Virgil Ney





Repr~uced by
; . ,.. Is 5

, un u de'

: " :



OTATN. AG0-7C04 irongfeld ni :al 2215y lech &Va. UNTDSTTS fo ed rl Scientific I4AQJATR

' " "*






by Virgil Ney

October 1968



, ,.i

ABSTRACT The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several thousand years; its American ancestors may be found in the units organized during the American Revolution. The modern infantry battalion in the United States Army began in the period just prior to World War H. The battalion was forged and tested on the battlefields of Europe and in the Pacific Area. Nuclear weapons, the Korean War, and the Cold War have exerted considerable influence on the size, composition, and weaponry of the presentday infantry battalion. The adaptation of the World War H armored division organization to the ROAD division has given the infantry battalion of the United States Army the highest fire and movement capability it has ever possessed in our military history. The advent of the helicopter and its application to troop carrier and fire support missions enables the infantry battalion to become highly air mobile.






/ I,








Anderson. and Major General Ben Sternberg. Johnson acted as a research assistant in the gathering of materials. B. USARet. USARet. Pentagon. Eva M. L. Jr. Librarian. Hanst. F. Combat Developments Command Library. Mead. Fort Belvoir.. Army Library. Major General A. iv CORG-M-343 . Department of the Army. The Army Library. and Mr. In addition to her secretarial duties. Mrs. Virginia. Office. Colonel B. Major K. D. Army Library. Fort Belvoir. John Wike. Virginia.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the preparation and research required for this studyi the author was assisted by the following individuals and institutions: Miss Dorothy Savage. and Colonel J. Pentagon. Chief of Military History. The Engineer School Library. Roberta Shearin. Miss Elenora Caruso. Emma M. The National War College. Conmy. Braund. Evelyn Robinson. Pentagon. USA. Mary Lee Stubbs.. Lois Aldridge of the National Archives. USA.

......... Selected Tables of Organization and Equipment ....... Infantry Battalion..... TO 7-15......... HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .. T/O 7-415.. 1 October 1940 . T/O 7-416...... COMMAND... Airdrome Combat Company.. ................... ... ....... TO 7-15.. 1 April 1942 .1i iv vii 1 10 27 41 51 57 189 191 208 ............. TO 7-15.......... CONCLUSIONS ............. TOE 7-95............... TO 7-15......... Striking Force Company... THE ROAD AND AIRMOBILE BATTALIONS IN VIETNAM ... Fixed Defense Company.........85 ....... 13 April 1943 ........... 1 April 1942 ... Air Base Security Battaion..... Air Base Security Battalion.........CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS SUMMARY .................... 60 62 63 65 68 70 72 75 77 79 ..... .... AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION .................. Air Base Security Battalion........ Armored Infantry Battalion.................... CONTROL.......... T/O 7-418....... Infantry Battalion......... 13 April 1943 .... T/O 7-417.. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTION .. TO 7-415........................ i.. Air Base Security Battalion........... B.... T/O 7-417. 88 92 96 v CORG-M-343 - 3 ..... Infantry Battalion..... Infantry Battalion.... 1 April 1942 .... 1 April 1942 ................ ... APPENDIXES A....................... infantry Battalion. 21 July 1943 ............ THE POST-WORLD WAR II BATTALION AND THE KOREAN WAR ....... Air Base Security Battalion......... 26 February 1944 ........... Rifle. TO 7-15............. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment..... 1 March 1942 ... Task Assignment . 1 April 1942 .......... 1 March 1943 ...............1775-1940 THE WORLD WAR 1 RIFLE BATTALION ............... ........ Air Base Security Battalion. LITERATURE CITED . Separate.......................

29 February 1944 .... 109 T/O & E 7-87.....170 Evolution of the Infantry Battalion and the Span of Control ...... 31 March 1966 ......... Chart of Civil War Army Organization.. Appendix I..I CONTENTS (Concluded) Page T!O & E 7-85. Ranger Infantry Battalion. Task Force Organization ..5 July 1963 . 7 August 1945 ....................... The Airmobile Cavalry Division .. .. .... Infantry Battalion (Mountain Operations). 3. Infantry Battalion......... Pentomic Infantry Division .... 6 21 29 31 36 54 54 55 vi CORG-M-343 • {! ...... 1 July 1945 ... Headquarters and Headquarters Company. 119 T/O & E 7-15.. 117 T/O & E 7-87.. Ranger Company....................... 4....... 6.... Ranger Infantry Battalion.... 13 June 1956...... .............. Infantry Battalion.. . Appendix UI. . TOE 7-15E.. .... Ranger Company....... Infantry Battalion (Jungle Operations).... 103 T/O & E 7-85... 13 June 1956 ........ 29 February 1944 ...... Ranger Infantry Battalion. Ranger Infantry Battalion.... 146 TOE 7-11T ROCID.. D...... 131 TOE 7-15C.. .......... Ranger Infantry Battalion... 142 TOE 7-11D............. .. Infantry Battalion...... Infantry Battle Group "Pentomic" Division . . Pentomic Battle Group.. 5... .. 126 T/O & E 7-15N.... Infantry Battalion......... The Airmobile Division Organization ............ 155 TOE 7-15G...... Revised Battalion Organization ........... ... 7..186 C. Infantry Battalion . ... 1 February 1960 .....Pacific.. 138 TOE 7-15C....... ........ World War II .... 8......... 106 T/O & E 7-86... ..... 179 The Span of Control: ROCID and ROAD Divisions . FIGURES 1. 7 August 1945 .. 2..... ............. 15 November 1950 ....... 16 April 1948 .. 29 February 1944 . Current Battalion Organization .............. Infantry Battalion.............123 T/O & E 7-15N.

What it does there will portend what it will be.. combat units which would be responsive to all types of 20th century warfare. low-intensity type of warfare. nonconventional warfare. the battalion first emerged in the American Revolutionary Army under the cornmand of General George Washington. In the United States Army. The infantry battalion was returned to the Army as the basic building block for the Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) program of creating streamlined. The Korean War period began with the infantry battalion much the same organization it had been in World War II. SUMMARY The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several centuries. These tests culminated in the activation of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and its deployment to Vietnam where it has already earned a citation for distinguished combat service. Vietnam is the proving ground for establishing its efficacy in a limited. The modern United States infantry battalion may be dated from the period of 1939-1945. The battle group of the 1960' s eliminated the regiment permanently and the battalion temporarily from the Army for a brief period of time. over the years. the infantry battalion was faced with operational requirements for possible nuclear warfare. The battle group was abandoned primarily because of its assumed poor capability of response to low-intensity. The infantry battalion has evolved. into an essential element of our combat forces. and what it can do. was evidenced in the experimental tests conducted at Fort Benning with a view toward an airmobile division. In the mid-1960' s the trend toward air mobility of the infantry battalion. Aside from the missions of conventional warfare. other than airborne troops. Heavier weaponry. The "flexible response" was a doctrinal approach toward establishment of an infantry unit which could function in response to the requirements of conventional or nuclear war or any other land combat mission.f. in the near and distant future. better smallunit (squad) organization and training were noted in the infantry battalion of 1950-1953. Prior historical eras produced the ancient equivalents of the military formation which became known as the battalion. CORG-M-343 vii .

for the two terms were virtually synonymous) and several unattached companies in the establishment. Often these grenadier companies were detached from their parent regiments and consolidated into provisional grenadier battalions for difficult assignments and dangerous posts on the battle line. By December 1775 there were forty-nine infantry battalions (or regiments. Eight of these companies were termed the "battalion companies" and the remaining two the flank or "elite" companies. under such skilled commanders as Daniel Morgan.EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION: 1939-1968 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . as such. Of these two flank units. " Like the grenadier units.1775-1940 On the 14th of June 1775. In the English regiment there were ten companies. The following extract is significant because it shows the first official recognition of the value of "light infantry" in the early American military organization. one was designated as the "grenadier company" and only the best men were assigned to it. Another interesting development in the British Army battalion was the designation also of the tenth company as a "light company. it should be noted that the term "battalion" was often interchangeable with the term "regiment" (Ref 1). Colonel Thompson's Battalion was the first rifle battalion in the Continental Army and. Historically.p 2) British and American forces were organized in similar fashion. The six companies from Pennsylvania were organized as William Thompson's Rifle Battalion. screening. carried out the same missions for the Americans (Ref 1). This recognition has persisted in every war in which the United States has engaged. they could be consolidated into battalions for provisional service as scouting. and Virginia. The riflemen. and harassing units with the mission of moving in advance of the regular line of battle. the Continental Congress authorized the formation of ten companies of riflemen which were to be raised in Pennsylvania. Maryland. (Ref 1. the lineal ancestor of all infantry rifle battalions of the United States Army. CORG-M-343 . At this early date in American military history.

during every campaign thereafter. 1790) against the Miami Indians in Ohio. Beginning in August 1777. exerted great influence upon the organization and tactical training of the Continental Army. With the end of the war and the ratification of the peace terms in 1783. A brigade generally consisted of two infantry regiments with supporting artillery. At this point in the Army's history there were no battalions in existence! (Ref 1). the infantry of the United States Army underwent innumerable crises. that Anthony Wayne stormed Stony Point 15 July 1779. It is of further interest to note that. While American unit strengths were greater than the British. after 1777.At first there was no counterpart to flank companies in the Continental Infantry. General von Steuben's reorganization of battalions and companies into standardized units and his instructions for their commanders brought order out of the military chaos at Valley Forge and success to American arms (Ref 2). the Continental Army contained a total of sixty battalions of infantry. It was with the Light Corps. The disastrous experience with the Miamis resulted in a drastic reorganization of the minuscule Army. however. but it had proved so useful that Washington urged Congress to authorize one light company for each battalion to be formed into a separate corps. In the interim between the American Revolution and the War of 1812. When winter came this corps was disbanded. General Washington directed that 108 men and 9 officers be drawn from each brigade and formed into a temporary Corps of Light Infantry. proved unwieldy and unsuccessful in its early Indian campaigns (c. as the volunteer Inspector General and Drillmaster of the Continental Army at Valley Forge. p 6)1 Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. General Washington was forced to reorganize and consolidate units after every campaign due to battle losses and the uncertainty of the militia recruiting system then in vogue. His Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States was such an important contribution to the military art that some of its features may still be seen in the United States Army of today.784 there were only 80 artillerymen left on duty guarding military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. which resulted. The regiment. 1 2 CORG-M-343 . in the most celebrated night attack made by Americans during the Revolution. (Ref 1. the Army and its battalions was steadily reduced until by 2 June 1. These strengths were greater than the British counterpart units which totalled 477 and 38. respectively. with each company containing 78 enlisted men. At the surrender at Yorktown. 18 October 1781. regiments in the Continental Army were authorized a strength of 728 officers and men. with its battalions much the same as in the Revolution.

besides one of riflemen. in the first six months of 1812. were called the infantry of the "additional force. The 3d through 7th Regiments. Congress had authorized the largest regiments and battalions seen up to that time in the United States (Ref 1). By 1812. Thus all the infantry regiments were made uniform on paper. but it must be considered an ancestor of the battle group instituted in the post-World War H search for a suitable unit for and/or conventional combat in the atomic age. In 1796 the legion was legislated out of existence by Congress as it had not proved successful in the field against the Indians. arranged in two battalions. " and they had ten companies of seventy-six enlisted men.. authorized in 1808.The entire military establishment was converted in 1792 into a legion. it established an organization that was at variance with the seven existing regiments. The period before the War of 1812 was a time of drought for the infantry. riflemen. Each infantry regiment had ten companies. and a standard of organization established that persisted throughout the conflict. and reduced to eight infantry regiments and one rifle regiment. each with a reduced strength of seventy-eight men.there. Like the battle group of over a century later. p 9) The sublegion was not only-the forerunner of the regimental combat team of World War H. indeed it was the forerunner of the modern regimental combat team. Second. for they had 18 companies of 110 enlisted men. and artillery. infantry. The 1st and 2d Regiments made up the infantry of the "military peace establishment.were to be twenty-five regiments of infantry. that is into a field army in which the three combat branches. "1 and comprised ten companies-with two more officers and two more enlisted men than the 1st and 2d had. were combined in the same organization. there were three-differentsized infantry regiments. consolidated. pp 10-11) After the War of 1812 the forty-six infantry regiments and four rifle regiments were reorganized. In 1821 CORG-M-343 *nuclear / i IV 3 . the legion was an experimental search for a flexible combat formation to meet all requirements. In June 1812.. The element of the Legion in which they were combined was known as a Sublegion.(Ref 1.. The 8th through 17th in no way resembled the others. At one point in 1802 there were only two infantry regiments in service. . (Ref 1. British aggressive acts caused the Congress in 1808 to increase the Regular Army by five infantry regiments and to reactivate the regiment of riflemen. Each sublegion contained infantry. and artillery. exclusive of the rifle regiment. As a result. each containing ten companies of 102 men. cavalry. of which there were four. cavalry.

commissary sergeant). quartermaster sergeant. an additional thirty-eight privates and one sergeant were added to each infantry company and another Eighth Infantry Regiment was formed. and from sixty-four to eighty-two privates. a lieutenant colonel. light battalions of Regulars were often formed for specific missions by temporarily detaching companies -. increased the accuracy and lethality of infantry shoulder weapons. the War Department on 4 May 1861 prescribed the organization and strength of the regiments to be formed. The volunteer regiments. Composite battalions of this sort usually did not do as well in battle as established ones. and regimental pride was an active stimulant. furnished by the States.not necessarily the flank ones -. There was. notably the invention of the expanding base lead bullet by Captain Minie of the French Army and development of the experimental breech-loaders. This factor caused all infantrymen to become light infantrymen or "skirmishers" -.I Congress reduced the size . Briefly. a surgeon. an adjutant. a second lieutenant. The flank rifle companies which resulted were often detached from their regiments and used together for special sharpshooting assignments. twn principal musicians. The regimental staff consisted of the colonel. two musicians. In answer to President Lincoln's call for troops. eight corporals. a hospital steward. however. The minimum strength of the regiment was 869 officers and men. The latter organization was not usually retained by the regiment. The regiment comprised ten companies -.with the designations "regiment" and "battalion" interchangeable. At the same time. a quartermaster.all were required to function as the flank companies of historic fame. instead of being numbered or named after their captains. and a band of twentyfour members. a first lieutenant. a major. a first sergeant. four sergeants. By 1838. The companies were lettered after 1816. Following the old tactical patterns. Threat of war with Mexico brought forth official permission to increase each infantry company to a strength of 100 enlisted men. were patterned after the Regular Army units of the period. more distinction between flank and line in the volunteer regiments. p 15) Improvements in weapons. The Seminole War (1836-1842) had some effect upon the organization of the infantry of the Regular Army. one wagoner. each infantry regiment was composed of ten companies.of the companies to 51 enlisted men.from different regiments. maximum strength was 1046. Congress deactivated the rifle regiment and the 8th Infantry (Ref 1). Ia the War with Mexico. Two companies out of ten were specifically organized as light and were given a choice between rifles and muskets. two assistant surgeons. (Ref 1. three sergeants (sergeant major. the regiment could be 4 CORG-M-a49 . in which the men and officers understood each other. a chaplain. Each company comprised a captain. al though the naming practice persisted until after the Civil War (Ref 1).

a further reduction in 1890 eliminated two companies. the new Regular regiments were reorganized to the conventional one-battalion pattern. Also reflecting European practice. or as a single battalion. and 62 companies unattached to regiments (see Fig. the post-Civil War United States Regular Army was authorized forty-five regiments of infantry. each of them was assigned to a geographical region from which it was to recruit. tencompany unit. With a lessened need for troops on the western frontier. of eight companies to the battalion. But these regiments. At Gettysburg none of the Regular regiments represented had more than eight companies present. After the Custer massacre in June 1876. The regiment. the strength of a company dropped to a low of thirty. The cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons (battalions) of two companies (troops) each. 1861. the infantry of the Regular Army underwent a number of changes in organization. In 1866. because recruits perferred the looser discipline and higher bounties of the volunteers. They were to be composed of two or more battalions each. I and K. When the war ended. failed to reach full strength. pp 226227) It is of interest to note that the Army of The Confederate States followed generally the patterns of organization established by the Federal Army except that all regiments in the Confederate service contained ten companies. Weigley explains this by noting that In European armies the organization of the regiment into several battalions was growing !n favor in the middle nineteenth century.000 men and the cavalry increased by 2. The nine new Regular infantry regiments which were called for on May 4. Infantry regiments numbered about 642. aow no longer the three-battalion type. the 11th through the 19th. By 1876. 163 battalions. 1). commanded by the lieutenant respectively. since it made for greater tactical flexibility and permitted the detachment of battalions for recruiting duty. The European upon American military wasand particularly strong influence during the Civil War in the areas organization of organization tactical doctrine.- Icolonel and major. The remaining two hundred companies each contained one sergeant and four corporals less than before and a total of forty-six privates (Ref 1). the infantry strength was reduced by 5. From 1866 to 1890. there were 9 legions. from each of the twenty-five authorized regiments. in addition. (Ref 3. because of an economic depression and government retrenchment.seven men. CORG-M-343 5 'A 4 A A~t . handled in combat either as two battalions. Each company was authorized a minimum of 64 and a maximum of 125 private soldiers. Each of them was to have the three majors appropriate to three battalions.500. with regiment and battalion one and the same (Ref 1). reflected this tendency. was established as the traditional prewar.

[G ARMY (CSA) Geneta MajtGeneral (USA) A e CORPS F-j4anGeneral (CSA) j Major General Source: ivil Wa Centen 6~~ i CGeneralo CORG-M3 ~ .

Companies-were increased from 50 to a total of 106 enlisted men.The improvement of weapons. The battalion contained 424 men. This 100-year reversion. the United States entered war with Spain. especially in breechloading snall arms and artillery. The fault in the shift was that the American battalion was too small to perform its work. (Ref 1. the Army had returned to the regimental organization used from 1790 to 1792. The French and Prussian infantries both used regiments of three battalions . did not arise from a study of the earlier period -.000 enlisted men in theirs. As we have seen. in the shift to more modern practice which the infantry was making. the number of machinegun companies in the regiment had been increased optimistically to one per ba:. without eliminating rifle companies from the battalions. coupled with that of the later wars in Europe. and the regiment. this experience had demonstrated that the old regiments were far too big to be effectively controlled in battle. the battalion was a fighting subdivision while a regiment exercised administrative control over three of them. In 1898. the French had close to 700.ttalion but this could not be continued. With this. anJ its direct effect upon the control of the troops by the commander. By July 1917. however.finally brought about by the War with Spain -. The solution was to CORG-M-343 7 .rather it sprang from the experience of the Civil War. The regimental strength was 112 officers and 3. On the other hand. consisted of 1309 enlisted men. The battalion comprised four companies of 6 officers and 250 men each.720 enlisted men (Ref 3). it is interesting to note. This may be illustrated by comparing the new organization with those in Europe. while we had no more than 425. The three-battalion infantry regiments previously suggested by the professionals of the Regular Army were adopted. pp 30-31) The World War I US infantry regiment was organized to include three battalions and a regimenial machinegun company. As long as the system in which battalion and regiment were one and the same was followed. The following extract describes the role of the battalion in the US Army after the Spanish-American War: The organization of infantry regiments into three battalions of four companies each -. A three-battalion regiment (four companies each) was urged by the Secretary of War in 1890 (Ref 1).persisted as a permanent alteration. It was believed by these authorities that no man could control ten companies (the regimental organization) in combat.. with addition of noncommissioned staff. the regiment was a fighting subdivision in the line of battle. The Prussians had 1. but the battalions were far larger. by terms of the National Defense Act of 1916. caused the military thinkers of the 1890's to consider the need for dispersion on the battlefield.

the machinegun battalion elements could be attached to and detached from attacking or defending units as required. Of especial interest is his evaluation of the changes wrought in the infantry which is quoted below: The 1918 organization of the division had undergone considerable change from that of 1914. threeinch mortars and machine guns from the regiment and brigade were usually attached to the battalion. Gray. This meant that the company had become the basic element of maneuver and the company commander the highest-ranking officer habitually advancing to the assault. or about 50 more than the infantry was the addition of a light mortar and 37-mm gun platoon in the regimental headquarters company and a machine-gun battalion in the division. a rifle company attacking on a normal 250-yard front deployed two platoons in assault and two as reserves. In each platoon one section led and one section followed as a support. upon the organization of the infantry at all levels. The machinegun battalions were: brigade (three companies). To support the infantry advance. In fifty years we had moved from a division commander's war to one by battalion commanders.132 squads. pp 24-25) The infantry battalion of the United States Army in 1940 was the lineal descendant of those battalions which had served in the wars and expeditions of the past. United States Continental Army Command has commented. but the rifle companies now had four platoons instead of two. in detail. Under this organization. and division (four companies) which was eventually reduced to two-companies and motorized. while the reserve platoons could either outflank or pass through the initial assault platoons to continue the attack. giving the division 1. Each platoon had two sections of three squads each.create separate machinegun battalions and to leave one machinegun company in the regiment. These supports provided the additional momentum essential to break into the enemy's position. (Ref 4. World War II was a war of 8 CORG-M-343 ' ° . Clearly then the basic element of fire support became the battalion. Each regiment still had three battalions of four companies each. Essentially. Thus the battalion commander no longer as a normal practice accompanied his battalion in the attack but positioned himself where he could control the use of his supporting fires and of his reserves. the battalion of 1940 was tried and proven in the maneuvers of 1940 which tested the triangular division concept against the old World War I square infantry division. 37-mm guns. Major General David W. As a rule. The three brigades of three regiments each had been reduced to two brigades of two regiments each (the so-called "square division"). Headquarters.

except for the . the foot establishment was arranged along lines that had been more carefully tested than ever before in peacetime. while the heavier mortar. Table of Organization 7-15 (see App B) of 1 October 1940 prescribed an infantry rifle battalion as follows: a headquarters (T/O 7-16). Organizatiorwise. they were turned over completely. pp 47-48) An historical summary of the evolution of the infantry battalion and the span of control from 1777 to 1964 is given in Appendix C. the 60-mm mortar (first adopted as standard in 1937.50-caliber. Finally.'I movement and all units. the Springfield 1903 shoulder rifle had yielded to the semi-automatic MI. As for weapons. and a heavy weapons company (T/O 7-18). (Ref 1.30-caliber heavy machine gun. In other words. The battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel assisted by a major as executive officer. . new small arms such as carbines and submachine guns. The Chief of Infantry. -together with the larger machine gun. had been adopted and the BAR so much improved as to be virtually made over. I . In addition.I CORG-M -343 9 2. of which 28 were commissioned officers. three rifle companies (T/O 7-17). were pared of excess personnel and equipment to give them greater mobility and flezibility. 81-mm. including the division. the . Major General George Lynch contended in his annual report that in the years from 1937 to 1941 American Irfantry had undergone a real revolution. had entered infantry armament. but remaining scarce) had replaced the old Stokes and its successors. In examining the above unit structure it will be noted that the 1940 infantry battalion was quite dissimilar to the prewar one. a headquarters detachment (T/O 7-16). The aggregate strength of the battalion was 932. / / .

because.a reduction of 20 men. Large unit organization. when extraordinary needs arose. The rationale behind-these reductions may be found in the following extract: General Lesley McNair.S THE WORLD WAR II RIFLE BATTALION The attack upon Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese brought all prewar preparation to a climax. T/O 7-15 (see App B) allotted a total of fortyseven vehicles. The organization of the infantry units prior to Pearl Harbor was to be tested in combat. The enlisted strength of the battalion was set at 884 compared with a total of 904 in the T/O 7-15 of 1 October 1940 -. this versatile vehicle gave the infantry a mobility which It had never before experienced. There was then a definite purpose to maneuvers and training as the Army faced combat in every type of environment in a global war. All vehicles in the infantry were motor-propelled and the infantry battalion was furnished transportation nearly evely purpose from command to weapon and supply vehicles. Foremost among these was pooling. and a hauler of supplies. in March 1942. and grading the newly formed units occupied the bulk of the energies and talents of General Headquarters of the Army. there were those in command who did not feel that the troops were properly organized and trained for the waging of modern war. p 52) By 1942. Almost immediately. However. The phase-out of theohorse and horse-drawn equipment was in its final stages. embodied the outcome of the reforming ideas of the 1930's and the establishment of the Armored Force in July 1940. testing. and cut the other segments to a minimum. of which 22 were jeeps. the conversion of the prewar United States Army to a wartime national force was being accomplished slowly but surely. and he believed in the basic principles of the revision that had resulted. Another one of the important principles embraced by McNair was that which gave the best of men and equipment to the offensive portions of units. Training. those units could draw from the pools maintained at the next higher level. had been chief of staff of the provisional division that had tested triangularization in 1937. The jeep served as a command vehicle. also included were 3/4-ton weapons carriers. Its natural corollary was to keep all units lean. These cuts were found principally in the rifle companies and heavy weapons companies. The application of these austere principles was sharpened by the urgent need to conserve shipping space. (Ref 1. so McNair caused infantry organization to be finely combed for excess personnel and equipment. The March $ 10 CORG-M-343 . The for I -ton truck (jeep) became at once the "pet" of the infantryman. a gun vehicle. Other vehicles were assigned to the battalion and by 1 April 1942.

was "to provide ground force units properly organized. The mission of the Army Ground Forces. which began to be activated in March 1942. exerted a profound and lasting influence upon the organization of every unit in the United States Army. The purely wartime divisions. Naturally conservative as a professional soldier. The main features of the new plan -triangular structure through elimination of the brigade. today . adaptation to conditions of open warfare. McNair (1883-1944). - - - --. The internal character of each unit.. as fixed by its tables. He believed that all people in a combat unit should be able to function in combat. as stated in Circular 59. General McNair was a genius at organization and training. cavalry. T/O units were the blocks out of which the Army was built. was indispensable to the preparatory effort as well.directive enumerated siz types of divisions: infantry.- - * - - . (Ref 5. he demanded that all units be functional and without excess personnel or materiel. armored. Tactical organization.portation / CORG-M-343 11 -. Not until 1940. He questioned everything that went into the TOE and especially he cut command and headquarters personnel to the minimum. His ideas were implemented during World War I. which designed for combat. after the collapse of France. use of motor transonly . airborne and mountain. (Ref 5. dictated the total number of similar units required. pp 1-2) The Army Ground Forces. The Regular Army divisions were then physically reorganized. followed the new pattern from the start. p 7) The War Department took a novel step toward correction of these deficiencies by the establishment of the Army Ground Forces in 2 March 1942. Tables of organization and equipment were the basic guide to mobilization. did these ideas crystallize in an approved table of organization.. motorized. Essentially one of the Army t s finest artillerists.- - . Not until after Pearl Harbor did it prove feasible to bring the National Guard divisions into conformity with the new system. trained and equipped for combat operations. ofInfantry divisions were barely emerging from a tumult of reorganization. from the rifle squad to the division. under the command of General Lesley J." The tactical organization which offered the greatest possibility of success in battle became the principal desideratum of all planning and organizational changes (Ref 5).had been discussed in the Army since the early thirties (had in fact been urged by General Pershing in 1920). The total of all T/O units constituted the major portion of the troop basis. and tentatively endorsed by the War Department in 1935 and tested in the field in 1937 and 1939.

The overall reduction was achieved by elimination of personnel in the infantry divisions as follows: The triangular division lopped some 13. with their-overhead machinery relegated to armies. General McNair was saying. such as the infantry. One was to have a minimum of non-combat soldiers. staffs and administrative personnel could be kept small by elimination of unnecessary links in the chain of command. and effect upon the enemy. The strength of the new division was about 15. and constitute excellent guidelines for the Army of the future. 000 men from the square divisiont s strength. Such pools not only kept personnel and equipment from idleness. and armor. Weapons and units primarily defensive'in character should absorb as little as possible of the national resources. to hold down non-tactical overhead and make tactical staffs small and efficient. 000.Ii they survive in the tactical organization of the current Army. p 6) From the above extract may be derived the general organizational policy which existed during World War II and has persisted until the present. What a unit needed only occasionally should be held in a reserve pool under higher headquarters. The following paragraph sums up the General' s ideas on tactical organization: General McNair' s leading idea in tactical organization was a simple and defirdte one: to concentrate a maximum of men and materials in offensive striking units capable of destroying the enemy' s capacity for resistance. that "he wanted military units that were lean and mean. Combat units should be streamlined for quick decisive action. The reduction was achieved by reducing 12 CORG-M-343 . should be discouraged. 000 men from the oldsquare-division strength. divisions and corps should be lightened. but also permitted rapid massing for concentrated use." Lean to the point of functional numbers and mean as to firepower. This is especially true of the combat-type units. striking force. (For special type battalions see App B). emerging with about 15. artillery. by reduction of paper work and the use of verbal orders. This ideal strives to be achieved in the tables of organization and equipment published for the United States Army. Headquarters companies. The derivatives of this idea were many. (Ref 5. Special type units and excessively specialized personnel. Transport and impedimenta of all kinds should be assigned sparingly and pooled where possible. Links in the chains of supply and administration should be cut. 000 men. useful on certain occasions only. in effect. The triangular division cut off nearly 13. they should have only such personnel and equipment as were needed always.

184 -- CORG-M-343 13 .30 light machine guns and three 60-mm. The result was a lean.. tough.. This arrangement did not last long. being cut from 198 to 192 through removal of a transportation corporal. (Ref 1) How these radical cuts in strength were accomplished is shown in the following extract. mortars as its primary weapons. It reremained a team of twelve men. The 27 rifle companies of the division retained a strength of 5. a cook' s helper. a messenger. but gained three antitank rocket launchers and one cal. Three such squads formed a rifle platoon. (App B and Ref 7) In November 1942. the 1 April 1942 TOE substituted a headquarters company for the old headquarters detachment as it existed in the 1940 TOE. a truck driver. . Equipment and materiel were cut to the essentials. it was valid then and its validity has not diminished. the overseas troop-movement shipping space problem became so critical that another drastic reduction in infantry units was ordered by General McNair. These drastic changes were reflected in TOE 7-15 published 1 March 1943. This new organization in the rifle battalion was not well received by General McNair but it and the new regimental cannon company were included over his vigorous objections. The principal casualty in this reduction within the infantry was the cannon company which was dropped from the table and its howitzers placed in the regimental headquarters and headquarters company. The Reduction Board finally cut 216 men from headquarters and the heavy weapons companies of the battalions. It is of considerable value to note the rationale used in the removal and addition of men and weapons to the component units of the " as the base for figh'rs Thecombat recognition "close-in rifle battalion. the infantry rifle squad was unchanged. Automatic rifles were brought out of the automatic rifle squad (which was dropped) and returned to the rifle squads where they had been before February 1940.50 machine gun. (Ref 6. that is. an orderly and a basic private.* headquarters and administrative staffs and thinning out support and service troops. The weapons platoon was modified slightly. one per squad. It retained two cal. The strength of the new headquarters company totalled 130 enlisted men and 5 officers compared with the old headquarters detachment of 48 enlisted men. A Reduction Board was established to accomplish this difficult and sometimes painful task. Three rifle platoons were grouped with a weapons platoon to form a rifle company. more maneuverable division. p 35) In the infantry battalion. one automatic rifle and one M1903. . the latter for antiaircraft defense. Appropriate TOE were published on 15 July 1943. It lost two automatic rifles. armed with ten M1 rifles. The General was determined to cut the infantry rifle regiment by 400 men and to do this without removing many riflemen from the battalions. Personnel of the rifle company was virtually untouched. the division and its units of is the a most valid ou-. .

the rifle companies. they must be capable of being displaced by hand or transported across country. that. There was a suggestion that the 4. It should be noted that the addition of the rocket launchers and the. the type of weapons to be added. 50 machine guns were added. It is safe to conclude that in infantry units of all types and sizes. was cut into more deeply than the rifle company. therefore. At this time the new 2. the rifle battalion's firepover was increased despite reduction of manpower and in an area where it was anticipated that it would be badly needed-. mention is made of the heavy weapons company and how the economies in personnel were achieved. "whenever unit strength is reduced. to each rifle battalion. The heavy weapons company. Saving 6 men in each company saved 162 in the division. Lessons learned from the European Campaign point out that the support of battalion weapons must be continuous and. perforce. HB.2" mortar replace the 81mm mortar but a clear majority (47 out of 57) preferred the 81mm mortar. The following commentary bears out this great need for continuous support of battalion weapons.. 50 caliber machineguns to the battalion was in keeping with General McNairls basic concept that antitank and antiaircraft defense should be the responsibility of individually fired weapons. Armament was strengthened.seven antitank rocket launchers and three cal. 36-inch rocket launcher (the Bazooka) appeared in a total issue of 24 to the battalion. Thirteen of the 21 men removed were truck-drivers. Thus. These advanced (for the times) antitank weapons were located in the headquarters company. 50 machineguns. flexible. mortars and eight cal. M1. in effect.. To the primary weapons .six 81-mm." The gaps in the line must. 30 heavy machine guns . one to each rifle company and three to the heavy weapons company. will depend upon the unit and its mission. p 8) The anticipated losses in firepower within the rifle battalion was corn pensated by the addition of seven caliber . in the last paragraph. p 2 2 ) It will be noted in the extract above.'200 if 100 infantry divisions should be mobilized. (Ref 5. be closed by additioual firepower.the close-in fighters around whom the rest of the division was built. or 16. and the heavy weapons company within the battalion. not those that were crew-served.antitank defense. Obviously. or amplified. The fire-power of a mortar platoon at the immediate call of the battalion commander is needed. (Ref 8. bi cCORG-M-343 . This instance seems to exemplify an axiom which might read. weapon strength must be increased. being reduced from 183 to 162 officers and men. that is. with which three rifle companies were grouped in the infantry battalion. only those weapons that will assist or accelerate the maintenance of fire and movement will be found in this category.

to three. obtained a net augmentation of armament. which therefore. we find an excellent example of the economy-of-force principle that guided the general in his organizational concepts. was charged-with specific study of the battlefield functioning of all units. and members of the type units concerned. The four 37-mm. Three cal. gun proposed in its place. and that in any case 57' s were not yet available to replace it.50 machine gun. falling from 135 to 108. was cut proportionately far more than the line companies. a saving of 66. (App B) Not all changes shown on the TOE were actually made. Total reduction of personnel in the infantry battalion was from 916 to 850. antitank guns assigned to the antitank platoon were reduced. and eight antitank rocket launchers were added to the battalion headquarters company. gun was retained despite adverse report from North Africa. The 37-mm. that it was effective when used within its proper range. one cal.Here again. as noted in the following extract: The headquarters company of the battalion. The 37mm guns of the antitank company and the remaining nine guns were divided equally among the headquarters companies of the three battalions. With reference to the battalion headquarters company. it was reinstated in the same year in July. with 32 officers. Experience indicates that an CORG-M-343 15 *1 Fantitank / j .. 1 March 1943 was 818. European Theater of Operations. on the grounds that it was easier to manhandle than the 57-mm. Communication is the greatest problem and insufficient personnel is presently allotted to insure a continuing and adequate wire and radio net. pp 22-23) The General Board. Defensive weapons earmarked for the security of headquarters were particularly frowned upon by General McNair. Although it was dropped in the TOE of 26 May 1943. 30 machine guns. of which only 18 were in the rifle. including the infantry rifle battalion and its component elements. He did not like the mine platoon of the antitank company because he considered that it was purely a defensive unit. the board reported: The problems encountered by this unit are closely parallel to those of the regimental headquarters company. The purpose of the board was to recommend changes in organization with a view toward better combat performance and guidance for more efficient organization in the future. at all levels of command. on the principle that headquarters overhead should be trimmed. The total enlisted strength of the rifle battalion under TOE 7-15. The loss was largely in the platoon. they were based upon direct interviews with numerous commanders. These reports were not theoretical. companies. although reduced 20 percent in personnel. on the principle that defensive personnel should be held to a minimum. (Ref 5. with a strength of 31 men.

the battalion supply officer (S-4) is not assigned to the battalion and is answerable only indirectly to the battalion commander. p 7) With reference to the foregoing battaion strength and organizational patterns. when first organized. He was France. The first one was the wealth of combat experience accumulated in Europe. Ground Forces once more examined the tables of organization and equipment. Army Ground Forces. Lo. and the third. 2 These factors resulted in a general enlargement of infantry units. while observing frontline units in combat.increase in the personnel of the communication platoon by two wire teams is necessary. Provision should be made for personnel to perform these duties without depleting the strength of the ammunition and pioneer platoon or the rifle companies. Hence. In 1940 the tanks were separated from the infantry and the armored force was established. This time three factors were decisive in the appraisal. for reasons listed earlier under the heading of the anti-tank company makes it desirable to eliminate this platoon. This solution did not solve the problem of the infantry/tank relationship on the battlefield. Essentially. To appreciate this organization problem. promoted to General posthumously in 1954. this requirement was caused by the advent of the armored divisions. the second. McNair was killed in action at St. 12 enlisted men. The best military thought at the time pointed to the need for infantry integral to the armored division for the protection of the tanks and for seizing and holding terrain. that the scarcity of shipping space had ceased. when redeployment to the Pacific area became necessary. and the organization developed for infantry in that year persisted for the duration of the war in Europe.. However. p 54) World War II witnessed the first use of armored infantry by the US Army. 16 CORG-M-343 . (Ref 1. the death of General McNair. (Ref 8. it is necessary to review the background. faced by Army Ground Forces during the year from October 1942 to October 1943. It is thought best to assign this officer to the battalion. 25 July 1944. The inability of the battalion anti-tank platoon to furnish adequate protection against hostile armor. the design of armored infantry battalions and regiments to carry out these vital missions was initiated somewhat over the objections of the Chief. No enlisted men are available to perform the functions of command post guards. The armored divisions. escorts for prisoners of war and other miscellaneous duties which arise in combat. the following extract is highly significant: All the complications. however. Supply of the battalion is a responsibility of the battalion commander. For this purpose a section. did not provide organic infantry for the protection of tanks and ground exploitation 2 Lieutenant General Lesley J. has been added as a military police section.

pp 322-323) The armored infantry battalion. Within a few months the new armored infantry regiments were broken up to form separate armored infantry battalions. once deployed from the vehicles. After that. the firepower was greater than the standard battalion because of the machineguns mounted on the vehicles (M2 and M3 half-tracks).. there were standard infantry battalion elements. 46th. 59th. certain numbers which to had been inactive on the infantry list since just after the first World War were activated in 1941 and 1942 to become armored infrintry. required more infantry in proportion to tanks and. they were smaller with less men in--the rifle companies. This training was seldom employed in combat. It was recognized that the armored division.. Conversely. The training given the armored infantry battalion was essentially dismounted infantry tactics. fought dismounted the same as standard infantry (Ref 9). It was called "armored infantry. The intial inception of the armored infantry in the United States Army may be noted in the following extract: The next type of specialized infantry.4 of armored gains. This battalion was the smallest infantry battalion in the US Army during World War II. had always doubted the invulnerability of the tank. (Ref 10.. p 49) The armored infantry battalions were essentially copies of the standard infantry rifle battalions. However. externally. These were the 36th. His attitude toward the armored force and its basic concept is shown in the extract below: General McNair. First and last there were sixty-six of the latter (Ref 1. 48th52nd. and 62d Regiments. General McNair was again to exert great influence in the organization of the armored infantry. One factor which reduced the number of fighting men available in the armored infantry battalion was the specific battalion requirement for drivers and maintenance personnel. 58th. A look at the armament of the arnrored COlRG-M-343 17 { i / ." The first of this type in the United States Army came into being when the old 6th Infantry was converted armored on 15 July 1940. 1 March 1942. as provided under TOE 7-25. It became clear that tanks would frequently have to be escorted by foot troops sent ahead to locate and destroy antitank defenses. contained a battalion headquarters and headquarters company (T/O 7-26) and three rifle companies (T/O 7-27) with a total of 676 enlisted men and 24 officers.. The increasing rapprochement between tanks and infantry raised not only the question of the internal structure of the armored division but also that of the number of armored divisions which ought to be mobilized. although some training was given in fighting from the vehicles. 54th-56th. as the armored infantry. such as the heavy weapons company. Obviously. would usually operate in closer proximity to infantry divisions than had been supposed. internally. 41st. which it did not require for the performance of its combat mission. was that intended to provide the foot elements of the new armored divisions.

