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8, Time and Eternity (1947), pp. 1-140 Published by: Artibus Asiae Publishers Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1522567 . Accessed: 09/03/2011 13:54
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ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY
ARTIBUS ASIAE PUBLISHERS ASCONA (SWITZERLAND)
Introduction Hinduism Buddhism Greece Islam Christianand Modern
1 8 30 61 86 105
PB = Paiicavimsa Briihmana. ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenldndischen Gesellschaft.. SBE = Sacred Books of the East. 4th ed. CU = Chiindogya Up. = Upanisad. Meister Eckhart. = Dtpavamsa. Pfeiffer = Fr. D = Digha Nikiiya. ?vet.Sutta Nipita. Vism.. S = Satiiyutta Nikeya.. The Di'wiwni Shamsi Tabriz. 1898. AJP = American Journal of Philology. BSOS = Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies. Mil. Taitt. = De opificio mundi. Dh = Dhammapada. = Vinaya Pitaka. Pfeiffer. HJAS = Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. MU = Maitri Up.BrS = Brahma Slitra (text). KU = Katha Up. SB = Satapatha Briihmanza. = MahiIbhiirata. JUB Iaiminiya Upanisad Briihmaza. AV Atharvaveda SamhhitiC. BrSBh. U. KhP = Khuddaka Piitha. 1924.. vols. Brahma Sistra Bhi4sya (Sanikara). Shams-i-Tabriz: DIwizn = R. JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society. Evans = C. Vin. NIA = New indian Antiquary. SA S&nkhikyana A'ranyaka. I and II. Kaus. Philo Judaeus: Gig. Mbh.. 1924 and 1931. Heres = Quis rerum divinarum heres sit. JRAS f Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. Mundaka. = Kaushtaki. A. = De gigantibus. = De specialibus legibus. Spec. JHI = Journal of the Histor-y of Ideas. . = 5vetid?vatara. M = Majjhima Nikiiya. = Taittiriya. LA = Legum allegorium. A = Aniguttara Nikiiya. Evans. Nicholson. TS = Taittirlya Samhhitti. or Up. AA = Aitareya Aranyaka. Manu = Miinava Dharma S&stra.. Munuj. BG = Bhagavad Gdiiz. Meister Eckhart.LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS RV = Rgveda Sarithitti. = Milinda Pajiha. BU = Brhadiiranyaka Up. AB = Aitareya Brifhmana. Dpvs. J = Iiztaka. de B. Sn . Opif. = Visuddhi Magga.
. 3.nach . - St.. Greek and Sanskrit can be translated from one to the other. I . tra ast ovta.Jacob Boehme. in sapientia fecil. 190.. 207. 1 Nec praeteritus nec futurus. aniidy-anantam . Mane fluens facit tempus. 221 B. 13. isano bhiUta-bhavasya-ca eviidya s-a svahl.xat dae2esutirpog dv. a&reaivaIogxo.YeYO7V4 Ovth oo&sevcg.20.12. It was an -everlasting beginning. 5. Meistfer Eckhardt.. aA2ia xvSepoc giv ravvrcovTrcv reyovorcov xat Eoottvwv.. 6. ' Oure... In ewikeit ist weder vor noch. Ant 0J2eov NcataveLoov Aided by Professor George Chase. die beschepfet got nit zemile. Ille solus est hodie atque eras. Anyatra bhtihiic-ca bhavyiic-ca . 4.TIME AND ETERNITY INTRODUCTION ' T6 be=6-teeov xat 6v ' -ai)t' VtaEov eVx1vqjael &-ov.223 A ? 4.. I put this into Latin and Greek only to show how easily and perfectly Latin. ot5iog to'vo. Dominus omnium praeteritorum et futurorum. Mysterium Pansophicum 4. daz got ie geschuof . and Professor Werner Jaeger.Katha Upanisad 2.. sine initio aut fine. Confessions. In principio . Pfeiffer pp.. munc swans facit aeternitatem.28. Allez. n adt ovra. 14.. Augustine.14. 4.. . .. oix EcrImcv Aristotle Phys. Boethius De consol..9. 12. id est in verbo . 15.xeovo eV Xeo'vc TLv.
nom. or that present point of time (nunc fluens) that always distinguishes the two durations from onle another. Here. Both terms are ambiguous. may be understood to be far less beautiful than the whole of which it is a portion". to understand the sense in which the Scripture speaketh of Time and Eternity" (Dionysius. The absurdity of these positions is made apparent if we ask with St. From what may be called the fundamentalist or literalist point of view. so that what delights in a part. from our temporal point of view a duration without beginning or end or. Buddhist. Eternity is either. Augustine. of course. De div. as it is in itself. time in the first sense is thought of as having had a beginning and as proceeding towards an end.eword "before" in such a question has no meaning whatever. and from 2 Cf."Need there is. St. the doctrine of Time and Eternity will be discussed in Vedic. De ordine 2. does not imply a "bieginning in time" but an origin in the First Principle. and Islamic contexts. whether of place or time. that unextended point of time which is Now (nunc stans). "Time" is . methinks. that inasmuch as time and the world presuppose each other and in terms of "creation" are "concreated".either all or any part of the continuumof past and future duration. 51: "In this world of sense it is indeed necessary to examine carefully what time and place are. Hence it is commonly argued in Christian exegesis that ev adXf. th. and so contrasted with ieternity as everlasting duration without beginning or end. Christian. "What was God [the Eternal] doing before he made the world?" the answer being. Greek. X. 3)2. in principio. 2 . Augustine.
TOOV. and phenomenon. it is "we" who move. and there seems to be an endless series of nows. It is a matter of relativity. and this has an intimate bearing on the nature of language itself. or idea. "now" succeeds "now" without interruption. or 3 . denken. as measures. Here confusion only arises because for any consiousness functioning in terms of time and space.we have to speak of an ultimate reality that is not any thing.-much as the sun onlv seems to rise and set because the earth revolves. res. and "thing" with "think". of which the primary application is always to concrete things. collectively adding up to "time". and probably reor. "think". ens) whether reality or being can be predicated of any "thing" 3 that exists in the flux 3 The words "real" and "thing" have an interest of their own. of which a "sum" is unthinkable. and only seems to move. The metaphysical doctrine simply contrasts time as a continuum with the . but coincides with the real present or now of which temporal experience is impossible.this the logical deductionfollows that God [the Eternal] is creating the world now.eternity that is not in time and so cannot properly be called everlasting. The problem that arises is that of the locus of "reality" (satyam. That a "thing" is an appearance to which a name is given is precisely what is implied by the Sanskrit and Pali expression nIzma-rupa (name. "estimate". as much as he ever was. This would imply that appearances are endowed with reality and a quasi-permanence to the extent that we name them. so that we must resort to negative terms (via negativa) when '. "Real" is connected with Lat. while the Now is unmoved. all alike are zeros. This confusion can be eliminated if we realise that none of these nows has any duration and that.
67 viihninassa arammanam). S. Ov and Sanskrit satyam (from as. cf. and in the same way for Plato.of time and is therefore never self-same. Sum. The distinction goes back at least to Plato's opposition of yEvess bhava to ovoia = astita. the "nature referred to is that primary and formless matter that can be informed.. or only of entities or an all-inclusive entity not in time and therefore always the same. "nameless". one cannot say of the modifications that they are. Theol. 1. and cognition. and to be distinguished from "being" or "essence" in seipso sistens. 41. In these senses. 1. is the "real". "Name-and-appearance in combination with consciousness are to be found only where there are birth and age and death. to "be"). 1.-ens satyam can be predicated of existents4. only where there is motion involving a cognizibility as such or such" (D. 63). 6.18) or "by which the Father begets" (St.. survives in St. if even to say that much is permissible (Timaeus 50 A. are used in the strict sense of ex alio sistens. or et bonum convertuntur. 5). CU. Augustine (De Trin.. properly speaking. but only that they are "such and such". only where there is signification. A brief discussion of this problem will provide a setting for the treatment of the traditional doctrine of time and eternity. like T6 ovoia (from dE/i. 4 . "good". 2. The Vedantic position is that all differentiation (naturation or qualification) is a matter of terminology (vacarambhanam vikarah. B). Thomas. "for they change even while we speak of them". "exist". "true". "the same account must be given of the nature that assumes all bodies. interpretation. or falling away and uprising. that which is ultimately real being. In this passage. all the accountable individualities susceptible of statistical investigation. for which body) of which the reference is to all dimensioned objects. to "be"). Orth. 4-6. etc. De fid. "existent". 4 Throughout the present article. nature as being that by which the Generator generates" (Damascene. 2.
b6xacoovvr. 8. Justice. Paradiso 4. one of His names "who alone is today today and tomorrow" (BU.4.15.. unless that Truth shine upon it. 7 with Comm. 3). that thou art" (CU."things" in all their variety the collective term is "name-and-shape" (ndma-rupe. Lex Aeterna (BU. 10. and as which it is differentiated (BU. 6 The Vedantic and Buddhist distinction of empirical knowledge. 14). also. o6Ayo. Met. the Spirit of Life is concealed" (etad amrtam satyena channam. 6).Thomas (De ente et essentia).3). BU. In the same way.7. it is "that Reality. 11).2). from the intellectually valid and axiomatic truth of first principles is the 5 . just as the Sun. 15. teSdm esa satyam. valid for practical purposes. tdbhydm ayam pranas channah.). 1. 1. and prob-able. 6.16.3. BU. but "the Truth that the Self is.4.. 20). 10. Isa Up. the powers of the soul are "true" or "real".2. 1.3.uoepq. 124-126) 5. prano vd amrtam. 2.1. "nor ever can our intellect be sated. is the Reality of their reality. CU.5). 6. is concealed by his rays (JUB.6. In this absolute sense. Truth or Reality (satyam) is synonymous with Dharma. that Self. 23): and he only who knows this Ultimate Truth (param&rtha-satyam) can be called a master- speaker (ativadati. 7.6. which he is asked to dispel so that his "fairer form" may be seen (BU. that of the name-and-shapeby which God is present in the world (SB 11. the Truth. Aristotle. 6. 1. xatl 6 .4. beyond which no truth has range" (Dante. 5. CU. 1. "the Immortal. and is fully dealt with by St.16). 3. namarupe satyam. 1. or Truth of their truth" (satyasya satyam. 6): and by this (relative) truth.
1. Diels frs. from the relative truth of name-and-form that the Comprehensor is liberated (namarupad vimuktah.28). Dogm.2. The Vedanta does not in fact. surviving in Leibnitz'two forms of intuition.It is. and Plato. Truth absolutely. (Sextus Empiricus.and perhaps actually.and truth to being (Parmeopinion corresponding nides. to becoming. for example. 2. the distinction.8. deals only with the "bastard" Modern"pragmatism". Mungd. however it may be a valid truth for practical purposes. which avoids the textremes "is" and same as that of "opinion" from "truth" in Greek philosophy. also.the former reachedby the senses. and does not begin".respectively bastardand legitimate. That Safikaracarya misinterprets the Buddhist position. 22. 1. the modernconcept of art as a merely aesthetic experience. we expect (though we do not know) that the sun will rise tomorrow. and act accordingly.Up. it is a falsity or unreality (anrtam) when compared with the "Truth of the truth. of course. 2. evidenced by all criteria. 6 . 31). the latter intelligible.Hence. BrSBh. and it is by this falsity that our True Desires" are obscured. is virtually. In other words. 8). the other "the truth of reason". Diogenes Laertius 9. 138 f.29). the former reachedby the senses. 2. as has so often been asserted. truth of facts.who recognized"two forms of knowledge. Timaeus 28. then.reason being the criterion". opinionhaving to do with "thatwhichbegins and perishes" and truth with "that which ever is.).Adv. 2. 3. "the nonexistence of external objects is refuted by the fact of our apprehension of them" (nabhiva upalabdheh. temporal "things" are both real and unreal. according to which.-"for tattvam) of this world of affairs. deny an existthe distinct suchness (anyatence of temporalia. cannot be denied" (BrSBh. one giving "the truth of fact".a restatementof Democritus.
7. An existence (esse) they have. nirmanakara) in whom the paradigm subsists. nor are at all" (nec sunt). Anaxagoras. "illusion" cannot properly ble predicated in an object. and with the Christian doctrine as formulated by St. and saw that they neither altogether are.Dogm. 7 6 ."is not" (S. it can only arise in the percipient. and yet no existence.dva) are the vision of things unseen" (SextusEmpiricus. because they are not what Thou art. that remains unchangeably. they are neither beautiful.Adv. Augustine in Conf. and are (sunt). but when "compared to Thee. 1. Heaven and Earth are beautiful and good.20. nor good.e"the things that were made" for the reality after which they were made. nor altogether are not. is not "the real thing" of which it is an imitation.2. is irrelevant in the present connection. Cf. cf.4: "I beh. BG. The point of importance is that the Vedantic position is in perfect agreement with the Platonic.17. since God made them". For only that really is. though it exists.16). the shadow is a shadow.ta) in the sense that an imitation."things apparent (ta (pazvo. The Vedantic doctrinle that the world is "of the stuff of art" (miay-maya) is not a doctrine of "illusion" but merely distinguishes the relative reality of the artefact from the greater reality of the Artificer (mayin. The world is an epiphany. whatever we make of it. which is that things are "false" (y)eSbo-= uan. because they are from Thee.eld these others beneath Thee. 11 and 11. 140). and Romans1.2. the phenomenon itself for that of which phenomena are appearances! 6 Moreover. and it is no one's fault but our own if we mistak.
my Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power . 4. i. combination or union (sarmhita) ". to pronounce them in Pratrnna fashion separately [as aT] is appropriate for on!e who desires only the sky (yonder world). To pronounce in Nirbhuja fashion without distinction [as e] is appropriate for one who desires only food.eral. 7. in the intervenient Middle Way [as ai... 2.. 8 . Sathdhi. 3. and CU. In gen. a series of progenitive triads is expounded on the analogy of grammatical crasis. as Sayana says. g. as in AB. cf. their combination or union (samthiht) the child. the "posterior form" the father. Earth and Sky. includes both and is appropriate for one who desires both worlds. Voice and 1 Evidently to be taken here in the sense of the hermeneia saman == s + ama "she and he". 23. and so "the mora that declares the crasis is their harmony (saman)1. the crasis of prior and posterior forms [e. really neither confuses nor splits them apart.. 6. 1. the "prior form" is the mother. 1 and 7. in divinis. of a+ 1l. 53. JUB. e.3. AA. cf. within you. diphthong]. 51ff. to pronounce them in Ubhayamantarena fashion. parents of the Gale or Lightning or Time (kMla): or subjectively.5ff.I HINDUISM In SA. Analogous triads are. earth (this world).
and Prescience2 and Faith.). as he has. parents of Sacrificial-Action (karma)3. 516). as an honorific. 10. All measures of time.. 55. 3. and the present (bhava) 5 is their union (samhiti). and cf. for bhutam. After "hidden Name" might have been added AA. and his wife. the doctrine of "Total Presence". "the past (bhitam) is the prior and the future (bhavyam) the posterior form. 7. and by these All This (world. SBE XLVIII. 5 Note that bhavat. and stasis.Mind. 2. The text goes on: "Time (kala) unites procession. as. 2 9 . and far extending. rightly. that of the Stasis. That is. 8. e. above. or Truth. 10. this is the doctrine attributed by Ramanuja to the Jains: "'Time' is a particular atomic substance which is the cause of the current distinction of past.g. are united in this union (samihit. or Self. or Knowledge.1. psychologically. procession (gati == pravrtli) and recession (nivrtti).. "past". from dhvamtsi's up to Years. or universle) is united"4. 2. tasmin devih sarvayujo bhavanti and AV. parents of the Breath. or product". and future" (in comment on BrS 2. the Aranyaka quotes RV. parents of stasis (sthiti).31.2. recession. Aitareya Aranyaka. Milton.3. "'Sov'ran Presence". But the most significant from the present point of view is the further triad. 3 Cf. present. Faith. whereby thou madest past6 and Future (bhuiam .--"it unites these times" (kalan satndadh&ti). 210.10 where the sacrificer represents Truth. 1909. Subjectively. SB. "Great is that hidden Name. bhavyam)" Pra/nii: Keith's mistaken and unintelligible "offspring" merely reflects the misprint praj/ in his own edition of the text. is also "Presence". 11. in divinis. 4 Essentially... 6 Keith's "present" is an obvious slip. In illustration of this. and AB. 4 yasmin namii.
. in one and the same frame. primitive atemporal era.53. p. 47 stutdh. in which the Law is being fulfilled" (Laura Thompson. Aitareya Aranyaka. 'was born' or aor. p. 1945. what hath been and shall be 7. 3. 16.Hopi. Brabant. It may be worth noting in the present context that "the original sense of the perfect was not distinguished from the present in point of time but denotes a state" and that this "oldest sense is common in the Rgveda. "not impf. 894). 211. cf. "are survivals of a. time is not cut up into segments which can be measured. 1. when 'preterites' were used indifferently for the present" (G. Sanskrit Grammar 889. Again. or a year. n. having been born' . p.. 81. 542): "Once we have rid our minds of the idea of parts of Time. American Anthropologist 47. n. Bonfante in Word I. he can. which is also the light that is now. 1.and might have cited AV. n.5 and 54. in Genesis. 177). a day.3: "Sent forth by Time (kala). Examples of participles are "the originally timeless force of the form krtya" (ib. but it is rather conceived as a duration. 22 [skambha = brahma] yatradityis rudrai-ca vasavas-ca [the prin!zih of CU. Time and Eternity in Christian Thought. ['past'] participles which express a completed action whose results persist into the present". 1945. 1. all the notes are held together by the uninterrupted succession which in this . 1909. and BD. and in RV. 5 jito.. The common Buddhist expression yathk bhufam. 1937. Whitney.. p. H. used with reference to things "as they really are" implies the ripening of past causation in present effect. 148). "Logico-aesthetic Integration in Hopi Culture". the "long 10 . As I have often remarked. elsewhere often = devah] samahiiah. 'has just been born' but 'exists. Keith. no time interval can be inferred as between "Let there be light" and "There was light". 19. 8 and 247. "To the . 179.case is the tun:e" (F. Something of the same sort can also be recognized in that kind of ancient art in which successive events of what is verbally expressed by narrative are represented as if occurring simultaneously. like an hour. not "were praised" but "are praised". 8. p. Some scholars assume that such forms as he may. "as become".
22: "Wherein what hath been and shall be. for example. 115. 4. The contrast of "standing" with "going" may be noted in Mbh. 1.96. and contrasting with gam. to "stand". recession. 19. Hle is both today and tomorrow". to "go" or "move".-a statementthat is not specific as to time or place. "be in a given state". Hebrew olam. land". 1). 53 where Time is the source of past and present. and stasis" (kalo galinivrfti-sthitih samdadhiti. "exist". 10. 13 "Lord of what hath been and shall be.. implying instability: "what goes" and "what stands" together making up the whole lof the existence of which the Sun is the Self (RV. implying stability. This last can only mean that here Time (as in AV. cal. 13. renderedby Gk atov): and a remarkableillustrationof this can be cited in the fact that the Indianfable so often begins with asti. and KU. 7. "Time unites procession. "There is". 20). above (1).6 where the Sun ago" or "once upon a time" with which our fairytales begin are really timeless expressions (cf. and all worlds are instant (prati-tisthata). SA. that Time is on a par with Lightning and (2) the words. "There is a city in a certain myth is really des yaoe v d&XZ.beginning asti kasmin-cit pradese nagaram. that of the Stasis in which the two contrary motions momentarily coincide. The 11 .stand apart . and so cannot be identified with either one or both of these durations) is a static point.the first story in the Pancatantra. but which otherwise separates them. and AV. Time hath lengendered what hath been and shall be". The root in sthiti is sthi. Note. what it may be". Axis Mundi). 7.. or car. tell me thou of that Pillar (skambha.
8. I. The problem is fully dealt with by Aristotle (Phys.in the case of vertical projection there is no actual time. that is not."stands at mid-day for half a twinkling of an eye" (in Jamadagni's words. "but only that it 'is there at an instantaneous 'now' (etSatEv ryZ viv) and not in any space or period of time at all" (Wicksteed and Cornford's rendering). a real pause in the Zenith was always: miraculous 7.tihirya. When a missile is projected not merely . 262 A). 7 As in J.reversal takes place is no more an actual stopping place than are any of the other of the indefinitely numerous 12 . 8.upwards but at the same time forwards. but still moves for others. 13 "the sun stood still in the midst of heaven". and this is expressly a pl. and we do not even imagine that it stops or hangs for however short a time at the highest point of the curve. ever stop 8. and neither does the revolution of the earth. For even for those who thought of the sun as daily ascending and descending. and Joshua 10. during which it "hangs". however short. The point at which the .reached" or "has left" the point at which the reversal takes place. which first rises and then falls. madhyahne vai nimesardham tif$hasi). of course. but only a point without duration in which the upward and downward motions. thrown into the air vertically. which makes the sun seem to rise and decline. past and future. it also rises first and then falls. who shows that when the direction of motion of a continuously moving object is reversed we cannot properly say that the object "has . to be thought of as a measurable period of time. and in the same way . addressed to the Sun. but its course is an unbroken curve. 58 where the sun stands still above thte Bodhisatta for so long as he is plunged in jhdna. 8 Consider a stone. meet. how long does it "hang" in the air before it begins to fall again? The answer to this depends upon the fact that the vertical projection of a missile. is only the limiting case of a course that is really curved.
the Sun 9 "having risen in the Zenith. no yesterday.14. CXXXVIII. 16. 10 "Thy sun shall nevermore go down". series has no place. 24. "all rest is in time" (Phys. "the Sun of the Angels" as distinguished from "the sun of sense". 3) 10. 4.On the other hand. but the Sun whom not all know with the mind". Philo's "Sun of the sun". 53. 11. Isaiah 60. 54. 11 Abhiksnam = abhi (intensive) + ksanam. AV 10. 1. 279.-that concept (samkalpa)" points on the way. And. 23. and within you. In any case. also. 8.--"not the sun whom all men see. 7. Paradiso 10. Augustine.. Conf. SB. but will stand (slhalr) in the middle . e. it should be realised that the final "coming to rest" of the object on the ground is not a "stasis". 2.not. St. will . 3. Plotinus.no more rise nor set. That which. 221 B). in each of which the object might have stopped but did . 12. with reference to Brahma. "There all is one day. "the eternal day which neither dawns nor sets". Apollo as distinguished from Helios. That in the Lightning that flashes forth and makes one blink (nyamimisat). Many other parallels could be cited.. 13 . Dante.14. "there is this indication: in divinis. Spec. 20. Augustine In Ps. 2. 1. XI. 4. 13. as it were. comes to the mind.g.possible confusion. Enneads 4. and St. no tomorrow". it is onoe-and-for-all (sakrt) day" (CU. see IAOS. as in the case of the miracles cited 7. 9 Here the "intelligible Sun". i. To avoid any . but only a condition of relative immobility for some period of time beginning from the terminus of the particular kind of motion first considered. For the Comprehensor of this Brahmopanisad. though this does not arise in connection with the sun or earth. and by which one instantly (abhiksnam)ll remembers. of which the motion is continuously of the same kind. e. Plutarch. Moralia 393 D. so in that of the Comprehensor.
"Suddenlya light. 2.6). Sakrt is "one-making". cf. in the primarysense of this word.6.8 + BU. will be enkindled in the soul". 55). the Full Awakening (abhisambodhi)of a Buddha is "single-instantaneous" (ekaksana-).the Immortal.Truth". 5): on which Deussen comments. as if from a leaping fire.a brilliance"like lightning in that it lights up the whole body at once". and simple. revelation and illumination. "in the Lightning. 4. 2. "eye". iks. 4. 3 lokuttara-camatkfira-priZna. Cf. Zen satori. 2. is precisely to "consider". Evans. Obermiller in Acta Orientalia 11. as it were a sudden (sakrt) flash of lightning.v.and passes like a flash of lightning" (Eckhart.Up. VII.pure. In some uses. I. Plutarch. Brahma. Cf. abhi + an obsolete iksnam. to "see". note: or perhaps better. Acts 22. flashes through the soul like lightning and offers itself in a single moment's experienceto and vision".De Iside c. i. s.that is conceptual. and even such is his splendor who is a Comprehensor thereof" (JUB. Numbers12. "tasting of Brahma".entanen (Sechzig Upanishad's des Vedas. in der Seele an dem mom. Vorstellungsbilde" 1907. For the Abhisamayalainkra. and Index. gateway.Ksana should also be noted as "leisure" and "festival". 7. 82.Kaus. the End of the Road has been reached.26. ed. 4. the Harmony (sdman). 12 Lightning is the standardsymbol of divine manifestation. Lat. Ep. "the principleof knowledge. "the Lordspake suddenly when unto Moses". "suddenlythere shone from heaven a great light". Many other parallels could be cited. Plato. Sanskrit Literature 229): the opposite of asakrt. 14 . 4. "Das zeitlose Brahman hat sein Symbol in der Natur an dem momentanen Blitze. 77. 208) 12.MU. "the moment apprehension of (supreme)illumination is short-lived.409.Vedic Grammar 306. Keith. mora: and also ksana as "opportunity".(Kena Up. MU. 4. 3. "The Person in the Lightning is the Breath. 1.e.a-krt= "lightning": and in the Sahitya with reference to the Darpana 3. 11. "once". "recurrent".81. "but once" (Macdonell. 11. ksana-dyutiand nime. see E. The event is truly "momentous".
not itself a lutely-is duration. "Time"-absothe source of all relative times. transcendentand immanent. 2). 427-430. From Time advance to their full growth. also death) 14 reflows afar.In AV.3. for they are only the occasion of his rising and setting" (VddhulaSitra). both. two forms of Brahma. again. As it has been said: From Time flow forth all beings. 13 14 15 . aspects of the two natures (dvaitibh'ava)13 of the single essence (tad ekam). It is in these terms that the Maitri Upanisad distinguishes the "two forms" (dve ripe) of Brahman. 6. Eternity..3. and the Timeless. time (kata.'Time' is the formed (miirti) and formless. Cf. i. cited above. 2."is called time (kala). "for the Comprehensor it is evermore high noon" (CU. And in Time. and its form is that of the Year . who devours all existences (bhtutfni) as his food" (Maitri Up. "Day and night are death. win home. thinking 'Time is Brahma' (kalam brahmeti). cf. as "time and the Timeless (kalas-cikalas-ca): "From one who worships. 7. Claudian. Prajapati . 3. 15 The solar Self (alman).e.8. That which is prior to the sun is the Timeless (akala) and partless (akala). 19. 11. MU. but that which begins with the sun is the time that has parts (sakala).. to which all moveable time is ever present.. 2. it is from this all-devouringsolar time or death that the concept of a timeless Time is a deliverance.22 etc. BU. but really "he never rises nor sets" (AB.Stilicho 2.44). but they do not affect the divinity Aditya '(Sol invictus). time.53 and 54.3).. As it has been said: MU. Self 15. 6. indeed. but rather the Timeless. There are.
