to say. From said resolution of dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order. under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative Code. by its resolution of 23 May 1955. the Tax Court. with costs. those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of Customs. then the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released. citing section 7 of RA 1125. not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. however. Lopez & Sons appealed to the Supreme Court.

Cruz. Later. The matter was elevated to the Minister of Local Government Jose A. as contrasted to appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading “any person holding public appointive office or position. Batas Pambansa 697. petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. governors. petitioner informed ViceMayor Benjamin A. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and denied the writs prayed for. The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1). As the President of the Association. Roño. Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City. that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute as a whole. in the 17 May 1982 Barangay elections. 19 July 1985 (137 SCRA ___) En Banc. holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the officials. Ozamiz City. Article 5 of BP 697. Issue: Whether the accused is considered resigned from the latter’s filing of a certificate of candidacy for the Batasan. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Invoking Section 13(2). without costs. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction. namely. mayors. petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election. the legislative intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2). but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 1 took no part Facts: Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. that he was resuming his duties as member of that body. members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials.” is clear. he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 14 May 1984 Batasan elections. Held: Although it may be that Section 13(2).Sanciangco v. 1 dissents in separate opinion. On 27 March 1984. . must be followed. Melencio-Herrera (p): 10 concur. admits of more than one construction. Fuentes. who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official. as he was appointed by the President as a member of the City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. Rono GR L-68709. and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials. he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. taking into sconsideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein. can be gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa.

the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply permissive. with costs against defendant-appellee Ocampo. at the election of the plaintiff. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. Under ordinary circumstances. Capati entered into a sub-contract with the Dr. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. however. On 23 May 1967. the term “may be” connotes possibility. Due to the delay. Capati filed in the CFI Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages (Civil Case 3188) in the sum of P85. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court (See related case in Nicolas v. They merely agreed to submit their disputes to the said court. 30 April 1982] Second Division.Capati v. By the said stipulation. The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order. Ocampo further bound himself to complete said construction on or before 5 June 1967. Pampanga was the contractor of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga. The lowe court dismissed the complaint. 2. it does not connote certainty. Reparations Commission: “May” is not mandatory). Ocampo [GR L-28742. 1. Where personal actions may be filed The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Section 2(b). Since the complaint has been filed in the CFI Pampanga. or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides. 2 on leave. In the case at bar. Ocampo. where the plaintiff resides.00. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. a resident of Bacolor. permission or possibility. the venue of action is properly laid in accordance with Section 2(b). the parties did not agree to file their suits solely and exclusively with the CFI Naga. whereby the latter. Facts: Virgilio Capati. The motion was premised on the stipulation printed at the back of the contract which provides that all actions arising out. which provides that such actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. Camarines Sur.200. a resident of Naga City. or relating to this contract may be instituted in the CFI of the City of Naga. Said section is qualified by Section 3 of the same rule. “May” only permissive The word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. and ordered the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings. Hence the appeal. plus attorney’s fees and costs. was only able to finish the construction on 20 June 1967.000. in consideration of the amount of P2. undertook to construct the vault walls. without waiving their right to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2(b). Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. opportunity.00 with interest. exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated therein. . providing that by written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another. Jesus Ocampo. Escolin (p): 4 concur.

