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5 Issue 2, p5-5, 1p; Abstract: Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. One of the current interdisciplinary assumptions is that globalization necessarily amounts to the loss of cultural identity. A particular culture is usually singled out claiming some sort of cognitive and ethical absolutism. In contrast to this view, there have been other approaches urging us to rethink our conceptions and commitments to culture, but leading to a malign relativism that regards all forms of cultural expression as equally valid. In any case, culture and globalization came to be understood as mutually exclusive or incompatible. If the ideal Hegel suggests through philosophical reasoning helps us to overcome this alleged dilemma, it is interesting to ponder over its future in the current circumstances of globalization. These circumstances stress the need for global communication and recognition among the different, and quite often conflicting, cultural creations. The challenge the Hegelian philosophy of Bildung (culture) has to deal with is to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of current Bildung. It has to avoid, on the one hand, the arrogant complacency of those values that claim any kind of absolutism. On the other hand, it has also to avoid a rampant relativism that distributes validity and praises to all forms of cultural expressions in the name of the need to self-expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]; (AN 20068250) Vínculo persistente a este informe (enlace permanente): http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=2006 8250&lang=es&site=ehost-live Cortar y pegar: <A href="http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN =20068250&lang=es&site=ehost-live">HEGEL ON CULTURE AND GLOBALIZATION.</A> Base de datos: Academic Search Complete
HEGEL ON CULTURE AND GLOBALIZATION Abstract Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. One of the current interdisciplinary assumptions is that globalization necessarily amounts to the loss of cultural identity. A particular culture is usually singled out claiming some sort of cognitive and ethical absolutism. In contrast to this view, there have been other approaches urging us to rethink our conceptions and commitments to culture, but leading to a malign relativism that regards all forms of cultural expression as equally valid. In any case, culture and
cultural identity. As it has been plausibly suggested. In fact.( n4) So this ideal presupposes universality. it has also to avoid a rampant relativism that distributes validity and praises to all forms of cultural expressions in the name of the need to self-expression. a culture "is no longer a discrete world. he had also to stand clear from any form of malign relativism that would attribute validity and significance to all forms of cultural . on the one hand. globalization is important because it affects both selfunderstanding and cultural identity. but it also thrives in culturally and historically specific traditions of ethical thought and practice. Globalization has attracted the attention of many disciplines. The difficult task Hegel undertook to accomplish was to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of modern culture.globalization came to be understood as mutually exclusive or incompatible. he had to avoid the arrogant complacency of any set of values that claim a kind of cognitive and moral absolutism. It is transformed to accord with a world of ruptured boundaries"( n2). cultural creations. These circumstances stress the need for global communication and recognition among the different. absolutism. relativism Introduction Philosophers may argue endlessly about globalization. the arrogant complacency of those values that claim any kind of absolutism. Cultural identity is important for Hegel. On the other hand. this profound need of humanity should be understood in universalist terms and viewed through cultural and historical lenses. as Hegel says. we could argue that this ever-increasing tendency reflects the expression of the most profound need of the human mind to understand itself through dialogue and interaction with what is different from oneself. globalization. It has to avoid. but they can all agree that it refers to an increasing interconnectedness and convergence of activities and forms of life among diverse cultures throughout the world. In other words. likes "to see things with the eye of reason". The challenge the Hegelian philosophy of Bildung (culture) has to deal with is to steer a viable theoretical middle way for the values of current Bildung. philosophy itself has some important cultural presuppositions. This remains a universal and eternal truth about humanity. Hegel would not be of much help to anyone who insists to understand the process of globalization as necessarily implying homogeneity and the annihilation of all difference. through acts of reciprocal recognition( n3) and never through isolation. unfortunately. Key words: culture. If the ideal Hegel suggests through philosophical reasoning helps us to overcome this alleged dilemma. it is interesting to ponder over its future in the current circumstances of globalization. Following Hegel. it has been reduced to a mere economic logic. indifferent to all cultural and historical differentiations. On the other hand. But. Quite often. and quite often conflicting. On the one hand. why does that matter? For a moral and social philosopher who. On this basis.