. days. and years exist apart" 16 The formless and undividedTime of MU. "at the command (aiia. years. specific. and of whatever fair or foul there is to be seen in the world" (MU. future and present. without beginning or end. omnipresent (nityo nityinim . immortal.14-16)16.The time (that has parts) cooks (pacati. i. 20 cited above).. past. correspondsto the absolute Time that "unitesprocession.. indeed. eko bahinam . 6. Lord of what has been and shall be. amrta . Logos) the moments (nimesi). But the Comprehensor of That (Time without parts) in which time itself Is cooked. the One of the many. "Other than 'has been' and 'shall be'.15.. as a verb. also "Word".. arrangements(kalpita. 4.e. kalakdrah. . all-maker. all-knower.13-19): hence to exercise authority) of that to know. he knows the Vedas! This extended (vigraha. Vivekaciiudmani all duration is an articulateform imposed by our own thinking on a Reality to which all such articulation is foreign. and to Saikara's "impartiteTime" (ni4kalakala) of which the aeons. hypostasised) tim. (the ultimate source) of All This here. In other words..13).e is the regal-river of begotten beings . seasons and all other "times" are only "imagined" 497). 16 . matures) all things. Up. 7... He alone is today and tomorrow" (KU. the constant amongst the inconstant. 2.. hours. In the Great Self. niskalam) is the "creator of time" (klaakalah.and stasis" (SA. visvakrd visvavit . 3. primarily Imperishable (aksara.14. sarvago .. Svet. "who is partless... then. 6. He...recession.
and cannot be further divided up . "the Deliverer" (taraka). and the continuous flow of such moments is their 'course' (krama) . it reminds us also of Meister Eckhart's saying. And such is what William Morris rightly calls "the entering in of time from the halls of the outer heaven".. empirical self or "I". 6. a moment (ksaRa) is the "ultimate minimumof time. For the Yoga Sitra Bhisya 3. The whole world passes through a mutation in any one moment. Finally. 52. 54). for the Viedanta.9). how can the words 'I am omniscient' 18hold good for the I. so all the external qualities of the world are relative to this present moment". can she pass over to the unknown good". The control of the moments and their sequence leads to a discriminative gnosis.. of which the final development (ibid.. since 'it' can only be seen for an instant (ksanikatvddarsantt). that exists for a moment only?" (aham"How can that which is never in the same state be anything?" (Cratylus 439 E).(vidhrtas tilthanti.. It will be seen that this is the same procedure that is described in the Buddhist Kalacakratantracited below.8. 18 "The Self knows everything". Their uninterrupted course is what is called 'time' . and all times.the reality or actuality of things is only momentary.it is folly to say of the world that it "is" 17. 17 17 . BU. etc. withoutregard-to-their-course (akrama) as its object".. MU. "Not till the soul knows all that there is to be known.7. This could not be said of the inconstant.. and "neither is 'I' a substance. 3. "has all things for its object.
or potential) engendered by all that has taken place in the past. by Whitehead (The Concept of Nature. however inoons19 For the Buddhist doctrine in detail see the following chapter.147). A. 73) who insists that "past and future meet and mingle in an ill-defined present" [i.e. It is not in the instantaneous present. but that is an objection that would only hold good if the doctrine had been one of a discontinuous time made up of successive instants. for example. 3.2. 2. that causality operates. In view of this it is difficult to follow Sahkara's polemic in BrSBh. 18 . 20 directed against the Buddhist doctrine of "instant dissolution" (ksatiika-bhanga-vdda) 19. and it cannot be too strongly insisted that in the traditional doctrine everywhere time and space are uninterrupted continuities. and that were it otherwise the hare would never succeed in passing the tortoise. It is only when time is thought of as discontinuous that the operation of causality becomes unthinkable. and that the "individuality". and carries along with it the momentum (. 20 It seems to be from exactly the same point of view (involving a misunderstanding of the traditional doctrine) that the notion of the "instantaneous present" is rejected in "modern" theories of time. whereas the Buddhist doctrine is that the stream of existence is incessant (na ramati. This is to ignore that any such "ill-defined" present must consist of two parts always "with a narrow ledge of definite instantaneous present" determining them. in what Buddhaghosa calls the "extended moment" (santati-khana)]. Saikara rejects the Buddhist doctrine on the ground that it is incompatible with the operation of causality 20. 293). p. but in time and space. but without interrupting their continuity because it has no duration and is not in time.adeh ksanikasya. Vivekacuddamai 230.
"so it is with the powers (vvdaiesi) in seeds (each with its corresponding matter.e. Augustine "the world is pregnant with the causes of things as yet unborn".2. 21 This "sooner or later" is essential to a proper understanding of the concepts of "gradation" and "evolution ". "so that at this time or that. In other words. The traditional idea of "evolution" is "emergent".45). and in this or that way. coming out 19 . 16). 5. whether sooner or later21. the thing created may emerge. analogous to this phylogeny is the ontogeny of individual organisms. Accordingly for St. John 5.tant. the formare.. 3..9. And there already are the formative-principles of (ev vZ the hand and the eye. which will be separately known when they come into being together with their sensible matter. The doctrine of "seminal reasons" is not unlike the theory of "genes" by which we now interpret "heredity".. but it "comes into being at that time 'when it ought to come into being"' (De gen. Just as the pure Intellect embraces the ideas of many things in simultaneous identity with itself. all present at one point active-principles (AoyoL) vl vre).6).17" (ib. is always the heir of past actions of which the effects mature in due course.. a thing or species is eternal in the Word of God "in which there is no then and sometime". break out and be outwardly created in some way by the unfolding of their proper measures" (De Trin. 1. as it were. This some call the 'nature in the seed' . and "as in the seed there are invisibly and at one time all the things which in course of time will grow into a tree.23. their preexistence as possibilities is what is meant by "gradation". as possibilities) "before in the course of time they [actually] came into being in the shape in which they are now known to us in those works which 'God worketh until now'. as species are included in a genus. not distinguishable in the whole. ad litt.. Further. while their emergence in the course of time is their "unfolding" or "evolution".. so the universe must be conceived" and in this way those things which are producted by the operation of physical causes existed potentially (i. such as moisture). which.
History of Indian Philosophy 2. moulds the matter by bestowing upon it the formativeprinciples. 6.22). ad lilt. Aquinas. and this Self is eternal. St. oJEesarxo's). Given the formative principle. 12. 1) 22 admits that cognitions are momentary (kSatika) but. he says "not as in the Buddhist scriptures 'lasting for a moment only"' (eka-ksattavasthdyinyah). 56). expounds the nature of the Self to his son by comparing it to the infinitesimal germ that you cannot see in the seed. 368. though the rise of consciousness in it is occasional.8. 1. 141. "Sicut autem in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul quae per tempora in arborem surgerent". 5. Katha Up. Enneads 5. 24 All experiencesor intuitions being ever present to the "one 20 .. the experient" (bhokti mahe'svarah. But the opposition is unreal. and the matter that can receive that seminal reason (o6yo. 3. because the like light from fire. 10). 7). for there is also a continuity (samthana) because of which the experiencing Self 23 is called a Unity (ekataya acyate). 367. and not mechanicallyas so many have said. the Vedantist Cakrapani. taking for granted that "the Self (Spirit") knows everything" (Maitri Up. Manu 1. 45). but it is very much in the same way that Uddalaka.55. "the Lord. cf. Maitri Up. "because of the concurrence of its own past and future intuition" (nityatvam catmanah pirvaparivasthttubhut artha-pratisamdhant) 24. commenting on the Caraka-samhita (1..1. 22 See in Das Gupta. 23 "Experient immanent Person" (bhokti puruso'ntasthah.23. 4). 11. "whom the wise call the experient" (bhoktety ahur manlsinah. but will become such a great banyan tree as you see yonder (Chandogya Up. constant. The Indian texts are rather less detailed. 6.9. Th.6 and 10). 6. the living thing itself must come into being" (Plotinus. or eternal. De gen. Bhagavad Gita 13.Again.
. "in") has also the primary meanings of "innate" "native". it is clear 'enough from the canonical Buddhist scriptures that while the Buddhadenied the reality of the transient self (of which he allowed a postulation only for everyday purposes). often synonymous with suk. The word anu. cf. 5. ?-vi. Note that nitya (tfni. but does mean "indivisible particle or principle". others to do the same. "canon". or paramdna and anutva. whereas. it can have been only of the Self-"the Lord of the self". while the Vedantist continuity and unity is that of the true experient. Hence one might render Cakrapani's formula more freely: "The intrinsic nature of the Self is its present contemporaneity with whatever has been or will be". and recommends. "own". at once my Self and the Self of all beings. 21 .erroneous supposition that in Buddhism both the transient and the real selves are denied. "innate". are and only transmigrant. "own". The whole. ni-ja. 3 to JAOS. so that aut. is an admirably concise enunciation of the doctrine that eternity is that Now to which the past and future are ever present. saci.380-that he is speaking when he "takes refuge" in it himself. Ok. 4. Indian and Platonic"..sma. "needle"). 1944. Reference must also be made to the Indian "atomism". Dh. and ni-vid. "code". Supplement No.. Cakrapani's formula.Buddhist predication of a merely "single-moment-enduring" experience is to the transient self that is "not my Self". Prasna Up. the Lord".: see my "Recollection. "subtle" or "acute" (cf. is not literally "atom". 160. etc. "Vorschrift". explaining the meaning of nityalvam. or almost the whole basis of the Vedantist critique of Buddhism seems to rest upon the .
and may be translated accordingly. "Atomism" is primarily associated with the Vaisesika position (darsana). and SA. where he says that for KanadaTime is the ultimate cause and for this idea elsewhere refers only to Svet. 1. and on the other RV. atom etc. and kaninaka.nimanby "minimum". related to kana as used for alpa in comparative and superlative forms. or to a "point" of time. cain. Ir.The contentsof the Sutrasis conveniently summarised by Das Gupta. and I render a. ignoring on the one hand MU. young or virgin girl. the related ani is the sharp "point" of anything. but Das Gupta's own commentsmust be read with some reservations. undefiled.g. 22 . History of Indian Philosophy I. from kana. 10. mote. in which alone it becomes a possibility to pass through "solid matter" or wherever there is no dimension through which to pass. 55. so the reference of anu may be either to a "point" of space. references cited above. Up. e. cf. though in some contexts it stands rather for the power to assume the "minimum" form (which is really that of the "threadspirit". 2 and the AV. without duration. without dimension. 8. is to explain Dharma (Eternal Law) as the ground on the one hand of eventuation (abhyadaya) 25 and on the other of the "Atom-eater".the real equivalents of "atom" and "atomicity". drop. 1. Furthermore. and just as z'aroto can be used of either spatial or temporal minima. and present in such words as kanya.. ch. Kanada's25 avowed purpose in the Vaisesika Sitras. sutratman). minutium. such as an axle or needle. which takes its name from the fact that the material atoms are regarded as having each its own "particular" (visesa) eternal quality or substance. regarded by Das Gupta as pre-Buddhist. pupil of the eye. 2.
i. "The characteristic of the traditional solution of the space-time problem is that reality is both in and out of space. not clad with any quality of thy being".414-8). 27 This is a proposition quite different from Descartes' Cogito ergo sum. Time is the cause of temporalia.. B). posterior (no longer in existence).. as for the Vedanta. p. 23 . like "the horns of a hare"). mutually exclusive (definitive.Summum Bonum (nihsreyasam). 28 Thus both one and many. where the argument is based on behaviour and leaves us still in an ego-centric predicament.e. it is one in all. both temporal and eternal. prior (potentiality of existence). 5. "Self" is not an inference drawn from behaviour. Causality (hetu) is relation. but absent from eternal things. and because of this yutasiddhy-abhava need not be thought of as either "connected" or "dis26 Thus. as in Buddhism. the four types are recognized. 270). the validity of the Vedas is established by the fact that such are their results. 16. The Intelligible World. 4. both in and out of time" (Wilbur Urban. Ruml's "one single soul that is nominally manifold in relation to bodies" (Mathnavi. Kanada's "I" refers to what the author of the Book of Privy Counselling calls "the naked blind feeling of thine own being. but seems to be many because of the particular limitations of the things in which it is manifested 28. "this is a jar" implying "is not a cloth"). Plato's "nature that assumes all bodies" (Timaeus 50A. 10. but cause and effect have no independent existence. as in SB. Nonexistence (asat) is the absence of activity and quality. in the world and not of it. and absolute (antinomial. and many only logically. but directly known in the experience "I"27. Liberation26. 2. one really. passim.
but even so would seem to leave the Vaisesika system fundamentally valid if regarded strictly as a "point of view" (darsana). and can no more than aggregates be thought of as everlasting. Sankara's rejection of the Vaisesika doctrine of the elemental atoms in BrSBh.junct". nor Greek ttro. however small. in passing. i. "indivisible" (acchedya)29. 2.16. avibhaktamt ca bhiitesu . "minute". An atom is "an everlasting uncaused existence" (sad akaranam. nityam.2. 18. 4 "the Spirit of God indivisibly divided to all". particles. and are no longer atomic. 13. atomicity (anutva) and magnitude (mahattva) are the basis of the concepts large and small. We can now consider the true atomicity or homogeneity 29 BG. 4. cf.e.. BO. 24. what must be avoided is any confusion of material "atoms" with the really atomic and partless time or space that is not a "part" of time or space in the way that material atoms are parts of things in time or space. Let us observe.. all production "depends on the operation of unseen causality" (adrstakarika).os. the atoms themselves are spherical. there is Liberation. and where there is no such causal operation. VS. 2. vibhaktesu. must be of some size. In any case.11-17 consists . 1). The "atoms" of modern science have been "split". 20.ontology in which the development of physical atoms is taken for granted and no attempt is made to go behind them. but composite. but both can be predicated of the same thing at the same time.essentially in a demonstration that constituent parts of things. 24 . actually predicatesan absolute lack of size. this is undeniable. as an . Clement of Alexandria Stromata 6. that neither Sanskrit anu.
31 Anim na rathyam .17).. 85. ard iva rathanTbhausamthat . Oxford. The subject is very difficult. its "point" corresponds to Dante's "punto dello stelo a cui la prima rota va dintorno . 10..e. 35. ana occurs only as an adjective.3 where the Brahman Kandviya is looked down upon because he "did not seek for what is atomic in the Saman (anu samnah). as in JUB. but has no decided view. Atomicity and immensity are attributed simultaneously to the ultimate reality in so For an excellent and much fuller discussion of Indian atomism. i. Keith. 11 + 17.. and the proposition really answers the (perfectly intelligible) question. 12 vyano aksah). But ani (xEVtrov)as "axle-point" is significant in I. 1921. Keith considers it possible that the Indian theory may be partly of Greek origin. 25 . and in so far as the question is one of material (elemental) atomicity or particularity has no very important bearing on the doctrine of time and eternity. In RV. adhi. 2.10. B. Up.of the ultimate reality without further reference to Kauada 30. qualifying the "fingers" that prepare and qualify the Soma. "How many angels can stand on the point of a needle?" Elsewhere anu stands for the "fine point" or "subtle essence" of anything. "fine". in which respect PracinaSalisurpassed him". yatra. 2.. 6 where "as upon the axle-point of the [cosmic] chariot stand fast the immortals" (inim na rathyam amrtEdhi lasthuh)31: and since the "axle" here must be identified with the pneumatic Axis Mundi (RV. Kandviya had "missed the point". 6. Indian Logic and Atomism. da quel punto depende il cielo e tutta la natura" (Paradiso 13. 3. see A. Mund...
Manu 1.13). 2. and this implies at the same time a total and omnipresence..2 + 3. the atomic (anam etam ipya). Truth (satyam. 26 . existential or sensational sense. BrSBh. 1 7. 3. r6 ov). 6. 2.20. Up. 12. 3. 9) 32.. and as in the Buddhist propositions. 19-29 on the anutva and mahaliva.. Svet. S. 1925. 444). "less than an atom. then is he glad" (KU. 3. 45). p. The Yogi who makes himself a master of the elements can reduce himself to this minutiumor attain magnitude at will (Yoga Sitra 3. Immortal . that art thou" (CU.which these two.wmntrika. KU. "that imperceptible minutium (animan) that you cannot detect in the seed by dissection. and the coincidence in eternity of whatever is 'everlasting with whatever is now. 32 33 Dharmyam here in its ontological.things originated causally" (hetusampanna dhammnt.. 2. extremes meet. .). A. siikmataram .56).. 547). greater than these On this cf. "Less than the atoms (anubhyo'nu).-sicut erat in principio. with reference to "things" (as rightly main- tained by Keith. 2. cf. that is this atomic Self" (brhac-ca ... is "of merely atomic measure" (a. 9).. when it inhabits any seed. 13): "When a mortal has torn away all that exists (dharmyam)33 and hath obtained Him. 5. Religion and Philosophy of the Veda. that is Self (atman). At once immense and very subtle. minutenessand immensity of the Self. eso'nur dmai. "less than a grain of rice . that is the imperishable Brahma.. and all. that is the Truth (satyam. This Universal Self. greater than immensity" (anor anziyan. "all things are impermanent" (sabbe dhammi anicca. 2. rz ov). Up. but from which the whole tree grows. 20. in whom the worlds and their inhabitants are set. 3. 132 etc. mahato mahiiyn. Mund. that intangible taste as of salt in water.
Janua Coeli" in Zalmoxis 2. stable. indivisible. "the ancient narrow (atm = siuksma) path whereby the Contemplatives... avikdryah. liberated hence on high to the world of heavenly-light" (svargam lokam ita irdhvafmvimakith.worlds" (CU. nom. 25). that is the target of our aim (Muud. so also must be. BG. 1). and such also is. Dionysius explains that "greatness is attributed in the Scriptures to God . 3.2784-5. 8. 8). Up. 2. omnipresent. equivalent of aroyoc. although we have also translated anu. 6.-that Brahma. BU. is the razor-edged Bridge that holds these 31 Acchedya. by "atomic". "minute".. "indivisible.3).. 4. 9.. 30). The Self. 27 . If now the ultimate reality. knowers of Brahma. and Philo's "the Spirit of God.. 5. 4. atomic (to az/yrov). 6. 36 For the Janua Coeli see further my "Svayamatrnna. the Way that leads to and through it.. 2) -is so minute. if the Janua Coeli 35 is so tiny as to be imperceptible to deluded men and visible only to those who have overcome anger and mastered the powers of the soul (svargam dvdrara sauuksmam . diffused in its fulness in and through all beings" (Gig. CU. the literal Skr. tarn ta pasyanti purasa jitakrodhajitendriyah. 2. 28) is almost verbally identical with the passage cited from the Bhagavad Gita.14.24. and Smallness. in other words. immutable" (acchedyo34 . 14. or Rarity" [-= atwva or siukmata] respectively with reference to His transcendanceand His immanence (De div.. enter in. Such formulations are not at all peculiarly Indian: for example. and Truth. 2. Mbh. cf. 1941. immoveable. nityah sarvagalah s/htutr acalo . tenduring. MU.
RV. Mathnawl 1. The Road to Hel. "the causewaywhich God hath built for His liegBhaktamala. 1.31.3. p. 1. BrSBh. 6. As it descended from the heavens so it will reascendthither and at the last pass away into the Divine Majesty"). 8. 158. men from this world to the next" (Sir G. pp. Bridge of Welfare" in HJAS. VA. Before doing so. Alexander.. p. 3. 35. and few there be that find it".1. pp. Indian. X. 25.Mythology of All Races. Dance and Drama in Bali. Coomaraswamy. JAOS. 1943. p. cf.3. Ellis. 77. 7. de Zoete and W. No man cometh to the Father save by me . M. in Borneo. Spies. TS. 1910. V. Nicholson. Rfmi. 186 ("golden bridge"). Grierson in JRAS. hyperuranian36. H. It is against the background of all these contexts that we shall have to consider the Buddhist doctrine of the instant moment (khana = iksana. 273. Enter ye in at the strait gate . 8 "for he (Agni) is the warden of the waters who is offered up in the sacrifice".. "glance". trans-etherial.sa). 13 (peru). 8 (peru) and 6. 1944. nime. 28 . Because strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life. R.. A. 1. 2. As in the Christian Gospels: "I am the way . B. N. 93).. it should be noted that "time" (kala) is employed in the passages quoted above both in the plural with reference to periods of time. 106. Commentary(sirat). Am. 180. 3. 78.Al-Ghazalithe Mystic. see D.2. at once the beginning and end of time.. L. H.. B. 36 For the "The Perilous Bridge. therefore. Smith. and in the singular to denote the point of time from which duration extends both backwards and forwards and that is. 3.worlds apart and that must be crossed by all who would reach the Farther Shore. 84. 143 (the RationalSoul "is the Divine bridge stretchedbetweenthe brutes who are unmixedevil and the angels who are unmixedgood. 3700. 235.. p.. I am the door . Additional references: Setu vuccati maggo. 6.
-the "six days" referring only to the logical order of creation. where human reasoning finally "in one tremulous stroke of vision arrived at That which Is . and it is only to creatures of time that the creation presents itself as a series of events. 37 E. 13.. "Twinkling of an Eye". 4 and De genesi ad litteram 4. In other words. For some discussion of these passages see M. pp. "people of the moment".2. 34. 55). "Epic Chronology". Carre. St. Augustine. 2. 1946. 43. God is always creating the world "now. it is the same in English and in Arabic. Realists and Nominalists. Mass. H.. of CU. Oxford. where "time" and waqt may refer either to periods of time (whether long or short) or precisely to a point of time (as when we ask. and may be compared to the Islamic designation of the true Sufi as ibnm'l waqt. Conf.1. sed aciem figere non evalui). There is nothing peculiar in the verbal ambiguity of the word kala.. 1903. this instant". 44. In the latter sense Nimisa. Hopkins. 1940. and not to any sequence of divine acts. Cambridge. is implied by the naimisiyah. W. 17. as a name of God. p. "a son of the moment37a".. AlP. when God "made all things at once" (De genesi contra Manicheos 1. The Problem of Matter and Form in the De Ente et Essentia of Thomas Aquinas. in ictu trepidantis aspectus . 7. What time is it now?). cf. but I could not hold the vision" (pervenit ad id. quod est. It may be noted that ksana and nimesa may refer either to "brief moments" (measurable units of time) or to moments without duration. JAOS. 24.we have distinguished "time" as period from "Time" as principle by the use of the capital for the latter. or "evolution". 29 . 7-55. where the reference is to sacrificers. according to the context 37.. 1ff. This "stroke of vision" corresponds to the "twinkling of an eye" in which the world was created. 37a Cf. 24. 7 and John Goheen.
135 evamhkhandesu santesu hoti satto ti. Aristotle. I. 211 sabbe satta satnkhdratthika: S. De an..II BUDDHISM Early Buddhism. D. 384). 2. 72 n'atthi koci satto yo imarhhd kayd annath kayamzsankamati. and asserts unequivocally the unreality of "beings" (satta) and of the "self" (atta) 2. sammuti. D. Mil. in a word. nayidha sait' upalabbhati. It should be needless to say that the postulated "self" (atta) or Ego (aham) is other than the Self to which the Buddha "resorts" (S. Eathydemus 284 D. 2 Nothing that can be named or sensed is a real "Self". both in the Canon and as interpreted by Buddhaghosa. JAOS 67. 120). and "the very mother of illusions". the Buddhist regards "individuality" as nothing but a transitory association of sensuous data. other than the "plenary.-cf. 3. On the two "I's" cf. 1. its mortality in the sense that "all change is a dying" (Plato. mere name and phenomenon. 70. pp. 3. Eckhart. but at the same time denies absolutely that all that "is my Self". When the Freedman realises that in the postulated "self" there is no 30 . 143. 69.. 6 zO yaeo ipWsiVo v avvOoe a del. Vivekacutiimani 240). although 1 S. great 'I"' (piirnam aham mahah.. other than the "I" that is "proper to none but God in his sameness" (Meister Eckhart).97 sabbe satta marissanti. 1947. Just as much as the modern positivist. 1. Evans ed. 3. 268 na paramahthena satt'upaladdhi. emphasizes the inconstancy and the iextreme brevity of life under any conditions.
"Life is like a dewdrop. cf.. harika) and conventional (sammuti = sammata. is said that "his life is little.. then he "no longer worries about what is unreal" (asati na paritassati. i.-"like a dewdrop on the tip of a blade of grass when the sun rises. none to whom death cometh not" (S. 1. the moment of the life (jivita-khano) of beings is just as over-brief (atiparitlo)4 as the turning of a single thought. On fric see my "Unatiriktauand Atyaricyata". 4.135). 143).249 where the little self (of which the "life" is referred to above) is paritto. "contingent")from absolute (paramatthika) affirmative language of postulation applies literally only to the world of accidents (D. or perhaps = 31 . and when this ends the being is said to have ended. so is the life of beings that of a single moment of thought. 4 Cf. 1. Even of a Brahma. "Brief is the life of human beings . D.231). 52-56. which turns by means of just one place on its rim. do not hold me back from the Path.. Mother! do not hinder me" (Vism. like the turning of a chariot-wheel. cf. 2. A. As it has been said. 3 The pragmaticvalidity and real invalidityof the postulates corresponds to the distinction of relative.NIA. such is the lifetime of men. and no longer sees Self in what is not-Self. everyday purposes 3. whose day is of a thousand years. 6. A. 2.63) and can only be employed analogicallyor negatively to ultimate reality. The sarmvrti. a bubble on the water" (A. 'In the past thought-momentone lived.). 137.. not for long" (S. 136). M. in the future thoughtveritableSelfhood.both are permissible terms when postulated merely for practical. and stands still by means of only one. 1. 246 f. "In the last analysis. 108.. 1.e. transactional (votruth. the Great Self aparitto.. 4.
of thought" that the Yogi seeks to suppress. the self-ish nature (atta-bhava). is precisely that "reincarnation" (punabbhava. or "hunter". vattate (rv.. -agamana) from which a final escape is sought. im-mortality (amata) and life or becoming (bhava) are 5 "All". i. "Connatural are life and its theft7. so that instant death (khanika-maranam) 8 is connatural with advent" (Vism. of which a particular birth and death are only special cases. Such is the 'Recollection of Death' in terms of the 'Brevity of the Moment'" (Vism. but "instant death" all through it. in the present thought-moment one is alive'. by the "robber".e. 7 "Theft". or inconstancy. and its moment passes lightly'6. and hence often compared to a monkey. The mind is always on the move..230). it breaks up together with the aggregates of which it is composite. 6 Eka-citta. i. pleasure and pain.. the passible five-fold composite "that is not my Self" (na me so atta). 8 Not "sudden death" at the end of one's life. In other words. and this liability. For indeed their recurrent thinking is infected with inveteration coincidently with its origination. all 5 Are conjunct (samayatta) in a single thought. 'Life. passim.e. birth and death are not unique events of any contingent existence... Death.moment one will live..rt) khano implying that citta-vrtti. Beings are born bearing in themselves inveteration and death.. like a stone that falls from a mountain top. 1. or "waylayer".238). but of the very stuff (evam-dhammo) of "life". 32 . "turning..