At El Alamein. and three of armored field artillery. assault guns. General Sir Bernard L. Hence they could readily be attached to the armored division. The 2nd and 3rd ended the war as old type "heavy" divisions. 2nd. (Ref 10. particularly the "heavy" its two armored regiments of six tank battalions and armored infantry regiment of three armored infantry battalions. three of armored infantry. The rationale for this change was found in the improvement of antitank weapons. antitank guns. the 1943 type were employed in combat. based upon combat experience in Africa and Sicily.he armored units could advance. Montgomery of the British Eighth Army used his armored infantry to probe the German lines and to open a gap through which t. and the extensive use of antitank mines. at this early period. and 3rd divisions were employed under the 1942 table of organization.infantry battalion shows that it was. and separate armored field artillery battalions were set up in nondivisional pools. The 1st. separate armored infantry battalions. in view of wide differences of opinion. (App B) It was at this point in the organization of the armored division that the concept that interchangeable battalions of all types were mandatory for that unit appeared. The regimental echelon in the armored division was abolished. The ratio. The 18 CORG-M-343 1v- . p 327) The armored infantry regiment was retained within the armored division until 15 September 1943. were found in both.. 60mm mortars. furnished with organic weapons affording heavy firepower support. such as rocket launchers and the German Panzerfaust. At the same time separate tank battalions. Infantry strength in proportion to tanks was thereby doubled. in October 1942. The division received organizationally three battalions of tanks. Both types of divisions were successful. The "heavy" type was capable of longer sustained action than the "light" type. at which time the regiment was disbanded and separate armored infantry battalions were established. Certii weaknesses. and 81mm mortars. of armored infantry battalions to tank battalions... was now changed from one-to-two to one-to-one. The following extract is of value because it differentiates between the types of armored divisions and explains the employment of the armored infantry battalions: Both the 1942 type of division and. All other divisions were employed as organized under the 1943 table of organization or as "light" divisions. The battalion became the basic unit. that is. Even before the armored divisions entered combat and .. Both t division with were weak in infantry. These battalions were made identical with the corresponding battalions organic in the armored division. the 1st later being reorganized in Italy to conform to the 1943 table of organization. both the Army Ground Forces and the Armored Force desired as elastic and adaptable a structure as possible.

when new tables were published. that is. the assault section (2. the planners in the War Department and Army Ground Forces faced toward the Pacific and a new problem: redeployment (App B). 36-inch rocket launchers) and the special weapons section (57ram recoilless riflea). p 34) j TOE 7-15.and the Pacific. Examination of the TOE noted above reveals that the infantry regiment was increased in personnel from the old 1944 strength of 3.) The TOE 7-15."light" diviaion with three tank battalions and three armored infantry battalions fared better. was the table establishing the infantry rifle battalion until 1 June 1945. New members of the battalion were principally in the rifle companies where two new sections were added to the weapons platoons. With this goal in sight. This was "a lean and mean" organization. (Ref 8. 323 enlisted men to a new strength of 3. (See App B for complete TOE 7-15. TOE 7-15. Experience in the European Theater indicates that the major subordinate units of the infantry division were insufficient in strength and general composition to insure the division's ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations independently with maximum efficlency. so lean that many thought that its efficiency in combat had been decreased. p 2) In the infantry rifle battalion the new 75mm recoilless rifle was added in a new gun platoon in the heavy weapons company. The 1944 TOE 7-15 carried a total of 825 enlisted men and 35 officers for the battalion. Enlisted strength of the rifle CORG-M-343 19 4 . 3 warrant officers. (Ref 11. reflects the influence of US Army infantry combat experience inboth Europe.6 February 1944 with changes to 30 June 1944. 15 September 1943. The strength of the company was increased from an aggregate of 193 to 242 men so that casualties could be absorbed and enough personnel left to function efficiently ina fast-moving combat situation. but needed at least one additional rifle company in each armored infantry battalion in orcer that tank and infantry battalions could be married up--squad for squad. The absence of tanks in the division organizaticn was especially felt. platoon for platoon. 1 June 1945. These new weapons gave the infantry rifle battalion a new type of mobile artillery which greatly increased firepower. The increase in overall strength -within tha armored infantry battalion was found basically in the inclusion of the additional rifle company. The bulk of these men were assigned to the rifle companies within the battalions. and 982 enlisted men. 26 February 1944. The organization of the standard infantry rifle battalion as it was in 1943 and 1944 remained fairly stable with minor additions of men and equipment. and corapany for company. shows the armored infantry battalions of the armored division to contain 35 officers. The rifle companies were believed to be too small for the type of heavy ground combat encountered in Europe. 688 enlisted men. The austerity program of General McNair was replaced by a program of "beefing up" the battalion and its elements to ensure the manpower and firepower to bring the war to a victorious close.

and a signal corps detachment. coupled with the fact that the peneotrating power of the 57mm projectile is insufficient to stop the modern tank. the group and grouping concept with reference to the battalions within a division had been advanced by the Commanding General. field artillery. a combat engineer company.. It differed from the regiment in that component battalions were self-sufficient for supply and administration (in the manner. notably tanks and tank destroyers. The regimental cannon company.. Lack of cross-country mobility. These ad hoc organizations were employed with success in both the European and Pacific Theaters during World War II. equipped with heavy tanks mounting 105mm guns. Group headquarters companies (batteries). The majority of experienced combat leaders agree that the present anti-tank weapon should be replaced by a self-propelled tank destroyer or a medium tank. with a ratio of 1 to 4 battalions (squadrons). in view of the concepts advanced by General McNair. were activated. In 1942. a form of organization already employed with certain newer weapons. a medical collecting company. Present recoilless weapons lack the necessary penetrating power demanded in an effective regimental anti-tank weapon and other protection is therefore matndatory.company rose from 187 to 235. may be found in the tollowing extract from Report No. but attached to it and detached from it as circumstances 20 CORG-M-343 -- .. The towed guns (57mm) were eliminated from the regimental antitank company and were replaced by tanks mounting 90mm rifles. (Fig. was. a tank unit for the direct support of the battalions of the regiments. This was a daring and novel experiment in US Army unit organization which made of the group . to note that. European General Bcard: The present 57mm towed anti-tank gun is unsatisfactory. mechanized cavalry. military thinking was tending toward "a flexible response" to the requirements of the modern battlefield. Army Ground Forces. a battalion of artillery (105mm). and combat engineers) were converted to separate battalions. the nondivisional regiments (antiaircraft. Prior to the formation of the regimental combat team. and that the battalions were not assigned organically to the group... of the reorganized armored division).. (Ref 8. makes it imperative that another weapon be substituted. p 6) The principle of flexibiiity in the employment of the infantry regiment and its battalions was noted in the creation of the regimental combat team (RCT) for the vEccomplishment of specific combat missions. The reorganization of the nondivisional units in the Army ground forces during World War II was to have a salient effect upon the existing wartime Army organization and the formation of the present Army. 15. that is. Backup for the changes effected above. in effect. This concept consisted of a planned grouping of certain divisional elements around a standard infantry regiment. 2) It is of interest. even at this early date.

id. 0 00 1 U1. - Ow c ? I#..I 0 u .-1i O-- * °" - Cie to.": Li3 0 00cc . a.0 1V I "c w 1 '.. .-- . ..I =. 0 V' . . O A3 12-41 :3 04 Q* N 0 -m> I. C. CORG-M-343 21 .._3..'. U-_ 0. O 0. .= l . N .4. . . to 0 zz wd 0..

014. Organically the battalion included a headquarters company. The group was not a TO unit. Heavy machineguns 22 CORG-M-343 . mounted in half-tracks and armored cars. and to supervise their training. Well supplied with the best weapons American ingenuity and industrial knowledge could produce. In the United States Army these battalions (in reality infantry) were hastily assembled from a temporary TOE and trained to take over the task of holding the air fields after the regular infantry battalions had conquered the areas in which they were situated (App B). to control battalions in combat. the infantry battalion of the US Army possessed an aggregate strength of 691. p 51) The above conversion served General McNair's purposes. up to that time. The same purpose was achieved in the armored division with the establishment of the Combat Commands. It effected a considerable economy in the elimination of the headquarters of the regiments of the cited nondivisional units.dictated. The air base security battalion was commanded by a lieutenant colonel and possessed the usual battalion staff. Group headquarters were supposed to eschew administration. It might contain. It also served as a pattern for the elimination of the regiments in the armored division and the creation of separate armored infantry battalions where there had formerly been armored infantry regiments of three battalions. three rifle companies. However. they are worthy of careful consideration in view of current air base protection and security problems in Vietnam. By July 1944. As early as 1938. in effect. the average strength of the US Army infantry battalion was 876 men. which were. group headquarters. In June 1945. and brought their own supplies from army supply points. to be tactical only. This was especially true in the Pacific and to a lesser extent in Africa. at a given moment. C. A. prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. the battalion had grown to a strength of 932. the aggregate strength of the battalion rose to a wartime high of 1. The proposed strength for the rifle battalion in March 1943 was 850. they were sized and shaped for combat by careful military planning and eventual combat experience. it had been increased to 871 and by January 1945 it had been reduced to 860. During the period of World War II. no battalions or half a dozen battalions. All elements of the battalion were motorized. The requirement for the military unit known as an air base security battalion became evident in 1942 while the North African campaign was in full operation. p 52). Battalions in principle dealt directly with army on administrative matters. within one year its strength was slightly less: 916. By June 1941. A further benefit of the reorganization was the cutting of the strength of the headquarters companies at all levels (Ref 5. B. The infantry battalions of World War II were the most modern and bestequipped of any infantry units ever fielded by the United States Army. During World War II the struggle in many areas of the globe became a battle for air bases. (Ref 5. The air base security battalion was tailored for a very specific task of defense and only a limited number were organized. though three or four were considered normal. and a heavy weapons company.

The Southwest Pacific area presented a variety of environmental differences from that encountered by the troops in the European Theater of Operations.and cannon were included in the battalion's weaponry. were also included in the armament. These elite units were noted for their high esprit. were of the opinion that the jungles aud tropical areas of the Pacific would require specialized military organizations. Additionally. Planners in the War Department and individuals in the various training commands and units. and physical toughness. Tough. the 71st and 89th Infantry Divisions. dry. p 50). In the SWPA and the Philippines. But in actuality. The theory behind the light features of these units was that in heavy jungle areas the standard infantry battalion would become "bogged down" with conventional unit organizational patterns and equipment and vehicle transport. dash. the six Ranger battalions were organized as hard-hitting. This condition called for troops and organizations capable of operation in hot. Ranger battalions were employed in the European Theater. Mountain units were lightly equipped with motor transport and the troops were trained in mountaineering skills. No particular organizational problems were presented by the European environment. both light and heavy. wet. V The global character of World War H dictated certain tailoring of to special climatic and environmental conditions. the Sixth Ranger Battalion served with the Sixth US Army under General Walter Krueger. Jeep-mounted machineguns. and functional in organization and personnel. These battalions fought with distinction in both Europe and the Southwest Pacific area. these units which were designed and trained for jungle combat in the Pacific never had the opportunity to prove themselves in jungle combat.t in Italy where infantry mountain divisions were utilized. Thus. The European Theater of Operations functioned in a conventional temperate zone four-seasonal weather pattern. The general organization of the security battalion stressed high mobility and heavy firepower. light infantry battalions capable of independently conducted commando-type raids deep into enemy territory. General Krueger organized a non-TOE unit of battalion strength which he designated as the "Alamo Scouts. and those trained for Arctic service appeared in various highly specialized operations where conventional troops could not be expected to perform efficiently and effectively. Iorganizations 1. and snow-type weather. especially organized and trained for jungle warfare. cold." Following closely the ancient Ranger tradition and the scout idea of nineteenth century CORG-M-343 23 j . The Rangers were a traditional American military organization dating back to the French and Indian War period of our colonial history. Battalions were not required to be especially organized for combat--excep. standard infantry battalions were used in jungle combat in the Pacific and proved themselves to be adequate for the task (Ref 1. As the result of training tests these units. there were light infantry battalions and regiments. lean. A highly efficient system of communication was provided within the battalion and with other combat nets within the battalion's area of air base security responsibility. but this was because of the peculiar nature of the mission and had little or nothing to do with the environmental conditions. Special forces. Hence. were reconverted to standard infantry in 1944. ski troops.

who were volunteers. it was eventually deactivated in December 1944 and its members transferred to a standard infantry regiment (Ref 13). The mission was a "behind the enemy lines" type of operation which meant thatthe "Marauders" had to possess high mobility. Logically. " This unit was organized for a specific mission in Burma and in essence. this unit was an especially elite force. the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) which became famous as "Merrill's Marauders. the somewhat lean infantry battalions were increased in personnel.. 1958. both officers and men. Office of the Chief of Military History. battalion.I I western Indian and Philippine campaigns. was another "commandotype" unit. Infantry. and game wardens. After an arduous and bitter campaign against the Japanese in Burma. World War H battlefield experience from Europe and the Pacific continued to influence the teachings at the Service Schools and its effect was noted in the reorganization of infantry units. In addition. and regimental sizes. led to the formation of an unusual type of specialized unit. Washington: Department of the Army. In addition to the foregoing special-type infantry units. In the new tables of organization dated 1 June 1945. Mortars and howitzers were mule-packed and man-carried. Obviously such a unit must either live off the country or rely upon air-drop delivery of rations. the Alamo Scouts became one of the most effective intelligence-gathering and raiding units in the Pacific area (Ref 12). The Phantom Major New York: Harper and Bros. the greatest increase was in the infantry rifle battalion. and other essential supplies. was a carbon copy of the contemporary British "Long Range Penetration Unit" " which operated in Africa and the Middle East. 538 and additional weapons and vehicles were included. the 5307th was reorganized as the 475th Infantry Regiment in August 1944 (Ref 14). 34 I For detailed information on. Transport was a combination of animal pack trains and essential air-deliverable motor vehicles. ammunition. see The Army Lineage Book. In World War II the requirements of possible special missions. it had the unusual distinction of being filled with both United States and Canadian soldiers as an experiment in international cooperation. such as operating behind enemy lines during winter under adverse weather conditions. 1953. 24 CORG-M-343 __ __ . the 1st Special Service Force. and independence of action. From this viewpoint. with the rifle company increased from 193 to a total of 242 enlisted men. for an account of one of these units and its activities. 323 enlisted men to 3. including those of company. Ideally composed of lumberjacks. the wartime service of Ranger and Scout battalions and the armored infantry and separate infantry battalions. The unit was filled with jungle-fighting specialists. flexibility. forest rangers. 4See Virginia Cowles. infantry regiments were increased from 3. it was highly successful and while it operated well. With redeployment to the Pacific a fact to be faced when the war in Europe was terminated. Vol II.

Usually. (Ref 15. a medical collecting company. it was still possible for certain battalions to be organized and designated as "Battalion Landing Teams" for the accomplishment of special missions. p 6 2 ) 4in . When the battalions were operating within the RCT structure. respectively. "' This type organization was temporary and utilized in connection with special missions. 5 _ 5 The reorganization of the infantry under the ROAD concept has eliminated the regiment from the US Army--the ROAD infantry brigade approximates the WWII and Korean War RCT organization. the typical combat team comprised the following: a regiment of infantry. was a smaller version of the RCT formed for separate amphibious operations. the basic unit for planning an assaultlanding. gave the infantry battalion the heaviest and most accessible weight of fire our military history up to that time (Ref 1). The additionofthis recoilless rifle. these RCT were military tactical ad hoc organizations of great flexibility. AR 320-5. operated by a gun platoon which was added to the heavy weapons company. A World War 1H modification of the divisional organization of the infantry was noted in the organization and employment of what were termed "Regimental Comabat Teams. in effect. and a signal detachment. when themission was accomplished. Essentially organized around the infantry regimental structure. a company of combat engineers. April 1965. the infantry rifle battalion was capable of being formed into what was designated as a "Battalion Landing Team" which. Without lineage or tradition. The novel and highly unorthodox 75mm recoilless rifle appeared in the infantry rifle battalion at this time. These temporary units were of especial value in the Pacific area where they were the answer to the requirement for forces capable of landing and taking an island-based enemy objective (Ref 1). they reverted to their regular divisional unit.[ A considerable number of these additional men were located in the new assault and special weapons sections added to the weapons platoons of the rifle company. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. CORG-M-343 25 . a battalion of 105mm artillery. has this to say about a Battalion Landing Team: INi an amphibious operation. 36-inch rocket launchers (Bazooka) in the company and the addition of the 57mm recoilless rifle required additional operators in the assault and special weapons sections. Conversely. The increase from three to six of the 2. an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements.

7 26 CORG-M-343 _Z . two or more battalion level combat units and the reinforcing combat and service elements required for combat and interim logistical support during the period it conducts independent tactical operations. depending upon the mission and the objective assigned. It is a balanced task organization composed of a brigade headquarters. The ROAD concept of the use of the battalions as "building blocks" is employed in this temporary organization--as well as in the permanent organization structure. p 73) In the above-quoted extract it will be noted that considerable flexibility has been built into the concept in that two or more battalions may comprise a brigade landing team. (Ref 15. the old "Regimental Landing Team" becomes "The Brigade Landing Team" and is defined thus: An assault landing team.With the elimination of the regimental organization under the ROAD concept.

These capabilities were not essentially different Al from those possessed by the World War H infantry battalion under the 1945 TOE. These had been overshadowed and outranked by a new and terrible force. Her ideology and propaganda were employed and her military might displayed as often as possible to upset the status quo in the post-War world. frustrate. The reduced battalion regiments were not large enough and the infantry battalions (reduced by one rifle company) were even weaker when facing a determined foe. the United States and her Allies were in a somewhat secure position because the United States possessed an atomic monopoly. The principal tactic of the Soviet Union was to be difficult and testy in her diplomatic relations with the West. and even in equipment. up to the task of facing a tough. The North Koreans proved to be skillful. the United States and her Allies must be prepared for nuclear warfare. The two-battalion regiments were too thin for sustained resistance on fluid battlefields on which the enemy had captured momentum before they arrived. whenever the USSR would achieve a breakthrough in the atomic field. as yet. capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver or repel his'assault by fire or close combat. While some attempt had been made to make them war-ready. The assigned mission was "to close with the enemy. The absolute lack of experience of any Army in combat under nuclear conditions served to inhibit. Gone was the period of exclusively conventional explosives for the waging of war. and puzzle the military profession. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur marked the end of an era. (Ref 3. The detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki served to end the war with Japan but more than that they heralded a new age of nuclear war. tough. psychologically. For a few years after World War II. a new form of political warfare "the cold war" was mounted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites against the Western Allies with whom it had collaborated during World War II.THE POST-WORLD WAR H BATTALION AND THE KOREAN WAR The end of the war in Japan and the surrender of the Imperial Japanese government to the Supreme Commander. 16 April 1948. they were not. Allied Powers. and numerous. American troops hastily shuttled to Korea from the occupation army in Japan were unready for them physically. it was the27 CORG-M-343 27 ." There was little new in the assigned mission. The Uvited States Army had just finished the demobilization of the World War II Army and was in the throes of reorganization to meet the prospective challenge of the nuclear age when the United States Army plunged back into combat in the Korean War (1950-1953). p 507) TOE 7-15. aggressive enemy like the North Koreans. The divisions first committed in Korea were those hastily ordered from occupation duty in Japan. However. established the infantry battalion as having the capabilities of furnishing a base of fire. maneuvering in all types of seizing and holding terrain. At the same time.

15 November 1950. It provided for a headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16).and . served to preserve the status quo of the existing military units. . and 105-mm howitzers. The full strength of the battalion was 919. by the last war. reduced strength was 722 (see AppB). The battalion still consisted of headquarters and headquarters company (TOE 7-16N). was published by the Department of the Army. than by the past. and three rifle companies (TOE 7-17). and procurement had lagged still more. of infantry battalions from time immemorial. With World War I weaponry. Weigley: This Army of 1950 was very much a postwar Army. and now often warworn the M-1 rifle.2-inch mortars. 28 CORG-M-343 .30. Active Army. 75-mm bazookas. the Browning Automatic Rifle. 60. developed as long ago as the period from World War I through the mid-1930' s. It is of considerable interest to note the comment upon the postwar Army by Russell F. There were three 57mm recoilless rifles in each rifle company. and three rifle companies (TOE 7-19N). both actual and political. The only real change organizationally in the infantry division Was the addition of a tank battalion and the reduction in strength of the infantry battalions. (Ref 3. This table reduced the 1948 battalion from 917 men (34 officers and 883 enlisted men) to an aggregate strength of 32 officers and 685 enlisted men. to which this Army so often seemed irrelevant. Though Pershing tanks had made limited appearances on World War II battlefields. p 502) On 27 June 1949.50-caliber machine guns. 7-15-N-20 Infantry Battalions.and 81-mm and 4. the Army was geared for World War II tactics. This reduction was ordered approximately one year before the outbreak of the Korean War. and four 75mm recoilless rifles in the heavy weapons company (see App B). a heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18). The infantry divisions which entered the Korean peninsula were much the same as those which had fought across Europe and the Pacific six years before. of whose massive armies it was the remnant. Its effect was to be tragically felt upon the early battlefields on the Korean Peninsula. the heavy weapons company (TOE 7-18N). This great power. The infantry battalion of the Korean War was essentially that prescribed by TOE 7-15. The possession of an "atomic monopoly" after World War II gave the United States a distinct advantage in planning for the organization of the postwar units of the United States Army. shaped less by military doctrine looking to a future war. The combat in Korea called for strengthening of the battalion in both personnel and weapons. The aggregate strength of the battalion was 917 (34 officers and 883 enlisted men). a Reduction Table No. available tanks were still mainly Shermans. development of nonatomic weapons had lagged.r traditional mission. Under the shadow of atomic power. so the weapons of the Army remained those of World War II. despite their shortcomings.

Thus the armored divisional organization offered a partial solution to the planning for nuclear warfare. devastating firepower. great firepower. by virtue of its World War II organization. and it had high mobility.° I' In 1955. was almost the ideal atomic warfare combat unit. The armored division. the Soviet Union exploded its first tactical atomic device and thus marked the end of an era. Figure 3. The infantry and airborne divisions were not so adaptable in organizational format--they required complete overhauling for use in future warfare. the planners were forced to look toward Army units possessing mobility. Pentomic Infantry Division CORG-M-343 29 .~. September 1965. above all.3) as the new organization was called. and shock action. What the future battlefield would demand of units seemed to center about the matter of dispersion and avoidance of the massing of troops. Inherently. The following extract describing the pentomic division (see Fig. rapid and highly efficient communications and. With these qualities in r-ind. nuclear or conventional. This historical event signalled the requirement of the United States Army for military units capable of operating on the atomic battlefield.1: Source: Army Information Digest. explains the radical changes introduced: 4 I I 04MOOTOWC ~OGAVWAIMOU MANM3 OUUO E I 1. it was dispersed in its three combat commands and small battalions.

New infantcy weapons. There was a strong trend toward added air mobility for the infantry. and was completely air transportable.. Gray points out in a most succinct manner the employment of the pentomic concept.085 to division to 13. and boards such as the Howse Board deliberated. whose strength remained about the same (14. these changes were farreaching in that they eliminated the regiment and the battalion: By the end of the Korean War. The battle group (1. (Ref 4. each having five companies. The airborne division vehicles and heavy weapons.6 strength of 17. experimented. the pentomic division was smaller than the triangulk division. and in projecting the Pentomic concept beyond its present successful start. Each rifle company had four rifle platoons and one weapons platoon. we must continue to seek the best balance between selective firepower (atomic and conventional) and new mobility means. was adopted as standard in 1956. The infantry division was partially air transportable. iager than a battalion and smaller than a regiment. the divisions of the Army were reorganized according to the pentomic formula. 2-inch mortar company was retained in the battle group but now it was manned by artillerymen. The trends in development of future firepower are reasonably evident. The regimental 4. who was Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. This organization. C17). and recommended.486. said of the pentomic concept of organization in 1958: In looking to the future. planners were hard at work on certain very fundamental changes in the organization of the infantry divisions--changes which ostensibly were designed to better enable the Army to fight a tactical nuclear war. and the automatic rifle. 4). The infantry .Except for the armored division. the Br'wning machinegun. As he notes. p 10) Major General David W. 30 CORG-M-343 . the pentomic. we must look largely to new forms of air vehicles for our greatest advances. By July 1958. The three 81-mm mortars were placed in the weapons platoon of the rifle company. all elements being mounted on tracked or wheeled vehicles or in army aircraft. p 61) General Clyde D. The three regiments were replaced with five battle groups. p 26) The regimental organization which had served the United States Army since the American Revolution was eliminated and the new "battle group" took its place in the order of battle (see Fig. Eddleman.460 division was reduced from its from 17.748 and the airborne lighter with less was 11. The armored division had complete mobility.400) was an unusual unit. In the field of battlefield mobility. (Ref 17. (Ref 16. the M14 and the M60 were replacing the older M1 rifle.


DePuy: There would seem to be merit in the idea of organizing heavy. The regiment and the battalion were unJif that had served from the very beginning of our Army's history.. Westmoreland was closely involved with (General Maxwell D. terrain and climate. The best thinking in the United States Army held to the thesis that nuclear war unit battlefield vulnerability to nuclear weapons could be reduced.The level of command at which "pentomic" planning was conducted is shown in the following extract from a recent (1968) book: The official theory that future wars would be atomic encouraged at least one change for which the Army could show genuine enthusiasm. The regimental organization had been the cornerstone of all US Army organizational structure since the American Revolution (Ref 30). (Ref 18. the military planners in the Pentagon and at the Service Schools could Justify the demise of these ancient and traditional tactical structures by virtue of the possibility of their having to engage in nuclear warfare. the creation of the battle group which was neither a regiment nor a battalion presented an enigma. First. (Ref 19. intended to operate independent of the traditional front lines of earlier wars. made up of five battle groups instead of three regiments.. and nuclear or conventional operations. the substitution of the battle group headquarters. and the phasing out of the battalion puzzled many traditionalists among the military professionals. However. perhaps medium and light. mode of movement. The tread was toward "flexible response" to all types of warfare and the organizational criteria required to achieve this ideal military condition were well-stated in the following comment by Colonel (now Major General) William E. Dispersion must be coupled with other passive measures CORG-M-343 32 . less cumbersome maneuver units. combat iorces in separate TOE building blocks which could then be assembled in various combinations within non-TOE divisions heavily supported with organic and supporting mobile nuclear weapons systems in order to fit more precisely any set of variants in the enemy or the mission. pp 239-240) (parenthesis added) The loss of the regimental organization. p 40) Under the pentomic concept the battle group as organized was a most radical departure from traditional US Army unit organization. That was the reorganization of the combat division to give it smaller.) Taylor and his operations staff in devising the new commands and giving them a name--the "pentomic" division. especially in that it eliminated the regiment as a tactical unit of the infantry division. by dispersion into formations smaller than those considered to be lucrative atomic targets.

Worley. Second. the effectiveness of the battalion in combat is measured in terms of the effectiveness of the rifle squad as it performs its combat mission by fire and maneuver. Hence. and transport means allocated by the division commander. engineers. and that with the defender dispersing in greater depth the attacker needed more rather than fewer basic close combat elements. The battle group will normally be employed as an organic element of the infantry division to which it is assigned. ". blast and radiation. This organization. including the use of armored fighting vehicles and carriers. This meant that now the basic element of close combat was the five-man fire team of which the company could dispose at most 24--the same number. The formation of battle group task forces 'ill be acccmplished by the attachment of tanks. four organic rifle companies and an artillery mortar battery. by physical protection against heat. for it finally recognized. General Gray has this to say about the reorganization of the rifle squad: The most important change in the infantry structure was the division of the squad into two five-man fire teams. CO1RG-M-343 33 L . This was a momentous step. many years of error. is important because the squad is the forward element of the battalion having close contact with the enemy. commented upon the battle group as follows: The battle group is a self-contained unit consisting of a headquarters and headquarters company. by mobility so that the enemy would be presented only with fleeting targets. as in World War I. _Third. additional fire support elements. When properly reinforced.4 . the smallest unit within the infantry division was completely reorganized. p 4) At this point in the reorganization. that one man cannot effectively control eight or more fighters in the critical phase of close combat. Jr. the battle group may be assigned independent missions under corps.designed to reduce the susceptibility of our forces to detection. after many. such as concealment and camouflage. small as it is. pp 26-27) The battle group has passed into military history but it is worthy of note for certain contributions to flexibility it made during its brief existence.or field army control. The infantry rifle squad was divided into two fire teams of five men each. The composition of task forces may change frequently to meet the need for flexibility in the organization of the division for combat. In 1958 Captain Marvin L. (Ref 17. (Ref 4. although they were now smaller.

the battle group does not have the capability to effect its own resupply under the supply point distribution system. and a weapons squad with 2 machineguns and two 3. The eventual plan contemplated equipping the assault gun platoon with the M56 gun or the DART. organized into 2 fire teams of five men each. vehicles from the transportation battalion may be attached to the battle group so that the battle group can draw and transport its supplies from the division supply points. p 62) 3! 34 CORG-M-343 II . The counterfire squad was equipped with sound-locating devices for target acquisition. and 1 weapons platoon. These latter weapons gave the rifle platoon its own antitank capability. (Ref 20. The rifle company of the battle group was compactly organized and supported with organic heavy weapons.5-inch rocket launchers. The weapons platoon with its three 81mm mortars and two 106mm recoilless rifles provides fire support for the 4 rifle platoons. The mortar battery was organized and equipped to tie into the division artillery fire support nets in order to call in additional fire support. except for ammunition and emergency food supplies. When required. It provided communications. the division transportation battalion will deliver all supplies. p 61) One of the distinctive features of the battle group was its support by an organic artillery mortar battery. This support was the heaviest ever allocated organically to a United States Army infantry unit smaller than a regiment. 4 identical rifle platoons. The assault gun platoon. There was considerable maneuver built into the rifle squad with the establishment of two fire teams of five men each. The reconnaissance platoon was a basic unit for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition but it also possessed the characteristics of a patrolling and screening force for the battle group commander. Additional support will be provided by the division service support units. Each rifle platoon has 3 rifle squads of 11 men each. In normal situations. except ammunitior to the battle group (unit distribution). Unless vehicles from the division transportation battalion are attached. It functioned under the group intelligence officer (Ref 20). A supply and maintenance platoon and personnel section which provide logistical and administrative support. (Ref 20. 5 rocket launchers.S The rifle company consists of a company headquarters. he communications platoon was equipped to handle communications for the battle group headquarters and to the companies but not within any other elements. reconnaissance. There was also an air control team for communication with the forward air control officer (see App B). The weapons squad was armed with two caliber .30 machineguns and two 3. and antitank support for the group. The headquarters and headquarters company of the battle group was a most versatile unit. provided the group with an extra heavy antitank fire capability. The battery was also provided with a forward observer section to be with each rifle company. with four 106mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps.

However. the fifth company in the old battle group. . The regiment was not revived although its protagonists fought a sharp rear-guard action in the pages of the Service Journals inan attempt to restore the ancient and honored unit." the three combat commands were highly interchangeable and flexible. The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13. Thus the maneuver rifle battalion of the ROAD division was assured of the support fires of organic heavy weapons (Ref 4). was reduced to platoon strength. The battle group was replaced by the traditional battalion--adjusted to a new age.By 1962. hot or cold. (Ref 16. The armored divisions. The same concept was applied to the infantry division under the program of Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) (see App C). an infantry division might have 8 infantry battalions and 2 tank (armor) battalions. 5). With the headquarters functioning as the "power handle. with their three combat commands under the division headquarters. the pentomic concept had lessened somewhat in importance because of the international situation. The Army planners were convinced that there should be only one basic type division for both nuclear and conventional combat. which gave the infantry the most maneuverable and balanced rifle squads in its long history. are parachute-qualified. The 81 mm mortars remained with the rifle company in the weapons platoon. the following comment was made relative to the ROAD concept: A fundamental concept underlying the new structure is that of tailoring divisions to meet varying requirements. Three of these. modern war. 500. seems to have left the regimental colors and traditions to the tender care of the historians and museum curators (see Fig. Further. In the Army Information Digest of March 1962. However. a mechanized (infantry) division might have 7 mechanized (infantry) battalions and 3 tank battalions.2inch mortar company. This is done with "building blocks" that are interchangeable within and between divisions. an armored division might contain 6 tank battalions and 5 mechanized (infantry) battalions.000. and an airborne division might include 9 airborne (infantry) battalions and 1 tank battalion. there is no fixed normal or standard mix of maneuver battalions for ROAD divisions. the others have a strength in excess of 15. pointed the way toward the new one-type divisional concept. p 63) Of greatest significance to the Army was the return of the battalion tb the infantry division and the elimination of the battle group. The phaseout of the battle group in 1962 and its replacement by the maneuver battalion of the ROAD division did not eliminate some of the better features of the pentomic battle group. the artillerymen who formerly operated the mortars for the battle group were replaced by infantry mortarmen. one brigade. The following extract explains: For example. The new battalion organization retained the rifle squad and its two fire teams. CORG-M-343 35 5. nuclear or conventional. The new airmobile division is heavy with cavalry battalions (infantry). The 4.

4L -j 8 .1'8 0 TA8 4mz viie .

one of which was its unwieldy command structure--there was no intervening authority between the group commander (colonel) and the company commander (captain or lieutenant). In addition. for all practical purposes it consists of the division headquarters. administrative. the division artillery. other required combat and combat support units such as the reconnaissance squadron. an engineer battalion. their equipment. Artillery support for the ROAD division was contained in three 105mm howitzer battalions. its flexibility rests in the three brigade headquarters and the maneuver battalions. an aviation battalion. the ROAD division possessed artillery and missile weapons with both conventional and nuclear capabilities. While it was not so identified. was charged with provision of medical. The types of units that make up the division base are the same for all divisions. Essentially. There were a number of reasons for dropping the battle group. and a battalion (composite) of 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. a military police company. and an engineer battalion. and methods of operating may vary depending upon the type of division and its mission. maintenance. the pentomic battle group was eliminated and a smaller battalion substituted in its place. Although there are slight variations in the composition of the base. it perpetuates the term "cavalry" bacause It employs ground vehicles and aircraft in much the same manner as troopers of old employed horses. The "experience gap" of the commanders in the battle group chain of command was too great for modern warfare with its requirements of dispersion and independent operations. It includes the command and control elements. The following comment is significant of tbe ROAD fundamental concept. there was a missile battalion with HONEST JOHN and LITTLE JOHN rockets. a new departure for the United States Army. and a support command. a support command which provides administrative and logistical support of the division. a signal battalion.- . however. organization. The primary mission of the cavalry squadron Is reconnaissance. a signal battalion. a cavalry squadron. p 39) The support command. As can be seen from the above. The pentomic concept was one 37 CORG-M-343 - 4 -------------- - . p 4) The ROAD concept was not new to the United States Army. and supply service. (Ref 6. three subordinate brigade headquarters (thus retaining the triangular armored division' s format of three combat commands). the ROAD concept grew out of the organization of the World War II armored division.These building blocks are the COMBAT MANEUVER BATTALIONS that are assigned to a common DIVISION BASE. and three brigade headquarters. All ROAD divisions have a common base. The ROAD division brought a maximum of flexibility and versatility to the infantry. the division artillery. The DIVISION BASE contains the elements required for all divisions. an aviation battalion. (Ref 21.

