JACKSON V AEG July 2

nd
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Witness: Jean Seawright Human Resources expert
Augments prior to witness being called
Mr. Panish: Yes, your honor.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I intend to continue cross-examination and reference these documents, so if
arguments are needed, we should probably do it now.
Judge: My initial thoughts about it is: one, Judicial Notice, no. If it's regulation, a statute, fine. Policy, not so
much. But I do think that on cross-examination, it's something that can be inquired, mostly because she had
already started to answer questions about it and basically admitted that it was something that she had
considered. So once she opened that door, there really wasn't anything, I think, that could be done to close the
door. So that's where I am. But that doesn't mean the document itself comes into evidence.
Mr. Panish: Well, first of all, your honor, I believe, number one, that pursuant to article 6, section 10, of the
California constitution, that the court improperly commented upon the evidence, and under the case of Stafford
vs. Alexander, 182 cal.app.2d 301. The court made the following statements: that this was a law to the jury,
counsel stated in front of the jury that -- things that were not true regarding "this is an official government
policy." it is not. It is a guideline which has been determined by a court --
Judge: Well, let's see what -- where are you quoting?
Mr. Panish: Quoting?
Judge: Let's look at the --
Mr. Panish: I'm quoting from the transcript. Let's put the transcript up and see exactly what you said to the
jury and what counsel said. And I'll put it up for the court and everyone else to see what transpired yesterday.
Please put it up.
Mr. Boyle: Page 9305 to 9306.
Mr. Panish: Let's start with page 9305. And as the court will recall, I objected. Okay. Here we go. Let's
start with counsel -- let's go back up more. Go up more. Right there. Counsel's questioning: "in fact...do you
know what the EEOC's current policy is on credit checks? "no, but I know the EEOC conducts credit checks."
"not my question. "she answered it."
Judge: Is this page 9 --
Mr. Panish: This is page 930 --
Mr. Boyle: 9305.
Mr. Panish: 9305 of the official trial transcript.
Judge: Okay. I'm trying to find where you are.

Mr. Panish: I'm on line, right now, 14.

Judge: By Ms. Bina, "do you know what their current policy is"?
Mr. Panish: Right. Question: "they conduct credit checks." okay.
Mr. Panish:
"she already answered." "overruled." witness: "so their policy must be to require to have" -- "require
credit checks, because that's part of their process." question: "so you don't know that the EEOC Now
considers credit checks to be a prohibited practice?"
That's a false statement. The United States courts and the Supreme Court have found that there's no basis
whatsoever. And the court should recognize that counsel spent at least five minutes on the civil rights act of
1984 or '74, okay? '64, the civil rights act, and all the discriminatory intent, knowing that a majority of the jury
are a protected class. They went all into this to make an allegation that it's a discriminatory class, that this
would be discriminatory under title 7. Keep in mind that AEG has never made that claim for the reasons why
they didn't make credit checks. This is a lawyer-created defense after the fact. Continue on. Then I say -- and
then she says to consider --
"pull up the prohibited practice page."
It goes right up. Next page.
"it's hearsay, number one...and irrelevant. I've never seen it." court: "hearsay." Ms. Stebbins: "your
honor, it's not hearsay. It's the kind of thing an expert reasonably relies upon. She's stated she has to
advise her clients as to EEO Policies." Judge: "there's probably a better -- Judicial Notice?" the court
is volunteering a basis, how to get it. Ms. Stebbins: "Judicial Notice, your honor. Fine." Mr. Panish:
"we haven't even seen it. Judge: "Judicial Notice. It's the law." that's another misstatement and
comment on the evidence which is violative of article 6 of the California constitution. Ms. Stebbins:
"it's official government policy listed"
-- it is not an official government policy. At best, it's a guideline, which under the U.S. Supreme court, case
law, a guideline. And that's in the case of national railroad passenger company vs. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S.
101, and it states that these are not persuasive, and these are -- the EEOC Enforcement guidelines are not
controlling law. They may provide some -- "some" -- guidance to employers only to the extent they have the
power to persuade. So this is not a law, which the court said -- which Ms. Bina has represented continually.
Keep going to the next -- this is the web site. By the way, I did try to get Judicial Notice of the California
corporations code section on the corporation number of AEG, which the court denied. And if we continue on to
the next page:
Mr. Panish: "this is irrelevant. Was this in effect in 2009? It's collateral."
Now we're opening up the 352, undue confusion and prejudice. The court itself was confused already. The jury
clearly could be confused. If you, as a member of the bar, are confused by what counsel said, clearly the jury is
going to be confused. And is it in a prohibited section and on a web site? That's what she said. She doesn't say
it's a policy or that she's relying on it. And it wasn't in effect in 2009.
Judge: Well, those are questions that we were kind of going over at the time.
Mr. Panish: Right. Well, no, but it wasn't. And if we continue on, what the jury was told -- and then she
reads it twice. First she doesn't put it up, then she reads it again. And if you read, at the bottom, it says exactly

what the court finally said. It doesn't say what she said it says. She's trying to use it to impeach her, and it
doesn't say that it's a prohibited practice. Even though it's already been thrown out by one court that's
examining the Kaplan case, which we cite to the court, the lawsuit -- that she also brought up lawsuits being
filed. If we keep going down more --
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor --
Mr. Panish: And then she gets back into it. So, number one, there's been numerous misstates. She said --
and I don't want to get into all the sidebar stuff, but she said it was a policy or regulation. You told the jury it
was the law. It is not. And now we're in this whole 352 issue. She has not relied on that for any opinions in
this case. There's been no foundation laid for that. And it's totally inappropriate. Wasn't in effect at the time,
and now we're going to open up a whole bunch of other issues. And the sole purpose is to try to say that it's
discriminatory to run credit checks, which it's not, and there's no basis for it, and the court found there is no
basis for it. And that's why they want to get it in, and AEG never --
Judge: I think what the policy says is that it's not recommended.
Mr. Panish: It's a guideline that's been revoked by a court in a lawsuit that challenged it. In the Kaplan case,
they could not establish, the government, that there was any disparate discrimination as a result of this.
Judge: Right.
Mr. Panish: So they tried to enforce it --
Judge: In one case.
Ms. Stebbins: And the problem with the Kaplan case, your honor, is that they had bad evidence. They tried
to get in driver's license photos and had a panel trying to figure out the rates of individuals based on the driver's
license photos, and the court said it was an improper method. But there were other issues in the case. That was
the reason it was thrown out. It had nothing --
Mr. Panish: She brought up the lawsuit. She brought it up, the lawsuit that rejected this whole basis. She
asked those questions. "were you aware of the lawsuit?" so she had to answer the question, which had no basis
what -- she asked those questions.
Judge: I don't remember questions about a lawsuit.
Mr. Panish: Well, there are. If you want me to show you those questions, because they're in the record, and
she brought it up.
Judge: Okay.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, first off, what they just showed,
I asked: "are you aware that this section is found to be in the prohibited practices section of the EEOC's
web site?" the witness said, "yes."
so clearly she is familiar with the policy. The question was, "are you aware of it?" your honor, I never
represented that it was anything more than a policy on the EEOC Web site. I think it's appropriate to clarify it
to the jury and, actually, was planning with my cross-examination yesterday, had it not been interrupted, to
explain that this was web site guidance and that it was nonbinding, but it was a recommendation by the EEOC
The arguments that we are advancing is that Ms. Seawright's gotten up and testified, and plaintiffs have

repeatedly testified that there's no reason whatsoever a company wouldn't conduct credit checks on everybody
under the sun, where in fact, HR Policies are created with this idea of job-relatedness. And the -- under the
shadow of title 7 and the EEOC's longstanding rule -- from our brief it goes back to the 1970s, and Ms.
Seawright's clearly familiar with it -- that any kind of employment test must be job related and must be
necessary --
Judge: Her point is it is job-related, isn't it? So --
Ms. Stebbins: Sure, your honor. But I'm pushing on that a little bit, and I think that's fair cross-examination.
The witness links to the EEOC Web site on her home page, she is familiar with the policy, she talked about
them at her deposition, on the stand yesterday. She acknowledged she's familiar with this particular policy.
Judge: So if we clear up what this is --
Ms. Stebbins: Yes. Absolutely, your honor.
Judge: But if we clear up what it is, but it's still not coming into evidence. What I've said is you can use it as
a basis to cross-examine her, is all I've said.
Mr. Panish: But you told the jury it was the law.
Judge: Well, we can clear that up.
Ms. Stebbins: We'll clear that up.
Mr. Panish: And counsel represented things in front of the jury, which I objected to, which are not true.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I think I represented that it was a policy on the EEOC Web site.
Mr. Panish: No.
Ms. Stebbins: I think that is true, but I'm happy to clarify that it is a nonbinding policy, that it's an advisory
policy and does not have the force of law. And I'm happy to clarify that with the witness in any way, shape or
form. I certainly did not want to mislead the jury by --
Judge: I can do it. One of two ways: I can do it or you can do it.
Mr. Panish: I want you to do it.
Ms. Stebbins: I think I should do it, your honor.
Judge: If I do it, you two get together --
Mr. Panish: Well, you made the statement, your honor.
Judge: Yeah. What I'm saying is, you can get together, do something you can agree on, and I'll read it to the
jury.
Mr. Panish: Well, I want you to correct the improper statement that you made to the jury. That was an
improper comment on the evidence by the court.
Judge: It wasn't an improper comment on the evidence. It was an assumption that it was a regulation.

Mr. Panish: Because you misled.

Judge: Nobody corrected me that it wasn't a regulation.
Mr. Panish: I did. I did. I said it was not.
Judge: You objected.
Mr. Panish: No.
Judge: You didn't say it wasn't a regulation.
Mr. Panish: Yes, I did.
Judge: You said it was hearsay.
Mr. Panish: No, no, no. I did say it's not a regulation, there's no foundation for it whatsoever. If you
continue reading --
Ms. Stebbins: For the record we just looked at, your honor, you said it was the law, and I said it was the
official policy on the EEOC Web site.
Mr. Panish: It is not.
Ms. Stebbins: I should have said, "unofficial policy on the EEOC Web site." I'm happy to correct that, your
honor. If plaintiffs believe it must be you that correct that, that's fine. I'm also happy to build it into the cross-
examination, your honor, you know, "Ms. Seawright, yesterday we were talking about a page from the EEOC
Web site. To be clear, that's not a law, that's just informal advice the EEOC puts out, right?" and go from there.
Judge: Either way. But if you want me to do it, I suggest you get together and put it in writing, and I'll read it
to the jury. That way you're both satisfied with --
Mr. Panish: It's not even a policy. That's the point. Let them read --
Mr. Boyle: Your honor, just because there was -- counsel just said that they didn't ask about lawsuits. I just
want to read for the record --
Ms. Stebbins: I didn't say that. Her honor --
Judge: I said I didn't remember what was said about lawsuits.
Mr. Boyle: Okay. I'm sorry. Okay. So you did ask about -- so on page 9305, question -- this is going to
come up in our redirect, so this is why I'm bringing this up.
Question: "for instance, the EEOC Has filed lawsuits against companies for conducting credit checks
on employee candidates?" answer: "I've heard about some cases that have been filed on the basis of
that."
And then that's where it all led into the policies. So those lawsuits are going to need to be explored.
Mr. Panish: And I did say --

Judge: Let me say this: I don't want to get too far afield, if you start talking about other lawsuits and what's
happening in other lawsuits --
Mr. Panish: She brought it up. I objected.
Judge: Look, you can cover this in a cursory manner --
Ms. Stebbins: Yeah.
Judge: -- but I don't want to spend time litigating other lawsuits in other files.
Mr. Panish: That's why I objected.
Judge: We can cover it in a cursory manner, but I don't want to get into details of any other lawsuits.
Ms. Stebbins: And, your honor, my only point is that credit checks are controversial. Companies can have
good reasons for not doing them, and the EEOC Has weighed in -- I think the earliest case was 1971, in which
they sought to challenge the practice of credit checks. Now it has gone back and forth. There's been numerous
hearings before the EEOC There's currently proposals --
Judge: You want to get into that with her?
Ms. Stebbins: Not in great detail, your honor.
Mr. Panish: She already did. Now we're past this case. AEG . Never claimed this, your honor.
Ms. Stebbins: That's right.
Mr. Panish: They never claimed that that was the reason they didn't do it.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, our --
Mr. Panish: So now they're going to come in and raise new things, which was not a basis for not doing it. It
has no relevance to this proceeding, it's hearsay, it's not a policy, it's an enforcement guideline. Now the jury is
going to have to be explained, what is an enforcement guideline. It's 352. You yourself were misled by this
whole area, and she spent extensive time on it over my objection.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, this is hardly new. The extensive discovery requests, which was the subject of
testimony of our own HR Person, who was cross-examined at length over two days of deposition. This is not
the first time they've heard about the concept of job-relatedness. I don't plan on going deep. I plan to deal with
it in a cursory manner just to establish, your honor, that credit checks are controversial. Ms. Seawright may
recommend them in this instance, but that they do have to be job-related and that there could be good reasons
why companies don't do credit checks on everyone. That's about as far as I intend to go with it.
Judge: Here's a question: when did that guideline or --
Mr. Panish: 2010.
Judge: When did it come into effect?
Mr. Panish: 2010, according to their papers.

Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, we can't actually determine, because the web site was remodeled in 2010. We
know it's been on the web site since 2010. But as our brief makes clear, it's not a new policy. For instance, they
were giving guidance letters on this issue in 2005, they conducted a lengthy series of hearings in 2007 in which
there was testimony that credit checks have no rational basis and are discriminatory. They filed a lawsuit going
back to 1971 on the issue. Again, your honor, the idea is not to say credit checks are bad or that they have a
disparate impact. It's to say the EEOC Has had issues with credit checks, and there could be a good reason why
a company might not choose to have them in every -- might be careful in choosing when or not to use credit
checks.
Mr. Panish: Mr. Trell -- I'm sorry. Go ahead.
Ms. Stebbins: That's fair cross-examination, your honor. The witness has said that she is familiar with this
particular document in question, that she's aware of where it's located on the EEOC Web site, which she links
to from her home page. I think it is more than fair cross-examination, and I don't intend to spend
A. Lot of time on it. I had about three more questions at the time we were interrupted.
Mr. Panish: Well, your honor, Mr. Trell was on the stand six days, never mentioned it, as the person most
knowledgeable at human resources at AEG and the reasons they did or didn't do anything. Okay. So now we're
on this collateral matter which, over my objection, you've allowed them to do it. There's been misstatements to
this jury. I would like the court to say that this is not
A. Law, this is not a regulation, it's not appropriate for Judicial Notice --
Judge: Okay. Well --
Ms. Stebbins: And, your honor --
Mr. Boyle: To clear something up, too, counsel just said, I think, that Rhoma Young, their expert, talked
about this in her deposition. Not mentioned once in their entire deposition. That document was never
referenced in her deposition. They just made this up during the direct of Ms. Seawright.
Ms. Stebbins: We did not use this document on Ms. Young's deposition. We certainly discussed the policy,
the job-relatedness, EEOC., the fact that they filed a lawsuit, all of that.
Judge: Right now all I want you to do is, if you want me to say something to the jury, get together, put your
heads together, and come up with something that I can say to the jury. I'll get off the bench, you come up with
something, I'll read it to the jury, and you can continue with your examination.
Ms. Stebbins: Thank you, your honor.
Mr. Panish: And I'm going to clean it up when I get up there.
Judge: Okay. I typed your instruction. I noticed that it missed the word "commission," so I typed that in.
There were references to the equal employment opportunity commission document. There's a dispute on the
last paragraph there?
Mr. Panish: Right. The bracketed part is what they want, and I objected. I don't think it's coming into
evidence at any time, so --
Judge: Is there some belief it's going to come into evidence?

Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, there's a possibility that it will come into evidence with the defense expert, Rhoma
Young, down the line. The only reason to add these three words is because at this point you're making a
determination that it's not admissible at this time, not that it wouldn't become admissible in the defendants' case.
Judge: Even if she relied on it, those things don't typically come into evidence. The opinions come into
evidence, but not all the documents supporting the opinions do.
Ms. Stebbins: There are ways they do come into evidence.
Judge: Are you calling the EEOC?
Mr. Panish: They won't even testify. There's
A. Regulation against them testifying.
Ms. Stebbins: I guess my point is that all evidentiary rulings are temporal, they're made at the time. I don't
think there's any harm in adding that language, because it's accurate, and it's just explaining to the jurors what
you're doing with it now, because they are going to then go back and use it. So that way it will be clear to the
jury that it's not coming into evidence today even if I'm talking about it.
Mr. Panish: Your honor, there's --
Judge: Oh, the witness needs to leave the courtroom.
Mr. Panish: Okay. I thought we were done.
Judge: Madam, you need to step out. (Ms. Seawright exited the courtroom.)
Mr. Panish: There's no basis that it ever could come in, and you already decided that. Why do we say, "at
this time"? That just makes the jury think it's going to come in. There's no basis whatsoever for it to come into
evidence.
Judge: Doesn't sound like there's any basis right now that it's going to come in.
Mr. Panish: There's none.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, there may not be a basis with this witness --
Mr. Panish: For any.
Ms. Stebbins: But it may come into play with another witness. Maybe someone relied on this document or --
Judge: Even if they do --
Mr. Panish: It doesn't come in.
Judge: -- the documents and the text and the treatises don't come in themselves, it's the opinions.
Ms. Stebbins: As a general matter, that's correct, your honor. But there are times when particular documents
are admitted for the effect they had on the listener or various other things. My point is, your honor, there's no
reason not to add the words in the sense of, I don't think it hurts anything --

Mr. Panish: Well, it --

Ms. Stebbins: -- and I think it's clear that the court is just making a present ruling, not a ruling for all time,
which I don't understand it to be a ruling for all time.
Judge: Well, wait a minute. No evidentiary rulings are. The court can always reconsider them.
Mr. Putnam: That's the point.
Mr. Boyle: No.
Mr. Panish: "the document has not been admitted into evidence."
Ms. Stebbins: That's fine.
Mr. Panish: There's no basis for it ever to be admitted, your honor. You know that. It's a charade.
Ms. Stebbins: It's not a charade, your honor.
Mr. Panish: There's no basis to admit a hearsay document like that at any time.
Judge: Okay.
Mr. Panish: And then the rest about the law, you're not instructing on the law in this. That's why we're on a
collateral issue. You see how we've gotten to this collateral issue, and now you're telling the jury you're going
to instruct them about the law on this collateral evidence?
Judge: "at the close of evidence, I will instruct you on the law in the matter."
Mr. Panish: Why don't you say, "the law that applies to this case"?
Ms. Stebbins: That's fine.
Judge: "on the law," okay, "that applies to this case."
Mr. Putnam: That's fine.
Ms. Stebbins: Okay. I think any time the court comments on the law, it's a good idea to remind them you're
instructing them at the end.
Judge: Okay. And I'll print out a copy for you --
Mr. Putnam: Thank you, your honor.
Judge: -- and we'll be ready to go.
Ms. Stebbins: Sounds good.
(brief pause in the proceedings.)

*****(the jury entered the courtroom at 11:06 a.m.)

Judge: Okay. Before we get started, I have a jury instruction to read: "ladies and gentlemen, yesterday there
were references to an equal employment opportunity commission document. The court mistakenly referred to it
as a law. It is not a law or a regulation, rather, it is a guideline for enforcement by the EEOC. The document
has not been admitted into evidence. At the close of evidence, I will instruct you on the law that applies to this
case." okay. You may continue.
Ms. Stebbins: Thank you, your honor.
Jean Seawright, recalled as a witness by the plaintiffs, was previously sworn and testified as follows:
cross-examination (resumed) by Ms. Stebbins:
Q. Good morning, Ms. Seawright.
A. Good morning.
Q. So let's start off with what the court was just talking about, which is the EEOC Guideline that we were
discussing yesterday, okay?
A. Okay.
Q. And you say you were familiar with that document, right?
A. Yes.

Q. And you're aware of its placement on the EEOC's web site, which is, you can click on it, and at that point it
says, "prohibited practices," and it lists a number of prohibited practices and explains what's allowed and not
allowed, and provides guidance on that issue, right?
A. Not precisely how to get to it in that way.
Q. Right. But you are aware that the EEOC's policies are -- or rather, their guidelines, let's call it guidelines --
generally should be avoided because of the potential for adverse impact, and that exceptions exist if the
employer can show that such information is essential to a particular job in question, right?
A. If that's the document that you referred to yesterday that I saw, I'm familiar with that.
Q. And that's based on title 7 of the civil rights act which requires that any employment test or background
check be job-related and consistent with business necessity, correct?
A. No. Title 7 requires that employers not discriminate. That's the essence of title 7. You can't discriminate
based on protected classes.
Q. Fair enough. And if a particular practice is shown to have a disparate impact, then the way that you defend
it is showing its job-related and consistent with business necessity, right?
A. That's one way, yes.
Q. And the EEOC Guidelines pertaining to pre-employment inquiries of all types say that decisions have to be
made on the basis of, pre-employment inquiries have to be job-related and consistent with business necessity,
right?
A. I would have to see that to know what you're referring to there.
Q. I'm quoting your deposition, actually. Shall we play it, or do you agree with that?
A. Can you read it again?
Q. Sure. "there are EEOC Guidelines that pertain to pre-employment inquiries of all types, and notifying
employers that decisions made on the basis of pre-employment inquiries have to be job-related and consistent
with business necessity."
A. Yes. Didn't sound like any EEOC, written.
Q. Yeah. I think it's a Seawright quote.
A. Yes.
Q. I'm just asking you if you agree, in general, that's true with credit checks, as well as other background
checks, right?
A. It's true of employment practices.
Q. Including credit checks?
A. Including pre-employment -- pre-hire practices, which may include that, yes.

Q. Correct. And if you're advising a company on their pre-hire practices, you would advise them that any
credit checks conducted needs to be job-related, consistent with business necessity, and that the EEOC Had
advised to use them only when they're really necessary to the position, right?
A. I advise clients to ensure that the pre-hire practices, including credit checks or background checks, are job-
related and consistent with business necessity.
Q. And as we talked about yesterday, you're not aware of any studies whatsoever that suggest there's a
relationship between a physician's competence and a physician's debt or even judgments against a physician,
right?
A. I am not.
Q. And any studies relating to any profession that suggests that debt or judgments against a person relating to
debt makes someone more or less likely to commit a crime?
A. I have seen some studies addressing fraudulent acts in the workplace over the years that have identified
certain behaviors that can lend themselves towards fraudulent acts.
Q. None of those studies found causation, though? Some sound correlation relating to fraud?
A. I wouldn't know, as I sit here today. I would have to go back and identify those and find those.
Q. And there's been no study whatsoever, that you're aware of, that show an association between debt and
manslaughter, right?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. No studies that show a relationship between debt and medical malpractice?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Now, you reviewed the judgments that plaintiffs provided you that were put in against Dr. Murray in this
case, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Or I shouldn't say "in this case," but plaintiffs provided you in this case some judgments that had been
entered against Dr. Murray relating to his debt, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So you're aware that Dr. Murray had debt for quite some time?
A. You have to define "quite some time." and I'd have to have the information in front of me to just
characterize that properly.
Q. So you're not sure, as you sit here today, how old the judgments were?
A. I don't recall the exact date, dates.
Q. Are you aware that at least some of them went back to 1992?

A. That may be the case, but I don't have those dates committed to memory. I'm sorry.
Q. And as we established yesterday, you don't know whether or not Dr. Murray, despite having debt for all
those years, had ever done anything bad, medically?
Mr. Panish: We've been through this. Asked and answered yesterday.
Judge: Overruled.
A: could you ask again? I'm sorry.
Q. sure. You're not aware of Dr. Murray's history of treating patients?
A. I'm not.
Q. So you have no idea whether, despite having financial troubles for quite some time, he had ever harmed a
patient before?
A. I have no knowledge of that.
Q. And you didn't think it was important to know in assessing the risk that Dr. Murray posed in this case?
A. Well, once again, I assessed the credit history and the financial status first. And once I came to my
conclusions, it wasn't necessary to assess anything further.
Q. You're aware that a large portion of Dr. Murray's debt related to default of student loans, right?
A. A portion of it related to that.
Q. Are you familiar with what percentage of student loans are actually repaid on time?
A. No, I'm not.
Q. You didn't consider that important to your analysis?
A. No, it was not.
Q. And you're aware from Detective Martinez's statement that he also had a potential foreclosure on his house?
It hadn't actually gone into foreclosure, but there was some behind payments to the house?
A. I'm aware that he was delinquent by 180 days on his mortgage payments.
Q. You're aware he lived in Las Vegas, right?
A. I believe that's where he was located.
Q. Do you have any idea what the rate of foreclosures was in Nevada in 2009?
A. No, I don't.

Q. Did you consider that important to your analysis?

A. No.
Q. So it didn't matter to you whether Dr. Murray's financial situation in 2007 -- or 2009 was a relatively rare
one or a relatively common one?
A. Well, I'm not sure what "rare" or "common," how you would define that.
Q. Well, you determined that having substantial debt, substantial unpaid debts, disqualified him for the
position, correct?
A. In this particular position, yes.
Q. And you didn't think, in making that determination, it was necessary to know whether it was common or
uncommon in 2009 for a person to have adverse judgments or substantial financial problems?
A. No. That was not a factor.
Q. Now, I wanted to ask you briefly about something that you said yesterday that caught my attention, which
is the reason why you believe background checks, in general, are necessary. And you said that: "it's because
you're putting someone in a place of trust with your business and your customers and your clients." do you
recall that?
A. I do.
Q. But that wasn't the case here with Dr. Murray, was it?
A. Oh, yes, it was.
Q. Well, Dr. Murray wasn't being placed in charge of AEG Lives' business, was he?
A. He was certainly a large part of the success of the "This Is It" tour by rendering care to Michael Jackson,
the artist.
Q. But he wasn't being placed in charge of AEG Lives' business?
A. He was -- in the sense he had a lot of responsibility over the artist who was the key component to the tour.
Q. So you think providing medical care to his long-term patient made him responsible for AEG Lives'
business?
A. I'm sorry. Could you ask that again?
Q. Sure. You think providing medical care to his long-term patient made him responsible for AEG Lives'
business?
A. I think that
Mr. Panish: Just object. Vague as to "long-term patient."

Judge: Assumes facts not in evidence.

Mr. Panish: Right. That, too.
Judge: Sustained.
Q. Did you review evidence in this case showing that Dr. Murray had been treating Mr. Jackson for at least
three years?
A. I don't recall the time frame that he had treated him. I saw evidence that he had treated him in the past, but
I don't recall coming to any conclusions about the length of time.
Q. Well, I'll represent to you that plaintiffs' counsel said in opening statement that he had been treating him
since 2006. So I want you to assume that's true for the purpose of this question, okay?
A. Okay.
Q. So assuming he had been treating him since 2006, is it your testimony that continuing to treat him made
him -- Dr. Murray continuing to treat Mr. Jackson made Dr. Murray responsible for AEG Lives' business?
A. Dr. Murray was responsible for providing medical care to the artist who was the primary component in the
tour, and that was his responsibility. So I see that as directly related to being responsible for that particular
project and tour, so therefore the business in that sense.
Q. So you think contributing to one tour makes someone responsible for AEG Lives' business?
A. For this particular aspect of its business. This tour.
Q. Dr. Murray wasn't going to be interacting with AEG Live customers, was he?
A. I have no idea of that.
Q. And he wasn't going to be interacting with AEG Live clients, other than his long-term patient, Mr. Jackson,
right?
Mr. Panish: Same objection to the term of "long," the use of the term "long-term."
Q. We'll make the same assumption of three years.
Mr. Panish: That's okay.
Judge: If you want to cast it as an assumption --
Ms. Stebbins: Yes.
Q. I want you to assume for purposes of all of these questions that there is and will be evidence that Dr.
Murray treated Mr. Jackson for three years.

A. Okay.
Q. So assuming that's true, AEG live wasn't putting Dr. Murray in contact with any of its other clients, correct?
A. I didn't evaluate the case to determine that.
Q. You said that was part of the reason for the background check, right?
A. That can be a reason for a background check.
Q. So let me ask you something differently. Does the fact that Mr. Jackson had a long-term relationship --
again, assuming a three-year relationship -- weigh in on your analysis at all?
A. It had no bearing on it, no.
Q. You didn't consider it remotely important?
A. I did not.
Q. Even though Dr. Murray wasn't being hired as a permanent AEG live employee?
A. It did not have an impact on my opinion.
Q. And even though the only role that Dr. Murray was going to have at all was to continue treating Mr.
Jackson at Mr. Jackson's request and expense?
A. Did not have a bearing. I was, again, looking at it from the standpoint of what the position was with regard
to the "This Is It" tour.
Q. But isn't that part of what the position is?
A. Isn't what part of that?
Mr. Panish: Objection, vague as to "what."
Judge: Sustained.
Q. isn't the fact that Mr. Jackson personally requested Dr. Murray and was going to pay him part of what the
position is in this case?
Mr. Panish: I'm going to object, then, on that "was going to pay him" part of the question.
Judge: Do you understand the question?
A: I need to hear it again. I'm sorry.
Judge: I'm having a hard time understanding your question.

Q. let's back up. You reviewed the AEG Live/Dr. Murray draft agreement, correct?
A. The independent contractor agreement? Yes.
Q. So you're aware that that draft agreement states that Dr. Murray was going to be engaged, if at all, at Mr.
Jackson's request and expense, right?
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't consider that factor at all relevant to your analysis?
A. It was akin to a referral, again.
A. Referral from the artist, so --
Q. That actually brings me to my next point, is I was going to look at this board you brought up yesterday.
A. Okay.
Q. Let's see if I can put this thing up without it falling down.
Ms. Stebbins: Can everybody see that?
Q. Ms. Seawright, if you need to get up to see it --
A. That's okay. I can get up if I need to.
Q. Okay. Ms. Seawright, you talked about this exhibit yesterday, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is an exhibit that you're familiar with because you reviewed Mr. Trell's testimony here in this
courtroom?
A. I reviewed his testimony, didn't review it here in this courtroom.
Q. You reviewed the testimony he gave here in the courtroom?
A. What do you mean, "reviewed it"? We talked about it.
Q. What I mean is, you reviewed Mr. Trell's trial testimony?
A. Oh, yes. Okay. Yes. Sorry. I'm with you.
Q. Trying to phrase this clearly.
A. Okay. Sorry.
Q. So you're aware that this was kind of a demonstrative chart that he used, right?

A. Yes.
Q. And that it included not only how employees were found, but also what checks were run on them, and then
where the obligations were laid out as between the person who was engaged and the person who was doing the
hiring?
A. I don't know if it was characterized quite that way.
Q. You just don't recall?
A. I don't recall precisely how it was characterized.
Q. Well, it's not important. I actually just want to ask about a couple things on the chart. You said yesterday
that the first three things on the right-hand side were just in the nature of referrals, correct?
A. For the most part, yes, that's right.
Q. And that you would still have to do all of the same background checks that you would recommend on the
left-hand side of the column, even if the three things on the right-hand side were true, right?
A. Again, depending on the position, yes.
Q. And I wanted to ask about that, particularly the first one. Is it your testimony that a previous working
relationship with AEG live has no effect on whether or not you need to conduct a background check on
someone?
A. Umm, it has -- it's a consideration. You would go back, and you would look at whatever information was
available. But in a lot of cases, if a company doesn't keep good records or has no records, then it would have no
bearing on that whatsoever. If there are good personnel files, good records, good documentation, good
information, then it would be like getting a reference check from another employer, only you had it right at your
fingertips.
Q. Let's say, for example, that AEG live had used a given independent contractor on hundreds of tours. Would
you really need to do any further diligence to check out that person to see if they were a good independent
contractor?
A. In my opinion, yes.
Q. So in your opinion -- let's go back to the painter again from yesterday. You hire a painter to paint your
office, or a painting company.
A. Okay.
Q. And then a year later, you need to paint the office again. Do you -- and the painter did a good job the first
time. Wouldn't you just go back to the same painter?
A. I may or may not. It depends on a lot of factors.
Q. Is it your testimony that you would need to conduct full diligence on the painter you already worked with?