.163). 427). S. "un-oome"). that of the moment (khana-) in which there meet forthcoming. stasis and break-down (appida-t. measured by a thought.. future (anigata. be dissolved (Vism.e. 626). i.2. to decay. "overgone"). "Four and eighty thousand aeons the Maruts abide. though it may also be meant that it is "of the stuff of thought"... like a flash of lightning in the ether they arise and pass away" (Vism. 16)9. In the present lives the world. From the unseen come forth born beings. is corruptible" (palokadhammam.. or present (paccappanna. 5.117). whatever is beoome.. such is a mortal" (A.43 "this world. "co-ition") is past (atita. "the cessation of becoming is Nibbana" (S.300): "Could a man be called 'qluick' who could so run as to catch in the air arrows loosed at the same time by four master-archers?Quicker than that is the wearing out of the composite-factors of life" (S. "As between one thought and the next (citt'antaro). paluj. and yet abide not even for so long as for the sequence of two thoughts. "up-come"). and broken-up pass into the unseen. lasts only for so long as a thought. 6. 625. and with the break-up of a thought it dies (paccuppanena jivati cittabhahga mato loke) lo.34. the conflux. Time (samaya. but incompatible. 17 and 6.. It is in this sense that "the Buddha looks upon the world in momentary (khan. 10 Similarly in MU. 2.ekhane) dissolution" (Dpvs.hiti-bhahga9 Buddhaghosaderives loka from luj.. 1. The present has three senses. conceptual. cittam-eva sarisairam). 266). 33 . 5. just a thought" (idamrcittamatram. "All that is born.not compossibles.
and there is no moment. I erred in speaking of p.. but in which..473). In my Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought. the first is included in the second. failing to penetrate. not in the continuing present. except in the sense that the moments are surrounded by the continuum. as "byway" from "highway". Mor. a relinquishing of all conditions.e.... mahauto) in which it comes to rest 12. 432 A. i. or minute (khaizo. run and wandered! on this long road. indeed. n.3.. Plutarch.. layo.. Observe that the Stasis is only momentary. How is a Monka 'Wayman? In that he is moving fast on this long road to where he has not yet been.. or "selves". both you and I. "as it might be a mountain torrent flowing swiftly from afar and carrying everything along with it... 1946. "It is through not understanding.60.extended and usual meaning of the word. 10 (on ksanika-nairatmddi) existenceas "not a continuitybut a successionof uniqueinstants 34 . and that of road (addha-) 1 in the sense of span of life. even so is the life of men 11 In its most extended sense the Road (addha) as distinct from the Way (magga) .. B (on the stream of Time).164 and 2.2. an arrestof becoming. 159. i. more tears have been shed than would fill the sea. 431. its origin and its eradication.. an absence of gust. that of the continuation (santati-). The becoming of the five-fold aggregates. already. There is no surcease of III until World's End has been reached" (D. of "beings".the Four AriyanTruths and the Way) that we have (of Ill. is that whole extent of the past habitations (pubba-nivisa)that were "not my Self". there where there is a cessation of all composites. Nibbana. much.e. A. and the second in the third.a waning out of thirst. takes place in the course of all these "times" (Vism. 12 Cf..pattam). "now" in the .49). whether long or short.. . pause.. and of these three presents.
1. that the three phases of existence. 12. adxyr. Theol. "Alteratio est via ad generationem et corruptionem". 15 Aristotle's atYotg. but one. 12. vayo. Up. sthiti and laya. Euthydemus 283 D. Vishnu and Siva in so far as they are logically distinguished from "the unity of the Person". and Meister Eckhart (Evans ed. "for the body moves slowly". 4. ed.. also. S. 1. 2 annid vai praji prajdyante. are the respective functions of the Trinity of Brahma. dependent on food.. that are resumed in every instant. and 9viotl. 2 annena himani sarvani bhuiZtnisamananti. 221 B: "All change is a dying". Thomas Aquinas. Taitt. De mixt.brief and light (parittamt lahakam). which is as much as to say that they are not three consecutive moments. 13 Aristotle's zro avrov . Parma 16. 3. AA. 11. and it is because of both that the question. 2. 13. 2. 8. 35 . 1. Aristotle Phys.The Buddhistdoctrineis one of "continuity without identity". or like the mark made by a stick on water. mental body. 7 ad 1.. elementorum. and alteration or 15 of things while dying (appada. 222 B. thiti.404-405. bhahiga)14 are the same as the "forthcoming.. cf. Sum. 353. 105. 285 B. 211 sabbe sattid ihdratthika. xai ysveots xai Met.. aniiathatta) of consciousness".384). he does this "in the momentof the forthcomingor momentof stability or moment of break-upof the resolute thought" of going there. Oodpa. 12. Vism. 14 De an. srsti. Plato. It can hardly be overlooked. 4.137). 4. maturity. 2 and I-II. cf. I. where it is asked whether in the case of one who visits the Brahma-world in an invisible. Is it the same man or another that reaps what has been sown. Buddhaghosa's three momentary accidents (appada. 97 sabbe sattd marissanti. 3. St. 113. "All change is a desistance from a nature". It has been previously explainedthat if he goes in a visible body the journey takes some time. D. cannot be answeredby a simple Yes or No. and answeredthat he goes "in all three moments".. For the born there is no 'not dying"' "3 (A.
is the inexhaustible font (MU.e.without accidents. 16 Incomposite. 4. nor falling nor uprising. Est igitur sempitema" (Sum. Sum. ThomasAquinas. aeternitas non varietur per praesens. 3. 10. cessionem.. nisi simul. nivrtti) that are synthesised in Time. 36 .. incomposite that is. 15.. as the "procession. 6. I. SA. 15). no this world and that world. no support.20. and as the "efflux. I would add. i. contra gentiles I. 1 and2. stlhiti. no motion. A. "simple": "intellectus noster. stasis and recession" (gati. and were it not. astam gamana) of which the Time without time.359). in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest. no inception" nor of that "unborn. God is immutable. 7. 80) 17.. A.99). uncreated. 137. v. not of that home (Jyatanam) "where there is neither coming nor going nor stopping. there would be no way of escape from the born. 89. too. for example. cf. and Heimgang" (srava.impassible. 1.Theol. created and composite" (Ud.rddhi. and these three are characteristicof whatever is composite (samkhatam) but not of what is incomposite (asamkhatam. quomodo omnisciens? 17 It will not be overlooked that all these negative terms. "igitur vita eius non habit suc- having nibbana and dhamma as their reference.-and emphatically not of the Buddha's "incomposite Eternal-Law" (asamkhalata dhammam. praeteri- tum et futurum"(St. are equally such as are applied to God secundam viam remotionis in Christianity. contra gentiles 1. 18. sed est tota simul.. 14. not of Nibbana (asamkhatam.. maturity. 152)16. 23. cf.Sum. nisi per remotionem compositionis. the same. become. Mil.. contra gentiles I.. etc. Sum. Brahma to wit. cc. incomposite.become. 14). 270).they last" (fhit4nam) predicated in S. un.
as Ritter and Preller say. 4. XLI. always followed by the words.7 and 15f. wholly devoid of destruction and generation". and when Aristotle goes on to say "it is only the realm of sense around us which continues subject to destruction and generation. That all things-note the plural-are in flux is no more a denial of the real stability of that which is not a "thing" than is the Buddha's destructive analysis of the composite "self". but there is a one and only Wisdom is distinct from "all things" (fr. there can be "also another kind of essence of things that are. "that is not my Self".132). 22). incomposite nature is explicitly asserted over against the -evanescenceof the composite transients. and if. the "Ever-living Fire" is such that ande manat omnis motus. fr.HIdvTa Heracleitus.5.XVIII). no doubt.-not one of them. 3. "all things" flow. It cannot be shown that Heracleitus ever explicitly or implicitly denied this. for other waters are ever flowing in": sabbe dhamma anicca (S. the indivisible moment is immanent in time. but as a continuum (saftfana). In Buddhism the reality of an unmoved. "You cannot dip your Qe4: feet twice into the same rivers. a denial of the Self. this does not mean that itself is moved. but this is a practically negligible part of the whole" (ib. this might just as well have been said by the Buddha himself! That there is "no moment in which the river rests" shows clearly that time is not to be thought of as "made of" a succession of stops. 37 . As Aristotle (Met. Aristotle had absolutely no grounds for accusing "these men" of the belief that "sensibilia are the only realities".) points out.
What are we. just as for Aristotle "time is not composite of atomic nows. 9. or that 18 "Du solt sin stete unde veste. it is from the inconstancy (anicca) of life and thought that the Wayfarer seeks to be emancipated.175. Pfeiffer p.D. dhammabhuto. 262 A). S. 6. any more than any other magnitude is made up of atoms" (Phys. though be it noted that in one the past and future meet. 38 . cf. 55. and that both are withoat duration. and from the other flow. and notably Sn. As we have seen above. 372). and reached the Farther Shore (Nibbana). 93) "has become". D. but we have not yet drawn the obvious conclusion that these two are one and the same. but all is still. 920). 57. to understand by such expressions as "one whose thought is stable" (thita-citto D.thiu'attam)and "stable. 1. brahma-bhuto. so for the Monk. S. 84. S. 3. "as in the ocean's midmost depth no wave is born. 3. 74) "one whose self is stable" (fhif'aftt. 5. then. nor should he swell at all" 18 (Sn.but not a part of time. or by statements such as that "'having crossed. geliikes und ungeliikes" (Meister Eckhart. Sn.219). 71). 3.157. 4. motionless" (thito anejo. 3. and stands' (titthati). daz ist: du solt gelich stan liebes und leides. 8. Stasis is predicated only in the moment (khana) or in the Time (kala) without time that is Brahma-that Brahma and Dhamma that the Freedman.946). Th. 2. Inasmuch as all change is a dying. 1. A. who's still and does not move (thito anejo). cf. 239 B. 359 parinibbutam .-"seeking for stability" (afthitam nissaya. 8. 'an Arahant' is meant" (S.
and more generally. mutabilia sunt" (De nat. they 'stand ' (thassanti. Evang. investigated both of them. VII. its life. St. they left it too. and an uncreated "Soul of the soul" above them. and went in search of something that should be immutable. 10. Augustine. Sermo CCXLI. again not knowing.35) and "omnia quae fecit."having overpast inveteration and death. contra gentiles. and found that each is mutable in man. Thomas Aquinas. ad litt. with St. They passed to the soul. now knowing. 19 "Stability is the peculiar property of eternity" (Marsilio Ficino.e. saviinnana-kaya]. J.. its ailments. And thus they arrived' at a cognition of God the Creator by means of the things which He created. now willing something. X. The body is mutable in its various ages. Philo and the Upanisads. quia ex nihilo fecit. 2. "whatever has had a beginning must have an end" (Aristotle. sed tamen temporaliter" (ib. in fact. 3 + In Joan. S. How. 18). rel. boni. pondered them. now remembering.46). which they certainly comprehended as being the better.4. can "the" soul be or become "immortal"? Only if. XXX. Think on God and thou wilt find 'is' where 'has been' and 'will be' cannot be" (St. Plato. They saw that it was mutable. 3.203B. 1). in its corruption.). "non quidem localiter. "clarum est eam [animam] esse mutabilem" (De ver. Samyutta Nikaya 4. mutabile est" (St. 3. again forgetting. now advancing in wisdom. Examine the mutations of things and thou wilt everywhere find 'has been' and 'shall be'. 54). vel in vivendo successionem patitur. respectively mortal and immortal by nature. 46) 19. XXXVIII. "Men saw these two things [body and soul. S. Phys. its reflections and its defections. again daring. "anima vero jam ipsa crearetur" (De Gen. again relapsing into folly. further. 24. But they found it too to be mutable. 16). then. now not willing. now fearing. Commentary on Plato's Symposium IV. 99).Thomas. Sum. But "Quod autem incipit aut desinit vivere. and also wondered at as being invisible. 1. I. Augustine asks.. versions by Erich Przywara. "how 39 . we recognize that "duo sunt in homine". its death.-a created "soul" subject to accidents. i.
. and that I am defined as something both rational and mortal at the same time?" and reflects. An aeon (kalpa) qua saeculum. 2. 10. 20 On the incalculable length of the aeons (kappa). A. 4. am reason. "if reason is immortal. and having arisen. The Freedman. then that and we ought by which I am called mortal is not 'mine'. related to kr) is also "concept" or "multiple arrangement". A. St. 6. ending with the words. must be. like the Dhamma. is properly speaking a "day of Brahma" consisting of a thousand yugas or 4320 million human years. "transcends the aeons" 20 (kapptito . Sn. na me so atti. Lex Aeterna) is one of the Divine Names (dhamma and brahma being interchangeable terms in the Upanisads and the Pali Canon).359) and by the same token "timeless" (akiliko. But it should be noted that kappa (}fk'p. 30 nihsarikalpo 40 .. in fact.Augustine's "then that by which I am called mortal is not mine" corresponds exactly to the Pali tam n'etam mama. "Impermanent are all composites the nature of which is to originate and age. vipanutto.406). see S. "simple" (asamzkhata. and if I who analyze and synthesize all these [temporal] things. to have done with them is bliss".The answer in terms of time is that the Buddha. is it that reason (ratio o= dyos) is immortal. If we bear in mind that "Dhamma" (&tcatooav7. in his days and nights successive worlds are manifested and dissolved. 11 katidha vi akalpayan? and conversely MU.. identified with the Dhamma. RV. 90. both were "intensely sensitive to the pathos of mutability". 4. Justitia. It is from even this "brief" life that the Buddha teaches a "further escape". then to perish. The life-span of a Brahma is a hundred years made up of such days. it will be seen that Augustine's words might as well have been those of the Buddha himself. 50). xdoaog (cf.. to fly from the mortal to the immortal" (De ordine II. n'eso'ham asmi. 178-193. in their sequences of hundreds and thousand for which no earliest point can be recognized.
as in CU. It as if they formed a circle (beginningless and endless cycle) of which he is the centre. The three modalities of personality (atta-bhava). 410) Buddhaghosa speaks of the remembering of "how I was then. 202). less adept.e.". 26. The "former habitations" and past aeons are all immediately present to a Buddha who can pounce upon them like a lion or reach them like an arrow its mark. not in very truth (paramatthena). 8. 411). and of the past conditions as being those "in one's own continuum" (attano samtitne)-or better. 1. Sn. 31. as is explicit in Pv. 35). D. while others. past. etc. 4.373). so akappiyo (Sn.) is not only ex tempore but also "other than whatever is conceivable seriatim".202). 1. and that just as a Wake is nippapanca "unelaborate". no farther from one than from any other point on the circumference. i. "one's own lineage"-this (samucca). and future. others need to look backward through the ages. or What am I now.6. 39 and 4. Similarly in D. "not a man of the aeons" (akkapiyo. 2. or What shall I be in the future? For he sees things "as become". 1.e. transcendent not only with respect to "times" but also with respect to temporalia. not ultimate realities (D. of such and such a family. So-and-so. 860). strictly in terms of causal process and only speaks of an "I" for practical convenience in everyday life (S. present. are mere conventional terms of every speech. one or myriad according to their ability. prapaica. but a Buddha or Arahant envisages past or future aeons directly (Vism. i. 914 etc. the contemplation of one's 41 . 81 the analogy of cult and upapatti to the case of a man who goes to another village and again returns to his own (the "villages" being this and yonder worlds. When just above (Vism. 2) would be a heresy if taken literally. "they call him 'awake' (buddha) who discerns the nirabhimanas tisthet). In just the same way for the Yoga Sitra (2. peris said "conventionally" haps. must work their way backward along the circumference if they are to see any past time. What was I in a former life. for any well taught Buddhist monk knows better than to ask. 3.
Reincarnation. sva-prakiaa. correspond to the distinction of metaphysics from "philosophy" (in the narrow sense of the word).. but such a first cause. but behind the experience of order "there is a further cause of that which is 'always so"'. The prob-ability of the relative truths can be established by repeated observation. being itself uncaused. vikara." (sammuti-. "there is neither past nor future" (na lassa paccha na purattham atthi. loka-vohira-. yEvecaS) is at an end" (Sn.and paramrrthika-satyam). the flux of things in which they fall and rise. For such as these.e. and to Plato's distinction of "such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one ore another of the things that wo nowadays call realities" from "the knowledge that abides in that which is absolutely real" (Phaedrus 247E). 141). corresponding to the Vedantic avidya and vidya. parallel to that of becoming from being (Timaeus '27D. etc. 1. explicitly. is not prob-able but axiomatic (Aristotle.. a Buddha's "recollection" does not operate by a following up of the sequences of births and deaths in time. it is because of eternity that "there never was or will be any time when movement was not or will not be". but siezes immediately and former personalities (atma-bhiva) may be a profitable exercise in the earlier stages of a Yogins' development. "selfrevealing". "self-evident". 252 B). in other words. is a fadon de parler. but one who no longer confuses sattva with Self will never propound such questions as "Who was I?". S. the other absolute and certain. VIII. Phys. one for whom birth (jaii = bhava. It should be observed that the Buddhist "double truth. and such are the statistical "laws of nature" discovered by science.-i. loka-niruttiyo.aeons. 42 . 28A). 1.. etc.517). not really a matter of persistent individualities. one relative and conventional. and on the other hand paramattha-saccam. and distinction of "true opinion" from "truth".
60.. for they shall mourn passes23. as explained above. 22 Inter-vallum: the "needle's eye" and "strait gate" in the wall of Paradise. It is true that for beings in time the momentary now (khafza) is ever present. in other words. 10. qui nisi vincatur. Nicolas of Cusa. "locum.2. that is to say. the Symplegades or Clashing Rocks. and of the Sundoor. 43 . sa and ama. X. 411). i. and separated only by the now-without-duration through which the Hero (mahavira) finds his way. 40 arhana) to pass through it". cuius portam. De visione Dei. et iste est murus Paradisi. 1. "Where there is neither past no future" must and can be only Now21. IX). in fact. Vin. in quo [tu Domine] habitas. 21 "Ubi futurum et praeteritum coincidunt cum praesenti". in the sense of "right time" means also opportunity. the Lightning" (ib. cf. 226. custodit spiritus altissimus rationis. M. 1. is able to take the way of the "unobstructed Saman. 4. 1. or which "Saman"' otherwise. 23 Past and future being. is to be thought of as the "Harmony" of the past and future forms. gateway and although as such this interval 22 is continually opened and closed agailn as time what if the instant opportunity is never seized? From this point of view the Buddha counsels: "Get ye across this sticky-mire. the jambs of the "Doorway of Immortality" (amatassa dvari. let not the Moment pass (khatto ve ma upaccaga).-i.30. "Who is able (arhati. S. of which it is asked. A. De visione Dei. c. RV.e. non patebit ingressus" (Nicolas of Cusa. 226. cf. 4. all times are present to a Buddha's instant glance. 94) threw open to his followers.e.4). c. 7) that the Buddha (Brahma-become and the Giver of Immortality..instantly upon whatever situation in whatever time the Buddha chooses to perceive (Vism. But the word. cinctum contradictoriorum coincidentia.
The moment of release is sudden (sub-it-aneus. cf. Dh. in JUB. Tha. "moment". 126) 25. 459 where Sumedhasays..-viz. 7. 7. Anth. 8. in fact. which can Almost exactly as William Blake's: ".. 459). "going stealthily"): comparable.khano laddho). to that of an arrow loosed without further effort from the bow to pierce all obstacles and penetrate its mark.. 60. 275 on the passing Moment. I. S. "This is an age of the Buddhas. he who kisses the joy as it flies Lives in eternity's sunrise.the moment'ssiezed!" (virajjito akkhano. But. Pal. 403..gone is the absenceof opportunity. if once you let the ripe moment go. Cf. 1. and that he congratulates those of the Monks "whose Moment has been caught" (khano vo patiladdho) and commisle rates those "whose Moment has past" (khandtitd. as in Thi. samddha. 26 Akkhana= Skr. 26 It must not be overlooked. Sn. that khana has also the meaningof "opportunity"present during a relativelyshort period of time. akha. "target". 16. 1. 5. 418 + Mund. 4. 24 44 . 333. when the archer's stance."synthesise" applied to the setting up of the bow and the placing (yoga) of the arrow. grip and draw are correct. Thi. Up.-the arrow corresponding to the Self and the target to Brahma (Mil. 2. You can never wipe off the tears of woe". brahma-bhuta). 315. 8 and CU. 2. i.e. and is not to be connected etymologically with khana. being already "thatbecome" (tad-bhita.1-4): and the adequacy of this trope (apami) is so far precise that it 'extends to the use of the same verbs whether the archer be in fact a bowman or a "target-piercing" (akkhana-vedhin) 26 Monk.whose Moment's past" 24 (khantiit& hi socanti. 653.of course.a. 1005.
and vyadh. and in this connection it is not insignificant that a synonym for samtdhiis brahmabhiuti. 82. "loose". as of "time" considered absolutely. with reference to the liberation of the arrow or the Self. and it is not without interest that the word yoga in its astronomical sense can be substituted for the "moment" of Awakening (Thi. also samayaitum (co-ire). "penetrate" (in some forms identical with vid. the event takes place at a conjunction of times past and future. where when the end of the long road has been reached. 81. pp. Abhi-samaya. "full attainment". 627) the Awakening takes place at dawn. "The Doctrine of Prajiia-paramita as exposed in the Abhisamayalamkara of Maitreya". 1943.therefore be thought of as "in samadhi" 2."becoming Brahma". that is to say at a junction of times (sarmdhi). the aeonic time that is now and once for all escaped (much as the sudden release of the arrow contrasts with the archer's long training). 4). JUB. suggesting an 45 . and this is especially emphasized in the Mahayana. 27 See further my "Symbolism of Archery" in Ars Islamica 10. I. cf. muc. 28 E. notably in Vasubandhu's Abhisamayilankara. 173. Even at any point of time. The suddenness of the Awakening contrasts with the length of the Way. the Great Awakening (abhisambodhi) is "single-instantaneous" (eka-ksana-) 28. 1933. 6. Tha.or twilight. when it is neither night (the prior form) nor day (the posterior form). Acta Orientalia 11. "know" or "find") with reference to the attainment of the archer's "aim" 27 In the case of the Buddha and some other Arahants (cf. 1. to "pass through" (the midst of the Sun). Obermiller. Thi. may be more literally something like "super-coincidence".
a double signifance. I substitute "singleinstantaneous" for Obermiller's "momentary" because the latter word could be understood to mean "ephemeral" or "transient". the instant or timeless Wakefulness from which generation (the descent of spirit into matter) proceeds is not only the first but also the last moment of the temporal cycle (kala-cakra) of existence (samsdira). but not for eka-ksane. "forthwith". "this day". then it assumes an actual-form (mirtim vimunaati) ". evolution (utpatiikrama = pravrtti) and involution (utpannakrama = equation of abhisamaya with parayana. unus autem diei nomine incommutibilitas aeternitatis vocatur. The Tantra asserts the intemporal. 1. 1. Manu I. 29 Cf. 46 . like sakrt. such a point being at one and the same time its beginning and end. 56 "When [the Great Self] becoming atomic (anumiiriko bhfitva) and with a view to existence and motion inhabits the seed with which it is associated.e. St. 77 Millia dierum in temporis mutibilitate intelligantur. "momentary" would be right for khane khaze. De lib. Eka-ksa. As beginning. "no sooner than". 25. comparable to that of a point on the circumference of a circle. when consciousness returns to its source. alpha and omega.. sadya. arb.where it is given. the awakening is the instantaneous quickening29 from which the development of the embryo proceeds to the conscious perception of the "net of contingency" (mayajiala) in the dimensioned (nirmana-) body. III. On the other hand.na. cf. 11. quite logically. etc. Manu the undimensioned quality of the animating principle. Augustine. which is not intended. timeless] awakening" (ekaksanabhisambodhi) persists also in Tantrik Budidhism. as already explained above.The notion of "instantanous [i.corresponds to Sankara's sadya in sadyo-mukti. BrSBh.
and that is. 8. a designation of Brahma. we find a contemplation on time. including all creation from its rather.nivrtti) representing the two halves of the cycle of existence. and day night (TS. "not fluent". 1. and 1.3) and is in fact the "other whereby men live" (KU. and of the syllable OM by which he is represented in verbal iconography. 1. of the "who blows as one. from a Hindu point of view. each being sacrificed in the other (BG. 5. the in-and out-breathing"(SB. directed towards the immediate realisation of iever greater and greater durations and pursued until the whole of time can be experienced now.-lor ation (palingenesis). but in man Gale Unity (Vayu) becomes these two. 12). the in. 2. regenerbeginning to its reabsorption". Inspiration and expiration 30 are correlated successively with day and night. 29. of which the purpose is involutionary. 1. when the 'heart' is lestablished in the 30 In Yoga practise.8. 4. 74). "who bestows these breaths" (TS. comes at length to the great universal aevum. months.3. fortnights. 47 . "still". the procedure culminating in "a complete resolution of microcosmic time by the disciple who. So in yoga practise.27). 1. for "this is the yogic rebirth. and of the 12) (SB. having successively fixed his mind on ever greater periods of time and successively rid himself of them in the course of his breathing. 3. briefly and clearly described in the following quotation from Kalacakratantra: 'The birthplace of the Royal Conquerors is in one constant moment (ekasminsamaye'ksare) 31.5). 2. 31 Aksara. and so on. 5. in the last analysis a realisation of the Supreme who are both the in-and-out-breaths Identity of Mitravarunau.and out-breathsare equated or identified. whether cosmic or individual.
. text p. 33 These "joints" (parva-ni)are (in a surgical sense) "re- set". Carelli. 3. 1. 1941. 7 (but the version of the Kilacakratantra passage is my own). at the same time that the Sacrificer himself is reintegrated (Salapatha Br. 52) as this is the contemplative equivalent of the Vedic seasonal sacrifices by which Prajapati. where Time unites (samdadhati) past. complication by simplification. i. days and nights. then I see All. etc. is made whole and complete again 33.e. Having thus realised his own-nature or intrinsic being (svabhava).eka-k$ana) . cf.. and actual breathing has ceased. unstrung and dismembered into the parts of the year (time). "For because the year is a counterpart 32 Mario E. Sekoddesatfka. Such a "control of the moments and their sequence" (Yoga Sutra 3. of which the conjunctions are his broken "joints".6. Great King.. then there is naught that is not always seen"'.. in wholeness or health. 20. 48 . when the physical sense-powers are relinquished and the divine have arisen. when the natural planes have been left and the planes divine are seen. the Yogi "without any subjective-objective relation. by the act of creation.Great Breath. Time is drowned in eternity" 32. or literally "put together" or "syn-thesised". become what he is. the Year (Time) having been. Baroda. present and future times. 7. 17 and Skr. The separative act of creation is necessarily followed by the unitive (re-collective) process of involution. knows all because it [his essence] comprehends all in a geometric point (bindu) and in one instant (. 35 and passim).. Introduction pp. and this completes the cycle that began with their division and sickness (vyadhi). AA. 16. Things thus put together (samtita) are in sam&dhi.