2inch mortar possessed characteristics similar to field artillery which was authorized in the ROAD reorganization of the infantry division. tested. p 407) In the battalion the heavy weapons company paces the battalion. yet he was somewhat of a generalist rather than a specialist.2-inch chemical mortars. the ability to shift fires quickly.2-inch mortar to be retained. The heavy mortar provided not only a heavier punch but it could. reach areas that artillery could not. The obvious need for a weapon with artillery capabilities and effects in support of the infantry battalions in all types of foreseeable combat caused the 4. Heavy mortars have capabilities similar to cannon. They are characterized by flexibility in employment. But in nuclear war. 2-inch mortar was retained for several cogent reasons. They are readily moved by air and can be 38 CORG-M-343 . it is well to note the advantages of the heavy mortar over the conventional artillery cannon in the following terms: Cannon are capable of delivering all types of fires. relatively short ranges. An infantry regiment in combat should have a 4. shorter minimum and maximum ranges. such as ROAD. From consequent increased independence of command and maneuver under nuclear warfare arises the requirement for independent and heavy supporting fires for the infantry battalion.2-inch mortar had been good. However. General George S. Combat experience of the infantry in Korea with the 4. a high rate of sustained fire. and comparatively heavy tonnage requirements for ammunition. when available should be attached to an infantry division.2-inch mortar survived with distinction the various organizational changes effected by Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID) and ROAD. Jr. His notes and recommendations for the conduct of war throw considerable light upon his military thinking and they are as valid today as when written. The ROAD divisional organization was established to give the infantry a built-in flexibility for response to a requirement for operations in either conventional or nuclear war.2-inch mortar in the ROAD organization: A battalion of 4. In essence. (Ref 22. The 4.tI which served essentially as an interim measure until a better infantry division structure. and adopted. Patton. could be conceived. Cannons have restricted mobility in difficult terrain. The following quotations are significant rationale for retention of the 4. accuracy. p 410) The 4. by virtue of its high angle of fire. and greater volume of fire per tube. dispersion of units for combat was indicated. They differ from cannon primarily in their higher trajectory. was essentially an armor commander. this response was to be effected by the traditional doctrine of fire and maneuver.2 chemical company attached. The 4. and the ability to mass large volumes of fire from dispersed positions under all conditions of weather and terrain. (Ref 22.

was reorganized under ROAD to contain three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. It will be recalled that in World War I. Experimental firing ports have been installed in a number of APC with the idea of employing the full combat potential of the comments are based upon information received from a former Chief of Infantry Section. The use of the armored personnel carrier (APC) by infantry units has been on the increase since the Korean War. since the doctrine of fire and movement and the need for certain weight fires and certain celerity of movement would still govern. where jungle rice paddy and mountains make the movement of the 4. the heavy machinegun was organized into machinegun battalion units which were separate from the infantry rifle battalions and regiments. Required machinegmus heavy to had no battalionwere rifle and battalions for specific missions companies organically attached ~machineguns and combat operations. in the current battle actions. The trend toward smaller caliber and lighter mortars may be a particular requirement of the limited war in Vietnam. The armored or mechanized infantry rely almost entirely upon the APC for mobility and maneuver to the final assault phase of the combat. The rifle platoon contained three ten-man rifle squads and a five-man weapons squad. . as it was neither desired nor desirable to form a separate divisional heavy mortar unit..2-inch mortar in a more or less semi-fixed fire base along As has been noted in Evolution of the US Army Infantry with the artillery. (Ref 23. terror. That the trend would obtain in a conventional conflict cannot be judged with any degree of accuracy. In Vietnam. in reality.2-inch mortar and its ammunition a heavy task for the foot soldier. This arrangement was not satisfactory and the planner . there is a tendency to return to the smaller caliber mortar (the 8r1mm) as a heavy weapon for the battalion. In the infantry rifle battalion. CORG-M-343 39 6 These :1 • I I i j '. the Infantry assigned. the Marines have returned the 60mm infantry mortar to combat service. now G-3." ARPAC. G. of ROCID and ROAD organizations had this lesson of history before them. four rifle companies. Within the past year or so there has been considerable feeling that the soldier mounted in the APC should Le si->. and a mortar battery. The mortar battery included a battery headquarters and two mortar platoons.. The M79 is still regarded as a fine grenade launcher. it required the same organic heavy fire support as the eliminated regimental organization. They are useful in providing large volumes of fire in support of close combat forces. p 37) A battle group comprised a headquarterF company. . this doctrine is being tested by combinations of guerrilla war. the 4. especially in Vietnam. Although the battle group was.f emplaced in positions inaccessible to grotud vehicles. This return of the smaller caliber mortar has not displaced the M79 grenade launcher in the battalion rifle companies. Mortar Squad: The Argonne to Pleiku. the rifle company.from the moving vehicle.2-inch mortar remained organic to the ROAD battalion. and conventional war including siege warfare. OCAFF. a large battalion. The principal component of the rifle battalion. By this token. and employ the 4.

is a poor tank. The addition of numerous gun and rifle ports in the hull would tend to weaken the personnel protection potential of the carrier. there are advantages. thus altered. to be gained by firing from the interior of the APC while it is in motion. psychological and military.tt troops being carried therein in the maneuver phase. p 55) Here we are presented with a d ilemma: the sacrifice of the overall protection of the APC up to the point of close contact with the enemy or engagement while moving by small arms and grenade fires from ports in thehull of the APC. They can operate in combat without tanka or they may combine both mounted and dismounted actions in their tactical patterns. (Ref 24. delivery of aimed fires upon the hostile position and personnel prior to dismounting. 40 CORG-M-343 . Mounted combat from the present armored personnel carriers is difficult if not impossible for the squad personnel within the vehicle. Fires of the carrier-mounted weapons only can be delivered while the vehicle is moving. that is. The protection afforded by the armored personnel carrier enables the armored infantiy squad to get as far forward as possible for the delivery of a decisive blow upon the enemy when he is subjected to or recovering from the heavy fire power of the accompanying tanks. The following comment in 1965 is of significance in view of 'the tirend toward fighting from the APC: Armored infantry are specialized in that they advance mounted in armored personnel carriers and upon dismounting. There are those who consider this move as one in the wrong direction and they are quick to allege that the APC. Among these are occupation of the passengers with a combat task prior to disembarkation and closing with the enemy. Conversely. fight as infantry. thus inhibiting the hostile force from delivering accurate and effective fire against the APC as they advance. The fires of the carrier-mounted weapons assure the squad close support when it is needed.

command. Sun Tzu. At that period of history. shape. as cited above. education. the span of control was measured in terms of the number of subordinates the leader could control in combat with his voice or visual signals. and determination exert significant influence upon the span of control of the commander. intelligence. size. (Ref 25. It is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. the human qualities of age. the span of control is limited by the terrain. climate. bravery. had stated: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men." there must be criteria that affect the organization. Dictionary of United States Army Terms. Throughout history. the span of control is limited by both human and material factors. How many subordinates can a commander control under the stress of combat? This condition has varied throughout military history and is directly related. the span of control has been established by the format of military tactical organization which is prescribed by regulations or orders based upon current doctrine. the physical and mental abilities of the commander and the state of the art of weaponry and communications. training. Specifically. experience. It is merely a question cf instituting signs and signals. and control of the infantry battalion. tactics. Broadly. and general environment of the combat area. but a standard military training and academic education will tend to equalize these differences. coordination. Each period of history has produced outstanding field commanders at all levels of military organization. not only to the human factors. It is impossible to average these individual differences. and interior organization of the battalion has been influenced throughout history by human factors. CONTROL. AR 320-5. the number was deemed to be in the area of eight to ten men. The size. Historically. that is. In the Greek phalanx and the Roman Legion. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one. Inasmuch as war is conducted by humans and not machines. Prior to this era.ed in the organization and control of the infantry battalion. but to the weapons. defines command in the following terms: "Command: The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction. ability. Assuming that the human factors do cause what the psychologist terms "individual differences. the military profession has endeavored to limit the number of individuals in the commandert s span of control by constant reorganization of units and redefinition of tactical doctrine and individual functions. p 55) Aside from the requirements for mechanical and lethal weaponry there are additional factors invol'." CORG-M-343 41 a - J . including transport. and control of military forces. the Chinese general. AND COMMUNICATIONS OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION The span of control may be defined as the number of principal subordinates a commander must direct to insare that the unit he commands is functional in garrison or in the field.COMMAND. and state of the military art.

connecting armies. Ergo.t Command is then an expression of the authority of the state in the person of an individual who holds rank for this purpose. and by the latter part of the Civil War. they were both vast improvements over the use of runners or horsemen. the primary means of transmitting orders on the battlefield was either by runner or by mounted aide: semaphoric and later rudimentary electrical means were employed only between the army in the field and the seat of government. they were in common use in both contesting forces. Recent advances in communication techniques have afforded the commander instant and effective communication with his unit commanders.. There is justification for challenging the foregoing statement. pp 11-12) 42 i Lif CORG-M-343 J . assumption will be made by some that because of improved communications the span of control may be increased. the number of subordinates that a commander can control has been found to depend upon the state of communication existing between them. Thus the span of control of the battalion was established at four subordinate unit commanders plus a minimal battalion staff of two or three officers and noncommissioned officers. each under the command of a major. Command of any military unit is exercised by the commander through means of subordinate commanders. and division. wars." Over the years and through many campaigns. and of Major Meyer' s visual signalling system which extended to smaller units. corps. Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century (1890) this fact was recognized by the reorganization of the US infantry regiment into three battalions of four companies. In ancient times. The battalion and other military organizations from the field army to 'he rifle squad of the infantry are subjected to command by an individual assigned solely for that purpose by virtue of his rank and position in the military service. While neither of these systems can be compared in efficiency to the electronic methods. Questions relating to the above assertion may be phrased somewhat as follows: (1) Is span of control a direct function of the efficiency of the means of communications available to the commander? (2) When did communications evidence such improvement that the span of control could be increased? (3) What form of improved communications has exerted the most influence upon the span of control? The following extract will shed some light upon the above queries: From the earliest times through the Napoleonic period. (Ref 26. But early in our own Civil War the Union Army took the lead in the adoption both of the mobile field telegraph.. This span of control has survived generally until the present period of 1968. vis-h-vis control was traditional. and battles. The number of principal subordinate commanders serving under a higher commander constitute the "span of control. but with warfare becoming more complex and dispersed due to improved weapon lethality and mobility this was no longer possible. Examples of command and control situations from history have shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates a commander can control.

However. under the span of control principle always included the staff of four to eight officers and noncommissioned officers at headquarters. Such fact assumes that the incumbent at each level of the command structure is involved in a span of control situation. If battalions were formed in the Volunteers. It must be remembered that the staff officer of the battalion or regiment possessed the authority by delegation to issue orders in his commander' s name (see Fig. established tables of organization and promotion systems. is noted in the Historical Background to this study. or battalions. Thus. It follows that the spans of control of all commanders are established and they must perforce accept them and operate. Occasions when this is done are in emergencies and usually when CORG-M-343 43 P . In the American Civil War (1861-1865) the tactical organization of the regular Army infantry battalion took the form of an eight. Numerically.or ten-company unit. The officers who reported directly to the colonel of the Volunteer regiment were the lieutenant colonel. In practice. etc. 1). The span of control of the battalion commander. the regimental commander had only to command his staff in order to implement his span of control over the companies. These ranks have been attained by prescribed periods of service in grade. and the two assistant surgeons. Administration was accomplished by the adjutant who worked directly under the second-incommand. hence. when formed. The battalion commander' s span of control was almost as great as that of the Volunteer (State Troops) of the regimental commander which Included ten company commanders in addition to his staff. These are career patterns by which certain individuals are posted to specific assignments by rank. from the beginning of the US Army. the number of subordinates a commander can direct successfully in battle has been shown historically to be approximately eight or nine. The number of individuals controlled directly by either the battalion commander. by experience. in the military hierarchy. the quartermaster. the span of control of the colonel was reduced to his staff and two principal subordinates. is established by law. the adjutant. seniority. Traditionally. under certain conditions. or selection. it has varied from three to ten subordinate unit commanders less a staff of from three to six battalion headquarters personnel. Assumption Is made by all concerned that by the time the individual has reached a certain grade in his specific arm or service. bypass his staff and issue orders directly to his principal subordinates. the span of control for each rank. the chaplain. the major. either as a superior or as a subordinate of a superior commander. One of the peculiarities of the chain of command system which is the basic rationale for the span of control is that the commander may.\I t I The matter of individual differences establishes the superior from the average or mediocre performer. in addition to the eight or ten company commanders. the military structure is based upon approved. Training and operations functions were performed by the major when he was not doing duty as a temporary battalion commander. it was possible for the lieutenant colonel and the major to command them. or the regimental commander.. to command a unit comparable to his rank. that he is qualified professionally. training.

as a matter of personal policy or professional ignorance. professional education and training will make the difference. and directives of the unit commander. an S4 (captain). In this instance. only poor battalion commanders. exercised by the commander' s deputy. A brigade commander. the battalion commander must ke3p his staff fully aware of his location and his actions and to whom he has issued specific orders either verbally or in writing. commands. and the staff functions. Within the battalion.tI the battalion commander is on the ground away from headquarters or his command post. the commander may find that his span of control has become unwieldy. second-in-command. However. the administrative. Unless he does this. the companies are the "building blocks" of the battalion structure. Obviously. and the battalion commander' s primary responsibility is that they are properly emplaced and combat functional. he usually deals with his staff through his executive officer. Ile also possesses a staff and administrative span of control of his executive officer and the S1. the battalion commander would send one of his staff to take command. The tactical span of control is directly-concerned with the command and control of combat troops in operations. S1 (captain). and S2 (captain). In the type of combat encountered in Vietnam. These are the tactical." The battalion is the largest ground unit which is personally influenced. in full or fragmentary form. a communications officer (captain). "there are no poor battalions. a battalion commander often directly controls one ol his own companies--for example. does not interfere with the operations of one of his battalion commanders. the span of control totals five men. is concerned with staff command. In further clarification of the span of control principle and its operation. and a sergeant major. when the unit is faltering because of the combat loss of its commander. If this latter officer is bypassed. an adjutant (captain). This is a typical infantry battalion commander' s staff. In the modern infantry battalion. On high levels the chief of staff performs the command and control function under the orders. if the battalion commander does not follow the chain of command principle. or executive officer. thus influencing the action indirectly. While the staff does increase the number in the span 44 CORG-M-343 I i . The staff span of control. whereas the administrative span of control is concerned with noncombat or support units. In the event that all company officers are casualties. In this instance. an S3 (major). the span of control can be discussed as three functions. As noted. except in an emergency. hence. under "usual" conditions of combat by its commander. the command and control function of the battalion under the chain of command and span of control system will collapse. this is usually the situation with the command helicopter constituting a highlymobile command post for the battalion commander. and S4. his span of control will be increased as he deals directly with his staff and not through the executive officer. S3. Under the ROAD concept of organization the battalion commander' s st'af consists of an executive officer (major). S2. that is. the commander does possess a tactical span of control of four company commanders.

basic to the organization and operation of the . both voice and CW (code). land telegraph. sophisticated communications systems have not enlarged the span of control but have afforded better control by the next higher commander. C. it should be noted that in practice the battalion commander deals with his staff through the executive officer who functions as a chief of staff. How many subordinates a commander can control in battle is determined by several conditions. panels. commented thusly: "The key to the whole thing is communcatiGns. and 269 enlisted men and. World War 11. in a sense. or local. the span of control has been CORG-M-343 45 . Weaponry. Captain Roger H.ttaion. This span cf control principle enables the battalion commander to operate with a span of control of six (one staff officer and five company commanders). Theoretically.j2 of control. as such. The great distances required a maximum effective performance from the contemporary communication media. available to the commander have significant effect upon the control limitations inposed upon the commander. tactical radio-telephone and its assignmont down to the infantry rifle platoon and squad. Concerning modern tactical communication and its impact upon the span of control. an extension of the commander' s authority so that he may cope wiih the span of control required for control of the battalion. in 1968 the battalion commander possesses a apan of control of one executive officer plus four company commanders. he issues orders and directives in the name of the commander on the basis of delegated authority. his span of control may be enlarged as he controls each staff officer personally. These media included radio. warrant officers. flags. ground. Donlon. The headquarters and headquarters company has grown from a battalion headquarters detachment of World War II days to an organization comprising 19 officers. international. the battalion staff officer does not command. and especially communications. The battalion staff operates through the elements of the headquarters and headquarters company assigned as integral to the battalion. Historically. This belief is based essentially upon the fact that the past World Wars were global in extent. Without it we had nothing. With communication thus assured from the higher to the lower level units a control of combat was achieved to a degree never before attained in the long history of warfare. He is. of course. and lights. Korea. Among these conditions are the period of history involved or the time frame in which the commander finds himself and his unit. is one of the four companies within the span of control of the battalion commander. the thinking among professional soJdiers is that the dimensions of the battlefield are growing. In modern warfare." The span of control principle is. and Vietnam were especially marked by the advent of the portable. Whether this situation occurs depends mainly upon the professionalism and experience of the battalion commander and the training of his subordinates. These latter conflicts involved millions of men and millions of miles of territory. the battlefield can be national. These were the types of communication available to the air. USA hero of Vietnam. Today. If he does not use his executive officer as he should. and naval services of the combatants. telephone. As such. in site and area.

late of the staff and faculty of the United States Military Academy at West Point. it was noted that: •. in general terms. p 11) The modern means of communication available to the commander enabled the Army to reorganize the infantry division and its component units under the now outmoded and outdated battle group (ROCID) concept.unsuccessful exercise of military command. Theoretically. deaths. S4 (the battalion staff). With the battalion headquarters personnel of executive $1. defined as ' the maximum number of subordinate elements at each echelon which can be controlled effectively. S2. Colonel Arthur P. Whether or not three or four companies are the maximum that a commander can control in combat is a question that has never been definitely answered. For his rank and responsibility this span of control is about all he can operate under combat conditions. That the battalion organization is centered about the span of control is an acknowledged fact of military life. by the principle of 'recognition of increased span of control possible through modern signal communications'. The maneuver phase. which is employed by the military profession to test proficiency..demonstrated as having exerted vital and far-reaching influences upon the successful or. was the idea that the new division should optimize a span of control. A basic tenet of the reorganization. and under the new concept of employment of atomic fires--the nuclear delivery means of division artillery. and various enlisted men as assistants. a tank battalion.that is. Nonbattle or garrison situations are marked by an absence of the pressure engendered by the possibility of combat wounds. S3. a reconnaissance squadron. This span of control 46 CORG-M-343 I . the division commander now controls directly 8 subordinate maneuver elements: 5 infantry battle groups (the battalion was eliminated--as well as was the regiment). At the time of this concept. (Ref 26. Wade. for example. under the span of control concept. The span of control in a noncombat situation will be affected by the mission of the unit--training. It should be noted that these circumstances are environmentally and tactically different. ' This theory was expressed. and military failure -. had this to say in his previously cited paper on the subject of the span of control: In recent years a theory has gained circulation that a commander' s span of control is directly related to his means of communicating with his subordinate commanders. The theory has now been expressed officially in the directives which led to the reorganization of the infantry division. the commander functions by controlling three or four company commanders. should reflect a realistic span of control comparable to that employed in combat. There is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in garrison or in the field. it will be seen that the span of control of the battalion commander extends much farther than to the three or four company commanders of the battalion organic units. surrender. 1956.

152 Officers 6 27 100 225 975 4 Ii S ' In the World War I United States National Army organization.755 8. including veterinarians. The infantry regiment consisted of three battalions of approximately 1000 men each. mathematical spacing of the men and the lining up of the units. The battle thus became more indirect and the soldier only closed with his enemy at the final phase of the battle. Historically. the adjutant. Weaponry and its employment in battle exerted considerable influence upon the precise. second-in-command. or. S-4 Supply.000 riflemen. The battalion was larger. The infantry brigade was comprised of 2 infantry regiments of 3000 men each and the infantry division consisted of 2 brigades with a division rifle strength of about 12. Spacing between troops and units as a factor of span of control has always been a minor concern of the commander in the field. The span of control of the infantry rifle company commander covered 5 lieutenants and his company first sergeant. mess sergeant. there were 4 companies of 250 men in each infantry battalion. (Ref 26 p 11) The World War I United States Infantry was organized and reorganized along the lines of the French and Allied tables of organization. On battalion level. But the theory of massed fires of CORG-M-343 47 . a tank battalion. The regimental commander' s span of control encompassed three battalion commanders and a small regimental staff. but lean in personnel and mean in its weaponry and capabilities.210 27. Weapons wielded by muscular power alone required that the wielders be compactly arranged to give the maximum effect of the cutting edge of the hand-held weapons in the man-to-man struggle. the ancients utilized the order of battle alinement system to help solve this perplexing problem. Eventually the various infantry units were organized as follows: Organization Company Battalion Regiment Brigade Division Enlisted Men 250 L026 3. a reconnaissance company. S-3 Operations. pp 83-84) The infantry organization of World War H was perhaps the best planned and most tightly organized ground force ever sent into battle by the United States. S-2 Intelligence. commanded four company commanders and his adjutant. the traumatic power of the weapon was increased since it projected its force at greater distances. the regimental executive officer and S-1 Personnel. a major. There was generally a Chaplain assigned plus the necessary medical officers. wherein the division commander controlled directly only three infantry regiments. (Ref 27. the battalion commander.is contrasted with that of the old triangular division. and supply sergeant. With the discovery of gun powder. and to a lesser degree.

However. cannot be predicted accurately. (Ref 27. Units. From the Civil War through World War I. Under modern mobile conditions of combat no precise mathematical table. were controlled and directed toward their missions by fragmentary orders. battlefield communication was constantly drawing away from the vis-a-vis command procedures of previous wars. p 117) Span of control must always be correlated with the contemporary state of the art of tactical communication.-i companies and battalions caused the compact phalanx or square-type formations of the ancients to be retained until weaponry became too accurate and lethal to withstand in formation. even remote. CORG-M-343 48 . wire telephone and other less technical means of communication gave the commander of a World War H unit communication above and beyond that ever before available." While this article does not claim to prescribe troop spacing it does furnish invaluable historical comparison with a view toward the future. entitled "Interaction of Firepower. in a modern war-. vis a vis leadership of the Civil War combat commander. these orders were as pertinent and direct as they were personal and human. with the distance between soldiers about 14 inches. this has meant a five-pace interval between skirmishers on the line. the spacing of troops in moderin war dated from the field manuals of the Civil War which stated "that the comrades in battle were to maintain visual and vocal contact. the tone of the voice and the personal contact with the commander. The factors of environment. In terms of contemporary communications before the great discoveries and inventions. 7 The spacing or dispersion of units on future battlefields. Improved communications permit distances between "his comrades in battle" to be greatly increased. the personal and human capabilities of the commander and the commanded are directly involved: Radio telephone. as worked out by the ancients. is applicable. taking advantage of all cover and concealment. Improved weaponry and updated organization and tactics exerted significant influences upon the span of control. This was not the equivalent of the direct. who waved his sabre and charged. climate. comparisons have been made in an interesting and informative article in the Military Review of March 1960. in the United States Army. especially in event of nuclear war. In the parade formation ranks the distance between ranks is traditionally 40 inches. Given over the radio by the voice of the commander.a good substitute. The size of the infantry squad eight to ten men) has been correlated with the number of men the squad leader can control in combat by hand and voice signals. Mobility and Dispersibn.7 There has been some doubt raised as to the effect of the state of the communication art upon the span of control exercised by the commander on the battlefield. Basically. was. Over the radio. and visibility determine the spacing of the troops and units. With modern communication devices the distances between soldiers have increased. personal. The soldier must adjust himself to the terrain. terrain." Essentially. ai all levels.

Wade has said it well in the following extract from his cited paper: Even with the ultimate in communications -.long-range thought transference -. these will be subject to the limitations of the military professional intellect which must direct and control their implementation. the limited capabilities of the human mind tend to negate the advantages of these technical advances in c3ommunicatiuns. particularly in dense foliage. on their own in combat. the Korean War. or fractions of squads. knit companies tighter together than had been the case since the Civil War. and supported by a highly competent staff. an increase in the span of control wholly based upon improved communications may handicap the average commander. it was and is possible for a commander of an infantry battalion to talk directly with the leaders of the attacking units and direct their efforts. keen concentration. In effect. and the specific intelligence quotient of the commander himself. if he does not possess these. Dispersion to avoid the deadly effects of enemy fire threw squads.ontrol solely upon the invention and utilization of improved means of communication is neither sound nor wise.I Human factors are essential elements in the span of control in the areas of memory. and in night operations. Individual mental. (Ref 1. but it by no means made them act as one man. In World War II. It has been said that the span of control is basically a function of the mind of the commander. a highly-developed intuition. and telephones. the increased span of control may not only be a handicap but a military disaster as well. Justification of increased span of . p 57) Thus. As noted. he will experience little or no difficulty (Ref 26). p 14) Historically. the addition of the so-called Walkie-Talkie and SCR 300 gave the infantry and other arms instantaneous and generally reliable communication. The Army Lineage Book comments: Five hand radios were included in a companyt s equipment. If he is gifted with certain attributes of the great captains such as a photographic memory. and Vietnam. would find it restrictive to work directly with more than 5 or 6 subordinates. tactics and organizational concepts will change. Often this direction is vital because the commander is either airborne or in a terrain or tactical situation remote to the subordinate unit commanders. (Ref 26. However. in the mountains. and moral factors will positively or negatively influence this function.optimum span of control would still vary with individual commanders. and a photographic memory might have no difficulty in controlling 8 or 9 subordinate elements. For the first time in our military history. However. and weapons and communications will reach fantastic capabilities. creativity. others. physical. there was radio communication between the elements of the infantry company. Supporting CORG-M-343 49 . mental concentration. Those blessed with rare flexibility of mind. in World War II. These.. probably equally fine tacticians.

8 Beginning with the Korean War. the helicopter was an ideal transport vehicle for evacuation of the sick and wounded. the helicopter introduced radical changes in the time and space factors of tactical ground operations. or hover. fire support. of course. and transport vehicle. this air vehicle enabled a commander to reach the troops quickly. the helicopter came into its own as a command. the helicopter has given the battalion commander in Vietnam a high degree of personal contact with and control over his frontline elements. In the post-Korean development period. Highly maneuverable and capable of vertical ascent and descent. for a condensed review of communication facilities and equipment available to the infantry from squad to division level. he was afforded maximum observation of the battle area. During the Korean War and after. With its high speed and vertical ascent and descent characteristics. Maximum employment of the helicopter in this activily was initiated in Korea. the helicopter began to assert itself as a most important new means of command. CORG-M-343 50 . pp 172 and 174. in addition to its revolutionary effect upon tactical operations in the delivery of troop units to or from the combat area.fires of mortars and artillery are also controlled and directed by radio and telephone (airborne or ground) communication in ways which were never thought attainable in past wars. Aside from its great command axd control potential. This outstanding contribution of the helicopter is. there was some advancement of the idea that helicopters possessed a tactical combat potential. By its inherent speed and mobility. Enroute. above his combat units on site and possess visual and vocal contact with the units and individuals in his span of control. control. 8 See Army 1967 Green Book. and transport at all levels. The effect of the helicopter upon the span of control at battalion level has been noted primarily from the standpoint of communications. Never in our military history has the infantry battalion commander been able to fly. control.

the unit can again push forward small units to survey the situation and to bring in new supporting fires. p 17) In Vietnam combat experience has demonstrated many important facts about the battalions of the present-day infantry arm. and division commanders must know how their platoons and squads operate and insure that they ope-zte soundly and professionally. conventional war. Because of these two factors. battalion. The following commentary by a combat-experienced brigade commander in Vietnam is of interest as it defines the role of the battalion in the typical "search and destroy" operations carried out there: The battalion is the basic operational unit in jungle search-and-destroy operations. brigades. standard infantry battalions of the ROAD concept are engaged in comnbat. The brigade commander. These battalions possess mobility and celerity never envisioned even in World War 1i and Korea. including the battalion. uninhibited employment of supporting fires. once the enemy is located. In both the ROAD standard infantry division and the airmobile 1st Cavalry Division. In connection with operations in Vietnam it must be recalled that the US Army is fighting a three-faced type of warfare. Its fighting is done principally by squads and platoons under company commanderst control.THE ROAD AND AIRMOBILE BATTALIONS IN VIETNAM In Vietnam. guerrilla (unconventional war). planning at all levels. if appropriate. The "building block" employment of the rifle battalions within the brigade and division has functioned well according to reports received from the battle zone. The position of the brigade in the overall chain of command is well established by the tables of organization of the various types of infantry CORG-M-343 51 t . After supporting fires have done their damage. must be more closely coordinated than in the days before the helicopter became a vehicle of command and control. and fire support. The infantry battalions depend upon the UH-1D helicopter for logistic support and the artillery and armor battalions look to the CH-47 to deliver the goods to the battle units. or continue its search. and nonviolent warfare (civic action). that is. and divisions operate by means of platoon and squad tactics. To establish a battalion organization thaL can operate equally well in all three types of combat has been difficult for US Army planners. brigade. (Ref 28. supply. the battalion is the primary functional unit for supply and combat operations. should see that massive volumes of supporting fires are put on the enemy and simultaneously commit additional battalions to block the enemy' s withdrawal and to employ supporting fires to destroy him. The unit that locates the enemy should not be reluctant to break contact and withdraw far enough to permit free. Therefore. :i * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Battalion.

campaigns. (Ref 28. the rigiment was in the same relation to the officers and men as was the family to its children. faithful service which the current personnel by their membership were obliged to try to emulate. He can insure the availability of adequate supporting fires and airborne artillery observers and forward air controllers constantly overhead. The brigade air officer must aim to prcvide maximum support to battalions. The transmission of this "power" to the battalions is cortrolled by the brigade commander. Further. and expeditions -.13 and one UH-1D will satisfy the battalion commander' s minimum needs. The brigade commander can assist the battalion commander in several ways. The brigade acquires.. one solution to the problems of maintaining unit historical continuity throughout the United States Army. the repository of the esprit of the fighting unit. The battalion of today has inherited its history and traditions from the old regimental organizations of which the battalions were formerly integral parts. (Ref 29. The battalion commander can use one helicopter for command and control purposes and for assisting his units with land navigation.. The regiment was. In a sense. the historical record of the regiment-its wars. was approved by the Secretary of the Army on 24 January 1957. allocates. The concept was designed to provide a flexible regimental structure that would permit perpetuation of unit history and tradition in the new tactical 52 CORG-M-343 . The other he can use for administrative and logistical missions. the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS).set a pattern of heroic. and coordinates the use of helicopters for logistic support of the battalions. It insures that the division locates logistic elements in the best position to support the brigade's operations. The lineage has not been broken as evidenced by the following: . and also expedites solutions to the logistic problems with which the battalions need assistance. p 18) One of the problems envisioned by Army personnel when ROAD displaced the regimental structure and substituted the battalion was the matter of unit spirit. One OH-. the commander was often in loco parentis to his troops. battles. for centuries. p 38) The brigade and division headquarters are related to the maneuver battalions of the infantry division as the "power handle" is related to the attachable-detachable tools it operates. How the brigade commander and staff serve the battalions is excellently stated in the following extract: There are several ways in which the brigade can assist battalions with logistic support of their operations. The brigade provides planning guidance to the battalion and insures a close marriage of operations and logistics during planning and execution.divisions. He can place at the battalion commander' s full-time disposal at least one and preferably two helicopters.

famous regiments were selected to serve as parent organizations of all Infantry. Except for the 1st and 2d Infantry Brigades. The battalions are not permanently assigned to the brigade. Armor. He points out that unit spirit is an absolute of success in combat operations. the brigade commander has a different problem in building brigade esRit. which was inactivated when division headquarters was expanded to form the current division headquarters and headquarters company. p46) CORG-M-343 53 . p 24) Colonel Sidney B. for the time being. commands every battalion in the division. Jr. the brigade must build its esprit on the present and the future. Cavalry.. which served briefly in World War II as airborne Infantry brigades. at one time or another. (Ref 30.organization of the divisions. Being recently created and lacking a distinctive history or tradition. However. USA. p 17) * With reference to the brigade lineage and tradition authors of the abovecited article point out that brigade histories and traditions will come from Brigades that were inactivated or disbanded when Regular Army divisions were triangularized in 1939-40. the brigade should build its own esprit in a manner that disparages no other unit and contributes to the ability of all battalions and brigades to work together smoothly and in wholehearted cooperation. Berry. (Ref 29.. unit esprit is built most effectively around the battalion and the division itself since these have distinctive histories and traditions and a fixed organization. This source will provide two of the three brigades for the 1st through 8th Infantry Divisions. a brigade commander in Vietnam has furnished a most valuable contemporary commentary upon the function of the brigade commander vis-A-vis the battalions and the division (see Figs. (Ref 30. not the past. hence. and Artillery tactical units in the Army. The third brigade in each division will perpetuate the history of the former division headquarters company. Being one of three tactical headquarters which. without restricting organizational trends of the future. This is an old military axiom and has been stated in many ways by as many commanders as there are armies. the Regular Army Infantry brigades have not been used since then. How to build es t in the brigade which is in reality a functional "power handle" for the employment of its tools (battalions) constitutes a real challenge to the brigade commander. To accomplish the purpose. This is not essentially so as indicated in the following extract: .. 6 and 7). and from 1958 to 1962 as Infantry brigades. one might surmise that the spirit of the brigade will be found in the spirit of the battalions it commands.

MCAL MOIA . 0 10A . U PRLLMENT . . Current Battalion Organization " SUPPORT i COMMUICATION SUPPORT MAINTENANCE . Figure 7. Figure 6. company headquaeers. . 54 Revised Battalion Organization CORG-M-343 .• • see tooler • . and battalion headquarters section of heedquarter3 and headquarters company. A lees desirable solution would be to form a separate combat support company The antitank platoon would be at cadre strength. . I HEAVY MORTAR IRCONNAISSANCi Z NTITANK FLSURVEILLNCf RIFLE COMPA Ol EP N *This alternative shows combat support element retained In headquarters and headquarters company.!WEAPONS Note: This organization is based on TOE 7-15E. and Davy Crockett and chaplain sections augmentations are not shown.I MPj RECONNAISSACE R HEAVY MORTARj MAINENNC ANTTANK_ I E3~~A I UIL LNCE RIFLE COMPANY 600 0*0 g F -. To simplify..

and 3 IN Ins.p 34) i .BD HQ. August 1965. The following extract sums it up well: Airmobility brings to the Army the advantage of permitting the commander to apply decisive firepower and manpower in the most critical area of the battlefield at the most critical time of the battle. about one-third of its combat elements can be moved into combat by its own aircraft. The high degree of mobility of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was succinctly stated by the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. are assigned to the brigade headquarters in much the same manner as tools are attached to a power-handle unit (see Fig.600 VEHICLESE MANEUVER BATTALIONS" *One ide Hqs. will have an Airborne 'Capability -Maneuver Ins will be assigned to Srigade% as required. of which three have airborne-qualified personnel. 8 for battalion organization).787 OFFICERS AND MEN 434 AIRCRAFT !. The eight infantry battalions. (Source: Army Information Digest. McNamara on 16 June 1965: As a result. 15. pp 146-154 for a concise review of Army aircraft and aircraft weapons systems. p 35) 9 9 See Army Green Book. the tactical advantages accruing to the airmobile division are many and varied. For the first time in our military history infantry battalions have gained mobility far beyond even the early thinking expressed by General James M. The Airmobile Cavalry Division On brigade and battalion levels. p 36) Figure 8. (Ref 31.Deployed to Vietnam in 1965. October 1967. Mobility has been a desideratum for all commanders from the beginning of history. 55 CORG-M-343 . the other two-thirds will move simultaneously either in air transport aircraft or by shuttling of the division' s own aircraft. the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) has already earned the Presidential Unit Citation for distinguished service in combat. Gavin in his book Airborne Warfare. the airmobile concept appears to solve the maneuver problem in a positive and dynamic way. (Ref 31.

10 For a factual.. 1967. it is not presumptuous to note that Vietnam is in reality a proving ground for the latest concepts concerning the organization and operation of the US Army infantry battalion. Because of the nature of the war there--a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare and jungle and urban combat--the battalion commander faces a more proximate relation with combat and combat leadership. S. In pursuit it can be persistent and deadly. The following comment is revealing with reference to the area of human factors: Comparing the demands and stresses of combat in the jungles of Vietnam with those experienced during the first year of Korean combat. it seems that company commanders in Vietnam are subjected to about the same stresses as platoon leaders in Korea. 1 0 In view of the drastic changes brought to the infantry by ROAD and the airmobile concept. and the average battalion commander in six to eight months. than its honored ancestors met the challenges of the past. informed of this fact. it is interesting to note what effect these changes have had on the commanders of these most modern military formations in such a combat situation as Vietnam. p 41) While it is too early to deal with Vietnam with a proper historical perspective. After-action reports indicate that the infantry battalion as constituted. Its ability to surprise the enemy is a real advantage. (Ref 32. on the ground. of course. This. attest to the ability of the newest concepts of military units to wage battle under conditions of modern warfare. Marshall. L. the average company commander in Vietnam seems to bura himself out in five to seven months. brigade commanders should be able to command for a longer time. armed. A.With reference to communications (within the airmobile division). Gen.i . p 14) The infantry battalions now in combat in Vietnam are almost completely different from those that fought in World War II and the Korean War. and commanded today is meeting the challenge of combat as well. (Ret 2 9. varies with individuals and with their experiences. Inc. Unlike paratroopers an air infantry assault force can fly out after a raid deep into enemy territory. Supply helicopters can catch up with him wherever he goes. Battles in The Monsoon. achieved in the stresses of battle. These awards. New York: William Morrow and Company. account of the operations of US infantry battalions and other units in Vietnam see Brig. While there are exceptions. One has only to read the listing of distinguished unit citations to . 56 CORG-M-343 . or better. the following comment has been made: The airmobile unit commander need not fret that he is outrunning his line of communications. and battalion commanders to about the same stresses as company commanders in Korea.