A. It would depend on the circumstances. And that -- again, it depends on the position. I think we have to be
very careful here, because a painter is very different from a doctor rendering medical care to an artist on a tour
like this, so --
Q. Well, let's talk doctors. If you've been going to a doctor for 20 years, do you need to check their credentials
before you visit them again?
A. I may or may not check their credentials. It depends on the circumstances. But that's not an employment
setting, so that's very different as well.
Q. I'm just trying to figure out whether a long-term relationship has any bearing on the need to check someone
else.
A. The bearing that it has is that you may have some historical knowledge about how they performed.
Q. And that historical knowledge may, in some instances, negate any need for a more thorough background
check?
A. It may determine that you're not going to hire them again because they left under poor circumstances, or
they did a bad job. So in that sense you'd say, "well, we pulled the file, and we saw how they performed last
time, and we're just not going to work with them again."
Q. And the opposite might be true, too, right?
A. It may be.
Q. You've worked with them dozens of times, they've always done a good job, so we can use them again
without checking their credentials?
A. So we can proceed in the process. That is the next decision you could make. You could say, you know, we
haven't ruled them out because they performed for us last time, but it's been a year, a couple years, so you go
through the process.
Q. What if it hasn't been a couple years?
A. You may still go through the process.
Q. But you wouldn't necessarily, right?
A. You probably would, yes. You're rehiring. And so my recommendation has always been, when you're
rehiring, it's a whole new employment period.
Q. What if someone had been working with someone for three years continuously? Would there be at that
point need to check them out?
A. A continued employee?
Q. Continued relationship.
A. There is something called "ongoing monitoring" now with background checks, and that's something that
we've been recommending that offers, where you have people working for you, but you periodically revisit to
make sure things like their driver's license hasn't been suspended, that they have not had any criminal conduct in

the time period they're working for you. So depending on the circumstances, it may be something that I do
recommend.
Q. Let's say that Michael Jackson had engaged Dr. Murray personally for three years, and Michael Jackson
was going to continue to engage Dr. Murray for the "This Is It" tour. At that point, would Michael Jackson
need to do diligence on his own long-term doctor?
A. That would be up to him, and I would have to evaluate the totality of those circumstances, and the
arrangement in order to answer that. I have no opinion on that right now.
Q. You can't give me an answer on that?
A. Not possibly, without evaluating what the arrangement would be and the circumstances, just like we would
do with any position. I would have to go through the same process to give you an opinion on that.
Q. Let me ask you something different. In order to determine what checks should be run, and how, is there
any kind of standard that you can point me to to identify what checks should be run?
A. It's evaluating the knowledge, skills, abilities of the position, the environment. All of the different elements
of the job.
Q. And it's based -- it's subjective?
A. It's commonly known in the HR Industry how you develop a job description and look at the different
aspects and elements of a job.
Q. And -- but in determining what specific processes to run, you do that yourself, correct?
A. Every employer does that themselves, whether you're EEOC Or anybody else.
Q. And different people in the HR Field might differ as to what should be done in a given instance?
A. They may.
Q. Now, you talked yesterday about this chart, and you said that, in your view, it was inappropriate to have
different processes for retaining independent contractors than for hiring employees, right?
A. I don't recall precisely how I said it, so I'd probably want to see exactly how I said that.
Q. Well, do you disagree with that statement, ma'am?
A. Well, I'd have to see what I said, and how I couched it.
Q. Forget what you said yesterday. I'm asking you today, do you think it is ever appropriate for a company to
have different processes for engaging employees and engaging independent contractors?
A. Depends on the position.
Q. So for some positions, it's okay, and some positions, it's not?
A. It depends on the position and what the risk factors are associated with the position.

Q. It's not really quite the answer. I understand you're saying it depends on the position.
Mr. Panish: Excuse me, your honor. Move to strike. Counsel is arguing with the witness.
Judge: Argumentative. Sustained.
Q. Ms. Seawright, are there ever circumstances where it is appropriate for a company to have established
policies, one for employees and one for the retention of independent contractors?
A. It would depend on the nature of those policies. I'm not sure -- with regard to what?
Q. So is it, "yes, it's okay sometimes"?
A. It depends on the policies. If I'm talking about pay, for example.
Q. Is it ever appropriate for a company to have different background check policies for employees and
independent contractors?
A. That, in my opinion, again, should be based on the position. And so there may be differences based on the
position and the duties associated with that position.
Q. So your opinion is that it should be based on the position and not based on the status of the employee as an
employee or independent contractor?
A. The label does not make a difference.
Q. So to you, the label does not make a difference?
A. The label does not make a difference.
Q. Now, Ms. Seawright, you've given expert testimony in other cases, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. For instance, in 2011, you gave an expert report for the case of Keen vs. Robertson?
A. I don't know the date, but I did work on that case, yes.
Q. And do you recall your report in that case?
A. I recall that I wrote a report in that case.
Q. Do you recall that in that case, you cited a survey conducted by S.H.R.M. On the frequency of people -- of
companies conducting criminal background checks on job candidates?
A. I may have.
Q. And that's the kind of survey you rely upon at times in your profession, correct?

A. It depends on the circumstances. Again, I think I mentioned that I do look at the S.H.R.M. Surveys, and I
often get a question about, you know, a certain practice and rates of pay, and what have you, and I will
reference those surveys from time to time.
Q. And in fact, in this 2011 report, you cited the S.H.R.M. Background check survey as evidence that:
"conducting criminal background checks is a commonly accepted HR Practice utilized to minimize hiring
risks." right?
A. I'd have to see it, but that does sound familiar.
Q. Are you doubting that you said it? I can show it to you, if you want.
A. It depends. If you're going to ask me more about it, I would indeed like to see it.
Q. I'm just asking if you recall citing the survey for that proposition.
A. I recall the general context, but -- I don't want to doubt you. I feel that I did, but I always like to be certain.
I don't even know the date of the survey or what -- I want to be accurate with that.
Q. Let me give it to you just so there's no confusion.
A. Okay.
Q. I'm not going to ask very many questions about it, but just so we're all on the same page.
A. Appreciate that. Thank you.
Q. If you can pass a copy up to her honor.
A. Sure.
Q. And if you just want to turn to page 3, Ms. Seawright. You see on paragraph 1, you cited the S.H.R.M.
Survey?
Mr. Panish: Page 3?
Ms. Stebbins: Page 3, and also I'm looking for another page.
Mr. Panish: A or b?
Ms. Stebbins: I'm sorry. What?
Mr. Panish: There's a paragraph a and a paragraph b.
Ms. Stebbins: It's paragraph 1. Ms. Seawright: paragraph 1 down at the bottom?
Ms. Stebbins: Yes.
Mr. Panish: Doesn't say anything about that. Ms. Seawright: I don't see it cited there.

Ms. Stebbins: Give me a second. You know what? I think I gave you the wrong folder. That can explain
why you can't find it. This is the one I should be referring to.
Judge: Give you this one back so you can put it in the right folder.
Q. Apologies for the confusion, Ms. Seawright. They were right next to each other in my box. Now I think
we're on page 3. And by page 3, I mean page 3 of the report, not page 3 of the document.
A. Page 3 of the report. Okay.
Mr. Panish: I think it's also page 3 of the document. Ms. Seawright: I think --
Ms. Stebbins: I have "page 3 of 17" and "page 4 of 18." so it's the page that says, "page 4 of 18" on the top
right-hand column.
Mr. Panish: It says, "3." Ms. Seawright: I see. Okay.
Q. and paragraph 1, the second full paragraph under that section?
A. Yes. I see that. I see the paragraph here. And what is your question with regard to it?
Q. Just, do you recall citing a survey conducted by the society for human resource management on the
frequency of criminal background checks on job candidates?
A. Yes.
Q. And concluding from that survey that: "conducting criminal background checks is a commonly accepted
HR Practice utilized to minimize hiring risks"?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That's all I think we need from that.
A. Okay.
Q. You didn't cite any S.H.R.M. Surveys yesterday in your direct examination, did you?
A. I don't recall, but I don't believe so.
Q. You were asked, however, by Mr. Panish about statistics, right?
A. I may have been. You'll have to remind me of the question, if I was.
Q. Do you recall being asked, "do statistics matter to you in your opinions in this case?"
A. I actually don't recall that precise question.

Q. Do you recall discussing some survey data from S.H.R.M. And taking issue with the sample size or
discussing certain categories on that survey?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I'd like to look at that survey --
A. Okay.
Q. -- which is a survey that -- not the criminal background survey you cited in your report, but a survey on
credit checks, correct?
Mr. Panish: Well, she didn't rely or consider these for her opinions. No foundation.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, she did consider it for her opinions. Also been established that it's similar to a
survey that she relied upon in another context, and therefore it's acceptable under 721(b) as foundation for
cross-examination.
Judge: How did it come in, in your direct?
Mr. Panish: I asked her if she relied or considered it, and she said, "no."
Ms. Stebbins: Also then proceeded to ask her questions about it, particularly --
Judge: Okay. Let's go to sidebar.
*****(the following proceeding was heard at sidebar:)
Ms. Stebbins: So, your honor --
Judge: Wait, wait, wait. Close the door.
Ms. Stebbins: Here's what was asked yesterday.
Mr. Panish: What page and line?
Ms. Stebbins: Starting at page -- this is from her deposition, first of all. Page 259, lines 10 through 11:
question: "and you have mentioned that you rely on articles and surveys published by S.H.R.M. In your
field?" and "was that a 'yes'?" "sorry."
answer: "yes."
question: "page 259 of her deposition, lines 20 to 23: 'and do some of those articles relate to criminal
background screenings, credit checks?
'Answer: "surveys relate to that and possibly some articles, yes."

at trial yesterday, Mr. Panish asked her, at page 9264, lines -- actually, this might be me. Lines 15
through 24:
question: "do you respect S.H.R.M.?"
answer: "respect in what sense?"
question: "respect them as an entity that provides a valuable service in the human resources industry."
answer: "I think they do provide some valuable resources in the industry."
question: "and you relied on publications that they've issued on cases you've done before?"
answer: "I have used their surveys to reference in certain circumstances."
Mr. Panish also asked her about her deposition
Judge: Okay. Was this at trial?
Mr. Panish: Wait a minute.
Ms. Stebbins: This was at trial yesterday.
Judge: Okay.
Ms. Stebbins: Page 9190, lines 13 through 20:
Question: "now, Ms. Bina was questioning you in the deposition about statistics, what percentage of
employers do background checks in hiring people for high risk. Are there such statistics available for
hiring at high-risk jobs?"
answer: "there's not a specific survey that I'm aware of that evaluates that in particular." also, page
9235:
question: "okay. All right. Now, at your deposition in this case, Ms. Bina was questioning you about --
what was it called? -- some trade publication. Do you remember that?"
answer: "yes."
question: "and she was questioning you about the percentage of the people that do health -- that do
background checks or credit checks, I think. "do you remember that?"
answer: "I do, yes."
Question "is that information at all relevant to your opinions in this case?"
answer: "it's information about the percentages of employers that conduct background checks and credit
checks on employees."
question: "what was she referring to? Is that a worldwide or a nationwide survey?"
answer: "it was a survey of members of a national trade association in the field of human resources."
question: "and did that -- is that something that's reliable and authoritative in your industry?"

answer: "I wouldn't call it authoritative. It is the only national association in the HR Industry, so they
have publications that I will refer to from time to time and use their survey data from time to time."
question: "all right. And Ms. Bina was questioning you, suggesting that only 2 or 3 percent of medical-
type people check credit. "do you remember those kinds of questions?"
answer: "I remember that statistic, yes."
question: "does that have anything to do with this case?"
answer: "well, the particular chart that she was showing was referring to showing the percentage of the
people who participated in that survey who had conducted credit checks, and I believe there were 158,
and that might not be quite right, but right in that range, and people responded to that question. "and of
that 158, 3 percent of them indicated that they did credit checks for employees in the health care-related
field. And so I noted in my deposition that that was a very small number, especially given the fact that
there are 700,000 health care facilities in the United States, and the number reflected in that survey was
just a smidgeon, far less than 1 percent of all health care facilities. "and what I didn't mention then, I'll
mention to you now, is that there's another percentage on that table that pertains to the percentage of
workers who work in people's homes, and that number is 30 percent. So 30 percent of the employers
who responded to that question indicated that they have a worker in the home working in a home
environment and that they conduct credit checks."
Your honor, she's clearly opened the door to questions on the survey. She testified about it extensively on direct
examination. She cited similar surveys in past expert reports. She didn't cite this one in this case because it
doesn't support her, even though she's admitted that they are the kind of things that she relied upon and that she
has cited them in other surveys.
Mr. Panish: First of all, under 721, she didn't rely on this for her opinion. What I was establishing --
because Ms. Bina brought this up in her deposition. There's no one to establish it's reliable or authoritative, and
she says it's not. That's the reason I brought it up. Under 721, it has to be established it's reliable or
authoritative, or she relied on it in this case, neither of which she did. What happened was, Ms. Bina brought it
up in the deposition. In the other case they brought up, they were talking about criminal background checks,
totally unrelated, in a different time frame and a different type of job. She didn't rely on this in this case, period.
And it's not authoritative, and there's no one to lay foundation for 721 to use this document. She can ask her
questions about that, but she can't use this document under 721(b). That's the same thing they tried to do with
that EEOC Document yesterday, and it's not appropriate under 721(b).
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, she does not need to rely on the survey, she merely needs to have considered it, or
it needs to be of the kind of material that she considers. She relied on an identical survey with the same sample
size, addressing criminal background checks in another case, or functionally identical survey. It's clearly the
kind of thing that she has relied upon in the past in her own value as an expert witness. She also, on direct
examination, testified extensively about a chart in the survey, testified wrongly about it. I'm entitled to show
her that chart and cross-examine her on it, your honor.
Judge: Well, what's curious, how was she so familiar with it if she didn't rely on it?
Mr. Panish: Because Ms. Bina brought it to the deposition and showed it to her. That's what I was trying to
bring out. She didn't bring it as her materials to consider. Ms. Bina brought it and showed it to her and then is
trying to use 721 without appropriate foundation. And the other study is not identical nor in any way similar.
Judge: The other study that she referred to was the criminal background check?

Mr. Panish: In another case.

Ms. Stebbins: Published by the same entity using the same methodology.
Mr. Panish: There's been no foundation of that, okay? So the reason that she knew -- I knew she was going
to try to do this -- was Ms. Bina brought it to the deposition and used it. That's how she was familiar with it. So
that means anytime you bring something to the deposition --
Ms. Stebbins: Yes.
Mr. Panish: -- then you can use it on 721. That's not the standard, your honor.
Judge: Well, I'm assuming she brings it to the deposition, and she would just say, "I know nothing on this, I
didn't rely on it, I have no information about this study."
Mr. Panish: She said she didn't rely on it, and it's not reliable or authoritative. How can you use it? Just
because you bring something to a deposition and show someone, does that mean that they considered it and it's
admissible for cross-examination? Absolutely not.
Judge: Did she say it was not authoritative?
Mr. Panish: Yes, she did.
Ms. Stebbins: She did yesterday, your honor, but after already relying on similar surveys and testifying on
direct examination about the contents of the survey in question. Let me finish.
Mr. Panish: I didn't say anything.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, 721 does not require that she relied on it, only that she considered it. She testified
on direct examination that she considered it and rejected it. That is fair cross-examination.
Mr. Putnam: Very fair.
Mr. Panish: It was only considered because she brought it to the deposition.
Judge: Yeah, but you brought it up.
Mr. Panish: Okay. Because she was going to do that.
Judge: Well --
Mr. Panish: No, your honor. So in other words --
Judge: So you put up the straw man so you could knock it down, basically. The clerk: Mr. Panish, they can
hear you outside with your screaming.
Judge: That's what happened.
Mr. Panish: I'm sorry.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor --

Mr. Panish: No, that's not what happened.

Judge: You brought it up because you realized she was going to do it, and you brought it up to knock it down.
I understand.
Mr. Panish: No, no, no. I brought it up to show she didn't consider it, because she was going to -- so what
you're saying is anytime the other lawyer brings something and shows it at a deposition, then the other side can
get it in under 721(b), and that's not what is the standard.
Mr. Putnam: And it's important that that's not what was said here. You made a determination on direct, you
asked her extensive questioning on this that you did not need to do. And just because something happens at
depo doesn't mean that it would necessarily happen at trial. You chose to ask all of these questions about it,
down to the size of the sampling, whether she relied on it, et cetera. As a result, not only has it been opened to
this one issue, but, in addition, for 721, you're allowed to use it even if you hadn't opened it.
Mr. Panish: It's absolutely not true.
Judge: Okay. I'll overrule your objection.
Mr. Panish: Well, it doesn't go into evidence.
Judge: The report itself? No.
Ms. Stebbins: Although, I am going to put it up just to cross-examine her on it, and --
Judge: No. You can ask her questions about it, but the report itself isn't going in.
Mr. Putnam: Doesn't go in.
Judge: So you can't put it up.
Mr. Putnam: On, you can't even put it up?
Judge: No.
*****(the following proceeding was heard in open court:)
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, may I approach?
Judge: Yes, you may.
Q. Ms. Seawright, I handed you a 2010 S.H.R.M. Survey called, "background checking, conducting credit
background checks." have you ever seen this document before?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And is this the document you were talking about yesterday with Mr. Panish that we discussed at your
deposition?