2. S. it asserts. Many other scholars. which. 23). De la Vallee Poussin. 1. was suppressed by the Buddha be3s Although Keith himself asks respectingthe Buddha's"unfathomable" nature predicatedin S. 393. 12. they call him the Year" (ibid. but "really. and Stcherbatsky. and that is what ' Imperishable' means" (ibid. 26). 1. and the Comprehensor of this doctrine of the Year himself becomes the Year" (ibid. 4. of course. only one. 3.23. Except for the last references. but certainly did not originate. D. Keith34. 1. "the Year is everything. but rather counselled men to "seek for" and "take refuge" in it (Vin. All schools. in which it is expanded. II. etc. indeed. 12). notably Jacobi. but probably more in accordance with the ideas of the teachers of the early Canon" (Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon. have studied it only from the Mahayana sources. 6.13)..(image) of Prajapati. 11. "How many days are there in the year?" That depends upon the way it is divided. 11. Keith. Vism. so far as to say that the Vaibhasika doc143)-goes trine "interpolates the moment of existence (sthiti). retain the doctrine of the causal efficacy of the past operative in the present. whether this "is not to argue that the Tathagata apart from the mortal constituentsis something real but ineffable?" and calls it "unwise to insist on seeing negativism in passages where another explanationis not merely possible. 49 . 120. 2.2. p. the doctrine of the "Now that stands" has been dealt with so far only on the basis of the Hinayana. the Year is just that day after day". 374. 1923. always assuming that the Buddha denied the reality of the Self-which he never did.
and the time of its appearance.ent" Self and "impermanent" self involves no antinomy. cf. 1. For the Sautrantikas. where being arises only from being. 1. 1. because the notion of a "perman. 50 .g. nor can there be any question but that the Dhamma.2. will not be. 30. "Lead me from non-existence unto existence". Augustine. B.cause of the danger which it involved to the doctrine of impermanence" 35. and in any case the word thiti.ts. "being in potentiality". they are not yet. e. are not.66. and when they are passed away. 7. "not from the non-existent". 10. 36 35 A. pass away. 72. absolute. In Aristotelian terms.De lib. p. no longer are" (St. is by no means avoided in the Canon. 3. 1. CU. 2 and BrSBh. 6. "appearance from non-existence(prdgabhdva)" would be "reductionfrom potentiality to act". arb. in the contraryformulae of TS. and when they are. 2. On the other hand. 7. 3. and action are Keith. wh ere also the verbs titthanti and ihassanti (as cited above) are used of Arahan. ibid. 21). 2. where "non-existent" means "not yet existing". the efficiency. 19. when they are future. activity. "Which temporal things before they are. 1. 2. implausible. CU. entities appear from non-existence36. And so. prigabhiva. that of things that could never be. and when past. they exist for a moment. 167. then they cease to exist. 28. and this is the sense in the beautiful prayer of BU. In RV. also JAOS. "the existent springs from non-existence". even in combination with attb. atyanta. "the true doctrine is that there is no distinction between the entity. asato ma sad gamaya. Their existence. 3. 17. Taitt. Up.the reference is to the fourth. "the son of a barren woman". 4. with which the Buddha identified himsielf is an "eternal substance" (akaliko dhata). 2 asatah sad ajayata. 154. 6. Cf. kind of non-existence. n. 18. whose very name implies their orthodoxy.
Aristotle... if we are to know what is meant. The current answer is. ibid. 2201.. to which the definition really applies" (Phys. III. 5. 9. 4. in reality. if the "Annihilationist Heresy" (ucchedavida) is to be avoided. But that is the explanation given by those who hold that nothing 'is' but 'matter' (oaCba). 213 B-213 A). and references in my 51 . who points out that "to determine whether the 'void' (z6 xsvov) 'is' or 'is not' we must know what those who use the word really mean by it. 'a place in which there is nothing'. cf. 5. lof course. 1. Aristotle Met. cf. this via negativa implies a "transvaluation" of values. It is only because such questions are not asked that so many a modern recoils from what he calls the "negativity" of Buddhist formulae. and no one that yet supposes they are thinking of the 'point' (r oarycrj). p. Of what? As Hermes Trismegistos says. 512. 508). 38 Just as in the case of "destruction" (khaya) it must be asked. On various senses of the term suhhaid see Vism. but rather coincide. and what the modern empiricist and "optimist" really resents is precisely the sacrifice that any transvaluation of values demands. "you must not call anything 'void'. Rimi. 4.. Mathnawi 1. All this involves. The Buddhist "Void" is empty of things that become and to which the language of affirmative empiricism really applies (D. that which is 'tangible' (ijzrdv). though a good. 63). Keith. 33 C). "Past and future are to thee a curtain from God". the old doctrine of the Void (sunyata) 38 which Keith discusses in connection with the 37 A. 2. "Freedom". just what can and should be destroyed (Vism. is always a freedom from limitations.all one. 166. or "de-void" of them. so in the case of the "void" (suiinam) it must be asked. Past and future are mere names" 37.. B. 4. 7. and as in the case of "escape" (nissaranam) it must be asked. From what. without saying what the thing in question is void of" (Ascl. Note also that "Void" and "Plenum" are never unrelated. and To what. and not their destruction.
i. 39 For example. and this was the false position. if things exist only for a moment.e.". For them "the doctrine of causation must he taken as referring only to the world of ignorance". transferred from its original environmentto another and different set of conditions.. yac cid visesatvam tad sada- sivatattvamare only saying the same in other words. BSOS. 1. continues to flower in "its own" time regardless of the new conditions. can they work on one another? How can their order be explained? In fact.and the words of the T~vara ism. This coincidenceis implied by the Mahayanaaphortan nirvanam. 52 .but cannot "see" them as they still actually exist in the plant. in which cause and effet coincide at every "moment" of its growth. this representsin it the working of a kind of memory that. in so far as language (the language of postulation) is employed affirmativelyonly to events (D. 1934. who can investigate the distant causes in the plants original environment. 1. 487-497. then the orderly sequence of events will have to be explained by a "pre-established harmony". if we presume that acts are causes. is "imperceptible" (adrsta) to human beings. whose name again asserts their orthodoxy. yas samisaras Pratyabhijnai Vimarsini. opinion. So we find it uneasy to understand just how a cause can operate at a distance 39.7.Madhyamikas. when a plant. as such. how. This I take not only to mean that things only happen in time and space but also that cause and effect are not only transcendentally but actually always simultaneous.or Middle-Waymen. into which the Islamic Mutakallemin "Kha and other words denoting Zero. arbitrarily established.202). 193. pp. we think of cause and effect as precedent and sequent because all logical formulation applies..
the latter term.at the same time implying that the efficacy of an act (unlike the act itself) is really present-when the effect appears. one must have "denied himself" (denegat seipsum. but the actions leaves its trace in the environment. From this point of view there remains no inconsistency in a combination of the concept of instant actuality with the operation of mediate causes in time. 24) and passed over from becoming to being. Thomas Aquinas says. Math. it would be obviously impossible to apply the causal formula. as St. It stands to the high credit of Indian logic to have distinguished acts (karma) from causes (karana). 53 .116. On the other hand. and to have given the significant names of "unseen" (adrsta) and "notpast" (apurva) to "causality". to escape from fate. in particular. Theol. but are present when and where their -effects are seen40. "fate lies in the created causes themselves" (Sum. that the efficacy of the 40 So it is that. which is to fulfil one's destiny (reach one's destination. man's last end).were forced by the logic of their own kind of atomism. The answer to all these difficulties is that causes never operate at a distance. Nothing of an act outlasts the act itself. 1. The deduction will naturally follow that. 16. of which one (which is perceptible) and the other (which can only be inferred) persists. the consequences of past actions always remaining latent until the conditions under which they can operate arise. to be free. the act and its causal efficacy are two different things. 2). which will for iever afterwards be other than it would have been if the event had not taken place.
the truth is silence. 3. to that other world in which there is no becoming and no triad of origination. and what is probably the oldest text on Silence in this sense is to be found in the verses quoted in AA. that follows". ibid. Dh. All of these are positions already established in the Hinayana Canon 42. pp. v. avyakatam. Keith continues: "Absolute reality. Just as for Sankara"this Brahmais silence" (BrSBh. it would be obviously impossible to apply the causal formula. Silence is the "Middle Way" between affirmation and negation. X.cause is really present-when the effect appears. for that moves in the realm of relativity and error. for all that he "holds nothing back". Cantideva points out. 4.) which the Buddha. I and II). cannot reveal for lack of any "speechway" (vidapatha). whereas. the causal act and its effects are never simultaneous. Kena Up. 8.31.3. 1. I. for to uphold one would be wholly erroneous. Nagarjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own. does not fall within the domain of the intellect (buddhi). however soon the latter may be realised. 87. 235-239. On the other hand. cf. existence. Augustine. 2.5): "Nothing true can be said of God" (Meister Eckhart in Evans. A. the consequences of past actions always remaining latent until the conditions under which they can operate are established.S. "this being so. Silence is a "Middle Way" between affirmationand negation. which is neither affirmation nor negation'41. 3: 41 42 54 . 17): "Whom only silence can declare" (Hermes Trismegistos. 374f. 2. and decay to be accounted for. B. cf. Keith. 218. citing St. and corresponds to that "untold" (anakkhaiam.
2). But this no more in Buddhism (or Islam) than in Christianity excludes the entity's responsibility for what. 837. neti. that which is 'yes' and which is 'no'. I. One further reservation must be made: the Buddhist doctrine of Causality (hetuvida. cf. and so on. The Buddha characteristically "discards the yes and no" when he so often says that the condition of a Freedman. for the Upanispads.-just as. 914). but all that "is not my Self" (na me so attd. it elects to do. "everything becomes from some cause. and whoever does not identify himself with it is in a position 55 . the same applies to the Western doctrine of causality as formulated by Leukippos (Aetios.. post mortem. 390 and passim) would be meaningless. to eradicate this and to make that become. The Buddha. 4): for Plato. Arahant. the prophets (kavayah) found -their-quest. It is true that all the reactions of the self or Ego are fated and determined by past causes. Discarding. cannot be described by such expressions as "is" or "is not" or by any copulative or disjunctive combination of these expressions. I. and the whole concept of "selfcontrol" (the conquest. Otherwise. moreover. Thomas Aquinas. 24) and the modern scientist's "faith" in order. or in other words to necessity. 160. and in this sense "fate lies in the created causes themselves" (St. [now] they delighted in audition (sruti). out of the bundle of possibilities that it inherits.. 152 and 878f. control or management. q.De la Vallee Poussin43 discusses ksana (1) as a measure of time and (2) as the limiting minimium of "Of speech. likewise denies that he has any "views" (Sn. 379 attani codiy'attanam. 104. [Erst] bound by names. the Self is neti. 25. Dh. and impulsion of self by Self. all the Buddha's exhortations to do this (kiriyavada) and not to do that (akiriyavada).. Timaeus 28 a. of necessity". passim). Sum. literally "etio-logy") refers only to the operation of natural or mediate causes. 116. to the scholastic doctrine that "nothing happens by chance" (St. Theol. Past events determine the character of any entity at any given moment. Augustine QQ LXXXIII.
which is nil 45. 1931. b): time is "always beginning" (&adya'e iv 56 . 48 "Notes sur le 'moment' ou ksana des bouddhistes". Rocznik Orientalistczny. it is simply that with "repentance".. previously inoperativecausesare brought into play.265. a moment is simply the indivisible present in which the three phases of any existence take ne peut douter que. "changeof mind". 13. it is just as incalculably short as the sum of the aeons would be incalculably long.time. le ksanta. He cites various definitions of the moment in which a thing (dhamma) 44 exists. with new results. 4 Aristotle deals with the problem in much the same way (Phys. i. and in the same way the space between two atoms is no larger than the measure of an atom.8. This is not an interferencewith the operationof causality. 44 Dhammaas "thing".es". must not be confused with Dhammaas "Eternal Law" and (in sa-dhamma)"Natural Law".. in which he quotes from his own version of Vasubandhu'sAbhidharmakosa and from other sources. 1-13. all amounting to this. a very common meaning also in the Pali sources. that the moment has no real duration. oomme le corps etendu est fait d'atom. because the interval between two ksanas is no more than the ksana itself a period.-"on Dharma [chose] soit une grandeur de temps se rapprochant de zero a l'infinite".e. 222 a. he barely mentions Hinayana sources. 2. IV. duree du place. though he quotes Vasubandhu on S. analogous to the atom (paramanu) considered as an indivisible minimum of "matter". At the same time it does not seem to me correct to say that "le temps est discontinu et fait de ksatas. and ignores their background altogether. Time flows to make it behave as he will.
46 TattvarthIdhigama.ksatas57 . "interval between two successive advents". kalo vastu-sunya-buddhi-nirmdnah sarva-jiana-anupitt. and Ganitasirasamtgraha.in one sense the nows are different from. and "a moment is the time required by an atom to pass through the interval between two atoms" (a. citt'antaracited above. is neither Rangacharya's "un autre atome" nor Poussin's "l'intervalle. quoting dexf): it is by means of the indivisible now (aoltoo vvv) that "time is continuous". Jacobi in ZDMG. Leningrad. but only three. Steherbatsky's treatment of the Moment. treated by H. and he does recognize that "the origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is probably preBuddhistic" 9. Poussin cites also some Jaina sources46 in which samaya as point of time corresponds to the Buddhist ksanza: "a moment (samaya) is the minimum time (kala) required by an atom (paramant) to move its own length". two contiguous points will not make a line.40.but in their functionof holding time together they are "always the same" (del r6 arod). cp. Rangacharya.1932. 47 Anvantara. Vyasa on III. as in many others. 48 Stcherbatsky does not go very far back. 1912. because a line is not a line unless it has a beginning. "Moments" are like "points" determininga line. 52- 49 BuddhicaXXVI. Madras.2 vols. they are the thing itself".vantaram) 47. and buddh'antara. in Baddhist Logic 48 is fuller. and never rests (na ramati). l'etendu d'une atome". middle and end. continuously. H. editedby M. Bibliographica 1930. comes very near to the Buddhist view. and so with all other series. In a footnote he says: "The Sankhya-Yoga in this point.e observes that for the Buddhist "existence and non-existence are not different appearances of a thing.in the same way that a river flows. one another.cf.
and therewith time. respectively relative and absolute. in Vasubandhu's words.95).1) 50 and would have bleenright in emphasizing that motion itself. 58 . motion is. which produces the appearance of a line tu vastu patitah". vols. 137. "the nature of anything is its own momentary stasis and destruction" (yo hi bhavah ksanastfhyi vinasa iti giyate. Such a destruction is not. not an external reality but something constructed by ourselves. continuous. and a derivative of the moment. But he is not right in deducing from this that "motion is discontinuous". Paris 1923-1931. L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu. experientially. and as we have seen. is only a pragmatic postulate -just as for Buddhists the Ego. involves a discontinuity such as would be involved if we relapsed into the fallacy of thinking of a line as "made up of" points. there is no (real) motion" (na gatir nsait.. "because of immediate destruction. Abhidhammakosa4.-Kant's "forms of our intellect". the empirical . Vasubandhu illustrates his position (as Riimi did) by the example of a moving light. is only a pragmatic postulate-and as a concept. but as much intrinsic to the thing as is is very existence (pp. of course. Stcherbatsky is right in saying that. 50 See in L. "the river never stops". Tattvasahgrahap. individuality. there is no motion really. 94.26). which I take to mean that time is a baseless mental construction. de la Vallee Poussin.event that takes place when the jar is shattered by a blow and is then no longer a jar.Santaraksita. and neither of these propositions. whose manner of knowing is in terms of time and space. for. 5. on the one hand. while on the other.
he distinguished two levels of truth. 1909. Northrop.g. this last position has been destructively analysed by Wilbur M. real is duration. chiefly in Bergson.. 23. p. For Leibniz there may be consulted F. 42). 24) and "the Ego has no reality. and "moves" in the same sense that we speak of a man as "walking". p.. "Leibniz's Theory of Space" in JHl. And. I am unable to understand in what respect there is a contradiction. and "the proposition that movement is made out of immobilities is absurd" (ib. 1929. pp. 99) that the so-called "motion consists of a series of immobilities". that of "the primary truths of fact" (amongst which are propositions relating to the self) and "the truths of reason" (axiomatic propositions. 4). who concludes that "the metaphysical idiom of the Great Tradition is the only language that is really intelligible" (The Intelligible World. on the other hand. and even particles not actually divided. What Vasubandhu actually says is that "the arising of instants is untiinter51 Tscherbatsky goes on to discuss "some European parallels". 7. Leibniz denies "the void in space. on the contrary. 3. p..-all of which "has the consequence of making matter as known by any scientific knower or observer purely phenomenal".. the moments are artificial cuts in it". further. Urban. atoms. 118) by saying "for the Buddhists there are no stops at all other than in imagination. and ought not to be described as knowledge" (Aitareya Aranyaka. the universal motion never stops... 1946. But when he (Tscherbatsky) sums up (p. is durable and absolute"). pp. It is an endless flow" (ib. Keith. 326). 471)! 59 . e. C. for Bergson. that "every spirit.of light. He cites "the world that the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn every instant. There is a certain irony. in' the fact that for a typical modern nominalist such as A. B. But Tscherbatsky51 is wrong in saying (p. S. the world which Descartes was thinking of when he spoke of continuous creation" (Creative Evolution. "such knowledge as is not empirical is meaningless.
and by no means contradictory. 60 . the connectionof the SupremeSelf with the body is not inter1. 1. and these are complementary. 55). Commenton 1. and that it is just in the same way that "this man. and the word that Tscherbatsky renders by "series" is actually samitna52. and there is no essence (sattg) that moves on. that Cakrapaniso well observes that "the constancy (or eternity) of the Self is a matter of its concurrencewith its own past and future hypostatic experiences" (nityatvam cdtmanahpurvdpardvasthanubhziifrtha-pratisardhandt. And herein there is no departure from early Buddhist doctrine in which punar utpadina is already explained in terms of the lighting of one lamp from another.41). inasmuchas It is the one and only transmigrant. So-and-so's" name is conventionally given to what is really a continuing process. In any case. also. i. and what he says is that "'lamp' is the name conventionally given to a continuum of lights so as to make a sort of unity". any division of the continuity of time into a series of immobile instants would be just as artifical as a division of time into a discontinuous series of hours or days. not a substantial "self". mittent but constant (Comment on Caraka-samhitd It is significant here. or as the division of a line into a series of points. which is literally and etymologically a "continuum". which Dasgupta also misrenders by "series") that enables Cakrapanito say that althoughthe existenceof the body is momentary(ksaiika). 1. one might as well think of time as a thing created by the jerky motion of the hands of a clock! 52 It is precisely this continuity (samttna.rupted" (nirantara-ksanta-utpdda).e.Thus what is for one a proof of the pseudo-identityof the transient self is for the other a proof of the real identity of the constant Self.propositions.
however small. Physical atoms must have some dimension.III GREECE In discussing Time and Eternity in Greek contexts I shall refrain from entering into any long account of Greek ". and explicitly "not a part of time". just as the point divides or unites parts of a line from or to one another. 61 . And so. and the atomic time that divides and unites periods of time from and to one another. just as the point is the principle and sine qua non of extension. with perfect logic. Plato does not speak of the elements as "atomic". and only forming visible masses when these particles are assembled in sufficient numbers (Timaeus 56 C). since it appears that a distinction must be made between the physical atoms of which bodies may be a composite. if anything is to be "made of" them. having no extension.atomism" as a whole. but only as existing in particles "so very small as to be invisible". cannot be added up to make a length. and we cannot say that extended things are "made up of" points. It would be truer (though not exact) to say that past and future are parts of the time-atom than it would be to describe a period of time as "made upof" time-atoms. but the time-atom is a zero. but points.
Atomic constitution implies.264 A. and they are invisible owing to thie smallness of their bulk" (Aristotle. 8. 4 And can therefore. a discontinuity of matter.c. Our concern is only with th. or with those of th!e "atomists" such as Leukippos for whom "there are an infinite number of them. therefore. but does not require a dis- 62 . The Intelligible World. 324 b 35) 2. Phys. 6. he knows that "nothing continuous can be made of atoms" (e drtotcov). 8. 2 As cited by Burnet. they would be one and the same point). 1. De gen. but each of which "has magnitude" and extension3. Burnet. p. 3 J. perceptible things can be constituted. 241 A. in fact. and not at all with such "atoms" as have now been actually "split". atoms that are "not mathematically indivisible". corr. quite logically. p. and which are really only particles 4. 260). 335. be thought of as constituent parts of great magnitudes. 1 "Non-spatial and non-temporal intuition is the condition of the interpretation of the space-time world itself" (W.Aristotle. is not an "atomist" in the material sense.e really and absolutely indivisible and undimensioned atom or point that gives a meaning to time or space . Urban. A. and of which. cf. 231 A. 234 A). similarly. 4th ed. M.and that "all magnitude is continuous" (Phys. indeed. 232 A. Early Greek Philosophy. only be so called for so long as men have not yet been able to divide them. 336. p. 241 B): atoms have no magnitude. and one cannot speak of atoms "next to" one another because what lies between two points is always a dimension (if not. cf. B + 8. though an "atomic now" and "indivisible point" are essential to his thinking (Phys.-atoms that can. 3.
and true belief rejects them". since coming into being and passing away are excluded and far away from it. but only means that it is not a void or chaos but a plenum. this sounds strange to us. continuity of the space in which they must be thought of as arranged.Before Aristotle. 63 . equally poised from the centre in every direction. nor will it be for Now it is. ally a void. this implication of a bounding circumference (as it were dividing the light from the outer darkness). is no more inconsistent with the concept of an immaterial essence than is St. a continuous One. omnipresent and altogether present One is unoriginated and indestructible.. This indivisible.. is other than the things that only seem to be and since they come into being and pass away. When he goes on to say that "it cannot be called 'infinite'. all at once. and being Now. All traditions speak of an original separation of heaven and earth. mentis 5). but the space thus created is aerial rather than empty. without beginning or end. cannot be said to be. only "finite" in the sense that it is self-contained. nor does it require that this space should be liter. 8 preserved by Simplicius) had set forth in thle clearest possible terms the doctrine that "that which is". for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than another". immoveable.. Parmenides (Diels fr. "it is complete. It is all alike.. Nor was it ever. Bonaventura's thought of God as a circle of which the centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere (Itin. And if he also calls the One a "sphere. because it is in need of nothing". in order that there may be a room or space in which things can exist. and endless.
Parmenides is speaking of the Essence that others call "God". 298b21. and to contrast it with the world of mortal opinion that is characterised by opposite forms. D). but a duplicate (Cratylus 432 C. stable. the contraries. living paradigm. not generated but eternal (dta&o). "he designed to make out of Eternity (acxov. Aristotle. and the realm of the contraries. of which light and darkness are the types. or would be not an image. ayus. of which he also says that one should be ignored. since it is merely a privation of the other. when He was ordering the whole Heaven (Universe). asserts that Parmenides is speaking all the time only about a sensible reality.Skr.) image. which is itself the world of "sensible reality"? Indubitably. the world was made by Zeus according to a self-same. 'life') a someeth!ing moving. but how could that be true of a description that expressly 'excludes an existence in time. and being therefore an un-reality cannot be thought. and it is significant that he not only ienunciates the Now-ness of the One that is. moving 6 An image is never like its archetype in all respects. in the present case the point is that "generation" and "eternity" are incompatibles. and as it would have been impossible to attach the quality of Eternity wholly to what was generated5. For Plato. in De caelo 1. 64 .Parmenides goes on to say that that which is is what is true. but can only define it by negations of all that it is not. He made out of that Eternity that ever abides in its own unity a sempiternal (atcbvto. and so. to be sure.
in fact. that motion includes "rest". although this is etymologically inconceivable.2. only means that Eternity is both the source of all times and their sink. 8."time". that were not before the generation of the Heaven (Universe) 8. can be equated with the Year. For an analogous myth cf. who. while that Kronos swallowed all his children. 1. 4 ad 3) also points out that time "not only measures motion. 253 B + 6. 115. both of which are "in time" (Phys. the father of Zeus. 4.3. 6. 10. and months and years. "Nature is the principle (or origin) of rest aswell as motion".according to number6. but only a potential and temporarily inhibited motion. As Aristotle says. which is not the same thing as "immoveability". This distinction is made already in RV. 234 A): and our present concern is with this timeless "Nature" (Plato's talcwvta evvoLt. qua time. was later on assimilated to xzeovos. 7 KeovoS.5: "Whatever He (Death. not to mention that things "at rest" are not thereby exempted from change and alteration. It should be noted. however. 1. St. who is also the Breath of Life) brought forth. that he began to eat". which is the distinction of the stasis of that which is from the motion-and-rest of things that become. but also rest". jagat. 1 where the Sun is the Self (principle) of "all that is in motion or at rest" (jagatas tasthusas-ca). Theol. Zeus excepted. that he overthrew his father means that. 239 A. he subdivided Time.e. and must be identified with time. An admirable summary of Plotinus on "Time 6 65 . "the moving" i. BU. the world. the Year. 8. 1. Skr. Timaeus 37B) as distinguished from its temporal manifestations. the Sun. 12. 3. For simultaneously He contrived the days and nights. Prajapati. like Prajapati. Thomas (Sum. Following Aristotle. And Cf. It is. Zeus. 8 In all these positions Plato is so closely followed by Plotinus (who ought much rather to be called a Platonist than a "Neo-" Platonist) that I have not thought it necessary to quote him here. even that which we have called 'time' (xe6vos)7. 221 B) and impossible in the "now" (ib.
indeed. been recognized that Plotinus' position is thoroughly Indian. nor. although in truth of speech the 'is' alone is appropriate. it by no means ifollows that he derived many. 9 The like ideas find expressioneven today. but in the lang66 . but it does not pertain to that which is always (del) self-accordant and motionless. nor to 'have become so'.uj ov) that it 'is' non-existent. Nor is it really accurate to say of what has become that it 'is' become. Nor does Neoplatonismencourage the belief that the blessed life is a state which will only begin for the individual when the earthly course of the whole human race has reached its term". It has often.-these being generated forms of time.-for we say that Eternity 'is'. since both are movements. Incidentally. in general to be subject to any of the conditions that are associated with what is sensible because of its 'becoming'. parts of his doctrinefrom India. even as 'was' and 'shall be' are generated parts of time. or of what will becom'e that it 'is' about to become.these are all parts of time. The Philosophy of Plotinus. while 'was' and 'will be' are properly applicable only to the becoming that proceeds in time.the Dean remarksthat "the kind of immortalitywhich 'psychical research' endeavoursto establish would be for him [Plotinus] a negation of the only immortality which he desires and believes in. 2nd ed.92-103. nor to be 'about to be so' in the future.. 1923. and Eternity" will be found in Dean Inge.. or of what becomes that it 'is' becoming.. 'was' and 'shall be'. to become older or younger by way of time. though we casually misapply them to thle Eternal Essence [when we call it 'everlasting']. 2. or of the nonexistent (-zo .. which imitates Eternity and revolves according to number. 9.or any. nor to 'be' so now.
