Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Section 20
Safety Instrumented Systems

Section 20

Haward Technology Middle East 1

Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Safety Instrumented Systems

Section 20

Haward Technology Middle East 2

Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Safety Instrumented Systems
TOPICS  Introduction  Probability of Failure  System Architecture

 Safety PLC
 Major Systems  Typical Questions & Answers

Section 20

Haward Technology Middle East 3

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Introduction Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 4 .Process Control.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 5 .Process Control.

in the year of 1880 Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 6 . but instead.Process Control. our responsibility to fellow human beings and common sense” Werner von Siemens Berlin. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION “The prevention of accidents should not be considered a question of legislation.

OSHA recognizes compliance with the standard ANSI/ISA S84.as a good engineering practice for safety instrumented systems. e.  SIS typically are composed of sensors.Application of Safety Instrumented System for the Process Industries . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION  Safety instrumented systems (SIS) are used to provide safety control functions for processes. emergency shutdown (ESD). logic solvers and final control elements.Process Control. fire detection and blow-down functions. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 7 .g.  Due to the critical nature of such systems.01 .

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION Scope of a Safety Instrumented System Logic solver Sensor Logic Solver (Hardware and Software) Actuator Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 8 .

IEC61511 as well as ISA S84. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 9 . are creating more stringent safety requirements for process plants. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION  Today SIS Safety Instrumented Systems play an increasingly important role in many process plants. Safety standards such as IEC 61508.Process Control.01.

Burner Management Systems (BMS). High Integrity Protection Systems (HIPS). Nuclear 1E Safety Systems. Semiconductor Life Safety Systems (SEMI S2). High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 10 . other names used for SIS Safety Instrumented Systems are: Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD).Process Control. Railway Switching. Fire and Gas Systems (F&G). Critical Turbo-machinery Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION  Depending on application use.

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 11 . equipment and the environment by reducing the likelihood (frequency) or the impact severity of an identified emergency event. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems INTRODUCTION  The operation of many industrial processes involve inherent risks due to the presence of dangerous material like gases and chemicals.Process Control.  Safety Instrumented Systems SIS are specifically designed to protect personnel.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems PROBABILITY of FAILURE Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 12 .Process Control.

The first way is commonly called a spurious trip which usually results in an unplanned but safe process shutdown. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems PROBABILITY of FAILURE  By understanding how components of a Safety Instrumented System can fail. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 13 .  While there is no danger associated with this type of SIS failure. it is possible to calculate a Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD). the operational costs can be very high.  There are two basic ways for SIS to fail.Process Control.

permitting continued process operation in an unsafe or dangerous manner. These failures are known as covert or hidden failures and contribute to the probability PFD of the system failing in a dangerous manner on demand. the failure remains undetected. Instead. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems PROBABILITY of FAILURE  The second type of failure does not cause a process shutdown or nuisance trip. the SIS would be unable to respond properly. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 14 .  If an emergency demand occurred.  The PFD for the Safety Instrumented System SIS is the sum of PFD's for each element of the system.Process Control.

it is imperative that these components of Safety Instrumented Systems be tested frequently enough to reduce the PFD and meet the target SIL.  Thus. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems PROBABILITY of FAILURE  The governing standards for Safety Instrumented Systems SIS state that plant operators must determine and document that equipment is designed. tested and operated in a safe manner.Process Control. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 15 . maintained. inspected.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems System Architecture Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 16 .

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Operator system Maintenance station Engineering system Industrial Ethernet High-availability ET 200M Redundant/ Non-redundant Fail-safe fault-iterant and high availability Redundant/ ET 200M Non-redundant Standard Standard/ safety-related ET 200iSP Redundant & non-redundant Standard ET 200S PROFIBUS ET 200iSP Redundant & non-redundant Standard ET 200S PROFIBUS Standard Standard/ safety-related Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 17 .Process Control.

sensors / transmitters) Power supplies Output devices/ final elements (e. actuators) Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 18 .Process Control.g.g. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Basic PLC System Input interfaces Communications Output interfaces PLC Input devices (e.