With this step he was also able to avoid the strictly individualistic understanding suggested by German romanticism. Crucial to this view was the idea that man has a natural tendency to change and develop through a process of a smooth. It is a concern for its limitations and for the prospect for its completion in a historical process that prepares us for life within a civil community. p. he tried to preserve its former classical and Baroque elements together with the modern progressivist and secularist fragrance of the Enlightenment.expression unconditionally.p. the very project of establishing a critical tribunal of reason is for Kant "the full and complete development of human reason" (A851/B879. trying not to lose some of its perspicacious conceptions. In his essay on the Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolital Purpose. unilinear perfection. Kant associates directly the concept of culture with the idea of the critical self-explication of reason. he incorporated in it the idea of sharing the clustering of cultural values by which we live. because this might lead us to an understanding of culture in quantitative terms. as the only creature whose natural capacities are directed towards the use of reason. This paper exposes the basic steps of the Hegelian venture and the endogenous strains of tension from which this venture suffers. The Kantian idea of a struggling human reason enabled him to appreciate the significance of a project in which both .43). Bildung came to be associated with Kultur as the complete and harmonious unfolding of one's undeveloped natural talents and capacities. Therefore. Hegel opposed forcefully this idea. In his criticism of Lessing for making the education of humanity "a constant growth of knowledge". In the Critique of Pure Reason. Bildung as culture Hegel's preoccupation with the notion of Bildung as culture reveals a great number of influences and an enormous complexity due to the interdependence of its dimensions.p. It also encourages us to ponder over the value of the Hegelian theory for us today. "the greatest idea of the eighteenth century" (1985. It was probably.( n5) In fact.10). Man.( n6) It was Kant who broadened the scope of the concept of culture and exercised the most definitive influence on Hegel. Above all. Hegel shaped his understanding of culture under the weight of the Kantian legacy. Hegel says characteristically: "one can go in this manner at great length without ever reaching any definite conclusions or making any qualitative pronouncements". as Gadamer rightly said. The philosophers of the Enlightenment assigned to culture a prominent place. this is an act of culture. Culture was seen as self-cultivation and self-improvement. In fact. Kant says that the development and further exercise of one's natural abilities is a duty to oneself. must make complete use of his capacities in order to reach that stage where his development is up "to that degree which corresponds to nature's original intention" (1980.665). The Kantian approach to culture constitutes a deliberate approach to reason and a certain concern for it.
However. It was not meant to be just an instruction into world history. universal essence of the mind.230. this process had to follow the prescriptions of the Hegelian dialectic: a pattern of estrangement from an initial state of natural unity and a subsequent reconciliation with it. We are not mere transcendental possibilities or members of the Kingdom of Ends. to broaden what has been suggested so far. it is bound to be unrealistic and impossible to live up to for actual.p. At its best. the road to culture is the road to reason and anyone who "travels on that high road" must learn to appreciate the universal significance of Geist and avoid being conspicuous (para. What the Hegelian notion of Bildung allows us to do is "to settle for a second-rate naturally constrained spontaneity" to use John McDowell's phrase (1994. No matter how much selective Hegel has been in his focus on various cultures and historical periods.e. between rational abstraction and historical relativity. Of course. custom and social norms. living human beings. In the Hegelian light. Besides. The essence of the Kantian view of culture comes down to the idea of our being able to legislate for ourselves spontaneously. We read in the Introduction of his Lectures on the Philosophyof History: . this idea amounts to the exercise of the capacity to self-compulsion and the subsequent triumph of reason over nature. In the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel. emotional and volitional terms by sharing the world's most significant objective dimensions. Werke 7. the life of somebody capable of achieving the ideals of a cultured way of life.67).individuals and cultures try to come to terms with their internal imperfections and inadequacies. so that both individuals and cultures learn to appreciate what lies behind the transience of history and is therefore capable of "infinite modifications".96). of moral autonomy and political freedom can be represented as a process of training oneself in mental. but as the richness typical of humanity. how to steer the middle theoretical way between rational universalism and cultural diversity. his concern has always been to bring each individual and culture closer to the stock of universal conceptions. He deviates from the Kantian prescriptions. we must also bear in mind that Hegel thought that this would enable us to be in conformity with the genuine. it was primarily thought to be important for self-expression and the achievement of a deeper appreciation of the significance of our own culture. The basic idea is that we achieve a less inadequate and a more enriched understanding of ourselves. i. when he determines to view this struggle not as a predicament of poverty and incorrigible deficiency. p. p. if we learn to confront the "other" and engage in a dialogue with it. but living organisms sharing a world of language. His underpinning assumption has always been the sharing of and the communication with other points of view. That was precisely the challenge to which Hegel had to respond. The Hegelian understanding of culture involves a process of alienation and confrontation with what is different from us.15A. the problem is that because such an ideal of culture presupposes the endorsement of dualism.