Wilbur Urban. but this argument 67 . The Intelligible World. 417-421: "The identification of being with that which becomes. That is as much as to say that being neither lives nor dies.e. 6). who 'is. 1).3."Time.. and that nothing can be added to or subtracted from it.. 2. eternal (dat&a) and imperishable.. pp. 8. and it was made according to the paradigm of the Everlasting (6tatlivta) Nature. if ever any dissolution of them should be. one Death who both devours his (AV. There is no entropy of being. For example. and that as in SB. 21.-i. 2. future and past] are moments in a larger life". and it is not without good reason that Terminus (Hermes) was once a nomen Dei. B. became together with the Heaven (Universe). on the other hand 'is' for all time (anavra XQovov)10 wholly uage of the time. J. the oopy. for while the paradigm 'is' for all Eternity (tnavra aci-va). children and generates them (PB. so that having been generated together they might also be dissolved together. to be as much like it as was possible. the two phenomenal categories of life and death [i. 10.2. indeed. On the other hand. then. a "scientific" author. 5. Haldane. Phaedo 106 D.-it is one and the same Father who "killeth and maketh alive" I Sam. 86 the "recollection" of things not learnt in this life is taken to show that the Soul must have existed "throughout all time" and is therefore immortal. at once both man's beginning and his end.e.E. can write on "Time and Eternity" (in the Rationalist Annual for 1946) wifhout for a moment suspecting that he is only discussing time and completely ignoring the traditional meaning of "Eternity"! 10 In Meno 85. 13 our very life depends upon the presence of death within us..S. Wilbur Urban's "terminus" [a quo and ad quem] corresponds to Aristotle's "moment" or "point" that as its "limit" defines 'and gives a meaning to existences. 1929.3. with processes of evolution and devolution is impossible.
such as to have become. 'He will not get over it"'. and St.) 97. N. cf. p. As Wilbur Urban (Language and Reality. p. exist. "the scientist speaks of 'a machine that winds its own springs'. Bernard. Augustine. The same distinctions are implicit in the Cratylus 439 E. he is attributing "reality" to things that cannot be grasped because they never stop to be. "From the moment a man is born. Timaeas 29 A. De grad. of a 'natural selection' which is really not a selection". in spite of himself. Sermo (de Scrip. it is evidently not at that time transient. and is driven. and if it is always self-same and 'itself'. B. exactly Skr. quia primus morimur nascituri. sva-rupa) 11. it may be said. Nascimur morituri: ideoque nascimur morituri. 1 and 4. 9. and also the various Brahmanical and Buddhist contexts in which it is emphasized that immortality and birth are incompatible. because incarnation itself is a kind of dying. 515). 30. 3. thumilitatis 1. D.T. 708) remarks. how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form?" (J avrov lMea. and be about to exist". abandons logic! "A machine that winds its own springs is as much a fiction as a thinking reed" (ib. Eternity was referred to above as self-same "in Unity" and can hardly be other than the "One" of from pre-existence (and repeated incarnation) is not a rigorous proof. that in acknowledging the reality only of that which can be grasped. and that the seeds of death are born with us.-a word that is nothing but one of the names of God. to postulate the reality of some such abstract entity as "Energy". therefore of a machine that is not a machine. 3.-and in so far as he resorts to these antinomies. St. Cf. 11 This is the predicament of the positivist or "nothingmorist" (nistika). JUB. 9. Phaedo 95 C. where it is asked: " How can that which is never self-same 'be' anything? For if it is ever self-same. 3. and 37 D-38 C. 68 .
When.. it both partakes and does not partake of time. Now. Whosoever finds it. in The Cloud of Unknowing: "Let be this everywhere and this aught. does it change?. that it is both unchangeable and also changes.. 69 the Western "mystics" e. in comparison of this nowhere and this naught.which the nature is discussed at great length in the Parmenides 141 ff.g. whether it can be said that an Arahant. What is he that calleth it 'naught'? . both static and in motion means that "it must itself be in no time at all. is "Arozon. at the same time they remind us very strongly of the Buddhist answers to the question. if it is. "it is all things and nothing at all" 2. finds nothing and all things".. and Jacob Boehme: "Nothing and All. after death. and of the distinction of a Nibbana with or without residual "assumptions".. changes and does not change. rendered usually to be by "extraordinary". it is and is not. and neither one nor many.... then. "is" or "is not". Is there this out-of-place-thing (iaronov)13 wherein it might be. The One is both one and many. 65. 70). (for) there is no time in which anything can be at once static and in motion. where it is asked whether it "is" or "is not" and how the answer bears upon the nature of the "others". And therefore travail fast (earnestly) in this naught and this nowhere" (cc. The answers describe the two contrasted natures of one and the same essence.but here especially appropriatein its literal sense of "placeless". However.. and not our inner.. or that nothing-visible out of which all things proceed. and of the attributionboth of temporality and of timelessness to the Dhamma.. Our inner man calleth it 'All'.. 12 A significant formula that often recurs in the sayings of Surely it is our outer man..
222 b) as "minimally removed (from the indivisible now) by an imperceptible time". 16 Plato's four kinds of non-existence. would be said.'when' it changes? And of what sort? The moment 4 ! For the moment seems to signify a some(eaiqpvs) thing from which there is change in both directions. 13. 13. 341 C. cf. 9. the "no longer" (1t/xErt) of things that change and perish so as to "not be" what they 70 . it changes instantaneously. 14 Here unquestionably "instant" or "moment" without duration. Thomas Aquinas Sum. "out of place". 7 on the "suddenness" of the Holy Ghost.. but when it is nieither in motion nor static. Theol. But in changing. 2 (&pvco). not existent in any time. arzojro. and not in any time. stealthily" (sub-it-aneus). 7. since it is synonymous with "not in any time". 113. 'E~ai/YvrS is defined by Aristotle (Phys. In Skr. Ep. to be distinguished from "at rest" in the merely relative and physical sense in which things "at rest" are really only in "unstable equilibrium". 36. in NT. something enthroned between motion and stasis.cf. Acts 9. the word is rendered by "suddenly"-Mark 13. and that whatever is static changes to be in motion. and in the same way as regards its other 'changes'. apvwo 15 "Static". 6. and also Plato. from whatever is "not in any time" being necessarily also "not in any place". 22. Luke 2.. and it is into this and out of this that whatever is in motion changes to be static15. 4.while "sudden" means "going in the sense of "unawares". and similarly Mark 9. The word itself seems to mean "out of the unseen" (E~-4gavrs). 13.uij elval = pragabhava)16 to becoming (TO yiyveoLat = bhava).. 3.-the "not yet" of things that may or will exist. akala. "untimely" is used where in Gk. as from non-existence (ro . 8 (Ed&Ttva) and Acts 2.. there is this instantaneous nature that has no place (aro7oc). St. I-II.
or in other words both God and Godhead.in that it means freedom from affirmative limitations. 1. and co:nthat it is neither in a state of increase nor versely. 17 I. this is anyonya. but are not parts of it. anyonyibhdva. future and present conditions of becoming. for it has no parts. 2.e. the "mutual" or "relative" (reference 3 in the text above. from being like (itself) to being unlike. 258 E). ieok avAra (anyonya). it is shown that the "others" participate in the One. 71 . viz. or manner". so that when the Deity is described as sad-asat this is tantamount to niruktiniruktam and means that it is both with and without such definitions. so that their participation is both in the Whole (of Further.-just as the finite is not the opposite of the infinite. so to speak. and atyanatbhiva. and Sophist 258 E "as regards others"). otherwise. past. as Western mystics express it "free in its non-existence". Euthydemus 282 D).ucsoTv). C) and non-existence is not the opposite of existence. in the same order. and "absolute" (Parmenides 163 C "non-existent in any way. pradhvarmsibhiva. 7.being one to being many. but only to be contrasted with it. from being small to being great. for example. and also Parmenides 163C. SB.-so of decrease nor of equality"17 (Parmenides 147-157A). and Sophist 237 B TOur16a. for there is no "opposite of being" (ib. In the non-existent is "that which is uncharacterised" (yad vai nasti tad alaksaaam. the discussion is indefinite. shape. because it and ou$always imply a difference of some kind (Sophist 257 B. the Godhead being uncharacterised and so.are respectively identical with the Indian set of four kinds of non-existence. prigabhava. or ysr3ayco (atyanta). Plato's discussions of non-existence will be found easier to follow if at every point we pause to consider which of the four kinds of non-existence is referred to: whether. an excerpt from it. and properly to be called "nihil". when he changes from being ignorant to being wise. 7). "absence of existence in which we say that it is not there". but only. were (like Cleinias.
. and it results for these others than the One "because of what they have in common with the One and with themselves. 16 20 corresponds exactly to the Indian distinction of the corporeal or elemental self from the unborn.which last are their portion in and of the One in its "own form". indivisible (sarira. 18 Luke 15. 20 Cf. 19 "That which is the real self of each of us.which they are parts) and in the One. 4.&v. So that the things that are other than the One. 4.. being mortal as they are in themselves (ev eavokTs) and immortal as regards their Selves (xaY' 'avTd)19. 16 6 R(o r .ov v1 cowos 6ta9pet'e?iEsra.the Self of all thingsbecome" (sarva-bhiltandmitman) 21 The distinction of things as they are "in themselves" from what is "their own authentic nature" (as above.--a distinction of the "man" from the "Inner man" (c6 vrog av'0wno.or bhiita-mtman) Ultimate Self (parama-atman). tr. II Cor. 12. all'o Ceco c4uxtdvdvaxavov:al 'u-*ea xal pt-ce4a. R. 158 D). 589 B == ayam antah purusah. 17 dsgEavto' 68e1. Rep. 3. as in II Cor. etc. 72 . See in Note 1. Bury). mortality and immortality. 8) that. 21 Jacob Boehme's "Being of all beings". xaY' eavrd) is unlimited. both that there are differences amongst themselves by which they are limited in their relation to one another and to the Whole18. In other words. whether as wholes or parts. are both unlimited and participant in limitation" (ib. they bear within themselves the "trace" of the One's one-andmanyness.. passim. and that 'their own authentic nature' (i ' eavrcv qpvai. CU. Cf. and which we term the immortal soul" (Laws 959 B.
. 24 Literally. ZT avioqv4s. but the technologists are not. and how they operate. one that is ever for the sake (?vexa) of the things- that-really-are. students of this Nature (p. 10. one authentic Self (a0to xaO' avTro). Rep. svaruh. or otherwise. that is ever natured in accordancewith itself (xardrzavbrov del nEpvx6o 23 = svayambhu. ib. bhava).. Skr. and really is. destrucand both of these conditions are other than tion (ro' qpOeieQoaat). 4. 486 E. and the other their lessence (ovova..e.. 12. that third (Middle) and contemplative life in which there is neither gree nor grief.and cf. "how they suffer this or that" (on/ fdoxeL nl). avioyevr. xijv avrov iviotv with the "man". and (yvcoatg. things not in time are impassible (oaWs ndaeL). (this last) being the becoming (yevEacs. 240 B). and the other ever pursuing something other than itself . "how they are economically. what their passion is24. how they become. Philoctetes 902.). avro) is further clarified in terms of time and eternity in the Philebus. 73 . 53 D-59 A: "There are [in our existence] two things. 221 B + 6. 903 contrasting man's "authentic nature". 55 A..vtcu)."parasitic". the other that which having become for the sake of (xdaev... bhava)22 of all things. determined". 23 Cf. in later Gk. as they imagine. growing from its own roots: and contrast sre8oqpv^4. i. perhaps 'for the love of') the former-(that is) for the sake of something (other than itself)-is leverbecoming... as we should say. change being impossible in that which has no parts (Phys. The truest knowledge jiitna) is of that which is. On the other hand. taking no pains whatever to discover the 22 Which becoming is inseparable from its opposite. as Aristotle points out.what they spend their lives in the investigation of is the things of this world. Sophokles.
divides the past from the future. of course..things-that-really-are. 26 "Point" can be said either with respect to time or space: cf. Eth. 222 B + 10. and in dividing and uniting ( btataeots xat these two functions is altogether like the undimensioned Point ((atyt) 26 that simultaneously divides and 25 "What we have called the Great Person (mahipurusa) is the Year that scatters some things and unifies others". but only those that become and will become and have become". cf. not here "destroys" (empirically) but rather literally "makes dust of" in the sense that "dust thou art" (Gen.218A + 8. or that.. 4.221 B + 13.. the Now is not a part of time at all. by the fact of their eternity. in other words. "things leternal (td 6' dti&a)are neither generated nor destroyed" (Nich. which end is also the beginning of another period of time. "for time is always in the beginning" (del ev dagfi. 2): "eternal entities (da dae ojva)... everlasting. the mark of Whichis their impassibility . 2 eki bhavati. 222 B).. Phys. In time all things are generated and destroyed. By the "now that is lnot a part of time" is meant. 13..."slays". 4.263 B): and this is as much as to say that Eternity is Now. 4. 3.2. Plutarch. and aikya bhavayan. 8. 3. Mor. "is dying".-temporalia! For Aristotle. 3): pradhvarhsayan. 3. the "atomic now" (&froyos vvv) that marks the beginning or the end of any period of time. 4. 19). i. 6. or not at all.. are not in time. and like movement. BU. Time is made up only of the past and the future. 117 E "the longest life is short and mo- 74 .12. So the indivisible Now has the double function of a evc)ota ) 25. Time cannot be divided into atomic parts" (Phys..e. generates some in their diversity and puts an end to the existence of others (AA.
then she casts herself into the centre. Paradiso 17. or to take a different example. though it is really always the same and never discontinuous with itself. "A Neo-Pythagorean Source in Philo Judaeus". are 'the same throughout" (ib. oavvsez. just as space is unlimited but apparently differentiated by the boundaries of a mentary (otryuaroS) compared to limitless Eternity". Mun. 6) is equally the motionless centre of all existence. 222 A). 75 . 17 il punto a cui tutti li tempi son presenti. 4. 27 In this paragraph. The "point (of Time impartite) to which all times are present".219 B). Up. 11 with RV. den diu sele umbeloufen hat"-and when the soul has been her rounds and found the circle endless. but in the sense that the point is that which traces the undivided line. 94 un punto solo. 13. 35. nows are always differentiated (del &ieQov)by their relation to different (.-"Daz ist der zirkel.ael o av6o). and that is just as. in other words. "Nows". in terms of transmigration. just pasts and futures. but apparently differentiated by the really different times with which they are associated (Phys. "in ein punt" (Meister Eckhart. 117-164.unites the parts of a line. are all the same. and Dante. As dividers. Yale Classical Studies III. Pfeiffer 503). cited above) is empirically many by the superimposition of the empirical qualities of the many vehicles to which it is present. Goodenough. and "from which point heaven and the whole of nature depend" (Paradiso 28. the one "atomic Self" (anar atman. cf. pp. R. "a single moment". "the moment to which all times are present". 41. and 33.11. 1932. bracketed numbers refer to E. 1. but as uniters always the same as in the case of points which as dividers are manifold (since a line can be divided in different places).
It is interesting that this last illustration is also used by Aristotle himself in Phys. in parenthesis. this would imply the existence of an infinite number of individual "places" existent in one and the same continuous space. 10 "He divided them in the middle.) and Unifying Bond (Eao/u6o) ably as envisaged by Philo.dvandvau] held together in harmony by the very creative impulse or agent Which had originally separated them out from primitive and unformed matter by a series of bisections" (132)27. Here. leaning out of the Sun. not(rouevi. that "God is always geometrizing" (as we see Him in Blake's Ancient of Days. hardly necessary to say that the concept is referable to Plato. 5. and are. describes the created world "as consisting of an almost infinite series of opposites [evavtla. extending his compasses. where he points out that if the imaginary spatial entity left behind when the vessel is removed were really identifiable.85. and laid the pieces opposite each other". 15. 76 .4. RV.e. de-limitations or measurements28. cf. 8. who.jar. 25. but when the jar is broken the "space in which it was" is no longer identifiable. it may be observed that the dual functions of the instantanieousnow or undimensioned point which divides and unites extents of time or space are precisely logical functions. 6. 4. 5). 18 and TS.211 B. starting from Gen. 4. cf. i. 5.5 miineneva tasthivan antarikse vi yo mame prthivim suryena.uoviaof opposite tensions. a single nature which develops itself in the twofold 28 It is. perhaps. in fact the functions of the Logos that is at once the Divider of all things. Just as for Heracleitus "reality is a da.
is at once the Cutter of the universe and the glue binding it together" (133. but a premise (arotleiov) and a principle" (adQx. what is obvious enough. i. passim. "The Monad is the image of God who is single in his unity and at the same time a pleroma". and that are also seven men. "ungenerated and indestructible" and "without beginning or end" Plato.. Axis Mundi. truth. "the Logos as being God in relation to the world. It is emphasized by Philo (Heres 207 f. Rimi. 3. but much rather (as Clement of Alexandria also saw) "the bond" that holds the universetogether. while elsewhere the characteristic symbol of the Logos is the Pillar. 8..)31. 31 Compare Daqiqi's wonderful vision of the seven candles that become one. Phaedrus 245 D + Aristotle. Phys. 30 Gold. 1985ff. and passim). that all creation and existence involves a distinction or separation of contrary concepts. while "the others. as in India. light.252 B. nothing I cannot here enlarge upon values of ociyyo and TCiyf. so for Philo the "Monad [Plato's 'One' as distinct from the 'others'] is not a number at all.e. 4. except to say that the Sphinx is certainlynot "the strangler". and immortality. 188). Heres 190.1.-and so. and recognized throughout the tradition. being the recognized symbol of life.. cf. 29 77 . are held together (aopiyyetat)29by the Divine Word" (Heres 187. This "One" (zo yae 'v) is represented by the central light of the sevenfold 2ivxva. 146).. of course. Mathnawi3.-and as such. of which the golden30 material is the symbol of unbreakable extensibility and so of total presence (Heres 215f. 203 B).directions" (132). and seven trees that are both seven and one.
4) where the "Active Door" is an ever revolving razoredged wheel (as in Genesis "a flaming sword which turned every way") between the spokes of which "thle Skyfarer.. wherein God dwells. 7. 9). Ashley Montagu (Ed.e.. 1). darted in an instant" (ksanena). Studies.and no one who has 'not overcome "the highest spirit of reason" [i. whether Greek.. . our opportunity is instantaneous. "Now (vvv) is the day of salvation". It is inasmuch as "strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life" that "few there be that find it" (Math.). American or Indian31a. 22). we shall be changed" (II Cor. So it is that for Nicolas of Cusa (De vis. but is qualitatively "this" and "not that". 2 and I Cor. 52). of 31a See my "Symplegades" in M. 4.14): "I am the door" (John 10. na nibadh- yate.. or that is "now" in the vaguer sense of the word. is gbuilt. 15. Irish. In a moment (ev aro/tcp). and th:is is apparent in all the traditional accounts of the passage of the Symplegades or Sundoor.that very "moment without duration".28. the twinkling of an eye. 78 . 3.. 1947. 6.. Liberation is "from the delusion of the pairs" (dvandva-moha-nirmuktih BG. Offered in Homage to George Sarton.that was or will be. F..29. In other words. . IX) it is of these contraries that the wall of Paradise. the Logos] that guards the undimensioned point that divides the contraries from one another and unites them can attain to thie coincidence of opposites that subsists in the divine intellect: and in the same way in India. I. "overcoming the pairs" (MU. Dei c.. 7. dvandvdito . diminishing his body. for example in the Mahabharata (Poona ed.
but may be near or far from one or the other . Whereas. that is to say along thie Axis Mundi or Seventh Ray. wherever it may be. All that this apparent discrepancy means is that actual walls or lines are artificially delimited from a potentially indefinite 'extension in either direction. and this will be true wherever the dividing point may be accidentally placed. or as extents on this or that side of a dividing point. the Hero. It is only by approaching the murity at right anglles. trying to find a way around the barriers. if we think of the opposites. seeking to avoid the dangerous passage of the clashing opposites. but anywhere: whereas Philo emphasizes that the logical Divider and Uniter is always in the middle and always makes divisions of two exactly lequal parts. for. simply as past and future. 79 . and than which Via Miediathere is no other Way. indeed. and "apart from which there is no side door here in the world".which we have been speaking.end of the wall. just as a line can be bisected not only in the middle. doors are not necessarily median. It is precisely for this reason that in some versions of the myth of the Symplegades. in actual walls. and return to the "point" of division and contact. and that the position of the door or point is accidental. is said to turn aside in leach direction. he will find no other passage than that which is afforded by this point that retains its median position all down thie line. In connection with the "door" one further point should be noted. but has to abandon such an endless quest. the two parts are exactly 'equal in lextent because both extents are indefinite and unlimited.
Were the Now in time as a part is in a whole. if the before and after are both in one and the same Now. "thien everything would be in anything.ave meant to deny the simultaneity of past and future in this One and Eternal Now. in neither of which is there any discontinuity. the Way is just as narrow as the Gate is strait. Aristotle can hardly h. for if the grain and the uni80 . 221 A). and not bleing before or after. and nothing would be before or after anything else" (Phys. 218 A). with reference to their difference that "if simultaneity as to time. 10. 4. in discussing the essential identity of the indivisible Now. To return to Aristotle. It seems to me that the only purpose of these difficult statements is to distinguish thle accidental simultaneity of things in time from their essential simultaneity apart from time. and that it must be the whole of the past and the future. but only in the sense that time surrounds it. that meet in the Now that faces both ways. and the universe in a grain of millet. and is in the Now. much as the sea surrounds an island.that one can hope to pass "through the midst of the Sun". Again. and the accidental distinction of the two Nows that delimit a given period of time he says. only because the grain of millet and the universe are both existent at the same time" (ib. implies coincidence. or to deny that there is a sense in which the universe is "in a Igrain of millet". then what happened ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous with what is happening today. the Now itself is not in time so as to be a part of it. in the Now that unites the past and the future. 4.12. whether One or accidentally two.
"a World in a grain of sand. unless by our own fault we suppose that all is gold that glitters. 81 . but is not the reality of which it is an imitation. and one might say also "Indian": "All things on earth are overtaken by destruction for without destruction there can be no origin(9#oQad). But the things that come into being out of destruction must be false (Ve6sog) 32. is not real.). and how can that be real (or 'true') which is not the same that it was before. then it can be said that the universe is "in" the grain at the same time that the grain is in the universe. because they become different at different times. An imitation is not unreal as such. 'but man is a composite of many things.. The things that come into being must needs arise from those that are destroyed.-in the words of William Blake. Man himself. I must. however. if origination (or 'becoming') is to go on. and those that come into being must be destroyed. and Eternity in an hour". insofar as he is a man.. I do not propose to cite these doctrines in detail as they recur in the works of the Hermetists and Neoplatonists. quote from "Hermes Trismegistos" a passage at once Platonic and Aristotelian. and remains what it is in itself.verse are considered not in their extension but as regards their common and immutable essence that insists in the absolute Now. but not necessarily deceptive. ation (yeveot. and does not remain such as he is in himself.. but shifts 32 "False". For the real is that which is absolutely self-subsistent. For it is impossible for the same things to become a second time.
my note 7 in Psychiatry 8. him do I worship.. p. is real... but "seeing that the 82 . changeless and unalterable. What then. The [Supernal] Sun.and changes from one age to another. and Scott is falling into the error derided by Plutarch. nothing is real that does not remain what it is. He rules over all things. 288. and from one form (iSea) to another.. nor embodied.387-389 (Excerpt II A. That One. 1945.g.. who is colourless and formless. who does not change. acknowledging him as the Maker. Hermes (whom Plutarch and Hippolytus identified with "Reason") also discusses "the three times" and remarksthat "they are made one by their continuity. and I adore his Truth. You must understand that that alone that ever is. as a descriptionof Brahma.. is real. but remains what he is. all that Hermes is saying is that both the Son ("through whom all things were made") and the Father are "true" or "real". is the Primal Truth (or Reality)? Only that One. 15). Hermes to Tat). Cf. but to the intelligible Sun. but the latter even more superlativelyso. But a man is not a thing that ever is. 34 Scott. who is not made of matter.throughouttradition. and the distinction. Oftentimes men fail to recognize their own children after a short interval. and children likewisle fail to recognize their parents. and makes all things. 3. Put into Christian terms.. the reference is not to the physical sun. KU. The last sentence might have been taken word for word from an Upanishad(e. Hermetica 1. next after the Primal One 33. 33 I cannot agree with Scott that the passage referring to the Sun "is inconsistentwith the text.of the sensible from the spiritual Sun. that of confusing Helios with Apollo even when the word Helios really stands for Apollo. and who Is eternally" 3..
'in-standing') when it cannot stand in equilibrium?" ('oni) (Excerpt 10).. unborn and unperishing. and if he changes. The last corresponds exactly to BG. and to which time brings no change. he is not 'himself'. even for an instant (xsvreov= panctus). but himself changes as other proceeds from other. quotes Heracleitus and goes on: "nor is it possible to lay hold twice of any mortal substance in the same state. by the sharpness and swiftness of the change in it there 'comes dispersion and again combination'. for he has died into the man of today (oarjteov = Skr. is that which really is? That which is . but at the same instant (IMta) it both takes its place and leaves it and 'comes and Igoes'. apparent in connlection with matter in motion. then. sadya). and "that which is ever becoming is ever perishing. Our sensibility. 1.. 5).. not at another time nor later. any supposed objection to such an expression as "having come to be" falling away because the reference is really to That One who is "selfbecome" (svayam-bhi. through ignorance of what really is. infra..20b. All this is equally Aristotelian and Buddhist. but is a very good philosopher. falsely tells that the appearance 'is'. nor is he 'one'. Cf. Dead is the man of yesterday. will he ever more come not to be".. who may not be very "original". he is not the same. "nor having come to be. and if he is not the same. or. 1. p. "What. 83 . how can it be said to be 'present' (lit.eternal. avtoq~vs) and was not brought into being by any external cause.. For time is something moving.2.Plutarch. 65. ever present does not stand fast. rather. So that that which is born of it never attains to being. but becomes many. No one persists. but that which has become once for all (ina$) perishes not at all" (Excerpt 11.
it hardly need be said.ere are no atoms. 84 .not a retainer. is conveyed to the worlds as being "round about" (geit) all things. for ever in the present Now. 106. Eternity. for of necessity it suffers a division [is not an d'To/lo.e. nor future nor past. and wherein there is no before nor after. whole. has with one [indivisible] 'Now' filled 'for ever' "35. St.7 and 3. self-same. of course. 3-11). 'shall be' and 'has been' when they are said. vvv].. p. as the circumference surrounds the centre. Cf. 4. On the other hand. nor older nor younger. in th!efull sense that nothing whatever is absent from it. not this now and now that other. like an ever-flowing stream. In 422C he speaks also of eternity" "whence time. God is. all things are "round about" eternity. an imitation of Eternity. and He is not for any time but for the ieternity(atcov) that is motionless and timeless and undeviating. whose familiar 'after' and 'before'. 4. "is a life changelessly motionless and lever :holding the universal content in actual presence. For 'now' is crowded out into the future and the past. is "the life of the soul as she passes from one phase of activity or experience to another".. but always all. for whom "th. 7. being One. So that nothing is in store for it: for if any35 Plutarch. in the last analysis identical with God. and time. are of themselves a confession of not being. but Hle. infra. Augustine. for Plotinus (Enneads 2... but as it were a vessel of destruction and becoming. all-pervading..flowing (Peovade). Finally. all body is divisible endlessly". i.. In another sense. Moralia 392C-393A. time and motion are continuous. n. when we regard it as a point [of time]. "But.