CONCLUSIONS The present-day infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several hundred years. Its formation and size have varied with the type of weaponry and tactics in use at a particular period of- history. Essentially, the battalion evolved out of the necessity for a system of command and control on the battlefield. Initially, this system was one based upon conditions of visual or vocal control. Because of this, the "span of control" was recognized as a determining factor in establishment of the size, shape, and organization of a battalion. The present-day battalion with its self-sufficiency, mobility, and heavy firepower is capable of operating independently in certain type missions. To date, it has not been tested in nuclear war but it has shown its ability to function in conventional and unconventional operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. The battalion organizational structure has been shaped by the requirements of weapons and tactics. Within the battalion, the most important building block is the rifle company. The battalion is a military unit having both combat and administrative functions. It can maneuver, fight, advance, hold, or defend ground. It can march or ride; be airborne or airmobile.. It can travel by water and land on hostile shores; it can land on hostile terrain from the air. The battalion is an important building block of the current infantry division. It possesses great flexibility and firepower and can adapt to the varied conditions of land combat. It is an organizational military entity the parts of which are interchangeable much in the same way that a type tool is attached to a power handle (the brigade headquarters). The mission assigned to the unit will determine the type of tool (battalion) to be employed. The company is the basic element of the battalion, which includes one or more such units. The elements of the battalion are controlled by a commander who is assisted in his exercise of command and communication by a staff. This staff consists of officers other than those assigned to the component companies. Usually, the staff officer has no command within the battalion -- he serves primarily as an assistant and advisor to the battalion commander. The staff operates on the basis of delegated authority; the responsibility for what the battalion does, or fails to do, rests upon the battalion commander. In essence, the rifle company is to the battalion headquarters as the battalion is to the brigade headquarters. Within the rifle company, the platoons are in a like relationship to the company headquarters; within the platoons and between the rifle and weapons squads the same relationship to the platoon headquarters obtains. When centralized control of communications fails, alternate and decentralized systems of communications must continue to furnish subordinate commanders with intelligence and operational directives and orders.







Less sophisticated and decentralized systems of communications will be required to function on the battlefields of the prevent and the future. The span of control and the communications afforded the battalion commander have a critical bearing upon his ability to exercise unit control. In the rifle battalion, the commander possesses a span of control of four, that is, one headquarters and headquarters company commander and three rifle company commanders. The span of control principle has a direct bearing upon the physical size of the infantry rifle battalion. History has shown that there is a limit to the number of subordinates that a commander can control in battle. With advanced communication techniques, the span of control may be increased. Vulnerability of these communication techniques to failure, or to enemy action, will require that the span of control be basically that capable of operation with less sophisticated means of communication. Centralized control of communications and staff procedures in warfare is one of the results of modern electronic progress. Such control has been sought after and achieved in varying degrees throughout military history. However, in the exercise of unit control, centralized control of communications aid staff procedures has its limitations. Mechanical breakdown, or destruction by enemy action, of complex devices and machines which create such controls, is to be expected and planned for under modern operational conditions. Sophisticated communication equipment may increase the degree of command and control over units of the battalion but it can never completely eliminate the human factor in command. The span of control principle will be assisted by new and now unknown and undeveloped communication equipment, but its operation will continue to be a human function; individual differences between commanders will always determine the quality of the control exercised over men and units. These communication devices will also have the adverse effect of removing the personal element in field leadership at higher echelons of command, including the battalion. There will be some compensation for this situation by the improved organization of the company and the platoon and the squad--those units which actually "close" with the enemy on the ground, and are the "forward" elements of the battalion. The principle of pooling of equipment is as applicable to the infantry rifle battalion as it is to any other military organization. For years pooling of equijment and weapons'has been'a controversial subject in the military profession. In combat, the infantry soldier needs his weapons with him and immediately available for operation in the performance of his mission.' To pool, or not to pool, weapons and other equipment is a decision governed by the military situation, the terrain, and the combat mission. Weapons, being the soldiers' principal tools of survival, will be less often pooled than vehicles. In current (1968) combat operations in which the infantry battalions of the United States Army are engaged, the pooling of organic vehicles is, for practical purposes, a standing operating procedure. It is concluded that in future operations pooling may become more general because of the success of this most recent combat practice. 58 CORG-M-343

For the warfare of the future, the infantry battalion will be required te meet new challenges in combat. A battalion organization can be structured with men and weapons to meet all tests of combat. Improvements and innovations in weaponry will cause distinct changes in combat doctrine affecting the battalion. The battalion may be decreased in strength as organic weapons become more lethal. Crew-served weapons may be found to be more useful and effective in establishment of certain types of infantry formations, as yet unknown to the military profession. The infantry platoon and company, integral parts of the infantry battalion, may likewise be decreased in size for the same reason. The battalion commander of the future will have much in common with his brother officers of the past. However, with this difference, he will be operating in a context of combat which has become complicated and one wherein personal example and courage will be even more necessary than in the past. He will be required to operate, with his units, often in an independent mission--at remote distances from headquarters. Hence, he must make decisions which will not be those equated normally with his rank and service. He must be able to wage combat, or plan and conduct pacification operations, simultaneously, or separately. ie must be able to wage combat with either violence or with nonviolent "civic action." He must oe aware of the political connotations of warfare. In essence, he will be the "educated" soldier as envisioned by Milton "skilled in the arts of war and of peace."










12 September 1967 (CORRECTED COPY)


Director, CORG

Task Assignment 18-67, "Evolution of the U. S. Army Infantry
Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam"

1. The Commanding General requests that you perform a study within the scope of Project 1 of your contract for Calendar Year 1967. 2. TAtle Evolution of the U. S. Army Infsntry Battalion: Valley

Forge to Vietnam.
3. Obiectives To show the evolution and development of the U. S. Army infantry battalion from the American Revolution to the present. Included in detail will be the historical perspective of the battaliontype organization -- as noted throughout our military history. The effects of weaponry and tactics upon the organization and function of the infantry battalion will be shown by historical examples. Further, the evolution of the battalion as a tactical unit -- rather than an administrative formation -- will be covered. The direct effect of the emergeftce of the battalion as an independent unit of maneuver and firepower, upon the command and rank structure of the Army will be noted. 4. Administration:

a. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a CORG memorandum. b. Project officer. Mr. Jean Xeith, HQ USACDC, 44632.

c. Direct coordination with th- USACDC Infantry Agency is authorized. 5. Correlations This project is assigned Action Control Number 11609.

6. Thls task must be completed by September 1968.



PIERCE III GS lColonel. Estimated technical man months by calendar year. S. Army Infantry Battalion: Valley Forge to Vietnam" 7. Operations Research Support Division Evaluation Directorate ! IM I is K . b OGProject Leader. Request that you indicate your acceptance. [ ICORG-M-343 61 . ts I 1OH T. analyze your resources and provide the following information: a. "Evolution of the U. Chief.CDCRE-O SUBJECT: Task Assignment 18-67.

Because of the physical impossibility of the inclusion of all tables pertaining to the evolution of the infantry battalion. for the evolutionary changes noted in the long and distinguished history of the United States Army Infantry Battalion. these tables should be of considerable value in establishing the "reason why. it is useful to examine the various tables of organization and equipment which establish the battalion for a certain period of our military history. 62 CORG-M-343 i .APPENDIX B SELECTED TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT To understand in detail the evolution of the infantry battalion. especially in the period from World War I to 1968.±'.s of future battalions. As additional aids to plan'. historical process involved in the creation of the modern Infantry Battalion. For this reason they were included as valuable adjuncts to the documentation of this study. Many of the tables herein are rare and out of print and not generally available. the author has included those tables which he considered most relevant and pertinent to the evolutionary. " or the rationale.

Lieutenant Colonel 2. Total Commissioned 7. Staff Sergeant 9. Basic 19. C. Specialist 16. 1 October 1940 TO 7-15 Infantry Blattalion. Captain 4. D. Specialist 15. lIrst Sergeant 8. Private 13. Second Lieutenant 6. 91 0 Ig 0 ~&o Remarks 1.Washington. Rifle 2 3 4 5 6 7 98 . Major 3. Aggregate 4 (4) 48 48 (417 (57) 651 669 (96) (18) 205 211 (535) (79) 904 932 16 COPG-M-343 63 . Private. Sergeant 10. Total Enlisted 20.. FIrst Lieutenant 5. First Class 12. Specialist 14. Corporal 11. War Department. Specialist 1 _ _I 1 3 2 6 9 4 18 3 2 1 6 72 57 210 309 3d 4th 5th 6th 16) (6 (6) (9) (3) (27) 1 5 4 13 9 6 1 28 2 16 28 64 96 (3) (4) (12) (27) 89 91 200) 427) (9) (13) (21) (60) )16 )22 16 16' (22) 18.

Cal. . 1940. M 1 This table supercedes T/07-15 Mar 1. M2 klexible 23. 1940 13 25 64 CORG-M-343 . . 1918 A 2 Browning.t Par Washington. D. Gun. Rifle. M 1917 22.50. April 26. M 1919 A 4 24. Mortar. Machine.. C. Browning. Cal. Machine. Motorcycle with sidecar 27. M Automatic. Automatic. Browning. Weapon Carrier 29. 81mm 26.30.30. Gun.30. War Department. . Machine. Cal. Cal. Truck i-tony Command and ) Reconnaissance 28.45 Rifle. Gun. 6 138 24 29 513 2 5 16 152 8 59 6 9 4 4 7 24 313 32 601 25. 1 October 1940 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion. Pistol.. !ncluding Cl. 0 0ti ]- 21. . US (al. 60mm 8 8 - 6 9 4 2 2 2 4 19 . Changes 1 Une 12 Line 13 War Department November 6.30. 30. 1940. .. Mortar. 31. Cal. Truck [-ton. Rifle P J 4 a0 5 6 7 8 9 101 emarks 2 3 - e 0 O 2&tt tL 0. Browning.

Corporal Washington. War Department. Technician. Captain 4. Lieutenant Colonel 2.w/armament 20. Second Lieutenant 6.half-track. I March 1942 TO 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion ___________ 2 3 4 5 6 o -.M3. Car.. Staff Sergeant 10. First Class 15. First Sergeant S. Private 16. 1 3 3 9 1 2 7 12 8 4 27 41 55 (14) 157 166 8 3 18 11 2 23 49 04 (16) 173 178 4 12 2 2 5 4 9 9 24 4 2 22 66 41 10 96 188 247 (62) 676 700 20 39 97 97 4 2 22 56 4 . Total Enlisted 18.I il 1 1. Technician. 3 12. . FMrst Lieutenant 5. Carbalf-Track. Aggregate 19. Major 3. lkauic 17. Sergeant 11. with armament CORG-M-343 65 - - . Technical Sergeant 9. Grade 4 13. Grade 5 14. M2. I -- I 1 Remarks 1. C. Total Commission 7. Private. D.

M3. . antitank. cal. Equipment Kitchen 4 9 32 (1) (2)(1(5 (1) 1 4 12 9 (4) 66 CORG-M-343j [ j . machine. (incl.30. Gun. Gun. light 28. . half-track. . cal. 00mm 33. Mortar. oubmach. Car. seN~propelled 25. ausault.on ordnance vah.0 Washington. 21-ton including: 39.) 30. Pistol. D. marldne. Gun.Trale~-t4 36. cal. W. cal. light. War Department. antitank.w/armament '22. Gun.45 34. .. half-track. Towed 26. Carbtie. wit ground mount 29. Cal. w/armament 23. . C. i-ton 38. 40.1 13 88 ~fies. solo 37. Gun.30. Car. 3 1 19 9 3 18 1 31 1. 81mm 32.30 24. Gun. (on J-ton truck) 31. submach. Truck. Motorcycle.30 m~ unition and33 35. 1 March 1942 TO 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion Page 2 2 1 3 4 516 UI6~O 1 3 56 1 jtjRemarks 1 4 3 58 1 4 230 4 12 3 1 6 4 18 73 12 3 3 9 70 315 21. Truck. self-propelled 27. Mortar. Gun.

CORG-M-343 67 . 1940. Noveher 15. 1 March 1942 - 'I) 7-15 Armored Infantry Battalion 2 3 4 5 6 41.. Radio set ' 17 1 4 29 table supersedes T/O 7-25. A.Washington. C. War Department. D.

45 25. D. Private lkrst Class 14. Corporal 11. 133 68 CORG-M-343 . . automatic. antitank 20. Pistol.8. Mortar. Sgrgeant 3 3 ____12 ______ 4 5 1 6 8 11 4 7 41 52 (12) 130 6 1 5 16 16 2 3 66 83 5 1 4 10 24 :1 3 59 74 (16) 178 183 105 32 5 25 66 83 13 19 298 375 (82). cal. 0Cmisind E d t- E _____1____ 3. Aggregate -18. Gun. Private. ____ 4. Staff Sgrgeant 9. Gun. machine.C. . Including 15. cal. Total Enlisted 17. 30 21. Carbine. Ca. First Lieutenant 1________ 1__2_4__12 5.30 22. 81mm 24.n&ieutenjnt-3mark c 7 9 1. cal.30 . 60mm 23. Technician Grade 4 12. Gun. automatic. Lieutenant Colonel1 -2. First Sm reant .i April 19-12 Infantry Battalion S2 "3 4 5 -) Unit =. Cal.30 Ml 26.19. machine. War Dcparment .. Second Lieutenant 6. Basic 16. 37mm. Mortar. 2 4 2 (18) 192 198 :15 884 79 916 79 1315 78 4 '90 4 8 8 '2 3 6 6 9 6 60 47 469 _ 10 7 41 11 28 7 29 Rtifle. Rifle. 1 Cd __________I 5 2 _5 ______ Major Captaln Tla . . cal. __ 5 24 17 5 12 16 _ ___ 10.30. .Washington. S. . Total (Commissioned) 7. Technician Grade 5 • 13. light.

C.RfeCa._ ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ ___________________________ CORG-M-343 69iM4_ . (D. Inanr War.. 1 ~1 C eak _ _ _ _I _ _ _ _ _ -)-. War Department. D. .Deatet Batlcae j 0 1 E 1942rk 2d 3 44 9 550 Trc 3/-n Unit Comad Rc n.i Wasinitn D..TI :1 2..0190 Washington. I April 1942 Infantry Battalion 1 Page2 i.

Lieutenant 1. Private. Lieutenant Colonel 2. Captain 5. MI 20. Sergeant 11. Gun. Technician. 7 9 1(o . f'irst Class 15.II Washington. Major 4. Technician. Private. Gun. including 16. 1 6 15 15 2 3 6'4 80 (17) 186 192 28 1 4 6 13 11 5 1 5 9 21 3 4 50 64 (14) 157 162 78 32 5 30 59 74 1: 20 273 344 (74) 818 850 211 3 76 76 5 29 11 5 12 14 17. lrnt Sergeant 9..I 5 . D. .19. basic 4 1 1 CS Major- gt 0 a SoloRela1ks i 2 2 5 1 7 5 8 4 7 31 '10 (9) 103 2 3 . Aggregate 4 2 108 47 3 . Second Lieutenant 7: Total Commissioned 8.30. 37am 21.. Grade 4 13. Ca. War Department. Cal. C. Machine. 'first Lieutenant 6.308 70 CORG-M-343 . Staff Sergeant 10. Grade 5 14. Carbine. Corporal 12. Total Enlisted 18. I March 1943 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion .

.30. October 4. amphibian 34. Truck -ton. Weapons Carrier 35. Cal. 1-ton 32.50. Rifle. Rifle. Mortar.30 3 2 _ 1 9 22. War Department. . 1942. CORG-M-343 71 . Machine. Rifle. M1903 47 8 1 6 I 4 2 135 10 48 8 500 46 i 31. 60mm 26. Cal. MI 25. 30_ . Light. Mortar. Automatic.30. C. 3/4-ton. .45 28. flexible 23. Pistol. 1942. Rocket. Truck.Washington. I March 1943 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion Page *1 7 8 I 26 :1~~ ~ ~ : . Truck.30 _ 1 8 1 3 3 7 7 24 9 _ - 6 28 6 66 27 2 6 10 9 29. Machine. Cal. AT. Cal. Gun. Truck. Automatic. April 1. . Gun. M2 I!B/ 24. Launcher. Cal.. -ton 5 It 1 33. MI 30. 11-ton 1 1 7 5 12 This table supersedes T/O 7-15. Cal. D. Trailer. incluziing Cl. o _ Remarks 22. . 81mm 27.

Captain 4. 26 February 1944 jTO 7-15 Infantry Battalion 2 3 4 5 6 7 0Remarks . 17. Technical Sergeant 9. Cal. D. Sergeant 11. Technician. Technician. Major 3. Cal. First Sergeant 8. heavy. C.30.o 6o 1. 0 . Gun. Corporal 12. Basic Total Enlisted Aggregate 4 2 4 1 1 1 2 2 5 1 3 9 6 5 6 11 55 21 (11) 117 122 51 SO. Lieutenant Colonel 2. 18. Including 16. Grade 4 13.Washington. Machine. War Department.. . Grade 5 14. Private.30 20. First Lieutenant 5. Total Commissioned 7. Second Lieutenant 6. FIrst Class 16.-a 1 3 2 6 1 4 16 15 1 2 4 104 40 (17) 187 193 1 3 4 8 1 3 15 11 13 3 2 79 31 (14) 158 166 82 6 15 12 35 5 18 72 62 21 15 25 446 172 (76) 836 871 219 76 76 5 18 19 3 5 12 14 19. flexible I 28 8 72 CORG-M-343 . Private. Carbine. Staff Sergeant 10. .

4-ton 32. Cal. Towed 24. automatic. . 4-ton 34. Gun. 28. 81mm 27. 59mm. 2. 1k-ton. AT.30. .36-inch 25. A4 31. HB. cal. Mortar. Truck. Gun. War Department. Gun. Mortar.30 29. . 23. C. 30. .50. Rifle. 26 February 1944 TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion Page 2 N k to 3 4 - 5 6 7 8 9 -V Remarks 21. Machine. 15 July 1943. cargo This table supersedes T/O&E 7-15. MI 30.30. Weapons Carrier 35.45 2 15 flexible 2 3 8 2 1 1 6 6 3 5 3 6 29 9 6 10 9 56 143 3 2 1 9 1 4 2 19 1 2 14 50 34 6 81 27 535 9 22 1 34 2 4 . . M1903. Truck. Truck.Washington. 60mm 26. cal. 1-ton 33. Rocket. Machine. 3/4-ton.light flexible 22. Trailer. automatic.. Rifle. Rifle. Launcher. Trailer. Cal. cal. I CORG-M-343 73 . Pistol. D. Cal.

30 Jine 1944 Changes No.tt Washington. War Department.. D. I TO 7-15 Infantry Battalion 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pae3 8 9 2 I2 'CO0- 2 _ E Remarks ~ 104 40 (17) 187 193 2 6 15 "d Line 14 Line 16 Line 16 Line 17 Line 18 Line 21 Line 22 Line 28 Line 29 52 19 (6) 112 117 6 2 76 28 (8) 152 160 440 167 (65) 825 860 12 20 45 51 143 44 524 74"~ CORG-M-343 . C.

I SMajor ... 3 148 ................... 2 ....!A TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONJ %ft DEPARTMENT......... Radio .......... 6 1 IS . Total enlisted . ................. 7 3 16 26 Technician grade56 .... grade 4. 12 ........i 1' 5 captain ............. 6 Rilfh.................. ..................... I ............ i can........ 4 .. .......... 6 5 7 17 == -I ...................31 12 .. Truk.and relief craws ---amenot Included tothis battalion since theyr I will not be required in 2 its normal functi¢no 2 11 14 3 2 28 2 3147 ............ . 14 11 ....... : 6 ... .. half-track...... 1942... i34.... 10 Te.. 2 1 12 .. 5 67 83 145 Private . 6 ... ton..... AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION Designation: t -----Air Base Security Battalon 3 4 5 6 7 8 12 Unit I ...... Warrantofficers........-hnical sergeant ........................22 20 21 23 24 25 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ............. 27 0 Itfe Cal...... machine............... 66 Pistol.... self-propelled .. R-tou . Truck... _ ee........... ... 7-415 April 1.. .. automatic....... ........ .............. 45061q--'42 ... CORG-M-343 75 " ...... 1 .... k.......... Carrier..... 30 36 66 .... 46 .30 .. 3 ....... a Second lieutenant . I... 1 4 6 11 r ant ....... ca ........ 240 429 11 440 37 12 ...... . 4 12 .............[..... 4 Car half-track.......... 6 ......... 11 Staffsergeant ....... I ... t Inqert number of ...........30............. 6 ....... 3i I It 5 3 3 11 --10 422 .............. I ...........30 a. 2 3 5 .... 75-m. heavy.................. Lieutenant colonel . V First sergeant ...... 1 7 20 '4 12 ....... . ---:........ 13 16 ...... . 1 1 2 ............... M2 52o50.................12 12 . I ........ ..... ca.............. 4 4 ......... M3 ... ..... 4 .................... Gun........ 12 [........ 3 2 8 5 5 First lieutenant...... cal....... .......... weapon carrier....... 16. :: '*................................................................... 2 2 .... I.... [...... frt class .. 4 4 ..... :...( Substitute: rifle....... cal........ Gun..... 29 150 233 412 Aggregate ......... I Mas ter sergeant .... 5 ..... I 1 ..... Carbine.... '1 7 Total commisioned ... ........... 37 .. ............ boo.. 2 19 21 42 orporal....... 3 3 .. battalion..... 28 Q "!ruc ..... 28 1 43 ...... WASHINGTON.. 8 56 83 144 Private........................ 13 8 15 16 17 is 19 I. ........... cal........... cal............ cargo ..... 4 .. .. • Q ~329 31 8 .......... ..........0.............. r] No.... %-ton.. 2 .

.including.... surgical (2... . ULTO.. AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION Designation: Medical Detachment.. 6 32 Technician.. A nittiber telow NK) refers toahmxcupa~itlonalspIelallst wlhoqo qunhification nnalysis Is ft.....15) Technician.. ....... ....2 (44942).. 35 36 17 Total enlisted...... .. STechnician........ 5 hielq (67:3)... A. C'hie'f of Staff....... I f Insert numbe~hr of bat... ... 76 CORG-M-343 .. ..... 7 Medical (673)................... The Adjutant General....... 14 and 67.... 5 14 Technician...... 3 ...inlion... (]....... ..... ........ 4 Staff %sergeantl.. Aggregate... T1otal coniniNIoned ..... tnedteal (123) .. )o hotSIwnI ini pprenieaw... first class.. I Trhe serial nunaber syrn(1) I (1) 2 3 3 (4) (I) (I (1) (I 10 ti n Insotarnhle ptf I the slweifllst meslgnnti................ [A.......3 Technician.. OFFI1CIAL: J............and In Alt 1. gra~ d... C....-6 Anumrrber nhovo ........ g Private. War D~epartment. ... ......... . . 6 Corpr... Inocluding 10 Privatte......--Air Baeie Security Battalion 12 Tchgrade 2 ~3j 4 Cap3taitn....... ...... .'rARY OF W~AR: C.... 1942...5(w) refers to a miulitary occupational piaitlsdInCru trs Nog........T/ 7-415 ~ MEDICAL DETACHMENT...I 31 Compnny alt! (M...j................. M2...... BY ORtI)1R OF TIlE 1LcRF..........5J ... ............. miedical (123)...... NAIISHAIJI....... ...............) . ... Inclifuling. ....... t ....] ......... . Major General.... surgical (225).........

............ CORG-M-343 77 4 ....... Staff sergeant .. .. r........ scout..... 32:: 2:: 5 .......... 350 T ruck.... 612 .. ............ onactivationorder... ... 3..r.. M3 ..........l *This table supersedes T/O 7-416.. I 1 ... 31.............. first class . 2 3 4 8 6 7 Lieutenant colonel ....23......... 0 Gun..... cal... 18 . 2-wbee ............ igton............. 6 'Mster sergeant .................. MARSHALL....... cal...............................0................ cargo . I .......... 6 12 .......... Basic . April 1.. MA ...... M.. .... ....... To be activated 7 ..4 "T/O 7-415 TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONJ No. April 13............. :" i '812 . WASHINGTON........ 4 . 1. Technician... ........................ BY ORDER OF THI SECRZITARY OF WAR: OFFICIAL: G............. 62 43 148".......... :... cal. 3 8 13 13 1 1 1 9 19 a 3 1 22 44 2 .......... 32 0 Rifle............... 1942.. Major General...........................30 .... Firstserg-ant ........... .............................. ULIO......30 .. ...... OTrai. automatic...................................... 5. 2 Total commissioned ... 9 9 8 3 1 10 1 12 6 6 9 It 63 137 ....... . 7-415 WAR DEPARTMENT........ Private........ .. + J.......... ........... utomatlo... 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 . AT..... 1 1 3 8.. gradeS .................. ...... _ __o 0 Car...... Chief of Staff....... 1113...... ............ IA... AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION - Designation: t -----....... arg......50...............45 30 0 Rifle.. 6 12 ....... M3 ........ Tcinfil sergeant ......................................... 0 0 Gun machine... ... . 4 0 Carrier......... rocket..........................' -ton ..... 8 Warrant offor..... rcrck...........Air Base Security Battalion 2 2 4 8 6 7 1unit 0 .... 4 4 .... 3 1 First lieutenant .....2 (3-20"-43)................. I .......only when specified 4 .. 2 .. ' ................... .. The Adjutant General......... 0 Launcher.............. Major ... weapons cirrier ............ M2.......... Corporal ... 1 3 Second lieutenant .... cal........... Aggregate .......... 5 Carbine........... half-track....... I I .. Total enlisted . .. Sergeant...... 1943.. Including .... personnel. sl-ton. Private...... 3 . 360Truck: 2)l-ton...... submachine............... a 2 (3) (16) (55) .... 4 1 14 78 170 .. flex ble ............. c 1201 23......... t number of attalion..........45... C. 3210............ Ie ...... .. Techniciaograde 4 ................. MI ..........l... 3......... 0Pistol................. (2) (1) 54 62 179 185 412 432 39 39 22 23 15 15 28 0otr+WM . Captain ......... A.... ....

.. oal.. .....56 . 21 22 ...... (9) 179 (21) 396 20 21 31 Total enliset A ... MARSHATL IWARD F.... 5 (1) Baio ....... egtae ........ ..73... WITLL Major General Aoting The Adjutant General Chief of Staff 78 CORG-M-343 ...... 3 (2I4a YW 45)) BY affl OFFICIAL: R 0TB MU OF WAR : 0.30 ...... C.. 178 114 418 228 0 Rifle.....AIR BASSE ECURITY BATTALION WS= NO.. 1 e... i6'ahlwW AS follo Colum : 18 Private. (AG 320... C... WAR Z3PARTT D.... 19 i zd.. 30 IM I1945 T/O 7-41 13 April 1943...

..................... ULIO... ....hs I 1..... ... HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT.... 14 I8 Corporal...... 5 ........... === ........... I....... G.. War 27 Operator radio and telepbone (776) ......... A 1 Technic 20 Private..... .............. ..4 Agreat 12 .. ... :... 11 2 2 1 so 31 32 12 _8 ....... No.... 28 Clerk....... I 2 .. .. ......... A.... . ... I 4 ........5) to a military oecupational Operator... Major.... Department....0) ..... .... . Including . 23 Orderly (6) ...... ... an Inseparable prt of the rade 4 1g Tecn t designation.......... (8) 25 ...... . Ae..... bol shown In paretheseu Is 1 otor 348). 2 1 ton (1) The serial number sym.... 0. n number below 00 refers to 5 ............ b5-1 and ".[.... specialbt listed In Circu26 Operator..........I .......... an occupational apeislal Private ----------m 22 Chauffeur (345) . Communication (542) .......... operations (40) .Ilnludlng .............. The Adjutant General... 12 18 Sergeant. OFFICIAL:* OFFIIAL:Chief J.......... () ........ cal... 38 R..... aseistant (64) ..... i ct v........ 14 and 07... ....... Ia e No#. ocludng ........0Detachment command............... I . 16 1 ..-4ton ........ 7-416 J April 1.. .........3o... major02).... Major General... .............. radio and telephone (778) .. sls is found In AR 615-25......... AIR BASE SECURITY BATTAION" Designation: Headquarters...................... 34 "2 4 ................ t ---... . ........2 (4-9-42)... .......... 1942..... MARSHALL... 2..... 0 T Carbine.... In addition ----to motor officer duties se 04).......... ().... ---(2) .. ..... A number above 800 refers 24 Clok... WASHINGTON......... a sergeant. 320.. supply (37) . radio and telephone 776) ... 4 ... 6.... Suppln O (1) ....... (1)...I1 since they will not e re..................... aI number of bat...... 2 2 whose qualification analy...... (1) (11)tiun its normal opr.. 7 Master Sergeant 8 Technical sergeant...... .. .... (1) I 1 or............. I I Wretofcr..... of Staff...... I I I and roel 8w arenti (1) (1) (1) cluded in this battalion [1.... u k.] BY ORDER OF THE SECRETA:RY OF WAR:C .... Clerk (4...... including..d...... CORG-M-343 79 I+ ... including ..... 2 substitute: rifle.. 2 .. ...... C.18. .. .(acts a Fotal commissioned ......... 1942............. 11 .... (2)... 5 .......T/O 7-416 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION) WAR DEPARTMENT.... 4 IA..........................Air Base Security Battallem 1 2 4 4 6 7 8 ] 2 3 S I Unit Remarks Lieutenant colonel ..... MComuukation.Air Base Security Battalion hjeadquarters Detachment.....al... 2.......... ..... t ---.. ........ ... I.......io........... iI Staff sergeant............


Il ' I ' 000 '. 0 061M CORG-M-343 81 . 44 .. 444"4. :' ' ' :. . '"'- zg. = :1 4 :. I 4 :''o- . :11 :: : .. 1 11 .4.9' II I I..T/O 7-416 i. I II I t Ia 4.. . .: 4l I-I -. .. i riin i i4sI. ZE" ':o C Zm 9i H= a ° I . I 44 " :I .. z _ _ _ Ii----- -4 l fi l Il: g=. .".

. . I . . -9SS4.... .... .. le....20 t . gee . lie 1.. gee. ' eI g I e... . II I ..' ..=e e. ell e * ... I I SIO..g . ....e 1 . l ..gg.. p.. ~ e .. . eg ggg g...eg . I e ~ e•~ i~ iui ~ i ~ O4 i~l l-rile H 82 CORG-M-343 . . g gg. j.. .... o: . .... ..a: . .' t o 0 S R 0 0 STO^WE ..... . e.. . ee j. IOIII1 I l I Il g gg g.... &. i d d o3 A J4. .. I g oa ge 9 1g gg E gg . : :: 1 I I oI I n e e e eel... . .. *.:.g .... o ... . .. .-~- 4 I I i . * gge e . g ei .. ... ........ II II II I II e I Ie .. M .. e ..IT T/() 7-4 16 . I_ l I •~R l. " . w~1 C *. ... ... I -o SI II . I€ . e geeel ..ee iiIIIIIIOIlIIIII I gO O OIIeIg..... I I_ 1 ' I : 1'.0 : .. o C oo .


T/O 7-416


Chief Of Staff.

J. A. ULIO, Major General, The Adjutant General.



CORG-M-343 83

T/O 7-416 CI
No. 1


WASHINGTON 25, D. C., 30 JULY 1945

T/O 7-416, 13 April 1943, is changed as follows:
1. Delete 1 basio (521), line bO, column 11 (not Included in *-,ils).

2., This results in the following:




Private ..................................



basic (5 21) ............................
Total enlisted ..................... Aggregate ..........................


* F1 O 621

iCi 22 22


68 0 Pistol, automatic, cal..45 ...........

8(AG I


320 .3 (24 May 45)) OF 'ME SSCM ARY OF WAR:

EDWARD F. WITSBrLL Major General Acting The Ad jutant General

Chief of Staff



T/O 7-411

Designation: Company A. t I1 2 machinegun la' toons (each)] R

-Air Base Security Battadlon
9 101'x 12



; I Iii i I H
' 94

ill V IN




o,' .

.4 -~

2 o

|: Flret |:,*tenant... Captain ...................... Fir 4 econd lieutenant.(. ........... ----Total oommissioned .........

I...... I I--. ............... 2 l .. m, I

n ... I 1 12 t Dreseld Insert number of I-. '-eot battalion. 2.. -*DrvsvhceI ... .. addition to other du.I---1 8 ... ties.

ista~ergeant ) ............. ... .................. 1 Ibl0. 10 Stergeant n n ........ 1 1ud I ... 1 4 4 Areo with ea) Mess (65) a24) ................. . (6) (.. d For us of detch(V f 1 ... (1 3 ) b.ne.bir. . (of)....... .... .... .... ....... 9 Platoon 10 Sergegnt, Including-::........ !...( merits reinforcing

11 Squad leader (6).......... ....... .. .... . (a)l( nearby ai bseo

ri l

1 when sed s part of ( .... ............... Supply (821) ................ 13 Corporal, includIng ............. .... I6 6 19 1 the mobile revrve. ((1) r Armed with pls"l .... ............... 14 Clerk (405) .................. Is Squad leader (63................ ... ) ......... (12) .. . Armed with rifle. 16 quad lder, astaut (65).................. .() (8) (6) .. This ompany will 817Te.hn cian, 4 ( 3 be used primadly to tablish the fixed doI is Technician: dea 19 Private, first class ilin . .. 17 2 2 10 62 .83-fenses of an air base 20 Private ........... 57 and will be supple. 21 Ammunition bearer (04) ............ ('1) ( (18.. wanted by peronnel ........... (1 ...... Armorer (511) ........... Warrant olleea, be() ... , otboalbae. Chauffeur (345)............. (6..... ............... 23 24 Cook(00) ............. 4 (.) .... .......... (2) 1 sl, andrellofcrewamrs 2 Cook (00)............. (2).. ...... ......... ( (1 Included in they this since battalion 2 ..- not ......... -22)(*2)................... Cook's heler 26 27 Gunner ( 5) ................................... (12 .. will not be requlred lin 28 Gunner, asslstant (605 ................... (12 its n9 o The ae(I 4 ("1)...................(1-., automobile (014). ... 29 Mechanic, In, pi-p ( . 2:)) ( .... (2) (8.. sybol shown number 30 Messenger(675) ............. (,2 ( ... ....... (I .. Brthes Ilalss 81 Orderly (695) ............... 32 Rifleman (748) ............. :... ..... . .. (r7 ) (42) - arable purt of the ap) (6) (8) ... cialit designtion. A 33 Rifleman, automatic (746) .................... 34 Rifleman, automatic, unumber below B m (,1) (8 (6fer to an o..up.tionfl ...................................... austant i746) 8 2 12 a W 1 12 flosto analyi.i Total enlisted ............. ... 1 3 35 -3 I 8 == = found in AR 616-26. A .......... A=pegt M~~~~~~~~ 36 Agrgte.......... .. 23 4 4 8 4 27615 2number above 600 re, -. fern to a mlhta oeu. r-I ...... .... 81 --I ,aym ,rocpealist 37 0 Carbine, cal. AD b........... ... 23 .. 2 1 4 ... fleet646 flstdin CiraularsNos. 38 0 Gun, machine, heavy, cal. .... 1 ....... .... 1 ...14 and 67 WarDepart.30 ........................ ....... 2 12 ... 30 ... meat, l94i, 39 0 Pistol. cal. .45.......... 40u0 Rife, itu tom atle .1i.. :".. 1I 8 .,6 Trk ..- .............. ...................... -

, J



T/O 7-417


(G.C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff.

Major General, The Adjutant General.



. 3W0.... is changed as follows: Line I Column 1 10 (1) Bu. T/O 7-417.....2 By ORDER OF TINS SECRETARY OF WAR: O. April 1.. C.. CORG-M-343 87 . 1942.1u (505).(. 0. MARSHALL.1) (11-21-42). Thi Adjutant G enal.... A. Major General..] IA. J. WASII mTOx.. AIR BASE SECURITY BAT ALION CHANGES No..f V 1 T/O 7-417 ol I FIXED DEFENSE COMPANY. ULIO..1 J WAR DEPARTMENT. November 25. 1942.


e I VF i .. .14. 4 W4 CO G e-4 ___i ft a OR4000I ______ l 89 .--. o -3S I a ggl gg-I IH S fi. si .....g. 0 .s- "-~' itI *1-* gg . ..a. .gl.1 i !.... 1i .-as VIA . ..T/O 7-417 F .-.. 4 .2.. S.

5 :00 S~q . :00 a.1 raC 49#5.-T/0 7-417 4a 44. CORG-M-35 ciii000 90 .

. 171 11 (9) 172 178 114 36 0 Rifle. o.. column 3 and 11......... ... C... 4 / G.. 28 29 30 Basic (521) .......30... Delete 7 basics (521)..... AIR BASE SECURITY BATTALION C1NS 1.. C......3(24 may 45)) BY ORPE OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: OFFICIAL: EIARD F... 16 class Private... WITSEL. 1.... This results in the following: I Column Line 1 3 13 (9) 16 18 13 n1 5 including . is changed as follovs: 1.... 2.. line 28. Aggregate ./ T/O 7-411 CI AIRDROME COMBAT COMPANY... 1 j WAR DEPARTIMT W SMUKON 25.. 30 3L'1945 T/O 7-417........ MARSHALL Chief of Staff Major General Acting The Adjutant General CORG-M-343 91 ....... D.. (AG 320.. wade Technician.... first 17 18 Private ..... 13 April 1943.. Total enlisted .. cal...


~. : . 0.tIIA COG--3 :11'! 93~1 . . .: . t I. "IRI -.= :.11111. (qwupue 1. :. ___ ____ ____ -011 - : 0 * Il . - n . t . .TJO 7-418 I Lrnwoo JAI ~ t"01to 1 01 ~ S~ 01d 4%~ tT NqO") sgbe 1 ~ 1 T~ u.~ =.. H::: 1' jffn~m I !IULJ0. . I I1.

. . . o. .I I io7-418 R | .. 1.. I .. '" iP il * 666. 6 o 66 I 66 6 IO H 0 6u'. 66 66 . 6 . ia 6 . . . 66 6 6 666 ' * 6 6 6 . € 00000006666666 94 *66666 6 i COR-M-66 . i o *. II . l o III o o lo i i* i _____________ i* II I i OI 6 6 6 6 6 6i66 o o O 6 ..

0.Dwew tOftfr s [A. U92. ULIO. IL&RSHALL.4 flugwW) ...1....M-343 95 . A. April 1.. -(1 1 BY OflD23 OF TU BROB3TUST OF WAaM CL 0. 32.1 (11-M2. e~~ CORG. JW~mmaTmi..... * .TIO 7-413 01 STRIKING PORCS COMAY AMl BASE SECUBIT BATTALION No.. T/O 7-418. 1 C~uqm WAR~ DEPARTMENT. November 23. J. n. 1%%P Inchanged as fallow3: Lim- 2..