A. I don't recall if it was or not.

Q. Well, perhaps I can refresh your recollection. If you'd like to turn to page 5.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you recall discussing with Mr. Panish yesterday the numbers shown on the chart on this page?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. And let's talk about this survey a little bit more. This survey was a survey conducted by S.H.R.M.,
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And it had approximately 350 participants? I'll get the exact number here.
A. I see 312.
Q. We can go with 312. And this was a survey of human resources officers or professionals, and whether or
not they conducted credit checks in their organizations, right?
A. It's a survey of their membership.
Q. But the survey of the membership asked, "do you conduct credit checks? And if so, under what
circumstances", right?
A. It asked them a variety of questions about credit checks.
Q. And if we can turn to page 11, the largest percentage of responders here were in the health care and social
assistance industries, right?
A. 18 percent of 312. So 60-some businesses.
Q. So the majority -- the largest proportion were from that industry?
A. In this particular survey, yes.
Q. Let's turn to page 3. By the way, Ms. Seawright, do you know whether this survey has been cited by any
government agencies or organizations?
A. No, I don't know that.
Q. Okay. Turn to page 3.
A. Okay.
Q. And this question is: "does your organization, or an agency hired by your organization, conduct credit
background checks for any job candidates by reviewing the candidates' consumer reports?" right?
A. Yes.

Q. And that was the question that was asked of the survey participants?
A. Yes.
Q. And this survey was in 2010, correct?
A. It's published in 2010, so it was likely conducted in 2009.
Q. Around the same time that AEG live was doing the "This Is It" tour?
A. In 2009.
Q. And according to this chart on page 3, only 13 percent of respondents conducted credit checks on all job
candidates, right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And 47 percent conducted them on selective job candidates?
A. That is correct.
Q. And a full 40 percent conducted no kinds of credit checks whatsoever on any candidates?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's for employees, as well as -- that's for everyone they're hiring, right?
A. I'm not certain about that.
Q. Does it differentiate at all?
A. It does not. I believe it may use the term "employee."
Q. But in any event, the respondents on this survey, when asked about, "does your organization conduct credit
checks," a full 40 percent said, "no, we don't ever do it"?
A. They said, "no," and 60 percent said they do it on all or select.
Q. Right. And only 13 percent on all?
A. 13 percent on all, yes.
Q. And then turning to page 5, which is the chart we talked about yesterday --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- you testified that -- we talked at your deposition about the fact that only 3 percent of job candidates who
work in health care conducted credit checks in this survey?
A. That's what it says here, yes. In health care or with access to drugs.

Q. And then it provides examples, including "hospitals, nursing homes, clinics, pharmacies and rehabilitation
centers"?
A. Yes.
Q. So that means 97 percent of respondents did not conduct credit checks on those kinds of positions?
A. 97 percent of 158, because for this particular question, only 158 people responded.
Q. Right. Because the 40 percent of people who never conducted credit checks couldn't answer this question
because they didn't conduct credit checks on anyone?
A. That could be how they come up with 158. I'm not positive about that. It's the ones who conducted credit
checks on select candidates that they used.
Q. So that would be 47 percent of the total of respondents of the survey?
A. I don't think that number adds up exactly right, but I don't have my calculator, so --
Q. That's close. 158 is roughly half of 312?
A. Okay. All right. I can't disagree with that. Roughly.
Q. And the jury already knows my math is terrible, so --
A. So is mine, so --
Q. So that's probably as far as we're going to go there. So only 3 percent conducted background checks on
medical fields in this survey?
A. In the health care.
Q. And you also talked yesterday about the idea that you believed a background check was warranted for Dr.
Murray because he was working with children, correct?
A. I said that he was going into Michael Jackson's home where there would be children.
Q. Didn't you also say he would be treating Mr. Jackson's children?
A. No, I don't believe I said that.
Q. I thought you did. In any event, the next category, you would agree with me, only 3 percent of companies
conducted credit checks on job candidates who work with children, the elderly, the disabled, and other
vulnerable populations, right?
A. It does say that here, yes.
Q. You also talked about the idea that, in your view, Dr. Murray's position was high risk, right?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, that's a slight change from your deposition when you characterized it as both "high risk" and "safety
sensitive", correct?
A. I think I did refer to it both ways, yes.
Q. Do you still consider it a safety-sensitive position?
A. I do.
Q. Then let's look at the next category, which is only 5 percent of job candidates who were employed in safety-
sensitive positions conducted background checks, credit checks.
A. And that's, again, based on their definition of "safety sensitive" for the purposes of this survey.
Q. And that was something I was going to ask you. This survey defines "safety sensitive" differently than you
do, right?
A. Yes, it does. Part of my definition of safety sensitive, and the general, common understanding of safety
sensitive in HR., include things like this, but other elements as well.
Q. And in your 2011 report in the Keen case, you talked about the idea of high risk and safety sensitive, too,
right?
A. I may have. I don't know what language I used, but that was probably the general concept.
Q. You recall in those cases you cited the bureau of labor statistics for your definition? Support for your
definition?
A. I probably did, yes.
Q. Can you point me to any published authoritative source that provides support here for your definition of
"safety sensitive" and "high risk"?
A. In -- as I used it in my -- no, there's no authoritative cite on that, no.
Q. It's a determination that you made personally?
A. It's a commonly-understood, I don't want to say "definition," that's kind of a precise word, but commonly-
understood practice in HR
Q. But it's not the definition that this survey by the national society for human resource management used,
right?
A. Not in this particular survey, no, it's not. Just like they defined what health care was for them in the survey,
which may not include all definitions that someone else may use.
Q. The S.H.R.M. Folks define safety sensitive as "including operating heavy equipment and transportation",
right?
A. "et cetera."
Q. A far cry from providing medical care, right?

A. I don't know what the "et cetera" would have referred to there.
Q. Right. You'll agree with me, there's a separate category here for medical care?
A. There is "health care and access to drugs," yes.
Q. And you'll agree that operating heavy machinery and transportation are different than medical care?
A. Yes.
Q. Those are careers that provide greater risk, both to the employee and to the public?
A. What are?
Q. Operating heavy machinery and transportation.
A. More higher risk -- they provide what? I'm sorry.
Q. They put the employee at greater risk to the public.
A. Than what?
Q. Than medical care.
A. I'm not going to necessarily say that. It depends how you define "public" and what we're talking about.
Q. You think it's just as dangerous to go to the doctor as to operate heavy machinery?
A. Well, I could foresee some situations where, for example, in health care, they could put out some kind of
virus vaccination that would be very dangerous to the public. So I think there can be circumstances where it
can be very dangerous to the public.
Q. Okay. So medical care is dangerous, according to you?
Mr. Panish: Objection. Argumentative, your honor.
Judge: Overruled. Ms. Seawright: it may be.
Q. now, you also talked yesterday in response to a question by Mr. Panish -- and I want to make sure I quote
you properly -- you said that:
"in addition to the data that I brought up at your deposition that we've just talked about, there was
another part of this outline, or this chart, that referred to: "'30 percent of the employers who responded
to the question indicated that if they have a worker in the home, working in a home environment, that
they conduct credit checks.'"
Do you recall testifying to that yesterday?
A. Yes.

Q. That's not exactly what this says, is it, Ms. Seawright?

A. Well, no. I think it essentially says that.
Q. Well, let's read what it actually says. We agree that the 30 percent here is: "job candidates who have access
to company or other people's property or otherwise placed in a position of financial trust, e.g., information
technology, administrative services, et cetera."
A. I see that, uh-huh.
Q. So it's your testimony that Dr. Murray falls into that category?
A. I do believe he does, yes.
Q. So you think he falls into that category and not the category of people who work in health care?
A. Well, he was not working in a hospital or nursing home, a clinic, pharmacy or rehab center, in this
particular position.
Q. Well, you'd also agree that 70 percent of persons in that position also did not conduct credit checks?
A. In what position?
Q. The one that you've just referred to, the job candidates who have access to company or other property or
otherwise placed in a position of financial trust.
A. In this particular survey, out of 158 respondents, 30 percent do conduct credit background checks on people
who have access to other people's property.
Q. So 70 percent don't?
A. Correct.
Q. More than a two-thirds majority don't?
A. Correct.
Q. And then let's look at the top of this survey, because there's one category where -- only one category where
a majority of organizations conduct background checks, right?
A. A majority? Yes, that is right.
Q. And I should say credit checks, not background checks?
A. Credit checks, yes.
Q. And that's: "job candidates for positions with fiduciary and financial responsibility, e.g., handling cash,
banking, accounting, compliance and technology." right?
A. That is correct.

Q. And that's what AEG Live's policy was in this case, right? They conducted credit checks only on people
who have financial responsibility?
A. Well, the stated policy for Mr. Trell's deposition and the chart indicated that, but the employee handbook
listed another category called "security sensitive," so --
Q. And you're aware from Mr. Trell's testimony that that employee handbook covers a number of different
AEG .-related companies, and Mr. Trell testified that in this case of AEG live, it's only financial positions?
A. I recall reading that. And, again, it was unclear to me, because it was kind of mixed testimony, because in
some cases, certain policies seemed to apply, and others didn't. So I was a bit, you know -- it was still a
question in my mind, as far as which ones did and didn't. And I believe that policy was referenced in other
testimony as being one of AEG Live's -- part of their process.
Q. Are you aware of any testimony that AEG live conducted credit checks on anyone other than employees
they're hiring for financial positions?
A. I'm not aware of that, no. I'm just aware of what the handbook says for management, security-sensitive and
financial positions.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, move to strike everything after "I'm not aware of that, no" as nonresponsive.
Judge: Motion denied.
Ms. Stebbins: So there's no testimony, correct?
Mr. Panish: She answered the question.
Judge: She answered the question.
Q. now, Ms. Seawright, according to this survey, at least, the only category where a majority of candidates
surveyed in 2009 conducted any kind of credit check was for people working in finances, right?
A. The only category that they what? I'm sorry.
Q. That a majority of respondents conducted any kind of credit check, was for employees being hired in
positions with financial and fiduciary responsibility?
A. The majority of 158 respondents, yes.
Q. And in every other category, it was the minority that conducted the credit checks?
A. Yes.
Q. And for the one you cited yesterday, it was less than a third for people who have access to company or
other people's property, or otherwise placed in a position of financial trust?
A. It wasn't less than a third, it was a third.

Q. It was 30 percent?
A. There's my math again. 30 percent is less than
A. Third. True.
Q. And for persons who work in safety-sensitive positions, it was a tiny percentage?
A. As safety-sensitive as defined here, it was 5 percent.
Q. And health care, it was an even tinier percentage. 3 percent?
A. 3 percent, yes.
Ms. Stebbins: Time for the lunch break, your honor?
Lunch break
(The following proceedings were held in open court, in the presence of the jurors):
Continued cross examination by Jessica Stebbins:
Q. Ms. Seawright, did you have an opportunity to talk with plaintiffs' counsel over lunch?
A. Just chatting about hair and nails and things of that nature.
Q. Since this examination started, have you had a chance to meet with them at all about your opinions or your
testimony in this case?
A. Last night for about 20 minutes.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. They just asked me some questions on my opinions about the survey that we're talking about today.
Q. The SHRM survey we've just been talking about?
A. Yes.
Q. Anything else?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Let's go back to the survey, then.

A. Okay.
Q. One thing I realized I forgot to ask you before we left, I think we established that a majority of companies
that conducted credit checks did so on financial jobs, but not exactly what the percentage was that did so. Can
you turn back to page 5 for a moment?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you agree with me that of the companies that conducted background checks on some candidates,
91 percent conducted job candidates (sic) for positions with fiduciary and financial responsibility?
A. It's -- of the organizations that conducted background checks on select, 91 percent, yes, that's right.
Q. As opposed to the 40 percent that didn't conduct them at all, or the 13 percent that conducted them on every
job candidate?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, you testified yesterday that you had some issues with the survey size, the sample size of the survey,
right?
A. Not issues, but just pointing out to put it into context.
Q. We did talk for a moment about the expert witness report that you did that we were talking about earlier in
the keen case. Do you still have that up there?
A. I do.
Q. And we talked about in that case you cited a 2010 SHRM survey on criminal background checks, right?
A. Yes.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, may I approach?
Judge: Yes, you may.
Ms. Seawright: I just have one here. Did you want me to have one more to --
Ms. Stebbins: You're right. I should have given you two copies. There you are.
Ms. Seawright: Thank you.
Q. Ms. Seawright, is what I've just handed you that 2010 survey?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that survey on criminal background checks, you cited in the keen report as evidence that conducting
criminal background checks was a commonly accepted HR practice, right?

A. Yes.
Q. And you relied on it in the -- in the keen case?
A. In part, yes.
Q. And that survey was actually published on the same day as the one we've been discussing on background --
on credit checks, right?
A. It has the same date on the cover?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, it's a very similar looking survey, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Uses similar methodology?
A. I haven't studied that.
Mr. Panish: Your honor, she didn't review, consider, rely upon, in this case, this survey. It wasn't part of her
opinions.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, it was part of her opinions in a prior case. I'm just establishing something that was
questioned earlier, whether the two surveys were similar.
Judge: Who questioned her?
Mr. Panish: I didn't.
Ms. Stebbins: Plaintiffs' counsel did at sidebar.
Mr. Panish: No, I didn't. How could I question anyone at sidebar?
Judge: That's true.
Ms. Stebbins: Did not question the witness, your honor; but -- I'm not going to go deep into this survey, your
honor. The point is it's a survey that the witness has relied upon in a similar situation in a similar case.
Judge: But not in this case, though?
Ms. Stebbins: Right. But it's the kind of materials that an expert in her field generally relies upon and a kind
of survey she's found reliable before. That's all I'm establishing here.
Mr. Panish: It doesn't meet the requirements that we discussed.
Ms. Stebbins: I don't plan on introducing any material from inside this survey other than the sample size,
which is relevant.

Mr. Panish: I wanted to make an objection, if I could have a minute. It doesn't meet the requirements of
evidence code 721(b), relied upon, considered in this case, authoritative treatise, et cetera; so I object to counsel
getting into this.
Ms. Stebbins: It doesn't need to meet 721(b) if it's a document that the witness has relied upon in her own
professional career as an expert. It relates to her credibility, it relates to her testimony on cross examination.
Mr. Panish: It's hearsay. That's no exception whether somebody did something in a different case.
Judge: I'm going to sustain the objection. This is a document she relied on in another case.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, maybe we should have a brief sidebar. I can explain why it's relevant. I don't plan
on doing a lot with it.
Judge: No. I'm sustaining it. Let's just move on.
Ms. Stebbins: Let's turn back to your expert report, then. According to your report that you cited --
Mr. Panish: I'm going to object on this because this is another case and another unrelated-to-this-case expert
opinion in another case. Are we going to get into the facts and try that case now?
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, on direct examination, this witness testified that the 2010 survey on credit checks
was not authoritative or reliable because it had a small sample size and it was not the best survey that she could
have conducted. She went into some detail on that on direct examination. I'm laying a foundation that she has
relied upon in the past nearly identical surveys with similar sample sizes. It goes to her credibility and is
relevant and admissible evidence on cross examination.
Mr. Panish: It's not. It's hearsay, there's no foundation. Under 721(b), it's collateral, tangential, 352.
Ms. Stebbins: I'm not entering anything into evidence. I'm trying to establish what sample size the witness
considers reliable, which is a subject that the door was opened on on direct examination.
Judge: Well, this report, no. This is her own report, right?
Ms. Stebbins: Her own expert report in another case.
Judge: All right. That, I'll allow you to cross-examine on; but this other one, no.
Q. So in this prior expert report that you issued, you relied on the 2010 criminal background check survey,
right?
A. I cited the 2010 criminal background check survey.
Q. Right. And as we discussed earlier, you cited it as evidence that, quote, conducting criminal background
checks is a commonly accepted HR practice utilized to minimize hiring?
A. Yes.
Q. And according to your own expert report here, on page 4 --
Mr. Panish: "Here" meaning the other case?

