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Michael Hardt Gilles Deleuze an Apprenticeship in Philosophy 19932

Michael Hardt Gilles Deleuze an Apprenticeship in Philosophy 19932

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Sections

  • Introduction: Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism ix
  • Chapter 1. Bergsonian Ontology: The Positive Movement of Being 1
  • The Early Deleuze: Some Methodological Principles
  • 1.1 Determination and Efficient Difference
  • 1.2 Multiplicity in the Passage from Quality to Quantity
  • 1.3 The Positive Emanation of Being
  • 1.4 The Being of Becoming and the Oganization of the Actual
  • Remark: Deleuze and Interpretation
  • 2.1 The Paradox of Enemies
  • 2.2 The Transcendental Method and the Partial Critique
  • Remark: Deleuze's Selection of the "Impersonal" Nietzsche
  • 2.3 Slave Logic and Efficient Power
  • Remark: The Resurgence of Negativity
  • 2.4 Slave Labor and the Insurrectional Critique
  • Remark: The Will to Workers' Power and the Social Synthesis
  • 2.5 The Being of Becoming: The Ethical Synthesis of the Efficient Will
  • 2.6 The Total Critique as the Foundation of Being
  • Remark: The End of Deleuze's Anti-Hegelianism
  • 2.7 Pathos and Joy: Toward a Practice of Affirmative Being
  • Speculation
  • 3.1 Substance and the Real Distinction: Singularity
  • 3.2 Expressive Attributes and the Formal Distinction: Univocity
  • 3-3 The Powers of Being
  • Ontological Expression
  • 3.4 The Interpretation of the Attributes: Problems of a Materialist Ontology
  • 3-5 Combatting the Privileges ofThought
  • Power
  • 3.6 The True and the Adequate
  • 3-7 What a Body Can Do
  • Practice
  • 3.8 Common Notions: The Assemblages of Composable Being
  • 3.9 The Constitution of Reason
  • 3.10 The Art of Organization: Toward a Political Assemblage
  • 4.1 Ontology
  • 4.2 Affirmation
  • 4.3 Practice
  • 4.4 Constitution
  • Notes
  • Index

Gilles Deleuze

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Gilles Deleuze An Apprenticeship in Philosophy Michael Hardt University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London .

recording. cm. Gilles. MN 55401-2520 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Third printing. mechanical. or transmitted. Tide. Michael. 2002 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publicatioii Data Hardt. Published by the University of Minnesota Press 111 Third Avenue South. Includes bibliographical references and index. All rights reserved. or otherwise.D454H37 1993 194—dc20 92-21849 The University of Minnesota is an equal-opportunity educator and employer. p.—ISBN 0-8166-2161-6 (pbk. Minneapolis. Suite 290. Deleuze. ISBN 0-8166-2160-8 (acid-free). . I.Copyright 1993 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota Cover photographs of Baruch Spinoza. and Friedrich Nietzsche: copyright by Roger-Viollet in Paris. No part of this publication may be reproduced. Henri Bergson. electronic. photocopying. stored in a retrieval system. B2430. Gilles Deleuze : an apprenticeship in philosophy / Michael Hardt. : acid-free) 1. in any form or by any means. without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction: Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism ix Preliminary Remark The Early Deleuze: Some Methodological Principles xvii Chapter 1. Bergsonian Ontology: The Positive Movement of Being 1 1.1 Determination and Efficient Difference 1.2 Multiplicity in the Passage from Quality to Quantity 1.3 The Positive Emanation of Being 1.4 The Being of Becoming and the Organization of the Actual Remark: Deleuze and Interpretation Chapter 2. Nietzschean Ethics: From Efficient Power to an Ethics of Affirmation 26 2.1 The Paradox of Enemies 2.2 The Transcendental Method and the Partial Critique Remark: Deleuze's Selection of the "Impersonal" Nietzsche 2.3 Slave Logic and Efficient Power Remark: The Resurgence of Negativity 2.4 Slave Labor and the Insurrectional Critique Remark: The Will to Workers' Power and the Social Synthesis
V

vi

CONTENTS

2.5 The Being of Becoming: The Ethical Synthesis of the Efficient Will 2.6 The Total Critique as the Foundation of Being Remark: The End of Deleuze's Anti-Hegelianism 2.7 Pathos and Joy: Toward a Practice of Affirmative Being Chapter 3: Spinozian Practice: Affirmation and Joy 56 Speculation 3.1 Substance and the Real Distinction: Singularity 3.2 Expressive Attributes and the Formal Distinction: Univocity Remark: Ontological Speculation 3.3 The Powers of Being Ontological Expression 3.4 The Interpretation of the Attributes: Problems of a Materialist Ontology Remark: Speculative Production and Theoretical Practice 3.5 Combatting the Privileges of Thought Remark: From Forschung to Darstellung Power 3.6 The True and the Adequate 37 What a Body Can Do Practice 3.8 Common Notions: The Assemblages of Composable Being 3.9 The Constitution of Reason Remark: Theoretical Practice and Practical Constitution 3.10 The Art of Organization: Toward a Political Assemblage Chapter 4: Conclusion: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy 4.1 Ontology 4.2 Affirmation 4.3 Practice 4.4 Constitution Notes 123 133 112

Works Cited Index 137

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge, with respect and affection, two of my teachers, Charles Altieri and Antonio Negri.

vii

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Perhaps dazzled by the impact of this theoretical rupture. between communitarians and liberals—in such a way as to misdirect and blunt its force. This problematic. we find. At the hands of both its supporters and its detractors. Poststructuralism. within the contemporary field of social practices. within the philosophical tradition. but only by recognizing the nuances and alternatives it proposes within modernity.Introduction Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism Continental poststructuralism has problematized the foundations of philosophical and political thought. The importance of poststructuralism cannot be captured by posing a new series of oppositions. it is involved not simply in the rejection of the tradition of political and philosophical discourse. but more importantly in the ix . at the complex social and theoretical pressures it encountered and the tools it constructed to face them. diverse American authors have embraced this movement as the inauguration of a postphilosophical culture where philosophical claims and political judgments admit no justification and rest on no foundation. poststructuralism has been incorporated into a series of Anglo-American debates— between modernists and postmodernists. settles too easily into a new opposition that obscures the real possibilities afforded by contemporary Continental theory. is not oriented simply toward the negation of theoretical foundations. however. we can recapture some of its critical and constructive powers. If we look closely at the historical development of poststructuralist thought. but rather toward the exploration of new grounds for philosophical and political inquiry.

Chatelet argues. a code that we are still at the very heart of today. Hegel.. in the domain of Continental theory during this period. in large part. Hegel was the figure of order and authority that served as the focus of antagonism. the early works of Gilles Deleuze are exemplary of the entire generation of poststructuralist thinkers. For the generation of Continental thinkers that came to maturity in the 1960s. Deleuze speaks for his entire cohort: "What I detested above all was Hegelianism and the dialectic" ("Lettre a Michel Cressole" 110). those who attempt simply to turn their backs on Hegel. moreover. "Certainly. a language. he claims. They are dealing with the false meaning of absolute beginnings. The roots of poststructuralism and its unifying basis lie. then. Sartre. Hegelianism was such a powerful vortex that in attempting to ignore it one would inevitably be sucked in by its power. Hegel was ubiquitous. however. however. run the risk of ending up as mere repetitions of the Hegelian problematic. Any account of Continental poststructuralism must take this framework of generalized Hegelianism as its point of departure. Deleuze attempted to confront Hegel . it appeared to Francpis Chatelet that every philosopher had to begin with Hegel: "[Hegel] determined a horizon. and political practice. there are many contemporary philosophical projects that ignore Hegelianism. and. we have to recognize the serious restrictions facing such a project in the specific social and historical context. that the only viable project to counter Hegelianism is to make Hegel the negative foundation of philosophy. they deprive themselves of a good point of support. It is better—like Marx and Nietzsche—to begin with Hegel than to end up with him" (4). is our Plato: the one who delimits—ideologically or scientifically. in curiously dialectical fashion. social theory. in a general opposition not to the philosophical tradition tout court but specifically to the Hegelian tradition. Only anti-Hegelianism provided the negative point of support necessary for a post-Hegelian or even a nonHegelian project. From this point of view. As a result of influential interpretations by theorists as diverse as Kojeve. by this fact. In order to appreciate this antagonism.x INTRODUCTION articulation and affirmation of alternative lineages that arise from within the tradition itself. In 1968. is how to evade a Hegelian foundation. In order to understand the extent of this problem. Hegel had come to dominate the theoretical horizon as the ineluctable centerpiece of philosophical speculation. Gramsci.. The first problem of poststructuralism. we must realize that. Those who neglect the initial step of addressing and actively rejecting Hegel. and Bobbio.. In his early investigations into the history of philosophy we can see an intense concentration of the generalized anti-Hegelianism of the time. positively or negatively— the theoretical possibilities of theory" (Hegel 2).

the unity of the One and the Multiple. antiHegelianism quickly presents itself as the second. The philosophers that Deleuze selects as partisans in this struggle (Bergson. the attempted deracination from the Hegelian terrain is not immediately successful. missed the most powerful thrust of his thought. Deleuze has gone the furthest in extricating himself from the problems of anti-Hegelianism and constructing . It may seem. Paradoxically. perhaps since this cultural and philosophical paradigm was so tenacious. he engaged Hegelianism not in order to salvage its worthwhile elements. have charged that the poststructuralists did not understand Hegel and. Hegelianism is the most difficult of adversaries because it possesses such an extraordinary capacity to recuperate opposition. Nonetheless. Many recent critics of French poststructuralism. however. In many respects. with a facile anti-Hegelianism.INTRODUCTION xi and dialectical thought head-on. If Hegelianism is the first problem of poststructuralism. with a rigorous philosophical refutation. that to be antiHegelian. and Spinoza) appear to allow him successive steps toward the realization of this project.2 The problem of recuperation that faces the anti-Hegelian foundation of poststructuralism offers a second and more important explanation for our selection of Deleuze in this study Although numerous authors have made important contributions to our critique of Hegel. a theoretical separation from the entire Hegelian problematic. becomes a position more Hegelian than ever. one might claim that the effort to be an "other" to Hegel can always be folded into an "other" within Hegel. have rightly emphasized this dilemma. claiming that the work of contemporary anti-Hegelians consists merely in unconscious repetitions of Hegelian dramas without the power of the Hegelian subject and the rigor and clarity of the Hegelian logic. seeking to discount the rupture of Continental poststructuralism. Deleuze may appear to be very Hegelian. We find that Deleuze often poses his project not only in the traditional language of Hegelianism but also in terms of typical Hegelian problems—the determination of being. in effect. in his effort to establish Hegel as a negative foundation for his thought. Nietzsche." but rather to articulate a total critique and a rejection of the negative dialectical framework so as to achieve a real autonomy. from this perspective. if only because Hegel has made the very notion of 'breaking with' into the central tenet of his dialectic" (Subjects of Desire 184). Judith Butler presents the challenge for anti-Hegelians in very clear terms: "References to a 'break' with Hegel are almost always impossible. then. Many Anglo-American authors. then.1 Deleuze is the most important example to consider in this regard because he mounts the most focused and precise attack on Hegelianism. not to extract "the rational kernel from the mystical shell. There is in fact a growing literature that extends this line of argument. through a dialectical twist. as Chatelet said one must. and so on.

understood with their new forms. in the eventual resurrection. a terrain for contemporary research. negation and practice. "despite its various forms.or post-Hegelian. Nondialectical negation is more simple and more absolute. Let us briefly examine the general outlines of these two central elements of Deleuze's project. I repeat. If our first reason for proposing Deleuze as an exemplary poststructuralist thinker was that he is representative of the antagonism to Hegelianism. however. authors like Deleuze propose this nondialectical concept of negation not in the promotion of nihilism. We must recognize their nuances and pose them on an alternative plane. negation becomes an extreme moment of nihilism: In Hegelian terms. comprise the foundation of the new terrain that poststructuralism has to offer for philosophical and political thought. The nondialectical concept of negation that we find in Deleuze's total critique certainly contains none of the magical effect of the dialectic. alternative terrain. "Nondialectical difference. unrestrained force. then. in the contemporary world.xii INTRODUCTION an alternative terrain for thought—no longer post-Hegelian but rather separate from the problem of Hegel. the absolute character of negation has become dreadfully concrete." but not in the sense that nuclear weapons pose the threat of negation. and the magical resurrection implicit in the dialectical negation appears merely as superstition. not in the sense that they pose the universal fear of death: This is merely the "standing negation" of a Hegelian framework. We can situate this theoretical position in relation to the field of "nuclear criticism. We cannot understand these elements." Judith Butler writes. The negation of the bomb is nondialectical in its actuality. is the labor of the negative which has lost its 'magic' " (184). The dialectical negation is always directed toward the miracle of resurrection: It is a negation "which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded. our second is that he is anomalous in his extension of that project away from Hegel toward a separate. but merely as the recognition of an element of our world." merely an abstract conception of negation. and consequently survives its own supersession" (Phenomenology of Spirit §188). With no faith in the beyond. Nondialectical negation is absolute not in the sense that everything present is negated but in that what is negated is attacked with full. "the absolute Lord. it points to the death of the other. The concept of negation that lies at the center of dialectical thought seems to pose the most serious challenge for any theory that claims to be anti. These two themes. not in the planning . On the one hand. Hegel considers this pure death. if we merely oppose them to Hegelian conceptions of negation and practice. preserving the given order. There are two central elements of this passage that Deleuze develops in different registers and on different planes of thought: a nondialectical conception of negation and a constitutive theory of practice.

in this sense. he limits us to a strictly immanent and materialist ontological discourse that refuses any deep or hidden foundation of being. On the other hand. pars construens. questions of the nature of being. it is fully expressed in the world. however. positive. most importantly because Deleuze will only accept "superficial" responses to the question "What makes being possible?" In other words. Practice provides the terms for a material pars construens. Nietzsche. however. synthetic moment. nondialectical negation: It is as new as the destructive force of contemporary warfare and as old as the precritical skepticism of the Scholastics. The radical negation of the nondialectical pars destruens emphasizes that no preconstituted order is available to define the organization of being. it is a bipartite sequence that precludes any third. Marx. and Lucretius—and we will refer to them in our discussion to provide illustrative points of reference. Deleuze refuses any "intellectualist" account of being. to reject Hegelian ontology is not to reject ontology tout court. and full. we should be careful from the outset to distinguish this from a Heideggerian return to ontology. with an eye toward the philosophical tradition. Deleuze's total critique involves a destruction so absolute that it becomes necessary to question what makes reality possible. Thus we can at least gesture toward solid grounds for this radical. There is nothing veiled or negative about Deleuze's being. on Deleuze's constitutive conception of practice as a foundation of ontology. The important characteristics are the purity and autonomy of the two critical moments. any account that in any way subordinates being to thought.3 There are numerous contributions to this project of a materialist ontology throughout the history of philosophy—such as Spinoza. On the other hand. The radicality of negation forces Deleuze to engage questions of the lowest order. The pure negation is the first moment of a precritical conception of critique: pars destruens.INTRODUCTION xiii rooms of Washington but in the streets of Hiroshima. The investigation of the nature of power allows Deleuze to bring substance to the materialist discourse and . We should emphasize that. Although he denies any preconstituted structure of being or any ideological order of existence. as an agent of total destruction. no magical resurrection: It is pure. we can locate this radical conception of negation in the methodological proposals of certain Scholastic authors such as Roger Bacon. is superficial. on one hand. the rejection of Hegelian ontology does not lead Deleuze to some form of deontological thought. that poses thinking as the supreme form of being. Deleuze insists instead on alternatives within the ontological tradition. Deleuze still operates on the highest planes of ontological speculation. practice is what makes the constitution of being possible. There is nothing positive in the nondialectical negation. Once again. We will focus. Negation clears the terrain for creation. Being.

What will be important throughout our discussion is that the traditionally fundamental terms—such as necessity. Spinoza covers this same passage and extends it to practice. at the center of ontology.xiv INTRODUCTION to raise the theory of practice to the level of ontology. or joy. where the positive movement of being becomes the affirmation of being. This approach to ontology is as new as the infinitely plastic universe of cyborgs and as old as the tradition of materialist philosophy. then. Deleuze argues that Spinoza's is an ontological conception of practice. of the contemporary field of practice. Nietzsche allows him to transpose the results of ontological speculation to an ethical horizon. The evolution of Deleuze's thought unfolds as he directs his attention sequentially to a series of authors in the philosophical canon and poses them each a specific question. that is. of sense and value. he opposes the irreducible multiplicity of becoming. To the negative movement of determination. is delimited by the outer bounds of the contemporary imagination. autonomous of any "theoricist tendency. Just as Nietzsche poses the affirmation of speculation." a "practical practice" that is oriented principally toward the ontological rather than the epistemological realm. Spinoza conceives practice. reason. to the dialectical unity of the One and the Multiple. of the being of becoming. as constitutive of being. Spinoza poses the affirmation of practice. an nth nature. resides both on a corporeal and on a mental plane. to the field offerees. however." but rather a more practical conception of practice. and being—though shaken from their transcendental fixity. nature. The question of the organization or the constitution of the world. that is. . still serve as a foundation because they acquire a certain consistency and substance in our world Being. pushes Deleuze to pose these ontological issues in ethical terms. In the precritical world of Spinoza's practical philosophy. a hybrid nature. This is not an Althusserian "theoretical practice. in the complex dynamics of behavior. in the superficial interactions of bodies. by following the progression of critical questions that guide his investigations during successive periods. The thematic of power in Nietzsche provides the theoretical passage that links Bergsonian ontology to an ethics of active expression. Deleuze's thought finally discovers a real autonomy from the Hegelian problematic. he opposes the positive movement of differentiation. The only nature available to ontological discourse is an absolutely artificial conception of nature. The foundation of being. now historicized and materialized. I elaborate these conceptions of nondialectical negation and constitutive practice in Deleuze's work by reading the evolution of his thought. a nature produced in practice—further removed than a second nature. His work on Bergson offers a critique of negative ontology and proposes in its stead an absolutely positive movement of being that rests on an efficient and internal notion of causality.

to credit the enemy with too much force. in fact. simply to find the solutions to contemporary theoretical problems. but only to affirm another notion that is more adequate to its ends. to designate the coordination and accumulation of accidental (in the philosophical sense. on the other hand. Deleuze's ontology draws on the tradition of causal arguments and develops notions of both being's "productivity" and its "producibility. against a given. Against a transcendental foundation we find an immanent one. Once we stop clouding the issue with crude oppositions and recognize instead the specificity of an antagonism. When we look closely at Deleuze's critique of causality we find not only a powerful rejection of the final cause and the formal cause.. from outside the material scene of forces. By the order of being. but also an equally powerful affirmation of the efficient cause as central to his philosophical project. however. More important. but rather as an immanent creation or composition of a relationship of consistency and coordination. We do not look to Deleuze here. What we ask of Deleuze.e. above all. Throughout this study we will encounter unresolved problems and propositions that are powerfully suggestive but perhaps not clearly and rigorously delimited. when I pose the question of the foundations of poststructuralist thought I mean to contest the claim that this thought is properly characterized as antifoundationalism. in effect. open one. with too much theoretical terrain. For example. In other words. of its aptitudes to produce and to be produced. or of society I intend the structure imposed as necessary and eternal from above. from within the immanent field of forces. is always an art. I use organization. the composition of creative forces. Poststructuralism does critique a certain notion of foundation. to test our footing on a terrain where new grounds of philosophical and political thought are possible. we inquire into his thought in order to investigate the proposals of a new problematic for research after the poststructuralist rupture. I do not conceive of organization as a blueprint of development or as the projected vision of an avant-garde. . is to teach us the contemporary possibilities of philosophy. I will argue that efficient causality. In this sense. organization. nonnecessary) encounters and developments from below. we can begin to bring out finer nuances in our terminology.INTRODUCTION xv One lesson to be learned from this philosophical project is to highlight the nuances that define an antagonism.4 A similar nuance must be made in our discussion of causality." that is. teleological foundation we find a material. i. To pose the issue as an exclusive opposition is. The nuances in the use of "foundation" and "causality" are perhaps best summarized by the distinction between order and organization. of truth. provides a key to a coherent account of Deleuze's entire discourse on difference.

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Empiricism and Subjectivity. "Contrary to the theories of law that put the positive outside of the social (natural rights) and the social in the negative (contractual limitation). it becomes clear that Deleuze requires an extensive ontological detour before arriving at this positive political project.Preliminary Remark The Early Deleuze: Some Methodological Principles In the Introduction to Instincts et institutions. we see the general outlines of a philosophical and political project beginning to take shape as a theory of the institution. inventive society. the theory of the institution puts the negative outside of the social (needs) in order to present society as essentially positive and inventive (original means of satisfaction)" (ix). Admittedly. There is not the space nor the terms for this constructive project without first conducting a broad destructive operation. a collection of texts edited by Deleuze in 1953. with its focus on association and belief. We can already recognize latent here a powerful notion of constitution and a suggestive glimpse of a radically democratic theory. the general development of Deleuze's thought does not immediately follow this line. Deleuze's early work thus xvii . at this early point Deleuze's use of "the negative" and "the positive" is rather vague and thus the proposition can only provide an initial intuition of a project. as an early attempt to address directly this politicophilosophical project. One could attempt to read Deleuze's book on Hume. This schematic presentation of a theory of the institution already gives us two fundamental elements of Deleuze's project: It designates the attack on "the negative" as a political task and it poses the central productive object of philosophy as the construction of a purely positive. though.1 However.

though. Deleuze requires a positive ontology in order to establish a positive theory of ethics and social organization. mathematics. when we look closely at his arguments. we have to understand this as an affirmation of other elements of that same tradition.3 If. Deleuze himself provides numerous statements to substantiate such an interpretation.2 However. then. after all. The various mots d'ordre heralded by Deleuze in this period—the destruction of the negative. we cannot read Deleuze's work as thought "outside" or "beyond" the philosophical tradition. This long passage through the history of Western philosophy forges a multifarious edifice on the highest planes of metaphysical meditation that supports and informs the entire breadth of Deleuze's work. the affirmation of the positive—lack their full power and significance when they are not firmly grounded in an antagonistic engagement of Hegel. then. we can already recognize antiHegelianism as a driving force of his thought: What characterizes Hegel better. constitutes our first methodological principle for reading Deleuze: Recognize the object and the terms of the primary antagonism. literature. In other words. implacable siege on Hegelianism. we are to read Deleuze's work as an attack or betrayal of elements of the Western metaphysical tradition. Many read Deleuze's work as a rejection of Western philosophical thought and hence the proposition of a postphilosophical or postmodern discourse. art. 162). the cutting edge of Deleuze's thought is a persistent. "Du Christ a la bourgeoisie. As Deleuze himself asserts while reading Nietzsche. than the strict continuity between Christianity and bourgeois thought? It is important to establish and clarify the terms of this antagonism from the outset in order to gain a clear perspective on the sense and trajectory of Deleuze's overall project. an attack on the negative." published when he was only twenty-one years old. psychology. politics. even in the early works. Throughout this period. One can certainly recognize. This. we find that not only is his thought saturated with the Western philosophical tradition. Deleuze's detour. or even as an effective line of flight from that block. a desire to move away from philosophy. to depart from his training and branch out into other fields: biology. pars canstruens.xviii PRELIMINARY REMARK always takes the form of a critique: pars destruens. in order to gain an adequate understanding of a philosophical project one must recognize against whom its principal concepts are directed (Nietzsche and Philosophy 8. is not only an attack but also the establishment of new terrain: The early intuition of a positive political project is recast by means of the long passage that we will follow—from Bergson to Nietzsche and finally to Spinoza. but even when his examples seem "unphilosophical" the coherence of his positions and the mode of explanation that supports them remain on the highest logical and ontological planes. Indeed. rather we must see it as the affirmation of a (discontinu- . Even in his very first published article.

then. that Deleuze is an unfaithful reader? Certainly not. then. he does not critique them but simply leaves them out of his discussion. what Deleuze forfeits in comprehensiveness. Deleuze's early work constructs an odd sort of history of philosophy in which the connecting links depend not on actual philosophical historiography but on the evolution of Deleuze's own thought. we would have to pose the statement in paradoxical form and say (borrowing a phrase from Althusser) that Deleuze develops "a nonphilosophical theory of philosophy. Might it be said. Deleuze adds a specific point that builds and depends on the previous results. In each of the stages of this philosophical journey. Each of Deleuze's philosophical monographs is directed toward a very specific question. Even though Deleuze's monographs serve as excellent introductions. (For example. Deleuze does not announce the end of metaphysics. but rather a sort of theoretical process of aggregation. By evolution I do not mean to suggest a unilinear or teleological progression. and viewed as an ensemble the development of these philosophical questions reveals the evolution of Deleuze's thought. Often. but on the contrary seeks to rediscover the most coherent and lucid plane of metaphysical thought. Deleuze's journey through the history of philosophy takes a peculiar form. they never provide a comprehensive summary of a philosopher's work. Deleuze selects the specific aspects of a philosopher's thought that make a positive contribution to his own project at that point. .4 If we wanted to insist on his rejection of a certain form of philosophical inquiry. but nonetheless deeply embedded within that same tradition. Here.) Therefore. Deleuze does not accept all of Nietzsche or all of Spinoza.PRELIMINARY REMARK xix ous. instead. we have our second methodological principle: Read Deleuze philosophically. Deleuze's early works are "punctual interventions"—he makes surgical incisions in the corpus of the history of philosophy." In any case. he gains in intensity of focus. Deleuze's explanations appear incomplete because he takes for granted and fails to repeat the results of his previous research. many of Deleuze's claims for Nietzsche's attack on the dialectic remain obscure unless we read into them a Bergsonian critique of a negative ontological movement. If his readings are partial. In effect. This leads us to our third methodological principle: Recognize Deleuze's selectivity. it is precisely to emphasize the properly philosophical nature of his thought. they are nonetheless very rigorous and precise. As Nietzschean or as Spinozist. If a philosopher presents arguments with which Deleuze might find fault. if in the course of this study our references to the resonances between Deleuze's work and other positions in the philosophical tradition seem at times excessive. with meticulous care and sensitivity to the selected topics. but coherent) line of thought that has remained suppressed and dormant. as we will see below.

That is what I find interesting in lives. as an evolution. sometimes dramatic. sometimes not. we must try to interpret what this reorientation can mean. when we do not place them in the context of these early investigations. eight years represents an enormous gap.5 Hence. . but for Deleuze. the holes they have. and the latest works—are in large part reworkings of the cluster of problems developed in this formative period of intense and independent research. "It's like a hole in my life. Perhaps it is in the holes that the movement takes place" ("Signes et evenements" 18). even untenable. who after 1962 consistently published a book each year. When we look at Deleuze's early work from a historical perspective. . and what emerges is the process of Deleuze's own philosophical education. some of the most spectacular innovations in what one might call his mature work—the major independent philosophical texts (Difference et repetition and The Logic of Sense). This eight-year hole in Deleuze's intellectual life does in fact represent a period of movement.6 This is the period of Deleuze's subterranean research—the period in which he forged new paths. and how it characterizes the evolution of his thought.xx PRELIMINARY REMARK Focusing on this progression highlights the movement in Deleuze's thought. an eight-year hole. The profound originality of Deleuze's voice is perhaps due to the fact that during these years he was not following the same course as the majority of his generation. in effect. outside of the limelight and commonplaces of public French cultural debates—that perhaps allowed him to surface with such a . we can posit a final methodological principle: Read Deleuze's thought as an evolution. Indeed. he shifts from the Hume-Bergson axis that characterizes his very early work to the Nietzsche-Spinoza identity tha carries his work to its maturity. the cinema studies. In these works Deleuze develops a technical vocabulary and conceptual foundation that serve him through the entire trajectory of his career. the collaborations with Felix Guattari. what new possibilities it affords Deleuze. During this period. . The positions of the later works can appear obscure. his apprenticeship in philosophy. This focus on the evolution of Deleuze's philosophical education best explains why I have chosen in the following study to deal exclusively with his early writings. In order to read this hole in Deleuze's intellectual life. The lines of this educational journey help explain the counterhistorical development BergsonNietzsche-Spinoza that guides Deleuze from ontology to ethics and politics. the lacunas. Eight years might not seem like a very long break for some authors. a dramatic reorientation of his philosophical approach. the most striking fact is that he wrote his first book when he was rather young (he was twenty-eight years old in 1953 when Empiricism and Subjectivity appeared) and then waited eight years before publishing his next book.

this difference does come to mark our century. If. as Michel Foucault suspected. if our times do become Deleuzian. this early work. . in fact. the subterranean Deleuze.PRELIMINARY REMARK xxi profound impact later. will hold the key to the formative developments that made this new paradigm possible.

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Deleuze reads Bergson as a polemic against the dominant philosophical tradition. perfection. Deleuze does not claim that a direct antagonism against Hegel is what primarily drives Bergson's thought. We should be especially attentive at this point. because Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson (formulated as early as 1956) stands at the head of a long discourse on difference in French thought that constitutes a theoretical touchstone for poststructurali . "Difference" is the Bergsonian term that plays the central role in this discussion of ontological movement. As we have noted.. multiplicity. Bergson critiques several philosophical arguments. Bergson does not challenge the central criteria for being inherited from the ontological tradition— simplicity. though. It may seem strange at first. and so on—but rather he focuses on the ontological movement that is posed to address these criteria. that what Deleuze finds principally is an ontology: an absolutely positive logic of being rooted in time. one might expect to find a psychology or a phenomenology of perception. reality. but behind each of these Deleuze finds Hegel occupying an extreme...Chapter 1 Bergsonian Ontology The Positive Movement of Being In the work of Henri Bergson. In Deleuze's interpretation." ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 79). exaggerated position. aggressive moment: "What Bergson essentially reproaches his predecessors for. then. Deleuze does not move directly to the positive project but rather approaches first by means of a critical. and the faults of his predecessors are found in their most concentrated form in Hegel's logic. unity. but his reading of Bergson continually retains the attack on Hegel as its own critical edge.

The result of Deleuze's second period of Bergson study isBergsonism. Here we find a particular and rigorous usage of the term. rather. The first is a chapter on Bergson for a collection edited by Merleau-Ponty. The major result of the first period is an article tided "La conception de la difference chez Bergson. presents a complication—and at the same time an opportunity—for studying the evolution of his thought because it is conducted in two distinct periods: one in the mid-1950s and another in the mid-1960s. difference marks the real dynamic of being—it is the movement that grounds being. dimension of being. This early article is very dense and contains the major points of Deleuze's reading of Bergson. and the second is a selection of Bergson texts. the "eight-year hole" that. In Deleuze's reading. but neither substantially modifies the early essay. published in 1966. Deleuze's work on Bergson. Memoire et vie (1957). Second. then. 1. as a false conception of difference. These two phases of Bergson study.1 Determination and Efficient Difference Deleuze's early reading of Bergson is grounded on an attack against the negative process of determination. he must use Bergson's critique of the ontological tradition to reveal the weakness of Hegel's dialectic and its negative logic of being. because they straddle not only the work on Nietzsche (1962) but also the long publication gap. The essential task that Deleuze sets for himself in the investigation of Bergson's concept of difference. This attack is directed against two foundational moments of Hegel's logic: the determination of being and the dialectic of the One and the Multiple. then. additions that show the influence of Deleuze's intense Nietzsche period in the intervening years. as Deleuze suggests. The specter that looms over this ques- ." which was published in Les etudes bergsoniennes in 1956 but written at least two years earlier and presented to the "Association des amies de Bergson" in May 1954. Bergson's difference relates primarily to the temporal. is twofold. Les philosophes c&ebres (1956). First. Bergson's difference does not principally refer to a quidditas or to a static contrast of qualities in real being. he must elaborate Bergson's positive movement of being in difference and show how this movement provides a viable alternative for ontology. It is precisely the aggressive moment against Hegelian logic that prepares the ground for the productive moment. however. provide an excellent opportunity to read the orientation of Deleuze's early project. not the spatial. This short book takes up much of the argument presented in the early article but shows a change in focus and offers some very interesting additions to the original interpretation.2 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY ism. may be a site of considerable reorientation of the project. Deleuze published two other Bergson texts in this period. Thus.

it dissolves into nothingness just as does Spinoza himself in Hegel's Romantic imagination: "The cause of his death was consumption. It is necessary that being actively negate nothingness to mark its difference from it. because Spinoza's being is not held different from nothingness as its opposite. affirmative ontology must remain abstract and indifferent. nothingness. Negation defines this state of determinateness in two senses: It is a static contrast based on the finitude of qualities and a dynamic conflict based on the antagonism of differences (see Taylor 233-37). Hegel takes a phrase from one of Spinoza's letters and. there is an active negation that animates determinateness. according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance" (Lectures on the History of Philosophy 257).BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 3 tion throughout Modern philosophy is Hegel's reading and critique of Spinoza. In the first sense. from which he had long been a sufferer. yellow. Since Spinoza's being is absolutely positive. however. The Logic begins with pure being in its simple immediacy. it lacks the fundamental difference that could define its real existence. it will fade . but this simple being has no quality. In the second sense. and finally. This insistence on a negative movement of determination is also the heart of Hegel's critique of Spinoza. etc. inevitably. finally. This polemic against Spinoza constitutes one of Hegel's strongest arguments for the ontological movement of negation: Being not determined through negation will remain indifferent and abstract.). what is other than themselves (in the sense that red negates green. in other words since in Spinoza pure being does not actively negate nothingness and does not proceed through a negative movement. but must be actively engaged and really negated—this is the role of the process of determination. In Hegel's eyes. Determinate being subsumes this opposition. this was in harmony with his system of philosophy. The existence of something is the active negation of something else." Hegel maintains. Spinoza's ontology and any such positive. even the state of determinateness is essentially a negative movement. since it is not held different from its opposite. Therefore. turning it back against Spinoza. Consequently. no difference—it is empty and equivalent to its opposite. or passively negate.1 This phrase describes for Hegel the process of determination and the state of determinateness. Negation cannot merely be passively "thought away. determinateness involves negation because qualities are limited and thus contrast. makes it a central maxim of his own logic: "Omnis determinatio est negatio" (Science of Logic 113). "Reality as thus conceived [as perfection and affirmation] is assumed to survive when all negation has been thought away. and this difference between being and nothingness at its core defines the foundation of the real differences and qualities that constitute its reality. but to do this is to do away with all determinateness" (Science of Logic 112). because determinate things are in a causal interaction with each other.

Deleuze engages this proximate enemy on the specific fault that marks its insufficiency. this method of triangulation shows us that even in this early work Deleuze has a problematic relation to opposition. More important. the fundamental enemy. he claims that the difference constituted by the negative movement of determination is a false notion of difference. It is clear that Deleuze is attacking the dialectic as the fundamental enemy.4 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY into nothingness. with the rejection of determination. always remains external to being and therefore fails to provide it with an essential. and then he proceeds to show that Hegel. though. He does not attack the dialectic directly. we can recognize the anti-Hegelian approach of Deleuze's early work. Like Bergson. or else. Here. Deleuze engages Mechanicism and Platonism as the proximate enemies. necessary foundation. necessary quality of being. but rather he introduces a third philosophical position that he locates between Bergson and the dialectic." in the indifference of pure. The advantage of first addressing these proximate enemies is that they provide a common ground on which to work out the attack that can be subsequently extended to the dialectic. In the Bergson studies. Deleuze argues. the Mechanicists try to theorize an empirical evolution of the differences of being. These are the terms Deleuze uses to critique the simple determination of Mechanicism: "Bergson shows that vital . his reaction to the dialectic of negation. Deleuze's early reading of Bergson seems to accept the Hegelian formulation that the determination of being must be characterized by negation. The form of difference proposed by the process of determination. but in doing so Mechanicism destroys the substantial. we must first recognize the negative movement of being. as Deleuze's thought evolves we will see that he has continually greater difficulty in finding a common terrain for addressing the Hegelian position. Hence. Deleuze's critical method takes on an interesting form. it must be indeterminate. and in the Nietzsche study he brings in Kant. This discussion of ontological determination turns on an analysis of the nature of difference. In this process. Indeed. Deleuze's Bergsonian challenge to Mechanicism takes the form of a curious proposition: In order for being to be necessary. the process of determination both destroys the substantial nature of being and fails to grasp the concreteness and specificity of real being. however. carries this fault to its extreme. the real difference that characterizes the particularity and individuality of being. Deleuze charges that the process of ontological determination itself undermines the real grounding of being. but this method affords him an oblique posture with regard to Hegel so that he does not have to stand in direct opposition. we must disappear along with Spinoza in "acosmism. Rather than challenging that formulation. Hegel insists that if we are to recognize difference. positive ontology.

" Deleuze gives difference a radically new role. we have to find Deleuze's explanation puzzling. an end. (3) accidental—a cause that has a completely contingent relation to its effect. while it attempts to trace the evolution of reality. Deleuze has reversed the terms of the traditional ontological problematic here. as causa sui. that can sustain being as substance. I would suggest that we can best understand Deleuze's explanation through reference to Scholastic conceptions of the ontological centrality of causality and the productivity of being. He does not question how being can gain determinacy. Through this internal productive dynamic.2 In many respects Deleuze reads Bergsonian ontology as a Scholasticism in which the discourse on causality is replaced with a discussion of difference. the fundamental ontological cause must be internal to its effect. The determination of Mechanicism cannot fill this role because it is constituted by an external. But also. or a chance" as an attack on three conceptions of causality that are inadequate for the foundation of being: (1) material—a purely physical cause that gives rise to an external effect. or chance) and thus it introduces an accidental quality into being. it provides being with its necessity. then. we might say that efficient difference is the difference that is the internal motor of being: It sustains being's necessity and real substantiality. its substantiality. (2) final—a cause that refers to the end or goal in the production of its effect. end. not a substantial interiority.4 In the Bergsonian context. A Mechanistic determination of being. however. in other words. precisely because of its internal nature. material causality. We should empha- . d'une fin ou d'un hasard].3 We do not have to depart very far from the text to read the claim that determination "can only sustain its being through a cause. at least it can only sustain its being through a cause. an end. or a chance [elle ne peut tenir son 6tre que d'une cause. and it therefore implies a subsistent exteriority" ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 92). but rather how difference "can sustain its being [peut tenir son etre]. In effect. Difference founds being. determination implies a mere subsistent exteriority. it is only the efficient cause. destroys the necessity of being. The external difference of determination is always reliant on an "other" (as cause. We cannot understand this argument for internal difference over external difference unless we recognize the ontologically fundamental role that difference is required to fill. This internal cause is the efficient cause that plays the central role in Scholastic ontological foundations.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 5 difference is an internal difference. that internal difference cannot be conceived as a simple determination: a determination can be accidental. Right away. how being can sustain its difference. Furthermore. the being of efficient difference is causa sui. What is central in each case is that the cause remains external to its effect and therefore can only sustain the possibility of being. For being to be necessary.

whereas in Plato this role is only filled by an external inspiration from the finality: The difference of the thing can only be accounted for by its destination. Hence. The key to the argument turns. the discussion of difference is perfectly consistent with a causal ontological argument: Bergson's efficient difference is contrasted to Plato's final difference. . . especially given the sweeping claim about the originality of this conception in the history of philosophy. Deleuze engages Plato. Platonic difference is not capable of supporting being in its substantiality and necessity. Bergson presents difference as causa sui." "What Bergson essentially reproaches his predecessors for is not having seen the real differences of nature. the critique is focused on the external nature of difference with the ontological criteria as measure. but what Deleuze challenges in Plato is the principle of finality. Once again. After having laid out the terms of an attack on the external difference of determination with the critique of Mechanicism. once again. they only recognized differences of degree" (79). to the tradition of Scholastic causal arguments: "Differences of nature" appear as those differences that imply ne- . a second proximate enemy. Once again. If we translate this into causal discourse. . . but. in Bergson there is no separation between difference and the thing. Where there were differences of nature. Deleuze recognizes that Plato shares with Bergson the project to construct a philosophy of difference ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 95). In Bergson difference is driven by an internal motor (which Bergson calls intuition). between cause and effect: "The thing and the corresponding end are in fact one and the same. on its ontological centrality. does conceive of the articulations of reality in terms of functions and ends. efficient notion. there is no longer room to say that the thing receives its difference from an end" (96). on the need for difference to sustain a substantial nature. There is no longer any room to talk about an end: When difference has become the thing itself. This explanation of the faults of Mechanicism and Platonism provides us with a means of understanding the Bergsonian distinction that Deleuze finds so important between "differences of nature" and "differences of degree.6 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY size here that Deleuze's argument is certainly not a critique of causality tout court. We gain a much clearer perspective if we refer. we can say that Plato tries to found being on the final cause. while Plato's difference is forced to rely on the external support of finality. to refine the attack. supported by an internal dynamic. this interpretation proves inadequate. At times it seems as if Deleuze and Bergson are using these terms to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative differences. the Good (95). . as it did in the case of Mechanicism. . like Plato. Although Bergson. but rather a rejection of external conceptions of cause in favor of an internal.