Midsayap Communication. BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. RA 7692 was enacted granting BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right. (BellTel) filed with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure. Inc. On 6 February 1995. On 29 March 1995. BellTel filed on 5 May 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority. On 12 July 1994. Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority (NTC Case 93-481). In an Order dated 11 July 1994. financial and legal documents in support of its application.000 telephone lines in 10 years using the most modern and latest stateof-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network. it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service Only GMCR. an unenfranchised applicant. operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire. No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion.” Subsequently. (J): 2 concur. privilege and authority to carry on the business of providing telecommunications services.. Inc. were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May 1994. BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application (NTC Case 94-229) praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation. Smart Communications. BellTel proposed to install 2. Dumlao. Northern Telephone. Hermosisima Jr. at that time. Inc. Capitol Wireless.. the CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q.Kintanar vs.. In the second application.. Smart Communications. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation. BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion reiterating its earlier prayer. Isla Communications Co. Philippine Global Communications. On 20 December 1994. without prejudice. Isla Communications Co. satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. Bell Telecoms [G.. Pilipino Telephone Corporation. conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of BellTel. and International Communications Corporation. Inc. among others. Bell Telecommunication Philippines.. 1 took no part. In view of the favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members of the NTC. 126526] First Division. Facts: On 19 October 1993. NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto. it was declared that BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial 2 years.. Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD. BellTel’s proposal is technically feasible. BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical. microwave radio. Inc. Install. Eastern Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative. and International Communications Corporation. a Memorandum manifesting that “based on technical documents submitted. Inc. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company. Since BellTel was. 1 concur in result. BellTel’s second application was opposed by GMCR. Thus. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. Pursuant to its rules. Liberty Broadcasting Network. Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority. Inc. On 21 December 1994. this earlier application was ordered withdrawn.R. No. Inc. the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft 10 of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel. Inc. At the time of the filing of this application. On 25 March 1994. BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application docketed as NTC Case 93-481.600. the chief of the Rates and Regulatory Division of CCAD. Inc. wireless.. private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service. PAPTELCO. on 12 May 1995. Inc.. In an Order . and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office. Radio Communications of the Philippines.

BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve). 4. the Court issued a Resolution referring said petition to the Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9. the Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. 2. On said date. directing the NTC to meet and banc and to consider and act on the draft order within 15 days. the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime. The NTC acts through a three-man body. created the Board of Communications . resolution or decision. together. Chairman Kintanar and the opposing telecommunications companies filed their separate petitions for review. on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who. 1. the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. Corollarily. The Supreme Court dismissed the instant consolidated petitions for lack of merit. no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on 13 June 1995. On the latter date. the NTC. instead of resolving the two pending motions of BellTel. Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated 4 July 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate. into law. On 26 July 1995. On 23 September 1996. the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act 146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. Historical milieu of the NTC: PD 1 (Integrated Reorganization Plan) On 24 September 1972. Vote requirement NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. the law made it clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service Commissioner. in turn. then President Ferdinand E. par. however. As amended by RA 2677. NTC is a collegial body. While providing that the PSC shall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. set the said motions for a hearing on 29 May 1995. PD 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which. and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. Having been organized by EO 146 as a three-man commission. The amendment provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en banc. the vote alone of the chairman of the commission. 1 of BP 129. BellTel filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari. Marcos signed. composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. BellTel’s petition for mandamus was also granted. setting aside NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 for being contrary to law. constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. with costs against petitioners. absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision. the Court of Appeals promulgated decision. On 17 July 1995. praying for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel. Historical milieu of the NTC: CA 146 as amended by RA 2677 On 17 November 1936. granting BellTel’s petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition. On 4 July 1995.dated 16 May 1995. is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order. 3.

page 286). This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Philippine Consumers Foundation.” 8. However. a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon. It is not. and neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasijudicial functions. versus National Telecommunications Commission. 109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd. 6. However. by the full membership of the BOC in which case the concurrence of at least 2 of the membership of the BOC is necessary for a valid Decision. the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts. 2nd. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. 16 of EO 546 provides that “the Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners. . The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order 546. the BOC promulgated its “Rules of Procedure and Practice” in connection with applications and proceedings before it. the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Practice. This time. (Black.” The Executive Order took effect on 24 September 1979 . the new regulatory board was composed of 3 officers exercising quasi-judicial functions. EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body. Historical milieu of the NTC: BOC Rules are NTC Rules. merger of BOC and the Telecommunications Control Bureau as NTC On 23 July 1979. a surplusage in . 261 Southwestern Reporter. Historical milieu of the NTC: EO 546. Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. Rel. Law Dictionary. the BOC (now the NTC). 131 SCRA 200′ when it declared that: “The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on 25 January 1978 by the Board of Communications. the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. 9. On 25 January 1978. Statutory Construction: “And” construed The conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without any legal significance. Inc. Johnson versus Independent School District No. The Puno Opinion that the NTC is not a collegial body is not correct. 810. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration. Commission defined A Commission is a body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to perform some public service. There is persuasive authority that a ‘commission’ is synonymous with ‘board’ (State Ex. NTC While it may be true that the BOC Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order 546. page 596). the immediate predecessor of NTC govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then.(BOC) in place of the PSC. by any chance. 5. Sec. . creating the Ministries of Public Works. En Banc. merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity. A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or service . Wabash County. President Marcos issued Executive Order 546. Historical milieu of the NTC: Opinion of Justice Secretary (Puno) entitled to great weight but not conclusive upon the courts The opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules. however. Admittedly. or heard. Consequently. and of Transportation and Communications. the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). page 246). 7. preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and another an economist. now NTC.