 Reliability of software (also stability of versions)  Flexibility without security  Unprotected communications  Limited redundancy Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 19 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Basic PLC System .Problems  Not designed for safety applications  Limited fail safe characteristics  High risk of covert failures (undetected dangerous failure modes) through lack of diagnostics.Process Control.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Upgrading of Standard PLCs for Safety Applications Improvement Steps  Improve Software QA  Add hot back up  Add I/O diagnostic circuits  Install dual redundant system components Problems Remain  Reliability Analysis  Cost and complexity  Risk inherent in custom designs  Documentation control  Need for certification Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 20 .Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control.

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 21 . if this is demanded.Process Control. any hazardous failure causes the failure of the safety function. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IEC 61508 / 61511 defines the following architectures: 1oo1 The architecture consists of a single channel for the safety function.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Basic PLC architecture without diagnostics Type: 1oo1 Input Circuit Output Circuit CPU Risk of covert failure due to failures of :  Input circuits  I/O comms  Processor  Program cycle  Output circuits Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 22 .

Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Safety Instrumented Systems
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Characteristics of Safety PLCs (1)
 Automatic diagnostics continuously check the PLC system functions at short intervals within the fault tolerant time of the process.  >99% faults are notified for attention and repair.  Redundant hardware options available to provide uninterrupted operation even if one channel has failed.  On line hot replacement of failed modules can be provided.  All application software updated transparently to redundant channels.
Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 23

Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Safety Instrumented Systems
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Characteristics of Safety PLCs (2)

 Provides a predictable and safe response to all failures of hardware, power supplies and malfunctions of system software.
 Fault injection testing is applied to all of the system  I/O subsystems continuously checking all I/O signals  Bus communications self-checking with group isolation on fault.  High security write protection on communication ports
Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 24

Process Control, Instrumentation and Safeguarding

Safety Instrumented Systems
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Characteristics of Safety PLCs (3)  Software QA applied on life cycle principles

 Program flow control checking
 Data verification checks validity at all times  Operating system and application program tools by same vendor.  Application software use limited variability language.
Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 25

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Single Channel Safety PLC Architecture With Diagnostics Type: 1oo1D Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits V+ Diagnostic Protection System Fail safe operation: (single fault tolerance) Independent output opens on detection of faults in      Input circuits I/O comms Processor (self test or watchdog) Program cycle Output circuits Haward Technology Middle East 26 Section 20 .Process Control.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Single Channel Safety PLC Architecture With Dual CPU Type: 1oo1D V+ Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits Diagnostic Protection System Control Module Dual redundant processor option in single channel module Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 27 .

This system is safer than 1oo1 but has twice as many nuisance trips. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 28 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IEC 61508 / 61511 defines the following architectures: 1oo2 The architecture consists of two sensors and two final elements of which only one set is required for shut-down.Process Control.

This system is less safe than 1oo2 but has fewer nuisance trips. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 29 .Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IEC 61508 / 61511 defines the following architectures: 2002 The architecture consists of two sensors and two final elements. both of which are required for shut-down.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Dual Redundant Channel Safety PLC Architecture With Diagnostics V+ Type: 1oo2D Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits Diagnostic Protection System Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits Diagnostic Protection System Both channels must operate to trip output . Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 30 .Process Control. Diagnostics must check other CPU. Reverts to 1oo1D if module fault is detected.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems 1oo2D Safety PLC with mode switching Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits V+ Diagnostic Protection System Calc Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits Diagnostic Protection System Verify Calculate mode is on-line. verify mode is off-line Using alternating modes reduces risk of common cause Hw/Sw errors Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 31 .

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems 1oo2D Safety PLC with mode switching Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits V+ Diagnostic Protection System Verify Input Circuits Control Module Output Circuits Diagnostic Protection System Calc Calculate mode is on-line. verify mode is off-line Using alternating modes reduces risk of common cause hw/sw errors Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 32 .

Process Control. The output state does not change if the result of only one channel does not conform to the other two. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE IEC 61508 / 61511 defines the following architectures: 2oo3 The architecture consists of three redundant channels that are connected with a majority output device. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 33 .