Ms. Stebbins: I'm referring to her expert report, Mr. Panish.

Mr. Panish: Does it have an exhibit number?
Q. The 2010 criminal background check survey you relied upon, published the same day as the credit check
survey, had a survey of 347 employers, correct?
A. Where are you --
Q. I'm on page 4 of your may 16th, 2011 expert report.
A. Page 4 of -- your page 4, not my page 4.
Q. The 4 of 18.
A. Okay. Yes, I see that.
Q. So in that case, you relied on the survey of 347 employers conducted by SHRM regarding the commonness
of criminal background checks?
A. I was citing the only statistical survey that I was aware of at the time that was available, and I did mention
there were 347 employers, so there was an awareness of the sample size. And I didn't rely on it exclusively. It
was something they referenced in this report, but not in my exclusive reliance in terms of my opinion in that
report.
Q. I'm not saying it was your exclusive reliance, but you cite it on a number of pages in this report.
A. I don't know if I did or didn't on a number of pages. I'd have to look at that. But, once again, I was very
forthright about the sample size, so there was complete awareness about that.
Q. But despite the sample size, you cited it as evidence that conducting criminal background checks is a
commonly accepted HR Practice?
A. That comes from my education -- excuse me -- my experience in consulting for the past 25 years, and then
being the only survey that I was aware of at the time that -- that supported that.
Q. But the only thing that you discussed in this paragraph of your expert report is the 2010 survey?
A. In that paragraph, that -- I need to look at it a moment here.
Q. Sure. Take your time.
A. In that paragraph, that is true.
Q. In fact, you discussed the survey results in that paragraph in some detail?
A. I -- I put forth the percentages on one or two of the pages. I can't recall. But yes.
Q. But you didn't in your report -- in your testimony in this case cite the 2010 SHRM survey on credit checks
which revealed that 97 percent of medical providers don't conduct credit checks?

A. I did not.
Q. Now, in your 2011 expert report, you also talked about a case -- a -- a definition of safety-sensitive and
high-risk positions, correct?
A. Where are you looking there?
Q. I am looking -- I am looking at page 5, 5 of 18, paragraph 3.
A. Okay.
Q. You talk there, you see, about safety-sensitive and high-risk.
A. I see that.
Q. And in that report, you gave examples of safety-sensitive and high-risk positions; and you said, for example,
those involving the use of vehicles, working in water, handling storage or disposal of hazardous waste
materials, using dangerous tools or instruments, or individuals hired to work at remote client locations and
unique arrangements?
A. I did, which included living and working with others outside the home community.
Q. Right. You didn't say anything about medical care in that paragraph.
A. There wasn't a medical care matter in this particular case.
Q. And you filed a supplemental report on that case, as well, right?
A. I did.
Q. And in that case, the supplemental report, you cited specific statistics for your definition of high-risk and
safety-sensitive from the F.T.C., the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of -- U.S. Department of
Labor?
A. That, I don't remember.
Q. Is that the sort of thing that you would cite in a court of that nature? I'm trying to save some time --
Mr. Panish: Your honor, I'm going to object. This has no relevance to this case. It's a completely different type
of circumstances here.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, it does have relevance in another case if she had any basis for her definition. She
testified today that she doesn't have any.
Mr. Panish: This is in the deep water horizon oil spill, Pescaluga -- Pascagoula, Mississippi.
Judge: Overruled. You can explore that on redirect.
Q. Ms. Seawright, you cited bureau of labor statistics and things of that nature in your other report?
A I recall the bureau of labor statistics report that you mentioned, yes. That one, I recall. I don't recall the other
one.

Q. But in this case, you can't cite any published report for your definition of safety-sensitive and high-risk,
right?
A. In this case, I did include the same bureau of labor statistics report that -- just to give simple examples of
safety-sensitive type of environments. There are many elements associated with evaluating the position. Some
of those hazards relate to the position itself, some of the hazards relate to the risks that can occur with regard to
customers or third parties, so there are different elements of risks and safety-sensitivity. And so my point simply
was that when evaluating a job, you have to look at all of those. You have to look at the harm -- potential harm
to the worker himself or herself, you have to look at the potential harm to customers and third parties, and you
have to just look at all elements of the job. So that was merely my objective in mentioning, you know, the
different -- different types of concerns with the position.
Q. All right. And the chart that you cited at your deposition that you've just referenced now dealt with
percentage of the establishments by selected potentially hazardous work environment characteristics, industry
and size of class?
A. That's right.
Q. And it referred to things like working with the public, exchanging money with customers, delivering
passengers goods or services, working with unstable persons in health service or criminal settings, working in
high-crime areas, guarding valuable goods and property, working in small numbers, working house to house or
in community settings, and other potential hazards?
A. Yes.
Q. And those are situations where the job is actually hazardous to the employee, right?
A. In most cases, although this could be elements of being hazardous to others. But yes, for the most part; and
that came on a survey that was focused and hazards to the employees. Once again, that being one of the
elements that you would evaluate in terms of whether or not there was risk associated with a position.
Q. But you're not saying that Dr. Murray was in a position that was hazardous to his health in this case, are
you?
A. Not necessarily, no.
Q. So that definition you provided from the Bureau of Labor in this case really isn't applicable to the facts that
we've talked about in connection with this case?
A. To the extent that anything on that list would have pertained to his work, then there may have been a hazard
for him. I know that maybe isn't the issue in this case; but I'm pointing out, again, for every job, you have to
evaluate all of the risks associated with it to determine what's necessary.
Q. So the reason for your belief that this job was high-risk was that it was risky for Dr. Murray?
A. No, I didn't say that, no.
Q. Okay. So you're not basing it -- your conclusions that Dr. Murray's position was high-risk on the Bureau of
Labor statistics?
A. No, I'm not.

Q. And you're not actually basing it on any published definition of high-risk, right?
A. I'm basing it on an understanding in the field of HR that there are risks that exist in any position; and in this
particular case, the position was high-risk because of all the different elements that we've already talked about.
Q. I understand that, but I'm asking there's no published source like the bureau of labor, like you cited in your
other case, or like SHRM that's actually defined high-risk or safety-sensitive in the way that you have here
today?
A. There's none that defines it that I know of in employment anywhere.
Q. None that you -- what about the SHRM survey we looked at?
A. High-risk?
Q. It defines safety-sensitive, right?
A. Safety-sensitive is used by many different agencies, meaning many different things in my experience in HR
But high-risk is something that's assessed by an employer depending on the setting and their work environment
and so forth.
Q. Didn't you, in your 2011 -- I actually may have to go to your supplemental report here. Let's see.
Judge: Ms. Stebbins, when you're referring to a supplemental report, are you referring to a supplemental report
for this may 16, 2011 report, or are you referring to something that was produced in connection with this
litigation?
Ms. Stebbins: No. I'm talking about the keen case again, your honor.
Mr. Panish: There are no reports in this case; and I'm going to, again, renew my objection. Now we're on the
supplemental report on the oil spill case. It's tangential relevance, 352.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I was just trying to confirm whether there was any definition of high-risk that she
used there. I think it was also safety-sensitive, so I don't need to go there.
Q. So, in any event, you consider the position both high-risk and safety-sensitive here?
A. I consider the position to be a high-risk position; and there were safety-sensitive elements associated with it,
in my opinion, yes.
Q. And that's based on the fact that there was medical care provided?
A. Yes.
Q. But you don't have any published HR-relied-upon documents to suggest that medical care in general is a
high-risk or safety-sensitive position?
Mr. Panish: Objection; asked and answered five times.
Judge: Sustained.

Q. It's also based on the fact that Dr. Murray was going to be working remotely?
Mr. Panish: Same thing. Objection, asked and answered.
Ms. Stebbins: I haven't asked that.
Mr. Panish: She has.
Judge: I don't know if she asked that one.
Ms. Stebbins: I haven't.
Judge: Well, I forgot if you did. Overruled. You may answer.
Q. It's based on the fact that Dr. Murray was going to be working remotely?
A. Yes, in Michael Jackson's home, yes.
Q. That was true for a number of personnel on the tour, correct?
A. It may have been. I didn't evaluate that for the purposes of my opinion here.
Q. And also based on the fact that the job involved travel?
A. Yes, the job involved travel.
Q. But that's true for everyone working on the tour, right?
A. I didn't evaluate that for the purpose of my opinions here.
Q. You're aware that the entire tour was starting in Los Angeles and going to London, right?
A. Yes, I was aware of that.
Q. And that was true for Mr. Jackson?
A. That he was going to London?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yes.
Q. And Dr. Murray?
A. Yes.
Q. And presumably everybody else on the tour?
A. The people who needed to go to London. I don't know if everybody had to go or not.

Q. Can you remind me of the reasons why it was high-risk and safety-sensitive?
A. Yes. Again, there was medical care provided; he was working out of Mr. Jackson's home, and in and around
his family; he had access to confidential information, access to the lifestyle and so forth of Mr. Jackson. And
there was some elevated risk associated with the position that -- the awareness by AEG that Mr. Jackson had in
the past -- or Mr. Gongaware had some knowledge about Mr. Jackson's past use associated with a tour.
Judge: Past use?
Ms. Seawright: Past alcohol or drugs that were supplied by a tour doctor.
Ms. Stebbins: So we've already talked about two of those, which is working remotely and medical care.
Q. Then you also said working in the home and having access to Mr. Jackson's confidential information, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But that was something that existed before AEG Live came into the picture, right?
A. I don't know whether or not it did.
Q. Did you review the trial testimony of Ms. Chase?
A. I don't recall that, if I did or didn't.
Q. Would it make any difference to you if Ms. Chase testified that Dr. Murray was already working regularly
in Mr. Jackson's home in early april 2009 before he had any contact with AEG Live?
A. Not at all.
Q. So in your opinion, it doesn't matter whether or not the position actually created the contact in the home or
not?
A. It doesn't matter what happened prior to the point at which AEG became part of -- part and parcel to this --
to this employment situation, this hiring.
Q. So you don't think that the risk is mitigated at all by the fact that Dr. Murray had been in Mr. Jackson's home
many, many times before?
A. No, I don't.
Mr. Panish: Well, I'm going to --
Ms. Stebbins: Okay.
Q. Then turning to the last one that you mentioned, which is Mr. Gongaware knew that Mr. Jackson had a
painkiller problem in the past -- right?

A. I don't think I said it that way.

Ms. Stebbins: Well, I -- I can't remember exactly what you said.
Judge: She said a tour doctor, he knew that a tour doctor was providing him with drugs.
Ms. Seawright: Right.
Q. And your basis for that is?
A. It was testimony from Mr. Gongaware's deposition.
Q. Didn't Mr. Gongaware testify that he became aware of the drug use when the tour ended?
A. He may have, and there was also testimony from a doctor by the name of Dr. Finkelstein, and I believe he
may have become aware of it after. But that was still prior to this incident occurring, so he had knowledge of
that.
Q. Is it your understanding that that testimony established that tour doctors were providing Mr. Jackson with
drugs improperly?
A. I didn't conclude that one way or the other.
Q. Because it's possible, isn't it, that tour doctors could be helping Mr. Jackson cope with a medical problem or
an addiction, right?
A. I didn't evaluate that.
Q. So that -- you didn't evaluate that one way or another?
A. No.
Q. And you are aware, aren't you, that Mr. Jackson publicly announced in 1993 that he was going into rehab for
an addiction to prescription painkillers?
A. I'm not aware of that, I didn't read that myself.
Q. Would it make any difference to you if the knowledge of prior painkiller use was known to the whole world
and not just Mr. Gongaware?
A. No, I didn't evaluate it from that perspective on this case.
Q. So that doesn't matter?
A. No.
Q. And you're not aware of any awareness by any AEG Live person that Mr. Gongaware had a continuing
problem with prescription drugs after 1993, are you? I'm sorry. Mr. Jackson. I apologize.

A. Can you ask again?

Q. Sure. You've not seen any evidence that anyone at AEG Live had continuing knowledge of Mr. Jackson
using prescription drugs after 1993, right?
A. I don't recall seeing any testimony like that.
Q. And so have we now covered all the bases for your opinion this was a high-risk position?
A. All that I can recall at this moment.
Q. In that case, I want to turn to a different topic, which is the idea of different -- we'll call them engagement
and background check processes for an employee and independent contractor. Okay? You testified earlier, if I
understand you correctly, that what matters is the position and not the label, right?
A. Yes.
Q. But at your deposition, you did produce some data addressing whether there is a difference in the HR Field
between employees and independent contractors in this arena, right?
A. I don't know that it's stated that -- exactly the way you said it. I presented some data to make the point that
there -- there are background checks conducted on extended workers in the event that there was a question
about whether or not that ever occurred.
Ms. Stebbins: Now, let's talk about that survey. Your honor, may I approach?
Judge: Yes.
Q. This is a document you produced at your deposition, right, Ms. Seawright?
A. Yes.
Ms. Stebbins: Pam, could you put up the front cover of that.
Mr. Panish: Well, it is hearsay.
Ms. Stebbins: You said yesterday you had no objection to me cross-examining on this.
Mr. Panish: I've never discussed this with you. First of all, let's lay appropriate foundation. Because she
produced it in her deposition. She can ask about it, but there's no foundation.
Judge: Are we introducing all the underlying --
Mr. Panish: No.
Judge: I thought we were just introducing the opinions, you were going to cross-examine her on what she
relied on, but that the treatises and everything else weren't coming into evidence.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I'm actually probably not going to introduce this into evidence. I'd like to use this
as a demonstrative because it's something that is easier to show as I'm asking the witness about it. I'm not going
to go through all of it or send it back to the jury room; but I think it is helpful, since the jury has sort of had to

sit here and listen to me for a while, just to show some of the numbers that she's talking about and the fact that
she cited --
Mr. Panish: It is hearsay.
Judge: There is an objection. If there wasn't an objection, we could do it. If there's an objection, it's sustained.
So it's a little more boring because you can't show charts, not as exciting.
Q. Ms. Seawright, you brought along this 2009 Highright report to your deposition?
A. I did.
Q. And it was something you relied on in forming your opinions in this case?
A. It was something that I set forth as an example that there are background checks conducted on extended
workers.
Q. Right. And you produced this document?
A. I did.
Q. And this is a survey conducted by a company called Highright?
A. Yes.
Q. In 2009?
A. Yes.
Q. And Highright is a company that does background checks professionally, right?
A. That's right. That's why they have the data.
Q. And so they are -- they are a company that's sort of committed to the idea of background checks and
endorses the concept of background checks, right?
A. They're in the business of -- of offering -- like a consumer reporting agency, is what they are.
Q. And their background check -- and this survey was based on their customers, if I recall correctly?
A. I believe that's right.
Q. So they surveyed people who actually purchased background check materials?
A. I don't -- that's an assumption, I think. I don't know that they say that. But it's -- it's -- it's their customers.
Q. Customers of a background check company?
A. Yes.
Q. So all the people in the world who don't conduct background checks, they would not be customers of a
background check company?