"One can even. foresee the objections that he would make to a dialectic of the Hegelian type. "with all that it is not"—this is absolute exteriority. The Bergsonian critique is obvious when we focus on the causality implied by the dialectic." The dialectic presents the thing differing with an unlimited other. "all the way to contradiction. In effect. Hegel is the one who takes the exteriority of difference to its extreme. however. however. and thus the exteriority of difference in each case is limited. . the difference of the thing is sustained through an internal. to the founding moment of Hegel's logic. One might expect that with the critique of Platonic finality as an introduction Deleuze would mount an attack against the final cause and teleology in Hegel —in effect. Hegelianism. corresponding to the Scholastic causaeper se. the thing differs with itself first. raising difference to the absolute—that is the sense of Bergson's effort" (90). causae per accidens? "Thinking internal difference as such. immediately. to absolute exteriority. The process of the mediation in the opposite necessarily depends on an external causality. A such. From the very first moments of Science of Logichorn pure being to nothingness to determinate being—the dialectic is constituted by a dynamic in which the cause is absolutely external to its effect: This is the essence of a dialectic of contradiction. is the fundamental target we find at the base of each of these critiques. which he is much further from than that of Plato" (96). arriving at a pure concept of difference. as pure internal difference. "In Bergson . . based on certain of Bergson's texts. "differences of degree" are those that imply accidents. the thing immediately differs with itself. The common fault of Mechanicism and Platonism is that they both conceive of difference as dependent on an external support. According to Hegel. Hegelian dialectics takes external difference to its extreme. While Mechanicism and Platonism do succeed in thinking difference.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 7 cessity and substance. they each identify specific external supports (an external material thing in Mechanicism and a function or finality in Plato). Instead. Hegel appears to gather the faults of Mechanicism and Platonism and repeat them in their pure form by taking external difference to its extreme. thus. if we ignore the question of historiography. he turns back to the process of determination and the basic negative movement of the dialectic. the thing differs with itself because it differs first with all that it is not" (96). Hegel's logic of being is vulnerable to a Scholastic response: A conception of being founded on an external cause cannot sustain the necessity or substantiality of being because a cause external to its effect cannot be . he already has the weapons for such an attack at his disposal. they only arrive at contingent differences (per accidens). efficient production. In Bergson. Bergson's conception of internal difference leads us to recognize substantial differences (per se). in other words.

the objection that he makes to a dialectic of contradictions is that it remains a conception of difference that is only abstract" (96-97)." Deleuze has attributed difference with an ontologically foundational role and then constructed a scale for evaluating var ious conceptions of difference based on their capacity to fulfill this role. This claim is based on another fundamental principle of causality: An effect cannot contain more reality or per fection than its cause. Bergson claims that a dialectic of opposites remains a mere "combination" of two terms. and subsume consequently the two antagonistic concepts. but it also fails to grasp the concreteness and singularity of being: "Now. like Mechanicism and Platonism." The core of a Bergsonian attack on the Hegelian concept of dialectical mediation. and mainly in the early article "La conception de la difference chez Bergson. Not only does the Hegelian dialectic. First. necessary causal chain. Bergson claims that the result of this combination of abstract concepts cannot produce something concrete and real.. We have found that. is that its result must remain both contingent and abstract. This charge is backed once again by the principle that an external cause cannot be necessary. cited from La Pensee et le Mouvant 198. then. introduce accident into being.8 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY necessary. Up to this point we have considered Deleuze's Bergsonian attack on Hegel's negative ontological movement as it is presented in Deleuze's first phase of Bergson study. 207). Deleuze's discussion on difference can be clearly understood if it is continually referred to a Scholastic discourse on causality. if the objection that Bergson could raise against Platonism was that it remained a conception of difference that is still external. the argument is most clearly understood in terms of causality.. not a synthesis. because of the ontological demands at its core. is that it cannot sustain being as necessary and substantial. Once again. The logic of this further attack is not immediately clear. The heart of a Bergsonian attack on the Hegelian concept of dialectical synthesis. because the terms remain absolutely external to one another and thus cannot form a coherent. Bergson's internal . because of the contingency of this external causal movement. the successive external mediations that found dialectical being cannot constitute causaeperse but must rather be recognized as causae per accidens.. the being of the dialectic is the extreme case of a "subsistent exteriority. Thus. then. Second. How does it follow that the difference of dialectical difference is abstract merely from the condition that its support is absolutely external? Deleuze backs up this claim by quoting Bergson on the logic of external perception: "It is hardly concrete reality on which one can take at the same time two opposing views. This combination (of two contradictory concepts) cannot present either a diversity of degree or a variety of forms: It is or it is not" (96-97.

the acceptance of the term "indetermination" to describe Bergson's difference should be read principally as a refutation of the negative movement of the dialectic. with its absolutely external negative movement. in his work on Nietzsche or in Difference et repetition. and perhaps for this reason it is his most powerful critique. Later. Deleuze has managed to turn Hegel's argument for determination completely upside down. here. appearing as an efficient causality. actually ignores difference altogether. the Hegelian dialectic. We should note here that this early article is the only occasion on which Deleuze attacks the Hegelian dialectic directly. on its own terms. We will find later. Deleuze turns the charge of abstraction against Hegel and claims that dialectical determination ignores difference: "One has substituted for difference the game of determination" (96). Indeed.6 The negative movement of dialectical determination. Mechanicism and Platonism. the philosophical reason that is not determination but difference" ("Bergson" 299). but it is rather the contrary—given the choice it would be indetermination itself" (92). but to arrive at the true reason of the thing in the process of making itself. When Deleuze claims that "not only is vital difference not a determination. warning us not to confuse Bergsonian "indetermination" with irrationality or abstraction: "When [Bergson] talks about determination he does not invite us to abandon reason. he always addresses an extrapolation or derivation of the dialectic. can grasp neither differences of nature nor differences of degree—the being of the dialectic remains not only contingent but also abstract. is only capable of carrying differences of degree that cannot support being as necessary. grasps differences of nature or differences that support substance in its necessity and reality.7 Deleuze feels the need to correct this false impression. finitude. however. already raises a serious problem: The radical opposition to the dialectic appears to force us to read Bergsonian being as "indeterminate" in the Hegelian sense. on the basis of classic ontological argumentation. when Deleuze returns to attack the dialectic in the second Bergson phase of study. finally. and reality—are equally claimed by the being of Bergson's internal difference. it is very clear "against whom" these concepts are directed. while purporting to establish the basis for real difference. in fact. the external difference presented by the proximate enemies. The antagonistic project against Hegel is clearly the driving force of this argument. however. We will find. that Hegel's claims about the attributes of the state of determinate being—quality. This direct antagonistic foundation. "That which carries neither degrees nor nuances is an abstraction" (97). however.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 9 difference. Hegel proposes the negative movement of determination on the basis of the charge that Spinoza's positive movement remains abstract and indifferent. that Bergson's "indetermination" has little to do with Hegel's "deter- .

the Multiple in general: These terms are too large. Deleuze has three arguments ready in his arsenal from the earlier attack on determination. (1) Contradiction is a misreading of difference that can only be achieved by posing general. It is still the opposition to Hegel's ontological problematic that provides the dynamic for Deleuze's exposition of Bergson's position. that when Deleuze approaches the problem of the One and the Multiple in Bergsonism. This reorientation. the One in general. but his polemical foundation changes slightly. that is.10 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY mination. imprecise terms that are abstract from reality Being in general. We will return to the specifics of Bergson's positive ontology. it is as if Deleuze has merely descended one level deeper into Hegel's logic of being. . close at his side. Or else we are told that the One is already multiple. They share the characteristic of claiming to reconstruct the real with general ideas" (Bergsonism 43-44).2 Multiplicity in the Passage from Quality to Quantity When Deleuze returns to Bergson in the mid-1960s to write Bergsonism. Deleuze provides us with two examples of this generalizing negative movement: "We are told that the Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis). nonbeing in general. too abstract to grasp the specificity and singularity of reality. "like baggy clothes" (44). he takes up again many of his early arguments. therefore. his Virgil. then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis). does not by any means mark a departure from the earlier analysis. his critique of the dialectical solution is very similar to the earlier critique of the dialectical process of determination. (2) The negative movement of the dialectic violates the real relations of being. it is sufficient at this point to recognize the force and the initial consequences of the antagonistic foundation of Deleuze's argument. as Bergson says. that Being passes into nonbeing and produces becoming" (44)." but rather it relates to an idea of the creativity and originality of real being: "I'imprevisible. It should come as no surprise. 1. "Bergson criticizes the dialectic for being afalse movement. but now the central critical focus is directed toward the problem of the One and the Multiple. moving from chapter 2 on determinate being to chapter 3 on the construction of being-for-self through the dialectical relationship of the One and the Multiple. they are cut too big and hang loosely on reality. "There are many theories in philosophy that combine the one and the multiple. with Bergson. Bergson's term is neither consistent with nor opposite to Hegel's. however. but simply a progression: We can imagine that Deleuze has merely continued in his reading of "The Doctrine of Being" in Hegel's Science of Logic. The analysis still contains an attack against the negative movement of determination." the unforeseeable.

As we found earlier. then. Let us venture into the complexity of Hegel's argument. Is Deleuze merely setting up a straw man? A Hegelian could well object that Deleuze's characterization is presented in "inappropriate form" since it expresses the One and the Multiple as propositions: "This truth is to be grasped and expressed only as a becoming. the principle that an effect cannot contain more reality than its cause denies the power of the dialectical synthesis to move from abstraction to reality. gives way to the abstract. to gauge the validity of Deleuze's attack. though. but that the movement of the dialectic is a false movement. the dialectical synthesis cannot grasp the plane of reality by combining opposed abstract concepts: Of what use is a dialectic that believes itself to be reunited with the real when it compensates for the inadequacy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invoking the opposite concept. we have seen elsewhere. the movement between the One and the Multiple represents a higher level of mediation than the movement of determination and constitutes a logical passage from the quality to the quantity of being. to evaluate Deleuze's characterization of the dialectic. The singular will never be attained by correcting a generality with another generality. Hegel's treatment of the One and the Multiple is much more complex than this. which is no less broad and general? The concrete will never be attained by combining the inadequacy of one concept with the inadequacy of its opposite. however. as a process. which goes from one opposite to the other only by means of imprecision" (44). abstract) otherness. as the posited negation of negation—is the mediation in which it repels from itself its own self as its absolute (that is. (44) As we have noted. a process.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 11 a movement of the abstract concept. which in a proposition has the character of a stable unity" (Science of Logic 172). For Hegel. This One enters the quantitative domain dirough the dialectical process of repulsion and attraction. and in relating itself . a repulsion and attraction — not as being. "The Self is one (thesis) and it is multiple (antithesis). Determinate being. then it is the unity of the multiple (synthesis)"—certainly. posited unity of being-forone. (3) Finally. which is simultaneously internal and external in its complex movement of self-relation: The one as infinitely self-related—infinitely. (the many). polemics about false and real movements of being have their foundation in causal ontological arguments: The dialectic of contradiction can only imply causae per accidens. that Deleuze's principal charge is not that the dialectic fails to recognize being in terms of a dynamic. We should pause for a moment. from generality to singularity. This is certainly a valid charge against Deleuze's mock dialectic. the result of the previous development.

a realized ideality. Deleuze invokes Plato and his metaphor of the good cook who takes care to make his cuts in the right place according to the articulations of reality (see Bergsonism 45 and "Bergson" 295). is the realized ideality. The mere fact of abstract mediation results in a real determination. that is. its nonbeing. and it contains this mediation with itself as its determination" (174). which plurality? "What Bergson calls for—against the dialectic. then. a posited indetermination. is completely external and can only imply an accidental relation. posited in the one. Furthermore. as having restored itself as the one.. neither is it as result.12 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY negatively to this its non-being. "The one one . enters into relation with its abstract and multiple other. who give precedence to multiplicity.. he also refuses a dialectics of contradictions the power of real synthesis: The "combining" and "joining" of abstract terms cannot have a real. It is very easy to apply Deleuze's charges against the negative ontological movement to this passage. concrete result. To these two attacks we can add the charge that the very terms that Hegel uses are imprecise. (Science of Logic IT!) The infinitely self-related one. in sublating it. and one is only this becoming in which it is no longer determined as having a beginning. against a general conception of opposites (the One and the Multiple)—is an acute perception of the "what' and the 'how many' of what he calls the 'nuance' or the potential number" (Bergsonism 45). For this argument. just as Deleuze charges that external mediation implies an accidental relation. from the discussion of quality to the passage from quality to quantity? As always. this movement between terms (Hegel calls them "absolute") claims to arrive at a determinate synthesis. the one as equally immediate and excluding. in Platonic fashion. affirmative being. into its nonbeing. and through the sublation of this opposition we get the becoming of the One. it is attraction through the mediation of repulsion. the process which it is posits and contains it throughout only as sublated. Which being. it is only selfrelation. To arrive at a singular conception of unity and multiplicity in real being we have to begin by asking. The initial movement of the One into its opposite. Hegel is very clear about the stakes in the discussion. in this second phase of Bergson study. by refocusing his attack from the problem of determination to that of the One and the Multiple. What Hegelian terminology lacks is close attention to the specificity and singularity of real being: Hegel appears as a careless dialectical butcher when compared to Plato's fine talents. is no longer posited as an immediate. he pro . What has Deleuze gained. that is. which unity. As we have seen. that is. Describing the defects of the conception of one and many among the ancient atomists.

The configuration of proximate enemies. What this new attack gives rise to specifically is a new conception of multiplicity. Bergson. is to attack the primacy of the State in the formation of society. just as much as does the theory of the State which starts from the particular will of individuals" (Science of Logic 167). though. in contrast. this principle of extreme externality. B. which is thus utterly devoid of the Notion. but merely of numerical. from chapter 2 to chapter 3 of "The Doctrine of Being. is a multiplicity of "order". on the contrary. 1. then. an ontological basis for politics. To attack the dialectical unity of the One and the Multiple. of distinguishing two types of multiplicity" (39). because we find there are two types of multiplicities. Bergson's internal multiplicity is a multiplicity of "organization" (Bergsonism 38).BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 13 vides a suggestive analogy: "Physics with its molecules and particles suffers from the atom. unable to think multiplicity at all because it recognizes neither differences of nature nor differences of degree. allows Deleuze's Bergson a detachment from the Hegelian terrain: "For Bergson it is not a question of opposing the Multiple to the One but. occupies the third.3 The Positive Emanation of Being Let us turn now from the aggressive moment directed against the Hegelian dialectic to the positive alternative that Deleuze finds in Bergson. realizes a qualitative multiplicity founded on differences of nature. This is where Deleuze manages to establish his preferred triangular configuration of enemies. The first. quantitative multiplicities that only succeed in grasping differences of degree (32-34)." brings ontology into the sphere of politics. of course. The Hegelian dialectic. a political problem. these thinkers are able to conceive of multiplicities. but it is important now to recognize the clarity of the political framework of the project that has resulted from the critique: Deleuze has created a position to advocate a pluralism of organization against a pluralism of order. "The notion of multiplicity saves us from thinking in terms of 'One and Multiple' " (Bergsonism 43). The stakes are quite high. Here we begin to see traces of the movement that has taken place in Deleuze's "eight-year hole": The slight shift in focus in his attack on Hegelian logic. R Riemann and Albert Einstein. the multiplicity of exteriority. The passage from quality to quantity reveals at the heart of an ontological problem. The proximate enemies are G. It is clear to Hegel that the relationship between the One and the Multiple is an (analogical) foundation for a theory of social organization. extreme position. The . And this is far removed from Hegel's State philosophy of the unity of the One and the Multiple. to insist on the real plurality of society. We will return to analyze this positive project of multiplicity below.

("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 93). links the pure essence and the real existence of being: "Virtuality exists in such a way that it is realized in dissociating itself. two concepts of being: Virtual being is pure. which never presents anything but differences of degree (since it is a quantitative homogeneity)" (Bergsonism 31. Differention is the movement of a virtuality that is actualizng itself" (93). We can begin to approach Bergson's position by trying to situate it in traditional ontological terms. this vital process of differentiation. we do find a conception of pure being in Bergson: The virtual is the simplicity of being. then. internal movement. in this essential relationship with life. which 'tends' for its part to take on or bear all the differences of nature (because it is endowed with the power of qualitatively varying with itself). It does not look outside itself for an other or a force of mediation because its difference rises from its very core. actualized being is real being in that it is different. modified). This discussion of ontological movement relies on Bergson's claim of a fundamental difference between time and space. from "the explosive internal force that life carries within itself" . in itself. then. In effect.8 This elan vital that animates being. a differentiation" ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 93). but since. However. Being differs with itself immediately. virtual being is not abstract and indifferent. pure recollection (le souvenirpur). Bergson's alternative logic of being must also address the question of unity and multiplicity. Duration is the domain in which we can find the primary ontological movement because duration. and limited. that it is forced to dissociate itself in order to realize itself. This issue of quality is common in both of Deleuze's periods of Bergson study. between duration and matter. which is composed of differences . and neither does it enter into relation with what is other than itself—it is real and qualified through the internal process of differentiation: "Difference is not a determination but. "The division occurs between duration. being must become qualified and concrete in its singularity and specificity. both unity and multiplicity. The central constructive task of Deleuze's reading of Bergson.14 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY terms of the alternative are already given by the critique: Through a positive. Bergson sets up. as we noted. internally. Deleuze's concerns move to the passage from quality to quantity in the second period. transcendental being in that it is infinite and simple. time contains differences of nature and thus is the true medium of substance. qualified. is to elaborate the positive movement of being between the virtual and the actual that supports the necessity of being and affords being both sameness and difference. and space. We have already seen how Deleuze focuses on ontological movement as the locus of Bergson's originality. pure.9 Space is only capable of containing differences of degree and thus presents merely a quantitative variation.

the discussion appears as a simple transposition of causal foundations of being: Substance that is cause of itself (causa suf) becomes substance that differs with itself. Now that along with Bergson and Deleuze we have adopted an ontological perspective firmly grounded in duration. but also that it poses a more profound unity. Recognizing the contour of being in the real differences of nature is the task of the philosopher. "Everything that Bergson says always comes back to this: duration is what differs with itself. universal. Bergson's discussion is very strong in analyzing the unfolding of the virtual in the actual—what Deleuze calls the process of differentiation or actualization. modified). internal difference. Deleuze characterizes the distinction between duration and matter precisely in the traditional terms of a substance-mode relationship: "Duration is like a natura naturans. Once again. but rather repeats. and the Platonic resonances are very strong. in effect. a sim- . This is precisely the context in which Deleuze notes the Platonic passage very dear to Bergson in which he compares the philosopher to the good cook. The ontological criterion assumed here is differing with self. Furthermore. Bergson is a philosopher of the emanation of being. To recognize the essential nature of being as a substantial unity. In this regard. Indeed. is the domain of modal movement because space cannot differ with itself. then. on the contrary. pure duration presents an internal multiplicity. which contains only differences of degree. Space. a heterogeneity of qualitative differentiation. because the process of differentiation is the basic movement of life. In the second phase of Bergson study. one. Elan vital is presented in exactly these terms: "It is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized. it is not oriented toward a location of essence. a process. in time. we still need to see how the virtual and the actual communicate. impersonal" (78). what repeats" ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 88). we have to think being in terms of time: "a single Time. The discussion of difference in Bergson is not directed toward distinguishing a quidditas or a state. Deleuze argues not only that the domain of duration provides a more profound multiplicity than space. is what does not differ with itself. Matter. but rather toward the identification of an essential movement. a numerical multiplicity of quantitative differentiation. The modal nature of space. though. or matter. Why is it. is able to differ qualitatively with itself.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 15 of nature. that duration can differ with itself and matter cannot? The explanation follows from our first observations about Bergson's difference. Deleuze extends this distinction between duration and matter to the two distinct types of multiplicity: Space reveals a multiplicity of exteriority. a multiplicity of organization {Bergsonism 38). does not afford it an inherent unity. a multiplicity of order. and matter a natura naturata" (Bergsonism 93. "who cuts according to the natural articulations" ("Bergson" 295).

This is how differentiation addresses the ontological criteria of quality and quantity: Vir tual being. Deleuze argues that Bergson's ontological movement relies on an absolutely immanent. First. as a relationship between the virtual and the actual. unfolds and reveals its real multiple differences. totality— emanates or actualizes through a process of differentiation." There is no room for Platonic finalism as a force of order. if we are to understand Bergson's emanation of being correctly. virtual. that is bring them back to the virtuality ac tualized in them. then. Pure being—as virtuality. This discussion is presented through an enigmatic constellation of terms that constitutes a very complex argument. in order to see that differentiation is never a negation but a creation. we should be careful not to exaggerate the similarities to Platonism. we should not conceive it as a differentiation in space but an "actualization" in time. The creative movement from the past unity to the present multiplicity is the process of actualization.10 After setting up these two couples (virtual-actual and possible-real). as unity. Second. differentiation. rather than as a relationship between the possible and the real. a process that marks or cuts along the lines of the differences of nature. (Note that here the discussion relies heavily on the primary French meaning of actuel as "contemporary") This is where Bergson's theory of memory comes into play. In this context. The general goal of this discussion is to offer an adequate critique of the notion of the possible. Deleuze claims that the actualization of "the virtual Whole" is not a degradation of being—it is not the limitation or copying of the ideal in the real—but instead Bergson's actualization is the positive production of the actuality and multiplicity of the world: "One only has to replace the actual terms in the movement that produces them. which reveals the important difference between Bergson's and other conceptions of ontological movement. a totality in the process of dividing: Proceeding 'by dissociation and division. Situating Bergson's emanation of being in time allows Deleuze to demonstrate the force of his terminology. and that difference is never negative but essentially positive and creative" (Bergsonism 103). There are at least two aspects that distinguish Deleuze's description of Bergsonian actualization from Platonic emanation. However.16 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY plicity in the process of differentiating.' by 'dichotomy. In the past Bergson finds pure being—"a recollection that is pure. . inactive. we can understand Bergson's ontological movement as creative emanation of being free from the order of the Platonic Ideal (105-6). efficient production of being driven by "the explosive internal force that life carries within itself. impassive. as we have seen. simplicity. as Deleuze makes very clear. However. Deleuze asserts that it is essential that we conceive of the Bergsonian emanation of being.' is the essence of life" (Bergsonism 94). in itself" (Bergsonism 71).

is clearly a violation of this principle and on this basis must be rejected as a model of ontological movement. from the first point of view. In other words. Virtual is the Scholastic term to describe the ideal or transcendental. the most real being. in contrast. The progression from the possible to the real. it is the ens realissimum. however. Bergson's usage becomes even more interesting: Bergson's "actualization" maintains the Aristotelian meaning and adds to it the temporal dimension suggested by the modern French usage. Deleuze explains that. In Bergson. however. the passage from virtuality to act takes place only in duration. from the point of view of the concept. Deleuze elaborates this evaluation by adding a further constellation of terms. which is translated by saying that. . the real is thought to be in the image of (thus to resemble) the possible that it realizes—"it simply has existence or reality added to it. the virtual Scholastic God is not in anyway abstract or possible. We should note that. To understand this evaluation we need once again to refer to the causal arguments of Scholastic ontology. the process of actualization is guided by difference and creation. The essential point here is that the virtual is real and the possible is not: This is Deleuze's basis for asserting that the movement of being must be understood in terms of the virtual-actual relationship rather than the possible-real relationship. ideal without being abstract" (96). The ontological movement from the virtual to the actual is consistent with this principle since the virtual is just as real as the actual. What is at stake for Deleuze in this enigmatic group of terms—in rejecting the possible and advocating "actualization" over "realization"—is the very nature of the emanation of being and the principle that directs it. while the virtual may not be actual. there are several contemporary (actual) possibilities of which some may be realized in the future. the mode of explanation and the very terms of the discussion are thoroughly Scholastic. The possible is never real. A fundamental principle of causality that we had occasion to invoke earlier is that an effect cannot have more reality than its cause. even though it may be actual. Finally. there is no difference between the possible and the real" (Bergsonism 97. The process of realization is guided by two rules: resemblance and limitation. in memory) and may become actualized in the present. virtualities are always real (in the past.11 In this context. Furthermore. emphasis added). it is nonetheless real.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 17 Deleuze proceeds to note that the transcendental term of each couple relates positively to the immanent term of the opposite couple. Deleuze invokes Proust for a definition of the states of virtuality: "real without being actual. On the contrary. since all the possibilities cannot be realized. even though Deleuze makes no explicit reference to the Scholastics here. actualization is the Scholastic means of describing the familiar Aristotelian passage from the virtual into act.

in that all of reality is already given or determined in the possible. since the image of reality is already given in the possible. there must be a process of limitation that determines which possibilities will "pass" into reality. because all of real being is pregiven or predetermined in the "pseudo-actuality" of the possible. presents a dynamic multiplicity in which the process of differentiation creates the original arrangement or coherence of actual being: This is the multiplicity of organization. if we pose the issue in terms of the principle that determines the coherence of being. it must create its own terms of actualization. However. an original production of the multiplicity of actual being through differentiation. The stakes of the discussion appear more clearly. which has been inherent in the discussion all along: Free from any determined order or preformism. On the contrary. as a creative evolution free from the ordering restraints of both Platonic finalism (final cause) and the realization of the possible (formal cause). The multiplicity of order is "determinate" in that it is preformed and static. Earlier we cited a distinction that Deleuze makes between the "multiplicity of order" and the "multiplicity of organization" (38). though. We can partially understand this complex discussion as a critique of the movement of the formal cause (possible-real) and an affirmation of that of the efficient cause (virtual-actual). the passage of realization cannot be a creation. Therefore. Thus. The actualization of the virtual. original being. reality preexists itself in the "pseudo-actuality" of the possible and only emanates through a limitation guided by resemblances (98). the creative process of organization is always an art. Deleuze finds a sort of preformism in the couple possibility-reality. on the other hand does not resemble the virtuality that it embodies" (Bergsonism 97). We have shown that Deleuze presents the Bergsonian actualization of being as a dynamic and original emanation. since there is no difference between the possible and the real (from the point of view of the concept). The difference between the virtual and the actual is what requires that the process of actualization be a creation. this formulation begs the important question. what constitutes the creative mechanism in Bergsonian being that is capable of continually forming a new.18 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY since the realm of the possible is greater than the realm of the real. a new plane of composition? What is the . the multiplicity of organization is "indeterminate" in that it is creative and original—organization is always unforeseeable. "The reason for this is simple: While the real is the image and likeness of the possible that it realizes. the actual. The realization of the possible clearly gives rise to a multiplicity of order. a static multiplicity. the process of the actualization of being must be a creative evolution. in order for the virtual to become actual.12 Without the blueprint of order. With no preformed order to dictate its form. on the other hand. as a critique of order and an affirmation of organization.

Bergson might very well respond in Spinozian fashion that actuality is perfection. Its emanations are distancings from its undimmed clarity. However. Bergson insists that "successive productions" are not "less perfect". the differentiation constituted by elan vital is a creative process that produces new equally perfect articulations. the movement is not a "progressive loss. finally.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 19 basis of Bergsonian organization? This is precisely the point on which one could mount a Hegelian counteroffensive. does lack the "reflection-into-self" that Hegel identifies as the missing element here. Responding to this is the final task posed in Deleuze's reading of Bergson. 1. the negative. Along with the ancient atomists. The need for actual organization obviously becomes much more important as Deleuze moves to his second phase of Bergson study. Only it not only illumines itself but also emanates. as he . Hegel recognizes that a positive ontological movement can account for the becoming of being (as emanation). the organization of the multiplicity. Hegel's analogy between physics and politics returns as a serious political challenge. The attack on order (the order of finalism. of the possible. How can it account for the being of becoming? Furthermore. this is just as mad as trying to base a State on the individual wills of its citizens. the successive productions are less perfect than the preceding ones from which they arise. he asks. From a Hegelian perspective. but. and. this is the point on which Bergson's thought seems to prove insufficient for Deleuze. the becoming only as a progressive loss. (Science of Logic 538-39) Clearly. as we have seen. it is true that Bergson's movement. like that of Spinoza. Hegel finally characterizes Spinoza's positive movement of being as an unrecuperative emanationism: In the oriental conception of emanation the absolute is the light which illumines itself. Deleuze and Bergson refuse the preformism of the multiplicity in the unity. Thus being increasingly obscures itself and night. and insist instead on the originality and freedom of the multiplicity of organization. the Hegelian attack serves as a pressure to back up this Bergsonian claim with an immanent creative mechanism. The process of emanation is taken only as a happening. which does not return to the primal light. If we return to Hegel's critique of Spinoza we can recognize a pressure that also applies to Bergson's position. they refuse the order of the State.4 The Being of Becoming and the Oganization of the Actual The question of creative organization poses a serious problem. of the dialectic) creates both the space for and the need for an organizational dynamic: the organization of the actual." but rather. is the final term of the series. However.

Deleuze seems to suggest that there is a convergent movement of the actual: "The real is not only that which is cut out [se decoupe] according to natural articulations or differences of nature. that the unity only appears on the plane of the virtual. that in order to make sense of this passage we cannot read recoupement as a creative process that organizes a new virtual point of unity. however. What is important for us here is that while univocity implies a general equality and commonality of being. from a multiplicity to a unity. it does so only on the virtual plane. nonetheless. It seems. is a mechanism for the organization of the actual multiplicity. would be an enlarging.13 What we are in need of. However. looking backward we see the universal (recollection-memory) and looking forward we see the individual (contraction-memory). but rather merely as a process that traces the lines of the natural articulations back to the original point of departure. is a means of communication between the two planes. it is also that which intersects again [se recoupe] along paths converging toward the same ideal or virtual point" (Bergsonism 29). This passage suggests. Unfortunately. that is. What Deleuze's argument demands at this point.20 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY shifts focus from the issue of quality to the passage between quality and quantity. on the contrary. Recoupement is a Bergsonian way of expressing the Scholastic principle that being is univocal. In other words. What would be necessary for the creative organization of the actual. because all of reality can be traced back along convergent paths to one unique virtual point. There are. inclusive movement oriented toward the future capable of producing a new unity. Bergson is insistent on the temporal directions of the movements. the process of differentiation or actualization. This theory of univocity opposes a theory of the analogy of being. But now we discover a need for a complementary organizational movement in the opposite direction. however. The unity of the virtual resides only in the past and we can never really move backward toward that point: "We do not move from the . In our analysis up to this point we have seen that Bergson is very effective in describing the emanative movement from a unity to a multiplicity. What exactly is this process of recoupement or intersection that relates the actual multiplicity to a virtual unity? Deleuze does not treat this point extensively. several points at which Deleuze's reading suggests that we might find an answer to this need in Bergson. on the contrary. We find another example of the communication between the virtual and the actual in Bergson's two movements of memory: the "recollectionmemory" that dilates or enlarges in an inclusive movement toward the past and the "contraction-memory" that concentrates toward the future as a process of particularization (Bergsonism 52). we can verify that being is always and everywhere said in the same way. this organizational movement is nearly absent in Bergson's thought. and indeed we often find in Bergson's work.

Deleuze adds soon after. that actualizes all the levels at the same time. In many of his major works (in his studies of both Nietzsche and Spinoza. "And what is this creative emotion. With the cosmic Memory. this notion is filled out more clearly. . cannot account for the human powers of creativity14 For solution. but Deleuze notes that there is not a direct movement between intelligence and society. The intuition is that same "explosive internal force that life carries within itself' that we noted earlier as the positive dynamic of being. Deleuze presents in the final pages his densest and most elusive argument that points the way toward future research. from perception to recollection. of going beyond both his own plan and his own condition. if not precisely a cosmic Memory. is not immediately obvious. but this time it is a new memory. in order finally to express naturing Nature [natura naturans]" (107). in order to make him a creator. a society of creators. society is more directly a result of "irrational factors. adequate to the whole movement of creation?" (Ill. that liberates man from the plan or the level to which he belongs. In this final section ofBergsonism. modified). for example).' crossing closed . but from the past to the present. Deleuze has arrived at a mystical Bergsonian sociability that is available to the "privileged souls" (111) and that is capable of tracing the design of an open society. In these terms. This original production of sociability through creative emotion leads us back to Bergson's plane of unity in memory. society is formed on the basis of human intelligence. however. The explanation of this human freedom and creativity. though. Certainly. the capability to take control of the process of differentiation or actualization and to go beyond the "plane" or "plan" of nature: "Man is capable of burning the plans. "What is it that appears in the interval between intelligence and society . what fills this gap between intelligence and sociability is the origin of intuition. the organization of the actual would have to be a movement from perception to a new "recollection" that would be a future memory (a sort offutur anterieur or future perfect in the grammatical sense) as a common point of real organization.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 21 present to the past. The incarnation of the cosmic Memory "leaps from one soul to another. ? We cannot reply: It is intuition" (109). from recollection to perception" (63). Here." Deleuze identifies "virtual instinct" and "the fable-making function" {la fonctian fabulatrice) as the forces that lead to the creation of obligations and of gods. More precisely. . however. 'every now and then. Deleuze tries to explain the human capacity for creativity. These forces. we have to go back to analyze the gap that exists between human intelligence and socialization. Deleuze does his best to address seriously the question of organization and socialization in the final pages ofBergsonism (106-12). Instead. which is creative emotion (110).

In these .22 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY deserts" (111). However. productive emotion. Furthermore. Remark: Deleuze and Interpretation Before turning to Nietzsche. One aspect that makes Deleuze's work so unusual is that he brings to each of his philosophical studies a very specific question that focuses and defines his vision. This twofold shift between the two Bergson studies shows clearly one aspect of the movement that takes place in Deleuze's "eight-year hole". Nietzsche allows Deleuze to translate the positive ontology he has developed through the study of Bergson toward a positive ethics. Furthermore. More important. The selection involved in Deleuze's narrow focus is what seems to confuse some of his readers and to irritate others. in effect. creative movement of being. we have found that Deleuze is principally concerned with developing an adequate critique of the negative ontological movement of the dialectic and elaborating an alternative logic of the positive. What we have here sounds distinctly like a weak echo of the voice of Zarathustra on the mountaintops: creative pathos. a community of active creators who go beyond the plane of nature and human beings. suggestive as this brief explanation of a Bergsonian social theory might be. Nietzsche gives Deleuze the means to explore the real being of becoming and the positive organization of the actual multiplicity. let us take a moment to consider two critiques of Deleuze's reading of Bergson that will help us clarify the characteristics of Deleuze's interpretative strategy. In the case of the Bergson studies. this reorientation announces the need for and the advent of Nietzsche in Deleuze's thought.15 This final section ofBergsonism is the most notable positive argument in the second phase of Bergson study that does not appear in the first. In Bergsonism Deleuze succeeds in addressing this pressure to an extent. by shifting the terrain from the plane of logic to that of values. and it perfectly corresponds to the shift from the problematic of quality to that of the passage from quality to quantity that we noted in the attack on Hegel. however. it remains in this final section obscure and undeveloped. the rest of Deleuze's work on Bergson does not serve to support this theory In effect. At the outset of our essay. The critiques of Gillian Rose ("The New Bergsonism") and Madeleine BarthelemyMadaule ("Lire Bergson") offer us two examples of this problem. Deleuze feels the pressure to bring the ontological to the social and the ethical. we noted that the peculiarities of Deleuze's work require that we keep a series of methodological principles in mind. we have to refer to Deleuze's Nietzsche to give these claims real coherence and a solid grounding.

' which is in effect the vocation of philosophy for Bergson. . which she reads as consistent with the work of Comte (Rose 98). beyond the human condition. She concludes her brief discussion of Bergsonism with an ambiguous attribution that illustrates this confusion very clearly: "On Deleuze's reading Bergson produces a Naturphilosophie which culminates at the point when elan vital 'becomes conscious of itself in the memory of 'man' " (Rose 101). To back this claim she cites the final page of Bergsonism (112 in the English edition). by failing to recognize Deleuze's selectivity. Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889). In addition. the principal conclusion . though. however. the diversity of perspective between these two critics will serve to illustrate the slippage that results from the gap between the Anglophone and the French traditions of Bergson interpretation. we have a completely ahistorical reading of Bergson that fails to distinguish between his early and late works. Not only does Deleuze not mention Naturphilosophie in this passage. a French Bergson specialist. is not that Bergson's thought does or does not constitute a Naturphilosophie. it is that this aspect does not form a part of Deleuze's project. . Throughout "The New Bergsonism" (chapter 6 of Dialectic of Nihilism). but he has spent the previous pages (106-12) arguing that Bergson shows how we can go beyond the plan of nature and create a new human nature. they confuse the different projects that guide his various works. these authors conflate Deleuze's positions with those of the philosophers he addresses. by ignoring the evolution of Deleuze's thought. which supports the second half of her sentence in part but does not support the first half at all. Barthelemy-Madaule's primary objection is that Deleuze tries to read Les deux sources as a Nietzschean and antihumanist text when in fact it demonstrates the profoundly religious character of Bergson's thought: "The process of 'going beyond the human condition. Here Deleuze is drawing principally on Bergson's late work Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932).) The central point here. Rose reads Bergson's work and Deleuze's interpretation as if they constituted a perfect continuum. Rose derives the idea of Naturphilosophie not from Deleuze but from Bergson's earliest work. rather.' . and second. cannot be formulated in terms of the 'inhuman' or the 'superhuman. Her reaction.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 23 critiques we can discern two methods of reading Deleuze that lead to interpretative difficulties: First. comes from a very different perspective from that of Rose. In any case. We find a similar problem of interpretation in the essay by Madeleine Barthelemy-Madaule. that this is not what Deleuze takes from Bergson. and it is interesting that in her reading it is precisely these same pages of Bergsonism that create the greatest irritation. (Therefore. to add to the confusion. since she is grounded in the French spiritual reading of Bergson rather than the Anglo-Saxon positivist reading.

104. Now it does not seem to me that this is the case here. Bergson is indeed not Nietzsche. With this in mind. although it flirts with the question of ethics. which we find in both Rose and Barthelemy-Madaule.120). from a confusion both of his use of sources and of his relationship to the philosopher he studies. combined with small additions from Nietzsche and Duns Scotus. from a failure to recognize Deleuze's evolution. She substantiates this claim with a quote from a section of Difference et repetition in which Deleuze is discussing the univocity of being in Duns Scotus. Barthelemy-Madaule is a very careful reader of Bergso and. Barthelemy-Madaule is reacting primarily against Deleuze's principle of selection: "Interpreting a doctrine supposes that one has accounted for all the terms of the ensemble. and Spinoza: "Univocal Being is both nomadic distribution and crowned anarchy" (quoted by Rose 99. It is certainly strange that when Rose seeks to engage Deleuze's work in relation to her general theme about juridicism and poststructuralism she would choose to read Bergsonism— any of his other studies in the history of philosophy (on Kant. but that does not . Deleuze's investigation of Bergson is focused primarily on ontological issues.24 BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY that we take from this interpretation is that Bergson is not Nietzsche" ("Lir Bergson" 86. and. then. 108). it gives no solid grounds for a discussion of law. As we have seen. Deleuze 55). Hume. Rose repeatedly refers to the intent of Deleuze's new Bergsonism as the attempt to found an "ontological injustice" (99. however. Nietzsche. The problem here is quite simple: In the cited passage. For our purposes. to a certain extent. The second type of problem results from a misreading of Deleuze's projects. or Spinoza) would have been more adequate to her task. it should come as no surprise that Rose has difficulty writing directly about Deleuze's Bergson. these are prefaced by a reading of Bergson's Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience in relation to Comte and positivism and followed by a reading of sections of Deleuze's Difference et repetition. one has to accept her criticism. I have argued that in Deleuze's treatment of Bergson we can find the suggestion of a concept of univocal being. The first type of problem in reading Deleuze. Deleuze is dealing neither with Bergson nor with justice. thus. is how one inter prets a philosopher. In fact. then. she dedicates less than two of the twenty-one pages toBergsonism (99-100). Nietzsche. Deleuze's (perhaps strained and unsuccessful) effort to bring the two together in these pages indicates the important effect that the period of Nietzsche study has had on his thought and the need to move beyond the Bergsonian framework. This problem arises primarily in Rose's critique. Deleuze's use of Bergsonism as the title of his study" (120). The main issue at stake in the conflict with Barthelemy-Madaule. I would contest Mr. results from a failure to recognize or accept Deleuze's selectivity and.

First. we must look at the conception of efficient power (force internal to its manifestation) developed in the study of Nietzsche. we need to pass through at least two more important phases. or even as a statement about justice. of socially constitutive practice and of right. I would maintain. one must assume.BERGSONIAN ONTOLOGY 25 mean that we can transfer the Duns Scotus-Spinoza-Nietzsche nexus directly to Bergson: This is a simple methodological issue. univocity gives us an intuition of politics through its implication of an ontological equality and participation. . (This is apparently how Rose can come to the point of attributing Scotus's ethics to Deleuze [107]—with the belief. Such a claim attempts to collapse a complex development from ontology to politics and to assume that such a development admits only one solution. that there can only be one ethics that corresponds to a univocal conception of being. so that Deleuze can elaborate a positive alternative to law. this passage reveals the inadequacy of Rose's entire argument. because this founds an attack on law and juridicism. More important. to move in effect from ontology to politics. It is absurd to read the statement that univocal being is "crowned anarchy" as a directly political statement. that in order to bring this intuition to a veritable conception of justice in Deleuze's thought. Jus versus lex: This a much more adequate formulation of Deleuze's position against legalism and juridicism. we must turn to the study of Spinoza for its investigation of common notions. however. though.16 Second.) At the very most. this equality is what "crowns" the anarchy of being in Deleuze's account (Difference et repetition 55).