T/O & E 7-95 TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONWAR DEPARTMENT. Infantry Battalion. Equipment: 5 General ------------------------------------------6 -------Chemical -------------------------------6 Engineer -----------------------------------------Medical: 6 Individual equipment -------------------------6 Organizational equipment ----------------------7 Ordnance ----------------------------------------Quartermaster: 7 Individual equipment --------------------------7 Organizational clothing -------------------------7 Organizational equipment -----------------------8 Signal -------------------------------------------- 96 CORG-M-343 . II. 21 July 1943.. Organization: 2 A. D. 8 B. Separate... Medical Detachment. C. AND EQUIPMENT 1 No. Infantry Battalion. WASHINGTON 25. Separate ------------------. SEPARATE SECTION Pago I. 7-95 INFANTRY BATTALION.

..INFANTRY BA'ITALION. . 22 Lnitcher.. CORG-M-343 97 ........ 3 0 28 .............30 ...... -mi .....ON. ........-. cal....... 40 15 is Trehniint..... Ilnert number 2 1 6 Ca1 Inln or first lieutenant .. hattnlion.... Will be (urtorlture for oversea duty.7-n....cargo. ... ..... ..... Totlil enlit.... 12 ..... . SMI'PARATX Designation: t ---.. a.............. 13 14 S laff se rg ea n t ... .... .. 8. . . val........ ...... ...d ... .....eql.... . 'ortnr...1 57 4 ... Malor .. 7 . antitank AT. 116..30 carir. 4 ....r !J-l'.... ..-. grne 3.... C*onl le .sO TeenHlan... 17 Techniclan......... 1% lilt-... including ... 9 W arrant o l~ er -----........ ............... of ... ........o .....1 0 .... 1 6 1 ....... .. 0Olin. .. ..........i ...... .......... lrro......... ' .. 1 28 70 . .......... . 2 .. ... 3 12.. fir........... 0 Carbine...._ Aggegnto .. 19 Private. .3 0.... ... 14i -nlv~l )tjcrrer ...... r.....4..! ....... I.... . 3.. rocket.. 5 0 ... 1 .... . 2 0 30s C) 31 32 0) 8............. M .. 1 4 ......9 ..................... ....60... 41 a 2 6 7 b3 8 6 8 'otRI comnilloned . 0 . .... SEPIM ATZ Sec'-rioN I ORGANIZATION A..... 78 a (3). 3 15 ..........lml .. Oin mchine.....s 20 Private.... 2V -ton ... 7 Second liulenant . ............ .. 7 ... nutomntlie.......... O 3: 34 0 35 O 30l 0) 3t O 37 0 T4 0 3............ ..... ........... ... 'm ik.. Captain . 70 Trmihcr..-----...... 2 1 22 .... 3............... 1.. .. grade 4.... 3 15.... 12 Tochnihvnl rgeant . 1... 4 12. 3.17 9 .. .......31ir 0 ... l0 2 "l Ti e.. h n shed prior to de - 7 10 Mac:er sergeant ... cal........ 1903A4....01 EO 2 3 4 lieutanant colonel .----...... 1 2 a First Ilculemnt ........411 ) ... 1.. aullomali .... ..... . 14 h 1 m 8 3 1 (81) 9 22 23 1 6 .... 'rrit'-k 11.. cal... lgh...c......... ... ('orrml .. %1 Hine.... 4 ...... II Firrt Ferge-it ..... Totefurnshed onl m required nravailable with..... ... ........ 14 l..... machine... ..................... 9 -Ifille'.cal... Trler.... I ............ 3 i 15 2 2 . Infantryonly..... fle(i.... Trtwk........ 3...... grnde 5...................l..... .............. ..I.. I Remuka A ..... ... un.. M) 0 -2 352 11 ----81 . Scrrmiont ...20 4 2 31 9.... In tile continental thp United I-Iftnisof States.l ..1 hlorck..8............ iileliet...1 Ioln.................. ........ . .. ..45 ........ 4.... ... I..... l11...... ........ .. 2............Battalion 12 3 ....27. 81-min ............. :: ... 5A6 78610 a - 10 Unit tL ..30 ..lll ............... ..... 237 .. (tVil....... 1'lW ol.. 2 8 1 3 2 1 2 7 . 2M :17 C4 48 277 ...... INIVANTRY BATTALI... 21 lasic ....1. 23 8 ........... 9152173 1. 9 .......... ............ I _ 8 41 0 'T'rck.50 193 'IleA Po 911s 21 2 26 27 2 ..........

.. 0 Corporal........................ stiryical (912)... ...... 12 Private ......S in. I....... .o........... ....... (et......... ..PARATIS Designation: Medical Detachtment.I .. Separate 4 niste cadre RnitdIemarkcs - Tlech lMeiiu Il.. .. .. 2.. (b2) ' 'o he furnuiqhid only wqreniId av..4 2?) 'ectinivinn.. ..................... nuedical (OWa)....... Totalcoiunlssoncu Totl cnjilmond .......Ihiun (li4Ct men I gratulo 2 Captin or first leutenant.... ........................... AIt 61 &24.... uty... u (12) . SEPARATE B...... pany Rid 2 1 . 34......... . heavy 3 iweapwum platoon................. a hedieni (673) ..ton... 4 Il6 l'echnicilin............. 3 4 0 Trailer...... sctrgicipl (SP1i)..... (d_ 2)3...br sown In ienthee...... ttidirstI (069)...... 11 Privale. MIEDICAL DETACHMENTr............ 0 Ineiu'lq 12 co ......... d 9 .... stirica2 (86) ............ 0 1 ......... for overea........... .. 41 10 'Ieellnittl nille 6~Includinig. surgical (661) ........ or speelfl on serfinl num't................ I... Ineludhing... (3)... SF.. en -I tsr r ifle pliltoon..thhlo within the contillentl 1I Ii ntt~of tile I ......oltd I I States.. 17 Teelo'lcl kA 18 Trechinician...............qiiirell ---- t Insert numbiler of battalion.... Including...................... first class.... . (1)...... medical (40 O... .....+ INFAN'rllY BATTALION. 22 Basic (021)... m 4 34 24 25 26 AggrcgAte. 23 Total enlisted'......... ........ .. 98 CORG-M-343 . () (2) () .. t 1 I Unit 2 3 -. I 23 U. t J* 4 Staff surennt.3. ..Infantry Ilatillon.. a 21 Teeini1clan. dental 15.. (I) ( 2) () (' 2)... eeilia 8Teelmipjan.. grade. 1% Illlie furiitd ior (1) (1) to de.... TchcianIh......'nrturu......................... INFANTItY BATTALION..... 7 htediodu (673)..tter hearer (857) . 15 TechinIcian. 0 Truck.. (a........ ............ ..... 3/6tun .... .. .. ........ a() 14 Teetinicinn.... b Aiqo drive trucks..1Iientnl.....

and it will be the authority for requisition in accordance with AR 35-6540. special equipment." the amount shown in column 2 will govern. spare parts. are contained in the following publications: Chemical Warfare Service. OQMG. Items of clothing and individual equipment. Allowances of Expendable Supplies. Signal Corps. Table of Clothing and Individual Equipment. Qualificatiun in Arms and Ammunition Training Allowances. Parts 1. Circular No. This table rescinds all Tables of Basic Allowances and Tables of Equipment heretofore published except T/E 21. components of sets and kits. 2. Medical Department Supply Catalog. Components. Supply Catalog. GENERAL 1. and Expendable Supplies. Medical Department. Spare Parts. Allowances of Spare Parts. QuartermasterCorps. Accessories and Contents of Chests. Targets and Target Equipment. Recoil Fluids. 4. Accessories. Items and Price Lists of Begular Supplies Controlled by Budget Credits and Price List of Other Miscellaneous Supplies. so far as they pertain to the allowances of equipment for the organization and individuals covered by this table. Circular No. Standard Nomenclature and Price List. SGO. WD. "Allowances. T/E 21. AR 775-10. . When there appears a discrepancy between the allowances shown in column 2. Allowances of Expendable Supplies. and for the issue of all items of equipment listed herein unless otherwise indicated. "Basis of distribution and remarks. Circular No. SECTON II EQUIPMENT SEPA)RATE 21 July 1943 A FOR MEDICAL DETACHMENT ONLY For equipment of other components of this organization. T/A for Cleaning. Alt 30-3010. and 3. Preserving and Lubricating Materials. Allowances of Expendable Supplies. CORO-M-343 99 . Allowance and Distribution. 2. Ordnance Department. Allowances of Expendable Supplies. Military Publications. index to which )s the Ordnance Publications for Supply Index (OPSI). Circular No. accessories. 10-1. Signal Corps Catalog (T/BA items). T/A 23. Circular No. and allowances of expendable items. 1-18. Corps &fEngineers." and column 4. 1. This table is in accordance with AR 310-60. OCofCWS. OCSigO. OQMG. special tools. Kits and Sets and Other Items of Quartermaster Propprty.INFANTRY BATTALION. 26. Special Oils and Similar Items of Issue. Series A. AR 310-200. Clothing and Individual Equipment. 3. see section II of the Tables of Organization and Equipment shown in column headings under section I of this table. Standard Nomenclature Lists SNL.

-. per Indiv. Offloer's-----------------. 1 4. gas proof. steel pole.. SEPAIRATE CHEMICAL ItemAllow- For &ne$ompg.. or watch... -.. decontaminating. Y 4-ton. 12-Splint.. transparent. 8 -----.2per trk. Not camouflage. InT of Opnri. pack..~~. 2 -----.Maskc. 2----1 per med 0.Pendingailbithefowinp may be Issued in lieu thereof: 1-Case tent pin 2-Blanket set. Imprinting -----------2 . liquid filled..... --.--Unit mIa Wequipment. Private'. 21 x 21. shrimp. . Respirator.Per dent 0. IN~e cam. 12-Litter. Gas casualty cheat----------1-----.------I------. aervice 9--. solid dir in T of Opne only when and as authorized by 8---.I-----...1.. MD 00-------------------1I-----Per dentO0. Geneva Convention ----. Machine. tir.Per dent techn. MI--------. 2----1 per a sgt. ENGINEER Compass. Kit: Dental: 89------. V4-ton. 2-Chest. cotton.. M2----------4-----. gas. shrimp. 100 CORG-M-343 offcer's-----------------1. wrist.1 per 0.. M2_ I r ofpercmd Individual equi~pment Brasrd... basic. Organisationalequipment Chest: MD 04------------------.qt. INFANTrRY BATTALION. dust. Private's----------------. med driving trk. MD 02. MD 411. M2.I per indiv In T of Opns. 4 ---trk. ncstation Basis of dstributf on and remarks Apparatus. wRil be issued In od or sand... smnall. Kit. a sgt. cotton. Curtain.I per trk. map.. 1-Chest.83------1 per litter bearer.-... techn. Medical: Noncommissioned offieer'us.2. surg teohn. In T of Opns only..2------. opt... Uitter btrr.. suction. med techn.. snake bite---------.. 2-S plint set. MEDICAL Templet.

.. Intrenching. M-1938---------. I per axe. canvas. 2 2 -----. tent. YWton. galvanized. electrio windshield.1Iper Cover.I ------. bag.Per stove. M. Intrenching. dismounted.1 per trk when authorized by Sarmy or T of Opne corndr. 1 per shovel.7-----CORG-M-343 . canvas. canvas.I 1Axe.. canteen. M-1941 - Wnrenching. I per wire cuitter. M13----------------1. belt. Organizationalequipment handle. impermeable.--Defroster and deicer. water sterilizing. M-1910. with 4 ------.Do I -----. _________________________I Organizationalclothing Gloves. oil .. M-1941 when authorized by WD.) ID. water. M-1928 ---------. Se--e SNL G-529. M-1936-. I per pickmattock. Burner. '4-ton. M1910. 8------. stove. 101 Can. intrenching. M-1938.30-------1I per 39 -----. 3------. carrying.INFANTRY BATT'ALION. I8 qt ---------General purpose. 141-qt.See SNL G-503. protective. 2. 2-wheel.1Iper tyk. Truck. 0. fId. 1---2 -----.I per 10 EM. pack. with cover and hanger. M-1928 -----------3------1... (To be stored in nearest available dep for issue as determined by T of Opns comdr. field. 36-------I per Haversack. intrenching.. M1910. cargo.. Intrenching.-1910-Wire cutter. protective. 25 ------Fsiovel. complete.. Bag. W/o lip. mndiv. heavy weight. EM. Trailer. 4 x 4------------- 2------. indivi EM. field. bag.I per 0..I per 5 mndiv or fraction thereof.. 5-gallon -----------Carrier: 4 ------Axe. per Strap. canvas. M-19368---------3------1I per _____________________________ Bag.Per 40 EM outside continental US. impermeable-. SEPAJRATE ORDNANCE 1 Itom 2 3 4A Allow-Fo wcscompu? Basis of distribution and remarks B~inocular. Suit. intrenching. tent. M-1910 --7 ------Pickmattock. M-1936-. water. Suspenders. pistol or revolver. od. Carrier. Bucket: Canvas.. QUARTERMASTER Individual equipment 39------1 per Belt. od. one-piece.

Serv C or T of Opns comdr. OFFICIAL: J. M-1910 Stove. Major General. A.. M1910. 7 per 10 EM. Shovel. . M--1941.... s sgt. s sgt. ambulance marker.. Flag: Geneva Convention. Goggles. tent.. Whistle. M-1938 (gasoliquid.. dispatch ---------Clipper. and bunting. command post. Pickmattock. C. '\IAI Itel AI~ v- For Alow. thunderer ------------- 3 -----2 -----2 -----7 -----5 -----2---1 -----1 -----2 -----4 -----SIGNAL 2 per 10 EM..3 (14 Jul 43).1#0N.t i ~ ~~~INFANTRY BATTAM. hand . two-mantle. M-1943: NN ith clear lens--------------With green lens -------------- 2 2 ---- I per mcd 0. I per trk. bunting -------------. with grate. w/carrying handle.) BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: G. 5gallon.---Guidon. complete. RedCross. _ . Drum.. Gasoline.. intrenching... wire. 2 7 -----Y4-ton. 1 per 0. Chief of Staff. Flashlight TL-122-( )--------- 7 ------ 1per 0. Tent. Tube. sewing -------------------Lantern: Electric. eanvw. The Adjutant General. . per 10 ENJ. Kit. n s tation Basis of distribution and remarks CQume. 102 CORG-M-343 . intrenching.. 320.. UJLIO. with handle.. epl.-----I per 24 indlv operating in extremely cold areas. portable. flexible nozzle . Per tent when authorized by army or T of Opus comndr. MARSHALL. 1 per 12 indiv. inlflanimable line). 2 -----1 per trk. 1 per div not otherwise issued goggles.. [A 0. M-1943 with clear or red lens when authorized by CG. hair -------------------------Cutter. 2 1 2 -----7 -----I per indiv driving trk.. coinmercial. indiv driving trk.. complete (with pins and poles).

Ranger Infantry Battalion ----------------------B. 25. Fage RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION SECTION I. 1)..*T/O & E 7-85 TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONJ AND EQ1JJPlLNT No. Organization -----------------------------------------A. C.miation of IliIs unit.--11. Ranger Infantry Battalion. Medical Dutaclmciit. 29 February 1944. Equipment: Cencral ---------------------------------------Army Air Forc's --------------------------------Chemical---------------------------.----------Engineer --------------------------------------Mediical: Individual equipment---------------------------Organizational equipmnt ------------------------Ordnance: Weapons and nlisecellancomi -----------------------Vehicles -------------------------------------M~otor transp~ort equipment----------------------Quarternia4Qr: Individual equipment---------------------------Organizational equipmnwIt ------------------- 2 2 8 4 5 65 5 5 5 0 06 6 7 7 Signal ----------------------------------------- 8 on the orgn. 'ils inme 41ii-rm(es all prior tablos and ('rqtil'zieft B19te 570501' 44--AtIO 271 CORG-M-343 103 . 7-85jA IWASHIINGTON WAR DEPARTMENT.

.45 ..mm . See a . e.... 4 weapon carrier 0 Truck.. 1 I ......... flexible............ Caiptain I ... numberof hatI .......... 14 ............... submachine.... ........... . 7 .............. firet cl:..... .................. cal............. ........... - Unit 93:t 49 h~ - marks $ 2 Maeor............ AT.. 4 1 ................. 0 Motorcycle.....8 7 wi lin the continental 7 71 limits of tho United I I Master sergeant .................... rocket............... 17 ................. M .. 1 3 4 18 I 10 0 8 301 i8 19 90 0 Toaenlisted ...... MI 0 Rifle cal................... 3 0 3P ... * Infantry only........ 4 5 6 14 18 10 17 TecnIangrado ......... 7 VA 17 198 0 Pistol................. Ranger Inraniry Battalion 1 2 dOz 3 -I 485077 . 0 Truck.. .. pc 3 rattachedmed............ 62 C'3 30 for oversen duty.... cal.. grado4 ........1l cndrm 15 .. 0...... Captain or first lieutenant .... tanin.. A4 ..........i T/O & E 7-85 RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION SECTION I ORGANIZATION A.. grado 5................... 27 Technician... 17 Technician.....65 ...... 2 I0 11 Staff sergean .. 1 O First sergeant ...... automatic.........ton. ........... .......IT " e furnished only aq required end avnilable 3 26 1 27 . 2. ... .............38.. 104 CORG-M-343 ... 326 ....... 5-ton.ton.. 39......... 20 Gun.. ....... 96 o 08 2 501 21 1 210 22 24 25 29 81 8 22 26 27 28 80 2 18 0 Mortnr....... 78 78 ... "-' Gun.... .. cal..... 2....... oent ....... 0 0Tru.......................... 9.. .............................108 1 30.. 6 0 Mortqr.... 2 12 . 18 I8 iqhed prior to Juparture 0 2 10 Technical sergeant ...................................lnch . light... 2 60.............47 4 8 11 489 12 510 .....I I Lieutenant colonel ..30. 0 Launcher...... ... 0-mm ....... 20 .......... cal... 8 2 20 0 Rifle... ................ .. 3 2 First lieutenant ... command ............ 18 .. etnmcoht I ....... ................................ soo ..30..... machine...... 14 18...... antitank................ RANOER INFANTRY BATTATION Designation: t..45 ..... 12 1 11 7 4 1 10 13 Corporal...... 81.... t nsert ....... Total commissioned ........ 12 .. ....... 27 45 207 Private. 7 ... C.................. ..... 50 46 326 0 Rifle...Will be Iwr7 ........ I ** 7 7 -tntes. .. ... Aggregate ......... cl.

.......... 4 duty&....... & ....... see AA (b 015-20.. .......... CaOni 343 -wepons cr -- 105 CORG-M-34310 ........ 1 ................ frAtclas........... Total enlisted. 4 Ranger Infantry Battalion 0 Tech..12 2 19 Aggregate ... In the continental limits of .. 801 H I...... .... .. numbers shown In column _........ ........ . surgical . wepons carrier. . X-ton... 20 0 Truck.... ==== the United States. 3) ...... Will be Including....... ... *Includes I aid man per Medical ...... .. for enlisted mor............... grade 4 including . . (1) (1) for overse prior 073 ...T/OI RANGER INFANTRY DATTAION B. 9Technician....... duty. .............. . 11 Technician...... grade I For specification sert i0 Technician........ 1 3 t3............... 17 2 11 ...........e 4 . Corporal.. grade Captain or first lieutenant....4M .........and for offloeN Pee IS Technician.. 1 oompsny..... Surgical.SR Technician...... surgical .. . .... Technician surglcnl ... medical...... MEDICAL DTACnMnNT.. I I furnished to departum 6 graft Nrgeant.... 86 Technician...... . Inlisted cadre tlnaert .. including .......i To be furnished required and available with...100 Total commissioned .. only s 'eneral (1).........talon........ ...... I . ( (I) TM 12-406 and 19-407............... b Also drives truck.. uncation niclan Total No... Remarb number" of bat- officer.. '94%rcs ... p8t .... grade 5 12 Privte. .................... RANGER INPANTaY BATTALON 7-U Designation: Medical Detachmnent......... Ineluding.... 4 is Technician......

.......................... ....*T/O & a 7-86 AND No.................... Inivxm equimnt ........ Orgamizatioma1 Ord noe.......... * .... *....... * 2 Equipment: 3 5 ArM Air Forcs....... eMIl011eA squiei................... ....... s... ..... D...... pment qee Motor tranaport mrtmuter: Q .... Mdioal Detao1et............................... logine... 0 .............. Chscical . .. ITiydal equipment ........... * . & Battalio .......... aeonles. a....... ............. ......... C.............. ........... Sial 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 7 106 CORG-M-343 .......... . WORlin M d......... ... ............... 7 AU1MT 1994 RANGER INWANTRY BATTALION pap. o.....*..... WAR DEPARTIMDIT iMONon I Organ zation: 11 A. .............. . ........... Helical: #..... 7-85J TAuZ Or momrEmcE WAWaIECU 25................. Orajzattonal equipment ..........: ........ B. Ranger Infantrr Battalin . Raew Infantry .. ..............

.......... cal... 24.............. 10 Technical sergeat .... wt r tnk.......2 100 74 77 36 62.. ...... . .. 0 Trailer............ ................30 lht .... 6 .. 11 e a3 la..... b& 17 26 3a1c6... ..... ?1 .. 1 ... 5Captain or first lieutenant .. ..... 2 10 12 . 6' ..........0Page 3 for 14... al... 7 9 Total commissioned ........ Mortar..... 10 ].... 15 0 231........... M1 . Rifle........ . I ..... ..ade cal... cal. I .. o t 15 . .... be rnsed e1 prior to departuire 29 . cal. 3auton weapon carrier. 7 /Insert number or baltal Ion. 1 .....Tb & E 7-85 RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION SECTIOi I 0RWATTR'A'rI0N A.... 1 Motorcycle....................30..... . .... 13 2 lgt.. -Ton.....- 1 0" 1 L......................... 1 ........... 7...m .. I ........ ... 13 Technician...... cfle............................... 28o i 63 18 United States. 0 Crbin......only as r. ... 2. Tc.... 4.. cal... .........rk.... grade 3 ..---26 [ bI 8 3 =-. -.. cal......... I ....... 3 Kljor ................... grade .quired .... 4. Captain .............. .. 2 12 .. t 17 Private.....15 .. 1............ 7 ......4. - .................... 0 Truck.bro be furnished 271 . 60..... .... Mortar. .. 6 2 18 ........ I4 ....... ... Pauer Infantry Battal ion eAU~gattOAL :..............m...... .. and available vIth1 1 in the continental 7 7 limite of the . 1 82 ........ ... 15 Technician....... .. coand.... 4. .......... 4... 3 3p 6 7 226 12 336 12 1 . .r 247... .... solo ...... 54 7 51 336 ... 0 ]1 ' Rema............ 3 1 6 1c Sergeant Corporal .2..... Launcher. 20 10 1 0 cun. rocket. Machin ....... Aggregate .. (Sniper) ............ 1 2 11 . irst sergeant . I ...... .... 1l 39 ....12 57 0 0 Carbine...... 6i 14..... first cla .. . .. weapons crler.. .......... I .......... 22 23 21 21 26 27 2 21 29 30 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 so 1 ............ 10 104 3 .......... 18 62 ..36-nch .....t~l 2 3 1........ for overie duty...... ... 340 Trck crgo.. Ia .. ..30....... .... 16 Technician...ton .. unit o o ..... . 2-ton... .... 20 ..... rntyony 10 ........ -....... attaclied cadre...... ....... 24 .... i rd 21 33 flexible................... Rifle... 1 [....... 18 19 Total enlisteo ... ....23 37 51"[4.................... ... 6 2 11 tar fereant ........ 2 .. CORG-M-343 107 i .......j 2r-on 1 .. 7 .. 4 . 6 First lieutena~nt ..s 2 Lieutenant colonel .... . .........JMirlr ntra. Machin... ....... 31 0 Truck. 6 ............ grade 4 ...............30 ... automatic.. ......... 25 0 gallon... . 8Master sergeant . ... Pistolecc.. . ....

. general duty ..... l) 6 m~dical ....... 9(3)...... 409 ......861. 7 Corporal... V 0 Truck... ji .I 1 Aggregate. Technician....... (1) 673 ... first class ............... .. ..............::(bl) [Ci (1) 14 jInssrt number of battalion........861 Technician......... 3100.........................861 861 Technizian... grade 5.......... ......Tb RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION Detachment. 10 11 12 13 14 15 Technician.(C)..... Medical Designationt Medical Detacbmen _. surgical............. surgical .... medical . Technician..... surgical...... grade 14........ ...... weapons carrier .......... .............. 3 .........' 16 17 18 19 20 5 ~(2). ....... listed men see r1-4 21.......- 108 CORG-M-343 ..... Technician. 673T... 2 ..... surgical:. cl................ Medical officer.......... Will be furnished prior to depewtvre for oyrqei duty.........Oii48 0 I aid an for company..C() 8 medical .... For specification serial numbers for off icers Ps TM fo~r mi12?-14c6 and 12-1407.............:..... grade 3.......Cal) -... 3/II-toi............. 3 .... 1 .. 1I .... Drives trazck........ Ranger Infantry Blattalion B..... .. Total comissioned ... . aTo be furnished only an required and arailable within co)ntinental limits.......... ................ .. Technician.......... 2 Total enlisted . Private.... al 1 1 5 Staff sergeant. 3. 1 1 9 Techniciar....... of the United qtatem............L ' 2 r Dt Iattalion 14 56 3 _ & E 7-85 1i2 I Unit -CIRe~marks 2 3 14 Captain or first lieutenant . .. .... 3/4-ton.

. E RENT. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY. C..8 Quzartermaster: Organizat ional clothing------------------------8 Indi viduarl uq iiiimei ..-. D 25..-----------------------------10 CORG-M-343 109 .. D. Equipment.---------------------------. Organization --------------------------------------------.. 29 February 1944.al iqitpment ----------------------9 Signal .. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION Page SECTION I. 7-86 1AR J WASHINGTON WAR DEPARTMENT.------------------------------6 Chemical ------------------------------------------6 Engineer ------------------------------------------6 Medical -------------------------------------------7 Ordnance: Weapons and miscellaneous --------------------7 Vehicles.2 II.-----------------------7 Motor transport equipmen -----------------------..8 Organizal im.-. General -------------------------------------------5 Army Air Force .*T/O & E 7-86 TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT No.------------.

......... my Rsiltaht .. (1).......(1)...... 21 (seralnumbersshown 4............... .................... 4010 ... 810 ... automatic. 3.. 2 ........... . .... U. including .........t..... ...f platoon = Unit Q 0 0 Remarks . ...... 9 Supply........ 0 for battalion .. M I.(2) ... 1 ..... (1) (1) listed men...... 2162 sistant 8-3 ................... Clerk....... 4 Major..... ........ (1) b Battalion pool of 8 Intelligence. ........ 8-3 1542 .........345 .... ('6) ...... 17 First serwant ..... personnel ... ....... 20 For specification 1) .... ('2) (2) (1) (6)-....... (1) ....... LDrier............. ....... 821 . A e 0 ~ E .... 060 5 (21 5)...........T/O & E 7-86 HQ AND HQ CO.... (1) (4 ().... first class Tecian. .... 15 Master sergeant..... 8-4 .............. 13 Pertonnel.... Clerk... 405 4 .. light ................. 405 4 ....... 30 821 ........ (I0) . ......... rations ..... truck.................. 3 Battalion commander ... cal. 1) (1) . ................ for officers 2 ........ 31 Suppl. 22 Operations .... .... 23 Personnel .. 2 Armed with rifle............ .2200 .... 2 ... (2). ammunition.......... 511 8............... . ................(1) (1) (1) () cal....23 [27 38 Private.. (1) ........ Supply.......an grade 5lncu'llng. . . It Communication .... ('2) (2) ........ Including . 3 28 Sergeant. t Headquarters Company... 813 .. 27 3 ..... 12-407........ ........(1) 37 Technici. . see TM 12-406 and (1) ...30..... U 0 1 t Insert number of ... 7 Company comniander... or mcscengr ... typist ..... S Executive . Draftsman .... 631 .. including . 7 == I I per company. .... ..... .... 824 .......... weao )..' ..... 3 ......... ... ((l 45 t.. 6 Can... ....... .. including ..... 11) (I) .. 26 Supply ..... . ............... (I) Intelllgnre . pool of weapon.. 4 British (1...... I (......... 1) ... ..... () 405 ........ (4 345 8 ....... 25 Staff sergeant.......... ... (1) .. Driver.. a12 ......... 2 Lieutenant colonel...679. (1) .. . 1 for supply and .. t . 29 Mctorcycle.. ........ 679 ....... 18 I I tol........ ....) ..... lg..... battalion. soraice........ 2 18 Technical sergeant.... Operations and training.... ...... 41 42 43 44 48 48 47 48 49 (2) ...... 8-1 ...... -2........... 02D0 ment.acluding ........ I I.......... Clerk. (1) (1) . (1).. ......... .......... .. equip.. . 9301 .(1 ... 070 4 ....... t1 2 8 4 Ranger Infantry Battalion Ranger Infantry Battzlion 0 i 12 Headquarters company St........ 842 Communication chief .. ... Cook's helper . 3 (2162)..... &e AR ... ) ..... ...... . ... 2 2 4 1 32 C Zrora Including .. 2)...... 615-2G.. (I) and training. 05 . -Armed with pl.1 . ('1) Clerk.......... grade 41 10 5 24 62 19 2 39 40 Armorer artificer.I)).................Also operations . truck.. 821.. mail ..... ).......... ......... ('10 10 ......... Including....... () Cook.....1) ranportatlon se1)1........ ................. I spare...... Cook ....... (1) ( Sergeant major .. I.. I)1) I)..... 02 .. Communcain 34 35 Motorcycle ..... . 90.. iiO CORG-M-343 .. 060 4... 405 .. () ..(I). typist ..... () .. .. 2) (2) . 10 First lieutenant........ ....... ...... 2 ... tion...(!) 24 Supply .... (1) I) in column 2. o SCerk.................... . RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION S-T1ON I ORGANIZATION Designation: Headquarters.....(1) (1) 19 Battalion mes . Including....... Motor ........ 1 1 6 0 4t.... ) () ....... 2) ........ for en.... ) 1542 ..... ........ 2 1..... 8 1 14 Total commissioned ... including ............

tdI: radi ............................ . .... 7 ........b Mortar........ 8 .. 16) . . 4 ..... .7 S .. radio . ......... 679 . .. .. 2) ................. Aggregate.. . cal...........4 4 22 60 ... 8648 4. (3) (3).... ... ( 2 30 6' Mesenger..... .............. MI ......... Truck. ..antitank. .. Rifle ..... aton.) Motorcyclist ...... ( I ()(.. 07 7 7 7 ................. solo . (1) Operator.................3d ... 7 28 731t622 824 29 7 31 87 22 096 24 20 20 ..... Truck....... CGRG-M-343 111 I L2i " ............ 7 29 7 81 87 22 96 ............ 5 ... Total enliuted....2D ... cal.................. Pistol..... be 6 ....... ('2) ('2)....... 1 ..mand Truck -ton... .............. ... Rifle.. weapons car4 ... ................. (... 4 ..... .... 6 .......... ..................rk.......... 62 83 84 N8 87 88 89 60 0 61 0 62 0 63 0 64 0 88 0 6 60 0 88 0 9 0 TO Motorccli .......6 . . ....tl..mm. ... 1 ........ 7 .45 ...... Motorcycle.. Including [ Ammunition andextra weap- 71 72 73 Ossand Ol ... co.....ton..... (4) ... ........... tier.878. 2)...................... 00 ...2.. RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION 1 3 34 a e1ii iuI 1 lol 11 Headquarter........... Launcher rocket... .. subrachline.. ................ 9 9 .... ..... 80 . 7768 4.........1 Mortar............inch.... Kitchen ......... 1 ................. .... ... 238...81-mm ....80......... .............ton.cWl.. company Staff platoon z Unit ...... ......... Reran..... 8 2......T/O & E 7-86 1rQ AND HQ CO....45.. .. . Gun.... 2 1 2 .. ............automatlc....

..... HEADQUARTERS AND RANGER IEADQUARI'EIRS COMPANY.................................nt: General.............. 112 CORG-M-343 ............................ Med Ordnance: Weapons and misce...... cal ................................................ BATTALION INFANTRY .PTI0 & i7:7-86 TABLE OF ORGAIWNATIOV UIflT [fI' AND W/d (i'X:IIiT WtuIl'............................................... ineer ..... 8 July 1944............................................... Chemical ........................ ........... Vehicles ........ Including (i............Uaneoue ................. 0 6 6 6 6 Motor transport equipment ..................................................................... Organizational equipment .........l Equipme............. 8 8 Sig al ......................................... lOOx)A/152lB--656866-45 ') Vobrumry 19hhl........ Quartermster: Organizational olothing .............................. 7.............. (F............ Army Air Forces ...... 7 I I Individual equipment ..... i)............................. SE £ION I Orqn ization... 6 *This table supersedes T/O & E 7-86......... Ar....................... ........' AI W'I |i' No.....mN '..

-open -Touo _0_A ..a.... RANGER INFANTRY BAIWALION 04 d ~ ~ 3 OKI v 4 1 M' 'A U-vd o tro~lom voT~jxo.. r...... .... .. .. o UOW UOcudu. .....4-CJ .4...ww~ .. .... A.. ...~oo U040 . ......L... J.4 ii UO~O3eOTu... d... ... 'jv __ i- 1..... 43 10 g 113 COFIG-M-343 .-i 4 cr I...Tb & E 7-6 HQ AND HQ COMPANY... to - 4 .. ..4 .....~'AS uuouqo... h.A. ~ '.4 ..

A W O 00 O cEI $PE. ~~~~. 000000 114 CORG-M-343 . 0 C Ito S-i S. .~ ..*-t .** cm pr ir In:4tntw - -t cy ug afr~- al C- . RANGER IM~ MITY BATTALION E 7-86 C'4 m 4I mmt-c m YWNr% N0 4Yo ~ . * 4. .~ .*\ I g~ -M~f Tm . s. .T/O HQ AND HQ COMPANY..Il Rn .

..40d weu~rou ... uo. ~tjoa .. 0~4...... RANGER INIPANTRY BATTALION -T40 u...-.... 0u ____________ .. .~o~ uo~iIJ 00000 .......... mma... ..wl4o ...T/O 4z 7-6 Tb I -NHQ AND HQ COMPANY....... ...... .boq~ uo. ....w~od loVJ-IUU4volnde r* *... ....lutbi. ~ U o -d2 u....

RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION pawr SronzoN 1..-----------------Army Air Forces-. Organizational equipment ...... Chemical -_-----------------------------------Engineer ----------------------------------------.--.......... *Thls table s apnds all pulor table and equipment lists on the onanhatlon ot this unit.. Org4meiation ----------------------------------------4 B 8 a II.......-------------signal .. C............ 6 6 7 8 116 CORG-M-343 ............ D..--------------L.. 29 February 1944. WASIINOTON 25............. Quartermaster: Organizational clothlng.. Ordnance: Weapons and micoellaneoa ----------.. I-8 RANGER COMPANY.. Individual equipment ----------.....4 T/O A 9 -87 TABLE OF ORGANIZATIO1 8UIPMENT AND E WAR IDEPARFMINT........... Equipment: General ------------------------------------------.......... -.....&. No.

T/O B 7-87 RANGERl COMPANY. . . I . Lza~ig 11H 1* CORG-M-34u 11 . N_ _ _ _ _ _I n 4 4 S uOioas~oj Z p ileVu"I . R~ANGERl INANTRY BlATTALION 194 Stdu l noovidpn . . . . 1. . "'*. . . * .n *L t_.. . . 1. . * . saodem jpold U0110" Moi III v I. .

.4 E . T/O & E7-87 COMPANY. I A1:O1111 1 0000o 444444444 I 44444 .IRANGEP.E1.j iirH vuvi H4 4if44. RANGER INFAN'fRY BATTALION 'I 41 _ Ii i H ::r I I I I .

............................... 2 ................................. 5 6 6 aig i ....... 7 CORG-M-343 119 ................... IndivIdual oqxpmunt ..... Qu~oiioiaster t Organizational clothing ............ '7-8'Jf WAH DKPART!* T WA[1OLG'N 25................ 5 5 noor .......................'I 1)45 RANGER COMPANY.................. Organizational oqiLJpmont ..... ... D................................................. 'I Fqutpont: Conerl ...................................... 5 ..................... RANGER INFANTRY BATTALION SECTION I Organization ..... ....... C.i *T/O & E 7-87 tAMIZ OF 011QMfIZATIO I AAG COMPANUYIVRNE 11o............... 7 AAII.................................................. Cheritcal .......................

~9 9 12 1OR+-Mv343 . paiulM9 1 - CZ (J4* t -- - - - -- ~~- V~nba w so tpuvqtUOT4009 '-d * -t. ~o uooltvTI t cu~0 .4 .T/C E 7-87 RANGER CO. .po V ON. . RANGER IUFANTRY BN 0 ' 4~ 0 ".

'0~~ . H. 0 0 .T/0 RANGER tHANGER E 7-87 DIFMNTRY BN m . s000000 cuc OD~ H cm o% mH )mMn* U U mmI CORG-M-34 C O R G .. .3 4 31 21 . .0 .H C4 m . .. . ..

..... CO .TO & E 7-87 RANGER CO... . .4 • • •• . CORG-M-343!!i 12. .OJ • 4 . . .. .° . . • • •- 0 . n *n e . • o .. . cv •un • •. . 0. . . . . 42J o 4.•Vo• .4. .. .. • • . RANGER INFANTRY BN i . •G / I. . . .44 ... 122 -. 1 cv• 4 . fr. - 2" t. 4 .. . .. .

C. is changed as follows: Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific War Department approval. Washington 25. A.WAR DEPARTMENT. ULIO Major General The Adjutant General CORG-M-343 123 . 2. 1 INFANTRY BATTALION T/O&E 7-15. 1 June 1945. T/O&E 7-15. 26 February 1944. C. Change No. MARSHALL Chief of Staff OFFICIAL: J. D. has been renumbered T/O&E 7-15-OS by Change No. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: 1 July 1945 G. 1 June1945.