A. Again, I don't know how they define customers. I don't want to split hairs, but essentially they survey HR
Recruiting talent managers, security, safety and other professionals. And, again, to say it's their customers, I
guess I'd probably need to look a little more careful here to be certain on that; but I believe that was correct.
Q. And they -- they actually did some studies from their own customers of whether or not background checks
are conducted in various circumstances, right?
A. Help me out there. Where do you -- what are you referring to?
Q. All right. Let's -- let's jump to page 20, I believe.
A. Page 20 of the survey?
Q. Yes.
A. Okay.
Judge: Are you talking about the bottom number? No, couldn't be the bottom number.
Ms. Stebbins: Actually, it is -- it's 702, dash, 76. And for the record, I should say this is exhibit 702, dash, 57.
Q. And this is the front page of a section on background screening, right? And some findings related to
background screening?
A. Yes, that's right.
Q. Now, before we go into this in some detail, Ms. Seawright, can you tell us what an extended worker is in the
HR definition?
A. Yeah. An extended worker is any type of a worker that is sort of coming from the outside. So it could be
someone from a temp agency, it could be someone who is an independent contractor, it could be someone who
is -- I think they -- they included vendors, different types of workers coming through third parties, or as a third
party himself or herself.
Q. So is it fair to say it's kind of a catchall for anyone who is not a regular employee?
A. That's right, uh-huh.
Q. And it might include independent contractors; but it might include a whole host of other persons, as well?
A. It typically includes independent contractors in our -- in our world of HR.
Q. Right. The definition includes it, but you couldn't tell from a survey of extended workers what percentage
was independent contractors versus temp employees, you would just know that if any of those were included in
the survey, they would be put in that bucket?
A. Well, it depends on the survey; but that's the case here.
Q. Right. Because this survey only distinguished between employees and extended workforces, right?
A. Yeah. And they also broke down a little bit further. They had regulated workers as a separate category, and

they kind of broke it into current and candidates, so there was several breakouts there.
Q. Right. There were several breakdowns, but they didn't break down the extended worker class so that you
could tell what portion was independent contractors or not?
A. That's right.
Q. And the first page of this section says background screening procedures vary, with organizations screening
their candidate employees much more often than their extended workforce or current employees, right?
A. That's right.
Q. So the conclusion of this 2009 Highright survey is that potential employees are screened in every capacity
much more often than independent contractors or any other kind of extended worker, right?
A. Yes, and that's not unusual. A lot of extended workers are already screened by the temporary agencies
they're working for.
Q. And independent contractors might be screened by their own companies or their -- regulated in their own
fields, right?
A. Possibly.
Q. For instance, in the medical profession, there's background checks required to become a doctor, right?
A. I recall you mentioning that to me in the deposition, that that's part of getting a license for being a doctor at
the time you're licensed.
Q. But that's not something you looked into personally in this case?
A. I -- I recall -- I think I mentioned that I had knowledge of that generally.
Q. And it's your understanding, as well, that the medical field regulates itself in the sense that it can suspend --
the medical boards of states can suspend licenses for misconduct or otherwise intervene if a patient is accused
of improper -- if a physician is accused or convicted of improper conduct?
A. I'm not in the medical field. That -- I wasn't an expert on that, so I didn't look into that or render an opinion
on that.
Q. So that's just something you don't know anything about one way or another?
A. I don't.
Q. And it has no bearing on your opinion in the case?
A. It does not.
Q. And let's just turn to the next page, 702, dash, 77.
A. Okay.
Q. So according to this survey, for every kind of background check, including criminal background checks and

reference checks, the most common ones, 78 percent of the companies that were customers of Highright
surveyed employees -- potential employees, but only 31 percent screened any kind of extended worker?
A. First of all, again, I'm not certain it was their customers; so I want to be careful with that. But it does state
that 78 percent of the organizations that performed background screening screened their candidate employees,
so people applying for a job; and 31 percent screened candidate extended workers.
Q. And the 31 percent may or may not include independent contractors; but if there are independent contractors
in the survey, they would be included in that 31 percent?
A. That's right.
Q. As would temp workers and vendors and anybody who is not a permanent or full-time employee?
A. Not a regular employee, yes.
Q. So at least in 2009, there was a stark difference between the companies that surveyed -- that performed any
kind of background check on employees versus independent contractors?
A. That's right. I wouldn't say "stark difference." let's be specific here. 31 percent versus 78. I guess it depends
how you define "stark difference."
Q. So nearly four-fifths, 80 percent, nearly, screened employees, right? Four out of five?
A. Nearly 80 percent, 78 percent, do.
Q. And less than one-third screened candidate workers of any kind?
A. I'm going to get it right this time. I know a third is 33 percent; so yes, less than one-third, that's correct.
Q. Meaning more than two-thirds did not conduct any kind of background screening whatsoever --
A. You're going to confuse me.
Q. -- on any kind of extended workers?
A. 31 percent screened candidate extended workers, so that is what this says. So your question again -- I don't
know -- you threw in the word "any," so can you repeat that and I'll try to decipher this that way?
Q. Sure. Based on this survey, at least, in 2009, more than two-thirds of employers surveyed did not conduct
any kind of background check whatsoever on independent contractors or any contingent workers?
A. I believe that is what this says; and, honestly, I'd feel better if I could take a little time and just verify. But
that -- I believe you're right about that. I'm just requesting to withhold a little bit of reservation in case I look at
this a little more -- spend a little more time with it.
Q. Well, if it helps, we can turn to page 702, dash, 78.
A. Uh-huh. Okay.
Q. You see on the left-hand bottom side there there's what type of workers require background screening; and it
says candidate hires, transfers and promotions, 78 percent; and then it says candidate extended workers

contingent, temp, vendor, et cetera, 31 percent?

A. Yes.
Q. And I believe you told me at your deposition that it's your -- your understanding that based on this survey,
independent contractors would be included in that 31 percent?
A. Yes.
Q. So 31 percent is less than one-third, so more than two-thirds didn't conduct that --
A. Yes, I think we've already established that, yes.
Q. You weren't sure, so I wanted to make sure.
A. I thought it was a different question you were asking. I'm sorry.
Q. And this difference actually applies to a lot of kinds of background checks that -- that Highright conducts,
right? If we turn to page 702, dash, 81, this is organizations that perform drug and health screening?
A. Yes.
Q. And here again we see 68 percent of companies screening candidate employees, but only 26 screening
candidate extended workers?
A. For drug and medical exams, yes.
Q. So, once again, there's a pretty stark difference between employees and people who are not employees but
are part of the extended workforce?
A. There is a difference.
Q. And the same is true -- turn to page 702, dash, 86. We talked a little bit about employment eligibility checks
and verifications.
A. Yes.
Q. And, again, there's a big difference between the 79 percent in this case of companies that screened candidate
employees and the 24 percent that screened candidate extended workers?
A. Yeah. And that kind of indicates that probably a large part of those were -- could have been independent
contractors because there's no obligation to go through the I and I process for independent contractors.
Q well, for people hired through a temp agency, the temp agency would often handle that, right?
A. They may. Depends on the relationship, but they may.
Q. So this may be temp workers, it may be independent contractors?
A. Could be.
Q. It may be vendors who have their own licenses or other requirements?

A. Could be, and that would explain the difference for sure.
Q. I think that's good for that survey.
A. Okay.
Q. You will agree with me, though, that based on this survey in 2009, even though you believe labeling doesn't
matter, there was a difference in how employers treated independent contractors and employees for background
check purposes, right?
A. I think it's almost saying the same thing; that, you know, depending on the position, that those decisions are
made; so you may see distinctions and differences based on the position. 100 percent of employees were not
screened, zero percent of external workers were not screened, so they're making decisions based on the position,
clearly.
Q. But on the average, independent contractors are screened, if at all, much less than employees?
A. Independent contractors in this particular survey are screened less than employees.
Q. Now, Ms. Seawright, we talked a little bit earlier -- you testified on direct examination that there's no federal
or state law that prohibited AEG Live from doing a background check in 2009 on Dr. Conrad murray, right?
A. Correct.
Q. And we talked a little bit about the EEOC guidelines, that they don't prohibit such checks, but they have
required them and did require them in 2009 to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, correct?
Mr. Panish: I'm going to object. That misstates. It's not a requirement, it's a guideline.
Judge: I think that's true. It's a guideline. We keep talking about it being a guideline.
Ms. Stebbins: your honor, I'm actually referring to her own -- her own testimony here.
Judge: Well, then be clear. If you're referring to her testimony versus referring to the EEOC guideline -- we're
going around and around about that thing.
Ms. Stebbins: I'm not talking about the website here, your honor; I'm talking about her testimony the EEOC
guidelines say you should not be hiring --
Judge: Well, "Is it your testimony?" or "Did you testify that?" Just so we're clear.
Ms. Stebbins: Sure.
Q. Is it your testimony that even in 2009, the EEOC and title 7 required that any kind of background check be
job-related and consistent with business necessity?
A. I'm not sure I said it that way.
Q. Is it your testimony that you could do a background check lawfully without it being job-related or consistent
with business necessity?

A. I'd have to go back and see exactly how -- refer back to the testimony of what I've said.
Q. I'm asking you now is it your current testimony.
A. Well, employers have the right to conduct background checks. At the same time, they have to comply with
-- you know, with practices and ensure that they're non-discriminatory. So in that sense, we always recommend
that they make decisions that are job-related, employment decisions that are job-related.
Q. And the EEOC guidelines have long required that any background check or test of employment be job-
related and consistent with business necessity, right?
A. They haven't required that. Again, they allow employers to conduct them; and should there be an allegation
of discrimination, then the employer has to establish that it was job-related and consistent with business
necessity. So the job relatedness aspect of that only comes into play if there's an allegation of discrimination.
Q. But it would be pretty risky, wouldn't it, to conduct background checks that aren't job-related and aren't
consistent with business necessity?
A. It depends what you mean by "risk."
Q. You would be exposing yourself to risk of a discrimination lawsuit from the EEOC, right?
A. Not necessarily, no.
Q. "no"?
A. Not necessarily. Again, you know -- what exposes you to a charge of discrimination or an allegation of
discrimination -- you know, maybe there's another reason. I mean, there's a lot of factors that go into a hiring
decision.
Q. And I don't want to get into all that. You, as an HR Professional, if you're advising a client on the kinds of
background checks they can conduct, you would advise them that the background checks should be job-related
and should be consistent with their business necessities, right?
A. I do advise that, right.
Q. And that's what a responsible HR Department would do in 2009 or anytime?
A. That's what I would advise a client to do.
Q. Now, Ms. Seawright, you testified yesterday that you didn't believe indemnities were a helpful protection
with independent contractors, right?
A. I think I -- I testified that indemnification in a contract is not checking out a person.
Q. But you would agree that a company's willingness to indemnify their product, to back up their product, in
some ways implies that they're taking responsibility for it?
Mr. Panish: It's irrelevant, a company.
Judge: Sustained.

Ms. Stebbins: Say there's an independent contractor company that has an employee who is going to be
working for someone else.
Q. The company's willingness to indemnify the third parties for the employee's acts is a sign to some extent that
the company takes responsibility for the employee, right?
A. I got lost in the first part of that because you said "independent contractor company," and I'm not sure what
you meant.
Q. Sure. It's common with independent contractor agreements for there to be two companies involved, right?
One company that is utilizing the services of a contractor, and the other company that is offering the services of
a contractor?
A. Not necessarily a company. There could be just an individual.
Q. It could be; but it's often a company, right?
A. I don't have any statistical data on that so I don't want to
Judge: You might want to just use the Murray example.
Ms. Stebbins: I was going to, your honor.
Q. You agree in this case there was a company involved, right? GCA Holdings LLC?
A. Yes.
Q. And the draft agreement you reviewed was between AEG Live productions, GCA Holdings LLC and Dr.
Murray, and had to be approved by Michael Jackson?
A. Yes.
Q. And to some degree, GCA Holdings LLC's willingness to indemnify AEG Live for the conduct of Dr.
Murray shows -- would you agree that in any way, shape or form it shows that GCA is taking responsibility for
Dr. Murray's conduct?
A. Well, I guess -- I'm not an attorney, so I have to be careful here. That's the tough part. It's -- the
indemnification is saying, you know -- basically AEG is saying "We're not taking responsibility for this, you
are." it's not that Dr. Murray or his company were asking for that responsibility. That was something that was
put into the contract by AEG Live; so it was part of their decision to put that in there, to ask for or require, in a
sense, as part of that agreement, that they be indemnified. So to say that that's -- what you suggested, I'm not
sure I agree with that.
Q. Let me put it differently. If a company wasn't willing to indemnify for the acts of its employees, you would
be nervous about them, right?
A. I guess you would want to have an agreement in that sense.

Q. Right. You would want to have an agreement with a company that backed up its employees and agreed to
take responsibility for them?
A. Say it again?
Q. Sure. If you're entering into an independent contractor agreement with a company who is going to be
furnishing employees to do work -- let's go back to the painting company example. The company says, "you
know what? I want my workers in your house, but I'm not going to take responsibility for their conduct, that's
all on you." you'd be nervous about that, right?
A. I wouldn't want to enter into that kind of arrangement.
Q. And it says something about the company that they'd be willing to take responsibility for their workers and
back that up. That does offer some protection, right?
A. It offers protection, protects AEG in this case.
Q. Well, background checks protect the company, too?
A. They protect the company and they protect others, yes.
Q. All of these things ensuring safe workplaces always protect both the company and the person somebody
comes in contact with, right?
A. Well, they protect the people. They may reduce the risk for the company in terms of any legal liability, not
in terms of safety or harm.
Q. So --
A. Because it's people who can be harmed. A company, in a sense -- in terms of human beings, I'm speaking.
There's financial harm, of course, that a company can suffer. But in terms of harming another person.
Q. Right. But a company that's financially responsible is going to be motivated to take precautions to avoid
them, right?
A. What kind of harm?
Q. For instance, let's go back to the painting company. If the painting company knows that it's responsible for
the work of its painters, then it's motivated to make sure that its painters are proper, screened, adequate, good
painters and not causing harm to the people in the house?
A. Correct.
Q. And a common reason for indemnities is to decide who amongst a group of people is going to be
responsible?
A. That, I don't know. You're getting into the indemnification thing that's beyond my scope.
Q. Got it. I want to ask you briefly, you wrote an article -- one article out of your 136 that is specifically on
background checks, right?

Mr. Panish: Is that a question?

Ms. Stebbins: Yes. I asked is there -- did she write an article specific on background checks, one article.
Ms. Seawright: I did write that one. I may have written others that address background checks in some form or
fashion. I think that one has a title with background checks.
Ms. Stebbins: Right.
Q. And correct me if I'm wrong. I think you told me at your deposition that this is the only one that is
specifically addressed to background checks. You may have mentioned it in other articles, but this is the only
article you've written specifically on that topic.
A. That's right.
Q. And, Ms. Seawright, this is an article that you authored in -- let me see what year it was. I'm not sure what
year -- in "HR Matters," a publication from your company entitled "Background checks, what you don't know
can hurt you," right?
A. Yes.
Q. And according to the second page of this document, it was updated in July 2009?
A. Yes.
Q. And here you lay out statutes and information about criminal background checks, and you talk about -- you
start out with the idea of you wouldn't want someone with a criminal conviction performing services inside your
home, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you talk about employers and reducing risk?
A. I do, yes, uh-huh.
Q. And you talk about certain state regulations that require fingerprinting and background checks for certain
kinds of industries?
A. Yes.
Q. By the way, there's no law that requires anyone to conduct background checks on doctors other than those
done by the medical boards, right?
A. I only, again, was looking into this employment situation. I wasn't looking at it from a perspective of doctors
and outside of this realm.
Q. But you're not aware of any law that would have required AEG Live to conduct a background check in this
case?
A. I'm not, no.

Q. I want to look specifically at page 702, dash, 111. In the middle of the page, you talk about outsourcing
risks, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And your advice in July of 2009 was to be careful in retaining temporary employees or independent
contractors, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And your advice was to help mitigate that risk for temporary employees, they should insist that staffing
agencies conduct appropriate background checks and list your company as an additional insured on their
coverage, right?
Mr. Panish: You missed something there when you were reading that.
Ms. Stebbins: I'm just asking her if that's right. I'm sure she'll tell me if I missed anything, Mr. Panish.
Ms. Seawright: Okay. I don't recall now what you just said, but --
Ms. Stebbins: Sure.
Judge: You want to just read it?
Q. Your advice on mitigating the risk with regard to staffing agencies for temporary employees was to insist
that the staffing agencies conduct appropriate background checks, be specific and list your company as an
additional insured on their coverage, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then your advice was also to consider requiring agency contracts to include language indemnifying
your company for any liability that occurs as a result of the worker?
A. Yes.
Q. So your advice in 2009 was to make sure there's insurance, require the company to do the work, and
indemnify your company, right?
A. In -- with regard to temps coming through an agency where there's an agreement that already exists between
the company and the employer.
Q. You talk in this paragraph about temporary employees or independent contractors, right?
A. I simply made the statement in general that there could be some liability, but then I went specifically into
the temp agency piece of that.
Q. And you didn't specifically recommend anything for independent contractors, right?
A. Beyond the initial comment about the fact that there could be risks associated with that, no. I was speaking
specifically about temp agencies there.