Chapter 2 Nietzschean Ethics From Efficient Power to an Ethics of Affirmation In order to appreciate Deleuze's work on Nietzsche we have to situate it in the context of the development of Deleuze's own project. Most important. but also forward to the subsequent study of Spinoza. on the contrary. we should refer the study of Nietzsche not only back to the previous work on Bergson. The analysis of power provides the basis for the fundamental passage in Deleuze's study of Nietzsche: from the ontological foundation of power to the ethical creation of being. all kinds of new figures immediately spring up. such a gap is not indicative of inactivity. This study of Nietzsche is the intervention that gives rise to the important differences between the two phases of Bergson study that we discussed in chapter 1. "perhaps it is in the holes that the movement takes place" ("Signes et evenements" 18). Nietzsche and Philosophy is the concrete result of the "eight-year hole" in Deleuze's intellectual life. will perhaps give us a key to reading the movement that animates Deleuze's early work. logical dynamism has entered a new horizon. where all the logical issues are posed now in terms of sense and value. According to Deleuze. The work on Nietzsche. a field of forces. the longest gap in his prolific career. We will find that Deleuze's construction of an ethical horizon within the framework of Nietzsche's thought brings to light the questions that make possible (or indeed necessary) his subsequent investigation of Spinozian practice. We can summarize this reorientation by saying that Bergson's positive. 26 . though. then. On this new terrain. Finally. the heart of the Bergsonian logical discussion is transformed into an analysis of the nature of power.

As in the Bergson studies. nor "to do" any form of dialectics if critique itself had not been standing on its head from the start. the ultimate enemy? Deleuze has to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis. In other passages. however. or with Hegel. Deleuze brings in other antagonists who are closer to Nietzsche's position and who share some of his concerns in order to maintain the vast distance from Hegel. These two stances form a paradox: Is Nietzsche's primary antagonism with Kant. Deleuze's analysis is driven by an antagonism toward Hegel. Nietzsche . And finally. Instead. we find that Deleuze views the fundamental antagonism toward Hegel as an urgent and central element of his reading of Nietzsche: "We will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work if we do not see 'against whom' its principal concepts are directed. Nietzsche's philosophy forms "an absolute anti-dialectics" (195). . Deleuze's strategy of triangulation that we discussed earlier (Section 1. as a sort of negative raising to the nth power. In several passages. Here. . Once again.1 The Paradox of Enemies In the study of Nietzsche. In these passages the need for a direct confrontation with Hegel is very clear. however. "Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge" (8). the dialectic comes from the original Kantian form of the critique. Although Nietzsche and Philosophy contains some of Deleuze's harshest rhetoric against Hegel. Deleuze tries to displace the relationship to Hegel. to destroy its binary character with the same type of triangular configuration we found in the Bergson studies: Nietzsche's relation to Kant is like Marx's to Hegel: Nietzsche stands critique on its feet. (89) In this passage it seems that Hegel is not of real concern to Nietzsche. just as Marx does with the dialectic. Hegelian themes are present in this work as the enemy against which it fights" (162). Nietzsche addresses Kant as his proximate enemy. the polemical focus is already moving away from Hegel in important ways.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 27 2. however. we find that Hegel inherits the faults of the proximate antagonists and takes them to their extreme. Deleuze gives seemingly contradictory indications about the best way to choose and relate to one's enemy. There would have been no need to put the dialectic back on its feet. are all those related to his developing conceptions of antagonism and opposition. Deleuze refuses to descend and struggle on Hegel's own terrain. as in that of Bergson. Posing Nietzsche as the ultimate anti-Hegel presents a real danger. . the proximate enemy. The ambiguities in Deleuze's position.1) becomes more complicated and more ambiguous. the dialectic constitutes a false problem.

toward a complementarity (Dionysus/Ariadne) (14). but opposition to the dialectic itself" (17). Nietzsche discovers the fundamental enemy in Christ. on the other hand. And furthermore. This is the radical. we seem to run the risk of initiating a new dialectic. but in a problematical fashion. however. When Socrates proves to be merely a proximate enemy. it must constitute an absolutely destructive negation that spares nothing from its force and recuperates nothing from its enemy. toward a more profound opposition (Dionysus/Socrates or. absolute opposition seems (in a Hegelian framework) to imply the initiation of a new dialectical process. it must mark the death of the enemy. later. The first couple does constitute a weapon. "we will misunderstand the whole of Nietzsche's work" (162). and what marks its difference from dialectical negation? We do not have the means to give the answer yet. Nietzsche first shifts from Apollo to Socrates as the real enemy of Dionysus. What exactly is this nondialectical negation. the enemy has completely disappeared and the relationship is one of mutual affirmation. According to Deleuze. of reaction. with the Antichrist and the opposition and negation it implies. Here. takes no prisoners. but this proves insufficient because "Socrates is too Greek. 2. Deleuze finds that this early text presents a "semi-dialectical" argument based on the Dionysus/Apollo antithesis (13). with no resurrection. but cannot suffice on its own because it does not provide Nietzsche a weapon with which to attack his enemies. of ressentiment. however. a little too Apollonian at the outset because of his clarity. it must be an absolute aggression that offers no pardons.28 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS appears in the position of negation. pillages no goods.2 The Transcendental Method and the Partial Critique Kant's enormous contribution to philosophy is to conceive of an immanent critique that is both total and positive. Dionysus/Christ) and. The answer will have to be found in Nietzsche's total critique. We can get a preliminary idea of Deleuze's treatment of this problem of enemies by looking at his reading of The Birth of Tragedy. In the second couple. this couple is productive. a little too Dionysian in the end" (14). if we try instead to focus only on a proximate enemy (such as Kant) and do not recognize antiHegelianism as the fundamental driving force. Deleuze claims that this is not the case: "The opposition of Dionysus or Zarathustra to Christ is not a dialectical opposition. Deleuze gives an elegant explanation of this problem in terms of an evolution of Nietzsche's thought that resolves the antinomic couple in two directions: on one hand. Kant. that of complementarity. nondialectical negation that Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche must develop. However. fails to carry out this . but the question itself sets the tone and the task for Deleuze's reading.

as a limitation on critical powers. Finally. on the contrary. The partiality of the first destructive moment of the critique allows the essential established values to endure and therefore fails to clear the ground necessary for the value-creating. Therefore. then. requires a materialistic. is to correct Kant's errors and salvage the project (89). in effect.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 29 project. but it also fails to be positive. In contrast. too well mannered. In other words. the Kantian critique can proceed to treat claims to truth and morality without endangering truth and morality themselves. Kant's critical reason functions to reinforce the established values and make us obedient to them: "When we stop obeying God. A total critique. The issue is the extent of. monistic perspective in which the entire unified horizon is open and vulnerable to the critique's destabilizing inquiry. and thus Nietzsche's role. a traditional intellectual in Gramscian terms. restrained by the "humble recognition of the rights of the criticised" (89). and the limits on. the failure to be total obstructs the possibility of being positive. no limits on its power. The negative. The very positing of the transcendental plane and the consequent partiality of the critique. Kant's double failure is really one. Therefore. a total critique must be an all-out attack on the established values and the ruling powers they support. Kant's discovery of a domain beyond the sensible is the creation of a region outside the bounds of the critique that effectively functions as a refuge against critical forces. Kant is too genteel. it is the transcendental method itself that requires (or allows) that the critique remain partial. the State. according to Deleuze. Kant effectively grants immunity to the established values of the ruling order and "thus total critique turns into a politics of compromise" (89). Kant's critique is too polite. Under the cloak of disinterest. Critique is always violence—this is not the real issue. the reign of critique's destructive force. is what allows Kantianism to be conservative. reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile" (92). Kant appears as a passive State functionary. The principal fault of the Kantian critique is that of transcendental philosophy itself. the total critique recognizes no restraints. destructive moment of the critique (pars destruens) that draws the total horizon into question and destabilizes previously existing powers must clear the terrain to allow the productive moment (pars construens) to release or create new powers—destruction opens the way for creation. This conclusion follows directly from Nietzsche's focus on values: "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values" (1). legitimating the values of the ruling powers and protecting them from critical forces. With the ideal values safely protected in the suprasensible. The Kantian critique not only fails to be total. our parents. too timid to question seriously the fundamental established values. . and is therefore necessarily insurrectional.

when and where. Deleuze approaches this issue by considering "the form of the question" that animates philosophical inquiry. This transcendental space immune from the critique is the locus of order. The object of the attack in the question "Qu'est-ce que?" is the transcendental space that it implies. Deleuze will later call the materialist question "the method of dramatization" and insist that it is the primary form of inquiry throughout the history of philosophy (except perhaps in the work of Hegel). but precisely the opposite. Therefore. "Qui?" is a materialist question that looks to the movement of real forces from a specific perspective. as a suprasensible principle ordering the various material instantiations. In effect. invoking perspectivism. the focus of the attack is the transcendental method. not differences of nature). how and how much?" ("La methode de dramatisation" 95). The "active instance" (89) that the Kantian critique lacks is precisely that which truly legislates: To legislate is not to legitimate order and preserve values. what is justice. and (2) it assumes either a formal or a final cause (the form of justice and truth.1 The method of dramatization. The question "Qu'est-ce que?" remains abstract because it implies two errors: (1) It seeks essence in a static quidditas rather than in a dynamic of movement (and thus can only reveal differences of degree. This attack on Kant's transcendental method. we must locate the perspective on the immanent plane and identify the interests it serves. an internal. Deleuze claims. to create new values (91). then. the only possible principle of a total critique is perspectivism (90). We can certainly detect a Bergsonian inspiration in this argument." or rather. though. goes hand in hand with the Nietzschean attack on Platonic idealism. the two questions point to different worlds for their answers.30 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS constructive power. Nietzsche. Since we can accept no transcendental standpoint external to the plane of forces that determines and legitimates absolute knowledge and universal val ues. . of the Just and the True) as the ordering principle of reality. The central question for Platonic inquiry. efficient force of differentiation.This critique of values forces us to consider the question of interest and perspective. is "Qu'est-ce que?": "What is beauty. and that provides a sanctuary for established values from the destructive power of inquiry and critique. "Which one is beautiful?" Once again. "Qu'est-ce que?" is the transcendental question par excellence that seeks an ideal that stands above. The question "Qui?" that brings us to the terrain of will and value asks for an immanent dynamic of being. is an elaboration of perspectivism as part of a critique of interest and value: "It is not enough to pose the abstract question 'what is truth?' (qu'est-ce que le vraf)"\ rather we must ask "who wants truth (qui veut le vrai). wants to change the central question to "Qui?": "Who is beautiful?. etc?" (76).

therefore. Deleuze tries to explain this nuance further in his preface to the English translation: "Here we must rid ourselves of all 'personalist' references. The impersonal "Qui?" is not more concrete because it locates specific subjects or agents. that is. at Deleuze's suggestion he translates "qui" as "which one" (207. nearly all of which are centered around a "personalist" interpretation and selection. The "impersonal" interpretative strategy can also be seen as a political selection. This insistence on the impersonal nature of the question "Qui?" casts a different light on Deleuze's charge that the question "Qu'est-ce que?" is abstract. does not refer to an individual. and the genetic relationship that determines these forces (power)" (xi). 53). Not only is there a long tradition of reading Nietzsche in this way. that is. It is often a strain to read Nietzsche without adopting personalist references. it is effectively this "impersonal" aspect that marks the limit of Deleuze's development of ethical and political veins in Nietzsche. but rather to an event. but rather in a presubjective force or will. The one that. Whenever we ask the question "Qui?" we are going to look to a certain will to power for the response (cf. how Deleuze's selection fits in with the scope of his project. to a person.. because in Deleuze's Nietzsche the answer it seeks will never be found in an individual or collective subject. Deleuze's research moves from a Bergsonian logic of being to a Nietzschean logic of the will. In effect. . Deleuze's reading has made such a profound impression on Nietzsche studies partly because it succeeds in making so much of Nietzsche's thought while avoiding or effectively diffusing the force of arguments about Nietzsche's individualism and reactionary politics. however.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 31 Remark: Deleuze's Selection of the "Impersonal" Nietzsche We must be careful with the question "Qui?". to the forces in their various relationships in a proposition or a phenomenon. as a logic of the will and value that animates the field of presubjective forces. but also it would not be difficult to cite several passages in which we cannot help but read Nietzsche "personally. It is clear. note 3). that although this selection may be necessary for Deleuze.. then. I will argue. In fact. Deleuze brings a Bergsonian approach to Nietzsche so as to read him in logical terms." Here we have a very clear example of Deleuze's selectivity. but because it operates on the materialist terrain of an efficient causality. however. The difficulties presented for the English translation of this passage serve to highlight the problem: Hugh Tomlinson notes that "who" cannot function as a translation of "qui" because it directs inquiry toward a person.

This shift to the horizon of forces marks the tendency in Deleuze's thought that we noted earlier in the second phase of Bergson study. positive ontological movement). then. pure and empty. movement that can never move closer to a real. provides no substantial foundation for these claims here. Deleuze's Nietzsche takes this Bergsonian analysis of the abstract character of the negative ontological movement of determination for granted. This is very reminiscent of Bergson. The direct Nietzschean attack on Hegel.3 Slave Logic and Efficient Power Thus far we have considered Deleuze's Nietzschean attacks on the proximate enemies. concrete affirmation.32 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 2. by an imprecise view of reality. . that affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. Once we recognize that Bergsonian arguments are functioning as the foundation for this discussion. exteriority). As in the works on Bergson. it never had to pass into what it already was." In fact. and thus false. Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of difference" (9). Hence. Contradiction and opposition can only give abstract results (157) and can only lead to an abstract determination of being. and inferiority vs. Deleuze. But this being was never different from its opposite. Hegelian ontological movement remains abstract and accidental. The core of this attack is that Hegelian being is abstract. however. We no longer have purely logical categories (external vs. to its singularity: "The being of Hegelian logic is merely 'thought' being. except that we can note that the terms of the conflict have become more concrete— now the "speculative element" is contrasted with the "practical element. it should be no surprise that Deleuze finds a Bergsonian alternative in Nietzsche: "For the speculative element of negation. and negative vs. not really different from its opposite. In effect. real difference does not go "all the way" to opposition. the fundamental enemy. but now the logic is presented in terms of volition and value (negation vs. We have seen that Bergson argues that difference is only conceived as opposition through an abstraction from real differences. blind to its subtle nuances. affirmation. The transposition to the terrain of values marks the beginning of our trajectory from ontology to ethics and politics. internal difference. Hegelian being is pure and simple nothingness" (183). Deleuze's initial charge against the dialectic is once again that it is driven by a negative movement that cannot arrive at a concrete. the advent of Nietzsche in Deleuze's thought transforms the Bergsonian theoretical scene with a very important contribution. Moreover. Kant and Plato. and therefore they can sound rather hollow unless we read Bergson's critique of determination into them. singular conception of being. the movement implied by this Hegelian being "passing into its opposite" is a completely external. appears first in Bergsonian form. opposition or contradiction.

Deleuze's attack seems somewhat misdirected. even though we are dealing with the question of self-affirmation. On this new terrain we have dramatic personae representing the two philosophical methods: the slave of abstract speculation versus the master of concrete pathos and practice. but rather deals strictly with a logic of valuation dramatized in terms of two personae. In a very careful and intelligent study of Nietzsche and Philosophy. Deleuze has taken the logical attack developed in Bergson and added the question of will—"Who wills a negative ontological movement?" This is the method of dramatization: In Bergson. Here we need to refine the first methodological principle we presented in the "Preliminary Remark": It is necessary not only to recognize "against whom" the polemic is directed. We should be careful to keep in mind. but this should indicate to us that perhaps we have misinterpreted the primary target. In this dramatization. or even a social class. a group. Nietzsche presents the slave syllogism as the false attempt to arrive at self-affirmation. then. Once again. the slave is the persona who plays the will to a negative movement. "Qui?" leads us to identify a kind of force. The slave plays the negative logic of valuation: "You are evil. or a specific quality of will. though. though. In effect. Wahl is undoubtedly correct in noting that Deleuze's Nietzsche does not directly confront Hegel's central focus in the Phenomenology. However. Deleuze is reading On the Genealogy of Morals as a harsh attack against Hegel—but against which Hegel? Since we are dealing with the master and the slave. as the way of thinking of the slave: the abstract thought of contradiction then prevails over the concrete feeling of positive difference" (10). or perhaps Kojeve's popularized version of it. Jean Wahl notes the shortcomings of this attack: "Isn't there in the Phenomenology of Spirit something more profound that is able to resist the Nietzschean critique?" (364).NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 33 The complexity of this new terrain and the importance of Nietzsche's transformation become evident as Deleuze treats Nietzsche's polemic against slave logic and thereby develops a new attack on the Hegelian dialectic: "Nietzsche presents the dialectic as the speculation of the pleb. rather. and should be careful to recognize from the outset the specific focus and polemical content of Deleuze's argument. if we posit this as the focus. with Nietzsche. he can make the discussion more concrete by dramatizing the investigation in terms of will. the discussion has nothing to do with the subject of consciousness. Clearly. but now. Deleuze asks the Platonic question "What is the negative logic of being?". We are entering a very difficult passage. it seems obvious that Deleuze's target is the Phenomenology of Spirit. but against which specific argument. We gain a more adequate view of the Nietzschean attack presented here if we read it as a continuation of the polemic against Hegel's Science of Logic. therefore I am . that the question "Qui?" does not find its answer in an individual.

" The master's syllogism is the inverse: "I am good. Deleuze explains that the negative value given to the other from the slave perspective is not attributed simply because the other is strong. positive statement. whereas the first negation ("You are evil") is a negative evaluation. In the master's syllogism. In the slave's syllogism.34 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS good. and more powerful. therefore you are evil" (119). like the determination of the dialectic. The slave logic negates the force of the strong not by opposing it with another force. the first clause is independent and thus carries the essential. Master logic appears in Deleuze's description as a sort of efficient causality of valuation—the effect is completely internal to the cause and comes forth through a logical emanation. Deleuze brilliantly brings this back to the question of logical movement by focusing on the different function of "therefore" in the two cases. Furthermore. This is where Deleuze locates the primary slave paralogism: The initial evaluative negation is based on "the fiction of a force separated from what it can do" (123). exterior or transcendent to the field of forces. we find that the slave's "therefore" can only mark a causa per accidens. is a false movement that merely produces a "subsistent exteriority. it attempts to reverse the negative first clause to arrive at a positive conclusion. but by the "fiction" of dividing it into two parts. Slave logic tries to operate a completely external movement by using the logical operator "therefore" to relate the two opposite clauses. however. which looks forward to Spinoza. Negation takes on a different form in the field of forces: The second negation of the slave syllogism (contained in "therefore") is a purely logical negation. accusation. The slave's evaluative negation is based on a false conception of the nature of power. The affirmation of the slave. Deleuze is also able to develop a further. "therefore" merely introduces a negative correlate. The slave maintains that power is a capacity. that can be manifest in action or not. This separation of power into two parts allows for the creation of a "fictitious" causal relationship: "The manifestation is turned into an effect that is re- . but because the other does not restrain that strength. If we try to pose this logic in causal terms. the slave's second clause cannot be a real affirmation because the effect ("I am good") cannot contain more perfection or reality than its cause ("You are evil"). "therefore" plays a completely different role. "Therefore" marks the necessity of an internal movement. This fictitious division creates the space for the imputation of evil: It is not evil to be strong." While this first Nietzschean attack on slave logic is looking back to Bergson for its foundation (since now will and force have come into play). "This is the strange syllogism of the slave: he needs two negations in order to produce an appearance of affirmation" (121). but it is evil to carry that strength into action. Deleuze is clearly drawing on the Bergsonian logical charges against the negative movement of the dialectic.

. to the limit of power or desire" (53). but nothing is knowing or resting unless it is actually knowing or resting.3 As we noted earlier. the slave conception is a "fiction" precisely because it introduces an accidental quality into the power of being by setting up an external causal relation. it is the more prevalent conception in history. how ever. but can exist in the universe. Hence. necessary relationship between a force and its manifestation.possible manifestation. This evaluation follows from a materialist conception of being. he has in mind that the name "being" is predicated of some thing by means of the verb "is." in a proposition that merely states a fact concerning a thing and is not equivalent to a proposition containing the mode of possibility. that is. when Aristotle divides "being" into potentiality and actuality . to such an extent that "the strong always have to be defended against the weak" (58). the manifestation internal to the cause. expresses the point clearly: The distinction between potential existence [ens in potentia] and actual existence [ens in actu]. in Spinozian terms. power is the essence of being (Ethics IP34). or that something else that is in the universe is also a being. . as knowledge and rest are". one of the strictest materialists in the Western tradition. does not mean that something that is not in the universe. insists that power exists only en octe and cannot be separated from its manifestation: "Concrete force is that which goes to its ultimate consequences. . and. indeed. . . efficiently linked to its manifestation. Aristotle declares in the same place that "being is divisible into potential and actual. (Philosophical Writings 92) Ockham's insight leads us directly to the nucleus of Deleuze's Nietzschean distinction between master power and slave power.2 Nietzsche's master. The master logic provides a more substantial conception of power by posing the effect. in Scholastic ontologies the essence of being is its "productivity" and its "producibility. we have to bring it back once again to the ontological plane. The master conceives an internal. is truly a being.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 35 ferred to the force as if it were a distinct and separated cause" (123). The slave sets up a relationship in which force appears as merely a formal cause—force represents a. Therefore. ." The slave's conception of power is a "fiction" because it fails to recognize the real sub- . To say that "the name 'being' is predicated of some thing by means of the verb 'is' " is to say that the power of being is necessarily. this cannot be read as simply an empirical observation because Nietzsche would be the first to say that slave power is very real." and master power more real or concrete? Obviously. and William Ockham. internal to being. that the force of being is inseparable from "what it can do. What is the reasoning behind Deleuze's claim here? By what logic is slave power merely a "fiction. To understand this argument. Rather.." or.

Framing the discussion in these terms. in this sense. everything that separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated from what it can do. We have a substantial theory of power that can serve as an attack on juridicism (based on the conception of power it implies). Every force that goes to the limit of its power is. it is clear that Hegel's master and slave do not tread directly on this same terrain. expresses the triumph of the weak over the strong. then. It is not a law that every force goes to the limit.36 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS stantial nature of being. we do not yet have the practical. at this point in our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche. Everything that separates a force from what it can do he calls law. but we do yet not have any positive alternative to complement this attack. in other words. We have made great progress in fleshing out the logic and value of Nietzsche's distinction between master power and slave power. and tries to maintain a separation between the potential and the actual through a notion of possibility. constructive elements necessary to elaborate this ethical and political terrain. and then he opposes jus to lex. between power and what it can do. However. it is even the opposite of a law. Deleuze brings out the ethical and political implications of the two types of power with an interesting comparison between Nietzsche and Callicles: Callicles strives to distinguish nature and law. The entire discussion of power has little to do with strength or capacity. Law. active. we can only read the Nietzschean analysis of power as suggestive of a future ethics and politics. but with the relation between essence and manifestation. "What Nietzsche calls weak or slavish is not the least strong but that which. To fill out this alternative we will have to wait until we can elaborate a conception of ethical practice. Nietzsche adds: the triumph of reaction over action. but it cannot exist as a real expression of substance. whatever its strength. but with its quality. Hegel's slave is interested in consciousness and independence.4 This analysis of the nature of power is already very suggestive of an ethics. Indeed. it expresses the essence of being as the actual and efficient (not merely possible or formal) power of being. we can see that Nietzsche's argument has to do not with the quantity of power. However. (58-59) This passage presents a terrain that is very close to that of Spinoza's political writings. on the contrary. For the moment. Slave power is real and certainly does exist. democratic politics. This formulation serves Spinoza as an extension of his ethics and as the foundation for a viable. What Nietzsche contributes to this discourse on power is an evaluation—he judges the power internal to its manifestation as noble. is separated from what it can do" (61). First Spinoza affirms that power = virtue = right. he . The master conception of power reveals being in its actual productivity.

NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 37 is too preoccupied with his death. Houlgate explains: Hegel's dialectic is not in fact based upon an initial external negation of the specific differences between things. it should be clear that these two points are well off the mark. in effect. and (2) its conception of self does not meet the requirements to achieve genuine interiority. Deleuze directs the Nietzschean attack not against Hegel's master and slave. the preceding discussion has not been dealing with the Phenomenology. of sense and value) so that he can carry out the combat there. but he actually completes the Nietzschean project better than Nietzsche himself did. to pose the question of value. or mediated. He makes two central counterattacks against Deleuze's Nietzscheanism: (1) It fails to appreciate that Hegel's negative logic is required for determination. but against an extrapolation from Hegel's Science of Logic. Thus. (7) . . an implication of his dialectic.. to go back on the offensive. This new tactic affords Deleuze a greater autonomy from Hegelian terminology. Given our reading of the evolution of Deleuze's work and the development of his project. it transports the dialectic to Deleuze's terrain (in this case.. Even if the rhetoric has intensified. We should note that Deleuze's tactics for attacking Hegel have changed somewhat. We no longer ask the question "What is the dialectical logic of being?" but "Who wills this logic?" This is the line of reasoning that leads us to master and slave valuation and to the two conceptions of power. if it is to have any determinate characteristics . at all. . Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics can help us frame the importance of the arguments we have presented. Deleuze fails to see Hegel's point. However. The notion of something real or specific that is not negatively determined. like a good Hegelian. demonstrating that not only is Hegel invulnerable to Nietzschean critiques. . Remark: The Resurgence of Negativity A parenthesis about Steven Houlgate's response to Deleuze's charges against slave logic in Hegel. the polemic no longer applies directly to Hegel's argument. and too busy thinking about his work. . According to Hegel's Science of Logic. a thing must be in itself the negation of something else . . and does not therefore constitute a flight into an abstract world of fictional concepts as Deleuze asserts. Deleuze conducts a second-order critique of Hegel that builds on Bergsonian logic and looks forward to Spinozian politics. it addresses a derivation from Hegel.5 Evidently. is precisely what dialectical philosophy shows up to be an impossibility. Houlgate's project is to defend Hegel against the recent charges wielded by the French Nietzscheans (Deleuze in particular) and. and.

we found that this external foundation is abstract. However. that there is something richer and more pro- . we must have negation. as causa sui. We can see this point clearly if we keep in mind the implications of Nietzsche's two types of power. when we considered this movement in a causal framework. Deleuze has shown us in his studies on Bergson that he agrees with this point—but Deleuze is not the one who wants determination. he views it as a sickness. by definition.38 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS "Omnis determinatio est negatio. not his ends. wants to have nothing to do with self-consciousness and the self it gives rise to (cf. Houlgate shows us one reason why Deleuze might choose not to address directly the master and slave of Hegel's Phenomenology: The entire terrain is oriented toward promoting the sickness of interiority and self-consciousness. Along with Nietzsche. we have come back to this argument so many times now that it can only appear comical when Houlgate claims that. Deleuze. concrete selfhood is to be understood in terms of the negation of. We must admit that Deleuze does not repeat this argument in Nietzsche and Philosophy." Houlgate reminds us that if we want determination. so too he assumes as another goal the inferiority of selfconsciousness. just as Houlgate assumes that Deleuze is striving for determination. as Jean Wahl claims. doctor subtilis: "What are the consequences of Deleuze's failure to appreciate Hegel's somewhat rarefied point of logic?" (8). Houlgate is assuming that Deleuze's project is to refine or complete Hegel's argument. a completely external movement. Further.4 Slave Labor and the Insurrectional Critique Is it true. Deleuze does not have an adequate familiarity with Hegel the logician. 80). 41-42. Deleuze does not believe that genuine self-consciousness requires consciousness of the other's recognition of oneself" (8). Nietzsche and Philosophy 39. And further: "In contrast to Hegel. that it cannot adequately support being as substance. a ressentiment caused by the reflection of a force back into itself. Jean Wahl is much closer to the mark when he claims that Deleuze at times falls into rhetorical exaggerations by giving in to his unbridled hatred for Hegel. he takes the Bergsonian point for granted and builds on it. which likewise proves to require negation: "Deleuze thus rules out the possibility that true. We have seen that the negative movement of determination that founds Hegelian being is. He reads Deleuze's Nietzschean critique as if it remained a reformist endeavor. instead. or mediation by. Thus. is a productive exteriority that is based on affirmation (36).6 Houlgate's second charge shows a similar confusion of Deleuze's project. 2. on the contrary. What Deleuze is searching for. content to criticize Hegel's means. Finally. like Nietzsche. which implies negation. as we have said. the other" (7).

as a result of chance or hazard. because it preserves the "essential nature" of the consciousness under siege." The logic of this syllogism takes two routes—one implicit path in relation to the master. instead. we cannot understand the logic of this passage unless we note that this "melting-away of everything stable" is not. then life appears as merely unsubstantial. therefore I am good". absolute negativity. the absolute melting-away of everything stable. "The master is evil. Therefore. we can already venture a Bergsonian response to this implicit process. If the difference that animates life is its opposition to death. this restraint of the destructive force of dialectical negation is what allows for conservation—it is a negation "which supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded" (§188). "the absolute Lord. therefore I am an independent self-consciousness. Now. On a first consideration. we are dealing in terms too imprecise and too abstract to arrive at the singularity and concreteness of the difference that defines real life and subjectivity." Furthermore. The death of the slave would not serve Hegel's purposes: He wants to destroy all that is inessential in the slave. the slave undergoes the negation of everything that is solid and stable in its being: "But this pure universal movement. . In effect. an absolute or total negation. a simple being-for-self. when we pose death in general as a contradiction of life in general. on the contrary. assuming we do accept that it is the opposition (albeit partial) with death that affirms the life of the slave. but to stop at the threshold of essence. Life and death in their abstract opposition are indifferent. properly speaking. pure being-forself which is implicit in this consciousness" {Phenomenology §194). and one explicit path in relation to the object of the slave's labor—which are linked together as a progression to describe the education of the slave. if the difference of life is absolutely external. However. the implicit process seems to develop the following logic: The initial self-consciousness of the slave." In this encounter. This partial aggression. is negated in death and then resurrected as an affirmation of life and as a pure being-for-self. The implicit path is founded on the slave's confrontation with death. Hegel's slave does not reason.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 39 found in Hegel's analysis of the master-slave dialectic that escapes the Nietzschean critique? Or. the affirmation of life that the slave attains "in principle" through the confrontation with death can only be abstract and hollow. that is. we are dressing life in baggy clothes. a "subsistent exteriority. essential nature of self-consciousness. has Deleuze already provided us with the weapons for an adequate Nietzschean attack? Let us try to test Deleuze's Nietzschean challenge by bringing it onto Hegel's own terrain. we can pose Hegel's slave syllogism as "I fear death and I am constrained to work. is the simple.

This educational fear prepares the slave for his work. the slave is able. It is not clear exactly where we should look to . the slave negates a specific other (the aspect of himself that has gone out of himself) through working or transforming it. However. and thus appears as permanent and independent: "Work . for in the lord it exists for him as his object. like death. and an actual negation in the slave's relation to his labor. from the initial implicit relationship to the final explicit relationship. the object of the slave's labor. . There is a great deal of slippage and ambiguity regarding the level of abstraction and the register of Hegel's argument.40 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS Hegel. dissolves the fixity of his life and focuses his attention on the universal (Charles Taylor. the slave is confronted by an independent self-consciousness that negates him. the slave cannot gain recognition from the master. Through his forced labor. We can understand this entire complex process. transitory other. then. Thus prepared. however. is a "dialectical" or partial negation that allows the "essential nature" of the other to survive and thus perpetuates the relationship. allowing him to become "conscious of what he truly is" (§195). he retrieves the essential nature of himself through his negation or transformation of the thing. explicit moment of labor. his consciousness is not this dissolution of everything stable merely in principle. just as the master negates the object of his desire in consuming it." abstract death. The slave comes out of himself by engaging the thing as object of his labor. immediately follows with a response to this challenge: "This moment of pure being-for-self is also explicit for the bondsman. Master desire. which leave it open to a variety of interpretations. the slave's confrontation with death. The primary difference between these two negations (master desire and slave labor) lies in the fact that the object of the master's desire appears as a dependent. The first moment. and thus this form of opposition can only give him "the beginning of wisdom. . Work. finally. as the progressive education of the slave." The second explicit relationship reveals the slave's essential nature. is too thorough in its negation for Hegel's purposes: It is the total destruction of the other and the end of the relationship. fleetingness staved off" (§195). however. and therefore can provide only fleeting satisfaction. is desire held in check. This explicit negation takes two forms that are linked together in a progressive movement: a formal negation in the slave's relation to the master. Hegel 155). resists his negation. in the second. In the master. however. to achieve his true self-realization: He becomes "conscious of what he truly is. Furthermore. but he confronts a particular master and is forced to work. he loses or negates himself and finds himself in the thing. in his service he actually brings this about" (§194). like the near-death Hegel posits in fear." We should take a moment here to clarify the terms of our reading of this passage. Here the slave no longer faces "the absolute Lord.

If we read the text from a strictly logical perspective. in contrast. Later in the text. Spirit. however. . it can only successfully fit into a personalized mold for brief sections of the analysis. while slave negation is the model of restraint: "desire held in check. Master negation does not hold back its powers but attacks with full force. In the implicit half of the passage. which is always embodied. Indeed. whether we should read the slave's drama in personal or impersonal terms. in effect. insisting that Hegel's analysis spans the different registers and effectively unites them in the movement of historical being. we can only maintain the coherence of the passage if we attribute no personal contents to the master role and read it as an impersonal. Let us explore these two possibilities in turn. as a development of a personal. the slave negation is the hero because it operates a partial destruction and perpetuates its object (the slave in its labor). human consciousness (individual or collective) in an objective world. but never gains acknowledgment from a human or personal other. brings on the death of the other). it is clear that the personalist hypothesis provides certain difficulties for a consistent reading of the text. the sociohistorical subject. On this basis. how could the slave possibly find satisfaction through his relation to the object of his labor? The working slave gains a reflected image of himself from the thing. is simultaneously the individual subject. and through his interaction with this object the slave gains the necessary self-recognition. or as a purely logical development. thus. and the essence of being. The question remains. logical role or as an objective other. Hegel's argument slips comfortably between personal and impersonal references. however. the master moves to the extreme extension of its role: "The absolute Lord" is death. the master-slave drama illustrates the conflict between two forms of negation. many interpreters invoke a personalist reading to pose the master-slave relation as the affirmation of a liberal ethics of mutual respect that spans both the personal and formal registers: "Men seek and need the recognition of their fellows" (Taylor 152)7 However. the slave discovers his other in the object of his labor.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 41 locate the master and the slave—in real individuals? in social classes? in the logical movement of Spirit? What is unclear is the nature of the contents we should attribute to the agents of the drama. The master negation is the villain of the drama because it totally destroys its object and ends the relationship (the master. Should we read the master-slave dialectic in personalist terms. This should already indicate to us that the master cannot be read in personal terms. in its desire/consumption. or rather as an impersonal. and between microcosm and macrocosm. The master term presents difficulties because. If we read this section as the human need to gain acknowledgment from another human. logical drama of being? A Hegelian might immediately object to the form of these questions. when we refer back to the argument.

however. turned back against itself (Nietzsche and Philosophy 127-28). death. the essence of being is power. This confrontation purports to free the slave from the fixity of its previously stable conditions and allows it to operate the second moment of the critique. or Spinoza's potestas. It is not really productive. but the distinction is clear: On one side. in both cases. Both seek to locate essence in the movement of being. Hegelian reflection.42 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS fleetingness staved off. Master negation is simply destructive force carried through to its logical conclusion. a force inseparable from its manifestation. such as pain. Nietzsche recognizes that this slave negation is the reflective moment of self-consciousness. or fear of. this moment is the pars destruens. Here. The first moment of the critique is the slave's close confrontation with. through the slave's labor. in these same logical terms and in a perfectly coherent fashion. Deleuze follows Nietzsche's argument and shows a series of negative practical effects that are consequent on this slave victory of interiority. however. Interiority is the essence of Hegelian being." that is. is not properly apars construens. This is the "fiction" at the essence of slave power. there is power separated from what it can do. but rather revelatory. and Nietzsche proposes a force that emerges unhaltingly outside itself (the will to power or exteriority). because the entire discussion is directed toward self-consciousness." This is where Deleuze's Nietzsche can finally enter the discussion. but it is a limited pars destruens since the "essential nature" of the slave is spared. a condition antithetical to joy and affirmation. If. Furthermore. Ockham's ens inpotentia. the interiorization offeree: "Whatever the reason that an active force is falsified. and sin (Nietzsche and Philosophy 128-31). Ockham's ens in actu and Spinoza's potentia. Slave negation is force "held in check. the pars construens. The discussion comes back once again to the nature of power. Once again we can see why Deleuze might choose not to address Hegel's master-slave dialectic directly. it is turned back inside. This is perfectly coherent with the Hegelian argument. on the other side. Here we can see Hegel and Nietzsche on the same terrain. there is power internal to its manifestation. but Hegel discovers a force reflected back into itself (self-consciousness or interiority). they are two radically different conceptions of power. deprived of its conditions of operation and separated from what it can do. toward interiority. This second moment. guilt. marching in precisely opposite directions. Our terms are clumsy. the "education" of the slave reveals a critical method of partial negations. restrained from full expression. The essence of the slave that emerges victoriously from the dialectic is the universal essence of being: pure self-consciousness. We have seen that a modified Scholastic argument is available to Deleuze to defend the "efficient" conception of power in logical terms. the slave is not created or substantially transformed in this second .

then. but is the very essence of being. the essence of the slave has to involve his servitude.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 43 moment. of course. However. However. The partiality of its destructive moment spares precisely what takes the place of creation in the productive moment. while Kant "seems to have confused the positivity of critique with a humble recognition of the rights of the criticised" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 89). All of this we have discovered by reading Hegel's argument as if the slave were an impersonal force playing out a logical position. "standing" negations. Only the master's active negation. then. the unrestrained attack. however. and therefore to the opportunity for a positive. the pars destruens that initiates the critique can only be partial. Posed in these logical terms. What exactly is the "essential nature" of the slave that survives the onslaught of critical forces and emerges victorious from the development? Hegel would have us believe that the slave essence is content-less as pure self-consciousness. when power is separated from what it can do. We see. as Hegel does. that the master does not embody this movement. Charles Taylor's term for this moment of labor—a "standing negation"—is adequate because it shows that there is really no progression here. It is precisely slave labor . Nietzsche's master power. on the other hand. but rather "becomes conscious of what he truly is" (195). The coherence of Hegel's argument. knows no restraint and thus operates a total critique. the dialectical critique described by the education of the slave is neither total nor positive. original creation: "Destruction as the active destruction of the man who wants to perish and to be overcome announces the creator" (178). we can finally make good on Deleuze's claim cited earlier that it is precisely the errors of the Kantian critique that lead to the Hegelian dialectic Like the Kantian critique. The movement that defines and reveals essence cannot develop with any actor. and that this essence is not particular to the slave. and the second moment (work) is its pure expression. but is dependent on a specific position in the relationship. the "essential nature" of the slave. the relation to the master) makes the slave more intent on its activity. in which force is internal to its manifestation. are directly related to the two types of critique. The differences between the two types of power. The triumph of this dialectical critique is that the essential nature of the slave survives and is revealed in pure form in a stable configuration of partial. if we are to emphasize the educational journey of the slave as the development of a particular self-consciousness.8 The first moment of the critique (the fear of death. it seems that we have to fill the slave with some general personal contents. relies on the differential relationship between the slave and its master. the death of the adversary can lead to a total critique. Since the logic of the drama turns on the slave's position in the relationship. this Hegelian slave critique has made the criticized into the hero of the drama.

but because he passes off what it is as the essence of the State" ("Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right" 63). living labor.44 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS that survives and is purified through the critical education." at the values that define the worker as such—against servitude. is a beautiful means of understanding Nietzsche's "man who wants to perish and to be overcome. attacking himself inasmuch as worker. They both conceive of real essence not as work. The worker attacking work. but the proposition that this role constitutes the essence of the worker. Workers' struggle against work. Thus. on the contrary." the inessential character of the worker in order to affirm the essential nature of work. Marx will have no part of this: Leave it to the bosses to sing the praises of work." In attacking himself. "melting away. they must both conduct a radical. The text makes clear. the working class must struggle against itself inasmuch as it is capital. the will to power. an unlimited pars destmens. that the work of the slave cannot be considered as creative energy or productive force.9 But in order to liberate that force. against work. This is where we can see Deleuze's Nietzsche and Marx very close to one another. to provide the room for the pars construens. The worker is liberated inasmuch as work is affirmed as his or her essence. struggle of the worker against himself inasmuch as worker" (Tronti 260). the constructive. Marx makes a perfectly analogous argument in relation to the State: "Hegel is not to be blamed because he describes the existence of the Modern State such as it is. however. The tradition of Marxist thought has known all too many interpretations that (directly or indirectly) exalt this Hegelian proposition: The worker occupies an exalted position because his or her work expresses human essence. the slave's work is fundamentally his role in a "standing" relationship. attacking the essence of the established values. This is the Stakhanovite "dignity" of the worker. the history of the workers' struggle becomes an educational drama that assaults.10 In this context. but as a force: power. transformative force. total critique. Nietzsche appears in the position of Marxist workerism: "In order to struggle against capital. . creation. And only that unrestrained destruction of established "essence" can allow for genuine ere- . What is at issue here is not the description of the worker's existence in a relationship. he is attacking the relationship that has been posed as his essence—only after this "essence" is destroyed can he truly be able to create. in an unrestrained attack on the essence of established values. . If the worker is to reach a point of genuine affirmation. the attack has to be directed at the "essence. preserving the essence of what it attacks—it "supersedes in such a way as to preserve and maintain what is superseded" (Phenomenology §188). A Hegelian partial critique is at best a reformism. of self-valorization. . A total critique is necessarily an insurrectional critique.