. with St. Augustine and Boethius. it were better to say 'Being' simply.. but is prior to all quantity... and so it could not be the All... "is their seeking after perpetuity by way of futurity". the circling of all things round about their ..thing were yet to come. in whom the Platonic tradition persists.existent by the very fact that it is. that is Eternity". complete. Th. itself means 'ever-being' (del ov). Life. is liable to introduce the false notions of stage or interval. instantaneously entire. nowhere broken into period or part. Eternity (ati'v)...of our enquiry. which has no connection with any quantity. such as instalments of time. we reach the beginning of the Middle Ages. spoken not of time but of the inoorruptible and endlessly whole.though 'always'. And he adds that motion.e word.. pertaining to the Self. since 'everlasting' really adds nothing to the concept of Being.. . that thing must have been lacking to it. After Plotinus. that has been the object .eternalcentre. 85 .
"based on the paradoxes of Zeno. in an article entitled "Continuous re-creation and atomic time in Muslim scholastic theology". body or atom. this is not the Aristotelian doctrine but. the world is made of atoms that "have no quantity... rather.IV ISLAM D. Accidents are inseparable from the atoms. 86 . there is a separation between them in which absolutely nothing. He starts with Maimonides' account of Muslim "atomism". according to which. that is. but out of which compounds can be made which possess quantity" and that 'exist in a vacuum.. exists. It may have been the Ash'arite doctrine. he says. but is certainly not that of the indivisible "instant" of the Suifis.. then Allah creates another accident of the 1 As Macdonald himself points out. This means that when Allah creates a material atom he creates in it whatever accidents he wills.. Macdonald has dealt with a part of our subject at some length in Isis 30 (June 1927)... This means that time is made up of a great many 'times' which cannot be further subdivided..~ which cannot be logically resolved except by eliminating all infinitesimals".. Time is made up of now's ('andt) 1. the accident does not last two atoms of time. B.. When an accident is created it passes away at once.
. So also in Hinduism and Buddhism. For some of the references see Sankaracarya. but only to be. like their exemplar. merely behaves ill or well. 87 . pp. vv.. of himself. and for Philo. ye are not under the law" (Gal. All injunctions and prohibitions imply a freewill attributed to those to whom they apply. This by no means relieves the "individual" of full responsibility for "his" actions. where the notion that "I am the agent" is equally fallacious. etc.. and is under the Law. Augustine. but this in no way relieves the man of responsibility for so long as as he still thinks of himself as "this man. If it holds for Christ that " I do nothing of myself. he doeth the works" (John 8. 48 (SBE. 119. "I am". In Islam. But "if ye be led of the Spirit. holds together the 2 The notion that "I am the agent" is fallacious equally from the Islamic.. Vedantic and Buddhist points of view. all with reference to the egocentric delusions. So. injunctions and prohibitions are valid for him. for so long as his individuality lasts. 129. 2.45. "necessitarianism" and jabr in the Index). 14. Commentary 1. and it is a heresy to maintain that there is no "ought to be done" and "ought not to be done". and s.. The Christian position is not different.. "co-workers with Him who doeth the works" (St. 4. and he will reap as he sows. Man. BrSBh. 35). 66) and s. whose olotca = Skr. [but] he creates in the mind of the supposed actor an 'accepting as his own' of his supposed act2.. 10) it is hardly for his followers to assert their own independent agency..v. Mathnawi. he is absolutely the only agent [asli kar] in existence. the "necessitarianism" (jabr) that would make of man a merely passive instrument is a well recognized heresy (for some of the references see Nicholson. 3. et gratia 31.same kind . Only Allah. and Pali mdna. 1939. Akiriyavada and Ahatmkarain HJAS. De nat. "I do". freedom from obligation is only for those who are no longer anyone.. and-so". 38. it is God alone who acts in us. the Father that dwelleth in me. 28..
St. 2 and 3. 20. Augustine. and to obey or disobey the Natural Law. 3. is from th:e Holy Ghost" (St.3). 18). But truly to act (facere vero) belongs only to God and other divine essences" (Boethius. Sam. "insofar as they are sinners. Contra Eutychen 1. but only a failure to act. Heracleitus as interpreted by Sextus Empiricus IIPO AOFIKOYS 131-134). and anything but a freedom. Laws 644). every mis-deed. 11. Aquinas. I-II. have no being at all. not being "in act". cf.Th.. "whoever is born of God cannot sin" (1 John 3. The same applies to lies and truth. Sinners themselves. 2. 12. to appropriate or shirk the specific functions that have been delegated to men as vocations ("for everyone is predisposed by God to that for which he was created". 1). Theol. 2 ad 3).T.9). 2 ad 4): that is. by whomsoever it has been said. as the words mis-deed. The human puppet is free to hold or not hold onto the "golden cord" (of the "thread-spirit") and either acts or merely reacts accordingly (Plato. Aquinas. "To 'act' (facere) and suffer belongs to bodies and their soul. Allah is the only Reality. Freewill is the liberty to accept or refuse the status of "co-workers with God".96. Accordingly.. "the acts of a man who is led by the Holy Ghost are not his acts. John 8. Ambrose on 1 Cor. are not "in being". Sermo [De Script N. a virtual non-entity. 44. is referable to man as he is in himself.whole stream of the existence of the world. akrtam truly tell us. and so He is the "sole agent".. Freewill is not a liberty to do as one likes-a matter of passive reaction to pleasure and pain. All this can only be rightly understood when the nature of an act.] 166. Theol. for it both 'acts' in the body and suffers through the body. and the relation of act to being has been rightly understood. 88 . but whatever is really done is referable to God. 115. whatever is "not-done". man in himself is a liar (Ps. Sam. We must eliminate the conception of causality from the universe except as to the imme5. 1. Th. No sin is an "act". but fall short of it" (St.. but those of the Holy Ghost" (St. Hadith). but "all that is true. Un-that.
convinces us . Macdonald seems to be quite unaware that his own cinematographicanalogy is invalid. Macdonald himself does not seem to realise that nothing that has extension can be "made of" parts that have none! Macdonald points out that the Arabic word jauhar. and reason. Finally (p.of that". Aristotle's "reasoning"-that makes it perfectly clear that time and space are continuous and that motion is anything but "a series of leaps and rests". and secondly inasmuchas it is precisely "reason"-in this case. actually. p. and while Aristotle's atoyuo.diate. 89 . Elsewhere 3 Macdonald had remarkedof the Muslim atomists that "these atoms of space or time. in either case without 'extension.exposition that "motion" seems to our senses to be continuous. are precisely the same as Aristotle's". working of Allah". 202. Macdonald. 337) he finds in Maimonides' . The Development of Muslim Theology. But this would certainly not be true of the Muslim atoms as described by Maimonides. moment by moment. B. 1903. Jurisprudence. The pictures in the cinematograph of recreation in each successive moment of time produce a continuous impression on our eyes. demonstrating that time must be in atoms.vvv is the same as the Islamic andar wvaqtand Boethius' nanc stans. New York. and Constitutional Theory. but we know by reason that it consists of a series of leaps and rests. in the first place because the successive "frames" are not "without extension". but it is an illusion. it is lequally certain that Aristotle was not himself an atomist in the material sense. 3 D.
ii padme huri. but philosophically. Macdonald further remarks that al-Ghazali. a physical body". and remarks that Ibn HIazm's jauhar is the Aristotelian "substance". which last are. "Allah is perpetually giving existence to every entity. "seems to have rejected entirely the atomic scheme and to have attached himself to the Aristotelian-Platonic wing". ovala. Sometimes they add the word 'separate' (fard). For Ibn Hazm. indeed. as long as it is an entity. a word that can be used absolutely in the singular (Omr ma.. but for the atomistic philosophers it means 'atom' in the exact sense. nevertheless. who rejected Ash'arite doctrines and therewith that of "separate atoms" (al-jauhar al-fard). 'a part which cannot be further parted'.Persian gauhar. or to the concept of the Word. and that of "words" of which the truth depends upon their participation in the truth of that Word in which all things are spoken simultaneously. corresponds to Skr. as "gem" or "pearl".). ens. cf. as it seems. side by side with "beings". It seems to me that that exactly corresponds to our use of "Being" absolutely. 7. In philosophy it has become the broadest word for 'substance'. mazi. "Pearl" of great price). 90 . participant in Being. "developed many secondary meanings. and in the plural not only to denote gems or pearls. as in the sutrStman doctrine (BG. 1064. just like our word 'substance'. Later on he quotes Ibn Hazm (d. whose influence "triumphed". a century and a half before Maimonides). originally a "gem" of any kind4. jawhar came to be used for a portion of matter. to mean "substances" or "entities". in reality only "becomings". etc. essentia. to be. at every moment (waqt) of time".. 4 Gauhar. Finally. accordingly. 7.
translated by M. Friedlander. on whom he (Macdonald) relies. 2nd ed.e. the original in full can be easily. ch. The foregoing is taken from Macdonald's summary in Isis. II. Maimonidies is by no means describing a doctri. at first a Mu'tazilite and later orthodox. The Mutakallemim.. but scholastic theology of an atomistic type. but that of the Muslim M. 1926. 120124 (i. Friedlander. 673.be. Having remarked of the Mutakallemim that they believed in indivisible atoms not only of matter but also of time and space. Part 1. lxxxiii). 1. translated by M. separated from one another by a vacuum. Ixxiii). he says. 1925. behind whose orthodoxy lay the atomistic system that was Islam's most original contribution [!] to theology" 6.. 2nd ed. p.utakallemim. and although he (Maimonides) lived a century 5 Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. ch. called themselves Ash'arites. never refers to the Stfis. 672. 120-144 (i. We realise. and a mutakallim came to mean a theologian. pp.ne in which he believes. and should be consulted in Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed. he very properly remarks that "the Mutakall. 6 How so. Elsewhere5 Macdonald remarks that the "'Ilm alKalam [Science of the Word] came to mean not simply theology.e. going back most strangely to Democritus and Epicurus. followers of "The Word" whom one might call fundamlentalists.emim did not at all understand the nature of time" (Third Proposition). if derived from Democritus and Epicurus? 91 . pt. then. that Maimonides. he (al-qalam). consulted in Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed.
The basis of all the manifestations of the world. Their atoms were not of space only..v.. of which the affinities are with Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. p. s. Between them is absolute void. is a multitude of monads. if the expression may be permitted. I wonder.goes back to Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. which could not be further divided . and do not touch one another. also absolute void-of time-between them. whether Macdonald himself understood the problems involved: for he says.. They have simply position.. 307. and that any confusions apparent in Maimonides' account are of little significance for us.later than al-Hujwiri.. Allah. indeed. whose concern is not with atomism as a physical hypothesis but only with the relation of extended time and traversable space to the Time and Space that are indivisible and unextended.. and leaps across the void from one to the other with the jerk of the 92 . Each has extension neither in space nor time. Macdonald quotes from his own Development of Muslim Theology. is really telling us nothing about the Sufi doctrines of Time and time. their path. The time-atoms.. 1.. already cited: Of the Ash'arites he says that "when they rejected the Aristotelian view of matter as the possibility of receiving form. of necessity. "the division of time into atoms.-whereas it is precisely the theory of discontinuous time that makes motion impossible! In the Encyclopaedia of Islam. and made motion possible". it was a solution of that paradox. are equally unextended and have. not bulk. but of time. led them straight to the atomists. time is only in a succession of untouching moments.
he asks. Horten. From what has been said above. which is itself continuousand uninterrupted. 93 . if this was Islam's "most original contribution to theology".e. But. He remarks that "the Muslim scientific civilization cannot be 'explained entirely as a product of Greek influence" and that "there is a tendency at present among students 7 Need it be pointed out that the jerks of the hands of the clock are not movements of time? They take place in brief durationsof time. By heretics he means "all who applied dialectic to questions of the Faith". "no one [atom] is the cause of the other" and this "annihilates the machinery of the universe". Again. and how irrational. although "they were certainly the immediate heirs of the Greek civilization so far as science and philosophy were concerned". i. ignores the operation of mediate causes. it will be seen how un-Greek this all is. Macdonald proceledsto discuss "the exceedingly difficult question of the origin of this atomic scheme in Islam". it was certainly nothing to be proud of. Philosophische Systeme der speculativen Theologen im Islam [date?] and to De Boer's "Atomic Theory (Muhammadan)" in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. 8 He refers to M. "how did the system of material atoms come to be combined with a system of time-atoms and made into a complete theory of the origin of the universe?" He is unable to find "any trace of anything of the kind in Greek thought" and cannot believe "that the Muslim thinkers originated it". At the end of his treatment of the subject in Isis. He says that it goes back in its bleginnings to Muslim heresy"8.hand of a clock" 7.
the Stfi doctrine of the "moment" (waqt) could have been so derived. with further references. 65.of Islam to look to India for a sollution of some of our remaining problems". Jacobi's "AtomicTheory (Indian)" in Hasting's Encyclopaedia. it cannot be overlooked that. Introductionto the Study of Hindu Doctrines. and from S. Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy: but more fully outlined above. as Jahangir remarked. though it does not follow that is was in fact so derived.edic and Buddhist. and to regard it as one that belongs to all of them by right iof inheritance from antecedent sources ultimately beyond the reach of historical investigation. Rene Ouenon. 20. He turns therefore to India. If. for 9 Knownto him only from H. Vedanta and Tasawwuf "are the same"). 18. so to speak. 300. Historical method is only of limited value here. partly because metaphysicaldoctrines "do not 'evolve' in the Western sense of the word" and partly 94 . 237. 1945. on the other hand. Now I am not much enamoured of researches into origins or sources undertaken in this historical manner. the problem lof origins thus arising at the very beginning. of oiur studies. nevertheless. The question is further complicated by the fact that the Pythagorean-Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies already embody so much that is equally V. and suggests that the Muslin atomism is derived from Buddhist sources 9. 10 On the limitations of the "historical method" cf. we are to discuss the affinities of Islamic and Indian philosophy (not forgetting that. pp. I cannot see that the Ash'arite doctrines could have been derived from Buddhist sources. and prefer simply to recognise the common ground on which the traditions rest. 58.
But all this is to ignore another side of the question. In fact. or nunc stans. seen as relative. R. at a relatively recent date. For instance. in Christian philosophy. Meister Eckhart's words. appears the world Viewed in its essence is the very 'Truth' imply just what is meant by the Buddhist expression. There are very few metaphysical doctrines in Islam that could not."the fllux and the absolute are the same".instance.. yas sathsaras tan nirvianam. be very plausibly derived from Vedic or Buddhist sources. but are almost certainly not of Buddhist origin. 206) might have been said by any Sufi. for example. if one made the attempt. of a teaching which was originally transmitted by word of mouth and to which an author can rarely be assigned". 95 . one that is represented by the survival of the doctrine of the Eternal Now. Not that the question is of great importance: historical studies have a certain value in that the universality of fundamental ideas can be dlemonstratedas against those who think of them as having been the inventions of these who enunciate because "in a general way and in most instances a traditional text is no more than a recording. Nicholson overstressed Greek and neglected equally striking equivalences of Siufi with Indian metaphysics. A. in Jami's Lawa'ih XXV the words What. the vhole doctrine of "time and eternity" in Suifi Islamic and Christian contexts could have been derived from Platonic-Aristotelian sources. "God iis creating the world now. this instant" (Pfeiffer p.
96 . is incumbent on everyone" (p. Nicholson's version. In this sense. and of all outward and inward circumstances of which the due effect depends on 'time'. but these exoteric and esoteric aspects of Truth must not be divorced" (p. things pertaining to the practise of religion belonging to the former. Gibb Memorial Series XVII. 14). and How can it best be disentangled from individually heretical misinterpretations. "the most ancient and celebrated Persian treatise of Sufism" asserts: "Knowledge of 'time' (waqt).them. without a full acknowledgement of the truth that "knowledge without action is not knowledge" (p. the literary history of ideas is of valuteonly in so far as it can oontribute to the ultimnate answering of the questions. A. 1st ed.D. for the rest. 1071-2 A. and so rightly understood. of which the expansion must antedate al-Hujwiri's treatise. We have discussed the atomism of the Miutakallemim at so much length only to dispose of it. "waqt is that whereby a man becomes independent of past and future".-it is not. Time has both external and internal aspects. Those who possess it say: "we are happy with God in the present (andar 11 The page references are to R.)11. 13). and true cognition to the latter. Is such and such a doctrine true. 1911. The Kashf al-Mahjiub of al-Hujwiri (d. 12) that the present thesis is restricted to a consideration of "Time" in its absolute and "interior" sense. and can now consider the Sufi doctrines of time and eternity. in fact.
If we occupy ourselves with to-morrow. or let any thought of it enter our minds. 12. Cf. and obliterates care of yesterday and tomorrow from the heart" (pp. 4. and Mathnawi6. cf. 13 Actually. p. my "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight". of course. 6. 3. he is no more subject to 12 The foregoing statementsimply.waqt). 368-9)12. and 'Time' cuts the roots of the future and the past. Time is the devourer of time. 97 . and that is also the sword of the Word of God that "sunders soul from spirit". Now] is a cutting sword'. Again. "the most precious of human things is the state of being occupied between the past and future. above.. we shall be veiled (from God)". because it is characteristic of a sword to cut. 17 (1944). for waqt is beautified by hal and subsists thereby 3. "The lovely winner of hearts became a sword and appeared in the hand of 'All and becamethe slayer of time".e.. and the Shaykhs have said that 'Time [i. The experience of "Time" in this interior sense may be found or lost: "waqt has need of hidl [condition]. that we should "let the dead bury their dead" and "take no thought for the morrow". For Time (the Eternal Now) as "a cutting sword". 76.-as in AB. When the owner of waqt comes into possession of hhal. In other words. the immediate allusion being to the sword DhW'lfiqar given to 'All by the Prophet and that is the death of those who "die before they die". 44 and MU. Speculum 19. hal as "condition" or "mode" or "ecstasy" implies the experient'sreal responseto the momentaryillumination. on the L6gos Tomeus: as in the Ode from Shams-i-Tabriz' Diwan translated by Nicholson in JRAS. Heb. Ralmi.2. but not a stability or permanencein the sense that maqam is a "station". 1913. 1522.
c. Cf. or says. 15 Maurice Browne. Kazwini. Clartes). pp. 329. London 1906. H. The "interior Time" is the "instant of illumination" that is so often compared to a flash of lightning. 1946. 1946. and it became. Lawi'ih. Thus. is to "become". Allen. of kaun) is the Command. 36. p. that he should be filled with joy" (pp. Be. that he should be stricken with grief. or becomes". as remarked by D. nor of union. for most of us. London. pp. But "Abrahamwas a possessor of hal: he was not conscious of separation. 17 E. for all".change. and the instant has become all time"15. and that for the usual rendering "God said. and is made steadfast (musiaqlm) in his state. Become. or is" should be substituted "God said. and on him who is thus forgetful hal descends and waqt is made stable. p. 42-45. "now he was blinded by separation. Macdonald. it is only when "the light is constant. "Become". It is by no means momentary. p. however. He who is [still] in the state of becoming (matakawwin)14 may be forgetful. 15. "illumination occurs instantaneously and. 98 . the infinitive serving for the noun. 19. Whinfield and M. supra. 373-4). London. Oriental Translation Fund XVI. XXVI17. or says. in the Law'ih ("Flashes". B. Cf. i. This would also agree with the meaning of the expressions du kaun. 13.. lasts but a moment. W. summarises the doctrine of the Moment (or "interior 14 Kaun. "the two becomings". The Timeless Moment. 16 See above. that the Sun "never sets" 16. now he was restored to sight by union". Jacob had waqt. Jami. just as werden means "becoming". and it was. The Atom and the Way. past and future. It would follow that the creative Word kun (imp. M..
78-80. the instant samtdhi separating and uniting night and day (past and future). like an ever-rolling stream Bears all its sons away.. And from the force that works within the stream The hidd.. 3309). F. the Light of the Divine Epiphany (Nicholson.18 Compare the hymn by Isaac Watts (1719): A thousand ages in Thy sight Are like an evening gone. Offered in Homage to George Sarton. Short as the watch that ends the night Before the rising sun. and pp. Persian fa/r.universe cons- ists of accidents pertaining to a single substance.Time") according to Ibnu'l-'Arabi: "the. In consequence of this rapid succession.e. p. the spectator is deceived into the belief that the universe is a permanent existence.. Every instant one universe is annihiliated and another resembling it takes its place. note 3. Comment on Mathnawl 5. cf. For a fuller discussion of this meetingplace of Day and Night see my "Symplegades" in M. ordinarily "daybreak" or "dawn" is also the nur-i tajalli. 18 99 .. and the next it has to go. called also brahma-bhiti. Time.. 1947.. Ashley Montagu Studies.enworking of the Truth may learn. men of insight may discern A stream whose currents swirl and surge and churn.. p. 23. In nearly the same way. This universe is changed and renewed unceasingly at every moment and every breath. "Dawn"... which is the Reality underlying all existences.. In the world. above.. "Theosis". "Before the rising sun": i.. it lasts One moment.. 463ff. The being of the world's a wave.
and therefore immaterial. Nicholson similarly summarises Ibnu'l-'Arabi's doctrine: "Phenomena are perpetually changing and being created anew. mode is no more".emphasize a distinction between the Ibnu'l-'Arabi's true doctrine and that of the Ash'arite "atomists" who seem to have belileved in an independent reality of momentary monads. whereas "Ibnu'l-'Arabi will brook no secandam quid. or Eternity. it never happens that the Very Being is revealed for two successive moments under the guise of the same phenomenon".19. and shall be. p.. is. Both the Lawa'ih and Nicholson . 154. The saying that "this world is but a moment" (sa'at) 20 is attributed to the Prophet: 19 R. Mathnawi 3. 196f. The whole infinite series of individualisations is in fact one eternal and everlasting tajall [illumination] which never repeats itself". Studies in Islamic Mysticism.A. "to escape from the moments (si'at) is to escape from change. The concept of the absolute and indivisible Time. Ftusltu'-Hikam. R. 2074-2075.Thus. adding in a Footnote the important reservation "but there is no moment of not-being between the successive acts of creation". not even one that endures only for a moment". Here we seem to meet again with the distinction of a materialist atomism from the very different principle of an atomic time or space without duration or dimensions. Cambridge 1921. taking this from al-'Arabi. Nicholson. Note also 100 . reappears again in Jalalu'd Din Rfimi's magnificent Mathnawi. 20 Cf. while God remains as He ever was. A.. When for a moment you escape from the moments.
85. bhavacakra. the "spark" that represents the Now of Eternity is unique.. thou art dying and returning. though in the body it has the semblance of continuity: because of its rapidity it seems to be continuous. 101 . "Were there no translation or recurrenceof accidents. St. like the Buddhist eka-ksa. !events.1142-8). Heracleitus frs.. like the spark that thou revolvest swiftly with thy hand. i.. The world is renewed at each breath (nafas).asambodhi. St.e. intentions) in no way 'excludes the oontinuous operation of causality. as-sd'at. doings. Nicholson comments: "The whole circle of creation [Skr. the SiSficoncept of the momentary existence of accidents ('arz. Resurrection. 3. by the "suddenness" of the Holy Spirit."Every instant. like the stream 21. whatever its apparent position on the line of incessant motion. linking past with future events. Augustine's "continuous stream of everflowing succession" (De Trin. and we know it not because it remains (apparently the same). Life is . the Buddhist stream that "never rests". i. At the same time. the Essence of God.. the moment.e. yevoeeco] really begins and ends in a single point. a flash of Divine illumination (tajalli) revealing the One as the Many and the Many as the One". then. 21 Cf.happenings.-or as a Christian would express it.ever arriving anew. The swift motion produced by the action of God presents this length of duration [extended time] as [an appearance caused by] the rapidity of the Divine Action" (Mathnawi 1. 41.. which is perceived by us under the form of extension.. 6). James' o Teoxo?rT4. in fact. The analogy is a good one because.
and the Sufi is a 'son of the Moment' (ibnu'l waqt). III.960-1000 22).. Tadhkiratalt Awliyi 2.. adrsta. became a cause" (Mathnawi. for 'the Moment (waqt) is a cutting sword'. that. and when the effect was born. 111. 23 As in Sanskrit.. 2. 9.action would be in vain. too. and not clearly seen" 23 Again.. 16). Augustine. every cause is a mother. 132-3. cf. St.2628 and note). it is not the rule of the Way to say 'to-morrow'" (Mathnawl 1. 1142-8 Wali Muhammad's explanation that "the Sufis believe that at every moment a world ('alami) is annihilated and that instantaneously the like of it comes Cf. the recurrence of everything mortal is another existence. but you think them two" (Mathnawl 111.179. and make haste. both are the same to Him... or present? "His existence in time past or future is only in relation to you.1152-3).. what has he to do with the past. and on 1. and that by this. But the operation of this causality is mysterious. in productive succession. This is produced by that. All the parts of the world are the result of nothing but accident. This world and that are forever giving birth. "hidden. 22 102 . 133 quotes from Faridu'd Din 'Attar. "Feed me. regarding the man transcending space. in whom is the Light of God. "The world is pregnant with the causes of things as yet unborn" (De Trin.10 "A thousand years multiplied by a thousand years to come are present (naqd) to thee in this 'Moment' (waqt) in which thou art". But these accidents are transient in another guise. for I am hungry.. the effect is born as its child. or future. Nicholson's note on 1.
into existence, because God has opposite attributes which never cease to be displayed; e.g. He is both Muhyi, 'the One who brings to life', and Mumit, 'the One who puts to death24' ". So "this 'I-hood' comes to me from Him moment by moment" for so long as I live" (Mathnawl 1. 2917): ",every instant that Loved One assumes a new garment" (Shams-i-Tabriz, Diwan) 25.