Claim of non-joinder of indispensable parties untenable The oppositors in NTC Case 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as . NTC Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 void NTC Circular No. At the most. “that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed. 14. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC. Such nominal designations are without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. Use of word “deputy” does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC Even if Executive Order 546 used the word ‘deputy’ to designate the 2 other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. The word ‘and’. these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of EO 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. Statutory Construction: Every part of statute should be given effect In interpreting a statute. not the commissioner alone. in the first place. it is they whom BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. 11. only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all. as the action does not go into merits of the case. phrases or full sentence[s]. BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar for the former’s adherence and defense of its one-man rule as enforced by the latter. 1-1-93. Oppositors not absolutely necessary in an action for certiorari. 330. not the commissioner alone. 12. is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. The collegiality of the NTC cannot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof. instead of a commission or a threeman collegial body. From the context of Section 16 of Executive Order 546. Thus. a ‘one-man’ governmental body. 15. no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations. intended to implement. At the least. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. Memorandum Circular No. but of the commissioner and the 2 deputy commissioners. he would not have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of. 3-1-93. It means ‘in addition to’ (McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams. the Commission is composed of a Commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners. every part thereof should be given effect on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. are contrary to law and thus null and void. these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power. Courts cannot refrain from duty to nullify illegal regulations Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of EO 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body. As the aphorism goes.the law. and the Order of Kintanar declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity. Only the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar are indispensable parties in the action for certiorari In its certiorari action before the Court of Appeals. 13. 10. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were. 167 Northwestern Reporter. page 332).” Herein. if it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity. whether it is used to connect words.

It is elementary legal knowledge. after all. Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. and this score alone. All that Court of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion. the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal question. is a realm outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus. . and the subject of the deliberation of the 3-man commission would be the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on BellTel’s application for a provisional authority. As to how this discretion is to be exercised. Furthermore. that mandamus does not lie to control discretion. 16. Mandamus does not control discretion Jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in a case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper disposition. and so the Supreme Court must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the appellate court on this score. were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar. Basilio Bolante of the Legal Department of the NTC. 17. The appellate court did not order the NTC to forthwith grant said application. said court was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body. Engr. No evidence proffered that working draft was obtained by BellTel was obtained through illegal means The working draft was said to have been prepared by Atty. Petitioners have not proffered a single piece of evidence to prove the charge that the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel was obtained by the latter through illegal means. initialed by the CCAD Head. regardless of the merits of a case. No one among the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or declared it to be spurious. In the ultimate. that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission. Herein. the oppositors’ cause could not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires. when the Court of Appeals directed Commissioners to meet en banc and to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel. however.chairman of NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the Solicitor General.