unable to create. The danger they present is that of a forced stasis. Thus. that is. . the workers' attack on work." I wish only to touch on the question. However. somewhat indirectly. we have found a surprisingly strong confluence between Nietzsche and Marx (and even Lenin) in terms of the power. the radicality. Those in the PCI [Italian Communist Party] were bread and work. a simple. and it is precisely this acceptance of the established values as essence that makes them dangerous: "Thick people obtuse without the least bit of imagination dangerous. Workers who accept the established value of work appear to him as closed. a refusal of a specific existing relation of production. In Nietzschean terms." an attack against their established essence so as to be able to create new terms of existence.12 What interests me initially in this comparison is the radical attack on the established notion of essence as a precondition for change and creation. blocked from what they can do. what he hates most of all is precisely what defines his social existence and what is presented to him as his essence. beautiful Italian novel that recounts the story of a worker at the FIAT plant in the late 1960s and his involvement in the formation of the political movement Potere operaio (Workers' Power).NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 45 ation. But they completely accepted work and for them work was everything" (85-86). In the first section of Vogliamo tutto. I never understood why work ought to be celebrated" (74). Those who accept "bread and work" as their essence as workers are unable to imagine. by considering Deleuze's Nietzschean arguments in terms of Nanni Balestrini's Vogliamo tutto (We want everything). he cannot understand why anyone would want to celebrate work on May Day: "What a joke to celebrate labor day. Deleuze's Nietzsche appears as a prophet of what Lenin calls "the art of insurrection. a dead- . value-less] at least I was recuperable."11 Remark: The Will to Workers' Power and the Social Synthesis Is Nietzsche and Philosophy an untimely hymn to the workers of '68? Through Deleuze's reading. In this "Remark. In other words. I was a 'qualunquista' [nonideological. Not fascists just obtuse. we are not prepared here to confront the Nietzsche-Marx question in all its complexity. to create new terms and values of human existence (Nietzsche and Philosophy 64-65. and the creativity of the practical critique. their violentpars destruens. the protagonist cannot yet pose his desires in such political terms. is directed precisely at their own essence. nonetheless. Note that the workers' refusal is not only a refusal to work but a refusal of work. Deleuze often expresses this as the attack on "man" or as a moment in the effort to go beyond man. . . This is the same notion expressed by the workers' "refusal of work. also Foucault 131-41).

however. The workers' attack on their essence as workers arrives at a moment when they are able to "go beyond. the point where the struggle transforms from a. . Of discovering that these demands that this struggle were the demands of everyone that it was the struggle of everyone" (171). this moment of intense violence. Finally. . from the recognition of his antagonism toward work as a relation of production. this collective destructive expression. pars destruens driven by hatred for the bosses and work to apars construens of workers' joy in feeling their power. The protagonist of Vogliamo tutto. we are still on the terrain of Deleuze's Nietzsche." the PCIista who completely accepts work (cf. Here we have a developed example of the worker attacking work. in short" (128)." Nietzsche's transmutation (Nietzsche and Philosophy 171-75).46 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS ening of creative powers. From this position. All the wealth all the power and no work" (128). a "qualunquista" is already in a better position. and therefore attacking himself inasmuch as worker—a beautiful instance of Nietzsche's "man who wants to perish. the struggle is converted from negation to affirmation. In this focal point. . opens the possibility for the subsequent joy and creation: "But now the thing that moved them more than anger was joy The joy of being finally strong." the active and liberatory destruction that must be distinguished from the passivity of the "last man. The voice of the narrative takes on a continually broader scope. The expansion of the collective expression is matched by an expansion of the will. and a perpetuation of the established essence. We want everything. It is precisely the wealth of the collectivity that provides the basis for the violent radicality of critique: "What began to come up was the desire to struggle not because the work not because the boss were bad but because they exist." to discover a terrain of creation and joy beyond the "worker. of beliefs. provides a space on which imagination and creation can act. The recognition of collective desires goes hand in hand with the development and expansion of collective practice. shifting from first person singular to first person plural as the mass of workers begin to recognize what they can do and what they can become: "All the stuff all the wealth we produce is ours. This is the hour of "midnight. What began to come out was the demand to want power. Thus far. only gains the real power to carry out this destructive project when he begins to recognize his commonality with the other workers. the protagonist begins a progressively more political attack on work itself." . This is the climax of the novel. In this context. The workers' strikes build to the point where they spill outside of the factory as demonstrations in the streets and violent conflict involving large parts of the city. The lack of values. Nietzsche and Philosophy 174). with the total critique of established values.

it seems that the irreducibility of the multiplicity prohibits any idea of organization. its only profound enemy" (8). when they pass into action in the factory and in the streets. We have argued that the failure to provide an adequate notion of organization . We have treated this charge at some length in the second phase of Bergson study (Section 1. of differences of nature.3). the most potent Bergsonian attack against the dialectic in this regard is the construction of a veritable multiplicity. The workers form a powerful assemblage.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 47 I would like to emphasize two elements of this workers' transmutation. logical terms. in this context Deleuze only succeeds in posing the complementary moment of the organization of the Multiple in very weak terms. as we have seen. The "actualization" of the workers is a practice of joy. they achieve the constructive moment of joy and creation. The synthesis involved in the workers' collectivity is an eternal return of the will not in time but in space. the workers' power and their joy lie precisely in the fact that they will and act together. the return of the will laterally throughout the mass of workers. Deleuze brings out the irreducibility and eminence of multiplicity in clear. Rather. Through the analysis of Bergson's work. It would be a poor formulation to say that the workers are powerful because they come together—this would imply a calculation of individual sacrifice for achieving extrinsic collective goods. We find this same attack in Deleuze's Nietzsche: "Plu ralism sometimes appears to be dialectical—but it is its most ferocious enemy. their will and power grow.5 The Being of Becoming: The Ethical Synthesis of the Efficient Will When Deleuze approaches the question of a Nietzschean synthesis. and how do these forces manifest themselves in terms of practice? 2. The first is that the entire critical movement is necessarily tied to a broadening movement of the collectivity The workers' recognition of their commonality and their expression in collective action take the form of a spatial or social synthesis. but. composing an expansive and coherent body of desire: As the body of workers expands. Precisely when the workers "actualize" their critique. As we have seen. The second element I would like to emphasize is that the transmutation comes about through the practice of the workers. Indeed. "Hegel wanted to ridicule pluralism" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 4): The dialectic of the One and the Multiple sets up a false image of multiplicity that is easily recuperable in the unity of the One. Pluralism or multiplicity is so dangerous for the dialectic precisely because it is irreducible to unity. These two elements give us the terms for the remainder of our study of Deleuze's Nietzsche: How does Nietzsche conceive a real synthesis offerees. he comes back once again to the affirmation of multiplicity and the attack on the dialectic.

the affirmation of necessity. (27-28. is more obscure and more complex: "The dice that are thrown once are the affirmation of chance. But it is also the return of the first moment. The moment that the dice fall back. of multiple reality. and in Nietzschean terms this is the becoming of being: pure multiplicity. The return of the dice is an affirmation of the dicethrow in that it constitutes the original elements of chance in a coherent whole. Necessity is affirmed of chance in exactly the same sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity" (26). "The game has two moments that are those of the dicethrow—the dice that is thrown and the dice that falls back" (25). we have to relate the dicethrow metaphor to the eternal return: The dice that fall back necessarily affirm the number or the destiny that brings the dice back. the repetition of the dicethrow. but in an original organization. however. but we must recognize the second moment as a moment of organization that constructs unity. . The two moments of the dicethrow constitute the basic elements of Nietzsche's alternative to the dialectic of the One and the Multiple. the number that brings together all the parts of chance. the falling back of the dice is a moment of the organization of unity—it is not the passive revelation. and it would risk negating rather than affirming the first moment of the game. the result of the dicethrow. The eternal return is the second moment. the unforeseeable. Not only does the first moment (of multiplicity and becoming) imply the second moment (of unity and being). this would merely be a determinism. the combination that they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity. but the active creation of being. This is where Nietzsche provides Deleuze with an enormous advance. Instead.48 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS is what makes Deleuze's Bergson most vulnerable to a Hegelian counterattack. that constitutes being by bringing together "all the parts of chance" created in the first moment—not according to any preformed order. this is not the multiplicity of order. the reproduction and reaffirmation of chance itself. emphasis mine) The dicethrow metaphor is admittedly somewhat strained at this point. there is nothing preformed in the possibility of this moment—it is the indeterminate. but this second moment is also the return of the first: The two moments imply one another . The throw of the dice is the affirmation of chance and multiplicity precisely because it is the refusal of control: Just as we saw in the Bergson studies. This is Bergson's creative evolution (or emanation) of being. The first moment of the game is the easier to understand. . . To understand this. The falling back of the dice is not merely a confirmation of the necessity of the given.

being must be willed. so that we can only consider such ontological questions in terms of force and value: The synthesis is one of forces. only affirmation returns. Nietzsche's terrain. as emanation and constitution. the eternal return is the synthesis that has as its principle the will to power. however. The ethical will is the will that returns. The principle of the eternal return as being is the efficient will as an ethical will. How. does the will provide a foundation for being? We are not so far from the Scholastic horizon that we earlier drew on so heavily. defining the necessity and substantiality of being. quoted from Thus Spake Zarathustra 191). The eternal return of the will is an ethics inasmuch as it is a "selective ontology" (72). The ethical will is whole." This "also" can be very misleading because the eternal return is not separate from the will.NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 49 as a perpetual series of shattering and gathering. It makes willing something whole" (69). which one apart from the will is capable of serving as the principle of a synthesis of forces by determining the relation of force with forces? (50) We have seen from the outset that the will is the dynamic that moves and animates the horizon offeree and value: The logic of the synthesis. The will to power is the principle of the synthesis that marks the being of becoming. the will to power is the principle of the eternal return in that it plays the role of a primary cause. then. however. In effect. is the logic of the will. Nietzsche has transformed the terrain. The eternal return is the selection of the affirmative will as being.13 It is selective because not every will returns: Negation comes only once. We should not be surprised by the word "will". but internal to it. Being is not given in Nietzsche. of their difference and their reproduction. ethics comes before ontology in Nietzsche. the unity of the multiplicity and the necessity of chance. as a centrifugal moment and a centripetal moment. we must be careful not to emphasize the word "also. though. that when we read Deleuze's rule of the eternal return. In this sense. "How does the eternal return perform the selection here? It is the thought of the eternal return that selects. the ethical will is the will that wills being. Deleuze formulates the ethical selection of the eternal return as a practical rule for the will: "Whatever you will. This is the sense in which the eternal return is a temporal synthesis of forces: It demands that the will to power wills unity in time. What is the logic of the synthesis or constitution of being in the eternal return? We can no longer pose this question on a purely logical plane. will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return" (68). We should note here. internal to its return: "Always do what you will" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 69. . quickly transforms this logical/ontological point into an ethics.

eternally I am your affirmation" (187. the principle of the eternal return.50 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS We can now trace a beautiful trajectory of this fundamental idea of efficiency and internality: from the logical centrality of efficient difference (the difference internal to the thing). the raising of the being of becoming to its highest power." Deleuze presents the critique this time through a combination of refurbished Kantian and Scholastic terms. which in turn leads to a new dicethrow. therefore. Ariadne's creation of pure being is an ethical act. affirmative will. since Ariadne takes Dionysus for the object of her affirmation. As we have . 2. The love of Ariadne for Dionysus is the affirmation of the eternal return. Dionysus's affirmation marks the being of becoming. Here we have a Nietzschean answer. and now to the ethical centrality of the efficient will. to the ontological centrality of efficient power (the force internal to its manifestation). metaphysical foundation: The internal nature of the cause to its effect is what supports the necessity. now in terms of valuation—as "transmutation. infinite affirmation—affirmation raised to the nth power. one last time. substantiality. more properly. it is a spiraling. Ariadne's affirmation is a double affirmation ("the 'yes' that responds to 'yes'" ["Mystere d'Ariane" 15]). Deleuze reproposes the drama of the total critique. We asked ourselves earlier. quoted from Dionysian Dithyrambs).6 The Total Critique as the Foundation of Being On this ethical terrain of the efficient. albeit in distant. and univocity of being. also. but enhances it. indirect form. A Scholastic logic runs through this series as the guiding thread. an act of love. In effect. she marks the pure affirmation of being. Finally. it is a double affirmation. singularity. and it is presented in the persona of Ariadne. The ontological selection does not negate the indetermination of the dicethrow. just as the eternal return is an affirmation of the will. transmutation moves from Kantianism to Scholasticism in that it moves from a critique of knowledge to a foundation of being.14 Here. in our analysis of Deleuze's work on Bergson (Section 1. The dicethrow (the moment of becoming. or. of indetermination) is followed by dice falling back (the selection of being). This is how we can understand the eternal return of the efficient will as the ethical pillar of a Nietzschean philosophy of being. Dionysus is the god of affirmation. a finality. affirms it. but it takes Ariadne to affirm affirmation itself: "Eternal affirmation of being. we find Deleuze's final attack on the Hegelian dialectic. how we can have both becoming and being. pure being is attained in Nietzsche as an achieved state. providing it a materialist.3) how a philosophy of "indetermination" can also be a philosophy of being.

Deleuze has explained at great length that nihilism. Zarathustra loves being. These terms allow Deleuze to reformulate a statement of Zarathustra as an ontological ethics: "I love the one who makes use of nihilism as the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power. (Thus the thought of the eternal return goes beyond all the laws of our knowledge. the focal point. instead. Affirmation. we are finally finished with negativity. affirmation. Like Ariadne. though. this "completed" nihilism is an active will to nothingness—"self-destruction. the unknown God" (173) that is beyond the ratio cognoscendi. and this is what Zarathustra loves. there is a transformation. is the will to power. the completion of nihilism is the end of "man" as a constructed interiority—it is the suicide of the "last man. Being is primary over knowledge. beyond suffering: The power of the negative in this critique does not operate a Hegelian "standing negation". As Kant has taught us. the standpoint of the critique. .NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 51 already seen. is full of pain and suffering. With the active completion of nihilism and the transmutation to affirmation and creation. Now the antagonistic moment. there is a beyond to this knowledge: "We 'think' the will to power in a form distinct from that in which we know it. from painful interiority to joyful exteriority: "The legislator takes the place of the 'scholar. Deleuze explains. active destruction" (174). Exteriority. is "the unknown joy.)" (172-73). from savage negation to absolute affirmation. Completed nihilism is self-destruction in two senses: Completion means that nihilism defeats itself so that the final act of the negative will to power is to extinguish itself. the pars construens of the will to power. however. and consciousness as such. also. is played by nihilism. tine pars destruens of the critique." At the limit of this destruction. We gain knowledge of ourselves and our present through the suffering of the negative will to power. at midnight.' creation takes the place of knowledge itself and affirmation takes the place of all negations" (173). Exteriority is the condition for the grounding of being: The ratio essendi of the will to power. the creation and affirmation of being. but who finds in the will to power a ratio essendi in which man is overcome and therefore nihilism is defeated" (174). this same nihilism is what reveals "all the values known or knowable up to the present" (172). the efficient will to power: This is the ratio that supports being. is affirmation. Deleuze explains that nihilism is the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power: "What we in fact know of the will to power is suffering and torture" (173. as a project of interiority and consciousness. free from its transcendental instance. the unknown happiness. a conversion from knowledge to creation. interiority. emphasis mine). Nihilism itself is what takes us beyond interiority.

then. savage attack. the "breaking with" that is a central tenet of the dialect can only be a partial rupture. Butler answers these questions in strictly Hegelian fashion: "References to a 'break' with Hegel are almost always impossible. it is a sort of low-intensity warfare that can be prolonged indefinitely in a "standing negation. partial attack that seeks to "preserve and maintain" its enemy. Therefore. Deleuze's elaboration of the total critique provides us a direct response by showing that there are two different types of opposition. opposition itself is essentially dialectical. and this is the fundamental error that Nietzsche corrects. Dialectical opposition is a restrained." Nondialectical opposition. the dialectic pillages and reforms the essence of its predecessor through a partial critique. The result of this profound opposition is a separation that prohibits the recuperation of relations. Through our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche we have explored two points that could constitute adequate responses to Butler's proposition." as if it built on. even as they claim to be in utter opposition to it? What is the nature of this 'opposition. It . Judith Butler forcefully poses the question of an opposition to Hegelianism in Subjects of Desire: "What constitutes the latest stage of post-Hegelianism as a stage definitively beyond the dialectic? Are these positions still haunted by the dialectic. This exception is a result of Kant's incompleteness. In Hegel's dialectical critique.' and is it perchance a form that Hegel himself has prefigured?" (176). the established values that are posed as essence are presented as the central protagonist of the critical drama. preserving the continuity that characterizes the prefix "post.52 NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS Remark: The End of Deleuze's Anti-Hegelianism We noted at the outset of this chapter that one of the central goals in Deleuze's study of Nietzsche is to flesh out an alternative to dialectical opposition that would be an "opposition to the dialectic itself" (17). is that which operates a complete rupture with its opponent through an unrestrained. or completed Hegelianism. In other words. if only because Hegel has made the very notion of 'breaking with' into the central tenet of the dialectic" (183-84). and hence "opposition to the dialectic itself can only mean a reinforcement or repetition of the dialectic. to call this Nietzschean position "post-Hegelian. Deleuze's claim is that the Nietzschean total critique is a "post-Kantian" position—it corrects the Kantian errors to realize the goals of Kant's own original project. however. however. any effort to be an "other" to Hegelianism can be effectively recuperated as an "other" within Hegelianism. reformed. It is precisely the dialectic's ability to recuperate opposition that is often used to critique contemporary anti-Hegelians such as Deleuze." In effect. It would be a mistake. Kant's critique allows established values to persist on the transcendental plane as essence. From this perspective.

Deleuze. however. it is only to repeat the arguments developed in these early studies. from exteriority to practice. to forget the dialectic. it is not the construction of an interiority. The development of a total opposition to the dialectic seems to have been an intellectual cure for Deleuze: It has exorcised Hegel and created an autonomous plane for thought. .NIETZSCHEAN ETHICS 53 is impossible to conceive of the Nietzschean total critique and its unrestrained para destruens as a reform of this position—it can only appear as a profound rupture. At this point. a second response. and the Nietzschean attack on the master-slave relation. for example. it is not only a reformation of the understanding or an emendation of the intellect. has forgotten the dialectic. quite simply. Posed in historiographic terms. Deleuze offers us. not to develop new ones. insists that the history of philosophy contains real discontinuities. are carried out on planes completely removed from Hegel's discourse. one that is no longer anti-Hegelian. in the opening of Difference et repetition. Deleuze's Nietzsche can appear as "post-Kantian" but only "anti-Hegelian": The difference is between reform and rupture. but the terms never come out clearly. The exteriority of thought and of the will. We have arrived at the end of Deleuze's anti-Hegelianism. It is very clear.7 Pathos and Joy: Toward a Practice of Affirmative Being A philosophy of joy is necessarily a philosophy of practice. reformed to a greater or lesser extent as differences of degree. Even though rhetoric against the dialectic will reappear. is not yet an adequate characterization. Throughout Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche we have the impression that practice plays a central role. on the other hand. however. and that discontinuity is the only way of posing the Hegel-Nietzsche relationship: "There is no possible compromise between Hegel and Nietzsche" (195). we can clearly see the need for Deleuze's care in positioning the relation to proximate and fundamental enemies. and we have seen that his attacks on the dialectic have become more and more indirect. but a creation of exteriority through the power of affirmation. what Deleuze's Nietzsche is not: It is not an investigation of consciousness. 2. in short. but that. veritable differences of nature. on the contrary. The Bergsonian attack on the One and the Multiple. because Nietzschean affirmation is also corporeal. Butler's Hegelian claim is that there are only continuous lines in the history of philosophy. As we have proceeded through the evolution of Deleuze's thought we have seen the terrain on which he can address Hegelianism constantly shrinking. We have one last passage to make in our reading of Deleuze's Nietzsche: from will to appetite and desire. Deleuze's strategy of developing a total opposition to the dialectic is accompanied by another strategy: to move away from the dialectic.

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Deleuze's elaboration of Nietzschean exteriority rediscovers a Spinozian proposition: "Will to power is manifested as a power to be affected [pouvoir d'etre affecte]" (62, modified).15 Spinoza conceives a positive relation between a body's power to be affected and its power to effect (see Section 3.7): "The more ways a body could be affected the more force it had" (62). Two aspects of this Spinozian conception interest Deleuze in the context of Nietzsche's work. First, this power to be affected never deals with a possibility, but it is always actualized in relations with other bodies. Second, this power defines the receptivity of a body not as a passivity, but as "an affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation" (62). What this notion affords Deleuze is a means of posing inner experience as a mode of corporeal exteriority. The receptivity of a body is closely tied to its active external expression: Affectivity is an attribute of the body's power. In Nietzsche, as in Spinoza, then, pathos does not involve a body "suffering" passions; on the contrary, pathos involves the affects that mark the activity of the body, the creation that is joy. To arrive at a practical conception of joy, however, this rich sense of the power of the affectivity of bodies must be accompanied by an elaboration of the activity of bodies in practice. The very last section of Nietzsche and Philosophy approaches this problem:
Nietzsche's practical teaching is that difference is happy; that multiplicity, becoming and chance are adequate objects of joy by themselves and that only joy returns. . . . Not since Lucretius has the critical enterprise that characterizes philosophy been taken so far (with the exception of Spinoza). Lucretius exposes the trouble of the soul and those who need it to establish their power—Spinoza exposes sorrow, all the causes of sorrow and all those who found their power at the heart of this sorrow— Nietzsche exposes ressentiment, bad conscience and the power of the negative that serves as their principle. (190)

This history of practical philosophies of joy (Lucretius, Spinoza, Nietzsche) is very suggestive. However, in Deleuze's Nietzsche there are two elements that block the development of a practical struggle against the sad passions: elements that direct us forward to the study of Spinoza. First, Deleuze's "impersonal" reading of Nietzsche blocks the development of a theory of practice because it limits our conception of agents to the interplay of forces. We have noted that when Deleuze asks the question "Qui?" he avoids all "personalist" references, and looks rather to a specific will to power. At this point, however, we need to look not only to the will, but also to the appetite and desire.16 The attributes of a practical agent must be "personalist" in some sense—for a theory of practice we do not need an individualist theory, but we do need a corporeal and desiring agent.

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Spinoza is exemplary in this regard when he defines the agent of practice, the "Individual," as a body or group of bodies recognized for its common movement, its common behavior, its common desire (Ethics IIP13Def). A corporeal agent such as Spinoza's can lead a struggle against the sad passions and discover a practice of joy. Second, Deleuze's study of Nietzsche fails to arrive at a theory of practice because it does not arrive at a conception of a spatial or social synthesis. The Nietzschean synthesis, the eternal return, is a temporal synthesis that projects the will to power in time. Spinoza will show us, however, that a practice of joy takes place on the plane of sociality: Spinoza's common notions, for example, provide the terms for an expansive collectivity, for the creation of society, and thus constitute a powerful weapon against the sad passions. This final section of Nietzsche and Philosophy, then, is already looking forward to the next passage in Deleuze's evolution: from Nietzschean affirmation to Spinozian practice.

Chapter 3

Spinozian Practice Affirmation and Joy

One can recognize immediately that Deleuze's reading of Spinoza has a different quality than his treatment of other philosophers. There is a certain modesty and caution before Spinoza that we do not find elsewhere. We should keep in mind, of course, that Deleuze presented Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza as the historical portion of his doctoral thesis, but this fact can only provide a partial explanation for the change in tone. As we have seen, Deleuze often presents his investigations in the history of philosophy in the form of extreme simplicity, as the elaboration of a single idea: ontological positivity for Bergson, ethical affirmation for Nietzsche. These studies take the form of clean-cut jewels. They pose the essential idea from which an entire philosophical doctrine follows. In comparison, Deleuze's work on Spinoza is very ragged; it is spilling over with underdeveloped insights and unresolved problems. Precisely for this reason it is a more open work, and at the same time a work that is less accessible to a general public.1 Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza appears as a set of working notes that do not present a completed interpretation, but rather propose a series of interpretative strategies in the process of development. Therefore, the theoretical passages that we will follow here are necessarily complex, and often elliptical:
It was on Spinoza that I worked the most seriously according to the norms of the history of philosophy—but it was Spinoza more than any other that gave me the feeling of a gust of air that pushes you on the back
56

Deleuze carries his baggage with him. but rather it is a process of accumulation and constitution. etc. treating the final books of the Ethics. we will take a further step in this evolution. in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza we can find a summary of the entire evolution. we find a reelaboration of the terrain that he treated in his study of Bergson (the plenitude of being.). the positivity of difference. toward politics. he takes a few steps back in order to prepare the leap ahead. His historical monographs approach the work of the individual philosophers according to the demands of his own intellectual project. In other words. With Bergson. but rather reproposes the terms of its predecessor. the problem of emanation. A particular and important aspect of Deleuze's evolution is that it does not involve exchanging one theoretical perspective for another. he sets that ontology in motion to constitute an ethics. standing as his primary predecessors: In Deleuze's inverted history of philosophy. however. building a new wing onto the structure of a Bergsonian ontology and a Nietzschean ethics. Deleuze does not immediately proceed beyond his previous results. In the first half of his study. Spinozian politics is Bergsonian ontology and Nietzschean ethics transported to the field of practice. in the second half of Deleuze's reading. and I myself no more than others. each new terrain of investigation. Spinoza seems to be able to look back and see that he too is not alone on the mountaintops. In effect. Our task is to discern how the reading of Spinoza contributes to the development and evolution of Deleuze's project.2 . each step. We presented as a hypothesis at the outset. (Dialogues 15) Spinoza remains an enigma. through a rich analysis of power and a conceptual elaboration of practice. etc. rather. In the study of Spinoza. Spinoza's politics is an ontological politics in that. Let us go back to our initial methodological principles.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 57 each time you read him. corresponding roughly to his reading of the first two books of the Ethics. Deleuze develops an ontology. and we have confirmed in our first two chapters.). Bergson and Nietzsche breathe life into Spinoza. We have not yet begun to understand Spinoza. the principles that animate being are the very same principles that animate an ethics and a practical constitution of political organization. a witch's broomstick that he mounts you atop. the ethics of power and activity. that there is an evolution in Deleuze's early thought. we find a reworking and extension of the Nietzschean terrain (the affirmation of being. With Nietzsche. is a construction that never abandons or negates. Nietzschean ethics is Bergsonian ontology transported to the field of value. Ontology inheres in ethics. With Spinoza. which in turn inheres in politics.

necessary. absolute. Deleuze's Spinoza presents a speculative. but they remain autonomous and distinct—each with its own method and animating spirit. Throughout Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza.58 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE Our focus on this Deleuzian evolution allows us to recognize another thesis that is important in the context of Spinoza studies. We still find a Deleuzian opposition in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (to Descartes. which remains implicit in Deleuze's work. to the Scholastics. One of the important consequences of recognizing these two moments of Spinoza's thought. we can see that it clearly constitutes a challenge to the traditional commentaries on Spinozian thought. but the moment of opposition. ethical constitution: Forschung followed by Darstellung. we can see that Deleuze treats the Spinozian system as two distinct moments. For example. as two perspectives of thought. we have insisted at length on the importance of his critical procedure: pars destruens. the Forschung. Here we are presented with a similar procedure. but from different perspectives. presents the Ethics as a double text that proceeds from both of the perspectives identified by Alquie: The first moment of the Ethics. Rather than a destructive moment followed by a constructive moment. pars construens. adequate. A philosophy of pure affirmation. etc. one of the most acute readers. but this opposition no longer plays a foundational role.. Deleuze. practical and synthetic. In reading Deleuze's previous works. but rather a "philosopher of system" setting out directly from the point of view of God: The Ethics is principally a systematic. In other words. proceeds in the centrifugal direction from God to the thing in order to discover and express the principles that animate the system of being. The two moments cover the same terrain of being. unlike Descartes.. Ferdinand Alquie. Spinoza is not a "philosopher of method" who starts from the human point of view to build toward a divine perspective. speculative and'analytic. the Ethics . etc. This distinction between speculation and practice. is that there are substantial nuances in Spinoza's major concepts (universal.) when one considers them from one perspective or the other.). as we will see. the second moment of the Ethics. logical investigation followed by a practical. then. rational. although Deleuze does not highlight this distinction. of destruction.. however. speculation and practice. one speculative and another practical. the Darstellung. has changed. text (Nature et v&rite 34). it is to practice what affirmation itself is to speculation. is both a theoretical claim and an interpretative strategy. are fundamentally linked. of antagonism. prepares the terrain for the moment of presentation and practice. The two moments are fundamentally linked: The moment of research. "The sense of joy appears as the properly ethical sense. to Leibniz. moves in the centripetal direction from the thing to God by forging an ethical method and a political line of conduct. The two moments. rather than a methodological. maintains that.

and causality in Deleuze. The affirmation of speculation and the joy of practice are the two threads that weave together to form the general design of the Ethics. All discussions of power. so too the analysis of power functions as a point of conversion in Spinoza: It is the moment in which we stop striving to think the world. and begin to create it. we can feel the tendency to move from the first moment to the second. in admiration and damnation. between joy and sadness. Continually in Deleuze's reading of the Ethics.1 Substance and the Real Distinction: Singularity The opening of the Ethics is remarkable. in that being is defined in its power to exist and produce. In the study of Nietzsche. This analysis sets the terms for a real conversion within the continuity of the theoretical framework. as a Nietzschean transmutation. The elaboration of this passage will form the pivot of our study. In the ontological domain. the point of passage from speculation to practice. from the absolute? This remarkable opening. In this study of Spinoza. productivity.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 59 is also a philosophy of the joy corresponding to such affirmation" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 272. because the essence of being is its productive causal dynamic. incomprehensible text—how can one possibly embark on a project starting from the idea of God. in amazement and irritation. The investigation of power constitutes the end of speculation and the beginning of practice: It arrives at the hour of midnight. as in Spinoza. we were able to transform the ontological discussion into an ethics. . we found that by recognizing the distinction within power between the active and the reactive. Causa sui is the essential pillar that supports being. refer us back to this ontological foundation. The catalyst that allows Deleuze to make this passage is the Spinozian analysis of power. the investigation of the structure of power occupies a privileged position. On the contrary. the same passage through power gains a richer and more extensive function. Just as the Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology are said to constitute a "break" in Marx's thought. Here we find an entire system of distinctions within power: between spontaneity and affectivity between actions and passions. though. does not appear as problematic to Deleuze. is not only an element that brings us back to first principles. it is also the passage that allows the discussion to forge ahead onto new terrain. Speculation 3. Power is the crucial link. The analysis of power. It is precisely these initial passages that have inspired so many readers. to declare that the Ethics is an impossible. from affirmation to joy. however. from speculation to practice. modified).

Number cannot have a substantial nature. rests on the definition of the internal causality of substance (P6C). or. cannot pertain to substance. To approach the question of distinctions in Spinoza. In effect. a numerical . and (3) a conceptual distinction (distinction de raison) between a substance and an attribute (29). Deleuze brings the two doctrines together in an unusual and complex way. and then that a real distinction is never numerical (P9-P11). the infinite substance is not indeterminate. (2) a modal distinction between a substance and a mode that it implies. of course. and. though. Spinoza challenges this Cartesian idea from two angles in the opening of the Ethics: First. according to Deleuze. not to misread this innocence—infinite does not mean indefinite. By affirming the existence of two substances. orients and dominates the first book of the Ethics: What kind of distinction is there in the infinite. modified). but rather quite natural. Deleuze insists that substance is completely removed from the realm of number. then. . have an external cause to exist" (P8S2).3 However. Deleuze notes the three distinctions of being in Cartesian philosophy: (1) a real distinction between two substances. The connections between Bergsonism and Spinozism are well known. is the proposition of number in the definition of substance. Starting with the infinite is not impossible. in the absolutely infinite nature of God? We should note immediately a Bergsonian resonance in this problematic.4 In other words. From the definition of substance (D3) we know that it cannot involve an external cause. Spinoza's first demonstration. The first error in this system of distinctions. because number involves a limitation and thus requires an external cause: "Whatever is of such a nature that there can be many individuals of that nature must . that a numerical distinction is never real. This is the challenge that provides an initial key to Deleuze's analysis and that. Deleuze uses the opening of the Ethics as a rereading of Bergson: He presents the proofs of the existence of God and the singularity of substance as an extended meditation on the positive nature of difference and the real foundation of being. although we find no direct references in the text. We should be careful. According to Deleuze. we must assume Descartes's position as a point of departure.60 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE he seems to be perfectly at ease with Spinoza's initial step: Along with Merleau-Ponty. he argues that a numerical distinction is never real (Ethics IP1-P8). he sees seventeenth-century thought generally as "an innocent way of setting out in one's thinking from the infinite" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 28. we can be certain that Deleuze is sensitive to the common features of the two philosophies. while traditional interpretations have generally identified Spinoza's substance with the number one or with infinity. from a Spinozian point of view. for Deleuze. . A numerical distinction. in other words. Descartes presents the real distinction as a numerical distinction.

Spinoza's challenge is to eliminate the relational." Spinoza wants to identify the real distinction in itself (there is a distinction in x. It becomes capable of expressing the difference in being and consequently it brings about the restructuring of other distinctions" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 39. Spinoza's substance is posed outside of number. raising difference to the absolute— that is the sense of Bergson's effort" ("La conception de la difference chez Bergson" 90). and second. It would be absurd to maintain at this point that we are dealing with a numerical domain in which the two endpoints. does this complex logical development of the real distinction appear as fundamental to Deleuze? We should be aware that Spinoza does not use the term "real distinction" when he discusses substance. on the other. more explicitly. ens realissimurri) consists of an absolute infinity of attributes. x is different). What we find in common here is the ontological grounding of difference and the central role of difference in the foundation of being. he proceeds to demonstrate that substance envelops all the attributes (i. modified). real distinction is carried into the absolute. its immersion in the . In both Bergson and Spinoza. it proposes a concept of difference that is entirely founded on negation (x is different from y). Why. the more attributes it must have (P9). however.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 61 distinction cannot be a real distinction. Spinoza proposes first that the more reality a thing has. and serve together to make the definition of God (D6) a real definition: An absolutely infinite being (God. even though he is certain to be familiar with its usage in Cartesian and Scholastic philosophy. Rather than pose the real distinction as a "distinction between" or a "difference from. or negative. the real distinction is not numerical. the essential characteristic of difference is. as pure internal difference. the real distinction is not numerical). This second proof consists of two parts. one and infinity..5 Once again. which is really the more fundamental one: Having shown that each attribute corresponds to the same substance (i.e. are united. The two points essentially cover the same ground. and. the numerical distinction is not real). God is both unique and absolute. Spinoza proceeds to the inverse argument. the more existence it has (PUS). or rather. Deleuze introduces this term because it serves to highlight the fundamental relation between being and difference. its internal causality. we have to be sensitive to the Bergsonian resonances here: "Dissociated from any numerical distinction.. This strained and tendentious usage of the "real distinction" should draw our attention to Deleuze's original conception of difference. This statement bears a striking resemblance to a passage in Deleuze's early essay on Bergson: "Thinking internal difference as such. he proposes that the more attributes a thing has. though. Starting with P9. Descartes's real distinction is relational (there is a distinction between x and y)\ or.e. arriving at a pure concept of difference. aspect of the real distinction. on one side.

This internal causal dynamic is what animates the real distinction of being. Real distinction appeared to open up a new conception of the negative. that refers neither to an external cause nor to external mediation—pure difference. absolute substance might be read as an indetermination. What can be meant by a distinction that is not numerical? In other words. closes off this possibility. This is the impossible opening of the Ethics. of an internal and efficient causal dynamic that can be traced back to the materialist tradition and to the Scholastics. To this extent. We should dwell a moment on this point. being is not indifferent. how can something be different when it is absolutely infinite and indivisible? What is a difference that involves no other? How can we conceive of the absolute without negation? The enormous difficulties posed by these questions point to the ambitious task of the opening of the Ethics: "Spinoza needed all the resources of an original conceptual frame to bring out the power and the actuality of positive infinity" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 28). As I have insisted at length. there is a positive correspondence between Bergson's difference of nature and Spinoza's real distinction: "Non opposita sed diversa is the formula of a new logic. Singular being as substance is not "distinct from" or "different from" any thing outside itself. Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian difference depends heavily on a conception of a being that is productive. As a first approximation. in itself and through itself (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 162). more important. we would have to conceive it partly through another thing. if it were. In both cases. and allows for a confusion between the infinite and the indefinite. and pantheism might be read as acosmism. a special conception of difference takes the place of opposition: It is a difference that is completely positive. we could say that singularity is the union of monism with the absolute positivity of pantheism: The unique substance directly infuses and animates the entire world. in that it is remarkable. Here we are confronted with the Spinozian principle of the singularity of being. In other words.62 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE absolute. difference in itself. Here we can begin to appreciate the radicality of Spinoza's definition of substance: "By substance I under- . and thus it would not be substance. Being is singular not only in that it is unique and absolutely infinite. This is the absolutely positive difference that both supports being in itself and provides the basis for all the differences that characterize real being. And yet. This conception takes on its full import in Spinoza: "Spinoza's ontology is dominated by the notions of a cause of itself. because its sense is not immediately evident. Deleuze's reading. from an idealist perspective. difference raised to the absolute. but. however. free from opposition and privation" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 60). The problem with this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic interpretation of substance.

It is.' Each attribute expresses an essence. The distinction of being rises from within. on Deleuze's reading. Causa sui means that being is both infinite and definite: Being is remarkable. with Spinoza's theory of the attributes. Deleuze sets up a simple progression of theological paradigms to situate Spinoza's theory of expressive attributes. but deny that the essence of the world is the essence of God. any other thing. in that being is absolutely infinite and indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate. The real nonnumerical distinction defines the singularity of being.. has nothing to do with individuality or particularity. rather. the divine essence always surpasses or transcends the essence of its expression: "What conceals also expresses.2 Expressive Attributes and the Formal Distinction: Univocity At this point.6 Once we propose this common terrain of the singularity of being. are the expressions of being. In other words. and attributes it to substance" (45). The first task of the real distinction. In order to grasp the univocity of being. or. Deleuze arrives at a second Spinozian principle of ontology: the principle of the univocity of being. from which it must be formed" (D3). then. it seems that we can identify Deleuze's reading of Bergsonian virtuality with that of Spinozian substance in that both propose singular conceptions of being animated by an absolutely positive and internal difference. the problem of the attributes of God is closely tied to that of divine names. although the world is a divine expression. Negative theologies in general affirm that God is the cause of the world. Through the investigation of the formal distinction of the attributes. is to define being as singular. we have to begin with an investigation of its vocality its expressivity. Traditionally. in Bergsonian terms. the correlate of efficient causality and internal difference: The singular is remarkable because it is different in itself. to recognize its difference without reference to. now. Spinoza's conception of the attributes rises up as a real departure and as a profound contribution. Singularity. i. that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing. The Spinozian attributes. that a difference of nature is not a difference of degree. in Deleuze. The issue of divine names becomes a problematic of divine expression. Deleuze will extend this argument beyond Bergson to show that the real distinction is also a formal distinction. or dependence on.e. Spinoza transforms this tradition by giving the attribute the active role in divine expression: "The attribute is no longer attributed.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 63 stand what is in itself and is conceived through itself. however. 3. but what ex- . but is in some sense 'attributive. We have established thus far that the real distinction is not a numerical distinction.

because they do not present us with a common form. Spinoza's conception of the singularity of being shows clearly his opposition to this negative theological paradigm: Immanence is opposed to eminence. The central element that allows for this absolute expression is the commonality of forms contained in the attribute. Spinozian monism opposes all dualism. Thus. God as essence or substance can only be defined negatively. Spinoza's theory of the attribute reverses this formula: "Attributes are forms common to God. should not be referred back to a negative theological conception. there is neither reserve nor excess. but analogy is employed precisely to bridge this gap. omniscience. In the Thomistic tradition. This Spinozian distinction of essence. as commandments. Spinoza's God is fully expressed in the world. among these theories there are important distinctions in the way that they affirm God's positivity. nothing is hidden. on the contrary. They appear to us as signs. "Properties are not properly speaking attributes. the qualities attributed to God imply an analogical relation between God and the creatures of the world. Properties are notions impressed on us that cannot make us understand anything about nature. but with a certain essential reserve.64 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE presses still conceals" (53). perfection. The distinction between the essence of the expressing agent and the essence of the expressed does not deny the immanence of the one in the other. without reserve. between two senses of "the word of God": one . Spinoza's attribute. for example. This conception both elevates God to an eminent position and renders the expression of being equivocal. transcendent. The divine is absolutely expressed. The properties of God (omnipotence. It is a formal method based on community" (48). The distinction between expression and analogy becomes clearer when Deleuze distinguishes attributes from properties. both negative and analogical. as revelations. The God of negative theology is expressive. However. etc. whose essence they constitute. as an eminent. God and the creatures are different in form. though. and to modes or creatures which imply them essentially" (47). in contrast to theories of analogy. pantheism is opposed to transcendence. Positive theologies. Through the attributes (the expressions). precisely because they are not expressive" (50). and concealed source of expression. Deleuze distinguishes. affirm God as both cause and essence of the world.) do not express anything of the nature of God: Properties are mute. substance (the expressing agent) is absolutely immanent in the world of modes (the expressed). therefore. Deleuze finds it most important to distinguish expressive theologies from analogical theologies. and thus cannot be said in the same sense. Analogy proposes to reconcile the essential identity and the formal difference between God and things. proposes a commonality of form and a distinction of essences: "Spinoza's method is neither abstract nor analogical.