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Triple Modular Redundant PLCs (TMR) IN CPU OUT IN CPU OUT 2oo3 IN CPU OUT Comparators & 2oo3 voters at each stage No single point of failure.Process Control. High safety integrity. High availability. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 34 .

c) For event recording.Safety Instrumented Systems SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Strong need for communications between the SIS and the plant control systems. b) For tidy up of DCS or PLC controller states or sequences arising from action of the SIS. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 35 . d) For I/O status and status of the SIS itself.  Communications and data formats need to be compatible with DCS/PLC vendor standards or open standards. a) For operator information and co-ordination with control system.  Security required in communications to prevent incorrect writing of data into the SIS.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 36 .Process Control.

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 37 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC  This is a specially designed class of PLC which provides high reliability and high safety through the use of special electronic design. special software and preengineered redundancy.  The Safety PLC has I/O circuits which are designed to be fail-safe with built-in diagnostics.Process Control.

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 38 . watchdog timer and all communications systems.  One-out-of-one with diagnostics (1oo1D) architecture uses specific diagnostic circuits to convert dangerous failures into safe failures by de-energising the output. processor operation. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC  The processor of the Safety PLC has built in diagnostics for memory.Process Control.

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 39 . from the input modules through the Main Processors to the output modules.Process Control.  Every I/O module houses the circuitry for three independent legs. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC  The TRICONEX system is designed with a fully triplicated architecture throughout.

Backplane of the Main Chassis Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 40 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Power Termination TriBus Power Supply #1 Dual Power Rails Power Supply #2 Channel A Channel B Channel C Channel A Channel B Channel C Right I/O Module* Left I/O Module* Communication Module Typical Logical Slot Comm Bus I/O Bus Main Processors A. & C *Either the left module or right module functions as the active or hot-spare module.Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC ELCO Connectors for I/O Termination Terminal 8trip 81 Terminal 8trip 82 Process Control. B.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC  Each leg on the input modules reads the process data and passes that information to its respective Main Processor.  The three Main Processors communicate with each other using a proprietary high-speed bus system called the TriBus. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 41 .Process Control.

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC SIMPLIFIED TRICONEX SYSTEM Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 42 .Process Control.

hardware voting takes place.Process Control. transmit. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC  The individual input table in each Main Processor is transferred to its neighbouring Main Processors over the proprietary TriBus.  During this transfer.  The TriBus uses a Direct Memory Access programmable device to synchronize. vote and compare data among the three Main Processors. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 43 .

the signal value found in two out of three tables prevails.  Any disparity is flagged and used at the end of the scan by the built-in Fault Analyser routines to determine whether a fault exists on a particular module.  The three independent Main Processors each maintain data about necessary corrections in local memory. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 44 .Process Control.  One-time differences. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC If a disagreement is discovered. which result from sample timing variations can be distinguished from a pattern of differing data. and the third table is corrected accordingly.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems SAFETY PLC Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 45 .

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems Major Systems Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 46 .Process Control.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS YOKOGAWA PROSAFE – RS SYSTEM Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 47 .

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 48 .  Conventionally. two separate monitoring and operating environments were required for a DCS and SIS.Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Yokogawa / ProSafe-RS  Achieving absolute integrity between distributed control systems (DCS) and safety instrumented systems (SIS) for plant automation has traditionally raised complex design and integration issues. Different communications and distinctive hardware architectures had to be set up.

 Now Yokogawa puts an end to DCS-SIS incompatibility with the new ProSafe-RS. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 49 .Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Yokogawa / ProSafe-RS  Plant managers striving to optimize process operations have taken it as a given that project time and expenses would escalate. the world’s first truly integrated "safety PLC" for the process industries.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Emerson .DeltaV SLS-1508 Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 50 .

Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 51 .  The resulting smart safety instrumented system provides an integrated approach to complete safety loops .from sensor to logic solver to final control element.  It also uses digital intelligence and diagnostics to enable more automated safety loop testing and other features that increase system availability while reducing lifecycle costs and easing regulatory compliance.Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Emerson Process Management / DeltaV SLS-1508  Emerson extends the proven innovations of their PlantWeb® architecture to safety applications.

and increase the mandatory proof test interval. the DeltaV SIS system takes advantage of the PlantWeb architecture's digital communications and smart diagnostics within field devices to increase the availability of the whole of the Safety Instrumented Function. reduce the number of risky personnel trips into the field.Process Control. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 52 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Emerson Process Management / DeltaV SLS-1508  As a key component of this smart SIS solution.  Scheduled partial-stroke testing of final control elements can improve the safety level.