Grade 4 14 Technician. 12 q r I I4 45 61 9 9 6 _'q 4 41 2 4 i01 IOl II IN I 2 S 2 9 124 COlG-M-343 . Automatic. Cal 45 28 Rifle. Cargo I I 2 II1 I 5 4 I 2 7 6 2 6 I| 16 il (4) 5 3 S4 HS 40 1 4 I 4 Is 21 13 3 4 123 4N (21) 235 242 17 7 I 1 4 1 1) I 1 A 91 13 (9) INN 195 95 9 2 1 5 I 6 3 6 2 48 22 I5 171 3 1 6 3 i 4 I 4 14 3 20 I 3 46 54 N h "I I II 7 I IN NO -1 . 2. 3/4-ton. Gun.0 1I4 24 49m 190 (76) 977 1014 249 N 14 6. Cal 30. M20 33 Trailer. Grade 5 15 Private.n 1 ) 1 lNF'A. 1/4-ton 38 Truck.hn. Cal 30 29 Rifle. MI 30 Rifle. i-1/2-. Cal 30. 8tmnf 27 Pistol.. Cal 30 21 Heavy. I-ton 35 Truck. Flexible Gun. 1/4-ton 34 Trailer. Machine. 60mm 28 Mortar.rlt 2 ItATI Al IlI' 4 2 Lieutenant Colonel 3 Major 4 Captain 5 '"IrIt Lieutenant 8 Second i 1evienant 7 Total Commissioned t FirstSergeant 9 Technical Sergeant 10 Staff Se eeat 11 SergearAt 12 CorpreA 13 Technician.%it rsli %"r 1. MI (Snlpers) 31 Rifle. HB. MIS 32 Rifle. Flexibl. Automatic. Weapon Carrier 37 Truck.36-inch 25 Mortar.on. 57mm. Machine. Rocket.. Cal 50 23 Flexible 24 Launcher. Cal 30 Gun. First Class 18 Private 17 Basic 18 Total Enlisted 19 Aggregate 20 CarbiDe. Machine. Cal 30 22 Light. 75mm.LC %kA It w I.

emarks 20 Carbifne. Washigton 25. 1) C Chanfe 2 T/O&F 7-15 INFANTRY BATTAION 5 SeptemIer 1945 S 3 4 0 5 16 7 9 t: fl.WAR DFPARTMFNT. MI COJIG-M*-343 125 . Cal 30. Cal 30 50 38 259 605 29 Rifle.

d.-Organio to Infantry Regiment. 126 CORG-M-343 .T/O & E 7-15N TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT D No.-a. Asslgnment. 2.---------------------------SBcriow I I a 6 GEN1ERAL 1. General -----------------. 8. 7-15N J OF THE ARMY W DEPARTMENT WAsHrNGTo 25. Equipment -------------. D. b. Mlsuone-To close with the enemy. T/O & E 7-11N. or to repel his assault by fire or close combat. C. Organization -----------------------------------------III.. Capabililties. Seizing and holding terrain. Furnishing limited antitank protection. 16 April 1948 INFANTRY BATTALION Reorganlzation to be effected under ths table requires specific Department of the Army approval Pas Section I. c. Maneuvering in all typed of terrain and climcAio conditions.----------------------------II. capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver. Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver.

T/) E 7-15N INIANTRY B''~' CORG-M-343 127 .

ws . 93 no : 0**I J SIX. S 128 CORG-M-343 .T/O & E 7-15N INFANTRY BATTALION ErI . l se 55555SII: 5*** S S5S S SS SS I -.. .

....: _ t...R..T /O & E 7-15N IN FANTRY BA'IrA.. e V.-. cee c :.°l 42r coto ~. : .JON a...id 00000000000 CORG-M-343 129 ....

. .... .. ..T/O &E 7-15N INFANTR1Y BATTALION z 4 N 4 k X C mC6 co ________________ _______________________________ _________ 64 4 3 4 4 . .. CO. . OD.. 130 ..4.

. Maneuvering in all typer of terrain and climatic conditions. 7-15N J WAsHnimo0N 25. Equipment Sacrori I GENERAL I."T/O & E 7-15N Tznj or OsoANZATIOn DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND EQUIPMENT No. CORG-M-343 131 . Furnishing a base of fire and maneuver. Capabilitles. L AssignmenL-Organic to Infantry Regiment. b. C. General -------------------------------------------------8 1I. or to repel his assault by fire gr close combat. d. . D.-a. Organization ---------------------------------------------8 ----------------------------------------III. Seizing and holding terrain. 15 Nevmber 1950 INFANTRY BATTALION Reorganization to be effected under this table requires specific Department of the Army approval Pan 1 Section I. c. Furnishing limited antitank protection.-To close with the enemy and capture or destroy him by means of fire and maneuver. T/) & E 7-11N. Mision.

T/O & E 7-15N INFANTRY 1PATTALION 8 132 COG-M-34 .

4"1 it a.w 0l 0% v 1. Vq 3 C 4m 0 ~ a". ii~ I ' : a1 ft J 0-.vq CWO1 C1 .4 'CD 0.. -~t- t 11 OG-M-34313 .


















A) 00flflOV C

Clt ,1;





Nv V V4









I 0 3 14





.4 m






14 N








4 v



.m m.m 4




aww _
-- _

.4 1WI~~ 10

CW~C.4.OJ 'tI1 C 1 Wlf "I4* 11

0' inV .4 in V4 V

















%a Inv4





",4.4 A









z w












For mobility of components of the battalion. MISSION. General. 13 June 1956. 20 September 1952. Section I. Capabilities. 4. C. see paragraph 4. That of Infantry Battalion. 138 CORG-M-343 .*TOE 7-150 Appendix II TABLE OF ORGANIZATION ) AND EQUIIMENT ) NR. When operating under prolonged mountain conditions. 3. units organized under TOE 7-15C. 2. General. 13 June 1956 INFANTRY BATTALION (Mountain Operations) Designation: Battalion. Appendix I. Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C.. under prolonged mountain conditions. Organization. Organization. may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. SECTION I GENERAL ORGANIZATION 1. Infantry *This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15. Section I. D. 13 June 1956. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto. The Assignment. of each applicable Table of Organization and Equipment. 7-15C (Appendix II)) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington 25. MOBILI7Y. TOE 7-15C. of each applicable Appendix and/or paragraph 6.

I LA ISF -"EQXj-w a - fsa I -& PAR ADDITIONSS 2 4 TOEI-hlc. - -8 SS APPE IXII 11 Aa-D5t~Li-0- - 0 511 "O 2 AT _ - 42 T._______________ t1_ zzz~zzz139 CORG-M-343 .


CORG-M-343 141 . Hq & liq Co.3 (25 May 56)/ By Order of Wilber M. Secretary of the Army: OFFICIAL: JOHN A. United States Army. Same as Active Army. MAXWELL D. TOE 7-1R (2). Major General. DA (5) except DCSLOG (2) CNGB (10) CARROTC (2) COFCH (2) CMH (1) Tec Svc. DA (5) except Admin & Tec Svc Bd (2) Hq CONARC (60) Instl (3) Gen & Br Svc Sch (20) PMST ROTC Units (1) Trans Terminal Comd (2) OS Sup Agencies (2) Mil Dist (3) HAAG (5) CSIGO (21) Mil Msn (5) Units org under fol TOE: 7-12R. TOE 7-12R (2).TOE 7-15C Appendix II /AG 320. Hq & Hq Co. United States Army. The Adjutant General. see SR 320-50-1. TOE 7-16R (2). Chief of Staff. For explanaLion of abbreviations used. Brucker. TAYLOR. Inf OS Maj Comd (5) OS Base Comd (5) Log Comd (3) Regt (2) 7-16R. KLEIN. General. Distribution: Active Army: Gen Staff. Inf Bn (2) Armies (25) Corps (10) Div (8) NG: USAR: State AG (5).

C. *This Appendix supersedes TOE 7-15. may be reorganized under this Appendix when specifically authorized by the Department of the Army. 13 June 1956. MISSION. Basis of Allocation and Category of this unit are as established in TOE 7-15C. TOE 7-15C. 17 August 1953. For mobility of components of the battalion. General. units organized under TOE 7-15C. see paragraph 4. under prolonged Jungle conditions. of each applicable Appendix. To determine authorized allowances of personnel and equipment for units organized under this Appendix the modifications shown herein will be applied to the authorized allowances in TOE 7-15C and changes thereto. SECTION I GENERAL Infantry' ORGANIZATION 1. That of Infantry Battalion. Section I. 2. 7-15C (Appendix III)) INFANTRY BATTALION (Jungle Operations) Designation: Battalion.*TOE 7-15C Appendix III TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT ) ) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Washington 25. 3. When operating under prolonged Jungle conditions. The Assignment.. 4. 13 June 1956. Organization. 13 June 1956 14R. 142 CORG-M-343 -p. Appendix II1. Capabilities. . D. MOBILITY.








stO nfl




"Ise1 4


TOE ?-14C
Val (2 3

'miod ION%.4











1.2o) 31000

4 -A-





77 i~~








?08 7-19.

Am_ emuIII










4L -A-R


4142 'b " 441BB0

,io1INC.NC 2SI!r f0 LITY 11. TOM2.4 itEIMI 4



N"' 20251 -A'050











to 0










CQIR G-M-343

TOE 7-15C
Appendix III

LAG 320.3 (25 May 56) 7 By Order of Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army:

JOHN A. KLEL4, Major General, United States Army, The Adjutant General.

General, United States Army, Chief of Staff.

Distribution: Active Army: Gen Staff, DA (5) except Instl (3)

DCSLOG (2) CNGB (10)
CARROTC (2) COFCH (2) CMH (1) Tec Svc, DA (5) except CSIGO (21) Admin & Tec Svc Bd (2) Hq CONARC (60)

Gen & Br Svc Sch (20) INST ROTC Units (1)
Trans Terminal Cord (2) 08 Sup Agencies (2) Mil Dist (3) HAAG (5) Mil Man (5) Units org under fol T%.E: 7-12R, Hq & Hq Co, Inf

OS Maj Comd (5)
OS Base Comd (5) Log Comd (3) Armies (25) Corps (10) Div (8) NG: USAR: State AC (5), TOE 7-1R (2), Same as Active Army.

Regt (2)
7-16R, Hq & Eq Co, In£ Bn (2)

TON 7-121 (2),

TOE 7-16R (2).

For explanation of abbreviations used, see SR 320-50-1.



TOE 7-ilD-PENTOMIC BATTLE GROUP, 1 February 1960
7-Wa..., flaw


7 A7


0170 00










'4.3 '1



701 7-17D
____ --T __i __ -





7....Al 1 A
.. JS3'2





-46J -f-k












A -1





0 AR 100
0 11

11 I 1 1
a 6 2

103f --


0 IN -0192 0 IN 000 IN 0 0 IN 29004 2 0 It 30A 30






0 Vc 0 lO CO*I50

90 4000 1

ms -iO6






____NC 05390 22 E 14C 1160f ENC 11170 -19






-PI ____

is 1

E WC11370 --E NC 11380 E NC 1190 E NC 12190



1 2 1 3-



new" I - oo*SMUAUON 3 to "C a9CK '7@4I1 RC 700 aC II ~ 1 __ _ __ I I 13'00 1 _ _7 C 619 -- _ 18 9 0 ft 1 04t 8 11110 8 1210 201 40__ 14 __ _ _ - - - 21 £ 11239 12000c _ Is _ _ 04 Ha - 1 ---- £ 10 1 1 4000 7 1 [~ ~ _110 7 0110 20 1610 -~ - MH --- I- 1 4 2j- 1 1420 91000 __1-- ~ ~ ~ i1 1 4 O 94110 at - -oA yet ~ - - M A 1 _ _ _ __ 1 0 0 1W 0 1IN 0600__ _ 5 CORG-M-343 147 .

INC1 O a~~~ tis 1tic 2 1 1 -- - -- 111110r a1 0 23121 40 4 1 131000 2 ____I - L J4 148 CORG-M-343 .. 1 1nw 4 1 1 11 1 {1 1t 1 _ ___ -n - 2 I- 2 - -- .I - lo- ~i. 11 11 11 43 1 2 4 - -T - 0 IN 9301 0NC 3100 is 39 V 400 -COMSI NO I :EM 60 c11 3170 11 Nc 11170 - -" is0 7 2 3 -- 7 INC 11?A* INC 60 C110 4 -WK.. I 0 IN 2142 001NI.Z1 m11641 eIC3101 c c160 9 Nc 3140 $140 a NC 6110 MI.

... ' 1 4241510 4340 .. .- iI i PRO ---.-I11i0 -2"~2i _ E__ K COC 11--0 4e _.. -- . _ _ _ _ _....... yo .... - 1 II -I..l 2* - - - ------- ---- -- - -2 1 "-?"..:" - 'C -220 " " " 1 - 2 .. .0 .. ... . . M..- -.. - ....... . - -to A ll 14 9...--- ~:l 0 AR 12 0 . MIN__ 7|lie 1 -a- ..I "..... ...C 11.- - - ~ ~ ~ 1 -SIf 14 16 a 0_0 ____ ~p0O -- GO1RG-M-343 149 5 ... - . . 1 1 . 3- ..... . . . - 4 1 O SIONER- I S . ... .t ... - .- 1 310 - I __ - - .. Iii An" - A8MW o -. E K 1116011 C C 1110 0~~ 1 Ji c..

. . og7. . ~~ t 2." ________O - -AL ________________ 150 CORG-M-343 . ~ .oI l ia ~~ me 941. 1110 -- 1 ~1 1010 -- I -.


1I 2____ ? --O M IL KIT___ ORO_ TOOLJ~~~ 1 tN 3[ COMMON1 4580TOOL KITORG I OR') RAINY NA. 4 747mT -8HI 420600 420130 ifis8 423700 LAUNCHER ROCKET 3.KEt P0TAL FOR.. AL 18 12 4- - -443792 _A44021 449710 A9980 45330 -49389 TABLE GRAPHICAL 110FR4INAMTA TANK~~A PULL TRACEI LIGHT GYN~ TELESCOPE SC . ii i~slt. I 'IJ2-TQN TRAJLETAN VAT9 1fAIJC AMiULANCE FRONT LINi 1744014N 4X4-- CARGO 1 1/2-TON 2-WHEEL TRAILER 14 /4*ToN 4x* -. - 14119.. II0J%5SIqH JYPC FOR CAN CORSIGAEU 34188 HEATER WATER IMMERSION GAS OPERATED 340MTTOCKP1C I L!_NONINAL SIE W-36 INt LO HANDLE 54493 212 SPACE HEATER T LAO jNAL Q0L8$JLM&- I6 -- T1VU5W----u - xiftT 80 7 _____ 201 45 40________8 - 82 152 CORG-M-343 .gim5go 4 9 4832 9 -It T UCKCARGO 8-ON1LR 2 UCK CARGO 9. TRUCK JQN4 PISTOL CAL s49 SEMIAUTOMATIC 16 --______ 414 ___ - 429280 -09210 435940 I oft .76N 408 Lye4RN ______ -_____ _ -4 -- LW5 o-LAC CARGO !ii 6X6r~o~TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON 441190 441834 48130 !8S'8 404____- 88 11X6_ 8 TRUCK VAN SHOOP 2 1/2-TON 80 TRUCK WRECKER MEDIUM 8-TO WATCH WRIST GRACE &0x& N 11_________________ 176 43 9 ____ OUARTERWASTERITN 300149 S ACCESSORY OUTFIT GASOLINE FIELD RANGE 7 7___ IN HANDLE SIT 4 LO 4 3/4 IN CUT__34 0149S_ AX VNGdLE BOTIE VACUUM1 07 RITA RAILINGCAKU 30.n _ C.1ISCOPELg§2jISTION TOOL KIT ARMORERS -AN 1 I 2~1 1L.?S 7413 EQUMUWNT SECTION M22.IIOUS CARGO V/ TON 2-WML --.CAYALRAILLIL1 CHEST 4YM4 ROOK I'1348I Jf U.2l ga-l ij'f I RIPLA EIUOAICI!SRE i AL. .9±jj4~1RQUIfI 523789 826501 tIS1 SCAIY100TL$SO - - 320683 COOK SET FIELD 22486 QLOCK MI33AGELCENTE8-DESK FINLD PLYROO ILt0A1R9AD2SlNI5-19 3/0 IN 8 11 1/4 IN H 14 i/I IN 0P 0 .981 IAlL tCABIr10O SPARE PARTS W/ll DRAWERS 310280 _CABINET IYORAGE ASEMBLYTOOL44 3/A88 523493 k-IN CASE cLO OFF MACH 18 1/2 X 13 1/401 CASE MILITARY RATER CAN 3 GAL -------- 185 154 U 1711 mV 11 I2j~~J 1 27 DP ~ GJ 2 a ___ _ r T 1 1? - - - 3)69 514757 CHAIR FOLDING 111L11.5-INCH_____$4 MORTAR111-404 ON I'OUN' M46UNTTAI40M1iNTWY61M tOUNT TRU.F 1 4 -9 iF 49 . *A I - DUPLICATING MACH STENCIL PORTABLE j 1112 S LA )4!J 1CHAPLAINC"IIR 3O 13 L ILK A COLOR O9GAkIIAtIOHAL 34 ' jF3 HAEDUTTYPE rOROAjLj GA'*4" 834889 FLAG GUID0N BUNTING OWA 1T VA - 7 241541_ 3--868 iOGGLEt M-1944 !j(4IER.2 SAPPLErEN-TAL-TOOIIUYL 4 431220 457491 499832S- Io RALER AMPHI.


CNIAN/T1CC1A TST SIT ELECTRON TUBE 1%7/U TOOL EOAIPRINT TE-33 IOLt EOVIP.17CHBOARO It LLpl0Ni E ANVAL $R6/6P TELEPHONI TA-I/PT TELEPmONE SET 16-317/PT TII. 17 14 ~ till056 DEVELOPMENTAL.11RES-LICING (IT M"-356/6 TRANISPORTATIO0NITEMS 110 &1 9 p a 79 87 2 17z 2 156 * 1 3 12 179 .AL SIT-9931GT SRI TCNRD(AFD I LIPROI 14A NUAL ":3227/PT 5.39O 6 98400 698470 98372 698570 SOAND PANIAAN SET AN/TRS-3 SPD(T./ASSAVLT MISSILE -9A5?6O SIMULATOR TRAININGELECTRONIC$33 A ITANK/A5OAULT MISSILE 9 K 154 CORG-M-343 ..0 6 8 16 1 3 12 IT9 N0 1 10 - h5? f 715077 CAIN ASSi SIL LEG P/PEAR LINKS AND 1 GRAFI . EQUIPMENT 4-144/G " 17000 7667160 67?77 67380 672390 676070 0 1 a020 :80750 681470 0071 68365 ORROZ 6600 689090 694790 618350 60.1/Vkq-3..000 ( 518 IN ASY 16 FT 01 'LSIFE 001100311P YOKE GA4 OR OAAL INFLATION WINYLON ENVELOOE -.ENT TE-41 TOOL COOIUT II al . ITEMAS LAUNCHR AND GUIDANCE1 StT TRACK MT6 ANTITANP.71 A SET A. E6.474.1 TE.ITVPk4*ITEP SET AN/PAC'. AL STRI TNIp L TL EIAI "AP-!T41. .NIT RL-31 I IRK 1/4 TON2 IRK 1/A TON CARGO i 2 ?27 7 12 2 7 12 I 110 13 a 93 :7 1 1 I 1. ? WIRE RELI L-19/.TOT 7-U11 SECTIONOIII EQUIPMENT 6 OI2I 690104 6577222 660110 RADIO SET AP/VR'1-3 -TD IN RADIO SIT A. IN RDOTLI~6 66UUL) REEL1 T.4IR ND-!/TO ON SPO) O-a /4~MI NIRE D0-1/T IN !IRIE LDISPINSR MX-306/6 IA RL-153/U N INE WD17ITT W41 Pill . VIBRATOR P'ACI P-AR/ . VRa $W41IT ARDAII./6RCA6 PEL R-39 609365 REIPANOuISSIOIN CARLO KIT MK-126/G OZ382 ST'ELT A ILIONI.- A 12. TELLPIONC HANV.

2 .. .OROANWATION E 13JO1 ----. 4 E 31330 22 £ 0 3. - ______ - C Woo _ _ ..1) 459 CAOA(57914007 A -f - - - ___________0 T- 07 IN 21012lW ____________ 40 MO-OMSIN-LTFcx NC -- N~ II IN --- C 109 - 138 SIC 1138 - COHG-M-343 155 .2 313 I si 3. 900I IyI1 71t0 2--I 7 ...TOE 7-11T ROCID INFANTRY BATTALION ?Ol 7-11? MOCID SI CTTN 11.. 1110 9 1120 947000 2 a1 - 2 1 11 2 IL 2 96S 1 - 71 .__ 19 I__ -716202 .

.' -.IA U 0 At A~~ -- 119 3 5 A * 9 1 .'A 3 3 -- ~ ~ - ~~~ Ef -. 31 ii..4 I 0 I 3% I -. .1 ~ 65 i -- OC N__ 11070 16 F N 14 1101 4310 1 NC 1 60 t NC M0 INC -14 9 _ a 1 2 17 61 . 2010 --- 1 --- 1 olIN 901 lJi I A o 1 11 C3 00210 O 2200 21 -I 101-0 T -4CN 0 190 _ 1 ..-2 A OIN to. - l IlC1110 .________ - 1010 1 9---------------------- 11120 156 CORG-M-343 . 9 -. . . tNC SIN NC 130 NCRFM __ 4 -- - -- -- CNC - 641 _ I NC 14800 9 4 6- - OTHEIN I14Nsla PNC1110 IN 4110 I _ 41.U IM 0~ 1 11001 --.

r5ttU 1 To.751 AN1ITCC.-- 2....__________ 5u'I TELEPHONE tA-1IT? TELAPISONE SET 4412 PLCDI IISLEHNELIL 1L2/U A ..f3IjT lT&laEI ANIPOC-1Jj9UJ~ I 402491 TERMINAL STRIP TM-184 4 47 ..JU.. A-_________ 2 & 2 7 A2 -I ii472380 1129 06417o 67826u ~QL 1190. F74 N CAGo6D+~ RADIO SET AN/VAC-15 MID IN CARRIER PER$UNNOL FULL TRACKED '1111JM _j10101 RI Irsr7I7V V.~. !4 .&4 2 A .J5 4 -- 4 4 1)I -.11319 498122 7T47970 TOOLfouIpmNTTE-41 C~SPENSERK3961 in R 40J~Ji zi 4 MIREwo-I/ ON [ R-os 9/U RIM-PIKE 14C-123 WIRE REEL AL-159/U IRANiPbiTATION LL - & 4 ..1?~W !!D# Si ANCR - 11 _IR 1/ O I~ 4IU0 -M9lDL RADIO) SIT AN/VRCIT M15' IN IRXK 1/4 tiN Ag I2 644014 649566 RADIO SET AN/VIRC-lO1MID lINIRK 1/4 ?ON RADIOE f Hi2. oRESWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE MANUAL 502/FT !?O8Q-AttQ-llU.I~ s0 4 I 50 k.LiILEW3pfl. 2___________ 4 *.0 MDO SET AN/VRC-30 MWD IN TAC REEL EOUIPMENT (9E1) 34 34 440343 - RETANSMISS ION CABLE OA1 NE126/G - a 7 -.J 11 1 - v.UTvTPCTX-rT7J -eis -- 2 3 -_ "o 45 9 Ai~ AA6Irr A R!DIO Sit ANIVAD-3 MID :N IK CARGO 6-..1.I TprTJ-T[hrTON 1/4 TON 1/4 TON_________ i 3 2 -- A ol 1 00f. 4 ITEMSTypt 6-9 4~ L~iiiPA-iiA-v-eA vsVESNEIMATIC SIELF-IFLATN -T- r -- - 'I CORG-M-343 157 . . - 4 00 47 L2 4 .7U -6 q li~*io 1.4 --.$=TON m- Ourpmw INIT NO7.. A I~j-"A. ...TELpmlt 616120 I48640 TQ5? QUT 101 109..


S=~fON fl - ORGAHrZATION T09 M-IT MD Ii I 76620 1 ± It 1 IL E 9112o - 1 iit- E W9o0 E_____ 9 l10 C CORG-M-343 159 .

A 82 448 - OkAl 2I x~ As 1/1 1 17 IN i-1 46 41131k talus? CLOCE ALA&M CET.. R . L 194 110 GI 41 11. ILLAM . MONTIN ....-... -T'OL SET ARMORERS 4)421) 41 0i LTO E RI'LL~eR MHANC HIMM LAINTEAt 49 1I TOOLSET GENRAL ' 45223 j 451040 451190 TOOLSET ORON PAINT 2ND ECHMO 2 COMO= Y4I4SP.1.t .13 RIFLRU CAL ..2 ON 1R E GUNCAL .. 41 1J .NG9 429280 43)9. M TRUCE ITU( fOR 1/A TOM4214 EOAL 'ITLT AL .. L 102& So$ CANVASWAER1MILiINGF IUL919 55141 wtPr.. ftC' NaSSAU M 1"FCIS CIIIS..10 w If AS A ..AZ.flS AI 0E~h~tAIMINGCM 4010 C4ASS :4 34 3 ITT ** 54 3 411) EMOLITIUN(OUIPMENi SET NO ELCYRIAL 1 1/6 IN WIDE I LEG 1 1/16 IN LONGI LEG CLINSERS STEEL 414940 GAUGIE 5/6 IN LONGS IN OW I REFERENCE LINE MARKINGS - 43111 HUI 22 MACNIN Cl .30 SNI0ERS 11ME STRAPPING HAG §/& 4429T 44150 TABLE GRAPHICAL FIRING ~ 1 110 ...?0~ I.S~fL.R860 POROUS 2 AS3 so 4 so14 1 &CRISN4 COVER CAP TAPIR SHAPE MIAIL *Al CUIW 021 UCKEEMENUPOS9 METALGAMV KV bT WIC U 146 ST 114108 - 1427f j~CNM 184)51 NESGALV NCOVER 10 GAL CAll CORR 53 GAL 41IJEST OA I COVER CANGAOL E 1 0 it 1 as--il J 9 ' I9 53)315 - ~ ~ ~ IT REPAIR CANIVAS 1 ~ 31f 11 IN -- AMMA)I lit11311.j 5 MO Pk" GUN NOUN? 15 V MM4 TMEIRKRMMM1....10 46 . 34 L..1I 45 45 -- illi.....0 N...30 MI VasAI MUNTTRM 24M1 34 .822 INI STRAPPING a. ~ ~ l% TRUCK A11'1'111 r1 3/TN. 1& O 41 51 61 -- LkI CARGO 2 12 TON 6114 41 TRUCK - 61 1t TRUCKARGO 2 /TN 0 L 1+ It 46013 VAICJ OIS TYPE 9CLASS It QUARTERMASTER I TENS ..SFL0 S A .......4IjN ITION 2-TOM 2W2 TRAILER AM"RO 3/4-TONM lvW TRAILER CARGO 8 I-...TLJ -113k..40 4) 1 + 4) 160 CORG-M-343 .1 1 194 110 ....J 04- - - SU ...... 1 449140 nTELSCOPE SCI TLESOPEOBSERVATION-. iZ 1t it ~ 41 41 41 ..S) IV4 - IFULE AUTOA CAL NO MAG1ISA2 AI2L. N IN1A4 HE9AVY REL MCHIN CA)..-.

....2Aliti.i ~ - 4480 AD lOE TA/PAM1 CORG-M-34316 161 .60 ILL!L..t ..IW/T o FL~j AjO 41B0FREOULN 11m I 9108I~ 11L -ETHADSLT H-11I/Ua 21 10 2-962 11J4?FJL 4193 1 MKT4 E1MULTIMETE 440RADIAC SET AN/Fo - ..0MODIF .U..-. t..-ia ash. - __ 5)71SAFE FIELD COM81NATION LOCEK.i-2 21.J. 5861497 j9020O 590265 IM WftiCOMB /IGURESND li 1/2 IN DM0 i INI 24 I .J.J.61 J11O_MNECTING AND SWITCHING KIT MO-ISO/aT 4 A 4I -f 12..U01 EFEL LOCK PAD BRASS 1 31.. A 5 - j 2 ... gD 0 ST km/RRC A C- ___Jm___ IAN __ __ __ ~ .J IS_____ 4 2 2) - TABLE CAMP FOLDING /Io-E TENT COMMAND POS COI OMB/ISOE FLPA PRO TENT KITCHEN-i SHLE If /FAnSEAND PINS 1 EN I i4AyLEA 59063S TENT WALLSALCOBNPNPLS NO2L F EROLE .Jl 4 0 1 1 2 144 6 .. -0 61)T 41490 pPAMIC LOUOSPLAfER LS-1A4/V EMI(LNYSNITCHSO6AAD12T. fqB CANS CORRUGATEDj ..1 CARGO MTD IN IRK 1/4 TONCARGO... s 4100COI C.A 18130 ~5N - $79815 2§2908 SHEARS OFFICE ST1 00K G BANKERS 9 INCH GAOINE 1R 2 2 . IN CARRIAGE7 J NCARAGE 96 8 EMBIf1iK NO 24 4 2 9... IiYE $96643 TYPEWRITER NON PTL iS.. 4 .....±72fl.10l. 2.A ANtIN TYPC 300 Ll CAP G LA CAmF 'u7T CREEN LATRINCIP W/PINS-POLES..L. 2 ..... 4 2 f 10 a 1. - .1.E 3 HOLEI 572224 ?pl R2Lt ANGE A PACK RANGE FIELD B PACE NLATR GASO0L CONE +4 REFLECTING fMPUIA$EG LANTIN RU I FIELD A-i -A.&. O R R460 ADIO SEAN/GRR-S NED IN TRE 3/4 10....J9021S JA.951L_ 550403 $52230 95_ N9201 559631 142002 j&2034 1f4I ...i - J _7L PjIMER_C:24O/U_ ..TOS 7-UT 1000 R=CTIO m EouIP4NT________ OUAMtT ft 6 1 5 ' a~~r 1 AN IA~ $14512 FLAG NAYL COLORS SILK A ISO I 534B86 GOGGLES M-1944 TyPI... CO~tRLGUVAN/GA-6 1-3 UNIT SET CE46/PRCW CRYSTAL 1: 1. 2.jf 1.. 6 4 17 L KIT BARBER W/CASE LANTERN GASOLINE.....K )~4 TON M~~... N2s/oR ICAIO Kit M ~ 4 4 6390 Aj~I1~r 6376 ADIO SET AN/6ROMDI 0.R9...-h a2 2 .L JJU_~L 947055 __I .1401 SR78 TYPEWR1?ER PTSL W/CA RYN_ AE~~ 60129Z _ANTEN NA AT-219/pIC 40)250 ANTEN4NA EQUIPMENT RC-292 4040oo0 MgAIL-27 0OOTCHANEL ALIGNENT IDCTRI-R/RAiAL H I BC-S 4120CIPHER MACH4INE TSEC/EL-7 - 4 4.2 4 2 12.1 * a a. I1C MACHINE i8DPL ICAtING STENCIL FIELD Kit ORGAN FOLDINO 5 CHAPLAIN N/CASE2 OUTFIT OFVIU' I ESS PNL klETAP-jO:C 1 1 I 52 20 111 56439 4_j5 PANKL SIGNAL VS-17 651 PAULIN DUCK 00 40X20 FT____________________ AULIN DUCK 00 ITRfl2_Tfl PfERFORATOR ADJUSTAB.. 2. OPERATED i. jj~ I9j HEATER TENT GASOLINE 200CO0 BTU2 541470 ~IJ~ff ..

500 1----------*-.WC*TON! a N ORGAIOAI1OU L1 Vl 7-U 0cm -8 is I . 1 011.31 1 .l 1 8 e IM 1-0 1 - - - IC 13160 -- 3 0 ENC 14170 mc 1:5. ' * COR z: 162 COR-"M-3 . I I " - AT 71 1.I NC 140 1170 0l? 1 NC 80 aNC 94160 1 ?0lllo ISI_ Sligo 4 l 64 e U I -110i --- - A .0 : SRI 1- -1o ]I - ic i i a IN 1a9 I O0 ______________ 001 41O0 ____ At - -f - -11 v C I005- I :Izzzzzz! :-I _ u 162 :Izz .. o --------------I I----------- .6 1 's is .610 INC 14.- .10 It.

70 C NC 33160 L NC 6. C E 4300 43003- 33 --- 1 41310 C 7434 C E ______ __ _ 13830 3 o 3 2 4Q ---A C C 7410 6322fl0 1 2 COR-M3 1 1630 . 04390 ' 0 _ 4 1 3&W4u14 I 45 99 39 S~3 1 2 33 1 £ C1340 A - 4NC 12160 L HC 12170 NC m3. C 3404. -lit .id f Nc MOO.--10- .-- - -- .1 t - 3 4 - 2 1 3 1 4 6 4 -_ 2 1 __ 4 _ __ -- 1 13 - 1( __ C 94.0 t NC 1301 £ I I 1 - 1 2 C NC 3937032 E___ NC 34)4w C NC 3457. E NiC 3130 E tic 31370 E NC 313CO L___ NC 333.moo Tt 7-11T SECTOH fl ORlGAH3ATION HOH-COMMISSIONL uF CC4k! E NC 00300 £ NC f____ e ECNC E N tc 1123.13170 E NC 64003 E NC I76340 E NC 1.10 - - - C 3330 C 300 29 290 48 _____ P.116G K 9111 I I 41 .

. 1 %ftC07 1 it to 91 101- Tr Tog 7-17T 40Cm __ ob UT.00.U-T MIDATA~ 01 Tog -H. n il It -Utof.M ___ - -4 R4~~ 1 t0 I110 4 13 156 340 32 6-18T ftOCIP..1.SflON 9 . 10Q 80 *: 1 _ 0 si0c NC 100 -- I N IC O .00 - C110 3 1 _ 164 CORG-M-343 . _ Ta ix1 4 426 237 a __ _0_ _ ATl 1290 __ 2 _AT C _ IARN 1F 1__ _~ ~~ CN ~~ 0 -RC~C0- - - - - -- N 2000 2 _ 0 N00 1U.CUOAAYIMI im7-15CI Iii 4 9 9 1 1.

.-. .360j NC 7187.Mo M-IT ROCID S=C~ON fl ORGA~n7TIOI 57 1 - -.2 12110 - Il____ L30 E1 1 11 8 1' __ 12 - 7 16110 E C E 14510 E 14520 1-46 10 14820 3112O E 31120 __ -__2 .. -1T * AEUI SRNT -.-- . E 13100 C::1-. 4 s _ E_ NC".. L.3U 11 li 11210 11311 2 7 a . £ NC 7680 PC 76070 I I 1 - -- 1 l - C 91160 E NC 9l75 c ro____ N 9416t0 8 1) 6& 11T -- L - -- A t..2y. CO G-M-343 15 f~ 441W 0 1 .~ E C - 112.. E 1o -A L 6 2102 4- - E 76000 2 ICCS 1016 EA I 3 - . 4 4 NC 60 N 31160 M I3136 t NC 313 I I.6o 29 2 29 - _-~ _ -- _ _ _ - ~ ~ . 1.111.~ 8 4 . c. .A LNC8317 E_ NC 6310 C 161. * fa 9 1.

TOE 7-11G-INFANTRY BATTALION. 31 March 1966 0 0 * 0 z 6 -4c4 - ~ ~ ~H z w z -4L 166 CORG-M-343 .

Nc 1:7' £2C40 :C 17220406NO 1-7 12040CNO 1 .Its. .06 1 1-6 11F24%1 [.1O 01 32 to 29 to 468 is 417 u TAILE TOTALS m 7. RfF ICEIS 170 019421 2N FSA01942 INI 2 P44 02162 IN I CPT 002002IN C 42mM-34 IN 36 CPT 1 1 2110 IN tPT 0900 cfi 03100 of I CF704268 1 C" 993OfIN I Li 012046 AM I Li 01942 216 18 LT 019433 1 IN Li 02900 INI I ti 0504M As C 1 00 0I iN ij. &1f 262 RfCAPIULAIION OY GRAI. 2 9 4 I 2 I I 1 2 I 32 I 2 9 44 I1 2 I I I 1 1 1 9 19 I 2 I 4 I I A I I 3 4 NO I I1 _ 6440N 2 1 2 2 I I I I 2 1 1 a 2 11 I I 1 11 2 a I1 17 14 I 2 I I 1 2I 1 iTOAL 001 10162 INL35120 Z-9 22in0me 1:86 90 N 1.OPPAKIES lar ?..l!GSOc 01 Fo A6. I I!! I I 1 I 4 29 is I.71 I40 C No 1-7 64C40 NO 1-7 160 MC 1-76 140 :1 1 F1 4.TANA 0 DDIAM"A0 M m1i - SC11ON NI PIRSONN AALOWANC1 E SIC c(.4 " 1 1 COB-M34 2 1 3672 .: __ __ __ __ __ _ __ __ __ __ __ _ I .0 H COPPIAkY IOF 02 146 2 2 2 03 of ' 289 16 29 RIFL ..

41 4 4 3 Is$ 1 93 7 1 4 4 I 1 * It 7 4 4 34 1 31 4. SP3I11M TOTAL 41PI5*13i1.43 2 0 12 1-9 94920 E-4 09920 1-4 OSCIO ' 1-4 3352 1-433SUN UC2O 1:4 1-481020 1-4 SU20 1-33420 1-4 33133 1-4 4*30 1-4 44C20 1-4 8292C 1-4 63920 1-4 4A*30 44520 -4 9-41:620 E-4 1530 1-4 1420 1-4 W20 1 -4 VAN 9192f) V-4 "1-4920 9-8 13530 1-3 3330e !330 ..U00ONU a Io"II 3144 PIgONiNK ALLOWANIS 32-5311. I 1 0 3 I 2 3 1 4 4 34 6 1 1 1 0 2 1 41 2 41 M~ 4 63 I47 3 i 1 1 4 4 4 4 It 26 is*3 14 1 2 4 3 330 949 0 1 4 134 142 i 4 446 *19 140 342 0*200 INI I 00400 INI a I1 AN 032204* 03542 25 "1? 03543 34 3 10#110 I I 02142 IN I I IN 312005 0303 1 04000 IN I 0403'03 'A I 821.a1 OP11iCsR I?40 I 4.440 1 116920 1 .:. 4 I's 9 6 1 111 32 2 1 9 3 % a 9 3411 .3 am I 14320 I a I 32 1 I I 3 3 1 I 1 I 1 I 19 1I 1 1 I 1 1 3 I I I 1 8 3 I #IST6O 03520 03370 33530 3353 4 2 4 1 3671320 4 4 4 1 64 4 168 CORG-M-343 . i-34210 136I 1-3 610 9-1 76AC 1-3 94*30 1-2 464*0 TOTAL.