This concept provides a logical mechanism whereby he can maintain both the differences among the attributes and the commonality within each attribute: The attributes are formally distinct and ontologically identical. it expresses an essence. the conception of common forms is implied by the real distinction: The singularity of being requires the absolute immanence of the divine in the world. and another that refers to the property as sign: "A sign always attaches to a property. The attributes are not only characterized by an internal common form (that follows from immanence). through the common forms of the attributes. He denounces at once the negative eminence of the Neoplatonists and the pseudoaffirmation of the Thomists" (63). the mute signs and the commandments of semiology close off ontology. It is this participation that distinguishes between the understanding given by the expressive attributes and the obedience imposed by the analogous properties. God is absolutely immanent (fully expressed) in the world of the modes. it makes it known to us" (57). The divine essence is not only expressed in one attribute. In other words. it always signifies a commandment. Deleuze traces Spinoza's theory of the attributes back to Duns Scotus:8 "It was without doubt Scotus who pursued farther than any other the enterprise of a positive theology. with the plurality in one perfectly according with the simplicity of the other" (64). that of formal reason and that of being. but not sufficient. To an extent. we would need to distinguish between two substances. but also by an external plurality. The positive expression of the formally distinct attributes constitutes. To fill out this positive theological framework. condition for univocity. in order to pursue this theory of an expressive positive theology. however. we have critiqued negative theology and analogical positive theology on the basis of the expression of the attributes through the common forms of being. Once again.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 65 that refers to the attribute as expression. then. Immanence and participation are the two sides of the expression of the attributes. A system of signs tells us nothing about being. a nature in the infinitive. for Spinoza as for Duns Scotus. by means of the attributes. This conception can be seen from two sides: On one hand. the expression of the attributes can only take place through the common forms of being. is a necessary. but in an infinite number of formally distinct attributes. Absolute immanence. because if God were not absolutely immanent. "There are here as it were two orders. that is. and it grounds our obedience. Expression always relates to an attribute. the formal commonality embodied in each infinite attribute has to be complemented by the formal distinction among the different attributes. . The positive theology of Duns Scotus is characterized by the theory of the formal distinction.7 Thus far. the modes participate fully in divine substance. Only expression can open up our knowledge of being. and on the other hand.

but completely autonomous from. the expression of being is the affirmation of being: "Attributes are affirmations. univocity implies a formal difference between attributes. Duns Scotus remains too much of a theologian. This conceptual autonomy demonstrates not only how Spinoza represents a turning point in the evolution of Deleuze's work. that is to say 'creationist. that Spinoza's theory of univocal being well surpasses that of Duns Scotus. Deleuze is careful to point out. in its essence is always formal. In Duns Scotus. on the full expressivity of being. we argued that Deleuze was disengaging his own thought from the dialec- . univocal: therein lies its expressivity.' perspective forced him to conceive univocal Being as a neutralized. And here. the heroic moment of a pure. Univocity means precisely that being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice. as an alternative logic of speculation—not in opposition to. Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of pure affirmation. In reading Deleuze's study of Nietzsche. which had been long dominated in Continental philosophy by a Hegelian reading. Therefore. goodness. the Hegelian progression. Since univocal being in Duns Scotus is not absolutely singular. Deleuze gives affirmation an original and precise definition: It is a speculative principle based on the absolute singularity and univocity of being. wisdom. actual. elevates univocity to the level of affirmation. In the Spinozian context. however. we can recognize a typical Bergsonian appreciation of Spinoza: "Spinoza allows us to put a finger on what is heroic in speculation" (Ecrits etparoles 587). Affirmation is the speculative principle on which hangs the whole of the Ethics" (60). though. somewhat inexpressive. In Duns Scotus. and so on—are really merely properties. once again. God the creator is not the cause of all things in the same sense that it is the cause of itself. but also how Deleuze's interpretation constitutes a revolution for Spinoza studies. or. the attributes each express being in a'different form but in the same sense. what are called attributes—justice. In effect.66 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE a conception of the univocity of being. indifferent concept" (67). Spinoza's real distinction. Affirmation constitutes the pinnacle. Deleuze has read the first two great steps of the Spinozian system. in other words. thanks to the Spinozian conception of the expressivity of the attributes. and thus he cannot abandon a certain eminence of the divine: "For his theological. the elaborations of substance and the attributes. it remains somewhat indifferent. In the Spinozian attribute. In the final analysis. but a real and absolute ontological commonality among the attributes. speculative philosophy. Remark: Ontological Speculation Let us pause for a moment and consider carefully the ground we have covered. in other words. but affirmation.

this process is complete. that it is different. When determination is denied. the unique and absolute being of Spinozism cannot provide a basis for determination or difference because it involves no other or limitation. from which he had long been a sufferer. Hegel claims not only that Spinozian substance is indeterminate. this was in harmony with his system of philosophy. As we have argued. is absolutely infinite. from a Hegelian perspective. Determinate being must negate and subsume its other within itself in order to attain quality and reality. it is not determinate in the sense of being limited. the unique substance. the real distinction presents being as different in itself. Singularity is. However. we can easily construct a comparison with Hegelian ontology in order to demonstrate the important conceptual autonomy marked by Deleuze's Spinozian foundation. It would be false. according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance" (Lectures on the History of Philosophy 257). If substance were to be limited (or to have number) it would have to involve an external cause. a real threat to Hegel because it constitutes the refusal of the speculative foundation of dialectics. "Omnis determinatio est negatio"? Clearly. we will be able to recognize the radical departure constituted by Deleuze's reading of the singularity of substance and the univocity of the attributes in Spinoza. it is cause of itself. Deleuze's reading of the real distinction stands in sharp contrast (but not opposition!) to this interpretation. to set up an opposition between singular being and determinate being. is an acosmism. so too Spinoza the philosopher dissolves into nothingness. and it is the point that he refuses to recognize: Spinozism. on the contrary. there is no . This is where Deleuze's discussion of number comes into play. Spinoza's being. In other words. Singularity is and is not determination. Substance. in fact. However. he claims. is determinate in the sense that it is qualified. Singular being is not different from anything outside being. In Spinoza. even though there is no mention of Hegel in the entire text. The definition of being as singular is precisely what irritates Hegel most. Causa sui cannot be read in any ideal sense: Being is the material and efficient cause of itself. Hegel's own interpretation and critique of Spinozian ontology. According to Hegel. The crux of the issue here is the Hegelian conception of determination. In this context we can understand clearly the theoretical demands that could drive Hegel to give this final judgement of Spinoza: "The cause of his death was consumption. but that all determinations are dissolved in the absolute (Science of Logic 536). and neither is it indifferent or abstract: It is simply remarkable. and this continual act of self-production brings with it all the real determinations of the world. in fact. serve to highlight the differences of Deleuze's work. then. The Spinozian conception of singularity is a logical impossibility.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 67 tical terrain through the theory of the total critique.

there is no question of determination. Hegel conceives of the theoretical movement from substance to the attributes as the shadow image of the dialectic of determination. in opposing the rhythm of the dialectical process of determination. have proved to be problematic. Deleuze's reading of the attribute moves in a very different direction. If the central issue in the interpretation of substance is determination. There was a tendency for Deleuze. to oppose determination. the opposition to determination and the acceptance of indetermination. with this real conceptual autonomy from the Hegelian problematic. in his view. but rather. and to affirm indetermination instead. to determine it (Science of Logic 537). again based on his different interpretation of substance. The concept of singularity constitutes the real dislocation from the Hegelian theoretical horizon. the attributes fill the role of expression. the Spinozian movement of being is an irrecuperative series of degradations: "The process of emanation is taken only as a happening. In the earlier Bergson studies. it brings with it immediately all the freshness and materiality of reality. I would argue that here. To a great extent. according to Deleuze. we noted a certain equivocation on this issue. The proposition of indetermination allowed that being would not be restricted or constrained by an external cause. Both aspects of this position. Through the attributes we recognize the absolute immanence or expressivity of being. Deleuze was accepting its opposite (indetermination). which is doomed to failure because it omits the fundamental play of negations. This difference in the two interpretations of the Spinozian substance continues and develops in the interpretations of the attributes. the attribute serves to limit substance. the infinite and equal expressions constitute the univocity of being. Deleuze's theory of expression effectively constitutes a challenge to Hegel's judgment that Spinozism is an "oriental conception of emanation" (Science of Logic 538). According to Hegel.68 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE room for this equation in Deleuze's Spinoza—not even as a point of opposition. Since. we find that determination and indetermination are equally inadequate terms. In effect. in that it is always and everywhere expressed in the same voice. Furthermore. However. substance is already real and qualified. Hegel's reading of the attribute follows directly from his interpretation of substance: Since substance is an infinite indetermination. and thus remained locked on the dialectical terrain. Being is never indeterminate. in the Spinozian context. Singularity is the concept that marks the internal difference. Deleuze of- . the real distinction that qualifies absolutely infinite being as real without recourse to a dialectic of negations. we can recognize a significant evolution of Deleuze's thought. the becoming only as a progressive loss" (539). along with Bergson. the interpretation of the attributes focuses on emanation.

complicare-explicare. Since being is singular. but still being and remaining in it" (172). Deleuze's analysis. What Deleuze's explanation makes clear is that Spinoza's ontology. the externality of the effect with respect to the cause allows for a successive degradation in the causal chain and an inequality of essences. Immanence denies any form of eminence or hierarchy in being: The principle of the univocity of the attributes requires that being be expressed equally in all of its forms. not emanation. The immanence and expression of Spinozism. as in something else. when its effect is 'immanate' [immane] in the cause. its production can involve no other. can never be interpreted as a degradation: At the level of essences. We have thus far treated Deleuze's reading of the opening of the Ethics (roughly as far as IP14). then. and the universal explication.. Deleuze explains this with the terms of medieval philosophy. In an emanative process. on the other hand. The difference between the essence of the immanent cause and the essence of its effect. of course. univocal expression is incompatible with emanation. in the sense that it is in everything" (175). gathering being back within itself. a combination of immanence and expression. the "progressive loss" of being. not only presents Spinoza as an alternative logic of ontological speculation. by considering only positive ontological processes. which presents in compact form the principles of ontological speculation. but it appears equally present in all beings" (173). this Deleuzian history of philosophy completely disregards the Hegelian and dialectical tradition. in the sense that everything is in it.. This positive movement is precisely what philosophies of emanation and immanence share: Both are animated by an internal causality. citing Nicholas of Cusa: "God is the universal complication. Inasmuch as expression is an explicative or centrifugal movement. there is an absolute ontological equality between cause and effect. according to Deleuze. Nonetheless. presents a modern version of this medieval couple. We can clearly see at this point that Spinoza's ontology is a philosophy of immanence. but also provides us with the terms to respond to the Hegelian critique of Spinoza.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 69 fers us a response to this Hegelian critique in the form of an extended analysis of the relation between emanation and immanence in the history of philosophy As one might expect. "Their common characteristic is that neither leaves itself: they produce while remaining in themselves" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 171). it is also a complicative or centripetal movement. We should be very clear about the simplicity of . "A cause is immanent. The essential equality of immanence demands a univocal being: "Not only is being equal in itself. is not susceptible to the Hegelian critique of the dispersion. rather than emanating from it. What defines an immanent cause is that its effect is in it—in it. therefore. there is an important difference in the way in which the emanative cause and the immanent cause produce. Therefore.

Gueroult" 432). "Bergson et Spinoza" 71. we will certainly be disappointed. We can affirm this same claim in another way by saying that in the opening of the Ethics. Spinoza is clearly conscious of this fact. but a real definition: "This is the only definition that presents us with a nature. If we read this theological terminology in a traditional sense. then. Spinoza accomplishes a logical constitution of the idea of God. and if we demand more of his speculation we are bound to be disappointed." Spinoza's real constitution of being takes place in another field of activity. it merely can provide us with the fundamental principles by which being is constituted. There is nothing hypothetical about the opening of the Ethics. This is all we know about being (about God) at this point in the analysis: It is singular and it is univocal. Speculation . with his "God made of ice.70 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE what has been developed thus far: "a logical constitution of substance. "a genealogy of substance" (Deleuze. Ontological speculation is not productive. This logical constitution developed in the opening of the Ethics consists of two principles: singularity and univocity. "Spinoza et la methode generale de M. however. from Bergson's course at the College de France. a 'composition' in which there is nothing physical" (79). He is excavating being in order to discover the real ontological principles of speculation. though. The principles that demonstrate the reality of the definition of God (D6) are those of the life of substance itself. singularity and univocity. it is a speculative development of the genetic sequence of being. There is an implicit polemic in this affirmation about the nature and the limits of speculation. he means precisely that the principles of being are active and constructive: From these principles being itself unfolds. reacts to the purely logical character of Spinoza's presentation: "The God of the first part of the Ethics is engendered outside of all experience. which is autonomous from the field of speculation. they are the a priori constitution of being (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 81). in an ontological practice. 1912). the expressive nature of the absolute" (81). we can see clearly why Spinozian thought is not recuperable within a Hegelian (or within any idealist) framework. Spinoza is not. it is not constitutive of being. On this point. instead. Spinoza shows that the definition of God (D6) is not merely a nominal definition. The truths that we can learn through speculation are very few and very simple. constructing an image or idea of God in any conventional sense. as Bergson is. as a circle would be for a geometrician who has never seen one" (quoted in Mosse-Bastide. What Spinoza has arrived at is simply the fundamental genetic principles. that guide the production and constitution of being. When Deleuze says that this definition is a genetic definition. Through the expression of the absolute as singular and univocal. Bergson. for one. Speculation does not constitute the world or construct being.

3-3 The Powers of Being The seeds of the Spinozian principle of power can be found in the a posteriori proofs of the existence of God. however. Like Descartes. Spinoza substitutes an axiom of power that links the power to think with the power to exist or act: "The intellect has no more power to know than its objects have to exist and act. but rather its use of "the power to exist" in the logical foundation. as merely a midpoint in Spinoza's development. power. The axiom of power attains a mature deployment in the a posteriori proofs in the Ethics. Spinoza offers three demonstrations of the proposition that God necessarily exists. (2) it would be absurd to say that finite beings exist while an absolutely infinite being does not exist. Power is the essence of being that presents essence in existence. the Cartesian axiom about the quantities of perfection or reality is not sufficient to support this proof. However. Descartes's proof is based on the quantities of perfection or reality: A cause must have at least as much reality as its effect. but Deleuze is primarily interested in the third because in this proof Spinoza no longer passes through the idea of God and the power to think. but begins directly with the power to exist. Spinoza makes power a principle of being. Deleuze claims that Spinoza takes up this Cartesian proof in his Short Treatise with an original modification. but first we should investigate a third and final ontological principle: the principle of the powers of being.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 71 merely traces the contours of being's productive dynamic. Deleuze prepares his treatment of these proofs by first presenting the Cartesian a priori proof as a framework. because that would be to say that the finite beings are more powerful. without which Spinoza's thought would remain speculative and never make the conversion to a practical philosophy. Soon we will turn our attention to the constitutive nature of Spinozian practice. (3) therefore. Spinoza begins from the idea of God and asserts that the cause of this idea must exist and contain formally all that the idea contains objectively (Short Treatise 1:3). The importance of this proof for our purposes is not its logical coherence. the cause of an idea must have at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. Deleuze presents this a priori proof of the Short Treatise. the power to think and know cannot be greater than a necessarily correlative power of existing" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 86. now I have the idea of an infinitely perfect being. production. an absolutely infinite being necessarily exists (IP11D3). and so on. and es- . Spinoza's argument proceeds as follows: (1) To be able to exist is to have power. (4) since we exist. either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite being also exists. The intimate nexus in Spinoza that unites cause. In its place. modified).

72 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE sence is the dynamic core that makes his speculative system into a dynamic project. an active principle of development" (Nature et verite 9). the essence of nature as power implies equally a production and a sensibility: "All power bears with it a corresponding and inseparable power to be affected" (93). but also that the power to be affected. without any transcendental and ineffable reserve. and this power to be affected "is always filled. Power in Spinoza has two sides that are always equal and indivisible: the power to effect and the power to be affected. pathos plays an active. in Spinoza as in Nietzsche. the power to exist of a mode always corresponds to a power to be affected. Therefore. God produces as it exists. Ferdinand Alquie. God also has the power to be affected in an absolutely infinite number of ways. is completely filled with active and passive affections. in Nietzsche and Philosophy. either by affections produced by external things (called passive affections). explains that this Spinozian nexus constitutes an active principle: "Spinoza's nature (is) above all spontaneity. Deleuze identified a link between Spinoza and Nietzsche (62). modified). The Spinozian couple power-affectivity echoes some of these Nietzschean elements. a principle of affection. for example. productive role. An affection in Spinozian terminology may be an action or a passion. rather. . Therefore. production and sensibility. In effect. but also. a reference to modern materialism (Hobbes. means not only that being is always and everywhere fully expressed. Spinoza can add a second aspect to the affirmation of the a posteriori proof of God: Not only does God have an absolutely infinite power to exist. Furthermore. and that draws on the work of Renaissance thinkers such as Giordano Bruno. or by affections explained by the mode's own essence (called active affections)" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 93. The plenitude of being. which corresponds to the power to exist. Deleuze claims. This is precisely the point at which. this Nietzschean pathos does not involve a body "suffering" from passions. Our use of the term "sensibility" to try to describe the power to be affected may well be misleading. in action [en acte]" (93). but for him it presents only half the picture. at least. In other words.9 Deleuze accepts this conception of Spinoza's naturalism. "The identity of power and essence means: power is always act or. depending on whether the affection results from an internal or an external cause. to the same extent. A will to power is always accompanied by a feeling of power. Deleuze complements the reference to Renaissance naturalism with a second reference. Many commentators have recognized in Spinoza's conception of power a naturalism that is in direct opposition to Descartes. Spinoza's conception of power is not only a principle of action. in particular).

. and power—and develop them into a full speculative logic of being. we should note that Spinoza's principle of power always presents itself as a principle of conversion—a conversion from speculation to practice. we must turn back to the three ontological principles we have identified—singularity. Immediately. and not jump too far ahead. However. univocity. but when we investigate the first side of the equation. This conversion is possible because Spinoza's analysis of the internal structure of power. pressing the question of the causal dynamic at every point. At present. Its structure is opaque to us. When we pose the question of cause in this context. because we still know too little about the structure of power. this distinction suggests the outlines of an ethical. With Spinoza's proposition of the principle of power. we have only opened the door (or as Althusser might say. illuminates the real steps that we can take in constituting ourselves and our world through practice. we are unable to address this task. power power to exist = power to be affected / \ active affections passive affections / \ We can begin to see at this point how Spinoza's proposition of the equivalence between the power to exist and the power to be affected can lead us toward a practical theory. though. Spinoza's power enters the scene at the hour of midnight. We must be patient. Nonetheless. from the analysis of being to the constitution of being. we can shift our investigation to the other side of the equation. "nous avons ouvert des voies") toward the development of an ontological practice. once Spinoza has proposed the equivalence between the power to exist and the power to be affected. however. Here we find a truly differentiated structure and a rich terrain for our analysis. the power to exist. project: How can we favor active affections so that our power to be affected will be filled to a greater extent with active rather than passive affections? At this point. there is more work to be done in order to prepare this terrain. To understand the nature of power we have to discover the internal structures of power. we find a real distinction: Our power to be affected is constituted by active affections (internally caused) and passive affections (externally caused). power appears as pure spontaneity. and our analysis is blocked. and ultimately practical. at the moment of Nietzsche's transmutation.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 73 These two distinctions constitute our initial essay in discerning the internal structure of power.

the Spinozian theory of the attribute solves many problems. In the context of the Spinozian system." The first of these two is perhaps the more problematic: "I say that by Israel I understand the third patriarch. but the proposition of an equality in principle between the corporeal and the intellectual. including thought itself. What is most important to Deleuze in this regard is to maintain a strictly materialist interpretation of Spinoza's ontology (and we will see that there are several tensions involved with maintaining this position). the only true ontology must be materialist. then. so that not only matter but also being itself would somehow be dependent on thought. The intellectual and the corporeal are equal expressions of being: This is the fundamental principle of a materialist ontology. etc. such as those in Letter 9 to Simon de Vries. Several examples illustrating the role of the attribute. Spinoza offers two examples of how in the attributes "one and the same thing can be designated by two names. One of the problems that presents itself immediately is that the definition grants a certain priority to the attribute of thought over the other attributes: Thought is the means of perceiving all the attributes of substance. In this letter. materialism repeatedly appears in the history of philosophy as a corrective to idealism.4 The Interpretation of the Attributes: Problems of a Materialist Ontology As we have seen.74 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE Ontological Expression 3. Any privilege of the intellect. Materialism should never be confused with a simple priority of body over mind. extension. Spinoza corrects Descartes just as Marx corrects Hegel. but it also raises many others. as a denial of the priority of mind over body. This materialist correction is not an inversion of the priority. From this perspective. This discussion will help us flesh out the role that materialism plays in Deleuze's thought. my emphasis). I understand the same by Jacob. as constituting its essence" (Ethics ID4. Deleuze makes clear that this refusal of the priority of the intellect serves to point toward and reinforce the priority of being equally over all of its attributes (thought. we can identify the central issue in the very definition of the attribute: "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance.). One of the most serious difficulties that it poses is the threat of an idealist or subjectivist tendency in Spinoza's thought. . Deleuze finds it necessary. of the physical over the intellectual. give an even more problematic explanation. Rather. to combat an idealist account of being not only in order to valorize the material world. would subvert the ontological structure of the system. in other words. but more important to preserve the coherence of the ontological perspective.

the intellect would be anterior to them. Hegel conceives of the attribute as the determination or limitation of substance that is dependent on the intellect and that "proceeds outside the absolute" (538). are the very terms of a materialist ontology. The idealist or subjectivist interpretation defines the attribute primarily as a form of knowledge. However. and therefore ontologically posterior to the attributes. that is. I repeat. and not as a form of being. but seems to credit it to an error in the Spinozian system rather than to a fault of his interpretation (Science of Logic 537). is not the logical contradiction of the subjectivist reading. What is at stake. Martial Gueroult points out that there is a logical contradiction in this reading that weakens the foundations of Spinozian ontology: The attributes cannot be dependent on the intellect because the intellect is a mode of thought. Hegel himself recognizes this contradiction. the intellect plays only a secondary role in the functioning of the attributes. "All formally distinct attributes are referred by the intellect to an ontologically single substance. the difference resides not in the object perceived but in the perceiving subject. Hegel's presentation in the Science of Logic is the seminal reading in this tradition. but rather the priority that it grants to the intellect. when Spinoza presents the attribute as merely a way of knowing or conceiving. more important. "In fact. which is absurd" (I. In other words. not directly in being but in the intellect. the intellect merely reproduces in . I would maintain. if the attributes were to result from the idea that the intellect had of substance.10 The nucleus of the dispute involves the position of the attribute with respect to substance on one side. as in Letter 9. But the intellect only reproduces objectively the nature of the forms it apprehends" (65). and with respect to the intellect on the other: It is a question of the priority of ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi.11 As we noted earlier. The question. he is giving only a partial or simplified explanation of the attribute's real role (61). In Spinoza studies there is a long-standing controversy over the interpretation of the attributes. "which appears as external and immediate over against substance" (537). According to Deleuze. the primary issue at stake here. and consequently anterior to the attribute of which it is a mode. The attribute does not depend on the intellect. ontological interpretation. in other words. the relation of the attributes to substance is prior to and independent of the intellect's apprehension of this relation. is the relative import of the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi in the system as a whole. Deleuze provides us with an alternative reading of the Spinozian attributes—an objectivist. as an objective and invisible agent of representation. an ontology that does not found being in thought." The distinction here is merely nominal and. on the contrary.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 75 the name that was given him because he had seized his brother's heel. 50).

What is clear. Deleuze does not seem to be disturbed by these problems (or perhaps he is determined not to be sidetracked by them)." the partisans of the trilogy Marx-Nietzsche-Freud. and it resolves the contradiction posed by granting a foundational role to the intellect in the theory of the attributes. even if we are to accept the intellect as secondary in the foundation of the attribute. The intellectual hegemony in 1960s France of the "masters of suspicion. through the interpretation of the attributes Deleuze is working out the dimensions of a materialist ontology. Remark: Speculative Production and Theoretical Practice When we broaden our perspective beyond the specific questions of Spinoza interpretation. for example. How can the objectivist interpretation account for this "quod intellectus de substantia percipit" without giving a foundational role to the intellect? (And we should note that reference to the original Latin offers us no way out in this dilemma. Let us return. The ratio essendi is prior to the ratio cognoscendi. Nonetheless. The stakes here go well beyond the realm of Spinoza studies. we must recognize that we cannot maintain this thesis without a certain strain. as sustaining a precariously minoritarian theoretical position. Deleuze's philosophy has to be recognized in its difference from both the idealist ontological tradition and any deontological approach to philosophy. and refer instead to the nature of the return to ontology central to Deleuze's philosophy and the radical difference it marks with respect to other contemporary philosophical positions. instead. to the definition of the attributes: "By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance. The various mots d'ordre that sprang up from different camps throughout the French intellectual scene in this . m emphasis). even when this effort seems to go against clear statements in the text. we can see that Deleuze's objectivist reading marks him as radically out of sync with the intellectual movements of his time. however. how are we to understand what Deleuze describes as its "objective reproduction" of the nature of the forms it apprehends? This "reproduction" is certainly a very weak conception of expression. as constituting its essence" (Ethics ID4. and he does not treat this issue in any depth. is the insistence of Deleuze's effort to preserve the ontological integrity of the system and combat any priority of thought over the other attributes.12 although to a certain extent antiHegelian. nonetheless (if we can allow ourselves a transposition to the terrain of the Spinozian controversy) have to be counted on the side of a subjectivist reading of the attributes. This objectivist interpretation succeeds in preserving the ontological integrity of the system.76 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE objective or cognitive terms the primary ontological relation.) Furthermore.

in fact. Althusser's insistence on the centrality of ratio cognoscendi is a characteristic central to phenomenological speculation. First. Subjectivist reading puts an end to the myth of pure speculation. the thought object is produced in a specific relation to reality. or rather the focus on "interpretation" as a privileged field of investigation. however. reading the classical economists. consider. let us briefly investigate Althusser's reading of Marx as an example—perhaps not a representative example. is the act of reading itself: reading Marx's Capital. we must grasp that there is a distinction between the object of knowledge and the real object—or." Althusser's strategy of reading. we must consider how these things are presented to our consciousness. As a second step. to follow Althusser in a Spinozian example. How can Deleuze possibly maintain the . which in this respect is representative of a general intellectual movement. there is a distinction between the idea of a circle and a really existing circle (40ff. of society. The general trend.)." on the seen and the non-seen. Deleuze's proposition of an objectivist ontological speculation in Spinoza runs counter to this entire stream of thought. and to bring into question. At first sight. seems to fall directly and heavily on Deleuze's objectivist reading of the attributes. of a "specular" speculation: There is no innocent or objective reading of the world. according to phenomenologists. This is where the Spinozian attribute reappears at the heart of the discussion: "quod intellectus de substantia percipit. we must recognize that the importance of this distinction lies in the fact that the two domains exist under different conditions: While the real object is given.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 77 period all insist on the foundational role of the intellect. So as not to fall into abstract generalization. One element that Althusser wants to bring into focus. and conceive knowledge as a production" (Reading Capital 24). along with phenomenological speculation in general. Deleuze gives the intellect precisely the "specular" role that Althusser denounces: "The intellect only reproduces objectively the nature of the forms it apprehends" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 65). Before we can consider real things in themselves. Althusser wants us to find in Marx a revolution in the theory of knowledge: "We must completely reorganize the idea we have of knowledge. the importance of the widespread discourse on "vision. for example. but certainly one that was influential. We can distinguish two elements in Althusser's effort to conceive of knowledge as a production. we must abandon the specular myths of immediate vision and reading. "No doubt there is a relation between tbought-about-the-real and this real. but it is a relation of knowledge" (87). Althusser's critique. of the ratio cognoscendi. seems to constitute a forceful attack on Deleuze's position. of political economy. reading capitalist society. coincides perfectly with a subjectivist interpretation of the attribute. to our intellect.

and independent of. This first response. in line with a subjectivist ontology. immediate. directly address Deleuze's argument. We can approach a more adequate explanation of Deleuze's position if we bring into question the domain proper to speculation. Every discussion of causality and difference is based on this foundation. rather. we would have to say that they are not actually principles of being. The objectivist interpretation of the attributes claims simply that there are certain principles of being that are prior to. we find that in certain respects the Althusserian critique does not. rather. in Deleuze. he gives the functioning of the intellect a reproductive role in the theory of the attribute. we can interpret Deleuze's position on the reproductive role of the intellect as principally an affirmation of \heproductive role of being. However. and. when we examine the matter closely. ontological principles. as we have insisted. What would it mean to conceive of this ontological speculation as production? We would have to say.78 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE theory of a specular." This subjectivization of being would undermine the ontological foundation of the Spinozian system in its entirety. and power are not principles of being (as real objects). Deleuze is not ignoring the centrality of production. and absolutely positive terms. We could summarize Deleuze's ontology in precisely these terms: Being is productive in direct. and in Spinoza we can trace it to Renaissance naturalism. Deleuze poses a purely ontological speculation. Society. speculation is brought to bear exclusively on ontological issues. because the primary production is elsewhere. and its economy are not appropriate objects of speculation. in logical and ontological terms. . in fact. we related this conception to the causal discourse of the Scholastics. but it applies merely to a very specific terrain. that singularity. can only serve partially to deflect the critique. With this in mind. capital. and very simple. however. In other words. We have emphasized throughout our reading of Deleuze's various works that his ontology is founded on the conception that being is a productive dynamic. Against a phenomenological speculation. Deleuze's philosophy is not a phenomenology. Deleuze's speculation does claim an objective representation. objective intellect? How. In the Bergson study. can Deleuze relegate the apprehension of the intellect to a reproductive role? We are certainly faced with conflicting positions here. we can hazard a preliminary Deleuzian response to our first Althusserian critique: Bringing cognitive production to center stage in philosophy masks the fundamental productive dynamic of being that is really antecedent to the intellect. when the entire French philosophical community is focusing on the productive nature of knowledge. but rather products of our intellectual activity (as objects of our knowledge). First of all. not answer it. it arrives at very few. univocity. Thus. the productive power of thought. but rather "quod intellectus de substantial percipit.

Pure ontology and absolute materialism: These are the complementary positions that Deleuze sustains against the tide of his contemporaries. With the critique of practice. understood in an ideological (empiricist or idealist) way. Althusser's challenge can serve. The recognition of the production involved in knowledge and its distinction from reality. as a critical axis to orient our discussion and highlight the difference marked by Deleuze's approach. on the contrary. not change it. tries to preserve the specificity of ontology within its specific domain. banishes practice from the field of speculation. Deleuze. Deleuze's conception of practice does not escape Althusser's indictment: "It is enough to pronounce the word practice. 3-5 Combatting the Privileges ofThought We must return now to consider in greater depth Deleuze's treatment of the Spinozian attributes. we inevitably fall into either speculative idealism or empiricist idealism" (Reading Capital 87). The stakes in the discussion of the attributes should be clear. but we do not yet have control of the terms to investigate it further. is still open to a further Althusserian critique. the counter-connotation of theory (the pair of 'contraries' practice and theory composing the two terms of a specular field). is merely the compliant specular counterpart to objectivist and idealist speculation in a fraudulent word game. From this perspective. appears as idealism on both sides of this practicotheoretical synthesis: a speculative idealism and an empirical idealism held loosely together in one philosophy. however. Deleuze's thought. "the theory of theoretical practice. we have to level the accusation that Deleuze's philosophy can have no practical power. which pretends to be autonomous from speculation. The objectivist interpretation of the attributes seems open to the critique from a phenomenological perspective that it implies an ide- . What lies outside of the realm of ontological speculation is treated by Deleuze in empirical terms—it will be the foundation of Deleuze's conception of practice. is the defining factor of all materialism: "If we do not respect it. is only the mirror image. according to Althusser. for the present.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 79 these principles constitute the field of speculation. then. Drawing on one of Althusser's favorite texts. Deleuze's practice. Althusser's materialist and phenomenological speculation is precisely what allows him to propose his famous concept of practice within theory. the Theses on Feuerbach. This second Deleuzian response. then. which. it can merely attempt to think the world. Clearly." The objectivist interpretation of the attributes. we have touched the heart of the matter. to reveal the play on words that is its seat" (57-58).

then. This conception of the autonomy of the attributes rests on one of the principles of efficient causality: Insofar as two things are different. point in a very different direction. "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (IIP7. Spinoza 140). emphasis mine). We can identify three elements that constitute Deleuze's theory of ontological parallelism: autonomy. The attributes. in opposition to Descartes. but an . goes beyond a mere separation between the attributes. how important it is to combat the privileges of thought. however. equality. it is simply a logical extension or development of the idea of the univocity of being.13 The idea of a parallelism of the attributes should not be considered as another principle of being. Ethics IP3). one cannot be the cause of the other (cf. but also that they are organized in a parallel order: "And indeed. and unity. The autonomy of the attributes should be understood foremost as a rejection of the Cartesian conception of the primacy of the mind over the body. but would also subordinate any material and corporeal conception of being to the intellectual realm. There is a real separation between the attributes. identity of connection means not only the autonomy of corresponding series. of course. then. is that the attribute of thought be given a priority over the other attributes. Spinoza conceives the mind. Deleuze articulates his idea of the equality of the attributes through a theory of ontological parallelism. This intellectualist conception of ontology would not only destroy the univocity of being. must be said of the body: The body is a corporeal automaton because in movement and rest the body obeys only the laws of extension. and similarly the body neither controls nor suffers from the mind.80 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE alist conception of ontology and thus precludes a theoretical practice. as a "spiritual automaton" (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect 85) because in thinking the mind obeys only the laws of thought (cf. viewed from above. Deleuze's concerns. or any real notion of practice. rather. If being is always and everywhere said in the same way. Expressionism in Philosophy-. The real danger. if. that the mind neither controls nor suffers from the body. then viewed from below it appears as the equal participation of all the constituent parts. This discussion will necessarily be complex. Spinoza claims. The proposition of parallelism. univocity appears as the absolute uniformity of the whole. In other words. constitute independent series of cause and effect. however. The same. then the attributes must be equal expressions. according to him. Spinoza's proposition claims not only that the attributes are autonomous. but this complexity and this tension should only indicate to us how important this point is for Deleuze's philosophy. that the mind be given priority over the body. and at points Deleuze's interpretation will seem strained with respect to Spinoza's text.

The body and the mind both participate in being in autonomous and equal ways. they are. the same expression. that is.. This is the complete rejection of the Cartesian position: Not only is the body formally independent of the mind. The different attributes are not only equal expressions of being. A second component of parallelism. excludes any causal action of one on another. one that will guide us throughout our study of the Ethics: Every proposition we affirm with regard to one of the attributes must be affirmed equally with regard to the other attribute. thought and extension. modes that differ in attribute form one and the same modification. then. specifically between the two attributes accessible to us. said in the same voice. In other words. But because attributes are really distinct this correspondence.)15 . there is an identity of connection between modes differing in attribute. and so there is a correspondence between modes of different attributes. is the establishment of an equality of principle among all the attributes. Because the attributes are all equal. in a certain sense. each time we recognize an aspect of the structure or function of the mind. the modes of the various attributes are the same from the point of view of substance.14 but rather as a central lesson for speculation. (For example. we must also affirm a parallel nature of a true act of the body.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 81 isonomy. but it is also equal to the mind in principle. and vice versa. (110) The substantial modification (modiflcatio) is the unity of modes that are produced in parallel in the different attributes by a single affection of substance. In Deleuze's interpretation. we must ask ourselves how we can recognize a parallel structure or function of the body. an equality of principle between autonomous or independent series" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 108). this theory of Spinozian parallelism functions not so much as an analysis of the organization of being. this proposition follows directly from the principle of univocity: Corporeality and thought are equal expressions of being. Because attributes constitute one and the same substance. if we are to affirm a certain nature of a true idea of the mind. The concept of the modification itself is the demonstration of what Deleuze calls the ontological parallelism. In other words. We must understand equality of principle here in terms of ontological participation. We can already recognize that equality does not suffice to explain ontological parallelism. God produces things in all attributes at once: he produces them in the same order in each. Once again.The modes produced autonomously and equally in the different attributes appear as a unity from the point of view of substance in the form of the substantial modification (see Spinoza: Practical Philosophy). or identity of order.

Deleuze certainly recognizes this as a serious problem. Deleuze proposes epistemological parallelism as secondary. nonetheless. This parallelism is not established equally among the various attributes. then. In this way. generalizing the case of thought (of the idea and its object) to all of the attributes. it does not agree with Spinoza's actual statement in Proposition 7: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (IIP7). for example. the essence of thought (the power of thinking) is equated to the essence of being (the power of acting). (See. The beautiful simplicity of it consists in the fact that it follows very directly from the principle of univocity. then all its attributes must be structured as parallel expressions. The privilege that seems to be accorded to thought here goes against the general design of the ontological system.82 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE Deleuze's reading of ontological parallelism is an original interpretation in Spinoza studies. objectum ideae"). but not the equality of the mind and the body. To appreciate the depth of this problem. on the contrary. The theory of epistemological parallelism. which straddles the different attributes. we must keep in mind that "action" in Spinoza's terminology does not refer only to the movement and rest of the body. Therefore. but rather it focuses primarily on the attribute of thought. IIID3. but rather an epistemological parallelism (99). establishing the relationship between an idea and its "object" ("res ideata. Deleuze explains that in the scholium to this proposition Spinoza proceeds from the epistemological parallelism to the ontological parallelism. Deleuze claims.). "forces us to confer on the attribute of thought a singular privilege: this attribute must contain as many irreducible ideas as there are modes of different attributes. testifies to the univocity of being. Once again we are confronted by what seems to be a Spinozian tendency to privilege thought over the other attributes. If being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice. Furthermore. is proposing an equality. the difficulties that we focused on earlier regarding the priority of thought in the foundation of the attribute seem to be resolved (or at least left behind) by the theory of the equality and ontological parallelism of the attributes. as merely a . We should recognize. The problem is posed most clearly in the corollary of this proposition: "God's actual power of thinking is equal to its actual power of acting" (PTC). Deleuze recognizes that here Spinoza is not proposing an ontological parallelism. still more. In a first attempt to resolve this problem. This formula of P7C. that while Deleuze's interpretation fits very well with the general spirit of Spinoza's ontological system. but equally to all the attributes. we are thrown back on the same problematic terrain of the subjectivist interpretation of the attribute. This privilege seems in flagrant contradiction with all the demands of ontological parallelism" (114). as many ideas as there are attributes. the substantial unity of the modification.

This is a restatement of ontological parallelism. though. then. the power to think. The fundamental goal. This formulation of the two powers gives Deleuze the opportunity to combat the notion of the eminence of thought over the other attributes by subsuming the epistemological perspective within the ontological. is the objective essence of God. as formally distinct expressions. The task here is to find a way to reconcile the two parallelisms so that they do not contradict one another. not to confuse the attributes of being with the powers of being: "The distinction of powers and attributes has an essential importance in Spinozism" (118). it has only two powers: the power to exist and act. and the power to think and know (103). is to combat the privileges of thought and thereby preserve the ontological foundation of the philosophical framework. in fact. formal essence of God. but certainly does not state it clearly. . Deleuze embarks. which we should keep in mind throughout this complex argument. is not very well substantiated in the text. We must be careful. in the power to exist. "God's absolute essence is formal in the attributes that constitute its nature. This reading. Deleuze begins. however. the power to exist. The same attributes that are distinguished formally in God are distinguished objectively in the idea of God. then. the more profound theory. This slippage between powers and attributes sets the terms for a priority between the two powers. I do not think that this difficulty should draw into question Deleuze's proposal of an ontological parallelism—indeed. Even though Deleuze affirmed earlier that the powers are in some sense equal. and objective in the idea that necessarily represents this nature" (120). is the. there is sufficient evidence elsewhere in Spinoza's work to support this thesis. "The attribute of thought is to the power to think what all attributes (including thought) are to the power to exist and act" (122). to discover a way of avoiding the epistemological parallelism altogether. While being has an infinity of attributes. The scholium is somewhat suggestive of ontological parallelism. here we find that the power to think (objective essence) is dependent on the power to exist (formal essence): "Objective being would amount to nothing did it not itself have a formal being in the attribute of thought" (122). or better. The first power. the most suggestive supporting statement. All the attributes participate equally in this essence. Deleuze's claim of the priority of the ontological power (the power to exist) over the epistemological power (the power to think) thus preserves the equality among the attributes. The second power. The immediate object of this discussion is to rework the interpretation of the epistemological parallelism proposed in IIP7. on a more involved discussion in order to address this task.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 83 "detour" (99) for reaching ontological parallelism. is very weak: "I understand the same concerning the other attributes" (IIP7S).