The Sufi, then is "'the son of the Moment'... the Sufi's kind father, who is the 'Moment', does not let him be reduced to the necessity of looking to the mort row... He (the Suifi) is of the River26, not of time, for 'with God is neither morn nor eve': there the past and the and th,e future and time without beginning and time without ,end do not exist... He (the Sufi) is the
"The root of the mystery" of the only momentary reality of existences is referred to the opposite attributes also by Jami, Lawa'ih 26; these are respectively those of Mercy and Majesty (jamal and jalil) of which the reflections in this world man calls good and evil, existence and death. God is he "who killeth and maketh alive" (AV. 13.3.3; I Sam. 2.6, 1 Kings 5.7). 25 For this origin of "I-hood" cf. SB. 7. 3. 2. 12 (see my "Sunkiss", JAOS. 60. 47); and for the "garments", BG. 2. 22, Phaedo 87 D, and Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 530 ("volgunge ist materie, daz diu sele an sich nimet niuwe forme unde begit die sie vor hate. Daz si iuz einer wandelt in die andern, daz ist ir tot, under der si uz get, der stirbet si, die si an sich nimet, da inne lebet siie"). 26 Here, of course, the "River" is not the "stream of time", but its source: "ein brunne in der gotheit, der an allen dingen uz fliuzet in der ewikeit und in der zit" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 530).
son of that 'moment' by which is to be understood -only a denial of thiedivisions of times, just as 'God is One' is to be understood only as a denial of duality, not as a description of the true nature of Unity" (Mathnawi, VI. 2715, Heading). Nicholson's Note points out that "River" here represents "the indivisible continuity of the spiritual world, where all things 'ooexist in an eternal Now"'; also, on VI. 2782, that inasmuch as the uninterrupted ooming and going of thoughts "never ceases for a single instant, they must be phenomenal manifestations of an Essence which alone is changeless and parmanent". Time, in other words, is an imitation of eternity, as becoming is of being, and as thinking is of knowing.
V CHRISTIAN AND MODERN In Christianity, the significance of the Present is asserted by the words of Christ, "Let the dead bury their dead" 1 and "Take no thought for the morrow"
(Mat. 8. 22 and 6. 34). Aristotle's ato/uo; vvv is unmis-
takeable in I Cor. 15.51,52 "Behold, I show you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye (ev
at the last trump... ut:7n6qpOa2Auov),
dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed" 2; a dictum that also reminds !us of the Buddhist "Single-instant Awakening" (eka-kanta-sambodki). For, again, just as for Aristotle and the Buddhists, corruptibility is inseparable from any existence in time; and to be "raised incorruptible" can only imply a passing over from the flux of temporal exist1 Who are "the dead"? "Dead is the man of yesterday, for he has died into the man of today; and the man of today is dying into the man of to-morrow" (Plutarch, Mor. 392 D). 2 This can be applied by no means only to the resurrection of the body in the distant future but (as in Islam) to the present moment of enlightenment,when "the soul which lay dead in a living body doth rise again" (St.Augustine, Sermo [De scrip. NI.T.] 88, 3.3), or as St. Thomas expresses it to "the first instant that grace inheres".
3 A. Rene Guenon "he who cannot escape from the standpoint of temporal succession is incapable of the least orienconceptionof the metaphysicalorder" (La metaphysique tale. and in which the Christian has already lived in so far as he has been able to fulfil the commands of Christ to have done with the past and to take no thought for the morrow. Cf. and we find these "Sudden" (sub-it-aneus)is literally "going stealthily". and II Cor. 38. 2 "Behold.141)4. whose operation is immediate. a "son of the moment". A. and as much as the Buddhist Arahant a Freedman. now is the accepted zeodso&xto. Acts 22. Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.-"And suddenly (a('vco) these came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind" (Acts 2. "for whom there is neither past nor future" (S.e true Christian is really expected to be. 6 "Suddenly (eaiqvt?c) there shone from heaven a great light". p. behold.enoe to a present eternity in which there is neither any yesterday nor a to-morrow. sE- apvcoalso has the meaning "mysteriously". 4 where Agni sadyo 106 . 4 "Think on God and thou wilt find 'is' where 'has been' and 'shall be' cannot be" (St. 1938. 1. 6. Augustine. I think it is in just this sense that A. in RV. Evang. Bowman observes that "the religious preoccupation with life is specifically the preoccupation with a life of experience which is momentarily reborn in every fleeting instant" 3: and it would appear that th. 145. now is the day of salvation" (Mov. viv xatLeo . 17). and will be. lof time. Bowman.for example. and ideas also in India with referenceto the divine processionand immanence. 5 Cf. In loan. 2. The reality of the eternal present is bound up also with that of the Holy Ghost. as much as the Sifi. 346. Paris 1939. 1. 10). A. 2)5. v Wv rfwa owrtela).
4). but instantaneous" 6 [i. 2.. as to this speed: "Even now when I (God) am present here. 1980). In answer to the further objection that opposite conditions cannot coincide in the same instant and so there must be a last instant in the state of sin jatas tatsara.In this connection St. this goes standing" (Isa Up. 6 St. Theol. for which Grassmann writes "kaum geboren schleicht" and one might say "like a thief in the night".. I-II.. Up.. just what the Buddhist would have called a "single-instant awakening"]. Sacr. Thomas' "instant" is strictly atomic. and his argument rests upon the fact that such instants are not parts of time. Mathnawc. ihaivivartate. and man's free-will "whose movement is by nature instantaneous" 7... 2. 19). 7 In the things above time no interval whatever divides cause from effect or beginning from end. 113. as in Maitri Up. 107 .e. 2. past others running. antas carate bahudhi jayamanah. 68). but it is there" (Hermes Trismegistos. 7) decides that such justification is "not successive.. of course. because "to will and not to will-the movements of the free-will-are not successive. 1. 8 "The journey of the spirit is unconditioned with respect to time and space" (Rfimi. is swifter than the mind. an etymology-to connect "repentance" with repente. 3. "the One. It would be an interesting hermeneia-not. adresyam agrahyam . 16. Further. for such a justification depends upon the movement of Grace. Thomas.. or Mund.. 5 sa va esa siksmo'grdhy'drSyah.. siuskmam . I stand at the same time also there" (Philo. 16. "it (voiv) has not moved as one moves from place to place. Whether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or Successively (Sam. discussing the problem. guhacara. which is sudden. immobile. but instantaneous" 8. 1. the justification cannot be successive. 6 and 2.
On the "two minds" (mortal and immortal) cf. transformation. in so far as it understands with continuity and time 9. that in time we are not to consider one instant as immediately preceding another instant. i. and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject. and this for the reason.. as is proved [by Aristotle] in Phys. though it is subject to time accidentally. he replies that "the succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time. of mind.. 1. whereas there is a first instant 9 In other words. it is under the opposite form.. but in the last instant of this time. as reason mortal. But time is terminated by an instant.e. like the angels or. it has the form which is the term of the moment. aeviternal. 32-40: "metanoia" is a change. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form.. 1942. and as intellect immortal (though "reason" is sometimes used in the sense of "intellect". and this is above time. But in those things that are above time it is otherwise. For in those that are in time.. VI. which is [also] the first instant of the subsequent time.and another in the state of grace.. there is no 'last instant' in which the previous form inheres in the subject. and had originally this higher meaning). but there is the last time. say that there is no last instant that sin inheres. nor points in a line. my "On Being in One's Right Mind" in Review of Religion 7. We must therefore. That which is justified is the human mind. but a last time. 108 .
but "God does not move at all. Thomas distinguishes more fully between time. 15 St. aeviternity.. nor can any succession be found in Him. in terms of the circle (o rQeozorrs yevoecoE.existence at once (simul). and so cannot be measured by time.that grace inheres. 10 "On the Immutability of God"..enumeration of motion" (Phys. In the Summa Contra Gentiles I. "time is the . 11-5-219 B) and points out that only those things that are in time can be measured.17 and Num. Jac. 6. All this might have been expressed.3. O Lord.12) "But thou. so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside movement. He bases his argument on the assertions of God's immutability in Malach. and that is the nature (ratio) of leternity".bhava-cakra) and its (seventh) ray. and perhaps even more clearly. consists the idea of eternity. 14. and thy years shall have no end".19. 101. he quotes Aristotle. those things are said to be measured by 109 . 23. Thomas discusses the eternity of God. St. and he concludes with Ps.. temporal succession corresponding to motion along its circumference and the ex tempore motion of free-will to centrifugal motion (fall or descent into matter) and centripetal motion (ascension or resurrection). but has the whole of His . In the Summa Theologica I. 1. shalt endure for ever" and 28 (27) "But thou art the same. and eternity.13 (102. "The idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement. Further. and in all the time previous sin inhered". neither does he exist 'before or after' or no longer exist after having existed.
and from eternity.. but it differs in aspect. aticv)ll of a 'thousand years'..time which have a beginning and end in time. and the word 'perfect' to exclude the now of time. Likewisethe flow of the now as alternating in aspect... in its fre- atlv. 11 Etymologically cognate. both words can mean either "life" or "age". Aeviternity differs from time. as being here and there.. aeternus. 10.. even as one the whole course of time. as well as accordingto Boethius. and hence eternity is not the same as the now of time" (I.end. are measured by aeviternity. a space of a thing's duration. however. who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice. The IE root is /. of course. cf. while eternity has nleitherbefore nor after. nor is it compatibliewith such at all... The now that stands still is said to make leternity10. not because it has parts. which can. (present also in dai. Time has before and after. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession. is time.. as the mean between them both. 4 ad 2). the . and thus we say 'many aeviternities' when we mean 'ages"'. is the term that could be applied to the lifetime of the Indian Gods "born with a life (ayus. but because it is wanting in nothing. then. Eternity is called 'whole'. ever and aye). "Aeviternity".expression 'simultaneously whole' is used to remove the idea of time. Aristote10 "The now of time is the same as regards its subject in lian. [But] aevit'ernityis sometimes taken for 'age'. be annexed to it.. ewig. aeviternity in itself has neither before nor after... aevum.. 110 .. to "go".. This is.. But eternity remainsthe same according to both subject and aspect.. so it has no beginning and no .. that is. The angels...
30). and time are not entities separate from the respectiverealities. "for time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered.. viz. 9. 15. Boehner. I.The Tractatusde Successivisattributed to William of Ockham. "time is one". When Agni is contrasted with the other Gods. p. Philo 1.. as "the only immortal". but by reason of the thing numbered".7. "the whole of life".. the moved body. and the moved body in time. for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number [ten]. the located body.end of each yard and then begin again.496. v. Bonaventura. the piece of cloth does not stop being a piece of cloth at the .6. 111 .619" (Liddelland Scott). he can be called visvayus. 10. De Coelo 1.St. Not because it is a number. their "not dying" (amrfattva) contrasting on the one hand with that of the man who lives for a hundred years. either of each particularlife or of all existence. on aitovandx. cf. Further (Sam. The position is quite Aristotelian. it implies quentativesense. 6). and so in the case of any extent. but existing in the thing numbered 2. it is one piece of cloth. Ockhamthinksthis the true opinion of Aristotle" (P. 3f. 1944. place. that of continuation to "exist" or "be". 1. Aristotle.might see in the distance the farther shore. "not dying" prematurely.). and this totality is analogous to fulness of a man's "whole life" (sarvam aiyus) who does not die before old age. whether in a given state. Y.ovoscf. Taittiriya Samhita 5. On atic as [like iayus]the complete period. 12 This seems also to have been William of Ockham'sview: "his main purpose in the Tractatusde successivis is to show that motion. 15. Theol. otherwise it would not be continuous. and on the other with the timeless immortality of Brahma. N. even so did they behold the farther shore of their own life" (Satapatha Brahmatza 11.
"nothing is past. De Trin... "HE IS. Time and space are continuous. 28.10). 27f. but to understand is to live.elf. simply is" (In Ps.. and by seeing Him WHO IS. Both concepts are common in the Vedic tradition. but the same thing to be and to exist. 101.) . becoming "the God of Isaac and the God of 112 .. as if it were no longer. in God.. He is when he sees Him WHO IS13. "the mutations of things and thou wilt find everywhere 'has been' and 'will be'.. "Examine". 101..7. nothing is future. Nor doth the human soul itself stand .of time or space. 11). the Hebrew as "He is turned 13 Jacob"... Sermo 7. the Greek considering Him as "He is in Himself".. Being is a term for immutability. by that alone can He be apprehended" toward us". Man's mind itself. is mutable. as if it existed not yet. "I am that I am" is the Greek version of what was really in Hebrew "I become what I become". 'But Thou art always the self-same' (Ps.. Whatever is there. in which it is not one thing to be living. like numerical unity. another to understand. He is when he sees God... 6. which is called rational. in which it is not one thing to . St.10. Augustine says. are infinitely divisible. and all things are one" (In Joan. save that which is? .. And: "What is the same. the body that he hath is not the same. Think on God and thou wilt find 'is' where 'has been' and 'will be' cannot be. Both. for he is changed and altered if he does not participate in Him 'Who is the same'. Nobody hath the same from hims. on the one hand. Evang. Man in himself is not. Sermo 2. Thiere is primal and absolute life.exist and another to be. is not the same... and primal and absolute intelligence. 10. and is to be. Again.
pp. What then have we got of these 'years'?" (In Ps. for as Meister Eckhart says. 5. amend. Perhaps ieven more striking in its wording: "Behold we speak and say 'in this year'. and you get the ever-flowing. art Varunaat birth. 273). unmoving. who is often cited by St. Say 'in this moment'. 76. while God's 'now' abiding. 14 "Through charity".. 1) and "Became (abhavat)the Sun of men" (RV. 121) 14.. But of 'this hour' what have you got? Some moments of it are already past.. daz sie zuo disem minnerichenfriden natiurlicher bekenntnussekamen" (Pfeiffer p. 147. Agni. the practise of maitri. 4. Des vindet man vil an den heidenen. Add semper to aeternitas.. Say rather to-day. 8). according to his measure.4 he remarks that "God is 'ever' (semper) because 'ever' is with Him a term of present time.. 1.. incessant 'now' and therefore perpetual course of time that is (KU. in De Trin. and [the 'now' which is] the divine present. "Also minnet got alle creatufre gelich und erfiillet sie mit sinem wesenne.. on the other "Thou. and say 'in this hour'.he also begins. But how? Through charity" (In Ps. But in what moment?.148). I. and there is this great difference between the 'now' which is our present. 3. 13). Time and eternity had been admirably discussed by Boethius. for example. muditl. Thomas. too.. upekkhain the Buddhistbrahma-viharas (cf. karuni. 146. To begin with. John 1. cf. 113 . Und also sullen wir mit minne fliezen uf alle creatfiren. This. to be. 4). if you would speak of anything in the 'present. and self-subsistent makes eternity. 6. and those that future have still to oome. that oar 'now' connotes changing time and stempiternity. in my Figures of Speech or Figures of Thought. and becomest (bhavasi) Mitrawhen kindled" (RV.
Of the transitory moments of time he says that in a way they imitate the now that stands still.. V. 16 It does not seem necessary to discuss the problem of the "eternity of the world" in the present context. And so.. without beginning or end. not "lasting". and he doubts whether God's 'ever' is a form of time at all. as if of the future. Just as in tradition. but the series of of cycles has neither beginning nor end. and another thing to embrace the whole of an interminable life present in all its complexity". Wherefore it is not called a prevision (praevld. whereas there is nothing placed in time which can embrace the whole of its life at once. I will only observe that the Christian "world without end" seems to refer to the world in one sense (that in which time can be called "interminable").'sempiternity"'. i. For it is one thing to be led through an interminable life (which Plato attributed to the world)16.. 15 114 .entia) or foresight but rather an onsight (proviIn the Loeb edition.. let us call God 'eternal' and the world 'everlasting' (perpetuum)". it is time that "lasts".. there are cycles that begin and end. For Boethius. Then he points out that God's "foreknowledge" [so called] ought rather to be called "the knowledge of a never fading instant than a foreknowledge. so that at every moment a thing "seems to be". misrendered "everlasting". It is the perfect possession of an interminable life all at once (tota simul). eternity is in-finite. In De consol. but not a duration.e. 6 he remarks that the common judgment of those who live by reason is that God is eternal (aeternwm)15 and so "let us consider what eternity is. "following Plato.. and to this world in another sense (that in which a given time has a beginning and end).
25 "the intellectual cognition of eternal things is one thing. 1. it is a knowledge of all things. On this basis Boethius is able to deal effectively with the problem of free-will and "pre"-destination. then that by which I am called mortal is not mine".dentia)17. 115 . 6 where he speaks of himself as a "rational and mortal animal" and this means that he "has forgotten what he is". as 17 Sanskrit prajna. 18 Both here in the sense of vove. placed far from lower things. it overlooketh all things. and so not disturbing the quality of things which to Him are present. and that. as in Augustine De Trin. 1) "freedom to will or nill" is the work of reason. Augustine De ordine 2. 15. not derived from an observation of their occurence. and if I am reason. from the highest summit of things.. To understand this more fully it must be remembered that as Boethius has already said (V.. etymologically Greek aQovoiaand Latin pro-gnosis. not as reason is sometimes distinguished from intellect. as it were. [not as future but] as present". but in respect of time are future". is attributed to the all-seeing. intellectus vel spiritus.. For "God beholds those 'future' things which proceed from freewill. as in St.. while the so-called act of choice according to which we "do what we like" is not an exercise of freewill at all but an irrational and passive reaction to external stimuli. the rational cognition of temporal things another" or as in Boethius De consol. and freedom to will or nill is no more impugned by this present inspection or onsight than are the acts of a man in a distant field controlled by our looking on at what he is doing. omniscient Spiritual Sun and Self. 50 "If reason is immortal. because.
. 6) compared time to the circumferenceof a circle of which the centre (panctus medius)19 is eternity20. 49)'. spiral. which necessarily involves some degree of "separation" from the centre. evades the causal efficacy of acts. though he may still be in it. neither a Fall nor a Redemption are conceivable. being free from motion. figuratively. 13. the centre. the more it draws near to the pivot (cardo) 21 of all things. These are the two "halves" of the cycle of existence. and so the motion will be. 21 The punctummedium. 116 . and if it clings fast to the firmity of the Supernal Mind.41). nel vero farsi come centro in tondo" (ib. but in eternity extroversion and introversion coincide. i... Even the fallen angels could not have fallen for so long as they subsisted in the uncreated life. e vedrai il tuo credere".. it also transcends the necessity of fate": that is. which "take place" only in the world.11.e. and pointed out that "everything is by so much the freer from fate. and this actually guarantees the final apokatastasis of every "fallen spark". alroyos. of which the Freedman is no longer. 20 "Ad id quod est quod gignitur.referredto above as "indivisible". 22 Not in time..St. da quel punto depende il cielo. but their occurrence is ex tempore22: 19 Dante's "punta dello stelo a cui la prima rota va diintorno. ad aeternitatem tempus. In discussing "fate". ad punctummedium circulus.. In other words. Boethius has already (IV. e tutta la natura" (Paradiso 13. has been reached. nor in eternity. ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem". "apri gli occhi. apart from a "creation". the operation of reason or the mind (insofar as the latter really acts) is "above time". the movements of freewill are real. for the motion must have ceased when its goal. Thomas says. 28. but between them.
He who would worship 117 . and the Now in which the last man shall pass away. and the Now I speak in. He makesthe world and all things in this present Now (gegenwiirtig nu) . "in eternity. 190. 192). In these words Meister Eckhart summarises as briefly as possible the doctrine of Time (time) and Eternity (Time) that we have already followed up through two millennia. all are the same in God in whom there is nothing but one Now. for God himself is in this power as in the eternal Now (in dem ewigen nu). Again... 207. Meister Eckhart: "God is creating the whole world now. 297). so help us God !" (ib. one and the same Eternity..-"it is just for this that I was born" (ib. To live in that eternity.. God makes now instantly (alzemale). For the Now in which God made the first man.. 192. 190. what was a thousand years ago and what shall be a thousand years hence. and no shape was ever seen ... all that is there in the present.. "there is a power in the soul untouched by time... Were the spirit always joined with God in this same power. a man could never age. p. 266.. To speak of the world as being made by God yester- day or tomorrow were a folly in us.. Everything God made six thousand years ago and more when He made the world.and that they seem to us to be past or future is only the effect of our positions relativeto the now of eternity. there is no before or after.. Take the first brief words (of John 4. where time has never entered in. 284). 23) venit hora et nunc est. this instant (nu alzemlae). and he states its significance for us. Again.. -all that is overseas as much as what is here" (Pfeiffer pp.
where it hath done all its work. Le symbolisme de la "Vedic Exemplarism" in HJAS I. then I cast myself into the centre of the round (daz pant des zirk. itself unmoved. ib.. 45. De cipio scientiae croix. 2. That point is the power of the Trinity.everwrought... all that the Holy Trinity hath .the Father [in spirit and in truth] must set him in Eternity with his longings and his hopes. the essential point. div. centred upon God. where God is just as far from as he is near to all creatures24. James' the cycle of Dionysius. 57). On the symbolism of the circle cf. therewith atoned (geeiniget) she is capable of all things. 5. pp. 503. There is one. St.Thomas Aquinas. 44. and Indian bhava-cakra.. there is she eternally insistent" (ewikliche dar bestetiget wirt.... 'When I found it ever endless. 23 St. "This is the circle that the soul runs round.. 45. SatapathaBrahmanza for inasmuch as He is here on earth in the flesh He is near. as it says in the Book of Love. whose works are its circumference.els). Rene Guenon. 5. nom. 17 "Both near and far away. De prinDei 14. and inasmuchas He is That One in yonder world He is also far away". that stands above time and knows nought of time or body. time. 504). and my 24 o eox6s rqs ysveoeos.6. the day that was a thousand years ago is in Eternity no farther off than the very hour I am in now. So also when he speaks of the world as a "circle"23. Therein the soul becomes omnipotent. 10. All that happened a thousand years ago.. 118 . and. the highest part of the soul. nor is the day to come a thousand or as many years hence as could be counted any farther off in Eternity than is this very hour that I am in" (Pfeiffer pp.
SB. are the Several Gods. 7 "the rays. further.13 "where we are met together at the Nave.1. 119 .This is the point that St. 26 "Not the sun whom all men see. that Point where they lose their name and all distinction. 1. in that Eternal Point where all our lines begin and end. Aditi confirms our kinship". 109. which is the Point of Time. 1945. 19). 288. Bonaventura speaks of when he compares God to a circle. the hierarchy of Angels. and likewise the Justified Deceased with thle rays of the Intelligible Sun25: as. for parallels. "to know it we must be in it. 10 "the rays of Him who glows yonder are the Perfected (sukrtah)26. 7 "there be the very rays with which the Fathers of old were united".g. in RV.every Indian maadala and yantra. and the bindu that marks the centre of . p. yet ever remain in themselves nought else but lines that come to an end" (Ruysbroeck. De septem castodiis. 3. 8. 3. 13). see Psychiatry 8. and 2. 10.e. Note 7. ch. of which the centre is everywhere (Itin.64. All this symbolism is bound up with the doctrine that equates the persons of the "severalty of Gods" (Vi. indeed. a cui la prima rota va dintorno. that is Prajapati". 26 "As a Perfected (sukrta -= rteos) Self. mentis 5). 14. I passed into the uncreated Brahma-world"(CU. 10. but Him whom few know with the mind". as regards this Point. and become one with the Point itself. and what highest light there is. Dante's punta. And. 8. and what highest light there is 27.9. and that very One which the Point is. beyond the mind and above our created being. 1. e. AV. Intelligences or Powers).ve Devah i.
makes many references to this "essential point" or "moment". hence doth begin as from its turning-post" (meta. 29. I think meta is not literally the starting-point. 27 120 .that is verily Prajapati. a "aircus". there every where and every when are focussed (dove s'appunta ogni ubi ed ogni quando. so that "under the theory of procession by powers. there will be something external to his essence.3). the other distinct from it. for if God be less than All. 27. a "pantheism" is inevitable. souls are described as rays" (Plotinus. by which he will be. "The nature of the universe.e. Enneads 6. the Sun himself. ib. It w:ill be observed that these. 29 In this metaphor of a chariot race.t Tair). were there no multiplicity in unity.106) 29. All times are present to It (il punto a cui tutti li tempi son presienti. 28 In the proper sense. represented by the solar disk. and the Perfected are both. but the post round which the turn is made. and "from that point depend heaven and I. of course. and "there shalt thou back into thy Centre fall.Paradiso 17. 17). a conscious Ray of that eternal All" (Mantiqa'. ib. when he is speaking of Eternity.4.12). -one end of any ray is confused with its centre. not infinite. Dante. but limited. to "pass in and out" would be meaningless. or Indra" 27. such that it stills the centre and moves all the rest around. what the doctrine implies is a "fusion without confusion" or "distinction without difference" (bhedabheda). the Sun-door. together with the concept of "motion at will" (passing in and out) preclude any pantheistic interpretation on the heretical sense of the word28.