Q. And, in fact, in this whole paragraph, your only recommendations are insist that the company that you're
retaining do appropriate checks and get insurance and get an indemnity, right?
A. In this particular paragraph, again, I was just specifically dealing with temp agencies at the tail end there.
Q. Right. But that was your advice?
A. That was the advice, yes.
Q. And, in fact, AEG's policy in this case with regard to independent contractors is to require that they have
proper licenses, insurance and indemnities, right?
A. I don't know if it's proper licenses. On the chart, it was require a license, something that was vague that
didn't indicate that there was any verification of that license.
Q. But you've reviewed Mr. Trell's testimony so you know that the policy is to require proof of any license that
is necessary to perform the work, right?
A. Again, proof of the license, I'm not sure if that's verifying the validity. Kind of like the example I gave with
the driver's license. It's one thing to prove that I have a driver's license by showing it to you; it's another thing to
run the history of that license to see is it suspended, do I have a history of D.U.I.'s, all of that.
Q. So accepting the ambiguities in the word "proof," have I correctly stated the policy?
A. The policy for what?
Q. For AEG Live for independent contractors.
A. The policy in the handbook?
Q. No. If you'll recall, the testimony is that the handbook doesn't apply to independent contractors, right?
A. I don't recall that precisely.
Q. Do you recall the model independent contractor agreement that AEG Live uses as a basis for independent
contractors?
A. The model that was in the back of the handbook?
Q. It wasn't in the handbook. It was produced at the same time, but not in the handbook.
A. I do remember reviewing that, yes.
Q. And do you recall Mr. Trell's testimony that the model independent contractor agreement is what's used with
independent contractors, as well as other procedures, and the handbook applies to employees?
A. Don't recall that specifically. I'm sorry.
Q. Do you have any reason to believe as we sit here today that the handbook applies to independent
contractors?
A. I can see references in the handbook that applied to contractors. There were some definitions for contract

employees, there were some policies that mentioned the word "contractors." so I did see references to
contractors in the handbook.
Q. Is it your understanding that to AEG Live, a contract employee is the same as independent contractor?
A. The way it was in the handbook, I seem to recall it was defined that way. It was called a contractor
employee, and it mentioned individuals or individuals coming through third-party companies, if I recall that
correctly.
Ms. Stebbins: Well, the jury will review the evidence and evaluate it. I don't wanted to get deep into the
weeds with you.
Mr. Panish: Excuse me, your honor. I'm going to object to counsel's comments at the end.
Judge: Okay. Sustained.
Mr. Panish: And ask that she not continue to do that.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I'm just trying to wrap this up, and I didn't think it was a difficult question.
Q. Ms. Seawright, is it your understanding that AEG Live has a policy for independent contractors based on the
model independent contractor agreement that you reviewed and containing the things on the right-hand side of
the board?
A. No, it's not my understanding of that.
Q. Okay. So your understanding is that's not AEG Live's policy?
A. I have not seen a written policy for independent contractors.
Q. But you have seen Mr. Trell's testimony?
A. Outlying Mr. Trell's chart, that is.
Q. But you've reviewed Mr. Trell's testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understand that he testified that that was the policy, right?
A. You said that was a process, it's the AEG process for checking out people.
Q. Well, that's what the chart said. But you reviewed the testimony?
A. I did review the testimony. I don't recall the word "policy."
Q. Okay. So we're just fighting over the word "policy" here?
A. Well, there's a difference.

Mr. Panish: First of all, I would object. She keeps arguing with the witness.
Judge: Sustained. Argumentative.
Mr. Panish: And the document says "process." that's their exhibit, not ours.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, that was a demonstrative. She reviewed all of Mr. Trell's testimony which
discussed the policies in depth.
Judge: Sustained. I sustained the objection.
Q. Ms. Seawright, have you seen any evidence that with regard to Dr. Murray, the processes on the right-hand
side of the board were not followed in this case?
A. I'd have to look at the board again just to be certain, sorry to say.
Q. And -- let's just peek at it here so I can make sure I walk through this. So Dr. Murray was known to the
artist, right?
A. Yes.
Judge: Our alternates can't see.
Mr. Panish: Why don't you put it on the thing there. I want to use it anyway.
Ms. Stebbins: I was trying to be quick here.
Mr. Panish: A. Little late for that.
Ms. Stebbins: I'll use Ms. Cahan as a demonstrative aid.
Q. Dr. Murray was known to the artist, right?
A. Yes.
Q. The draft agreement with him required him to provide proof of licenses or permits, accepting that you don't
know what the word "proof" means?
Mr. Panish: I'm going to object. That's not what it says.
Ms. Seawright: It doesn't say "proof" there. Required a license.
Ms. Stebbins: Right.
Q. But the agreement with Dr. Murray, we established this morning, I think, required proof of licenses, yes?
A. There was a licensing paragraph in there. And I'm sorry. I'm not trying to split hairs, but I've got to be, you
know, precise. If it was proof, I don't remember if that was the word in there; but there was a paragraph or two
on licenses.
Q. I will help that it did include the word "proof," and you said you didn't know what "proof" meant. Do you
recall that?

A. I do.
Q. The draft agreement required Dr. Murray to have licenses and permits, yes?
A. To some degree, yes.
Q. That was necessary to practice medicine in the United States and the United Kingdom?
A. Yes, I recall that, yes.
Q. And it required that Dr. Murray be fully insured?
A. I don't know what "fully" means, but it required that he have certain insurances.
Q. Medical malpractice insurance with a liability limit of, I think, 2 million?
A. Yes, I remember that.
Q. And it had an indemnification provision?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. And the obligations between AEG Live, GCA Holdings, and Dr. Murray were laid out in the contract,
correct?
A. Yes.
Ms. Stebbins: I think we're set. And I have no further questions at this time, your honor.
Redirect examination Brian Panish:
Q. First of all, that agreement said that Dr. Murray -- by the way, was that a draft or was it called a final
agreement?
A. It was called final.
Q. And that final agreement that was signed by Dr. Murray said something about license to practice in the
United States; is that right?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. So that would indicate that according to that final agreement that Dr. Murray signed, he would be treating
Michael Jackson here in the United States, correct?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; lacks foundation as to this witness.
Judge: Sustained.

Q. Well, did it require -- is London in the United States?

A. No, it's not.
Q. Did the agreement say that he needed to be licensed in the United States to practice medicine in the United
States?
A. It did say he had to be licensed in the United States.
Q. Do you know if Beverly Hills is in the United States?
A. California, yes, it is.
Q. Now, Dr. Murray, he -- did he say how long it would take him to shut down his practice?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope.
Judge: Overruled.
A. I recall that there was an email where it said something about he needed ten days to wind down his
practices.
Q. Now, is there any law that prevents AEG Live from checking out Dr. Murray's credit or background?
A. None at all.
Q. Is there law that you're concerned as an employment -- human resources specialist where your client or the
employer can be held liable for negligent retained -- retention of an independent contractor?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope of this witness's expertise.
Judge: Sustained. And asks for a conclusion, legal conclusion.
Mr. Panish: No, no.
Q. What is the purpose for having an indemnification provision that counsel just asked you about?
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, the witness just testified she didn't know about indemnification provisions, it was
outside her area of expertise, and asked me to move on from then, which she did.
Judge: I think she was asked about indemnification. Overruled.
Mr. Panish: Go ahead.
Judge: Maybe you should re-ask the question.
Mr. Panish: Well, let's talk about exhibit 702 that counsel asked you about.

Q. Did you write anything in there about negligent retention of people?

A. I wrote about negligent hiring and -- and negligent retention.
Q. And what did you write about in that regard, negligent hiring and retention in exhibit 702 that Ms. Stebbins
just showed you?
A. I was --
Ms. Stebbins: I'm going to object as hearsay and cumulative.
Mr. Panish: Why, your honor?
Judge: Overruled. Where are you looking so I can follow along with her?
Mr. Panish: It starts on page 1, goes right to page 2. Where she started, it ends off right there.
Ms. Seawright: The whole purpose of this article was to notify employers that they could have risks associated
with negligent hiring and retention if they hired people without doing proper due diligence, so to speak, in the
hire process.
Q. And what was the risk to the employer?
A. Negligent hiring and -- and I believe I said somewhere in here negligent retention. But negligent hiring was
kind of the focus.
Q. And do you have an understanding --
Judge: It's on page -- I think it's on page 2.
Mr. Panish: Yes. Right before she left off, where she started.
Q. And do you have an understanding in this case -- is this a negligent hiring and retention case?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And have you worked in other negligent hiring and retention cases?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Now, let's talk about the EEOC That counsel wanted to talk about that guideline. You're familiar with that
guideline, are you not?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. And counsel asked you yesterday what -- the EEOC's policy for checking the credit reports of people that
they employed. Do you remember when she asked you that question?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; misstates my testimony, your honor -- my question. I asked a different question, and
that's what she gave me, your honor.

Mr. Panish: No. I have the transcript right here.

Ms. Stebbins: I didn't ask her the policy that the EEOC had on people they employ. She volunteered that in
response to a different question I asked.
Judge: Why are we revisiting this?
Mr. Panish: Because she brought it up, and I want to cover and clear it up. She brought it up improperly in
front of the jury, and I want to clarify.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I would ask that Mr. Panish's comments be stricken.
Judge: I think I already clarified this with an instruction that you both agreed on.
Ms. Stebbins: Yes, your honor.
Mr. Panish: You let her question with that, the EEOC guidelines, didn't you?
Judge: Okay. I'm sustaining the objection.
Q. Does the EEOC Check the background of credit
Judge: Sustained. It's the same question, Mr. Panish.
Mr. Panish: No.
Ms. Stebbins: It is, your honor.
Judge: It's the same question.
Mr. Panish: I want a sidebar on this, then.
Judge: No. Keep going.
Q. Do you have an understanding of why employers check the credit of potential people that they're retaining?
A. I do have an understanding of that from what I've read.
Q. Tell us about that.
A. They check the credit of -- I want to say maybe 84 -- 97 or 96 of their own positions, and they have
documentation out there that they make it pretty clear that they do that because they're very concerned that
financial stress can compromise a person's ethical obligations and ethical judgment.
Q. And counsel asked you about studies and whether people in financial condition -- have you reviewed the
materials from the United States government where they have assessed whether or not they should check credit
backgrounds of potential employees

Ms. Stebbins: Objection; vague as to potential employees and the United States government.
Q. -- in the hiring process?
Judge: Overruled.
A. I have -- I have seen that there are different branches of the government, including the transportation safety
administration. I think I mentioned them yesterday. There was also the Coast Guard and the Air Force and the
Army and the Navy, and all of them require credit checks. And those are folks who are not handling money, it's
all about their concern that people who are under financial stress or have delinquent debts can pose a risk in
terms of whether -- you know, compromising their ethical judgment. Or in cases where they're in a security role,
that they could be compromised to do something that would impact security. So that's their reason for doing it.
It has nothing to do with handling money; and, yes, it's multiple branches of our government that do that.
Q. And they cite to work that they've done to determine whether or not someone that has not just debts, but that
is -- overdue just debts, that they have an increased temptation to commit illegal or unethical acts as a means of
gaining funds to meet financial obligations?
A. Yes, that's --
Q. Is that your understanding?
A. That's what they say, and it isn't the debt. It's not just debt. That's not their issue at all. It's the delinquent
debt and the past-due debt that they're concerned about. It's not debt in general.
Q. Now, have you seen any evidence in this case from Mr. Trell or anyone that's ever testified from AEG
where they ever said that, "we can't check Dr. Murray's credit because we're concerned it might be
discriminatory"?
A. I've never heard that at all in any of the documents I've read.
Q. In all the days that Mr. Trell testified, six days in his testimony, did you ever see him mention the word
"discriminatory" or "title 7" regarding credit checks of Dr. Murray's background?
A. No, that was not in any of the testimony that I read.
Q. Now, you were asked about whether medical care can be dangerous. Do you remember those questions right
before lunch?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the medical care given by Dr. Murray dangerous to Michael Jackson?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope of this witness's expertise.
Judge: What was your question?

Mr. Panish: You were asked by Ms. Stebbins whether medical care can be dangerous.
Q. Do you remember those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the medical care provided to Michael Jackson dangerous?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope of this witness's expertise.
Judge: Sustained.
Q. Well, does dangerous medical care lead to death?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope of this witness's expertise.
Judge: Overruled.
Ms. Seawright: Indeed, yes.
Mr. Panish: Okay.
Q. In -- have you ever heard of Mark Twain?
A. I have.
Q. Now, in this -- these questions about this survey that you didn't rely on that Ms. Stebbins just spent a lot of
time on, I want to do a little math here on her statistics that AEG apparently is relying on.
Judge: Mr. Panish, our alternates can't see.
Mr. Panish: I'll set it up properly.
Judge: I don't need to see it. Put it so they can see it.
Ms. Stebbins: May I move so I can see it?
Judge: You may.
Mr. Panish: Let's see.
Q. Now, how many businesses are in the healthcare business?
A. How many -- there's 700,000 -- it's actually more than that, but let's round to 700,000 healthcare facilities in
the United States.

Q. And in this survey that Ms. Stebbins was questioning you about extensively, how many people responded to
that survey?
A. So the survey, there were 343, I'm going to say, but --
Q. How many of them were in the medical area that she was questioning you about?
A. I believe it was 63. 62 or 63.
Mr. Panish: Now, I did it at lunch, I figured it out. Let's see what percent that -- I wrote it down. I'm sure it's
probably wrong, but I'll try. Is it four zeroes or three?
Mr. Boyle: Four.
Mr. Panish: This will be the decimal point, and it's 1 --
Judge: Here's a calculator.
Mr. Panish: She can check my math, your honor. Is it one 8 or 8? 9. I'm going to round it off.
Ms. Seawright: Do you want me to do that little math equation? 63 divided by 700,000 equals -- there you go.
It has four zeroes, .00009.
Mr. Panish: Okay.
Q. So what percent is that? That's -- I kind of remember you go 10's, right?
A. Gosh. 10's, 100's, 1,000's, 10,000's, 100,000's, yes.
Q. I don't know. Whatever it is. Now, you -- as you a human resources professional --
(Mr. Panish and Ms. Stebbins speak in undertone)
Q. Now, do you, as a human resources professional, feel comfortable in relying on a statistic like that as to
whether or not credit checks should be conducted of a physici
an who's treating a patient receiving $150,000 a month?
A. I would not rely on that for determining that.
Q. Now, have you heard the saying from Mark Twain, "Lies, damn lies, and then you have statistics"?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; argumentative, irrelevant.
Judge: Overruled.
Ms. Seawright: I think I've heard that, yes.
Mr. Panish: He's also known as Samuel Clemens.

Ms. Seawright: Okay.

Q. Now let me ask you this. Do you know how many businesses there are in the United States?
A. Oh, I've seen numbers in the millions from time to time; but I don't recall the precise number.
Q. All right. This case, Dr. Murray, is this like any case in the survey? Are you aware of any survey that
determined what -- whose background was checked that received $150,000 a month to treat one patient in
preparation for -- and a tour, for a concert promoter and producer?
A. No, I've never seen any data that would be remotely close to that scenario.
Q. Did you see how much money Dr. Murray initially demanded for this job?
A. I do recall that, yes.
Q. How much was that?
A. $5 million.
Q. Do you know what he dropped down to accept?
A. 150,000 a month.
Q. Would that, in your mind, as a human resources professional, raise a question that you'd want to seriously
check the credit and background of that individual?
A. That raised a question in my mind when I read that as to why he would be requiring that much. It was a red
flag to me at the -- at the beginning of the process as to why, and I would want to explore that further with him.
Q. And I'm not going to go through all of these, but exhibit 702-57 through 100, that's 43 pages of documents.
Does that -- you said average jobs. Do you remember that? Something about average?
A. Average jobs?
Q. Did I hear that wrong?
A. I don't recall that, but I may have used it somewhere.
Q. All right. That's okay. And did they set out best practices, what are the best practices that should be engaged
in?
A. I do believe they used that language in here, yes.
Q. It's called "best practices for success"?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they say that you shouldn't do background and credit checks to be having the best practice for
success?

A. That you should not?

Q. Yes.
A. No, no. They said you should.
Q. And page 702, dash, 60, do they list what are best practices for success?
A. Yes.
Ms. Stebbins: What document is that?
Mr. Panish: What you just showed her.
Ms. Stebbins: The Highright survey?
Mr. Panish: 702-60.
Ms. Stebbins: Thank you. I just wanted to make sure.
Q. And did they say you should screen some candidates? A few candidates? All candidates? What do they say?
A. Screen all candidates whether they are employees or not, and include recurring screening.
Q. And that's under what topic?
A. "Best practices for success."
Q. Do they say whether you should minimally screen them? Medium screen them? Extensive screening? What
do they say about that?
A. Use comprehensive screening to determine if a candidate meets policy requirements; and comprehensively
screen everyone, basically, is what they're saying.
Q. For what? Is that -- is that to have best practices for success?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. Now, yesterday counsel, at the beginning, asked you about your assumption; and your assumption
that I asked you about was that Dr. Murray had been hired by AEG do you recall that?
A. Yes.
Q. And did I tell you that I was going to ask you that question before you came here?
A. No.
Q. Did I go over what you were allowed to testify to and what you couldn't?