Deleuze once again calls on the distinction of powers to address this difficulty: The two cases cannot be considered the same when considered from the point of view of attributes. Although Deleuze does not pose the issue in these terms. can be posed quite simply. The principal threat of interiority in this case is the creation of a priority of the mind over the body and the subsumption of the dynamic of being within a mental dynamic of reflection. What does it mean. The basic problem. seems to be constructing an interiority within the mind that. we should try once again to clarify what is at stake here. that he refuses any subordination of the body to the mind. Sylvain Zac. there arises yet another case in which it appears that thought is privileged over the other attributes. see also 121-28). While the idea and its object are conceived under two separate attributes. which can easily seem tedious and arcane. a philosophy of consciousness. The threat of an idealist perspective. however. as Zac says. Therefore. that he maintains the priority of ratio essendi over ratio cognoscendi. but only when considered from the point of view of powers (110-11). as consciousness. Zac's proposition makes clear the danger presented for Deleuze by this Spinozian example. and still other ideas of these ideas of ideas. on the one hand. for example.84 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE Finally. then. or rather the problem of the reflection of the mind. it is quite clear that when Deleuze approaches this issue his main concern will be to preserve the ontological equality of the attributes. The idea of the idea. which is the ground of a capacity of ideas to reflect themselves ad infinitum. poses the concept in this way: "Consciousness is the idea of the idea. but also ideas of these ideas. the idea of the idea and the idea are both conceived under the attribute of thought. is united with the mind as the mind is united with the body. In other words. In the mind there are not only ideas that correspond to objects (res ideata). It is united to the mind just as the mind is united to the body" (L'idee de vie 128. to say that there is the same relationship between the idea and the object as there is between the idea of the idea and the idea? The claim that the two cases constitute the same relationship seems to give thought the capacity to subsume the relationship to all of the attributes within itself: Its priority as the attribute of reflection seems to give it the capacity to reproduce the inter-attribute dynamic completely within thought itself. Before we enter into the details of this argument. though. and. Several commentators have argued that the problem of the idea of the idea in Spinoza is the problem of consciousness. on the other hand. the common . and so on to infinity: "Whence this final apparent privilege of the attribute of thought. then. still haunts the Spinozian system. Spinoza sometimes says that the idea of an idea has to the idea the same relation as the idea to its object" (125). As we have seen several times. he argues. Deleuze is not a philosopher of consciousness: What this means is.

We can pose this clearly in Bergsonian terms: Consciousness does not mark a difference of nature. A mode of thought. has a certain power to exist. there is no formal distinction because they are both modes of thought. however. however.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 85 relationship in the two cases should be explained by referring the first term to the formal power and the second to the objective power. is that in each case the two terms refer to the two different powers: the power to exist and the power to think. just like a mode of any attribute. not the formal distinction that differentiates the attributes. referred as such to the power to think. but merely a conceptual distinction (distinction de raisari). finally. The common relationship that Spinoza is referring to. The first case is very simple. Remark: From Forschung to Darstellung In the previous section we analyzed several examples of Deleuze's effort to preserve the univocity of being on the basis of an ontological parallelism . there is a formal distinction between an idea and its object because they are modes of different attributes. insofar as they are given in God with the same necessity. The idea of this object. as formal essence. though. however. that the mind's capacity for reflection (consciousness. attempts to show that this privilege is ontologically insignificant. but merely a difference of degree. drawing on the different powers and distinctions. In the first case. There is consequently only a conceptual distinction (distinction de raisori) between the two ideas: the idea of an idea is the form of that idea. by the same power to think. The res ideata. referring now to the power to think: This idea of the idea is an expression of objective essence. We can apply this same logic to the second case because an idea is also a mode of being. and is thus an expression of formal essence. He has answered the intellectualist challenge posed by consciousness by a reference to the different powers and. From this point of view we see the unity of an idea and the idea of that idea. The distinction involved in the dynamic of consciousness is not the real distinction that founds being. and is thus an expression of objective essence. points to an important difference when we consider the two cases from the point of view of the attributes. In the second case. as a mode of being (pertaining to one of the attributes). the idea of the idea) does give thought a certain privilege over the other attributes. then. can be referred to the power to exist. we can relate another idea to that idea. to the ontological hierarchy of distinctions. nonetheless. between the idea of the idea and the idea. (126) Deleuze is satisfied with this solution. Deleuze's argument. When an idea is thus conceived. We have to admit. This similarity. refers not to the power to exist but to the power to think.

which we have seen several times in our study. that thought is privileged in the theory of the attributes only in limited or accidental terms: Thought is the principal means of human speculation. between the mode of inquiry and the mode of presentation: "Of course the method of presentation [Darstellung} must differ in form from the method of inquiry [Forschung}. then. to the constitutive disutopia of his maturity. The attributes do indeed disappear from the Ethics after Part II (with only a brief reappearance in Part V). as a scientific Forschung. Negri's argument has come under serious critique. in the ontological parallelism of the attributes. and the theory of the attributes is linked to a mode of inquiry. If we imagine that there is something substantial about the priority of thought over the other attributes. The Deleuzian arguments certainly have a very strong foundation in Spinoza's ontology. but it clearly points to two issues that (even if we are to question his explanation) must be addressed: The theory of the attributes remains problematic in the context of the Spinozian system. We could argue. these arguments appear weak when. recognize the centrality of the univocity of being. have tried to resolve this problem by claiming an evolution in Spinoza's thought: Antonio Negri. in Spinoza's psychology and epistemology. but this explanation is not sufficient on its own. who.86 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE among the attributes. nonetheless. to analyse its . available in Deleuze's work itself. the privileges of thought and the problem of the attributes should be explained as a residue of Cartesianism in Spinoza's thought. from 1661 to 1665 and from 1670 to 1675 (The Savage Anomaly 48). is to subordinate ratio cognoscendi to ratio essendi. to account for the disappearance of the attributes. Marx makes clear the distinction between Forschung and Darstellung. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail. It seems to me that there is an alternative or complementary explanation. for example. Some readers of Spinoza. the problem of privilege continually reappears. which at several points seems to give a real privilege to thought. Negri argues. Deleuze's strategy. and Negri links this fact to historical evidence that Spinoza drafted the Ethics during two distinct periods. that Spinoza's philosophical transformation between these two periods precipitates the rejection of the attributes (59). like Deleuze. To a certain extent. consistently with Deleuze's interpretation. The theory of the attributes remains a problem in Deleuze's Spinoza. The opponent in each case is an intellectualist reading of Spinoza's ontology. argues that the theory of the attributes disappears as Spinoza proceeds from the pantheistic Utopia that characterizes the first phase of his thought. The attributes appear in the Ethics not as a form of being. and the attributes are relatively absent from the latter half of the Ethics. but as a mode of inquiry. I believe. we are merely confusing the form of our research with the nature of being.

" What does it mean to present appropriately the real movement of being? Here it means to present being as it makes itself. This seems to me. Let us turn our attention. Following this logic. after Part II of the Ethics. similarly.6 The True and the Adequate The question of the attributes has touched on Spinoza's epistemology. In fact. the Nietzschean transmutation: the hour of midnight. can be identified with two moments or approaches in Spinoza's work. we have treated Deleuze's . as the model of our speculation. In our research of being. only after the analytical moment has brought to light all the distinctions of the terrain can this same terrain be traversed a second time with a different bearing. then. then. but really it has only scratched the surface. Spinoza's discussion of power carries the developed ontological foundation onto the terrain of practice. as we shift from speculation to practice. in Spinoza's Darstellung. any priority of thought gradually disappears.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 87 different forms of development and to track down their inner connection. which Negri proposes historically. the moment of speculation. as we claimed earlier.102). As we move forward in Spinoza's system of emendation. "can the real movement be appropriately presented. the mind plays the initial role of model. therefore. with a practical attitude. in the moment of speculation. a consistent Deleuzian explanation of the questions of priority. Thought is given a certain priority in this moment. When the moment of research is complete. from speculation to practice? Deleuze's work makes clear that the hinge or the pivot that articulates these two moments is the thematic of power. "Only after this work has been done. the attributes no longer have a role and they drop out of the discussion. In other words. Thus far." Marx says. Only after this work has been done can the real movement be appropriately presented" (Capital. How does Spinoza make this shift from Forschung to Darstellung. The speculative Forschung of power yields to its practical Darstellung. in the process of its constitution.16 The Forscbung of the Ethics. the fundamental passage. 1. It constitutes. Deleuze presents a powerful argument that Spinoza's theory of practice initially privileges the attribute of extension: The body is the model of practice. appropriately presenting the "inner connections" and the "real movement" of being in the process of its own constitution. vol. the two phases of Spinoza's thought. in our practice of being. to Spinoza's development of the thematic of power. relies on the theory of the attributes "to track down the inner connection" of being. the body plays a parallel role. Power 3.

the Cartesian proposition of "clear and distinct" as the condition for truth provides us with a much more promising strategy because it addresses not only the form but also the content of the idea. implies merely a "subsistent exteriority. either formal or material. of being. the mind is a spiritual automaton that produces ideas autonomously. Spinoza searches for an intrinsic definition of the true idea. We will see that Spinoza's discussion of adequacy brings the epistemological debate back to an ontological plane. This basis provides Spinoza with a forceful critique of the traditional correspondence theory of truth that is implied by the epistemological parallelism discussed earlier: The true idea is the idea that agrees or corresponds with its object (res ideata). First. but this nexus reveals not the intellectual character of being. is blind to the production process and thus cannot fulfill Spinoza's initial criterion for the true idea: "The conception of truth as correspondence gives us no definition.) We can already note from this critique of the correspondence theory that an ontological logic provides the foundation for Spinoza's epistemological investigation. however. In epistemology. as we saw in the Bergson study. Now we should turn to Deleuze's positive exposition of Spinozian epistemology. as we have seen. From one of his earliest works." (See Section 1. There is certainly a close relation between truth and being in Spinoza. so too the true idea must be defined through an internal causality. This defense rests primarily on a conception of ontological parallelism that is developed through an extension of the principle of univocity. The content of the clear and distinct idea cannot be a real content because "clear . with reference only to the attribute of thought.1. the extrinsic designation gives a weak conception of truth. The correspondence theory. that is. the Emendation of the Intellect. while the Cartesian proposition does succeed in referring to the content of the idea. The adequate is defined as being: that which envelops and expresses its cause. an extrinsic designation" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 131). but rather the ontological criteria of truth. just as in ontology the external cause provides a weak definition of being. of truth. According to Spinoza. and specifically to Spinoza's proposal that we shift our attention from the true idea to the adequate idea as a more coherent and useful category of speculation. Just as real being is cause of itself and gains its distinction from within. In this context. Deleuze argues. which poses merely a formal agreement.88 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE defense against an intellectualist reading of Spinoza's epistemology. it proposes a purely nominal definition. or the singular production. The external definition. The essential role in the argument is played by an ontological conception of the internal causality. this reference remains superficial as a "representative" content (132). that the conception of clear and distinct is insufficient for a Spinozian theory of truth in three respects.

the form of the clear and distinct idea also remains superficial in the form of a "psychological consciousness" (132). Descartes does not recognize the spiritual automaton "that reproduces reality in producing ideas in their due order" (152). We know that since the mind is a spiritual automaton the proximate cause of any idea is always another idea. Second. the Cartesian strategy does not deal with the causes of ideas. the critiques of the "clear and distinct" strategy all spring from the fact that it attempts to define the true while only referring to the idea itself. but unable to provide a real principle of knowledge" (152-53). Third. and remains unexplained. Third. which is precisely our power to think. Once again. The superficiality in this case is due to the detachment from the formal cause of the idea. the conception of truth as clear and distinct does not give us the terms to answer our fundamental questions: Where does truth come from and what can it do for user. we can recognize Spinoza's ontological approach to truth. modified). the form of the adequate idea is a logical form that is explained by its formal cause (the power to think): "The adequate idea is the idea that expresses its own cause and is explained by our own power" (151). in the focus on causality and production. production. the Cartesian conception does not succeed in posing the unity of the content and the form of the true idea. We can contrast this with the Cartesian theory on all three points just presented. Second. "A clear and distinct idea is still inexpressive. Good enough for recognition. the adequate idea presents its content as the expression of its proximate efficient cause (another idea). The ontological critique of the clear and distinct idea prepares the terms for Spinoza's shift from the true idea to the adequate idea. We can see Spinoza's insistence on replacing the Cartesian clear and distinct with his conception of adequateness as an ontologization . the content and the form of the adequate idea are united in the movement internal to the attribute of thought: "The spiritual automaton. as Nietzsche might ask. is the unity of logical form and expressive content" (153). Deleuze relates this critique to his notion of expression: To be expressive. manifested in the concatenation of ideas. The essential feature of Spinoza's conception of truth is the internal relation of an idea to its cause: "The adequate idea is precisely the idea as expressing its cause" (133. and power. This Cartesian form does not attain the logical form of the idea that would explain the connection and order of ideas one to the other. First. in other words. and thus it cannot explain the process of their production. In short. but the superficiality of representation is precisely its detachment from this cause. Precisely because of its failure to express or explain the true idea by means of its cause.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 89 and distinct" does not recognize or comprehend the efficient cause of that idea. an idea must explain or envelop its cause. Why do we want truth? A Spinozian definition of truth must involve the expression of causality.

in this transformation of the epistemological toward the ethical."17 Adequate ideas are expressive. however. and inadequate ideas are mute. Spinoza. Through the causal chain expressed by the adequate idea. Spinoza's epistemology takes on an ontological character. "Whatever ideas follow in the Mind from ideas that are adequate in the mind are also adequate" (IIP40). giving rise to always greater expression. Spinoza's epistemology. when we necessarily have so many inadequate ones that divert our power and separate us from what we can do?" (148. Before moving on. it is not situated in the dynamic causal mechanism of the spiritual automaton. then. and the principle of power transforms this definition into a project. "Spinoza's ontology is dominated by the notions of a cause of itself. in itself and through itself' (162). the principle of singularity gives us the terms for the definition of the adequate idea. accompanies this claim with a realistic assessment of our condition. From an ontological perspective. Deleuze shows that Spinoza's theory of truth is a theory of "ontological truth. is that through the expression of its causes it increases our power of thought. modified). let us pause for a moment to recognize the importance of ontological parallelism and its relation to the Spinozian concep- . is singular insofar as it envelops and expresses its own cause. the adequate idea as enveloping its cause) and the principle of power (being as productivity. the more we know about the structure and connections of being. we see a combined application of the principle of singularity (an absolutely infinite being as cause of itself. The strategy of the adequate idea makes the question of truth a project of power. The vast majority of the ideas we have are inadequate ideas.90 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE of epistemology. Along with Thomas Mark. through the move from the true to the adequate. the inadequate idea tells us nothing because we cannot recognize its place in the productive structure of thought. in order to increase our power to think. this epistemological discourse quickly transforms into an ethical project. it is obvious how Spinoza would answer the Nietzschean question posed earlier: We want truth. One importance of the adequate idea. a perceptive American commentator. or rather adequacy. Spinoza's revolution in epistemology is to apply these same ontological criteria that define being as singular to the realm of truth. At this point. "Spinoza asks: How do we come to form and produce adequate ideas. and the greater our power to think. however. truth as creation). is dominated by this same focus on causality: Truth. Here. Once the question of power enters the discussion. too. the more adequate ideas we have. like being.18 In other words. the distinctive characteristic of an adequate idea is that it tells us something about the structure and connections of being (or at least the attribute of thought) through a direct expression of its efficient and formal causes. Adequacy is infectious.

on the other hand. applies to all the attributes equally: Just like an adequate action of the mind. how can we approach God (the infinite power to exist and act)? At this point. posing the ethical question in such grand terms is empty and pointless without some specific and concrete means of addressing our goal. however. We can easily pose this ethical goal more generally as the increase of our power to think. however. an initial question of power. parallel to our conception of a clear and distinct idea or a clear and distinct action of the mind. or. The concept of truth presents an interesting test for this theory. of expressing or enveloping the cause. One aspect of the very steep path that Spinoza is leading us on will direct us to proceed from inadequate ideas to adequate ones. their compatibility (or composability). We claimed earlier that if we are to maintain Deleuze's conception of ontological parallelism. it is not easily applicable to the corporeal plane. In fact. from epistemology to physics. with only an epistemological foundation. in the long passage from physics to ethics. "Spinoza does seem to admit that we have to pass through an empirical study of bodies in order to know their relations. and . because fundamentally all of them refer equally to the character or movement of being. We will see. for example. because it is the body that will reveal a model of practice. Spinozian physics is an empirical investigation to try to determine the laws of the interaction of bodies: the encounters of bodies. we have very little idea how this operation is possible. we are still far from being able to embark on an ethical practice. now we have to shift our concentration to the body. and how they are composed" (212). Spinozian adequacy. A further moment of speculation is needed. Since Cartesian truth does not account for movement and production. some conception of a clear and distinct action of the body. Following a Cartesian theory. Spinoza is able to develop the epistemological framework to the point where he can pose an initial ethical question. remains central to the development of Spinoza's argument. then in principle the character or movement of one attribute must in some sense correspond to that of the other attributes.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 91 tion of adequacy. that the criterion of adequacy. an adequate action of the body is expressive in that it explains or envelops its cause. The adequate is that which discloses the productive dynamic of being. their composition and decomposition. since it refers to the nature of being itself and to the genealogy of its production. in theological terms. or more generally still as the increase of our power to exist and act: How can we increase our power to exist. we would be forced to pose. Spinoza uses the mind as the primary model of speculation. 3-7 What a Body Can Do With the conception of adequacy.

we find that the power to be affected is filled by active affections and passive affections. there is an encounter between two dynamic relationships: Either they are indifferent to each other. a new body. it relates only to our power to feel or suffer (puissance depdtir). We said earlier that the power to be . Deleuze is fascinated by a passage in one of the early scholia of Book III: "No one has yet determined what the Body can do. then. destroying it. The importance of this distinction is clear: To the extent that our power to be affected is filled by active affections. This physical universe of bodies at motion and rest. they are incompatible and one body decomposes the relationship of the other. will provide the terrain for our speculation and reveal further distinctions within the body. modified). When two bodies meet. in union and conflict. Deleuze reminds us that the investigation of this structure must be conducted not in terms of the power to act (spontaneity). or they are compatible and together compose a new relationship. A body is not a fixed unit with a stable or static internal structure.. we must decompose the unity of the body according to its lines of articulation. The question of power (what a body can do) is immediately related to the internal structure of the body. a body is a dynamic relationship whose internal structure and external limits are subject to change. but to the extent that it is filled by passive affections. For no one has yet come to know the structure of the Body so accurately that he could explain all its functions" (IIIP2S). the essential logic of the argument refers to expression and production: The active is distinct from the passive in its relation to the cause. the lowest degree of our power to act" (224. This charts the initial direction of our investigation: To understand the nature of power.. Letter 32 to Henry Oldenberg). will provide the context in which we can delve deeper into the functioning and structure of power: "In order to really think in terms of power. "Our force of suffering affirms nothing. rather. distinctions within power. one must first pose the question in relation to the body" (257). On a first level in our model of power. we must first discover the internal structure of the body. but rather in terms of the power to be affected: "A body's structure is the composition of its relation. The horizon of affectivity. allows Spinoza a rich understanding of the interaction among bodies. that is to say.. On the contrary. because it expresses nothing at all: it 'envelops' only our impotence. Spinoza's physics are the cornerstone of his ethics. it relates directly to our power to act. Passive affections really mark our lack of power. or. What a body can do is the nature and the limits of its power to be affected" (218). its differences of nature.92 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE their conflict. just as a poison decomposes the blood (cf. of the continual flux of their internal dynamic. What we identify as a body is merely a temporarily stable relationship (IIP13Def)-19 This proposition of the dynamic nature of bodies. Once again.

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affected demonstrates the plenitude of being in that it is always completely filled with active and passive affections; yet the power to be affected only appears as plenitude from the physical point of view. From the ethical point of view, on the contrary, the power to be affected varies widely according to its composition. To the extent that it is filled with passive affections, it is reduced to its minimum, and to the extent that it is filled with active affections, it is increased to its maximum. "Whence the importance of the ethical question. We do not even know what a body can do, Spinoza says. That is: We do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our power. How could we know this in advance?" (226). This, then, is the first order of business in preparing the terrain for an ethical project: Investigate what affects we are capable of, discover what our body can do. Spinoza's theory of conatus (or striving) marks precisely the intersection of production and affection that is so important to Deleuze: "The variations of conatus as it is determined by this or that affection are the dynamic variations of our power to act" (231). Conatus is the physical instantiation of the ontological principle of power. On one hand, it is the essence of being insofar as being is productive; it is the motor that animates being as the world. To this extent, conatus is Spinoza's continuation of the legacy of Renaissance naturalism: Being is spontaneity, pure activity. On the other hand, however, conatus is also the instantiation of the ontological principle of power in that conatus is a sensibility; it is driven by not only the actions, but also the passions, of the mind and the body (see, for example, IIIP9). It is this rich synthesis of spontaneity and affectivity that marks the continuity between the ontological principle of power and conatus. At this point the ethical project requires a moment of empirical realism. When Spinoza begins to take stock of the state of our body, of our power, he notes that, by necessity, our power to be affected is largely filled by passive affections. God, or Nature, is completely filled with active affections, because there is no cause external to it. However, "the force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes" (IVP3). To the extent that our power is surpassed by the power of Nature as a whole, to the extent that external forces are more powerful than our own forces, we will be filled with passive affections. Now, since passive affections largely constitute our existence, we should focus our investigation on these affections to see if we can make meaningful distinctions among them. Within the domain of extension, passive affections are characterized by encounters between our body and other bodies—encounters that can appear as random because they are not caused by us. The order of passions,

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then, is the order of chance encounters, of thefortutius occursus (238). A simple encounter between two bodies, however, poses an extremely rich and complex scene for analysis, because one body itself is not a fixed unit with a static structure, but rather a dynamic relationship whose internal structure and external limits are open and continually subject to change. As we noted earlier, what Spinoza identifies as a body or an individual is simply a temporarily stable assemblage of coordinated elements (Ethics IIP13Def). An encounter between two bodies, then, will be characterized by the composability or the incomposability of their two relationships. Now, given this dynamic conception of bodies and their interactions, Deleuze proposes two cases of chance encounters that will allow us to distinguish two types of passive affections, and thus descend one more level in our model of power. In the first case, I meet a body whose internal relationship is compatible with the internal relationship of my body, and thus the two bodies together compose a new relationship. We can say, then, that this external body "agrees with my nature" or that it is "good" or "useful" for me. Furthermore, this encounter produces an affection in me that itself agrees with or is good for my nature: It is a joyful encounter in that it increases my power to act. The first case of chance encounter, then, results in a joyful passive affection because it presents a "composable" relationship and thus increases my power to act. In the second case of chance encounter, though, I meet a body whose internal relationship is not compatible with that of my body; this body does not agree with my nature. Either one body will decompose the relationship of the other or both bodies will be decomposed. In either case, the important fact is that there will be no increase of power, because a body cannot gain power from something that does not agree with it. Since this encounter results in a decrease of power, the affection produced by it is sadness. Actual encounters, of course, are more complicated than either of these two limit cases: There may be different degrees of partial compatibility and partial conflict in an encounter, or, further, the affects can combine in a myriad of ways (the sadness of what I hate brings me joy, etc.). These two cases, however, joyful passive affections and sad passive affections, provide us with the limit cases of possible encounters, and thus they allow us to posit a further distinction, describing a second level in our model of power.
power to exist = power to be affected active affections

/

\

passive affections

joyful passive affections

/

\

sad passive affections

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It is once again time for a moment of Spinoza's realism. What is the relative frequency of joyful and sad encounters? In principle, or rather in the abstract, humans agree in nature, and thus human encounters ought to be purely joyful. However, this is only true to the extent that our power to be affected is filled by active affections. "Insofar as men are subject to passions, they cannot be said to agree in nature" (IVP32). Therefore, in reality, humans agree very little with one another, and the large majority of chance encounters are sad. At each point in the investigation of the structure of the body where we have recognized a distinction, we have also recognized that the human condition lies largely on the weak side of the equation: Our power to be affected is filled largely by passive affections rather than active affections; and, further, our passive affections are constituted largely by sad passive affections rather than joyful passive affections. One could easily be disheartened at this point by Spinoza's pessimistic appraisal of the human condition—but that would be to miss the point of the project. The investigation of the internal structure of power and the realistic evaluation of our condition are oriented toward refining the ethical question so that it can provide the basis for an ethical practice; what may appear as pessimism is Spinoza's practical perspective. To appreciate the richness of this approach, consider the typical Nietzschean ethical mandate: Become active. How can such an ethical proposition be transformed into an ethical practice? In other words, through Nietzsche we can clearly recognize the desire, the power (and in this sense the good) of becoming active, but we find no means to follow it through in practice. Spinoza too recognizes ethics as an issue of becoming active, but he delves one step deeper to enrich that ethical perspective. "The ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two parts: How can we come to produce active affections? But first of all: How can we come to experience a maximum of joyful passions? (246). Through the investigation of power, Spinoza has now prepared the terrain for the conversion from speculation to practice that will set his ethics in motion.

Practice
3.8 Common Notions: The Assemblages of Composable Being Through Spinoza's investigation of the structure of power and his realistic estimation of the human condition we have arrived at the limit of speculation. The human condition resides principally in the point of the minimum of power; when we adopt this position, we can adopt too a truly ethical position. This is the end of speculation and the beginning of practice;

thereby increasing our power. presenting the project in negative form. By recognizing similar compositions or relationships among bodies. that in reality most of our passions are sad passions. Just like Nietzsche's ethical mandate "become active. Deleuze attempts another tack. The . is to combat sadness: "The devaluation of sad passions. how our practice can begin with joy. defined its primary structures. What does Spinoza mean by structure? "It is a system of relations between the parts of a body. however disparate they may be" (278). we are producing common notions: "A common notion is always an idea of a similarity of composition in existing modes" (275).96 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE this is the moment of transmutation—the hour of midnight. it is to practice what affirmation itself is to speculation" (272). because the common relationship guarantees a compatibility and the opportunity to compose a new relationship. "By inquiring how these relations vary from one body to another. now. that most chance encounters among bodies are incompatible and destructive. An encounter between our body and this other body will necessarily be joyful. form the practical object of philosophy" (270. We have already noted. Spinozian speculation has illuminated the terrain of power. he claims. Precisely in this way the analysis of bodies allows us to begin a practical project. to give it a more practical thrust: The first practical task of the Ethics. How can we effect this transmutation? Where can we find the impetus to put a practical project in motion? A first hint that Deleuze gives us is that we must shift our focus from affirmation to joy. How can we begin a practice of joy from such a state? The attack on sadness still lacks an initial practical key. we have the criteria necessary for a first ethical selection of joy: We are able to favor compatible encounters (joyful passions) and avoid incompatible encounters (sad passions). see also Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 25-29). is the affirmation of being in the moment of its practical constitution. our increase of power is the affirmative constitution of being itself. Our investigation of the structure or relationships that constitute the body allows us to recognize common relationships that exist between our body and another body. Joy. we must convert this speculative dynamic into a practical project. It is not immediately evident." Deleuze explains. we have a way of directly determining the resemblances between two bodies. "The sense of joy appears as the properly ethical sense. When we make this selection. We should begin instead by looking more closely at Spinoza's physics of bodies: "No one has yet come to know the structure [fabrica] of the Body so accurately that he could explain all its functions" (IIIP2S)." so too a Spinozian mandate such as "become joyful" lacks the mechanism by which to initiate a practical project. and the denunciation of those who cultivate and depend on them. however. in other words. though.

Precisely. are precisely those that are least useful to us. . common notions are ideas that are formally explained by our power to think and that. however. in other words. not a logic of thought: We would do better to locate them as rising up from a Hobbesian . what is common to all bodies. most local. however. The common notion provides us the means to construct for ourselves an adequate idea. The most universal common notions are those that recognize a similarity from a very general point of view: They may involve. On the other hand. is not yet precise enough to be practical. this adequate idea immediately leads to another adequate idea—in this way. in other words. that the common notion discovers an internal logic. These notions are those that represent a similar composition between two bodies that directly agree with each other. between common notions that are more universal and common notions that are less universal. is not yet satisfied that we have presented this initial moment in sufficiently practical terms: "There is. This conception of the production of common notions. such as extension. in what favorable circumstances? How do we arrive at our power to act?" (280-81). here too we must descend to the lowest. level of commonality to initiate our practical project. the least universal common notions are in fact those that immediately present us with the greatest utility.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 97 formation of the common notion constitutes the first step of an ethical practice. These very universal common notions. We can see. "Through such notions we understand agreements between modes: they go beyond an external perception of agreements observed by chance. and rest. that the common notion envelops and explains its cause. or. In other words. a danger that the common notion might appear to intervene like a miracle. motion. we can begin our constructive project to become active. we should be careful to avoid two dangerous interpretative errors. then. how do we form (common notions). Deleuze. We must make a distinction. Just as we continually descended within the internal structure of power. The first adequate idea we can have is the recognition of something in common between two bodies. Deleuze explains. express the idea of God as their efficient cause" (279).. unless we explain how we come to form it. to find in a similarity of composition an internal and necessary reason for an agreement of bodies" (276). especially in the most specific of cases. at the extreme. materially. though. however. When we consider the Spinozian theory of common notions. we should remember that common notions refer principally to a physics of bodies. that the common notion is an adequate idea: "Common notions in general are necessarily adequate. Deleuze warns us. The first error with respect to the common notions would be "overlooking their biological sense in favor of their mathematical sense" (281).. from their own local points of view.

This chance encounter with a compatible body allows us. Common notions are not primarily a speculative form of analysis. "We must then. This speculative presentation regards the commons notions as moving from the most universal (motion. to form a common notion. is adequate" (283). an affection that increases our power. This effort of selection does increase our power. "habemus enim ideam verum" (we have a true idea. from the speculative point of view. The first moment. when we experience a joyful passive affection.) toward the least universal. but never to the point of becoming active: Joyful passions are always the result of an external cause. but a practical tool of constitution. they are introduced precisely in their logical order. they always indicate an inadequate idea. rather than from a Cartesian mathematical universe. while a joyful action arises from an internal cause: "When Spinoza suggests that what agrees with reason may also be born of it. prepares the condition for this leap that provides us with an adequate idea.98 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE material terrain. which Deleuze insists must be kept distinct. The same joy is constituted by a joyful passive affection and a joyful active affection. Here. we are induced to form the idea of what is common to that body and our own" (282). rest. In the first moment. however. How do we make this leap? Hbw do we make an encounter adequate? We know that joy is the experience of an affection that agrees with our nature. Let us look more closely at this second moment. The second interpretative error we might make with respect to the common notions would be "overlooking their practical function in favor of their speculative content" (281). we strive to avoid the sad passions that diminish our power to act and accumulate joyful passions. There are two processes going on here. etc. The practical progression of common notions in Book V is exactly the opposite: We move from the least universal (a specific compatible relationship between two bodies) toward the most universal. to begin the practical progression. For this idea alone. the accumulation of joyful passions. form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own. by the aid of joyful passions. or we have at least one true idea). to recognize a common relationship. This experience of joy is the spark that sets the ethical progression in motion: "When we encounter a body that agrees with our own. we can assume that by chance we experience a compatible encounter. The process begins with the experience of joy. at the "leap" from the joyful passion to the common notion. We can translate the famous epistemological point of departure of Spinoza's Emendation of the Intellect. the only difference is that a joyful passion arises from an external cause. he means that . this common notion. to the realm of bodies and passions: "habemus enim affectionem passam laetam" (we have at least one joyful passive affection). or induces us. When common notions are first introduced in Book II of the Ethics.

the joyful affection ceases to be passive and becomes active: "It is distinct from the passive feeling from which we began. Being can no longer be considered a given arrangement or order. more precisely. of ontological assem- . on being's "productivity" and "producibility. chapter 5. but distinct only in its cause: its cause is no longer an inadequate idea of an object that agrees with us. then. cause of itself. We are suddenly thrown back to the opening definition of the Ethics—"Vet causa sui intelligo . With the establishment of the practical perspective. however. "Common notions are one of the fundamental discoveries of the Ethics" (292. The common notions constitute for Deleuze the "ontological rupture" of Spinoza's thought that marks the completion of the transformation from speculation to practice. This corporeal logic is parallel to the epistemological logic of adequacy that we discussed earlier. constitutes the "leap" to action and adequacy. We should keep in mind. in particular Il4ff. that is. it involves enveloping or comprehending the cause within the encounter itself. This operation of enveloping the cause. see also Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.). . however. "—but now we read it with an entirely different attitude. The practical strategy of the formation of common notions. more powerful body—this assemblage. This process of enveloping or comprehending the cause of an encounter allows Spinoza to claim that "an affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it" (VP3). because the process envelops the cause within the new body itself. This process of enveloping the cause. The new encounter is adequate (and active) because it expresses its own cause. is not merely a chance composition but an ontological constitution. the expression of the causal chain of being. here being is the assemblage of composable relationships. Spinoza has provided a radically new vision of ontology.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 99 from every passive joy there may arise an active joy distinguished from it only by its cause" (274-75). . still remains obscure until we recognize that a joyful passion presents us necessarily with a situation of commonality: A joyful passion can only arise from an external body that is composed of a relationship common to our body." The common notion is the assemblage of two composable relationships to create a new. When our mind forms an idea of the common relationship shared between this body and our body (a common notion). or. but the necessarily adequate idea of what is common to that object and ourselves" (284). however. has acquired a new. a new. that is. more powerful relationship. that the essential element for ontological constitution remains the Spinozian focus on causality. The passage from passive joy to active joy involves substituting an internal cause for an external cause. The essential characteristic of Spinozian ontological constitution is adequacy. it expresses the common relationship between two bodies. practical meaning. Causa sui.

they also construct a theory of ideas that is parallel to the theory of bodies. This constitutive epistemology that we find in the beginning of Part V of the Ethics is radically different from the given. Practice is moving upward. preformed epistemology presented in Part II. The driving motor that animates this entire operation is conatus: When Spinozian physics is transported to an ethical plane. we no longer see simply bodies in motion and rest. become adequate. become being. The Spinozian path to beatitude is an apprenticeship in power. an education in virtue. from passions to actions. constructing the relations of being from below. but rather we find bodies infused with desire. when Spinoza poses "becoming active" as a goal. . However. active affections (common notions) passive affections 4— joyful passive affections t / sad passive affections \ Speculation has mapped the terrain of power. has forged the ontological investigation into an ethical project: Become active. and now practice is inhabiting that terrain. we are discovering the path of the increase of our power. breathing life into its internal structure. Constitutive practice defines the productive series: joyful passive affections -» common notions -»active affections. and this difference is due in large part to the conversion from speculation to practice accomplished on the corporeal plane in Parts III and IV: In Part Two of the Ethics Spinoza considers the speculative content of common notions. while the common notions set off from a corporeal domain. We should continually keep in mind that this path of corporeal and spiritual emendation is not simply presented as a vague ethical mandate. in our becoming active: we should not overlook the importance in Spinozism of the problem of an educational process" (288).100 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE blages. supposed given. Spinozian practice is beginning to climb up the same ladder that the analysis of Spinozian speculation has constructed moving downward. As we move from sadness to joy. "There is a whole learning process involved in common notions. 3. . .9 The Constitution of Reason Spinozian practice always begins with the body as model. he supposes them given or potentially given. At the opening of Part Five he analyzes the practical function of common notions. this function consists in the common notion . he also presents the practical means of attaining this goal.