32 The Logos: "I am the door. 2. flame.all nature" (28. perfect. "is built of the contradictories"-of which the past and future are. life is ever arriving anew" (Ruimi. he says. 20). "there. from the present standpoint.-and. It is a flaming point of light. "veiling us from the vision of God". God. contraries. to cite Philo Judaeus. 31 It is only in this sense that God can be thought of as a "place": 6ojro. wherein are set the worlds and all things in them" (Munig." 121 .20): "every moment the world is renewed. 64). 109)31. that is. Mathnawi 1. as Rumi says-and whoever would enter in must first have overcome the highest Spirit of Reason that guards the strait gate that distinguishes them (De vis. whereby it thus doth steal it from thy sight" (22. in it alone is every part there where it ever was..25) 31. 1. as Nicolas of Cusa says. of the notion that the universe came into being 'in six days"' (LA. dwellest". 41) 30. then. for it is not in space. "Nor hath it poles".1142).of which the extended world 30 "Imperishable Brahma. loka in the Upanisads. 24).Up. 6. "there is an end. Also. or pairs of opposites. Dei Ch. the most significant pair.in Gnostic texts. 9) 32. and "round it there wheeled a circle of fire so rapidly it has surpassed the motion which doth swiftest gird the universe" (28. nor hath it poles. this is "the Paradise in which Thou.. ripe and whole is each desire. "like a sparkling fiery wheel" (Maitri Up.. of which the wall. and this heaven "hath no other where than the divine mind" (27.. These contraries. less than the least. 2. by me. 2). "neither before nor after was God's 'moving on the face of the waters'" (29.
is made, are the Symplegades, that must be passed by every traveller homeward bound. Moreover,Cusa says, "Whatever is seen by us in time, thou, Lord God, didst not pre-conceive, as it is. For in the eternity in which thou dost conceive 33,all temporal succession coincides in one and the same Eternal Now. So there is nothing past or future where past and future coincide in the present... Thou indeed, my God, who art thyself Eternity absolutely, art, and speakest [thy Word] above the now and then" (ib. ch. 10). And so: "Draw me, O Lord, for none can reach thee save he be drawn by thee; free me from this world and join me (jungar, Skr. iyuj) unto thee, God absolutely, in the eternity of glorious life. Amen" (ib. ch. 25). At this point it will be convenient to consider briefly the curious resistance that contemporary mentalities oppose to the concept of a static being definable only by negations of all limiting affirmations, all procedure from one experience to another. The most striking aspect of this resistance is the fact that it is almost always based on feelings: the question of the truth or falsity of a traditional doctrine is hardly ever raised, and all that seems to matter is whether one likes the doctrine or not. This is the sentimentality of those who would rather than arrive at any goal, keep on going not merely until it is reached, but "throughout all time", and who confuse their activity, which is only an un33 Of this conception Meister Eckhart speaks elsewhere as "the act of fecundation latent in eternity". It coincides with the eternal birth of the Word "by whom all things were made".
finished procedure from potentiality to act, with a being in act. Thus R. A. Nicholson protests that "to our minds the atoms, which have ,extension neither in space nor in time, seem insubstantial enough" (Studies in Islamic Mysticism, 1921, p. 154). The objection may be with special reference to the Ash'arite atoms as constituents of real magnitudes, but applies as well to the unique Atomic Time or Now of Eternity that we have been considering". As W. H. Sheldon remarks, "men feel that what cannot be put in terms of time is meaningless": but, he continues, "the notion of a static, immutable being ought to be understood rather as signifying a process so intensely vivacious, in terms of time as extremely swift, so as to comprise beginning and end at one stroke" (Modern Schoolman 21.133). We cannot and may not, in fact, ignore that these who speak of a static, immutable, and timeless being above the partiality of time, also speak of it as an immediately beatific experience and possession of all things that have ever been or shall ever come into being in time; not to mention the realisation of other possibilities that are not possibilities of manifestation in time; it is a more and not a less "life" that subsists in the "naught" that lembraces all things, but is "none" of them. In the same way men recoil from Nirvana (literally, "despiration"), although it pertains to the definition of Nirvana to say that "he who finds it, finds all" (sabbam etena labbhati, KhP. 8) and that it is the "supreme beatitude" (paramamz sukham, Nikayas, passim)! 123
"Eternal time" (Time, as distinct from the time that flies), as Boethius says, "is the total and perfect possession of interminable life in its simultaneity". The answer to what mena"feel" when they shrink from "eternity", just as they shrink from the "self-naughting" that shocks them only because they have not, in themselves, distinguished between the Self that "never became anyone" from the inconstant Ego of "this man, so and so", is to be found in such words as those of Meister Eckhart:"to have all that has being and is lustily to be desired and brings delight; to have it si;multaneously and partless (zemdle ungeeeilet) in the soul
entire and that in God, revealed in its unveiled perfection, where first it burgeons forth34 and in the ground of its essence, and all there grasped where God grasps himself,-that is happiness. And yet another
34 In dem ersten uzbruche: so, neither yet displayed (future) nor still hidden (past), but unmanifest-manifest (vyaktivyakta). On this state of perfect promise and eternal bloom, the state of highest tension conceivable, which is also the paradigm of an ideal art, see my "Theory and Practise of Art in India", Technical Studies 3, 1934, p. 75. This perfect moment occurs at "Dawn", cf. Mayfra's Suryasataka 26 "Rather, at the time of beginning, when the splendour of the Sun, like a painter's brush uncloses, as it were [an opening eye or flower] the whole world picture". It is like the archer's stance at the moment of release, when the arrow is on the point of leaving; and as in Chinese art "the movement represented is the pause before the action begins when the body is [still] tense" (H. Fernal in the Burlington Magazine, Jan. 1936, p. 26). It is remarkable that the Shakers also held that that beauty is best which is "peculiar to the flower", not that "which belongs to the ripened fruit".
1). 36 Literally and etymologically. that would be the 'Fulniess of Time'. No Sufi. throughout all times. It would have been the same for Origen. or everywhere.od. no Western mystic. as the Upanishad puts it. throughout all time. when the soul knows all things as they are in G. "if Fulness be taken. 5.e. 105). of whichthe presentworld-age is only one. That is the Now of Eternity (daz nu der ewikeit). ever felt diminished by his "moment of illumination". all this assembled in one present Now (ein gegenwertic nu). as new and fresh and lovely. and eternity in an hour"-if one only could-for whom would it not be enough? Freedom to be as and where and when one will.as a Hindu might express it. as I find them now" (Pfeiffer p. "synthesis". Fulness still remains" (BU. the existence of which is inseparable from any form of existence in time and space? How can one "feel" that there must be something wanting in an "eternity" that by definition "wants for nothing"? In this "all-obtaining" (sarvipti) 37 there remain no desires whatever un35 I. or nowhere-does such a liberty as this imply a privation only becausel the word in-dependent states a positive good in the negative terms of a freedom from all limitations. To see "the world in a grain of sand. raptus. Such is the Fulness. in the then generally accepted sense: but rather. 37 "The Spirit of Life (prana) is the Prognostic Self (praffi- 125 . no one in samadhi 36.Fulness of Time: if someone had the art and the power to gather up the time and all that ever happened in six thousand years or that shall be until the end of the world 35. from which.
men "who would not like to live without hunger and thirst if they could not also suffer the natural consequences of these passions" (Plato. men who forget that nothing more can be added to infinity. Up. 3). and those who live as they lived will see what they saw. nor can one imagine a being "without desire" otherwise than when all desires are satisfied. but for others. Whoever approaches Me as Life and Immortality. 38 I am aware that there are modern men for whom the satisfaction of all possible desires would not suffice. 126 . mistakenly identify ourselves with.experience for those who speak of it so certainly.and our whole tradition recognize. Life" (Kaus. and so think of ourselves as creatures of time. the mutr able psycho-physical tabernacles that our Self assumes.. Parmenides 163 A. and obtains inexhaustible (aksiti) immortality in the world of This is the 'All-obtaining' in the Spirit of heavenly-light.experienceone to be shunned.. cf. as Plato (Euthydemus 283 D.satisfied. These are those who have never known what it means to be contented with a little. It is a matter of . Life and Immortality together. 3. he lives out his life in this world. It is atman). or one to be desired? 38 Here. because "all change is a dying". and cannot imagine a state of contentment even though possessed of everything there is to be desired. Meister Eckhart. and ievery parting is for ever... Meetings and partings (of which birth and death are but special cases) are only possible in time. 2. is such an . B). they want to entertain and to pursue others not yet satisfied. desire then being at rest in its object. Philebus 54 E). and they please or grieve us only because "we" are or. beyond that. rather. every meeting is a meeting for the first time.
41 The same question is asked in Katha Up. but overlaid by falsity (. Augustine. "It is in the soul of man. This does not mean that "here" and "there" are simply here and now on the one hand.as creatures of time that the fading of flowers and the death of friends distresses us. finally. yet not I. "That". 13. De Trin. (aiCvog sE6&oov) 131.. If St.2). 17].. it shall altogether adhere to Him..14). But those who are still alive here. but Christ in me". and answered. There are such and such desires or loves (kamaih) that men feel: and these "are real (or true). indeed. that is. but we seek one to come" (Hebr. 40 "The kingdom of heaven is within you". 3.2. "all beings and all thesle desires are content (samahitah) 39 in this 'City of God' [the living body]. For.. and whatever !else one wishes for but does not get.e. that we must find that image of the Creator which is immortally planted in its immortality. 6. whoever of one's loves deceases. then. all this he finds who enters in there" (Chandogya Up. Paul could say. 8. 4.. and those deceased.. when. And this image of God. and there and hereafter (post mortem) on the other.... God. but the image of Eternity remaineth(AsliseraL = atigisyate) alive" Pindar. the rational or Dirge intellectual soul. 42 " For here we have no continuing city. Brahma. But what is left over (atisisyate) 41 of the 'city' when age overtakes it and it breaks up? 42 What is left over 39 Samihita. "in samadhi": literally and etymologically. 4. will be 'one spirit' [I Cor.. "synthesised ".). it will live immutably" (St. 5. one no more gets a sight of here. for the universe itself. i. "I live. 1. 127 . in the ether of the heart40.or unreality). what would have been "left over" when this man Paul died? "The body of man is subject to overmastering death.
where we can be with it.. cludes". 2.. undesirous. 9). Whereforelet every man question himself as to what he loveth. eating what he will and assuming what aspect he will". unaging and undying. 28 and In Ps. that we shall be then swiftly where us list bodily. for the love of what endureth not.. 1. And this concept of the "two cities" and of true and false desires is Augustinian. 2). are repeated and further expandedin Maitri Up. 10-13 + 2). RV. 10. 3.. 113. who. Enneads 6. and the heavenly. see ib. Those who fare away having already found (or known) here the Self and those true desires (or loves). 8. hurtful and loves of shadows that change and pass. whom if one knows.e. the love that breathes aright" (Paradiso 15. deathless Self (atman) 44 whose desire is true (or real). 59 "so subtle in body and in soul together.. Augustine. for s43 Two loves have created these two cities . they become 'movers-at-will' in every world" (ib. 7. 10. 44 "the self-subsistent. the earthly. whose concepts are real45. but before him.Up. "shall pass in and out. De civ. not the good that we are really in search of. Dei 14.. youthful Self. But there is the true object of our love. 28-33). eternally doth strip him of this love. "The objects of earthly loves are mortal... Cloud of Unknowing. Platonic.1-6) 46.. ageless. 9 "where there is motion at will".9. Plotinus. 45 The last words. and he shall find of which he is a citizen" (St. as we be now in our thought ghostly". For the "City of God" (brahmapura. Taitt.-the sorrowless. descriptive of the Self. ch. where no covering of flesh ex46 I. 7.1. 5 "up and down these worlds. and "right is he who should grieve without a limit. 8. he fears not death" (Atharva Veda 10. and find pasture" (John 10. grasp it and really possess. 64. for these are not what we really love.9. 440). 128 .of it is the true (or real) 'City of God'43.
we are participating in eternity. "really real" corresponding to satyasya satyam. Augustine. TO OvtcoSov. satyam (fas. the things that do not change. Islam and Christianity is as much as Eternity one of the 47 '0 yE Tor 0o . whatever is true. however. 2.sywv xat zT o'va Tzxda 'syec. Augustine's. formless. 5. a mere erudition. pp. Skr. alike in Brahmanism. of which both parts are really far away. 48 Not. but that which is really real" (Phaedrus 247). Eternity is not far away from us. ens realissimum. 2. and 25. of course.. paramartha-satyam. was always true and will be true for ever. but nearer than time. In other words. not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things that we now call 'realities'. knowledge of the "essence that is for ever.Euthydemus 284 A. 129 . "truth" or "reality" can likewise be predicated either relatively of temporalia or absolutely of immutable being. one far ahead of us and the other far behind us. 6. "Truth". Verum mihi videtur id quod est. (dairlze) 47 those that are taken in beauty. whilie we are thinking of eternal things. and those of learning48. For a fuller discussion see above. in which there is no admixture of pain (ib. 521 D): "all true knowledge is concernedwith what is colourless. n. pain. St. Soliloq. and is not made to wander between generation and destruction" (Plato. 51). to "be"). primarily as exhibited in mathematical forms. Republic 485 B. n."there are false pleasures in the souls of men. But the truth of facts and the truth of principles pertain to different levels of reference. and intangible. Buddhism. c. lib. imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures" (Philebus 40 C). 8.. but "the learning that draws the soul away from becoming to being". of which the false pleasures (yevSEZ j bsovai)are the with true and mixed affects.
is the endowment of many successive events with a kindof permanent identity. as a Sufi might desire to make his waqt. 1. and this already indicates that the intelligible world has more to do with !eternity than with time. BG. 14.er way in which the nature of the lexperience of eternity can be suggested. 58. 130 . indeed. Even the giving of names to things. but not a communicationof thoughts. one also thinks of many other things. at least of a floor. where although it is there one. we do not participate in eternity now. of the form in the artist's mind. For example. without this. before "feeling" so much afraid of it.4. 18.25. If the eternal basis of existence-dhamma-is both here and now (ditthe dhamme) and timeless (akaliko). and it is only our forgetfulness that makes us need to pray "O thou who changest not.names of GOod. 7. the communicationof feelings would be possible.6. hal. walls. 15. perhaps we never shall 49. that is to say. 4. A more complex example is afforded by the well-known.4. in thinking of a "house". 1. It can be assumed that a given mind cannot think of more than one thing at a time. 8. abide with me". and roof. an intellectual power. CU. apart from time. If. leven though a pseudo-identity. There is also anoth. And in the same way spatially. consider the complexity of the art in the artist. it might be well to see what it "feels" like here and now. although far 49 BU. this one form is the form of many things that could be and will be afterwards thought of separately. But this does not mean that the life of thieintellect is only arithmetical.2.
from unique, instance of Mozart, who heard his compositions first not phrase by phrase, but as a totum simul, and thought this "actual hearing of the whole together" better than the subsequent hearing of the whole extended. The most complex example is that of Dante's vision of "the universal form" of the world picture 50 of which he says that "within its depths I saw interned, bound up by love into one volume51, all the scattered leaves of the whole world, substances and accidents and their successions, as it were together (insieme) 52 fused in such a way that what I speak of is one simple flame ... Such at that light doth man
50 Plato's "eternal paradigm" on which the sensible world is modelled, Timaeus, 29: "the world-picture (jagac-citra) painted by the Spirit (the Self of all beings) on the canvas of the Spirit, and in which it takes a great delight" (Sankaraas for Empedocles (Diels carya, Svatmanirupana 95),-just fr. 23) and for Plato (Timaeus 55 C) the Creator paints, and in Islam is called a painter (musawwir, qur'an 53.24) or, to employ Philo's equivalent, just as the ideal pattern of the thing that is to be is as it were "engraved" on the maker's mind
51 Cf. Empedocles (Diels fr. 26) "all brought together in one
order by Love".
52 Insieme, "in-same", as regards both time and place. "The centre of the whirl, wherein all things come together, so as to be one only" (Empedocles, Diels fr.35,36): "all are the same there and nevertheless distinct; in the same way that the soul possesses the knowledge of many things without confusion, each fulfilling its own task when the need arises" just as in the case of the "powers" that inhere in a seed (Plotinus. Enneads 6. 9. 6): "Nu sint alliu dinc gelich in gote unde sint got selber" (Meister Eckhart, Pfeiffer p. 311). One might say, plures, non tamen multa, sed unum.
become that to turn thence to any other sight never could he by any possibility consent!" (Paradiso 33. 85-100). One thinks also of the immediate operation of "mathematical genius"; and of a Buddha's vision that "does not work in terms of the composites" but alights where he wishes, "'just as one might skip the sequence of a text', coming to the point at once" (Vism. 411). There is also the mystery of the possibility of the communication of ideas from one apparently circumscribed mind to another, hardly understandable unless on the assumption of some transcendent element common to both 53. And, finally, there is the fact that is "a single knowledge of contrary things", of which the intellect can be aware at the same time, when, for example, it entertains the idea of "temperature", in which the notions of hot and cold are included 54; from which an inkling can be had of what it might mean to be "liberated from the pairs of opposites", for example, from a knowledge only in terms of the past and
53"All human properties proceed from One... otherwise one man could not understand another in the sound" (Jacob Boehme, Sig. Rer. 1.2). "In all conversations between two persons tacit reference is made to a common nature. That third party, or common nature, is not social, it is impersonal; it is God" (Emerson, Varieties of Religious Experience): "Self [of
the self], who controls the speech from within... the ununderstood Understander" (BU. 3. 8. 17, 23). "Consciousness is a singular of which the plural is unknown" (Erwin Schrodinger, What is Life? 1945, p. 90). More generally, W. M. Urban, The Intelligible World (1929) and Language and Reality (1939). 54 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol. 1. 75. 6, where this
the anima intellectiva.
supplies an argumentfor the incorruptibility(immortality)of 132
future that, as we have seen, "are a veil to thee from God". And though omniscience may be nothing quantitative, and not a mere aggregate of knowledges of things, it still holds good that the synoptic and synthetic powers of the merely human intellect provide us with an analogy of what it might be like to see and know all things at once, not in contradistinction of subject and object, but where "to know and to be are the same thing"55. One does not imagine that the
55 This was not, as is generally supposed, first enunciated
by Parmenides, fr. 5. His ra ya'eoav'o voesv eorv te xal esva simply
means that "that which can be thought is the same as that which can be" (see Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th ed. 1930, p. 173, n.2). Plotinus, Enneads, 5.9.6 quotes Parmenides' words, but although by this time it was possible for the infinitive to be the subject of a sentence and, in fact, Plotinus uses zo ELvatas subject (Enneads 3. 7. 6), his citation of Parmenides' words is to show that "in the immaterial knowledge and the known are the same", and while this implies that there the knower, knowledge, and the known are the same, what is actually predicated is hardly more than the Scholastic adequatio rei et intellectus,-Plato's "making that in us which thinks like unto the objects of its thought", which, if they be eternal and divine, will restore our being to its "original nature" (Timaeas 90). It seems to have been St. Augustine who first explicitly enunciated that in divinis to live, to know, and to be are one and the same thing (De Trin. 6. 10. 11, In Joan. Evang. 99. 4, and Conf. 13. 11). To be what one knows is not a given status, but one to be achieved. What is presently true is that "as one's thinking is, such he becomes" (yac cittas tanmayo bhavati); and it is because of this that thinking should be purified and transformed, for were it as centred upon God as it now is on things sensibly perceptible, "Who would not be liberated from his bondage?" (Maitri Up. 6. 34. 4, 6).
36-45) tries to invert the Platonic and traditional concept of time as being an image or imitation of eternity. actually. as Meister Eckhart says. while the Suifi "son of the moment" "takes the 134 . in his Las Ierarquias del Ser y la Eternidad. who is similarly "both formed and formless. H. to use the language of exemplarism 56. 1936. E. HJAS 1. Mueller's "Experimental and Existential Time" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. God has only one idea and is but that one. my "Vedic Exemplarism. 1943. that postpones his felicity. G. and needs no means at all. who believes in the perfectibility of human society. although much could be added to what has already been said 57. 1946. and Deity I have not seen. 57 I have made only a limited use of F. and it is certainly as true of India as of Greece that "the beauty and substance of human culture is made manifest in the seasonal celebrations and festivals of the year of the soul". I do not understand his words. 424-435) deals with Greek and Christian sources. The Angels. have fewer ideas and use less means than men. Brabant's admir- able and comprehensive Time and Eternity in Christian Thought. 1937. forgetting that the nunc aeternitatis is as present here and now as it ever was or will be. "audible and silent" and so on. but much rather a Word or a Form that is the form of many different things. 44-64. "Over against this absolute affirmation of being in the recurrences of natural time lies the Hindu negation of time". In conclusion. for it is hardly a "negation of time" to say that "time and the timeless" are both forms of God. and also makes the very common mistake of supposing that because the satisfaction of all desires is only possible "beyond time" such a satisfaction must be "postponed". There is a valuable discussion of our subject by Alberto Rouges. 1946. Alexander's Space. I shall only trace the persist56 Cf. Time. Joseph Katz in his "Eternity-Shadow of Time" (Review of Religion 11. Tucuman. it is the secular utopiast. Argentina.Divine intellect is a sort of dictionary. 6.
see above. so that one has no longer. One shrinks from the upper waters only because because of attachment to the empirical and transient Ego that "is not my Self".. properly speaking.. how they Are lost i'th'Sea 58 Of Vast Eternitie cash and lets the credit go".-admitting that "no joy could ever be were there no want". for this implies the loss even of one's individuality. Cf. according to whether it is into the upper or the nether waters that one plunges. infinitely hath. "anonymity". "becoming no one" are of two utterly different kinds. also Meister Eckhart's "Plunge in. 13. this is the drowning". Katz. Behold I go.. and to have lost one's self in the in- 135 . For example. Traherne supplies the answer. His life in wants and joys is infinite. but only a number.. one should shrink from a drowning in the nether waters. thinks that the satisfaction of all desires would be "meaningless" because the needs that prompted them would be lacking. p. or as in proletarian societies. moreover. To have "lost one's self" in the infinite. Herrick: O yeares! and Age! Farewell. a name. It should be needless to say that "drowning". Where I do know Infinitie to dwell And there mine eyes shall see All times. becomes a statistical unit and no longer a person. And both are felt as His Supreme Delight"! 58 On the "everlasting day". like a convict.ence of the traditional concept of time and eternity in some of the English metaphysical poets. he says of God that "He infinitely and all those wanted pleasures He wanteth all His joys.
a long naQabootg. and rest oonfident in him. Dennwirstdu meine Seel' im grossen Gott erkennen59. worlds apart. praying God. and instant aye. 121. To-morrow. and also Labadie's beautiful last testament. 136 . 1. shall be Drown'd in one endless Day. Herrick's second verse combines the thought of Joshua Sylvester's To-day. determinate are. "When shall I come to be again in Varuna?" RV. 60 Quoted by Dean Inge. as. And Night. 59 Angelus Silesius. This well-known motif--the dewdrop slips into the shining sea"-has. 7. giving it back like a drop of water to its source. literally. Cherabinische Wandersmann 2.Where never Moone shall sway The Starres. and like that of the exile returninghome. 2. 25. Yesterday With Thee are one.86. and Angelus Silesius: Wenn du das Tr6pflein im grosse Meere nennen. like the analogous concept of the sparks of the divine fire that arise from and returnto it. far apart as heaven from hell. that he will take me into himself and engulf me eternally in the abyss of his being" 60. my origin and ocean. 2nd ed. "I surrender my soul heartily to God. but she. Philosophy of Plotinus.
Pfeiffer p. 86. 69 The "Witness" and the "Person" are one and the same. 314. Ode XII). thought of as an "unfathomable sea". Diwan (Nicholson. but respectively as seen sub specie temporis and sub specie aeternitatis.198 is an almost literal lequivalent) we find: "Just as the flowing streams that move towards the sea. 10. 6. 68 Tao Te Ching 32 "To Tao all under heaven will come. an exact equivalent of Pali ogadha. 4. Meister Eckhart 62 and Dante 63 to Greek sources in the West. 8. e quel mare. the Undying". Paradiso 3. Ruysbroeck makes constant use of the term "immersion". Mun. 65 Mathnawi 4. For example. Up. 202. even so of this Witness (paridrastr) 69 the sixSee below. 86. Udana 55. but not her essence". and also Chinese68 sources. so the soul is deified. 67 Chandogya Up.85. that your drop may become a Sea that is a hundred 'seas of 'Oman"'. 2. 3. of sufficient knowledge of them. 7. 1. Vedic67. 1. Cf. 487. 5 (of which a Buddhist version in the Ahguttara Nikiiya 4. 62 "As the drop becomes the ocean. notably Shams-i Tabriz 64 and Rumi 65. in the Prasna Upanisad 6. 5. 7. on reaching it. 64 "Enter that Ocean. 2616 and passim. Kaus. and Prasna Up. 61 as streams and torrents flow into a great river or sea". Up. losing her name and work. 1.traceable through Ruysbroeck 61. RV. 66 A. their name-andshape are broken down. M. . al qual tutto si move". or plunge into. 8. and in the East to the Sufis. In the present work I have only neglected Chinese sources for want 137 . 63 "Nostre pace. in the common expression amat'ogadha "immersion in. and one speaks only of the 'Sea'. are coming home. 2 "When shall we come to be again in Varuna?" (the Sea) = Brahma "whose world is the Waters". and to Buddhist66.
5. 3. and one speaks only of the 'Person'. compared to the nave of a wheel. immanent Person" (Maitri Up. that which abides (kslyate. "the Person here. their name-and-shapeare broken down. 94. 10). and beyond whom there is nothing more whatever (Katha Up. as spokes are set in the "Witness (upadrasfr). support. other than whom there is none that sees" (Brhadaranyaka Up. immortal. 4. xrtow). 11).. it is with this residual (atisista) sixteenth part. This is the residual "Person" whose unity (ekatvam) is reached by transcending all his aspects (Maitri Up. the "unseen Seer (drastr) . this is the Fons Vitae. 14. 11). that one understands the Vedas (Chandogya Up. yea-sayer. ib. 138 . 261. Again. describes as the "synthesis (samadhi) of all things" and "orir gin of all". 4.7.8. which abiding part..teen parts (kala) that move towards the Person (purasa) 69. So. is represented by the new-moon night about which the half-months of waxing and waning revolve (Brhadaranyaka Up. when they reach the Person. 1. such is the Highest Person called when in this body" (Bhagavad Gtii 13. when the other parts have been mortified. Jaiminiya Brahmana 3. "the experient.. are coming home. This is also the Residuum (ucchistam) that the Atharva Veda. is himself that Progenitor (Prajapati) who is the Year whase fifteen parts are his properties. 6). 6.. 15). 3. 'On whom the parts are supported. This Person is also Agni as upadrastr. and I know of no other text in which the fulness of the content of Eternity is so adequately expanded. 6. and also the Self Supreme. 11. 6). He (who is a Comprehensor) then becomes without parts (akal). the Comprehensor. 3. experient. 7). then. from whom nothing done by the "outer. the sixteenth part. Great Lord. the Witness is our "inner Man". 22). This is "he who looked forth through beings" (Katha Up. man" is hidden. in whose likeness the Purohita functions as the king's charioteer and upadrastr to see that the latter does no wrong.
The Intelligible World. Urban. except for th. For "nonspacial and non-temporal intuition is the condition of the interpretation of the space-time world itself" 70 "all states of being. 10): "And this takes place beyond time. 280.-let not death disturb you!" As one last illustration of the universality of the ideas that have been discussed above I cite from John of Ruysbroeck's Sparkling Stone (ch. We have traced. And this downsinking is like a river. without before or after. which without pause or turning back ever pours into the sea. We can only accept these establishiedmeanings without question.. 9): "For it we possess God in the immersion of love-that is. the history of the meanings of the concepts of time and of ieternity: the one. in which all things come and go.. in an Eternal Now. 1929. they have always been..ose who elect to live in a merely existential world without meaning. And from The Book of Truth (ch. and the other. as in their eternal origin". and will always remain an integral part of human experience. that is. if the integrity of communicationis to be preserved. according to ability. 139 . beyond themselves.hub of a wheel. if we are lost to ourselves God is our own and we are his own: and we sink ourselves eternally and irretrievably in our one possession which is God. seen in principle. are simultaneous 70 Wilbur M. the home and the beginning of all life and all becoming. And so all creatures are therein. him do I know as the Person to-beknown. in which all stand immutable.. one Being and one Life with God. p. since this is its proper resting place".
. R. 1.in the . and in the "unified experience of reality the whole process of creation from the Primal Covenant to the Resurrection is a single timeless moment of Divine self-manifestation" 72 OM NAMO ANANTAYA KALANTAKAYA! Rene Guenon. (and) he who cannot escape from the standpoint of temporal succession so as to see all things in their simultaneity is incapable of the least conception of the metaphysical order"71. Nicholson.. A. 2110-2111. 15. La metaphysique orientale. pp. 72 71 140 . Mathnawi. Commentary on Rumi. 17.eternalnow.
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