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Ivensys Triconex / Tricon Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 53 .

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Ivensys Triconex / Tricon  The TRICON is a state-of-the-art fault tolerant controller based on a Triple-Modular Redundant (TMR) architecture. The system uses two-out-of-three voting to provide high integrity. error-free. TMR employs three isolated. parallel control systems and extensive diagnostics integrated into one system.Process Control. uninterrupted process operation with no single point of failure. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 54 .

Process Control. All diagnostic information is stored in system variables and annunciated with Light Emitting Diode (LED) indicators. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems MAJOR SYSTEMS Ivensys Triconex / Tricon  Setting up applications is simplified with the TRICON. because the triplicated TMR system operates as a single control system from the user's point of view. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 55 .  The extensive diagnostics are inherent and transparent to the programmer.

and documenting safety and critical process control applications for the Tricon and Trident programmable logic controllers. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 56 . user interface. Instrumentation and Safeguarding MAJOR SYSTEMS Ivensys Triconex / Tricon  The Tricon controller can interface with Modbus masters and slaves. testing. and self-documentation capabilities make the system superior to traditional and competing engineering tools.  The TriStation 1131 Developer's Workbench is an integrated tool for developing. The programming methodology.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control. external host computers on Ethernet networks and other Tricon systems on a Peer-to-Peer network. Distributed Control Systems (DCS).

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL QUESTIONS & ANSWERS Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 57 .

Process Control. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 1. sensor(s). Other common terms for SISs are safety interlock systems. It is designed to prevent or mitigate hazardous events by taking the process to a safe state when predetermined conditions are violated. emergency shutdown systems (ESD). A SIS can be one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF).  A SIS is composed of a combination of logic solver(s). Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 58 . What is a SIS?  A SIS is a Safety Instrumented System. and safety shutdown systems (SSD). and final element(s).

Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 2. and final element(s).  One or more SIFs comprise a SIS.  A SIF is designed to prevent or mitigate a hazardous event by taking a process to a tolerable risk level.Process Control. A SIF is composed of a combination of logic solver(s).  A SIF has an assigned SIL level depending on the amount of risk that needs to be reduced. sensor(s). Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 59 . What is a SIF?  SIF stands for Safety Instrumented Function.

What is SIL?  SIL stands for Safety Integrity Level. the lower the probability of failure on demand for the safety system and the better the system performance.Process Control.  The higher the SIL level. or probability of failure on demand (PFD) for a SIF or SIS. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 3. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 60 .  A SIL is a measure of safety system performance.  There are four discrete integrity levels associated with SIL.

 A SIL level applies to an entire system. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 61 . typically the cost and complexity of the system also increase.Process Control. What is SIL?  It is important to also note that as the SIL level increases.  Individual products or components do not have SIL ratings. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 3.  SIL levels are used when implementing a SIF that must reduce an existing intolerable process risk level to a tolerable risk range.

 Functional safety is achieved when every SIF is successfully carried out and the process risk is reduced to the desired level. What does functional safety mean?  Functional safety is a term used to describe the safety system that is dependent on the correct functioning of the logic solver. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 62 . Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 4.Process Control. and final elements to achieve the desired risk reduction level. sensors.

Why were the ANSI/ISA 84. as the application and usage of software has evolved and proliferated. and specifically for IEC 61508.Process Control. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 63 .  Additionally. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 5. IEC 61508. and IEC 61511 standards developed?  The standards were a natural evolution for the need to reduce process risk and improve safety through a more formalized and quantifiable methodology. there was an increased need to develop a standard to guide system / product designers and developers in what they needed to do to ensure and “claim” that their systems / products were acceptably safe for their intended uses.

00. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 64 .Process Control. the ANSI/ISA-84.  Specifically. and finally implements a SIS when a hazardous event cannot be prevented or mitigated with something other than instrumentation. designs a variety of layers of protection. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 6. When do I need a SIF or a SIS?  The philosophy of the standards suggests that a SIS or SIF should be implemented only if there is no other noninstrumented way of adequately eliminating or mitigating process risk. conducts a process hazard analysis.01-2004 (IEC 61511 Mod) recommends a multi-disciplined team approach that follows the Safety Lifecycle.

system architecture. What is a proof-test interval?  Proof testing is a requirement of safety instrumented systems to ensure that everything is working and performing as expected. and final elements.  The testing frequency varies for each SIS and is dependent on the technology.Process Control.  Testing must include the verification of the entire system. sensors. and target SIL level. logic solver. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 7. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 65 . The proof-test interval is an important component of the probability of failure on demand calculation for the system.