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being the cause of an adequate idea of an affection, that is, of an active joy (286)

The two epistemological arguments share the same categories and terminology, but they approach the topic from different perspectives, with different attitudes. In Part II, in the speculative moment, Spinoza laid out the mathematical and logical order of the three different kinds of ideas, but in Part V Spinoza's practical perspective puts this epistemological order in motion. The common notion, recognized now as a constructive agent, as an assemblage, is the mechanism by which the mind moves from a passion to an action, from an inadequate idea to an adequate idea, from imagination to reason. The formation of common notions is the practical constitution of reason. The theory that epistemology can be constituted in practice rests on a notion of the materiality of the intellect that solidly locates Spinozian thought both philosophically in the materialist tradition and historically in the age of the birth of modern industry. An early passage from the Emendation of the Intellect discussing the method of improving our minds illustrates these connections very clearly:
Matters here stand as they do with corporeal tools. . . . Just as men, in the beginning, were able to make the easiest things with the tools they were born with (however laboriously and imperfectly), and once these had been made, made other, more difficult things with less labor and more perfectly, and so, proceeding gradually from the simplest works to tools, and from tools to other works and tools, reached the point where they accomplished so many and so difficult things with little labor, in the same way the intellect, by its inborn power, makes intellectual tools for itself, by which it works still other tools, or the power of searching further, and so proceeds by stages, until it reaches the pinnacle of wisdom. (Emendation of the Intellect 30-31)

The mind forges the common notion from inadequate ideas, just as the body forges a hammer from iron. The common notion serves as a practical tool in our effort toward the pinnacle of wisdom. This practical and material perspective provides a new foundation and a new dynamic of movement for Spinoza's system of the different kinds of knowledge: the first kind (imagination, opinion, and revelation), the second kind (reason), and the third kind (intuition). Spinoza directs us to analyze the lowest kind of knowledge in the same way that he insisted we focus on the passions. First, he operates a devaluation: "Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity, whereas knowledge of the second and of the third kind is necessarily true" (Ethics IIP41). However, just as we have seen with regard to the passions, once Spinoza operates this devalu-

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ation he also adopts a realistic attitude and claims that the vast majority of our ideas reside in the first kind of knowledge. Those philosophers who persuade themselves that humans can live strictly by the dictates of reason, Spinoza is fond of saying, end up simply cursing and bemoaning, rather than understanding, human nature. We cannot simply exclude or negate the first kind of knowledge, but rather we must use it as our point of departure. The practical project of epistemology, then, is the movement from the first to the second and third kinds of knowledge. At this point, Spinoza can reassess the value of the first kind of knowledge with a different attitude: Even though it is the only source of falsity, the first kind of knowledge is nonetheless composed of ideas that may be true. This revalorization does not yet give us a practical point of departure. At this point, just as we have recognized the distinction between joyful passions and sad passions, we must discover a relevant distinction within the first kind of knowledge. What imagination, opinion, and revelation have in common is that in each an idea is characterized by signs rather than by expression; in other words, an idea of the first kind depends on an external rather than an jnternal cause, and is thus inadequate. However, unlike the other two forms, imagination arises from the chance encounters between bodies: "This knowledge is obtained through Vague experience' [experientia vaga], and Vague' relates, etymologically, to the accidental character of encounters" (289). Spinozian imagination is a material imagination in that it provides the possibility of reading the commonality and conflict in the encounters among bodies. Since it operates on the material plane, where constitutive relationships are possible, the imagination presents us with indicative signs. On this terrain, the analysis can open up to the consideration of common notions and composable relationships. On the other hand, the other two forms of the first kind of knowledge, opinion and revelation, present no corporeal encounter, but merely opaque mandates: They merely provide us with imperative signs. The causes of these ideas remain obscure to us, and thus they cannot indicate the real genealogy of their formation, their real productive structure. Therefore, while all of the ideas of the first kind may be true, the imagination is distinguished from opinion and revelation because an idea that arises from the material field of imagination gives indications of its cause. In other words, since the imagination presents us with corporeal relationships, it is open to the laws of composability. The imagination not only may be true, but, through the indication of its cause, it may be adequate. The common notion demonstrates the practical force of this distinction and puts it in motion. "If we consider their origin, common notions find in imagination the very conditions of their formation. If we consider their practical function, moreover, they apply only to things that can be imag-

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ined" (294). Common notions, as assemblages, are the practical pivot; they are building blocks that arise on the terrain of the imagination to constitute reason. The production of common notions shows that there is what Deleuze calls a "curious harmony" between the imagination and reason. Through the common notion, imagination and reason are linked on a continuum as different stages or planes in the process of intellectual constitution. However, there remains a real difference between them. The imagination begins by affirming the presence of an object, but no matter how strong or intense an imagination may be, we continue to regard the imagined object as present in a possible or contingent way. The specific property of reason is to consider things as necessary. The common notion, then, transforms the fluctuation and contingency of imagination into the permanence and consistency of reason: "An affect which arises from reason is necessarily related to the common properties of things, which we always regard as present . . . and which we always imagine in the same way" (VP7Dem, emphasis mine). Here reason is presented as an intensified imagination that has gained the power to sustain its imagining by means of the construction of the common notion. "Necessity, presence and frequency are the three characteristics of common notions" (296). Reason is the imagination that returns, the refrain. Earlier, we found that the central difference between the joyful passive affection and the joyful active affection is the external cause of the former and the internal cause of the later. The common notion operates the transformation, maintaining the affection while enveloping or comprehending the cause. Here, in the epistemological domain, we are presented with a corresponding framework of constitution through assemblage. The imagination, like the joyful passion, is the condition that allows us to begin the process. The central difference between the imagination and reason is the contingency of the former and the necessity of the latter. The common notion operates the transformation that makes the imagination permanent; it is the passage to reason. Therefore, we can plot an epistemological construction parallel to our earlier diagram of the structure of the affects. A constitutive epistemological practice is defined by the series: imagination -» common notion -» reason.
second kind of knowledge (common notion) first kind of knowledge ^— imagination opinion and revelation

The keystone of Spinoza's revolution in epistemology is his conception of

reason was defined in a Cartesian. and thus the production of reason was completely obscure. One of the most important contributions of Deleuze's interpretation is to discover and clarify these two related moments in Spinoza's thought: speculation and practice. Spinoza leads us toward a real constitution of being in corporeal and epistemological terms. in certain regards. contingency and necessity. The imagination provides a real (if fluctuating and contingent) indication of the state of bodies and relationships that are present. The crux of the issue. we may be tempted to say that the positions presented by Althusser and Deleuze are finally not so distant because. Remark: Theoretical Practice and Practical Constitution Now that we have articulated the basic elements of Deleuze's conception of practice in Spinozian philosophy. Therefore. from a practical perspective. but rather they are plateaus linked together on a productive continuum by the process of constitution. Spinoza demystifies reason. The operation of the common notion makes clear that the Spinozian process of constitution is not at all dialectical. imagination and reason are not exclusive and opposing couples. Althusser presents a similar relationship between theory and practice. we find an important distinction between the different forms of the first kind of knowledge and a valorization of the imagination. The common notion intervenes with the capacity to make our imagining permanent and necessary: The assemblage does not negate the imagination. We have seen that Deleuze reads Spinoza as an extended drama dealing with the form of this relationship: In the first sections of the Ethics. the only strategy could be its negation. we can return to Althusser and reconsider the strength of the phenomenological critique we posed earlier. preserving it with greater intensity and substance. could play no positive role in a project for truth. Now. On this specific point. Spinoza investigates being from a speculative perspective and discovers the fundamental ontological principles. the source of all error. Reason was a given system of necessary truth. In the speculative argument of Part II.104 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE the role of the common notion as the link between imagination and reason. later. in the practical moment of Spinoza's thought. but instead carries it to the plane of reason. The progressive movement to a further stage is not accomplished through the negation of the present stage. but rather through its composition. First we find that theory draws from practice: "Posing and resolving our theoretical problem ultimately consists in theoretically expressing the 'so- . In this context. the first kind of knowledge. mathematical spirit. is the relationship between speculation (or theory) and practice. from the perspective of our study.

no revolutionary practice. Althusser's extension of Lenin involves an important modification. Althusser's analysis always tends to focus on "theoretical practice" as the central political form. presenting the "inner connections" and the "real movement" of being in the process of its own constitution. but a synthesis that always maintains the priority of theory. . Thus. there are other forms of practice. recuperated. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 105 lution. of course. Although. The relation between theory and practice in Lenin's motto could be read as a relationship of equality. as the essence of practice. we have also developed a certain interdependent relationship between theory and practice. This is best expressed by one of Althusser's favorite quotations from Lenin: "Without theory. in his work. The interrelation between theory and practice in Althusser always concedes. Deleuze gives a slightly different. practice is dependent on theory. using this image of relays. with a practical attitude (as Darstellung). no revolutionary practice": Without theory there is no terrain on which practice can arise. no revolutionary practice" (166). just as inversely. this same terrain is traversed a second time in a different direction. The October Revolution gives Althusser a concrete example: "The practice of the Bolshevik Party was based on the dialectic in Capital. the archetype of practice. how Althusser interprets Lenin's motto: " 'Without theory. a practice is necessary for piercing this wall" ("Intellectuals and Power" 206). but always present. as a series of relays between theory and practice: "Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another. The primacy given to theory here allows Althusser to subsume practice within theory itself. there is no terrain for theory. with a different bearing. Each provides the conditions for the existence and development of the other. a priority to theory. practice is continually undermined.' Generalizing it: theory is essential to practice" (For Marx 166). "Without theory. on Marxist 'theory'" (175). we find a fundamental difference that is often masked. Inversely. for example. we can give a Deleuzian reading to Lenin's insight. Consider. at Althusser's conception of the relationship between theory and practice. Ontological speculation prepares the terrain for a constitutive practice. after ontological speculation (as Forschung) has brought to light the distinctions of the terrain. Reading Deleuze's Spinoza. or rather. Theoretical practice is a synthesis of theory and practice. but Althusser poses theory as primary. that Marxist practice has given" (For Marx 165. in the final instance. without practice.' existing in the practical state. modified). When we look more closely. however. subsumed. In an interview with Michel Foucault. theory is a relay from one practice to another. but I think compatible explanation of this relationship.

he gives a (new?) definition of the theory-practice relationship. (See Sections 3.) Let us propose. in contrast." which represented the culminating point of this theoreticist tendency (147). and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion. "The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking. On this basis. Philosophy is "politics in theory. We should keep in mind. Deleuze's view of the relationship between theory and practice. political power. however.5. The common relationship we are pointing to is the autonomy and equality of the terms in each ." of any privileging of thought. years later. he sees the need to revise his "theory of theoretical practice. of course. similarly. in the spirit of self-criticism. We have to read this sentence very carefully. Here. he does not substantially modify this essential relation between theory and practice. as always. he reframes the discussion of theory and practice in terms of philosophy His error was to misjudge philosophy—in overestimating philosophy theoretically. In Deleuze there is no synthesis of theory and practice. Althusser claims to want to correct the "theoreticist" error (Essays in Self-Criticism 105. to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else)" (Ethics IIIP2). as a first approximation. He must extend his understanding of philosophy to appreciate its practical. the practical constitution of being involves both the mind and the body. he underestimated it politically. more specifically. with no direct causal relationship and no priority between the two. 142) that skewed his analysis. emphasizes that the two activities remain autonomous and equal in principle. Deleuze poses the primary condition for a materialist philosophy as the critique of any "theoreticist tendency. that there is not an identity between the two couples mind/body and theory/ practice: Our speculation investigates the principles of being equally in the domain of thought and that of extension. as those who correctly accused me of not 'bringing in' the class struggle were quick to point out" (150). his argument serves instead to reinforce that same position. that theory relates to practice as the activity of the mind relates to the activity of the body.106 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE Even when. Social practice is present. in the last instance. Althusser has been criticized (correctly) for not having given sufficient importance to the class struggle as a force of political practice. and no priority of one over the other. I underestimated it politically." or. Althusser is addressing this position as a problem. Accepting this critique. "philosophy is. Althusser is very subtle in his self-criticism. class struggle in theory" (150). When he seems to be modifying a past position. then. We have shown at great length that. 128. The displacement of the problem to philosophy allows Althusser to subsume practice within theory once again as a secondary and dependent element. but only insofar as it is within theory. in effect.4 and 3. specifically. His self-criticism of the theory of theoretical practice functions in exactly this way: "In theoretically overestimating philosophy. and.

in contrast to Deleuze. but instead we must search for an accumulation of desires. Finally. . With his conception of a practice of common notions. nonteleological forms as original. The central project of materialist philosophy. It might even make sense in this context to speak of a theoretical automaton and a practical automaton as expressions that equally refer back to the power of being. dictated from above. imaginations. This practical practice cannot be subsumed within the unfolding of spirit in its progressive instantiations. The movement of a Hegelian practice is always recuperated within the logic of order. is a large step toward discovering the power of social practice. Deleuze can imagine the relationship as a series of relays. The articulation of the practical function of the common notion in Spinoza. should be read above all as polemical positions. Deleuze might say. These arguments for autonomy. when we pose the question of a foundation or cause of a practical act. to try to discover what it can do. for the common notions that transformed the joyful passions of the revolutionary encounter into actions. Once again. Althusser remains too Hegelian in the continual reemergence of the priority of theory and the continual subsumption of practice within the theoretical domain. this proposition of the relative autonomy of a constitutive practice should be read as a polemical position. Just as Spinoza said of the body. so too our Deleuzian claim of the autonomy of practice is a reaction to conceptions of a primacy of theory that effectively subsume practice within theory. unforeseeable. such as Marx's use of the dialectic in Capital. In this sense. Just as Spinoza's claim of the autonomy of the attributes is an attack against the Cartesian primacy of thought. as an attempt to bring practice out from the shadow of theory and recognize its full force. bring practice out from the shadow of theory. we need to search. and powers that coincide and become necessary in the event. creative structures. against the theoretical framework that effectively subsumes the body within the order of the mind. no one has yet determined what practice can do. in other words.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 107 couple. that accumulates its elements from below in open. such as the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection. The logic of constitution reveals a progression that marches to a different beat. in all its autonomy and dignity. For example. we cannot look to a theoretical reason that determined it. whereas a Deleuzian practice rises from below through an open logic of organization. to challenge the notion of interrelation as subsumption: Bring the body out from the shadow of the mind. in its many historical guises. a materialist practice of constitution that refuses to be recuperated within the movement of theory. Deleuze has completely removed himself from the Hegelian terrain. however. is precisely to combat this proposition of priority. however.

Deleuze has posed the common notion and its process of assemblage as part of an ethical project (becoming active. every element of Spinozian society must be constituted internally with the elements at hand. as we have seen on several occasions. The ancients defined natural law in terms of perfection. as its model. Just as no one is born rational. and the question of the power of the body served as its primary terrain. is greatly different from the natural law of the ancients.10 The Art of Organization: Toward a Political Assemblage Politics arises in Spinoza as a question of bodies. is also its 'natural right' " (257). The productivity of being itself is the motor that animates the entire discourse on right. so too no one is born citizen. always rejects the final cause for the efficient cause: "The law of nature is no longer referred to a final perfection but to the initial desire. along with that of Hobbes. one must pose the question in relation to the body" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 257). on the basis of . they conceived of nature as oriented toward its ends. It is the ontological assemblage whereby the chance joyful encounter is made adequate. Spinoza. or rather. toward a final cause. We start with a devalorization. To understand this proposition of natural right we have to recognize that Spinoza's ontological logic of assemblage and constitution guides the reasoning here: organization versus order. From the beginning. Since no order is predetermined. We have seen that Deleuze's interpretation of the common notions in terms of the logic of assemblage has brought to light the real constitutive force of Spinozian practice: A passive affection constitutes an active affection. Spinoza insists that we begin our political thought from the lowest level of our power. which should by now be very familiar. by the constituent subjects (be they ignorant or learned). from the lowest point of social organization. The common notion is an ontological mechanism that forges being out of becoming. Let us take a moment to work through this constitutive procedure.108 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 3. what is a political assemblage? Spinoza is able to pose political questions directly in ontological terms by constructing a passage through the juridical domain. to the strongest 'appetite' " (259). but how can we recognize this process in properly political terms? What is the Spinozian process of political constitution. Spinoza's theory of natural right. necessity out of chance. the joyful encounter returns. Just as we have seen on other terrains. The theory of power and bodies is brought closer to political practice in the form of a theory of right: "All that a body can do (its power). with a typically Machiavellian ritorno aiprincipi. "In order to really think in terms of power. The introduction of the ontological principle of power was the key that opened the field of Spinozian practice for Deleuze. becoming adequate. imagination constitutes reason. becoming joyful).

"There could be only one way to make the state of nature livable: by striving to organize its encounters" (260-61). more accurately. The society described by the state of nature itself. then. the increase of our power involves the organization of composable relationships: "If two come together and unite their strength. It is here that the Ethics takes the body as model. then. or. not rules of duty" (268). in this condition. however. And we know that the human condition is characterized predominantly by our weakness. This ethical perseverance is the open expression of multiplicity. I experience chance encounters with other bodies that. the freedom of society in anarchy. Spinoza's conception of natural right.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 109 the existing affections (be they passions or actions). here we must discover a passage for the increase of our power from natural right to civil right. as we have seen. the freedom of multiplicity. and thus any conception of duty or morality must be secondary and dependent on the assertion of our power. that our power to be affected is filled largely by passions. but rather it poses a dynamic between the limit and what we can do—each time we reach an extreme point. than either of them alone. "True natural laws are norms of power. In the state of nature thus conceived. When Spinoza insists that our natural right is coextensive with our power. it is the state of nature infused with the project of the increase of our power. is . The expression of power free from any moral order is the primary ethical principle of society. is also an affirmation of our freedom. Therefore. In a sense every being. The civil state is the state of nature made livable. each moment. this means that no social order can be imposed by any transcendent elements. presents us with an unlivable condition. pushes to the utmost what it can do" (269). more precisely. poses the freedom from order. Just as previously we have moved from passive affections to active affections and from imagination to reason. but also those passive affections are mostly sad. however. the present order. and the more there be that join in alliance. what we can do rises up to move beyond. or. This devalorization. our material conatus moving in the world to express our power beyond the given limits of the present arrangement. And. have very little in common with my own. The heart of Spinozian politics. for every body extends its power as far as it can. "Pushing to the utmost what one can do [aller jusqu'au bout de ce qu'on peut] is the properly ethical task. The ethical task highlights our perseverance. This ethical formulation does not primarily place the accent on the limitation (le bout) of our power. it presents us with the minimum point of our power. not only is my power to be affected filled predominantly by passive affections. they have jointly more power. and consequently more right over nature. the more right they will collectively possess" (Political Treatise 11:13). since we are predominantly determined by passions. anything outside of the immanent field of forces.

the intellectual constitution of community. but in its dynamic of increasing power it attains a plane of consistency. then. And it is absolutely controlled by he who through common consent manages the affairs of the republic. but rather it is preserved and intensified. an extension of Deleuze's ontological theory of common notions. it is "this art of organizing encounters" (262). which is defined by the power of the multitude. must be equalled and complemented by a corporeal constitution of community. then the State is called a democracy" (Political Treatise 11:17). inadequate. we must be able to recognize a similar passage in the realm of extension. is founded on the "art of organizing encounters" (262). develops through the common notion. The multitude is multiplicity made powerful.110 SPINOZIAN PRACTICE oriented toward the organization of social encounters so as to encourage useful and composable relationships. And the rule of the multitude is democracy: "This right. then. just like the passage from imagination to reason. the practical passage from the joyful passive affection to the active affection.. just as imagination is fortified in reason.20 The multitude remains contingent in that it is always open to antagonism and conflict. is generally called a State. as it is in dialectical conceptions of society.. adequate. . If this charge belongs to a council composed of the general multitude. In other words. and joyful encounters. This vision of the freedom and organization of social encounters is. just as on the basis of inadequate ideas (imagination) the intellectual common notion constitutes adequate ideas (reason). In the passage of freedom. is given material form in the multitude. the adequate social body. In this transformation the multiplicity of society is forged into a multitude. the freedom of multiplicity becomes the freedom of the multitude. in effect. Natural right is not negated in the passage to civil right. from multiplicity to multitude. Pushed to its conceptual limits. we have seen how the common notion is the mechanism by which practice constitutes an order of knowledge. The corporeal common notion. if we are to pursue Deleuze's interpretation of parallelism consistently. Spinoza's conception of civil right. the absolute rule of the multitude through the equality of its constituent members. and predominantly sad encounters of social bodies into coherent.. Now. it has the capacity to pose social normativity as civil right. Spinoza composes and intensifies anarchy in democracy. the theory of ontological parallelism tells us that if we can identify such a practical passage in the realm of thought. On the epistemological plane. ontological parallelism means that the constitution of knowledge. Spinozian democracy. complements the first notion of freedom with a second: from the freedom from order to the freedom of organization. we have to discover a corporeal common notion that serves to organize the chance.

In effect. the process of political assemblage. the point at which theory runs into a wall. . Only social practice can break through this wall. the process of the formation of the multitude. but the central element. risks appearing obscure and mysterious until we flesh out its concrete constitutive mechanisms. is the limit of Deleuze's analysis in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. this is the limit of a "theory" of democracy. This.SPINOZIAN PRACTICE 111 These outlines of Spinozian freedom and democracy provide us with a general political orientation. by giving body to the process of political assemblage. however.

and constitution. Nietzsche. affirmation. making it adequate to his concerns. I have fleshed out a cluster of four themes that coalesce in my mind as the core of this endeavor: ontology. for his apprenticeship in philosophy. In the process. Deleuze's work. he both makes the history of philosophy his own and makes it new. It is true that part of my interest in this study has been to demonstrate through Deleuze's work that the history of metaphysics is not dead. an emerging generation is being schooled in Deleuze's thought. my own apprenticeship in philosophy. I have tried to make his work my own. In this way. practice. merely an exercise in the history of philosophy. that it contains powerful and radical alternatives still very alive in the contemporary problems we face. developing a new taste for philosophy. In this study I have tried to read Deleuze's work using his method of selection and transformation in order to pursue my own education. however. however. 4.Chapter 4 Conclusion An Apprenticeship in Philosophy We have navigated through Deleuze's early work to discern a powerful line of development.1 Ontology Deleuze's ontology is grounded in the conceptions of difference and sin112 . does not stop with a revalorization of this alternative tradition: He selects what is living and transforms it. This is not. a progressive evolution: Bergson. These philosophers form a foundation for Deleuze's thought in that they provide the material for his own education. Spinoza. Today.

however. this logic points to the tradition of causal arguments. Expression is the opening of being that makes clear its internal causal structure. which rests on an "abstract" conception of causality: abstract in the sense that the negative movement of contradictions poses a cause that is absolutely external to its effect. the positivity of being is characterized by its singularity and its univocal expression. above all. Bergson's difference. is too crude a notion to capture the nuances that mark real differences. The ontological movement of the Mechanicists rests on a crude conception of the material cause that risks posing being as purely contingent. Opposition. which relies not on a material cause.CONCLUSION 113 gularity that he discovers in Bergson and Spinoza. is defined by a notion of efficient causality. real distinction is carried into the absolute. Just as being is cause of itself and thus supported by an internal causal structure. The expression of this internal difference is precisely the movement of being." On the other hand. but how it moves. Spinozian being is remarkable. Bergsonian difference must first be distinguished from the difference of the Mechanicists. The singularity of Spinoza's being is not defined by its difference from an other. Bergsonian difference defines. ontological movement is freed from any play of negations and is posed instead as absolutely positive. Bergsonian difference must be distinguished above all from Hegelian difference. who pose an empirical evolution in which each determination is caused by a material "other" through an accidental relation. being is singular. The singular and univocal expression of being is. Bergsonian difference must be distinguished from Platonic difference. The Platonic ontological movement is equally external in that it is determined by its end. This focus on ontological movement can easily be situated in the context of traditional philosophical discussions on the nature of causality. so too being is different in itself and thus sustained through a notion of internal or efficient difference. Once again. In other words. it hangs loosely on reality like baggy clothes. in the Spinozian . that is. as a "subsistent exteriority. It becomes capable of expressing the difference in being and consequently it brings about the restructuring of other distinctions" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 39). by its finality. "Dissociated from any numerical distinction. as an internal differentiation. In the Spinozian context. Bergson does not ask what being is. but a final cause. from nonbeing. The movement of being is a progression of internal differences in that the cause always inheres within its effect. the temporal principle of ontological articulation and differentiation. Finally. in contrast to all these versions. and thus the expression of singular being cannot but be univocal: Being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice. but rather by the fact that being is different in itself. its genealogy. it is different without any external reference. the principle of the positive movement of being. In this way. Deleuze claims.

the efficient causal genealogy that rises from within. but also an exaltation of being with respect to both realms. however. we could say that Deleuze has displaced the center of ontological speculation from "omnis determinatio est negatio" to "non opposita sed diversa"—from negation to difference." for example. In comparison. Real being is singular and univocal. Deleuze's ontology requires a materialist perspective because any priority accorded to thought would weaken the internal structure of being. but rather to establish an equality between the two realms. Deleuze's being is logically prior to. then. the positive difference that marks its singularity. thought and extension equally. it strikes at the movement of the entire dialectical system. pure and empty" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 183). and. As we know from Scholastic arguments about the "productivity" and "producibility" of being—its aptitudes to produce and to be produced—a thing cannot be the necessary cause of something outside itself. In Spinozian shorthand. Materialism must be understood here as a polemical position that combats any priority afforded to thought over matter. more important. the highest possible affirmation of being. Any term such as being-in-the-world would have no sense in Deleuze's ontol- . there is no separation between being and nature. (See Etienne Gilson. the being that must look to negation for its foundation. Only materialism can adequately grasp this understanding of being. Deleuze refuses any idealistic conception that in some way subordinates being to thought. to mind over body. In essence. This logical priority. the progression from pure being to determinate being.) The dignity of being is precisely its power. not in order to invert that relationship and give matter the same privilege.114 CONCLUSION context. Hegelian being can manage neither a real unity nor a real multiplicity—it is abstract in the sense that it can grasp neither its power to produce nor its power to be produced. it is different in itself. its internal production—that is. and comprehensive of. is no being at all. "is merely 'thought' being. "The being of Hegelian logic. Materialism. and an effect cannot have more perfection or reality than its cause. There should be no doubt at this point that this Deleuzian conception of ontology is radically distinct from the Hegelian andHeideggerian conceptions. Deleuze appeals to the precritical world of Spinoza and the Scholastics to demonstrate the weakness of Hegelian ontology The being that must seek an external support for its difference. La philosophic au Moyen Age 595. particularly with regard to its positivity and its materialism. And this proposition casts our thought on the highest plane of ontological speculation. This strategy strikes at the very first moves of Hegel's logic. From this efficient difference at the heart of being flows the real multiplicity of the world. does not mean that being exists at a distance from the actual world. is not only a refusal of the subordination of the corporeal to the mental world.

Deleuzian affirmation does indeed contest the Hegelian form of negation and critique. thoroughgoing critique that pushes the forces of negation to their limit. nondialectical character of the negative moment. then. Subjects of Desire 183-84. This is the way in which Nietzsche "completes" the Kantian project. (See. In other words. so too the concept of affirmation has been misunderstood and ridiculed by the Hegelian tradition. then. it is based on a total. it is always fully expressed in body and thought. Only a materialist approach can adequately account for both this superficiality and this plenitude. for example. A first lesson we can draw from Deleuze's philosophy. rather it highlights the nuances that form alternative conceptions of negation and critique more adequate to his project. On the contrary. as a naive and irresponsible optimism. . and hence our power to act and our power to be affected. A positive.) Contemporary Hegelians continue this vein of criticism when they claim that philosophies of affirmation remain impotent because they have deprived themselves of the power of negation. materialist ontology is above all an ontology of power. 4. but rather we can pursue the materialist ontological tradition as an alternative. is not opposed to critique. Affirmation is intimately tied to antagonism. One of the advantages of choosing this alternative is that it allows us to bring out the productivity and producibility of nature.2 Affirmation Like the notion of positive ontology.f>ars construens.pars destruens. according to Deleuze. In effect. Affirmation. The form of the Deleuzian critique harks back to the Scholastic philosophical method-. or even anticritical. see also my "La renaissance hegelienne americaine et I'inte'riorisation du conflit" 134-38). Reason and Revolution viiff. The great thinkers of the Frankfurt School. thinking.CONCLUSION 115 ogy because being is always already actual. they have lost the "magic" of the labor of the negative (Judith Butler. have conceived of affirmation as a passive acceptance of the contemporary state of affairs. for example. is that what some suppose to be the masterline of metaphysical speculation—from Plato to Hegel and Heidegger—does not have a monopoly on ontological thought. but it does not reject negation and critique tout court. Here we are once again faced with a nuance or an alternative that is misunderstood as a polar opposition. to contest the claims of an idealist ontology we do not need to go all the way to the opposite and propose a deontological perspective. The key to this alternative conception is the absolute. Herbert Marcuse. He brings out the coherence of an alternative tradition—from Lucretius and Duns Scotus to Spinoza and Bergson—that is equally rich and varied. Affirmation is thus conceived as uncritical.

but simply that what is negated is attacked with unrestrained force. a transmutation. In itself. The negation that forms the core of the total critique is nondialectical precisely because it refuses the conservative attitude of the dialectic: It does not recuperate the essence of its enemy. it is a mise en cause of the entire contemporary horizon. "One of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 1). it is an unrestrained attack on the established values and the ruling powers they support. The transcendental reserve shields the essential order from any radical destruction or restructuring. an act of love. but in this case the affirmation is already prefigured in the negation—it is merely a repetition of the same.116 CONCLUSION The Kantian critique must remain partial and incomplete because it guards the suprasensible as a privileged terrain. but rather a pure and uncompromising antagonism. The total critique is always insurrectional. it does not "preserve and maintain what is superseded" (Phenomenology of Spirit §188). Deleuze's affirmative philosophy does not refuse or ignore the power of the negative. This is a spiraling affirmation that feeds on its own power. There is thus no magical resurrection of the other within the same. this negation involves no preservation. The slave logic of the dialectic tries to pull an affirmation out of the supersession of the negation. This is not to say that all that is present is negated. The destruction without reserve creates the space for free and original creative forces. to unleash them across the unlimited horizon so that all values of the established order would be at risk. engenders a true affirmation that stands on a separate footing. It should be clear that this Deleuzian affirmation is not a mere acceptance of what is. "the 'yes' that responds to 'yes'" ("Mystere d'Ariane" 151). is merely the caricature of affirmation. looks only to its own power. then. eternally I am your affirmation" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 187). the affirmation of affirmation itself. protecting it from the destructive forces of the critique: Kant can treat claims to truth and morality without endangering truth and morality themselves. but rather points toward a different concept of negation—a negation that opens the field of affirmation. The yes of the ass. only . in contrast. the affirmation that returns: affirmation raised to the nth power. Ariadne's affirmation of being is an ethical act. but only Ariadne can affirm affirmation itself: "Eternal affirmation of being. then. The subsequent affirmation. but rather a real rupture. The love of Ariadne for Dionysus is perhaps the ultimate expression of this affirmation in Nietzsche's work. Dionysus is the god of affirmation. Ariadne's affirmation is a double affirmation. The master logic. On the contrary. Nietzsche wants to give the critical forces free reign. the yes of the one who does not know how to say no.

In Spinoza. however. joy is properly the moment that creates the being to come. but must find an avenue to enter the field of practice. power linked to what it can do and power separated from what it can do. Deleuze discerns a distinction between two qualities of power. that is. but to release. This is how ethics realizes its full constructive force. The concept of affirmation allows Deleuze to transport the power of his ontology to the terrain of sense and value.. as a practical constitution of being. A philosophy of pure affirmation. on its "productivity" and "producibility. In effect. then. Much of Deleuze's work is concerned with the problem of practice: How can we set the creative forces in motion? How can we make philosophy truly practical? Deleuze finds the key in the investigation of power.. in other words. but to create new values which are those of life. the expression of an unrestrained negation. must be complemented by the joy of practice. it is to practice what affirmation itself is to speculation. The affirmation of speculation. is liberating—it makes one lighter. to take on the burden of what is. already occupies an essential position. for the active production of being. Ethics here is precisely a line of conduct. Affirmation by itself. the Ethics is also a philosophy of the joy corresponding to such affirmation" (Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza 272). which make life light and active" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 185). To affirm is to unburden: not to load life with the weight of higher values. and thus to formulate an ethics of being. Deleuze would have it instead that affirmation is actually the creation of being. Affirmation is not the acceptance of being. then. affirmative speculation needs a corresponding joyful practice to make good on its claims to creativity and activity.CONCLUSION 117 the one who knows how to wield a powerful negation can pose a real affirmation.3 Practice Affirmation. for the expression of power. to set free what lives.. 4. risks appearing as simply that which grasps and selects the being that is." The thematic of power and production. this same distinction is given a richer definition with respect to the adequate and the inadequate: The adequate is that . In Nietzsche. on its genealogy of causal relations. "To affirm is not to take responsibility for. The mobile and malleable conception of being found in Bergson and Spinoza already prepares the terrain for this work: Deleuze's ontology focuses on the movement of being. An ethical project cannot remain on the plane of speculation. Spinoza's conception of joy gives Deleuze the key to this new terrain: "The sense of joy appears as the properly ethical sense. is not enough for a Deleuzian ethics. The no of the total critique. the active and the reactive. or a practical guide.

but it is also linked backward to its internal genealogy of affects. to become joyful. since it is a passion. the adequate is linked forward to what it can do. into the distinctions within power. When our mind forms an idea of the common relationship shared between this body and our body (a common notion). they are the raw material for the construction of the common notion. in order to discover the point of departure for an ethical practice. For this idea alone. within our affectivity. in contrast. The . we are ready to set out on the steep path to increase our power.118 CONCLUSION which expresses (or envelops or comprehends) its cause. The adequate gives full view to both the productivity and the producibility of being. Deleuze begins the elaboration of practice on the field of chance encounters and focuses on the encounters with bodies that agree with our nature. he poses the distinction between joyful passive affections and sad passive affections. The joy of the encounter is precisely the composition of the two bodies in a new. the joyful affection ceases to be passive and becomes active. the common notion is already latent in the joyful passion. A joyful passion. it nonetheless opens an avenue toward adequacy: "We must then. undifferentiated. form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own. is adequate" (Expressionism in Philosophy-. to become active. We must delve. and thus always indicates an inadequate idea. As Deleuze formulates each of these distinctions within our power. Deleuze's investigation of our power to be affected reveals two tiers of distinctions: At the first level. With this realistic assessment of our condition. this common notion. by the aid of joyful passions. appears as pure spontaneity. however. the power to act and exist. the inadequate is mute. and at the second. then. and thus remains opaque to our analysis. This Spinozian "pessimism" is precisely the point of departure for a joyful practice. he also recognizes that the human condition lies principally on the weak side of the equation: Our power to be affected is dominated by passive rather than active affections. Spinoza 283). Like the active. In effect. since it is joyful. The importance of the power to be affected is that it reveals distinctions within our power. This power of producibility provides the communicating corridor between ontology and practice. Joyful passions are the precondition for practice. because joy necessarily results from an encounter with a body that has a relationship that is compatible or composable with our own. is always the result of an external cause. that increase our power: encounters that engender joyful passions. This is the crucial relation that opens up the field of power for Deleuze: Corresponding to the power of being to act and exist is its power to be affected. the genealogy of its own production. more powerful body. he poses the distinction between active affections and passive affections. and the majority of our passive affections are sad rather than joyful.

many of which have differed greatly from Hegel's own political views. What can Deleuze's thought afford us? What can we make of Deleuze? In other words. during the past 150 years. as Spinoza tells us. There is not one.4 Constitution Many American authors have tried to pose the general question of the political consequences of poststructuralism. it is making a new incision into being. Each of these distinctions hinges on a notion of constitution that remains latent. but active. of course. Joyful practice brings ethics back to ontology—it exploits the producibility or composability of being. and the assemblages of power (les agencements de la puissance) against the deployments of power (les dispositifs du pouvoif). is that which is cause of itself. what are the useful tools we find in his philosophy for furthering our own political endeavors? In this spirit. the enveloping or comprehension of the cause of the affection. This is perhaps the largest payoff for Deleuze's extensive and complex investigation into ontology. and thus the active constitution of being. look for the political position that follows necessary from a theoretical body of work. Hegel's philosophy has served as a primary support for a wide variety of political positions. Indeed. one should not expect to find a clear response to such a question about a broad theoretical movement. in effect. but many corridors one can follow for the passage to action. The joy of the active affection is no longer contingent on a chance encounter. One should not. the joy supported by the common notion is the joy that returns. Such investigations have led to a wide range of judgments across the political spectrum.CONCLUSION 119 construction of the common notion is. For example. or even of the politics of Deleuze's philosophy. constructing a new assemblage of its structure. to attempt a general definition of the politics of poststructuralism. and an affection that expresses its cause is no longer passive. but nonetheless central. become active. This is the practical process that fleshes out Deleuze's ethical mandates: Become joyful. both regressive and progressive. 4. The practice of joy is the construction of ontological assemblages. Deleuze can help . From this perspective. The distinctions that I have tried to highlight in Deleuze's work pose the multiplicity of organization against the multiplicity of order. It is more appropriate and more productive to ask ourselves. then. It will not be very fruitful. When the common notion envelops the cause of a joyful encounter. Being is a hybrid structure constituted through joyful practice. I have tried to discover in Deleuze some tools for the constitution of a radical democracy. in Deleuze's thought. and thus makes that encounter adequate. What raises this encounter to the level of being is precisely its comprehension of the cause: Substance.

in fact. but it does not for that reason refuse the tradition of ontological discourse. in effect. in opposition to an ontological vision that determines a conservative. on the contrary. is the only philosophical position that can support a democratic society open to a multiplicity of ends. however. To an extent. horizontal. What Deleuze develops coincides with the liberal vision in its affirmation of the openness of ends in democratic society. By organization here I do not understand any sort of plan or blueprint of how social relationships will be structured. Liberal thinkers who reason in this fashion have. The power of society. (The fact that the tradition appears to some so thin in alternatives is really only evidence of the weak state of contemporary philosophical inquiry. The priority of right over good is thought to insure that the freedom of society's development is not constricted or closed by an externally determined telos. and what links the ontological to the political. by organization I understand a continual process of composition . it is not a monolithic block. but rather contains within itself radical alternatives. Deleuzian being is open to the intervention of political creations and social becomings: This openness is precisely the "producibility" of being that Deleuze has appropriated from Scholastic thought. to translate in Spinozian terms. one need not reject ontology tout court. In other words. This political refusal of teleology leads directly to a philosophical refusal of ontology. and Spinoza. they believe that a deontological theory is necessary to allow for a democratic.) When Deleuze interrogates Bergson.120 CONCLUSION us develop a dynamic conception of democratic society as open. they are still too tied to the logic of contradictions. Nietzsche. is the expression of power: the free conflict and composition of the field of social forces. One need not. The priority of the right or the good does not enter into this conception of openness. too quickly accepted the Platonic and Hegelian claims about the link between ontology and social teleology. then. This open organization of society must be distinguished from the vertical structures of order. Perhaps the most important single tenet of liberal democratic theory is that the ends of society be indeterminate. and thus they miss the important nuances. make this leap to the opposite pole. he is reaffirming and articulating an alternative tradition within the history of Western metaphysics that presents a strong notion of ontology but does not propose any ideological mapping or any determination of ends. corresponds to its power to be affected. open society. What is open. Deontology. in order to affirm the openness of ends in society. and collective. The tradition of Western metaphysics is not of a piece. this vision of democracy coincides with that of liberalism. and thus that the movement of society remain open to the will of its constituent members. because ontology itself is presumed to carry with it a transcendental determination of the good. closed society.

invent their own constitution. from an external space of transcendence. Political assemblage is certainly an art in that it has to be continually made anew. and can thus. to the real forces of destruction and decomposition. who insisted that all representation be subject to immediate revocation). in the sense that social organization proceeds without any predetermined design. Organization carries within itself the destructive power of Machiavelli's ritorno aiprincipi. then. continually reinvented. constitute the mechanisms of social organization from below. for example. the absolute and equal inclusion of the entire immanent plane: Democracy. is the absolute form of government. as if by the indefatigable pressures of gravity. agencements. moves instead between multiplicity and the multitude. and thus remain always and completely susceptible to restructuring. but that they receive a strictly immanent determination. while they remain at the same time open to internal antagonisms. structure a social order from above. of the Communards. and destruction (in the spirit. the composition of joyful social relationships. Once again. This is not to say that social institutions (or other instances of verticality) are not formed. Dispositifo. The process of political assemblage. The multitude is assembled through this practice as a social body defined by a common set of behaviors. needs. be thrust back at any time. between the individual and the collective. in principle. are indifferent to the boundaries posed by individualism. is directed toward creating social bodies or planes of composition that are ever more powerful. The horizontal society is the open site that fosters practical creation and composition as well as destruction and decomposition. from the immanent social plane. more precisely. on the basis of the interaction of immanent forces. the borders of social bodies are continually subject to change as the practice of assemblage decomposes certain relationships and composes others. as Spinoza is fond of saying. of social constitution. There is no contradiction. in other words. The horizontality of the material constitution of society puts the weight on practice as the motor of social creation. to its zero state of equality. perfectly horizontal. just like Marx's living labor that refuses to be sucked dry by the vam- . The processes of social assemblage. reform. or assemblages. or. The Deleuzian practice of affirmation and joy.CONCLUSION 121 and decomposition through social encounters on an immanent field of forces. we find that the productivity of social being corresponds to its producibility. or deployments. The model of this constitution is the general assembly. the constitution of society rests on a different axis. and desires. A practical politics of social bodies sets loose the immanent forces from the strictures of predetermined forms to discover their own ends. The skyline of society is perfectly flat. This is Deleuze's way of grasping the living force in society that continually emerges from the dead forces of social order.

What Deleuze gives us. raises the multiplicity to a higher level of power. with composable practices and desires. the multiplicity of social practices and desires presents us with the conditions of composition or assemblage.122 CONCLUSION pires set in flight by capital. however. On the political horizon. Filling out the passage from multiplicity to multitude remains for us the central project for a democratic political practice. in the networks of laboring cooperation. but on the contrary. joyful relationships and thus powerful subjective assemblages. And this quality of living is defined both by the power to act and the power to be affected: a social body without organs. The composition or the constitution of the multitude does not in any way negate the multiplicity of social forces. in the affective expressions of popular culture. affirmative. in effect. All of this. remains only the hint of a democratic politics. is a general orientation that can suggest the paths of future research into the contemporary forms of social assemblage. . In the existing social practices. we still have to flesh out its constitutive mechanisms with concrete social practices. we should seek to discern the material mechanisms of social aggregation that can constitute adequate. This is the field on which the process must be defined: Assemblage must be pursued by bringing together social bodies with compatible internal relationships.

see Gillian Rose. the geological sediment that forms the context of our contemporary interventions. ground 123 .5). for example. of Stephen Houlgate in Hegel. see Michael Roth. "natural" structure or order. I do not directly confront Deleuze's ontology with that of Heidegger. Although this is similar to the conceptual distinction I am referring to." 2. We will return to his arguments to consider them carefully in chapter 2. "Remark: The Resurgence of Negativity. Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France. Dialectic of Nihilism. For an account that does recognize a successful rupture from the Hegelian problematic in the French thought of the 1960s." The organic metaphors evoked by "ground" carry all the problems of a predetermined. This is the argument. Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics. Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics.Notes Introduction 1. History and Totality: Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault. and John Crumley. for example. Here I hope only to indicate the general lines of confrontation so as to offer a helpful guidepost and situate Deleuze's approach. and ultimately ethical developments and "grounding" to refer to a materialist and historical conception of the humus or. 3. 4. In addition to Judith Butler's Subjects of Desire and Stephen Houlgate's Hegel. in the specific context of our study. Some authors have recently begun to use "foundation" and "foundationalism" to refer to an idealist conception of the necessary and eternal bedrock that underlies and determines the unfolding of epistemological. We will deal with the refusal of an "intellectualist" account of being and the bases of a materialist ontology at length in terms of Deleuze's interpretation of the attributes in Spinoza (see Sections 3. but I think posing this question could be very fruitful and deserves a complete study of its own. Deleuze and Guattari's critique of root structures in "Introduction: Rhizome. (See. more appropriately.4 and 3." A Thousand Plateaus) Furthermore. ontological. I have reservations about the appropriateness of the terms "foundation" and "ground.

and Nietzsche (52-61). the philosophical tradition contains radical alternatives within it. et al. is that Deleuze is not pulling away from metaphysics. we also find the tendency to exaggerate the marginaliry of the opposing tradition that is dear to Deleuze. After Deleuze's presentation entitled "La methode de dramatisation" (The method of dramatization) before the Societe francaise de philosophic. 2. My point is that we should not minimize the coherence and the enormous power of this alternative tradition. Preliminary Remark 1. form a "minority" in the sense that they are partially eclipsed by the contemporary political-academic hegemony of "State philosophy" (Plato. again. but it is by no means the only way to approach his work." his reasoning and explanation are purely philosophical in the strictest sense. Duns Scotus. Spinoza. even if Lucretius.124 NOTES (Grund) plays such a central role in the Hegelian system (see. "La conception de la difference chez Bergson" (1956). Spinoza. Readers familiar with Deleuze's work might well question the order of my proposed evolution (Bergson-Nietzsche-Spinoza) because Deleuze's Bergsonism (1966) appeared after Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). but rather as an affirmation of its most powerful and most lucid elements. As a result of this simplification. however. We say Duns Scotus because he knew how to raise univocal being to the highest point of subtlety." However. in turn.1 do not mean to suggest that Deleuze's book on Hume is in some way incidental. in other words. Deleuze's respected professor Ferdinand Alqui£ charged that by exclusively drawing on examples from biology. What Alquie seemed to misunderstand is that although Deleuze's exemplification may be "unphilosophical. The central point here. Deleuze's opposition to "State philosophy" should not be conceived as an opposition to Western philosophy tout court. I have simply done my best to make Deleuze's work my own. Massumi is certainly correct to insist on Deleuze's opposition to "State philosophy. In any case. Deleuze sees the history of ontology as fundamentally supported by the arguments of Duns Scotus. More important. who gave being one single voice. nonetheless this "minority" constitutes some of the highest and most central moments of Western metaphysics. In his Foreword to A Thousand Plateaus. From the point of view of the univocity of being. Because I believe entirely in the specificity of philosophy and I owe this conviction to you yourself' (106). We can see this point very clearly in Deleuze's relation to Duns Scotus: "There was never but one ontological proposition: Being is univocal. we find that Deleuze's reading of Bergson leads logically to questions that he seeks to resolve in the study of Nietzsche.). that most of Deleuze's reading of Bergson was established well before he turned to Nietzsche. It is perhaps because of this confusion that many in the United States mistakenly regard Deleuze as a "postmodern" thinker. Science of Logic 444-78) that it is difficult to recuperate any difference it might mark from foundation. 4. There was never but one ontology. 3. to my mind the best reader of Deleuze. without giving in to abstraction" (Difference et repetition 52). We can see in an early article. 5. Massumi (and admittedly Deleuze too at times) tends to exaggerate the centrality and hegemony of "State philosophy" in the history of Western thought: " 'State philosophy' is another word for the representational thinking that has characterized Western metaphysics since Plato" (xi). psychology. etc. that of Duns Scotus. Deleuze was noticeably hurt by this accusation and he gave an emotional. provides us with a pertinent example. for example. affectionate response: "Your other reproach touches me even more. I have chosen to take a certain slice across the body of Deleuze's work that I have found particularly productive. the . Western metaphysics should not be characterized in such a univocal manner. Brian Massumi. Hegel. but on the contrary reaffirming its highest points. and other fields Deleuze had lost the understanding of the specificity of properly philosophical discourse.

pp. esse. This is why the Cartesian proof. but cause of itself." That Hegel changes the quotation to simplify it for his purposes is not a serious issue. aliud quid. (2) only efficient causes are accepted as real causes. the Scholastics in general maintain the four genres of cause inherited from Aristotle (material. Bergson wrote his Latin thesis on the concept of place in Aristotle. the efficient cause of everything. reality. Some of these principles will prove especially useful in our discussion: (1) an effect cannot have more perfection or reality than its cause. 3. non poterit. Therefore. in his interpretation he completely distorts its Spinozian meaning. even though they change the meaning of the genres significantly. Even without close examination. Disputacion XII. much later. & determinatio negatio est. Hegel is apparently quoting here from Letter 50 from Spinoza to Jarig Jelles. perfection. 2. In Spinoza we find two important modifications of this Scholastic relationship between being and causality: (1) God is not an uncaused first cause. and Etienne Gilson explains clearly how this modification of Scholastic doctrine is not so much a departure as a refinement of Scholastic reasoning that serves to intensify the close relationship between causality and real being. one cannot say that everything has a cause. the most general facts of Deleuze's biography. of course. (Ockham adds that God is not only the efficient but also the immediate cause of everything. It should come as no surprise. formal." see Pierre Macherey. and consequently one cannot prove the existence of God by the principle of causality. however. instead of being the proof of a first cause that has no cause. The power.) As Etienne Gilson explains in relation to Duns Scotus. that we find Scholastic resonances in Deleuze's study of Bergson. efficient. quam negatio. Chapter 1. causa sui. particularly the things that he did not do.' or the aptitudes to produce and to be produced" (La philosophic au Moyen Age 595). Bergsonian Ontology: The Positive Movement of Being 1. at the foundation of Scholastic ontology are the complementary properties of being: " 'causality' and 'producibility. Disputaciones metaflsicas. the Scholastics take meticulous care in elaborating and observing the principles of causality. The work of the Scholastics (from Roger Bacon and Duns Scotus to William Ockham and. Hegel ou Spinoza. The original reads "Quia ergo figura non aliud. 4. while the efficient cause is primary in proofs of the existence of God. quam determinatio. and univocity of being are all established through causal arguments. For an extensive analysis of Hegel's misreading of Spinoza's "negativism. the divine essence is a productive capacity—it exists as the first cause. 141ff. (2) a thing cannot be the necessary cause of something outside itself. and final) as real causes. What I find most important in relation to Deleuze's work is the Scholastic mode of ontological reasoning and the criteria they establish for being. In the course of these ontological discussions. For a detailed analysis of the genres of cause see Francisco Suarez. if God does not have a cause. Seccion III. Francisco Suarez) gives central ontological importance to causality and to the productivity of being. "If everything has a cause. I would justify my proposition of an evolutionary sequence both on the basis of the historical order of Deleuze's consideration of the authors and the logical progression traced by his thought 6. is the proof of a . Spinoza inherits the first change from Descartes. necessity. God has a cause. and he was never fascinated by the work of Martin Heidegger. given both Deleuze's interest in the Scholastics (particularly Duns Scotus) and Bergson's extensive knowledge of Aristotle. ut dictum.NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 125 reading of Nietzsche reveals questions that lead him to study Spinoza This is the trajectory I seek to trace from a logic of being to an ethics and finally a politics of being. indicate his difference from nearly all other major French philosophical voices to emerge from his generation: He was never a member of the French Communist Party. he did not attend the exclusive Ecole Normale Superieure. Finally.