A. No.
Q. Did I show you an order from this court that all experts can only assume for the purposes of their testimony
that Dr. Murray was hired by AEG Live?
A. I was made aware of that.
Q. And is that why that question was posed and answered, because that was the instructions of the court? Or
was it because I just wanted you to make an assumption, as counsel suggested in her questions?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; calls for speculation as to what Mr. Panish was thinking, and argumentative as to
me.
Judge: Argumentative as to you. But I think the question generically is true, that there is an order to that effect.
Ms. Stebbins: Certainly, your honor, there's an order.
Mr. Panish: Yesterday it was suggested that you were making an assumption.
Q. Do you remember those questions by Ms. Stebbins?
A. I do.
Q. Do you have an understanding of why that assumption had to be assumed and not a fact by you?
A. Yes. I was told that I needed to assume that, that that was part of a court order, if that's the right language.
Q. And did you give an opinion in your deposition about whether or not Dr. Murray had been hired by AEG
Live?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the -- it violates the court's order.
Mr. Panish: I'm just asking if she gave an opinion.
Judge: Wait a minute.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, you issued an order that no experts may opine on this issue.
Judge: I've said it a couple of times.
Ms. Stebbins: And that's been made clear to the jury over and over again.
Mr. Panish: Then why did she ask that question to suggest that she was making an assumption?
Judge: That's okay. You can ask. They can hear it over and over.
Mr. Panish: Okay.

Q. Did you have an opinion in your deposition about whether or not AEG Live hired Dr. Murray?
A. I believe they hired Dr. Murray.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I'm going to move to strike. The expert is not supposed to give an opinion on this
issue per your honor's order.
Judge: Right.
Ms. Stebbins: She just gave an opinion, your honor. He just asked for an opinion, and she gave it, which is
why I objected.
Mr. Panish: I just asked whether she has an opinion. That's all I want to know. Don't tell us what your opinion
is.
Mr. Putnam: It's too late. Your honor, this is the fourth time an M.I.L. Has been violated by them in exactly
this way.
Judge: Well, the answer is stricken.
Mr. Panish: Okay. She shouldn't ask that question.
Judge: Okay. Prior to trial, there was a motion in limine -- we call them a motion in limine for a court pretrial
ruling. In order for the experts to give opinions, they have to assume certain facts are true. For example, they
have to assume one way or the other whether Murray was hired or not to give an opinion. Some of the experts
assumed he was and gave opinions, some of the experts assumed he wasn't and gave their opinions. And so
that's why, when counsel asks the questions, they say, "assume Dr. Murray was hired.
What is your opinion of --" whatever, and then they give their opinions. So that's how these opinions come out.
That's why the questions are asked as hypotheticals. What they're not allowed to do is say, "Dr. Murray was
hired, Dr. Murray was not hired." that's because that's your duty, that's your responsibility. You're going to be
asked at the end of the trial -- you're going to be given a verdict form, and you're going to be asked whether he
was hired or not. It's not for them to state whether he was hired or not. You can state assumptions; but
ultimately, you're going to decide that. So that's why they can't say it. So anybody who has said it, who's
intimated it, disregard it.
Mr. Panish: And anyone who asked a question about why you made an assumption, that should also be
disregarded.
Judge: No. The assumptions are fine. What's not okay is for any witness to say he was or was not hired. But
assumptions are okay because their opinions are based on the assumptions. If it turns out that the assumption is
not true, then the opinion goes out the door. But that's an instruction I'll give you at the end of the case.
Mr. Panish: And the lawyers shouldn't question someone for making an assumption.
Judge: Mr. Panish, please. I don't want to confuse the jury any more.
Mr. Panish: Okay. Well, I didn't ask that question.
Mr. Putnam: Move to strike, your honor.

Ms. Stebbins: Can me move on and move to strike and ask Mr. Panish to move on to another line of
questioning, please?
Judge: Well --
Mr. Panish: I'll move on to something --
Judge: Why don't we take a break. 15 minutes.
(Break)
Mr. Panish: Yes. Ms. Seawright, I only have a few more questions. Okay?
A. Okay.
Q. In 2009, if AEG Live was your client as a human resources professional, and they came to you and asked
your advice whether or not they should enter into a contract with Dr. Murray and pay Dr. Murray directly, what
would your advice have been?
A. I would have said absolutely no.
Q. Why would you say that?
A. Because of the risks associated with -- with the position and because of the potential for the conflict of
interest.
Q. What if I -- what if they told you, "You know what? We're not going to listen to your advice, and we're
going to go ahead and hire this person"? Would you have any other advice for them?
A. Well, if they insisted on doing it, then I would have recommended a comprehensive vetting process,
including the background checks that we've been talking about, the credit check, criminal, all of that.
Q. Okay. And after all the questions, have you changed any of your opinions?
A. No, I've not.
Mr. Panish: Thank you. That's all.
Ms. Stebbins: Very briefly, your honor.
Judge: All right. Recross.
Recross examination Jessica Stebbins:
Q. Ms. Seawright, Mr. Panish just asked you about exhibit 702-60, and that was the Highright survey.

A. Yes.
Q. And he asked whether that survey recommended background checks in all cases, and you said it did, right?
Mr. Panish: I don't think that was my question.
Q. Thorough background checks in every circumstance?
Mr. Panish: I checked it. I think I asked her about best practices for success that are on the right side of the
page, 702, dash, 60.
Q. He asked you about the Highright survey, right?
A. He asked me about the Highright survey, yes.
Q. And the practices recommended therein?
A. The practices that we were talking about on the page that he referenced, yes.
Q. Now, Highright is a background check company, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So a company that sells background checks recommends background checks be done frequently?
A. That's the business that they're in, they're a consumer reporting agency that offers background check
services.
Q. And their recommendation is, "People should use our product more"?
A. I don't know that that's their recommendation, but they're -- one of their best practices is to screen all
candidates whether they're employees or not.
Q. But they're a company that sells background checks?
A. They're a consuming reporting agency.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, may I approach?
Judge: You may.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I'd like to write one number on this chart.
Mr. Panish: Your honor, I object. They can't write on my chart.
Judge: Use a different color. Have you got a different color?

Mr. Panish: But I want to preserve my -- before she writes it, can she tell us what it's going to be?
Judge: Why don't you tell him.
Ms. Stebbins: Sure.
Q. Ms. Seawright, we talked about the survey you reviewed, it had 63 out of -- you said 700,000 healthcare
practitioners?
A. Facilities.
Ms. Stebbins: Facilities. And I'm going to add the number of facilities that Ms. Seawright has consulted with
in the last 17 years.
Mr. Panish: She doesn't have to write that on this board.
Judge: You want her to do a percentage, the same calculation?
Mr. Panish: She can do her own exhibit.
Judge: She can do it on there. Is there room? I can't see it. Let me see it.
Ms. Stebbins: It's just the background.
Judge: That's fine. You can write on the bottom as long as it's in a different color so everyone knows the black
one is Mr. Panish's and the red one is yours. You can take this if you need to do --
Ms. Stebbins: Let me just save some time here.
Q. Ms. Seawright, you wrote about a survey that has 63 representatives from healthcare companies, right? You
know what? I'm going to try to finish my cross examination, and then we'll move on. That's not your fault, the
pen exploded. You said 63 wasn't a very representative sample, right?
A. I said 63, yeah, out of 700,000.
Q. But in the last 17 years, you've only worked with four, right?
A. I think I've worked with more, but --
Q. That's all you could recall on the stand?
A. That's all I can recall, that's right.
Q. And you didn't do any research in this case to find out what healthcare companies are doing?
A. I did not.
Q. Or what concert production companies are doing?
A. I did not.

Judge: I want to see the numbers now.

Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I'm not sure at this time of day either me or Ms. Seawright can do four into
700,000.
Q. But can we agree that that's a smaller number than .00009 percent?
A. It is.
Q. And you, in your expert report in 2011 for a different negligent hiring case -- you relied on an expert report
that had a very similar sample size to this one, right?
Mr. Panish: Beyond the scope.
Ms. Stebbins: It's not beyond the scope, your honor.
Judge: Overruled.
A. Once again, I cite the survey, and I mentioned I cited the survey and the sample size in order to demonstrate
that that's the only thing that's available regarding any type of statistics for background checks for employees.
So I cite it for that purpose. It's not authoritative, it's not what I'm relying upon exclusively. It's simply to
acknowledge that there is a survey, and this is what it says.
Q. But you did rely on this survey as evidence that everyone considers criminal background checks to be
commonly accepted HR practice, right?
A. No. If you'll read the report again, it talks about my experience in 25 years of working with employers, that
that's what my opinions are based on.
Q. Relied on it in part?
A. It was -- again, it was mentioned to demonstrate that it's all that's out there, and it's what we know that's
available.
Q. So this survey was worth mentioning because it's all that's out there and it's available; but even though the
same thing is true with this survey, you want us to ignore it?
Mr. Panish: It's argumentative.
Judge: Overruled.
Ms. Seawright: I did not mention that because that pertains to employees, so that wasn't something that I used
in my opinions.
Ms. Stebbins: Okay.
Q. Ms. Seawright, are you familiar with the Gallup Poll?
A. I'm familiar with the Gallup Poll organization.

Q. They only survey about 1,000 people to get the opinions of the entire country, right?
A. I do not know that.
Q. You talked a little bit just now about governments and -- testimony, right? Government policies related to
credit checks?
A. Government practices.
Q. Are you aware of whether the EEOC Has had any panels relating to whether or not credit checks are
legitimate or not?
A. I am not positively aware of that. It sounds vaguely familiar to me.
Q. But you are aware that California last year passed a law stringently limiting the use of credit checks, right?
Mr. Panish: Objection. Misstates law; and it's also irrelevant, what happened.
Judge: Last year. Yes, sustained.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, it's relevant because he asked about all these government policies that are in effect
at the moment.
Judge: Overruled. Let's not focus on -- if it's something in 2009, we can talk about that, but
Q. Are you aware that there were proposals in 2009 in the federal government to pass legislation restricting the
use of credit checks?
A. I'm not aware in 2009.
Q. Because there was concern that the undue use of credit checks could injure the public who was suffering
during a recession?
Mr. Panish: first of all, there's no foundation whatsoever for that question, number 1. 2, it's beyond the scope.
Judge: Sustained.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I don't think it's beyond the scope. They introduced the idea behind credit checks
and said there were all these reasons for it. I do have the foundation for it. I don't have it with me because I
didn't know it would come up.
Judge: Overruled.
Q. You're aware that legislators have, in 2009 and later, expressed concern, some members of the legislature,
about the idea that credit checks used indiscriminately could injure people in an already bad economy?
A. No, I'm not aware of that.

Q. And that's not something that you considered in your analysis?

A. No.
Q. And you didn't do any research to find out what the HR practices in the healthcare industry were in this
case?
A. No. This was not a hospital setting that we were hiring Dr. Murray for -- AEG was hiring Dr. Murray for.
Q. You didn't do any research to find out the practices in the concert industry, either?
A. I did not.
Q. And you told us yesterday that the case you consider most analogous to this one is seasonal workers and
Christmas trees?
Mr. Panish: Beyond the scope.
Judge: Overruled.
Ms. Seawright: I don't know that I said "most analogous." I think you were just simply talking about some
analogies. I don't believe I said "most analogous."
Ms. Stebbins: I thought you promised that if you thought of anything more analogous, you would tell me.
Ms. Seawright: I did. But I haven't thought of anything more. That doesn't mean there isn't anything.
Ms. Stebbins: No further questions.
Further redirect examination Brian Panish:
Q. Since counsel wants to bring up credit checks in 2009, was EEOC checking credit of people?
A. My understanding is that they were.
Q. And how many agencies within the EEOC Were they checking?
A. How many agencies?
Q. How many positions, classifications?
A. It's 83 or 84 out of 96 or 97.
Q. So what percent would that be?
A. Oh, gosh.
Q. You know what? Don't even do it.

A. Please don't ask me that.

Q. It's like eight-ninths, whatever that is.
A. Okay.
Q. And then did they -- do you know why -- why the EEOC, in 2009, felt it was important to check credit of
potential employees?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; calls for hearsay, beyond the scope of recross.
Judge: Lacks foundation. Sustained.
Mr. Panish: Oh, no. I have the foundation right here. I would like the court to take judicial notice --
Judge: I'm not doing that.
Mr. Panish: Why not?
Judge: What do you have, a statute?
Mr. Panish: I have a decisional statute of the United States government which I filed a request for judicial
notice this morning --
Judge: I saw --
Mr. Panish: -- properly.
Judge: -- a summary judgment motion ruling.
Mr. Panish: No, no. It's an order of the United States district court setting forth the policies.
Judge: on a summary judgment motion. No, no, no.
Q. From a human resources professional standpoint, why would you want to check out someone's credit and
determine whether they were in severe financial distress?
A. Because financial distress can impact their ability to make ethical judgments and decisions. It -- it can
absolutely affect that. And so that's the reason that EEOC Does it, they've gone -- I've read quotes from them
that they've
Mr. Panish: All right.
Ms. Stebbins: Your honor, I move to strike the hearsay.
Judge: It's going to call for hearsay.
Mr. Panish: I stopped, your honor. Your understanding, not what the EEOC --

Judge: Oh.
Mr. Panish: Can I ask the question?
Judge: Mr. Panish --
Mr. Panish: Your honor, I haven't gotten to the question. Okay?
Judge: We've talked about these questions.
Mr. Panish: We sure have.
Judge: The "understanding" kind of questions.
Mr. Panish: Fair enough. And I haven't asked that question. You don't even know what my question is, I
haven't got a chance to ask it yet. Could I have a chance to ask a question?
Judge: And if it's going to elicit hearsay, I expect there will be an objection before the answer comes in.
Mr. Panish: I'm sure there will be an objection. That's -- I'm not --
Judge: Okay. Ask your question.
Q. As a human resources professional, do you believe it's important to check the credit of somebody that's
being placed in a high-risk, safety-sensitive job?
A. I do; and, again, I -- the position is relevant to me. And high-risk and safety-sensitive, I would evaluate that;
and in many cases, that is what I recommend.
Q. Now, counsel asked you about -- do you know how many background checks AEG ran of Dr. Murray?
A. I don't believe they ran any background checks.
Q. Do you know how many financial checks they ran of Dr. Murray's credit?
A. None.
Q. Do you know -- you told us about your review of Detective Martinez's testimony. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Detective Martinez do any background or credit checks of Dr. Murray?
A. Yes.
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; beyond the scope of recross. Also asked and answered extensively on direct.
Judge: We did go through Detective Martinez.
Mr. Panish: No. Not this -- I haven't got to my question yet again. All I was doing was trying to lay a
foundation, and I'm going to respond to the question that counsel just asked in the recross.

Judge: Okay. We'll wait for the answer.

Q. Counsel just asked you about credit checks. Do you remember those questions she just asked?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is there any reason that you're aware of that AEG Live could not have found the same information
that Detective Martinez did had they run a credit check?
Ms. Stebbins: Objection; lacks foundation. This witness testified at her deposition she's not competent to run
credit checks herself and doesn't know what a credit check of Dr. Murray would have found. Detective Martinez
testified that all of his checks were done after death, so I don't think there's any foundation for this witness to be
able to testify as to what would have been found in May 2009.
Judge: Okay. Sustained.
Mr. Panish: On which basis?
Judge: All of them.
Mr. Panish: All right.
Q. But we -- we know that AEG did nothing to check Dr. Murray's background as far as credit checks; is that
right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And as far as you're concerned, they acted inappropriately in not doing that, because it was a high-risk,
safety-sensitive job; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Mr. Panish: That's all.
Ms. Stebbins: Nothing further, your honor.
Judge: Thank you, Ms. Seawright. You are excused. You may step down. And we do have a witness we're
going to start with, a new one? Who are we calling now?
Mr. Panish: Dr. Schnoll.
Mr. Koskoff: Dr. Schnoll, please, ladies and gentlemen. For the record, in case everybody has forgotten me,
I'm Michael Koskoff for the plaintiff.
Judge: Thank you. Sidney Schnoll, called by the plaintiffs as a witness. Thank you. You may begin.
Mr. Koskoff: Thank you, your honor.