76010G 1603)v 16K4L)8 'O1I2fJC 1 9 2 . ?. PERSONNIL ALUOWANCES 31 PA'CH 1%6 3s47 3 Ic 11031 4ri .OF 3631W OU. 63800 hC! 64:3C 64C4013L 7360 I w32C '" I C .1 3~ 4 3 2 4' 6 2: 2' 4r 4.Al AN MWPk 10 lot. I 2 36 1 2 1 6 3 1 e &l I F I2 6 2 311 4' I 2 4 6 2 2 t ' 3 4 6 2 0 3 q. 34 4 1 6' 2 j4 4 1 2 31 ' 2 1 ru. ?(1 11 140~ Fso c~ i1 4 2' 1 26C 21 381) 36A3C.c. 0)1I I04841) IC.190 SECTION 11.4O 9 86kC 1 94R4cC 7 4142 4 I 4 4 f 4 I J! CORG-M-34 1691 .

TOE 7.15E I z IZ z~ u< 0 170 CORG-M-343 .

1._____ -LC 337^ - -z ___________ I I1 6 1 ' INPC 71260 )1NC 70 NC 731970 C7 6 60 NC 76870 ______ Nc -~~9 11 1 912170 A 1 7 20 61 10'.0770S00 NC 0536C (6 ENC E_ NC 2 1 '3 N1 11167 11260 2360 11 t 7. ..L 1 Pilfl.6 I.I t .L I.. It It1 TI TOE 7-. 2 ~-- . _ [CORG-M-3 . C NC 11s 8."c 111921 I. T' _ __j2 -_ 1 2 a J. I -t 19 ______29c.L 1. J3T 1 a a W T 7 9 T 259 73 2 1 4 6 8 61 2 02 3 R IFLE COMPMAIES3 01 0 18 18 2 $71 77 _63 3 15 3 IS _ _ __5______ 40 519 3 _ 12 1 _r 0 -5 67 __ 268 2c? r o AR 1204 I 1 __ _____ 0. It _ It It T nI 171 .0 0 AM *' ______I IN _ 1 I ____ I I - 293 29 1 4 I_ o 0 1to C 6010 310c 1 I 1 I N07.

0*0 (0 if0fASIn "11 (. 1110 172000 E 1-..i.9 9 9* | c MA( (aPI * (9 * * ::::. I _ 34212 E ?12 0 I.i OW 1. 2 . T 6370007 E 1. .. I I I 2 ~ 3 .. ~~. . i -2 2 . . -T 3 43 3 4 _ - 5 2 31 2 1 40 1224767 -- E NC EC 40 223( 40 2360 4 172 CORG-M-343 .9 . 1_2 i__: 1_ 17 ..11 2 ( i $I0006 II •OBOANZAOIOH * l C*t e I 9 r ~ ~ ~lM... .... 7 21 8 1~ 4 2 2 -' I.1 I .I 20 ...2 . 0 IN2 152 0 0 N274 10 16 7 2" 29260 4010 0200 -1 _ I 2 .. IF 6 AO _l 1 .....C 62 0 0. 1 9 E OFFI2CERS III lii 02of +... - - . - ...24 I I EN 05360 _.1 1 22 1 22 1..Ac116 4 I ... ...1 ____ - I2 1 10 0 0 IN 0 IN 0 4N-4030 ___ 4 STRNGT w644 64 OFFiCEF 0 m( 100 iAEVE _ I 2 11 211 1 rl 06001.4 2 2 E_ E __ 7 0 76000 4---re J ..11.00i. 2 2 + 4- I 1 7 62 911620 9 11220 E 1 .94 6 _ E_ 11120 E 1210 92 - I E_ 120 133210 2 3000 411 44 E E l ----20'2-i " 7 ..= ssi.I E r. .

2 4 - 991 1-0300I r 94C0061 4 I COR-M34 AR730 N00 .ISIION liI ONOANIZATION Y01 7-15L NCS I NC 0 6- 3110C I" IN 14 -I--- I MC600 1 60 I C t C 91200 91630 56 661 1 6 ar 9112006 1 1 1- 13310 031C0 117110 2 22 6 1 2 1 10 1 1 11000 6 10001 1 7630 76C0O -1 4 2 - - Zi~ I ar - 600 6 1000 o 1I o 02 1 - 202 IN 21 6 20 1 0 763 90 600 3 2 2_ 1 4_ _1 2 I I _ .

- PM IIE NC 11270 if5 1 .MC 16870 1- EENc 94160 ll 4 !. A.31000 E 9 E Il 391033 63110 71620 76310 5 4 11 2E .3 72 38 9-1 9~ ~ 111 174 CORG-M-343 . - P ."0 IISR CION Ii.5 E tic 13270 EEEC1170 -E 1 E MC 61310 E. OROANIZAION wo CAM Cf .


4200565 428a35J 4851)0 42 9280 MOUNT4 TRIPOD MACOIJNI1. 11070 810A 1 (0' 0Du 84886 00 IT 71 10.1190 L 006110 DAD CARRY 69 558400 SLING1 0919. 0 MWR (01EN1L 12t$.CA0 3/-14 161190 TRUCK 'IT : I I "1/-4 14.110.0 5 GAt CAPACITY1 AL1UMINUM RF1AN4001 I 114101A98188 01 (0141141148t9h 026.. I0 16 3?tt[.0$ I 8'01AR1210 1.E N1194.0 A1161841.9N6I1.A1E 56974 689 (.-I109 A1. I.. 811 14840811.11 1 01 WITH1MAILING CASE RO1I1LE YACIAI 26 004 1400(4019~b 'PACE(RIAIER 500960 081( AN8D SPARI 6PA8TS11 ORAES 35 1/2 114H 21 :N 0 10101.1.01.0 11 1/114 t 111.191 MI iV 7.1 ( ::t9106-m.440611 080 06148190 90 9190441 AN104111 C141. 2 094001.PAIR Nl 11.88114 029100 GOGGLES 1. E 111( I-ION 606 14/41 1460980 W141CHWRIST GkADE 11 OVARIERIIASIIR Ill4 ACC1. CARGO 1/ -ION 1401 460020 ON41 ARGLON294/32 14 A6.06 NO 71. Opi I2 1401 SOCi 0(91 V (1 811.5 1/2 N10 10 11 P t16IN 0) 2 S031641 CA13INLI T0O1 AND0 $9181. OL AU O8AI I / 1 * '5 4 3 V.11 TOLKIQU01.6 080 PAWI. 5071280 C14811111 5076.10 .51 1 00L.1 IRUCK 114"608 CARGO 2 .RAL INIIDUAL L00 74EIAtPCBONI 41IA1 81 TRAP40114 4811 1 ( 31 1l A1481. 10(1 011 V I iLI 1110 5689 0419221 I IRAwER 2 C041A614814l It 11 I 14 I? I/O IN 0 104120 1148.1014 190 95.61-4m SI MIUIO"IAIII 11 IIA11IIl 4319605 RIF I MORTAR 41260 SCALE GRAPIIIIAL 111114.IOII 1001 Al S8PA8T' PARIS 12 RA EkS .4891 00711 F1ELD 114 (.28 a PC ME 52&128 FOR TINT1F8RAME IF81 0014 I PLASII( 1. 11. MARKER 1.141 .081 FA L. FA9l 11) 4-14~ 440835 449980 IT11 G" 081RMORTIAR SELES14(09011S181VA1101 2 4 14 14 453190 1 611.8 2 5081I.88 180CKR K88.16 (AORGIOI 3/14-114 2-111 I1G4 .1.111 R O11 1/211 "' 45102 141" L 3/40 ION41 Cr (ARG 6407 19 I180(8. 7. L 0014981 LI8(11x1 (Ab NETI I1111 1214380 FILL V1 K hOSS.1 461193 TR0CR UOlIl'11-1014 4814 tAIIRIIR F1)8 44134 140CR VAN 08109 2 1/2-10146.4(f (041 OA il 1450000 018118 4/9 1981 90181 GAOLN (1414108E 141 0011E TYPE(l9 13222is 0 IN 1.% 61 18 84 1141/12 L1 49 1/ (A1 JA LON1.9 26 S2 18 2 2 13 3 2 6214 ? I I 1 UNIT 5144311 00UI014NYL01 149D 14001810111 A01.1MOUNT 7. CA. Il~(01149148 Pt(RI$COPI TlA IR1 . 91141118TfjjL 81411 '.9E 040515 61.114 N Mo. 06090 901 181 18 1 176 COB G-M -34:3 .1 OOA O 8406PYO1 8/10140081.8'..119 7. 0 69101 SM5._51140S14 otKI1 CAaPFNTt S 1t9N./ 1 lb 106-M1 RIFLL 1I 8 I I 50 10 I 13 1 14 14 14 1 /1 4 I 1 6 14 122 14 I 1 6 144 I 114 1 I 9 1 1 lid 6 I 14 1 T 1 li 1 Id 14 142 22 IN 1 16 12 11x 4 I 2 I 13 1 2 012 4 a I .C+18P041.6261.1418 IMME(RSIONLIQUID 801 811110kL 031 120 84 II22 5311140 14881105. 4 80 RE. IIk 11021 CASEL 11 L 01055J COOK E fII 5120 (LOCK ".10. 00/ 1al20 1 SLIDE ROLL 000141.ELD PC1Y9W0O022 5/8 I14W 2 5 ?/ 1IS 5116600 DVPLICAII140 MAC1..6o1KII S 1110114D 0400971$ RCR 111 ) /14 10' Of 811! 8/1.. !s .1NL WO000EN141101 ON 9LA11'. A)460LANLL 14149( F LAG 8RED(6C 52014612.IO4 416 147/1 46011401 i LI0CK 606 (2 h /1 460020 TRUCK.110A9 0UTFIT 014101198 718(1 RANG RAPR1.6 14. EDI L1 8 OR 9 SLIOL.11 AP1-)0( 540500 SE AP10-0 9141(1.L. K I1111 RO 091 PIN14 110( 84b 1448 01.91 564111$ 546001 T1." E I f101 R0141R11 L1(UDFELr81980I $326 10 91EA18 114211-1-4-5118/-511 191441 N40 071 1N1ENCINGOUTIT 53 240 50001) 101120 116191 FLAG 9141101414 USA 814T01 W/9811401 3 FT 11011 14 IfFLY R9AP . 12 FI1 1.1 140000 PANEL MARKER6 14111141 02.SSA0( CENTER8 (LH(($A ((IR M1 I ti14 1/2114 0N 518370 DESK F.814 1 (080811.62-Mg MM FORl -151 01.1 NI1 I "A49 140 71..PARIS 29 it 46 3/148 23 C /2 III" ' E7F810 OFFICE MALii 18 112 22 1/? 16 1/2311 010320 CA11 j.N1 0 R V 0 D tOULLOIR P14(61401490 540D20 r1410 2 F jtI98 LIAISN YLN6 149.. 1.

. _ I .AA1 ...PPIS/P is 1 is -- 2 I4 2 -- 4 -E -U -22 - 619410 283 6)4443 64470 - SET EMERAILLILB1t!LUY_________ 111 ... j * J .. 52 2 I .... 4401 R1..L-11.498 0 - 57155) 5755)5 - 1S*. It I RADIO SET CONTROLGROUP AN/GRA-39 11 l T I ~REELING MACHITIE CABLE HAND ML-31 84O4 22 ANEW-A -T REELING MACHINE CARLE HAND1 .i RC-" ....AaMQaCAL"TD IN TRX 5/4 TOM CARGO '655249 RADIO SET AN/VRC-4t.IO SET A....HEADSET MICROPHONE H-144/U N mTEN AR/URN-lIos RADAR SET AN/PPS-44 RADIACMETER IM-.. 1 is - - 1 3"lHR 44570260 CIIAl TELEPHONE TA:-)R4/Oll CAEL AD__ 7 110-L _ 11 15 __ _ COR -M 34 / 177''F't~.RDO E At/R -1". 20 5 49) I ~ 24 49 - - 2. ~52 I& 2 22 - 2A SPEECH SEURT . MTD IN TRK SHOP VAN L~lX2tLlJD4lIRJ4 'no ADI 45704 6514RDOSET AM/VRC-47 MTD IN IRE 314 TOM CARGO 457124 "40000 "40120 644 472510 - GMi RJ1/4 o 4I 2ARSCM - 2 _J 44 s I a * -pl -' -"P'' 44 .L1. Z~ GENERATOR SET GASOLINE ENGINE PU 53ZIPPI 409425 410280 41451 6-10 418109 L UI 4 9 11A./ORC-19 NTD IN IRX 3/R Tom CARGO -- ILA 44)101 RADIO SET ANIVRC-53 MTD IN TRUCK..KIT $10 PART MO TA-IS TRUN( LOCKER NETAL-VOCO METALRIP5 O1 )OE 4 1 . 0. .. EIPENT I S'C/EY!-RL - 472)90 SWITCHBOARDTELf. MTD ITREK 1/4l Tom AftlO..ILLJSMLNAMIAL. I____ L.4QA _~~2 609119 ANTE NNA AT -7 4/PRC CHANGERRADIAC OETECO CIPHER MACHINE ISEC/&L-7 ELECTRONIICTELETYPEWRI~TR SECURTEQgUIPMENT TSEC/KV-? fnJj4A PR9EX TEER_ ANIUR~f.hkL"tI SWITCHBOARD TELEPHONE TERMINAL 32-061P5 A __A2&ZSH .KI _ JflJ~j TOl KIt LCTOICIAMS NO OR0D DRAWING0 7541473 PIOI HCt-G1lR~ EE M....U 33ANTR NINP _ ...58~t.. TOOL./GNC 121 MTD IN TRUCE 1/4 TOW CARGO 141'100~~~ 44)00 RADIO SET Ah/PAC-Zl IOTNCARGO R SOI pA""M 21AYL' 611101..IEP'MI-AMK15 .______MANUAL4.PHOME MANUAL SR-K'3/07 AAG..1 I 9 2 - . TYPEVRITER PTBL UPPER A4D LOWER CASE ELITE OltPICA 42 KEYS TANK AND PUMP UNIT IQIDISPENSING t"L!xa JlZZ9LiLkIPES I..704 RADIO SET A. 1/4 TOM CARGO 1440 ". llAmumHCN TYPE TRUCK MOUNTED 170910 - TYPEWRITER WOMPTBL 16 11 19 opt 20 IN ELITE OR PICA TYPE 1? 4IE 1 222-I 9 $1722) t1P..TOE 7-15C .


including I major 390 men 20 officers Tho regiment was increased to 12 companies (3 battalions) with 3 majors as battalion commanders. 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battnllon coramanded by a major and the other by the senior csptair. 1808 10 or 5 The Infantry battalio dl: not appear as an established unit. each with 3 officers and 76 men 4 companies. and 60 privates. or as Infantry when dismounted. 3 officers and 76 men 10 companies.. When the number of men in the regiment was less than 160 it was operated am a battalion with the regimental commander as commanding officer. In combat the regiment was operated as an . The rifle battalion was composed of 4 companies armed with caliber .APPENDIX C EVOLUTION OF THE INFANTRY BATTALION AND THE SPAN OF CONTROL Historical Period American Revolution 1777 Nur. When battalions were not formed. 2 battalions of 5 companies each were for-ned with -ebattalion commanded by a major and te ot)" by the senil'r captain. trained to flight a cavalry when mounted. 1812 10 companies. If required. 4 383 men 16 officers Orgization of the Army Act of April 30. each with 4 officers and 78 men 4 304 men 13 officers. the infantry regiment contained 10 companies ( a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. 4 corporals. a rifle battalion. Organization of the Army June 26. unless two 4-campany battalions were organized. each with 35 officers and 95 men 8 766 men 32 offi:ers The infantry battalion was composed of 8 ccnpnieas armed with caliber . each commanded by a bripaler general. (von 8euben. 1790 4 companies. each wit. each with 4 offcers and 02 men 10 or 5 510 men 20 officers The infantry battalion did not appear as an established unit. 1789 4 companies. including 1 major 304 men 13 officers. The legion was dropped in the reorganization of 1796.1 Organization of the Legion of the United Stas 8actions 2 and 3 of the Act of March 5. Organization of the Army March 3. 8 companies. each consisting of I captain. and a compony of artillery.ber of Companies 4 companies each with 40 or more men ". The legion. Each sublegion was compoa&1 of an infantry battalion.54 (or smaller) rifles and was employed as flank support for the infantry.sn of Control 4 Strength 160 Remarks Rifle battalions were formed. 1791 4 Organization cf the Army April 12. was composed of four rublegions.. If required. each with 3 officers and 95 men 4 companies. CORG-M-343 179 . 1792 6-company battalion. the infantry regiment contained 10 cobipanies I a large battalion) and was commanded by a ( )Ionel. When the number of men in the regiment exceeded 160. The dragoons were mounted troops. This organization was based upon the Roman Legion and certain theories of Marshal Maurice de Saxe. a company of dragoons. I ensign. 1 lieutenant.69 smoothbore muskets. battalions were formed with the senior captain amcommandIng officer. "Regulations") S4 companies each with less than 40 man 4 ess than 160 Post-Revolutionary Army Act of September 29. 4 sergeants. commanded by a major general. Thiv was the largest US retment to date. 2 musctans. each with 3 officers and 70 men 4 or 8 280 men 12 officers The infantry regiment was authorized 8 companies. When battalions were not formed.

It remained at this strength for 15 years. Diring this period companies were designated by letters rather than by th:eir captain' a name. 18 CMPG-M-343 . This was the Infantry orlanisation during the Muxican War (1846-1848). each with 3 officers and 51 men 10 or 5 255 men 15 offlcer. 1846 10 companies. Model 1841 were the regulatton infantry shoulder weapons. 3. If reqpired.:. 10companies. When tattalious were not formed. Orpnaatlon of the Army July 5 . Composite battalions were formed for specific mlsions. This reduction decreased emopany strength to the lowest ever authorized. the Infantry regiment contaIned 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a coronet. The regiments of the new army contained 3 battaliona.s men 15 41flcers Remarks The Infantry battalion didnot appear as an established unit. The caliber . When battalions were not formed. 10 or 5 ech with 3 officers and 70men Orga-atlos of the Army March 3. C were designated as battalion companies and 2 wereassigned as flank companies.1. This poet-war reduction resulted In a total "peace" establishment of 10. The infantry battalion does nit appear as an established unit.69. it and June 18and 26. smoothbore. 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed withone battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. 1821 10 companies. If required 2 battalions of 5 companies each were formed with one battalion commanded by a major and the other by the senior captain. The Seminole War (1836-1842? necessitated the addition of 38 privates and 2 sergeants to each Infantry company.54 percussion cap rifle. 2 battalions of 5 companies etch were formed with one battalion commanded by & major and the other by the senior captain. If required. Orpasatiom 2 theArray May 13. each with 100 men 8 800 men This act provided for 10 regiments of Infantry In the old army and 9 regiments In the new regular army. the Infantry regiment contained 10 companies (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonel. When battalions were not formed. Flank companies were designaled A and B. 2 of which were used In the field and one was used as a depot or training 1nit. 16.000 men. If required.Ib i Historical Period Orlmatlon of the Army March 3. Organzation of the Army July 29 and August 3. Of the 10 companies. etch with 3 officers and 8 men 10 or 5 440 men 15 officers The infkntry battalion does not appear as en established unit. 1538 10 companies. flintlock musket and the new caliber . 1815 Kumbar f Companies a1aa ofr Control th U rVO. I battalions of 5 companies each were formed w:th one battalion commanded by a major and the ether by the senior captain. each with 3 officers and 106 men 10 ur 5 530 men 15 officers The regiment and battrlion were the same.rge battalion) end was commanded by a colonel. the Infantry regiment contalnd 10 compnles (a large battalion) and was commanded by a colonl. 06t 8 companies. the battalion companies C through K. When battalions were not formed. the inf'ntry regiment contained 10 companies (.

8J9 companies contained 112men am regimras imente ottscompanies 4 I. These regimets were composed of men who were Immune to troolcal diseases. tactically. 1876. company strength In the Indian Campaigns fell to as lowe as 37 Men. TbeofOrganization. Organization of the Army June 16and23. March 2 and3. Illt sergeant. 4 sorgeants. and 64-82 privates. There were no battalions. brgd acisu battalion of 3 companies (tateec to 2 bataioo motorized companies) werefored a "pnicinfantry units to support Infntr rile attlioscompanies. Organization of the Army March$6. 1674. 12company regiment. the Secretary of War recommended adoption of a 3-battalion.d moch~ngun Company orgaized iogo 3 battalions of 4 companies each. When the war ended the new regular infantry regiments were organized ao 10-company (battalion) units.700 volunteer regiments had served. andplatoons. ilrearma (dispersion). 1876. rarely done. but this wae. 1 wagoner. 10 484 men 30 officers This regiment was one of the smallest eve authorized. 8 were active and were divided Into two 4-company battalions. each with 3 officers and 48 men 10compsnies. Iqy March~ 1. COB G-M-34318 . 8 corporals. A zogitmestal machinagun company was a dded to the regiment at this time. A similar organization was established In 1190 but iPwas supplanted by the 4 424 men 12 officers Becase o impovemasIt. rifle 11-118companiesontmn each with 6 offirsr am 26 mhn a 1 026 mae 4oanie These tibias were basically the foundation for terlabtaioso h World War Iarmy but they required adjustment to Frenchad rtshcma exper~ence. Ilost lieutenant. 2 musicians. As in the Civil War. Each company contained I captain. theproer ponofcontrol was thoughtl to be 4 companies for I leader (a battalion commander). As early as 1890. The regiment had a lieutenant colonel and a major In addition to a colonel and it was possible to organize 2battalions from the 10 compantes. 10 United Rtes Volunteer (Moe-&&te) regiments were formed--five negro and five white-~ each authorized 992 enlisted men. Four companies in a battalion plus an attached platoon of the machinoom company made con* ___________________ __________more lead*7 In the span of control. 1898 (Spanish-American War) 10companies.Historical Period Civil War 1SSI1 1865 Number of Companies 10 companies. They were organized as 10 company (batta~on) regiments because the War Department believed that the new 3-battalion regiment was too complicated for the Rate-raised unite. tach with 3 officers and 98 men apan of Control 10 or 5 Strength 960 men 68 officers Remarks The voluntter infantry regiments were raised bythe Rtates. 1 2dlieutenant. In addition. Blythe end of the war over 1. Of the 10 eompaoles zuthorized for each reXImeet. the States were requested to furnish volunteer troops. and June 26. The twvo Inactive companies plus two new companies formed the third battalion.

trench mortar.dq'jarters company reflects the trend towLrd better control andmore personnel to absorb expected combat losses. Unfortunately. limited antitank protection.rbo.') Table of Organtzation. Table of Organlzation._ torical Period Number of Compan:n span o( Control Srengh Remarks Automatic rifles (BARI were introduced at squadlevel. 1948 Pro-Korean War Period Redwcton Tablo Ho. Rifle I October 1940 3 rifle compasies. 7-16-11-20. I heavy weapons compiny. 7-1. I leadqurtats and beadquartrs I compny 685 men 32 officers 182 COPG-M-343 . 1945 3 rifle corn5 ponies. Because of the Introduction of newweapons (the machinegin. the Korea Police Action began in 1950and these low-strength units were found to be Inadequate to meetthe demands of combat. 1949 3 -ilocompWstia. was second In command. World War It (pro-Pearl HI.pany 4 884 men 52 officers This battalion with Its gre tly Increased strength andthe addition of the h. I leavy wrunona cor. TOE 7-1. maneuver capabilitias in ali terrain and climates. General McHair' policy of trimming all TO of ' excess" units and personnel Influenced this change. There were 4 self-propelled atitank gn and 12 towed antitank guns In each battalion. This pont-war battalion reflected a reduction in personnel in an effort to return topeacetime unit strenrth andat the same time be capable of furnishing abase of file. as part of the headquarters. gun plaloon of the battalion heavyweapons comp-ny. I headquartars company 977 men 37 officers With General Mcair' a death in action. I heavy weapons compony. 7-1 bIaay Battalion I March 1943 818 men 32 officers The hattalion headquarters company was dropped and the headquarters detachment reinstated by ths TO. 1944 3 rifle companies. I ioadquarters cornpany 9 836 men 35 officers Tab o of Organization. did not increase the spanof control of the battalion commander. The inastence by General Pershing. Machflreguns andheavymortars were now the heavy weapons organically assigned to company of the battalion. I heavy weapons com3 rifle comlonies. The traditior' icommander. Table of Organisation. Although smaller in strength than the rifle battalion. The rifle battalion had 24 vehicles. Table of Orglanination. Infantry Battalion February 3d. 7-16 Bttalion. handsd rifle grenedea) and the defense doctrine of trench warfare with its needfor manpower. This organization of the largest infantry battalion during World War nfindicates the desire to strengthen the battalion because of the impending victory in Europe and the probable redeployment of units to the Pacific. Post World War i Pro-Korean War Period Table of Organizaion and Mquipment. This type of battaiion Is an example v( the eperfifted urJts created by the advances in weaponry andtactics. 7-15. I heavy weapons company. I heavy weapons cornpiny. American Expeditionary open warfare and maneuver brougit the battaunits into fire anemovement lion and smaller tactica. I headquarters and headquarters company 5 883 men 34 officers 3 rifle com5 panies. This greatly reduced battalion war the result of post-war economies. The ucrense In strength was necessitated byprospective combat losses In the ground combat tobe sagedin Europe. 7-25 Arrned Infantry Battalion I March 1942 3 rifle com4 panies. 7015N x. upon in-Chief. The new 75mm recoilless rifles were added to the battalion in the at. Infantry Battalion June27. it was a highly recile uzit (M2 and M3) with mounted in half-track cars armament. CommanderForce. I leadquarters compny. 7-18 Waifnty Bs~ataion April 1942 I 2 rifle companies. anda force for seizng and holding terrain. his austerity program was no longer a factor in organizat'onal policy. the major. 1 battalion headquarters and headquarters company 676men 24officers This battsiio was formed to furnish protection endinfantry support for the armored divisions. Table of Organization. the infantry rifle company was increased from 150 to250 men andfrom 3 officers to 6. The detachment..ntry Bet!4.ion Aprii 14. 1 heavyweapons company 4 904mon 28officers The battalion corimander was now a lieutenant colonel. Infantry Battalion JuneI.

For this reason the Army almost returned to the triangular division organization of World War 1 ar.r battalions can be approximated for each type division. The organization of fire teams In the infantry rifle squadwas also a feature of the battle groip. Three of these -. However. For example. The Pettomic Period Table of Organization and Equipment. 7-11D Battle Group I February 1960 4 rifle cornpanies. and simplified operation and maintenance. (5 in the Pentomlc Airborne Battle Group) I headquartecs company I mortar battery (4. made the battle group similar to the regimental combat team of World War P sna Korea.one brigade -. The authorization for rapid expansion to mee" combat reqilrements was a built-In feature of this organization which was rt that time engaged in combst in Korea._'d (infantry) division might have seven mechanized (infantry) battalions and three tank battalions. decrsnaed %eight." p 184. airborne.000." (Pizer). 7-I5N. The battle group was smaller than the regiment but larger than the battalion. Currit'. The basic structure of the ROAD division isheAdquarters . which was staffed with artillery personnel. but the regiment was not. November 15. I headquarters and headquarters company San of Control 5 Fregh Full strength 880 men 5 warrant officers 34 officers Reduced strength 685 men 5 warrant officers 32 officers Remarkb A full-strength and reduced-strength battalion was provided by this Table. an armored division might contain six tank battahons and five mechanized (infantry) battalions. armored. They are assigned or attached to division headquarters (brigade headquarters structure).iew airmoblie dhl'alon I heavy with cavalry battalions (Infantry). Table of Organization and Equipment. mechanized. the other divisions have a strength in excess of 15.illtorlcal Perlod Korean War Table of Organization. 3 rifle companies 4 792 men 2 warrant officers 37 officers The Reorgniatlon Objective Army Division (ROAD) was organiz period.2-in) 6 1286 men 3 warrant officers 67 officers Reorgnzation Obiecttve. The number of maneuver (Infantrv) battalions may vary. t his organization aihmznated the regiment In favor of t'he battle group. "It was designed for sustained combat operations either alone or In combination with one or more battle groups. infantry battalion SOURCES: See "Sources. The ... The battle gromip was ronsidered "not big enough" (Weigiey). and an airborne divfsion might Include nine airborne (infantry) battalions and one tank battalion. I heavy weapons cornpany. Korea. The airborne division has a strength of approximately 13. The addition of the mortar battery. there Is so fixed normai or standard mix of maneuver battalions for POAD divisions. The commanding officer was a colonel. examples of representative mixture of maneu.rd headquarters company aviation battalion engineer battalion armored cavalry squadron support command military police company signal battalion brigade headquarters and headquarters comoany division artillery tank battalion 4 N~ote. CORG-M-343 183 . The battalion And brigade were restored to the infantry division. Among the weapons replaced were the M-1 and the Browning autoniatle rifle.500. Although i: practice division structures vary. 7-15E Infantry Battalion. fhe ROAD Infantry battalion (maneuver) was organized as an integral part of the division structure (see Note). nfautry Division 15 July 1963 I headquarters company. 1950 Number of Companies 3 rifle cornpanies. and airmobile. lndivldoail and crewserved weapons were replaced by Improved models that Increased firepower. an Infantry division might havc eight Infantry battalions and two tank battalions.are parachute-qualified. a mechani. These divisions are currently authorized by TOF. and tested during the 1962 to 1964 Four types of divisions were organized under ROAD -.Infantry. 5lrtM Division (ROCID).

Washington. 1967. Army in Postwar Years. Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces. T. P. Ganoe. G. Washington. Appleton Co. "The Atomic Age Division. et al. 1956.C. "1 Combat Arms Regimental System.D.S. Office. Department of Army. History of the United States Army. D. Francis A. et al.. Office. Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army From Its Organization. K." Army Information Digest. 1903..C. 1953. William A. John Miller.a Status Report. to March 2. New York. Historical Division. Vol 2.. July 1965. 1947.C.W. Tables of Organization and Tables of Organization and Equipment from 1917 to 1968. 184 CORG-M-343 .C. Gardner. December 1961. The United States Army in War and Peace. The Stackpole Co. Chief of Military History.. Sr. Kent Roberts Greenfield. 1860. Eddleman. February 1963. Dictionary of the Army of the United States (Second Edition). Washington.. United States in the World War. Lord. Myles G. The Army Lineage Book: Infantry. D. The History of the United States Army D. New York. . 1903.. " Army Information Digest. Army Information Digest. New York. Historical Division. 1948. Department of the Army." Army Information Digest. Department of the Army. 1960.. 1967. September 29. Harrisburg. D. " Army Information Digest September 1965. Frederick A. The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. 1917-1919. Parker. "1 The Field Army in 1970. ' Army Information Digest.. Lamison and John W. Marken. The United States Army. Macmillan Company. United States Army in Abrld War II. Charles K.R. Van Nostrand. New York. War Department and Department of the Army. Ross. They Fought for the Union. Praeger.E Sources Fravcis B. 1967. Government Printing Office. Putnam' s Sons. Oliver Lyman Spaulding. September 1964. 1924.. Heitman. "The Army Division Keeps Pace with the Times. September 1958. "The Pentomic Reorganization . Korea 1951-1953. New York. John E. Vernon Pizer. Department of the Army. Weigley. The Army Ground Forces. Washington. Russell F. Wike. 1789. D. Chief of Military History. C. "The U.

Army Information Digest. The United States Army Infantry School. the Army. Fort Benning.. Y. Jr. ". °RMi1 CORG-M-343 185 . 0. Fort Benning. Department of "'6niber1965." Troop Topics. Headquarters. "Activation to Combat in 90 Days. y "The Airmobile Division. The ROAD Battalion in Vietnam. ROAD. February 1964. Infantry Reference Data. DA Pam 360-'6 "1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Created."Army Divisions Go ROAD. Kinnard. Georgia. Georgia." Ar_ 6m Information Digest. December 1963. September 1966. Y. " Army. The United States Army Infantry School. " Army Information Digest. Operations and Training Handbook. (1st Edition). Phillips. Harry W. FY 1965. April 1966." August 1965.

security. the ROAD organization consisted of three brigade headquarters. the cavalry squadron. in that case. the divisional brigade provided by ROCID contained a two-battle-group task force commanded by the assistant division commander (ADC). Hence. and movement aspect. an armored cavalry squadron. **The support commander' s responsibilities to the administration company are limited to tactical.488 HHC 0-42 E-95 Sig Bn 0-24 E-547 W-4 Armd Cav Sqdn E-749 0-45 W-22 Engr Bn 0 -44 E-896 W-2 Div Arty 0-191 E-2308 W-17 Spt Comd** 0-141 E-1778 W-23 MP Co 0-9 E-179 W-1 Bde HHC (3) 0-23 E-94 W-6 Tank Bn 0-34 E-538 W-3 Inf Bn* (8) 0-37 E-792 W-2 Avn Bn 0-45 E-250 W-23 *Number of battalions shown represent a type division only. In 1964. or commands. to the division commander' s span of control.132 Enlisted . In practice. the division commander' s span of control. the armor battalion. The ROAD concept reduced the division commander' s span of control from eight to five units. under the provisions of TOE 7E. In 1962. Compositions of divisions may vary. In combat. would be eight units. the ADC was relieved of active control oi a maneuver unit. the ROAD Infantry Division consisted of the following units and personnel: Officers .14. the ADC was directly under the division commander. and the artillery. three battle groups.APPENDi D THE SPAN OF CONTROL: ROCID AND ROAD DIVISIONS The ROCID division actually added more subordinate units.974 Warrant Officers . and division artillery. The division commander' s span of control consisted of seven units: the brigade. If the brigade was not used. 186 CORG-M-343 . This was an achievement in assuring stronger and more effective unit control.

Simplicity must be tempered with consideration of the - other factors affecting organization. fighting. or situation. responsibility must be CORG-M-343 187 . the organizational structure of these units must be one that will facilitate the formation of combat groupings or task forces containing the necessary elements to accomplish the essential functions of finding. Mission In providing a unit with the necessary means to accomplish its mission. * Simplicity. Equipment not used on a day-to-day basis should be pooled at the highest echelon practical and requested by the using units as needed. At each level of command. a command or control structure is necessary. * Flexibility. Only the personnel and equipment normal'y-. and finishing the enemy..Principles of Organization All military organizations are designed to perform an anticipated mission. would be short-lived on the battlefield of today. with or without nuclear weapons support. The commander is responsible for everything which his unit does or fails to do. there are two basic principles which must be considered in developing any organization regardless of the mission. The requirements of the mission determine the number of men and the type of equipment which the unit must possess. Essentially then. These are the principles of Mission and Control. required in performance of the mission should be organic to the unit. and in any type of terrain. the following factors must be considered: 0 Unity of Command. An army organized and equipped in this manner however. Infantry units must be capable of a wide variety of operations. weather. fixing. To effectively direct the efforts of the various groupings of men and equipment toward the accomplishment of the mission. Infantry units have this flexibility to a high degree and are capable of receiving and directing the operations of attachments and coordinating the efforts of reinforcing units. Control The organization must have Pn effective command and control system. The simplest weapon is the fist or a club. In developing a control system for a unit. care must be exercised to insure that the following factors are considered: * Economy. that will insure success on the battlefield. Consequently. such as a weapons system. This factor expresses the need within a command structure of having one and only one commander.

Source: Infantry Reference Data. In the Infantry Division Infantry Battalion. By definition. February 1964. Fort Benning. or direct. If he directly commanded the actions of all elements however. supervise. ROAD. his span of control would be excessive. for example. Maximum and minimum limits of span of control vary with the conditions under which the unit is designed to operate and the complexity of functions performed. communication facilities. span of control is the number of immediate subordinates one commander or leader can effectively control. The commander has overall responsibility for the actions of all elements of his unit. United States Army Infantry School. 188 CORG-M-343 . the span of control should be greater than in a similar size unit composed of different type elements each with a different function. and staff and command assistants available to the commander. composed of identical elements each performing the same function. In a unit. Unit commanders employ the same procedure with platoon leaders. the battalion commander assigns tasks to his unit commanders and holds them responsible for the successful execution of such tasks. By using a chain of command he can limit the number of subordinates that he directly supervises. for example. " Span of Control. Georgia.mat ched by corresponding authority which enables the commander to carry out his responsibilities. " Chain of Command. Other factors affecting span of control are: freedom of movement. It is the factor which enables the commander to retain unity of command of all elements of his unit without exceeding the maximum practical span of control. and platoon leaders with squad and section leaders. Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.

D. Evolution of the US Army Field Manual. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-244. Department of the Army. Inc.LITERATURE CITED 1. Organization. 15. 1947.. 2. Washington. 1967.. F. April 1965. 12. Headquarters. Department of the Army. 10. Technical Operations. Virgil Ney. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-194. Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters. D.. 1946. New York. Combat Operations Research Group. Historical Section. Merrill's Marauders (Feb-May 1944). d. 1945.C. January 1965. D. 189 9. Combat Operations Research Group. The First Special Services Force: A War History of the North Americans. D. Gray.. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318. Washington. Department of the Army. CORC-M-343 . 27. Virgil Ney. Infantry Journal Press. The Armored Force Command and Center Department of the Army. Praeger. 14. A. Employment of Armored Infantry. a.. 8. 1942-1944. Volume 11. D. Washington.. Organization and Equipment of the Infantry Rifle Squad: From Valley Forge to ROAD. 3. Vernon Pizer. Hastings. 1947.. Burhans. D. Equipment. Alexandria. Fort Belvoir. 1941-1967. 15 of the General Board. Kenneth Heckler. The Army Lineage Book. 1967. 4. The Macmillan Co. Virgil Ney. D. 1942. Russel F.C. 5. Virginia. The United States Army. R. C. 13. Robert R. Alexandria. Greenfield. AR-320-5. August 1968. 1953. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II-The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. Henry S. Infantry. and Tactical Employment of the Iniantry Division Report No. Historical Section. Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat. Kent R.. Wachington. Army Ground Forces Study No. Palmer." Army. US War Department. Virginia. Military Intelligence Division. C. Army Ground Forces Study No. Department of the Army. 6. 7. The Armored School. Technical Operations. C. Historical Section. Technical Operations. January 1966. United States Forces. December 1967. 8. .. "Our Future Infantry: Can History Help Us?. 1946. Virginia.. David W. New York. et al. Inc. History of the United States Army. European Theater. Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD). Weigley. C. Washington. 11. Combat Operations Research Group. Washington. Inc.