Principally is not equivalent to exclusively The word “principally” as used in article 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Grounds for change of name The following may be considered. . as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name. On 15 June 1952. Alfon since childhood. She was registered at the Local Civil Registrar’s Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. Anthony de Padua Church. (1) when the name is ridiculous. to avoid confusion. Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. The Supreme Court modified the appealed order in as much as that petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as Estrella S. Civil Code of the Philippines. she used the name Estrella S. without costs. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. 2. 29 May 1980] Second Division. Alfon. In the case at bar. among others. and Mrs. Alfon. or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce. She lived in Mandaluyong for 23 years with her uncle. Haw Liong v.Alfon v. Abad Santos (p): 4 concur Facts: Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on 15 May 1952 at the UST Hospital to Filomeno Duterte and Estrella. granting the change of first name but not the surname. Alfon. After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing. She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor. Hector Alfon. the petition of name should be granted as the petitioner has been using the name of Estrella S. 1. tainted with dishonor. Hector Alfon. Singalong. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name. In the case at bar. she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. The CFI (Branch XXIII) partially denied petitioner’s prayer on 29 December 1978. Alfon. When Maria Estrella started schooling. the lower court erred in reasoning that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father. 1953 ed. Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (1 Tolentino 660. such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated. She filed a verified petition on 28 April 1978 praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Republic [GR L-51201. (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status. Manila. Alfon. Republic).

1. Hence the instant petition. not to the date of the commission of the crime. Rura appealed to the RTC Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the lower court. without costs.e. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 524. Conviction does not retroact to the day of the commission of the crime. Rura applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground that Rura is disqualified for probation under Section 9 (c) of PD 968 or the Probation Law (i. 19 June 1985] Second Division.Rura v. not to date of commission of a crime The statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction. “Previous” applies to date of conviction. The Supreme Court granted the probation and directed the judge to give due course to the petitioner’s application for probation. When the accused applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final judgment. Tubigon. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his application. denominated as Criminal Case 523. 525. 526 and 527. Bohol. Lopena [GR L-69810-14. In each criminal case the sentence was 3 months and fifteen 15 days. Abad Santos (p): 5 concur Facts: Teodulo Rura was accused. The 5 cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on 18 August 1983. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin. The court denied the application for probation. . Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of 17 months and 25 days. applicable to those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day and/or a fine of not less than P200).

He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch. A govt-owned corp. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. Juco. Sec. corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Code funded by a willing legislature. These subsidiary corps. Conceivably. without exception. such a situation cannot be allowed . 2 (1)] of the Consti. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. 1. B. XII-B [now Art IX. Certainly. xxx The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created.owned or controlled corps. covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? HELD: Sec. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law. This case refers to a GOCC. and the regulations of the COA. under the general law. subdivision and instrumentality of the Government. "Every" means each one of a group. NHA in turn appealed to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation. v. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. no longer by special charters. All offices and firms of the government are covered.National Housing Corp. could create several subsidiary corps. xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service. Art. including every government owned and controlled corporation. 134 SCRA 172 (1985) F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. On appeal. not the Labor Code. free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. but through incorp. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. employees of govt. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil serv¬ice shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. agency. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. and the fact that pvt. This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. a GOCC without original charter. 11. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. under the Corp.

Galido then asked for reconsideration. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election. ISSUES: 1. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. 91 G. page 159 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. Comelec Case No. shall be incompetent to act on the said body. 1967) Chapter 4. No. there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. No.R.Demafiles v. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. considering that they were reelectionists. In light of this. stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. 3. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. . However. 2. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. since there is a possibility of fraud. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor. L-28396 (December 29. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit.18. Footnote 126.

L-37684 (September 10. 43 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. is entitled to a refund. 2264. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. Footnote No. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. Arabay Inc. Since Sec.. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. oil and other petroleum products. ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. in excluding gasoline. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress. v. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. No. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance.Arabay Inc. . with the exception of gasoline. lubricating oils. 16 G. to a refund. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. distributor of gas. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. diesel fuel oils. and petroleumbased products. 2 of RA No. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.R.

No. driver. when the owner. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: “Sec.R. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder. 1997) FACTS: Sec. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder. Nos. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. 2. 14. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. . 119407 (July 7. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.People v. If the crime was frustrated murder. Mejia Case No. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. whether it is homicide or murder. and not frustrated murder.” ISSUE: 1. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder. 111 G.R. 118940-41 and G. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. The killing. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping.

Burden of proof on the validity of a legal collection of duties upon who questions it The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that their exaction was unlawful. taking account the purpose of the article. In the case at bar. without special taxation of costs in either instance. as follows: “A thin piece of wood. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. leather. not otherwise provided for. Nature of dust shields Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. and detached parts thereof. Malcolm (p): 6 concur Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909 provides that the manufactures of wool. 4. and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same section of the law. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing. 3. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former.Manila Railroad Company v. in case of doubt It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. because burdens are not to be imposed.” is defined in the work Car Builders’ Cyclopedia of American Practice.” which is the same as “dust shield. 41. while paragraph 197 provides that vehicles for use on railways. the particular enactment must be operative. such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen. In every case of doubt. and the general language are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.” Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs and held that dust shields should be classified as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. The Insular Collector of Customs decided that dust shields should be classified as “manufactures of wool. Particular enactment must be operative over the general one in the same statute Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. it is used as a detached part of railway vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909. “Dust guard. and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Insular Collector of Customs [GR 30264. The component material of chief value is the wool. 12 March 1929] En Banc. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but whether the importer was right.” 2. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do not extend their provisions. beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber at the back of a journal box. it is acknowledged that in reality. Dust shield are manufactured of mixed wool and hair.. not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem tax. Its purpose is to exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. and are used in railroad cabins of the Manila Railroad Company. p. . 10th ed. felt. are subject to 10% ad valorem. It thus affirmed the appealed judgment in its entirety. 1922. 1. nor presumed to be imposed.

in turn. Footnote No. The very next day. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. purportedly under Sec. 12 of RA 183. as amended. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed.A 183. alter. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. No. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. 1960. 2 of Sec. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. 12 of the Pasay City Charter.L-23800 (December 21. 67 FACTS: RA183. provides in its Sec.Almeda v. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. 1947). Repeals by implication are not favored. 14 of R. . 1965) Chapter VI. Florentino Case No. 14 of the City Charter. 10 G. RA 2709 amended Sec. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21.R. On the strength of Par. Page 265. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18.

especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law. or if there be no Vice-Mayor. Contemporaneous and practical interpretation of re-enacted statute sWhere a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted. Laxamana. supplements. section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter. In the case at bar. other than that of the municipal president. Sections 2180 and 2195. However. 19 September 1952] First Division. suspension. regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. what with the presumption against implied repeals. Pampanga. unless the intent to repeal or alter . the allegedly conflicting sections. 288. but if there is any conflict. Act 190). The incorporation of Section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code as Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Law did not have the effect of enlarging its scope. section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor. Baltazar [GR L-5955. could be interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (Sec. vice-mayor Jose T. 3. Section 21(a) derived from Section 2180.president stepped into the office. the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives. Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms. Section 2195 Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that upon the occasion of the absence. Thus. Section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code provides that whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs. the two should be harmonized if possible. assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. was suspended. 1. the quo warranto petition. Baltazar. the vice-president takes his place by virtue of Section 2195. by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes. his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor. or other temporary disability of the Mayor. and by the provincial governor. The portion of Section 21(a) relating to municipal offices was taken from section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code. and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon reenactment. and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way. when the office of municipal president (now mayor) became permanently vacant. It must also be noted that paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to municipal offices in general.Laxamana v. who immediately took the corresponding official oath. general in its terms. Otherwise stated. is not repealed by a subsequent statute. Thus. Particular not repealed by general statute unless there is manifest intent to repeal such A special and local statute. 4. the provincial governor. the vice. not repeal. 2. Particular over general Even disregarding their origin. must prevail over the general terms of section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal (local) offices. supplemented each other. providing for a particular case or class of cases. Bengzon (p): 7 concur Facts: In July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan. acting under section 21(a) of the Revised Election Code (RA 180). to supersede or repeal section 2195. if it is a municipal office. The Supreme Court dismissed the quo warranto petition with costs. Likewise. and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. as mayor of Sexmoan. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute. with the consent of the provincial board. thus. provisions and applications. with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. when the municipal president is suspended. the latter will prevail. the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office.

the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor. general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute. and if the vice. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute.mayor is not available. 5. assume the office of the mayor. even after the Revised Election Code was enacted. will ordinarily not affect the special provisions. In the case at bar. by operation of law. one as a general law of the land. Executive Construction given weight by Court The contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts. the other as the law of a particular case.is manifest. the Department of the Interior and the office of Executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal governments. of such earlier statute. although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. . the vice-mayor shall. the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. Where there are two statutes. have consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor.

heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran. or order of the authorities.Butuan Sawmill v. Ordinance 104 an invalid exercise of police power The passage of ordinance 104. 1. heat and power of Butuan Sawmill. one as a general law of the land. Stoll. prohibiting the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any consumer’s building with the power plant. Act 2264). 1 on leave Facts: Butuan Sawmill. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision with costs against appellant City of Butuan. The logical construction of section 2 (d) of RA 2264. The court also annulled Ordinance 104 for being unconstitutional. by enumerating the kinds of businesses required to pay the tax. unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by cities or municipalities. Ordinance 104 was enacted. Agusan. Hence. Inc. and further by Ordinance 148. 399. unreasonable and oppressive. the other as the law of a particular case. as far as they imposed a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light. It was further amended by Ordinance 131 (16 May 1961) by modifying the penal provision. nor can the power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise. Inc. Earlier special over the latter general Where there are two statutes. vs. Petition for declaratory relief). 4. The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of Butuan Sawmill (see Section 2. and its effects Subparagraph (j) of the section 2 (RA 2264) specifically withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax. Reyes JBL (p): 9 concur. 11.(State vs. for an electric light. 2. Ordinance 7 imposed a 2% on the gross sales or receipts tax of any business operated in the city. is an unwarranted exercise of power . Rafferty). 29 April 1966] En Banc. making it unlawful for any person or firm to cut or disconnect the electrical connection of any consumer in the city of Butuan without his consent. It must be noted that the franchise was granted by act of the legislature on 18 June 1949 while the city’s charter was approved on 15 June 1950. 18 June 1949). was granted a legislative franchise (RA. subject to the terms and conditions established in Act 3636. Construction must consider other provisions of the same act. that would not nullify section 2 (j) of the same Act. is that the local government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are not subject to franchise taxes. the court declared Ordinance 7. as amended by CA 132 and the Constitution. without the consent of the consumer. Manila Railroad Co. Further. except in case of fire. the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general. clear and positive danger to residents. The issue on the gross sales tax was raised with the CFI Agusan (Special Civil Case 152. City of Butuan [GR L-21516. 131 and 148 of the City of Butuan unconstitutional and ultra vires. It was also issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18 March 1954. since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power. arbitrary. heat and power (sic).” On 13 April 1960. The inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill. 3. the direct appeal on questions of law to the Supreme Court. approved on 11 June 1962 by including within the coverage of taxable businesses “those engaged in the business of electric light. the city’s interpretation of the provision would result in double taxation against the business of the franchisee because the internal revenue code already imposes a franchise tax. Taxation of franchise beyond city’s taxation power. by the city of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. On 1 October 1950. This ordinance was amended by Ordinance 11 (14 December 1950).

for the general welfare The ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current to a company even if the latter does not pay the bills thereof. and to that extent deprives the company of its property without due process. How the general welfare would be promoted under the ordinance has neither been explained nor justified. . The general welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of the complaining consumers against the franchise holder. and not in the City of Butuan. supervision and control over public services and their franchises in the Public Service Commission. because the legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction.

Sec. and he started paying the Government for such.R. Joya Case No. was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. while Act 1120 is a special law. 16. No. herein petitioner. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. 1928) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. which are contrary to the Civil Code. disposition. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow. and transmission of friar lands. he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. . His widow. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition. Joya as administrator. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. L-28067 (March 10.Arayata v. 9 G. Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. The special law must prevail. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. The Civil Code is a general law. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law.

therefore. J. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. What said article requires is that the province. admitted that P. Burgos Avenue were.City of Manila vs. in effect. No. city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Under Article 2189 CC. the City." . Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P.R. a national highway. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico. Due to the fall. within a "loading and unloading" zone. Burgos Avenue. In its answer to the complaint. this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision. Teotico suffered injuries. On appeal. 29 January 1968. and took a few steps. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision. 1958. Ruling: Decision affirmed. city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. Burgos Avenue. he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. waiting for a jeepney. it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province. Genaro N. Even if P.: Facts: On January 27. Teotico and CA G. Teotico City of Manila vs. L-23052. Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA Concepcion. alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition…and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned…" Thus. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed. the City had. CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Manila.

Footnote No. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. which shall be determined by law. 2. What the term of office of barangay officials is. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law. Commission on Elections Case No. No. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. ISSUE: 1. shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials. . 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. Sec. 10. should be the one followed. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. Art. 1997) Chapter X. ‘The term of office of elective local officials. the Supreme Court in Paras v. Furthermore. the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. 6679. 8 of the Constitution. 2.A. R. HELD: 1. 10. 8 of the Constitution provides that. 105 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. 8 of the Constitution. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. W/N there was a violation of Art. Page 413. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A.David v. 127116 (April 8. R. 10.A. 85 G. Sec.R. Sec. except barangay officials. No.

the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. L-9144 (March 27. 1915) Chapter III.95 FACTS: Defendant. it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution.R. Finally. No. Upon reaching the witness stand. 19 and 20 are constitutional. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers. 297 G. HELD: Sec. Page 94. Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. However. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. Footnote No. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution. . was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. nevertheless.US v. discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. De Guzman Case No. looking at the legislative history of the statute.

including corporations owned or controlled by the Government” (par. s. 4. 1958). employment purely casual. 3 concur in result. reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional objections. SSC [ GR L-15045. it would not have defined an “employer” in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. Intent of law limited to corporations and industries The discussions in the Senate dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. 7 and 8). hence. or any of its political subdivisions. 3. The definition of the term “employer” is. undertaking. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of the law. employee. however. the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161. it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employeremployee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded. operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. Had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain. In the case at bar. industry. covers any service performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder. 8. Gutierrez-David (p): 5 concur. denied the request. branches or instrumentalities. etc. which took effect in 1957. requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request. natural or juridical. The Supreme Court affirmed Resolution 572 and 767. *d+ sec. however. subpars. Ejusdem generis applies only if there is uncertainty The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. has been deleted by express provision of RA 1792. 1. [j]. 1 reserves vote Facts: On 1 September 1958. this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5 (c) of RA 1161. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. 2. 1958). with costs against appellant. “Employment”. sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as regards the employment. domestic service in a private home. 8).In RE exemption from SSS coverage: Archbishop of Manila v. Definition of employer. wholly or partially. thru counsel. except the Government and any of its political subdivisions. sec. 1958 of the Social Security Commission. *c+. services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. the Social Security Commission in its Resolution 572 (s. domestic or foreign. Acting upon the recommendation of its Legal Staff. like employment under the Government. which are directly or indirectly. was denied by the Commission in its Resolution 767 (s. That portion of the law. branches or instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government. and employment (as defined in law) The term “employer” as used in the law is defined as “any person. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. who carries in the Philippines any trade. 8). filed with the Social Security Commission a request that “Catholic Charities. business. as amended. Intent of legislature: exemption excluded in new law When RA 1161 was enacted. according to paragraph [j] of said section 8. while an “employee” refers to “any person who performs services for an `employer’ in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such services” (par. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. 20 January 1961] En Banc. as amended (Social Security Law of 1954). thus. par. But this is readily .

5. Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government.explained by the fact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or gain. Valid exercise of police power. sickness. old age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. Inclusion of religious organization does not violate prohibition on application of public funds for the benefit of a priest. and is in full accord with the constitutional provisions on the “promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people. Social justice The enactment of the law is a legitimate exercise of the police power. since such payment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee. but funds belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the Government. they are intended for the protection of said employees against the hazards of disability. death or disability benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provision of the Constitution. sickness. Even assuming that said funds are impressed with the character of public funds. pursuant to the “policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to employees against the hazards of disability. old age and death. does not violate right to disseminate religious information The funds contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds. especially to working women and minors.” It affords protection to labor. Further. . the contributions are not in the nature of taxes on employment.” 6. their payment as retirement.

HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments.00 pursuant to PD 42.600. The petition for Certiorari is granted.00. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA. Reyes Case No. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6. whichever is lower. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor.400.National Housing Authority v. 1983) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25. No. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation.00. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6. . 85 G. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases.000 sq/rn.R. 49439 (June 29.600.

D. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. and secure the benefits intended.R. 68a. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery. 95 G. . 111107 (January 10. suppress the mischief. 1997) FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. HELD: No. equipment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P. No. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed.Paat v. He insists that only the Court can do so. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 705. Court of Appeals Case No.

Villegas v. Mayor Villegas appointed Manuel D.’ on the ground that Romualdez ‘is not empowered to make such designation. quo warranto and mandamus. one moreover whose appointment is expressly vested in the city mayor. 1968. After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by the parties. Mayor Villegas and Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition.” It was not until the filing of the petition that Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City Treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. chief of the each division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila. the Secretary of Finance (Romualdez). not an employee. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. whether such duties are precisely defined by law or not. The principle therein announced does not extend as far as the choice of an assistant city treasurer whose functions do not require that much degree of confidence. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari. 2. without pronouncement as to costs. Fernando (p): 8 concur. Lapid. basing his action on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated 19 September 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code. and that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Commissioner of Civil Service commanding him to approve the appointment of Lapid to the said office in accordance with the Civil Service Rules. authorized the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila (Gloria) to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective 1 June 1968. Implied repeals not favored. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it . praying that judgment be rendered to declare illegal and void ab initio the authorization given by Romualdez to Gloria to assume the duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila. as Assistant City Treasurer. who necessarily must enjoy the fullest confidence of the local executive. Mayor Villegas of Manila. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. RA 5185. Subido [GR L-31711. In AO 40 (s. not to mention the specific grant of such authority to the President. 1.” In the case at hand. with application for writ of preliminary injunction. 1908). that undue interference with the power and prerogatives of a local executive is sought to be avoided considering the City Mayor’s primary responsibility is for efficient governmental administration. the Commissioner of Civil Service (Subido) disapproved the appointment of Lapid. 30 September 1971] En Banc. the Assistant and City Treasurer is an officer. 3. Pineda v. Officers and employees distinguished The Revised Administrative Code distinguishes one in that category from an “officer” to designate those “whose duties. and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. In a 1st indorsement dated 14 February 1969. Reyes.” On 25 February 1969. may be considered to involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government. not being of a clerical or manual nature. directed Gloria ‘to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer. the lower court rendered its decision on 4 August 1969 dismissing the petition. Claudio does not apply The principle. Standard to determine repeal Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended (See US v. 2 took no part Facts: In a letter dated 3 June 1968. 17 June 1968). was announced in connection with the appointment of a department head.’ On 1 January 1969. the chief of police.

An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. At any rate. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. indicates a contrary intention upon the part of the legislature. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. considered in its entirety.” . (see Manila Railroad Co. 4. Subsequent general statute does not repeal a special enactment unless intent is manifest A subsequent statute.irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. the specific provision controls unless the statute. while a special act is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. general in character as to its terms and application. General and special laws distinguished A general law is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. Rafferty. Generalia specialibus non derogant. 1919). in the event harmony between provisions of this type in the same law or in two laws is impossible. v. 5.

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