With this powerful link. The first level consists of what we nowadays mean as language games. The second level refers to the involvement of these concepts and meanings in what Ivan Soll has styled as paideutic games. Most importantly. It is no realm in heaven or a transcendental standpoint. . practices and institutions. For the first time the concept of Bildung abandoned the Procrustean bed upon which it was placed for quite some time.e. they need to be re-considered or even totally rejected. In the Hegelian system this act of "getting beyond" takes place at two levels. social. Moreover. living world of cultural expression and sociopolitical association. i. There are a number of occasions where Hegel speaks of a cultural tradition as man's "second nature" or "second birth". Important about this order are its recognitional structures that provide our judgements with social confirmation and our quests with coherence and intelligibility.57)."The cultured man is accustomed to act in the light of universal perspectives and ends" (p. Sittlichkeit (usually translated as ethical life) is the term used by Hegel in order to refer to the worldview of each cultural tradition that exercises upon its members such a determining influence. Their common feature is that they all constitute structures that afford their members with acknowledging recognition. but our being in a constant dialogue with the finest values of our and of other cultures. economic and strictly political relationships and practices (1972. ethical (or customary). i. What Hegel entitles Sittlichkeit is meant to be an ethical and cultural order expressing patterns of ideals and beliefs and embraces individuals.32). For Hegel. but it has also a pervasive social and ethical dimension. Hegel makes it clear that the modern imperative of being cultured should no longer be understood as the free development of personality. he exposes the myth of selfsufficiency and our need of the "other" for reasons of spiritual survival and not biological maintenance. the process of Bildung involves not only the education of mind and character. The most important part of Hegel's strategy was to create a powerful link between Bildung as a process of self-formation and the world of culture. In getting beyond his naturalness man finds himself already engaged in a cultural world humanly constituted through language. custom and civil association. they both were seen as important for self-understanding and cultural identity as they were linked inextricably with each other. It permeates our lives even without our own awareness and consent. Hence Bildung in the sense of culture (Kultur) becomes a pervasive impersonal mode of thought. The "subjective" (or individual) and the "objective" (or social) were now considered to be the two significant componential elements of a single concept. if they cease to express the emotional and intellectual needs of their participants.p. but the actual. concepts and meanings shared and commonly used by individuals living and interacting in a certain culture.e.( n7) By utilizing the Aristotelian notion of second nature.
But culture in Hegelian philosophy has also a historical dimension and it would be wrong not to stress the interconnectedness of these dimensions just because there are many puzzling questions that surround Hegel's trust in "the rational process of world history". There are some significant details about the historical dimension of culture. or an entire culture. or the "strife with the negative" referring basically to the incessant dialectic confrontations in which the human mind. In his Reason in History. a publicly shared ethical background from which its members cannot fully or really abstract.estrangement -reconciliation. when it is fully aware of what it is really capable. the significance of a certain culture is not understood and appreciated through acts of solitary contemplation. Although this might seem as a weakness of the way human reason operates. The temporary satisfaction that disquiets consciousness in the context of the Phenomenology of Spirit is present within the universal scope of human history. So the incessant negative activity of human reason becomes for Hegel the foundation of history. we find again the famous pattern of simple unity -. The inner dialectic of reason applies both to individuals and cultures. engages with other subjects or cultures.33. is a selfdevastating attempt of a stubborn sceptic to strip off our cultural clothes leaving us with nothing significant. The phases of this process procure an enriched form of self." (p.21). Characteristic examples in the Hegelian texts are the classical Greek culture with its internal strife between the individual and society and the Enlightenment culture with its famous antithesis of reason and faith. it constitutes the animating virtue of Hegelian Bildung: the incessant need of human spirit to fight immediacy and to be open to and receptive of the cultural space in general.Hegel's portrayal of culture as the reflection of man's rational nature implies a number of things: Firstly. p. any attempt to "raise the veil" of culture. Werke 12. Hegel styles this process as the fight against immediacy.( n8) Hegel invites us to assume that each culture overcomes its strains according to an internal plan. the historical dimension must be understood in relation to the dynamic nature that characterises reason. A rational culture is a culture that consciously posits its difference within itself and achieves unity with itself and the world. The first is that Hegel believes that this process is conducted in . In the first instance. So. It manifests all its powers in every possible way. culture constitutes a rationally articulated structure that respects difference. Each historical culture suffers from internal strains and oppositions it needs to overcome. Finally.understanding. Secondly. Beyond absolutism and relativism The association of culture with Sittlichkeit endows this process with a social dimension. he writes characteristically: "The forms it produced become the material on which it labours to raise itself up to new forms. It achieves this. but through its members' active re-constitution of and participation in its practices and institutions.
accomplish some of their goals in their broader project of self-development. The doctrine of reason in history was designed to integrate reason and nature in their ever. We are natural beings who inhabit a cultural world and this world is our immovable ground. it is not just our purposeful self-surrender to the universal demands of Geist.growing knowledge of what human consciousness attains gradually. as Hegel put it in his Reason in History (p. Hegel is adamant on this: we no longer have to fight against nature. but the end of a long inquiry conducted by human spirit and not by a single somehow superior culture. This means. In this light. we realise that "spirit begins from a state of infinite potentiality". We are already "thrown" into a world of historical change and cultural demands. Bildung is not only our individual paideutic investigation. a being capable of integrity and freedom. living beings with our limited capacities and psychological vulnerabilities. for our picture of ourselves as crude natural beings has been dismissed. that feeds the arguments of platonism and the lure of "the transcendental". but a duality created from the standpoint of culture.the light of an ever. as we indicated earlier. this kind of cognitivism justifies Hegel's going into so much trouble to describe the "pathway" of Bildung. what spirit knows is important for its ascending the various cultural stages. It also means that this duality is not the final predicament of the human condition. In a sense. that there is no natural condition totally devoid of the operations of reason. Nor does it mean that man needs this process in order to escape from an alleged state of animal insensibility. or nature. The process of self-creation takes place partly on the level of individual education and partly it is already an ongoing concern of our culture. Hegel should be understood to be suggesting that man needs culture in order to understand himself as a spiritual being. However this does not necessarily translate to a process of incessant improvement.131/78). In other words. To suggest that culture must be looked at from this historical perspective simply stresses the fact that the achievement of integrity is not instantaneous. Culture is available to us as real. It is that persistent temptation to discover the "mystery" of our existence. At this stage. Going through the stages of this inquiry. The second is the fact that our realization of our rationality and of the possibility for further self-actualization is something that occurs not from the standpoint of "bare" nature. we must see history as a prolonged education of both individuality and humanity. In other words. or an achievement of our historical heritage.increasing over historic time interaction. the historical dimension of culture should not be understood as encouraging some kind of evolutionary speculation about a possible ungebildet (uncultured) stage from which humanity emerged. Trying to go beyond this recognisable background will only trap us in a vicious circle of evolutionary speculation. or indeed whole cultures. As it has been so . There may be an ever-growing awareness of freedom as individuals. but from the standpoint of culture.
) which reveals itself through activity.31).plausibly put: "Mere ignorance about how human culture might have come on the scene in the first place is hardly a plausible starting point for an argument that initiation into it must actualise an extra-natural potential in human beings. In other words. According to Hegel. this is not an optional process. that this "vast spectacle of events and actions" is itself a process governed by an "original" reason is. The proposition finds its proof in history. We have left last the most important idea. On the level of world history. this makes room for a diverse range of interpretations.". or freedom is the goal of history. in the products of its self-transformative activity. reason is both universal and historically specific.( n9) There is no doubt that Hegel cherished full trust in the rationality of history. So. On the one hand. if we recognise the significance of being initiated into a certain historical tradition of ethical thought and practice. p. it is possible (according to Hegel) to understand that human history in its entirety obeys a rational principle. World history. . But on the other hand. only if we see ourselves as parts of this world. according to Hegel. any attempt to hypostatize Geist is rejected from the beginning. but is instead governed by an "ultimate design". This idea makes Hegel's project particularly interesting. as the latter exhibits the relation of this "original" and universal design of reason to the world. we cannot relativize the significance and indeed the content of our values and ideals. states and individuals" (ibid. Hegel's conclusion must read something like this: we can only come to terms with our nature and we can only realise our potentialities. Therefore. this view appears to be a presupposition only from the historical standpoint. So. For Hegel. we do have a chance to selfrealization. of infinitely varied constellations of nations. since the only ultimate purpose of the entire process is the self-expression of universal reason. namely the idea that history itself is a rational process through which mankind progresses towards freedom. From the speculative standpoint. In this light. this highlights the universal significance and necessity of the theory. but the result of our being creatures that actualize themselves in this particular way. it is "a divine and absolute reason" (ibid. On the contrary. though it creates difficulties for the compatibility of these two aspects. it cannot achieve an adequate degree of a comprehensive understanding of the history of mankind.. This dimension introduces the idea that world-history is not at the mercy of contingency. Hegel says. a proposition we must assume. is "a vast spectacle of events and actions. But of course. We may assume that this is because the historian will be absorbed in the empirical particularity of historical events losing the connecting principle that explains or justifies them. We are given sufficient warning that this design does not assume the rationality of a singular self-conscious subject. however. First of all. this reason manifests itself in a bewildering diversity of cultural traditions. In his eyes it is impossible to escape from our culture.
what drives an entire culture forward is the determination to overcome its internal contradictions and achieve thereby its aims and ideals. This strategy may not undermine the developmental character of Bildung as culture.66A.16. p. From the earliest stage. Hegel firmly believed that we respond to the imperative of culture because we are prompted by our nature to do so. however. the purpose of human consciousness is always to gain knowledge of its own rationality. On this basis. Although necessity is one of the central concepts in his works. The necessity and significance of our cultural values are not answerable to some kind of a purer or universal reason. In this light. as Hegel himself admits. the dialectic should be consonant with the universal purposive plan according to which the world of culture unfolds. p. Hegel has never articulated or defended clearly this concept. I am entitled to the union of my potential and my actual being. but in terms of the immanent purposiveness of human nature to realize an all comprehensive plan. why do we need such a universal standard of Bildung in the first place? To respond to this question.241/p. however. p. It does encourage. particularly in relation to his views on culture.8/p. the kind of necessity involved in this process should not be understood in terms of formal necessity or deductive certainty. Or. we respond to the demands of culture precisely because we find ourselves in a world shaped by cultural demands. are they? It may be useful. On the background of this suggestion. questions about the internal consistency of Hegel's theory. Therefore. Hegel himself has shown that human nature is second nature. Our nature.21- .9/pp. This idea is expressed in the Philosophy of Right: "The spirit is always one and single and should dwell in me. We take the notion of purposiveness to explain the "traffic" that develops between the Aristotelian concepts of "potentiality" (dunamis) and "actuality" (energeia). Unquestionably. is not the "bare" nature of vulgar naturalism. there is an inner dialectic in the activity of spirit that presses it forward to what Hegel understands to be genuine self-completion.this universality imposes upon human culture a certain kind of formalism that conflicts with Hegel's firm adherence to the notion of second nature.144). On the one hand. Similarly.21) which fails to be integrated with a monotonous and empty formalism (para. But can we avoid formalism on this basis? One should not forget that in the Preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel condemns what he styles as "a boring show of diversity" (para. at this point. Human life is described as an activity with an inner purpose: the realization of our rational nature as the kind of beings we are. we must deal with the necessity of this process." (para. we may read Hegel's position as follows: what characterises human nature is the immanent dialectical movement of thought which necessarily entails a transition to new and more educated or complete forms of consciousness. to raise the following question: if culturally dependent conceptions of reason are definitive of one's self-identity.15. we should employ some kind of contextual explanation and justification of our ideals and values.
he says: "The result is the same as the beginning. the standpoint point from which we embark on our expressive activities is the cultural standpoint of second nature.12/p. Hegel would go on. What is added in the final stage is the element of full knowledge of what we were capable from the very beginning. p. Of course. This would be a misunderstanding not only of Hegel's intentions. But there are several pressing questions that need to be addressed. only because the beginning is the process.46/p. It would be wrong to contend that Hegelian formalism amounts to the Kantian persistence in the transcendental perspective. had we believed that the general pattern amounts to the cultural variations of human expression. the purpose to be realized is essentially the same with the beginning of the entire process. here. constitute a good and reliable guide for the assessment of morally demanding situations? . He insists on this critique because of the "monochromatic formalism" that ensues from any approach that imposes an external governing principle on all the instances of the teleological unfolding.29).( n10) Hegel might defend himself by saying that we would totally miss the point of the process. but. Why do we need. In the Phenomenology of Spirit.22. however much it may vary. then. should we accept any modification or change in our cultural space unconditionally as part of the paideutic inquiry of Bildung? Could the idea that all cultural differences reflect an underlying universal pattern. but also of the premises he uses as his starting point. For example. it is our self-discovery in the world of culture that enables us to undertake any project at all. Hegel must surely have thought that we do need a conception of rational universality in order to avoid excessive relativism and historicism." (para. it nevertheless remains essentially the same". the idea of such a universal reason. This prompts us to assume that it was his belief in the immanence of the unfolding that made him distinguish the kind of universality he advocated from the vacuous formalism that he attacked in the Phenomenology. In the absence of a notion of secondnature. On the other hand.26) and in the Reason in History. The general pattern is capable of infinite modifications.22). past and present. he rephrases the same view by saying that "…the ultimate end is the intention which underlies the world" (p. The Kantian program struggles with the duality it has itself created. Hegel's saying that: "Descriptions of human nature are meant to apply to all men. that humanity achieves integrity when it has become fully conscious of what it is. We may recall. In contrast with this picture of humanity. the Hegelian project starts from a totally different conviction. The distinctions it draws have painful consequences on morality and culture. Actually. This project may use descriptions of different examples of what we mean by actualization of human nature. it insists to bargain the autonomy of reason at the expense of nature. is the purpose that guides all these diverse activities. What remains same. if second nature does most of the work? Although he endorses some form of relativism.
new questions arise about a number of cultural. But it may also be the case that a culture presents itself as dominant on the basis of its contesting the legitimacy . he should be at least less vague while referring to the immanent teleology of reason as the driving force of Bildung. There may be a case where a culture exercises its authority over other cultures due to mere imperialistic interests. then Hegel would be right in maintaining that his theory is a good candidate that explains and describes universally necessary and significant things about humanity. Each of the candidates is culturally dependent. under the pretext that they all betray this hidden purposiveness? Hegel's aspiration to establish his theory as universally binding is understandable. For Hegel. It has been suggested that it was the concrete historical situation of Hegel's time that called for such an a priori conception of history. but it does imply that all the culturally diverse standpoints are ultimately answerable to this conception. This does not imply the elimination of cultural diversity. if fighting abstraction and redressing ethical contextualism was of equal importance to him. immutable canons of rationality. we are able to avoid "vulgar" relativism with the help of the concept of a universal truth and morality that goes "beyond the loud voices of history".( n11) Before one hastens to reject the theory and argue that we do not need such a conception. History shows. or that the development of reason in history should be understood in terms of a logical spiritual development. But. the defending position would go on contending that this original and universal plan of internal unfolding evinces necessity for all cultures including our own. even in our enlightened days. we should respond to the following question. Any culture defines itself in relation or even in opposition to other cultures. a better stock of values and ideals in order to confront the arising difficulties. In addition. whilst we commit ourselves to the cultural standpoint. this would also explain why. a better understanding of the problems. A frequent defence of Hegel assumes that any similar criticism attacks the internal consistency of this theory. Quite logically then. Concluding remarks Hegel has repeatedly asserted that cultural identity is essentially determined by difference. Do we need some purer. moral and political issues. several candidates emerge claiming a better worldview. since our own situation has changed dramatically.Could we accept all cultural expressions indiscriminately. according to Hegel. We may instead argue that Hegel's aim was to conceptualise development. that we need the conception of a universally valid and necessary standard in order to assess these questions. which are rigidly pre-determined and codified to operate in purposive terms and to which our conceptions of ourselves and of the world are necessarily answerable? If yes. that these relations are not always relations of equality. The defence would go on by suggesting that we should drop all interpretations of Weltgeist as a "metaphysical entity directing history from the supersensible shadows". Today. This means.
But we would be blind and naïve. Globalization is undoubtedly an important constitutive feature of the modern world. it will be enormously difficult to respond to the growing overlapping or transboundary problems with success without yielding to cultural fatalism or concealed imperialism.3). But these rights should be attributed to them on the basis that they are human (para. The relationships cultures form with each other aim precisely at self-vindication and not at the eclipse of cultural identity. But. For example. It should not be denied.of some of the beliefs or practices of another culture. In other words. although a law may have arisen from cultural practices. we do not see often an acknowledgement of the fact that it was Hegel more than Kant who created the conceptual framework allowing for both ethical contextualism and rational universality. to say the least. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel is exceptionally clear. For example. the criticism of that practice makes sense because it appeals to a deeply engraved belief that all human beings have intrinsic value and the inalienable rights to self-determination and freedom. is that globalization does not necessarily prefigure the end of cultural identity. we have to admit that quite often this is used as a useful pretext.270). What the Hegelian theory of cultural development and world history showed. When a culture discerns the importance of this distinction. Encyclopaedia III. we could say that globalization is "the judgement of the world" (para. Unfortunately. But even in the case of the use as a pretext. It certainly creates new challenges the .548).340. it may still be unjust and irrational (para. we should assert the ethical primacy and autonomy of each culture without denying however the possibility of appealing to certain universal ideas and impulses of modern moral and socio-political thought. the attribution of several rights to certain minorities may go against the customary practices of a community. to believe that we should grant. In recent years. Rephrasing one of Hegel's lines from the Philosophy of Right. Unfortunately. when it establishes relations of dialogue and interaction with other cultures. Unless we consider that such a synthesis is viable and operative even in our own predicament. it constitutes a reflective culture. in the name of cultural identity. our approval to a culture that violates the most important requirements of human rationality and moral autonomy. Held and Habermas have been addressing the normative implications of globalisation in an attempt to suggest some solutions to problems such as the absence of justice or the loss of democracy. para. criticism and rejection of children's exploitation and human slavery does not simply serve as a helping hand to somebody's concealed imperialism. It is the pre-existing customs of a culture that condition the laws of that culture. precisely because it attaches great importance to the stock of universal conceptions to which we referred earlier. Hegel was clear on this: Otherness should be confronted and acknowledged. philosophers such as Rawls. It must be obvious now that a culture is reflective.
Hegel describes a fragmented and incoherent culture suffering from universal perversion of meanings and values. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. A detailed analysis of this theory cannot be offered here for obvious reasons.74. August 2005 for their valuable suggestions and criticism. Introduction: Reason in History. But just because it is part of a culture. It is a complex concept with a long history. G. self-determined conscious subjects with acknowledging recognition and self-vindication enables him to depart from the Cartesian and Kantian tradition of the solitary knowing subject and opt for the social or intersubjective standpoint of Geist.) D. Hegel's emphasis on the process that affords separate. Culture". Werke 12.301) and Reason in History (p. Oxford University Press.279. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the concept of Bildung as well as of Hegel's own multi-dimensional use in a number of his works see my Reason and Nature in Hegel's Theory of Bildung (1998). Entry for the Oxford Companion to Politics. Footnotes (n2. we can only convey some of the most important aspects of the Hegelian use.) In the Phenomenology of Spirit. ( n3) We refer here to the theory of reciprocal or intersubjective recognition. p.McGrew. "Globalisation". The usual disclaimer applies. held at Pythagoreion (Samos) in Greece.significance of which we should not overlook. Here.F. p. p.. (n4. pp. For a discussion of this theory see Pinkard (1994). p.44.Held & A.W. perhaps with greater concern than ever before.108-109. as Hegel formulates it in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy of Right (para. we should reconsider. Hegel's point is that any similar culture that glorifies the arbitrary whim of individual expression fails to afford its . Today. but it also has an important social dimension. (n7.2004). thematic concepts of Hegel's philosophy. (n8. Acknowledgements I would like to thank conference participants of the 17 th International Conference on the "Philosophy of Culture and Globalization". p. It certainly betrays an educational ideal. Werke 17.) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. there is an entire section entitled "Self-alienated Spirit.151. (n5.97/57). No English word constitutes a successful translation.) Bildung is one of the central. Hegel's theory has also shown that no belief or practice develops ex nixilo. In this case.126. we have chosen to use the original German term. Oxford. our commitments about cultural identity and cultural diversity on a global level.) Hegel. Werke 7.146). this does not endow the belief or the practice with immunity from thorough examination and forceful criticism. Williams (1992) and Karavakou (1998. Therefore.) Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (II. (n6. Introduction: Reason In History. p.
translated from the German edition of J. 1979. Cited by volume. like those of the decadent 18 th century France. (1994). . Introduction: Reason in History. K. (eds. Grundlinien des Philosophie des Rechts.B. (n10. Oxford: Oxford University Press.44. Cited by volume and page number. (n11. In some cases. References Gadamer.) Reason in History. London. Translated as Hegel's Philosophy of Right by T. Additions are indicated by an "A".Knox (1967). Werke 16-17.members with self-recognition. pp. Phänomenologie des Geistes. St.) Houlgate. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III.) (1970). (2001).B. it is an uncertain.Forbes. Werke 3.G.) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.Wallace & A.Speirs & J.V. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Werke 10. Cited by paragraph and page number. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Miller (1971).Sibree (1956). (n9. Cited by volume. this happened precisely because the Enlightenment culture universalized its own principles and never engaged in a dialogue with other cultures. Vorlesungen Über die Philosophie der Religion.Miller (1977). Translated as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind by W. J. Cited by volume and page number. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. paragraph and page number. Apparently. Hence the strife with "the negative" is necessary. Cited by paragraph and page number. Cited by volume and page number. (1991.Sanderson (1895. Truth and Method. but it is a strife that needs to be resolved and the dialogue with other cultures is a valuable antidote against such a predicament.Hoffmeister by H. (1985). J. Translated as Phenomenology of Spirit by A. E.Nisbet (1975) with an introduction by D. Cited by page number. 3 vols. Werke 7. New York: Dover. Werke 12. p.B. Cited by page number. Cited by volume and paragraph number. are bound to assimilate such an alienated environment and perpetuate its contradictions in their language and activities. Shed & Ward.1993). Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Habermas. Translated as Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion by E. Translated as The Philosophy of History by J.M & Moldenhauer. German pagination follows English pagination. Cited by page number. Michel. reprinted 1968. as far as Hegel is concerned. Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden: Theorie Werkausgabe.123-124.) McDowell. Cited by paragraph and page. Hegel's message is that any culture that procures confusion and inversion and thrives on fragmentation. Additions are indicated by an "A". The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. Cambridge. Ma: MIT Press. Standard English translations are normally cited. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.M.V. Consequently its members. H. disorientated and self-estranged culture.
N. McDowell. Unpuplished PhD Thesis.gr Copyright of Globalization (15359794) is the property of Globalization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. (1995). ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Stanford.. (1993). Hegel's Theory of Individual Freedom. (1993). in G. I. Athens: Gutenberg Publications. (2004). Vasiliki Karavakou 17 Palaiologou Street. Kant. "World History as the Progress of Consciousness: An Interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of History". Critique of Pure Reason. users may print. Department of International and European Studies University of Macedonia. London. Pinkard.Stern. La información de los vínculos que verá más arriba proporciona un vínculo persistente a la búsqueda que solicitó. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ~~~~~~~~ By Vasiliki Karavakou.42-52. (1991).B. S. or email articles for individual use. 55236 Thessaloniki Greece. London: Macmillan Press. R. I. e-mail: vkm@uom.K. Soll. Political Liberalism. Karavakou V.22. vol. (1972). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.W. Greece Address for correspondence Dr.3. Stanford University Press. Williams. vol. (1994).Smith (transl. Panorama.). vol. R.26-33. Philosophical Inquiry. Kant. 2nd ed. J. pp. Freedom. Nisbet. I. Thessaloniki. University of London. H. (1992). download.Held. Karavakou. (1998). Houlgate. Rawls. Tel: 0030 2310 347441. Houlgate. (1980). Fichte and Hegel on the Other. J. New York. 25. . Reiss. ed. Cambridge. Ma: Harvard University Press. S. "Friendship and Recognition in Aristotle and Hegel". (1994). Educational Theory. Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy. V. Recognition. Columbia University Press. translated by H. V. D. (2002). Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Reason and Nature in Hegel's Theory of Bildung. "Hegel as a Philosopher of Education". Karavakou. Dr. (1989). Albany: SUNY Press. Mind and World. Political Writings.R. pp. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. However.F. T. Hegel: Critical Assessments.
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