The critique of the possible is directed toward Descartes and takes a slightly different form in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (30-31. 9. We should note at this point. Similarly. this attempt to distinguish process from achieved state is a distortion of both Hegel and Bergson. However. for the Scholastic God of pure action he substitutes the God that is causa sui that will later be grasped by Spinoza" (Discours de la me'thode. is directed against Descartes. not between the real and the actual ("Bergson" 288-89). Both Hegel and Bergson present philosophies of time in which no effective distinction can be made between state and process. My point is certainly not to prove that Deleuze has derived his argument from the Scholastics. We will return to these passages later. while the "indeterminate" being of differentiation relates to time and marks differences of nature. On one side. Duns Scotus defines a basic division between caitsaeperse that are essentially ordered and caitsae per accidens that are accidentally ordered. 10. (For an explanation of abbreviations in references to Spinoza's works. but that concept does not clarify the situation for us. The complete formulation comes in the second Bergson period. however. Bergson's difference refers not to a static quidditas but to a continuous movement in time. 5. Deleuze credits the Hegelian Dasein of the dialectic with neither differences of nature nor differences of degree: Hegelian being remains an abstraction. Hegel inherits the errors of Platonic ontology and exaggerates them. This line of reasoning could lead us to say that Bergson is adopting Hegel's ends but critiquing his means. as we have already seen. is that we can understand this point in Deleuze's argument more clearly when we keep in mind the Scholastic arguments or ones with similar concerns. note 4. the rejection of the formal and final causes. however. See Philosophical Writings. 11. but in the processes that purport to achieve them (determination and differentiation). see chapter 3. 38-39. the Scholastics and Bergson continually perfect the Aristotelian logic of being. Hegel continues. Deleuze's discussion implicitly sets up a fundamental division in the philosophical tradition that appears historically as a progressively more radical antagonism between Platonism and Aristotelianism. but it is constituted by the continual movement of this dynamic. the idea of space here is irrelevant (Science of Logic 110). On the other side. The second modification that we find in Spinoza. It may seem at this point that the real antagonism between Bergson and Hegel resides not so much in the claims for the states of being (determinateness and difference). See Ethics IP34-36 and lAppendix.122-26). Gilson edition 327). We will come back to this "explosive internal force that life carries within itself' because this notion is unclear at this point. in Hegel the state of determinateness is not only founded by a process of negation. 7. The rough outline of the history of philosophy suggested here. has one axis from Plato to Hegel and another axis oriented in an altogether different direction from Aristotle to the Scholastics to Bergson. It is tempting to give significance to the German etymology and explain Deleuze's usage on this basis: Determinate being or Dasein relates to space and marks differences of degree. 8. and it is repeated in exactly the same terms in "La methode de dramatisation" (78-79) and in Difference et repetition (269-76). However. as the dynamic of the articulation of being. . 40. although at this point he only makes a distinction between the possible and the virtual. being in a certain place. We can equally well attribute the Scholastic resonances to Bergson and his interest in Aristotle. This critique of the possible exists already in Deleuze's early period of Bergson study in the 1950s. taking them to their extreme. What is important. Hegel notes that in etymological terms determinate being (Dasein). It is precisely at this point that Nietzschean will to power and Spinozian conatus come into play in the later studies. but. p. then. As we noted earlier. 6. means beingthere.126 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 first cause that is cause of itself. that this obscure notion constitutes a central point in Bergson's system. Deleuze often invokes the Bergsonian intuition in this same context.

Later. being a dialectic of the empty and abstract essence. of the question 'Qu'est-ce que?." we will consider the review of Madeleine Barthelemy-Madaule in Les etudes bergsoniennes in which she focuses on this section and objects. In the other sense. he reinterprets "fable-making" or "confabulation" in a more positive light. precisely because his dialectic. 14. in the "Remark. Deleuze's being must be "determinate" in that being is necessary. pp.. see Antonio Negri. expresses the triumph of the weak over the strong. 16. We will return to this passage later. active. One might well ask of my reconstructed evolution of Deleuze's thought. One ought to take up the Bergsonian notion of confabulation and give it a political meaning" ("Le devenir revolutionnaire et les creations politiques" 105). 15. La philosophie au Moyen Age. In fact. on the contrary. pp. 599ff. one would search in vain for a philosophy that could proceed by the question 'Qu'est-ce que?'. and event (evenemeni)—insist on this point. in this sense. in a recent interview with Antonio Negri. Nietzschean Ethics: From Efficient Power to an Ethics of Affirmation 1. Ferdinand Alquie chastised Deleuze on this account: "I regret the rejection. "Bergson is not Nietzsche" (120). In the discussion following this presentation. untimely (intempestif). 96ff.. everything which separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated from what it can do.NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 127 12. particularly the books on cinema. Indeed. Deleuze suggests that we should go back to this Bergsonian concept to develop a notion of social constitution: "Utopia is not a good concept: there is rather a 'confabulation' common to people and to art. however. It is precisely this final section of Bergsonism that irritated the French Bergson community. In some of his later works. A central passage in this regard is Deleuze's description of Callicles' attack on law in relation to Nietzsche: "Everything that separates a force from what it can do he calls law. Every force which goes to the limit of its power is. Nietzsche adds: the triumph of reaction over action. a bit too fast. it is even the opposite of a law" (Nietzsche and Philosophy 58-59). 13. In one sense. Yet the gap between these two terminological registers reveals a serious issue that has not been adequately treated. Here we can finally make sense of Bergson's use of "determinate" and "indeterminate. qualified. on two separate planes. maybe there is only Hegel. It is not a law that every force goes to the limit. is not separated from the movement of the contradiction" ("La methode de dramatisation" 92). the universal and the individual. and actual. Law. This is how Nietzsche's conception of power can be read as a powerful antijuridicism. Some of Deleuze's most cherished terms—such as unforeseeable (jmprevisible). Why does Bergsonism not fully incorporate the Nietzschean themes and go beyond them? A response would have to agree with Barthelemy-Madaule that Bergson is not Nietzsche. See Gilson. The Savage Anomaly. At this point in his work Deleuze finds in Bergsonian fabulation only an explanation of obligation and the negation of human creativity. pp. singular. he will never stretch one doctrine to conform to another. even though Deleuze's interpretative strategy involves a high degree of selectivity. Maybe Hegel. "If one considers the ensemble of the history of philosophy. Chapter 2.' . For an explanation of the distinction between/Ms and lex in Spinoza. Deleuze's being must be "indeterminate" in that being is contingent and creative. This is one example in which Deleuze appears a little overzealous in his attack on Hegel. 63-65." Posed in a Hegelian context they have a completely different meaning. The role of the formal distinction in Duns Scotus is to mediate the unity and the multiplicity. Deleuze will use the conception of the real distinction in Spinoza to critique the formal distinction of Duns Scotus in Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza.

charges of "essentialism" are defused in the context of both Marx and Nietzsche. further." pp. Mario Tronti observes that precisely what is lacking in Hegel's master-slave dialectic is the question of value. the "re- . this argument can be found in various forms throughout the materialist tradition. In this Nietzschean context. The will to power is the essence of being. that no philosopher has posed this question. For an example of Nietzsche's argument. 3. intimidating us a bit. a superficial essence that has nothing to do with the ideal. I would maintain that just as Nietzsche's arguments against causality should be read as arguments against the external causality in favor of the internal cause. Kojeve's reading is perhaps the purest version of a personalist interpretation of the confrontation between the master and the slave: "A human-individual comes face to face with a human-individual" (Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 10). With this polemical proposition of efficient power. I would argue. In fact. etc. 4. The ultimate source. Wahl is certainly correct in pointing to this clanger. material. except Hegel" (104). Indeed. which plays such a central role in Antonio Negri's reading. too. but substituting one essence for another. profit. but sometimes. Deleuze's defense rests on his development of a nondialectical opposition." pp. "The Four Great Errors. This is why Marx needs to combine a critique of Hegel with a critique of Ricardo to arrive at his notion of labor value (Operai e capitate 133-43). 47-54.128 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 and I cannot accept what you say. "The Anatomy of power. the argument becomes clearer if we read it as an affirmation of internal cause rather than an attack on causality tout court. can be found in Aristotle's distinction between potential being and actual being in Metaphysics. Book 5. but it is not difficult to bring this back to the notion of the internal cause developed earlier in the Bergson section. rightly I believe. 10. perhaps. Spinoza's distinction betweenpotestas andpotentta. xi-xvi. It is true that each relies on a notion of essence. 2. but in both cases it is a historical. see Twilight of the Idols. The "refusal of work" was not only a slogan but also one of the central analytical categories of Italian Marxism in the sixties and seventies. at the beginning. that Hegel cannot be singled out so easily and that many philosophers (Plato. This evaluation of the two natures of power is one element that brings Deleuze's Nietzsche very close to Spinoza: "By virtue and power \potentia] I mean the same thing" (Ethics IVD8).1 can imagine an argument by which Hegel could be defended against the charge that slave contents are being attributed to essence here. threatens to misguide him" ("Nietzsche et la philosophic" 353). Leibniz. Deleuze presents the argument as if it were part of an attack on causality itself. In effect.) have emphasized the question "Qu'est-ce que?" in various degrees and in diverse contexts. 6. 5. see my foreword to The Savage Anomaly. One might well object at this point that in my argument Nietzsche and Marx are not attacking essence per se. transcendental structures that are usually the issue of "essentialist" arguments. from Ockham to Marx. 9. Kant. However. Nietzsche and Marx are united precisely on a Spinozian proposition: The essence of being is power (Ethics IP34). This is true. but a pure aggression. correlates very closely with Nietzsche's usage of slave power and master power. the attack on essence is the attack on an external form of essence. 8.). that is. etc. that Nietzsche's entire polemic against causality could be read productively as a polemic against the external cause and an affirmation of the internal cause. Just as Marx discovered surplus value as the general term that envelops the various forms of exploitation (rent. 7. but the reading of this passage as an affirmation of labor as essence is so widespread in the Hegelian tradition that I think it is worth considering this point. which would not be a ressentiment. living essence. For an explanation of this distinction in Negri's interpretation of Spinoza. Alquie argues. "There is certainly in the author a sort of resentment with respect to Hegelian philosophy that sometimes allows him to write penetrating passages. Deleuze is participating in a long philosophical tradition.

the connections between Nietzsche and Lenin are profound. In the terms of the tradition. Sylvain Zac. individual or collective: emigration. Nietzsche recognized that he had a spiritual companion in Spinoza. was inspired by 'instinct. and of causality). note 45. Deleuze finds resonances with the work of Tronti in his study of Foucault. For an explanation of Lenin's use of the phrase "the art of insurrection. and what it should have been. the chapter entitled "Le cercle vicieux en tant que doctrine selective." "appetite. My lonesomeness. often made it hard for ." see Antonio Negri. The French tradition is very rich. see Foucault. Lafabbrica della strategia. Chapter 3. which. utterly enchanted. Jean Wahl admires Deleuze's formulation of the will to nothingness as the ratio cognoscendi of the will to power in general and the affirmation of the eternal return as its ratio essendi.'68 was. 144. Aside from Deleuze and the Althusserians. but. 68ff. 13. however. even if I were to hold that this account is exemplary of the events of '68. that of Italian operaismo (workerism) as expressed by authors such as Mario Tronti and Antonio Negri. 16. We will have ample opportunity to draw on their readings in the course of our study. his interpretation of Spinoza has revolutionized Spinoza studies. one defined by Deleuze's selection. I have a precursor. Desire is appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.. pp. 150. sabotage. The reason I think that Vogliamo tutto best serves our purposes here is that it gives direct expression to the desires of the workers in action better than any other source I have found. Pierre Klossowski develops this idea of a selective ontology along different lines in his spectacular analysis. Deleuze's work is the major influence to have emerged in French Spinoza studies in the last thirty years. There is certainly a wide variety of differing accounts of what . and appetite is conatus with respect to the mind and the body. 14. 12." pp.Spinozian Practice: Affirmation and Joy 1. in particular. as I hope I have already shown. 11. but he finds it somewhat inappropriate for the Nietzschean context: "But isn't this expose of Nietzsche's thought perhaps too Scholastic in appearance?" ("Nietzsche et la philosophic" 378). be it constructive or destructive. Will is conatus with respect to the mind. it is the refusal of a relationship of exploitation. 2. He wrote to his friend Franz Overbeck: "I am utterly amazed. In regards to the theme of the attack on essence and the joy of destruction. work stoppage. Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux. it is also a particular interpretation of Marx..NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 129 fusal of work" is the general term that comprehends the various forms of proletarian resistance. 177-249. We should be very clear.1 use "will. reference to the Scholastics can help bring to light the ontological grounding of Nietzsche's thought (in the analysis of power. rather. I should also point out that just as it is a particular reading of Nietzsche that we are following. organized strikes. and so on.1 would not claim that it is representative. and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now. See. and Martial Gueroult. See Ethics IIIP9S. 15.'. some of the major twentieth-century figures who constitute this tradition are Ferdinand Alquie. note 28 and p. In any case. but rather is always actual. of will. Although this work has had a much smaller general audience than Deleuze's other readings in the history of philosophy." and "desire" here according to their Spinozian definitions. Wahl is certainly right to note that Deleuze is bringing in an element external to Nietzsche's thought. p. mass exodus. Along with the reading of Louis Althusser (developed by Pierre Macherey and Etienne Balibar). that the refusal of work is not the negation of productivity or creativity. as on very high mountains. Hugh Tomlinson translates "pouvoir d'etre aflecte" as "capacity to be affected." "Capacity" is a very poor choice because the "pouvoir d'etre affecte" does not imply any possibility. it is the affirmation of proletarian productive force and the denial of capitalist relations of production.

" See also Rose-Marie Mosse-Bastide. both in Bergson and Spinoza. 7. "Les themes spinozistes" 126). is now at least a twosomeness" (Postcard to Overbeck. is that of religion and mysticism. The most significant theme that Deleuze chooses not to treat. however. P for proposition. The lines of battle are univocity. of this traditional opposition. Def for definition. Both Zac and Mosse-Bastide consider this a fundamental aspect of the Spinoza-Bergson relationship. We will use the conventional abbreviated notation for referring to Spinoza's works. he notes. The "absent cause. against its enemy axis. but." I am very suspicious. in fact. that the common usage of "difference" implies an other or external cause. In Deleuze's work. of course. if an important nuance could be discerned between the two terms. in The Portable Nietzsche 92). and therefore. and expression (in Duns Scotus and Spinoza) versus equivocity. Thus. Deleuze makes one of his rare forays into philosophical historiography (63-67). We might ask ourselves. 8. we find that the conventional distinctions between necessity and contingency. Spinoza could have received a Scotist account of univocity and the formal distinction. who is certain to have read Duns Scotus. D for demonstration. Duns Scotus-Spinoza. Suarez-Descartes. It may be. and S for scholium. that Spinoza would have read Duns Scotus directly. it does not help us understand being through its causal genealogy. Roman numerals are used to refer to the five parts of the Ethics." which draws heavily on Bergson's courses at the College de France. "Bergson et Spinoza. Part I. not fully developed. Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of contingency" (Zac. 6. that Spinoza is an "absolute determinist. For an explanation of the theory of the formal distinction in Duns Scotus. In contrast. On the relationship between Duns Scotus and Spinoza. denies a positive ontological foundation. are effectively subverted. Deleuze's insistence on the thematic of expression constitutes a polemic against semiology on ontological grounds.July30. An acute analysis of the common themes in the two philosophers is presented by Sylvain Zac in "Les themes spinozistes dans la philosophic de Bergson. and Arabic numerals to denote proposition or scholium numbers. proposition 8. however. 4. scholium 2. we have to acknowledge what is commonly held to be the important difference: "While Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of necessity. to bring us back to an ontological foundation by making clear the genealogy of being. In a letter to Leon Brunschvicg. Deleuze's ideas about the history of philosophy are very suggestive. eminence. 5. Any student of the history of philosophy would point out. Ethics IP8S2 refers to Ethics. Deleuze then sets this axis of thought. La philosophic au Mayen Age. . It is unlikely. between determination and creativity. 599ff. A system of signs does not recognize being as a productive dynamic. as in that of Spinoza. Bergson wrote: "One could say that every philosopher has two philosophies: his own and that of Spinoza" (Ecrits etparoles 587)." while Bergson constructs an ontology based on "unforeseeable newness. however. immanence. along with Zac. while consideration of distinctions in Spinoza must be linked first to Descartes. from the philological or historiographic point of view." which supports much of the French structuralist and semiological discourse in the sixties. through Juan de Prado. C for corollary. "distinction" would be a better term for defining the singularity of being. see Etienne Gilson. the two separate contexts: Bergson's use of difference derives primarily from biology and Mechanicism. 3. Once we pose the common thesis of the singularity of being in Bergson and Spinoza.1 use "difference" and "distinction" as if they were interchangeable here because they seem to fill the same role in Deleuze's thought.130 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 me to breathe and made my blood rush out. 1881. a theory of expression seeks to make the cause present. pp. and then to the Scholastics. and analogy (in Suarez and Descartes). As always. A stands for axiom. We should keep in mind.

For this reason. 50. it is not clear that Zac's objection would adequately address Deleuze's interpretation. Mark explains that the traditional approach Qoachim. that Part V contains residues of the pantheistic Utopia of Spinoza's early work (169ff). however. although Deleuze eloquently proposes this ontological parallelism. an ideal construction. but rather is introduced by Leibniz's interpretation. objects to the use of the term "parallelism" to describe the relation between the Spinozian attributes: "It is not a correspondence nor a parallelism between the mental and the physiological. he fails to apply it to its fullest at a crucial point in the investigation. I would maintain that Spinoza's effort in Part V to rise from the second to the third type of knowledge. 17. Many have contended that it is not appropriate to apply this term to Spinoza's thought. this theory of ontological truth situates Spinoza in the Platonic tradition in line with Plotinus. but the crucial factor is that Mark does not recognize. 1. Deleuze's reading is consistent with Mark's to a certain point. have continued to maintain a common interpretation" (I. requires a new speculative moment. 462-68. the central relationship between truth and power.NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 131 9. Gueroult clearly supports an objectivist interpretation. This is the reason. however. viewed from different perspectives. See also pp. Deleuze. pp. but rather with theories of 'truth of being' or 'truth of things': ontological truth" (85). but the Nietzschean. Negri argues. See Spinoza. 466). a return to the earlier mode of research. to rise to the idea of God. but instead are substantially identical. 11.) poses Spinoza against a correspondence theory of truth and in favor of a "coherence theory" where truth is defined as coherence within the orderly system that constitutes reality Mark argues. as Deleuze does. Therefore. See Vincent Descombes. . We will see that. but an equality of principle. The ontological order that they constitute presents a being that is preformed. Stuart Hampshire. vol. we must contrast the correspondence view not with coherence. My Deleuzian proposal suggests a different explanation. Once the question of truth becomes also a question of power. Hegel's interpretation is "the inspiration of a whole line of commentators who. and St. 12. Sylvain Zac. Special difficulties are presented for my thesis by the reappearance of the attributes in Part V of the Ethics. Martial Gueroult presents a thorough history of this controversy. 428-61. According to Mark. for example. Negri maintains that this reappearance is due to the fact that Spinoza drafted different sections of Part V during different periods. Given this nuance. 13. Alisdair Maclntyre. Deleuze's reading situates Spinoza's "ontological truth" not in the Platonic. "Parallelism" is not Spinoza's term. tradition. 10. Zac argues that the attributes are not parallel. In Spinoza's Theory of Truth. etc. including the attributes. it is important that Deleuze not claim an equality of correspondence. for an analysis of the dominant lines of French philosophy during these years. 16. 15. Anselm. that the attributes must drop out of the discussion when Spinoza develops toward practical and political concerns. Antonio Negri poses forcefully the problem of the attributes as a problem of organization (The Savage Anomaly 53ff). that Spinoza is better situated in the much older epistemological tradition of truth as being: "If we wish to see Spinoza's theory of truth in its historical setting. According to Gueroult. The return to Spinoza's Forschung brings with it all of its scientific instruments. Thomas Mark gives a thorough account of Anglo-American and analytic interpretations of Spinoza's epistemology. when practice emerges on the terrain of constitution. Spinoza's epistemology tends toward a practical epistemology. Modem French Philosophy. this problem. Augustine. 14. from the beginning of the nineteenth century to today. or unconcerned with. seems to be either unaware of. Alquie presents a definition of Spinozism as the synthesis of Cartesian science and mathematics with Renaissance naturalism. neither a term-to-term correspondence nor a correspondence of the wholes" (L'idee de vie 96-97).

we shall say that those bodies are united with one another and that they all together compose one body or Individual" (Ethics IIP13Def). . it would involve an entire genealogy of ideas that result in this idea. it expresses its cause. but it remains inadequate unless it expresses the path of its own production.132 NOTES 18. A more important and complex example would be the idea of justice: An adequate idea of justice would have to express the means by which we would produce or construct such an idea. The Savage Anomaly (187-90. An adequate idea of a circle might. involve the idea of a fixed radius rotated around a central point.194-210). For an extended discussion of the Spinozian conception of the multitude. . see Antonio Negri. for example. are so constrained by other bodies that they lie upon one another. 20. A given idea of a circle may be clear and distinct. 19. . or if they move . . "When a number of bodies . . that they communicate their motions to each other in a certain fixed manner.

Balestrini. "Lire Bergson." Les etudes bergsoniennes. 1976. Editions d'Art Lucien Mazenod. . 1988." Lespbilosophes c6lebres. pp. Paris. Bergsonism. no. Indiana University Press. Paris. Nature et verite dans la philosophie de Spinoza. translated by Ben Brewster. Judith. 1ur. New York. Les cours de Sorbonne. New York.s. Genevieve. Vintage Books. Servitude et libertg selon Spinoza." Bulletin de la societe jrancaise d'etudes nietscheennes. Feltrinelli. no. 196. 1958. Louis. 194 Bianquis. Butler. Columbia University Press. 1. 77-112.. London. no. Seuil. 1959 Althusser. 83-120. Chatelet. "Le devenir revolutionnaire et les creations politiques. 1956. 1969.es. Hegel. New Left Books. translated by Hippocrates Apostle. translated by Grahame Lock. Barthelemy-Madaule. Henri. For Marx. London. Madeleine.. 1959. 37. New Left Books. Paris.Works Cited Alquie'.. 1987. 1959. Milan. 3. 197 Aristotle. Presses Universitaires de France. Vogliamo tutto. p.. 4. translated by Ben Brewster. edited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Paris." Les etudes bergsoniennes. New York. "Bergson. Spring 1990. Deleuze. "La conception de la difference chez Bergson. 1970. La Pensee et le Mouvant. Bloomington. Subjects of Desire. no. 133 . . Gilles. "Nietzsche et la philosophic. no. pp. 1968. Bergson. Paris. 1941. Les cours de Sorbonne. Nanni. vol. Francois. 292-99. 1973. Paris. textes rassembles par Rose-Marie Mosse-Bastide. Metaphysics. Zone Bookse Books. no. . 1963. 4 1956. 2. Essays in Self-Criticism. Reading Capital. translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.s.0n. Ecrits et paroles. Presses Universitaires de France. Ferdinand. 8. 1968. pp." Futur Anterieur. 1971.

1988.e Book New York. March 1963. 2. 4. translated by A.. pp.J. Spring 1990. Oxford University Press. Discours de la methode. 1988. Duns Scotus. 2. "La m&hode de dramatisation. Philosophical Writings. Vrin. translated by Sean Hand. N. "Signes et evenements. Ithaca. University of Minnesota Press. New York. Rene. Practical Philosophy.is. University of Minnesota Press." In Michel Cressole. V Miller. N. no. New York. A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze. John. London. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. 1968. translated by Hugh Tomlinson. Empiricism and Subjectivity. Minneapolis. 16-2 "Spinoza et la methode generate de M. Scott-Fox and J. Henri Bergson. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1983. 1969. translated by A. Hardt. 1986." Revue de metaphysique et deue et de morale. Columbia Universityrsitrsity Press. City Lights Books. Sanoks." with Michel Foucault. 1969. Presses Universitaires de France. Oxford. 1957. translated by Brian Massumi. New York. 1973.nguage." Espace. translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. W F. 1987.rsitarires Paris. translated by Constantin Boundas. Presses Universitaires de France. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. 1977. "Lettre a Michel Cressole. Atlantic Highlands. 16-25. Payot. pp. and Felix Guattari. The Logic of Sense. Spinoza-.y Press." Bulletin de la societefrancaise de philosophic. . Paris. "Du Christ a la bourgeoisie. S. Descartes. "La renaissance hegelienne americaine et 1'interiorisation du conflit. edited by Etienne Gilson. New York. Cornell University Press. Columbiaolumbia University Press. Martial. Nietzsche and Philosophy. History and Totality: Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault. G. Modern French Philosophy." Futur" Furtur Anterieur.p. with Claire Parnet. Gueroult.134 WORKS CITED Dialogues. 1946. Nelson. 1990. . 1968 . pp.93-106. 1980. Cambridge University Press. 2 January 1967. 133-46. translated by E. Instincts et institutions. no. M. 28opbie.. Aubier-Montaigne. La philosophic au Moyen Age. Etienne. pp. Language. 1925. Textes et documents philosophiques. In Michel Foucault.eapolis." Magazine Litteraire. "Mystere d'Ariane. Paris. Haldane and Frances Simson. Minneapolis. 1989." Foreword to Antonio Negri. translated by Hugh Tomlinson and BarbaraBarbanr Habberjam. 1968. 1991. 1953. 93-106. Routledge. 90-118. Editions Universitaires. Columbia University Press. Michael. Hachette.es. Foucault. New York. 1991. no. Hegel. 12-15. "The Anatomy of power. 1977. 1962. Crumley. Humanities Press. 1990. 257. translated by Martin Joughin. New York. no. Columbiaolumbia University Press. Counter-Memory. Minneapolis.Y. San Francisco. The Savage Anomaly. Phenomenology of Spirit. pp. Y Miller. Gilson. no. translated by L. France Paris. pp. 1968. Paris. Vincent. Difference et repetition. Memoire et vie: textes choisis. 1987. Science of Logic. Descombes. 1953 "Intellectuals and Power. Paris. Gilles." Bulletin de la societe francaise d'etudes nietzscheennes. translated by Robert Hurley. 426-37.ghlands. Gueroult. Zone Books. xi-xvi. Harding.is. translated by Allan Wolter. Practice. Spinoza: Dieu (Ethique 1). September 1988. Deleuze. Cambridge. University of Minnesota Press. Paris. pp.

L'idee de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza. 1987. Norton. Philosophical 'Writings. 1975. Cambridge University Press. 1960. Paris." Revue de metaphysique et de morale. 1984. Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics. Penguin Books. University of Minnesota Press. Princeton. Turin. Tronti. "Les themes spinozistes dans la philosophie de Bergson. Karl. Editorial Credos. Paris. Stephen. Charles. CLEUP and Libri Rossi. pp. Paris. Kojeve. Beacon Press. pp. Princeton University Press. The Portable Nietzsche. Opera. 1. New York. 4 vols. Mosse-Bastide. edited and translated by Edwin Curley. 1925rg. Presses Universitaires de France. 1968. "Pleasures of Philosophy. Rose-Marie. Rose. Marcuse. 1969. Brian. 1959. La morale de Spinoza. Universityniversity of Minnesota Press. 1972. Minneapolis. 1979. Sylvain. "Bergson et Spinoza. 1963. edited by Carl Gebhardt. Maspero. 1977. Cornell University Press. Hegel ou Spinoza. 1978. "Nietzsche et la philosophic. Friedrich." Foreword to A Thousand Plateaus by Deleuze and Guattari. edited by P. edited bydited by Robert Tucker. Massumi. Operai e capitate. Jr. Hollingdale. Francisco. Twilight of the Idols. 4 vols." Revue de metaphysique et de morale. William. Boehner. New York. 1986. Nietzsche et le cercle vicieux. Ithaca. 1925. . New York. 87-108. Cambridge University Press. Herbert. translated by Ben Fowkes. Klossowski. 3. 67-82. Suarez. I960. Vintage Books." Dialectic of Nihilism. New York. 1954. Nelson. 352-79. translated by R. Ockham." The Marx-Engels Reader. Cambridge. 121-58. 1966. Jean. Cambridge. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics. 8.Y. Pierre. New York. Roth. edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. Wahl. Antonio. Disputaciones metafisicas. Capital. Lafabbrica delta strategia: 33 lezioni su Lenin (1972). Hegel. Carl Winter.. "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. France. Basic Books. vol. 1968. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France. Macherey. New York. Basil Blackwell. J. Paris. N. Mark. 1957. Spinoza. Presses Universitaires de France. 1963. Marx. Mercure de France. New York. Zac. Pierre. 1985. Baruch. Nietzsche. 1988. Madrid. no. Padua. Michael. no. Thomas. pp. translated by James Nichols. Complete Works. Taylor. Heidelberg. pp. Minneapolis." Les etudeses etude bergsoniennes. Hegel. Mario.ew York. 1991. 1976. Gillian. 1949. 1969. Negri. Penguin Books. 1. New York. Columbia University Press.WORKS CITED 135 Houlgate. Alexandra. Boston. "The New Bergsonism. vol. Einaudi. Spinoza's Theory of Truth.

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127 n. Baruch: common notions constitution: of being. 49-50. 117-19. 15-19. 115. 47-48 body: and imagination. xv. 125 n. 4-11. 71-73. 112-13. 42-44. See also virtual adequate. 5. total. 9 Althusser. partial. 22-24. 4-10. 113-14. Louis. 3 assemblage. 104-11. as practical conception of politics. 126 n. 100-104 critique. 3. Nanni. 24-25. 2. "Du Christ a la bourgeoisie. 124 n. 128 n. 52-53. "La conception de la difference chez Bergson. 127 n. 35-36. 35." 1-2. 118-19.34. as principle of ontological expression. 54-55. 30. 19-22. 118-19. 117-19. 3. 124 n. 60-63. 2. 106-7. xi-xii. against dialectics. 34-36. 50-53 Deleuze. 4. 1-2. 28. 58-59. 130 n." xviii. 10-25. 66 Alquie. in parallel relation to mind. 27-28. and joy. xviii. 119-22. 39. 15. difference as an ontological category. 104-7 antagonism.Index actual and actualization. 97-104. 66. Gilles: Bergsonism. 78. 88-91. x-xi common notions. 74. 38. 124 n. 115-17. 13-19. Difference et repetition. 6. 87-91. 47. 54-55. Ferdinand. 86-87. multiplicity and organization. 17. 108-10. as key to practice and politics. 60-63. 58. 80-84. 101-4 affirmation. 58. 115-17. 70. 47-51. differentiation and actualization. 91-94. 85. 1. 70-71. 4-9. interpretation of Spinoza. See also constitution Balestrini. 67-69. 15 Bergson. 3. 77-79. 48-49. 96. 114. and the nature of power. and being. 72. 102-4. 14-22. 52-53. 91-95 Butler. 3. 99-104. powers of. 121-22. 96-100. 59. 124 n. 44-47. 115 causality. Empiricism and 137 .32. 61. 108-11. 128 n. 22-25. 14-15. 27-28. 131 n. Henri. 96-100. Francois. 10-13. 5. distinguished from true. of reason. 108-11. 117-19 Chatelet. criticized from a Hegelian perspective. Judith. 117. 45-47 Barthelemy-Madaule. 97-100. 28-30. 119-22. and adequate ideas. 115-16 Aristotle. Madeleine. See Spinoza. 125 n.

27-28. 125 n. 13. See also multiplicity Plato. 58-59. 129 n. 15. 128 n. 19-22. 68-69. 129 n. 72. xiii-xiv. 84-85. 5. 113 Mosse-Bastide. 119-21. 114-15 Mechanicism. E: the One and the Multiple multitude. Baruch. 88-91 Descombes. 45.138 Subjectivity. Alexandre. 83. 9 Heidegger. 94-100. master and slave. 1 Marcuse. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. 26-55. 127 n. 126 n. 11. G. the One and the Multiple. 4 Grumley. 1 joy. 119. univocity Gilson. Michael. W F. 3 multiplicity. 95-96. 12. Karl. 53-55. 20 Nietzsche. 105 Macherey. 19. Nietzsche and Philosophy. 13. 28-30. Rene." 30. 67-69. 110-11. 108-10. 125 n. 80-81. 72. 124 n. Stephen. 5. 4. 7-10. univocal expression. to be affected. in relation to Spinoza. 52-53. 33-34 Duns Scotus. 9. 2 materialism. 52-53. 109. 124 n. 86-87. 42-43. 1. 47-50. Martin. 115-17. 131 n. See also critique Klossowski. 2-4. 13 Kojeve. 123 n. Herbert. 125 n. 2 Gueroult. xiii. 128 n. Pierre. See Bergson. 53-55. 37-38. interpretation of Spinoza. 22-25 Roth. multiplicity and organization. 75. 109-10. 12 dialectics. 65-66. in politics. 47-48. 124 n. 79. in epistemology. 1. 123 n. ontological determination. 15. 54-55. 86-87. 114. 129 n. 17 Marx. Etienne. 30-31. 115-16 Negri. 4." 50. xvii. master and slave dialectic. as distinct from speculation. Gillian. 10. 125 n. compared to emanation. 119-22. 10 Hegel. 6 poststructuralism. xviii. 108-11. Antonio. 1-2. 15. 123 n. 2 Ockham. 75. See also Spinoza. Instincts et institutions. 46-47. 8 expression. 126 n. 90. 2. 42-43. 125 n. 131 n. 54. "La methode de dramatisation. "Intellectuals and Power. xvii. 13-19. Nietzsche. 115 Index Mark. Friedrich. 42." 105. 60-61. 121-22. 66-71. 114. Vladimir. 104-7. to think and to exist.. joy Rose. 3. 30. 22-24. 85 dramatization. 124 n. 126 n. Louis Massumi. 131 n. the organization of. 6 Houlgate. 121-22. 87. 6. 128 n. xv. W P. 13-14. W. G. x-xv. 7. Henri differences of nature and differences of degree. See also Hegel. 130 n. 15-16. 10-13. 24-25. 16. ix-xv. 14. 12. 132 n. xx. 1. Althusser's conception of. as distinct from order. 95-96. in ethics. 124 n. causality. Pierre. 115-16. 3. 2 organization. 34-36. 71-72. 130 n. method of. See also body. 27-28. 127 n. xii-xiii. 47-50. 12122. 126 nn. 117-19. 28. 3. 34-37. Friedrich: master and slave practice. 125 n. 33-37. Vincent. 46-47. William. 9. nondialectical. 53-55. 26. 62-63. 47. 50-53. 32-33. 121-22 negation. 96-100. "Mystere d'Ariane. 37-38. 43. 11. See Hegel. difference and differentiation. 74. Martial. on critique. 129 n. 89-90. 6-9. 58-59. See also body. 129 n. 2. 71. 113. 8. Rose-Marie. 4-9. 36-44. 44-45. 42-43. Immanuel. 127 n. 79. See also affirmation. 117-19. 131 nn. 5. 100104. 124 n. practice Kant. 123 n. 30. 5. 7 Lenin. 27-30. John. 44-45. 128 nn. 35. Thomas. 2 . 131 n. 128 n. 6-9. G. 2-4. 92-95. 18-19. 119 power: separated from what it can do. 55-111. Brian. See also Althusser. 5 Descartes. 72-73. 50-53. 113-15. 128 nn. 118.

3. E: interpretation of Spinoza. 63. 59-63.: master and slave dialectic Zac. Sylvain. xiii. Nietzsche. 130 n. 63-66. 10-11. 6. 17. 11. 125 n. 67-70. 6. 58-59. 44. 95-96. 3. 5. 121. 112-15. Duns Scotus singularity. 40-43 Tronti. ontological. 14-19. 5-9. 33. 69-71. Henri: 139 interpretation of Spinoza. See also Hegel. W F. 63-66. 24-25. See also affirmation Spinoza. Charles. 131 n. as distinct from practice. William. 77-79. 79-87. 87. 80-82. Friedrich: in relation to Spinoza Suarez. Francisco. 71-73. 38-39. 130 nn. 68-70. 20-21. 87-91. 20. 125 nn. 129 n.Index Scholastics. common notions. univocal expression. See also actual Wahl. power to exist and power to be affected. 91-95. 113-14. on critique. 114. 74-76. Baruch. 90. 108-111. See also Ockham. 59-63. 125 n. Mario. 4. 12 univocity. on causality. 95-100. See also Bergson. 8 Taylor. G. 118. 128 n. 112-14 speculation. 84. 2. the attributes and parallelism. 118. 80-82. 68-70. 20. 13 . on the virtual. G. singularity. social organization. 100-104. Hegel. 39-46. 2. Jean. W. 126 n. 113. 56-59. 129 n. 113-14 virtual. 128 n. 66. 67-68. 4. 50. epistemology. 14 work. on univocity.

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Labor of Dionysus: Communism as Critique of the Capitalist and Socialist State-form. The University of Minnesota Press will also publish his forthcoming book.Michael Hardt is the translator of Antonio Negri's Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics (Minnesota. coauthored with Negri. 1990) and Giorgio Agamben's The Coming Community (Minnesota. 1993). .

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