A Digest of New Developments in Army Weapons." Military Review. Kansas. US Army Paper No. Myles G. D. DePuy.. Inc. "Observations of a Brigade Commander. C. 20. 28. Jr. War As I Knew It.." Army. K. and John W. "The Pentomic Reorganization--A Status Report. Marvin L. Boston. Vol III. "The Airmobile Division-Joins Up. 1944. "Combat Arms Regimental System. and Equipment. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-217. Fort Belvoir. Jr. Brown and Company. Marken. No. "The Atomic Age Division. No." Military Review. March 1962. Wike. March 1968. Pa. Sidney B. No. February 1962. foston. 1968. McNamara. Virgil Ney. Introduction and Notes by Brigadier Thomas R. Combat Operations Research Group. C. 3. No. CORG-M-343 190 . Combat Operations Research Group. (Quotation by Secretary of Defense. Arthur P." Army Information Digest. Department of the Army. Westmoreland: The Inevitable General. 4116. 19 March 1965. Vol. September 1965. The Military Service Publishing Compai y. Wade. "Observations of a Brigade Commander. No. Virginia. 18. 6. Vol 19. The Art of War (Translated by Lionel Giles. 9. 29. Eddleman. 19." Army Information Digest. Harrisburg. William E. No. Jr. 26. 31. Organization. George Patton. 8. Fort Belvoir. August 1965. Virginia. 27. Worley. 20. 17. Harrisburg. Vol X. 10 September 1965. January 1968. d." Army. Lamison." Army Information Digest. 30. 13. 32. Departmeat of the Army. Houghton. _. "1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Created. E. "The Cab for a Dual Capshility.. Virgil Ney. September 1958. No. 1958 "The ROAD Concept of Tailored Divisions.16. Vol XLVIII. Washington. Berry.. B. D.. 500 BC-1965 AD. Furgurson.. Tactics. 1. Field Service Regulations. Inc. Command and General Staff College. 9. D. Robert S. _ 21. Technical Operations. Phillips). The Evolution of Military Unit Control. 25. Vol 15. FM 100-5. Washington. 24. September 1964. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-198. Mifflin Company." Army Information Digest. contained in articlB. I. The Evolution of the Armored Infantry Rifle Squad_ Technical Operations.. Fort Leavenworth. Little. 22. n. C. Pennsyivania. Vol XLVIII. January 1960." Army Information Digest. III. 1947. 23. The Military Service Publishing Company. August 1965. SUN TZU..

Van Nostrand. Indiana. 1961. James. 1941. History of the United States Cavalry. South to the Naktong. D. The Army and Navy Journal.C. Harper. C. New York. The Fighting Man. D. New York. E. Hugh Rees. Robert K. London. . and Dupuy. s Greatest Fighting Forces Through the Ages.SE LECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Adleman. Rudolf. 1941-1945.. Dupuy. 1932. Vol 1. Infantry Tactics for the Instruction. Administration. Government Printing Office. F. Van Nostrand. Alger. Historical Sketch of the Organization. Washington. Altieri.. Vol H: Organizations. 1923. Philadelphia and New York. North to the Yalu. Department of the Army. 1911. E. R. Toronto. Troops and Training. Ed. N. B. 1960. Robert H. Battalion. Coggins. A. Engineers of the Southwest Pacific. Roy E. Lippincott Co. The Army of the American Revolution and Its Organizer. The US Infantry Association. Appleman. New York. p. Spanish-American War. P. George.. Military Heritage of America. An Illustrated History of the World. and Maneuvers of the Soldier. D. 1922. GHQ. Harper. Office CE. 1863. Rudolf Cronau. Washington. Pacific. New York: n. Washington. Ltd.. Infantry Drill Regulations.. E ercise. Dickinson. 1901.C. CORG-M-343 191 . J. Evans. A. Charles. The Spearheaders (1st ed. The Building of an Army. McGrawHill Book Company. Washington. New York. 1865.. Bobbs-Merrill.. Inc. 1884.. C. Brigade or Corps d/Armee... and Walton.. Birkhimer... Garden City. New York. Becke. 1966. Line of Skirmishers...C.). Bond. Infantry Fire in Battle. Office of the Chief of Military History. and Garey. New York. New York. A Company. Jack.. Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery. S. New York. B. Doubleday and Company. The Devil's Brigade. Inc. United States Army. London. John. Brackett. DeGaulle.. Silas. 1865. de la. D.. 1966. 1956. Elements of Military Art and History. T. Albert G. Chilton Books. Barre Duparcq.. Cronau. A'my Forces. 1953. An Introduction to the History of Tactics. 190k. Casey. New York. Indianapolis. The Army of the Future. William E.

Counter Insurgency Operations. Maude. New York.. Montross. Morrison. J. Harper. New York. 1959. New York.French.. Edson D. 1967. US Cavalry Association.. 1906. Sanger. Machine Warfare. C. Eagles Books. Shannon. C. New York. Clark Co.. 192 CORG-M-343 . Battles of the Monsoon William Morrow and Company. M. 1861-1865 Arthur H.. Walkef and Co. The Military Service Publishing Co. Pennsylvania. Notes ol Guerrilla War. Hutchinson and Company. New York. Ridgway. 1946.. 1953. Training Infantr. Matthew B.... Potomac Books. Washington. 1900.. Paget.. John F.. R.. Julian. Leavenworth. 1846.. Harrisburg. Cleveland. Garden City. F. Theodore. A. Clowes and Sons. Frederick A. 1928. 1908. Stokes Co. C. C. Frederick N. The Army of the Potomac From 1861 to 1863. The Organization and Administration of the Union Army. Scctt.p. New York. John P. L. The River and the Gauntlet. 1964.. Orgorkiewicz. New York. 1961. Raff. John J. S. My Experiences in the World War. Publishing Society of New York. A. Washington. London. London. Durham. 1931. Washington. 1944. 1967. Winfield. Command Publications.. New York. Fred A. Duke University Press. Ltd. ... Praeger. Virgil. D. D. The Korean War. Richard H.. 1914. War in the Modern World. Lynn. Pershing. Army Reorganization. War Through the Ages. . 1955..w York. Williamn Morrow and Company. Fry. Harper. Men Against Fire. (New Edition). Notes on the Evolution of Infantry Tactics. Armor.: n.d. Marshall. Fuller.. Doubleday and Company. Nelson A. Fort Ney. We Jumped To Fight. Assault Battle Drill. D. North Carolina. 1960. Ropp. Inc. W. n.. New York and London. Nev. 1968. Miles. William Morrow and Company.. Samuel Livingston. 1967. Ltd. Insurgent Era. C. Kansas. Vol I. Infantry Tactics or Rules for the Exercise and Maneuvers of the United States Infantry.

June 1949. February 1957. CORG-M-343 193 '4 . A History of Tactical Communication Techniques. Organization and Tactics. Pennsylvania. Vol XLVI. Orlando. von Steuben. Regulations for the Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Florida. " Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States. Cornwallville. Matthew Forney. H. "A Modern Organization for the Regular Army and Its Use as a Model in Organizing Other Forces... Uptc:. "A Modern Infantry Division.. Arthur L.A Modem Weapon System. "Air Mobility Study. 1963." National Guard. The Armies oi Asia and Europe. 1939." Military Review. 1912. Martin Company. Woods. 1807. Maneuver in W The Military Service Publishing Co. August 1962. Charles B. Some Notes on the Continental Army.. Appleton and Company. "Administration in Pentomic Infantry. Stuart." Military Review. No. 201. May 1965. Kansas City. "Electronic WarLare -. Backus and Whiting. Bernard Quartitch. B. G. Martin-Marietta Corporation. "A Rifle Company in an Airborne Landing. Willoughby. New York.2-inch Chemical Mortar. Wagner. P. May-June 1916. Emory. 1867. No. New York. History of infantry. Oliver L. Steele. 1861." Military Review. D. Albany. Wright.. New York. New York. A New System of Infantry Tactics Double and Single Rank Adapted to American Topography and Improved Fire-Arms. March 1960. August 1944. London. D. Charles Andrew. 11. Appleton and Company." Military Review. January 1958.." Military Review. "Active Army to Pentomic. 1937. American Campaigns. November 1966. " Military Review. The Military Service Publishing Co. Harrisburg. " Military Review. New York.. November 1961.Spaulding. The United States Army in War and Peace. "A New Weapon . David L. Missouri. May 1951. Articles "A Basic Fighting Force. Putnam's Sons. Ablett.. John W.." Military Review. Harrisburg. 1878. Franklin Hudson Publishing Co. Hope Farm Press. Baron Friedrich..The 4. . Pennsylvania. Vol 58. April 1959. "A New Concept for Military Organization.

" Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register. June 3. August 1966. Bebbett. Donald G. MayJune 1963." Military Review. Martin... Robert J. 8. "Spot Report: Intelligence Vietnam." Military Review." Signal Vol 19. 7 January 1956. December 27." Army Navy Journal. "Army Reorganizes Pentomic. October-December 1928. "Army' s New Division." Military Review." Military Review. November 23. August 1965. "Army Changes in February 1957. 1958. Blumenson. Vol 15." Army Navy Register. No. "Army Reorganizes Pentomic." Army Navy Air Force Journal. "Army Organization in the Atomic Age. Combat Maneuver Battalions Will be the Key Elements. "ALL ROAD Divisions by 1964. "Armor In the Land Battle. (digested from an article by H. Harry 0. "Army Launches ROAD Reorganization." Military Review. Donald G. 8. Berens." Infantry Vol 53. "The Rangers at Hwachon Dam. "ROAD Communications." Army Navy Register. March 1963. January 1965. Vol XLVI. "A Constructive Look at ROAD Division Communications.Effect--. _ . "Army Reorganizes Pentomic."Airmobile Division Organized." Army. Pyiran in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. December 1956. "American Surrender in the Philippines." Military Review. Bennett. January 5." Military Review.. "Army Reorganization Goes -. Charles L. December ." Armv. 194 CORG.. April-May 1942." Military Review. July 1965." Military Review. 1957. Vol 100. March 1955. "Army Reaffirms Pentomic." Army Navy Journal. No. April 1958. August 1966. 1967. Augupt 1949. "Atomic Play in Infantry Battalion Test. February 2. "Army Reorganization. 1957. "Battalion." Military Review.. Amos. "Artillery Support of Vietnamese. Vol XLVI. "Spot Report: Intelligence Vietnam.M-343 "The ROAD Dilemma. No." Military Review. 7 January 1956. May 1954). February 1949. May 1957. 1961. August 1966. 1963. April 1962. "Army Reorganization. E. Bachtel." Military Review. Vol XLVI." Armed Forces Management. 8." Army Navy Register.

August 1930. "The Hidden Versatility of Our New Division. Cunin. No. "Command Organization for an Overseas Theater of Operations. H. March 28." Military Review. November 1956. 1962. March-April 1962. "Battalion in the Defense (ROAD Doctrine). No. Bruce C... "Divisions .." Armed Forces Management December 1961. Vol 18. "11th Airborne ." Army.. September 1930. August 1948.." Army Navy Journal. Dunn. November 1960.Review." Army Information Digest." Army Information Digest. "Modern Infantry. "Army's ROAD Concept Division Reorganization Plan Promises Much." Army Information Digest." Military Review. "ROAD Doctrine--What's New?. . Vol 14.Bradley. Vol 28.. Dager.." Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register. August 1951." Military Review. R. February 1961. Chamberlain. ." Review of Military Literature." nfantry. May 1956. December 1961. December 1949. Cassibry. Cullison. E. "The Integrated Battle Group. Dupuy." Armor. Edwin C. "Divisional Changes.. May 1963. "Describes New Pentomic Division. October 1958." Infantry Journal." Military Review. Robert C. Vol 99." Military Review. Ernest." Military. March 1940. Vol 36. Vol 52. William A. Kenneth A.Pentomic. Vol 52. "The Offensive and Defensive Use of the Chemical Mortar Battalion. James L. February 1958. Andrew J. "Combat Surveillance. "Some Thoughts on Military Tactical Organization." Infantry Journal Vol 37. De Graff. 1957." Infantry. April 1964. "Military Review. May-June 1963. January 1949. G. Jr. "Changes in Infantry Divisions." Military Review.Tree on Fire Elements?. "Combat of an Infantry Battalion.. "Reorganization of Infantry. "Red Diamond (5th Infantry Division Mechanized) Goes ROAD. B. "Divisions Reorganization. "Development of Doctrine. Clark. . Edward C. 2. Vol 72." Army. May-June 1962. 10. "LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols) and Nuclear Target Acquisition. March 31. Brown. "Command in the Pacific: 1941-1945. CORG-M-343 L 195 .

Part 2. July 1954. 10. Gentil. No." C&GSC Military Review.. E. February 1961. L. "What Changes Will ROAD Bring?." National Guardsman. September 1940. "Fighting Support Command." Military Review.. August 1957. "Infantry in Modern War. "The Infantry PB. E. A Perspective on the Civil War. "Frame of Reference. B. December 1961. October-November 1959. Cyril." Infantry. Vol XL. "The Great World War: The Metamorphosis of Infantry. Military Review. July 1957. Victor W. 1959." Infantry Journal. .ttle Group .. May 1959. 2. Falls.. February 1961." National Guardsman. and Organizational Concepts. Part 3.Ethel.. January 1943. July 1959. A.. James W." Military Review. Armor. Granger. June 1965. Vol XU.Three or Five Elements?. "Foot Mobility of Infantry. "Divisions . January-February 1964. No. Tactics." Armor. E. . C. B. Cermains." Infantry. Vol 7. "Flags of the ROAD Divisions." Army. "The Infantry Battle Group ." Military Review. Gustav J. and Moore... "Evolution of the Infantry Division. Jr. Freeman. June 1960." (translated by the Military Review from an article by Afonso von Trompowsky in "Mensario de Culture ivilitar" (Brazil) Nov-Dec 1959). No. "Atomic Age Army. Gibson. Garth. and Nelson. N. M.. June 1959. "Atomic Age Army.. "Infantry Planners Look Ahead." Nineteenth Century. Perret." Army Navy Air Force Journal and Register. J. C. P.. . Jr." Army Information Digest Vol 18.in the Defense. "Evaluation of Weapons." National Guardsman. May 16." Military Review. "Whispers in a Windstorm. "4Ar Information Digest (1958 world-wide US Army Infantry Conference). "General ' Gar' Davidson' s Censored Comments on Shortcomings of Army ROAD Division. December 1963. 196 CORG-M-343 .in the Offense. 1964. "Atomic Age Army. Gillert. Vol 101. "Faster Location of Distant Targets Aim of Army Map Selector Machine. January-February 1960. 3. Part 1.

P.." Infantry Journal. May 1943. "A Fighting Rifle Company. "Ground Forces . "History of the Organization and Tactics of the Different Arms. January 1955._. "Infantry in a World of Machines." Infantry. Frederick S." Military Review." Army. 2. Hungate. Vol XLVII. VolXLII. Harrigan. April 1967. Vol XLVII. November 1947. July 15. William J. Huppert. "Infantry in Modern Battle. Heintges." Military Review. "This Is a ROAD Brigade.." Military Review.Key to Survival. "Organizing and Training the New Army. C. No." Army. "Guard Units on Pentomic. "Infantry in Battle. February 1967. "Ground Warfare in Vietnam. D.. Baton Rouge." Military Affairs." Military Review. "Inantry.. Vol 47. No.. September-October 1961." Military Review. 3. Vol 16." Military Review. 1939." Military Review. July 1957. September 1939. 2. No. February 1963. Charles H. 4." Infantry Journal November-December 1938. "Infantry Fire in Offense and Defense. C. Hilsman. CORG-M-343 197 . April 1956. Hall." (Interview). 11. Army Navy Air Force Register. 0. "Infantry Division . Reorganization. Vol 13. Where You Must Stay Loose But Not Limp.. August 1956." Army and Navy Publishing Company. April 1963. 1946. "Wanted: An Infantry Fignting Vehicle.Where?. No." Army Information Digest Vol 2. August 1941-March 1942.Defense. Anthony." Military Review. 2 February 1946.Attack of a Fortified Position. "Ground Forces Organization. 11 April 1959." Army Times. John A." Military Review. "Doubts About the Regimental System. "Mechanized Infantry. May-June "Ground Forces in Future Warfare. "W. H. "Battle Group . David W. No. 1961. March 1932. July 1957. May 1954. G. October 1961. "History of the 59th Armored Infantry Battalion." Military Review. Haydon. James W. ." Military Review." Army and Navy Register.. "Infantry Emphasis . "Automated Command and Control System. Hollis. "Army's New (ROAD Combat) Division Tailored for Action. Gray.. Harrison.

" Infantry. Harold J." USA Aviation Digest. Kyle. 4. 198 CORG-M-343 . 1. March 1928. Izenour." Armv. A." Military Review." Military Review. Lynch. No.. October 1947. Vol XLII. "The Infantry Needs Mobility . "The Commander and Civil-Military Relations." Military Review. "The Task Organization for Amphibious Operations. L. "Battle Group R&S Forces. Vol 26. Miksche. November 1963. "The Cost of Going Regimental. . Vol 17. April 1967. Wood B. M. April 1946." Military Review. Vol XLVII. Miles. "Infantry Organization. April 1959. June 1953. 3. "The ROAD Ahead. F. April 1964." Military Review... "Logistical Support Under Modern Conditions." Infantry Journal January-February 1938. October-November 1959." Military Review."Infantry in Mountain Operations.. Vol 32." Infantry Journal. No. "ROAD Aviation Battalion. March 1948." Military Review. Stephen G." Military Review. Marko. "Return of the Infantry. Kent. Perry L. Millener. Jr." Infantry. March 1958. Carl P. 1941.. Marshall. G. "Maintenance by Helicopter in the Nuclear War. "Major Problems Confronting a Theater Commander in Combined Operations.. G. September 1958. 4. August 1957.Not Armor. A. No. A. S. "The Regiment Must Return. Vol 9.. "Inside the Infantry Division.." Infantry." Military Review. Military Review. March-April 1961. "Current Infantry Developments. Jones. 1. Frank P. No.The Department of the Infantry Division. May 1967. Vol XLIV. January 1962." Infantry. April 1959.. Irvin M. Meyer." Military Review. April 1959. No. Part J. George F. Keiser. "Infantry Today and Tomorrow." Infantry Journal December Martin. . "The Simple and the Complex. Ferdinand Otto. January-February 1963.. "ROAD Support Platoon. Part II.... Vol 53. April 1928. "Keeping Pace with Future . "ROAD Changes." Infantry.

"Psychological Warfare: Key to Success in Vietnam. "New Division (ROAD). July 1943. December 1938. Mrazek. May 1943. "Pentomic Division.. John. March 1940. June 1940. June 1943. Vol XL. London. April 1968. Vol 47. 4. "New U. James L. June 1943. 5. December 1939." Armor. August 1943." Army Information Digest August 1961. July 1961. December 1940." Military Review. "New Divisions. Edwin J. No. June 1960. "Infantry Combat Vehicles. "New Look for Army--Increased Mobility (with ROAD). 1." Military Review. No. McCarren." Army Infantry Digest. October 1941. "New Divisional Organization." Armed Forces Management. 3. Ogorkiewicz." Military Review. "The Nerve Centers of Command." Armor." Military Review. January 1958. September 1940. and Tactics. "Organization and Equipment. April 1963. 1. 3. Vol XL. March 1941." Military Review. Vol XLLLLVI. October 1960." Military Review. July 1943. March 1942. September 1939. "Modern Infantry. March 1943. Infantry Journal. December 1940. 5. August 1943. September-October 1961. "MOMAR Plans Reverted. Vol 9. Williard. September 1942. September 1939. Reuben S. June 1942. December 1942. May 1964. "Mobile Concept.? Military Review April 1962. June 1939. "Modern Infantry Battle Formations and Tactics. March 1941. Weapons. "Pentomic Division in Combat. Vol 12. Vol XLVIII. April 1968. September 1942. March 1943. Nathan. No. No." Military Review. Richard. March 1940. December 1939.. Vol LXX. March 1939. No. May 1957. December 1942. September-October 1961. CORG-M-343 9 199 ." The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal. No. June 1939. Pearson. December 1941. "Offensive Combat. Divisional Organization. "Support Command or Trains Organization for the Division." Military Review. Military Review.. March 1944. April 1960. "The Philosophy of the Guerrilla Fighter." Military Review. March 1940. September 1940.S. "Men. June 1941. No. October 1941. December 1941. July 1957. March 1942.Miller. June 1942. December 1954." Military Review. "Organization for Frontless Wars. June 1940." Military Review. March 1939.

" Infantry Journal. June 1959. April 1959. "Reorganization of Divisional Infantry." Military Review. "Army. March-April 1966.. "A Basic Fighting Force." Military Review.. Robert C. 12. " Army Sackton." Military Review. Phillips. "TASTA-70. Schmierer. II." Infantry Journal." Aviation Week.. No." Infantry. 21 December 1929. Army Navy Register. "Airmobile Concept Proves Effectiveness in Guerrilla Fight.M-16' ." Infantry Journal. "Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion." Military Review. "Toward an Elite Infantry. March 1964. "Walking Infantry Battalion. July-August 1940. 3. No. 1. No." Infantry. 9. January 1958. "The Armed Helicopter. 6. "Reorganization. Powell. January 1930. "Infantry Journal.. Vol XLIV. September 1967. No.. September 1966." Recommendations of the Infantry Board. 3. "Long Live the Regiment.. Plattner. Rigg. January 1964." Army. "Reorganization of the Infantry in the Division. April 1959. Vol 36. Y. 200 CORG-M-343 .. In-formation Digest. No. Vol 86. Vol 35. "Reorganization of the Infantry Battalion... September 1929. "Military Review. March 1960. "Light Infantry. Vol 39.. "Rifle Units in Defense." Military Review." Military Review. Vol 36. Y. Vol 54.. September-October 1937." Military Review. "Principles of War in a Nuclear Age. "The ROAD Battalion in Vietnam. July 1966. Ross." Military Review. Frank J." Infantry Journal. 7. Scammel. Schlotzhauer.. March 1964. July i963. Elmer." Military Review. John E. "The UfS Army in the Postwar Years. 3."Pentomic Infantry Division in Combat. M. J." Infantry Journal Vol 37.. 10 January 1966. Pouget. March 1930. Walter S. December 1961. "Rifle 'M-14' . C. No. "Inside ROAD! . Robert B. "Reorganization of Infantry Battalion. Quinn. "Rifle . March-April 1964. Vol XLVII. John T. No. Phillips. No. "Cheap Solutions for Winning Wars. June 1930. Thomas R. Vol XLVI. J.

." Infantry. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-221. June 1965. "A Staff Officer Looks at the Infantry." Military Review. VolXLVI. 4." Army Navy Air Force Journal.. March 1957. November 1957. "Soviet Tactics on the Nuclear Battlefield. 1961. AprilMay 1960." Military Review."Scrap Pentomic Division. "Tactics and Atomics. April 1968." . No. June 1935.. "The Battalion and Zero Defects." Military Review. April 22. "Evaluation of Weapons. and Organizational Concepus.They Form a First Line of Defense in the Far North." Canadian Army Journal. "Soviet Armed Forces. Truman R." Military Review. No. Vol XLVII. "Alaska' s Eskimo Scouts . 8." Military Review.Army Infantry Digest. July 1954. May 1954. P. "Streamlining the Infantry Division. Shackleton. Thomas J. March 1936.. "Sky Cavalry Takes Over Reconnaissance Role. April 1956. November 1959." Military Review.. Sorley." Military Review. Secretary Decides: Battalion Return. No. 11. Target Detection Training. N. August 1966.. "Army. "Tanks and Infantry ." Military Review. July 1967. Shanley. Vol 34. August 1965. A. "Surveillance. 4. "Special Infantry.. Sherron. Smith.The Need for Speed. B." Military Review. Vol XLVIII. June 1948. Paul T." Army Digest. January 1960. "Service in a Unified Command Headquarters." Military Review." Military Review. "On Target. "Armoured Infantry and Atomic War." Military Review. January 1944.. "Soviet Unconventional Warfare Capabilities. December 1945. Shay." Military Review'. February 1952. June 1962. W.. Strobridge.' Military Review. July 1961. III. "Structure of New Divisions. Gene T. November 1967. Smith. R. "The Quiet War. "Special Infantry. Stone. Lewis S. "TOE 7-17. No. "Target Information. CORG-M-343 201 . C. C." Troop Topics. R." Military Review. "The Division Administration Company. Tactics." Infantry.

. "Thoughts on ROAD Changes. "The Airmobile Division. "The Evolution of Defensive Tactics." Military Review." Military Review. E.. "Building and Training a Combat Division."Task Forces. 12. September 1965. 4. Military Review. Part 2.. Vol 30. H. January-February 1964. Robert B. History of the US Army in World War II. January 1951." Military Review. 202 CORG-M-343 41 ." Military Review." Military Review.. No. "The Evolution of Methods of Warfare. "Inchon: The General' s Decision. No. Vol 54. June 1942. April 1967. "The Final ROAD. "The Combat Team in an Infantry DiN ision." Military Review." Infantry. "The Final ROAD. May 1944. "The Impact of Guided Missiles on Ground Warfare. December 1948." Infantry. May 1943. "The Nuclear Legion. "The Problems of the Bases and Supply in the Southwest Pacific. "The Infantry of Tomorrow. January 1958. February 1964. H." Military Review. "The Soviet Army Is an Entirely Armored Army. August 1954." Military Review. March 1942." Military Review." Military Review. "The Infantryman under Nuclear Pressure. "The Army of the Future. March 1958. Tomlinson. August 1952." Military Review. 2. August 1957. December 1959." Military Review. September 1942. Vol XLVII. December 1957. Tully. November-December 1963. Pat. May 1950. Thomann." Military Review." Military Review. June 1960." Military Review.58. Charles E. No. April 1959. March 1958." Military Review.Organization. "The Tactical Organization of Troops. Vol XLVII." Military Review. May 1944." Military Review September 1952." Military Review. "The Battle Group." Military Review. . "The Motorized Infantry Threat. "The Army of the Future ." Infantry. "The Infantry of 1965. Townsend. "The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. April 1956. Part 1. "The Soviet Army Today. "Mobility on the Battlefield. November 1956. December 1942. Vol 5?. May 11." Military Review. December 1967. Army Information Digest. "Tradition and the New Look. December 1941.

" Army and Navy Journal. "ROAD Can Be Geared to the Needs of the Nuclear Battlefield." Military Review. "Armoured fnfantry Combat. March 1943. Vol 47. January-February 1933. December 1940. CORG-M-343 203 . 1936." Military Review. March 1958. May 1951. December 1961. "The U." Military Review.. Winfree. von Senger und Etterlin. Jr." Army. September 1940." Military Review. March 1963. Vol 14. Charles H." Army. Army in Vietnam: A Survey of Arms.937.S. 1961. 1. "Weapons. F.. "United States Army Pacific." Military Review. Vol 40. Jac. August 1943.. Wermuth. December 1942. M. June 1942. June 1940. February 18. April 1957. "Unity of Command. "Weapons." Military Review. No. June 1942. "Motors and Infantry." Military Review. October 1941. White. July-August 1933. "What is Happening to Army Amphibious Know-How?. December 1941. . "Weapons. December 1938. "Weapons. December 1939. "Why Five. "U. Wheeler. "Weapons. S. November 1949. S. Robert T." Military Review. October 1967." Infantry Journal." Military Review. No. "Will the Army Abandon ' Pentomic' Divisions for Panzer Structure?. "High on the ROAD: Some Observations on the Role of the Brigade. Operations and Weapons. Waller." Military Review. "Wanted: At. September ." The Infantry Journal.. 23 September 1939. October 1959. Army Progress." An Consantoir. "Thoughts on Organization. 2." Infantry Journal. Army to Have Five ' streamlined' Divisions. Vol LXXXV. Infantry Fighting Vehicle.."Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches. "The Infantry Battalion in War." Army Navy Air Force Journal. September 1942. February 1963. Walter R. Vol 40." Infantry Journal." The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal. "Unified Command in Theaters of Operations." Military Review. Anthony L. November 1963. "U." Chief of Information Office 1963. .

No. The Armor School Library. "Mechanized Fighting Vehicle. Kentucky. D. Kentucky. G. After Action Report 20th Armored Infantry Battalion. Boston. Jr. D. July 1956. 1st Armored Division._ "The United States Army: Its Doctrine and Influence on US Military Strategy. No.Wyman. Hilliard. "959. 10th Armored Infantry Battalion. January 1945 through April 1945. Kentucky.. Fort Knox. H. Kentucky. 1920. 1607-1958. General Staff. Fort Knox. . Kentucky. American Military History. March 1958. 12.. Arm. April 1945 through May 1945. . W. Department of the Army. 7. 204 CORG-M-343 . 14th Armored Infantry Battalion. Fort Knox. W. "A Study in Battle Formation" Historical Branch. Francis Bailey. Fort Knox. Washington. 10th Armored Division. Army. Fort Knox. Lancaster.. After Action Report. Zeigler. Zierdt. Little and Wilkins. 1802. Kentucky. The Armor School Library. 14th Armored Division. Pennsylvania. Vol XXXVII. Documents Abstract of Infantry Tactics (including Exercises and Maneuvers of Light-Infantry and Riflemen). The Armor School Library. C. Headquarters. Vol XLVI. May 1945.. C." Military Review. February through April 1946. After Action Report. Robert P. "Let' s Get Going on Our New Combinations for Combat. 15th Armored Infantry Battalion. The Armor School Library. 10 July 1944 through May 1945.. July 1966. "The Structure of the New Army Divisions. After Action Report. An Act for the Regulation of tbh Militia of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Armor School Library. The Armor School Library. 1 November 1944 through 1 May 1945. War Plans Division. After Action Report. Washington." Military Review. 19th Armored Infantry Battalion. Government Printing Office. Gray. After Action Repot. 1830. 4th Armored Division. Fort Knox. July 1961. October 1944 through 3 March 1945. 6th Armored Di-v is ion. 9th Armored Infantry Battalion.

"Conference Course Training Bulletin No. Virginia. 5. Evolution of the US Army Infantry Mortar Squad: The Argonne to Pleiku. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-310. The Army Field Printing Plant. General Reference Bureau. Momar I. CORG-M-343 205 . Division-Evolution. n. Pentana Army (U). January 1965. The Infantry School. Fort Benning.. Rifle. D. Georgia. ___ I 4 j ' . Evaluation of Modern Batte Forces. National Archives. Ney. Alexandria. C. (SECRET) Naisawald. February 1964. Georgia. 15. Pennsylvania. Memorandum. AWC. 1941. Technical Operations. Special Text No. "Reports of the General Board. n. Equipment. July 1967.Chronology: Reorganization of Airborne Division-Pentomic. The Infantry School. 1940. Combat Operations Research Group. Infantry Reference Data. Organization of Infantry. Inc. Fort Benning. Combat Operations Research Group. Headquarters. Vol I and II.. Technical Operations. C. ORO Study.. 1912. Georgia. The Infantry Division: Changing Concepts in Organization. July 1966. Inc. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-194. Washington. The Infantry School. 1952. 1. d. Huston. 10 February 1960. Virginia. 5 May 1941. United States Forces. April 1941. US Continental Army Command. and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Division. Virginia. (Ref. 1941). Combat Operations Research Group. General Reference Bureau. Organization and Composition of Major Army Units for Combat. Misc 322. 1935. No. The US Soldier in a Non-Violent Role.. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-281. Washington. Report of the Chief of Infantry. G. Fort Belvoir. D. (SECRET) "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States. Carlisle Barracks. Inc. Technical Operations. " Organization. Office. " Organization of the Infantry Regiment. Government Printing Office. Based on T/O 7-11 October 1.. 1952. Lynch. Milburn M.d. A. DivisionEvolution. European Theater. Van Loan. d. Virgil. Organization and E 4 uipment of the Infantry Rifle Squad: From Valley Forge to ROAD (U).. Edition April 10. Chronology: Triangularization of Infantry Division.. 1900-1939. Virginia. . ROAD. Chief of Military History. n. L. G-3 to WPD. WPD 3674-52. US Continental Army Command. Chief of Military History. Alexandria. Modern Mobile Army 1965-70 (U). Fort Monroe. Office. Misc 322. Fort Benning.

C3. C. FM 7-10. D. d. Technical Operations. . Fort Leavenworth.. September 1960.. Army War College. Rifle Company and Airborne Division Battle Groups. USAC&GSC 60-3. C. ". "A Letter on the Subject of an Established Militia and Military Arrangements addressed to the Inhabitants of the United States.. D. Combat Operations Research Group. Depar-tment of the Army. Infantry and Airborne Battle Groups. C. American Forces in Action Series. Armored Infantry Unites. No. 3. August 1957. Vol 33. Platoon. C. et al. Field Manuals FM 7-10. Very Long-Range Field Army Concept (U). Small Unit Actions. C. Rifle Company. Department of the Army.. Washington. C. Platoon. CDOG Project No. Suggs. Baron Friederich W. Department of the Army.. Armored Infantry Battalion. D. Tank Units. Fort Belvoir. 1929. Virginia. 29 January 1959. December 1961. D. Company and Battalion Headquarters. Plans Directorate. Alexandria.. D. Fort Leavenworth. Washington. Robert. Short Title: FA-75 (U). August 1962. Washington. C. Headquarters. 1946. 11. Kansas. Headquarters. 206 CORG-M-343 i . Department of the Army. "The Genesis of the American First Armay.. Command and General Staff College. US War Department.. Inc. Headquarters. Company and Battalion.. d. D.. FM 17-20. Rolls and Records of the Continental Army. The Army Lineage Book.. MSS Div LofC. Virginia. Tables of Organization.. Government Printing Office. 1967. Washington. US Army Socio-Political Education Requirements for Internal Defense and Development Operations. Department of the Army. No. January 1065.Rifle Company. TOE 7-27. The Armored Concept in the British Army Between World War I and World War II Historical Division. FM 17-15. (SECRET) von Steuben. Washington. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-293.. 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe. n. D. Washington. Vol II: Infantry. United States Army Combat D3velopments Command. US Army Command and General Staff College. Washington. "1Historical Section. 1937. C.. War Department. n. D. Paper on Reorganizing the Army.. Kansas. Washington. 2 August'1944. 1953. Historical Division. 1784..

"A Study of the Continental Army. "Historical Section. Washington. . Wright. D.M-343 207 . Fisher. John W.. Chief of Army Field Forces. Office. Ernest F. April 1925. Chief of Military History. 1949. Maher. et al. Jr.V Unpublished Material Annual History. Office. and 1950.. " prepared as a study for the Command and Genral Staff College. John R. - tt I I4 ' CORG. "Evolution of the Organization of the American Field Army.. C.. 1961. Weapons and Equipment Evolution and Its Influence Upon Organization and Tactics in the American Army from 1775-1963 (draft). Army War College.. 1948.

The adaptation of the World War II armored division organization to the ROAD division has given the infantry battalion of the United States Army the highest fire and movement capability it has ever possessed in our military history. middle Initial. was forged and tested on the battlefields of Europe and in the Pacific Area. The advent of the helicopter and its application to troop carrier and fire support missions enables the infantry battalion to become highly air mobile. . ARMY VON.) Ney. AUTHOR(IS (Frt name. composition. J. IIG rinTN e. WHICH IS E W . DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Distribution of this document is unlimited II. Virginia 22060 ABSTRACT _-The infantry battalion has evolved over a period of several thousand years. 54. Keith Directorate of Concepts and Plans 13 AOISTRAC T IS ASSFRAC United Sates Arny Combat Developments omman Fort Belvoir." REPORT SECURIY CLASSIFICATION . and weaponry of the presentday infantry battalion. SUPPLEMEN Y NOTES 12.1 PO JAN O 4111. . OF PAGES [Tb NO OF REFS 209 Sa. CORG-M -343 b. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY 6 Mr. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES ( ype of ePott and Inclusivedatea) Final Report S. Virgil . Whiting Street Alexandria.N 4. dN/A CORG Project No.MEN . PROJECT NO. TOTAL NO. the Korean War. Nuclear weapons. D D " o * 7 RE73 PLACES DO OISSOLUlE. last ine. E. ORIGINATOR*S REPORT NU ERIS) 32 DAAG-05-67-C-0547 b. CI o I& Combat Operations Research Groupb 101 S.Security Classification INCLASSLFIED DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA . CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. its American ancestors may be found in tho units organized during the American Revolution. Virginia 22304 3 REPORT TITLE R LAP N/A 1939-1968 EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY INFANTRY BATTALION: 7 4. REPORT DATE 70. (Securityclassification of ftllt. and the Cold War have exerted considerable influence on the size.R & D body of abstractand Indexing arnototlon must be entered when the oeralltrepott Is ¢las* led rp . The modern infantry battalion in the United The battalion States Army began in the period just prior to World War I.10. A3728 OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any othernumbers that may be assgned is report) 10.

battalion infantry company rifle command control unit Pentomic ROCID ROAD span of control organization communications airmobile American Revolution War of 1812 Mexican War Civil War Valley Forge World War I World War Ii Korean War Vietnam division brigade lwiding team tasK force regiment Army Ground Forces weapons fire-power maneuver major lieutenan colonel UNCLASSIFIED Secuity Classlfication .UNCLASSIFIED Security Classification IINK I4 KEY WORDS WO A WY LINK 0 ROLE WT LINK ROLE C WY F.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful