This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Strategies of StruggZe and Strategic StruggZes
n one of his many biographical sketches of Pedro Albizu Campos, Juan Antonio Corretjer wrote: “El misterio de su existencia es tan llicido que desfila en la extraordinaria versatilidad de su liderato. Ning6n dirigente anterior baraj6, defendiendolo, igual niimero de formas de lucha. La magia de su palabra oral y escrita la enfoc6 en casi todas formas m9s eficaces. La disquisici6r-r filos6fica, la exposici6n juridica, la oraci6n religiosa, politica o agitadora; el folleto, el aru’culo y la correspondencia privada, la gesti6n discreta entre amigos y simpa&antes en el campo adversario, el sufragio coma medio de organizacidn politica y discusi6n doctrinaria, el retraimiento coma resistencia y ttcnica revolucionaria, la huelga de obreros y estudiantes, el medio diplomitico, el trabajo international, 10s contactos con gobiernos e instituciones extranjeras en cada moment0 determindado disponible, 10s puertorriquefios residenciados en el extranjero, principalmente
domiciliados en Nueva York.. ., la conspiraci6n, la acci6n directa, la lucha de calle, la insurreccibn; en fin, la mobilizaci6n de todos 10s factores para la fecunda actividad en la que despleg6 su fascinaci6n y eficacia, la mas esplendida imaginaci6n politica de nuestra actividad creadora que respaldaba con un total olvido de sus conveniencias personales, hizo de Cl un gran poeta de la vida.“’ This portrait of the Puerto Rican Nationalist by one of his oldest and closest companions in the struggle differs radically from the vision that has dominated Puerto Rican iconography. For the majority, whatever their political ideology, the name of Albizu Campos evokes violence, whether terrorism for some or revolutionary justice for others. The various constructions of the life of Albizu Campos are founded on the theme of violence: the RIO Piedras Massacre; the “execution” of Colonel Riggs and the “assassination” of Rosado and Beauchamp; the Ponce Massacre; the insurrection at Jayuya; the “gag laws;” the attack on Blair House; and the assault on the U.S.
CARLOS RODRIGUEZ-FRATICELLI is Assistant Professor, Social Science Department, College of General Studies, University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras. The article was translated from the Spanish by Jose Medina. n Left to Right, Haitian poet Pierre-Moraviah Morpeau, nationalist Juanita Ojeda and Pedro Albizu Campos, San Juan Puerto Rico. 1947. Ruth M. Reynolds Papers, Centro Library.
’ The former covers the first years of Pedro Albizu Campos’s militancy in the Nationalist Party prior to being elected its president. . e/ Pam’do Nacionalista rehusa pam. he limits these to the electoral arena. a raia delpobre resrikado que obtuvo su pam’do en 80s comin’os. Prior to 1930. From then on.2 In one of the most recent attempts to re-evaluate the historical figure of Albizu. All the other dimensions of Albizu’s political work. If it is true that this one-dimensional image of Albizu has been promoted by defenders of the colonial system. Albizu se habia manifestado proclive al uso de las armas coma medio de lucha. Albizu’s global strategy is reduced to a choice between two tactics: elections or armed struggle. the year he assumed . However. lo que de$nid su tJha&gia globalhe justamente e/ fraaso de cscl tdtfico ekctoral. acomoa’ando sus piezas y probando algunas tdcti~s inicioks. political agendas or simply theoretical or methodological deficiencies.cipar en has ekcciontzr Iocaks y encauad su /uo$a par otros mtdios no przciramenw pacaifico ‘a Like others before him. it is no less true that the same view has been consciously or unconsciously nurtured by social scientists committed or sympathetic to the national liberation struggle of Puerto Rico. according to Ferrao. Sin embargo. Thus. while the latter covers the time Albizu spent in New York City after his release from Atlanta Federal prison! A study of these two periods would help to create a more rounded picture of Albizu’s global strategy and demonstrate the methodological limitations of previous studies. a greater violence has been perpetrated against history. Although Ferrao recognizes the existence of other forms of struggle within Albizu’s arsenal of tactics prior to 1932. Both periods also culminate with the imprisonment of the Nationalist leader.. Ferrao proposes a direct causal relationship between electoral defeat and a change in strategy when he argues that with the 1932 electoral defeat. in his highly controversial Pedro Albizu Catnpos y el nacionalljmo puercom~ueiio. completely ignoring other elements in Albizu’s strategy. Si se nos permite la analogia adrejecista. pero tambien habia hecho claro en reiteradas ocasiones su firme predilecci6r-r por 10s mttodos pacificos. With this history of violence. perhaps due to their ideological prejudices. the dramatic and the spectacular.’ This narrow view of Albizu’s global strategy practically dominates the literature on the subjects This formulation of Albizu’s strategies of struggle has been founded mainly on the study of two historical moments: 1930-1936 and 1950-1954. Para nosouos esto significa que el Partido Nacionalista no habia definido todavia cual seria el medio indicado para llegar al poder y obtener la independencia. few have investigated the periods between 1924-l 9296 and 1943-l 947. 1930-1939 (1990) reproduces the same view with some variation. Desde ese momento en adekzntc. According to this author: “Previo a noviembre de 1932. are diminished and pale before the imagery of the heroic. Luis Angel Ferrao. his strategy and his tactics. have concentrated on the tactical-military aspect. Both are periods of direct confrontation with the colonial regime characterized by the use of revolutionary violence as an instrument of struggle. the Nationalist Party (read Albizu) opted for strategies that were %ot precisely peaceful” (a euphemism used by Ferrao to avoid using the ugly word “violence”) to attain the independence of Puerto Rico. the strategy that Albizu would utilize until his death was set. para pasar luego a d&nir la twrategik global QUG urihanb e/ rest0 de i’a Pam-da. pensamos que All&u se ha/Ma apenas en la fase initial de lo que w&a un compliczdfiimo y am’esgadisimo jucgo politico. These researchers of the Al bizu phenomenon.Congress.
and on the response of the U. imperialism was an unequal battle that could not be exclusively undertaken nationally. Albizu did not reject the possibility that the United States would peacefully withdraw from Puerto Rico. Albizu understood that Puerto Rico presented a serious international problem for the United States. the contradictions between the official discourse and the practice of U. metropolitan and international-drove him to favor certain forms of struggle over others at different moments.S. of the conjunctural forces on all three levels-national. through a constituent assembly. for example. had UI be developed to unveil the true face of colonial- 27 .the presidency of the Nationalist Party. Albizu supported a motion in the General Assembly of the Nationalist Party in 1926 to send a delegate to the Latin American republics to promote the Nationalist cause. where the first international resolution supporting the independence of Puerto Rico was passed. However.‘0 At the same time. to the different foreign embassies in the United States. The isolation of our nation from the rest of Latin America and from the rest of the world had to be broken. Armed struggle was one of the historic means that oppressed nations. During this period.S. and the international forum that the United States administration was promoting. a thesis he had been developing since 1926. he insisted correctly that no empire had ever voluntarily abandoned its subjugated territories. Its use. He postulated that all forms of struggle were legitimate to eradicate an illegal regime born and maintained by force. recognizing the terrible human cost that war involved. His decision to personally undertake this mission. and the formation of common fronts in every possible sphere had to be achieved in order to exert pressure on the United States to end colonialism in Puerto Rico. as soon as he became editor in chief of fi’/ Nacionaksta de Porn in 1924. The colonial reality of Puerto Rico stood in contrast to the rhetoric on Pan-Americanism and hemispherical brotherhood. is incontrovertible proof of the tremendous importance international work had in his global strategy. The use of different pressure tactics. Albizu had to demonstrate to Latin America that the historical mission to serve as a wall of contention against U.12 At the same time. He preferred it. Albizu’s global strategy was also founded on the premise that the struggle against U.” Also. His analysis. Albizu began to mail copies of the newspaper and official declarations of the Nationalist Party to the authorities in Washington. he played an important role in the Nationalist Party’s decision to send a representative to the First Anti-Imperialist Congress in Brussels in 1927. The fight had to be taken to the very heart of the metropolis by every means necessary. Albizu’s firm belief that the case of Puerto Rico had to be taken before the international community was also reflected in the actions he took as vice-president of the Nationalist Party (1925-1930). however. Thus. government and its representatives in the colony. imperialism belonged to Puerto Rico. It was also essential that the struggle go beyond the confines of the colonial meuopolitan context.S. Albizu had defined the strategies of struggle he was to follow for the rest of his life. Furthermore. would depend a great deal on the capacity of the people to act united. had utilized to achieve their independence. respect for national integrity. imperialism had to be unmasked. correctly or incorrectly. Albizu believed in the nullity of the Treaty of Paris. and to high officials of Latin American and European governments. he began an intense campaign to get the support of famous Latin American leaders. and that it be connected to the debate over the new world order that began to develop after the First World War. writers and journalists to promote hemispheric solidarity with Puerto Rico. including the United States.9 On the hemispheric level.S. which lasted over two years (19271930). in Albizu’s view.
the principal anti-imperialist leader of Latin America. which was proclaimed on September 23. “the illusion that through elections one can attain power” was finally dispelled. government. The Nationalist Party’s petition. with this electoral defeat. 1934. vis a vis the power of the federal authorities was unveiled. Al bizu ran as a candidate for senator-at-large. Months later.28 ism to his countrymen and to the rest of the world. Nevertheless. was not an automatic one. who also demanded electoral space. Thus. The nation was experiencing a general discontent that affected all classes and was being expressed through nationwide strikes. There are other factors to consider regarding the Nationalist Party’s rejection of the electoral arena. the Nationalist Party participated in the colonial elections. Albizu argued. The question we should be asking is: what happened between 1932 and 1934 to convince Albizu and the Nationalist Party that they should reject the electoral process as an arena of contention? The answer is complicated and requires exhaustive study.” In addition. In fact. As had occurred in 1924 and 1928. work centers. In 1932.*5 In response to the demands of the Socialist Party. controlled by the Coalitionists. With the arrival of Colonel Francis E. Once again. the impotence of the colonial Legislature. there were still two more years before the next election.” Moreover.S. the Nationalists’ poor showing was due to corruption. intensified the political crisis in the colony. the police of Puerto Rico began to modernize and were better equipped. The writing on the wall was obvious. he ran as representative from the district of Ponce in 1924 and as senator-at-large in 1932. Two years had passed between the elections and the Nationalist Party’s new tactic. organized and armed by the U. Contrary to those that defend this thesis. For instance. was denied. the decision of the Federal Rehabilitation Administration (1934) to favor the Liberals over Coalitionist elements. in February 1934. Albizu accepted participation in the electoral process as a strategy. the National Guard of Nicaragua. and . the decision of the Nationalist Party to withdraw from the electoral process and establish the tactic-and it was a tactic and not a principle--of non-cooperation with the regime. however. this time with Albizu in the presidency. saw the Nationalists as a potential stumbling block. the Nationalist Party received few votes. Albizu changed his tactics and chose violence. granting the latter administrative positions in the Puerto Rican Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration (PRRA). For many. it can be argued that until March 1934 the Nationalist Party still intended to use the electoral process to expose American colonialism in Puerto Rico. The forms that these could take would be determined in the final instance. and later the Socialists.r6 Finally. A study of that era reveals how the Unionists. and did everything possible to impede the Nationalist Party’s attempts to open up a space in the electoral arena. Between 1924 and 1934. The Nationalists intensified their agitation in the streets. While Ghandi in India chose non-violence as a strategy for struggle. With that in mind. as in 1924 and 1928. there was increased governmental repression between 1932 and 1934. *’ This ranged from the refusal to pay taxes to disobeying colonial laws and armed confrontation. Riggs in 1933. Albizu filed a petition in the Legislature requesting that the Nationalist Party be officially represented in the Insular Board of Elections. the Legislature reformed the Board. The crisis was systemic. assassinated General CCsar Agusto Sandino. The prevailing view has been that. by concrete conditions. Albizu maintained early the mOre flexible strategy of civil disobedience. we must remember that Albizu’s dismissal of the electoral process was determined within the context of an economic crisis of intense proportions. at sugar cane fields.
‘9 In the six years Albizu would remain in prison. following the political line of the Third International. Albizu tried to keep abreast of all new events. At that moment. the Popular Party. he had not done the same with the juridico-legal process. Up to the moment of his imprisonment.schools. under the skillful leadership of MuAoz. as it has been commonly understood. It is important to emphasize that the tactic of non-cooperation with the regime did not imply the rejection of peaceful and legal forms of struggle. Meanwhile. had come to the conclusion that the regime had lost all legitimacy. as the only party in the United States committed to the independence of Puerto Rico. the Popular Party established a precarious control of the colonial legislature. President of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). Albizu continued to promote the formation of a Constituent Assembly represented by all political parties to end colonialism in Puerto Rico. it overwhelmingly won the elections. including Earl Browder. At the same time that the federal authorities in Puerto Rico repressed and imprisoned the Nationalist leadership. Albizu defended himself.” Although Albizu had rejected the electoral process. Albizu shared his analysis of the new situation with other political prisoners. During his imprisonment. along with other Nationalist leaders. The Allies. the creation of a just international order that would recognize the independence of all the nations that united behind the democratic cause. in spite of the limitations imposed by prison authorities. the United States and on the international level. opposed the European war as an interimperialist war. Washing- ton promised to help resolve the political status of Puerto Rico as soon as the war ended. promised through a series of treaties such as the Atlantic Charter and the Treaty of Teheran.z’ In Puerto Rico. Albizu was found guilty and sentenced to ten years at the Federal prison in Atlanta.ZO New political fronts had to be opened in the Island. who had committed itself to financially and organizational support the undertaking. By 1942. Albizu understood that the Communist Party was a national party that was well organized and had important influence in the organized labor movement. He attempted to demonstrate the illegality of the United States judicial system in Puerto Rico. Albizu. Contrary to the expectations of many. Even though the Popular Party followed an increasingly ambiguous line regarding indepen- 29 . they negotiated a solution to the political crisis in Puerto Rico with the recently created Democratic Popular Party. the national and international situation changed dramatically. The case of Puerto Rico was a factor it could exploit: The CPUSA sought to encourage internal opposition in the United States to prevent that country’s entry in the military conflict.‘* In a clearly political trial. Initially. rapidly distanced itself from the goal of independence. including the University. seeking international support in their struggle against the Axis forces. By 1936. Four years later. The period between 1934-1936 was one of violent confrontation between the Nationalists and the colonial regime. the federal authorities had decided to stop the Nationalists at all cost That year Albizu was arrested and accused of “conspiring to overthrow the United States government in Puerto Rico by force. In the 1940 elections. the CPUSA. Albizu saw the necessity to create in the United States a powerful solidarity movement with the independence of Puerto Rico. Also. he counted on the help of the Communist Party of the United States. Albizu understood that the ideal of independence was still strong despite the repression against the Nationalists. where pro-independence forces had regrouped. Albizu had concluded that a favorable juncture had been created for the United States to withdraw peacefully from Puerto Rico. its support was well received. If the Popular Democratic Party supported them. During this period. In 1939 the Second World War began.
accepted a suspended sentence on orders from Albizu.S. In 1945. After the loss of Pueblos Hispanos. became the representative of the Congress in the United States. the main center of Nationalist activity in the United States. The principal enemy continued to be U. Corretjer contacted the Communist Party who supplied him the necessary funds to publish a newspaper promoting an anti-imperialist line and supporting the independence of Puerto Rico. The rupture was inevitable. imperialism. After an unsuccessful attempt to convince Albizu to accept the new line. Juan Antonio Corretjer. Albizu’s new strategy soon failed. However. Albizu established contact with various anticolonial activists. Secretary General of the Nationalist Party. and moved to New York. followed by other activists that identified with the new political line. Corretjer. it was also limited. He immediately developed a new base of support with liberals. the Communist Party abruptly changed its position on the war.S. Now the Communist Party maintained that the immediate task of the progressive forces was to support the Allies. Under his influence and with the active participation of the Nationalist Party. imperialism.2S This signified the loss of a series of respected leaders and valuable activists. the same year Albizu was released from Atlanta.dence. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Albizu did not allow this to stop him. Although the Nationalist Party did not officially take part. From Albizu’s perspective the situation had not changed. Nevertheless. the Pro-Independence Congress was created in Puerto Rico. the Nationalist Party developed another publication. In 1943. some of its leaders participated as individuals in the deliberations that helped constitute the Congress. Corretjer.” In the meantime. Later.= As soon as he arrived in New York.% However. and Puddos Hispanos ceased to represent the Nationalist position. left the Nationalist Party. His mission was to pursue the new political line. the publication languished.was waged to support the Pro-Independence Congress. who supported the political line of the CPUSA. in spite of the official position of the Nationalist Party of non-cooperation. Albizu set in’motion the necessary steps to bring the case of Puerto Rico before the new international forum created at the end of World War II. What was a struggle between imperialists suddenly became a struggle between democracy and fascism. From his hospital bed. Although its work was very important. official discussions began in San Francisco to create an international organization that would peacefully mediate international conflicts-the United Nations. an intense campaign. The purpose of the organization was to take the case of colonized nations to the San Francisco Conference and demand the complete elimination of imperialism. the independence sector within the party was considerable and influential. progressives and non-communist radicals. the monthly Puerto Rico aimed at the Puerto Rican community in the United States. This group formed the American League for the Independence of Puerto Rico. these activists created the Provisional World Congress of Dominated Nations in 1945. Albizu Campos was prepared to open another battlefront against U. the Communist Party finally withdrew its economic and political supportU This precipitated a crisis and a division within the ranks of the Junta of the Nationalist Party in New York. the group lacked both a strong social base and a solid organizational apparatus. The unity of the independentiktas above party loyalties was essential. Albizu proceeded to take the case of Puerto Rico before the international community. In PUGblos Hispanos.” The delegates to the Congress in San Francisco-among them Julio Pinto Gandia representing the Nationalist Party-succeeded in convincing the Philippines’ representative to present their case at the Assembly’s . Lacking economic support.
The participation of the PIP in the electoral process created a new obstacle for Albizu’s plans. When asked by the custom inspector if he had brought seeds with him. The inclusion of “independence” was accepted as one of the objectives in the Constitution of the United Nations but it was limited only to those territories that were to be administered and supervised under a system of international trusteeships. The case of Puerto Rico had been brought before and included in the agenda of the recently created United Nations. In 1946 the leading body of the Popular Democratic Party forced a crisis within its ranks by declaring that it was incompatible to be a member of both organizations. including its committees and subcommittees. Once the conference ended. When the UN began to officially function. Divisions within the Pro-Independence Congress were becoming more evident. However. endangering the possibility that the organization would become a broad independence front. it established that the administrative nation had to periodically provide information on the economic. Albizu had to start anew.plenary. Although recognition of Puerto Rico’s right to independence was not immediately obtained. and officially sanctioned in 1952 under the name of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. A large number of Populares abandoned the Congress. Puerto Rico among them. Al bizu Campos answered with the now famous words: “The same seeds I took are the ones I bring back” 0 . since it served to legitimize the new colonial arrangement then being developed. Albizu returned to Puerto Rico to initiate the reorganization of the Nationalist Party and to continue the revolutionary process against colonialism. On his return to New York. social and educational conditions of the territories under its jurisdiction. the Assembly approved a clause establishing that colonial powers were to be responsible for their administration. Albizu’s strategy yielded fruit. The remaining majority supported the transformation of the Congress into a political party.” Meanwhile. At that moment. The opposition of the colonial powers was intense. new developments in the Island dealt another blow to Albizu’s formulations. the federal authorities unleashed a wave of repression. After long debates the delegates reached a compromise. In December 1947. The activities of the Provisional World Congress proved to be an embarrassment for Washington. a few months after completing his sentence. thus was born the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP). Pinto Gandia faced arrest for violating the selective service laws. For the other territories. the possibility of achieving independence seemed to have dissipated. Even so. it was necessary to develop new strategies to prevent the consummation of the new colonial state and to assure that Puerto Rico would never become a state. the Nationalist Party obtained recognition and accreditation as a non-governmental organization with the right to observer status in all the sessions of the General Assembly.
imperial and international. “Puerto Rico before the International AntiColonial Congress. Representatives. government. Albizu would concentrate the Party’s political activity on confronting the violence of the regime with revolutionary violence. Pedro Albizu Campus y lo independencia de Puerto Rico. who will by reuding it. Hunter College. The subscription form states that the newspaper would “go to Washington and be read by the President. su presente y su porvenir. Torres. Luis A.” in this issue of the Cenko &I//e/in. according to some critics. April 9. postulates thot after 1932. pp. Albizu established “the bases of the tripode on which the strategy of the notional liberation struggle of Puerto Rico would be mounted” (Mari Br6s. be mode generally aware of all political matters associated with this I&d. Albiw’s stay in New York is the subject of o book in progress ty Carlos Rodriguez-Fraticelli titled fn /OS entraiias de/ monstruo: nocionalismo y anti-imperialismo puertorriqueijo en 10s &ados Unidos. Pedro tibizu Compos: gconselvador. the orgumenk have fallen on deaf ears among the social scientists who hove researched this theme. San Juan: Editorial CEPA. 3. p. in both cases. 12. pp. Ironically. Sept. 95). . 1. N independentismo. This episode is discussed in Corlos Rodriguez-F roticelli. El independentismo en Puerto Rico: su pas&o. El independentismo. 11 The resolution was presented by the renown Mexican philosopher. JuIy 13. pp. 9 142. emphasized the military aspect of Albizu’s strategy. 5-6.although on attempt at demystification . . For many this period is considered “dead time. pp. 1924. in his work.ENDNOTES 1 2 Cited in Juan Mori Brcls.” N Nocionolisto de Ponce. has defended the complexity and originality of Albizu’s global strategy. 1926-l 927 (forthcoming].8. and other members of the U. 89-l 20. Manuel Maldonado Denis. Juan Angel . 1984. Vasconcelos had visited the Island the year before. Amilcor Tirodo Avik%.” “Subscription form. “Jo& Vosconcelos. Beniomin Torres. and as a result of the electoral defeat of the Nationalist Party. p. 1925.” El Nacionalisto de Ponce. whose chronology of the life of Albizu Compos is the most widely known at-d disseminated work on the Nationalist leader. Ferroo. Un odelon/odo de nuestro tiempo ( 1985). 1. Lewis was the first to “scientifically” validate this myth in his Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in rhe Caribbean ( 1963). CUNY is researching this period. So little is known about this period that it is common to hear the phrase “on his return from Atlanta. His initial studies ore found in “to forja de un lider: Pedro Albiw Compos. * even among those who hove studied Puerto Rican politics.. ‘pp. See Juan Mari BrCrs.S. first from on apologetic stance in his /-locia uno visi6n positiva de/ puetiorriquefio (1970) and later in Pedro Albizu Campus (1976]. 32 3 4 12 “Magna Asamblea del Partido Nocionalista. for a more extensive although not exhaustive discussion of methodological errors in Ferrao’s book. Senators. 1924-l 930. Mari Br& erroneously posits that between 1930 and 1936. However. 1 G2 1. 83. Although Lewis revised some of his arguments as to the supposed “fascism” of Aibizu in his Notes on the Puerto Rican Revolution ( 1974). See his Pedro Albizu Compos. Gordon K. During his visit he met Albizu and was profoundly impressed by him. see Taller de Formacibn Politico. politician and educator Jo& Vosconcelos on behalf of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.exalts the violenceterrorism aspect of Albizu’s strategy. of the Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios. The exception has been Juan Mari BrCls.” Albizu’s internment. presents the Nationalist leader as preparing from youth to strike the revolutionary blow to the colonial regimen.%I&. Pedro Albizu Compos y el nocionolismo puertorriqueiio (Rio Piedras: Ediciones Cultural. Albizu.” N Nacionchto de Ponce. N movimiento libertador en /a historio de Puerto Rico (San . 10 Albizu initially transformed El Nocionalista de Ponce into a bilingual weekly with the aim of utilizing it OS a nationalist propaganda organ not only in Puerto Rico but also in the United States. did not allow him to understand in what ways Puerto Rico in 1947 was different from the Puerto Rico he had been exiled from for ten years. Juan Mari Brcls was the first to acknowledge the three pillars of Albizu’s global strategy: national. At present. I 926 I 947. who like Corretier. Ram& Medina Ramirez. 1927. he nonethe less maintained the thesis that Albizu primarily utilized revolutionary violence as his principle strategy. 19901. in his attempt to justify Albizu’s use of revolutionary violence. p. fascista o revolucionorio? (Rio Piedras: 199 1).
I936 [reproduced by. President of the National Congress of Negro Women. 33 2 4 Vito Marcantonio took the same position as the Communist Party of the United States. Mary Mcteod Bethune. the Nationalist Party highlighted the fact that rhe National Guard was organized by the U. 1972).S. September 9-23. p.” Puerto Rico. Among its members were the well-known writer Pearl Buck. Obras escogidas. The notice of Corretier’s ouster from the Party appeared in a short announcement entitled “A 10s Nacionalistas Puertorriqueiios. “Entrevista con Albizu Campus en Atlanta. and Richard Walsh. 2 7 “la Awciacibn UniMundial ante el Congreso de los Estados Unidos.S. John Haynes. president of the Indian Famine Committee. 17 Albizu Campos. Tomo IV [Mexico: Editorial Cloves tatinoamericanas. 18 Albizu’s strategy during the thirties was to recognize the legal authority of the [U. 1926. 17-24. 1947. Puerto Rico. University of Puerto Rico. Vol. Delegate. 1934. [October 1946):7-l 5. “Corretjer irnico delegado del Congreso National Prolndependencia de Puerto Rico en EE. 1942. That status was withdrawn in November 1950 as a result of the Nationalist insurrection of that year. Medina Ramirez.” at the “Pedro AJbizu Campos y la nation puertorriqueria” Conference. 1943. 1991. President of the American Civil Liberties Union. The Party de&red that “the imposition of gangster-like tactics in international struggles would bring the bloodiest repressions known to history. pp. December 25. a matter of necessity. a ‘de facto’ situation. 2 6 Ruth Reynolds. See Vito Marcantonio to Julio Santiago. 21 22 23 Ibid. “Proclama sobre el Aniversario de la Revolution de Lares. ll:24-26. Albizu had proposed transforming the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico into ‘a revolutionary organization throughout the Island that would co nia and [that] would seek the recognition from all the definitivefy break with the lo regimen. however. 1943.” Pueblos l-lispanos (NY). Box 15. p. 2. Siglo XXI.” in Albizu Campus.). los Quijotes. Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. 19711. Editorial Jelofe. 45-46. 2 5 On November 24.” Pueblos Hispanos. Dr. Obras escogidas.S. II:2 l23. May 29. 4.] courts. Reynolds was the Secretary. II (San Juan. p. 50.UU. North American Christtan pacifist. pacifist leader Jay Holmes Smith.” Pueblos l-lispanos. editor and publisher of Asia and rbe Americas. Paul Hutchison.” March 1. Reproduced in Pedro Albizu Campos.” Pueblos Hispanos. p. La Liga Americana Pro lndependencia de Puerto Rico vs.” See “Albizu Campos. 1943. 1945):18.” The decision of the Nationalist Party to make demands through the legal system [Albizu] posed was “a question of necessity. p. the painter Rockwell Kent. La conciencia national puertorriqueria. 2 8 On January 9. Reproduced in Manuel Maldonado Denis (ed. 81-82. “Ante Ias Naciones Unidas. Obras escogidas. (Mexico. never withdrew his support of the Nationalist Party. 2 0 See Albizu’s position on this in “Des cartas. 4. the United Nations approved the Nationalist Party’s petition to have observer status. government. I923. “Pro&ma sobre el Aniversario de la Revolution de tares” in Albizu Campos. May 15. accepting their existence “de facto. pp. ll:49. . In Vito Marcuntonio Papers. N movimiento libertodor. 1987). June 26. 1943. 440-441. 19 The 1936 trial is discussed by Harry Rodriguez in his presentation. 127. 10s Estados Unidos. General Correspondence. the prestigious African American labor leader and excommunist Philip Randolph. Albizu officially removed Juan Antonio Corretjer as General Secretary of the Party and U. 15 “letter to Rafael Martinez Nodal. 1943. 14 Pedro Albizu Campos. I free nations of the world of our independence in order to reconcentrate North American attention ta our situation.” in Albizu Campos.” “Proclama ante la muerte de Sandino. May 14. Obras escogidas. 16 In their response to Sandino’s death.” Interview with Albizu Campus. was in charge of organizing the league. pp.” Puer?o Rico II (March. Obras escogidas.S. 198 1 ). Managing Editor of The Christian Cen/ury. Marcantonio. 13 before leaving for his trip to Latin America. introduction and notes by Benjamin Torres) Vol. “los proceso judiciales incoados conrrc Don Pedro Albizu Carnpos.Juan. The organization was headed by U.
This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?