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FEMA). and preplans alternative emergency actions if safety systems fail.  The PHA must be conducted by a diverse team that has specific expertise in the process being analyzed. There are many consulting and engineering firms that also provide PHA services. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). Instrumentation and Safeguarding TYPICAL Q & A 8. What is a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) and who conducts this?  A PHA is an OSHA directive that identifies safety problems and risks within a process. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 66 . develops corrective actions to respond to safety issues. PHA methodologies can include a What-If Analysis.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control. and a Fault Tree Analysis.

the number of system components. the probability of failure on demand (PFD) numbers for each component. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 67 . voting). Instrumentation and Safeguarding TYPICAL Q & A 9. and the proof testing intervals all play a significant role in the determination of a SIL level. The type of technology employed. the system architecture (e.g. What voting configurations are required for each SIL level?  Obtaining a desired SIL level is dependent on a multitude of factors.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control.. The voting architecture must be analyzed in the context of all the factors noted above. redundancy.  There is not a standard answer for what voting configurations are required for each SIL level.

Many times.  Additionally. which inevitably will require increased maintenance. it is likely that the higher the SIL level. This is why the standards recommend a SIL based solution only when process risk cannot be reduced by other methods. Instrumentation and Safeguarding TYPICAL Q & A 10. implementing a SIL solution will require increased equipment.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 68 .Will a SIL rated system require increased maintenance?  SIL solutions are certainly not always the most costeffective solutions for decreasing process risk. the more frequent the proof testing interval will be. which may ultimately increase the amount of system maintenance that is required.

 Correct sensor placement is more important than deciding whether a F&G SIF / SIS should be SIL 2 or SIL 3. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 69 . If there is incorrect placement of the gas / flame detectors and hazardous gases and flames are not adequately detected. Can a F&G system be a SIF or SIS?  A Fire and Gas (F&G) system that automatically initiates process actions to prevent or mitigate a hazardous event and subsequently takes the process to a safe state can be considered a Safety Instrumented Function / Safety Instrumented System.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control.  It is absolutely critical in a F&G system to ensure optimal sensor placement. then the SIF / SIS will not be effective. Instrumentation and Safeguarding TYPICAL Q & A 11.

However. What is SIL 4?  SIL 4 is the highest level of risk reduction that can be obtained through a Safety Instrumented System. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 70 . in the process industry this is not a realistic level and currently there are few.  SIL 4 systems are typically so complex and costly that they are not economically beneficial to implement.Safety Instrumented Systems Process Control. then fundamentally there is a problem in the process design which needs to be addressed by a process change or other non-instrumented method. Instrumentation and Safeguarding TYPICAL Q & A 12. if a process includes so much risk that a SIL 4 system is required to bring it to a safe state. products / systems that support this safety integrity level. Additionally. if any.

Individual products are only suitable for use in a SIL environment. Section 20 Haward Technology Middle East 71 .  A SIL level applies to a Safety Instrumented Function / Safety Instrumented System. Can an individual product be SIL rated?  No. Instrumentation and Safeguarding Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A 13.Process Control.

SafetyNet (MTL). Options include. Instrumentation and Safeguarding 14. the ISA SP84 committee is working on developing guidelines for a safety bus. ControlNet (Allen Bradley). to make sure that the foundations comply with IEC 61508.What type of communication buses or protocols are applicable for SIL 2 or SIL 3 systems?  The type of communication protocol that is suitable for a SIL 2 or SIL 3 system is really dependent on the type of platform that is being used. and PROFIsafe.Safety Instrumented Systems TYPICAL Q & A Process Control. but are not limited to: 4-20 mA output signal. and IEC 61511 standards. Haward Technology Middle East 72 Section 20 . DeviceNet Safety (Allen Bradley). Currently.

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